A quiet revolution

The moral economies shaping journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia in mainstream news about Africa

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A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Media and Communications 2014
Declaration

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.
Acknowledgements

With grateful thanks to my study participants for their time, trust and candour - without you there would be no study. I also want to thank my supervisor, Natalie Fenton, who manages to combine the sharpest of minds with the warmest of hearts. Your support has meant so much to me over the past few years. The encouragement and constructive criticism of others at Goldsmiths has also been invaluable, especially Aeron Davis, Des Freedman and Gholam Khiabany, who all kindly read drafts of chapters for me.

Next, I want to note my debt to my dear colleagues in Journalism at the University of Roehampton. I especially want to thank Ros Coward, whose passionate belief that practitioners should ‘get into’ research started me off down this route in the first place. In addition, the words of advice and support from colleagues at other institutions have been really helpful, especially those of Mel Bunce, Lilie Chouliaraki, Glenda Cooper, Nick Couldry, Shani Orgad, Chris Paterson, Martin Scott, Helen Yanacopulos and Silvio Waisbord.

Finally, I want to thank my husband for the red wine and hugs, and last (but never least) my thanks to our darling boy, Fergus, for regularly reminding me that it’s important to play as well as work.
Abstract

Mainstream news coverage of Africa relies increasingly on material provided by NGOs, who stand to gain in political influence as a result of becoming ever-more media savvy in a digital age. But at a time of widespread cost-cutting in mainstream journalism, is it appropriate for NGOs to ‘make news’ by providing audio, photographs and video to increasingly time and resource-poor journalists or does this diminish what news should be?

Building a body of empirical evidence about why and how journalists use such multimedia and the consequences of this for journalism, NGO-work and those represented, is the central focus of this thesis. Unlike previous research on news coverage of Africa and journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia that tends to focus on the coverage of ‘disasters’ or ‘humanitarian emergencies’, this study analyses journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia about Africa during a very different news-making period – what journalists call a ‘quiet news week’.

The research involved sixty semi-structured interviews with those whose decisions shaped the production of six media items, which were also subject to qualitative content analysis. These items were about a range of topics and African countries: all of which were published or broadcast in news readily available to British audiences. But why and how journalists used NGO-
provided multimedia was shaped most powerfully by the ‘moral economies’ (Sayer 2007) structuring each news outlet.

These moral economies were found to have brought about a ‘quiet revolution’: leading to the emergence of a number of heterogeneous, normatively-laden coalitions between NGOs and news outlets, often hidden from the view of audiences. Consequently, journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia was found to have limited progressive potential: for it inhibited collective reasoning by preventing critical scrutiny, as well as systematically excluding the political value of ‘voice’ in ways which further marginalised the disadvantaged and powerless (Sen 2010).
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Chapter 1

Introduction

During the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and its protracted, bloody aftermath, I faced a recurrent journalistic dilemma. For at the time, I was working for BBC Radio News,¹ so I was statutorily obliged to remain impartial (Agreement between Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for National Heritage and the British Broadcasting Corporation 1996). Yet often, the only audio of accounts given by the survivors or witnesses of military attacks had been provided by a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO),² and without this kind of audio, I knew that programme editors would be unlikely to run the story.

In such circumstances, I tended to argue in favour of using the NGO-provided audio, rather than risk having to drop the story altogether. For although the chain of causality between media attention, audience attention and policy change is complex, non-linear and highly contested (Couldry et al. 2010; Gilboa 2005; Voltmer and Koch-Baumgarten 2010), the risk of failing to do what I could to raise the alarm about the repeated massacres of civilians seemed too great. Indeed, I was haunted by questions about whether the Rwandan genocide (1994) could have been prevented or stopped if the

¹ This included a period when I was the sole radio producer working for the Corporation’s Africa Editor, Martin Plaut.
² This was Human Rights Watch. My explicit location of myself as the author of this thesis forms part of my overall epistemological approach and this, along with my role as an ‘insider’ in this area of work, will be discussed in Chapter 3.
world’s largest media organisations had ‘paid as close attention to Rwanda as we do to Israel – or even to Iceland’ (Zuckerman 2003, Global Attention Profiles website).

But I have often wondered whether I did the right thing in trying to persuade my seniors to allow me to use NGO-provided multimedia, and what I should advise my Journalism students to do should they find themselves faced with similar situations in future. For arguments about whether or not to use the audio, video and photographs provided by NGOs are not confined to the BBC, as can be demonstrated by a series of reports about NGOs’ role in news production which were published by Harvard University in 2009-2010 (‘NGOs and the News’, n.d.), as well as two dedicated forums which were held at the media-related Frontline Club in New York (2008) and London (2011).3

Indeed, since I left mainstream journalism in 2006, such debates have gained a much more pressing, urgent quality because of the widespread cost-cutting carried out within news organisations which has led to reductions in the number of foreign news bureaux and foreign correspondent posts, as well as severe cuts to other staffing and travel budgets (Beckett 2008; Franklin 2011; Sambrook 2010). For NGO-provided material can be viewed as enhancing journalists’ dwindling newsgathering capabilities, so extending an already interdependent or ‘symbiotic’ relationship (Unsworth speaking at Frontline Club 2011) and even improving journalism’s diversity, dynamism and social engagement (Beckett 2008; Beckett and Mansell 2008; Sambrook 2010). But

3 The Frontline Club is an international members club for journalists, other media-workers and interested parties which hosts frequent discussion events.
other journalists and scholars disagree, arguing that that it operates as a kind of public relations (PR) or ‘branding’ exercise for NGOs, in ways which damage the critical independence and diversity of journalism (Dozier speaking at Frontline 2008; Franks 2008a, 2008b; Seaton 2010) and harm NGOs’ alterity (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Fenton 2010a).

The examples given by journalists and former journalists in these debates tend to involve the use of NGO-provided material in news about Africa (Beckett 2008; Franks 2010a; Frontline 2008; Sambrook 2010). But academic studies about journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia do not examine this in a systematic way; instead, they tend to focus upon the use of NGO-provided multimedia in ‘humanitarian emergencies’ (Cottle and Nolan 2007:863) and/or ‘disasters’ (Cooper 2007a, 2011; Franks 2010a). However, these are very specific kinds of periods when particular kinds of organisations, priorities and working practices might be expected to shape news production, especially when such periods coincide with a joint fundraising appeal co-ordinated by the Disasters and Emergency Committee (DEC).

This is because the DEC has arrangements with all of the major UK-based broadcasters which enable the British international aid agencies who are its members to gain a lot of media coverage on the day of any appeal launch, and the British government often matches public donations (interview Paddy 2009). So it is highly problematic to try and build general theory about the

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4 Brendan Paddy is the Head of Communications at the DEC and also my husband, so the potential conflicts of interest attendant on analysing the use of NGO-provided multimedia during a DEC appeal was another reason why I focussed on an alternative period.
nature and effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia based solely on such case studies.

Therefore this thesis not only seeks to bring together the concerns of practitioners and scholars by investigating why and how journalists used NGO-provided multimedia in the news coverage of Africa, but it also seeks to analyse this in relation to a very different kind of news-making period - what journalists would call a ‘quiet’ news week. By going on to assess the effects of these forms of media production on journalism, NGO-work and mediated discourse about the continent, I therefore hope to address my own commitment to reflective practice as a teacher of news journalism (Niblock 2007) and to facilitate broader improvements in journalism through the critical inter-relationship of theory and practice (de Burgh 2003; Glasser and Marken 2005; Harcup 2011).

However, before proceeding, I must first contextualise my object of study by explaining in detail how this area of media production relates to existing academic arguments about journalism and NGO-work. In order to do that, this chapter will begin by analysing contrasting arguments about the potential impact of NGO-provided multimedia on journalism. First, it will situate journalists’ use of NGO-provided material in relation to research about news organisations’ increasing reliance on public relations material, particularly in relation to online output, and related claims about the rise of politically conservative ‘churnalism’ (Davies 2008). This will then be contrasted with the

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5 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
6 The specific mechanisms involved are discussed in Chapter 3.
claims made about the potentially progressive role of NGO-provided multimedia and User-Generated Content (UGC) within more fluid forms of ‘networked journalism’, which rely on a much more positive reading of the capabilities of digital media (Beckett and Mansell 2008; Heinrich 2012; Sambrook 2010).

Next, the second section of this chapter will address why it is necessary to conduct a dedicated study of NGO-provided multimedia at all, despite the theoretical relationship of this area of media production to arguments about journalists’ use of other kinds of contributed material. This will argue that NGOs are very specific kinds of political actors which merit particular critical attention because of the rapid growth in their popularity and power; because media coverage has been a crucial component shaping their growing influence; and because NGOs are increasingly involved in ‘media development’ work (Berger 2010; LaMay 2007; Scott 2014a) in ways which may feed into mainstream journalism (Beckett 2008).

The last section will then focus on arguments about the potential impact on NGOs of providing multimedia to journalists. This will begin by exploring ideas about the relationship of such work to potentially progressive forms of ‘advocacy’ (Piccinini and Taylor 2010; Powers 2014). It will then outline a range of critical perspectives which view NGOs’ engagement in these kinds of media work as having far more conservative consequences. This includes arguments pertaining to NGOs’ efforts to maintain editorial or interpretative control (Cooper 2009; Franks 2008a, 2008b), the dominance of ‘media logic’
(Altheide and Snow 1979, cited in Cottle and Nolan 2007:863) and ‘news cloning’ in NGOs (Fenton 2010a:154), all of which may be seen as driving out others’ perspectives and values. Finally, I will introduce some more recent work, which indicates that the nature and effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia may be heterogeneous, given its grounding in compromise and conflict, within NGOs as well as within journalism (Nolan and Mikami 2013; Orgad 2013a; Powers 2014; Waisbord 2011).

1.1: ‘Churnalism’

The study of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia can be situated in relation to scholarly traditions which analyse the orientation of the mass media to power through a focus on journalist-source relations. At the heart of such work lie central questions about who holds greater influence in such relationships, how this influence is structured, and what the effects of it might be on the reproduction of political and ideological power (Berkowitz 2009; Cottle 2003a; Franklin and Carlson 2011). But although these questions may be approached according to different theoretical paradigms, including ones arising from cultural studies (Cottle 2003a), most of the work on journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia tends to blend attentiveness to the political economy of mainstream journalism with sociological perspectives.
In particular, those who situate their concerns about the political effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia within broader critical arguments about their increasing reliance upon PR material tend to emphasise the ways in which the political economy of journalism has shaped changes in journalistic routines or practices which then interact with sources’ strategic interventions in order to reproduce dominant ideologies within mediated discourse. For example, Curran and Seaton (2003) and Davis (2002) have argued that journalists’ reliance on PR first began to escalate when news organisations cut journalists’ production budgets in response to the increased commercial competition prompted by industry deregulation in the 1980s.

More recently, Boyd-Barrett has claimed that the global economic downturn of 2007-9 has prompted another dramatic increase in journalists’ dependence upon both public relations and wire agency material,\(^7\) because of the detrimental effects it has had on news organisations’ advertising income (2010). However, even before the crisis, Boyd-Barrett broadly concurred with Herman and Chomsky regarding the role of mainstream journalism in manufacturing mass consent to the dominance of elites via a series of ‘filters’ which reinforce the ability of elites to define events, position social groups and shape cultural meaning to their advantage (Herman and Chomsky 1994, discussed in Boyd-Barrett 2004). These include its predominantly corporate modes of ownership; its need for advertising revenue; journalists’ fear of flak;\(^7\)

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\(^7\) Although I distinguish between ‘mainstream’ journalists and wire journalists here, these roles may be performed by the same person, and/or may ‘feed off’ one another procedurally (Pawson 2007).
their overdependence on official sources via professionalised media reporting routines; and the ability of official sources to hire press relations (PR) specialists (Herman and Chomsky 1994, discussed in Boyd-Barrett 2004).

In contrast, scholars at Cardiff and Goldsmiths take a far more optimistic view of the potentially normative role/s which mainstream journalism could play in society: arguing that it has been relatively recent changes in the broader political economy of journalism which have shaped journalists’ heavy reliance on PR material because of news organisations’ privileging of everyday practices geared towards producing more content, faster and at lower cost (Fenton 2010b; Lewis et al. 2006). In particular, these researchers emphasise the ways in which such journalists’ use of PR is founded upon the economically-driven erosion of traditional forms of journalistic scrutiny: arguing that the increased use of PR and wire agency material is causally linked to journalists’ inability to spend time investigating and sourcing new stories themselves (Lee-Wright 2010; Lewis et al. 2008a, 2008b; Phillips 2010); having face-to-face meetings or phone conversations with sources (Lewis et al. 2008b; Phillips 2010); and double-sourcing facts and statistics (Lewis et al. 2008b).

Since the freelance journalist, Nick Davies, helped to fund the research project produced by the Cardiff team (Lewis et al. 2006) in order to underpin the arguments made in his book, Flat Earth News (2008), it is hardly surprising that there are striking similarities between this body of work and his notion of ‘churnalism’ (2008). This term refers to journalists’ mechanism
acceptance and rehashing of others’ material without analysing, contextualising or checking it themselves, so becoming

…passive processors of whatever material comes their way, churning out stories, whether real events, PR artifice, important or trivial

(Davies 2008:59)

However, there are subtle critical/political differences between Davies’ work and that of the research produced by scholars at Cardiff and Goldsmiths, which need to be drawn out, particularly since Davies arguments are so frequently cited by those in the industry. Indeed, his ideas have gained so much traction that the British journalism pressure group, The Media Standards Trust, has now developed its own ‘churnalism’ search engine, which automatically matches the textual content of the hard copies of journalistic articles to that of press releases (Churnalism.com, n.d.).

Firstly, Davies (2008) stresses journalists’ passivity to a much greater extent than either the researchers at Cardiff or those at Goldsmiths. In this regard, Davies seems more heavily influenced by the early work of the Glasgow Media Group (1976, 1980) as well as that of Hall and his colleagues (1975, 1978). In contrast, those at Cardiff portray journalists as being actively engaged in a ‘dance’ (Gans 1979) with sources, but argue that PR is leading this dance by ‘setting the agenda’ (Lewis et al. 2008a:8). In addition, both the Cardiff researchers and their counterparts at Goldsmiths argue that the kind of pre-packaged ‘news’ produced by PR specialists enables journalists to make with valuable time and cost savings, so providing them with what Gandy
called ‘information subsidies’ (1982; Fenton 2010a; Franklin 2011; Lewis et al.
2008a, 2008b).

Secondly, Nick Davies’ tends to portray mainstream journalists as unwittingly
reproducing a single dominant ‘world-view’ (Cottle 2003a:10) by repeatedly
privileging the accounts given by what Hall et al. called ‘primary definers’
(1978:58). As he puts it,

> By favouring facts and ideas which are safe, especially those which are supported by
> official sources, the news factory tends to recycle a view of the world which reflects
> the status quo.

(Davies 2008:192)

Davies views NGOs as complicit in this: citing instances when major charities
and campaigning groups have used the influence of PR professionals and/or
wire agencies to gain media acceptance for exaggerated or poorly
contextualised ‘facts’ which furthered their organisations’ own interests, so
‘distorting’ public political discourse (2008:186-192). Therefore he sees news
organisations’ reliance upon NGO-provided material as damaging journalists’
ability to scrutinise the activities and claims of those in power, as well as
narrowing the range of perspectives included within mediated debates:
thereby harming citizens’ ability to make informed decisions about their
participation in national, and transnational, politics.

In contrast, work by Aeron Davis at Goldsmiths has explored the ways in
which elites engage with the mainstream media in order to engage in
struggles with one another over definitional advantages (2007, 2010): so
highlighting both the absence of elite consensus and the role of the
mainstream media as a site of contestation (Schlesinger 1990; Sparks 2007).
His work has significant implications for the conceptualisation of this study,
indicating that even PR produced by the most powerful International NGOs
(INGOs) may have different and potentially more progressive effects to that
produced by other official sources. For example, it may be used to counter the
official messages issued by political parties (Van Leuven et al. 2013) or
commercial companies through their publication of challenging investigative
reports (Currah 2009).

Nick Davies’ rather undifferentiated view of the nature and effects of
journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia is also questionable on the
grounds that how much PR material journalists use appears to vary according
to the topic, organisation and media in question. For example, the Cardiff
team found that the media items most strongly shaped by PR were about
health, consumer/business news, entertainment and sport (Lewis et al. 2006).
They also found that NGOs were far less successful in placing material than
commercial corporations, governments, or other public bodies (Lewis et al.

Furthermore, the Cardiff team found that newspaper journalism seems to rely
far more heavily on PR and wire agencies than broadcast journalism. For
although they found that a fifth of the print newspaper articles taken from
samples in 2006 were derived ‘wholly’ or ‘mainly’ from PR sources and half
from wire agency copy (Lewis et al. 2008a:7), broadcast journalists relied on PR and wire agency material about a quarter of the time (Lewis et al. 2008b). Finally, Lewis et al. argued that broadcast journalists tended to treat such material in a much more flexible way: using it to set their news agenda, but adding their own elements, or developing alternative angles themselves (2008a).

Why newspaper journalists use so much public relations material may be shaped by additional demands specific to this industry sector. For they have had to find ways of dealing with a greatly increased workload, caused by the need to produce more of the print ‘supplements’ believed to be attractive to both advertisers and consumers (Phillips 2010; Moore 2010). Indeed, a study of UK newspapers published in 2008 found that editorial employees were expected to produce three times more page-by-page content than they did twenty years ago (Lewis et al. 2008b). A later study found that The Mirror had more than doubled in size; The Guardian had almost tripled; The Daily Telegraph had grown by 81%; and The Daily Mail by 89% (Moore 2010).

However, the six-year freeze of the BBC’s licence fee which commenced in 2010, as well as the fall in the value of the spectrum licensed to broadcasters following the digital switchover in 2012, may well have affected broadcast journalists’ approach to PR material. In addition, significant differences may exist between the use of PR within the domestic broadcast outlets studied by the Cardiff team and satellite TV news channels. For although significant overlaps exist between transnational and domestic output (Hepp and Couldry
2009), the rapidity and volume of work required of journalists specifically working for such channels is far greater (Sambrook 2010), so these kinds of media have been strongly associated with the uptake of NGO-provided multimedia (Cooper 2007a).

Nevertheless, the area of journalism most strongly associated with reliance upon PR and wire agency material is online journalism, and the extent of this reliance appears to be increasing rapidly. For instance, a study by Paterson, found that the proportion of duplicated news agency text in online news sources (including UK and US aggregate portals, print and broadcast websites) rose from 68% in 2001 to 85% by 2006 (2006). But by 2008, Paterson and Domingo found ‘a near complete absence of original journalism’ taking place in online newsrooms, with web journalists ‘almost exclusively’ working on ‘reformatting and rewriting stories’ wire services and PR firms, as well as from their affiliated print or broadcast outlets (discussed in Paterson 2010:231).

Likewise, in 2010, Redden and Witschge found that ‘a considerable part of the activity’ in online newsrooms involved relying upon press releases and wire agency material (2010:175). Yet there is also a significant area of overlap between online output and other forms of journalistic production, for most journalists are now expected to routinely reformat print or broadcast pieces for their organisations’ websites, in addition to their existing workload (Cooper 2007a; Davis 2007; Sambrook 2010). They may also be expected to ‘refresh’ online pieces more frequently because of the greatly reduced news cycle
which came about because of the advent of 24-hour satellite TV and the internet (Sambrook 2010), as well as the nature of online news consumption, in which users repeatedly reload pages in order to look for new developments in running news stories (Zuckerman 2010a).

The production of online news also impacts on other forms of journalism because of the costs of developing and running online outlets, which have led to news organisations restructuring their organisational budgets, infrastructure, and even their spatial lay-out (Currah 2009; Lee-Wright 2010) in ways which have made news organisations far more web-centric. The associated transformation of journalists’ working lives (Boczkowski 2009) may seem questionable as most British people still get their news through TV programmes (Kantar Media 2012; Preston 2014a; Newman and Levy 2013).

In addition, most online news is free at the point of access, so only generates revenue because of the general shift of advertising online (Brock 2013). But despite the wealth of data which advertisers are able to obtain regarding users’ socio-economic profiles, consumption habits and search history, so enabling them to target potential consumers with far more precision (Anderson 2009; Freedman 2012), online adverts are worth far less than their print, TV or radio equivalents (Currah 2009).

However, the use of online news has increased rapidly, especially amongst 18-34 year olds (Kantar Media 2012; Newman and Levy 2014), who have traditionally been viewed as the most desirable demographic by advertisers.
In addition, British news organisations are starting to increase advertising revenue by attracting overseas audiences to their websites (Sambrook 2010; Wall and Bicket 2008). Indeed, The Guardian’s website now has a larger readership in the US than the Los Angeles Times and sites for The Daily Mail and The Times are also generating a considerable American following (Currah 2009). Even that bastion of ‘public service’ journalism, the BBC, has placed commercial adverts on its international-facing site – a move the Corporation estimated would raise £70 million a year (Holmwood 2007).

In addition to attracting larger, younger and/or international audiences, NGO-provided multimedia may offer journalists other kinds of ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) by enhancing the ‘stickiness’ of their websites (Scott 2005:98). That is to say, providing material which persuades online users to return and/or stay for longer in order to click through a variety of different material: something which is particularly important in the retention of those who arrive at news sites via search engines and social media (Newman and Levy 2012; Preston 2014a).

Yet, this body of research suggests that although journalists’ uses of NGO-provided multimedia may not be uniform, its effects are likely to be at least partially conservative in nature. For they seem likely to be shaped by news organisations’ privileging of skills associated with the speedy ‘churning’

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8 Although Tuttle notes that given the combination of soaring mortgages, increased student fees and poor job prospects following the global economic crash of 2007-9 this age group has far less disposable income than in years gone by (2012).

9 Figures relating to the Corporation’s actual income, which have not previously been published, are cited in Chapter 6.
(Davies 2008:59) or ‘cannibalisation’ of others’ material, over the exercise of mature, considered and independent journalistic judgement (Phillips 2012a): so hampering journalistic scrutiny in ways which damage the links between mainstream journalism and informed, civic engagement.

This critical/political perspective then relates to a much broader critique about the manner in which patterns of accessing online journalism may themselves be damaging to democratic practice. For online news consumption tends to be directed by audiences, many of whom rely on search engines and aggregated news portals to take them to the stories that interest them, rather than logging onto a specific news site and reading all or most of its content (Currah 2009; Newman and Levy 2013). This therefore risks rendering online news users largely unaware of all but that which personally appeals to them (Sunstein 2001; Seaton 2010; Thurman 2011). It also risks news organisations allocating journalistic attention and resources according to what algorithms tell them is most popular with audiences (Currah 2009; Dick 2011; MacGregor 2007): so creating a vicious circle of ignorance about, and disengagement from, the lives of others.

1.2: ‘Networked journalism’

Nevertheless, journalists’ decision to adopt NGO-provided multimedia may be shaped by more than commercial imperatives, even in online news
production. For some studies suggest that online journalists still refuse to be driven purely by what will generate high audience figures and related revenue (Currah 2009). For example, Dick’s ethnographic study into the use of search engine optimisation within the BBC and the Guardian, showed that it informed, rather than led, journalists’ decisions about the time and effort they put into particular stories, because of their commitment to maintaining what they saw as traditional news values, as well as market-related concerns about preserving their organisational brand (2011).

A recent study by Sambrook et al. also demonstrates that foreign stories were often covered by the BBC’s TV and Online Editors for ‘public interest’ reasons, and that these sometimes played an agenda-setting role by stimulating audience interest in related stories at a later date (2013). Similarly, MacGregor’s research into journalists’ use of audience tracking data supports the idea that journalists take a complex approach to the popularity of online stories (2007). For the journalists in his study - who worked at the BBC, The Financial Times, CNN, AOL and EMAP - sometimes avoided prioritising the most popular news stories in favour of preserving niche audiences or developing what they perceived to be a higher quality of audience engagement (MacGregor 2007).

Furthermore, inspired by Castells’ work on the ‘network society’ (2000), a number of critics have begun to explore what the role of journalists might be in facilitating more dialogic forms of digitally-enabled ‘network’ (Bardoel and Deuze 2001) or ‘networked journalism’ (Beckett 2008, 2009, 2010; Beckett
and Mansell 2008; Heinrich 2011, 2012). Such scholars tend to argue that news is moving away from the ‘top-down’ model of journalism by eroding distinctions between professional and amateur, producer and product, audience and participator, in ways which could result in more diverse and potentially more democratic forms of representation, even if such changes in journalistic practice were partially triggered by economic constraints.

Although this critical approach is most strongly associated with journalists’ use of UGC (Wardle and Williams 2008, 2010), Beckett and Mansell have called for journalists to embrace NGOs’ involvement in ‘networked journalism’ (2008; see also Beckett 2008). They argue that this involves mainstream journalists retaining the responsibility to ‘report, analyse and comment’, but surrendering their monopoly over newsgathering, in favour of filtering, editing and disseminating material from NGOs, along with a variety of different sources, through a process of constant communication and interaction with their audiences and other interest groups (Beckett and Mansell 2008:93). Such a shift in journalistic practice, they claim, would not only be more cost-effective, but would also be more ‘ethical’: allowing journalism to move beyond the dichotomies of ‘North’ and ‘South’, ‘information rich’ and ‘information poor’, ‘hegemonic’ and ‘indigenous’ knowledge, towards a new, not yet completely understood, ‘alternative’ (Beckett and Mansell 2008:99).

Heinrich (2011, 2012) and Sambrook (2010) have voiced some support for this view. They have some grounds to do so, for a number of NGOs have long been involved in producing ‘alternative news’ websites (Wall 2005), and/or in
stimulating dialogue with and between the visitors to their own websites (Taylor et al. 2001; Wright 2001). In addition, there are a growing number of NGOs which provide journalistic training, or which support news journalism in other ways, for a host of progressive reasons, including the promotion of ‘peace’, ‘development’, ‘democracy’ and ‘humanitarianism’ (Beckett 2008).

Moreover, major NGOs tend to have extensive local and cross-border networks of staff and/or local partner organisations in ‘developing’ countries in the Global South. For instance, the International Crisis Group has more in-country analysts than The New York Times, The Financial Times or CNN (Meyer and Otto 2011:16), the majority of which are based in African countries (correspondence Jurema 2011). These kinds of extensive networks could give NGOs early warnings about the emergence of localised or more fluid forms of political activity, which mainstream news organisations may miss, since foreign reporters who are still in post tend to focus their working routines around state institutions (Livingston and Asmolov 2010). Thus NGO-provided multimedia may help to provide journalists with representations of actors, issues and geographic areas which wouldn’t otherwise be easily accessible to them.

Finally, although there is a broad correlation between the amount of mainstream media coverage generated by an organisation and the numbers of dedicated PR staff it has, resource-poor and/or ‘ unofficial’ sources, like smaller NGOs, can gain access to the mainstream news if they can manage to be judged newsworthy, either by strategic action or because of the nature
of externally-occurring events (Davis 2002, 2003; Deacon 2003). When this happens, smaller NGOs may be given a degree of legitimacy by the media which allows them greater opportunities to define events in future (Davis 2002, 2003). For more moderate critics then, the issue is not the degree to which news organisations’ dependence on NGOs poses a ‘threat to informed discussion’ (Seaton 2007:7), but under what circumstances the pluralistic potential of NGO engagement with the mass media can emerge.

However, whilst Beckett’s work on the role of NGOs in ‘networked journalism’ draws on sociological theory, his account of the diverse and democratic nature of such media production tends to be highly personalised and visionary in nature, rather than relying heavily on detailed empirical studies (2008). This approach has led a stinging attack by Curran, who argued that he was engaging in ‘prophecy’ rather than rigorous journalism research (2009).

Curran has a point: for Beckett’s work tends not to engage with the kinds of real-world inequalities which might make the prospect of ‘networked journalism’ rather less appealing. For example, he does not address the way in which governments, political parties and other powerful groups are already producing ‘UGC’ in the hope of skewing news coverage in their favour, which can be very difficult for journalists to spot: risking mainstream news organisations becoming complicit in the spread of propaganda (Hamilton and Jenner 2004; Maguire 2011; Morozov 2012).

Nor does Beckett address evidence about the socio-economic structuring of UGC, for as Wardle and Williams have demonstrated, only 4% of the British
public have contributed material and the typical profile of a UGC contributor is a white, male late-middle aged, working in a non-manual profession (2008). In addition, he does not interrogate the way in which access to the internet, and indeed the nature of the internet itself, is structured in ways which reinforce the dominance of English-speaking, urban elites (Curran et al. 2012).

Furthermore, Beckett does not engage with the arguments of those who demonstrate that the spread of communications technology itself is far from being politically neutral, since it has been developed to work in particular kinds of ways and not others, and since access to it involves the spread of particular kinds of understandings of property rights, privacy and trade (Alzouma 2005; Saleh 2010). Thus Beckett does not marshal convincing arguments to counter those who assert that the spread of digital media is tied up with the ever-expanding reach of Anglo-American transnational companies, with the continuing dependence of the South on the North, and with the increasing domination of the capitalistic notions of ownership and consumption (Herman 1997; Herman and McChesney 2001; Hills 2007; Murdock and Golding 2010).

Finally, although the coverage of events like the Asian tsunami, the Haitian earthquake and the protests which followed Iran’s disputed election demonstrate that unpaid media workers can operate in a journalistic manner - at least in the sense of being the first to get footage of what had happened into the public domain via YouTube and other online outlets (Cooper 2009, 2011; Zuckerman 2010a), the ability of unofficial sources to cover events very
much depends on the kinds of stories concerned. For offering footage of what is currently happening is one thing, but being able to shoulder the costs of the time needed to thoroughly research and check all the details needed to provide a more contextually-based piece, or to put together investigative stories, is quite another (Peters 2010; Zuckerman 2010b).

Thus unpaid or poorly paid individuals and groups tend to need the resources provided by richer organisations, such as INGOs and mainstream media organisations, in order to be able to offer audiences more than fragmented, and potentially inaccurate leads or tip-offs (Peters 2010; Zuckerman 2010a, 2010b). So although there may be some progressive or inclusive aspects to journalists’ use of contributed multimedia, it seems wise to gather empirical data about the specific nature and provenance of such material, as well as the variety of professional, editorial and commercial structures through which it may pass, and be changed by, before passing judgement on its effects.

2: Why NGOs?

Journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia also deserves dedicated forms of scholarly scrutiny because of NGOs’ increasing role in politics. To begin with, the initial definition of NGOs given by the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) explicitly restricted their activities to private, rather than political, activities, in order to allay the fears of Cold War adversaries and
newly-independent Southern states (Resolution 1296 (1968), discussed by Korey 1999). A number of rules introduced later by ECOSOC sought to constrain NGOs’ political influence even further, such as obliging NGOs to derive most of their income from voluntary contributions (Martens 2002; Willetts 2006; Gotz 2008) and permitting the UN to withdraw or suspend their consultative status if they were found to have secretly accepted governmental funding and/or acted against the UN Charter, including by seeking to overthrow an existing government (Willetts 1999, 2006).

However, many INGOs in particular have gained the ability to manoeuvre within and between the centres of power which have proliferated since the end of the Cold War (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Reimann 2006). Much has been made of the progressiveness of such manoeuvring, with some critics viewing this, together with the boom in NGO numbers which occurred in the mid-1990s, as sparking a ‘global associational revolution’ (Salamon 1994:109) which loosens the grip of repressive regimes by enabling people around the world to come together to challenge them, and to seek positive solutions to transnational problems within international fora (Anheier et al. 2001; Kaldor 2003).

Mainstream journalism has been crucial in constructing these more fluid, transnational forms of political influence, with INGOs often claiming to harness ‘public opinion’ in order to place pressure on policy-makers through satellite TV and online media (de Jong et al. 2005; Gaber and Wynne Wilson 2005). Whilst it is doubtful whether there are simple, direct causal links between
media coverage and state policy (Gilboa 2005; Hawkins 2002), there is evidence that some politicians in democracies monitor and take media coverage into account in their self-presentation, because of their wish to be re-elected and to participate more effectively in political environments about which they have no direct experience (Davis 2007; Sireau and Davis 2008; Voltmer and Koch-Baumgarten 2010). Since public trust in NGOs has soared at precisely the same time as such trust has waned in British political parties and governments (Cousins 2011), it therefore makes sense for national politicians to at least appear to take heed of their views.

Some INGOs involved in other forms of international campaigning also maintain that non-state actors, like armed militia and commercial businesses, may be shamed through the mass media in ways which cause them to modify their behaviour, if they need international goodwill to engage in trade or other kinds of negotiations (Gaber and Wynne Wilson 2005; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). But INGOs’ ability to exercise political influence by campaigning in the mainstream media is likely to be most effective in influencing the decisions of transnational bodies because such bodies are often unelected and need to legitimise their own power by demonstrating their accountability to wider publics (Searle 2008). Indeed, such NGOs are now believed to have a more positive global influence than transnational bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and even the United Nations (UN) (Global Opinion Poll, BBC World Service, cited in Unerman & O'Dwyer 2006), so there are strong incentives for such transnational bodies to be seen to respond to pressure brought to bear by NGOs.
However, although media campaigning is often seen by INGO-workers as less fraught with the dangers of cultural and political co-option than more direct forms of political participation (Sireau and Davis 2008), it is not really separable from them. For the ‘consecration’ afforded to some of these organisations by the mainstream media (Darras 2005) has helped to construct many INGO workers as ‘experts’ on single issues. This has led to their playing significant roles in political processes which had previously been the preserve of nation states, such as conflict resolution (Howell and Pearce 2002; Ramsbotham et al. 2005; Simmons 1998); monitoring compliance with international protocols (Gulbrandsen and Andersen 2004); and even negotiating new international treaties, such as that which banned anti-personnel landmines (Chandhoke et al. 2002; Korey 1999; Rutherford 2000) and that which established the International Criminal Court (Chandhoke 2002; Glasius 2010; Korey 1999).

In addition, INGO-workers seen as human rights ‘experts’ now play a pivotal role in the work of the UN’s High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR): providing UN investigators with ‘expert testimony’ about abuses considered to be crimes under international law; testifying formally against states and other actors when other governments are unwilling to do so; and/or serving on monitoring missions and other specialist panels when required (Gaer 1995). Even when denied a formal role within transnational working groups, some INGO workers consecrated by the media as ‘experts’ have used this status to gain access to informal meetings on new treaties and other developments: so gaining considerable political influence by helping to frame the debate at an
early stage (Willetts 1999). For example, when the official working group convened to begin drafting the Protocol to the Convention against Torture, they found that an initial draft had already been put together by politicians working in conjunction with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Joachim and Locher 2008).

INGOs have also worked collaboratively with smaller local and national NGOs to use mainstream media coverage to overcome more explicit obstacles to political participation. For example, when China tried to block the access of human rights NGOs to the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, INGO workers positioned within governmental delegations as ‘experts’ gave so many interviews to the mainstream media, and reported back so frequently to informal ‘open’ NGO caucuses, that the boundary between private and open sessions - and between different kinds of NGOs - became thoroughly eroded (Clarke 1998; McDougall 2004).

Finally, INGOs have been known to launch campaigns directed at the mainstream media at precisely the same time as engaging more direct forms of political participation, so encouraging international relations specialists to view their media and their political work as different, but overlapping, forms of governance (Yanacopulos 2005). Thus the mainstream media have played a key role in constructing the transnational power of some NGOs, especially INGOs, which has grown to the point when the United Nations says it views them as the ‘indispensable bridges between the general public and the intergovernmental process’ (UN report A/53/170, cited in Rugendyke
Indeed, Seaton has even argued that they should be interrogated as the ‘fifth estate of the new world order’ (2007:46).

Yet many NGOs’ role in shifting power away from the nation state and towards international political bodies and arena, including mainstream journalism, is highly controversial, with many scholars arguing that the degree of political influence now routinely accorded to them is inappropriate given their own lack of democratic accountability (Hearn 2007; Shivji 2007). Specific objections have been raised about the dominance of INGOs in the provision of welfare services, such as health and education, which were previously the province of the nation state: with some critics arguing that this undermines democratic practice in developing countries, because INGOs, unlike state agencies, are primarily accountable to foreign donor governments rather than their beneficiaries (Turner and Hulme 1997). In a related point, others have voiced concerns about the ways in which INGOs’ engagement in service provision may prevent some countries from becoming fully functioning nation states because of the manner in which it perpetuates structural dependence on others (Cooley and Ron 2002; Fisher 1997; Weiss and Gordenker 1996).

Both of these critical/political critiques then relate to a further area of concern: that is, the increasing tendency of some Northern governments to tie their funding of NGOs to the propagation of particular social or political views, most often through the kinds of short-term project or contract funding which emerged in the 1990s and 2000s (Chouliaraki 2013; Cooley and Ron 2002; Sogge and Zadek 1996). More recently, the US, UK and Australian
governments changed their funding practices following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001, and the subsequent attacks on the London Underground, as well as on Australian citizens visiting a nightclub in Bali in 2005. All three shifted away from funding NGOs claiming to promote ‘grassroots’ civil society and towards funding NGOs openly advocating the promotion of particular ideologies, especially human rights and liberal democracy, which are perceived by these donor governments as stabilising nation states and preventing extremism - so serving their security interests (Ayers 2009; Kamat 2004).

Causal links between funding INGOs and spreading particular ideologies may also be more subtle. For many highly influential foundations have been established by US-based entrepreneurs, such as the Gates Foundation (Hursh 2011; Scott 2013, 2014b), which is often criticised for encouraging US and the UK governments to support organisations which prioritise market-driven ‘solutions’ to social and political problems. Such approaches to the creation of social good are clearly in the economic interests of wealthy donor countries, since they offer little resistance to multinational companies’ efforts to secure access to African markets and resources (Bunce 2013; Wilkins and Enghel 2013).

Such critiques also have relevance to news-related INGOs which often gain funding from the US, the UK and Australian governments on the grounds that media development is necessary to support good governance or more participatory forms of democratic practice (Berger 2010; LaMay 2007;
Schiffrin 2012; Scott 2014a). However, such news-related INGOs have also been criticised for bringing about the dominance of Anglo-American conceptualisations of the relationship between journalism and democratic practice which may be inappropriate for African countries (Nyamnjoh 2005a).

These INGOs have also been criticised for conflating Anglo-American normative ideas regarding the benefits of free speech with those regarding the benefits of a ‘free’ capitalist market, so that a free and independent media is only seen as possible in the context of a liberalised media market (Berger 2010; LaMay 2007; Miller 2009). The danger is therefore that they risk drowning out a number of African critics who argue that constructing sustainable and inclusive newsgathering and distribution structures requires so much investment in many African countries that the relationship between the media and national governments may need to be re-negotiated, rather than thrown out altogether (Ansah 1991; Berger 2002; Mwangi 2010; Ogundimu 2002).

Therefore, committing time and energy to researching journalists’ use of NGO-provided material in detail is worthwhile for several reasons: firstly, because NGOs are specific kinds of political actors, who are gaining in power and popularity, despite fierce debates about the consequences of their

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10 See section 2.2 in the next chapter.
11 Such critics tend to discuss this in relation to broadcasting, especially radio, as newspaper circulation is improving rapidly in a number of African countries (Franklin 2008, 2012; Wasserman 2008).
influence. Secondly, mainstream journalism has been integral to NGOs' rise in power and popularity in ways which make it impossible to view NGOs' provision of multimedia as separate from their political participation. Finally, mainstream journalism is imbricated in particular kinds of economic and political projects via foreign donor governments’ funding of ‘media development’ NGOs in ways which may stifle, rather than enable, debate about how to structure relationships between the media, the market, and the state in African countries.

3.1: Mediated ‘advocacy’

But if journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia is to be evaluated in terms of whether it stimulates progressive change (Risse et al. 1999), it is necessary to consider not only its potential impact on journalism, but also its impact on NGO-work. Discussions of this in academic literature pertaining to NGOs usually revolve around the notion of NGOs’ potentially progressive engagement in particular kinds of strategic action described in related literature as ‘advocacy’. However, such ‘advocacy’ can mean a variety of different things, including NGOs’ ability to influence policy-making via the media; NGOs’ ability to include the perspectives of the more vulnerable, poor and/or disempowered people, so giving them greater definitional advantages; and, finally their ability to increase public knowledge about the kinds of
problems and contexts which are relevant to their lives (Anderson 2007; Piccinini and Taylor 2010; Powers 2014).

Thus it is important to examine how NGOs balance speaking for others with enabling those people to speak about their experiences themselves (Couldry 2012). Indeed, Northern INGOs’ claim to speak on behalf of Southern peoples was subject to a legal challenge by Southern groups in the 1990s (Zadek 1996). This not only sparked heated debates about how legitimate it was for NGOs to claim to speak for others, given that they are not elected bodies (Hudson 2000; Lister 2003; Slim 2002), but also about whether the mediatisation involved in such work served to remove discussions about rights and development of disadvantaged people from local and national political spheres which they had a better chance of influencing (Manji and O’Coill 2002; Shivji 2007; Tandon 1996).

Northern INGOs responded to this crisis of legitimacy in several ways. Firstly, they sought to strengthen the credibility of what they had to say by investing in their own research and developing alliances with relevant academics, adding this intellectual context to their own experience of project work in the form of case studies (Collingwood 2006; Slim 2002). Secondly, they tried to find ways of strengthening their right to speak about such issues, by developing networks of partnerships with Southern NGOs (Ollif 2007; Zadek 1996): some of which have involved helping Southern NGOs to gain media coverage in their own countries (Malan 2005), whilst others involved shaping transnational media campaigns. For example, local Ugandan NGOs involved in the ‘Jubilee
2000’ campaign began talks with their government about debt relief options, whilst supported by Northern INGOs, and the results of this dialogue then informed the content and direction of the transnational media campaign led by INGOs (Edwards 2001).

But Southern NGOs may not be any more representative of the people they claim to serve than Northern INGOs. For although UK and British-based INGOs have been accused of acting as self-serving ‘lords of poverty’ (Hancock 1991; see also de Waal 1997), NGOs in developing countries can also be dominated by the ruling and middle classes, and may even be run for the benefit of their staff, rather than for the benefit of the disadvantaged (Aginam 2008; Igoe and Kelsall 2005). Partnerships between Northern INGOs and Southern NGOs have also been criticised as largely symbolic: allowing Northern INGOs to be associated with the culturally rich ideals of ‘bottom-up’ democratic participation and organisational independence, without having to make any of the attendant economic or political sacrifices (Batiwala 2004; Lister 2003; Mohan 2002). Indeed, a recent empirical study of Northern INGOs’ engagement in advocacy work revealed that 21 out of the 23 organisations surveyed did not even consult their Southern ‘partners’ about advocacy objectives and strategies (Anderson 2007), let alone involve them in detailed decision-making processes about the production of multimedia.

Nevertheless, NGO umbrella groups have developed formal policies regarding their beneficiaries’ right to influence media representations of their situations. For example, the Code of Conduct published by the World
Association of NGOs in 2005, states that NGOs should not ‘improperly assume the authority of the community [they] serve’ (2005:29) when producing mediated material. The Code of Conduct adopted by the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development goes one step further, arguing that not only should ‘the viewpoint of the South... be taken into account when producing images and messages’, but that those whose situations are being represented should have the opportunity to communicate their stories themselves (2006).

Such policies are somewhat vague, lacking any discussion of what it might mean for ‘Southerners’ to ‘tell their own stories’, and the processes and safeguards which NGO-workers should put in place to enable this (Couldry 2012). Nor do they put in place any kinds of accountability mechanisms to evaluate NGOs’ media production processes according to these values, or to offer redress to those who believe themselves to have been wronged in relation to them. However, these policies do at least draw NGO-workers’ attention to relatively ‘sophisticated ethical discussions’ regarding the politics of representation (Lidichi 1999:100). Although the debates which informed them took place at a time of relative affluence, and there is a danger that in harsher economic times NGOs may be tempted to abandon the idea of media engagement as a mode of advocacy for their beneficiaries, in favour of using it as a marketing tool for themselves (Lidichi 1999).
3.2: Interpretative control, ‘media logic’ and ‘news cloning’

Cooper has argued that INGOs’ recent move into multimedia production is related to a very different kind of strategic action: that is INGOs’ efforts to increase their organisational income via the mainstream media because of the strong positive correlation between the number of minutes of TV airtime given to particular disasters and money raised (2011). She doesn’t argue that this financial imperative operates separately from INGOs’ efforts to gain definitional advantages. Instead, she portrays INGOs as seeking to regain control over the interpretations of events in locations remote from Northern audiences following the rise of UGC, in order to restore the privileged, symbiotic position in which Northern INGOs helped journalists gain access to case studies in return for a ‘name-check’ (Cooper 2009).

Thus Cooper’s work can be linked to that of Franks, who also sees NGOs’ provision of multimedia as an effort to return to the ‘quid pro quo’ (2010a:79), and who discusses the way in which aid agencies’ provision of multimedia enables them to compete with others and to gain definitional advantages through particular kinds of ‘trusting’ relations with news organisations (2008a). Indeed, perhaps the most important contribution which Franks’ work makes to debates about journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia is the wealth of empirical evidence which she marshals to demonstrate the harm that can be done when journalists’ ‘trust’ in INGOs allows them to gain control over the definitions of problems and solutions circulated in mediated discourse (2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2013). In particular, her analysis of the BBC’s coverage of the
Ethiopian famine in 1984 - which she argues marked a key turning point in the relationship between aid agencies and news organisations - demonstrates that NGOs’ influence over the interpretative frames used in mainstream news skewed public understandings of the nature of the famine, its causes, and relevant actors and solutions, in ways which led to misguided forms of collective action (2013; see also Rieff 2005).

However, this event was thirty years ago and the balance of power between aid organisations and journalists may have altered. Indeed, Cottle and Nolan (2007) argue that such INGOs are now so keen to gain acceptance for their multimedia by journalists in order to gain better brand awareness of their organisations, that their own interpretative framing has become dominated by existing news norms and industry priorities. They explore this critical/political concern in relation to Altheide and Snow’s work on ‘media logic’ (1979, cited in Cottle and Nolan 2007: 863), which again seeks to integrate research into the political economy of journalism with media sociology (Altheide 2004), albeit in ways which approach everyday media practice in a manner which is informed by culturalist insights into the importance of narrative form and imagined audience responses.

Thus Cottle and Nolan argue that the spread of such ‘media logic’ into INGOs means that they package the text and multimedia they produce in conformity with the needs and angles of individual news outlets, as well as using celebrities, staging ‘pseudo-events’ (2007:868) and personalising political issues in order to gain media attention: so eclipsing the agency and voices of
local people. Indeed, Cottle and Nolan assert that this ‘media logic’ has become so pervasive in NGO-work that even those NGO-workers who aren’t press officers now interpret the world, and their concerns within it, in conformity with mainstream news culture (2007).

Such arguments resonate with Fenton’s work about NGOs’ engagement in ‘news cloning’ (2010a:154), because she also queries the political consequences of NGOs’ complicity with the professionalised norms of news-making. For by producing material which ‘fits’ existing news norms so neatly that it requires little reworking by time-poor journalists, she argues that NGOs may gain airtime, or space in news, but do little to challenge dominant conceptions of news criteria (2010a:158).

Like Cottle and Nolan (2007), Fenton sees NGOs’ organisational cultures and values as being put at risk by such practices. But she argues that NGO-journalist relations are changing very rapidly, and that there is now a much ‘thinner’ level of interactivity (2010a:156) between journalists and NGOs than there once was. She also portrays journalists as having become far too time-poor to attend NGO-constructed events, preferring instead to pick up NGOs’ stories and related material via social networking sites and/or to download their pre-packaged material ‘at the click of a button’ (Fenton 2010a:164).

Fenton also stresses the importance of NGO press officers’ sense of working identity: proposing that former journalists who still see themselves as journalists are likely to push even the most outspoken NGOs away from overt
forms of ‘advocacy’, and towards the ‘public image of neutrality’ more typical of traditional journalistic aims (2010a:156-157). Thus Fenton’s work can be read as building upon that of Deacon, who argues that NGOs are much more likely to receive news coverage when they act as commentators in a fairly uncontroversial way, or are seen as performing non-contentious ‘good works’ rather than being engaged in political activism (2003:106).

Finally, Fenton joins a number of other critics and NGO practitioners who decry the way in which NGOs’ engagement in multimedia production pressurises poorer NGOs to try and compete in a ‘media arms race’ (Jones 2004; see also Wall 2003). For although communications technology is now cheaper than it was historically (Beckett 2008), it is still well beyond the budget of many smaller and/or Southern NGOs and as it is constantly evolving, once such work has become accepted as a normal part of an NGO’s activities, the pressure to update it is enormous (Fenton 2010a).

It is also extremely costly to employ former journalists with the technical skills needed to create industry-standard material; the social capital within journalism to maintain warm, intimate personal relationships with editorial staff; and the cultural capital necessary to understand how newsrooms and news values work in order to pitch it successfully to journalists (Fenton 2010a; Phillips 2010). Given the limited budgets of smaller and/or Southern NGOs, the prospect of having to reserve precious resources for media work is therefore highly controversial (Jones 2004; Ross 2004).
Tensions within the field of NGO-work regarding media production have also intensified following the global economic crisis of 2007-9, as rapid inflation coupled with a sharp fall in individual giving have had a harsh detrimental effect on NGOs’ finances (Charities Aid Foundation 2012; Cowley et al. 2011). In response, many NGOs have stepped up their fundraising efforts (Institute of Fundraising 2013): heeding repeated calls to become more ‘donor-centric’ (Joyaux 2009; see also Charities Aid Foundation 2010) by shaping their ‘messages’ to appeal to specific target groups and their ‘psychological needs’ (Saxton 2009:35), rather than framing them in terms of advocacy issues relating to recipient needs or perspectives (Third Sector Foresight 2008; see also Chouliarakis 2013).

The implications of these developments for NGOs’ ability to bring about more diverse or politically progressive mediated discourses are serious. For if Southern NGOs are financially and culturally inhibited from accessing media coverage in wealthy Northern countries, and if Northern INGOs are financially, and culturally inhibited from introducing alternative or oppositional viewpoints and framings of issues, then NGOs’ ability to introduce greater diversity into mediated discourse is likely to be severely affected. Journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia might therefore create the very opposite of the richness and plurality inherent in the vision of ‘networked journalism’ put forward by Beckett and Mansell (2008).

Nevertheless, a much smaller, third group of critics have stressed the need to explore the potentially heterogeneous influences at play in this field of work,
and the mixed political consequences which may arise from them. Nolan and Mikami, for instance, have stressed the complex interplay between the idealised discourse of humanitarianism and every-day instrumentalised practice (2013). Powers has also explored the ways in which INGOs’ publicity strategies may vary according to their internal and external structuring, including which departments are most dominant in each organisation, their forms of funding and their relationship/s to the political field (2013, 2014).

Meanwhile, Orgad has highlighted the tensions between NGOs’ need to differentiate themselves from one another and their need to be seen to speak as one coherent community (2013a), as well as joining with Powers in stressing the intra-organisational tensions within NGOs (2013), especially between fundraising and media departments: so concluding that the visual material produced by NGOs should be seen as having mixed effects related to its grounding in ‘conflict, negotiation and compromise’ (Orgad 2013a: 296).

One of the most innovative aspects of Orgad’s work is her exploration of the manner in which NGOs’ relations to journalists is shaped by NGO-workers’ imagined positioning of media audiences (2013b), although this may have little bearing on audiences’ actual responses to media texts (Orgad and Seu 2014; Seu et al. 2012). In this way, she blends work on organisational sociology and political economy with culturalist research about the importance of real and imagined media reception practices in order to produce a nuanced approach to the nature and effects of NGOs’ communicative power (Cottle 2003a).
However, perhaps the most theoretically ambitious model of journalist-NGO relations is provided by Waisbord, whose work on NGOs’ involvement in news-making in Latin America emphasises the heterogeneous nature and effects of NGOs’ engagement in news-making. In particular, he urges researchers to explore the ideological differences between, as well as the conflicts within, the various news-making coalitions between NGO-workers and journalists: stressing that these involve actors’ personal, agentive efforts, interests and values, as well as different kinds of social, political and economic structures.

So rather than evaluating NGOs’ engagement with journalists in terms of a general ‘media logic’ (Altheide and Snow 1979, discussed in Cottle and Nolan 2007: 863), Waisbord advocates using a more detailed framework relating to what he calls ‘journalistic logic’ (2011:149). This involves pulling together the main strands of research into journalist-source relations, including work on the political economy, sociology and cultural studies, by analysing how journalists and NGO-workers engage in potentially heterogeneous ways with ‘four components: news values, media formats, labour conditions and editorial positions’ (Waisbord 2011:149). Thus Waisbord calls for researchers to attend to the complex and recursive links between technological environments; reporting styles; narrative forms; the production and consumption practices attendant on particular kinds of media; editorial issues and positions; organisational cultures; ‘media ownership, business interests, and...upper management’, and broader political and socio-economic structures (2011:149).
The level of detail involved in this analytical model seems highly appropriate to this study: addressing my own experiences of the specific nature of the dilemmas involved, as well as the findings of previous research about the potentially varied uses of PR according to media type, topic and organisation (Lewis et al. 2006). For this reason, Waisbord’s work, along with that of the other scholars discussed in this chapter, has been used to develop my approach to the broad questions outlined in the introduction to this chapter into clusters of more specific research questions, in ways which I will now explain.

**Conclusion**

Although NGOs are clearly highly significant political actors whose power has been constructed in and through the mainstream media, there is little agreement about the effects of using NGO-provided multimedia in news coverage. Given the organisational cuts which have occurred in mainstream journalism, there is a particularly pressing need to guide both practice and policy-making by conducting detailed empirical research into three clusters of research questions. These are:
Why do journalists use NGO-provided multimedia?

How do they use it?

What are the effects of this on journalism, NGO-work and mediated discourse?

However, the literature examined in this chapter indicates that why journalists use NGO-provided multimedia in the coverage of Africa in particular may be driven by a range of other issues, as well as news organisations’ engagement in cost-cutting. In order to begin to answer the first research question properly, it is therefore necessary to analyse the variety and weighting of the different causal factors shaping journalists’ and NGO-workers’ deliberations about this material, including political, economic and cultural structures, as well as individual and collective forms of agency.

This then feeds into the second cluster of research questions pertaining to how journalists actually use NGO-provided multimedia in news output. For the literature examined in this chapter encourages me to analyse the formal and informal practices, positions and relationships involved in these kinds of media-making: attending to the potential heterogeneity which may be brought to bear upon it by different journalist-NGO coalitions, different kinds of media and genres, and the different kinds of tensions or struggles which journalists and NGO-workers may experience in relation to them.

Yet the reason why the first two clusters of questions matter is because of the potential that journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia has to produce
social change. So the third and final cluster of research questions involves establishing *who gets to frame the nature of the events and people addressed in media texts, how this is accomplished, and which kinds of interpretative frames are used in mediated discourse about Africa.*

However, conducting this kind of study entails following Waisbord’s lead (2011), by bringing together approaches to journalism research which are usually kept separate. These include blending synchronic and diachronic accounts (that is, accounts of how things are and how they came to be); accounts of actors’ agency and the political-economic structures which enable/constrain them; as well as examining the potential relationship between particular news texts and the processes involved in making them (Cottle 2003b; Schudson 2003).

In so doing, I also aim to do journalism research which is, to use the words of so many of my study participants, ‘a bit different’. For I have not only explored journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia during a ‘quiet’ news week rather than during ‘humanitarian emergencies’ (Cottle and Nolan 2007: 863) or ‘disasters’ (Cooper 2007a, 2011; Franks 2010a), I have also aimed to respond to a growing call for scholars to develop more holistic research strategies in order to ground explicit, normative evaluations in thorough empirical research: so intervening more effectively in the social world (Hesmondhalgh 2002; Massey 2008).
Such an approach involves considerable theory-building in order to clarify the epistemological, ontological and axiological grounding of this thesis. The next chapter will therefore reflect critically upon the values and potential problems involved in focussing on news about ‘Africa’, as well as the difficulties of engaging in normative evaluation in relation to it, before going on to deal with why and how normative evaluation was carried out in this study. The third chapter will then explain why and how this thesis is grounded in Critical Realism and the relevance of this philosophical approach to my research methods: so clarifying the nature of the knowledge produced in this thesis, before moving on to outline my findings.
Chapter 2

‘Good’ news journalism about ‘Africa’

Although some of the literature examined in the previous chapter warned of the dangers of scholars focussing so much on what journalism should be like, that they fail to attend to actually-existing media production practices (Curran 2009; Orgad and Seu 2014), even the earliest conceptualisations of a research project depend upon normative evaluation. This is because deciding which phenomena in the social world can be grouped together, which groups of phenomena it is important to know more about, and which kind/s of knowledge it would be desirable to have are all inherently value-laden activities (Benson 2014; Carter and Sealey 2009; Sayer 2000a). So it is not only impossible to exclude normative evaluation from academic research, it is vital to reflect critically on the specific normative values framing any academic study before any other research begins in order to consider their potential impact on the nature of the knowledge produced.

Whilst the normative implications of my definitions of ‘NGO’, ‘NGO-provided’, ‘news’ and ‘mainstream news organisations’ will be discussed at the beginning of the next chapter, this one will begin by interrogating my rationale for replicating the critical/political focus on ‘Africa’ which has dominated much of the discussion by journalists and former journalists about the use of NGO-provided multimedia (e.g. Beckett 2008; Franks 2008a, 2008b; Frontline 2008; Sambrook 2010). To be more specific, the first section will explain why a
critical focus on the coverage of ‘Africa’ offers particularly fertile grounds for studying NGOs’ provision of ‘information subsidies’ to news organisations (Gandy 1982), before exploring, in the second section, why a focus on ‘Africa’, together with my intention to engage in normative evaluation, risks producing imperialistic kinds of ‘safari research’ (Hanitzsch 2009:422), because of the unequal forms of ‘power geometry’ (Massey 1993) structuring academic scholarship.

As part of this, I will consider challenges to dominant European and North American frameworks which assess mainstream journalism in relation to democratic practice, including the objections of African critics who argue that Northerners have little right to speak in judgement of journalistic practices carried out within radically different kinds of cultural contexts (Kasoma 1996; Nyamnjoh 2005a; Sesanti 2010; Shaw 2009). Thus I aim to clarify some of the reasoning behind Zelizer’s argument that Journalism scholars who are alert to cultural, political and economic difference should refuse to engage in normative evaluation altogether, in favour of treating all perspectives equally (2004a).

However, I then go on to argue against Zelizer: contending not only that it is impossible to exclude normative values from academic research, but also that even attempting to refuse normativity would not serve as a kind of ‘critical strategy’ to ‘reinvigorate the debate about the purpose/s of journalism’ (2004a:6). As part of this argument, I will demonstrate that such a stance would undermine Journalism Studies just as it is becoming established as an
academic field because of the way in which adopting Zelizer’s stance would prevent journalism scholars from engaging in effective critical/political critique, as well as undermining the normative links between theory and practice.

In the third and final section, I propose an alternative evaluative framework which endeavours to take into account the unequal ways in which academic discussions about normative evaluation are structured, but which permits still some normative judgements to be made. This involves applying Sayer’s model of the ‘moral economy’ to journalism research, so treating financial and normative values as interacting with, and modifying, each other (2001, 2003, 2004, 2007). However, I break with Sayer’s grounding of such a model in relation to Nussbaum’s work (2001, 2003): preferring to use Sen’s non-essentialist model of peoples’ inter-related capabilities, including their ability to consider a range of models of ‘the good’ through collective reasoning (1999, 2010).

This chapter therefore revolves around my critical/political reflections on the nature and purpose of normative evaluation and its relationship to power. Although this has immediate relevance to my object of study, it also speaks to broader debates about the future direction of journalism research, the purpose of locating the study of journalism in the academy, and the function of universities in society. As such, it involves an explicit commitment to a much larger normative project: that it is, the effort to kick-start the stalled attempts of the Left to explore the social function of academic critique (Cohen 1993), specifically in relation to journalism.
1.1: The coverage of Africa and ‘information subsidies’

My initial rationale for focusing on journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia in the coverage of ‘Africa’ involved hypotheses about the probability that this would be a particularly fertile area to study. For some of the literature I examined (Beckett 2008; Franks 2010a; Sambrook 2010), as well as practitioners’ comments in a related forum (Frontline 2008) indicated that NGOs might be likely to offer journalists exceptionally valuable ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) by providing them with multimedia about Africa, as they often found this particularly difficult to produce themselves.

In order to understand this, it is worth attending to the characteristics of the African places mentioned most frequently in relation to journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia. For example, in the Frontline forum which triggered my decision to write this study, the most frequently mentioned places were Somalia, the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Darfur region of Sudan (2008). These are not just African places but particular kinds of African places, for apart from BBC World Service Radio, no Northern-based mainstream news organisation has an organisational bureau or a reporter in or near any of these areas. The nearest major ‘hub’ of journalists and journalism-related services would be Nairobi in Kenya, or Johannesburg, in South Africa (Hannerz 2004:52), so arranging travel to these areas would be difficult, expensive and time-consuming.
Travelling internally within such areas can be even more daunting, because of their lack of even basic travel and communications infrastructure, and because all three are subject to armed conflict. Furthermore, negotiations about transport, accommodation, security and food would need to be carried out with several different ethnic groups, many of whom have their own languages, as well as shifting political and military allegiances. Such issues have long been accepted as inhibiting more extensive or detailed coverage of Africa (Carruthers 2004; Franks 2005a, 2005b; Marthoz 2007).

Previously, reporters wishing to cover events in these kinds of areas needed to negotiate several weeks away from rota duties; organisational support from local freelance producers called ‘fixers’; logistical support from the UN and/or other organisations working in the areas they wished to visit; and hefty expense allowances, most of which had to be readily available in cash. Thus INGOs able and willing to offer practical, and sometimes even financial, support to journalists have already gained a great deal of influence in the way in which the continent has been interpreted and framed for Northern news audiences (Franks 2010b, 2013).

However, declining news audiences, dwindling advertising revenue, and reduced newsroom budgets now make such trips much harder to justify (Dozier speaking at Frontline 2008). Moreover, there are now far fewer reporters working for Northern media organisations who are based within the African continent (Bunce 2011; Sambrook 2010) and previous rationales for
covering African news, such as the movement of previous colonies towards independence and the Cold War, have vanished (Franks 2010a).

This puts British broadcast organisations in a particularly difficult position as they are formally obliged to continue to provide international news via a variety of regulatory and legal mechanisms (Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) 2006; OFCOM 2009; Digital Economy Act 2010). In addition, many broadcast journalists committed to public service ideals argue that offering a wide range of international coverage should be ‘an integral part of any serious news offer’ (Sambrook 2010: 66) and that retreating from that principle would come at a great cost: damaging British people’s ability to understand, and participate effectively in, transnational politics (Harding 2009; Sambrook 2010). Although, in practice, the majority of broadcast news about Africa focusses on only three countries: South Africa, Kenya and Uganda (Harding 2009).

Research into British newspapers’ coverage of the continent paints a more mixed picture. For Scott found that the range of African countries and topics covered by print journalists was not particularly narrow (2009a). Indeed, he stressed that China was covered far less than Africa (2009a): although China is only one country - albeit a large, complex and powerful one – whereas the African continent is comprised of over fifty countries, so this does not seem an entirely fair comparison.
More generally, a report issued by the Media Standards Trust found that *The Telegraph* and *The Daily Mail* had halved the proportion of their newspapers dedicated to coverage of international affairs since 1979, and the proportion in *The Guardian* and the *Mirror* had fallen by a third (Moore 2010). But this does not necessarily entail a loss of column inches in all cases, as newspapers have grown considerably in size because of the addition of numerous supplements (Moore 2010).

What is agreed upon is that foreign affairs coverage has long been regarded as a ‘loss-maker’ by both British and American newspaper editors (Hamilton 2009:460; see also Meyer and Otto 2011). However, online audiences seem much keener on international coverage (Scott 2009b), although studies into the responses of British audiences of *BBC News Online* indicated that their interest varies according to the nature of the subject and the way in which it is presented - with ‘human interest’ stories rating particularly highly (Sambrook et al. 2013).

Similar academic studies have not yet been conducted into the responses of overseas audiences, but industry data shows that those visiting British news websites seem to be far keener on foreign news than their counterparts in the UK (Newman and Levy 2012). This is particularly true of US-based users: in fact, the dearth of foreign coverage in US-based news outlets is their main motivation in seeking out British-based websites, as well as BBC World TV (Bicket and Wall 2009; Wall and Bicket 2008).
No studies yet exist which address online audiences’ interest specifically in African news or on the relationship of this to particular kinds of narrative framing, but there are some indications that members of the African diaspora may have higher rates of interest in African news (Kenney 1995; Marthoz 2007; Seaton 2007). We also know that although African news is covered by some US media, their networks of actual reporters and news bureaux on the continent are limited, especially within Sub-Saharan regions. For instance, although CNN has dedicated African news and current affairs programming, they only have a single reporter in Nairobi, another in Lagos, and one news bureau, which is based in South Africa (correspondence Brown 2011).

