PICTURING LIVE WAR

A research practice in an installation and in a text

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Declaration

I confirm that the work presented herein is my own, and that it was produced as a result of my original research

Signed:

Sabine El Chamaa
ABSTRACT

As a local filmmaker I was compelled to film during the 34-day war waged by the Israeli government on Lebanon in July 2006. My questioning of the function of my images amidst the proliferating international and local live media images of that war led me to pursue an interdisciplinary research. This thesis project, presented partly as an installation and partly as a theoretical text, is the result of my research.

My thesis argument and original contribution to knowledge is that ‘co-liveness’ has become inherent in the act of watching live war since the first televised live broadcast of war (The First Gulf War, 1991). I have defined co-liveness as the local citizens’ experience of war as an embodied reality and as a mediatised event turning them simultaneously into potential targets and media spectators.

My colleagues’ non-recognition of ‘co-liveness’ in my edited sequences leads me to question how the factual/fictional construct of what counts as an image of war is recognised revealing the ‘technostrategic discourse’ (Cohn, 1987) as a recognisable language/view from a gun/air raid perspective.

Michel Foucault’s “return to the origin” (1977) inspires the analysis of the framing of first Gulf War (1991) and its critique as ‘infotainment’ and ‘spectacle’, as discursive practices where foundational omissions are inscribed in a critique that perceives all spectators to be distant to war’s materiality. A diffractive reading enables me to propose an imaginary co-live perspective on the margins of the text.

The accompanying installation “Fragments” is conceived through the combined influences of ‘Détournement’ (Debord, 1958), the ‘Parergon’ (Derrida, 1979) and ‘Articulation’ (Haraway, 1992) where every visitor’s trajectory maps a personal interaction with the elements on display. Co-presence lends a renewed reading to what it means to ‘watch war’ when visitors share their impressions in a final discussion.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Each exchange with colleagues, friends, family members, and supervisors, has been a building brick in a research journey that has been as tedious, humbling, and challenging as it has been fulfilling. I would like to thank, in no particular order, all the individuals who have helped me along the way and without whose support my research would not have been possible. Rachel Moore, for leading me through the rough beginnings of my research and encouraging me to trust my instinctive writing. Tony Dowmunt and Pasi Valiaho for being extremely patient supervisors and for guiding me to surpass my limitations. Michelle Obeid for her unfailing advice and relentless positive outlook. Sami Hermez, Helena Nassif, Layal Ftouni, Onur Suzan Kömürcü, and Stefania Charitou for our inspiring conversations. Dana Dajani for offering me to stay with her in the last endless months prior to my final submission. Paul Saint Amour for his support and our inspiring exchanges at U-Penn University. Apostolos Papadimitriou for single-handedly and passionately setting up the space for *Fragments* in 2012. Jessica Harrington for donating her time to give me advice on my installation space. Khyam Allami, Fortunata Calabro, and Nadine Gharzeddine for their friendship and invaluable support in setting up *Fragments* in 2013. Zahera Harb for her generous and immediate advice when it was most needed. Nazira Kalache, my grandmother, for inspiring me to look beyond the mundaneness of watching war on Television. Helene Kalache, my mother, and Dania Chamaa, my sister, for their relentless and unquantifiable moral encouragement and daily support.
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The topic of war preoccupied me for a long time before I engaged in this research, having punctuated a large part of my childhood and adolescence, later becoming the main theme of my fiction films. It was as a civilian whose immediate family members did not partake in the fighting that I experienced the intermittent wars constituting what came to be known as the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), and it was as a civilian and filmmaker that I experienced the July 2006 Lebanon war, filming without any intention to turn my images into a research by practice. I am stressing the civilian aspect of my experience because of its pertinence to my own camera placement, and therefore to the perspective of the images that I filmed at the time, and to my subsequent mode of address in my thesis. My access to the visibility of the 2006 war came from inside the house where I stayed with my grandmother and from public spaces that were (supposedly) not being targeted. The Israeli army’s air raids drafted differential zones of security within the country separating those who were going to be spared and those who would be targeted, while keeping everybody under the threat of potential accidents. Although my grandmother’s house was not in a regularly targeted area, the frequent air raids that were labelled either as ‘accidental’ or ‘tactical’ meant that all residents were potential targets.

When the Israeli government waged war on Lebanon in July 2006, I had been filming intermittently in Beirut since 2001 around my preoccupation with a feeling of a pending war. I continued filming, but now it was the July 2006 war’s course in my (and my family’s) daily life that took over. “There are situations,” writes Slavoj Zizek on the topic of violence, “when the only truly practical thing to do is to resist the
temptation to engage immediately and to ‘wait and see’ by means of a patient, critical analysis.” I waited for three more years following the end of the July 2006 war before engaging with the footage I had filmed. However these years of waiting came from a sense of disappointment and were not the result of calculated patience. Before my introduction I would like to elaborate the reasons why I have pursued a research by practice instead of the post-production path that I would have normally followed and to contextualize the choices behind my writing style as a guideline for the reader.

1. A re-generative practice

Unedited mini-DV tapes gathered in a drawer in my Beirut flat between 2001 and the early summer months of 2006. Containing recordings of intermittent filming, they seemed like an endless project in the making. I lived in the United States most of these years and filmed every time I went back to Beirut to visit my family. Distance from the routine of life in Beirut exacerbated my impression that the city was prey to a continued and continuous pending threat making citizens (myself included) live in a constant state of ‘waiting for the next war’. I then thought that filming Beirut (its streets, some moments with my family, road trips with friends, etc.) where my memories of the civil war persisted would make me understand the quotidian that produced this tension. However, what my footage mostly revealed is the manner in which the city reflects the conflicted local and regional perspectives leading to the sensation of perpetually ‘waiting for the next war’. Anthropologist Sami Hermez’s doctoral thesis entitled ‘In the Meanwhile: Living everyday in anticipation of violence

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in Lebanon’ (2011),\(^2\) spells out the very nature of the sensation I was seeking to capture on film. Hermez sees anticipation of war as part of the mundane suggesting that “it is a practice that moves elusively in duration and is not confined to a specific moment in time.”\(^3\) As a way of living, of speaking, of being, the anticipation of violence for Hermez constantly makes “the past fold into the present.”\(^4\) In my countless conversations with Hermez, I understood the complexity of the anticipation of war as a structure that is inscribed in the routine of daily life, in the regional political climate, and in the intricacies of language with its enmeshment in individual memories of the Lebanese Civil War. It was in the early summer months of 2006 that I returned to settle in Beirut. For all the filming around the anticipation of war, the onset of the July 2006 war as a daily reality was shocking. I borrowed a friend’s video camera during the 34-day siege fuelled by disbelief at the sudden extensive use of violence and by a compulsiveness to document its traces in my immediate surroundings. For myself, and for many people that I filmed and interviewed during that war, an overall sensation of being at an impasse and expecting no political solutions was a feeling that was often verbalized and fuelled by the Israeli government’s actual and psychological warfare (through leaflets, drones, random phone calls offering rewards in exchange of information). Additionally, the 24-hour media visibility of the resulting deaths of civilians and the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure continuously asserted the technological superiority of Israeli military equipment.


\(^4\) Hermez, “The war is going to ignite,” 341
“How can the world just watch and do nothing?” was a persistent question repeatedly asked by interviewees on camera. I realize now that what this question raises is the degree of responsibility one human being has towards another, and brings to the forefront an important consideration as to the relationship between the visible as knowable in the media (the world watches, therefore the world knows), and the awaited action that could produce the change that would stop the course of war. As John Ellis writes: “Events on the screen make a mute appeal: ‘You cannot say you did not know’,” adding that this produces: “an aching sense that something must be done.” The sensation that something must be done acknowledges that the quest for peace during war resides in others, ‘others’ being citizens of the countries that are not under attack. The people who ask this question ponder whether the so-called world is incapacitated or does not care. Yet the complaint about the silence of those who watch and cannot act or re-act masks the fact that we too watch, we in that case being the citizens living war just as we had watched on TV other wars in other cities. There are clearly degrees of incapacitation operating in different countries, and if watching means knowing then it is a form of knowing that does not enable immediate change. The immediacy required in war is suppressed by the military technology which functions at a speed far superior to the time it takes decisions makers to reflect on the next step that could halt violence. That question opens up another, namely that of filming war (or what to film of war), since watching comes as a result of someone having filmed which, in the case of media institutions, is (and has been since 1991) live. Watching live war can result in fear, anxieties, muteness, activism, indifference etc., and is not quantifiable since it varies from one individual to another and may

well be cumulative. In my case it was detrimental to my ability to bring my film project into completion.

The end of the July 2006 war left me with a sense of utter disappointment. People died, families were displaced, and bridges and buildings had fallen and as the daily reconstruction started fast, my own video images became dated and they reasserted our incapacity (mine, others’, and the world’s) to stop the course of war while watching it on TV, living it on a daily basis, and filming its traces. My footage reminded me how quickly adaptation to war’s course and to its end takes place and how the persistence of life’s quotidian motions helps one to incorporate and negotiate daily notions of danger and impending violence. This was an adaptation to a forced fate however, and not to a choice of life and self-realization, for who would choose war as a means of growth? Life and death here belonged to the whims of politicians and soldiers taking orders and my own images only asserted that my everyday life in Beirut (consisting of pre-war, war, and post-war in repeating cycles) deepened my alienation between life’s course (with its hopes, loves, dreams and yearnings) and its resulting images (waiting for war, living war, adapting to war). My images revealed to me how random this war was in its beginning and ending and yet how impactful on my everyday life for years to come, as this research attests.

I’d like to borrow feminist theorist Donna Haraway’s notion of ‘regeneration’ from her philosophical reflections on science and technology to reflect on why my own images (videos as well as photographs) may have become non-regenerative in the immediate wake of the end of the 2006 war. “For salamanders” Haraway writes, “regeneration after injury, such as the loss of a limb, involves regrowth of structure
and restoration of function with the constant possibility of twinning or other odd topographical productions at the site of former injury,” adding that “we have all been injured, profoundly. We require regeneration, not rebirth.”

Using the hybridity between humans and machines visible in cyborg imagery, Haraway calls for abandoning myths of (re)birth and the categories that separate the technological from the natural, in order to find ways in which the bodily and the technological can be explored as complementary. War creates multiple sites of injury where the technological and the bodily always clash (through the destruction of places and of bodies) and/or combine (through the reconstruction of places and of bodies). A process of regeneration necessarily starts just as war ends, as the rubble is cleaned, the dead are counted and mourned, and the realization of what happened slowly settles in requiring adaptation to a changed life. It is precisely in the interconnectedness between the latest military technology of war and the helplessness of bodies that my confusion grew. Drones, for instance, that I learned to hear and detect, (and was told not to film because my camera would appear to be a weapon to its operator) were technological vision-weapons and they placed (us) local citizens under constant surveillance and the threat of an impending strike. The soldiers who operated these remote-vision killer machines were akin to invisible cyborgs capable of striking anyone they wanted from a distance, and through the recorded vision of a camera lens. The video camera in my hands was also akin to additional mechanical eyes and revealed, parallel to my own vision, my quotidian life through its recorded image. Mine were embodied and private records whereas the camera on the drone took aerial images of me as a potential target. Both cameras turned a life-course into recordable and visible bits of information to be used for very different purposes, one enabling the

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killing of a life in its course, the other attempting to preserve the personal memory of 
the traces of war in daily life. Additionally, the internalized and imagined 
visualizations of how Beirut appears through the drones and bomber planes’ sighting 
devices (available on the internet) competed with local media’s live camera angles 
revealing the resulting destruction. In the midst of so many competing angles of 
recorded sights, a forced and an imposed fusion between the technological and the 
embodied experience of war was taking place with a violence that I had not felt prior 
to that war. It is what I have proposed naming ‘co-liveness’ in my thesis, that is, for a 
local citizen the hybrid space between the living body’s experience of war (with 
smells, sights, and presence on the ground), and its live mediatisation. My growing 
scepticism towards the production and dissemination of images as part of the natural 
and expected flow of evidence of war, and my incapacity to process the significance 
of so much imagery while experiencing war as a material reality, led me to pursue 
research as a regenerative practice.

In order for the technological and the bodily to merge, or for regeneration, as 
Haraway calls it, to take place when the technological (as drones, as air raids, and as 
live TV images of death through air raids) had been antagonistic, a practice that 
questioned and reflected upon what it means to record sight in contemporary wars 
became necessary. My research is a modest step in that direction. When everyone 
possesses and uses cameras (from armies, media institutions, fighters, to civilians 
with phones) and when there is no lack of space to post the results (TV, the internet, 
portable phones) it is important to situate whose sight is being recorded (a soldiers’, a 
citizen’s, an institution’s), to determine its angle (space, the air, the ground, an office 
far away, the house) and to understand how it gets translated in order to create
meaning. Does the recording of sight sustain war, does it suppress others, does it teach one how to resist, does it seek a common ground, does it demonize, etc.?

The performativity of war was and continues to be a topic of inquiry for various Palestinian, Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese filmmakers and artists some of whose works question in content and in form the production (and suppression) of the meaning and memory(ies) of war. By way of example, Ghassan Salhab’s feature film Beyrouth Fantôme (1998) poetically addresses the fictionalization of war by weaving a thread between fiction and non-fiction. Interspersed within the film’s narration, the films’ protagonists (who presumably grew up in Lebanon during the years of the civil war) look into the camera lens and relay the ongoing anxieties that the years of the Lebanese civil war left them with. Thus the non-fictional traces of a real war that turned into a memory merge into the fictional war of the film revealing their inextricability and the ungraspable, yet persistent marks of violence in the performers’ psyches. Actor, writer, director, musician and artist Rabih Mroué’s lecture-performances, installations and videos equally explore the material traces left by the Lebanese civil war unsettling the fixity of meanings in the act of interpreting images. In Make me stop smoking (2006) for instance, Mroué displays a personal archive of videos, photographs and images that he had been collecting for many years and uses them to reconstruct and narrate to his public what may or may not have taken place revealing how, for every individual memory, fabrications, truth, and fiction continuously merge to produce meaning. Mroué plays himself and other personas in

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7 To name a few artists who have been exploring the traces and narratives of the Lebanese civil war since the late nineties: Lamia Joreige, Rabih Mroué, Lina Saneh, Akram Zaatari, Joanna Hadjithomas, Khalil Joreige, Walid Sadek, Tony Chakar, Walid Raad amongst others whose individual works often probe the fluid borders between film, performance, video art, architecture, and archives.
his performances disrupting the notion of separateness between self and others, while juggling with the figure of the witness/actor in war. Similarly, filmmaker, artist, and photographer Akram Zaatar’s films and installations question the fluid line that runs between rumours, silences, and official histories of war. His installation entitled “Letter to a Refusing Pilot” (2013) for instance is evocative of a side-shadowing\(^8\) poetic proposition where the horror of what ‘might have been’ is subtly intertwined with the melancholy of ‘what has been’. Zaatar’s installation is based on a rumour he heard during the 1980’s about the refusal of an Israeli pilot to follow his superior’s orders to target a school in his hometown in Sidon and who released his bombs into the sea instead. Zaatar later realized that what he thought was an urban legend was the real story of an Israeli pilot who spoke publicly about his refusal after ten years of silence. Weaving an ominous music track into video images of the quotidian daily life of the pupils attending the school, Zaatar evokes the threat of the potential bombs that never materialized. In his installation, the fragility of life (where schoolchildren nature, ants, and the breeze that makes the paper rockets in the hands of schoolboys fly, and his memories all interconnect) seems to be always in danger of extinction. It is one soldier’s decision to disobey that maintains the pulsating rhythms of a life of incalculable possibilities in Zaatar’s installation.

The installation format was not one that I had explored in depth prior to this research. But the freedom of looking at images as traces rather than as carriers of fixed stories led me to a deeper understanding of the complex interrelatedness between war and its representations. In my installation entitled “Fragments”, submitted alongside this text

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\(^8\) In his book *Foregone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History* (1994) Michael André Bernstein proposes to fight against foregone conclusions and claims that embracing the technique of side-shadowing (or what could have happened) allows for the untold possibilities to be taken into consideration, thus opening up the richness and mystery of the continued interpretation of life
and elaborated upon throughout this thesis, the combinations of texts, photographs, video sequences, computer images, and my co-presence with visitors revealed how different interactions with the materiality of war (from a distance, from proximity, as a fiction, as news, as a grandparent’s story) produce and alter the reception of the meaning of the images. Just as my practice became more relational, its regenerative potential was revealed to me and my research tools (video editing, writing, and setting up the installation space on three different occasions) turned into the constitutive means of a project that is (continuously) in a state of ‘becoming’ and that can only be complemented through my interactions with others. For that reason, my thesis structure details my research journey through my exchanges with colleagues, and reveals how these exchanges branched to lead me to explore existing scholarship on the representation of war.
2. On the linguistic and the visual

The “linguistic” and the “visual” can't be neatly distinguished because their relation is not one of binary opposition, negation, logical antinomy, or even dialectic in the usual sense. Word and image are more like ships passing in the night, two storm-tossed barks on the sea of the unconscious signaling to each other.9

W.J.T Mitchell

I propose that the reader approach this thesis as a practice in words and in images rather than as a research divided into separate categories of theory and practice. My research is anchored in practice and where practice initially referred to my filmmaking practice that I questioned during war, it later came to designate the processes of editing my footage, writing my thesis, sharing and co-learning. The tools I used to engage with my research are verbal and visual and they combine and clash to reveal the limits inherent in the verbal and visual representations of war. These tools led to a map of the spatial and temporal interactions with my colleagues allowing my research to take shape. In London, new angles on war and its representation were revealed to me that I had not previously reflected upon. Becoming a subject of study, ‘air raids’ transformed from being loud terrifying sounds into two words written on a historical timeline whose development for military science could be traced in books and whose impact could be analysed in war images. My experiences too had turned into digital images that I carried around and excavated for meanings. Although distance from ‘war’ as a daily anticipation allowed

me to engage in quiet reflection I understood that reading and writing about ‘war’ in
general might constitute the trap of ‘objectivity’ that would lead me away from the
materiality of war. The July 2006 war had produced a sense of urgency that I did not
wish to put aside as irrelevant. The search for the interconnectedness between
language and weapons (or where to position my new self as opposed to my old self in
a practice that reflects on war) led me to a seminal text by the feminist scholar Carol
Cohn, entitled “Sex and Death in the World of Rational Defense Intellectuals” (1987).
Cohn writes that by learning the language of nuclear strategists (which she refers to as
‘Technostrategic’) she almost lost her own (which she refers to as ‘English’):
“Speaking the expert language not only offers distance, a feeling of control, and an
alternative focus for one’s energies, it also offers escape. Escape from thinking
oneself as a victim of nuclear war.” Cohn discusses this as a linguistic position
giving power to the speaker in relation to the subject and eliminating some of the
notions that she wanted to address, such as ‘peace’ and ‘human suffering’. Cohn’s
text confirmed my hesitancy to fully embrace a new language by affirming that for a
victim of war language is embodied, subjective and thus never distanced from the
feelings of pain and mourning. I understood I would have to withstand the same
challenge with critical analysis for it provided me with a linguistic stance that
distanced me from my own emotions. The sense of loss and of mourning had
propelled my choice to pursue a research. Negating my emotions was not my aim, but
learning how to incorporate them in my critical reflection was. My thesis thus
expresses both my lived experience of war and my distance from it through a constant
back and forth changing of linguistic and visual registers that are nonetheless

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10 Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” *Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society*, 12, no.4 (Summer, 1987): 706, accessed May 15, 2013:
subjective. Using the analogy of a camera, critical reflection and self-reflexivity represent the different lenses that I use, while I remain the person operating the camera from a subjective and situated position. Feminist epistemology posits situated knowledge as the embodied way of knowing life first through its direct experience and through its effects on the body. Yet situated knowledge, for Haraway, neither denotes authenticity nor absolves one from responsibility, but only asserts the partiality of experience and serves to abolish the illusion that one angle denotes objectivity. The situatedness of my body and therefore my knowledge as a civilian who has lived and feared the violence of war is the position from which I wrote and is by no means privileged, superior, nor is it inferior, to other positions, but it is one that I have inhabited and aimed to understand more deeply in my pursuit of research in London. Presented with a different font (e.g., Baskerville in pages 27, 28, 29, 30), the self-reflexive parts of this thesis are meant to question how mundane dealings with war produce bodily knowledge (Fear, for instance, is the embodied knowledge of danger). They may alter a reader’s reception of the information shared, may lessen or sharpen its authoritativeness, may question it, etc., but invariably are meant to question what knowledge of war is, from where and from whom does it generate and in which form/at (namely form and format) is it considered viable. In this sense, the text remains open to interaction and exchange reflecting the fragmented structuring principle of my accompanying installation where, as noted, visitors could walk and experience different views of war (personal, military, media). In both the text and the installation, I aspire to implement filmmaker and theorist Trinh T. Minh-Ha’s recommendation, in her essay about representation, otherness, and authority: “It is crucial to bring about ways of looking and of reflecting that make it impossible to engage on a subject (the content, the cause) without engaging at the same time the
question of how (by what means) it is materialized and how meaning is inter-produced in the process.”\textsuperscript{11} It is my hope that Minh-ha’s question of how it has materialized is continuously revealed in this thesis through the fragmentation of the text to draw from the installation and vice versa.

3. The articulation of co-liveness through reflection and diffraction

Self-reflexivity and critical analysis have enabled the articulation (rather than the representation) of co-liveness as my main thesis argument. Co-liveness is a space that exists at the intersection between the experiential embodiment and materiality of war as it happens (and is therefore a present-tense), and its simultaneous mediatisation. By the time I wrote about it, co-liveness had turned into the lived memory of the embodiment of war and into the recorded signal of its mediatisation (in my own footage). A filmed image of co-liveness turns its experiential and embodied side into an image of civilians watching war on television erasing the material reality of war and removing the capacity for action or the imposed inaction inherent within that space. Donna Haraway uses the term articulation in lieu of representation to reveal the ‘artifactualism’\textsuperscript{12} of nature (or how we perceive/construct nature, as she says through fiction and fact) writing: “To articulate is to signify. It is to put things together, scary things, risky things, contingent things.”\textsuperscript{13} Articulation has allowed me


\textsuperscript{12} The French philosopher Jacques Derrida elaborates on the artifactuality of Televised liveness, where factuality is made into an artifice, as elaborated further in the body of the thesis. Artifactualism in Haraway’s writing points to the non-divisiveness of the categories of nature/culture and fact/fiction.

to look for new ways to express co-liveness instead of attempting to represent it within a filmed image. For Haraway articulation does not rely on reflection (or that which creates a duplicate image) but operates through diffraction (akin to a ray of light that spreads to reveal interference patterns): “an articulated world has an undecidable number of modes and sites where connections can be made.”

By way of example it is precisely through the articulation of the multiplicity of my colleagues’ reactions to my own footage that I was able to perceive how my images diffracted into different readings. Co-liveness was only visible to colleagues who had recently experienced war as civilians but appeared like images of watching war without any perceivable physical danger inherent to that space to others who had only known war through images. In taking into account this difference in perception, and in noting this as a diffraction path, my research branched in order to find the parameters that make a war image recognizable.

Although Haraway considers reflection to be merely transposing a mirror image of the same and therefore merely reflecting the same pattern or problematic into a new space, I view the process of reflection as inherent to vision, and to the camera’s functioning, and therefore an essential component to my research aims. Reflection (as self-reflexivity), diffraction (as a registering of interference patterns), and critical analysis are complementary methods of inquiry for me. In short, it is through effects of reflection and diffraction that this thesis took shape, and itself can be seen as an artifactual articulation of questions, emotions, and reflections about the representation of war that my research journey in London has enabled.

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14 Haraway, “The Promises of Monsters”
4. The chapters

It is important to note that my thesis project neither proposes a new theory of liveness nor suggests a model for the representation of live war, and despite the fact that it is guided by feminist epistemology and situated knowledge it does not engage with the analysis of gender and war, itself a complex topic worthy of a separate study. I have approached my thesis project as a practicing filmmaker and my aim is to observe how proximity and distance to the materiality of war impacts the reception of its mediatisation and to suggest additional angles for rethinking the complexity of the role of image making during war.

The chapters of my thesis reconstruct my research journey beginning in Chapter 1 with recollections of the July 2006 war (Harb Tammuz) when competing versions of live war were at once useful to map areas of safety, and paralyzing by the sheer quantity of violent information. My argument in this chapter is that live war has rarely been observed from the place of reception of air raids. Elaborating on my research aims my research question is proposed as finding methods that would allow me to reveal the interconnectedness between the experience of war and its mediatisation (co-liveness), to counter the view of war as a spectacle, and to explore the inherent ambiguities in any attempt at representing war.

The process of watching and editing sequences from the footage I filmed during the 2006 July war is explored in Chapter 2. I question what makes a war image recognizable when two edited sequences showing my grandmother watching live war
on local television are perceived by my colleagues as ‘not looking like war’. My argument in this chapter is that my colleague’s non-perception of co-liveness is inseparable from what happens in the hors-champs (out-of-frame) of the material TV set itself. While war continues through the night and after the TV has been turned off for some viewers, (Lebanese viewers in this case), others, living at a distance from war, fail to perceive the co-existence of the materiality of war and its live mediatisation. Noting that my colleagues’ perceptions are diffractions of their experiences of war, I decide to maintain co-presence as a constitutive learning element in my research project. Guy Debord’s ‘Détournement’ (1958), Jacques Derrida’s ‘Parergon’ (1979) and Donna Haraway’s ‘Articulation’ (1992), are explored as having influenced the building blocks of “Fragments”. In the fragmented and exploratory space, cohesion is maintained through co-presence where I gather with attendees at the end of their visit to exchange their immediate opinions and views.

Chapter 3 explores what counts as an image of war through a short historical account. My argument in this chapter is that what Carol Cohn has called ‘the technostrategic discourse’ (1987) used by nuclear strategists, has been transposed into the visual framing of live war. Combining strategy and technology, it is the language/angle used by nuclear strategists to discuss war from a disembodied and aerial view. My argument in this chapter is that transhistoricity (looking at war as having a continuous narrative) and tecnnotstrategy combined are what make a live war image recognizable rather than the view of war from the quotidian space of a local home where war is being waged.
In chapter 4, Foucault’s advice to “return to the origin” and look for foundational omissions leads me to analyse the first Gulf War on CNN (1990-1991) and the critiques of live war (war as a spectacle, as infotainment, as virtuality) as part of the discursive practices of live war. My argument in this chapter is that co-liveness remains a blind spot for critics of the first Gulf War CNN broadcast such as Paul Virilio, and Jean Baudrillard who do not theorize the local conception of war as an embodied danger that is mediatised at the same time. Inserting performative/diffractive readings of fictional propositions that respond to the critique’s omissions I evoke co-liveness on the margins of the text itself.

And finally, my conclusion reiterates the trajectory that my research took to take shape in the form of a text and an installation.
Chapter 1. Introduction: I am free

Someone’s body is sitting in a small plane. That body will never be mine, it is not mine. It’s a man’s body. He is smiling to the photographer, in black and white. The body is comfortable, seated in a plane flying over a city. This body can, with a move of the hand press a button to release a bomb and his eyes, still smiling, may never know the true impact of one hand move on other bodies. Newsreels watched for this research have often doubled me, whether in Hiroshima, Vietnam, Baghdad and Gaza turning me into the viewer of the aggression and the receiver of the bomb at once. I saw this scene in the countless photographs, and newsreels I watched for this research. I saw how the view from the plane makes it look like a mere piece of empty land on fire. Distance in the
photograph equates with the absence of other human bodies. Now I see why they insist, ‘they’ being the military spokesmen, that their wars are clean. For this soldier, it is clean. Between him and his target there are spaces and more spaces while his tiny space remains unaffected by his own actions.

It is a duel between a finger and many invisible bodies. Blood is absent here and only dust rises to cover the view. If he could see it (the blood that is) he would not recognize it as human anyway. Everything on his screen is black, white or green. It is the colour of the blood of aliens in Hollywood science-fiction movies. If he could see it, blood that is, would he stop, turn around, doubt, and maybe like that pilot I heard about fly back to his home and refuse to obey orders?
The year: 2006.
A war was waged by technologically equipped democratic bodies, or were they democratically equipped technological bodies?
I walked a street, my feet were on the ground but the soldier’s feet watching me remained invisible to me. Where were they? I would’ve liked to throw a stone straight into the camera lens of the it/he/she/there (what I learned to call a drone) as it followed me in a small Beirut street. A flying object, a buzzing sound controlled by a he or a she, sitting there in another country. It terrorized me with a camera and enslaved me to a possible death. But I was free to run away. And I was free to be followed, tracked, and surveilled. “You are free to be arrested, imprisoned and even hanged,” the Turkish poet Nâzım Hikmet wrote.

