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ABSTRACTS

The Perception of Emotional Coldness in Andrei Turgenev’s Diaries

Andrei Zorin

In this article, Andrei Zorin discusses the generational shift in the techniques of self-analysis that occurred in Russia at the turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries as revealed in the diaries of Andrei Turgenev, a document that has attracted the attention of many scholars but still remains largely unpublished. Young Turgenev was influenced both by his upbringing in the circles of Moscow Freemasons and by the literature of German Sturm und Drang and especially by the early tragedies by Friedrich Schiller. In his self-reflections, his dramatic love story, and his attempts to translate Alexander Pope’s Eloisa to Abelard into Russian, Turgenev demonstrated his quest to resemble his favorite literary characters and the despair caused by his failure to meet these self-imposed standards. Both his quest and his personality as revealed in the diaries can serve as a symbol of the new emotional culture that emerged in Russia and became prevalent there throughout the Romantic age.

Fear: Soldiers and Emotion in Early Twentieth-Century Russian Military Psychology

Jan Plamper

This article provides an analysis of the locus of fear in military psychology in late imperial Russia. After the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution, the debate coalesced around two poles: “realists” (such as the military psychiatrist Grigorii Shumkov) argued that fear was natural, while “romantics” upheld the image of constitutionally fearless soldiers. Jan Plamper begins by identifying the advent of modern warfare (foreshadowed by the Crimean War) and its engendering of more and different fears as a key cause for a dramatic increase in fear-talk among Russia’s soldiers. He links these fears to literature, which offered—most prominently in Lev Tolstoi’s Sevastopol Sketches (1855)—some of the vocabulary soldiers could use to express their fears. Mikhail Dragomirov’s fear-centered military theory during the Great Reforms was the next milestone. Plamper closes by sketching the history of fear after World War I, from Iosif Stalin’s penal battalions to the rehabilitation of military psychology under Nikita Khrushchev and beyond.

Poetics of Disgust: To Eat and Die in Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg

Olga Matich

The article examines the aversive emotion of disgust and its deployment in the visual arts and in the premier Russian modernist novel, Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg, which has not been considered in regard to its affective poetics before. Based on recent studies of the emotions in cultural history and theory, it explores the philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic
aspects of disgust as a response to something viscerally and/or morally repugnant. The emotion, induced by the experience seen or imagined close up, provokes the observer’s recoil as defined by cultural norms. As such, disgust is performative in spatial terms. Olga Matich argues that movement away from the loathsome image or idea affords the possibility of making the experience cognitively readable or legible, that disgust creates a space in which the individual negotiates her emotional as well as moral response. Yet she claims that aesthetically—and in certain instances ethically—disgust, which is always about the boundaries of the permissible, is also liberating: it offers society, its artists, and their consumers the opportunity to transgress established norms. Through extensive close readings of *Petersburg*, Matich shows that Belyi’s experimental novel does precisely that, challenging the reader not to avert her readerly gaze from that which is unsettling and to appreciate, even to delight in, his shocking metamorphic image-making. She calls *Petersburg* a modernist exemplar of baroque aesthetics, characterized by excessive affect and grotesque representation, especially of the corpse, invoking the transience of life and dissolution of form.

“With a Shade of Disgust”: Affective Politics of Sexuality and Class in Memoirs of the Stalinist Gulag

Adi Kuntsman

This article addresses a topic seldom discussed in gulag studies: same-sex relations in the camps. In particular, it deals with affective politics of sexuality and class in gulag memoirs and the role of disgust in the formation of sexual and class boundaries. It approaches disgust as existing between the individual and the social, the subjective and the historical, the internal and the external, and traces the ways the gulag memoirs constitute the disgusting, the disgusted, and the boundary between them. At the center of the article are descriptions of same-sex relations in the Kolyma camps of the 1930s–1950s by Evgenia Ginzburg and Varlam Shalamov. Based on a critical reading of these and other memoirs, Adi Kuntsman reveals how same-sex relations among the common criminals are constructed by the memoirists as disgusting because they go against gender norms and against class perceptions of sexual morality. Kuntsman shows how these perceptions of the appropriate, embedded within the habitus of the intelligentsia, are transformed in the memoirs into the universal category of humanness, locating the common criminals, and, by association, anyone who engages in same-sex relations, beyond the bounds of humanity.

Between Ideology and Desire: Rhetoric of the Self in the Works of Nikolai Chernyshevskii and Nikolai Dobrolubov

Konstantine Klioutchkine

Departing from the familiar scholarly focus on the ideological content of works by intelligentsia forerunners, this article examines the record of everyday life in their private and public writing. Konstantine Klioutch-
Kine argues that their obsessive focus on ordinary experience indicated that articulating mundane desires was as important to the two writers as expressing progressive views. As professional journalists, Nikolai Chernyshevskii and Nikolai Dobroliubov organized their experience primarily by way of writing. Accordingly, the article explores rhetorical procedures accommodating both ideology and desire in their influential account of themselves as prototypical new men.

The Covert Design of The Brothers Karamazov: Alesha’s Pathology and Dialectic

James L. Rice

A future revolutionary, Alesha Karamazov is, at nineteen, an inexperienced boy who lives in a monastery and who has been considered strange since birth. Fedor Dostoevskii endows him with hysteria—then a serious psychopathology with convulsions that were clinically seen as analogous to epilepsy, the morbus sacer from which Dostoevskii himself suffered. Recognized as an epidemic problem, hysteria in this novel is elaborately deployed as a symbol of Russia’s social ills and the underlying cause of far-reaching personality changes in Alesha (for better or worse), preparing him for a heroic destiny. Although hysteria was soon altered and later eliminated as a clinical syndrome, James L. Rice enables us to read the novel for the first time in the light of documented medical history.

Pollution and Purification in the Moscow Human Rights Networks of the 1960s and 1970s

Barbara Walker

In this article Barbara Walker examines the theme of (samo)zhertvovanie in the Moscow human rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Some participants in that movement have expressed emotional satisfaction in the belief that they were motivated by the desire for self-giving; but that belief has sometimes been received with doubt. Walker uncovers the social phenomenon of a charity movement for the benefit of political prisoners that, she argues, lies near the social and emotional heart of the human rights movement. An important theme of the charity movement, whether real or constructed, is emotional purification of a sense of personal and social contamination stemming from participation in what some experienced as corruption in Soviet state and society. This article draws on ideas of spiritual atonement and salvation through altruism as explanatory cultural factors in this phenomenon.
CONTRIBUTORS

Konstantine Klioutchkine is associate professor of Russian at Pomona College. He works on the history of late-imperial Russian culture with an emphasis on the interrelation of literature and the press and the formation of intelligentsia identity.

Adi Kuntsman is a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the Research Institute for Cosmopolitan Cultures, Manchester University, United Kingdom. She has published extensively on the topics of immigration, diaspora, nationalism, sexuality, and on-line cultures. Her recent book, *Figurations of Violence and Belonging: Queerness, Migranthood and Nationalism in Cyberspace and Beyond* (2009) deals with affective formations of post-Soviet queerness in Israel/Palestine. Kuntsman is currently working on a new project on hate, transnationalism, and the Internet.

Olga Matich is professor of Russian literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Her most recent book is *Erotic Utopia: The Decadent Imagination in the Russian Fin de Siècle* (2005); its expanded version has appeared in Russian as *Eroticheskaia utopia: Novoe religioznoe soznanie i fin de siècle v Rossii* (2008). Her current research concerns Andrei Belyi’s *Petersburg* and Petersburg the city. Together with current and past graduate students, she is currently working on a book titled *Petersburg/Petersburg: Novel and City 1900—1921* and a related Web site titled *Mapping Petersburg*.

Jan Plamper is a Dilthey Fellow at the Center for the History of Emotions, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin. After obtaining a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, Plamper taught Russian history at the University of Tübingen from 2001–07. He is the author of *The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power* (2009) and *Geschichte und Gefühl: Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte* (2010). His current projects include a Habilitation on the history of fear among Russian soldiers and a short book on personality cults in modernity.

William M. Reddy is William T. Laprade Professor of History and professor of cultural anthropology at Duke University. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1974. The author of a number of works on the history and anthropology of emotions, Reddy is currently working on a history of romantic love in Europe.

James L. Rice is professor emeritus of Russian language and literature at the University of Oregon. His publications include books on Fedor Dostoevskii’s medical concerns and on Sigmund Freud’s Russian connections, as well as articles on topics in literature and folklore. He is currently writing a memoir of Joseph Brodsky from 1976 to 1996.

Barbara Walker is associate professor in the History Department at the University of Nevada, Reno and author of *Maximilian Voloshin and the*
Walker is currently researching relations between Soviet human rights activists and U.S. journalists in the Cold War era.

ANDREI ZORIN is professor and chair of Russian at the University of Oxford. He has published *Kormia dvuglavovo orla* (Moscow, 2001; 2d ed., 2004) and articles on the relations between literature and official ideology. Zorin’s current research fields include the emotional culture of early Russian Romanticism and the literary heritage of Lidiia Ginzburg.
LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

The Slavic Review Web site advises authors that “Slavic Review is a peer-reviewed journal featuring new scholarship, in any discipline, concerning eastern and east central Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, past and present. We seek original and significant new research that also explores conceptual and analytical themes with potential resonance across fields and disciplines.” This terse second sentence implies a body of purposes, values, and experiences that shape this journal’s personality. We receive, of course, a great many more manuscripts than we can ultimately accept for publication. As editor, I must make difficult choices, with the help of external peer reviewers and the editorial board, even among publishable articles. To put in a few words the complex mix of considerations that shape decisions, we seek research that makes an original and important contribution to scholarly interpretation with fields, try to ensure fair balance across disciplines and geographic regions, and, prefer studies that explore significant concepts, categories, and theories and that can speak to scholars in different fields and disciplines. When these have the promise of interesting scholars outside the Russian and east European field, all the better.

Although every article is expected to do this work well on its own, organized clusters of articles around specific topics and themes, sometimes accompanied by invited commentary (including by scholars outside Slavic studies), have particular potential to realize this desired intellectual synergy and reach. The cluster on emotions featured in this issue, joined by individual articles that also engage questions of emotion and self, demonstrate this, I hope. Although these articles all concern Russia (to be sure, from the end of the eighteenth century to the late twentieth century and from the perspectives of three disciplines), at stake are conceptual and analytical issues at the heart of a great deal of humanistic and social science research, including how the study of emotions illuminates questions of class, gender, sexuality, power, morality, science, literature, religion, and ideology—social and cultural structures and practices that are both powerfully normative and continually contested and transgressed. Though prisms of sensibility, feeling, passions, and emotions and discourses about these, the articles in this issue also explore such large (and elusive) terrains as the self, the spaces of public and private, notions of thought and perception, the body, death, and modernity. Not least, by focusing on emotion, these articles ponder a methodological challenge facing most of us: how to “read” texts and language for “meaning” and to understand the interplay of cultural significations with society, politics, and history.

As always, I welcome comments and suggestions on the work of the journal.

M.D.S.

Slavic Review 68, no. 2 (Summer 2009)
EMOTIONAL TURN? FEELINGS
IN RUSSIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE

Introduction

Jan Plamper

Recent scholarship in the humanities and social sciences is awash with emotions. Affective social science, the cognitive poetics of emotion, the philosophy of emotions, the history of emotions, and the outer markers of institutionalization and professionalization—conferences, research clusters, dissertations, publications—together create a solid impression: this is a “turn,” if there ever was one.1

It appears that this turn has reached Slavic studies.2 That it has taken so long may seem surprising. After all, in the western European imagination, “the east,” and Russia as a part thereof, has long been linked with emotion—so unmediated and untrammeled that an indication of quantity sufficed as a description: too much emotion, extreme emotion, rather

Thanks to Michael David-Fox, Catriona Kelly, Barbara Rosenwein, Mark D. Steinberg, and Ilya Vinkovetsky for very helpful comments.

1. On emotions and the social sciences, see Patricia Ticineto Clough with Jean Halley, The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham, 2007); on cognitive poetics and emotions, see Keith Oatley, Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions (Cambridge, Eng., 1992) or Reuven Tsur, Toward a Theory of Cognitive Poetics, 2d ed. (1992; Brighton, 2008); on the philosophy of emotions, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge, Eng., 2001). For signs of the professionalization of one field, the history of emotions, consider in the United States, the Institute for the Study of Emotion at Florida State University (with William Reddy, Peter Stearns, and others as inaugural lecturers in 2002) and a monograph series (“The History of Emotions Series” at New York University Press edited by Peter Stearns and Jan Lewis); in Germany, an Excellence Cluster on “Languages of Emotion” at the Free University (Berlin), directed by Winfried Menninghaus, as well as a Center for the History of Emotions at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development (Berlin), headed by Ute Frevert; and, in Switzerland at Collegium Helveticum (Zurich), a section on “Die Rolle der Emotion: Ihr Anteil bei menschlichem Handeln und bei der Setzung sozialer Normen.” A milestone in the professionalization of the history of emotions was a 1998 conference “The Historicity of Emotions,” which grew out of a half-year seminar at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Hebrew University, Jerusalem. The conference was convened by Michael Heyd and Yosef Kaplan and attended by such historians as Natalie Zemon Davis and Anthony Grafton (e-mail communication from Michal Altbauer-Rudnik, 10 June 2007).

2. Take only conferences, such as Sheila Fitzpatrick’s workshop “History of Emotions in Russia” at the University of Chicago (2003); a roundtable “Thinking about Feelings: Emotions in Russian/Soviet History and Culture” at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (2004); the conference “Emotsii v russkoj istorii i kulture” organized by Marc Elie, Schamma Schahadat, and myself in Moscow (2008); the conference “Interpreting Emotion in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Eurasia” convened by Mark D. Steinberg and Valeria Sobol at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (2008).

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than a different kind of emotion. Whence the current emotional turn? Let me briefly map some of the roads that led to it.

If there is a single overarching distinction that has structured all humanities and social science emotions research, it would have to be a variant of the nature versus nurture binary, namely universalism versus social constructionism. Historical writings on emotions can certainly be grouped around these two poles. Medievalist Johan Huizinga in 1919, first-generation *Annales* Lucien Febvre in 1941, third-generation *Annales* Jean Delumeau in 1978, and psychohistorians (Peter Gay, Lloyd deMause, Peter Loewenberg) during the 1970s all operated with historically invariable emotions concepts, either in a straightforward anachronistic (past emotions are the same as in my own time and culture) or in a psychoanalytical-anachronistic key (culturally specific Freudian concepts work everywhere and always). Emotions, according to the universalists, deserved a place in history, but they did not have a history; they moved through time and space more or less unchanged. By contrast, historical sociologist Norbert Elias in 1939, historian of France Theodore Zeldin in 1973, social historian Peter Stearns in 1985, and medievalist Barbara Rosenwein in the late 1990s and early 2000s imagined emotions in a more relativist way as being culturally variable, while allowing room for some universal aspects.


Emotional Turn? Introduction

can be seen as a new synthesis of the social constructionism associated with cultural anthropology, which since the 1970s has been uncovering an ever greater variety of emotion expression, and the universalism of cognitive psychology, which is experiment-based, works with living subjects, and operates with such natural science verification procedures as Karl Popper’s principle of falsifiability.

Among Soviet historians and western Russianists it took longer for social constructionist positions to gain ground. In the Methodology Sector at the Institute for General History (Academy of Sciences) in Nikita Khrushchev’s time, Mikhail Gefter, Boris Porshnev, and others pioneered the Soviet study of the (social) psychology of individuals and groups in history. Gefter and his colleagues took the lead from the prerevolutionary St. Petersburg school of philologically oriented history, from Soviet psychologists like Aleksandr Luriia and Lev Vygotskii, from Mikhail Bakhtin, from the mentalités concept of the French Annales school (mediated through Polish Annalistes like Bronislaw Geremek), and from the Moscow-Tartu school of semiotics. These were fragile first steps and historians labored hard to package their research in ideologically compatible language, pointing to the centrality of the category of emotion in Vasilii Kliuchevskii and especially Vladimir Lenin. The sector was closed down in 1969 and Porshnev died in 1972, but historians like Aron Gurevich and Iurii Bessmertnyi continued the tradition, first underground and later, since perestroika, openly, resulting in such publications as the volume Chelovek v mire chuvstv (Man in the world of feelings). Also during per-
estroika, ethnographically informed historiography became immensely popular. Lev Gumilev and his “passionarity” (passionarnost’) and “passionate peoples” (passionarnye narody) belong in this rubric. Emotion here is eminently cultural, in fact so much so that the cultural gets ethnicized and biologized.\(^\text{10}\)

It was only when a handful of western (cultural) historians of Russia began to absorb the findings of Stearns, Rosenwein, and especially Reddy, that emotion as a socially constructed concept entered Russian history. Mark D. Steinberg was one of the first, as he excavated an emotionally charged “vocabulary of spiritual affliction” in early twentieth-century worker poetry and stated “the still obvious fact that human experience and action are composed of emotions as well as rational perception, of moral sensibilities as well as ethical conviction.”\(^\text{11}\) Catriona Kelly, in her studies on advice literature, problematized—for Russia—Elias’s linear process of increasing emotional control.\(^\text{12}\) Sheila Fitzpatrick traced some of the specifically Stalinist notions of happiness (schast’e) and yearning sadness (toska).\(^\text{13}\) Árpád von Klimó and Malte Rolf found that Nazi ecstasy (Rausch) differs from Stalinist enthusiasm (entuziazm) in its objectlessness: Rausch aims at transgressing all boundaries while entuziazm is always oriented toward some goal deemed worthwhile.\(^\text{14}\) Ronald Grigor Suny explored the emotional coloring of Soviet and post-Soviet ethnic politics.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{11}\) Mark D. Steinberg, Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925 (Ithaca, 2002), 232, 15.


\(^{15}\) Ronald Grigor Suny, “Why We Hate You: The Passions of National Identity and Ethnic Violence” (paper delivered at Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies,
Glennys Young gave the 1962 Novocherkassk riots an emotions-centered reading that joins political science literature on “contentious politics” with the history of emotions. And Alexander Martin, following Alain Corbin’s lead, hinted at the emotional dimensions of the olfactory experience of Moscow in the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries.

More obviously than in the case of history, feelings have long been a staple of scholarship on Russian culture. For more than a century, literary scholars and others have been reconstructing the rich heritage of emotion talk in Russian poetry, prose, theater, cinema—from Nikolai Karamzin’s Poor Lisa to Lidiia Ginzburg’s On Psychological Prose, from the novels of psychological realism to the Stanislavsky method, from symbolist love to Sergei Eizenshtein’s films. Or they have been exploring emotion’s active suppression and absence—from ideinost’ in nineteenth-century literary criticism to socialist realism, from the suspicion of emotions in modernism (Russian and general) to formalist criticism (Boris Eikhenbaum on Mikhail Lermontov). However, emotion as an analytical—and variable—unit has only recently come into play. Emotion was, as it were, hidden in plain view. In the new emotion research on Russian culture, the binary of universalism versus social constructionism has also held. Cultural studies and students of rhetoric have tended toward more social constructionist positions. Psychoanalytically inspired scholarship...
has operated with more universalist concepts. The impact of universalist life science has so far been marginal in the Russian literary field; while many of their colleagues in English departments are “going neuro” and studying brain scans of readers, Russianists have generally been more hesitant. Perhaps the Bazarovs and Rakhmetovs, the nihilists and materialists, Ludwig Büchner’s Kraft und Stoff during Fedor Dostoevskii’s time, and the Soviet scientific experiments of the 1920s have resulted in a greater skepticism about “bio-revolutions.”

Historically informed skepticism toward the life sciences is something Russianists could contribute to the wider field of humanities emotions research. Yet there are more general grounds for such skepticism. First, humanities scholars rarely access the primary life science research on emotions, and if they do, they are hardly in a position to judge its quality. For the most part they rely on such life science popularizers as Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux as “translators,” yet all of these translators are players in the life science field with distinct interests and idiosyncrasies. Second, on many questions life science research is just getting off the ground; it would be fatal to step—once again, after eugenics and Aleksei Zamkov’s rejuvenation experiments in the Stalinist elite—into this pseudoscience trap. Third, even if certain universal life science findings on emotions do hold, they are, as Daniel Gross has written, only “trivially true,” for the gist of humanities research is variation across culture and time. The historian of fear, for instance, is not so much interested in the universally true brain chemical reaction to a source of threat but rather in the fact that fear of being buried alive was rampant among Britons in the late nineteenth century, as evidenced in the engineering of coffins with breathing tubes and bells and wills that stipulated the cutting of throats after death, and that this fear object vanished around 1914.

Just as the overarching binary of universalism versus social constructionism is only one possible way to group what has been done so far, so the list of roads leading up to the emotional turn is far from exhaustive. One could also have retraced the impact of Pavlovian psychology (and that of Vygotskii and Luriia) on the development of western neuroscience:

22. For a critique of an attempt to validate Norbert Elias’s civilizing process with a peculiar brand of evolutionary psychology, see Barbara H. Rosenwein, “The Uses of Biology: A Response to J. Carter Wood’s ‘The Limits of Culture?’” Cultural and Social History 4, no. 4 (December 2007): 553–58.


early (and late) twentieth-century Russian Freudianism;\textsuperscript{28} the eastern European field;\textsuperscript{29} the cultural anthropology of postsocialist everyday life in the eastern bloc writ large;\textsuperscript{30} the comparative linguistics of emotion in which the Slavist Anna Wierzbicka has been leading;\textsuperscript{31} the nonverbal semiotics of the Moscow school of applied linguistics;\textsuperscript{32} the political science and nationality studies on emotional-ethnic conflict;\textsuperscript{33} musicology;\textsuperscript{34} dance studies;\textsuperscript{35} and many more.

Or one could have pointed to some of the perspectives of future emotions studies. A sustained analysis of emotions in history and culture often resembles, not venturing into a new world, but rather putting a new lens on the objective through which one views one’s own world. Once the new lens is on, one asks incredulously: How is it we have no study of the emotional impact of the psychological realist novel on the reader? How could we study the Russian gentry without an eye for its notion of disgust toward others (persons, things, times)? Where are the comparative histories of national emotions stereotypes, such as Russian \textit{khandra} or \textit{toska} (and Portuguese \textit{saudade}, German \textit{Angst} or \textit{Weltschmerz}, the British “stiff upper lip”)? How could the history of the Russian revolutionary movement have been written without some idea of its constructs of hatred and anger? And how could a history of the Great Terror of 1937–38 have been written without attention to fear?

The articles in this forum try to give an inkling of the range of vistas that open up when the emotions lens is put on. Chronologically, they range from the late eighteenth century when Andrei Turgenev started keeping the diary Andrei Zorin writes about to the Stalin era Adi Kuntsman’s gulag memoirists chronicle. As for disciplinary background, Zorin and Olga Matich are literary scholars with a keen eye for the literary strategies of emotion talk—the tricks writers use to represent and evoke


\textsuperscript{30} On postsocialist Omsk, see Dale Pesman, \textit{Russia and Soul: An Exploration} (Ithaca, 2000).

\textsuperscript{31} Anna Wierzbicka, \textit{Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals} (Cambridge, Eng., 1999); Jean Harkins and Anna Wierzbicka, eds., \textit{Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective} (Berlin, 2001).

\textsuperscript{32} See, e.g., I. A. Sharonov, ed., \textit{Emotsii v iazyke i rechi: Sbornik nauchnykh statei} (Moscow, 2005); Grigorii Efimovich Kreidel, \textit{Neverbal’naia semiotika} (Moscow, 2002). Also see V. M. Kruglov, \textit{Imena chuvstv v russkom iazyke XVIII veka} (St. Petersburg, 1998).


\textsuperscript{34} David MacFayden, \textit{Songs for Fat People: Affect, Emotion and Celebrity in the Soviet Popular Song, 1900 to 1955} (Montreal, 2002).

\textsuperscript{35} See Irina Sirotkina, “Plamya i ekstaz v Rossi ot Serebrianogo veika do kontsa 1920kh gg.,” in Plamper, Elie, and Schahadat, eds., \textit{Rossiiskaia imperia chuvstv: Podkhody k kulturnoi istorii emotsii}. 
feelings. Kuntsman, a social anthropologist by training, draws on cultural theory, queer theory, and literary scholarship to alert us to the linkages between disgust, metonymy, and same-sex sexuality in gulag memoirs. I am a historian and my article constitutes an attempt at analysis of a scientific discourse that revolved around emotion.

Let us take a closer look at the articles and the numerous connections between them. More generally, all confirm both the clichéd but fundamentally true dominance of literature in Russia and the well-known “life imitates art imitates life . . . ” pattern. Early nineteenth-century noblemen learn to feel with German, French, and British writers (Zorin); the key text of disgust à la russe is Russia’s most celebrated modernist novel (Matich); highly literary memoirs reached a status of objective (and ethically impeccable) historical documentation of the gulag and abused this status to slip in and buttress a brand of heteronormativity that sits uncomfortably with the tradition of human rights these memoirs are seen to belong to (Kuntsman); and soldiers learn to express their fear after, and with, Lev Tolstoi (Plamper).

I want to close with a few words on figurative speech and how metaphors are employed to evoke emotions. Zorin, whose larger project is to put sentiment back into sentimentalism, presents a proliferation of thermic metaphors when his young diarist turns to the emotion of love: “cold,” “hot,” “burning,” “flame.” These metaphors are marked by their binary nature. The metaphors in Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg, as detailed by Matich, and in prominent gulag memoirs, as described by Kuntsman, are of a different order: they are metonymies and rest on relations of contiguity. It is precisely the proximity of an abominable object and the sign that draws the reader close and creates a reaction of disgust, of away-movement, of ot-vrashchenie. Humans are brought into close, too close, contact with the not-quite-human—animals like pigs in Belyi’s novel, blatari and kobly in the gulag memoirs. Same-sex sexuality is represented as disgusting, and this representation is intended to evoke disgust in readers. Dudkin and Lippanchenko in Petersburg are brought into homosexual closeness, and so are criminal camp inmates and homosexuals. In their transgressiveness and contiguity, the metaphors of disgust are in fact meant to reinforce the binaries of life and death, human and nonhuman, heterosexual and homosexual, valorizing the first item and thus being ultimately conservative, in the sense of conserving hierarchy and difference. In the end, then, they are not that different from Andrei Turgenev’s thermic binary metaphors outlined by Zorin.

One way out might lie in the very act of analysis that these articles perform. While Matich demonstrates how Belyi mobilizes disgust’s transgressive potential and by means of a baroque poetics of disgusting excess breaks through the cyclical temporal concept of the high classicist city-

36. On this pattern, see Irina Paperno, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: A Study in the Semiotics of Behavior (Stanford, 1988).

37. For another study in this vein see I. Iu. Vinitskii, Uteki melankholii (Moscow, 1997).
text that is St. Petersburg, Kuntsman lays bare the perfidious imbrication of underclass criminality with homosexuality via metonymies of disgust. Kuntsman’s work of making this transparent suggests how we, the unassuming readers of Ginzburg’s morally righteous, heroic memoir, might resist being glued to this imbrication by means of sticky metaphors, how we might break out of the dissident icon Ginzburg’s cycle of homophobia-as-disgust we are otherwise prone to repeat. Ad nauseam.

Figurative speech, poetics, and scientific discourse—these foci are the stuff of literary scholarship and cultural history. They also mark a certain distance from neurobiology, brain science, evolutionary biology, and other life sciences that currently dominate many public and academic debates traditionally in the domain of the humanities (free will, intentionality, selfhood, love). While it remains to be seen whether future humanities emotions research with a Russian focus keeps this distance, it seems fair to predict that there will be such research—beyond the four articles to which we now turn.
The Perception of Emotional Coldness in Andrei Turgenev’s Diaries

Andrei Zorin

Russian Schillerian

The diaries of Andrei Turgenev, an aspiring writer, a leader of a small circle of young Moscow intellectuals and one of the forerunners of Russian Sturm und Drang, have attracted scholarly attention ever since they were discovered about a hundred years ago.1 Since then, many scholars have quoted different parts of Turgenev’s diaries, usually in articles dealing with the history of Druzheskoе literaturnoe obschestvo, the literary group that Turgenev formed together with his brother Aleksandr, Vasiliy Zhukovskii, Aleksei Merzliakov, Andrei Kaisarov, Aleksandr Voeikov, and several other young Moscow authors, and with the Russian reception of western, especially German, writers.2 The document itself, however, apart from one extract, remains unpublished.3 This text reflects a major generational shift in the value systems of the educated Russian public at the

1. Vasiliy Istrin presented extensive quotes from the diaries in his article on Turgenev’s younger brother Aleksandr. See Vasiliy Istrin, “Mladshii turgenevskii kruzhok i Alexander Ivanovich Turgenev,” in Arkhіv brаt’ev Turgенеvykh (St. Petersburg, 1911), 2:15–111. Evgenii Tarasov started preparing Andrei Turgenev’s diaries for publication as a special volume in the Arkhіv brаt’ev Turgенеvykh series, but the edition never appeared because of the revolution and civil war in Russia.


3. See Mariia Virolainen, ed., “Iz dnevnika Andreia Ivanovicha Turgeneva,” in E. M. D’IAkonova, ed., Vostok—Zapad: Literaturnye vzaimovVirazh v zarubezhnykh issledovaniakh (Moscow, 1989), 100–139. See also Vadim Vatsuro and Mariia Virolainen, eds., Pis’ma Andreia Turgeneva k Zhukovskomu,” in D. S. Likhachev, R. V. Ieizitov, and F. Z. Kanunova, eds., Zhukovskii i russkaia kultura (Moscow, 1987). A full scholarly edition of Turgenev’s diaries is currently under preparation by myself, M. Virolainen, and A. Koiten. I am grateful to my co-authors for permission to draw on the results of our work

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turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and provides us with a
glimpse at the emergence of early Romantic sensibility in Russia.

A son of Ivan Turgenev, one of the leading members of the circle of
Moscow Freemasons, Andrei Turgenev was brought up in a Masonic en-
vironment. Diary writing was not only encouraged but directly prescribed
by the traditional Freemasonic upbringing. The diarist was supposed to
“examine every evening the preceding day” in order to “keep watch con-
tantly over all the impulses of our mind and heart, to scrutinize their every
disposition and every action.” 4 Ivan Turgenev translated the most popular
manual of this sort: Self-Knowledge by John Mason. The third edition of this
book appeared in Moscow in 1800 with a special “Epistle to my children”
attached to the treatise by the translator. Here Turgenev urged his sons
to follow the instructions given in the book and “to acquire means to pass
through difficult and unpleasant ways leading to self-knowledge.”

Masonic diaries were often read during the meetings of the lodges,
becoming in that way a sort of a joint enterprise, a collective exercise in
self-disciplining, self-fashioning, and moral improvement. In one of the
personal confessions drafted for the lodge meeting, Ivan Turgenev ac-
cussed himself of “gluttony,” “debauchery,” and “pride.”

