The Ethics of Space

Homelessness, Squatting and the Spatial Self

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Declaration:

I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where I have drawn on other sources this has been indicated as appropriate.

Stephanie Grohmann, 21.2.2015
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Abstract

This thesis discusses the interconnection between spatial practices and the construction of moral personhood, based on the example of homelessness and squatting activism in ‘Austerity Britain’. Drawing on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork with persons who have no fixed address in the West of England, I explore the connections between spatiality, embodied cognition and the moral construction of self and other.

Because bodies are spatial objects, embodied cognition is necessarily spatial – ‘human beings are spatial beings’. Moral personhood is therefore also and especially spatially constructed, most importantly through metaphors of ‘inside’ vs. ‘outside’. Drawing on cognitive anthropology and psychoanalysis, I identify two distinct models of the self informed by spatial metaphors, which I refer to as the ‘territorial self’ and the ‘spatial self’. These cognitive models, and the types of relations between self and other they imply, come to inform the construction of distinct spatial configurations which can be observed from a small scale – for example an individual ‘home’ – to a large scale, e.g. the territorial nation state. The territorial self corresponds to a ‘moral space’ characterised by notions of securisation, defensible boundaries and a dual mode of exclusion and internment that produces (racialised and gendered) ‘spatial others’. The spatial self, on the other hand, implies an ethical stance that takes seriously the spatial component of embodiment, and thus the vulnerability of the self to the absence of shelter, understood as the minimum amount of safe space – within and without the body – that embodied persons need in order to physically, cognitively and socially function.

On this basis, I argue that homelessness can be understood as the result of multi-layered social processes based in a pervasive logic of territoriality. ‘The homeless person’ is characterised by a lack of territorial entitlement that translates into a loss of moral personhood, often referred to in the literature as ‘social death’. I conclude that squatting, as a political and ethical practice, aims not only at the removal of an immediate material lack, but also and especially at the reconstruction of moral personhood through a practical ethics of recognising and responding to the vulnerability inherent in embodiment.
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Just because you're nobody
It doesn't mean that you're no good
Just because there's a reason
It doesn't mean it's understood
It doesn't make it alright

The Specials
Introduction

One day in the winter of 1921, Harry Cowley, a chimney sweep from Brighton, decided that enough was enough. A drummer boy in the Royal Navy in his youth, Cowley had been injured at the age of 17 and, after his recovery, had been redeployed to bury the dead soldiers of World War One. On his return to Brighton, he had found the survivors and their families living in abject poverty in overcrowded slum accommodation or in tents on the local racecourse. The day Cowley decided to take action arrived when he met the family of an ex-serviceman, camped out in the tent-city overlooking town. He recounts: “I thought; this wont be allowed to go on, I asked the man ‘are you prepared to go in a house if me and my men find you one’ he said ‘yes’ So we got together our boys and at 3 in the morning under cover of dark we forced our way into an empty house in Cheltenham Place and moved the family in”\(^1\).

Cowley proceeded to form a group of local men who soon began to routinely break into empty properties and move in homeless locals. The group not only lent practical support to the squatter families, but also acted as vigilantes to protect the new residents from eviction and violence by landlords or the police. Their actions continued until after World War Two, when a new wave of impoverished and traumatised ex-soldiers returned from the front, to find what in today’s terms one could refer to as a property bubble. In Cowley’s words:

“Well when this last War ended Brighton was loaded with empty houses, yer see. There was a lot of people buying empty houses cheap and selling them or renting at exorbitant prices, people couldn’t afford them, One day I went to do some work in an old ladies home, she saved £400 in her life, her and her husband was old people. I valued the house at £600 and they was being asked £1,600. I thought this don’t come right, your £400 gone up in the air and you’ll never live long enough to buy the place and be secure”

\(^1\) All citations by Harry Cowley taken from: BBC Southern Counties Radio (2005) at BBC WW2 People’s War archive, Article ID A4212217
Cowley's sense of justice made him not only a squatting activist, but also a staunch antifascist: “When I read about the brutality to the Jews anything like that I could cry and have cried. And I felt it was my duty to fight against it”. Fuelled by this sense of solidarity, Cowley and his group fought the rising far right in the shape of Oswald Mosley's ‘British Union of Fascists’ – oftentimes physically. Cowley recounts being assaulted and hospitalised, having his property attacked and having himself incited violence to shut down local fascist rallies. Asked, after one such bloody battle, to justify their actions, Cowley replied on behalf of his men: “no mine wasn’t rough boys; they were conscientious”.

Some 90 years later, Mike Weatherley, conservative MP for Hove – a place so close to Brighton that nowadays they are considered the same town, Brighton and Hove – launched an entirely different campaign. Weatherley had become irate with the activities of local squatters, who he saw as infringing on the fundamental territorial claims of Hove's citizens:

“It is true that some of those who are homeless have squatted but this does not make them squatters. A typical squatter is middle-class, web-savvy, legally-minded, university-educated and, most importantly, society-hating. They are very often extremely intimidating and violent. They are political extremists whose vision for society is a dysfunctional medieval wasteland without property rights, where an Englishman’s home is no longer his castle”.

Despite his most likely inaccurate account of medieval property relations, Weatherley made it his mission to prevent such an apocalyptic scenario from becoming reality. In 2010, he tabled a motion to parliament, which for the first time would make squatting in the UK a criminal offence; a piece of legislation later dubbed ‘Weatherley’s law’ by squatting activists. The campaign in favour of criminalisation that Weatherley spearheaded during 2010/11 sparked a

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2 Mike Weatherley's official home page: http://www.mikeweatherleymp.com/2013/03/04/squatting-statement/
veritable media frenzy about ‘antisocial’ squatters, and increasingly linked them to another group whose occupancy of space frequently arouses resentment: Gypsies and Travellers. According to some parts of the media (The Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph being the most vocal, see also Dee, 2013, 247), and somewhat contrary to Weatherley’s sociological assessment, squatters were now supposed to be predominantly ‘Eastern European Gypsies’ who, according to a common trope, broke into hardworking citizen’s houses when the residents had just left to go to the shops, and proceeded to drunkenly lay waste to honest taxpayer’s possessions and bank accounts.

Squatters and Homelessness charities, who were consulted on the proposed law, pointed out that not only was this scenario highly unlikely3, but also that an effective ban on squatting would criminalise possibly tens of thousands of homeless persons who had no other means of shelter. Regardless of their protest, the law was passed by parliament in September 2011 – stuck, somewhat like in a Trojan horse, as an amendment to the back of the controversial ‘legal aid bill’. Since then, over a hundred persons have been arrested on the new charges, and some have been sentenced to several months in prison. The law has been cited as playing a crucial role in the death of at least one homeless man, Daniel Gauntlett, who froze to death outside an empty bungalow in 2011, after allegedly being denied access to it by the police4. Mike Weatherley commented shortly after: “Squatters should not be allowed to peddle their myths. If squatters really cared about the homeless then they would help them access council services, not scare them into believing that they would be arrested”5.

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3 For legal reasons – a house that was actually occupied was already protected by law under the clause of a ‘displaced residential occupier’, i.e. squatting in such a building was already a criminal offence before the introduction of ‘Weatherley’s law’. Squatters were well aware of this and the first task in finding a squat was practically always to ensure the property was actually uninhabited

4 www.ismikeweatherleydeadyet.co.uk – a website dedicated to collective anticipation of the demise of Mike Weatherley MP

5 Mike Weatherley’s official home page: http://www.mikeweatherleymp.com/2013/03/04/squatting-statement/
Harry Cowley and Mike Weatherly personify two different approaches to what one could call Britain’s on-going space crisis. It is of course not called a ‘space crisis’ – in so far as humans have parcellated space in order to negotiate living arrangements, it is usually called a housing crisis. The current one has been the subject of lively public debate since the 2008 recession and the following austerity cuts, job losses and benefit cutbacks. At the time of writing, the crisis has reached endemic proportions, with hardly a week passing without news of a steep increases in homeless applications to local authorities, more people living in insecure and hazardous rented accommodation, repossessions, soaring rents and property prices, and reductions in housing related benefits. Despite its constant presence, quantifying the housing crisis is difficult – at the time of writing, charity Shelter estimates that over 30,000 people are threatened with eviction in London alone, but how many exactly is almost impossible to establish. The private rented sector is so unstable that being a renter counts as only one step up from homelessness, and there are staggering numbers of ‘hidden homeless’ – according to charity Crisis about 380,000 –, people with no fixed address who sleep on floors and sofas at the houses of friends or family. For women, this frequently translates into extreme vulnerability to violence and sexual exploitation as they are specifically targeted by men offering shelter in exchange for sexual and domestic services. Tens of thousands of households are only able to afford their mortgages or rents with difficulty, and no one is sure exactly how many street homeless there are, since the official figures only count those who have come to the attention of the authorities – which many avoid for good reason. Despite the lack of comprehensive statistics, government figures show that the number of counted rough sleepers has increased by 55% since 2010. In recent months, the topic has gathered momentum, with public protests and marches against homelessness – however, from the side of official politics

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6 http://www.crisis.org.uk/data/files/publications/HHBIC_report%5B1%5D.pdf
7 At the time of writing, a cursory search of online platforms like Craigslist reveals several advertisements a week explicitly offering such a deal. See also: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2307630/Im-creep-just-looking-help-The-men-using-Craigslist-offer-free-rooms-exchange-maid-service-sex.html
and policy, the problem is generally seen as a lack of available space, and thus the suggested solution most often consists in ‘build more housing’. It is of course not true that there is no space – according to the Institute of Public Policy Research, there are an estimated 635,000 empty properties in the UK, 200,000 of which have been empty for more than six months⁹. The problem is that there is no mechanism of allocating this space to those who need it, and no language in which to talk about the necessity of doing so besides the rhetoric of the invisible hand.

Homelessness and housing precarity are thus most often framed as an economic problem, an issue of the unequal distribution of property rights. That is of course not incorrect – since space under capitalism is allocated by economic rather than political means, the homeless most often find themselves in this position because they are, for one reason or another, unable to participate in the market for shelter. To trace the reasons for this in welfare policy, labour market conditions, the dynamics of the housing market or the contractions of global capitalism is important, and I will consider some of these aspects in the following pages. Generally, however, this text is going to approach the matter from a slightly different angle – while I will discuss the economic aspect of allocating space, I will at the same time try to cut through this layer and its language, and have a look at the thing that is being allocated – space itself, and the manifold ways human beings use it to structure their phenomenal world.

My argument is based on a general observation: human beings are spatial beings. This means on the one hand, that we perceive of ourselves and of others in inherently spatial ways. For example, we relate to each other in space and through space – from the micro-politics of arranging bodies relative to each other in public or private places, to the macro-politics of defining ‘territories’ and constructing insiders and outsiders. We also perceive of our own embodied existence as spatial – because our bodies are spatial objects, we experience ourselves as ‘being spaces’, we talk about ‘having boundaries’, of bodily

‘invasions’ and of ‘externalising’ parts of what we consider ‘us’. For this reason, as Judith Butler writes, it is important that we feel that our bodies are our own and that they are safe spaces for us to ‘inhabit’ (2004, 25). Moreover, there is a necessary connection between this experience of the body as spatial and of the body in space – bodies are built so that they require a minimum of space to function as much as they require food and air. For example, in order for our nervous system to unwind and recover, we need a safe space in which we can let our body relax. The absence of such a space means that basic biological functions cannot be fulfilled, and deprivation from rest is therefore also form of torture. As I will argue, to be homeless, in its most basic existential form, means not to have a safe space within or without the body, and as we will see, ‘spatial abjection’, thus understood, is not limited to those who are conventionally considered ‘the homeless’.

Because space is such a basic need, it also profoundly informs the ways we construct ourselves and others cognitively and socially. We speak of ‘distant’ relations and ‘close’ friends, we say that something is ‘beneath’ us or that we are ‘beside ourselves’ with grief or rage. Perhaps the most momentous spatial metaphor is that of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ – we construct social categories according to who belongs on the inside of a real or imagined space, and is thus one of ‘us’, and who belongs on the outside and is one of ‘them’ (Anderson, 2013). More importantly, we do not just assign these categories, but we construct real, material spaces according to this very principle. This goes, on the one hand, for the built environment, in so far as we construct material arrangements that produce and re-enforce particular categories of people. On the other hand, it also goes for the construction of ‘social spaces’, that is, symbolic spaces that are ‘made of’ social relations. Homelessness is one of the most visible results of this fact – the homeless are ‘outsiders’ in that they are both outside of social relations – a state often referred to as ‘social death’ (Patterson 1985) – and also outside of the material structures that shelter bodies. Their example shows how the metaphor of inside and outside can translate into a matter of sheer survival, and that ‘social death’ and real death are often closely related. The political and ethical practices
of squatters I will discuss in the following can therefore be seen as strategies of survival in more than one sense – on the one hand, physical survival through obtaining shelter by any means necessary, and on the other hand, social survival through providing those who are abandoned ‘outside’ with basic human respect and solidarity.

As the reader may have already guessed, my position on these issues is not exactly neutral. I hope that the following chapters will make clear why this is so – mostly it is a result of the fact that during the fieldwork that has led to this thesis, I also was a squatter, and, at least in legal terms, homeless. My ‘data’ therefore stems not so much from disinterested observation, but from – unintended – affectedness, a circumstance that has, as I will discuss, profoundly influenced my approach. This thesis is therefore at least in part autoethnographic, although I hope to have avoided the pitfalls of excessive navel-gazing. My own involvement with the squatting movement influences not so much the ‘validity’ of my data – I will freely admit that I do not believe ethnography, as a social practice in which human beings comment on social practices among other human beings can ever be ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ – but the angle from which I chose to approach the data. As I will discuss, there was never much of a question about whether I was going to approach squatting from the perspective of policy, economics or even ‘proper’ anthropology – not because these things do not matter, but because from the perspective of a squatter, the immediate question is a basic moral one – whether or not the needs of people outweigh the interests of property. Perhaps a better anthropologist than I am might have succeeded in taking a balanced position on this issue, but I have found myself unable to pretend that I am in any doubt that what the squatters did was, on the whole, morally justified. I will therefore not bore my reader with a dishonest attempt at ‘objectivity’, although as I will discuss in chapters 3 and 4, I will try to replace it with (Critical) Realism.

The decision to base this thesis on a CR framework occurred not at the stage of data collection, but at the stage of data analysis, or more precisely at the point of
transition between fieldwork and writing. This choice was initially not so much indicated by the data in the strict sense, but rather, by the necessity to find some kind of speaker position or perspective to author my text from. In constructing such a speaker position, I found that I largely had the options of speaking about my respondents as if I were neutrally describing natural phenomena ("homeless people as they occur in the natural world"), or as autonomous speakers whose voices I could represent, while simultaneously relegating them to mere subjective opinions. I found some understanding for this particular problem in the work of Sayer (2005, 2011), and from there ventured into CR more broadly, especially into Bhaskar’s work on ontology.

Gaining an approximate understanding of what CR is and what it does, I became increasingly convinced that it was not only a suitable framework to construct my own positionality from, but that it could also be used to mount a critique of the metatheoretical underpinnings of anthropology more generally (for one anthropologist who agrees, see Brereton 2004, 2011). While it was not the purpose of my thesis to write a comprehensive critique of anthropology, I therefore used chapters 3 and 4 to sketch the basic building blocks of such a critique within the limits of my present topic and as far as they were relevant to my own positionality. Within these limits, the use of CR is first and foremost strategic in the sense I discuss in chapter 3 – it serves as a platform on which I am satisfied I can treat the expressions of my interlocutors with epistemic respect and allow for the possibility (if not the certainty) of their claims being true.

It would therefore be misleading to claim that this is ‘a Critical Realist Ethnography’ in that every step of data collection and interpretation was informed by CR. Nevertheless, concepts and processes from CR were used in a number of ways throughout the work, in a theoretical sense for example in the use of the concept of emergence in chapter 5, or practically, in employing a broadly retroductive approach to data analysis. Retroduction, as opposed to induction or deduction is a mode of reasoning that goes "from a description and
analysis of concrete phenomena to reconstruct the basic conditions for these phenomena to be what they are” (Danermark et al, 2002, 80), i.e. it asks what has to be the case for the observed phenomena to be the outcome. This mode of argument leads to the discovery of what CR calls ‘transfactual conditions’ of a given phenomenon, or the ‘powers and mechanisms’ that underlie it (Danermark et al, 2002, 78), and thus to increasingly general and abstract theoretical categories. An example for this kind of generalisation are the categories I call here ‘relational patterns’, as they are generalisations arrived at by comparing and abstracting from the dynamics of different types of concrete social relations. For additional discussion of how CR informs the structure and argument of the thesis see Literature review and conclusion.

My personal involvement in the field has also led me to realise that a discussion of space has to begin with acknowledging that spatial practices, in so far as they are social practices, are also inevitably ethical practices. This means that the social relations that construct and are constructed by spatial configurations contain particular statements about how people ought to relate to each other – space is therefore not only socially, but also and especially morally constructed. In this context, Harry Cowley and Mike Weatherley can also be seen to stand in for two different moral paradigms – roughly speaking, while one attempted to get those on the outside inside, the other tried to get those inside out. As I will argue, these are not just individual political or moral standpoints – they stand for two different ‘meta-patterns’ in the construction of space, and the ‘ideal-types’ Cowley and Weatherley represent will therefore repeatedly pop up in this thesis in a variety of – perhaps surprising – contexts. Harry Cowley (the myth, if not the man), can be seen to represent a paradigm that I will describe in terms of the ‘spatial self’. This construction, which I will trace through different discursive arenas, from Winstanley’s account of the Fall to feminist ‘Safe Spaces’, refers to the embodied self in its basic spatiality. Ethical practices focusing on the spatial self are informed by a logic of embodiment and vulnerability, and by an ethical ‘imperative’ to respond to need. Mike Weatherley (I cannot know to what degree the man is deserving of the myth) on the other hand, can be seen as a proponent
of a different kind of paradigm – that of the ‘territorial self’, as it is exemplified from Hobbes’ account of the State of Nature to contemporary ‘gated communities’. As I will show, it corresponds both to a spatial practice that centres on notions of securisation, exclusion and internment; and to an ethics of domination and violent competition. While the real Cowley and the real Weatherley may or may not be ‘selves’ of these kinds, their political and ethical practices make them fitting exemplars for the two spatial configurations I will describe.

While in my discussion I will touch on a number of disciplinary fields – for example moral anthropology, psychoanalysis and cognitive anthropology - the focal point for this discussion will be squatting as a response to homelessness. This thesis is therefore something of a salvage mission, since with ‘Weatherley’s law’, squatting in the way I describe it here has been made a criminal offence. This does not mean that squatting has disappeared – it is still legal to squat commercial properties, and even though a law banning this, too, is underway, the sheer magnitude of the homelessness problem means that squatting is not likely to go away any time soon. However, for an ethnographer it makes a great amount of difference if the practice one is documenting is this or that side of the law – although ‘illegal’ and ‘immoral’ are hardly the same thing, the documentation of illegal practices can pose considerable ethical challenges. In this case, these lie not least in the fact that the ‘criminals’ I am talking about are people who are, on the one hand, vulnerable because they are homeless, and on the other hand, as I will discuss, were the target of police investigation and infiltration even before the new offence was created. As I will discuss in chapter 11, ‘Weatherley’s law’ therefore targeted not only homeless people, it also and particularly targeted political dissent.

Under these circumstances, even the ‘innocent’ documentation of practices this side of the law may cause harm, let alone of those that may be of debatable morality but certain illegality. Therefore, I cannot offer a traditional ‘ethnography of’ squatters, detailing a ‘community’ in all its colourful detail, since more often
than not this kind of anthropology ends up being used as an infiltration manual. This text is therefore not so much an ethnography of squatters as it is an ethnographic text about squatting as a political and ethical practice, and its particular cultural and political context in ‘Austerity Britain’. This means that I will deliberately take a wider angle than just one focusing on ‘squatters’ as a discrete group, rather, I will consider other aspects of social and political life in Britain in so far as they are related to the theme of homelessness and resistance. This wider view will on the one hand support my argument that spatial/ethical practices are not limited to one particular cultural group, and on the other hand, will ensure that this text does not become an example of the ‘culture of poverty’ genre that studies deprivation as if it was the product of a bounded, self-perpetuating milieu rather than wider social and political processes (Bourgois, 2001). For the same reason, the reader will also not find any detailed ‘case studies’, descriptions of particular persons or ‘life histories’ of the people who appear in this narrative. All names are made up and in some cases, I have composed characters from different real people. For this reason, my ethnographic data may not be as ‘thick’ as it may have been otherwise, and in some parts of the text I will have to resort to unusual ways of depiction. For example, in presenting a particular squatting action in chapters 9 and 10, I will adopt a form of narration that does not place any particular person at the occupation, and voices the aims and goals of the project through materials the activists themselves intended for the public view (this is not because the action was illegal, but rather because activists in general are often under on-going surveillance). For the same reason, I will read the 2011 Bristol riot in chapter 11 through materials that have been deliberately put in the public domain by eye-witnesses, which, as I will discuss, is a necessary step to ensure that this text does not cause any harm.

The text is structured not so much along a particular analytical framework but along a narrative – my fieldwork as it happened, beginning to end. This, to me, seemed the most appropriate way of telling a story, and I found out belatedly that the mechanics of constructing a narrative are somewhat different from those of
constructing an argument. Rather than presenting a conclusion up front and then substantiating it in the following chapters, I will therefore develop an argument as the story progresses, and so also document the process through which I arrived at my conclusion. I hope in this way to partially mediate the tension Sayer (1992, 2000) identifies between narrative and analysis in Social Science writing, which is owed both to the abovementioned difference in impetus – showing versus explaining – and in part to the technical demands of the writing process itself, i.e. the fact that a writer always implicitly interacts with an audience (Sayer, 2000, 148).

In summary, this thesis argues that social cognition, and especially moral cognition, have a specifically spatial component. This argument is based on several premises: a) due to the spatial nature of embodiment (Metzinger, 2004) the human experience of having a ‘self’ is inherently spatial; b) since this experience of self is dependent on affirmation and reinforcement by others, social cognition itself can be seen to have a spatial component, which becomes especially evident in the cognitive and social construction of an ‘inside’ vs an ‘outside’ (see also Douglas, 1966); c) these social categories are on the one hand constructed cognitively in social interaction, and, on the other hand, come to bear upon the construction of material spaces such as ‘homes’ or nation states. There are therefore connections and parallels between the structure of the embodied self and human-made spatial arrangements, some of which this thesis will discuss in detail; d) the social categories of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ inherently contain a moral component, and thus, the kinds of ‘selves’ cognitively constructed through these spatial categories, as well as the construction of the kinds of spaces these selves operate in, have a moral component. ‘Space’ can therefore be seen to be not just socially, but also and especially morally constructed.

On this basis, the thesis draws on the ethnographic data to show that squatting as a political practice involves on the one hand the co-operative construction of particular kind of embodied selves, and on the other, the construction of particular kinds of spatial arrangements. It is therefore not merely a response to
material deprivation or a form of political protest – although it can be both of these things – but it can also and especially be interpreted as a form of ethical practice that can offset some of the negative implications homelessness has for the experience of being an embodied self. In the context of homelessness, this experience is often discussed under the label ‘mental health’, in so far as homelessness and associated forms of social exclusion involve disturbances of the functioning of the self usually referred to as ‘mental illness’. As outlined in anthropology e.g. by Tanya Luhrmann (2007, 2008), street homelessness has a severely negative impact on mental health, often leading to symptoms of psychosis and suicidality. Luhrmann suggests that these adverse cognitive symptoms correlate with ‘social defeat’, i.e. with consistent experiences of “an actual social encounter in which one person physically or symbolically loses to another one. The encounter, then, must be contested (or the individual must experience it, at least, as contested), and the individual must experience loss” (2007, 151). While I agree with Luhrmann’s description of homelessness as a state of near permanent ‘social defeat’, the concept itself is derived from animal studies and for this reason, naturalises and de-politicises ‘social defeat’ among humans. In this thesis, I will therefore use a term that describes a very similar social dynamic, namely the Hegelian concept of ‘misrecognition’ (see chapter 2). As I will argue, misrecognition, analogous to ‘social defeat’, threatens a person’s experience of self, while its opposite ‘recognition’ on the other hand reinforces and strengthens this experience of self. In so far as the self has spatial properties as outlined above, recognition and misrecognition are here interpreted as spatial practices in which selves are cognitively and materially constructed as spatial categories, most importantly along the distinction of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. To be misrecognised, for the homeless, therefore means to be constructed as an outsider to the moral order, which on the one hand involves a process of cognitively splitting and projecting morally undesirable traits of the dominant class onto those who are misrecognised, and on the other, to materially exclude them from the means of obtaining shelter, thus making them both metaphorical and literal ‘outsiders’.
The guiding research questions of this thesis are:

How does social cognition impact the phenomenal experience of self in the context of inequality and exclusion, particularly homelessness?
In what ways can these forms of social cognition be said to be ethical and what follows from this for a discussion of homelessness and squatting?
What is the role of spatiality in the co-operative cognitive construction of selves and are there different kinds of spatially constructed selves in relation to others?
**Literature review**

This section gives an overview of the main bodies of literature used in this thesis, as well as secondary literatures drawn on in order to discuss specific points emerging from the data. In general terms, the use of literature in this project followed the direction(s) suggested by the ethnographic data, i.e. after data was first systematically organised and analysed, literature was then chosen to interpret and discuss potential connections indicated by the data. For this reason, while an initial literature review was undertaken before fieldwork commenced, this literature was subsequently amended in order to include other bodies of theory that could be put in productive dialogue with the data. The choice of literature is therefore driven by connections between phenomena observed in fieldwork and the motivation to explain these; as opposed to the impetus to place the data within one or more specific bodies of literature, or to contribute to the development of any one literature. As ethnographic data is by its nature diverse, i.e. in this case potentially spanning the domains of divergent fields such as politics and policy, economics, psychology, biology and many more, a compromise must be made between limiting the use of literature sources to a manageable scope, and representing the data in as comprehensive a way as possible without limiting what can be observed to what can be explained by any one theory. While this thesis therefore draws on a diverse range of sources from a variety of disciplines, care was taken to ensure that literatures used are structurally and logically compatible and do not produce contradictory or incommensurable accounts. For this purpose, a core structural argument was chosen as outlined below, and further literature was added based on its structural compatibility with the core theoretical argument.
The literatures used fall, for the most part, into three intersecting categories, namely:

- literature on embodied cognition, including psychoanalysis
- literature on morality and ethics
- literature on social and political structure, including the social production of space

In the following, I will therefore give a short overview of the relationship of these three areas in the context of this thesis and of the overall structure, before discussing them separately in more detail.

1. Structure of the Thesis

![Diagram](image)

Figure 1: Overall Structure

The above diagram illustrates schematically how the three fields of theoretical interest relate to each other. At the central intersection of the three domains is what in the following I will discuss as the theoretical core, comprised in the main by the work of Axel Honneth and amended with work drawn from Hegel and, in parts, Judith Butler. The rationale for centring Honneth was that his work on...
recognition theoretically grounds the argument made in this thesis – that there are important connections between embodied cognition, ethics and social status – and provides a broad theoretical framework for discussing what these connections could look like. In drawing on Hegel, Honneth establishes several key theoretical assumptions that guide this work, namely: a) that there are two basic forms of social relationships, characterised by a tendency towards equality and inequality respectively, b) that these relationships can be framed as ethical and thus equality and inequality have an ethical dimension c) that there is a cognitive dimension to how these relationships are established and maintained, which can be productively discussed by drawing on object relations psychoanalysis and d) that there is a social dimension to these relations which is reflected on the level of social structure. The thesis therefore adopts Honneth’s argument that the terms ‘recognition’ and ‘misrecognition’ refer to two specific forms of ethical relationships, which can be discussed both in terms of individual cognition and in terms of larger-scale social relationships, as its core assumption.

Figure 2: Initial Abstraction
In terms of the mode of analysis, Honneth’s argument was operationalized in such a way that his terms ‘recognition’ and ‘misrecognition’ were taken to refer to internally related structural patterns characterising a range of different human relationships as illustrated in the above diagram. ‘Structural pattern’ here refers to the result of a process of abstraction (see also Sayer, 2013, 120f) in which the two relational modes in question were stripped of their concrete content to function as structural representations of the two type of internal relations in question. In this way, the two abstract modes of relating were made available for the process of abduction, which means “to interpret and recontextualize individual phenomena within a conceptual framework or a set of ideas - to be able to understand something in a new way by observing and interpreting this something in a new conceptual framework” (Danermark et al, 2002, 79). The abstract patterns were thus transposed into a variety of theoretical and disciplinary contexts in order to show parallels and connections between these contexts. For example, in locating the pattern of misrecognition first in fieldwork relationships, then in specific forms of the social relations pertaining to gender and ‘race’, and finally in the construction of concrete spaces which reflect these relations, it became possible to make the argument that all of these manifestations share structural similarities.

The ‘mechanics’ of the argument are therefore based on moving the structural patterns through the different bodies of literature as illustrated overleaf, while continually referring to the dimension of ontological depth suggested by Critical Realism in order to identify the concrete powers and mechanisms that accompany the emergence of the patterns in a particular setting. For example, in asking what mechanisms underlie the emergence of a pattern of misrecognition in the context of homelessness, the thesis draws on psychoanalysis, cognitive science, and social psychology, to ask what individual and social mechanisms are responsible for the emergence of the pattern of misrecognition in the relation between homeless and ‘settled’ persons. As is usual for the CR understanding of powers and mechanisms, these are not seen as absolute, causal relationships, but
rather as dynamic and contingent powers and thus, tendencies rather than absolute properties (Sayer 2005).

The abductive argument is moved along by way of an ethnographic narrative, which provides the ‘vehicle’ by which the abstract patterns are moved forward through the theoretical domains. In this way, the abstract patterns derived from the core are moved through the areas of ethics, social structure and embodied cognition in a roughly (but not strictly) circular motion, with the conclusion arriving back at the question of ethics on a higher level of generalisation than discussed in terms of the fieldwork relationship at the beginning of the thesis. The below diagram schematically illustrates the movement of the argument.

\[ \text{Figure 3: Mechanics of the thesis} \]

In the following, I will discuss the base and theoretical core as well as the adjacent literatures in more detail. While some of the sources drawn on fall clearly into one of the domains, others (such as for example the discussion of connectionist models of moral cognition in chapter five) fall into more than one, i.e. serve as
‘bridge-building’ theories that allow for a translation, and strengthen the conceptual links, between the three domains.

2. Literature

2.1 Base: Critical Realism

The thesis rests on a metatheoretical framework grounded in Critical Realism, exemplified in the work of Archer (1995), Collier (1994), Bhaskar (1978/2013, 1987/2009, 2010, 2014), Danemark et al (2002), Sayer (1992, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2011) among others. As the rationale for this choice of metatheory is discussed elsewhere in the thesis (see introduction and chapters 3 and 4) I shall only repeat these arguments here briefly: a) CR provides a grounding for ethnographic research and writing that allows for a real dialogue between competing perspectives on the social and material world, as opposed to a mere reiterating of simultaneously existing ‘subjective’ points of view, none of which can be verified; b) CR allows for a discussion of causality that allows for the identification of causative mechanisms which make the emergence of specific phenomena more likely without causally determining them, thus lending credence to theories that are difficult to verify in more traditional approaches, such as e.g. feminism, Marxism or the here implied general humanism; c) CR thus adds a ‘depth dimension’ to ethnography which takes it beyond mere description into the realm of explanation of what human beings are like; d) CR adds to possible explanations a specifically moral/political dimension via the concept of ‘explanatory critique’ and; e) via the concept of ‘emergence’, CR opens an arena for the discussion of embodied cognition that goes beyond mind/body dualism (see chapter 5). It is important to note that, as discussed in the introduction, the use of CR in this thesis is located purely on the conceptual/theoretical level and did not specifically influence the process of data gathering, although especially Sayer’s work allowed for a post-hoc theorisation of some ethical issues encountered during fieldwork.
2.2 Theoretical core: Honneth, Hegel, Butler, (Heidegger)

The argument in this thesis draws together three more than substantial areas of theoretical interest, and it would certainly be a formidable task to attempt to integrate these from square one. For this reason, I have chosen to build my argument on the work of Axel Honneth, in particular his discussion of recognition as derived from a Hegelian ethics (Honneth, 1996), since this conceptual framework does much of the work of establishing the links between morality, social status and cognition that I want to discuss. As I outline at more length in chapter 2, Honneth draws on the early works of Hegel to establish an ethical theory based on the concepts of ‘recognition’ and ‘misrecognition’. Following Hegel, these terms refer to particular kinds of social relations based in either the relationship of two mutually constituting subjects (recognition) or a subject and an other who, within the relation, is specified as a less-than-subject, i.e. an object (misrecognition). It is worth noting that, in line with Hegel’s general theory, these forms of relations should not be seen as static configurations but rather as processes, movements or tendencies. This means that the mutual co-constitution of the partners in these interactions is not a singular event, but rather, an ongoing dynamic in which the relationship tends either toward increasing equality or toward increasing inequality. The reason for this dynamic is that each act of recognition begets another act of recognition, and conversely, ‘misrecognition’ of an object by a subject invariably results in the object not being able to reciprocate, and thus the subject-character of the original subject is lost as well. Objectification therefore begets objectification and vice versa, in a dynamic and constantly evolving relation.

This basic structural view of relationship opens up Honneth’s theory in two directions. On the one hand, drawing directly on Hegel, he can specify these relationships as ethical, since ethics is the original concern of Hegel’s theory of Sittlichkeit as a state of harmonious integration of all parts of society. Honneth’s theory therefore invites a link between the discussion of (in)equality and moral theory, and in the context of this thesis, allows me to connect with current
debates in moral anthropology. On the other hand, Honneth links this ethical
time to embodied cognition by discussing the Hegelian terms ‘recognition’ and
‘misrecognition’ in terms of their correlates in individual psychology, drawing
specifically on object relations psychoanalysis. This thesis takes up this strand
too, expands on the psychoanalytic theory and links it with work in cognitive
anthropology and the philosophy of mind.

In addition to Honneth and, going back to the source, Hegel (1807, 1812, 1820),
the core theoretical framework also borrows from the work of Judith Butler,
specifically her argument in *Frames of War* (2009) that the appreciation of
vulnerable embodiment can form the basis for recognition and empathy. Since
Butler’s overall work is theoretically diverse, broad in scope, and has undergone
important and profound developments in recent decades, it would not be
possible here to give a full appreciation of her contribution, however, the
abovementioned argument is relevant here because of the link it establishes
between a theory of recognition and vulnerable embodiment. The ‘import’ of this
argument is necessary since embodiment is relatively under-discussed in both
Honneth and Hegel himself (Stark, 2014, 93). Butler’s discussion of vulnerability
is interesting for my purposes here because she links the themes of empathy,
embodiment, recognition and vulnerability that, as my argument progresses,
open up a dialogue with psychoanalytic approaches centering on trauma and the
body.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) This should not obscure the fact that Butler has drawn on Hegelian theory in earlier work, for
example the *The Psychic life of Power* (1997). In that text, Butler discusses the dynamics of
subjection under a Foucauldian/Nietzschean/Althusserian paradigm and arrives at the
conclusion that the linguistic convergence of the two meanings of ‘subjection’ (a) ‘becoming a
subject’ and b) ‘being subordinated’) exhaustively reflects the real process of subject-formation
by means of power. Hegel’s ‘unhappy consciousness’ is therefore the result of the fact that
subjectivity is necessarily the result of power relations, and thus the emerging subject is
confronted with the fact that it is constituted by the very power it attempts to emancipate itself
from. In contrast to her later work, which I draw on here, Butler’s use of a
Foucauldian/Nietzschean concept of power, as well as her insistence to take a linguistic
confusion for a real convergence to me appears problematic in several ways, not least that
Foucauldian/Nietzschean and Hegelian notions of the power dynamics of subjection are quite
different. However, due to the ultimately different focus of this thesis, I cannot undertake a
systematic analysis of Butler’s work at this point in time, and I therefore explicitly limit my use of
her theory to her discussion of vulnerable embodiment as a basis for empathy and recognition.
Finally, I include aspects of Heidegger’s work in the core framework, not so much because his theory supports my argument, but because it serves as a counterpoint to the Hegelian notion of relational ethics derived from Honneth. As I discuss in chapter eight, I draw on critical interpretations of Heidegger’s notion of ‘Being’ in order to argue that his ‘Struggle for Being’ implies a particular form of misrecognition, and that his discussion of spatiality can therefore be seen as a prime example of how relations of misrecognition come to bear upon the construction of space and spatially constructed gendered and racialised identities (see also: Faye, 2006, 2009; McBride, 1997; Iris Young 1997, 2001; Eubanks/Gauthier, 2011, Julian Young 2001). For my purposes here, Heidegger therefore serves somewhat as the antithesis to a Hegelian notion of *Sittlichkeit*. Additionally, through his influence on French philosophy and thus poststructuralism, Heidegger also illustrates the anti-humanist impetus of the meta-theoretical models in Anthropology which I discuss in chapters three and four (see Wolin, 1993, 2004).

**2.3 Area 1: Ethics**

The first area of literature this thesis branches out into is ethics, primarily as discussed in the subfield of moral anthropology as represented by e.g. Laidlaw (2002, 2013), Oksala (2005), Faubion (2001, 2011), Zigon (2007, 2008, 2010), Mattingly (1998, 2012), Robbins (2004, 2007, 2012, 2013), Csordas (2013), Lambek (2000, 2010), Parish (1994). From the core theoretical framework, I take the assumption that in order to discuss the ethical character of different kinds of social relations, the concept of ethics used must be explicitly relational, i.e. take into account two sides of a dyadic ethical relationship. As I discuss in chapter 4, this is a slight deviation from the bulk of current work in moral anthropology, which, as Laidlaw (2013) argues, is based predominantly in a paradigm of virtue ethics. Anthropologists concerned with virtue ethics, including Laidlaw (2013), Oksala (2005), Lambek (2010), generally speak about morality in terms of the formation of a person’s moral ‘character’. The possession of virtues, in this model, is what renders a person ‘good’, and moral development is seen predominantly
as a result of the acquisition of such virtues. Debates subsequently focus on questions of structure and agency in moral behaviour (Faubion, 2010, 2011; Zigon, 2007, 2008, 2010), and the relationship between ‘everyday ethics’ and conscious ethical choice. As I argue in chapter 5, these arguments have two weaknesses, namely a) a focus on individual ‘character’ at the expense of an assessment of the quality of the relationship with the other; and b) an implicit tendency toward a covert form of mind/body dualism. I seek to resolve these problems by drawing on a) work in cognitive anthropology that seeks to theorise embodied cognition in a roughly monist fashion (e.g. Bloch, 2011), b) work that seeks to address the moral dimension of embodiment (e.g. Sayer, 2005; Ignatow, 2009) and c) the relational concept of ethics derived from Honneth (see above).

This relational concept of ethics also informs my discussion of methodology in chapters 1 and 2, since, as I discuss, I have attempted to interrogate my own fieldwork ethics under the same theoretical paradigm as the data. The result is a discussion of the dynamics of recognition and misrecognition in anthropological fieldwork in general and this thesis in particular. In order to make this argument, I also draw on literature concerned with methodology and fieldwork ethics more broadly, for example Bourdieu’s (1977) discussion of what he terms a ‘theoretical distortion’ inherent in fieldwork and Wacquant’s (2005) concept of ‘carnal’ ethnography as a stance that takes seriously the role of embodiment in fieldwork. From these authors, I take the argument that a lack of recognition in the ethical sense discussed by Honneth underlies many of the problems of power in anthropological fieldwork and writing, discussed e.g. by Schepers-Hughes (1995) Rosaldo (1993) Geertz (1988); Clifford & Marcus (1986); Marcus & Fischer (1986), Said (1979), and argue that in order to address them, it is necessary, as argued by Sayer (2011, 2005), to take seriously the moral dimension of fieldwork relationships, which I again theorise through Honneth. Additionally, I draw on literature on empathy as represented by e.g. Koegler and Stueber (2000), Stueber (2000, 2006), Makkreel (1992, 1996, 2000), Grondin (1994), Clark (2007), Bohart and Greenberg (1997), Gladstein (1984), Rachman (1988), (1983, 1987, 2000), Eisenberg (1987, 2000, 2007), Batson (1991, 2009), Ickes (1997), Decety

2.4 Area 2: Embodied cognition

The second theoretical area of interest is that of cognitive science, since, as Bloch and Astuti (2012) argue, “anthropology is part of cognitive science in that it contributes to the unitary theoretical aim of understanding and explaining the behavior of the animal species Homo sapiens” (453). ‘Cognitive science’ in this sense spans several disciplinary fields and subfields in as far as they are concerned with cognition or the cognitive aspects of social relationships. The literature used in this thesis falls into two broad categories, a) philosophy of mind and b) psychoanalysis.

Cognitive Science/Philosophy of Mind: I draw here mainly on work which seeks to integrate ‘naturalist’ and ‘culturalist’ views of embodied cognition, such as Bloch (2011, 2013), in order to strengthen the links between psychodynamics, embodiment and ethics made throughout the thesis. Another contribution in cognitive anthropology comes from Sperber (1985), whose theory of an ‘epidemiology of representations’ I use in chapter 10 to talk about the cultural transmission of the relational patterns discussed above. Furthermore, I draw on literature from the philosophy of mind, such as Dennett (1989), Clark et al (1996), Churchland (1989b, 1996), DesAutels (1996) Clark and Chalmers (1998), May et al (1996) in order to strengthen my argument about the link between embodiment and moral cognition. All these approaches argue that there need not be a rigid conceptual, theoretical or even disciplinary distinction between ‘mind’
and ‘embodiment’ or between ‘human nature’ and ‘culture’, and that the study of ethics should take both aspects into account, a suggestion this thesis seeks to follow. I also include further sources in this area such as Lakoff & Johnson (1980) Lakoff & Johnson (1999), Lakoff & Nunez (2000) Clark (1997), Edelman (2004), Damasio (1999), Clark (2001), Churchland (1988), Dennett (1993), Dennett/Humphrey (1989), McGilchrist (2009), Hofstadter (1980, 2008), in order to illuminate individual points, without claiming to represent the full scope of these author’s works. A special place in the argument falls to Metzinger's (2004) self-model theory, which gives a useful model of how the ‘self’ emerges from the brain. Metzinger also makes the link between the body as a spatial object, space as a survival need, and the experience of selfhood that guide this thesis. As I discuss, his ‘self-model’, read through a Hegelian lens, can help to answer the question of why inequality has a detrimental effect on the experience of self and mental health (Luhrmann, 2007b), without having to resort to ultimately biologistic concepts such as ‘social defeat’.

Psychoanalysis: As already implicated in the core theoretical framework, psychoanalysis, particular the bundle of approaches known as ‘object relations’ is well suited to a discussion of how social relations – in this case, recognition and misrecognition – are intrapersonally represented and interpersonally transmitted. As I discuss in chapter 5, this brand of psychoanalytic theory assumes that particular relational configurations ('object relations') are internalised during development and reproduced in individual and collective behaviour. I follow Honneth here in drawing mainly on work by Donald Winnicott (1965/1971, 1990) and Jessica Benjamin (1988, 1990, 1998, 2013), which I amend with work by Fairbairn (1954/1994, see also Kernberg 2002, Peireira and Scharff, 2002), since, as I argue in chapter 5, this work provides some important theoretical tools for linking the discussion of object relations to the discussion of (Hegelian) ethics. I further discuss aspects of psychopathology as they relate to the representation of object relations through specific aspects of the work of Kernberg (1975, 1976, 1984), Fromm (1964) Kohut (1971), John Bowlby (1951), Hare (1999) and Babiak/Hare (2006). Further work in this area

2.5 Area 3: Social/Political theory

This area encompasses, broadly speaking, theory that discusses social relationships outside the individual dyadic relations implied in most of the above theories. While authors in the fields of psychoanalysis or cognitive science frequently make statements about the relevance of embodied cognition in large-scale human relationships (e.g. Duffell, 2000, 2014 or Fiske, 2010), the precise modes of interaction between individual cognition and collective behaviour are far from straightforward. In the context of this thesis, a balance therefore had to be sought between a sufficient contextualisation of the ethnographic data within the broader political and economic situation at the time of fieldwork, and the intended focus on embodied cognition. This issue was technically addressed through approaching the choice of social theories from the perspective of their formal structural compatibility with the theoretical core, while ensuring their content resonated with the themes and concepts emerging from the data. In this light, some theories proved more compatible than others – for example, Corey Robin’s treatment of Conservatism in chapters 9 and 10 was chosen not only because it discusses conservative ideology, but because Robin’s conceptual and explanatory framework, which pitches a ‘master’ ruling class against a rebellious
subaltern, is structurally compatible with the Hegelian conception of the basic dynamics of social relations as derived from the core theories, and thus amenable to the abductive transference of the abstract relational patterns discussed above, while at the same time ideologically reflecting a position that resonates with the values, ideals and sentiments expressed by respondents in the field. Similarly, Patterson’s (1985) discussion of slavery and ‘social death’ can be made productive in this discussion first and foremost because he specifically discusses slavery on the basis of a quasi-Hegelian power dynamics, and thus renders the concept of ‘social death’ meaningful in the context of the core theoretical position of this thesis. The fact that Patterson’s argument has widely been used to discuss the situation of homeless people (see below), furthermore opens up an avenue to ground the abstract concept of ‘recognition’ in empirical data from secondary sources, and thus supports the argument that ‘recognition’ is not merely a theoretical entity, but a real process manifesting on a number of levels from the biological to the cultural. In this sense, theory was generally chosen for its explanatory or integrative potential in the context of the concrete data in dialogue with the theoretical core, in order to guarantee a maximum of coherence between different theories and theoretical positions, while allowing for a maximum of flexibility in adapting the theory to the data.

On this basis, there are several relevant literatures relating to aspects of social and political theory this thesis draws on. As the argument specifically focuses on how the abovementioned relational patterns come to inform the construction of physical and social space, and how they are in turn reflected by such spatial arrangements, I draw on literature discussing the social production of space in general (Lefebvre, 1974/1991; Massey, 1992, 2005), the specifically spatial component of cognition as relating to psychoanalysis (Bachelard 1958/1994), and the role of power in this context through a discussion of human territoriality (Sack, 1986; Newman, 1972; Minton, 2009). Additionally, I draw on authors who discuss (spatial) power relations in terms of gender and ‘race’ (Dworkin, 2000; Stoltenberg, 2000, 2005; Dresser/Fleming; 2007 Fanon 1967), and since this thesis is concerned with homelessness, particularly authors who discuss

Furthermore, I draw on two types of work from the field of political theory, namely a) work that theorises the structure of the ‘self’ in terms of political categories, (e.g. Brace 1997; Nedlesky, 1990; Bartelson 1995). Here, I draw particularly on Brace’s (1997) conception of a ‘territorial’ versus a ‘spatial’ self and their respective political configurations, since, as I argue in chapter 6, these concepts are exceptionally well suited to describing the inner dynamics of actually existing embodied ‘selves’ and the kinds of spaces they construct in the material and social world. In accordance with the structural patterns derived from the theoretical core, I read the ‘territorial self’ as a representation of a self involved in a relational pattern of misrecognition, and conversely, the ‘spatial self’ as a representation of recognition. The theoretical positions Brace develops these categories from (Winstanley and Hobbes respectively) furthermore provide valuable insight into the speculative social conditions of possibility of the emergence of such ‘selves’ in the physical world. b) work on the immediate political context the fieldwork was situated in, i.e. UK politics between 2010 and 2012 and some of the underlying ideological figures of this politics as far as they have relevance for the ethnography. This involves literature on contemporary events in party politics, social policy and political economy, and additionally selected work on conservative ideology, to the degree that it serves to contextualise the actions described in the ethnography, for example Hodkinson/Robbins (2013), Kisby (2010), Levitas (2012), North (2011),
Teasdale et al. (2012), Buckland et al. (2013), Jacobs/Manzi (2013), Bale (2008), Davie/Pill (2012), Hughes/Mooney (1998), Newman (2001), Eccleshall (1980). Furthermore, approaches were included which provide a broader background to the above specific political questions, such as Robin (2011), Brace (2004), Scruton (1980/2000), Faulks (1998), and, for illustrative purposes, original quotations of political theorists referenced by the above, such as Burke (1790) and von Mises (1951/1981). Anthropological discussions of property are represented by Hann (1993, 1998, 2003, 2007), Hann and Hart (2009), Carrier (1998), Bloch (1975, 2013), Nugent (1993), Strathern, (1996, 1999, 2009), Graeber (1997, 2006), MacPherson (1978), Meillassoux (1972) and Macpherson, (1978), and in a wider context Cooper (2007) and the authors in the 2009 Special Edition of *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*. In order to illustrate the cultural transmission of the abovementioned structural patterns through political ideology, historical evidence was included in so far as it pertained to the type of social relations in question, such as Wood (2001), Garnett (2007) Keats-Rohan (1999), Singman (1998), Littrell (2009). Additionally, authors were included whose work illustrates particular aspects of this process of cultural transmission in so far as it relates to spatiality/territoriality, such as Shearing (1983, 2001), Cahill (2001, 2006) and Clark (2010, 2014). Harvey (2003, 2005, 2008) is included because of his focus on spatial aspects of political economy, Anderson (2013) for a discussion of spatial 'othering' in the context of migration, and Postone (1980) as well as Scholz (2007) for their discussion of the transference of racist argumentative figures onto other than the originally racialised groups.

Picton Street, Bristol, five in the afternoon. I am pushing everything I own, packed into bags and bin liners, through the streets of St Pauls on a wooden trolley.

The trolley is heavy and unwieldy, and more than once tries to escape my grip on the icy roads to launch itself into the rows of parked cars that line the pavement. Gavin saunters next to me, ostensibly refusing to get involved in my struggle with the vehicle. We are heading south from Redland to his squat in Easton, where I am allowed to store my belongings until our crew has finally sorted out a squat of our own. We have just been evicted for the third time in two weeks and I’m tired of hurried packing manoeuvres and heavily loaded treks across the city. If there is no safe place for my body at this point then at least for the carefully selected objects that constitute the whole of my worldly belongings.

Swearing, I try to wrestle the trolley around a sharp corner and nearly end up flying downhill towards Shaftesbury Avenue dragged by its sheer weight. Gavin grudgingly stretches out a hand and stops both me and the trolley before we can turn in to a bag-lady-shaped missile. A few careful turns later we are back on even, yet slippery, ground, beginning to feel warm despite the -15 Celsius temperatures.

The intervention seems to have triggered Gavin out of his sullen silence. “This trolley is shit,” he declares, “whered’ya get that from anyway?”

I inform him that the trolley has been sourced by Simon, who borrowed it from another crew, who has picked it up somewhere under unclear and possibly not entirely legal circumstances. Gavin rolls his eyes.

“Simon’s an idiot” he says, “I mean, did he really think squatting hospital property was going to fly? I mean, re-ally?”
I bite my tongue and keep pushing while he launches into a lengthy analysis of our most recent eviction and our crew’s general ineptitude at squatting. He is not being fair, but then I’m guessing the source of his aggravation is not our crew’s strategy, nor the origin of the trolley for that matter. He proves me right a second later.

“I don’t get what you’re doing anyway” he says, pointing at my miserable load. “I mean, look at you”. I look at myself. In my tatty army coat and five layers of woolly jumpers I look like an extra from Les Miserables.

“I really thought you were cleverer than this,” he continues, shaking his head. “You’re just like all the other middle class kids coming here playing revolution. Like, look at me, I’m homeless, I’m hard-core” - at the word ‘hard-core’ he makes the ironic speech-mark-gesture with his fingers - “you should ask some people who really are homeless, they’ll tell you how hard-core it is”.

Figure 4: Fieldnote 1
Chapter One: Of Life and Fieldwork

Only those with no concerns can be literally aimless
Margaret Archer

If anthropologists and the homeless have one thing in common, it is that they have no place. To be homeless as a socio-spatial phenomenon “is by definition to be a person without a place of one’s own, to be someone who is dis-placed or out-of-place” (Wardhaugh, 2000, 111). According to Pierre Bourdieu, this condition of ‘placelessness’ is nothing less than the anthropologist’s default state:

“These anthropologist’s particular relation to the object of his study contains the markings of a theoretical distortion inasmuch as his situation as an observer, excluded from the real play of social activities by the fact he has no place (except by choice or by way of a game) in the system observed and has no need to make a place for himself there, inclines him to a hermeneutic representation of practices.” (Bourdieu, 1977, 1, emphasis mine)

What unites the homeless and the anthropologist is thus the fact that their presence within the network of social relations that constitute ‘society’ is, from the perspective of society, superfluous, a non-position. Both are seen to contribute nothing to the ‘real play of social activities’ and thus, are presumed to have no stake in a social system they can only observe from the outside. But while the homeless person is, at least in some explanatory models, presumed to have had this position forced upon them, the anthropologist is seen here as a free agent who can choose to make a place for himself in the system he observes, or choose not to. Bourdieu critiques the fact that the latter – choosing to remain an outsider who tries to reconstruct the rules of a game he has no particular interest in playing – constitutes what is commonly seen as ‘scientific distance’ or ‘objectivity’, namely: “making a virtue out of necessity by converting a de facto exclusion into a choice of method” (ibid, 10). The emphasis on ‘choice’ is certainly
a hallmark of Bourdieu’s anthropologist\textsuperscript{11} – he distinguishes himself from the homeless person in that he is free to elect to join or not join the game, and he certainly has no ‘need’ to. As Andrew Sayer remarks: “This removal from the pressures of practical activity also reflects and signals the privileged social position of the academic” (2011, 15).

Precisely this was the charge that was levelled at me by my friend and fellow squatter Gavin in the scene at the beginning of this chapter. But what for Bourdieu amounts ‘merely’ to a theoretical distortion, for Gavin constituted an insult. In the following chapter, I want to argue that these two problems are not only related, but that they stem from the same kind of dynamic. What Bourdieu identifies as the ‘placelessness’ of the anthropologist produces a particular attitude to ‘fieldwork’, which defines it as something categorically other than ‘life’. As I will discuss, this peculiar opposition stems precisely from the fact that the anthropologist has no ‘place’ in the field specifically as a moral agent – he ‘has no need to’ make such a place for himself, since he does not in any way depend on the recognition of others that would reflect to him what his place is or should be. Thus staying outside of ‘the real play of social activities’, he is presumed to be outside of social relations, not, like his interlocutors, part of complex relationships that create and sustain identity, but a solitary ego who, from an ‘objective’ vantage point, observes and chronicles these relations. His ‘objectivity’ is defined not just in the sense that he has no stake in the social process, but that he has very little at stake \textit{relative to the other}. From this fundamental difference in outlook stems not only the ‘theoretical distortion’ Bourdieu points out, but also the kind of imbalance that led to the above argument.

My relationship with Gavin has shaped the making of this thesis like no other, academic or ethnographic, and it is no exaggeration to say that without him, this thesis would not have happened. Our friendship was initially based on a number of cultural misunderstandings, not least of which was my initial ignorance of the

\textsuperscript{11} Actually, the anthropologist of Bourdieu’s critique – Bourdieu’s theory is after all devised to rectify this situation
nature and background of squatting in the UK. When I first arrived in Brighton to do a postgraduate degree at the University of Sussex after a short and unsatisfying career as a social worker, I had no plans whatsoever of doing research on and within British society. In so far, I approached ‘British culture’ with all the naivety and enthusiasm of a privileged migrant who is making a polite effort to fit in, but has not bet her fate and fortune on her chosen destination (in so far I was perhaps already an anthropologist in the making). I had been heavily involved in vaguely anarchist ‘autonomous’ politics in my native Vienna, and thus circumvented British ‘mainstream’ culture as a matter of course, aiming to join the British branch of the same movement I already considered myself part of. Luckily, Brighton supplied ample opportunity to attach myself to what by dress code and jargon I identified as my subcultural niche, and it did not take long until I met my first squatters. What I did not immediately understand, however, was that squatting in the UK – for the most part – had little to do with what I was used to.

Shortly before I left, Vienna had seen some rather spectacular squatting ‘actions’ on part of a radical left that was comprised largely of middle class students like myself. The modus operandi of these actions involved a very public takeover of high profile (council) properties, passionate demands (addressed to no one in particular) for ‘autonomous spaces’, and subsequent heavy-handed eviction by police, usually all within a matter of days. The occupations drew intense media attention, especially when they involved more than the usual degree of police brutality, but rarely made it beyond a spectacular assertion of solidarity with those deprived of affordable living space. Few of the occupiers themselves were precariously housed, and the occasional participation of actual homeless people tended to turn theoretical solidarity into practical class conflict very quickly. This, however, was my unquestioned understanding of ‘squatting’ when I came to Britain, and I was thus thrilled to be told that here, squatting was actually legal (or at least not illegal). The first squats I visited in Brighton were grim, dingy places without heating and sometimes without electricity, but how lucky were
these anarchists (which is what most identified themselves as) to have an unlimited supply of spaces to turn into anything they wanted!

I met Gavin one night after a squat party, me trying to get out of the house by the half-barricaded entrance, him trying to get in. He was 17 and making a point of classic punk attire, including a tidy green Mohican and a Subhumans t-shirt. We ended up chatting and it turned out that he had just been thrown out of the squat because of a romantic relationship gone badly wrong, and had nowhere to go. Drunk and by identification always on the side of the romantically disadvantaged, I offered him to crash at the windowless room I was renting in a flat near the seafront. That Gavin’s experience somewhat differed from mine became obvious the minute my middle class housemates started to hide their valuables at the mere sight of him. Offended by their lack of respect for my guest, I assured the embarrassed Gavin that my house was his house, and over the next few months he became a regular visitor when he was in between squats or just plain hungry. One of the first born-and-bred British people – as opposed to other academic migrants – I came into contact with, he forever shaped my intuitive understanding of ‘British culture’ by introducing me to The Specials, trilby hats and the ‘This is England’ films. Unencumbered by the requirements of ‘research’ and curious to learn about my new friend’s life, I enthusiastically embraced a whole world of cultural references, the class implications of which I did not even begin to understand. Much later, I would sometimes wonder why some British people snubbed me, until I realised that I had inadvertently picked up mannerisms and ways of speaking that for them, had very clear class associations.

Gavin’s biography, which he volunteered over the course of my first year in England, forced me to take a critical look at some of my unquestioned cultural preconceptions. When I first told him I was a social worker (in Austria synonymous with ‘bleeding heart liberal’), his eyes darted to the nearest exit and he became extremely uncomfortable until I explained I wasn’t entitled to work in Britain. As it emerged, Gavin, who had been homeless at age 15, had filed social
workers right up there with cops as authorities that were not to be trusted. His experience of the system of homeless provision was one of coercion and contempt, and he empathically preferred squatting or even the street to the ‘help’ they offered him. I admired Gavin’s aptitude at survival – he was street-wise in a way I could never have been – and looked at the world with the eyes of someone who could find use value where others saw only waste. I would watch in dismay as he investigated bins and thrown-away lunch packs for edible scraps, and was informed that he had once, when there was nothing else, eaten a pigeon. In time, we developed an awkward dance around food and other provisions, which I saw no reason not to fund in order to also have something to contribute to our adventures. Gavin’s survival instincts clearly told him to go for a free lunch when one was offered, but his pride meant he had to refuse at least twice before accepting.

The offense that Gavin later took at my ‘voluntary’ embracing of poverty stemmed, in essence, from the same conclusion as Bourdieu’s: that I had no place in that world. Unconcerned with theoretical distortions, Gavin simply thought I was lucky, and my failing to acknowledge this privilege made my behaviour offensive to him. From his point of view, I not only misinterpreted the situation (I thought his life was glamorous and fun while he felt it was difficult and restrictive), but more importantly, I failed to see what his situation meant for him, and thus, I failed to see him. The problem the two of us confronted here was a classical anthropological one – if Bourdieu is right, then all anthropological knowledge is fallible in so far as it is impossible for us to ever really know what the situation another is in means from their own perspective. While for Bourdieu this issue is mainly a practical one – a question of the appropriate technology of knowledge production – it has wider implications for some of the questions I will ask in the following chapters, particularly the question of what is commonly referred to as ‘empathy’ and its role for morality and ethics. But most importantly, the problem was a personal one, and if I concern myself here with empathy, then I do so at least in part to make up for my personal failure to use it.
When I speak about ‘empathy’ in this thesis I use the term loosely, in order to simply refer to the capacity to gain insight into what another’s circumstances mean for them from their own perspective. This should not obscure the fact that what exactly empathy is and how it works is subject to vast and longstanding debates, which I can only rehash here in the briefest of summaries. The concept is widely used in a number of different disciplinary contexts and has no one clearly defined meaning. The considerable body of literature on empathy spans several centuries – beginning with David Hume’s (1739) and Adam Smith’s (1759) discussions of the human propensity to “sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own” (Hume, 1739, 317). It ranges from relatively wide definitions, encompassing forms of empathy common to human and non-human animals (e.g. de Waal, 2009) to relatively narrow ones, focused on a very specific form of identification with the experience of another (e.g. Wollheim, 1973, 1974, 1984).

Feminist theorists such as Gilligan (1982), Noddings (1984, 2010, 2013) and Held (2006), have emphasised the role of empathy, understood as a particular way of “feeling with” (Noddings, 1984), for a feminist ethics, which, as they argue, departs from traditional approaches that emphasise the role of abstract rules and principles as the basis for ethical life. For feminist writers, the problem consists mainly in the fact that these models underestimate the role of emotion and concern in ethical behaviour, and that they construe ethical actors as entirely autonomous and independently-rational actors, thus adhering to a Western-masculine notion of the subject in general and the ethical subject in particular (Noddings, 1984, 30). Noddings warns that some of the most prominent models of empathy repeat this bias, in that they understand empathy as a way of


13 For a historical and systematic overview see e.g. Coplan and Goldie, 2011
projecting oneself into the situation of another (thus technically ‘replacing’ the other with the self) rather than a mutual, communicative process of sharing experience (Noddings, 2010). However, in critiquing this state of affairs, some feminist authors appear to have end up in the opposite extreme – for example Tronto (1995) takes her account of empathy as ‘care’ so far that the self relinquishes its own needs and wants for the sake of the cared for, to the point that it all but disappears as an autonomous entity. This shows the general problem of conceptions of empathy which focus on a particular mode of ‘perspective shifting’ – e.g. Wollheim’s concept of ‘central imagining’ (1973, 1974, 1984, critical: Goldie, 2006, 2011): empathy is most often assumed to involve a replacement of one self with another, rather than a meeting in which both are preserved. Another variant of this problem is exemplified e.g. in the work of Hartman (1997) who writes against ‘empathy-based’ attempts at solidarity in the context of black slavery. She asserts that for the white subject, to attempt to empathically experience the pain of the black slave amounts to an act of colonisation and appropriation of the black body by the white. Due to the inherently unequal relationship between white master and black slave, the black body becomes an “empty vessel” which is “stolen” by the white man in an act that turns empathy into a further extension of racial violence (35). Almeida (2013) concludes on the basis of Hartman’s argument that therefore, empathy is precluded between racialised bodies, precisely because of the relationship of domination and submission that is already established. This critique is certainly persuasive if indeed empathic recognition could only be understood as a form of travelling of the “universal, powerful and dominant” white spirit into the “empty black body” whose own experience thus becomes “irrelevant” (Almeida, 2013, 88), or more generally, as a form of shifting one’s own first-person viewpoint ‘into’ the phenomenal world of the other. The point of care ethicists however is that this conceptualisation precisely rests on a dubious a priori assumption of self and other as separate and isolated entities, which can only ever replace one another, but never actually ‘meet’.

I will therefore here go with a definition along the lines of Arne Vetlesen:
“Empathy I define as humanity’s basic emotional faculty, and as one indispensably at work in an unimpaired exercise of moral judgment. Being essentially a Sichmitbringen as opposed to a Sichaufgeben\textsuperscript{14}, empathy preserves the ‘meeting of particulars’... as the very kernel of moral judgment. In preserving this kernel, empathy leaves intact the distinctness and unique identity of the person who empathises as well as that of his or her addressee. Having stated this, I hasten to add that empathy maintains distinctness; it does not absolutize it, nor does it suspend it” (Vetlesen, 1994, 119, emph. orig.).

Empathy, thus understood, does not involve a ‘perspective shift’ so much as it involves an understanding what the perspective of the other is directed at – it involves having some kind of common language or experience that both selves can agree represents what is being empathised about. In the next chapter, I will make some suggestions what that could be.

Despite these conceptual challenges, the question whether it is possible to understand what another person’s circumstances mean for them from their own perspective is crucial for the question of what kind of insight can be gained from participant observation as a fieldwork method. As I will argue later on, it also provides a helpful framework for some of the ethical questions my respondents actively addressed. This is not to say that political issues such as homelessness can or should be reduced to a matter of empathy (or lack thereof), but rather, that the social and political relations which create homelessness as a phenomenon also create the conditions of possibility for empathy (or the conditions of possibility for its absence). As I will argue in the following, empathy in the sense of ‘feeling with’ becomes possible on the basis of particular ways of relating to one another, and the example of homelessness shows that conversely, particular ways of relating to one another can make empathy difficult or impossible. The relationship between anthropologist and respondent is an example of how a social relationship can be set up from the start in a way that impedes empathic

\textsuperscript{14} German, roughly: “a ‘bringing oneself along’ as opposed to a ‘surrendering oneself’.”
understanding, simply by assuming that there is nothing of significance that could be shared between self and other. Particularly – and this was the gist of Gavin’s criticism of me as well as of Bourdieu’s criticism of our discipline – there appears to be a lack of a shared element that is crucial to an adequate appraisal of what a social situation is about: actual affectedness. As far as Gavin was concerned, in order to adequately empathise with his situation, I would not so much have had to ‘put myself into his shoes’ but to share his evaluation of what was going on, and he concluded that I was unable to do so because my own possibilities of encountering joy or suffering were not nearly as affected by the situation we found ourselves in as were his. In the next section, I will have a closer look at how this discrepancy in evaluative judgment underlies the problematic of empathic understanding as a means of producing ethnographic knowledge.

The ‘Field’ As Morally Neutral Zone

The prevalence of Bourdieu’s ‘theoretical distortion’ is exemplified in the reluctance of some anthropologists to admit that what they think of as ‘fieldwork’ is the same thing as what they think of as their ‘life’. Consequently, when anthropologists Athena McLean and Anette Leibing issued a call to colleagues to contribute to a volume that would address the ‘blurred boundaries between ethnography and life’, they were surprised at the enthusiastic response they received. Anthropologists from a variety of research areas and career stages volunteered experiences that were meant to address the “shadow side of fieldwork”, that is, “situations where the borders of personal life and formal ethnography begin to blur and the research field loses its boundedness” (McLean/Leibing 2008, xii). It appeared almost as if the sheer act of questioning a strict dichotomy between ‘personal life’ and ‘formal ethnography’ had a cathartic effect on a number of researchers, who had long suspected that such a dichotomy might be spurious, but had been afraid to say so. In adopting the imagery of ‘blurred boundaries’, the participants could finally verbalise their
experience that, actually, their life and fieldwork had mixed quite a bit, without having to go all the way and question why such a dichotomy should exist at all.

The apparent contrast between life and fieldwork cannot solely be explained in terms of the cultural difference that is implied in much anthropological research, although this difference is often invoked to justify it. Moral relativism – that is, the assumption that anthropologists should not make moral judgments about the kinds of relationships and actions they encounter in the field – is a hallmark of the anthropological habitus for a good reason: early anthropology has often been all too ready to pass judgment on people it regarded ‘uncivilised’ or ‘savage’, without questioning its own moral assumptions. But, as for example Andrew Sayer points out, the assumption of moral neutrality on part of the researcher comes at the price of a severe misrepresentation of the life-world of the people who are being researched. Sayer, following Margaret Archer, emphasises that human beings are ‘evaluative beings’, i.e. that they crucially interpret the world around them in the form of normative judgments: “we do so because, while we are capable and can flourish, we are also vulnerable and susceptible to various kinds of loss or harm; we can suffer” (Sayer, 2011, 1). He therefore argues that ignoring precisely the dimension of social life that matters most to people, social science “tends to produce bland accounts of social life, in which it is difficult to assess the import of things for people” (ibid, 6).

The problem Sayer addresses here is that Bourdieu’s ‘theoretical distortion’ in practice translates into a cognitive and behavioural distortion. Cognitively, the conflation of ‘dis-affectedness’ and ‘objectivity’ leads to a complementary conflation of ‘affectedness’ and ‘subjectivity’, which results in a paradigm in which those who are most affected by a situation are least likely to be able to ‘objectively’ understand it. The disinterested, detached rationality of the person who is least affected, on the other hand, is seen as most likely to be able to make a ‘scientific’ contribution. This has not only epistemological consequences in the strictest sense, such as have been challenged by feminist standpoint theorists, among others (e.g. Harding 2004; Hartsock 1983, 1998; Stanley and Wise 1990),
but more generally political ones – to interrogate it would inevitably mean to ask: by what token of power is the anthropologist exempt from being affected by things that fundamentally shape the reality of the other? How is it possible that he or she can afford to suspend judgment and act as if the possibilities of flourishing or suffering inherent in a situation did not matter? In not asking this question, ‘the field’ is cast as a morally neutral zone in which the anthropologist’s evaluative judgment is suspended, and is precisely in this way distinguished from the anthropologist’s life, in which things arguably matter a great deal to him or her. This cognitive distortion then leads to a behavioural distortion, in that the anthropologist acts as if he or she indeed had no ‘place’ in the field as a moral agent, and thus has no need to recognise the other as such.

In my own case, I partly circumvented this issue due to the fact that what eventually became my ‘fieldwork’ started out as simply a new and exciting part of my life. My first forays into Bristol were weekend excursions during which I stayed wherever Gavin was currently bedding down – sometimes I would be hosted in a stately Victorian building in the centre of town, sometimes in a ramshackle warehouse in an area not even the squatters liked to walk around in at night. Gavin took his role as a host very seriously, making sure that I had a safe place to sleep even when he himself did not. On one occasion, a squat we were staying in was evicted during my stay and Gavin made a point of depositing me at the door of the safest house in Bristol (the Co-op Road squat that was going to become an important hub in my Bristol geography in the years to come, see chapter 12) before disappearing to an unknown crash place with all his belongings stuffed into the stacked up bags he carried on his back. I would, in return, buy food, drinks and tobacco for both of us, and sometimes the entire house, always vaguely guilt-ridden at this obvious display of my economic privilege. When housing was secure, we would spend my weekend stays walking around town and visiting important nodes in the ever-fluid network of squats and social centres. Gavin, having nothing else to do than socialise all day, was a walking grapevine of information that he passed around on his tours, and he always knew where a particular group or person could be found. Having very
limited funds and a deep suspiciousness toward bicycles, he walked everywhere, and trudging along behind him often for several hours at a time, I got the topography of Bristol into my feet long before it ever reached my head. As Tim Ingold puts it: “As people, in the course of their everyday lives, make their way by foot around a familiar terrain, so its paths, textures and contours, variable through the seasons, are incorporated into their own embodied capacities of movement, awareness and response – or into what Gaston Bachelard calls their ‘muscular consciousness’” (Ingold, 2004, 333).

During this phase, I got an impressive demonstration of the kind of havoc that ‘detached’ research can cause in the lives of those it is about. One afternoon, Gavin and I visited a squat (now long gone) near the Fishponds junction of the M32, a place that would later become my home for over a year. The squat was a smallish terrace with low ceilings and a narrow staircase, kept well and, judging from the degree of furnishing and gardening already accomplished, squatted for quite a while. When we arrived, the handful of residents assembled in the cluttered living room were engaged in animated debate, and there was a palpable sense of agitation in the air. As it emerged, the squat had been visited by a team of students from one of the local universities just hours previously. The students had elected to do a research project about squatting for one of their courses (apparently this was all the rage among ‘radical’ students at the time, myself being no exception) and had approached one resident, who had agreed to do an interview. Evidently though, they had been less than tactful:

“They just come barging in here and shove a camera in everyone’s face and stick their nose in people’s rooms” one exasperated resident complained, “I mean, I

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15 In my case, this learning-by-walking resulted in a completely false mental image of Bristol’s geography, which I only realised when after several months I finally looked at a map. Throughout my time there, I was constantly confused about what direction I was walking in and was frequently surprised at having ended up somewhere completely different from where I thought I was going. This only ended when I got a car and could move around much faster than on foot. As most squatters, I never used public transport in Bristol, mainly due to the forbidding price of tickets (compare here Urry’s (2000, 51) argument that due to affordable public transport, walking has largely lost its stigma as connected to poverty – this does not necessarily mean that it isn’t connected to poverty).
never agreed to be filmed. I don’t give a fuck about their project. And then they ask what we live on and so and if we break into houses, what the fuck! Like, yeah, I do criminal damage all the time, (and they expect me to say this) on camera!"

The residents appeared visibly shaken by the student’s intrusive behaviour. What upset them most was the fact that the students had invaded their private space as if it was some sort of exhibit, with no regard for the fact that this was actually somebody’s home. “Ya know, I live here!” was said several times during the discussion, as if to reaffirm that a squat was indeed a home like every other and that the rules of etiquette that apply to being invited to someone’s house apply here as much as elsewhere: “you don’t go round someone’s home and film them in their undies, do you?”

This ‘academic burglary’ is a good example of how the distinction between life and ‘fieldwork’ leads to the kinds of distortions I have discussed above. Whatever the student’s motivation, they had clearly set out to quarry the ‘field’ for some ‘data’ (the more visually exciting the better), and thereby suspended any consideration of the fact that they were interacting with persons who considered the ‘data’ their life. Behaviour that would certainly be unacceptable in most other social situations was thus sanctioned in that the question ‘should one behave like this’ did not even arise – the squatters were simply not regarded as the kind of equals in relation to whom one asks such questions. Whatever the result of this research turned out to be, it thus categorically failed to recognise the meaning of the squatter’s situation had for them, namely that they regarded the space they were occupying as their home, and saw the scientific intrusion as a violation. The ‘theoretical distortion’ of privileged detachment (i.e. the assumption that one does not have a ‘place’ in the social system one is researching and can thus suspend evaluative judgment) thus translated seamlessly into cognitive and behavioural distortions that made it impossible for the researchers to see and treat the squatters as actual people with concerns not unlike their own.
Acerbating the sheer intrusiveness of the researchers was, for the residents, the fact that they did not understand (nor was it explained to them) what the students were doing this research for. As a result, they had, perhaps correctly, concluded that the researchers were after a grade, a degree, or something else that was going to advance their careers, and that they, the residents, had been made instruments in attaining this objective. They had thus identified another dimension of the problematic life-fieldwork dichotomy – that if the people who inhabit the field are not regarded ends in themselves, then this means that they are being made means to ends other than themselves. The resulting relationship between researcher and researched is characterised by what Max Horkheimer (1974) refers to as ‘instrumental reason’:

“Instrumental reason has two opposing elements: the abstract ego emptied of all substance except its attempt to transform everything in heaven and on earth into means for its preservation, and on the other hand an empty nature degraded to mere material, mere stuff to be dominated, without any other purpose than that of this very domination” (Horkheimer, 1974, 95)

The ‘abstract ego’ here is Bourdieu’s anthropologist, who has not place nor stake in the social system in question, but nevertheless hangs around to see what can be made useful for his or her own ends. ‘Empty of all substance’, i.e. devoid of the needs, desires, potentials and vulnerabilities that would result in an evaluative judgment of the social situation, his/her only reason to even be in the ‘field’ is to collect the ‘data material’ that will allow him/her to advance his/her own social and economic self-interest. The other is thus objectified as the ‘stuff’ that will allow the subject to get ahead, and his or her concerns are made into the ‘product’ that the academic sells in the marketplace of publications, presentations and job interviews. This ugly scenario is not, per se, the result of the anthropologist’s inherent immorality or callousness – it is simply a result of the fact that for the overwhelming majority of us, paying the bills is a necessity, and our research is (among other things) a means to do so. ‘Fieldwork’ (with its
etymological link to ‘work’, i.e. ‘labour’) and life are thus separate also because ‘fieldwork’ is that which one does in order to be able to have a ‘life’.

Of course, most anthropologists would protest that this is hardly the whole story of doing fieldwork. Many researchers – those who responded to MacLean’s and Leibig’s project are just a few examples – have found mutually supportive, solidary and nurturing relationships with their respondents, and many have openly campaigned for methodologies which minimise exploitation and maximise the benefit of ethnographic research for those it is about (e.g. Scheper-Hughes, 1995). On a theoretical level, Horkheimer’s bleak outlook has been challenged by theories emphasising a more communicative concept of rationality (e.g. Habermas 1984; Honneth 1996), while at the same time, fieldworkers have begun to realise that in order to abandon the instrumentalisation and objectification of the other, we must allow ourselves to be affected and transformed by the experience of ‘the field’. As Loïc Wacquant puts it:

“The multiplex rapports that we develop with our key informants are malleable and subject to the same variations and vagaries as ordinary social ties; they range from the instrumental to the affective, from the exploitive to the mutual, from fleeting to lasting, and from shallow to deep ...(t)hey always have a peculiar curving due to their inscription in the research enterprise, but their import is not eo ipso reducible to that single purpose. One does not have to hold an exalted notion of interpersonal fusion or an irenic vision of the family to recognize that long-term field friendships

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16 This assessment arguably also applies to the here present endeavour of obtaining a PhD in anthropology by means of telling this story. Traditionally, if the student wants to persuade the disciplinary gatekeepers to grant him or her full status as a member of the anthropological discipline, he or she has to demonstrate that somebody or other has successfully been objectified in an anthropological fashion. As proof of this act functions the ethnographic text, which represents the final gestalt of the other made into a thing. Anthropological initiation therefore could be seen to involve an element of relating in which equality of subjects is ritually established by objectifying a third party, constituting, metaphorically speaking, a kind of sublimated human sacrifice. Stoltenberg (2000, 2005) makes a similar argument for the constituent act of masculine subjectivity – he argues that men prove to each other their identities as men by together objectifying an ‘other’ who represents the less-than-masculine. This parallel, in my view, is not coincidental, as the ‘scholarly subject’ of the traditional academic hierarchy has variously been identified as inherently masculine (e.g. Harding, 1986, 1993; Hartsock, 1987)
can, under definite circumstances, be transformative of both parties and grow to take on a filial or fraternal/sisterly quality” (Wacquant, 2005, 450).

In order to establish the conditions of possibility of such mutually transformative relationships, it is however necessary to enter into the fieldwork situation as a ‘real player’ – not in the sense of a cultural insider or practiced participant, but as someone who is willing to behave as if the situation and relationships actually mattered to oneself.

