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Abstract

Surveillance features routinely in discussions of migration in terms of boundary crossing and border policing; that is, of how states and state-like entities seek to limit and control movement, often at a distance. What is less frequently examined is how migrants who are excluded from care by forms of selective non-surveillance have to rely on their own informal social networks, referred to here as embodied infrastructures, to provide both care and the forms of watching that enable that care. Drawing together Foucault’s (2009) notion of pastoral power and Simone’s (2004) notion of ‘people as infrastructure’, I explore ethnographically the way that surveillance features in and is gendered by migrant Filipino practices of care in Saudi Arabia, an overlooked but vital part of the way that people create ‘platforms for living’, as well as enact social control and normative conformity, in sometimes precarious situations.

Introduction: Beyond Borders and Boundaries

In November, 2012, various news media reported on a new mobile phone app that enables border control officials in Saudi Arabia to automatically send an alert to men when one of their ‘dependents’ seeks to leave the country (Guardian, 23 November, 2012). The mobile app was conceived of originally as a means to enable men to digitally replace or supplement the written letter of consent, the so-called ‘yellow’ slip, that women must secure from their male guardians (muharram)—husbands, fathers, brothers or adult sons—in order to travel unaccompanied. The app, initiated as part of the Saudi e-government strategy, subsequently developed from being a device documenting approval to one that alerted men to women’s movement. One feminist activist, Manal Al-Sharrif, alerted followers (some 150,000) via tweet when her husband, with whom she was travelling at the time, received a text notification saying she was leaving the country. The Guardian reports another freelance journalist and documentary maker, Safa Alahmad, as responding:

The new compulsory text service, compliments of the Saudi ministry of interior, is not only a vicious reminder that Big Brother is watching me but that now he will snitch and tell my ‘guardian’ every time I leave the country.

(Guardian, 23 November, 2012)

This story is an illustration of the way that modern technologies have been harnessed by states, liberal and illiberal, to monitor and constrict people’s movements often at a distance and in gender-specific ways (Adey 2012; Torpey 2000; Walters 2006; Anderson 2013). It is also a useful reminder of the contingent social situations within which surveillance systems operate and that trouble universalizing accounts of surveillance societies or the surveillance assemblage based on findings and concepts arising out of the particular historical experiences of Western societies (Murakami Wood 2009). In flagging up comparative cultural differences, however, it is necessary to trouble those accounts that suggest an unchanging and timeless tradition that is only now being challenged by modernity arriving from elsewhere: as this and other examples suggest (see Alhadar and McCahill 2011) surveillance technologies may in fact be instruments of retraditionalization as they are of so-called detraditionalization. In the case of Saudi Arabia, in particular, the legitimacy of the ruling elite depends in part on its being seen to moderate outside influence and guard against the corrupting influence of foreign culture not least by affirming publically the privacy of the home and the protection of the modesty of women under the guardianship of men (Doumato 2000; Al-Rasheed 2007: 128-9, 2013).

An underreported aspect of the above mentioned app is that it not only alerts men when their wives leave, but also migrant domestic workers who are tied formally to their employer as a condition of their stay in that country under the "kafala" system of visa sponsorship. The app thus reinforces and extends employer control over workers’ movements. That is detrimental especially to migrant domestic workers who already face considerable constraints on their movement. Those constraints include the legal requirement to have a sponsor’s formal permission to travel and leave the country and the illegal, but rarely sanctioned, practice of passport confiscation (see Frantz 2013; Johnson and Wilcke 2015). In 2014, reported Twitter and blog outrage about ministry of information text alerts led to a partial review to make government reporting on a man’s ‘dependents’ available on an ‘opt in’ basis rather than an automatic process, but migrant workers are unlikely to benefit from the nominal relaxation of that monitoring process.2

I start with this story, however, not because it is unique but rather precisely because it is yet another, if extreme, example of the by now well established connections between surveillance and migration summarized neatly by Fassin (2011) in terms of ‘policing borders, producing boundaries’. That work has highlighted both the historical precedents to and increasing forms of contemporary surveillance practices and technologies deployed by the state and by agents acting in fields beyond the state. Those surveillance systems produce and store information about migrants in order to monitor, regulate and control people’s movement in an age of globalization and figure centrally in the production of the new migrant division of labour in many world cities. In this new ‘banopticon’ (Bigo 2008; see also Bauman and Lyon 2013)—that is, the mechanisms in place to regulate people’s mobility and exclude them, or more precisely, differentially include them (Andriajasevic 2009; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) from state ministries and market participation—borders become a moveable feast and social boundaries created and extended in the making and sorting of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants, consumers and surveillance subjects (Aas 2011).

The aim of this paper is to move beyond the news headlines and that important focus on borders and boundaries, security and control to investigate the broader and more complex articulations of surveillance practices in the everyday lives of migrants. In particular I theorize and explore migrants’ bodily practices of care and watching (out for) each other that form the underside of the banopticon and regimes of deportability that characterize the situation of low-wage migrant workers especially (De Genova 2010). State and market provision of care relies on a complex surveillance assemblage that is highly mobile and global, involves hierarchical and lateral forms of surveillance and makes universities extensions of state border authorities and hospitals sites of social sorting to ensure that care is delivered for some, and not others, at variable costs (Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Walters 2006). Migrants are not just subjected routinely to that surveillance, but also, precisely because they are often excluded from care by those

systems, rely on and extend their own forms of mainly lateral or bottom up forms of surveillance via a range of more or less informal practices and associations to achieve a sense of control and extend care in precarious situations. In order to conceptualize and describe these forms of lateral and peer-to-peer surveillance (Andrejevic 2005; Albrechtslund 2008), I draw together Foucault’s (2009) notion of pastoral power and Simone’s (2004) notion of ‘people as infrastructure’, each of which in modified form offers important insights into migrant surveillance practices. The concept of pastoral power highlights especially forms of watching practices concerned both with people’s souls and people’s bodies that frequently involve the intimate intermingling of both care and control. The ‘people as infrastructure’ perspective, extended here in feminist terms as an embodied infrastructure of care, foregrounds the affective, embodied and gendered nature of watching as care and its differential effects in terms of the monitoring of women’s and men’s conduct in this migrant and diasporic context.

