Cultural policy frameworks

(Re)constructing national and supranational identities:
The Balkans and the European Union

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Dedicated to Dragan Klaić (1950-2011)
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At the threshold of the 60th Anniversary of the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) in 2014 we mark a decade since the launch of the Cultural Policy Research Award (CPRA). It was in 2003 when ECF and the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond decided to launch a project for encouraging young scholars (under 35) to work in applied and comparative cultural policy research in Europe.

The CPRA award is a 10,000 € investment in the best and most promising new research project, which should be accomplished within a year by a young researcher. Thanks to the long-standing commitment of our partners, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and ENCATC, as well as the international jury, the competition has grown in strength, and the research topics have become sharper and more relevant. Today CPRA enjoys an affiliated and vibrant community of young researchers.

*Cultural policy frameworks (re)constructing national and supranational identities: The Balkans and the European Union* by Aleksandar Brkić was the project that won the 8th Cultural Policy Research Award in 2011. This contribution comes at a time when citizens’ actions, movements and networks are mobilising against political populism and neo-nationalism, where EU institutions and international conventions are being questioned. Intercultural awareness embedded in sound participatory cultural policies is becoming an ever more important factor for peace and prosperity in Europe – at all policy levels. Aleksandar has presented evidence for this by researching the role of cultural networks and bottom-up frameworks for fostering interculturality and social engagement of cultural sectors. He makes clear arguments for core values that support an open, democratic and inclusive Europe. Furthermore, Aleksandar outlines how these values might be fostered by connecting different communities to policy processes thereby reinforcing democracy. These ideas and principles
are at the heart of the ECF’s work and have been independently verified by this research.

Aleksandar Brkić defended his PhD in July 2013 at the Faculty of Dramatic Arts, University of Arts in Belgrade and is now a lecturer at the Arts Management Programme, LASALLE College of the Arts in Singapore. We are happy to celebrate his double success with this publication.

Isabelle Schwarz
Head of Advocacy, Research and Development
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And, of course, I would like to thank my wife Dragana Ladjevac-Brkić and my daughter Tara for having immense understanding during the period I invested in this research. Together with our son Veljko, expressing his support while still being in the stomach, they were my biggest inspiration. Sara, my sister, was helping me in a practical way, transcribing the interviews I conducted, and being there for me whenever I needed her, while my best friends, Vlastimir Puhalo, Zoran Stojanović and Stefan Mladenović, were “the last men standing” when everyone else was gone. My parents... well, they became so nervous
while waiting for me to finish my PhD thesis, that in the meantime they retired and became pensioners. I just hope they are proud, at least half as much as they were when their grandchildren were born. I would also like partly to dedicate this research to Dragi Ladjevac, my father-in-law and a wonderful man, who passed away in 2012.
Preface

My personal and professional development has been influenced by the events happening in the Balkans during the 1990s and the 2000’s. On the one hand I had to develop a personal defence mechanism with which to process all the overwhelming negative events, hoping that my region would become a more stable community (or a network of stable communities). At the same time I tried to think critically about the EU integration processes from a larger perspective, trying to avoid the simplifications of the black and white context in which we lived in.

This research helped me to connect my direct and indirect experiences from former Yugoslavia (an attempt at supranational union) (Volcic, 2007) with the experiences of the European Union, both conceived as abstract concepts with permanent or occasional identity crises. This was also a serious challenge for me, because the proposed research demanded an interdisciplinary approach with deep insights into the knowledge bases of different scientific fields, while trying to avoid a superficial approach (which can easily happen with topics like interculturalism, identity, etc.). I hope that by using my experience, knowledge and motivation, I was able to avoid these traps and come up with an innovative approach and inspiring results which will be used by my colleague researchers, cultural policy experts, as well as cultural practitioners.
Executive summary

The interdisciplinary research that follows is an analysis of the influence of European and regional cultural networks and platforms on the (re)construction of national and supranational identities, with a focus on European Union and the Balkans. It emphasises the role and some functions of networks and platforms in the field of culture as well as those elements of cultural policy frameworks relating to intercultural dialogue, which favour intercultural and transnational cultural models. A special focus is placed on the spaces of overlapping identities from the perspective of cultural policy. The case of the former Yugoslavia is used as a specific example of similar experiences of supranational identity practice that can be compared to cultural policy experiences in the European Union.

Using three case studies - Banlieues d’Europe, a European network, based in Lyon, France; Clubture, a network based in Croatia; and the Transeuropa Festival (TEF) based in a number of cities across Europe, the research focuses on existing and potential connections between cultural policies in Europe and the construction of identities, and on networks in the field of culture, which take intercultural dialogue from ideology and theory to cultural practices and grass roots initiatives.

At the same time this research investigates how it is possible to have more influence on explicit cultural policies, which are often accused of significant separation from the reality of communities whose voices and visions they should represent.
This research defines new roles and formats of cultural organizations and the importance of cultural networks in Europe in the context of “methodological cosmopolitanism”, proposing not only a vision for Europe which has a cosmopolitan spirit, but a vision of a cosmopolitan Europe that is also applicable through cultural policies, strategies, goals, criteria and indicators. It proposes a new angle on the role of cultural networking in Europe from the perspective of methodological cosmopolitanism, connecting it to four concepts - European community, cultural policy, academic reflection and artistic creativity. In this model, methodological cosmopolitanism shifts the cultural network and places it at the centre of a multi-layered and multi-perspective communication and cultural production process. The cultural network is viewed as a social change network, with a social leadership as a prerequisite for its sustainability, and wider aspects of cross-collaborative perspectives that can help the network to have a more substantial effect in the society.

Taking into account problems in the practical application of the “methodological cosmopolitanism” model within the landscape of cultural networks in Europe, the outcome of the research provides policy recommendations that can lead towards a new European value chain. These recommendations are dealing with the “us and them” paradigm; proposals for much more focused interventions in the spaces of traditional, amateur and popular culture, as well as in the media; support for macro-regional cultural networking initiatives; encouragement of ‘artivist’ approaches in cultural practice; support for participative and bottom-up initiatives and a transition in European discourse from the margins of public space to the centre of political space.
Acronyms and abbreviations

BE – Banlieues d’Europe

COE – Council of Europe

CBC – Cross-border co-operation

CBR – Cross-border regions

CEEC - Central and Eastern European Countries

DG EAC – Directorate General Education and Culture of the European Commission

DMIS – Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity

EA - European Alternatives

EC - European Commission

NCB – National Coordinating Bodies responsible for delivery of the EYID at the national level

ECF – European Cultural Foundation

EU – European Union
EYID – European Year of Intercultural Dialogue

ICD – Intercultural dialogue

KUD – Kulturno-umetničko društvo (Culture/arts Association)

NCB – National Coordinating Bodies

NEF – Network of European Foundations

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SIZ – Samoupravna interesna zajednica (Self-governing communities of interest)

TEF – Transeuropa Festival

UEFB – Union of European Football Associations

WWII – World War II
1 Introduction: Dialogue of identities as a precondition to Europe

1.1 Research backdrop: Intercultural dialogue in Europe and the Balkans

The first set of objectives in the document entitled European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World, was the “promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue” (European Commission, 2007). This priority was set in the year 2008 when the European Union (EU) celebrated The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (EYID) under the title “Together in Diversity.” Most of the events and initiatives that were co-organized or supported by the European Commission (EC) that year were related to the topic of intercultural dialogue (DG EAC, 2008).¹ The EC’s programme aimed to celebrate

¹ Events were organized on three different levels: supranational, the so-called “European level”, with its flagship projects involving partner organizations from all around Europe www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/354.0.html (accessed 3 December 2012); the level of cooperation of the member-states of the EU and 3rd countries www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/653.0.html (accessed 3 December 2012), mostly focusing on the conflict territories of Israel and Palestine and Maghreb countries of
cultural diversity, mediation and dialogue, and tried to push forward policies on these issues. Policy aims in this field were segmented into the following topics: culture and the media, education/science, migration, minorities, multilingualism, religion, the workplace and youth.²

As a follow-up to The Faro Declaration (Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society) by the Conference of European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs (Council of Europe, 2005), the Council of Europe (COE) launched the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue in May 2008 (Council of Europe, 2008). UNESCO also supported these initiatives, contributing to the debate on the implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2011).

The European Cultural Foundation (ECF), whose first guiding principle is “support for different communities in Europe and especially encouragement of the exchange and empowerment of under-represented groups”,³ together with the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage (now Culture Action Europe) and the support of the Network of European Foundations (NEF) set up The Platform for Intercultural Europe, which published The Rainbow Paper (Intercultural Dialogue: From Practice to Policy and Back) on 25

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September 2008 (Frank, 2008). The Rainbow Paper aimed to be the voice of over 200 local, national and European civil sector organizations dealing with the issues of intercultural dialogue and acting as a framework linking “people and organizations promoting Intercultural Dialogue at the grass roots with those who work on policy” (Frank, 2008).

At a national level various initiatives, including platforms and flagship projects have taken place such as, The Year of Multiculturalism in Sweden in 2006 or The Kosmopolis Project in Netherlands,⁴ where the cities of Utrecht, Den Haag and Rotterdam had the goal of nourishing dialogue between communities through arts and culture. Europe was, at least at official levels, interlinked with intercultural dialogue initiatives, policy analysis and debates. At the same time, during a year that was supposed to celebrate intercultural dialogue, one more topic unexpectedly appeared and proved to be much more important and visible in 2008 - the collapse of the global financial system with all its consequences. The overarching crisis, which is not only a European issue, but also a question of the “world risk society” (Beck, 1999) and a crisis of neoliberal capitalism (Ali, 2012), transcended all official and unofficial frameworks and appeared to be one of the most serious challenges to the European Union since its beginning. The crisis brought to the surface some crucial issues facing European societies, which were far from being connected only with the economy (Bonet and Donato, 2011) and brought into focus relationships between identity, nationalism and cultural policy.

It is debatable whether EYID brought any significant change to Europe (Näss, 2010). Prior to the implementation of EYID not all

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⁴ www.kosmopolis.nl (accessed 22 February 2013)
commentators embraced the theme, some noting that intercultural dialogue was adding to the pot of “shallow global diversity” (Friedman, 1995) or being boiled down to “an exchange of polite truisms” (Klaic, 2006). Problems of intolerance, religious/sectarian conflicts, problematic immigration policies and nationalist forces continue to figure on the European list of priorities.

This rising nationalist sentiment is easily noticed when conducting comparative policy research on the issue of intercultural dialogue. By looking at the cultural policy reports by local independent experts in individual European countries for the Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe (Council of Europe and ERICArts, 2012) it can be seen that centre-left and centre-right ideologies (if there are any real ideologies left?) are merging, giving relevance to political discourses and directing them toward “politico-economic uniformity and intellectual conformism” (Ali, 2009: 103).

Statements and decisions by the Chancellor of Germany (Angela Merkel), former President of France (Nicolas Sarkozy) and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (David Cameron), (arguably three of the strongest partners in the EU), claim the end of multiculturalism, and question the frames and even the need for the European Union (Jura, 2012). This is a signal to researchers, policy makers and cultural practitioners that they need to connect with other fields and sectors and to rethink the role of culture and arts in building on the concepts of multicultural society and intercultural dialogue. At the same time, voices introducing concern over the crisis of multiculturalism in the UK (Runnymede Trust, 2000), Germany (Diehl and Blomm, 2003), France (Kastroyano, 2005), and other EU countries, can be considered as a
starting point for the search for new definitions and narratives in Europe.

It is necessary to evaluate the results of former years, when these concepts were emphasised, but obviously not enough substance was put behind them. The period of economic crisis (which is actually an identity crisis) revealed in a very vivid way that Europe is still placed low on Bennett’s DMIS scale (Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity) (Bennett, 1986, 1993), somewhere between Defence and Minimization (Dragičević Šešić and Dragojević, 2011).

Radical identity politics were brought back to the surface in Europe through events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the wars in the former Yugoslavia (Neumann, 2006). After the process of territorial and cultural deconstruction in the region of the Balkans (or more precisely, in the region politically defined as Western Balkans), which has still not been completed, all the young (or refurbished) states which came out of the former Yugoslavia entered processes to establish and consolidate their new/old national or ethno-national identities.

These identities were almost always based on strengthening and supporting existing and “undisputed” ethno-national paradigms (e.g. Serbia and Croatia) or creating new ones i.e. Bosniaks⁵ in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Landry, 2002) and Macedonians “invented

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⁵ Although there is a tendency to present ‘Bosniak’ (‘Bošnjak’) as an expression representing all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it actually most accurately represents the members of Muslim community of the Slavic origin in the country; it is not the same expression as ‘Bosnian’ (‘Bosanac’), which represents all the citizens living in the territory of Bosnia.
tradition” (Hobsbawm, 1983). The process from Slavic into Ancient Macedonian identity in the Republic of Macedonia\textsuperscript{6} is also a clear illustration of this point.

