Fielding Transnationalism: An Introduction

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The new interest in transnational phenomena since the 1990s has produced a wide range of studies across the social sciences. In the discipline of history, Akira Iriye (1989: 2) has called for historians to ‘search for historical themes and conceptions that are meaningful across national boundaries’, a call echoed by the new global and transnational history. In sociology, agendas for a ‘global sociology’ have come from former President of the American Sociological Association, Michael Burawoy (2000; 2008) and prominent European theorist Ulrich Beck (2006), among others. Meanwhile, Immanuel Wallerstein has long urged social scientists to ‘unthink’ state-centrism and theorize on a more global scale (Wallerstein 2001).

The intellectual space constituted by this work has been interdisciplinary. It has also sometimes been ‘undisciplined’ in its use of diverse concepts, theories and literatures. Rather than overarching theoretically-guided research programmes, we find disparate areas of research: studies of immigration, global cities, neoliberalism, neoimperialism, the global diffusion of organizational forms, and so on. The interdisciplinary and undisciplined nature of this space has had its advantages. It has led, for example, to surprising dialogues across the boundaries that sometimes separate theoretical schools within disciplines. It also brings with it potential disadvantages: It might mean, among other things, that the full potential of any one theoretical approach is not fully explored. Each of these empirical areas are rich but they have yielded, and engage with, separated theories of the middle-range: e.g. theories of immigration, theories of global cities, theories of

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global culture, and so on. Besides a few exceptions, to be discussed below, shared theoretical frameworks or concepts on transnational processes across the subfields are comparably lacking.

The papers in this collection specifically explore the potential of the concept of the ‘field’ in the Bourdieusian tradition for analysing transnational processes. Throughout his career, but especially in his latter half, Bourdieu theorized ‘field’ as an important part of his overarching theoretical corpus, alongside and part of concepts like practice, habitus, and capital (Swartz 1997: 117-142). He explored a diversity of fields, starting from the religious field (Bourdieu 1991b) and then to the political, artistic and literary fields (Bourdieu 1993), and the intellectual and academic fields (Bourdieu 1984a), among others (Bourdieu 2005). Bourdieu did not systematically examine field dynamics or processes at non-national scales. Early in his career (Bourdieu 1959), he was prompted by his work in Algeria to theorize cross-cultural relations wrought by colonialism, but he did not employ the field concept. His latest work only alluded to a global economic field of neo-liberal capitalism (Bourdieu et al 2000; Bourdieu 2003). In between, he wrote about the transnational circulation of ideas (Bourdieu 2002), the ‘possibility of a field of world sociology’ (1991a), and briefly referred to globalization and culture in his book on television (1999). But in both instances he focused on intellectual fields rather than other types of fields, and he did not identify transnational or global logics. He argued instead that, for the time being at least, national fields were impeding the construction of transnational or world intellectual fields. A full systematic consideration of transnational and global fields in the work of Bourdieu himself eludes us.

As we will develop in more detail below, we suggest that field theory offers a set of concepts especially generative for analyzing transnational processes and relations. It gives us a lens through which we can inquire about patterns and institutions in the social world in a way that does not privilege the national state a priori, and in a way that transcends the opposition between ‘national order’ on the one hand and ‘global flows’ on the other hand. This project of ‘fielding transnationalism’ – and ‘transnationalizing fields’ – is a collective one. This volume builds on
recent work in sociology, IR and history by some of our authors and others. Fielding

Transnationalism is a work in progress and one that we hope will be sustained in the future.

Together the papers in this volume show the strengths of field theory for apprehending transnational processes and relations, even as they also raise questions for future work. In the spirit of Bourdieu’s own work, the papers are grounded in fine-grained empirical research, and the empirical range is wide. Some speak to institutions that are or could be central to discussions of the transnational in political science – such as the European Central Bank (Mudge and Vauchez, this volume), the US government (Stampnitzky, this volume), the British and the German empire (Wilson this volume, Steinmetz this volume). Others show their sociological heritage by also paying attention to cultural production (Buchholz, this volume), to academic disciplines (Steinmetz and Krause, this volume), and to journalism (Christin, this volume). Empirically, of course, there are many further areas of inquiry that could benefit from a field-analysis. We could learn from a wide range of historical and contemporary cases. These papers offer a starting point.

There is also more work to do theoretically. One motivation for bringing these papers together is that they all are deeply engaged with a similar set of theoretical resources, organized around Bourdieu’s thinking, which we do think are very useful. Precisely because of this, the work also shows productive tensions, fault lines and building sites for future theoretical work. There is more work to be done, for example, concerning the implications of different versions of field-theoretical approaches and concerning the way field theory can be used while also dealing with issues that have traditionally been outside its focus, such as technologies and territory. Still, we hope this volume is

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2 Scholars working within the field of International Relations have been the most interested in using Bourdieu’s concepts for analyzing relations on scales beyond the national scale, though they have tended to focus less upon his field concept and more on concepts like habitus and practice, e.g. Adler-Nissan (2012), Bigo (2011, 2012), Leander 2004, Mérand (2010), and Villumsen Berlin (2012). The potential of field analysis for analyzing international, transnational or global relations is indicated in the work of scholars, who have already used it to discuss a diversity of phenomena: art (Buchholz 2013), forms of expertise associated with the European Union (Bigo 2011; Mérand 2010; Mudge and Vauchez 2012, Vauchez 2009, 2011, Georkakakis 2009, Cohen 2011); the field of empires (Go 2008); colonial states (Steinmetz 2007, 2008); social science (Heilbron, Guilhot, Jeapierrre 2014; Heilbron 2014), democracy promotion and humanitarian relief (Guilhot 2001, 2005, 2007 Krause 2014), international law and international commercial law (Dazalay and Garth 1995, 1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2011, Hagan 2005), among other sites (Adler-Nissan 2012, Guilhot 2007, Leavin-Glick-Schiller 2004, Marginson 2008, Stampnitzky 2007; see also Bohn 2006 and Sapiro 2013).