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I was free to hear my city bombed by the latest technologies and I was even free to watch it on my television and to film it as I did, in between breakfasts, lunches, and dinners, and then to research it as I was compelled to do, and to write about it as I have done and continue to do. But, as the poet said: “this kind of freedom is a sad affair under the stars.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} Hikmet Ran, “A Sad State of Freedom”. 
1.1 A newsreel from the eighties and a shipment of bombs in 2006

Watching newsreel footage of Beirut being bombed relentlessly by the Israeli army during the 1980s, filmed in a panoramic angle with the camera placed right by the tank firing rockets startled me. Is this how Beirut was being bombed when I was growing up there? Although more than a decade had passed since the end of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), these images left me with an irreconcilable sensation of an offence perpetrated twice. The first offence was the actual Israeli bombings of Beirut the scope of which I could not grasp at that age, as must have been the case for several Beirutis of my generation who were born in a city already at war. That offence was revived in the mediated environment of the Israeli soldier in a frame that sustained my gaze right on the Israeli tank and on a faceless soldier buried in the invisibility of his function and the commonality of his military role. With every new firing round of rockets I shuddered far more in front of the images than I did as a child residing in the city, or so it seemed to me as I tried to reconstruct my memory. These images made me aware of a new angle of vision, one that had never been my own. This was a military angle, a soldier’s viewpoint from his tank. The angle was static for the tank was placed far enough to know what it was targeting and the camera operator neither searched for the aim nor tried to predict where the explosion would occur. His video camera appeared to be a mere extension of the soldier’s weapon. My memory of my lived experience and that military camera angle had never stood face to face before. Watching these images was akin to being visually exposed to a foreign language, a language that displayed the source of the missing half of my predominantly aural memory of the Israeli bombing. No visual record of the mental space of my experience of war was recorded or recordable. It had moved

into a hazy space where reality and dreams mix to form a subjective and forever shifting mental image. The video images relocated me and made me part of the Israeli soldiers’ environment as they claimed precedence. I stood with the soldiers who were manning their tanks and I could even look behind them and around them as the cameraman’s lens moved about, whereas in my memory I remained with family members and neighbours in a dimly lit room, or was it a garage filled with strangers, or maybe even a staircase listening for the sound of metal ripping through stones? This military video managed to confuse my memory as well as my sense of responsibility, as I was able to detect in a couple of recurrent dreams. In those dreams I would see myself walking alongside Israeli soldiers as they prepared to launch missiles into Lebanon. Unable to communicate with the soldiers despite my presence amongst them, I wished to alter the course of their attacks but was incapacitated. I was invisible to them, and akin to a ghost who could only watch but not act. Inside the dream state, the thin material separation that was provided by the TV screen vanished to leave me standing right inside a video image’s unfolding of events whose outcome was not negotiable. When the image started with the launching of a rocket, the next one would be its landing.

Although these presumed bombs did not actually kill me, for I sat watching the video, the framing managed to turn me into a ghost to my own lived experience, albeit symbolically. The frame asserted the absence, invisibility and unimportance of the local citizens being bombed and the interiority of the city’s houses was erased while the re-ordering of its external architecture was made visible through the massive destruction. There seemed to be no inside to this frame in which Beirut was turned into a mere cityscape or what could have been a pre-fabricated Hollywood set.
Additionally, the images claimed that this was an important day in the telling of the history of my city, demonstrating that my human capacity at recollection would never equal the video camera’s immortalizing of military operations in images. What was I doing on that particular day? Where was I sitting? I had no idea. As the images progressed, a reporter translated them to his (intended) audience. Standing by the tank, he stated that these bombs, though destructive, were only targeting the terrorists, implying that the complex notion of what defines and who categorizes terrorists was now programmable into weapons, and immediately detectable and destroyable by bombs. These images communicated in audio-visuals a military perspective inscribing the politically say-able within the see-able as image. In this instance the epistemology of war became invariably linked with the trajectory of the functionality of weapons and of the mediatized visibility of the weapons’ impact on cities. My direct experience that was neither indexed, nor documented, and that could only be accessed through a hazy process of recollection was momentarily muted by these images. But had I filmed my own hiding and waiting during the 1980s would that have changed the course of the bombing? Not really. These bombs did victimize and kill in action and in reality at the time, but the trace left by their representation can no longer kill anyone.

The very production of these images in their choice of framing and distribution as images of war betrays the processes by which the practice of watching war from a military perspective is normalized. In defence of such a military war report it could be claimed that it is natural for soldiers in the army to kill and that these images only document this killing. “What is ideological” writes Trinh T. Minh-ha, “is often
confused with what is natural or biological, as is often implied in women’s context.” 17 In the context of men who become soldiers, killing is naturalized through the ideology of the ‘right to wage war’. Thus the ‘right to kill in war’ can only be exercised through the ideology of war whereas the removal of that context turns killing into a crime. Who gives that right, and who removes it? The ideology of the right to kill (and who gave these Israeli soldiers this right) is what the archival newsreel video images masked. The visibility of the military angle separates the act of war (and bombing) from its inception as a political perspective. The physical distance from the resulting impact on the bodies residing inside the city leaves an invisible-out-of-frame which is inhabited (so does the reporter assert) by bad people and therefore, killable people. In these images it is the techno-scientific progress of smart bombs (that can target Arab terrorists) that thus upstages the subjectivity of all the people in the filmed frame (and outside of it) grouping them into one reading. Thus the Israeli soldier, the reporter, as well as the targeted individuals are victimizers and victims, heroes and/or villains (depending on which side deciphers the frame), leaving no place for what is in-between and what lies outside of the perimeters of the visibility of war as an orchestrated, framed spectacle of punishment, explosions and fires.

Unlike the delayed exposure time between my lived experience of the 1982 Israeli bombing of Beirut and my viewing of the newsreel of that bombing more than a decade later, it was common during the 2006 July War to simultaneously hear the Israeli air raids, see their live mediated transmission on various local and international channels, and receive additional information from the web. It became impossible to

separate the immediate visibility of war’s targets (future and present) from the local civilians’ TV sets. One particular live war report on CNN struck me at the time as it revealed how watching live war maintained the sensation of the anticipation of violence during war (Hermez, 2011) through the airing of military information as ‘objective’ news.

The war started on the 12th of July 2006 with the Israeli military bombing of Lebanon and the enforcement of an air and naval blockade for a period of thirty-four days. A week into the war, I was at my grandmother’s house watching a CNN live report where the news anchor announced that a shipment of the latest smart bombs was soon to be flown from Washington via the UK to Israel to be used in the Lebanon war. I was angered at being exposed to this information while the city was being bombed. It is not that I preferred to be misinformed but this type of information asserted my position as a passive, incapacitated audience member watching my own city’s predetermined future. I understood that there was nothing I could do to stop or change that decision and my being informed of it through the media turned it at once into knowledge of a political decision as well as a position of power with the prediction of real (and violent) effects due to take place in the near future. Not only was the bombing to continue is what the live report implied, but audiences were informed of the means of its continuation in the name of objective news reporting.

Educating viewers on the destructive and highly efficient capacities of the bombs in question, the CNN anchor was heedless of the open circulation of news and the geographic position of the viewers watching this report seemed irrelevant. This type of information did not alter the life of an American citizen living in New York City
for instance (unless they were related to someone in Lebanon, in which case it still asserted a general public impotence in the face of the decision to wage war), rather it reinforced the power dynamics between the United States and its allies versus Hezbollah, who were presented as a potential worldwide threat. Not only did the live report boast of the technological inequalities between the Israeli army and Hezbollah but it also foreshadowed the failure of political endeavours to stop the bombing. It projected scenes of destruction for days to come and announced the type of ‘recently invented’ bombs that would lead to the death of some Lebanese citizens in the near future. The thought that some of the citizens who died as a result of these bombs weeks later may have watched that live report on television, begs for a moment of reflection on the multiple effects (psychological as well as real) of such information. The anticipation of the arrival of the latest weapons is at once imposed and normalized through the news (for who can stop it once it’s been declared on TV?) and their usage on the local population is a non-negotiable (future) outcome. The satellite technology that serves to relay live news is revealed as a potential (visual) apparatus of punishment, which propels the creation of a time of anticipation of the visible effects of these smart bombs on other cities and other citizens (or of live war). For Michel Foucault, as cited by Hall, an apparatus of punishment is “inscribed in a play of power, and always linked to co-ordinates of knowledge.”18 As one of the local civilians who watched this live report I now had information which submitted me to the power of ‘smart bombs’, and was made just as invisible as in the 1980s newsreel report I’d mentioned earlier. This time however, it happened before the act of bombing had taken effect. In this instance, war and its proceedings were announced to local and non-local citizens as though they were a lethal injection and an inescapable

fate delivered as an objective news item before it turns into a future reality for some, and images of that reality for others. The normalization of the news items happened through placing the utmost importance on the type of arms deals that take place during war (and this is what my grandmother first commented upon a week later when we heard them). The media in this instance serves war’s aim acting as the institutionalized means to produce a discourse of power/knowledge and leading to the anticipation of war as a future (and anticipated) spectacle of punishment.

Michel Foucault elaborated on the role of institutions (hospitals, prisons, universities) in enforcing power through a process of segregation and separation that produces discourses around madness, crime, etc. Taking the live war report of the shipment of smart bombs as an example, it segregates populations in a manner that is similar to that effected by a prison or a hospital. The live information addresses (while separating) those living outside of the borders of Lebanon from those living inside and presents them with a way of understanding and finding meaning in (or a discourse of) the July 2006 war on Lebanon. Foucault’s definition of discourse, as cited by Hall is relevant: “By discourse Foucault meant a group of statements which provide a language for talking about a way of representing the knowledge about a particular topic at a particular historical moment.”¹⁹ A military transaction between Israel and the United States, presented as ‘live news’ thus turns into the ‘future’ pre-ordained reality of a city’s destruction and as information (or knowledge) about the means. Although anyone who owns a TV set at home can presumably watch live war, the term watching unifies the how, what, who and when, whereas it is precisely in the detail that this watching can potentially turn into an extension of the act of waging

war. The same live report (be it the one detailing the shipment of weapons, or the one revealing to my grandmother and I what the air raids we heard were targeting a week later) would have been received with a different necessity for engagement and action in another city (which is not to suggest that all Lebanese citizens reacted or felt similarly).

A week into the airing of that report, air raids woke me up in the early hours of dawn and I headed to the living room where I found that my grandmother was also awake. She asked me if the new shipment of bombs that they mentioned in the news had arrived from Washington: “these air raids” she said “have a different sound from the ones used last week. I think they’re the new ones. Don’t you think so?” We turned the TV set on and watched the live news that relayed images of the targeted areas. My grandmother and I were, at that point, potential targets of unmediated war (as heard in the sounds and as seen in the smoke in the night sky) and media spectators of live war showing the city on fire. The disparity is substantial between a citizen watching the spectacular effects of the bombing on his or her TV set in London and pondering the intensity of the destruction, and a citizen living in Beirut watching the same live report revealing what is happening a few blocks away. Proximity creates a subjective position which necessitates decision making in reaction to every given live war report, whereas being geographically distant turns the same live news into information that may produce indifference or at most a sense of shock at the horrors of contemporary wars. This is what I later came to call co-liveness which I filmed and experienced as part of the quotidian of war. Watching live war and being potential targets of that same mediatized war had merged into one space. Live war in this instance was not
relayed only through one local or international channel. Instead it meant being able to
navigate between various stations, and various versions of live war.

1.2 Live War during the July 2006 War on Lebanon (*Harb Tammuz*)

The mere switch of a channel on the various local and regional satellite channels
(such as Al Manar, Future TV, and Al Jazeera) as well as on international satellite
channels (such as CNN and BBC), all accessible to Lebanese residents, showed a
different live framing of the same war. This difference revealed the manner in which
power relations manifest themselves in (and as) live images of war. Power according
to Foucault is “neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and
existing only in action,”20 and here the exercise of power is observed as the combined
effects of the act of war as well as relaying that act live. The complexity of live war as
a media construct lies in its claim to a ‘liveness’ that continuously shifts allegiances
and therefore angles (depending on who it is framed for and who frames it). By way
of example of how live transmissions are imbricated in power struggles, Israeli
General Dan Halutz declared on local Israeli television on July 12th: “we will turn
Lebanon’s clock back 20 years.”21 Two days later, Hezbollah’s leader (Hasan
Nasrallah) in an apparent answer to that statement stated in a live address that ‘we’
(implying Lebanese citizens) are no longer helpless the way we used to be in the late
seventies and early eighties adding that this time we will retaliate and not suffer alone
the Israeli aggression on Lebanon. Nasrallah finished his speech addressing local
viewers telling them to watch the live destruction of an Israeli warship: “Now, in the


21 Elise Labott, “Israel authorizes ‘severe’ response to abductions” *CNN.com*, July 12, 2006, accessed
June 19, 2013,
/index.html
sea and in front of Beirut, the Israeli military warship that has been targeting and bombing our infrastructures, people’s houses, and civilians, watch it burn and drown.”22 A few minutes later, the live transmission showed one of the Israeli military warships on fire. Celebratory fireworks were heard in the city in the midst of additional Israeli aerial bombings that were also relayed live. In this instance, war’s live image and the real time of war became mixed up turning me into a TV audience to a war where the framed reality appeared to have surpassed fiction. I remained glued to the TV set awaiting the next ‘live’ update as to what was happening a few blocks away.

Noam Chomsky rightly discredits the reasons given for the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon: “The standard Western version is that the invasion was justified by legitimate outrage over the capture of two Israeli soldiers at the border. The posture is cynical fraud.”23 If accepted as legitimate, however, the justification denotes the acquiescence to an alarming disproportion in the value of human life across borders and nationalities. The capture of two Israeli soldiers was accordingly punishable by the destruction of a country’s infrastructure, leading to the deaths of 1200 Lebanese citizens and the displacement of a million others. How was targeting the bridges that linked the Lebanese cities going to bring back the two soldiers, and what did the airport runways that were bombed or the blowing up of power plants leading to a massive oil spill in the sea have to do with it? The Israeli military seemed unconcerned that the indiscriminate bombing could lead to the death of the soldiers who were held captive in Lebanon. With the ‘War on Terror’ having been declared in

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2001 as an on-going conflict by George W. Bush (following the New York City 9/11 attacks which he labelled as an ‘act of war’) the July 2006 Lebanon war fell under the American discourse of fighting terror. The Israeli politicians employed the same rhetoric by labelling the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers as an act of war (artificially) linking the twin tower attacks (2001) the Afghanistan War (2001), the Iraq War (2003) with the Lebanon July war (2006) as part of the global war on terror. However, the July 2006 war seemed to be largely a display of the Israeli government’s ‘right to punish’ which, according to Foucault, as displayed in public executions is part of the sovereign’s right to wage war on enemies where the aim is to portray to all eyes “the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law, and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength.”24 Hence for having failed to foil the kidnapping of two of their soldiers and refusing to negotiate a prisoner swap with Hezbollah, the Israeli army showcased their power to kill publicly and disproportionately.

The spectacle of war as punishment was implemented at once by the use of the latest Israeli and American military technologies that surpassed any weapons held by the Hezbollah fighters and by the airing of war on regional and international satellite TV. On the regional channels, the details were graphic and the corpses of the victims being snatched from under the rubble were daily images underlining the fact that air raids were indeed targeting civilian populations. Censorship regulations limited the international satellite channels to wide-angle frames of aerial bombings, omitting scenes of carnage and confirming the Israeli government's insistence that civilians were not being targeted. The back and forth image and counter-image, and their truth

versus our truth that both regional and international live transmissions aired all contributed to framing the images of war as a spectacle of destruction and punishment, deepening the impact of the launch of war as the continued ‘right to punish’.

Relaying the live images of war seemed to have become a new way of censoring one’s right to an unmediated reality. In The War of Dreams (1999) the anthropologist Marc Augé claims there is a general and invisible war being waged on people’s dreams adding that: “confrontations of the imaginary have accompanied the clash of nations, conquests, and colonisations.” Seeing a growing threat posed to the imagination by the fictionalization of world events in the media, he writes: “We all have the feeling we are being colonized but we don’t exactly know who by.” Indeed the relentless relaying of the July 2006 war through competing angles broadcasting death, destruction, and explosions created the incessant necessity to replenish oneself with images, if only to map areas of safety. Simultaneously this need to know through images created the sensation that a double war was being waged on the country: one of the senses and another mediatised one impacting on, populating, and imprisoning the imaginary. The imaginary, as the malleable and private universe which opens up many possibilities of evasion, was blocked as its projections were inhabited by a 24/7 structure that pre-scripted what was happening and what will happen. Real-time (as the subjective, individual perception of the real which is inherently a plurality of experiences) was warped into live time as though the only access to survival would be to watch the live war news where politicians exchanged their daily promises and threats. The interruptions of sleep by air raids disallowed dreams from fulfilling their nightly potential of escape into an elsewhere, while beeping messages from friends

26 Augé, War of Dreams.
with additional instant news accentuated the links between information, connectivity and the brutality of the bombings.

What I am questioning here is not the importance of gaining access to information during war, but the obsession with live news that colonize the present moment. “Instead of colonizing by force territories exterior to one's own, we are now colonizing and being colonized through monitors and passwords within our own territories,” writes Minh-ha in relation to the competing imageries on cyberspace, where the colonization of the mind occurs through imagery both produced and received incessantly through a state of connectedness. Minh-ha differentiates the uses of technology when in the hands of artists and philosophers who aim “to give form, trans-form, and de-form” as opposed to its use for consumerist purposes and as a technique to maintain power effects. 27 While the technology of the weapons inflicted psychological and material defeats, the preponderance of images of large-scale destruction and death mirrored their power effects and pointed to the failure of the international justice system to change the course of war. The incessant consumption of images of war became a habit, while the dated belief that images could and would change the course of war slowly gave way to the disappointing realization that images merely mirrored and accentuated the existing hierarchies of power.

The instrumentalisation of memories and of the imaginary are explored by the filmmaker Chris Marker in his philosophical science-fiction film La Jetée (1962). In the film’s plot, following the large-scale destruction left by a Third World War,

humanity is saved from total annihilation by the protagonist’s ability to focus on a visual memory from the past that allows him to connect with a war-less world. The protagonist is capable of finding new forms of life through his mental search for the face of a woman he is unable to forget. His survival consists of his ability to escape the present time and to draft new universes connecting him with a future that possesses the required energy to save the present from total annihilation. Being able to (mentally) leave the present is in Marker’s film what saves humanity from total destruction, even if it doesn’t end up sparing the main protagonist who is ultimately killed by the scientists. Marker’s exploration of war through the inseparability between ‘visualizing’ and ‘being’ reveals that the capacity to evade the grim present of war is activated through one’s imagination.

During the July 2006 war, the live frame of war claimed to be the only valid present that required me to sit, watch and hide, to be scared, to look for targets, to seize the joy of the occasional cease-fire, and to be bound to one spot like a prisoner waiting for a cease-fire to be able to go for her walk in the garden. Wasn’t my continuous watching of live war and filming that watching a form of acquiescence to my incapacity to do anything else? Was I waiting to see how things would turn out in the live feed or in reality as they mixed and depending on which came to me first? Waiting for the live update had turned into an unending infectious activity. However, the ‘imprisonment and colonization of the imaginary’ (to use Augé’s terminology) lost its hypnotic effect when I left the TV/computer screen. There were other realities on the streets of Beirut, outside of the relentless live war frame. Organizations as well as activists volunteered their efforts to host displaced families and children in public
parks and in schools. My daily trips to Sanayeh garden accentuated how live war on competing TV channels was rarely about life, singular, and embodied and more about targeted areas and death tolls. I evaded the live news of war as much as I could and filmed that which continued to exist outside of the mediatisation of war, namely the quotidian of survival.

The end of the July 2006 war left me with an irreconcilable disappointment. Walking amidst the rubbles of the city my nostrils filled with the smells of decayed bodies stuck under piles of five or six storey-buildings that had collapsed under the impact of bombs. I couldn’t stop taking photographs from sheer shock at the immensity of the resulting destruction. Weren’t my photographs also part of the imposed spectacle of destruction and war?

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28 In the Sanayeh garden for instance, my point of contact was with Wissam Abousleiman, the general coordinator from the Heiket Il Ighathe El Madaniyye a local initiative of civilian volunteers. As part of the citizen initiative, they gathered donations to temporarily relocate the hundreds of refugees who had fled from areas with the heaviest destruction tolls.
1.3 Elsewhere

Visitor: May I have a copy of this photograph? 

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29 In her essay entitled “The Promise of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d others” (1992), Haraway writes about Elsewhere as the SF (which stands for the Science-Fictional and the Speculative-Factual) where new stories and spaces emerge by avoiding to replicate the existing narratives and finding new unexplored combinations. In this case, the Elsewhere is un-reachable, these images being repetitions of the redundant narrative of the city of Beirut as the site of destruction.

30 The under-titles are an example of Diffraction, revealing some visitors’ reactions to them. Placed inside a large textbook in the desk area of “fragments”. I took these photographs during the 34-day 2006 July War on Lebanon, and a few days following the cease-fire.
Visitor 1: I didn’t know how to read this photograph. Does he wear a mask because of pollution?

Visitor 2: He doesn’t seem to care that he is surrounded by all this death, reading his newspaper calmly.

Visitor: How fantastic! I mean, in a strange way of course.
Stuck. It was akin to claustrophobia on a city level. A surge of joy filled my body at the sound of the first airplane crossing into the Beirut city sky following the reopening of the airport. I had not noticed the absence of the sound of planes during the siege. That sound’s return marked a return to normalcy and the existence of the possibility to connect with an elsewhere. I can neither reproduce that sound in words, nor reproduce that feeling in pictures, but it may be that the eradication of the elsewhere is one of the tactical aims of war. An airplane is after all a seeing /flying device that allows one to view other cities from atop, to stop being the target down below and land within a few hours into a place where a siege of this kind is inconceivable, unless it’s on TV, in a film, in the news, in history books, archival pictures, a grandparent’s reminiscences, or someone’s elsewhere.
1.4 Co-liveness, research aims, and research question

As noted in the preface, my pursuit of research was fuelled by questions raised by having experienced, filmed, and watched war during the July 2006 war on Lebanon. Donna Haraway’s use of articulation to observe how the myths of creation (the accounts of the Garden of Eden, Modernism, etc.) restrict the prevalent scientific discourses on nature allowing scientists to speak in the name of nature informed my method. “Articulation is not a simple matter,” Haraway writes adding that: “language is the effect of articulation, and so are bodies.”31 It is important to be articulate in the face of war. In its most literal meaning articulation as talking, or explaining, is precisely what war incapacitates. What to articulate and who can articulate during war is a question with an infinite number of answers. When a politician with the power to wage war is articulate (through politics, which is based on communication, and exchange), it is to incapacitate the other side’s articulations and to supress any form of response. My own realization that the dailies I filmed prior to and during war were non-regenerative was a form of inarticulateness in the face of war. For a filmmaker articulation, at its purest form, is the joining of one image next to another, and another, in order to communicate an emotion through the passage of time on a screen.

Where to articulate (in language) means to be able to speak clearly, in anatomy refers the combination of joints that help a body to move. Articulation, with both meanings combined, allows for new bodies of knowledge to get formed, new ways of seeing to be perceived, and new ways of speaking to be heard. Articulation is therefore an important component of regeneration. I have used articulation in my thesis both as a

31 Haraway, “The Promises of Monsters”,105
form to link the visual and the linguistic in my text (such as the personal reflections throughout the thesis) and to create disjointed enclosures within one large space in my accompanying installation entitled “fragments” where visitors created their own articulations (elaborated in chapter 2). I approached my research as a filmmaker for whom the interrelatedness between war and the media had become incommunicable, and filmmaking remained my primary research tool. The post-production process of viewing and re-viewing footage, selecting, editing, and screening drafted the roadmap of my research.

Although my thesis unlike Haraway’s body of work does not analyse scientific discourses and their impact on the prevalent discourse on nature, science is not remote from war. Haraway sees the science question as relevant to the military where “struggles over what will count as rational accounts of the world are struggles over how to see.”

Live war is always a media channel’s decision on how to see life (whose life), and on how to see death (whose death) and is inflected through the framing of war (which in others words is where to see from) as well as the language used to describe what counts as an account of war, and who matters in these accounts. The ‘rational’ account of the July 2006 war that was provided by the Israeli government borrowed the ‘war on terror’ discourse, as noted previously, borrowing the ‘you are with us or against us’ rhetoric. The Israeli propaganda war leaflets (referred to by the Israeli army as psychological operations or leaflet missions) dropped all over Lebanon not only revealed their desired reading of the July war, but asserted their aerial military control of the whole country. The flyers proposed that

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33 Psychological Operations during the Israel-Lebanon War 2006, by SGM Herbert A. Friedman
Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah will lead Lebanon to its demise and that he should be stopped at all costs. Drawing Nasrallah as a cartoonish character or as a double-headed snake betrayed a patronizing conception of residents as childlike and simple-minded. Some flyers provided numbers to call should people wish to collaborate with the Israeli government, using terms such as ‘terror’ and ‘terrorists’ to delineate a (a universal) conception of right from wrong. The philosopher Achille Mbembe suggests that it is the duality of “reason and unreason (passion, fantasy) that has determined late modern criticism’s ideas of what is considered political, but that other more tactile categories such as life and death should be observed in order to determine the place that politics gives to life and death.”

Observing the tactile categories of life and death that dominated the July 2006 war, the resulting civilian deaths reveal that the Israeli government’s re-interpretation of the war on terror motto was ‘either you are with us, or you die’. Although this rhetoric unified many residents who temporarily put aside their politics and tried to help the displaced residents, sectarian divisions also occupied a place in the reading of the July 2006 war. Whom do I support? Am I Moslem or Christian, Maronite, Sunni, or Shia and furthermore am I with the Sunnis or with the Shias etc.? These questions, which I was sometimes asked in the Sanayeh garden and later in London, revealed the lack of choices in rehashed territorial and political crises. The sought for answers betray the expectation of a stereotype that would neatly arrange the unstable notion of belonging (and/or not belonging) to a citizenship, a community, and to a country into a clearly delineated narrative. Being all of the above while simultaneously being none of the above

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34 This has, since 2006 become a common accusation aimed at Hezbollah due to the subsequent alliances that Hasan Nasrallah made with the Syrian government in response to the 2011 uprising. This thesis will not delve into these changes but will remain rooted in the July 2006 Lebanon war.

appears inconceivable or fictional under the alphabet that categorises people into one thing or the other.

“The myth of sectarianism,” says Ussama Makdisi “and the myth of perpetual co-existence, cannot explain the contradictions of real history, or why religious diversity becomes a problem at some point in time.”36 If these myths are necessary tools for war waging, for mobilizing troops and mercenaries, and for metanarratives, they fail to capture the exceptions that make up the quotidian of daily life in a country where various nationalities as well as religions have intersected and continue to intersect. Managing to find ways to cross back and forth in the divided Lebanon of the seventies and eighties was quotidian to some families including my own and this has contributed to my perception of Lebanon’s divisions as porous and continuously shifting whereas the fear of being targeted by an invisible sniper, or a sudden car bomb explosion remained the same on all sides. I am neither dismissing the seriousness of the reality of the sectarian violence that took place during the civil war years nor am I claiming that a peaceful co-existence is what defines Lebanon, but attesting to the volatile nature of sectarian and political divisions that sometimes erupt and at others remain dormant.

The interconnectedness between the Israeli army’s drone activities and air raids during the 2006 July war and what was relayed live by local and international media turned most residents into target/witnesses, as noted earlier. Whether they were Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Kurdish, Iraqi, Armenian, Christian, Moslem, Druze or a mixture thereof, they all appeared to drone operators as silhouettes, walking,

running, driving etc. on a street down below, and silhouettes cannot debate their political subjectivity. Whilst sectarian debates could in the long-term turn into a tool for analytical questionings of the socio-economic and international political alliances that foster divisiveness and violence in the country and region, an aerial military supremacy transforms all citizens alike into targets who cannot look into the eyes of those who are aiming at them, but who can only perceive the results (on live TV and on the web) of such a military aggression and perception. My thesis will thus remain rooted in questions of the representation of war and its materiality.