Andrei Ivanovich, who started his diary in November 1799, followed
the patterns set by the Freemasons in trying to use the diary as a means
of self-scrutiny and of measuring his moral qualities, abilities, and perfor-
mance against the given standard. It seems unlikely that his father would
have approved of this text, however. First of all, Andrei’s diary was a mani-
ifestly personal venture: in his first entry, he wrote,

Здесь буду я вписывать все свои мысли, чувства, радостные и
неприятные, буду рассуждать об интересных для меня предметах, не
боясь ни чьей критики.

Here I’ll write all my thoughts, feelings joyful and unpleasant, shall de-
liberate upon the subjects interesting to me without being afraid of any-
one’s censure.

He deliberately “privatized” his inner life, deciding to focus only on the
subjects interesting to himself and to shun any outside interference.

On 30 May 1803, forty days before his untimely death, in one of his
last diary entries (in his forty remaining days he managed to write only six
more), Turgenev once again returned to this topic in more general way:

Как дорога должна быть человеку его Selbstheit. Как он должен быть
всегда он и везде сохранить ее, хотя бы наставником его был Руссо

4. I. I. Panaev quoted in Douglas Smith, Working the Rough Stone: Freemasonry and Soci-
ety in Eighteenth-Century Russia (DeKalb, 1999), 40. See also Lydia Ginzburg, On Psychologi-
5. Ioann Mason, Poznanie samogo sebia, 3d ed. (Moscow 1800), iv.
7. Andrei Turgenev, The Diaries, Rukopisyotdel, Institut russkoi literatury (Push-
kinskii Dom), St. Petersburg (RO IRLI), f. 309, d. 271, 1. 2ob.
и Фенелон. Виланд сказал это, даже говоря о Христе. Не я (человек) должен войти в Руссо, но Руссо в меня и сделать меня собою.

How dear should one’s Selbstheit be to a person? How should he be always himself and preserve it everywhere even if Rousseau and Fenelon were his mentors? Wieland said it even about Christ. Not I (a person) should come into Rousseau, but Rousseau into me and he should turn me into himself. 8

According to Turgenev, the need to cherish your own selfhood does not preclude accepting universally valid models. These models, however, were not to be simply imitated; instead one should imbibe the teachings and actions of one’s spiritual mentor and thus gradually draw closer to him. In this process, one’s distinct individuality is asserted by the choice of an object of emulation that is based on personal affinity with one’s ideal.

The explicit equation between Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Christ clearly shows that young Turgenev’s Persönlichkeitideal (to use Alfred Adler’s terminology) was radically different from the ideal of his elders.9 He aspired to become not so much an ascetic moralist and mystic of Masonic breed as an enthusiastic genius of the Sturm und Drang, like Friedrich von Schiller and his main characters.

Turgenev’s adoration of Schiller has been interpreted in different ways. While Vasilii Istrin has suggested that Turgenev was primarily interested in the psychological descriptions of Schiller’s characters, Iurii Lotman has insisted that the political character of Turgenev’s interest focused on rebellion against tyranny and injustice.10 Schiller and his works are mentioned dozens of times in the diary, providing enough material for both points of view. Still, it is important to keep in mind that, for Turgenev, Schiller was first and foremost a poet, a literary genius. The follower of Sturm und Drang would naturally regard artistic creativity as an embodiment of the creative spirit governing the universe—Turgenev called Schiller “the true monarch” who “rules hearts at his will” at the distance of “hundreds and thousands of miles and years.” 11

Turgenev dreamed of becoming one of those creative geniuses, but he was never sure whether he would be able to live up to the ideal he had set for himself. He alternated between fervent hope and terrifying doubts verging on total despair. Given the level of his personal and literary ambitions, failing to qualify for the desired status meant not to deserve to be alive. The diary became the main tool for his obsessive self-examination.

One of the most revered principles of Sturm und Drang ideology and aesthetics absorbed by young Schiller was the demand of “the fullness of

8. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 55ob.
Emotional Coldness in Andrei Turgenev's Diaries

heart" ("die Fülle des Herzens"); the distinctive feature of a true genius was the ability to be passionate.12 This ability was often expressed through the metaphor of temperature, the juxtaposition of "hotness" and "coldness" in the human soul and in nature.

The use of this metaphor to describe human character goes back to Aristotle, but in the age of sensibility it became especially widespread and was supplemented by the equally value-charged opposition between softness and hardness.13 This metaphorical constellation enabled the moral transformation of an individual to be understood as a process of "melting," when cold and hardened hearts suddenly become hot and soft under the transformative heat of nature, religion, art, love, or even great misfortune. According to Edward Young, suffering was sent by Divine Providence to "melt [a man] like wax."14 At the same time the capacity to feel this melting brought about the most refined pleasure and could serve to distinguish a truly sensible man. "Is there an emotion more delicious than to feel your heart pour and melt [. . .] Where is the unfortunate who cannot feel that sweet and intimate heat?" wrote Louis Sebastian Mercier, and Rousseau in his Confessions insisted that, "If anyone can read these letters without feeling his heart softened or melted by the same emotion that dictated them to me, he had better shut the book; he is incapable of judging matters of sentiment."15

It is not completely clear to what extent the young Russian enthusiast was able to differentiate between the sentimental didactics of tender feelings leading to virtue and the apology of unrestricted passion characteristic of Schiller, but he never challenged the valorization of inner "heat" itself. Turgenev constantly measured the temperature of his soul in order to assure himself that its level was above average. His main concern was to keep himself in a state of self-imposed fever. For him, one of the ways of achieving this state involved reading, rereading, reacting to, copying in his diary, and translating the great works of the literature of sensibility. Turgenev was sure that these works were the direct expressions of passionate hearts, thus getting immersed in them was an exercise in arousing in him the feelings experienced by their authors. Once, trying to translate Schiller’s “Ode to Joy,” his favorite poem, he covered all the margins of the sheet he was writing on with the word Joy written several dozen times.16 Clearly this was an effort to bring himself into the emotional state experienced by the author of the original.

On 29 November 1799, Turgenev was translating or paraphrasing from

16. Rukopisnyi otdel Rossiiskaia natsional'naia biblioteka, St. Petersburg (RO RNB), f. 386, op. 2, d. 330, l. 20.
German the fragment that he entitled “The Winter,” which was actually an ecstatic description of the beginning of spring. The exact source of the quotation remains unidentified, but most likely it was written by one of the numerous German imitators of James Thomson’s *The Seasons*. Turgenev used the image to describe the birth of a tender sensibility in the soul:

Весна низлетит к нам в дыхании любви Отеческой.—Огонь любви разольется во вселенной, счастье озарит людей светлыми лучами в объятиях любви; дух жизни—будет дух любви.

Все восторжествует, все исполнится радости.

The spring will fly down to us in a breath of Fatherly love. The flame of love will spread over the universe, happiness will brighten the people with radiant rays in love’s embrace; the spirit of life will be the spirit of love.

Everything will triumph and rejoice.17

In this sentimental piece, warm feelings are equated with virtue, but six weeks later, on 17 January 1800, Turgenev copied in full in his diary Schiller’s long poem *Freygeisterey der Leidenschaft* where “Herzens Flammentrieb” (heart’s flame), “heißen Blut” (hot blood) and “die Feuer, die electrics mich durchwallten” (the fire that flows electrically through me) were glorified at the expense of “die Tugend” (Virtue).18 Turgenev’s first sexual experience, which he interpreted as the fall that forever severed him from the age of childhood and innocence, left him feeling deeply scarred by the imminent consequences of his transgression, and he tried to make sense of his misfortunes: “Misfortunes soften hearts; they can transform a sharp cold wit into a kind and tender brother of his brothers.”19 Viewing himself with utter dismay as a sort of “sharp cold wit,” Turgenev aspired to be transformed into a warm and sensible person. On 27 March he noted in his diary that “several days ago I again took up the intention to rid myself of my inclination to mockery.”20 This “inclination to mockery” of which he accused himself was for him an attribute of the culture of triviality and emptiness characteristic of the aristocratic salon—a culture not only fully incompatible with the idea of the sensible heart but completely opposed to it.

The ultimate test of the real temperature of one’s soul was its ability to experience love, the passion that since the classical age had been compared with burning fire. These metaphorical representations abound in Schiller’s *Freygeisterey der Leidenschaft*, which appealed so strongly to young Turgenev, as well as in Wolfgang von Goethe’s *Werther*.21 Thus, the poten-

17. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, l. 16.
18. Ibid., ll. 38–38ob.
19. Ibid., l. 42ob. See Andrei Zorin, “Pokhod v bordel’ v Moskve v ianuare 1800 goda (Schiller, gonoreia i pervorodnyi grekh v emocional’nom mire russkogo dvorianina),” *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie* 92, no. 4 (2008).
20. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, l. 53.
tial to experience passionate love and feel its noble flame in your breast was the most self-evident proof of one’s sensibility. In June, Turgenev recorded his “highly interesting” conversation with his friend Zhukovskii:

о моем характере и о нечувствительности моей. Я думаю, что я никогда не могу влюбиться. Этот источник приятнейших наслаждений Природы для меня закрыт. Как беден ум без души! Может быть, я слишком обвиняю себя. Я бы желал несколькими годами жизни моей, желал бы счастьем своим пожертвовать для сего. Чувствительный человек и в несчастье счастливей холодного. Ах! естьли бы я когда-нибудь нашел свое блаженство, нашел свою Луизу, свою Шарлоту, какие сладкие слезы стал–

No, now my heart is dead. It does not experience raptures, feelings are no longer washed by joyous tears [. . .] This horrible coldness! Where does it come from?22

To support his self-analysis, Turgenev quoted Werther’s letter from the second part of Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werther. This passionate character’s sensibility had also hardened under the burden of terrible calamities and life at court. Turgenev admired Goethe’s first masterpiece and tried, together with Zhukovskii and Merzliakov, to produce a joint translation of the book. Werther became a life model for him.23 Later he even bought an extra copy of the book and ordered it bound with sheets of white paper between the pages. He planned to continue his diary on these blank pages so that he could compare his own feelings with those of his favorite literary hero.24 Werther had finally managed to regain his ability to feel deeply and passionately, so Turgenev was not entirely hopeless about himself. He continued the quoted entry by noting that he “was still able to shed tears when witnessing an unfortunate father speaking about the loss of his daughter.”25

No doubt this reference contains an allusion to Schiller’s Kabale und
Liebe, another classical work of German Sturm und Drang that Turgenev was translating with Merzliakov. He was also describing his personal experience, however. Several months earlier, on 9 December 1799, he had paid a visit to Moscow University law professor Feodor Bauze who had lost his daughter.

Вчера был у Баузе и был тронут до слез его горестию [. . .] С каким жаром, с какою скорбию говорил он о своей потере! и после (что меня тронуло больше всего и заставило утереть слезы) с каким уверением, с каким жаром говорил он, что ей лучше, что она перешла из рук отца в руки ОТЦА, и что некогда она встретит его у престола Божия.—Но горесть изображалась во всех чертах его.

Я плакал и радовался слезам своим.—Дотронувшись до раскалённой печки, он обжег руку, так что вздулись пузыри, и от сильной душевной горести и не почувствовал этого.—Уже через час сказала ему об этом жена.

Yesterday I visited Bauze and was moved to tears by his grief. [. . .] He spoke about his loss with such heat and such sorrow! and later (and this touched me the most and made me wipe away my tears) he said with such certitude and such heat that she is better now and that she has passed from the hands of her father to the hands of the FATHER and some day she will meet him near God’s throne. But grief showed itself in his every feature.

I wept and rejoiced in my tears.—Having touched the scorching oven, he burnt his hand, blisters appeared, but because of the powerful sorrow in his heart he did not notice. An hour later his wife told him about it.26

This fragment is highly representative. The diarist repeats twice that Bauze spoke with passion, literally “with heat” (s zharom) about the loss of his daughter and his hope for her eternal salvation. The temperature of his discourse reflected his inner heat, which was so unbearable that he failed to notice being burned by the oven. What is more, the heat of Bauze’s feelings made Turgenev’s heart melt and the latter rejoiced in his tears as they proved that his own soul had not hardened for good and was still capable of real sensibility. This experience was so important to Turgenev that a year later he was still referring to it.

The difficult problem of the correlation between passion and virtue, between “hot” and noble feelings, continued to worry Turgenev deeply as it was of utmost relevance to his self-analysis and self-assessment. On 2 August 1800 he recorded in his diary a “strange thought” from a French poem claiming that “even a criminal may fall in love, while only the noble heart can feel friendship.” Turgenev continued

Мне кажется, что тут автор хотел разуметь и злого человека! Но я не знаю, всякый ли злой человек может влюбиться. Например, холодный, ни злой, ни добрый, и, следственно, более злой (тиёдл), не так скоро, по крайней мере, влюбится, как Разбойник Карл Моор. (Пусть мне скажут, что это только идеальное существо, но могут

26. Ibid., II. 29–29ob,
byть подобные ему в основании и начальном расположении, хотя и не в такой мере и не с такими accessorires). Почему же такой человек скорее почувствует любовь, нежели дружбу? Может быть потому, что любовь больше имеет огня, пылкости и не столько рассуждает.

It seems to me that the author meant to include here even an evil person. But I am not sure whether every evil person can fall in love. For example, a cold person, who is neither good nor evil and consequently more evil (tiéde), would not fall in love as quickly as Robber Karl Moor.

Let them tell me that this is only an ideal being, but there can exist people who are like him in the foundation of their characters and in initial disposition, even if not to such a degree or with such accessorises). Why then would such a man sooner feel love than friendship? Probably because love has more fire, more ardor and reasons less.27

Here the diarist uses both French and Russian, choosing adjectives that describe “temperature” with different meanings from both. Turgenev searches for a word to express the idea of despicable mediocrity; when a person is unable to be either good or evil, the diarist sees him as “more evil.” In Russian, he describes such a person as “cold” and at the same time puts the French word tiéde meaning “slightly warm,” in parentheses. Turgenev could not use the Russian equivalent for warm (tepłyj) as this word had positive connotations in the Russian discourse of sensibility, while Rousseau had used the expression “l’âme tiéde” with derogatory overtones. In the same manner Turgenev also tried to substitute the word criminal, used by the unknown French poet, with the vaguer notion of “vile person.” He strove to identify himself with Schiller’s Karl Moor and insisted that comparable characters may exist in real life; thus for him the idea of criminality was connected, not with cold indifference, but with strong and somewhat noble passions.

Turgenev had intimate friendships but was unable to regard himself as a genuinely “hot” person.28 Only passionate love could serve as the test of his real nature.

On 23 August 1800, Turgenev made an entry summarizing the main motives of his diary for the nearly ten months he had been keeping it:

Сейчас (после обеда, вечером) получил письмо от Жуковского и читал его с самым холодным духом! Боже мой! Это ужасно. Естьли?? бь, думаю, надобно было расставаться с ним, я бы расстался без слез! Что со мной?—Мне беспрестанно казалось, что я не могу чувствовать так, как он; так благородно и, особливо, так нежно. Часто сам восхищался я великою, чувствительною мыслью и в ту же минуту в состоянии смеяться над нею. По крайней мере—проклинаю мою нечувствительность!

Я несчастен; больше, нежели несчастен, потому что источник приятнейших наслаждений для меня иссяк! Злосчастный плакучий, проливающий тихие неизвестные слезы сердца,—не меняйся на довольную улыбку нечувствительности, мертвой холодности.

27. Ibid., ll. 63–63ob.
28. On the cult of friendship in this circle, see Raeff, “Russian Youth on the Eve of Romanticism,” and Lotman, Andrei Sergeevich Kaisarov.
Just now (in the evening after the dinner) I received a letter from Zhukovskii which I read with the coldest spirit. My god! This is terrible. I think that if I had to part with him, I would part without tears! What’s happening to me? It always seemed to me that I couldn’t feel like he does, as nobly and especially as tenderly. Sometimes I am enraptured by a great thought and at the same time I am ready to laugh at it. At the least, I curse my insensibility!

I am unfortunate, more than unfortunate, because the source of tender feelings has dried up for me! Miserable wretch, shedding quiet, unknown tears of your heart, do not change your situation for the satisfied smile of insensibility, dead coldness.\(^29\)

This technique of self-flagellation, based on comparing one’s soul with an unachievable object, was typical of Freemasons. Turgenev uses it, however, not to confess his sins and express aspirations for moral improvement, but to complain about his lack of sensibility. Thus, his main hope is that future love will revive him, not only emotionally, but also morally and even religiously, as only love can resurrect a “fervent belief” in his soul:

Я прежде был не таков, сколько могу помнить,—или нет, все то же.
Не могу, однако ж, сказать о себе ничего решительного, хотя не
предвижу ничего отрадного.—Кто будет та, которая разрешит мне
загадку?
Боже мой! Перемени сердце мое—нет в сердце моем и веры
пламенной. [ . . . ]
(Несколько часов спустя).
Однако ж я все в нерешимости; после этого сердце мое начало
развертываться, и не так уже было холодно.—Буду ли я когда-нибудь
и стильно влюблен? Это одно, думаю, может переменить меня.

I was different before, as far as I can remember. No, always the same. However, I can’t say anything decisive about myself, though I do not expect anything good. Who will she be who will solve my riddle?

My God, change my heart. There is no fervent belief in it! [ . . . ]
(several hours later)
However I am still in a state of irresolution. After this, my heart began to unfold and was not that cold. Shall I ever be truly in love? Only this, I think, can change me.\(^30\)

Investing love with such ardent expectations for transformation could not fail to produce totally unexpected and rather bizarre results. Turgenev found himself in love with three sisters at nearly the same time. His feelings in all these interrelated “love stories,” though, were based on entirely different literary patterns that he had assimilated during the preceding period. To understand these patterns, it is also important to reconstruct the actual circumstances of Turgenev’s romance as the only existing reconstruction by Istrin is full of mistakes and misreadings.\(^31\)

\(^29\) RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, ll. 64–64ob. Emphasis in the original.

\(^30\) Ibid., ll. 64–65. Emphasis in the original.

Three Sisters

On 18 September 1800, Turgenev heard the story of Varvara Mikhailovna Sokovnina, a young woman of noble birth who had escaped from her house in Moscow to a nearby village, vowing never to return. (She later entered a monastery, took the veil in 1808, and eventually became the prioress of the convent.) The same day Turgenev wrote to Zhukovskii about this incident, claiming that Sokovnina had taken the Bible and Rousseau with her on her journey. According to Turgenev, her father’s death several years earlier had afflicted her so strongly that she could never reconcile herself to the world. The whole story provided Turgenev with one more chance to compare Sokovnina’s tender heart with his own insensibility:

Я досадую на себя: я бы желал быть в сто раз чувствительнее, чтобы сожалеть о ней, чтобы проливать над ней слезы и утешать ее слезами. Какая нежность к отцу! Кто способен к этому? Кто не позавидует и ее помешательству? По крайней мере, не я . . .

But why am I so insensitive? Now this preoccupies me in the most painful way.

Turgenev decided to dedicate his translation of Werther to Sokovnina and, in his diary, wrote two versions of a dedication expressing his desire to present Sokovnina with this “representation of fiery [plamennoi], unfortunate love.” Sokovnina, who had behaved like the literary martyrs of sensibility, acquired in his eyes an almost saintly status; in his diary Turgenev compared her to Laurence Sterne’s Maria—the famous character of both Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy and Sentimental Journey, who became mentally deranged because of her misfortunes in love.

By equating the sufferings Sokovnina experienced at the loss of her father with the amorous mishaps of his favorite literary characters, like Werther and Maria, Turgenev aspired to initiate a kind of a “local cult” of Sokovnina. He became the most ardent adept of this cult and, apart from dedicating his translation of Goethe to Sokovnina; he began writing an “Elegy” to her, glorifying her feelings. Turgenev worked on the “Elegy”

32. See Georgii Piasetskii, Zhizneopisanie blazhennoi pamiati igumenii i shimomonakhini Serafimy (Orel, 1886).
34. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, l. 71ob.
35. Ibid., l. 72ob.
36. Ibid., l. 71ob. See Vadim Vatsuro, Lirika pushkinskoi pory: Elegicheskaia shkola (St. Petersburg, 1994), 38.
for nearly two years; it remained his single most important literary venture and one of only two poems published in his lifetime. It is worth noting that the text of the poem gives no clue as to whether the main character laments her deceased father or her late lover. Likewise when Maria in *Sentimental Journey* was speaking about her loss, Yorick, the sentimental traveler, believed “she was thinking more of her father than of her lover.”

Turgenev tended to merge these two types of sorrow, subtly eroticising Sokovnina’s image.

Representing Sokovnina as a version of Maria was also relevant for Turgenev as his attitude towards her was modeled on the reactions of the sentimental travelers in both of Sterne’s novels, combining pity, admiration, remote erotic infatuation—Yorick explicitly imagined Maria “lying on his bosom”—and full understanding of the complete impossibility of interfering in the poor girl’s fate.

Unlike Yorick, who had one brief encounter with Maria, Turgenev never met Sokovnina. He knew her family quite well, however, for his younger brother Aleksandr was secretly engaged to Varvara’s younger sister Anna. Through some sort of “mimetic desire,” Turgenev also developed a strong interest in Anna. Unlike the self-reflective and sublime Varvara, Anna was lively, extraverted, highly social and enjoyed giving signs of mild encouragement to her admirers who, in addition to both Turgenevs, included Zhukovskii. But this liveliness did not disappoint Turgenev, since he interpreted it as the manifestation of the childlike simplicity and innocence of Anna’s heart.

Varvara’s Romantic story immensely increased her sister’s attraction for the young enthusiast. During the winter of 1800–1801, Turgenev’s feelings for Anna grew stronger and stronger. After a family dinner on 9 February 1801, he admired Anna’s “playfulness and naïveté” and confessed to a secret wish “to hug her in his embrace.” He added that he did not “know a single beauty for whom” he would “exchange her.”

Turgenev felt that Anna could become “his Louise and his Charlotte,” the maiden whose love saves the weary sinner. Several times in his diaries he recalled the monologue of Karl Moor who found temporary bliss in the arms of Amalia. Unfortunately, being his brother’s bride, Anna was no more available to Turgenev than Varvara, who by that time had become a novice in the convent. On 1 November 1801, several days before he was to depart from Moscow to St. Petersburg where he was to start his career in the diplomatic service, Turgenev wrote in a state of ecstatic despair: “Kak ia liubliu Annu Mikhailovn[ai]u! Samoi bratskoi liubov! Kak ona mila,

39. Ibid.
40. See Aleksandr N. Veselovskii, V. A. Zhukovskii: *Poezia chuvstva i “serdechnogo voo-brashteniia”* (St. Petersburg, 1904), 73–74.
41. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 3.
42. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 276, l. 29ob. and d. 271, l. 45ob.
kakoi um, kakoe serdtse!” (What familiarity did I acquire with them! How I love Anna Mikhailovna. With true brotherly love! How nice is she, what a mind, what a heart!)43

Schiller, desperately in love with the wife of his closest friend, expressed in *Freygeisterey der Leidenschaft* and *Resignation*, two poems Turgenev earlier copied in his diary, his clear preference for the “heart’s flame” over “virtue.” This choice, however, was totally beyond Turgenev’s imagination, and he felt obliged even in his diary to qualify his emotional outbursts with half-hearted insistence on the “brotherly” character of his love for Anna. He needed such devices and self-assurances, not only because of his obligations toward Aleksandr, but also because by that time he had developed strange semi-romantic relations with the middle Sokovnin sister, Ekaterina or, as he referred to her in his diary, Katerina Mikhailovna.

Torn between exalted admiration for the sublime shadow of the absent Varvara and a growing passion for the lively and childlike Anna who was quite present, but equally tabooed, Turgenev lamented to Katerina Mikhailovna about his broken heart and lost happiness, most likely without explaining the exact reasons for his despair. The young woman interpreted his misplaced confessions as a veiled declaration of love and developed a strong attachment to him.

Initially Ekaterina must have regarded these relations as entirely hopeless. Not only would it have been extremely difficult to persuade the elder Turgenevs to agree to the marriage of either of their sons to the penniless Sokovnins, but according to Russian family legislation, marriages between members of the same families were forbidden as incestuous. One of the couples would have had to sacrifice itself for the other. In these circumstances, Turgenev was able to allow this strange romance to go much further than would otherwise have been possible.

On 6 June 1801, Turgenev recorded his impressions of one of their first conversations:

> Я слушал ее со стесненным сердцем. [. . .]

> Боже мой! Что ето! Что совершенней, что блаженней, что святее любви! И самая эта любовь больше, больше, нежели что-нибудь, делает нещастными! Не для чего бы и жить в сем мире. У тебя в сердце пламя, и судьба налагает на тебя холодную руку, и люди гонят тебя и ты ни в каком углу земли не найдешь спокойствия сердцу. [. . .]

> Зачем я не знал тебя! Зачем могу издали только следовать за тобою! Святая дружба! Здесь ты изливаешь свое благословение. Здесь ты возносишь сердце слабой девушки выше всех геройских подвигов! ты горишь в ее сердце.

I listened to her with an oppressed heart! [ . . .]

> My God! What is this! What is more perfect, more blissful, and more holy than love! And this is the same love that more, more that anything else makes us unhappy! But there is no use living in this world without love. You have a *flame* in your heart and fate lays its *cold* hand upon you

43. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 13ob.
and people are persecuting you and nowhere will you find repose for your heart. [ . . . ]

Why did not I know you! Why can I only follow you from afar! Holy friendship! Here you pour out your blessings. Here you lift the heart of a weak girl higher than all heroic deeds, you burn in her heart!44

At this point Turgenev envisaged his future relations with Ekaterina as a “holy friendship” joining two congenial and unhappy souls. Several days later he wrote in his diary that while “five years ago [Ekaterina] had been as lively and careless as Anna Mikhailovna,” she had recently become “more pensive and solemn” and, in another five years, would probably “wither in her separation from the world.” At the same time he worried that the tenderness of Anna’s heart could contain the “seed of her future misfortunes.” But having indulged in such feelings Turgenev immediately doubted whether he was worthy of having them:

Здесь я обвиняю сам себя. Что если бы это увидел кто-нибудь, кто знает мою насмешливость, кто сам терпит, может быть, от моей холодности! Но что же делать. Я это чувствую и хочу питать в себе всякое такое чувство. [ . . . ] Я и так больше склонен к холодной насмешливости; надобно умножать, а не потушать в себе чувства доброты и задумчивости.

Here I find myself guilty. What if someone saw this who knows my inclination to mockery, who himself, perhaps, suffers from my coldness! But what is to be done[?] I feel this and want to nurture in myself these kinds of feelings [ . . . ] Even so I am more inclined to cold mockery; I need to multiply, and not to quell in myself the feelings of goodness and pensiveness.45

Not surprisingly, “the holy friendship” project never materialized. Relations between Turgenev and Ekaterina soon became quite dubious and risky. Turgenev most likely believed that his imminent departure for St. Petersburg would somehow solve the problem, but the results turned out to be exactly the opposite. Their separation allowed Ekaterina to abandon all her previous reserve. She engaged in a secret correspondence with Turgenev, and her letters grew more and more passionate, completely defying the conventions of behavior appropriate for a noble maiden. She also disclosed her feelings to her younger sister, who volunteered to sacrifice her own relations with Turgenev’s brother for the sake of her sister’s happiness.

Turgenev had to adapt his plans and his emotions to these new developments. Two weeks after his arrival in St. Petersburg, he started to copy Ekaterina’s letters into his diary, probably willing himself to experience some sort of empathy with the passion that dictated them. Earlier, he had planned to write his diary between the pages of Werther, so that he could compare his feelings with the experiences of the famous literary charac-

44. RO IRLI, f. 209, d. 276, l. 24. Emphasis added.
45. Ibid., ll. 10–10ob.
Emotional Coldness in Andrei Turgenev’s Diaries

Now he had a different object for comparison, and it proved to be highly unfavorable to him:

Перечитывая ее письма и мукусь своей холодностью! Сегодня пришла мне в голову мысль замечать здесь часы и минуты, когда я буду думать о своей нечувствительности, буду сожалеть о себе и почитать себя от этого искренне нечастным. Ах! Если бы почасто они приходили!

I am rereading her letters and suffer from my coldness! Today I had an idea of marking here the hours and minutes I spend thinking about my insensibility, and I pity myself and consider myself truly unhappy because of this. Ah! If these minutes would come more often!

He wrote this on 25 January 1802, and four days later, facing the horrifying necessity of making the fatal decision, he made the same comparison again:

Это величайшее пятно в моей жизни. Я не любил ее, не был влюблен, и говорил ей о нежности и с таким притворством. Она представлялась мне, забывая себя со всем жаром святой невинной, пламенной страсти! [ . . . ] Что будет тогда, когда я потеряю и чувство моей холодности, и чувство моей низости! Когда буду доволен собою? Может быть и это с летами будет.

This is the greatest stain on my life. I did not love her, was not in love, and spoke to her about tenderness and with such dissembling. She gave herself to me, forgetting herself with all the heat of holy, innocent, flaming passion. [ . . . ] What will happen when I lose even the sense of my coldness, the sense of my baseness? When will I be content with myself? Maybe this will also happen with time.

Turgenev found himself in a trap. To marry a girl whom he did not love was for him akin to admitting that he was not the passionate enthusiast he aspired to be. More than that, it would inadvertently ruin his brother’s relations with Anna. To betray Ekaterina’s sincere and ardent love, however, would qualify him as a cold-hearted cynical seducer, which he found even more unacceptable. By the end of January he had made up his mind. On 1 February he informed Zhukovskii that he had sent Ekaterina some sort of formal proposal. He added that his brother, who was of course disappointed, started to “believe more in the truth of her [Ekaterina’s] feelings” “after he had read her last letter.”

During his stay in St. Petersburg Turgenev sought solutions to his emotional and moral dilemmas in Rousseau. He reread La Nouvelle Eloise and Emile and decided that these books would serve as his “Code de morale in everything: in love, in virtue, in the duties of public and private life.” He was especially impressed by Emile’s characterization of the per-
son who cannot feel the pain of injured love: “une âme étroite, un cœur tiède ‘Are not those my features?’” Turgenev asked himself and answered, “Ah! I don’t know.”49 The tortured emotional relations that he had initiated with Ekaterina in order to convince himself that he really was a person endowed with “a flaming heart” backfired and served as the final proof of his coldness.

Actually La Nouvelle Eloise could offer Turgenev a flattering description of a marriage between a “cold” man and a “hot” woman—the family of Volmar and Julie. But these idealized relations could not serve as a pattern for Turgenev, as Julie’s husband never aspired to be an enthusiastic genius and never became an object of passionate love. In his search for a model for his traumatic situation Turgenev turned from the new Eloise to an old one.

New Abelard

Deliberating on his situation a month and a half after deciding to propose to Ekaterina, Turgenev remarked that the prospect of family life had become more attractive for him. This change was gratifying and frightening at the same time. Turgenev feared that the pleasures and obligations of family life would stifle his poetic vocation, which for him constituted the only goal and justification of his existence:

Будучи один, часто размышлял я, представляя себе семейственную жизнь [ . . . ] И все это мне мало-помалу больше начинало нравиться. Но еще не равнося с другими представлениями. Иногда я мог concevoir радости и счастье отца, сравнивая любовь к детям с любовью, которую я имею к маленьким братьям. Но все я с большей приятностью думаю о К.М. и радуюсь ее любовью. Только все думаю, что нельзя мне будет с такими живыми чувствами заниматься литературой и поэзией. [ . . . ]

К чему теперь главные стремления моего духа? Быть известным в литературе! [ . . . ] Кажется оно никогда не оставит меня, но тогда бы я умер духом.