So there are some market-related arguments for retaining, and perhaps even extending, the coverage of Africa in some kinds of news outlets, as this might help news organisations to differentiate their ‘brands’ from others (Newman and Levy 2014), as well as tapping into potentially lucrative advertising markets. However, the financial and time costs of producing news about many parts of Africa mean that mainstream journalists working for non-niche news outlets have traditionally relied far more heavily on wire agency material in their coverage of the continent than when producing any other kind of foreign news (Boyd-Barrett 2010; Pawson 2007; Rantanen and Boyd-Barrett 2004).

The result of this has tended to be news output which is rather bland and homogenous as it focusses on, and is uncritical of, Anglo-American politics and policies (Paterson 2007, 2011). Therefore NGOs which are able to provide multimedia about Africa to journalists may have some progressive
political effects. For in helping journalists to distinguish their organisations from others in the media market by offering them exclusive material (Esperidiôo 2011), they might not only be able to introduce multimedia about different kinds of countries and topics, but also to include less frequently-heard speakers and/or alternative perspectives.

1.2: Critiques of news about ‘Africa’

Introducing greater diversity into the mainstream news coverage of Africa is important because African and African diaspora organisations have long argued that mainstream news perpetuates the ‘under-development’ of the continent (Stock 2012:38) as the negativity of such news reinforces notions that Africa is a hopeless case (de Beer 2010a, 2010b; Marthoz 2007; Opoku-Owusu 2003). But negativity is an important news value, regardless of the country being represented (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001), which may help to explain why Scott found that British coverage was not significantly more negative than African coverage of the continent (2009a). Moreover, parts of Africa are subject to famine and disease and failing to report this would also be distorting (Martin 1994, discussed in Scott 2009a).

However, the specific kind/s of ‘negativity’ which critics have portrayed as being bound up with news constructions of Africa beg further examination. The first significant problem appears to be that Northern news organisations’
coverage of African countries - especially those where there is no colonial tie - tends to be so sporadic that events seem to come from nowhere to the audience (Franks 2010a; Marthoz 2007; Philo 1993). Moreover, this kind of reporting tends to be of the ‘fire-fighting’ variety, where reporters are flown in and expected ‘to deliver something within days if not hours’ (Franks 2005b:132), or may even involve producing such news remotely from offices situated in London, Atlanta or New York (Franks 2010b).

Both practices risk causing journalists to misunderstand the situation and/or making them vulnerable to being manipulated by African elites who have ready access to electronic communications and who may want to promote particular versions of events which are of benefit to them (Carruthers 2004; McNulty 1999; Marthoz 2007). Some Northern journalists also try to compensate for their lack of specific, local knowledge by using mythic, and often Biblically-inflected images and language about good and evil (Atkinson 1999). Media coverage of armed conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa tends to provide particularly strong examples of this: for instance, both the Somali conflict in 1992-1993 and Rwandan genocide of 1994-5 were repeatedly represented using colonial, ‘othering’ language, suggesting, for example, that armed groups are ‘barbaric’, ‘wild’, ‘mad’ or ‘savage’, or that their grievances are purely ‘tribal’ in nature (Carruthers 2004; McNulty 1999; Marthoz 2007).

Northern journalists also tend to omit any discussion of the specific military or political contexts of famines or floods (Franks 2013; Moeller 1999; Philo 1993): focussing on their ‘natural’ causes, as if such disasters ‘just happen’ in
Africa (Rieff 2005). Moreover, African people tend to be portrayed as emptied of cultural and political engagement (Höijer 2004; Seaton 2005). The classic example of this is the recurrent close-up image of a lone, suffering African child, or a woman, or a mother and child pair, which was repeatedly found in the coverage of the Biafran famine in the 1960s, the Ethiopian famine in the 1980s (Burman 1994; Duffield 1996; Fair 1993; Franks 2013) and even the East African famine of 2011 (Magee 2011; Seu et al. 2012).

These kinds of images are thought to represent ‘ideal’ or ‘worthy’ victims (Höijer 2004; Seaton 2005), as well as alluding to the need for the audience’s response through their use of Christian iconography (Seaton 2005; Wright 2002). Indeed, such images are so powerful that they are now used to denote the innocence of suffering civilians in other kinds of situations: as happened, for example, in British newspapers’ representation of flood victims in Mozambique in 2000 (Okere 2004) and refugees fleeing Darfur in 2004-5 (Campbell 2007).

But such representations are often seen by critics as exploitative, and even pornographic: stripping Africans’ personhood down to their corporeality and exposing the undignified details of their suffering to Northerners’ gaze, in ways which fulfil Northerners’ desire to view themselves as powerful and morally superior: a pattern which tends to be reinforced by the tradition of African subjects speaking very little in news coverage (Hannerz 2004; Seaton 2005). When they are allowed to speak, it tends to be within a ‘human
interest’ frame which personalises, emotionalises and often depoliticises issues (Wright 2011a).

Rather than serving as a corrective to these kinds of representations of Africa, Northern INGOs have often been viewed as perpetuating them: steering journalists towards de-contextualised and stereotypical images of ‘ideal’ victims, in order to raise money for their own organisations (van der Gaag and Nash 1987; Kennedy 2009; Manzo 2006, 2008). This tendency may have been exacerbated by the global economic crisis of 2007-2009 for, as Gidley puts it: pictures of starving babies ‘bring in the cash’ (2005). Certainly, a recent report on British aid agencies’ engagement in a joint appeal for East Africa in 2011 found that although there was now much more awareness amongst policy specialists about the need to avoid clichéd imagery portraying starving babies with ‘flies in their eyes’, the kinds of photos and film issued from such INGOs’ press offices were still decidedly mixed (Seu et al. 2012:4).

At their worst, NGOs may be accused of being complicit in propagating ‘Afro-pessimism’, in which ‘black Africa’ is portrayed as unable to make progress according to a very narrow definition of ‘development’ shaped by ‘neo-liberalisation, free trade, structural adjustment or what is sometimes referred to as the Washington consensus’ (Garrett and Schmidt 2011, cited in Nothias 2013a:57). This therefore appears to echo the theories of scientific racism prevalent in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century (Nothias 2013a:57; see also Cuvier 1863; Linnaeus 1735; Lubbock 1865, 1870; Nott and Glidden 1857).
But whilst this body of academic research about news representations of Africa draws from a rich, sociologically-influenced approach to textual analysis which examines the social functions of positioning individuals and social as inferior (Cottle 2003a; Orgad 2014), Scott has expressed concerns that academic researchers may be guilty of ‘cherry picking’ some of the worst examples of coverage to analyse, rather than conducting more systematic studies (2014b). In particular, he (2013), along with Bunce (2013, 2014a, 2014b) and Nothias (2013a, 2013b) have highlighted the existence of a different set of interpretative frames which can be loosely clustered together as ‘Africa rising’ narratives.

Such narratives purport to contrast with Afro-pessimism by offering a more positive view of Africa: concentrating for example, on economic growth, self-help, returnees and the spread of mobile phones and other kinds of communications technology (Bunce 2013; Nothias 2013a). However, these scholars and several journalists have noted that they also carry several risks, including masking the inequalities involved in economic growth (Biney 2013a; Bunce 2014), as well as disregarding serious imbalances in African economies, which continue to lack a strong manufacturing base (Rowden 2013) and which remain heavily dependent on international aid (Biney 2013a, 2013b; Muchayi 2013). Indeed, they may even be seen to represent the ‘flip-side of Afro-pessimism’ (Nothias 2013a) by vindicating ‘liberal capitalist democracy’, promoting ‘neoliberal economic policies as universally successful’ (Biney 2013a) and even encouraging wealthy American and
European-based multinationals to engage in expansionist forms of profiteering (Bunce 2013).

2.1: ‘Africa’ and the operation of ‘power geometry’ in academia

Such critiques are highly relevant to a study of NGO-provided multimedia, particularly given that INGO-workers often regard ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ imagery as polar opposites (Dogra 2012; Orgad 2013a). But although a critical focus on ‘Africa’ relates to existing literature about the qualitative nature of news representations, as well as resonating with academic and journalistic discussions about particular kinds of important ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982), any researcher embarking on such a study runs the risk of inadvertently engaging in imperialistic ‘safari research’ (Hanitzsch 2009:422).

This is because ‘Africa’ is a value-laden construct which was invented by European cartographers (Mazrui 2005; see also Mudimbe 1988, 1994), and which has been repeatedly re/imagined by journalists as a homogenous mass in ways which have shaped, and been shaped by, imperialist thought (Hochschild 1999; Spurr 1993). By focussing on the coverage of Africa, this study therefore risks reproducing these imperialistic, homogenising tendencies: so treating the continent as if it were an undifferentiated mass,
rather than over fifty countries with their own distinct characteristics, systems, and political and economic interests.\textsuperscript{12}

Nevertheless, focusing on the news coverage of individual countries would not avoid this problem since many national boundaries in Africa are also colonial constructs, some of which were drawn up more or less arbitrarily (Mbembe 2003). Indeed, all boundaries rely upon cultural conventions, whether these are perceptions of natural limits, the result of diplomatic negotiations, treaties or exchanges, or whether they have been imposed by outside forces. Yet such boundaries may still be valid critical categories, as they gain significance for those living within them due to the social, political and economic structures which accompany their establishment, and/or which grow over time in relation to them (Mbembe 2003).

In addition, African peoples have themselves been actively involved in participating in the imagining of ‘Africa’, in ways which have acquired concrete forms, such as the political body, the African Union; the economic development organisation, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development; as well as numerous pan-African arts organisations and events, such as the Ouagadougou Television and Film Festival, and online news aggregators, such as \textit{AllAfrica.com} and \textit{Afrigator.com} (discussed in Sambrook 2010).

Thus although the notion of ‘Africa’ has imperial origins, it is a category which I have chosen to retain in this study. However, I am wary of the potentially

\textsuperscript{12} Although news about African countries may also be about other countries, including the UK: so blurring the line between domestic and international news (Franks 2010b).
racist implications of lumping together all of Sub-Saharan Africa or ‘Black Africa’ as if it were the ‘real’ Africa (Appiah 1992; Bonnett and Nayak 2002; Nothias 2013a, 2013b): ignoring the interconnectedness of North Africa to the rest of the continent (Bentahar 2011), as well as the distinctness of other kinds of African regions, such as the Great Lakes.

Professional journalists in particular tend to classify events occurring in ‘North’ Africa as ‘Arab News’, and to exclude it from the category of ‘African News’ in ways which are highly questionable (Hannerz 2004:56). For instance, the chain of popular protests which took place in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco in 2010-11 and which spread to Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait was widely described as the ‘Arab Spring’ (Cottle 2011; Mair and Keeble 2011). Yet conceptualising the protests taking place in North Africa as ‘Arabic’ and not also ‘African’ obscured the links between these protests and others taking place further south on the continent: some of which also took place in Arabic-speaking, and largely Muslim countries, like Sudan (Al Jazeera 2011), whilst others occurred in countries with different linguistic and religious traditions, such as Uganda (Africa Confidential 2011a, 2011b).

Thus, although I have no personal pan-African political commitments, I remained open to the prospect of examining NGOs’ involvement in providing multimedia about any place within the African continent in this study, whilst also making it clear exactly which people and places are involved in individual case studies. I regard this approach as helping to avoid imperialistic homogenising tendencies by paying critical attention to the ways in which
multiple identities, allegiances and structures may inter-act with one another to produce different kinds of social effects within and across national borders (Hanitzsch 2009).

Nevertheless, I am still left with the question of how to evaluate the news coverage of Africa when very little work about the normative purpose/s of news journalism has been published from Southern perspectives, especially from poor and/or rurally-based people (Fourie 2010; Josephi 2005; Rao and Wasserman 2007; Wasserman 2010a). This situation is perpetuated because of the nature of the academic sources available to those working within the field; the kinds of funding on offer for research projects; the languages which dominate academic publication; and the relative accessibility (or inaccessibility) of academic publishing houses to scholars (de Beer 2010a; Khiabany 2011; Mano 2009). So it is important that I interrogate the normative frameworks with which I am most familiar: remaining mindful of the ways in which normative theorising within Journalism Studies is itself dependent upon deeply unequal, transnational social structures. These have historical, political, material and spatial dimensions (Appadurai 2001; Bartolovich 2002; Dirlik 2003), so forming what Massey calls ‘power geometry’ (1993).

In particular, I am wary of replicating Northern assumptions that journalism has a ‘natural’ relationship to political democracy and should therefore always be evaluated in relationship to this (Carey 1996, discussed in Josephi 2005). For there is no universal agreement that mainstream journalism can serve democratic purposes at all, rather than the furtherance of capitalism, cultural
imperialism or other elite interests (Herman and Chomsky 1994; Herman and McChesney 1997; Murdock and Golding 2010). There are also numerous schools of thought which propose that mainstream journalism can and should be made to serve other, positive purposes, such as fostering ‘peace’ (Lynch 2005, 2008; Keeble et al. 2010), ‘development’ (Chalkley 1970; Domatob and Hall 1983; Mody 2003), or greater intercultural understanding (Couldry 2012; Silverstone 2007).

Even if one were to accept the argument that journalism should serve democratic practice (Carey 1996, discussed in Josephi 2005), there is no universally accepted framework of the kinds of journalism which might do this (Muhlmann 2010). Instead, the dominant theories in Journalism Studies which evaluate journalistic practice in relation to democracy all originate from Europe or North America (Berger 2000, 2002; Mafeje 1995; Mak’ Ochieng 1996; Mwangi 2010). In particular, it is noticeable that little democratic theory has emerged from Africa (Mafeje 1995; Mwangi 2010), despite the fact that almost all of the constitutions upon which independent African states were founded involved statements regarding their democratic aspirations (Anyang’ Nyong’o 1995).

What we do know is that the manifestations and combinations of democratic institutions in Africa vary tremendously from country to country, as well as from countries in Europe and the USA (interview Fakir 2012). So journalism critics would do well to heed Nyamnjoh’s warning that there is no ‘One-Best-Way of being and doing to which Africans must be converted and be
converted in the name of modernity and civilisation’ (2005a:3). Indeed, Nyamnjoh goes on to argue that adopting Northern journalistic ideals of political balance and even ‘impartiality’ could inhibit the ability of journalism to stimulate democratic practice in Africa: driving some African journalists’ pronounced political, ethnic and local affiliations underground, rather than out into the open, where they could contribute to democratic practice within their communities by helping to form a more pluralistic media (Nyamnjoh 2005b).

Certainly, it is easy to find examples of African journalists benefitting local and national democratic practice through their partial and critical engagement in news-making. For example, clandestine radio stations and the nationalist press have played a crucial role in ridding their countries of colonialism (Agbaje 1993; Hyden and Okigbo 2002; Ogbondah 2002; Shaw 2009). Journalists at The Bulawayo Chronicle in Zimbabwe, The Post in Zambia, as well as The Guardian in Nigeria, have also played important roles in exposing incompetence and corruption (Beckett and Kryke-Smith 2007; Hyden and Okigbo 2002).

More recently, it’s worth paying attention to the campaigning approaches adopted by many Egyptian journalists in the period leading up to the overthrow of President Mubarak (Hanitzsch et al. 2011). Although in new or unstable democracies, such as those recently emerging from civil conflict and divisive regimes, journalists’ criticism of those in power may benefit from being paired with their efforts to locate common interests and construct shared identities (Ansah 2005, discussed in Kuper and Kuper 2001).
Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that a number of African critics as well as scholars located within the African diaspora have rejected all forms of liberal democratic theory as inappropriate to their cultural and political context/s. Indeed, many view them as resting upon Anglo-American notions of personhood and agency which are antipathetic to indigenous approaches, which they say prize solidarity, respect for the community and the importance of various forms of social belonging (Kasoma 1996; Mafeje 1995; Sesanti 2010; Shaw 2009). Instead, they have sought to rediscover and revalidate their own philosophical traditions: so ‘decolonizing the mind’ (Ngũgĩ 1986).

2.2: The need for normativity

Given the various ways in which unequal power structures combine to shape normative theorisation within Journalism Studies, Zelizer has proposed that scholars should seek to avoid making normative judgements themselves (2004a). Instead, she asserts that they should treat all perspectives equally as a kind of ‘critical strategy’ in order to ‘reinvigorate the debate about the purpose/s of journalism’ within the academy (Zelizer 2004a:3-6). In particular, Zelizer recommends that scholars analyse the complexity of journalistic ethics as they are embedded within specific forms of political, cultural and economic contexts: proposing that understanding the specific interpretative communities in which journalistic practices are situated is the key to bringing together the study of political economy and normative theorisation (2011).
Whilst I take Zelizer’s point about the need to inter-relate these two areas of research, if we accept that academic debate is an unbounded affair which cannot be separated from other forms of social practice, then it seems grossly irresponsible to represent all normative frameworks as equally justified according to their specific contexts, including that of ‘hate radio’ (Somerville 2012; Thompson 2006). Although this is by no means widespread in Africa (Somerville 2012; Thompson 2006), the existence of ‘hate radio’ serves to illustrate a number of other problems with Zelizer’s argument. The first of these is that it is not only politically irresponsible, but also logically impossible, to represent the perspectives of all equally, because the normative values, political claims, and even the identities, of some groups are premised in ways which are at the expense of others (Fraser 1997).

This point also undermines the argument famously made by the Afrocentric critic, Kasoma, who argued that only ‘indigenous’ approaches to journalistic practice should be used in the evaluation of journalistic practice carried out by Africans because of their radically different cultures (1996). For the existence of ‘hate radio’ forces an admission that ‘culture’ is not unified within individual African countries, let alone throughout the continent, and that ‘culture’ is far from being the only factor shaping different approaches to journalistic practice. This point is reinforced by research about ways in which low pay interacts with other local political and economic contexts in order to shape the work of Ethiopian and Cameroonian journalists (Lodamo and Skjerdal 2009; Ndangam 2009).
Thus differences in journalistic practice can be seen to have been shaped by different conceptualisations of the nature of the relationship of journalism to social power, which is in turn shaped by the way in which social and economic power structures relations between different social groups (Khiabany 2011). Since the production and consumption of news about Africa - as well as the production of academic knowledge about it - are shaped by transnational flows of people, ideas and mediated representations (Massey 1993), it therefore becomes necessary to make a further theoretical point. This is that it is impossible to maintain a clear and absolute separation between ‘our’ (British) and their (‘African’) approaches to journalism (Tomaselli 2003).

So I would contend that Journalism scholars need to avoid responding to charges of research imperialism by retreating into a pluralistic/relativistic stance. For such an approach would be both politically irresponsible and critically unsupportable: reifying and balkanising conceptualisations of ‘culture’ in ways which inhibit scholars’ ability to analyse the imbrication of journalism in the exercise of power, especially on a transnational scale (Fraser 1997). Indeed, a pluralistic approach would render this study critically and politically impotent: unable to engage effectively with the issues of commercialism which have been so central to criticisms of NGOs’ production of multimedia and journalists’ use of it.

However, stating an intention to resist the critical/political pitfalls represented by pluralism has broader implications for the positioning of journalism research in relation to other forms of social power which are worth spelling
out. This is because pluralism is devoid of any principle except that of differentiation itself, so the only means of political resistance which it can offer is that of a politics of difference: so splintering into smaller and smaller social fragments (Fenton 2008; Karppinen 2008, 2010). The social isolation involved in this is hardly a recipe for the coherent, collective political action necessary to successfully resist powerful social actors, forces and structures, let alone on a transnational scale (Fenton 2008). In contrast, journalism research which fully embraces active, normatively-informed kinds of participation within the grossly unfair political and economic power structures which shape both journalism and Journalism Studies (Cohen 1993; Nolan 2008) lends itself to broader forms of collective political resistance.

This has important ramifications for the relationship of theory and practice in Journalism Studies because treating all perspectives equally as a kind of ‘critical strategy’ in order to ‘reinvigorate the debate about the purpose/s of journalism’ within the academy (Zelizer 2004a:3-6) would produce a schizophrenic situation. For journalism scholars would be obliged to try and refrain from making normative judgements in their research, whilst regularly evaluating Journalism students’ practical work in their teaching, and indeed, making normative evaluations in the course of their own journalistic practice.

Refusing to make normative evaluations in journalism research is therefore incompatible with broader efforts to make Journalism Studies a more ‘coherent domain of knowledge and skills’ (Reese and Cohen 2000, discussed in Wright 2011b: 157) by enabling theory to ‘talk’ to practice in a
meaningful manner and vice versa (Greenberg 2009; Phillips 2005; Skinner et al. 2001). But my intention here is not simply to explain why Zelizer’s approach would hamper Journalism Studies’ development as an academic field. Rather, I want to highlight the ways in which trying to sever the normative links between theory and practice would undermine the primary purpose of locating journalism in the academy in the first place: that is, the hope that improvements within journalism can be brought about through the critical inter-relationship of theory and practice (de Burgh 2003; Glasser and Marken 2005; Harcup 2011).

This is because teaching students journalistic practice is not just about transferring ‘skills’ which make them more employable: instead, it is about encouraging them to make thoroughly-considered decisions (de Burgh 2003; Burns 2012), so that they can become ‘reflective practitioners’ (Schön 1987). This is vital because newspaper pages and television or radio air-time, as well as journalists’ resources and audiences’ time, are all finite, so journalists have to prioritise the coverage of some events, people, places and narrative frames over others (Dayan 2007; Hafez 2011; Wright 2011a). Normative judgement therefore underpins journalistic practice, especially in news production, which depends quite explicitly on notions of what, who and where audiences should know about (Gasher et al. 2008; Gasher 2009; Schudson 2003).

Yet such normative evaluation cannot involve entirely subjective forms of judgement because journalists’ individual decision-making relates to broader collectivities, including the editorial teams and news organisations in which
they work, as well as their sources and audiences. So although we may criticise current news values (Harcup and O’Neill 2001; Ogunyemi 2011), some common framework regarding newsworthiness is necessary to shape journalists’ engagement with their colleagues and with others: thereby guiding explicit editorial debates about potential actions, as well as journalists’ ‘reflection-in-action’ (Schön 1991:54) regarding their personal engagement in research, interviewing, writing, and editing processes (Burns 2012; Niblock 2007).

News journalists’ need for commonly-understood normative frameworks becomes particularly acute when they are located within the kinds of massive, complex media organisations whose work dominates the provision of international news, and which are most closely associated with the uptake of NGO-provided multimedia (Cooper 2009, 2011; Frontline, 2008, 2011; Franks 2008a, 2008b). For such organisations broadcast and/or publish material electronically on a 24/7 basis, and must therefore rely upon vast and intricate systems of inter-related practices, enacted by individual journalists and groups of journalists. In such organisationally complex contexts, there therefore need to be commonly adhered-to sets of rules, routines and related organisational structures which guide journalistic practice by constraining who is allowed to engage in which kinds of actions at which times, and how these actions should be performed, otherwise confusion and conflict could easily lead to organisational paralysis (Wright 2014).
So Zelizer’s recommendation that journalism researchers try to avoid making normative evaluations (2004a) would prevent their scholarship from informing their ideas about what ‘good’ journalistic practice should look like, and also how ‘good’ news organisations should be structured. This is important because the structuring of journalistic work within news organisations organises journalists’ external relationships with other social groups, including audiences, sources and advertisers (Benson and Neveu 2005; Benson 2006; Bourdieu 1998; Wright 2014).

A pluralistic approach has little to say about the advantages or disadvantages of structuring journalistic organisations in any particular way. Indeed, journalism academics adopting such an approach would be obliged to metaphorically sit on their hands: contributing nothing to contemporary professional and political debates about the structuring of journalistic practice in relation to national regulatory bodies and/or to specific laws governing privacy, media ownership and funding (Aalberg et al. 2010; Fielden 2011; Frost 2011), including the exceptionally heated arguments which have surrounded the recent Leveson Inquiry13 (Fenton 2011; Franklin 2014; Lloyd 2011).

This is surely an untenable position, not only because some scholars have potentially valuable contributions to make because of their research expertise,

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13 This was the public judicial inquiry held in 2011-12 into the practices and ethics of the British press, following the phone hacking scandal at News International.
but also because of the potential which mainstream news journalism has to cause substantive physical, financial and reputational harm (Morozov 2012; Sanders 2003) through its transmission of content, potentially, to millions (Couldry 2006). Thus my rejection of Zelizer’s approach (2004a) is linked not only to arguments about the coherence and development of Journalism Studies as an academic field, but also to broader critical/political arguments about the public function of universities in seeking to identify, and to challenge, different forms of harm (Bailey and Freedman 2011; Holmwood 2011; Collini 2012).

3: Towards a critical moral economy of international journalism

However, there is no transnational/transcultural consensus about the nature of harm, or the undesirability of avoiding inflicting it on others (Couldry 2004). Indeed, journalism can even be conceptualised in ways which result in journalists being seen as having a duty to do certain kinds of harm, if in so doing other, more serious kinds of harm may be averted (Banaszynski 2011). For example, journalists’ normative commitment to a watchdog model might oblige them to conduct an exposé into business or government corruption, thereby harming the reputations and livelihoods of those concerned (Elliott and Ozar 2010).
So although journalism scholars need to retain an ability to engage in political critique, they also need to try and ‘de-Westernize’, or rather ‘internationalise’, Journalism Studies (Curran and Park 2000; Thussu 2009). This involves making efforts to attend to the specific theory and practice-based contexts in which it takes place; the organisational, political, economic and cultural structures which shape it; and the role/s which journalism plays in re/producing particular kinds of power relations in society as a result: so demonstrating how

...certain people, places, social entities, objects, ideas, voices, and relations are accorded visibility, authority, normality, legitimacy and “truthfulness”, whilst others are rendered invisible, deviant, and/or illegitimate.

(Orgad 2014:142)

Yet current critical approaches are poorly suited to this task. Neo-Marxist scholars working during the so-called ‘golden years’ of media sociology in the 1970s and 1980s (Molotch and Lester 1974; Gitlin 1980; Golding and Elliott 1979; Hallin 1986; Hall et al. 1978; Tuchman 1972, 1978), as well as the contemporary writers influenced by them (Boyd-Barrett 2004; Herman and Chomsky 1994; McChesney 1999) have tended to analyse the relationship between journalists’ sourcing practices and their symbolic naturalisation or normalisation of relations of dominance in ways which depend upon the notion of the ‘professional ideologies’ of journalists. However, this presupposes the dominance of professional journalists in journalist-NGO relations: so foreclosing many of the arguments introduced in the previous
chapter about the nature of the balance of power between the two, as well as arguments about the influence of UGC (Cooper 2009; Fenton 2010c).

As discussed in the previous chapter, such a critical/political approach also has an unfortunate homogenising tendency: often assuming the existence of an elite consensus when none exists (Davis 2007, 2010; Schlesinger 1990; Sparks 2007), as well as masking potentially important differences in how journalists use NGO-provided material in different kinds of journalism and in relation to different kinds of topic and organisation (Fenton 2010b; Lewis et al. 2006). In addition, NGOs may have very different orientations both to the mainstream media and to mainstream political power, depending on their own internal and external structuring, as well as their geographic positioning (Orgad 2013a; Powers 2014; Waisbord 2011).

Furthermore, the ideological perspectives of both journalists and NGO-workers may be shaped by actors’ personal socio-economic positioning, such as their gender, ethnicity and politics, as well as their class (Khiabany 2011). Finally, as Waisbord has argued, normative conceptualisations of ‘professionalism’ may even stimulate some journalists’ determination to engage in various forms of resistance to commercialised imperatives (2013). Thus a focus on ‘professional ideologies’ would constrain my ability to explore the potentially heterogeneous nature and effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia, as well as preventing any exploration of meaningful forms of journalistic agency.
In a related point, such an approach would also inhibit my ability to investigate whether some of the ways in which journalists use NGO-provided multimedia have progressive dimensions. For ideological criticism rests upon the assumption that the operation of mainstream (media, political and economic) power operates almost entirely in the interests of the powerful: so foreclosing any discussion of its potential to enable, as well as constrain, more vulnerable and disadvantaged people (Powers 2014).

However, this chapter has argued that exploring the potential heterogeneity involved in journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia using a purely ‘cultural’ lens is also inadequate because this also tends to involve homogenising tendencies, such as those employed by the Afrocentric critic, Kasoma (1996). When it does not, culturalist approaches tend to lead to the kind of splintering which risks undermining political collectivity, as well as divorcing questions of power from issues of the political economy (Fenton 2008; Karppinen 2010; Khiabany 2011): thereby risking complicity with neoliberalism, as well as sliding towards moral relativism.

For these reasons, although I draw from the works cited, I rely much more heavily on the analytical and evaluative framework provided by Sayer’s model of the ‘moral economy’ (2001, 2003, 2004, 2007). This is because Sayer’s work is grounded in understandings about the complex and heterogeneous ways in which normative and economic values may interact with - and modify - each other. It builds upon the work of other scholars about the impossibility of separating economic from normative structures, as well as the political
conviction that the purpose of having an economic life is to enable the well-being of its participants (Booth 1994; Thompson 1971).

However, Sayer’s work draws upon the work of other economic theorists, including Polanyi (2001 [1944], Granovetter (1992) and Callon (1998), in order to argue that all economic activity is underpinned by - or ‘embedded’ within - notions of social inter-dependence, responsibility and obligation (Sayer 2000b, 2001, 2007). But although Sayer argues that actors’ normative values may change the nature and effects of economic exchange, he also asserts that when actors become embedded in such relations, their normative values tend to change in subtle and complex ways (2001, 2007).

That is not to say that Sayer tries to recast the self-interest involved in profit-making into something far warmer and more congenial than it is (2001). For although his work is unusual in allowing for the possibility that actors embedded in exchange-relations may develop moral and/or political notions of responsibility which are not in their self-interest, he argues that more often, these notions of responsibility work in conjunction with self-interest by legitimising exchange-relations (Sayer 2001, 2007).

Sayer’s work therefore helps to pull together many of the different strands of research about journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia: linking a critical focus on the political economy with an alertness to the causal power of different kinds of normative values as they relate to actors’ multiple positioning within different kinds of organisational, professional, socio-economic, and
cultural settings. In particular, Sayer’s ideas can be used to develop those of Franks regarding the ways in which journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia are shaped by value-laden forms of trust, as well as relating to the cost-cutting taking place within news organisations and competition between NGOs (2008a).

As will be discussed in the next chapter, Sayer and I also share a grounding in Critical Realism which helps to breach the epistemological divide between the realism inherent in mainstream news journalism and academic work about the role of particular kinds of sourcing practices in constructing reality. Suffice to say here that this epistemological grounding means that Sayer is able to explain the emergence of new social/economic structures from their predecessors in ways which cause him to argue that actors may become ‘partially dis-embedded’ from the cultural contexts in which they originated (Sayer 2000b:90): so gaining characteristics and producing consequences of their own (Sayer 2001).

In this way, Sayer’s work has much in common with that of Davis regarding the embedding and dis-embedding of elites (2007, 2010). However, Sayer argues that it is impossible to regard economic activity as absolutely dis-embedded or autonomous since moral-political norms are ‘always somewhere there, structuring relations in the media market and shaping workplace interactions’ (Banks 2006:461). Although they may have become so naturalised, normalised or compromised that they require critical ‘unearthing’ (Sayer 2007:263-4). Indeed, if commercial activity could become completely
dis-embedded from broader social, political and moral norms, then critiques, including those of the Left, would have no purchase.

I would therefore argue that Sayer's model of the moral economy helps me to develop the theoretical framework for this study in a number of ways which are compatible with the goal of improving journalistic practice. Firstly, it lends itself to an exploration of the ways in which media workers' formal entitlements, rights and responsibilities interact with their informal ideas of who and what they ‘are responsible for, beholden to and dependent upon’ (Sayer 2000b:79). This helps me to address the first two clusters of research questions pertaining to why and how journalists use NGO-provided multimedia by enabling me to investigate why and how particular forms of structured relationships between NGO-workers and journalists have shaped the framing of particular kinds of media and media narratives, without negating journalists’ or NGO-workers’ personal and collective agency (Sayer 2001, 2007).

Sayer's work also enables me to tackle the thorny issue of normative evaluation, which pertains to my final cluster of research questions about the effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia on journalism, NGO-work and mediated discourse about Africa. For his articulation of moral-political norms as the necessary precondition for all commercial activity enables me to reground the purpose - and indeed the imperative - of engaging in normative critique within academic research, without denying the
ways in which this is also shaped by particular kinds of socio-economic structures (Sayer 2007). This is because

A critical moral or political economy turns questions of economic behaviour back into questions of validity, by asking not only what happens, but on the basis of what kinds of legitimation, and it [then] assesses those legitimations.

(Sayer 2007:268)

I do, however, have some criticisms to make of Sayer’s work. These relate to his efforts to underpin his model of the ‘moral economy’ in the form of Nussbaum’s list of inter-related ‘capabilities’ which all human beings should have if they are to attain well-being (2001, 2003, discussed in Sayer 2007). For although I would agree that our common embodiment as human beings means that our survival is predicated on basic capabilities like having enough to eat and drink, enough rest, and protection from physical danger, there is no universal agreement about how those goods are to be distributed, or the relationship which these basic goods should have to more complex social goods.

This universalism also distracts critical attention from the ways in which power relations between specific groups and individuals are structured, as well as which (and whose) specific normative ends they do (or do not) serve (Wright 2014). So I prefer to draw more heavily on other aspects of Sayer’s work which explore the ‘fuzzy’ relationships between cultural norms of morality, politics and economics (2000:98): underpinning this with Sen’s non-essentialist articulation of inter-related functional capabilities (1999, 2010).
Therefore I will address my final evaluative questions, not only in terms of Sayer’s ideas, but also in terms of Sen’s quite specific suggestions about ways in which mainstream journalism may contribute to public reasoning (2010). These include the manner in which journalistic coverage may promote free speech and disseminate knowledge which enables critical scrutiny in ways which do not preclude the expression of vested interests or emotionality (Sen 2010). It also includes the way in which such coverage may ‘give voice’ to those who are neglected and disadvantaged in other forms of mediated discourse: so serving a protective function and aiding more open and inclusive forms of communication and argument, including those which pertain to the analysis and re/formation of values (Sen 2010:336).

However, there are significant unresolved tensions between Sen’s commitment to public reasoning as a prerequisite of global justice and his privileging of democratic practice which are highly problematic, especially when considering journalistic coverage produced in a transnational context (Wright 2014). So I have not attempted to follow other media scholars who have sought to use Sen's work to construct a global media ethics (Couldry 2012; Ward 2010, 2011) or who have used Sayer’s work to try and develop a global theory of communication rights (Calabrese 2005).

Indeed, I see the critical reflections contained in this chapter as leading in the opposite direction: that is, towards an acknowledgement that, because of the unequal power relations within and between societies, many will not wish, or will not be able, to engage in ‘globalised’ debates about journalistic norms.
Thus, I see my evaluation of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia as involving the constant re/negotiation of the serious (but potentially fertile and productive) tensions between differing notions of justice and democratic practice (Wright 2014).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the advantages and disadvantages of focusing on the news coverage of Africa, interrogating the manner in which constructions of the continent, as well as forms of normative evaluation are structured through the operation of ‘power geometry’ (Massey 1993). It argued that these inequalities not only constrain normative theorising within Journalism Studies, but also make it impossible to separate critical debate from grossly unfair political and economic structures (Nolan 2008).

However, I then contested Zelizer’s recommendation that journalism scholars abandon normative evaluation altogether, in favour of treating all perspectives equally (2004a). In particular, I argued that this does not fully address the imbrication of culture in the exercise of power; that it undermines efforts to bring Journalism theory and practice into a closer relationship; and that it undermines the possibility of both intellectual critique and the collective solidarity needed to engage in effective forms of political resistance.
Following on from these reflections, in the last section I proposed a different approach to the axiological grounding of normative evaluation: suggesting instead the application of Sayer’s work on ‘moral economies’ to journalism research (2001, 2003, 2004, 2007), albeit in ways which underpin this with Sen’s (1999, 2010), rather than Nussbaum’s (2001, 2003), model of interrelated functional capabilities. However, I resisted the current trend to use Sen’s work to move towards a global evaluative framework, as well as questioning whether it is possible or useful to apply Sen’s work to resolve critical/political tensions between notions of democracy and notions of justice (Wright 2014).

Thus I hope to have laid the ground for an explanation of the epistemological and ontological approach adopted in this thesis, which will be discussed in the next chapter. I will now go on to argue that a Critical Realist (CR) approach to Journalism research provides the means of resolving the theoretical conflicts between my claims about the existence of substantive harm; my acknowledgement of the constructed nature of social knowledge about it; as well as my awareness of the manner in which all academic knowledge is inevitably structured by power imbalances. I will then go on to demonstrate that CR provides the means through which innovative research strategies may be constructed: so grounding the mixed methods employed in this study in a coherent epistemological and ontological framework.
The research questions set out at the beginning of this study were *why journalists use NGO-provided multimedia; how they use it; and what the effects of this might be on journalism, NGO-work and mediated discourse about Africa*. However, there are serious epistemological/ontological problems with the way in which I have framed my approach to these questions which I discuss in this chapter, before explaining the methodological decisions which were taken as a consequence. These problems emerge from the underlying issue of why any of this matters: for there is an apparent contradiction between my insistence on the need for academics to engage critically and politically with substantive harm, at the same time as acknowledging the constructed nature of journalistic representations and academic knowledge about it.

This seeming contradiction has its roots in a broader conflict within Journalism Studies between the constructivist stance which underpins much of the academic theory about journalism and the realist stance which underpins journalistic practice (Windschuttle 1999, 2000): so hampering the development of Journalism Studies as a field, by preventing the inter-relationship of theory and practice (Wright 2011b). The first section of this chapter will therefore begin by explaining why and how Critical Realism (CR)
offers a ‘third way’ between constructivism and positivism in a manner which is appropriate to journalistic practice. But it also provides innovative ways of linking politico-economic, organisational and culturalist fields of research which have hitherto been divided (Fenton 2007; Lau 2004) and which are particularly appropriate to the critical-political critique contained in this thesis.

It then goes on to outline Critical Realist definitions of adequate knowledge, as well as explaining the ways in which Bhaskhar’s concept of emergence (1979, 1998, 2008) and his notion of ‘position-practice systems’ (1979:51) provide ways of examining the interaction of different kinds of structure and agency. Such a detailed theoretical model is crucial in order to address the research questions in this study in ways which are sensitive to currently-existing insights into journalists’ potentially heterogeneous uses of NGO-provided material (Lewis et al. 2006; Waisbord 2011), as well as NGO-workers’ potentially heterogeneous approaches to the media (Orgad 2013a; Powers 2014).

However, there is no ready ‘cook book’ of CR methods (Yeung 1997:56) and very few works which illuminate the kinds of methodological approaches which CR researchers might take (Carter and New 2004). Indeed, CR has often been accused of being a ‘philosophy in search of a method’ (Yeung 1997). So the subsequent sections in this chapter contribute to CR research more broadly by developing specific methodological strategies grounded in CR theory. Specifically, the second section seeks to implement CR insights about the concept and value-laden nature of knowledge by exploring the
value-laden implications of the remaining terms used to frame this study - that is, ‘NGO’, ‘NGO-provided multimedia’ and ‘mainstream news’.

The third section then explains how my own efforts to inform my pedagogic practice, as well as CR theorists’ conceptualisation of media texts as emerging from specific ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskhar 1979:51), shaped the focus on media production found in this thesis. Next, it explains why and how work by Lawson (1998) and Bergene (2007) informed my approach to achieving generalizability: so shaping my approach to sampling media coverage, and my use of quantitative and content analysis in order to choose six media items to use as the basis of contrasting case studies.

Next, the fourth section explains why and how CR theorists’ conceptualisation of the ‘peopled’ (Archer 1995:75) nature of media production (Toynbee 2008) prompted me to use these media items to build case studies by conducting hour-long semi-structured interviews with all of those involved in making decisions shaping the production of these media texts. These study participants included the local NGO-workers and interpreters working in the African countries concerned, the journalists and NGO press officers who worked directly on each piece, their immediate and more senior managers, and a host of other media actors, including freelancers and commercial PR specialists.

I then move on to explain how my specific interview questions were grounded in further theoretical work, which blends the work of Archer (2003a, 2003b,
2007) with that of Bourdieu (1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) in order to better address the nature of the relationship/s between, and relative weighting of, different kinds of structure and agency. These theoretical deliberations are then used to inform my explicit positioning of myself as the author of this thesis, my decision to name study participants, and how I dealt with my positioning as an ‘insider’ in journalism and, to a certain extent, NGO-work.

Finally, the last section examines how I triangulated accounts of events by different interviewees and used decision-making trees as well as other kinds of graphic representation (Miles and Huberman 1994) in order to engage in data analysis. This also involved my use of ‘negative cases’ (Bergene 2007:11) and counterfactual questioning (Danermark et al. 1997) in order to interrogate participants’ accounts of which and whose decisions were most important, as well as the ways in which their agency was enabled and/or constrained by structural factors. Thus not only did I seek to address why and how NGO-provided multimedia was used in mainstream journalism, but also which and whose capabilities were enhanced in the process (Sen 2010).

Given the theoretical focus in this thesis on Sayer’s model of the ‘moral economy’ (2001, 2003, 2004, 2007) a central issue in this analysis was the ways in which such activity was legitimised by actors in relation to economic imperatives; the impact which this had on their interpretative framing of the events and people depicted (Franks 2013; Stones 2014); and the consequences of this for actors’ framing of NGO-journalist relations in future (Entman 1993; Goffman 1986). Thus I sought to reach conclusions about the
effects which the use of NGO-provided multimedia had on journalism, NGO-work and mediated discourse about Africa.

1.1: Why Critical Realism suits Journalism Studies

Windschuttle has famously argued that much of the theory included in universities’ journalism curricula undermines ethical journalistic practice by eroding the belief in an external reality (1999, 2000). For the whole notion of ‘facts’, which is central to notions of ‘best practice’ in news journalism, is premised on there being an external, material reality, and on that reality being both know-able and communicable to an audience. Thus, a purely constructivist approach undermines what makes news distinct and valuable as a form of communication: that is, its claim to refer to or be ‘about’ something external to itself (Gauthier 2005: 52), and therefore to be able to ‘cover’ real-world ‘happenings’ (Lau 2004: 701).

However, accepting Windschuttle’s stance wholeheartedly would involve rejecting all of the insights offered by work premised on constructivist views of reality about the ways in which mainstream news is bound up with the structuring of power: offering its audiences not just ‘facts’ but also a kind of schema or mind-map about which places matter, how much they matter, who matters in relation to them, and the characteristics of those places (Gasher et al. 2008; Gasher 2009; Mulhmann 2010; Schudson 2003).
As a researcher interested in mediated representations of Africa, the prospect of rejecting all forms of constructivist thought is a particularly unattractive one, as much of the critical work analysing these kinds of texts, and their political and normative effects, is based on constructivist premises. Indeed, much of the previous chapter was spent demonstrating how impossible it would be to fully extricate the construction of academic knowledge from unequal systems of economic, political and cultural power.

Yet material objects may exist independently of our interpretations of them, as O’Neill so wittily demonstrates by hypothesising about what would happen if one were to throw a glass of beer at even the most determined constructionist (1995). But there is also a more nuanced argument to be made here: that is, that material objects and entities related via constructed systems of social meaning can have real effects on people: for example, a lack of money can cause serious suffering because of hunger, exposure from lack of shelter and so on.

Mainstream news may also have real effects: ‘consecrating’ particular actors, events and places (Darras 2005) in ways which might alter both media participants, sources’ and audience members’ dispositions towards others (Boltanski 1999; Chouliaraki 2006, 2008; Cottle and Nolan 2007; Fenton 2010a). Indeed, that is why it is so important to analyse why and how journalists are using NGO-provided multimedia about Africa, as well as examining the potential effects of this on journalism, NGO-work and mediated discourse about Africa.
To argue thus is not to imply that the entrenched social and material structures which perpetuate inequality and suffering can be altered simply by encouraging journalists, NGO-workers and/or journalists to represent them differently in mediated discourse. Rather, it is to take the more moderate position that news may have some role to play in ‘reimagining the political’ (Cottle 2009:311), whilst rejecting as overly media-centric any approach which implies that mainstream journalism is the ‘primary sense-making practice of modernity’ (Hartley 1996:12).

Therefore, the first advantage of adopting a CR approach is the way in which it presents a coherent meta-theoretical stance which avoids the extreme split between positivism and constructivism. This involves acknowledging the existence of substantive reality, but insisting upon the constructed nature of human knowledge about the nature of that reality (Archer 1998; Danermark et al. 2002). So journalists and journalism scholars are encouraged to speak and write about real objects, systems and experiences, as well as about the social constructions involved in explaining them to others. In so arguing, I follow in the footsteps of scholars in International Relations and Economics, who have also used CR in order to get past the positivist/constructivist split in order to analyse the relationship/s between political and economic structures, specific world events and cultural representation (Jones 2006; Patomäki 2002; Patomäki and Wight 2000).

However, the notion that media representations, even of ‘facts’, are concept or theory-dependent (Bhaskar 1979; Danermark et al. 2002) may be
somewhat challenging to practising journalists. It need not be: for to assert the
count-dependence of knowledge - and therefore the impossibility of
attaining a final statement of ‘truth’ - is not necessarily to slide towards moral
relativism by treating all claims of knowledge as if they were of equal worth
(Schudson 2008). Rather, it is to stress the necessity of making rational
judgements about the adequacy of accounts of reality based on the available
evidence, and to always strive to improve this adequacy by reconsidering this
evidence and being open to reinterpretations which may emerge following the
introduction of new evidence (Bhaskar 2008; Cruickshank 2003).

Thus factual truth is seen in CR as a question of finding the best possible fit
‘between statements and a world outside of those statements’ at any given
time (Tallis 1988: 247-8). In so doing, CR restores to journalists their
responsibility to continually and rigorously assess the adequacy of their
sources’ - and their own - accounts of reality: using their position to point out
discrepancies in their sources’ accounts; to clear up popular
misunderstandings; and to expose lies, using all of the evidence available to
them. This is particularly important in the coverage of Africa, as many British
people will have little - if any - personal experience of the continent, so it is
vital that journalists provide adequate understandings of the continent via the
media, if the public is not to respond in ways which are politically blinkered, if
not downright dangerous (Franks 2013; Rieff 2005).

Critical Realists’ rejection of the notion that ‘facts’ have a permanent one-to-
one correspondence with reality (Lau 2004) is also compatible with journalistic
practice in other ways, for in their day-to-day work, most journalists are acutely aware that they have to be selective about what they can and can't include in their reports for reasons of duration, newsworthiness, angle, genre, the depth of their audience's pre-existing knowledge on the subject and so on. Indeed, how selective they must be is a source of considerable frustration for journalists: editorial meetings are full of tussles about what and how much can be included in any given report - and then one's carefully-crafted piece may be cut again by a sub-editor or studio producer anyway (Wright 2011b).

Journalists also make explicit references to their use of narrative or dramatic devices in their editorial discussions with one another. For example, Editors routinely ask for 'colour' or 'human interest' pieces, and radio producers discuss how best to 'cast' discussions or 'add texture' to clip sequences. In addition, a tacit understanding of the ways in which new interpretations and evidence can emerge is implicit in journalists' search for 'new leads' or 'fresh angles', as well as in their publication of retractions and apologies (Wright 2011b).

Finally, CR is compatible with journalistic practice because of its opposition to pragmatic and neo-pragmatic schools of thought, which evaluate knowledge according to its usefulness (Rorty 1989; Shalin 1992). For some of the most prestigious forms of journalism involve disseminating knowledge about events, such as atrocities or corruption scandals, which groups - and sometimes even the large sections of a population - find useful to cover up, or to be in denial about (Cohen 2001; Krog 1999).
Thus, a second advantage of CR is that it returns to the pursuit of knowledge (including journalistic knowledge) a positive, non-ironic basis for political and ethical engagement, precisely because of the capacity that knowledge has to prompt and shape social change. Indeed, in CR such engagement is hard to avoid, for it is difficult to pass judgement about what constitutes a false or inadequate account of reality without making some normative suggestions about what would be better. In this way, CR is also compatible with mainstream journalism because it is closely bound to normative values, including notions of the ‘public good’ (Lau 2004; Toynbee 2008).

So CR is ‘critical’ in two key senses. It is critical of other epistemological theories and the inadequate accounts of reality they produce, and it is critical of social structures and practices which produce or perpetuate suffering or other social ills - including those which are caused by the circulation of false or inadequate accounts of reality. For these reasons, CR provides a basis from which scholars can seek to hold journalists to account for the adequacy of their representations, and the practices or systems which produce them (Hesmondhalgh and Toynbee 2008; Toynbee 2008), without engaging in thought processes which are incompatible with journalistic practice.
1.2: ‘Adequate knowledge’

Having established that knowledge in CR consists of adequate (if socially-constructed and therefore fallible) accounts of reality, it is then necessary to explain what constitutes ‘adequate’ knowledge in more detail and how this applies to this thesis in particular. CR proposes that the aim of research should be to investigate and identify the ‘relationships and non-relationships between what we experience, what actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce events in this world’ (Danermark et al. 2002: 21). This is because CR focusses on explaining the production or causation, of reality, a focus which is closely linked to its political purposes (Elder-Vass 2010).

Roy Bhaskar founded this approach: proposing that reality should be viewed as a series of layered strata or domain, with each domain being composed of structures of relations between objects (1979, 1998, 2008). Each domain, he argued, could be seen as being formed by, but existing semi-autonomously from, underlying or deeper strata or domains. The most basic or lowest strata he called the domain of the real (Dr), arguing that it contained generative mechanisms with the potential or tendency to make certain events happen. Whether those events came to pass or not, he saw as being dependent on the relationships which such mechanisms had with each other. For example, two generative mechanisms might exert forces which reinforce each other, leading to a particularly pronounced outcome, or they might counteract each
other, in which case there might be little or no outcome at all (Bhaskar 2008; Sayer 2000a; Toynbee 2008).

Bhaskhar then described the next domain of reality as the domain of the actual (Da), which includes all the events which actually happen when the generative mechanisms of the Dr are activated. For instance, the movement of tectonic plates activates a combination of other generative mechanisms, including hot magma, gas and geological fault-lines, so producing a volcano. But such events are only perceived or interpreted by human minds in relation via ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskhar 1979: 51). These are structures of relatively enduring relationships between positions (functions, rules, tasks, duties and rights), enacted by individuals through their agentive engagement in recognisable activities, whilst utilising particular resources (Bhaskar 1979).

So, to expand on the example of the volcano eruption, this event may be interpreted as an interesting scientific phenomenon, an environmental crisis or a divine judgement. Moreover, the literature addressed in the introduction to this thesis suggests that the approaches which journalists might take to the coverage of such an event are likely to be shaped by the position-practices associated with ‘news values’ (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001). But they may also be shaped by a variety of other position-practices relating to the production of a particular topic or sub-genre, the production of particular kinds of media, as well as those structuring the relations between particular organisations and others, including NGOs (Lewis et al. 2006; Waisbord 2011).
However, Bhaskhar then went on to argue that such position-practices may shape how we perceive or experience them, but they do not entirely determine them, because of the multiplicity and complexity of the position-practices involved, as well as human agency which mediates between them, albeit in certain structurally-constrained ways. For this reason, he asserted, we need to conceptualise a third and final strata of reality, the domain of the empirical (De) (Bhaskhar 1979). Thus each domain or strata can be seen to emerge from its antecedents, but to have properties particular to itself: just as water is different to hydrogen and oxygen, although it is composed of both (Sayer 2000a).

Nevertheless, Bhaskhar did not just see emergence as being a one-way, bottom-up process, but a complex web of feedback between the different layers of reality (1979). For example, people's perceptions of events (taking place at the top-level, the De) may shape the production of new events (at the level of the Da), including changes to the 'position-practice systems' shaping interpretation (Bhaskhar 1979:51). Indeed, if sufficient changes are made to these 'position-practice systems' (Bhaskhar 1979:51), this may modify relations between the generative mechanisms themselves, at the deepest layer or domain of reality (the Dr) (Bhaskhar 1979).

Therefore Bhaskhar's model of reality is appropriate to the study of news journalism in a number of ways. For it enables journalistic texts to be conceptualised as 'emerging' from the interaction of external events with multiple 'position-practice systems' (Bhaskhar 1979:51) and human agency.
This therefore enables me to account for potential complexity and variation by exploring the links between journalists’ and NGO-workers’ acts of agency, the recursive links between ‘news values, media formats, labour conditions and editorial positions’ (Waisbord 2011:149), as well as other kinds of cultural, political and economic structures. These include professional ideologies (Lau 2004); the cultural belief-systems and/or socio-economic positioning of individual actors; the structuring of news organisations in relation to the media market and communications technology (Phillips et al. 2009); and the political/legal structures shaping media ownership and industry regulation (Lau 2004).

2.1: Key terms - ‘news’ and ‘mainstream’ news organisations

However, if social interpretation not only has the capability to affect how events are perceived, but also to produce new events and/or deeper generative mechanisms, then it is vital that researchers reflect critically upon the kinds of concepts and values which key terms may bring to bear on the study, so shaping the nature of the knowledge it produces. Whilst the previous chapter interrogated my use of the word ‘Africa’, this section will analyse my use of the term ‘news’ and my reference to ‘mainstream’ news organisations, before going on to consider the definition of ‘NGO’ and my use of the phrase ‘NGO-provided multimedia’.
The rationale behind my focus on ‘news’ emerged from much of the literature about NGOs' involvement in journalism\(^\text{14}\) and from my own critical/political commitment to reflective practice as a former news journalist and a current teacher of news journalism (Niblock 2007). For, as I discussed in the previous chapter, it is important for journalists working together in major media organisations to have some common understandings about appropriate news-making practices, in order to locate their practice in relation to their colleagues and others in a relatively reliable fashion.

Yet ‘news values’ and other ideas about what practices constitute ‘news production’ have evolved, and continue to evolve, in particular times and places (Allan 2004; Chalaby 1998; Harcup and O'Neill 2001). Indeed, even companies and corporations which self-identify as ‘news organisations’ and which are located in the same time-space may take very different approaches to the definition of ‘news’ and the practices which are appropriate to it. For instance, even the most cursory examination of *BBC News Online* shows that this outlet has separate sections for ‘News’, ‘Features’ and multimedia items (Watch/Listen), whilst the *Guardian.co.uk* does not, listing the latest postings first whether these are blogs, multimedia items, or other kinds of written articles.

Studies of public perceptions also demonstrate that what is taken to be ‘news’ may vary according to many factors, including gender and socio-economic positioning (Kantar Media 2012). So I did not wish to foreclose potentially

\(^{14}\) See previous chapter.
important lines of inquiry about the nature and role of ‘news’, and its recursive relationship to agentive choices and multiple socio-economic structures (Waisbord 2011) by beginning with my own theoretical/professional definition of the genre. Therefore I approached ‘news’ as a concept defined as such by newspapers, news websites, radio news bulletins, and TV news programmes.

The only kinds of media item excluded from the study were those which were contained within ‘news’ platforms but which made no claim to be journalistic coverage at all, such as problem pages, horoscopes, cartoons and adverts, as well as ‘trailers’ for other kinds of journalistic genres, such as documentaries. Since my focus was on why and how journalists used NGO-provided multimedia, I only examined material which was in the main body of the media item, rather than that added later by audience members, for example through audience Tweets or ‘Have Your Say’ comments at the bottom of webpages.

In addition, I only focussed on media items about Africa which have been produced by news organisations regarded as ‘mainstream’ in the UK. By this, I mean those organisations whose output is most frequently bought, read, watched, listened to, or simply clicked-upon by audience members located in Britain, as defined by the Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board, Radio Joint Audience Research, the Audit Bureau of Circulation and Alexa Internet. Using the term ‘mainstream’ should not therefore be read as implying that I think the journalistic practices involved in producing such coverage are somehow editorially or politically uniform.
Indeed, significant structural tensions have arisen within mainstream journalism in the course of its formation over time and because of the positioning of individual journalists and news organisations in relation to political and economic power (Bourdieu 1998). These include the tensions which exist between more commercialised and ‘public service’ approaches; between populist and specialist media; between left-wing and right-wing journalists and outlets; between outlets which are local, national or regional in focus, and those which claim to be ‘global’; and between outlets which publish or broadcast in English and those which employ other languages (Wright 2014).

2.2: ‘NGOs’ and ‘NGO-provided’ material

Much of the professional and critical discussion of NGOs’ involvement in media production has tended to treat ‘NGOs’ as if they were more or less synonymous with Northern-based INGOs (Cooper 2009; Cottle and Nolan 2007; Frontline 2008, 2011). But relying on this definition also risks shutting down the possibility of exploring new data relating to the potential diversity of new forms of ‘networked journalism’ (Beckett and Mansell 2008; Heinrich 2012; Sambrook 2010).

However, I wanted to avoid the very broad approach which defines NGOs as all organisations which are not private companies, governmental agencies or
intergovernmental bodies. For shifts in donor governments’ practices over the past two decades - such as tying funding to short-term contracts and related ideological agendas, as well as using NGOs to deliver welfare services on behalf of ‘failing’ states - make it difficult to see how the organisations involved in such work could be described as separate from, or independent of, donor governments’ interests (Fowler 1998; Kilby 2004: Sogge 1996).

In addition, such an approach risks causing confusion about the status of limited private companies, because many not-for-profit co-operatives, think-tanks and campaigning groups are registered in this way as it allows members to control group liability in case of financial debt. For example, the anti-poverty advocacy organisation, War on Want, and the gender equality campaign, The Fawcett Society, are both registered as limited companies and as charities.

Instead, I followed the UN’s approach to defining NGOs: beginning by defining them as ‘formal, non-statutory and non-profit-making organisations’ (Deacon 2003: 99). This is also a negative definition of NGO-work which was inserted into the UN’s Charter in order to differentiate private groups from others wishing to be involved in UN consultations (1945, cited in Alger 2002). But subsequent documents flesh this out in more detail (Martens 2003): insisting that NGOs should not use violent means, or seek to replace an existing government: thereby excluding political parties, national liberation and guerrilla organisations from being classed as ‘NGOs’ (Willetts 2006). The same rationale excludes animal rights and Pro-Life organisations which
engage in violent activities (Willetts 1999). Although violent acts designed to break and enter or even destroy property do not seem to have prevented environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, from being considered as 'NGOs' by the UN or others (Howell and Pearce 2002).

Moreover, some positive definitions of NGOs' work and purposes do exist within UN literature: such as the UN’s articulation of NGOs’ goals as lying within the remit of the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): so leading to an articulation of ‘NGO-work’ as involving ‘economic, social, cultural, educational, health, scientific, technological and … questions of human rights’ (ECOSOC 1968, discussed in Weiss and Gordenker 1996: 22). Furthermore, the UN provides a positive definition of NGOs’ moral-political authority as being derived from representative and participatory processes (ECOSOC 1968, discussed in Donini 1996): a principle which is reflected in its other judgements about the importance of NGOs being ‘self-governing’ (ECOSOC 1968, discussed in Willetts 1999). For this reason, organisations which have been set up to generate profit and quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QUANGOs) were excluded (Clarke 1998; Deacon 2003).

Some critics have argued that the formal organisational structures required by the UN - such as written constitutions, formal representative bodies and detailed voting mechanisms - may constrain what is considered to be an ‘NGO’ in a politically conservative manner (Collingwood 2006; Weiss and Gordenker 1996). For the detailed administrative work which this involves
tends to mean that only those organisations with paid ‘professional’ positions (Martens 2003) are classed as NGOs by the UN: thereby risking excluding more radical and/or grass-roots groups from the scope of this study (Kamat 2004).

However, whilst it may be inadvisable to follow the UN’s insistence on specific organisational reporting requirements to the letter, it seems justifiable to follow the UN’s classification of NGOs and NGO-work more broadly, in terms of the kinds of mutual and public benefit organisations it defines as being ‘NGOs’.

For a degree of organisational formality indicating longevity is necessary to distinguish NGOs from more amorphous social movements (Martens 2003; Willetts 2006), as well as from other kinds of ephemeral, ad hoc groupings (Mercer 2002). The table below clarifies which kinds of organisations are and which aren’t classed as NGOs for the purposes of this study:

**Figure 1: Table defining NGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>NOT NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional guilds or associations</td>
<td>Government agencies and QUANGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not-for-profit co-operatives and collectives</td>
<td>Armed guerrilla groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid organisations</td>
<td>National liberation movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organisations, such as churches, mosques and temples</td>
<td>Pro-life organisations which engage in violence against people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think-tanks</td>
<td>Animal rights organisations which engage in violence against people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charities</td>
<td>Agencies established by intergovernmental agreements, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy groups not geared towards overthrowing a particular government or governments</td>
<td>All UN agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, the term ‘NGO-provided’ requires some explanation. Initially, I had intended to examine journalists’ use of ‘NGO-produced’ or ‘NGO-generated’ multimedia. But during a pilot study, I found that this terminology would involve excluding potentially illuminating cases where NGO-workers had played a vital role in the coverage of Africa by acquiring, curating, editing and redistributing material which had been created by others.

‘NGO-provided’ material also seemed to better describe the ways in which others worked for NGOs, including instances in which NGO campaigns used multimedia produced by freelancers, or other kinds of advertising, marketing and PR professionals on a paid or voluntary basis. This flexibility is in keeping with my situation within a particular CR tradition known as adaptive research which treats theory-building as a continual or iterative process: beginning with loose ‘orienting’ concepts and refining these concepts in relation to actual data, before going on to ‘test’ them to see if they ‘fit’ empirical evidence adequately, and then adjusting or dropping initial concepts wherever necessary (Layder 1998:19-40).

3.1: Production practice, demi-regularities and contrasting case studies

Since my intention was to inform my pedagogic practice as a journalism educator, and since in CR, media texts are generally conceptualised as emerging from the interaction of external events with ‘position-practice
systems' via people’s agentive deliberations and actions (Bhaskhar 1979:51), the primary focus of this thesis was on production practice. In addition, CR research in general, and adaptive research in particular, stresses the need to continually challenge the presumptions of the researcher, so researchers working within this tradition tend to prioritise methodological strategies which enable them to examine detailed empirical data about the phenomena in question, as it occurs within real-life contexts (Carter and New 2004; Layder 1998).

Therefore one obvious methodological strategy might have been to pursue ethnographic studies at different news organisations and NGOs, so following a rich sociological tradition, perhaps in conjunction with other methods better suited to exploring external forces and internal managerial pressures (discussed in Cottle 2007). However, an ethnographic approach would have excluded the study of African NGOs. In addition, such an approach would have made it difficult to fulfil my intention of contributing to the construction of general theory by studying a relatively ‘quiet’ news period: so contrasting with existing research which focuses on ‘humanitarian emergencies’ (Cottle and Nolan 2007:863) or ‘disasters’ (Cooper 2011; Franks 2010a).

This is because news is, to a certain extent, dependent on external events which aren’t always entirely predictable and won’t necessarily be replicated (Gauthier 2005; Lau 2004). So I risked a number of ‘false starts’ where weeks which had looked ‘quiet’ according to newsgathering diaries suddenly became far less so because of unanticipated events. Not only would such ‘false starts’
be time-consuming, they also seemed likely to try the patience of those working for major news organisations and INGOs, so risking a number of withdrawals from the study.

Lawson’s work (1998, 2003) provided another way forward, for although he, like other CR researchers (Carter and New 2004), is sceptical of the ability of quantitative data alone to explain causality even in very large samples, he argues that the patterns observable in any given sample may be treated as ‘demi-regularities’: that is, the partial regularity of certain events in a defined time-space, in relation to particular generative mechanisms (Lawson 1998: 144-169). They can therefore be used to select specific examples to study through other qualitative methods geared towards addressing questions of causality (Lawson 1998). In this way, discerning demi-regular patterns in pre-existing data can be used as an initial step towards generating ‘expectations about the world and about the results of our actions in it’ (Sayer 2000a: 43).

This retrospective approach to news coverage allowed me to check whether a period anticipated as being a relatively ‘quiet’ news period had indeed been so, before commencing qualitative research. The work of Bergene (2007) was then used to develop Lawson’s approach further. This is because he not only joins with others in suggesting that case studies are well-suited to examining the kind of detailed interplay of causal factors in real-life contexts (2007; see also Maxwell 2004; Yin 2003), but also suggests that the presence of contrasting cases can help a researcher move from the particular to the general. For Bergene argues that using strongly contrasting case studies
enables researchers to sift out false assumptions and bad abstractions which lump together different kinds of causal factors, as well as non-essential context (2007).

In particular, Bergene stresses the merits of including ‘negative’ cases where what might be expected to occur, did not, or vice versa (2007:17) in order to challenge the presumptions of the researcher and help them to develop hypotheses with greater explanatory power. This seemed likely to be particularly helpful in dispelling the kinds of assumptions which I inevitably bring to this study as an ‘insider’ in the field, whilst allowing for an exploration of the potentially heterogeneous nature and effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia. Thus, as I will now go on to explain, I sampled news output during a week which I had reason to believe would be relatively ‘quiet’, before checking that this description was reasonably accurate. I then conducted some small-scale quantitative and qualitative content analysis in order to identify ‘demi-regular’ patterns (Lawson 1998) in ways which drew on the findings of previous research: so guiding my selection of contrasting media items to build into case studies (Bergene 2007) via a CR-informed approach to mixed methods.