All processes of identity translation pose a new challenge for the process of reconciliation and intercultural dialogue in the region. (Re)creation of the identities of ethno-national communities which make up the majority in a certain nation-state initiate the (re)creation of identities and repositioning of minorities in the neighbouring countries (Montenegrins and Bosniaks in Serbia; Serbs in Croatia, Montenegro, and Kosovo; Croatians in Bosnia etc.). We can define these processes as the consequences of the “unfinished modernization” (Kulić, 2009) of the countries in the Balkans. These processes do not allow the region of the Western Balkans to start relating to other types of communities either by reconstructing the memory of local and micro-regional patriotism, seen by some as the only relevant type of patriotism (Kecmanović, 2006), or by developing a relation with the supranational European identity.

Parallel to the processes happening in the Balkans, cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue were being promoted as the

\textsuperscript{6} The flagship project of this invented identity process is the redevelopment of the central urban area of Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, described as “an eclectic mishmash of ½ applied, ¼ explained, and 1/10 understood historical references” (Vilikj, 2012). This case is thoroughly analysed in the master’s thesis written by Lea Linin at the UNESCO Department for Cultural Policy and Management at the University of Arts in Belgrade. “Trying to incorporate a new city identity layer, the project Skopje 2014 fuses together a contradicting set of identity narrative lines: ‘Europeanization’ (referred to as a term which expresses modernization) and ‘antiquisation’ (a term which refers to the Renaissance practice of classically organizing city structures in order to resemble ancient Rome or Athens) (Linin, 2012: 36).
core values in society in the European Union, but the problematic relationship between national identity and supranational unity remained unsolved. Although approaches to the construction of identities in the Balkans and the EU were different, the results are very similar - in the majority of the individual EU countries and in the countries of the Western Balkans, nationalism is a growing political and cultural trend. Culture played (and continues to play) a large role in these processes of strengthening identities, both in the EU and also in all of the countries of former Yugoslavia (Mokre, 2011; Dragićević Šešić, 2011).

Nevertheless, some important questions are being asked by professionals working in the field of culture/arts and cultural policy in the EU (as witnessed in numerous conferences and debates organized by the Platform for Intercultural Europe; More Europe; Culture Action Europe; Banlieues d’Europe; Transeuropa Festival; Subversive Festival etc.). Questions such as: Does culture and art have enough power to influence these processes? Do European societies understand the value and power of culture? Was this power understood only by some parts of society, mostly by right-wing political parties and their supporters in Europe, who did not see an interest in developing a more intercultural, open and shared space (Ali, 2012)?

Trying to find answers to some of these questions, we must constantly be aware that the consequences of globalization, which radically changed the relations between subjectivity, location, political identification and social imagination (Appadurai in: Baldauf and Hoeller, 2008), and life in the network society (Castells, 2000) are the crucial elements for the (re)thinking of cultural policy frameworks.
New cultural spaces defined by flexible borders provide for cultural (re)identification and at the same time are subjected to emerging (re)established ethnic, national and professional delimitations (Švob-Đokić, 2011: 114). Cultural networks emerged as crucial elements for future cultural integration processes, and we must start from them to understand the institutions (Beck, 2005). Cultural organizations as part of networks and the civic society may prove crucial to the organization of social and political life in the times “Beyond 2020” and the world of “real virtuality” (Rheingold, 1993).

1.2 Research questions, objectives and methods

This research raises the following questions:

- How do culture and arts organizations in Europe influence (re)constructions of national and supranational identities?
- What is the importance of European and regional cultural networks for the construction of supranational and transnational identities in Europe?
- What are the links between these networks and cultural policy frameworks in the context of intercultural dialogue?
- Under what conditions can cultural organizations help bring more efficient, bottom-up approaches to cultural policy-making?
- How can cultures of diverse national and macro-regional communities of Europe be more directly represented?
- Is it possible to contribute to the development of a common, supranational cultural policy framework for the European Union?
The objectives of this interdisciplinary research are to analyse the influence of European and regional cultural networks and platforms on the (re)construction of national and supranational identities, with a focus on the European Union and the Balkans, as well as to research the connections between these networks and platforms and explicit cultural policies in Europe.

The main objective of the research is to emphasise some of the functions of networks and platforms in the field of culture as well as those elements of cultural policy frameworks relating to intercultural dialogue which favour intercultural and transnational cultural models.

This research will also analyse the relation between European and regional cultural identities, focusing mostly on the relations between the European Union and the Balkans, researching the spaces of overlapping identities from the perspective of cultural policy. The case of the former Yugoslavia is used as a specific example of similar experiences of supranational identity practice that can be compared to some experiences of the European Union, concerning cultural policy.

This research brings more focus on existing and potential connections between cultural policies in Europe and the construction of identities, and on networks in the field of culture, which take intercultural dialogue from ideology and theory to cultural practices and the grass roots. This also means challenging the roles of cultural organizations that are (should be) part of civil society, and asking whether they could get closer to the communities they (should) represent using “timely action in the present, seeking to transform historical patterns into future possibilities” (Chandler and Torbert, 2003). At the same time this
research investigates how it is possible to have more influence on explicit cultural policies, which are becoming significantly separated from the communities whose voices and visions they should represent. In real life, “the formal documentary life of mission statements, policies and procedures may contrast sharply with the informal life of organizations” (Williamson and Prosser, 2002: 588).


Also, the research uses theories of nationalism (Orwell, 1945; Calhoun, 1993; Ignatieff, 1996; Smith, 2001; Brubejker, 2003; Kecmanović, 2006; Duelund, 2011) and the theories of multiculturalism and interculturalism (Bennett, 1986, 1993; Dragićević Šešić and Dragojević, 2004, 2011; Klaić, 2006; Nass, 2010; Nasar and Tariq, 2012) to be able to evaluate the cultural
policies in Europe connected to intercultural dialogue (Dragićević Šešić and Dragojević, 2005; Mulcahy, 2006; Višnić and Dragojević, 2008; Đukić, 2010; Brkić, 2011; Bonet and Donato, 2011; Dragićević Šešić, 2011a), with an interdisciplinary and multi-perspective approach using different critical theories (Kellner, 1995).

This research is based on qualitative research methods, such as semi-structured interviews, along with direct and indirect observation. It has been conducted in four phases:

**Phase 1: Literature review with the aim of setting up a theoretical framework for empirical research**

**Phase 2: Empirical research**

**Phase 3: Analysis of empirical data**

**Phase 4: Interpretation of empirical data (qualitative interpretative methods) with theoretical contributions and policy recommendations**

**Phase 1: Literature review**

Interdisciplinary research, such as this, needs to cover a wide scientific scope. In the initial research phase literature from different fields was read, reviewed and put in the context of the research topic. The methodology includes, philosophy (discussions on globalization, national identity, the idea of Europe, networks in contemporary society etc.); sociology (theory of networks; community studies etc.); studies of identity (European identity and the identity of the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia) and; cultural policy.

**Phase 2: Empirical research**

**Phase 2.1. Desk research**

During the desk research phase a large number of secondary
sources of data were used, mostly available online, such as Compendium of Basic Trends and Facts (Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe), Labforculture, Council of Europe, national governments databases, and UNESCO. These are used mainly as resources for the comparative analysis of the top-down approach to cultural policy strategies and of measures connected to intercultural dialogue at the level of the EU and national levels of European countries (Council of Europe members). Most of the available sources connected with the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (EYID) were also used, such as evaluations and information on projects and initiatives conducted under the frame of EYID, UNESCO and the Council of Europe. A comparative analysis of these instruments was used as a basic research method in this phase.

Phase 2.2. Field research: Cultural policy conferences and seminars
Observation of cultural policy expert circles at academic and cultural policy conferences with intercultural dialogue as one of the topics of the discussion has been conducted. This phase was connected with action research according to Kurt Lewin’s notion that in order to “understand and change certain social practices, social scientists have to include practitioners from the real social world in all phases of inquiry” (McKernan 1991: 10), because documenting idiosyncratic, local knowledge (Selby and Bradley, 2003) was a crucial element of the research process.

Cultural policy conferences and seminars observed during the process of research included:
• Platform for Intercultural Europe and Arts Council of Northern Ireland, 6th Practice Exchange on Intercultural Capacity-building: Navigating the journey from conflict to interculturalism - The role of arts in Northern Ireland, Belfast (UK), 15-16th November 2012.
• 19th Meeting of Banlieues d’Europe, “The Role of culture Faced with the Rise of Nationalism in Europe: Citizens Resistance!”, Turin (Italy), 21-23th November 2012.

**Phase 2.3. Case studies method**

The central phase of this research is based on the case studies method (Yin, 1985; Miles and Huberman, 1985; Bogdanovic, 1993; Denscombe, 1998), analysing three particular case studies. The case studies were carried out in seven steps:

Step 1. Typology: Criteria for the selection of the organizations
Step 2. Selection of the organizations and research of the available materials
Step 3. Initial contacts with the organizations - short interviews conducted by email
Step 4. Direct observations in and around the organizations including informal conversations
Step 5. Interviews with the leaders of the organizations and their partners
Step 6. Creation of the basis for comparison and generalization
Step 7. Pattern matching and explanation-building
Printed and online materials were used for the preparation of case studies while semi-structured interviews were used as a method for the development of central points of case studies. Before every interview short introductory questions were sent to participants, or a short online conversation (mostly by email or Skype) was conducted in preparation for the interview. The interview questions were adapted to the reactions to the questions asked in the period of preparation. After each interview the whole conversation was transcribed and sent to the interviewee for authorization. Organizations, processes and relationships were studied and processed through analytical and theoretical frameworks.

Three cases were chosen for the purpose of this research: Banlieues d’Europe (BE), a European network, based in Lyon, France; Clubture, a network based in Croatia; and the Transeuropa Festival (TEF) based in number of cities across Europe, organized by the European Alternatives (EA) organization. They were chosen based on the following criteria:

- Based in Europe and having a clear European dimension,
- Working in the field of culture/arts,
- Functioning not only at the national level,
- Working on practical projects while connecting with explicit cultural policies.

**Phase 3: Analysis of empirical data**

Integrated policy analysis, comparison, content analysis and discourse analysis were used as the main analytical tools in this phase. “Integrated” policy research method was used as a method of evaluating various cultural policy documents, strategies and
reports connected with the topic of intercultural dialogue, mobility and networking, on mostly national and supranational levels. Discourse analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) was applied to relevant international academic journals dealing with cultural policies and cultural management, mapping and analysing the discussion around the topic of intercultural dialogue and cultural policy/cultural management in Europe in professional academic circles.

**Phase 4: Interpretation of empirical data and synthesis of the theoretical contributions and policy recommendations**

All the collected data, which was analysed in the previous phases, were tied into the theoretical framework based on the resources reviewed in the first phase of the research. The main interpretative apparatus was created which was then used to create theoretical patterns that led towards the theoretical explanations and policy recommendations. The results of the analysis were synthesised and the main theoretical conclusions drawn.

### 1.3 Key terms and related definitions

**Culture**

The term “culture,” from the perspective of cultural policy, is most commonly defined according to Raymond Williams in three categories: “a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development; particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general; description of the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity” (Williams, 1988). Although most research papers state that they refer to culture as a particular way of life, they actually more often relate to the last and most recent meaning of the word - culture as intellectual and artistic activity.
This inconsistency can be connected with the sometimes pretentious character of the cultural/arts sector (understandable in advocacy contexts), which tends to present itself as directly contributing “to the resolution of massive, global issues that involve questions of power, or income, exploitation or sheer human folly” (Isar, 2011: 49). As much as all these issues are connected with culture and the arts, to expand the notion of culture to its broadest sense, actually takes it “to the point of practical meaninglessness” (Isar, 2011: 49).

In this research, the term “culture” will be used in its broadest sense, “as the set of values and beliefs that inform, guide, and motivate people’s behaviour” (Castells, 2009: 36). However, this is keeping in mind that often both cultural practitioners and researchers mean “arts” when they say “culture.”

If we consider that public policy represents “the sum of government activities, whether pursued directly or through agents,” and that these activities “have influence on the lives of citizens” (Peters, 1996: 4) cultural policy can be defined as public policy in the field of culture representing “concrete needs and problems of the citizens...and general principles of political and cultural elite” (Đukić, 2010: 23-24). Cultural policy can be explicit/nominal or implicit/effective. The explicit cultural policy represents “any cultural policy that a government labels as such,” while implicit is “any political strategy that looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides (or on that of its adversary)” (Ahearne, 2009). Explicit cultural policy is, more clearly, considered to be the sum of governmental activities “with respect to the arts (including for-profit cultural industries), humanities, and heritage” (Schuster, 2003: 1).
In the cultural context of contemporary Europe the term cultural policy is used to highlight explicitly defined governmental policies connected with culture. Nevertheless, in recent decades it has also included complementary visions, strategies and activities of the civil and private sector in culture (Brkić, 2011). Given how large the field of culture is, there are many more agencies involved in the policy-making process beyond just governmental bodies. A significant part of cultural policy is implicit, and made without a focused intention (Mulcahy, 2006). At the same time, much of cultural policy is the result of a wide variety of interventions (Schuster, 2003: 8-9) interfering with many other public sectors, such as the economy, health, sports, tourism, youth, social services, etc.