Being alone, I often abandoned myself to reflections, contemplating family life. [ . . . ] All this started gradually to please me more and more. But it still does not equal other conceptions. Sometimes I could conceive of the joys and happiness of a father, comparing love for children with the love I have for my younger brothers. But it is more agreeable to think about K.M., to rejoice in her love. Still I keep thinking that with such lively feelings I will not be able to engage in literature and poetry. [ . . . ]

What are the main aspirations of my spirit? To make myself known through literature! [ . . . ] It seems this aspiration will never leave me, but if it did my soul would be dead.50

The idea that “lively feelings” were somehow incompatible with literary or poetic activity might seem counterintuitive, but Turgenev was afraid

50. Ibid., 119.
that the ability to enjoy the small pleasures of family life would jeopardize his ambition to become a literary genius. This perception was reflected in his new literary enterprise, his final attempt at emotional redemption.

After his initial conversation with Ekaterina in June 1801, Turgenev ended his lyrical outburst in his diary with a literary quotation. Usually Turgenev looked to Schiller or Goethe for models for his emotional experience, but this time he tried to interpret the Sokovnina sisters’ misery through the prism of Alexander Pope’s *Eloisa to Abelard*:

> Now warm in youth, now withering in my bloom
> Lost in a convent’s solitary gloom.  

The mistakes in the quote, as is generally the case, show that Turgenev was quoting from memory and knew these lines by heart. The image of the poor nun whose loving heart was fading in the gloom of the convent was first and foremost associated with Varvara, but at the same time the contrast between the flame of passion burning in Eloisa’s soul and the coldness of her castrated lover also reminded him of the rupture between Ekaterina’s sincere passion and his own inability to respond to it. At roughly the same time, Turgenev began translating Pope’s epistle and wrote in his notebook a prosaic rendering of the first ten lines and a verse translation of lines 257–262. It is worth noting that he started the translation with the fragment that was especially full of temperature metaphors:

> Приди мой Абельр! Чего тебе страшиться
> Для мертвых пламеник Венеры не горит
> Хлад венчный во груди твоей навеки обитает,
> Но Элоиза вся любовию сгарает,
> Подобно тем огням, которы освещают
> Унылые гроба, но их не согревают.

At that point Turgenev did not go much further in his translation, but the next year, in April 1802, he once more felt the urge to translate *Eloisa to Abelard* as he noted that Ekaterina wrote to him “опиат прешним звёздом как будто прошлогод [again with the same heat as if it were last year].” These thoughts about Ekaterina inevitably brought him to Pope’s poem. This translation became especially meaningful to him since in early May, following more than a year of labor, he finally completed his “Elegy” dedicated to Varvara. On 17 May, having received the information that he was to be dispatched to the Russian embassy in Vienna, Turgenev decided

51. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 276, ll. 23ob.–24, 41. As Pope wrote it, the first line reads: “Now warm in love, now withering in thy bloom.” Alexander Pope, *The Rape of the Lock, and Other Poems*, ed. Geoffrey Tillotson (New Haven, 1954), 322, ll. 37–38. At least one of Turgenev’s mistakes was not totally arbitrary, however, as the expression “warm in youth” can also be found in the text. Ibid., 329, l. 110.

to use his sojourn there to “occupy himself with Eloisa.” The translation he wanted to resume was for him a test of whether he indeed had a poetic soul and could achieve something meaningful in literature and therefore in life.

Turgenev began his Viennese diaries in early September, and over the next five months through the end of January, when he was suddenly sent back to St. Petersburg, he mentions his translation of Pope’s epistle thirty-six times. The first reference is on 10 (23) September: “I’ll dedicate my nights to Eloisa, the important time has arrived. Is something going to come of it? Don’t be despondent and remember that the second half will be easier than the first.”

In three days, as a warm-up exercise, Turgenev copied the opening lines of the poem again, together with the corresponding verses of its most famous translation in French by P.-C. Colardeau. A month later he again tried to inspire himself by copying exactly the same lines, this time accompanied by two German translations by I. Eschenburg and G. Bürger. He doubtless found the texts in the Viennese edition of 1799 where both were published together with the English original.

Because he could not make any progress in his work, Turgenev reworked the opening verses of the epistle again. On the next day he wrote:

Вот ровно месяц, как я начал переводить Элоизу и еще ничего не сделал. [ . . . ] Есть ли б я только не забывал, не пренебрегал того, что сам себе обещаю. Есть ли б я всякую минуту чувствовал всю важность этого перевода.

It has been exactly a month since I started translating Eloisa, but have not accomplished anything. [ . . . ] If only I would never forget, never neglect the promise I made to myself. If I could feel the importance of this translation every minute.

The more important this project became for Turgenev, the more desperate he became at his total lack of success. For several months he continued to record the number of hours he spent on the translation “without success” and how much time had passed since he had started his work. He also kept constructing for himself his ideal daily schedules where the translation of Pope’s Eloisa to Abelard figured prominently. The dismal results of this undertaking convinced him that his hopes for a literary career were doomed.

Сижу за Элоизой. Успехов нет. Но что еще прискорбнее, я боюсь, чтоб не простыла во мне ревность переводить ее. Мне кажется, что я и теперь чувствую какое-то прохладение; но очень может быть,
I am working on *Eloisa*. No success. But what is more sorrowful, I am afraid that the desire to translate it will freeze in me. It seems to me that I am now feeling a certain cooling, but maybe it only seems so [ . . . ] It still seems to me that I am indifferent, not only to *Eloisa*, but to any success in Literature in general. [ . . . ] How many joys, how many delights will I lose in the future on the day when my doubts would be resolved not in Literature’s favor. But maybe all these joys are destined to exist only in my imagination anyway.\[58\]

Turgenev made this entry in January 1803, two weeks before his departure from Vienna. He returned to Petersburg without having accomplished anything. Still when he found out that Zhukovskii intended to translate the same epistle he begged him not to proceed:

Брат, оставь мне Элоизу. Признаюсь тебе в своей слабости. Я ни к чему иному не готов. [ . . . ] Поговори мне об Элоизе, но я просил уже тебя, чтоб это между нами осталось.

My brother, leave *Eloisa* to me. I’ll confess my weakness to you. I am not ready for anything else. [ . . . ] Speak with me about *Eloisa*, but I have asked you already to keep it between the two of us.\[59\]

Turgenev wanted his plans to remain secret to everyone except Zhukovskii as this work was for him too intimate. Not only had he invested all his literary hopes and aspirations in this project; for him it was also deeply connected with his emotional life and relations with Ekaterina.

Pope’s heroine was a passionate woman writing to her former lover who had grown cold and was unable to respond to her feelings. Turgenev’s own identification with Abelard was implicit in the parallels between Ekaterina and Eloisa. “She adores and you can’t even love,” he wrote in his diary.\[60\] Although this line has no exact match in Pope’s text, it serves as a sort of imaginary reaction by Abelard to Eloisa’s letter and at the same time as a commentary on Turgenev’s own situation. Translating *Eloisa to Abelard* was one more exercise in empathy, like copying Ekaterina’s letters into his diary.

Following Rousseau and Schiller, Turgenev always considered poetry to be the direct reflection of an author’s soul. Pope’s epistle provided encouragement for this perception: it ends with Eloisa imagining “some future Bard” who would write about their “sad, tender story.” These lines directly connect the poet’s ability to write about love with the intensity of his personal emotional history:

58. Ibid., ll. 53ob.–54ob.
60. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 39ob.
Such, if there be, who loves so long so well;  
Let him our sad, our tender story tell;  
The well-sung woes will soothe my pensive ghost  
He best can paint ‘em who shall feel ‘em most.61

By the same token, the poet who would be able to find Russian words to express Eloisa’s passions would have to be capable of love and worthy of being loved. Turgenev sought to convince himself, the Sokovnin sisters, and the narrow circle of his close friends as well, that he could understand real passion and was thus also able to experience it.

The cluster of meanings that Turgenev associated with this translation project included some more important components. Eighteenth-century admirers of the story of Eloisa and Abelard were especially fascinated and struck by Eloisa’s initial rejection of Abelard’s proposal to marry her and her insistence that “the quality of mistress” was “a hundred times more pleasing” to her “than that of wife.” “Indeed a refusal of this nature is so extraordinary a thing that perhaps another instance of it is not to be found in history,” wrote John Hughes, the author of the standard life of Eloisa and Abelard that was published together with all English translations of their correspondence during the eighteenth century. (The text of Pope’s epistle was customarily also appended to the edition.)62 Hughes dedicated several pages of his preface to explaining Eloisa’s arguments. According to him, she did not want to “rob the world of so eminent a person,” being certain that “the study of divinity and philosophy” did not “comport with the cries of children, the songs of nurses and the rush of the family.” As Hughes summed it up, her reasons were “chiefly grounded upon her preference of love to marriage, of liberty to necessity.” 63 Pope’s Eloisa wrote to Abelard that: “Love, free as air; at sight of human ties, / Spreads his light wings and in a moment flies.” 64

The romance of Andrei Turgenev and Ekaterina Sokovnina, though they seem never to have gone as far as Abelard and Eloisa, also developed in an unconventional manner that transgressed the norms of accepted behavior. Expressing her passionate confessions in secret correspondence with a young man could irrevocably ruin the reputation of a noble young woman like Ekaterina.

It is impossible to say whether Turgenev truly hoped that his translation of Eloisa to Abelard would convince Ekaterina that she should reject his proposal; it is also unlikely that he was urging her to become his mistress instead. But in this literary venture it was possible for him to seek the proof that his unwillingness to marry a young woman, whose sincere love and ardent soul he did not doubt in the least, was dictated not by the mean-spiritedness of a seducer, but by much loftier aspirations. He also needed to validate his belief that his literary future would be threatened

61. Pope, Rape of the Lock, 348–49.  
62. Letters of Abelard and Heloise, To which is prefix’d a particular account of their lives, amours, and misfortunes. By the late John Hughes, Esq. To which is now first added, the poem of Eloisa to Abelard by Mr. Pope, 9th ed. (London, 1775), 16.  
63. Ibid., 18–20.  
by the “lively feelings” of family happiness that were totally incompatible with his exalted pursuits.

Turgenev had staked all his ambitions on this poetic enterprise and lost. He never managed to translate more than several lines of the epistle and gradually became convinced that he had failed this self-imposed test and was hopelessly torn from the source of real bliss available only to “heated” enthusiasts endowed with poetic sensibility. He intended to show himself and others that he could emote like Eloisa and ended by believing himself to be emotionally castrated like Abelard:

Пустота и холодность души, самолюбие, эгоизм, сжимающий сердце [. . . ] Творец! Зачем закрыты во мне сии источники слез; ты мог меня сделать способное к счастию, зачем же эта бесчувственность, эта тягостная холодность души?

Emptiness and coldness of the soul, vanity, egoism that grips my heart. O Creator, why are the sources of tears cut off in me; you could make me more capable of happiness; why then this insensibility, this burdensome coldness of the soul?65

All of the moral and existential dilemmas that the young Turgenev faced dramatically intensified after his return to Russia. Rumors about his secret correspondence with Ekaterina had begun to leak out and had reached his parents. Turgenev knew that it would be immensely difficult to convince them to consent to his marriage. The idea of explaining the details of the situation to them was even more terrifying for him because deep in his heart he felt that he was not at all inclined toward this union himself. At the same time he understood that his relations with Ekaterina had long ago passed the point of no return. His only desire now was to escape. On 19 May he wrote in his diary:

Новой план: через год ехать путешествовать с Кайсаровым и с Воейковым на два года. После я вздумал, что мало еще имею познаний, и нет Элоизы на русском, но кажется это не помешает. [. . . ] А Елоиза! О!

A new plan: to leave in a year for a two-year journey with Kaisarov and Voeikov. I’ve decided that I don’t yet have enough knowledge and there is still no Eloisa in Russian, but that seems not to be an impediment. [. . . ] And Eloisa! Oh! 66

The choice of exclamation rather than question marks in the two concluding sentences shows that Turgenev did not believe any longer in his ability to translate Pope or to produce anything worthy of the Sturm und Drang type genius he had once aspired to be. His future existence was losing all of its meaning and gratification. He dreamt of journeys to more and more exotic and remote destinations—the United States, China, Japan, or even further: “How invigorating and pleasant it can sometimes be to think about death,” he wrote in his diary on 10 June 1803, adding, es-

65. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 40ob. Emphasis in the original.
66. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 55.
pecially “at night.” He died a month later, on 8 July, from “sudden fever” at the age of 21. As Vladimir Toporov perceptively noted, “The real causes of his death cannot be considered completely known.” The existing evidence seems to exclude planned suicide, although the parallels between Turgenev’s untimely end and the last days of Werther, one of his favorite literary characters, may not be purely coincidental.

Turgenev dreamed of literally writing his diary between the pages of Die Leiden des Jungen Werthers. In a symbolic sense, he wrote his entire emotional life between the pages of the great works of eighteenth-century European literature. Having removed the diary from the institutional framework of Masonic self-disciplining, he inevitably brought it into the literary field. This transformation of the form of the diary into a purely intimate enterprise made it a powerful vehicle for self-examination and psychological analysis, releasing the artistic potential of the form that within several decades became the established literary genre used by Mikhail Lermontov, Nikolai Gogol, Fedor Dostoevskii, Lev Tolstoi, and many other major Russian writers.

For the entire nineteenth century, Turgenev’s diaries were totally unknown to the Russian reader, and they remain largely unknown even today. Thus his diaries could not have had any direct influence on the process of literary evolution. But the type of personality reflected on its pages and to some extent formed by the process of keeping the diary was brought into the cultural mainstream by the circle of his friends in Druzheskoe literaturnoe obshchestvo who became leading figures in the Russian literary world.

What is even more important, young Turgenev seems to be one of the first figures who perceived and embodied the major trend that resonated in Russian culture for decades to come. He passionately believed that literary, aesthetic, and philosophic ideals borrowed from western, especially German, authors should define his personal life in its most intimate manifestations and, primarily, in love, which he understood both as an earthly projection of the celestial fullness of being and as a litmus test of the inherent value of one’s personality. He paid for these beliefs with his happiness and his life, but for the generations of young Russian idealists and Romantic individualists to come, this price never seemed excessive.

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67. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 59ob.
71. On individual manifestations of this set of attitudes in Russian culture, see Veselovskii, V. A. Zhitkocheshi; Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Molodye gody Mikhaila Bakunina: Iz istorii russkogo romantizma (Moscow, 1915); John Randolph, The House in the Garden: The Bakunin Family and the Romance of Russian Idealism (Ithaca, 2007); Ginzburg, On Psychological Prose; and an entire joint issue of Russian Literature 61, nos. 1–2 (2007).
Fear: Soldiers and Emotion in Early Twentieth-Century Russian Military Psychology

Jan Plamper

The main feature of the Suvorov school of drill was the eradication from the heart and banishment from the human head, not just of the emotion of fear, but of the very idea of this feeling, which is so disgraceful for the soldier.

—[V. P.?] Prasalov, in Voennyi sbornik, 1911

Just as I cannot imagine a plesiosaurus on Nevskii Prospekt, I cannot imagine that anyone does not know what fear is and how it affects the organism.

—A. [M.] Dmitrevskii, editor of Voennyi sbornik, 1913

Looking for the emotion of soldierly fear in first-person accounts of the War of 1812 resembles the proverbial search for a needle in the haystack. One is more likely to discover overt absences, which sound like this comment made by officer Mikhail Petrov: “Yet the Russian soldiers looked at the huge enemy hordes with an unflinching spirit. With Faith, Hope, and Love, and with the Great Suvorov implanted in our hearts, our souls were prepared for sacrifices to save the Fatherland.” Only the following quote from Petrov offers a deeper glimpse into the soul of the soldier in Alexander I’s times: in the Battle of Borodino, Petrov’s men were ordered to destroy two bridges, which they did “under heavy enemy fire at close quarters; the enemy shot at us with eight cannons from the hills of the village and with guns from the outermost houses and fences. But I executed this order successfully thanks to my officers’ special striving for honor [chrez osobennoe sorevnovanie k chesti moikh ofitserov].”

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1. Mikhail Petrov, 1812 god: Vospominaniia voinov russkoj armii; iz sobrania Otdela Pis’mennykh Istochnikov Gosudarstvennogo Istoricheskogo Muzeia, eds. F. A. Petrov et al. (Moscow, 1991), 180. Thanks to Ingrid Schierle for pointing me to this source.
2. Ibid., 183. Sorevnovanie k chesti at this point indeed signified “striving for honor” rather than “ambition”.

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A hundred years later descriptions of fear were legion. Consider this Russian World War I memoir:

“What kind of fear is that supposed to be?” a bearded guy in rags interrupted Semenych. “You don’t croak from that kind of fear. In the trenches—that is where the real fear is! It creeps under your very skin. I once crawled out of my trench. Boom! Shells are exploding with terrible noise. Around me there is lots of groaning. I want to walk away, but can’t lift my leg; it’s as if someone grabbed my ankle. I can’t look left, can’t look right—I’m afraid. Fear of death has taken hold of me, has overwhelmed my heart, and no fear is more brutal than this kind of fear. It’s as though someone poured cold snow under your skin; your jaw starts chattering, and your blood stops flowing in your veins: it has frozen. I wanted to aim with my rifle, but it was so damn’ heavy, like a pud; I wanted to scream, but I could only rattle like an animal, I wanted to pull the trigger, but I couldn’t.”

Clearly, something changed between 1812 and 1914. Either soldiers at some point began to experience more fear, and in different ways, or the boundaries of what could be and actually was said about soldierly fear in personal documents profoundly shifted, or a new and real experience of fear came together with a discursive shift. One thing is certain: constituting fear as a legitimate object of scientific inquiry was crucial in this change. Here the disciplines of neuropathology, psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis, and pedagogy, which for purposes of simplicity I will collectively call “military psychology,” played a pivotal role. These fields formed in the late nineteenth century and underwent complex processes of cultural transfer, entanglement, and professionalization. Just how the practitioners of these fields wrote about fear is my main emphasis, but I will also ask why it became possible to speak of fear in the first place and provide short answers.

The chief sources for this article are publications (journal articles and books) by military psychiatrists and psychologists. Since the historical and cultural specificity of emotional expression becomes visible in sharper relief when compared with other cultures and over the longue durée, there

3. L. N. Voitolovskii, Po sledam voiny: Pokhodnye zapiski. 1914–1917 (Leningrad, 1925), 69. The opening of the discursive gates regarding soldierly fear was accompanied by professions made by soldiers, officers, and doctors that fear escaped all attempts at verbalization. Consider, for instance, this Russian soldier who suffered a surprise attack by an enemy soldier in World War I: “He attacked me from behind, and there are no words to describe my fear.” Sofja Fedortschenko, Der Russe redet: Aufzeichnungen nach dem Stenogramm, trans. Alexander Eliasberg (Munich, 1925), 19–20.


5. Medical case records are the major lacuna in the documentary record; they only become available for the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940 and are used in the publications of D. A. Zhuravlev, such as “Osnovnye etapy razvitiiia gosudarstvennogo voennogo zdravoookhraneniia Rossii,” Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal, no. 2 (2004): 4–12.
Fear: Soldiers and Emotion in RussianMilitaryPsychology

will be several side-glances at Germany, France, Britain, and the United States as well as a look back to the early nineteenth century. The chronological focus, however, is the first two decades of the twentieth century, when Russia fought two major wars (the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 and World War I, 1914–1918). In these years it became the first nation in history to deploy front-line military psychiatrists to treat the fear-induced symptoms of soldiers that would later come to figure as “military contusion” or “traumatic neurosis” (voennaia kontuziia, travmaticheskii neuroz) in Russia, “shell shock” in Britain, “war commotion” or “war emotion” (commotion de la guerre, émotion de la guerre) in France, and “war neurosis” (Kriegsneurose) in Germany and Austro-Hungary.6

How Soldiers Learned to Articulate Fear: Six Causes

What accounts for the striking fin-de-siècle expansion of fear in soldiers’ textual artifacts? I believe there are six explanations, which I will sketch briefly. Most important, since this expansion coincided with the modernization of warfare, it was connected with an increase in the real psychological stress that modern war produces. Modern war exposes soldiers to drastically longer periods of rifle and machine gun shooting, shelling, and air bombardment. It makes the source of the attack difficult to locate. Trench warfare, a major feature of World War I, immobilizes soldiers, thus incapacitating the reflex to flee from the source of danger; by contrast, a premodern open battlefield and one-on-one bayonet combat offered the—shame-free—option of forward attack as an outlet for fight-or-

flight reactions. And modern war is fought by national, mass-conscripted armies, whose soldiers serve for comparatively short periods of time, can hope for a return to civilian life, and lack much of the esprit de corps that united standing armies. All of these factors amount to a real and significant increase in psychological stress that had to spill over into the ways soldiers felt—and sometimes wrote—about what they endured.

Also connected with the onset of modernity was the emergence of an image of man as a creature who fashions his world and ultimately himself, of, in short, an autonomous self. The possibility of destruction of self—for example, by death in a war—then produces much greater anxiety than if the potential for death remained in the realm of transcendent forces that control man and his world; it is no longer the will of a god, just as a business success or horse-riding accident is no longer the will of a god, but a threat to the autonomy of selfhood, the very foundation upon which man rests in the modern world.

Another explanation, a Foucauldian explanation, points to the interiorization of feelings that was a hallmark of modernity. As soon as soldiers became autonomous subjects and ceased to think of themselves as caught in webs of dependence, intent on saving their honor in front of fellow human beings, feelings moved from the body surface to the body interior. Linked with this shift was the invention of “sciences” of the interior, psychology and psychiatry. The psychological sciences, in this explanation, not only furnished some of the language in which emotions could be expressed, but their own emergence legitimized, if not invented, the public communicability of soldierly fear.

It can further be argued that the Russian case differs from the western European case in that it imported the change in speaking about fear related to modernity. Russia, in other words, widened the limits of the say-

7. On the 1874 military reform and Russian mass conscription, see Werner Benecke, Militär, Reform und Gesellschaft im Zarenreich: Die Wehrpflicht in Russland 1874–1914 (Paderborn, 2006). One might also emphasize that in the creation of the national army, service in this army and death for the nation become endowed with different meaning. If in armies of paid mercenaries, fear forms part of an act of economic free will, much as a miner’s death is part of his autonomous economic decision and therefore silenced, the paid soldier does not talk about his economic decision. Only once this risk becomes not his own but part of a decision made by a larger body—the nation—can a discursive space be opened for talking about it.

8. This is inspired by Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (New York, 2004), 11–12. One might also point to the emergence of pacifism in the nineteenth century. As soon as a choice other than war became a thinkable way to solve conflicts, the hardships of warfare and its ever-loomming end, death—as well as the attendant fear—became options.

able, not because it entered modernity itself, but rather because it aped an entrance into modernity—a variant of mimicry. By producing texts about soldierly fear, Russia proved to itself and the outside world that it had arrived in modernity.

There was also the expansion of literacy and the new mass media, which produced not only more soldiers who could write about fear but also genres like crime novels and a scandal-hungry yellow press with unheard-of possibilities to evoke fear in readers.\(^{10}\) Static media such as broadsheets, paintings, and photography are less apt to evoke (as opposed to depicting) fear; moving media such as narrative text and especially film are ideal for the creation of suspense and fear. This explanation hinges on the very characteristics of a genre or medium. The argument goes like this: because new genres like crime novels that allowed for the production of fear in readers (whose numbers were increasing due to the spread of literacy) appeared, a new permissibility of fear took hold. This permissibility eventually affected medicine, which began turning fear into an object of inquiry, as well as soldiers’ first-person accounts.

Finally, and second in importance only to the onset of modern warfare, Russian belles lettres played a large part in widening the boundaries of what soldiers could publicly say about fear. Lev Tolstoi’s \textit{Sevastopol’skie rasskazy} (Sevastopol’ sketches, first published in 1855) are crucial here. In these stories, which build on Stendhal’s \textit{Chartreuse de Parme} (1839), Tolstoi provides three snapshots from different phases of the siege of Sevastopol until its fall in September 1855.\(^{11}\)

Twenty-seven-year-old Tolstoi experienced the siege of Sevastopol at a close distance as an observer. A veteran himself (he was almost killed by a shell in the Caucasian Wars), Tolstoi sets his readers on a long road to fear, the central emotion in these stories, suggesting that one of his aims was to elicit fear in his readers. He starts with a description of the whole gamut of sensory impressions that overwhelm the soldier, including the howling of bombs, the pinging of bullets, and the booming of bursting


\(^{11}\) On the connection between Stendhal and Tolstoi, see Gottfried Schwarz, \textit{Krieg und Roman: Untersuchungen zu Stendhal, Hugo, Tolstoj, Zola und Simon} (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), esp. 85. Also see Clarence A. Manning, “The Significance of Tolstoy’s War Stories,” \textit{PMLA} 52, no. 4 (December 1937): 1161–69 (I am grateful to Benjamin Schenk for directing me to this literature). Tolstoi’s \textit{Sevastopol’ Sketches} were widely received. To get an inkling of how shocking (because realistic) the description of soldiers’ emotions seemed to contemporaries, consider writer Aleksei Pisemskii’s letter to his friend, playwright Aleksandr Ostrovskii, about “Sevastopol’ in May”: “Horror takes hold of you, your hair stands on end just from imagining what is happening there. The story is written in such a relentlessly honest manner that reading it becomes almost unbearable. Definitely read it!” A. F. Pisemskii, “Pis’mo A. N. Ostrovskomu ot 26 iulia 1855 goda,” in \textit{A. F. Pisemskii: Materialy i issledovaniaia} (Moscow, 1956), 82.
shells. “Suddenly you realize, in an entirely new way, the true significance of those sounds of gunfire you heard from the town. [. . . ] You start thinking more about yourself and less about what you observe around you, and are suddenly gripped by an unpleasant sense of indecision. The sight of a soldier glissading downhill over the wet mud, waving his arms and laughing, silences this cowardly voice that has begun to speak within you at the prospect of danger, however, and you find yourself straightening your chest, lifting your head a little higher.”12 In what follows, Tolstoi creates a sense of mounting danger. Fear in Tolstoi arrives excruciatingly slowly; it is as though the narrative strategy of evoking fear overpowers his photographic realism, as though a war between two narrative strategies is taking place, with realism losing out to emotionally conditioning readers. The first utterance of the fear word terror is climactic (and mirrored by the narrator’s arrival at the apex of one of Sevastopol’s defensive hills): “You think you hear a cannonball land not far from you; all around you seem to hear the various sounds that bullets make—from the ones that hum like bees to the ones that whistle rapidly by or twang with a noise like a plucked string; you hear the terrible boom of an artillery discharge: it shakes you to the core and inspires you with a profound sense of dread. ‘So this is it, the 4th bastion, that dreadful, truly dreadful place,’ you think to yourself, experiencing a slight feeling of pride, and an anything-but-slight feeling of suppressed terror.”13

From now on Tolstoi maps that vast and multifarious terrain he calls “a whole world of feelings.”14 He describes the corporeal aspects of soldiers’ fear—the heart-pounding, sweating, breathing difficulties, pallor, and cold blood.15 He describes the phenomenon of thrill (Angstlust—as Michael Balint called it)—“a strange blend of fear and enjoyment.”16 He describes how both soldiers and officers feign bravery. He describes cowardice and the fear of appearing a coward to others. For Tolstoi there is only one hope: religion—its practices (prayer, icons) and its promise (life after death). At the very end of his second story, “Sevastopol in May,” Tolstoi legitimizes his realism in religious terms. “It might be supposed that when these men—Christians, recognizing the same great law of love—see what they have done, they will instantly fall to their knees in order to repent before Him who, when he gave them life, placed in the soul of each, together with the fear of death, a love of the good and the beautiful, and that they will embrace one another with tears of joy and happiness, like brothers. Not a bit of it! [. . . ] No, the hero of my story, whom I love with all my heart and soul, whom I have attempted to portray in his beauty and who has always been, is now and will always be supremely

15. Ibid., 231–32, 326.
magnificent, is truth.”17 With a love for truth, grounded in the Christian virtue of charity, Tolstoi proffered officers—and indirectly soldiers—a strong argument to break the silence of their fear. Thus an idiosyncratic realism with Christian-Tolstoian undertones contributed to a significant expansion of the boundaries of what could be said about soldierly fear in nineteenth-century Russia.

The Place of Fear in Russian Military Psychology I: Before the 1860s

In late nineteenth-century North America and Europe (including Russia), the medical fields of psychiatry, neuropathology/neurology, psychology, and psychoanalysis developed and differentiated rapidly. The military had a much greater part in this than histories of psychiatry usually acknowledge.18 The military looked to the psychological medical sciences to treat—in order to restore to fighting capability—soldiers who suffered from nervous disorders, and medical scientists looked to soldier-patients to observe, classify, and indeed create the symptoms, causes, and treatments of nervous ailments. At the center of it all was fear. How fear moved there only becomes clear by taking a closer look at the institutional, political, and ideational contours of the evolution of the psychomedical sciences.

Until the early 1920s Russia followed the western and central European pattern of development, some time lag and differences notwithstanding.19 As for institutions, insane people were largely left under the purview of their family, local communities, the church, and monasteries until the first insane asylums were established during Peter I’s reign. In 1832 an insane asylum opened at St. Petersburg’s Hospital of All Mourners under the direction of first I. F. Riu, and later F. I. Gertsov, who both have been termed the “grandfathers” of Russian psychiatry. In the 1830s psychiatry was included in the curriculum of regular medical students but remained a marginal subject. The state university statute of 1835 advanced psychiatry, but it was the Crimean War—and Russia’s 1856 defeat in it—that gave

18. This is probably due to the nonmilitary disciplinary backgrounds of most historians of psychiatry. There are exceptions to this downplaying of the military’s role. See Friedlander, “Psychiatrists and Crisis in Russia, 1880–1917”; Paul Wanke, Russian/Soviet Military Psychiatry, 1904–1945 (London, 2005); Richard A. Gabriel, Soviet Military Psychiatry: The Theory and Practice of Coping with Battle Stress (New York, 1986). These accounts also differ from the story of professionalization Julie Vail Brown tells in her pioneering “The Professionalization of Russian Psychiatry: 1857–1911” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1981).
the greatest boost to psychiatry. The military defeat not only spawned the Great Reforms and thus the educational professionalization of psychiatry, but it also—and this is often overlooked—made clear to military officials that in future wars the psychological sciences would play a crucial role in restoring soldiers to full fighting power, which would become ever more necessary given the elements of modern warfare foreshadowed in the Crimean War.