3 For example, this volume includes a paper on transnational religion using a field perspective (Petzke this volume, see also McKinnon, Trzebiatska and Brittain. 2011) but, in the context of contemporary transformations of organised religion across the globe, this can only begin to highlight the potential for work that would ask about how different actors with which organizational features and structures position themselves vis-à-vis each other, and vis-a-vis different national settings and political fields.

a fruitful beginning.

In what follows, we will first briefly outline field theory and then discuss some of the advantages of the approach in dialogue with other approaches to the transnational, including world-systems theory, world society/neoinstitutionalism, and global governmentality. We will highlight field theory's specific version of going beyond methodological transnationalism, and we will highlight why, in the context of discussions about transnationalism, field theory's efforts to go beyond the dualism of meanings and interests and its focus on differentiated spaces and practices might be of value. We will discuss the distinctive emphasis field theory brings to discussions of world culture, and the ways in which field theory raises questions about change. Lastly we will provide a glimpse into the papers comprising this volume.

Bourdieu’s Field Theory

Field theory does not start with Bourdieu. Field theory first arises from physics and philosophers then extended the concept ‘field’ for various purposes (Martin 2004, Hilgers and Mangez 2014). Kurt Lewin (1943) is generally cited as the first social scientist to have used the term. Today scholars in a number of areas within sociology, such as especially organizations and social movements, have employed the ‘fields’ concept (eg Dimaggio and Powell 1991; Fligstein 2001, Fligstein and McAdam 2012, Thornton, Occasio and Lounsbury 2011). However, not all of these theories are directly indebted to Bourdieu. For example, as Wilson in this volume notes, Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) concept of ‘strategic action fields’ has a different emphasis and set of concerns than Bourdieu’s field theory. This is part of a larger pattern. In organizational studies or social movement studies, ‘fields’ often refer to any meso-level social relation (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008 cf. Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Alternatively, Bourdieu’s field theory is much more specific.

So what is a ‘field’ in Bourdieu’s sense? Bourdieu’s conceptualization is initially straightforward enough: a field is not just any meso-level relation, it is a social space of relations or
social configuration defined by struggle over capitals. That is, it is an arena of struggle in which actors compete for a variety of valued resources. Bourdieu refers to these resources as different species of ‘capital’ that are potentially convertible to each other. Fields, then, consist of two related but analytically separable dimensions: (1) the objective configuration of actor-positions and (2) the subjective meanings guiding actors in the struggle, i.e. the ‘rules of the game’ and particular types of cultural or symbolic capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97). The actors can be individuals or corporate actors; the ‘capitals’ pursued by any particular actor in the field might be multiple (e.g. economic capital, political capital, or symbolic capital); and the ‘rules of the game’ can vary across fields or across time (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 232). In brief, fields are multidimensional spaces of social action and struggle. They are not ‘structures’ or ‘systems’ – entities with stable and essential identities. They are collections of fluid and dynamic relations. ‘To think in terms of fields is to think relationally’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96).

There are many other aspects to Bourdieu’s field theory, and the essays in this volume each offer their own elaborations and highlight different aspects of it. Here we register five additional points. First, what actors in fields compete for is capital but, in any given field, there might be multiple forms of capital: economic, political, cultural, symbolic, or whatever the particular field in question may valorize (Bourdieu 1986). In some fields, economic capital dominates; in others, cultural capital reigns (Swartz 1997: 66). And there can be different forms of different types of capital, such as different kinds of symbolic capital, depending upon the field: ‘academic capital’ (Bourdieu 1984a) or ‘juridical capital’ (Bourdieu 1994), for instance (see also Desan 2013: 329). ‘It is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognized by economic theory’ (Bourdieu 1986: 242). In other words, there is always the possibility that there may be more than one form of capital, and field theory is attentive to this possibility. Furthermore, there is also the potential of convertibility. A field may valorize economic capital more than cultural capital but this does not mean cultural capital is not important or fought over; it just means that its value is less, in
that particular field, than economic capital. Cultural capital, in such cases, may indeed convert to
economic capital, which is why actors might still seek it in the first place; or other types of capital
might be at play in the field. In any case, the point is to recognize the possibility of multiple forms
of capital.

The multiplicity of capitals in fields brings us to the second point: fields, like capitals
themselves, cannot be analytically reduced to either their ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ dimensions.
Rather than stressing either the material or cultural dimensions of social life, a fields approach
incorporates both. The concept field refers to the configuration of actors (the multidimensional
‘field of forces’) and the classificatory schemes and rules of the game which actors use as they
strategize and struggle for position (i.e. the ‘rules of the game’) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97).
Field is an inclusive concept orienting analysts to both objective positions and cultural meaning, to
both objective positions and cultural stances (ibid).

Third, fields are typically characterized by dominant and subordinate positions; or ‘dominants’
and ‘pretenders’ (Bourdieu 1996: 206). In any given field, at any given time, one group of actors
will likely wield most of the capital (whichever form of capital is most highly valued) while others
will have less (Bourdieu 1971: 161). This establishes some of the key logics to fields. Actors
compete for capital, which means subordinate actors compete with dominant actors even if they
might compete with each other. The ‘rules of the game’ are most often set, and protected, by the
dominant actors, while subordinate actors eventually come to challenge those rules and impose new
ones. The latter become ‘heretics’: they challenge the existing rules, or ‘orthodoxy’ of the dominant
players who cling to their privileges through their ‘conservation’ strategies in the face of the
‘subversion’ strategies of challengers (Bourdieu 1991b; Swartz 1997: 124-5). Thus challengers or
subordinate actors might try to make some forms of capital more valuable than others - i.e. the types
of capital that they might happen to have access to – and they might engage in “classification
struggles” (see also Barman 2013). In short, struggle and hierarchy are not only characteristic of
fields, they also form the basis for many of the processes and logics of fields themselves.
Fourth, fields exhibit certain logics (of competition for capital; of particular capitals being valued more than others; of which form of capital transfers to another form and their conversion rates, etc.) that are not entirely reducible to other social logics. Bourdieu thus speaks of fields as ‘relatively autonomous’ in the Althusserian sense of autonomous - following their own inherent logics - but also connected with or related to other fields. As Steinmetz and Buccholz in this volume points out, fields are only ‘relatively’ autonomous because they are often ‘influenced by external causal chains or mechanisms.’ Therefore, there are often several fields that intersect or relate, but they are each relatively distinct (see also Hess and Frickel 2014). The field of universities in France may connect with or be adjacent with the field of finance, but they each follow their own distinct rules and principles (Bourdieu 1984a; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). One field may subsume another field into it; or one field may break off from another. The struggles in one field may correspond with and depend upon struggles in another field - as Bourdieu (1996) argues in discussing the literary field; and agents in a field may appropriate resources from other fields to deploy as capital in their own field (following the ‘heteronomous principle’) (Bourdieu 1996).