In her elaboration of epistemologies of situated knowledges, Haraway argues for “the view from a body, always a complex, conditioning, structuring, and structured body, versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity. Only the God trick is forbidden.”37 Situated knowledge is neither innocent nor devoid of complications because every single body is made up of existing emotional, social, and intellectual structures that condition knowledge and therefore limit the manner in which knowledge gets mediated through it. Situated knowledge is a reminder of the partiality of knowledge, of vision, and of location and is therefore a modest and vulnerable place that calls for connectedness with other partialities as the basis for knowledge formation. All views come from bodies and what Haraway contests as the ‘god trick’ are claims to possess a higher truth, and to have access to an objective all perceiving, unifying vision that comes from nowhere. This vision disallows communication with others, since it is secure in an all-seeing aerial place. My use of situated knowledge as a framework in this thesis centres my research always leading me back to my own experience, and reminding me of its limitations, while equally

making me question whose situated knowledge I am reading, facing, and conversing with inside the research.

“We are all chimeras,” writes Haraway, “theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism. In short, we are cyborgs.”

If all humans are cyborgs, living through and with technology, it is the body/machine combinations pertinent to contemporary war that I would like to observe closely in this thesis from a citizen’s situated position. A cyborg is “a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction,” writes Haraway, adding that “social reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction.”

Nowhere is it more evident that the machine/organism combination is a struggle of continuously shifting fictions than during war. Two examples of the machine/organism combinations are: Live war on Television and on computers / civilians at home watching, drones in the air / civilians on the streets. There are more combinations of machine/organism fusions that show how struggles for survival during war are struggles over how to translate information in order to survive and to ensure the safety of loved ones. Live war reveals how the machine/organism fusion between the military and communication technologies is always controlled by the military although it seems as though a civilian living in the city under attack is ‘free’ to know what’s happening. What use is it if a citizen is free to know how, or with

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40 By way of example, the Iraqi blogger Raed Jarrar who posted occasionally in Salam Pax’s blog “Where is Raed” during the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq, wrote, on the 24th of December, 2003: “The breaking news at Al-Jazeera TV said American fighters were bombing AdDora where one of my uncles lives. My father decided to call them and see what happened, but they were sleeping! My cousin said: ‘they are using cluster bombs, and we can hear the sound of a 57 (an Iraqi anti-craft gun) shooting back, but everyone here is sleeping’ LOL. What?? Where did the 57 come back from!”
which latest weapons (that their own governments will never match) s/he may get killed?

In the case of drone attacks, the satellite technology provides an unlimited flow of information to citizens while also enabling the drone operators to scan the area from above, and to pick areas to bomb. A drone is an example where the cyborg soldier sits in an office in a distant city without risking any physical injury himself/herself and can take a life based on a camera view from above, capacitated through satellite vision. Although the communication technologies place all citizens on an equal footing, since most people are connected via satellite technologies to the imaged production of war, the military technologies function within a hierarchical structure that dictates that one portion of the viewers will also be the targets. When seen from the perspective of a civilian residing inside the city and subjected to bombing, the access to technology during war signifies an unlimited access to the communication technologies consisting of the simultaneous production of war visuals aired during or after raids have been released, and to the impossibility of safety in the face of advanced military technology.

How does this configuration of technological in/equalities get articulated in the current debates surrounding live war? Although the advent of live war during the first Gulf War (1991) has produced critical reflections on the war as a ‘spectacle’, the war as ‘infotainment’, and the ‘post-modern war’, it has rarely been observed from the place of reception of actual air raids. The argument in my thesis is that the

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configuration of in/equalities between military and communication technologies produces different readings across a spectrum of war as a spectacle, war as distant suffering, war as infotainment, but that war as a co-live space, is left largely unexplored. The lived experience that determines the co-live space varies with every individual, and is not recordable, definable, or categorizable. The cyborg is a suitable analogy to explore co-liveness as a fluid, embodied, and ungraspable space. Using Haraway’s definition of the cyborg, co-liveness can be explained in her exact terms: “It is between fiction and lived experience…It is a struggle over life and death, where the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion.” Fiction, science, and social reality interrelate in co-liveness where war, as an embodied struggle between life and death, involves a continuous deciphering of the optical illusions of the live mediatisation of air raids, as well as their proximity to the senses. In this case, a local citizen has to continuously determine where the border between the live image, and the lived experience exists, and how that border can reveal survival methods. The live images of war may well be fictional constructions made to fool the enemy, or to encourage the allies, and are akin to optical illusions, in as much as war itself functions and propels itself through such illusions. What senses are to be trusted when immediate vision is put at the service of a mediatised view? The cyborg for Haraway is also a reminder of the necessity to drop the illusion that categories are immoveable. The category of power, and powerlessness that can be reversed, the category of allies and enemies that is always rearranged, the category of us and them that is a mirror illusion are all at play in a moment of co-liveness when a civilian has to decide what to do next. Co-liveness submits a body to the power effects yielded by a system operating through aerial control capacitating both

information and bombing, and engages a civilian with one concern: how to survive the war. My aim is to articulate co-liveness through the practice of editing my footage, and writing my thesis and to delineate a situated conception of distances when reflecting on live war. My research question is:

How can I turn audio-visual subjective/real-time images recorded during war from a civilian perspective into a practice that 1) questions the interconnectedness between live time and real time in contemporary war; 2) counters the mediatized live view of war as a spectacle of destruction and; 3) questions--in form and in content--the limits inherent in representing war?

I do not imply in my question that real-time exists as an absolute. Although I am opposing it to live-war it is no less a site of representation and therefore just as ambivalent in its relationship to the ungraspable, non-representable real. ‘Real-time’ and ‘live-time’ are only opposed in my research question in the sense that the real-time footage captured in my camera consists of moments (such as conversations with my grandmother, or my grandmother and her neighbour watching live war) that are not newsworthy. Although these images served to decentre the framing of live war temporarily, revealing a frame within a frame, another citizen’s perspective would have produced completely different footage. The ambivalence of the ‘represented’ and its relationship to the ‘experienced’ is a structural question in my relationship to my dailies and to my practice. This ambivalence, inherent to any image, reminds me of Nicholas Mirzoeff’s call to the right to look. Mirzoeff writes that the right to look is “the right to the real contained within a subjectivity that has an autonomy to arrange

the relationships between the sayable and the visible.”⁴⁴ In my application and use of Mirzoeff’s right to look in my thesis, I question the manifested authority inside any image framed as a war image for it is an imposed frame/framework regulated by an authority that determines what/how I should and/or should not see. Moreover, the right to look equally revealed to me the partiality of my own images. “The right to look” writes Mirzoeff “is not about merely seeing. It begins at a personal level with the look into someone else's eyes to express friendship, solidarity, or love. That look must be mutual, each inventing the other, or it fails. As such, it is unrepresentable. The right to look claims autonomy, not individualism or voyeurism, but the claim to a political subjectivity and collectivity.”⁴⁵ I perceive the autonomy of the right to look, as reclaimed by Mirzoeff, not only in relation to the limits of representation, but also as a reminder that it is an inherent right to one’s political subjectivity. It is a right that is constantly challenged, repositioned, and erased through the imposition of social orders that are forcefully implemented through war. One is able to look prior to representing, and that look exists before the image, and this simple observation is eluded in the race to appropriate ‘real time’ within images. To look into the eyes of another is to continuously re-create one another beyond the imposed frameworks of representation, and beyond voyeurism as Mirzoeff notes. To look into someone’s eyes in a city at war is a shared questioning as to the fragility of life, and a realization of its evanescence, and beauty, and maybe of the possibility of that being the last look. It is therefore an existential look that is unrepresentable. How can that right to share with another, to look, and to reinvent together, be respected and transferred from Lebanon to London through my practice?

1.5 Real time and Live time

A contextualization of my use of the terms real time and live time follows. The use of ‘subjective/real time’ in my research question points to my own practice of filming during the July war (that led to the footage and the photographs I took prior to, during, and at the end of the 2006 July war on Lebanon and that became the basis of my London research). As for live-war, the term designates the media practice of transmitting war as live news to relay information (that I watched on CNN, Al Jazeera, Al-Manar, etc.). The interconnectedness between live time and real time points to what I have called a co-live space where access to multiple views of live war is possible while hearing the unmediated bombing inside the city. Liveness is used to map and to translate (through the political agenda of the channel in question) the audible sounds of air raids into practical bits of information to decide whether to escape or not. Is it CNN? Then the angle would differ from Al-Manar (Hezbollah’s channel), etc. This personal screening of the information on the TV screen through the channel’s bias is not unfamiliar to Arab audiences. In his description of the growth of the pan-Arab satellite channels since 1990, Marwan Kraidy writes: “The channel surfing Arab viewer sees the same military action described as a ‘terrorist attack’, a ‘suicide bombing’, a ‘resistance operation’, or a ‘martyrdom operation’.”46 Many of these TV stations, being privately owned institutions, reflect their owners’ political affiliations, fragmenting the same news of an explosion through different political lenses. What matters in the case of an explosion (for a citizen residing in the city) is whether it took place in an area nearby (can I leave the house? Will there be a second explosion?), whether friends and family have been affected (Who needs my help?

where?), and if there are any signs that this will be on-going (checking the different channels precisely because of their different political affiliations for clues, etc.).

The multiplicity of live views of the same reality reflects the complexity of the artifactuality of televised liveness. For the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, artifactuality refers to the performative nature of news where actuality [les actualités] is produced by media institutions who continuously mediatise an event (by recording it, editing it, and broadcast it) while it is taking place.47 Ute Bern writes: “The terms ‘performativity’ and ‘performance’ derive from the verb ‘to perform.’ They denote the capacity to execute an action, to carry something out actually and thoroughly, as well as to do according to prescribed ritual.”48 The performativity of the actuality of an explosion (to use Kraidy’s example) allows for the live staging of the political agenda of the channel and its diffusion through the live images of the killing of people. How to frame the images, from which angle to film, what not to film, what the voice over says, and how the reporter narrates it, etc., are technical specificities that combine to reveal the media institution’s political perception of that act. The mediation of the operating body behind the camera is always political. Yet, when I, as a citizen, know that every live angle shows me the same news differently, I have to search for the essence of what the event means to me, to make sense of it, and decide on my next action. This means that when I am in connection to pending news, I am always in a state of alertness and can never settle into the information as though it were transparent and devoid of mediation. However, the fact that each channel frames

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the same event differently does not imply that no one died in the explosion, nor that
the explosion did not happen, as Derrida cautions: “The necessary deconstruction of
all artifactuality must not serve as an alibi. It must not exaggerate the simulation and
thereby neutralize all threats in what might be called the delusion of delusion, the
denial of the event: “Everything, one might then say, even violence, suffering, war,
and death-everything is constructed and fictionalized, constituted by and for the
media, nothing ever happens, there are only simulations and delusions.”49 Although
artifactuality is inherent to media’s staging of actuality and is important to deconstruct,
such a deconstruction should not be used as an alibi to disbelieve everything. That
would lead, according to Derrida, to a form of nihilism where death, violence, and
pain would be seen as constructed and therefore irrelevant. Deconstructing
artifactuality for Derrida should serve to search for truth and strive for justice and
equality.50 There are various constructions and competing notions of truths during war,
yet the only truth that matters for a person who lives close to where the act of violence
has been perpetrated, is the one that reveals how to ensure survival. The more distant
the viewer is to the act of the violence, the more the deconstruction of artifactuality
could turn into a philosophical exercise.

Artifactuality was inherent to the live coverage of war in Lebanon in July 2006 where,
as noted, each channel proposed a variation of the same news. However the
information revealing the destruction of the city and the death of civilians placed
performativity on a second level of importance. Did it matter how the live news was
framing the fact that the city was being subjected to air raids? Not immediately. It was
clear that the Israeli army was bombing the city. What mattered urgently, and in the

49 Derrida, Negotiations, 88.
50 Derrida, Negotiations
face of impending danger, was to ensure one’s safety. The artifactuality of liveness in this case only reflected the conflicted local and international political agendas through competing angles, but the real in the event always took over. “However artificial and manipulative it may be,” Derrida writes, “we cannot help but hope that artifactuality will bend itself or lend itself to the coming of what comes, to the event it bears along and towards which it is borne [se porte]. And to which it will bear witness, whether it wants to or not.”51 In other words, the staging of the actuality through liveness remains the artifactuality of what is taking place (a reality with all its elusiveness as seen through the construct of liveness, of lenses, of the audiences every channel addresses, etc.). Derrida hopes that the artifactual would always bend to bear witness to the event since it is born of it, and from it. When what is at stake is one’s safety, artifactuality bends to the immediacy of the proximity of the event which in the case of co-liveness may be visible/audible and mediated at once. The necessity to deconstruct artifactuality is precisely in order to avoid complacency and remain alert as to how live war gets incorporated in the quotidian of one’s life during war.

“It is immediacy, clearly, which is at stake, as far as ‘fully' live television is concerned,”52 writes Stephanie Marriott. She illustrates her statement with the September 11 World Trade Center attacks that one can watch as they happened, with the recording having maintained the instantaneity of the moment of liveness of the attack, while the immediacy of the event can no longer be accessed.53 Distinguishing between the immediacy and the instantaneity of liveness, Marriott questions the thesis

51 Jacques Derrida, “Negotiations”
53 Marriott, Live Television, 50.
that television is ontologically live. Since the instantaneity of electronic communication is preserved, as Marriott claims, the event will always be perceived as live despite the fact that it is not immediate, arguing against the view of television as ontologically live. Taking Marriott’s example, what mattered most to the people residing in New York at the time, was to ensure safety by walking to safer areas, trying to understand what to do next, etc. The construct of liveness at that moment varied between instantaneous and immediate, with replays of the first crash and immediate transmission of the second, but the people’s experiences were very different depending on how distant or close they were to the Twin Towers. For New York City residents, co-liveness took over for a day and media channels kept broadcasting the tragedy in a loop, while no one knew what would happen next. I would like to consider a more fluid reading of instantaneity versus immediacy through the specificity of the location, the distance to and from the attack, as well as the lack of information as to what was happening. Karen Barad’s notion of onto-epistemologies, as the study of practices of knowing in being is helpful in observing how the distinction that Marriott makes between immediacy and instantaneity gets blurred in a city at war, where violence is perpetrated for months.

Knowing and being are fluid and connected during co-liveness, diffracting into information by way of live war and through the embodiment of the materiality of war just as media channels compete to guess and to broadcast what is happening.

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54 Marriott, Live Television, 54.
55 I resided in New York in 2001, and was away in Beirut for a short time and due to fly back in September. My reflections are based on my exchanges with close friends whom I called instantly to try and locate them.

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Instantaneity and immediacy get mixed up in replays of the last few days’ events, and they serve to reorient (or disorient) a citizen residing in a city being bombed, which goes on for days on end (and which unlike 9/11 is made of continuous impacts). Although war is continuously supplemented with live views from multiple sources, most citizens continuously mediate this mediatisation. Taking the example of the newscast I wrote about in my introduction, where a CNN reporter explained how missiles were being sent from the US to Lebanon, the instantaneity of the live report in the US (constructed with images of missiles, and a reporter explaining their future uses) became the source of a pending immediacy in Lebanon. For a week in between, irrelevant of whether the images on TV had been live, they predicted the future changed reality of the Lebanese residents. When viewed from the US this report may have been either instantaneous or immediate, but never became the source of a lived experience for people residing outside of Lebanon. Distance changes the very perception of immediacy and instantaneity depending on the situatedness of the viewers. I wish to probe this further borrowing Haraway notion of response-ability, in its combined meaning of responsibility as well the ability to respond. Since I reside in Beirut, I cannot but feel responsible for a live report detailing bomb shipments since it is telling me my city will be bombed shortly. I am responsible for the preservation of my life and for the lives of my friends and family, and the live news is a threat to my very existence. What are the responses that are incapacitated, or capacitated by this live report that implicates my future very actively? While giving me knowledge that is in a most obvious manner linked to power effects, it is putting me in a position of alertness which makes me anticipate the act of war, as well as its ‘immediate’ accompanying live report. The question of distance, or in this case proximity, changes the reception of the live report. I will venture to say that such a knowledge provides
response-abilities to escape, change areas, hide, etc., but never to halt the promised violence it delivers as live news, as though it were a set football match in the future. But I refuse to compare tragedies with soccer games, and/or to adopt the often used term spectacle to describe live war, because if liveness as a format delivers the war news in a similar fashion to spectacular sports news, that does not mean that sports and war have conflated. One is a game, and the other a political decision, and liveness as a construct does not change the tragic reality of one content or the entertaining value of the other. Reflecting on liveness in war versus liveness in entertainment should be clearly separated, because the actual and the virtual distances that are continuously eluded and enacted alter the relationship of the local viewer to television and to liveness in specific.

Citing and debating Heath and Skirow’s proposition that “liveness – transmission ‘live’, as it ‘happens’, ‘unrecorded’, ‘en direct’ might be regarded as part of the essential structure of television”, Marriott writes: “Only an argument from immediacy, then, will permit us to offer an account of the essential liveness of television. This account would appear, at first glance to be difficult to sustain given that the majority of the encounters with the world which are afforded to me by television are not immediate.”57 The distinction between the content that liveness delivers may be the key question in this case. The encounters that Mariott has with a variety of shows are not applicable to all countries. If the content I, as a viewer am watching happens to be news of war in a co-live space, I am still afforded different types of live programming. I may choose to watch a soccer game instead of war because I am tired of the news, but the moment I hear an air raid’s impact in a neighbouring street, I will switch the

TV to the live news channel to see what is happening. In that case, the essence of television news is indeed its liveness, and how it relates to my future safety. Presuming Mariott’s interaction with television’s liveness may not have occurred through sustained wars where TV liveness has been made essential within a quotidian space, her argument is experientially sound. But that has not been my own experience with liveness (specifically live war). Am I then arguing that the ontology of television is liveness? No I am not, but I am arguing for a situated discussion on liveness that neither considers the location of the spectator as irrelevant to the viewing process itself, nor conflates the materiality (and singularity) of the event being represented through the construct of TV liveness. The equalization of war, famine, floods and football through the same live lens leads to their depoliticization and exploration as images devoid of material manifestations.

When failing to consider the ways in which live war (not liveness in general, but live + war as a filter of violence through liveness) alters one’s ability to respond, the body of the viewer experiencing war is removed from the picture, rendering her/him irrelevant in the midst of arguments that favour TV signals and their ontology. By maintaining that one has the choice to turn the TV off all the time, and becoming present to one’s presence, the debate changes. If that presence is similar to what is on live TV, such as war, TV becomes helpful in mapping war’s material effects in the city. My aim is not to engage with debates about the ontology of TV liveness, nor to propose co-liveness as a category, because that would remove the materiality of war from the debate and blur the singularity of each experience. By exploring, (in this thesis and in the accompanying installation) the onto-epistemological diffractions (through language and through images) that different distances from live war and war
(as a lived violence) produce, my aim is to understand how the ‘being’ and the ‘presence’ of some citizens count as places from which debates about live war emerge, while the ‘non-being’ and ‘absence’ of other viewers changes how live war is theorized.

I began to explore the question between the live versus the real in war by watching my own dailies and attempting to edit a couple of short sequences to share with colleagues.
Chapter 2. This does not look like war

“We know that under the revealed image there is another one which is more faithful to reality, and under this one there is yet another, and again another under this last one, down to the true image of that absolute, mysterious reality that nobody will ever see. Or perhaps, not until the decomposition of every image, of every reality.”

Michelangelo Antonioni

Fig. 9

Visitor: The painting behind the TV is captivating.
Did you deliberately frame it like that?

When I started editing my footage, the interconnectedness between live time and real time appeared to me in London as a third image. The subjective real that had framed a
live TV image, was itself now framed by a new subjective embodied reality. It appeared on a cold winter afternoon in London, on a timeline in an editing program, and inside a library. The traces of the real had already vanished to leave me with digital images of a frame within a frame. I did not even remember the July 2006 war through my dailies. They were taken in a rush and they settled in my mind as a memory only a couple of years later when I had already travelled to start my research. These digital traces were fluid and filled with potential meanings that the process of re-watching and re-editing revealed. They evoked a universe that was partly familiar, pixelated, and electronic. Some images that were filmed at night for instance revealed the impossibility of the technology in my hands to copy my sense of hearing as I tried to record the nightly distant air raids. I knew I could add these sounds in my edits (I tested some sound effects of explosions, from the Second World War), and enhance them in order for the image to fit the reality that I remembered. But would that have meant that I was re-constructing reality? “Reality runs away,” writes filmmaker and theorist Trinh T.Minh-ha “reality denies reality. Filmmaking is after all a question of framing reality in its course. However it can also be the very place where the referential function of the film image/sound is not simply negated but reflected on its own operative principles and questioned in its authoritative identification with the phenomenal world.”58 Minh-ha’s reflection is a reminder that image/sounds when viewed in their own terms, as mediations of a subjective perception of the real through a recording apparatus, rather than as identical references to life as one perceives it, can lead to a deeper questioning as to their accuracy and inaccuracy in providing a record of a lived moment. Repeatable, rewind-able, and moveable at will on a timeline that can be accessed, created, and changed, digital images reveal how

memory too is continuously reformulated, tested, questioned, and opposed through their shuffling. To recompose these images outside of a structure that favoured a daily chronology of the July 2006 war events, and to accept the inaccuracies resulting from the mediation of the camera as a recording device, were the first steps I took in approaching my footage. Abandoning the attempt to fix meaning in my sequences, to present a ‘larger picture’, to contextualize, or to historicize the July war to an invisible audience by organizing dailies on a chronological timeline of events etc., I recomposed my sequences without the constraining imposition to tell ‘the real story’. My sequences started to appear more truthful to my eyes in their evocation of a place, (in this case my grandmother’s house), rather than an event.

Following the screening of two of my sequences to my colleagues, a discussion followed. “This does not look like war,” I was told. The images in the first sequence were of a sunny morning in July when my grandmother was preparing the day’s meal and talking about the anxiety that the ongoing war made her feel. She asked me to stop filming her because she felt her heart was weak. The second sequence showed images of my grandmother and her neighbour watching news of the July war on television, while chatting. Assembled from footage that was filmed during the 34-day July 2006 war on Lebanon, both sequences were representations of Beirut at war, seen from inside my family’s house. Filmed from a perspective that revealed the quotidian life of my grandmother, whose flat is a forty-minute car ride from the neighbourhoods that were being targeted by air raids, both sequences stood outside of the recognized view of war. As images, they lacked the familiar pointers that would determine their recognition as ‘war images’. My colleagues’ remark was not meant as a critique but as a confirmation of the novelty of this angle to their eyes. Seeing images of war from
a local house where citizens were also watching war on a local TV channel pointed to a mediation of war that they were not accustomed to seeing.

I was reminded of a similar response (dating from a couple of years prior to my research) when an elderly Italian anarchist in Cagliari (Italy) exclaimed at the sight of my portrait photographs: “Where is the blood? Where is the rage I saw on the Internet? These cannot be displaced refugees! Are you purposefully hiding the atrocities? This is outrageous! People in your photographs look relaxed.” He had seen my photographs of displaced refugees whose neighbourhoods had been targeted and who had moved to a public garden (Sanayeh garden) living in makeshift tents while waiting for the end of the war. Photographing people who refused the camera lens access to the privacy of pain was deemed unacceptable. I had a body of images of war without war. The daily images in local newspapers and on local television of women in tears and of bloodied men carrying dead children, made my own photographs and video footage appear questionable in comparison. “The media’s message may condemn war, violence, and bloodshed,” Trinh T. Minh-ha writes, “but its language operates as a form of fascination with war, and war scenes persist in dominating the spectacle.”59 Although the spectator in this case was infuriated by the spectacle of destruction and death that the July war had led to, he expected to see more of the same, refusing that war may have produced different images. Images had to exist as documentation, as proof, and as a record of the proximity of death, a proximity that demanded blood as proof of truthfulness and of the reality of war.

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Was the recognition of an image as one of war only possible through its framing as a spectacle of death and destruction? What was the inherent conception of ‘the real in war’ that disallowed different configurations from recorded video images taken during war to appear like war? “The real world,” writes Minh-ha about the documentary category that is supposedly suited to capture reality, “so real that the Real becomes the one basic referent—pure, concrete, fixed, visible, all too visible.”

Since there was no visible evidence of war inside my (domestic) images, was it really about war? John Tagg’s *The Disciplinary Frame* (2009) examines how the documentary frame has evolved to document, record, and reveal the image as an evidence of value, as a record of evidence, and as a surveillance method which arrests and limits photographic readings. “Like all realist strategies,” Tagg writes, “documentary seeks to construct an imaginary continuity and coherence between a subject of address and a signified real – a continuity and coherence in which not only the work of the sign but also the effects of power and a particular regimen are elided.”

When images of war (‘war’ being a site where the exercise of power is most evident) are taken as the only existing proof of the real, they invalidate the embodied experience of life and become allied to it (to the materiality of experience, that is) as evidence. When the subject (war on Lebanon in July 2006) is confounded with the representation of the subject (my recorded images) both the subject as well as the nature of digital images are made to serve an uninterrupted reading of the subject as an image. But neither is war only an image, nor are my experiences images, nor was my recording of images meant to be representative of the complex multiplicities of (told and untold) stories and experiences accumulated during that war. “There is no

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60 Minh-ha, “The Totalizing Quest of Meaning,” 33.
61 John Tagg, *Introduction to The Disciplinary Frame: Photographic Truths and the Capture of Meaning*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 2009), XXXII- XXVIII.
such thing as documentary—whether the term designates a category of material, a
genre, an approach, or a set of techniques,” writes Minh-ha, “This assertion—as old and
as fundamental as the antagonism between names and reality—needs incessantly to be
restated despite the very visible existence of a documentary tradition.”63 Experience
and vision precede the written and the filmed that leaves traces, (as signs), that appear
to be more real that the real. The documentary category appropriates the real within
an image eluding the process (cameras, recording, reordering, editing) by which the
production of ‘the real’ is enabled, and dissimulating how it is just as much an
alteration of the real as fiction is. The images of war as a spectacle of suffering
manufacture expectations of what a social reality of war should look like. Here,
recognition of a partial and mediated reality becomes dependent on its recognition
within a dominant image. “Realism as one form of representation defined by a
specific attitude toward reality is widely validated to perpetuate the illusion of a stable
world,” writes Minh-ha, “(even when it depicts sickness, poverty, and war), in which
the ‘how-to-do’s’ are confidently standardized and prescribed for different
realities.”64 In this context to be realistic, to represent truthfully a war meant
following the prescribed “how to do’s”: a hand-held camera, destitution, photos taken
on the run amidst screams and cries, etc. A reality once fixed within a representation
that becomes the referent to the topic of war in the Arab world. Iraq, Lebanon, Syria
all become interchangeable amongst themselves as signs, and their topic as equivalent
to famine, poverty, and violence as the tragedies of the others. This image of people’s
distant suffering zapped interchangeably (sometimes by the very same people who are
being portrayed) denotes stereotypical notions of the other as inexistent under any

64 Trinh T. Minh-ha, “Bold Omissions and Minute Depictions,” in When the Moon Waxes Red:
other configuration but that of a subject that can portray a recurrent sameness of suffering within a recognizable image.

Following my colleagues’ reflections, I began to question how what counts as ‘real’ in war is regulated through particular visual and audio-visual codes. Indeed my images were not meant to be images of war singular as though war were one solid definable entity, but the non-recognition of my images as images filmed during war made me question whether there is a prescribed artifactuality that regulates the recognisability of war in (and as) filmed images. I am using the term artifactuality here in allusion to both Donna Haraway and Jacques Derrida whereby it is the staging of actuality through the media (the performativity of actuality through the apparatus of teletechnology as Derrida writes) and the inextricability between the factual and the fictional in one’s understanding of war. When a formalized and normalized merging between the factual and the fictional framing of war becomes necessary for the recognition of the subject within an audio-visual or photographic image, such a recognition becomes determined by one source only. Derrida has warned against this type of international artifactuality: “This international artifactuality, this monopolization of the ‘actuality effect’, this centralizing appropriation of artifactual powers for ‘creating the event’, may be accompanied by advances in the domain of ‘live’ communication, or communication so-called real time in present tense.” 65 For Derrida, advances in the technologies of liveness have to be accompanied by a rigorous reminder that the real and the live are neither pure nor stripped of interpretation, and although they will always be present, ways have to be found

against their mystification. Submitting the real and the present to an international artifactuality redefines the real as the immediate, the latest news, the present that is from one perspective only. This perspective is neither pure nor devoid of prior treatment, however, such as framing, editing, and selecting. Clearly, if there is one benefit to being exposed to various versions of live transmissions of war (such as on the world wide web where many channels may be accessed, or in Lebanon where the media is not centralized), it is in making citizens more aware of the continued construction of the subject of war through liveness. That failing, the performativity of an international artifactuality could turn the images and subject of war into a stable fiction with its chases, conflicts, and resolutions recurring as in any scripted Hollywood fiction. War’s recognition would then be conditioned by the repetition of these self-same elements. The reality of war (always fluid, changing, and embodied) is then eluded.