These case studies were constructed by tracing all of those who took decisions which shaped the production of the six media items selected and conducting hour-long semi-structured interviews with them, using interview questions designed to address *why journalists used these specific instances of NGO-provided multimedia, how they used them, and what*
the consequences of this were. Their accounts were then cross-referenced with written records, including emails between participants, trip briefs, editing notes, annual reports, circulation data, parliamentary hearings and organisational policy documents. Follow-up questions were then posed when further clarification was needed or when inconsistencies arose between participants' oral accounts and/or written documentation. Participants' accounts of their actions were also 'tested' using the kinds of counter-factual strategies recommended by CR theorists, before being subjected to diagrammatic forms of in-case and cross-case analysis.

3.2: Sampling

The period sampled was the week of 13-19th August 2012\textsuperscript{15} because mid-August is often a relatively 'quiet' news production period as the UK’s parliaments and assemblies are in recess. This week was likely to be particularly ‘quiet’ because no major national or international conferences or summits had been planned (as established using the BBC’s newsgathering diaries) and because so much news planning had focussed on the Olympics, which finished on Aug 12\textsuperscript{th}, and on the Paralympics which started on August 29\textsuperscript{th}. Finally, many of the foreign correspondents were either in, or on the borders of, Syria, trying to cover the civil conflict there, and few other

\textsuperscript{15} The brevity of this sampling period caused some problems vis-à-vis my ability to generate useful demi-regular patterns: this will be reflected upon in the Conclusion.
international stories were being regularly covered in mainstream news coverage before the week began.

Only one major story ‘broke’ during this period, as defined by three or more news outlets covering similar events in prominently-featured stories. This was an industrial strike at the Marikana mine in South Africa, which ended in the police opening fire, killing thirty-four people. But no NGO-provided multimedia was used at all, despite the ready availability of formal portraits of trade union leaders on these organisations’ websites, and, rather more intriguingly, the publication of a report two days before the shooting by the Bench Marks Foundation, a corporate responsibility pressure group headed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, which included photos of miners’ squalid living conditions (2012).

Since I wanted to study the coverage of Africa offered by mainstream news organisations to British audiences, I only included news outlets whose primary audience was British and which were UK-wide in scope. This included the national tabloid and broadsheet papers which published most international news (as established by pre-pilot ‘trials’ in August 2011), including related supplements. The flagship national news programmes which broadcast most international news on BBC radio and TV (correspondence Sambrook 2011) were also sampled, along with the BBC 5 Live radio programme Up All Night, which frequently carries international news (correspondence Rosser 2012).
Because of the strong association between the use of NGO-provided film and satellite TV in previous work (Cooper 2007a), the satellite channels readily available to British audiences via Freeview were also sampled (Sky, BBC News and Al-Jazeera English). In addition to the major flagship news programmes, 0100-0130 and 0400-0430 BST were chosen as sampling periods for Sky and BBC News, as well as for Up All Night. This was because journalists working on those outlets told me that this was when they would be most likely to broadcast news about Africa: after the working day in the US was over, but before much political or military activity in the Middle East had begun, as far less multimedia tends to come in from Asia (correspondence Rosser 2012).

Unfortunately, it was impossible to sample Al-Jazeera English at the same times as it is only available to British audiences on Freeview from 1800-2300. So I monitored the 1900 edition of their flagship, Newshour, and one excerpt of general news coverage (2200-2230), both of which were available on Freeview. Only Classic FM was selected from amongst the commercial radio stations because it was the only national station which broadcasts regular news bulletins (interview Chittenden 2009). Sampling was taken at times which correlated to the BBC’s flagship news programmes (0700, 1300 and 1900).

Finally, because of the relevance of online news to the increase and acceleration of journalists’ workload (Cooper 2007b; Davis 2002, 2007; Sambrook 2010), I sampled all of the online news websites of related print or
broadcast media at 0900 and 2100. The web page most likely to feature stories about Africa was chosen as an entry point, as established in pre-pilot ‘trials’. My sample frame was thus as follows:
**Figure 2: Table of Sample Frame**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDIUM/SECTOR</th>
<th>OUTPUT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **PUBLIC SERVICE RADIO** | BBC R4 *Today, World at One, PM, The World Tonight*  
BBC R5 *Breakfast; Drive, Up All Night (0100-0200 and 0400-0500)*  
BBC R1 12:45 & 17.45 editions of *Newsbeat* |
| **PUBLIC SERVICE TERRESTRIAL TV** | BBC One’s *Breakfast; News at One, News at Six, News at Ten*  
BBC Weekend News at Ten  
BBC Weekend News  
*Channel Four News* |
| **COMMERCIAL RADIO** | Classic FM 0700, 1300, 1900 |
| **COMMERCIAL TERRESTRIAL TV** | ITV One’s *Daybreak; News at One, Evening News; News at Ten. 5 News* |
| **PUBLIC SERVICE SATELLITE TV** | BBC *News at Five*  
General news output (Mon-Sun 0100-0130, 0400-0430)  
BBC 4’s *World News Today* |
| **COMMERCIAL 24-HOUR NEWS CHANNELS** | Al Jazeera English – *Newshour (1800-1900 GMT editions).*  
General news output (Mon-Sun 2200-2230 GMT)  
Sky News – *Sunrise; Sky News at Seven; Sky News at Ten*  
Sky news general output (Mon-Sun 0100-0130, 0400-0430) |
| **TABLOID PRINT** | Monday-Saturday Editions of *The Sun, The Daily Mirror, The Daily Mail* (including supplements and magazines) |
| **BROADSHEET PRINT** | Monday-Saturday editions of *The Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times,* and their counterparts on Sunday (including supplements and magazines) |
| **WEBSITES** | 2 x daily captures at 0900 and 2100 for the following:  
- ‘Africa’ page for *Al Jazeera English*  
- ‘Africa’ page for BBC News  
- Homepage for *Channel 4 News*  
- Homepage for *ITV News*  
- ‘World’ page for *Sky News*  
- ‘News’ page for *The Daily Mail*  
- ‘News’ page for *The Daily Mirror*  
- News’ page for *The Sun*  
- ‘Africa’ page for *The Guardian*  
- ‘World’ page for *The Independent*  
- ‘World’ page for *Telegraph*  
- ‘Africa’ page for *The Times* |
Print material was examined by hand, and Nexis searches used to double-check that I hadn’t missed anything. Online samples were taped using Camtasia software which captures all on-screen activity - thereby allowing me to capture video and audio-streams rather than simply taking a static ‘screenshot’. Finally, in the absence of an equivalent of Nexis for broadcast news, I checked the sampling methods used by Kantar Media Monitoring and employed them to send me email ‘alerts’ when any news coverage mentioning an African country or countries, or indeed ‘Africa’ itself, appeared in my broadcast sample. I then used these alerts to identify where potentially relevant news reports were in the many hours of material I had recorded using Box of Broadcasts software, before assessing them myself to see if any NGO-provided material was in them.

All of these sampling strategies were piloted on 12 August 2012, a date chosen because a high-level conference on famine at Downing Street made it seem likely that at least some NGO-provided multimedia would be used. However, as the Cardiff team found in their research (Lewis et al. 2006) one significant problem with this method of sampling is that journalists may not always attribute NGO material clearly within their final reports, or indeed attribute it at all. So I risked missing occasions when journalists masked an NGO’s work as that of their own, or another news organisation (Cooper 2007a; Franks 2008b).

I mitigated this risk by checking that all of the names in the by-line of a piece were indeed journalists and not NGO-workers (Cooper 2007a) and checking
the provenance of material in any report in which an NGO was named, or an
NGO worker interviewed. Finally, I checked the provenance of material run as
part of any piece attributed to an unnamed ‘Staff Writer’ or to freelance
journalists, as these kinds of workers might also work for NGOs. Some items
containing NGO-provided multimedia may still have slipped through the net,
but these checks were as much as could be done without obtaining details of
the composition of every item from the journalists who produced them.

3.3: Selecting media items

A total of 23 media items containing NGO-provided photos, audio or film
material were found in the sample: half of which were not clearly attributed to
the NGO, but employed a variety of allusive or ‘veiled’ methods of attribution
(Van Leuven et al. 2013:442), such as naming the freelancer without saying
which NGO they were working for, or using a quotation or clip from an NGO-
worker in the piece. The ‘demi-regular’ patterns (Lawson 1998) analysed
quantitatively in order to select media items were derived from existing
research about the ways in which journalists’ use of PR material differs
according to the kinds of media and organisations involved (Lewis et al 2006;
Orgad 2013a; Powers 2014), as well as Lawson’s suggestion that researchers
attend to the spatial and chronological distribution of the phenomenon in
question (1998). These were therefore:
• The kind of NGO-provided multimedia used (photographs were the most frequently occurring kind of media found: only 3 items included NGO-provided video and 1 included audio).

• Which news organisations were involved (10 items were found in the output of Guardian News Media; 8 in that of the BBC; and 3 each in that of Independent News Media and 2 at ITN).

• Which NGOs were involved (UK and US-based international aid agencies were by far the biggest providers, although no single agency dominated, but other kinds of NGOs were present including four African NGOs).

• When the multimedia was published/broadcast (marked clusters appeared on Sunday; no other demi-regular patterns regarding time or day were observed).

• Where it appeared (19 items were found online; 3 in the main body of newspapers; and only 1 instance was found on TV).

• What countries these media items purported to be about (over a quarter mentioned Kenya, although a total of 15 countries were mentioned, many of which were non-elite countries in which English is not one of the main languages).

The final set of demi-regular patterns which were analysed pertained to the Cardiff team’s finding that journalists’ use of PR varies according to the topic concerned (Lewis et al. 2006). The topics of these pieces were established by content analysis: namely, noting prominent key-words in the headline and the opening paragraph (or in the first 30 seconds of audio-visual pieces) and
placing them into modified versions of the subject categories Scott used in his study of the newspaper coverage of Africa (2009a).\textsuperscript{16} The most common topic string was ‘displaced people-armed conflict’, which was often accompanied by a second, subject ‘string’ relating to ‘hunger/famine’ and ‘aid’,\textsuperscript{17} but more unusual combinations of subjects were also present, including ‘disability-medical facilities-aid’, ‘displaced people-civil armed conflict-crime’ and ‘displaced people-culture-media’.\textsuperscript{18}

However, no media item was characterised by all of the dominant semi-regular trends: rather, items tended to conform to some trends whilst bucking others (Bergene 2007). So a limited number of media items were chosen from the output of all of the news organisations which was felt to be manageable: with two items each being selected from news organisations where the use of NGO-provided multimedia was most frequent, and one each from organisations where it was rarer.

\textsuperscript{16} I specified when key words related to involuntary displacement rather than using Scott’s category of ‘migration’, or when they related to disability and hunger/famine rather than using Scott’s very broad category of ‘health/disease’.

\textsuperscript{17} Two items contained within this sample were pegged to the UK ‘hunger summit’ held at 10 Downing Street on 12th August, which helps to explain journalists’ interest in ‘hunger’ at this time.

\textsuperscript{18} The range of topics was somewhat narrower than that mapped in Scott’s study of newspaper coverage of Africa (2009a). For although Scott found no articles on Africa which focussed on ‘disability’, none of the items which contained NGO-provided multimedia focussed on other subjects which did receive coverage in Scott’s study, including ‘Western visits’, ‘politics/elections’ and ‘industrial action’. However, Scott used a two week sample frame, so this may be an unfair comparison.
A mixture of items about different countries and topics were chosen, as well as those which pertained to different kinds of multimedia, media platform and NGOs. When a final criteria was required to act as a ‘tie-breaker’ in deciding between two media items, those which would enable an exploration of different kinds of working practices were chosen, including those which related to different kinds of attribution practices (Van Leuven et al. 2013).

The following media items were therefore chosen:

1. A two-page article which was published as the lead story in the ‘World News’ section in *The Independent on Sunday* (Hogg 2012) and was then published online without any changes. The piece was about the food crisis experienced by thousands of Malian civilians, many of whom had been displaced by fighting between the Malian government and Islamist rebels, as well as their Tuareg allies, in the north of the country.

   So it was about both main topic-strings (‘displaced people-armed conflict’ as well as ‘hunger/famine/aid’). It also contained the dominant kind of NGO-provided multimedia used in the sample (photos); was contributed by a UK-based international aid agency (Christian Aid); and was published on Sunday, where a marked cluster of material appeared.
But it was also unusual in so far as it was about a non-élite Francophone country; was one of only three items found in the output of Independent News Media; and was the only example found of an item which had been written exclusively by an NGO-worker (the Head of Media at Christian Aid): both he and the freelancer (Tom Pilston) who took the photos for Christian Aid were fully attributed as such in the text and online versions.

2. A small article published low down on page 3 of The Observer on one of the pages entitled ‘International’ (Kiberenge 2012), which was also reproduced without change online. Again, this characterised dominant ‘demi-regular’ patterns in so far as it contained a photograph; had been published on a Sunday; but it was part of GNM’s output which used the most NGO-provided multimedia. It was also about Kenya, one of the most dominant countries in the sample.

However, it was also about a more unusual topic-string (‘disability-medical facilities-aid’) as the article was about a Kenyan paraplegic called Zachary Kimotho, who was said to be wheeling himself from Kenya to South Africa, where the nearest spinal injury rehabilitation unit was situated, in order to try and raise money for the NGO to build a similar centre in Kenya.
The photo had been taken and provided to the news organisation by members of a commercial PR/marketing network, whose staff had been working with the Kenyan NGO featured, the Kenyan Paraplegic Organization (KPO), although it had not been attributed to anyone. It later transpired that the article was written by a Kenyan intern at The Observer who had become aware of the KPO campaign via Twitter. His internship was funded by another, news-related NGO, the David Astor Trust, but he was also only attributed by name.

3. A Guardian blog, which was not published off-line. References to this, as well as some identifying details, have been removed at the request of those concerned. However, I am at liberty to say that it conformed to dominant trends in so far as it contained a photo and formed part of the output of GNM, which used the most NGO-provided multimedia.

However, it was published on a weekday, was about a less frequently-covered, non-Anglophone country, and was about a more unusual kind of topic-string (‘displaced people-culture-media’) as the piece was about a media project run for refugees by Internews, a large, US-based media NGO. The writing and photos were contributed by two freelancers hired by that NGO, although only freelancers’ personal names were used in the attribution.
4. An audio slide-show, which was produced for *BBC News Online* only (Crowley and Fleming 2010a). This not only conformed to dominant demi-regular patterns because of its appearance online and because of the involvement of an international aid agency (Save the Children UK), but also because it employed dominant topic-strings relating to ‘displaced people-armed conflict’ and ‘hunger-aid’, as it was about Deng Chan, a former child soldier in South Sudan, whose family was dependent on the cash transfer scheme ran by the INGO.

However, it was unusual as it was published on a week-day and involved collaborative work on a shared trip to a more unusual country (South Sudan) with the NGO’s media officer providing the photos and the journalist providing the audio for the final piece. Both of these media workers were named in the attribution, as were their organisations. The production practices which led to the publication of this piece in the 2012 sample were also unusual, as it had been republished as part of a BBC Online ‘Special Report’ on South Sudan: that is, a collection of archived material, which was produced for the country’s first anniversary of independence in July 2012.

5. Another *BBC News Online* piece republished as part of the ‘Special Collection’ on South Sudan was chosen because it contained the only photos produced by an arts-related NGO, the South Sudanese film collective, Woyee Film and Theatre Ltd. (Copnall and Hegarty 2011)
which also comprised the only example of African NGOs providing photos via social media (*Facebook*). This article was about the collective’s production of *Jamila*, the first feature film to be produced entirely by South Sudanese people, so it also involved the more unusual topic-string ‘displaced people-culture-media’.

This was attributed to two BBC journalists and as the first name listed was that of a BBC correspondent, the production practices were initially assumed to be correspondent-led. However, it later transpired that the piece had been written by the second journalist, whose job it was to comb BBC World Service output for material suitable for re-versioning for *BBC News Online*, and who had come across the correspondent’s piece on the World Service arts programme, *The Strand*. Photos were clearly attributed to ‘Woyee Film’.

6. A *Channel 4 News* report which was the only broadcast item to include NGO-provided video (Miller 2012a). This piece conformed to a dominant topic-string (‘displaced people-armed conflict’) but instead of ‘hunger/famine-aid’ it employed ‘crime’. This was because it was about the activities of General Bosco Ntaganda, who at the time was leading an armed rebellion against the government in the DRC, and who was wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
It was also unusual in that it was broadcast on a weekday, although it was a pre-recorded package voiced by a correspondent. In addition, whereas most pieces used large amounts of NGO-provided multimedia, very little was contained in this report (a mere 20 seconds in a 7 minute piece). In addition, it involved unique production practices as this material had originally been shot by freelance journalists, the rights to which had been bought by the US-based international human rights group, Human Rights Watch (HRW), which redistributed by them in a video edited by another freelance journalist, who then went on to pitch the idea to C4 News.

It ran as the second last item on the programme and a video-stream of the report was reproduced online in its entirety immediately after broadcast, within a blog written by the correspondent in question (Miller 2012b), although this video has since been removed. No attribution was given of the freelancers’ or the INGO’s input, although a policy 'expert' from HRW was interviewed in the piece.

4.1: The relevance of CR to interviewing

60 interviews were conducted with participants who all made key decisions which shaped the production of these six media items in order to develop six
in-depth case studies. This included journalists, NGO-workers, their managers and a host of others, including freelancers and PR and advertising professionals. It also included those who made negative decisions, such as Editors who refused offers of multimedia from NGOs, although the numbers included in each case study varied according to its complexity. These participants were based in the UK, the US and in a number of African countries.

In addition to the theory discussed already, this approach was influenced by work on communicative labour in cultural and creative industries (Hesmondhalgh 2002; Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011; Toynbee 2008). It was also shaped by Örnebring’s attention to the growing importance of freelance work in journalism (2009); Bunce’s attention to the role of national-local ‘stringers’ (2010, 2011, 2014b); and the growing attentiveness of journalism scholars to the role of managers in media work (Küng-Shankleman 2011; Sylvie and Gade 2009).

But my transnational approach to selecting interviewees was also influenced by post-colonial critics like Mosco and Lavin (2009) and Shome and Hegde (2010) who argue that the internationalisation of Journalism Studies should entail a greater focus on the role of media workers in poor, Southern countries, whose editorial labour is often ignored. Indeed, my initial intention had been to try and trace and interview the African people portrayed in media items in order to explore their own decision-making regarding media participation. However, since so many of those represented were displaced
people living in mutable circumstances, and another was an army general awaiting trial at the ICC, this proved impossible. The full list of those interviewed is listed in figure 3 in the next section.

But before going on to explore my methodological approach to tracing and interviewing participants, it is necessary to return to Critical Realist theory for a moment, in order to explain in more detail why interviews were pursued at all. For one of the main reasons why CR regards society as so complex and open-ended is that it is ‘peopled’ (Archer 1995:75). This is because in CR, human agency is also seen as emergent, and thus semi-autonomous, from underlying social, economic or political: so people - how they think, feel and act - need to be differentiated from the ‘position-practice systems’ in which they are embedded (Bhaskar 1979:51).

Archer’s work is particularly helpful in fleshing out how individual human agency might interact with such ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskar 1979:51), in ways which are appropriate to a consideration of journalistic and NGO practice, for she argues that people possess ‘a reflexivity towards, and a creativity about, any social situation which they confront’ (Archer 1998:190). This reflexivity, Archer asserts, takes place through the ‘internal conversations’ which people have with themselves, as well as the external conversations which they have with others: both of which involve weighing up or negotiating differing, and often conflicting, commitments (2003a; see also 2003b, 2007). Thus, journalists, NGO-workers and others in this study can be conceptualised as making agentive choices about what to do, but from within
a range of options which is constrained (and/or enabled) by external factors which they do not choose.

The notion of the ‘peopled’ nature of social structure (Archer 1995:75) also shaped my decision to position myself quite explicitly as the author of this thesis; to outline my own journalistic dilemmas regarding NGO-provided multimedia at the very beginning, and treating other practitioners’ decision-making processes as a key focus in the exploration of the interplay of agency and social structure. Since this approach involved naming participants and explaining their particular organisational and socio-economic positioning, this formed part of my application for approval from Goldsmith’s Ethical Board before commencing data-gathering.19

However, like Elder-Vass (2010) and Toynbee (2008), I prefer to moderate some of the more voluntaristic overtones of Archer’s work by viewing social structure as also residing, at least in part, within human beings due to their personal positioning within particular kinds of personal and organisational socio-economic habitus (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). For this reason, agency is not treated as being synonymous with reflexivity, nor is

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19 The Board approved the wording with which I sought informed consent from participants; confirmed that repeating the contents of any interview to a subsequent interviewee would be inappropriate; and stressed that participants should be offered anonymity for all or part of any interview, should they prefer.

Participants were also offered the right to withdraw from the study at any point. Further consultation was held with the Board over issues which arose in the course of interviewing, which led to the exclusion of some anecdotes which could pose security and reputational risks to those concerned.
it treated as activity which is entirely free of the constraints of social structure (Elder-Vass 2010). Thus, broadly speaking, I find it useful to conceptualise journalism as an internally and externally structured field of activity which may be affected by other fields, including politics (Bourdieu 1998). Nevertheless, I regard some of the details of Bourdieu’s account of the internal structuring of journalistic field as inappropriate to the study of British journalism.

This is because Bourdieu argues that news organisations (and journalists) can be seen as being positioned differently between two poles relating to economic and cultural capital: with those positioned closer to the pole of economic capital tending to be wealthier and to have more mainstream influence, but also to be more conservative, because they have less autonomy from the field of power (1998). In contrast, he portrayed those positioned closer to the pole of cultural capital as possessing less wealth and less mainstream influence, but exercising greater autonomy because of their association with culturally rich values (Bourdieu 1998).

Yet news organisations in the UK do not conform to this kind of ‘map’: for both of the ‘public service’ broadcast outlets in this study (the BBC and Channel 4 News) have accumulated a great deal of cultural capital for the quality of their journalism, despite the significant differences in their resourcing. Moreover, much of their cultural capital is derived, not from journalists’ relative autonomy from the field of power, but from the structuring of these journalists’ obligations in relation to national law and related political bodies. Bourdieu’s ‘map’ also lacks explanatory power vis-à-vis British newspapers. For the most
resource-poor news organisation in this study (Independent News Media) was not regarded by study participants as possessing more cultural capital, or as being more subversive than other outlets, but as so poor that those working on *The Independent* papers lacked the wherewithal to exercise important editorial capabilities.

Therefore I go along with others who find it useful to draw more loosely from Bourdieu as well as Archer (Adams 2006; Elder-Vass 2010; Lawson 2003), particularly when looking at forms of position-taking in which journalists’ seek to differentiate themselves or their organisations from others in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Bourdieu 1998). Interviewing is appropriate to this broader approach, as it lends itself to an exploration of practitioners’ accounts of their deliberative processes as well as the structures shaping them (Cottle 2003b) in order to explore what Lawson calls practitioners’ ‘situated rationality’ (2003:58). However, the theory explored in this section demonstrates that it is important that these accounts cannot be taken at face value (Danermark et al. 2002; Elder-Vass 2010) because study participants will be aware that they are expected to uphold collective norms and may face negative consequences if they do not (Elder-Vass 2010).

So interviewees may lie, make significant omissions (Wengraf 2001), or contradict themselves, not only because of memory lapses or misunderstandings, but also because of tensions between what interviewees feel is expected of them by their organisation, their peers or the interviewer, and what they expect of themselves (Anderson and Jack 1991). Finally,
underlying social structures may undercut participants’ intentionality in ways that they are not aware of, and/or cause consequences which they did not intend (Bhaskar 1979, 1998; Toynbee 2008). Therefore my interviewees have been positioned as study participants, rather than co-theorists (Pawson and Tilley 1997).

4.2: Selecting interviewees and conducting semi-structured interviewing

Participants were selected by using the attribution/s in the strap line in print (or online) reports and the named reporter/s in broadcast pieces to contact relevant journalists and using that interview to trace other key individuals who were involved with the production of the story and/or with shaping the policies, working norms and organisational structures which shaped the production of these particular pieces. In this way, participants’ often played a crucial role in putting me in touch with the next person in the decision-making chain.

However, I made efforts to avoid coercion by starting my approach from the ‘bottom up’, so that more junior respondents put me in touch with their seniors, rather than vice versa. I also made a point of approaching African individuals and organisations independently, wherever possible, in order to avoid the post-colonial dynamics inherent in any initial contact coming from their organisation’s Head Office or INGO partners based in the UK or US.
In addition, I took the decision to try and remain sensitive to post-colonial dynamics by asking participants which language they would be most comfortable being interviewed in (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009; Bassnett and Trivedi 1999; Schäffner and Bassnett 2010): having first sourced interpreters experienced in intercultural work via the School of Oriental and African Studies and the Centre for Audio-visual Translation at the University of Roehampton where I work.

Two participants chose to be interviewed in French, but none in African languages. Interpreters were paid via a Santander Overseas Research Grant of £1,000: no conditions were attendant on the receipt of this grant. Finally, two freelancers who always worked closely together chose to give a joint interview, so that one could interpret for the other: so that although 61 people were interviewed, only 60 interviews were conducted.

This approach was time-consuming, as the networks of people concerned were often far more extensive than I had initially anticipated, especially on the NGO side where the organisational structures concerned were more complex. It took me until the spring of 2013 to trace and interview 57 respondents, although 4 more pertaining to the BBC case studies were added in 2014 when approaches to senior managers finally bore fruit. But this lengthy interviewing stage had some significant advantages: allowing me to manage security risks to interviewees more effectively, as well as exploring some of the longer-term consequences generated by this media work.
Nevertheless, the timing of research interviews meant that participants’ memories were not as fresh as they might have been immediately after the event/s in question: a problem which I mitigated by checking organisational documentation and using other interviews within the same case study to ‘triangulate’ any issues about which a particular interviewee was unsure. A more serious problem with the time lag between publication/broadcast and research interviews was that it caused me to ‘lose’ one respondent, a Malian interpreter who became displaced by the fighting.

The Editor of the ‘Global Development’ section at The Guardian.co.uk withdrew from the study and the sub-editor responsible for selecting one of the photos for The Observer declined to participate. In these two instances, I managed to ‘triangulate’ the missing interview to some extent by speaking with members of staff above and below them within their organisational hierarchy about the general issues shaping the work conducted within the organisation. But I was unable to ‘triangulate’ the Malian interpreter’s contribution because this individual spoke a dialect of Songhaï which wasn’t understood by anyone else on the trip.

Semi-structured interviews lasting an hour to an hour and a half were used, as this method which allows interviewees enough time and relative freedom to talk about ‘specific situations or action sequences’ (Kvale 1983, cited in King 1994:15) and the kinds of internal and external structures which shaped them. Such an approach involved me using open rather than leading questions,
employing active listening skills, and improvising follow-up questions to clarify or expand upon particular answers from interviewees (Wengraf 2006).

Nevertheless, the presence of a time limit and some structure enabled comparisons to be made between large numbers of interviews, as well as preventing data from becoming too unwieldy to manage (Bryman 2008). A semi-structured approach to interviewing also had significant advantages for me as an ‘insider’ in this field. For my professional background as a journalist and my resulting networks meant that I not only had greater ease of access to interviewees, but I also had knowledge of the ideolects of British journalists and NGO press officers (Wengraf 2006).

In addition, I had undertaken some voluntary work with NGOs as a journalist, assisting smaller, alternative and/or resource-poor NGOs to help them write press releases and ‘pitch’ more successfully to broadcast journalists under the auspices of the Media Trust, and running ‘sensitive interviewing’ workshops with larger INGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Oxfam. As I mentioned in the Introduction, I had also used audio provided by Human Rights Watch myself, and was regarded warmly by them as a ‘fellow Congo-watcher’ (interview van Woudenberg 2012).

Semi-structured interviewing therefore helped me guard against lapsing into uncritical assumptions about the nature of the phenomena in question, because of the powerful pull of shared ‘common-sense’ understandings about the ideas, institutions and practices involved: repeatedly forcing me and my
study participants to return to more rigorous forms of questioning (Bryman 2004). I built rapport by meeting in person wherever possible or using video Skype with overseas participants. Telephone interviews were occasionally used when neither option was possible, or when this was a better option because of security or privacy concerns.

Finally, I taped and transcribed what the interviewee said in full, as well as taking session notes about pauses, hesitations, laughter, and emphases (which have been represented as italics), as these are all important in terms of conveying the meanings which interviewees sought to convey (Pratt 1995; Wengraf 2006). I was assisted in this by a professional transcriber who transcribed 18 interviews: she was paid via the Santander Overseas Research Grant mentioned earlier.

A list of research participants interviewed for each case study is provided in figure 3 and a table indicating how the research questions mapped onto my interview questions is provided in figure 4.
**Figure 3: Table of case studies and study participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE STUDY ONE</th>
<th>PARTICIPANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Article about food crisis in Mali written by Head of Press at Christian Aid and several photos taken by a freelance photographer hired by the INGO. Fully and clearly attributed. | **THE INDEPENDENT PAPERS**  
- Sophie Batterbury, Picture Editor of *The Independent on Sunday*  
- Ivy Lahon, Deputy Picture Editor at *The Independent*.  
- Sean O’Grady, Deputy Managing Editor at *The Independent* papers and *The Standard*.  
- David Randall, Foreign Editor, *The Independent on Sunday*.  

**THE TIMES**  
- Jim McLean, Foreign Editor  
  (turned item down)  

**FREELANCER**  
- Tom Pilston, freelance photographer employed by Christian Aid  

**CHRISTIAN AID**  
- Steven Buckley, Head of Communications  
- Joseph Cabon, Picture Editor  
- Andrew Hogg, Head of Media  
- Abdourahamane Keita, Manager of Project Monitoring and Evaluation of the projects in Mali funded by Christian Aid  
  (interpreted from English-Bambara).  
- Yacouba Kone, Mali Programme Director of Christian Aid  
- David Pain, Director of Supporter and Community Partnerships  

**MALIAN NGOS (‘PARTNERS’ OF CHRISTIAN AID)**  
- Mamadou Tangara, Manager of Agricultural Development Projects, APH (Actions de Promotion Humaine), based in Bandiagarh.  
- Yacouba Tangara, Programme Director, GRAT (Groupe de Recherche et d’applications techniques), based in Mopti. |
### CASE STUDY 2

Small article in *The Observer*, written by intern funded by the David Astor Trust, including a single photo taken for a campaign run by the Kenyan Paraplegic Organization. The intern first became aware of the campaign via Twitter.

Several commercial PR and advertising agencies helped shape the NGO’s campaign after it was adopted by a major telecommunications business as part of its CSR programme.

The article was about the NGO’s efforts to raise money to build a rehabilitation centre in Kenya by sending one of its members to wheel himself to the nearest rehabilitation clinic in South Africa. The photo was unattributed and the intern was only attributed by name.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>THE OBSERVER</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Powell, Deputy Picture Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy Rock, News Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Webster, Deputy Editor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>INTERN AT THE OBSERVER</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenfrey Kiberenge, Kenyan journalist funded by David Astor Trust</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DAVID ASTOR TRUST</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jim Meyer, Executive Director, who chose Kiberenge for placement</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>KENYAN PARAPLEGIC ORGANIZATION</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zack Kimotho, the focus of the ‘Bring Zack Back Home’ campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim Wanyonyi, Executive Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>COMMERCIAL ACTORS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peter Arina, General Manager of Consumer Business, SafariCom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Fidel, Creative, RedSky Advertising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Miller, Creative Director of RedSky Advertising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nick Thiong’o Account Manager at Ogilvy PR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**CASE STUDY 3**

A blog published in the online edition of *The Guardian* about a media project run in a Francophone country for refugees by Internews, a large, US-based media INGO.

Written and photos taken by two freelancers hired by the INGO. Freelancers only attributed by name

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUARDIAN.CO.UK</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Stella Beaumont, Head of International and Business Development until 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sheila Pulham, Managing Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maeve Shearlaw, Communities Coordinator for the ‘Global Development’ section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Judith Soal, Africa Editor, <em>The Guardian</em>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FREELancers**

- A, freelance journalist employed by Internews who wrote the blog.
- B, freelance photographer employed by Internews whose photo was used.

**INTERNEWS**

- Deborah Ensor, Vice President, Africa, Health and Humanitarian Programmes
- Ian Noble, Director of East and Central Africa
CASE STUDY 4

An audio slide-show about a former child soldier, republished in *BBC News Online* as part of a Special Report on South Sudan.

Photos taken by multimedia producer at Save the Children UK and audio provided by BBC journalist. Fully attributed.

**BBC**
- Lucy Fleming, Broadcast Journalist, *BBC News Online* Africa desk
- Steve Herrmann, Editor of *BBC News Online*.
- David Moody, Head of Strategy BBC Worldwide.
- Jo Winter, Africa Editor at *BBC News Online*.

**SAVE THE CHILDREN**
- Colin Crowley, Multimedia Officer at time when item created
- Sarah Jacobs, Head of News at time media item created
- Gareth Owen, Head of Humanitarian (known as Emergencies at time media item created)
- Anthony Lodiong, Communications Officer for South Sudan at time media item created
- Kathryn Rawe, Media Manager, Africa at time media item created
- Hannah Reichardt, Emergencies Communication Manager at time media item created.
- George Kuan Yai, Assistant for Cash Transfer programme in South Sudan at the time media item created (interpreted English-Dinka.)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>CASE STUDY 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A BBC News Online</strong> article also republished as part of the ‘Special Collection’ on South Sudan. Contained several photos produced by an arts-related NGO, the South Sudanese film collective, Woyee Film and Theatre Ltd, via social media (Facebook).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WOYEE FILM AND THEATRE INDUSTRY LTD.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Daniel Danis, Chair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|  | Senior BBC managers and journalists on Africa page of *BBC News Online* as above, also |
|  | **BBC** |
|  | • James Copnall, Sudan and South Sudan Correspondent |
|  | • Stephanie Hegarty, Broadcast Journalist, World Service Future Media at time media item created. |
|  | • Bethan Jinkinson, Manager of World Service Future Media at time media item created. |
## CASE STUDY 6

A *Channel 4 News* report about allegations of war crimes brought against General Bosco Ntaganda, who was leading a military rebellion in the DRC.

Included 20 seconds of video footage provided by Human Rights Watch via a freelancer. The footage had originally been shot by two other freelancers: neither the freelancers nor the INGO were attributed.

### CHANNEL 4 NEWS
- Ben de Pear, Editor
- Jonathan Miller, Foreign Affairs Correspondent

### PANORAMA, BBC
- Tom Giles, Editor (refused HRW-provided multimedia).

### HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
- Pierre Bairin, Media Director
- Carroll Bogert, Deputy Executive Director (External Relations)
- D, Human Rights Watch researcher who identified man on film as Bosco
- Emma Daly, Communications Director
- Anneke van Woudenberg, Senior Researcher for DRC

### FREELANCERS
- E and F, freelance journalists who filmed the man identified by HRW as Bosco Ntaganda in Kiwanja
- Fiona Lloyd-Davies, Independent film-maker who pitched HRW-provided multimedia to *C4 News* after completing contract for HRW to make Bosco film.
**Figure 4: Research questions mapped onto interview questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Interview Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• How did journalists use multimedia?</td>
<td>1. Can you walk me through how [insert name of media item] came to be made? [Follow up on how item was conceptualised; interviewee’s role in production, broadcasting/publishing it; importance of topic, location, media and sub-genre involved in detail, see also 9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Why did journalists use NGO-provided multimedia?</td>
<td>2. Which structures, policies, or working norms at [insert name of interviewees’ organisation] shaped your approach to this piece? 3. Which structures, policies, or working norms at [insert name of other NGO/news organisation] shaped your approach to this piece? 4. Which other factors outside of these organisations shaped your approach to producing this media item? [Follow-up on normative ideas, political, professional and legal/regulatory structures] 5. What did you want to achieve? 6. What's your own background and how do you see this as having shaped your involvement in this piece? 7. How does this sit with the kinds of reasons that other people at [insert name of own organisation] or in NGO-work/journalism more generally give for their involvement in this kind of work? [Follow up on internal and externally-given rationales]. 8. Which factors do you think were the most important in shaping your approach to this piece? Why? 9. Did you, or anyone else you know of experience any problems, challenges or dilemmas in the process of producing this piece? [Follow up questions: how did you deal with them? Attend to participants’ own plans as well as what actually happened].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• What are the effects of this on journalism, NGO-work and mediated discourse about Africa?

10. As far as you know, what have the consequences of producing this piece been

   a/ for you personally
   b/ for your own organisation (where applicable)
   c/ for your relationship with the other NGO/news organisation involved
   d/ for the people and places depicted?

[Also attend in detail to any changes which interviewees indicate in the course of answering other questions, even if not fully conscious that they are doing so].
5: Analysing and presenting data

I began my analysis by identifying key themes and coding data accordingly. I also constructed diagrams of the decision-making ‘trees’ involved in each case (Miles and Huberman 1994): noting which individuals made particular decisions; when in the production process these decisions occurred; which decisions were constrained or enabled by previous decisions; as well as taking account of the nature of actors’ organisational roles and how these roles related to one another through particular formal and informal structures and practices (Bhaskhar 1979).

I then supplemented this initial layer of analysis with repeated close reading of the interview transcripts, taking notes as I went about the details of the relationships concerned (correspondence Davis 2013a). This was time-consuming and painstaking, but meant my cross-case analysis was led by a case-orientated, rather than a variable-orientated, approach: thereby avoiding the rather mechanistic ‘smoothing out’ of particularity which risks occurring with the latter (Miles and Huberman 1994: 174). During this more iterative, fluid kind of analysis, I began by focussing on why journalists had used NGO-provided multimedia: attending to the first cluster of research questions regarding the interaction of actors’ conscious intentionality with different kinds of structures.

I then wedded this to Sayer’s model of the ‘moral economy’, especially his ideas about trust, responsibility and obligation (2001, 2005, 2007) in order to
develop insights into how NGO-journalist coalitions (Waisbord 2011) were structured, as well as why and how those concerned legitimised this. Part of this involved drawing upon work by Goffman (1986) and Reese (2010) in order to analyse how journalists and NGO-workers ‘framed’ their relationship with one another. But I also tried to test practitioners’ accounts (Sayer 1992), by establishing which causal or generative factors were essential (that is, ‘internal’) to the phenomena of journalists’ use of NGO-provided material, and which were inessential (‘external’ or ‘contingent’) (Danermark et al. 1997; Yeung 1997). This involved paying close attention to counterfactual (‘what if’) questions or responses contained within interviews, as well as to the accounts given by those who refused to accept particular ‘pitches’ of story ideas or media items involving NGO-provided material (Bergene 2007).

These kinds of analysis overlapped with my examination of the **second cluster of research questions regarding how journalists’ used NGO-provided multimedia.** For this involved attending to the kinds of agency, as well as the formal and ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskhar 1979:51) involved in particular production processes. It also involved examining participants’ accounts of the particular dilemmas or challenges they had encountered regarding its use, the deliberate individual or collective decisions they had taken to cope with these situations, and/or the manner in which they dealt with these issues in much less consciously-addressed struggles (Schein 2004).
My analysis of these dilemmas or challenges also included analysing how and why journalists had arrived at particular kinds of interpretative schemas which defined the ‘problem-at-hand’ in particular ways; as well as defining its causes; the ‘primary actors’ and ‘powers’ relevant to it; and the ‘explicit or implicit moral judgements’, and/or practical ‘treatments’ or ‘solutions’ regarded as the best way/s of addressing it (Stones 2014:14-15, see also Entman 1993). In this way, I was able to begin to link understandings about how and why journalist-NGO relations were framed in particular ways, to understandings about how they approached the framing of particular media texts (Cottle 2003b).

This analysis then fed into my efforts to address the third cluster of questions regarding the political consequences of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia. This returned to the central problematic posed by the academic literature discussed in the Introduction – that is, whether the effects of this activity are progressive or conservative. Using Sayer’s work on ‘moral economies’ (2001, 2003, 2004, 2007) and Sen’s work on inter-related capabilities (1999, 2010), I approached this by examining which (and whose) definitions were privileged; which were marginalised or excluded; and how and why that had occurred (Berger 1986; Tuchman 1978). I also analysed how and why moral and political values interacted with financial values, as well as how and why individuals and groups who worked together on media items containing NGO-provided multimedia were affected by their engagement in this work in ways which had relatively enduring consequences.
Finally, I considered which and whose capabilities had been enhanced in and through such forms of media production (Sen 1999, 2010), and what this might have to do with kinds of contributions which Sen portrays mainstream journalism as making to collective reasoning: that is, the dissemination of knowledge; the enablement of critical scrutiny; the protective function afforded by ‘giving voice’ to those who are neglected and disadvantaged; and the beneficial effects which all of the above may have on facilitating free and inclusive forms of debate, including that which is about different kinds of value (2010:336). My analytical approach is summarised in figure 5 overleaf.
Figure 5: Diagram of the relationships between key research themes

- **EXTERNAL CONTEXT**
  - General Context, e.g. specific policies, financial climate, legal obligations
  - Case-Specific Context, e.g. location of story, availability and cost of transport, presence of violence or other crime, disposition of armed groups towards NGOs/journalists, disposition of governments towards NGOs/journalists

- **INTERNAL CONTEXT**
  - Professional habitus: rules, norms and practices
  - Organisational habitus: rules, norms, positioning within field, usual working practices
  - Actors’ personal habitus: inc. nationality, ethnicity, class and/or gender positioning, networks of social capital

- **RATIONALES RE: NGO-PRODUCED MATERIAL**
  - Organisational rationale/s regarding relations with media/NGOs (expressed internally to others within same profession or organisation)
  - Organisational rationale regarding relations with media/NGOs (as expressed externally to others not within same profession or organisation)
  - Individual rationale of NGO worker/Journalist regarding relations with media/NGOs (expressed privately)

- **DILEMMAS OR PROBLEMS ARISING**
  - To emerge in interview

- **DECISIONS MADE/ACTIONS TAKEN**
  - NGO/Journalist plans for implementation
  - NGO/Journalist Actual Activity

- **IMPACT ON NEWS OUTPUT**
  - Approach taken to construction of media texts, including definition of problems; normative judgements made; parties and powers referred to; and suggested solutions.

- **LONGER-TERM EFFECTS**
  - Long-term changes in inter-relationship of journalism/NGO-work
  - Longer-term changes in organisational perception/practice
  - Long-term changes in NGO-worker/Journalist perception/practice
In keeping with my intention to use the production of academic knowledge to improve journalism through the inter-relationship of theory and practice (de Burgh 2003; Glasser and Marken 2005; Harcup 2011), participants were informed before interviewing that criticisms of their work might be contained in this study. Agreement was also obtained in advance that the key findings of this study would be disseminated via academic publication, as well as in a briefer and more accessible form to interested practitioners. Since then, researchers at OFCOM have asked me to present my findings to them, in order to help them formulate policy recommendations (interview Preston 2014b); although further consent would need to be sought from participants before this could take place.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that CR offers a unique way forward for Journalism researchers: allowing them to embrace the important contributions which constructivist work has made, whilst avoiding articulations of reality, truth, and knowledge which are incompatible with journalistic practice. Indeed, I have argued that CR’s re-working of the ‘God-terms’ of Journalism - facts, truth and reality (Zelizer 2004b) - reinforce the value of thoughtful, rigorous journalism, as well as the need for researchers to be critically and politically active in holding media practitioners to account for the adequacy of their representations, and for the practices which produce them.
But I stressed that this critical ‘holding to account’ involves academics analysing not only journalistic agency, but also the material and social structures which constrain and enable their choices. In this way, I tried to open up ways of exploring the recursive links between structure and agency, subjectivity and reality, in order to establish new avenues of research by integrating or inter-relating subjects of study which had previously been divided into different research fields (Fenton 2007).

Following an introduction to CR theorists’ approach to the concept and value-laden production of knowledge, I interrogated the remaining key terms used in this study: ‘news’, ‘mainstream’ news organisations, ‘NGO’, and ‘NGO-provided multimedia. I then went on to develop new methodological strategies grounded in CR theory. To begin with, I used Lawson’s notion of demi-regularities (1998) and Bergene’s work on contrasting case studies (2007) to shape my choice of sample frame and my initial analysis of media items. I then wove together the work of Bourdieu (1998) and Archer (2003a, 2003b, 2007) in the relation to CR theories about emergence in order to inform my approach to semi-structured interviewing.

Finally, I explained how I analysed interview transcripts by using different kinds of data display and analysis which pertained to all three research questions: so treating media practice as emerging from the interaction of agency and structure in multiple and complex ways. I will now proceed to explain the findings of that research, beginning by explaining why and how journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia depended on the different kinds of ‘moral economies’ (Sayer 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007) found at The Independent newspapers and The Guardian/Observer.
Chapter 4

‘Professionalism’ and ‘charity’ at *The Independent* newspapers;

‘dialogue’ and ‘development’ at *The Guardian/Observer*

The findings of this study support the claim that the most important causal factor driving why journalists use NGO-provided multimedia is that it enables them and other kinds of editorial staff to work faster and more cheaply in order to cope with organisational cost-cutting (Davies 2008; Franklin 2011; Lewis et al. 2006). But what it adds to other studies are understandings about the ways in which the moral economies (Sayer 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007) of each news outlet shape the ways in which these ‘information subsidies’ are manifest (Gandy 1982): so producing heterogeneous production practices and different kinds of NGO-journalist coalitions (Waisbord 2011).

Specifically, this thesis will argue that NGO-provided multimedia helped journalists and other editorial staff to differentiate their news outlets from their competitors (Bourdieu 1998) and to manage different kinds of risk to their personal and organisational reputations (Banks et al. 2000), despite the limited resources available for newsgathering and more importantly, photojournalism. But why and how editorial staff used NGO-provided multimedia also depended upon relatively enduring perceptions of who or what those working for their particular news outlet/s were ‘responsible for, beholden to and dependent upon’ (Sayer 2000b:79). Such perceptions involved both normative and economic values: the specific combinations
of which were causally shaped by the way in which their news outlet was structured internally and externally, through a variety of inter-linked ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskar 1979:51).

This meant that journalists and other editorial staff at particular news outlets tended to frame the nature of the problems, challenges and risks posed by organisational cost-cutting in similar ways (Banks et al. 2000; Schein 2004), as well as framing outlet-specific kinds of editorial strategies as appropriate responses to it (Küng-Shankleman 2011; Schein 2004). Even when the use of NGO-provided multimedia was not collectively deliberated upon, journalists’ use of it tended to be shaped by collective ‘habits of thinking, mental models and linguistic paradigms’ which they shared with others at their outlet (Schein 2004:13).

Thus the particular moral economies of news outlets were found to have emerged from their specific political economies, but to function as important generative mechanisms in their own right. That is because they shaped whether journalists and other editorial staff thought that accepting NGO-provided multimedia was legitimate, and if so, which kinds of NGOs and which kinds of material were considered, as well as when and how it was appropriate to use. However, journalists’ agentive decision-making about the use of NGO-provided multimedia then fed back into the moral and political structuring of their news outlets in a recursive manner because it introduced new forms of obligation to, and dependency upon, particular kinds of NGOs (Sayer 2005, 2007) which editorial staff simultaneously framed and legitimated in terms of ‘trust’ (Franks 2008a).
This ‘trust’ involved inter-related forms of financial and reputational self-interest (Sayer 2001, 2007), as well as shared interpretations of problems, relevant actors and desired treatments or solutions (Stones 2014). It was justified by journalists by blending the normative values which dominated the news outlet and those which dominated the NGO in question (Sayer 2005, 2007) in ways which predisposed journalists to adopt multimedia and related interpretative frames from similar kinds of NGOs in future, by altering their perceptions of the nature and purpose of their outlet’s production of news: thereby producing distinct and relatively enduring sets of news outlet-NGO coalitions across the field (Waisbord 2011).

This chapter aims to open this broader argument by discussing why and how particular kinds of moral economies were generated at the newspapers in this study; why and how they shaped journalists’ and others’ uses of NGO-provided multimedia; and the consequences of this for the news outlets concerned. The first section will begin by explaining why NGO-provided photographs were so sought after by newspapers: highlighting the problems caused by their drastic reduction in the numbers of photographers and picture editors at a time of vastly increased demand for visual material in online output.

The second section will then attend to the ways in which particular ‘modes of media ownership and managerial strategies’ (Waisbord 2011:149) relating to the valuation of ‘efficiency’, role-merging and profitability eroded intercollegiate ‘trust’ and inter-dependence at The Independent papers (Sayer 2001, 2007). It will then demonstrate how new forms of ‘trust’ in and reliance upon NGO-workers, justified by notions of ‘professionalism’, caused editorial staff at The Independent papers to associate
value-laden notions of ‘professionalism’ with those ‘charity’ in ways which had relatively enduring effects on the moral economies of their outlets.

This section relies most heavily on the first case study, in which the Foreign Editor of The Independent on Sunday accepted a double-page spread about a food crisis in Mali at a time of civil conflict from Christian Aid. This consisted of a lengthy ‘World’ news article written by the INGO’s Head of Media (who was a former editor of a number of Sunday papers), as well as several photos taken by a former Independent photographer working for Christian Aid on a freelance basis: both the actors and the INGO concerned were fully and clearly attributed. However, the acceptance of complete ‘packages’ of material was unusual at the paper, and attributions were often unclear or omitted in other items which were examined, so other comments made by participants about their other uses of NGO-provided multimedia have been included to place this case study in context.

The last section will then go on to explain why and how work at The Guardian and The Observer was shaped by a very different mode of ownership (Waisbord 2011), relating to a not-for-profit trust, as well as ‘web-first’ strategies (Collis et al. 2011) legitimised by ideas about the ‘progressiveness’ of building dialogic communities online. In particular, it will examine the way in which such normative notions interacted with those of the Gates Foundation and news-related NGOs in order to facilitate the acceptance of large amounts of multimedia from British and European INGOs, in the name of privatised notions of ‘development’.
In so doing, it will draw upon the findings of the third case study, in which a freelancer, who regularly worked for *The Guardian*, as well as other news outlets, wrote a blog for the Gates-funded ‘Global Development’ section of *Guardian.co.uk*. This was about the same media project that she had been employed on by the news-related INGO, Internews, and it included a photo taken by another freelancer, who was also employed on that project, although the website only attributed the freelancers by name. The final subsection of this chapter will then draw on evidence from the second case study about the role played by another news-related NGO in facilitating the acceptance of NGO-provided multimedia outside of the ‘Global Development’ section’. This involved the use of a photo taken by commercial advertising agencies working with the Kenyan Paraplegic Organisation, which was accepted by a Kenyan intern at *The Observer*, who was funded by the David Astor Trust, and who wrote the small ‘human interest’ article which appeared low down on page three of *The Observer*.

1: *The impact of organisational cuts on photojournalism*

The newspapers in this study were already struggling to cope with the competition presented by ‘free’ print and online news outlets, the rising costs of print, falling circulation figures and the migration of advertising online - where a still advert is worth around a tenth of its former print value (interview Beaumont, Head of International and Business Development, Guardian News and Media, 2013; interview Pulham, Managing Editor, *Guardian.co.uk*, 2013). The national recession
which swiftly followed the global economic crisis of 2009 then pushed cover sales down even further, although circulation figures for *The Independent* papers had always been lower than those for *The Guardian* and *The Observer*, as illustrated below.

*Figure 6: Circulation figures for print editions 2000-2012*

![Circulation figures for print editions 2000-2012](image)

Figures provided by Audit Bureau of Circulation (correspondence Bancroft 2013a, 2013b)

But, as with other newspapers, managerial concerns about the impact of the global economic crisis on falling circulation were relatively minor in comparison its impact on advertising revenue which plunged to a ‘frightening degree’ after 2009 (interview Beaumont 2013; see also Brock 2013). Thus the year immediately after the global economic crisis, 2010-11, marked a watershed for the newspapers in this study, in which managers dramatically accelerated organisational cuts, legitimising this (Sayer 2005, 2007) as ‘efficiencies’ (interview Beaumont 2013; interview O’Grady, Deputy Managing Editor, *The Independent* and *The Standard* newspapers, 2013).
However, the way in which these ‘efficiencies’ were enacted as role-merging meant that although visual content was seen as central to the development of online media by all of those concerned, highly specialised photojournalists were subject to some of the harshest staffing cuts. Thus although The Independent and Independent on Sunday had once been renowned for photojournalism (Argles 2013a; McCabe 2008), all three of the papers’ staff photographers had been made redundant in the past ten years (interview Batterbury, Picture Editor, The Independent on Sunday 2013).

Likewise, The Observer was found to have no full-time staff photographers left, although it still employs ‘a couple on day-a-week contracts’ (interview Powell 2013) and The Guardian only has two photographers left on staff – a sharp fall from the six staffers and six contract photographers employed in the 1980s (correspondence Argles 2013b).20 Indeed, the loss of staff photojournalists was a particularly serious problem for The Guardian and The Observer, because editorial staff at those papers were not only expected to transfer the content prepared for print publication onto their online outlet, Guardian.co.uk, but they were also expected to prepare large volumes of web-specific content, including visually-driven genres, such as photo galleries and audio slideshows (interview Powell, Deputy Picture Editor, The Observer with special responsibilities for the Guardian.co.uk, 2013).

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20 At a recent meeting of the NUJ’s Photography branch, former Guardian photojournalist, Martin Argles estimated that although Fleet Street employed 150 photographers in the 1970s, this was now down to the mid-twenties (2013b). Similar patterns of redundancies are happening in the USA (Anderson 2013).
However, all of the newspaper picture editors described themselves as having become heavily dependent upon freelance photographers (Sayer 2000b), many of whom they knew also worked for INGOs, especially the major aid agencies. Picture editors were largely sanguine about these freelancers’ involvement with NGOs: viewing this as a pragmatic solution for many of their former colleagues whom they could no longer afford to employ on a full-time basis, as well as offering them a very valuable ‘information subsidy’ (Gandy 1982) in the form of ‘free’ access to technically sophisticated and distinctively composed photographs from freelancers whom they knew and ‘trusted’ (interviews Batterbury; Powell 2013).

In addition, the picture editors at both news organisations reported that their numbers had been ‘decimated’ in ways which had dramatically increased their workload (interview Lahon, Deputy Picture Editor, The Independent, 2013; see also Powell 2013). Those at The Independent were concerned that further cuts to their numbers were imminent. As Lahon explained

There is the … assumption that, ‘Oh, the art director could step in and do a bit of that,’ … or we could get a sub [editor] to pick a picture instead …

I just think it comes down to… the fact that our organisation is losing money and, you know, what they can cut is the departments where they think the people who are left behind could stretch to do more.

(interview 2013)²¹

Those who remained said that the responsibilities associated with their role had expanded dramatically in order to cover several different outlets and/or platforms

²¹ Lahon had chosen to take redundancy by the time of the research interview, but took a job as a picture editor at Save the Children UK shortly afterwards. Her reasons for this related to her desire to specialise in her chosen media, as will be discussed in Chapter 7.
This meant that the ‘basic’ responsibility for selecting and attributing pictures was often distributed amongst very busy sub-editors, who usually had little or no photographic training (interviews Lahon; Powell 2013). In theory, picture editors were meant to overseer this process, but their increased workload meant that participants admitted that errors relating to the publication of pictures were ‘slipping through the net too often’ (interview Lahon 2013); especially close to publication deadlines when time was particularly limited (interview Powell 2013).

Picture editors participating in this study said that the most common of these errors involved attributing photos to a freelancer by name, rather than mentioning which NGO they had been working for at the time, or including no attribution at all (interviews Batterbury; Lahon; Powell 2013). The second case study supported this claim, as it involved a sub-editor at The Observer who had been left to pick a photo alone and under considerable time pressure, and who had left out any attribution ‘by mistake’ (interview Rock, News Editor, The Observer, 2012). Thus these findings indicate that a lack of attribution or partial attribution (Cooper 2007a; Franks 2008b; Lewis et al. 2006) may happen in newspapers because of staff errors, caused by the marginalisation of visual specialisation, lack of time and over-work: so helping to explain why so many items published in newspapers’ online or print editions did not include correct, full and clear attributions.

Nevertheless, newspaper managers tended to articulate such role-merging as an inevitable part of organisational cost-cutting given the seriousness of the financial crisis and the need to invest in online distribution for commercial reasons (interviews
Beaumont; O’Grady; Pulham 2013). In particular, Sheila Pulham, the Managing Editor of Guardian.co.uk, stressed that advertisers were willing to pay five times more to place adverts on pages containing video than on ‘static’ pages, and ‘pre-roll’ adverts which are placed at the beginning of an embedded video were more valuable still (interview 2013; see Thurman and Lupton 2008).

However, at the time of writing, none of the newspapers in this study had been able to make their digital platforms profitable. A number of scholars analysing American newspapers have also argued that repeatedly cutting editorial staff and commissioning budgets becomes self-defeating: leading to a ‘suicide spiral’ (Rosenstiel and Mitchell 2004:87) in which the quality and breadth of coverage declines, alienating readers in ways which cause a decline in circulation, thus triggering a fall in advertising revenue - which in turn leads to further cuts (Bogart 2004; Chen et al. 2005).

Therefore any analysis of why and how these particular organisational cuts have been carried out, and their relevance to newspaper journalists’ use of NGO-provided photographs, needs to avoid repeating managers’ assertions about the inevitability of role-merging (interviews O’Grady; Pulham 2013). Instead such an analysis should attend to the kinds of normative rationale/s used by managers and other staff to legitimise organisational cuts (Sayer 2005, 2007) and how these rationales, as well as the nature of the cuts themselves, have affected the recursive links between labour conditions, newsroom cultures and daily editorial decision-making (Waisbord 2011).
2.1: ‘Efficiency’ and the erosion of inter-collegial trust at The Independent newspapers

The managerial decision to merge the news desks which produce The Independent and The Independent on Sunday with that of The Standard in order to provide multimedia content for all four papers, as well as for a new TV station, London Live, was not announced until February 2013 (Ponsford 2013). That was five months after the sample was taken, but editorial staff at The Independent papers said they were aware, even then, that the Lebedevs, (the Russian oligarchs who own both The Independent newspapers and The Standard), were keen to pursue further integration (interviews Batterbury; Lahon 2013).

Indeed, as Sean O’Grady, the Deputy Managing Editor of the Independent papers and The Standard, explained, the Lebedevs had been engaged in repeated role-merging since they bought The Independent newspapers in 2010. As he put it,

We were talking… about developing closer working relationships from the moment the Lebedevs took on Independent print as well as The Standard…

I mean… we are integrating the daily and the Sunday paper and so on, and these things are just [sigh] going on all the time really…

At the end of 2011, for example, we integrated the business and the sports desk between The Standard and The Independent because this yields efficiency savings…We have produced the same output or more output with fewer heads… it is much more efficient.

(interview 2013)
The editorial staff which O’Grady referred to merely as ‘heads’ (interview 2013) were indeed far fewer by August 2012 than they had been in the mid-2000s. Although O’Grady refused to release official figures of the cumulative impact of repeated waves of redundancies, David Randall, the long-serving Foreign Editor of The Independent on Sunday, estimated that between 2008-2012, a third of The Independent papers’ editorial staff had taken redundancy, or had left and not been replaced (interview 2013).22

Staff were also seriously concerned about the possibility of more job losses at the time of sampling (August 2012) because they were aware that both The Independent and The Independent on Sunday were continuing to lose both readers and money at ‘an alarming rate’23 (interview Randall 2013). They tended to be unconvinced by managerial arguments that the advertising revenue generated by The Independent’s cheaper sister paper, the i (which was launched in 2011) had begun to restore the fortunes of The Independent newspapers overall (interview O’Grady 2013: arguing that such assertions masked managers’ more significant commitment to business strategies which involved giving content away for free, either online24 or in the form of ‘free’ newspapers, like The London Standard (interviews Lahon; Randall 2013).

Indeed, editorial staff tended to regard the whole notion of giving content away for free as ill-advised, but felt trapped into it because of the dominance of BBC News

22 Randall had also chosen to take redundancy by the time of interviewing.
23 All of the Independent papers combined were still losing around £17.5 million per annum in both 2011 and 2012 (Independent Print Ltd Company Accounts).
24 In 2010 The Independent introduced a ‘hard’ pay-wall, and then in 2011, amended this to a ‘metered’ pay-wall: but neither of these strategies worked, so it had abandoned pay-walls by the time of sampling.
Online, whose network of journalists is subsidised by the licence fee. As Randall put it:

The fundamental problem with the newspaper industry is that, to a large extent...the business model is broken and one of the reasons for that is that the newspaper managements in their wisdom have decided, all of them, that it is sensible to pay people like me decent salaries to produce work which they then give away for free ...in the hope of getting some advertising.

They do get some advertising, but it doesn’t begin to scratch the surface of paying for the salaries...

But you know, the great problem in this country is the BBC’s state-subsidised mega online newspaper. In the US you don’t have that, which is why pay walls have some chance of working.

(interview 2013)

Whilst the structuring of BBC News Online will be discussed in the next chapter, here it is worth stressing that there were significant grounds for concern about Independent managers’ reliance on ‘giving away content’ (interview Randall 2013) because although the i was beginning to generate some advertising by summer of 2012, this had been achieved on the basis of others’ perceptions of its growing popularity. As O’Grady, the Deputy Managing Editor of The Independent explained, this impression of popularity had been sustained, in part, because of the way in which managers had transferred the existing ‘bulks’ from The Independent to the i (interview 2013),25 as well as dramatically increasing the numbers of bulk copies of the i in other ways (correspondence Bancroft 2013b).

This means that actual consumer sales of the paper were much lower than advertisers may have realised: indeed, only 9% of the i’s circulation figures in its

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25 This is the distribution of papers purchased for a nominal fee by airlines, hotels and gyms.
launch year can be counted as ‘true sales’, although this did increase to 22% in 2012 (correspondence Bancroft 2013c). Enlarging circulation figures through very large bulk distributions is not only widely regarded as unethical in the newspaper industry (Greenslade 2009, 2013) it is also explicitly forbidden by the ABC, which has recently pursued a number of news organisations for breaching its rules (ABC 2012; correspondence Bancroft 2013c).

Editorial staff were also concerned about their ability to cope if yet more jobs were to be cut: describing themselves as ‘already stretched pretty thin’ (interview Lahon 2013) because of the cumulative loss of so many staff, at the same time as an increase in their workload because of the need to produce the i as well as The Independent and The Independent on Sunday. In keeping with research carried out at newspapers in the US (Gade 2004; Reinardy 2000), there was evidence that the prolonged stress and uncertainty caused by job insecurity was leading to some staff becoming partially disembedded from their organisations (Polanyi 2001; Sayer 2001): with ‘trust’ in colleagues, managers and the organisation as a whole becoming ‘corroded’ (Sayer 2001, 2007; see also Sennett 1998). The worst account of this involved a participant discussing

... just terrible bullying. Workplace bullying.... It’s one of those classic things where if you set everyone off against each other...you keep control...

[It’s] absolutely related to cost-cutting because getting to do good stories was such a scarce opportunity, that it was much, much easier to pit people against each other.

(interview, freelancer, 2013)
Yet the senior manager interviewed for this study insisted that the ‘efficiencies’ which he had implemented before the sample period in August 2012, and was continuing to implement at the time of interviewing, were ‘going fine’: resulting in greater staff ‘productivity’ but without ‘anyone having to work harder’ (interview O'Grady 2013). Given the relatively high rates of trade union membership at the Independent papers (correspondence Ayrton 2013; see also Örnebring 2009), it seems surprising that the discrepancy between the accounts given by managers and staff about workloads had not led to industrial action before the summer of 2012. But this can be explained by the ready acceptance by editorial staff of the kind of pro-market logic used by their organisation’s owners and managers to legitimise the repeated cuts (Sayer 2005, 2007).

Indeed, a resigned TINA--esque tended to dominate the thinking of the editorial staff who were interviewed. For example, Randall had this to say:

If we made board games or sprockets, we would have been shut down years ago: years and years ago. So I fully understand that these cuts are necessary...

We don't have an entitlement to be subsidised in perpetuity by multi-millionaires in order to do the kind of journalism which... for which there is not apparently an economic demand.

(interview 2013)

Such a quiescent acceptance of media workers’ powerlessness vis-à-vis both the modes of media ownership and the managerial policies which related to them (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011) was not only caused by the sense that newspapers’ business model was irretrievably ‘broken’ (interview Randall 2013), but also by the close, recursive links between the papers’ ideological positioning and its
journalists’ ‘habits of thinking, mental models and linguistic paradigms’ (Schein 2004:13).

As study participants made clear in this and other case studies, they had chosen to work on news outlets which they felt reflected their own world-view (interviews Batterbury; Lahon 2013). In addition, as Callon has argued, people whose daily practice is embedded within particular systems of commercial relations also gradually change: adjusting their thinking to the social norms and discursive values which structure the economic relations in which their work is embedded in ways which they may not even be aware of (1998; see also Davis 2010). Thus the harsh right-wing economic approaches prevalent at *The Independent* papers can be seen to have interacted with their socially liberal attitude in ways which produced a particular moral economy.