In my own case, the practical convergence of evaluative judgment that came to inform my fieldwork was due as much to consideration as it was to accident. On the one hand, it was clear to me at the beginning of my fieldwork year that a conventional ‘researcher’ habitus was not going to be regarded with much sympathy by the squatters. Not only were they keenly aware of the potentially exploitative nature of this kind of thing, they also related this very nature to the class privilege that they saw in academic research. The majority of the squatters I met squatted at least in part because they could not afford any other living space, most identified as ‘working class’ and many did not have access to the labour market due to immigration, health- or disability status; and so spending a decade in university for them was a matter of privilege indeed. Moreover, since there was a considerable overlap between squatters and ‘leftist’ activists engaged in a variety of causes, they were well aware that police infiltration was a real possibility (see also chapter 11). The resulting mistrust of any kind of data-gathering activity meant that at the very least, I would have to clearly demonstrate that I was willing to align my personal interests with theirs. I therefore had to reconsider the housing arrangements I had expected to set up

\[37\] The term ‘working class’ was used to mean a number of different things. While some squatters used it strictly in the sense of Marx’ political economy, others used it in a more sociological/cultural context and again others to refer to a binary relation of domination they identified between the ‘ruling’ (including the ‘middle’) and the ‘working class’. While some used ‘class’ to refer to the type of employment, others used it to refer to the height of income and yet others to the amount of wealth. To make matters more complicated, some held that if one was born ‘working class’ one remained so despite social mobility, while others claimed that even formerly ‘middle class’ people could become ‘working class’ if they fulfilled the requirements regarding type of employment etc. Disagreements over the meaning of ‘class’ and its membership could fill entire evenings.
during fieldwork – I had planned to rent a cheap room in ‘the field’ while keeping my place in Brighton and to go back and forth between the two whenever I needed a break. This spatial set-up was of course designed to establish and keep up the ‘life-fieldwork’ dichotomy, and thereby my privilege of disinterest. Driven more by a vague intuition than any ‘proper’ methodological consideration, I therefore abandoned this plan and decided to move to Bristol full time and live in a squat.

On the other hand, my efforts at arriving at the possibility of empathic understanding via the route of evaluative alignment was aided by the fact that ‘life’ decided to intrude into my ‘fieldwork’ in a rather personal way. Anthropologists do not usually include in their ethnographies an account of the finances behind their project or the way that they materially sustained themselves during their fieldwork – it is assumed that if the anthropologist was not funded at least to the extent that he or she could eat and put a roof over his or her head, the research would not have happened. I don’t know how frequent exceptions to this rule are, but my fieldwork most certainly fell into that category. The problem was not that I had been unable to obtain funding – I had been accepted by a postgraduate school in Vienna that was generously endowed with a stipend, and was intended to run parallel to my PhD programme. At the time I applied, its teaching structure was organised in such a way that I could comfortably do a PhD in Britain with the traditional year-long fieldwork, and fly to Vienna every two months to attend classes. My plan fell apart, however, when the postgraduate school announced that it had changed its teaching schedule, so that presence would be required every other week and fieldwork was limited to a maximum of three months.

In the light of this change, I had to make a decision that basically came down to returning to Vienna and doing a PhD there, or staying and having no money. After short deliberation, I opted for returning my scholarship and moving to London with a few hundred pounds to my name. One may call this choice profoundly irresponsible, but it turned out to be the decisive factor in the course my research
took. I managed to obtain another, smaller grant, enough to get me through my first year, and embarked on fieldwork with a rapidly declining budget and no certainty of future income. About halfway in, I ran out of money, just at the same time that my flat in Brighton – then my only home – was evicted in the course of what has come to be known as a ‘revenge eviction’\(^\text{18}\). While it would therefore be entirely fair to attribute the fact that I became really homeless at least in part to my own recklessness, as a result I experienced first hand the difference it makes whether one participates in any kind of fieldwork situation as a matter of freely chosen scientific interest, or if one is actually affected by the sort of phenomena one studies.

For one thing, I was soon to find out that being a squatter, rather than just being a visitor in squats, demands near constant attention and focus. The logistics of scouting, opening, repairing and securing buildings, the legal scuffles over possession, eviction proceedings and the near constant threat of facing the exposure and danger of the street are not only time-consuming, but put the mind and body in a state of constant alert, as there is never quite a sense of safety, even in sleep. At the same time, the ‘activist’\(^\text{19}\) nature of squatting, its political and ethical underpinnings, inform a political identity that (by virtue of removing one’s own and others’ profound lack of something elementary to survival) relies heavily on a sense of ‘fighting for a good cause’. While I had previously experienced similarly unsafe-yet-invigorating situations as part of political activism, these had always been temporary, a matter of days or weeks. With constant exposure, as I was to learn, a situation like this produces a peculiar form of embodiment, a sense of collectively ‘living on the edge’ that suspends many conventional distinctions between individuals, such as race, class or gender, and

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\(^{18}\) The term ‘revenge eviction’ has been used in public debate to refer to an eviction due to the fact that the tenant has made a complaint about the property that the landlord does not want to respond to. In this case, the property was in such bad shape that my housemates and me complained to the local Health and Safety authority, who had ordered the landlord to fix the most pressing problems. A week later, we received notice to vacate the property.

\(^{19}\) I use the concept of ‘activism’ with caution, since similarly to ‘fieldwork’ it implies a bounded set of practices, which are removed or distinguished from ‘normal life’. Squatters did not commonly refer to themselves as ‘activists’ since they regarded their political activities (including squatting) a necessary consequence of their condition. For them, being politically active was their life.
certainly that of researcher versus researched. In the next chapter, I will therefore have a closer look at embodiment, and particularly its relation to spatiality, and argue that embodied experience forms the basis for establishing the kind of relationship between self and other that above I have identified as the condition of possibility for empathic understanding.
Chapter Two: Shelter

*Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing something.*

Judith Butler

‘Ethnographic space’ exists in a physical and a textual sense. Critiques of domination within anthropology typically focus on the textual representation of the other (e.g. Said, 1979), rather than the actual spatial relation between the anthropologist and the ‘native’. It could of course be argued that textual space in some ways reproduces power relations in physical space – Said’s ‘Orientalism’ for example refers to the imaginary construction of an other who is at the same time spatially removed enough to be able to serve as a canvas for all kinds of projection. Similarly, the prototypical ‘colonial other’ is produced spatially before he/she enters the textual space of ethnography – in subjecting this other to its territorial claim, the ‘Western’ subject has actually established the relationship of domination and submission that finds its textual representation in a condescending and exploitative attitude toward the ‘native’. In this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between the anthropologist and his ‘other’ through a discussion of their respective positions within and toward space, based on my arrival in Bristol and the way that spatiality informed the relationships I began to form there.

As my starting point, I want to take the assumption that since the body is a spatial object, spatiality is an integral feature of a person’s experience of their self, physically grounded in the very way our brains produce the phenomena we call our ‘selves’. As the German cognitive scientist Thomas Metzinger (2004) argues, our experience of ourselves as ‘selves’ (what he calls our “phenomenal self-model” or PSM\(^\text{20}\)) essentially consists in our brains continually mapping our

\(^{20}\)To be entirely clear, Metzinger is saying that actually, there is no such thing as a ‘self’ in the sense of a discrete, empirically recognizable entity, a ‘little man’, ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’. The subjective experience of having a ‘self’ stems from the way our brains render incoming perceptual data, since without such a perspective, it would be impossible for our organism to operate in the
entire psycho/physical system, creating an (ideally accurate) simulation of it, and endowing this virtual model with a first-person perspective which he calls the “Phenomenal Model of the Intentionality Relation” (PMIR). The latter means that a self becomes a functioning self only through a form of directedness at the world, a consciously experienced “nonverbal arrow” linking self and non-self, “uniting subject and object” (316). Without such an experience of directedness – of being in an active relation with the world – our experience of ourselves as ‘selves’ is literally extinguished.

The ‘protagonist’ of this intentionality relation – the entity we think of as our ‘self’ – is by definition spatial. Since our bio-physical ‘system’, the body, has spatial properties, our phenomenal self-model is spatially coded within the brain, in so far as the brain represents physical states through the experience of embodied emotions. “Emotional content” therefore, “is always spatial content” (382), and through bodily sensations we construe ourselves as spatial beings. But not only that – spatiality, for Metzinger, is also what enables us to become evaluative beings:

“The emotional self-model can be analyzed as the integrated class of all those representational states modeling the overall state of affairs of the interests of the system. As opposed to other forms of representational content they are structured along a valence axis. They contain a normative element, and this element is, for instance, expressed as affective tone. What is nonconceptually represented by this

world. The ‘phenomenal self model’ is therefore more of a necessary cognitive illusion. However, since people cannot perceive of themselves in any other way, we can assume that for practical purposes, the PSM is what people mean when they refer to their ‘self’.

Although the PMIR shares a lot of features with that which is commonly referred to as ‘agency’, I consider it a more useful concept to distinguish the directedness of humans and some nonhuman animals at the world of objects. ‘Agency’, in some accounts, is defined purely as the ability to cause some effect in the world, and thus for example in Bruno Latour’s actor/network theory (2005) can without difficulty be attributed to inanimate objects. Although this is in principle possible precisely because ‘agency’ is so loosely defined, in my opinion it strips the concept of any explanatory power whatsoever and produces accounts that border on the absurd (see for example Nimmo, 2011, for a discussion of the agency of milk). But even if one agrees that inanimate objects can have ‘agency’, they most certainly cannot muster intentionality in the sense of the PMIR. Although I cannot expand on this discussion here, in my opinion it is therefore worth considering altogether replacing ‘agency’ with a concept modeled on the ‘intentionality relation’.

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affective valence or tone will in many cases be the survival value of a specific state of affairs” (ibid, emph. orig.).

This is, in essence, an evolutionary biologist’s version of Sayer’s claim that things matter to people because they impact on whether we flourish or suffer. It points to the inextricable connection between self, spatial experience and evaluative judgment: “By possessing a conscious, emotional self-model we are not only given to ourselves as spatially extended beings, but as beings possessing interests and goals.” (384)

The experience of the spatiality of our bodies as our own spatiality is therefore a crucial condition for our experience of ourselves as beings who have ‘selves’, and who can flourish or suffer. As a result, as Judith Butler puts it: “It is important to claim that our bodies are in a sense our own and that we are entitled to claim rights of autonomy over our bodies” (2004, 25). I read Butler’s claim that embodiment implies that “our bodies are in a sense our own” as describing a relationship of identification rather than ‘ownership’ in the sense of possession. As I will argue in chapter 6 onwards, the concept of ‘ownership’ of the body or the self is fraught with all kinds of conceptual difficulty, first and foremost that ‘ownership’ logically implies a form of non-identity of ‘owner’ and ‘owned’. This idea therefore feeds into an implicit mind/body dualism in which some kind of entity comes to be separated out from the whole person to become sovereign ‘owner’ of the rest. Since, as I will argue in chapter 5, I do not subscribe to such a dualistic view, it would be incorrect to say a person ‘owns’ their body; rather, they are their body. I therefore take Butler’s remark here to refer to what Metzinger calls the experience of ‘internality’: “Phenomenological internality is consciously experienced ‘mineness’ It is a characteristic feature of all contents integrated into the phenomenal level of self-representation, continuously, automatically, and independently of any high-level cognitive operations” (267). This is also why a claim to bodily integrity is “essential to so many political movements” (ibid), pointing to the fact that undisturbed enjoyment of one’s own spatial expanse is not necessarily a given for many people. Nevertheless, a basic
claim of the person to the space of his/her body and an awareness of where it ends and the world begins is considered integral for consciousness. Metzinger emphasises that “a self-model precisely emerges from drawing a self-world boundary” (p 313), and if this boundary becomes blurred or disrupted, the very experience of self is jeopardised. Violations of bodily integrity – for example through torture or rape – therefore have devastating long-term consequences, precisely because the person’s taken-for-granted congruence with the bounded space of their body is (deliberately) shattered by the intrusion of another. Violence of this kind can be said to be a form of ‘interpersonal colonialism’, in that it establishes the territorial rule of another in the space of the self, and to undo this intrusion and re-establish confidence in one’s physical integrity can be a long and arduous process.

The immediate space of the body is embedded in another layer of spatiality, not completely private, but also not quite public. This space is often referred to as ‘personal space’, i.e. the space within which any event is potentially of immediate consequence for embodied consciousness. Personal space in this sense constitutes an extension of the domain of the self, and its violation is experienced as adverse since it potentially pre-empts the violation of the actual body. The extent of what is considered personal space differs culturally and individually (see e.g. Sussman and Rosenfeld 1982)\(^{22}\), but its invasion without good cause appears to be universally experienced as aggressive. Conversely, allowing another person to enter one’s personal space constitutes an act of trust that is usually reserved for intimate relationships, like those between friends or lovers. But personal space is not only defined in interpersonal terms – the immediate material environment also has a decisive influence on physical reproduction, for example in terms of providing necessary rest and recuperation. I therefore use ‘personal space’ here to refer to the area that is included in a person’s ‘self-

\(^{22}\)There exists an entire field of research into how persons define and experience physical proximity, called “proxemics”. Proxemists have, for example, developed detailed measurements of the precise distance that persons of different cultural and social backgrounds define as personal space, and suggest that uninvited invasions of whatever is thus defined, without a good reason, are universally experienced as adverse (see Hall et al 1968; Worcel and Yohai, 1979)
domain’ in so far as it provides the body with the safe space that it needs to function. An example of such a space could be a person’s bed or sleeping area – this area is considered intimate and personal because in it, the sleeping body is at its most vulnerable and exposed, and at the same time, the existence of a space for rest is a fundamental requirement of physical functioning (e.g. Pilcher et al, 1996).

In so far as the existence of a safe personal space is thus a necessary requirement of physical survival, it can be seen to constitute a symbolic extension of the self beyond its bodily boundaries. As I will discuss in chapter 6, ‘dwelling’, i.e. inhabiting a particular physical space, e.g. a house, therefore involves a variety of symbolic acts which serve to establish this relation. The arrangement of personal objects in a previously empty room, for example, is a way in which the individual claims the room as an extension of their person, as ‘their room’. At the same time, due to the essential survival importance of safe personal space, the physical properties of this space become all the more important the more hostile the environment. ‘Shelter’ – usually understood as an arrangement of material objects that are supposed to ward of the elements as well as hostile creatures – is thus at the same time a material, a cognitive/emotional and a social construct, and its absence threatens the embodied person in all three dimensions of his or her being. The absence of shelter – like the absence of food or air – is a problem of such immediate gravity that a person’s entire physical and psychic resources are mobilised in order to resolve it, and until it is resolved, little else matters.

The persuasive urgency of the absence of shelter (in a material, a cognitive/emotional and a social sense) was also at the core of squatting as a political practice23. Squatting can be seen as an attempt to resolve this lack by taking occupation of physical spaces, on the one hand in the sense of producing a sense of safety and containment for the residents, and on the other, in the sense

23 This claim is not uncontested, as some authors (e.g. Prujit, 2013) list a number of different motivations for squatting, not all of which refer to an immediate survival need. As I discuss in chapter 4, these ‘taxonomies’ in my opinion introduce conceptual boundaries between rationales that are not in the same form borne out by the understandings of squatters themselves, nor by the actual material circumstances they refer to.
of forming a relatively stable social ‘milieu’ which allowed for a sense of belonging. Squatters usually formed ‘crews’ of between three and ten people in order to occupy a building, and the size of consecutive spaces permitting, such crews could remain stable over a long period of time. ‘Crews’ could be organised around pre-existing friendships, but most often were simply formed around a mutual need for shelter. It was possible to squat on one’s own, but to do so posed practical difficulties (for example since one person always had to be inside the squat to ensure legal possession, see chapter 3) and was also considered dangerous in case of illegal eviction. Because of this dependence of crewmembers on one another in order to fulfil a fundamental physical and psychological need, the social ties within crews could become exceptionally strong, as has been demonstrated for different kinds of ‘survival groups’ (e.g. Torrance, 1954). In so far, ‘crewing up’ for me was not only a necessary step in joining the ‘scene’, it also to some degree determined my position as an observing participant, in putting me literally and figuratively into the same space as my ‘respondents’. When I finally began my official ‘fieldwork’, my first concern was therefore to find myself some squat-mates.

Gavin was excited at the prospect of my moving to Bristol, however, since he had not always shown to be the most gifted at finding himself a good crew to live with, I was somewhat doubtful whether I should rely entirely on him to find me one. Another avenue had opened up in the form of Ralph, another Austrian migrant and fellow activist I had met a few months previously. When we first met, Ralph and I had sized each other up with a mixture of territorial suspicion (another Austrian on my turf??) and the sentimental excitement that sometimes grips exiles when encountering something associated with their ‘native’ culture. Ralph had left Austria for much the same reasons as me – boredom and a sense that the world had more to offer than the quaint, parochial tranquillity of our home country. We soon became friends, bonded over the traditional Austrian pursuit of raunzen (a mixture of badmouthing and complaining that can be applied to just about anything) and the fact that we knew enough activists in common back home to dissect their various flaws and shortcomings for hours on end. Our
shared nationality elicited a kind of instinctual solidarity on either side; and when I told him I was going to move to Bristol, he took me under his wing as a matter of course. When I finally arrived one sunny October afternoon, I only had to walk a few blocks from the Bus station into St Pauls to arrive at my new squat. Ralph had already gained the resident's permission for me to move in with them indefinitely, which meant that he must have unconditionally vouched for me as a safe and sane person. He himself lived in the three-story building along with seven other people who occupied all but one of the one- and two bedroom flats. The remaining flat was inhabited by a middle aged Asian man who was hardly at home – I never established if he knew that no one else in the house was paying rent, but if he did, he did not seem to care.

The five flats each consisted of a living room with kitchen area, a bedroom and a bathroom. Apparently the house had been accessed by means of an open window some months previously, and the remaining flats had then been opened by tunnelling through walls and ceilings until the doors could be opened from the inside to avoid the flat's individual alarms. On the ground floor lived a couple in their late twenties with their dog, the first floor was occupied by Ralph and three other men and on the top floor lived another young man and two women. Since there were no more spare rooms, I was to share with someone else until one became available – after inspecting the impressive array of various species of mould in Ralph's quarters, I opted for the living room of the top floor flat. I shared this flat with Joe, a friendly, perpetually smiling guy in his early twenties with a predilection for reggae music and ganja. Completely unfazed by the installation of a stranger in his living room, he bid me a warm welcome and treated me to a semi-clean mattress that had just been collected from the streets in anticipation of my arrival. I had stayed with Gavin often enough to appreciate a functional mattress – or indeed, any other piece of furniture or equipment – found on the street as an asset rather than a health hazard, and proceeded to build myself a nest in a corner. It was located in the living room/kitchen, and people were in and out of the room continuously, giving me little sense of privacy. Despite the cramped conditions, however, this “most sordid of all havens, the corner”
(Bachelard, 1958/1994, 137) functioned as my personal space, in the sense that everyone – residents and visitors alike – kept a respectful distance. Nobody sat on my bed without invitation, none of my things were removed, and if I wanted to rest, people went out of their way to make noise somewhere else.

There was a certain paradox involved in the allocation of personal space in squats. On the one hand, since the space was clearly none of the resident’s property (not even in the temporary sense of being rented), others could not be excluded from it on that basis. It was therefore acceptable practice to simply knock on the door of a squat and ask for temporary accommodation if one had just arrived in town or was in transition. Some squats used particular symbols on the outside of the building to indicate to informed passers-by that they operated such a policy. On the other hand, squatters, as already discussed, had no less requirement of the inviolable personal space of a ‘home’ than other people, and the continuous presence of strangers was sometimes seen as disruptive. Large enough spaces – such as the former social centre ‘The Factory’ in St Paul’s – solved this issue by segregating residents and visitors on separate floors, smaller ones most often decided on an ad-hoc basis if a visitor could be accommodated. In general, however, keeping an ‘open door’ was seen as an important expression of the political aims of the squatting movement.

Over the course of my first few days in Bristol, I met the other residents of the house. There was Dan and Mary, the couple with the dog, mostly referred to as a functional unit named ‘Danandmary’. The first floor inhabitants were T, who came from a north-African country, which, as it was implied, he had had a very convincing reason to leave24, Drew, a very quiet man in his forties, and George, the house pariah. George appeared to live a precarious existence on his bunk in the living room, as he had previously upset the rest of the housemates with drunk, homophobic and sexist behaviour and there was an on-going debate as to whether or not this was grounds enough to put him out on the street. Finally

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24 He left everyone guessing as to his immigration status, an issue that would later become relevant when during a large scale altercation his behaviour prompted the calling of the police, see chapter 7.
there were ‘the brothers’, two British-Asian men in their late twenties who treated the house to Dubstep at high volumes and their newly acquired pit-bull puppy (a hyperactive little monster that left turds all over the house, which made navigating the stairs at night a challenge) plus their sister who shared one of the top floor flats with another British girl named Therese. I had only a rudimentary ability at the time to guess British people’s class background by their accent and mannerisms, but as it turned out I was right in inferring that Therese came from a wealthy background, had a public school education, and was mainly living in a squat to make a point toward her parents.

The residents were a fairly representative sample of the composition of the Bristol ‘scene’ as a whole. Relatively balanced in terms of gender, the largest group of squatters was white and in part British, in part comprised of European migrants. A smaller sub-group came from non-European countries, and a sub-set of those had no legal claim to remain in Britain. While a fair few squatters came from an Asian background, I met very few from British-Caribbean, other Black British or African backgrounds, an issue I do not have a definitive explanation for. My suspicion – confirmed at least by one British-Caribbean squatter I spoke to – is that Blacks in Britain experience a disproportionate amount of police repression as it is, and involving themselves in the squatter/activist scene would make them prime targets for police violence. In terms of ‘class’, definitions were difficult, since, as I have mentioned in the last chapter, precisely what was meant by the ‘class’ people identified as differed widely. It was however obvious that only a small percentage were in a position to have access to other forms of accommodation, and thus squatting for most was a matter of material necessity.

The person I bonded most with in the house, after Ralph, was Drew. My first impression of him had been of extreme shyness, as when he spoke at all, he did

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25 This does not imply, however, that because of her wealthy background Therese should be seen as the kind of ‘voluntary’ middle class squatter that is often invoked in public discourse to argue that squatters are not ‘really’ homeless people. As I will discuss in chapter 5, a boarding school education, this venerable institution of Britishness, produces its very own form of psychological abandonment, not at all unlike the experience of lacking a safe space which often precedes actual homelessness in the less well off (compare Duffell, 2000, 2014).
so in a voice so low as to be barely audible. I found it hard to believe when Ralph told me that Drew had a completely different side to him and that I should mind my step with him as he could exhibit an explosive temper – to my mind, here was a kind and gentle person who, once he warmed up to conversation, possessed a subtle wit, a sophisticated political standpoint and heart-warming common sense. I had decided to be upfront about my ethnographic activities from the start, in order to give people a chance to avoid me should they not approve, but as it turned out I was far more concerned by the potential ethical pitfalls of my status than anyone else. My studying anthropology was mainly regarded as some kind of eccentric hobby, especially since few knew what anthropology even was (and my attempts at explanation did little to elucidate the matter). Most often, I was teased for being a ‘useless intellectual’ who would nevertheless kindly be fed when the revolution finally came. The few exceptions to this – of which Drew was one – believed that my research could in some way benefit squatter’s political cause. After observing me for a couple of days with an intelligent alertness that became somewhat unnerving, he began to strike up conversations about politics and direct action. I learned that he had studied biology at university before deciding to turn his back on mainstream society and apply himself to all sorts of political projects – a story that, as I would later learn, was only half the truth. However, he was keen to get involved in some sort of political action, and for some reason saw my arrival as an opportunity to do so. Drew was among the few who received benefits at the time, a large part of which he used to procure food for the entire house. Nearly every evening, we would come home to find he had prepared a full roast dinner or other meal which we would eat while watching films together, until people went to sleep and Drew passed out in his chair after having consumed impressive amounts of beer.

Life in the house followed a daily rhythm that I soon got accustomed to. Mornings started late with the brewing of great amounts of strong coffee and breakfast of eggs and bacon in one of the living rooms. As soon as the smell of coffee filled the house, residents would one by one come out of their rooms and sit around chatting and juggling caffeine until about midday. Then activity started and
people left to go about their day's business, most of which took place in one of the numerous squats and social spaces around Stokes Croft, to re-converge around evening for another communal meal. After this, most evenings there would be a party or other social gathering in one of the squats, or we would sit around drinking, smoking and talking until the small hours of the morning. In all this, there was a pervasive sense of communality – it rarely occurred to anyone to segregate themselves and eat on their own, and rarely did people retreat to their rooms and close the door as a sign that they wanted to be undisturbed. The constant company was unfamiliar for me at first, but in an astonishingly short amount of time I got used to thinking of myself as part of a ‘we’. This ‘we’ was not in the first instant a matter of identity, in the sense that I became ‘a squatter’ as opposed to ‘an anthropologist’. Rather, the communal provision of food and shelter pointed to a deeper level of interconnectedness: with few exceptions, we were all dependent on one another in order to preserve and reproduce our bodies.

For the ‘Western’ subject, the experience of dependency on others for physical survival is largely regarded as shameful (Butler, 2004; see also Duffell, 2014). Dependency is reserved for children, the very old, or those in ill health, for the ‘normal’ adult, however, independence is not only a matter of pride but central to one’s understanding of oneself as an autonomous individual. In Capital, Marx goes to great lengths to demonstrate that this independence is fundamentally an illusion, created by the fact that relations of interdependence between humans, under capitalism, become mystified in projected relationships between objects (Marx, 1867). Rarely, however, is the subject confronted with this illusion head on. Confrontation only occurs in situations when the social structures that mediate relationships between persons – the market, the state – no longer function, be it because an individual has lost access to them (such as in abject destitution) or because they have broken down on a large scale. In situations like these, the subject realises that fulfilling his own needs as an ‘independent’
consumer is no longer possible, and the only path to survival is co-operation with others.

The experience of such dependency, for the ‘autonomous’ subject, is initially frightening. If the other has the power to raise the chances of one’s survival, then he or she ergo also has the power to lower them. Consequently, such dependency is rarely discussed in the context of anthropology, although a fair amount of the time anthropologists are fed and sheltered by the people they study, and, especially in remoter areas, would be in serious trouble if this were not the case. Alas, to admit to such basic bodily dependency would not only topple the superiority of the ‘traditional’ anthropologist, it would also put into question the capacity of the more progressive one to frame the interests of those who temporarily give him life as ‘subjective’. Writing, therefore, traditionally takes place after the anthropologist has returned from the field, and his autonomy from the people he has lived among is re-affirmed. In the ‘fieldwork’ situation, however, the denial of dependency is another aspect of the distortion I have discussed in the last chapter – a ‘disinterested’ stance is after all impossible to maintain if one’s basic survival depends on the same conditions as the survival of the other. Part of the ‘life-fieldwork’ dichotomy is therefore the assumption that one’s basic needs are being met by some means outside of the field, and that the basic survival concerns of the other are separate from one’s own.

If this separateness breaks down – by design or, as in my case, the constituent power of accident – the fieldwork situation shifts. The asymmetric investment I have described in chapter one gives way to a situation in which the anthropologist has at least as much at stake as the ‘native’, if not more (since the ‘native’ may already be an expert at survival under the particular conditions, while the anthropologist’s dependency is exacerbated by the fact that he or she lacks this knowledge). With this shift also comes a shift in how the utterances of the other are regarded – what could formerly be framed as merely somebody’s

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26 Or, in fact, the violent subjugation of others. This option was however generally not available to squatters, due to a lack of the sheer material means to dominate more than a handful of others at the same time, and thus co-operation was effectively left as the only viable option.
subjective view on *their* situation, now becomes supremely important for the anthropologist, because it refers to his or her own condition as well. The assessment of another that ‘it is cold out’ constitutes a ‘subjective’ evaluation only if one has a warm place to stay in – in the absence of such a place, ‘it is cold out’ is not a description of individual opinion but a vital piece of information relating to one’s own survival. The question whether or not squatting constitutes a legitimate response to being without shelter ceases to be ‘academic’ if one is without shelter. The suspension of evaluative judgment that drives the ‘life-fieldwork’ dichotomy is therefore revoked, not for methodological or formally ethical reasons, but because the focus of the anthropologist’s interest has shifted – the evaluative judgment of the other ceases to matter only as an object of inquiry, and begins to matter as a way of navigating one’s own embodied existence. In such a situation, the evaluative judgment of the anthropologist and that of the other can therefore become aligned, in that they are directed at the same object or condition.

This shift, in and of itself, does not yet produce empathic understanding in the sense I have discussed in the previous chapter. It does, however, produce the conditions of possibility for this kind of understanding, in that it includes the anthropologist as a vulnerable, i.e. potentially affected actor. To be vulnerable in this sense means to acknowledge the fact that before the emergence of an autonomous, independent self, there is a basic level of interdependence between self and other on a bodily level, “the fundamental sociality of embodied life” (Butler, 2004, 28), which consists in “a vulnerability to the other that is part of bodily life... (and)... becomes highly exacerbated under certain social and political conditions, especially those in which violence is a way of life and the means to secure self-defense are limited” (ibid, 29). To experience and acknowledge this vulnerability can then become the basis upon which empathy, based on identification with the suffering of the other 27 becomes possible, as “an

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27 This does not mean that the suffering of the other therefore is ‘the same’ as one’s own, or that the actors necessarily have to share exactly the same experience of injustice to understand each other. The crucial point is not the commensurability of oppression, but the shared condition of consciously experienced *vulnerability* to insult and violence.
apprehension of common human vulnerability” from which can spring “the principle of protecting others from the kinds of violence we have suffered” (ibid 30). As Butler’s essay argues, the ‘Western’ subject goes to great lengths to undo and deny this basic vulnerability, and the anthropological self is no exception, in that it has made ‘invulnerability’ (the illusion of disaffectedness) its epistemological position of choice. Joel Robbins’ (2013) attack on what he calls the “anthropology of the suffering slot” might here be a case in point – whether or not one agrees with Robbins’ argument that anthropologists should cease to identify with the ‘suffering subject’, the underlying assumption is that they are by definition free to choose which position to take in the matter.

**An Attack On One Is An Attack On All**

Butler suggests that the shared experience of vulnerability – in this context, caused by the absence of shelter – can engender “a sense of political community of a complex order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility” (2004, 22). Within the squatting scene, this sense of community was not so much of a theoretical than of a practical, material kind. Our crew did not only live, eat and sleep together but also had a shared project in the form of the ‘Smiling Chair’ bookshop just a few corners down on Stokes Croft. The Croft’, the street that leads from the city centre in north-eastern direction up toward the up-and-coming Montpellier, was the main artery of ‘alternative’ Bristol, and at the time, the squatting scene. At any one point there were at least four or five squats on Stokes Croft, among them the Smiling Chair, the Free Shop, a former motorcycle shop that was being used as an events space, and several housing squats, including the (in)famous ‘Telepathic Heights’, the eviction of which sparked the Bristol riots in 201128. The Stokes Croft area had a longstanding reputation as the centre of alternative art and politics. Famous for its music

28 See chapter 11
venues and an ever-changing visual landscape of colourful shop-fronts interspersed with graffiti by artists such as Banksy, it was home to an eclectic mix of punks, hipsters, students, artists and squatters. After what was commonly referred to by locals as a long period of ‘intentional neglect’ by the council, the opening of the Cabot Circus shopping centre nearby had led to a steep rise in land values in the area, and when I arrived, the battle against the gentrification and ‘regeneration’ of Stokes Croft was already well under way.

There was a somewhat uneasy strategic alliance between local residents, shopkeepers and squatters in this conflict – although the enemy was clearly identified as the property developers who had secured contracts with Bristol City council to ‘improve’ the area by building offices and flats, the squatters were keenly aware of the class differences between them and the middle class ‘hipster’ types who frequented cafes like the Canteen in the self-managed Hamilton house. The most vocal community action group, the ‘People’s Republic of Stokes Croft’ was frequently referred to as the ‘Pretentious Republic’ – a jibe that pointed to the fact that while the cultural flair of Stokes Croft was doubtlessly important, squatters had more at stake than others in the battle against gentrification. On the one hand, rising interest in properties in the area meant an increase in Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs)29 issued by the council for derelict, empty spaces – the very spaces that the squatters lived in and had often renovated and repaired in months of hard manual labour30. On the other, there had been heightened police interest in the area, mainly targeting the street drinkers and rough sleepers at the bottom rung of the Stokes Croft food chain. It was generally assumed that ‘driving out the squatters’ would be the council’s first step toward making the area more interesting for investors and homebuyers – a suspicion that would later prove only too accurate.

The ‘Smiling Chair’ was a small shop space with a bright pink front at the bottom end of the street, just across from the Free Shop. It provided zines and flyers, a

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29 A legal instrument that allows local authorities to buy property that has been abandoned or neglected without the owners consent
30 This was the eventual fate of ‘Classics’, the free-shop I discuss further down.
lending library, some books for sale, and tea and coffee in exchange for donations during the day; and doubled as a meeting room for various activist groups in the evenings. With the comfortable sofas and coffee for a few pence rather than the several pounds the ‘pretentious’ Canteen charged for its lattes, it was also a favoured hangout and community hub for squatters. Several members of our crew were involved in running and maintaining the space, stocking the shelves and introducing the project to anyone new who stepped through its door. Although the space was in theory open to anyone, members of the general public only entered infrequently – the aesthetic of the shop front and the look of its usual patrons may have put them off. It was, however, a meeting place for squatters and their associates, and during the course of a normal day, one would meet at least one representative of every squat around the area there. As such, it served as a kind of ‘village square’, a hub for information, gossip and rumours and a place where plans for actions and campaigns were devised. As my personal rhythm adjusted to that of my new crew, I found myself there most afternoons, showing my face as the new person in town and making myself useful.

I had initially planned to spend most of my time in ‘Classics’, the Free Shop across the road, as I had previously been involved in a similar project in Vienna. This plan was soon abandoned, however, mainly because my conviction that Free Shops provide a viable model for an economic alternative to capitalism had somewhat waned. Essentially, Free Shops are spaces where items that have outlived their usefulness for their owner can be deposited and picked up by whoever needs them, free of charge. Numerous such projects exist throughout Europe and are generally based on a mixture of three arguments: an ecological one (waste reduction), a social one (providing for the poor and disadvantaged) and an economic one (wanting to demonstrate a viable economic alternative to the commodity economy). As a Marxist, it was this last argument that I was most interested in, as the intellectual underpinnings of Free Shop collectives often refer to some concept of a ‘gift economy’ as derived from a more or less in-depth reading of Mauss. The project I had helped to run in Vienna was no exception in
upholding this presumed logic of a ‘gift economy’ as the revolutionary alternative to commodity exchange.

Yet, while Free Shops undoubtedly contribute to their local communities in redistributing goods and providing a commerce-free space for socialising, I had a rising suspicion that the politicised concept of ‘gift economies’ had turned into something like the economic equivalent of the ‘noble savage’ – the imagined morally superior other of the (indeed) problematic commodity economy. In practice, the donations to the Free Shop tended to come from people with more economic power and a relatively secure housing situation, while poorer patrons contributed comparably little and possibly benefitted relatively more. There is of course nothing wrong with this in principle – if translated into an economic doctrine however, it is difficult to see how it differs from traditional ideas of redistributive charity. Unless the question of private property is addressed – an issue notably absent in the politicised ‘gift economy’ concepts and possibly the reason they tend to appeal to middle class liberals – an economic model that focuses entirely on the ‘sphere of circulation’ (Marx, 1867, ch. 3) is hardly a radical alternative to the status quo.

Squatting, on the other hand, addressed the question of property directly, both in the sense of property rights in the buildings the squatters were occupying, and in the context of economic relations within the squats. Material goods came roughly in three categories: First, personal items such as sleeping bags, clothes,

31 There are in fact striking parallels to the concept of the ‘noble savage’ in terms of its racist/colonialist implications. Several ‘gift economy’ related email lists and blogs use the term ‘potlatch’ as a vignette for ‘radical’ gift giving, seemingly oblivious to its cultural context and history – as well as to its actual meaning, which is certainly very different from idyllic ‘gift giving’ in a proto-communist society.

32 In terms of classical anthropological theory, it could be argued that the focus on exchange is what is wrong with the entire concept of ‘gift economies’ – where actors are assumed to be in the first instance independent and separate, anything outside a ‘pool’ economy must logically appear as a form of exchange, including gifts (see e.g. Sahlins, 1972; Bourdieu, 1977, 10f). Structurally, these ‘gift-exchange’ models have everything in common with what Marx identifies as the essence of commodity fetishism: one substitutes relationships between people with relationships between things and then proceeds to behave as if the people were separate and the things were connected. It remains to be established if this point of view is not simply a necessary distortion caused by the fetishistic consciousness of the anthropologist (see also discussion of reciprocity further down).
mobile phones and laptops, books and objects of personal value. The individual ownership of these items was rarely, if ever, disputed and they could normally be left in accessible places without being carried off. Second, communal items, which belonged to an entire crew or house, were used by all residents, and were often the most difficult to salvage in the event of an eviction (these were things like tools, cookers, kitchen items, washing machines, amps, and occasionally a computer). And finally items that occupied a place somewhere in between the two – objects that were in principle communal but that somebody was presently using and that were therefore treated as if they were personal items until the person did not need them anymore. This applied to things like mattresses, heaters, small furniture, lighting and blankets.

With the exception of personal items, distribution of things within – and to a lesser degree, between – squats followed a needs-based logic. If an item was not in use, and would not be in the near future, it was generally accepted to ask for it or to give it away to someone who did need it. If a squat was short of a mattress due to a new inhabitant, and another squat had one spare, the mattress generally changed its location. It has been suggested to me that this could be referred to as a kind of gift-giving scenario, I am however doubtful whether this concept applies here. Most objects were simply not regarded individual or collective property (in the sense of an inalienable association between object and owner which transcends the moment of its actual use) and thus fit to be ‘given away’ by one individual or group to another. The situation was closer to a form of commons or pool of resources, which extended throughout the ‘scene’ and sometimes beyond it to affiliated non-squatters.

Exchange of ‘goods’ between squats developed a particular dynamic in times of evictions. Since vehicles, with which to move the contents of an entire house, were in short supply, many crews abandoned (or sometimes simply lost) a good part of their material possessions when they moved on. Since evictions were usually expected, crews would announce that there was ‘stuff to go’ some days in advance, so other, temporarily more established, crews could pick it up. In one
case an entire building, scheduled for demolition, was not only cleared of its inhabitants but also stripped of heaters, cookers, electric showers, fans, shower trays and washing basins, many of which reappeared as community assets throughout the scene. Even so, equipment like showers (for crews that squatted commercial properties) and washing machines were in short supply, which engendered a kind of cleanliness tourism between squats. I often walked from one end of town to the other to have a shower at Gavin’s squat, only to realise that the long walk home rendered the entire exercise redundant.

Evictions were a regular part of everyday life for squatters. They came in two forms: legal ones, i.e. ones where the owner of a property had gone through the civil court system to obtain a possession order as specified in the Criminal Law Act 1977\textsuperscript{33}. And illegal ones, in which owners attempted to take the law into their own hands and evict squatters by means of threats or violence. The former usually gave squatters time to prepare a legal defence, move their possessions in case the owner was given right (which nearly always happened eventually), or organise resistance. In case of the latter, attacks by irate owners or ‘heavies’ sent around by them could happen quickly and without warning, and were sometimes the reason crews lost all their belongings in chaotic escapes. These evictions were literally illegal, since the law forbid an owner to force his way into a squatted property or use violence to get the squatters out, but a significant proportion of property owners was unaware this was the case.

For this reason, there was a system of eviction alerts in place that functioned much like a 999 call. If a crew found themselves under threat, the system allowed for the quick mobilisation of a large number of persons who would gather around the threatened squat to ‘show presence’ and demonstrate to the attackers that their actions would not go unnoticed. Alerts could come any time day and night and usually resulted in all but one crew member jumping into clothes and boots, and cycling or running to the site of the attempted eviction (all but one because one person had to ‘squat-sit’ at all times since leaving the squat unattended

\textsuperscript{33} Now amended by 'Weatherly's Law'
meant losing all rights granted under the ‘squatter’s law’. It usually did not take more than ten minutes for an ‘emergency crowd’ of often masked up and deliberately menacing-looking squatters to arrive to the rescue of the besieged, and more often than not this convinced owner or heavies that the legal route to eviction may be more promising after all. Exceptions were cases when squatters realised they had entered a property owned by organised crime (which happened surprisingly often), in which case it was thought more prudent to just move on.

The same strategy sometimes worked with legal evictions. When an owner won possession in court, they would usually send a legal representative or a court bailiff, sometimes accompanied by police, to take possession of the property and make it inaccessible by changing the locks. The reason this was often prevented is that the police did not seem very motivated to enforce such possession orders – after all they were a civil matter – and so it sometimes took as little as a small ‘Christmas market’ with a couple of stalls right in front of the squat’s door to turn them away. In other cases a squat would be abandoned to the ‘conquerors’, only to be re-squatted hours later by means of a secret entrance that had been prepared before the squatters left. One such case was the motorcycle shop across the road from the Smiling Chair, which served as an events space for gigs and parties and would often see up to a hundred people celebrating until the early morning. It was evicted and re-squatted a total of four times, since the roof proved just too easy to access, no matter how well the door was secured.

The system of eviction alerts illustrates Butler’s argument that vulnerability can create community. Few squatters were exempt from the threat of eviction, and

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34 see chapter 3
35 Exceptions to this occurred when police suspected that known political activists were inside a squat, in which case evictions were sometimes enforced with dogs, pepper spray and occasionally, a helicopter.
36 It would of course also be possible to theorise it under a paradigm of ‘reciprocity’ that amounts to a covert version of the social as a collection of individual self-interests: squatters could then be seen to help each other because they expected that others would come to their aid when they were in trouble. This shows the fundamental problem with the concept of ‘reciprocity’ – since it is formulated as an exchange, it presupposes the actors as independent beings who are connected only by the act of exchange itself. This is basically the extension of
even those who had been in long term possession of their squats had no actual certainty that they would not be put out on the street on any given day. More commonly, crews were made to move on within the space of a few weeks, sometimes months. The stress of this enforced mobility, the occasional violence and the re-occurring state of being without shelter let no one forget for long the dependency of his or her bodily integrity on the availability of a safe space to inhabit on the one hand, and on the requisite comrades on the other. To be a squatter, on one level, therefore meant to acknowledge this vulnerability in oneself (whether it was called that or not) and subsequently to be in a position to recognise it in others as well. While the “apprehension of common human vulnerability” (Butler, 2004, 30) thus created commonality, it also laid the basis for mutual aid, in that one’s own experience of vulnerability became precisely “the principle of protecting others from the kinds of violence we have suffered” (22) and compels one to “treat the other...as deserving an ethical response from us” (30), that is, to treat him or her as an ethical subject.

Butler explains, somewhat self-consciously, that her theory of recognition is “perhaps a version of Hegel” but it is “also a departure, since I will not discover myself as the same as the ‘you’ on which I depend in order to be” (2004, 44). It is possibly an oversimplification of Hegel’s theory to conclude that his complex account of the sublation of dynamic contradictions results in them merely turning out to be “the same”37. Nevertheless, Butler’s intuition that she has reformulated a Hegelian account of ethics deserves a closer look, since, as will become clear in the following chapters, mutual recognition of one another as ethical subjects can be seen to lie at the core of squatter’s political and ethical practice. I do not have to return all the way to Hegel himself for this purpose, as a recent reappraisal of his theory of ethics, formulated by Axel Honneth (1996), provides an excellent basis for my discussion. Honneth takes as his starting point Hegel’s early theory of the social as a struggle for mutual recognition, which in

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37 Although it is also fair to point out that embodiment really does put limitations on the applicability of Hegel’s system in the interpersonal realm, since humans simply cannot merge into a physical unity.
Hegel's later work survives mainly in the shape of his famous Master-Slave dialectic. Its central thesis is that people's struggle for recognition of one another as (ethical) subjects leads to a state of moral tension in society, which in turn sparks political struggle and thus historical change. For Hegel the ideal state of society is one of ethical consensus ('Sittlichkeit') beyond state law or merely subjective moral convictions (Honneth, 1996, 13). He therefore sees the resolution of these struggles for recognition as a precondition of what he calls 'absolute ethical life' (ibid.). Honneth argues that between the early Jena period and the Phenomenology, Hegel undergoes a shift in focus from the interpersonal social to the inner structure of consciousness, with Lordship and Bondage arguably referring to the latter. While this has some important consequences (which I will discuss in later chapters), it has not kept numerous writers (including Kojève, Fanon and Jessica Benjamin, among others) from applying the logic of 'Lordship' to social relations. In my view, this is not technically a misreading, since for Hegel, the structure of individual consciousness and that of Geist as the universal collective consciousness is fundamentally the same (with the two mutually reproducing each other). Furthermore, given that Hegel took a keen interest in the actually existing slave revolts of his time (Buck-Morss, 2009), it could be argued that even though he uses Master and Slave as metaphors for parts of consciousness, the metaphor is in fact derived from the observation of real-life relations of domination. In so far as these relationships become internalised (see Benjamin, 1988/2013; Duffell 2000, 2014), the circle between intrapersonal and interpersonal relations of domination closes in the above sense. With this caveat, I will therefore follow the well-trodden path of using the terminology of Lordship and Bondage to refer to interpersonal relations of domination. A similar observation is made by Marx, who remarks in a footnote in the first chapter of Capital: "In a sort of way, it is with man as with commodities. Since he comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtian philosopher, to whom "I am I" is sufficient, man first sees and recognises himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul,
just as he stands in his Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the *genus homo* (1867)

According to Hegel, recognition is crucially important because a subject's identity as a particular subject (an autonomous individual, a 'self') is constructed within an inter-subjective relation, and thus, the experience of oneself as a 'self' is fundamentally dependent on recognition through another:

“To the degree that a subject knows itself to be recognised by another subject with regard to certain of its (the subject's) abilities and qualities and is thereby reconciled with the other, a subject also always comes to know its own distinctive identity and thereby comes to be opposed once again to the other as something particular” (Honneth, 1996, 16f).

Only in an encounter with an other can a self therefore experience itself as *itself*, i.e. a fully individuated person (compare to this Metzinger's 'phenomenal self model' as discussed above). Lack of recognition, or 'misrecognition'38, on the other hand, constitutes a threat to the subject, since its existence as an autonomous39 self is denied and it can therefore not be certain of this existence itself. But if it is not an autonomous self, it follows that it is merely a function of the self of another, an object – denial of recognition therefore is what constitutes objectification or Verdinglichung40. This inevitably leads to a struggle, since the

38 In the German original, Honneth speaks of ‘*Missachtung*’, which has been translated into English as ‘disrespect’. As German is my first language, I find this somewhat misleading - my own translation would be closer to something like ‘malicious contempt’. The same goes for the translation of its opposite, *Achtung*, with ‘respect’. For the German speaker, *Respekt* indicates a stance of cautious apprehension, and it is often invoked by authority figures when what they mean is ‘obedience’. *Achtung* on the other hand is etymologically close to *Achtsamkeit*, deriving from a common root that means ‘awareness’. It is therefore not so much ‘respect’ in the sense of apprehension that the misrecognised lack, but *Achtung*, namely awareness of them as people who exist, who matter.

39 ‘Autonomous’ here means ‘existing in oneself and for oneself’ as opposed to existing merely as a function of the self of another'. 'Autonomy' therefore does not mean an existence outside of, or unaffected by, social relations – on the contrary, Honneth/Hegel emphasise the crucial dependency of the experience of such a self on recognition and mirroring by an other.

40 I add the German word because it helps to underscore that ‘objectification’ does not merely mean, as it is often used in everyday political discourse, the sexualisation of the (female) body, but points to a more encompassing regard of another person as a thing without a first hand perspective of his/her own.
thus objectified self must then prove to the other that it is, indeed, a ‘someone’ and not a ‘something’, a subject like the other and not just an object at the other’s disposal (compare also Fanon, 1968, 217). As Honneth argues, “The ‘grammar’ of such struggles is ‘moral’ in the sense that the feelings of outrage and indignation driving them are generated by the rejection of claims to recognition and thus imply normative judgments about the legitimacy of social arrangements” (1996, xxi). The moral grammar of this kind of relation is therefore the grammar of dissent – a grammar in which the speaker constitutes him or herself in the very act of speaking against an other who expects him or her to remain a silent tool. Speaking – through words and actions – however, involves the kind of active relating to the world that with Metzinger we have above called the ‘phenomenal model of the intentionality relation’ (PMIR). The hallmark of the Hegelian subject is therefore precisely that it involves a functioning intentionality relation, namely the ability to relate to the world with intention and direction, precisely the ability that a mere object does not posses. In order to ‘prove’ that one is a subject, one therefore has to demonstrate that one’s directedness at the world is ‘real’, that one’s desire can produce an effect, that one is indeed self- and not other-determined - hence why in Lordship the ‘slave’ eventually manages to liberate himself through his labour – laboring on the world enables him to develop and experience the intentionality relation that the Master has denied.

My point here – and the reason I have brought Metzinger into this discussion – is that the concepts Honneth, Hegel and the other theorists we will encounter in the following chapters use to describe ethical relations are not merely poetic metaphors. They correspond to material, physical processes through which our bodies and brains are involved in the production of the kinds of psychophysical processes we experience as our ‘selves’. When Hegel speaks of a ‘struggle to the death’ then this can therefore be understood quite literally – a self who is objectified and enslaved, that is, whose intentionality relation to the world is severely impeded, may eventually stop functioning altogether. I shall return to this point in chapter 12.
Recognition and misrecognition can thus be seen as dynamic processes by which people either create or undo each other, each developing its own inner necessity. On the one hand, in being recognised by an other, a person can develop a “practical relation-to-self” (Honneth, 1996, xii), which in turn enables him or her to give recognition back to the other. In this sense, people always mutually mediate each other’s experience of full personhood. Crucially, recognition must necessarily be reciprocal, since only a person who has been recognised as a subject is able to reciprocate in kind. In this mutual relation of recognition lies, for Hegel, the key to both individual and collective freedom (a freedom for each other, as opposed to a Hobbesian idea of the freedom of atomised individuals from each other). Because persons can only co-create one another as free subjects, a communicative sphere is necessary to facilitate both individual and collective freedom. This relationship of mutual co-creation is also discussed by Butler (2004): “to ask for recognition, or to offer it, is precisely not to ask for recognition for what one already is. It is to solicit a becoming, to instigate a transformation, to petition the future always in relation to the other. It is also to stake one’s own being, and one’s own persistence in one’s own being, in the struggle for recognition” (44).

On the other hand, the master/slave model illustrates what happens when this mutual recognition fails: the result is a relationship of domination and submission, in which one party attempts to force the other to respect them while at the same time refusing them recognition. However, in denying the slave recognition as an autonomous subject, the master has at the same time reduced the slave to a person whose recognition of the master is worthless. In dominating the other, the master thus destroys the possibility of recognition for himself; in other words, in enslaving the other he has relinquished the possibility of his own freedom. Freedom, for Hegel, therefore must be thought as a process of mutual liberation, since it is impossible to be submissive and free, but equally impossible
to dominate and be free – the master's "existential impasse" (Kojève, 1947/1980, 19) therefore consists in the fact that he is always also in a sense a slave.\footnote{The dynamic of misrecognition is therefore something like a 'race to the bottom' in terms of human emancipation.}

Honneth argues that recognition and misrecognition are basic dynamics of human relating that can affect a person in different dimensions of their being. Overt physical, emotional or sexual abuse therefore count as forms of misrecognition, as do the denial of rights, insults or general disregard. Honneth identifies three ‘levels’ of identity formation through social relations, which he refers to as self-confidence, self-esteem and self-respect. They are produced within three associated domains of the social: close relationships/friendships, which affirm a person’s basic needs and physical/emotional existence; institutionalised relations, which affirm the universal autonomy and dignity of persons (e.g. legal relations); and relations of solidarity, which affirm each person in his or her particularity. Each follows a particular mode of recognition, corresponding to different dimensions of the ‘personality’: emotional support, cognitive respect and social esteem. Each makes a demand for recognition at a different level of the social, and each corresponds to particular expressions of disrespect, such as abuse, rape and torture on the level of self-confidence (physical/emotive existence); exclusion and denial of rights on the level of self-esteem (universal personhood); and insult or denigration on the level of self-respect (particular individuality) (Honneth, 1996, 129) Honneth, slightly confusingly, contrasts misrecognition on the physical level though such acts as abuse and rape with the form of recognition he terms ‘emotional support’. I would argue that the kind of mutual respect that leads people to respect each other’s physical integrity amounts to more than just ‘emotional’ support, it means specifically also practical respect for the embodiedness of the other. Honneth may here simply conflate embodiment and emotion (as the experience of embodiment), but his formulation could be understood to mean that a physical assault is on the same level of gravity as hurting somebody’s feelings. I therefore
explicitly include physical integrity as one level of recognition/misrecognition in my further discussion.

Recognition, on the other hand, is not merely a matter of affirming one another’s social or cultural identity – it refers to the most basic mode of acknowledging or disregarding one another’s physical, emotional and cognitive integrity. As Butler above, Honneth specifically acknowledges the importance of the experience of ‘ownership’ of embodied space in the sense of identity of self and body, and of having secure boundaries – misrecognition therefore often involves a disregard for the boundaries of another’s spatial self, and a colonisation of their ‘inner space’ by another. Thus disregarding the vulnerability of another person’s body, in Butler’s terms, then connects to a disregard for one’s own vulnerability, and in chapter 5 I will discuss how such a stance is produced in the ‘Western’ subject. Crucially, the “apprehension of common human vulnerability” (Butler, 2004, 30) and thus the recognition of each other as ethical subjects, in such a stance becomes impossible – a situation not unlike the ‘cognitive distortion’ of Bourdieu’s anthropologist.

One – in its simplicity intriguing – consequence of this conception of ethics is that fundamentally, there are only two types of human relationships – those based on recognition, and those based on misrecognition. In the following chapters, I will make use of this very opposition to explore what happens when they come to bear on what since Lefebvre (1974/1991) has been called the “social production of space” – namely the construction of spatial arrangements in such a way that they simultaneously reflect and reproduce particular social (and for my purposes

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42 Honneth uses the term ‘integrity’ without a strict definition. It could therefore be interpreted in two ways: it could refer to a) the intactness of a person’s physical, emotional and cognitive boundaries and b) the ‘integration’ of different parts of the person into a consistent, unbroken whole (see chapters 5, 11). Arguably, the notion of respecting a person’s ‘boundaries’ could be taken to describe an atomistic view of social relations, in which persons are clearly separated and bounded against each other. However, I do not take this reading as necessarily at odds with a more intersubjective notion of individuality, in so far as the recognition of other as other (autonomous and separate from self) is a crucial step within recognition. At the same time, as Jessica Benjamin (1988) notes, the ‘internal’ integration of the person to a point where he/she is not in contradiction with him/herself is equally important for the formation of full subjectivity (see chapter 11).
here, ethical) relations. Before embarking on this discussion, however, I will return once more to the anthropologist’s relation to his ‘subjects’, particularly homeless ones, and ask not so much what the anthropological literature has had to say about homelessness, but what the literature about homelessness tells us about anthropology.
“Ok, so who needs a space?” Joe’s eyes scan the small circle of about two-dozen bodies he is currently presiding over. A few hands go up.

Joe points his biro at a young man who is indecisively perched on a chair between the circle and the door. As attention shifts to him, he sits up and clears his throat.

“Hi, I’m Andy” he says “I heard about this in the bookshop. I’ve been evicted from my place two weeks ago. Now I sleep on my mate’s couch but I can’t stay there. The people in the bookshop said I should try coming here.”

“Have you squatted before?” Joe asks. Andy shakes his head. “Anyone got space?”

For a short moment, the room is alive with non-verbal communication. Glances wander from Andy to other participants, faces are made and hands waved. Andy shifts uncomfortably as he is aware he is being sized up but does not know what rules he is being judged by. From where I’m sitting, I can tell he won’t have it too difficult – he is in his early twenties, looks fairly together and does not show any obvious signs of alcohol or drug abuse. He should be easy to house.

Eventually Liz, who is sitting with a small delegation of her squat-mates, speaks up. “We have plenty of space. It needs a lot of fixing though. You any good with fixing roofs?”

The question is asked half-jokingly, as if to imply that the roof-fixing is not the make-or-break condition of this offer, but Andy nods enthusiastically. “Sure, I’m not too bad with tools, I can give it a go”. He seems relieved to have found something to contribute that will ensure his accommodation. Liz smiles and nods “cool, you come with us after this”.

“Great” says Joe “next?”
Chapter Three: Making Truth Claims Like You Mean It

For, after all, how do we know that two and two make four? Or that the force of gravity works? Or that the past is unchangeable? If both the past and the external world exist only in the mind, and if the mind itself is controllable – what then?
George Orwell

In the last two chapters, I have discussed the question of empathic understanding – that is to say, the capacity to understand what a particular situation another human is in means from their own perspective – for the kind of insight that participant observation as a fieldwork method is supposed to produce. I have argued that the assumptions of disaffectedness and invulnerability to the kinds of things that impact the flourishing or suffering of another cause the ‘cognitive distortion’ which, according to Bourdieu, prevents anthropologists from experiencing ‘the field’ from the perspective of someone who is fundamentally affected. In more general terms, I have argued that this kind of detachment also informs what we could now refer to as an ‘ethical distortion’, in that it precludes people’s ability to mutually recognise each other as ethical subjects, and thus leads to relationships characterised by what with Honneth (1996) I have referred to as ‘misrecognition’. Before I now turn to a more in-depth discussion of how recognition and misrecognition inform the production of space, I want to return once more to the relationship between the anthropologist and his/her respondents. There are two reasons for this course of action: on the one hand, a doctoral thesis is normally expected to contain a chapter covering the ‘literature review’. In my case, this turned out to be a fairly complex task, since the question would be which of the many literatures I am drawing on should be included. In order not to entirely neglect convention, I have therefore decided to opt for a review of the literature on homelessness, not least because this allows me to critically contrast my ethnographic data – namely what homeless people say
about themselves – with what scholars from a number of disciplines have said about them. The ‘literature review’ I undertake in this chapter and the next is therefore not so much comprehensive as structural: I will introduce types or kinds of literature about homelessness, and discuss in what way they can be seen to replicate or critique the methodological quandaries I have raised so far. On the other hand, doctoral theses are also supposed to contain some account of their epistemological premises, although especially in ethnographic writing these are often left implicit. This relative lack of enthusiasm for epistemological debate is understandable in light of the fact that most ethnography is based in one of just two possible paradigms – a positivist, ‘scientifically’ oriented one, or a critical, ‘poststructuralist’ one – and the reader can often tell from the back cover which of them he or she is looking at. However, as I will argue in the following, both these paradigms produce particular problems when applied to the study of ‘homelessness’. I will therefore spend some more time discussing what position I am taking, and why this question matters.

I have argued in chapter two that when the normative detachment that distinguishes the anthropologist’s stance from that of the ‘native’ breaks down – for example in the shape of an unintended experience of shared vulnerability between anthropologist and ‘native’ – the result can be a practical alignment of evaluative judgment that suspends this distortion. However, that such experiences are most often unintended, accidental, and perceived as undesirable (as illustrated by notions such as ‘going native’), points to the fact that anthropology in general considers this type of normative alignment somewhat gauche. As a result, the discipline has gone to considerable lengths to not only keep Bourdieu’s distortion intact, but has utilised whatever epistemological and meta-theoretical\(^{43}\) positions it has encountered within the past hundred years chiefly to cement it. ‘Meta-theory’ is certainly not a term that flows freely from ethnographer’s pens, as too often we identify with statements such as Dell Hymes’: “the justification for the existence of anthropology is to find out about

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\(^{43}\)Meta-theory: “theories about the foundational assumptions and preconditions of science. Critical realism, phenomenology, hermeneutics and positivism are metatheories building on different ontologies and epistemologies” (Danermark et al, 2002, 118)
the world, not produce third-rate philosophers”\textsuperscript{44}. However, I will argue here that meta-theoretical assumptions have a decisive influence on what anthropologists can and do find out about the world, and I believe that it is part of our ethical obligation towards our respondents that we should strive to be at least second-rate philosophers when it comes to questioning our own epistemological biases. In this chapter, I will therefore introduce a meta-theoretical paradigm based in Critical Realism (CR)\textsuperscript{45}, and demonstrate why in my view such a paradigm is an important prerequisite for an adequate analysis of ethnographic data, also and especially in the context of inequality and ‘marginalisation’.

Let us start with the scene at the beginning of this chapter. It took place in late 2010, at a meeting of BHAM (Bristol Housing Action Movement), which used to happen every Monday night in a squatted shop space near Stokes Croft. According to its official website, BHAM is “a non-heirarchical (sic) collective of squatters and their supporters. We help provide housing and other support for homeless people”. During my fieldwork, BHAM was the public face of Bristol squatting – unless one was already part of the scene, it was the first point of entry for new squatters and at the same time served as a communication and coordination platform for existing crews and individual activists. BHAM meetings covered a number of issues, from the individual (such as allocating newly homeless persons to groups or supporting them in getting their own squat) to the collective (as in the case of campaigning, lobbying and providing

\textsuperscript{44} Via faculty website at https://anthropology.virginia.edu/faculty/inmemoriam/profile/dellhymes

\textsuperscript{45} Critical Realism (and in a later development, Dialectical Critical Realism), has been developed since the 1970 by Roy Bhaskar and others (Margaret Archer, Andrew Collier, Andrew Sayer, etc.) as an intervention in debates on the scientific method that were seen marked by dualisms (universal vs particular, positivism vs hermeneutics, theoretical vs empirical etc.) and went along with a perceived gap between theory of science and social science practice (Danermark et al, 2002, 4). Its proponents addressed metatheoretical issues in the debate on the scientific method that have informed the formation of Anthropology since its inception, in particular the tension between a Nomothetic approach (i.e. trying to ascertain general laws by applying and developing abstract theoretical models) and an Idiographic approach (i.e. the description of social reality in all its complexity and diversity) (Danermark et al, 2002, 6ff). The challenge for Critical Realists was to find out whether there can be a metatheoretical approach that can reconcile these dichotomies.
information). The meetings served as a platform for the pooling of skills, tools, and information, from warning each other about problematic persons within the scene, to discussing current developments in the housing market. Despite its non-hierarchical approach, BHAM meetings were usually presided over by a number of ‘old-timers’, most of them men in their 40s or 50s. Joe, whose experience made him especially apt at moderating meetings with such a diverse range of topics, was widely considered the heart and soul of the group. Himself not a squatter, he nevertheless devoted a majority of his time to organising, spreading information and mediating conflicts within the scene. He led through meetings with calm and routine and when, at the end of the session, he asked for donations, a small heap of coins unfailingly formed at his feet. The donations went towards tools, equipment or necessary repairs for all who needed them, as well as into publicising written materials.

Meetings usually opened with taking stock of existing spaces, acknowledging new ones and flagging up those that were threatened by eviction. After this followed a phase of distributing tools and skills – who needs what and who can provide it – before attention shifted to the newcomers who turned up practically every week. BHAM was a well-known institution, and on most nights there was at least one anxious and disoriented person, newly homeless or just about to become homeless, who came for help. Some did not immediately want to squat and were looking for information how to deal with landlords and courts, others were all too eager to join the squatters and many expressed explicitly political reasons for wanting to enter squatting rather than entering the official system of homelessness prevention provided by the council. Some were coming from within that system, having lived in hostels and B&Bs, but found themselves disempowered and socially isolated in these places (a frequent experience that has been described in the literature on homelessness, e.g. Hutson, 1999; Rosengard et al, 2002). Squatting seemed preferable to them, because it provided social, instead of just material, security as well as a greater scope for agency and self-determination.
BHAM’s motto – ‘opening doors for the homeless since 1984’ – pointed to the fact that squatters did not necessarily think of themselves as ‘homeless’. Although in precarious occupation, the act of squatting in and of itself was seen to remedy the lack of shelter, and thus turn a homeless person into a squatter. On the one hand, this notion coincided with the definition provided by the Housing Act 1996, which states that

“A person is homeless if he has no accommodation available for his occupation, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, which he—(a) is entitled to occupy by virtue of an interest in it or by virtue of an order of a court, (b) has an express or implied licence to occupy, or (c) occupies as a residence by virtue of any enactment or rule of law giving him the right to remain in occupation or restricting the right of another person to recover possession” (legislation.gov.uk)

Since section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (short ‘section 6’, see chapter 6) made it a criminal offence for a landlord to force entry to premises without the consent of the person in occupation, this effectively amounted to a fulfilment of condition c); and squatters were thus technically no longer legally homeless once they occupied a squat.

On the other hand, the ‘opening of doors’ pointed to the symbolic meaning of the door as a threshold at which a political identity is transformed through an act of disobedience and appropriation. In this sense, the refusal of the term ‘homeless’ and its replacement with ‘squatter’ corresponded to a practical refusal to accept the condition of being without shelter, and the decision to take action to resolve this state of affairs. The crowbar, ubiquitous component of squatting-related art and imagery, thus was both a tool of this overcoming and a weapon in what was seen as a political struggle. “We are committed to the opening of community spaces and to solidarity with existing social centres. We campaign against the

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46 This was also the legal reason that one person always had to be ‘squat-sitting’
47 In practice, however, squatters who chose to turn to the council for help with housing were usually regarded homeless (although this did not amount to being eligible for help yet), since the protection of section 6 was correctly assumed to be only temporary.
privatisation of public land and housing and for the defence of public space”, the BHAM flyer continues, “whilst commercial property developers are continuing to evict squatters from buildings that have sometimes been left empty for 10 years or more in the Bristol area the rising tide of people being made homeless continues to increase...Squatting is one of the solutions to the housing crisis”.

Even before ‘Weatherley’s law’, this view was far from uncontested. For example Crisis, one of the largest national homeless charities, states on its website:

“Squatting is relatively common for single homeless people with 39 per cent having squatted at some point...Most homeless people who squat try other avenues for resolving their housing problems before turning to squatting. While a few describe the squats as in a reasonable condition and have positive experiences living in them, this is not the case for many. The conditions in squats are often difficult to discern from rough sleeping; with dereliction, discomfort, and life with no amenities or furniture typical.”^48 (Crisis online, 06. 2013)

From the perspective of a homeless charity, it would certainly be ill advised to advertise squatting as any kind of ‘solution’, if only due to the potentially detrimental effect on revenue. What becomes apparent in the differing views of BHAM and Crisis, however, is that the relationship between squatting and homelessness was far from clear. What one side saw as a practical act of self-help that turned homeless people into something else, the other saw as an act of desperation that continued the state of homelessness, and prevented persons from receiving help. It is situations like these – in which ‘truth claims’ made by a particular group of respondents substantially differ from claims that are commonly made about these people – that questions of meta-theory become practically relevant for ethnography.

^48 This description is then followed by a quotation from a supposed squatter that involves rat infestations and used needles
‘Activist’ groups like BHAM confront the anthropologist with a particular set of ‘truth claims’: they identify a specific form of oppression or injustice, and frame their practice as a struggle that is meant to, in one way or another, overcome this condition. To return to the dilemma of Bourdieu’s anthropologist, this situation essentially leaves the ethnographer with two options: either to sympathise with the ‘native’ interpretation although one cannot verify it, or to reject it and offer an alternative one based in the anthropologist’s own cultural background. Both of these subject positions have been alternately argued for or against by anthropologists, but whichever one is chosen, the question of whether a truth claim is taken seriously or not remains dependent on the respective subject position – whose interpretation is given precedence is then mainly a matter of taste and political leanings. What this situation does not provide, however, is the possibility of examining both the truth claim of the other, and the anthropologist’s ‘outsider’ point of view, in relation to the independent reality of that which the claim purports to be about. For example, in discussing the causes of homelessness, a squatter may claim that speculation in the housing market is to blame for this problem. The ethnographer can accept this explanation, or reject it and substitute another. They will, however, not be able to adequately judge whether any of these explanations is actually correct, unless they assume that ‘the housing market’ is a really existing entity, which may be examined as to whether or not it really does have an influence on homelessness. This may appear self-evident, but as I will discuss below, unless ethnography is based in a specifically realist paradigm, it cannot necessarily be taken for granted.

What is therefore at stake in the meta-theoretical debate, from the perspective of anthropology and specifically this thesis, is not just an abstract argument about the nature of the social and natural world. Included in these discussions are important methodological and political questions, which are pressing for anthropology in particular because of how intimately it becomes involved in the lives and struggles of its ‘others’. The alignment of evaluative judgment I have previously discussed requires that what the judgment is about has a reality independent from whoever is making the judgment. As Andrew Sayer puts it:
“When we use terms like ‘domination’, ‘oppression’ or ‘exploitation’ we imply that some harm, injustice or suffering is objectively done, not merely, as subjectivism implies, that observers don’t like what they refer to and are upset by them. They allude to damage and suffering that we have good reason to believe exist objectively, indeed exist even if we fail to recognise them (for example, presumably sexism actually inhibited women’s flourishing before it was identified as doing so)” (2005, 11)

In other words, if the anthropologist wants to find out whether what his or her interlocutors say refers to actually existing reality, i.e. if it is true (a question all the more pressing in a situation of mutual dependency, as discussed in chapter two), then there must be a possibility that it is. The condition of possibility of developing a shared conceptualisation of reality requires that there is something that both parties can agree about, even if they come from different cultural or epistemological backgrounds. This problem becomes especially pressing in the context of narratives of oppression and suffering, since if it is not assumed that a claim of being oppressed is at least potentially true, anthropology will not only inevitably misrepresent the experience of the other in terms of Bourdieu’s distortion, but also lose any and all possibility of becoming itself an emancipatory practice. To relegate claims to suffering and oppression to the realm of the

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49 In my personal experience, these terms have a remarkable propensity to produce a collective rolling of eyes in audiences of an anthropological and general social science background, often followed by “what is ‘oppression’ even supposed to mean?” That these words have become unpopular to the point of appearing anachronistic may have to do with their importance in discourses such as Marxism, second-wave feminism and others, which have lost traction in current academia, but it may also be the case that academic language shares some properties with Orwell’s Newspeak, in which “a heretical thought…should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words…this was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by eliminating undesirable words and stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all secondary meaning whatever” (1989, 174)

50 If, for example, a respondent tells the anthropologist that he is affected by witchcraft, then there must be something that ‘witchcraft’ actually refers to, even if the anthropologist would describe it in different culturally specified terms (e.g. ‘psychological manipulation’). If this assumption cannot be made, then ‘witchcraft’ becomes either a case of ignorant superstition (such as was traditionally ascribed to native beliefs by colonial anthropology), or it becomes something so specific to the cultural epistemology of the ‘native’ that the anthropologist cannot ever assume to understand it (this is to some degree the case in the current debate on ‘multiple ontologies’, see chapter 4)
subjective, as Sayer argues, produces a particularly insidious form of misrecognition – one in which I treat my interlocutor as somebody who can, by definition, not be saying anything relating to his or her objective situation in the world, in other words, one who cannot possibly be telling the truth. As we will see in the next section, when this form of misrecognition comes to bear on studies of homelessness, the result is not just epistemological confusion but a downright silencing of the very voices that anthropologists purportedly want to make heard.

The Possibility Of Truth

Let us now have a closer look at how this process of silencing is executed on an epistemological level, even when anthropologists explicitly claim to be doing the opposite, and what, if anything, a critical realist paradigm can do to help with this situation. We will do so by means of drawing on the body of literature that has come to constitute ‘homelessness studies’. Not all of this literature is written by anthropologists, but nevertheless it provides some excellent examples of the very same kinds of distortions and fallacies that routinely undermine the good intentions of ‘critical anthropology’. Of course it must be said that outside a few regrettable exceptions (e.g. Ravenhill’s ‘Culture of Homelessness’ which I will discuss further down), the study of homelessness and the study of ‘culture’ arguably have different aims. Where anthropology traditionally aimed to understand how particular cultures work from an ‘insider’s’ point of view, ‘homelessness studies’, while employing some of anthropology’s methods, frames its object in entirely different terms. Homelessness, such is the tenor, is not so much a phenomenon to be investigated as it is a problem to be solved. Research therefore has a legitimate interest to uncover the causes of homelessness and make suggestions as to how it can be eliminated.

On the positive side, this preoccupation assigns a purpose to the practice of inquiry that legitimately transcends a sheer ‘thirst for knowledge’ (which, in the worst of cases, is driven – and funded – by an interest in domination and
exploitation). Even the most politically conservative explanations for homelessness are based on at least a performative commitment to its elimination (although the method of elimination may be debatable). This means that such research has a defined practical purpose and thus is inherently normative and at least potentially critical of the status quo. However, that does not mean that it is *explicitly* so, and thus the underlying assumptions about 'how the world should be' in order to end homelessness are often left unexplained.

On the downside, there are inherent limitations in the kind of question such inquiry can ask. The disciplinary institutional context that research takes place in determines to an extent how far the net can be cast in the search of potential causes for a problem. There are certain questions – the legitimacy of private property being one of them – that can only be asked within ‘reasoned debate’ with great difficulty, and have to be shrouded in either the most abstract theoretical detachment or precisely the relegation of evaluative judgment to the realm of the ‘subjective’ I have pointed to above. Thus, an explanation such as BHAM’s “People are motivated to squat by a combination of simple need for space and shelter, and a desire to resist a system that allows property to lie empty while there is social need for it” (flyer) must be presented in a way that relegates it to the status of a subcultural trope, an expression of ideology, or a discursive metaphor. In order to liberate such claims from this epistemological straitjacket, it would be necessary to identify a meta-theoretical framework on the basis of which such claims are least potentially about something other than the speaker’s personal sensitivities. As I have said above, I consider Critical Realism a suitable basis for such an endeavour, and I will therefore here give the briefest of introductions to what it is, before turning to the question of what it can do for us.

At the core of Critical Realist meta-theory is its model of a stratified and emergent reality. ‘Stratified’ means that CR assumes different ‘levels’ of reality, which are more or less accessible to empirical investigation. Bhaskar (1978/2013, 56) speaks of three ‘ontological domains’: the Empirical, the Actual and the Real.

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51 See also chapters 9 and 10
Simply speaking, the Empirical domain refers to that which can be experienced, the Actual is that which happens whether we experience it or not, and the Real, finally, is the domain of what Bhaskar calls ‘powers and mechanisms’: those events that cause things in the domains of the actual and the empirical to happen, and that are not directly accessible to empirical investigation. At the same time, reality is ‘emergent’ in that powers and mechanisms\textsuperscript{52} found in the deeper strata combine in particular ways to bring forth phenomena in the higher strata in qualitatively new combinations. Of course, some anthropologists may bristle at the notion of ‘causation’ when it comes to describing social phenomena. The word invokes a crude empiricism which anthropology is supposed to have buried along with its colonial past. However, within a Critical Realist framework, ‘causes’ are conceptualised not as deterministic cause-effect relationships, but as interrelated and mutually constituting ‘mechanisms’ that concurrently influence social objects. Since social systems are necessarily ‘open’ systems (as opposed to experimental settings, which are by definition ‘closed systems’), mechanisms rarely act in isolation, but rather, mutually re-enforce or weaken one another. It therefore becomes possible to speak of powers and structures that make the emergence of certain social phenomena more or less likely, without assuming a straightforward causal relationship that leaves little room for agency or variation in outcome. By way of an example: if one assumes that the housing market is one of the mechanisms that underlie the emergence of homelessness, this is not the same as saying ‘the housing market causes homelessness’. The housing market does not causally determine homelessness, rather, in combination with other powers and mechanisms, it creates a tendency for homelessness to emerge that is on the other hand amplified or extenuated by other mechanisms (such as e.g. state intervention or kinship structures).

As I will discuss in the next chapter, this notion of causation allows us to examine the claims of our respondents as to why they do what they do in a fresh light. Here, however, I am mainly concerned with the question of the potential factual accuracy of such claims, that is, with the notion of ‘truth’. Since the ubiquitous

\textsuperscript{52} For further discussion of what is meant by ‘powers and mechanisms’ see chapter four
linguistic turn in the Social Sciences, this word has practically disappeared from anthropological writing, except in the form of the subjective claims of actors to be telling it. As Sayer (2005) argues, this state of affairs is ‘disastrous’, not only for the project of arriving at any kind of rational understanding of the social world, but first and foremost for those situations in which our interlocutors confront us with politicised expressions of pain, suffering and oppression. At the same time, however, anthropology, perhaps more than any other discipline, must be vigilant to the implications the idea of truth has in a world where not just the relationship between anthropology and some of its interlocutors, but also (at least some of the time) that between these interlocutors and their social world, is one of hierarchical power relations. After all, the reason the category of ‘truth’ has come into disrepute in the first place is because anthropologists, as part of the with the rest of the white, Western “Rational Man Project” (Duffell, 2014), have in the past tended to claim exclusive ownership to it. I will therefore use the word here in the sense that Critical Realists apply it: Truth is a kind of knowledge that is “practically adequate to the world” (Sayer 1992, p70). The idea of practical adequacy allows one to speak of ‘truth’ not as absolute, totalising knowledge, but rather addresses the fact that some interpretations of the social world are more adequate to what it actually looks like than others. The job of inquiry, then, is to find out which interpretations those are, by way of what Critical Realism calls “explanatory critique” (Bhaskar, 1987/2009), which I will discuss in the next chapter.

Critical Realism is conceptualised as an alternative to both foundationalist and antifoundationalist positions in Social Science\(^{53}\), and it is precisely the tension between these two positions that in a politicised form underlies anthropology’s perpetual ‘crisis’. In social and cultural anthropology, positivist, empiricist

\(^{53}\) ‘Foundationalism’ refers to a position that regards as ‘scientific’ strictly that which is empirically observable and tries to deduce general laws from empirical data. ‘Antifoundationalist’, on the other hand, are those positions that emphasize the locality and contextuality of knowledge and reject totalizing and universalist claims made by objectivist science.
‘science’ is often seen as something to be avoided at all cost – after all, the naïve optimism about the empirical accessibility of the ‘native’s point of view’ that informed early anthropological endeavours turned out to be misguided (not least because of critique’s like Bourdieu’s), and the impetus to discover the transcultural ‘universal laws’ of human society has consequently all but crumbled under the force of constructivist critiques. The case of anthropology underscores, perhaps in a particularly painful way, how closely objectivist approaches to science were tied in with the colonial project of imposing the principles of ‘Western’ rationality as superior to and inclusive of all possible other views of the world. At the same time, however, the discipline’s embracing of the ‘crisis of objectivism’ has resulted in the nearly unsolvable double bind of trying to say something worthwhile while avoiding universalist claims to ‘truth’, and has thus has left anthropologists caught uncomfortably between a positivist rock and a subjectivist hard place.