An international artifactuality proposes to citizens who watch war from a distance to forget that war is also about life in the quotidian, so that deaths appear and disappear through the latest news as though they were natural disasters that cannot be stopped. John Ellis writes that since reality is always mediated (by understanding, by one’s experiences, by others etc.,) and is therefore always subjective, ‘witness’ is a more suitable term for a viewer who watches distant events with mixed feelings of power and safety: “The feeling of witness that comes with the audio-visual media is one of separation and powerlessness” Ellis writes, adding that “the events unfold, like it or not. They unfold elsewhere—especially in film—another time as well. So for the viewer, powerlessness and safety come hand in hand, provoking a sense of guilt or

disinterest.”

Ellis’ use of the term media witness gives body to the feeling of helplessness when confronted with images of distant violence, but it does not take into consideration the nuances in the act of witnessing, nor the naturalization of the status of the media witness. The television witness can be seen as an extension of various witnessing practices where detachment and non-intervention are perceived as objective perspectives. The war reporter is meant to be an objective witness, just as the journalist, the war photographer, the TV anchor. The status of a media witness follows a chain of command in this case and can be linked to a professional code of ethics which prohibits ‘going native’ and of witnessing and relaying information, while remaining ‘objective’. The term ‘going native’ denotes, in journalism, lack of objectivity and is used when a foreign reporter writes from a local perspective. Initially used by European colonizers whose assimilation into indigenous cultures was considered a sacrilege, the term has since shifted allegiances (from anthropology to journalism), and has been demoted and criticized, while reflecting a rooted belief that the separation between subject and object, or observer and observed is possible. The journalist who is not a native always has the choice to go back ‘home’, but the journalist who is a native and who is home faces a dilemma in that proposition. Similarly, the media witness who watches the world safely through a television screen is offered the possibility of ‘not going native’ by entering and exiting other worlds through the guidance of reporters, TV anchors etc., while the safety of her/his home is untouched. However, defining a media viewer as a witness clearly excludes a witness

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who is also a potential target (for e.g. in co-liveness) and who feels powerless and unsafe as a direct result of the visibility of war in the media. That the war will happen whether a media witness likes it or not equally applies to the local and non-local viewer but when the events unfold on local television the relationship to the live report is one of separation, guilt, anxiety and fear, all mixed together and these exclude any insurance of safety.

Jonathan Corpus Ong argues that although the current media witness literature about distant suffering questions the ethical implication in witnessing violence on television, the defining feature of witness universalizes the concept of audience as a “western-centric and middle class conception of an audience.” Although Ong’s argument raises a valid point, even a western-centric audience is not homogeneous and it would be misleading to presume that all middle class audiences in the west watch distant suffering with a sense of safe detachment. Indeed the problem with conceptualizing distant suffering stands the risk of leading to the observation of the televisual event of suffering as devoid of the political reality that led to it, or of the complexity and individuality of the bodies living it. The notion that an ideal television viewer is the one who resides in the west, and who is detached from the realities of other cities, is, I would argue, one of the constructs inherent to an international artifactuality which, by framing the subject of distant war is also framing the supposed neutrality of its ideal target audience. Such a construct maintains the illusion of what Nick Couldry calls the myth of the mediated centre, which, by direct opposition also constructs the non-

western viewer as an absent other who is not part of this centre even if s/he constitutes its topic of discussion (by comparison/otherness).

For Couldry the myth of the mediated centre relies on “the belief, or assumption that there is a centre to the social world, and that in some sense, the media speak ‘for’ that centre.” Derrida’s definition of international artifactuality as the “centralized powers invested in the performativity of the real” appears reversed but is a complementary notion. For it is precisely by centralizing the mode of artifactuality that a false sense of centre (or the myth of the centre) is created. In that sense an international artifactuality both maintains the powers to manufacture the real through actuality while also creating the sense of a universal mythical centre, the outside of which is considered rogue or illegal (such as the American government considering other sources of actuality like Al Jazeera to be unreliable). Nick Couldry’s exploration of liveness as a ritual category contextualizes the naturalization of the boundaries that are created through liveness between real time and live time. “Rituals do not so much express order as naturalise it,” Couldy writes, “they formalize categories, and the differences or boundaries between categories, in performances that help them seem natural, even legitimate.” In order to determine which categories are formalized as legitimate during war, the media’s relationship with the military becomes central. In the case of journalists being embedded within military units (implemented during the 2003 Iraq war), the myth of the centre gets shifted onto the military body itself that becomes the regulating source of categories and borders. By extension, the Iraq war

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74 Derrida, Negotiations, 86.
for instance could only be visualized through the international artifactuality of a military angle that is presented as a natural and unmediated reality. Couldry gives the example of rites of passage to manhood to explain his rituals theory, where for instance men undergo a ritual that confirms their crossing the boundary from boyhood to manhood, but the whole ritual confirms the exclusion of women from that rite, and legitimizes the division between man and woman. In the case of an international artifactuality the ‘other’, the ‘local’ who is being invaded/liberated, is altogether excluded in a live address that naturalizes the rationale of invasion from a tactical/military perspective.

How does one exit this closed formulation of an international artifactuality, and the relentless simplification and banalization of war as seen through the myth of the mediated centre? Jacques Derrida’s advice beyond this apparent inextricability between ‘actuality’ and its continuous mediation is to always separate ‘presence’ from ‘actuality’. This reflection is a reminder that presence is not only always subjective, embodied and situated, but that it is also the lived ‘present’ time that flows in parallel to the timeline of media actuality. Situated, and partial, presence brings one back to the body experiencing the moment beyond the continuously shifting notion of ‘actuality’ as a lens on world events. Derrida writes: “I’m trying not to forget that it is often untimely approaches to what is called actuality that are the most “concerned” with the present. In other words, to be concerned with the present, as a philosopher for example, may be to avoid constantly confusing the present with actuality.”

When the present is seen as existing by the side of actuality rather than as a result of it or as dependent on it, then every present can inhabit the layers of complexity that

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76 Couldry, Media Rituals, 27.
exist on a timeline that is separate from actuality. What Derrida refers to as “untimely approaches to actuality” is an invitation to reflect on the time/space restructuring that actuality occupies, produces, and reproduces.

What about when one has no time, such as in co-liveness where the actuality and the present are continuously feeding one another? Co-liveness in this instance, as previously noted, becomes the continuous deciphering of what matters most in the present moment, to the body in danger, and through the layers of the multiple artifactualities showing different live framings of war. A separation between the present, (or presence), and the war as a televised signal becomes essential, in order to survive and not get ensnared in the optical illusions of representation practices. Such a separation, in my opinion, is inherent to the space of co-liveness where the information relayed live is continuously decontextualized from the screen and recontextualized into the body of the person watching the news. It consists of the re-mediation of the news through person-to-person phone calls in order to continuously map areas of safety and consider what should be done in urgency. This implies that despite the fact that my colleagues and I may watch the same live war report on CNN, it is every individual’s presence to actuality that determines the recognition (or non-recognition) of live war and of co-liveness as ‘war’. This process occurs in the degrees of safety of the material space where the watching of live war takes place. The necessity for a complete separation between actuality and presence can be unsettling. Can one simply turn the TV off when one’s own city is under attack? In co-liveness where mediatisation and embodiment appear mutually dependent, not being connected to live war implies not knowing, and not knowing could lead to lack of safety.
2.1 The hors-champs of the TV as a space of diffraction

The history of representation abounds with accounts that caution against the reliance on sight and on the frame that hosts illusory reflections. In Plato’s allegory of the cave for instance (even if it is an allegory on the life and learning of the philosopher), the world of sight is described by Socrates as a prison-den that enslaves the reasoning capacities of the prisoners who perceive the shadows projected on the wall in front of them as reality, so much so that they are unable to accept or fathom the real shapes of people and objects under the sun. If one of the prisoners were to leave his chains and go out into the sunlight, he would perceive the richness of the shapes. Yet, other accounts relate the pleasure derived from being deceived by an optical illusion, and of the superior skill of the one who is able to pull off such a trick. The story of a competition that took place in the fifth century BCE between two Greek painters, Zeuxis and Parrhasius, as told by the Roman scholar Pliny the Elder (23-79 AD), provides an illustration of this. In it, he recounts how Parrhasius painted grapes that looked so real, that birds perched onto the stage in order to eat them. Proud of having won the competition, he asked for the curtain hiding the painting to be fully opened, whereupon he realized that the curtain was a painting by Zeuxis. As a framing device the painted curtain camouflaged its presence by directing attention onto what it revealed and thus hid itself by seeming to be outside of the work itself, or an hors-champ (out of field) when in fact it determined – and was part of – the painting. Iraqi cartoonist Abdul Raheem Yassir’s caricature of watching war in Iraq is a comic

sketch that illustrates both accounts of a citizen being so taken by the shadows of his TV screen and of failing to see the (deadly) tricks of such an illusion.

In this case, what is thought to be someone else’s spectacle is the staging of the real of the citizen’s life where the TV frame set itself is the trickster. If one were to crop the left part of the frame, this would be a caricature of the spectacle of war, and the citizen could be a resident of any country. But the left side of the frame immediately situates the sketch in a post-first Gulf war (1991) period when the advent of live war during war was introduced by CNN. Besides capturing the spectacle of watching war inside a city at war, Yassir also stages the spectacle of one’s own gaze by allowing one to see more than what the subject inside the sketch can see (namely the oncoming destruction of the citizen’s house). As a tragi-comic reflection on the blind spots inherent in the partiality of vision, on the ingrained violence of watching war and of watching the watching of war, the caricature articulates the normalization of co-liveness. In the space inhabited by a citizen who is at once a media witness and a target, the sketch’s hors-champs of live war coincides with the living-room wall that
is visible to the citizen as an image, yet non-perceivable as his own wall. With his
attention captivated by the mediatized quotidian of live war (for he is sipping tea as he
watches), the local citizen in the sketch is prey to the spectacle of war and he misses
the evidence of his being its very aim.

As a parody of live news and of war, Yassir’s sketch questions the limits of the live
frame, and its hors-champs. Can the separation between the present as presence and
between actuality be accomplished here? Yes, but the viewer is so immersed in
actuality that he forgets his ‘present’. The outside and the inside merge and the
viewer’s vision functions within a closed system of interpretation that disallows him
to perceive fully where the frame stops being a frame. Where the frame stops being a
frame is difficult to pinpoint as Derrida writes in his critique of Kant's *Critique of
Judgment*, in which the work (or ergon) is dissected from the frame (or parergon).
Derrida contemplates the difficulty of extricating the intrinsic from the extrinsic in the
frame of works of art, and he goes on to define the paregon as “a form which has
traditionally been determined not by distinguishing itself, but by disappearing, sinking
in, obliterating itself, dissolving just as it expends its greatest energy.”80 Accordingly,
a frame is an absent presence that determines the subject while it appears to be
external to it. In Yassir’s sketch the ergon and the parergon are one and the same but
the ‘citizen’ is unable to recognize them as such.

Going back to the screening of my first two sequences and pondering on my
colleagues’ perceptions of the quotidian of war not looking like war, I considered
their hors-champs (or out-of-frame) in relation to live war. What led to the non-

http://www.jstor.org/pss/778319.
recognition of war in my footage is the context (theirs and mine), and is therefore inseparable from what happens once their TV set is turned off. Separating presence from actuality brings to light the heterogeneity of the present (as a lived experience) in relation to actuality, and it is only within the differences experienced in that separation that the space of co-liveness becomes visible. Although the term hors-champs normally refers to the out-of-frame of the filmed frames, I propose to consider it, just as in Yassir’s sketch, as the out-of-frame of the material frame of the TV set in order to elaborate my point. The hors champs of the edited sequences that I screened to my colleagues triggered in me remembrances of an embodied experience (as presence) that accompanied live war on TV. The same held true for the Iraqi, Palestinian, and Lebanese visitors who attended my accompanying installation “fragments”. Colours, smells, sensations and the dailiness of war’s impediments such as electricity cuts, generator noises, being stuck at home, being anxious, being scared etc., accompanied the perceptions of watching live war. Whereas for most of my colleagues the hors-champs (of the TV set, and their presence as opposed to actuality) was not a quotidian of war, and when they watch live war, cook, eat, etc., just as I would, they later turn the TV set off, and their lives continue with other concerns that are not related to war as a daily struggle.

Therefore war gets inscribed in one’s environment and memory in relation to the actual distance between the lived present and the actuality of war as liveness. What was not familiar in my sequences to colleagues who resided in Europe, was to watch war from the perspective of its citizens who were themselves watching it live on TV, as that defied the notion of presence as always being separate by large distances from actuality. For that reason, the television set inside my video frame (or the framing of
the frame) was perceived as a type of artifactuality (of war) framed within a larger unfamiliar (local war from the quotidian local angle) yet familiar context (watching war in a living room, on TV, with one’s family). In other words, the familiar image of watching television that appears to be the same, whether one resides in the United States, in Europe or in Lebanon, revealed itself as a far more complex space than I had previously considered. The familiarity of the setup (a living room, a television set, family members) can be cloned but is experientially linked to very distinct individual experiences and to social orders that allow particular modes of presence/absence in relation to live war. Stanley Cavell proposes that it is the “mode of absence” of the viewers that should be observed in every medium’s (photography, film, TV) generation of a “mechanical defeat of their presence to that reality.”  

Cavell notes that the nature of film allows the mechanical absence of an audience to a film's performers, who appear as mere reflection of light on light. The viewers’ presence or absence is towards something that has happened in the past that they absorb like a memory, allowing them reflection just as a novel does. Thus viewers are exempt from the ethical imperative that may occur when watching the representation of a tragedy, for their helplessness is ‘mechanically assured’: “The fact that I am invisible and inaudible to the actors, and fixed in position, no longer needs accounting for; it is part of a convention I have to comply with; the proceedings do not have to make good the fact that I do nothing in the face of tragedy, or that I laugh at the follies of others.”

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83 Cavell, The World Viewed
In my opinion, the mechanical absence that ensures audiences do not need to worry about the tragedies of others in drama and in film is replicated in the media format of live war. For what is presented as ‘real’ is also presented as ‘unchangeable’ (as in a film) and therefore suggests a forced compliance with live war where mechanical helplessness translates into political helplessness. The mode of absence is just as heterogeneous as its complementary facet which is the presence that Derrida recommends his readers to separate from actuality, and which consists of the life one returns to after the television set is turned off. A viewer watching live war from Europe is led to think there is nothing s/he can do to change the course of war, and her/his political helplessness is mechanically, or more specifically electronically assured, (since it is a TV signal), making live war appear like a movie. When it comes to co-liveness, the electronic signal is simultaneously revealing one’s proximity to the mediatized images, ascertaining one’s political helplessness to change the course of war, while the materiality of air raids are confirming the necessity for immediate action. In short, the military technology and the satellite technologies converge to confuse the understanding of presence and absence through co-liveness when the viewer is the target. Cavell defines live television as more like a gun-sight keeping an event from the world on view and thus exposing it: “In live television what is present to us while it is happening is not the world, but an event standing out from the world. Its point is not to reveal, but to cover (as with a gun), to keep something on view.” 84 The mode of absence, as a viewer’s absence to the materiality of war while watching live television as a gun view, necessitates the question of whose gun view this is. More specifically, if live television covers a view just as a gun covers a view, then who is holding the gun and who is the target? Is the audience the target, or is a distant

‘other’ the target? In Yassir’s sketch where the view and the viewer of live war are both the target, the mode of absence, which ensures that the materiality of war is someone else’s problem on a TV screen, is a trick, and the sketched character has to shift his attention back to the physical space of the living-room, (or just turn and look around), in order to re-establish a connection with the fragility of his life and try to escape.

For Haraway, technology is a way of life implicating social orders and practices of visualizations, where positioning is always necessary to ground the knowledge organized around the imagery of vision.\(^8^5\) Positioning forces one to ask: “Where are you when you watch what you watch?” and it unravels the social orders implicated in practices that capacitate distant vision as relayed on international satellite channels, and/or adjacent vision as relayed on local satellite channels. Haraway proposes to question visualizing practices: “How I see, when I see, from where I see, why my seeing is capacitated, who gets to have more than one point of view? Who gets blinded? Who wears blinders? Who interprets the visual field? What other sensory powers do we wish to cultivate besides vision?”\(^8^6\) These questions produce different answers implicating memory into visualizing technologies. If I have seen, simultaneously, the fire caused by an air raid from my window and on live TV, the term ‘war’ becomes the physical embodiment of an experience that is partly mediatized and partly affective. Watching war is not the same for two people since their perceptions occur from different experiential places. The situatedness of knowledge and the limits of what one can know from one particular spot, implies that the apprehension of experiences happens through a lived memory that continues to be

\(^{85}\) Haraway, “Situated knowledges,” 587.

\(^{86}\) Haraway, “Situated knowledges.”
excavated and added to as one interacts with other situated knowledges. Cavell’s mode of absence, and Derrida’s call to separate presence from actuality are both reminders that televised signals constantly warp one’s space/time relationship into proposed combinations of absences/presences where the individual memories of the conditions in which watching war is capacitated are just as pertinent in understanding the topic of ‘war’ as are the mediatized images of ‘war’. Everyone may feel that s/he knows what war is, be it as an image in a fiction film, as an experience told by a grandparent, or as a lived experience, and these knowledges do not annul one another.

An excavation of memories took place when I watched my sequences with colleagues, as they each tried to recall and compare how they watch war while at home. That made me consider co-presence as a necessary component of the development of my research practice. If each viewer’s experience with war (as a mediatized subject, as a lived experience, or as both) relocates him/her back to a material space, how, and
from where each one watches war on TV reveals how every “present” and its relationship with actuality frames the subject of war either as a distant absence, or as an immediate urgency. “When our cultural practices of remembering and forgetting are interrogated as loci where multiple power relations and power struggles converge,” José Medina writes in his reflections on the uses of Michel Foucault’s counter-history and counter-memory as epistemological sites of resistance, “the first thing to notice is the heterogeneity of differently situated perspectives and the multiplicity of trajectories that converge in the epistemic negotiations in which memories are formed, de-formed, maintained alive or killed.” For Medina, the very process of questioning the acts of remembering and forgetting as cultural practices reveals the inscription of dissimilarities and similarities in situated relationalities with institutionalized power. Whose material experiences and histories are eluded when live war turns the act of war into a history being written in a mediatized now, and whose untold situated perspectives are made irrelevant, or simply non-recognizable, through the conception of live war as always being a distant war?

Every viewer is bound within particular practices of remembering/forgetting that are linked to power relations and to their imprints on the material space where such memories are/were formed. A London flat in 2006, a house in California in 2006, and a house in Japan 2006 do not relate in the same manner to what has been termed as “war” in 2006 in Lebanon. By extension, even I could not relate to the live images of war on Lebanon in 2006 since my lived present was always interrelated with the actuality of war. It is only by reflecting in hindsight that co-liveness became visible to

me. War and live war were maintained, drafted, memorized, quantified, and recognized for each one of us in different ways. Failing to see, or even to remember when, how, and why liveness had become so necessary to the waging of war necessitates counter-memories where individual genealogies of the intersection of the practice of liveness into the quotidian (singular and diverse) would get articulated.

Thus I perceived my colleagues’ comments (or non-recognition of war in my dailies) as diffractions through a subjective prism of memory and experience that produced a singular understanding of the same images. “Diffraction does not produce ‘the same’ displaced, as reflection and refraction do,” Haraway writes, “diffraction is a mapping of interference, not of replication, reflection, or reproduction. A diffraction pattern does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the effects of difference appear.”

Live war, for e.g., functions through the visible mapping of the appearance of differences on a city-scape that is being destroyed, whereas questioning how the materiality of the destruction affects one’s daily life and one’s understanding of the representation war is a way to map where the effects of differences appear. The under-titles to my photographs in this thesis provide a diffractive mapping of the difference of reactions to similar photographs. The Black and White photograph of a man wearing a face mask in order to protect himself from the stench of corpses, while reading his newspaper for example (Fig. 4), is perceived as resulting from pollution by one visitor and to the display of carelessness to the death of others by another. The mapping the effects of the appearance of differences in recognizing (and not recognizing) co-liveness as war in my sequences, led me to formulate two questions:

88 Haraway, “The Promises of Monsters”, 70.
1) If the images I shot during war do not look like war then what counts as an image of war?

2) Is the act of watching live war linked to the assumption that distance from the material effects of war is inherent to watching war?

These questions guided my subsequent choice of literature leading me to research what of war makes it recognizable (the weapons, the soldiers, the blasts, the civilians?) through its representation. As the live and real in war began to take on different meanings through my interactions with my colleagues’ co-presence became a guiding method for my audio-visual practice. The possibility of exchanging with others in a space where the diffraction of views would be capacitiated meant that an installation space favouring co-presence was most suitable for my research. I will first elaborate on my installation space entitled “fragments” although this is not an indication of a chronological order in my research where reading, writing, editing, and setting up the installation took place simultaneously, and where my research questions were practiced both within the installation space, and within the text as practice. Therefore “fragments” can be read outside of the order in which I placed it.
2.2 There is nothing to see

Visitor 1: This photograph spoke to me, 
I don’t know why. I wanted to know more about her.

Visitor 2: This portrait really reminds me of Sarajevo.
This woman could be from Bosnia.
Visitor: I keep wondering how a caged canary perceives air raids
“Why do you want to go to Sanayeh? There is nothing there to see, just refugees in the garden. I can take you to where people have died.”

The taxi driver eyed my camera case in his mirror.

“You’re a journalist?”

I can’t remember, precisely, what I answered, but I explained what I feel, felt, at that moment about the media and death and life, and the images, their excess.

"As you wish, but you know, people have to see the truth, and since you have a camera. It looks like a professional camera.”

Life in war, validated only as the framed representation of its end.

Everything else counted as nothing.
2.3 Fragments

During my research I presented “fragments” three times, in 2010 in Philadelphia, at the University of Pennsylvania, and in 2012 and 2013 in London at Goldsmiths, University of London.

My theoretical inquiry into what counts as a war image’ (Chapter 3) introduced me to a massive amount of images from newsreels, historical photographs, and war archives, some of which I incorporated into the sequences I continued to edit from my dailies. In *Cameras, paintings, wars remix* (2013) for instance, a CNN commercial advertising the latest live broadcasting technology shows short interview clips with famous CNN war reporters who praise the ‘cutting-edge technology’, and its
efficiency in enabling them to broadcast live news live in war zones citing Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan as examples where this technology has been used. My insertion of the commercial into a sequence showing video images of my grandmother watching live war reveals the commodification of war for the main concern of the journalists is the efficiency of the technology and the speed at which it allows them to relay information. In its remixed position, and in the presence of my grandmother and her neighbour as its supposed audience members, the commercial appears irrelevant to the two women who are watching live war on TV. The commercial frames the reporters as the heroes of war, and as the holders of the stories of war, while its (the commercial’s) intended audience members, (in this case as fellow reporters or distant viewers), are those whose consumption of the spectacle of war is linked to the speed at which this spectacle can be documented. The method that inspired me to edit this remix sequence is ‘détournement’ which was the guiding conceptual and visual technique that led me to present my final research project as an installation project instead of a film, as I will elaborate further.

It was during my research residency at U-Penn University in Philadelphia and my explorations of the predominance of the use of the term spectacle in relation to live war that I came to read French theorist and filmmaker Guy Debord’s *The Society of the Spectacle*, (1967). Debord was the co-founder of the Situationist International (SI), the group that played a key role in initiating the May 1968 revolt in France. Inspired by Marxist thought and avant-garde artistic movements like Dada and Surrealism, situationists perceived the spectacle as “an affirmation of appearances and an


identification of all human social life with appearances.”

Accordingly, the commodification of life and of direct experiences always takes place through a medium of sorts and is led by a select few leading to a society engaged with the contemplation of a spectacle of images. In response to the loss of connection with daily life, and to the loss of meaningful and creative direct experiences, the Situationist International (SI) aimed at creating an art that would allow for new situations to subvert the predominance of the spectacle. Détournement is one of the proposed artistic techniques used by the situationists as a means to subvert the intended meaning of films, adverts, or political speeches etc., produced for consumption in a society that is fascinated by the spectacle of images and that has consequently become impoverished in living daily life. Defined as “the reuse of pre-existing artistic elements in a new ensemble,” and as “the negation of the value of the previous organization of expression,” détournement serve to dissect and dissolve that which creates cohesion in any given structure, (be it a poem, a film, a political statement, etc.), and to reorganize it within a whole new structure that eradicates the original work’s underlying ideology by undermining its foundation.

In my questioning of the delineation of the live from the real in war, a layer of words had gathered upon a layer of experiences that had turned into memories. The real (the everyday real that keeps shifting) in that sense could only be accessed in London within a space that questioned the memory of war. Reflecting on my own research

92 Debord, Complete Cinematic Works.
project through détournement made me perceive writing, filming, gathering information, editing, and sharing with colleagues as the constituent elements of my research and therefore as the potential building blocks of an installation. I mapped my research questions into frameworks/frames to be experienced and traversed by visitors. Nicholas Mirzoeff’s right to look is prioritized in “fragments”. As cited previously, Mirzoeff sees that right as starting on a “personal level with the look into someone else's eyes to express friendship, solidarity, or love. That look must be mutual, each inventing the other, or it fails.”95 That right was recreated and maintained through co-presence, revealing it is possible to reinvent together and collaborate in a space that is outside from the quotidian of war but which questions war at every step. In a research concerned primarily with the mediatized production of war images where the producers and cameramen remain invisible thus maintaining the power effect of the spectacle of war invisible, I problematize the authority of the 'maker of images', an authority maintained through the invisibility and inaccessibility of the author/director/artist/writer/producer. Whether or not “fragments” can be said to break the spectacular space of war is uncertain for it can be argued that the space itself is a production of a different type of spectacle. Yet it is the final dialogue and exchange that changes the dynamics of the space for me from spectacular to engaged in revealing how the personal and the political merge in each of the visitors’ reflections. The installation culminates in my asking the visitors to gather in a round chair discussion where an open conversation follows. Although “fragments” is set up in an installation space, it is also a situation in Debord’s sense of the term where visitors gather in order to play, watch, interact and finally to sit together and discuss how each one of us perceives the space, and ultimately how we each remember

experiencing war. “Installations,” writes Monica McTighe “can be described as a form of heterotopia, a place set off from society where different times and places intersect via objects, materials, and images.”96 Coined by Michel Foucault in the late 1960s the term hetero/topias (other/places) is, in reference to the term u/topias (non/places), a site that brings together various incongruous other sites where different temporalities can exist side by side. Foucault writes: “The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several places, several sites that are themselves incompatible. Thus it is that the theatre brings onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series of places that are foreign to one another”97 The juxtaposition of several places within the same place can be perceived as enabling reflection outside of the time when these places were formed.

Visitor: does it really say you can touch and move things around? Have I read correctly?
I perceive “fragments” as a Site/Sight specific tactile space where co-presence is the means to a multiplicity of trajectories and meanings. Sites are inextricably linked to sights in Donna Haraway’s writings. Her proposition to always remember the partiality of vision and to reject the fabricated god sights that pretend to see from nowhere⁹⁸ points to the politics inherent in visualizing practices where a location (a site) capacitates a located form of vision (or sight). My initial viewing experience with my colleagues and our diffracted readings revealed how the quotidian act of seeing (one’s city, one’s daily life) is not separate from the act of watching war on TV. “Fragments” recreates that possibility in prioritizing the visitors’ subjectivities while maintaining mine, leading all of us to observe the divergence of our views, and therefore the blind spots inherent to situated knowledge and partial vision. “The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there, and original,” writes Haraway, “It is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together, without claiming to be another.”⁹⁹ Through the stitching of multiple partial visions, I wanted to experiment with the possibility of situating where (how and for whom) the real and the live as images of war intersect, meet, and separate. How does the creation of a genre such as live war (introduced during the first Gulf war in 1991 as the new way to watch war) militarily inscribe an image so as to crush and disempower an enemy who watches CNN as well, while enacting the myth of the warrior nation, manufacturing a consenting/dissenting spectatorship, but a spectatorship nonetheless? Live war universalizes the notion of a spectator/citizen for whom the actual distance to the geographical location of war is blurred. The interactions of visitors who grew up in


different cities led to a subtler vision and to the enactment of distances between
countries, revealing the manner in which the political intersects with the quotidian.
“Every spectator mediates a text to his or her own reality” writes Minh-Ha for whom
the language of the spectacle is repeated every time a work denies the mediating
subjectivity of the spectator as a reading subject and meaning maker-contributor.\footnote{Trinh T. Minh-ha, “All-Owning Spectatorship” in When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, Gender, and Cultural Politics (New York/London: Routledge, 1991), 93} If
the spectator forgets that s/he is part of the spectacle as a decoder it is precisely when
s/he is unaware that her/ his televisual participation through presence, attention, vision,
interpretation is a component for the deciphering of the meaning of a text/film. The
functionality of a spectacle of war is enabled and enacted by the process of counting
oneself as an outsider who watches the world of ‘others’ as it goes by on a screen.