For example, David Randall, the Foreign Editor of *The Independent of Sunday*, spoke at length about his concern for what he called ‘the underdog’, arguing that this stemmed his own, less privileged background (interview 2013). Yet when he explained how this concern shaped his journalism, he focussed on his publication of a ‘Happy List’, which he argued had been designed to resist *The Sunday Times* ‘Rich List’ which ‘just worships at the altar of wealth’ (interview 2013). Nevertheless, this resistance was only framed in terms of individuals ‘who give back’ to society (interview Randall 2013).

Therefore why and how participants used NGO-provided multimedia at *The Independent* papers was strongly shaped by the papers’ ‘social conscience’
(interview Randall 2013), but also by the manner in which this was modified by journalists’ naturalisation of individualistic, free market structures. This led to editorial staff positioning their audience as individual consumers of commercial media products, and privileging editorial strategies designed to minimise risks which would damage their papers’ as well as their personal ‘reputations’ in a harsh market environment (Banks et al. 2000).

2.2: ‘Professionalism’

NGO-provided photos were found to reach the pages of The Independent papers through three different organisational routes: each of which involved Independent staff engaging in particular kinds of position-taking strategies in order to differentiate their outlet from others whilst working faster and more cheaply (Bourdieu 1998; Gandy 1982; Franklin 2011). However, editorial staff repeatedly framed and justified such strategies in relation to ideas of ‘professionalism’ (Goffman 1986; Sayer 2005, 2007).

Picture editors said that the first route involved UK-based international aid agencies, as well as some environmental and wildlife INGOs, approaching them with offers of images of varying sizes which had been taken by freelancers whom they had hired (interview Batterbury; Lahon 2013).\(^{26}\) They used these photos when last-minute,\(^{26}\) The brevity of the sampling period meant that examples of this were not found, as will be discussed in the Conclusion.
rapid layout changes occurred at *The Independent*,

including when very late adverts were placed which managers weren’t willing to turn down because the paper needed the money (interview Batterbury 2013), as on such occasions, picture editors needed to fill in any holes created in the mosaic of articles with ‘stand-alone’ images (interviews Batterbury; Lahon 2013). Thus although picture editors also used images from wire and photographic agencies, about once a month Lahon estimated that she did precisely what her Deputy Managing Editor claimed that *Independent* staff would never contemplate: that is, she used INGO-provided photos as a ‘space-filler’ (interview O’Grady 2013).

Picture editors also used INGO-provided photos to give them extra flexibility during ‘quiet’ news weeks, like the one sampled, when cuts to their newsgathering and photographic staff meant that they had fewer ‘off-agenda’ items coming in (interviews Batterbury; Lahon 2013). In these kinds of situations, picture editors said that they used INGO-provided photos which had been provided with a limited, but generous time frame, in order to help them manage forms of personal risk during a period of job insecurity (Banks et al. 2000). As Batterbury explained,

> Photos with a bit of longevity are good, but … if something doesn’t have a particular peg, they tend to get list-fatigue. Everyone moans at you when you use photos which are a bit old…

> [It’s different when photos are from an INGO because] it’s not our investment then… You know, we hadn’t paid to send [that photographer] somewhere, so…they don’t get that list-fatigue.…

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27 This applied only to the daily newspaper, since *The Independent on Sunday* uses a poster lay-out, so it is rare to have more than one or two articles on a page.
So there will always be uses for [INGO-provided] stuff we can, you know, hold…

(interview 2013)

However, such practices did tend to create a sense of obligation that the photos would, at some point, be used. Batterbury explained this using an example of some Oxfam photos which the Editor of The Independent on Sunday had agreed to take at the beginning of December in 2011, saying:

He said ‘yes’ on the basis that it could well be very useful for something between Christmas and New Year when it’s very quiet. But I mean, in the end, we ran it this week [12th June]… It was, like, we have *said* we’re going to do this, so we absolutely *have* to do it now.

(interview 2013)

Picture editors simultaneously framed and legitimised these practices in terms of their ‘trust’ (Sayer 2001, 2007) in the ‘professionalism’ of the freelancers whom such INGOs employed: portraying this ‘professionalism’ as involving their willingness to uphold collectively-understood ‘rules of the game’ in photojournalism (Bourdieu 1998:39), as established by professional bodies (interviews Batterbury; Lahon 2013; see also Aldridge and Evetts 2003; Örnebring 2009). This included paying scrupulous attention to factual detail about when, where and of whom the photographs had been taken, as well as an avoidance not only of faked pictures, but also of digital ‘touching up’ (Ritchin 1990, 2009).

Thus the kind of ‘professionalism’ which picture editors referred to could be characterised as a form of occupational professionalism (Aldridge and Evetts 2003) which relied implicitly on the relationship of ‘truth-telling’ to the ‘public interest’
Moreover picture editors said that they saw freelancers’ ‘professionalism’ as involving the ability to construct pictures in ways which ‘draw the reader in and make them ask questions, rather than giving them obvious answers’ (interview Lahon 2013; see also Batterbury; Randall 2013). So picture editors’ ‘trust’ in freelance photographers’ ‘professionalism’ had a number of progressive dimensions (Waisbord 2013).

Nevertheless, this ‘trust’ meant that freelancers, who were often working for relatively low pay and in insecure and dangerous situations (interview Pilston, freelance photographer, 2012), bore much of the cost of this kind of specialised journalistic production for news organisations (Gandy 1982; Sayer 2001, 2007). The political effects of such ‘trust’ must therefore be viewed in terms of an on-going tension between the progressive and the conservative.

The second organisational route through which INGO-provided photos reached the Independent papers was also framed/legitimated through ideas of ‘professionalism’. The Foreign Editor of The Independent on Sunday explained that this involved ‘news stories’ being ‘pitched’ by INGO press officers to the paper’s reporters via personal phone calls and emails (interview Randall 2013). This also requires further research because it was not the focus of the case study in question,28 so reporters were not interviewed. But initial analysis conducted in order to select case studies uncovered one example (Morrison 2012), in which a press officer from Water Aid had framed their ‘pitch’ to the reporter in question as an ‘exclusive story’ with accompanying photographs (correspondence Koundarjian 2013; see also Esperidião 2011).

28 Again, this omission stemmed from the brevity of the sampling period, as will be discussed in the Conclusion.
However, the ‘exclusive story’ was simply a single aspect of a WaterAid report (2012), which the press officer was willing to release to the reporter before the general date (correspondence Koundarjian 2013). The reporter had then fleshed this out using her own interviews, in ways which the paper’s Foreign Editor thought reflected the longer amount of time which reporters for the Sunday paper had to spend on research, as well as satisfying reporters’ notions of their own occupational ‘professionalism’ (interview Randall 2013; see also Aldridge and Evetts 2003).

But the degree to which the addition of other interviews indicated critical scrutiny (Sen 2010) or journalistic independence (Van Leuven et al. 2013) is questionable, because the interpretative frame used in the article (Morrison 2012) had not changed from the pitch made by WaterAid’s press officer (correspondence Koundarjian 2013). Such practices can therefore be seen as a form of ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154) which involved reporters at The Independent on Sunday using a relatively small proportion of actual material from NGOs in their final report, which enabled them to accumulate the cultural capital associated with their production of long, ‘investigative’, ‘campaigning’ and seemingly ‘reporter-led’ news stories (Bourdieu 1998) but without shouldering the full costs of newsgathering (Gandy 1982).
2.3: Complete ‘news cloning’

However, the kind of ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154) involved in the item on which the first case study was based was much more unusual, both in terms of the Independent newspapers and in terms of the sample as a whole. This was because it involved Independent journalists accepting what, again, their Deputy Managing Editor claimed they would never accept: that is, a total ‘package’ of material including a full article authored by an INGO-worker and accompanying INGO-provided photos (interview O’Grady 2012), which appeared as a two page ‘World News’ lead.

In fact, the complete form of ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154) carried out by Christian Aid in this instance was so unusual that no organisational route had yet been established for dealing with it: so informal, interpersonal relationships with working journalists underpinned by their common experience of specific newsroom positions and habitus came into play (Fenton 2010a). The problem was solved by an Independent journalist who was a personal friend of Andrew Hogg, the INGO’s Head of Media, who had written the piece and was a former journalist himself, because this friend advised Hogg to pitch directly to the Foreign Editor of The Independent on Sunday, David Randall. As Hogg explained,

What I did in the end was I phoned a mate at The Independent …and said I have just got back from Mali, I’ve got a good piece, are you interested? And ...I was told by my mate who to send it to; he said ‘Put his name on it’ [thumps desk for emphasis]

(interview 2012)
Since Randall also assessed offers of articles provided by freelance journalists, his deliberations about this INGO-provided piece were very much framed by comparisons with these kinds of contributions, as well as by considerations about saving time and money and preventing reputational risk (Banks et al. 2000; Gandy 1982). First of all, Randall stressed what a ‘great catch’ it would be for the paper to get a piece from an unusual place like northern Mali as he could not have afforded to send his own Africa correspondent or one of the paper’s regular freelancers on such a trip, especially if it were not an ‘obvious lead’ which other news organisations were covering and which would be likely to ‘run for several weeks (interview 2013).

Secondly, Randall was greatly influenced by the ‘crisp’ news writing and ‘tight’ article structure of the piece: contrasting this favourably with other unsolicited pieces submitted by freelancers, whose writing he described as often being overly personalised, indirect and out of keeping with the tone and style of the rest of the paper (interview 2013). As Randall was well aware, it tends to be large, well-resourced INGOs who are capable of offering employment to former journalists with the cultural capital necessary to create pieces which need little re-versioning to fit into an existing mainstream news outlet (Fenton 2010a). In this case, the author of the piece had been a news editor at The Observer and The Sunday Times, as well

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29 Taking into account the costs of travel, accommodation, food and armed escort (interview Hogg 2013), as well as the cost of hiring translators and the freelance photographer’s fee (interview Pilston 2012), the trip would have cost a newspaper between £7-8,000. It could also have taken much longer (and become more expensive) because it involved negotiating progress roadblock by roadblock. Indeed, this was the main reason why Christian Aid decided to do the piece themselves because a journalist or photographer from a news outlet would usually be required to file within five days and this could not be guaranteed (interview Hogg 2012).

30 Daniel Howden, who is based in Nairobi.
as the latter’s Africa correspondent (interview Hogg 2013), although this was not known to Randall at the time (interview 2013).

However, despite Randall’s understanding of the economic factors structuring the inequality of this kind of media access, he still evaluated the ‘crisp news writing’ in the piece positively because of the growing time-poverty associated with his job: arguing that it was good that the piece needed little more than shortening in order to make it fit a two-page ‘World Lead’ spread (interview 2013). Indeed, the extent of Randall’s time poverty was quite breath-taking. As he explained

You know, I am looking after the foreign pages of The Independent on Sunday, but that’s about a twentieth of what I do in a week.

I write comment pieces, I get ideas for features, I quite often write them, I’ve just done a big thing on cars, the first three pages of the Features section I write, big breaking stories, I write home stories sometimes.

On a Saturday, I write a good deal of the news headlines... I’m also acting Deputy Editor of the paper and I write pieces for the magazine from time to time.

But ten years ago, The Independent on Sunday had a foreign editor who did nothing but edit foreign copy, and he might have written himself but only in his field. That’s not the case now.

(interview 2013)

Randall’s prioritisation of ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) associated with saving time in order to allow him to meet his organisational responsibilities reflect the manner in which he resolved an earlier dilemma regarding conflicting obligations (Sayer 2000b). This was because Randall had long been uneasy about issues which he saw as pertaining to his (occupational) professionalism (Aldridge and Evetts 2003) especially, the ‘skimpy’ spread of stringers in some geographic areas which
rendered him unable to offer ‘the kind of geographic coverage [that] the Editor of the World pages on a national daily newspaper should be able to provide’ (interview 2013).

He had also got to the point when his time poverty was making it increasingly difficult to take the time to build ‘trusting’ relationships with new freelancers (Sayer 2001, 2007), arguing that

_Ideally, you still want to meet [freelancers] if that’s possible …because you want to find out if they’ve got two heads on them! Or they’re barking! And an email and sometimes a phone call can’t always tell you that…But it’s getting harder and harder to [meet in person]…_

_You know at The Observer where I was for thirteen years, you would have time to… say ‘Let’s meet! I’ll come over to your office this afternoon and we’ll chat… Then, you did have time and you got things out of that._

(interview 2013)

Since Randall consistently associated ‘quality’ journalism with ‘professionalism’ he rejected any possibility of using what he called ‘citizen journalism’: seeing this as being characterised by self-indulgent ‘navel-gazing’, ‘sloppy’ writing and a dangerous lack of attention to rigorous fact-checking (interview 2013). He therefore tried a different approach which he implicitly positioned as a ‘second-best’ option vis-à-vis the operation of ‘trust’ (Sayer 2005, 2007): investigating the possibility of using material from an organisation which acted as a filter and a showcase for work by journalists in ‘the developing world’ (interview Randall 2013).³¹

³¹ Unfortunately Randall could not remember its name, or whether it was an NGO or some other kind of organisation.
But although Randall was keen to find ‘something a bit different’ from less frequently reported-upon places, he complained that the organisation had not been run by a ‘professional’ journalist with ‘national print experience’, so the whole process had become far too time-consuming: involving a number of long, unsolicited phone calls and the submission of copy which needed extensive rewriting in order to ‘fit with the rest of the paper’ (interview 2013). Thus Randall’s commitment to organisational professionalism and specifically to fulfilling his obligation to deliver large amounts of easily assimilated, risk-free content within increasingly tight timescales can be seen to have ‘trumped’ his informally-held beliefs in occupational professionalism (Aldridge and Evetts 2003), including his normative belief in a foreign editor’s responsibility to cover ‘the world’ (interview 2013).

Indeed, Randall’s thinking seems to have been so powerfully shaped by the specific kinds of responsibilities attendant on ‘organisational professionalism’ at The Independent papers and their embedding in the ‘norms, values and discursive practices of markets’ (Davis 2010:133), that he framed/legitimated the kind of ‘trust’ involved in his least-preferred option - using INGO-provided material (Granovetter 1992; Sayer 2001, 2007) - like this:

In cases like that [points to Christian Aid article] I don’t go and send someone to double check what Andrew [Hogg] has written.

You know he is there, tied to his agency and if it turns out that he’s made a third of it up, and that emerges then he’ll lose his job and his agency will suffer big time. And none of them can afford that either. So that is my insurance policy.

(interview 2013)
Therefore the main source of ‘trust’ in INGOs (Sayer 2005, 2007) which Randall articulated operated negatively, as it was far less focussed on trying to achieve something good than on avoiding the worst possible consequences (Banks et al. 2000). Moreover, rather than ‘trusting’ INGOs to represent something other than the market (Fenton et al. 1999), Randall’s articulation of ‘trust’ actually relied upon the imbrication of INGOs in commercial markets, and assumptions about the relationship of this to INGOs’ management of risks to their personal and organisational reputations (Banks et al. 2000).

Whilst Randall’s reasoning clearly relates to a laudable desire to avoid disseminating falsehood (Sen 2010; Wright 2011b), it was also shaped by competitive commercial logic in ways which inhibited his consideration of the other capabilities listed by Sen, such as giving voice to the disadvantaged and enabling the critical scrutiny of knowledge and values (2010:336). Indeed, Independent workers’ articulations of normative values were so embedded in the kinds of individualistic norms associated with liberal markets (Davis 2010, 2013), that they tended to only be articulated within the context of personal, voluntary ‘giving’: with interviewees repeatedly legitimising the use of NGO-provided multimedia through references to their papers’ Christmas fundraising appeals (interviews Batterbury 2013; Lahon 2013; Randall 2013).

Thus the use of INGO-provided multimedia at The Independent papers reproduced a highly conservative ‘moral economy’ in which journalists’ and picture editors framed their relationship to INGOs in ways which inter-related neoliberal market values with notions of ‘professionalism’ and ‘charity’ in relatively enduring ways. Indeed, Randall concluded his research interview by stressing that ‘there’s a lot of
scope for more of that sort of thing [complete packages of contributed material] from big international charities at The Independent’ (interview 2012).

Nevertheless, the paper’s very dependence on the ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) provided by Christian Aid, when coupled with the moral economies shaping the work of the freelance and full-time INGO-workers involved, led to the INGO being able to disseminate complex forms of causal knowledge, as well as stimulating some debate about values (Sen 2010). Whilst these will be discussed more extensively in the chapter on NGOs, here it is important to this that this included veiled criticisms of the free market economy which meant that thousands went hungry whilst plenty of food was still available for sale (Hogg 2012): so the piece only recommended ‘charity’ as one of a number of possible ‘treatments’ or ‘solutions’ (Stones 2014:14-15).

3.1: The ‘web-first’ strategy at The Guardian/Observer

In contrast with the overtly commercial ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskar 1979:51) which structured editorial labour at The Independent newspapers in relation to their managerial strategies and owners (Waisbord 2011), those which structured editorial labour at The Guardian and The Observer involved an explicitly non-commercial remit. The Guardian was established by a Manchester cotton merchant in the nineteenth century and bought by a long-serving editor, C.P. Scott, who left it to his descendants in the form of the not-for-profit Scott Trust in order to sustain journalism
that is free from commercial or political interference (Guardian Media Group website, n.d.).

Whilst the trust was converted into a limited company in 2008, the work carried out by journalists at the papers is still cross-subsidised by the Trust’s investments and by the portfolio of other business enterprises maintained under the umbrella corporation, the Guardian Media Group (GMG) within which Guardian News and Media (GNM) is embedded (Starkman 2013). The question for GNM managers was therefore not how to attain overall profitability, but, as the current Managing Editor of Guardian.co.uk, Sheila Pulham, explained how to stem unsustainable losses (interview 2013). Indeed, at the time of interviewing, Pulham confirmed that the company was still losing around £50 million per year (interview 2013).

The organisational cuts which managing editors had put in place to try and minimise these financial losses had also led to the number of editorial staff employed at The Guardian and Observer being cut from around 850 in the mid 2000’s to 5-600 at the time when the sample was taken (interview Pulham 2013). So the number of editorial staff had been reduced by a third, roughly the same proportion as experienced by The Independent newspapers over a similar period of time (interview Randall 2013). But unlike The Independent papers, the repeated threat of collective industrial action from the largely unionised workforce, galvanised into collective action by their organisational history of resisting the effects of pro-market policies, had forced managers to state that it was unrealistic to continue to expect fewer people to produce more content (interview Pulham 2013).
In addition, unlike *The Independent* papers, GNM had abandoned distributing bulks in 2009 (correspondence Bancroft 2013c). Instead, all of the participants at GNM described their business and editorial approaches as being shaped by a ‘web-first’ strategy oriented towards the ‘global’ as well as the domestic market (interviews Beaumont; Powell; Pulham; Shearlaw; Webster 2013). However, this also depends on the notion of content being ‘free’ online, as well as publishing material on the papers’ website before it is available in (paid-for) print form (Collis et al. 2011). As GNM’s former business head, Stella Beaumont, explained:

*The Guardian* won’t [charge for accessing content] … while Alan [Rusbridger] is the editor…They just think it’s completely wrong…

The whole *Guardian* strategy and philosophy was being ‘of the web’, not just ‘on the web’, and if you are ‘of the web’ and you live and breathe and, you know, it is part of your ecosystem, then you don’t charge.

(interview 2013)

This approach had been forged by the interaction of economic and cultural, rather than normative, values because, as Beaumont went on to explain, prior to Rusbridger’s appointment as Editor in 1995 the ‘cool and avant-garde element of *The Guardian’s* staff’ had become ‘immersed in the culture of the web’, creating niche commercial projects with the journalists at *Wired* magazine (interview 2013). But a managerial decision was taken to integrate these operations with the papers and to rebrand the website in ways which reinforced their unity because *The Daily Telegraph* had begun to ‘eat their lunch’ by developing their own website in 1999 (interview Beaumont 2013).
Indeed, it was only much later, in relation to the aftermath of 9/11 when ‘traffic went beserk’ in the US, that Beaumont, who launched the US site in 2010-2012, mentioned the emergence of any normative rationale for the ‘web-first’ strategy (interview 2013). As she explained:

The liberal left in America had absolutely nowhere else to go because at that time, even The New York Times, you know, which is probably the most left of centre of the American newspapers, was feverishly patriotic...You would never really hear a dissenting voice about America and foreign policy anywhere than on The Guardian website.

And, so... that’s the time the traffic really started to take off in the US, and the Second Gulf War [of 2003-2009] added even more to that. So that’s when we thought – yeah, this is a good thing to be doing; this is important. As well as, you know, the business side of it.

(interview 2013)

Thus it appears to have been during this period that ideas emerged about the normative capability of The Guardian’s website to wield ‘substantial geo-political influence’ in relation to ‘the global superpower’ (interview Pulham 2013).

Nevertheless, GNM staff routinely legitimised the emergence of web-specific genres, such as blogging, which occurred much earlier, the incorporation of UGC, and the practice of leaving all stories open for audience comments, as if they were the product of GNM’s inherently progressive stance to the creation of knowledge. As Pulham, the Managing Editor of Guardian.co.uk, put it

[The Guardian’s approach] involves wanting to have as many views as possible and to move away from the kind of ‘us to them’ model of journalism. So...I suppose, we’re there in the centre, and there’s everything else around us and we want to make sure that communication is going in multiple directions, because I think the internet has helped people to realise that, on any given subject, the world expert in that is not necessarily sitting in this building.
It might be a particular individual somewhere else in the world or it might be a combination of the shared knowledge of the wider community, whatever that is, and you know, the more people you speak to or the more people you allow to speak, the better the answer you get.

(interview 2013)

So mediated dialogue was seen as enabling information-gathering and verification and the exchange of different people’s ‘expertise’ in order to reach, if not a single ‘truth’ (Hornmoen and Steensen 2014), then at least a single ‘best answer’. As The Guardian’s Africa Editor, Judith Soal explained, this dialogic approach to knowledge-building had even shaped her far more fluid approach to the news journalism, arguing that

I don’t think there is one definition [of news]; people’s opinions vary. I mean preferably when something happens which is either new or startling or um interesting... I would have thought.

I think we [journalists at The Guardian/The Observer] have probably got a looser definition than others...But I don’t feel the need to have a fixed definition; it’s more about having something that you can work with.

(interview 2013)

Thus even these post-hoc legitimations of the ‘web-first’ strategy had progressive potential: making journalists more willing to question the dominant values of the journalistic field and to act as a facilitator of further debate (Sen 2010). Indeed, such conceptualisations are strongly redolent of descriptions of ‘networked journalism’ (Beckett and Mansell 2008; Heinrich 2012; Sambrook 2010). Nevertheless, it is important not to downplay the economic elements in this moral economy for, as Pulham at the Guardian.co.uk went on to acknowledge, the primary purpose of creating more dialogic forms of journalism was to persuade readers - many of whom
had arrived through aggregators or search engines - to stay for longer and to return again (interview 2013). The commercial purpose of making the site ‘stickier’ (Scott 2005:95) was therefore to enable GNM to tap into the ‘enormous markets and lucrative, large advertising sectors’ in the US and in Australia where little liberal media had previously existed (interview Pulham 2013).

But as Beaumont, GNM’s former Head of International and Business Development, explained, the website was still making ‘significant losses’ at the time when research interviews were carried out (interview 2013). Few extra staff had been hired to cope with web-related editorial responsibilities, so one function of this legitimating rationale was to make GNM staff more willing to take on new web-related roles in addition to their existing work. The picture editor of The Observer, Jim Powell, had experienced a particularly steep increase in his workload, because although some of his previous day-to-day responsibilities had been reallocated to sub-editors, he was still expected to carry out many aspects of his old job, in addition to taking on the responsibility for the high volumes of photographic material placed on Guardian.co.uk (interview 2013). That, he said

…takes a lot of work. It’s not just … finding one image for a story like I used to do. It’s about doing a whole gallery for the story. It’s also going out, interviewing photographers, and doing audio slideshows, choosing pictures of the day, choosing the 20 pictures of the week…

So [my working remit is] broader, much broader [because] the web is … a machine that needs feeding quite a lot! [laughs].

(interview 2013)
The workload and editorial positioning of other staff had also been affected (Waisbord 2011). For example, the Africa Editor, Judith Soal, explained that in addition to commissioning coverage about Africa for *The Guardian* and *The Observer*, she now runs a web-centred social network and indeed, that this forms the biggest proportion of her workload. As she put it,

> The website is different from the African network which is what I work on mostly - that’s quite separate to the Africa page…

> The network sort of links with other blogs and sites in Africa where we kind of publish and cross-post with different bloggers or organisations…

> That’s more of a kind of conversation or a social network.

(interview 2013)

The risk is therefore that the fusion of powerful normative ideas regarding ‘dialogic’ approaches to journalism with the marketised values shaping journalists’ increased time-poverty and multi-tasking may inhibit critical examination of which people are allowed to speak on *Guardian.co.uk*, how this occurs, which conditions shape their mediated dialogue, and what its potential consequences might be (Sen 2010). These issues are particularly important given the comments made by Pulham, the site’s Managing Editor, about GNM’s efforts to minimise future financial risk by exploring the possibility of further ‘commercial partnerships’ in order to develop sub-sites based around lifestyle content, like fashion and travel, as well as building sub-sites designed to attract a more ‘loyal’ base of ‘professional communities’ whom advertisers are willing to pay a premium to reach (interview 2013).
3.2: The ‘Global Development’ section

However, the event which opened the way to these particular kinds of position-practices was the creation of the ‘Global Development’ section, which is sponsored by the US-based Gates Foundation, the world’s largest charitable owned foundation (Bishop and Green 2008). This sponsorship deal is worth $2.5 million dollars to GNM (Ribbens 2011): ‘a shit ton of money’ given GNM’s current financial state (Salmon 2011). The Gates deal is also highly significant to this thesis given that the ‘Global Development’ section frames its approach to journalism in terms taking ‘a particularly open approach to NGOs’, including regularly using INGO-provided multimedia in particular (interview Soal 2013; see also interview Shearlaw 2013). Indeed, the vast majority of NGO-provided multimedia found on The Guardian’s website was found to have originated from the ‘Global Development’ section.

This was explained by the Africa Editor, Judith Soal, in terms of the very high volume of material about African countries which the Gates funding of the ‘Global Development’ section prompts, as well as the way in which this is automatically cross-listed to the main Africa webpage through electronic tagging, because GNM lacks the money to employ someone to filter such material manually (interview 2013). Soal then went on to say that the dominance of the material produced by the ‘Global Development’ section on the Africa page was even greater on ‘quiet’ news weeks, such as that studied, when the absence of ‘obvious leads’ and the cuts to GNM’s own newsgathering network and budgets, meant that she and her colleagues on the Foreign Desk would have commissioned few other items (interview 2013). Indeed, on such occasions, Soal confirmed that it was not unusual for the majority of
the African coverage on the page to have been cross-listed from the ‘Global Development’ section (interview 2013), as was found in four days of the sample.

However, Soal was clearly unhappy with the prominence of INGO-provided material, derived from the ‘Global Development’ section, in the site’s coverage of Africa, saying that she thought it emerged from ‘a kind of ideology’ or

…a theory about Africa that sort of stereotypes it in a very particular way as this needy, desperate continent that wants us great benevolent Western powers to help it.

I am personally opposed to that stereotyping… I think it’s demeaning.

(interview 2013)

Nevertheless, much like the Africa Editor at BBC News Online who held similar views, Soal remained complicit with her organisation’s frequent use of INGO-provided multimedia: refraining from challenging her colleagues at the ‘Global Development’ section because these values varied so much from the economic and normative values which dominated GNM (interview 2013). Instead, when pressed, she compartmentalised what she had initially described as ‘political…progressive’ values as her ‘personal’ opinions, as well as stressing that she was ‘not involved’ in the ‘Global Development’ site at all, even though ‘we do sometimes run their pieces in the paper’ (interview 2013).

Rusbridger’s defence of the Gates sponsorship has long been that it enables journalists to justify reporting on ‘long-term’ stories about social justice and internationalism which are not in keeping with the event-based nature of conventional news values and which do not necessarily have a mass appeal
(discussed in Fortner 2010). Indeed, the Gates deal was not imposed on journalists by others but was negotiated by a *Guardian* journalist, Madeleine Bunting, in order to aid the economic survival of the organisation when the extent of the company’s financial crisis became clear in 2008 (interview Beaumont 2013).

As such, GNM has become part of a broad portfolio of media organisations which the Gates Foundation funds, for it has already given in excess of $1 million to several major US-based broadcast organisations (ABC, NBC, PBS and Viacom), as well as to some smaller outfits, like the California-based *LinkTV* (Doughton and Heim 2011; Fortner 2010). This forms part of the Gates Foundation’s investment of over $1 billion dollars on ‘advocacy and policy’ in the past decade, which also includes donations to, and sponsorship of, media organisations, but also journalistic training programmes; research into the best ways to craft media ‘messages’; and the insertion of Opinion Editorials into major news outlets (Doughton and Heim 2011; Fortner 2010).

Thus, as Marc Cooper, a media professor at the University of Southern California asserts, the Gates Foundation is in danger of making mediatised discourse in the US ‘an echo chamber’ in which its values and activities go unchallenged (quoted in Doughton and Heim 2011). Some other US scholars have even linked the Gates’ funding of North American journalism and other kinds of mass media to its funding of US elementary and secondary schools (Barkan 2011; Kovacs 2011) Higher Education colleges and research bodies (Parry et al. 2013): arguing that this constitutes a growing domination over knowledge creation in ways which prioritise,
normalise and naturalise private, technological ‘fixes’ to social, health and political problems (Hursh 2011; Scott 2014a).

However, as most of this debate has taken place in the US, the influence of the Gates Foundation on The Guardian has come in for comparatively little critical scrutiny. The brief pieces which have been published tend to accuse Guardian journalists of either evading criticism of the Gates Foundation and/or of publishing overtly fawning coverage, such as its profile of Melinda Gates (Doughton and Heim 2010; Fortner 2010), although The Guardian website is also credited with having published a blog questioning Gates’ investments in Monsanto, a commercial company which develops Genetically Modified crops (Vidal 2010, discussed in Fortner 2010).

Certainly, GNM staff were at pains to stress how transparent they were about accepting Gates’ money and repeatedly stated that, as the Foundation made no efforts to influence specific stories, they remained ‘editorially independent’ (interviews Pulham; Shearlaw, Communities Co-ordinator for Global Development 2013; Soal 2013). This seemed curious because of the strong contrast which this seems to provide with the very directive approach which the Foundation is known to have taken in the US: for example, it provided the NewsHour programme with a list of ‘potential story subjects’ (Doughton and Heim 2011). Such claims of editorial independence are also questionable because those working on The Observer argued that the Gates sponsorship, and the Global Development section’s ‘openness’ to using material provided by NGOs (interview Soal 2013) meant that the ‘old rules that governed relations between media organisations and NGOs’ had
changed, and that therefore it was admissible to use multimedia provided by NGOs in GNM’s other output (interview Webster, Deputy Editor, 2013; see also interview Rock, News Editor, 2012).

Moreover, stressing editorial independence is a common legitimising rationale used by other kinds of foundation-funded journalists, which may mask the more subtle ways in which systems of financial incentives may shape their understandings, allegiances and editorial approaches. In particular, Browne (2010), Feldman (2007) and Fortner (2010) have argued that the financial incentives provided by liberal foundations and trusts, and the social relationships in which these incentives are embedded, tends to lead to the naturalisation of pro-market ideologies and elite-centred systems of commercial ‘globalisation’ even when no explicit editorial intervention is involved.

Yet those working at Guardian.co.uk repeatedly refused to consider that their relationship with the Gates Foundation might cause any problems or dilemmas in relation to their coverage of Africa (interviews Pulham; Shearlaw 2013). Indeed, when asked this, participants tended to introduce a second legitimating rationale (Sayer 2005, 2007), which involved arguing that problems or dilemmas could be avoided by finding a good match between sponsors’ agendas and their own editorial priorities. As the site’s Managing Editor, Sheila Pulham, explained

“Well, it’s all around ‘fit’ between them and us. So, for example, if the North Korean government came along and wanted to do a human rights project with us…we might be a little sceptical [chuckles]…
But there is often common ground between our values and those of some foundations and companies.

(interview 2013)

However, as Edmonds has argued, a foundation’s ability to influence journalists’ thinking may actually be greatest when its goals and cultural norms overlap with those of the recipient news organisation to some degree: making it more, rather than less, difficult ‘for editors and journalists to draw the distinction between accepting a grant and accepting a funder’s point of view’ (2002).

So although a focus on ‘development’ may help to move mainstream journalism away from its preoccupation with news values and events, and towards understandings relating to other values and longer-term processes (Scott 2014a), the structuring of the ‘Global Development’ site in relation to particular modes of funding (Waisbord 2011) risks shaping its journalism in ways which only demand accountability of political, rather than private, forms of power: ‘continuing to hold to the fire the feet of those politicians who’d signed up to the millennium goals’, as Beaumont put it (interview 2013).

This study found that this risk has been exacerbated because of the increased editorial power of the ‘community team’ whom GNM started hiring from 2009 onwards (interview Pulham 2013; see also Bakker 2014), because the Community Coordinator for the Global Development site, Maeve Shearlaw, served as a gateway for much of the INGO-provided multimedia found on the site, accepting it far more often and far less critically than Soal, the Africa Editor, would have liked (interviews
2013). But Shearlaw did not class herself as a ‘journalist’ and her approach to her work was causally shaped by her enculturation in the *habitus* of INGO work, rather than journalism: arguing that her previous experience of working for an INGO was what helped her to get the job at *The Guardian* because ‘there is a particular synergy between the INGO community and the Global Development site as a whole’ (interview 2013). She then substantiated this claim by arguing that many of those commenting on stories

…will either put an INGO name in their profile or … people [working for INGOs] will email us and get in touch … I mean, we can’t tell, specifically, what the proportion is, but…there’s a feeling, .. erm that our, kind of… core committed readership in the UK at least are working in development….

(interview 2013)

Shearlaw’s positioning of ‘those working in development’ as professional INGO-workers and then placing INGO-workers at the heart of the ‘imagined’ online community constituting the ‘Global Development’ section (Anderson 2006) was linked to her re/production of a geographically-situated ‘interpretive community’ (Zelizer 1993) embedded in warm and seemingly informally relations with major INGOs based in the UK and elsewhere in Europe (Sayer 2000b, 2001). As she explained,

I’ve been trying to [meet up with INGOs], like, once a week….People come in and, like, they’ll often have a new strategy they want to talk about …and they’ll just give us a really big, really helpful off-the-record briefing of….what the key moments are going to be.

But, then, just as a way to… keep in touch with people… we’ll do a, kind of, very informal chat every… now and again … Either they’ll approach me or, if I’m doing a specific project and I need a bit more information about stuff, then I’ll approach them.
Usually, they're...UK-based INGOs or... they have people from other countries... travelling. Sometimes, their country programme directors come to see us, as well. And...sometimes we get to catch up with some of the, kind of, European-based people, so, like, Geneva, Strasbourg... as well.

(interview Shearlaw 2013)

Thus although Shearlaw did make personal efforts to try and engage with smaller, African NGOs when there were ‘big umbrella events happening’ (interview 2013; Waisbord 2011), the main ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskar 1979:51) structuring her work led to a systematic privileging of the voices, values and concerns of INGO-workers, who are already relatively privileged, rather giving voice to those who are marginalised and disadvantaged (Hardt and Negri 2000; Sen 2010).

Shearlaw simultaneously framed and legitimised these strategies in terms of relations of ‘trust’: ‘trust’ in the INGOs with whom she regularly met, ‘trust’ in freelancers who regularly worked for the site; and ‘trust’ in her readers’ ‘intelligence’; (Sayer 2001, 2007). Although interestingly, she never placed contributions made by full-time INGO-workers and freelancers within the context of UGC, or more ‘democratic’, ‘bottom-up’ forms of participatory journalism associated with it (interview 2013; see also Beckett 2008; Gillmor 2006; Heinrich, 2012).
3.3: News-related NGOs and ‘these grey areas’

Shearlaw was not alone in this, as a similar approach seems to have shaped the decisions of others involved in commissioning for the ‘Global Development’ section. For example A, a freelance journalist who works regularly for it as well as for other news outlets, spoke about she came to do a blog for the site on a project funded by Internews, a US-based INGO, whilst employed on a project by the same organisation:

What happened is that I do [a regular item on the ‘Global Development’ site]…And so I chat to [this editor] quite a lot and s/he knows that I go off and do these other kinds of projects, so I have done various things for them in the past on other trips that I have done…

Anyway, in a conversation about [my work for the World Service Media Trust, [another news-related INGO] with [this editor], I mentioned that I was going to [a hard-to-reach, Francophone African country] as well with Internews and I said ‘Don’t you think it would be quite interesting to do maybe a feature [on that project]?’…Because I know that they are always looking out for…some kind of a development angle…

[So] … what I’m saying [is] it’s these kind of grey areas …In some ways I don’t want them to be formalised too much because then people would start saying ‘You can’t do this, you can’t do that’.

(interview 2012)

Much like the ‘trust’ in freelance photographers described by picture editors at The Independent, these kinds of informal ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskar 1979:51) enabled freelancers to indirectly pass onto news organisations the ‘information subsidies’ provided by INGOs (Gandy 1982). As A went on to explain,
I think the way that [staff at the Global Development section] operate is that if you can go to them and say ‘Do you want a piece on [a Francophone African country]? It won’t cost you anything. It will just arrive in your in-box in a perfectly formed package and you don’t have to do anything. You don’t have to take any responsibility for me. You don’t have to do anything, you will just get that piece’, of course they are going to say ‘Yes’.

But if you go to them and say ‘I want to go to [this country] but you know, you have to do my risk assessment, you have to pay my flight, and you know, blah di blah…’ They’re just going to go ‘What?’ and they won’t do it… You know, the bottom line is that you just don’t cause anybody any problems.

(interview A 2012)

Yet the use of these kinds of cheap,32 ‘trusted’ and ‘risk-free’ freelancers was found to inhibit Guardian journalists’ ability to scrutinise – and to enable others to scrutinise - the nature of the knowledge afforded by NGO-provided multimedia in a critical fashion (Sayer 2001, 2007; Sen 2010). This was because such INGOS not only employed respected freelancers, they were also prepared to invest significantly more time and energy in briefing them and setting up interviews for them – thereby framing their approach to the topic in hand to a significant degree (Stones 2014).33

Indeed, the blog in question said that the INGO project had made ‘huge strides’ forward because of its empowerment of individual local journalists and its facilitation of dialogue within and between local communities, in keeping with the ‘legacy’ report

32 *The Guardian* paid £90 for the blog in question, whilst Internews paid the freelance journalist concerned £300 per day for a period of three weeks (interview A 2012) - a total of £6,300. The freelance photographer was paid £45 by The Guardian for the image it used, but said she was paid ‘around’ £6,000 by Internews for her work on the trip (interview B 2012). Internews also paid for all the trip expenses, which the photographer estimated had cost ‘several thousand’, as the flights alone had cost more than £3,000 (interview B 2013).

33 This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
which the journalist in question had been hired to write for Internews (interview A 2012). Although it indicated that ‘money will be an enormous challenge’ in future, it drew back from saying that all of those concerned were worried that the project would collapse after the withdrawal of Internews, which they attributed to wealthy, Northern donors’ short-term approach to funding (interview A, freelance journalist, 2012; interview Ensor, Vice President, Africa, Health and Humanitarian Programmes, Internews 2013; Noble, Director of East and Central Africa, Internews, 2013).

Therefore the blog stopped short of defining ‘the problem-at-hand’ (Stones 2014:14) in terms of the deep, value-laden structures shaping media development work, including its ongoing dependence on short-term international aid from private and governmental donors (Berger 2010; LaMay 2007; Miller 2009; Scott 2014a): so implying that the appropriate ‘treatment’ would simply be more international aid (Stones 2014:15). The audience’s ability to scrutinise the values involved was further inhibited by the omission of any mention of the commitments of the freelance journalist and photographer to Internews, even though both were employed by the INGO at the time, and said they had made the editor in question aware of this (interview A, freelance journalist, 2012; interview B, freelance photographer, 2013; Sen 2010). Nor was the funding of Internews by the Gates Foundation mentioned anywhere in the blog, which appeared on ‘Global Development’ site, which is also funded by the Gates Foundation: so masking precisely the same sort of ‘echo chamber’ criticised by US scholars in relation to North American media (Cooper cited in Doughton and Heim 2011).
However, the manner in which news-related INGOs constructed liminal ‘grey areas’ overlapping NGO-work and journalism was also evident elsewhere in GNM. In particular, the second case study, which pertained to a photograph provided by the Kenyan Paraplegic Organization (KPO), was included within an article which appeared to have been written by a Kenyan journalist employed by *The Observer* (Kiberenge 2012). But Kiberenge was sponsored by the David Astor Trust: another news-related INGO set up in memory of a former *Observer* Editor, which provides short, paid, internships for individual journalists from East Africa whom it judges to be ‘promising’ at major newspapers in Johannesburg and London (interview Meyer, Executive Director, David Astor Trust, 2012).

As with the Gates Foundation, the BBC World Service Trust and Internews, the David Astor Trust was not considered by GNM staff to be an INGO at all, even though its remit explicitly states that its purpose is to promote ‘human rights’ (interview Meyer 2012). Instead, *Observer* editors’ conceptualisation of, and trust in, Kiberenge as ‘a fully-fledged journalist’ (interview Rock, News Editor, 2012) rather than an INGO-worker, helped to shape their decision not to question his eagerness to accept multimedia provided by KPO on the grounds of his journalistic competence (Sayer 2007). Their conceptualisation of Kiberenge as ‘a journalist’ also caused them to make no mention of his financial dependence on the David Astor Trust in the published article: thereby inhibiting others’ ability to scrutinise the potential connections between the interpretive frames used by these two NGOs (Sen 2010).

Whilst it is tempting to explore potential causal links between journalists’ approach to the Astor Trust and the dependence of GNM on the Scott Trust, study participants
did not raise this issue, nor did they see any point in exploring potential connections when prompted. Instead, Kiberenge’s immediate editor, Lucy Rock, described her decision to proceed with this story as having been shaped by cost-cutting and role-merging. She stressed that she had ‘trusted’ Kiberenge to write the story because ‘he will know more about Kenya than I do’ (interview 2012) because she was not only ‘not an Africa specialist’, she was not even particularly experienced in covering international news (interview Rock 2012). Instead, she had been forced to cover international news because organisational cost-cutting exercises carried out at The Observer had included merging the roles of the domestic and international news editor (interview Rock 2012).

In addition, both the photo and the interpretative frame in which it was embedded were highly personalised (Cottle and Nolan 2007) and were therefore positively valued by the Deputy Editor of the paper, Paul Webster, whose opinion was sought during a routine editors’ meeting (interview Webster 2013). As Webster explained, his decision not to veto Rock’s decision to allow Kiberenge to pursue the story had been shaped by previous audience studies into newspaper page traffic, but, more importantly, by recent GNM data generated by online algorithms which, he said, showed that ‘people would find that kind of [human interest] story engaging’ (interview 2013; see also Sambrook et al. 2013). Webster and Rock therefore decided to place it in a vacant slot on page three of the paper which had arisen on a Friday, relatively late in the production cycle, as this positioning usually denoted something which was not really ‘hard news’ but ‘human interest or

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34 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
something...cultural...just something different to throw in the mix’ (interview Rock 2012; see also Harcup and O’Neill 2001).

The combination of these generative mechanisms had highly problematic consequences, because Kiberenge not only readily accepted not just of the multimedia provided by those working for the KPO campaign, but also their interpretative frame. This defined the nature of the ‘problem’ faced by Kenya’s paraplegics as the lack of a rehabilitation clinic for those suffering spinal injuries; relevant actors as KPO and its supporters; and the relevant ‘treatment’ or solution’ as raising enough money through voluntary donations for KPO to build a rehabilitation clinic (interview Kiberenge 2012; see also Stones 2014:15). Unfortunately, accepting this interpretative frame without conducting rigorous checks\textsuperscript{35} meant that Kiberenge and The Observer’s editors remained unaware of the complex financial and political interests involved in KPO’s multimedia campaign (interview Rock 2012; interview Webster 2013).

However, a final generative mechanism was crucial in shaping GNM journalists’ acceptance of the NGO-provided multimedia contained within both the Kiberenge article and the blog. This was the way in which both stories were viewed by GNM staff as refreshingly ‘positive’, because they focussed on Africans’ own acts of agency, rather than portraying them as passive recipients of aid (interview Rock 2012; interview Shearlaw 2013). But whilst the portrayal of Africans as agentive individuals may encourage greater empathy than portraying Africans as an undifferentiated mass of passive victims, (Scott 2014a), the perception of such

\textsuperscript{35} See chapter 8.
stories as purely ‘positive’ inhibited questions about which ‘Africans’ were involved, how they were involved, what the conditions of that involvement were, and which (if any) relatively enduring capabilities they might gain as a result (Sen 2010).

Thus journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia at GNM was characterised and legitimised by the interaction of normative ideas about the progressiveness of mediated dialogue and ideas about ‘development’ in ways which reconstruction the moral economy of related outlets. But it also had important consequences for the political economy of those outlets: inhibiting journalists from addressing the embedding of such ‘positive’ portrayals of Africa within broader ‘Africa Rising’ narratives, which frame ‘development’ and ‘African self-help’ as privatised and depoliticised phenomena (Bunce 2013; Scott 2013).

**Conclusion**

At both *The Independent* newspapers and *The Guardian/Observer*, journalists were found to have incorporated US and UK-based INGOs into the network of people upon whom they depended for contributed material, and at GNM this involved normative notions similar to those articulated by proponents of ‘networked journalism’ (Beckett and Mansell 2008; Heinrich 2012; Sambrook 2010). However, the findings contained in this chapter do not sit easily with such theoretical models because multimedia provided by INGOs as well as that provided by national NGOs was never considered alongside UGC, nor was its use found to involve more
‘democratic’ or ‘bottom-up’ approaches to journalism associated with it (Gillmor 2006). Indeed, at The Independent newspapers, the editor in question stressed that he preferred INGO-provided multimedia to ‘so-called citizen journalism’ because of the ‘professionalism’ of those involved (interview Randall 2013; see also Sayer 2001, 2007).

Instead, this chapter demonstrated that why and how multimedia provided by NGOs helped newspaper journalists to cope with their additional workload at a time of organisational cost-cutting: enabling them to produce more content at much faster speeds for print and/or online outlets (Fenton 2010a; Franklin 2011; Lewis et al. 2006). So it builds on existing research which analyses journalists’ uses of NGO-provided material in relation to operational ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982). In particular, it highlights the complexity of these subsidies by demonstrating the variety of ways in which journalists’ use of such material in order to work faster or more cheaply related to their ability to differentiate their outlet from competitors and to manage different kinds of personal and organisational risk (Banks et al. 2000).

But the main focus of this chapter involved demonstrating that the ways in which these ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) were manifest was causally shaped by news outlets’ particular moral economies. These were found to have emerged from news outlets’ internal and external structuring, including that which related to their specific political economies: prompting journalists to view the problems posed by organisational cost-cutting in ways which were strongly shaped by their normative ideas of who and what those working for their outlet were ‘responsible for, beholden to and dependent upon’ (Sayer 2000b:79). Thus although newspaper journalists all
engaged in relatively rapid re-versioning processes which bore some resemblance to ‘churnalism’ (Davies 2008), they tended to privilege different kinds of NGOs and noticeably different kinds of value-laden ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskhar 1979:51) were involved is using the material they contributed.

These position-practices were simultaneously framed and legitimised by journalists who blended the normative values dominant in their own news outlets with those of the NGO whose material they accepted, so producing new ‘strings’ of inter-related normative value-systems: namely, ‘professionalism’/’charity’ at The Independent newspapers and ‘dialogic communities’/’development’ at The Guardian/Observer. This normative blending had important political effects, for it shaped the emergence of heterogeneous sets of relatively enduring ‘trusting’ coalitions between newspaper staff, different kinds of NGOs, and freelancers who worked for both (Franks 2008a; Sayer 2001, 2007; Waisbord 2011).

The emergence of these heterogeneous NGO-news outlet coalitions predisposed editorial staff to accept NGOs’ definitions of particular problems, relevant actors and solutions (Stones 2014), as well as predisposing them to accept future offers of multimedia from them. This was because the emergence of these normatively-laden coalitions with journalists’ increased workload, commercially-driven role-merging, and the related devaluation of geographic and media-based specialisation tended to prevent journalists and other editorial staff from having the time, knowledge and/or inclination to raise difficult questions internally about the nature of the values concerned, let alone to facilitate public forms of reasoning about them (Sen 2010). Therefore although NGO-provided multimedia enhanced journalists’ ability to cover
different kinds of places, issues and processes, journalists’ use of it tended to have predominantly conservative effects.
Chapter 5

BBC News Online: public-commercial hybridity, international aid organisations and African collectives

Much like the editorial staff at newspapers, journalists at BBC News Online used NGO-provided photographs to differentiate their outlet from others despite organisational cuts (Bourdieu 1998), which not only prevented them from hiring their own photographers, but which also involved them producing far more content at a much more rapid pace. Casual labour was also a highly significant generative mechanism shaping these ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) with BBC staff benefitting from INGOs’ employment of highly experienced freelance photographers, rather than having to manage the cost, time and risk involved in hiring such freelancers themselves (Banks et al. 2000; see also Örnebring 2009).

In particular, strong parallels can be drawn BBC News Online and at Guardian.co.uk, with journalists at both outlets using NGO-provided multimedia to cope not only with the very high volumes of visual material thought appropriate to online news outlets, but also to address the problem of how to make their site more immediately attractive and ‘stickier’ to online users, who have a notoriously brief and fickle attention span (Scott 2005:95). However, the manner in which BBC journalists went about this was shaped by the Corporation’s legal obligations, vis-à-vis editorial ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’ (DCMS 2006), which are tied to its particular
structures of media ownership and funding, as well as related forms of accountability to political and regulatory bodies (Sayer 2007; Waisbord 2011).

The first section of this chapter will therefore begin by outlining why and how particular managerial strategies relating to the BBC’s political economy shaped the work of journalists producing the Africa page at BBC News Online. In particular, it will attend to why and how forms of public-commercial hybridity (Küng-Shankleman 2000; Steemers 1999, 2005) have come to shape this outlet. Using internal documents as well as rarely-granted interviews with senior executives, it will demonstrate how the tensions which this hybridity created were tackled by an important committee, which sought to sustain public ‘trust’ in the Corporation’s journalism (Sayer 2001, 2007) by separating day-to-day editorial decision-making conducted by journalists within BBC News from the Corporation’s commercial operations, conducted by BBC Worldwide. But despite this committee explicitly ruling out the possibility of accepting adverts from NGOs, it will then go on to demonstrate why and how organisational cost-cutting in conjunction with dominant aesthetic values and online reception practices predisposed the Africa Editor at BBC News Online to regularly accept multimedia which they have produced.

Next, the second and third sections will explore why and how different forms of public-commercial hybridity shaped the three specific ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskhar 1979:51) structuring the ways in which NGO-provided multimedia reached journalists working on the African page of BBC News Online. Like the newspapers studied earlier, these production processes were separate from the position-

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36 This was the name of Corporation’s commercial wing at the time of sampling: BBC Global News Ltd. was launched a month later.
practices and interpretative frames which shaped the Corporation’s use of UGC (Wardle and Williams 2008, 2010), with the first involving the press officers of international aid agencies approaching the page’s Africa Editor with galleries of images in order to enable him to put together photo slideshows.

This has been included in order to contextualise evidence about two other organisational routes: both of which fed into BBC journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia about relatively long-term issues in their construction of ‘Special Reports’ of archived material pertaining to particular countries and/or issues. The first of these involved BBC journalists collaborating on trips with international aid agencies, and which is explored in relation to the fourth case study, which involved BBC journalists collaborating with staff at Save the Children UK on a trip to rural South Sudan in order to produce an audio slideshow about a former child soldier living there.

Meanwhile, the last organisational route was found to involve the deliberate ‘cannibalisation’ of World Service content (Phillips 2012a) by dedicated teams of BBC journalists, in order to put together items which they then ‘pitched’ to those working on the Africa page of the site. Why and how photos taken by African collectives and cooperatives came to be included in items conceptualised as ‘features’ is discussed in relation to the fifth case study, which involved photos taken by a South Sudanese media collective, Woyee Film and Theatre Ltd and provided to journalists involved in ‘reversioning’ work via Facebook. This discussion will conclude by discussing why and how the use of NGO-provided multimedia led journalists to reconstruct their conceptualisations of the normative purpose/s of the
BBC’s ‘public service journalism’ in ways which had important political, as well as moral implications.

1: Public-commercial hybridity

It is worth beginning by stressing that the BBC is a public corporation whose very existence is justified in British law by notions of its normative value to the British public, including its obligations to provide high-quality international news to British people which is independent from, and impartial to, political and commercial interests (DCMS 2006). Indeed, the body to which the BBC is most immediately accountable, the BBC Trust, announced that it would be conducting a major investigation into the impartiality of the Corporation’s output only ten days before the sample was taken (Plunkett 2012; see also Prebble 2013).

Nevertheless, at the point of renewing its Charter in 1996, the Corporation was obliged to accept that one of its core objectives should be to generate income through commercial activities, in order to supplement the licence fee (discussed in Steemers 1999; Tracey 1998). This move was portrayed by the Conservative government at the time as the logical next step after the Broadcasting Act of 1990, which introduced multichannel competition in ways which benefitted Tories’ commercial allies, especially the Murdoch family (Born 2004; Küng-Shankleman 2000). The Conservatives’ influence also shaped the appointment of John Birt, who became Deputy Director General in 1987, and then served as Director General from
1992 to 2000: during which time he introduced a number of marketised intra-organisational structures, including the highly controversial ‘Producer Choice’ which obliged journalists and others to buy the products and services they needed from in-house departments or external providers (Born 2004; Debrett 2010).

During this period, another new intra-organisational structure was introduced which explicitly repositioned the Corporation in relation to commercial/international, rather than democratic/national, collectivities - BBC Worldwide. Since BBC World TV was embedded within this department\(^\text{37}\) (Küng-Shankleman 2000), it might therefore be assumed that a similar commercial/global model dominated the Corporation’s launch of its online service in 1997 (Allan and Thorsen 2010; Born 2004). But senior managers stressed that it was the rapid growth in online audiences overseas, especially in North America, following the bombing of the World Trade Centre in 2001, and the later bombing of the London Underground in 2005, which prompted them to consider whether placing advertising on the international-facing English-language site (BBCNews.com) might help the Corporation fund its international coverage and digital expansion (interview David Moody, the Director of Strategy for BBC Worldwide, 2014; Mark Byford, former Deputy Director-General, BBC, 2014; interview Richard Sambrook, former Head of Global News, BBC, 2014).

In particular, senior BBC executives hoped that the monies raised would enable them to divert the Foreign Office Grant-in-Aid - which was at that time funding the international-facing section of the website, as well as World Service Radio - to Arabic satellite TV, because the Iraq war had led to this being ‘a big priority’ for the

\(^{37}\) This is now called BBC World News.
Corporation (interview Sambrook 2014). Thus one of the things which this study adds to existing work about *BBC News Online* and its increasing centrality within BBC news production (Allan and Thorsen 2011; Jones and Salter 2012; Lee-Wright 2010) are understandings about the way in which the website was repositioned, rather belatedly, as the ‘partner’ of BBC World TV (interviews Byford; Moody 2014).

This involved BBC Worldwide selling ‘cross-platform’ advertising packages spanning both outlets and BBC managers merging both outlets’ ‘back office overheads’ (interview Sambrook 2014), as well as developing automated systems which would allow video to be transferred quickly and easily from BBC World TV to Online where it could be used to generate highly lucrative pre-roll video advertising (interview Moody 2014; see also Lee-Wright 2010; Thurman and Lupton 2008). So it is not only the Corporation which can be seen as a kind of commercial-PSB hybrid (Steemers 1999, 2005), but also *BBC News Online* itself, which now brings in considerable revenue through adverts visible to its English-speaking international users, but which remains entirely advert-free to its UK users, in accordance with the terms of the BBC Agreement.

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38 Data about advertising income is not usually published by the BBC, but Moody, the Director of Strategy for BBC Worldwide, agreed to share some ‘ball-park’ figures with me. He said that at the time of interviewing in 2014, the projected advertising income of the site was $75 million, having risen from $50-55 million in 2012 when the sample was taken, and $20-24 million prior to that in 2009, when the effects of the global recession combined with the relative newness of the BBC brand to US advertisers made for ‘a tough couple of years’ (interview Moody 2014).

He added that the US is the largest advertising market, bringing in 40-50% of the site’s advertising income, especially through ‘premium display’ adverts aimed at socio-economic elites, although other sizable markets exist in Canada, Europe, Australia and Asia (interview Moody 2014).
Nevertheless, BBC staff did not tend to talk in terms of hybridity, but in terms of a clear ‘split’ or ‘separation’ between the ‘commercial and public’ functions of the site (interview Herrmann 2013; interview Moody 2014). This conceptualisation stems from the work of a committee established by the Deputy Director General, Mark Byford, after he took the decision to go ahead with advertising on BBC News.com in 2007. For Byford had decided that it was necessary to come up with organisational structures and policies in order to ‘ensure a clear divide’ between editorial and commercial decision-making, so that the ‘public trust in the authority of the BBC’s journalism’ was not endangered (interview 2014).

However Sambrook, who chaired that committee in his capacity as Head of Global News, spoke much more frankly about the ‘enormous’ internal tensions underpinning its institution (interview 2014), explaining that

> Worldwide had always wanted to make the site as commercial as possible...Basically, they thought they could make a fortune from it. But they didn’t always understand the editorial sensitivities involved.

> They just kept pushing and pushing... So this is why you had the committee set up, and reviews and panels and reports and things... It was to keep Worldwide honest, really.

(interview 2014)

The committee constructed a series of organisational policies and structures which were designed to prevent editorial decision-making from being influenced by commercial aims, including ruling out accepting adverts from NGOs after a test-case regarding Oxfam. For ‘along with other political...lobby or pressure groups’ accepting adverts from NGOs was found to be ‘inappropriate’ and potentially damaging to
public perceptions of the BBC’s impartiality and independence (BBC Strategic Approval Committee 2009:10; see also interview Sambrook 2014).

But in March 2010, Mark Thompson, the BBC’s then Director General, decided to cut the budget for Online by 25%: a ‘tactical move’ designed to ward off attacks by the Corporation’s commercial rivals, especially the Murdoch family, who argued that the hybridity of the BBC’s funding meant that it was being given an unfair commercial advantage in the global media market (Franklin 2012:7). Such criticisms were not new, but the threat they posed to the BBC seemed likely to have greater effect under a government led by the Conservative party, which has a long history of ideological opposition to state-supported public service broadcasting (Hendy 2013; Tumber 2011), and which looked likely to win the General Election in May.

But despite Thompson’s efforts to pre-empt attacks on the licence fee, the new Conservative-led Coalition government announced a six year freeze of the licence fee in October 2010, as well as obliging the Corporation to pay for other services previously subsidised directly by the British government, including BBC World Service Radio (WSR): all of which led to the BBC experiencing a 16% drop in income in real terms (Hendy 2013; Tumber 2011). The combination of these two rounds of organisational cost-cutting led to widespread staffing reductions at BBC Online by the summer of 2012, including one post from the Africa Online team (interviews Herrmann; Winter 2013).

The site’s Africa Editor, Joseph Winter, said the loss of this post had left him and his remaining team-mate, Lucy Fleming,
…just *flying* around [smiling] …like …a blue-arsed fly…. I mean, Africa is a very busy patch *most* of the time….

And now? [shrugs] *Much* more so.

(interview 2013)

Winter attributed this change in his working conditions to a deliberate managerial strategy to allocate staff and limited resources in relation to the size and location of *Online* audiences, which corresponded to the location of the site’s main advertising markets (interview 2014). As he put it,

We’ve only got two people; there’s one person on Latin America; and there’s two on Middle East. But there’s a whole *team* on North America…

But the online audience in Africa [and for African news][^39] is still relatively small…So *Online* managers are going to put their resources into where their audience is biggest, which is Europe and the West.

(interview Winter 2013)

Winter’s account of the location of online audiences corresponds, broadly speaking, to Moody’s account of the site’s main advertising markets (interview 2014). But the overall Editor of *BBC News Online*, Steve Herrmann, denied that editorial staff had been allocated on the basis of the geographic location of online audiences or advertising markets, asserting that

We are actually taking posts out of the operation on a fairly regular basis…not just Africa, but in general…

[^39]: Winter later explained that African webpage was the second least popular regional page with around 250,000 unique users per week (interview 2013).
It’s just about [tuts] trying to find the most efficient ways of producing content, based on [inhales sharply] …on the art of the possible and multi-platform working…just trying to make the most of the content that we’ve got really.

(interview 2013)

It is interesting to compare Herrmann’s comments with those made in the previous chapter by O’Grady, the senior manager at The Independent newspapers, because both seemed unwilling or unable to reflect upon the possibility that ‘efficiencies’ might have unforeseen consequences (Bhaskhar 1979; Toynbee 2008): changing the nature of journalistic practice, as well as journalists’ views of its purpose. In this case, Winter’s response to this change in his working conditions was to concentrate his and Fleming’s energies on the production of news, which he re-framed as ‘our core job’ as public service journalists, even though news stories were not always the most frequently-viewed items (interview 2013; see also Goffman 1986). For, as he put it

…if there’s some huge story, I don’t know, Boston marathon bombings or 9/11 or, you know, those kind of things, that’s when… we come into our own.

That’s our real … when people really come to our sites in huge numbers, so we have to give them the news. That’s really public service journalism….

Actually…that’s what journalism is really, isn’t it? Mostly, it’s telling people the news, what’s happening, wherever it is.

(interview 2013)

Thus although the BBC continues to refuse to take adverts from NGOs in order to avoid damaging public trust in the ‘impartiality’ and ‘independence’ of its journalism (interview Byford 2014; see Sayer 2001, 2007), Winter regularly accepted NGO-
provided multimedia to help him to fill the Watch/Listen section built into the bottom of the page (interview Winter 2013). For then, he could concentrate on producing news, which he regarded as both visually and symbolically ‘central to what we do at Online’ (interview 2013). In particular, large amounts of INGO-provided photography about Africa were found on the UK edition of BBC News Online – roughly equal to the quantities found on Guardian.co.uk – most of which was included in this section.

2.1: International aid agencies and ‘impartiality’

Although this was not apparent in the sample taken, journalists claimed that the main ‘position-practice system’ (Bhaskhar 1979:51) through which NGO-provided multimedia entered the Watch/Listen section of the site involved the press officers for major international aid organisations approaching Winter, the site’s Africa Editor, by calling or emailing him in person, rather than going through Corporation’s UGC hub (Wardle and Williams 2010). Much like the practices discussed by Powell at The Guardian.co.uk (interview 2013), this involved such press officers offering him a selection of photos, in order to create photo slide-shows for the Watch/Listen section (interview Winter 2013). Although the fourth case study involved a much rarer occasion when an INGO press officer (from Save the Children UK) had offered to collaborate with a BBC journalist (Fleming) on a trip, with the journalist producing the audio for the slideshow, and an INGO-worker (Crowley) providing the photos (interview Fleming 2012; interview Winter 2013).

40 The problems which the brevity of the sampling period caused will be discussed in the Conclusion.
Winter made the editorial decisions to go ahead in both kinds of situations, describing the main factor shaping his decision-making like this:

> The big aid agencies often come up with very good photos; very strong, powerful photos... I'm looking for emotion, artistry, you know, just a... a powerful picture that tells a story. You know it when you see it, really...

> If we were to be offered pictures that weren't very good, we wouldn't use them. But mostly they're really good.

(interview 2013)

Underpinning this judgement are obviously shared aesthetic traditions which will be discussed in Chapter 7, but also shared judgements about the desirability of avoiding photos of suffering which only have ‘shock value’, at least outside of major ‘emergencies’, in order to avoid ‘wearing out audiences who just tune out that stuff after a while’ (interview Winter 2012; see also Moeller 1999). But both of these generative mechanisms also relate, more broadly, to a third: that is, the highly visual nature of online journalism. This was problematic for BBC journalists working on the Africa page because BBC News Online only has one picture editor who sometimes takes his own photos, along with a second photographer with whom he occasionally works. As Herrmann, the site’s overall Editor explained, neither are usually available for travel outside the UK (interview 2013).

For these reasons, Herrmann argued that staff should make creative use of the Corporation’s other resources, by taking still ‘grabs’ from BBC footage or by asking in-country reporters to take their own photos, even if this was only on their mobile phones (interview 2013). But the journalists working on the Africa page disagreed
with him: arguing that photos of a greater technical and aesthetic quality than could be afforded by either strategy were more appropriate to online publication, given the ferocity of competition between online providers of ‘global’ news and online audiences’ short and fickle attention span (interview Fleming 2012; interview Winter 2013). Indeed, in both case studies, BBC journalists could have taken their own photos, but chose not to because they felt that these would be of insufficient quality: in both cases, photos taken by NGOs were used instead (interviews Copnall; Fleming 2012).