A great example of this problem is the controversy between Mary Madden and the authors of *Braving the streets: the anthropology of homelessness*, Irene Glasser and Rae Bridgman, in the journal *Critique of Anthropology*. Glasser and Bridgman claim to deliver nothing short of “the best information on homelessness garnered throughout the world” (Glasser and Bridgman, 1999, xi), specifically stressing a “native or ‘emic’ point of view as anthropologists refer to it” (ibid). They discuss at length various definitions of the term “homeless” and who, by circumstance or self-appointment, may fall under this category, and profess that “through the utilization of extended fieldwork, a holistic approach and cross-cultural perspectives, anthropologists attempt to understand what drives individuals to life on the streets and to shelters, and what prevents them from gaining permanent and secure housing” (6), eventually concluding that

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54 A slightly different picture emerges in the ‘biological’ and ‘cognitive’ branches of the discipline, leading to a rather regrettable intra-disciplinary split between ‘positivists’ and ‘constructivists’

55 Who place their work in a tradition of anthropological research on poor ‘subcultures’ in North America such as Spradley’s *You Owe Yourself a Drunk*, Elliot Liebow’s *Tally’s Corner* and Carol Stack’s *All Our Kin* (Glasser and Bridgman, 1999)
“careful and extensive fieldwork, and a philosophy of cultural relativism, that is, understanding how each element of a culture fits into the larger cultural context without passing moral judgements, form the intellectual underpinnings of anthropological homelessness research today” (ibid.) and „the insider’s approach attempts to avoid the a priori categories of other disciplines, and therefore enables us to see the world through the eyes of the homeless themselves“. (7)

Glasser and Bridgman exhibit an astonishing degree of faith in the potential of ethnographic research to ‘directly access’ the reality of homelessness ‘through the eyes of the homeless’. Their approach is reminiscent of Rosaldo’s (1993) figure of the ‘Lone Ethnographer’ who sets out with a commitment to retrieve the objective and timeless truth of the native and turn it into an objectified museum piece to be archived. The supposed aim of their ethnography (to unearth ‘what drives individuals to life on the street’) betrays an unreflected ideological complicity with individualising explanations of homelessness, and thus arguably manages to fulfil Rosaldo’s criterion of “complicity with imperialism” (31) while geographically remaining at home. In reifying homelessness as an objective phenomenon that is the same ‘throughout the world’ Glasser and Bridgman provide a shining example of the sort of universalizing and totalizing thinking that has brought anthropology into disrepute, while at the same time justifying their lack of ‘moral judgment’ with what they call ‘cultural relativism’, thereby also illustrating how moral relativism can become a smokescreen for the cognitive distortion of disaffectedness.

The constructivist answer is exemplified in Mary Madden’s scathing review of Braving the Streets. Invoking an intellectual tradition from Saussure via Foucault to Said, she reminds us that “‘The homeless’ and ‘the street’ are constructed categories with culturally and historically specific meanings” (Madden, 2003, 290) and accuses Glasser and Bridgman of „positioning the normalized viewing ‘I’ as gazing on and attempting to understand the Other”, so that “their work uncritically reproduces aspects of the colonial encounter inherent in the history of ethnography” (293). Madden discusses at length Glasser and Bridgman’s
romanticising notions of the street homeless as modern ‘nomads’, as well as the author's presumed commitment to ‘fixing’ the issue of homelessness in accordance with the requirements of the disciplinary apparatus that produces it in the first place.

“In Foucauldian terms, the human sciences do not simply constitute a site from which to comment or act on the operations of the state but form a crucial and integral part of its functioning. Therefore Glasser and Bridgman’s work has disciplinary power in another unacknowledged sense. It is part of the process of the formation of the homeless subject as Other“ (294).

Madden’s response is rooted in a tradition that, coming from a Nietzschean perspectivism, casts doubt on the possibility of objective appreciations of reality, since all such appreciations come from a particular point of view. This point of view, as Foucault has said, is never ‘neutral’ but reflects ubiquitous power relations within society and thus any statement as to the nature of reality must be examined as to whether it is rooted in and perpetuates such power relations. In the debate on the scientific method in general, this point of view is exemplified in perspectives such as that of Richard Rorty, who asserts that since all knowledge is dependent on perspective, there is no transcendental or ‘God’s eye’ perspective from which objective reality can be accessed (Rorty, 1979). Consequently, all descriptions of reality are relative, contextual, and ultimately reducible to what Rorty terms “language games” (Danermark et al, 2002, 9).

At first glance, this epistemological argument appears to relieve anthropology from its objectivist baggage and provide it with a more level playing field in which the interpretations and experiences of the Other are no more or less valid than those of the anthropologist. It corresponds with the so-called ‘fourth moment’ or crisis of representation in anthropology that called for a more reflexive and relativistic approach to anthropological research. Questions of positionality and authorship came to the forefront of anthropological debate and the entire

56 see Geertz, 1988; Clifford&Marcus, 1986; Marcus&Fischer, 1986; etc
project of anthropological representation of the Other was critically examined, both in terms of the conceptual misapprehension of ‘cultures’ as bounded wholes, and in terms of the political ramifications of such totalizing accounts. As Said puts it, anthropologists had acted “to shut and block out the clamor of voices on the outside asking for their claims about empire and domination to be considered” (Said, 1979, 219). Against an anthropological practice that had silenced all voices other than the authoritative one of the anthropologist, and had thus helped to dominate the ‘colonial other’ through representation, the constructivist paradigm appeared to make space for the ‘voices on the outside’ to be heard.

On second glance, however, this approach creates at least as many problems as it purports to solve. For one thing, a strong constructivism turned into political critique has an inevitable tendency to invalidate itself by way of its own categorical logic. If social categories are indeed the product of speech acts then the constructivist standpoint, in critiquing a power differential it has itself postulated, is doing precisely what it criticises, namely categorically constructing a subjugated other. In more practical terms, however, the relativistic and pluralistic position that was meant to give (back) a voice to anthropology’s ‘other’ can just as well be seen to do the exact opposite. Here is another example from the anthropology of homelessness:

Robert Desjarlais Shelter Blues – Sanity and Selfhood among the homeless (1997), coming from a similarly Foucauldian background as Madden, takes great care to critically engage popular images of the homeless as the grotesque, undisciplined, dirty other of civilised society. However, his subsequent analysis of shelter resident’s lives and interactions with state and bureaucracy, as well as with the architecture surrounding them, frames their experience in terms of ‘language games’ and ‘constructions of self-representations’ that produce accounts like:

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57 As it has been remarked, taken to its most extreme, constructivism invariably proceeds to deconstruct itself (Danermark et al, 2002)
58 A move that is at least a little ambiguous since it appears to imply that in reality the homeless are pretty, hardworking and clean-washed just like the rest of us
“(T)hey often alluded to some private feeling or personal trouble, but primarily for practical reasons: by noting a pain or oppression, the complaints could effect a reality to which one's audience might feel compelled to respond.” (Desjarlais, 1997, 189). While Desjarlais thus fully acknowledges the social construction of 'homelessness' as a category and the validity of homeless voices in principle, the 'pain and oppression' that these voices communicate, for him becomes just another discursive strategy in the construction of selfhood, and is ultimately reduced to the status of attention seeking. I do not in any way want to imply that this is Desjarlais' intention – rather, the problem is that within his meta-theoretical paradigm, he has very little alternative.

As we have seen above, within a meta-theoretical framework that "lower-cases" notions such as 'truth' or 'reason' (Rabinow, 1992, 7), statements that people make about social reality inevitably come to be seen as subjective, performative and, ultimately, as strategies of domination of whatever relationship they may be uttered within. As a result, it appears as if

“flourishing or suffering are no more than what prevailing ways of thinking define them as, regardless of how they relate to our capabilities and susceptibilities – indeed, the latter are themselves deemed to be voluntaristically constructed. On this view, concepts of oppression, or violation, or abuse are incomprehensible, for there is nothing independent of the practices to which they refer that can be damaged by them: the damage can only exist in the mind of the beholder” (Sayer, 2005, 11)

This, then, is where a strong constructivism spectacularly backfires in terms of representing people in general and marginalised or oppressed people in particular. Granted, the anthropologist has been stripped of his/her claim to know the 'truth of the native' – but so has the native. The notion of 'language games' implies that whatever is said is a strategic intervention in a power dynamic rather than a (potential) statement about reality, and that in principle, no statement can be assumed to refer to anything outside of the discursive situation. The ‘pain and oppression’ these people allege therefore cannot be assumed to be an account of actually existing misery, because in this paradigm
there is no concept of ‘actually existing’. It is debatable whether this approach does anything to alleviate the totalising claims of anthropology to know the ultimate truth of its respondents – Desjarlais appears confident that in dissecting his interlocutor’s discursive strategies, he knows what they are up to. But instead of presenting his account as the ‘ultimate truth’ of homelessness (as Glasser and Bridgman do), he implicitly denies that such truth can even exist. In terms of a politically engaged anthropology, this is highly problematic in that it silences not only the ‘oppressor’ but, even more effectively, the ‘oppressed’. It undermines any possibility of a critique of the political and economic circumstances that homeless people’s situation arises from, because there is no common denominator of a ‘reality’ that their complaints may objectively refer to. If we assume, however, that homelessness is (for example) the product of an uneven distribution of wealth in society, then it must be possible to critically address this circumstance – to pull the ‘epistemological rug’ out from under precisely those political arguments which (by virtue of being at the bottom end of this relation) would have reason to criticise it, seems at best ill informed, and at worst, malicious.59

In the light of this dilemma, a Critical Realist framework first and foremost can serve to reinforce the project of an anthropology that takes seriously the aim of providing a basis on which the political claims of the other can be heard. It does so by assuming that while “all knowledge is fallible, not all knowledge is equally fallible” (Danermark et al, 2002, 17), that is, claims about reality (particularly the reality of supposed oppression) are not merely subjective constructions, but at least potentially correspond to something that exists. By assuming that reality has ‘ontological depth’ (Bhaskar, 1978) and that social phenomena are the product of powers and mechanisms that may not be directly observable, but can be accessed through the method of retroductive argument (i.e. asking the question ‘what would have to be the case for this to be the outcome?’), CR thus

59 It seems significant to me that historically, the emergence of constructivist approaches in the Social Sciences coincides with the point at which various oppressed groups (women, people of colour, the ‘colonial subaltern’) first began to make their own voices heard. It is a bit as if we were saying: ‘first we professed to know the absolute truth about you, but now that you’ve joined the debate let’s just say all is relative’.

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opens up a space in which political claims like BHAM’s can be examined beyond the level of mere performativity. While this epistemological move is not a political analysis per se, it provides the ground on which political analysis can be examined under the assumption of the possibility of its accuracy. To assume the ontological possibility of truth thus is not only crucial for any kind of (social) scientific inquiry, it is even more crucial for the emancipatory projects of those whose voices have gone from ignored to relativised.

Before moving on to a more-in-depth discussion of the ‘powers and mechanisms’ that shaped the lives of squatters, let me briefly consider the problem of structure and agency\(^{60}\) and the CR ‘solution’ as far as they are relevant for my discussion here. While it is beyond the scope of this text to discuss the great volume of work on this issue in detail, and demonstrate how the CR model differs from other approaches (see e.g. Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 2014), the question of agency and its relationship to structural conditions is arguably a crucial aspect of a critical analysis of squatting. On the one hand, as I will discuss in the next chapter, both academic and political discussions of homelessness are frequently suspended in an uneasy balance between interpretations that favour individualising and those that favour collective, structurally oriented explanations. While the relationship between these two factors is a topic of academic interest, it is also and most importantly one with potentially grave consequences for policy and practice, and thus the lives of actual homeless people. On the other hand, squatter’s own paradoxical attitude to their practice illustrates the same problematic: groups like BHAM vocally emphasised the necessity of identifying and resolving structural problems that lead to rising homelessness, such as economic inequality, patterns of property ownership, etc. At the same time though, the abovementioned difference they made between a homeless person and a

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\(^{60}\) As I have mentioned before, the inflationary use of ‘agency’ for any kind of ‘having an effect in the world’ has unfortunately led to the concept being watered down to the point of meaning everything and nothing. I therefore think that it could be useful, especially when talking about people’s relation to the world around them, to reframe ‘agency’ around something like Metzinger’s PMIR, but to do so (let alone reframe the ‘agency/structure’ problem along these lines) is certainly outside the scope of this thesis. I will therefore in the following stick with ‘agency’.
squat also demonstrates that precisely not remaining helpless and passive in the face of these structural dynamics was a crucial part of their identity and self-understanding. Poignantly, one could say that the difference between a squatter and a homeless person is precisely that the squatter is a homeless person who musters enough agency to go out and solve his housing problem through direct action. Charities like Crisis are certainly critical of this type of agency, since in their view it prevents people from getting the kind of help they consider appropriate. Squatters themselves, however, frequently felt that the official system took their agency away and stripped them of their choices, and many were more comfortable taking their housing situation into their own hands. They were often extremely critical of the ways ‘society’ had caused their problems, and simultaneously took great pride in their (often remarkable) abilities to not only survive but to thrive under these difficult circumstances. In order not to discount either their political analysis or their claim to agency, the question must therefore be: what is the relationship between the two?\(^{61}\)

The CR account of structure and agency is, essentially, an attempt to find an alternative to a Durkheimian model, which sees social objects as “possessing a life of their own, external to and coercing the individual” (Bhaskar, 2014, 31) and a Weberian one in which, „social objects are seen as the results of (or as constituted by) intentional or meaningful human behaviour“ (ibid.). CR, however, also rejects what it calls ‘central-conflationist’ approaches such as put forward by Berger and Luckmann (1991) and also in a modified form by Giddens (1979)\(^{62}\), since these, according to Bhaskar, conflate individual and social factors without sufficiently accounting for the mode of mediation between the two. The

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\(^{61}\) The same dilemma plays out in other contexts, for example in the discussion about prostitution/sex-work, where a gulf extends between interpretations that see it as a structural institution of oppression and those that focus on women’s choice and agency (Anderson/Andrijasevic, 2008). While one side insists that focusing on agency is cynical and victim-blaming, the other objects to being denied agency and choice and being treated as helpless and powerless. The problem is simply not resolvable without taking a closer look at the structure/agency dilemma more generally.

\(^{62}\) Fitzpatrick (2005) sees the CR model as equivalent to Giddens’ theory of structuration, although Bhaskar explicitly denies this. He sees Giddens as a proponent of what he terms a ‘central-conflationist theory’ which does not sufficiently account for the specific factor of mediation.
CR model, therefore, holds that individuals and society mutually constitute and reproduce each other in a *dialectically mediated* form:

> "People do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did so...Society, then, provides the necessary conditions for intentional human action, and intentional human action is a necessary condition for it." (2014, 36-7)

‘Dialectically mediated’ means, in simple terms, that two factors are mutually constitutive, mutually exclusive and stand in a relative power relation to each other that results in a conflictual, dynamic tension (i.e. *dynamic contradiction*). As Bhaskar emphasises, while individuals and society mutually constitute each other, there is also an “ontological hiatus” (1978, 40) between them, since society in its developed form is also independent of and prior to individual action. This means that individuals both transform and reproduce society, but they do not strictly speaking ‘create’ it, since it also always predates them63 (see also Archer, 1995) – while the dynamic tension between individuals and society drives a continuous historical movement toward change, it is therefore also always hampered and slowed down by different kinds of historical ‘baggage’.

In practical terms, this model gives us an opportunity to account for both structure and agency, while simultaneously recognising that ‘agency’ does not necessarily equal ‘completely unrestrained freedom to act in any way one pleases’. I would therefore suggest – although due to limited space I cannot expand on the idea here - that in the context of squatting (but potentially also in the context of other debates) it could be helpful to further develop concepts such

63 “Society is both the everpresent condition (material cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency. And praxis is both work, that is, conscious production, and (normally unconscious) reproduction of the conditions of production, that is society. One could refer to the former as the duality of structure, and the latter as the duality of praxis” (Bhaskar, 1978, 37, emph. orig.).
as “coerced agency” as suggested by Hartman (1997, 7). This would be a form of agency, which, while exerted by an individual voluntarily and deliberately, is produced, enforced and circumscribed by the structural conditions the person lives under. Squatters could then still be seen as homeless people who exert agency through direct action – but at the same time, it would be possible to identify this form of agency as one which would not exist if structural factors – from the housing market to austerity politics – did not conspire to produce a situation in which this form of agency becomes necessary, reasonable and, for some, unavoidable. Like Marx’ ‘doubly free’ worker, who is free to sell his labour power in any way he wants, but is not free to not sell it, a squatter could then be seen as a homeless person who takes their fate into their own hands – but arguably would not have to do so if they were not, for structural reasons, homeless in the first place. The fact of homelessness therefore is the condition of possibility of a form of agency and a range of choices that, without it, would not be necessary, beneficial or even meaningful – the freedom to act is here therefore a coerced form of freedom. This way, it becomes possible to see agency not as the absolute other of structural affectedness, but as its necessary outcome – and at the same time, potentially its transformation.

I hope that in the course of this chapter it has become clearer why I am taking what is possibly the scenic route to my discussion of the ‘moral construction of space’, taking a critical look at the foundations of anthropological inquiry in the process. On the one hand this is simply a – perhaps transparent – attempt to strategically enlist meta-theory in order to endow my respondent’s claims and interpretations of the world with as much ontological gravity as possible. This does not mean, of course, that everything they say about the world and their place in it is necessarily factually correct – like myself, the squatters could of course be wrong about what the world is like. But I would rather present their (and my own) accounts here as true and have them shown to be false, than presenting them as something that cannot be proven true or false because it is merely somebody’s personal opinion, related to nothing in particular.
On the other hand, and perhaps less obviously, the very concept of an ethics of recognition depends on the assumption of the ‘ontologically real’, because if people are supposed to recognise each other as subjects, then ‘subject’ (however defined) must refer to something that a) objectively exists and b) is interpersonally recognisable. Conversely, if there is no such thing as truth, then there can be no such thing as misrecognition, because there is nothing there that could be misrecognised. My fellow subject could then jump up and down in front of me until she goes blue in the face, demanding her humanity to be recognised, and I could just shrug and reply “what is this ‘humanity’ you're talking of?” (I am being only slightly hyperbolic, as my above examples demonstrate). In chapter 8, I will argue that this very effect is all but unintentional – it is, in a sense, what a particular kind of epistemic stance is designed to do, both individually and socially. For the time being, however, I want to assure my reader that we are well under way to the ‘moral construction of space’ – we have just constructed the discursive space in which we are going to hear what the squatters had to say about the causes of their political practice, both in the sense of reasons and in the sense of goals. In the next chapter, we will take a closer look at the relationship between the structural reasons for squatting and the political aims of squatters, and establish the concept of ‘ethical patterns’, which we will then identify as informing different spatial configurations.
Chapter Four: Causes and Reasons

The thing worse than rebellion is the thing that causes rebellion. Frederick Douglass

So far, I have sketched the outline of an ethics based on mutual recognition and shared vulnerability, and argued that such a model is relevant in the context both of the anthropological fieldwork relationship, and the kinds of relationships that political actors like squatters form among each other. Parallel to this discussion, I have argued that a realist paradigm – here, in the shape of Critical Realism – is an important theoretical tool for an anthropology that wants to avoid the universalising/totalising mistakes of the past, without resigning itself to a mere “hermeneutic representation of practices” (Bourdieu, 1977, 1). Finally, I have promised that I will identify some ways in which the kinds of relationships we have begun to call ‘recognition’ and ‘misrecognition’ come to bear on the social construction of space. This, of course, raises some general questions. How would a particular form of human relating – that between mutually recognising subjects, or that between a subject and a (misrecognised) object – translate into a specific spatial configuration? If there is such a thing as a ‘space of recognition’ or a ‘space of misrecognition’, then how and why does it happen that an abstract relational structure manifests itself as a concrete spatial arrangement? In more general terms, how does it happen that any kind of ethical configuration – what in everyday discourse is often called ‘values’ – translates into a particular kind of interpersonal (and thus political) practice? In order to address these questions, I will in this chapter look at squatting as a practical form of what Critical Realism calls ‘explanatory critique’:

“In its basic form an explanatory critique demonstrates that, if we can show a belief to be both false and necessary\textsuperscript{64}, that is, explain it in terms of underlying social causes, then inference to the negative evaluation of its sources and the positive evaluation of action oriented to removing them is mandatory. It thus unites criticism

\textsuperscript{64} I.e. under the given circumstances unavoidable
Explanatory critique’ therefore means to identify what causes a false belief (such as, speaking from a squatter’s perspective, the belief that the interests of private property trump the interests of people without shelter), and then to proceed to remove these causes, so that more ‘practically adequate’ beliefs can emerge. At the same time, ‘explanatory critique’ can be practical rather than theoretical – for example, BHAM, whom we have met in the last chapter, did not only address false beliefs about homelessness – it directly addressed what it considered false states of being, caused by specific underlying social phenomena (see Collier 1994, and below). What is important about this concept is that it points to the connection between ‘causes’ in the sense of ‘the kinds of phenomena that make other phenomena happen’, and ‘causes’ in the sense of ‘the political aims and goals that people believe should come to replace the status quo’.

For the squatters, and many other political movements, the critique of social conditions implied, at least by extension, some kind of normative project of what things should be like instead. This alternative model was not so much a detailed political programme or utopian master plan, but evolved, somewhat akin to Adorno’s ‘ethics of resistance’ (Finlayson, 2002), from the negation of that which is and the conditions that cause it to be like that. The mode of explanatory critique therefore provides a clue as to how evaluative judgment comes to be translated into action – and this is exactly the question I will have to address when arguing how patterns of ethical relating translate into practices of constructing space. I will therefore in this chapter have a closer look at the causes of squatting – both in the sense of ‘what makes it happen’ and ‘what does it try to achieve’ – and specifically, at what constitutes the mode of translation between the two. In so far as the squatters defined their practice as reaction to the condition of homelessness, I will start with providing a general overview of the kinds of explanations that ‘homelessness studies’ have provided for this issue, and, in the second part of the chapter, examine how squatter’s own interpretations differed
from them. This will eventually bring us to the concept of ‘ethical patterns’ and thus, to a better understanding of how people’s ideas about ‘the good’ shape the production of space.

That the aims of squatting are closely related to the identification of the reasons for social ills is not a new insight. Prujit (2013) for example offers a taxonomy of squatting projects that lists five “configurations”: deprivation-based squatting; squatting as an alternative housing strategy; entrepreneurial squatting; conservational squatting and political squatting (2013, 21). Each of these corresponds to a different conception of social problems – lack of affordable living space for the poor, danger to sites of cultural significance, etc. – and employs different strategies to amend those. For example in ‘deprivation based squatting’, there is

“an organizational pattern that makes a clear distinction between activists and squatters...the activists open up buildings for the squatters and support them....the central demand in this configuration does not involve structural change, but instead focuses on helping the squatters obtain (temporary) leases or alternative accommodation” (ibid.).

In ‘political squatting’, in contrast, “squatting is not a goal in its own right; it is attractive because of its high potential for confrontations with the state...because here the involvement in squatting is driven by an ulterior anti-systemic political motive” (44). Prujit’s data comes mainly from the Netherlands, and it is therefore possible that these clear distinctions apply in the Dutch context. In the UK however, and Bristol in particular, while all of these configurations could be observed, projects could rarely be assigned to just one category65. Prujit contends, “conceptually, squatting projects are the units of analysis. A squatting project can only belong to a single configuration, but it is possible for squatting projects

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65 Although, as I will discuss in chapter 6, Bristol squatters did refer to some squats as more ‘political’ than others, what they usually meant was that in addition to removing a housing need, the inhabitants of these squats also subscribed to some kind of political ideology, most often Anarchism. What they certainly did not mean was that their only motivation for squatting was an opportunity to throw bricks at the establishment.
belonging to different configurations to share the same building” (21). Thus defined, there is no place in his model for hybrid configurations within projects or for a diverse array of sub-units such as crews (not always congruent with squats), families/couples or individuals. Equally, Prujit’s highly compartmentalised model does not account for changes over time, such as when for example a former ‘deprivation-squat’ becomes more stable and thus more politicised. BHAM itself was most obviously a combination of ‘deprivation based’ and ‘political’ squatting, since its members helped ‘the homeless’, but also wanted to affect systemic change. Most importantly, BHAM saw no theoretical or practical contradiction between one and the other, since for them, the sustained practice of helping others obtain shelter was a way of affecting structural change.

The difficulty with Prujit’s taxonomy of squats is in a lot of ways a mirror image of the difficulty in defining in what, exactly, constitutes homelessness. The literature virtually blossoms with neatly compartmentalised descriptions of types of homeless people, definitions which (usually in a policy-oriented manner) try to establish a list of positive criteria that must be present for someone to fall into one category or the other. In this way, authors have arrived at various taxonomies of ‘rough sleepers’, the ‘precariously housed’, the ‘hidden homeless’ etc., and there is on-going lively debate about who should be included in what category and why. The multitude and heterogeneity of definitions has led some scholars to suggest that: “...there is no such thing as homelessness, but instead a range of heterogeneous characteristics that give rise to a wide range of symptoms that we term ‘homelessness’” (Williams, 2001, 1). Williams is of course not suggesting that there are no people without shelter, merely that the categories used to describe them are so numerous and contradictory as to be practically useless. He does, however (Williams 2003), compare ‘homelessness’

66There appears to be a persistent impulse among a particular kind of squatter (notably the one who writes academic books) to distance ‘political’ squatting from the kind that has “no other motivation than to remedy a desperate situation, secretly and in silence” (Cattaneo et al, 2014, 3). I am not entirely sure what is behind this impetus, but I suspect that this is a variety on the theme of denying and projecting vulnerability, neediness and dependency; making these traits ‘other’ to one’s own autonomous macho-activist habitus. In Bristol, I have observed this kind of attitude in a handful of individual squatters, but it was by no means generally accepted.
to ‘Greekness’ in order to argue that ‘homelessness’ is essentially an empty category, which only exists by virtue of the identification of those subject to it. Fitzpatrick (2005, see also below) challenges this assumption by arguing that “homelessness... is not a cultural phenomenon but rather a signifier of objective material and social conditions, and as such intersubjective recognition is, I would argue, less central to its existence” (p12) – in other words, homelessness is not a matter of identity. The conflation of 'objective material conditions' with (socially constructed) cultural categories is an example of what CR refers to as the ‘epistemic fallacy’. In Bhaskar’s original terms, the epistemic fallacy “consists in the view that statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be transposed into epistemological terms. The idea that being can always be analysed in terms of our knowledge of being, that it is sufficient for philosophy to ‘treat only of the network, and not what the network describes’ (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, § 6.35, footnote in orig.) results in the systematic dissolution of the idea of a world (which I shall here metaphorically characterize as an ontological realm) independent of but investigated by science” (Bhaskar, 1978/2013, p 26f).

In collapsing ontology (what is)\(^67\) into epistemology (i.e. what and how we can know about what is), social scientists end up producing ‘flat’\(^68\) accounts of the

\(^{67}\) Another prominent example of this fallacy in anthropology is the recent debate on ‘multiple ontologies’ in the course of the so called ‘ontological turn’ (e.g. Holbraad et al, 2014, Holbraad, 2012, Henare et al. 2007). As commentators such as Heywood (2012) note, this use of the term ‘ontology’ is fundamentally different from its use in analytical philosophy: “Holbraad and others use the word ‘ontology’ precisely because of the connotations of ‘reality’ and ‘being’ it brings with it; yet they neglect to acknowledge that insisting on the ‘reality’ of multiple worlds commits you to a meta-ontology in which such worlds exist” (Heywood, 2012, 146; for a similar critique see Laidlaw, 2012). Although such a meta-ontology is not per se out of the question, it is usually not what these anthropologists refer to. Rather, they want to emphasise that the interpretations of the world various actors hold can be seen as so incommensurable that they appear to refer to different ‘worlds’. Since these theorists are, however, still concerned with *interpretations* of what the world is like, they are still operating in the realm of epistemology, i.e. what they refer to as ‘multiple ontologies’ is, from a CR perspective, actually multiple epistemologies with very, very different premises. The ‘ontological turn’ therefore appears to entail a more extreme version of the kind of radical perspectivism that (as I discuss in chapter three) constitutes anthropology’s perpetual ‘crisis’ and against which my CR model is explicitly formulated.

\(^{68}\) ‘Flatness’ refers to the conflation of a statistical co-occurrence with an account of causation, which, according to CR, requires an account of ‘ontological depth’, i.e. the assumption that
The difficulty ‘homelessness research’ has in establishing a clear definition of ‘homelessness’ repeats itself on the level of explaining its causes. Traditionally, explanations of homelessness have been suspended between those that focused on individual responsibility and those that focus on structural factors. An example of the individualist kind is Megan Ravenhill’s The Culture of Homelessness (2008). Ravenhill uses the word ‘culture’ to explain how the survival practices of homeless people are actually to blame for homelessness. Ravenhill’s discussion of the ‘roots’ of homelessness focuses almost exclusively on factors in the individual lives of her subjects, as if there was ‘no such thing as society’, and indeed the language she uses seems to be borrowed directly from a Conservative Party manifesto. She identifies adverse childhood experiences as one of the major causes of “rooflessness” (Margaret Thatcher’s preferred term for the homeless), along with “institutionalization, prostitution, drug and alcohol abuse, personality disorders – as well as more mundane problems such as the breakdown of adult relationships and tragic-comically trivial barriers to resettlement” (xvii), plus the fact that homeless people become accustomed to their predicament remarkably quickly. The titling ‘culture’ of homelessness to her then are those social relationships that people on the street form and that, in her view, provide a

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causes and mechanisms on the level of the Real produce what science can measure in terms of a co-occurrence of categories on the level of the Empirical.

69 The problem is to some degree that in working backwards from a descriptive category, as is the usual mode of social science research (e.g. in deciding to research ‘homelessness’ or a particular ‘culture’) one has already pre-defined a sample. On discovering that this sample has heterogeneous characteristics, one then has to explain these differences. This approach is methodologically opposed to one which, as I have done in this ethnography, starts with a loosely defined sample and looks for common elements or patterns which explain how and why the sample has some degree of inner coherence (similarly to a Grounded Theory approach, see Glaser/Strauss, 1967). I have, for example, adopted the phrase ‘persons who have no fixed address’ to characterise my respondents, since this seems to be the most prominent common element uniting them. But even this wide definition still encompasses a wildly different array of people from an equally wide array of backgrounds, who were linked by a network based on a particular form of explanatory critique, resulting in direct action. To explain what these people have in common merely in terms of co-occurring characteristics (in the sense of sociological categories) would therefore be missing the point of their association as they understand it.
subcultural social context that they find hard to escape: “if we are serious about preventing and resolving rooflessness we need to understand the importance of the homeless culture, in attracting and holding members” (145). After providing an exhaustive taxonomy of these seductive subcultural currents, she asserts that what she calls the “homeless industry” (namely shelters, social work and charities) plays a crucial part in keeping these ‘cultures’ alive and well.

On the other end of the individual vs. structure spectrum is Kathleen Arnold’s *Homelessness, Citizenship and Identity* (2004). Arnold analyses homelessness as a political and economic problem: “Homelessness represents the extreme case of (...) economic marginalization and thus is worth exploring for what it tells us about political economic norms, the status of democracy, and the deployment of prerogative power in the modern nation-state” (3). Arnold does not so much attempt to ‘explain’ homelessness as she uses the issue to launch an attack on the concept of citizenship and the nation state, which, in her view, are instrumental in producing it:

“The forces that homeless people deal with are disenfranchise and social ‘death’, degrading myths and stereotypes, punitive treatment by case-workers, deficient school systems that perpetuate illiteracy and joblessness, and most importantly, the loss of rights as a citizen, and thus, as a human that these individuals suffer. Perhaps some people are responsible for their homelessness, but in this milieu, it is difficult to tell. And why should they suffer such dire consequences?” (ibid)

The latter question – although asked here in a more rhetorical fashion – is indeed pertinent, and in the following chapters, I will suggest a few possible answers. For the time being, Arnold’s and Ravenhill’s approaches can be seen as exemplary of the kinds of arguments about the causes of homelessness – and, by extension, about what should be done to end it – made by political and social groups on the

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70 For further discussion of the British Conservative Party's attitude to 'rooflessness', see chapters 9 and 10
left and right of the political spectrum. For example BHAM, who would certainly want nothing to do with anything to the right of the political centre, makes an explicit connection between “commercial property developers”, the “housing crisis” and “the rising tide of people being made homeless”, and campaigns not only for housing for its individual membership, but also “against the privatisation of public land and housing and for the defence of public space”. In its roughly socialist outlook, BHAM acknowledges that individual trajectories into homelessness can vary, but that nevertheless the basic fault lies with the social system rather than with individual actors. In contrast, after Westminster council attempted (unsuccessfully) to ban soup runs for the homeless in 2011, Daniel Astaire of Westminster Council (Conservatives) was reported as saying: “Soup runs have no place in the 21st century. It is undignified that people are being fed on the streets. They actually encourage people to sleep rough with all the dangers that entails. Our priority is to get people off the streets altogether. We have a range of services that can help do that”71 (emphasis mine). In claiming that donated food “keeps people on the street longer” (ibid), Astaire appeared to mirror Ravenhill’s claim that homeless ‘culture’ is to blame for encouraging people to sleep rough72.

Outside of these extremes, research on homelessness in the UK has undergone a historical transformation from ‘individualistic’ to ‘structural’ explanations (Fitzpatrick 2005). Since the 1960s, explanations that located the causes of homelessness in individual deficiency or pathology were increasingly replaced with macro-structural explanations. A number of studies now investigated structural factors such as poverty and housing shortages as explanations (e.g. Drake, O’Brien, & Beuuyck 1981), but were somewhat troubled by the fact that the individual factors that frequently accompany homelessness were still ostensibly

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72 This argumentative figure crops up time after time in right-wing discussions of poverty and welfare regimes, since any kind of help for the economically disadvantaged is seen to undermine their motivation to pull themselves up by their bootstraps.
present. As a result, a position emerged that Fitzpatrick terms the “new orthodoxy” in homelessness research, namely a stance that attempts to weave together both individual and structural explanations while emphasising the overall primacy of macro-structural factors (4)\textsuperscript{73}. The basic tenet of the ‘new orthodoxy’ is that while structural factors cause homelessness, people with additional issues are more vulnerable to these factors, and thus more likely to become homeless. As Fitzpatrick discusses, this position remains uncomfortable in so far as, while more practically adequate than purely individualistic or structural explanations, it is theoretically unsound in that it still relies on an agency/structure dichotomy that has been largely discredited\textsuperscript{74}. On the one hand, this poses the problem that some factors that have been identified as contributing to homelessness cannot be slotted neatly into one category or the other. On the other hand, as Fitzpatrick holds, ‘new orthodoxy’ accounts also lack a clear definition of what they mean by ‘causation’. She therefore proposes to adopt a Critical Realist framework for the study of homelessness and outlines what such an analysis could look like. As I have discussed in the last chapter, the dialectic account of structure/agency favoured by CR means that in this context, the question must be how the individual and social factors that go along with homelessness are mutually constituting and constituted, and most importantly, how one translates into the other. As Fitzpatrick shows, this is in stark contrast to a (positivist) mere assumption of statistical co-occurrence of factors such as substance abuse or mental illness, but rather, asks the question what could be responsible for the fact that substance abuse, mental illness and homelessness frequently occur together. It also has a different theoretical thrust than interpretative approaches to homelessness, in that its focus is not on the meanings people assign to this condition, but its real properties\textsuperscript{75}.

The dialectic account of the agency/structure problem therefore holds some implications as to how the question of causes (here, of homelessness) should be

\textsuperscript{73} see also Dant & Deacon 1989, Fitzpatrick 1998, Kennett & Marsh 1999, Fitzpatrick, Kemp & Klinker 2000

\textsuperscript{74} see also Neale 1997, Pleadix 1998, 2000, Stones 2001

\textsuperscript{75} This is not to say that the interpretation of meaning is any less relevant, it is just a different debate.
approached more specifically. ‘Causation’ is not something anthropology often speaks about, which may in part be due to the association of the term with positivist models of unilateral determination. A positivist framework, generally speaking, attempts to discover (statistical) regularities in data in order to establish potential cause-effect relationships. Critical Realists, on the other hand, rather than assuming that a mere co-occurrence between factors constitutes a satisfactory explanation, delve into the ontological depth of the Real “to ask what ‘makes it happen’, what ‘produces’, ‘generates’, ‘creates’ or ‘determines’ it, or, more weakly, what ‘enables’ or ‘leads to’ it” (Sayer, 1992, 104). These questions are based on the assumption that social objects and structures have causal powers “which may or may not be activated (and produce “actual” effects) depending on conditions” (Fitzpatrick, 2005, 3)76. Thus it could for example be said that the housing market may have the causal power to bring forth homelessness, but whether or not it actually does so depends on a variety of other factors. Causal powers thus are potentialities inherent in social objects and relations, which need to be examined in ensemble with other objects and relations to see whether their causative potential unfolds.

“Realist explanations of actual social events and phenomena are not ‘mono-causal’ and deterministic, but rather ‘complex’ (with intricate feedback loops linking multiple causal mechanisms); ‘emergent’ (from this complexity new properties may emerge which cannot be deduced from the individual components); and ‘non-linear’ (small changes in these complex relationships can bring about sudden and dramatic outcomes)” (ibid.)

Fitzpatrick then outlines how a CR framework approaches the question of the causes for homelessness in terms of the emergent powers of social objects. In accordance with the CR model of a stratified reality, such explanations will have to view homelessness as emergent from the combined potentiality of the

76 Intriguingly, as Fitzpatrick demonstrates in her discussion of feminist approaches to homelessness, this model can also account for assumed causal mechanisms such as ‘patriarchy’ even in the light of empirical evidence that appears to contradict it, since the assumption of emergent and mutually constituting causes can account for variations in outcome without having to abandon the entire explanatory framework (see Fitzpatrick, 2005, 14).
mechanisms that underlie it. These causal mechanisms may exist on various levels and interact with each other in complex and non-linear ways that can produce varying outcomes depending on particular circumstances. This means that situations in which the seemingly same set of circumstances produces different outcomes (e.g. people with substance abuse issues are more likely to become homeless, but not all people with substance abuse issues become homeless) do not necessarily mean that the explanatory model is flawed, only that there are potentially other mechanisms at work which can account for the disparity. At the same time, some mechanisms can be seen to be so powerful that they routinely override others, especially when a mechanism that has previously kept another in check (say, the welfare system has helped to ameliorate the effects of the housing market) becomes weaker (e.g. austerity weakens this effect and the potential of the housing market to cause homelessness comes into its full force).

Why is this important for our discussion here? First and foremost, it avoids the problem of having to clearly distinguish between individual and structural factors in accounting for homelessness, and opens up a space of interpretation in which one and the same mechanism can account for effects on both levels. This model is thus structurally closer to the interpretations of squatters themselves. For example, the co-occurrence of seemingly disparate configurations such as ‘deprivation-based squatting’ and ‘political squatting’, rather than appearing as a coincidental overlap of unrelated issues, becomes understandable as a strategy for addressing the same underlying causes – namely the absence of shelter – on different levels of the social. At the same time, the concept of emergent powers can help to formulate a definition of homelessness which avoids the difficulty associated with a category that depends on the presence of positive criteria, as discussed above. In arguing that a) homelessness is an objective, material condition that b) emerges from particular causal mechanisms which act on both the individual and the social structure; the focus of analysis has shifted from a particular configuration of statistical variables that constitute the ‘homeless person’, to the configuration of material and (by extension) ideological
mechanisms that ‘produce’ him or her. ‘Homelessness’ can then be seen as a condition of spatial abjection that is produced by the combined powers of those mechanisms which cause a person to experience a lack of shelter – this can be housing policy in the strictest sense, but, as we will see, also patterns of ‘human territoriality’ (Sack, 1986) influenced by gender, race and class; processes of colonisation and displacement; forms of violence that disrupt a person’s embodiment and so on. A ‘homeless person’ then is somebody who is, in some way or other, affected by these mechanisms in such a way that they experience lack of a ‘safe space’ – and, as will become obvious in the following chapters, this definition is by far not restricted to those that public policy will regard as ‘homeless’. What is more, the idea of causation as driven by underlying emergent potentialities can also help us to understand how squatters translated evaluative judgment into action – specifically, into the construction of a particular kind of space.

From Values To Relational Patterns

Above, I have indicated that the concept of explanatory critique has a cognitive and a practical dimension. The cognitive one, as described above, refers to the identification and rejection of necessary false beliefs. The practical or ‘needs-based’ one, on the other hand, starts from the identification of lack or suffering, and demands that this state should be removed (Sayer, 1997, 475; see also Collier 1994). It could be said that any kind of practical political project, in so far as it identifies a form of suffering and makes suggestions as to how to remove it, is engaged in a very similar form of reasoning. Squatters, for example, in specifying who and what squatting is for, also name the conditions which, in their view, make squatting necessary in the first place:

“Squatting is a solution to homelessness, empty properties and speculation. It provides homes for those who can’t get public housing and who can’t afford extortionate rents. Squatting creates space for much-needed community projects.
Squatting means taking control instead of being pushed around by bureaucrats and property owners” (Advisory Service for Squatters, 1996, 1)

This short paragraph contains a number of evaluative judgments about the causes of homelessness and – implicitly – makes suggestions for their removal. I do not so much want to discuss the precise suggestions at this point, but look at the specific mode of reasoning involved. Squatters here identify a number of problems – lack of public housing, excessive rents, lack of access to public space – and simultaneously propose that direct action in the form of squatting is a solution to these. The mode of explanatory critique inherent in this kind of argument means that the identification of a less-than-desirable state of affairs directly translates into some kind of recommendation for action (although the precise kind of action may be subject to debate). To view political claims as a mode of explanatory critique, therefore, means to take seriously and to critically examine the evaluative judgment inherent in them, that is, to engage with them as explicitly ethical.

Anthropologists (e.g. Laidlaw, 2013; Csordas, 2013; Robbins 2012; Lambek, 2010), as well as sociologists such as Sayer (2011), have recently commented on the necessity for social science in general and anthropology in particular to acknowledge the moral dimension of social life as central to inquiry. Sayer holds that “social science’s difficulties in acknowledging that people’s relation to the world is one of concern” (2011, 1) leads to precisely the kind of ‘cognitive distortion’, to again use Bourdieu’s term, that I have attempted to tackle in the first two chapters. Lambek concurs: “the people (anthropologists) encounter are trying to do what they consider right or good, are being evaluated according to criteria of what is right and good, or are in some debate about what constitutes the human good” (2010, 1). But, as Laidlaw remarks, “until recently morality has been, depending on how one looks at it, either only intermittently or uncertainly

The Advisory Service for Squatters is a London-based squatter’s organisation that provides legal and practical support ‘for squatters and other homeless people’. It distributes the ‘Handbook for Squatters’, a comprehensive manual for squatting within legal parameters.
an object of anthropological analysis” (2013, 3). In drawing together existing approaches, Laidlaw observes that

“Anthropologists interested in moral life have found virtue ethics more readily congenial than any other style or school in modern moral philosophy. Virtue ethicists think that an understanding of morality requires an account of specific qualities of character, such as courage, generosity, elegance, piety, prudence, weakness, vulgarity, impertinence, or cruelty (they differ in their lists of virtues and vices)” (Laidlaw, 2013, 47)

Laidlaw notes the ‘striking’ degree to which this current in anthropology has been influenced by the work of Alasdair McIntyre, and discusses at length the problematic implications of this approach (53ff). Among other things, he calls into question McIntyre’s assertion that submission to authority within specific ‘traditions’ can lead to a state of social harmony characterised by the absence of moral conflict, and demonstrates that fragmentation and contradiction are ubiquitous features of moral life (75ff). Laidlaw therefore suggests to alternatively approach virtue ethics through the work of Foucault, whom he regards as widely misinterpreted as leaving no possibility for conceptions of freedom or truth (92) and as prioritising the self as locus of the ethical in favour of the social (114, see also Oksala, 2005). On the latter point, Laidlaw states:

“Foucault is quite clear that, although the fact of reflection is what grounds the possibility of a relation either to the self or to others, and therefore that in that sense the relation to the self is ‘ontologically prior’...it is nevertheless the case that ‘in the practice of the self, someone else, the other, is an indispensable condition for the form that defines the practice” (2013, 92).

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78 A major challenge to virtue ethics is the position referred to as ‘situationist’. It centrally holds that whatever virtues a person embodies is not as relevant for their actual ethical conduct than the specific situation they act within (see e.g. Kamtekar, 2004). This opposition seems to be a moral variant of the agency-structure problem discussed in chapter 3.
To be an ‘indispensable condition’ for the self-formation of an other, however, is not the same as to be in a relation in which self and other are mutually constituting and constituted subjects. While the difference may seem relatively minor, it has serious consequences for the conception of ethics as relational. Within this model, there is for example no a priori reason that others should not simply come to be seen as instruments – i.e. objects – serving the continuous development of one’s own character, whatever one holds that to be. One of my respondents made this point quite succinctly when she, approached by members of a Christian organisation reaching out to the homeless, replied: “Why should I help you to get into heaven? Get there on your own”. In her estimation, the Christians were not interested in her for her own sake, but were trying to enlist her as a means to the end of fulfilling the ethical demands of their religion. While thus, as Oksala (2005) argues, “Foucault does not advocate blatant egoism” (194), the focus of ethical consideration on the formation of the self does not in any way rule out blatant egoism – of the spiritual or the worldly kind – either. I therefore think that a model of ethics that explicitly and centrally addresses a relational mode of subject-formation, such as exemplified in Honneth’s recognition approach, can help to contextualise the practices of self-formation Laidlaw discusses as processes of mutual subject constitution, in which people are one another’s condition of possibility. This shifts the locus of the ethical from the configuration of the self to the configuration of the relationship between self and other – in other words, one can only be a good person if one has the right kinds of relationships with others (for Honneth, these are relationships of mutual recognition), regardless of what virtues one may possess. This is therefore one reason why I have chosen here to focus on the concept of ‘relational patterns’ rather than a particular kind of identity or selfhood.

The influence of virtue ethics – understood as the building of some kind of ‘character’ by developing or acquiring attributes considered virtuous – also has consequences for the way anthropologists look at the causes for moral practice. Lists of virtues and vices such as Laidlaw cites above – courage, generosity, piety etc. – can, on the one hand, be seen as simply terms for attributes that are
desirable or undesirable in persons because of the kind of self (and, consequently, the kind of social relations) their possession brings forth. This reading would certainly resonate with the everyday sense in which we use these words – if a person is considered ‘generous’, then this means by implication that they can be expected to be inclined to give to others. However, this reified account of virtues as ‘things’ one can possess or acquire contributes to the objectified and objectifying account of social relations that the focus on self-formation implies. David Graeber (2001) for example demonstrates that anthropological debates about ‘values’ follow a similar pattern as those about economic ‘value’, which, at least in a Marxian account, is considered the ultimate of reified social relations. More importantly, however, in terms of the political projects I am discussing here, this view also impedes to some degree the conceptualisation of ‘causes’ – namely political ends and goals – in terms of explanatory critique, and thus, of ethics.

As an example, let me return to the practice of squatters, discussed in chapter 2, to respond to eviction alerts by assembling at the property in question and trying to turn away bailiffs and police. As Laidlaw points out, virtue ethics does at first glance appear well suited to discuss this kind of situation, since it can neither be sufficiently explained by a purely utilitarian notion of ‘reciprocity’, nor by adherence to a specific set of rules, as implied in a deontological approach. However, the above idea of self-formation by acquiring particular virtues does not quite seem to capture the situation either. Squatters certainly did not respond to the distress calls in a self-reflective attempt to ‘do the right thing’ or ‘become a good person’, nor did they regard the others as an opportunity to hone their courage, generosity or other admirable trait (although these values certainly existed within the scene). There was, of course, a degree of bragging going on after such actions – “did you hear what I said to that cop??” – which indicates that people did take successful resistance as a means to enhance their self-image (and why shouldn’t they). But to say that this post-hoc incorporation of a more ‘courageous’ version of oneself was the motivating force in responding to the call in the first place would just mean a return to an utilitarian paradigm in which one (to paraphrase Bourdieu) maximises one’s ‘virtue capital’ by helping others.
To discuss ethical reasoning in terms of ‘virtues’ or ‘values’, therefore, has a tendency to derail the interpretation of causes in so far as the virtue or value itself comes to be seen as the cause of ethical action in both our senses. Squatters could for example be seen to protect each other because they are, or aspire to be, ‘courageous’, with ‘courage’ being both the cause of action in terms of ‘what makes them do it’ and in terms of the goal they hope to achieve. To frame squatter’s actions in these terms means, however, that their reasons and aims, as they themselves formulate them, become merely secondary phenomena to the project of self-formation, or means to the end of becoming an ethical subject (this problem remains also when, as Laidlaw (103) suggests, one considers collective ethical subjects). Their own explanatory critique of social reality thus becomes merely circumstantial to the realm of the ‘ethical proper’, and is therefore prone to be relegated to the realm of the ‘political’, feeding into a discourse that treats these two categories as separate conceptual spheres (see also critically: Laidlaw, 2013, 44).

Of course, few anthropologists would, in practice, subscribe to such a narrowly reifying notion of ‘virtues’ or ‘values’, and instead realise that these categories are, ultimately, abstractions of social relations (see e.g. Graeber, 2001). I want to argue, however, that in order to adequately speak about the causes of political action, it is worth picking these abstractions apart into their interpersonal configuration, and to examine what kind of social relation they refer to. In the above example, we would then see that a squatter who was considered particularly ‘courageous’ (in squatter parlance: ‘on it’) in an illegal eviction was one who simultaneously protected others from violence and challenged whatever forces were perpetrating the attack. Moreover, the more the person risked physical harm in this confrontation, the more ‘on it’ they would be considered to be afterwards. The concept of ‘courage’ or ‘being on it’ in this context therefore referred to a twofold social relation: one, a relation of solidarity with other squatters (as discussed previously, meaning identification in the sense of a recognition of mutually shared vulnerability) and two, one of resistance to the
forces that were threatening these others (i.e. a dis-identification with the aggressor). Adding to this was the degree to which a squatter risked being injured, i.e. ‘courage’ in this context involved not so much a display of belligerent invulnerability, but quite the opposite: what elicited admiration was that in taking a risk, the person had simultaneously affirmed their vulnerability, and decided not to let that stop them.

This last sense is closest to what could be seen as a relation-to-self in the sense Laidlaw discusses, in that ‘courage’ here involves the overcoming of fear and thus a certain amount of ‘work on oneself’. The first two, however, can only be adequately understood in the broad context of the kind of movement they were based in, which explicitly named structures of domination and injustice as its raison d’être and tried to align its practices with its beliefs. This alignment is not automatic – it is of course perfectly possible for a political movement to act in ways that directly contradict its own purported values. In order to understand if and when this is the case, however, it must be possible to deduct what kinds of social relations should logically follow from these values, i.e. to apply a form of immanent explanatory critique. To do this, and this is my point here, statements about social relations must be interpreted within a framework that allows for the evaluation of the particularly relational character of what is being discussed. Instead of ‘virtues’ or ‘values’, I will therefore speak about relational ‘ethical patterns’, as the units of analysis, without wanting to imply that ‘virtues’ are, ultimately, anything else.

The idea of normative patterns, that is, of recurring configurations in ethical relations, which can be observed both in individual and in collective behaviour, is long familiar to anthropology and to social science in general. Ruth Benedict (1934) uses the idea of ‘patterns’\textsuperscript{79} to be able to compare configurations within

\textsuperscript{79} Rosaldo (1993) is critical of Benedict’s approach, since, as he argues, the assumption of discrete ‘patterns’ between or within cultures leaves no room for “zones of difference” or “cultural borderlands” (27f). While it is certainly true that no ‘culture’ consists of only one single pattern, it is not entirely clear to me what the ‘differences’ in these ‘zones’ should consist in, if not precisely in the meeting and interaction of different patterns of thought and practice. In my
the individual and within the larger cultural context: "A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action" (46). A pattern in this sense can therefore be observed on several different levels of scale, from the individual person to the entirety of a ‘culture’. Specifically in terms of ethics, Max Weber described ‘charismatic authority’, as “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative pattern or order revealed or ordained by him” (Weber 1978, 215, emphasis mine). Individuals here appear as phenomenological expressions of a deeper structural logic, which their acts are seen as both revealing and bearing witness to\(^8\). Talcott Parsons adopts this notion in ‘Actor, Situation and Normative Pattern’, where he asserts:

“From the cognitive point of view, situational objects can always be described in terms of existential propositions...A normative pattern, on the other hand, does not, from the point of view of the actor, ‘exist’ in the same sense. The propositions involved may, to be sure, describe a ‘state of affairs’. But so far as their significance is normative, it is not asserted...that this exists...but that it **ought** to exist...What exists is the normative pattern, an ‘ideal’ entity, not the state of affairs to which it refers” (Parsons, 1939/2011, 41, emphasis orig.)

Normative patterns, for Parsons, therefore refer to a part of the collective imaginary, in so far as they form ideal ‘blueprints’ for patterns of social relations that actors believe ought to exist. Although ‘ideal’ here refers to an element of transcendence of the present situation in a normative sense, no metaphysical quality of this kind of pattern is implied – analogous to Weber’s ideal type, a normative pattern is a heuristic device which helps to explain human behaviour based on an oversimplified, abstracted description of a social phenomenon that does not, in this simplified form, occur in the real world. Normative patterns are thus abstractions for the social relations actors believe ought to exist.

\(^8\)view, the assumption of recurring cultural patterns in and of itself therefore does not suggest homogeneity or ‘boundedness’.

\(^8\)‘Bearing witness to’ is meant in the sense that the ‘revelation’ of the pattern through the person is taken to be proof of the existence of the pattern. Note the parallel to religion.
According to Parsons, normative patterns contain a transcendental element in so far as they always point to an ideal, not-yet-realised situation. However, in the sense that I will use the concept here, this transcendental element is only one aspect of such patterns – they also form part of actually existing social relations and inform embodied practice in so far as this practice is meant to establish the desired ideal state of affairs the pattern refers to. An example of this is the idea of 'prefigurative politics', i.e. the idea that political action should anticipate an ideal 'post-liberation' state by actors behaving as if they were already free. Actors here attempt to bridge the gap between the actual situation and the ideal situation by (at least temporarily) behaving as if the transcendental state had already been achieved (such as in the case of squatters who arguably behave as if humans were already more important than property). Similarly to Weber's charismatic authority, actors thus both reveal a transcendental ideal order of things, and testify to the possibility that this order can become embodied reality.

Drawing all this together, it has perhaps already become apparent that the structural patterns we have called ‘recognition’ and ‘misrecognition’ can be understood as normative patterns in the sense of Weber and Parsons. The reason I have explicitly identified them as such is that in the following, I will attempt to make an argument similar to that of Ruth Benedict, and try to identify these patterns on different scales – from the micro-level of the embodied individual in the next chapter, to the meso-level of interpersonal relations in the home, and finally the macro-level of culture, in those that follow. I am going into this much detail because, as I will argue next, in this way it will become possible to view ‘recognition’ not just as a cultural metaphor or abstract descriptor of social relationships, but as something that affects the concrete relationships of embodied persons on an individual and collective level. By pursuing these patterns through different human scales, I therefore hope to bolster my argument that they are ‘real’ in the sense of Critical Realism – they are concrete causal mechanisms that can be observed from the neural firing patterns of individual brains to the large historical streams of land ownership; from gender
relations to the territorial conflicts of differently ‘raced’ groups of people. In the next chapter, I will therefore have a look at how these patterns come to be embodied by individual ethical actors.
Chapter Five: Ethical Bodies

Revolution is but thought, carried into action
Emma Goldman

In the last two chapters, I have established the concept of a relational ethics based on the ideas of recognition and misrecognition, and have argued that based on a Critical Realist account of causation, the resulting ‘ethical patterns’ can be seen as mechanisms underlying the emergence of particular kinds of political practice. Further, I have claimed that these patterns can be encountered on different levels of scale, from the individual body/mind\(^\text{81}\) to the macro-level of culture. All this may have left my reader slightly puzzled: how can a ‘pattern’, that is, an abstract relational structure, ‘cause’ anything? And how and where would we be able to locate such a pattern in actual people’s lives, individual or collective? In this chapter, I therefore want to shed some light on these questions by showing in what way the patterns we have discussed manifest on the level of the individual, embodied person. As I will argue, the most congenial approach for this purpose comes from psychoanalysis, in particular the kind of approach known as ‘object relations’, and I will introduce some of the main tenets of this kind of theory below. First however, I want to address a related question, namely: how is it possible that morality – relational or otherwise – comes to be ‘embodied’ by individual actors at all? I will have a brief look at how anthropologists of morality have approached this matter, and suggest an outlook that can reconcile the problem of how ‘embodiment’ and ‘ethical choice’ can be thought together. With this in mind, I will then move on to the question of an embodied relational ethics, and demonstrate how this idea will inform the rest of my ethnographic narrative.

\(^{81}\) ‘Body/mind’ is my reluctant phrasing for the entirety of a human person, incorporating both the aspect of embodiment and that which is commonly regarded as ‘mental’. In writing the two words together, I want to emphasise that although I do not want to imply any kind of strong mind/body dualism (see below), there is to my knowledge not yet an adequate term by which to refer to the complete ensemble that comprises the person in both dimensions. For the same reason, I will use the word ‘mind’ in quotes, since even when talking about ‘psychological’ phenomena, ‘mind’ cannot meaningfully be separated from body and brain.
I have suggested in the previous chapter that the concept of ‘emancipatory critique’ implies that the ‘causes’ for social ills can at the same time be seen as the ‘causes’ of political action, that is to say, that the same mechanisms that produce one also produce the other. From an activist’s perspective, what happens here is that a negative evaluative judgment of social relations translates into a form of direct action, which attempts to practically install a different form of social relations instead. The question is now, how is it possible for perception, ethical judgment and practice to at least potentially become ‘ethically aligned’, in other words, how is an ethical pattern of relating on the level of the social ‘taken inside the body’ and, depending on evaluation, either reproduced or replaced with another one? In the example from the Advisory Service for Squatter’s assessment that “bureaucrats and property owners” are “pushing people around”, how does this perception translate into ‘this state of affairs is undesirable’ and then ‘let us act in a way that implements something different’? The emphasis on direct (embodied) action means that the process of translation cannot be based purely in ‘reason’ or ‘thought’, but that in some way an evaluative judgment of perceived social relations turns into an embodied practice of either reproducing these social relations or replacing them with different ones. In order to understand how that is possible, I therefore want to ask how ethics ‘gets into people’, that is, how what I have called ethical patterns come to be embodied.

This, of course, relates to the wider question of how culture comes to be embodied, and therefore requires a model that can account for the translation of social forms into embodied dispositions. The best-known model to come to mind here is certainly Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ (1977), which seeks to explain how embodied practice is constituted by, and simultaneously reproduces, social structure. However, as Moore (2007a) remarks, habitus leans strongly toward a determination of individual disposition by the social, and thus Bourdieu “cannot adequately theorize individual experiences, desires, motivations and self-awareness” (34). Similarly Laidlaw (2013) and Mattingly (2012) have pointed out that habitus is a relatively ‘closed’ category which, because of the logic of the general theory it is embedded in, does not leave many options for behaviour
outside of ultimately economistic relations of capital maximisation. Other authors like Sayer (2005) and Ignatow (2009) believe that habitus is ‘redeemable’ for the purpose of the study of ethics, albeit through a considerable departure from Bourdieu’s original formulation. The question is therefore: how would habitus have to be conceptualised in order to allow for the embodiment of social roles and structures and, simultaneously, the possibility of ethical judgment? Or, in broader terms, how can the embodiment of culture – and thus of ethics – be framed in a way that accommodates for the fact that people come to ‘unconsciously’ embody particular dispositions, and yet believe and demonstrate that they are able to make ethical choices?

The problem of how embodied dispositions and ethical choice can be thought together has preoccupied a number of anthropologists82. I will briefly consider the arguments of Faubion (2010, 2011) and Zigon (2007, 2008, 2010), as exemplary of attempts (albeit somewhat differing ones) to reconcile the ‘unreflective’ embodiment of morality with the ‘reflective’ element of ethical choice, in order to illustrate what I see as the problem with this sort of debate. Zigon distinguishes between ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ in defining morality as “a kind of habitus or an unreflective and unreflexive disposition of everyday social life. This embodied morality, is not thought out beforehand, nor is it noticed when it is performed. It is simply done. It is one’s everyday embodied way of being in the world” (2008, 17). For Zigon, morality therefore is what allows people to act in ways they consider appropriate in everyday life, without having to constantly question themselves. What he refers to as an “ethical moment” (165) on the other hand, occurs when this unreflective state is disrupted and a person has to consciously reflect upon what response to take to an event, in order to then be able to return to their previous, unreflective state. “Thus, this moment of ethics is a creative moment, for by performing ethics, persons create, even if ever so slightly, new moral selves and enact new moral worlds” (ibid). Similarly, Faubion distinguishes between “themitical normativity”, that is, routine and everyday

embodied moral being, and dynamic moments of crisis which disrupt this homoeostasis: “The scene of crisis is a scene of the unfamiliar or of disturbance, in which the experience of the disruption or of the failure of the reproduction of routine is also the impetus of thought and action (2011, 81f)”

The dilemma these accounts refer to is that on the one hand, people “are able to act in ways that are morally appropriate most of the time without ever considering their actions” (Zigon, 2008, 164) while on the other hand, as Mattingly (2012) remarks, “to consider the complexities of everyday moral practice, one needs something more than an unconscious moral habitus” (306), that is, some way in which this habitus can be temporarily transcended. The question is, if ethical dispositions can become quasi-automatic behavioural patterns, then precisely how and why do people in some cases consciously reflect on their ethics and act in ways that transcend or even contradict this ‘programming’? In my view, a good part of the problem stems from the implicit mind/body dualism\(^3\) that underlies these debates. ‘Embodiment’ is here simply equated with ‘unconscious and unreflective’ dispositions, which are “not thought out beforehand, nor (...) noticed when (...) performed” but “simply done” (Zigon, 2008, 17), while ethical choice is seen to involve at least some degree of ‘free will’ and thus by implication involves the ‘mind’. It is of course true that people do not constantly consciously deliberate about what the ethically sound course of action would be in a given situation, although some certainly do so more than others. But this can hardly be a question of ‘embodiment’ – after all, a consciousness that makes an ethical choice would have to be equally ‘embodied’, unless we should imagine it floating in space. Yet, whatever entity these authors see as the agent of ethical choice seems to be somehow separate from the body, at least to the extent that it can manage to raise itself above its automated routines. The debates about

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\(^3\) Mind/body dualism refers to the idea, deriving from Descartes, that body and mind are two different substances, i.e. that ‘mind’ is opposed to ‘matter’. This concept has been widely criticised by a number of theories put forward in philosophy, cognitive science and the neurosciences, which all hold that phenomena of the ‘mind’ cannot be meaningfully separated from their biological basis in the body and the brain (see, e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Lakoff & Nunez, 2000; Clark, 1997; Edelman, 2004; Damasio, 1999, Clark, 2001, Churchland 1988, Dennett 1993). Such explanations are called ‘Monist’ because they assume that there is only one ‘substance’ namely matter, and no such thing as a ‘spirit’ or ‘soul’.

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‘embodied’ morality therefore contain an implicit assumption of distance between the body and the consciousness that inhabits it, as if the body was a vehicle running on autopilot, which only occasionally has to be re-directed by the intervention of the conscious mind. This duality of ‘driver’ and ‘driven’ in a lot of ways resembles the dynamics of Master and Bondsman, in that the mind as conscious subject encounters the body as a mindless automaton that bumbles through the world by force of sheer habit. This implicit dichotomy can therefore be seen as to some extent responsible for the perpetual problematic of how to reconcile embodied dispositions and conscious choice. For this reason, I will here suggest a slightly different conceptualisation of the relationship between ‘body’ and ‘mind’, before returning to the question how ethical patterns ‘get into’ either.

Instead of imagining body and mind as two separate entities, I want to suggest viewing them as two layers of an emergent system. I take the idea of ‘emergence’ from Critical Realism, where it is used to discuss how the causal mechanisms (see chapter 4) of phenomena combine to bring forth other phenomena. As we have already touched upon, Critical Realists view the world as ‘stratified’, that is, organised in layers of increasing complexity. When thinking about a human being, for example, one can identify some very basic ‘layers’, which can be fully explained with reference to the laws of physics and chemistry. The causal powers of these layers then combine in such a way that they bring forth a more complex structure, which we call the organic body. The layer of the body is therefore emergent from the layers of chemical and physiological processes, it depends on them, but at the same time it is a more complex, higher order phenomenon in its own right, i.e. it is ontologically irreducible to just chemistry or physics. In the same way, the kind of phenomenon we call a ‘mind’ is a product of the combined causal powers of the biological body, but at the same time, it is a phenomenon of a higher, more complex order that cannot be reduced to the body or the brain:

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To be precise, the world is not organized in layers, but since we can only conceive of the world through the lens of our systems of cognitive categorization, and since these systems are organized in such a way that they divide the world into ‘layers’ (which we, not coincidentally, assign to the different scientific disciplines), Critical Realists generally assume that, for the sake of communicability, we can just as well treat the world as if it consisted of layers – provided we do not commit the epistemic fallacy and assume that this is ‘really’ what it looks like.
“When the properties of underlying strata have been combined, qualitatively new objects have come into existence, each with its own specific structures, forces, powers and mechanisms. The start of this new and unique occurrence is called emergence, and it is thus possible to say that an object has ‘emergent powers’” (Danermark et al, 2002, 60, emphasis orig.).

What ‘emergence’ can do, in short, is to give us a model to work with in which ‘body’ and ‘mind’ are still meaningfully separable if we want to talk about phenomena that specifically affect each stratum, yet it does not assume that the two are separately operating entities. The question whether something is ‘embodied’ or ‘en-minded’ is then, to a certain degree, moot – it is always in some form present on both levels. In this way, it will still be possible to speak about ‘unconscious’ versus ‘conscious’ processes, but we do not have to assume that one is located in the body and the other somewhere else. I am also discussing emergence here because further down, and in some of the following chapters, I will make reference to cognitive theories which see ‘mind’ as a natural, biologically based phenomenon. Such accounts are sometimes critiqued as ‘reductive’ or ‘sterile’ (e.g. Prokhovnik, 2002, 154), since they are seen to “reduce all phenomena, including human agency, to molecular, mechanistic explanations” which “reduce the body to materialism” (ibid.). I cite Prokhovnik as an example for what I see as a general communication failure between cognitive science and the social and cultural sciences: to look for material explanations for mental phenomena is first and foremost a strategy to dissolve the kind of mind/body dualism that logically requires the existence of a ‘spirit substance’ or ‘soul’ as the ‘mind’ component. To see ‘mind’ in terms of materialism therefore does not imply reducing the phenomenology of the mental to ‘molecular explanations’, but merely to see consciousness as an emergent function of biology. To say, for example, that ‘mental’ events appear on the level of the material body in the form of neural firing patterns does not automatically imply that therefore, neurobiology on its own can explain things like ‘love’ or ‘racism’. Daniel Dennett, whom Prokhovnik accuses of ‘reductivism’, for example explicitly refers to
different emergent ‘domains’ of the mind/body continuum, and nowhere suggests that they should be collapsed into each other (Dennett, 1989). Prokhovnik demonstrates the necessity of such a position herself, when she speaks of the ‘interrelatedness’ of body and mind and of ‘interaction’ and ‘acting in concert’ between them, thus still implying two different but ‘related’ categories. Anything other than ‘materialism’ inevitably maintains dualism, and thus an idealist (proto-religious) element that I personally do not subscribe to.

A structurally similar model has been introduced in anthropology by Maurice Bloch, who offers a ‘layered’ model of the ‘natural phenomenon’ he (in order to avoid such ambiguous terms as ‘person’ ‘self’ or ‘subject’) simply calls ‘the blob’ (2011). Bloch is not so much concerned with ethics as he is with bridging the disciplinary gap between cognitive science and anthropology, since “cognitive scientists and social scientists may have been talking of different things with the same words, but both really want to talk about the blob” (14). He therefore sets out to mediate in the “apparently irresoluble conflict between the universalists and the culturalists” (3), by proposing a model which can account for cultural difference, while taking seriously the species-specific conditions of possibility of enculturation. The result is visualised as a layered, pyramid-shaped structure, organised into several different ‘strata’ of the body/mind. At the bottom, there is a layer named the ‘core self’, which incorporates “1) a sense of ownership and location of one’s body, 2) a sense that one is author of one’s own actions” (7). Above that is the “minimal self”, which involves a sense of temporality, but no coherent, reflexive, narrative consciousness. These two basic levels of the blob are, according to Bloch, shared between humans and non-human animals. Beyond them is the level of the “narrative self”, which is linked to autobiographic memory and “significantly involves reflexive interaction with others so that the self can become, in Mead’s words ‘an object to one’s self in virtue of one’s social

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85 A similar point is made by Sayer (2011): “Sociology and anthropology lean towards (culturalist explanations) and are often extremely wary of any invocations of ‘human nature’; and for good reason, as we are cultural beings, albeit ones who can easily mistake our cultural specificity for some general human nature. But not everything is capable of cultural variation – you can’t teach a stone or insect a language or acculturate it, and it can’t feel French or Muslim – so we must have the kind of nature that is capable of cultural variation.” (7)
relation to other individuals” (cited in Bloch, 2011, 9). Finally, Bloch argues, there is a level of meta-representations, which involve the conscious representation of the self through public ‘performance’ of one’s narrative self. This layer is, as Bloch discusses, not present in all cultural contexts.

The important point of this model is that it is organised in a way that implies an emergent structure:

“the narrative self is continuous with the primate-wide requirements of the minimal self and the minimal self is continuous with the living-kind-wide requirements of the core self. Similarly the narrative self is continuous with the minimal self which will itself be affected by the core self. We are psychologically and physically one” (15).

The species-specific levels of consciousness of a ‘blob’ – those ‘layers’ that non-human animals don’t share – therefore emerge from lower, more general and less complex ones, and the higher levels logically depend on the existence of the lower ones. By moving up through the strata, Bloch argues further, the experiences of self move from the ‘private’ or personal toward the public and social. The influence of ‘culture’ on the self thus becomes stronger the higher one gets, but there is no part of the ‘blob’ that is not touched by it:

“We might be tempted to assume that the private is untouched by the cultural while the public, caught up in social discourse, is entirely cultural. This would be misleading because it would forget the continuity of the blob through its various levels. The blob is a process. It is not a matter of a binary contrast but one of more or less. In other words, like icebergs, the blob is 90% submerged but the exposed part has no real independent existence from the submerged part and vice versa86” (ibid).

86 The ‘tops’ of the blob-icebergs, Bloch argues, are not separate but connected via social relations. One can therefore examine a blob ‘vertically’ (in examining an individual person from their social role down to the level of the ‘sub-conscious’ embodied existence), such as traditionally the approach in cognitive science, or ‘horizontally’, in terms of the connections
Blobs are therefore simultaneously interconnected and separate, and it is not possible to draw a clear line between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. Blobs, therefore, can be seen as conscious bodies which possess the emergent power to bring forth culture, and are simultaneously shaped by it. They can do so because the different layers of the blob contain particular powers and mechanisms, which in combination allow for the emergence of the respective higher strata.

In terms of our discussion of ethics, a model of this kind is useful in attempting to reconstruct what happens in the ‘black box’ of habitus when ‘culture’ becomes ‘embodied’. As I have argued in chapter 3, society pre-empts the concrete individual in so far as it is always already given. This means that whatever ‘blueprints’ for social relations come to be taken inside the body/mind, they first have to be presented to the individual through its relationship to the world. This insight will not be new to anyone interested in psychoanalysis, since it is a basic tenet of practically all psychotherapeutic approaches that people learn about ways of relating to one another through the relationships formed and observed in the environment of early childhood. As particularly proponents of the ‘object relations’ school of psychoanalysis hold, different kinds of relational patterns in this way come to be ‘stored’ inside the body/mind as dyadic structures (‘object relations’), which form the “basic building blocks of… consciousness” (Kernberg 2002, 12) and can subsequently be activated and applied to relationships in later life. In combination with an emergent model of embodied consciousness, these psychoanalytic concepts could therefore be cleared from the suspicion that they ‘only’ describe phenomena in the ‘mind’, and can thus give us quite a good idea both of how ‘blueprints’ for social relations – also and especially in terms of ethics – can come to be ‘embodied’. Moreover, psychoanalysts have developed detailed accounts of what these patterns could be expected to look like in a specific

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between blobs, as is usually regarded the sphere of anthropological inquiry. The challenge, according to Bloch, is to integrate these two modes of looking at the blob in a coherent theory. 87 Bloch concludes therefore that “that because of culture there are no purely generic humans” (p 15), a view also expressed by Moore (2007a) who asserts that “humans are not biological entities with the capacity to acquire culture, but biologically cultural beings” (p 9), see also: Toren (1999), Ingold (1991)
cultural context. I will therefore present here some theoretical tools borrowed from psychoanalysis, which will become relevant for our further discussion.

‘Object relations theory’ is a relatively wide and heterogeneous field, and it is not possible within the scope of this text to do justice to the individual schools or theorists, or to give a fair account of the (important and substantial) differences between them. I will therefore limit myself to introducing the positions of three theorists, namely W.R.D. Fairbairn (1952/1994), Donald Winnicott (1965/1971, 1990) and Jessica Benjamin (1988, 1990, 1998, 2013). Unsurprisingly, these three theorists disagree in important respects, and where necessary for my discussion I will point out their differences. Nevertheless, all three have presented theories that are highly compatible with the idea of an ethics of recognition – Honneth, from whom I have borrowed the idea of recognition and misrecognition, draws on Winnicott and Benjamin, and his concepts can therefore be seen to be developed in part from the theories of these authors. Additionally, I bring in Fairbairn, because as I will argue below, his preference of a structural model of ‘dissociation’ to the dominant model of ‘repression’ will become relevant for my discussion in a number of ways.

Object relations theories, which Benjamin refers to as the “intersubjective view” (1988, 18), share in common an important departure from Freud's original formulation of psychoanalysis, namely “the original Freudian model, which takes as its starting point the instinctual drives” (Greenberg, 1983, 20) While Freud's theory located the driving forces of the dynamics of the psyche in the individual, the “relational/structure model” (ibid.) object relations theorists propose sees these dynamics as inherently interpersonal. Fairbairn, basing his theory explicitly in the ideas of Hegel (see Peireira and Scharff, 2002, 2), goes perhaps furthest in rejecting the drive/structure model. Freud, as is well-known, sees the psyche as a tripartite structure consisting of Id, Ego and Super-Ego, whereby the libidinal or aggressive impulses of the Id have to be mastered and controlled by the Ego and later in development, the Super-Ego. Therefore, “for Freud and his followers, the child’s interaction partners were initially significant only to the
degree to which they acted as the objects of libidinal charges stemming from the intrapsychic conflict between unconscious instinctual demands and gradually emerging ego-controls” (Honneth, 1996, 96). Fairbairn and other object relations theorists argue against this model that rather than seeking out others merely as a means to the end of resolving psychic tension (the ‘pleasure principle’), it is these others *themselves* that are the focus of libidinal impulses, i.e. libido is ‘object-seeking’ (Peireira and Scharff, 2002, 3). Fairbairn thus uses the term ‘object relations’ to emphasise that what is internalised during psychic development

“*is not an object but an object relation or, better yet, a series of object relations – that is to say, the child experiences a series of relationships with people who are important to the child and then internalises that experience through identification in order to build... psychic structure. (Fairbairn) viewed the mind as organised by splits into several sub-systems, each of these composed by the relationship between a self component and an object component*” (ibid. 5, emphasis orig.)

Rather than the dynamic of ego and id, for Fairbairn it is therefore the dynamic between different conceptions of self-in-relation-to-object that structure the mind. As a consequence, he views the internal structuration of the psyche, which Freud had seen as necessary, as actually a sign of pathology: while some versions of the original self-to-object relation remain at the centre of the personality (what Fairbairn calls the ‘central self’), other constellations have to be repressed because their implications are too painful or overwhelming, and thus result in a splitting of the self (‘dissociation’) into sub-systems formed by specific self-to-object configurations. It is therefore possible for the self to contain ‘blueprints’ for different kinds of social relations (e.g. a libidinal self to an exciting object, an aggressive ego to a rejecting object etc.), and for these blueprints to be structurally separated by the mechanism of dissociation, so that they do not come into consciousness at the same time.
A similar approach is represented in the work of Winnicott, whose brand of object relations theory informs Honneth’s exposition of recognition and misrecognition as sociological categories. Honneth particularly draws on Winnicott’s insight that the earliest relationship between self and other is not a one-way relation in which the infant treats the ‘mother’ merely as an instrument for the satisfaction of its physiological needs. Rather, it has to be thought of in terms of the mutual constitution of both the child and the ‘mother’ through a gradual process of recognising each other as independent beings, i.e. as subjects. When Winnicott talks about the stages of maturation in the life of a young child, he therefore does not mean only the maturation of the child him/herself “but rather of each of the states of the relationship between the ‘mother’ and child” (Honneth, 1996, 99). Winnicott sees maturation as a form of increasing differentiation from a basic state of unity between child and ‘mother’, in which both nevertheless remain connected by mutual interdependence. In the course of this, the child has to learn to test the ‘mother’s’ boundaries in order to discover that she is a separate being and not under the child’s immediate control – for Winnicott, this is a necessary and positive learning process. It is not difficult to see how this is structurally similar to the process in which the Hegelian subject enters into a ‘struggle’ in order to ascertain whether the other is an independent consciousness and thus a possible source of recognition.

Jessica Benjamin, finally, adds to this picture a feminist analysis that refines the above on several key points. She challenges “the assumption that we grow out of relationships rather than becoming more active and sovereign within them, that we start in a state of dual oneness and wind up in a state of singular oneness” (1988, 16, emph. orig.). Rather, Benjamin argues, infant/mother relationships are never completely symbiotic but contain from the start the necessity to relate to each other by taking an active interest in others and their relation to oneself: “the issue is not how we become free of the other, but how we actively engage

88 Like Honneth, I use the term ‘mother’ in quotes to emphasize that while it is in most cases the biological mother who fulfils this role, this is a cultural convention rather than a strict necessity of early development. The role of the ‘mother’ can therefore also be fulfilled by the father or another primary caretaker.
and make ourselves known in relationship to the other” (18). Benjamin therefore proposes that a sense of self and of the efficacy of one’s actions comes about through affirmation by an other, i.e. through recognition: “recognition is thus reflexive, it includes not only the other’s confirming response, but also how we find ourselves in that response” (20). Benjamin emphasises that the need for recognition is mutual, i.e. “the child has a need to see the mother, too, as an independent subject, not simply as the ‘external world’ or an adjunct of his ego” (22). The fact that both traditional psychoanalysis as well as wider cultural discourse have mostly framed the mother in terms of an object rather than a subject (which ultimately stems from her subjugated subject position as a woman) for Benjamin then is one of the biggest obstacles to the development of the capacity for mutual recognition as the capacity to form, not subject-object, but subject-subject relations. Benjamin, too, explicitly refers to Hegel to argue that what is being ‘internalised’ in early development is not so much ‘objects’ but the specific quality of the relation between self and other, a relation that can be either characterised by mutual recognition, or by misrecognition and thus result in relations characterised by a hierarchy of domination and submission.

Lost In (State) Space

While it is thus widely accepted in both psychotherapy and everyday discourse that people ‘internalise’ representations, it is by far not as clear how one should imagine this works. Psychoanalysis – and its application for other fields – is generally hampered by the fact that it is often not clear how its postulates have been arrived at, what kinds of phenomena they describe, and where these phenomena are thought to be located. For example, if people ‘internalise object relations’, then what are these things made of and where do people keep them? These questions are not naïve – if we assume that ‘mind’ is indeed inseparable from ‘brain’, then the phenomenology of the mind must ultimately be compatible with a naturalistic view of embodied consciousness. Unfortunately, attempts to marry psychoanalytic approaches to the study of the cognitive architecture of the
brain have so far not been particularly successful, causing some scholars to answer the question “are psychoanalysis and neuropsychology compatible?” (Wilson, 2014)\textsuperscript{89} with ‘no.’\textsuperscript{90} Nevertheless, if object relations theories are indeed of any relevance for the study of embodied morality, then we will have to develop some kind of idea of how the ‘embodied’ part of this statement is supposed to work in actual brains.