Surveillance, Migration, Care

Surveillance is defined generally as a set of watching and data collection practices to gather, produce and store information about people for the purposes of governance, i.e. the control, regulation, securitization and care of a population. Most work on surveillance and migration tends to focus on control, regulation and securitization rather than on care. Moore (2011) contends the same is true of Surveillance Studies in general. That is despite the assertion that surveillance always operates along a continuum between care and control and the acknowledgment that, “notions of ‘care’ developed within feminist theories offer some constructive counterpoints to the often overwhelming concerns about ‘control’ in surveillance” (Lyon 2007: 22).

There have been two notable exceptions to this as it pertains to migrants in particular. The first is work that has shown how (Northern) state practices create an exceptional few—such as victims of trafficking or ‘modern day slavery’—who, as the other side of what Aas (2011), following Hyndman (2000), refers to as the exceptional ‘supracitizen’—qualify for care in terms of a discourse of humanitarianism and the larger majority whose care the state routinely seeks so far as possible to disavow in one way or another (see e.g. Ticktin 2011). The selective forms of surveillance that seek to sort out and differentiate the former from the latter is mirrored too by what Hintjens (2013) refers to as ‘selective non-surveillance’. Hintjens claims that the emphasis on punitive forms of surveillance that act to exclude some people—terrorists, presumed ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, irregular migrants, etc.—ignores forms of exclusion that operate through ‘selective non-surveillance’; that is, deliberate choices made not to gather and/or make available data about certain groups of people, such as irregular migrants, especially those sorts of surveillance intended to protect and reduce harm. One example she cites is of the denial of health screening for TB for some migrants in France.

The second body of work that links surveillance, migration and care is that focused on migrants who as part of global care chains (Hochschild 2000) perform commoditized forms of ‘intimate labour’ in the home (Boris and Parreñas 2011; Constable 2009), the site most commonly acknowledged in Surveillance Studies too as exemplifying the ambivalent line between care and control (Lyon 2007:14; Nelson and Garey 2009). For example, Brown’s (2011) recent ethnography of West Indian born nannies for middle class, predominately white, families in New York shows how absent parents monitor and try to exert control over the care of their children through ‘nanny cams’ and the dissemination of information about nannies via parent blogs (2011: 113ff).

While care givers are routinely subjected to different sorts of surveillance by their employers, migrant domestic workers’ own transnational parenting practices of watching out and providing for their children at a distance likewise evince the complexities of care and control. Though rarely theorized in terms of surveillance, recent research discloses examples of transnational parents who—mirroring the way that some parent-employers monitor their migrant care workers—leave the webcam on for extended periods of
time as a way to observe and comment on aspects of life from afar (Madianou and Miller 2012; see also McKay 2012). If, as Madianou and Miller (2012: 84ff, 131) note, the various ‘polymedia’ practices do not ever substitute for physical intimacy, the impetus to be connected in other ways—through texts, Facebook, game play and Skype—may intensify parental involvement; involvement perceived by some children to be an exercise in surveillance and control.

What these migrants are doing in their transnational parenting practices might be described as lateral, peer-to-peer or participatory surveillance (Andrejevic 2005; Albrechtslund 2008). Lateral surveillance is theorized generally as an effect of government and corporate strategies to encourage people, enabled increasingly by new media technologies, to produce and gather information for and about each other, part of the so-called ‘democratization’ of surveillance. My interest here is how lateral or peer-to-peer surveillance is taken up by migrants and foreign residents who are subject to selective non-surveillance practices; those who in Hintjens’ (2013) terms are not just excluded from care by forms of punitive surveillance, but also excluded from surveillance as care.

I think we can see that quite clearly in recent writing about migrants in the gulf and elsewhere. In writing about Dubai, Vora (2013; see also Kathiravelu 2012) contends that migrant communities there are of necessity self-governing and their talk sometimes quite explicitly refers to those putatively informal sets of relations as ‘government’. Moreover, though the term ‘government’ also calls attention to the structures of authority and power that migrants are subjected to, it describes precisely the situation that migrants, irregular migrants in particular, find themselves in; outside of, if not criminalized by, the state, and hence reliant on those informally constituted governments for the most basic level of support and assistance (cf. Stock 2013: 169ff on the experience of so-called ‘transit migrants’ in Morocco). One of the most vital services that those shadow, and sometimes shadowy, ‘governments’ provides is surveillance in the basic sense of watching, collecting, storing and disseminating information for and about each other. While states deploy various forms of top-down digital and file based, as well as face-to-face surveillance, and have access to, if not control over, wider networks of other sorts of market-based apparatus that comprise the surveillance assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2000), the surveillance infrastructures mobilized by migrant networks operate mainly via lateral, bottom-up surveillance.