**Networks**

Networks are not specific to modern society (Buchanan, 2002), but “a pattern that is common to life. Wherever we see life, we see networks” (Capra, 2002: 9). They represent a “set of interconnected nodes...which exist and function as components of networks, with network as the unit, not the node” (Castells, 2009: 19). It is all “about organizations and individuals joining forces and/or building relationships...with a common goal in mind” (Gardner, 2011: 205). Networks are open-ended and multi-sided with no fixed boundaries, with “values and interests programmed” into them (Castells, 2009: 19).

Castells defined the society we live in as a network society “whose social structure is made around networks activated by microelectronics-based, digitally processed information and communication technologies” (Castells, 2009: 24), which has origins in a sort of networked globalization in antiquity (LaBianca, 2006) or in the Muslim culture (Cooke and Lawrence, 2005).
Although living in the network society most people are still excluded from networks - which does not mean that they are not affected by the processes initiated by networks (Hammond et al., 2007). Networks function based on the logic of inclusion and exclusion and they are defined by its program, which sets the base for its goals and rules while being organized around flows representing “streams of information between nodes” (Castells, 2009: 20).

UNESCO can be considered as one of the first organizations to initiate and foster international cultural networks in the NGO sector (starting from the 1950s). A first wave of international cultural networks in Europe emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, with networks forming around the national representation model - individuals or groups of national representatives gathering at international meetings. The first European cultural networks were formed in the 1980s with the idea to transcend the existing hierarchies and enable direct cooperation and exchange between producers, artists and other cultural operators (Minichbauer and Mitterdorfer, 2000: 3).

The Council of Europe (COE) had an important role in the development of international networks that until then had functioned primarily within the framework of nation-states. COE projects, such as “Culture and neighbourhoods” (i.e. Delgado, Bianchini et. al, 1996) and “Culture and Regions” (d’Angelo and Vesperini, 2000) helped to establish a more stable environment for the development of civil society networks operating at an international level in Europe.
**Nation**

Nation can be defined in at least two ways. In the “world of nations” model, defined by Anthony Smith, “nation” is defined as a human population with a common historical territory, common myths, historical memory, common mass and public culture, common economy and common laws and duties of all the members (Smith, 1991). In a second model, nation is not defined as the “real entity” but more as an institutionalized form, a practical category, even as a contingent event (Brubejker, 2003; Handler, 1994; Calhoun, 1993). In this research, nation will be treated as a construct that does not have to be seen as the only, or dominant framework when thinking about communities, cultures and cultural policies of the future.

**Nationalism**

Nationalism is a historical phenomenon which has these basic starting postulates: the world is made of specific nations; nations are the only source of real political power; loyalty to the nation is the strongest type of loyalty; every nation seeks its space for expression and autonomy; global peace and justice have the world of autonomous nations as its prerequisite (Smith, 2001: 22; Kecmanović, 2006: 242). It is difficult to analyse nationalism rationally since it is post-rational and post-universalistic, meant to be “felt and believed in... as a matter of passion and emotions” (Denitch, 1994: 172). In the same way as religion, it relies on followers that are believers. They share a universal need to be members of a group but also a developed need to underline and practice the differences between the members of theirs and members of other communities, where their group is always dominant and painted as positive (Kecmanović, 2006: 144, 162, 164).
Cultural diversity

The terminology around cultural diversity can be confusing. What are “the right” definitions of the terms multiculturalism, cultural pluralism, transculturalism, and interculturalism? The meanings of these terms are still evolving while public and political debate on cultural diversity shifts.

The term “multiculturalism” is defined in many ways (Tiryakian, 2003) and is often misused in the political discourse when there is a need to formally acknowledge the existence of different cultures in one space. The spirit of such multiculturalism is mere “tolerance” – certain groups exist side by side, usually in the framework of the same nation state, but they almost do not communicate and merely acknowledge each other’s existence. In this context, we can talk about multiculturalism as a demographic feature in some parts of the world without even entering the space of politics, policy or ideology (Jelinćić et al, 2010: 17).

At policy level, multiculturalism is used as a concept to define cultural diversity policies with goals such as stimulating the participation of immigrants in mainstream society, improving their social and economic position, establishing equal rights and, preventing and eliminating discrimination (Schalk-Soekar, 2007; Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Toth, & Breugelmans, 2006).

Multicultural

A multicultural perspective is looking at different cultural groups as closed units, defining their position of autonomy in a society, and can be defined as “internal cultural diversity” (Obuljen and Švob-Đokić, 2005). It represents the “idea of different ethnic and cultural groups living together in the frame of the same pluralistic society” (Dragićević Šešić and Stojković, 2007: 318) that is usually
one of the most complex challenges for the nation-states in the
globalized world of today. This model represented the idea through
which different individuals and groups can become part of a
society without losing their uniqueness and still have all the rights
offered by that society.

**Cultural pluralism**

Cultural pluralism, as a democratic value, indicates “an equal,
tolerant and open relationship between the national cultures, not
relating to the culture on the sub-national level” (Dragićević Šešić
and Stojković, 2007: 318). It is often connected with developing
countries as a prerequisite for their membership in transnational
and supranational communities. “Transculturalism” is the opposite
of the term “monoculture” and represents the process of fusion or
hybridization of cultures in one “new” transculture (Jelinčić et. al,
2010: 17).

**Transnationalism**

Transnationalism often denominates phenomena dealing with the
interactions between migrants’ native countries and their
countries of residence, networks of migrants and relations
between migrants and “hosts” (Meinhof and Triandafyllidou, 2008:
277). Although this term or a phenomenon seems new,
transnationalism is “the constant of modern life, hidden behind
the methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Shiller, 2002:
302; Smith, 1983: 26; Martins: 1974: 276f) meaning that the nation-
state is an implicit ontological base for social research and politics.

**Interculturalism**

Interculturalism is a term closely connected with the European
Union, and represents perhaps one of the most controversial social
notions. It can represent some sort of “dynamic interrelationship,
transmission and exchange of values, attitudes, ideas and concepts, and the interaction of different cultures on one another” (Dragićević Šešić and Stojković, 2007: 322) or “the political concept which represents the need for the balanced exchange between the cultures and states, including the cultural goods and services” (Obuljen and Švob-Đokić, 2005).

Interculturalism, when compared to multiculturalism, tends to emphasize the common values of people from different cultures, working in a space of dialogue and interaction, and is “more likely to lead to criticism of liberal cultural practices (as part of the process of intercultural dialogue)” (Nasar and Tariq, 2012: 177). What seems a plausible difference is the relation towards openness - interculturalism has openness as a prerequisite, a setting for development, while multicultural places are not always open (Wood et al, 2006: 7).

In the field of cultural and artistic practice interculturalism calls for the exchange, mobility and collaboration of different groups, presuming that cultures evolve and trying to find solutions for the question “what we can become together” (Frank, 2008). In European cultural policy discourses it became one of the buzz words (in the same manner like “decentralization,” “social networking,” “narratives,” etc.), too often without real content backing it up. This manifestation of interculturalism can be understood as “political interculturalism” (Wood et al. 2006).

**Intercultural dialogue**

In its report *Sharing diversity: National approaches to intercultural dialogue in Europe* from March 2008 contracted by the European Commission, ERICarts experts came up with their definition of intercultural dialogue:
Intercultural dialogue is a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange or interaction between individuals, groups and organisations with different cultural backgrounds or world views. Among its aims are: to develop a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives and practices; to increase participation and the freedom and ability to make choices; to foster equality; and to enhance creative processes (ERICarts, 2008).

There are many other definitions of intercultural dialogue however this definition most closely explains the concept as used in this research.

1.4 Limitations of the research and the significance of the study

Read the “rigorous” literature in our field, and you may come to the opposite conclusion: that this kind of rigour—methodological rigour—gets in the way of relevance. People too concerned about doing their research correctly often fail to do it insightfully.

Henry Mintzberg, Developing Theory about the Development of Theory, 2007

There is a risk that a qualitative approach to the connections between identity building, cultural policy and cultural networks could lead to vague conclusions. Quantitative indicators that could connect these notions are however, difficult to determine. The multiple layers of the research could also at times seem not directly connected. Yet when connected to each other in a larger picture, these layers develop a system that brings different and fresh views to the surface.
Concepts like “identity” are not researched deep enough because this study analyses identity only in the context of the role cultural networks play in identity (re)constructions through cultural policies in Europe. The term “cultural policy frameworks” could mean much more, although in this research the focus is only on certain frameworks, such as cultural networks. They are defined as crucial both for European cultural policies and identity building processes connected with cultural policies.

The arguments and the results of the qualitative analysis are steps towards a different approach to the role of culture in society, the relationship between cultural policy and identity building, as well as the roles of cultural networks and culture/arts organizations in the processes of intercultural dialogue. This would not have been possible without vast amounts of research previously done on these topics both in Europe and internationally by senior researchers whose work is appreciated.7

This research defines new roles and formats of cultural organizations and the importance of cultural networks in Europe in the context of “methodological cosmopolitanism” (Beck and Grande, 2007) as well as their influence on different identities on a quest for more intercultural societies and for transnational approaches to culture. The importance of cultural networks is a well-researched topic, however there is a significant difference in the approach to networking in culture from the perspective of the 1980s and 1990s, when most of the cultural networks in Europe were founded (Višnić and Dragojević, 2008: 34-36), and the perspective of “Beyond 2000.” Cultural networks needed and still need to find new and more efficient ways of functioning, following

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7 It has been a privilege to have the opportunity to discuss some of the issues directly with them at numerous conferences and seminars.
the vision of a new European society that is not restricted to national borders or represented through the nation-states.

The case studies of Banlieues d’Europe, Clubture and the Transeuropa Festival are analysed as examples that can be criticised but also praised, depending on the elements analysed. This research makes a step forward towards a more efficient and effective practice that could connect the cultural networks, cultural policies and cultural/art practitioners under a more substantial cosmopolitan framework. It means the European Union should not only have a vision which is cosmopolitan, but a cosmopolitan vision which is applicable through cultural policies, strategies, goals, criteria and indicators.

Moreover, this research contributes to the heated debate in Europe about multiculturalism, interculturalism and transnationalism, led by researchers from various fields of social and humanistic sciences, as well as the arts. It works with the notions of communities and different levels of identity in Europe, from the perspective of a researcher from the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia that was an important example of a supranational identity and community. This parallel research perspective in a conscious and unconscious way brings a new angle to some questions throughout this research.

The main goal of this study was to analyse historical examples and contemporary cultural policy frameworks so as to contribute to the development of a more sustainable, open and democratic supranational European identity. It is hoped that results from this research could help policy-makers and cultural practitioners on all sides to re-evaluate their intercultural diversity toolboxes and offer some answers particularly to the question posed by Peter
Duelund: is the concept of diversity based on multiculturalism and individual cultural rights of the citizens, or the consolidation of national monocultures? (Duelund, 2008).
2 Setting the scene: Communities, identities and cultural policy in Europe

*The world was all before them, where to choose  
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide.  
They, hand in hand with wand’ring steps and slow,  
Through Eden took their solitary way.*  
John Milton, Paradise lost (1968: 292)

We live in a time of different parallel dimensions of global community. One is the global community experienced as “internal globalization, globalization from within national societies” (Beck, 2002: 17), connected through networks “that produce both homogenization and exclusion” (Auge, 1995: ix). This aspect of globalization has multiculturalism or “technical” diversity - a mere fact of different individuals or groups living next to each other (Sassatelli, 2002a) and the “breaking of strong connections between
communities and social life” (Wittel, 2001: 64), as its implicit outcome. The other is the community of nations which, in spite of postmodern prophecies, constantly reinvents itself, and reinforces the notion of homogeneous societies, especially through the persistence of national frameworks within which popular culture, sport, high culture and scientific events are organized, and are assigned symbolic importance.

Both of the aforementioned aspects of globalization constitute the paradox of the world we live in, in which “at the same time we can think about the unity of the terrestrial space and the rise of the clamour of ‘particularism’, in a world where people are always, and never, at home” (Auge, 1995: 28, 87). This is the world where people are at the same time afraid of loneliness but also of community - “of too much shared experience, all shared being, all together now” (Blackshaw, 2010: 15). A world where strength is not so much connected to community, but to the social capital one can accumulate.

In trying to define cultural policy, one is confronted with two concepts: the democratization of culture and cultural democracy. The democratization of culture represents a top-down approach to cultural development, whereby high culture is shared (sometimes referred to as ‘culture of the elite’) or “democratized” with the majority of the people with the “quality of culture” as the main argument (Mulcahy, 2006). Cultural democracy by contrast represents a bottom-up approach to cultural development, a “process in which we are all participatory” (Duelund, 2003: 22). Individuals, organizations and networks push the issues, projects and policies that are important for them to the top. This is a pluralistic rather than a monocultural model.
However, this model is often underestimated since it tends to also include popular and amateur forms of culture, ethnic and traditional art, different forms of dance and music. Instead of being stigmatised as cultural populism, these forms of culture can be perceived as contributing to cultural diversification and decentralization. This “culture of the people” space has a lot of potential for intervention and if influenced in a right manner, can lead to more effective results when it comes to topics such as intercultural dialogue.