Winter’s deliberations about using NGO-provided photos were also shaped by the fact that Online’s budget for buying in photographs from external parties was ‘not big’ (interview 2013) and was used primarily for agency subscriptions, rather than paying for freelancers because, much like GNM, the Corporation’s senior managers had prioritised investing in online video because of the greater commercial value of pre-roll adverts to advertisers (interview Herrmann 2013; interview Moody 2014; see Thurman and Lupton 2008). In addition, like their counterparts at The Independent on Sunday, the main cost which Winter felt that BBC journalists ‘couldn’t afford’ was not so much the fees commanded by ‘really good’ freelancers,41 but their travel costs which could run to ‘thousands of pounds’ (interview 2013).

Moreover, BBC staff saw international aid agencies’ employment of freelancers as helping them to manage other kinds of risk (Banks et al. 2000). For, like staff at The Independent, BBC journalists believed that these kinds of organisations ‘had a reputation to protect’ (interview Winter 2013). Although they interpreted this as

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41 The BBC’s fee for a photo slideshow in 2012 was £300 (interview Winter 2013).
involving such organisations putting in place safeguards to prevent freelancers ‘faking’ sensational material to advance their careers: remaining mindful of an incident in 2011, when the Corporation was obliged by the BBC Trust to hand back an award which Panorama had won for a documentary which included footage taken on trust from a freelancer, which was later found to be inauthentic (The Daily Telegraph 2011, discussed in interview Giles, Editor, Panorama, 2012).

BBC staff also described the benefits of INGOs’ employment of freelancers in terms of the Corporation’s increased reluctance to commission them, especially when this involved trips to dangerous areas. In these discussions, most cited an incident in 2003 when Pascale Harter - who was covering an outbreak of the deadly flesh-eating virus Ebola in a rural area of Northern DRC for the BBC World Service - was believed to have contracted the disease (Harter 2003). As Harter regularly worked for the BBC, one staff journalist said that

...no-one really realised that she was technically on a freelance contract until then... Of course, she was very sick and it was absolutely right that we got her out of there as fast as possible and with the best medical care we could find. But it did cost the BBC an absolute fortune because, as a freelancer, she wasn’t covered by our insurance in the same way...

So it was drummed into us after that by our managers: ‘If they are freelancers who are hired by the BBC to do a job of work for the BBC, then we have a duty of care towards them, and if they really get into trouble we have a responsibility to get them out of there – and that isn’t going to come cheap’. So we tend not to send freelancers on risky gigs so much these days.

(interview 2012)

Whilst parallels can be drawn with the way in which newspapers used INGOs to shoulder the time and financial expenditure involved in sending freelancers to dangerous and difficult-to-reach areas, the manner in which BBC staff embraced
such subsidies (Gandy 1982) was also shaped by the Corporation’s Editorial Guidelines, which are in turn shaped by the BBC Agreement. This Agreement stresses that the corner-stone of the Corporation’s ‘public service’ mandate is its provision of ‘accurate’ and ‘impartial’ news and current affairs coverage to the British public, in order to help create and sustain an informed and engaged national electorate: a commitment which the BBC Trust enforces in between Charters (Hendy 2013; Jones and Salter 2012).

But neither the BBC’s Agreement nor its more detailed Editorial Guidelines deal specifically with the issue of whether to use NGO-provided multimedia, and if so why and how this should be done. Instead, the Guidelines really only address the BBC’s engagement with charities. These clauses were last updated in October 2010 because of a ruling issued by the BBC Trust in response to complaints made about the Corporation’s refusal to take part in the DEC’s Gaza appeal of 2009 (correspondence Wiseman 2014). They therefore focus upon BBC employees’ approach to charities’ fundraising appeals (BBC Editorial Guidelines 16.52-16.4.55). Although they also contain general statements about the need for BBC employees to maintain their ‘impartiality and independence’ when dealing with charities in relation to ‘other output’: taking care ‘that such arrangements do not give the impression that the BBC is promoting the charity or endorsing it above other charities working in the same field’ (BBC Editorial Guidelines 16.4.57-16.4.58).

Journalists at BBC News Online were found to have developed their own collective strategies in relation to these general organisational policies, which included being
meticulous about the full and accurate attribution of all NGO-provided material\(^{42}\) and ‘paying their way’ on the far rarer occasions when a *BBC Online* journalist went on a trip with an NGO, in order to collaborate on a project (interviews Herrmann; Winter 2013). However, the site’s Africa Editor, Joseph Winter, had also developed his own approach. This involved emphasising the retention of his ‘editorial judgement as a journalist’ by insisting that INGOs gave him a large collection of photographs to choose from in order to compose slideshows,\(^{43}\) and by always making a point of rewriting the captions underneath photographs, even if the changes he made were quite minimal\(^{44}\) (interview Winter 2013).

In addition, Winter stressed that his extensive experience of covering Africa had taught him to be ‘wary’ of using material from NGOs which had ‘party political links’ and to remain mindful of the need to research smaller NGOs with which he was unfamiliar (interview 2013). But he lacked the time necessary to conduct thorough checks regarding such material, so tended to use material from international aid agencies whose charitable status meant that they had to avoid explicit political links (interview 2013). Finally, Winter tended to ‘spread out’ his acceptance of material from different international aid agencies because

\(^{42}\) The only example of BBC output in which NGO-provided multimedia was not clearly attributed was a film clip which had become archived in the BBC’s library without being properly tagged and which was subsequently re-used by a correspondent in a TV package.

\(^{43}\) Fleming, Winter’s colleague, said that choosing from a gallery of 30-40 shots was normal (interview 2012) and the slideshows in this sample contained between around 20 different images.

\(^{44}\) The implications of journalists’ focus on text, rather than pictures, as the locus of editorial control will be discussed in Chapter 7.
...otherwise we get complaints from all the other aid agencies, saying, you know ... you're giving undue prominence to one aid agency over another.

(interview 2013)

Thus the everyday demands of Winter’s workload meant that he tended to veer away from a more radical interpretation of the demands of ‘impartiality’ in his day-to-day decision-making, such as the ‘wagon-wheel’ model espoused by the BBC’s Head of Global News, Peter Horrocks, which commits the Corporation to finding ways of including a wide range of ‘cultures, beliefs and identities’ (2007:5). Nevertheless, much like Soal, the Africa Editor at The Guardian, Winter’s geographic expertise caused him to be somewhat uneasy about the implications of his repeated acceptance of photographs provided by major aid agencies: linking this not to BBC policy, but to broader political concerns that it was not good ‘for Africa’s long term health to be forever dependent on foreign aid groups going in and building schools and hospitals or whatever’ (interview 2013).

Nevertheless, the prominent role of NGO-provided multimedia in the Watch/Listen section of the site, when coupled with the relative devaluation of regional editors’ geographic expertise caused both to re/frame and compartmentalise these political concerns as ‘personal’ in ways which absolved them from more overt forms of conflict with others in their organisation (interviews 2013). Indeed, Winter not only compartmentalised these values as his ‘personal views’, he also compartmentalised the role of NGO-provided multimedia on the site: stressing that it was usually used in the Watch/Listen section, so didn’t affect the ‘real [news] journalism’ carried out at BBC News Online (interview 2013).
However, editing such material clearly took up a significant amount of Winter’s time, especially when he republished INGO-provided photographic slideshows within the other section where it was found. This was the ‘Special Report’ section, for, as Fleming, Winter’s junior colleague on the Africa page explained, such reports are curated collections of archive material, which are meant to provide ‘background’ about a particular country and/or theme, in an ‘engaging’ manner, rather than as ‘dry analysis’ (interview 2012). The visual impressiveness of INGO-provided slideshows, as well as their coverage of relatively ‘long-running’ issues (interview Winter 2013), meant that they were seen as suitable for republication within these ‘Special Reports’, even a year or two after their original publication date, and could ‘sit’ on the website for longer periods than other kinds of content.45

But Winter made it clear that he suspected that the time-consuming processes involved in producing these ‘Special Collections’ were driven by commercial imperatives, rather than editorial priorities or audience preferences, saying that

> To be honest, [the Special Collections] are a pain, you know. They take a lot of time, fiddling around, putting them in, making them look nice, and not many people click on them… But, erm, [thinking], you know, the thing to say is, who decides when we do them is important …

> There has been, if not exactly pressure, then talk of experiments about advertisers, because … if there’s a special event coming up then there’s so many adverts around it.

> And if there’s a special page, then … for example, banks operating in South Sudan, you know, the likes of them may like to advertise around that so the page has to look really snazzy.

(interview 2013)

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45 The two ‘Special Reports’ found in this sample remained online for 6 and 8 weeks respectively.
Such position-practices provide an illustration of a different way in which journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia was causally shaped by the commercial considerations: so undermining what Moody, the Head of Strategy at BBC Worldwide, had claimed was the Corporation’s ‘absolute and clear separation between Church and State, editorial and commercial decision-making’ (interview 2014).

2.2: ‘Selling in’

However, this study found that the highly commercialised, promotional position-practices (Bhaskhar 1979; Davis 2013b) structuring internal relations between staff at BBC News Online were far more significant in shaping why and how NGO-provided multimedia was used. Lucy Fleming, Winter’s junior colleague, discussed this at length: explaining that the kinds of distinctive and high-quality photos provided by international aid agencies enhanced her capability to persuade other BBC staff to ‘promote’ such items on the main indexes of the site. But Fleming not only characterised this process of internal negotiation as a form of ‘pushing’, but as ‘selling’, as this extract from her interview demonstrates:

I think [aid agencies] are often able to provide that something a bit different we are always looking for [sic]…For example, these [indicates photos provided by a major aid agency] got quite a big push on the site…You know, when it comes to clicks, it’s often a question of whether you get quite good promotion on the front pages.

So at Online you are always trying to sort of sell your story to different pages. So…you’ve got the World index and you’ve got the international front page [and] the UK-facing front pages.
You’re always trying to get these features onto those front pages, so that it gets the most hits….If you are Desk Editor that day, you will call up those Editors and push it to those front pages.

So it is very much up to those Editors on the day, although sometimes at the morning meeting something will get a great big push from the overall Head [of Online].

(interview 2012)

Indeed, what was particularly significant in Fleming’s account of these practices was the manner in which she extended the same metaphors of promotional ‘pushing’ or ‘selling’ to the whole chain of relationships involved in using INGO-provided multimedia: beginning with aid agencies’ approaches to her, continuing through her relations with her colleagues at Online, and ending with the act of persuading as many online users as possible to click on the material in question: all of which hinged on the notion that the success of stories could be measured by their popularity with audiences, as indicated by the site’s algorithms.

Much like at GNM, BBC journalists were well aware that the most popular material was that which featured highly emotive, ‘personalised’ or ‘human’ stories (Harcup and O’Neill 2001; Sambrook et al. 2013). As Fleming explained

LF: When you are on Online, you’ve got all the statistics you can see what people are clicking on and you have to try and sell your story in a way that people will read them [sic]…I mean, you get daily [algorithmic] reports and when you go on [to the site] you can even see the most popular stories. So there’s always loads of statistics about what works well.

So, you know dry analysis is just not going to work. Well, some people will be interested in it, but to really sell the story you need to get personal in [sic]. So you are always trying to find you know, the human story …
Actually Deng [Chan, a former child soldier in South Sudan whom Save the Children provided photographs of, whilst Fleming provided the audio] was perfect, I mean he is really easy to sell, isn’t he? You know, a boy soldier… [tails off and gesticulates]

KW: Why did you see Deng as having been ‘easy to sell’?

LF: Well, he’s got a personally strong story so you can always find lots of little emotive ways of getting people to click on it...

(interview 2012)

Thus BBC journalists’ representation of Africans as ‘human’ was intricately bound up with, and indeed dominated by, marketised processes within the BBC and their relationship to ‘globalised’ systems of financial capital. The kinds of personalisation and emotionalisation found in such media representations therefore risk marginalising specificity, otherness and politics in order to entertain the kinds of largely Northern-based élites consuming BBC News Online without challenging them in any profound fashion (Calhoun 2003; Cheah 2013; Chouliaraki and Blaagaard 2013).

Yet it would be overly simplistic to describe even Fleming’s uses of NGO-provided multimedia as a complete shift away from a Reithian model of ‘telling people what they need to know’ and towards a wholly commercialised model which offers some, privileged people ‘what they want – when, where and how they want it’ (Lee-Wright 2010: 74). For Fleming legitimised her approach in terms of her engagement in the Reithian mission to educate (Born 2004; Küng-Shankleman 2000): arguing that the ‘whole point’ of her work was to try and get as many Online readers as possible to read items about Africa because ‘they should understand at least some of the issues involved’ (interview 2012).
The kind of education which Fleming used to legitimise her acceptance of NGO-provided multimedia involved forging imaginary relations of empathy between the audiences of *BBC News Online*, whom she conceptualised as living in Northern cities, much like herself, and others whose lives were very different, through the highly visual nature of new media (Chouliaraki 2008; Chouliaraki and Blaagaard 2013; Silverstone 2007). For she added that she saw the kinds of highly evocative photos provided by aid agencies as invaluable in ‘people understand what it’s like to be them’, particularly more innovative forms which allow *Online* readers to ‘move around’ within or between digital scenes ‘as if they were really there’ (interview 2012).

But Fleming did not examine the tensions between these aims and the possible consequences of the interlinking position-practices of ‘selling in’ which she described as characterising her relations with INGOs, with her colleagues at *Online*, and their audiences. This is highly significant, not only because she was correct in assuming that this was the way that press officers at Save the Children UK framed their negotiations with her (Goffman 1986), but also because of the way in which their shared position-practices had emerged from public relations in ways which privileged individualistic and advantage-seeking forms of behaviour (Davis 2013b; Moloney 2006).

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46 What Fleming is referring to here is the 360° photo with audio inserts which was compiled during the same Save the Children trip to South Sudan as the slideshow about Chan (Crowley and Fleming 2010b), as will be discussed in Chapter 8. However, it is debatable how much these kinds multimedia projects really do help bridge the distance between audiences and distant others, as their ‘hypermediacy’ tends to concentrate attention on the technological sophistication of the media project itself (Scott 2014a:163; see also Kennedy 2009).

47 This will be discussed in Chapter 8.
Given Fleming’s own background in public relations at the BBC, future studies might therefore do well to explore not only how and why journalists’ use of NGO-provided material might be shaped by former journalists’ importation of journalistic norms into NGOs (Fenton 2010a), but also whether a related importation of promotional norms (Davis 2013b) into journalistic production is being conducted by those who used to work in public relations. Moreover, Fleming, along with Winter and Soal at The Guardian, were deeply uncomfortable with being invited to reflect upon the possible ways in which their ethnicity and upbringing might shape their editorial decision-making: so refusing to confront the way in which these white, relatively privileged African-born journalists controlled the representation of ‘ordinary Africans’ as ‘human’ (interview Fleming 2012).\(^48\)

But something specific to the BBC also seems to have been going on here, because Fleming’s approach was explicitly shaped by the interaction of two very different sub-organisational cultures – BBC News Online and the African services of World Service Radio (WSR). For she repeatedly claimed that Online items with a ‘more human focus’ were in keeping with a specific ‘African service’ ethos, especially when they enabled ‘ordinary Africans’ voices to be heard’, like the audio slideshow of the former child soldier (interview Fleming 2012).

Indeed, all but one of the journalists (Herrmann) in the case studies carried out at the BBC had a professional background within the African services of World Service Radio (WSR), and both members of the Africa Online team were physically seated alongside those working for these services – a whole floor away from others working

\(^{48}\) Winter was born in Malawi; Fleming was born and raised in Zimbabwe; and Soal was born and raised in South Africa.
on *News Online* colleagues within the BBC’s new Broadcasting House. This is crucial because as BBC journalists become less able to leave their desks because of the nature and volume of their work (Lee-Wright 2010), who they are able to interact with on a daily basis, whilst remaining seated, gains a disproportionate significance (interview Fleming 2012; interview Winter 2013).

### 3: African collectives and the ‘cannibalisation’ of World Service Radio

This seating plan had been decided upon by managers in order to mitigate the loss of the third *Africa Online* post (interview Herrmann 2013). For, inspired by the Egyptian uprising of spring 2011, the British Foreign Affairs Select Committee had argued that the funding of WSR should be ring-fenced because of the way in which it ‘helps those living under dictatorial and tyrannical governments’ (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011). Whilst this did not lead to the reversal of the cuts which had already been implemented,49 or to the reinstatement of the Grant-in-Aid, it did lead to the Foreign Office giving WSR some additional funding to help smooth its transition to being funded by the licence fee (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2011).50

Yet seating *Africa Online* journalists alongside those working for the African services of WSR was not conceptualised by managers in terms of serving WSR, but was framed as an extractive process which served the Corporation’s top commercial

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49 This included the loss of 60 Arabic Service staff and the whole Portuguese for Africa Service in 2010; earlier cuts included the loss of the West Africa Correspondent in 2005.

50 These monies totalled £253m in 2011, £242m in 2012 and £238m in 2013.
priority, BBC News Online. For the site’s Editor explained, the seating plan was
designed to encourage a more ‘efficient’ transfer of knowledge from the ‘experts’ in
African services to staff working on the website (interview Herrmann 2013). Likewise,
a group of WSR journalists had been tasked with ‘combing’ the station’s content in
order to locate and ‘reversion’ (interview Herrmann 2013) or ‘cannibalise’ (Phillips
2012a) stories suitable for Online. These journalists then had to ‘pitch’ to Winter or
Fleming, who were both time-poor. So as Stephanie Hegarty, the World Service
journalist tasked with looking for non-news items in the English language explained,
she tended to choose ideas which they knew Winter and Fleming would find
immediately appealing (interview 2012).

As Hegarty went on to clarify, features were often prioritised during this process
(interview 2012) because the journalists on the Africa desk ‘just don’t have time to do
that themselves…They’re *insanely* busy’ (interview 2012). In fact, less than a year
after the sample was taken, the work of those ‘combing’ the English-language output
of WSR was formally restructured. Jinkinson, Hegarty’s former line manager,
explained that this restructure favoured non-news items by allocating more members
of staff to this form of reversioning work (interview former Manager of BBC World
Service Future Media, 2014).51 This begs for more research to be done about the
ways in which this restructure might relate to commercial imperatives, because
Moody, the Head of Strategy at Worldwide, had stressed that he needed more
features because

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51 Separate arrangements have always existed for those ‘combing’ other language services
(correspondence Landor 2014).
Advertisers do not want their brand around hard news for the most part because ... [sighs]...
Well, firstly there are also very strict [BBC] rules around what adverts can appear around [news]....But, secondly, advertisers... you know... who wants to advertise a piece [sighs in exasperated fashion] let's think... about Syria for example?

It is just too depressing and it is also very unpredictable. What people tend to want in advertising is the stuff around news, which tends to be...if we think about the traditional newspaper format, the stuff you would find in the features section.

(interview 2014)

In particular, Moody had argued that advertisers were looking to ‘associate their brand’ with ‘up-beat’ features

... around Business, around Finance, around Health and Well-being, around Motoring – all the things that in their extreme form would be in what the Financial Times publishes in 'How to Spend' on a Saturday.

(interview 2014)

Indeed, Moody said that Worldwide was ‘having to’ spend money commissioning these kinds of features from ‘the market’ rather than from BBC journalists because BBC journalists simply didn’t make enough of these kinds of media items: stressing that these Worldwide-commissioned features now comprised ‘an increasingly large part - often the majority’ of the features on BBC News.com (correspondence 2014).

Nevertheless, Hegarty, the producer combing BBC World Service output in this case study, was not aware of these commercial imperatives. Instead, she had only a generalised impression that the site ‘needed more features’ and that ‘positive’ features would be particularly warmly received by those senior to her, as long as they were also immediately engaging ‘human stories… with a bit of drama’ because
‘they’re always fun to read’ (interview 2012). So she did not consciously select media items to re-version on the basis of their appeal to advertisers; rather, she described herself as serving a different commercial aim - helping the BBC to differentiate itself from its competitors (interview 2012; see also Bourdieu 1998).

This was part of the reason why Hegarty said she was keen to ‘pick up’ media items about small African collectives and cooperatives, including the South Sudanese NGO, Woyee Film and Theatre Industry Ltd: arguing that

…it’s really something different that you probably won’t get anywhere else…

It’s the kind of story that the BBC is in a unique position to do because of how big our network of reporters is. It shows that they are all over the world – unlike many other news organisations.

(interview 2012)

But she went on to explain that particular kinds of ‘reporters’ were involved in this, because although these kinds of items were sometimes produced by the ‘big Newsgathering-sponsored correspondents’, they were more frequently produced by semi-freelance local-national ‘stringers’ working for the African service of WSR (interview Hegarty 2012; see Bunce 2011). So whilst selecting such stories for Online seems to have been strongly shaped by commercially-related factors, the organisational structures concerned did seem to have some progressive potential, in so far as they involved more diverse kinds of journalists and disseminated knowledge about the work of lesser-known groups (Sen 2010).
However, since WSR contains no pictures, Hegarty’s ‘reversioning’ work not only included conducting other interviews, but also soliciting photographs from the NGOs themselves, either directly through email or through social media such as Facebook pages (interview 2012). Indeed, Hegarty stated that a large number of photos were usually needed per article because BBC practice involves users having ‘at least one visual’ within view at all times as they scroll down the page, in order to make the site visually appealing (interview 2012). Therefore access to BBC Online was often limited to those NGOs with enough financial and cultural capital to maintain a web presence (Curran el al. 2012); those which were based in the geographic locations where internet access was a realistic possibility; and those which were also able and willing to take photos of ‘reasonable’ technical and compositional qualities (interview Hegarty 2012). Although compromises were sometimes made ‘as otherwise we wouldn’t be able to do the story at all’ (interview Hegarty 2012).

In addition, Hegarty’s representation of the Woyee story is worth attending to, for this involved reframing the nature of the ‘problems’ involved; the nature of the actors’ powers and relations to one another; and the nature of the ‘treatment’ or ‘solution’ recommended (Stones 2014:14-15). This is because Hegarty’s focus on ‘the human element’ led her to exclude much of the complexity and political context contained in Copnall’s original radio package (interview 2012), including the conflicts between those returning and those who stayed during the civil war, as well as the conflicts between those dwelling in rural villages and those living in Juba, South Sudan’s capital city (Copnall 2011).
Hegarty’s representation of the piece also involved her excluding any mention of the alternative value systems included in Copnell’s original piece (Sen 2010), which were crucial to understanding how and why Woyee functions in the way that it does. As Daniel Danis, Woyee’s Chairperson, explained

‘Woyee’ is an enchantment [a chant] that is used in South Sudan to…appreciate somebody or to appreciate what has been done by somebody. So during the revolution and during the war in South Sudan soldiers would always encourage each other by saying ‘Woyee’…

[We chose that name] because we all have the same vision and we want to encourage each other to keep it…

You know, the original members met in Kakuma [a refugee camp in Kenya]… So we go to… same school from primary [laughs] … and we would go back in the evening to eat together. So myself and my friends have always been tied together in ways which encourage co-operation. ...

[That is why] whenever we have an activity for the entire community, we are sure that everybody participates…If the number is limited, we take turns. One time you try at the Director, the next time you become the camera person.

(interview 2013)

Indeed, as Danis went on to explain, no-one in the co-operative has a regular, paid position, and members have often decided collectively to not pay themselves after fulfilling contracts because they wanted to reinvest in purchasing technical equipment or in renting premises for the good of the whole group (interview 2013). So by concentrating solely on the desire of Woyee members to create a South Sudanese film ‘industry’ in her writing (Copall and Hegarty 2011) and by choosing photographs which depicted Woyee members’ use of modern cameras and other technical equipment (interview Hegarty 2012), Hegarty marginalised Woyee
members’ egalitarian and communitarian approach to a series of complex, interrelated social conflicts, in favour of foregrounding a more simplistic and ‘positive’ ‘Africa Rising’ narrative, which linked the spread of communications technology, returning diaspora, and ‘African’ culture to capitalistic entrepreneurialism (Bunce 2013; Scott 2013).

Whilst such an approach is clearly far more ‘advertiser-friendly’ (interview Moody 2014), Hegarty legitimised this as part of her desire to resist to African ‘stereotypes’ (interview 2012; see also Sayer 2005, 2007). She attributed this to her experience of working in the BBC’s African Service; to her Irish identity which led her to seek forms of ‘solidarity’ with others from previously colonised countries; and finally, to her transformative experience of studying post-colonial literature at university, including African literature, which had led her to travel extensively (interview 2012; see also Bourdieu 1984). For she argued that all three operated as generative mechanisms: causing her to reflect on the ways in which the way ‘in which people are imagined is all tied up with inequality and deprivation’ (interview 2012). However, Scott has argued that ‘Africa Rising’ narratives are often shaped by the interests and world-views of entrepreneur-funded trusts, such as the Gates Foundation (2014a), so it is significant that Hegarty got her first break in journalism by winning a competition for International Development Journalism, run by the Gates-sponsored ‘Global Development’ site at The Guardian (interview 2012).
James Copnall,\textsuperscript{52} who made the radio package about Woyee, which was re-versioned for \textit{Online} by Hegarty, also freelances regularly for the ‘Global Development’ site (interview 2012). As he explained, this had been strongly shaped by the cumulative effect of organisational cuts at the BBC, which had led to many of the Newsgathering-funded ‘correspondent’ jobs on the continent being replaced with semi-freelance ‘stringer’ positions – including his own. But Copnall’s extensive experience of working within the African service led him to stress that the way in which such stringers’ pay is structured also incentivises them to work more often in English than in other languages; to spend their time ‘reversioning’ stories for multiple outlets rather than producing original work; and to do many, short news ‘lives’ from the capital, rather than taking the time to seek out more unusual stories and speakers located in outlying areas for features (interview 2012).\textsuperscript{53}

However, Copnall felt strongly that this kind of work was not an adequate response to the ‘public trust placed in a BBC correspondent’ and risked undermining the Corporation’s commitment to ‘accuracy’ by only covering a particular geographic area when there was ‘a real crisis…[and] not covering the efforts, projects and interests of a variety of people in a longer-term way’ (interview 2012; see also Sayer 2001, 2007). Underpinning Copnall’s personal interpretation of the Corporation’s mission, and his own role within it, was a strong ‘sense of justice’ which he saw as being derived from his mother (interview 2012). Nevertheless, like Hegarty, Copnall

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{52} Copnall is the Correspondent for Sudan and South Sudan for most of the BBC, but only the Sudan Correspondent for the Africa Service for historical reasons.

\textsuperscript{53} For example the BBC’s stringer charge sheet for 2011-12 (which Copnall provided) lists the fee for a live two-way up to two minutes as £60; £80 is payable for one which takes more than two minutes. But the fee for a short package or feature which might take several days to a week to make, including travel, is £275.
\end{footnotesize}
had also had a transformative experience of studying post-colonial literature at university: describing encountering Chinua Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart* (2006 [1958]) on an English Literature course as having ‘changed [his] life’: prompting him to change his course to French and African literature, to travel extensively and to begin his career as a stringer in Francophone Africa in the hope of challenging harmful stereotypes by ‘just representing as many aspects of life as possible – including African cultural life’ (interview 2012; see Bourdieu 1984).

In order to try and square these conflicting economic, normative and legal imperatives, Copnall said he had learned to ‘dodge and dive’ through the commissioning structures of the BBC, as well as those of other major London-based news outlets like *The Guardian* and *The Economist*, in order to put together enough money to fund the trips he wanted to do (interview 2012). He explained that this had even affected his ability to visit the South Sudanese capital, Juba, where Woyee are based, saying

> The BBC does pay for travel expenses, but sometimes, for example *The Strand* [the arts programme for whom he did the piece of Woyee Films], didn’t have a budget for that much because it’s *really* expensive to visit Juba…

So I think they probably paid for a day or two and I combined it with work on another couple of pieces for other outlets…What I normally do is a news trip which pays for the flights and two or three days of news reporting and then tag on the feature I want to do.

(interview 2012)

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54 Copnall went on to explain that direct flights from Khartoum to Juba were around $1,000 dollars, but when Sudanese officials had previously banned direct flights, and going via Kenya had cost up to $3,000. Moreover, even the most basic hotels in Juba cost about $120 dollars a night because the frequency of visits by NGOs and the UN officials had inflated the price (interview 2012).
Yet this ‘solution’ means that it is only those with the cultural and social capital necessary to be able to negotiate their way through the commissioning structures of major news organisations (interview Copnall 2012; see also Waisbord 2011) who are financially able to make these more time-consuming features. Indeed, one the reasons why Copnall said he was able to find the money to get to Juba – let alone any areas outside the capital – was that he is not a ‘local-national’ stringer (Bunce 2011), but a white middle-class British man with ‘good contacts’ in other international media organisations based in the UK, which he ‘refreshes’ when he returns to visit family and friends (interview Copnall 2012).

These findings therefore build on Bunce’s work about the way in which stringers’ need to ‘sell’ their stories constrains their progressive potential (2011). As such, this case study opens avenues for future research, for the inter-related economic and cultural structures at the BBC appear to constrain ‘local-national’ journalists (Bunce 2010, 2011) disproportionately. So the capability of BBC journalists based on the continent to stimulate critical debate about the nature of knowledge and the formation of values (Sen 2010) is limited by a variety of different kinds of overlapping socio-economic structures, even before such WSR content is ‘reversioned’ for BBC News Online.
Conclusion

Much like the newspapers analysed in the previous chapter, journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia at *BBC News Online* was powerfully shaped by their efforts to attain market differentiation (Bourdieu 1998) despite organisational cuts which prevented them from hiring more staff photographers. In addition, like newspapers, BBC journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia was not framed by notions of ‘networked journalism’ (Beckett and Mansell 2008; Heinrich 2012; Sambrook 2010), either normatively or in terms of the position-practices employed. For, as with newspapers, the use of NGO-provided multimedia was framed in relation to casual labour rather than UGC: with journalists at *BBC Online* perceiving themselves as benefitting from using INGOs’ employment of experienced freelancers, rather than having to manage the cost, time and risks involved in hiring such media workers themselves (Banks et al. 2000; see also Örnebring 2009).

Moreover, strong resemblances were found between journalists’ deliberations about NGO-provided multimedia at *BBC News Online* and *The Guardian/Observer*. For editorial staff at these outlets not only stressed the high volumes of photographic material required by their websites, but also the need for such material to be immediately appealing to online audiences and to enhance the ‘stickiness’ of their sites (Scott 2005:95): so encouraging online users to ‘click’ on more material, and return to the site more often. Both sets of editorial staff also used the multimedia provided by African NGOs to bolster their claims regarding their provision of ‘global’ news coverage, whilst constraining the ability of their Africa Editors to raise concerns about why, how and how often NGO-provided multimedia was being used.
However, journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia at BBC News Online was also shaped by forms of public-commercial hybridity which were particular to it (Steemers 1999, 2005). For BBC journalists’ approach to NGO-provided multimedia was strongly shaped by their efforts to fulfil their statutory obligations vis-à-vis political and commercial impartiality, as laid out in the Corporation’s Editorial Guidelines. Nevertheless, the increased speed and volume of their work caused by the cuts which both proceeded and followed the licence fee freeze of 2010, as well as intense competition for the ‘global’ media market, meant that material from international aid organisations ended up being privileged over that of other NGOs. This was because such organisations were not only able to employ large numbers of highly skilled freelance photographers, as well as press officers who knew exactly who to pitch them to, but also because BBC journalists did not have time to check out whether other kinds of NGOs had party political connections.

In addition, journalists’ privileging of the multimedia provided by international aid organisations was found to have been shaped by increased commercial pressures to make pages look immediately appealing in order to attract advertisers: pressures which had emerged from the erosion of organisational structures designed to maintain an absolute division between day-to-day commercial and editorial decision-making. But what was far more important was the way in which journalists’ use of such material, alongside that provided by African collectives in relation to material ‘cannibalised’ from WSR (Phillips 2012a), was shaped by the structuring of editorial labour inside the BBC in accordance with marketised norms. For journalists were expected to ‘promote’ or ‘sell’ material to others in the BBC and to their online audiences (Davis 2013b), so tended to privilege multimedia framed in highly
personalised and emotionalised ways which would be immediately appealing (Sambrook et al. 2013).

These kinds of decision-making were justified by forms of normative hybridity which came about because of the seating plan utilised by managers to deal with cost-cutting, as well as the professional backgrounds of those concerned (Bourdieu 1998). This was because these generative mechanisms facilitated the interaction of the normative values associated with the Africa Service and BBC News Online, so causing journalists to legitimise their use of NGO-provided multimedia in ways which were bound up with reconstructions of the kinds of ‘public/s’ and ‘service/s’ involved in ‘public service journalism’. These reconstructions repositioned ‘news’ as the ‘real’ location of public service journalism and/or conceptualised the use of NGO-provided multimedia as helping to attract as many online users as possible in order to given them a kind of value-laden ‘education’, by using the transnational and technical capacities of new media to try and forge imaginary relations between individual members of their largely Northern audiences and ‘ordinary Africans’ on the basis of their shared ‘humanity’ (Chouliaraki and Blaagaard 2013; see also Chouliaraki 2008).

Thus BBC Online journalists’ reconstruction of the normative values guiding their work risked doing little more than legitimising ‘entrenched power relations’ (Sayer 2000b:80), further inhibiting them from reflecting critically upon the ways in which the structuring of their labour and that of reporters on the African continent, systematically prevented BBC journalism from including the insights and values of those usually excluded from mainstream mediated discourse (Sen 2010). Indeed,
they risked co-opting representations of ‘ordinary Africans’ in order to re-legitimise the BBC’s reputation to offer a ‘global’ public service, but without interrogating the validity of its claim to represent their perspectives to the world (Cheah 2013; Chouliaraki and Blaagaard 2013; Denčik 2013).
Chapter 6

‘Attached journalism’ and ‘human rights’ at

Channel 4 News

Much like the BBC, Channel 4 News is positioned as a provider of public service news, so has legal obligations to provide programmes ‘of high quality’ which deal with ‘national and international matters’ (OFCOM 2004 Annexe 1.2) and which must be presented with ‘due impartiality’ (OFCOM Broadcasting Code 2011 section 5; see also Sayer 2000). These responsibilities were built into the terms of Channel 4’s licence at its inception in 1982 (Brown 2007; Hobson 2008); are underpinned by the UK’s Broadcasting Acts of 1981 and 1990, as well as the Communications Act of 2003; and are written into Channel 4’s own Producer’s Guide (Channel 4, n.d.). But Channel 4 also has different legal obligations: to ‘demonstrate innovation, experiment and creativity’; to appeal to ‘the tastes and interests of a culturally diverse society’; and ‘to exhibit a distinctive character’ (Communications Act 2003 Section 265).

In addition, its executives have long made claims about the ‘public service’ value of the programme which relate to the prestigious awards its journalists have won; to public perceptions that it is more ‘independent’ of government and big business than other news outlets; and that it is more popular amongst harder to reach news
audiences, including younger and ethnic minority groups (Channel 4 Annual Reports 2007-2012). So perhaps it is unsurprising that evidence gathered for the sixth case study showed that Channel 4 journalists’ use of INGO-provided multimedia was bound up with their efforts to meet both internal and externally generated definitions of the programme’s ‘public service’ remit, albeit with far fewer resources than either the BBC or ITV, which had been further depleted by organisational cost-cutting following the global economic crisis in 2008.

The first aspect of this involved what the programme’s Editor, Ben de Pear, described as a conscious decision to avoid ‘aping the BBC’ by producing a 24-hour ‘rolling’ online service aimed at the international market (interview 2012). So although INGO-provided multimedia was found on the programme’s website, it had not been produced specifically for online output: instead, a report which had been produced for the nightly TV programme broadcast to a British audience (Miller 2012a) had been embedded in a blog written by the correspondent concerned (Miller 2012b), which was felt to ‘add extra journalistic value’ at a relatively low cost (interview de Pear 2012).

The TV report was therefore chosen as the main focus of the case study. This was about General Bosco Ntaganda, a man wanted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC), who was leading an armed rebellion in eastern DRC. It included a short clip of video of a man identified as Bosco by a Human Rights Watch (HRW) researcher, which two freelancers claimed to have filmed in the village of Kiwanja on the day of a massacre, and which seemed to show him giving commands
on a walkie-talkie whilst walking with a group of heavily armed men. *C4 News* was made aware of the existence of this clip by a third freelancer with whom they regularly worked, who had just finished a contract with HRW to produce a film about Bosco, and who offered to undertake secret filming of an interview with Bosco on their behalf, having failed to manage this on a commission for HRW because of technical problems.

Thus journalists’ use of INGO-provided multimedia at *C4 News* was also strongly shaped by position-taking strategies designed to differentiate the outlet from its competitors (Bourdieu 1998). These pertained not only to the ‘scoop’ offered by the third freelancer, but also to de Pear’s privileging of relatively long-form, ‘correspondent-led’ ‘investigative’ stories about less frequently-covered countries. For both de Pear and Jonathan Miller, the programme’s Foreign Affairs Correspondent, had filmed the immediate aftermath of Kiwanja massacre in an award-winning report which portrayed them as ‘revealing’ the bodies: so their deliberations about the possibility of following up by claiming to have evidence about who was responsible, and the further bloodshed involved in the M23 rebellion which he was leading, were found to have been shaped by commercial values relating to market differentiation; news values of continuity and personalisation (Galtung and Ruge 1965), and moral-political values to do with ‘witnessing’ and ‘attached journalism’.

Parallels can be drawn with other case studies for, like those at *The Independent on Sunday*, these journalists privileging of long-form, ‘investigative’ and seemingly
‘correspondent-led’ stories predisposed them to accept the multimedia provided by INGOs engaging in related kinds of ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154). Much like journalists at *BBC News Online*, accepting INGO-provided multimedia was also found to be bound up with their reconceptualization of the nature and purpose of public service journalism.

However, unlike any other case study, journalists at *C4 News* were willing to invest considerable time, money and effort over many months to obtain other material in a manner which was far from ‘churnalistic’ (Davies 2008). Yet the influence which HRW had on the kind of journalism produced by the programme, and journalists’ perceptions of its purpose was far more pronounced and enduring than that which other INGOs exerted over different news outlets. Indeed, Miller, the programme’s Foreign Correspondent, claimed to practice ‘human rights journalism’ (interview 2012).

In order to address these issues, the first section of this chapter will begin by outlining why and how the programme’s overall editorial approach had emerged from journalists’ agentive responses to the problems created (Schein 2004) by its model of media ownership and related responsibilities (Sayer 2000b, 2007; Waisbord 2011). Next, it will clarify why and how journalists’ longer-term engagement with human rights NGOs played into this, before exploring the ‘thick’ but indirect forms of interactivity (Davis 2010:122; see also Fenton 2010a) found to have taken place between this INGO and the programme, because of their employment of the same
‘trusted’ freelance videographer, who made journalists aware of the INGO-provided video in question (Sayer 2001, 2007).

The last section will then explain and evaluate the recursive relationship between the political economy of C4 News, including an initial discussion of how this relates to those shaping work at HRW; the relevance of this to news values relating to continuity and personalisation (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001); and the deliberations of Channel 4 journalists regarding audience popularity. Finally, it will qualify claims about HRW’s influence over journalists on the programme by highlighting the ways in which their decision-making was also strongly shaped by the multimedia provided by another INGO, Invisible Children Inc. whose video, *Kony2012* (2012), went viral in the spring of 2012.

### 1.1: Conflicting pressures

Channel 4 is a public corporation funded through a cross-subsidy model, in which the cost of ‘public service’ output is off-set by popular programmes which are more attractive to advertisers. Indeed, *C4 News* is usually cited by Channel 4 executives as ‘the absolute epicentre’ of their claim to fulfil their legal/political ‘public service’ remit (Abraham, speaking to Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2010 Evidence 17), so it has traditionally been perceived as having the moral-political ‘right’ to be
insulated from commercial pressures to a large degree, as long as it is perceived to carry out its responsibility to fulfil its public service remit (Barnett 2011).

However, the ability of C4 News to meet its external and self-imposed obligations vis-à-vis this ‘public service’ remit are coming under increasing scrutiny. For in addition to the negotiations which take place every 3-5 years in the run-up to renewing the contract between Channel 4 and Independent Television News (ITN) - the non-profitmaking company which makes C4 News (McNair 2009) - the programme’s annual report is now discussed at the special meetings between channel executives and the UK’s Culture and Media Select Committee.

These parliamentary hearings began after Channel 4 experienced a financial crisis in 2007-8 (correspondence Candy 2013), which was caused by the expenses it incurred during the course of the digital switchover and the loss of advertising revenue attendant upon related forms of audience fragmentation, as well as the global economic crisis (Channel 4 2008b, 2009). At that time, channel executives tried to renegotiate the balance of the channel’s legal responsibilities and entitlements with MPs, by arguing that they needed help to plug a funding gap of what they projected would be £150 million pounds per annum by 2012 (Channel 4 2008b).

But pressure from the European Commission on the UK government regarding its legal obligations to uphold commercial competition laws (Brown 2008; Sayer 2007)
caused the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to withdraw his earlier plans to grant Channel 4 a slice of the BBC’s licence fee (Burnham 2008). For this reason, the channel’s managers asked ITN to make 10% cuts to C4 News as part of a wider package of ‘efficiencies’ (Channel 4 2009; Harris 2013). Therefore at the very time when Channel 4’s ‘public service’ obligations were being extended to cover its expansion into digital media by the 2010 Digital Economy Act, C4 News lost 20 of its 60 editorial staff (Harris 2013) - the same proportion described by those at The Independent newspapers and Guardian News Media.

Channel 4 managers stressed that the core programme would be protected, because most of the editorial redundancies pertained to the cancellation or shortening of other, related programmes - namely, the 8pm edition, More4 News, and the lunchtime programme, News at Noon (Channel 4 2009). But staff and union sources have disputed this: arguing that this grossly underestimates the input which staff based on News at Noon and More4 staff had into the main evening programme (Holmwood 2009). Participants in this study refused to comment on such matters, or to discuss how personnel and budgets were now arranged on the programme with regard to the provision of international news, because it was judged to be too commercially sensitive.

However, the programme’s Editor did confirm that the overall budget of C4 News had remained stable since 2009 (interview de Pear 2012), and participants’ other comments indicated that the cuts carried out then, together with the extra work and costs incurred by the development of the C4 News website, meant that the
programme faced considerable challenges regarding its staffing and other resources. In addition, journalists at C4 News seemed likely to face some anxieties about the programme’s future funding, as Channel 4 has struggled to replace the advertising revenue it gained through the reality TV show, Big Brother (Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2011 Evidence 10-11).

So journalists on the programme face conflicting pressures: firstly, they need to work more ‘efficiently’ with fewer staff, but secondly, they need to prove the ‘public service’ value of their journalism to channel executives and politicians using data about the public perceptions of their independence and impartiality (Channel 4 Annual Reports 2007-2012). In addition, the programme has come under increasing pressure from MPs about its dropping audience ratings (Evidence 10 Media and Sport Committee 2013), which make it difficult for the programme to sustain its claim to be of service to the general public, particularly since the biggest drops in viewing figures have been amongst precisely the ‘hard-to-reach’ 16-34 year olds (Evidence 20 Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2011), which the channel had always cited as part of its claim to be a PSB provider (Channel 4 Annual Reports 2007-2012).

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55 This document pertains to discussions about C4 News’ Annual Report of 2011.
1.2: ‘Persistent journalism’, ‘attached journalism’, ‘human rights journalism’

One of the position-taking strategies which journalists on C4 News took (Bourdieu 1998) to try and meet their contractual responsibilities to provide alternative and engaging forms of international news, at the same time as experiencing organisational cost-cutting, involved attending to less-covered places or topics. As the programme’s Editor explained,

... We have a very clear remit to do international news but … we’re not the BBC, who have … hundreds of people all over the world and twenty thousand journalists, whatever they say they’ve got …

We are not even ITV News … which has much more money… We have a contract with Channel 4 and they pay us a certain amount of money each year and…we have to work within that budget.

[So] … we have to box very clever because we can’t just throw all of our resources at [foreign news]… What we tend to try and do is to … tell stories that other people perhaps aren’t telling.

(interview de Pear 2012)

Similar approaches to domestic competition were found at The Independent on Sunday: with both outlets not only privileging news from less frequently-covered places, but also privileging the production of ‘investigative’, ‘reporter-led’ news sub-genres about them. However, the position-practices in operation at C4 News were different because its Editor stressed that he was particularly keen to pursue ‘one person’s long take on a story’, instead of multiple ‘live’ two-ways with many different reporters (interview de Pear 2012).
This cheaper, long-term approach had shaped the informal, organisational division of labour on the programme (Waisbord 2011) in ways which had economic, emotive and normative dimensions. For, as de Pear went on to explain, he avoided allocating particular ‘foreign stories’ to reporters who hadn’t reported, or even been, to the geographic areas concerned before: arguing that the ‘knowledge and emotional involvement’ that came from journalists’ extended experience of, and emotional ‘attachment to’ particular places and ‘stories’ was more engaging and ‘convincing’ to viewers, and was therefore ‘gold’ for the programme (interview 2012).

Thus reporters tended to repeatedly ‘return’ to particular places and issues in a practice which the programme’s Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Miller called ‘persistent journalism’ (interview 2012). Such an editorial approach worked in the interests of the programme as it enabled journalists to regularly re-use their own, archive footage (interview Miller 2012): thereby maximising the cultural capital they had accrued through previous award-winning reports (interview de Pear 2012; see Lanosga 2014). This then reinforced the programme’s claim to fulfil its ‘public service’ remit, which had implications for its journalists’ moral-political ‘right’ to be protected from any further cuts (Barnett 2011; Sayer 2000b).

However, this approach tended to be legitimated within C4 News through moral-political rationales (Sayer 2005, 2007) which linked the programme’s correspondents in particular to what the Editor, de Pear, described as ‘attached journalism’ (interview 2012): so referring to the work of the BBC’s former correspondent, Martin Bell, about his experiences of covering the Bosnian civil war of 1992-5, in which he advocates a ‘journalism of attachment’ (1997:7), ‘which ‘cares as well as knows’ and which ‘will
not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong’ (1997:8). Such a journalistic approach entails separating a rigorous attention to ‘objective’ fact from political or emotional neutrality (interview Miller 2012; discussed in Gutman 1993; Hilsum 2011a; Ruigrok 2010; van Oppen 2009) and, as Spellman (2005) and Tumber (2008) have indicated, it was widely discussed within mainstream journalism during the war crimes tribunals which followed the Bosnian war.

Both Channel 4 journalists described this approach as personally meaningful to them because of their extensive experience of covering wars in which civilians were routinely targeted, including the lengthy Sri Lankan civil war (interviews de Pear; Miller 2012). But the reflective ‘internal conversations’ (Archer 2003a) in which they engaged regarding these experiences had also been shaped by other experiences which had emerged from their personal socio-economic positioning (Bourdieu 1984). For, like the BBC journalists, Copnall and Hegarty, the Editor of C4 News, de Pear, said that his transnational outlook had been shaped by his study of African Literature at university. For he explained that this had shaped his decision to travel ‘for five or six years around the continent’, before starting his journalistic career there and working his way up to become the Africa bureau chief at Sky News, prior to moving to C4 News (interview 2010).

In contrast, the programme’s Foreign Correspondent, Miller, described himself as having studied ‘political geography and the geography of underdevelopment’, saying that

*I am still fascinated by … tracing where things come from that we use in our everyday lives, the coltan, the casseiterite that comes from these mines in the Congolese jungle …*
It is just like joining the dots between the causes of extreme poverty, repression and human rights abuses, you know mad soldiers with guns in the jungle and our mobile phones that we use in London...

Effectively my job today is still the Geography which I studied at University - just using it in a different way.

(interview 2012)

This work was also personally meaningful to Miller because he was born and raised ‘travelling around Malaysia’ with parents who were Christian missionaries,\textsuperscript{56} and although he said he did not share their religious faith, he described his upbringing as having made him ‘acutely aware of poverty… and I think I am probably driven by the same sense of injustice that my parents were’ (interview 2012).

Thus both journalists framed their creation of mediated representations as a form of moral, as well as political participation (Goffman 1986): portraying their primary obligation to provide international news as a matter of conscience, ‘our responsibility to ourselves’ as de Pear put it (interview 2012; Sayer 2000b). So it is morally, politically and economically significant that the specific instance of NGO-provided multimedia which \textit{C4 News} used in this report (Miller 2012a), and in a related report four months earlier (Miller 2012c), were seen by both journalists as offering the programme something unusual which had not been shown on other British news outlets,\textsuperscript{57} and which served as a continuation of an investigative ‘story’ they had previously reported upon together (Miller 2008). Indeed, lengthy clips of Miller being

\textsuperscript{56} The influence of Judeo-Christianity was also an important generative mechanism shaping the approaches of two freelancers and a number of actors within Christian Aid, see Chapters 7 and 8.

\textsuperscript{57} Although one clip had been shown on \textit{France 24} four years ago (interview D 2012).
shown where the corpses lay by a local man, which were first broadcast in their award-winning report in 2008, formed the ‘centrepiece’ of the package.\(^{58}\)

Furthermore, it is significant that the organisation which gave *C4 News* an award for its first report on the killings at Kiwanja was Amnesty International (UK): so helping to frame the events at Kiwanja as a ‘human rights’ issue. Indeed, Amnesty has given the programme a number of journalistic awards over the years: thereby encouraging journalists to frame their concerns about justice as ‘human rights’ and to view human rights NGOs as supporting and complementing, rigorous, emotionally-engaged journalism about injustice. For instance, as Miller put it,

> I am motivated by a sense of injustice… I cannot bear it when I see a minority or poor people being shit on by the rich or by the powerful and... that’s what keeps me going. I mean ... I do a lot of human rights journalism.

And so of course there is overlap, because why else do people join Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International? It is exactly for the same reasons that I do what I do.

> I... [stumbles]...I care...and I just want other people to feel the same outrage and sense of injustice that I do.

(interview 2012)

Moreover, although the former journalists working within HRW did not explicitly draw upon Bell’s theory of the ‘journalism of attachment’ (1997:8), the moral economy which shaped their work involved portraying them as engaging in the same kinds of rigorous investigative ‘reporting’ valued by Miller and de Pear (interviews 2012), in

\(^{58}\) A package is a pre-recorded mixture of clips, the narrative to which is usually written and voiced by one reporter.
ways which were also strongly influenced by their value-laden reflections about their own experiences of covering unequal forms of violent oppression, especially during the Bosnian war. There was therefore a pronounced ‘synergy’ with (interview de Pear 2012) or ‘overlap’ between (interview Miller 2012), the approaches taken by journalists at *C4 News* and the former reporters working at HRW before the NGO-provided multimedia in question was accepted.\(^{59}\)

This has long been reflected in the warmly appreciative comments made by other senior *C4 News* journalists about HRW and other human rights organisations. For example, the programme’s International Editor, Lindsey Hilsum, has spoken publicly about her admiration for, and reliance upon, what she calls the ‘in-depth reporting’ done by Amnesty and Human Rights Watch (HRW), which the programme itself cannot afford to do (2011b; Meyer and Otto 2011), as well as writing about the way in which such organisations’ reports have enabled her to maintain her political even-handedness and awareness of causal complexity when engaging in normatively-engaged and emotionally-attached forms of journalism during times of war (2011a).

This warm appreciation and engagement in a common approach to ‘reporting’ was shared by communications workers at HRW. For example, Emma Daly, their Head of Communications argued that

*C4 News are exactly our kind of people because they’re wonky [sic] and they are willing to do really chunky pieces of human rights journalism…*

\(^{59}\) See Chapter 8.
So they are kind of *perfect* for us … They *care* about foreign stories, you know, and they think of themselves as progressive and crusading in a certain way…

(interview 2012)

The Editor of *C4 News* was therefore seriously understating the case when he said that there was a ‘certain ethos’ about the production of foreign coverage on the programme which was ‘slightly more focussed on human rights’ (interview de Pear 2012). Indeed, Miller, the programme’s Foreign Affairs Correspondent, explicitly described himself as engaging in ‘human rights journalism’ (interview 2012; see also Shaw 2012). So, Channel 4 journalists can be seen to have developed collective ‘habits of thinking, mental models and linguistic paradigms’ (Schein 2004:13) which predisposed them to accept the multimedia which formed the basis of this case study.

2.1: A ‘direct deal’ with freelancers?

Since Bosco’s co-accused, Thomas Lubanga, had been the first to be found guilty by the ICC in 2012, HRW decided to capitalise on news values of continuity (Galtung and Ruge 1965) by putting together a series of clips of ‘raw’ unedited material, in order to try and use the interest generated by the Lubanga case to ‘get them to tell the Bosco story’ (interview van Woudenberg, Senior Researcher for the DRC, 2012). Much like the picture galleries provided to newspaper and online editors, the position-practices employed by HRW involved offering journalists a selection of material to choose from which satisfied their need to prove their editorial
‘independence’, but which was constrained by the INGO’s own interpretative frame (Tuchman 1978).

Like the case at *The Independent on Sunday*, this involved quite specific kinds of ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154). For, as Pierre Bairin, HRW’s Media Director explained, he had deliberately modelled HRW’s electronic distribution of multimedia on wire agency feeds, using ‘shot lists’ which included a mix of relatively ‘exclusive’ material and the kinds of ‘cutaway’ shots needed to compile an edited TV news ‘package’, and by making any multimedia seem as ‘unprocessed as possible’ (interview 2013). His rationale for this was that

> The more ‘finished’ it looks, the more contrived and controlled, the less [broadcast journalists] [will] trust what they see as raw and direct

(interview Bairin 2013)

However, Bairin stated that this unedited material had been carefully selected to prevent journalists from telling stories other than ‘the one that we want telling’ (interview 2013), so any ‘trust’ journalists’ place in the ‘uncontrolled’ nature of unedited multimedia seems rather misguided (Sayer 2001, 2007).

In addition, much like *The Independent on Sunday* case, Channel 4 journalists’ ‘trust’ in the claims made about this video clip was further enhanced by the fact that it had not been shot by a HRW worker at all, but by two experienced freelance journalists, the rights to which had been bought by HRW (interviews van Woudenberg 2012; interviews Bairin; Daly 2013). This meant that *C4 News* journalists did not see a need to carry out any checks themselves. For although they recognised the street as
being in Kiwanja (interview Miller 2012), they did not ask any questions about how the person in the film clip was identified; who carried out this work; nor did they try to carry out any further checks themselves to identify the man in the clip, or even check whether the video metadata contained information regarding the date and place where it was filmed (interviews de Pear; Miller 2012). Instead, they argued that the freelancers concerned were well-respected in their field of work so, as Miller, the programme’s Foreign Correspondent, put it, ‘if they say it’s Bosco on the day of the massacre, I believe them’ (interview 2012).

Thus, once more, the involvement of ‘trusted’ freelancers in the construction of NGO-provided multimedia can be seen to have facilitated the transfer of significant ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982; Sayer 2007) from NGOs to journalists: enabling staff at C4 News to put together a piece about the claims made against Bosco which other British outlets had not carried, but without having to carry out time-consuming fact-checking themselves. However, in this case, the involvement of freelancers allowed Channel 4 journalists to argue that even though they would not have been aware of the existence of the clip of Bosco at Kiwanja without the actions of HRW, this was not an instance of their accepting INGO-provided material at all, but was, as the programme’s Editor insisted, a ‘direct deal’ between themselves and the freelancers concerned (interview de Pear 2012).

This framing hinged upon the programme paying the freelancers, although they had already been informed that there was no need to do so, because HRW had already
This relatively small payment allowed Channel 4 journalists to legitimise their use of this video in the context of their commitment to fostering long-term relations with talented freelancers (Sayer 2005, 2007), especially those with expertise in particular geographic areas, on whom the programme depends in order to deliver what its Editor called ‘ground-breaking’ investigative reports (interview de Pear 2012).

This semi-casualised approach to news production was not only shaped by financial constraints, but also by the Blair government’s association of freelance labour with creative risk-taking, which led the programme to set up an ‘Independents Fund’ in 2008 (interview de Pear 2012; see also Channel 4 2008a). Thus legitimising using this video clip as if it had only been provided by freelancers involved drawing on normatively-laden, as well as commercialised, ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskhar 1979:51). However, framing the use of HRW-provided multimedia as a ‘direct deal’ with freelancers (interview de Pear 2012) also had other implications which worked to the programme’s advantage (Sayer 2007). For it would normally be regarded as ‘best practice’ on the programme to attribute material contributed by an NGO, whereas freelancers were not normally attributed unless they voiced the piece. As the programme’s Editor put it

60 HRW paid the freelancers £800 for four minutes of footage. *C4 News* knew which 20 seconds they wanted because of HRW’s prior investment, and only paid them £400; although D said he wanted more, they ‘bartered him down’ (interview 2012).
There are some freelancers who say you can’t use this unless you use my name and normally I would say, we’re not going to do that, because we are not an advertising agency…

(interview de Pear 2012)

Therefore the involvement of freelancers in shooting the film clip provided by HRW helped journalists at C4 News to avoid attributing HRW. In so doing, casual labour enabled Channel 4 journalists to maintain their politically and economically advantageous claims regarding public perceptions of the programme’s ‘original’ and ‘independent’ journalism (Channel 4 2008a-2012), as well as seeming to fulfil their statutory obligations regarding impartiality (OFCOM Broadcasting Code 2011 section 5). For as de Pear argued,

Attributing footage to other people weakens the journalism – always. Because people think ‘Oh right, so it isn’t your story, it’s their story’. So it is something you try and avoid doing.

(interview 2012)

2.2: Importing HRW’s interpretative frame via freelance work

The most important way in which ‘trust’ in freelancers facilitated the acceptance of NGO-provided multimedia by C4 News was through the agency of Fiona Lloyd-Davies, a well-known freelance film-maker with a long record of experience working both in the DRC and at C4 News. For Lloyd-Davies was recruited by HRW to conduct interviews with Bosco’s alleged victims in the DRC, to try and get a secretly-
filmed interview with Bosco himself, and to edit the ‘finished’ version of HRW’s Bosco video for their website, under the direction of Bairin, the INGO’s Media Director61 (interview Lloyd-Davies 2012; interview Bairin 2013).

As with other cases, the news outlet benefitted from freelancers’ willingness to work in risky environments (Banks et al. 2000; Sayer 2007) although in this case the INGO also benefitted from minimising risks to its staff. For Anneke van Woudenberg, HRW’s Senior Researcher on the DRC, described their decision to hire Lloyd-Davies as being shaped by her extensive experience of coping with the kinds of the security risks this kind of interviewing would pose to herself and her interviewees, as well as HRW’s desire to disassociate itself from the secret filming of Bosco, lest it place HRW’s in-country researchers, their informants and other associates in danger (interview 2012).

But after that contract ended, Lloyd-Davies ‘pitched’ the same ‘story’ to journalists at C4 News, making them aware of the existence of the video clip which HRW had acquired and which they claimed represented Bosco in Kiwanja on the day of the massacre (interview Lloyd-Davies 2012). Indeed, their decision to hire her was shaped by her promise that she could deliver for them an ‘exclusive’ in the form of a secretly filmed interview with Bosco (interviews de Pear; Miller 2012), which she had already attempted for HRW, although the camera, on that occasion, had not worked (interviews Lloyd-Davies; van Woudenberg 2012). However, despite the extensive precautions taken by C4 News, Lloyd-Davies and a freelance fixer with whom she was working were attacked in the DRC in November 2011 in the course of pursuing

61 The project took around 6 weeks and cost around £20,000, including Lloyd-Davies’ fees (interview Lloyd-Davies 2012; interview Bairin 2013).
that interview, and the Editor of C4 News, de Pear, took the decision to ‘pull back’ both journalists for security reasons, as well as Miller and another producer who were in travelling to meet them (interview de Pear; see also interviews Lloyd-Davies; Miller 2012).

So the programme’s commitment to ‘tell the Bosco story’, as the senior HRW researcher on the DRC put it (interview van Woudenberg 2012), preceded the ‘news pegs’ used by the programme by several months. The first of these ‘ pegs’ was the Bosco-led M23 rebellion which happened in April 2012, when the programme first used the clip of the man identified as ‘Bosco’ in Kiwanja, as well as clips of the interviews which Lloyd-Davies had conducted for HRW with Bosco’s alleged victims (Miller 2012c), although no attributions were given (interviews Lloyd-Davies; Miller 2012).

The second ‘news peg’ involved the mass displacement of civilians caused by the M23 rebellion, and which only included the video clip purporting to be of Bosco in Kiwanja (Miller 2012a, 2012b). Although this news report, and the accompanying blog in which it was embedded, were ‘rather late’ in the opinion of the programme’s Foreign Correspondent (interview Miller 2012). This was because the mass displacement of civilians had begun months earlier, and indeed, the report had been prepared a month prior to broadcast (interview Miller 2012). But its transmission had been delayed for a month by the Olympic Games, because journalists had considerably less space in the programme for foreign news during this period, especially very negative foreign news which the Editor claimed ‘would not have been
in keeping with the [positive] mood of the programme at that time’ (interview de Pear 2012).

Thus further parallels can be drawn between *C4 News*’ use of this video clip and other uses of NGO-provided multimedia at *The Independent on Sunday* and *BBC News Online*: with editorial staff at all three outlets choosing material ‘with longevity’ in order to provide them with greater flexibility (interview Batterbury, Picture Editor of *The Independent on Sunday*, 2013). For the NGO-provided material provided the basis for a lengthy piece on international news at a time when the programme’s Foreign Correspondent was away on holiday and other correspondents were unavailable because they were trying to travel around Syria (interview Miller 2012). So the NGO-provided multimedia helped the programme operate with what the Editor described as a relatively slim team of correspondents (interview de Pear 2012), as well as relatively few members of staff dedicated to newsgathering.

But although these ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) operated at a broad, structural level, this case was very different to others in this study. For this case involved journalists using very little NGO-provided multimedia and investing considerable time and money, as well as undertaking significant security risks, themselves in order to try and tell stories relating to it over the course of ten months. In so doing, *C4 News* journalists exhibited considerable tenacity, refusing to be deterred by a series of disappointing, dangerous, time-consuming and expensive dead-ends. This is because the programme not only tried (and failed) to secure an ‘exclusive’ interview with Bosco, but it also tried (and failed) to produce other kinds of ‘original’ material. This included video commissioned from a Ugandan stringer hired
to gather interviews with other members of the M23 movement, but whose footage
the programme’s journalists thought was too technically flawed to use (interviews de Pear; Miller 2012).

In order to explain why the normative values shaping the approaches of journalists at
C4 News modified the tendency of NGO-provided multimedia to enable journalists to
work faster, more cheaply and with less risk (Davies 2008; Franklin 2011), it is
necessary to analyse the position-practices involved in the ‘pitch’ employed by the
freelance film-maker, Lloyd-Davies. This is because the person in charge of the
Independents’ Fund at that time had far more conservative views of the security risks
it was appropriate for freelancers to take than either the programme’s Editor (de Pear, or its Foreign Correspondent, Miller: both of whom had extensive experience in
war zones and other kinds of ‘hostile environments’ (interviews de Pear; Lloyd-
Davies; Miller 2012).

Therefore, Lloyd-Davies, who had an ongoing working relationship with de Pear and
a strong personal friendship with Miller, emailed both directly to let them know what
she had found out in the course of her work for HRW. As she explained,

I knew that Ben [de Pear] had been producing Jonathan [Miller] when they did the Kiwanja
film in 2008…

So when I sent the proposal saying ‘Here is the man responsible for the Kiwanja massacre’
for them, I was pretty sure it would be like ‘Oh my God, we’ve got to do this, we have the
footage, we were there.’

(interview 2012)
By discussing her ‘pitch’ in this way, Lloyd-Davies provided a powerful example of the crucial role played by freelancers in journalists’ adoption of INGO-provided multimedia. For she not only made use of her personal contacts, she also used the ‘insider’ knowledge she had gained during her previous work at C4 News by appealing to its journalists’ privileging of ‘persistent’, ‘correspondent-led’ reporting (interview Miller 2012), their re-use of archive material, and their positive regard for HRW. But Lloyd-Davies also used her detailed understanding of de Pear and Miller’s sense of personal responsibility to act as ‘witnesses’ to the massacre, in ways which hinged on the attribution of moral-legal responsibility to their embodied presence, as well as on normative ideas about the capabilities of television to give others the capabilities to ‘witness’ the massacre indirectly (Ellis 2000; Frosh and Pinchevski 2008).

In order to demonstrate the accuracy of Lloyd-Davies’ estimation of de Pear and Miller’s likely reaction to her ‘pitch, it is worth comparing her earlier quote with Miller’s reflections about his experience of reporting the Kiwanja massacre. For, as he put it,

You just got the sense that a terrible, terrible thing had happened and that you were... you were just there and you had to... the... the... the public service journalist instinct just cuts in and you think... this is something I have to be here to report. This is really important.

And so there was almost a sense of sort of evidence-gathering on a crime scene, there was never going to be any police doing that.

We... ... we were there as witnesses...

(interview 2012)
The kind of ‘public service’ journalism which Miller describes here relies far less on the formally accepted rationales about the programme’s enablement of national democratic practice, than on ideas about political and moral purposes of commemorating and enabling the prosecution of crime in relation to an imagined global public (Nash 2009). So the agency of Lloyd-Davies enabled the HRW-provided material to be perceived by Channel 4 journalists as addressing their informal, moral-political beliefs about what and who they were ‘responsible for [and] beholden to’ (Sayer 2000b:79), as well as helping them meet their programme’s statutory responsibilities in a powerful and complex manner.