Finally, the degree of autonomy of any given field can vary over time. And we can differentiate between different types of autonomy (Benson 2005, 2013, Krause n.d, Buchholz this volume). Thus the dynamics of field autonomization, articulation, convergence, subsumption, or separation are exactly the sort of processes susceptible to empirical analysis and further theorization. Also susceptible are the spatialization of fields. This brings us to the possible utility of field analysis for transnational and global analysis, to which we now finally turn.

Fields beyond the nation state

The field approach has been used to answer many different questions, concerning cases from different time-periods and geographical areas. But we are interested not just in field theory per se but in how it might be fruitfully deployed for thinking about social relations beyond the nation-
state. We are interested in spatially extending or ‘scaling’ up field analysis – or ‘scaling’ down – in order to understand social struggles across, between, and through conventional national boundaries. In short, we are interested in transnational and global fields, which Bourdieu himself did not pursue. What, then, are the premises, possibilities and promises of extending the field concept in this way?

*Boundaries: Beyond Methodological Nationalism*

An important aspect of transnational and global analysis has long been the scale or unit of research and theorizing. This rethinking of scales or units has been pioneered by dependency theory (Frank 1967), world systems theory (Wallerstein 1974; 2004), world society/neoinstitutional theory (Meyer et al 1997; Meyer 2010) and a range of approaches in international relations (Holsti 1985; Slaughter 2011). Within the terms of its own theoretical logic, field theory can be rightfully deployed to join the existing scholarship critiquing and reaching beyond methodological nationalism. As has been noted, much of Bourdieu’s work analyzes fields that align with the national state. But theoretically, for Bourdieu, fields are not predetermined, given or static. The starting point of field-analysis are relationships, not any pre-given unit of analysis. The boundaries of fields are always open to redefinition and fields can extend or contract (Sapiro 2013).

This relational feature of social fields - that their boundaries are never settled or preordained but contingent and open to expansion or contraction - is one of the features that make it particularly amenable to transnational and global analysis, equipping scholars with a conceptual apparatus that is not intrinsically tied to methodological nationalism. Fields do not necessarily overlap with the boundaries of the nation-state. Bourdieu himself notes that the boundaries of fields do not typically correspond with geographic and political boundaries. When it does, it ‘is a special case of a field where the limit in the mathematical sense is a border in the geographical and political sense’ (Bourdieu as quoted in Sapiro 2013: 71-72, emphasis added). Therefore, as social relations of competition bleed across or through national boundaries - as they often do - the concept ‘fields’
captures transnational relations and offers categories for analyzing their dynamics and outcomes.

Indeed, field analysis helps overcome attempts to privilege any one social scale a priori. World systems theory (Wallerstein 2004) insists that the appropriate unit of analysis is the world system. Others privilege the ‘local’ or ‘micro’ as a privileged window into all scales of relations. Recent works in micro-sociology and actor-network theory, for instance, claim that they have transcended the issue of scale, but in many ways they still privilege the micro because of their very narrow conception of what is observable (Knorr-Cetina 2007, Hilbert 1990, Latour 2005, Latour et al 2012). Alternatively, from a field perspective, we should treat the question of scale as an object of empirical inquiry. We can ask, which other actors are important to a given group of actors? On what scale are stakes that are relevant to actors articulated? What are the range of responses to scale-relevant stakes? How do these change?

We can learn about empiricising scale by looking at the history of the national: the national as a scale is itself the result of specific struggles. State-formation as a project is successful when stakes are constructed on the national scale; that is, when elites become actors on the national level (e.g. Bourdieu 1994; Loveman 2005). This was not always so: the aristocracy, for example, was not traditionally oriented towards national stakes. Norbert Elias (2000 [1939]) describes the European’s aristocracy’s international outlook: aristocrats were oriented towards other aristocrats, holidaying in the same resorts, using French as their shared language. They were also to some extent interested in the fields of their own locality, comprising tenants, clergy and local competitors. In France, the king’s court was one step towards producing a national field. In Germany and in many other contexts, it was ultimately a bourgeois project to restrict relevant competitors to those tied to language and territory. Some aristocrats started buying into the stakes of the emerging national fields. This did not mean that the international aristocratic field, or that local fields ceased to exist, but they lost in relative importance via-a-vis national fields.

We see here that in some cases transnational fields precede national fields. But in some contemporary fields, we see global fields emerge from national fields, such as with the globalization
of art (Buchholz 2008, Buchholz this volume) or science (Gingras 2002, Heilbron 2014, Fourcade 2006). This is what Buchholz, in her contribution to this volume, calls the ‘vertical’ autonomization of transnational fields. Or we can see how some new, genuinely global fields emerge that were never national. This is the creation of entirely new fields: arguably, the first is the system of states itself after 1648. International law is another, studied by Yves Dezalay and Bryan Garth (1998, 2001a 2001b, 2011). Humanitarianism, defined as cross border neutral relief, is another genuinely transnational field, though organisations may at the same time be embedded in national fields of charities (Krause 2014; see Dromi, this volume; also Stamatov 2013).