“Fragments” is a hybrid space (textual, photographic, audio-visual but mostly a space
for exchanging views) where visitors traverse the categories/frames/frameworks that I
questioned in my research, and interact with the material traces of the inscribed
memories in DVDs, photographs, texts, while retracing their own through interactions
with these elements. The space is comprised of various fragments, separated through
transparent cloth into enclosed yet fluid “frames” or “frameworks” which denote both
the fragmented nature of the space, and the fragmented nature of the contents within it.
The framing devices as cloths are meant to divide and regroup the larger space
allowing for interruptions or interactions with the materiality of the elements that are
always in need of rearranging and reframing. DVDs that are picked, placed, and
played by the visitors, texts, pictures, (and other elements that have propelled the
trajectory of my research), are placed in such a manner to allow for their continuous
displacement to enable individual and subjective experiences of the whole. The
elements on display necessitate different types of interactions (categorizing, colouring, reading, watching, etc.) that visitors can play with in the order they wish.

The installation space’s division into fluid enclosures is a reflection on framing as a presence/absence that limits, isolates, encloses, while it also discloses, reveals, and interrupts other possibilities in the larger space. Jacques Derrida questions the limit(lessness) between the parergon (as the frame) and the ergon (as the text, or the work): “What is the place of a frame. Does it have a place. Where does it begin. Where does it end. What is its inner limit. Outer. And the surface between the two limits.”  

The space enacts these questions in its (dis)organizing principle, as well as in the context of the critique of live war. Having multiple framing choices within the details of the space (such as which enclosure to pick) the visitors choose what not to engage with. The visitors’ awareness of installation space as a whole is never remote, and its materiality (the cloth separations as well as the tactile nature of their interactions with photographs and DVDs) is meant to continuously reveal my own framing as beset with a sensation of incompleteness that only their trajectories can complete. Moreover, the visitors’ reframing and handling of the space always brings them back to the presence of others, myself included, and to the artificiality of a space that is nonetheless taking life and meaning by everybody who is involved in it. Visitors can pick an isolated enclosure and choose to read all the time, or to watch DVDs in the solo screening enclosure, but that is a choice that is not dictated by me. The space questions the confines inherent in the photographic, audio-visual, and textual representation of war through their proximities within the larger space. A framing representing war from a quotidian space as revealed in my sequences can

therefore be watched for a short while, and an altogether different framing of war from the perspective of a soldier in Iraq can then be explored through suggested search words on You Tube channels. When these two modes of representing war are watched within proximity to one another, the viewer becomes more conscious of how framing and filming produce war within recognizable visual codes. The proximity of the different modes of watching and exploring the representation of war in the space, questions whether it is through the abstraction of the city (Baghdad, for, e.g.) and its representation as a target through the military angles on live war that recognition of war is produced, and whether the representation of the quotidian space where people sleep, eat, awake, watch war, try to go out, etc. (as evoked in the footage I filmed in Beirut) obscures the recognition of war.

“Fragments” is composed of ten enclosures/spaces: 1) A puzzle photograph(s) that needs rearranging and reordering; 2) A desk with texts I wrote and photographs I took to leaf through; 3) A shared viewing space with eight DVDs of 7-8 minute sequences edited from the footage I shot in Beirut; 4) A computer space with suggested search words on YouTube that lead to different military angles on live war; 5) Medium format printed portrait photographs that I took during the 2006 July war on Lebanon mixed with US soldiers’ night vision photographs (re)printed from You Tube war clips be categorized according to shape, style, or colour; 6) Two large format Black and White photographs that I took in Beirut during the 2006 July war to be reframed with small wooden frames (that always leave parts of the photographs unframed); 7) Copies of war leaflets that were dropped by the Israeli army onto city streets in July 2006. The visitors are told to inquire if someone in the space speaks Arabic to provide a translation into English; 8) Two large format Black and White photographs that I
took in Beirut during the 2006 July war to color with colouring pens; 9) an isolated viewing space with eight DVDs of my edited sequences; 10) a computer installation with the soundtracks of the CNN live coverage of the First Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq war (2003) to be listened to on earphones while leafing through the images that were printed from the screen onto paper.

"Fragments" is not meant to be ‘seen’, ‘traversed’, ‘explored’ in one visit (that being impossible given the amount of information, photographs, videos, and internet-based installations) rather to evoke both the question of the incessant consumption of
information on war during war, as well as the continued sensation of a lack of closure in relation to the topic of war, while at the same time bringing out questions as to how watching war takes place for each one of the visitors.

Visitor: The solo viewing room was my favourite spot. I wanted to hide here all the time while other visitors watched TV in the living-room. It was like being an adolescent and watching my program while grown ups watched theirs in an adjacent space.
Visitor: I organized the texts on the desk, compulsively, and then I came across a poem about people having to clean up after every war. Here I was cleaning up too. That was strange.

The three installations led to different interactions with the visitors. As a situation its culmination resides in the agreement of the visitors to stay in order to reflect together and to evoke differences, and therefore in accepting to enact one’s mediation of the space through dialogue. Twice, visitors expressed the desire to leave, and to talk with me alone later, because they were left with sadness, and preferred to reflect alone. I was later told this was due to the combined effects of watching war in my footage through an everyday quotidian lens, and taking a few steps and watching it on a computer through a soldier’s perspective, namely through a military lens. The exchanges with the visitors revealed that inherent to their interactions were very distinct and different conceptions of distance to war. These distances determined how far back into memory they would dig. Those whose recent relationship to war was through the media, reflected on the daily impact it had on their grandparents’ lives,
(such as food rationing in Britain during the Second World War), detaching war from its spectacular notions bringing the reflections back onto war in the quotidian.

![Image](image)

**Fig. 21**

Visitor in Philadelphia: Did you intend the space to feel like a bunker?

Visitor in London: I liked the fact that I could touch things.
A select excerpt from a recorded exchange with visitors on 23-04-2012:

Visitor 1 question: Why did you remove and print the images and only leave the sound in the computer, here in the Gulf war corner. What was your intention?

Answer: The idea is that when you listen to the sound, you visualize something that is completely different from what is on the screen. What I realized when I was watching it was that the sound informs the frame, it inform a visual frame which you actually don’t see. In the sound, the reporter says: I am seeing colors, explosions, whereas what you see on the live TV screen is maps. So what they are saying is what is worth seeing, are colors. There is no mention of death, there are no humans, unless it is stories of the reporter. So the separation was meant to question what live war meant according to the first live war transmissions, as maybe the ancestor of what followed in live war which by now has been naturalized.

Visitor 2: When I was listening to it I tried to remember where I was at the time, and what I was doing in Baghdad as an Iraqi citizen. The sound allowed me free reign and my memory was getting reconstructed. I stopped hearing the reporter’s voices and remembered myself sitting in a staircase. Hiding. I tried to recall what I was feeling, and seeing at the time. By listening, I saw something else. I was trying to put things from my own experience in sequence. I’ve seen this footage before and it never did to me what happened now. The black screen allows a reliving of a memory that is mine. I didn’t realize the framing had been restrictive in that way.

Visitor 3: Why do you ask visitors to arrange and be the narrators of these photographs in that corner? What is your narration since you picked the images?

Answer: There is no particular story here, because the images belong to different languages as I see it. Some are military pictures taken directly from soldiers’ night vision footage and others are very personal portraits of refugees that I took. The difference between embodiment versus techno-strategic imagery is the main question here. I wanted to engage in the game of trying to arrange –categorize- to see what thoughts it would evoke in visitors.

Visitor 3: some aestheticize the war, and could go into galleries, and others are not considered art, so that mix is interesting.

Answer: yes, it is also a question of how can someone tell us that someone’s death is art. The whole space questions that.- what goes into a gallery? I question my own pictures as well, out of a feeling of responsibility. A bombed car from Iraq did get a Turner prize no?

Visitor 4: I thought of the TV show homeland. I turned the night vision images into a Hollywood movie, which basically mixes all… it says a lot about how we interpret images. As for the bombed car making it into a museum, if you think about it, it is like the memorializing of something that is a horrible memory.
Visitor 1: The space feels like a news room, you miss a lot of things and it gives you a feeling of lack.

**Answer:** different spaces are different frames, that’s also the idea… Watching together is different from watching alone, and so there’s no way to experience everything, and one’s choices will inform their experience.

Visitor 1: The fact that I have to change DVD’s, messing around with the technology is a step further as most galleries will tell you not to touch.

Visitor 2: I actually wasn’t sure. The DVD started again and again and I watched it many times, and didn’t dare change it. (They all laugh) There are also different kinds of framing alongside one another which I thought was very powerful, the info war, and journalists boasting of how great they were, next to other types of framing. It was hard for me to watch the CNN stuff being watched from that perspective. I never thought about it from that perspective.

Visitor: the feeling of missing out in interesting for me, because the way we follow news is that we don’t want to miss out, this is how I do it, at least. So it makes you conscious of that.

Visitor: I am not comfortable with sharing my views with others. I feel exposed and vulnerable.
“...In early December, I made my way in the bitter cold to the 40th Street Artist Residency where Sabine had installed “Fragments,” the open-platform multi-media piece that came out of her semester’s ruminations. The Residency is aptly named: one half of a red brick duplex in West Philadelphia, indistinguishable from the homes around it. Sabine opened the door and, lightly embracing the role of host, welcomed her viewers, took their coats, and showed them around the installation space. Yet here were strange objects for hospitality. Small tables on which sat miscellaneous-looking stacks of photographs, diagrams, and articles. Laptops where earbud-wearing viewers sat watching Sabine’s wartime interviews with civilians as well as more dreamlike pieces less clearly connected to war. Printouts of digital photos loosely arrayed along the Residency’s dusty floor—uncaptioned images that seemed, on closer inspection, to have been taken on a walk through Beirut after a raid had freshly devastated a neighborhood whose residents were beginning to sort through the rubble for salvage. And in a narrow backroom, a flat-screen television on which other visitors were watching more clips chosen from a stack of ill-labeled DVDs. About the rooms there was a sense of the homemade, the makeshift—as if these things had been laid out quickly, with whatever was to hand, and might need to be packed quickly or even left behind. A sense, too, that the piece was grappling not with discrete wars—the kinds with start and end dates, names, numerals—but with war, singular.

The various stations in the house were unnumbered so I wandered for a few minutes then sat down at a recently vacated laptop. I watched the civilians under the drone sketching portraits of one another and keeping, as they spoke to the person behind the camera, one eye always on the circling fleck. I heard Sabine’s voice asking them sympathetic questions then giving way, on another clip, to the music playing on the stereo of a car being driven through an inhospitable landscape. At another station, among stacks of other images and texts on a small table, I discovered Sabine’s copies of the readings for my seminar, complete with her underlinings and marginal notes. They seemed out of place, these essays written in French, British, and U.S. universities far from the places that had shaped and preoccupied the filmmaker. But now they, too, were documents in war, things that might have to be hurriedly packed or abandoned. And seeing these writings among photographs of rubble and copies of propaganda leaflets placed them in war’s production chain as well...”

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Chapter 3. What counts as (an image of) war?

Look, the photographs say, this is what it’s like,  
This is what war does, and that, that is what it does too.  
War tears, rends, war rips open, eviscerates.  

Susan Sontag (2003)

War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.  

Carl Von Clausewitz (1830)

An inexhaustible archive of war images is accessible through internet search engines. Using Google with the search word war produced 655,000,000 results revealing ‘war’ in a mix of fictional and non-fictional images. A small digression onto algorithms is necessary to maintain that search engines (as filters of realit(ies)) are not neutral bearers of information. Using Google as a search engine takes a word like ‘war’ through algorithms that the company named PageRanks linking the search word to page results supposedly appearing in the order of the measurement of their importance. The algorithm remains private under the first Amendment US rights, which protects the right to free speech: “PageRanks are opinions, the company’s judgement of the value of webpages. These opinions are protected by the First Amendment.”\textsuperscript{103} Therefore the supposed value of the search results for a word like war is programmed by one group of people’s judgement of what counts as war, leaving out that which is considered to be without value. This digression is neither to

support nor to question the integrity of one search engine over another, but to maintain that knowledge is not separate from the process that produces it. Being private, the algorithm’s exclusions cannot be known, but are to be taken as the personal judgement of the company owners. When viewed as an intra-active process, my internet search takes shape and becomes the material (of the topic) through entanglements, exclusions, inclusions. Neither is the algorithm neutral, nor am I, and my search does not determine what war is, but reveals the processes I pursued to articulate war.

In my initial search results for the term war, the fictional-factual merging of war movies, war games, and documentary footage of various wars pertained to Google’s algorithm that mixes all genres under the term ‘war’, but the results displayed also reveal war’s imaging as transhistorical. By showing one image from the First World War, next to one from the Crimean war, next to another from the Vietnam war, wars get mixed up while the figure of the soldier is maintained as the emblem of war. Defined as: “transcending historical boundaries; eternal,” it is the transhistoricity that is practiced by politicians (Georges Bush) and reporters (Peter Arnett reporting live from Baghdad) that led me to continuously research wars that were unrelated to the First Gulf war (which propelled the advent of live war) in order to understand the suggested imaginary links that they made by comparing and contrasting the first Gulf War (1990-1991) with the Second World War (1939-1945) and the Vietnam War (1956-1975). Through transhistoricity, epistemic exclusions are

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104 Incidentally, other internet search engines such as DuckDuckGo or Bing produce completely different organizing orders of wars. In the former, the reader has to select the war before being able to look at images and in the latter, war images appear with twelve additional categories including the Cold War and the Korean war.  
normalized and imaginary links are made from one war to the next regardless of the specificities of time and place. I will return to transhistoricity as a political tool that maintains a mythic ‘image’ of war as an on-going American story, but prior to that will follow the suggested epistemological research pathways that link every war to the one that preceded it.

![Image](image1.jpg)

Fig. 23, Screen grab no.1, Google/image search for the term: “War” (2013).

![Image](image2.jpg)

Fig. 24, Screen grab no.2, Google/Image search for the term: “War” (2013).
Watching different images of wars through the proposed organizing lens of the Google image search engine as if on a film editing software or a war photographer’s proof sheets reveals the flaunting of weapons in war photographs. The proposed categories that my search led to were of war games, Hollywood war films, as well as documentary and war photography images. My familiarity with these representations takes place through my exposure to Hollywood war movies, but they are far removed from my own experience of war as a disruption of daily life, be it through its interruption of schools, universities, and the frequent displacements from home to ensure safety. My aim is not to analyse the images of soldiers and weapons that predominate the five categories suggested by the Google image search page, but to reflect on the suggested angles with which war is represented and therefore recognized. What struck me first about the image results was that a category for Modern War (that I thought would lead me to the recent Gulf Wars) appeared next to the First and the Second World War and led to a computer game of war with the same naming. To deduce that Google’s suggestion is that Modern war is a game that comes third after the First and Second World Wars may be too hasty. Yet the critique of the first Gulf War (1990-1991) was precisely that it was presented as a game, and as infotainment (a mix between information and entertainment). The blurring between the boundaries of War as a game, and War as the result of the embodiment of an offensive on a civilian’s daily life suggests that it is the operational representation of war (as a real war, or as a game) that defines its modernity.

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106 This game of war in particular is called “Modern War”, linking modernity in war with the merging of technology as war/as a game. For the topic of war and games check: Tim J. Cornell, and Thomas Benton Allen, eds. War and games Vol. 3, (Boydell Press, 2002).
The measurement of an advanced civilization is judged by the novelty of the weapons it produces, the American humourist Will Rogers cynically joked: “You can’t say that civilization don’t advance, for in every war they kill you in a new way.” From bows, arrows, gunpowder, explosives, cannons, to submarines (shooting blindly from a distance to seeing from underwater) balloons, rockets, helicopters (allowing a bird’s eye vision), cruise missiles, atomic bombs (exposing a large field to destruction while remaining at a safe distance) spy satellites, to unmanned aerial vehicles (controlling and seeing without being seen/surveillance) etc.; the list of military technology displays a gradual capacitating of remote vision and surveillance where visibility becomes allied with power over a remote terrain which in turn impact the representation of war through images and through the language used to describe war.

Susan Sontag’s quote that opens this chapter is about photographs as evidence of a war that has already taken place, and about its material manifestations on a cityscape. A photograph of war reveals how war ‘tears’, ‘rips open’, and ‘eviscerates’ writes Sontag. Carl Von Clausewitz’ quote underneath it is evocative of war as a necessary means to an end, without detailing what ‘the act of violence’ is, or what it does to bodies. The term ‘war’ can be used to designate tactical notions of war, the act of waging war, and the embodied effects of war on a human body. Is war the tactical view of the map of a terrain about to be bombed, is it the landscape of burning cities, or is it the body of a civilian escaping the violence of war? Carl Von Clausewitz’ unfinished treatise on strategy Vom Krieg (On War) continues to be referenced by war strategists. It was written after the Napoleonic wars, and published posthumously by his wife Marie Von Clausewitz in the 1830s. On War expands on the strategies

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nations use to achieve what Clausewitz perceives to be war’s aim (curbing the enemy’s will), whether on the battlefield or through political means. The customary reading of Clausewitz’s treatise outside of the specific historical context in which it was written was objectionable to Foucault for whom such a reading fails to take into consideration the discontinuities that exist from one war to another. Discontinuities between wars reveal how power struggles in war are enacted, and the traces left by war (whether in images, texts, theories, or laws) that count as war’s outcomes are not external to the struggles inherent in the representations of war. In other words, one should probably question why Clausewitz whose theories of war are inspired by Napoleonic battles is still quoted by strategists to this day and what discontinuities such a referencing eludes and/or propels in one’s understanding of more recent warfare. The inseparability of war from its photographic representation has become unavoidable according to Sontag for whom “the ultra-familiar, ultra celebrated image of an agony, of ruin, is an unavoidable feature of our camera-mediated knowledge of war,”¹⁰⁸ But harrowing photographs do not necessarily produce any understanding of war, she writes in Regarding the pain of others (2003): “They are not much help if the task is to understand. Narrative can make us understand. Photographs do something else, they haunt us.”¹⁰⁹ For Sontag, photographs of war offer a space to reflect on the fact that some people’s sufferings are located on the same map as others’ privileges and on how the two may be interrelated “as the wealth of some may imply the destitution of others.”¹¹⁰ Critiquing her own notion that an excess of war imagery is affecting people’s capacity to respond to the suffering of others with empathy, a view that she held in her earlier book On Photography (1977), Sontag proposes that it is

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¹⁰⁸ Susan Sontag, Regarding the pain of others (New York: Picador, 2003) 24
¹⁰⁹ Sontag, Regarding the pain of others, 70
¹¹⁰ Sontag, Regarding the pain of others, 80
not indifference but fear that makes people look away from contemporary representations of the horrors of war.\textsuperscript{111} “In each instance,” Sontag writes, “the gruesome invites us to be either spectators, or cowards, unable to look.”\textsuperscript{112} The ‘us’ for Sontag designates those who live at a distance from the daily material manifestations of violence and who end up not knowing how to turn the photographs they’re viewing into a meaningful action: “It is because a war, any war, doesn’t seem as if it can be stopped that people become less responsive to the horrors. It needs to be translated into action or it withers.”\textsuperscript{113} Sontag ponders whether it may be better to withhold one’s undisputed right to look at photographs since the unstoppability of wars maintains one’s empathy without any outlets: “Perhaps the only people with the right to look at images of suffering of this extreme order,” Sontag writes, “are those who could do something to alleviate it—say, the surgeons at the military hospital where the photograph was taken—or those who could learn from it. The rest of us are voyeurs, whether or not we mean to be.”\textsuperscript{114}

As opposed to Sontag’s excavation of potential reactions from empathy, outrage, indifference, voyeurism, to the incapacitation of action while faced with the photographic representations of suffering, Ariella Azoulay refuses to use these emotions as the guidelines of a passive gaze and claims that it is “our historical responsibility not only to produce photos but to make them speak.”\textsuperscript{115} Azoulay calls for ethical spectators to interpret actively rather than passively the representations of the manifestations of violence that occur under the aegis of governing democracies.

\textsuperscript{111} Sontag, \textit{Regarding the pain of others}, 79  
\textsuperscript{112} Sontag, \textit{Regarding the pain of others}, 34  
\textsuperscript{113} Sontag, \textit{Regarding the pain of others}, 79  
\textsuperscript{114} Sontag, \textit{Regarding the pain of others}, 34  
“We look at the photograph of disaster as something that concerns us, not because we have to identify with the victim,” Azoulay states “but because we are governed by the regime that produced these disasters.”116 She proposes that all people are bound by a civil contract of photography composed of a borderless citizenry and constituted of “anyone and everyone who bears any relationship whatsoever to photographs- as a photographer, a viewer of photographs, or a photographed person.”117 Every citizen within this citizenry has equal rights, according to Azoulay, although governments only protect some of citizens, while designating others as enemies, or non-citizens. “This inequality amongst equals”, she adds, “imposes a common though not equal, burden of responsibility on the shoulders of all citizens of photography.”118 The citizenship of photography ensures the visibility of offences that are perpetrated against some people and not others. Those who are unjustly treated and forced to remain silent can negotiate with others in the citizenry of photography and to rebel against their very silencing inside the photograph that the government willed.119 Azoulay gives the example of a photograph of Israeli soldiers posing next to a dead Palestinian man as though he were a trophy of sorts. “Only several yards from the soldiers stood another photographer who watched what was happening,” she writes, “and thought it was proper to record it: not a photograph of soldiers next to a body, but of soldiers having their pictures taken with a body.”120 In this instance, a photograph of a photograph reveals the violated rights of the dead man’s body. According to Azoulay, the Palestinian citizen’s photograph thus turns into an active indictment against the acts violence he suffered (his death as well the disrespect to his

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117 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 97
118 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 144
119 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography
120 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 145
dead body). The Israeli regime, according to Azoulay, does not acknowledge the citizenship of Palestinian citizens and continually tries to turn them into subjects through military force.121

Yet indictment within a photograph cannot bring back the Palestinian man in question who remains nameless in both photographs nor can it change the course of his death, or remove the pain it engendered. Were the soldiers ever punished for their actions, or did this act fall into oblivion as one of many other similar violations? If the photograph reveals the workings of the ruling power and the normalization of an act of violence that remains unpunished by law, it also reveals how photography (as used by the soldiers) is sometimes inseparable from the exercise of power, and how the power is inherently self-protected from being held accountable.

Whereas Sontag affirms that society merely chooses to highlight some photographs rather than others to instruct citizens on ‘important memories’ and asserts that there is no such thing as collective memory, or collective guilt,122 Azoulay perceives the collective citizenship of photography as enabling a new formulation of human rights that is based on the link between visuality and citizenship.123 For Azoulay photography reveals the ways in which some people have been and are being dominated by a sovereign power suggesting that an active spectator can reconstruct the harm done to citizenship.124 Although the notion of an active and ethical spectator leads to the recognition of war within the mundane acts of violence that have been incorporated and normalized in society, how can an active spectatorship effectively

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122 Sontag, *Regarding the pain of others*, 34
124 Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography*, 131
transform the laws of the sovereign powers? An active spectatorship does not take into account that those whose rights are continuously and actively violated may be tired of being the subject of a photographic debate while their daily life cannot provide respite from violence. Azoulay’s notion of a citizenry of photography does not eliminate Sontag’s proposition of the potential existence of an uninterested and apathetic spectator whose only concern is to be on the safe side of authority, or that of a passive spectator whose incapacitated action leads to a lack of interest. But her imperative of the active spectator highlights the urgency of questioning what one is looking at all the time, and reconstructing the social reality that led to the meeting between the photographer and the photographed. It also propels reflection on how the formulation of laws to halt any questioning of the authority’s actions may be implemented to limit an active spectatorship from turning into a tool for immediate action.

“The law is not born of nature, and it was not born near the fountains that the first shepherds frequented” Foucault writes, “The law was born in burning towns and ravaged fields. It was born together with the famous innocents who died at break of day.”\textsuperscript{125} According to Foucault violence results in the drafting and the implementation of new laws, and it is within these laws that war as the manifestation of power can be best observed. Foucault questions whether the very function of laws in society is not simply an extension of war that ensures the domination of some over others: “Does what has now become the commonplace theme, though it is a relatively recent theme, that power is responsible for defending civil society imply, yes or no, that the political structure is so organized that some can defend themselves against others, or can

\textsuperscript{125} Foucault, \textit{Society Must Be Defended}, 50.
defend their domination against the rebellion of others, or quite simply defend their victory and perpetuate it by subjecting others? The application of laws through the institutions that are assigned to protect civilians from harm, and by extension from seeing the ‘harmful’ effects of violence in images, occurs through censorship laws and camouflage ensuring the domination of one group over another thereby crushing any potential (foreign or local) rebellion.

Searching for images that ‘count’ as war is just as much a delineation of the manner in which the cultural production of the knowledge of war is fraught with epistemological struggles among polyvalent interpretations of war. This is most evident in anti-war representations that decry the injustices and violence suffered by civilians as a result of war, and that sometimes remain banned for many years. Francisco de Goya y Lucientes’ *The Disasters of War* (1810-1820) for instance, consisting of eighty-two prints that were only released publicly in 1863 more than three decades following the artist’s death. Painted between 1810 and 1815 they depict Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and the subsequent guerrilla war that was unleashed following the defeat of the Spanish monarchy. There is no glory, valour or beauty only misery and violence to be found in war as Goya portrays it, just as there is no escape or breathing space for the body stuck in the nightmarish etched frames. One of the plates entitled *De qué sirve una taza?* asks what one cup can do to save a family from famine.

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“Foucault invites us to pay attention to the past and ongoing epistemic battles among competing power/knowledge frameworks that try to control a given field,”

Medina writes. The epistemic battles of what counts as war not only take place on the ground through battles, but also through the maintenance of the authority of some texts as seminal war texts and some images as famous war images, whereby ‘irrelevant’ information/images/representations are kept in the dark, no longer contributing to the recognizability of the political struggles that are inherent in war.

Clausewitz’ famous dictum of war being the continuation of policy by other means was inverted by Foucault who defined “politics as war by other means”.

![Image of Francisco de Goya Y Lucientes: De qué sirve una taza? (1863)](image)

**Fig. 25**

It is within the application of laws that war can be perceived most clearly for Foucault and not in the act of war itself, nor in the analysis of the strategy that leads to war.

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129 Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 16.
Foucault saw the theory of sovereignty that functions as an analysis of power from subject to subject (or the subject of the sovereign who makes subjects of his subjects) as insufficient to explain: “how operators of dominations inform relations of power.” He suggested a theory of domination instead in order to understand how power functions through bodies: “We should not, therefore, be asking subjects how, why, and by what right they can agree to being subjugated, but showing how actual relations of subjugation manufacture subjects.” The representation of war can be perceived as a practice of subjugation that manufactures the subject of war according to the drafting of laws that limit what can and cannot be seen, and what can and cannot be articulated through that visibility. Although it was in the Crimean War (1853-1856) that the first order of censorship was enacted and photographers who did not follow the rules were jailed, censorship laws forbidding the revealing of death in war were maintained alongside the development of the progressing technology of the camera from the daguerreotypes that necessitated the immobility of the subject being photographed for fifteen minutes (thereby leading to the staging of some war scenes by photographers such as Roger Fenton (1819-1869) who had to transport bulky camera equipment in his van to photograph the Crimean war) to handheld cameras capable of capturing an image in a click and that could well be placed in the centre of warfare as in Vietnam.