In the greater tree of medical knowledge and institutionally (university departments, hospitals, state licensing), a combined psychiatric-neurological branch began growing out of internal medicine from the 1850s onward. In the 1890s psychiatry and neurology began to separate, and later psychoanalysis grew out of psychiatry. By 1900 Russian psychiatry could be said to have “come of age.” It is impossible to disentangle the military and civilian sides of these developments. Suffice it to say that the “father” of Russian psychiatry, I. M. Balinskii, was a military physician by training; that St. Petersburg was the undisputed center of medical learning in large measure due to the presence of capital-city state institutions, first of all the War Ministry; and that the best-funded institution of medical education was the Military-Medical Academy in St. Petersburg (later Leningrad), which only ceded this position to civilian universities in the 1940s under Iosif Stalin. The Russo-Japanese War, the First Balkan War of 1912, and World War I gave a great boost to military psychiatry; the Russo-Japanese War, which produced an estimated 6,225 total Russian cases of “hysteria and nervous exhaustion” and is often considered the first modern war or World War Zero, was watched closely by the outside world because, as the American military psychiatrist Captain R. L. Richards observed in 1910, “for the first time in the history of the world mental diseases were separately cared for by specialists from the firing line back to the home country.” By the second decade of the twentieth century, Russia had become the leader in global military psychiatry.

20. These roots in internal medicine led to the curious fact that such medical journals as Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal continued to feature psychiatric articles under a rubric of “internal diseases” well into the twentieth century and long after psychiatry had become an established branch of medicine.

21. This is attested by its move out of the confines of purely medical and psychiatric “scientific” journals into the premier military journal, Voennyi sbornik, and by its influence on other branches of knowledge and the arts—literature, painting, and theater. On this, see Etkind, Eros nevozmozhnogo, and Sirotkina, Diagnosing Literary Genius.

22. For the number of shell-shocked soldiers, see Wanke, Russian/Soviet Military Psychiatry, 18. For the quote by the American military psychiatrist, see R. L. Richards, “Mental and Nervous Diseases in the Russo-Japanese War,” Military Surgeon 26 (1910): 177. The western reception of the Russian experience with mental illness in the Russo-Japanese War was based not only on the exchange of expert knowledge but also on the treatment of Russian officers in German psychiatric sanatoria. On this, see Hans-Georg Hofer, Nervenschwäche und Krieg: Modernitätskritik und Krisenbewältigung in der österreichischen Psychiatrie (1880–1920) (Vienna, 2004), 205. The Russo-Japanese War is often regarded as World War Zero but in fact many wars have been tagged the “first” modern war (most recently the Napoleonic wars), see David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (Boston, 2007). Thus the definition of what constitutes a modern war and, even if one agrees on the criteria, the designation of war, is exceedingly dif-
Russian psychiatrists themselves frequently turned to the past of their own discipline. Their histories and periodizations—religious care, Peter I, the establishment of the Medical-Surgical Academy in 1798, and the influence of western psychiatry—resembled each other greatly, but the locus of fear in these shifted markedly. In A. L. Shcheglov’s 1899 historical overview of Russian psychiatry, fear surfaced only twice, and one of these times, almost, but not quite, as a psychological cause for mental disorders. This emerges in his recounting of German psychiatrist Werner Nasse’s writing on the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and once in an account of German psychiatrist Rudolf Arndt’s work on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, where fear was clearly portrayed as pathogenic. A mere eight years later, M. O. Shaikevich squarely placed fear at the center of pathogenicity for mental disorders and eventually even elevated fear to a cipher for a multitude of pathogenic factors in wartime. The proliferation of fear, now both pathogen and symptom, was spawned and sped up by the Russo-Japanese War on the one hand and by the 1905 Revolution on the other. While the Russo-Japanese War had made it patently obvious that soldiers broke down with nervous disorders in modern war, and that fear was critical in this, the revolution of 1905 definitively opened the discursive floodgates: widespread talk of fear in society—fear of revolution and chaos—made it possible to talk of soldierly fear as well and to insert fear retroactively in the Russian psychiatric profession’s version of its own history. Psychiatrists were now able to write self-confidently that while “the leaders of the medical institutions could claim that there were no soldiers suffering from nervous disorders” in the Crimean and Russo-Turkish Wars, in truth “of course there were nervous disorders; [. . . ] it is only because the doctors at the time had an inadequate knowledge of nervous disease that these disorders were not recognized and filed under other diagnoses.”

23. According to Angela Brintlinger, “they also aggressively wrote their own history and, by the late nineteenth century, constructing those histories had become a primary source of their legitimacy.” Thus history or, rather, a lineage psychiatrists identified for themselves was meant to provide stability for a profession that still felt insecure about itself. See Angela Brintlinger, “Writing about Madness: Russian Attitudes toward Psyche and Psychiatry, 1887–1907,” in Brintlinger and Vinitsky, eds., Madness and the Mad in Russian Culture, 173.


Psychiatrists’ historicizing insider writings on the place of fear in psychiatry are one thing, but what does fear’s trajectory in the psychiatric sciences look like from the outside? An 1834 book, The Experience of the Military-Medical Police, or: Rules for the Healthcare of the Russian Soldiers of the Land Forces, explicitly mentioned fear only once; when discussing the advantages of the Russians, Ukrainians, and Cossacks over other ethnic groups of the empire, the book stresses the idea that these three particular peoples tend to be “brought up in fear of God.” True, the book encouraged officers to shape the will of their soldiers so that they can “overcome all needs, difficulties, and dangers in order to defeat the enemy, without kindling depressing passions in them or weakening their mental powers.” But on the whole the categories in which fear could be discussed or almost discussed were still in the realm of morality and religion rather than medicine and psychology, and the strong ethnic component in the description of soldiers deduced national character from climate and religion rather than genes or individual personality types. Insofar as diseases surface, these are epidemics caused by a lack of hygiene, and insofar as feelings surface, these are primarily religious and patriotic feelings caused by national character (“v strakh Bozhiem, liubvi i pokornosti k GOSUDARIU”). The emotionalization (“feelingization” would be a better term because feelings and passions had yet to turn into scientific “emotions”) of religion, the tsar cult, and patriotism had gotten under way, which, together with such existing physiological feeling categories in Russian as organy chuvstv (sensory organs) and obman chuvstv (hallucination), was crucial in preparing the linguistic ground for the later medicalization of soldierly fear. This language of emotions is also evident in A. Kislov’s Military Morality (1838), in which fear of God and love for tsar and fatherland are considered inborn qualities; heroism is depicted as a natural outgrowth of these qualities and hence independent of any kind of remuneration, material (money), symbolic (medals), or otherwise; officer and soldier are said to be bound by feelings of love and gratitude. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

27. Roman Chetyrkin, Opyt voenno-meditsinskoi politisii, ili pravila k sokhraneniyu zdorov’ia russkikh soldat v sukhopolznoi sluzhbe (St. Petersburg, 1834), 66. Politisia in the title signified early modern Polioey rather than the contemporary “police.” The very first mentioning of strakh was a case unrelated to our concerns, namely a description of a “negro [negri]” who lost consciousness in London when lying on the operating table for aneurysm and was found dead after the operation, literally as a result of “fear.” “Deistvie strakha,” Voenno-medititsinskii zhurnal 2 (1825): 285–86.


29. Ibid., 66. Emphasis in the original.


31. A. Kislov, Voennaia nazvestvost’ (St. Petersburg, 1838), 32, 79, 47. Consider also the rich lexicon of an ideal soldier’s emotional traits, presented on a mere two pages: nenavist’ towards the enemy, zapal’chivost’, smelost’, revnost’ k dolzhnosti, chuvstvo obiaznosti. Ibid., 72–73. The taxonomy of feelings, to be sure, is still confused and replete with non sequiturs: despite the religiosity and patriotism with which soldiers are supposedly universally equipped by birth, the decisive, superordinate feeling of “good nature” or “virtue” (velkhodushie) is variable according to soldier, which is why, when faced with danger, not all soldiers exhibit “fearlessness” (nevstrashimost’) and some fall prey to the worst of all
Despite introducing a language of feelings, then, these 1830s works still belong to a universe of honor and the duel, a universe in which the negation neustrashimost’ was sayable but strakh was not and in which Kutuzov showed tears not of fear but of grief, and only once, namely, when he was forced to condemn two of his soldiers to death.32 This did not change overnight. The Crimean War, Tolstoi’s Sevastopol’ Sketches, and the military reform during the Great Reforms, accelerated this continuum of change. Part of the military reform was intended to give soldiers better training and one result was a new doctrine and a manual of training. Here the work of General Mikhail Dragomirov deserves to be singled out.33

**General Dragomirov and the Doctrine of Controlled Berserkerdom**

Mikhail Dragomirov (1830–1905) quickly rose through the military ranks and was sent to western Europe in the late 1850s to study tactics and the training of recruits. After his return to Reform-era Russia, not only was he instrumental in revising basic military training, but he also served as a private tutor to several tsareviches. His active military duty included the suppression of the Polish 1863 uprising, his participation in the Second Prussian Army during the War of 1866, and especially his command over the Fourth Division in the victorious Russo-Turkish War. He was wounded in that war and henceforth directed the Military Academy in St. Petersburg, where he excelled as Russia’s most productive—and widely read, both at home and abroad—military theoretician.34

The fear problem was at the heart of Dragomirov’s influential military theoretical writings. Dragomirov started from an axiomatic assumption about human nature: “the willingness to suffer and to die, that is, self-sacrifice,” was universal.35 According to Dragomirov, the Russian variant of self-sacrifice was marked by the soldier’s special loyalty toward his fa-

32. See ibid., 92, 90, 98. On honor and the duel, see also Ute Frevert, Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel (Cambridge, Eng., 1995); Irina Reyfman, Ritualized Violence Russian Style: The Duel in Russian Culture and Literature (Stanford, 1999). The quote by Petrov from the War of 1812 cited at the beginning of this article is a typical expression of this culture of honor. On the pre-Petrine culture of honor, see Nancy Shields Kollmann, By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia (Ithaca, 1999).

33. Dragomirov came not from psychiatry but from military theory, and yet he belongs in this genealogy because military psychologists (not so much psychiatrists, but the borders between psychologists and psychiatrists were fluid anyway, as we have seen) learned and cited from him liberally.


therland, embodied in the tsar. The Russian soldier was characterized by "a feeling of duty toward tsar and fatherland, a feeling that goes as far as self-denial."\(^{36}\) Self-denial in Dragomirov's scheme constituted the antipode to self-preservation.\(^{37}\) The key to the victory of self-denial over self-preservation was drill, especially the training of obedience. The most effective antidote to fear, in other words, was practice and routine. It was only logical that maneuvers in peacetime ought to be as realistic—as fear-inducing—as possible.\(^{38}\)

A crucial part of the Dragomirov theory was the doctrine of controlled berserkerdom. Dragomirov believed the Russian army differed from western armies in its emphasis on morale instead of military technology, and the Russian soldier differed from the western soldier in his ability to unleash and reign in his aggressions without using modern fire weapons and in a manner that was fundamentally superior to that of the western soldier, who had become weak and decadent because of modern life.\(^{39}\) This doctrine is often expressed in the short formula “bayonets before bullets” (pulia dura—shytk molodets).\(^{40}\) At bottom, we have an attempt to resuscitate the premodern immediacy of face-to-face warfare. Paradoxically, Dragomirov's doctrine was based on an image of self that stemmed from the Enlightenment and modernity: only an autonomous, rational subject can, on command, start and stop himself from going berserk. Put differently, in order to conceive of the subject's planned retreat from reason, this subject first has to be endowed with reason.

The Dragomirov doctrine was turned into normative documents (for example, via the first new infantry regulation since 1831, the Ustav stroevoi pekhotnoi sluzhby, published in 1866) and Russian soldiers received their training on its basis until World War I. With this doctrine Russia developed an “emotional regime” that openly revolved around fear surpris-
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...ingly early—with the express goal, of course, of channeling, managing, and ultimately overcoming this fear. Thus, Tolstoi’s realist fiction and Dragomirov’s military theorizing were the first stages in a wider rhetoric of soldierly fear. They prepared the ground for early public talk about fear by high-ranking officers in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). General Mikhail Skobelev, for example, wrote, “There is no one who does not fear death; and if someone tells you that he does not fear death—spit in his eye; he is lying. I myself fear death no less than everyone else. But there are people who have enough willpower not to show this, while others cannot restrain themselves and flee out of fear of death. I have the willpower not to show that I am afraid; but the battle inside me is terrifying, and this has a constant effect on my heart.”

The Place of Fear in Russian Military Psychology II: After the 1860s

As for the psychomedical sciences proper, Russia first imported the idea that fear caused nervous disorders in soldiers from Germany in 1873, that is, in the immediate aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War. The next milestone was A. I. Ozeretskovskii’s 1891 dissertation “On Hysteria in the Army.” One of the first Russian commentators to factor fear into the equation, Ozeretskovskii denied that fear caused hysteria. The etiology of “male hysteria,” which he found occurred mostly in young soldiers, boiled down to a notion of psychological trauma stemming from causes understood in exclusively physiological terms—“dropping off the gymnastic lad-

41. “Emotional regime” is from William Reddy, who defines it as “the set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime.” William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge, Eng., 2001), 129. It is possible that other armies developed similar emotional regimes; the role of élan in the French army is worth studying from this perspective (I owe this point to Chad Bryant).

42. Quoted from N. N. Golovin, Issledovanie boia: Issledovanie deiatel’nosti i svoistv cheloveka kak boitsya (St. Petersburg, 1907), 52. Note also Skobelev’s pointing to his heart; on “soldier’s heart,” see Joel D. Howell, “‘Soldier’s Heart’: The Redefinition of Heart Disease and Specialty Formation in Early Twentieth-Century Great Britain,” in Rober Cooter, Mark Harrison, and Steve Sturdy, eds., War, Medicine and Modernity (Stroud, Eng., 1998), 85–105. Another general, Petr Parensov, confessed after the Russo-Turkish War: “It was only then that I noticed Turks, only Turks, who were closing in on me from all sides; there were none of our own soldiers in the redoubt. I was all alone. I admit, terror took hold of me [Priznaius, uzhas okhvatil menia].” P. D. Parensov, Iz proshlogo: Vospominaniia ofitsera General’nogo Shtaba (St. Petersburg, 1901–1908), 2:135, quoted in Golovin, Issledovanie boia, 141.


44. For the avtoreferat, see A. Ozeretskovskii, “Ob isterii u voiskakh,” Voenno-meditsuinskii zhurnal 69, no. 11 (1891): 371. Ozeretskovskii was later often presented as the Russian discoverer of male hysteria. See, for example, Pospelov, “K voprosu ob isterii u soldat,” Voenno-meditsuinskii zhurnal 76, no. 8 (1898): 1138.
der or trapeze, infelicitous jumps, and similar downfalls or injuries” as well as light and sound impressions, in one case “caused by continuous work in an electric light factory, where the factory light itself was electrical.”

Ozeretskovskii’s uncoupling of fear from mental disease dominated the discussion for about a decade until this uncoupling gave way to an understanding of fear as the primary cause of mental illness, an understanding that, as we have seen, was around before the Russo-Japanese War but became more common and more highly charged because it was intertwined with the massive social crisis of the 1905 Revolution. This shift was not a sudden but a gradual move that included such spurts as a physical trauma-cum-“fright” (ispug) pathogen that saw fear as a symptom of illness (“after fright from some loud thunder”); and a patient’s identification of fear as a cause of his illness while the doctor denied this causal link.

As for the image of human nature that lay at the bottom of first Ozeretskovskii’s, then others’ etiology, there were, in essence, two options: either fear was a component of human nature, or fear was unnatural. This binary opposition received a highly influential label in 1911, when Voenyi sbornik published an article that identified two “doctrines” regarding the fear of soldiers—a “romantic doctrine” and a “realistic doctrine.” As the author M. V. Enval’d explicated it, the romantic doctrine saw fear as an aberration from the norm of brave, fearless soldiers, while the realistic doctrine assumed that all soldiers experience fear before, during, and often after battle. This binary of a romantic versus a realistic doctrine provided a language for an existing opposition and, after it began to circulate in the military-scientific community, was cited again and again. Thus fear in military psychiatry was a discursive field demarcated by two poles—on the one hand an image of soldiers who were constitutionally fearless (the “romantic doctrine”); on the other hand an image of soldiers who were constitutionally fearful (the “realistic doctrine”). Over time the latter came to dominate, though this was not a linear development and one that requires qualification depending on the group one is speaking about (generals, officers, soldiers, or military psychiatrists). Unsurprisingly, military psychiatrists always tended toward this latter pole; after all, they owed their jobs—treating soldiers for fear-induced disorders—to the existence of soldierly fear.

There were other reasons why Russian military psychiatrists were likely to believe that their patients’ symptoms resulted, not from personality (the “cowardly” type), innate mental disorders merely triggered by an eerie moment in war, or mental-cum-moral retardation (the female-coded “prissy” or biological “degenerate”), but from war-related events too trau-

46. See Ia. P. Gorshkov, “K kazuistike psikhov sifiliticheskogo proiskhozhdeniia,” Voenna-meditsinski zhurnal 76, no. 8 (1898): 1168; E. Erikson, “Dva sluchaia tiazheloi isterii na pochve samovnusheniia,” Voenna-meditsinski zhurnal 80, no. 11 (1902): 4185 (“Incidentally, the patient himself traces his [fits], not to his head injury or wounds, but to strong fright [ne ushibu golovy i raneniiam, a sil’nomu ispugu]”).
matic to be managed by the coping mechanisms soldiers had at their disposal. Russian military psychiatrists by and large belonged to the liberal intelligentsia and the chasm that separated them from the autocracy was wider than that between military psychiatrists and the state in western Europe. Consequently their empathetic hearts and social consciences sided with the common soldier. Of consequence too is the fact that Russia never produced the kind of veteran pension debate that took place in Germany, where breakdown in battle was aggressively essentialized and depicted as the phenotypical expression of a preexisting genetic disposition—in order to absolve the state from having to pay the follow-up costs, namely veteran pensions, as Paul Lerner has convincingly argued.

The dominant realistic approach to fear provided plenty of room for definition, differentiation, and discussion. Scientists customarily began with a description of the symptoms and then moved to the definitions of different kinds of fear (for this they used the Russian terms strakh, ispug, trepet, boiazn', trevoga, panika, and others). In an article for the general reading public, the head of the psychiatric ward at the military hospital in Harbin during the Russo-Japanese War and the preeminent military psychiatrist during the first two decades of the twentieth century, Grigorii Shumkov, summarized the panorama of feelings a soldier experienced: “Soldiers go through a lot; they fear, they get angry, they rejoice, sometimes they despair, they hope, they believe in victory, are disappointed and start to believe again. Life in a war is a striking kaleidoscope of different feelings, feelings that people experience in time of peace as well, but that get expressed more clearly and vividly in war.” From this followed a distinct set of tasks for the military psychiatrist, which Shumkov also summarized: “Followers of the second, realistic school attempt to study man, the psychophysical nature of the soldier, they try to penetrate into the realm of psychological phenomena; they try to explore the laws of soldiers’ psyches in armed conflicts, and having analyzed these laws, they explain to future soldiers the nature of these phenomena and recommend means of fighting these undesirable phenomena.” Eager to elevate nervous disorders to the status that respectable, bacteriological diseases enjoyed and to indicate that nervous disorders could be studied in a comparable rational manner, Shumkov drew parallels between the fear of soldiers and cholera: “In order to fight cholera it is essential to study cholera. In order to fight fear of death in war, the followers of the second, realistic school study the manifestations of this fear; in order

48. Infamously, in Germany the minority opinion of psychiatrist Max Nonne and others that the war merely acted as a catalyst for preexisting psychological disorders and the state was thus freed from its monetary obligation to shell-shocked soldiers was elevated to majority status at the September 1916 military psychiatry congress in Munich, whereas the majority opinion of Hermann Oppenheim that the war itself was the cause of mental disease and hence the state responsible for pension claims was relegated to a marginal position. On this, see Lerner, Hysterical Men. It is also important to note that Russia never had the same kind of prolonged debates about compensation for industrial injuries that sowed the ground for German doctors’ attitudes during World War I.

49. See, e.g., Sh—[most likely Grigorii Shumkov], “‘Za’ i ‘protiv’ voennoi psikhologii,” Voennyi sbornik 55, no. 8 (1912): 72.
to avoid panic, they strive to analyze its nature, genesis, manifestation, dissemination, etc." Shumkov’s final conclusion was that “the science of military psychology is indispensable.”

As time went by, psychiatrists’ descriptions of the symptoms of fear grew more complex and multifaceted. Grigori Shumkov’s study of the “mental state of soldiers” before, during, and after combat is unsurpassed in this regard. Drawing upon his own practice and a wealth of other sources, Shumkov construed an ideal-typical soldier and followed his psychological state through a battle. At least one of his thick descriptions deserves closer scrutiny; the pre-combat stage is particularly apt, since if we are to believe Shumkov, it exceeds combat and post-combat on the anxiety scale. The “psycho-physiological” picture of the soldier before combat starts with preparations for battle and the background noise of artillery; everybody is waiting for the order to go. “The soldiers all start digging in their notebooks, purses, and bags, they pull out the letters and read them. Most of them get burned after having been quickly reread. They hand each other notes and verbal requests: ‘If I die, send this home and let them know that I thought of them’ . . . Many religious soldiers take their sacred icons out, cross themselves zealously, kiss the icons, and hang them on their chest.” After the “last” tasks of existential significance have been completed, soldiers turn to fixing their uniforms, their equipment, and especially their weapon. Because soldiers are so nervous, “boots and belt hurt more noticeably than in peacetime.” Throughout it is impossible

50. Ibid., 76. In line with the liberalism of the military psychiatric establishment, Shumkov at times seemed to believe in straightforward enlightenment: If doctors only properly explained to soldiers that their physiological signs of fear before combat were normal, soldiers would not consider themselves sick and would continue fighting. “Sometimes before a battle, during the waiting period when the fighting has yet to start, about 6–8 percent are incapacitated, because they seriously believe they are sick. These are honest people, not shirkers, who are convinced that they have fallen ill (heart, breathing, involuntary defecation). But their illness is the product of ignorance about the psycho-physiological processes in their agitated organisms [pri volneniakh],” Ibid., 81. Shumkov’s liberalism might also stem from his peasant background. See G. E. Shumkov, Vospriyedenie dvigatele’nykh razdrazhennykh aktivnykh razdrazhenii aktivnogo kharaktera v zavisimosti ot istekshego vremeni. (Eksperimental’no-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie po metodu ob’ektivnoi psikhologii). Dissertatsiya na stepen’ doktora meditsiny. Iz psikhologicheskoi laboratorii Akademika V. M. Bekhtereva (St. Petersburg, 1909), 163. I am grateful to Kim Friedlander for this source.

51. Sh—, “‘Za’ i ‘protiv’ voennoi psikhologii,” 80. A. Dmitrevskii basically concurred with Shumkov’s views but begged to differ in one aspect: yes, all soldiers experience fear and it is important that they know it; however, not its expression but its suppression must be encouraged, because if expressed, fear becomes like a virus and infects all other soldiers—Dmitrevskii demanded “that nobody express his fear, because this is awfully infectious.” A. Dmitrevskii, “‘Za’ i ‘protiv’ psikhologii g-na Sh-a,” Voennyi sbornik 55, no. 11 (1912): 96.

52. Consider, for instance, the elaborate catalogue of soldiers’ emotions in Sh—, “Emotii strakha, pechali, radosti i gneva v period ozhidaniia boia,” Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 2 (1914): 109–18.


54. Ibid.
to concentrate on a single thought, “Thoughts are cascading as rapidly as the pictures in a movie.” The atmosphere is characterized by general silence and tense nervousness. “Many run off to relieve themselves, and this several times.” Everyone tries to quench their thirst and fill their water bottles. “The rifle gets examined many times [. . .] The bag for bullets is also there, and hands go into it more often than necessary.”

Finally the unit starts moving and part of the tension disappears. The increasing proximity of artillery fire makes all soldiers feel “that they are about to die. ‘But death is better than waiting for death.’ Everybody pushes forward and hopes to reach the destination and some kind of end, any kind of end.” A few hundred steps in front of the firing zone the order comes to stop and wait. “It is precisely this situation—’stop and wait’ for combat—that is the most unbearable of all in war.” “Not only did I pace back and forth from all the anxiety,” recounted one officer, “I think I rather ran and leaped . . . I couldn’t sit still in any place . . . In my soul . . . my heart aches so bad, hurt so much, as never before . . . You start talking and jump to the next topic, without finishing the previous sentence . . . When you ask a comrade about something, you don’t hear his answer, and at the same moment it is as though you are intoxicated by your own thoughts. As soon as he stops talking, you wake up and ask: ‘what? What did you just say?’” During this worst waiting period the receptiveness for rumors, half-truths, and lies grows strongest. A propaganda newspaper item can become the truth. “Suggestibility more than anything else is responsible for upswings and downswings in the mood of the troops.”

If there is bad news, everyone falls silent, the mood deteriorates, and soldiers go into battle in a depressed state. Good news has the contrary effect, Shumkov concluded.

The symptoms that doctors observed in the Russo-Japanese War were one source of information. Another method of gathering data was to interview soldiers after their return from the war. In 1909–1910 at the behest of the military psychology section of the Society of the Devotees to Military Science (Obshchestvo revnitelei voennykh znaniy) K. Druzhinin distributed a questionnaire to veterans, which included such questions as “How did you feel (sad, happy, angry, did you experience fear, were you terrified [ispityval li strakh, bylo li zhukto])?” and “Were you aware of danger, to what extent and when exactly?” (see figure 1). The rubric “How did you feel physically” asked about body temperature, perspiration, heartbeat, breathing, appetite, sleep, urination, and defecation. Another rubric, “What did you notice in others at the same time,” inquired about the kinds of things fellow soldiers were talking about and in what tone of voice, about “the expression on and color of the faces of those

55. Ibid., 90.
56. Ibid., 100.
57. Ibid., 101.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 102.
II. Что чувствовали самъ и переживалъ по сравнению съ спокойнымъ состояніемъ.

1) Какъ текли мысли, скоро или медленно и какія именно (одна навязчивая или нѣсколько быстро смѣняющихся, никакихъ мыслей, касались ли данной обстановки или нѣть и т. д.).

2) Какое было настроение (приподнятее, безъ-различное, подавленное и т. д.).

3) Какъ себя чувствовалъ (грустно, весело, злобно, испытывалъ ли страхъ, было ли жутко).

4) Что дѣлалъ (сидѣлъ, стоялъ, ходилъ, лежалъ) и почему: безъозначительно или сознательно. Влияние примѣра другихъ. Влияние получаемыхъ извѣстій или слуховъ.

5) Не было ли невольныхъ движений, схватыванія за голову, за сердце, за шею, за животъ, за ноги и т. п.

6) Сознавалась ли опасность, въ какой мѣрѣ и когда именно.

Figure 1. K. M. Druzhinin, Issledovanie dushevnoho sostoiniia voinov v raznykh sluchaiakh boevoi obstanovki po opytu russko-iaponskoi voiny 1904–05 gg. (St. Petersburg, 1910), 4–5.

surrounding you (calm, agitated, sad, pale, cyanotic-pale, etc.),” and “did you notice any awkwardness or trembling hands (when lighting matches, rolling cigarettes, loading the rifle, etc.)[?].”

Druzhinin summarized the results of this questionnaire and interspersed accounts of his own experience as a reconnaissance officer in the Russo-Japanese War. Immediately before the beginning of a battle, and especially “when cannon and, most important, rifle shots can be heard, the anxiety [. . .] and fear of the unknown, the consciousness of a possible close death or injury, becomes maddeningly palpable in soldiers who are not being shot at.” There was, to be sure, a learning curve or at least some kind of adaptation, which meant that “before the first battle, the mood was more nervous; before further battles, calmer.” The soldiers’ ability to overcome their fear rested largely on the prospect of victory. As long as victory was on the horizon, soldiers were able to endure incredible hardship; logically, therefore, a principal task of the successful officer.

63. Ibid., 14.
64. Ibid., 60.
was to make soldiers believe that victory was certain, even if things were hopeless. A command to retreat is always dangerous, since retreat runs the risk of dissolving into chaos and panic. During the Russo-Japanese war, Mukden was emblematic of everything gone awry: “To delay the main battle, as was the case in Mukden, and then to admit a loss and to order the soldiers to turn their backs on the enemy is too dangerous, in fact, it is totally impossible.”

Druzhinin’s own experience already pointed in the direction of distinguishing between different kinds of fear. Here is how he differentiated between two types of fear that he himself felt before his first-ever battle:

In late March 1904 around noon I was lying on my bed in the dark. A dragoon who had been sent from the sea coast appeared at the door and reported: “Your Honor, the Japanese have started to disembark!” I didn’t have to worry about hiding my excitement [volnenie], because, though I was able to see the dragoon standing in the light of the room next door, the dragoon could not see me. This message from the dragoon—never mind that it turned out to be a false alarm—had special meaning to me: for the first time in my army life I heard that I was about to engage in combat. I remember clearly that I didn’t get scared, but I did experience a highly uneasy feeling [trevozhnoe chuvstvo], perhaps palpitation.

The term trevozhnoe chuvstvo would resurface three years later, when a number of specialists, above all Shumkov, A. S. Rezanov, and Antonii Dmitrevskii, the influential editor of Voennyi sbornik and an amateur military psychologist himself, plunged into a long discussion about the types of fear. This discussion with its obvious philosophical overtones (Søren Kierkegaard!) revolved around Shumkov’s thesis that “anxiety” (trevoga) was not goal-oriented—it was impossible to be anxious of some object—and ought to be separated from “fear” (strakh), which always had an object.

A related set of issues that occupied military scientists concerned

65. Ibid., 29.
66. Ibid., 17.
67. In 1910 Vladimir Polianskii announced in a footnote that his colleague, Shumkov, was working on a taxonomy of fear: “The doctor and psychiatrist G. E. Shumkov in one of the meetings of the ‘military psychology’ section of the Obshchestvo revinitelei voennykh znaniit aired an approximate classification of the term of the emotion of fear according to its manifestation in the human organism.” Polianskii, “Moral’nyi element v oblasti fortifikatsii,” Voennyi sbornik 53, no. 11 (1910): note on 136. Emphasis in the original.
questions of heroism, valor (*khrabrost*), cowardice, and medals. While some argued that constitutionally fearless soldiers were abnormal and potential sociopaths, unsuited to and even dangerous in civilian life, others, such as Shumkov, actively tried to reinterpret the meaning of heroism and to forge an image of a soldier who was fearful and heroic at the same time. After reviewing “heroes of bravery [*khrabrosti*],” “heroes of audacity [*smelosti*],” “heroes of decisiveness,” and “heroes of cold-bloodedness,” Shumkov introduced a quiet, “unnoticeable” hero, a “hero of patience,” as the title of his article announced (based, most certainly, on a medical history from his Harbin psychiatric ward in the Russo-Japanese War). Veteran Iushchenko recounted: “I am thirty years old and a peasant [. . . ] and married, I have children [. . . ] I was always healthy and went to this war with pleasure. I didn’t know cowardice and was never afraid, as sometimes happens with others. I knew no fear, not when getting shot at, not when fighting with a bayonet. What was there to fear! If they kill me, I will die for the tsar and the faith; perhaps God will forgive my sins; and if I stay alive, thank God!”