Considering fields beyond but including the national levels invites students of fields to ask new questions about their object of analysis. To give one example, we can try to analyse how the question of scale itself becomes a stake within fields of struggles. For a field of any given scale, we can ask to what extent access to resources from fields on other scales play a role in the symbolic oppositions that differentiate positions. National fields, for example, may be divided between globalisers and their opponents. Scale here becomes a stake in the competition within a field. Marion Fourcade (2006), for instance, reveals how international links have played a role in national fields of economists in peripheral countries, and international influence also plays some role in structuring national fields in core countries (see also Bockman and Eyal 2002). Adopting a different analytical starting point, we could inquire about whether resources from national fields create symbolic divisions within global fields, and whether links to local or regional fields create symbolic divisions within national fields. National and transnational fields interact in complex ways (see also the contributions by Dromi, Buchholz and Christin to this volume).

Finally, related to this question of scale is the question of who the ‘actors’ or ‘players’ are in the field. In Bourdieu’s standard analyses of fields, the actors are individuals: priests in a religious field, state officials in a state bureaucratic field, artists and curators in artistic fields, sociologists or literary scholars in the academic field, and so on. Analyzing fields at the international, transnational or global level surely offers promise for examining individuals as actors: think, for instance, experts
and professionals in the global humanitarian field, international union organizers in a global field of labor, or European diplomats in a regional political field (e.g. Neumann 2002). But, following the lead of the sociology of organizations, we can also think of organizations themselves as actors in a wider field (assuming, of course, their terrain of action are ‘fielded’ already in Bourdieusian terms). In such cases, an organization itself might constitute a field while also being embedded in larger transnational fields external to it, and its actions would then follow the principles of field action laid out by Bourdieu. We could then think of national states as actors in a wider international field (e.g. Go 2008); or humanitarian organizations as actors in a global humanitarian field (Krause 2014). These organizations would be seen as competitors for capital in fields that transcend national boundaries, and their actions could be analyzed in those terms.

*Global Culture Beyond World Culture*

Field theory thus offers a novel way to conceptualize and analyze social relations at multiple scales, not just the national or the purely “world-systemic” scale. In doing so, field theory also opens a new perspective and new questions regarding transnational or global cultures. Existing theories of global space often fail to treat culture as a distinct arena of production. World society/world polity approaches to culture analyze it only in terms of cultural models or forms that spread throughout the globe. The only logic is diffusion. Other studies follow the cultural imperialism thesis, insisting on culture as merely a vehicle for Western ideologies and the spread of consumerism (Tomlinson 1991). By contrast, studying global or transnational fields urges us to examine struggles between cultural producers, relations of power within cultural fields the different types of capital at play, and the activities and practices of various cultural agents.

The global field of contemporary visual art, as analyzed by Buchholz (2008, 2013), is a case in point. Contemporary visual art operates on a global scale. And it constitutes a field in its own right – a competitive arena that revolves primarily around acquiring international artistic legitimacy or obtaining the monopoly for determining the criteria of international artistic legitimacy itself.’ In this global field, a variety of actors strive for ‘international artistic legitimacy,’ from artists, curators and
museums. And they are not all equal partners in a flat world. Buchholz’s analysis finds hierarchization between dominant players monopolizing ‘Western symbolic capital’ and pretenders. This is similar to what Christin finds in her discussion of US and French journalism in this volume; the only difference is that the opposition is not between “western” and “non-western” but rather between “U.S./Anglophone” and “Non-U.S./Non-Anglophone.” In short, a fields approach illuminates such relations, conflicts and power relations that are otherwise elided in theories of diffusion or one-way imposition (i.e. ‘westernization’).

Not only does Bourdieusian field theory offer an alternative to world society theory’s implicit dualism between meaning and economic system, it also offers an alternative to its emphasis upon functional cohesion. World society theory sees global culture as cultural templates or models to which all societies and organizations adhere and which they support and so reproduce. The image projected is of a consensual world society (Finnemore 1996). In contrast, as discussed, Bourdieu’s very definition of field theory incorporates conflict: fields are spaces of struggle or competition for capitals. As Krause's paper in this volume suggests, the sciences are not only a sphere of rational truth-seeking that gradually spreads throughout the world, or only a unified hegemonic ideology that subjugates other forms of knowledge, but an arena for struggle among positions that are intertwined with struggles about the kind of knowledge that is valued. As Petzke’s contribution to this volume shows, religious fields also involve such competition. In fact, it is part of the nomos of the Christian missionary field that is imposed upon India in the nineteenth century. Field theory also emphasizes inequality and power relations along with competition. Fields are structured in terms of dominant and dominated positions. We might think, for instance, of the distribution of different capitals across nations in the global political or economic field. When states participate in the United Nations, they clearly not only have different economic resources but also different amounts of political capital, with dominant states monopolizing such capital from others. A field approach thereby illuminates these aspects of the world polity that world polity theory categorically brackets (see Go 2008). Whereas other approaches do not, a field approach enables us to analyze global
culture as an autonomous realm, not fully reducible to economic systems - and one that is contested and conflicted, shot through with power relations.

*Meanings and Interests, Differentiated Spaces and Practices*

While helping us reconceptualize and analyze culture on transnational scales, field theory also helps us overcome the dualism that often arises when studying culture – or when ignoring it. This is the dualism between interests and values that is evident in many theories and empirical studies of transnational phenomena. The theoretical debates in International Relations (IR) scholarship is one manifestation of this dualism. In classical realist IR theory, for instance, the key actors are states who presumably always strive to maximize their resources, and hence their power, due to the anarchic nature of the international system (Waltz 1979). In reaction to this, a range of theories, from regime theory (Krasner 1983, Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 1993, Breitmeier, Young, Zuern 2007) to neo-institutionalist work (Keohane and Martin 1995) has emphasized the role of norms and values. And some recent scholarship has focused on the power of human rights and human rights actors to constrain and shape states' behaviour (Risse 2002, Keck and Sikkink 1998). The analysis thus shifts from material resources to values or norms, and the analytic opposition between them is reproduced. Sociological theories of the global also manifest this dualism between the material and the symbolic. Consider, for instance, the materialist emphasis of world-systems theory as compared with the culturalist analysis of world society/world culture theory – the latter often directly pitched as an alternative to the material focus of world-systems theory (Boli and Thomas 1997, Boli and Thomas 1999, Meyer 1980; Meyer et al 1997, Thomas 2007).