There are two divided concepts of cultural policy connected with the issue of identity: “territorial (state) conceptualised cultural policies,” as an idea close to Habermas’s vision of “democratic constitutional state” (Habermas, 2001) and “ethnic community-driven cultural policy,” which we can connect to any national state in Europe, going towards a more “cleaner” ethnic community, using ethnicity as a synonym for a nation (Dragićević Šešić and Dragojević, 2008: 63, 70, 72).

This research places cultural networks and networked cultural/art platforms in the role of basic units for framing cultural policies that focus on intercultural dialogue. It questions the extent to which networks and platforms in the field of culture can have influence on communities in terms of diversity and relationships with other cultures. It also links experiences of cultural networks and platforms to the wider and explicitly defined cultural policy frameworks at the supranational, regional and national levels.
2.1 National, regional and supranational identities

To what do I belong?
Julia Kristeva cited in Wajid, 2006

Identity, which is based on both “sameness” and on “distinctiveness”, is often explicitly defined as a lasting possession, although it is actually a “project” on which we permanently work, and which can never be completed (Bauman, 2004). A consequence of the “sameness”, which always relates to “difference”, calls for distinctions which subsequently generate conflict with others (Young, 1990), a conflict which “struggles to affirm what others deny” (Melucci, 1989: 46). The everyday uncertainties and constant changes of a disconcerting and disorienting existence make identity a “variable product of collective action” (Calhoun, 1991: 59) and an important refuge from the constant shifts of modern life (Bauman, 1996). It is a consequence of the changes in character of contemporary society that “the individual can thus live rather oddly in an intellectual, musical or visual environment that is wholly independent of his immediate physical surroundings” (Auge, 1995: viii).

Community, whatever level we talk about, is a vague scientific concept, meaning everything and nothing. In the words of Nisbet, “community is a fusion of feeling and thought, of tradition and commitment, of membership and volition. It may be found in, or be given symbolic expression by, locality, religion, nation, race, occupation or crusade” (Nisbet, 1967: 47). If we put aside most of the inconsistent and unstable elements that are forming it we can identify three key elements at the centre of any community: location, social network and a shared sense of belonging (Blackshaw, 2010: 5).
Communities seemingly protect from the uncertainties of life in contemporary society. They are perceived as some of the basic social units, by themselves in need of interpretation, which in practice means that they are often burdened by romanticism and evoke nostalgia and closeness (Heller, 1999). They can be “understood as the life people live in dense, multiplex, relatively autonomous networks of social relationships. Community thus, is not a place or simply a small-scale population aggregate but a mode of relating, variable in extent” (Calhoun, 1998: 381).

Communities in the globalized society of today are elective communities. They connect people through their needs, desires and beliefs, no longer only through local tradition and culture (Castells, 1999).

Each individual is a member of several communities that influence his/her identity. We get “born in a place” (and time), which becomes “a constituent of individual identity” (Auge, 1995: 43). Some of these communities we do not choose, we become members by birth (i.e. race or ethnic community) or before we are capable of making the decisions by ourselves (i.e. religious traditions connected with the newborns or children, common to most religious groups); other communities have a democratic form where every member directly enrols while actual participation is a matter of a delegated responsibility and often lacks real responsibility (various civil society/citizen association organizations, which in reality function as small companies); and there are communities which have structures where members have a small level of distance from the centre(s) of the community in trying to give members the opportunity to work closely on the issues important for all, directly defined by them as the relevant issues (as in the case studies of Clubture or Transeuropa Festival).
Societies are segmented and constantly reshaped, representing “a network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level of interaction or cleavage between it and its environment. Society is a unit with boundaries” (Mann, 1986: 13). It is important to recognize the notion of boundaries, “frontiers” between communities, and the possibility that the “ideal, egalitarian world may come not through the abolition of frontiers, but through their recognition” (Auge, 1995: ix).

Along with the development of communities, strength was often found in the reification process of what Bourdieu called “the quasi-performative discourse of the nationally oriented politicians, which can at certain moments create a nation as a real social group which can be mobilised” (Bourdieu, 1991: 220-228). Notions of religion/church or a nation as the ultimate “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991: 6) are often perceived as “organic,” primordial substances and entities, instead of accepting them as institutional forms, practical categories and contingent events, something that could change its role, or even stop actively existing, depending on the situation (Brubejker, 2003: 289). New technologies of mass communication are the main pillar to various types of “imagined communities.” They allow people not only to create a community by physically knowing each other (as Rousseau believed is the only possible way) but by imagining it collectively.

Although Smith perceived our society as a “world of nations” (Smith, 1991) this is not enough proof that the nation is a substantial and permanent collective. The nation-state did not find a solution for its “inability to control global networks of wealth, power and information” which led to the loss of efficiency and legitimacy (Castells, 2009: 296). On the other hand, even in a world that seems irreversibly globalized and more cosmopolitan,
with the nation-state as a sovereign entity in crisis (Appadurai, 1996; Price, 2002; Beck, 2005; Fraser, 2007), the national still remains ineradicable (Debray, 2007), “filling the legitimation void left by the democratic participation of citizens” (Bauman, 2004: 133), always transforming and adapting to different contexts.

In the era of a globalized way of perceiving social phenomena, of social networks, and from the perspective of constructivist social theories, any group or community cannot be analysed as something static, but rather constructed, contingent, and inconstant (Brubejker, 2003: 283). This is why it is not easy to define the nation. Some theoreticians enter the space of primordialism, in which it is already predefined that the nation as an entity exists (often as a ‘collective individual’ capable to act coherently), although it is a historical construct that is elusive and very hard to define (Brubejker, 2003; Handler, 1994; Calhoun, 1993).

Nations provide people with a common history, a shared culture, collective answers and an apparent sense of purpose where people are in the position of “subjects of the state as patriots of the nation, ready to sacrifice their individual lives for the sake of the survival of the nation’s ‘imagined community’” (Bauman, 2006: 37). They usually tolerate just a modest amount of diversity - as long as it does not threaten the harmony of the fraternity.

Before the world became over-connected, we believed that the precondition for the existence of free institutions was to have state borders coincide with the borders of nations, and “we had no other criterion of truth or right-reason than the example and form of the opinions and customs of our own country” (Montaigne, 1991: 231). However, at some point the nation-states stopped being “the omnipotent masters of its territory” (Zolo, 2007), instead
becoming “just a node (however important) of a particular network, the political, institutional, and military network that overlaps with other significant networks in the construction of social practice” (Castells, 2009: 19).

Another important notion to keep in mind is that nations were constructed from above “with important assistance from cultural elites, cultural ideological apparatuses and cultural ideologies” (Breznik, 2011: 128), by “constantly producing ideological institutions which culture may offer to nation state building projects” (Močnik, 1998: 55), thus helping the homogenization of the nation.

Supranational structures, such as the European Union, are often objects of great scepticism because of the large disbelief in the option of the existence of “post national” solidarity. The sceptics hold on to “ethno-cultural ties” and believe that citizenship is not possible without “Eros,” the emotional dimension of civil rights and responsibilities, which, they claim, cannot be connected to anything other than national sentiments (Shore, 2004a: 29). The idea of supranationalism can either develop in the direction of “cultural fundamentalism, which undoubtedly puts nationality, civil rights and responsibilities in the common cultural heritage” (Stolcke, 1995: 12) or it will become a test case for cosmopolitan democracy, where cultural and political identities will be strictly separated (Kraus, 2003: 669).

In past decades, researchers in the field of social sciences and cultural policy have also dealt with the issues of the relationship between macro-regional, national, micro-regional and city (urban) identities, interculturalism and cultural policies (d’Angelo and Vesperini, 2000; Bassand, 1993; Bianchini, 1993). They even came
up with indicators of openness and interculturalism in an urban context (Wood and Landry, 2008).

The regional cultural identities started becoming more important in the European Union and the rest of Europe during the 1990’s, since they were closer to the “empirical content on the level of the way of life” (Stojković, 2008: 10). Region is constructed from “the complex interaction of different political, economic, ecological, cultural and many other factors” (Isard in Benko, 1987: 154). Regions can be classified in different categories (Self, 1964: 584, 585):

a) ethnic or cultural regions;
b) industrial or urban regions;
c) topographic or climate regions;
d) economically specialized regions;
e) administrative regions;
f) supranational political-economic regions.

They can be defined on the sub-national level, constructing micro-regions (for example the Dalmatian region in Croatia or Lombardy in Italy) that are part of national states; or they can be on a supranational level, transcending the border of nation states, constructing macro-regions (the Balkans or Western Balkans; Middle Europe; Benelux). Regions are one of the elements that deny the right to nation-states of placing themselves in a position of the ultimate historical and geographical level of governance or being presented as homogeneous units, since the fundamental historical events did not follow the nation states as geographical units (Todd, 1990: 18).

In the beginning of the 1990s the EU administration began to differentiate four main macro regions in Europe - Central Europe,
Baltic states, South East Europe (later on broken down into East and West Balkans) and Eastern Europe (Dragicević Šešić and Dragojević, 2008: 65). These regions are political constructs and their borders are based on the national borders of the countries that form them. They are often used as frameworks for regional cooperation.

However, from the perspective of cultural policy, the notion of cross-border regions (CBR) is more open to intercultural dialogue, and opens a way towards a New Regionalism (Keating, 1998; MacLeod, 2001). A cross-border co-operation can be defined “as a more or less institutionalized collaboration between contiguous sub-national authorities across national borders” (Perkmann, 2003). Public authorities are its main protagonists. They collaborate on a sub-national level in different countries, are concerned with practical problem solving, and try to influence the institutionalization of cross-border contacts over time (Perkmann, 2003).

There are more than 70 of these cross-border ‘Euroregions’ in Europe today and most of them are involved in cross-border cooperation (CBC), actively supported by the European Commission and the EU member states (Perkmann, 2003). The European Commission supports CBR’s through large Interreg funds (within the EU territory), the Phare programme (for Central and Eastern European Countries/CEEC) and the Tacis programme (for Newly Independent States/NIS - mostly former USSR states and Russia) and the ‘Credo’ grant scheme (projects between CEEC and NIS border regions). In a certain way, cross-border regions function as “implementation agencies for specific type of transnational

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8 EUREGIO was the first ‘official’ cross-border region in Europe, established in 1958 on the Dutch-German border.
regional policy” (Perkmann, 2002) and although heavily supported by the European Commission and national governments, they usually function as bottom-up initiatives (Perkmann, 2003).

These types of regions could have a more important role in the future development of the European society, with the regional consciousness becoming a crucial element of identity for European citizens, even constituting regionalism as a social or philosophical movement (Stojković, 2008: 143) moving towards de-ethnicization and post-national identities (Rizman, 1991: 940).

It is characteristic of contemporary European society in the first decades of the 21st century that, in spite of the declared common framework, the predominant model through which identities are constructed, is still the national one, which relies on a homogenising discourse (Verdery, 1993a: 38).

Habermas, claims that “nation-states increasingly lose both their capacities for action and the stability of their collective identities” (Habermas, 2001: 80) and advocates for a “vision of a democratic constitutional state, not mentally rooted in ‘the nation’ as a pre-political community of shared destiny” (Habermas, 2001: 76). He promotes an exclusively politically conceptualised nation, as an ambitions and abstract concept. What it lacks is the emotional component including “the love for own people and community, which is in the base of (moderate, not extreme) patriotism” (Kecmanović, 2006: 268).

However, since the beginning of the global economic crisis that is also a social and ethical crisis, arguments supporting the vision of democratic constitutional communities were insufficient for the evolution of European democracy from a union of nations
towards a union of different types of communities. These so-called “communities of interest” are not easily controlled by traditional authorities, especially when members of the community feel that their interests are endangered. This usually initiates a community action, turning people collectively into activists (Blackshaw, 2010: 157).

In the current crisis, for which the year 2008 can be considered the “square one”9 (Tesich, 1996), fear and insecurity do not push people to look for change and solutions in themselves, but in others. They are “taking work from the natives, bread from their mouths, security from their streets and taxes from their pockets... people who live as neighbours turn into enemies; casual nationalism veers into xenophobic us against them” (Weber, 2003). This fear drives the nationalisation of narratives, perceptions, beliefs and feelings. It insists on “simple truths” which make all the social processes “clear and understandable” and leave enough space for xenophobia to take over as a “perverse reflection of desperate attempts to salvage whatever remains of local solidarity” (Bauman, 2004: 99).