Iushchenko was then caught by the Japanese, which he described as a great dishonor. After several attempts, he managed to escape. He wandered through the heat for eighteen to twenty days and probably only survived because he drank his own urine. Eventually he was rescued by a Cossack reconnaissance troop who described this event as follows: “Suddenly we see a stark-naked man running down from a hilltop toward us and screaming something incomprehensible. He stumbled, fell down, and couldn’t get up again. Emaciated, covered with scratches, with bulging eyes, he lay there mumbling something. Our little Russian soldier has gone mad, we thought [. . . ] He was constantly talking nonsense about the Japanese: ‘The Japanese . . . ,’ ‘the Japanese are whistling . . . .’” Thanks to the Cossacks who picked him up in this state, Iushchenko came to Shumkov in Harbin. Shumkov summarized his diagnosis and treatment as follows: “On 14 August 1904 Iushchenko was declared nervously feeble [nervno-slabyym] and emaciated and sent home for recuperation.” Shumkov concluded this article, a collage of his own, medical-diagnostic voice, his liberal-political voice, the Cossacks’ voice, and Iushchenko’s voice (extracted from his medical history): “He, yes he, Private Iushchenko, is a true hero!”

What about the etiology of a collective version of soldier trauma that went beyond individual bodies and psyches? Softline liberal doctors were fond of locating the larger cause of the epidemic of Russian shell shock in the sociopolitical sphere. They reasoned that the Russo-Japanese War was

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69. Indeed, the discussion about true heroism often centered on the distribution of medals like the Order of St. George. See, for example, A. Dmitrevskii, “Mozhno igrat’ na slabykh strunakh, no ne vospityvat’ v nich,” *Voennyi sbornik* 57, no. 4 (1914): 117–18.

70. As one author put it, there is such a thing as innate bravery, but “natural bravery is seldom sensible bravery.” B. Nikulishchev, “Moraľ’nyi element v oblasti voennogo iskusstva (Opyt psikhologicheskogo issledovanii),” *Voennyi sbornik* 55, no. 1 (1912): 14.

unpopular, hence the breakdowns of soldiers. According to these softlin-
ers, a comparison between the Russo-Turkish War and the Russo-Japanese
War clearly showed the difference: if the narod was motivated by the
“touching idea” of the Russo-Turkish War to “stand up for their slain Slavic
brothers,” the “baselessness” of the Russo-Japanese War turned “society”
against this war, or at least led to “indifference, which had an extremely
detrimental impact on the morale of the troops.”

But this was just a minor strand in the psychiatric community’s discus-
sion about the larger causes of the breakdowns. Like their western col-
leagues, Russian psychiatrists were most likely to attribute this increase to
the development of modern warfare and technology.

One doctor argued that, although technology had made huge strides,
“man’s soul, his inner ‘I,’ remains unchanged.” With the old training,
soldiers “could be victorious at the beginning, perhaps the middle of the
bygone [nineteenth] century, relying on the Suvorov bayonet and a feel-
ing of unconditional self-sacrifice, which is characteristic of the Russian
soldier, but nowadays it would be too hard for them to bear the demoral-
izing impact of modern warfare with its new, destructive factors.”

The modern soldier was almost as atomized and lonely in the battlefield
as modern man in the city: “the battlefield is empty, you can see neither
your own soldiers nor the enemy, you don’t feel any support” and, to make
things worse, neither auditory nor visual diversion is available (“the ban-
ners don’t fly, the music doesn’t play”).

This is not to say that the so-called romantic, hardline doctrine ever
completely disappeared. In fact, this doctrine’s denial of the existence
of soldierly fear led to a greater silence on this subject, as did something
else, namely the argument that an open discussion of soldierly fear in the
mass media would prove infectious and produce more fearful soldiers.
Both factors skew our view of fear’s place within military psychiatry, factors
that are amplified by our own liberal bias, which makes us more likely to
side with the liberal psychiatrists. There were, in short, plenty of observ-
ers who plainly denied the idea that all soldiers experienced fear. The
hardliners argued that the best antidote to fear was fear—of punishment
and shame, and more concretely, of reintroduced military colonies and
corporeal punishment.

73. Ibid., 86. By “soul” he had in mind a transcendental, religiously infused entity.
74. Druzhinin, Issledovanie dushevnogo sostojaniia voinov, 42.
76. Ben Shephard has astutely observed about novelist Pat Barker’s Regeneration
trilogy (and the study that served as its inspiration, Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady:
Women, Madness, and English Culture, 1830–1980 [New York, 1986], chap. 7) that we tend to
overestimate the importance of humane psychiatrists, such as Rivers, the hero of Barker’s
novels. See Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century
77. See, e.g., Prasalov, “Neskol’ko slov k stat’i V. Polianskogo,” 85–95; continued in
Voennyi sbornik 54, no. 7 (1911): 87–104.
78. This is not to say that the suggested hardline solutions lacked procedural, legal
regularity. Much of the discussion focused on forensic medicine, especially the definition
The liberals in turn were quick to point out that army training in its then-current state, with its reliance on drill and the drill masters (*diad*ki), contained enough brutality and fear, which only worsened preexisting mental conditions; as N. Butovskii put it in 1888: “Strictness and coarseness are synonyms for such a commander . . . He experiences his greatest pleasure when the new recruit stands in front of him at attention and shakes under his terrifying stare. He thinks of military service as something that is based on the fear that the officer exerts over his subordinate.”79 As the liberal Shumkov demanded, “Means of frightening and intimidation should be eliminated from military pedagogy.”80 Dmitrevskii concurred in an article that bore the programmatic title “The Education of the Soldier Can Only Rest on Shame of Punishment, Never on Fear of Punishment”: “Just as I cannot imagine a plesiosaurus on Nevskii Prospekt, neither can I imagine that anyone does not know what fear is and how it affects the organism. But I guess I have to reiterate. Fear is the expectation of evil, misfortune, trouble, pain, and so forth.”81 In the late 1890s the theories of French crowd theorist Gustave Le Bon began to infiltrate the arguments of both hardliners and softliners. Army units at all levels were thought to act like Le Bon's hyperemotional, “hysterical,” feminized crowds and show a high susceptibility to external stimuli. Only a male officer could shape them and direct their functioning.82 From here it was a small step to the outright pathologizing of the act of desertion, panic, and the lack of military discipline and the likening of rumors to contagious viruses.83 And while Russian specialists continued to of recruits as unfit for military service due to mental feebleness according to paragraph 24, lit. A of the statute military psychiatrists operated with. In a similar vein, imperial Russian officials often ascribed suicides of serfs to fear of (corporeal) punishment by their landlords. See Susan K. Morrissey, *Suicide and the Body Politic in Imperial Russia* (Cambridge, Eng., 2006), chaps. 3–5, esp. 126–27. 79. N. Butovskii, *O sposobakh obucheniia i vospitaniia sovremennogo soldata*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1888), quoted in Shumkov, “Chto delat’ s porochnym elementom v armii?” *Voennyi sbornik* 54, no. 11 (1911): 112. This was not yet *dedovshchina*, which emerged later. 80. Shumkov, “Chto delat’ s porochnym elementom v armii?” 116. 81. Dmitrevskii, “Vospitanie voina mozhet byt’ tolko v styde nakazaniia, a ne v strake nakazaniia,” 100. Emphasis in the original. Also see Dmitrevskii, “Mozhno igrat’ na slabykh strunakh,” 116. 82. In one author’s words, “In periods of imminent combat people turn into machines and, if properly guided, are capable of showing such elemental force, such examples of total self-sacrifice and great heroism, that no obstacles can stop them on their path. In these minutes the quality of leaders becomes ever more important, for unconscious activism, automatism, also has a negative side: under the influence of some negative factor the elemental pushing forward can reverse its direction and turn into running back that is just as hard to stop. Yet the example of the leader, the brave leader, spreads as quickly as a psychological infection (suggestibility is heightened) and can again provoke a forward rush.” Polianskii, “Moral’nyi element v oblasti fortifikatsii,” 101–2. Such books as Rezanov’s *Armiia i tolpa* and N. A. Uchach-Ogorovich’s *Psikhologia tolpy i armii* (Kiev, 1911) are indicative of the new importance of crowd theory. Also see Daniel Beer, “‘Microbes of the Mind’: Moral Contagion in Late Imperial Russia,” *Journal of Modern History* 79, no. 3 (September 2007): 531–71; Beer, *Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 1880–1930* (Ithaca, 2008). 83. On rumors as viruses in the battle of Mukden, see Zaglukhinskii, “Psikhika boitsov vo vremia srazheniia,” 98.
be less likely than their French or German colleagues to make a connection between lower-class background and pathological heredity, liberals such as Dmitrevskii still thought that smarter, better-educated soldiers were less prone to fear. “Indeed,” he claimed, “the higher the intellectual level, the fewer superstition-based fears, the fewer fears you will generally find. [. . .] The intellect only [. . .] tolerates fear in certain situations, and a fear that has been tailored to these situations, that is, rational fear: caution and circumspection.”

This exploration of fear in Russian military psychological thought leaves us on the verge of the cataclysm that is often regarded as the proper beginning of the twentieth century. As World War I drew closer, many Russians—and not just Russians—felt that they lived in “an era of nerves, nervousness, neurasthenia, that is, of mental imbalance.” The centrality of soldierly fear in the psychological military sciences was both a symptom and a product of this era. A century earlier there was hardly any military psychology, but there was also hardly any mentioning of soldierly fear in first-person sources. The beginnings of modern warfare in the Crimean War and the introduction of a modern, mass-conscripted army in its aftermath; the channeling through fiction in general and Tolstoi in particular, a variant of the well-known “art imitates life imitates art” pattern; the invention of the autonomous self; the interiorization thesis; modernity as mimicry; and the birth of soldierly fear from the spirit of the crime novel—these are, in descending order of significance, six explanations of why soldiers’ fear entered different kinds of Russian texts in the late nineteenth century.

By 1914 fear could look back on a remarkable, if willful career with distinct way stations: its emancipation in the writings, first of Tolstoi, then of military theorist Dragomirov, was followed by a migration (via the analyses of German colleagues) into military psychiatry, which, confronted with traumatized soldiers from the Franco-Prussian War, had begun to ponder the pathogenic nature of fear. At first Russian military psychiatry mostly saw fear as a symptom of combat-induced mental illness, but the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution moved fear to the top of the list of causes of mental illness.

Where does this exploration, then, leave a Russian history of emotions? While future research in this young field might delve into the history of concepts of emotion (Begriffsgeschichte), the analysis of emotional norms, or the causal role of emotion in explaining human action, I have attempted to trace across time the locus of fear in military writings, especially military psychology. In other words, I have tried to unearth scientific emotion talk and have hinted at the causes of this talk’s appearance—a

84. A. Dmitrevskii, “Da, voin (rytsar’) bez strakh i upreka—dostizhimyi ideal (Otvet g-nu Sh-vu),” Voennyi sbornik 56, no. 6 (1913): 99.
85. A. Dmitrevskii, “Logika bolgarskih uspekhi... poeziia russkoj chuvstvitelnosti,” Voennyi sbornik 56, no. 7 (1913): 115. This was a shared European sentiment. For Germany, see, e.g., Joachim Radkau, Das Zeitalter der Nervosität: Deutschland zwischen Bismarck und Hitler (Munich, 1998); Volker Ullrich, Die nervöse Grossmacht: Aufstieg und Untergang des deutschen Kaiserreichs, 1871–1918 (Frankfurt am Main, 1997).
departure from much of discourse analysis with its disregard for causality. The current attention paid to the history of emotions itself is due, in part, to a renewed interest in causality in history writing. Life science approaches to emotion hold the greatest potential for the establishment of clear causal connections. This is a potential I have chosen not to tap into for general methodological reasons that I expound in the introduction to this cluster and elsewhere. The expansion of the history of emotions we are presently witnessing is further prompted by the turn from the linguistic turn that was underway within the historical discipline and by 9/11, which sped up this turn. The events of 9/11 occasioned, first, an acute interest in fanatical hatred and religious ecstasy, extreme emotions understood at the time as overwhelmingly corporeal, prelinguistic phenomena, and, second, a (admittedly short-lived) discrediting of irony as the dominant style of historical exposition.

This exploration of soldiers and fear, finally, leaves us with swaths to be mapped out in the future and prospective paths to be taken. One could move beyond 1914–18 and discuss the reincarnation of Enval’d’s “romantic” fear paradigm in penal battalions and blocking detachments (zagraditel’nye otriady) formed after Stalin’s “no step backward” order no. 227 in July 1942: their task was to shoot panicked, deserting soldiers, that is, to place these soldiers in a kind of Catch-22. Or one could look at the rehabilitation of military psychiatry and the “realistic” school under Khrushchev. One could also move beyond Russia and point to the signs of a Cold War entanglement of 1970s Soviet psychopharmacological fear research and the development of modern western anxiety drugs. There may well be a Soviet genealogy of Prozac waiting to be researched and written. Or it would be possible to examine the return of legal prosecution for cowardice in the American military, which had been dormant since the Vietnam War because of the inroads psychoanalysis was making

86. Foucault’s concept of discourse in the archaeological method up to the 1975 publication of *Surveiller et punir* (Discipline and punish) was infamously murky about causality, prompting two sympathetic early interpreters to complain that “the causal power attributed to the rules governing discursive systems is unintelligible.” Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago, 1982), xxiv. His later understanding of discourse in the genealogical method also elided causality. As one commentator has written, “The genealogist/historian looks for beginnings, not origins. This for Foucault was an essential distinction. Origins imply causes; beginnings imply differences.” Patricia O’Brien, “Michel Foucault’s History of Culture,” in Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, 1989), 37.

87. This potential is embodied, for example, in Steven Pinker, *The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature* (New York, 2007).

88. See my *Geschichte und Gefühl: Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte* (Munich, 2010).


in military psychiatry: because of the curative promise anxiety drugs hold, the tolerance of behavior that might be deemed cowardly has diminished, so that in November 2003 during the Iraq War the U.S. Army initiated its first cowardice prosecution since 1968, charging Sergeant Georg Anderas Pogany, aged 33, with “cowardly conduct as a result of fear.” 92 The likelihood of an uncoupling of soldiers from the emotion of fear—anywhere and anytime soon—is about as high as the appearance of a plesiosaurus on Nevskii Prospekt.

Poetics of Disgust: To Eat and Die in Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg

Olga Matich

Disgust is a sentiment that regulates transgressive experience with the purpose of enforcing social and cultural taboos. An aversive emotion, disgust is performative. The disgusting in literature tests the reader’s affective tolerance, gauging if and when the reader as spectator averts her mental gaze from an idea or image that provokes feelings of revulsion. It distances the reader from a text that displays shocking visceral detail producing emotional recoil. Yet the deployment of the disgusting in the arts also has a liberating function in that it pushes the borders of the sensibly and aesthetically permissible, inviting fascination, even delight on the part of the reader or viewer. Disgust is always about borders. In challenging our senses, the loathsome and shocking can produce delight precisely because they attack the norms of “civilized moral good” and traditional aesthetic beauty. The aesthetic sensibility that comes closest to inscribing such conflicted affect is the baroque, in the generic sense, which tends to extremes and to grotesque representation. In the words of Geoffrey Galt Harpham, “the grotesque is preeminently the art of disgust.”

Unlike the French degoût and the English disgust, which literally mean repugnant to the taste, the Russian otrvraschchenie comes from a verb signifying motion. It refers to the gesture of pushing something away with the purpose of calming visceral and/or moral revulsion. The emotion is associated with taste, smell, and touch, suggesting a close-up rather than a distanced experience. As such, it is associated with the physical properties of decay, bad smell, sliminess, and stickiness. According to Norbert Elias, disgust marks the “threshold of repugnance” that establishes normative social, moral, and emotional behaviors that serve the “civilizing process.”

Turning to literature and using the threshold metaphor as a springboard, I would suggest that disgust, especially in the Russian, spatializes the text by creating a discursive space in which to negotiate the reader’s aesthetic, sensual, and moral values. Considered from the perspective of aesthetics, disgust reveals the reader’s, or spectator’s, response to dissolu-

tion of form, one of whose primary subtexts is the body that has crossed
the threshold of death—the ultimate threshold of repugnance. In the
words of Winfried Menninghaus, “every book about disgust is not least a
book about the rotting corpse.” Death transforms the body into a corpse
that will eventually dissolve into formless organic ooze—proscribed by
classical aesthetics—which in the end turns into waste. “The corpse,
the most sickening of wastes,” writes Julia Kristeva, “is a border that en-
croaches upon everything” and represents the infection of life by death.
One of the most controversial corpses in the visual arts is Hans Holbein’s
Dead Christ in the Tomb, which represents Christ’s body as the site of death
and decay—utter abjection, in other words—not of sacred and prophetic
speech (see figure 1). Certainly the response to the painting in The Idiot
by Fedor Dostoevskii, in which it has an important symbolic as well as
emotional function, reveals the profound anxiety its viewers experienced
regarding faith in the resurrection.

The gaping mouth, featured prominently in the Holbein, has its ori-
gins not only in the naturalistic corpse, but also in the repulsive sight of
food and the idea of eating it. The function of disgust, then, is to ward off
mortality and decay, suggesting that our refusal to ingest spoiled food has
to do precisely with affirming life and thereby warding off death, as well as
the dissolution of meaning that is ultimately rooted in death.

Yet “death is the ‘other side’ of birth,” writes Mikhail Bakhtin. Death
in nature produces the generative rot from which new life is born and
thus perpetuates the organic life cycle. For the Russian philosopher
Vladimir Solov’ev and his follower Andrei Belyi, the life cycle was the
ultimate philosophical source of revulsion precisely because it perpetu-
ates death in life. In this regard, the loathsome in death is the gener-
ate excess that originates in putrefying organic matter. It represents the
economy of life: people die and produce the fodder for new birth, and
it is the relationship between life and death, the recognition that oppo-
sites coexist and dissolve into each other, that is at the heart of the dis-
gust reflex. This recognition informs baroque and modernist decadent
aesthetics.

The abject and loathsome figure prominently in the most important
Russian modernist novel, Belyi’s neo-baroque Petersburg. Its poetics are
characterized by striking grotesque and metamorphic imagery that re-

Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, eds., Handbook of Emotions, 2d ed. (New York,
(Minneapolis, 1985), 59–60.
7. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington,
1984), 407.
Figure 1. Hans Holbein, The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb (1521).
Poetics of Disgust: To Eat and Die in Belyi’s Petersburg

Belyi’s use of modernist fragmentation, however, does not tell the whole story, nor does the symbolist aspect of the novel. What such approaches to Petersburg overlook are its profoundly psycho-visceral affective aspect, one that simultaneously engages the reader’s fascination and revulsion, stimulated especially by those images that represent dissolution of form, including into unshaped biomorphic images. It is my claim that disgust animates Belyi’s novel and that it represents its organizing affect.

Even though the disgust response has been premised on the experience of something viscerally and morally intolerable from which we typically recoil, I would propose that it also mediates its readability: the act of distancing helps make the disgusting readable in cognitive terms and facilitates a moral as well as a considered aesthetic response. Such is the impact of Francisco Goya’s profoundly disturbing Saturn devouring one of his sons, a cannibalistic image that underlies Belyi’s Petersburg (see figure 2). The nightmarishly grotesque painting produces recoil. But this gesture of recoil also helps the viewer read—contemplate from a distance—the horrific representation. A considered, cognitive response is after all contingent on the object’s readability. Relevant to what can be described as Petersburg’s baroque excess, or exuberance, is the painting’s horrific disfigurement of a well-proportioned nude figure; its young body stands in sharp contrast to the father’s grotesque body, especially to his gaping, devouring mouth, an important source of disgust in the visual and literary arts.

The statue of the cannibalistic god by the Italian sculptor Francesco Cabianca (1716) at the Neva entrance of the Summer Garden (an important setting in Petersburg) offers a horrific baroque image that very likely inspired Belyi’s representation of the mythical Chronos/Saturn, themed as time and will to devour the next generation (see figure 3). Although the sculpture lacks the extreme baroque excess of the Goya and remains unnamed in the novel, on close examination it inscribes precisely the kind of recoil that Belyi self-consciously provokes.

8. Describing his creative process in Arabeski in 1908, Belyi compared it to the action of the bomb-throwing anarchist: “My writing is a bomb that I throw. The life inside me is a bomb that has been thrown at me. One bomb strikes another—sprays of shards, two intersecting rows of sequences. Shards of my writing represent the forms of art; shards of the visible are the images of necessity that blow up my life.” Andrei Belyi, “Iskusstvo,” Arabeski, in Kritika. Estetika. Teoriia simvolizma, ed. A. L. Kazin (Moscow, 1994), 2:200. In his memoirs, Belyi compares himself to Ivan Kaliae, the bomb-throwing assassin of Grand Duke Sergei. See Andrei Belyi, Mrezh dviukh revolutsii, ed. A. V. Lavrov (Moscow, 1990), 79.

9. Chronos/Saturn defines the relationship between father and son. Much has been written about the mythological and theosophic meaning of the god in Petersburg, whom I consider in relation to the oral sphere. Apollon Apollonovich, the Chronos/Saturn figure in the novel, is also associated with the devouring tarantula by both Nikolai and Dudkin and with the Gorgon Medusa: “the unseen little white light that flared up between the eyes and forehead scattered sheafs of snake-like lightning; the lightning-thoughts dispersed like snakes from his bald head, and if a clairvoyant stood before the distinguished gentleman at that moment, he would undoubtedly see the head of the Gorgon Medusa. And he would be seized with Medusa-like terror by Apollon Apollonovich.” Andrei Belyi, Petersburg (Moscow, 1981), 50.
Figure 2. Francisco Goya, *Saturn Devouring His Son* (1819–1823)
The word in Russian that best characterizes the unformed organic detritus produced by the bomb explosion and other acts of violence in *Petersburg* is *bezobrazie*. Invoked on numerous occasions in the novel, the word designates hideousness and deformity. Literally, it means without face (*bez obraza*), suggesting a lack of form as in this disturbing passage from *Petersburg*: “Totally red half of the wall: oozing redness; the walls are wet, and
therefore, sticky, sticky [ . . . ] to see [ . . . ] under one’s feet the same dark red stickiness that splashed here after the loud sound; it splashed from a hole with a scrap of torn-off skin . . . (but from which part of the body?). Look up and find above me that it is sticking to the wall . . . Brrr! . . . Lose consciousness at that point.”

The passage, which inverts the murderous act in Goya’s and Cabianca’s Saturns depicts the patricidal fantasy of the son of Senator Apollon Apollonovich Ableukhov. It represents the father’s imagined sundered body in the form of blood oozing down the bedroom wall, a shred of skin stuck in it. Exemplar of reactionary political authority and Petersburg’s rational geometry, the Senator has been dissolved into “bloody ooze” in the son’s and reader’s eye. The reference to “the sticky walls” evokes the name of the most menacing father figure in the novel, Lippanchenko, from lip-kii (sticky). Instead of the beloved geometric shapes that help Apollon (Apollo in Russian) maintain rational order in his life, his body is transformed into organic ooze. The image suggests the body’s unfinished and fluid aspect—its imaginary transformation into a corpse—characteristic of baroque aesthetics. The narrative engages us, together with the son, in a spatial performance of disgust. Like the son, who loses consciousness, we both avert our eyes from the representation of shapeless viscosity, which reminds us of our own mortality and its degrading consequences, and delight in the transgressiveness of the image. The distancing gesture, like the one we perform on seeing Goya’s Saturn, helps us read the scene and express either moral revulsion or aesthetic delight, or a combination of both.

We perform a zigzag so to speak: moving toward the representation, then away from it. The novel frequently refers to the figure of the zigzag, a spatial image that inscribes recoil, to represent fear on the one hand, and the will to readability and knowledge on the other: for example, Nikolai Apollonovich traces a zigzag in a book to highlight an important passage. We encounter the zigzag for the first time when the young revolutionary Dudkin slips on the stairs as he tries not to drop the bomb in the mysterious bundle; as the Senator tries to make sense of the confrontation with Dudkin, from whom Apollon Apollonovich had recoiled in fear, he assigns his movement the threatening zigzag gesture. Fear, like disgust with which it is frequently aligned in the spectrum of aversive emotions, is typically associated with a recoiling movement. It is the Senator’s desire to interpret the meaning of the zigzag that initiates his investigation of the young terrorist. So the zigzag, which describes movement toward and away from something—just like the prefix of in otvrashchenie—is intimately related to interpretation in the novel. An involuntary gesture, the zigzag, like the emotion of disgust, is transformed into one that is cognitive, revealing to us the attendant process of reading Belyi and appreciating the experience. It adds a spatial dimension to the act of interpretation, which can be likened to the act of viewing a painting, both close up and from a distance.

To return to Nikolai’s fantasy: Instead of a moral response, the pat-

ricidal desire gives rise to feelings of loathing about his own conception; he remembers that he used to be called his father’s spawn, concluding that “man is slime sewn up in skin [. . .] his [Nikolai’s] blood putrified early [. . .] this is probably why he evoked disgust.” 11 The ooze of birth and the ooze of death become one in his mind: Nikolai contemplates the beginning of the life cycle—his own conception—and its end—his father’s death—as equally viscous and disgusting. 12 The attendant feeling of shame, an emotional kin of disgust, has more to do with the recollection, however, not his patricidal fantasy. The look beneath the surface of the skin at the body’s slimy interior suggests the unformed, morally and aesthetically loathsome aspect of life that slips effortlessly into death, a look that can be aligned with aesthetically grotesque experience. Slime, located in between hard surfaces and freely moving liquids, dissolves boundaries. Yet it is very much present as a physical substance occupying space and slowly expanding over its surface, engulfing everything along its way. In the words of Robert Rawdon Wilson, slime is “too appalling to contemplate, too compelling to ignore.” 13 And even though Nikolai’s memory stimulates a cognitive response, his conclusion reveals that disgust is deeply lodged in the senses, arguably more so than any other affect, because it always originates in the body, and in psychoanalytic terms, in sexual anxiety and repression.

In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre describes slime—le visqueux—as an in-between state, one that is amorphous and therefore aberrant, disgusting to contemplate because it represents the continuous threat of annihilation and nothingness. Sartre affiliates the slimy with feminine nature and its sticky engulfing essence, one that sucks everything into itself. 14 In theoretical terms, slime—its sticky, viscous formlessness—can be associated with category slippage, a condition that produces not only visceral but also cognitive disgust because it dissolves meaning. 15 In aesthetic terms, however, the dissolution of form and category slippage represent Belyi’s modernist challenge to traditional representation, as evidenced by Lippanchenko, certainly the slimiest character in the novel. He is slippery in more ways than one: politically, he is a double agent who works for the revolutionaries and the police; ontologically, he deprives Dudkin of meaning and faith in revolution.

Belyi’s most startling evocations of disgust in conjunction with death
are those associated with the imaginary ingestion of food. Lippanchenko links death and food directly in the deceptively innocuous comment, “I am deathly hungry.” They are linked by the image of a repulsive mouth whose most transgressive activity is the consumption of human flesh, as in the Goya and the Summer Garden sculpture. Lippanchenko, moreover, is the owner of the novel’s most repulsively grotesque body, one which is in flux—or unformed. He is variously a shadow, silhouette, persona (osoba), a giant clod (besformennaia glyba), fatty back, and viscous organic slime, almost all feminine nouns, suggesting that, like Sartre, Belyi affiliates the disgusting with the feminine. Dudkin associates Lippanchenko with the letter ы, describing its sound as “something dull and slimy,” which he links to bezobrazie.

The owner of a repulsive mouth, Lippanchenko is also disgustingly edible: “Lippanchenko’s lips resembled little pieces of sliced salmon—not yellowish red, but oily and yellow (you have probably eaten such salmon with bliny in a family of modest means).” 16 The reference to “you have eaten” insinuates the reader into the act of eating Lippanchenko’s lips. His edibility is quickly subverted, however, as his fat whispering lips morph into rustling ant legs on a dug-up anthill, reinforcing the essentially unfinished quality of his body. These quick shifts that capture Lippanchenko’s unfixed aspect, contributing to his sinister presence in the novel, reflect Belyi’s representational practice—one that inscribes recoil by means of the zigzag.

The reference to his fishy lips links Lippanchenko to the sinister sardine tin containing the bomb he has prepared for the Senator; in a grotesque association of eating and death, Nikolai imagines swallowing it despite his aversion to the “yellow slime teeming with sardines.” 17 As we read these passages with growing fascination, we may experience the vomit reflex ourselves, and as we squeamishly distance ourselves, we also begin to make sense of the images by developing a cognitive response, which is what Nikolai tries so hard to do throughout the novel. The question that arises in this context is whether the readability of the image, which requires a reasoned approach, undermines its emotional impact. I would suggest that it thickens our response by locating the cognitive moral layer of the initial visceral recoil.

The most startling representation of Lippanchenko’s edibility is Dudkin’s cannibalistic fantasy of Lippanchenko as a suckling pig, an image first articulated in Nikolai’s patricidal fantasy. 18 According to Elias,

17. Cf. Belyi’s representation of Maiakovskii’s expressive hyperbolic poetry: “The poem War and Peace is a hyperbole that gapes its snout at Gogol’s hyperbole, having swallowed it to grow fat from its juices and then release them into the juicy plumbing of the arteries: ‘rusty viscous liquid was oozing in the plumbing‘; ‘continents hang like carcasses on bayonets.’” Andrei Belyi, Masterstvo Gogolia (Moscow, 1934), 312.
18. Earlier we are told that Lippanchenko wanted to export Russian pigs abroad for the purpose of getting rich. In an earlier patricidal fantasy, which is accompanied by feelings of nausea, the narrator and Nikolai imagine plunging a knife into his father: “This is how a suckling pig in aspic and horseradish sauce is carved,” which is the first instance of this astonishing culinary figuration of death in the novel. Belyi, Peterburg, 221.
“people, in the course of the civilizing process, seek to suppress in themselves every characteristic that they feel to be ‘animal.’ They likewise suppress such characteristics in their food,” removing all traces of its animal origin.19 In *Petersburg*, Belyi does the exact opposite.

Undressing Lippanchenko’s fatty shoulder and back in his mind’s eye, Dudkin imagines that he could be carved as easily as the delectable dish, but this transgressive culinary fantasy is interrupted by a cockroach, located outside it, which makes him spit in disgust. The spitting gesture—which signals the threshold between inside and outside—evacuates the desire quite literally. Saliva, like other bodily fluids when they leave the body, evokes disgust, marking Dudkin’s threshold of repugnance in the scene. Next, the culinary fantasy of carving Lippanchenko produces a sense of horror in Dudkin: he imagines his fatty neck as a noseless, eyeless face (a literal instance of bezobrazie) with a torn, toothless mouth. As in the instance of the salmon lips, the fantasy and its interruption by vermin followed by the frightening metamorphosis represent the performative zigzag function of disgust through close-up and distancing: the fantasy performs Dudkin’s desire to kill and eat Lippanchenko, but the subsequent images distance him from it. The reader, whose fascination and revulsion have been engaged, participates in Dudkin’s gestural double play.