The sort of watching I am concerned with here may be usefully thought about in relation to Moore’s (2011) deployment of Foucault’s (2009) concept of pastoral power to help conceptualize what she refers to in a very different context as therapeutic surveillance. Moore notes a number of key features of pastoral power identified by Foucault in the shepherding relationship. It is benevolent, aimed at the temporal and spiritual care and salvation of people cared for and it is tied directly to surveillance: ‘[t]he shepherd is someone who keeps watch’ (Foucault 2009: 127, cited also in Moore 2011: 258). There are several other dimensions to the way that Foucault talks about pastoral power that make it especially pertinent to the migrant practices of care described here. First, the subjects of pastoral power are a, ‘flock in its movement from one place to another. The Shepherd’s power is essentially exercised over a multiplicity in movement’ (2009: 125). Second, though this is implicit rather than explicitly formulated as such by Foucault, the shepherd’s power is exerted through bodily practice: the shepherd physically goes to seek out, rescue and bring back the lost sheep. Similarly, migrants’ watching involves practices that are part of what I describe further below as an embodied infrastructure of care. Finally, while the aim of the watch is benevolent rather than the achievement of honour, the concern not just with physical security, but also with social conduct and spiritual salvation that characterizes pastoral power speaks directly to the ‘Janus-faced’ (Lyon 2007: 22) nature of surveillance practices that both enable care and exert gendered forms of constraint and control on migrant women especially.

In sum, in the situation described below, migrants’ surveillance—watching out for each other—are forms of embodied practice conditioned and enabled by people’s infrastructural positioning betwixt and between sending and receiving states’ selective non-surveillance practices: a ‘collateral consequence’ (Staples...
of the perceived punitive surveillance practices of the receiving state and perceived failures of both sending and receiving state to watch over and care for them adequately. Moreover, extending Foucault (2009), this is a distributed form of shepherding: migrant ‘governments’ formed in the liminal and precarious spaces of global governance are not led or watched over by shepherds with well-defined and pre-established flocks and the line between sheep and shepherd, watched and watching is always blurred.

**Investigating Filipino Migrants in Saudi Arabia: Methods and Contexts**

Before proceeding further, it is important to briefly set out something of the context of Filipino migration to and residency in Saudi Arabia and of the research data on which the article draws. There are over one million Filipino migrant workers in Saudi Arabia (Philippines Overseas Employment Agency [POEA] 2009). Saudi Arabia continues to be the destination attracting the largest number of Filipinos, second only to the US both in terms of remittances and the total number of ‘overseas’ Filipinos. The predominant image of Asian migrants in the Middle East is of the domestic worker (in the case of women) and the general labourer or construction worker (in the case of men), but Filipinos work across many economic and occupational sectors of Saudi society. Relative to other countries where migrant Filipinos live and work (outside of the immigrant Filipino population in the US), Saudi Arabia offers not just the most but also the greatest range of employment opportunities segregated generally along gender lines. At the lower end of the wage scale, domestic work and manual labour together account for approximately 25 per cent of Filipino workers while at the upper end of the wage scale, migrant women work predominantly in nursing and other health-related professions, whereas men work in various engineering sectors together accounting for approximately 17 per cent of the Filipino workforce. The remainder work in all sorts of industries across the full range of pay levels (Johnson 2010).

The majority of migrant Filipinos who move to and reside in Saudi Arabia are bonafide travellers rather than irregular migrants. Although they are restricted from permanent residency and citizenship rights migrant Filipinos are frequently long-term foreign residents: some migrants are able to craft successful middle class careers in that country while others experience more precarious working conditions. Migrant domestic workers in particular are subject to the vagaries of the *kafala* system of visa sponsorship that confers enormous powers on employers who are deemed legally to be their guardians and responsible both for a migrant worker’s condition of stay in that country, including nominally their health and social care as required (Longva 1997; Gardner 2010). Here we confront a particular example of Hintjens’ (2013) selective non-surveillance of migrants. While the state increasingly monitors and requires employers to report on the status of the foreigners employed and sponsored by them, it has largely abdicated its responsibility for monitoring labour relations between employee and employer: claiming, especially in regards to domestic workers, that it cannot interfere in private relations conducted in the intimacy of the home (Frantz 2013; Johnson and Wilcke 2015). In that situation, a limited recourse for migrant domestic workers is to abscond, without consent from their employer, and go ‘freelance’, a process that entails violating the conditions of their residency and becoming irregular migrants. In doing so, they often rely on compatriots from across the class divide both to find new employers / sponsors and to help them during the transition period when they are vulnerable to criminalization and deportation.

The data about Filipino migrant lives in Saudi Arabia presented here derives from an AHRC-funded project entitled ‘In the Footsteps of Jesus and the Prophet: sociality, caring and the religious imagination among Filipino diaspora’. The project which investigated Christian Filipino experiences of living and working in Israel and Muslim Filipino experiences living and working in Saudi Arabia aimed to move beyond the usual focus on labour relations in order to disclose the broader sets of cultural practices and social relations that characterize Filipino migrant lives in those countries. This paper reports on findings