These complex ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) were conveyed through Channel 4 journalists’ ‘trust’ in Lloyd-Davies’ journalistic rigour and longstanding experience of working in the DRC as a freelance film-maker, but also, crucially, through their sense of ‘trust’ in their common commitment to a shared moral/political framework (interviews de Pear; Miller 2012; see also Sayer 2005, 2007). Indeed, it was this ‘trust’ which was found to be the most important causal mechanism in enabling Lloyd-Davies to ‘import’ into C4 News the interpretative frame used by HRW.

This involved defining the ‘problem’ as the suffering of civilians; ‘those responsible’ for causing it as Bosco Ntaganda himself and his government backers in Rwanda; and defining the proposed ‘solution’ as Bosco’s arrest by the UN and swift transportation to face trial at the International Criminal Court (Stones 2014:14-15). So even though Channel 4 journalists used only 20 seconds of NGO-provided multimedia, HRW was able to frame the item in question to the almost the same
degree as Christian Aid, which provided a complete package of written and visual material to *The Independent on Sunday*.

3.1: *Instrumental selectivity, inter-elite contestation and ‘impartiality’*

Like that case study, there were some progressive elements to Channel 4 journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia, for those involved managed to find commercially viable ways to sustain coverage of a serious, long-running war in ways which avoided the worst extremes of sporadic and decontextualized journalism (Franks 2005b; Marthoz 2007; Pawson 2007). Should the video footage which *C4 News* broadcast prove to be of Bosco Ntaganda in Kiwanja on the day of the massacre, then they will have also played a valuable role in disseminating knowledge (Sen 2010). Indeed, they will have exposed falsehood (Wright 2011b), because Bosco had always claimed that he was never there when the attack took place.

However, there were significant problems with Channel 4 journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia. The first of these was the way in which the framing of NGO-journalist relations (Tuchman 1978) in terms of normatively-laden ‘trust’ in freelancers (Sayer 2001, 2007) tended to inhibit journalists’ ability to acknowledge their acceptance of the interpretative frame provided by HRW, so preventing critical scrutiny of its validity (Sen 2010). This reinforced the tendency of ‘attached journalism’ (interview de Pear 2012) to lead to instrumental selectivity (Hume 1997). So, both the August report and Miller’s accompanying blog, described Bosco and his
fellow rebels, and their Rwandan allies, as being driven by a ‘greed for mineral wealth’ (2012b). This drew on the programme’s previous reporting on the involvement of militia in smuggling of tin ore over the border into Rwanda five years earlier (Miller 2007), and reports issued by both HRW and another NGO, Global Witness (interview Miller 2012).

However, detailed analysis of the diplomatic and military tactics carried out by the M23 group indicates that gaining control of the mines was not a key priority in this rebellion. Rather, the main aim of the M23 movement seems to have been to resist control by President Kabila – whose election was widely seen as ‘lacking credibility’ (Carter Center 2011) - by building a political power bloc in the east of the country, although this gradually grew into more nationalistic ambitions after the capture of Rutshura and Goma (International Peace Information Service 2012).

In addition, journalists’ normatively-laden ‘trust’ (Sayer 2001, 2007) in freelancers tended to prevent them from scrutinising the potential friction or conflict between the normative models they employed internally and those which they employed externally. The most obvious of these relate to the clash between journalists’ sense of investigative work as moral-political participation, including their relatively enduring alliance with HRW (Waisbord 2011), and their official obligations to ITN, Channel 4 and ultimately, to the UK government vis-à-vis ‘impartiality’ (OFCOM Broadcasting Code 2011 section 5).

When challenged, Miller, attempted to address this by emphasising the importance of rigorous interviewing and research techniques. For he argued that
If the story is to have any legs, to have any *credibility*, it must be classed as impartial... I follow the same rules as I ever used when I was a BBC correspondent...

We have to try and reinforce and back up different sources and what we are told about them. We have got to have our own information and by going to these places and by interviewing people ...

[But] I also inject an element of caring into the stuff that I report by simply ... trying to personalise the stories... [because] if you can hear from the people at the sharp end of the violence or the repression, you’re obviously going to have a better understanding and more empathy...

Empathic reporting doesn't mean that you leave journalistic standards of impartiality and objectivity behind. You *can* have it all.

(interview 2012)

However, by attempting to elide political impartiality and a conceptualisation of objectivity as a kind of journalistic rigour (Carpentier and Trioen 2010), Miller ultimately tied up in theoretical knots: concluding by trying to claim that he was engaged in both ‘impartial’ and ‘campaigning’ journalism within the same sentence (interview 2012).

This kind of conceptual confusion further inhibited journalists’ critical reflections about the ways in which ‘official’ models pertaining to the relationship between mainstream journalism and national democracy were becoming dominated by very different normative models, which pertained to journalists’ ability to wield international political influence in ways which had little to do with democracy. For although Miller did speak about his desire to inform ‘British voters’ about the man ‘fomenting’ war in the Congo’ whom ‘their tax money’ was helping to prop up
(interview 2012),\(^{62}\) this was only mentioned very briefly in his report (2012a) and his articulation of his ‘right to look’ at those killed in Kiwanja (Sontag 2003; see also Sayer 2000b) reconstructed his role as a ‘public service’ journalist in ways which depended upon other value-laden ideas about a transnational ‘public’ constructed through mediated/imagined links, as well as through international law (Kant 1963, discussed in Shaw 2012; see also Chouliaraki 2006, 2008).

In addition, Miller and de Pear stressed that they saw the April and the August reports about the allegations against Bosco as a means of applying direct pressure on officials from the Department of International Development (DFID) and the Foreign Office, whom they knew watched the programme because of personal correspondence, in the hope that they would cease aid to Rwanda and/or place pressure on the UN to arrest Bosco (interviews de Pear; Miller 2012). De Pear argued that this was in keeping with the manner in which the programme’s journalists used other forms of news-making practice in order to exert direct pressure on political elites (Miller 2007, 2013). For instance, he said

The press or journalists are an extremely good way to focus organisations’ priorities [because] the last thing that anyone wants in a position of responsibility in an organisation like that [the UN] is to either avoid the press so that they end up being door-stepped by them…

They also don’t want to come across as someone who is hiding something when they are giving an interview.

So… normally we find that just booking an interview time with someone in a position of authority means they’ll try to do something about what you are going to ask them about, before they even do the interview …

\(^{62}\) Miller is here referring to allegations that Rwanda, a long-term beneficiary of international aid from the UK, was one of the main supporters of Bosco and his M23 rebellion.
You know the classic line is ‘Well, it’s funny you asked me about that because just this morning I was speaking to the country director…’ or...you know. It’s a way of making things happen.

(interview de Pear 2012)

Much like the BBC/Save the Children case study in which both journalists and INGO-workers utilised similar position-practices pertaining to ‘selling in’ multimedia, de Pear’s comments indicate that INGO-journalist coalitions could have far-reaching effects on journalists’ political, as well as their editorial, approach. For as will be discussed in Chapter 8, the former reporters working at HRW also regarded the NGO as applying ‘pressure’ through journalistic practice (Miller 2007, 2013) long before any media item was aired or published, in ways which did not rely on traditional conceptions of the relationship between mediation, public opinion, and policy change.

Channel 4 journalists’ engagement in exerting such elite-oriented forms of political pressure can be seen to have emerged from their experiences of higher education and travel (Bourdieu 1984), but also from partial understandings of the ways in which the processes of mediatisation constructs politics itself by serving as a ‘public’ site of conflict between elite groups (Davis 2007, 2010). However, such elite-oriented practices are not intrinsically democratic: after all, even fascist dictators need ‘reputational authority’ in order to stay in power (Miller 2007:44). Indeed, engaging in such strategies in democratic contexts usually involves privileging the appearance of democratic practice in order to legitimate the intervention of NGOs in different forms of governance (Yanacopulos 2005).
This was precisely why HRW had not confronted *C4 News* about its repeated non-attribution of its material in this and other cases (interview Bairin 2013). For as the INGO’s Deputy Executive Director, Carroll Bogert explained,

> Sometimes it’s helpful that not everything *appears* to be coming from HRW, do you know what I mean?

> It’s just …er… a broader chorus of voices kind of saying the same thing can be very *helpful* [in placing pressure on policy-makers].

(interview 2013)

Whilst this may be an effective form of cultural politics which enables NGO-workers and journalists to negotiate between the national and the global in ways which enhance their capability to achieve specific objectives in the short-term (Nash 2009; Powers 2014), it undermines the goal of public scrutiny (Sen 2010). Indeed, the danger of too much concentration on inter-elite forms of conflict (Davis 2007, 2010) is that, over time, it risks partially dis-embedding both NGOs and public service journalists from the broader groups to whom they are accountable (Sayer 2001): embedding them instead in an insular socio-political structure which defines ‘problems, agendas and lines of consensus’ solely in terms of elites (Davis 2010: 125, see also Hind 2010).

Certainly, the interpretative frames shared by media workers at HRW and *C4 News* seemed to be self-reinforcing, for when asked about the consequences of their decisions, both tended to only cite positive, ‘hoped for’ consequences, most notably, Bosco’s surrender in March 2013: treating that event as if it were at least partially due to media attention. However, participants consistently avoided discussing the
ways in which mediation might interact with other generative mechanisms, in order to produce negative, unintended consequences (Bhaskar 1979; Toynbee 2008). So they did not, for example, reflect upon whether media-orientated ‘pressure’ in spring 2012 might have contributed to Bosco’s decision to rebel in the first place. This seemed curious, given that the report which had been broadcast by the programme in April had included an interview with the newly-appointed Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, saying that Bosco’s arrest was a priority for her and that she was travelling to the DRC in the next month to encourage the authorities to arrest him (Miller 2012c).

The exception to this was the freelance film-maker, Lloyd-Davies, whose repeated and extended freelance work in the DRC had made her much more aware of the multiplicity of generative mechanisms at play in that country, and whose positioning on the Serb side during the Bosnian war had made her wary of naïve moralising about journalistic activity (interview 2012). She saw the ‘increasing outcry’ about the need to send Bosco to face trial at the ICC in the mainstream media, as interacting with the newly-elected President Kabila’s announcement that he should face justice in Congo, in ways which may have shaped Bosco’s decision to rebel (interview 2012).

This troubled Lloyd-Davies deeply, prompting further reflection about whether the attention given by the media to atrocities carried out in the DRC might contribute to sustaining violence there more generally, and if so, what this might mean for her own involvement in Channel 4’s ‘attached journalism’ (interview de Pear 2012). As she put it,
The militias have publicly said that if they are unhappy with their situation once they have been absorbed into the Congolese military - they still haven’t been paid or they don’t have any food or they haven’t got the responsibility they wanted or … whatever - then they go and rape women because it is reported.

Then there is an international outcry, and the Congolese government, instead of saying ‘We must stop this to prevent them from doing it again’, say ‘We must hush it up and ask them what they want…’

So, one becomes kind of strangely complicit in a way. But I don’t want to stop reporting things because that’s important too…. You know, [de Pear and Miller] call it the ‘journalism of attachment’ or something. … But I don’t know, I don’t have the answers.

(interview 2012)

3.2: ‘This could be our own Kony’

This radical self-reflexivity and (self) doubt was not something which was reflected in other journalists’ interviews. Instead, Channel 4 journalists were mainly focussed on using the means available to them to lobby for Bosco Ntaganda’s arrest: arguing that he is ‘a bad ass who we want to see in the Hague’ (interview Miller 2012). But this cannot be wholly attributed to the influence of HRW, as journalists’ deliberations were also strongly influenced by the multimedia produced by another INGO, Invisible Children Inc. For their half-hour long film, Kony2012 (2012), which lobbied for the arrest of a general who used to lead the guerrilla group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, went viral in spring 2012: achieving over 40 million views on YouTube in four days (Goodman and Preston 2012; Gregory 2012; Harding 2012; Nothias 2013c).
The programme’s Editor stressed that both he and Miller were ‘deeply annoyed’ about the popularity of *Kony2012*, given its ‘inaccuracy’ and ‘oversimplification’ (interview de Pear 2012). They therefore sought to ‘remedy’ some of its weaknesses (Nothias 2013c), by making sure that their account of a different ‘warlord’ was factually accurate, and included far more political and economic context, including the nature of M23’s international alliances and the relevance of this to the lucrative mining industry (Miller 2012a). At the same time, de Pear’s background in commercial broadcasting, which stressed ‘strong, simple story-telling’, made him keen to capitalise on parallels with *Kony2012* (interview 2012). For rather than emphasise the continuity of focussing on Bosco after the ICC case of his co-accused, Lubanga (interview van Woudenberg 2012), de Pear stressed that the news values of focussing on ‘another African general’ wanted for war crimes (interview 2012), as well as the likely popular appeal of such a personalised story (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001). Indeed, he argued that ‘this could be our own Kony’, particularly given the strong cultural resonances of Bosco’s nickname - ‘the Terminator’ (interview 2012).

Thus much like those at *BBC News Online*, Channel 4 journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia was bound up with their efforts to frame their coverage of Africa ‘in a more compelling, human way’ and by framing the report with representations of ‘human suffering’ at the beginning and end (interview Miller 2012): so simultaneously personalising and globalising the causes and effects of the problem. But rather than this forming part of journalists’ response to the pressures exerted by the nature of online news consumption and competition between competing ‘global’ news providers, at *C4 News* journalists’ considerations about the need to make such
coverage more immediately appealing related quite specifically to pressure from MPs regarding its dropping audience ratings (Evidence 10 Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2013), particularly amongst younger viewers (Evidence 20 Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2011).

However, Miller made a valid, broader point when he argued that

...all public service journalists are involved in trying to strike a balance between presenting engaging television which keeps a million viewers keeping watching and actually delivering meaningful investigative television which enlightens people as to something which is happening, often in some terribly depressing parts of the world.

(interview 2012)

Certainly, if only a small handful of the most dedicated foreign policy experts watch, then any scrutiny engaged in can hardly be said to be ‘public’ at all (Sen 2010). Yet Channel 4 journalists’ efforts to ‘strike the balance’ effectively between making ‘engaging television’ and ‘enlightening’ their viewers (interview Miller 2012) was undercut by their refusal to acknowledge, either internally or externally, the role that HRW played in constructing their narratives, let alone scrutinising it in a critical manner (Sen 2010).

They also failed to confront the inherent contradiction between the discourse of ‘human rights’ and their dehumanisation of Bosco and the M23 rebels (Douzinas 2008). For the piece not only avoids any discussion of the group’s political grievances - including important questions regarding the legitimacy of Kabila’s election - it also repeatedly ‘Others’ the renegade soldiers: treating them as bringers of ‘chaos’, whose conscription of children symbolises their destruction of social order
(Coundouriotis 2010; Macmillan 2009), and whose leader is not only a ‘greedy’ and opportunistic ‘warlord’ or ‘turncoat general’ but ‘the Terminator’ (Miller 2012a) – an inhuman assassin, rather than a rebel commander.

It may be argued that both Bosco and the M23 movement thoroughly deserve to be demonised, and indeed that such representations enhance the capabilities of Congolese and other civilians by helping to make such abuses of power emotionally and ethically repellent (Nash 2009; Ramos et al 2007). Certainly, I would not wish to imply that Bosco and his fellow fighters are simply innocent victims of imperialistic misrepresentation. However, by enabling a human rights INGO to frame journalists’ perceptions of the solution to the problem (Stones 2014) in terms of the prosecution of a single ‘bad' individual for crimes against humanity, the programme’s coverage risks closing down the possibility of discussing the fighting as an expression of political agency. This therefore excludes the values of others (Sen 2010) to such an extent that it risks constructing the M23 rebellion as simple barbarism (Atkinson 1994; Marthoz 2007; Said 2003 [1978]) – the very thing which Channel 4 journalists had said they were opposed to (interviews de Pear; Miller 2012).

**Conclusion**

Useful parallels can be drawn between this case and that at *The Independent on Sunday* because the coalitions of journalists and INGOs (Waisbord 2011) which emerged at both outlets were shaped by the ways in which these outlets privileged
the production of relatively long-form ‘reporter-led’ investigative reports about less frequently-reported places for reasons of market differentiation, but lacked the means with which to undertake this internally. For this reason, journalists at both outlets were drawn to INGOs which employed not just former journalists, but former reporters highly skilled in the production of this genre, whose own moral economies involved them engaging in related forms of ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154).

Yet the C4 News case also raises far more serious challenges to the models employed in previous research. Firstly, it raises questions about the merits of trying to evaluate the extent of NGOs’ influence on journalists via a quantitative analysis of the sources used in news texts, and the related assumption that if relatively little NGO-provided material is used alongside many other sources, then this means that journalists’ ‘critical faculties [are] still intact’ (Knight 2011, discussed in Van Leuven et al 2013:439). For C4 News used a very small proportion of HRW-provided multimedia in the final report - a mere 20 seconds in a report lasting 7 minutes. In addition, as the production process spanned ten months and involved considerable investment of journalists’ time and money, C4 News’ use of HRW-provided material does not easily fit the ‘churnalism’ model (Davies 2008).

Nevertheless, HRW, Amnesty International and Invisible Children Inc. all played powerful roles in shaping journalists’ understanding of the problem at hand, as well as relevant actors and solutions (Stones 2014) in indirect ways. These involved freelance work, award-giving practices and the popularity of Kony2012: all of which worked together to prompt journalists to approach the conflict in the DRC in terms of
the ‘human rights abuses’ allegedly carried out by one individual, rather than in terms of mass military or political action.

Indeed, journalists’ relatively longstanding relationship with human rights INGOs appears to have been instrumental in reconstructing their understandings of the nature and purpose/s of ‘public service’ journalism in relation to an imagined international arena. Some comparisons with the BBC can be made in this regard, particularly in so far as both Channel 4 and BBC journalists placed moral value on representing the African as ‘human’ - or inhuman (Douzinas 2008; Harcup and O’Neill 2001). But the way in which journalists blended notions of ‘public service journalism’ and ‘human rights’ at C4 News was particular to that outlet, as well as their related efforts to exert direct forms of moral-political pressure on policy-makers through mediation in order to achieve specific objectives (Miller 2007, 2013).

Unlike the BBC, audiences watching C4 News would also not have been aware of these kinds of political and editorial influence because of the lack of any attribution. Such an omission would clearly inhibit public scrutiny in relation to any news output (Sen 2010) but is doubly troubling here because of the programme’s statutory obligations regarding impartiality (OFCOM Broadcasting Code 2011) and its reliance on public perceptions of its editorial independence (Channel 4 Annual Reports 2007-2012). Indeed, the way in which journalists structured and conceptualised their use of HRW-provided multimedia and the interpretative frame in which it was embedded in terms of a ‘direct deal’ with freelancers meant that they were even able to deny being influenced by HRW internally. Therefore this case not only provides the last piece of evidence in broader arguments about the pivotal role played by freelancers
in the transfer of INGOs’ ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982), it also provides the most powerful illustration yet of the complexity of these subsidies and the heterogeneity of their effects.
Chapter 7

Seeking specialisation:

Freelancing for INGOs and news organisations

Since one of the key generative mechanisms in the production and acceptance of NGO-provided multimedia was freelance work, this is worth more detailed analysis. Indeed, freelancers played a crucial role in case studies examined in relation to all four news organisations. The structural significance of freelancing was most obvious in the Channel 4 case study, in which a freelancer ‘pitched’ exactly the same ‘story’ to a news organisation which she had been previously working on for an INGO, including making them aware of the existence of some video, but which had been filmed by two other freelancers. However, the case study conducted at Guardian.co.uk also included two freelancers who were employed by the site’s ‘Global Development’ section to produce a blog about an INGO project, whilst simultaneously working on commission for the same project.

The structural importance of freelancing was also apparent in other cases pertaining to The Independent on Sunday and BBC News Online, when editors made more general comments about the way in which INGOs’ employment of ‘trusted’ freelancers enabled them to access free multimedia with considerable technical and aesthetic merits, whilst also managing different kinds of ethical, personal and financial risk (Banks et al. 2000; Sayer 2001, 2007). Finally, freelancing can be seen
to be a limited, but still significant generative mechanism in shaping some, limited forms of interaction between organisations: with some freelancers acting as normative ‘cross-pollinators’, moving back and forth between different news organisations and INGOs in order to obtain editorial commissions.

Indeed, out of the seven freelancers interviewed for this study, six worked on a regular basis for news organisations, but had also been paid for their work by INGOs: four in the form of INGO commissions (interview A, freelance journalist, 2012; interview Lloyd Davies, freelance film-maker, 2012; interview B, freelance photographer, 2013; interview Pilston, freelance photographer, 2013) and two in the form of having the distribution rights bought to some film which they had shot (interview E and F, freelance film-makers, 2012). The only freelancer who had not been paid by an INGO was James Copnall, who was explicitly barred from so doing by the nature of his contract with the BBC as its Sudan and South Sudan Correspondent (interview 2012).

But it is important to stress that such freelance work is also shaped by its own moral economies which involve particular groups of actors embedded in different kinds of social and economic structures (Sayer 2000b, 2001), who exercise their own distinct forms of editorial and normative agency. For these freelancers argued that their involvement with INGOs formed part of their wider efforts to juggle different kinds of financial, family and normative commitments, and to find ways of doing the kinds of time-consuming and highly specialised work which they had reason to value (Sen 1999, 2010).
This sample of freelancers is relatively small, but the issues they raised are clearly central to this study. Investigating the ways in which freelancing brings about interactions between INGOs and news organisations also adds an additional dimension to previous studies, which have only sought to investigate the ‘blurring’ of news organisations’ and NGOs’ work (Cooper 2009) by examining the accounts given by journalists and NGO-workers in full-time employment (e.g. Cooper 2011; Cottle and Nolan 2007; Fenton 2010a; Nolan and Mikami 2008; Orgad 2013a, 2013b).

Furthermore, analysing such freelancers’ accounts of their own decision-making provides an interesting contrast with recent research on the heightened stress and dissatisfaction experienced by freelance journalists working for news organisations and public relations as a result of their perceptions of ‘inter-role conflict’ (Obermaier and Koch 2014). This is because freelancers in this study who had been paid for their work by both INGOs and news organisations were found to have developed complex legitimising rationales (Sayer 2005, 2007) about this decision which minimised any internal and external conflict about their differing roles, including conceptualising their work for INGOs in ways which did not pertain to ‘PR’ at all.

The following chapter should therefore be read as indicating new avenues for future research by interrogating the potential generative mechanisms which shape, and are shaped by, the work of those who freelance for both INGOs and mainstream news organisations (Örnebring 2009). For the moral and political values involved in such work not only provided freelancers with forms of personal legitimisation (Sayer 2005,
they also enabled some, limited kinds of heterogeneity to be introduced into mainstream media output as a result.

The first section will begin by exploring the dynamic relationship between freelancers’ position-taking (Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and the conversations which they had with themselves about different kinds of commitments (Archer 2007): drawing on theorists writing about other kinds of cultural labour in order to illuminate the relational and affective aspects of this (Gill and Rossiter 2007; Gill and Pratt 2008; McRobbie 2002a, 2002b, 2007). The second section will then explore why and how the ‘internal conversations’ (Archer 2003a) of freelancers with a background in public service broadcasting differed from those engaged in by freelance photographers, and the relevance of this to differences in their experiences of working habitus.

Finally, the third section will explain the ways in which freelancers overestimated the ‘creative autonomy’ they were able to exercise whilst working on commission for INGOs (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40) in ways which prevented them from confronting potential ‘inter-role conflicts’ (Obermaier and Koch 2014). This involves attending to freelancers’ perceptions of INGO staff employed as picture and multimedia editors as fellow ‘specialists’. It also involves analysing the manner in which such INGO editors’ possession of in-depth knowledge about, and enculturation within, particular aesthetic traditions (Bourdieu 1984), enables any conflicts between freelancers and INGOs to be pre-empted and/or resolved without reference to INGOs’ inter and intra organisational struggles (Orgad 2013a).
1: Negotiating different commitments

Given the increasing cuts in news organisations and the recent, repeated waves of redundancies which have ensued, large numbers of skilled freelancers are flooding the media market (Brown 2010). At the same time, news organisations are also cutting newsroom budgets and this has led them to offer far fewer freelance shifts and commissions, as well as failing to increase the rates offered for commissioned work (Brown 2010). So those who are well-established as freelancers - like these study participants - are experiencing multiple pressures on their livelihoods (Brown 2010; Obermaier and Koch 2014). For the freelancers in this study, who were all in their thirties or forties at the time of interviewing, these pressures were often exacerbated by the increased financial demands of parenthood. For example, Pilston, a freelance photographer, stressed that he took commissions from INGOs as well as news organisations, in part, because they ‘couldn’t leave too long between jobs’ as ‘my kids need to go to school and eat and be clothed…all that stuff’ (interview 2013).

Parenthood, or the imminent prospect of it, had also been a crucial factor in the decision-making of many of those who had left staff jobs at news organisations to go freelance to begin with. For although freelancing involved considerable financial insecurity, both male and female participants saw the career paths available to them on long-term contracts within news organisations as incompatible with parenting small children. This is because those who described themselves as freelance journalists or film-makers viewed the only options as being newsroom work, which involved long, gruelling shifts during anti-social hours, or alternatively, basing their
family in the kinds of conflict-ridden places in which ‘news’ was regarded as occurring sufficiently regularly by mainstream media organisations to ‘make ends meet’ (interview A 2012; see also interview E and F 2012).

These freelancers’ reflections about such issues were not only practical but also normative, since they involved judgements about the ‘good’ or ‘right’ treatment of their children and partners. For neither of these career paths was seen as allowing them to be ‘a decent parent’ (interview A 2012), nor did they think it was ‘good’, (interview E 2012) or ‘fair’ (interview A 2012) to compel their partners and/or children to accommodate the kinds of lifestyles which would be involved in either career choice. Thus freelancers’ decision to accept payment from INGOs must be read within the context of their broader position-taking strategies regarding freelance work itself, which were designed to generate greater personal autonomy (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), but which were not shaped by the kinds of youthful and/or individualistic approaches usually associated with freelance or other forms of precarious labour (Gill and Pratt 2008; McRobbie 2002a, 2002b). Instead, they were shaped by more mature reflections upon these participants’ inter-related normative, social and financial obligations to those not normally considered in studies of media production practice - their families.

Although INGOs did not always pay more than news organisations, INGO commissions tended to be of a longer duration, to be planned more in advance, and to involve some paid editing work back in London as well as ‘trips’ abroad: all of which made it easier for freelancers willing to accept INGO commissions to keep a relatively steady stream of income coming in; to maintain a better balance in their
working lives; and to sustain good long-term relationships with partners, other family members and friends (interview A; Lloyd-Davies 2012; interview Pilston 2013). This balance was particularly attractive to freelancers who were, or were planning to become, parents (interview A 2012; interview Pilston 2013), but it was also a significant attraction for those without children, but who wished to continue rich and rewarding personal lives as well as ‘some sense of home’ (interview Lloyd-Davies 2012).

However, none of the freelancers in this study had chosen to address the work/life issues they faced by relying heavily on commissions from commercial clients, despite the way in which they thought this would have enabled them to attain a better work/life balance in terms of securing more predictable and lucrative work, much of which could be conducted in the UK (interviews A; E and F; Lloyd-Davies 2012; interview B 2013; interview Pilston 2013). Indeed, A and Pilston were the only participants who had ever accepted work for commercial companies other than news organisations, and they only did this very occasionally.63

Thus credence must be given to freelancers’ claims that the main factor shaping their decision to accept payment from INGOs pertained to their wider efforts to continue to do the kinds of work which they enjoyed and had reason to value (Sen 2010). All of the freelancers interviewed tended to link these kinds of statements to representations of their sense of themselves in highly affective ways (Gregg 2009).

63 A, a freelance journalist, said she was occasionally employed to assist with ‘risk analysis’ for business consultancies who needed country or regional expertise’ (correspondence 2014) and Pilston, a freelance photographer, said he had once ‘done some video and photographic work for medical and scientific companies’ (correspondence 2014).
with those who had chosen to leave news organisations voluntarily (interviews A; E 2012; interview Pilston 2013) and those who had always freelanced (interview B 2013; interview Lloyd-Davies 2012) talking enthusiastically about their ‘love’ of travel; their ‘curiosity’ about people living different lives to themselves; their deep ‘enjoyment’ of practice in their chosen media; and/or the pleasure they took in their awareness of their proficiency in related skills.

These generative mechanisms can therefore be seen to exist in tension with the familial commitments discussed earlier, for they entail a stress on self-expression or self-actualisation (Gill and Pratt 2008; Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011) through what McRobbie calls ‘passionate work’ (2007). For instance, as the freelance journalist, A, put it,

What I really like is reporting. You know, being out there, talking to people, getting out and about. I love it. That's just me.

(interview 2012)

However, the tensions between these generative mechanisms make much more sense when one considers the normative values (Sen 2010) which freelancers attributed to such work and the ways in which such values were used to critique the homogeneity, repetitiveness and lack of physical and creative autonomy which they saw as characterising full-time work in mainstream news organisations. For these kinds of deliberations led to the emergence of intensely-felt moral and political concerns about the nature of the relationship of media production to broader social groups (Archer 2007). But in order to analyse this, it is necessary to split the sample of freelancers into two groups, because there were two distinct kinds of
specialisation which freelancers sought and these were connected to very different sorts of dispositions, which had been acquired, at least in part, through enculturation in the *habitus* of different kinds of journalistic work carried out in relation to different news organisations.

### 2.1: Public service broadcasting and geographic specialisation

The first group was comprised of freelancers whose decision to accept payment for their work from INGOs was strongly shaped by their desire to continue to develop their (and others’) knowledge of particular African countries or regions in which they had been based as correspondents, or to which they had repeatedly returned, over a number of years. All of these participants had backgrounds in ‘public service’ broadcasting and their enculturation in this *habitus* had made them strongly critical of contemporary industry trends which they saw as undermining the educative function of journalism.\(^64\)

Specifically, this group of freelancers spoke at length about freelancing as a form of position-taking (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) which countered prevailing trends which they thought would leave them ‘stuck on a treadmill’ (interview A, 2012) or ‘caged’ in the office (interview E 2013). Aside from a taste for travel (Bourdieu 1984), such statements were significant because freelancers argued that they wanted more time and physical mobility in order to engage in the kinds of time-consuming

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\(^{64}\) This is discussed in relation to Reithian values in Chapter 5.
research and interviewing practices which they believed were necessary to produce the kinds of media which could educate audiences about the countries concerned. Indeed, they tended to describe such work as the proper goal of ‘the craft of journalist’ (interview A 2012; see Sennett 2009), or simply as ‘real journalism’ (interview E 2012).

This perspective was particularly pronounced in interviews with those who had been based in African countries for an extended period of time as BBC correspondents. Such participants had been used to occupying particular kinds of positions within a particular kind of organisation which had previously allowed them a large amount of (relative) autonomy (Bourdieu 1998). But these participants described several different inter-related financial, political and technological factors as altering these previously privileged positions in ways which prompted them to go freelance in order to regain the kinds of autonomy they felt they needed to produce and disseminate the geographically specialised knowledge which they valued (Sen 2010). For example, A said

I found that working out in the field [as a correspondent] was not something I could continue to do at the World Service… [because] the opportunities weren’t really there…There have been massive, massive cuts at the BBC…and I could just see from ten years of working there that it was getting harder and harder and harder to do the actual journalism.

More and more money was being spent on PR and marketing and … editors’ jobs in London … and like loads of money was being spent on all-singing, all-dancing multimedia [drawls] production - which was again, carried out in London….It just [pause]…it jarred with me…

I really wanted to get back to reporting on [X African region]…which I couldn’t do properly from London…
I just wanted to be freer to do the kind of journalism that I think needs to be out there…because most people in the world know fuck all about [x region]. It’s like…it’s not even on the map for them.

And that’s… well, it’s not right, is it?

(interview 2012)

Although E, who had also been a BBC correspondent, did not find that work had dried up, he also described the interaction of a number of different factors at the BBC as shaping his decision to ‘go freelance’ in order to attain the kinds of creative autonomy which he thought he needed to produce the time-consuming and geographically-specific forms of knowledge he had reason to value (Sen 2010). As he put it,

It’s one deadline after the other… right the way round the clock. Then with Online, it just got worse, and then the cuts ….oh God.

It was just like, more and more demands, all the time because, you know, when you cover a country [which is prone to civil conflict], there’s an important news story every day…

But you know, I have been working there for a long time now, and I think I am finally in a position to contribute some proper journalism…real investigative stuff. But that takes time…

That’s why I now freelance for [news] organisations who need my time or my work in a much more …[pause] much more contained way… So I can then go and do my own investigations for my own production company.

(interview 2012)
Taking commissions from INGOs as well as news organisations was viewed by most of these freelancers\textsuperscript{65} as way of enhancing such broader position-taking strategies (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). For both A and Lloyd-Davies, who had a long-standing history of covering the DRC for the BBC and \textit{C4 News} on a freelance basis, this was intimately bound up with a radical politics of listening (Couldry 2006; Rentschler 2010) to those who have been marginalised, in order to produce and disseminate knowledge about their lives (Sen 2010). For instance, as Lloyd-Davies explained,

If I can draw on commissions from lots of different sources [including news organisations and INGOs]...I have more control to be able to do the things that I am passionate about and that make me want to get out of bed in the morning...

I think it came from going to Bosnia which was my first film that I worked on, listening to extraordinary testimonies from people who aren’t normally heard, and finding things out that aren’t widely known about...

You know I want to do that - to try and tell stories that matter; that people should know about...

Why? Because knowledge is power. And maybe we can use that knowledge to make the world a better place; maybe we can help people’s lives …maybe we can help stop wars [pause]...

Well [pauses and spreads hands expressively]... maybe [laughs in self-deprecating manner].

(interview 2012)

All of these freelancers, who had a long history of reporting from particular African countries, explained that this \textit{habitus} had caused them to develop friendly relations

\textsuperscript{65} E and F were the only freelancers who had never accepted a commission for an INGO, although they had sold the distribution rights to their video to HRW.
of mutual support with INGO workers who were based in the same country as them or in countries which they repeatedly visited. Indeed, they often juxtaposed accounts which positioned themselves as working together with INGO workers ‘in the field’ with descriptions of the tensions - and sometimes the screaming rows - which they experienced with journalists working in the head offices of their news organisations, who were based in major cities in the UK and US. For they argued that such colleagues not only failed to appreciate the conditions in which they were working, they often lacked the specialised knowledge needed to understand why such stories were important in the first place (interview A 2012; interview E and F 2012).

However, what was most important to these freelancers was the way in which prolonged immersion in, or extended visits to, particular African countries had triggered reflective ‘internal conversations’ (Archer 2003a) about their working identities, the relationship of this to the production of mediated knowledge, and the educative and other social function/s of such knowledge. These kinds of conversations strongly resemble those which Archer argues are characteristic of ‘meta-reflexives’: that is, people who habitually use such ‘internal conversations’ (2003a) to ‘define and dovetail concerns’, to ‘develop concrete courses of action’, and to ‘establish satisfying practices’ in order to adjust their career path (2007:93) when they find that there is an ‘imperfect correspondence’ between occupations which they had previously idealised and the ‘structural reality’ of that work (2007:244).

Moreover, as Archer argues, such ‘meta-reflexives’ really ‘value values’ (2007:230) and as such, when they find a mismatch between their ideals and the realities of
particular kinds of labour, they experience intensely-felt forms of disillusionment which prompt further reflections about what might constitute more ‘effective action in society’ (2007:93). For such freelancers, this involved their gradually moving away from the norms of ‘impartiality’ and critical distance which dominate official discourse about British broadcast news, especially within the BBC. As A put it,

There are people at the BBC who take the kind of impartiality thing absolutely literally but after I had been in X [African country] awhile, I thought, ‘Who can ever be impartial about anything, you know?’

I am a white western woman who has worked in X as a journalist …I have absolutely got a viewpoint … I can’t be entirely impartial.

I will try my best to be honest with you about what I have seen. But living in X has kind of ‘undone’ the belief that it is ever possible to produce a piece that’s completely free from all the kinds of ideas and values which you bring to a story - just by being yourself really.

(interview 2012)

Thus, the kinds of profound meta-reflections found within these freelancers’ inner conversations had even caused many of them to alter their sense of their working identity, in ways which relocated them in a more liminal way in relation to the journalistic field (Bourdieu 1998). For although all of these freelancers repeatedly referred to themselves as doing journalistic work, and often ‘real journalism’ (interview E 2012) two out of three described themselves as coming to a point, after a long period of time, where they no longer described themselves as ‘journalists’, but as ‘film-makers’ (interviews E; Lloyd-Davies 2012).

E even declared that he now saw himself as an ‘activist’ as well. As he explained,
I have ended up going waaaaay beyond my role as a ‘journalist’ [indicates inverted commas with fingers]. [Pause]

Now I think…maybe I am…[pause]…I must be…[pause] a sort of a …[pause] an activist now…[sounds faintly surprised]…

[Speaking rapidly now] I know there is a kind of school in journalism which teaches you to keep a distance; I know what those people say. But I think, somehow…[pause]…you are involved…[pause] and the longer you are involved, especially in one place, the more you can’t deny that [pause].

And one day you just say to yourself, ‘Yes, I am a part of this now’.

(interview 2012)

Thus the position-taking strategies which such freelancers used to try and generate greater personal autonomy (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1998) were modified by understandings of the potential effects of their own embedding in broader kinds of social structures (Sayer 2001). Such strategies were therefore not purely about personal gain. Indeed, former correspondents often described the sacrifice of their official position as entailing the loss of both financial and cultural capital: a loss which they were prepared to accept in order to pursue work which they thought was socially useful and normatively important - ‘worth giving a shit about’ as E put it (interview 2012).

For all of these reasons, such freelancers were happy to engage in work in a variety of different media, as long as they could continue to specialise in the African countries which they wanted to produce mediated knowledge about, and as long as such work helped them fulfil their broader social and political goals: viewing such work as a form of
... self-fulfilment through ‘making a difference’ [so] that personal expression and social realisation of their value-commitments are inextricably intertwined

(Archer 2007:264)

2.2: Freelance photographers and media-based specialisation

In contrast, the two freelance photographers in this study had never been based for extended periods of time on the African continent, and so did not describe similar kinds of epistemological and/or identity-related shifts. Nor were these freelancers concerned about developing their own specialised forms of geographic knowledge in relation to particular African countries or with enabling others to do so. Indeed, although they did describe some normative values as shaping their work, these tended to be very general and vague, such as ‘wanting to make the world a better place’ (interview B 2013) and produce work which ‘mattered’ (interview Pilston 2013), with no accompanying reflections about how or why that might be possible.

The normative concerns which photographers attributed to their work also tended to be based rather more on perceptions of personal ‘morality’ and rather less on the kinds of overtly ‘political’ considerations which had dominated accounts given by freelancers with a background in ‘public service’ broadcasting. Compare, for example, these participants’ accounts of the impact of Judeo-Christian traditions on their decision to work for NGOs as well as news organisations. Both focus quite intensely on personal accountability, but B, a freelance photographer, described the shaping influence of her Christian faith in generalised, moral terms:
I’m a Christian. I’m a person with faith, so that’s probably where it [the desire to work for INGOs] stems from... You know, I don’t [pause] I don’t want to sell nuclear weapons because I think that’s wrong [chuckles]. I don’t want to work in a bank; I don’t wanna [tails off]...

I just want to do something that makes the world a better place during my life...So that’s the kind of faith I try to live - just loving and doing and giving and leading by example.

(interview 2013)

In contrast, E, one of those with a background in public service journalism, who described himself as ‘culturally Jewish, but not a believer’, related his decision to allow an INGO to buy the rights to some of his video to the formative influence of his Jewish heritage on his approach to media production. For he said

From an early age I knew about the Shoah and the people... the heroes of those times, and about the importance of resistance. So I believe that sometimes you have to decide which side you take ... That means it is up to you; it is part of your duty to take a stand...

So although we [himself and F, with whom he works] have received repeated threats from the rebel movement, we have kept going...

I mean after a massacre we covered I called [one of the generals he thought was responsible] and said... ‘Let us come [to talk with you] so we give you the opportunity to challenge our reports’.

And the guy received me into his living room and he was like ‘How come there are fifty journalists in town... and you, you are the only one who saw massacre? What’s wrong with you? You have special eyes? You have special glasses? Who do you think you are?’ [gesticulates and points aggressively].

Meanwhile, F was in the car with her head down so the armed men outside the house couldn’t see her, editing the next piece on the laptop... and I was like, trying to play it diplomatically with this guy who ended up giving us an interview denying that the massacre had happened. We ran it intercut with more footage we had of all of those bodies.

(interview 2012)
Freelance photographers’ discussions about their normative values were also closely interwoven with their reflections, not about the way in which freelancing had entailed the surrender of social status - as had been the case with former correspondents - but rather, about the way in which it had afforded them greater career advancement. Thus although these photographers were very far from being the kind of ‘minimal citizens’ who are only concerned with themselves and their immediate family and friends (Archer 2007:226), their ‘internal conversations’ (Archer 2003a) had more in common with the category of the more individualistic ‘autonomous reflexives’ as outlined by Archer, than with the ‘meta-reflexives’ considered in the previous section (2007). This is because such ‘autonomous reflexives’ internal conversations tend to lead quickly and directly to practical action, part of the purpose of which is to enhance their personal social mobility (Archer 2007:93).

The interview with Tom Pilston, who left his position as a staff photographer at The Independent to go freelance, afforded a particular striking example of this:

My career was going nowhere at The Independent. It was just dying on the vine, because there was no money to do the more ambitious... the more creative kinds of projects, especially the kinds which involved a bit of foreign travel – which is really interesting in and of itself.

You know at... how old was I then? Forty-two or something. Just when you are sort of old enough to use all the experience you've got but still got a bit of energy, and you think ‘I’ve got to do it now…

I could be shooting better pictures than I have ever done: powerful pictures, pictures that make people sit up and take notice, that matter. I was just going backwards career-wise. So I left and now... I do this [work for news organisations and INGOs] and mostly, it works for me.

(interview 2013)
In contrast, B had starting off by working for INGOs and other non-profit organisations on a freelance basis, although she now also works for a number of news organisations, including *The New York Times*. Yet the kind of strategic approach which she adopted is again highly characteristic of the nature and function of the internal conversations for ‘autonomous reflexives’ (Archer 2007: 214-223). Although it also involved the way in which the *habitus* of photographic work is structured, in so far as it reflects the scarcity of full-time positions available in mainstream news organisations. For B explained her choice of career like this:

I was doing journalism at [an American university]…and my professors kindly took me to one side and said ‘Look B, you know you’ll never be able to be a photojournalist. The jobs just aren’t there’…

So I thought ‘If I can’t be a photojournalist, I’ll go and work in the non-profit sector instead’. I mean, that’s work that’s worth doing too!

So I quit my degree and started doing that. But I found out pretty quickly that I *could* work for news organisations too, as long as it was freelance. So my career has always had this sort of *dual aspect* [working for news organisations and INGOs].

(interview 2013)

Rather than conceptualising this ‘dual aspect’ of their careers (interview B 2013) as involving potentially problematic kinds of PR work, freelance photographers avoided any reflections about ‘inter-role conflict’ (Obermaier and Koch 2014). This was partly achieved through their very practical approach to work, which focussed on the immediate outcome of each project, and their strong preference for concrete details about ‘real’ situations over abstract thought: both of which Archer sees as characteristic of ‘autonomous reflexives’ (2007:202). However, such freelance photographers also tended to legitimise their work for INGOs and news
organisations in relation to another ‘position-practice system’ (Bhaskhar 1979: 51) which structures the *habitus* of freelance photography - that is ‘syndication’.

This long-established ‘position-practice system’ (Bhaskar 1979: 51) involves photos taken on an independent basis, or on contract for a particular client, being ‘sold on’ through photographic agencies to which most mainstream news organisations subscribe.\(^{66}\) Although no photographic agencies made direct decisions in relation to the media items forming the basis of the case studies examined in this thesis, ‘syndication’ was still important in these case studies because both freelance photographers argued that there was a commonly-held precedent for selling photos on afterwards.

Pilston argued that as the two ‘clients’ were structurally and temporally separated, there was no ‘conflict of interest’ (interview 2013). Indeed, the possibility of ‘selling photos on’ to news organisations through syndication was one of the reasons why he found working for INGOs attractive in the first place. For even if INGOs did not always pay as much as news organisations, the kinds of long-running conflicts and social problems which they hired freelancers to cover were usually still ‘live issues’ by the time that the INGOs’ period of exclusive use expired, so such pictures were usually relatively easy to ‘sell on’ (interview Pilston 2013).

\(^{66}\) Although HRW bought the rights to redistribute material produced originally for news organisations, and freelancers mentioned other instances where other INGOs had done something similar, they stressed that this was relatively rare and not normally conducted through third parties (interviews E; Pilston 2013).
Working simultaneously for news outlets and INGOs was viewed by both photographers as being far more problematic, for ethical and practical reasons practically (interviews B; Pilston 2013). But interestingly, B, the photographer who had done so, ⁶⁷ legitimised this decision by arguing that the fault lay with The Guardian’s ‘Global Development’ section which had not ‘given full disclosure’ that her picture had been taken whilst working on a project for an INGO: so failing to follow the rules of attribution which she ‘expected a picture editor to follow when dealing with any kind of syndicated pictures’ (interview 2013).

This focus on misleading or partial attribution as the key area of normative contention, and the conceptualisation of this contention in relation to the position-practices associated with ‘syndication’, led freelance photographers to view unclear attribution as a failure to acknowledge who had initially paid for freelance work, rather than reflecting more broadly on its potential consequences, or on the broader effects of their own role in blurring the line between the media provided by news organisations and INGOs (Cooper 2009).

So although freelance photographers, along with other freelancers, felt uncomfortable with unclear attribution, they were not overly condemnatory of it, nor did they regard it as a political issue: tending to refer to it as ‘a bit naughty’ (interview Pilston 2013) or ‘rather unethical’ (interview B 2013). Certainly none thought it worth harming their own livelihoods by broaching the subject with the media organisations concerned - although neither did any of the other freelancers in this study.

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⁶⁷ See Chapter 4.
3.1: ‘Autonomy’, ‘truth’ and ‘beauty’

Nevertheless, it is important not to overemphasise the differences between these two groups of freelancers because by far the most important factor shaping their lack of ‘inter-role conflict’ (Obermaier and Koch 2014) was their over-estimation of the ‘creative autonomy’ they were able to exercise whilst working on contract for INGOs (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011). That is, the degree to which their creation of knowledge or symbol-making operated independently of INGOs’ influence (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40). For such freelancers tended to talk in glowing terms about the extensive efforts which INGOs made to brief them in advance of trips; to establish travel and security arrangements for them; to set up people to meet them on their trips; and to oversee edits of their work on their return: often comparing this in a very favourable manner to the treatments they received from news organisations (interviews A; B; Lloyd-Davies 2012; interview Pilston 2013).

But, curiously, they then refused to reflect upon the manner in which INGOs’ intensive editorial and logistical ‘support’ of their trip might have framed their particular understandings of the problem/s they were ‘covering’; the kinds of actors and powers relevant to it; and the nature of the solutions or improvements suggested by the INGO in question (Stones 2014). When challenged about this, such freelancers tended to stress that they believed that the INGO ‘trusted’ them as media producers (Sayer 2001, 2007) and so ‘respected’ their ‘editorial judgement’ (interview Lloyd-Davies 2012), ‘creative freedom’ (interviews B; Pilston 2013) or ‘craftsmanship’ (interview A 2012; see also Sennett 2009). Such statements then tended to be linked to others about their friendly inter-personal relations with specific
INGO-workers, whose acquaintance they had often made through mutual friends and/or on past projects in which these individuals had ‘helped them’ by shaping their creative work in other ways, like arranging flights or paying for trips, whilst they were still working on staff for news organisations (interview A 2012; see also interviews E; F; Pilston 2013).

Nevertheless, freelancers rarely considered how this might have imposed limitations imposed on their ‘creative autonomy’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40), nor did they consider the constraining effects of INGO-workers’ supervision of editing processes (interviews Bairin; Cabon; Daly; Ensor; Hogg; Rawe 2013). For example, although none of these former reporters interrogated INGOs’ reproduction of mainstream news values (Fenton 2010a), their interest in listening to those who were marginalised (Couldry 2006; Rentschler 2010) and in explaining the specific causes of events and trends in the countries to which they were committed had made them far less keen to produce hard ‘news’: preferring more flexible genres like ‘features’ (interview A 2012) and ‘documentaries’ (interviews E; Lloyd-Davies 2012). Yet, the INGOs as well as the news organisations which employed them often required them to work in a news format: indeed, Lloyd-Davies was asked to re-edit her piece twice to make it ‘newsier’, the first time by Bairin at HRW, and the second time by de Pear at C4 News (interview 2012).

One of the reasons why freelancers accepted these constraints involved the normative value/s which they placed on working with the kinds of dedicated picture and multimedia editors employed on a full-time basis by INGOs, whom they perceived as fellow ‘specialists’ and whom they believed shared similar, critical views
of the kinds of homogenised, speeded-up, ‘multi-skilled’ practices now commonplace in mainstream news organisations (interviews A; Lloyd-Davies 2012; interviews E; Pilston 2013). For reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, these freelancers were not entirely wrong in their perception of the critical stance taken by at least some INGO staff towards the mainstream media, nor in their belief that this influenced the amount of lee-way given to them as freelancers.

But when challenged about the way in which both pre and post-production processes constrained their ‘creative autonomy’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40) freelancers’ tended to switch from discussing issues of ‘creative autonomy’ to issues regarding ‘work-place autonomy’, which pertains instead to the degree of ‘self-determination’ that they are able to wield within a given work situation (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40). Thus such freelancers tended to contrast working for INGOs with working on occasions for news organisations, whose editors were often far more intrusive ‘just ringing me up all the time, wanting me to do this, wanting me to do that – you know, get this angle, get that angle’ (interview A 2012).

Freelancers’ final line of defence tended to be that they had just written or photographed ‘what they saw’ (interview A 2012). Thus, initially, they sounded much like the kinds of staff journalists and sub-editors who usually made decisions about NGO-provided multimedia within mainstream news organisations. For such staff journalists, who had little time and no specialist photographic training or education, tended to regard visual images as representing reality in a relatively simplistic manner (Sturken et al. 2009; Wells 1997). For instance, Paul Webster, the Deputy Editor of The Observer, maintained that if his paper was
Journalists at *BBC News Online* had a slightly more nuanced view, although this stopped also short of an engagement with interpretative framing. For instance, Steve Herrmann, Editor of *BBC News Online*, said that he would refuse NGO-provided photos if they were ‘faked’ or ‘staged’, but also if he had reason to believe that they

...gave a distorted, unrepresentative or unrealistic picture of whatever it was they were seeking to portray, you know... if we suspected that we were only getting, erm, a small part of that story.

(interview 2013)

Yet Herrmann went on to argue that he would be much more ‘troubled’ about accepting NGO-provided film, because stills were ‘less complex than video’ and so less ‘fraught with potential problems’ (interview 2013). Nevertheless, Channel 4 journalists regarded video, which is an increasingly integral part of cases conducted under international law (Chuter 2003; Spellman 2005; Tumber 2008), as being imbued with truth-telling power. For instance, the Editor of C4 News, Ben de Pear, viewed the film clip provided by HRW as conclusive ‘proof’ that ‘Bosco Ntaganda was ‘at the scene of the massacre on the day of the massacre’ and indeed, that was ‘all that mattered’ (interview 2012).

Thus even in a digital age, when making and manipulating sophisticated images and video is relatively easy for non-specialists (Klein-Avraham and Reich 2013; Ritchin...
1990, 2009), there was a distinct lack of understanding about, or valuation of, what Lahon, the former Deputy Picture Editor at *The Independent*, called ‘visual language’ (interview 2014). Instead, the camera tended to be strongly associated with ‘trust’ in its truth-telling power (Sayer 2001, 2007): trust which Tagg has argued derives from its positioning in ‘the ‘scientifico-technical domain’ in Anglo-American cultures, in ways which enable it to derive its authority from the apparatus of police identification and court evidence which was initially associated with the state (2003:59; see also Sontag 1979).

However, this study found that other generative mechanisms also shaped these approaches within mainstream journalism. For the marginalisation of visual expertise in news organisations meant that words, rather than visual images, tended to be viewed as the main locus of interpretive control, as well as remaining the ‘core’ element in journalistic labour (Thurman and Lupton 2008). In this way, journalists simultaneously framed and legitimised their use of NGO-provided photographs as supplementing or illustrating the written/spoken ‘story’, which they were in charge of writing (interviews Herrmann, Editor, *BBC News Online*; Soal, Africa Editor, *The Guardian*; Webster, Deputy Editor, *The Observer*; Winter, Africa Editor, *BBC News Online* 2013). Indeed, what’s so intriguing is that journalists stuck to this justification even when discussing their use of a photo slideshow, which is an obviously visually-driven genre: insisting that they not only retained control by picking photos from an

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68 Lahon legitimised her acceptance of a picture editor post at Save the Children UK on the grounds that ‘they *really* value visual language here’, although she then went on to argue that this was because this was because ‘they have the research to demonstrate that this exact shot rather than that shot will raise then X thousand more’ (interview 2014). This is explained in Chapter 8.
INGO-provided gallery, but by rewriting the captions - even when the changes they made were fairly minimal (interview Winter 2013).

Interestingly, both of the Africa Editors in this study still saw some potential problems with accepting INGOs' visual images because of their concern about re-enforcing a particular view of the continent as helpless and in need of Northern aid (interviews Soal; Winter 2013). But the prominent role of this and other kinds of NGO-provided multimedia in their news outlets’ moral economies coupled with the relative devaluation of the time-taking practices associated with their geographic expertise meant that, despite their unease, they generally adhered to a collective, informal policy which involved accepting ‘NGOs’ pictures but not their words”⁶⁹ (interview Soal 2013).

However, although freelancers initially sounded like they took similar epistemological approaches to staff journalists when they argued that they just wrote, filmed or photographed what they saw, when asked to elaborate on the composition of multimedia which they had produced, the responses of freelance photographers and film-makers changed. For then, they talked at length about the kinds of US and British academic theories which had informed their work, including those pertaining to the need to avoid the stereotypical representation of suffering. For instance, B discussed the influence of Moeller’s ‘compassion fatigue’ (2002) on her work at length, linking her desire to produce ‘different’ kinds of images to the relatively large

⁶⁹ This is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5 and an example of when this approach was particularly problematic will be discussed in section 3 of the next chapter. It is also worth noting that other studies have indicated that news outlets may use INGOs’ ‘words’ rather more frequently, and with fewer modifications, than their journalists would care to admit (Fenton 2010a; Van Leuven et al. 2013).
amounts of autonomy which she believed was allowed by INGOs ‘on the job’, as well as the relatively generous durations of INGO assignments (interview 2013).

This resonates with research by Campbell (2007) and Grayson (2013, 2014), both of whom argue that freelance photographers employed for longer periods of time by INGOs may be able to produce different kinds of images. However, the nature of this ‘difference’ deserves much more critical attention, because freelance photographers and film-makers also portrayed their work as being engaged in a kind of inter-textual ‘conversation’ with other kinds of visual media found in elite cultural traditions in Britain, North America and Europe. For Lloyd-Davies spoke in detail about the influence of famous documentaries on her approach to film-making (interview 2012), whilst the photographers, B and Pilston, discussed the influence of the magazine photojournalism published in *Time* in the 1960s and 1970s (interviews 2013). Indeed, Pilston even described his decision-making regarding the lighting and composition of one of his shots as being shaped by his love of paintings by ‘Old Masters’ (interview 2013).

Such comments make it clear that despite the empiricist epistemology which appeared to shape freelancers’ world-views, they deliberately framed images in ways which would have connotative as well indexical functions for viewers. Indeed, what was particularly striking about the way in which freelancers discussed this intertextuality, was the way in which they couched it in terms of their efforts to make their work ‘beautiful’ (interviews B; Pilston 2013). This was precisely the same term used by INGO managers about why they employed these freelancers (interview Daly, Communications Director, HRW, 2013; interview Ensor, Vice President, Africa,
Health and Humanitarian Programmes, Internews, 2013) and by those based in mainstream news organisations when they talked about their aesthetic reasons for accepting INGO-provided multimedia (interview Batterbury, Picture Editor of The Independent on Sunday 2013; interview Powell, Deputy Picture Editor, The Observer with special responsibility for Guardian.co.uk, 2013; interview Winter, Africa Editor, BBC News Online, 2013).

Yet no-one in this chain really interrogated the manner in which both the coding and decoding of the kinds of visual language (Hall 1997) employed in INGO-provided multimedia was dominated by both the producers’ and recipients’ positioning within Northern aesthetic traditions (Gupta 1986; Walker 1997). In addition, a host of other, related issues about the aestheticisation of suffering were left unexplored by photographers; those who employed them in NGOs; and those who accepted their photographs in news organisations. For although photographs may be particularly powerful because of the way in which they ‘freeze-frame’ memory (Sontag 2004, discussed in Kennedy 2009), the nature of viewers’ emotional reactions to such images, including their pleasure at the visual spectacle provided, is highly questionable, as is whether such aesthetic pleasure can lead to effective political action (Bal 2007; Kennedy 2009; Sontag 2003; Strauss 2005).

Such critical considerations then lead to others about the way/s in which the silence of those photographed, and the embedding of such photographs within consumer-oriented media, may constrain the effectiveness of any political action embarked upon by the viewer/s - or even perpetuate the unjust political and economic systems which produced their suffering in the first place (Bal 2007; Reinhardt 2007; Rosler
2004; Sontag 2003; Strauss 2003). So although significant forms of ‘workplace autonomy’ may have been given to freelancers (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40), and although this may bring about some forms of heterogeneity, serious questions must still be asked about the role which such multimedia has in the re/construction of the imperial ‘gaze’ (Dogra 2012; Pratt 1992; Spurr 1993).

This leads to a problematisation of the commonly-assumed links between the beautiful photograph, the truthful photograph, and the politically effective photograph (Friend 2012; Rohde 2013). But such difficult issues tended not to be reflected upon by freelancers, either in their reflective conversations with themselves or in their external conversations with others (Archer 2007) because of the sheer speed with which they rushed from job to job; their need to legitimise the work they did; and because they tended not to reflect too deeply on the ways in which the multimedia they produced played into INGOs’ own inter and intra-organisational struggles (Orgad 2013a).

3.2: Freelancers and INGOs’ inter-organisational struggles for funding

One of the most interesting examples of the way in which the ‘beautiful’ multimedia produced by freelancers played into INGOs’ inter-organisational struggles involved some INGOs’ use of it at specially hosted events, or as part of specially prepared reports for elite donors in the UK and America, precisely because it would be aesthetically and emotionally appealing to them, but would be sufficiently different to
more stereotypical images to avoid ‘compassion fatigue’ (Moeller 2002). However, position-practices varied between INGOs. For instance in the case study pertaining to the Guardian.co.uk, Deborah Ensor, the Vice-President of Africa Health and Humanitarian Programmes at Internews, had employed two freelancers, A and B, to produce ‘journalistic’ writing and images for a ‘legacy report’ on one of their projects (interview Ensor 2013). For although Internews had produced detailed impact evaluations on other projects, the difficult security situation at the beginning of the project had made it too difficult to collect ‘base line data’ (interview Ensor 2013). Moreover, the project was funded on a very short-term basis, so the INGO could not set out to look at change over a specified number of years because ‘we never knew each year if it would be funded’ (interview Ensor 2013).

But Ensor later decided that these images were so ‘striking’ that she wanted to use them at a special event they planned to hold in Washington DC for the US State Department’s Bureau of Refugees, Population and Migration, as well as representatives from UNHCR, DFID and USAID: some of whom had supported the project and some of whom had not (interview Ensor 2013). Meanwhile, A, a freelance journalist, had gone on to successfully pitch an article about the project to the Editor of the ‘Global Development’ section of The Guardian’s website, which included one of B’s photographs (interview A 2012).

Ensor granted A permission to make this pitch and was ‘happy’ about it - even going so far as to post the piece on Internews’ website (interview 2013). But she stressed that she had not ‘sought PR in that way’ (interview 2013). Instead, she explained that

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70 Ensor did not end up running this planned event because she was called away to deal with a crisis in South Sudan (correspondence 2014).
The reason why I hired A and B was because I just wanted to have a beautiful piece of journalism about a beautiful journalism project, you know? [Laughs]…

So…we’ll hang up the pictures - B’s pictures are really stunning - and we will hand out this beautiful magazine piece that A wrote. Then we are going to have a very interactive kind of panel discussion with donors … to talk about what we achieved…

We want to make the case, you know, in a soft way that this is really important… I mean … it was a beautiful project that did tremendous things...

So it’s… almost like a kind of love letter to the project and to the people who supported it.

(interview 2013)

Thus the purpose of using the ‘beautiful’ multimedia produced by freelancers at this special event was to encourage donors to give again by generating warm feelings of ‘love’ for the project they had supported, as well as feelings of being ‘loved’ by the INGO, whilst avoiding confronting them with the ways in which their own short-term funding structures had prevented more rigorous forms of evaluation. Indeed, the very short-term nature of donor funding and the project’s dependence upon it meant that all of the freelancers and Internews staff who were interviewed expressed serious concern that it would not survive Internews’ withdrawal: a lack of sustainability which the impression of ‘beauty’ and ‘love’ carefully disguised.

In contrast, Pierre Bairin, HRW’s Media Manager, briefed freelancers to be mindful of the multiple uses of their work from the outset: asking them to ‘document human rights abuses’ by shooting photos or filming video which would be pitched to journalists as well as published on the organisation’s website, but also asking them to take some shots or footage of HRW researchers ‘at work’ for use in donor reports or at specially-hosted events for well-known foundations and trusts (interview Bairin,
Indeed, Bairin, stressed that multimedia of actual abuses or victims’ accounts of them were never used in fundraising because the INGO felt that that would be ‘exploitative’ (interview 2014).

Nevertheless, as HRW’s Deputy Executive Director, Carroll Bogert, argued the ‘beauty’ of the multimedia produced by freelancers played a key role in shaping the NGO’s efforts to stimulate donations (interview 2013). Although in this case, HRW tried to use this ‘beautiful’ multimedia to make donors ‘feel moved’ to shift away from giving in a restricted way (to a particular activity, theme or appeal) to giving the kind of ‘unrestricted’ or general funding needed to pay for core costs like staffing, electricity, IT and the INGO’s head offices in London and New York (interview Bogert 2013).

Indeed, the search for unrestricted funding was a major concern to many INGOs. For senior managers at all of the INGOs in this study reflected upon the way in which the rapid expansion of their workloads, when coupled with rapid inflation and the culture of short-term ‘project’ or ‘contract’ funding which emerged in the 1990s and 2000s (Chouliaraki 2013; Cooley and Ron 2002; Sogge 1996; Sogge and Zadek 1996), had led to a situation in which they struggled to pay for the basic running of the organisation (interview Daly, Communications Director, HRW 2013; Ensor, Vice-President of Africa Health and Humanitarian Programmes, Internews, 2013; Jacobs, former Head of News, Save the Children UK; interview Pain, Director of Supporter and Community Partnerships, Christian Aid, 2013).
Even staff at HRW, which is able to draw upon large philanthropic donations (Powers 2013), said they struggled to gain secure enough ‘unrestricted funding’ to pay for electricity, office space and staff salaries (interview Daly 2013). As HRW’s Deputy Executive Director, Bogert went on to explain,

It is really serious. I mean you see NGOs go down because they brought in too much restricted funds and not enough funds for the central functions.

There are examples of NGOs going belly up and people being out of a job because someone didn’t get that right. So I mean it is something that….everyone is very, very conscious of.

(interview 2013)

Using freelancers, rather than employing more staff, helped to preserve INGOs’ precious streams of unrestricted income, because they could easily be budgeted for within specific short-term ‘projects’ and so paid using the kinds of ‘restricted’ funding which were much more plentiful (interview Bairin, Media Manager, HRW; Cabon, Picture Editor, Christian Aid; Ensor, Vice-President of Africa Health and Humanitarian Programmes, Internews, 2013). But most importantly, all of the INGO managers interviewed stressed that they saw the ‘different’ and visually ‘beautiful’ multimedia produced by freelancers as having a vital role to play in safeguarding their existing streams of ‘unrestricted funding’ from the general public through the mainstream media.

This was because they believed that being able to make regular ‘appearances’ in the mainstream media ‘strengthened’ their existing relationships with individual donors, who might otherwise donate to another INGO instead (interviews Daly; Ensor;
Jacobs; Pain 2013) and the immediate visual appeal of the multimedia produced by veteran freelancers was known to be crucial to news organisations’ acceptance of it, particularly in online output (interviews Daly; Jacobs 2013). Furthermore, such freelancers’ cultural capital helped to prevent ethical objections being raised because of other journalists’ ‘trust’ in their expertise (Sayer 2001, 2007); so ‘nobody would question the integrity of their work’ (interview Daly 2013).