The narrative reifies the image of Lippanchenko as a pig actually being slaughtered by Dudkin (“this is how we slice the white hairless skin of cold suckling pig in horseradish sauce”).20 He seems to have overcome the feeling of disgust, which according to William Ian Miller is an enervating emotion, resulting in loss of energy and resolve to action. Positioning the reader directly on the threshold of repugnance, the narrative performs the slaughter as if with culinary intentions, but instead merely produces a corpse. Yet the affiliation of Lippanchenko’s flesh with a delectable dish suggests coprophagy, which ups the ante of the disgusting, despite the laughable scissors with which the murder is performed. Even the sea near Lippanchenko’s dacha participates in the murder and consumption of the body: the narrative refers to the waves running up on the sand like thin blades and “licking” it, and running back as if mimicking the recoiling movement of Lippanchenko’s body during the slaughter and ours in response to it. As he touches the viscous liquid that drips onto the sheet and falls abruptly on the bed, Lippanchenko realizes (on ponial) that his back and stomach had been slit open, meaning once again that recoil facilitates readability, not only for the reader, but for him as well.

20. Belyi, *Peterburg*, 386. Earlier in the novel, the narrator offers a cannibalistic image of his own: he compares Lippanchenko to a bloody skinned carcass with a gaping snout hanging in a butcher shop. Ibid., 282. As in Dudkin’s fantasy of carving Lippanchenko’s cooked body, the image of slaughter (resulting in a skinned carcass) is insinuated into the narrator’s fantasy; the narrator, like Dudkin, also subverts Lippanchenko’s edibility: the surreal carcass appropriates the power of the gaze and confronts us with its bloody meat that has assumed the shape of a gaping snout. (Note that elsewhere in the novel, there is a reference to the city’s slaughterhouse and its butchers.)
The corpse as emblem of the novel’s poetics engages its metamorphosing representational practice that inscribes organic decomposition. The next day we see Dudkin sitting astride Lippanchenko’s corpse in a pool of blood, one arm outstretched and a cockroach crawling on his lips and through his nose, as if he were a corpse as well. The grotesque tableau suggests Étienne Maurice Falconet’s *Bronze Horseman,* Petersburg’s genius loci, transformed into the site of a dying and decaying city. The tableau figures the novel’s baroque sensibility, here represented as the invasion of the city’s emblematic statue by vermin and decay. The monument, a figure of classical aesthetic proportion, is turned into one of baroque excess, with the horseman transformed into a figuration of madness and physical putrefaction, both of which have invaded the city.21

The last name of Lippanchenko’s wife is Fleisch (“meat” in German) which links the double agent and mastermind of the assassination plot to meat from yet another perspective. Smelling the delicious roast that she is cooking in the scene in which Dudkin sees Lippanchenko as a delectable dish, the latter announces to everyone that he is famished: “I am deathly hungry.” The comment and its context cement the attendant association of food and death, prefiguring Lippanchenko’s slaughter.

How do we explain the culinary metaphor and the grotesque affiliation of food and death that inform both Nikolai’s and Dudkin’s murderous desire and the role of Lippanchenko’s wife as cook, who, so to speak, offers up her thoroughly repulsive husband as that delectable dish? And how do we interpret his representation variously as dangerous animal, raw meat, delectable pork, and salmon dish, interspersed with images of insects and vermin? Suggesting the ingestion of moral and physical decay, the images remind us of our own mortality from which we shrink away in disgust. The insects and vermin connote moral and physiological putrefaction; they herald the transformation of Lippanchenko’s body into a corpse that will ultimately metamorphose into viscous organic matter.22 Certainly, life in Belyi’s novel enacts the inexorable end of Petersburg as represented in the apocalyptic myth of the Petersburg text, only Belyi’s images tap into a decadently grotesque representation of the dying city, contrasting its traditional image of classical Apollonian beauty and restraint.

Lippanchenko’s initial figuration in the novel is that of formless slime that gets under Dudkin’s collar and oozes down his spine. According to Belyi, man is but “a little glob of slime” pursued by primordial chaos throughout history, suggesting that the body’s smooth exterior surface is merely a cover for oozing matter, as if to invoke the baroque sensibility of

21. The sculptor Falconet, whose work was influenced by the Baroque sensibility, created an equestrian statue whose rider is represented in neoclassicist terms, but as Alexander Schenker writes, the representation of the horse rearing on its hind hoofs reflects “baroque restlessness,” as does the “fluid wave-like shape of the pedestal.” Alexander M. Schenker, *The Bronze Horseman: Falconet’s Monument to Peter the Great* (New Haven, 2003), 265.

grotesque opposites.23 The suggestion is that the body is merely a deceptive surface and that man emerges from slime and returns to it, that slime erases the distinction between life and death, the most sacred cognitive as well as existential distinction.

Next the image of Lippchenko morphs into the adverb “suddenly,” the temporal cornerstone of baroque aesthetics premised on surprise. In one of the novel’s striking passages, the narrator offers a long disquisition on “suddenly,” emphasizing its animal nature and ravenous appetite: “Sometimes [. . . ] an alien ‘suddenly’ looks at you from behind the shoulder of an interlocutor, wanting to sniff your ‘suddenly.’ [. . . ] Your ‘suddenly’ feeds on your cerebral play; it devours yourileness with pleasure, then it swells up as you melt like a candle. If your thoughts are vile [. . . ] having stuffed itself like a fattened, but invisible dog, ‘suddenly’ starts to precede you everywhere.” 24

Belyi endows the adverb with a repulsive canine body and suggests devouring once more, this time in a passage addressed to the reader (“your ‘suddenly’”), which makes ‘you’ complicit in suddenly’s loathsome activity. The nominalized adverb, which has stuffed itself with “your” vile cerebral play, challenges the reader to identify with his own disgusting animal nature.25 It reinforces the action grammatically, with the nominalized adverb instantiating the metamorphosis on the level of language—what the futurists called sdvig (displacement), a modernist trope that destabilizes traditional representation.26 The affiliation of “suddenly” with Lippchenko, and with the reader, refers to a moment in time—a sudden feeling of revulsion—yet one that acquires a loathsome spatial dimension: this “suddenly” has grown fat, having gorged itself on vile thoughts. Moreover, the act of devouring that is associated with “suddenly” evokes the novel’s ubiquitous figure of Saturn/Chronos. The link between the adverb and Apollon Apollonovich as Saturn had been established in the novel a few pages earlier; the question of who will devour whom—the fathers the sons, or vice versa—is the key to Petersburg. “Suddenly’s” narrative power, affiliated with Lippchenko, and its metamorphic power of conflating time and space mark the novelistic space of the future murderous act, about which the ticking time bomb periodically reminds us.

The figuration of Lippchenko as slime under Dudkin’s collar and the image of dogs sniffing each other, however, have other connotations as well. They imply a same-sex relationship between the two conspirators, which Belyi suppresses as loathsome and into which he insinuates unmistakably homophobic feelings.27 We learn later that the young revol-
tionary had participated in a loathsome “act” in Helsingfors involving Lippanchenko, which resulted in Dudkin’s entrapment in the assassination plot. Although Belyi elided the meaning of the act from the final version of the novel, a draft version explains that it involved “kissing the Goat’s arse and stamping on the cross.” This mysterious act, recalled several times and marked by italics in a key scene, is the hidden source of Dudkin’s despair.

Belyi’s covert representation of same-sex desire as loathsome, or so I would suggest, engages another aspect of disgust, one that stigmatizes sexual difference. Martha Nussbaum, who has examined the exclusionary function of the emotion more extensively than anyone else, emphasizes the cultural and social politics of disgust that underlie racial prejudice, homophobia, and misogyny, all of which figure in Petersburg. Nussbaum argues that disgust, contrary to the belief that it is a moral sentiment, is in fact essentially immoral and should not only be contained but transcended. Needless to say, Belyi, writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, makes no such claims, nor does he distinguish between the affect’s philosophically existential and socially exclusionary functions. An undifferentiated disgust defines both the novel’s aesthetic politics and practice and its generalized sexual anxiety.

What is striking about all sexual references in Petersburg is that they inscribe utter revulsion of the sort that a psychoanalytic reading of the novel would associate with deep-seated sexual anxiety: Nikolai, for instance, imagines his own conception in the moment when his father is performing his “conjugal duties” and experiences “familiar nausea with new power”; his father in turn remembers these duties in very similar terms. Nikolai’s nausea is of the same sort that Sartre would later associate with existential

Dudkin-Lippanchenko relationship is Ljunggren in The Dream of Rebirth. In contrast to Belyi’s treatment, there are also positive coeval representations of same-sex love in Russian literature at the beginning of the twentieth century, e.g., in Mikhail Kuzmin’s Kryl’tia (Wings, 1906). Belyi initially wrote a negative review of the novel (“`Kryl’tia’ Kuzmina,” Pereval, 1907, no. 6: 50–51), although he later changed his opinion of it.

28. See “Commentary” by S. S. Grechishkin, L. K. Dolgopolov, and A. V. Lavrov, in Belyi, Petersburg, 676n41.

29. For example, it is suggested that Lippanchenko is a Jew; the representation of Sof’ia Petrovna can certainly be described as misogynist.

30. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity. Instead of furthering the civilizing process, disgust, according to Nussbaum, frequently does the opposite: it undermines the values of what she calls liberal society. Although much less concerned with its illiberal function, Miller attributes a similar exclusionary function to disgust. Miller, Anatomy of Disgust, 194–205. Aurel Kolnai, the first modern thinker to consider the emotion in philosophical and theoretical terms, wrote as early as 1929 that, in certain instances, disgust “stands, one might say, in irregular service of the morally good.” Aurel Kolnai, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Barry Smith, On Disgust (Chicago, 2004), 81.

31. Here is Apollon Apollonovich’s memory of the first night with his young wife: “an expression of disgust, disdain, masked by a submissive smile. That night Apollon Apollonovich, already a state councilor, committed the vile act sanctioned by set form: he raped the young woman. The rape went on for years, and one of those nights, Nikolai Apollonovich was conceived—between two different kinds of smiles, lechery and submission. Was it surprising then that Nikolai Apollonovich was as a result a composite of disgust, fear, and lechery?” Belyi, Petersburg, 362.
Poetics of Disgust: To Eat and Die in Belyi’s Petersburg

angst and dissolution of meaning, which both Nikolai and Dudkin identify with sexual desire.

A particularly vivid instance of the affiliation of death, food, viscosity, and sex is the description of Nevskii Prospekt in which the crowd turns into ooze, blurring all human boundaries. A variation on “What is this Russian empire of ours?” the parodic bureaucratic opening of the Prologue, the later passage opens with “What is a fish egg?” and continues with a ridiculous disquisition on the equally ridiculous question in which Dudkin has morphed into a grain of caviar—a fish egg—that is hurled into the sticky, oozing crowd:

What is a grain of caviar? It is both the world and an object of consumption. As an object of consumption, the grain does not represent a satisfactory whole; caviar—is that whole: an aggregate of grains of caviar. The consumer does not know caviar grains, but he does know caviar, i.e., the sediment of grains spread on an open-faced sandwich that has been served. This is how the body of individuals rushing onto the pavement turns into a collective organic body on Nevskii Prospekt [. . .]: the sidewalks of Nevskii become a sandwich field. The same happened to the body of Dudkin, who flew here.32

Despite the comic parody of philosophical discourse, the disquisition in midstream introduces edibility into the image of Nevskii’s “human sediment.” Its subtext once again suggests cannibalism: in the narrator’s imagination, the sidewalks morph into a delectable caviar sandwich; not just a single person becomes edible, but all people walking on the avenue. And like Lappachenko’s salmon lips, the metaphor once again inscribes fishy organic matter. Only this later image, as in the case of Goya’s Saturn, assumes gluttonous proportions, suggesting a comical, though revolting image of the end of Petersburg in an orgiastic meal, worthy of François Rabelais’s pen and of Bakhtin’s analysis.

Belyi’s Petersburg is a dying city whose architectural beauty has been invaded by putrefaction. In keeping with baroque aesthetics, the image juxtaposes life and death, only to show their inexorable linkage: the fish eggs insinuate conception and death into the simultaneously comical and disgusting crowd on Nevskii. In the words of the author of The Anatomy of Disgust, “the having lived and the living unite to make up the organic world of generative rot—rank, smelling, and upsetting to the touch,” what Miller calls “life soup, fecundity itself. [. . .] It is slimy, slippery, wiggling, [. . .] generating spontaneously. [. . .] Images of decay imperceptibly slide into images of fertility and out again.”33 Miller’s description would have resonated profoundly with the thinking of Solov’ev and his followers, but not with Bakhtin, who writes that, in the culture of laughter, death represents the necessary joyful condition for the renewal of life.

The image of Nevskii as a caviar sandwich, though comical, reminds us that we are what we eat, not only in the sense of what we ingest, and not even that we ingest the disgusting, but that we ingest ourselves. The mes-

32. Belyi, Peterburg, 256.
sage is that we appear in the world in the shape of a single sticky fish roe only to devour ourselves collectively. The image evokes an earlier disquisition on truth and eating that parodies Pilate’s question “what is truth”; the answer is rendered by means of a pun: “istina—estina” (the truth is what we eat), cannibalizing the truth. The punning response is framed by people eating pork in a tavern and calling each other pigs. The message is obvious: we eat pork, and we are pigs. The pun erases civilization’s desired distance between man and animal. Belyi subverts the truth by identifying it with eating, just as he deflates the human body, morphing it not only into animal flesh but also into human food and thereby transgressing society’s most sacred taboo. The result is a transgressive aesthetic challenge to the squeamish reader—Belyi’s contemporary who had not yet been assaulted by violent, sexually disturbing expressionist and surreal aesthetics.

Feelings of aversion have always been associated with the body’s orifices (mouth, nose, ears, genitals, and anus) and with gaping wounds as artificial orifices created violently. They have been considered dangerous openings through which the outside world—in the form of disease and moral decay—penetrates the physical and moral body and contaminates it.34 I have focused primarily on the repulsive mouth as the orifice that ingests repulsive food. But the mouth in Petersburg is also the path to the anus, the most unclean body part. Apollon Apollonovich, who suffers from indigestion, spends a lot of time on the toilet, the private space that links the ingestion of food with its expulsion. The narrator refers to the toilet as that “incomparable place,” which the Senator considers a place of refuge, locking himself in it after the bomb explosion, but not only then. Pushing the threshold of repugnance, Belyi has him defecate in bed during a bout of diarrhea, imaged as a bathtub filled to the brim with stinking excrement that the narrator compares with watery dung and a disgusting hippopotamus splashing in it. The comical comparison of the tiny Senator to a large blubbery animal suggests the gargantuan size of the excrement.

The mouth and anus, however, are also linked to same-sex desire, which is the hidden subtext of desire in the novel. I have already referred to the homosexual underside of Dudkin’s relationship with Lippanchenko. His sidekick and double agent Morkovin, a man with a gaping mouth and cannibalist desire (he brings his mouth up to Nikolai like a cannibal wanting to swallow him), places a wet kiss on Nikolai’s lips in a smelly, sleazy restaurant, to which the latter responds with utter revulsion. What is striking about Belyi’s deployment of their mouths is that they are both animal-like and that they commingle eating and sex in a disgusting way.35

34. Petersburg makes reference to the pollution of the Neva by germs.
35. “Nikolai Apollonovich stood in the billowing white clouds of stench from the kitchen, pale, white, and crazed, his red mouth agape, but not laughing, with a halo of very light, fog-like linen hair—a hunted animal, he bared his teeth and turned to Morkov.” Belyi, Petersburg, 212. The gaping mouth, which is here framed by stench—of food and, by association, of a decaying corpse—morphs into an image of bared teeth, revealing Nikolai’s animal nature. Before the kiss, Morkovin brings his “open oral cavity up to Nikolai Apollonovich like a cannibal who was going to swallow Ableukhov.” Ibid., 203–4. What we see are two disgusting oral cavities facing each other in a scene permeated by disgusting animal imagery.
Perhaps the most repulsive depiction of Lippanchenko’s mouth is Dudkin’s surreal fantasy: “Suddenly a fatty neck fold bulged out between the back and the back of the neck in a giant smile [. . .] and the neck acquired the appearance of a face, as if a monster with a noseless, eyeless snout was sitting in the chair; and the neck fold acquired the appearance of a toothless torn mouth.”\textsuperscript{36} The image of the torn mouth—simultaneously mouth and wound—has, as I mentioned earlier, been displaced onto Lippanchenko’s fatty backside. Dudkin’s response is one of recoil. His most powerful experience of revulsion toward the “vile act” in Helsingfors occurs during the visit to his garret by the mysterious Shishnarfne, whose body is utterly changeable and fluid:

He would see himself holding his belly and shouting intensely into absolute emptiness [. . .] his head was thrown back, and the huge orifice of his screaming mouth would appear to him as a black abyss. [. . .] “But then, after the act,” his mouth tore open deafeningly and closed after being torn. Suddenly, the curtain was rent before Aleksandr Ivanovich’s eyes: he remembered everything clearly . . . That dream in Helsingfors [. . .] roars were being pushed out of him [. . .] and he understood: “Shishnarfne” [. . .] It was a familiar word which he uttered as if he was performing \textit{the act}; only, this dreamily familiar word had to be turned inside out \textit{naiznanku}. And in a fit of uncontrollable fear, he tried to yell out: “Enfranshish.” [. . .] a voice that was roaring from his throat just before that roared threateningly: “Yes, yes, yes . . . It is me . . . I destroy irrevocably . . .”\textsuperscript{37}

The biblical rent curtain, metaphorizing the way back into Dudkin’s troubled memory, reduplicates the image of the torn, wounded mouth that opens onto a dark abyss. He suddenly remembers that the word emanating from him during \textit{the act} was “Enfranshish,” the mysterious palindrome that he recognizes as “Shishnarfne” turned inside out: “naiznanku” comes from “iznanka,” which means the wrong, seamy side, here by extension also suggesting the backside. Later Dudkin will tellingly refer to Shishnarfne as his “iznanka.” One of the meanings of “shish,” the first and last syllable of Shishnarfne/Enfranshish, is the obscene gesture of the thumb between the index and middle fingers. If we return to the idea that bodily orifices have been considered openings through which physical and moral dangers penetrate the body, then Shishnarfne represents precisely that. He is the link to the “vile act” that Dudkin performed with Lippanchenko: the association of Dudkin’s lacerated, shouting mouth with the baroque palindrome—a case of verbal inversion—insinuates inverted desire.\textsuperscript{38} Putting the connection between them in anatomical

\textsuperscript{36} Belyi, \textit{Peterburg}, 277.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 298–99.
\textsuperscript{38} We get our first inkling of Dudkin’s homosexual desire during his first meeting with Nikolai, when he tells Nikolai that he has never been in love with women, and that since Helsingfors he has lusted after fetish objects: women’s body parts and parts of clothing like stockings. He also tells Nikolai that men have been in love with him, which Ableukhov interprets to mean Lippanchenko. In other words, Dudkin represents himself as a fetishist, which at the turn of the twentieth century was associated with same-sex desire. In his conversation with Shishnarfne, he speaks about ritual fetishism, especially in satanist cults, suggesting once again the suppressed reference to “kissing the Goat’s arse and stamping on the cross.”
terms, the mouth is the beginning of a tube, the anus the end, or as Miller writes, “the gate that protects the inviolability, the autonomy of males.” The association also sheds light on the image of Lippanchenko as slime oozing down Dudkin’s back.

If we return to the representation of Dudkin’s gaping mouth during Shishnarfne’s visit once more, we see that it also expresses an emotion greater than disgust. The heartrending shout expresses shame, as well as profound existential angst, bringing to mind Edvard Munch’s famous proto-expressionist painting _The Scream_ (1893). Belyi described his lecture “The Tragedy of Dostoevsky’s Art” at the Religious Philosophical Society in 1910 as “a scream about my situation.” The same claim can be applied to his groundbreaking novel. Like Dudkin’s shout, Munch’s painting also gives voice to anxiety that cannot be subdued. Here is how he depicted the source of _The Scream_: “I was walking along the road with two friends. The sun set. I felt a tinge of melancholy. Suddenly the sky became a bloody red. I stopped, leaned against the railing, dead tired, and I looked at the flaming clouds that hung like blood and a sword over the blue-black fiord and the city. My friends walked on. I stood there, trembling with fright. And I felt a loud, unending scream piercing nature.”

If we place Belyi’s drawing of Nikolai Apollonovich side by side, especially with the black-and-white lithograph version of Munch’s painting (1895), we are struck by the similarity (see figures 4 and 5). Even though Nikolai’s mouth is closed, his expressive serpentine form (his body often assumes such a shape) and the thick pen strokes that serve as background are strikingly similar to those in the lithograph. Belyi’s representation of the figure’s angst and, especially, the general mood of the drawing seem to evoke Munch’s proto-expressionist style.

I have not been able to ascertain whether Belyi knew the painting or

40. Similar feelings are evoked by Dudkin’s grotesque morphing body in the subsequent scene in which the Bronze Horseman pours his molten metals into Dudkin’s veins. Like other characters in the novel, the Bronze Horseman is a metamorphic figure, changing shapes and assuming different forms.
41. Ljunggren, _Dream of Rebirth_, 14. Here is how Munch described his painting: “You know my picture, _The Scream_? I was being stretched to the limit—nature was screaming in my blood—I was at a breaking point.” Quoted in Sue Prideaux, _Edvard Munch: Behind the Scream_ (New Haven, 2005), 152.
42. It is a commonplace of Petersburg criticism that the image of Sof’ia Petrovna Likhutina and Nikolai’s romantic involvement with her is Belyi’s parodic representation of his obsessive love for Liubov’ Dmitrievna Mendeleeva, Aleksandr Blok’s wife, and of their tumultuous relationship in the summer of 1905.
43. Vanessa Rumble, “Scandinavian Conscience: Kierkegaard, Ibsen, and Munch,” in Jeffrey W. Howe, ed., _Edvard Munch: Psyche, Symbol and Expression_ (Chicago, 2001), 27. In _The Philosophy of Art_, Arthur Schopenhauer claimed that art was not able to reproduce a scream expressively; Belyi proved him wrong, as did Munch the symbolist, deploying what can be described as symbolist synesthesia, with light and color rendering sound and rhythm, and vice versa.
Munch’s work, which was frequently exhibited at the beginning of the century; *The Scream* has been exhibited at Oslo’s National Gallery since 1909. Belyi traveled to Norway twice, in 1913 to attend Rudolph Steiner’s lectures and in 1916 for a brief visit. In Munich in 1906, he became acquainted with Stanislaw Przybyszewski, one of Munch’s close friends and admirers who collaborated on the first monograph of the painter’s works (1894). We know that Belyi had read Przybyszewski and wrote an essay about him, in which he describes his tormented heroes, as well as their gaping mouths, roaring into chaos. Przybyszewski inscribed Munch’s *Scream* into the first volume of his novel *Homo Sapiens, Über Bord* (which

45. In 1906, Belyi frequented the café Simplicissimus in Munich—gathering place of the Secession artists with whom Munch was affiliated.

Belyi knew), in which the painter Mikita depicts a sunset as “1000 open mouths in the sky screaming color (rivers of blood in the shape of dark red stripes) down onto the world.” If not the painting, then this passage could have been one of the sources of the ubiquitous shout or gaping mouth in *Petersburg*, for instance when Nikolai’s tormented murderous mouth gapes at the sunrise as it turns into a bloody red column that dances in the air and then lands on the surrounding objects in the shape of bloody red spots.

In the novel, the only figuration of a shouting lacerated mouth that exclusively expresses despair is that of the noble caryatid whose shout is prophetic. Belyi transforms the muscular bearded caryatid, which supports the edifice of state, into an oracular image as it rends its oral cavity by sounding the prophetic shout of coming destruction: “His muscular arms that flew up over the stone head would straighten out in the elbows, and the chiseled sinicput would jerk wildly. The mouth would tear open in a thunderous roar, a long desperate roar—the mouth would tear, and you would say: ‘it is the roar of a tornado (thousands of black caps of the city’s hooligans roared like this at the pogroms).’” The image of the lacerated mouth in this instance serves as an expression of terror-inspiring prophecy. The roar of the despairing caryatid, which has long observed Petersburg’s immutable, ignorant, and unseemly human centipede from its dignified position high above the crowd, announces physical destruction, prophesying the whirlwind of the coming revolution and of the end of Petersburg, prophesied since the beginning.

The mouth of Belyi’s emphatically baroque caryatid resembles the Hellenistic Laocoön, beloved by the Baroque, even though Gotthold Lessing claimed, in his eponymous treatise on classical aesthetics, that it expresses pain and suffering nobly and does not transgress the classical “law of beauty” (see figure 6). Laocoön’s jaw is constricted, not open, according to Lessing and is therefore not disgusting. But the loathsome shout proscribed by Lessing and classical aesthetics clearly emanates from Belyi’s caryatid. The shout, which dissolves rational measured speech, is a typical motif of baroque and modernist excessive emotion. What made disgust the subject of representation in baroque, Romantic, and modernist aesthetics was also its morbidly alluring aspect. The excessive, not just the loathsome, is an important locus of aesthetic representation in *Petersburg*, where the motif of the lacerated and gaping mouth disfigured by pain or incoherent prophesy is aligned with the sphere of baroque terror tempered by disgust, which represents the decadent underbelly of the beautiful imperial city. Just like the novel’s Bronze Horseman, who is linked to death and decay, the caryatid announces death and destruction figured in baroque terms—through its torn gaping mouth.

Belyi deployed this image in his writing elsewhere as well. “A large as


Figure 6. Detail of Laocoön from Laocoön and His Sons (160–20 BC)
if lacerated mouth with a protruding lip” is how he describes Solov'ev’s mouth in Arabesques (1911). Besides evoking revulsion, Solov'ev’s mouth, as described by Belyi, is oracular (like that of the caryatid): it gives birth to “the words of a prophet.” He depicts the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev in similar terms, framing his philosophical discourse with the disgusting representation of a violent seizure of the oral cavity, a facial tic that Berdiaev suffered. The description evokes the figure of a gargoyle, yet another grotesque sculptural figure that evinces a baroque sensibility. As in the case of Solov'ev, Belyi endows Berdiaev’s disgusting mouth with prophetic philosophical power. In line with baroque, Romantic, and modernist aesthetics, he situates the disgusting in the context of the higher truth and the sublime, of which the disgusting functions as the underside. The mouth serves this dual purpose—as the conduit of the power of philosophical or prophetic language and, because of its direct link to the digestive tract, the source of revulsion. What seems to connect the sublime and disgust emotionally and aesthetically is that they inspire terror: both perform the reader’s, or the spectator’s, attraction to and recoil from terror and the sphere of grotesque representation.

In his study of the grotesque body, Bakhtin offers a somewhat different view of the gaping mouth, which he identifies with the grotesque face: “The grotesque face is actually reduced to the gaping mouth; the other features are only a frame encasing this wide-open bodily abyss.” The grotesque body, which is inseparable from the rest of the world, is a body in the act of becoming, continues Bakhtin: “it is never finished, never completed; it is continually built [and] created”—shapeless and formless, in other words. This can certainly be ascribed to Belyi’s figuration of Lippanchenko and his ghostly emanation Shishnarfne. Like subsequent theorists of disgust, Bakhtin claims that the grotesque body is characterized by its “apertures and convexities” and that it expands in “copulation, pregnancy, childbirth, the throes of death, eating, drinking, and defecation,” revealing the body’s constantly changing state. The gaping mouth and grotesque body, however, are positive, joyful concepts for Bakhtin, which he affiliates with the culture of laughter. Yet as in Belyi’s novel, the gaping abyss in Bakhtin is associated with chaos, which in classical Greek meant the formless, wide-open abyss from which the world emerged.

One of the conclusions that may be drawn from my discussion of Petersburg is that representation in it is utterly misanthropic. But is that really


51. “His red mouth tore open [ . . . ] his teeth, that were biting, shone in the oral cavity that appeared for a moment to be a snout; his head began to write commas; finally, freeing himself from the armchair, he squeezed his fingers hysterically below his torn mouth and pressed his curly head to his trembling fingers in order to hide his tongue.” Belyi, Mezhdu dvukh revoliutsii, 416. I remember my grandfather, who had known Berdiaev, performing the philosopher’s nervous tic at the dinner table. The rest of us would invariably watch with fascination, especially my brother and I, and then proceed to express our disgust with my grandfather’s bad table manners. At table? Really! How disgusting!

52. Bakhtin, Rabelais, 317.

53. Ibid., 321.
the novel’s message? Most theorists of disgust have emphasized the affect’s normative moral function, as well as its exclusionary connotations. It is undeniably protective and conservative: it polices the normative hierarchical boundaries between life and death, sublime and base, man and animal, self and other, male and female, heterosexual and homosexual desire; in each pair, the disgust response validates the first item against the second.54 It protects not only from baseness, contamination, and our own mortality but also from the racial other, female danger, and same-sex eros as the self reassures itself “about its own solidity and power,” writes Martha Nussbaum.55 She questions, however, the emotion’s moral viability in instances when it is an expression of social, political, or cultural intolerance. Most of these boundaries are under attack in Petersburg. The experience of disgust in the case of Dudkin and Nikolai Apollonovich suggests a response to their internalized moral boundaries: Dudkin feels shame and horror in regard to the act, the repressed enfanzhish, which he performed with Lippanchenko; Nikolai imagines killing his father many times, yet is horrified by his Oedipal desire and by sexual desire in general. Despite marking moral boundaries around patricide, murder, and other forms of violence, disgust does not result in the reestablishment of moral order in the novel. Nor is it contained or surmounted in line with Nussbaum’s call to overcome the kind of socially defined disgust that violates another’s self-definition.

In regard to Bakhtin’s theory of the grotesque and its affiliation with laughter, my discussion of Petersburg has self-consciously eschewed this dimension of the novel, including its scathing dark satire. Instead I have chosen to emphasize the profoundly disturbing aspect of the novel’s affect by foregrounding the horror it evokes, which Belyi links primarily to the troubling dissolution of the boundaries between life and death, especially in Petersburg’s slimy aspect. It is oozingly spatial, a dimension that laughter lacks.

The question that remains is whether Petersburg can be associated with the decadent in the arts at the turn of the twentieth century, an ambivalent sensibility in regard to ethical norms. Decadence famously aestheticized the transgression or inversion of social and artistic norms, yet revealed a troubled view of sexuality. If we return to slime and its embodiment of the transience of life, which characterized the baroque, it symbolizes “life’s soup” from which new life is born. The self-conscious evocation of disgust in this regard reveals Belyi’s own profound anxieties about sex and the life cycle. If we consider the deployment of disgust in Petersburg from this perspective, we can compare it with some emendations to Sigmund Freud’s theory of the life and death instincts—eros and thanatos—which was most certainly tinged with decadence. According to Freud’s later writing, the theory consists of the struggle of eros—a unifying life-affirming principle—contra thanatos, which represents the instinctual desire to return to an original inorganic state. Belyi’s novel is about the victory of the death instinct, a decadent view, but instead of an inorganic state, it is af-

55. Ibid., 204.
filiated with the dissolution of the body into oozing organic slime, which is utterly decadent. The dissolution of Lippanchenko’s body in the end takes his novelistic life full circle by returning it to the slime that oozes down Dudkin’s back at the beginning of the novel. It brings to mind Solov’ev’s idea of eros and thanatos, partners in the self-perpetuating life cycle—the cause of death in life—which was instrumental in shaping Belyi’s views. Solov’ev’s paradoxical “erotic utopia” in Smysl liubvi (The meaning of love) called for abstinence as the only possible weapon against the death-dealing cycle of birth and death, which his utopian project was meant to bring to an end.