A promising approach for this purpose, in my view, comes from the cognitive science perspective known as ‘connectionism’. Very briefly, connectionist – also known as ‘parallel distributed processing’ – models view mental phenomena as emergent processes of the activity of interconnected neural networks. One consequence of this is that the ‘classic’ computational view of consciousness – that is, of ‘mind’ as a quasi-linguistic symbol-processing machine, much like a modern computer – is replaced with “sophisticated pattern-completion devices exploiting very high-dimensional (supralinguistic) modes of information storage” (Clark et al, 1996, 4). As Andy Clark (1996) argues, in the context of moral cognition, this means that rather than arriving at moral judgment through the application of particular language-like rule-systems\textsuperscript{91}, brains operate by judging particular moral instances according to their relative similarity to what

\textsuperscript{89}In the light of the screamingly ludicrous examples of psychoanalytic interpretation Wilson (a neuropsychologist) has encountered in her practice (see Wilson, 2014), her view is understandable. Her discussion elucidates the fact that in the same way as some anthropologists have, on occasion, interpreted ‘culture’ in self-serving and biased ways, some proponents of psychoanalysis have done the same to the psyche. A good example of this is Melanie Klein, generally credited as one of the founding figures of Object Relations. Klein’s theory includes for example the assertion that in the first six months of life, the inner experience of the infant is dominated by imagery of murderous rage, cannibalism, and the desire to invade and plunder the mother’s body and devour her whole (Klein, 1946, 8f; 1997, 128f). The problem with this is simply that even if it were true, it would be impossible for Klein or anyone else to know it is the case – all we can really know about this early age is the fact that the child lives in some kind of symbiosis with the ‘mother’ and gradually learns to distinguish between ‘I’ and ‘non-I’. Klein’s therapeutic ‘methods’ of sexually traumatizing children have rightfully been described as ‘sheer terrorism’ (Deleuze/Guattari, 1988/2000, 45), and her assertion that the adult psyche is characterized by either a ‘depressive’ or a ‘schizoid’ position is aptly reflected in the lives of her own children/victims, one of whom is suspected of having committed suicide, while the other purportedly hated Ms Klein’s guts (Nicholas, 2003, 156). It thus stands to reason that the ‘Terrible Mother’ (Stephen, 2006, 192) of Klein’s theory is in fact a projection of her own self (see also Duffel, 2000, 2114).

\textsuperscript{90}The aversion appears to be mutual – on the few occasions I have presented psychoanalytically informed scholars with the considerations outlined above, the reaction was flat out rejection of anything to do with ‘brains’.

\textsuperscript{91}Similar to deontological theories of morality
these theories call ‘prototypes’. A ‘prototype’ is a particular neural firing pattern that is encoded in the brain in the course of learning through the observation of concrete instances (‘exemplars’), from which the statistically most salient features are extracted. For example, the prototype for ‘pet’ is coded through extracting the most typical features of all pets a person has encountered (number of legs, biting rate, etc.), and new instances of animals are recognised as ‘pets’ depending on their relative proximity to the prototype (ibid)\textsuperscript{92}.

‘Proximity’ refers to the relative distance of instants to a prototype within what is called a ‘representational state space’. This is a multi-dimensional mathematical space produced by the activation patterns of different kinds of neural units. In the same way that for example colours can be represented in a 3-dimensional ‘colour cube’ by applying three coordinates, a prototype is specified in the state space according to the coordinates defined by the activation or inhibition of specific neural networks. ‘Plotting’ an instant near a prototype then means to represent it as a vector, that is, the mathematical expression of a tendency or movement. Recognising a dog as a ‘pet’ therefore mean representing the dog as a movement of a certain distance towards the coordinates that specify ‘petness’\textsuperscript{93}. In the same way, representing moral instants in the brain works through plotting them in relative proximity to previously encoded prototypes of morally ‘good’ exemplars (Clark, 1996). Some theorists (e.g. Churchland, 1989b, 1996) argue that this kind of state-space representation could be how ‘virtues’

\textsuperscript{92} A dog is therefore judged a better instant of a ‘pet’ than a snake, although both can be ‘pets’ (Clark, 1996, 110). This should remind us of Weber’s ‘ideal types’, and indeed as far as I can see it is the same thing expressed in the language of cognitive science.

\textsuperscript{93} One reason I am very enthusiastic about this model is that it could possibly help to resolve some of the conceptual difficulties that plague academic and political discourse. For example, it is frequently asserted that the feminist understanding of gender as a binary power relation is inadequate, since in real life, people do not express gender according to a strict binary, but most fall somewhere in between (e.g. Moore, 2007a). As a result, it has become standard practice to refer to ‘masculinities’ or ‘femininities’, plural rather than the singular, thus diluting the force of (‘second wave’) feminist critique. A model like the above state-space representation could however lead to a view of gender that sees individual expressions not necessarily as faithful representations of the ideal-type (i.e. the most polarized expression possible), but as tendencies or movements towards the extreme. For example, an individual’s ‘masculine’ gender expression could then, in theory, be mathematically expressed as a vector in the representational state-space of ‘gender’, i.e. a term specifying a movement of ‘x distance towards masculinity prototype’.
come to be encoded in the brain and subsequently inform moral judgment. However, in the light of our previous discussion, it could be equally said that the prototypes Churchland calls ‘virtues’ are actually what we have called ‘ethical patterns’, or what psychoanalysis calls ‘object relations’.

The state-space model of moral learning can therefore give us an idea what is meant by the ‘internalisation’ of relational patterns – our two modes of ‘recognition’ and ‘misrecognition’ could be seen as two different prototypes for how to relate to other people, encoded in the brain through exposure during development. Despite the reluctance of cognitive scientists and psychoanalysts to consider each other’s contributions, it could therefore be said that psychoanalysis is nothing other than a phenomenological ‘map’ of the kinds of prototypes that can reasonably be expected to be encoded in a brain socialised within a particular cultural context. If recognition and misrecognition can indeed be seen as two competing patterns of basic ethical relations, then they are therefore, in this view, both completely ‘embodied’ as neural firing patterns in the brain. The abovementioned question of ‘choice’ in matters of morality could then be reframed as a question of what DesAutels (1996) calls ‘gestalt shifts’, namely cognitive shifts between different, incommensurable prototypes (131). However, as Held (1996) remarks, cognitive science on its own will not be able to explain why people choose to shift from one pattern to the other, or why they choose not to – for this, we need cultural and social explanations (77). While I have therefore outlined the state-space model of moral cognition in order to demonstrate that object relations accounts need not necessarily be ‘unscientific’ or ‘metaphysical’, I will stay in the psychoanalytic idiom for a little longer, and consider some ways in which psychoanalysis has framed the concrete process of coding the ‘data-architecture’ of the mind. We will then revisit the connectionist view of ethics in chapter 11.

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We have already seen that in a psychoanalytic view, a pattern of recognition is coded within the very first interactions of an infant with its environment. It forms the prototype of an ethical relation that emphasises mutuality and shared subjecthood, or if one so wants, shared humanity. Its opposite – misrecognition – then is the prototype for what Nick Duffell (2014) refers to as “dump truck ethics” (71). This type of relation is characterised by what psychoanalysis calls ‘defense mechanisms’, namely ‘splitting’ and ‘projection’, which can characterise both the psychic structure of particular individuals, and those of collective entities like ‘classes’. ‘Splitting’ is the psychological manoeuvre by which a person externalises aspects of the self that they regard as unacceptable, and projects these aspects onto another person. An example of this would be the tendency of the ‘white male western subject’, discussed in chapter two, to deny and externalise his own vulnerability and dependency, ‘dumping it’ on somebody else, and then denigrating that person for ‘being that’. Ironically, as Duffell points out, this manoeuvre achieves the precise opposite – it makes the ‘autonomous’ and ‘invulnerable’ subject dependent on the presence of other people who come to carry his disowned aspects for him and thus come to be identified as ‘the vulnerable other’.

“Whatever does not count as rational – women, children and foreigners, especially indigenous peoples – is made into an object of derision and loathing. It subsequently morphs into an object of fear because it is unfamiliar and unworthy of curiosity; in consequence, these objects lose their subjectivity and then have to be dominated rather than related to” (2014, 7)

Splitting and projection can thus be seen to be involved in most concrete manifestations of the pattern of misrecognition, since here, the other literally becomes an ‘object’ – a mere function of the subject’s self.

An important prerequisite for this kind of psychological ‘outsourcing’ is the mechanism of dissociation, which we have touched upon above. Dissociation, as we learn from Fairbairn, means that internalised object relations (or prototypes)
come to be compartmentalised and separated from each other, with some of them not or only partially available for conscious reflection. This means in practice that the ‘splitting off’ of undesirable parts of the self, which on the one hand results in externalisation, continues within the individual, resulting in a compartmentalised and fragmented inner experience that lacks cohesion. This inner fragmentation is, in a sense, the flip side of the externalisation of one part of an object relation – here, a conflictual dyadic relation encountered in the social environment is ‘taken inside’ and left there in the same conflictual form. Think, for example, of the many forms in which psychoanalysts have tried to tackle the issue of how to reconcile ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ aspects of the psyche, which by general consensus a person forms by internalising models of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ encountered in childhood. In a patriarchal society, the relationship of the genders must be experienced as hierarchical and conflictual, and thus the same conflict will encounter the individual ‘on the inside’ when masculine aspects of the psyche are pitched against ‘feminine’ ones. Hegel, ever the keen observer of the human mind, remarks on this point: “It shows an excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradiction from it and then to transfer the contradiction to reason, where it is allowed to remain unresolved” (Science of Logic, 1812, § 529). By taking a social conflict inside the mind and leaving it unresolved, the person thus forms a prototype of a conflictual relation, resulting in a psychic structure in which different prototypes are quite literally at war with each other.

In consequence, such a person is thus capable of ‘gestalt shifting’ between contradictory prototypes, i.e. expressing vastly different and logically incompatible attitudes at different times, sometimes exhibiting a personality structure akin to the emblematic ‘Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’. In chapter 11 we will encounter a real-life example of this kind of personality organisation, and we will see how this internal fragmentation produces a very specific form of spatial practice. This kind of space, which later we will come to refer to as ‘Secure Space’ to distinguish it from the ‘Safe Space’ of shared vulnerability, is the material representation of a self that is rigidly and violently defended, and therefore prone
to becoming what I will call a ‘territorial dominant’. But while, as we will see, some squatters were prone to slipping into this role, it is more characteristic of the sort of mind-set squatters formulated their practice against. This mind-set has been described by a great number of authors, but in the context of British culture, none has portrayed it more aptly than the abovementioned Nick Duffell. I will therefore here draw on his work at more length, to show how the embodiment of ethical patterns – in this case, of misrecognition – works in a concrete cultural context.

Duffell identifies himself as a ‘psychohistorian’, i.e. he applies the concepts and explanatory models of psychoanalysis to the interpretation of culture and politics. The great merit of his work, in my view, lies in the fact that he does not simply use psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic device to ‘read culture as text’, but draws on evidence which one could without much effort call ethnographic. He looks back on several decades of psychotherapeutic work with a very special client group: members of the British ruling class who have gone through the educational system of elite boarding schools, and whom he, borrowing from Schaverien (2011) refers to as "boarding school survivors". Duffell is therefore one of the few who has access to a wealth of ethnographic data on the inner dynamics of British men who have been systematically groomed to rule, and the psychological and emotional distortions this kind of upbringing entails. Compassionately yet critically, he describes the ruling class ideology these schools instil in young boys through emotional and physical violence, by fostering a masculinity based on hyper-rationality, entitlement, lack of emotion or empathy, bullying, misogyny and a seething contempt for anyone and anything seen as weak, vulnerable or dependent. British boarding schools, in this account, are human factories for the production of the prototypical ‘white male western subject’ of chapter two, a subject that is not just a cultural stereotype, but in the persons of concrete political leaders comes to actually rule society. Writing in 2014, Duffell points out that more than half of the current cabinet – the very politicians whose policies my squatter respondents were up against, among them David Cameron, Boris Johnson, George Osborne and, indeed, Mike Weatherley –
went through a boarding school education, and, if Duffell is to be believed, have been severely psychologically damaged in the process.

The manufacturing of the ruling class begins with removing boys as young as 5 or 6 from their families and placing them in a closed, all-male institution, where they emotionally have to fend for themselves. The sudden separation from parents and siblings causes trauma for the young children, even more so since they are given the confusing message that it is a ‘privilege’ that will be “the making of them” (the title of one of Duffell’s books). Inside the institution, they enter a hierarchical system not unlike that of a prison, in which older boys are encouraged to bully younger ones (for example in the still existing practice of ‘fagging’, in which older boys are allowed to use younger ones as personal servants), and every sign of weakness or neediness can come to be seen as an invitation to verbal or physical attack. The child therefore “has no other choice but to repress feelings and to refuse to identify himself as the one who has such emotions” in order not to be seen as “vulnerable amongst the other little boys who are busy toughening up” (2014, 79). The boy soon realises that the cardinal sin in such an environment is coming to be seen as ‘the wrong one’: the one who cries, who makes a mistake, who says something stupid or who misses his mother. Consequently, the social dynamics in the school are governed by constant attempts to not be ‘that one’ – fuelled by an institutional system full of Kafka-esque rules, which constantly and relentlessly compares students to each other and thus fosters incessant competition in every aspect of life. While corporal punishment by staff has been outlawed in recent years (in 1999 – i.e. after current members of government graduated), physical and sexual abuse by staff and older boys still occur (174 f).

In order to psychologically survive in this environment, the young boys must come to rely on splitting and dissociation as defences against being ‘the wrong one’, in other words, undesirable attributes such as vulnerability, weakness and victimhood must be ‘dumped on’ somebody else. While initially, this may be the ‘softer’ boys who are thus turned into scapegoats, the all-male, (almost) all-white
environment also ensures that women and people of colour remain available targets for projection (see also Schaverien, 2004, 696 f). The result is the internalisation of object relations between a hyper-rational, over-entitled and emotionally numbed self, and it’s split-off and projected ‘others’. This points to the relationship between pattern-prototypes and what with Metzinger (2004) we have called the ‘phenomenal self-model’ (chapter 2) – some prototypes are thus incorporated into the self-model while others are rejected. Psychoanalysis calls this ‘identification’ and it means nothing other than the basic categorisation of prototypes as ‘I’ or ‘non-I’. In order to prevent the ‘non-I’ self-prototypes from ‘returning’ and causing havoc in the psyche, the really existing others who embody them have to be controlled, dominated or simply kept away. In this way, a boarding school education is practically a guarantee that a boy will internalise a pattern of misrecognition – and then come to re-enact the precise same pattern in his later public and personal life.

Duffell details the history of boarding schools as “an industrial process with a military ethic” (2014, 1) producing ‘Rational Men’ for the governance of Empire, and argues that to this day, British society reflects the mechanisms of splitting and projection that its rulers are forced to acquire in the ‘hothouses’ of public schools. We will encounter some of his arguments in later chapters, when we will see how the attitudes he describes come to play out in the realm of national politics. For the time being, I want to take two insights from his work: on the one hand that the pattern of relating we have called ‘misrecognition’ is the product of a mind that has become accustomed to using dissociation, splitting and projection in order to defend itself against attributes that it has come to view as dangerous, because in the violent, hyper-masculine environment it is formed in, they could make it the target of attack. And on the other hand, that dissociation – whether as an individual or as a collective phenomenon – results in an inner division that pitches the self against itself. Dissociation is therefore a modern term for that which Hegel arguably actually meant with his Master/Bondsman analogy – after all, for him it is primarily a dynamic found within the human ‘spirit’. Here, the self has come into contradiction with itself, resulting in a
struggle in which one aspect comes to rule over the other, much in the same way as Duffell’s clients have had to learn to control the ‘soft’ and vulnerable parts of themselves by subjecting them to the rule of an overbearing, hyper-rational bully of a mind. In order to resolve the unbearable psychic tension of this state of affairs, the subject then externalises one half of the contradiction, thus making another human into either his master or his slave, turning an inner contradiction into an interpersonal one, and creating a relationship characterised by dominance and submission. This way, it has now perhaps become a little more transparent what I mean when I say that ethical patterns can be found on different levels of ‘scale’ – they are, quite literally, transferred via projection from inside an individual body/mind into interpersonal relations, and, through the cumulative effect of millions of dyadic relations, eventually come to form ‘patterns of culture’ (Benjamin 1934).

So what does this tell us about the abovementioned question of embodied dispositions versus ethical choice? What we take from the emergent model above is that there is a continuum between body and mind, and that any cultural content – including ‘object relations’ or patterns – is therefore present on all ‘levels’ of the human being. Whether something is ‘conscious’ or not is therefore not a matter of to what degree it is embodied, but a matter of to what degree it is split off from conscious awareness. This means, consequently, that if a particular prototype (for example vulnerability) becomes a ‘no-go-zone’ for identification, i.e. is split off within the ‘mind’, then this split will affect the whole person in so far that it also entails splitting parts of the ‘body’ from awareness. Psychoanalysts refer to this fact when they speak about distressed people having to ‘come back into their bodies’ or similar, as splitting means that the person has subjectively declared part of their body ‘non-I’. In extreme cases, this can lead to psychosomatic disorders, such as Freud famously diagnosed in his ‘hysterics’. Instead of seeing the body as a reservoir for unconscious ‘dispositions’ and the

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95 Compare to this the discussion of the implicit mind/body dualism in the ‘embodied ethics’ debate at the beginning of this chapter. The body, with its habitual and ‘unreflected’ responses is here made into the other of the rational, reflective mind, thus writing the Master/Bondsman split into the ‘ethical body’
mind as consciously reflecting ‘driver’, we can therefore look at the whole ensemble as involving a number of splits, which each have a ‘body’ and a ‘mind’ component. An ‘unreflected moral habitus’ is therefore nothing other than a person operating within the pattern that, due to the requirements of their environment, appears to be the most ‘workable’ solution – Duffell’s boarding school survivors for example are actively encouraged to develop a ‘habitus’ of superiority and entitlement and to objectify and dominate others.

A ‘moment of ethical crisis’ then occurs when the pattern one is habitually enacting becomes unworkable. This would for example be the case when the dominated and objectified other begins to make a convincing case that he or she is in fact a human subject. When the dominating self can no longer deny this possibility, the defence mechanisms that have kept the disowned parts of the self safely away break down, and the subject is confronted with the fact that that which it has tried its best to ‘dump on’ somebody else is actually part of its own system. For the ‘invulnerable’ subject, this would mean to accept that vulnerability is not just part of the reviled other, but that the loathed thing is actually its own vulnerability, including all the fear and insecurity that comes with it. In order to overcome its tendency split and project, the subject thus has to take the disowned aspect back inside itself, and there mediate it with its opposite in a kind of ‘inner sublation’. This is normally a painful and difficult process for the person involved, and it is not surprising that it is most often virulently resisted. However, the inner fragmentation and impoverished experience that goes along with dissociation is effectively what cuts the subject off from mutual recognition and thus real relationships, and the suffering caused by this state of affairs is the reason outwardly privileged men end up on couches such as Nick Duffell’s. If we speak about ‘ethical choice’ therefore, we have to ask not so much ‘what enables a person to transcend their embodied dispositions’ but ‘what embodied and ‘en-minded’ dispositions does the person have available to them, and how can they learn to switch from a mutually harmful to a mutually beneficial one?’ Ethical choice, in this view, is therefore not so much imposed upon the flesh by the despotic decree of the sovereign mind, but consists in the
ability of the body/mind to access a repertoire of different prototypes, and to seek out relations which bring forward beneficial rather than harmful ones.

This finally brings me back to my discussion of virtue ethics in the last chapter. Although I have argued that ‘values’ can ultimately be seen as abstractions of social relations, the above discussion also illustrates why an exclusive reliance on ‘values’ or ‘virtues’ in the pursuit of building a ‘character’ can be a slippery slope. On the one hand, unless the relational dynamics of that which a ‘value’ refers to are considered, it is quite possible that the acquisition of a value such as ‘courage’ or ‘honesty’ goes along with a splitting manoeuvre in which an other is made into the ‘coward’ or ‘liar’. In fact, it appears that the ‘character building’ experience of boarding, as Duffell describes it, relies almost entirely on this principle. On the other hand, as we have seen, the ‘character’ that is thus acquired is internally fragmented, with the different parts not communicating in terms of a coherent inner experience, so that this kind of person can become a master at “the art of (simultaneous) sincerity and duplicity” (2000, 72). The kind of men Duffell describes therefore certainly have a ‘character’ – in so far as they have been moulded into “a representative of the school, a faithful servant to his country and class, one who has put away childhood and the fussiness of feelings forever, bound for leadership and success” (2000, 35), they have certainly thoroughly absorbed the values of their environment. What they lack is the opposite of internal fragmentation – the kind of inner mediation that in the context of ethics is often referred to as ‘integrity’.96 As a result, “they find

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96 This problem already features in Plato’s Gorgias, where Socrates says: “It would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus I direct were out of tune and loud with discord, and that most men should not agree with me and contradict me, rather than that I, being one, should be out of tune with myself and contradict myself” (Gorgias, 482 b-c). More recently, Metzinger (2004) affirms: “The classical notion of ‘virtue’ can now be interestingly reinterpreted, namely, in terms of increasing the internal and social consistency of the self-model, for example, in terms of functionally integrating cognitive insight, emotional self-modeling, and actual behavioral profile. Traditional notions like ‘intellectual integrity’ and ‘moral integrity’ now suddenly possess new and obvious interpretations, namely, in terms of a person having a highly consistent self-model. Ethical behavior may simply be the most direct way of maximizing the internal coherence of the self-model” (632). Compare also the notion of the ‘multiplex’ self e.g. in Hardcastle/Flanagan, 1999
authenticity and intimate relationships beyond them, and their suffering goes quite unacknowledged” (2014, xiii). In acquiring a ‘character’ through the banishment of vulnerability, they have abandoned the possibility of mutual recognition of shared humanity, and thus, the possibility to come together to give each other shelter. “Boarding children, despite the advantage of their prestigious schools, grow up amongst their peers and never really come home again” (ibid), and perhaps this is part of the reason that some of them as adults appear to go out of their way to make somebody else ‘the homeless one’. In the next chapter, we will now take a closer look at the concept of the ‘home’ and what it means for homeless people, those with and without privilege.
Chapter Six: Hope

We live fixations, fixations of happiness.
We comfort ourselves by reliving memories of protection.
Gaston Bachelard

Now that we know what ‘ethical patterns’ are and how they can be identified in an individual person as well as a collective, it is time we finally asked what all of this has to do with the ‘social production of space’. In previous chapters, we have already encountered the notion of space in a conventional sense – as a three-dimensional expanse that contains and envelopes objects, bodies and ‘selves’. But of course, this is not the only way to look at space, as Henri Lefebvre (1974) has famously argued, but rather, space is also and especially a social phenomenon. On the one hand this means that humans shape their physical environment in profound ways, and on Earth, there is little space that has not in some way or other been moulded by human intervention. On the other hand, in a more abstract sense, physical space also contains what one could see as its fourth dimension – namely the invisible matrix of interrelatedness that spans between human bodies. Massey (2005) therefore identifies space as “the product of interrelations...constituted through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny...predicated upon the existence of plurality...(and) always under construction” (9). Space, in this view, is the product of social relations, or perhaps more to the point, space is a social relation. In the following chapter, I will discuss what this means in terms of the relational ethics I have described, and what kinds of spaces our two relational ‘modes’ could be seen to produce. Since we are discussing homelessness, let me start with the question of what kind of space is implied in the ‘home’ the homeless ostensibly lack.

As Andrea Dworkin notes, older dictionaries of the English language show under the entry ‘hope’ a version of the following: “‘a piece of enclosed land, e.g., in the midst of marshes or wasteland'; or ‘a small enclosed valley'; or ‘an inlet, small bay, haven’” (2000, 1). Deriving from the Old English word ‘hop', ‘hope' is
therefore part of the name of many places, such as ‘Stanhope’, ‘Wollhope’ or ‘Salershope’, and contemporaries of the first Domesday book\textsuperscript{97} remarked that in it, ‘hope’ “signifyeth a vally” (Fenton, 2006, 5). The historical connection between concepts of place and the anticipation of good things is not limited to the English language: as Dworkin notes, “in Hebrew, too...the words for hope and for a small enclosure derived from the same root” (ibid). Although this use of the word ‘hope’ has become obsolete in modern language, the connection it invokes between belonging and optimism points to the fact that to have hope for the future, one must be securely located in the present. It therefore recalls what Mallet (2004) calls the idea of “home as a haven” (70), that is, a refuge, a secure and safe space, differentiated from the insecure and dangerous outside, and therefore, a place that allows for the sheltered self to project itself into a welcoming and inviting future.

This understanding of ‘home’ as a safe haven or place longing is, of course, not uncontested. Numerous critics have attacked the “idealized view of home perpetuated by such ideas” (Mallet, 2004, 71), prompting Moore (2007b) to assert: “Home has to be discussed without the idealistic rosy glow that typified earlier debates. For many, it is not a secure, free, safe, or regenerative space...Home as a romantic space is not the reality of most people” (148, see also Douglas, 1991). Dworkin, never given to euphemism when it comes to the oppression of women, sums it up: “home may be the equivalent of a woman's prison: women may be locked inside or not permitted to egress or too injured to be able to leave; women may be tortured or burned alive there; women may be menial, brutalised, servants; legal chattel; sexual chattel; reproductive chattel” (2000, 9). Especially for women and children, but also for some men, 'home' is therefore a contradictory concept that points to “a tension between individuals' perception of what relationships within the home should be like and what they are really like” (Moore, 2007b, 149)\textsuperscript{98}. Moore's phrasing, however, points to the

\textsuperscript{97}The first Domesday book is a record, compiled in 1086 under William the Conqueror, documenting the structure of land ownership throughout the British Isles. It remained the only record of land ownership patterns in Britain until the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, when the second Domesday was compiled, a record I will discuss at more length in chapter 10.

\textsuperscript{98}See also: Despres, 1991; Moore, 2000; Somerville, 1997
fact that statements about ‘home’ – the ideal haven or the really existing prison – are most often statements about social relations, either those that exist or those that one believes ought to exist, and thus, those one hopes for.

It would therefore appear that there are at least two different versions of ‘home’ – one that is a haven and one that is a prison. As is not difficult to guess, I will argue in the following that ‘home’ in the sense of ‘haven’ implies ethical relations of mutual recognition, in so far as recognition is the basis for the establishment of a space that fulfils its function as providing shelter. Its opposite – home as a place of oppression and torment – then would be one form that misrecognition can take in a spatial sense. The tension between the two, i.e. the gap between the is and the ought of ‘home’, could then be seen as the kernel of an explanatory critique, and thus potential transformation, of ‘home’ – of the concept and of the really existing places. What I hope to achieve with this is not only an approximation of ‘home’ as a space structured by ethical patterns, but also an understanding of ‘homelessness’ as a paradoxical condition, in which patterns of misrecognition in really existing homes lead to the symbolic and material absence of ‘home’ in the sense of a ‘haven’ or ‘refuge’. Recognition and its absence therefore structure not only the social relations that homeless people are part of, but they centrally structure the spaces they traverse between exposure and shelter.

In the last chapter, I have argued that ethical relations (‘object relations’) structure not only the social, but also the ‘inner space’ of the self. This would imply that there is some kind of connection between the structure of ‘inner space’ and that of ‘outer space’, an idea that has been explored by Bachelard, who argues that space, and particularly the space of the ‘home’, is an a priori condition of the development of psychic structure. “Before he is ‘cast into the world’, as claimed by certain hasty metaphysics, man is laid in the cradle of the house” (1958/1994, 7). Bachelard argues, and therefore, “a great many of our memories are housed (...) a psychoanalyst should, therefore, turn his attention to this simple localisation of our memories” (ibid, 8, see also Cooper 1976). Bachelard coins the
term ‘topoanalysis’ for the reading of the psyche through the structure of the spaces it inhabits: “topoanalysis, then, would be the systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives” (ibid.). Somewhat similarly to Winnicott, whom I have introduced in the last chapter, Bachelard sees the original state of being as a state of oneness and wholeness, from which ‘man’ is only reluctantly forced to depart in the process of differentiation. Bachelard thus protests against a metaphysics of consciousness which privileges the state of being ‘cast into the world’ before the state of ‘being at home’ in what he refers to as a ‘cradle’. In this way, he anticipates the above debates in which the ideal ‘home’ is contrasted with the really existing ‘home’, and argues that the state of wholeness that ‘home’ implies is the reason that ‘place’ and ‘hope’ were once so intimately connected. In a similar vein Dovey (1985) notes: “yearning-for-home is ‘about’ being-at-home” (10), that is, the is and the ought are connected by a memory – even the faintest one – of what ‘being at home’ could and should feel like. Between being and yearning, then, stands the experience of being cast out, not, as I will argue at more length in chapter 8, as an expression of a universal human condition, but rather, as the expression of specific social relations which make the ideal state of being-at-home impossible. For squatters, this experience was a common one, crystallised at times of eviction, when “being is cast out, that is to say, thrown out, outside the being of the house”, so that the thus expelled wind up in “a circumstance in which the hostility of men and of the universe accumulates” (Bachelard, ibid, 7).

The first eviction I was personally affected by occurred a few months after my arrival in Bristol, when the time for our squat in St Pauls was finally up. For the past several months, our door had been sporting the ubiquitous ‘Section 6’, a photocopied piece of paper that informed the world at large of our legal right to possession of the space we inhabited (see overleaf).

TAKE NOTICE

THAT we live in this property, it is our home and we intend to stay here.

THAT at all times there is at least one person in this property.

THAT any entry or attempt to enter into this property without our permission is a criminal offence as any one of us who is in physical possession is opposed to entry without our permission.

THAT if you attempt to enter by violence or by threatening violence we will prosecute you. You may receive a sentence of up to six months imprisonment and/or a fine of up to £5,000.

THAT if you want to get us out you will have to take out a summons for possession in the County Court or in the High Court, or produce to us a written statement or certificate in terms of S.12A Criminal Law Act, 1977 (as inserted by Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994).

THAT it is an offence under S.12A (8) Criminal Law Act 1977 (as amended) to knowingly make a false statement to obtain a written statement for the purposes of S. 12A. A person guilty of such an offence may receive a sentence of up to six months imprisonment and/or a fine of up to £5,000.

Signed, The Occupiers

N.B. Signing this Legal warning is optional. It is equally valid whether or not it is signed

Figure 6: 'Section 6' notice
Source: Advisory Service for Squatters Handbook 2009
Putting a physical ‘Section 6’ on the door was not a requirement for the legal possession of a squat, yet nearly every squat had one or several attached to its entries. The paper served several purposes, from warning the novice squat-landlord not to take the law in his or her own hands, to conveniently identifying the building as a squat to friendly passers-by. Perhaps most importantly, the Section 6 served as a magical seal of sorts, a paper wall that separated and protected the squat’s inside from its outside, banning the bureaucratic state apparatus by the power of its own legalese.

The protective seal of the Section 6 could only be broken by one of two things – one was the police, armed with their own magic paper by the name of ‘warrant’. The other manifested one cold, wet morning at our front door, as if served by an invisible hand: a summons to attend possession proceedings at Bristol Magistrates Court. The envelope, announced with the dreaded words ‘we got papers!’, was, as usual, addressed to ‘persons unknown’ (a common trope of squatter humour, e.g. when the prototypical squatter was referred to as one ‘Mr Percy Unknown’). The fact that it was attached to the door, rather than inserted through the letterbox, did not bode well for our success in court. The serving of ‘papers’ followed meticulously detailed regulations, and the slightest deviation – such as serving them not on but through the door - could give squatters a lever to have court adjourned; and could thus mean a few more weeks of safety for the squat (while causing considerably more cost for the owner). Whoever had served the papers appeared to be well aware of this and had made a point of putting them right over our ‘Section 6’ like a bureaucratic trump card. Inside the clear plastic was a letter informing us of the date and time we were to appear before a judge, who would decide whether we could stay in the building or had to move on. On the basis of experience of such court proceedings, chances that this event would turn out in our favour were estimated around zero.

The immediate effect of ‘papers’ was that even though the inevitable eviction was still weeks away, the social equilibrium of the house shifted. With the magic seal of the Section 6 broken, the outside had asserted its right to the inside space, and the resulting change in atmosphere manifested itself in a peculiar kind of
carelessness. Cleaning and tidying became a thing of the past, and the house began to increasingly resemble the kind of desolate hovel that the yellow press likes to make squats out to be. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that all energy now had to go into finding a new space, but the sudden drop in cleanliness seemed to point to more than just a lack of time. People spent less and less time in the house, dropping their things where they stood, and there were no longer nice roast dinners and film nights. I later came to think of this phase as ‘last-days-of-squat-mood’, as I observed the same phenomenon in most other squats when eviction was inevitable. It was as if people severed their emotional connection with the building, shrinking back into their physical bodies after they had briefly extended their selves to encompass the space they were inside of. The building was no longer expected to provide safety and comfort, and was thus treated little differently from a public space.

The arrival of court papers therefore marked the precise point when the common theoretical distinction between a ‘house’ and a ‘home’ became practical for us. As discussed previously, squatters did not generally think of themselves as homeless, while at the same time insisting that squatting was a form of political action for or by the homeless. In part, as was already said, this was due to the perception that to take action and appropriate a space is in and of itself a remedy for homelessness. Dovey (1985) appears to agree: “paralleling the distinction between house and home is a distinction between the house as property and the home as appropriated territory” (16). In this sense, a ‘home’ is therefore produced through practices of the appropriation of physical space, and the transformation of a house into a home thus occurs at the precise same moment that a homeless person turns into a squatter. Intriguingly (for a German speaker), ‘property’ in the English language has two meanings – it can refer to buildings and land (property 1), or it can refer to private property in the sense of a (legal) claim to possession (property 2). Depending on how one chooses to interpret Dovey’s statement, ‘property’ and ‘appropriated territory’ can be seen as distinct, or, in the case of a squat, as a practical contradiction. The territory of a squat is always appropriated in spite of and against property 2. The process of appropriation that makes a homeless person into a squatter, and a squat into a ‘home’, therefore
consists both in a transformation of property 1, and a simultaneous negation of property 2. Conversely, making a squatter homeless begins when property 2 asserts its right to property 1, thus re-appropriating whatever territory has temporarily been liberated, and negating the 'home' that has been created. I will discuss the peculiar consequences of this linguistic merger at more length in chapters 9 and 10.

Ensuring access to a building was only the first step in this process – as I will discuss below, once the space was taken, its transformation into a 'home' entailed a number of different practices through which the formerly homeless came to think of themselves as at home. Conversely, there was a reverse process, one by which a squatter could be turned into a homeless person, and physically removing his/her body from the building was equally only the last step in this transformation. While we were still physically resident in the building, 'papers' therefore marked the beginning of homelessness for us, not only in a legal or policy sense – in this sense we were homeless all along – but in terms of the emotional and social quality of 'home' that I want to discuss here.

A 'home', as opposed to a mere house, consists of many layers of relationality and experience (e.g. Bowlby et al., 1997; Wardhaugh, 1999; Somerville, 1992) and can thus refer to “not only a physical place but also...a center of activities, source of identity, belonging from the past, a goal for personal and social development, an abstract state of being, and a legal concept” (Moore, 2007b, 145). A squat could be a home in all of these senses, but in so far as it was considered an alternative to homelessness, its primary function was to protect vulnerable bodies from harm. For this reason, the abovementioned interpretation of 'home as a haven' was among the chief concerns of squatters, for whom the danger of 'romanticising' the concept was decidedly secondary to the imminent need for shelter. After all, from the perspective of a homeless person, the dialectic of 'inside' and 'outside' that guides much of the theoretical discussion of the 'home' (see Dovey, 1985, 16) can make all the difference between life and death. I can

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99 For a comprehensive literature review of these debates see e.g. Mallet (2004)
hardly make this point more succinctly than a 2012 University of Sheffield study in collaboration with charity Crisis:

“It is...shocking comparing homeless people’s chance of dying compared to the general population. At the ages of 16-24, homeless people are at least twice, and possibly nearly three times (depending on scenario), as likely to die as their housed contemporaries; for 25-34 year olds the ratio increases to four to five times, and at ages 35-44, to five to six times. Even though the ratio falls back as the population reaches middle age, 45-54 year olds are still three to four times more likely to die than the general population, and 55-64 year olds one and a half to nearly three times...As these findings clearly indicate, being homeless is incredibly difficult both physically and mentally and has significant impacts on people’s health and wellbeing. Homelessness leads to very premature mortality and increased mortality rates. Ultimately, homelessness kills”.
(Thomas, 2012, 8f)

Homeless charities therefore routinely advise not to sleep rough if at all possible because it is “dangerous and traumatising” (Shelter), and research shows that the homeless are at a disproportionate risk of suffering all kinds of violent assault on the street. In a 2004 survey of homeless people in England, “52% had experienced violence in the past year, in contrast to 4% of the general population” (Newburn and Rock, 2004, 6)\(^{100}\). An “alarming amount” of these attacks was found to be committed by the “general public”, especially against rough sleepers, whose presence in public space makes them vulnerable to “unexpected and disturbing” (ibid.) levels of violence. In addition, 67% of the homeless had suffered theft (general population 1.4%), and 43% damage to property (g. p. 7%). The authors therefore conclude:

“Homeless people are often seen as a cause of crime, but the research suggests that in fact they are far more likely to be victims than they are perpetrators. Our findings paint a portrait of ongoing abuse and harassment creating situations of extreme

\(^{100}\)See also Luhrmann, 2008; Bourgois, 1998
vulnerability for homeless people, particularly in public settings. Almost two-thirds reported having been insulted publicly whilst sleeping rough and distressingly one tenth said that someone had urinated on them” (ibid, 7)

In addition to physical violence, homeless women are at a disproportionate risk of sexual assault. In one study, 9 per cent of homeless women reported being raped within the last month (Wenzel/Koegel/Gelberg, 2000), another found an incidence of 13% within one year (Wenzel, et al., 2000), and yet another puts the lifetime risk of violent abuse for homeless women with a mental illness “so high (97%) that rape and physical battery are normative experiences” (Goodman et al, 1995). It is therefore no surprise that “homeless people are over 9 times more likely to commit suicide than the general population” (Crisis, 2011, 2), or, to break it down by gender, 56% of homeless men and 78% of homeless women report suicidal ideation, and 28% of men and 57% of women have attempted to follow through (Eynan et al, 2002). While homelessness therefore shortens the average lifespan to 47 years (compared to 77 years in the general population), for women this figure is even lower – only 43 years (Crisis, 2011, 2).

Although ‘homelessness’ can therefore indicate a lack of ‘home’ in many of its dimensions – as a source of personal identity for example, or as the legal entitlement to occupy space – the lack of a space that is relatively free from the constant risk of being beaten up, raped, insulted, mugged or urinated upon, or of dying from cold, illness or suicide is arguably the most pressing problem homeless persons are faced with. This version of ‘home’ corresponds to what in chapter two I have referred to as the space that is necessary for immediate physical survival, i.e. a place where one’s ‘spatial self’ is undisturbed and free from threat, a place, therefore, where the embodied self has good reason to feel safe\footnote{It is, of course, a truism that ultimately, there is no completely safe space, since even in the most ideal of settings, the physical world sometimes intervenes in unpredictable and dangerous ways (think e.g. of natural disasters or a sudden, grave health condition). However, my point here is not a contemplation of the general existential insecurity of human life, but of the insecurity of concrete, embodied lives, for whom existential threat is not a theoretical possibility but a realistic prospect.}. I have argued that such a space is a compelling necessity, en par with food
and air, that the ability to claim such a space, however small, is a condition of physical and psychological survival. A definition of ‘homelessness’ along these lines could therefore well be: homeless is who has no entitlement to any safe space, whose body is always, by definition, out of place, and therefore at risk of being removed, assaulted or invaded.

The concept of ‘home’ as a safe space is reflected in Dovey's definition: “home is demarcated territory with both physical and symbolic boundaries that ensure that dwellers can control access and behavior within. To be at home is to know where you are; it means to inhabit a secure center and to be oriented in space” (1985, 3). As I will discuss in the following, safety and security are not necessarily the same thing, and in the conceptualisation I will outline, refer to very different patterns of spatial relating. Nevertheless, Dovey’s claim that “home is a place of security within an insecure world, a place of certainty within doubt, a familiar place in it strange world, a sacred place in a profane world... It is a place of autonomy and power in an increasingly heteronomous world where others make the rules” (ibid. 10) points to the fact that ‘home’ (the ideal, if not the actually existing one) is always also a place where the continuous existence and integrity of the body/mind is secure enough to warrant an optimistic outlook on the future, that is, hope. It therefore speaks of the connection of ‘home’ with what has been called ‘ontological security’, namely “a centrally firm sense of [one’s] own and other people’s reality and identity” mediated by one’s experience of one’s “presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and...[temporally] continuous person” (Laing, 1973/2010, 39). Giddens, expanding on the idea, emphasizes the importance of confidence and trust in the natural and social worlds as well as one’s own sense of self (Giddens, 1991, 374f) and finally Cassell argues that it is: “a psychological state that is equivalent to feeling ‘at home’ with oneself and the world, and is associated with the experience of low or manageable levels of anxiety” (Cassell, 1993, 14).

Ontological security is thus characterised by the absence of real or perceived threat to the trusted structure of reality and the self, and to the aliveness and
wholeness of body and mind. Honneth (1996) echoes this in his idea that recognition involves respectful awareness of the physical, mental and emotional integrity and inviolability of the person – one could say that recognition involves affirming that the other person is safe, at least from oneself. ‘Ontological security’ is therefore a different way of defining what is at stake in the struggle for recognition – the state of being that arises when one’s personal integrity on all levels of one’s existence is being recognised. Homelessness, on the other hand, involves a near permanent state of ontological insecurity, as a person’s physical and mental survival is under constant threat, not least, as we have seen, from those around. However, Honneth’s definition of misrecognition as a form of “practical maltreatment in which a person is forcibly deprived of any opportunity freely to dispose over his or her own body” (132) at least partially misses the mark when it comes to the kind of misrecognition that involves the forcible deprivation of the person of a safe space. What is at stake here is precisely not the possibility to “freely dispose” over one’s body (which, once again, implies some kind of dualism between ‘disposer’ and ‘disposed’), but the possibility to be an embodied person and remain unharmed.

As we have already touched upon in the last chapter, the question of whether one has a body or is a body is not merely one of grammatical pedantry. It points to some very profound questions about the nature of embodied consciousness and the relationship between body, self and mind; and since we are here discussing the self as a spatial phenomenon, a difference in conceptions of the relationship between the self and its space. Brace (1997) summarises the distinction in contrasting the notion of a ‘territorial self’, the product of a Hobbesian war of all against all, with that of a spatial self which does not reign over a territory so much as it inhabits what Brace calls a “domain” (137). Brace traces the distinction between spatiality and territoriality back to the 17th century and the writings of Hobbes and Winstanley. Hobbes, as is well known, imagined the ‘state of nature’ as a violent and deeply unpleasant affair, in which every self – individual or collective – has to assume that every other is out to get it. As a result, the self has to establish a kind of sovereignty that “encloses the self, trying to create a fortress
from within which to resist invasion from the outside” (139). This defensive structure necessarily relies on force, both in terms of absolute control of the inside, and in terms of banishing, excluding and marginalising anything on the outside that could threaten its sovereign rule. The territorial self thus becomes characterised by “a rational inside coping with problems on the outside” (Bartelson, 1995, 42), and it is not difficult to recognise in this the structure of a self characterised by splitting and projection, as discussed in chapter 5. This structure, as we have seen, crucially involves establishing the spurious rule of the ‘sovereign mind’ over the body, and is thus a self that perceives of itself as ‘having’ rather than ‘being’ a body.

Winstanley’s own political programme included “common ownership of the land, the abolition of the buying and selling of land, the communal practice of agriculture, and likewise...the communal operation of forestry, mining and manufactures, the abolition of the payment of rent and of wage labour” (Aylmer, 2013, 8), and he and his associates, dubbed the ‘Diggers’ set out in practical pursuit of this vision by occupying and attempting to cultivate land and freely distribute the crops. The most prominent of these occupations at saint George’s Hill in Surrey in 1649 was evicted only the following year by enraged landowners, and other Digger communities suffered the same fate not long after (Bradstock et al, 2013). The Digger occupations continue to inspire movements to communalise the land, such as the contemporary ‘The Land Is Ours’ campaign, and is frequently echoed in socialist theories which interpret property as property in the means of production and distinguish it from possession, i.e. the rights to an object bestowed by its actual use. Socialism, in this view

"abolishes private ownership of the means of production and distribution, and with it goes capitalistic business. Personal possession remains only in the things you use. Thus, your watch is your own, but the watch factory belongs to the people. Land, machinery, and all other public utilities will be collective property, neither to be bought nor sold. Actual use will be considered the only title -- not to ownership but to possession.” (Berkman, yr, 217)
Winstanley’s version of the spatial self, on the other hand, is far less antagonistic. While he, too, recognises the central importance of spatiality, the ‘domain’ that his self inhabits is less of a fortress and more of a garden, a spatiality that is “concerned with wholeness rather than restriction or protection” (Brace, 1997, 145). Winstanley uses the Christian metaphor of the Fall to describe the predicament of a self that is ‘cast out of itself’ by the force of what he calls the ‘imagination’; and what in modern language one could see as the forces of a compartmentalising reason that divides up the world and introduces separation into the primal state of unity. Again, this imagery mirrors the concept of dissociation we have discussed in the last chapter, that is, a splitting of the self, which results in inner fragmentation. In order to ‘return to the Garden of Eden’, to become whole again, Winstanley argues that ‘man’ has to overcome his impulse to ‘covet’ things outside of himself, and to return to his ‘inner kingdom’ and a state of wholeness (Hill, 1973/2006). I interpret this not so much as an admonishment to forego the temptation of coveting outside ‘stuff’, but more as a metaphor for the tendency of the dissociated self to split and externalise parts of itself, which then have to be ‘brought back’ into experience through their embodiment in others. Winstanley’s account can therefore be read as a call to recognise that the true battle is not between the self and its outside, but between the self and the ‘imagination’ that builds a ‘hedge’ or ‘dam’ inside it (Brace, 1997, 138), thus splitting it in two. In a similar vein to Hegel, Winstanley therefore sees the goal of ethical development in an overcoming of this division, a process of inner sublation that will restore the self to wholeness and integrity. This, as I have argued, crucially involves overcoming the division between ‘mind’ and ‘body’, and thus the idea that the latter can be ‘disposed over’.

102 Although Winstanley, being a Puritan, at least partly does mean ‘stuff’, see conclusion.
103 The traditional gender binary could be seen as an example of how this ‘covetousness’ works in terms of psychodynamics. If culture requires individuals to exhibit particular traits that are associated with their body type, then other aspects – those associated with the ‘opposite’ gender – have to be split off. Since this splitting is (in my view) dysfunctional, crippling and harmful, people attempt to ‘heal’ the split by ‘coveting’ the aspects they have been forced to dissociate in others – the result is widespread ‘heterosexuality’ with all of its associated problems.
We will discuss these two versions of the self at more length below. For now, I
want to return to the question of the ‘home’ and argue that the ‘home’ that is at
stake here – the haven, the shelter, the place of ontological safety – is the domain
of a spatial self that has achieved sovereignty not in the sense of ‘despotic
dominion’ (Brace, 2004, 1) but in the sense of a return to unbroken wholeness –
in Winstanley’s terms, a return to the Garden before the Fall, or in Bachelard’s
words, the cradle. The fact that these are metaphors of return and restoration
should not obscure that they are, at the same time, metaphors for becoming: they
imply a kind of backwards utopianism that seeks to approximate a future through
invoking images of an idealised past. As Jessica Benjamin (chapter 5) reminds us,
the embodied self emerges from an original relationship of mutual recognition
between subjects, the original, unbroken state of a self that is safe in being
recognised as a whole person and thus can provide the same recognition for the
other. If the metaphors of return therefore point to the future, then to say that
the cradle of mutuality that first sustained the self is not forever lost, but can be
re-created in a ‘home’ characterised by honouring the shared human
vulnerability of its inhabitants; thus re-affirming the age-old connection between
belonging and hope. In the following, we will look at how squatters went about
creating a home that is such a safe space, or at least has the potential to become
one.
Becoming At Home

Critics of the idea of home as a safe space\textsuperscript{104} have rightly pointed out that it poorly reflects the empirical reality of many people for whom ‘home’ is the exact opposite, such as for example victims of domestic violence (Saunders/Williams, 1988). As we have seen above, the problem here is not so much that the notion of home as a ‘haven’ does not have any basis in reality, but rather, that in really existing homes, there is often a tension between what its inhabitants would wish for it to be and what it really is. Rather than saying that a ‘home’ should not be defined as a safe space, I would therefore argue that if it is not safe then it does not deserve the name of ‘home’. The controversy does however point to the fact that as Tucker (1994) notes: ‘most people spend their lives in search of home, at the gap between the natural home [conceived as the home environment conducive to human existence, i.e. dry land] and the particular ideal home where they would be fully fulfilled” (n.p.). In this definition, ‘home’ is not so much a place as it is a process, the continuous approximation of an ideal and thus an on-going project of becoming safer in the world.

Dovey recognises this when she contrasts the Heideggerian notion of ‘being-at-home’\textsuperscript{105} with a process of ‘becoming-at home’, which to her means precisely the process of appropriation that distinguishes mere geographical space from the relational space of ‘home’. However, as the example of squatting illustrates, this approximation does not always point to a harmonious movement of appropriating the material world through human agency, as Dovey’s concept implies. Rather, ‘becoming at home’ as a squatter implies a struggle, as the project of becoming safer in the world requires a confrontation with the social structures that prevent this from happening, and is thus paradoxically opposed to the strategies that the ‘housed’ population employs for the same purpose. For


\textsuperscript{105} As I will discuss in chapter eight, this is a very generous interpretation of Heidegger, and in the light of what he (as I will demonstrate) actually means by ‘being at home’, his concept should be approached with caution.
example, for the general population, private property is one mechanism by which ‘home’ is established as a place of safety (at least until the next housing market crash illustrates the precariousness of this approach). Being homeless, on the other hand, precisely means being excluded from property as a means of establishing spatial entitlement, and thus what is one person’s ticket to safety is another person’s existential threat. In this sense, the delivery of ‘papers’, by which property asserts itself, is the precise moment a squatter turns into a homeless person, a person for whom the relative safety of inside space is no longer guaranteed. ‘Papers’ signify a bureaucratic assault that breaches the protective boundary of home, strips away the temporary safety of the interior space and puts its inhabitant on the street – not, in the first instance, by putting them outside of the building, but by putting the unsafe, dangerous space of ‘the street’ inside. For our crew the expectation of eviction meant that while our house still sheltered us from the elements, this physical shelter did not fully translate into a subjective experience of safety any more, since the future no longer held the promise of being sheltered.

Although there was little conversation about it, this uncertainty had immediate effects. Life in our ex-home took on a new quality of urgency, almost militancy, as if we were collectively breaching ourselves for the confrontation with the outdoors that lay ahead. During the day, we scouted the city for empty properties via the internet, at night we went out in person, wrapped in thick layers against the cold, to scout eligible ‘empties’ and find possible points of entry. After some reshuffling of crewmembers, a new group of seven people from the St Pauls squat emerged, who committed to taking on a new space together. Among the seven, fierce competition began to ensue as members tried to ascertain that they were an asset to the group, rather than, to use Ralph’s favourite term, ‘a liability’. On the face of things, we were a leader-less and non-hierarchical crew, but there was

106 The image of ‘the street’ is often invoked as code for racist or classist descriptions of the kinds of people who are assumed to hang out there (see for example the controversy around Anderson’s ‘code of the street’ in the next chapter). I therefore want to point out that I do not refer to the ‘street’ as code for anything, but am talking about the actual street, i.e. publicly accessible urban space, which as I have discussed above, for the homeless is quite a dangerous place.
nevertheless an unacknowledged hierarchy in terms of what and how individuals contributed to the group. The reason for this was not so much existential – no crew member would be left out cold just for being lazy – but could perhaps be seen as a need for recognition of a higher order, since the question of who would make the crucial contribution that resulted in a new home for us held implications for this person’s future status in the group. By virtue of resolving an urgent problem – that of shelter – the successful ‘hunter’ would prove beyond a doubt that his or her skills and experience were supremely matched to the requirements of squatter life, and thus the indisputable fact of success would give their opinion a greater weight in future decisions. As a result, several crewmembers came up with particular empties and plans to take them, and refused to consider other options, lest someone else took all the glory. The competitive atmosphere was contagious, and before long I found myself just as eager to prove myself an asset as the others.

This situation of literal ‘house-hunting’ led to one of the few occasions that gender politics were overtly discussed in our crew. Competition had begun to crystallise around two of the men, each favouring a different ‘empty’, and their personal rather than practical refusal to agree on a course of action was starting to stall the entire operation. There were at this point only two women left in the squat – me and a 22 year old named Katy – and one night we decided that we could take care of the crew just as well as the men could or better. In a meticulously planned action involving a truck, several yards of carpet roll and a temporarily distracted CCTV camera, we took our own building, sliding from the back of the vehicle through a 1ft gap in the broken glass of the front door, using the carpet rolls as padding. Our pride at the fact that none of the men could have accomplished this feat (due to their sheer size) was however short-lived – unbeknownst to us, and to each other, two other breaking crews had set out the same night, and when the sun rose it turned out that our crew was holed up in three different empties, each group refusing to give up the space they had

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107 I am not being flippant in invoking a ‘hunter’ metaphor, since references to ‘tribes’ and ‘hunter-gatherers’ were on occasion invoked by squatters themselves, albeit also in a not-quite-serious fashion.
conquered to join the others. All three of these occupations failed eventually (our ‘girl’s squat’ turned out to be un-heatable), but bragging about who had technically gotten us a squat that night continued for months after.

The crown eventually fell to Drew. He had found an empty property in the north of the city, a former nursery now scheduled for demolition, easily accessed via a low roof and an open door that led from the inside yard into the building. With only two weeks to go until the court date – and thus potentially immediate eviction – any alternative buildings were eventually ruled out as much more difficult to gain access to. The nursery was taken one night in time-honoured fashion: get in, secure all entrances with deadbolts from the inside, stick a section 6 on the door and, as they say, ‘Bob’s yer uncle’. As soon as the phone call came to inform the rest of the crew the house was secure, we shouldered our essential belongings and joined the breaking team.

Over the next few days, the transformation of our squat into a home began to take shape. The first step consisted in ensuring that there were no immediate reprisals to be expected in the form of an illegal eviction attempt. For the first 48 or so hours, this meant that instead of just one person ‘squat-sitting’, at least three or four were present at all times to deal with any potential attacks. Once it had become sufficiently clear that an attack was unlikely, and thus a level of basic security was established, we gradually began to move in the rest of our stuff (we collectively owned, among other things, seven double mattresses, a small oven with two hobs, a washing machine and an assortment of power tools) and claimed our individual spaces. The latter was done by putting one’s bag down in the middle of the room one wanted to occupy, and subsequently making the case for one’s entitlement to this space in more or less lengthy debates with other squatmates. The question of who had contributed what to the opening of the space here translated directly into claims to the nicest rooms in the house.

The nursery was a strange place for adults to inhabit. The building was made to accommodate four year olds, and moving through it made one feel like a giant in
a dwarf’s house. The ceilings were low, the chairs and tables miniature, the cheerful animal wallpaper stood in stark contrast to the damp and bitter cold air that hung in the rooms. This was the winter 2011/12, and, like every winter I have ever lived through in the UK, it was heralded by the media as the ‘worst winter in living memory’. In this particular case the media were not far off the mark – temperatures had dropped to -15 C, cold even by Austrian standards, and a thin, persistent layer of snow had covered the city for weeks. Our previous squat had benefitted from central heating, which the former occupants had not bothered to turn off, but in the nursery we had to revert to portable electrical space heaters and physical proximity to keep warm.

The cold drew the psychological demarcation lines between inside and outside more decisively than a legal warning on the door could. Heat was precious, and our bodies reacted by instinctively limiting the expenditure of precious calories on ventures outside of the house. Our nutrition was dubious at best, as we lived mainly on food ‘skipped’ from the bins of local supermarkets. Skipping had its limits, as much of the food that was thrown out was of the ‘gack’ variety – sugar and cheap carbohydrates in the shape of chocolate bars and biscuits. Vegetables and fruit were rare, as was the cooking of actual meals in the small nursery kitchen. Some of us, me included, had money to buy food, but the implicit logic of the space required something akin to a ‘solidarity of the smallest common denominator’, in other words, as long as some of us had no money, the others were careful not to flaunt theirs too openly. Despite the fact that some items of food were considered indispensable, and whoever had money would buy them (coffee was top of the list, followed by milk for the coffee), on the whole, a somewhat self-defeating logic of ‘we’ had begun to override a logic of individual self-preservation. In this, our crew was different from others I have known, since some squats were blessed with members who could make fantastic collective meals out of the most humble of ingredients. Our crew, however, seemed to contain a disproportionate amount of people who, for one reason or another, had trouble taking care of their basic physical needs. As a consequence, we all ate too
little of the wrong kind, and to run around in the cold weather began to seem increasingly frivolous.

Instead, we began to ‘make ourselves at home’ in a number of different ways. After making the space safe in terms of physical survival – which is not a metaphor for the homeless in winter – our next step consisted in symbolically appropriating it by means of decorating. As Bachelard observes, “an entire past comes to dwell in a new house. The old saying ‘we bring our lares with us’ has many variations” (1958/1994, 5). Most squatters then also had a limited amount of personal objects that represented their personal space, and in every new squat these were carefully distributed and arranged to produce the coherence that this person recognised as ‘their room’. The objects could be pictures or posters, small pieces of furniture or musical instruments, or objects the person associated with their role as a squatter, i.e. tools, climbing gear and other signifiers of ‘outdoorsiness’. Their particular arrangement varied from move to move, but their collective presence served to identify personal space as an extension of the identity of its inhabitant. It has been said that ‘home’ is

“a way of relating to the environment that may be transposed from place to place, and in this way the meanings of home may be re-evoked if the patterns are recreated. For instance the !Kung bushmen of the Kalahari Desert create a new home every night with just a fire to mark the center and a small windbreak or symbolic entry. These are enough to evoke a complex schema of spatial meanings that orients everyone in relation to the fire.” (Marshall, 1973, cited in Dovey, 1985, 5).

Similarly, a squatter’s ‘home’ could be easily transposed from one building to another, by projecting the psychic space of ‘home’ onto different architectural

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108 Latin: Lar, plural M, in Roman religion, any of numerous tutelary deities. They were originally gods of the cultivated fields, worshipped by each household at the crossroads where its allotment joined those of others. Later the Lares were worshipped in the houses in association with the Penates, the gods of the storeroom (penus) and thus of the family’s prosperity; the household Lar (Familiaris) was conceived as the centre of the family and of the family cult. (Encyclopaedia Britannica)
structures. The arrangement of objects thus helped to produce a sense of continuity of personhood, by giving the same symbolic meaning to a (often quick) succession of different architectures\textsuperscript{109}. To make oneself at home in such a way shares a lot of features with what Clark and Chalmers (1998) refer to as the "active externalism" of the mind:

"The human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right...If we remove the external component the system's behavioral competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain...this sort of coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head" (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, 3)

Since the production of a self-model is a cognitive process, and since it relies on the existence of a safe personal space to support and stabilise itself, one could say that such a space does for the embodied self what according to Clark and Chalmers external cognitive processing does for the 'mind' – it extends it past its immediate boundaries and produces a coupled system in which the self and its 'domain' become part of the same functional unit. The authors call the idea that the mind can join with external structures to form one and the same cognitive system the "extended mind" hypothesis (ibid). But if there is no meaningful line to be drawn between 'mind' and 'body', then it would have to be asked if there should not be an analogous 'extended body hypothesis', in which the material structures that immediately support and thus form a 'survival system' with the organic body are counted as part of its functional system as well. A 'home' in the sense I have been discussing here would be an example of how an external structure interacts with the 'spatial self' in such a way that the symbolic re-creation of a spatial arrangement simultaneously cognitively re-produces the

\textsuperscript{109} Martin, a Gypsy activist I spoke to (see chapter 12) pointed out to me that the same logic underlies the setting up of Gypsy sites – when people pull up at a new site, they arrange the vehicles in a specific pattern (tow end of the caravans facing inwards), creating a symbolic boundary between 'inside space' of the Travellers and the 'outside space' of the gorja (non-Traveller). As Martin put it, one of the first things people do on a new site is 'put the flowerpots out', i.e. arrange material objects in a way that structures the space and represents the identity of the dweller (See also Olwig, 1999)
identity of its inhabitant: “we build the intimate shell of our lives by the organization and furnishing of the space in which we live. How we function as persons is linked to how we make ourselves at home” (Ginsberg, 1999, 31; see also Ingold, 1995; Jackson et al 1995). Consequently, take away the ‘home’ and you will compromise the brain’s ability to come up with a functioning, stable self model. While I would not want to push the analogy too far, there is therefore a case to be made that the symbolic structure of the ‘home’ – mobile or static – has an indispensable function for embodied cognition and thus serves as something of an ‘extended self’.

At the same time, a squat needed to be made secure vis a vis the outside in the sense of fortifying it against possible intrusion. This involved, at the minimum, making sure that only one entrance was accessible, and thus access to the house could be strictly controlled. In the nursery this was not difficult, given that the building had been designed to keep four-year-olds from escaping. In other contexts, there were a range of different fortifications squats used, from sticking newspapers over ground floor windows to avoid being recognised from the outside, to elaborately booby-trapped staircases designed for days-long eviction sieges. The level of effort that went into such contraptions increased with the likelihood of a police raid or eviction attempt, to the point where squatters would occasionally barricade a building they had decided to abandon, only to watch with great hilarity from the outside as police or security forces worked for hours to get inside. Normally, however, fortifications were simply driven by necessity – the risk of illegal eviction, police raids, racist attacks or theft meant that a space had to some extent be seen from the perspective of a possible intruder, and all opportunities for trespass had to be eliminated. Squatters, of course, knew a thing or two about trespass, and so it was not surprising that in some cases nothing short of an outright SWAT attack on part of the police could breach the perimeter.

What we can see in these examples are therefore two different strategies by which the spatial self comes to feel ‘at home’. In the first, the self comes to shape its immediate surroundings in such a way that they can serve as a ‘safe space’
that sustains the experience of a continuous, unbroken identity. The production of this space crucially relies on the willingness of others to recognise its legitimacy, for example by not intruding into a person's room without permission. Such recognition, in the first instance, does not require defences, at least not as long as others are willing to acknowledge and respect the integrity of one's personal space as part of the integrity of the self. In chapter two, I have recounted how I was awarded such recognition of my habitation of the corner in Joe’s living room – no demarcation line required. Implied in this is the notion of shared vulnerability we have encountered before, as respecting somebody's personal space means to acknowledge that this space forms a protective ‘shell’ in which the self can reproduce itself through a sense of safety and containment, and to not wilfully disturb this process. Recognition here means to know that in its own space “physically, the creature endowed with a sense of refuge, huddles up to itself, takes to cover, hides away, lies snug, concealed” (Bachelard, 1958/1994, 91), and in precisely this way, can emerge anew to re-connect with others.

The second example – that of building fortifications – shares some superficial features with the first. Here, too, the immediate environment is shaped in such a way that the ‘creatures’ inside become safer. However, in terms of the social relations implied in this arrangement, recognition is no longer assumed, on the contrary – barricading and booby-trapping are activities that make sense only when there is a fair chance that others will not respect one’s spatial domain, which for squatters, as we have seen, is a very realistic expectation. I will therefore here draw a distinction, as announced above, between safety in the sense of the containment of the self in its domain, and security – the desired state of a self that already sees itself under attack. This latter self therefore corresponds to what with Brace (1997) above we have called the “territorial self” – a self who is “preoccupied with breakdown, with invasion and with identifying the risk the other poses” (142) and thus barricades itself into a space that resembles a veritable fortress. In the same way that we have called the ‘home’ of the spatial self a ‘safe space’, we can therefore call the ‘home’ of the territorial self
a ‘secure space’ – and have thus discovered a clue as to why the literature appears to consistently refer to two different versions of ‘home’.

In the following chapters, I will therefore use the term ‘safe space’ to refer to the kind of space created by relations of recognition, and ‘secure space’ to identify a space characterised by misrecognition and objectification. Drawing on further examples, we will see how these two ethical patterns, and the spatial configurations, they produce recur in the lives of homeless people in different contexts. Before moving on to this discussion, however, one last remark: in contrasting recognition and misrecognition, the spatial and the territorial self, and ‘safe space’ vs. ‘secure space’, I do not intend to draw a simple ‘good vs. evil’ dichotomy. While it is certainly appropriate to critique e.g. the structure of the territorial self in the abstract, as Brace does and I will do as well in chapter 8, the example of squatter’s barricading here shows that in practice, there is often a very good reason for a self to become territorial. Defending one's space does not necessarily speak of baseless paranoia or a desire to dominate and exclude others for the sheer sake of it. Sometimes – as in the case of squatters – selves really do find themselves under attack, and if they react by building barricades, the question needs to be asked what other option they have. While I therefore do not wish to advocate for the territorial self, it would also be inappropriate to flat-out condemn it. Rather, we need to ask the question what produces a territorial self, and what, if anything, could persuade it to trade security for safety. That said, in the next chapter, we will have a look at the connection between relational ethics and the construction of space in more detail.
Alongside our basic opposition between patterns of recognition and misrecognition, we have now established two analogous oppositions, namely between the spatial self and the territorial self, and between safe space and secure space. These three dyads will structure the rest of my discussion, as I will explore how they come to play out in a number of different contexts. This also involves the previously established claim that these patterns and their correlates in self and space can be found on different levels of scale – from the individual to the cultural and from the home to the nation state. In this chapter, I will present a number of examples of how the territorial self and the spatial self differ in the kinds of spaces they create, this time not so much in terms of the arrangement of physical structures, but in terms of the social relations that form the ‘fourth dimension’ of socially constructed space. As we will see, while theoretical binaries are easily established in the abstract, once they come to bear on real life, things can get considerably messier. The spatial and social configurations we will encounter in this chapter are only to a very small extent pure examples of their kind – most of them show at least a degree of hybridity and ambivalence in the kind of pattern they represent. As I will discuss, these hybrid configurations are for the most part a result of the fact that they represent attempts to establish an ethics of mutual recognition within and against a social context that is based on the opposite. While we will therefore not find a space that is entirely untouched by territoriality and misrecognition, we will encounter examples in which this form of spatial ethics was at least seriously contested, and thus consider the power dynamics of territoriality in more detail.

Sharing a space with others inevitably involves the explicit or implicit creation of, and adherence to, a certain mutually accepted normative framework. For our
crew this meant that while life in the previous squat had been relatively harmonious, in a new building the rules had to be re-negotiated. On the one hand, a new squat meant a ‘clean slate’ in terms of seniority for all who moved in simultaneously. In our previous house, people had moved in one after another, with Drew being the longest-standing inhabitant and me the last arrival. This temporal difference translated into a difference in degree of authority – the person who lived there longest was considered to have the highest investment in the space, and thus their voice was given more weight when decisions had to be made. At least in our crew, this construction of ‘authority’ was bound up not so much with a belief in leaders, but rather, with a peculiar understanding of being considerate towards the connection of personal identity and place – the person who lived in the house longest was seen to be most strongly entangled with the space, it was his or her ‘home’, in the sense of an extension of his personhood, more than that of whoever came later. Implicit in this understanding was the idea that whoever was thus most invested in the space was most vulnerable to its loss, and therefore, should have all the more say in how it was run and/or kept. Once we had moved into the nursery, however, the differences that had structured the group along these lines were wiped out – we were now all ‘equal’ regarding the duration of our connection with the place, and each had as much to lose as any.

On the other hand, we had decided that we wanted to be an explicitly ‘political’ squat. There were two ways in which squatters considered their squats to be ‘political’ – in one sense, the act of squatting in itself was considered a political act, and thus a squat was a ‘political’ space in that it was simply contested territory. In the other sense (the one our crew had in mind), squats could be ‘political’\footnote{I use the term ‘political’ here therefore in a different sense than Prujit (2013, see chapter 4), who refers as ‘political’ to squats whose inhabitants have the ‘ulterior motive’ of opposing the state. While this motive was certainly present for some squatters, it was not, in their own understanding, what made them ‘political’. Rather, ‘being political’ consisted in first and foremost adopting what one considered an appropriate way of relating to other people, followed by the realisation that the state was one of the social structures that prevented one from consistently doing so. Fighting the state therefore was a consequence of creating ‘safe spaces’, not its purpose.} in that their inhabitants adhered to specific political principles, most often of the anarchist (and as such by implication at least vaguely feminist)
persuasion. Squats of the latter type were those that explicitly referred to the concept of Safe Space as a guide for conduct, and often operated a type of written policy setting out that discrimination of any kind on the basis of gender, race, sexuality, age, disability and a number of other identity categories was prohibited. These sets of rules were generally referred to as ‘Safe Space policy’ (or, acknowledging the impossibility of a totally safe space, ‘Safe(r) Space policy’) and could often be found printed out and displayed publicly within a squat. But also where such systems of rules were not explicitly displayed, ‘political’ squats usually involved an expectation that anyone who used the space adhere, at minimum, to the proscription of ‘sexism’, ‘racism’ and other such forms of misrecognition.

The precise phrasing of Safe Space policies varied. BHAM, who we have met previously, simply state “we operate a safe space policy at our meetings, this means we do not allow racist, sexist, homophobic or any type of discriminatory behaviour” (BHAM flyer). In this negative formulation, Safe Space refers to a set of behaviours that are proscribed on the basis that they are seen as common forms of structural oppression against certain groups. Other spaces choose a positive formulation: Kebele Social Centre in Easton sees its purpose among other things in “providing a space that is equally welcoming to everyone (except cops, fascists etc.) irrespective of age, race, gender, background, sexuality and (dis)ability” (Kebele website). Whether expressly inviting people regardless of their specific positionality, or by proscribing discrimination against them, the assumption is that in order to ensure the safety of a diverse range of people, certain other groups must be expressly excluded. ‘Cops, fascists etc.’ therefore here becomes shorthand for the identified aggressor that the users of the ‘Safe Space’ have to be kept safe from – again emphasising the recognition of the shared vulnerability of these groups, this time to violent domination such as the ‘cops and fascists’ are (not without reason) seen to embody.

To a certain degree, ‘Safe(r) Space’ policies could appear strangely selective, as they routinely listed a (sometimes impressively high) number of proscribed
forms of discrimination, when they arguably could have simply proscribed any form of domination whatsoever. To an extent, this was due to the fact that some areas of presumed discrimination were not as clear-cut as others. Occupy Bristol, for example includes in its ‘Safe Space’ policy “race, gender, sexuality, age, ability, religion”, while the ‘religion’ aspect is notably absent in both BHAM and Kebele’s versions. This may point to the fact that within anarchist politics, religion is often regarded with suspicion, as it is seen as one form of social domination among many (exemplified in the slogan ‘No Gods, No Masters’). The fact that at the same time some people experience discrimination because of their religious beliefs makes this a complex and often contentious issue.

More importantly, however, the individual listing of different oppressed groups can be understood as an ethical and political gesture, a statement that these social struggles were recognised and supported each in their specificity and particularity. At the same time, however, the logic of addressing them under the same banner pointed to an implicit recognition of the fact that they all held something in common. The Bristol Anarchist Federation, for example, states in an article about ‘Safe(r) Space’ policies: “Looking at the world today we can see that it is full of prejudice. Gender, sexuality, age, physical ability, social class, skin colour and being part of a specific ethnic group are all used as excuses for society undertaking and accepting a catalogue of abuses against people”111. Inherent in this view is an understanding of oppression that looks beyond particular identity, in order to critique the binary logic of domination and submission, subject and object, that governs all of them – what the anarchists are here calling out is not a specific form of domination, but the fact of domination as such. The anarchist commitment to creating spaces free from these forms of abuse was therefore quite explicitly framed as a process of simultaneously acknowledging and rejecting relations of misrecognition, and their replacement with their opposite.

In practice, Safe Space policies were most often invoked in the context of gender relations, more precisely, in instances of gender discrimination and/or sexual

111 Author anonymous, http://floraker.net/2013/03/31/organised-safer-space-2/, 17.12.2013
violence. This was in part due to the fact that women were by far the largest of the ‘subjugated’ groups within the squatting scene, while other groups (such as people of colour) were relatively underrepresented. For this reason, as the anonymous Anarchist Federation writer puts it, “while [discriminatory] cultural norms can be seen wherever oppression takes place, I would argue that one of the most pervasive and widespread of these affecting all our radical spaces today are carried over from our dominant culture’s acceptance of rape and sexual violence”. Safe Spaces were therefore seen as a direct response to the observation that most spaces within the ‘dominant culture’ were not safe for women, and, in smaller numbers, for those men who also became victims of sexual assault. Preventing sexual violence – and where it could not be prevented, at least retrospectively keeping the victim safe from repeatedly having to face the perpetrator – thus was the most frequent reason 'Safe Space' policies were applied in practice. This meant that a collective effort had to be undertaken to exclude the alleged perpetrator from communal spaces, particularly those that were frequented by the victim, and thus also to socially ostracise him. In one instant, the following statement was publicly issued by a number of radical groups following an alleged sexual assault:

“Following notification from [a social centre] that X. has been banned from the centre and its activities due to allegations of a serious sexual assault, an emergency meeting of individuals and radical groups in Bristol was held.

As individuals and networks opposed to domination and oppression, including but not exclusive to misogyny, sexual violence, bullying and intimidation, it was agreed that X. would be excluded from involvement with the projects, organisations and groups named below. These groups will also, where they are able, take steps to exclude him from public events and actions in which they take part.”

This perpetrator was subsequently successfully removed from physical and social spaces and aggressively confronted when he did show his face in public. There was some criticism raised against this mode of action, mainly that in
creating a Safe Space for the victim within the 'scene', the perpetrator would be driven to go elsewhere to possibly find new victims. Involving the police (a decision that was generally left up to the survivor) did not appear too promising an option, given the abysmal conviction rate for sexual violence and the considerable emotional cost for the victim, even if a conviction is obtained. Additionally, there was a strong social taboo against involving the police in anything, based on the fact that they usually did the opposite of protecting anarchists from harm (this assumption was in no way unfounded, see chapter 11). The problem of ejecting a predator from one space and thereby inevitably inflicting him on somebody else thus pointed to the difficulty of creating safe space within a cultural setting in which such spaces were not generally the norm.

On the one hand, Safe Space policies were therefore based on a similar principle as the politics of mutual support against eviction described in chapter two – the recognition of a shared vulnerability and the readiness to protect one another from aggression. At the same time, they also illustrate the difference between an abstract principle and real life: in real life, very few things ever occur in the pure and unadulterated form the abstract model would suggest. This is apparent in the fact that while they implied a conscious politics of recognition, Safe Spaces also to an extent relied on territoriality, namely in the aspect that involved excluding all kinds of aggressors, if necessary by means of force. As I have argued in the last chapter, the fear that leads the territorial self to barricade itself in a fortress need not be baseless, since sometimes – such as in the case of sexual assaults or eviction attempts – there is every reason to assume that others are in fact out to get one. Actually existing Safe Spaces were therefore most often hybrid configurations, in which an ethics of mutually affirming one another's subjecthood met with the necessity to create a secure space in which to do so. It would be unfair to lay the blame for this lack of pure form at the door of the anarchists – they were, after all, attempting to create new forms of social relating amidst an environment that empathically did not want to acknowledge them. The problem of shifting the responsibility of dealing with sexual predators elsewhere is a case in point – trying to create safe space in an isolated bubble inevitably
leads to friction at the boundaries, where the ethical impetus of the inside collides with the realities of the outside. This problem is not exclusive to the construction of space – many forms of political action contend with the fact that they are in a contradictory relationship with precisely the structures they are trying to overcome. Critics of the money economy find that they have to earn a minimum amount of cash to participate in social relations, feminists find that the very women they want to reach hold unacceptably un-feminist views; and advocates of abolishing the prison system on occasion find out that the ‘political’ prisoners they have been sending letters of solidarity to are actually psychopathic murderers who kept somebody's head in a fridge (this actually happened). But while it is easy to point at these contradictions as evidence that the political goal is set too high, hybridity of practice is almost unavoidable in processes of social transformation, when the old and the new collide in really existing spaces. Rather than seeing this as evidence that a ‘pure’ ethics of recognition is impossible to realise, I therefore want to emphasise the degree to which it was realised, despite the traditional reluctance of structure to yield to the political demands of the individual.

That said, hybridity is rarely a smooth process of coexistence, but rather, illustrates the contradictions of praxis to a sometimes painful degree. For example, in as far as Safe Space policies were formulated, and most of the time practically applied to, gender relations, they had to contend with a certain ambiguous relationship with traditional masculinity. On the one hand, the state of material threat that squatters found themselves in, both in terms of their living arrangements and of their wider political activities, meant that a certain form of reactive macho behaviour was common within the scene, and by far not limited to male-identified persons. The image of the tough, tool-carrying, wall-scaling, police-fighting ‘man-archist’ was simultaneously an ideal and a source of ridicule, and while women (myself included) criticised this type of behaviour, they were at the same time no less apt at exhibiting it. Where women definitely did not compete with men was in terms of physical aggression – although many were perfectly capable of fighting, they were notably less inclined to do so. This may
have to do with gendered socialisation, which poses strong prohibitions against physical fighting in girls, and at least some squatter women saw in this a deliberate strategy by the patriarchy to keep women unable to defend themselves. One woman I squatted with for a while told me that as an adolescent, she had to literally train herself to be able to respond aggressively to a threat: “this guy said he’d teach me to throw a punch and I said yes, so I punched him. It took me a few tries before I could even do it. It was like there was this invisible rubber band holding my hand back”. Consequently, self-defence trainings especially for women were common features of many social centres.