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3 For a broader critique of that stereotyped view of Asian migration to the gulf see e.g., Osella and Osella (2000, 2008), Gardner and Nagy (2008), Vora (2013).
from the study of migrant Filipinos in Saudi Arabia, drawing on ethnographic research both in Saudi Arabia and the Philippines conducted by the author and a post-doctoral researcher, Alicia Pingol: the former in Riyadh and Dammam in April – May 2009 and Manila in July – August 2008 and January 2010, the latter in Madinah, Jeddah and Riyadh from September 2007 – January 2008 and intermittently in the Philippines from January 2008 – September 2009. As an ethnographic study the majority of the data produced was in the form of field notes derived from participant observation, informal interviews and guided conversations with a range of differently situated migrant women and men in the course of their everyday lives. The exception to that was a series of more targeted interviews with migrant domestic workers whose conditions of employment in that country made informal encounter and engagement difficult.4

As indicated, the study did not set out to focus on surveillance practices. However, throughout the course of ethnographic fieldwork surveillance related issues were routinely observed and reported on in conversation by participants, though usually not using the language of ‘surveillance’. Hence, while the ethnographic material presented here is not the result of systematic enquiries about surveillance, it has the advantage of disclosing something about people’s awareness about, perceptions of and responses to non-surveillance practices as it arose in natural settings with the researchers placed ‘in the local vortex of action’ (Wacquant 2009: 129) rather than as responses to explicitly solicited questions about surveillance (Gilliom 2006; Green and Zurawski 2015). Moreover, though caution must be exercised in generalizing these findings, the issues that the ethnographic vignettes disclose are ones that recur frequently in field notes about our respective encounters with various sorts of migrant Filipinos in that country.

Watching Bodies in Riyadh’s ‘Manila Plaza’

The following vignette focuses on the way that one man describes the watching that he does in support of his fellow compatriots: watching that is almost seamlessly woven into the fabric of the everyday rituals and convivial routines that are a regular feature of his life and work in that place. Kalemni (aged 29) works in a restaurant in Batha’, the old market area of Riyadh that has become a centre for working class migrant Filipinos especially, marked visibly by the neon Manila Plaza sign that dominates the central square. I had first been introduced to Kalemni by his older brother, Buddi, who was an officer in a regionally identified workers’ association that among other things organized ICT training classes, a madrasah and basketball tournaments. They also organized pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina (for umrah and hajj), as well as providing, often by means of those activities, help and assistance for fellow migrants. There are numerous organizations such as that in Saudi Arabia, some based on regional or ethnic affiliation, but others that aim to be broader in terms of membership and identified nationally as Filipino. I never heard these organizations referred to as ‘governments’ and was told repeatedly by Buddi that these voluntary associations always had to be careful because of official proscriptions against unions, political organizations and religious groupings and gatherings. Buddi told me that Kalemni frequently encountered and sometimes helped ‘DH’ (domestic helpers, the colloquial way of referring to domestic workers) who were escapees (takas). During one of my repeated visits to the restaurant to hang out and chat with Kalemni and other Filipinos who frequented the eatery, I asked him whether or not what his brother had told me was true, ‘did he offer help to fellow migrants, and, if so, what sorts of assistance had he given and how did he go about it?’

Kalemni said that while working in the restaurant he had over the years come to be able to readily recognize women in Batha’ who were newly escaped from their employers. The restaurant fronted the main square and, when business was slow, Kalemni and his other co-workers (Filipino, Indonesian and

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4 AHRC grant AH/E508790/1/APPID:123592. Dr Alicia Pingol who was the post-doctoral researcher on the project and on whose ethnographic material I draw here died at her home in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, Philippines in March, 2012.
Nepalese) would sit near to or, in the evening when temperatures were cooler, just outside the door watching people and activity in the area. Kalemni claimed to be able to spot escapees in the crowd either because they were sometimes, unusually for women in Saudi Arabia, walking alone and/or because of their nervous and watchful demeanour. When they run away from their employers, he contended, most came to Batha’ because they were likely to have heard of it, if not actually been there, and because they knew that many Filipinos frequented the place. He asserted that he observed and encountered between 5 and 10 escapees each year. He did not make contact with all of those he suspected to be escapees, but only those that came inside his restaurant. The reason for that, he averred, was because of the ‘mutawa’ or so-called ‘religious police’ (the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice [CPVPV]).

For many of the Filipinos that I encountered in Saudi Arabia, it was the ‘religious police’, rather than regular police, who were perceived to be the prime agents of state surveillance and that caused them most anxiety on an everyday basis. The same was reported of border situations where stories, including those that had the character of urban legends, which circulated among migrants about troubles entering or leaving the country, centred especially on ‘religious police’ finding prohibited materials such as the bible. Kalemni was reluctant to talk to female migrant domestic workers in public outside of the restaurant because that behaviour would likely draw the attention of the ‘religious police’ who, in addition to ensuring that businesses and people adhered to prohibitions on trading during prayer time, also monitored interactions between women and men. He sought to protect both the women and himself against charges of inappropriate conduct and, as a corollary of that, to ensure that he did not inadvertently draw their irregular status, or his offer of assistance, to the attention of the authorities. Kalemni reported seeing a sign up in the Philippine Embassy warning against offering such intervention and assistance. Rather, the sign instructs fellow migrants to tell escapees to go to the Embassy, who are housed in the Bahay Kalinga, the officially nominated ‘house of care’ for escaped domestic workers, on the understanding that the embassy will provide them shelter, but also report their case to the local police and, hopefully, investigate any claims of abuse, salary dispute, etc. As I have described elsewhere, many Filipinos, escaped migrant Filipino domestic workers especially, often regard the embassy route as an act of desperation when all other options have been exhausted (Johnson 2011).