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9“Square one” is an expression underlining that the year 2008 was not the beginning of the economic crisis but rather a return to the “place of the crime.” The global economic crisis was being prepared for a long time (i.e. Enron scandal in 2001). At the same time, this expression is used here and backed up by the reference from Steve Tesich’s play “Square One” from 1990, to mark vividly that the crisis which we are talking about is not actually economic, but a crisis of global society and current social and political systems.
2.2 The European Union and supranational identity

The world of supermodernity does not exactly match the one in which we believe we live in, for we live in a world that we have not yet learned to look at.
We have to relearn to think about the space.
Auge, 1995: 29

As a supranational structure the European Union has a specific relation with culture and cultural policy. The role of EU in this field, as well as the tools that have been implemented, changed and developed over the years, have tried to create more space for culture in the EU administration frameworks. At the same time, the narratives of the EU have been in a constant shift, following changes in perceptions of the EU, as well as the new roles and responsibilities that were transferred from nation states. The cultural sector has adapted to these changes on roles and in narratives, especially in areas relating to intercultural dialogue, and the questions of diversity connected to a narrative of common European values. In the end, this still did not create something that could be called a “defined European identity,” but nevertheless the position of European Union, relative to culture, constantly raises questions about roles, borders, responsibilities and values.

2.2.1 The European Union and cultural policy

This is the project of an élite, not in a qualitative sense, let’s say of a minority that manages things, that has all the means to make them happen. Therefore there will be Europe, but it will be a kind of pseudo political event; in reality, deeply, politically, nothing will happen.
Jean Baudrillard in Sassatelli, M. (2002b)
Explicit cultural policy in Europe was until 1992 an exclusive question of national governments with some initiatives from UNESCO and the Council of Europe. Presumably, one of the main reasons why the European Union did not take culture for its starting arguments are its absolute values compared to the relative political interests. The genesis of the relation of the European Union to cultural policy is strongly linked to the political context of the development of the idea of European Citizenship. While it was only a free trade community, the EU did not need cultural policy. When the project ambitiously became a road to European Citizenship and an ongoing attempt of development and definition of supranational identity, then came the need for the instrumentalisation of cultural policy.

At the beginning of the European (economic) integration (the period of ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community) the Council of Europe was the only supranational structure dealing with culture (Nugent, 1999). The COE had the role of an umbrella organization defending the common values of the nation-states in Europe, including the sometimes very vague notions of a common European cultural heritage. Culture remained in the shadow of economic integration until it was understood by the architects of the European Citizenship project that it could potentially help its development. It is then when some of the flagship EU culture programmes started - Kaleidoscope (cultural cooperation programme); Raphael (focused on cultural heritage); Culture 2000 (Creative Europe from 2014), European Capital of Culture (Pantel, 1999: 55). In addition the culture sector used the Structural Funds of the EU from which it was able to obtain twelve times more funding per year than from the Culture 2000 programme (Helie, 2004: 71).
A change in attitude towards cultural policy came with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that marked the formal creation of the European Union and introduced a legal category of “European Citizenship.” In its Article 128, culture was introduced for the first time as a formal jurisdiction within the European Community (EU):

(1) The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.

(2) Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging co-operation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:

- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
- non-commercial cultural exchanges;
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audio-visual (CEC 1992, 13).

Although criticized (with reason) for its vagueness and contradictions (Shore, 2006), Article 128 marked a symbolical move towards a new supranational level of cultural governance and cultural policy. At the same time, it can be perceived as the beginning of a new period of EU constructions of European culture. Some would argue a European culture of “privilege of an elitist, bourgeois intelligentsia vision of culture” (Schlesinger, 1994).

This instrumentalisation of cultural policy (but also of education, sports, media, etc.) is used to strengthen the legitimacy and wide
popular support for the EU, enlarge the scope of its power and authority, but also influence the development of “a common sense of heritage, history, and belonging - the goal being to turn member-state nationals into a ‘body politics’, or European ‘demos’” (Shore, 2006).

Since the beginning of the European Community, there were two visions concerning culture - Europe as a singular cultural entity and Europe as a space of many cultures and diversity. Zoran Djindjić, philosopher and ex-prime minister of the Republic of Serbia, warned that “if we start from culture while defining the political identity, and if the politics become a tool for realization of some cultural programme, we should expect the rise of conflicts which are hard to be solved” (Djindjić, 1990). This dilemma is still vividly present in Europe, and follows the similar political dilemma of the European Union. In its centre are the question of European identity/identities and the division of jurisdictions between the supranational, national, regional and local political authorities. Since the question of the definition of identity of the Europe/European Union is not “solved,” the borders of jurisdictions of the cultural policy on the level of EU are still unclear. However, they are constantly shifting towards a stronger involvement of the supranational bodies.

The relative success of the EU in effectiveness of its cultural initiatives on the European level lies in supporting the development of more or less formal networks and of networked projects of local cultural operators.10 Those networks follow the goals, methods and narratives of the EU (Sassatelli, 2008: 46). The multiplication

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of these networks in Europe has however resulted in more interconnected stories, thus avoiding the “one hegemonic story” approach (Eder, 2009). The focal problem of these kinds of networks is the dissemination and acceptance of their narratives, because of their diverse character (Eder, 2009).

One of the crucial problems of the current position of EU identity politics, which are reflected also through the cultural policy initiatives focused on cultural diversity, are the constraints of the proclaimed shared Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian roots (together with the Beethoven’s Ninth symphony acting as an EU anthem). These identity milestones often act as obstacles for the acceptance of the historical as well as current reality of everyday life in the EU that always had and still has a large number of citizens of non-European descent under its roof. They were also contributing and still contribute to both tangible and intangible heritage of Europe (Alibhai Brown, 1998: 38). This is the space in which we could seek the origins of the problems such as Muslim fundamentalists, illegal immigrants, and “false asylum seekers” (i.e. Runnymede Trust, 1997). The promotion of this kind of elite European culture provides “new rhetoric of exclusion” and instead of cultural diversity promotes forms of cultural chauvinism (Stolcke, 1995).

The result of this confrontation between the proclaimed identity discourse of openness and cultural diversity and the protectionist agenda of the European Union (i.e. Schengen border as the gates of the “fortress”; the question of illegal immigrants; the protection of European film industry and the “European way of life”) create constant cultural tensions inside the European space. Since it is more difficult to control them through policies and a “governmentalisation of culture” (Barnett, 2001), the spaces of
popular (“people's culture”) and hybrid forms of culture are not in practice recognized as official European culture (Shore, 2006). However, they exist and occupy the margins of European public and political space, in spite of that becoming more influential (Meinhof and Trandafyllidou, 2008).

By analysing both national\textsuperscript{11} and European (EU and Council of Europe) cultural policy documents, as well as documents of the European foundations and associations, one can come to the conclusion that there are significant differences in the visions, explicitly-defined cultural policies and strategies of the EU nation states and the institutions representing and promoting the European Union. What is similar to most of the examples, from both national and supranational level, is that the analysis, conceptualization, monitoring and evaluation of cultural policies tend to be applied from the top-down, very often without evidence-based arguments. It is also clear that dilemmas such as “cultural policy in Europe vs. European cultural policy,” or “Europeanisation of cultural policies vs. Europeanisation through cultural policies” (Sassatelli, 2008) are still unsolved.

\textit{2.2.2 Narratives of diversity and the EU}

Since the beginning of the European integration processes, the relationship between ‘Our’ culture and the culture of the ‘Other’ has been one of the key cultural policy questions for contemporary political relations in Europe. What is ‘Our Identity’ and how are ‘We’ distinctive from exotic, ethnic, cultural, social or the private

\textsuperscript{11} In recent years more transparent and accessible through the Compendium as a tool for comparative cultural policy research (Council of Europe and ERICArts, 2012).
other is the most common question, often assuming in its setting that the notion of identity is passive, static, conserved. European “dynamic identity” (Bassand and Hainard, 1986) actually represents a modern narrative, a “project” on which we always work on and which in its realization can never be completed (Bauman, 2004) - “a problem to be solved” (Blackshaw, 2010: 113).

When it comes to Europe there is a constant dilemma - should Europe deal with diversity, believing that having many narratives means there is no story (Sassatelli, 2012), or should it deal with the relation between the cosmopolitanism of elites and the localism of people (Castells, 2007)? An unavoidable factor of European existence is its historical and contemporary presence in all corners of the world, which “leads Europe to recognize, albeit with considerable hesitations and setbacks, that the other is a necessary component of its ‘identity’” (Balibar, 2003). The European “political community” acts as a framework that enables the confrontation of culturally divergent national identities (Tassin, 1994:111).

Europe, which discovered all the others, but no one ever discovered her (Rougemont, 1994) is set as something not to be made, created, or built, but as “a labour that never ends, a challenge always still to be met in full, a prospect forever outstanding” (Bauman, 2004: 2) - a phenomenon without a fixed identity and non applied identity-building techniques commonly used by nation states (education, media, welfare, military). This is an idea of a network of active, fluid identities, rather than a homogeneous identity (Macdonald,1993; Gowland et al., 1995).

This idea of “a culture that feeds on questioning the order of things - and on questioning the fashion of questioning it” (Bauman, 2004: 12) is a utopian quest for a society where liquid modern life
(Bauman, 2007b) could become something that makes people proud. It is still a challenge for European society, especially during times of crisis, to perceive this supranational form not simply as a new, oversized version of a nation state. Behind the need for a common European culture and identity we can find the “national subversion of Europe” (Delanty, 2000: 110). The European Union is conceived and imagined as a denial of the nation as the only relevant and sustainable community, and it proved to be “one of the most important imagined communities created in the post-colonial era” (Shore, 2000: 207).

The main narratives of the European Union are “the story of a successful common market; the cultural story of a shared past; and the story of a ‘new’ social bond of diversity” (Eder, 2009). The institutional “inclusive” slogan “unity in diversity” (often compared to Latin motto “in uno plures”12 in its intent to imagine the EU community as a space open for differences, could mean so much, but often does not. Its intention was to present the EU as a more pluralistic society with a less instrumental approach to culture, mediating between the “incompatible goal of forging a singular European consciousness, identity and peoplehood on the one hand, and claims to be fostering cultural pluralism on the other” (Shore, 2006). This slogan represents a form which does not project any real value when confronted with the reality of life in the EU, reflecting a kind of “postmodern communitarianism” (Delanty, 2003) and it is often read as an attempt to erase all particular values and to cover a centralist approach (Shore, 2000). It avoids potential drama in its theatrical meaning, drama that opens the community towards real inclusion instead of its avoidance (Sassatelli, 2008: 58).

12 Meaning “we are many in one.”
In a quest to create a narrative that potentially includes everyone the European Union falls in the paradoxical trap of every narrative, which by its nature has to include some groups and exclude others (Sassatelli, 2012). Because there is no story of everyone, neither is there a target group such as “everyone.” The official EU narrative is therefore never specific enough. It only calls upon universal values. On the other hand, the narratives of the European Commission and European Cultural Foundation programmes are showing us that anyone can become European, “but not everyone has, or will.” (Sassatelli, 2012). Europe nevertheless continues permanently “telling itself stories about itself and others” (Blackshaw, 2010: 115). It tries to make it ontologically more secure, although Europe has an “ontology that is not definite” (Bellier and Wilson, 2000: 16). What is certain is that at the heart of the process of European integration some of the main structural ideas are cultural diversity, multiculturalism and intercultural dialogue (Bekemans, 1994: 15) and not simply the economic issues and the idea of a common market, which were the starting points. In spite of the irrational fears of Others and a crisis of the concepts of justice (“international justice”) and democracy (political nomenclatures, with less and less direct connection with the citizens), the latter are perceived as the core values of Europe (Todorov, 2011). The “just society,” as the one that perceives itself as “never just enough” is thereby always trying harder (Bauman, 2004: 126).

The approach of the European Union to the communication of different cultures inside Europe as a space where people (at least the political elites) share the same vision was never consistent. There were always different ideas about the dialogue of cultures, its definition and meaning, as well as different practical implication of this ideology in everyday life. The idea of a
“European cultural space” was never enough to define the sociocultural reality (Sassatelli, 2008: 47). The state of this dialogue depended also on the state of relations between countries inside the European space and between Europe and the states outside the “fortress of Europe” (Toynbee, 2002) as well as on the process of the expansion of the European Union, mostly towards the East, the “unconscious side of Europe” (Todorova, 2006).

Stories link people in a space, creating a network of social relations which correspond to attempts to define the EU as a “political control project,” which links the citizens through “legal rules based on stories that bind,” and thus generate a political identity (Eder, 2009). The collective identity of Europe still has to find its boundaries, either following the political boundaries of the European Union or Europe as a vision that needs to be accomplished.

Scepticism connected with the current EU narratives comes from the proximity of citizens to the process of identity/narrative creation, while the narratives of the national constructs already seem embedded and far away, parts of history and tradition. The specificity of the construction of the narratives is that they are “not merely a neutral discursive form that may or may not be used to represent real events (...) but rather entails ontological and epistemic choices with distinct ideological and even specifically political implications” (White, 1987: ix).

This would mean that the narrative of the European Union as a supranational framework needs more time to be rooted; paradoxically, change, movement and the enlargement of the EU are in the centre of its narrative. The changes that are a constant of the EU do not give people time to get used to the “same
sameness” but instead push them to look at EU identity as a fluid structure. Whenever the crisis of European identity reached the cliff, people started to discuss and become more aware of what this identity could mean to them. When we are no longer sure of the existence of a community it becomes absolutely necessary to believe in it (Bauman, 2001).