Where masculine swagger got out of hand, it could occasionally tip over into serious trouble. There was a tiny but prominent minority of men present whose behaviour was characterised by a convergence of a general propensity for violence, and dominating and objectifying behaviour toward women. Most of them had first-hand experience of institutions where this form of aggressive masculinity was fostered, such as the military or the prison system – perhaps the working class equivalent of boarding schools as ‘human factories’ for the production of territorial selves – and like with boarding schools, the resulting habitus may well have been acquired as a survival strategy. One such man was once described to me as “the human equivalent of a hand grenade: very useful to have around in some cases, but dangerous when you get too close”. Implied in this statement is the idea that while these men were certainly valuable assets when it came to defending the boundaries of spaces from attack, they simultaneously made these spaces considerably less safe on the inside. Gavin, for example, went to great lengths to avoid a guy who had once beat him up in a rage, and was ostensibly relieved when this man eventually went to prison. On another occasion, he explicitly warned me against spending a night in a squat in the presence of a man who had committed a string of sexual assaults. In some squats, men like this established veritable reigns of terror, by aggressively dominating other men and women alike.
Cascading Solidarities

While on the one hand, squatted spaces were therefore characterised by a contradictory relationship between an ethics of recognition and an ethics of territoriality, they also showed that in real life, not all territoriality is created alike. In the most general terms, territoriality means “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area…this delimitation becomes a territory only when its boundaries are used to affect behaviour by controlling access” (Sack, 1986, 19). As Sack elaborates, this definition can involve a number of different scenarios. On the one hand, territoriality is not an absolute state, but “occurs in degrees” (ibid), that is to say, depending on the level of securisation, a space can be more or less territorial. On the other hand, since territories are not naturally occurring phenomena but social ones, the intention of the territorial actors must be taken in to account. As Sack argues, there can be reasons for territorial behaviour that are designed to benefit those controlled, for example when a parent limits the access of a child to a particular area to keep the child safe. He therefore distinguishes between “benign” and “malevolent” (31) territoriality, depending on who benefits from its exercise – those in control or those being controlled. Additionally, there can be more than one party involved, and while territorial behaviour may be designed to benefit one side, it may simultaneously disadvantage another. Territoriality therefore must also be assessed in the light of the concrete power relations between the territorial actors.

This caveat is important since paradoxically – given that their problem is the lack of an area they could control – homeless people are often found to behave in strongly territorial ways. Luhrmann (2008) discusses that in the absence of the protective measures that full citizenship (that is, full access to legal protection) awards, the homeless often adopt a certain aggressive style of interaction in
order to protect themselves from assault. Luhrmann compares this to “the ‘code of honour’ commonly found among nomadic peoples, pastoralists and ranchers... (who), because they are isolated... have few others to help to defend them. In such poorly policed settings, physical survival may depend upon an ability to defend one’s turf so aggressively... that the trouble slinks away” (3). For Luhrmann’s female respondents, who apparently did not have access to anything akin to the protection of the squatting scene, there is indeed good reason to do so, since as we have already seen, homeless women face an extremely high risk of being violently (sexually) assaulted. She therefore contends that homeless people employ a general mode of behaviour comparable to what Anderson (1999, 2002) has called the “code of the street”112, i.e. a pattern of behaviour that is designed to aggressively intimidate anyone who could potentially pose a threat. What for Luhrmann links such disparate groups as homeless women, inhabitants of a black ghetto and ‘nomadic peoples’ is therefore a particular kind of territorially, in which the boundaries of personal space are demarcated and defended through aggressive posturing and the threat of violence.

The ‘code of the street’, in the sense Luhrmann uses it, is therefore an example of the ‘territorial self’ in action. ‘The street’ here becomes shorthand for the Hobbesian “existential nightmare” (Prokhovnik, 1996, 1718) that puts the self into a position of such precarity that it “cannot distinguish between the wicked and the righteous” (Brace, 1997, 140) since every mistake might come at a cost to life and limb. It must therefore assume that all others are possessed of a “will to hurt” (142) and in order to pre-empt attack, must prominently exhibit such a

112 Anderson’s concept of a ‘code of the street’ has been widely criticised, notably by Loïc Wacquant, since it at least in part appears to attribute the emergence of violent interactions among poor, black residents of a US ‘ghetto’ to essentially a moral failure on their part (see Wacquant, 2002, 1486). Anderson replies that the ‘moral failure’ is not of his own judgment, but of that of his respondents, and the ‘code’ therefore is a relevant category of their own understanding (Anderson, 2002a). Both authors make serious and compelling arguments, although in the light of the entire debate (which I will not repeat here), I tend toward the opinion that Anderson’s approach is ultimately less problematic than that of Wacquant, who here speaks as a white man telling a black man he is ‘doing race wrong’ by using ‘native’ categories. However, the issue remains that the study of marginalisation must aim for systemic interpretations rather than attempting to explain poverty in terms of its own phenomenology, such as in approaches which assume a ‘culture of poverty’ or, indeed, of homelessness (see chapter 4)
will itself. The connection of this paranoid stance to a putative ‘code of honour’ is prominent in Hobbes, since the self “has to legitimate itself in relation to others through notions of honour and glory which consist in comparison” (141) and thus it “will challenge others to acknowledge his superiority and require them to honour and respect him” (142). This version of ‘respect’ is therefore a very different one from Honneth’s gentle awareness of another’s integrity – it consists in submission to the superior ability of another to cause harm, and thus speaks of intimidation rather than recognition.

While it is questionable whether Luhrmann’s ‘pastoralist’ indeed lives in a Hobbesian state of nature, or is merely seen to do so through the eyes of a Western anthropologist, it is undeniable that the homeless on the streets of Western cities have to actually contend with a permanent threat to their spatial selves. As I have argued, this threat is not merely a metaphor – in as far as bodies, and thus selves, are spatial, they do involve a risk of territorial attack through colonisation and invasion. This is nowhere more obvious than in the risk of sexual violation that homeless women face, when the space of their embodied self is violently intruded upon. While I would therefore agree, in principle, that the metaphor of the boundary as a fixed, defensible demarcation line of the territorial self must be critically questioned (Nedelsky, 1990), it would certainly be ill advised to demand this kind of disarmament from a self that is under actual threat of being colonised. As Brace argues, a critique of territoriality must always also involve an account of really existing power relations (152), and in the case of homeless people and especially homeless women, ‘aggressively defending their turf’ might be their only survival option.

On the other hand, not all territorial posturing occurs in self-defence. If, for example, one went out in Bristol city centre on a Friday or Saturday night, one could observe a ritual which, I am sure, can be found in similar form in many other places: mostly young men, under the influence of copious amounts of

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113 For a more in-depth discussion of the concept of ‘honour’ in this context see chapter 12
114 The same holds true for collective entities, such as colonized peoples.
alcohol, were wandering around looking for a physical confrontation. One very efficient strategy of finding it consisted in picking a potential opponent, walking into his path, and then to just keep walking as if his body was not there, so that one bumped into him. The gesture was universally understood as a challenge, and if the other took it up, the combatants would keep pounding at each other until the police arrived. What was interesting about this kind of challenge was that it was not a particularly efficient way to win a fight – if the point had been to just defeat an opponent, it would have made more sense to quickly run up and punch him in the face before he got a chance to do so. The ritual of ‘walking into’ the opponent therefore had the function of communicating a particular kind of insult – ’I am going to move through space as if your body wasn’t there (and what are you going to do about it?)’. It worked as an insult not only because it was painful, but because it clearly communicated that as far as the attacker was concerned, the other did not exist in a spatial sense, his body did not constitute an obstacle one had to move around, there was only ‘air’ where he existed. This became a matter of ‘honour’ then in so far as the attacked was forced to assert his spatial existence by means of his fists.

What these examples show is that territoriality – while universally problematic – must be read in the context of the dynamics of dominance and subjugation that characterise the social relations between the involved parties. What makes this kind of analysis quite complex is that often, it is not so easy to ascertain who in a given territorial conflict is the attacker and who the victim. As we have seen in Hobbes’ territorial notion of the self, territoriality is in a sense always the product of fear, and whether or not this fear is justified can be a difficult question. I want to approach this issue through the distinction, made in the last chapter, between ‘territory’ and ‘domain’. While a ‘territory’, as we have said, is the fortress of the paranoid Hobbesian self, a ‘domain’ is simply the space that a self inhabits as a consequence if its necessary spatiality. In order to make sense of territorial reactions in the context of really existing power relations, it is therefore worth asking whether the space that is being defended was, before it was challenged,
one or the other. While territorial defence looks quite similar in either case, the *reason* for this defensive reaction is quite different.

As an example, let us look at the territorial element of gender-based violence in the home. The behaviour of men who abuse women and children in the home can be seen as a prime example of the Hobbesian self – an abuser typically draws firm boundaries around ‘his’ territory by controlling who is allowed to come and go, and simultaneously establishes ‘despotic dominion’ on the inside, where no move of the interned escapes his attention. This kind of behaviour has then also been framed as an attempt on part of the abuser to make himself feel subjectively safer, by turning the ‘home’ into a fortress and including women and children in his territorial claim (e.g. Davis et al, 2000; Dutton, 2006). Abusers of this sort therefore act not so much out of a sadistic pleasure in hurting (although this is not ruled out either), but because they see the other inhabitants of the home as extensions of their own territorial self, who must be subjugated in order to make the inside ‘rational’ and keep any threatening influence out. As I have argued in the last chapter, such a home then ceases to be a safe space and becomes a secure space, i.e. a space that reflects the illusion of safety for a territorial self, bought at the expense of the safety of others. The abuser’s territorial sovereignty in the home is thus directly opposed to the sovereignty of the abused over their own bodies, in that the integrity of their spatial selves is disrupted and sometimes permanently destroyed.

Part of the reason that this pattern of territoriality is so common, especially in heterosexual relationships, is that women’s bodies are traditionally not seen as ‘sovereign domains’ in their own right. Because women under Western patriarchy have only recently been tentatively recognised as subjects, i.e. the types of entities who can inhabit a domain, the idea that they should have their own spaces is relatively new. Virginia Woolf famously called for ‘a room of one’s own’ as a fundamental demand of the feminist movement, pointing to the fact that women have almost universally been regarded objects in a man’s space rather than people who can be sovereign within their own. This also and
especially goes for the space of women’s bodies, which have traditionally been regarded as quite literally ‘uninhabited’ and full of ‘holes’ rather than organs, and thus fit to be penetrated and colonised. Maurice Bloch’s cavalier assertion that ‘we’ go “in and out of each other’s bodies” all the time “like in birth and sex” (Bloch, 2013), for example fails to mention that it is women’s bodies that are here frequented as if they were hotels. Since the resident woman cannot be evicted without the body dying, she is merely pushed aside to accommodate whoever wants to move in – be that a fetus, whose right to occupancy is seen as above hers, or the penetrations of a male body part or a male mind. This assumption of ‘uninhabitedness’ is not unlike those that have been made about certain parts of the earth, which white colonists could ‘discover’ and subsequently invade, and the same is also implied in the male ritual of ‘walking into’ the space that a potential opponent’s body occupies, namely that there is really nobody there whose spatial existence would have to be recognised. Unlike squatters, who generally made sure that the spaces they moved into were actually empty, the white male western subject is therefore groomed to habitually ignore that the space he wishes to occupy is already somebody’s home, and women and other colonised people often have little other choice than to aggressively defend their ‘turf’ or be overrun.

This means that while both the male defence of the ‘fortress’ home and a woman’s defence of her body within it can be seen to be territorial, what is being defended is quite different. While women’s (and colonised people’s) territoriality stems from the fact that their spatial selves are actually under attack, the territoriality of the white male subject aims not so much at the defence of his space (although that is part of it) but at the defence of his status as territorial dominant. This difference stems from the fact that unlike women and people of colour, the white male subject is precisely defined by his ability to rule over territory. A challenge to his territorial claim therefore is not only a threat to his embodied spatial self, but to his very status as a masculine, and hence dominant, subject. As Brace argues, male anxiety about boundary loss and invasion (1997, 144), such as for

115 And possibly gay men’s, but that’s exactly what supposedly makes them ‘feminised’
example implied in homophobic fears of potential penetration, points to the fact that masculinity is bound up with the idea of territorial control over the body and over the space the body occupies. Thus the reason a homosexual male is seen as ‘feminised’ and thus demeaned stems from the suspicion that the boundaries of his body might be permeable, and thus closer to the ‘uninhabited’ and thus invadable space of a female body. A homosexual, in short, is suspected of not fully ‘being there’ as a territorial self, and thus a man. By the same token, the view of the female body as penetrable, and thus not inhabited by a territorial self one would have to take seriously, is at the very core of the construction of femininity. Equally, the insult implied in the ritual of bumping into a potential opponent’s body is meant to question the victim’s masculinity, by insinuating that he cannot adequately control his boundaries and is therefore inferior to the more dominant and hence more masculine attacker. Territoriality must therefore also be seen under the aspect of what is being defended – a spatial self’s undisturbed occupation of her domain, or a territorial self’s dominant position in a power relation. While both can look similar to the observer, they come from very different backgrounds in terms of their respective positioning in a relation of dominance and subjugation, and the same holds true for the ‘territorial’ reactions of homeless people and squatters.

In practice, this meant that the hybrid nature of actually existing Safe Spaces also involved a ‘real-time analysis’ of power relations. As the following example illustrates, this on occasion demanded a quick succession of contradictory moves, the logical consistency of which nevertheless points to the underlying principle of recognising and protecting vulnerability. The situation in question arose when the nursery’s newly adopted Safe Space policy was put to the test. T, the (presumed undocumented) migrant who had shared our previous squat, had turned up at the door of the nursery one day, after having lived for some time with friends. He had nowhere to go and since the nursery was spacious enough, he was invited to move in. As it emerged, he had unfortunately since developed a cocaine habit, and the drug caused him (or gave him license to) behave aggressively and disrespectfully to those around him. To the particular chagrin
of the female squatters, he seemed to have decided that it was women's role to keep the house clean, cook and wash, and generally wait on his whim, which he noisily and aggressively demanded. He made unwelcome sexual jokes and insulted female housemates with obnoxious misogynistic language. The squatmates – at this point, the nursery was crammed after a wave of evictions, and besides ours was also home to another crew with several women members - grew increasingly impatient with T's behaviour, and he was confronted several times to no avail. Finally, one woman came forward to say that T had sexually assaulted her. She expressed that she did not feel safe or comfortable around him, and demanded that either he should leave the house or she would.

T was summoned to a house meeting, confronted with his behaviour, and, since no insight was forthcoming, asked to move out. His reaction consisted in an explosion of temper at this, in his view, unjust and despotic decision, and he stomped back to his room in a flurry of anger. As the afternoon progressed, he drank himself into a rage and periodically stepped outside his door to shout abuse at everyone present. Meanwhile, a callout had happened to summon auxiliary troops, should the internal 'eviction' escalate.

When the night fell, T had taken to angrily pacing up and down the corridor, brandishing an axe and threatening to kill anyone who dared come near him. At the other end of the building, a small mob of squatters, armed with assorted blunt objects, huddled in a corner trying to decide what to do. Periodically, one of the group would venture across the yard to try and talk sense into T, only to come back unharmed but without result.

The standoff lasted until finally Joe, more sensitive to the escalating aggression than others, lost his nerve and phoned the police. As he announced their imminent arrival, a shower of abuse rained upon him from both sides of the battlefield.

"You fucking idiot" someone shouted, "T is illegal".
In an instant, the weapons vanished on both sides, and when the police rang the
doorbell a few minutes later, they were bid a warm and relaxed welcome and
were repeatedly assured that absolutely nothing untoward was going on. The
police, having no heightened interest in squatter’s internal problems\textsuperscript{116},
grumbled something about wasting their time and were speedily sawn off to their
vehicle.

During the discussion with the police, someone had thankfully located T’s axe
and hidden it out of sight. Thus disarmed, T realised his battle was lost and began
to pack his things, presumably both placated and intimidated by his narrow
escape from the law. Several others eventually helped him carry his belongings
to a friend’s house and made sure he had a place to stay.

So what happened here? It is not difficult to see in T’s behaviour the stance of the
prototypical Hobbesian self, trying to exercise despotic dominion over the
women he considered part of ‘his’ territory, and following up with the requisite
aggression when his claim was challenged. He had a conservative understanding
of the rights of a man around the house, which translated into the idea that the
‘objects’, i.e. women, within the space should obey his will. The fact that the
women had the temerity to assert their own spatial existence – for example by
insisting that their bodies were their own and that he had no right to transgress
their boundaries – thus limited the control over the movement of ‘things’ in what
he considered, by virtue of his gender, his space. For the women, this resulted in
the home they lived in ceasing to be a safe space, as their peaceful enjoyment of
their domain – both of the house and of their bodies – was no longer guaranteed.
Under different circumstances, they may have had little defence against this
situation, since homeless women are often forced to accept unwelcome sexual
advances to put a roof over their heads or keep it there (e.g. Greene et al, 1999).

\textsuperscript{116} Police most often regarded squatting as such a ‘private matter’ as it was codified in civil,
rather than criminal law and therefore outside their responsibility. Unless they had a specific
interest in a squat because of its political activities or because they had a reason to suspect
crime, they often saw no reason to get involved.
Since these women however had access to the protection of the squatting scene, and thus the ethical impetus to create Safe Spaces, they used this leverage to mobilise the help of others. The rest of the house identified the women as the ones who, in this situation, were vulnerable to violence and thus in need of protection. The following reaction, namely to remove T from the space, was therefore doubtlessly territorial, but it was also based on a analysis of the concrete power relations at play – the setting of boundaries was not primarily geared toward excluding T, but was supposed to benefit the people he was threatening.

T (rightfully) saw his masculine ‘honour’ questioned and reacted in the time-honoured manner of the territorial subject, by posturing in a way that threatened violence, but not actually attacking anyone. His axe-wielding display was not really geared toward hurting, but at evoking the impression that he had the will to do so. The rest of the house reacted with another call for help, and again, more people arrived to support those they identified as the more vulnerable party, namely those who took the side of the women. It is important to note that even in terms of the anarchist’s own stated political analysis, this implied something of a trade-off, since T was not only a masculine subject, but also a person of colour. There were therefore two intersecting axes of domination involved, and it would certainly be appropriate to critically ask whether racism played into this course of action. What happened next, however, shows the weakness of such an identity-based analysis. Up until this point, all of this could have simply been down to the application of a certain normative rule – “if there is a conflict between a man and a woman take the side of the woman no matter what” – and does not yet show us any evidence that there is an ethics of recognition at play. Note, however, what happened when the police arrived: In relation to the police, T as an undocumented migrant was recognised as the more vulnerable party. As a result, the balance of solidarity shifted, and suddenly, the same people who just a moment ago tried to get T out of the house now protected him from the new aggressor. Again, there was a territorial element involved: the police were acting as representatives of a state which attempted to secure its territory against the
likes of T. While he had just been in the role of the territorial dominant, T therefore now found himself in the role of the subjugated party, a role that could be called that of the ‘territorial other’. As such, he was now the one in need of protection, until the ‘territorial dominant’, i.e. the state, had withdrawn. As soon as the police had left, the balance shifted again, back to solidarity with the women, and T was finally successfully removed.

What the dynamics of this situation show, therefore, is that this practical application of ethical principles rested not so much on identification with particular political identities, but on an assessment of who, in a concrete, situational power relation, was the more vulnerable party. Without any conscious deliberation, the anarchists sided first with the women against T, then seamlessly moved to siding with T against the police, and finally equally seamlessly moved back to siding with the women – all depending on who at a concrete point in time was most urgently in need of protection. The point was therefore not to privilege ‘gender’ at the expense of ‘race’, but to practically assess who was under threat right now and take that person’s side. While knowledge of actually existing political power relations was important to analyse the situation and identify who that was, the underlying logic was more encompassing than just “side with women” or “side with migrants” – it was an ethics that out of a rejection of domination as such implied solidarity with whoever was being dominated. The result was a flexible and dynamic shifting of solidarities, geared towards tipping the scales of power toward equilibrium.
The above diagrams illustrate schematically how this very simple and effective principle worked in order to stabilise the balance of power. What they cannot convey is the dynamic nature of this practice – it precisely did not attempt to fix solidarity in one particular configuration, but rather, flexibly adapted to the situational play of power dynamics, a form of recognition-in-motion. In the same vein, this was not a question of either applying an ethics of recognition or a territorial ethics, but involved a movement between one and the other – from the recognition of vulnerability came the need to adopt a territorial stance, but this territory equally shifted when the balance of power changed, sometimes including T, sometimes excluding him. This form of ethical practice therefore resembled a complex dance, in which a pattern of recognition was mapped onto a quick succession of manifest power relations.

What we can take from this, for the rest of our discussion, is the idea that our ethical patterns are inscribed into the matrix of power relations that is commonly referred to as ‘intersectionality’, also and especially when it comes to the construction of space. In the next chapter, I will explore this idea at some more length, by contrasting the already familiar ‘struggle for recognition’ with another kind of struggle prominent in philosophy – that of the ‘struggle for being’ as discussed in phenomenology and especially in the work of Heidegger. As I will aim to show, while the Hobbesian notion of the territorial self can inform us of the origins of such a self in a presumed antagonistic ‘state of nature’, Heidegger's
work and life are prime examples of what happens when such a self is taken not, as in Hobbes, as a necessary evil, but as an ideal model for human behaviour.
Chapter Eight: A Tale Of Two Struggles

*I've read Hamlet, I know men suffer.*
Andrea Dworkin

In the last chapter we have seen that territoriality – the spatial expression of a pattern of misrecognition – can be a double-edged sword. Like any weapon, it can be used for attack or for self-defense, and whether it does one or the other depends on the concrete power relations in question. Thus, paradoxically, the creation of safe space, that is a space comprised of the domains of equal subjects, sometimes comes to rely on territorial practices in order to secure its continued existence. If we return to the concept of recognition as originally formulated in Hegel, this very same principle informs the position of the slave in relation to the Master – since he is denied recognition of himself as a subject, the slave has to enter into a struggle in order to convince the Master that he is indeed an equal, thus acting with a similar degree of aggression, but a very different motivation. But if the ‘struggle for recognition’ can be read as the attempt of a spatial self to have the integrity of its domain respected, then what would be the equivalent stance from the perspective of the territorial self? In this chapter, I will suggest approaching this question through a reading of a different kind of struggle; namely the ‘struggle for Being’ as it has been discussed in the existentialist tradition, and particularly in Heidegger. On the one hand, this will give us a better understanding of how and when territoriality becomes what Sack (1986) calls “malevolent”, that is, how territorial dominance translates into the construction of a space that is designed to harm those affected by territorial control. On the other hand, this will give us an idea of how our ethical patterns – the pattern of misrecognition in this case – can come to manifest on the macro-level of culture, and thus replicate some of the features we have identified on the individual and interpersonal levels on a larger scale.

In addressing this aspect through Heidegger, I am arguably deviating somewhat from my cultural focus, drawing on the political life and work of a German
philosopher rather than a British proponent of this kind of argument. There are several reasons for this: first and foremost that if one is going to engage in any kind of cultural critique, it is only polite to start with one's own culture before pointing a finger at somebody else's. However, as I will discuss in the following chapters, many of the features of Heidegger's uniquely territorial account of spatiality can also be found in British culture, and as we have already seen, the British tradition has many fine examples of philosophies of territoriality, such as Hobbes from whom we have borrowed the notion of a ‘territorial self’. While I will return to Hobbes, I am choosing Heidegger here because his philosophy is in a lot of ways a purer example of ‘malevolent territoriality’. Hobbes, for all his pessimistic outlook, does not advocate the war of all against all – he merely diagnoses it; and suggests that territoriality, in the form of the territorial self or the state, should remedy this state of ubiquitous antagonism. Heidegger, on the other hand, does not so much see territoriality as a necessary evil as he glories in it, resulting in a convergence of his thought and his politics that led him directly to an identification with the territorial project of the Nazi state. As I will argue, this convergence is by no means a mistake or a temporary aberration in the life of an otherwise fine philosopher, it is the result of a thinking that has made the ideology of territorial dominance its pivotal point. The key to this ideology lies in the shape of the ethical relations implied in the ‘struggle for Being’

In order to understand the ‘struggle for Being’ we have to start with Heidegger's notion of the self. Heidegger prominently critiqued the Cartesian subject, i.e. the ‘self-objectifying’ rational mind, as an impediment to the pursuit of truth. This should remind us somewhat of the kinds of criticism discussed in chapter 5, where I have argued that the ‘despotic dominion’ of the mind over the rest results in an alienated account of embodiment, emotion and morality. Heidegger tries to resolve this issue by postulating ‘Being’ (rather than the ‘subjectivity’ of Enlightenment philosophy) as the central category of his account of human existence, and argues that while reasoning can only alienate Being from itself, it can ‘come to itself’ in a kind of primordial revelation or immediate experience that has decidedly religious undertones (Faye, 2009). Philosophy then for him is
also not so much a process of thought or ‘knowledge production’, but a quasi-religious practice of openness to the revelation of Being to itself. This process is not a peaceful one, since Being has to constantly assert itself against all kinds of imposition, not least that of thinking, and therefore, “ontology is a kind of warfare occurring within the realm of human existence, for it is only in and through such existence that Being can manifest itself” (McBride, 1997, 165). This ‘warfare’ encompasses the person in his/her entirety, since “the struggle for Being drives itself onto the field of thinking, of asserting, of the soul, of subjectivity” (Heidegger, cited ibid.), and war thus becomes the driving principle of existence.

To appreciate what this means in practice, it is worth looking at how anthropologists have used this notion to describe the lives of actually existing people. The ‘struggle for Being’, received through Heidegger’s student Jean Paul Sartre, informs a large part of the work of Michael Jackson (2005). Jackson’s ethnographic accounts of precarious lives of migrants and ethnic minorities is informed by an understanding of the “perennial struggle for existence” as “a dynamic relationship between circumstances over which we have little control...and our capacity to live those circumstances in a variety of ways” (p xi, emphasis orig.). ‘Being’ therefore here struggles against constraints on itself posed by the exterior world in a way that is “not reducible to history but is an expression of the human condition”, manifested in a hiatus between “the objects on which we fasten in our ongoing search for satisfaction...and the undifferentiated yearnings that are the precondition of existence itself” (ibid, 165). Jackson protests against a ‘clichéd’ understanding of existentialism which is concerned only with the individual and its ‘cast-ness’ into the world, and instead takes explicit recourse to object relations, and specifically Winnicott, to argue that anthropology should theorise the “dynamic relationship between the human capacity for life, and the potentialities of any social environment for providing the wherewithal of life” (ibid, xii).

After what we have heard about object relations in chapter 5, this should give us pause. As I have argued, the whole point of the ‘intersubjective’ approach to
psychoanalysis is precisely not to see a person’s social environment as a resource ‘providing the wherewithal’ of anything, but as comprised of other people with whom the individual stands in relations of mutuality and interdependence. To see them as ‘potentialities’ to sustain one’s own existence is paradoxically the hallmark of precisely the instrumental reason existentialism supposedly critiques, and leads directly to objectification and domination. It is this precise assumption about the ontological state of the self that Jessica Benjamin (1988/2013) criticises in Freud, who sees “the ego’s initial reaction to the outside world (as) hostile, rejecting its impingement” (p15) and has other people (like the ‘mother’) appear only as objects to satisfy the ego’s needs. Existence is here presented as in principle a permanent state of war of the self against practically everything else (reminiscent of Sartre’s ‘hell is other people’), and intersubjectivity only comes into play in so far as others are ‘objects’ or ‘circumstances’ which can facilitate or impede one’s own chances of survival. Consequently, Jackson’s solitary ‘struggle for Being’ turns out to be a fairly unpleasant affair, and he delivers many a chilling portrayal of human suffering while pondering what a shame it is that this should be the human condition. His account can therefore give us a good idea of the fundamental difference between the ‘struggle for recognition’ and the ‘struggle for Being’ – what is at stake in the former is, after all, a relation of mutuality, even if it is a conflictual one. The latter, however, does not make recourse to the other at all, save for its function as a life support system for the self, and thus rests on a model of the self very similar to the objectifying and instrumentalising ‘white masculine subject’ we have already met in a number of contexts. As was said, this subject is inherently territorial, and as we will see in the following, Heidegger’s notion of space and place therefore reflect the preoccupations of a territorial self.

In our previous discussion of the ‘home’ we have already seen that this self comes to stake its territorial claim by constructing a space that on the one hand relies on policing of boundaries and thus seeks to “banish, exclude and marginalise” (Brace, 1997, 141), and on the other hand, subjects those dwelling within this
territory to despotic, ‘rational’ control. This has led a number of writers\textsuperscript{117} to argue that a ‘home’ that is characterised by territorality does not constitute a safe space at all for those who live in it, especially women and children. They are joined by feminists and postcolonial theorists\textsuperscript{118}, who explicitly emphasise the ‘home’ as a site of political domination, both in terms of gender relations, and in terms of producing a space free from a racialised other\textsuperscript{119}. All these critiques aim, in different ways, at describing the dual strategies of internment and exclusion that characterise the territorial home, and turn it into what we have begun to call a ‘secure space’. Feminist critiques tend to focus more strongly on the aspect of internment: on the one hand, the subjugation of women as free domestic labour, and on the other, the outright domination of some women and children through ‘domestic violence’ and imprisonment. The latter issue is also intimately tied up with the construction of the ‘home’ as private, which can shield the physical, sexual and emotional abuse in it from detection (Young, 1997/2001).

Postcolonial critiques, on the other hand, emphasise the aspect of exclusion, here it is a subjugated and objectified other who has to be kept out (although, should he breach the perimeter, this other as well faces internment). In the following, I will therefore approach the logic of territorality implied in the ‘struggle for Being’ through Heidegger’s concept of ‘home’, and argue that it can be seen to involve both an account of gender and an account of ‘race’ that makes Heidegger’s notion of spatiality a prime example of a ‘secure space’.

Heidegger’s idea of ‘home’ rests on his conceptions of ‘building’ and ‘dwelling’. Dwelling is the specific way in which humans are ‘in the world’, and the specific mode of dwelling thus determines identity and belonging. It relates to building in so far as the shaping and making of the world itself is conceptualised as “world founding” (Young, 1997/2001, 256) and thus, a form of dwelling. Furthermore, “building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and the building that erects buildings” (Heidegger, 1971, 146). Although this

\textsuperscript{117} See chapter 6
\textsuperscript{118} Such as De Beauvoir (1952); Said (1993); Young (1997); Dworkin (2000); Mohanty/Martin (2003); O’Mahony (2006); Weir (2008)
\textsuperscript{119} In contrast, bell hooks (1990) argues that a home can become a ‘safe space’ also for those oppressed in terms of ‘race’, since the safekeeping from the racialised Other works both ways
conception is initially framed as a dual one – cultivating on the one hand and
erecting on the other – Heidegger then abandons the aspect of cultivation to focus
exclusively on construction. “Building in the sense of preserving and nurturing is
not making anything” (147) he states, thus privileging the activity of making to
that of nurturing and protecting. Feminist commentators such as Iris Young
(1997, 2001) have pointed out the relatively obvious gender bias in this
conception:

“Through building, man establishes a world and his place in the world, according
to Heidegger, establishes himself as somebody, with an identity and history...If
building in this way is basic to the emergence of subjectivity, to dwelling in the
world with identity and history, then it would appear that only men are subjects\textsuperscript{120}. On the whole, women do not build” (2001, 255)

The problem, as Young recognises, does not so much lie in the unequal
distribution of opportunities to construct, but in the hierarchical evaluation of
the activity of constructing versus that of preserving\textsuperscript{121}. Drawing on Luce
Irigaray, she then proceeds to name the gender bias involved in the concept of
building, which sees man constructing himself a place in a natural world that
precedes him. This nature, for Irigaray, is symbolic of the mother, from whose
womb man was ‘ejected’ and where he, in her view, attempts to return in every
act of heterosexual intercourse. The building activities of man thus come to
appear as a nostalgic attempt to replace the dwelling of the womb, with woman
as both building material and the mirror of his emerging subjectivity. In Irigaray’s
formulation, woman therefore \textit{is} a form of dwelling for man, which he comes to

\textsuperscript{120} This formulation is technically not entirely correct since, as I will discuss in more detail, for
Heidegger actually no one is supposed to be a ‘subject’ in the usual sense since ‘subjectivity’ is
precisely what his concept of \textit{Being} is formulated against.

\textsuperscript{121} Young therefore goes on to make a case for the equality of the activity of preserving to that of
building, without, however, asking why it is the case that building for Heidegger should lead to
the formation of subjectivity while preserving should not. I would argue that this becomes
understandable when looking at the situation Young describes in reverse – building in itself
does not produce subjectivity, but in a patriarchal setting where only men are subjects,
everything men do must appear to be connected to subjectivity. Conversely, if women are seen
to be objects, then whatever they do (building, preserving, nurturing or anything else) must
appear as but the raw material of men’s all the more essential contributions
shape to his requirements. Young, paraphrasing Irigaray, then sums up: “Everyone is born in loss. Ejected from the dark comfort of the mother’s body, we are thrown into a world without walls, with no foundation to our fragile and open-ended existence”.

Since this ‘ejection’ is a hallmark of Heidegger’s ‘struggle’, let us have a closer look at this idea. As Bachelard sums up in his ironic metaphor “before he is ‘cast into the world’, as claimed by certain hasty metaphysics, man is laid in the cradle of the house” (1958/1994, 7), and as object relations theorists elaborate, this scenario of ‘ejection’ into a cold and hostile world is the case only under the most unfortunate of circumstances, and, as psychoanalysts such as John Bowlby (1951) have demonstrated, in real life results in severe emotional disturbance and possibly death. Normal human development, rather than ‘thrownness’ and abandonment to the elements, consists in a prolonged phase of inhabiting what Bachelard calls a ‘cradle’, Winnicott frames as a ‘holding space’ and Benjamin speaks of as the original relation of mutual recognition between the child and its ‘mother’. Although the child is no longer inside the womb, it is therefore safely contained and in an intimate, mutually constituting relationship with an other, until it gradually develops enough independence to venture out of this safe primal space to engage with the world.

Why then the emphasis on ‘thrownness’, a Heideggerian conception that here curiously escapes feminist critique? The answer may lie not so much in ontology, but rather in precisely the masculine bias that Young and Irigaray set out to critique. As Jessica Benjamin argues, although the primal relationship involves mutual recognition between two subjects, it is also the case that the mother, in so far as she is a woman in a patriarchal society, is to some extent is externally defined as an object. This situation comes to bear on the socially enforced ‘gender specific development’ of the child, who, at the point that Freud called the oedipal conflict is forced to accept either that she is a girl (and thus like the mother) or that he is a boy (and thus different from the mother). In case of the boy-child, this means that the mother, the first other he was in mutual recognition with, has to
be repudiated, separated from, and denigrated, so the boy can come to identify with the father (another man/subject) instead. This crucially involves the repression, or ‘splitting-off’ of those parts of the boy’s psyche which are associated with the feminine, such as emotion, nurturing or vulnerability, traits that he then projects outside of himself onto other (female) bodies, which he simultaneously tries to control and violently rejects: “the vulnerability of masculinity that is forged in the crucible of femininity, the ‘great task’ of separation so seldom completed, lays the groundwork for the later objectification of women” (Benjamin, 1988/2013, 76).

We have already encountered the notion of ‘splitting’ in chapter 5, when discussing the embodiment of ethical patterns in terms of object relations. As I have argued with Duffell (2000, 2014), the production of masculine subjectivities in the boarding school system relies on a mechanism of splitting off and projecting parts of the self – primarily vulnerability, weakness and dependency – and projecting them onto somebody else. The trajectory of such a ‘boarding school survivor’ is therefore a real-life example of the above dynamic – separated from the feminine in both the concrete and the abstract, the young boy here is thrown into an all-male environment characterised by an ideal of strength, superiority and violence. If he does not want to come under suspicion of not being a ‘real man’, the boy therefore has to learn to ‘outsource’ the undesirable parts of himself and project them onto other people, thus constructing ‘femininity’ in conflictual opposition to himself. Such a boy is then literally ‘cast out’ and ‘thrown into the world’, and while he may not wish to return to the ‘womb’ it is reasonable to assume he might long to go back home – a longing, however, that is proscribed by the demands of an environment that wants to turn him into an embodiment of territorial masculinity.

The example of boarding schools thus illustrates that it is not an ahistorical ‘human condition’ that winds man up in a state of ‘thrownness’, but rather, this state is a result of social relations which force him to abandon his ‘cradle’ and to identify with the competitive and aggressive world of masculine subjects. As
Stoltenberg (2000, 2005) argues, this world is hostile in so far as men can never be entirely sure whether the separation from the devalued feminine has been fully accomplished. Certainty about this question (i.e. about the fact one is a subject despite the fact that one once was intimately connected to a mere object) can only come from another subject, i.e. a man, and so men are fundamentally preoccupied with asserting to each other and themselves the fact of their subjectivity. As I have argued in the last chapter, this also and particularly involves territoriality as a hallmark of the masculine self, and thus men challenge each other’s status through all kinds of territorial displays. Stoltenberg argues that this permanent state of warfare is only interspersed with tentative truces struck ‘over the body’ of another. This means that such men can only relate to one another at the expense of somebody who both can agree is less of a man than them – a woman, for instance, but also a gay man, a transgender person, or a ‘feminised’ racial other\textsuperscript{122}. This third party then becomes the ‘raw material’ that allows men to put their competition aside and join forces in the denigration of the ‘less masculine one’\textsuperscript{123}. The feminine thus becomes a proxy that mediates men’s mutual experience of subjecthood, since direct recognition of one another is precluded through the taboo on vulnerability.

In this relation then also lies a first clue as to the perspective taken by Heidegger in the ‘struggle for Being’. I am not implying, of course, that humans do not often have to struggle for their mere existence, physically or psychically, and that such struggles should not be taken seriously. In terms of the conception of this struggle as the human condition \textit{per se}, however, it would appear that the Being who finds himself ‘cast’ into a hostile and cold world full of existential threat is most likely male. Moreover, masculinity here is already a ‘fallout product’ – namely of the prior breakdown of the original condition of mutuality. The

\textsuperscript{122} As Stoltenberg argues, predominantly male institutions like the military or the police therefore also have the function of providing a strict hierarchy, which to some degree serves to channel masculine competition through removing the constant need to negotiate rank (2015, personal correspondence) – an assessment that appears to be equally true for boarding schools.

\textsuperscript{123} In this sense, the initial altercation in \textit{Lordship and Bondage} could also be read as the meeting of two masculine subjects who, for the sheer life of them, have to prove to each other that they are men.
masculine subject is thus essentially left alone in a world where everything and everyone else appears either as an object of his needs and wants, or a potential adversary who could challenge his dominance. In psychoanalysis, this state of affairs is also referred to under such labels as ‘pathological narcissism’ (e.g. Kernberg, 1975, 1976, 1984; Fromm, 1964; Kohut, 1971), or in more extreme forms, ‘sociopathy’ or ‘psychopathy’ (Hare, 1999; Babiak/Hare, 2006). It describes the structure of a self which is capable only of instrumental relations with others, who are not recognised as independent but come to be seen merely as functional extensions of the self. There is on-going debate among psychoanalysts as to whether a certain amount of narcissism is a ‘healthy’ component of the psyche or whether it is always ‘pathological’124, agreement exists however that in its more extreme manifestations125, narcissism inevitably amounts to a certain emotional solipsism, a condition of existential loneliness that results from an experience of others as mere objects, incapable of awarding intersubjective recognition, or as threats to the fragile and fragmented self. Beers (1992) sees narcissism as a specifically masculine phenomenon – i.e. a structure inherent in masculinity as such – and argues that at its core is a fear of disintegration and death, a fear that must be externalised in order to control it. He therefore draws a connection between male narcissism and sacrifice, arguing that religious rituals also and especially function to maintain the coherence of an unstable self by ritually destroying contradicting and unacceptable parts in the

124 I use quotes when using the terms ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’ in relation to socio-psychological conditions, in acknowledgment of the fact that what does and does not constitute mental health or illness is both a medical and a social and political matter (see e.g. Foucault, 1973), and such categories are therefore never unproblematic. At the same time, some mental and behavioural states are certainly more conductive to individual and collective flourishing than others, and thus attempts at framing as pathological that which causes suffering cannot entirely be attributed to political domination. In any case, since I do not have any medical qualification, my use of medical categories and diagnoses is strictly conceptual and does not make any claims to medical expertise.
125 Framed in the DSM V and the ICD 10 (the US and European diagnostic manuals for mental disorders) as ‘Narcissistic Personality Disorder’. The problematic nature of diagnostic criteria is exemplified e.g. in the newer DSM V version of ‘sociopathy’, namely ‘Antisocial Personality Disorder’ (ASPD). It is in part framed in terms of compliance with governmentality (e.g. breaking the law), rather than suffering caused to self and/or others, thus mixing medical, social and legal categories. Unlike psychiatric (i.e. medical) categories, the psychoanalytic description of the structure of a ‘sociopath’ or ‘malignant narcissist’ (Fromm 1964) does, however, come very close to the subjectivity I am discussing here.
form of others\textsuperscript{126}. Since a narcissist believes that others are extensions of him, he experiences their individuality and independence as threatening, and will go to great, and sometimes violent, lengths to bring them (back) under his control. Once this is achieved, however, he finds himself alone again, surrounded by ‘things’\textsuperscript{127} but devoid of real human contact. For him, the world therefore essentially consists of human property and enemies, and he is thus the ‘psych-profession’s’ version of the territorial self.

Narcissism or sociopathy can therefore here serve as metaphors for the structure of a white, masculine ruling class subjectivity that employs territoriality in order to cement its dominant position vis a vis an objectified other. The violence inherent in this way of relating stems from the fact that despite its rigid boundaries, this subject does not recognise limitations to the territorial claim of its ego, such as the spaces inhabited by other selves. “The Hobbesian self is thus a colonial self” \cite{brace} whose territorial claim must constantly be expanded. In so far as this self is constructed in opposition to the feminine and to the ‘inferior’ person of colour, it is precisely \textit{defined} by the fact that it has to recognise no one as its equal, and thus is cognitively and emotionally incapable of recognising others as the sorts of things that would put limits on the extent of his claim to territorial control. At the same time, the other’s assertion of independent subjectivity, or personhood, fundamentally questions this subject’s identity, since if his subjectivity is defined by virtue of his superiority over others, then if these others are no longer inferior, he must, in a sense, cease to exist. As a result, he comes to fear the humanity of others, and, because it illustrates to him his dependence on these others to act as proxies for his split self, his own.

\textsuperscript{126}Compare Douglas (1966) theory of sacrifice as a form of moral economy of the self, in which fears of impurity and contamination are warded off by trying to re-structure and ‘cleanse’ the self through sacrifice.

\textsuperscript{127}The ‘things’ to the narcissist are essentially mirrors, reflecting back to him an image of himself via a process of projection and projective identification. Others therefore really do become functions of the narcissist’s ego, in so far as they come to embody – via projective identification – a part of himself. Depending on whether the other reflects the narcissist’s idealised ego or his (rejected and feared) actual vulnerability, the narcissist either idealises the other or devalues them, often in rapid succession.
In this sense, the ‘struggle for Being’ can therefore be seen as the struggle of the white masculine subject to deal with the consequences of its own unfortunate constitution. Heidegger, of course, takes this specific subjectivity and the kinds of relations it has with others as an immediate, natural and necessary, trans-cultural and trans-historical human condition, reminiscent of what Bachelard calls the “all-of-a-piece school of phenomenologists who take the World as their next door neighbor” (1958/1994, 143). Consequently, when Heidegger speaks of ‘being-with’ another, he implies a particular relation to the other, not as a specific, individual other, but as a function of the self. As Levinas puts it, “Heideggerian ontology...subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relationship with Being in general” (Levinas, cited in Eubanks/Gauthier, 2011, 4). The reason for this construction becomes clearer when we take a look at how Heidegger’s concept of Being and its relation to ‘home’ develops over the course of his work, and what it actually refers to. In his earlier work, specifically Being and Time, Heidegger contemplates man’s existential state of ‘homelessness’ in terms of ‘thrownness’, ‘abandonment’, ‘anxiety’ and ‘expulsion from the homeland’, which for him at this point are necessary preconditions for ‘authenticity’. Authenticity here means that the attempts of Being to make itself at home – to ‘dwell’ – are doomed to failure, since they must result in a state of inauthenticity in which the self denies the radical ontological insecurity of its existence. As Julian Young comments, “thus, not dwelling but rather heroic alienation, the courage to carry on in the face of the nihilating pressure of the nothing, is the fundamental character of Being and Time’s (as Nietzsche would say) ‘higher type’” (2000, 190). Having abandoned all hope to return to the ‘cradle’, the subject thus decides to turn a necessity into a challenge and realise his ‘authentic’ manhood through existential nomadism. But from this relatively commonplace position, Heidegger’s project then takes a turn toward something considerably darker.
The Struggle For Lebensraum

As Young goes on to discuss, Heidegger’s conception of ‘home’ undergoes a radical transformation in his later work128, where the state of “heroic nihilism” (ibid) associated with homeless-but-authentic Being turns into a philosophy of homecoming. Becoming a ‘dweller’, man now begins to build himself a place in the world with, as Irigaray argues above, woman as raw material. Having stared into the abyss of disconnectedness (for Heidegger, synonymous with the emergence of the Cartesian subject, which he sees as a historical aberration129, Eubanks/Gauthier, 2011, 3), ‘man’ is now content to create for himself a space of ontological safety (Young, 2000, 190). Young uses the concept of ‘ontological safety’ here in a similar sense as I have done in chapter six, that is, he defines ‘home’ a place of protection from a hostile outside world. However, upon closer inspection it becomes clear that what Heidegger is referring to is by no means a place characterised by the mutual recognition of shared vulnerability, but rather, the security implied in the fortress of the territorial self. As Eubanks/Gauthier point out, “Heidegger’s essential philosophical project is to effect a return to a state of human consciousness that existed prior to the irruption of subjectivity” (2011, 3, emphasis mine), i.e. Heidegger does not wish to return to a state of recognition of mutuality-in-difference, but rather envisions a kind of unmediated merger of self and other in a fantasized primordial soup (the ‘fourfold’), where Being is unimpinged upon by the assertion of another’s ‘I’, that is, of the other’s individuality and difference. As I have argued above, difference is threatening to

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128 A transition that is historically situated at the watershed between the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazi Germany
129 It is important to note here that Heidegger’s project is not at all a critique of ‘Western subjectivity’ such as anthropologists would be interested in when trying to avoid ethnocentrism (see also discussion below). The ‘Western’ thought he critiques encompasses essentially all thought other than German thought (or, as Heidegger would possibly prefer, the fact that the authentic German doesn’t think). His criticism of biologism, for example, indicts Darwin and the ‘English’ school of thought, but has no problem embracing ‘scientific’ biological explanations of genealogy coming from Nazi Rassenkunde (Faye, 2006, 10). At the same time, while rejecting the ‘Western’ Cartesian subject, Heidegger replaces it with the collective subject of the German Volk (see Eubanks/Gauthier, 2011, 6), and thus arguably creates one of the most ethnocentric philosophies possible.
the territorial self, and thus Heidegger wants to overcome it by demanding that self and other merge in a half-biological, half-spiritual collectivity. This ecstatic merger is finally at the root of Heidegger's 'Being', and it points to the intimate connection between his philosophy and his politics.

It is of course largely undisputed at this point that Heidegger was an enthusiastic Nazi. Nevertheless, some of his adherents have tried to portray his involvement in German fascism as merely the temporary mistake of a confused ivory-tower dweller, who either did not quite understand what he was doing, was trying to save his hide, or, in some renditions, was actually a fascist but somehow still managed to make a useful and valuable contribution to philosophy (see e.g. Wolin, 2004, 36). However, as Emmanuel Faye concludes in a recent study of not only Heidegger's published writings, but also unpublished speeches, lectures and personal correspondence, this point of view severely underestimates the extent to which Heidegger's Nazism shaped not only his personal politics, but also and especially his philosophical system. Despite his feigned ignorance to which Heidegger's published writings, but also unpublished speeches, lectures and personal correspondence, this point of view severely underestimates the extent

\[ \text{In terms of the following discussion, I find it necessary to say that as a person who was born and raised in Austria, my perspective here is certainly more critical than that of scholars from different cultural contexts. There are several reasons for this. First, since German is my native language, I am sensitive to the specific cultural context of Heidegger's language and imagery. The Nazis fundamentally changed the German language forever, by entwining specific words and expressions so closely with their ideology that they became almost unusable after '45. The word 'Heldentum' (heroism). These words, while not forbidden, have become so strongly associated with their use in Nazi ideology that they now serve as a form of political code by which those on the radical right assert their political beliefs in public, despite the Verbotsgesetz (the law criminalising Nazi imagery or ideology, such as Holocaust-denial). The same is true for certain ideological figures, such as the belief in strong leaders or the idea of 'blood and soil'. As I will discuss below, Heidegger not only uses this kind of language, but his project is substantially implicated in the re-coding of these harmless words as ideological weapons of genocide. Second, I am to a degree the cultural and political product of a post-war radical left discourse in Austria and Germany, which centrally turned on confronting the Nazi past and the former perpetrators. Young people of the generations after '45 explicitly and overtly challenged the denial and silence of their parent's generation and demanded to know exactly what their parents and grandparents had been up to under Hitler. Through these political currents, it came to light that many of the perpetrators were still holding on to their power and positions, publicly denying that they had 'known of anything' or 'taken part in anything' (there were, after all, repercussions down to incarceration and execution to be expected for former active Nazis). It is a popular trope on the German and Austrian left that after the war, 'no one had known of anything' – Austria in particular insisted on its collective status as Hitler's first victim well into the 90s. In the light of this, while I can understand why Heidegger would hold some appeal for scholars not culturally sensitised to these issues, I am still quite puzzled why anyone would take his whining that 'it was all a big mistake' at face value – that is, after all, what hundreds of} \]
Heidegger “put body and soul to the service of spreading Nazism” (Faye, 2006, 55). He complained, for example, about the Verjudung ('Jewification') of the university, affirmed that ‘racial selection is metaphysically necessary’, that ‘racial thought springs from the experience of Being as subjectivity’, and worried about the ‘not-yet-purified German essence’ (60), the health of which should be ensured through eugenic euthanasia (Wolin, 2004, 91). But Heidegger was not content with merely passively embracing Nazi ideology – as Faye discusses, his entire philosophical system was deliberately constructed to introduce the foundations of this ideology into philosophy via his writing and teaching:

“(He) taught his philosophy students the very doctrine of Hitlerism, with its racist concepts and volksch supremacy of the ‘German essence’, its praise of the Weltanschauung (or world vision) of the Fuehrer, and its reference to the ‘blood voice’ and the blood heredity (das Gebluet). Heidegger’s Nazism is thus not limited to a few speeches of the moment. It can be found at the heart of his teachings from 1933 to 1944” (2006, 55).

At its “blackest, innermost core” (2009, xi131), Heidegger’s system was therefore conceptualised as a pedagogical device to infuse the minds of young people with fascism132, and simultaneously, to conceptually destroy ‘Western’ rationality as the basis of critical thought and dissent. Thus some of his most central concepts, read in the light of only recently published writings, are from their inception designed a vehicles for Nazi Weltanschauung. For example, the concept of the political as a ‘struggle for Being’, as evidenced in his lectures between 1933/35, links this abstract category with the concrete political content of his thought. In Heidegger’s own words:

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131 Citations/page numbers of Faye, 2009, correspond to the German edition, see bibliography
132 A project that worked, among others, on the young Herbert Marcuse, who has since taken every opportunity to distance himself from his youthful folly (see e.g. postscript to the 2005 edition of Heideggerian Marxism: ‘My disillusionment with Heidegger’)
“It is only where the unconditional subjectivity of the will to power becomes the truth of being in its totality that the principle behind the institution of racial selection, that is to say not merely a simple formulation of race deriving from itself, but the thought of race as knowing itself, is possible, which is to say metaphysically necessary” (cited in Faye, 2006, 62).

So: the ‘unconditional subjectivity’ (i.e. the egocentrism) of the ‘will to power’ here becomes ‘the truth of being in its totality’. As a result, ‘Being’ is now infused with a total will to power, so that that ‘race’ can come to know itself as a ‘metaphysical necessity’. But what is this ‘Being’? Crucially, for Heidegger, for whom the philosophical and the political fell into one, the relation between ‘Being’ and ‘entity’ (Sein and Seiendem) “really aim(s) at the relationship between the Hitler-State and the Volk” (ibid.). Therefore, “Heideggerian identification of Being with the voelkisch State, with the Fuehrer State, is total” (ibid.). The ‘struggle for Being’ is therefore nothing else than the struggle for existence of “the only people who still have a destiny” (ibid). i.e. the Germans, and the ‘revelation of Being to itself’ is the emerging self-consciousness of the Aryan race. This self-consciousness is opposed to individuality or difference, as Heidegger’s diatribes against "all forms of a philosophy of individual existence" (Faye, 2009, 10) demonstrate – individual existence of ‘beings’ for him therefore becomes merged in the ‘authentic’, immediate Being of the racial community, driven by “a will to destroy the thinking of the ‘I’, to make space for the ‘most radical individuation’ that does not by any means happen in the individual, but in the organically inseparable Volksgemeinschaft” (ibid). ‘Being’, in short, is here code for ‘white supremacy’.

In order to understand Heidegger’s notions of ‘home’ and ‘homelessness’, as well as of ‘being’ and ‘dwelling’, it is therefore essential to understand that the quasi-spiritual merger of self and other in ‘Being’ actually describes the mob mentality of a Reichskristallnacht: “he equates, in effect, the ontological relationship between Being and beings with the political relationship between the State and the people...It is a question, he says, of introducing the eros of the Fuehrer State
into the souls of the people” (Faye, 2006, 59). Indicting agonistic ‘Western’ politics for its involvement in modern subjectivity which he blames for man’s existential ‘homelessness’, Heidegger thus seeks shelter in an organic ‘community’ based on the immediacy of the monolithic Volk\textsuperscript{133}, collectively rooted in ‘blood and soil’. The ‘struggle for Being’ consequently comes to appear as the struggle of the white German ‘race’ under Hitler\textsuperscript{134} to realise its destiny in collective battle (Eubanks/Gauthier, 2011, 12); and ‘total war’ is consequently ‘necessitated’ by the assumption that the German nation is threatened with extinction and must fulfil its Geschick by asserting its absolute ‘will to survival’, or perish. It is not difficult to recognise in this a particularly brutal variant of the Hobbesian self, who permanently sees himself under attack and thus translates his ‘will to survival’ into a demonstrable ‘will to hurt’.

The relation between Volk and Boden then also constitutes the Nazi version of the territorial self’s impetus to exclude and marginalise, also and especially in terms of race. Since the Germans are organically ‘of the land’, anyone who lacks such rootedness must be not ‘of the people’ and therefore, alien to the Volkskoerper, i.e. the organic body of the people as a whole. Nazi anti-Semitic imagery for example constructs ‘the World-Jewry’ as essentially ‘un-rooted’, and Heidegger often referred to the ‘Weltlosigkeit’ (worldlessness) of the Jews.

“Jews for him are not just homeless but also ‘worldless’. In this regard, they appear to figure even below animals, of which Heidegger said...they are ‘world-poor’. The Jews therefore not only have no place in the world, they also never had one. The

\textsuperscript{133} It is important to note that the German word ‘Volk’ is not just a neutral term describing members of a coherent cultural group, as anthropology sometimes uses the term ‘a people’. It is somewhere between an ‘apolitical-political’ concept (Schicksalsgemeinschaft, i.e. ‘community of destiny’), and ‘kinship’ in terms of biological, genetic, racial relatedness. The term therefore has much more of an ideological slant than the English equivalent. Similarly the Volksgenosse (comrade-in-Volk) is not simply a member of the same culture, but essentially a ‘racial kinsman’.\textsuperscript{134} In terms of Hitler’s obsession with Lebensraum (living space) for the Aryan race, it is interesting to note that he himself was once a spatial other, a homeless watercolour artist on the streets of Vienna. While this cannot work as a moral excuse, it can be seen as a rather spectacular example of Duffell’s claim that a territorial self operates by splitting and projection. Hitler’s war of expansion was quite literally founded on the notion that somebody had ‘taken the German’s home away’, and he later turned his hatred specifically against those he saw as having no right to occupy space.
Heideggerian existential of being-in-the-world therefore has a prominent, discriminatory function. Who, like the Jews, has no world cannot be in the world” (Faye, 2013)\(^{135}\)

In this conception of being-in-the-world as ‘being of the soil’, therefore, lies ultimately the seed of the construction of a ‘spatial other’ who is seen to have no right to occupy any space whatsoever and therefore has no right to exist. This convergence of race and space not only informs Nazi anti-Semitism, but also Nazi racism against Gypsies, whose real or imagined mobility was seen as evidence of their racial inferiority, resulting in the murder of between 250.000 and 500.000 people\(^{136}\). If Julian Young (2001) therefore argues that the transition “from homelessness to dwelling” in Heidegger involves a “transition from ontological insecurity to ontological security” (192), then this is a prime example of how the security of the territorial self is bought at the expense of the safety of others. It reflects a ‘struggle for Being’ in which a territorial dominant asserts itself against an other who is excluded from the racially defined space of ‘Being’; and thus either exiled, interned in ghettos and camps, or massacred.

The Nazi territorial self also follows the Hobbesian one in terms of the internal ‘rational ordering’ of its territory. Heidegger here shows some enthusiasm for the hierarchical structure of the Greek polis, and his preoccupation with ‘heroes’ as outstanding leaders goes hand in hand with an “elitism (that) is a manifestation of his attempt to recover the sense of rank that characterized both Greek politics and philosophy” (Eubanks/Gauthier, 2011, 13). This politics of dominance to him is place-bound and thus opposed to any kind of cosmopolitanism, and rests on the idea that the Volk has a natural hierarchy, at the top of which stand the ‘heroes’ who, like Hitler, are born to lead the people onwards toward their territorial destiny. As Eubanks/Gauthier argue, therefore “Heidegger’s homecoming project looks to effect a return to a world of agonistic struggle,

\(^{135}\) Interview in Die Zeit, 27.12.2013, translation from German mine

\(^{136}\) There is no more exact estimate as to how many Roma and Sinti fell victim to the Nazis. To an extent, this is due to the general lack of written records and census data about Gypsies, but the huge scope of the estimate – a quarter of a million, on or off – also points to just how disposable Gypsy lives were seen to be.
heroic creators, and rootedness in the soil (Bodenständigkeit) and a people (Volk)” (15). If the world-weary wanderer of Heidegger’s early work now returns home, then this means essentially Heim ins Reich¹³⁷, to fulfil his destiny as part of the collective territorial dominant symbolically embodied by the Fuehrer. This is why, as Levinas comments, Heideggerian ontology “remains under obedience to the anonymous and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny” (cited in Eubanks/Gauthier, 2011, 4) – the subordination of the relation to the other to the relation of self to Being (that is, to the Aryan race) means that Heidegger abandons, quite deliberately, any possibility of individual ethical judgment and constructs as the only possible ethical subject the Volk. In this sense, ‘Being’ also comes to be a chiffre for the abdication of ethical accountability in the service of the survival of the race, and thus led to the kind of morality that Rudolf Höss, after his capture, summed up in the words: “I want to emphasize that I personally never hated the Jews. I considered them to be the enemy of our nation” (cited in Paskuly, 1992). In so far as the Fuehrer is the personification of ‘Being’ that envelopes the individual German ‘beings’, this means that the actual ethical subject of Heidegger’s philosophy ultimately looks a lot like Adolf Hitler, or as Heidegger himself put it in 1933: “The Führer alone is the present and future German reality and its law... Heil Hitler!” (cited in Wolin, 1993).

The reason I dwell on Heidegger’s fascism at such length is not merely to demonstrate that the Germans can produce territorial selves as well as the English, if not better. In addition to his continuing attraction to scholars working on notions of ‘home’, of ‘dwelling’ or of existential struggle (and, irritatingly, even to cognitive scientists, e.g. McGilchrist, 2009), Heidegger is also in part responsible for the kinds of epistemological trouble I have discussed in the context of methodology in chapter 3, namely the wholesale abdication of notions of ‘Truth’ or ‘Reason’ that has led anthropology to its current impasse. While the proponents of this kind of theory in anthropology are doubtlessly motivated by

¹³⁷ ‘(Coming) home into the Reich’, a Nazi slogan encouraging the Volksdeutschen beyond the borders of 1933 to return to the homeland.
the impetus to empower their respondents rather than to shut them up, as I have already pointed out, this project is riddled with contradiction. In the light of Heidegger’s sizeable contribution, it becomes apparent that the problem stems in part from the fact that these theories were, in their origins, never intended to be ‘emancipatory’. Although Nietzsche is most often cited as the source of the anti-universalist impulse in French philosophy, it was Heidegger who, in concert with some of his students such as Gadamer, turned a valid critique into an intellectual weapon of mass destruction. Wolin (2004) demonstrates how the anti-Enlightenment impulse of the German Lebensphilosophie – that is, precisely the disdain for reason, humanism and other values of the French revolution that led Goebbels to declare that “the year 1789 is hereby erased from history” (3) – has come to inform the philosophies of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and others. As a result,

“paradoxically, a thoroughgoing cynicism about reason and democracy, once the hallmark of reactionary thought, became the stock-in-trade of the postmodern left. As observers of the French intellectual scene have frequently noted, although Germany lost on the battlefield, it triumphed in the seminar rooms, bookstores and cafes of the Latin Quarter” (4).

It is perhaps not all that paradoxical that a number of white, western men should find comfort in a philosophy that ensured that they could present themselves as fashionably radical, while removing the ontological possibility of truth from those who might have a valid reason to demand such things as democracy, human rights or a recognition of their ability to reason. What I want to emphasise here is that this outcome is by no means an accident – it is exactly what the Nazi Heidegger intended, and therefore, as Faye puts it, it is imperative to be absolutely clear about this endeavour and to “resist its influence on thinking, before it is too late” (2009, iv).

We will return to this point once more in chapter 12. For now, I want to draw together what we have said about the gendered and racial aspects of Heidegger’s
account of 'home', which we have characterised as involving a dual mode of inclusion and exclusion. It therefore constructs a 'secure space', that is, space that rests on the control of the movement and spatial existence of gendered and racialised others, who are either seen as functional objects serving a purpose, or as territorial enemies who threaten the existence of the territorial subject. Gendered and racialized constructions of spatial domination certainly differ greatly in the ideologies justifying them, the identities they construct, and their historically situated modes of institutionalisation. In reading them together in this chapter, I want to emphasise, however, that they are connected not only by the general logic of white male domination that produces them both – they are also related in the way that they intersect in the production of concrete, historical configurations of ‘secure space’. Andrea Dworkin has discussed this convergence of territorial nationalism and the subjugation of women at length, examining it explicitly from the perspective of both a woman and a Jew. While discussing the Nazi murder and persecution of Jews and Gypsies on the one hand, she also critically reflects on the emergence of the state of Israel, and the construction of ‘the Palestinians’ as its spatial other, in terms of the emergence of a new masculine subjectivity:

“I think that women are the internal enemy regardless of the ethnic or racial or nationalist status of the groups men; and that Israel is a perfect example of how male dominance grows in a new state—it needs the subordination of one’s own women and the subordination of a racial or ethnic other: it needs internal and external scapegoats. The internal, intraethnic contempt for women is apparent in victors and losers. Nevertheless, it is the creation of a hated ethnic marginal and menial class that sustains success in creating a dominant sovereignty” (2000, xi)

While the oppression of women is therefore for her a universal feature of patriarchal societies, it serves a specific purpose in establishing territorial dominance, by constructing a spatial other on the inside. This other is defined differently from the other on the outside, but both are constructed in opposition to, and a hierarchical relationship with, the dominant masculine subjectivity that
is at the core of the nation state. The connection was not lost on the Nazis themselves: “Nazi theorist Gottfried Feder argued, ‘The insane dogma of equality led as surely to the emancipation of the Jews as to the emancipation of women. The Jew stole the woman from us… We must kill the dragon to restore her to her holy position as servant and maid’” (cited in Dworkin, 2000, 31). The movement of both these others within the boundaries of the ‘home’ and of the state, and their crossing of these boundaries, must therefore be strictly controlled, to the point of violent retribution for transgressions. While in some cases this involves the fixing of bodies in space, in others it means preventing them from standing still, while in some cases it means stopping them from coming in, in others it means keeping them from leaving. The dynamics of locking-in and locking-out can come to transform into each other, “exile can be internal, being separated from the common life, one’s human dignity and social legitimacy denied” (ibid, 16). The common element, however, is the masculine subject’s claim to absolute spatial control over the whereabouts of the bodies of both the gendered and the racial other. Since both are constructed as lacking a territorial claim, they are seen as, in Heidegger’s terms, not fully ‘being-in-the-world’ (woman because she does not ‘build’, and the racial other because he does not ‘dwell’, at least not in the sense of biological rootedness in the soil). Their individual bodies are thus on the one hand denied the right to occupy space, and on the other, are denied the right to be their own space, i.e. to have physical and emotional boundaries that preserve their inside. This position of absolute spatial abjection is the extreme result of a power imbalance, which ultimately aims at the annihilation of the spatial other.

The title of Dworkin’s book, ‘Scapegoat’, also points to the socio-psychological dynamics of this arrangement, which mirror those by which the territorial self splits off its undesirable aspects, and then seeks to either repress (intern) or project (exclude) them. Of course, it would be too simplified to infer that therefore, ‘cultures work exactly like individual psyches’, which could be understood to mean that ‘culture’ is some kind of collective subject in the sense of a monolithic ‘national character’. Rather, I would argue the opposite –
individual ‘character’ is by no means monolithic, but rather, underlies similar inner dynamics and contradictions as ‘culture’ does. The ‘mind’ can thus be integrated or fragmented, it can be at odds with itself or based on consensus, it can be governed by a dictatorial self, or it can involve the ‘democratic’ collaboration of different parts. Cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett plays on just such an analogy when he describes the role of the conscious self within the ‘mind’ as akin to that of a ‘head of state’ – as he argues, while neither the mind nor the state are monolithic, unified wholes, for the purpose of transnational politics or interpersonal communication, it is a good-enough model to take the ‘president’ as a symbolic representation of the ‘nation’, or analogously, the ‘self’ as a representation of the embodied mind. (Dennett/Humphrey, 1989). While the analogy between national politics and the inner dynamics of the mind is thus strictly metaphorical, Dennett’s example shows that a parallel reading can elucidate some of the ways in which social relations are internalised and replicated within the mind. The structure of the territorial self thus really does resemble that of a territorial state, and the ‘despotic dominion’ of the rational mind fulfils a similar role for embodied consciousness as a fascist dictator does for a people. Indeed, it could be asked that in so far as the ‘software architecture’ of the mind is ‘encoded’ through exposure to social relations, why, as a consequence, the mind should not be organized in a structurally similar way to the culture an individual is socialized in. As we have already seen, this is the case with gender – individual psyches contain elements that are symbolically coded as ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, and psychoanalysts like to refer to things like an ‘inner child’ or an ‘inner parent’. If this can be the case, then why should a psyche not contain, for example, an ‘inner homeless person’, or, as anarchists like to say, a ‘cop inside your head’ that must be ‘killed’? In this way, it becomes clearer how it is possible that ethical patterns within the mind can also be found on the level of culture and vice versa – the mediation between the two – i.e. the mechanisms by which one translates into the other – can then be found in the complex cultural ‘superstructures’ that humans have created in order to organise things like territorial dominance on a large scale. For example, as Hobbes recognised, in order to avoid total war of all against all, the individual claims of territorial
dominants (i.e. predominantly men) have to be mediated by a structure such as the state, or, as we will discuss next, the institution of private property.
“You have got to be kidding me”

I have just walked through the door of the HUB for the first time, turning a corner to the right and stepping into the large front room that until recently used to serve as a drop-in centre for the homeless. In the far corner, behind the bulwark of desks that separated the service providers from the service users, is a group of squatters crowded around a screen. On it I can see my own face.

“Check this out!” Tom spins around on his swivel chair and points to the camera in the ceiling that transmits my image. “We have CCTV!”

“So I see” I say, not wholly sharing his enthusiasm, “why is it still on?”

“We were going to turn it off, but look, it is pretty cool”. Joe pushes a button on the switchboard below the screen and instead of me it now shows a picture of the street outside at an awkward angle. At the push of a joystick, the camera swings around to display a 180-degree panorama view of the outside world.

“No one’s gonna creep up on us now!” Tom announces. He seems unusually pleased.

“Can anyone else see us?”

“Don’t think so. If we can turn off the inside cameras, we can keep the outside one for security”

“Starting right now” Joe grins. He has homed in on two figures leisurely strolling down the road, giving the house a once-over and coming to a halt at our front door. The camera follows them and with the push of a button Joe zooms in on two familiar faces. They belong to Pete and Jim, two squatters from across town, presumably here to check out our new premises.
Sam is already at the door and opens before they have an opportunity to knock. The befuddlement on their faces causes hilarity inside. Every squatter knows to never, ever open the door without asking who is outside – after all, if it is the landlord, all he has to do is to walk through the door to make the squatter’s temporary claim to possession null and void. The confusion clears as the two walk into the room and get a look at our technology.

“What the fuck!” Pete exclaims “Turn that thing off! It’s evil”

“But fun” Tom has taken the controller again and switched to inside view. On the screen is a close-up of Pete’s outraged face.

Pete pulls up his hood and tries to disappear into his clothing, while Tom is doing his best to follow him with the camera. Suddenly shouts of “car, car, car!!” prompt him to switch back to outside. A silver BMW - a potential landlord car – has pulled up and for a minute there is mayhem in the HUB. But the car only waits for the metal doors to the next property to swing open and disappears into a parking garage while the camera follows. False alarm.

“Can I have a go?” asks Pete.

Ten minutes later he is perched in the swivel chair, trying to focus the camera on passer’s-by at the far end of the cul-de-sac, and engaged in lively speculation with the others as to what said pedestrians might be up to: “That one is selling” – “naah, he’s just hanging out” – “Bollox, look at him, definitely selling!”

Tom strolls over and hands me a beer. “Oh shit” he says with a grin, “looks like we’ve created a monster”.

I’m not sure I’m going to argue.
Chapter Nine: Total Places

Unfortunately, there was a persistent tendency in polite circles to consider all the ‘roofless’ as victims of middle-class society, rather than middle-class society as victim of the ‘roofless’.
Margaret Thatcher

Let us briefly sum up where we stand. In the last chapter, we have seen how the structure of the territorial self produces a kind of space that is characterised by a dual mode of inclusion and exclusion, and in this way, is implicated in the production of gendered and racialised others. But while gender and race are the most prominent examples of spatially constructed identities, the structure of a ‘secure space’ is also not limited to just these two. As I have attempted to show, underlying ‘secure space’ is precisely not any particular combination of identity categories, but rather, a way of socially constructing space that, in the abstract, comes to appear as a relation between what we have called a ‘territorial dominant’ and an objectified and subjugated ‘territorial other’. Individual identity categories, such as gender and race (but also class, sexuality, disability etc.) then form the ideological ‘superstructure’ through which territorial claims are legitimised and symbolically encoded in individual ‘minds’. As a consequence, while particular identity categories can give important clues as to the legitimisation of territorial dominance, they do not per se produce it, rather, it is the other way around – territorial power is involved in producing specific identities. This difference matters, because unless we are absolutely clear about the relationship between identity and the power relations that produce it, we risk falling into an essentialism that sees territoriality as ‘naturally’ emanating from particular bodies, neglecting that the words we use to describe these bodies – ‘white’, ‘feminine’ etc. – all describe the same thing: a position in a

138 For example the territorial dominance of whites vis a vis people of colour is not a function of ‘whiteness’, but rather ‘whiteness’ is a function (i.e. a historically situated legitimisation) of territorial dominance. Similarly, the territorial dominance of males vis a vis females is not a function of their ‘masculinity’, but ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ are, in part, produced through territorial power relations.
dyadic relationship of dominance and subjugation\textsuperscript{139}. While particular identity categories can therefore give important clues as to the ways in which specific persons come to exist in a state of spatial abjection, this state \textit{in and of itself} can be diagnosed independent from and across a variety of identities. It simply consists in the fact that a person is seen not to have a legitimate claim to occupy space, and thus must either be subjected to the dominant rule of those who have such a claim, or must cease to exist. Of course, this is all fairly abstract, and while the previous example of the Nazi state can give us a good impression of the general dynamics of ‘malevolent territoriality’, the question is what this has to do with our cultural focus on Britain. In this chapter, I therefore want to return to my ethnographic narrative, and give an example of how the attempt to create a safe space can come into direct conflict with its opposite.

The building that came to be the site of this struggle sat nestled in the far corner of a quiet cul-de-sac in St Pauls, sporting a handsome red brick façade with a purple shop front such as one would expect from a solicitor or architect. Historically known as ‘Schooner House’, the place had until the winter of 2010 accommodated the ‘HUB’ drop-in service for homeless people, guided, per its own assessment, by a ‘holistic’ approach that took into account the numerous problems homeless people experience in addition to their mere homelessness\textsuperscript{140}.

\textsuperscript{139}This description may possibly appear questionable to those who, in line with the mainstream of postmodern thought, are critical of any kind of conceptual binary, also and especially in terms of power relations. There is a certain tendency, especially in the context of queer theory, to vulgarize a valid critique of binary oppositions in Western thought (such as e.g. in Derrida, 1978) into the assumption that therefore, such binaries do not describe real social relations (e.g. critical: Jeffreys, 2014). This is somewhat equivalent to translating a deconstruction of the historically situated concept of ‘homelessness’ into the assumption that therefore, there is no such thing as a homeless person; and constitutes a prime example of the epistemic fallacy (see chapter 2). I find it necessary to point this out, since the idea that ‘gender’ describes a basic relationship of dominance and subjugation has been heavily criticized in the context of Queer theory (e.g. Lorber, 1996; Butler, 2004) and feminist praxis. While I therefore agree that such binaries must be deconstructed, such deconstruction must however address the \textit{material manifestations} of power differentials and not just their symbolic equivalents on the level of ‘discourse’. To assume that a deconstruction of anything on the level of symbolic representation leads directly to the departure of this thing from reality is essentially a philosophical version of magical thinking.

\textsuperscript{140}“A multi-agency advice centre / one-stop-shop and outreach project for single homeless people that coordinates service provision and planning concerning housing, employment, social benefits, social services, health, training agencies and departments from public, voluntary and private sector agencies” (former HUB website, retrieved October 2013)
Just after Christmas, word on the street was that the closure of the centre was but the first step in the wave of government cuts to social services and welfare that the Coalition government had announced the previous year. Reducing the budget deficit had already been on the agenda of the previous New Labour government, but the financial crash of 2008 meant that the Coalition had a considerably easier discursive field to play in justifying more, faster and harsher cuts. Squatters, who were on the whole more avid consumers of news media than most university students I have met, were keenly aware that the combination of a global financial crisis with a Tory government could only mean trouble. It was no secret that, as the Institute for Fiscal Studies put it, the proposed cuts were „clearly regressive as, on average, they hit the poorest households more than those in the upper-middle of the income distribution in cash, let alone percentage, terms” (Hodkinson/Robbins, 2013, 58). For the squatters, the closure of the HUB therefore represented the first tangible sign that the cuts had indeed arrived in Bristol. Although the council officially cited a series of violent attacks on staff as the reason to shut down the centre, previous employees indicated that this was merely a guise for the enormous re-structuring process of the social services landscape that was under way. The real reason for the closure was never established beyond all doubt141, but if the HUB’s end was not a direct result of the cuts, then it certainly became a symbol of the resistance against them. In the early weeks of 2011, the following press release landed on the desks of local journalists (overleaf):

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141 A consultation document by Bristol City Council from October 2011 states that “the council needs to save 20%” in the commissioning of Homelessness Prevention High Support Services. The same report states that the number of accommodation spaces has had to be reduced through the consultation from 521 to 436 due to the low standard of existing accommodation, see part 4 of this chapter.
The Hub Drop-In centre re-opened by Squatters

The Hub Drop-In Centre for the Homeless, in Brunswick Square, Stokes Croft, has been re-opened by a group of squatters this week. The group are providing advice on housing and squatting, hot drinks and free English classes for the homeless.

The drop-in centre closed down three weeks ago due to funding cuts to services for the homeless, though the Council cite problems with violence and threats to staff as the official reason. Disgruntled ex-employees contacted local housing action group BHAM (Bristol Housing Action Movement) regarding the closure and helped the group to enter the building last week. The group of formerly homeless men and women took up residence on the top floor of the building and decided to re-open the centre in protest against the massive cuts to service for the homeless.

Housing benefit has been cut by £1.8 billion, affecting over 83,180 households in the South West and leaving 200 families homeless over the Christmas period. Bristol City Council is cutting funding to sheltered housing and homeless services by 20%. The result is that thousands of vulnerable Bristolians will be left without access to emergency accommodation or advice on how to cope with homelessness, and its relation with debt, unemployment, poverty, alcohol and drug abuse, sexual abuse and exploitation and other social problems.

Homeless figures have grown by 10% in the West in the last year and house repossessions have tripled in the last three year. The figures are forecast to rise as recession deepens and many newly homeless are left with nowhere to turn but criminal gangs and fundamentalist groups such as the Evangelical Crisis Ministries. Those most at risk are single young people without children and council tenants who may now be evicted from homes they thought they would be able to keep for life.

The squatters maintain that politicians have chosen an easy target who may be slow to react to attacks on welfare. However, like the students, the homeless and those threatened with repossession and rising rents will fight back. This is just the beginning.

The drop-in centre is open X Y and Z day. Anyone is welcome for advice, support or a cup of tea.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/bristol/hi/people_and_places/newsid_9148000/9148921.stm

Figure 10: The HUB’s first press release, Jan. 2011, hyperlinks original
I first walked into Schooner House the morning after it was occupied, to encounter the fairly bizarre situation documented in the field-note at the beginning of this chapter. The architectural arrangement of the building was a striking example of how the territorial logic of ‘secure space’ has been taken up by architects and planners to structure the material environment, particularly in terms of what Oscar Newman (1972) has popularised under the title ‘Defensible Space’. Newman argues that particular ways of organising the built environment can serve to enhance security for residents and ‘design out crime’\(^\text{142}\), and makes explicit reference to ‘territoriality’ in order to argue that a sense of territorial ownership is at the root of people’s willingness to take responsibility for their ‘patch’ (Minton, 2009, 73). Architectural design, therefore, can not only serve to produce such a sense of ownership, it can also help to stop crime by enabling surveillance and social control, and by visibly excluding undesirable intruders through both aesthetics and security features such as gates and fences. Strangers and outsiders, in this model, are by definition suspicious and potentially dangerous, and thus ‘Defensible Space’ to a large extent means a spatial arrangement that is designed ameliorate the fear of those inside (ibid. 142). In other words, had the Hobbesian self commissioned an architect, Newman would have been candidate of choice.

The HUB was arranged in a way that reflected all the key features of ‘Defensible space’. The open plan ground floor area was cut in two halves by a wall of desks, which had once formed the material ‘front line’ on which the representatives of the welfare system had encountered their charges. The notion of a ‘front line’ (as implied in the term ‘frontline worker’ for public service workers) invokes an imagery of war, in which servants of the state throw themselves into deadly trenches to defend the boundary between the safe hinterland and enemy territory. As if to emphasize this reading, the desks that divided the battlefield were set up in little compartments, and on the social worker's side, each was fitted with a panic button that was directly wired up to the police. On one side of

\(^{142}\) In the UK, this approach has become popular under the title "Secured by Design" (Minton, 2009, 72)
the room, there was a row of small cell-like rooms with secure doors, presumably for private conversations, and all doors had heavy code locks. The entire inside of the space was fitted with cameras, and the CCTV system was – as we have seen – fully functional.