When Bourdieu developed his version of field-theory, he confronted a different version of the same dualism. Debates about art, science, and religion in domestic contexts are shaped by a similar opposition between values and interests, though the historical succession of the two emphases is usually reversed. In discussions of art, for example, some observers assume art is guided by its inherent values – beauty, inherent aesthetic qualities – while others point out that actors and
institutions associated with the arts engage in self-interested behaviour or explain how these values serve the reproduction of some unfair state of affairs (Bourdieu 1996). Bourdieu sees his sociological approach as a departure from this opposition, trying to give an account of specific arenas of action that go beyond celebrating stated values, while acknowledging that actors' interpretations matter (Bourdieu 1977). In other words, Bourdieu’s field theory tries to absorb both the material and cultural dimensions of social life into the same logically-integrated conceptual apparatus. Bourdieu directs us to inquire how interests are interpreted and how values get articulated through mediating spaces, such as fields. Meso level sets of relationships shape how actors perceive and interpret their interests. But values also get entangled in games and symbolic values can become a kind of resource. Fields are shaped by competition for resources, but relationships within the field constitute their own interests, which also include symbolic interests. Bourdieu stresses, for instance, that the power of those who monopolize economic capital is not only due to economic resources but also to symbolic domination, which reflects the successful use of all capitals in the field (Bourdieu 1977: 183; Swartz 1997: 92). A field-theoretic approach thus insists upon analyzing multiple resources – i.e. capitals – that may or may not be purely ‘material.’ For example, states may seek prestige or honor, which is potentially convertible to other forms of capital (e.g. material wealth) but can also be an end in itself (Go 2008). And the pursuit of these resources or capitals is not intrinsic to the actor/state: the ‘interests’ are not given but shaped by the distinctiveness of the field at play. The field of art, for example, constitutes its own stakes – a field-specific capital – and so actors in this fields will be interested in that particular capital form rather another (Bourdieu 1993; 1996; see also Buccholz 2008). Field theory, in short, goes beyond the opposition between values and interests by inviting us to pay attention to the way meanings and interests are constituted within specific social spaces.  

4Bourdieu stands here in the tradition of differentiation theory, following Kant and Weber (see Calhoun 1993, Lahire 2014, Gorski 2013). While it might be compatible with theories of capitalism and imperialism, field theory is a departure from all work that posits a single logic of global processes without asking also about the logic of specific practices. The picture of global order that emerges from field-oriented studies is one of differentiated space with different communities of actors and different logics of practice. Also see Buchholz (2008) on differentiation, field theory, and globalization.
Global Governance and Fields

Field theory’s emphasis the complex interrelation of meaning and interests, as well as its attention to power, brings us to questions of global governance. Owing to a tradition in International Relations that linked states to power and power to states, and moreover emphasised state’s quest for power as a result of anarchy and distrust, international cooperation and the increasing role of non-state actors were initially conceived as opposed to the exercise of power (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Wapner 1996, Willetts 1996). Since then, it has become clear that transnational processes are part of how order is reproduced and power is exercised. Field theory here opens up new sets of questions about how power is mediated through specific logics of practices, specific forms of symbolic capital, and different kinds of actors.

This contrasts with two critical approaches that have been particularly influential. One diagnoses the present situation as a new form of imperialism; another emphasizes the novel features of governance through networks. In the ‘new imperialism thesis’ the new order is seen as the result of the direct outward projection of the power of certain key states (Furedi 1994, Chomsky 1999, Chandler 2001, 2002, 2004). NGOs are here seen as a tool of interested governments. Whether they subscribe to the notion of a new imperialism or not, it is worth noting that many critical accounts assume the interests of donor governments as the ultimate source of power in this new world order, according the insight that NGOs and states are very close a central place in their critique (Hulme and Edwards 1997, Brand et al. 2001). The other approach sees global power through the lens of ‘governmentality’ (Duffield 2001, 2007, Larner and Williams 2004, Hardt and Negri 2000), inspired by the work of Michel Foucault (1991). Accounts either emphasize NGOs as sites of disciplinary power themselves, such as in micro-credit programs (Rankin 2001), or refugee settlement (Lippert 1998). Or they imagine NGOs as integrated into a ‘strategic complex of liberal governance’ (Duffield 2001), governmentality (Sending and Neumann 2006) or empire (Hardt and Negri 2000).

Each of these approaches has its specific strengths. The imperialism thesis uniquely draws
attention to the amount of power that some actors accumulate in the new world order. The
governmentality approach usefully points at new aspects of power that are not visible through the
lens of the new imperialism, such as the non-territorial and multi-lateral nature of new forms of
governing and the possibly dispersed nature of power. But both also overemphasize the coherence
and totalization of global power. Even Foucauldian approaches, despite Foucault's explicit
statements to the contrary, risk overestimating the coherence of governmentality (as O’Malley,
Wear, and Shearing [1997] have also argued). As a consequence, it is difficult to understand the
mechanisms of reproduction, the mobilization of actors and their specific forms of resistance. A
field approach can provide a theoretical framework for asking these questions. Krause’s (2014)
study of humanitarian relief NGOs is a good example. Krause argues that neither a focus on stated
values nor a focus on state’s interests can fully explain what these organizations do and do not do;
or the role these organizations play. Rather, since the late 1960s a relatively autonomous field of
relief organizations has emerged which mediates the relationship between western publics and
western states on the one hand and distant suffering on the other hand. This shared social space
produces the sorts of assumptions that are common across agencies. It also produces the debates
agencies that have with each other over what it means to be a ‘humanitarian.’