Foucault suggests that operators of domination induce subjugation by manufacturing subjects who follow orders and who comply through the subtle functioning of dominations within the social fabric of institutionalized practices, rather than by a

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130 Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 45.
131 Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 45.
forceful imposition of power. Photographers were not forcefully disallowed from the terrain during the First World War (1914-1918) or the Second World War (1939-1945). Rather their presence ensured the spreading of the ‘image’ of an apparent liberty of press whereas the limits imposed by the drafted censorship laws pre-regulated both wars’ visibilities to reveal some angles and dissimulate others as is now common knowledge.

Fig. 26, Roger Fenton, *M.Sparling, seated on Roger Fenton’s photographic van* (1855)

Described by Rainer Fabian and Hans Christian Adam as being of a mechanized war, a mechanized death, and a mechanized destruction, First World War photographs of fighting served to reveal the action of war while camouflaging its effects on the bodies of the fallen: 135 “Never before had a war been so comprehensively photographed, and never before had the public seen so few pictures showing the realities of a war in which ten million men died, or so few depictions of death.” 136 In “The Storyteller” Walter Benjamin describes the returning soldiers from the First World War as “grown silent—not richer, but poorer in communicable experience” for bodily experience had never been so strongly challenged by mechanized

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135 Rainer and Adam, Images of war, 166.
136 Rainer and Adam, Images of war, 165
The soldier, for Benjamin, who once went to school on a horse-drawn streetcar, returned home to see that only the clouds remain unchanged. The fragility of his body in the face of the technology of war grows and he is muted by the sum of his experiences. According to Benjamin, the First World War marked the beginning of the decline in the communicability of all types of experiences. The tell-able and the see-able started to recede into secrecy and camouflage just as the technological means (print, photography, film) to transfer these experiences became more widespread.

Fig. 28, (Author Unknown), *WWI Troops in trenches*  

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138 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller”

One can’t perceive images of previous wars today as they had been perceived then, since the very dissimulations that regulated the war’s coverage and that curbed wars’ visibilities have by now been uncovered, and since the perceptual changes that happened through different wars have been normalized. The passage of time gives images new meanings as the fictionalization of wars by governments becomes public knowledge and the visibility of the traces that have survived, spell new stories. Old photographs of war display the presence/absence of that which a viewer now knows, namely that an unframed brutality may be next to a most mundane photograph of soldiers in trenches. Surviving images of war are therefore a visible proof of a legal angle that hides that which was not allowed to become visible. Archival images of war can be seen as tricksters for when they were taken, there was no knowledge of how they would end up losing their initial intent and changing allegiances to decry the very government that allowed their existence. Images are like agents, W.J.T. Mitchell

writes, adding that: “If images are agents, then, perhaps they should be thought of as
double agents, capable of switching sides, capable of being “flipped” by acts of clever
détournement, appropriation, and seizure for purposes quite antithetical to the
intentions of their creators.”

When it comes to archival images of war, the act of
détournement is most often done by the passage of time itself that supplies the image
with the hidden information to reveal how photography was put to the service of
camouflaging war, and how it is always part of the production of war.

Haraway’s definition of the artifactualism of nature is a suitable analogy in
understanding how fact and fiction combine in one’s understanding of war: “Nature
for us is made, as both fiction and fact. If organisms are natural objects, it is crucial to
remember that organisms are not born; they are made in world-changing
technoscientific practices by particular collective actors in particular times and
places.” Haraway’s quote is in reference to scientific practices that take place in
laboratories where samples of what counts as nature (animals, trees, cells, etc.) are
examined, visualized, tested, and reproduced through scientific experiments, leading
to a seeming factual understanding of nature, whereas the very interventions of human
and non-human actors (in reference to Bruno Latour’s actor-network-theory) such
as scientists and the tools they use actually determines the continuous ‘making’ and
‘understanding’ of what nature is/is not. Similarly the representation of war, and one’s
encounter with it, reveals war’s artifactualism not only through censorship laws as a

143 Bruno Latour explains: “Action is borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed, translated. If an actor is said to be an actor-network, it is first of all to underline that it represents the major source of uncertainty about the origin of action” From *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-theory* (Oxford University Press: 2005), 46
tool that governments impose to dissimulate war’s motives, workings, and outcomes but also because it is an all-encompassing violence produced by human and non-human actors such as soldiers, politicians, civilians, weapons, television sets, cameras, photographs etc. War, constituted of the combined effects of its elements, continuously alters the perception of the material space of life, as well as the understanding of those involved in it and their capacity to communicate their experiences. The specificity of ‘times and places’ that Haraway insists on in her definition of the artifactualism of nature, is just as important of a distinction in war as a reminder that war practices are always the result of the choices and experiments of a group of individuals (military personnel, scientists) that end up being used on the ground, in fields, on soldiers, and on civilians. War therefore always functions through and by individuals within a material space that redefines language, space, and communication in such a way that these changes become part of the course of life.

Fig.30, “Author Unknown”, *Gas mask drill for primary school children*, UK, 1941.\(^\text{144}\)

In his often quoted sentence where he writes that “weapons are tools not just of destruction but also of perception,”145 French theorist Paul Virilio explores the First World War’s soldiers’ notions of mobility in the environment, their conception of space and distance, the limits of their eye-vision versus the weapon’s optical vision, and how these continuously shift with the changing military technology. These perceptual shifts alter the civilians’ lives just as much as they do the soldiers’, as they capacitiate visibilities and angles (such as aerial views) that in turn circulate and become part of the recognition of war. The advanced military technology ushered in by the First World War led to a heightened visibility of distances, a growing inability to communicate bodily experiences and to the prevalence of deathless panoramic photography.

Photography continued to serve the preferred framing of war as a victorious and honorable venture during the Second World War, as Rainer and Adam confirm writing that more than 15,000 war photographers were accepted in German society as civilian observers, and were reportedly filming, photographing and writing about German victories while the German fronts were disintegrating.146 For Chris Hables Gray, the Second World War was a scientific venture favoring discourses of science, logic and mathematical calculation: “It is with good reason that World War II is often called the physicists’ war, for physics made the total weapon, atomic bombs, possible,” Gray writes, adding “Yet, as valid as that label is, it disguises somewhat the pervasive role of formal logical systems and other aspects of technoscience. Consider scientific management and operations research. Both of these formal/logical systems are rule

146 Rainer and Adam, Images of War, 166.
bound, explicitly defined, and involve a great deal of mathematical
calculation.”¹⁴⁷ Technoscientific thought was enabled by the military’s use of
computers allowing them to organize masses of people into punch-able categories and
numbers to be managed, moved, killed, or allowed to live depending on the trajectory
of the war. The Italian journalist Enzo Traverso, as cited by Mbembe, diagnoses
mechanized thinking as the basis of Nazi Germany’s dehumanization and
industrialization of death: “having become mechanized, serialized execution was
transformed into a purely technical, impersonal, silent, and rapid procedure.”¹⁴⁸ The
serialized execution and categorization of civilians as ‘enemies’ or ‘allies’ was made
possible through the management of masses of people on the ground, but also through
military technology’s capacity to oversee cities through aerial control. A dualism of
enemy versus ally ‘city space’ became more pronounced during the Second World
War where the citizen (singular) was made invisible to the naked eye of the airman
manning the military aircraft.

The atomic bomb, being the culmination of military and scientific experiments of the
Second World War, changed the conception of war to become the potential end of all
known forms of life on earth, as Foucault writes: “The power to manufacture and use
the atom bomb represents the deployment of a sovereign power that kills, but it is also
the power to kill life itself. So the power that is being exercised in this atomic power
is exercised in such a way that it is capable of suppressing life itself.”¹⁴⁹ Atomic
weapons have an impact on the perception (through language and through images) of
‘life and death’ within societies; where some nations possess the power to maintain

¹⁴⁷ Chris Hable Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict (New York: Guilford Press 1997),
128.
¹⁴⁸ Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics”158.
¹⁴⁹ Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 254.
life (on earth), their representatives (experts, scientists, politicians) therefore become the negotiators of whose life counts as life and whose death is irrelevant to the course of life.

What counts as a recognizable image of war prior to the advent of the atomic bomb was continuously regulated through images and through language to maintain epistemic hegemonies despite the public’s knowledge of the age-old governmental tactics and secrecies to blur war’s violent realities. The advent and use of atomic warfare towards the end of the Second World War and the deployment of the technology of nuclear aerial bombing created the possibility to kill civilians in large numbers, and the camouflaging of that immense power possessed by some and not others was produced in linguistic representations. “Anyone who has seen pictures of Hiroshima burn victims,” writes Carol Cohn, “or tried to imagine the pain of hundreds of glass shards blasted into flesh may find it perverse beyond imagination to hear a class of nuclear devices matter-of-factly referred to as ‘clean bombs’.”

Cohn describes having attended a workshop on nuclear weapons in the summer of 1984 where she spent some time learning the language that nuclear strategists used to describe nuclear weapons. Terms such as ‘clean bomb’, ‘collateral damage’, and ‘surgically clean strikes’ take their reference from a combination of technology and strategy as Cohn observed leading her to coin the term ‘technostrategic’ discourse.

Cohn noted that she was only spoken to and taken seriously if she employed the technostrategic discourse, a practice that made her gradually lose her fear of nuclear weapons: “The more conversations I participated in using this language, the less frightened I was of nuclear war. How can learning to speak a language have such a

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150 Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” 691
powerful effect? One answer, I believe, is that the process of learning the language is itself part of what removes you from the reality of nuclear war.” Cohn points out how language acts as a framing device screening out what is considered superfluous and revealing only the desired angle. In that sense, the technostrategic language of war censors by revealing, just as much as a photograph of war does, simply by locating words that reveal an aerial and distant vision. Situating the technostrategic discourse as a post-attack discourse, Cohn reveals its irreversibility for it is only concerned with what happens once weapons begin to fire: “The concerns of the dominant strategic discourse are limited to the destructive effects of the weapons when, and only when, they are detonated, and to the possible deterrent effects of possessing these weapons.”

The deployment of nuclear weapons and their accumulation therefore point to their conceptualizing and normalizing of a post-detonation language where the notion of peace is rendered irrelevant. The weapons themselves, their proliferation, and the damage they cause, functioned as the only reference point in the lab, screening out another language that Cohn had started out with, namely the one that described the suffering caused by nuclear weapons. Cohn’s comparison of two paragraphs describing the aftermath of a nuclear attack on Hiroshima (1945) reveal the distancing effect of the technostrategic discourse used by an American general versus the embodied language of pain as described by a Japanese novelist:

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They screamed with voices that were no longer human. The screams drowned out the groans rising everywhere from the rubble, groans that seemed to rise from the very earth itself.

Hisako Matsubara, Cranes at Dusk

You have ways to maintain communications in a nuclear environment, a situation bound to include EMP blackout, brute force damage to systems, a heavy jamming environment, and so on.

General Robert Rosenberg

For Cohn, there is no way to use the language of the second paragraph to describe the sensations of the first even if they describe the same explosion. Language here is revealed as embodying the epistemic struggles of two knowledges one being aerial and the other on being on the ground. Nuclear scientists that employ physics to the service of military tactics silence the embodiment of their actions onto other human bodies in the very language they employ revealing the artifactualism of war as a fictionalized scientific linguistic lens. Who can accuse the technostrategic discourse of lying, or of hiding the real effects of war? Instead of writing “causing death to human bodies” nuclear scientists will write “causing a blackout to systems,” thus turning the enemy into an alien species whose bodies are ‘systems’, and whose accidental deaths are ‘damage’. Underlying such a discourse is racism that gets rid of the old-fashioned “savage/civilized” divide and computes people instead into numbers. The other is no longer described as a savage in the technostrategic discourse but as some kind of a system to be dismantled, and blacked out.

154 Cohn, “Sex and death in the world of Rational Defense Intellectuals,” 705.
Building on Carol Cohn’s observations, I believe that the term technostrategic framing describes the audio-visual framing of live war, as a post-detonation frame where the weapons are on the highest order of importance in the image, and where the ‘reality’ of war is that of the soldier as the tool of strategy. Additionally terms such as ‘collateral damage’\(^\text{155}\) have become widespread in media parlance. To search for co-liveness in live war representations, as the embodied and mediatized experience of a civilian leads nowhere for the local quotidian space is outside of the alphabet that makes up the technostrategic framing. Distance stops being the geographical distance between countries waging war and becomes the strategic distance between air raids and targets. Just as the technostrategic discourse restricts language, so does the technostrategic frame restrict vision, and abstract emotions. “Abstract discussion of warfare is both the tool and the privilege of those who imagine themselves as the (potential) users of weapons,” Cohn and Ruddick write, “The victims, if they can speak at all, speak differently.”\(^\text{156}\) Similarly, the representation of war through aerial angles is the privileging of the tactical over the embodied proposed by those who cannot imagine they will endure the effects of aerial bombing.

What can one know of war through its camouflage in language and in images? Foucault’s advice to search for how the application of power functions in war, implies that one may be able to know more about war through the implementation of laws and prohibitions during and after war. Watching photographs and newsreels of war, listening to politicians talk about war, or nuclear strategists discuss their tactical views

\(^{155}\) Military Dictionary: Collateral Damage: “Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack.”(JP 3–60), accessed, February 22, 2012: \text{http://www.military-dictionary.org/collateral\_damage}

\(^{156}\) Cohn and Ruddick, “A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 11
on killing, are otherwise examples of governmentally regulated and approved evidence of wars which is camouflage in the making, a camouflage that changes allegiances and meanings with the passage of time.

What is camouflaged through acts of censorship is the revealing of the fragility of those who serve in the military institution. As the political causes that propelled acts of war become irrelevant with time, photographs and newsreels reveal how soldiers go to war to kill others and to risk getting killed. The notion of sacrificing one’s body for the sake of the nation is maintained by the continuous camouflage of death during war that politicians have continuously controlled through the images of the Crimean War, the First and Second World War.
“…Apart from the question of physical fitness, I am seriously hampered by not having access to a library & by not being able to discuss philosophical questions except rarely & briefly”.

Fig. 32, General Allenby’s Proclamation of Martial law in Jerusalem, Palestine. December 11, 1917

“The defeat inflicted upon the Turks by the troops under my command has resulted in the occupation of your city by my forces....”

It was the Vietnam War (1956-1975) that was, according to Susan Sontag, the first and last opportunity for the war photographer to act as the lone intrepid man operating out of sight most of the time.\textsuperscript{159} Despite the held belief that the war photographer was a lone hero whose aim was to reveal the horrific face of war, with the only aim to tell the truth through uncensored images, technostrategy dominated the Vietnam War with the continued use of aerial bombing. The popular belief that the Vietnam War was lost because of the media maintains fear from the ungraspable power of images and is presented by US officials as the reason why subsequent wars were tightly censored. This preferred framing of the Vietnam War suppresses both the military reasons why the United States lost the war, and ignores the fact that the passage of time changed the reading of many of the Vietnam War images. Two famous photographs from the Vietnam War namely Eddie Adams’ The Execution of a VC Suspect (1968), as well as Nick Ut’s Accidental Napalm Attack (1972), both Pulitzer Prize winners, are believed to have changed public opinion at the time, and resulted in a lack of support for the war. But various factors contributed to the de-popularization of the Vietnam War, and these were mainly rooted in anti-war movements that were mobilized in the 1960s in the United States and in Europe. The language depicted in the choice of the photographs’ titles indicates their intended reading at the time. Whereas the former stresses the criminality of the suspect being killed and of ‘rough justice’ having taken its course, the latter stresses the accidental nature of napalm bombing, adding to it the ‘human error factor’ that happens in war. Additionally, the three years between one photograph being taken and the other challenge the notion that Adams’ photograph halted the course of the war. The mythologizing effect of these two photographs on the course of the Vietnam War is questioned in the writings of scholars such as Robert

\textsuperscript{159} Sontag, Regarding the pain of others, 21.
Hamilton, Guy Westwell and Michael Griffin. The notion that the visibility of war in one snapshot can and did alter the course of history is critiqued by Hamilton who says that Adams’ photograph did not change the course of history, and that it is more accurate to say that it is history that has changed the course of the photograph just as the dominant perception of the Vietnam War gradually shifted: “The Pulitzer prize, and the many awards subsequently won by Adams, guaranteed the image a place in the histories of news photography… In this way, while the image enters the domain of history, its effect is exaggerated and de-historicised.”\textsuperscript{160} The photograph, later used and disseminated by anti-war movements lost its initial intended hegemonic reading and became known as an anti-war image. The power of images may then reside in the their longevity and the capacity to revisit them to see if and how they have changed allegiances.

The prevalence of aerial bombing reveals the continued implementation of technostrategy during the Vietnam War. In Peter Davis’ 1974 documentary \textit{Hearts and Minds}, interviews of local Vietnamese citizens are juxtaposed with those of US Vietnam War veterans revealing the traumatizing effects of the technology of weapons used in the war: “You never could see the people”, United States Vietnam veteran Randy Floyd says in one of the interviews about flying a bomber plane. “Occasionally you could see the houses when you were bombing a village, you know, you never heard the explosions, you never saw blood, or screams. It was very clean.”\textsuperscript{161} Floyd reveals how the disembodiment of the military view takes place through aerial bombing, and presents an image of the Vietnam War that is not very


popular. How could Floyd not have known about what was happening on the ground when the reporting of the Vietnam War was supposedly uncensored? Floyd’s reflection resulting from an interview conducted in the 1970s, reveals how the passage of time reframed the Vietnam War, and conveys how the materiality of his own position (inside the bomber plane and aiming at targets) produces and maintains the separation between his actions and the impact of his actions on others. “During the missions, the result of what I was doing,” Floyd says “the result of this…this game, this exercise of my technical expertise never really dawned on me. That reality of the screams or the people being blown away, or their homeland being destroyed. This was not part of what I thought about.”162 It is only when he imagines that someone may bomb his own children with napalm that Floyd sheds tears in the closing segment of Davis’ film. In a moving final address he says that he (and Americans in general) is trying very hard not to think of the lessons that the Vietnam War, and that the American military does not want to see that technology and military tactics will never be able to stop people from fighting for their freedom.163


163 *Hearts and Minds*, Peter Davis, dir.
3.1 Collateral Damage

**name:** collateral, **family name:** damage, **body:** irrelevant to the military **age:** irrelevant to the military, **crime:** at the wrong place, at the wrong time, **Aim of research:** to search again, to un-clone, to de-clone the medialitary technology’s unifying mono-vision.

The terms propaganda, and censorship may be unfitting to describe a photograph taken from an angle that allows the visibility of the combined effects of military technology (science, weapons, planes, and cameras) and media (framing, transmitting and distributing). From that angle, the other is not vilified but omitted altogether from the field of vision. The position of the camera communicates distance from the ground, as the source of visibility and as the relevant angle of knowledge. A technostrategic frame reveals instead of hiding, and by revealing disembodies and hides the actors who are part of the photograph. Who took the photograph, who enabled the explosion, who died, who survived, how many experiments were effected to capacitate the explosion, who is so fortunate as to look at this photograph and think it is merely a cloud formation? A photograph abstracts, simplifies, and brings the semblance of lightness to that which is heavy.
3.2 Transhistoricity and the advent of Live War.

At the onset of the first Gulf War, the American president George HW Bush compared the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to Hitler. “The phrase, *Saddam Hussein is Hitler* seems to me very weak, even optimistic,” writes Paul Virilio, “as the risks associated with the Middle East in 1990 are ultimately incomparable with those of Europe in the 1940s.”¹⁶⁴ For Virilio, the optimism of such a statement rests in its avoidance of the reality that an all-out nuclear war has reset the rules of war. A comparison of the sort eludes the military and scientific post cold-war nuclear weapons capabilities of the west who have the capacity to respond with nuclear weapons and unleash an irreversible war. “If the Russians and the Americans have just ended the ‘Cold War’ and have together initiated a promising disarmament,” Virilio states, “it is less by reciprocal goodwill than because they were no longer masters of an arms race that ruined their economies and threatened at any time to get out of control.”¹⁶⁵ Virilio considers the real risk to be beyond the claim that Hussein was planning to use chemical weapons on his enemies in the west just as he did on his own people, but that the fragile alliances between the strong nations (France, U.K, Germany, U.S, Russia, China) may change at any given time and gradually lead to an all out and unexpected nuclear war between the nations who possess nuclear capabilities. In other words, the real threat lies for Virilio in the very possession of these weapons by any nation.


¹⁶⁵ Paul Virilio, “*Desert Screen*”
Having first compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler, Bush later declared that the American victory of the First Gulf War (1990-1991) had finally closed the chapter of defeat left by the Vietnam War. Freely mixing between three unrelated wars Bush used transhistoricity as an affective tool to propel a certain reading of the First Gulf War. Re-editing history with the disembodiment of its complexity, transhistoricity serves to represent the past through a tactical and military lens in order to serve the present. While live war was introduced as the technostrategic bombing of Baghdad, Bush’s rhetoric proposed that Hitler clone’s was being targeted, and that waging war led to the redemption of the American soldier from the woes he felt during the Vietnam War.

What Bush’s speech proclaimed was that although a sixteen-year span separated two wars that are historically, geographically and culturally very remote to one another, wherever the war had stopped in Vietnam, (which is at the point of defeat) it was able to continue in the Gulf War and produce a happy and victorious ending. For Myra Mendible, the discourse of war in the United States had up until then been one of humiliation as seen in the news, in Hollywood films and in political speeches, whereas the victorious speech “pronounced an official end to the ‘Vietnam syndrome’, a malaise that had presumably stricken the American psyche for over 16 years.” Mendible challenges the false notion that each and every American is defined as having suffered that humiliation and is now proud to “reclaim their sovereignty.”

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167 Myra Mendible, “Post Vietnam Syndrome”.
Hollywood War movies such as Francis Ford Coppola’s *Apocalypse Now* (1979), Stanley Kubrick’s *Full Metal Jacket*, and Oliver Stone’s *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989) revealed the continued questioning of the soldiers’ experiences of the Vietnam War in the American psyche for years following its end. Yet these films often told the narrative of war as an American soldier’s narrative, supporting the myth of a one-sided trauma as Griffin confirms: “Intentionally or not, the corpus of post-Vietnam Hollywood films creates an image of the war in which the American soldier was the primary victim betrayed by the government, by the media, and by the American people”\(^{168}\) adding that “the deepest strain running through American mythic views of the war is that it was primarily American soldiers who ‘got screwed’ (never mind the millions of Vietnamese deaths).”\(^{169}\) Alternative epistemological readings of the Vietnam War are therefore suppressed within the agreed upon narrative of the war as one of loss and humiliation for the young American soldier. Local Vietnamese citizens are completely removed from that narrative unless they are seen as the escaping victims. For an affective link to be made between the Vietnam and the Gulf War is to instrumentalize the myth and to turn both nations’ civilian populations into passive vehicles for the drafting of an American soldier’s story of loss and redemption, trivializing the sufferings endured by the Vietnamese, and the Iraqis and making the first Gulf War appear like a Hollywood action sequel film to the Vietnam War.

“The Gulf was a vindication not just of Vietnam,” Phil Melling writes, “but of an entire Cold War thesis, a confirmation that history could be rewritten, wars refought


\(^{169}\) Griffin, “Media images of War,” 17
and failures overturned through rapid demonstrations of military authority.”170 W.J.T Mitchell’s advice to pay close attention to the crossing of the borders between imaginary and real wars reveals transhistoricity as a constructed image of war that uses language and imagination to abolish the specificity of history by closing the distance gap between the past and the present. New wars are turned into cloned images of a familiar past war that can be fought again with ‘better’ results. Foucault suggests that it is by looking at the incoherence of statements and by following the thread of analogies that an affective rather than a rational thematic can emerge.171 The analogy made between the Vietnam War and the Gulf war locates the essence of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ onto the military losses that can be redeemed with the advancement of the technology of the weapons deployed in the Gulf. Moreover, by removing the existence of traumatic post-war syndrome from the realities of war, regardless of its outcomes, and by making sure the violent realities of war are out of sight (as bloody), while fully in sight (as technostrategy), Bush redefined a national trauma from an army tactical perspective. It remains to be seen if technostrategic military wars will not produce their own traumas in time despite their being perceived as having been a success, as recent reports reveal of “first Gulf war psychological and physical syndromes.”172

By comparing the Vietnam War to the Gulf War, Bush dissimulates the restrictions imposed on the Gulf War coverage where journalists and photographers had to function under strict military control, and were forced to a pooling system which

limited the coverage to militarily and governmentally approved angles. “The terms for allowing the use of cameras at the front for non-military purposes have become much stricter,” Sontag writes in reference to the First Gulf War, “as war has become an activity prosecuted with increasingly exact optical devices for tracking the enemy.”

When all knowledge about war can only be viewed and given from the optical device of a military angle, or from a technostrategic frame, the ‘reality’ of war becomes the ‘reality’ of the military.

“The boundary between real and imaginary,” W.J.T Mitchell writes, “literal and figurative war, in fact, is just as important a consideration in the understanding of war as the borders between nation-states. And the crossing of those borders, their blurring by the “fog of war” (and the fog of images and language as well) is one of the most important themes for critical reflection, especially in a time dominated by a “war on terror” that recognizes no borders or limits of any kind.”

Mitchell’s use of the term ‘the fog of war’ may be in reference to Clausewitz’ On War where it is described as the uncertainty principle of war, an uncertainty that exists because the fighting parties never truly know what will happen to them if the rain suddenly interrupts them, or the fog provided cover for the enemy. That fog surrounds the representation of war, as Mitchell confirms, as well as the language used to describe and define war where the borders between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ wars is blurred before the actual borders between nation states are also physically reordered.

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173 Sontag “Regarding the pain of others” 53
The possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and its allies gives them the power to wage any war under the moral pretence of deterrence. This may be a real incentive in some cases, but it may be a lie in others. Camouflaged information from old wars often returns to reveal how settled facts were actually fictions that served to propel certain wars and (re) write history(ies). One recent example is the discovery that Saddam Hussein did not possess weapons of mass destruction that was presented by the U.S. president as the rationale for the 2003 Iraq War in 2003.\textsuperscript{176} Watching the presidential speech that was made on the eve of the Iraq invasion with this in mind can reveal a lot about the artifactualism of war. It may not fully divulge the reasons for waging war but it discloses the manner in which words/images/acts of war were employed by the United States president in a live address to stage a fictional incentive and to propel an act of war in another part of the world. The passage of time reveals the president’s live address as an auto-indictment in the making. The rationale for war is a policing one where Bush proposes to protect one side of the earth from the other side of the earth, therefore policing a certain law through the application of war: “We will meet that threat now with our army, air force, navy, coast guard marines,” Bush said in his speech, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters, police, and doctors, on the streets of our cities.\textsuperscript{177} Claiming to save local Americans from future harm, Bush rallied support for the Iraq war by evoking a very specific image of great distress. In that image local Americans would end up needing police and doctors to save them from the great fires that Saddam’s attacks may produce in American cities. The advent of liveness makes camouflage all the more pertinent to


war waging filtering it through satellite that addresses “world viewers” while separating them into different camps which the practice of transhistoricity supports.

Live War was introduced by politicians within the conceptualization of two imagined distances as the recognized distances to and from war. The one is the distance of the technostrategic frame, being the distance between the weapon and the target, and the second is the transhistorical lens, as the affective distance between one war (the First Gulf War) and a previous war (the Vietnam War) as the American soldier experienced it and as Hollywood films framed it. Within this configuration of distances, the non-recognition of live war from a local citizen’s perspective may result from the reframing of her/his life within larger transhistorical and transcultural performativities of war, while dissimulating the quotidian space of war where s/he is a holder of presence and subjectivity.
3.3 A fictional/ factual e-mail

Reading about war while in London. Images, pictures and formulations and I can now see from a distant lens of tactics, history, and words. War is someone else's experience, books tell me, someone in the distant past. War as the present, the mundane, that alters streets as it does individuals is silenced, appears as non-existent. It is nice to think, for a change, that war is someone else's problem.