‘Secure Space’ architectures such as this have frequently been discussed in terms of Foucauldian ‘technologies of power’ serving to produce docile bodies through discipline, control and surveillance. Williams (1996) argues for example that the spatial structure of homeless shelters is produced in a way that allows social workers to intimately ‘know’ their clients through a range of observation techniques, and thus serves to construct the homeless person not as somebody who has a problem, but somebody who is a problem (81). Williams goes on to discuss how the institutional task of ‘fixing’ the homeless person (as opposed to changing the social order) leads to individualising and blaming attitudes among social workers, and thus to the implementation of architectural arrangements that attempt to remove the personal shortcomings of the homeless by means of an ever tighter mesh of social control. Williams seems to imply that any attempt to frame the causes of homelessness in individualising terms, such as the idea that homeless people come from ‘dysfunctional families’, is ideologically motivated per se and aimed to obscure real structures of oppression. I disagree somewhat with this view. To see explanations of homelessness that account for things like mental illness, addiction or domestic violence, solely as strategies to reify the homeless as ‘the problem’, fails to recognise how these individual

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143 As a former social worker, I am all too familiar with the notorious ‘double mandate’ that makes the ‘helping profession’ equally accountable to its clients and to the state (or, increasingly, the market), which in practice demands a level of double-think that I have found myself unable to sustain. At the same time, however, I am somewhat sympathetic to a profession which, by and large, is sent to the trenches of class warfare without any adequate means of addressing the problems that it is supposed to solve. Social workers are called upon to administrate the most desperate and destitute, to hand out or deny subsistence levels of material help, grant physical shelter or not, and generally give or withhold necessary means of survival from parts of the population whose physical and psychological survival is not guaranteed. As a result, it is often these workers who are first in line to feel the rage that desperation lends, when rules and regulations that they have not made compel them to deny access to essential services. While thus architectures such as that of the HUB certainly reflect an impetus to control and contain the poor, they equally reflect the fear of a profession which (despite its continuous and futile effort at playing by its own rules) knows full well that no amount of control can prevent it from occasionally bearing the brunt of client’s discontent with the system it represents.
manifestations of ‘dysfunction’ are in themselves politically constituted. For example, taking into account in what way ‘dysfunctional families’ reflect structures of patriarchal violence, which in turn originate in larger social structures, can result in a view that avoids polarisation between ‘individual’ and ‘society’ and instead assumes a mediated and mutually constituting relation between the two.

Surveillance technologies are among the chief weapons of this disciplinary power, not only in social service institutions, but also in public space. Tosi (2007) argues that

"practices which restrict the use of urban space are targeted at a variety of street users, which are considered ‘undesirable’ in public space. Their presence, or their activity, is seen as constituting a danger, or a disturbance of the normal activities for which public spaces are intended, or they are seen as contradicting the images and symbols of those spaces" (226).

Such ‘disturbances’ can include busking, sleeping, camping or begging, or any other aspect of personal life which the street homeless are forced to conduct in public, such as personal hygiene. In addition, as Tosi argues, control and regulation of public space have contributed to the development of the social service sector that is supposed to contain the homeless so that they do not ‘disturb’ the dominant vision of the city. This has led to an increase in measures to remove them from public space and subject them to the ‘normalisation regimes’ of homelessness provision (228), or increasingly, to just ship them to the periphery and leave them there. While homeless persons are thus on the

344 While, as Wacquant notes, the penalisation of poverty that characterises the US context is not as strongly developed in Europe (Wacquant, 2001, 409), restrictions on the use of public space through regulation and policing thus nevertheless affect the homeless in more and different ways than the settled population.
345 For example, in 2012, homeless families from London were relocated outside of the city to avoid the high cost of housing them within the capital http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/nov/04/london-boroughs-housing-families-outside-capital and on a visit to Blackpool in 2013, I found that the town’s many B&B’s were mostly occupied by homeless families from urban areas in the south. See also further discussion below.
one hand denied a legitimate claim to occupy space, their spatial whereabouts are on the other hand tightly controlled and policed, and this control is legitimised by their construction as alien and ‘dangerous’ elements.

CCTV plays a central role in this construction of secure space. On the one hand, for street homeless persons the continuous presence of an anonymous gaze cannot, as for settled people, be escaped into the private space of the home, and thus constitutes an even greater infringement on their privacy146. On the other hand, as politically literate people, most squatters hated CCTV with a passion simply because for them it represented the all-seeing eye of the very power structures that their struggles were set up against. Consequently, the scene at the beginning of this chapter – squatters reacting with horror and repulsion to the CCTV equipment – repeated itself regularly over the first few days of the HUB occupation whenever new visitors caught first sight of the technology. Almost without fail, however, this rejection quickly turned into its opposite when they realised that the equipment was now in their hands. Foucault’s saying that “visibility is a trap” here worked in reverse – the squatters were entrapped by the fascination of a vision of the world from behind a camera that was usually pointed at them in a hostile manner. They had gone from being the observed to being the observers, and while it would be too much to say that they participated in disciplinary power (seeing as they usually hoped the public would misbehave to make their viewing more interesting), some seemed to thoroughly enjoy the possibilities of watching others without their knowledge. The amount of public life on Cumberland Street was limited, but in time, regularities were observed – who lived where, who visited, who dumped their trash, who hid their drugs and who picked them up. Stories were spun about the locals, based on the flimsiest of

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146 This in addition to the fact that, as for other users of public space, surveillance has the effect of causing the observed to at all times behave as if they were being watched and thus enforces certain types of self-regulation: “A real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation [...] He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribed in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.” (Foucault, 1977, 202)
observations, and speculation about people’s relationships ensued. As an anthropologist, I was in a very bad position to raise moral objections.

When the fascination with the CCTV finally faded, work began on restructuring the space. The desks were dismantled and from their parts, the squatters constructed small benches and tables, arranged in a number of circles across the room. A few donated sofas complemented the café-like arrangement and the walls had been painted a bright red colour that somewhat clashed with the turquoise floor. In front of the little kitchen was a long bar that served tea and coffee, and there was a table with brochures of other services, political literature, flyers and the ubiquitous “handbook for squatters”. The result resembled a very badly decorated living room, but the difference to the initial institutional architecture was immediately obvious. The way the space was ordered encouraged sitting comfortably in small circles without barriers, and although there were signs on the wall saying “No drugs, no alcohol, no abuse”, these were consensually decided rules which applied to the occupiers as much as any visitors. In short, the space was materially and socially constructed to enable relations between equals, and therefore, potential relations of recognition of mutually shared vulnerability as we have discussed in chapter 2.

This implies, by extension, a commitment to material and political equality, but even more centrally involves the insight that the other is, in fundamental ways, comparable to oneself. Authors such as Titmuss (1950) and Minton (2009) have pointed out that there is an observable connection between this kind of equality and interpersonal trust – where people conceive of each other as equals, or at least aspire to, they also report lower levels of anxiety in public or fear of strangers. Conversely, the greater inequality is, the greater social mistrust and subjective feelings of danger. As Minton discusses, this finding may provide an important clue as to the increasing ‘securisation’ of public space, despite the fact that the actual number of crimes is falling – according to her, it is not so much actual violence, but the potential violence inherent in unequal social relationships that motivates the building of ‘gated communities’ and the
surveillance of public space. It is not difficult to recognise in this the paranoia of the Hobbesian self, who is preoccupied with keeping the ‘not-I’ out at all costs. In the case of homeless people, this is achieved in part by ascribing to them characteristics – ‘personality disorders’, a lack of work ethic, a lack of ‘will’, etc. – that mark them out as different from the construction of the dominant self, and thus both ‘explain’ and legitimise their exclusion. In the context of capitalist relations, this argumentative figure has the added effect of casting the homeless as so ‘other’ that the settled person can suppress all fear that, but for the grace of the market, it could be them huddling in a doorway next.

In reconstructing physical space to reflect and enable a different kind of social relations, the occupiers therefore defied the division that sets the homeless apart from ‘normal’ society. The ‘formerly homeless men and women’ the press release refers to – ‘formerly’, because, in the previously mentioned logic, they now were squatters – countered the previous institutional logic of the ‘front line’ by constructing a material spatial arrangement that emphasised horizontality and barrier-free communication. The ‘front line’ can here also remind of the previously discussed split of the spatial self by what Winstanley refers to as a ‘dam’ or ‘hedge’, and what psychoanalysis calls ‘dissociation’: as we have seen, this splitting is a hallmark of the territorial self and the spaces it creates, and if the squatters removed the physical ‘dam’, then this sent a clear signal that they rejected the division. Hegel’s remark about ‘taking a contradiction into reason and leaving it unresolved’ was here reversed – in removing the internal barriers that symbolised the contradiction between the ‘helpers’ and the ‘helped’, the squatters in a sense pushed the division back out into the world where it came from. But since contradictions do not simply disappear without the requisite sublation, they come to assert themselves in a different form, and the HUB therefore soon had to contend with the contradiction between its internal logic and the territorial logic of the outside world.

In terms of the occupier’s own understanding, this involved a confrontation with what they consistently referred to as the ‘ruling class’. Although many of them
were familiar with both sociological and Marxist understandings of class, ‘ruling class’ referred not so much to a model of complex social stratification or economic exploitation (although these figured into it), but explicitly to an analysis of social domination. ‘Ruling class’ was here constructed in opposition to a subjugated class, which the occupiers saw both themselves and other homeless and poor people belonging to. As we have discussed in the context of ‘Safe Space’ policies, this understanding reflects a social ontology of power typical for anarchist thought: the ruling and the subjugated class are understood as collective categories signifying dominance and subjugation across a variety of binary identity constructions, and what is being opposed is the fact of domination as such. Although the HUB was not explicitly defined as a safe space, it therefore reflected a very similar logic to that we have discussed in chapter 7: the point was to side with the more vulnerable party (here: homeless people) against an aggressor. In the next section, we will have a closer look at who this aggressor was seen to be.

**The Big Society Strikes Back**

As a result of the HUB’s first press release, local newspapers were calling the council for a response, and the council therefore saw itself forced to reluctantly engage with the occupation. Utilising news media as a platform for their campaign thus put the occupiers in a position that is rarely available to homeless people – that of having a voice in a public discourse. The homeless are not usually asked their opinions on social policy, their role consists in putting their bodies in the locations assigned to them by social service agencies or police and security personnel, and to show appropriate gratitude that a place is assigned to them at all. For them to ostensibly take up space of their own accord, and then write press releases about it, was, to say the least, unusual. The ensuing confusion on part of press and council reminded of the words of political scientist Corey Robin:

“Every once in a while (...) the subordinates of this world contest their fates. They
protest their conditions, write letters and petitions, join movements, and make demands. Their goals may be minimal and discrete—better safety guards on factory machines, an end to marital rape—but in voicing them, they raise the specter of a more fundamental change in power. They cease to be servants or suppliants and become agents, speaking and acting on their own behalf. More than the reforms themselves, it is this assertion of agency by the subject class—the appearance of an insistent and independent voice of demand—that vexes their superiors” (Robin, 2011, 5)

Despite the council’s quick assurances that the closure of the HUB had nothing to do with spending cuts and everything to do with “saving taxpayers money” 147, the squatters had hit a nerve. Their intervention was situated within a public discourse that at the time was dominated by the figure of the ‘Big Society’, the guiding concept behind the Conservative Party’s pre-election campaign, and in 2010, the main ideological vehicle for the coalition’s restructuring of the public sector. The concept described a varied political programme that was based on a juxtaposition of a paternalistic ‘Big State’ with a bottom-up, community-based ‘Big Society’. The temporal proximity of the campaign to the announcement of local government funding cuts caused critics, first of all the opposition, to accuse the government of “cynically attempting to dignify its cuts agenda, by dressing up the withdrawal of support with the language of reinvigorating civic society” (Ed Miliband148). But as some commentators have noted, the ‘Big Society’ was not merely PR icing on a bitter austerity cake. Wrapped in a rhetoric of localism, self-help and social entrepreneurship, it appeared to be grounded in a peculiar combination of a conservative understanding of ‘place’ and ‘community’ on the one hand, and (neo)liberal market radicalism on the other; and despite its communitarian rhetoric, contained a commitment to a serious destabilisation of the welfare state.

The agenda was framed in an emotional language that invoked images of community, belonging and local autonomy, delivered with a moralistic undertone. In July 2010, David Cameron described his vision in the following words:

“For a long time, the way government has worked—top down, top-heavy, controlling—has frequently had the effect of sapping responsibility, local innovation and civic action...It has turned able, capable individuals into passive recipients of state help with little hope for a better future. It has turned lively communities into dull, soul-less clones of one another. So we need to turn government completely on its head. The rule of this government should be this: if it unleashes community engagement, we should do it; if it crushes it, we shouldn’t.” (Cameron cited in: Kisby, 2010)

Cameron here played on a number of tropes that characterise not only the Big Society discourse but conservative politics in general. As Brace (2004) elaborates, conservatism frequently plays on an opposition between a state that is generally suspected of a tendency toward authoritarianism, and civil society, which is set up as a “crucial line of defence” against it. "The danger of limiting the autonomy of civil society and allowing the state to determine the..."

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149 I would like to explicitly state that if in the following I focus on conservative politics and ideology this does not imply that I therefore consider any of the political alternatives (in terms of party politics) preferable. But since national politics, at the time of my fieldwork, was strongly determined by conservatism, I will focus on the direct impact I could observe it having. Conservative arguments of this kind occasionally make reference to German fascism to illustrate what happens when the state becomes too strong and smother civil society (e.g. Pipes, 1999). This appropriation is based on a widespread misconception, namely that the 3rd Reich was a system that was imposed, top-down, on a passive populace by an ‘authoritarian’ state. This account is a blatant historical lie, perpetuated at least in part by Germany and Austria themselves, whose populations have, until the present day, a tendency to pass themselves off as ‘Hitler’s victims’. More historically accurate is a description of Nazism as a bottom-up social movement, in which civil society merged with the Nazi state as part of one and the same organic *Volksgemeinschaft*. The fact of Hitler’s democratic election and the enthusiastic welcome he received at his arrival in Vienna (one cannot really call it an invasion) points to something profoundly different than a totalitarian state apparatus turning on its citizenry, namely to the extent to which in Nazi Germany an authoritarian state was created, enabled and supported by civil society. By the same token, the Nazi leadership did not originally come from a position of authority, they were ‘carried up’ through the ranks, in Hitler’s case all the way from a homeless shelter in Vienna to the position of Reichskanzler. The ‘totalitarianism-hypothesis’ of German fascism is therefore seriously flawed, and as an antifascist, I object to the instrumentalisation of the victims of the Holocaust for the nefarious ends of conservatives such as Pipes.
public good is obvious to conservatives, who emphasise individuals as the source of property and power” (ibid). In order for the state to not suffocate civic engagement and individual enterprise, intervention therefore has to be kept to a minimum. In its most market-radical variants (such as for example the Thatcher government), this translates into a “‘roll(ing) back the frontiers of the state’, stressing the values of personal responsibility, force of character and independence...the agencies of civil society needed to be strengthened so that charity, philanthropy, entrepreneurship and benevolence could flourish” (153). This, as Cameron’s statement sums up, is also essentially the programme the ‘Big Society’ stood for, and it can therefore be seen as a contemporary re-packaging of traditional conservative values.

The idea of the state as impeding the functioning of civil society is also expressed by Burke, who claims: “Everybody is satisfied, that a conservation and secure enjoyment of our natural rights is the great and ultimate purpose of civil society; and that therefore all forms whatsoever of government are only good as they are subservient to that purpose to which they are entirely subordinate. Now, to aim at the establishment of any form of government by sacrificing what is the substance of it; to take away, or at least to suspend, the rights of nature, in order to an approved system for the protection of them...is a procedure as preposterous and absurd in argument as it is oppressive and cruel in its effect” [cited in Dinwiddy, 1992, 236]

In contrast, the relationship between the state and civil society in Hegel is more ambiguous. In the Philosophy of Right (PoR) he writes:

“Just as civil society is the battlefield where everyone's individual private interest meets everyone else's, so here we have the struggle (a) of private interests against particular matters of common concern and (b) of both of these together against the organisation of the state and its higher outlook” (289)

151 The values, in other words, that the boarding school system seeks to install in its charges, see chapter 5
The state for Hegel has is the highest expression of Geist expressing itself in the symbolic unity of a nation’s collective life. It has an integrative function, which prevents individual self-interests from putting the whole into jeopardy:

“[Particularity by itself, given free rein in every direction to satisfy its needs, accidental caprices, and subjective desires, destroys itself and its substantive concept in this process of gratification. At the same time, the satisfaction of need, necessary and accidental alike, is accidental because it breeds new desires without end, is in thoroughgoing dependence on caprice and external accident, and is held in check by the power of universality. In these contrasts and their complexity, civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and want as well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to them both” (185)

The ‘spectacle of extravagance and want’ that civil society inevitably engenders therefore produces a class of people who are socially excluded through the fact of their absolute destitution, or what Hegel calls the rabble (see also Hampsher-Monk, 1992):

“When the standard of living of a large mass of people falls below a certain subsistence level – a level regulated automatically as the one necessary for a member of the society – and when there is a consequent loss of the sense of right and wrong, of honesty and the self-respect which makes a man insist on maintaining himself by his own work and effort, the result is the creation of a rabble of paupers. At the same time this brings with it, at the other end of the social scale, conditions which greatly facilitate the concentration of disproportionate wealth in a few hands” (PoR, 244)

Poverty, therefore, produces social discord by creating great inequalities in wealth and status, which, because they are socially mediated, take the form of “a wrong done to one class by another” (ibid), or what Marx would later formulate as ‘class struggle’:
“Poverty in itself does not make men into a rabble; a rabble is created only when there is joined to poverty a disposition of mind, an inner indignation against the rich, against society, against the government. A further consequence of this attitude is that through their dependence on chance men become frivolous and idle, like the Neapolitan lazzaroni for example. In this way there is born in the rabble the evil of lacking self-respect enough to secure subsistence by its own labour and yet at the same time of claiming to receive subsistence as its right. Against nature man can claim no right, but once society is established, poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class by another. The important question of how poverty is to be abolished is one of the most disturbing problems which agitate modern society” (244)

Since these inequalities are produced through the unbridled pursuit of individual desires, Hegel assumes that only the state can prevent inequality to the extent that it does not begin to threaten the social fabric itself. In contrast to Burke, he therefore advocates that the state act to mediate discord in society and ‘bring it into harmony’:

“Particularity by itself is measureless excess, and the forms of this excess are themselves measureless. By means of his ideas and reflections man expands his desires, which are not a closed circle like animal instinct, and carries them on to the false infinite. At the other end of the scale, however, want and destitution are measureless too, and the discord of this situation can be brought into a harmony only by the state which has powers over it” (185)

The basis for the harmony of civil society is, for Hegel, once again the mutual recognition of its participants as subjects, particularly through their recognition of each other as the kinds of people who can be property owners (Christi, 1978) and as such, who are fit to enter into contracts and be accountable to others (Brace 2004, 76, Connolly, 1988). Therefore, “freedom required this accountability; liberty needed restrictions, freedom and duty relied on civil
society for their fullest expression” (Brace, 2004, 76). Hegel thus takes as his starting point the ‘web of attachments’ that constitute the basis for people's ability to be recognised as property owners and thus, for him, “freedom and belonging were inextricable” (ibid), although this freedom was restricted to men as the ones whose community constitutes both civil society and the state (Landes, 1981). “Civil society thus involved a complex interdependence of each on all” (79), whereby its members simultaneously emerged as individual property owners and constituent parts of the social whole (see also Williams, 1998). The problem of poverty thus becomes explainable as a problem of a lack of integration of the poor into the social (80), i.e. their lack of property meant that they could not find belonging and recognition in the society of property owners, and thus their very existence constituted a threat to the social fabric (see also Plant, 1977; Wood, 1990).

On the face of things, ‘unleashing community engagement’ and ‘turning government on its head’ was exactly what the HUB occupiers were doing, and the irony was not lost on the press, who gave the occupation a fair amount of airtime. I can relate from conversations with the squatters that they were genuinely not planning to stage a parody – some had real hopes that the ubiquitous ‘Big Society’ rhetoric would help to sway public opinion in their favour. As a number of commentators have pointed out, the language of ‘community organising’ and grassroots solidarity the agenda was framed in was designed to invoke associations of traditional working class solidarity and emancipatory politics (Levitas, 2012, 334; North, 2011, 821), and the squatters could therefore be forgiven for believing that it was addressed to them. However, as we will see, the HUB instead became a material example of the ideological nature of the Big Society concept and its roots in a reactionary political position. It combined two, at first glance contradictory, elements: on the one hand, a rhetoric of ‘localism’ that invokes an idealised past; and on the other, a program of increased marketization of those services which for the political left are the prerogative of the welfare state (Teasdale et al, 2012). This contradiction can be seen to reflect a tension between the two major currents within conservatism, namely the
'paternalistic' and the 'libertarian' branch (Brace, 2004, 152f), or as Teasdale et al frame it, between traditional communitarianism (in its current incarnation of 'Red Toryism') and market liberalism. At closer inspection however, it becomes obvious that while these two positions represent slightly different perspectives, what they share in common is a convergence of class interests that identifies conservatism – not only that of the Tory Party, but conservative politics in general – as first and foremost an ideology of power:

"These ideas, which occupy the right side of the political spectrum, are forged in battle. They always have been, at least since they first emerged as formal ideologies during the French Revolution, battles between social groups rather than nations; roughly speaking, between those with more power and those with less...For that is what conservatism is: a meditation on—and theoretical rendition of—the felt experience of having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back" (Robin, 2011, 4).

Robin therefore sees conservatism as, in essence, the political ideology of the very people the squatters identified as the 'ruling class'. British conservatism has, in this context, taken a different historical trajectory from its European counterparts since the 'great transformation' (Polanyi) from feudalism to modern capitalism. Eccleshall (1980) argues that while in Europe this transition led to protracted confrontations between the bourgeoisie and the ancient regime, resulting in two largely incommensurable ideological positions, in post-civil-war England the new elites were gradually incorporated into existing structures of power:

"new ideological expressions were consequently grafted on to a set of pre-modern values, permitting an aristocratic ethos to persist in conjunction with the articulation of newer, bourgeois ideas...(blending)...traditional and modern ideological strands into a coherent and robust defence of class inequality" (4).

152 Other commentators see it as an expression of the necessity to reconcile Conservative and Liberal Democrat agendas within the coalition government (Hodkinson/Roberts, 2012, 64).
This convergence, centred around the mutual interests of property ownership on either side, is reflected in the seemingly contradictory nature of the Big Society agenda. On the one hand, its ‘localism’ agenda it is ideologically rooted in pre-modern aristocratic ideas of ‘natural’ social hierarchy, representing the organicist strand of conservatism which seeks to preserve a social order based on obedience, submission and ‘belonging’ in the sense of knowing one’s place. On the other hand, its market-radical aspect, exemplified in the idea of rolling back the welfare state and replacing it with a programme of ‘venture philanthropy’ (Buckland et al 2013), pointed to bourgeois notions of individualism and a meritocracy based on self-interest. What pulls these two strands together, according to Eccleshall, is the combined class interest of propertied groups, defended by an ideology of morality and virtue that serves to obscure the classed nature of its discourse (ibid). In thus combining the class interests of capitalists and the aristocracy, British conservatism can be seen as the collaboration of two dominant parties vis a vis the groups that would challenge their respective power: in case of the bourgeois, the working class; and in case of the aristocrat, the peasant. It is therefore no surprise that that conservatism, in general, is strongly associated with members of the traditionally dominant ‘race’ and class groups (Boston, 1988) and that their ‘primary fetish’\(^1\), namely property, “is firmly attached to inequalities of power and is always about hierarchy” (Brace, 2004, 140).

The moral legitimisation of this hierarchy based in a paternalistic view of the poor as morally corrupted and thus unable to govern themselves, a view that explicitly informed the Big Society initiative. As David Cameron put it:

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\(^1\) The word of the ‘primary fetish’ here applies in a double sense: on the one hand, it describes the ferocious attachment of conservative ideology to the notion that property alone can guarantee ‘liberty and civilised life’. On the other hand, however, it points to the fact that property, as I have previously alluded to, is what Marxists refer to as a ‘fetish category’: namely a reified abstract concept that simultaneously describes and obscures a social relation, see next chapter.

These moralistic admonishments of ‘broken Britain’ echo the aristocratic motif within conservatism, which bases its justification of inequality on the prerogative – if not duty - of the morally superior to govern the morally weak. According to Robin (2011), the conservative mind-set equates excellence, also and especially the moral excellence of an ‘aristocracy of virtue’\(^\text{154}\), with a natural right to rule. Conservatism, in its aristocratic current, is based on the idea of a ‘natural order’ of organically grown hierarchy, an image that recalls romanticised notions of feudal society, where the lord of the manor is obliged by noblesse to protect and discipline his subjects in the fashion of a father figure\(^\text{155}\). Consequently, conservative discourse has traditionally contained an element of paternalism, in that government by elites was justified with an otherwise inevitable decline in public morals that was assumed to directly lead to the destruction of the social (ibid p 12f). This idea of ‘natural’ authority can be traced through the intellectual history of the Big Society back to Edmund Burke, widely held to be the ‘father of modern conservatism’.

Burke’s direct influence on coalition policy is far from obscure – he was openly hailed the ‘hottest thinker of 2010’\(^\text{156}\) and ‘patron saint of the Big Society’\(^\text{157}\) by the media, and the authors of the Big Society agenda made liberal use of his

\(^{154}\) In the light of my previous argument that ‘virtues’ should be seen as patterns of social relations, the moral stance of conservatism thus quite explicitly involves an ethics of dominance and submission. This also again illustrates my argument that a ‘virtue ethics’ does not necessarily point to social justice.

\(^{155}\) A romanticised version of this kind of society can be found in the popular British TV series “Downton Abbey” which was screened from 2010 onwards

\(^{156}\) The Independent, 1.10.2010

\(^{157}\) David Marquand in Prospect magazine, 5.10.2010
terminology (e.g. Blond 2010). It is therefore worth pointing out that we are talking about a man whose argument can be summed up as "a defence of the aristocratic social hierarchy against the forces of individualism" (Brace, 2004, 144). Burke is well known for his diatribes against the French revolution, which would create "a nation of gross, stupid, ferocious, and at the same time, poor and sordid barbarians, destitute of religion, honour, or manly pride" (Burke, 1790). In particular, this danger lay in the fact that a disruption in one set of power relations would inevitably cause a ripple effect that affects others, thereby overthrowing an entire social order based on social deference and subordination on part of the subjugated. The revolution would

"break all those connexions, natural and civil, that regulate and hold together the community by a chain of subordination; to raise soldiers against their officers; servants against their masters; tradesmen against their customers; artificers against their employers; tenants against their landlords; curates against their bishops; and children against their parents." (Burke 1790)

Particularly the spill-over of insurrection from the public to the private realm troubled Burke, because, as Robin notes, conservatism conceives of power relations fundamentally as personal obligations: "the priority of conservative political argument has been the maintenance of private regimes of power—even at the cost of the strength and integrity of the state", and therefore, "no matter how democratic the state, it was imperative that society remain a federation of private dominions, where husbands ruled over wives, masters governed apprentices, and each 'should know his place and be made to keep it'" (2011, 15). This formulation of ‘private dominions’ should remind us of the territorial self, and if Brace argues that the conservative view of civil society implies that "the individual cannot be a territorial self" (145) then the emphasis here would have to be on individual. Conservative territoriality applies instead to corporate

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158 Some commentators have attributed the revival of Burke's ideas in the Big Society debate to a 'rebranding' of the Conservative Party, who, as a result of the Thatcherite dogma that 'there is no such thing as society', had come to be seen as the 'nasty party' (e.g. Jacobs/Manzi 2013; Bale, 2008) – one wonders what the enlisting of Burke did to resolve this problem.
entities, such as the feudal estate, and therefore becomes a collective endeavour, in which the “bonds of honour between gentlemen” (152) ensure that said gentlemen take their taste for dominance out on women, serfs and colonised peoples instead of each other159. As Robin recognises, the state in this context has the function to mediate the territorial interests of dominants, but at the same time, its existence is contingent and secondary to those interests – if the power structure of the ‘dominions’ (i.e. what we have called secure spaces) can be maintained otherwise, the state becomes dispensable.

The Big Society agenda’s impact on women gives a good example of how Burke’s concern about increasing independence and insubordination translates into a political programme. Levitas (2012) and others have argued that for example the attempt to roll back state provision of socially necessary care work and to encourage ‘voluntary’ social care has a disproportionate effect on women, who constitute the majority of workers in these jobs. The accompanying cuts to social services such as child care or care for the elderly mean that much of the unpaid care work traditionally done by women will fall back into their responsibility. In combination with the reduction in welfare payments for women, especially those raising children160, this means that overall, women will be increasingly dependent on male income, and thus at a higher economic and personal risk. At the same time, the domestic violence sector has been severely decimated by austerity, and remaining women’s shelters and charities are struggling to continue to provide services, despite the fact that in times of economic crisis, violence against women and girls usually rises (McRobie, 2012). In this light, the moral agenda for ‘broken’ Britain distilled from Cameron’s speech – ‘fathers, discipline, effort, punishment, responsibilities, control’ – echoes a return to a

159 The feudal model therefore deals with male competition in a way comparable to the structures Stoltenberg (2000, 2005) identifies in institutions such as the military, by introducing strict hierarchies of rank, see chapter 8.

160 The independent Women’s Budget Group, “made up of policy experts and academics” calculated that women “face cuts during the period 2010-15 of more than 10% of their disposable income, with single mothers losing 15.6%. Couples with children were shown to be losing 9.7%, while couples without children are losing 4.1%. Women pensioners are losing 12.5% compared with men, who lose 9.5%, and couples, who lose 8.6%” http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/21/spending-cuts-women-report.
patriarchal and authoritarian form of localism. This line of attack is by no means accidental: it reflects the conservative view that “women...are expected to find their substantive destiny in the family, and not to aspire to move beyond or transcend it” (Brace 2004, 139), and within the family, should be subjected to the total control of a man with no option of escaping him should he deem it necessary to ‘discipline’ her through violence. The positive evaluation of ‘traditional’ hierarchical social relations along with the deconstruction of the public sector therefore threatens to push many women back into the same relations of personalised subjugation that feminist movements of the past have struggled to overcome.

The same ideology of personal ties of dominance and submission infuses Burke’s approach to ‘localism’, reflected in the aptly titled forerunner of the Big Society agenda, ‘Total Place’. For Burke, the family is the basic social unit, followed by the neighbourhood and “our habitual provincial connection” (Burke 1790 cited in Davies/Pill, 2012, p 194). These social relations are “inns and resting places”, traditionally grown and locally situated in “little images of the great country” (ibid). His localism is spatial and social at the same time: “to be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind” (Burke, 1790). This view reflects the conservative notion of ‘being at home’ as opposed to ‘being let loose’ (Brace, 2004, 139) and underscores the connection of these ideas to property through the importance of inherited wealth for belonging: “for conservatives, there is a deep connection between...property and the sense of home as ‘the place where private property accumulates” (ibid). At the same time, the emphasis on organically grown local ‘community’, implies an outright “rejection of the social contract as a way of understanding the constitution of the state” (ibid, 148). Society here “exists through authority, and the recognition on

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161 Note here the nod to the structural similarity of the territories of the state and the individual ‘home’.
162 The notion of ‘little platoons’ was taken up by Blond (2010), whose book Red Tory is a core text of the Big Society
this authority require(s) the allegiance to a bond that is not contractual but transcendent” (Scruton, 1980/2000, 45). Considering that we are still talking about the ‘hottest thinker of 2010’, it is therefore worth noting that the idyllic image of ‘inns and resting places’ contains an implicit declaration of war on democracy. Burke himself then also leaves little doubt that democracy could ultimately “only change and pervert the natural order of things” (Burke 1790), since some parts of society could simply not be trusted in sharing “power, authority, and direction in the management of the state” (ibid):

“The occupation of an (sic) hair-dresser, or of a working tallow-chandler, cannot be a matter of honour to any person – to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments. Such descriptions of men ought not to suffer oppression from the state; but the state suffers oppression, if such as they, either individually or collectively, are permitted to rule” (ibid)

Burke, like most conservatives, thus sees government as the prerogative of the worthy elite, and the striving for democratic representation on part of the proles as a threat to its power. This philosophical background provides a context for David Cameron’s claim that

"The size, scope and role of government in Britain has reached a point where it is now inhibiting, not advancing, the progressive aims of reducing poverty, fighting inequality, and increasing general wellbeing ... The once natural bonds that existed between people, of duty and responsibility, have been replaced with the synthetic bonds of the state: regulation and bureaucracy” (November 2009)

The dichotomy between the ‘synthetic’ modern state and the ‘natural bonds of duty’ cites Burke’s view that “we can bring our artificial institutions into conformity with nature” (Brace, 2004, 148), and nature’ for conservatives means first and foremost ‘natural’ inequality (ibid). In this light, the general democratic participation of workers, women, or people of colour (also and especially through the welfare state with its function of re-distributing social wealth) appears as
essentially a temporary aberration within the natural order of things (Levitas 2012, 330), which involves a quasi-feudal federation of territorial dominants and their assorted chattel – a state of affairs Shearing (1983, 2001) refers to as ‘neo-feudalism’.

In its essence, the ‘Big Society’ therefore implies a social ontology that is, very explicitly, about establishing and maintaining spatially defined relations of dominance and submission. This ideological bent is further underscored by the agenda’s “un-gendered, un-racialised and non-antagonistic conceptions of the ‘public’” (Hughes & Mooney 1998, Newman 2001, 136). Newman warns of a homogenisation of public discourse resulting in “hegemony of local elites”, which are "unlikely to acknowledge the validity of challenges to dominant norms and discourses" (ibid), although perhaps this assessment underestimates the degree to which this is precisely the point. The emphasis on moral discipline, paternalism and deference to one’s superiors that runs through the Big Society is in and of itself opposed to dissent, because dissent implies insubordination. Thus, political conflicts based on class, race or gender inequalities come to be glossed over in romanticised notions of spatial belonging (Jacobs/Manzi, 2013, 39), and whoever does not agree comes under suspicion of actually being an ‘outsider’. This localism is therefore not wholly unlike that of Heidegger who emphasised the ‘natural’ connection of the German to his soil – while in this case not biologically but morally legitimised (Levitas, 2012), conservative ideology nevertheless reflects a similar naturalisation of spatial power relations in that each has its ‘natural’ place and some, by implication, are out of place. He or she who challenges ‘dominant norms and discourses’ is therefore by virtue of this fact identified as not belonging to the ‘natural’ organic community, and thus becomes cast as the spatial other.

The effect of Big Society localism on those who are homeless in the conventional sense illustrates this point. On the one hand, the focus on the local may lead to a structural blindness to those causes of social problems that lie beyond its limits:
“A weak state will effectively privatize many of the problems that are widely recognized as collective issues. So for example, homelessness and problems in the rental market will be less conspicuous, buried from the gaze of politics and effectively seen within the sphere of individual, private problems, often associated with deficiency in character, if not amorality” (Jacobs/Manzi, 2013, 39).

On the other hand, the ‘naturally grown’ local relationships that Burke fetishizes are inherently ‘settled’ – they tie people to each other as much as to their “inns and resting places”. Again, this view echoes Heidegger - those who have no resting places are by definition excluded from such a way of being in space, they are not part of the ‘local’ because they are ‘unrooted’ and ‘unroofed’ and therefore, have no business hanging around. As a consequence, the centuries-old practice of rounding up and deporting the homeless (e.g. Beier et al, 2008), has had a recent revival for example in London, where local authorities ‘outsource’ statutory homeless families to the north of the country because of cheaper accommodation. At the same time, the idea that state welfare fosters dependency and undermines individual enterprise led to precisely the severe cuts in public spending on homelessness services that the HUB occupiers were protesting against.

If the occupiers therefore identified a ‘ruling class’ as their opponent, then this reading was in a lot of ways more ‘practically adequate’ than sociological or even Marxist renditions of ‘class’ would suggest. It certainly mirrored the understanding of conservative politics, which agrees with anarchist thought at least to the extent that there really is a fundamental battle going on that transcends conventional notions of class – a battle between the forces who want to see relations of dominance and submission abolished, and those who want to see them maintained. It is not altogether surprising that the latter point of view should identify property as its pivotal concept – as we will see in the next chapter, property is both a result of unequal power and a way to maintain this inequality. But the emphasis on property should not obscure that in conservative ideology,

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163 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/24/london-exporting-council-tenants
property is not an end in itself – rather, it is a means to an end, and that end is, ultimately, power. In this way, by taking on the Big Society agenda and the ideology that sustained it, the squatters had quite literally challenged their arch-nemesis, and in the next chapter, we will see how this battle turned out.
Chapter Ten: The Enemy Within.

It's really nothing personal. I find you offensive as a concept.
Mike Carey

When the HUB finally opened its doors to the public at the beginning of February, the influx of people seeking help and advice was slow at first. But within a couple of days, word had got around, and a number of people dropped by to see what the place had to offer. The eagerness of the occupiers to provide support may have been slightly intimidating to the first few visitors, who were all but picked up, wrapped in a blanket and forced to drink multiple cups of tea while discussing their problems. The clientele mainly consisted in persons who were either at acute risk of becoming homeless, or had already done so and were now trying to find out what options were available to them. The HUB crew had a good understanding of tenancy law and court proceedings regarding evictions - the members had gone through this procedure more times than most people move house in their lives - and in some cases, evictions could be stalled or prevented until the tenant had found new accommodation. In other cases, persons who had not been able to prevent eviction were referred to agencies providing emergency accommodation, and were made aware of places they could get food, clothes or showers.

Although issues could be discussed in private (in the 'cells'), the open plan layout of the main service area facilitated spontaneous group sessions which permitted people to vent to their heart’s content. Political debate was always a central aspect of the squatting scene, and the minutiae of welfare reform were discussed as intensely as any other matters of great personal importance. For the newly homeless, however, these conversations also had the important function of integrating their personal experience of exclusion into a wider social narrative. It is widely recognised in the literature on homelessness that while previous psychological trauma is one of the main risk factors associated with homelessness (e.g. Hopper et al 2010), the experience of homelessness is also in
and of itself traumatic (Goodman et al, 1991). Spatial abjection is, after all, a social condition – becoming the territorial other means not only being excluded from a legitimate claim to space, but by virtue of that, from a legitimate place in society. Goodman et al note: “homelessness, like other traumas, may produce a psychological sense of isolation or distrust as well as the actual disruption of social bonds. Anecdotal accounts...reveal how becoming homeless strips people of most of their accustomed social roles” (1991, 1220). Becoming homeless therefore has been described as a form of ‘social death’ (Ruddick 2002; Patterson, 1985), pointing to the fact that a breakdown of the social affiliations that inform a person’s sense of self is in itself a traumatic experience. For the people who visited the HUB, the opportunity to find that there were others in the same situation, indeed that they could become members of a different part of society rather than being left to their individual struggle for survival, was as least as important as practical help. The occupiers did not hesitate to publicise their activities, much to the chagrin of the council (overleaf):

164 I will discuss trauma and its relation to homelessness at more length in chapters eleven and twelve
165 I will discuss the concept of ‘social death’ at more length in chapter 12
Squatters: Council understates homeless problem

The squatters occupying the former “HUB” drop in centre for the homeless reject claims that their protest against council spending cuts is unjustified. “We accept that the Council are doing their best to protect frontline services. But there can be no doubt that cutting housing benefit by 80%, combined with smaller housing budgets and the aftershock of the recession that is still causing people to lose their homes, is bound to cause a massive surge in homelessness.” says the group’s spokesman Simon Clarke.

The group also claims that the Council is massively understating the number of rough sleepers in Bristol: “We have been told that there are about 6 or 7 people sleeping rough in Bristol. Anyone who has worked with the homeless in this city can tell you it’s at least ten times as many, people the council just pretends don’t exist”.

The first opening week of the former HUB has been a success, the squatters claim. “Within the first three days, we’ve had about 20 people come in, most with housing related problems. We have been able to advise them on various options, such as council run services and self-help alternatives, which the council does not make people aware of as a policy.” Simon says.

Meanwhile, the group are preparing for legal proceedings to evict them from the unused building. “We are providing a vital service to Bristol’s most vulnerable in an area that the Council does not even acknowledge exist” says Simon.

Figure 11: The HUB’s second press release, Feb. 2011

An integral part of the advice the HUB offered was, of course, related to squatting. Many newly homeless persons were not aware that squatting was, at the time, entirely legal, and they had no idea how to go about it. More experienced squatters from the social environment of the occupation therefore regularly ran information sessions and provided practical support in the form of information about empties, and the lending of tools and muscle power for the new squatter’s acquisition of living space. As shown in the press release above, it was one of the central criticisms the occupiers levelled against the council that regular homeless services did not make people aware of the possibility of squatting or actively discouraged them from doing so. Of course, from the perspective of housing services, advocating squatting was tantamount to telling people to just sleep
under a bridge – in so far as squatters were legally homeless, it was seen as only an extension of the problem.

At the same time – and this was presumably the reason the council responded to the challenge in the first place – the squatters were drawing attention to the sensitive topic of welfare reform more generally. In early 2011, many of the details of the proposed reform were only theoretically formulated, but several notable institutions – among them the Institute for Fiscal Studies – had issued warnings that the poor would be disproportionately affected by austerity (Hodkinson/Robbins, 2012, 58), and the threat of social unrest had already begun to loom large (invoked, among others, by the police, who argued against cuts to their own budget by predicting "widespread disorder"[166]. It would seem plausible that under these circumstances, the council had little interest in initiatives that highlighted the coming cuts and in particular the council’s role in administrating them. Although the ‘Spending Review’ was ostensibly driven by the government, the new ‘autonomy’ for local councils that the Big Society promoted meant that local resistance could very likely be mounted first and foremost against those who were seen to implement the cuts. According to the council’s 2011 consultation paper, the budget for High Support homelessness prevention services was to be reduced by 23%, and an additional 85 supported accommodation spaces were to go for this client group. This was before the 2012 and 2013 budgets bringing further cuts, as well as the reduction in housing benefit and other benefits that were expected to negatively affect homelessness rates. Charities were already warning that a storm was brewing all over the UK – and the squatters were reminding the public of this.

Meanwhile, the legal owner of Schooner House – a London based property firm named Daejan Holdings Plc – had become aware of the occupation, and had taken the usual measures to remove the squatters. Before 'Weatherley's law', this meant making a claim to possession at the local magistrate’s court and, if possession was granted (which it nearly always was) to wait until bailiffs

employed by the magistrate performed the eviction. Daejan, however, was not a landlord like any other – with investment property assets of over GBP 1,546,718,000 in 2014, up from GBP 1,407,544,000 in 2013, or net valuation surplus for the year of £119,648,000 (2013 - £82,694,000)\(^{167}\), Daejan is part of a complex network of companies known as the Freshwater Group, one of the country's largest private landlords (Kincaid, 1972). In 2002, the 'Evening Standard' placed its director 16\(^{th}\) on its list of 'who owns London', with a total of 35 acres of land ownership. Daejan Holdings plc is part of the Freshwater 'empire', a complex network of 135 companies and subsidiaries, with Daejan itself seeing a total growth in share value of ca 12% and a net profit of £90m in 2013. The company had been founded in 1939, in order to acquire several rubber and coffee plantations in what was then the Dutch West Indies. The insurgencies in the region from 1949, which subsequently led to the formation of modern Indonesia, had seen a large share of the plantation business destroyed and the rest sold due to inoperability. The company was dormant until 1957, when it was turned into a property business via a reverse merger. Today, Daejan is headed by director Mr Freshwater whose personal wealth is estimated around £785m\(^{168}\). The company has been involved in several high-profile tenant disputes, most recently the landmark 'Daejan Investments vs Benson' (March 2013), in which the Supreme Court ruled in favour of Daejan and against several tenants who claimed that they had been forced to pay extortionate maintenance charges for the buildings they rented in. While the company has not been strongly in the focus of the public eye, they have informally been referred to as 'slum landlords' (citation) and have come to the attention of various activist groups. For example, in the prosecution of the 1970's Angry Brigade\(^{169}\), a plan was alleged to target the Freshwater Group because of its lobbying activities for the 1972 Housing Finance

\(^{167}\) Unaudited Preliminary Results Announcement for the year ended 31 March 2014, from: http://www.daejanholdings.com

\(^{168}\) Estates Gazette Rich List 2011

\(^{169}\) The Angry Brigade was a militant organisation sometimes referred to as the 'British Baader Meinhof', whose members were accused and convicted of several bombings in the early 1970s. The bombings, which were aimed at Tory politicians as well as government and corporate targets, only led to one instant of a minor injury and no deaths, but were nevertheless seen as a provocation of and embarrassment for government and ardently investigated and prosecuted. In 1971/72 several activists were sentenced to 10 year prison terms.
Act, which undermined tenant rights and promised higher profit margins to landlords (Carr 2010, 137/162).

With charitable donations of over £23m in 2013\textsuperscript{170}, Mr Freshwater himself may be precisely the kind of ‘venture philanthropist’ the Big Society discourse favours. He is a director of Mayfair Charities Limited, an organisation which by its own description “receives income from its investment properties, cash deposit fixed asset listed investments and subsidiaries which it utilises in the provision and distribution of grants, donations and loans for charitable purposes to organisations & institutions engaged in the provision of education...for the relief of poverty” (Charity Commission). A 2010 inquest by the Charity Commission describes the structure of the charity as follows: “The property assets are recorded in the Charity’s Accounts as having a value of £33,945,000. The properties are rented out (residentially and commercially) at market rate and the Charity uses the income this generates, together with other donations regularly received from the Freshwater Group, to make donations to charitable causes” (CC report 2013). The income received from other companies within the Freshwater Group include, for example, the 1985 gift of the entire issued share capital of Freshwater Property Management, the company that had acted on behalf of Daejan in the 2013 Supreme Court case mentioned above. As the trustees explained to the Charity Commission, “the gift was made to enable the company, at the time, to donate its profits to the Charity without tax being deducted at source” (CC report 2013). While property management and rent collection is formally conducted by other companies in the group, these incomes are subsequently transferred to Mayfair, which in turn, due to its charity status, is legally tax exempt for income from rents and property assets as long as this income is used for “charitable purposes only”. Among these purposes was for example a 1986 grant of £3m, made to another Freshwater subsidiary, Haysgrans Property Co Ltd, which ominously was never repaid. This was one of several loans that sparked the Charities Commission’s inquiry and its subsequent expression of ‘concern’ over Mayfair’s practices, with the recommendation to

\textsuperscript{170}Sunday Times Giving List 2013
appoint at least one independent trustee. The latter was seen as necessary, given that the directors of the companies on both the giving and the receiving ends of some of Mayfair’s charitable activities were the same three persons (CC report 2013). Meanwhile, Mayfair was fined by Wellingborough council in 2012 for failing to maintain one of its numerous empty properties to the point of it falling into abject disrepair.\(^{171}\)

Daejan, in other words, was not known to pull punches when it came to settling territorial disputes. By the middle of February, court papers had been served and the clock for eviction began to tick, but for the occupiers it was clear that this was not a ‘normal’ eviction. Instead of waiting for court bailiffs to enforce its claim, Daejan had hired its own private army in the shape of bailiff company Constant & Co. This company specialises in ‘Investigation and Enforcement Services’, which include the eviction of Travellers and squatters as well as rent recovery and repossessions. Since 2008, they also operate as High Court Enforcement Officers, authorised by the Lord Chancellor to enforce High Court writs, a position previously known under the name of ‘Sheriff’. ‘Cunts & Co’, as they were frequently referred to by the squatters, had been involved in several high-profile evictions, among them the Twin Oaks Traveller site in 2004 and the land occupation ‘Bristol Eco Village’ in 2010, and were scheduled to execute the clearing of the Traveller site at Dale farm later in 2011. Both previous evictions had been brutal, with property and dwellings purposely destroyed or burned, and several persons seriously injured – one man told me how his leg had been broken when a Constant bailiff had purposefully driven a bulldozer at him.

Constant’s reputation, in short, was enough to make this eviction a higher threat to the HUB occupiers than that of ‘normal’ squats, while at the same time contributing to the solidarity between squatters and Travellers that led to the strong support of the resistance at Dale Farm (see chapter 12). In the occupiers own words (overleaf):

\(^{171}\) BBC, 11.1.2012
The Hub Homeless centre facing eviction

The Squatters who have reopened the former Hub Homeless Drop-in Centre are facing eviction this week after a court hearing is to take place on Friday. If possession is granted, the Squatters are expecting immediate eviction by notorious bailiffs Constant & Co. The group claims that evicting the homeless from a closed down homeless centre is strongly contradicting the government’s recent line:

“This is quite ironic in the light of Mr Cameron’s recent commitment to self-organised community services” says the group’s spokesman Simon Clarke. He claims that the Hub’s situation highlights the problems inherent in the idea of a ‘Big Society’: “If people are to organize their own services, they need resources such as buildings. Despite there being plenty of empty properties, some of them unused for years, groups such as ours are regularly evicted when trying to set up volunteer projects”.

The former Hub building is owned by Daejan Holdings Ltd, one of the UK’s biggest property developers and landlords. “They are currently spending thousands of pounds on evicting homeless people from an adjacent building that has been empty for nine years. This is just one example of how the interests of property speculation are regularly put above those of people trying to organize themselves”.

Constant & Co, the bailiffs that will evict the Squatters if their court case is lost, have a track record of brutality and unlawful conduct. They have been under investigation by the Health and Safety Executive following evictions of Traveller sites across the country and were responsible for the bulldozing of the Bristol Eco village last year.

“We do not expect to get any notice before they remove us” says Simon Clarke. “We are basically prepared to be made homeless again by the weekend.” Still, the group are determined to keep up their work: “We simply hold that people are more important than empty buildings”.

Contact:

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Figure 12: The HUB’s third press release, Feb 2011
The HUB went to court a total of three times within one month, and was adjourned on each occasion. On the one hand, this was due to the impressive work of certain squatters who, without any formal legal training, managed to mount a sophisticated defence after many nights of poring over huge tomes full of legalese. On the other hand, their case was aptly supported by the plaintiff's legal representatives, whose astonishing incompetence prompted the occupiers to thank them for their efforts. The court dates were tense affairs, since theoretically, an eviction could take place within hours of a decision in favour of the landlord, and Constant & Co were not expected to be generous in granting the squatters time to pack. For every court day, all occupants of the HUB therefore had to be at the ready to move out all their belongings, only to unpack again after each adjournment. It was a nerve-wracking situation, and tensions in the HUB mounted to the extent that sometimes tempers began to flare. Imminent eviction was of course not a new situation for most, but what distinguished the HUB from other squats was that the occupants genuinely wished to contribute something useful to the city at large, only to discover that their contribution was not needed or wanted. The more cynical activists saw this as no big surprise – after all many squatted community projects have suffered the same fate – but for some, this was the first experience of the fact that society regarded them as useless even when they were actively and without compensation trying to help. One occupier expressed his frustration in these words:

“We’re doing their work for free here...for a place to sleep, no money, nothing. We get evicted, (which means) it’s more homeless, (which means) we go back in the system, it cost them money and they let this building rot. What sense does that make?”

It did, of course, make perfect sense in the light of a political ideology whose concept of ‘society’, big or otherwise, was never designed to include people like the squatters. As Hodkinson and Robbins (2012) point out, the Big Society approach to property (here in the narrower sense of land and dwellings) is a continuation of a conservative housing market politics that has since the Thatcher government pushed for the privatisation of space as a central theme.
This strategy, which David Harvey refers to as “the cutting edge of accumulation through dispossession” (2003, 157), is at the same time intimately connected to a citizenship regime which, as I will discuss below, re-creates essentially feudal social structures under the guise of ‘neo-liberalism’ through establishing new hierarchies of property ownership. I put ‘neo-liberalism’ in quotes because I identify it as a backwards move, rather than a new economic and political paradigm. This does not mean that it attempts to re-create a pre-capitalist economy (far from it), but it attempts to mediate its new cycle of accumulation by popularising a form of social discourse that in many ways resembles a return to feudal justifications of power (Robin, 2011, 35), such as those we have identified in the last chapter. While liberal in economic discourse and jargon, these narratives of power come to infuse the public imagination with the promise that power can be shared on the basis of individual allegiance to its values – thereby successfully undermining the collective interests that have historically driven working class struggles for public ownership of wealth.

Before having a closer look at this dynamic, two qualifying remarks: first, as I have already mentioned, it is one of the charming idiosyncrasies of British English that the word ‘property’ can refer to both possessions in the general sense, and to what Americans prefer to call ‘real estate’. As we will see in the following, this linguistic convergence is not entirely accidental, since the connection of power and property implied in British conservatism fundamentally rests on land ownership and territorial expansion in the form of colonialism. While ‘property’ in this chapter will therefore mainly refer to ownership of space, in terms of the role of property for the political discourse we are examining, both meanings can, for the most part, be read interchangeably.

172 I use the term ‘feudalism’ here in the sense of Robin’s term “democratic feudalism” (2011, 35, 55, 57, 100) to refer to a hierarchical and authoritarian form of social relations mediated by an appeal to traditional social structures and mores, see further discussion of Robin as well as Eccleshall and others throughout this chapter.

173 Following Harvey, “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” (2005, 2)
Second, as I have also briefly touched upon, when talking about property it is worth asking what exactly this refers to. As Brace (2004) details, ‘property’ means different things to different people, and discourses of property frequently mix legal, economic, political and socio-psychological conceptions. For my purposes here, I want to take the Marxist view that ‘property’ is essentially a ‘fetish category’ – i.e. a reified abstraction that both describes and obscures an underlying social relation. We have already encountered the notion of a fetish category in the discussion of ‘virtues’, when I have argued that ‘virtues’ really describe particular types of relationships between people. The question would then be, what kind of social relation does ‘property’ refer to?

Within anthropology, the concept has most often been treated by authors in economic anthropology, such as Hann (1993, 1998, 2003, 2007), Hann and Hart (2009), Carrier (1998), Bloch (1975, 2013), Nugent (1993), Strathern, (1996, 1999, 2009), Graeber (1997, 2006), MacPherson (1978) and Meillassoux (1972). As Carrier (1998) outlines, within anthropology, interest in property has somewhat declined with decolonisation, and has experienced a resurgence only relatively recently with the emergence of new forms of property such as intellectual property rights (116). Hann (1998) adds that anthropological discussions of property have most often understood the concept to denote a “bundle of rights” (8), or in the formulation of MacPherson: “the concept of property is, historically and logically, a concept of rights in the sense of enforceable claims” (1978, 4). MacPherson emphasises that therefore, both the common usage of the word property to denote material things (such as in the context of this thesis, houses), and the assumption that property necessarily means individual private property are misconceptions, since, as he argues, there also exist forms of ‘common property’, whereby enforceable claims do not attach to merely individuals but to groups or potentially, whole societies (such as in the case of state-owned property) (4).

MacPherson’s assertion that enforceable property claims are largely the domain of state law has been challenged for example by Cooper (1997), who draws on
qualitative data from Summerhill, a residential school in England, in order to demonstrate that “in contexts where other institutional authorities have significant effects, where property interests are fragmented, and the power ensuing from such interests is limited, fluid, and contested, a broader and more open approach to what counts as propertied things and relations, which can look beyond the kinds of property forms recognized by state law, is important” (35). Cooper argues that contrary to the view that communal property inevitably leads to a decline in individual responsibility and productivity, “community property practices that integrate individual and collective rights can prove relatively stable and enduring” and that “the prevailing and reified dichotomy between public and private ownership can be misleading” (34). Cooper aims to trouble the dominant legal understanding of property as exclusion, and argues for a broader definition that regards property under the aspect of belonging “as a relationship of connection of part to whole” (6), and thus as performing an integrative function that at the same time allows for a differentiated and pluralistic community life, combining individual and collective property interests (35). In this way, she wants to encourage “thinking about property as a set of networked relations in which the subject is embedded, rather than as simply exercising mastery or control over an object” (12).

Similar arguments about the diverse nature and function of property in the context of community are made by the contributors to the 2009 Special Edition of the journal *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*174. The authors are united by the aim to question the assumption that community and property function as “polar opposites...since paradigmatically community stands for collectivism, while property represents individualism” (Makiel, 2009, 1) and demonstrate in their contributions that this distinction in practice is often far from clear. Smith (5) for example explores the interaction between law and community custom and argues that how readily customs are incorporated in legal practice depends

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174 With regard to my discussion of the contributions to this volume, I must stress that I have no particular legal knowledge or training, and that therefore my interpretation of the legal arguments made by the authors is that of a layperson based in an entirely different disciplinary context.
largely on the degree of generalisation of a particular custom and thus the amount of effort required to process claims based in such custom. Lehavi (43) examines three different types of ‘communities’ - intentional, planned, and spontaneous – and argues that they all have different requirements regarding property law, and that property law plays an important role in supporting or hindering their functioning. Bell and Parchomovski (77) discuss forms of communal property such as commons or open access, and, based on an understanding of property incorporating three dimensions, namely a) number of owners, b) scope of owners’ dominion, and c) asset configuration, argue that such forms of property are situated in an intermediary position between private and communal property. Schorr (103) undertakes a historical inquiry as to the significance of Blackstone’s concept of property as ‘sole despotic dominion’ in property law, and outlines how and why Blackstone has conventionally been credited with this approach. Alexander and Peñalver (127) use the concept of ‘human flourishing’ to argue for a normative basis of property law that takes into account the mutual interdependence of individual and community. Waldron (161), providing an intriguing counterpoint to the above authors, argues that both the concept of ‘community’ and ‘property’ are exclusionary and based on false assumptions about the access excluded individuals have to resources. Using the example of homelessness, Waldron demonstrates that both property and ‘community’ work on the assumption that people who are excluded from one have another to go to, which results, for example, in homeless people being effectively excluded from public spaces, since they do not have an axiomatically assumed ‘home’ to go back to. He therefore argues that the combined effect of property and community serves as a bulwark for the interests of privileged groups. Margalit (217) then discusses the connection between property and belonging in the context of football fans and argues that since the community of fans is a constituent element of the club and since decisions made about the club have a considerable impact on them, they should have protected social or moral property rights in the club. Finally Getzler (241) discusses communal forms of property, and argues that legal conceptions of communal property as aggregates of individual interests and as legal entities in their own right can coexist, and
Munzer (271) makes a similar argument about the mutual co-constitution of community and property in Biotechnological assets.

Among these approaches, my own is closest to that of Penner (193), who contributes an argument close to my own in discussing property and redistribution under a Hegelian-Marxist paradigm. The author argues that “if one were to explain property fetishism in the same sort of way that a Marxist would explain commodity fetishism, one would say that it obscures the social division of labor, and that, to the extent the social division of labor is appreciated, it is distorted” (196), a point I refer to below as property being a fetish category. Penner then proceeds to critique the concept of distributive justice as exemplified in Rawls and contrasts it with a Hegelian conception of Sittlichkeit, since “The question for Hegel is not, as it is for Rawls, one of distributing something fairly to win acceptance of a particular social order and inhibit the loss of self-respect in individuals, but rather one of elaborating how society is the precondition for the realization of any genuinely human values, through the exercise of freedom (which thereby also expresses itself). Far from being a zero-sum game of distributive justice, political morality is the condition of our realizing any truly human values at all” (207f). However, Penner remarks that Hegel himself does not fully transcend property fetishism, although “his fetishism of property is the common one of not only treating property rights as the model of all subjective or private rights, but treating all subjective or private rights as property rights of different kinds” (209), and demonstrates this with the example of Hegel’s discussion of the rabble as discussed earlier. It eventually fell to Marx to fully transcend the fetish and specify property as “only the perceptible expression of the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same time becomes to himself a strange and inhuman object; just as it expresses the fact that the manifestation of his life is the alienation of his life, that his realisation is his loss of reality, is an alien reality” (1844, 45), which is what I mean by ‘fetish category’.
In terms of this ethnography, we can say there are at least two different meanings of 'property' at stake for the squatters, and they can be seen to correspond to the two types of selves and spaces we have discussed. On the one hand, we have the territorial self with its predilection for control and exclusion. Such a self would therefore correspond to a notion of property that emphasises unlimited control over that which is owned, and the possibility to exclude others from it. As Patterson (1985) outlines, this conception of property can be seen to originate in Roman law and describes a relation of absolute power of a person over an object ('dominium'). This notion informs the territorial self's attitude to property in the sense of 'real estate' – by turning its habitat into a fortress, demonstrates ownership through its capacity to control and exclude. The same notion of absolute control underlies certain notions of 'self-ownership', e.g. the idea of the 'despotic dominion' of the self over the body (see chapter 5). On the other hand, we have talked about the spatial self and its inhabiting of a 'domain' – the emphasis here was not so much on control and exclusion, but on the aspect of need. For this self, its domain is a necessary extension of itself, a space it requires in order to function. Others are not excluded primarily to exercise 'dominium', but they are asked to respect the spatial self's peaceful habitation and thus, its integrity. If such a self comes to own property, then this property, too, can be seen to fulfil a need, and if others are asked not to take it away, then because doing so would compromise the spatial self's ability to function. We have seen an example of this idea of property in chapter two – squatters did not act as 'total communists' in that private property was completely absent, but rather, they respected each others personal belongings because it was assumed that they were important for their owner's functioning and flourishing. Although both these things can be described as 'property', they therefore point to substantially

\[175\] Patterson argues that this notion of property emerged due to the necessity in Roman society to codify the relations between slaveholders and slaves: "It is not the condition of slavery that must be defined in terms of absolute notions of property, as is so often attempted; rather it is the notion of absolute property that must be explained in terms of ancient Roman slavery" (32). Patterson therefore argues that in legally codifying slavery, the Romans essentially invented the notion that human beings can be 'things', at least in terms of the law.

\[176\] This also limits the acquisition of property to what falls within a reasonable quantity to be considered as satisfying a need, although what precisely this quantity is in a particular case may be subject to debate.
different kinds of social relations – the latter resembles more closely the notion of *usufruct* as it is known in British Common Law.

These distinctions are important because, as I have argued, indiscriminately applying notions of ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ to the relations between people and their objects can lead to a number of conceptual difficulties, for example in the notion of ‘self-ownership’ as implied e.g. in discussions of slavery (see also Penner, 2009). If we look behind the fetish concept, it makes a great deal of difference if we read the idea that people should ‘own themselves’ as a relation between an abstract self and its material possessions (including the body), or if we read it as the idea that people should have sole and undisturbed use of all parts of themselves that they need to be a functioning human, including their agency. The scandal of slavery is not simply that a person has a legal title to ownership of another, but that this leads to a situation where the owned person loses the possibility for self-determination, and thus that ‘property’ here comes to stand in for an extremely polarised power relation (see also Patterson, 1985, 21)\(^{177}\). ‘Freedom’ therefore cannot mean to simply transfer a title of ownership from the master to the slave, rather, it must mean putting the slave in a position of being able to be wholly determined by his/her own will and thus, to no longer appear as an object that can be ‘owned’ by anyone\(^{178}\). With this caveat, back to the ‘Big Society’ and its notion of property – as will come as no big surprise, this notion corresponds to the type of property ownership a territorial self would prefer.

The Big Society narrative of property and property ownership recalls the “historical point of rupture” (Hodkinson/Robbins, 2012, 59) that the conservative government under Margaret Thatcher marked for the post-war social-democratic “class compromise” (ibid) embodied in the welfare state. The authors identify three overarching aims of Thatcherism:

\(^{177}\) Although I agree with Patterson to the extent that the category of ‘property’ comes to stand in for a power relation, in other regards I see grave issues with his discussion of slavery and ‘social death’, which I discuss at more length in chapter 12

\(^{178}\) This is how I would interpret Hegel in §66 of the *Philosophy of Right*, also cited in Brace (2004)
“first, to unite the factions of the ‘New Right’ and restore the political dominance of the Conservatives...second, to replace the post-war consensus with a ‘new conservative’ common sense...and third, to restore ‘the conditions for profitable capital accumulation’ through restructuring the British economy and attacking trade union power” (ibid, 60)

A large part of the latter objective was the privatisation of public assets, a move that Harvey (2003) argues, attempts to solve the problem of the overaccumulation of capital that plagues ‘neo-liberal’ economies by opening up new markets for private investment. In terms of housing, this meant the rapid privatisation of public housing stock, accompanied by an ideological push toward promoting and normalising private home ownership. As a new migrant from a country where renting is perfectly acceptable and does not per se indicate low social status, the importance British people place on home ownership has puzzled me a great deal over the past years. Although I soon realised that British tenants enjoy much fewer rights and legal protection than those in other European countries, this to me seemed to imply campaigning for tighter controls of landlords, rather than buying a house. What struck me as even stranger was the fact that many English people would refer to themselves as ‘home-owners’ when really what they meant was that they had a mortgage, and, effectively, the bank owned the house until it was paid off. On the few occasions I voiced these concerns – doubtlessly the product of a mind formed by a global centre of social democracy, the city of ‘Red Vienna’ – my ‘home-owning’ English interlocutors would turn away with a disapproving look, as if I had mentioned something inappropriate and embarrassing. Not wanting to be rude, I eventually stopped bringing up the issue altogether – but the mystery of the ‘housing ladder’ remained a source of fascination and anthropological interest.

One important step in selling this idea was the creation of a discourse that linked home ownership to the idea of full citizenship. In current debates, it is for example often claimed that young people are denied the opportunity to ‘grow up’
and ‘start a life’, because, in the wake of the financial crash, they are unable to earn or save enough to get a mortgage. The idea that, with appropriate legal protection through tenant’s rights, young people could ‘start a life’ in rented accommodation seems unacceptable to many, as being part of a ‘generation of renters’ is seen as equivalent to social and economic failure. It would appear that Margaret Thatcher’s strategy – “economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul” - has been successful in convincing large parts of the population that privately owned dwelling is the only acceptable form of dwelling for a (middle class) adult. If Thatcher’s ‘method’ was the selling-off of council housing stock and the promotion of private ownership through such measures as the ‘right to buy’ scheme, then the ‘change of heart’ this was trying to effect was the reinforcement of a model of citizenship in which only those who own property were seen to ‘have a stake’ in society. By implication, those who not only did not own property, but lived in publicly owned, rent-protected accommodation, had no such ‘stake’ and were cast as social miscreants in need of ‘activation’ through market forces.

The Big Society agenda seamlessly adopts this rhetoric, when it frames home-ownership (or lack thereof) as a matter of ‘aspiration’, frustrated only because of the detrimental influence of such enemies of the up-and-coming middle class as “the planning system, state welfare, social housing and an immoral ‘underclass’ of benefit claimants, tenants, squatters and the homeless” (Hodkinson/Robbins 2012, 67). The coalition introduced a number of measures aimed at vitalising the private property market, such as a renewed ‘right to buy’, equity loans and cheap mortgages, as well as tax breaks for developers and property investors such as Daejan, while at the same time continuing to push for the privatisation of public land under such socialist-sounding titles as ‘community right to reclaim land’\(^{179}\). At the same time, the coalition identified the housing benefit system as a main cause of the housing crisis, and consequently capped rent subsidies and the

\(^{179}\text{A measure which allows local actors to put pressure on local government to sell unused public assets}\)
overall percentage of rent paid, introduced the so called ‘bedroom tax’\(^{180}\), and, at the time of writing, is considering a complete removal of housing benefit from young people below 25 years of age. These cuts mean that

“from April 2011, private sector claimants have not only seen their weekly payments capped nationally at £400 regardless of actual household size, rent or location, but also their choice of accommodation has been narrowed from the 50th percentile of local private rents to the 30th percentile...From April 2013, this choice will reduce further as LHA payments are linked to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). London will be worst hit with the likelihood of ‘mass displacement’ from the inner to outer boroughs...but by 2030, 60% of English local authorities could be ‘very unaffordable’ to LHA claimants”\(^{181}\).

(Hodkinson /Robbins, 2012, p 68)

With homelessness and displacement thus expected to rise due to the cuts, these conditions were at the same time framed in a variant of the moralistic ‘broken Britain’ discourse that saw the root of moral decay in ‘welfare dependency’ – in this case, dependency upon subsidised housing. People were depicted as ‘trapped’ in social housing and therefore effectively excluded from social mobility. At the same time, the alleged ‘feckless’ abuse of the social housing system was described as abuse first and foremost in the sense that tenants who ‘could afford to buy’ preferred to remain in cheaper accommodation, which was therefore not available to those in ‘real need’. Home ownership was thus once more construed as a hallmark of social mobility, and the refusal to buy ‘if one can’ not as a personal choice, but failure to perform a moral duty. Social housing therefore became doubly stigmatised in the Big Society discourse – as a justification of the ‘second class citizenship’ of those who were too ‘feckless’ to buy a home; and as a direct cause (rather than a result of) social exclusion. As Hodkinson and Robbins demonstrate, this rhetoric reached a peak in the discussion of the 2011 riots, with council housing used as a direct way of

\(^{180}\) The ‘underoccupation charge’ by official title, this means a reduction in housing benefit for council and housing association tenants who are deemed to have a ‘spare room’

\(^{181}\) Add to this the ‘bedroom tax’ and the end to unlimited tenancies for existing tenants
disciplining suspected rioters and even their uninvolved relatives, and as a further opportunity to incriminate council tenants as a ‘feral’ underclass out of control. The authors therefore conclude:

“Such measures will only worsen the real housing crisis – the expansion of insecure, unaffordable housing, overcrowding, and rogue landlordism – but that is precisely the outcome desired by the class war conservatives in the Coalition as they seek to shore up private property and attack housing protections and rights so as to discipline the working class into working harder, faster, and longer for less pay” (Hodkinson/Robbins, 2012, 70).

I have little to add to this assessment, except that the disciplining of the working class through the introduction of an opposition between the ‘hard-working, taxpaying’ citizen and the ‘feckless scrounger’ (i.e. council tenants and the homeless) works to construct a territorial other of the kind I have previously discussed – if citizenship and belonging are defined through home-ownership, then those without such a ‘stake’ must come to appear as what Thatcher called the “enemy within”182. Property, or more precisely, a society of property owners, therefore here produces the kind of social relations that characterise ‘secure space’.

The ‘change of heart and soul’ about matters of property and power that Thatcher envisioned can thus be seen as a strategy of breaking dissent to ‘neo-liberal’ restructuring by creating not just a material, but a moral opposition between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. This is achieved in part through the promotion of private property – even in modest amounts – in what at first glance appears as an unusual act of generosity. David Harvey notes that “at first blush ... (the privatisation of council housing under Thatcher) ... appeared as a gift to the lower

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182 In her speech of the same title in 1984, Thatcher used this phrase to refer to the striking miners: “We had to fight the enemy without in the Falklands. We always have to be aware of the enemy within, which is much more difficult to fight and more dangerous to liberty” (Macdonald et al, 2012, 243). Although the miners were here the direct target of the insult, it is also more generally a good example of how the construction of a space of power depends on the construction of both an external and an internal territorial other.
classes, who could now convert from rental to ownership at a relatively low cost, gain control over a valuable asset, and augment their wealth” (2003, 158). What was more, in gaining a ‘stake’ in society they had thus achieved one of the main conditions of citizenship, as despite their differences on the question of how far property should be distributed, both the aristocratic-paternalistic current of conservative thought and its historically acquired counterpart, liberal-bourgeois market capitalism, can agree that it is the condition of possibility for civic life. However, as we have discussed in the last chapter, conservatives are on the whole opposed to the idea that property should be equally distributed, along with civil rights – how, then, does this ‘democratisation’ of property ownership fit with the notion of ‘natural’ inequality? On the one hand, the privatisation of space can be seen as a strategy of draining power from the state, which, as we have seen, conservatives are suspicious of, since it’s redistributive principles are “bound to require coercion at the expense of liberty and voluntary principles” (Brace, 2004, 154). On the other hand, however, the partial inclusion of the wider population in the community of property owners can be seen to have a stabilising effect on the interests of those who have traditionally been exclusive members of this club. In the following section, I will outline some examples to illustrate this point.

Eccleshall (1980) describes the necessity for British conservatism at the end of the 19th century to supplement its defence of social hierarchy with a meritocratic motif that was intended to prevent the exodus of voters to the Liberal party – a large part of the reason for the twofold character of modern conservative ideology. He argues that in order to defend the privilege of propertied elites, concessions had to be made to the aspirations of the working class, and political rhetoric had to ensure that privilege appeared as a result of individual effort and superior skill.

For example, while “in theory,...Locke acknowledges the right to equal citizenship, but in practice political rights are dependent on property ownership. By privileging property in this way Locke asserts the maintenance of economic inequality, rather than the achievement of political equality, as the key organising principle of the state” (Faulks, 1998, 14).
The Return Of The Savage Noble

Let us return to the ‘Patron Saint of the Big Society’. In his indictment of the French Revolution, Burke comments on the necessity to keep ancient wealth safe from the “invasions of ability” of the aspiring bourgeoisie:

“Ability is a vigorous and active principle, and as property is sluggish, inert, and timid, it never can be safe from the invasions of ability, unless it be, out of all proportion, predominant in the representation. It must be represented too in great masses of accumulation, or it is not rightly protected. The characteristic essence of property, formed out of the combined principles of its acquisition and conservation, is to be unequal. The great masses therefore which excite envy, and tempt rapacity, must be put out of the possibility of danger. Then they form a natural rampart about the lesser properties in all their gradations” (Burke, 1790)

Burke therefore believes that a great accumulation of wealth, protected from any attempt at re-distribution, guarantees the acceptance of unequal wealth through the acceptance of the principle of private accumulation as such. At the same time, the ‘lesser properties’ are here seen to benefit from the existence of the ‘great masses’, which form a ‘natural rampart’, guaranteeing the continued existence of the very institution of property. In as far as ‘property’ can now also and especially mean ‘spatial entitlement’, it would follow that the accumulation of large masses of territory functions as the condition of possibility of territorial entitlement by individual territorial selves. In other words: if Burke is to be believed that where there are small properties, there also have to be some large ones guaranteeing their existence, then it would follow that the same is true for the accumulation of space. Let us consider some evidence for this claim.

In trying to find out Who Owns Britain (2001), Kevin Cahill notes that the first difficulty in doing so is the lack of records. The land registry, which since 1925 requires all land transactions to be recorded by law, has in some areas been
rolled out as late as the 1990s, and for older land holdings there consequently exists no record at all. Those property transactions it does record are mostly for urban dwellings and other small property holdings, but for about 50% of agricultural land in Britain there exists no documentation at all, simply because this land has not been transferred since the inception of the Land Registry. The only complete record of agricultural land ownership in Britain thus is a book by the name of *The Return of Owners of Land*[^185], compiled in 1872, which for the first and only time gave a complete picture of who owns the entire landmass of the United Kingdom. According to Cahill, the volume “has been airbrushed out of the historic and administrative record of the UK” (2001, 5), and remains virtually unknown among the wider population, despite resting in the vaults of many a local library.

Cahill proceeds to painstakingly reconstruct the recent (i.e. 2001) ownership of the land holdings documented in the 1872 volume, and concludes that very little has changed since[^186]. Of the 60 million acres that comprise the UK, between 4.4 and 6 million are taken up by residential dwellings of the general population (59 million people in 2001), and ca. 12 million acres are uninhabitable. The remaining roughly 40 million acres are owned, Cahill’s research shows, by just 189.000 families. In other words, 0.3 % of the population own two thirds of the land, while 77% of the population own 5.8% (10f). Moreover, Cahill shows that the number and size of the large estates that comprise the landholdings of these families has hardly changed at all since 1872 – meaning that the same people who owned most of the land 150 years ago still own it today. Furthermore: “the vast majority of these large estates are held by just three classes of people: aristocrats,

[^185]: Also called the *Second Domesday Book*, see chapter 6
[^186]: The largest private landowners in Britain are, according to Cahill, the Duke of Buccleuch (270.000 acres), the Duke of Atholl’s trust (148.000 acres), The Duke of Westminster (140.000 acres), and finally the Royal family (comprised of the Crown Estate, the Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall and lands at Balmoral and Sandringham). The Crown Estate is not technically the private property of the Windsors, but as long as she is Queen, Elizabeth II is by virtue of her ascendency, freeholder of the estate. While the Estate turns all of its surplus over to the Treasury, the Queen receives a yearly allowance for personal expenses out of this revenue. The payment, formerly called the Civil List, was restructured under the new title Sovereign Grant in 2013, containing a rise of £ 5m in addition to the £ 31m Her Majesty received previously. These payments are tax free.
who would, until November 1999, have sat in the House of Lords, baronets and finally the residual landed gentry” (ibid). Moreover, landowners have not only been able to enjoy tax breaks intended for farmers, they also receive publicly funded agricultural subsidies, while the majority population “are subject to a land tax, the Council tax, averaging £550 per household” (12). Landowners therefore have an abiding interest, according to Cahill, to handle the issue of who owns the land with greatest discretion, fearing that exposure may lead the landless to revolt.

These figures about the distribution of territory not only point toward the great overlap that exists in Britain between inequalities in wealth and inequalities in entitlement to space. It also underscores how tightly territorial entitlement has been bound up with political power, ever since the time of the Norman conquest. Cahill describes Britain’s history as a series of ‘Great Land Grabs’, meaning not only the history of enclosure and dispossession of the commons by the aspiring capitalist class, but also the process by which the crown and aristocratic elites since the 11th century have stolen and conquered each other’s land, until patterns of ownership emerged which last until the present day. These territorial conflicts were characterised by mass displacement of the rural population through resettlement in urban areas, transport to the colonies or slaughter, prompting Marx to declare that “the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire” (Capital, vol 1, ch 6). The massive processes of displacement were accompanied by an emergent political system which “focused the most active form of economic development, manufacturing, into areas of marginal Parliamentary representation with a consequent lack of capacity to influence the law” (Cahill, 2001, 26). The resulting power imbalance between urban and rural areas, according to Cahill, persists to this day, and maintains a strong connection between wealth, territorial entitlement and political power.\textsuperscript{187} In the words of the 15th Earl of Derby;

\textsuperscript{187} In order to maintain these ownership patterns, Cahill writes, the landed aristocracy effectively controlled both houses of parliament at least until World War II, limiting democratic representation for urban and metropolitan areas. While post-war labour governments attempted to limit the number of landowners in cabinet, conservative governments and especially Thatcher gave them “another lease on life” (p 25), and large landowning families can
“the object which men aim at when they become possessed of land in the British Isles\textsuperscript{188} may, I think, be enumerated as follows. One, political influence; two, social importance, founded on territorial possession, the most visible and unmistakeable form of wealth; three, power exercised over tenantry; the pleasure of managing, directing and improving the estate itself; four, residential enjoyment, including what is called sport; five, the money return – the rent” (1870s, cited in Cahill, 2001, 8)

Why, then, would these landed elites come to embrace a diffusion of territorial entitlement into the wider population? Consider for example the interaction between land ownership and the domestic housing market, with its near-perpetual crisis. Cahill argues that since building land is the most expensive component of new house building, the availability of developable land is a key factor in planning. However, the lack of documentation, and thus valuation, of large swathes of the British countryside means that there is a perceived scarcity of development land, driving up prices: “(land) is perceived as scarce when not only is it not scarce but is being kept from dereliction by huge public subsidy” (16). This inflation of land values through artificial scarcity leads to an inflation of property values in the cities, due to a lack of possibility for expansion, and thus the property structure of the countryside is in part responsible for the lack of available housing in urban areas.