Field-theoretical accounts of other areas also offer generative perspectives on global power.
The wager is that if we are to understand power on a global level we need to pay attention to the
specific logics of mediating fields of practice. The European Central Bank, for example, could be
described as an expression of neoliberal ideology or a tool of German hegemony. But as Mudge and
Vauchez show in this volume, we can better understand its role if we also inquire into the specific
ways in which it is and is not integrated into the field of professional economists and if we also
consider it as an actor in the European political field competing for capital (Mudge and Vauchez
this volume, see also Lebaron 2008, 2010, Fourcade 2006). And as Stampnitzky's contribution to
this volume shows, fields have effects, not only on actors within it, but also beyond it. In her
account, the relatively new field of human rights has an effect on states, even if it is not always the
effect intended by actors within it.

We might even try to retheorize political globalization from a field perspective. This remains perhaps the more audacious promise of a field approach. For Bourdieu, a properly global political field would require, at minimum, actors who recognize each other and compete for capital. And we could say that, since the Second World War, we have such a political field. The main actors are nation-states competing for economic resources, raw materials, and legitimacy. On the other hand, if there is such a global political field, it is weak in Bourdieusian terms. The autonomization of the field is not complete: there is no single authority that fully sets all the ‘rules of the game’.

The UN, international law, and International Criminal Courts can all be seen as attempts to establish those rules of the game, but it is unclear how successful they will be. The rising field of non-governmental organizations and the economic field populated by transnational corporations pose further complications, impinging upon the full autonomy of the global political field. So how far will autonomization in the global political field go? And is this field of nation-states and international organizations going to be fully subsumed or undermined by the field of global capitalism? Might global capitalism create unique conditions for the global field, making economic capital dominant over global political or cultural capital – something Bourdieu (2003) alluded to but did not systematically address?

These sorts of questions raise the larger problem of globalization and meta-capital. For Bourdieu, the ideal-typical national state is a state with the capacity to regulate and define other forms of capital in its territorial domain. This is the state’s ‘meta-capital’: a form of power which, by regulating and defining what counts as capital, also carries the ability to regulate relations between fields. But since Bourdieu’s analyses have remained at the level of national states, he never addressed the question as to whether or how such ‘meta-capital’ might exist at the global level. Since the international organizations like the United Nations or the International Criminal Court have some but not full power over countries in the international system, it would be untenable to point to those institutions as exercising meta-capital. What about an organization like the World
Bank or International Monetary Fund? It might be that there is no meta-capital at the transnational or global level, and that processes associated with globalization unfold differently than they would if there were meta-capital. Maybe the end point of globalization is exactly the institution of global meta-capital, once and for all.

_Change: the role of struggles_

These questions of globalization as a historical process involving autonomization brings us to the contribution of field theory for transnational and global analysis: it can help us analyze social transformation on extensive spatial scales. An important if not obvious task for the analysis of global processes is the analysis of change: how to conceptualize and analyze transformations on transnational or global scales. How does change occur? What forms does it take? What explains transformation? Existing theoretical approaches have different answers - when they answer them at all. In world society/world polity approaches, change in global culture is treated as a matter of diffusion: change in this sense is really just expanded reproduction on a new spatial scale (i.e. one model spreads throughout the system) (cf. Chorev 2012). In conventional world systems theory, change in the global system not actually happen at all: the capitalist system retains its basic core-periphery structure. At most, exactly which countries occupy which positions change; but the slots themselves are never moved around (Wallerstein 2004). Other variants of world-systems theory see change as mostly cyclical: the system oscillates between hegemonic periods and competitive periods, and between periods of productive and financial expansion (Arrighi 1994). Finally, Luhmann systems (Cf. Holzer et al 2014) analyses offers a vocabulary for different forms of differentiation and includes also more recently a focus on dedifferentiation. But it rarely goes beyond description to discuss mechanisms of change (Holzer et al. 2014).

While Bourdieu has once been criticized for overemphasizing social reproduction, his corpus in fact includes at least two models of transformation (Gartman 2002; Swartz 1997; Steinmetz 2011; see also Gorski 2013). One model refers to changes in social actors’ habituses and associated social
transformations. In this model, changes in habitus occur when there is a disjuncture between the habitus and the field of its application. This disjuncture can happen either because the field faces novel elements (i.e. economic crisis or the installation of wage labor into subsistence economies) or because social actors are put into an entirely new or foreign field (i.e. migrants move to a new country) (Bourdieu 1961[1958]). Change thus happens due to some kind of external disruption, in which case the habitus forged in one field confronts an entirely different field and undergoes ‘hysteresis’ (Bourdieu 1990: 108).

The other model of change emerges from factors endogenous to the field rather than from an external disruption. It occurs through competition and struggle. Fields are typically structured between dominant and dominated positions - the former monopolizing not only capital but also the definition of capital and the ‘rules of the game’ itself. Conflict and struggle unfolds between the dominant and dominated, as the dominated challenges the definitions of capital and rules which benefit the dominant but keep the dominated at bay. This basic structure sets the basis for various types of change to follow, depending upon the nature of the field and contingent events. In cultural fields, for instance, both the dominant and challenging groups compete with each other but also different class fractions within the dominant class compete for distinction. The highest class seeks to differentiate itself from other classes by adopting a distinct ‘taste’ for ‘high art’, but then the petty bourgeoisie seeks to distinguish itself from the lower classes by imitating the highest classes. New struggles by the different class fractions ensue, and as these struggles unfold the content of culture itself changes (Bourdieu 1984b: 233). In other fields, such as the religious field, challengers to the dominant groups emerge as ‘heretics’ to the defenders of the ‘orthodoxy’ and struggle to question the dominant groups’ legitimacy to define the fields’ standards and rules. Bourdieu calls this a ‘subversion’ strategy of challengers, as opposed to the ‘conservation’ strategy of the orthodox defenders, and it can ultimately lead to a redefinition of the fields’ rules for the distribution or definition of capital (Bourdieu 1991b). In brief, the type of struggles in fields can vary, and the outcomes are contingent rather than predetermined. But the overarching model remains the same:
changes in fields or relations within fields result from competition over capital between subordinated groups challenging the dominant groups’ control over the distribution and definition of capital; or among class fractions competing for distinction (symbolic capital).