_Petersburg_, however, is not a utopian text. Quite the contrary! Its narrative succumbs fully to thanatos, in the decadent sense, as a site not of the beautiful corpse but of its grotesque decay. Structurally, the novel is premised on repetition on all of its levels—which in psychoanalysis is known as the compulsion to repeat, which according to Freud governs the death instinct, although I would suggest that it governs the procreative life instinct as well. _Petersburg_ represents the end of the Ableukhov line, whose parodic genealogy, which repeats the generative impulse to procreate endlessly, is traced back to Adam at the beginning of the novel. Quite obviously, the termination of the Ableukhov line has not abolished death, which still reigns in the Epilogue, but strikingly its termination no longer evokes revulsion. There are no disgusting close-ups; instead we contemplate the aging and death of Nikolai’s parents from a distance, the son’s reading of the Book of the Dead in North Africa, and his return to Russia to lead a solitary life in the countryside. We could conclude that the disgusting in death has been overcome since there is no generative rot in the Epilogue to reinvigorate procreative life and its representation in a family novel, of which _Petersburg_ is a modernist parody.

Evoking the baroque and late Romanticism as well as modernism, the novel intertwines horror and disgust as they degrade the beautiful imperial city—its classical order—and by extension those that live, eat, and die in it. Contrary to Petersburg’s architectural history in which classical order triumphed over the baroque, Belyi’s novel marks the return, or revenge, of decadent baroque excess. The novel dissolves traditional imagery by offering a disgusting yet stunning vision of the end of the imperial city. Baroque writing also triumphs in the novel’s epilogue, in which Nikolai is reading the eighteenth-century Ukrainian mystic Skovoroda, the most important representative of the Ukrainian baroque.

This brings us back to the aesthetic function of disgust in the novel and its will to undifferentiated, contingent slime. In the traditional idiom of Russian symbolist criticism, disgust defies Apollonian restraint and the fixity of classical aesthetic boundaries, revealing Petersburg’s Dionysian exuberance, symbolized by the ticking bomb in the sardine tin and the slime it contains and produces. But the deployment of the disgusting by Belyi in his crowning novelistic achievement confronts the reader with more than disgust. It encourages readers to delight in the loathsome aesthetically, and not avert their readerly gaze or resort to laughter. This does not mean that readers must elide an emotional response, quite the contrary.

The ultimate challenge of _Petersburg_ is to appreciate the ways it de-
ploys bezobrazie by pushing the boundaries of the permissible aesthetically, boundaries that lie beyond the novel’s rich musical and synesthetic structure and its symbolist poetics. The challenge is to recognize that it is precisely the loathsome that best informs Belyi’s unique experiment in modernist image-making: that the decomposition of form, which the loathsome in the novel produces, is the animating source of Petersburg’s modernist will to abstract representation. Perhaps the existential challenge of Petersburg is to stand in aesthetic awe of disgust and contemplate the decomposing corpse as the original source of abstraction that offers access to that which we call death.
“With a Shade of Disgust”: Affective Politics of Sexuality and Class in Memoirs of the Stalinist Gulag

Adi Kuntsman

Disgust, in both its subjective experience and social expression, is dense with cultural significance. It is a dynamic component of the most exalted philosophies and the most murderous political ideologies. It can work to protect cultural boundaries, but sometimes in ways that indicate their vulnerability to disruption, and the psychological and social cost paid for securing them.

—Jonathan Dollimore, “Sexual Disgust”

This article deals with the work of disgust in memoirs of the Stalinist gulag, and in particular, with what Jonathan Dollimore describes as the “cultural significance” of disgust in the formation of sexual and class boundaries. My engagement with this topic started several years ago, when I was researching attitudes toward sexuality in Israel’s post-Soviet émigré diaspora. During debates that took place in the immigrant media in the early 2000s about the Jerusalem Pride Parade, I came across a disturbing text—a poem that deployed Soviet criminal jargon, used for men and women engaged in same-sex contacts (words, such as pidory, kobly, and kovyrialki), to describe the marchers in the parade.1 In the subsequent debate that unfolded between the poet and a group of Russian-speaking gays and lesbians who protested against the poem, the poet wrote: “I am disgusted by the filth of sodomy.” He, and a number of journalists who

This article is part of a larger, ongoing project on the formations of sexuality and class in memoirs of Soviet prisons and camps and their circulation in various Soviet and post-Soviet domains. I would like to thank the participants in the Modern Russian History and Culture discussion group (Manchester and Sheffield Universities, United Kingdom) as well as participants at two conferences, “Queering Central and Eastern Europe: National Features of Sexual Identities” (London, 2008) and “Emotions in Russian Literature and History” (Moscow, 2008), for insightful discussions of this project. I am grateful to Dan Healey, Jan Plamper, Mark D. Steinberg, Vera Tolz, and the two anonymous reviewers for Slavic Review for their productive comments on an earlier draft of this article. The epigraph is taken from Jonathan Dollimore, “Sexual Disgust,” in Tim Dean and Christopher Lane, eds., Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis (Chicago, 2001), 368.

1. Pidory is usually used for passive homosexuals; kobly is often used for the women who play the “masculine” role in same-sex relations; kovyrialki is often used for the women who play the “feminine” role in same-sex relations. The link between homosexuality and criminality is almost a commonplace in Soviet and post-Soviet collective imagery, largely due to the criminalization of male homosexuality by Iosif Stalin in 1933, when Article 121 was instituted, sentencing men to up to five years of imprisonment. Female sexuality in the Soviet years was medically pathologized rather than criminalized, but same-sex relations between women were often mentioned in references to prisons and camps, in particular in Soviet penal literature and in the late Soviet years also in the media. For more details, see Laurie Essig, Queer in Russia: A Story of Sex, Self and Other (Durham, 1999); Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent (Chicago, 2001); and Igor Semenovich Kon, Lunniy svet na zare: Liki i maski odnopoloi liubvi (Moscow, 1998).

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partook in the debate, constructed same-sex relations as both disgusting and distasteful—they were represented as simultaneously low-brow, an offense to a good taste, and animalistic. During the debate, which I document and analyze elsewhere, several things stood out. The first was the poet’s extensive use of criminal imagery to denounce and humiliate his opponents; the second was the conflation of heteronormativity with class respectability and culturedness. And lastly, it was the sheer intensity of disgust, communicated through the poem and subsequent publications.

The debate about the Pride Parade revealed that disgust is indeed dense with cultural significance. Expressions of disgust link aesthetics and politics, social norms and internal struggles in the immigrant community, memories of the past and visions of the future. But most important, in the debate that took place in the post-Soviet émigré diaspora of the 2000s, the performance of disgust in the present was haunted by shadows of the Soviet past. It was a past that was constituted through silences, documented only partially, remembered with unease, or forgotten altogether. I am referring to the history of same-sex relations in the Soviet gulag, where millions of citizens—political dissidents, religious practitioners, former prisoners of war, and simply “family members of the enemies of the people”—were forced to spend years of their lives.

The atrocities of the Soviet gulag are widely documented in what is known as “dissident literature”—the corpus of gulag memoirs, written by the former political prisoners of Stalinist and post-Stalinist terror. Despite the substantial body of historical and literary scholarship dedicated to the memoirs of political prisoners and survivors of those times, we find little discussion of same-sex relations in the camps, with the exception of an occasional mention of homosexual rape or marginal references to lesbian relations. Both, importantly, are mentioned predominantly in relation to common criminals. This absence in scholarship can partly be explained by the lack of empirical material: most memoirs of the former political prisoners, “repressed” during the Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods, do not mention same-sex contacts and intimacies in their lives. But sexuality is not rare in the memoirs. In fact, we can find a lot of references to sexual encounters in the writings of both men and women. What we have to be attuned to, however, is how these encounters are described and by whom. In many memoirs the political prisoners are repeatedly and consistently heterosexualized, while descriptions of the criminal inmates contain many references to same-sex relations. Gulag memoir literature, in other

4. See, for example, a brief note on homosexuality in Toker, Return from the Archipelago, 61. On sexual relations between women, see Veronica Shapovalov, ed. and trans., Remembering the Darkness: Women in Soviet Prisons (Lanham, Md., 2001), 59.
words, creates the division into the heterosexual “politicals” from the intelligentsia and the homosexual “common criminals,” a division that, with few notable exceptions, is rarely challenged by researchers. The silence of the memoirists becomes the silence of the discipline; gulag studies as a field seems to have little interest in the topic of same-sex relations.

If we turn to the field of sexuality studies and, in particular, to the Russian scholars who first attempted to break the silence surrounding homosexuality in the Soviet Union, we find a rather different approach. In their discussions of same-sex relations in the Soviet period, the memoirs of former political prisoners figure as the main historical documents shedding light on the topic. Vladimir Kozlovskii, a Russian-American journalist, notes in his widely cited *Argo russkoi gomoseksual’noi subkul’tury*:

> We have practically no evidence on what happened with [homosexual relations] in Soviet prisons and camps; but the following period is reflected in the large body of the memoir literature, written by the former Stalinist prisoners and later also the contemporary political convicts, and rarely also by former criminals who became writers. . . . Apparently homosexuality occupies an important part of life in prisons and camps, because it is reflected in the writings of dozens of former Soviet prisoners.

Ol’ga Zhuk, a Russian scholar and activist, describes a similar problem in her book on lesbian subculture in twentieth-century Russia. The second half of her book, dedicated to lesbian relations in the gulag, is based on literary sources as well as on interviews with women who had been imprisoned in the 1970s and 1980s. “Information on women’s camps of the Stalinist period—the—1930s to the 1950s—is fairly limited,” notes Zhuk. “The majority of the older generation of women who have been through the Stalinist torture chambers avoid talking about the lesbian topic. In some respects this is compensated for by the so-called dissident memoir literature.”

Both Zhuk and Kozlovskii emphasize the bias of these sources. Kozlovskii, for example, points out that “political prisoners describe this [homosexual relations] with a shade of disgust, creating the impression that they keep themselves isolated from prison sodomy.” Zhuk echoes him when

5. For a discussion of intimacy among women in the camps, see Nadya L. Peterson, “Dirty Women: Cultural Connotations of Cleanliness in Soviet Russia,” in Helena Goscilo and Beth Holmgren, eds., *Russia-Women-Culture* (Bloomington, 1996) 171–208. For a brief but insightful analysis of the way some women memoirists described same-sex relations, see Beth Holmgren, “For the Good of the Cause: Russian Women’s Autobiography in the Twentieth Century,” in Toby W. Clyman and Diana Greene, eds., *Women Writers in Russian Literature* (Westport, Conn., 1994), 133–35. Both Peterson and Holmgren emphasize the importance of class position in the memoirs of political prisoners; both address the relations of distance and repulsion expressed by women from the intelligentsia towards the “common criminals.”


8. Ibid., 97. Translation from Russian is mine.

she states that the dissident literature “shows little compassion for the humiliating situation of homosexual men, and talks about women with disgust and unmasked contempt.”¹⁰ Both authors note the emotionality of the memoirs’ descriptions of same-sex relations. Yet neither of them explains the disgust they observe in the texts, its origins, or its effect on the formation of cultural knowledge about same-sex relations that the memoirs produce. It is this affective dimension of the memoirs that I will address here. The cultural politics of disgust and related emotions, such as contempt, fear, or hatred, is crucial to understanding the highly negative figurations of same-sex relations in the gulag literature, as well as the effect these figurations can have on contemporary formations of sexuality. A close reading of disgust, I believe, also sheds light on the classed mapping of the gulag world into “heterosexual” political prisoners from the intelligentsia, and “homosexual” prisoners from the criminal underworld. It is only by unpacking such a mapping that we can understand the persistent link between same-sex relations, social class, and criminality that prevails to this day.

In my analysis I will approach disgust as existing between the individual and the social, the subjective and the historical, the internal and the external. Following cultural theorists of emotions such as Sara Ahmed, Jonathan Dollimore, Mary Douglas, Julia Kristeva, William Ian Miller, and Elspeth Probyn, I will show how memoirs constitute the disgusting, the disgusted, and the boundary between them, and how the formations of all these are “dense with cultural significance.”¹¹

The aim of this article, then, is to explore the role of disgust in the literary world of the gulag memoirs. What disgusts the authors, and how is their disgust constituted through the text? According to Dollimore, disgust “can work to protect cultural boundaries, but sometimes in ways that indicate their vulnerability to disruption.”¹² Which boundaries does the gulag disgust aim to protect? What is the role of disgust in broader perceptions of morality and humanness? And lastly, what role does disgust (and do related emotions) play in the process of transforming memory into literature? This article concentrates on the period of Stalinist political terror and, more specifically, on descriptions of the Kolyma camps of the 1930s–1950s. I will be making references to several memoirists, but I will predominantly focus on the two best-known and most influential gulag survivor-authors: Evgeniia Ginzburg and Varlam Shalamov.

The Disgusting

Or take the repulsive goggle-eyed toad, Zoika the lesbian. This one was accompanied by three so-called kobly [studs]. Hermaphrodite-like creatures with short hair, husky voices, and men's names—Edik, Sashok, and a third one.¹³

12. Ibid.
This is how Ginzburg, the author of *Krutoi marshrut* (translated into English as *Journey into the Whirlwind*, volume 1, and *Within the Whirlwind*, volume 2), presents the world of women engaged in sexual relations with each other in the camps. These relations were based on the gendered division of roles: there were the “lesbians” (more often described as *kovyrialki*), the women who play a “feminine” role, and the “studs” (*kobyly*, sometimes also translated as “dogs”), who played a “masculine” role. The latter were also sometimes called “its” (*ono*). In many memoirs the masculine women were described as particularly ugly, fearsome, and violent, and their feminine counterparts appear as subservient, docile, and pathetic. Let us take a closer look at the affective textual means by which these women are depicted by Ginzburg.

Both the lesbian and the studs, whom Ginzburg later calls “infernal creatures” and “humanoids,” are described with disdain and disgust. Both are located outside the human world. The feminine Zoika, the lesbian, is endowed with animal features (“goggle-eyed”) and is called a toad. The masculine studs are described as “creatures.” In Ginzburg’s text, disgust appears as one of Zoika’s physical attributes; however, it is also transferred onto the studs by means of what cultural theorist Sara Ahmed calls “metonymic sticking.” Deploying Roman Jakobson’s idea of metonymy as substitution of objects located in textual proximity, Ahmed notes that emotions can stick signs together through affect. Here, the reader’s emotional reaction toward Zoika sticks to the studs—hermaphrodite-like creatures—and to their gender transgression: their voices, names, and visual appearance, so it is the studs that appear disgusting. What makes the studs disgusting seems to be both their textual and their sexual proximity to the feminine lesbian as well as the transgressive relations in which they are engaged.

Anthropologist Mary Douglas suggests that disgust guards social boundaries by defining what is “polluted” and expelling it beyond the boundaries of the social. In many cultures, the polluted and the filthy—dirt, blood, excrement, and so on, whether actual or metaphorical—is kept at bay through a complex process of physical and ritual purification. At the same time, objects—or people or actions—that transgress social norms and taboos are defined as polluting and are often perceived to be disgusting. In Ginzburg’s text same-sex relations and the deliberate

The English translation of this particular passage omits the nuances in Ginzburg’s description of the feminine and the masculine women; I therefore modified the translation slightly for the sake of accuracy. Evgeniia Ginzburg, *Krutoi marshrut: Tiar’ma, lager*, sylkha (Milan, 1979), 2:113.

14. See, for example, Healey, *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia*, 237.
15. For more examples of such descriptions in the memoirs, see Kozlovskii, *Argo russkoj gomoseksual’noi subkultury* and Zhuk, *Russkie amazonki*.
19. For a detailed discussion of cleanliness and its relation to gender, class, and morality in Soviet Russia, see Peterson, “Dirty Women,” 177–208.
insubordination to gender norms is what transgresses the social order.\textsuperscript{20} They are simultaneously positioned beyond the border of the feminine and the human. Gulag lesbians and studs exist outside the acceptable and are therefore located within the animal world of creatures, which is also the world of the infernal, as I shall elaborate later.

Similar expressions of disgust toward gender transgression can be found in other memoirs. For example, the Socialist Revolutionary Ekat-erina Olitskaia describes the masculine women she encountered during her imprisonment in the 1930s, in a style similar to Ginzburg’s:

The blessing of our barrack was that we did not have the criminals \textemdash \textit{ugo-lovnye}. We met them in the dining room, in the camp. We were immediately shocked by those extremely noticeable women— the “its” \textemdash \textit{ono}. Repulsive, disgustingly impudent creatures. In Magadan there were not as many of them as they were usually sent further away. Impudent faces, their hair cut in masculine fashion, their coats on their shoulders. They had their lovers, their mistresses among the prisoners. They went about the camp in pairs, arm in arm, boldly showing off their love. The administration and the great majority of inmates hated the “its.” Women in camps fretfully made way for them.\textsuperscript{21}

In Olitskaia’s text disgust and repulsion are merged with the hatred and fear experienced by most of the inmates as well as by the camp administration.\textsuperscript{22} These feelings are directed first and foremost toward the masculine women, the “its.” Similarly to Ginzburg, Olitskaia positions these women outside the human collective; they are “creatures,” not human beings. (In Russian the pronoun “it” is used for objects and for living beings that are symbolically located outside civilization, such as animals or monsters.) But Olitskaia brings in another aspect that is linked to disgust: the defiant visibility of these women. The “its” and their female companions cause disgust first because their individual “polluted” bodies are too evident, too out of place: they stand out and threaten the gender order. But they also appear disgusting because of their presence in the space of the camp and the visibility of their sexual relations. Such visibility goes against the intelligentsia’s concepts of shame and modesty in relation to female sexuality in general, and to what is considered deviant, sinful, or immoral sexuality—“vice”—in particular. Tellingly, the rare examples of same-sex relations among the political prisoners from the intelligentsia emphasize their discrete nature.\textsuperscript{23} For example, Maiia Ulanovskaia in her

\textsuperscript{20}. I want to distinguish these women’s masculine appearance by choice from a general degendering of women’s appearance in the camps. Many imprisoned women resented and mourned the destruction of their femininity by extreme conditions, camp clothes, and hard physical labor.

\textsuperscript{21}. Ekaterina Olitskaia, \textit{Moi vospominaniia} (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), 243–44. Translation from Russian is mine.

\textsuperscript{22}. The motive of fear is echoed by Vasilii Grossman, who describes lesbian relations in the camp as a “tragic and ugly world” that “caused chilling horror in the souls of thieves and killers.” Vasilii Semenovich Grossman, \textit{Vse techet: Pozdniaia proza} (Moscow, 1994), 319. Translation from Russian is mine.

\textsuperscript{23}. This was also true more generally for the descriptions of intimate relations between political prisoners. For an excellent analysis of the relations between class, sexual
description of same-sex relations between women in the camps, notes that while lesbian relations existed among all groups of female prisoners, the common criminals behaved openly, whereas “among the intelligentsia everything was hidden, masked, ambiguous. Only rarely would one admit the vice, but that happened, too.”

The lack of shame and hypervisibility is what makes the “its” and their “mistresses” disgusting.

The conjuncture of gender transgression and cross-gender practices, such as wearing the clothes of the opposite gender or adopting a genderly “wrong” name, with the lack of shame and embarrassment, is not unique to Olitskaia. We can find it, for example, in Varlam Shalamov’s “Women in the Criminal World”: “No discussion of women in the criminal world is complete without a mention of the vast army of ‘Zoikas,’ ‘Man’kas,’ ‘Dashkas,’ and other creatures of the male sex who were christened with women’s names. Strangely enough the bearers of these feminine names responded to them as if they saw nothing unusual, shameful or offensive in them.”

Writing about women in the world of common criminals he encountered in Kolyma, Shalamov’s descriptions effeminate those men who were engaged in sexual relations with other men and bore female names but did not experience embarrassment or shame regarding their situation: Sigmund Freud described shame, embarrassment, and disgust as mechanisms that protect civilization from the rule of instinct. But of course, the very concept of civilization and the civilized is a sociocultural construct that has its historical specificities (see, for example, the work by Norbert Elias on the “civilising process”). According to Douglas, shame and disgrace, as well as the sense of filth and disgust, appear at moments when the social order and associated boundaries of the normal are under threat. Shame and disgust, in other words, work to both define and guard the “normal” and the “civilized.” The lack of shame where it is expected to be experienced, locates those who do not experience shame beyond the borders of the civilized. It is not surprising that Shalamov, like Ginzburg, calls the effeminate men “creatures” and deploys a wide range of textual means to signal their monstrous status. Another, practically identical description of effeminate men appears in another story, “Swindler’s Blood,” where the “male creatures” are constructed, not only as lacking shame, but also as explicitly animal:

and moral purity, and the construction of memoir narratives, see Peterson, “Dirty Women,” 177–208.


26. A passive role was linked to low status in the criminal hierarchy; many men were raped and abused and then forced into the status of passive homosexuals. See Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia.


The criminals [blatari] are all pederasts. Each of them in the camp is surrounded by young people with swollen and muddy eyes—“Zoikas,” “Man’kas,” “Verkas,” whom the criminal is feeding and with whom he sleeps.

In one of the camps where there was no hunger, blatari had tamed and corrupted a female dog. They fed and petted her, and then slept with her, like a woman, openly, in front of everyone in the barrack.

One does not want to believe these cases, because of their monstrousness. But this is everyday life [byt].

In Shalamov’s gulag cosmology the pederasts—men, who play the active role in homosexual contacts—are akin to animals. In their beastly sexuality they do not distinguish between women, “creatures of the male sex” with female names, and dogs. The passive homosexuals—a nameless crowd of repulsive deviants—are similarly depicted through the use of animal imagery. In the text the dogs and the “young people with swollen and muddy eyes” mirror each other and appear metonymically interchangeable; both are attached to the blatari and engage in monstrous sexual relations with him. The parallels between the effeminate men and the dog are strengthened by the use of similar words: the blatari feeds and sleeps with both; and in both cases it is done openly and shamelessly.

While Ginzburg uses animal imagery metaphorically, Shalamov’s tactic of metonymic substitution clearly sticks together homosexuality and zoophilia. Same-sex relations in the camp simultaneously endanger two highly tabooed boundaries: between the male and the female, and between the animal and the human. Those who transgress these boundaries by breaking the rules of gender behavior or by engaging in “deviant” sexual practices are defined as disgusting. Their status preserves the boundaries of cultural mores in general, and of heterosexuality and gender normativity in particular. In that respect, the memoirs cited here are not unique: same-sex relations are tabooed in many, although not in all, cultures. But same-sex relations are not simply disgusting; rather, their affective constitution plays an important role in the very definition of the “human.” Ahmed in her discussion of emotions describes the work of disgust in the following way: “They [the disgusting bodies] are constructed as nonhuman, as beneath and below the bodies of the disgusted. Indeed, through the disgust reaction, ‘belowness’ and ‘beneathness’ become the properties of their bodies. They embody that which is lower than human.”

The very idea of the nonhuman as disgusting is not unique either, at least at first glance. According to Douglas, for example, the polluted/tabooed in cultural cosmologies is symbolically located outside the col-

lective, that is, outside the human “us.” Indeed, in both Shalamov’s and Ginzburg’s texts, gangster-pederasts, effeminate male “creatures,” lesbians, and kobly are all positioned lower than human, thus tying humanness and affect. But Douglas’s reading of disgust is, I believe, insufficient to understand the gulag memoirs and their cultural and historical specificity. Neither it is sufficient for approaching the work done by disgust. Ahmed reminds us that disgust is not simply about the bodies of others who are constructed as “hateful and sickening”; it is also about those who are disgusted and the boundary between them. Ahmed’s reading of disgust as boundary—an important aspect which I address below—takes us away from the focus on the disgusting object (or subject). Rather than focusing on disgust as a feature of the gulag “monsters” and exploring, following the Douglasian approach, what makes them disgusting, I want to shift the emphasis to those who experience and narrate the disgust. Who are the disgusted subjects in the memoirs? What are the boundaries of the human that they aim to preserve, and what threatens such preservation? As the following discussion will reveal, disgust in the gulag memoirs works not only to protect particular sexualities and genders but also to sustain the class distinction between criminal inmates and the political prisoners from the intelligentsia.

The Disgusted

Unlike Douglas who focuses first and foremost on analyzing the disgusting object, Miller, the author of The Anatomy of Disgust, turns to the subject who experiences disgust. He notes that “to feel disgust is human and humanising. Those who have very high thresholds of disgust and are hence rather insensitive to the disgusting we think of as belonging to somewhat different categories: protohuman like children, subhuman like the mad, or suprahuman like saints.”

Rather than focusing on the nonhuman nature of those who cause disgust, Miller approaches the feeling itself as humanizing: experiencing disgust is what makes one human. Of course, the ability to feel disgust is not universal and is mediated by many factors. In his extensive review of how and when disgust is felt, Miller notes both the role of psychological development (for example, children are not capable of experiencing disgust until a certain age), and the impact of changing social norms and shifting cultural concepts of the disgusting. In particular, Miller is interested in the relations between emotions and moral, social, and political hierarchies. He sees emotions such as disgust, revulsion, or contempt as central to the formation and existence of the social and political order.

Miller’s approach to disgust as a navigator of social hierarchies is echoed in the works of contemporary British cultural theorists. For example, Ahmed discusses the work of disgust in the formation of colonial relations and knowledges, as well as in the context of contemporary rac-

Imogen Tyler and Beverly Skeggs address the role of disgust in the formations of class and gender. Tyler and Skeggs approach class not as a pregiven social structure but as a world of subjectivity that is constantly in the making. Tyler, for example, notes that class is “emotionally mediated through repeated expressions of disgust at the habits and behavior of those deemed to belong to a lower social class.”

Disgust, in other words, maintains power relations and animates social hierarchies, such as those of class or race. It makes some bodies (or things) appear disgusting, while marking others as being disgusted by them. It is at the moment of experiencing disgust that social distinctions are both announced and reproduced. The question then becomes which social hierarchies are constituted by the disgust and contempt that the former gulag prisoners experience toward same-sex relations? As I already noted in the introduction, most memoirs attribute same-sex relations solely to the criminal inmates; the distinction between humans and monsters, coupled with the distinction between “normal” heterosexual relations and “deviant” homosexual ones, turns out to be a class distinction. By class I mean both the prisoner’s status (“political” prisoners, sentenced according to Article 58, as opposed to “criminal prisoners,” sentenced according to other articles of the Soviet Criminal Code) and whether or not they belong to the intelligentsia. The latter is less about one’s material status before arrest and imprisonment, and more about education and what Pierre Bourdieu referred to as cultural capital and habitus—embodied predispositions, knowledge, taste, and subjectivity. It is also, importantly, about morality and respectability, and these, as George Mosse reminds us, are closely tied to sexuality.

When Ulanovskaia writes that “among the intelligentsia everything was hidden, masked, ambiguous,” she is referring to same-sex relations between female prisoners in the gulag. But among the intelligentsia, the idea of discreteness and invisibility characterizes the overall approach to sexuality and the body. Even when writing about heterosexual relations, the authors—and this is particularly true for women writers—frequently deploy euphemisms and focus on the spiritual, rather than the physical,

35. Tyler, “Chav Scum.”
36. Article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code was used for a variety of “anti-revolutionary” or “anti-Soviet” activities. In addition, the camps had their own “class system,” as several survivors have noted: this system distinguished between different lengths of imprisonment, the denial of rights of settlement, and other civil rights.
40. See Peterson, “Dirty Women.”
aspects of heterosexuality. Direct descriptions of sex are rare, and when they occur, they usually refer, not to the narrator, but to someone else. Veronica Shapovalov, the editor of *Remembering the Darkness: Women in Soviet Prisons*, notes in the introduction to her collection that female survivors tend to avoid the topic of sexuality when describing their lives: “Few women made sexuality a special theme in their memoirs—not only because it was not a traditional theme in Russian literary memoirs, but also because of the reluctance of women to talk and write about it or relive the experience.”

Shapovalov’s main emphasis here is on the traumatic nature of the gulag experiences; however, her reference to the literary canon brings up another important factor. In the Russian tradition, sex and the body are often juxtaposed to the idea of art and literature. Svetlana Boym in her discussion of literary erotics, for example, notes that writing about sex was often considered not only immoral but also distasteful. Silences about sexual relations among the intelligentsia should therefore be understood as a matter of aesthetics (which, in turn, is embedded in classed norms of respectability, *kulturnost* [culturedness], and “good taste”), and not only as a question of history and testimony.

But descriptions of sexuality are only absent in the narratives about political prisoners. The presence of the criminal inmates in the texts is radically different: they are constructed as explicitly and disgustingly sexual. This is as true for the instances of same-sex relations as it is for the relations between the sexes. For example, in the chapter dedicated to questions of love and sex, Ginzburg presents a moral dilemma faced by fellow women prisoners in Kolyma. Many of them became intimate with the criminal inmates. For some, it was a way to survive the hunger and the horrific conditions (sexual relations would be exchanged for food and
clothes); for others it was also about sexual desire. Yet others rejected any form of intimate relations in Kolyma, “since it is too easy to slip into prostitution pure and simple.” Reflecting on the dilemmas these women faced, and on the horror of the conditions under which these choices were made, Ginzburg makes the following comment: “I should add that I am writing only of cases concerning women from the intelligentsia, imprisoned on political charges. The professional criminals are beyond the bounds of humanity. I have no desire to describe their orgies, although I had much to put up with as an involuntary witness.”

For Ginzburg, the distinction between the intelligentsia and the criminals is based on the juxtaposition of sexuality and morality. The criminals are associated with unruly, bestial sex and orgies; they do not experience moral dilemmas, on the contrary, they produce them (it is they who create the conditions of prostitution). It is only within the context of immoral criminality that we encounter stories of same-sex relations in the camp. In Ginzburg’s memoirs, as well as in those written by Shalamov and Olitskaia, criminality and homosexuality are constantly positioned next to each other. The relations between the two are best described by Jakobson’s idea of metonymic substitution. In the memoirs, this substitution occurs on two levels. First, it occurs on the level of what Ahmed defines as “metonymic sticking” through textual closeness (“Blatari are all pederasts,” “we met [the criminals] in the dining area . . . we were shocked by those . . . ‘its’”). Second, the criminals and the prisoners engaged in same-sex relations (men with female names, “pederasts,” “kobly,” “its,” and “lesbians”) are connected at the level of the plot. It is this second level that I want to discuss in further detail.