As a result, urban space becomes extremely interesting market for domestic and foreign investors, such as exemplified in the current inflation in house prices in London, which produces billions in revenue for companies like Daejan, the

\textsuperscript{188} And, it should be added, in the territories that the British Empire colonised

be seen to send representatives to the European Parliament. “The inner elite (...) have maintained their influence at the heart of government no matter the agenda of the party elected at the ballot box” concludes Cahill (p 8). After New Labour removed the majority of hereditary peers from the House of Lords in 1999, the picture has only changed superficially: “today that inner elite still owns the country, both by operating the inner levers of power, often at board level in banks and financial institutions” (8).
owners of the HUB 189. But not only corporations profit – thousands of small investors who own only one or two properties also have a vested interest in keeping property values high, and thus in financially and politically shoring up the power structure. This dynamic therefore appears to turn Burke’s argument on its head: ‘lesser fortunes’ here come to form a ‘rampart’ that guarantees the continued existence of the ‘great masses’ of property as well as the political interests that attach to them, thus providing a clue as to why Tory governments past and present have been so ready to promote individual home ownership. In a political situation in which the interests of landowners, investors and individual homeowners converge on high property values, the only people who could potentially have an interest in a devaluation of land are those who do not own any and cannot afford any 190. As was discussed above, these are exactly the people that conservatism since Thatcher has set out to stigmatise.

As this example shows, the conservative push toward individual home ownership can be seen as a strategy to enlist ‘the masses’ in the interests of the elite while appearing generous. But merely temporarily making affordable property available is not too promising a strategy in the long run – as the next generation of the working class have already had to find out, the supply of cheap housing could not last indefinitely, and it was not meant to. After all, economics was only ‘the method’, the goal was, explicitly, to affect a ‘change of heart and soul’. This points to the fact that the purpose of the privatisation of space was not merely material – the goal was to achieve a change in the cognitive and emotional experience of the population. In the final section of this chapter, I therefore want to offer some thoughts as to what this ‘change of heart and soul’ could mean, and

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189 To be precise, in 2014 Daejan’s property portfolio was worth GBP 1,546,718,000, up from GBP 1,407,544,000 in 2013, or as the preliminary results report for shareholders puts it: “The revaluation of the investment property portfolio at the year end has resulted in a net valuation surplus for the year of £119,648,000 (2013 - £82,694,000)” (Unaudited Preliminary Results Announcement for the year ended 31 March 2014, from: http://www.daejanholdings.com)

190 Cahill proposes a massive devaluation of land as a remedy for the issues he asserts, but I am not convinced that this is feasible under democratic conditions, precisely because of the ripple effect on the value of small and medium sized properties. Another suggestion comes from activists and campaigners for a ‘land value tax’, such as the ‘The Land Is Ours’ campaign started by writer George Monbiot. The campaign was well known among Bristol squatters and land rights were a regular topic of discussion.
how it could be read in terms of our previously established framework. Due to the nature of this discussion – we are, once again, talking about structural patterns – this discussion will be somewhat speculative in nature, and therefore has more the character of a thought experiment rather than ‘cold, hard evidence’. Although I will point out some structural similarities to things we have already encountered in other contexts, I cannot within the space available here reconstruct these similarities in detail. I therefore have to ask my reader to follow me on some leaps of the imagination, somewhat like an astronomer who points at the stars and asks one to see the shapes of an archer, a lion or a bear. Whether one chooses to do so, or merely to see a random spattering of shiny dots, is entirely a matter of good faith, and so, to some degree, will be the question of whether the reader sees anything of relevance in the following discussion.

So what ‘change of heart and soul’ could appear desirable to the conservative mind-set? Robin (2011) offers us a clue:

“How the masses must either be able to locate themselves symbolically in the ruling class or be provided with real opportunities to become faux aristocrats themselves in the family, the factory, and the field. The former path makes for an upside-down populism, in which the lowest of the low see themselves projected in the highest of the high; the latter makes for a democratic feudalism, in which the husband or supervisor plays the part of a lord” (Robin, 2011, 35)

A ‘change of heart and soul’ can therefore be achieved either through symbolic identification with the ruling class (as the Big Society agenda proclaimed, “We Are All In This Together”), or through a ‘trickle down’ approach to political power that gives certain individuals limited rule over others within personal social relations, and thus gives them a ‘stake’ in upholding the general architecture of power. In both cases, it must be made plausible that joining the elite is open to anyone but not everyone, and individual success stories help to keep the narrative alive. “One of the most central concepts of maintaining power is by sustaining a creed or belief...populations will serve power if they believe in the
concept or myth propagated by power” (Cahill, 2001, 26). Symbolic identification therefore rests on whether the ‘masses’ can locate themselves in the mythology of the ruling class, i.e. whether they can identify with the ideal model of the self and its social relations that this narrative provides.

What, then, constitutes this mythology? Burke gives us a pointer when he asserts that one of the hallmarks of power is that it is obtained through struggle: “I do not hesitate to say, that the road to eminence and power, from obscure condition, ought not to be made too easy, nor a thing too much of course. If rare merit be the rarest of all rare things, it ought to pass through some sort of probation...let it be remembered too, that virtue is never tried but by some difficulty and some struggle” (Burke, 1790). Only through adversity, therefore, does true excellence reveal itself, and is both political power and property earned. Burke here repeats a theme that permeates conservative thought: that of privilege earned not through labour, but through the heroic overcoming of resistance, epitomised in an imagery and language of war. We have already encountered a structurally very similar notion in chapter 8, namely in Heidegger’s idea that the ‘struggle for Being’ is, in essence, a state of existential war of the self against its environment, which politically translates into an ideology of territorial invasion. But the idea of Being as war is not just a German specialty: as Robin (2012) argues, to prove the superiority of one’s class or race on the battlefield is more generally the traditional path to establishing excellence for the aristocracy191 – in modern times translated into the battlefield of the marketplace:

“Though most early conservatives were ambivalent about capitalism, their successors will come to believe that warriors of a different kind can prove their mettle in the manufacture and trade of commodities. Such men wrestle the earth’s resources to and from the ground, taking for themselves what they want and thereby establishing their superiority over others”. (Robin, 2011, p 30)

191 Compare here again Heidegger and his preoccupation with ‘heroic’ struggle
In this version of the ‘struggle for Being’, the capitalist, as the aristocrat before him, thus comes to appear as a conquering warrior, a military leader in an economic war\textsuperscript{192}. His superiority is not granted merely by heritage, it is proven in battle, evidence of his excellence as commander of others. Accumulated private property, then, is tangible proof that the warrior is worth his salt: “the primal act of transgression – requiring daring, vision, and an aptitude for violence and violation – is what makes the capitalist a warrior, entitling him not only to great wealth but also, ultimately, to command” (ibid). Property, in this view, is the product of a transgression of boundaries, of a violation, and therefore, if it is indeed a fetish category, then the social relation it points to is that between a plunderer and his victim. Ludwig von Mises then also pragmatically sums up the conservative take on wealth as: “All ownership derives from occupation and violence...that all rights derive from violence, all ownership from appropriation or robbery, we may freely admit” (Mises, 1951/1981, 42f)\textsuperscript{193}. If the figure of the warrior is therefore at the core of conservative mythology, then this warrior is at the same time an invader and a thief, although theft is here justified by the fact that the original owner of the stolen goods was not aggressive enough to defend them, and thus robbery is morally legitimised as heroic acquisition.

I can only speculate about the historical origins of the warrior myth, but it is interesting to note in this context, that the term ‘Anglo-Saxon power elites’ that is sometimes used in political discourse to describe the white masculine subject and its entourage is technically a misnomer, since the actual Anglo-Saxon elites were mostly expropriated or exiled in the course of the Norman invasion of William the Conqueror, 1066 AD (Wood, 2001, 15). As a result of this conquest, parts of the modern British elite – precisely the people who, according to Cahill,

\textsuperscript{192} It is interesting in this context that economic conflicts between corporations are routinely framed in a language of war, such as the ‘patent wars’ between two large computer manufacturers that I once had the misfortune to be paid to research. Not only do the companies themselves take these confrontations as enactments of violent conflict (such as Apple boss Steve Jobs’ phrase of the ‘thermonuclear war’ he was going to wage on competitor Samsung), media report them as such – and for the workers in Asia, who labour for these companies under extremely exploitative working conditions, the declaration of ‘war’ can have severe economic and personal consequences

\textsuperscript{193} While conservatives and anarchists thus agree that property is theft, only one side appears to find this problematic.
own the majority of the land – are the descendants of these very invaders. Historian Gregory Clark discovered for example in a 2010 statistical survey of social mobility in Britain that certain surnames, associated with the conquerors, have since persistently remained at the top of British society. This puzzles the statistician, due to the fact that

“individual family histories such as that of the Stanley Earls of Derby, at the top of the income distribution for 29 generations, are statistically of extreme improbability. Their success over 900 years implies that at least at the very top of traditional English society there must be some limitation on regression to the mean” (Clark, 2010, n.p.)

Clark researches class in different cultural context by examining the distribution of surnames over several centuries, concluding in his 2014 book The Son Also Rises that class inequalities especially in Britain are a matter “of lineage”, and therefore, unless societies take active measures to balance these tendencies, the British class system perpetuates a ‘winner-takes-all’ model of the social in which class barriers have become increasingly difficult to cross (since the middle ages, which according to Clark were more permissive in terms of social mobility than the modern day UK) (Clark, 2014) Clark therefore comes to the conclusion that in Britain and beyond, social mobility is limited by the fact that wealth begets wealth through the principle of inheritance (Clark, 2014). As Brace (2004) notes, it is a core feature of conservative ideology that the principle of inheritance must be protected, and the conservative insistence that property is naturally unequal is inextricably linked to the idea that the ‘great masses’ of accumulated wealth have to be preserved for ‘future generations’ rather than squandered on misguided concepts of redistribution (138f). If this ideology therefore historically derives from the interests of the landed aristocracy, then this aristocracy is comprised, to a large extent, of the descendants of territorial invaders.
The land ownership patterns we have discussed above are a result of the same historical processes. After the battle of Hastings, William the Conqueror declared himself King William I, and decreed that all land in Britain now belonged to the monarch. He subsequently distributed the land among his fellow raiders, creating by and large the very structure of land ownership that still exists today (Garnett, 2007). To be precise, the word ‘ownership’ is here not entirely correct: William’s granddaughter by 22 generations, Queen Elizabeth II, still legally owns the entire landmass of the UK, and individual ‘landowners’ are only her tenants, granted their holdings in exchange for their allegiance to the crown. The Norman land-grab therefore laid the foundation for British feudalism, and for a class system characterised by the rule of the conquerors over the defeated indigenous population. Around 20,000 Normans came to rule over 1.5 million Anglo-Saxons in a system that has been referred to as ‘a medieval forerunner of apartheid’, and in which intermarriage between Normans and English was, for centuries, strongly discouraged (Keats-Rohan, 1999). The Normans established a regime of heavy taxation (familiar from stories such as ‘Robin Hood’, see Singman 1998), and in the following centuries, exported this model to other places they annexed in the course of territorial expansion, such as Ireland, Scotland and Wales – the previously mentioned first Domesday book was then also compiled mainly a tax register (Littrell, 2009, 146). In the light of this, it is quite possible (although impossible to prove) that the warrior myth originates in the history of colonial conquest which, quite literally, split Britain into a ‘ruling class’ and a subjugated class for almost a millennium. To be sure, the mythical warrior has gone through numerous permutations in the centuries since, not least the abovementioned one from feudal ruler to boardroom-warlord. What remains, however, is the is the mythological gestalt of a territorial dominant, who

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194 As well as a whole 6th of the earth’s surface (Cahill, 2006), making Her Majesty the world's number 1 landowner
195 ‘Feudalism’ is here used in the sense of Marx as describing a relation between lords and peasants, not, as in some British accounts, to describe relationships between members of the elite (see Thomas, 2008, 71f)
is legitimised in his claim to power by an essentially pre-modern ideology of heroic belligerence, and who regards property as the spoils of war.

If we fast-forward a couple of centuries (and take one of the abovementioned leaps of the imagination), we can see how the warrior myth informs what Nick Duffell (2014, see chapter 5) describes as the sites of production of ‘Rational Men’ for the governance of Empire, namely the British boarding school system. Duffell sees the emergence of this system in the first half of the 19th century as basically a reaction to fears on part of the elite that the ideas of the French Revolution might catch on in Britain. What was needed to counteract this danger was therefore a reinforcement of conservative ideas of ‘natural’ inequality, and the ‘public schools’ were essentially designed to socially engineer an elite who would uphold this principle at home and abroad. Central to this project was the establishment of a class of ‘Rational Men’ destined to become military and civil leaders, who would be deeply convinced of their inherent and deserved superiority, or afflicted by what Duffell refers to as the ‘entitlement illusion’. The collective effect of this is summed up by the remark of Lord Palmerston, 1858: “I may say, without any vain-glorious boast, or without great offence to anyone, we stand at the head of moral, social and political civilisation. Our task is to lead the way and direct the march of other nations”, to which Archibald Philip Primrose, 5th Earl of Rosebery, added in 1894/95 that the British Empire was “the greatest secular agency for good that the world has seen” (both cited in: Littrell, 2009, 145)

As we have discussed in chapter 5, this level of grandiosity is achieved by producing a subjectivity characterised by the values of strength, independence and invulnerability, and the projection of anything that does not fit with this construction onto other people. Duffell proceeds to point out how this same psychodynamic is repeated in the legitimisation of colonialism through the mechanisms of projection and splitting, executed this time in the collective rather than the individual psyche. If the warrior has over the centuries cleaned himself up and transformed into the ‘head of moral civilisation’, then in relation to him,
indigenous populations come to be seen as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘savage’, and therefore worthy of pity and contempt. The ‘savages’ are seen to have only limited capacity to reason, to be child-like and dependent\textsuperscript{197}, lazy, immoral and prone to fighting over silly things, in contrast to white men who fight over important things. Like the younger, weaker boys at school, they therefore must be put to work in order to develop their ‘character’: “we had the whole of India ‘fagging’ for us, as it were” (Duffell, 2014, 66). That colonialism involves not only occupation but also looting goes without saying for the ‘gentlemen’, repeating the theme of transgression and violation that characterises conservative ideas of property as theft. If we want to follow Duffell in the idea that colonial racism is mostly a case of projection, then the colonialist trope of the ‘Noble Savage’ could therefore be replaced by the more accurate description of the warrior as a ‘Savage Noble’.

If Duffell’s ‘Rational Man’ is indeed a latter-day incarnation of the warrior myth, then it is possible that his emergence in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century constitutes yet another adverse reaction to the French Revolution, such as we have already seen in Burke, Heidegger and, as it were, Goebbels. This would not be too implausible, seeing as the Revolution challenged precisely the rights of entail and primogeniture – that is inheritance – that have kept some parts of the British elite in power for the better part of a thousand years. The figure of the ‘Savage Noble’ could then be seen as somewhat of a collective defence mechanism, a narrative structure that by extension becomes the structure of individual and collective selves. Sperber (1985) speaks in this context of an ‘epidemiology of representations’, comparing the spread of cultural beliefs, practices and self-models to the spread of infections – a myth could thus become ‘contagious’ like a virus, or more in line with a ‘data’ view of the mind, a kind of cognitive malware. Sperber compares the diffusion of cultural representations (beliefs, practices, ideological figures etc.) to the way infections of the physical body spread in a population. In contrast to Richard Dawkins’ well known concept of a ‘meme’ (Dawkins, 1976), Sperber does not see the representations themselves as agents,

\textsuperscript{197} It is not difficult to see in this the classic projection of an abandoned child.
but rather uses the model of infection to explain “why some representations (are) more successful in a human population, more contagious, more 'catching' than others?” (1985, 74). Myths, for example, in order to become widely diffused, have to fulfil three criteria: memorability, attractiveness, and credence. A myth is memorable if it is easy to communicate through oral communication alone. ‘Attractiveness’ refers to how well the myth fits with the cognitive architecture of the human brain – since humans are optimised for efficiency, a myth is attractive if it achieves “as much cognitive effect as possible for as little mental effect as possible” (1996, 114). Finally, a story also must be credible, pointing to its connection with power. According to Sperber, credibility hinges on the fact that people have “confidence in those who tell it to them: typically their confidence in elders ...Reference to elders provides a self-perpetuating authority structure for a story which already has a self-perpetuating transmission structure” (1996, 96). Personally I prefer the idea of a computer virus to that of a physical infection, but otherwise Sperber's model is a great metaphor for propaganda.

If we want to believe Corey Robin that ‘the masses have to symbolically locate themselves in the ruling class’, it would appear that Thatcher’s ‘change of heart and soul’ aimed at yet another revival of the warrior myth198 – this time in reaction to the post-war rise of social democracy which once again jeopardised ruling class interest. In contrast to her predecessors, however, Thatcher recognised that it was not enough to put the fear of the warrior in the hearts of the people – the people had to be persuaded to identify with him, and thus to become “faux aristocrats themselves in the family, the factory, and the field” (Robin, 2011, 35). What Thatcher sought to effect, therefore, was not only a partial economic redistribution that ultimately served to cement the power structure, but a form of “democratic feudalism” (ibid), achieved through an infection of the ‘masses’ with the ideology of territorial dominance itself.

198 This would certainly cast an interesting light on the 2011 London riots, in which the dreaded ‘underclass’ stunned the nation by demonstrating that looting is no longer a matter of privilege.
This also means that ‘the masses’ are asked to adopt the structure of the self that this implies, that is, to maintain their delusional superiority by way of denigrating others. Opportunities for this exist plenty – the ‘feckless scrounger’ is one example, as are migrants in general (UKIP\textsuperscript{199} is presently basing an electoral campaign on this principle), but also of course women (see last chapter – there is now also an avowedly ‘anti-feminist’ party, \textit{Justice for Men and Boys}, standing for parliament), the disabled (the black triangle campaign, who documents the names of disabled people who have died through suicide as a demonstrable result of austerity, currently counts 72, stating that this is ‘the tip of the iceberg’\textsuperscript{200}), and of course Gypsies and Travellers, squatters and the homeless. What all these groups have in common is that on the one hand, they in one way or another function as the antithesis of the white, masculine elite; and on the other that their entitlement to occupy space is consistently contested. They are therefore all varieties of the ‘territorial other’ to a self infused with the dominant and dominating ideology of the mythical conqueror.

A striking feature of the warrior’s discourse is the perfectly circular ‘shut-up clause’ that is logically implied in the ideology of superiority. Because only the strong are accepted as ‘peers’, i.e. those whose opinion one would have to take seriously, anyone who raises critique of their behaviour must either come from a position of equal strength\textsuperscript{201}, or be discounted as ‘the weak one’ who simply could not hack it. Consequently, whatever complaints those at the bottom of the social ladder voice about their treatment is \textit{by definition} disqualified as coming from someone who, by virtue of the very act of complaining, has identified him/herself as not being part of the club. This subtle sleight of hand makes sure that the territorial self, English version, can automatically discount challenges to its politics, at least in as far as they stem from actual suffering. Conservative

\textsuperscript{199} United Kingdom Independence Party
\textsuperscript{200} “May their deaths be avenged” http://blacktrianglecampaign.org/2014/10/21/uk-welfare-reform-deaths-updated-list-october-21st-2014/
\textsuperscript{201} Such as the opposition, who is allowed to disagree but only based on the assumption that what is being fought over is not whatever the concrete issue, but political power \textit{as such} – the intervention has to be recognizable as a \textit{strategy of power}, or it is discounted with a condescending ‘Calm down, Dear!’ (Cameron to a female MP, April 2011, in: Duffell, 2014)
discourse, in this way, is almost hermetically sealed against all but the most disinterested dissent, since the very fact of its articulation disqualifies the dissenter\textsuperscript{202}.

It was, in this sense, no big surprise that the HUB occupation, with its logic of ‘but this 
\textit{hurts} people!’ was taken seriously as a nuisance, but not as an intervention. After roughly two months of operation and a protracted court- and media battle, the HUB was eventually evicted. On the day possession was granted – the judge, although he appeared sympathetic, had exhausted his options of adjournment – a large crowd had gathered around the building, expecting an army of bailiffs to march on the HUB and determined to defend it as long as possible. An initial attempt to turn away the ‘sheriff’ was successful – the operation involved no less than eight police vans, a helicopter, a cherry picker and a fire engine, but only a single bailiff – but Constant&Co had chosen, in this case, to take their time with the repossession they knew would eventually occur. Although the HUB was not physically conquered that day, the project in in it came to an end since it proved impossible to run a service under daily threat of physical removal, and soon after, a lone Constant bailiff discreetly crept around to change the locks.

The occupiers lost not only their project, but also the roof over their heads, and spent several weeks piled seven to a room in the Smiling Chair bookshop, before moving into a squat that was so damp it had actual algae growing on the walls (it was dubbed ‘the aquarium’). While for Daejan and the council the matter was thus resolved, at least for some of the occupiers it constituted a turning point, as they finally had to realise that they were not needed or wanted as part of the ‘Big Society’, whether they were trying to make themselves useful or not. While the more disillusioned squatters saw in this further proof that political promises are there to be broken, others were deeply hurt by the ‘conveyor-belt justice’ meted out by a judge whose own morals in this case appeared to clash with the law he

\textsuperscript{202} A related discursive manoeuvre is what one could call the ‘Johnny-Foreigner-defence’, i.e. the assumption that outsiders cannot make true statements about British issues by virtue of the very fact that they are outsiders, regardless of what their actual argument. This defence can be observed e.g. in the interactions of British politicians with other European leaders (see Duffell, 2014)
had to enforce. The occupier’s opinion that ‘people are more important than empty buildings’ simply had no representation in a legal system that is designed to protect the interests of property and those who own it, aided and abetted by thousands of miniature ‘faux aristocrats’ who rarely recognise the self-defeating nature of their allegiances until they themselves end up on the street. Some of the occupiers came to realise that what they had in common with the Gypsies and Travellers of Dale Farm was not merely an enemy in the shape of Constant&Co, but that there are deeper connections between those cast as territorial others, and as the HUBs last press release (overleaf) shows, translated this into a continuity of resistance (see chapter 12). What they found was that the ‘change of heart and soul’ among the residents of Basildon, the town that Dale Farm was part of, had been thorough enough to mobilise a small territorial army against the Travellers and evict them from their own land. Meanwhile, when I walked down Cumberland Road for the first time three years after my ‘fieldwork’ ended, Schooner House still sat empty and boarded up.
Residents of the Hub Drop-in Centre resist eviction

Residents of the Hub Drop-in Centre successfully resisted eviction on Friday by notorious bailiffs Constant & Co. The Drop-in centre closed in December due to cuts in funding. In January, it was re-opened by a group of squatters in protest at the massive cuts to services for the homeless. The adjacent building, which has been empty for nine years and is owned by the same London property company has been and continues to be used as emergency housing for the homeless.

The bailiff company contracted to carry out the eviction, Constant & co., are under investigation by the Health and Safety Executive following evictions of Traveller sites across the country and were responsible for the bulldozing of the Bristol Eco village last year. Constant & co. have also been contracted to evict Europe’s biggest traveller site, Dale Farm, home to around 1000 people who own the land they live on.

On Friday morning the building appeared heavily barricaded. A pirate flag flew from the chimney and banners hung from the windows: “80% cuts to sheltered housing”, “Less posh flats, more social housing” and “Mr. Constant you will receive a warm welcome at Dale Farm”.

At around 2pm, a bailiff arrived to post papers on the building and carry out a first inspection. He was met with a group of around 15 persons dressed in black, who surrounded him and prevented him from posting the eviction notice. The bailiff then retreated to his car. He was, however, unable to leave as the road had been barricaded with two lines of skips and bins. A line of petrol had been spilt between these two lines. The street was also blocked by neighbouring builders who had accidentally left their cherry picker blocking the exit during tea break.

Three vans of policemen arrived shortly after, along with a fire engine and helicopter. Onlookers were filmed and photographed by Police, who removed the bins and the bailiff from his vehicle. They then appear to have taken him to their van to breathalyse him while fire teams cleared the spilt petrol. After negotiations with the masked persons defending the Hub, Police gave assurances that the eviction would not be allowed today and the builders returned from tea break to remove their cherry picker.

The squatters, who prefer to describe themselves as “the empowered homeless” have called out for support as the centre remains under “Constant threat”.

Contact:

Simon Clarke, 0718630361

Figure 13: The HUB’s last press release, March 2011
Drew is in a lousy mood. It has been building all afternoon, and by the time I step out of the caravan to join the rest of the crew in the yard of our squat in Bedminster, it is about to escalate into a full-blown fit.

We’ve known of course that Drew has a temper, the stories were going round, but until the eviction of the HUB, he’s d never been like that with any of us. He was one of the people who most strongly believed in what the HUB was trying to do, and when it went, like it was always going to, it did something to him. The moods got worse.

It always starts subtly, unnoticeably for outsiders, but those who know Drew well know what is about to happen when his voice goes very quiet, quieter even than usual, and takes on an acidic tone of resentment. It is always some small thing – a careless remark, a window left open – that starts it, but by the time his voice has gone from a sharp whisper to a deep, threatening rumble, everything and everyone is fair game.

When I step out into the yard he has reached almost full momentum. The other guys – Ralph, Joe, Caz – are standing around staring at their feet, while Drew is giving them a good dressing-down. Plunking down on a chair in the middle of the yard I establish that the point of contention is the lit barbecue, smouldering in anticipation of a good dinner. The lads have apparently decided to put the barricading of the new place on hold to enjoy themselves in the first rays of the spring sun. Drew is livid.

“You just don’t get it, do you!” an accusatory finger pointed at the boys. “We got the cops and bailiffs barging in here any minute. We’re soon gonna be criminals. You know what that means, it means we go to prison for this. We got all the shit in the world about to hit the fan AND YOU BUNCH OF CUNTS THROW A PARTY!!!”
The last words are shouted and to give them some extra weight, Drew spins around and gives the barbecue a good kick. It tumbles to the ground with an almighty rattle, and the puppy, who has been sniffing contently in a corner, startles. With a high-pitched squeal of terror, he dives under my chair and huddles under my feet.

Like everyone else, I have learned to stay out of Drew’s way when he gets like that, but this day, something is different. Maybe it is the puppy, maybe I just feel more obstinate than usual, I don’t know.

“Oi there, keep it sweet.” My voice has no tone at all. It sounds flat and strange. Drew turns around and with two quick strides is standing right in front of me. The boys are inspecting their shoes even more intently. Drew stares at me.

“What?” he hisses

“I said calm down. This isn’t going to help now, is it?”

Drew just stands there but I can see every muscle in his body vibrating with tension. His fists and teeth are clenched, holding back a wave of force that is about to come down on my head. The moment stretches in a peculiar way, giving me time to consider my options. I am still sitting, and getting up would bring me face to face with Drew, in a gesture he could read as aggressive. I could move sideways and bail, but somehow I know that if I give in now, I lose more than just face. So I decide to do nothing at all. I stay motionless in the exact same sitting position, body relaxed, breathing deep. In the same toneless voice I say


I am sure he is going to pounce now, but he just stares. His gaze is unreadable. After what seems like another eternity, he turns away and stomps off into the
house in silence. It takes a few moments until we all breathe again, the boys scratching their heads, laughing embarrassedly. A few hours later, this will be their victory.

I pick up the puppy, go inside the caravan and phone Jon to come round with the truck first thing in the morning and tow me out. I was lucky this time, but I’m not going to push it. Weeks later, I will learn that Drew went inside the squat and proceeded to trash the communal kitchen with such force that he broke his own foot in the process, but by the time I hear that part of the story, the wheels of my home are on the road.

Figure 14: Fieldnote 4
Chapter Eleven: Fragments

The genius of any slave system is found in the dynamics which isolate slaves from each other, obscure the reality of a common condition, and make united rebellion against the oppressor inconceivable.

Andrea Dworkin

Drew was, for all intents and purposes, not a bad person. I had grown quite fond of him over the first months of my stay in Bristol, and the hardships of spending the winter moving from squat to squat (one colder, damper and dingier than the last), plus the spectacular occupation of the HUB (see chapter 10) had forged a bond of general camaraderie and friendship between us. Nevertheless, it had become obvious not just to me but to our entire crew that Drew had a problem. He liked to drink, which was not at all unusual for a squatter, but while in others the alcohol produced merriness or bravado, in Drew it brought out a dark side of his personality that stood in stark contrast to his usual gentle and thoughtful demeanour. Like the proverbial Jekyll and Hyde, Drew reacted to alcohol in a manner that seemed to turn him into a different person – he became first quietly acidic, then openly hostile, and finally, on occasion, physically violent. The altercation at the beginning of this chapter marked the end of a process of gradual decline in our friendship, as it marked the point at which I realised it was no longer safe to inhabit the same space as him. It also technically marked the end of my squatting career, since after moving out of the yard, I began to live in vehicles and on sites until I eventually moved back into rented accommodation.

Drew’s example has prompted me to think about what in chapter 5 we have called ‘gestalt shifts’ (DesAutels, 1996), namely switches between different, contradictory patterns of relating which can come to alternately inform a person’s or group’s behaviour. In saying that he was not a bad person, I mean that he was perfectly capable of standing in solidarity with those who are vulnerable to domination, and I have seen him do so on many occasions. He was a driving force in many an action and project that was designed to create a ‘safe space’ for
those labelled ‘homeless’. He was also a good friend a trustworthy comrade, in all the practical ways that surviving together entails. Some interpreted his switching between Jekyll and Hyde as a sign that the likeable side of him was only pretence and that when he was drunk, his real self came out to play. Although we will never know for certain, I do not entirely agree with this assessment – I think that both sides of him were ‘real’ and that their coexistence becomes understandable as an expression of a particular kind of inner fragmentation, the result of a disruption of the continuity of selfhood typical for trauma. In taking Drew as a starting point for the next part of my discussion, it is therefore not my intention to portray him as a villain, or to turn this text into a trial in absence, since he is not likely to respond in kind to provide his side of the story. Rather, I want to his example as a starting point to talk about the dynamics of traumatic fragmentation more generally, first in terms of individual ‘minds’, and in the second part, in terms of collective structures.

In chapter 5, we have seen how the psychological mechanisms of splitting and projection accompany such a fragmented psychic structure, in which different prototypes of social relations (‘object relations’) exist parallel, without necessarily being internally connected. However, while this can tell us what dissociation ‘does’ in terms of ethics, it does not tell us what causes it. In this regard, there is unusual agreement between the psychoanalytically and the cognitively oriented branches of the ‘mind-sciences’: dissociation is a consequence of trauma. ‘Trauma’ is understood to refer to a response to extreme life events, which include acute threat to a person’s physical or cognitive integrity, overwhelm his or her cognitive coping capacity, and are experienced as out of his/her control (Van der Kolk, 1984, 1994, 2003, 2012). That this ‘fragmentation’ is not merely a figure of speech becomes obvious when we again consider Thomas Metzinger’s (2004) account of the ‘phenomenal self model’ (PSM) as the kind of neural firing pattern that “allows an organism to conceive of itself as a whole” (1). This experience of ‘wholeness’ is the result of a continuous process in which the brain maps the entire ‘system’ and creates a representation

203 See also chapter 2
endowed with the kind of first person perspective Metzinger calls the ‘phenomenal model of the intentionality relation’ (PMIR). A self-model, according to Metzinger, is therefore itself a kind of representational prototype, such as the ones we have discussed in chapter 5. In the same way as prototypes for ethical relations are coded by extracting the central statistical tendency of a number of exemplars, the brain produces a PSM by establishing the central tendency of the system over time, thus producing a person’s experience of continuous identity and selfhood (365, 399, 384). If this process is disrupted, a person’s brain therefore becomes unable to produce a stable sense of self, and the experience of ‘being me’ consequently fragments.

The functioning of the PSM can be disrupted in a number of ways. On the one hand, a person’s thoughts and emotions “are subjectively experienced as inner events and, in standard situations, as one’s own states” (267) and therefore characterized by what Metzinger refers to as the quality of ‘mineness’204: “a characteristic feature of all contents integrated into the phenomenal level of self-representation” (ibid). The experience of oneself as a whole, embodied person therefore crucially depends on identification with the content that is represented: “The integration of self-presentational content into a unified, globally available representational structure underlies our phenomenal experience of embodiment, of being in direct and immediate contact with our own bodies” (439) Violent trauma disrupts this process, because the loss of control over parts or all of one’s body leads to a state where these parts are no longer recognized as belonging to ‘me’. This involves particularly the overwhelming experience of one’s body not being ‘a safe space to be in’, and many traumatised persons therefore report a subjective experience of ‘leaving their bodies’ during a traumatic/violent event (van der Kolk et al, 1996). This characteristically also means a disruption of memory, i.e. of the narrative the brain tells itself to produce the experience of continuous selfhood. If a traumatic memory is said to be ‘split-off’ or ‘repressed’, then this therefore means that it is not integrated into the self-model, and one’s

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204 Once again, ‘mineness’ is understood to point to a relation of identification rather than ‘ownership’ in the sense of an ‘ontological hiatus’ between owner and owned. The whole point of ‘mineness’ is for there not to be such a hiatus.
self is thus is not recognised as ‘the person this happened to’. Such trauma survivors sometimes present as ‘multiple selves’, alternately presenting a self-model that ‘this happened to’ and one that does not share the traumatic memory. On the other hand, the experience of losing ‘ownership’ of one’s own system also involves a disruption of the PMIR, i.e. the experience of having a unique, individual perspective in relating to the world – in other words, trauma involves a loss of subjectivity that results in a disintegration of the self (445), since “being a conscious person presupposes a minimal degree not only of cognitive and behavioral but also of self-experiential coherence” (438).

Metzinger emphasizes that dissociation need not be the consequence of a single, overwhelming traumatic event – multiple, incompatible self-models can also be the result of the fact that a person has had to adapt to highly incompatible social environments, by creating different self-models in response to incommensurable social demands:

“One and the same person, in different contexts, may be your most important and stable source of security, while at other times he or she may present a serious threat to your physical and mental health. ...The integrity of life itself is reflected in the integrity of the PSM. Therefore, it is easy to understand that there will be situations in which a system is forced to use multiple, alternating self-models in order to cope with ‘inconsistent data sets’, for instance, with highly inconsistent social environments” (522)

While ‘trauma’ can therefore point to either a single, violent disruption of a person’s sense of self, or a sustained, irresolvable contradiction that is ‘taken inside’ and ‘left unresolved’, the result in both cases is a subjectively and objectively experienced disruption of identity and integrity.

Metzinger’s account is interesting especially since he believes that the entities he is describing are not merely metaphors or ‘social constructions’: “A PSM and a PMIR are something to be found by empirical research in the mind sciences” (9). If he is correct, then it may well one day be possible to show that such

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205 We will discuss this aspect at more length in chapter 12.
‘metaphysical’ notions as ‘emotional’ or ‘psychological’ abuse are actually forms of physical abuse, since they have direct effects on the functioning of a person’s brain. To be able to empirically prove that some people deliberately inflict brain damage on others – and prosecute accordingly – would certainly go a long way towards justice for the victims. However, in principle these ideas are not new: psychoanalysis has been preoccupied with the effect of abuse on the personality for a long time, not least since authors such as Alice Miller (1984, 1996, 1997, 2002) or Arno Gruen (1992, 2007) realised that the intergenerational transmission of violence is one of the most pressing problems for social change. Particularly Miller is to be credited with drawing attention to the way in which certain cultural beliefs about child-rearing are prone to normalising and excusing emotional and physical violence against children. She connects these practices to the ideological construct of what she terms ‘black pedagogy’ (Rousseau’s ‘Emile’ being a prime example\(^{206}\)), which centrally assumes that children are naturally ‘bad’, ‘wilful’ and ‘evil’ and must be ‘broken down’ and re-constructed by the caregivers at the earliest possible occasion, since later in life, such tendencies are assumed to be much more difficult to break\(^{207}\). Central to ‘black pedagogy’ is, on

\(^{206}\) ‘Emile, or Treatise on Education’ (1762/1979) discusses the fictional education of a young boy, Emile, and thereby lays out Rousseau’s ideas on child-rearing. In order to become capable of entering in the Social Compact, Rousseau argues, ‘man’ has to be removed from the State of Nature (represented by the spontaneous and autonomous expressions of the child), if necessary by way of force. As Miller discusses, ‘Emile’ is therefore essentially a manual for ‘civilising’ a child by systematically breaking him or her through psychological manipulation and physical violence. The establishment of absolute parental authority, reward-and fear conditioning, and the systematic way in which the child is forced to dis-identify with his own needs and emotions and identify with those of the abusive adult, resembles to a large extent what in other contexts has been referred to as ‘brainwashing’ or ‘thought reform’ through sustained torture (for comparison see e.g. Lifton, 1989; Thaler-Singer, 2003). The ideas expounded by Rousseau in ‘Emile’ are, for Miller, the foundations of ‘black pedagogy’, and continue to inform attitudes to children today. While in recent decades the social acceptance of physical violence in child-rearing has declined, the focus on controlling children’s ‘evil’ natural impulses has now shifted to mass-medicalisation with psychoactive drugs and the pathologisation of dissent (or simply autonomous action) in children through the discovery of such ‘mental illnesses’ as ‘Oppositional Defiant Disorder’: “a psychopathological disorder, usually beginning in childhood, consisting of negativism, disobedience, and hostile behaviour toward authority figures’ (ICD 10, similarly in DSM V).

\(^{207}\) Miller demonstrates, for example, how child-rearing methods in the Weimar Republic – with their emphasis on militarist discipline and unquestioning obedience – formed the ground on which Nazi ideology, and ultimately industrially organised genocide, could flourish. Miller makes it clear that, in analysing how childhood experiences of violent subjugation could lead to the kind of attitude Arendt famously described as the ‘banality of evil’ – i.e. the unquestioning following of murderous orders – she does not excuse this behaviour, nor does she suggest it is inevitable. Nevertheless she deems it important to understand how relations of domination are
the one hand, a relational pattern between caregiver and child in which the child becomes a function of the carer’s ego, thus introducing an internal contradiction into the child’s experience that makes it impossible for the child to experience the world “from a single point of view” (Metzinger, 2004, 150). On the other hand, it involves a demand for compliance and obedience that aims to eradicate autonomy, resistance and dissent. Since an abused child cannot escape its ‘captors’, he/she has little other choice than to surrender and identify with them instead, thus giving up both a sense of control over his/her ‘system’ and the possibility to express his/her own first-person perspective. Later in life, such children often repeat the same pattern with their own children, thus perpetuating an intergenerational cycle of violence that frequently spills over into other kinds of social relations.

Childhood abuse is also one of the strongest predictors of future homelessness (e.g. Herman et al. 1997, Buhrich et al. 2000, Martijn/Sharpe, 2006, etc.). There are certainly more than cognitive factors involved in this correlation, and I do not want to imply that homelessness can be reduced to merely a consequence of childhood trauma. However, the frequent co-occurrence of homelessness and

transmitted individually and collectively through the application of harmful and erroneous beliefs about child-rearing and parental authority.

Anna Freud original formulated the idea that the two basic defense mechanisms are either surrender (i.e. identification with the subjugated position) or identification with the aggressor (1936/1966). While for her, these were normal stages in the development of the superego, later writers such as Miller have come to see them as responses to traumatic abuse, and thus as maladaptive.

While only a small fraction of those who have been abused go on to abuse others, most perpetrators of violence do have past experiences of abuse (e.g. Wisdom 1989). Duffell (2000) locates just such an understanding in the particularly British attitudes to child-rearing, in which the old adage “children should be seen but not heard” has more recently been complemented by a medicalization of ‘bad conduct’.

Although many ‘Western’ states have, in recent decades, adopted legislation that prohibits more extreme forms of violence against children, the right of parents to physical punishment is still widely upheld. In Britain, it is currently still legal to use ‘reasonable force’ in chastising a child, which according to the Children’s Act 2004 means violence that does not leave any physical marks. At the time of writing, a change in law is being debated that would make forms of non-physical child abuse a criminal offence, thus acknowledging that ‘soft’ forms of abuse can be no less damaging than outright assault.


There is a certain risk that discussions of social phenomena through the lens of embodied cognition, such as this one, could be interpreted as reductive, in suggesting that e.g. homelessness is ‘just’ a psychological phenomenon. As I hope to have made clear with my discussion, however, I do not think of the realm of the cognitive as in any way separate from the realm of the political, the economic or the social in a wider sense. Focusing on cognition
childhood trauma could be understood in terms of the primary consequence of trauma as a state in which a person literally has no ‘safe space’ to occupy, within and without the body. An abused child is confined within a (usually quite limited) space with a violent adult and usually little opportunity to hide or keep out of the way. The child’s most personal spaces – their room or their bed for example – are thus not safe, but are always at risk of invasion by a dangerous other. An abused child therefore in a sense grows up as a ‘spatial other’, interned under the ‘despotic dominion’ of a dominant whose claim to territorial control can, in the case of physical and sexual abuse, also and especially involve a colonisation of the inner space of the body. This state leads to a disruption of the experience of one’s body as ‘one’s own’, and thus an abused child is, in a sense, homeless long before he/she ends up on the street. Homelessness in adult life can then be seen as the continuation of a state of spatial abjection, in which a ‘safe space’ is only a utopian ideal to be longed for.

In the light of the above, the perception that a person can have two ‘selves’ who alternately influence his behaviour and hold incompatible views about how one ought to relate to others could be quite close to the truth. Such a person would not just ‘gestalt shift’ between two different kinds of moral perception or orientation, as discussed by DesAutels, but in so far as these types of ethical relating involve an account of self-in-relation-to-other, this would also imply shifting between two different self-models. As far as Drew was concerned, this could mean that as long as he could perceive of himself as a subject with an inalienable perspective, he could also perceive of, and treat, others as such. His other ‘self’, however, could well have been characterised by a defence against that which he did not want to assign the quality of ‘mineness’ to, a self-model that included the many different experiences of the absence of shelter that he had accumulated over the years. To reject these experiences as ‘his’ then meant that they had to be ‘not-his’, ergo somebody else’s, and in this particular instant, this other ended up being me.

therefore here is a way of looking at social phenomena from the perspective of what they do to a person’s brain – this is in no way meant to imply that the insides of people’s brains exist in isolation from the social and cultural structures that shape them.
I will never know for sure why Drew did not hit me that day – judging from other occasions when he had no such reservations about other people, it certainly was not that his raging was merely bluster. Maybe it was because I am a woman, maybe it was more personal than that – Drew did have a soft spot for me, and he later made several attempts at reconciliation, one of which ironically consisted in inviting me to see a puppet play about Hitler’s last days in the bunker. I will also never know for sure if Drew’s self-inflicted injury after trashing the kitchen was an accident or if he deliberately turned his aggression against himself. I like to think that, perhaps, he had a moment of ‘mini-sublation’ and made the experience of vulnerability ‘his’ again by victimising himself instead of other people – but that might be the German Romantic in me. In any case, if Drew acted like a right Hobbesian self, then it must be said that this was not entirely without reason: as I will discuss below, the threat that he saw a need to defend ourselves against was not merely a figment of his imagination. If therefore Van der Kolk notes that survivors of trauma “react to reminders of the trauma with emergency responses that had been relevant to the original threat, but that had no bearing on current experience” (1994, p 1)213, then it must be said that in Drew’s case, they did have bearing – in being at constant risk of forcible removal from where he was existing, he was really being told, once again, that he had no right to occupy space.

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213 Bessel Van der Kolk, MD, and other authors in the field of trauma (such as Judith Herman MD) have made extremely valuable contributions to the recognition of psychological trauma as a valid form of suffering. However, they also have, in my view, a tendency to de-politicise the issue by turning re-victimisation into a trauma ‘symptom’, which somehow attaches to the traumatised person, and of which they must be therapeutically ‘cured’. Van der Kolk says, for example: “having a history of helplessness with people in power, they (traumatised persons) tended to cast most subsequent relationships in terms of dominance and submission” (2012, p 197). This begs the question whether it is not possible that these relationships actually are characterised by dominance and submission. Such a view would be implied in a feminist analysis that sees violence during socialisation as a means to ensure later compliance with a hierarchical gender system and a hierarchical social order in general.
The Cop Inside Your Head

The deterioration of Drew’s social skills happened over the course of a winter of evictions, accompanied by lively debate among squatters about the austerity measures and the change to the ‘squatting law’ that was beginning to take shape. Many squatters, and especially those who were particularly socio-economically excluded, awaited these developments with a growing sense of dread. It was often discussed that in the near future, squats would have to be massively fortified against police and bailiffs, and that residents would have to live with a constant expectation of attack. Drew was among those who were most strongly affected by this rising pressure – perhaps due to experience acquired under duress, he was the one among our crew who most keenly perceived of bad things lying ahead.

We had moved into the yard after a string of impossible squats (the ‘aquarium’ mentioned in the last chapter was one of them), and after spending several weeks living in the ‘Smiling Chair’ (moving out in the daytime so normal business could resume), we had finally found a compound with a fenced yard and a building big enough for our crew. I had, at that point, acquired not only a car214 – a fairly ludicrous black Land Rover with too much alloy and a safari roof rack on which five double mattresses could be transported at once – but also an eighteen-foot ‘Buccaneer Clipper’ caravan. I had bought the car mainly as an asset for the entire crew – in the same sense that e.g. the washing machine was technically Ralph’s, but was effectively collectivised at least until he would leave the group – but the caravan, bought several months later, was to be my own space. Perhaps I was beginning to get somewhat tired of having absolutely no privacy, or perhaps I was beginning to sense that our group was not as harmonious as it used to be – but by early spring 2011, the prospect of having a moderate amount of space to myself had begun to look increasingly appealing. When we moved into the yard,

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214 Made possible courtesy of a settlement from London Metropolitan Police for falsely arresting me two years previously
I therefore began to live in my caravan in the open concrete space on the back of the building, while the rest of the crew moved into the house. The caravan functioned much like an extra room, and as the days grew warmer, our communal life increasingly took place outdoors. A few tattered sofas and chairs formed the open-air lounge that was at the centre of our squat, which is where the initial scene took place.

The yard was already structured in an architectural arrangement that lent itself supremely to the construction of a ‘secure space’. It was entirely surrounded by a massive fence through which one could look out, but not in, interspersed only by an iron gate with a robust chain and a huge padlock. Visitors had to rattle the bars, which triggered the puppy into manic barking and alerted someone inside who came out with the keys. The building itself was secured by another iron gate and a lockable door on the inside – the house-dwellers locked these doors at night so that in the morning, I had to wait for them to unlock if I wanted to use the bathroom. On top of the building was a platform from which the entire compound could be seen in a 180 degree view, and the roofs of neighbouring buildings were separated by partition walls which were later secured with rolls of barbed wire. Most windows on the lower floors had bars, and the door out to the street on the other side of the yard was permanently barricaded. If one did not feel paranoid yet, this environment could, in a paradoxical sense, induce one to do so – all the obstacles and barriers just underscored the idea that someone or something dangerous was trying to get in.

Drew had decided that this was where our crew was going to make its last stand against the forces of reaction. From the day we moved in, he began to make ‘improvements’ to the space by securing it against intrusion. He had a never-ending reservoir of suspicions of how others could come to intrude on us, and every morning, would hand out tasks he felt were necessary for our crew’s safety. Since the house included a cellar full of old and unused objects (tools, building materials, presumably stolen bicycles), he also had a never-ending supply of fortifications, which we began to distribute around our ‘vulnerable spots’ until
the squat looked like a prison complex. To do him justice, Drew really did believe at that point that we were in acute danger, and he had considerable reason to. Only days after we moved into the yard, Bristol saw what has come to be known as the ‘Tesco Riot’, and the heightened police presence across the area in the weeks that followed put the entire squatting scene in constant eviction alert.

The moniker ‘Tesco Riot’ is misleading. There certainly was a riot, and in the course of it the newly-built Tesco branch on Stokes Croft – subject to an ongoing fierce conflict between local residents and the corporation – was damaged and partly looted. However, neither was the Tesco the reason for the rioting, nor was it the primary target – it just happened to be right in the middle of a confrontation between protesters and the police, and, since due to its controversial status it did not enjoy the same degree of consideration as local businesses, it ended up collateral damage. What actually caused the scenes, however, was an incident that took place across the road from the contentious shop, and began when around 160 Bristol Police, in full riot gear, stormed the famous landmark squat ‘Telepathic Heights’

The squat lay on the upper end of Stokes Croft, a stone’s throw away from the Tesco, which in the past had been the target of some paint attacks and other expressions of discontent. This strategic location, in the minds of the police, made it inherently suspicious of harbouring the perpetrators of the criminal damage. As it emerged in the course of the days following the riot, the police were raiding on the assumption (based on unclear evidence) that somebody had been fabricating petrol bombs on the roof of Telepathic Heights, with the intention of throwing them across the street and setting Tesco on fire. The obvious idiocy of this course of action did not mean that squatters were not suspected of it.

215 Note: unless otherwise specified, all citations in the following section are taken from the public sphere, such as the interviews given to the Guardian cited here, or eyewitness accounts deliberately and knowingly published elsewhere by their authors. As will be discussed below, the police have been and may still be actively trying to place persons at the scene of the riot, and they have been and are currently actively harassing political activists in Bristol. Since I can therefore not guarantee that citing anyone in this context could not cause them harm, I will use material that has already been publicised at the time of writing, and of which I can assume that this has happened with the explicit consent of the persons in question.
When the police broke down the front door and stormed inside the squat, they caught the four current residents in the subversive act of cleaning. As one squatter later told the ‘Guardian’: “We were working on tidying the place up, as you do – it's a house, so it's got to be tidy.” Their objective was thwarted when armoured riot cops stormed into their living room, rudely pushed them out of the way and began to tip over furniture, rip open cushions and empty the bins on the floor. The same squatter recalls: "one of the officers barged me in the face with his shield and pushed me across the room and told me to sit down on the floor. Whilst he was pushing me I said, 'Leave me alone, I'm not doing anything to you.' Then he started shouting, 'Sit there, don't move.'"

While police began to search the house top to bottom, word of the raid had spread across the ‘scene’. Within minutes, the first bystanders were beginning to gather outside, demanding to know what was going on. Over the following hours the raid carried on at a snail’s pace, and the crowd outside grew steadily in size, some present in solidarity, some for the sheer spectacle, until finally the first minor scuffles ensued. The police were effectively surrounded, and Cheltenham Road, the extension of Stokes Croft toward Montpellier, was soon blocked off by quickly erected barricades. By midnight, the scene had begun to resemble an actual battleground, with bottles flying, bins on fire, and the Tesco meeting its fate as a source of supplies. Police were reported to baton-charge the protester’s lines, while protestors initially responded with sit-down blockades but quickly reconsidered. An anonymous eyewitness recalls: “The police began storming forwards, shouting out orders to one another as if in a military operation. I began running away to safety, but some people tripped over the barricades only to feel the full force of the law cracking their faces with batons and riot shields. The police refused to help anyone that was injured. Anyone who tried to help the fallen met with a similar punishment”.

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216 The following citations are taken from:
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/apr/23/bristol-squatters-tesco-attack-petrol-claims,
1.8.2014
217 https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/local-boy/observing-stokes-croft-riot
The conflict really escalated when the police made a crucial tactical mistake in picking their battleground. In order to conduct the massive raid, Bristol police had brought in reinforcements in the shape of their colleagues from the Welsh riot police. The Welsh, not as familiar with the local cultural geography as their Bristol counterparts, decided to push the protesters out of Stokes Croft, but instead of pushing downhill toward the city centre or uphill into Montpellier, they pushed east – right into the area of St Pauls that had been the site of the Bristol riot of 1980.

That riot had started on a very similar note – the police had raided the ‘Black and White’ café on Grosvenor Road, not even half a mile away from Telepathic Heights. As a result, rioting had spread though the area as the local population took to the streets in protest against what was seen as an act of racially motivated territorial aggression. Then as now, the population of this area was predominantly African Caribbean, and in the 1970s had been severely affected by high unemployment, ‘racial tensions’ (i.e. structural racism) and the ‘development’ of the area in form of the construction of the M32 motorway. The 1980 riot was as much a response to a specific act of police aggression as it was a more generalised outcry against forms of institutionalised racism such as the ‘sus law’, the rise of far-right groups such as the National Front, and the disproportionate affectedness of Blacks and minority ethnic persons by economic hardship (Dresser/Fleming, 2007). ‘Sus’ is short for ‘suspicious person’ and refers to a set of laws allowing police to stop and search any person they suspected of possibly planning to commit a criminal offense (sanctioned by section 4 of the Vagrancy act 1824). The sus law was disproportionately used against non-whites and is generally assumed to have played a large role in the 1980 Bristol riot and other ‘race-riots’ in the following years in Brixton, London and other British cities. The law was subsequently hastily repealed in 1981, although Black and Minority ethnic persons (particularly young men) continue to be disproportionately targeted by police ‘stop and search’ powers. This fact was widely discussed in public discourse as being a significant cause of the riots that
ensued in several major British cities in 2011 after the shooting of a black man, Mark Duggan, by Metropolitan Police. In the wake of the unrest, local authorities had re-assessed some of their policies – notably by abolishing police powers to systematically harass non-whites – and St Pauls had begun to enjoy a reputation of not being a place to mess about in if you were white and wore a uniform. Bristol police, on the whole, knew better than to look for confrontations there (to the extent that “ran into St Pauls” constituted a sufficient explanation among squatters as to how one had escaped being chased by the cops).

The Welsh police, however, lacked this local knowledge. As the clashes moved down Ashley Road, protesters were therefore joined by a large contingent of local youth, who, although mostly indifferent to the original raid, were now determined to drive the cops out of their area. Eye witness Oleg Resin reported online: “Many locals got out from their houses, some with support and some shouting ‘get lost from my street, who the fuck will clean this mess?!’. I spoke to some people who remembered the riots in the 80s and they were up for it. One older woman sceptically said that the area has been gentrified and the new posh population will never join this”.

Far from “local people standing up against the opening of a Tesco in their area” as local Labour MP Kerry McCarthy framed the events in hindsight (in unison with the majority of the established press), the so-called ‘Tesco riot’ was therefore more of a case of local people standing up against race- and class-based territorial aggression. While initially sparked by the state invading the space of a specific squat – considered by the residents, as most squats were, their home – the ensuing violence had brought out deeper issues relating to territorial domination – the displacement of poor and non-white populations from their areas, the hostile takeover of these areas by the “new posh population”, i.e. richer, ‘whiter’, more powerful groups; and the role of the state in facilitating this process by specifically targeting particular groups of ‘spatial undesirables’. As

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218 http://thecommune.co.uk/2011/04/22/the-first-funky-riot-in-bristol/
Resin’s report – representative of most accounts I heard over the following days – continues:

“When, on my way home, I spoke to a bunch of local black kids and asked ‘Have you heard that the new Tesco got smashed?’, they looked at me with confusion and asked ‘No, and this is bad isn’t it?’. My impression is that people joined the riot for different reasons: the harassment of squatters, ethical/political issue with Tesco, the commodification of Stokes Croft, the anti-cuts sentiment. And the black kids from St. Pauls probably have their own accounts they need to settle with police”.

The riot resulted in numerous injuries and hospitalisations on side of the protesters, eight injured police officers, and eighty five arrests. In the following days, police released CCTV images of suspected rioters and urged the population to come forward and report anyone who may be connected to the clashes. Violence – although on a smaller scale – again flared a week later, and a week after that, and for a considerable amount of time the city was in a surreal state of semi-emergency, as police aggressively patrolled the Stokes Croft and St Pauls areas from the air. Our ‘high-security’ squat was therefore permanently surrounded by screaming sirens, the noise of helicopters flying low, and the intrusive finger of the police searchlight shining into the yard at all hours of night. Following the eviction of Telepathic Heights, attack was a very real possibility for all squatted spaces, and if Drew’s militaristic approach to keeping our crew safe was socially counterproductive, it certainly was not unjustified.

The history of racial oppression that underlies this and past riots is a substantial topic in itself – it begins with Bristol’s history as one of the main slave-ports of the British Empire, and ends in the present day displacement of local ethnic minorities through ‘urban planning’ and ‘improvement’. It would be doing injustice to this history to sum it up in a few short paragraphs, and neither personal affectedness nor commission give me a right to speak for the inhabitants of St Pauls. For the same reason, I would consider it problematic to give an account of their intentions in reacting to the police invasion the way they
did – these intentions may have been various and contradictory, and I am certainly in no position to reconstruct them from my armchair. My positionality does allow me, however, to try and reconstruct the intentions of the police, albeit only because they owe me a good fortnight’s worth of sleep, which does constitute a degree of affectedness. The raid on Telepathic Heights took place in a climate in which squatters and political activists in Bristol were actively harassed not only due to their perceived status as social miscreants, but particularly because of their political beliefs. Shortly before the riot, a nationwide string of undercover police operations within activist circles had come to public attention. Police had been discovered to have placed agents within leftist activist groups, who had assumed elaborate false identities and lived complex double lives, sometimes for a considerable number of years. These infiltrators had fully participated in (or sometimes instigated) political actions, had formed deep friendships and collaborations with the activists they were spying on, and in some cases, had had ongoing sexual relationships with unsuspecting women activists, some of which resulted in the birth of children.

To literally infiltrate women’s bodies as a way of infiltrating their community, to my mind, raises the question of whether a person can meaningfully consent to having sex with someone about whose identity and intentions they are being gravely and intentionally misled, not just by that person themselves, but by the state. While I do not wish to define the experience of these women for them, I think there is an argument to be made in principle that, considering the power relations and level of deception involved, this constitutes state-sanctioned rape. At least one of the women expressed her own feelings in the same words: “We are psychologically damaged; it is like being raped by the state. We feel that we were sexually abused because none of us gave consent.” That the

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220 A Law Commission report from the year 2000 states: “At common law, therefore, an apparent consent to a sexual act does not count as a true consent if it is given under a mistake as to the identity of the person or the nature of the act.” (43). http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Consent_in_Sex_Offences.pdf
I claim no legal expertise whatsoever, but this to me seems to imply that here a crime may have been committed.

221 The state was, in this particular case, represented by Bob Lambert, at the time of writing a lecturer in ‘Terrorism Studies’ at the University of St Andrews, and, possibly in a previous role a
infiltrators had managed to go unnoticed for such a long time, and garner this amount of trust from their associates, was perceived as extremely disturbing – one wondered, inevitably, who in one’s own social circle would be the cop, if there were one. After all, it was not unreasonable to assume that the police would anticipate resistance to the new squatting law and attempt to gather information beforehand. Some more optimistic squatters proposed that this was a deliberate effect on part of the surveillers – to plant the seed of mistrust in activist circles was almost as good (read: destructive) as infiltrating them – and that we should not let this undermine our ability to trust each other. But even so, suspicion added to the growing pressure that the upcoming law put on squatters, and what had once been a relaxed and highly social lifestyle became increasingly more fragmented and tense.

Additionally, police were openly targeting individual activists, attempting to intimidate and harass them. A recent article in the mainstream magazine ‘Vice’ highlights the fact that this strategy is showing no signs of going out of style.222 “Over the past few months, activists from across the anarchist community say the police have been targeting them arbitrarily and indiscriminately. They say individual activists have been harassed, houses raided, work places visited and arrests made without charges”, states the magazine and cites the story of ‘Jon’, member of an anarchist union:

“One morning he (Jon) arrived at his workplace to an email from his boss asking for a meeting. When he turned up, he was told the police had visited the office with a dossier of “evidence” citing him as a domestic extremist, and someone that ‘might not be suitable to work with children’. As a person whose job involves helping young people with emotional difficulties, the suggestion was that he should be fired”223

222 I will quote from the article at some length, since I assume that the people cited have consented to having their words repeated. If the reader is wondering why I did not ask them myself, I can only say in my defence that I suffer from a strange kind of reverse paranoia – I am frequently worried that people might think I was out to get them.
223 http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-police-are-cracking-down-on-bristols-anarchists-833
‘Jon’ explains further:

"The stuff they provided as evidence was articles I’d written anonymously, on whether prison was an effective form of rehabilitation and whether underachievement in working class communities was down to the education system. No connection between me and any group was alleged or mentioned. It really seemed that their main concern was that I held anarchist views" (ibid)

Other activists, according to the article, found that police had tapped their phones or read their email, and some woke up in the middle of the night to having their house raided. An activist named ‘Alan’ recounts:

"I woke up and found my house full of police…and when I say full I mean literally – it was hard to move around. They took away a friend that was staying at my house and went through all the communal areas for hours. As well as taking electronic stuff like a hard drive and laptop, they seemed to be bagging anything that looked political. The arrested guy came back two hours later released without charge on police bail. They had no evidence at all. The whole point was to intimidate people and build up a sense that you are being watched the whole time” (ibid)

As a result of this campaign, in October 2014 several Bristol anarchist groups published a statement that included the following:

“These home visits, arrests, searches and requests to snitch are not just about information and evidence gathering. They have as much to do with a concerted effort to intimidate and divide us all. A big part of their plan is to scare people into inaction and to create divisions between us. They hope to get us blaming each other for increased surveillance to the point where someone falls for their lies and starts
talking to the bad guys. These are tactics that have been used against social movements in countless places and times”

As the above statement shows, the behaviour of the police was recognised by the squatters as a strategy to actively undermine collaboration and trust among activists and to terrify individuals into collaboration. As the activists were keenly aware, the millennia old adage ‘divide and rule’ exists for a reason – in order to subjugate any group of people, power has always first and foremost aimed at fragmenting the coherence of the community it wanted to dominate. Machiavelli advises in The Art of War: “A Captain ought, among all the other actions of his, endeavor with every art to divide the forces of the enemy, either by making him suspicious of his men in whom he trusted, or by giving him cause that he has to separate his forces, and, because of this, become weaker” (1521/2009). This strategy has been successfully used by many an imperial force, such as for example in the deliberate re-enforcement of ethnic divisions between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda by the Belgians (Makinda, 1996) or in the exploitation of divisions between Igbo and Hausa in colonial Nigeria by the British (Subrahmanyan, 2006). As diverse and manifold as the historical examples are, the basic strategy, in game-theoretical terms is very simple: “(1) A unitary actor bargains with or competes against a set of multiple actors. (2) The unitary actor follows an intentional strategy of exploiting problems of coordination or collective action among the multiple actors” (Posner et al, 2010, 419). As Posner et al argue,

“the stipulation that a ‘unitary actor’ is necessary does not literally require that the actor be a single natural person. Any group that has itself overcome its internal collective action problems, at least to the point where it is capable of pursuing a unified strategy vis-à-vis an external competitor, can be treated as a unitary actor... Similarly, the set of multiple actors may have originally had a unitary quality prior to being divided” (ibid)

A strictly organised and hierarchical ‘corporate’ structure, such as that of an army

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224 https://bristolabc.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/statement-against-police-harassment/
or the police, can thus serve the purpose of presenting as a ‘unitary actor’ while simultaneously attempting to introduce fragmentation and contradiction into the organisational structure of the opponent. One very effective way of achieving this is to introduce fear of each other – a single successful infiltration can leave long-lasting scars on a community, as regardless of what kind of information has been procured, the very fact of infiltration itself destroys social coherence by introducing suspicion and secrecy. Another timeless favourite is the co-option of some members of the opponent’s community through alternating reward and punishment – the police employ this strategy by on the one hand by rewarding ‘snitching’, and on the other, by singling out particular individuals for harassment in order to separate them from the ‘flock’.

I hope it is not too much of a stretch of the imagination for my reader when I point out the similarities between this kind of tactic on an interpersonal level, and the effect of traumatic violence on an individual psyche, as we have discussed in the first part of the chapter. In the same way as the imperialist ‘divide and rule’ strategy is designed to fragment the social relations of the colonised, traumatic abuse fragments the coherence of the inner experience of the victim, separating the self from itself. A central role in such trauma is thought to fall to ‘introjection’, which is another word for the internalisation of cognitive content presented in the environment, and its encoding in the neural pathways of the brain. ‘Introjection’ refers to the way that a subordinate comes to internalise a representation of a dominant, who in this way establishes a kind of ‘colonial outpost’ in the subjugated party’s mind – the anti-authoritarian slogan “kill the cop inside your head” (Shantz/Williams, 2013, 133) can then be taken quite literally. In terms of Sperber’s ‘epidemiology of representations’, a representation is here deliberately (although not necessarily consciously) inserted into another person’s mind to manipulate them – one could say, ‘the cop inside one’s head’ is a very efficient kind of cognitive malware. Introjection can thus be seen as a parallel the mechanism to infiltration – a way in which a dominant – or a class of dominants – establishes control within the psychic domain of the subordinate, thus ensuring that she will anticipate and pre-empt his wishes without him having to exercise permanent, direct control. The effect
on the victim's experience is quite similar to the effect of ‘divide and rule’ on the colonised – it destroys the ‘wholeness’ and integrity of the subjugated self and thus undermines co-ordinated resistance, while simultaneously producing a sense of ‘constantly being watched’ by an ever-present oppressor.

Fragmentation can therefore be seen as a general strategy of domination, common to many forms of oppression. Patterson (1985) discusses it in the context of slavery, where the possibility of the master to sever the slave's relationships among each other constituted a strategy to prevent them from forming lasting bonds of trust that could lead to resistance. In a similar vein, Marx describes alienation as both "the separation of the worker from himself" (EPM 1844) through his identification with the interests of capital, and the separation of the workers from each other through the principle of labour market competition. Feminists have emphasised how ‘identification with the aggressor’ in the form of internalised misogyny undermines women’s solidarity, and some writers have extended this critique to the cumulative effect of ‘identity politics’ more generally (e.g. Harvey, 2008). What all of these critiques share in common is a recognition of fragmentation as a technology of power, and a consequent call to fight these tendencies by ‘somehow coming together’ (ibid) and acting as a collective subject.

With regard to the individual and collective dynamics of splitting and projection we have discussed, it could perhaps be said that this constitutes a strategy on part of the aggressor to externalise his own fragmentation by making somebody else ‘the incoherent one’. This could certainly point towards an explanation of the strong inner coherence observable on side of the aggressor, for example the esprit de corps among the police that reliably protects uniformed perpetrators of violence from prosecution. By yet another stretch of the imagination, one could see in this the basic functioning of a territorial self – the inside is made ‘rational’ and controllable by externalising contradiction and making somebody else deal with it. ‘Divide and rule’ has therefore always also and especially been a strategy
of territorial power, both of colonial conquest and of the ‘colonisation’ of the inner domains of other spatial selves.

The above examples also show that while it is important to discuss the ‘Anti-squatting-law’ in terms of its impact on people without shelter, it would be an incomplete view to see it only in this light – as numerous raids such as the one on Telepathic Heights show, squats were often targeted because they were suspected of harbouring activists. The effect of ‘Weatherley’s law’ was therefore not just the protection of property in the direct sense – in taking away the spaces in which political resistance was seen to be flourishing, the law also and especially attempted to silence dissent to the institution of property as such. The direct attacks on squats were accompanied by a sustained media campaign throughout 2011, which portrayed squatters as destructive, anti-social quasi-burglars who stole people’s homes from under their noses when they had just popped out for milk. Some parts of the media – the Daily Mail and the Telegraph were at the forefronts – made a point of connecting squatters to Gypsies and Travellers, producing screaming headlines about ‘Gangs of Romanian Gypsy Squatters’! The politics of this kind of discursive warfare is a topic in itself, and we will discuss the conflation of different groups of spatial undesirables at more length in the next chapter.

\[\text{Telegraph, Aug 17, 2011}\]
The note is written in capitals, black marker pen on the back of an insurance certificate. I find it attached to the door of my caravan, no sender, no signature, no response expected.

ST WERBURGHS ROAD IS NOT A CARAVAN PARK!
IT IS A COMMUNITY AND LOVE OUR AREA.
YOUR CARAVAN IS OBSTRUCTING.
IT IS UNLAWFUL TO LEAVE CARAVANS UNATTACHED TO A VEHICLE. THERE ARE SPECIAL CARAVAN PARKS TO STORE CARAVANS OUR STREET IS NOT ONE.
WE ARE REPORTING TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND BE YOUR CARAVAN MAY BE TOWED AWAY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
THE POLICE HAVE BEEN INFORMED TOO.
OUR COMMUNITY IS ON THE CASE.

I’m not particularly surprised to find it there, although I was expecting to get a little more time out of the spot. I’ve been parked up there for two days. Jon chose the spot, after a decade of roadside parking he knows every alleyway in and around Bristol. “Outside the scout home no one can say a thing” he said, “you’re not on anyone’s doorstep.” Judging from the note, somebody’s doorstep extends across the road.

My caravan is the last of three, neatly lined up at the end of a cul-de-sac bordering on allotments. Two of them – mine and the one at the end – have their metal legs down, a sign to the attentive observer that they are inhabited. If a caravan is just parked, one would not bother with the legs, but a caravan that’s in use must be stabilised so it does not rock back and forth on its middle axis. I wonder for a minute if the letter-writer realises this.

While I undo the assortment of bolts and padlocks that lock the barn door, I feel a kind of defiant exhilaration about the note. This is great material, I say to
myself, I can stick that I my thesis, as evidence. For a minute, I fantasize about the day my adventures will be published in book form, and how embarrassed the note-writer will feel when he realises he has not been targeting just a roadside parker but an actual anthropologist. I wasn’t really there you know. I was doing research. I was exposing you and your intolerant middle class ways and repulsive grammar, you bastard. Now feel bad about yourself.

Then I realise how utterly ridiculous I am being. No one around here gives a flying fuck about whether or not I consider myself an anthropologist, not my friends and certainly not my foes. For all intents and purposes, I am living in a caravan by the roadside because I have nowhere else to live and no money. This is not a game.

Figure 15: Fieldnote 5
Chapter Twelve: Extinction

Death is the veil which those who live call life;
They sleep, and it is lifted
Percy Bysshe Shelley

After moving out of the yard, I relied heavily on my friend Jon, a seasoned vehicle dweller, to introduce me to the rules of roadside parking. Jon had parked up throughout the West Country for decades and knew every hidden, safe spot in Bristol. There were many of them. Once I learned to spot the signs that a vehicle was inhabited – a caravan with its metal ‘feet’ down, a van with a discreetly placed chimney – I realised that there was an entire hidden layer of habitation to the city. Vans and caravans congregated in backstreets, around green squares and on designated sites throughout Bristol and the surrounding areas. In 2011, there were three large sites in the city, one of them ‘legitimate’ (that is, tolerated) and situated on a piece of land adjacent to a large, multi-storey abandoned building, the other two not sites as much as they were groups of vehicle dwellers, who moved from property to property in the same way that pedestrian squatters did: finding a way in, pulling up, securing the place, waiting for eviction.

Although there was a large degree of social interaction between squatters and site-dwellers, the two groups were nevertheless distinct and followed their own rules and agendas. Vehicle dwellers had a particular set of problems of their own – the vans, lorries and caravans they were using were usually old and required constant maintenance, and the supply of basic amenities on site, such as water and electricity, required a great amount of work and technical skills. Although the use of ‘classic’ cars (i.e. cars that are more than 15 years old) helped to reduce the normally forbidding cost of compulsory insurance, the old vehicles also frequently broke down and required costly repair. Site evictions were also more dramatic than squat evictions – while squatters could often simply find a crash space anywhere in town until a new building was found, site evictions meant that up to 30 large, partly immobile, partly uninsured vehicles had to be driven or
towed off and parked somewhere secure (not always easy due to parking restrictions). Generators and communal equipment such as kitchens could not be used unless safely sited, and since every property could normally only be used once until it was evicted, sufficient space was often hard to find. Site dwellers therefore formed relatively closed communities, and joining a site was more difficult than joining a squatting crew. Since group size was a crucial factor in finding suitable sites, the number of newcomers had to be well considered, and to be invited to park up required connections and recommendations.

Those who did not have access to a site therefore simply parked wherever they could find an undisturbed space in the city, and throughout St Pauls, St Werburghs and Easton, mobile mini-sites dotted the streets. My first park-up was located in a cul-de-sac in St Werburghs, a relatively affluent area populated by people who frequented the local organic foods shop, cultivated nearby allotments and took pride in a generally ‘alternative’ lifestyle. At night, sitting in the caravan by the light of a gas lamp, I could hear them singing pagan chants amidst the vegetables while the people parked on their doorstep were trying to sleep. By daylight, some of them made calls to the local Community Support Officers, who came around to read us the letter of the law. It was not illegal to be inside a vehicle by the roadside, but it was illegal to sleep in one, a notoriously difficult to prove offence, since by the time one answered the knock on the door one was usually awake. CSO’s do not have actual police powers, but one would not know this by their uniform and demeanour – after their first visit, a fellow street parker pointed out to me that ‘I didn’t have to listen to them’, but they pinned notices with intimidating legal warnings on my door regardless.

As of 2014, I have been told that Bristol police have actually stopped harassing street parkers – if this is true then they should for once be commended.
population did not always make a clear distinction between who was a Gypsy and who was merely treated like one.

Moishe Postone, a Marxist theorist, is well known for his analysis of what he calls ‘structural anti-Semitism’ (1980). By this he means that the usual hallmarks of anti-Semitic propaganda – the figure of the greedy, all-powerful international Jewry that exploits and controls honest working people – can become detached from their conventional connection to secular or religious Jews, and applied to other groups, such as bankers and financial speculators, without changing the basic structure of the ideological figure. Postone ascribes this phenomenon to an truncated critique of capitalism which, rather than addressing the totality of capitalist relations, singles out a particular group which is seen to profit from this state of affairs (or, in the case of ‘bankers’, actually does), and thus personalises what should be a systemic critique. It could be said that this mode of argument, namely to detach a basically racist argument from its racial implications and turn it into a kind of free-floating ressentiment that can attach to other, non-racially defined groups, is not limited to anti-Semitism.

If one looks at anti-Gypsy sentiment, for example – which I will call here, drawing on the German theorist Roswitha Scholz (2007) ‘anti-Ziganism’ – one can see a very similar mechanism at work. Scholz writes that discrimination against gypsies, apart from its overtly racist component, involves two distinct but related stereotypes. On the one hand, ‘the Gypsy’ is seen as lazy, shiftless and work-shy, and therefore given to thieving and trickery, all in the pursuit of avoiding ‘honest’ work. In this regard, ‘the Gypsy’ is constructed as the opposite of the Protestant work ethic, the lazy, happy-go-lucky idler who will work exactly as much as necessary and lift not a finger more. On the other hand, he is also construed as an idealised nomad, a merry traveller who sings and dances all day long, and lives a life unfettered by the demands of property and responsibility. While the former stereotype tends to carry negative connotations while the latter is often positively romanticised, Scholz argues that the two constructions describe the same figure: the split-off and projected other of the capitalist subject. Both ‘work-
shyness’ and the imagined pleasures of ‘the simple life’ have to be repressed by the self in order accept the discipline of wage labour and the modest accumulation of property. ‘The Gypsy’ therefore embodies the laziness and idleness that the capitalist subject has to exorcise in order to ‘succeed’, and at the same time stands in for a longed-for freedom from the demands of work, self-discipline and the overwhelming sole responsibility for one’s own fate. The reality is of course very different, beginning with the fact that mobility, for real Gypsies and Travellers, is not necessarily a matter of ‘free movement’ but rather of ‘being moved on’. As my friend Martin, a Gypsy activist who identifies as English Romany, once expressed it, “it’s not up to me if I move, I’m being made to”, pointing out the frequent connection between mobility and the fact that one is not wanted where one is. He therefore suggests that the main reason people choose to live in caravans is so that they can get away if they have to – “it’s not about moving so much as knowing that you can move”, and he was surprised to hear that this was precisely the reason I lived in one, too.

Martin thinks that the word ‘traveller’ originally did not refer so much to a person who constantly moves but to somebody who has travelled ‘here’ from another place, i.e. an outsider. Like that of his imaginary colleague, the ‘Wandering Jew’, the nomadism of ‘the Gypsy’ is therefore perhaps more of a collective projection, another way of expressing that these people belong somewhere else. The Gypsy stereotype is another rendition of the racialised spatial other; the one who does not belong, who has no place, and who, like the proverbial scapegoat, is burdened with the parts of the collective self that have to be ritually driven out of the territorial space of power. As I have previously argued, such symbolic or real displacement is often racially legitimised, with ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ coming to stand in for ‘belonging’. But racial categories are not a necessary requirement for spatial othering, as the overlap in aversions to Gypsies, squatters and the homeless shows, and while it is important to acknowledge the specific implications of different racial stereotypes, they can also distract from the

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227 This is again a context in which a discussion of ‘coerced agency’ underlying a presumed (and ethnicised) voluntarism could be interesting, see chapter 2
underlying logic of spatial abjection that connects them. Analogous to the notion of ‘structural anti-Semitism’, it could therefore be said, there is something like ‘structural anti-Ziganism’ – the extension of the Gypsy stereotype to groups who have no ethnic connection to actual Gypsies and Travellers. Most obviously, this concerns the so-called ‘New Age Travellers’, the label most often attached to the kind of vehicle dwellers I encountered on my forays into street-parking.

In the UK, this group is assumed to have emerged out of the hippie movement of the 1970s, and experienced substantial growth in numbers in the 80s when Thatcherite housing policy forced more and more people onto the road. Soon, these travellers found themselves targeted by similar repression as ethnic Travellers, often perpetrated by the very same institutions, for example companies like Constant&Co, who police space regardless of the ethnic background of those who are seen to have no right to occupy it. As a result, some ‘New Age Travellers’ have come to identify strongly with the culture and traditions of ethnic Travellers – a sympathy that is not always reciprocated, adopting their songs and stories and, not unreasonably, demanding some of the same hard-won rights that award some ethnic Travellers a modicum of protection. It is not without irony that this protection, for example the duty of local authorities to provide legal pitches, is bound to a commitment on the part of Gypsies and Travellers to an ‘ethnic identity’ – the logic implying that it is only legitimate to live in a caravan or mobile home if one’s ‘ethnicity’ leaves one no other choice. Martin points out that for example attempts on part of Gypsies and Travellers to ‘settle’, i.e. to remain in one place, are frequently thwarted by the fact that it is significantly more difficult for them to obtain planning permission than for non-Gypsies, meaning that – like in the case of Dale Farm – they are forced to ‘move on’ even when they were trying not to. One result of this is that – like at Dale Farm – large families are often broken up by the necessity to move.

\[228 \text{ I have never heard anyone actually applying this label to themselves, but academic discussion of vehicle-dwelling populations regularly uses it to refer to those parts of the movement (here: literally) that are not ethnic Gypsies and Travellers (e.g. Martin, 2002, 1998; Davis, 1997)}\]
isolating members from each other, and once again highlighting fragmentation as a strategy of power.