For those reasons, Kalemni only approached the women if they entered the restaurant, not just because it was less visible than outside in the square, but also because he was able to talk to them circumspectly as he served them in the ‘family’ section of the restaurant. Restaurants and cafes in Saudi Arabia are divided into family and men’s sections. Women are not allowed into the men’s section and men are not allowed into the family section unless they are employees or are with their wife, children or other female relatives. As he served them, Kalemni would start talking to the women, and after a while when he told them a bit about himself and how long he worked there, some women would disclose their situation and predicament. They came to trust him because they knew where he worked and if he had bad intentions they would know where to come back to him. When asked why they ran away, some said because of salary being withheld, others because they were not being fed and others because there was too much work or because of physical or sexual abuse. On hearing their story, he would offer assistance and would phone various Filipinos, usually other families from the same ethnic group (Tausug) or home place (Zamboanga City) that were part of his social network to see if anyone needed the help of, or would be willing to take in, an escapee (takas). If someone said they did or they would, he would arrange contact between them and the woman and tell her that if things did not work out she could always come back and

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5 As I discuss elsewhere (Johnson 2010) middle class migrant Filipino families rely frequently on the labour of fellow Filipino migrant domestic workers both for cleaning and the care of younger children especially. From what I have observed and was told about, most of the women working in Filipino homes in that country are women who have, because of poor working conditions or abuse, left their formal employers to go, in their terms, ‘freelance’. Middle class migrants do offer genuine assistance and care for escaped domestic workers but benefit also from their labour since it is difficult and costly to secure a domestic worker otherwise.
try again. At the time of our conversation he said that he had in the previous month met two escapees who were now at his wife’s best friend’s house. He had also helped escapees before, both Muslims from Mindanao as well as Christians from other parts of the Philippines. And, he affirmed, it was because, ‘we are Filipino’, like them.

**Pastoral Power and Embodied infrastructures of Care**

There are several points that I wish to draw out of this initial story about Kalemni’s watching practices that echo and extend Foucault’s conceptualization of pastoral power. The first is that it is an ethical practice whose aim is benevolent. The second is that while the concern of pastoral power is not a ‘territorial unit’, nevertheless the people for whom one assumes ethical responsibility for, ‘the flock in movement’, are deemed to be fellow compatriots and diasporans. As Kalemni suggests, and affirmed by others, there was a common expectation that you should watch out for and take responsibility for fellow Filipinos even while that shared national identity might in different circumstances be divided up or ‘segmented’ along ethnic, provincial or religious lines, i.e. Filipino, Tausug speaking, Muslim from Zamboanga or Sulu. The third point is that what distinguishes simply people watching from the more purposive and careful watching of people is not just the ethical inclination and assumed responsibility for one’s compatriots the latter entails but also an embodied awareness and sensitivity to other people’s comportment and demeanour acquired through both direct observation and face-to-face encounters, as well as in mediated forms of exchange via mobile telephony, text messages, etc. It is creative and innovative, using the skills and resources at hand to negotiate, build bridges and overcome both real and perceived obstacles: in this case it involved Kalemni making use of his status as a waiter to enable careful connections with women in search of a helping hand out with the careless, and criminal justice, ministrations of the state.

The social and embodied practices of watching that I have conceptualized here as an example of pastoral power among migrants may be further illuminated through reference to Simone’s (2004) concept of ‘people as infrastructure’. People as infrastructure refers to people’s activities in urban environments where the lack of and/or routine failures of state organized infrastructure necessitates and enables forms of social, economic and material improvisation through which people create the ‘platform providing for and reproducing life in the city’ (2004: 408). In the Saudi context, there is no question about the government’s capacity to provide adequate infrastructure for its populace including foreign residents whose labour its citizens rely on daily. Rather, what necessitates and enables migrant practices of watching out and caring for each other are the forms of ‘infrastructural violence’ that shape their lives (Rogers and O’Neill 2012: 4030); that is, the ‘everyday, interpersonal violence and suffering many of the foreign workers in the Gulf states endure’ as a result of infrastructural arrangements that, ‘so intricately construct, limit, and govern their existence in the Gulf’ (Gardner 2010: 7; see also Madhavi 2011: 95-7; Nagy 1998a, 1998b, 2006).

Following feminist scholarship (Clisby and Holdsworth 2014: 7-12; Moraga and Anzaldua 1984; Irigaray 1977), we might further think about migrants’ practice as an ‘embodied infrastructure of care’, a formulation that highlights not just the exemplary forms of infrastructural piracy and poetics (Larkin 2004) but also the often unseen and unnoticed bodily practices that daily create those ‘platforms for living’. Elyachar (2010), for example, contends that social networks are often a secondary outcome of people’s, and in particular women’s, daily phatic, convivial and affective practices of sociality that create infrastructural pathways that are subsequently mobilized for private ends and/or public good. In the situation described here, the line between ‘phatic practices’ and ‘infrastructural pathways’ are rarely distinguishable. More significant is attention to the gender of embodied infrastructures and the differently gendered consequences of the practice of pastoral power. On the one hand, because migrant Filipino women’s participation in community and civil society organizations is curtailed or restricted in what is an overtly patriarchal and state-enforced gender segregated society (Al-Rasheed 2013), migrant men have come to the fore to assume much of the informal community care and solidarity work that at home might
conventionally have been undertaken by women (see Johnson n.d.). On the other hand, while caring has come to be a dominant model of and for masculinity among migrant Filipino men in that place, as I describe further below, it is often articulated in ways that extend men’s normative control over women and that reproduces what Young (2003), in another context, refers to as the ‘logic of masculinist protection’. 