We believe that such a field theoretic framework on change can also be extended to transnational and global scales. Existing work intimates the possibilities. For instance, Go (2008) uses Bourdieusian field theory to show how the mechanism of struggle between dominant groups and challengers led to changes in the global political field of empires. In the nineteenth century, colonial empires were the norm – the orthodoxy - but by the mid-twentieth century, direct colonization was no longer acceptable, so much that dominant powers like the U.S. ceased annexing new territory as colonies and instead turned to ‘informal’ imperialism. Colonies today are nearly non-existent: it is part of the doxa of global political culture that direct colonization is unacceptable. In Bourdieusian fashion, Go (2008) argues that this change occurred as a result of struggle among dominant powers and between them and revolutionary nationalists in the colonial world, ultimately making anti-colonial nationalism itself a new form of capital. The struggles changed ‘the rules of the game’, such that competition between great powers could no longer take the form of colonial scrambles.

Another promising example comes from Villumsen (2012), who analyzes the changing field of European security. In the 1980s, the orthodox view on European security, pushed by NATO, European states, and security experts saw ‘security’ as a matter of external material threats and therefore emphasized military balancing as the main strategy for maintaining security. It valorized military power as capital. The heterodox view, promoted by a small group of peace researchers, emphasized detente, dialogue and common security and thereby downplayed military power and emphasized democratic values. By the 1990s, the field had changed: the orthodox view now emphasized democratic values and the emphasis upon military power was downplayed. The fall of the Soviet Union, Villumsen explains, was key for this change, but only because the fall articulated with experts’ competition with each other to define the legitimate security logic in Europe. Again,
we see here how Bourdieusian field concepts help illuminate critical processes of change at transnational and global scales.

The Papers in this Volume

The contributions to this volume exploit this potential and expand upon and elaborate the issues regarding the rescaling of field theory, although they each do so in different ways, and each hit upon distinct themes. Together they address questions and problems that have been raised in the nascent interdisciplinary scholarship that rescales Bourdieusian concepts but which, as yet, have not been fully addressed. For example: if fields can be transnational rather than only national, what is the process by which such transnational fields are created? Or, what about field extension, i.e. when the social agents and relations in fields from one geographical locale are stretched across or enter into new social spaces? What are the modalities, either historical or contemporary, by which transnational fields are created or extended? If fields are indeed transnational or global, what role do national spaces or dynamics still play if any at all? And when or why do fields fail to become transnational or global? What are the limits of extending national fields or creating transnational ones? How can an analysis of the dynamics within and across fields be combined with attention to the material objects of practice?

Field Emergence

The first papers address the question of field emergence or how fields are created. One criteria, as noted earlier in this introduction, is autonomy. This is the concept explored in Buchholz’s essay. She argues that ‘autonomy’ is a useful concept but that it must be differentiated into ‘vertical’ as opposed to ‘horizontal’ autonomy. Horizontal autonomy is the sort of process of field creation that Bourdieu himself refers to in his analysis of the emergence of the literary field in France. It means the differentiation of a social space from existing spaces to the point where it develops its own unique nomos and a new practice – a social logic that is distinct from other adjacent fields. It can
thus be seen as part of the larger social process of field proliferation through social differentiation. Vertical autonomy is different: it involves the autonomization of a social space not from social fields adjacent to it but from fields ‘below’ it. It is an extension upwards. It is about ‘scalar differentiation’ rather than functional differentiation, and it does not mean an entirely distinct field of practice but rather a rescaling upwards of the same sphere of practice. In the case of the literary field in France, a domain of practice – literature – is differentiated from other domains of practice, like politics. But vertical autonomy means the same domain of practice – in Buchholz’s case, the visual arts – already differentiated from other fields is maintained, it just becomes autonomous from its previous national-level spatiality. Globalization in this light can be thought of as this rescaling upwards of existing domains as opposed to the mere geographical extension or differentiation of social spaces into new domains.

Wilson’s essay shifts gears to trace how the emergence of the East India Company as a territorial power in India after 1765 came with a distinct imperial administrative field structured around the rule of colonial difference. How exactly did this field form? Wilson suggests that Bourdieu’s field theory is helpful for identifying a key logic of this field and its emergence, especially Bourdieu’s concept of ‘interest in disinterest.’ A distinctively imperial field of administrative vision emerges when officials struggling with one another for metropolitan recognition provided moral accounts of themselves which, on the one hand, explained their behavior in terms drawn from abstract, purportedly-universal social spaces, and, on the other hand, claimed credibility through a personal ‘interest in disinterest.’ But to fully account for historical emergence, Wilson suggests that concepts from Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of ‘strategic action field’ and Padgett and Powell’s network approach.

Dromi’s paper also shows how transnational fields are created, but also shows how national-level dynamics in themselves shape the emergence of transnational fields. Drawing on Bourdieu’s work on the international spread of ideas, Dromi points to the role of intercultural translation processes in the expansion of field structures beyond national boundaries. His case is the nascent
humanitarian field of the late-nineteenth-century, and in particular the international Red Cross movement. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was a key organization in laying down the organizational and cultural infrastructure upon which a transnational humanitarian field would later be mounted. But the processes that led to the eventual establishment of the transnational humanitarian field initially deployed rather than transcended nationalism and national-level social relations. National Red Cross societies drew upon the transnational humanitarian language of the ICRC as they did their work but also articulated it with discourses promoting national identities. Nationalism, ironically, had a ‘generative effect’ upon the emergence of a transnational field.

*Field Extension*

Once fields are formed, there is always the possibility that they might extend outwards and be articulated with, or encompass, new previously foreign actors and relations. The next essays explore this possibility of field *extension*. Historically, we could point to particular modalities by which fields have been extended in the early modern or modern era, not least imperialism or religious diasporas or missions, and both of these are addressed here.