Rather than being less commercially-driven, relatively ‘quiet’ news periods were an important focus for this kind of media-related work: indeed, Daly, the Communications Director at HRW, joked that she ‘prayed for quiet news weeks!’ (interview 2013). The period which was sampled for this study was particularly significant, for not only were INGOs generally more concerned about funding in 2012 because of the absence of any major DEC appeal in that year, but securing more sources of unrestricted funding had become increasingly important because of the rapid inflation which followed the global economic crisis, coupled with the recent, sharp fall in individual giving (Charities Aid Foundation 2012; Cowley et al. 2011): both of which had led to a marked decrease in their organisational income in real terms.

However, NGOs’ shift towards forms of media work which might help them to secure more diverse sources of unrestricted funding was not simply about their own organisational survival, but was often tied up with their efforts to conduct NGO-work more effectively. As this senior INGO manager, who requested anonymity, explained
The way that the bureaucracy works can strangle your ability to do anything useful...The bureaucracies are often very complex, and the competition for funds among implementing partners is fierce.

The majority of the projects I have in Africa are only on year-by-year funding. So the second I sign an award, I figure I have to start looking for money again - it's exhausting.

And you can’t do any long term planning that way. You know, how can you plan for sustainability if you don’t know in six months if you are still going to be there?

(interview 2013)

For all of these reasons, both Christian Aid and Save the Children had undergone organisational restructures in order to forge a much closer relationship between fundraising and advocacy work (interview Buckley, Head of Communications, Christian Aid; Jacobs, former Head of News, Save the Children UK).

3.3: The role of freelance work in INGOs’ intra-organisational struggles

But there have long been tensions between fundraising and advocacy which shape conflicts within, as well as between, INGOs (Orgad 2013a; Powers 2013). So organisational changes designed to secure greater amounts of unrestricted funding were contested by others who believed that such commercialism risked subsuming the normative purposes of the organisation altogether. The positioning of freelancers and their role in creating multimedia to provide to the mainstream media has been central to some of these intra-organisational struggles (Orgad 2013a; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).
For example, Gareth Owen, the then Head of Emergencies at Save the Children UK,\textsuperscript{71} was opposed to what he saw as the very simplistic and commercially-oriented forms of visual media commissioned from freelancers by Save’s press team, which centred on acute emergencies (interview 2013):

\ldots You know, in the usual way we would hire a freelancer in the moment to go out and shoot some pictures of kids in day three of an earthquake and all the rest of it. And that was the sort of tried and trusted way of sort of gathering a certain amount of material, but\ldots it was …normally from a fundraising perspective or from a\ldots a very\textit{ simple} media perspective.

And we wanted\ldots to create a more honest relationship with the public who support us. I felt, and others felt, that [Save UK] had started to spin excessively through media because of fundraising. \ldots

(interview 2013)

Because Owen believed that the ‘next generation’ are ‘much more visually aware’ he hired Colin Crowley, a multimedia producer as a permanent member of staff in 2009: basing Crowley in Nairobi rather than London and embedding him alongside other ‘emergency response personnel’ within his own department, rather than in the Communications department along with the rest of the press team\textsuperscript{72} (interview Owen 2013). Owen’s aim was to use this member of staff to cover ‘emergencies’ but also to enable him to travel elsewhere on the continent in between ‘emergencies’, in order to create longer-form ‘magazine’ pieces (interview Owen 2013). Owen explained that the purpose of this was to enable local people’s ‘voices’ to be heard (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010); to illuminate their agency and resourcefulness; and to build ‘more

\textsuperscript{71} Owen has renamed his department ‘Humanitarian’ as another indication of his resistance to what he sees Save’s overly commercially-oriented approach to emergencies (interview 2013).

\textsuperscript{72} This member of staff helped create the media item which formed the basis of the fourth case study, the audio slideshow of the former child soldier in South Sudan.
authentic, trusting relationships’ with donors (Sayer 2001, 2007) by examining the problems with delivering international aid and with the aid system itself, which kept failing to prevent acute suffering (interview Owen 2013).

Rather than viewing all media work as opposed to ideal ‘humanitarianism’ then (Nolan and Mikami 2013), Owen’s position-taking strategy (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) was quite explicitly designed to use the provision of media to mainstream news organisations in order to try and forge different kinds of relationship with media audiences by ‘educating them’ rather than simply extracting their money (interview Owen 2013; see Orgad 2013b): a move which Owen portrayed as indirectly ‘mainstreaming the humanitarian gene back into … this big beast [of an INGO] that has largely forgotten all that stuff’ (interview 2013). Although Owen never mentioned ‘injustice’, his conceptualisation of ‘humanitarian’ media coverage as entailing an explanation of the difficulties of delivering aid, the structural problems causing ‘humanitarian emergencies’, as well as his repeated insistence that the ‘humanitarian system’ was ‘broken’ because it failed to act to prevent acute suffering (interview 2013), was a ‘definite form of politics’ (Nolan and Mikami 2013:62) which implicitly moved towards a critical engagement with states and markets (Calhoun 2008; Nolan and Mikami 2013).

Yet Owen was fully aware that the press team would resist both this normative vision, as well as his intrusion into an area of work usually controlled by the press team. So he not only had to exercise the authority associated with his formal position, but also his personal charisma and shrewd understanding of internal
realpolitik, in order to gain acceptance for his new multimedia officer. As he explained

[The press team] were hugely uneasy about this, especially at the start. They were like, ‘What are you doing?’

So I said ‘Well look, this is for me and my department. You can use him if you can’t use one of your freelancers... [said persuasively].

(interview Owen 2013)

The issue of freelance work was also found to be bound up with intra-organisational struggles regarding the relative weighting of advocacy and fundraising at Christian Aid (Orgad 2013a; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). For senior managers at Christian Aid explained that the difficulties regarding unrestricted funding which were faced by all INGOs were exacerbated in Christian Aid’s case by the demise of many of its long-standing private donors, who have traditionally been older members of the Church of England radicalised in the 1960s (interviews Buckley; Pain 2013). This prompted a significant organisational restructure in the months prior to the sample being taken, in which the teams dealing with marketing, media and advocacy were merged into one ‘Communications’ department, headed by Steven Buckley, a member of staff with a ‘marketing background in the commercial sector’ (interview Buckley 2013).

Buckley saw part of the purpose of this organisational restructure as reining in the press team who he argued ‘have sort of considered themselves journalists first and foremost, rather than press officers’ (interview 2013; see also Fenton 2010a). Since such press officers were often the only people supervising freelancers on trips, he
argued that both had ‘ended up’ pursuing stories and angles which they thought were worthy of media attention, rather than ones which were ‘necessarily priorities for the organisation’ (interview Buckley 2013). However, Christian Aid’s Head of Media, Andrew Hogg, was clearly uneasy with such encroachments on his creative autonomy73 (interview Hogg 2012) and Joseph Cabon, Christian Aid’s picture editor, had already successfully challenged Buckley on a number of related issues (interview Buckley 2013).

Indeed, Cabon had managed to retain exclusive control over the organisation’s picture policy; the commissioning of freelance photographers; and the short-lists of photos provided to news organisations, as well as having considerable input into the organisation’s ‘rebranding’ of itself in terms of the colours and fonts used in organisational material (interviews Buckley; Cabon 2013; interview Hogg 2012). Much like Owen at Save the Children, Cabon had been able to do this because of a combination of factors, including his forceful character, his official position, and the cultural capital which he had accrued because of his long-standing service at Christian Aid. Although his colleagues also reflected on the cultural capital attributed to Cabon because of his in-depth knowledge of photography itself (interviews Buckley; Hogg; Pain 2013; see also Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

However, these intra-organisational struggles over the control of visual media, its role in the organisation’s internal identity and external representation, also owed a great deal to Christian Aid’s tradition of valuing vigorous and varied internal debate: with disputants drawing upon a range of more political, as well as religious values,

73 A more detailed comparison of Buckley and Hogg’s approach to producing multimedia forms part of the next chapter.
such as those relating to post-colonial theory (interview Cabon 2013), liberation theology (interviews Hogg; Pain 2013), and Freire’s ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ (2000, discussed in interview Pain 2013). So the official position which Christian Aid had arrived at by the time of writing not only justified its restructure and move towards greater visual coherence in terms of its need to secure unrestricted funding, but also in terms of a collective form of position-taking (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) designed to generate greater organisational autonomy from the political priorities of major donors (interview Pain 2013). This involved re-conceptualising its media work in the context of multiple ‘partnerships’: thereby positioning media ‘audiences’ in ways which included, but were not limited to, relationships of financial support (interview Pain 2013; see Orgad 2013b).

For these reasons, freelancers’ creation of multimedia which were not the stereotypical, ‘stock’ images of suffering ‘others’ (Moeller 2002) but which were still ‘beautiful’ according to elite Anglo-American aesthetic traditions (Bourdieu 1984; Evans 1997; Gupta 1986) can be read as being closely bound up with the efforts of INGO staff to employ different kinds of internal and externally-oriented position-taking (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). These relate to such INGOs’ efforts to secure not only the amounts and kinds of funding which they need to survive, but also to engage in intra-organisational struggles over the meanings, values and distribution of resources shaping their organisations’ work, and thus, their relationship to broader social groups (Orgad 2013a).

However, freelancers seemed largely unaware of their role in these kinds of organisational struggles, despite the fact that all of them were highly experienced,
mature, well-respected, and often very thoughtful practitioners (interviews A; Lloyd-Davies 2012; interview E and F; Pilston 2013). This lack of awareness was caused, in part, by the nature of casual labour, for these individuals were not permanently embedded within the organisations concerned, so only had the most fleeting glimpses into their internal workings. Even if they had been aware of the way in which intra-organisational struggles shaped their work, they would have had no secure organisational framework within which to engage in such disputes, and given their nervousness about damaging their livelihood it seems unlikely that they would have raised such issues independently.

Finally, more overt conflicts over the structuring of their work were prevented by the cultural capital accrued by INGO picture and multimedia editors as ‘specialists’ in particular media (Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). For this enabled such editors to pre-empt and resolve any conflicts with freelancers by articulating their work together in terms of particular aesthetic genres: so effacing any contentious issues to do with organisational branding and/or internal power struggles.

Thus, in the first case study, Cabon, the picture editor at Christian Aid, hired the freelance photographer, Pilston, whose style he thought was in keeping with his own preference for ‘social documentary’ photography (interview 2013). Cabon described this as involving a focus on photos of groups of people in order to demonstrate social relationships; presenting as much physical context as possible; and demonstrating evidence of subjects’ agency; as well as refusing to pose or digitally ‘touch up’
pictures apart from balancing light and shade in order to clarify subjects’ features and expressions (interview 2013).

As Cabon predicted, this meant that he had no need to ask Pilston to adhere to the organisational picture policy which he had written because Pilston had already thoroughly internalised the aesthetic, epistemological and ethical dimensions of this photographic approach (interview Pilston 2013; see also Evans 1997; Morden 1986; Price 1997). These tacit, shared understandings about the requirements of a particular aesthetic tradition also meant that Cabon did not have to explain to Pilston that his focus on ‘social documentary’ photography had been integral to his attempts to generate a distinct organisational style associated visually with campaigns for social justice which he hoped would ‘draw people to Christian Aid so that they won’t go to our competitors’ (interview 2013). Nor did Cabon have to explain the way in which this particular approach to imagery, and indeed his production of the picture policy itself, had enabled him to stake his own claim in heated conflicts within Christian Aid about the approach which it should take to media production in the run-up to its amalgamation of the media and marketing departments (interviews Buckley; Cabon; Pain 2013).

Finally, when Pilston disagreed with Cabon’s decision about which shot to put forward, he did not challenge him because he said he ‘trusted’ that Cabon had simply had a different interpretation of which photo had contained the ‘decisive moment’ (interview Pilston 2013; Sayer 2001, 2007). The term used is highly significant because Pilston appears to have assumed that Cabon’s decision was framed exclusively by his aesthetic judgement, conducted in relation to the
normative/aesthetic principles as suggested by Henri Cartier-Bresson, who argued that the job of the photographer was to

…recognize - simultaneously and within a fraction of a second - both the fact itself and the rigorous organisation of visually perceived forms that give it meaning.

[Capturing the decisive moment requires] putting one’s head, one’s eye, and one’s heart on the same axis.

(1952: 191)\textsuperscript{74}

There are obvious problems with this logic: for if there can be disagreement about what constitutes the ‘decisive moment’, then how can it exist outside of the photographer’s subjective judgement? In addition, the notion of a transcendental ‘moment’ evades any consideration of the historical, geographical and cultural contexts shaping the codes employed by the photographer, as well as viewers of their photographs (Hall 1997). But what is most important for the argument in this section is the way in which the transcendentalism of this rationale effectively inhibits any considerations about Cabon’s use of photography in relation to his membership of a particular organisation - namely, Christian Aid.

So Pilston was on rather firmer ground when he argued that being over-ruled by a specialist picture editor at an INGO was, in any case, ‘way better than what happens in news organisations where any Tom, Dick or Harry can hack away at your work and they don’t have a clue what they’re doing’ (interview 2013). For that is precisely what happened when his pictures went through a ‘final cut’ at The Independent on

\textsuperscript{74} Although some photography scholars argue that this has been mistranslated from French to English and should be read as referring not to an actually-existing political climax, but to a visual one (Szarkowski 2007) or to something far less exact, an ‘image taken on the run’ (Travis 2003:79).
Sunday when one shot of an old man holding a rice-bowl, was cropped so severely that it looked as if he was begging. Sophie Batterbury, the paper’s Picture Editor, explained that that crop had been carried out by page designers, rather than picture editors, during the last reformat (interview 2013). But although this infuriated both Pilston and Cabon, neither thought it was worth damaging their relations with staff at the newspaper by raising the issue (interviews 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter has endeavoured to develop new understandings about the moral economies structuring why and how some freelancers chose to work for both news organisations and INGOs. In particular, it attended to the interaction of structure and agency in such freelancers’ ‘inner conversations’ (Archer 2003a, see also 2007) about the legitimacy of such position-taking strategies (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) in order to illuminate significant differences between the approaches taken by freelancers enculturated in particular forms of reporting within African countries for ‘public service’ news organisations and those socialised in ways which owe more to the habitus of photography.

It then went on to explain the potential heterogeneity which may emerge from the way in which such freelancers are given some kinds of ‘workplace autonomy’ by INGOs (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40). But it demonstrated that they consistently confused this with ‘creative autonomy’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40), as well as failing to reflect more thoroughly upon the ways in which
freelancing, and the kinds of ‘beautiful’ work produced through it, function within INGOs’ inter and intra-organisational struggles (Orgad 2013a; Powers 2013).

This lack of critical scrutiny (Sen 2010) may seem peculiar, given the undoubted intelligence and experience of those involved, as well as the habit, which many of them had acquired, of intense self-examination regarding their own practices and positioning within their respective fields. But it can be accounted for by the nature of casual labour itself, which constrained freelancers’ ability and willingness to contest the value-laden structuring and uses of the ‘beautiful’ multimedia they produced in a number of ways. This included the manner in which freelancers framed their relations with INGOs in terms of their ‘trust’ in their picture and multimedia editors (Sayer 2001, 2007), whom they perceived as ‘fellow specialists’: so enabling INGO staff to frame the projects concerned to freelancers in ways which relied upon the aesthetic/ethical values of particular genres.

Freelancers’ involvement in producing multimedia for NGOs can therefore be seen to blur the lines between INGOs and news organisations in ways which have not been anticipated by previous studies (Cooper 2009). This ‘blurring’ has some progressive potential, as it can involve very considered approaches to the construction and normative purposes of mediated knowledge about Africa, including a politics of listening (Couldry 2006; Rentschler 2010). Nevertheless, freelancers’ failure to realise why and how their ‘creative autonomy’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40) was constrained by these particular forms of casual labour, and the manner in which this was bound up with particular kinds of aesthetic specialisation, tended to undercut their potential radicalism. For when combined, these generative
mechanisms prevented such participants from contesting the ways in which their labour is structured and the uses to which it was put. Thus although such freelancers may seek to be freer to produce the kinds of time-consuming and specialised work they value, their efforts to disseminate different forms of knowledge, to enable marginalised people to be heard, and to interrogate dominant value-systems (Sen 2010) risk being co-opted by others.
NGOs are clearly engaged in multiple inter and intra-organisational struggles (Orgad 2013a; Powers 2013) regarding the provision of multimedia to journalists. But three kinds of moral economies were found to play a particularly powerful role in shaping journalists’ acceptance of NGO-provided multimedia. These justified positioning NGOs in relation to mainstream news, to media audience/s, to the market, and to those represented, in different kinds of ways (Orgad 2013b; Powers 2013; Waisbord 2011). All three had different enabling, as well as constraining properties (Powers 2014) relating to the dissemination of knowledge and the enablement of critical scrutiny (Sen 2010), as well as the enhancement of others’ capabilities to be free from hunger, physical danger, and to be able to access appropriate medical services (Sen 1999, 2010).

The first kind of moral economy, which will be examined in the first section of this chapter, can be seen to have emerged from criticisms of the commercialised position-practices structuring international news and current affairs reporting, as this was characterised by the notion of NGO-workers ‘doing proper reporting’. In contrast, the second, which will be covered in the second section, was characterised by notions of ‘selling in’ and had emerged from commercial marketing, advertising
and/or public relations, as well as from casualised and/or consumer-oriented forms of journalism.

INGOs’ approach to the provision of multimedia tended to be influenced more strongly by one or the other of these two moral economies. Rather than being causally shaped by their form of funding (Powers 2013), these differences, broadly speaking, were found to map onto the divide between the traditions of humanitarian work itself. For participants who were more strongly influenced by ‘selling in’ tended to belong to INGOs which identified with the ‘chemical’ tradition within aid work, which focusses on relieving suffering often in ‘emergencies’ (Orgad 2013a: 297), whilst those more influenced by that relating to ‘proper reporting’ tended to belong to INGOs identified with the ‘alchemical’ tradition, which involves a focus on empowerment, sustainable development and/or human rights (Orgad 2013a: 297).

However, it isn’t appropriate to view the moral economies found in INGOs as similar to those structuring news outlets, because they cut across INGOs to a far greater degree in ways which related to internal tensions between fundraising and advocacy (Orgad 2013a). It also isn’t appropriate to regard them as having totally different effects, as although that pertaining to ‘proper reporting’ was found to have greater potential vis-à-vis the capabilities outlined by Sen, neither enabled ‘voice’ in a political sense: so constraining public reasoning about the values and perspectives relevant to specific problems (2010).

In particular, this chapter will examine the case studies involving Christian Aid’s production of a written article and accompanying photos about a food crisis in Mali
and the collaboration of Save the Children UK with *BBC News Online* in order to produce an audio slideshow about a former child soldier in South Sudan. In so doing, it will demonstrate the manner in which both of the moral economies dominant in these INGOs undermined the process and value of ‘voice’: so failing to empower those who are currently disadvantaged and marginalised to give their own account of their lives and the conditions shaping them (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010).

But the last section of this chapter will go on to argue that accepting multimedia from African NGOs does not necessarily empower the ‘voices’ of those who are marginalised any more than accepting material from INGOs. For the multimedia provided for a campaign run by the Kenyan Paraplegic Organization (KPO) in the second case study was also dominated by ‘selling in’, because of the NGO’s reliance on multinational advertising and PR agencies working with the NGO on a *pro bono* basis as part of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) programme. This case study opens up new avenues for research because participants in this case study argued that such position-practices were now commonplace, as commercial businesses collaborated with NGOs to enhance the reputations of their ‘brands’ in relation to Africa’s highly lucrative emerging markets.

In addition, a third moral economy appears to have been at work here, which emerged from that of ‘selling in’, but which had its own distinct properties. For participants sought to ‘dramatize reality’ in ways which were immediately and emotionally appealing to audiences: so abandoning the normative commitment to realism which underpins mainstream news (Wright 2011b; Zelizer 2004b). Thus this final section seeks to expose the dangers of presuming that including multimedia
from African NGOs as unofficial sources will necessarily lead to more progressive forms of pluralism.

In addition, this chapter aims to challenge the current vogue for discussing the role of former journalists in NGOs’ media work as if their position-practices and the generative mechanisms shaping them were more or less the same (e.g. Cottle and Nolan 2007; Fenton 2010a). It also aims to ‘internationalise’ research in this area by exploring the manner in which unequal political and economic structures shaped the labour of different kinds of media workers in African countries (Mano 2009; Mosco and Lavin 2009; Shome and Hegde 2010), without portraying all Africans as an undifferentiated mass of passive and unwitting victims as well as attending to the relationship between ‘voice’ and the act of linguistic interpretation (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009; Bassnett and Trivedi 1999; Schäffner and Bassnett 2010).

1.1: Doing ‘proper reporting’?

INGO-workers who referred to themselves as ‘journalists’ had all been enculturated in particular kinds of international news and current affairs journalism over a period of many decades. This had involved them spending long periods of time based in one country as staff reporters (Hogg at Christian Aid) or correspondents (Bogert and Daly at HRW), and/or bureau chiefs (Bairin, Bogert at HRW). So all of them shared the general ‘cosmopolitan politics’ which Hannerz has argued is characteristic of such actors, involving ‘a sense of responsibility beyond the nation state’ and a
‘response to globalisation that emphasises that human beings are not only to be seen as a labour force or consumers’ (2004:20).

Like the freelance reporters in the previous chapter, who had also spent long periods abroad, this had led to them becoming partially disembedded from the mainstream news industry (Sayer 2001) because of their concerns about the increasing tendency of news organisations to seek commercially-oriented populism: using what Bogert, HRW’s Deputy Director for External Relations, called ‘the yardstick of the market to judge what would work in journalism’ (interview 2013). Such concerns tended to be ‘voiced’ within reflexive ‘internal conversations’ (Archer 2003a). For example, Hogg, the Head of Media at Christian Aid, who had spent forty years in print journalism, described his unease about the prurience involved in tabloidization (Conboy 2006; Sparks and Tulloch 2000; Zelizer 2009) like this:

_The Daily Mail sent me to stake out this MP who was in trouble for [having an affair with a choirboy]. I was parked up in the dark outside his house in this little village in Essex…_

_Two people came out of the pub and attacked my car because they knew that I was a journalist and there had been people door-stepping all afternoon, and as I sort of extricated myself and drove away I just thought… I don’t really blame them for doing that._

_I just didn’t want to be a part of that world any more…It’s not just The Daily Mail, I think the whole profession has changed…_

(interview 2012)

Likewise, Pierre Bairin, HRW’s Media Director, who had spent eleven years in TV news, predominantly at CNN, was appalled by the increasing pressure on himself and others to do risky stunts in war zones in order to provide viewers with popular
and sensationalistic live drama (Bromley 2010; Cushion 2010; Thussu 2008). For instance, he cited an occasion in the 2011 Libyan uprising when

Everyone was driving with the rebels along this stupid highway along the coast … between Benghazi and, like, all these towns... and we would get bombed …and that meant that the other side, the Gadaffi loyalists were approaching. So we would all rush back and it would make for great video to see this big, dramatic retreat.

But then, ok, so maybe you do that once to show what is happening; how disorganised the rebels are; and how scared they are; and how quickly they retreat etc. But doing it every day? First of all, it's not a story any more... And then you think... no, I don’t want to die doing this stupid thing.

And I don’t want to belong to … any group which thinks that this is what journalism should be.

(interview 2013)

This partial disembedding from mainstream news journalism was also causally shaped by new forms of embedding (Sayer 2001) which had emerged from these former reporters’ experiences of covering violent and unequal forms of oppression, most notably during the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. For participants highlighted the way in which the positioning of this war within Europe had collapsed the symbolic distance between them and those whom they were reporting upon: placing both within the zone of danger (Shaw 1996). As Hogg at Christian Aid explained,

Bosnia was a bit like looking at a model of a society, a functioning twentieth century society, in which somebody had ripped the roof off …and suddenly everything was exposed; everything that we take for granted in a functioning, orderly world had disappeared.

The truly [thumps table] remarkable thing about it was that it was happening to white [thump] Europeans [thump]. That I can only explain is as some kind of indictment of oneself, but it is absolutely true.
I had covered conflicts before: I was in Algeria, Israel, Afghanistan, and Iraq. None of them had the emotional power of Bosnia...because it was so similar to the world that one lived in.

(interview 2012)

In addition, the physical positioning of reporters during the Bosnian War shaped the emergence of more passionately-felt notions of obligation to those suffering (Sayer 2007). As Daly, HRW’s Communications Director, said

In Vietnam, you know people were going out to the front and then coming back and yes, Saigon got attacked and I guess, Phnom Penh as well. But it wasn't the same [as Bosnia]...

There wasn't the same proximity, I think, where you were living with people who were under attack all the time. So you felt ... more of a sense of duty to the people you were reporting on.

(interview 2013)

Thus all of these former reporters described this as shaping the emergence of a general, value-laden ‘desire…to prevent or… to mitigate situations when things like that were happening to other people’ (interview Hogg 2012), although Hogg was the only one for whom this involved Christian faith.

The tight networks of trust and mutual dependence which journalists formed with one another during this war (Sayer 2001, 2007) gave shape to this general desire, because participants who moved to NGO-work after the Bosnian war tended to be instrumental in recruiting others. For instance, when Bogert, HRW’s Deputy Executive Director needed to ‘fill’ the Communications Director post, she sought the advice of Laura Silber, who had been the Balkans correspondent for The Financial Times, before joining the Soros Institute, which is HRW’s biggest donor (interview
Bogert 2013). Silber recommended Daly, who had previously been the Balkans Correspondent for *The Independent* as well as Steve Crawshaw, who had been the paper’s East Europe Editor, for a different post - although Crawshaw has since moved on to a series of senior communications roles at Amnesty International (interview Daly 2013).

Daly later recruited Bairin to HRW, whom she had become friends with whilst he was acting as videotape editor for CNN’s Christiane Amanpour in Bosnia (interviews Bairin; Daly 2013). As Bairin explained,

> The press corps over there was quite small and tight... I mean [the war] went on for years...

> So when Emma moved to HRW we talked about how unhappy I was at CNN and she said ‘You know, that’s not how we do it here [at HRW].

> I think you should go for that... [Media Director] job.

(interview 2013)

Finally, many participants described how they had become embedded in networks of ‘trusting’ and mutually-dependent relationships with rights-based INGOs during this war (Sayer 2001, 2007), often conceptualising both journalists and NGO staff as working together ‘on the ground’ in ways which carried connotations of authenticity, collegiality and even solidarity: so helping to legitimise their later decision to work for that NGO full-time (Sayer 2005, 2007). As Daly put it,
When [Bogert] called me [about the Communications Director post], and I actually started to think about it, it made perfect sense…

You know, in Bosnia in particular and Kosovo, I spent quite a lot of time with HRW…especially in the…camps. So we had already done a lot of work together on the ground.

(interview 2013)

Thus although participants did speak frankly about the ways in which moving to NGO-work involved greater personal security, more regular working hours and lower levels of stress (interview Bairin; Daly 2013), these participants’ decision to move into NGO-work was shaped more powerfully by their internal and external ‘meta-reflexive’ considerations about the mismatch between their ideal of news and the realities of mainstream news production (Archer 2007:93). Such deliberations tended to revolve around ideas about the role which news should play in disseminating knowledge (Sen 2010), as Bairin demonstrated in his critique of satellite TV news:

> The problem with all this live, live, live business … is that most of the time what you watch on these news networks you know beforehand…

> They don’t pick up the phone and actually talk to somebody, or find something out. They, just like, rehash something that you already know by looking at the internet. They don’t have time for anything else…

> All that effort, all that stress, for what? [said angrily]… What exactly do we learn?

(interview 2013)

These INGO-workers conceptualised journalism’s dissemination of knowledge as being closely related to ‘threshold’ news values (Galtung and Ruge 1965): with participants repeatedly stressing the social and political need for ‘serious’ news
about ‘important’ issues (interview Hogg 2012; interviews Bairin; Bogert; Daly 2013). However, their perceptions of this ‘importance’ also pertained to the protective function of news, in so far as they thought that it was important to highlight the existence and causes of suffering (Sen 2010).

For these reasons, they were deeply committed to engaging in time-consuming and expensive practices, including detailed investigative research, careful and complex contextualisation, and ‘on the ground’ interviewing, regardless of whether the stories in question would be popular or not. For instance, Bogert said

> When I was at Newsweek...the highest praise that you could get from our Editor in Chief was ‘Ooh nothin’ but readers!’

> We were a magazine, we had to sell [pause]... So at some level, you ended up trying to write stories that people wanted to read.

> The difference is, at HRW ... we don’t care about how many people care about Burundi...we will still cover it.

(interview 2013)

All of these related value commitments were associated by these participants with ‘credibility’, ‘authority’, and, most tellingly, with the notion of these former journalists doing ‘proper reporting’ (interview Bairin 2013; see also interview Daly 2013; interview Hogg 2012). Thus the value-laden approaches shaping the work of these former reporters were much like those shaping the work of the former reporters who had turned freelance. However, these participants did not attend to a politics of voice (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010) or a politics of listening (Couldry 2006; Rentschler 2010), so they didn’t have a critical framework with which to analyse the effects of framing.
their organisation’s provision of multimedia in terms of conventional ‘news values’ (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001).

This is crucial because it means that the production processes involved tend to concentrate narrative-framing power in the hands of the white, European former reporters, located within the London and New York head offices of the INGOs which could afford to employ them (Fenton 2010a). Indeed, even when the freelancers whose ‘specialised’ knowledge they admired presented them with work which did not conform to mainstream news values, they sometimes asked them to re-edit it (interview Lloyd-Davies, freelance film-maker, 2012). Moreover, despite their disgust with commercially-driven populism, HRW-workers in particular personalised problems in a way which was consonant with popular appeal, so risking driving out understandings of political causality (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001).

Such a finding therefore supports Fenton’s claim that the dominance of news norms in NGO-work, transmitted by former journalists working in NGO press officers, risks pulling NGOs away from more effective and explicit forms of advocacy (2010a), particularly since these practices were legitimised by participants (Sayer 2005, 2007) through references to the ability of news to offer audiences seemingly neutral ‘information’ (interview Hogg 2012; interviews Bogert; Daly 2013). Again, participants at HRW provided the most repeated and striking examples of this. For example, Daly, the INGO’s Communications Director, described framing the provision of multimedia to journalists in this manner:

75 The Channel 4 News case study provides a particular strong example of this, see Chapter 6.
When we come to you, you can be pretty sure that we are bringing you good information; we’re bringing solid information. We’re not hyping it up; we’re not exaggerating...

We’re not coming to you with a political agenda...or a partisan agenda where we are playing up the abuses by the government and downplaying the abuses by the political opposition

(interview 2013)

Claims regarding political neutrality can also be seen to be made implicitly by HRW’s embedding of multimedia in electronic shot lists, which were designed to look as if they had been issued by wire agencies.\(^\text{76}\) For wire agencies are generally regarded as the ‘gold standard’ of impartial, news journalism by those in the industry (Franks 2010b:42): so inhibiting NGO-workers’, journalists’ and others’ ability to scrutinise the political claims their multimedia made (Sen 2010), including their conceptualisation of justice as individual human rights (Ignatieff 2001; Nash 2010; Wright 2011a).

However, there were important discrepancies between the kinds of legitimating rationales which such actors used internally and externally (Sayer 2005, 2007). For when challenged by others in their organisations regarding their dominance over media production, these participants won such intra-organisational struggles (Orgad 2013a) by stressing the ability of multimedia to ‘influence’ rather than ‘inform’ policy-makers through prestige media, such as broadsheets and particular kinds of

\(^{76}\) See Chapter 6.
broadcasting, such as *Channel 4 News* (interview Hogg 2012; interviews Bairin; Bogert; Daly 2013; see Powers 2013, 2014).\(^{77}\)

As Bogert, the Deputy Executive Director at HRW explained, this approach rests upon an explicit rejection of traditional models of media influence which conceptualise public opinion as feeding into democratic action, for as she put it,

> I don’t think [media influence] works through public mobilisation on an issue. So we don’t make any effort whatsoever to get on *Good Morning America* because although millions and millions and millions of people watch it, but we don’t think *policy makers* watch it.

> We really don’t …we have no public outreach function here…What we do is to raise a fuss in the media, and the media are a stand-in for public opinion in some ways.

> You know, if an issue is relentlessly raised in the media by journalists, policy-makers feel that, they experience that as *pressure*, regardless of the size of the constituency. …

> And sometimes there are even more *direct* ways [of exerting political pressure]…Like if at the daily briefing, you know in Ministry X, a journalist raises a question about something then the briefer has to go back to the policy makers and say this came up today, what *is* our policy on this?

> Or you know, I got beat up on *this* today, so why *are* we letting this general with a horrible human rights record have a meeting with the Minister? You know, we’re getting *whacked* here!

(interview 2013)

Thus these participants tended to use mediation as a site of inter-élite pressure (Miller 2007, 2013), or even antagonistic contestation (Davis 2007, 2010), with

\(^{77}\) My own experiences of this are discussed in the Introduction.
mainstream news becoming, at most, a kind of simulation of ‘public opinion’ (Schudson 2003; Lippman 2006 [1925], 2011 [1937]).

Therefore although the intensive research processes valued within this kind of moral economy have the potential to expose falsehoods\(^{78}\) and to give more detailed forms of causal explanation than would otherwise be available to journalists,\(^{79}\) it also involved a degree of complicity with the uncritical ‘churnalism’ (Davies 2008) which such INGO-workers decried, as well as risking confining debates about policy changes to elites (Powers 2014) by marginalising others’ values and perspectives, especially those which involved articulating ‘advocacy’ in relation to broader forms of collectivity and solidarity (Fenton 2010a).

1.2: Christian Aid, news journalism and North/South ‘partnerships’

One of the most interesting case studies shaped by notions of NGO-workers doing ‘proper reporting’ involved Christian Aid. This was because the most senior manager in the case study had reframed the work of the whole communications department in very different ways: explicitly positioning media work as part of the INGO’s efforts to develop deeper, more complex and more equal relationships with all of their ‘partners’, including financial supporters, the local NGOs with whom they worked, and the people whom Christian Aid hoped to help. Indeed, David Pain, the manager

\(^{78}\) See Chapter 6.

\(^{79}\) See next section.
concerned, had even changed his job title to reflect this change: calling himself the ‘Director of Supporter and Community Partnerships’ (interview 2013).

This organisational shift was shaped by Pain’s adherence to a politics of ‘voice’ (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010). As he explained,

> What we’re looking for is to strengthen the voice of our partners, who are close to people living in poverty, to strengthen their influence in the world…

> So we’re interested in …making sure that what we say is based on their experience. Those kinds of values are very important for us.

(interview 2013)

In this case, two partner organisations in Mali were involved: Actions de Promotion Humaine (APH) and Groupe de Recherche et d’applications techniques (GRAT).

Pain had also put in place new organisational processes to make it easier for Christian Aid’s in-country programme directors to request media attention, as well as giving them the right to ‘sign-off’ the final media item (interview Pain 2013). This was a change which Yacouba Kone, the INGO’s Programme Director in Mali, saw as representing a highly significant ‘devolution’ of control (interview 2013). But, Hogg, the Head of Media, who wrote the article and supervised the freelance photographer (Pilston) on the trip, made it clear that the moral economy which structured his own approach prevented any meaningful devolution of editorial control. That’s because he argued that if Kone had asked for changes, he would have refused on the grounds that ‘it was a journalistic exercise’ (interview Hogg 2012).
Hogg’s enculturation into the *habitus* of international news reporting also constrained a politics of ‘voice’ (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010) in other ways. For in accordance with the rest of the news industry (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009), Hogg asked the two Malian interpreters, Abdourahamane Keita and Moussa Sangaré, to ‘translate word for word’, rather than paraphrasing what interviewees had said (interview Hogg 2012). However, Keita made it clear that interpreting between French and Bambara involved far more than translating words: it involved trying to bridge very different and unequal cultures (Bassnett and Trivedi 1999; Schäffner and Bassnett 2010). Indeed, Keita, who had not been trained in interpretation and who usually evaluated projects for Christian Aid in Mopti, said that he really struggled to know how to ‘translate the context…the situation of desperate people and their emotions’ (interview 2013).

In addition, Keita said that it was impossible to translate some culturally-specific terms, especially ‘Ou ye lanogo’: a phrase in Bambara which was repeatedly used by interviewees and which he said means ‘a kind of humiliation in every way… on economic, social and cultural level’ (interview 2013). Rather than risk antagonising an important English visitor from London, who was already frustrated by the cumbersome ‘double-interpretation’ process, from Bambara to French, and then from French to English (interview Hogg 2012), Keita just tried to use words which were ‘roughly similar’, as well as giving ‘examples of other cases’ to try and aid Hogg’s understanding (interview 2013). However, Hogg was annoyed by what he perceived as digressions which further slowed down the interpretation process, so he insisted

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80 Sangaré is a Malian school teacher who had been asked to interpret between French and a dialect of Songhaï used in Northern Mali by APH. Unfortunately, it was impossible to interview him, because he was later displaced by fighting between the jihadi forces and the Malian government.
again that Keita just ‘stick to translating word for word’, rather than going off on a
tangent (interview Hogg 2012).

Nevertheless, other generative mechanisms were far more important in constraining
‘voice’ in this instance, which were outside of Hogg’s control (Couldry 2010; Sen
2010). These included the lack of time which he and Pilston were allowed to spend
with those whom they interviewed/photographed. As the two managers of local
Malian NGOs who arranged the trip explained, its brevity was necessitated by acute
security concerns because Islamist forces had recently kidnapped foreigners visiting
another NGO and Malian governmental bodies had insisted on British visitors not
staying in one place longer than a single night (interview M. Tangara, Manager of
Agricultural Development Projects, APH, 2013; interview Y. Tangara, Programme
Director, GRAT, 2013).

In addition, the mayor of Mopti alienated many of the displaced people waiting to
speak with Hogg, because of the way he had introduced Hogg and Pilston at a long,
formal meeting (interviews M. Tangara; Y. Tangara 2013). For unfortunately, the
mayor did not speak the dialect of Songhaï which was the first language used by the
displaced Malians at this location, and did not wish to speak in Bambara, which most
of them also spoke: preferring to use the higher prestige language at his disposal,
French (interviews M. Tangara; Y. Tangara 2013). But few of the displaced Malians
present spoke French, especially those from poorer backgrounds, and the handful
who did resented being addressed in a colonial language, particularly in the context
of receiving white European visitors (interviews Keita; M. Tangara 2013; see also
Bielsa and Bassnett 2009; Bassnett and Trivedi 1999; Schäffner and Bassnett 2010).
A serious row ensued which Keita, the interpreter, claimed caused many of those who had initially been willing to participate to change their minds (interview 2013).

However, Christian Aid’s ability to empower the ‘voices’ of the marginalised and disempowered (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010) was also seriously inhibited by the nature of the North/South ‘partnerships’ in which it was engaged, despite the intentions of senior managers in London. For Christian Aid’s Programme Director, Kone, had asked its Malian partner agencies, APH and GRAT, to arrange for those who were served by their projects to meet Hogg and Pilston (interview Kone 2013). But APH and GRAT framed their request for media participation to beneficiaries in ways which were consonant with their own interests and prior experiences of mediatised donor reporting (Goffman 1986).

For example, Yacouba Tangara from GRAT told displaced Malians near Gao that they needed to meet Hogg and Pilston because they had to make the ‘people who support Christian Aid’ know ‘that they have done the right thing [in] paying for this [project]’ (interview 2013). Likewise, Mamadou Tangara from APH said he had previous experience of a mediatised project reporting for EU donor agencies (interview 2013), so had approached potential Dogon participants, who lived near the military front, by arguing that they needed to ‘show that the monies given to the project had been rightly given, and rightly used’ (interview 2013). Indeed, he said that he had had a ‘very hard job’ to persuade the Dogon people to come and meet Hogg and Pilston because it was harvest-time and given the threat to their food supply posed by nearby fighting, they had not wanted to waste a whole day of labour on a media-related visit (interview M. Tangara 2013).
Thus the organisational position-practices which had been set up by Christian Aid’s senior managers to support a politics of ‘voice’ (interview Pain 2013) proved counter-productive: enabling Malian partner organisations to frame media participation to potential participants in ways which utilised their financial dependence as a form of leverage or coercion in a profoundly disempowering manner (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010). Moreover, the way in which media participation was framed by such NGOs severely restricted the kinds of accounts of themselves and their situations which media participants were able to give (Couldry 2010), as well as the problems, values, actors, powers and treatments relevant to them (Stones 2014). In particular, such an approach pre-empts any possibility of criticising local agencies, Christian Aid or NGO-work in general.

So notions of NGO-workers doing ‘proper reporting’ were not solely to blame for constraining a politics of ‘voice’ in this instance (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010). Indeed, in some ways the INGO’s Head of Media, Hogg, who subscribed to this approach had a far more sophisticated understanding of the ways in which ‘voice’ might be constrained than others in his organisation. For he argued that his experience of international news reporting had taught him that that ‘consent’ required a careful negotiation of unequal power relations: as he put it,

> What I have tried to explain to people here is that you can put together organisational consent policies all you like…you can even have things to sign [gestures in exasperated fashion].

> But … if that person is reliant on your partner agency for their livelihood and the partner is standing there with you, then that person is pressurised by that connection into saying yes.

(interview Hogg 2012)
Finally, although in many ways it would be unfair to make a direct comparison between the news article Hogg produced and the audio slideshow about Deng Chan which was produced in conjunction with Save the Children, given the very different word counts afforded to them, as well as different demands of the media and genres involved, it is worth noting that the piece Hogg produced was by far the most causally complex in the whole sample. For it explained the problem as emerging from several inter-related generative mechanisms: the fighting between the Malian government and Islamist secessionists and their Tuareg allies which had disrupted agricultural production and food supplies; the lack of rains which had led to poor harvests; the high prices asked for staples because of poor harvests; long-term poverty in the country which meant that few could afford such high prices; the displacement of people within and across Mali’s national borders because of the fighting; and finally, the tendency of rain, when it did come, to cause flash-flooding (Hogg 2012).

It was highly questionable to allow Christian Aid sole editorial control of this article, so allowing it to define the key ‘problem’ as a food crisis, rather than a military, political or trade crisis; to exclude any reference to the grievances of Islamist and Tuareg groups; and to focus almost exclusively on Christian Aid’s Malian Programme Director and displaced civilians as key actors (Stones 2014). Nevertheless, it did disseminate some forms causal knowledge with considerable explanatory power, as well as stimulating some forms of debate about market values

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81 See section 2.3 in Chapter 4.
(Sen 2010): thereby avoiding giving the impression that NGO-work either can or should provide the only ‘treatment’ to the problem (Stones 2014:14-15).

2.1: ‘Selling in’

The second moral economy shaped the dissemination of far less causally complex and critically-aware coverage of Africa, and appears to have been far more damaging to a politics of ‘voice’ (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010). This involved conceptualising NGOs’ provision of multimedia to individual journalists and to audiences as a form of ‘selling’ (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Kennedy 2009). It also depended on the agency of a number of former journalists: namely, Sarah Jacobs and Kathryn Rawe, two British journalists moved to conduct communications work for Save the Children UK\(^\text{82}\) and Nick Thiong’o, a Kenyan journalist who became an Account Manager at Ogilvy and Mather, a commercial PR firm which worked for African NGOs on a pro bono basis.

But there were several differences between the journalistic habitus experienced by these participants and that experienced by the first group. For these former journalists had only spent a few months to three years in journalism, instead of decades, so they were not so enculturated in journalism that they still regarded themselves as ‘journalists’ (interviews Rawe; Thiong’o 2012; interview Jacobs 2013; see also Fenton 2010a). In addition, these participants had no experience of working

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\(^{82}\) Jacobs was the Head of News and Rawe the Media Manager for Africa at the time when the media item was created.
as an international reporter, correspondent or bureau chief: instead, they tended to have done far more work for business and consumer-oriented media outlets. For example, Thiong’o had acted as an associate editor for the trade magazine, *Business Post* (interview 2012), whilst Jacobs had worked as a commissioning editor for *The Mail on Sunday’s You* magazine (interview Jacobs 2013).

Furthermore, these participants’ engagement in journalistic labour had been relatively insecure and/or poorly paid, which meant that they were used to having to ‘market’ their own stories as freelance journalists to a variety of different outlets (interview Rawe 2012; interview Jacobs 2013), and/or having to ‘market’ themselves in ways which enhanced their career (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011). This was particularly pronounced in the interview with Thiong’o, who explained that

> In Kenya newsrooms don’t pay well, so you have to find ways of pushing yourself forward. That way, you can follow a career trajectory from journalism to PR and communications.  

(interview 2013)

Thus, these former journalists’ highly individualistic and advantage-seeking approaches to media production (Coombs and Holladay 2013; Davis 2013b; Moloney 2006) go some way towards explaining why they did not encounter the major crisis of meaning, purpose and collective belonging experienced by former reporters on leaving journalism. Instead, they portrayed their shift into what they described as ‘public relations’ as a much smoother progression, often framing it as involving a straightforward transfer of ‘skills’ (interview Rawe 2012; interviews

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83 Schiffrin notes that the salary of a PR worker is several times higher than that of a journalist in Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria as well (2012).
Jacobs; Thiong’o 2013). These included their ability to ‘make use of their media contacts’ (interview Thiong’o 2013) and to work at great speed under pressure: both of which were associated with portraying their organisation positively (interviews Rawe; Thiong’o 2013).

For instance, Kathryn Rawe, described her move from working in ‘public affairs’ for South West Trains to working in the press office at Save the Children UK like this:

> There is a link [laughs] and the link is crisis management. So I did a lot of work on like… oh crap, we’ve screwed up all the engineering work in Portsmouth. Right, *scramble*, do it. Who do you need to talk to?

> Like interviews in my pyjamas while I am writing a press release – it’s the same set of skills to respond to a [humanitarian] emergency, but just in a very different place.

(interview 2013)

Thus the perspectives of these former journalists were very similar to the approach taken by Buckley, the Head of Communications at Christian Aid, who had a background in commercial marketing, rather than journalism. For all of these participants believed that ‘good’ could be achieved by implementing these kinds of skills in order to educate non-elites via the media (Powers 2014). Nevertheless, these moral values were never separated from the economic aim of heightening positive forms of brand awareness (Cottle and Nolan 2007). For instance, as Rawe went on point out,

> I always have a double agenda of getting the message we want publicised out there, and getting our name linked to it.
In addition, all of these participants argued that a key aim of media work was organisational fundraising (Powers 2014), which they also legitimised in moral terms such as ‘raising money to do good’ (interview Buckley 2013). So, rather than trying to influence elites politically by placing ‘serious’ news stories generated internally in prestige news media, these former journalists, tended to respond to existing news agendas by targeting populist outlets with visual multimedia relating loosely to ‘diary events’, such as South Sudan’s independence (interview Jacobs 2013). Moreover, these INGO-workers were far less interested in ‘hard news’, preferring to stress the ‘human interest’ value of ‘softer’ genres like ‘features’ (interviews Buckley; Jacobs 2013; see Harcup and O’Neill 2001), as well as the technical appeal of 360° photos, because, as Rawe argued, ‘you’ve got to think of the things that different kinds of audiences will like’ (interview 2012).

Indeed, rather than idealising the normative function of mainstream journalism, many of these NGO-workers regarded it rather cynically: talking about their distaste for how it ‘always knocked things down, rather than built them up’ (interview Rawe 2012) or commenting bitterly on how magazine editors just ‘waited for the feature fairy to come’ in the form of PR press releases (interview Buckley 2013). So these participants saw no problem with trying to advance the interests of their organisations by catering to audiences’ tastes in media goods (Bourdieu 1984; Davis 2013b): often explaining in detail the ways in which particular media items had been shaped by previous projects or internal research which indicated the kinds of media representations which they knew ‘people would respond to’ (interview Rawe 2012).
Given the identification of many of these participants with the ‘chemical’ tradition of aid work, which focusses on relieving suffering often in ‘emergencies’ (Orgad 2013b: 297), this finding therefore builds upon Nolan and Mikami’s work about the ‘instrumentality’ of much of the media work carried out within ‘humanitarian’ INGOs (2012), as well as highlighting the potential for future research about the relationship between ‘humanitarianism’ and media items framed in terms of their ‘human interest’ (Harcup and O’Neill 2001). But although such a moral economy may enhance others’ capabilities by enabling them to have enough to eat, drink and wear during times of crisis (Sen 1999, 2010), it does little for the kinds of capabilities which Sen argued that journalism should enhance in order to advance collective reasoning (2010). For these participants’ focus on ‘human interest’ frames not only personalised, it also emotionalised and risked depoliticising issues (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Harcup and O’Neill 2001): so inhibiting public reasoning about a broader range of values and perspectives (Sen 2010) by steering INGOs away from activism and towards seemingly uncontroversial legitimisations of their ‘good works’ (Deacon 2003:156-7).

Likewise, such participants’ emphasis on ‘branding’ inhibits critical scrutiny (Sen 2010) by obliging NGO-workers to deflect criticism of their organisation and NGO-work in general, in a rapid and skilful manner. Moreover, the grounding of ‘selling in’ in commercial PR inhibits NGOs’ ability to effectively resist corporations and market structures which create and sustain suffering. For rather than challenging the dominance of corporations (Coombs and Holladay 2013; Holtzhausen 2012) such participants tended to accept commercialised approaches uncritically: indeed, they
were often keen to develop what they assumed would be mutually-beneficial ‘partnerships’ between their NGOs and businesses (interviews Buckley; Wanyonyi 2013) and to implement business strategies which they thought would help their organisation achieve better ‘value for money’ (interviews Buckley; Jacobs; Reichardt 2013; see also Couldry 2010; Davis 2013b).

But which (or whose) values dominated their involvement in media production and provisions were rarely reflected upon privately, or scrutinised collectively, by those in this group (Sen 2010). For, much like the ‘autonomous reflexive’ freelance photographers (Archer 2007:226), who also articulated normative values in moral terms and were also engaged in personal advantage-seeking), NGO-workers preoccupied with ‘selling’ multimedia were not much given to intensive self-reflection. Instead, such participants tended to be very dismissive of others who wished to try to lead, correct or balance commercialised trends in the mainstream media through less populist kinds of media coverage: describing their approaches as too ‘purist’ (interview Rawe 2013) or ‘simply ineffective’ (interview Buckley 2013).

Participants tended to resolve any tensions which they did perceive as existing between their NGOs’ advocacy and fundraising purposes (Orgad 2013a) by indicating their adherence to formal organisational policies regarding the ‘ethical’ production of images and treatment of interviewees (interview Rawe 2012; interview Jacobs 2013). However, Buckley’s interview provided an interesting ‘negative case’ when what might be expected to happen, did not (Bergene 2007:11). For Christian Aid’s explicit positioning of itself as a ‘political organisation’ (interview Buckley 2012) which identifies with the ‘alchemical’ tradition of NGO-work (Orgad 2013b: 297)
functioned as a powerful generative mechanism which partially counteracted the commercialism of ‘selling in’.

This meant that Buckley’s discussion of ‘branding’ was itself shaped by explicit, ongoing tensions between its fundraising and advocacy goals (Orgad 2013a). As he put it,

The thing we are constantly wrestling with… with our colleagues in fundraising is that all too often NGO fundraising is a race to the bottom. It’s, you know, one small child looking up into the camera and very literal expressions of need and the fundraisers will say ‘If we don’t have that image, our metrics will say ‘You’re not going to raise this much’.

And I have to say ‘Now what do you want guys? Do you want the brand or the money’? Because Christian Aid is about portraying the world that we want to see...

We want to treat people with dignity and we also want to talk about more complex things than um the direct provision of aid which is often the …the... thing that a fundraiser... might want to... um... to talk about...

So…it's a constant battle.

(interview 2013)

For these reasons, scholars examining NGO workers’ engagement in organisational ‘branding’ cannot regard it as wholly synonymous with commercialism (Cottle and Nolan 2007). Rather, they should seek to be alert to the complex, and potentially contradictory meanings and commitments which may structure participants’ understandings of this phenomenon (Chouliaraki and Morsing 2010). Nevertheless, even Buckley’s more nuanced approach to ‘branding’ risked subverting the political values which he and others saw as underpinning Christian Aid (interview Hogg 2012;
interviews Buckley; Cabon 2013), particularly the politics of ‘voice’ espoused by his senior manager, Pain (interview 2013).

This was because Buckley’s preoccupation with organisational ‘branding’ meant that he did not understand why his colleagues were embroiled in fierce debates about the relative weighting of advocacy and PR, and the problems which might be caused by integrating both of these teams into one Communications department headed by someone with a background in commercial marketing. Indeed, when asked about this, he laughed and declared that he really didn’t see ‘any difference between advocacy and PR’ (interview Buckley 2013).

Therefore ‘selling in’ multimedia may enable NGOs’ financial survival (Charities Aid Foundation 2010; Third Sector Foresight 2008) and may enable others’ survival by securing greater streams of funding, including unrestricted funding, but it also risks undermining internal and external forms of critical scrutiny (Sen 2010) by suppressing any analysis of potential differences between the interests and values of the INGO and those of the people whom it claims to serve. In this way, it steers NGOs away from more overtly political and/or self-reflective discussions, as well as more political forms of collective resistance.

Finally, ‘selling in’ prevents audiences’ ability to engage in such activities themselves because the media-related ‘skills’ prized by these NGO-workers are geared towards promoting mass-oriented, positive ‘messages’ about their organisational brand (Saxton 2009). Therefore when notions of ‘selling in’ multimedia become dominant in
an NGO, they tend to drive out its political values-in-action, even when such values are enshrined in its formal organisational policies.

2.2: Save the Children UK and ‘voice’

The most striking example of this was found in the fourth case study, which relates to the photos taken by a member of Save the Children UK of Deng Chan, a fifteen year old boy living in South Sudan, who had previously worked as a soldier in the war against the Sudanese government (Crowley and Fleming 2010a). As discussed in the previous chapter, Gareth Owen, who was then Save’s Head of Emergencies, had appointed his own multimedia producer in order to try and develop a more ‘honest relationship’ with media audiences about the structural causes of suffering, and the limitations of aid work (interview Owen 2013). Both Owen and Colin Crowley, the multimedia producer whom he appointed, were also profoundly committed to a politics of ‘voice’ (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010), which they argued was in keeping with Save’s official policy to ‘empower children’s voices’ (interview Crowley 2012), but which Owen saw as having been undermined by the position-practices (Bhaskhar 1979) dominating Save’s current approach to media work (interview 2013).

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84 The piece was republished by BBC News Online in 2012 as part of a ‘Special Report’ of archived material on the first anniversary of South Sudan’s independence, see section 2.1 in Chapter 5.
85 See section 3.3.
Unlike Hogg in the Christian Aid case study, Crowley did not have a background in journalism, but had always chosen to work for NGOs because his experience of learning French, as well as living for extended periods in Francophone countries: for both of these had made him interested in how a politics of ‘voice’ might intersect with issues of interpretation (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009; Bassnett and Trivedi 1999; Schäffner and Bassnett 2010). For, as a white American from the mid-West, he described immersion in another language as having

… broke open my mind to see that the concepts you understand the world with are actually largely tied to your native language.

Once you jump outside that you learn… that there are all these different ways that we can see and understand reality, understand our culture, understand ourselves, our relationship to the world [speaking quickly and excitedly].

….So for me it is always been about how to balance how to empower someone to voice their reality with all its differences …

But at the same time, trying to figure out where is this space of commonality amidst all these differences, so that I can enable an audience who might be millions of miles away to understand.

(interview 2012)

Yet the dominance of ‘selling in’ at Save the Children UK, which had been entrenched by its former Chief Executive, Jasmine Whitbread, who had a background in the commercial sector, meant that Owen was only able to fund Crowley’s post by operating a complicated cost-recovery system (interview Owen 2013). This was levied across all of the departments in the organisation, so that Crowley ‘effectively cost … nothing’ (interview Owen 2013). But in practice, this meant that anyone in the organisation could ‘bid’ for Crowley to provide multimedia
for them during one of his trips. Indeed, they were encouraged to do so, in order to prove that each trip offered the organisation ‘value for money’ (interview Crowley 2012; see also Couldry 2010; Taylor 2009).

Both Crowley and Hannah Reichardt, his immediate line manager, found that this made putting together achievable briefs extremely difficult, as several departments were all acting in a typically promotional manner (Davis 2013b): ‘just pushing for what they wanted every time’ (interview Reichardt 2013). Although Reichardt was by no means the most commercially-minded participant in this group, her background in business as well as her experience of working in Save’s fundraising department, caused her to react to this pressure by negotiating internally so that ‘we got as much good content for a variety of different stakeholder groups as possible’ (interview 2013.) Unfortunately Crowley found that this, together with the organisation’s general stress on achieving ‘value for money’, meant that trips were often far too brief and pressurised to achieve either his or Owen’s political goals (interview 2012).

In addition, the dominance of ‘selling in’ at Save the Children UK meant that press officers were entitled to disrupt commissions already agreed through Crowley, if a more popular media outlet evinced an interest in the multimedia he produced (interview Crowley 2012). On the South Sudan trip in question, Rawe, the Media Manager for Africa, obliged Crowley to drop an arrangement he had made to do a short film about a former child soldier for The Guardian.co.uk as part of a year-long ‘Child’s Eye’ series, in favour of an BBC Online audio slideshow for which Crowley would produce the photos, whilst Fleming, the BBC Online journalist, would produce the audio (interviews Crowley; Rawe 2012).
Crowley objected vehemently to this because he had already had detailed discussions with *The Guardian* about the piece, which had included reaching an agreement with them about the use of subtitles: something he felt particularly strongly about because of his conviction that empowering children’s ‘voices’ was an ‘embodied process’ (Couldry 2010:8). As he put it,

There are things that come through when somebody is speaking, so that even if you don’t understand their language, you can hear them – their intonation, inflection, hesitations - all these sorts of verbal-emotional cues… That matters ….  

(interview Crowley 2012)

But the press officer, Rawe, regarded a child soldier as an eminently ‘saleable individual’ who could be embedded in a ‘saleable event’, South Sudan’s independence (Davis 2013b:2) so she thought she could ‘find a better home’ for the piece - which she defined in terms of larger audience figures (interview 2012). Jacobs, who was then the Head of News, backed her up, arguing that it was a ‘no-brainer to go with *BBC Online*’ because

The BBC was the go to place for global news then. So in terms of readership and spread and all of that it was … just basic maths…You see, the main thing we are trying to do is get our voice heard in the most influential and most widely-read spaces.  

(interview 2013)

Thus a moral economy involving ‘selling in’, which prioritised strengthening Save the Children’s already-powerful organisational ‘voice’ pushed out the political values associated with empowering Deng Chan’s marginalised voice (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010). Indeed, the opportunity to interview and gain photos of a former child soldier was not even the main topic of Rawe’s ‘pitch’ to the journalist at *BBC News Online*,

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Lucy Fleming (interview Rawe 2012), for their conversation had focussed on the opportunity to do another multimedia item, a 360° photograph of villagers who had returned to their South Sudan following the civil war, including audio inserts of ‘their stories’ (interviews Fleming; Rawe 2012).86

Furthermore, the INGO’s last-minute decision to prioritise the more popular media outlet, together with its overloading of Crowley’s South Sudan trip in the name of ‘value-for-money’ (interview Crowley 2012; see Couldry 2010), meant that Crowley and the South Sudanese press officer for Save the Children, Anthony Lodiong, did not have much preparation time with George Kuan Yai, the junior South Sudanese employee tasked with interpreting between Dinka and English for them (interview Crowley 2012; interviews Yai; Lodiong 2013). This was an important omission because Crowley was well aware of the difficulties of interpreting between languages and cultures with unequal status, which was rendered even more challenging by the history of Britain’s colonisation of South Sudan (Bielsa and Trivedi 1999).

The potential problems posed by such inequalities were further exacerbated not only by Chan’s young age, but also by the position-practices structuring his relationship with the INGO, and indeed the interpreter in question: for Chan and his family were financially dependent on the cash transfer scheme run by Save UK which Yai worked on (interview Yai 2013). Yet the time which Crowley had to discuss the interview with Yai was so limited, that Yai claimed that he was not told that Fleming was a journalist before her interview with Chan (interview 2013). So, much like those working for local NGOs in Mali, he framed his request for media participation to

86 A discussion of why this was attractive to Fleming is included in Chapter 5.
Chan, his family and the others in his village (who appeared in the 360° photo) in relation to his previous experience of mediatised accountability reporting: saying that he had asked for their participation on the grounds that ‘we want to make something that we are doing for them even better’ (interview Yai 2013).

Yai regretted this deeply because he felt that he had gained the villagers’ acceptance under false pretences: arguing that they had ‘trusted’ him as a worker for Save the Children and a fellow Dinka (Sayer 2001, 2007) and that ‘they would not have done it if they had realised that Lucy was a journalist’ because ‘they would not have wanted to make an interview world-wide’ (interview 2013). But although the INGO has detailed ethical policies relating to the need to obtain informed consent, especially when children are involved (interview Rawe 2012), the dominance of a moral economy characterised by ‘selling in’ multimedia meant that Deng, his family and his broader community were prevented from making any such choice. Indeed, they weren’t even made aware that they had been speaking to a journalist - and that the interviews and photos had already been published online in a popular ‘global’ news outlet – until Yai next returned to their village a month later (interview Yai 2013).

Finally, the actual voice of the former child soldier, Deng Chan, which Crowley had been so keen to preserve, ended up being partially obscured by the voice of an English child. The Africa Editor at BBC News Online, Winter, justified this decision on the grounds that it would make the piece ‘easier’ for online audiences to consume: something which he thought was necessary because ‘if they find it hard work, they’re just going to click on something else’ (interview 2013; see also Sayer
2005, 2007). But this decision also had commercial dimensions, as Fleming explained that the final piece was so immediately appealing that it would be ‘really easy to sell’ both to page editors and to the elites in Online’s audience (interview 2012). So despite the efforts of Crowley and Owen, the domination of Save the Children UK by a moral economy of ‘selling in’ multimedia shaped production processes in ways which marginalised the political values of giving voice to such an extent (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010) that this project risked coming close to imperialistic forms of ‘ventriloquism’ (Spivak 1988).

This affected the framing of the text itself. For it appeared to have some progressive dimensions: naming Chan and positioning him, the relative who identified him, and the father who rescued him as the primary actors in the story, before placing this in the context of his later choice to engage in armed struggle, along with other South Sudanese, in order to achieve their collective ‘self-determination’ (Crowley and Fleming 2010a; Stones 2014). It was also contextualised to a degree through references to the country’s haltering peace process: thus evading the stereotypical portrayal of child soldiers as passive, dehistoricised victims (Coundouriotis 2010; Macmillan 2009). But the causes of the civil war are not referred to, nor are the reasons why Arab raiders continued to trouble Chan’s village. So the only ‘problem-at-hand’ (Stones 2014:14) which online users could really understand was Chan’s inability to go to school because of his need to support his family, at a time when crops have already failed. The only ‘treatment’ offered implicitly in the text is therefore to give a donation to Save the Children, upon whose cash transfer project Chan’s family depended (Stones 2014:15).

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87 Discussed in Chapter 5.
3: ‘Dramatizing reality’

Including multimedia provided by smaller, resource-poor NGOs from within the continent might be thought to lead to more progressive forms of pluralism (Davis 2002, 2003; Deacon 2003). Certainly the journalists in this study who were not specialists in covering Africa believed that using multimedia provided by smaller African NGOs was not only likely to give them the capability to cover different kinds of ‘positive’ narratives about African self-help (interview Rock, News Editor, *The Observer*, 2012), but also more ‘empowering’ for the Africans concerned (interview Hegarty, Journalist, BBC World Service, 2012). Yet, rather than offering a genuine alternative, the multimedia provided as part of a campaign for the Kenyan Paraplegic Organization (KPO), which formed the basis of the second case study, was found to be even more profoundly shaped by ‘selling in’ than INGOs.

This was because, like many other African NGOs, KPO lacked the financial and cultural capital needed to produce its own multimedia or to target multimedia in a segmented manner (Fenton 2010a; Jones 2004). So its leader, Tim Wanyonyi, approached Peter Arina, whom he had met socially, and who is the manager of consumer business at Safaricom, a major telecommunications company, to see if Safaricom would be willing to ‘sponsor’ them as part of their CSR programme (interviews Arina; Wanyonyi 2013).

This programme was viewed by Safaricom’s managers as a form of commercial PR (Demetrious 2013) in which a laudable CSR programme was repaid by investor

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88 See section 1.1 in Chapter 1.
89 Wanyonyi was a lawyer and appeared to mix in some elite circles in Nairobi (interview 2013).
interest (Baillie, cited in StandardDigital 2010). Indeed, it seems to have functioned as a particular form of PR, crisis management, because it was launched in 2009 (Safaricom Foundation website, n.d.), only a year after high-level inquiries into allegations of corruption involving the company were finally dropped (Parliamentary Debates, 27 September, Kenya National Assembly Official Record 2007; interview Roe 2014).

Thus KPO’s campaign was shaped by ‘selling in’ even before Arina approached the commercial network of agencies collectively known as Scanad, which normally runs Safaricom’s PR and marketing, in order to ask its members to help design a campaign with KPO and Safaricom on a pro bono basis. As Mark Fidelo and Mike Miller who worked for the RedSky advertising agency explained, this was not a one-off request; rather, they were regularly approached to work on CSR projects in order to enable the businesses concerned to enhance their commercial ‘brands’ in relation to Africa’s highly lucrative emerging markets (interviews 2013).