**Gender, Care and Control in Migrant Surveillance Practices**

Migrant surveillance infrastructures that are part of informal practices of care are filled with contradiction and ambivalence, as evidenced in the way that Kalemni describes the women who he has helped and in his account of the uncertainty of their fates in different scenarios, as my field notes from our conversations reveals:

Just because someone runs away or finds somewhere else, doesn’t mean they are safe. [Kalemni] said that ‘some of them are bad girls, looking for a Filipino guy to take care of them. They say they are looking for a guy, even if that means living together unlawfully, just to have someone look after them. It may be the last solution, but not many are looking for other work’. Most of them he said did not want to work for Saudi families, and would prefer to work for Filipinos. The food is different and they are treated differently. Arabs usually pay less, 700 Riyals; Filipinos will pay more, 1000+ Riyals. Those that do find work, usually only stay for a short time. They don’t have the right iqama (official resident card that identifies work and sponsor). They may work in the home but may also clean offices and hospitals. They are looking for a partner to secure their stay even if they do not get legal status. ‘I [Kalemni] ask them, “why is that the solution”, and they say for legal reasons and protection, so that they may feel safe [those that get married]’. Kalemni said it does not always work out that way, there has been some bad feedback from the Bahay Kalinga (house of care), sometimes a saviour turns out not to treat them well. Kalemni has heard of cases where they are sold for sex. Sometimes, the Islamic Centre [where some takas also go] takes them and marries them off, rather than send them to the embassy, or give them work among the brothers. When they go there, they [people in Islamic centre] automatically ask if they are a Christian, tell them about Islam (da‘wah), try to get them to convert, then maybe see if there are brothers, Filipinos or Saudis, who might want to marry them.

Kalemni’s mention of the da‘wah centre makes the invocation of Foucault’s (2009) notion of pastoral power especially pertinent in this context; that is, in Saudi Arabia migrant workers have often and increasingly been specific targets of government-sanctioned and sponsored Islamic da‘wah centres. These da‘wah centres (officially the Cooperative Office for Call and Guidance [COCG] under the ministry of Islamic affairs) care for souls and to a lesser extent social and material needs, both those who are Muslim already but also and especially those from different faith traditions. For example, at the da‘wah centre in Batha’ in Riyadh, migrant men, mainly Filipino, but also some other South Asian men, many newly converted or ‘reverted’ to Islam participate in a range of activities at the COCG’s villa: a complex that in addition to teaching and prayer hall includes a basketball court and swimming pool. On one Thursday I joined a large group of men there and we were given religious instruction by the Sheikh, who is formally in charge of that centre, followed by prayers, a shared meal, and subsequently, for those who wished to participate, a game of basketball.

Tracing historically and ethnographically the way that the Saudi state has come to employ pastoral power through da‘wah centres is a topic for another paper: my focus here is on the watching practices of migrants. I draw attention to it here for two reasons. The first is that the gendered nature of pastoral power practiced by migrants—evident in the way that Kalemni and others, women and men (see below and Johnson 2011) talk about female migrant domestic workers as both victim and transgressor—is not only
shaped by dominant and disciplinary gender ideologies that travel with them from their home country. Rather it is shaped also by the gender regime encountered in Saudi Arabia that in law, as in dominant public ideology, positions both citizen and foreign resident men as ‘protectors’ and ‘guardians’ of women. In the talk that the Sheikh gave at the event sponsored by the da’wah centre which I attended, one part of his lecture alluded directly to the possibility that migrant men could rescue their needy compatriot women through marriage.

Second, Kalemni’s reference to the da’wah centre’s potential involvement in ‘rescuing’ women is evidence of the way that migrant watching practices may become entangled, even if indirectly, with state surveillance practices in one way or another. In the remaining part of the paper I recount and explore another series of related vignettes that further illuminate the gendered nature of pastoral power, the connections between care and control and the entanglements between different sorts of watching, from above and below, in a transnational social space. The starting point is the story that a woman, referred to here as Deng, disclosed during an interview in Manila in July, 2008.

**Entanglements of pastoral power in a transnational space**

Deng is a middle aged woman who is legally married but separated from her husband (who had taken a new wife) and her several children who lived with her husband in Basilan. Deng had recently returned to Manila from Riyadh where she had lately been imprisoned for some months, an abrupt and unpleasant end to a three-year sojourn and reportedly her fifth outing as a migrant domestic worker in the Kingdom. Piecing together a story that was recounted with some agitation, it appears that Deng had either left or been forced out of her original employer’s home. Her employer reportedly kept her passport, residency papers, salary and mobile phone. She then spent a year working ‘outside’ as a ‘freelancer’; that is, working irregularly in a variety of foreign expat homes in a gated community in Riyadh while living ‘outside’ with friends who I understood also to be ‘freelancers’. At various points in recounting her traumatic story she suggested that it was one or other or both her original employer and/or fellow Filipinos, identified as balik Islam (new Muslim converts from among formerly Christian Filipinos), alleged to be in the pay of the ‘religious police’, that turned her into the authorities, either because of her irregular status and/or because she and her friends with whom she shared a flat freely mixed with and invited other men into their home.