Email title: Re: are you ok?
Sent: sometime in July 2006, to a friend in New York City

“Yes..Beirut is calm, there is some kings of a cease-fire. Spirits are low though. There is no more fuel. Cars lined up in gas stations for hours.
Family and I woke up to images of the massacre, on TV, in the newspapers. It’s all too much. While driving my car, I felt people's eyes were haggard.
There are no rules, and no NO’s. Everything here is a target.
In the garden where I am filming, Malak, the young woman I told you about kept talking about death. Today, she asked me: what is death? and can one live after death? She’s 16.
I wouldn’t want to be watching this on TV, or in the news from the US. So no, I am not considering leaving.
I still haven’t read Šōeki’s I Am a cat. I thought I’d get to it this summer. I keep forgetting it’s summertime. They stole July.”
Chapter 4. The Artifactualism of live war

In *Hearts and Minds* (1974) directed by Peter Davis, the following scene evokes the complexity of filming war, where visibility from a weapon merges with the visibility provided by the camera lens and becomes a proof of vulnerability. Two Vietnamese men inspecting their home’s rubble following bombings by the American army see the filmmaker and his cameraman. “Look, they’re focusing on us now”, one of them says, adding: “First they bomb as much as they please. Then they film.” They, being the Americans, whose cameras are as invasive as their bomber planes for the man in question who has just lost his home and for whom the act of bombing and that of filming have merged into one single action. Davis, having included that segment in his film, reveals how his camera is viewed as an ally to destruction, and shares with his audience the complexity of being an *other* witnessing and filming a war being waged by his countrymen. It is a touching scene in its understatement and in its subtle engagement with the implications of Davis’ filming of the Vietnam War, revealing at once the director’s desire to engage with local perspectives while pointing to the filmmaker’s intrinsic separation from the lives he is filming. Although filmed during the Vietnam War, the scene shows that the difficulty of extricating the camera/gun/view from the camera/civilian/view has started to make itself visible. The filmmaker and the victim both know that a film cannot rebuild a house whose destruction was capacitated by an overhead camera inbuilt into a weapon, nor can a horrific image of war be so shocking so as to stop the course of war.

When the cease-fire took effect in Lebanon I took a car trip to the South of Lebanon with two friends to see what had happened. I was also filming the destruction on the
There was an inherent aggression to the ease with which filming took place following the cease-fire and pressing the record button left me feeling like a voyeur of atrocities, a sensation I became acutely aware of as I saw others like me, holding their cameras to film the destruction. Admittedly this aggression in the image also aggresses the act of aggression itself by turning it into a recordable signal, an image which – maybe – enables a symbolic form of taking control (albeit of an image), and of maintaining the visibility of the traces of an act of violence. It took us about six hours in total to return to Beirut and the sense of space and place that the trip provided cannot be felt through a television screen. One's own size relative to a destroyed bridge provides a spatial awareness, that of a body’s smallness within a city. A city’s reliance on the functionality of a bridge is taken for granted until the bridge falls. It seems simple enough, but the scope of such a loss is directly related to what it incapacitates. Circulation. Recording a destroyed bridge as a signal does not erase the continued impact of its destruction in one’s daily life. Recording destruction as an evidence may serve justice, but the loss becomes part of a series of actions that have to be followed in order to re-insure circulation. Even my grandmother who only saw the destruction on television may still feel its impact when the restricted circulation caused by the falling bridge affects her friends’ ability to visit her. In her observation of diffraction as a method of inquiry, Federica Timeto writes: “One way to observe the phenomenon of diffraction, which the naked eye can easily notice is when is a pebble is launched into water…”¹⁷⁸ The circular waves that are formed on the surface of a pond from the impact of a stone are diffractions, and taking that analogy into war, recording the impact of explosions ignores the diffractions of that impact in the location itself. A situated epistemology posits the importance of the body in a space,

and something as quotidian as no longer being able to circulate in a car because of a bombed bridge, is one diffractive path that shows the inseparability of the quotidian from the political. My filming of the destroyed bridge along the way revealed one angle only of a real impact on the lives of many citizens for many years to come through diversions, reconstruction, traffic jams, etc.

Live war is a post-detonation impact driven frame that is registered only through the act of aggression itself while the diffractions it generates in the quotidian are ignored as irrelevant to the ‘latest live transmission’. As weapons’ trajectories through space can be aired through CNN satellite transmissions, recording and airing the impacts of air raids became the signature of live war since the first Gulf War. Watching live war and filming the quotidian is what initiated the questions that led to my research project whereby live satellite transmissions exacerbated the sense that everything about war was being recorded from all possible angles. The competing angles of what live war meant in 2006 (with Al Jazeera, Al Manar, BBC, CNN all covering war) are not comparable with the 1991 Gulf War broadcast when live war was introduced to TV audiences and critiqued as showing war as a spectacle.

The second part of my research question namely ‘how to engage with a practice that counters the mediatized live view of war as a spectacle of destruction’ propelled me to look at the resurgence of the term spectacle (initially coined by Guy Debord as a critique of a society that is only concerned with consumption) as a critique of the first Gulf War and which remained in usage for subsequent coverage of live war (such as the 2003 Invasion of Iraq). Inscribed in a new history (through the passage of time) and materiality (on a computer screen) the first live war images can now be viewed
and re-viewed online outside of their initial intended context. By looking back at what is no longer ‘actuality’, Derrida’s advice to separate between presence and actuality can also be applied towards past artifactualities. As noted, the staging of the real through an international artifactuality is for Derrida the: “centralizing appropriation of artifactual powers for ‘creating the event’.” During the first Gulf War, the act of war was appropriated by the military gaze and was staged through CNN’s performativity of liveness. When the actuality effect has passed, as it has for the first Gulf War broadcast, the stylistic choices inherent in making war appear ‘live’ and appear as one ‘reality’ only, are more transparent as images begin to betray their initial intended meanings.

In my installation “Fragments” I approached the first Gulf war live broadcast through Debord’s ‘détournement’ by separating the audio from the video. As noted in my exchanges with the visitors (see “select excerpt from a recorded exchange with visitors”), I reproduced the separation on a computer screen where people could listen to the audio while flipping through papers where I printed the live war frames as stills. When re-viewed outside of their intended context and seen in a new material space where the frames could be watched/touched as prints on paper, the first Gulf War was re-inscribed within multiple situated readings. It is through co-presence, and the sharing of different views, that the aim of my research which is ‘the articulation of co-liveness by delineating a situated conception of distances in live war’, was achieved in my installation. The exchanges between different visitors capacitated the deconstruction of the term ‘spectacle’ that contains the notion of a spectator as being one type of spectator. Being spectators who came from different countries (some from

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Lebanon, some from England, the United States, Iraq etc.) revealed the diversity inherent in watching war, and made the word ‘spectacle’ appear detached from the notion of the spectator. In other words, exchanges between differently situated spectators reveals the complexity of being a spectator but also reveals how every framed spectacle is always itself reframed in a new space of reception and through the subjectivity of perception. The spectacle of the archival footage of the first Gulf War has aged and it appears dated through the passage of time, revealing how the interpretation of live images is an on-going process of deciphering that occurs not only visually but through the historical inscription of the American War in Iraq within a series of more current developments such as the Invasion of Iraq (2003-2011) and the capture and execution of Saddam Hussein (2006). Therefore whatever propelled war and the staging of the spectacle of war as live no longer exists. Inscribed within a new “now” and “here”, live war as it was introduced in 1991 defeats its initial promise of liveness but remains as a trace, a proof, an agent, as noted earlier in reference to W.J.T. Mitchell’s view of war images.

Questioning what the spectacle means textually (in my written thesis as opposed to my installation) and articulating co-liveness through diffraction capacitated an exploration of the imaging of distances in language, in images, and in the critique of live war as a spectacle. Terms such as ‘simulation’, ‘virtuality’, ‘infotainment’, have become defining factors to the recognition of live war and are a critique of the epistemologies of war as a live televised signal as I will elaborate further. However these terms often remain within the television signal and do not imagine the resonance of war in the quotidian space of a viewer residing in the country under attack. Just like the technostrategic discourse made nuclear war appear tame for Cohn, so did my
engagement with some critical views on live war (such as Jean Baudrillard’s and Paul Virilio’s) make me forget the embodied effects of war, and start to perceive all wars as spectacles, revealing the power of language in obscuring situated knowledges.

I have no recollection of the process through which live war became part of war in Lebanon, only that war and live war have become inextricably linked. “Omissions, and silences are foundational,” Medina writes in his elaboration of a Foucaultian epistemology of resistance, “a constitutive part of the “origin”, or the “initiation” of a discursive practice. For that reason the fight against those exclusions requires a return to the origin.”180 As a discursive practice live war’s original formulation can be perceived in the coverage of the first Gulf War on CNN in 1990-1991, where the production of the meaning of live war was actualized within a set of stylistic approaches. “Discourse,” Hall writes, “is about the production of knowledge through language, but it is itself produced by a practice—the discursive practice of producing meaning. Since all social practices entail meaning, all practices have a discursive aspect.”181 What live war entailed in immediate critiques (of war as a spectacle, and as infotainment) are also part of the discursive practices of live war for they engage with the deciphering of the meaning and significance of live war. My return both to the original First Gulf War CNN broadcast as well as to the critiques that it engendered follows Foucault’s advice to “return to the origin” and to see whether the absence of the recognition of co-liveness is a foundational omission embedded within the critique of live war. “The ability to identify omissions, to listen to silences,” Medina writes “to play with discursive gaps and textual interstices is a crucial part of

our critical agency for resisting power/knowledge frameworks.”

The necessity of play to identify the gaps and textual interstices existing in CNN’s broadcast of the First Live War is enacted in my text through the diffraction of an imaginary and fictional presence evoking co-liveness on the margins of the text. Eluded in both the live war broadcast and in its critiques, co-liveness reappears through a textual performativity which represents the ‘détournement’ of the original, and aims to question the established critical reception of live war as a spectacle, as infotainment, and as virtuality.

4.1 Frames

Visitor: I didn’t realize people can also watch CNN in Lebanon. It made me feel uneasy.
Visitor: I placed my frame on the photograph. Then I returned later and saw someone had placed it somewhere else. That was interesting. I hadn’t seen what they saw. It annoyed me though, and I changed it back to return later and see if it would stay the same.
4.2 Live war as a Spectacle and as Infotainment.

As noted previously, the term spectacle was coined by Guy Debord as a critique of capitalist society’s passive consumption of TV programming, and was revived (by Jean Baudrillard, and Douglas Kellner, for e.g.) as a critique of the sensationalist live media coverage of the first Gulf War. The separation between direct experience and the mediatization of that experience is addressed by Debord in one of his many definitions of the spectacle where “one part of the world represents itself to the world and thus becomes superior to it by this representation. The spectacle accordingly, becomes the common language of this separation.”¹⁸³ Debord’s definition implies that the spectacle is attractive, appealing, and is a leisurely activity to the people watching it, one that they would like to be part of but are separated from in their daily lives. “Debord was writing in 1967, the Gulf War may reflect that the US military had finally caught up,” writes Keith Solomon, “employing the ‘spectacle’ of technological warfare to ensure the public’s consent and complicity …”¹⁸⁴ Solomon sees the use of spectacle as a tactic to make the weapons and military technology appear attractive to ensure the public’s complicity in war.

Although the term spectacle is a critique of the militarization of the media through live war, what does calling war a spectacle entail? Does it mean that war has effectively become a spectacle? And where such a spectacle elicits excitement, can it still be called a spectacle when seen from a local setting? As the spectacle of the army’s weapons in action, live war renders military technology attractive, and it

¹⁸³ Debord, Complete Cinematic Works, 48.
makes the active soldiers’ role appear exciting. Twenty years following the publication of his first book *The Society of the Spectacle* (1967), Debord commented in a new book entitled *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle* (1988) that his early work differentiated between two forms of spectacular power, the concentrated as seen in dictatorial societies and the diffuse as seen in capitalist societies. He added that a third form of spectacle has made itself visible, namely the integrated spectacle which integrates itself into daily life just as it describes and reconstructs it simultaneously.

“The society whose modernization has reached the stage of the integrated spectacle,” Debord writes, “is characterized by the combined effect of five principal features: technological renewal; Integration of state and economy; generalized secrecy; an eternal present.”185 Debord locates the acceleration of the technology of the spectacle to the end of the Second World War with the rise of ‘specialists’ and ‘experts’ who based life on scientific calculations. In his analysis of the integrated spectacle and the appeal of Debord’s writings in anti-globalization movements, Julian Eagles analyses the notion of the integrated spectacle as the technological renewal of capitalist societies through “the existence of an Americanized system of mass production and consumption.” 186 Accordingly, an integrated spectacle functions by continuously presenting a so-called ‘reality’ as a consumable image of what capitalism allows one to achieve. Debord adds that secrecy is the other facet of the integrated spectacle that reveals in order to dissimulate. “Never before has censorship been so perfect… The spectator is simply supposed to know nothing, and deserve nothing. Those who are always watching to see what happens next will never act: Such must be the

spectator’s condition.”

Although Debord does not use the term ‘liveness’ his description of the condition of the spectator who always waits for what is going to happen next, appears to designate television’s liveness that creates the semblance of an eternal present. The spectator is made passive and all her/his energies are expended in waiting to see what will happen next on TV. In this reading, the situatedness of the spectator is lacking and so is the manner in which her/his interaction with the media is not necessarily uniform but occurs through a variety of other societal practices and concerns. The notion that the spectacle has a grasp on people’s attention and psyches generalizes the notion of a spectator and the prefix ‘the’ is presumably meant to evoke a clear notion of who the spectator is. Debord’s description of the way in which the spectacle manifests itself as that which is desirable as a distant, unattainable and attractive signal is complex yet that same complexity is lacking in his discussion of the monolithic spectator. Debord’s evocation of a general notion of spectatorship neither reveals how the measurements of the success of the creation of a passive media spectator can be ascertained, nor does it take into account the multiplicity of spectators’ situated experiences of spectacles.

“The orchestration of the Gulf War was a glaring expression of what the situationists call the spectacle – the development of modern society to the point where images dominate life,” writes Ken Knabb, adding that “the PR campaign was as important as the military one. How this or that tactic would play in the media became a major strategical consideration. It didn’t matter much whether the bombing was actually ‘surgical’ as long as the coverage was; if the victims didn’t appear, it was as if they

187 Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, 22
didn’t exist.” Knabb’s description of the live coverage of the Gulf War, just as Solomon’s, explores the situationists’ notion of the spectacle in the framing of the first Gulf War. What is different about previous wars (such as the Second World War) where camouflage was also enabled by technostrategic angles and later revealed in militarily approved newsreels? The difference would be in the format of liveness itself and the fact that acts of war can be watched without delay, captivating a viewer’s gaze into the moment of impact as Paul Virilio asserts. “No expert, no news specialist, can estimate the effects induced by ‘war at home’,” Virilio writes, adding that “the example of Vietnam is not a good test case since its effects depended solely on televised news programmes in deferred time.” Watching war at home, according to Virilio, may lead to harmful effects for a viewer who, up until then had been accustomed to watching war in deferred time. It is the liveness of war as a televised signal that is problematic for Virilio and ‘home’ in this case, is his home. The possibility that a home is also a place that is distant from Virilio’s home, where people are living the actual effects of war is eluded. In critiquing watching war from a distance, Virilio creates the same abstracted notion of distance to the materiality of war through language, as live war accomplishes through images, turning a highly critical stance on the mediatisation of war into a one sided critique. Similarly Knabb’s critique of war as a spectacle and its construction as a clean war fails to conceive of a local viewer/spectator of the spectacle of war as living the impacts of war. The term spectacle, while efficient in critiquing the staging of war within an abstracted TV signal always engages a situated viewer who then alters the very meaning of the

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189 Virilio, Desert Screen, 38.
spectator/spectacle combination. The spectacle functions through a conception of the western viewer as a consumer with no complexity and with no empathy.

“How can we fail to recognize, after a month of standoff,” Virilio wrote about the first Gulf War, “that the true intervention force in the Gulf is television? And more precisely CNN, the Atlanta network. Saddam Hussein and George Bush certainly, but also Ted Turner, the owner of Cables News Network.”

Virilio proposes that the epistemology of live war becomes imbricated with the competing angles that Saddam Hussein and George Bush exchange through Ted Turner’s CNN network that provides a platform for the broadcasting of live war. In her proposition to always ask readers to be critical of how one sees, and where one sees from, Haraway unpacks the multiplicity of views imbricated in vision and in positionality.

Virilio’s analysis engages with the Gulf War as an image, and as an information war whose aim is at once to deter an enemy while also winning the distant audience. When the cartography of war becomes that of the two military angles and to CNN, the engagement with Virilio’s theory (which may be accurate, militarily speaking) leads to the effacement of the multiplicities inherent in both the local and non local viewers’ situated perspectives.

In his notion of ‘the Total War’ Virilio writes: “Total War takes us from military secrecy (the second-hand, recorded truth of the battlefield) to the overexposure of live broadcast” later adding that the concept of foreign wars has been abolished with wars broadcast live into all the cities of the world.

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190 Virilio, Desert Screen, 16.
191 Haraway, “Situated knowledges,” 585
192 Virilio, War and Cinema, 66
isn’t clear who stands outside this definition. Does there is no more separates and frames just as the live broadcast does in its claim to present reality to its viewers. By contrasting ‘our experience’ of live war with the ‘old fashioned second-hand recorded truth from the battlefield’ war becomes an experience that belongs to one way of perceiving, namely through images and not through direct contact with its material effects. Virilio eludes the notion that even live war may have an unrecorded, unfiltered facet whose materiality does not (and can not) make it through the selection processes inherent to live war. Although his critique of the ‘overexposure’ of information evokes the saturation of live war as a non-stop mediatisation of war, this overexposure is neither omnipresent nor equally distributed amongst different countries. “For With the advent of strategic bombing, everything is now brought home to the cities,” Virilio writes, “and it is no longer just the few but a whole mass of spectator-survivors who are the surviving spectators of combat.” 193 Although strategic bombing merged combatants with non-combatant civilians, watching the spectacle of air raids and being its victim is not one and the same. If the residents of Paris or New York City watching live war on the streets of Kabul in Afghanistan are survivors of war, then what are the citizens of Kabul to be called in that case? Survivors who are not spectators are non-existent in Virilio’s definition of war and the survivors who are forced to be spectators at once (as in co-liveness) are just as absent. The actual loss of property, the loss of life, the loss of family is not comparable to the sense of loss one watches via a recorded live 24/7 format framed for citizens who have been experiencing war from a distance since the end of the Second World War.

193 Virilio, War and Cinema, 66
Limiting the epistemology of war to its representation only abolishes its multiple impacts. Indeed what concerns Virilio is how to mentally survive the live representation of distant wars whereas the body’s survival is a far bigger concern. An exploration of co-liveness in Virilio’s terms reveals that a new category of spectatorship did emerge through the advent of liveness, but remains silenced, or unseen. When live war is at once virtual and real (to the senses) the body living both effects is at a loss. The violence on the senses, and the (mis)information on the news as information wars combine and interrelate to create spectators who are potential targets and who want to be survivors. If the live-transfer of war in the cities distances some local viewers from its reality, making them unaware of a pending death, the opposite proposition that Virilio makes is not realistic: when a surviving audience, as Virilio describes contemporary live-war audiences, residing in Paris for instance, watches a bombing of Beirut, they don’t turn off their TV sets to find their homes have been destroyed, nor do they think they will, whereas the ones living in Beirut may, and they always fear it will happen, as noted. The appeal of live information may be universal, but the plurality of the experiences denies live war its militaristic and unifying lens. For Virilio, all individuals appear to be falling under the prey of live-mediated time, discarding the individuality of experiences as well as the disparate spread of satellite technologies on earth. Although Virilio questions how one can deal with “optical hardwares that become omniscient and omnipresent and like any totalitarian regime, encourages us to forget we are individuated beings,”¹⁹⁴ his critique mirrors omniscient visualizing angles in its failing to recognize the individuated beings who cannot escape war as a real destruction of space and place despite omniscient visualizing angles of war.

“It is absurd to identify the world with those zones in the well-off countries where people have the dubious privilege of being spectators,” writes Susan Sontag, “or of declining to be spectators, of other people’s pain, just as it is absurd to generalize about the ability to respond to the sufferings of others on the basis of the mind-set of those consumers of news who know nothing at first hand about war and massive injustice and terror.” For Sontag, the notion of war as a spectacle fails to take into consideration the complexity of what it means to be an audience to live war. The term spectacle conflates live war with watching war from a distance leaving aside the embodiment of war as a terrorizing violence, while being able to hear its mediatization (on live radio, or on live television). Although it is a critique of live war, as noted, the term spectacle limits spectatorship and fails to conceive that liveness in the first Gulf War was drafting a line separating Arab viewers from non-Arab viewers. The conception of an Arab spectator/potential victim is altogether inexistent. The critique of what it implies to watch live war locally while experiencing it as a civilian through a co-live space was a fundamental omission in the formulation of the critiques of live that emerged in 1991. In the Dictionary of Military History, John Childs also observes how the coverage of war has, since the first Gulf War, become a spectacle and a blood sport for worldwide TV audiences and cynically asks: “Will the future battles have to stop for the occasional commercial break?” Childs’ critique evokes the trivialization of war although the term worldwide TV audiences, once again, confines the definition of the world to some nations while excluding other. The critique of the staging of action-driven live war sequences presented with lively tunes,

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195 Sontag, Regarding the pain of others, 86.
logos, and expert commentators also gave rise to the term *infotainment* denoting a mixture of entertainment and news in the coverage of war.

“Emerging during the late 1980s,” Daya Kishan Thussu writes, “the term ‘infotainment’ has become a buzzword – a neologism that refers to an explicit genre-mixture of ‘information’ and ‘entertainment’ in news and current affairs programming.” Thussu lists the key features of war as infotainment as: “an obsession with high-tech reporting using a video-game format to present combat operations, and providing a largely virtual and bloodless coverage of war.” The bloodless coverage of war appears under different guises, as noted in the last chapter. Censorship laws and technoscientific processes continuously alter where war is represented from, and how it is communicated. The term infotainment is a critique of live war’s camouflage of the seriousness of war framing the information in an entertaining manner but the term also omits the media’s omissions by mirroring its effects. In other words, ‘infotainment’ as the information on war presented as entertainment does not reveal how the information is actually an entertaining military frame that may have no information value at all. Entertainment as such may can still provide information, and but when war is packaged as entertainment it is a form of military *misinfotainment*. So why is it called infotainment when in fact, it appears in Thussu’s critique to have no information value at all: “The TV’s obsession with high-tech war reporting has grown since the 1991 US attack against Iraq.” Thussu writes, and citing Edward Said adds: “CNN’s coverage of the Gulf War, for the first time in history brought military conflicts into living-rooms across the globe. In the high-tech presentation of war, cockpit videos of precision bombings of Iraqi targets were supplied to television

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networks by the Pentagon thus presenting a major conflict responsible for huge destruction of life and property as a painless Nintendo game and the image of Americans as virtuous, clean warriors.”

Although Said, as quoted by Thussu critiques the hypocrisy of the military angles provided by the Pentagon to CNN to turn war into a computer game, the question of who the viewers are across the globe remains obscure. I am not opposed to the critique of infotainment but to the language that leaves no space to conceive of co-liveness as a potential space in the making, where citizens are shown how they are being killed on their own television screens. The purpose of infotainment in war appears to be the camouflage of war’s ugliness but when the singularity of every viewer is abstracted from the term itself, all viewers appear uniform. Since infotainment relies on a viewer, the abstraction of the process of viewing favours a critique of the production aspect of the news while making the reception of infotainment to appear of a lesser importance.

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198 Thussu, “Live TV and Bloodless and 24/7 news,” 166.
General Shwarzkopf’s often referred to debriefing during the First Gulf War entitled *The luckiest man in Iraq* is an example of infotainment and of live war as spectacle.

The General instructs his audience to keep their eyes on the crosshairs on the television. A moving dot appears and he jokingly mentions that this is the luckiest man in Iraq on that day. He then adds, theatrically: ‘and in his rear view mirror…’ The silence that ensues is a moment when the audience knows what to expect. His own audience of journalists and reporters burst out laughing. The explosion then appears like a blotch of ink in the middle of the screen, and they continue to laugh.

Although Shwarzkopf is making entertainment out of war, and revealing a tragic moment as a spectacle that trivializes the loss of property and the dangers of war, and normalizes technostategy, it is in the reaction of the spectators that the success of Shwarzkopf’s performance lies. Had his audience yelled, or screamed in horror, or even stood up in protest, the scene would have played differently.

The spectators make the spectacle which then appears pre-inscribed like a TV show with a laughter track to tell more spectators how to feel, react, and not react.

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4.3 The virtual, the real, and the live war.

Nick Couldry’s exploration of liveness as a ritual category, as discussed earlier in the thesis, is of relevance to reiterate how the naturalization of the boundaries between real time and live time is instrumental to the media/army’s combined angle of war as a technostrategic framework. When the first Gulf War was relayed live on television, television liveness was not a novelty but its function was put at the service of transmitting war within a 24/7 structure. “It has always mattered that television is ‘live’ in some sense,” Couldry writes, adding “I want to argue that ‘liveness’ however obvious its meaning might appear at different historical moments, is a socially constructed term tied not just to television’s but to the media’s claim to present social ‘reality’.”200 The construct of liveness is maintained in television according to Couldry despite the fact that its meaning changes, through the media’s claim to present social reality. “Live transmission (of anything, whether a real event or a fictional narrative),” Couldry writes “guarantees that someone in the transmitting media institution could interrupt it at any time and make an immediate connection to real events.”201 By way of example the announcement of the 1963 JFK assassination interrupted a fashion TV program to broadcast the news.202

In live war, liveness becomes the combination between the live signal, the media’s promise of real war as social ‘reality’ and the military gaze. When the military/media gaze combine as a source of the real, the real is assigned within a policing lens that,

201 Couldry, Media Rituals.
202 JFK Assasination on Live Dallas TV, Accessed October 1, 2013: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TpicOfFajNE
akin to a surveillance camera tracks criminals and punishes them in live time and for all to see. In the first Gulf War, live war on CNN appeared as the technostrategic angle of the ‘operational reality’ of military technologies that were used to wage war in the early 1990s. “Claims to represent reality are multiplying in contemporary societies,” 203 writes Nick Couldry highlighting the connectedness between “the countless new forms of reality TV which have received attention in media studies, and the claims to present ‘reality’ associated with real-time information processing by government and other systems.” 204 Couldry suggests observing liveness in its connection to governmentally regulated forms of power such as the police force using CCTV. The merging between reality TV and CCTV in police shows such as Crimewatch UK, reveals how the normalization of surveillance methods happens through mediated forms of entertainment. 205 The merging between liveness and the technostrategic frame through an entertainment lens normalizes the practice of war through its operational military angle, just as reality TV shows normalize surveillance methods. Couldry’s reminder that liveness is a construct asserts that the invisibility of the televizual processes that make liveness appear seamless, are essential to its functionality as a source of ‘reality’. When applied to live war the authority of the aerial military angle from which war is being filmed relies on media’s designation of ‘liveness’ as the source of ‘now’, and ‘here’ thereby obscuring the ideology of the military angle, and normalizing the practice of live war.

Even in the naming of “live war”, as introduced by CNN at the onset of the first Gulf War (1990), language framed war so as to deny the obvious and to dissimulate within

203 Couldry, Media Rituals, 95.
204 Couldry, Media Rituals.
205 Couldry, Media Rituals.
the oxymoron of live + war, the violence inherent in war. What is live in war? The reference is ambiguous. Although live war is an angle on the live representation of death in war (without fully displaying death, but displaying the military means of the violence) what seems to be “exciting” in the promise of live war, is that the image is live first rather than who or what will remain alive inside its represented frame. The format and ideology of liveness as a construct overtakes the content (of war). Three initial frames constitute a large part of the first night of the live CNN coverage of the first Gulf War (1990-1991). It unfolds as a conversation between the CNN anchor based in Atlanta and the two reporters who are stationed at a hotel in Baghdad watching the events unfold from their window. The usage of the window as the frame from which watching/narrating the events occurs normalizes the distancing of the reporters from the streets of Baghdad. Distance is therefore inscribed in the space separating the local civilians from the American reporters and the proposed ‘real’ and ‘now’ of liveness is conceived as a reporter’s experience of war from a window of hotel Al Rashid. With the absence of video footage that the reporters say is due to the blackout in Baghdad, maps are used instead to illustrate Baghdad. The purpose of the live war is not to reveal but to cover, to keep something on view as though from a gunsight (to reiterate Stanley Cavell’s definition of the live frame)\textsuperscript{206} and to expose a frame until it explodes in an anticipated future. Inside the frames, Baghdad is represented through an aerial map, and the only human presences in the frame are the two reporters who are each shown as a headshot in a frame within the frame. They stand out as audible and visible – and thus recognizable – elements in a city whose distance and danger is highlighted by its representation as a rudimentary map. As Judith Butler writes, framing “the lives we can apprehend from those we cannot

\textsuperscript{206} Cavell, \textit{The World Viewed}, 24.
preordains the lives that matter as separate from those that don’t.”