Zoika, the lesbian, and the kobly appear in the book when Ginzburg describes a short time spent in one of the most distant and most terrifying camps in Kolyma. She was sent there as a punishment for hiding and then destroying a letter that would have endangered many people if found. The camp, where Ginzburg was the only political prisoner, is described as a shocking world where the people were “satyrs, Grand Guignol grotesques.” “Izvestkovaya. The punishment center to end all punishment centers. The isle of the damned,” is how Ginzburg begins her description of this camp, where she was miraculously saved from rape and death by a fellow prisoner, who managed to arrange a transfer for her to work with him. Ginzburg first describes Simka-the-killer, a violent and dangerous woman who looks like “an illustration from a psychiatry textbook come to life,” then she presents the other women whom she treated when working at a camp hospital, among them “Zoika the lesbian” and the “hermaphrodite-like creatures,” already mentioned earlier.

45. Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind, 12–13.
46. Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind, 12. Some women married former criminals after they were released and had settled in Kolyma. Having been denied the right to return to big cities and to their former lives, they settled and created new families there.
47. Ibid. Emphasis added.
48. Ibid., 104.
49. Ibid., 101.
50. Ibid.
These humanoids lived a life of fantasy in which there was no distinction between night and day. Most of them never went out to work at all; they simply lay around all the time in their bunks. Those who did put in an appearance out of doors did so merely in order to light a campfire, crouch around it, and bawl out ribald songs. . . .

An enormous iron barrel glowed red hot. These fiends were constantly boiling something or other on top of it, cavorting around the stove virtually naked.51

As Ginzburg depicts them, lesbian relations are part of the repulsive and horrifying world of retardation, violence, syphilis, alcohol, drugs, and orgies. This world is precisely what Ginzburg has “no desire to describe” when reflecting on the moral life of the women of the intelligentsia. But this world, importantly, is not simply sick or distorted. As Ginzburg presents it, it bears clear connotations of hell, and in particular, of the medieval inferno, with its grotesque ugliness, potions, and demons dancing.52 A captive witness of the monstrous, the author—like other women from the intelligentsia—sustains her humanness in a world that is beyond the borders of the human.

A similar connection between same-sex relations, criminality, sickness, and evil can be found in Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales. For example, in one of the stories, these relations are linked to venereal diseases. Both Ginzburg and Shalamov encounter the infected criminals while working in the gulag hospitals; for both the disease also stands for moral decay.53

Male venereal zones were always the source from which the hospital admitted the criminals’ young “wives” [zhertvy] who had been infected with syphilis through the anus. Almost all the professional criminals were homosexuals [pederasts]. When no women were at hand, they seduced and infected other men—most frequently by threatening them with a knife, less frequently in exchange for “rags” (clothing) or bread.54

Homosexuality in Shalamov’s Tales is also described in conjunction with general cruelty. For example, Shalamov’s depiction of the blatari’s male victims in “Swindler’s Blood” is followed by a reference to the blatari’s ruthless treatment of women. “It is difficult to imagine that a human can come up with something like that,” concludes Shalamov, “but the blatari has nothing human.”55 It is important to emphasize that the actual sex between men is only mentioned in the context of being infected with syphilis. Yet the closeness of same-sex relations to the cruelty and to the various horrors of the criminal world is constant. And just as in Ginzburg’s text, these horrors are constituted as nonhuman and as infernal, while the

51. Ibid., 102.
52. Metaphors of hell are not unique to Ginzburg and are common in many memoirs of the former political prisoners.
53. As Peterson notes, for Ginzburg and other women of her generation, the criminals are dirty inside and out; they are repulsive both physically and morally. Peterson, “Dirty Women,” 192.
narrator’s survival depends on his or her moral and spiritual strength and the ability to confront the diabolic.

The motifs of the infernal, and more generally, the presence of religious associations in the Kolyma Tales, have been addressed at length by Leona Toker. For example, she notes the many references to the New Testament, as well as the images of sainthood and redemptions, as well as those of demons and hell. In Shalamov’s prose in particular the survival of the political prisoner in the criminal world is depicted as martyrdom, as an encounter between the divine and the diabolic. But the suffering and the survival here is not only, and not necessarily, about narrowly understood religiosity. Rather, it is about the spiritual experience, which for many prisoners was linked to literature, and to poetry in particular. In “A Day Off” Shalamov writes:

I know that everyone has something that is most precious to him, the last thing that he has left, and it is that something which helps him to live, to hang on to the life of which we were being so insistently and so stubbornly deprived. If for Zamiatin this was the liturgy of John the Baptist, than my last thing was verse—everything else has long since been forgotten, cast aside, driven from memory. Only poetry had not been crushed by exhaustion, frost, hunger, and endless humiliations.

Ginzburg echoes Shalamov when she writes that what saved her spirit on the long journey to the camp was the poetry that she kept reciting. Both authors link the literary and the spiritual, the classed and the moral. What helps them or their protagonists survive is poetry, literature, or what Bourdieu would term cultural capital. Their personal endurance is transformed into the survival of the whole intelligentsia. And their (classed) humanness is mediated by their experience—and their narration—of disgust.

The Impossible Boundary

For both Ginzburg and Shalamov, then, disgust functions as both the form and the sign of survival—classed, moral, and spiritual. It becomes an invisible barrier that guards the human in a world that has nothing human, and a confirmation that the human is still possible in the inhumane condition. In this respect, we need to approach disgust not only as a feature of the subject—whether of the one who generates or of the one who experiences it—but as a boundary between the disgusting and

58. “Beyond the turning the going became easier and our steps more rhythmical. At this pace I could recite poetry to myself, which is what I proceeded to do.” Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind, 100.
the disgusted. Ahmed, for example, defines disgust as a fear of proximity, as an unwillingness to come close to the disgusting. 60 Another feminist scholar, Elspeth Probyn, similarly notes that public statements designating something as disgusting are a way “to distance ourselves from the uncomfortable proximity . . . to assuage doubts that we have not been contaminated, that we are not disgusting.” 61 But according to Ahmed, disgust is ambivalent: on the one hand, it can serve as a boundary between objects or subjects; on the other hand, it signals that the disgusting has already come too close and that these boundaries are *already* under threat.

Ahmed traces the ambivalence of disgust through her employment of Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject. 62 Kristeva notes that the abject is the horrifying and the unthinkable that threatens the boundaries of what is possible and tolerable. At first glance, one may see a striking resemblance between the notion of the abject and Douglas’s idea of pollution, where the “filth” marks the limits of the acceptable. But Kristeva’s account of the abject is radically different. For her, the abject signals that the boundaries are already threatened, and the unthinkable has already become part of the subject:

> It is no longer I who expel, “I” is expelled. The birder has become an abject. How can I be without border? That elsewhere that I imagine beyond the present, or that I hallucinate so that I might, in the present time, speak to you, conceive of you—it is now here, jetted, abjected, into “my” world. Deprived of world, therefore, I *fall in a faint*. In that compelling, raw, insolent thing in the morgue’s full sunlight, in that thing that no longer matches and therefore no longer signifies anything, I behold the breaking down of a world that has erased its borders: fainting away. 63

According to Kristeva, any attempt to push away the disgusting—the abject—signals the closeness and the interconnectedness of the “I” and the disgusting. Taking Kristeva’s account of the subject into the social analysis of disgust, Ahmed suggests that “what threatens from outside only threatens insofar as it is already within. . . . It is not that the abject has got inside us; the abject turns us inside out, as well as outside in.” 64

The textual closeness and metonymic substitution of same-sex relations and criminality, outlined throughout this article, is crucial here. Male creatures with female names, pederasts, lesbians, and “its” are disgusting not only because of their appearance or behavior. Rather, they condense broader cultural anxieties regarding morality and class, anxieties that are reworked in the memoirs into angst about humanness. In this respect, the threat of same-sex relations that are “already within” is less about sexuality per se and more about the simultaneous importance of boundaries and the impossibility of sustaining them for the gulag survivors.

63. Ibid., 3–4.
Almost all memoirs of the former political prisoners, and especially those that refer to the Stalinist camps, address the close connection between moral and physical survival—"a topos in the literature of atrocities in general and in concentration camps in particular," according to Toker. Stories of survival in the memoirs are always linked to the break-down or transgression of boundaries. This, however, does not mean that the boundaries disappear altogether. They are reworked, often incorporating the unthinkable into the everyday—or in Ahmed’s words, they show that the threatening is already within. For example, Ginzburg in her reflections on the intimate relations in the camps, already cited earlier, notes: "It is hard to describe the way in which someone ground down by inhumane forms of life loses bit by bit all hold on normal notions of good and evil, of what is permissible and what is not. Otherwise how else could there have been in the children's home infants whose mother might have a diploma in philosophy, and whose father might be a well-known burglar from Rostov? The relations between an intellectual woman and a thief cross the lines of respectability and class; by doing so they seem to shake the very foundations of good and evil. What appears unthinkable here is the intimate contact between the criminal and the intelligentsia: not only a spatial proximity of the infernal world, but its actual penetration of—and growth within—the body.

While Ginzburg focuses on sexual contact, Shalamov presents another form of physical contact between the criminal and the political prisoners—eating of tabooed food. In his “A Day Off” Shalamov describes two criminals who cold-heartedly butcher a puppy and prepare soup. After their meal, they offer some of the soup left in the pot to the narrator. Having witnessed the slaughter of the puppy, the narrator refuses. The soup is then offered to Zamiatin who used to befriend the puppy. (Zamiatin is already familiar to the reader: the first part of the story describes an encounter between the narrator and Zamiatin who was praying and saying the Sunday liturgy in the woods.) Unaware of its content, Zamiatin accepts the food. The criminals offer him the pot with the words, “Hey, Father! Have some mutton. Just wash out the pot when you are done.” When he learns the true nature of the soup, his body rejects the unacceptable food, literally, by vomiting:

Zamiatin came out of the darkness into the yellow light of the smoking kerosene lantern, took the pot, and disappeared. Five minutes later he returned with a washed pot.

“So quick?” Semyon [one of the criminals] asked with interest. “You gobbled things down quick as a seagull. That wasn’t mutton, preacher, but dog meat. Remember the dog ‘North’ that used to visit you all the time?”

Zamiatin stared wordlessly at Semyon, turned around, and walked

65. Toker, Return from the Archipelago, 153.
66. Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind, 13.
67. The description of the puppy, licking the hand of its killer, has simultaneous associations with public execution, martyrdom, and religious sacrifice.
out. I followed him. Zamiatin was standing in the snow, just beyond the
doors. He was vomiting. In the light of the moon his face seemed leaden.
Sticky spittle was hanging from his blue lips. Zamiatin wiped his mouth
with his sleeve and glared at me angrily.

“They are rotten,” I said.

“Of course,” Zamiatin replied. “But the meat was delicious—no
worse than mutton.”

Toker extensively analyzed “A Day Off” in the context of the relations
between moral and physical survival. She discusses at length the
two seemingly distinct components of the story: the liturgy in the forest,
and the scene with the soup. What particularly interests her is Shalamov’s
poetics of collocating fictionalized and factographic material: events, that
in reality took place in different locations and with different people, are
put together by “simulating the way things worked in the camp.” Textual
proximity allows Shalamov to explore the topic of survival through parallels and comparisons, challenging the simplistic separation of the moral and the physical.

But what is no less interesting is the bodily proximity, forced on the politi
cal prisoner. The unacceptable penetrates the body—the food “tricks”
its way inside the stomach, just as the bodies of the thieves get inside the
bodies of the women—and turn them inside out, physically and metaphori
cally. Both Ginzburg’s and Shalamov’s narratives signal the ambiva
lence of the unacceptable and the disgusting. It is attractive: Shalamov,
for example, notes how the inmates could not sleep “because of the smell
of the meat soup” and Zamiatin emphasizes how delicious the dog tasted,
“no worse than mutton.” Ginzburg mentions both the hunger and the
women’s sexual desire. But at the same time it is also repulsive, disgusting,
at times literally rejected by the body—as is the case for Zamiatin. Here
is how Kristeva describes this ambivalence: “Loathing an item of food, a
piece of filth, waste or dung. The spasms and vomiting that protect me.
The repugnance, the retching that thrusts me to the side and turns me
away from defilement, sewage, and muck. The shame of compromise, of
being in the middle of treachery. The fascinated start that leads me toward
and separates me from them.”

Babies in the children’s home born as a result of an unimaginable
sexual liaison and dog soup, sickening and delicious at the same time,
both demonstrate the complex interconnectedness of physical and moral
survival. They illuminate the impossibility of maintaining the boundary
between the criminals and the intelligentsia, between the human and the
monstrous, and yet, for the survivors, they simultaneously signal the des
perate need for such a boundary. It is this desperate need that leads to
the passionate disgust deployed in the descriptions of same-sex relations
in the camps by Ginzburg, Shalamov, and many other authors. For the

69. Ibid., 111.
70. Toker, Return from the Archipelago, 152–55.
71. Ibid., 153.
intelligentsia, the inferno of the criminal world, and its horrifying forced
closeness, are disgusting. It is not just the same-sex relations that are dis-
gusting. These relations, and the people involved in them, are only part
of the inferno. But in the process of transforming memory into literature,
they become the synecdoche of the camp experience. The “disgusting
creatures” embody the horrors of the repressions and the camps and the
sickening, but unavoidable, proximity of that which is “below the border
of the human.”

Concluding Remarks: Rethinking Gulag Historiography

Disgust can be a quality of the object or subject that causes negative feel-
ings as well as a feature of the subject that feels it. In the memoirs, same-
sex relations among the criminals—explicit, visible, not silenced by shame
nor restrained by codes of respectability—are constructed as disgusting
because they go against gender norms and against class perceptions of
sexual morality. These perceptions, embedded within the habitus of the
intelligentsia, are transformed into the universal category of humanness.
In Miller’s words, the memoirs served to humanize the disgusted political
prisoners, locating the common criminals beyond the bounds of human-
ity.74 For the political prisoner, sent into the infernal world of the gulag,
feeling disgust is more than simply humanizing. It was not just a form of
protection, a light in the darkness, together with poetry. In the upside-
down world of the camps, where criminals were the rulers and the ex-
ecutioners and the country’s former elite was “the enemy of the people,”
disgust provided a safe haven, or at least, the illusion thereof.75 The re-
petitive presence of disgust in the memoirs signals a desperate need to
sustain boundaries of respectability and morality, which are not merely
“vulnerable to disruption,” in Dollimore’s words, but are, more often than
not, impossible.76

My analysis is of course limited in terms of the material presented
here. Although my reading is informed by broader textual observations of
the memoirs, I chose to zoom in on two authors, Shalamov and Ginzburg,
both of whom describe a very particular time of imprisonment—the 1930s
to the 1950s of the Stalinist terror—and also a very particular location,
the Kolyma camps, considered one of the worst in terms of their condi-
tions. If we turn to other authors of gulag memoirs, we will find some
striking resemblances, but also many individual differences of literary
style and tone, of conditions of imprisonment, and of course of person-
alities and life trajectories. There are also notable differences between the
memoirs of the 1930s–1950s, and those of the 1970s–1980s, both because
the sentences became shorter and the conditions improved significantly,

75. Tellingly, Lev Samoilov (Klein), a Soviet ethnologist and a former camp prisoner,
who in the 1980s was sentenced to a criminal colony outside Leningrad on grounds of ho-
mosexuality, called his book on the criminal subculture *A Journey to the Upside-Down World.*
and because the authors were often already informed by the writings of their famous predecessors (such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn). All these undoubtedly have their effect on the way same-sex relations are or may be narrated. Indeed, one of the aims of my larger project is to map discursive and affective formations of sexuality across the different memoirs, noting, for example, the shift from disgust and hatred to pity and compassion.77 Such a shift, notable mainly in the later memoirs, is interesting because it offers a different figuration of sexuality, morality, and humanness, while often sustaining the distinction of class, in terms of both intelligentsia versus “common people” and political versus criminal inmates.

But the limited number of texts discussed in this article does not affect my arguments regarding disgust and its role in cultural formations of sexuality and class. Ginzburg and Shalamov’s writings are (together with Solzhenitsyn’s *The Gulag Archipelago*) among the best known and the most influential texts that constitute the post-Soviet cultural memory of the Stalinist terror. Drafts of these texts have been read since the 1960s and were initially distributed secretly through samizdat (later, the very act of possessing or distributing these texts could in itself become a reason for imprisonment). Some were first published in the west and became widely available only in the late 1980s. At that time, Soviet readers were flooded with materials and memoirs of political terror; later, in the 1990s, these and many other gulag memoirs came out as books. For many readers the memoirs were received as the truth about the Soviet regime, shocking and particularly memorable because of the painful revelations of terror that they offered. Needless to say, these texts had a high moral authority, both because of the suffering experienced by the political prisoners, and because the authors, following the traditions of Russian literature, presented their memoirs, not as private autobiographies and individual narratives, but as documents of transcendental historical significance. And finally, the memoirs were seen as the true history, juxtaposed to the lies, silences, and distortions that had constituted official Soviet historiography. The status of these memoirs as true testimony and as the “real history” metonymically granted them unquestioned authority about the other issues described by the survivors. Among them were same-sex relations, which for the memoirs’ authors—and later for their readers—became forever linked to criminality, violence, and monstrosity. Therefore the gulag memoirs—and the writings of Ginzburg and Shalamov first and foremost—have been a formative influence on the intelligentsia’s perceptions of morality and humanness since the 1960s. And although the memoirs were not the only source of the criminalization of same-sex relations in the public imagination, they are one of the main grounds for the persistent connection between same-sex relations, low classness, criminality, and monstrosity.78

78. Some papers and magazines of the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, offered accounts of same-sex abuse in male as well as female prisons.
At the same time, occasional references to same-sex relations among the political prisoners—for example, in Ulanovskaia’s memoir, in the interviews with former prisoners collected by Zhuk, or in some later memoirs such as Aleksandr Gidoni’s—demonstrate that sexuality, intimacy, and love existed among men and women of all groups and were not necessarily linked to violence, sickness, or crime. The interviews collected by Zhuk and the detailed historical research conducted by Dan Healey suggest that same-sex relations in the camps were not always forced and that ties of love and attachment sometimes continued for years after imprisonment. And yet, these relations never made their way into the collective memory. Similarly, neither the criminalization of homosexuality since Iosif Stalin outlawed it in 1933 nor the repression of Soviet homosexuals since then received any attention from Soviet dissidents. In the 1990s, Russian poet and journalist Gennadii Trifonov noted bitterly, “No one ever counted the number of victims of the criminal persecution of homosexuals in the Soviet Union. Even the Soviet human rights activists of the stagnation period never did and never tried to address this problem.” Earlier, Michel Foucault made a similar remark about the dissidents’ silence regarding the repression of homosexuals and about sexuality more generally, as Jan Plamper describes in his “Foucault’s Gulag.”

But it is not just the evidence of same-sex relations or the commemoration of homosexual victimhood that I am looking for here. I am not suggesting that gulag historiography has to “uncover a hidden history” of gulag sexualities in order to allow their remembrance. I am well aware of the epistemological limitations of such a task: most accounts of same-sex relations can be found either in Soviet penology or in the memoirs of the former political prisoners; stories of same-sex love among the imprisoned intelligentsia are mostly silenced; and the former criminal inmates of the 1930s–1980s have access to neither the literary cultural capital and the habitus of writing memoirs, nor the historical and moral authority of the political survivors. To some extent, prisoners engaged in same-sex relations—whether they were classified as politicals or common criminals—can be described as what Avery Gordon calls “lost subjects of history.” Their existence cannot be documented—it is covered by layers of silence or by narratives of dehumanization—but their absent pres-

79. Aleksandr Gidoni, Solntse idet s zapada: Kniga vospominanii (Toronto, 1980).
80. Healey’s pioneering work on the history of homosexuality and lesbianism in the early Soviet period and his particular emphasis on the role of the gulag and the clinic as two sites where same-sex relations were contained begs for a much needed continuation into the late Soviet decades. See Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia. Zhuk’s Russkie amazonki is yet to be translated into English.
83. Notably, the two sometimes intersect: former political prisoners became authors of academic articles on the “criminal subculture.”
ences in the past haunts the present, reappearing, like a shadow, at the most unexpected moments (such as a debate about Pride Parades among post-Soviet émigrés of 2000s).

So the path I would like to suggest for rethinking gulag historiography is a well-trodden one, albeit not in the emotions key: we must be more attentive to the ways the past is constituted through literature; to what is forgotten or overlooked as either unimportant or undeserving of attention. We must remember that the memoirs, as Toker and Beth Holmgren emphasize, are not neutral historical documents but rather a literary corpus, with their particular narrative traditions and their own aesthetics of silencing and exposure. And gulag scholarship as a field must face its own lacunae, provide a more careful and informed reading of the memoirs’ silences, and question the very formations of humanness in the memoirs. Unpacking the relations between sexuality, class, and humanness is central here, for it is the category of the human that constitutes historical subjecthood, a life worth understanding and remembering. My analysis of the work of disgust is one modest contribution to this important endeavor.

Each of these rich essays is framed as the discussion of a specific emotion or emotional attitude—the “perception of emotional coldness” (Andrei Zorin), “fear” (Jan Plamper), “disgust” (Olga Matich and Adi Kuntsman). But these authors offer us both much less and much more. Less, because individual emotions cannot really have their own history, independent of the kinds of self or emotional styles that emerge in given periods. More, because each essay opens up to these broader, interdependent configurations of self and emotion, creating a window on a complex landscape of emotional change. Zorin’s study of Andrei Turgenev provides a glimpse of the transition from an eighteenth- to an early nineteenth-century emotional regime. Plamper’s examination of the emergence of military psychology traces the development of a late nineteenth-century social science of the “psyche.” Olga Matich explores the somatic anxieties of an early twentieth-century novelist, reminiscent of a whole strain of troubled and troubling early twentieth-century reflection. Adi Kuntsman probes the powerlessness of victims of Stalinist-era labor camps, whose sufferings resemble those of millions of others caught in modernist state projects aimed at administering mass emotions.

As these essays themselves remind us, emotion words are notoriously vague, with multiple near-synonyms and overlapping meanings. Although the emotional vocabularies of western languages display many similarities, and words with shared etymologies, nonetheless translation among them is never easy and often hazardous. Distinctions between English terms that seem important to some (such as between feeling and emotion) have no equivalents in other languages; French sentiment does not mean quite the same thing as German Empfindsamkeit. Ennui does not mean boredom. Attempts by experimental psychologists to identify simple emotions have failed. Research has instead stumbled on new phenomena, such as stress and trauma, that correspond to no term in the traditional vocabulary, or the fight-flight response that corresponds both to rage and to panic. Everyday emotions such as love, grief, admiration, or envy defy identification even in the most sophisticated brain scans.1


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Ethnographic research reveals that the vague, overlapping character of emotion terms is common to all the languages so far studied. The domain of emotions is variously defined and its boundaries variously drawn. Yet something roughly equivalent to emotion is always found. Emotion terms are useful because situations are complicated and dynamic. If I say, “I am afraid of flying,” I indicate a general motivational orientation. In a given circumstance I may in fact take a plane; I may take planes frequently. But such a statement allows others to anticipate tendencies, preferences that may under some circumstances determine choices. We are only partially known to ourselves, as well. If I say, “I love you,” I may be trying it out to see if it works. If I say, “Have a nice day,” I may be actively managing my mood, hoping to keep it cheerful. In widely varying cultural contexts, local practices include schemas for performing approved emotions, emotional rituals, emotional ideals—such as Stoic *apatheia* (absence of feeling), Balinese *mue cedang* (the bright face), or *siniligur* (even temperedness) in the language of the Faeroe Island—and penalties for emotions that are not approved. Emotional experience is thus always in a state of becoming, in twilight at the edges, tinged with uncertainty, partially conforming to community standards, partially at odds. And it is always of great political significance.2

We are beginning to glimpse the long-term chronology of European emotional history.3 Each of these essays contributes to this project. The late eighteenth-century sentimentalist craze—signaled by the success of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Confessions*, Wolfgang von Goethe’s *Werther*, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre’s *Paul et Virginie*, among other bestsellers—burned itself out in the early 1790s, as revolution and terror reawakened doubts about the human capacity for virtue. As the dawn of a new era loomed, the last sentimentalist generation poured out their souls in letters and journals; they shed sincere tears before canvases by Jacques-Louis David and operas by Christoph Willibald von Gluck. They were enthralled with Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock’s poems for his dead wife.4 Germaine de Staël greeted each new love in her life with professions of absolute and undying devotion. Between 1796 and 1806 Berlin lawyer Ferdinande Beneke mentioned in his journal twelve different women who stirred feelings of


love in him. Too poor to marry without a dowry, he moved on, not without scars, especially when one of them, Charlotte Kramer-Chaupié, accepted the hand of Beneke’s best friend in 1804. Beneke’s experiences were not uncommon. The difficult, painful pursuit of love marriages preoccupied many and inspired voluminous letters and journal entries in those years, as studies by Amanda Vickery, Anne-Charlott Trepp, and Rebekka Habermas show. Doubt about one’s own feelings was common. There were also confirmed doubters like Melchior Grimm or Suzanne Necker, who found the younger generation to be intolerably self-absorbed and feared they were also shallow. But Andrei Turgenev’s doubts went deeper than most. He seemed on the verge of grasping Friedrich Schiller’s notion that intense emotions did not have to be virtuous; this idea foreshadowed the reconfiguration of emotional experience in Romanticism, as a realm of sublime engagement that existed for its own sake, detached from the everyday. So also did Turgenev’s fear of marriage. Only a Romantic, a Byron or a Marie d’Agoult, would have viewed the love and comfort of married life as opposed to artistic inspiration. But Turgenev proved himself to be a sentimentalist in his self-searching torment over Ekaterina Sokovnina; only a sentimentalist could have become so distraught over “this burdensome coldness of the soul.” It is as if Turgenev were both Clarissa and Lovelace rolled into one.

Nineteenth-century normative attitudes towards emotions broke sharply with those of the eighteenth. Reason and cool self-possession again came into vogue. Human nature was, as in the Reformation, condemned as prone to illusion and inconstancy—only now on scientific rather than religious grounds. Thomas Malthus, François Guizot, G. W. F. Hegel, and others offered new reasons to trust in authority and the rule of law. As philology, history, and political economy strove for scientific rigor, psychiatrists began advancing the medicalization of human sexuality and emotional experience. By Charles Darwin’s time, it was difficult for educated Europeans to see themselves in other than a diagnostic mode. Emotions were problems; they were symptoms or causes of conditions with etiologies and possible cures. Plamper tracks the impact of this developing psychiatric framework on military thinking in Russia. This is a highly original project that promises a new, deeper understanding of the impact of World War I. Russia confronted the new kind of warfare more intensely and earlier than other nations. Mechanized weaponry killed heroes and cowards with equal efficiency; most deaths were inflicted by anonymous

8. Ibid., 354–430.
shell fragments. Military psychology was ready with a new vocabulary of fear that gave voice to the soldier’s sense of helplessness, as well as with diagnoses and treatments.

In literature and the arts, the diagnostic mode won some over and inspired others to seek to transcend it. In works by George Bernard Shaw, Thomas Mann, or Marcel Proust, characters appear to be dominated by their inescapable limitations and perceptual errors. But another set of artists and thinkers, including Henrik Ibsen, Friedrich Nietzsche, Lou Andreas-Salomé, Rainer Maria Rilke, August Rodin, Colette, Igor Stravinsky, rebelled against the strict standards and the diagnoses, insisting that joy could be found in transgression and that the psyche could generate its own satisfying new mythologies. In this context, Andrei Belyi’s *Petersburg* looks forward to surrealism, as Matich suggests. Neither diagnostician nor rebel, Belyi plunges the reader into a world of pathological fantasy that seems to have no borders or purpose. Not only are the characters’ plans and actions undercut by their gruesome results, but there seems to be no safe ground from which an onlooker could diagnose or correct. Was Belyi already sufficiently aware of World War I’s likely effects to anticipate them? That seems hardly possible. Instead, both Matich’s and Plamper’s papers reveal a Russia that is hardly a follower or taker in relation to western European cultural change and appears several steps ahead.

In relation to avant-garde projects of moral liberation of the prewar period, such as those of the Pankhurst sisters or Magnus Hirschfeld, the Soviet regime, like the fascist regimes, preserved some ideas, but rejected many others. There was no return to repressive Victorian self-discipline, although, as Plamper suggests, certain interwar regimes relied on an older “romantic” view of fear. Through the massive deployment of coercive violence, and the universal fear it generated, governments sought to shore up unlimited dedication and heroism. As Modris Ecksteins suggests, this revaluation of fear may have stemmed from the trench warfare experiences of veterans as much as antiwar sentiment did. Without suggesting that “totalitarian” regimes were all of a piece, one can recognize that


Bolsheviks and fascists shared a moment in emotional history. Along with fear, they used obligatory pageantry and ceremony, disseminated through the mass media, to shape normative enthusiasm, unending optimism, unqualified commitment. These governments needed little from the populations they rounded up and confined in camps, only that rumors of their fates be sufficiently frightening.

The conditions described in Kuntsman’s essay—systematic deprivation, confinement, and neglect—differ sharply from those instituted by, for example, the French during the Battle of Algiers or the Argentine military during its dirty war. In those latter cases, forms of torture, including systematic humiliation and the careful staging of pain (so that others could see or hear), were aimed at breaking down resistance and forcing revelations. The Soviet gulags, in contrast, arranged a kind of social death, in which the social distinctions crucial to the identities of many detainees were systematically eroded. Disgust could become, in this context, an instrument for preserving a sense of self, a way to reassert a social identity in the face of threatening social death, a desperate gambit aimed at revivifying one’s sense of who one was. At the same time, the word disgust hardly begins to capture the range of emotions, of despair, defeat, violation, anxiety, that Kuntsman finds in the texts under consideration, suggesting that disgust was hardly enough to protect victims from the acidic effects of their internment. One wonders if a certain kind of trauma could be identified among the survivors, not one of combat with arms, but one stemming from combat for self. This possibility in turn suggests the need to better understand the systematic humiliation that individuals at the low end of the social order both routinely suffer and inflict on each other, in “normal” liberal societies.

In short, these essays shed precious new light on an emerging terrain, and, by their careful interpretive work, point to important connections and chronological twists. They share a method: a close reading of texts inspired by a conviction that texts can partially reveal personal experience. Unlike earlier efforts at psychohistory or psychological biography, however, these papers need not rely on a specific psychoanalytic or psychotherapeutic theory to find meaning in personal experience. Having gone through and beyond poststructuralism, historians are now capable of historicizing such theories and the selves that human beings “fashion” or, rather, with effort, “manage.”

As Plamper notes, historians of emotion can now begin to search for possible causal explanations of emotional change. As I have suggested elsewhere, one possible cause can be found in an interaction between prevailing conceptions of the self and the emotional styles these conceptions dictate, on the one hand, and the fate of these styles when put into

practice. Human emotions cannot be pushed too far; they are inherently vague and unresolved, because they are about orientations, not decisions. One cannot be perfectly sensible, perfectly rational, perfectly enthusiastic, perfectly sincere, perfectly healthy.\textsuperscript{13} When a government, a family, an institution, in a moment of crisis, tries to walk on water, it sinks. And when an individual tries to preserve an intact sense of self in radically altered circumstances, she or he will certainly fail, at least partially.

\textsuperscript{13} Reddy, \textit{Navigation of Feeling}. 