As indicated previously, on an everyday basis in Saudi Arabia, it is the ‘religious’ rather than the regular police who many migrants deemed the most troubling and troublesome. Deng’s story highlights the way in which migrant surveillance practices are not just controlling and corruptible, but also not separate entirely from state, or in this case quasi-state, surveillance. I have no way of corroborating directly Deng’s story about the alleged involvement of a ‘religious police’ informant she identified as a ‘balik Islam’ Filipino, though stories of fellow Filipinos acting as ‘religious police’ informers were reported by other Filipino migrants. Many, though not all, were said to be balik Islam Filipinos who are regarded ambivalently both by Christian Filipinos and by born or ethnically identified Muslim Filipinos. Others identified fellow ethnically identified Muslims as among the ‘religious police’ informers.

Kalemni’s brother Buddi, for example, told me about a born Muslim man who had worked as driver in the home of some official in the Muslim Youth League, and had, through them, come to work for both the ‘religious police’ (CPVPV) and the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution. Buddi alleged that the man was officially registered with them and carried a gun. His surveillance work was focused on the use of illegal drugs, religious gatherings of people proscribed by Saudi law (such as Christian gatherings) and meetings of mixed sex groups. Buddi said that he had heard that the police informer did not plan on returning to the Philippines. There were too many people who knew him and were angry with him for what he had done and was doing. Buddi compared the man’s actions to Filipino informers during the Japanese occupation, referred to commonly as makapili, and associated especially with the practice
whereby informers’ heads would be covered with a bamboo basket to enable them to mask their own identity while identifying members of the resistance in a line up. Buddi said that he knew the guy and on a one to one basis he could be ‘OK’, but he even ‘looked shifty’—‘you wouldn’t trust him with the cap of your pen’. He reportedly kept changing his cell phone SIM card. Buddi disclosed that he had eight different numbers for the guy stored in his iPhone. Explaining the reason for holding those numbers, Buddi referred vaguely to past dealings with the man to do with a fight between a fellow ethnic Tausug, whom Buddi deemed himself responsible for, and a Filipino from another ethnic group. Buddi said that he sought his help because of his formal connections with the police; he tried otherwise to keep his distance from him. He saw him occasionally at the local *tapsilog* (Filipino restaurant) near one of the hospitals in Riyadh where, Buddi alleged, he spied on Filipinos who worked and lived there. He just waved but did not converse with him. When he saw him in Batha’, the most visible meeting place for Filipinos, he would greet him in passing, but did not get close to him. He did not want people to associate him with the guy.

Again I have no way of corroborating Buddi’s story about the police informer or his involvement with him one way or the other. I did have the opportunity to meet, though significantly back in Manila, both a ‘balik’ (convert) and a ‘born’ (ethnic) Muslim Filipino who disclosed separately in conversations that they had worked with and alongside the ‘religious police’ as volunteers. Neither of the men, however, admitted to shopping their fellow Filipinos. Rather, they both contended, their role was one of providing sincere and friendly religious instruction, in keeping with what they said was the true spirit of the ‘religious police’, that is to ‘promote virtue and prevent vice’ and also to warn, in advance, Filipinos whose behaviour was likely to draw the attention of the ‘religious police’ so that they had a chance to alter their ways and avoid apprehension. The way that both men described their roles echoes Foucault’s (2009) delineation of pastoral power as care for and about people’s bodies, soul and conduct.

Having detailed something of the complexity of migrant surveillance, including potential betrayal and entanglements with state surveillance apparatus in the Kingdom, I want to return to Deng’s story to say something more about the context in which her story was recounted to me since it demonstrates the mundane ways that practices of care are linked with social control in a transnational social field (Levitt and Schiller 2004; Hannaford 2014). I had been directed to this women specifically by four young Masters students from the Institute of Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines who acted as research assistants during my initial forays into ‘Mini-Mindanao,’ the name given to an emergent community of Filipino Muslims in Quezon City that had grown up around the movement of migrants between the Southern Philippines and the Gulf in the past two decades. The home in which the story was recounted belonged to the aunt of one of the students who herself had formerly been a migrant domestic worker in Saudi Arabia. She now ran a boarding house for women, mainly from her home place in Basilan, who were on their way to or from the gulf, as well as, in the case of her niece, studying in Manila, part of the informal migration infrastructures and migration industry that has grown up around migration to the Gulf especially. At the time of my visit to their home, there were, in addition to Deng, two other newly returned migrants from Saudi who also listened into and commented on Deng’s story about her recent experiences.

Initially aghast at hearing about her arrest, Deng’s story was increasingly interrupted by the others present who, in the guise of clarifying the story for me, were drawn into our exchange and became her main interlocutors: did she run away or was she driven from her employer’s home? Why did her employer take her phone? Was it because of boyfriends? Did she see out her original contract, and how long was she TNT (*tago nang tago*, literally hide and hide, an escapee or irregular migrant)? Visibly weary from all the questions going back and forth, which I suspect she had heard repeatedly on previous occasions, she went to her bedroom and collected her phone, returning to replay what I anticipated would be a video recording of her arrest. As it turned out, it was just a picture of her flat in Riyadh and of her and her friends, women and men, watching TV: that, she said, ironically, was her ‘sin’.
Deng asserted, defiantly, that despite the arrest she enjoyed her life there, had made good friends and that given the opportunity she would return, possibly not to Riyadh, but to Dubai or Qatar where she had also worked previously. And while she might go as a domestic worker, she reckoned that her best bet would still be to work outside of the home as a ‘freelancer’ since she did not have qualifications that would enable her to secure a better paying job in the normal route. She then retreated back to her room and did not reappear. As she left, various remarks were made about how harsh and extreme (grabi) the Saudi authorities’ response to her had been. One of the other migrant women, however, who proceeded to share her experience of life working in the Kingdom prefaced her remarks pointedly by saying that she had a better experience in the country because she focused exclusively on her work and had not, in her words, forgotten her husband and family back home.