Individuals residing in Baghdad don’t matter. What matters is the “now” and “here” as determined by the reporters and anchors and the military action all merged into one time. “The live image is a filter,” Paul Virilio writes, “not through the space and the frame of the screen, but first through its time: a mono-chronical filter that does not allow the present to pass away.” Similar to Debord’s description of the integrated spectacle consisting of an eternal present, the present that is not allowed to pass away in live war, is the ‘actuality’. If it is always now in the mono-chronological filter of a live image implicates the ‘live’ and the ‘now’ where the illusion that the separation between presence and the actuality (as noted earlier in reference to Derrida) is blurred. Audiences are therefore engaged all the time in a televised ‘present’. Since the mediated presence is not the same as one’s material presence of the space however, I suggest that to be the difference that determines the meaning and substance of ‘presence’ as a heterogeneous materiality. Karen Barad describes existence as an entanglement where individuals are inseparable from their interactions. When meaning and materiality are inseparable they occur through entangled intra-relating where space, matter, and meaning are continuously reconfigured. A mediatized ‘now’ and ‘here’ ceases for some people if they just turn off the Television. Virilio’s own possibility to interpret war is not separate from the materiality of his space, what it enables, and/or incapacitates. “Everything is true in the offensive of direct broadcasting,” Virilio writes, adding: “true in the instrumental sense of the term, operationally and immediately efficacious. The audiovisual landscape becomes a

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“landscape of war” and the screen is a squared horizon, overexposed with video salvos, like the field of battle under the fire of missiles.” Virilio asserts that it is ‘operationally’ true when a viewer sees a smart bomb is hitting its target and is being broadcast yet the truth of the visibility of war is not sufficient to reflect on what other truths it generates through its construction and production as an image for all viewers to see. “Crucial to understanding the workings of power is an understanding of the nature of power in the fullness of its materiality,” writes Barad adding, “to restrict power’s productivity to the limited domain of the ‘social,’ for example, or to figure matter as merely an end product rather than an active factor in further materializations, is to cheat matter out of the fullness of its capacity.”211 In other words, the production of a landscape of war as a video battle is an active production power with multiple materializations to can only be excavated from different situated perspectives.

“I images do not go into battle and kill each other; human beings do.” WJT Mitchell writes, adding: “Images do not plan invasions, massacre populations, and shatter bodies… Images are ‘agents’ of war in the sense that a ‘secret agent’ works for a foreign power, or an ‘agency’ is an instrument of a state.”212 Whether they are secret or covert agents therefore, images are neither true nor not true but their instrumentalization and translatability gives them meaning. As an angle on war, the illusion of the eternal present of mediation, and the truth of the military televiulsual frame is irrelevant to some viewers, and is always interrupted for citizens whose city is under attack. When someone, as the Polish poet Wislawa Szymborska writes, has to clean the rubble: “someone has to get mired/in scum and ashes./sofa

210 Virilio, Desert Screen, 17.
211 Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity,"810
springs, splintered glass, and bloody rags…;”\textsuperscript{213} the meaning or truth of any live image of war is interrupted. In his description of the televised signal as the sole source of analytical inquiry, Virilio ignores the procedures that enable a mono-chronological illusion to appear mono-chronological whereas it engages various situated chronologies. Imagining for one moment the variety of the processes involved in making the truth of the military image translatable in different cities of the world (including those who ignore it as irrelevant and quickly switch channels) opens up to the multiplicity of translations, and enactments of the military image. Just as the conceptualization of the flow of televisional time cannot exist outside of the time of the consenting presence (and therefore time) of the viewer, so is the truth-value of a military frame directly linked to its translatability by experts who want to say that “this” or “theirs” is “the” truth of war that matters. The information presented in the opening three frames of the CNN live War broadcast is simultaneously true and false in highlighting some truths (maps, aerial views, probing about the reporters’ health) and blurring others.

Lisa Parks’ analysis of the 1967 BBC programme Our World reveals how the notion of a “scheduled liveness” was enabled through \textit{time zoning} in the late 1960s and remains in effect as a stylistic televisional technique. Park describes the technique as “a singular simultaneity, or a global now based on the interweaving of various time-based imaginaries, which the west tries to control, reorder and rearticulate as the time of the now.”\textsuperscript{214} Parks observes how this televisional technique separates the west from


other parts of the world creating a semblance of unity by intercutting from one location to another. Parks reveals how the show drew divisions between the industrialized nations of the west, and those of the “hungry” developing world, while excluding the countries of the communist bloc, challenging the assumption that early satellite technology was used to connect nations and generated a harmonious global village.²¹⁵ The use of Time Zoning remains in effect and her analysis sheds light on the manner in which the invisibility of the local viewer/target is effected during in the first Gulf War broadcast. By conflating the live signal with the now, through a montage between different TV studios, war’s materiality and significance is removed from Baghdad while it is taking place in Baghdad.

The editor has the flu.

Arnett remembers what it felt like in Vietnam.

He is excited about the war starting

The war has started

Now listen to the bombs in the background

The colors of the explosions are red

Smart bombs are really precise, and always hitting something

In Vietnam, bridges held for a long time. Here something is getting hit every time.

Fig.38. “CNN’s live war during the First Gulf War” 216

The start of war is a source of anticipation rather than one of fear for John Holliman for instance, one of the reporters in Baghdad, who says: “We are a little excited as I am sure is obvious,” later adding “our editor got a cold, you can probably hear her cough in the background.”²¹⁷ A prolonged imaginary countdown creates suspense, one that all the reporters refer to and are waiting for. The war becomes an inevitability thus preordaining a future within the present time of war liveness. The performativity of the global now of war is dependent on the construct of a global us of viewers, which is an imaginary and dystopic possibility.

²¹⁷“As it Happened, the Gulf war on CNN (part 1),”accessed March, 11 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlC60Kef9Mg
The global viewer’s eyes are told where to look from: The high angle, the technostrategic, the seeing from nowhere. A distant viewer is immortal when s/he watches war. There seems to be an underlying negotiation of mortality and immortality through live war. Some die while others watch from a high angle. Only debates on whose mortality is being negotiated by whom, who is at risk and who is not can relocate the subject of live war images back to the materiality of war. When the military shows global viewers how others die, it is also showing viewers how they will get killed if the term globe really means the whole globe, and if the term citizens, really includes all the citizens on that globe.

Fig. 39. “Maps of Baghdad on CNN,” (1991) \(^{218}\)

Watchi

ng the

tnews

the

central

railway

station

is

visible. Next to the yellow circle is where our house it. Does its clarity on the map mean that our house is a target?

\(^{218}\)“As it Happened, The Gulf War on CNN (part 1) accessed May 4, 2011 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlC60Kef9Mg”.
The pre-selection of the satellite view serves to reveal sites of attack from a military technostrategic view that needs interpretation by war experts. The translatable nature of satellite views is linked to some experts and not others, limiting the intelligibility of the views to the supposed transparency of the military. For Parks, satellite views are devoid of meaning but they acquire meaning from interpretation. Writing from an embodied epistemology Parks proposes satellite witnessing as a practice to be employed by citizens to demilitarize the satellite view: “Satellite witnessing is a critical practice that refuses to accept the satellite image as an omniscient view, a strategic map, a final perspective and instead appropriates its abstractions to generate further interrogation, discussion, and inquiry.”219 For instance by going to the places that satellites purport to display, a critical enquiry can ensue and reveal the omissions inherent in the military gaze. According to Lisa Parks, live war allowed for the media and the military gaze to join: “The Persian Gulf War has actualized a set of synoptic relations between the military machine and the television camera, making their gaze one and the same.”220 The fusion of the media and the military into one gaze makes any live war image a camouflage in the making, and watching television turns into watching a governmentally regulated view.

“With whose blood were my eyes crafted?”221 Donna Haraway asks. The verb ‘to craft’ has two different meanings, namely to have a skill, and to deceive. Haraway’s violent but necessary question could then be rephrased: Do I remember how, when, and with what means (or with which technologies of vision, be it satellites or video cameras) my own eyes were crafted by war images? In light of this question,

220 Parks, Cultures in Orbit, 96.
watching the first Gulf War broadcast crafted (perfected and deceived) people’s eyes with other people’s bloodshed. The first Gulf War aimed at teaching viewers how to wait for and to watch war with the help of reporters, anchors, and military personnel who served as interpreters of the images which by abstracting war removed the possibility of empathy and therefore revolt from distant viewers. All viewers are framed by live war images in Judith Butler’s observation of how ‘being framed’ also means to “to be subject to a con, to a tactic by which evidence is orchestrated to make a false accusation appear true.” The tactic of live war relies on the presumed guilt of the ‘accused’ who in this case appears to be Saddam Hussein but who in the broadcast is the whole city of Baghdad. Whoever believes the con is being framed. The attempt at highlighting the precariousness of Baghdadis only occurs, exceptionally, through the reports of Bernard Shaw, who relocates the reporting to the local experience of war. He mentions having been hiding with the personnel of the hotel, adding that the attack is unprecedented and will probably shake the psyches of Baghdadis. In a later instance Shaw says that Baghdadis are: “praying for fog, it was very thick they couldn’t come in this morning, and so I know they must be praying for fog.” Peter Arnett responds that fog has no power over the technology of the Americans and the Allied forces, effectively turning the United States military technology into an invincible power: “We mentioned earlier its strategic bombing, these American planes know exactly where they are going and what they are going to hit, and fog isn’t going to help anyone if they are on gun sites or bombsites.” Arnett supports the notion of strategic bombing as though he is part of the army personnel, failing to contemplate the notion that civilians do not wish to be bombed at all, neither

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222 Butler, Frames of War, 11.
223 "As it Happened, the Gulf war on CNN (Part 5)"accessed June 1, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRoEiqDz_LM
strategically nor in any other way, and may very well die accidentally. Such a statement relies on the technological faith that ‘smart bombs’ only hit desired targets, and small mistakes or collateral damage, is part of the risk. That risk is not taken by the ones bombing the city, nor by the reporters whose location is known to the army and who keep reiterating the hotel they are in has bullet-proof windows. Reporters who are on the ground are forced to see/report/produce material proof of war from the angle that is an extension of the technostrategic frame. Their access to the locale and their presence in Baghdad becomes stifling to their journalistic aims and serves a military frame that purports that bombs are smart and only hit their targets. If the opposite turns out to be true, if civilians are killed, or if it later emerges that some of the ‘live’ scenes were not live but staged, the controversies that are raised become centred around the blatant lies that media broadcasts to its own citizens. As necessary as the right of citizens is to know the truth, the right to not be bombed should precede that right, and debating media constructs while remaining removed from the materiality of war’s effects cannot repair the injustices resulting from waging war.

The first Gulf War was simulated to appear like a real conflict between two enemy forces but when in fact it was not, according to Baudrillard in his polemic book The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1995). As a critique of the virtualization of war on live television Baudrillard’s proposition is that simulation has reached a point, whereby the virtual war has eradicated the real war. Divided into three segments (The Gulf War will not take place, The Gulf War: is it really taking place? The Gulf War did not take place) and written during the standoff and as the Gulf War proceeded, the essays in the book were published in Libération in 1991. Baudrillard follows the CNN live war format of the “real war” where it is always “now” and “here” in his text using his
own words to play on the formulation of the live, and the real in war and to deny that a war was taking place at all. At once critiqued as a nihilist, whose writing is fragmented and hard to critique, and hailed as a misunderstood philosopher, Baudrillard achieved great notoriety after this book. “Simulation is the great theme in Baudrillard’s writing,” Chris Rojek wrote, “His definition of culture as ‘the collective sharing of simulacra’ reduces truth and reality to a language game. Image makers have opened up Pandora’s box of illusions, treatments and enhancements which have obliterated the division between reality and unreality.” What is real and what is not real is not a subject of debate according to Baudrillard, for whom everything is being constructed as a semblance of the real for the viewers. *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* may have shaken the complacency of those who watched the First Gulf War as a spectacle, but the passage of time makes it appear as a mimic of the very spectacle it critiques. Baudrillard’s book is best read while watching CNN’s live broadcast images of the First Gulf War revealing the image/language clash it enacts. Having written it at the exact time when war was being waged, the book reflects on the lies of the live images engaging with the now, and acts as a verbal duel to the audio-visual war liveness, or simulation as Baudrillard sees the war. However despite the fact that a military image of an exposed field of vision, appears like mere lines on a television screen or an abstracted simulated view that is everywhere and nowhere at once, this visibility is part of the military’s conception of sights as sites of attack that activate material realities and imagined spaces that block the visualizations of other material effects of war.

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The abstraction of some computerized live Gulf war images lulls one’s vision. Their violence resides in a semblance of peacefulness. Lunar, and devoid of sound they activate the fantasy of walking on the moon, and recreate the combined graininess and quietness of early silent cinema.

When they are exposed with the sound the hors-champs becomes audible as the operator’s calculations of targets, and they change. Their violence becomes evident. People’s eyes are still young and blinded by the decoding process of virtual images. Crying with empathy at these images can occur when the decoding no longer requires a military officer. The decoding authority hints at to the intention of the image.

Who is the interpreter? Who is the framer? What capacitates vision, or lack of? And who distributed the frames? Who and what is being abstracted and by whom? Could this be me I am looking at through the camera/eye of the military in my own living-room?

“Virtual space”, Haraway writes “seems to be the negation of real space; the domains of SF (as science fiction, and the speculative/factual) seem the negation of earthly regions. But perhaps this negation is the real illusion.”

It is in toying with the possibility that the virtual is not the negation of the real that Haraway sees multiplicities of knowledges emerging. For Paul Virilio just as the virtual substitutes the real, the real is in danger of disappearing: “We are entering a world where there won't be one but two realities, just like we have two eyes or hear bass and treble tones, just like we now have stereoscopy and stereophony: there will be two realities: the actual, and the virtual.” Virilio’s suggestion only functions if reality is truly one reality, and if so then whose reality is the reality that determines what is real? If every reality is the result of singular situated perspectives engaged in communication with one another, then reality appears to be too large a term to encompass the realities that every reality entails. Only a perception of reality as being one consensual reality can indeed be threatened by virtuality, eradicated and taken over by its copy. But if reality is the result of multiple realities then virtuality can be a tool to help enact these multiplicities. Virtuality for Haraway is the way to forge connections outside of a worldview as having one solid reality, a view in which simulation and virtuality enable the formulation of unheard and unseen ‘realities’.

Baudrillard’s critique of the first Gulf live War broadcast had references to the inexistence of the ‘real war’ such as: “how is it that a real war did not generate real images?” and “We have neither the need of nor the taste for real drama or real

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226 Haraway, “The Promise of Monsters,” 106
228 Baudrillard, The Gulf War did not take place, 82.
war”229 and “War is no longer what it used be,”230 “our virtual has overtaken the actual.”231 For Baudrillard the un-reality of war resides in the knowledge that the advent of nuclear weapons implies that only two unequal powers can confront each other, and therefore whatever is called war is won in advance by the stronger party, and therefore what took place on the live television screen was not war. As a show of power, a spectacle of force, a staging of the real and a staging of what a post-modern war should look like, the first Gulf War was an example of simulation. Yet presence in Baghdad was not only linked to actuality or to the virtualization of the city. By limiting the analysis of the event to its militarized virtuality, Baudrillard then proposes the disappearance of the real. Ian Almond, who is critical of Baudrillard’s book, wonders whether “Baudrillard could ever have written a book called 9/11 did not take place, or the second world war never happened,” adding that “even if the book were written in mockery of the western media’s complete imagization of the war, one inevitable side-effect of such a gesture is that familiar orientalist refrain – that of the east as a dream, a mirage, an illusion.”232 Admittedly, another reading is that Baudrillard purposefully arrests the debate on the representation of war, and on the surface of the frame, using language to engender shock and to reveal how live war itself recreates orientalist notions by imagining distant others as caricatures. In a text that is clearly meant to shock, I wondered if it could be perceived as a détournement of existing racist notions (such as his calling Arabs ‘rug dealers’, and his mentioning of the impotent Arab masses). However this was only achieved in the form of the text, and not in its implications for the real lives in Baghdad. In other words, by taking the televised liveness of the Gulf War and transferring it into a linguistic representation,

229 Baudrillard, The Gulf War did not take place, 68.
230 Baudrillard, The Gulf War did not take place, 86.
231 Baudrillard, The Gulf War did not take place, 27.
Baudrillard managed to deconstruct CNN’s claim that ‘this was war’, but failed to turn its visuals upside down maintaining a cynical reiteration of the images: “Strangely, a war without victims does not seem like a real war but rather the prefiguration of an experimental, blank war, or a war even more inhuman because it is without human losses.”\(^{233}\) Clearly writing in jest of the image and in mimicry of its lie, Baudrillard’s language game appears to be taken over by the visual which tricks it to reflect the same image all over again through words. Whereas live war as an image moves on to give its place to a new live war, the words in Baudrillard’s book remain confirming that which the military officials wanted to say, namely that there was no death in that war. Baudrillard’s soundness of statement as a critique of simulation, is one-sided for on the receiving end of simulated smart bombs and air raids death was still death as Derrida writes: “This [the manipulation of information/that in the end this was lived only through the simulacrum] should not make us forget and the event is unforgettable – that there were deaths, hundreds of thousands of deaths, on one side of the front and not the other, and that this war took place,” adding “we should not forget that these deaths are each time, by the hundreds of thousands, singular deaths. Each time, there is a singularity to murder. It happens, and no process, no logic of the simulacrum can make us forget this. For along this process, we must also think singularity.”\(^{234}\) For Derrida, the deconstruction of the format of transmission and its artifactuality took over the event in Baudrillard’s analysis. By ascertaining that the war took place, Derrida refuses to engage in Baudrillard’s language game while insisting on keeping the format of liveness and the event/reality of war separate, and therefore separable from presence. In his call to remember the singularity of every death Derrida cautions his readers to remain aware of that which is irreversible

\(^{233}\) Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, 73.
\(^{234}\) Derrida, *Echographies of Television*, 77
through the act of waging war, namely death, which only happens once every time it happens, and is lived only once by every single human being.

Although both Virilio and Baudrillard are highly critical of live war and they reveal how the ‘information war’ and the ‘military war’ are bound to one another, they both engage with live war from a place of distance while proposing no alternatives in a vision of the world that is bound to implode both through information excess and through technological acceleration. “Virilio’s lasting contributions and I would suggest that the power of his work resides in his sustained interrogation of the virulence and power of military technology,” Douglas Kellner writes, “but his works’ limitation in turn results from using the model of military technology to interrogate technology as such and particularly the new information technologies.”

235 The plurality of the uses of technology is eluded when Virilio’s model is confined to its military uses. The formulation of an elsewhere, in Haraway's sense of the term, as a place where binaries and categories can be traversed through fictional and science-fictional universes that pave the way for a different siting/sighting, could not be effected in a critique that sees the military cyborg as overpowering both the visual field as well as the information systems.

Haraway’s conception of the cyborg can be contrasted to Virilio’s and Baudrillard’s notions of technology. Although the military has produced cyborgs, Haraway proposes that they can be “unfaithful to their military origins.”

236 Cyborgs that end up producing unlikely configurations and connectedness with others can be liberated.

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from the narratives of war as a dualism (one god/one devil, one reality/one virtuality, one us/ one them) and from doomsday views where humans are imagined as headed towards apocalyptic disasters. These configurations began to appear online through personal blogs where the space of co-liveness is continuously reflected as part of the quotidian of war. By way of example, during the invasion of Iraq (2003) Iraqi blogger Salam Pax wrote: “We are counting the hours from the moment one of the news channels report that the B52s have left their airfield. It takes them around 6 hours to get to Iraq. On the first day of the bombing it worked precisely.”

237 Raed’s blog entries reveal how as a local Baghdad civilian, his engagement with live war in 2003 is inseparable from his quotidian. As a means of survival and of a limited responsibility interpreting the live war news by counting the hours it takes B52 bomber planes to arrive to Baghdad, while he is also on the receiving end of air raids, shows war as neither a spectacle, nor infotainment, nor simulation nor virtuality. Live war images become like international police agents of war (in W.J.T. Mitchell’s use of the term) who turn the local citizens into anticipators of violence that will be perpetrated on their own bodies and cities. The performativity of actuality reveals that international artifactualism normalizes power structures. In other words, and in this example, the United States can and does tell Arab citizens how and when it will send B52s to bomb their cities. The reception of this live report (which is quite similar to the shipment of weapons I elaborated upon in my introduction) in the presence of every individual space is that which gives it meaning. Raed reflects on the multiplicities of accessible and available angles of live war, revealing the manner in which a situated local Baghdad civilian always juggles with multiple sources of information, while constantly examining them in light of his daily life and fears.

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sorrows: “The images we saw on TV last night (not Iraqi, jazeera-BBC-Arabiya) were terrible,” Raed writes in another one of his entries, “The whole city looked as if it were on fire. The only thing I could think of was ‘why does this have to happen to Baghdad?’ As one of the buildings I really love went up in a huge explosion I was close to tears.” Raed’s blog neither claims a universal truth, nor to be representative of Iraqis, but rather to write of the individuality and complexity of his daily life in war. Exiting from the confines of a military perspective, his blog is not about the truth or falsity of competing live war frames (on Al-Jazeera, and CNN, etc.) but a reflection on its routine inscriptions in his daily life. Co-liveness appears in Raed’s blog as a potential space of excavation for the drafting of a counter-memory against the epistemic exclusions of militarized frames and towards the possibility of accessing a situated questioning of the imposed insertion of live war into the quotidian space of those who are under attack, and of those who watch from afar. The necessity to formulate, imagine, produce, and enact different conceptions of audiences is linked to the situatedness of the screens. If the preponderance of blogs, personal websites, and twitter feeds, etc., obscure the factual from the fictional, the real from the unreal, and the true from the untrue what they also reveal is that the process of image making is inseparable from space-time-material enactments.

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4.4 Tele-vision

No it’s not mine. I didn’t run away from my house holding my T.V. in my two arms. I borrowed it from a friend, to see what’s happening. It’s hooked to the generator, over there… And you? Which T.V. station are you filming this for?
Conclusion

In this practice-based thesis presented as an installation and a text, I have articulated a situated conception of distances in my reflections around live war in order to support my thesis argument. My argument is that co-liveness is inherent to experiencing and watching live war in the Arab world, but has been absent from critical scholarship where the conception of the viewer of live-war is that of a distant viewer. I have defined co-liveness as the combined space generated between the live mediatization of war on various satellite channels, and the embodied experience of war.

In the first Chapter, I contextualized my research in light of my experience of filming during the Lebanon July war (2006), as well as continuously watching live war where access to various satellites versions of live war exacerbated a sense of impotence, and made me question the function of images during war. Through my research question I aimed to find practice methods that would capacitate reflections on the connectedness between live time and real time in war, to counter the mediatized live view of war as a spectacle of destruction and to question – in form and in content – the limits inherent in representing war. Donna Haraway’s epistemology of situated knowledges inspired a continuous excavation of a situated and limited view where the materiality of the body takes precedence rather than an all-seeing objective and abstract account. By way of reflection (as the same, displaced) and diffraction (as a record of interference patterns) both the text and the installation capacitated an articulation of co-liveness as an experiential and material space.

In Chapter 2, the process of editing my first sequences necessitated the excavation of
my dailies where live war and real war had turned into digital images where meanings, emotions, and narratives could be recreated on a computer screen in London. Abandoning any attempt to ‘historicize’ the July 2006 War on Lebanon, I attempted instead to capture the essence of my quotidian life in my grandmother’s house. My colleagues’ non-recognition of war in my sequences made me question whether only violent and/or spectacular images of explosions are recognizable as ‘war from a distance’. Through Derrida’s definition of international artifactuality as the centralization of the performativity of the real, and contemplating his proposition to always separate ‘presence’ from ‘actuality’, I perceived the hors-champs of the materiality of the TV set as a constitutive meaning-making space of live war. Whether co-liveness is recognized (as the memory of turning off the TV where live war is broadcast but war still raging on through the night) or not recognized (as the memory of turning off the TV, and live war ceasing and continuing with one’s plans) depended on presence, rather than on actuality. My exchange with my colleagues left me with wondering what counts as a recognizable image of war and whether a geographical distance from war is perceived as imbricated in the conception of live war. Noting that it was through co-presence that the different conceptions of distance to war diffracted into different opinions, I decided to maintain co-presence as part of my practice.

In my audio-visual, textual installation entitled “fragments” presented three times in the course of my research, [The first time in Philadelphia at U-Penn university (2010) and the next two times in London at Goldsmiths University College (in 2012 and in 2013)], co-presence meant remaining in the space with the visitors and gathering together to articulate our different conceptions of watching war. Inspired by Guy
Debord’s détournement as the reuse of existing material in a new order, Jacques Derrida’s questioning of the limits between the parergon (as the frame) and the ergon (as the work) and Donna Haraway’s articulation as a means to join unlikely elements through diffraction, the space of the installation space was divided into fluid enclosures that question the act of framing as a presence/absence, and as a meaning-making trajectory enacted by visitors’ choices.

In Chapter 3, I searched for what counts as an image of war. I researched older wars in order to understand the imaginary connections proposed between one war and the previous by politicians who view war as transhistorical. Searching for images that count as war through the Crimean War, the First World War and the Second World War revealed that cultural production of the knowledge of war is not external to the epistemological struggles among polyvalent interpretations of war. Anti-war representations for example often remained hidden from the public for years. Following Foucault’s advice to look for how operators of domination inform power/knowledge, the implementation of censorship laws in war appeared to have constantly regulated the production of knowledge about war, ensuring death is never revealed. All images of war appeared like camouflaged double agents (as W.J.T. Mitchell writes) that meant one thing in the past but could change allegiances as years went by to mean another and to either reveal the multiples meanings of an image of war. Simultaneously, the capacity to communicate the embodied experience of war diminishes as it is directly related to the technology of the weapons that distanced soldiers from their targets. Through air space control, the end of the Second World War brings a technostrategic discourse as Carol Cohn termed it. Cohn’s exploration of technostrategy as a language that is only concerned with a disembodied aerial view
and that combines strategy and technology leads me to recognize it as a frame of reference in live war. Expressions such as collateral damage, and smart bombs, etc., initially coined in nuclear strategists’ labs have become common usage in live war. The use of transhistoricity is then explored as the affective facet of technostrategy. Only concerned with strategy, politicians such as George Bush (father and son) have employed transhistoricity to sift through past wars to frame contemporary wars as simplified myths of an on-going American soldier’s story of loss and redemption. The recognition of live war appears to stem from technostrategy, as the aerial distance between the weapon’s operator and his target, and transhistoricity as the affective (yet imaginary) distance two wars that are historically and geographically unrelated (the First Gulf War and the Vietnam War for e.g.).

In the last Chapter, Following Foucault’s advice to “return to the origin” and look for foundational omissions, I analyse the first Gulf War on CNN in 1990-1991, where the production of the meaning of live war was actualized within a set of stylistic approaches that led to critiques (war as a spectacle, as infotainment, as Virtuality) that became part of the discursive practice of live war. Although highly critical of the technostrategic frame, critics of the first Gulf War CNN broadcast such as Paul Virilio, and Jean Baudrillard do not theorize the local conception of war as an embodied danger, and as a co-live space. Inserting performative/diffractive readings of fictional propositions that respond to the critique’s omissions by evoking co-liveness I attempt to write the missing component in the analysis of live war in the margins of the text.
Postface and a situation

When I began my thesis, I was searching for a regenerative practice that would enable me to communicate with the video images that I filmed, and the photographs I took during 2006 July war, articulations of war beyond its spectacular view. The paralyzing impact of war images and their sheer excess coupled with the materiality of war left me with no space to imagine new configurations, new stories. Through diffractive enactments of multiple presence(s), the aim of image-making became the site to question how sightings (of different representations of war) enable completely different materialities. Instead of seeking out the ‘real’ in images of war, this research has taught me how to question how the creation of the real manifests itself in images and in words and how performativity is continuously enacted in the domain of critical analysis. “Performativity, properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything (including Material bodies) into words,” Barad writes, “on the contrary, performativity is precisely a contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real.”239 Performativity within this thesis allows for the contestation of the equally excessive power given to images to determine what is real. Within the combined playful linguistic and visual performativities, the real as elusiveness, movement, communication, and exchange produced regenerative possibilities within my practice.

239 Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity," 802
How I see, when I see, from where I see, why my seeing is capacitated, who gets to have more than one point of view. Who gets blinded? Who wears blinders? Who interprets the visual field?²⁴⁰

The success of the photograph resides in what one imagines the ones who are allowed to see, see. Its title ‘situation room’ has no bearing to Guy Debord although it may be a situation, and a détournement of the spectacle of war. Here the point is to no longer reveal the spectacle of war but its official spectators.

²⁴¹ Pete Souza, Situation Room, Time Photos, 2011
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