Steinmetz’s paper considers the extension of fields through imperialism. What happens as the social relations constituting a field in one site are extended elsewhere? Steinmetz shows, imperial ‘fielding’ is a complex process. It is not a mere extension of fields. As he points out, not all social spaces take on the logic of fields, and there are different dynamics to the extension of social relations to new scales. Some relations that have already formed as fields are extended into the colonies from their metropolitan origin and undergo little change, but they might also end up as subfields of other fields or end up as entirely new separate fields. He shows the former with the example of the field of French sociology; the latter with the ‘colonial state’ which becomes a new distinct field of its own. With the development of colonial states, metropolitan colonial offices and overseas colonial states were organized around completely different forms of symbolic capital. This is the creation of a new field. By contrast, the development in subfields is an internal differentiation
of an already existing field, not the breaking off into a new field. Steinmetz shows this with French colonial sociology. As sociologists went to the overseas colonies they remained attuned to the struggles and capitals of metropolitan sociology; at most they distinguished themselves from metropolitan sociology by trying to turn ethnography or non-Western research into a valued resource and strived to distinguish themselves from other adjacent disciplines. But unlike the colonial state, they did not organize themselves internally around completely different forms of capital.

Petzke’s paper also discusses field extension, though his historical medium of expansion is religion: specifically nineteenth century Christian missionaries who penetrated preexisting religious dynamics in India. The essay reveals a different outcome from the two outcomes sketched in Steinmetz’s essay. While Steinmetz points to field autonomization or subfield creation as a result of extension, Petzke’s story is one of field colonization or full replacement. The work of the Christian missionaries in India ended up not only penetrating but also supplanting local religious fields, compelling preexisting religious groups in the region to do religion according to new ‘rules of the game’ imposed by Christian missionaries. Religious competition centered upon religious affiliation and individual conversion became the new logic. Petzke also illuminates how this happened: through the census, a technology of quantification. The census classified different spiritual practices into distinct ‘religions’ with numbers of adherents, presenting them implicitly as converts to be targeted or defended. Preexisting religious groups in India thus became roped into a competitive religious game of conversion, reproducing thereby ‘western’ religious field dynamics. The new nomos became a matter of the ‘numerical preponderance’ of the religious group.

**Field Effects**

Stephanie Mudge and Antoine Vauchez and Lisa Stampnitzky explore transnational fields through their effects. Mudge and Vauchez examine the European Central Bank (ECB) and the specific kind of authority the institution exercise – a form of authority that combines charismatic and scientific authority, which the authors call ‘hyper-scientisation’. The authors argue that this construction of
the bank’s authority cannot be explained with German hegemonic influence or some underlying essence of (independent) central banks but is best understood as an effect of its field position. The ECB’s is positioned both in the European political order and in professional economics: the ECB uses academic production as a means to bureaucratic authority, and its heavy investment in scientific prestige expresses the scientization of the economic profession along with the less central position of European (versus American) economics within it. Both are made possible by the ECB’s oddly non-European research capacity, established on the model of the American Federal Reserve. The result is an institution that produces a unique sort of historical figure: the scientific, yet European, yet technocratic central banker.

Stampnitzky’s essay takes us from Europe to the United States. She deftly deploys field theory to explain why the United States has openly acknowledged torture during the ‘War on Terror’ following 9/11. Stampnitzky notes that the war on terror has been characterized by the development of a legal infrastructure to support the use of ‘forbidden’ practices such as torture and assassination, along with varying degrees of open defense of such tactics. So shy does the United States admit and justify torture in this way, rather than conduct it under the cloak of plausible deniability? Drawing on first-order accounts presented in published memoirs, she argues that the Bush administration developed such openness as a purposeful strategy, in response to the rise of a transnational field of human rights. Stampnitzky challenges theories that presume that the spread of human rights norms means that states will increasingly adhere to such norms in their rhetoric, if not always in practice. She suggests that a more robust theory of state action can help better explain the ways that transnational norms and institutions affect states, and suggests that such a theory is best formulated through the use of field theory.

The Limits of Fields

While the preceding essays reveal the complex effects of fields, the concluding essays by Monika Krause and Angèle Christin explore the limits of fields. Krause brings together field-
theoretical hypothesis with attention to the material objects of study inspired by science and technology studies in her discussion of inequalities among field positions and among research ‘objects’ or ‘topics’ in transnational social science. She argues that conventions surrounding privileged research objects (model systems) shape the way attention is distributed in the discipline of sociology, and the way knowledge travels across borders. The "West", and certain countries and cases within that, receive a disproportionate amount of attention in social scientific research. Krause suggests that conventions around model systems interact with processes of hierarchization and symbolic differentiation in national, regional and transnational disciplinary fields. Direct access to model systems, such as certain western countries and certain cities, can be a source of capital within national fields of sociology and within the transnational field of sociology; in second-hand references, knowledge about model system can provide a shortcut to field-specific capital for those in relatively peripheral positions who try to play by the dominant rules of the game – as opposed to those who are distanced by choice or by force. Thirdly, she hypothesizes that the constraints imposed by assumptions about model systems matter less for those with access to other forms of field-specific capital.

Christin examines an area of practice that we might expect to be fielded on a transnational level – journalism – and provides an explicit discussion of the criteria that need to be met for fieldedness more generally. Her paper draws on a comparative ethnography (we might also call it a relational ethnography) of the production and circulation of online news in the US and in France. She looks at a collaboration between two prestigious and two lowbrow partnerships across the Atlantic and finds that online news does not circulate easily across the two contexts in either case. She argues that U.S. and French web journalists do belong to a common, transnational journalistic field in the sense that they share terms for the contestation of legitimacy, but this is “weak” field at best. There are no reciprocal field effects and there is no mutual awareness, since U.S. journalists are barely aware of the existence of French media, while French journalists follow U.S. news obsessively. U.S. and French news organizations and web journalists also do not compete for shared stakes. Christin's
study thereby helps us better think about the question: when and where do social relations constitute a field? Ultimately, Christin’s essay shows us how fields are limited in the sense that not everything should be theorized as a field. But in the process her analysis, along with the others in this volume, shows us the benefits of raising the question in the first place. Is all the world a field? Probably not. But it is the sort of question that is worth thinking about.

References


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