Europe and its story about diversity, although often imposed in a top-down manner, is practised through a plurality of narratives, allowing it to be performed differently by different actors, in different contexts (Sassatelli, 2012: 8). New narratives of Europe and the European Union are not the narratives of similarities that are going towards some uber-identity that assimilates and bonds as strong as the national ones. Even if practised from the bottom-up diversities and differences are an inevitable and probably crucial element of European identity, which needs to be filled with narratives that are much closer to the citizens, narratives which have a much stronger emotional component. Conceptualizing the narratives and filling them from the perspective of the nomenclature, however knowledgeable, creative and skilful it is, mostly stays on the level of the rhetorical gimmicks and procedures imposed by ones perceived as bureaucrats or autocrats.

Although Delanty goes against essentialist and nostalgic European narratives, the ones with the “high culture of the past, and the unity of its traditions” (Delanty, 1995) he calls for a more political approach. This raises the narrative to a level that is too abstract to be comprehended by the critical number of citizens inside the diverse territory of the EU. Pledging for a more active citizenship and anti-racism, he places some of the core values in front, which are undeniably important for the European identity.
However, “post-national citizenship” does not seem like a respectable opponent to the national paradigm - it is too formal, general, risks vacuity and does not have a more substantial and emotional component that binds people together (Orchard, 2002: 419). Sassatelli sees Europe as “a kind of institutional shelter to protect, valorise and diffuse knowledge about European cultures” (Sassatelli, 2002a: 435), excluding culture as a potential “glue” of European integration. The existence of the European identity is based on its civic character, “social contract” and shared tradition (Delanty, 1995).

So far, diversity narratives of the EU did not prove to go much beyond the borders of “political interculturalism”, neither from the civic nor the EU member states' political leadership perspective. Europe and the European Union are in need of a new political vision and a new concept for political integration, which can be found in the cosmopolitan idea of Europe (Beck and Grande, 2007), which unties the communities from the “inevitability of their own ethnocentricity” (Blackshaw, 2010: 88). For this reason, probably the biggest question about the future development strategies of the EU is, whether the union is based on a common cultural identity or a common political vision of creating a space of “stability, peace and security” (Aksoj, 2008: 258). Or, is Baudrillard making us look in the right direction, when claiming that culture is really a “substitute of a political identity not to be found”? (Sassatelli, 2002b).
2.3 The Balkans and the former Yugoslavia: Culture and intercultural dialogue

Doubtless the Eastern European countries, and others, will find their positions in the world networks of traffic and consumption. But the extension of the non-place corresponding to them - empirically measurable and analysable non-place whose definition is primarily economic - has already overtaken the thought of politicians, who spend more and more effort wondering where they are going only because they are less and less sure where they are.
Auge, 1995: 92, 93

From the perspective of Western Europe, the Balkans was always considered a problematic region. The same can be said for the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the former Yugoslavia as a supranational model provides a historical perspective, which has not been taken seriously enough as a relevant frame, either by researchers or the architects of the EU; mostly because of the “ideological burden” it carried and the way it ended its existence.

2.3.1 The Balkans as a regional framework

From the Eurocentric (Western European) point of view, or the hegemonic point of view of the centre, the term “balkanization” will come as a first association with the mention of the Balkans as a territory. This term means historically, anthropologically, socially and politically connecting one region with often untrue and shallow statements, putting it on the pedestal of an ultimate symbol of something irrational, wild, exotic, aggressive, deconstructive, non-civilized - the very opposite of European. In the XIX century it was a common thing to write - “the Balkan peninsula
is, generally speaking, a territory of contradictions. Everything is exactly opposite from what would be reasonable to expect” (Miller, 1898: xvi as cited in Todorova, 2006: 72).

Most of the paradigms and fundamental concepts connected to the Balkans, were not produced in the Balkans (Mishkova, 2008: 239). Maria Todorova, in her thorough study of the Balkans (Todorova, 2006) analysed and de-constructed the historical and contemporary perceptions of the Balkans. For the purpose of her research, Todorova defined the Balkans as the territory of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and all the nation-states that were part of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo), with some of them being epistemologically “more balkanic than others” (Todorova, 2006).

For the purpose of this research, the Balkans is defined through historical as well as EU political discourse as countries from South East Europe that share an Ottoman legacy and, are currently not members of the European Union. This would include Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, which are all marked in the current EU discourse as the Western Balkans (with the exception of Croatia in some literature). In spite of Croatia’s accession to the EU in July 2013, it is included, since its shared history with other nations that were part of Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, Slovenia is not included in this study despite having had much stronger connections with the Austro-Hungarian Empire it only had indirect connections with the Ottoman legacy and has an already respectable history inside the EU.

Turkey also posed a dilemma. Although the Balkans is only a small part of Turkey’s complex identity, it is interesting as its Ottoman
history connects in certain ways all other nations on the peninsula. Adding to historical reasons, Turkey is connected with the Balkan countries over at least two contemporary topics: its long-term candidacy for membership of the European Union;\(^\text{13}\) and its aspirations to return to the Balkans through policies named by some researchers as “neo-Ottoman,” particularly since the civil and republican legacy of Kemal Ataturk was placed aside in Turkish society (Hakan Yavuz, 1998; Murinson, 2006). The impact of modernizing reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and Europe are often underestimated, using the notion of Ottoman only in opposition to European (Mishkova, 2008: 240).

One part of the history of supranational communities and identities in Europe can be traced back to the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, which are trying to be promoted in some contemporary discussions as attempts at multicultural societies, or at least communities which had multicultural society as an implicit result. Some are trying to re-frame the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the last few decades as a potential historical origin of the multicultural society (Sluga, 2001). Some voices are idealizing the Ottoman Empire as a pax ottomana for the Balkan nations (Gursel, 1995: 123). This can be questioned, of course, from many different angles, but that is not the topic of this research.

\(^{13}\) In spite of fulfilling all the political conditions needed by the EU candidate country, Turkey is one of the most controversial EU topics, because of several substantial reasons. First, it would be the only nation-state in the EU with the majority of citizens being Muslims (the fear of Islam); the problem of Turkish immigrants in Germany (origin of questions on multiculturalism policies); system of values imposed by the recent Turkish governments, that is replacing the civil society values promoted by Kemal Ataturk with the values of an "Islamic society", which is perceived by some of the most influential EU countries as non-compatible with largely Christian European values.
What is interesting for this research are the relations of these supranational structures with the nation states they ruled for a long period of time. The Balkans can be used as an example of a region in which we can find a variety of hybrid, overlapping identities (Smith, 1992) that were at the same time and in a historical sense the basis for conflicts and cooperation between communities. This is a region where most modern political forms were applied at some point - “from empire to revolutionary republic, from multi-national federation to nation state to protectorate” (Močnik, 2003). Some ideas and implications of this communication in the Balkans can be used as historical precedents of both the former Yugoslavia and the European Union.

As one of the last regions in Europe which is still not integrated in the framework of the European Union, the (Western) Balkans is now a region of countries in “transition,” still posing a false alternative: liberalism or barbarism (Močnik, 2003). A ‘dyistopian’ future of a “traditionally barbaric region” is often presented as the only vivid alternative to the implementation of neo-liberal policies in the Balkans. Representatives of the “international community” and transnational business act as “corrective factors” while any alternative is connected with “retrograde policies of the past,” often marking them as “non-European,” meaning “non-civilized.” The Balkans as a regional frame has the potential to initiate alternative regional visions, strategies and practices. Only if the strength is found in regional cooperation practices, alternative systems and wider international cooperation, this region would be able to overcome the stigma of being the historical and everlasting “powder keg” of Europe.
2.3.2 Yugoslavia as a supranational framework

It’s difficult to overstate the devastating impact of the implosion of Yugoslavia on European self-confidence. We couldn’t even figure out what it meant. Was it the sudden eruption of an unresolved part of the European past, linked to the fact that the Tito years in Yugoslavia had functioned as a “socialist refrigerator” in which the opposition of various nationalisms had slowly festered, dormant and unseen, for decades? Or was the return of war to Europe a prefiguration of an ominous and potentially fatal future?


The idea of Yugoslavia originally came from the “Illyrianists,” a Serbo-Croat linguistic movement that started in the 1830s. It became an ideological and social base for the creation of the first Yugoslavia, or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, formed in 1918 as the indirect result and consequence of the First World War and led by King Alexander of Yugoslavia (Djokic, 2003). The creation of the first Yugoslavia was not something expected. There were two streams of thought about the idea of Yugoslavia at that time - “internal Yugoslavism,” that saw no differences between the nations that shared the same place of the later Yugoslavia, and the other idea, of the unity in which the nationhood of all states would be respected (Rusinow, 2003).

In spite of the reinterpretations of the history of the idea and the beginning of Yugoslavia as a state, which were most common to find during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, at the moment it was formed the idea of Yugoslavia was stronger than both the national ideas of “Greater Serbia” and a Croat-dominated “Habsburg Yugoslavia” (Pavlowitch, 2003a). The year 1918 marked the beginning of one of the most important and specific supranational communities in Europe. It is important to recognize that the idea
of Yugoslavia, as a supranational union, inherited a strong legacy and influences from the previous regional “unions” (Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires) and that it is not an idea which started from the wider communal spirit of the post-WWII socialist Yugoslavia, but rather appeared on the stage much earlier.

The Second World War (WWII) found the “brotherhood nations” on different sides again - Croatia created an independent state under the protection of Nazi Germany; a part of the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina had their divisions fighting on the side of Germany; Serbia was divided ideologically between the remains of the monarchist Yugoslav army/nationalist Serbian forces (which were also collaborating at certain periods with Nazis, fighting together against partisans/communists) and the partisan/communist movement. The end of WWII brought the partisans, an antifascist movement led by Josip Broz Tito, to the surface as the victors both in the fight against Nazi Germany on the side of the Allies and in the civil war that was going on at the same time. Tito unified the South Slavs, bringing Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia together again under the same framework, trying also to reconcile the countries divided by their separate national visions. That was the beginning of what can be called the socialist period in the history of Yugoslavia (1944-1992) (Djokić, 2003).

While Yugoslavia existed (1918-1992) witnesses from the different nations within it had different experiences and views on life at that time. Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia used this period to continue developing ideas of their own ethnic states (Pavlowitch, 2003b; Cipek, 2003; Velikonja, 2003); Montenegro and Serbia were considered to be the members of the same nation (Pavlowitch, 2003b); the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted
Yugoslavia as the best protection from the nationalism of Serbs and Croats (Bougarel, 2003), while the Yugoslav Macedonians and Albanians were considered to be part of a pre-existing Serbian kingdom (Poulton, 2003).

Parallel to these processes, the sense of belonging to a Yugoslav community and a hybrid Yugoslav identity was being developed, especially amongst intellectuals. In view of the oppositional and “black wave” characteristics of some intellectuals, that were opposed to the Communist Party and the autocratic government and not necessarily towards the idea of Yugoslavia. Since the former Yugoslavia was mainly a rural country, intellectuals and educated youth were a minority, but with a very significant influence on the South Slav societies (Trgovčević, 2003). It could even be said that the process of creating Yugoslavia was completely opposite to the term “balkanization” and to the processes this term marks today. Democratic Yugoslavia, had it survived the 1990s and the fall of the Berlin Wall, could have been a part of the new Europe, with its multi-national composition, maybe even an example within Europe of how to continue with integration (Djilas, 2003).

Since the beginning of the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1989 the cultural spaces of new or renewed national states were moving towards national/ethnic and territorially-defined structures. The “three D” approach to transition - decentralisation, de-monopolisation and democratisation was promoted (Zlatar-Volić, 2010). Encouragement and enforcement of intercultural contacts (which were built in the

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14 Yugoslav Black Wave is the term used for the cultural movement that started in the former Yugoslavia during 1960’s and 1970’s, especially in film, theatre and visual arts. It is characterised as a critical view on the contemporary Yugoslav society, with dark atmospheres and a non-traditional approach to arts (opposed to social realism as a ruling cultural paradigm of that time). See more in DeCuir, G. (2011).
basic structure of the supranational frame of Yugoslavia) as well as the ideas and the ideology behind Yugoslavia were lost and forgotten. The national community became the only “real” community, creating an atmosphere of “cultural ethnicization” (Švob-Đokić, 2011: 115) and a cultural system between nationalistic and opportunistic tendencies (Čopić 2011). The institutions that existed in the once socialist country were transformed to the important symbolic elements of the old/new nation states, as a matter of their national interest (Katunarić 2004: 24). One of the results of this transition was a sort of institutional fatigue (Klaić, 2012: 123) and the development of an alternative cultural system connected with civil society.