In another context Deng’s video selfie would be unremarkable in an age characterised increasingly by what some theorists contend is our enjoyment of watching and being watched (Lyon 2006). In this context, however, that video selfie might reasonably be understood as a form of more careful self-watching, visual evidence recorded and safeguarded by Deng to be used and displayed against the implicit charge made by any interlocutor that she had engaged in perceived sexual misconduct: they were just a group of friends watching TV. At the same time her defiant display of the event might also be understood as a form of ‘counter conduct’, not just a refusal of the charge of actual sexual misconduct, but also a refusal of the gender normative constraints that she encountered both in Saudi Arabia and in her home country (Foucault 2009; Pingol 2010).

**Conclusions**

I have suggested that it is important to move beyond the usual foci on borders and boundaries that characterize much of the literature on surveillance and migration and that mirrors the overweening emphasis on control that characterizes surveillance literature generally. Rather, I draw together the notion of pastoral power with that of embodied infrastructures of care to develop a conceptual framework to help us understand the social processes and bodily practices that characterize the way that migrant Filipinos in Saudi Arabia watch, care and attend to each other: a distributed but hierarchically gendered, form of lateral surveillance that, like the unmarked but presumed masculine identified, shepherd or pastor, is concerned with ‘keeping an eye out for possible evils, but above all in the sense of vigilance with regard to any possible misfortune’ (Foucault 2009: 127).

What, if anything, new and distinctive might the conjunction of these two concepts add to our understanding of surveillance and migration? Infrastructure, so we are told, is invisible normally (Star 1999; Graham and Thrift 2007). That may be partially true for a privileged minority. For many others, perhaps the majority, filling in the cracks of and becoming the infrastructure of their own lives is the all too visible condition of existence. That is the situation for many migrants who not only wo/man the backstage infrastructural operations of the minority world’s front stage, but who also must create the offstage infrastructures that enables them to travel to, live in and work in those backstage operations (see e.g., Lindquist 2012). Like infrastructure, surveillance is also at its most effective as an instrument of social control when it is invisible and recedes into the background to become part of the furniture so to speak. I think it is reasonable to suggest that migrants rarely take surveillance for granted, even if they are not aware of all the sorts of surveillance they are subjected to and are likely to have varying degrees of knowledge about or interest in the apparatus of surveillance and its role in governance more broadly. The question I have posed here is: what sorts of surveillance practices do they choose to participate in actively themselves and/or are compelled to take on as agents, rather than simply subjects of surveillance, in order to facilitate daily life, including the life of those who they feel in some way morally and ethically responsible for and to?
As the ethnographic vignettes in this paper disclose, for many migrants, bodily practices of watching are an ordinary feature of people’s transnational lives and relations. They are also mobilized in the specific conditions of residence in particular situations; in this case, as foreign workers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia whose governance—in terms of monitoring and care—have largely been conferred by the state on to citizen employers, as well as to state sponsored forms of pastoral power in the form of the COCG da’wah centres and ‘religious police’ concerned primarily with appropriate religious conduct in the here and now and salvation in the hereafter. While the state increasingly oversees and supplements citizen employers’ powers of monitoring foreign residents’ / employees’ adherence to their conditions of stay through instruments such as the mobile phone app that alerts employers if their domestic worker leaves the country, it is only minimally concerned with and invested in regulating conditions of employment or ensuring their care. That specifically gendered form of selective non-surveillance is the other side of the ‘responsibilization’ process that other theorists contend lies at the heart of lateral and peer-to-peer surveillance under conditions of neo-liberal governance (Garland 1996; Andrejevic 2005; Staples and Dekker 2008). That is to say, while the ‘responsibilization’ of citizens is meant ideally to defer, partially, but never fully, state responsibility for security and care onto its population, what I describe here is a situation where the abdication of state responsibility for the care, if not control, of its foreign residents means that the former have to stand in as an informally constituted government watching out for and monitoring each other for the purposes of care especially.

That does not mean, as the ethnographic vignettes presented above disclose, that those surveillance practices and care work offer a singularly positive outcome for people reliant and dependent on what I have referred to as embodied infrastructures of care. Clearly they are not. However, the practice of pastoral power that I have identified here suggests that we need to complicate considerably the overly pessimistic premises of those who have suggested that contemporary forms of neo-liberal governance, including the bio-technological systems of surveillance and control, inevitably have a de-solidirising effect (see e.g., Starr et al. 2008; Wacquant 2008, 2009). The informal trust, hopeful expectations, ethical inclinations and creative capacities of people who feel bound to each other through the affective solidarities of ethnic, national and/or religious belonging and/or more broadly from the shared predicament of precarity often, though not always, engenders, as it genders in culturally specific ways, the kindness of strangers. Inevitably, of course, there are limitations to a ‘people as infrastructure’ system though it is not only the gender normative constraints, ethical lapses and abuses of people that compr(om)ises those infrastructures that is most troubling. Rather, as the police informers and da’wah centres suggest, it is the capacity of the state to colonize indirectly and corrupt purposively that bodily infrastructure through the rhizomatic tentacles of its own and other surveillance systems.

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