Martin sees one advantage of defining one's group in terms of ethnicity in the fact that “people are more racist when they think you should be living by their rules”, meaning that he sees more potential for tolerance when the dominant group assumes that a minority ‘cannot help’ but break the rules because of an innate ethnic compulsion. This line of argument recalls what has been termed “strategic essentialism” (see Spivak, 1987, 205) or “tactical essentialism” (Alleyne, 2002ab), namely a strategic or tactical appropriation of an essentialised ethnic category for the purpose of making political arguments on behalf of a specific ethnicised or racialised group. As Alleyne argues, this move involves using the notion of an essentialised ethnic identity as a means to an end, not setting this identity as an end in itself (2002b, 620). This strategy has been successful in so far as research on Gypsies and Travellers within the UK in general discusses the group under the paradigm of ethnicity, distinguishing most often between at least two groups, namely Roma on the one and Gypsies and Travellers on the other hand. Bancroft (2012) for example includes “under the term ‘Gypsy-Traveller’ English Romanichels, Welsh Kale, Scottish Travellers (Nawken) and Irish Travellers (Minceir)” (5), while referring to as Roma “the Gypsies of Continental Europe, including Roma, Sinti and so on” (6), while stressing that there is a considerable amount of cultural overlap between the two groups. This distinction has previously been criticised by Simhandl (2006), who argues that the division into ‘Western’ Gypsies and Travellers and ‘Eastern’ Roma shows an orientalist bias in EU policy. Judith Okely (1983), author of one of the very few ethnographies of Gypsies and Travellers, uses a similar distinction but refers to ‘Traveller-Gypsies’, an unusual name for this group. While, due to the difficulty of gaining access to this group for outsiders, detailed ethnographic data is limited, a wealth of research exists on a variety of subjects relating to Gypsy’s place in society, for example in terms of social policy (Clark and Greenfields, 2006; Greenfields and Home, 2006), mobility and settlement (Smith and Grenfields, 2012, 2013; Greenfields 2009, Greenfields and Smith 2010), health (Parry et al, 2004; van
Cleemput, 2007) and law (Greenfields, 2007). The broad tenor in research on Gypsies and Travellers is that this group is affected by a high number of issues preventing equal access to education (Bhopal, 2004), and social services (Cemlyn, 2008; Commission for Racial Equality, 2006). The fact that the Commission for Racial Equality is one of the key advocates for the equal rights of Gypsies and Travellers illustrates the value of a form of ‘tactical essentialism’ on part of Travellers – ‘race’ here becomes a vehicle for the legitimisation of claims to social justice. This point is particularly visible in debates around Gypsies and mobility, since, as Kabachnik (2009) argues, whether culture is seen as a ‘choice’ or as ‘innate’ in the case of Gypsies often translates into strategies to either ‘integrate’ them into the settled population or to quasi-condemn them to uphold their ‘naturally’ nomadic way of life.

While it would therefore be mistaken to hold against ethnic Gypsies and Travellers that they have, in this case, turned a racist stereotype into a strategy for protection, the veneer of tolerance implied in ‘multiculturalism’ still remains thin, as the eviction of Dale Farm in 2011 showed. The site was then home to about 1000 families who, contrary to popular images of Travellers as illegitimate occupiers, legally owned the land they were living on near the Essex town of Basildon. The Travellers had for a long time been the target of a campaign to remove them by the city council, since they were seen to inflict damage on ‘the green belt’. In 2011, things had finally come to a head and an eviction by Constant&Co had been ordered. The eviction itself was, in a sense, not remarkable – it was only the last in a long line of high-profile clearances of similar sites. What was remarkable in this case was the wide-spread solidarity those affected found from unexpected allies – squatters, anarchists and assorted activists who flocked in by the hundreds to provide human shields for the Travellers. This was certainly unusual, since despite the fact that they are often mistaken for each other, ‘New Agers’ and ethnic Gypsies and Travellers are not necessarily ‘natural’ allies. Martin points for example to the intricate practices and beliefs around purity among Travellers, manifested in elaborate rules regarding hygiene, a cultural area in which the ideas of Gypsies and ‘New Agers’ ostensibly clash. Nevertheless, the existence of a common enemy, and, more importantly, of a common position as spatial undesirables, helped forge an
alliance on this occasion. The resistance failed eventually, as despite last-minute efforts to reach an amicable solution, an army of bailiffs and riot police marched on the site and the Travellers had no choice but to move or be physically carried off. The alliance, however, left traces in the imagination – in 2013, I attended a history event with music performances and talks for and by Travellers. A young Traveller man performed a song one could have mistaken for a poetic ballad from a remote past, but listening closely, I realised it was a song about the end of Dale Farm, a beautiful and simple thank you note for those who had come to help defend it.

Back in Bristol, living in a caravan confronted me with problems I had never before considered, for example those posed by the lack of a bathroom. While male vehicle dwellers usually did their business in the shelter of the nearest bush, I was reluctant to do so, and not purely out of squeamishness. To have to leave my house in the middle of the night to go and squat down behind the last house on the street in the hope no one was looking out of their window became such a chore that, short of contracting a serious case of constipation, I invested in a chemical camping toilet, wedged inside the small bath cubicle inside the caravan. There was a shower too, but to regularly fill the water tank without access to a tap was, as Jon phrased it ‘a mission’, and so showers as well as clean clothes continued to involve trips to other people’s squats. In all this, I remained domestic to a degree that amused my fellow street parkers – the Ikea curtains I equipped the caravan with were the source of great hilarity. I did get fond of the caravan, thinking of it as my ‘shell’ – tucked in at night I felt like one of Bachelard’s molluscs, neatly contained in my housing of aluminium and wood, yet constantly aware of every noise outside in a way I had not been even in the most contested of squats. Wedged in a halfway space between the houses of the settled and the road of the travellers, I was keenly aware of the fact that I was alone in a place I should not be.

I eventually fled St Werburghs and pulled up in Easton, outside my friend’s squat in Co-operation Road (that was its actually name). Co-op road was one of the
longest-standing squats in Bristol, and on many an occasion I had found myself taking refuge on one of the dusty sofas in its windowless living room – the ‘Room of Gloom’ as Jon dubbed it. It was a leaking, ramshackle place, but it was also the safest space I knew about, and I naturally gravitated towards somewhere I was known. Ralph, eventually also exiled from the yard by Drew’s violence, had wound up camped out in the back yard in another caravan, and together with the five residents of the small house, we formed a kind of mini-site in the midst of Easton. The area was poor and considered dangerous by the residents of more up-market places such as Clifton, and we lived just adjacent to the infamous cycle path where muggers collected toll from anyone who was reckless enough to walk after dark. At the same time, Easton provided a kind of safety more affluent areas did not – only here could you find fly-posters reading ‘Muggers of Easton! Be a little more like Robin Hood and a little less like Margaret Thatcher!’ Only here would residents call each other to order because after all, everyone could agree that no-one wanted the police in the area. Only here were street parkers not just treated like people, but, in some cases, like neighbours.

Of course, a caravan still enjoyed less privilege than a house in terms of having one’s space respected – the fact that one’s house had wheels appeared to raise people’s curiosity, and frequently I encountered complete strangers sticking their noses through the windows to see if anyone was in. For the least bit of privacy, the curtains had to be permanently drawn, resulting in the ‘Room of Gloom’ being complemented by the ‘caravan of gloom’. Some passers-by skipped the peeping and just gave the vehicle a good kick to see if anything moved inside – in my case, the puppy took good care of such intrusion. He was already a huge dog at not even six months of age, and his bark sounded as if it belonged to a dog three times his size. German Shepherds are renowned for their (purposely bred) territoriality and protectiveness, and the sense of safety the furry Hobbesian produced was well worth the inconvenience of sharing a 15 by 6 foot space with a 130-pound animal.

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229 In other cases, not so, as evidenced by the torching of several vehicles later that year, luckily without their residents in them. The arson was thought to have been committed by local neo-Nazis, although this was never established for certain.
I don’t know how long I was outside Co-op road. The days had begun to blur into each other, filled with the technicalities of vehicle-dwelling – wheeling the heavy 12 volt batteries back and forth between the house and the caravan on a skateboard to charge them, replacing gas bottles and lugging water – one does not really appreciate one’s consumption of resources until one has to carry every single volt, litre or cubic centimetre of them. Days were spent in the Room of Gloom, watching others play video games, chain-smoking and winding each other up because there was nothing else to do. Money was scarce. In one particular instant, F., a long-term resident of the house, came back from the Jobcentre, having been sanctioned for being five minutes late. He sat there silently, staring at the coins in his hand, not even amounting to a fiver, which was now supposed to last him for two weeks. He turned around to me, a look of utter disgust on his face, but not directed at me – it was directed at himself and the fact he had to ask me for a tenner, “for bread”. I am not sure if the Jobcentre workers who regularly sanction people like this – according to a study by the University of Oxford, “between June 2011 and March 2014, the official data shows over 1.9 million sanctions were imposed on people receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance”230 – realise that leaving a person without any monetary income whatsoever essentially amounts to a death sentence231, and if they generally approve of this or if they just do not care. To take away the last few pounds that enable a person to sustain their basic biological functioning under capitalism amounts to an implicit command to suicide, and as we have seen in chapter 10, hundreds of disabled and able-bodied people on benefits have heeded this command in recent years.

Eventually, my caravan was broken into one night when I was over at the house and had the dog with me, and that was the final straw in my street-parking career.

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230 “The researchers’ analysis found there was a 40% increase in the rate of people being sanctioned after June 2011 compared with the previous seven years (which also covers years before the reforms came in). The research also shows that after 2011, an estimated 43% of people who received sanctions went on to leave the JSA altogether”. http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2015-01-21-sanctions-linked-drop-benefits-few-return-work-report-0

231 Or, for that matter, a sentence to pursue income by any means, including prostitution or other illegal action
Anyone who has been burgled knows the feeling of having the safety of one's home stripped away by such intrusion, and a caravan, though smaller, is no different. I did not have much worth stealing – two broken laptops and some tools – but I had to take the caravan off the road because it no longer felt safe, dog or no dog. There was not enough space in Co-op Road, and so I began to drift. I slept in the car, which, although cramped, was a little fortress on wheels. I spent a few weeks on a small and filthy but well protected site inside a building opposite the railway station, before it got evicted. There were about ten people there, all nice enough, but I had begun to withdraw into myself. Without realising, I had slipped into depression – a common feature of homelessness – and my focus and perspective imperceptibly narrowed until day-to-day survival was all that mattered. After I abandoned the caravan, there were endless weeks of me and the dog living in the Smiling Chair, finally on our own and a tolerated inconvenience for the collective that tried to run the shop as a radical hub on Stokes Croft. When we got chucked out of there – the dog was not always selective in whom he regarded a threat to my safety, and terrified the patrons – I couch-surfed in squats. Squatting in a squat is probably as low as one can get short of sleeping rough, but I felt insufficiently equipped to fend for myself on the street like an ‘Ordinary Homeless Person’, and so I clung on.

I was lucky, eventually, that the story that is me sometimes has a tendency towards the clichéd. Having sold the caravan and not being entitled to any benefit payments due to my still existing student status, I had exactly enough money left to fill up the car, drive it back to Austria and hope for my parents to take me in, when I found a job. I had previously worked in marketing, and had half-heartedly responded to an ad by a London company hiring German speakers – no one was more surprised than me when I got an interview and, thanks to an immediately required start date, was hired on the spot. I remember sitting in an office in a shiny glass tower high up above the city of London, across a table from two pinstriped men who seemed to belong in an entirely different movie, trying to hide the fact I had not had a shower in days and my clothes were still damp from washing them in the kitchen sink the night before. To show that life is sometimes
stranger than fieldwork: I found out, long after leaving this job, that the building in question, the Centre Point tower at Tottenham Court Road, had in 1974 been squatted by homeless campaigners in a protest against housing shortages in London, leading to the building continuing to be “a symbol of the plight of the homeless” (Wikipedia). The job saved my existence, if not my dignity, and the suits never learned that for the first four months I worked for them, I was commuting out of a squat in Bristol. They did not know this world even existed. The money they paid me eventually accumulated enough for a deposit on a room, and in the spring of 2012, I was no longer homeless, the past year being nothing but a blur.

I thus got a taste, albeit a fleeting one compared to many others, of why it is that while trauma is a frequent predictor of homelessness (see last chapter), the experience of homelessness in and of itself has also been described as traumatic (Goodman et al, 1991). On the one hand, this can be attributed to the fact that that homelessness describes a state of spatial abjection that is characterised by the absence of a safe space, and as Van der Kolk notes, the same can be said for trauma more generally: “Trauma occurs...when one loses the sense of having a safe place to retreat within or outside oneself to deal with frightening emotions or experiences” (Van der Kolk, 1987, 31). As we have seen in chapter 6, this lack of ‘safe space’ means that the bodies of homeless people are at permanent risk of violent attack. On the other hand, a sense of “being without sanctuary in a world filled with malevolent forces” (Goodman et al, 1991, 1220) also results from the fact that “people often react to victims by rejecting them” (ibid), either because they believe that the victimized person is responsible for their fate, or because they simply do not want to be associated with ‘losers’ (ibid). This means that in addition to the traumatizing experience of being at risk of death or injury from natural or human causes, homelessness also affects a person's sense of self through the severance of important social ties that have previously informed their sense of identity and selfhood.

My brief foray into street-parking made me realize that this social component of trauma does not merely constitute an absence – it is not only that sustaining
social relations are withdrawn, but that they are replaced with something else. My inner insistence on my role as an anthropologist, which before this point had not significantly impacted on the way I considered my position in the ‘field’, suddenly became important for me when I saw myself confronted with others who communicated with words, gestures and the occasional spitting-attack that to their minds, I was something entirely different. I realised at that point that for all its methodological quandaries, Bourdieu’s distortion also functions as a safety valve – if one is ‘not really there’ then one can ergo not actually be meant by such insult. It turned out, however, that in the perception of others, actual placelessness trumped epistemological placelessness, and so I got a flavour of what it feels like to be regarded “matter out of place” (Douglas, 1966). In the following, I will therefore attempt to reconstruct what this experience is about – not to over-dramatise my own limited exposure, but to capture what is that Bourdieu’s distortion ultimately secured my ‘self’ from.

**Res I psa Loquitur**

In a 2009 study, a team of social neuroscientists asked participants to step into an MRI scanner, and showed them images of a variety of persons who were visually recognisable as belonging to marginalised groups, hoping to gain some insight into how social relations influence neurological responses in the brain. When they showed participants pictures of “recognisably” homeless (that is, stereotypically dirty, dishevelled and toothless) people, the effect was quite remarkable:

“*Within a moment of seeing the photograph of an apparently homeless man...people’s brains set off a sequence of reactions characteristic of disgust and avoidance. The activated areas included the insula, which is reliably associated with feelings of disgust toward objects such as garbage and human waste. Notably, the homeless people’s photographs failed to stimulate areas of the brain that usually activate whenever people think about other people, or themselves. Toward*
the homeless (and drug addicts), these areas simply failed to light up, as if people had stumbled on a pile of trash” (Fiske, 2010, p)

Given that the human mind has been described as a “medley of sophisticated pattern-completion devices” (May et al, 1996, 4), such a failure to register the pattern ‘human’ is quite worrying, and would under different circumstances perhaps be seen as sign of a neurological disorder. From a strictly cognitive perspective, misrecognising a human being for an inanimate object – ‘trash’, no less – is a substantial category mistake, an attribution error of quite spectacular proportions, akin to the famous man who mistook his wife for a hat (Sacks, 1985). This kind of ‘misrecognition’ is not merely a matter of disliking certain political identities (as could be read into Honneth’s account of ‘misrecognition’), but a matter of brains physically failing to recognise others as members of their own species. For present purposes, we can therefore take ‘misrecognition’ not just as a social or ethical, but as a neurobiological category, and try to reconstruct what happens when people become the target of it. I am at present not aware of any MRI studies of people in the act of being misrecognised, and so I can only approach the matter phenomenologically, via some of the concepts that have been used to describe this experience.

As was mentioned before, a frequently used metaphor for the trauma of homelessness is ‘social death’ (e.g. Ligget, 1991, Ruddick, 2002), referring to the idea that through a severing of social relations, a person can be seen to no longer inhabit the symbolic sphere of the living. Despite my well-honed taste for blaming capitalism, ‘social death’ is not a modern invention. In ancient Greece, in times of crisis, a cripple, a beggar or a criminal would be singled out and taken outside the space of the polis to be ritually punished or killed (Bremmer, 1983). The body of the abject - called ‘pharmakos’, literally ‘poisoner’ – was seen as a representation of all that was wrong inside the space of the city, and its expulsion was seen to cure the ‘infection’ and restore the balance of the inside space. The

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232 Sacks, a neurologist, details several neurological disorders in which people make such category mistakes – it appears though that such issues are only considered a ‘disorder’ when they appear individually rather than as part of collective social relations
related word ‘scapegoat’ stems from the Jewish and old Testament traditions, and describes an ancient rite in which a goat was symbolically burdened with all the sins of the community and driven into the desert on the Day of Atonement (Levy, 1998). Modern homelessness is somewhat reminiscent of this, when a person who is seen to have offended against God Market is left to deal with the consequences, including ‘the market’ putting them out on the street where they can be attacked without impunity. Social forms like these point to a need that does not seem to have vanished from modern human life – that of cleansing the community from its own unwanted aspects through the enactment of an expulsion of the symbolic bearer of these aspects from the ‘inside’. On the basis of our discussion, we have seen that this kind of ritual can be seen to express a fundamental aspect of territoriality, understood as a particular kind of constructing space – a space that is ordered and pacified on the inside, and exiles all that is undesirable on the outside. The ideological justifications for this social process of splitting and projection change, as do the complex social structures that mediate who is excluded and for what reason – capitalism has certainly developed its own mechanisms of exclusion and its own ideological legitimisations for it, and they are no less murderous than those of religion.

The most in-depth discussion of ‘social death’ comes from Patterson (1985), who invokes it in the context of slavery. Scholars studying homelessness have found his argument congenial, since it appears to describe a number of things that can also be said about the homeless:

“The slave is violently uprooted from his milieu. He is desocialized and depersonalized. This process of social negation constitutes the first, essentially external, phase of enslavement. The next phase involves the introduction of the slave into the community of his master, but it involves the paradox of introducing him as a nonbeing” (38).
Patterson describes two different roads to ‘social death’ that echo the previous distinction we have made between racialised and gendered forms of spatial abjection, and the dual mode of ‘secure space’ as exclusion and internment. In what he calls “the intrusive mode of representing social death, the slave was ritually incorporated as the permanent enemy on the inside - the ‘domestic enemy’...unsupported by a chain of ancestors reaching back to the beginning of time”(39), which does not only recall the description of Margaret Thatcher’s ‘enemy within’, but also that of the racialised spatial other more generally (see chapter 8). This other is defined as an intruder, a hostile alien who has no business being where he is, and thus must be either excluded, or, if he breaches the boundary, interned, i.e. enslaved. On the other hand,

“in sharp contrast with the intrusive conception of death was the extrusive representation. Here the dominant image of the slave was that of an insider who had fallen, one who ceased to belong and had been expelled from normal participation in the community...The destitute were included in this group, for while they perhaps had committed no overt crime their failure to survive on their own was taken as a sign of innate incompetence and of divine disfavor” (41).

This echoes the gendered aspect of territorial othering, in that members of the in-group are seen to have sunk so low in status that they no longer count as people. The ‘destitute’ are explicitly covered in this explanation, since they have failed to demonstrate that they are able to survive ‘on their own’, recalling Anderson’s (2013) concept of the ‘failed citizen’. Patterson admits that societies in which slavery is based exclusively on this mode are relatively rare, which may point to the fact that the ‘social death’ of the domestic poor always also involves an element of othering. We may therefore “summarize the two modes of representing the social death that was slavery by saying that in the intrusive mode the slave was conceived of as someone who did not belong because he was an outsider, while in the extrusive mode the slave became an outsider because

234 For example when domestic groups such as the Roma come to be seen as ‘actually from India’. Anderson (2013) makes a similar argument, when she asserts that the differences between ‘non-citizens’ and ‘failed citizens’ are not nearly as striking as the similarities.
he did not (or no longer) belonged” (44).

In terms of the condition of powerlessness and the severance of social ties implied in ‘social death’, Patterson’s concept might therefore indeed be well suited to the discussion of homelessness. However, Patterson adds a third feature of this condition, which to my mind makes his account questionable, namely ‘dishonour’:

“the dishonor of slavery...was not a specific but a generalized condition. It came in the primal act of submission. It was the most immediate human expression of the inability to defend oneself or to secure one’s livelihood. It was not part of the institutionalization of slavery, for its source was not culture. The dishonor the slave was compelled to experience sprang instead from that raw, human sense of debasement inherent in having no being except as an expression of another’s being”

Patterson’s concept of ‘honour’ is explicitly that of the Hobbesian territorial self (10, 79), because apparently, “modern anthropologists have confirmed Thomas Hobbes’ insight that the sense of honour is intimately related to power, for in competing for precedence one needs power to defend one’s honour”(80). He agrees with Pitt-Rivers notion that “the claim to honour depends always in the last resort, upon the ability of the claimant to impose himself. Might is the basis of right to precedence, which goes to the man who is bold enough to enforce his claim, regardless of what may be thought of his merits” (80). This should remind us of the discussion of the ‘code of honour’ in chapter 7, and again of the

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Patterson presents this without any indication of critical distance, and I therefore think it is fair to infer that he agrees with the view that a person who submits to domination is therefore ‘dishonoured’. The ‘dishonour’ consists in the failure of the slave to operate as a territorial self and defend him/herself, which makes him/her fair game for plunder (in this case, with him/herself as the loot) and it is not a result of ‘culture’, but supposedly human nature to get that ‘raw human sense of debasement’ when one has been violently subjugated. This argument on the one hand represents the logic of the ‘invulnerable’, ‘independent’ territorial dominant who is only a man as long as he defends his turf, and on the other, it also replicates the kind of victim-blaming levelled, for example, at survivors of sexual violence, whose ‘shame’ is supposed to consist in the fact that they didn’t effectively fight back, or at least have the decency to die before being ‘dishonoured’. Patterson appears to be in favour of the latter option, since he quotes a long line of white men from Pascal to Nietzsche who glorify it (78) This is therefore not only the logic of rape apologists, but also of perpetrators of what is commonly called ‘honour based violence’ (see e.g. Gill, 2010), namely the injuring and killing of women over men’s precarious sense of self-worth.

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masculine subject in chapter 8 – status is here again negotiated through the capacity to engage in violent competition, expressed in real or metaphorical territorial posturing. Patterson's concept of 'dishonour' then also appears mainly as the emasculation of a territorial self, consisting in a loss of 'autonomy' read as the capacity to subjugate others, and summed up in the question “can he assert his will as a man of honor?” (ibid). With Hobbes, Patterson sees honour not as a form of recognition, but as a form of intimidation: “To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeys them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to Dishonour” (Hobbes, Leviathan, in: Patterson, 10).

Patterson continues: “Those who aspire to no honour cannot be humiliated’ What this immediately implies is that those who do not compete for honour, or are not expected to do so, are in a real sense outside the social order” (79). He thus repeats a theme that appears also in other anti-slavery writers – that the opposite of subjugation is not equality, but the possibility to fight other men for it, and freedom therefore is worthless if it hasn’t been won in struggle: "A man without force is without the essential dignity of humanity. Human nature is so constituted that it cannot honour a helpless man, although it can pity him; and even that it cannot do long, if the signs of power do not arise” (Frederick Douglass, cited in Patterson, 13). Franz Fanon adds a similar sentiment: "Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence on another man in order to be recognized by him" (1967, 168). While I am certainly not going to argue with these men’s analysis of their own oppression in terms of ‘race’, it would appear that the common theme underlying these accounts is that of a racially subjugated masculinity which asserts itself by challenging the white masculine subject on its very own terms – accepting that human is only he who imposes himself on others and takes recognition by force. It recalls Andrea Dworkin's argument that the privileging of masculinity transcends boundaries of

236 I am not implying that autonomous existence cannot be, in some contexts, a valid political goal, but I am disputing the a priori assumption that it can only be achieved through violent competition.

237 What this immediately implies to me is that whoever wants to be inside a social order that exclusively consists in competing over who is best at enforcing obedience through the imposition of his will on others would probably fit the description of a 'sociopath'.

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ethnicity or ‘race’: “the internal, intraethnic contempt for women (i.e. non-men) is apparent in victors and losers” (2000, xi). His inability to look past his masculine bias then also leads Patterson to arrive at the astonishing conclusion that "before slavery people simply could not have conceived of the thing we call freedom" (340), and therefore, freedom is actually a result of slavery.

This is not to say that Patterson is generally oblivious to the impact of gender in the context of slavery, as he demonstrates in later work (2012), in which he argues that “slavery has always been a highly gendered relation of domination” involving a “complex interplay of economic and socio-cultural factors” (1). Patterson rejects the view, taken e.g. by Bales (2005, 2010, 2012) that there is a fundamental difference between slavery in pre-modern and in modern societies, and argues – based on his previous argument that slavery is best viewed as a relation of physical brute-force domination – that on the contrary, there are strong continuities between ‘old’ and ‘new’ slavery particularly concerning the status of women. Since “slavery is no longer legally sanctioned, the closest approximation to traditional natal alienation are persons who find themselves illegally transported to foreign countries where they are fearful of seeking the protection of law enforcement and other state authorities and are isolated from familial and social ties” (2), and as the majority of trafficked persons are women, Patterson identifies the international sex trade, as well as trafficking for the purpose of domestic servitude, as the predominant way in which the master/slave relation is contemporarily enacted. After critiquing Bales’ distinction, Patterson presents extensive quantitative data from ‘pre-modern’ slave-holding societies and concludes that the single most prominent predictor of slavery is polygyny, indicating that “that the decisive factors determining trafficking and slavery in these societies was the demand for the exploitation of women’s bodies, as sex objects, as concubines and as secondary wives where free women were relatively scarce or too expensive” (16).

Patterson then proceeds to relate these findings to data about contemporary human trafficking and especially trafficking into prostitution, carefully distinguishing between prostituted women who are under “the total, violent
control of another person—a pimp or madam or other abuser—who exploits them both economically and psychologically” (22), and “older career prostitutes and high-end call-girls” whom he counts as “independent sex workers who voluntarily chose this kind of work, keep their earnings and freely turn to other forms of livelihood when they choose” (ibid), a distinction that, as Patterson acknowledges, remains contested among both academics and activists (see e.g. Jeffreys, 2002). Patterson then draws parallels between the traditional process of enslavement and the ‘recruitment’ of “sex slaves”, including social isolation, rape and torture. Finally, he returns to the point made in his earlier work, that the slave – in this case the prostituted woman – suffers intense and intentional degradation at the hands of her abusers, and shows how this degradation serves to enhance the “sense of manly power and honorific pride of her pimp-master” (27). Therefore, “like slaves of old the slave prostitute is an utterly dishonored and degraded person in the eyes of free members of the states in which she is exploited” (ibid), as well as in her own estimation of herself. While, in contrast to his earlier work Patterson here adds the caveat that the slave’s degradation lies “in the eyes of free members of the states in which she is exploited”, it remains subject to further inquiry whether the traumatic shame the forcibly prostituted experience – as Patterson outlines – can or should be discussed in terms of a loss or lack of ‘honour’. As it were, Patterson’s own description of the toxic masculinity of pimps appears to imply that the very concept of (male) honour is a substantial part of the problem. Despite his acknowledgment of the gendered nature of this kind of exploitation, Patterson maintains that “the absolute degradation attached to slave status, the fact that the slave is a person without honor, having no dignity that any free person is required to respect, and that this dishonor parasitically aggrandized the power and honor of the slave-holder” (3), without however problematizing the concept of honour itself. His argument could therefore be interpreted as implying that a re-balancing of the honour-stakes, rather than a radical critique of the very concept of honour as an essential feature of masculinity, could provide a solution to the problem.

Outside of Patterson’s treatment (see also Patterson, 2004, 1977) and the discussion of ‘social death’ in the context of homelessness already mentioned, the
concept has also been used by scholars in anthropology (Peter, 2010), Social Psychology and Health Studies (Sexton, 2011; Williams, 2007; Whitehead, 2001; Sweeting/Gilhooly, 1992, 1997; Dageid/Duckert, 2008); Sociology (Ouwerkerk et al. 2005, Cacho, 2012; Timmermans 1998; Mul kay/Ernst, 1991), feminist theory (Mills, 2007; Card, 2003), and history (Brown, 2009, Mason, 2003), among others. Judith Butler employs the concept in her discussion of vulnerability and ethics as outlined in chapter 2, although, as Mills (2007) remarks, she departs from Patterson’s original formulation in so far as hers “entails a transformation of the sociostructural logic of Patterson’s conception of social death as liminality to make social death a topological feature of subjectivation itself” (138) which, as I discuss in the literature review, can be seen as a consequence of her Foucauldian conception of subjectivation as subjugation. For the discussion of social death in the context of homelessness, this latter argument may be of less relevance, as the social death of the homeless arguably does not result in the formation of a fixed, necessary ‘homeless subjectivity’, but rather, as in Patterson’s original formulation, a stripping-away of the full moral status of the homeless in relation to the ‘settled’ population, and thus, their structural exclusion from the ethical relations that constitute ‘normal’ society, manifesting in “a marked lack of safety in both public and private places” (Huey, 2010, 79).

Patterson’s (and Fanon’s) focus on a recovery of ’honour’ as the only road to freedom appears to stem from a particular misreading of the opening position of Lordship and Bondage. I make no claim to the ‘correct’ interpretation of what the passage is ‘actually’ about, since what it appears to describe is a self-consciousness that gets in trouble with itself over the subject of self-recognition, and any interpretation of it as a metaphor for real social relations is necessarily somewhat of a projection. However, since the story appears to function as a kind of Rorschach test for political critiques, I will in the following suggest an interpretation of my own, and argue that it can give us a conception of ‘social death’ without having to resort to a concept such as ‘dishonour’. It is true that in the first meeting of the two self-consciousnesses, both cannot be sure of their own existence and therefore have to fight each other to the death. However,
Hegel also informs us that the reason the two combatants end up in this position is that they both operate on the assumption that they are disembodied: “pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as a pure negation of its objective form, or in showing that it is fettered to no determinate existence, that it is not bound at all by the particularity everywhere characteristic of existence as such, and is not tied up with life” (§187). Hegel here describes the problem of a consciousness that conceives of itself as pure abstraction, as disembodied res cogitans, not bound to mortal form. What the two want to prove to each other is therefore not their humanity, but precisely the fact that they are not human, that they are ‘immortal souls’, or ‘minds’ as opposed to ‘bodies’. They proceed to try and kill each other over who is the most abstract, and the consciousness who, through fear for its life, first realises that it is embodied consciousness decides to yield and is thus ‘enslaved’. This is what the ‘struggle for recognition’ is, and this is where it ends. It is over. Now, something new happens: the slave, in having accepted his embodiment, begins to labour on the ‘thing’, i.e. the external world, and in doing so, discovers his self in relation to the object: “Thus precisely in labour where there seemed to be merely some outsider’s mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware, through this re-discovery of himself by himself, of having and being a ‘mind of his own’” (§196). So what does this mean?

I want to approach this question through Thomas Metzinger’s theory of the self as a mental representation, as discussed in the last chapter. As I have discussed in chapters 2 and 11, according to Metzinger brains operate by constructing a representational prototype of the whole ‘system’, called the ‘phenomenal self-model’ or PSM, which most people mean when they refer to their ‘selves’. Trauma can then be understood as a disruption of the brain’s ability to produce a coherent self-model, and results in a fragmentation of cognitive experience. In this context, I have also mentioned the importance of the PMIR, the ‘phenomenal

\[238\text{To add yet another interpretation, }\textit{Lordship} \text{ could therefore also be read as a subversive, tongue-in-cheek rendition of the transition from a religious to a secular society} – \text{ the illusion of the self as supernatural, immortal soul here leads to conflict, and true selfhood is only obtained by understanding that consciousness is embodied, and created in an ongoing relationship with the material world.}\]
model of the intentionality relation'. Metzinger argues that “the experiential perspectivity of one’s own consciousness is constituted by the fact that phenomenal space is centered by a phenomenal self: it possesses a focus of experience, a point of view” (157). This point of view is the ‘arrow of intentionality’ that connects the self to the world, and a self with a functioning PMIR is therefore a ‘self in the act of having a perspective’.

A PMIR is also a condition of possibility for the subjective experience of 'being someone': “generally speaking, to become a true subject of experience you have to represent the world under a stable PMIR” (570). This kind of perspectivalness is not an all-or-nothing matter but occurs in degrees (572), i.e. a PMIR can be a more or less stable relation to the world. How stable it is – and this is the crucial point for a discussion of ‘social death’ – depends to a large degree on intersubjective affirmation that one is the kind of thing that has a perspective: “a phenomenal reality as such becomes the more real – in terms of the subjective experience of presence – the more agents recognizing one and interacting with one are contained in this reality. Phenomenologically, ongoing social cognition enhances both this reality and the self in their degree of ‘realness’” (365) In order to be able to experience oneself as a subject i.e. “a model of the system as acting and experiencing...as opposed to a mere phenomenal self” (159), other agents therefore have to affirm that one is indeed acting and experiencing. So what happens to a self-model when it is confronted with others whose brains, like those of the participants in the MRI study above, activate the representational prototype for ‘rubbish’ instead of that for ‘person’? This self-model has just experienced itself as literally misrecognized as the sort of thing that does not have a PMIR – a mere object, a thing. From Metzinger’s account would follow that as a result, the phenomenal ‘realness’ of the self-model declines – the self is subjectively becoming ‘less real’ to itself, it is ‘disappearing to itself’. In the extreme, this can lead to a state of consciousness that is in clinical terms is called ‘depersonalisation’ and in political terms ‘objectification’:

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239 Metzinger alternately compares the PMIR to concepts such as ‘agency’ and then again ‘perspective’, implying that what is at stake here involves both a direction and a ‘doing’.
“a transparent, conscious self-model is in place, but it is not a subject-model anymore, only an object-model. Something still exists, something that looks like the model of a person, but something that is utterly unfamiliar, not alive, and not a phenomenal self in the act of living, perceiving, attending, and thinking. The PSM has lost the emotional layer. The PMIR in such a case would not be a model of a subject-object relation, but only one of an object-object relation. It would not constitute a phenomenal first-person perspective, but rather a first-object perspective. The ‘first object’, for purely functional reasons, persists as the invariant center of reality, because it is tied to an invariant source of internally generated input. Phenomenally, this functional center is the place where things happen, but all of them – as well as the center itself – are not owned. The phenomenal property of ‘mineness’ has disappeared” (460)

As Metzinger notes, this extreme loss of phenomenal subjectivity is the farthest outlier on a spectrum of depersonalisation: “human beings can consciously be someone to many different degrees, and they can also lose this property altogether without losing conscious experience as such” (438). While a single instant of being objectified will thus not lead to a complete extinction of phenomenal subjecthood240 as described above, from Metzinger’s account would follow that continued and exclusive misrecognition as a ‘thing’ could be likely to cause a person’s brain to produce a self-model that has lost its personhood and is reduced to ‘phenomenal bare life’ – being treated like a thing has then caused the person to become a thing in their own perception.

To take ‘social death’ to mean just being dead to the social order therefore implies that one is speaking from the perspective of those who are still part of this order, declaring a body ‘dead matter’ since it is not recognized as a living being. Seen from the perspective of the ‘dead’, ‘social death’ implies being literally cognitively

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240 Although even intermittent objectification can be seen to cause a disruption to the self-model, which manifests in symptoms of depression, anxiety and a subjective experience of ‘self-objectification’. For example, numerous studies of sexual harassment have confirmed a link between experiences of objectification and negative self-perception among women: street harassment “functions to socialize girls and women to, at some level, treat themselves as objects to be looked at and evaluated” (Fredrickson/Roberts, 1997, 177) and can therefore result in negative mental health outcomes such as depression and PTSD (Street et al, 2007, see also: Bowman, 1993; Fairchild/Rudman, 2008; Sullivan et al, 2010; Rajoura et al, 2012)
extinguished through the invisible violence of social relations. In legal terms, a ‘social death’, i.e. a death that involves the participation of more than one person, is usually called ‘murder’, or at least ‘manslaughter’ – in so far as most people do not simply die a symbolic ‘social death’ all on their own, ‘social murder’ or ‘cognitive murder’ would perhaps be more appropriate. It results in the experience of a self that has lost the ability to represent ‘itself as in the act of experiencing’, and thus, its possibility to relate to the world as someone, as a person with a unique perspective – this self stops being a subject and develops something that could be described as ‘object consciousness’. This is also the condition of Hegel’s ‘slave’ after his tussle with the Master. The ‘fear of death’ that has reminded the slave of his embodiment has also disrupted his previous experience of his self, and as a result, he has temporarily lost his ability to conceive of himself as coherent:

“For this consciousness was not in peril and fear for this element or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire being; it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within it. This complete perturbation of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its stability into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple, ultimate nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure self-referent existence” (§ 194)

‘Pure, self-referent existence’ is the experiential state of a self that has lost its subjectivity and is thrown back on the most basic representation of itself in the act of existing, the ‘empty’ perspective of the ‘first object’. It is still there, but it is no longer somebody, since “full-blown conscious experience – phenomenal subjectivity in a philosophically interesting sense – is more than the existence of a conscious self, and it is much more than the mere presence of a world. It results from the dynamic interplay between this self and the world, as situated in a lived, embodied present” (Metzinger, 569). If the world does not affirm that one is a subject but communicates that one is an object, the connection between ‘self’ and
'world' is severed, and the experience of living, embodied present turns into absence, into 'cognitive death'.

So how does Hegel's slave return from the dead? Not by trying to shake recognition out of the master, but, as Hegel informs us, through his labour, i.e. “in fashioning the thing, self-existence comes to be felt explicitly as his own proper being, and he attains the consciousness that he himself exists in its own right and on its own account” (§ 196) The slave therefore finds himself by directing himself at the world as object, and in doing so, rediscovers that he is not a thing but someone with a unique perspective: “phenomenal subjectivity... is the moment in which the system experiences itself as directed at a possible object of knowledge, an action goal, or a perceptual object” (Metzinger, 568). In other words, through his work the slave re-creates himself as a subject because in the act of ‘work’, i.e. of causing an effect in the world, he becomes real to himself – he re-creates his phenomenal subjectivity in something that could be referred to as ‘externally mediated autogenesis’. ‘Autogenesis’ refers to the fact that the slave creates his experience of himself as an actor through his own constituent act – ‘fashioning the thing’. He is, so to speak, no longer ‘feckless’, but he has precisely discovered himself through the experience of having an effect in the world. But this is at the same time only possible through the experience of the external world (the ‘thing’) that feeds back to the slave that he has just acted, i.e. it is ‘externally mediated’. This means that the slave’s subjectivity is not exclusively ‘self-generated’ nor is it exclusively ‘other-generated’, but is conceived from the interaction between self and world. The ‘thing’ that gives the slave back to himself can be any aspect of the phenomenal world which he can relate himself to “as currently being a subject of experience, as currently being an agent, bodily, attentional, or cognitive” (576). His constituent act may not be any more structured than John Holloway's “in the beginning is the scream. We scream” (2002, 1). In the first instant, what is important is that it is directed at the world and that the world is thus ‘fashioned’ in such a way that it confirms that somebody has just screamed, and thus a self-world relation is established. However, in order for this relation to become stable and ‘real’, it has to be affirmed and reflected by other people:
“Ongoing social cognition enhances both this reality and the self in their degree of ‘realness’. It is interesting to note that there is a basic underlying content common to all such states...we could call this the phenomenal ‘I-Thou structure’: the conscious experience of currently being confronted with another conscious agent, the phenomenal representation of currently interacting with a being possessing a genuine phenomenal first-person perspective itself - thereby constituting a first-person plural perspective”. (365)

The term ‘I-Thou’ structure is borrowed from Martin Buber (1970), but on the basis of our previous discussion we could also recognise in this this phenomenal structure what we have called the ‘pattern of recognition’ – a prototype of self-world relation in which self and other treat one another as subjects, i.e. entities who have a unique perspective and experience. In the previous chapters, we have seen a number of practical examples of this principle – the HUB occupation, in giving people an opportunity to be treated like equals in a safe environment, counteracted the experience of ‘social death’ by re-affirming the moral personhood of everyone involved, the fact that people mattered because they were people. In the same way, squatting as a whole worked by affirming intentionality – in the transformation of a homeless person into a squatter through the constituent act of squatting, but also through the affirmation of a common goal and a shared perspective. The feminist movement has known this principle for a long time, and it is called ‘consciousness-raising’ for a reason. Brace (2004) argues that the same concept of ‘social death’ that attaches to slaves also was and is applicable to the situation of women, and argues that in the context of traditional marriage, “the very being and existence of the woman is suspended...or entirely merged and incorporated in that of the husband” (191) and that women thus became socially ‘invisible’ or simply “ceased to exist” (190).

The cognitive corollary of this status was, for may women, that the social extinction of their independence was mirrored in a experienced extinction of their selfhood – the ‘social death’ of women qua women therefore means that performing ‘femininity’ in itself becomes an auto-aggressive disappearing act, the coerced and self-re-enforced extinction of the subject-consciousness of a
female body, so that this body can be used by others. Feminist consciousness-raising therefore has precisely the function to rekindle selfhood, by mutually affirming one another’s experiencing and acting. Although just one Hegel-interpretation among many, if there is anything to my description of this ‘struggle for personhood’, then through perceiving of each other, and treating each other, as subjects, people literally, physically, enable one another’s brains to produce the experience of subjecthood, countering ‘social death’ with a ‘social spark of life’.

I see no reason to assume that the slave would now once again turn around and once again challenge the master to a duel of wills. Their initial struggle was motivated by negating death, through proving that one does not fear it, but this negation is ultimately fuelled by fear – the master’s delusional ‘invulnerability’ is a desperate denial of the fact that his body is mortal. The slave, on the other hand, has experienced his embodiment through vulnerability and fear, and has thus discovered himself as mortal and as part of the natural order. He can now relate to embodied others on this basis, and pass on the spark of recognition. The slave may perhaps even have discovered that she is a woman – women, after all, have always been suspicious of being ‘the ones with the bodies’ (see Prokhovnik, 2002), and proving that one is ‘not bound up with life’, like Hegel’s two self-consciousnesses, is thus once again a way to prove, that ‘honour’ lies in not being one of ‘them’. Either way, accepting her body and its needs, and finding acceptance of it in others – what is more, finding needs met and vulnerability protected – has led the slave from delusion to truth (in the sense of ‘practical adequacy’). This does not mean that former bondsmen and -women may not have to fight the master in whichever guise he appears, but now they will be fighting for their humanity, not its negation. Such persons might then really “aspire to no honour”, and they might very well end up standing “in a real sense outside the social order” (Patterson, 79), but to call them ‘dishonoured’ is to look at them from the perspective of the master – from the perspective of the ‘slave’, the rules...

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241 I like to think of this as the ‘phenomenal model of the solidarity relation’.
have changed.

The rules have also changed for squatters – since Weatherley’s law came into force on September 1st 2012, squatting in residential properties is now a criminal offence, punishable with up to 6 months in prison or a fine up to GBP 5000.00. Immediately after the law was implemented, an example was made of 21-year-old Alex Haigh and a Bristol man only identified as ‘Henry’, who were both sentenced to several months in prison for occupying an empty building. Just three weeks into September, the Squatters Legal Network reported:

“There have definitely been arrests in Brighton and Bristol, but most other police interventions have ended either with the police being persuaded that no offence has taken place, or in the police persuading the occupiers that they should get out or else be nicked. In one case this happened despite the fact the occupiers were licensees, or at least licensees holding over, and the fact that some of the people threatened with arrest were not living at the property and so not committing any offence. The police then handed the property over to someone with no apparent right to the place, although he reckoned he did”

Since then, several squatters were acquitted or convictions overturned on appeal, since the wording of the law makes the specific offence of ‘squatting’ difficult to prove – prosecutors have to show that a person is ‘living or intending to live’ in a squat, which, as a squatter’s organisation remarked, is “difficult to prove...without a major surveillance operation”. The law has thus proven to be, in practice, largely ‘unworkable and unenforceable’ (ibid), and squatters have developed a number of successful strategies to fight convictions. Additionally, squatting commercial properties – shops, pubs, etc. – is not yet covered by the law, although at the time of writing, Mike Weatherley has tabled a new early day motion in Parliament to make squatting in commercial buildings a criminal

242 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-19753414
243 https://network23.org/squatterslegalnetwork/2012/09/23/the-first-3-weeks-of-s144/
offence, too. In 2013, a person was charged with ‘threatening and intimidating behaviour’ in Brighton Magistrates Court for publicly calling Mike Weatherley a ‘coward’ – the case was, however, dismissed, and despite all other legal challenges, at least saying that Mike Weatherley is, in fact, a coward therefore remains entirely within the law.

Squatting has not disappeared, it has just become more difficult and more dangerous. It would be unreasonable to assume that in the middle of a ‘space crisis’ squatting is likely to decrease purely because it is prosecuted, and one inevitably wonders why lawmakers would assume it would. Watching the parliamentary debate on section 144 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill on television, I got the impression that considerations never went this far – the law was pushed through in a late-night session, stapled to the back of another, no less controversial bill, and despite the efforts of two female MPs to make clear to their colleagues what was actually being debated, interest in the issue appeared to be drowned out by the interest to finally make it home and go to bed. What has been achieved by the law is next to nothing – homeless numbers are still skyrocketing, people are still squatting, and the Conservative’s core voters – private landlords – are still picking up the tab for decades of failed housing policy, by finding the very homeless people the state has abandoned in their own properties (it can only be a matter of decades now before they realise this). One squatter’s group remarked:

“In the main, it seems that a standoff has developed where the police are fairly reluctant to charge people, but will use it to evict under threat of arrest, especially when the squatters are seen by them as easy targets. This might then explain why 41 out of the 95 people arrested for squatting by the Metropolitan police were Romanian (who perhaps but not necessarily were inexperienced squatters and/or could not speak English very well to assert their rights)”245

245 https://rooftopresistance.squat.net/this-new-law/
The standoff continues, as does the ‘space crisis’, although as of spring 2015, a number of grassroots campaign and large public protests have begun to draw attention to homelessness and precarious housing in general. As the above squatter’s group puts it: “can we mobilise and take action again? Well it’s not going to be easy, but it doesn’t seem impossible. Putting people in prison for occupying empty property won’t help solve the housing crisis. We’ll have to solve it ourselves”.
Conclusion

And a beautiful world we live in, when it is possible, and when many other such things are possible, and not only possible, but done - done, see you! - under that sky there, every day
Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*

I did not hear from Gavin for over two years after I left Bristol. There had been some strong words, nothing that would break a friendship necessarily, but enough not to pick up the phone and ring each other for a while. In retrospect, Gavin’s criticism – not the one that I was dabbling in poverty without good reason, but the later one that I was getting somewhat proficient at territorial dominance myself – had been completely warranted, and (having straightened myself out) I was glad to hear from him. There was much catching up to do, and two weeks later I found myself in Gavin’s living room in Bristol, reminiscing about the old days. He had moved to a flat in Montpellier with his partner, situated in exactly the kind of building an ex-squatter would pick: thick, solid walls and double-glazing. I remembered Gavin’s old home in Easton – the holes in the walls and ceilings were so big that somebody had stuck the entire leg of a mannequin through one of them, and the window in Gavin’s bedroom had never shut. He seemed much happier now, having managed to get a job and some money, and calmer than I remembered him. Gavin was amazed that I was still doing ‘that PhD’, even when I told him that it was not the writing but the thinking that took so long. When I told him about the part in which he features, and recounted the story about the argument that started my argument - “So my point is: you were pissed off because I was squatting when I didn’t have to, whereas you had no choice” – his face lit up and he nearly jumped out of his chair, shouting “Yes! Yes! Yes!” and pointing at me. I was genuinely impressed at what effect the attempt at understanding somebody can have – and it only took me four years and well in excess of 100,000 words of writing to get there.

My discussion has moved around in somewhat of a circle – from the initial problem of a cognitive distortion in chapter one we have returned to another one
in the last. I will briefly re-capitulate the steps that have brought us this far, and then see what conclusions we can draw from this. I have argued that the initial cognitive distortion I have discussed – the one that made me blind to what Gavin saw in my behaviour – stemmed from a particular construction of the ethnographic ‘field’ as a kind of ‘morally neutral zone’, in which the anthropologist is defined as an actor who is by definition not affected in the same way as his/her respondents. This factual or imagined disaffectedness leads to a cognitive distortion, because it removes an element from the experience of the social that fundamentally influences the perspective of the ‘native’, namely that what is going on matters to oneself because of its potential to cause flourishing or suffering, i.e. because one is an embodied and thus vulnerable actor.

The immediate experience of embodiment stems from the experience of need for certain things – food, air and, importantly, space. Since we are spatial beings, ‘safe space’, i.e. the undisturbed spatial experience of the body, and of the body’s embeddedness in ‘outside space’, is an immediate survival requirement, and its absence is a problem of absolutely vital importance. Mutually recognising one another as a being for whom this matters – a being who is, in this regard, vulnerable, who can suffer – is thus the basis for what we have referred to as recognition. Recognition was defined, with Honneth, as the mutual recognition of one another as moral subjects on the basis of this shared ability to suffer. Misrecognition, on the other hand, lies in the fact that another is not considered a subject but an object, and thus not a moral agent.

We have then discussed some of the ways in which the literature has treated homelessness, and pointed out some difficulties in defining what it is and what causes it. In the course of this step, I have also discussed a Critical Realist framework, not only as the meta-theoretical position underlying this thesis, but also as the epistemological position that is best suited to overcome the in-built cognitive and ethical distortions of both positivism and strong subjectivism.
From the consideration of ethics as about bodies we have then turned to a discussion of how ethics gets into bodies. Drawing on anthropology, psychoanalysis and cognitive science, we have seen that embodied ethics can be thought of as a variety of relational patterns, which, in the form of representational prototypes or ‘object relations’ are at the same time embodied and ‘en-minded’. Drawing on psychoanalysis, I have discussed the example of ‘boarding school survivors’ to show how a process of socialisation can be designed to manufacture a particular kind of self, which, due to the kinds of relational patterns it has internalised, is well suited to serve in the territorial interests of Empire. Such a self structures relationships spatially through metaphors of ‘inside and outside’, characterised by a dynamic of splitting and projection that establishes control through exclusion and internment.

I have then discussed some of the ways the embodied relational patterns I have described come to structure physical and social space. On the one hand, this consists in arranging the material configuration of space in a way that reflects belonging, on the other hand it consists in particular social arrangements, such as the creation of ‘Safe Space policies’. In discussing the logic of ‘Safe Spaces’, I have pointed out that they reflect a commitment to the protection of vulnerability, which can be assigned in dynamic and flexible ways. Based on this, I have identified ‘safe space’ and ‘secure space’ as two possible spatial configurations, and compared them to the different models of spatial selfhood suggested in the work of Hobbes and Winstanley. Discussing the logic of ‘secure space’ as the space of a territorial self, I have pointed out the overlap of this concept with both dominant masculinity and ideas of racial superiority, resulting in the construction of racialised and gendered ‘spatial others’ through a dual strategy of exclusion and internment.

In the discussion of the HUB occupation, we have seen how these two spatial ‘modes’ can come to clash. The logic of creating a ‘safe space’ for those affected by homelessness was here confronted with a political agenda that reflected a particular attitude to territoriality as it is typical for conservative thought, understood as an ideology of power. We have looked at some ways that the built
environment on the one hand, and a conservative understanding of ‘property’ on the other, are both informed by territoriality and the logic of ‘secure space’, and have thus informed British housing policy since Thatcher. We have then discussed some of the territorial strategies of aggressors, particularly the state, and finally arrived at the notion of spatial abjection as ‘social death’. ‘Social death’, as I have argued, describes not just a social phenomenon, but importantly, the experience of being cognitively extinguished though objectification. In this way, we have finally come full circle and ended where we started: with a cognitive distortion.

Our trajectory therefore resembles what cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter calls a ‘strange loop’:

“not a physical circuit but an abstract loop in which, in the series of stages that constitute the cycling-around, there is a shift from one level of abstraction (or structure) to another, which feels like an upwards movement in a hierarchy, and yet somehow the successive "upward" shifts turn out to give rise to a closed cycle. That is, despite one's sense of departing ever further from one's origin, one winds up, to one's shock, exactly where one had started out” (2008, 101).

This time, surprisingly, our ‘cognitive distortion’ it is even measurable – and perhaps even more surprisingly, it can kill. Metaphorically, by removing from a person the recognition as a human subject that is necessary to make them that, and literally, when the cognitively distorted treat the bodies of homeless people as if they were actual rubbish and set them on fire. What should give us pause here is that despite its more devastating scale, we are still dealing with the same distortion – one that removes a layer from one’s perception of the other, namely the one that identifies them as a living and experiencing subject with the capacity to suffer. The first distortion – merely pretending that what matters to this other is unrelated to what matters to oneself – is the first step in a process, in which the other becomes

246 A ‘strange loop’ is an abstract feedback loop of the kind Goedel’s incompleteness theorem proves for any complex logical or arithmetic system (Hofstadter, 1980, 2008). Hofstadter – similarly to Metzinger – believes that such feedback loops underlie the phenomenal experience of self, in that they produce the kind of perspectivalness expressed in the notion of the PMIR.
more and more dehumanised until eventually, nothing is left in common and the other might as well be dead.

So what conclusions can be drawn from this?

We have seen in this thesis that when we ask what homelessness is – not just how it is defined by law and policy, but what kind of thing it is, things can get quite messy. We have seen that homelessness is not an absolute state, but rather, that it consists in occupying a particular subject position – or, more to the point, ‘object-position’ – in a spatial configuration – be that the ‘home’, the city, the state, or the abstract, mathematical ‘state space’ of embodied cognition. What all of these spaces share in common is that they are defined by a conflictual relationship between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and spatial abjection consists in the fact that one is considered either an ‘outsider within’ or an ‘insider without’. Homelessness, in the sense of ‘spatial abjection’, can therefore be seen as both the result of the process in which this boundary is drawn, and the process of splitting itself. Spatial abjection is then not just a category to describe those who end up ‘outsiders’, but it also describes the process of their production, the political, economic and social mechanisms by which we ‘make outsiders’. Homelessness, in this view, is something that we do to each other, by splitting space and thereby the social, or by splitting the social and thereby the spaces we construct – and homelessness, as we have seen, kills.

As an immediate consequence, it would appear that people’s attempts to counteract this socialised form of killing by creating spaces in which people’s embodied, spatial, selfhood is protected, should be encouraged rather than punished. ‘Weatherley’s law’ did more than just to criminalise squatters – in attempting to take away their spaces, it directly attacked people’s ability to keep themselves and each other alive through mutual recognition and protection. It attempted to destroy the connections people in squatting had built, in the same way that power has always tried to silence dissent through the violent fragmentation of communality. It thus put people at risk of social, cognitive and, as the example of Daniel Gauntlett shows, physical death. The same can be said for the
general thrust of the politics it was embedded in – as we have seen, an ideology of territorial dominance and exclusion. While conservative politics may be more explicit about this than other ideologies, the logic of creating an ‘enemy within’ is not limited to the Tories or political parties in general – it is the logic of a social order that maintains its integrity by externalising contradiction, in just the same way as a territorial self maintains its inner order through internment and exclusion. Like in the scapegoat-rituals of old, the fundamental problem lies in the refusal of the self to, as the saying goes, ‘own its shit’ – its sins, its failures, its emotions, its vulnerable body, its mortality. And as long as it does, others will end up being the symbolic incarnations of the ‘non-I’, and die because of it.

While it is thus important to acknowledge specific political struggles in their particularity, the multiplex connections between the different proponents of the ‘non-I’ show that they themselves are beginning to realise that they share more in common than separates them. What could unite them is not only a ‘Right to the City’, as David Harvey (2008, after Lefebvre) advocates, but more generally a ‘Right to Safe Space’, understood as the right of every human being to an undisturbed spatial existence as concrete, embodied consciousness. This means to demand that one’s body must be a ‘safe space’ to occupy for the self, it must be kept in a state that allows the brain to form a self-model that is integrated, whole and capable of conceiving of itself as a person. Maybe this is what Winstanley referred to when he spoke of the ‘sphere’ that the soul occupies, and that is its lasting connection to the ‘Kingdom’, the mythical ‘home’. As Winstanley writes, the ‘Kingdom’ has been divided by a dam built by the imagination – in modern language, by splitting the space of the self into partitions, such as mind/body, masculine/feminine, reason/emotion, dominant/subordinate. The divisions that fragment the inner realm are reflected on the outside, and thus the ideology of private property repeats in outside space what the ideology of ‘honour’ does on the inside. Cognitive and material splitting is the basic manoeuvre of the territorial self – the Hobbesian self, the masculine self – and it fuels this self’s delusion of invulnerability and superiority over others. As we have seen in my take on Hegel, at its core is the delusion of immortality, the negation of embodiment, which ultimately betrays
nothing other than a fear of death. The securisation of this self is the attempt to ward off the inevitable consequence of being human – that one is vulnerable, that one will die – and in the process, it externalises death by making it the death of others.

The other kind of self, the one Winstanley advocated, is more difficult to describe, mainly because we do not have nearly as much evidence of its existence than we have of our Hobbesian tendencies. The metaphor of the ‘sphere’ points to the fact that this possible self is whole and undivided, internally mediated instead of split into partitions, integrated instead of fragmented. ‘Integrated’ does not necessarily mean homogenous – such a self can still be multifaceted, fluid and flexible. As Metzinger writes, we do not have just one self-model – our brains produce a whole kaleidoscope of prototypes for ‘possible selves’, and depending on context, we enact a version of ourselves that is best suited to the task at hand. ‘Integration’ means, however, that these possible selves are not compartmentalised, contradicting each other, producing a self at war with itself. ‘Integration’ means that fragmentation is owned and resolved on the inside instead of externalising it, and therein lies its connection to the moral concept of ‘integrity’ – integrity in this sense means to own one’s contradiction instead of acting it out with reluctant others in the role of the ‘non-I’.

It is in this context that psychoanalysis becomes a relevant tool for integrating the self in its social and biological dimensions, as discussed e.g. by Metzinger, and political arguments about how embodied selves – i.e. people – should relate to each other. While philosophers such as Metzinger are usually relatively little concerned with politics, and political theorists do not often take recourse to the biological and psychological substrates of social structure in the individual, psychoanalysis – and particularly object relations – can serve as a type of ‘common ground’ which allows for ideas and concepts from both types of theory to be discussed under the same conceptual framework. In this way, it becomes possible to talk about political processes such as ‘othering’ as something more than either a bio-psychological or a political process, and to show that in fact, it
is both at the same time. The specific contribution of psychoanalysis to this work is therefore that it provides an understanding of how cultural forms such as patterns of relating are transmitted and learned, and possibly, how they can be changed once they are internalised. Within the here described Western context, psychoanalysis can also provide a helpful framework for discussing the topography of the self, and particularly, how defensive psychodynamics such as projection and splitting organise and maintain the boundaries of this self.

Winstanley’s ‘spheres’ also point to the fact that integrity depends on the ability to assign the quality of ‘mineness’ to the space that one is, and the space one is in. ‘Mineness’ is not the same as ‘ownership’ or ‘property’, although language makes it very difficult to express relationships in anything other than an idiom of subject and object. ‘Mineness’ is a form of identification – if I say ‘my body’ this does not mean that an abstract ‘I’ is the owner of a biological body but that ‘I’ am this body, and at the same time, I can perceive of it, and describe it, as an object, as ‘my hand’ or ‘my face’. According to Metzinger, the Cartesian error that is built into such statements is a necessary consequence of being an embodied consciousness – we cannot not perceive of our selves as ‘I’s’ who ‘have’ bodies. But ultimately, this relation is a cognitive illusion – there is no ‘I’ separate from that which we experience as characterised by the property of ‘mineness’. The domain of ‘mineness’ could be seen as Winstanley’s ‘sphere’ – the experienced spatial expanse that is ‘me’, an organism under the strong phenomenal impression of being a ‘self’. When ‘mineness’ is lost, such as in ‘social death’, then it is more than just ‘ownership’ that is taken away – it is the very capacity to experience myself as a person. Ironically, the very idea of ‘ownership’ destroys ‘mineness’, in separating the self from its connection to the body – both in the sense that somebody else’s claim to ownership can cognitively displace my ‘self’ from its spatial expanse; and in the sense that the idea of ‘self-ownership’, in introducing a split between owner and owned, substitutes a property relation for an integrated experience of embodiment.
‘Social death’ therefore describes not only a position of certain selves in relation to others, it also refers to a subjective experience of ‘homelessness’ – the loss of one’s sense of being ‘at home’ in one’s body, and of the body being ‘at home’ in the world. One could see this eviction of the self from itself as a particular kind of territorial aggression, a form of displacement that, for Winstanley, was akin to the eviction of man and woman from the Garden of Eden by a god who appears to have more in common with Hobbes than with Jesus. Where I therefore part ways with Winstanley is in the remedy – where he believes that ‘man’ can return to Eden by “reject(ing) outward objects and prefer(ing) his inner kingdom to outward riches” (Brace, 1997, 148), I am quite content that we are out of there, since in Eden, we were only ever god’s tenants. What we need to do to become ‘at home in the world’ (Jackson, 1995) is precisely not to reject the magnificent riches of the natural world that we are part of, but to understand that no mystical maker pulls the strings of our consciousness behind the scenes – the world out there, especially in the shape of other people, is the condition of possibility for us to be ‘selves’, and in our communion with it we become our own makers and each other’s. The reason Winstanley’s ideas live on in the collective imagination is not his puritan theology – it is the fact that the Diggers understood that in order to be human, you have to squat the world.

The importance of recognition lies in the fact that in order to restore our ‘sphere’, to return to the mythical home, others have to communicate in words and deeds that they respect the bubble of ‘mineness’ we are in, and that they will take care not to violate its boundaries. This is another way of saying that we must respect each other’s spatiality, each other’s bodies, in all their vulnerability and proneness to suffering and death – that in order to make each other human, we have to respect each other’s humanity. Interestingly, for a discipline that calls itself ‘knowledge of human beings’, anthropology appears to have trouble with this concept – somewhere throughout the awful confusion fascism caused in France, ‘humanism’ ended up being cast as a bad thing, and 90 years later some of us are still rolling
with that\textsuperscript{247}. This legacy is perhaps the reason we do not quite appear to get what people want from us when they insist that ‘human’ is what they are.

At Dale Farm, and elsewhere, I have observed that people who fall into common descriptions of ‘oppressed’, when questioned about their oppression, will at some point often exclaim, with great emphasis: “I am human!”, or, if referring to their whole group, “we are human!” This happens quite regularly, and even the quietest, most introverted interlocutor, when uttering these words, will look one straight in the eye, emphasising their words with gestures of urgency, as if to locate in the other the part who will respond, solemnly and sincerely, “yes, you are”. The people who thus lay claim to humanity are not making a factual statement, they do not wish to inform their audience that they are members of the species homo sapiens, they do not make a ‘truth claim’\textsuperscript{248} or invite their listener to play a ‘language game’. They do not put up for debate their cultural or individual understanding of what a human being is. What they want, I believe (and I could be wrong, but I do not think I am), is to be seen, to be recognised, as the sort of being who has a perspective – and whose perspective is irrevocably determined by the fact that through his/her embodiment, he/she has the capacity to flourish or to suffer.

In this finally lies another, although in this thesis more implicit, relevance of Critical Realism as a metatheoretical framework, since if we assume that ‘humanism’ refers to some kind of really existing (or potentially really existing) entity called ‘human’, then there must be a possibility that this entity has reality beyond subjective appreciations of what ‘human’ is. It has not been my purpose here to go deeper into this question and it is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to answer it, but the particular kind of recognition ethics discussed in this thesis rests on the possibility of mutual recognition of one another’s humanity, especially in the aspect

\textsuperscript{247} One of the excuses that was made for Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism was that what drew him to it was its ‘humanism’ (Wolin, 2004, 254) – who knows, had he disavowed it earlier, he might have joined the \textit{Resistance}.

\textsuperscript{248} A ‘truth claim’ is not the same as a ‘true statement’. The word ‘claim’ indicates that somebody just purports to be speaking the truth, leaving that modicum of skeptical distance, in case the ‘claim’ turns out to be false.
of shared vulnerable embodiment, and in order for this possibility to exist, it must be supported by the metatheoretical assumptions the argument builds on.

At the same time, the logic of recognition is such that, in the same utterance, the addressee is identified as the sort of being who can award such recognition – a being who, through its own embodied perspective, has the capacity to recognise the other as a being such as itself. “I am human!” therefore always means “and so are you”. A person who asks to be recognised thus does not simply make a demand, he/she also offers something: an opportunity, in recognising them as human, to identify oneself as such, in recognising to be at the same time recognised. It would seem that to be human then is not the scarce good that the critics of humanism want to make it out to be, nor is it an essential property of some but not of others. Being human, here, is something that is constantly co-created in relations of mutual recognition – one could call it, perhaps, a gift, but it is not an object that is passed around, rather it is a unique property of the strange organisms that we are, one that it only ever realised in the act of sharing.

In chapter 11, we have touched upon the idea that representations can be passed around between humans like ‘viruses’. I have suggested that rather than thinking of these infectious patterns as parthenogens, we could see them as something like computer viruses – data patterns that are exchanged through interaction and ‘infect’ the bio-cognitive system of the ‘host’. While this can be true for all kinds of ‘malware’, such as for example harmful myths, beliefs and practices, it can also be true for the opposite – for representational patterns that encode how to treat one another in pro-social ways. What we have called the ‘pattern of recognition’ or the the ‘I-Thou structure’ is such a representation – the abstract model of the kind of human relationship that makes human consciousness as we know it possible. This pattern is passed on between people in every act of recognition, from the constituent act of welcoming a new human to the world, to the myths of solidarity and cooperation that inform some of our ‘grand narratives’. It could be said that we ‘subjectify’ each other by continuously infecting each other’s systems with the spark of phenomenal subjecthood. If this is indeed true, then it would
mean that human consciousness – in as far as it is ‘subject-consciousness’ – is a genuinely social phenomenon. We are human to each other and to ourselves because we constantly co-create each other as human – we are no longer human if we fail to do so.

One consequence of the metaphor of a computer virus is that a representation such as this would very difficult to contain. If it is extinguished in one system, for example through ‘social death’, there can be a ‘backup’ in the next, and the spark can be sent back and forth again and again, like a form of existential file-sharing. This would lend some credence to the claim that ‘solidarity is a weapon’ – not because it harms, but because it is a powerful ‘technology of consciousness’ that anyone can use to bring the ‘socially dead’ back to life. And, to express a speculative thought at the very end of this text, it would also mean that our ‘existential software’ is bound to our bodies, but not necessarily limited to our bodies. Andy Clark’s ‘extended mind’ hypothesis holds that objects in the environment, such as a notepad or a computer, can come to function as parts of our ‘mind’ if we use them as such, for example to store or edit information. If that is so, then it would appear that other people can become part of our ‘extended mind’ as well, in so far as we keep a backup of our ‘data’ on their ‘bio-hard-drives’. Anyone who, after a long time of solitude, has ever met up with an old friend and instantly felt ‘like themselves’ again, has experienced this effect – the friend has here acted as an ‘external storage device’ that contained a copy of the self-model he/she has last stored us as. In our encounter, he/she relates not so much to our current self-model but to the one he/she remembers – and thus induces in our own system the experience of being that person again. In this way, embodied consciousnesses can be seen to partake in a web of representations that extends between individual bodies, where possible selves and possible kinds of relating to others exist not just inside one’s own brain, but are distributed throughout a network of all whose brains one has come in contact with.
Whether one wants to see in this a parallel to Hegel depends strongly on whether one wants to translate the word Geist (as in Weltgeist) as ‘spirit’, or, as is equally valid, as ‘mind’ – in the latter sense, we would be talking not about an ideal spiritual substance that infuses the natural world, but about the ‘world-mind’, the network of representations that links our bodies into the big data-streams of culture and history:

"With this we already have before us the notion of Mind. What consciousness has further to become aware of, is the experience of what mind is — this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: ‘I’ that is ‘we’, and ‘we’ that is ‘I’. Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness – the notion of mind – its turning-point, where it leaves the parti-coloured illusion of the sensuous immediate, passes from the empty night of the supernatural beyond, and steps into the mental daylight of the present"249 (PoM §177)

Like most things with Hegel, this is certainly a matter of interpretation. But interpreted this way, it would seem that a ‘world-mind’ could be read as more than just the idealist vision of an atheist who could not quite let go of religion – it could point to the idea that the continuous movement between ‘I’ and ‘we’ and ‘we’ and ‘I’, the vibrating spark of consciousness flying back and forth between individual bodies, could be what makes us human – that humanity lives, ultimately, in the network.

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249 Translation from German mine. In contrast to the translation at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phb.htm, I have translated Geist as ‘mind’ instead of ‘spirit’, Ich as ‘I’ instead of ‘Ego’ and geistig with ‘mental’ instead of ‘spiritual’
Appendix 1: Methodology and Method

The methodology herein applied is, as befits an Anthropology thesis, an ethnographic one, in the spirit of the approach originally pioneered by Bronislaw Malinowski (1922) and subsequently refined through the efforts of generations of fieldworkers such as Frantz Boas, Margaret Mead, E.E.E. Evans-Pritchard, and many distinguished others. As Atkinson and Hammersley (2007) outline, while in the 19th century ‘ethnography’ has the relatively clearly defined character of a comprehensive description of a particular (usually non-Western) culture, in recent decades the term has come to define a more diverse spectrum of qualitative approaches, covering also the description of relatively circumscribed social contexts (e.g. individual ‘life histories’), partial accounts of larger cultural contexts, and non-geographically constituted field sites (such as in the case of online ethnography). The authors assert that “carrying out such work, usually in a society very different from one's own, became a rite of passage required for entry to the ‘tribe’ of anthropologists. Fieldwork usually required living with a group of people for extended periods, often over the course of a year or more, in order to document and interpret their distinctive way of life, and the beliefs and values integral to it” (Atkinson/Hammersley, 2007, 1), and such is also the shape and impetus of the work undertaken in the pursuit of this thesis. The thesis therefore displays all the main characteristics of ethnographic research, as there are according to Atkinson and Hammersley: a) a data gathering through extended fieldwork, i.e. work within the everyday contexts encountered by participants, b) a focus on participant observation and informal conversations, amended by use of other documentary evidence, c) a relatively small-scale setting and d) an interpretative approach to data analysis (3).

The main method employed in this study consisted in participant observation within the specific local community herein described, as well as numerous informal conversations with members of the social group under investigation, in addition to a number of other data sources detailed below. As has been remarked by a number of authors, for example Junker (1960) and Gold (1958) (cited in
Atkinson/Hammersley, 2007, 93), participant observation can further be subdivided into four subtypes, namely: complete participant; participant as observer; observer as participant; and complete observer. These four categories describe on the one hand, the relative weight given to either participation or observation during the fieldwork process, and on the other hand, give clues as to the relative openness or concealment of data collection within the fieldwork situation. While thus a ‘complete participant’ may be engaged in participation but not overt data gathering, conversely, a ‘complete observer’ would be a researcher who is disengaged from the social world under study for all but the purpose of data collection. In anthropological practice, most participant observation will fall between these two extremes and constitute a combination of the roles of participant and observer, while potentially foregrounding one or the other depending on the concrete context, and such is also the case for the heretofore presented data, in as far as the ethnographer during the fieldwork period oscillated between observation and participation while most of the time engaging in both simultaneously.

Participant observation in this case focused on the ‘squatting scene’, as defined by its members, i.e. a relatively unstructured association of individuals engaging in or supporting squatting and associated practices herein described. As the bulk of the ethnographic material here presented concerns squatting, ‘participation’ here refers in the main to participation in the inhabitation of squatted spaces, including the social practices herewith associated, such as meetings and informal gatherings; as well as in activities of the ‘squatting scene’ not directly related to habitation, such as political activism, practices relating to culture and art such as community workshops, parties and raves, and networking meetings. Since, as this thesis argues, squatting in the particular ethnographic context under investigation largely constituted a response to homelessness, ‘participation’ in a wider sense also meant participation in homelessness itself, in that the ethnographer, as detailed in chapters one and two, was herself legally homeless during the fieldwork period. ‘Observation’ here can for the most part be taken in its most literal sense, i.e. the visual and auditory recording of practices and speech acts pertaining to squatting and related activism through the sensory-
cognitive apparatus of the ethnographer, and the subsequent chronicling thereof through the means of handwritten fieldnotes in a notebook specified for this purpose.

Furthermore, due to the specific circumstances of the ethnographic situation, especially the omnipresent concern with police infiltration permeating activist environs (see chapter 11), the manufacture of electronic recordings of an audiovisual nature, as well as the writing of fieldnotes, was circumscribed by the necessity to not arouse the suspicion of participants who may have interpreted such recording as evidence of an ulterior motive on part of the ethnographer. This pertained particularly to voice recordings and photographs, both of which were generally explicitly or implicitly prohibited in squatted spaces. Similarly, the overt taking of handwritten notes during social interactions, e.g. meetings, was prone to arouse suspicion, and note-taking therefore in the main took place during times when the ethnographer had retreated to whatever personal space was available at the time. The same considerations applied to individual informal conversations with squatters, since the general feeling within the community appeared to be that excessive note-taking during a conversation could be regarded evidence that said conversation was not conducted for its own sake but for a purpose outside of the conversational situation, which inevitably would have raised questions about what purpose this was. While the ethnographer was, throughout the fieldwork, open about the observational nature of her participation, it could be said that this was accepted by the community under investigation only in so far as the observation should not distract from the participation, and thus in the spirit of ‘full immersion’ ethnography that forms the backbone of anthropological methods, data gathering activities had to be performed in a way that did not interfere with being regarded a useful and trustworthy member of the social network.

In addition to participant observation and informal conversations, data was also drawn from documents provided by participants (such as the press releases used in chapters 9 and 10), online sources such as squatter’s blogs and websites, as well as public discourse as represented by mainstream news media. The
rationale for including the former was specifically to include the reasoning and motivations of squatters who were involved in the occupation detailed in chapters 9 and 10 without making individual squatters recognisable by associating their utterances with descriptions given elsewhere in the thesis, and thus potentially placing particular persons at the scene. Furthermore, this material was included to give a first-hand account of these motivations as expressed by the squatters themselves, while avoiding a post-hoc distortion of these intentions through the interpretations of the ethnographer. The same rationale holds for the inclusion of squatter’s websites and blogs, which were here treated en par with primary data since they represent much the same opinions and concerns voiced by squatters within the specific fieldwork situation. Finally, material from mainstream media such as the Daily Mail or Vice Magazine was included in order to illustrate specific points about the public perception of squatting and squatters, the general political climate within public discourse around the time of the research, and specifically in the case of the article cited in chapter 11, in order to provide first-hand accounts of police repression without the risk of exposing participant’s identities.

As Atkinson and Hammersley detail further in their discussion of the ethnographic method, ethnographic ‘research designs’ are usually more open-ended than other methodologies, and this ethnography is no exception. While, in the spirit of Malinowski, the general direction of investigation was ‘foreshadowed’ in the main through the choice of fieldwork location and participant group, it was also the case, as Atkinson and Hammersley argue, that the research took an exploratory course in that the research questions emerged from, and were developed alongside the discovery of, the concerns and understandings expressed by participants during fieldwork (compare Atkinson/Hammersley, 2007, 3). While it was therefore clear from the beginning of the research that the focus would be on activities within the wider squatting community, the angle eventually taken, namely a focus on the moral and cognitive dimensions of homelessness and squatting, emerged from fieldwork experiences. Data in the shape of fieldnotes was first organized in a chronological manner and subsequently arranged into themes while simultaneously, existing
and potential theoretical connections between these themes were explored. The
decision to draw specifically on moral and cognitive anthropology as well as
wider literature in the field of cognition was taken at the point that primary data
was first systematized and analysed, and patterns in this data became visible. As
Atkinson and Hammersley assert, this approach is typical for ethnographic
research, since “in ethnography the analysis of data is not a distinct stage of the
research. In many ways, it begins in the pre-fieldwork phase, in the formulation
and clarification of research problems, and continues through to the process of
writing reports, articles, and books” (158), thus resembling the process of
‘grounded theorizing’ promoted e.g. by Glaser and Strauss (1967).

Finally, the writing process of this text, despite taking place after returning from
the field, can be seen to constitute an extension of data analysis. This pertains on
the one hand to the primary data proper, i.e. fieldnotes, photographs and other
materials, and on the other hand, secondary data and theoretical sources drawn
from a range of literatures. The scope of literatures drawn on is relatively broad
and not restricted to just one disciplinary context, following Atkinson and
Hammersley’s suggestion that “we need to cultivate the capacity to read for the
rhetoric and forms of writing employed by others, not just to read for content.
And what is read need not be confined to the work of other ethnographers, or
other social scientists. There are, after all, many genres through which authors
explore social worlds. The domains of fiction and non-fiction alike provide many
sources and models for written representations” (192). What is needed,
according to the authors, is therefore “an appreciation of texts as the products of
reading and writing. This calls for a widening of the ethnographer’s traditional
range of interests. One needs to think about more than ‘research methods’, as
conventionally defined, or just the substantive focus of inquiry” (191). For this
reason, while literature was drawn from research on homelessness in the
conventional sense, further partial literatures were added based on whether they
were seen to contribute to an understanding not just of the immediate field of
inquiry but also and particularly the connections that the data implied for
theoretical concepts which were hitherto unconnected (see literature review). In
this manner, literature from the area of psychoanalysis was put in a dialogue with literature from the philosophy of mind, ethics and politics, among others, in order to show recurring themes and patterns and develop ideas as to why and how they may refer to the same real world phenomena.

The choice of sources followed a core theoretical structure roughly outlining the intersection of a Hegelian ethics with the realm of the cognitive as exemplified in the work of Axel Honneth, and other sources were added to this core configuration in order to discuss particular questions arising from field data (see literature review). From this theoretical core, the concepts of recognition and misrecognition were defined as abstract relational patterns describing basic tendencies or movements toward equality and inequality respectively, and these patterns were then transferred abductively into other bodies of theory in order to argue that theoretical constructs from a diverse range of disciplines can be interpreted to refer to the similar kinds of dynamics and phenomena as observed during fieldwork, in other words, that different theoretical positions can be seen as different particular perspectives describing the same general ‘powers and mechanisms’ (as defined within Critical Realism). The rationale for this methodological approach was to ensure that the theory in this instant was put in the service of the data (and, by extension, the community under investigation), rather than making this community a means to the end of refining or supporting a specific theoretical position. Moreover, as Atkinson and Hammersley warn “it is almost always a mistake to try to make a whole ethnography conform to just one theoretical framework” (157) since this would restrict the interpretation of the data to the categorical limitations of the theory at the expense of explanatory or interpretative power.
Appendix 2: Field overview

Project timeline:
Oct 2010: Arrival
Oct-Nov 2010: First squat and smiling chair bookshop (events of chapters 1-2)
Nov 2010 - Jan 2011: The Nursery (events of chapters 6-7)
Jan – Feb 2011: HUB occupation (events of chapters 9-10)
Feb-April 2011: The Yard (events of chapter 11)
April-July 2011: Street parking (events of chapter 12)
November 2011: Return into rented accommodation
Nov- May 2011: Involvement in campaigning against squatting criminalisation, first sighting of data, conceptual work
May 2012: End of official fieldwork
Sept 2012: Begin of data analysis, additional literature review
May 2013: Begin writing up

Facts and Figures:
Note: the following figures are estimates since no quantitative data was collected during fieldwork due to confidentiality

Number of squats visited during fieldwork: 40
Number of other locations visited (e.g. community centres, free-shop, etc): 10
Number of interlocutors: ca. 40 regularly, ca. 150-200 on occasional basis
Number of squats lived in: 13
Number of squats evicted from: 9
Number of illegal evictions: 2
Average number of weeks in one property during fieldwork: 4
Longest period in one property: two months
Shortest period in one property: 24 hrs
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