The patriotism of war agitators, or so-called “jingo patriotism” (Marshall, 1992: 25) became the basis for most cultural relations between countries that were previously part of the same federation, building the new (old) cultures on the presumption of the postulate “one culture - one nation” (Breznik, 2011: 127). In relation to culture of memory and monument policy, there were several models that were used for the (re)construction of the new social, cultural and national identities in the countries that emerged from the breakdown of Yugoslavia, out of which the model of “anti-culture” was the most common (Dragicević Šešić, 2011: 35). Anti-culture meant the removal of all traces of the socialist and anti-fascist past, with appropriation and annihilation being the two major strategies. Appropriation meant the removal of red stars from monuments and the covering of anti-fascist slogans with ones connecting the monument with the nation, thereby becoming a monument devoted to the glorious past of the nation. Annihilation was actually a “spontaneous” cleansing of all the traces of cultures of other nations and a way to fight against
symbols of “denationalization,” “Yugoslavization” and “atheization”15 which were all a threat to the main pillars of the renewed nations.

Three major streams of cultural development were common for most of the new national states during the first decade after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia: strong support for “institutional” culture which was backed by the concept of “national culture;” development of “independent culture” that was following international trends and influenced by the opening of the region to Europe; and “market-oriented” culture, related to pop-culture consumerism (Švob-Đokić, 2011: 116). From a contemporary perspective, divisions and “clusterization” inside the spaces that in the past represented Yugoslavia are related to the position of the new nation countries to European integration (Dragičević Šešić and Dragojević, 2008). As a result of all the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, instead of a modern multinational and intercultural federation “post-Yugoslav states as feeble imitations, indeed travesties, of European nineteenth-century nation states” (Djilas, 2003) were born.

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15 Within the policies of socialist Yugoslavia, all religions were allowed to continue to exist in the institutional way, but the ruling, mainstream and visible paradigm was ‘atheism’ (since it was ideologically not plausible to be communist and religious at the same time).
2.3.3 Implicit cultural policy in socialist Yugoslavia: The roles of culture in a supranational union

We are Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, but all of us together are also Yugoslavs, all of us are citizens of socialist Yugoslavia. In this sense, we must strengthen the sense of belonging to the Yugoslav socialist community of equal nations and nationalities. This is not Yugoslavhood in the unitarist sense that denies the nation or endeavours to diminish its role. (...) What I refer to is the need to deepen awareness of belonging to Yugoslavia, of the fact that the strengthening of our Yugoslav community is the concern of all our nations and nationalities and that only if strong can it guarantee them true prosperity.


In brief, the essence of today’s Yugoslavism can be only the socialist interest and socialist consciousness... Socialist forces would be making a big mistake if they allowed themselves to be carried away by futile ideas of creating some new kind of nation.

Edvard Kardelj (1957), one of the main creators of “workers self-management” system in SFRY.

From a contemporary perspective, implicit policies of socialist Yugoslavia had two main but very different approaches that are captured in the above quotes from two prominent Yugoslav personalities. The first approach was the community of equal nations nurtured under the socialist ideology and umbrella of the Communist party; and the second, a so-called constructivist tendency with a quest to create a new, socialist, harmonious, Yugoslav man through the creation of “a new (integrative) culture” (Švob-Đokić and Obuljen, 2005: 59). This second approach today is
often observed as utopian or even manipulative, as a way of denying the natural, primordial rights of nations, even as a cover-up to hide the secret nationalistic ambitions of Serbs or Croats participating in the Yugoslav nomenclature. It is very difficult to decide which one will be used to prove how close these approaches are to the explicit or implicit policies, plans or wishes of the ones which were the constructors of the Yugoslav federation (Jović, 2003). Ideologies, nostalgia, populism, nationalism, revisionism, and mythologies on all sides are some of the reasons why even the academic and scientific sources and texts about these issues still do not bring an objective point of view on this topic.

Educational and cultural policies were crucial for the transformation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), a country which after WWII was still focused on agriculture and with a mostly peasant population. The process of systematic industrialisation initiated mass movements of the farmers to urban centres, which is not seen by all researches as a prior step towards modernisation (Djukić-Dojinović, 1997). These policies had “the aim to create a branched system of socialist education and schooling in accordance with the demands of modern production, new life and the role of a personality in society where it evolves into a free producer and manager” (Mala enciklopedija, 1971: 689). The conceptualization of socialist Yugoslavia relied on Marxist theory connected with nations and states, with the goal of the socialist revolution to create a stateless form of social order (Jović, 2003; 159), or in the official words of the Party - “a society without a state, classes, or parties.”

It is interesting to re-assess the official slogan of socialist Yugoslavia: 'brotherhood and unity,' which dominated the public

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16 The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists, Belgrade, 1958, pp. 266-7.
space during the first two decades after WWII. It represented an official multinational, multicultural and socialist policy framework, with “brotherhood” referring to the community of nations in Yugoslavia and encouraging tolerance between them, while ‘unity’ referred to the unity of the working class as the ideological overarching framework secured by the Communist Party (Cipek, 2003: 79). It is important to emphasize that ‘brotherhood’ was not only meant as an ethnic category but as an ideological basis, calling for solidarity, equality and fraternity as socialist but also humanistic concepts (Jović, 2003: 160). It was the differences in the interpretations of the idea behind the slogan, between Josip Broz Tito and Edvard Kardelj, that led to the weakening of the Yugoslav state and gave more power to the national states and their national elites. After the change of the Yugoslav Constitution in 1974, what was once a strong union was headed towards dissolution (Jović, 2003: 176). Because of the consequences of the conceptual differences behind the narratives of Yugoslavia it is important to connect the ‘brotherhood and unity’ slogan of socialist Yugoslavia, with the slogan of ‘unity in diversity’ of the European Union.

After the conflict between Stalin’s Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia began in 1948 (the crisis of the Informbiro, 1948-1955), Tito and the Communist party initiated a ‘socialism of the third way’ which they called ‘workers self-management.' It represented something between planned socialism, controlled by the Party, and a pure market economy, controlled by the working class in industry. Although still being a one-party political system, “some elements of political pluralism, market economy and civil society had been introduced, resulting in a kind of quasi democracy (the pluralism of so-called self-management interests and strong peer evaluation), quasi market (cultural organisations were allowed to
generate their own earnings) and quasi-civil society (an independent cultural scene operated under the legal status of associations, in principle envisaged for amateur culture)” (Čopič, 2011).

However totalitarian and non-democratic the upper levels of the Party and the state were, it was very important and specific that at the lower levels there was a real, direct democracy through the mostly sovereign workers’ councils. When it came to the questions of distribution of income in the organization, all the workers (not only educated and highly skilled ones) were making decisions. When the organization was faced with questions concerning engineering, technology, or dramaturgy, theatre direction, and other similar points that needed someone with expertise, there was a sovereignty of experts. It could be said that this was an attempt to create/determine a multi-layered and mixed direct democracy (Kuljić, 2003).

The concept of workers self-management was also applied and deeply rooted in the cultural sector in socialist Yugoslavia (Jović, 1980), since it “incorporated in its circle the majority of the cultural elite, which was allowed to manage the cultural sector, as long as somebody from the top did not find some decision questionable or want to decide by himself” (Čopič 2011). Trying to draw the parallel to contemporary cultural practice and cultural policy, self-management as an organizational theory and practice can be connected with the idea of the “autonomy of culture.” It perceives culture as “something untouchable which cannot be tailored according to any tactical or technical considerations” (Adorno, 1978: 108). This idea is strongly expressed as a need through some of the networks and platforms in Europe, and it is reflected in the case study of the Clubture network. The workers self-management
system did not reach its ambitious goals, but it left an important legacy in the cultural systems of the countries of the former SFRY, such as “direct revenues for the financing of cultural activities, a strong cultural administration that was aware of cultural needs, cultural development planning based on a model where cultural providers met cultural users, an extensive peer review system that contributed to the professionalization of cultural policy decision-making and the relative autonomy of cultural institutions as separate legal entities” (Council of Europe, 1998a, chap. 2.3).

Amateur cultural involvement by the workforce17 was a significant aspect of life in socialist Yugoslavia. It was developed under the wings of workers’ syndicates, in the form of associations called “cultural-artistic societies”18 (Dragićević Šešić and Stojković, 1989). These ‘amateur collectives’ were freely chosen and practised by a majority of workers in socialist Yugoslavia. Culture and the arts were not the main occupation of most workers, but these collectives had an effect on the integration, expressiveness and competitiveness of people in the workers’ organizations and developed their cultural needs (Dragićević Šešić and Stojković 1989). The networked society of today is witnessing a global movement of ‘amateur culture’ mostly influenced by the possibilities of the Internet as a participatory medium with democratization potentials (Castells, 2000). Complementary to this, questions of ‘cultural participation’ and ‘democratization of culture’ are very widely spread as ideas in recent years in cultural policy circles in the EU as well as amongst cultural practitioners and artists (Vanherwegen et. al., 2011).

17 A specific terminology exists in the Serb-Croat language for a workforce involved in amateur cultural activities: ‘radnički amaterizam’ which literally translated would be ‘amateur engagement of the workers’.

18 Kulturno-umetničko društvo (KUD).
Self-governing communities of interest in culture (SIZ\textsuperscript{19}), represent a special form of self-management organizations “through which the free exchange of work in between the workers from different cultural institutions, and between the workers in the sector of culture and other sectors, was secured” (Jović, 1980: 180). Their responsibilities were to: define the interests of the cultural sector (personal and common); set programmes for cultural development; establish cultural organizations (cultural centres, museums, theatres, etc.); develop programmes of construction and adaptation of new buildings for culture; promote cultural and artistic activities as well as; support organizations and individuals working in the cultural sector financially (Jović, 1980: 181). There were SIZs for culture at municipal and provincial level as well as at the level of the republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia), all run by “cultural workers” or cultural operators, as they are called today. The experiences of SIZs can be connected with the arms-length cultural policy model as well as the “bottom up” approach to cultural policy-making, which will also be analysed in the case studies in this research (Višnić and Dragojević, 2008).

Multiculturalism and the aspiration of intercultural dialogue, as an approach to different cultures, ethnicities and nations, is not the exclusive concept of the EU. Neither are the ideas of autonomy of culture, cultural democratization, the “bottom up” approach to cultural policy-making and the legitimization of itself through the cultural field (Habermas, 1992) original to the EU. Although it could not be considered as a truly democratic system, socialist Yugoslavia used similar strategies to unite the citizens in whose name it governed under the same idea/ideology. For these reasons

\footnote{\textsuperscript{19}Samoupravna interesna zajednica (SIZ).}
the European Union can be (maybe controversially) considered as a “post-Balkans’ phenomenon - an archetype and utopia” (Ugričić 2005: 45), with all the chances of repeating the mistakes of previous supranational identities but also the hopes of learning from them.

The parallels that can be drawn between the formal narratives and slogans of socialist Yugoslavia and the European Union provided inspiration to compare the experiences of these two different supranational communities in order to explore the different ideological and political mindsets.
3 Questioning cultural policy frameworks for intercultural dialogue

3.1 New nationalism in Europe

By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people.

Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power.

The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.

George Orwell (1945), Notes on Nationalism

Modern society is steadily providing for more independent, critical, introspective and free individuals but as a consequence those same individuals are becoming more socially isolated and lonely.
While trying to move out of this space of freedom, some people start seeing authoritarian and totalitarian spirit as an alternative. This alternative opens a new hope for integration in a group, and takes the burden of responsibility off our back, placing it on the back of a nation or a charismatic leader - or usually on the symbiotic connection of those two subjects, where the leader becomes the embodiment of the nation itself. This helps us to escape from the vicissitudes of modern life (Bauman, 1996). In a group with a “clear identity” it is easier to classify things or persons, because “human social life is unimaginable without some means of knowing who others are and some sense of who we are” (Jenkins, 1996: 5).

Although national identity is a political category it is perceived in a different way depending on the nation and context - it has the potential to be open, and connected with the notion of “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas, 2001). Nevertheless it is often considered as a synonym for ethnicity, which makes it equally closed and exclusive, producing hatred towards members of other nations. This hatred is often generated by self-victimisation discourses with the strong denial of any possibility that “our side” was ever capable to cause victims and in that way, and at the same time become a victim (Kecmanović, 2006: 103). If it becomes evident that some members of our community did something bad to the member of other communities the discourse of relativisation is often put in front. Nationalism is one of the ways of “fighting against our fear of dying and death itself - our own death and death of the members of our national community” (Kecmanović, 2006: 115).

In times of crisis like the one which started around 2008 in the interconnected global financial and economic systems, and which
then spread to all other aspects of life, nationalism becomes one of the “reasonable alternatives,” strengthening the cohesion of nation or the nation state much more than universal liberal principles (Kecmanović, 2006: 255). There is also a question of the so-called “narcissism of small differences” (Kecmanović, 2006: 86) where we deal with a psychological paradox - the more similarities there are between nations, the stronger hatred is developed. And “as for the nationalistic loves and hatreds... they are part of the make-up of most of us, whether we like it or not” (Orwell, 2000). Nationalism is not created by nations (as imagined communities), it is inducted by specific political, economic and cultural spheres (Brubejker, 2003: 288; Verdery, 1993b).

Alternatives to patriotism/nationalism can be found in the practice of local patriotism or regionalism as probably the only authentic types of patriotism. While national patriotism has to be learned, nurtured, and encouraged, local and regional patriotism are constant, unchangeable and universal to the extent in which all people are local patriots (Kecmanović, 2006: 237). Local patriotism or regionalism are rooted in people’s need to live in the community where they feel safe, in a predictable environment and surrounded with places and people they know or at least are close to their views and beliefs (Kecmanović 2006: 238).