Such executives sometimes spoke about the personal sympathy which they had for individual Kenyan paraplegics whom they had met, but usually they legitimised these practices by conceptualising the organisational advantages gained by both businesses and NGOs as interchangeable forms of ‘good’ (Sayer 2005, 2007). For example, Miller, the Creative Director of RedSky, said

There’s always a business need to do something good for their own organisations [through CSR], as well as the NGO you are doing good for…It’s a very big thing at the moment…

(interview 2013)
Yet when conflicts arose between Miller and KPO members, Miller’s will prevailed. As he explained,

What happened was some [KPO members] thought the idea [for the campaign] was too big and we were asked to do a Plan B. So I got everybody in a meeting in front of RedSky and did the ‘Over my dead body, this is not going to happen’ number...

They were just going ‘What if it doesn’t work? [said in panicky voice]. What if... what if?’ And I was like, ‘You can’t not go with this now. 

But [some KPO members] still thought it had got out of hand and that, maybe, we were doing the wrong thing... Yeah... there was a lot of bad feeling there.

(interview Miller 2013)

Miller’s rationale for over-riding these KPO members involved the benefits which he saw pro bono work as offering advertising and PR executives: viewing it as enabling him and the other expats who dominated Scanad’s creative team90 to exercise far more creative freedom than they would normally be given by a commercial client, in ways which enabled them to run for international industry awards (interview 2013). In particular, Miller wanted to design a ‘360°’ campaign (interview 2013) which would span mainstream and social media in an innovative manner, in order to differentiate himself from other ‘creatives’ in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992): so enabling him to ‘brand’ and ‘sell’ himself internationally. As he explained,

90 Fidelo and Miller were both white British men and the others in charge of the campaign were a white German woman, a white Australian man, and an Indian man who had been living in Sydney: the film crew were white Kenyans but were working according to the instruction of the expats (interview 2013). Miller argued that apart from Fidelo, who had settled in Nairobi, the others were part of an ‘incestuous’ group of itinerant expats who moved wherever work opportunities presented themselves. Indeed, by the time Miller was interviewed, less than a year later, he was living in Taipei, and had previously lived in the UK, Germany, Australia, and Taiwan (interview 2013).
There are a lot of people out there struggling with their careers and with, you know, with the global financial crisis... [sighs]. So you really need to prove that you can... go beyond the normal ...

As a creative, you're always wanting to do work that gets you noticed, that brands you as an innovative thinker, because, on a selfish note, erm, you know..... you're looking after your own career.

(interview 2013)

Therefore the way in which the KPO campaign was shaped by this kind of moral economy caused both Scanad and Safaricom to disregard the possibility of lobbying the Kenyan government to extend the clinic which already existed for the acute care of those with spinal injuries (interview Miller 2013). Instead, together they focussed on finding a way to raise enough funds for the NGO to build its own new rehabilitation clinic by creating a ‘saleable event’ (Davis 2013b:2) in order to raise money from Kenyans living in Kenya and around the world via Safaricom’s mobile donation platform, M-PESA (interviews Arina; Miller; Wanyonyi 2013).

To be more specific, Fidelo, a more junior creative at RedSky, had come up with a concept which he hoped would stimulate regular small donations from Kenyan wananchi (Swahili for ordinary people), as well as larger donations from Kenyan élites and international audiences (interview Fidelo 2013). This involved choosing a member of KPO to wheel himself from Nairobi to Johannesburg, nearly three thousand kilometres away, in order to illustrate the distance an individual with spinal injuries had to travel to access long-term rehabilitation services (interview Fidelo

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91 Interestingly, Fidelo read this as meaning the mass of poorer individuals who might only be able to afford to donate a one Kenyan Shilling a day (interview 2013), but the word can also be translated as meaning ‘citizens’.
This ‘event’ was made even more ‘saleable’ (Davis 2013b:2) by using another agency within the broader Scangroup network, Squad Digital, to track this person’s progress using GPS technology in order to publish constant Facebook updates, Tweets, and embedded photo and video feeds: so causing a ‘social media storm’ which Fidelo hoped would attract the attention of the national and international media (interview 2013).

Both Fidelo and Miller then set about finding a ‘saleable individual’ to embed in this ‘saleable event’ (Davis 2013b:2) This involved interviewing a number of possible candidates before selecting Zack Kimotho as the best KPO member ‘for the job’ (interview Fidelo 2013), not only because of his level of fitness and determination but also because

He was a vet before he got shot and he’s got two kids. But, you know, he’s determined to live his life, and erm … that kind of thing was always going to go down well.

Plus, you know, like a lot of people here, he’s a very big-hearted fella and wanted to do something to help other people in his condition…And …we thought it would be like a secondary er… bonus if we got somebody, you know… who’s a good-looking guy.

(interview Fidelo 2013)

Thus although the campaign was not consciously designed in relation to mainstream news values (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Fenton 2010a), it was highly personalised, with an obvious ‘human interest’ focus (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001). For these expat advertising executives framed the campaign in ways which were designed to persuade individual media audience members that the key ‘problem-at-hand’ was Kimotho having to continue on his arduous, exhausting and
dangerous journey and that the ‘treatment’ for this was for them to ‘Bring Zack Back Home’ by giving enough money via their mobile phones to enable a new rehabilitation centre to be built (interviews Fidelo; Miller 2013; see also Stones 2014: 14-15).

This emphasis on the positive, but low-intensity emotions of audiences; on the marketization of suffering; on the simple, immediate and technologically-delivered ‘solution’ offered to audiences via communications technology; and on the capabilities of mediation itself seems to mark the KPO campaign out as an example of ‘post-humanitarian communication’ (Chouliaraki 2013). As such, it might be expected to be detached from the traditional ‘grand narratives’ which link emancipation to solidarity (Chouliaraki 2013: 9-15). However, despite the domination of the campaign by the highly individualised commercialised position-practices (Bhaskhar 1979) of largely white European and Australian expats, it was framed and legitimised by notions of Kenyan empowerment and collective self-help (interview Miller 2013; see also Goffman 1986; Sayer 2007). For it was conceived as ‘capitalising upon’ the success of the ‘Kenyans for Kenya’ campaign which had been run by a coalition of aid organisations and commercial companies, including Safaricom, in 2011 to raise money to aid those suffering from a famine in the north of the country (interview Fidelo 2013).

Indeed, Nick Thiong’o, a black Kenyan account manager at Ogilvy and Mather, (which is also positioned within the Scanad network), thought that he had been appointed to deal with press enquiries because of his previous experience on that campaign (interview 2013). As Thiong’o explained, this caused him to ‘pitch’ the
campaign to journalists who called in a very similar manner: arguing that ‘we Kenyans shouldn’t all the time rely on the government or external donors…to solve problems for us’ (interview 2013).

However, *The Observer’s* acceptance of a photograph from KPO’s campaign was not only shaped by journalists’ trust in the authenticity of this value-laden association (Sayer 2001, 2007), but also by the manner in which ideas of Kenyan self-help intersected with another ‘grand narrative’ (Chouliaraki 2013:9), that of ‘Africa Rising’, which articulates ‘progress’ and African self-help in privatised and techno-centric terms (Bunce 2013; Scott 2013). For the degree of interest evinced in and through social media - often by Kenyans forwarding Tweets and Facebook messages to Kenyan diaspora based overseas - was precisely what triggered the interest of journalists working at *The Observer*, including Kiberenge, a Kenyan journalist working on an internship as part of a scheme funded by a news-related INGO, the David Astor Trust.92 As Paul Webster, the Deputy Editor of the paper, explained

When it comes to stories about Africa, we try and include as wide a range as possible so it’s not all well, here’s another story about a disastrous situation in an African country brought about through war or poverty or what have you.

Reflecting on media trends is part of our effort to have more varied coverage of the continent, which is itself extremely varied and going through some extraordinary, and often very positive, transformations.

*(interview 2013)*

So it was the way in which the ‘Bring Zack Back Home’ campaign played into ‘Africa Rising’ narratives which enabled expat executives based in Nairobi to ‘sell’ the notion

92 See Chapter 4.
of African empowerment to Northern news organisations (interviews Fidelø; Miller 2013). Rock, the News Editor of The Observer, also thought that this ‘positive story’ would help them sell the paper as a ‘Sunday’ ‘cannot be all doom and gloom’ (interview Rock 2012). She also assumed that doing a story about an African NGO’s use of social media’ would be so ‘different’ to other forms of news coverage about the continent that it would help them to distinguish their news outlet from their competitors (interview Rock 2012).

But Observer journalists did not run any checks to see if this was the case. Had they done so, they would have found that Kenya’s The Standard (StandardDigital 2012), Al-Jazeera (Greste 2012) and The New York Times (Gettleman 2012) had already covered the campaign - the BBC then covered it two days later (BBC 2012). Thus the way in which the KPO campaign was framed caused journalists to believe that related multimedia and the interpretative frame in which this multimedia was embedded, would operate as an ‘information subsidy’ (Gandy 1982) relating to market differentiation (Bourdieu 1998), even though other news outlets ran very similar stories.

The lack of challenge which the campaign posed to Anglo-American cultural norms and neoliberal market systems also deterred Observer journalists from scrutinising the issues and values concerned (Sen 2010): making them think it was a not just a ‘light’ news story but also a ‘simple’ one…one of the most straightforward that we do actually’ (interview Rock 2012). Indeed, the only original research which Kiberenge was tasked with carrying out by his editors, in addition to monitoring social media feeds, was to call and interview Kimotho himself (interviews Kiberenge; Rock 2012).
This was highly problematic, for the Executive Director of KPO admitted that the NGO had no plans to fund the equipment, staff and running costs of a rehabilitation clinic (interview Wanyonyi 2013). The NGO also had important political links which were not made clear to readers, although these were published on its website, if journalists had had the time and inclination to look, and if the forms of role-merging which took place at GNM had not precluded them from possessing the specialised understanding of Kenyan politics to understand what they read. This is because Ida Odinga is listed as a member of the NGO’s advisory panel (Kenyan Paraplegic Organization website, n.d.) and Ms Odinga is the wife of the then Prime Minister, Raila Odinga. Indeed, KPO’s Director, Wanyonyi, stood successfully as an MP for the same party as Odinga93 less than six months later in Westlands, the same wealthy constituency in which Safaricom is based (Ken 2013).

Journalists’ eager and uncritical use of this NGO-provided multimedia was also problematic because the campaign, and these news outlets’ coverage of it, all depended upon Kimotho’s determination to go all the way to Johannesburg if necessary (interview Rock 2012). But no logistical plans, financial budgets, fundraising licences or travel permits had ever been put in place to allow him to continue over the Kenyan border because none of the senior figures at Safaricom, Scanad, or KPO had thought that Kimotho would need to go more than ‘a week’ (interview Miller 2013) or ‘fifty kilometres’ (interviews Arina; Wanyonyi 2013) before enough money had been raised.

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93 The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).
So the campaign was based on a kind of ‘pseudo-event’ (Cottle and Nolan 2007:866). Indeed, Kimotho had already stopped by the time that Kiberenge made his call on behalf of *The Observer*, citing exhaustion, although donations had also tailed off (interviews Arina; Kimotho; Wanyonyi 2013). Kiberenge said he was told that this was a temporary break, to enable Safaricom to apply for a new fundraising licence (interviews Kiberenge; Rock 2012). But at the time of writing, two years later, no such application had been made and the clinic had not been built.

When challenged about why those in charge of the campaign had not been more transparent with Kiberenge and other journalists about the nature of Zack’s journey, Arina, the Kenyan senior executive at Safaricom, replied by blending commercialised, ‘promotional’ logic (Davis 2013b) with an ironic approach to mediation (Chouliaraki 2013): dwelling not on the accuracy of the representation, but on the instrumental effects of stimulating consumers’ emotional/financial responses to it. For, he said

> In hindsight, we probably could have explained it better, like in a preamble before the launch, to say this is the idea and this is the intention. So we are just dramatizing it...like in advertising, it is just creative licence!

> You know you have you see it on the TV you see someone driving a Toyota and then starting to drive a BMW, it is a dramatization about how BMW is better. He doesn’t really have a blonde wife and happy blue-eyed kids playing in the surf.

> It’s not reality but it’s a dramatization ...to move towards an objective. It is a mood, a goal, a feeling. In our case, that was to fundraise, yeah?

(interview Arina 2013)

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94 73 million Kenyan Shillings had been raised (nearly £500,000), less than half the projected target (interview Wanyonyi 2013).
Thus the work of Arina and the other elites who dominated the KPO campaign appears to have produced a different moral economy which emerged from that of ‘selling in’, but which had its own distinct properties. For workers on this campaign used social media in ways which prevented them from having to tailor media content to individual outlets, but they also separated NGOs’ engagement in news-making from any normative/epistemological commitment to realistic modes of representation (Berger 2000; Chouliaraki 2013; Wright 2011b).

Indeed, Arina at Safaricom, Miller at RedSky, and Wanyonyi at KPO all tended to describe news coverage itself as a form of ‘advertising’ (interview Wanyonyi 2013), ‘publicity’ (interview Arina 2013) or ‘space’ (interview Miller 2013) donated by media owners. Although, Wanyoni, the Director of KPO said he later became aware that journalists had a very different understanding of the relationship of news coverage to external reality, but by then, KPO had decided to

...just play along because we didn’t want [journalists] to write a different story from what we were selling... Because if we had told anybody that, er, we actually don’t intend to go to South Africa, they would have not given us any money.

(interview Wanyonyi 2013)

This moral economy therefore had important political implications, for the very ease with which it slotted into those of The Observer reinforced simplistic ‘Africa rising’ grand narratives; enhanced the cultural capital of a Kenyan parliamentary candidate; gave commercial advantages to expat advertising professionals; and strengthened the dominance of Scanad and Safaricom in relation to Africa’s emerging markets; as
well as privileging commercial aims over truth-telling in journalism. Thus even though *Observer* journalists did not use the NGO’s words, their uncritical acceptance of a picture produced for one of its campaigns, and the interpretative frame in which it was embedded (Stones 2014) was seriously problematic.

The lack of insight which *Observer* journalists had about these potential problems was quite startling. For the Deputy Editor at *The Observer* claimed that no serious harm had been done by the subeditor’s accidental omission of any attribution for the photograph concerned: arguing that it showed Kimotho in his wheelchair in front of a long road, so ‘it’s obvious what it’s about, isn’t it?’ (interview Webster 2013). But even the photo itself was not what journalists took it to be - it was a still taken from a staged TV advertisement (interview Miller 2012).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the three different kinds of moral economies which were most causally significant in shaping journalists’ acceptance of the NGO-provided multimedia found in this sample: attending to how and why they have emerged, and the impact which they had on NGOs, on media organisations and on the coverage of Africa provided by mainstream news outlets. The first of these was structured by position-practices pertaining to INGO-workers ‘doing proper reporting’ which were found to have emerged from the normative value placed on elite-oriented political

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95 See section 2.1 in Chapter 7
advocacy and participants’ enculturation in the *habitus* of foreign reporting during periods of violent and unequal oppression, especially the Bosnian War, .

This was found to have some progressive potential, for the time-consuming and highly specialised forms of knowledge-building involved sometimes allowed INGOs to offer complex causal explanations, to dispute some kinds of values, and to challenge falsehoods: all of which play a valuable role in public reasoning (Sen 2010). However, although participants repeatedly stressed the ‘threshold’ news values inherent in their provision of ‘serious’ and ‘important’ forms of investigative news as a form of resistance to the commercially-driven norms of mainstream journalism, they also sometimes personalised stories in ways which played on their popular appeal (Galtung and Ruge 1965).

In addition, at the same time as attacking the uncritical, rapid reversioning processes employed by mainstream journalists, they developed distribution/discursive strategies designed perpetuate them (Davies 2008) through particular forms of ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154). This inhibited others’ critical scrutiny (Sen 2010) by presenting their material externally as if it were neutral ‘information’ (Fenton 2010a; Mulhmann 2010; Schudson 2003), whilst arguing internally that it functioned as a means of exerting inter-elitist forms of political influence or pressure via niche media (Davis 2007, 2010; Miller 2007, 2013).

However, the most serious problem with this stemmed from these INGO-workers’ own inability to scrutinise their commitment to mainstream news values which concentrated narrative-framing and policy-making power in the hands of news and
political elites (Fenton 2010a). For this risks cutting such INGOs off from the participatory and representative processes from which their authority to speak on behalf of others is derived (ECOSOC 1968, discussed in Donini 1996; Slim 2002).

In contrast, the second moral economy was structured by position-practices pertaining to ‘selling in’ (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Kennedy 2009; Miller 2005), which positioned INGOs and NGOs as vendors of media goods to journalists and audiences (Orgad 2013b). This was shown to have emerged from participants’ enculturation in the *habitus* of commercial PR and/or marketing, and to a lesser extent, from their enculturation in particular kinds of business or consumer-oriented journalism. It was legitimated (Sayer 2005, 2007) in moralistic, rather than political terms: as ‘doing good’, most often thorough raising money.

For this reason, this kind of moral economy involved valuing ‘softer’ genres, such as features, which were almost exclusively framed in terms of their ‘human interest’ (Harcup and O’Neill 2001), as well as visually appealing and/or technically innovative forms of photographic genres: both of which had a popular appeal, so could be placed in news outlets with very large audiences. But whilst this may help NGOs to secure vital streams of unrestricted revenue, it also tends to undermine internal and external forms of scrutiny, and to suppress debate about the merits of other, non-commercial values (Sen 2010).

This tendency is not only caused by the depoliticisation which tends to accompany ‘human interest’ frames (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Harcup and O’Neill 2001), but also by the ways in which this kind of moral economy encouraged participants to avoid
distinguishing between the interests of the NGO and the interests of those whom it is meant to serve. In particular, it fostered such an uncritical acceptance of business norms that the ‘voices’ of others tended to be co-opted in ways which were exploitative (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010).

Finally, the claim that using multimedia provided by smaller, resource-poor NGOs from within the continent might lead to more progressive forms of pluralism (Davis 2002, 2003; Deacon 2003) was challenged via the analysis of a third moral economy. This was found to have emerged from that of ‘selling in’, as it stemmed from poorer African NGOs relying on corporate CSR programmes as well as the commercial promotional industries, in order to fundraise by producing personalised, emotive and technically innovative media representations. But this differed from the kind of ‘selling in’ structuring INGO-work because these media workers used social media and conceptual links to ‘Africa rising’ narratives in ways which obviated the need to target multimedia in a segmented manner (Fenton 2010a).

Whilst this helped African NGOs avoid dedicating their own limited resources to pursuing a multimedia ‘arms race’ (Jones 2004) this not only led to the voices and values of less prominently placed NGO members being marginalised (Sayer 2010). It also privileged the commercialised aims and values of PR and advertising in ways which reinforced ‘Africa rising’ narratives, obscured the NGO’s party political links and departed entirely from the commitment to realism which is fundamental to the normative claims made by news journalism: seeking only to ‘dramatize reality’ for fundraising purposes. So, rather than being the most progressive, this was perhaps the most harmful moral economy, as it not only prevented journalists from
disseminating knowledge, debating values and empowering the voices of those who are disadvantaged (Sen 2010), it actually led them to disseminate falsehood.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

This thesis set out to inform academic and practice-based debates about the nature and effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia with regard to the news coverage of Africa (Beckett 2008; Franks 2010a; Frontline 2008; Sambrook 2010). In particular, it aimed to help build general theory about whether NGO-provided material has gained a more significant role in such news output (Price et al. 2009) by analysing journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia during a ‘quiet’ news period: so contrasting with existing studies which focus on ‘disasters’ (Cooper 2007, 2011) and ‘humanitarian emergencies’ (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Franks 2008a, 2008b).

In order to do this, I used Sayer’s model of the moral economy (2000b, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007) to bring together lines of inquiry which have hitherto been divided, including organisational issues, political economy, and culturalist concerns about the relationship of actors’ agency to their personal and collectively-held values, their imagined positioning of their audiences, and newsroom cultures. This enabled an innovative approach to the object of study by making it possible to consider how normative and economic values might modify each other. In addition, I hope to have contributed to further theory-building by analysing the recursive relationships which these values have to formal and informal structures of obligations, responsibilities and dependencies (Sayer 2007), as well as different forms of ‘trust’ (Franks 2008a; Sayer 2001, 2007).
To be more specific, the first research question entailed asking why journalists used NGO-provided multimedia about Africa in their news output. In addition to Sayer, I used work by other Critical Realist theorists about the nature of reality, especially that of Bhaskhar (1979, 1998, 2008), as well as work by Bourdieu (1984, 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and Archer (2003a, 2003b, 2007). This was conceptualised as involving an analysis of the ways in which individual and group agency interacted with cultural, political and economic structures in order to shape journalists’ and NGO-workers’ decision-making regarding this material. Work by Cottle (2003a, 2003b) and Goffman (1986) also influenced my approach to this question, encouraging me to consider how these actors framed their relationships with each other, in ways which rendered the ‘information subsidies’ offered by NGOs acceptable (Gandy 1982; see also Franklin 2011).

My approach to second research question overlapped to a significant degree with the first, as it involved asking how journalists used NGO-provided multimedia, and the answers to this were powerfully shaped by the formal and informal position-practices which shaped the ways in which journalists used this material (Bhaskhar 1979). In addition to Bhaskhar, work by Orgad (2013a, 2013b), Nolan and Mikami (2013), Powers (2013, 2014) and Waisbord (2011) informed my approach to this question: encouraging me to pay attention to the relationship between particular kinds of funding structures and managerial strategies, as well as the particular kinds of media, genres, reporting styles and editorial values which shaped the problems, dilemmas and struggles which journalists and NGO-workers encountered, and the manner in which they resolved them (Schein 2004).
Yet the reason why the first two questions are important is because of the potential that journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia has to produce change in journalism, NGO-work and/or mediated discourse about Africa. So a third and final research question involved evaluating the effects of this kind of work on these three areas. A crucial component of this involved establishing who framed the nature of the events and people addressed in media texts, how this was accomplished, and which kinds of interpretative frames which were used (Entman 1993; Stones 2014), although such considerations were ultimately related to Sen’s articulation of the kinds of contributions which journalism may make to collective reasoning (2010).

In order to summarise my findings in relation to these three research questions, to clarify their theoretical significance, and to indicate potential routes forward for further research, I have organised this chapter into four sections. The first two address why and how journalists’ used NGO-provided multimedia. These begin by dealing with the complex ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) which journalists’ obtained via NGOs’ provision of multimedia, especially photojournalism. I will then go to argue that news outlets’ specific moral economies had emerged from their specific political economies, and controlled the interactions of editorial staff, full-time NGO-workers, and third parties, including freelancers. For these shaped the emergence of heterogeneous position-practices which were not only characterised by journalists’ obligation to, and dependence upon, particular kinds of NGOs, but were legitimated by blending the normative values dominant within each outlet with those present within the NGOs whose multimedia it privileged (Sayer 2005, 2007).
The second section will then clarify the ways in which journalists’ deliberations about the use of NGO-provided multimedia were shaped by their privileging of particular kinds of media, media genres and editorial values in ways which led to distinct coalitions of NGOs and journalists (Waisbord 2011). For newspapers and broadcast outlets which privileged the production of relatively long-form and seemingly ‘reporter-led’ pieces of ‘investigative’, ‘campaigning journalism tended to use material by INGOs dominated by notions of INGO-workers doing ‘proper journalism’ whilst outlets embedded in organisations oriented towards ‘global’ audiences online tended to use material provided by both INGOs and NGOs dominated by notions of ‘selling in’ multimedia.

Next, the third section deals with the broader consequences of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia. This argues that despite the heterogeneity of such value-laden practices and the ways in which the media texts which emerged from them were ostensibly about a broad range of countries and issues, different values and perspectives were systematically stripped out, either by journalists’ own practices or, more often, by NGOs’ own media-centric practices, which failed to value ‘giving voice’ in its fuller, political sense (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010), even when they claimed to enable underprivileged Africans to ‘tell their own story’. Finally, the fourth section demonstrates the limitations of this thesis which were introduced by the methodology employed, as well as highlighting the new avenues of research which this study opens up.
1.1: Generative mechanisms

During ‘quiet’ news weeks, such as the one studied, journalists used the multimedia provided largely by US and UK-based INGOs in order to construct very different kinds of media items to the ones investigated in previous studies (Cooper 2009, 2011; Cottle & Nolan 2007; Franks 2008a, 2008b). These included relatively long ‘investigative’ news stories, short, lower-ranking ‘light’ news stories and other ‘off-agenda’ features and blogs, as well as more visually-driven genres, such as photo slideshows. Since these items were designed by editorial staff to differentiate their news organisation’s output from that of their competitors (Bourdieu 1998) without having to bear the full financial or time costs of such media production, this work can be read as supplementing prior research about the role of PR material in providing journalists with valuable ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy 1982) which help them to cope with the organisational cost-cutting (Franklin 2011; Lewis et al. 2006).

Multimedia representations of African countries not normally covered in mainstream news output were particularly prized by editorial staff because cuts to staffing and newsroom budgets meant that journalists were too cash and time-poor to travel to smaller, non-Anglophone and conflict-prone countries on the continent, or to commission others to do so (Carruthers 2004; Franks 2005a, 2005b; Marthoz 2007). The ‘efficiencies’ carried out at news organisations (interviews Herrmann; O’Grady; Pulham 2013) also meant that journalists were inhibited from engaging in time-consuming practices from their offices, such as sourcing different story ideas, participants, and carrying out their own research and interviews (Fenton 2010b; Lewis et al. 2006). Indeed, these cash and time constraints were particularly
pronounced when related to media items which were not obvious news ‘leads’ according to journalists’ collective understandings of traditional news values (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001).

The lack of time needed to double-check facts (Lewis et al. 2008b; see also Niblock and Machin 2007) was a particularly powerful generative mechanism influencing journalists’ acceptance of multimedia provided by INGOs, rather than other kinds of sources. For rather than seeking to ‘triangulate’ material provided by NGOs (Zuckerman 2010b), INGOs were ‘trusted’ not to falsify or otherwise misrepresent the situation (Franks 2008a; Sayer 2001, 2007) because they were so large and well-established that journalists felt that it was in their own organisational interests to take steps to protect their own reputations and/or market ‘brands’ (Sayer 2001). In addition, they usually employed former journalists as communications officers, who possessed the cultural capital needed to frame and pitch multimedia to the right people in news organisations in ways which were tailored to the requirements of their specific outlet (Fenton 2010a).

However, one of the ways in which this study develops theory about this kind of media production involves the manner in which it highlights the shortcomings of the ‘churnalism’ model (Davies 2008) in explaining the nature and effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia. For the sixth case study involving HRW and C4 News, as well as other comments made by participants in relation to reporters’ practices at The Independent on Sunday (interview Randall 2013), demonstrated that even when journalists’ use relatively little NGO-provided multimedia during longer production processes which involve seeking other forms of material, this does
not necessarily mean that journalists’ ‘critical faculties are still intact’ (Knight 2011, discussed in Van Leuven et al 2013:439).

In particular, this study draws attention to why and how journalists’ uncritical ‘trust’ in INGOs (Franks 2008a; Sayer 2001, 2007) was often mediated via highly experienced and well-respected freelancers (Örnebring 2009), many of whom had left mainstream journalism because organisational cuts had made it increasingly difficult for them to practice the geographic or media-based specialisms which they had reason to value (Sen 2010). Thus it draws attention to the existence of a liminal freelance economy which ‘blurs’ the division between news organisations and NGOs (Cooper 2009) in ways which have not been addressed by related studies which have focussed exclusively on full-time news and INGO workers (Cooper 2011; Cottle and Nolan 2007; Fenton 2010a; Nolan and Mikami 2008; Orgad 2013a, 2013b). For these freelancers sometimes syndicated material produced for INGOs in ways which might be used by news organisations and vice versa, as well as working on commissions for both news organisations and INGOs: often using their personal cultural capital and insider knowledge of news organisations to ‘pitch’ exactly the same material and interpretative frames to news organisations after their contract with an INGO had ended, as happened in case studies at The Guardian and Channel 4 News.

These casual forms of specialised editorial labour then interacted closely with another generative mechanism, which was crucial in shaping the very frequent use of INGO-provided photographs in particular, for editorial staff really struggled to source enough of the kinds of photos which they needed to visually distinguish their
outlet from others in an increasingly competitive market. This is because all of these news outlets subscribed to the same wire and photographic agencies (interview Batterbury, Picture Editor of *The Independent on Sunday*, 2013; Herrmann, Editor, *BBC News Online*, 2013; interview Lahon, Deputy Picture Editor, *The Independent*, 2013; interview Powell, Deputy Picture Editor, *The Observer*, with special responsibility for *Guardian.co.uk*, 2013; Winter, Africa Editor, *BBC News Online*, 2013).

At the newspapers included in this study, managerial policies regarding ‘efficient’ role-merging and multi-tasking had led to relatively high-earning and specialised photojournalists being disproportionately affected by repeated rounds of redundancies (interview Batterbury 2013; Powell 2013; see also Argles 2013). Meanwhile, the ways in which BBC managers had tried to economise by making ‘the most of the content that we’ve got’ (interview Herrmann 2013), together with the historical positioning of *BBC News Online* as the ‘partner’ of *BBC World* (TV) meant that this news outlet had never recruited significant numbers of staff photojournalists to begin with (interview Herrmann 2013; interview Moody, Head of Strategy, BBC Worldwide, 2014; Sambrook, former Head of Global News, BBC, 2014).

The difficulties of acquiring enough technically sophisticated and aesthetically appealing images to visually distinguish their outlet from others without a large body of in-house photojournalists were stressed particularly vehemently by those working for *BBC News Online* and *Guardian.co.uk*, where the demand for photos was especially high, because of the highly visual nature of online media and because of the brief, fickle nature of online news consumption (interviews Pulham; Winter 2013;
see also Currah 2009; Scott 2005). This meant that staff were not only expected to publish large numbers of immediately appealing photos required per article, but also photo galleries, slideshows or other forms of interactive visual media, not only to engage in different kinds of digital story-telling (Lillie 2010) but also to enhance the site’s ‘stickiness’ (interviews Powell; Winter 2013; see also Scott 2005). Yet senior managers at both the BBC and GNM had prioritised investing in video over photography, as pre-roll ads generated far more revenue than ones placed on a static page (interview Pulham 2013; interview Moody 2014; see Thurman and Lupton 2008).

So the dominance of INGO-provided photographs in this sample was strongly shaped by their employment of experienced freelance photojournalists, selections of whose work press officers regularly offered directly to regional and picture editors working on such news websites. One major factor influencing INGO-workers decision to do this was their desire to consolidate their relationships with individual donors via the mainstream media, particularly during the kinds of ‘quiet’ news periods studied, in order to secure the unrestricted or ‘general’ funding needed to pay for their core costs: so engaging in inter-organisational struggles (Orgad 2013a) in ways which reacted against INGOs’ work being dominated by short-term project or contracts funded by major donors (Chouliaraki 2013; Cooley and Ron 2002; Sogge and Zadek 1996).

Such photographic work was not only technically proficient, plentiful and easily accessed by journalists, it was also, as participants repeatedly stressed, really ‘beautiful’ (interview Fleming, Journalist, BBC News Online, 2012; interviews
Batterbury; Powell; Winter 2013). These judgements clearly rely on the embedding of these freelancers, the INGO-workers who hired them, and the journalists considering using their work in the same kinds of Northern aesthetic traditions: the naturalisation or universalisation of which tended to obscure journalists’ ability to engage in more in-depth considerations about the kinds of interpretative frames afforded by images, and the possible relationship of these frames to forms of political and economic power (Bal 2007; Kennedy 2009; Reinhardt 2007; Sontag 2003; Strauss 2005). But they also relied on a surprisingly naïve approach to visual imagery, with journalists repeatedly assuming that if images were not faked, digitally ‘touched up’ or ‘misrepresentative’ of reality (interview Herrmann 2013), then they could be taken to be reasonably accurate portrayals of that reality.

This naïve realism (Wells 1997) can be seen to have been shaped by broader cultural generative mechanisms, which tended to attribute the camera with truth-telling power (Tagg 2003; Sontag 1979). But it was also shaped by organisational cost-cutting, because the role-merging which took place at news organisations meant that those in charge of selecting NGO-provided photos were rarely picture editors with a long-standing experience of, and training in, analysing visual images. Rather, they tended to be overworked subeditors or other journalists with no specialist knowledge of this area of journalistic production (interviews Lahon; Powell; Winter 2013).

So even at news outlets where the presentation of visually distinctive online media was held to be central to their broader organisational strategy (Allan and Thorsen 2010; Collis et al. 2011; Lee-Wright 2010), these journalists’ enculturation in the
**habitus** of print or radio journalism, together with their desire to legitimize their own actions (Sayer 2001, 2007) tended to lead them to locate interpretative power in words, rather than images. Thus an informal policy was observed across a number of news organisations which treated journalists’ acceptance of INGOs’ pictures as legitimate and even ‘a perfectly good arrangement’ (interview Webster, Deputy Editor, *The Observer*, 2013), although accepting written text from them was widely regarded as inappropriate (interviews Soal; Webster; Winter 2013). Indeed, only one instance was found where an article was published which had been written by a full-time INGO-worker and this was so rare that staff did not have organisational position-practices in place to deal with it: Christian Aid’s article on a food crisis on Mali, which was published in *The Independent on Sunday.*

However, no such prohibition prevented some journalists at GNM from printing articles written by freelance journalists and interns funded by news-related INGOs, as these actors were regarded by editorial staff as ‘fully-fledged journalists’ rather than NGO-workers, so were simply attributed by name (interview Rock, News Editor, *The Observer*, 2012). But as this last point indicates, despite the importance of outlining dominant trends in journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia and the manner in which these were shaped by broad economic and cultural generative mechanisms, the position-practices involved were complex and varied.

Examining journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia solely in terms of the time and financial subsidies it afforded them (Gandy 1982; Franklin 2011) was therefore found to lack sufficient explanatory power on its own. In particular, it failed to account for the existence of ‘negative cases’ (Bergene 2007:11) in which what might be
assumed to have happened did not, or vice versa. These instances included the case studies at BBC News Online and The Observer where journalists’ used photographs provided by African NGOs, and the case study pertaining to Channel 4 News when INGO-provided video was used in ways which cost journalists a great deal of time, effort and money.

In addition, participants’ repeated use of the word ‘trust’ to describe NGO-journalist relations - including those involving freelancers - points towards the embedding of these exchanges within relationships laden with normative, as well as economic and cultural values (Franks 2008a; Sayer 2001). For these reasons, this thesis sought to employ Sayer’s model of the moral economy (2001, 2003, 2004, 2007), in order to explore why and how the use of NGO-multimedia addressed the normative as well as the economic values which shaped journalists’ work, as well as how each set of values interacted with – and modified - the other in order to bring about heterogeneous effects (Waisbord 2011).

1.2: News outlets’ moral economies

To be more specific, this thesis has argued that why and how journalists used NGO-provided multimedia can be explained by the interaction of more specific moral economies within NGO-work, freelance work and journalism. These interactions were controlled by the moral economies of specific news outlets which had emerged from their particular political economies, and which shaped the perceptions of
editorial staff regarding the nature of the problems caused by organisational cost-cutting and the kinds of editorial strategies which they saw as being appropriate to responses to it (Küng-Shankleman 2011; Schein 2004).

This is not to imply that such outlet-specific moral economies were static. Rather, they were found to be continually re/produced by the way in which news outlets were structured externally, through different ‘position-practice systems’ (Bhaskhar 1979:51) pertaining to modes of national regulation, media ownership, forms of political and market positioning, as well as relations with sources (Phillips et al. 2009; Waisbord 2011). Such external structures were then closely inter-related to internal structures pertaining to different management strategies, which in turn affected the structuring of different editorial position-practices relating to particular media and genres (Waisbord 2011).

Indeed, these internal and external structures were so closely inter-related that any changes tended to trigger intended consequences (Bhaskar 1979, 1998; Toynbee 2008). So when managers responded to macro-economic pressures by cutting costs in order to try and make more ‘efficient’ use of what journalists and other editorial staff already did (interviews Herrmann; O’Grady 2013), this tended to alter the nature of journalists’ position-practices, including their sourcing practices. Nevertheless, these changes were never entirely commercially-driven. Instead, they were shaped by the manner in which the internal and external structuring of particular news outlet shaped the perceptions of staff regarding who and what those working for their news outlet were ‘responsible for, beholden to and dependent upon’ (Sayer 2000b:79). These perceptions tended to cause editorial staff to perceive the problems or
challenges caused by organisational cost-cutting in particular ways, as well as viewing some practices, but not others, as legitimate responses to it (Schein 2004).

Thus the moral economies of particular news outlets can be seen to have emerged from their specific political economies. Nevertheless, it is important not to ignore the ‘peopled’ (Archer 1995:75) nature of journalists’ decision-making, including the ways in which journalists’ personal values, socio-economic positioning and sense of identity often underpinned the ways in which they reconstructed their news outlet in relation to others (Chouliaraki and Morsing 2010). In particular, it’s worth highlighting the importance of transformative experiences of travel and particular forms of university study, such as geography, languages and world literature, which shaped several participants’ internationalised world-views in ways which inclined them towards valuing NGO-provided multimedia (Bourdieu 1984). However, when conflicts arose between journalists’ own value-commitments and the moral economies structuring their news outlets (as in the case of the two Africa Editors), the former always trumped by the latter, so the structuring of news outlets was found to have far greater causal power than individual agency and related forms of socio-economic positioning.

Moreover, although in the case studies pertaining to The Independent on Sunday and Channel 4 News, INGOs were able to ‘import’ their own interpretative frames into news outlets, they were only able to do so because these outlets were already heavily dependent on freelance labour, and because the value-laden frames they offered harmonised with the moral economies structuring the news outlet in question. Finally, freelancers were found to have the potential to introduce some limited forms
of heterogeneity because they were allowed some forms of ‘workplace autonomy’ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011:40) by INGOs because of the cultural capital they had amassed as geographic or media-based specialists (Waisbord 2011).

However, their ability to shape the interpretative frames involved was severely constrained by the editorial control exerted by both INGOs and news organisations, particularly during briefing and editing processes. In addition, freelancers’ ability to contest how their work was used by news outlets and INGOs was limited because of their partial dis-embedding from institutional structures (Sayer 2001), which meant that such freelancers not only lacked the broader contextual knowledge about what was going on, and a relevant arena in which to make their views heard, but they also lacked the financial security which would have enabled them to speak.

Thus although it is important to acknowledge the limited heterogeneity which may be introduced by the agency of NGOs and freelancers, as well as full-time journalists, news outlets’ moral economies were found to be the most important generative mechanisms. For these had the greatest causal power to shape journalists’ decisions about whether or not to accept NGO-provided multimedia, as well as their privileging of the multimedia provided by some kinds of NGOs over others. Yet when journalists from a particular news outlet used NGO-provided multimedia, this tended to create changes: generating not only new forms of obligation to, and dependence upon the NGOs in question, but also new legitimating rationales, characterised by blending the moral values already dominant in those news outlets with those common to the NGOs concerned, in order to form ‘strings’ of associated normative values (Sayer 2005, 2007).
This re/construction of news outlets’ moral economies was then found to feed back into their political economies in a recursive fashion: predisposing journalists’ to accept multimedia from similar kinds of NGOs in future. So, for example, journalists and picture editors at *The Independent* papers were found to combine notions of ‘professionalism’ with ‘charity’ in ways which inclined them towards using multimedia provided by international charities, especially aid organisations. In contrast, editorial staff at GNM blended notions of web-based ‘dialogic journalism’ ‘community-building’ and ‘international development’ in ways which predisposed them to use not only multimedia from development INGOs, but also that provided by African NGOs when this was subject to considerable attention on Twitter and Facebook.

Meanwhile, journalists at *C4 News* blended ideas of ‘public service journalism’ and ‘attached journalism’ (Bell 1997) with notions of ‘human rights’, in ways which made them more open to using multimedia offered by international human rights organisations. Finally, journalists at *BBC News Online*, whose moral economy was structured in the most organisationally complex manner, blended ideas of ‘public service journalism’, including notions of ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’, with a Reithian approach to the educative purpose of media consumption; and an ‘African service ethos’ which privileged representing ‘ordinary Africans’ (interviews Copnall; Fleming 2012; Hegarty; interview Winter 2013): so enabling them to embrace the multimedia provided by both international aid organisations, as well as African collectives.
2. Genre, media and news values

A crucial factor in journalists’ deliberations about the use of NGO-provided multimedia involved the value/s which they placed on the production of particular genres, which had a privileged role to play in their news outlets’ orientation towards specific kinds of media and media audiences, in ways which were related to competitive position-taking within the media market (Bourdieu 1998; Waisbord 2011). This meant that journalists working at print and broadcast outlets competing with local and domestic rivals tended to use NGO-provided multimedia in different genres to those working on online outlets, which were oriented towards a ‘global’ market.

The genres which newspaper journalists prized included stand-alone photojournalism (interviews Batterbury; Lahon 2013), but a more common pattern of use at this paper and at C4 News involved journalists trying to differentiate their news output from that of their better-resourced domestic and global competitors by producing relatively long-form kinds of ‘campaigning’, ‘investigative’ news reports about countries rarely covered by other outlets. These often gave the appearance of being ‘correspondent’ ‘reporter-led’, so giving the impression that staff at the outlet had the capability to ‘tell the stories that others …aren't telling’ (interview de Pear, Editor, C4 News, 2012).

Thus journalists at both C4 News and The Independent on Sunday were found to be more predisposed to accept multimedia from ‘alchemical’ INGOs, like HRW and Christian Aid, which focus on empowerment, sustainable development and/or
human rights (Orgad 2013a:297). These kinds of INGOs employed full-time communications workers with a lengthy and prestigious record in international affairs reporting. Moreover, these NGO-workers’ own moral economies were shaped by notions of their continued engagement in ‘proper reporting’ (interview Bairin, Media Director, HRW, 2013; interview Hogg, Head of Media, Christian Aid, 2012; interview Bogert, Deputy Executive Director, HRW, 2013; Daly, Communications Director, HRW, 2013). This entailed them placing value on engaging in expensive and time-taking forms of travel, research and interviewing in less frequently covered parts of Africa, before framing and pitching such work to journalists in ways which were structured by mainstream news values (Fenton 2010a).

So only did these INGO-workers tailor content precisely to the values and needs of particular kinds of the elite news outlets which they targeted (Fenton 2010a), they even offered them what purported to be ‘exclusives’ (Esperidiō 2011), which journalists fleshed out using other material. This was not the sole province of broadcast journalists and it would be misleading to describe such journalists as using INGO-provided multimedia in a more flexible way (Lewis et al. 2008a) because they kept the same INGO-provided interpretative frame (Entman 1993; Stones 2014).

Typically, INGO-workers paved the way for this approach by stressing the ‘threshold’ news values of the story in question to journalists (Galtung and Ruge 1965): portraying their work as ‘serious’, rigorous ‘reporting’ about important incidents, and contrasting this with the trivial and sensationalistic stories prioritised in the mainstream media for commercial reasons. However, they also employed some forms of personalisation which had popular appeal (Galtung and Ruge 1965), as in
HRW’s production of multimedia designed to persuade journalists to ‘tell the Bosco story’ (interview van Woudenberg, Senior Researcher, DRC, HRW, 2012). More broadly, their engagement in ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154) can also be seen to involve complicity with media commercialism, for this facilitated precisely the kinds of rapid reversioning of others’ material which had been instrumental in causing such INGO-workers’ decision to leave the industry in the first place.

Furthermore, questions need to be raised about the discrepancies between the impression of journalistic neutrality generated by some INGOs’ engagement in such ‘news cloning’ (Fenton 2010a:154) and the kinds of legitimating rationales which such they used within their own organisations. For these former reporters justified their stance to their colleagues by framing such activity as a kind of ‘advocacy’, geared towards producing policy change (Meyer and Otto 2011; Powers 2014), by exerting pressure on (Miller 2007, 2013), or conflicting with (Davis 2007, 2010), political and socio-economic elites through the sorts of niche news media they consume. Thus such communications officers tended to win intra-organisational struggles within their INGOs (Orgad 2013a): concentrating interpretative power within the hands of news and other elites and marginalising more broadly-based forms of political activities and solidarities (Fenton 2010a).

Nevertheless, journalists used far more INGO-provided multimedia in news outlets embedded in organisations which were oriented towards ‘global’ online audiences. The most common ‘position-practice system’ (Bhaskhar 1979:51) found in such outlets involved INGO press officers directly approaching regional and picture editors with galleries of ‘free’ photographs from which they could choose in order to publish
online ‘slideshows’ (interviews Powell; Winter 2013; see also Lillie 2009). This tended to involve different kinds of INGOs belonging to the ‘chemical’ tradition of humanitarian work, which focuses on relieving suffering especially in ‘humanitarian’ emergencies (Orgad 2013a: 297).

However, these online news outlets also used photographs provided by different kinds of African national NGOs to construct other kinds of ‘soft’ genres, as in the third case study, which involved journalists’ constructing a ‘light’ ‘cultural’ news story (interview Rock 2012) using material provided as part of a campaign for a Kenyan disability advocacy group and the fifth, in which journalists’ constructed a ‘feature’ using material provided by a media/arts collective. In order to understand how these diverse sources worked together within these news outlets’ specific moral economies, it is necessary not just to attend to the nature of online news consumption and the possible connections between such upbeat stories and greater advertising revenue, but also the need for such sites to make credible claims to offer ‘global news’.

Such claims have normative as well as commercial dimensions, yet the normative values involved did not disrupt journalists’ efforts to gain commercial advantages (Sayer 2007), because they tended to legitimise their efforts to persuade as many online users as possible to click on multimedia about African countries and subjects by making them immediately appealing (Davis 2013b). So although journalists used NGO-provided multimedia from a variety of different sources and in relation to a variety of different genres, they did so in ways which framed it either in terms of the classic single focus of a ‘human interest’ piece (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Wright
2011a), or in terms of several individuals’ highly emotive and personalised accounts: so catering to journalists’ perceptions of what would prove popular based on their news outlets’ algorithmic data (Currah 2009; Sambrook et al. 2013).

Journalists constructing relatively long-form ‘investigative’ news stories for domestic outlets were sometimes also interested in framing Africans as ‘human’ in ways which they thought likely to be more engaging to audiences (Harcup and O’Neill 2001). For example, in the case study involving *C4 News*, the Foreign Affairs Correspondent deliberately framed the beginning and end of his report with wire agency images of ‘human suffering’ on the grounds that ‘that’s what makes the audience care about what is happening’ (interview Miller 2012). These journalists’ use of a HRW-provided clip also depended upon its embedding within a narrative which was likely to resonate with audiences because of the popularity of *Kony2012* (Invisible Children Inc. 2012) which went viral in the same year (interview de Pear; Miller 2012).

But the ways in which journalists used NGO-provided multimedia in different genres online involved articulations of ‘human interest’ which marginalised discussions of specific political causes and solutions (Stones 2014) to a far greater extent than those which appeared in domestic media. Indeed, even when online journalists were presented with NGO-provided multimedia which was embedded in alternative value-systems via the internet, this did not improve journalism’s diversity and dynamism (Beckett and Mansell 2008; Heinrich 2012; Sambrook 2010), because any alterity tended to be squeezed out during re-versioning processes, as happened with the use of material from the South Sudanese collective, Woyee Films and Theatre Ltd at *BBC News Online*. 
However, different normative judgements, interpretations of problems, and recommended solutions (Sen 2010; Stones 2014) had often been excluded long before NGO-provided multimedia ever reached online news outlets. The most powerful causal factor at work in this process was the domination of some INGOs and NGOs’ provision of multimedia by notions of ‘selling in’. This involved different kinds of former journalists, namely those enculturated in the *habitus* of business or consumer-oriented media outlets, as well as in freelance journalism and/or PR work, who were well-versed in constructing and ‘pitching’ multimedia in a manner which would have an immediate appeal to a very large audience via the mainstream media.

Such actors valued this form of media participation (Sen 2010) because of its ability to enhance their organisational reputations, its fundraising potential, and, to a lesser extent, its educative potential. Thus the INGO-workers who fell into this camp tended to emphasise ‘human interest’ rather than ‘threshold’ news values (Harcup and O’Neill 2001) in ways which caused them to frame material in ways which helped them capitalise on its mass, emotional appeal. Although they also tended to tailor their provision of multimedia to the preferences of those consuming specific outlets, including exploring the technical and social capabilities of media itself, in ways which were very attractive to those working in new media because of the manner in which this enhanced the ‘stickiness’ of their site (Scott 2005:98).

Moreover, others working for African NGOs were also dominated by moral economies pertaining to notions of ‘selling in’, like the marketing expats working for the Kenyan Paraplegic Organization in the second case study, who did not deliberately frame their campaign in relation to mainstream news values at all, but
attended instead to what they knew would create a ‘social media storm’ in ways which would elicit the most voluntary donations. Finally, journalists’ acceptance of multimedia from INGOs and NGOs dominated by notions of ‘selling in’ sometimes depended upon their conceptualising and positioning it as a ‘non-news’ item at *BBC News Online*. So the relationship between mainstream news values and journalists’ acceptance of NGO-provided multimedia seems to be much more varied and more complex than has been indicated by previous studies (Cottle and Nolan 2007; Fenton 2010a).

Nevertheless, such NGO-workers’ stress on producing items with mass, immediate and emotional appeal, the prominence of their concerns regarding the promotion of their organisational ‘brand’ and their uncritical acceptance of commercialised models, especially those to do with ‘value for money’ tended to systematically exclude difference, including any overtly political considerations, in ways which led to different forms of exploitation. The first example of this involved Save the Children UK, which was so dominated by notions of ‘value for money’ that in the third case study, its members inadvertently misled a vulnerable former child soldier, his family and community about the uses to which the photos taken of them, as well as the interviews which they had given, would be put: only correcting this a month after these items had already been published by *BBC News Online*. The second involved the case of the Kenyan Paraplegic Organization, which was dominated by a moral economy which had emerged from that of ‘selling in’, but which involved value being placed on ‘dramatizing reality’ in order to elicit cash contributions from individual donors, including relatively poor Kenyan *wananchi*, under false pretences.
Thus journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia involved different kinds of position-practices and had different kinds of effects on NGOs and news organisations. In particular, marked coalitions (Waisbord 2011) were found to be emerging between news outlets which privileged relatively long-form, serious forms of ‘investigative’ journalism aimed primarily at domestic audiences and ‘alchemical’ INGOs (Orgad 2013a: 297) dominated by notions of their doing ‘proper journalism’. In contrast, other coalitions (Waisbord 2011) were found to be emerging between ‘alchemical’ INGOs dominated by ‘selling in’ multimedia and online outlets aimed at a ‘global’ market who privileged sourcing ‘human interest’ material with an immediate, emotive appeal, as well as the kinds of technically sophisticated multimedia which would enhance the ‘stickiness’ of their sites (Scott 2005:98).

3: Political consequences

In addition to the diversity of position-practices involved, the range of stories incorporating NGO-provided multimedia appeared to be relatively diverse, as they were ‘about’ a relatively fairly broad range of topics (Gauthier 2005) and places, including areas which were expensive and time-consuming to travel to and around, especially those which were not English-speaking, and/or which had been subject to armed conflict (Carruthers 2004; Franks 2005a, 2005b; Frontline 2008; Marthoz 2007). Both journalists and NGO-workers were also found to be highly motivated to avoid an unremittingly negative stream of stereotypical images, portraying Africans as an undifferentiated mass of passive, worthy ‘victims’ (Burman 1994; Duffield
Indeed, there was a marked interest within some news organisations for media items which showed Africans’ agency. Journalists at online outlets in particular were found to be keen to publish more ‘positive’ representations of Africans which dwelt on issues of self-help, those returning after civil war, and/or which demonstrated the engagement of African groups with communications technology in keeping with ‘Africa Rising’ narratives (Bunce 2013; Scott 2013). Although the dominance of NGO-provided photos tended to exclude the possibility of giving ‘voice’ to those represented (Sen 2010), some of these online items, such as audio slideshows, purported to allow individual Africans to ‘tell their own story’.

However, this appearance of diversity was deceptive because the range of values, perspectives, and interpretative frames employed in such media items was actually very narrow (Sen 2010), as such stories tended to portray privatised and/or international ‘solutions’ as the sole ‘treatment’ for local problems in specific African countries or regions (Stones 2014:14-15; see also Franks 2010b). In addition, the marginalisation of media and geographic specialisms within news outlets, the involvement of highly specialised freelancers, and the sheer speed and volume of work expected of editorial staff, was found to constrain journalists’ ability to identify this narrowness; to reflect critically upon the nature of the values and interpretative perspectives contained within such stories; and to reason collectively about the political effects of this (Sen 2010).
Nevertheless, journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia was found to have some potentially progressive dimensions, for instances were found where the engagement of ‘alchemical’ INGOs (Orgad 2013a: 297) in investigative news journalism enhanced journalists’ capabilities to disseminate forms of knowledge which challenged falsehoods (Miller 2012a) and which had considerable explanatory power vis-à-vis the causes of suffering (Hogg 2012; see also Sen 2010). In addition, journalists and INGO-workers’ joint efforts to influence or combat other elites through narrowly-defined forms of mediated ‘advocacy’ may help to shape some progressive policy changes, such as DFID’s decision to withdraw aid from Rwanda until it ceased support for General Bosco Ntaganda, who was wanted by ICC, although it is notoriously difficult to prove when this has been the case (Powers 2013, 2014).

Moreover, although ‘chemical’ INGOs’ and NGOs’ (Orgad 2013a:297) engagement in the creation of other genres for online outlets, including ‘light’ news items, features and more technically innovative forms of photography, were not found to enable the kinds of ‘democratic’ capabilities envisaged by Sen (2010), they may yet serve some kind of protective function if they raise mass awareness of the existence of some forms of suffering, and/or raise money to enable others’ more basic capabilities, such as their ability to be free from hunger and to access relevant medical facilities (Sen 1999, 2010). They may also serve broader educative functions, because of their deliberate targeting of popular, rather than elite news outlets (Baum 2002; Powers 2014) Although the manner in which ‘chemical’ NGOs’ provision of multimedia was shaped by ‘selling in’ multimedia in order to gain organisational advantages was found to slip too easily into facilitating unchallenging forms of media consumption, and even exploitation.
Thus journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia can be conceptualised as a kind of double-helix (Bates 2006, discussed in Wright 2011b), with each ‘turn’ representing the heterogeneous interactions of different news outlets and NGOs, including the specific value-laden structures and forms of agency shaping their work (Waisbord 2011) and the different opportunities and constraints afforded by it (Power 2014), but which nevertheless constitutes a general trend wherein NGOs, especially UK and US-based INGOs, have gained an increasing role in many news organisations’ coverage of Africa (Price et al. 2013).

Figure 7: Diagram of change over time
But by far the biggest problem with the effects of all the moral economies analysed was the ways in which they legitimised concentrating interpretative power in the hands of existing elites: including current journalists, former journalists, and PR and marketing experts: so creating an increasingly closed system where only certain kinds of values and perspectives are permitted to circulate. This not only inhibited the inclusion of others’ ‘voices’ (Sen 2010), it also ‘towed’ both news organisations and NGOs towards ‘globalised’, pro-market approaches to defining problems, relevant actors and solutions: thereby encouraging them to ‘channel their energies’ into relatively ‘mild reformism’ (Feldman 2007:427). For this reason, journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia was found to have predominantly conservative effects: enabling and legitimating the restructuring of news organisations and NGOs in ways which seriously restrict the capabilities of both to foster public reasoning about a more diverse range of values and perspectives relevant to events and developments within African countries (Sen 2010).

4: Research limitations and implications for future study

However, the combination of a short sampling period coupled with a research strategy which privileged contrasting case studies, explored through extensive interviewing, introduced a number of problems, the exploration of which should help to inform future studies. Firstly, whilst I maintain that it would be impossible to capture a truly ‘representative’ sample of news, a week was such a limited time-span that this inhibited my ability to discern useful semi-regular patterns (Lawson 1998) in
the distribution of NGO-provided multimedia. In particular, it was problematic that I did not find any examples of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia about any North African countries, so I wasn’t able to tackle the role of NGO-provided multimedia in constructing representations of different kinds of countries in the continent as fully as I had intended.

In addition, I did not find examples of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia on any satellite TV channel, even though these have been strongly associated with the use of such material in previous studies (Cooper 2007a). In particular, Al-Jazeera’s use of NGO-provided multimedia seems worth further study, as HRW-workers stressed that this channel used their material in a manner which they thought was similar to C4 News - that is to say, in the context of a ‘reporter-led’ package framed as a ‘campaigning’ ‘investigative’ report (interview van Woudenberg 2012; interviews Bairin; Daly 2013).

Likewise, sampling for only a week meant that I did not find examples of what appeared to be more frequent uses of NGO-provided multimedia at The Independent. That was the use of ‘stand-alone’ photographs, which picture editors said they employed roughly once a month in order to plug gaps created by last-minute lay-out reshuffles and/or as ‘fillers’ during relatively quiet periods (interviews Batterbury; Lahon 2013). Instead, I relied solely on the case study which involved the acceptance of a ‘complete package’ of material from Christian Aid (interview O'Grady 2013) which provided a strong contrast to the other case studies in this study, but which was unrepresentative of the position-practices in operation at The Independent papers.
Moreover, the brevity of the sampling period meant that I did not initially realise that one of the most common uses of NGO-provided multimedia was as a photo slideshow online (interviews Powell; Winter 2013). This is because only one of these items tended to be used at a time by news outlets, and they remained online for relatively long periods (between 4-6 weeks) so large numbers did not fall into my sample. Concerns regarding manageability also meant that I did not add one of these media items to my list of case studies when this became apparent later on in research interviews.

Instead, the audio slideshow which I selected involved more unusual forms of collaboration between Save the Children UK and BBC News Online on a trip to South Sudan (Crowley and Fleming 2010a). This case was also potentially unrepresentative because other INGO-workers at Christian Aid said they regarded Save the Children as being exceptionally commercialised in its approach to multimedia (interview Buckley, Head of Communications, 2013; Cabon, Picture Editor, 2013). So although this case provided a powerful illustration of how intra-organisational struggles (Orgad 2013a) driven by a different interpretation of ‘humanitarian’ values’ (Nolan and Mikami 2013) were quashed by the dominance of a particular moral economy, if time had permitted, it would have been helpful to include a photo slideshow provided by other INGOs, such as Oxfam or the International Rescue Committee.

Nevertheless, the extensive interviewing strategies employed in this study did open up several major avenues for future research. The first of these pertains to the operation of individuals and groups not normally addressed in research about
journalists’ use of NGO-provided material or NGOs’ creation of it. These include news-related INGOs and other trusts and foundations, most notably the Gates Foundation. In order to study the latter better access would need to be negotiated with The Guardian.co.uk and particularly with the Editor of the ‘Global Development’ section who was unwilling to participate on this occasion.

The operation of freelancers is also well worth further research because of their tendency to work for both news organisations and INGOs and/or because of their engagement in formal and informal processes of syndication. In addition, there were indications that the growing dependence of both INGOs and news organisations on casual labour is bringing about forms of cross-organisational economic and normative interaction, not just between INGOs and news organisations, but also between news outlets themselves, especially between the BBC’s African Service and The Guardian’s ‘Global Development’ section.

Some of the claims made by commercial actors in the KPO study also beg for further investigation. For they argued that international marketing and advertising agencies are increasingly being asked by commercial clients to work with African NGOs whom they have adopted as part of their CSR programmes (interview Fidel, Creative, RedSky Advertising, 2013; interview Miller, Creative Director, RedSky Advertising, 2013). Since the multimedia which these ex-pats created was used by several news outlets outside of the sampling period, it appears that their social media strategies play into the moral economies of a number of different mainstream news outlets.
This therefore feeds into another set of opportunities for future research which involve exploring the complex relationship which NGO-provided multimedia has to mainstream news values. For the strategies employed in the KPO case did not involve the kinds of heavily segmented ‘news cloning’ explored in previous studies (Fenton 2010a:154). In addition, the acceptance of NGO-provided multimedia at BBC News Online depended upon the site’s African Editor conceptualising it and positioning it on the page as a ‘non-news’ item (interview Winter 2013). Furthermore, very different value-laden position-practices were found to be involved in producing different sub-genres classed as ‘news’ by journalists, including ‘reporter-led’ investigative, campaigning pieces and relatively ‘light’, ‘cultural’ or ‘human interest’ items, presented either as written articles with accompanying photos, or as visually-driven genres.

Finally, the last major direction for future research indicated by this study involves examining how INGOs’ search for unrestricted funding affects the moral economies dominating their provision of multimedia, particularly during this kind of quiet news period. However, this thesis indicates that too much weight should not be given to the operation of communications officers working in INGOs’ headquarters, for one of the most intriguing findings involved the way in which both traditions of media production were undercut by African NGO-workers tasked with sourcing participants and interpreting between them and Northern media workers.

This is because evidence was found that Malian and South Sudanese NGO-workers’ experiences, expectations and interests caused them to approach potential media participants in ways which were framed by marketised donor reporting processes.
(Chouliaraki 2013). They therefore stressed to their beneficiaries that they needed to participate in media-making in order to demonstrate that donors’ money had been well-spent (interview M. Tangara, Manager of Agricultural Development Projects, APH, 2013; interview Y. Tangara, Project Manager, GRAT, 2013; interview Yai, assistant cash transfer project, Save the Children, 2013).

These findings clearly beg for more research, because framing the nature and purpose of media participation to potential participants is crucial in shaping the amount and kinds of ‘voice’ which they believe will be afforded to them and the values which they bring to the act of media participation (Couldry 2010; Sen 2010). Such work would also help to develop the much under-researched relationship between the political value of ‘voice’ and the act of interpretation in mainstream media production (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009; Schäffner and Bassnett 2010), as well as challenging the ways in which journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia has been framed solely in terms of the labour of Northern NGO-workers and journalists (Mosco and Lavin 2009; Shome and Hegde 2010).

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, this thesis found that journalists used INGO and NGO-provided multimedia to differentiate the output of their news outlet from that of their competitors at a time of organisational cost-cutting, by subsidising the publication or broadcast of media items about African countries and topics which they thought
others would not cover during a ‘quiet’ news period (Bourdieu 1998; Gandy 1982; Franklin 2011). The manner in which photographic and geographic specialisms have been marginalised and devalued within news organisations, and the subsequent casualization of this kind of editorial labour (Brown 2010; Örnebring 2009) was found to be a key generative mechanism shaping why and how the acceptance of INGO and NGO-provided multimedia took place.

INGO-provided multimedia was usually privileged because of such organisations’ employment of highly experienced and skilled freelancers who often worked for both news organisations and INGOs, so blurring the line between the two (Cooper 2009) because of journalists’ ‘trust’ in them (Sayer 2007). Relatively ‘quiet news-making periods were found to be a particular focus for this kind of work, as they were judged by INGO-workers to be particularly suitable for engaging in certain elite-oriented forms of ‘advocacy’ (Powers 2014), as well as consolidating relationships with individual donors in order to secure their streams of general or unrestricted funding.

The very high volumes of instantly appealing and unusual visual material required by online outlets seeking to differentiate their output from others in relation to a highly competitive ‘global’ market was also a particularly pronounced theme in this study. So the aesthetic appeal of the multimedia provided by INGOs, as well as the increased speed and volume of work involved in journalists’ day-to-day labour because of the advent of online media (Lee-Wright 2010; Phillips 2010), also led to major INGOs being privileged. For not only were such INGOs able to afford to employ highly experienced and specialised freelancers, but the different kinds of journalists employed by INGOs as press officers were also well-versed in ‘pitching’
multimedia to specific news outlets in ways which met their specific operational requirements, their editorial requirements vis-à-vis news values, and normative/organisational imperatives regarding the retention of some kind/s of interpretative control. Moreover, using largely unchecked material from such INGOs was also judged to pose fewer reputational risks than accepting it from less well-known organisations (Banks et al. 2000).

Although journalists’ use of INGO and NGO-provided multimedia had some potentially progressive dimensions, it tended to concentrate interpretative power in the hands of news and other elites, so locking out others’ voices and values (Sen 2010). This, together NGOs’ privileging of the privatisation of social goods, was found to restrict journalists’ ability to foster public reasoning because of the way in which it normalised ‘globalised’, pro-market approaches to defining problems, relevant actors and solutions (Stones 2014). However, in order to fully understand the effects of journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia on journalism, NGO-work and mediated discourse about Africa, it is necessary to examine why and how journalists’ use of NGO-provided multimedia played into the moral economies in operation at specific news outlets, in ways which caused journalists to favour different kinds of NGOs, as well as using their multimedia in order to produce different kinds of genres: so reconstructing their approaches to the nature and purpose of ‘news’.

Therefore this study has important implications vis-à-vis media funding and organisational policy, for it demonstrates that organisational cost-cutting does not just produce greater ‘efficiency’ (interviews Herrmann; O’Grady; Pulham 2013).
Rather, it tends to produce unintended qualitative changes in what journalists do, how they do it, and how they view the purpose/s of journalism in ways which further marginalise those who are already disadvantaged and relatively powerless (Sen 2010).
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