There are many factors influencing the rising nationalism in Europe in recent years but globalisation, European integration processes, and migration are considered to be the most influential, with the questionable politics of collective identities and still dominant primordial approach to national identity formation (Duelund, 2011: 2). Migration is presented as a danger for society (Bigo, 1994, 1996) with migrants perceived as an abnormality for the national system (Sayad, 1991).
The issue of immigration in Europe is not something that can be solved so easily or only through EU bureaucratic procedures, especially because the economy of the European Union needs new workers and mobility as a crucial element of business, cultural and leisure life. The other reason why it cannot be stopped is because movement and change are inherent parts of the European identity. In 2008, 6% of the population of the European Union came from countries which are not EU members (Statistical Portrait of EU 2008 - European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008: 16), not to mention that there are still serious issues concerning mobility of workers from countries which became part of the EU in 2004 and later, and the citizens of the countries of “old Europe.”

A series of political events around Europe such as the biological and genetic “arguments” reinforcing cultural hostility towards Muslims in Germany (Sarrazin, 2010), the issue of national cultural cannons introduced by governments in Denmark and the Netherlands20 (Duelund, 2011), through quasi-scientific, populist, and conservative discourses, placed national questions in the centre of both the public and political space. According to Peter Duelund, this new wave of nationalism in Europe is being manifested in various ways:

“- interconnection of national identity politics and immigration policy;
- revitalisation of national unity in cultures with clear distinctions between us and others;

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20 One of the members of the Canon of the Netherlands Committee said: “The canon was produced to identify the historical and cultural events that have made the Netherlands what it is today, and its purpose is to add this collection of common events, through education and culture, to the separate spiritual baggage of the different groups in Dutch society” (Duelund, 2011: 4).
- a move from integration to assimilation, despite political rhetoric to the contrary;
- improvement of heritage at the expense of contemporary culture and art forms open to the world;
- primordial transformation of culture and identity and of the narratives of cultural institutions, at the expense of the cosmopolitan view of identity formation;
- a human rights emphasis on individual citizenship and the protection of rights is being overshadowed by collective stigmatisation and identity protection;
- anthropological concepts of shared traditions, lifestyles, and values are receiving priority;
- classical liberal republicanism, with individual citizens at the centre of an inclusive democracy is being replaced by particularism, tribalism, and inward-looking parallel societies;
- culturalism is replacing equal social and political rights and opportunities;
- the human rights-based view that all human beings should be treated equally regardless of their differences is being superseded by political multiculturalism, i.e. the view that people should be treated differently because of their differences.” (Duelund, 2011: 7)

Contemporary European society is obviously dealing with the “ethnically marked cultural differences associated with the international movement of peoples, and within national territories, the claims to difference associated with the protracted struggles of indigenous minorities to maintain their identity.” (Bennett, 2001). It is important to analyse the origins of rising nationalism and opposition to cultural diversity and interculturalism in Europe.
Taking Bennett’s synthesis, Raj Isar defines civic, administrative, social, economic and conceptual contexts as important policy and practice frameworks crucial for the further development of cultural democracy approaches (Isar, 2005: 8). In debates about future societies, we should be clear with ourselves that a completely tolerant society is utopia and as such, not possible to accomplish (Ignatieff, 1996). Because “the power to do something is always the power to do something against the values and interests of this ‘someone’” (Arendt, 1958) and “individual and collective identity is always constructed in relation to and in negotiation with otherness” (Auge, 1995: ix).

However, a goal which could be strived for is to create the conditions for human aggression, dissatisfaction and anger to exist only at a interpersonal level and avoid intergroup developments (Kecmanović, 2006: 107), while mastering the arts of conversation (Appiah, 2006) and investing the energy to individualize ourselves and others as a precondition for tolerance (Ignatieff, 1998: 63).

### 3.2 Explicit cultural policy and intercultural dialogue in Europe

*Lenin’s methods lead to this: the party organization at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organization; and finally a single “dictator” substitutes himself for the Central Committee.*

Leon Trotsky, Our Political Task, 1904.

Everything surrounding the question of cultural diversity is a matter of “doxa” - the knowledge we think with but not about. Cultural policy tools are often explicitly used to reaffirm the old, or construct new identities of different communities. The topic here
is the ‘instrumentalisation’ of cultural policies. Cultural policy is often used as part of the (re)constructions of narratives of “old societies”, such as in the UK during the rule of New Labour (Back et al., 2002), or of the intelligent conceptualisation of new ones, such as the branding of Kosovo as the country of ‘young Europeans’ by the Saatchi & Saatchi advertising agency. In practice cultural policy is often misused, and creates a serious gap between political and public space, as well as between political elite and citizens.

Although believers in the ‘positive’ postmodern community have a vision of cultural differences becoming more accepted ‘descriptions’ rather than ‘divisions’ (Rushdie, 2005), the concept of a diversity of cultural interests is still not fully practised. A diversity of cultural interests exist where physical place is not centrally important to community dynamics, i.e. where real and virtual ‘non-places’ matter more. Auge defines the ‘non-place’ as a “space which cannot be defined as relational, historical, or concerned with identity,” as something which could “never be totally completed” and which is the “opposite of Utopia - exists, and does not contain any organic society” (Auge, 1995: 63, 64, 90). Airports, with their crucial role in a global society, often serve as examples that can be symbolic of a non-place. Excessive movements of the population and a multiplication of ‘non-places’ have started to become reality, running counter to the traditional idea of culture localized in time and space (Auge, 1995: 28).

Intercultural dialogue as a challenge to explore the relationship of ‘our culture’ with the cultures of ‘Others’ is central to international society today. It is therefore also one of the priority questions to

which every cultural policy should have some explicit or implicit answers. If, however, it stays in closed circles of experts, it influences the sustainability and inefficiency of the model of intercultural dialogue that has been raised to the level of an ideology by the European Union.

The first international convention which gave guidelines to national governments concerning the protection of human rights and relation to ‘Other’ was the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in Rome in 1950 (and amended in 1970 and 1971) (COE, 1950). The European Cultural Convention (COE, 1955) adopted in 1954 and ratified in 1955 was the first cultural policy document at European level which called for cultural cooperation in the fields of cultural research, cultural heritage, education, and science. It can be considered as the basis for future development of cultural policy tools connected with cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and cultural sustainability.

UNESCO’s first official documents relating to cultural diversity appeared in 1995 with the report *Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development*, which called for some kind of “global ethics” related to human rights, democratic legitimacy, public responsibility, transparency, equality of the sexes, respect towards children and youth, preservation of heritage and nature (McGuigan, 2004). In 1998 the Council of Europe published *In From the Margins - a contribution to the debate on culture and development in Europe* (COE, 1998a) which emphasized the importance of the connection of culture and sustainable development and analysed the possible developments of the European society from the cultural and cultural policy perspective, underlining the importance of cultural diversity for Europe and
the creation of policy instruments which can support it. At a more general level it called for the transition of cultural policy from the margins to the centre of political life.

These first official publications and documents led to the creation and adoption of the Council of Europe Declaration on Cultural Diversity (COE, 2000) and the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO, 2001), which still serve as the main frameworks for the creation of the conditions for more culturally diverse and open societies in Europe and globally. UNESCO continued developing this framework with the adoption of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression (UNESCO, 2005) and the report Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue (UNESCO, 2009) with the goal of influencing policy-makers at national, regional and local levels and to encourage them to include cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue elements in cultural, educational and communicational policies.

In May 2007 the European Commission adopted the European Agenda for Culture (EC, 2007) as a form of European cultural strategy, where emphasis was placed on openness towards other cultures through mobility of artists and cultural operators and an intercultural approach to lifelong learning.

By carefully observing dynamics inside circles of experts and by comparing them with social and political developments in the countries of Europe (above all in countries of the European Union and the Balkans) we can identify that cultural policies influenced the construction of ‘new’ or the reconstruction of ‘old’ national identities. Problems also arise from the process of change that is initiated by the interactions of supranational identity in the EU and the European member-states. Some of the implications of these identity interactions are the new waves of nationalist ideas
and ideologies, as well as violent anarchist movements throughout Europe.

The consequences of these movements in Europe can be seen in examples of “institutionalized depolitization of masses” (Ali, 2012), the emergence of “the extreme centre” and the new strategies of the right wing (White, 2012) nationalist political movements. These movements connect with their followers not only through racist messages but also through “clear visions” of society, which were traditionally reserved for the programs of socialist movements and the intellectual left (Ali, 2012). It can be said that the right-wing and nationalist agendas are driven by left-wing and social equality narratives.

3.2.1 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue

One of the largest problems of cultural policy-making connected to intercultural dialogue in Europe is its primarily top-down approach, which can be seen from the example of European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008. Analysing the ECOTEC Final Report, Evaluation of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008 from July 2009 (ECOTEC, 2009), contracted by the European Commission, various problems can be identified connected with methodology, criteria and indicators resulting with vagueness in official evaluation results.

In the ECOTEC evaluation report, apart from some quantitative data proving the success and effectiveness of the initiative, some important qualitative questions and conclusions should be highlighted:
- A question was raised concerning development and “ownership” of the EYID;

This concern - that some stakeholder organisations owned the ICD agenda through their participation in the development of the EYID, (and that it was therefore relevant to them) but that they “lost” some of that ownership during implementation because of the way national projects and activities were funded/implemented - was echoed by several other interviewees and in particular by a focus group comprising players in the field of active citizenship. (ECOTEC, 2009)

- A missed opportunity for a more active collaboration between the top-down and bottom-up stakeholder needs;

In some cases there was likely to be some tension as a result of NCBs\textsuperscript{22} influencing the allocation of funding received from the EC. One stakeholder network consulted felt this resulted in missed opportunities to build confidence at the local level; and allowed a ‘relevance gap’ between top-down and bottom-up needs. From the Commission’s perspective, an interesting feature which the EYID tested was the ambitious goal to link grass-roots activity to policy. (ECOTEC, 2009)

- Vagueness in the definition of intercultural dialogue that resulted in a number of non-relevant answers to the topic;

These positive and potentially negative effects of the breadth of the EYID were highlighted by a number of stakeholders and indeed NCBs\textsuperscript{23} as well: the lack of a precise definition of ICD allowed

\textsuperscript{22} NCB is an acronym for National Coordinating Bodies responsible for delivery of the EYID at the national level.

\textsuperscript{23} NCB is an acronym for National Coordinating Bodies responsible for delivery of the EYID at the national level.
sufficient room to develop relevant and more tailored activities, but posed the risk that there would be narrow understandings which excluded the most challenging issues. A clearer focus would have reduced this danger.

(ECOTEC, 2009)

- Elusiveness of the results connected to the impact in the target groups;

  It was a key aim that the Year reached out to as large a number as possible of the public at large. Evidence of direct effects or impacts in this respect is elusive, but it is possible to assess the level of appropriate inputs and outputs to provide an indication of the likelihood of the extent to which the Year achieved visibility, for example through the numbers of people who attended events, or the extent of press coverage and media cooperation.

(ECOTEC, 2009)

- Not enough focus on the space of popular and traditional culture (i.e. football and religion);

  Certainly most believed that the objectives of the Year met the needs of stakeholders; but in practice some sectors participated more widely than others. For example UEFA\textsuperscript{24} noted the relative low profile of the sports sector, which to a degree was offset by the very strong and high-profile contribution that UEFA itself made to the Year in close collaboration with the European Commission (30-second TV commercial Different Languages, One Goal aired during Champion’s League football matches and estimated by UEFA to be the equivalent of some €20 million in terms of commercial

\textsuperscript{24}UEFA - Union of European Football Associations.
advertising space). The religious theme was another area which appears to have had a low profile in many Member States (although it was the subject of one of the Brussels Debates) during the Year, with specific activities identified in Finland (which produced the Helsinki Declaration on Inter-faith Dialogue) and Portugal. In fact it may be the case that while religion was not often addressed explicitly during the Year, it was part and parcel of a significant range of activity where faith is closely linked to culture, tradition and heritage.

(ECOTEC, 2009)

- Not enough proof of sustainability of the initiatives that were supported by the EYID;

  The impacts of the Year appear to have been largely short-term and individual in nature, characteristics which do not typically promote sustainability.

  ... The extent to which such effects are sustainable is difficult to assess but is likely to be weak. For example while individuals valued the experience of participating in the Year, they appeared to be less confident that organisations and systems within which they worked were likely to change significantly, or that they had the power to promote change from within. It is however probable that a significant number of participants will nonetheless have received a boost from the Year and in many cases will carry on their activities with renewed vigour.

  (ECOTEC, 2009)

On the other hand, there were some results which came out of the EYID that continue to raise questions and influence the sustainability of the process. The Platform for Intercultural Europe
introduced intercultural dialogue as an integral part of civil sector activities in Europe and still continues to raise questions and stimulate debate on issues related to intercultural dialogue on many levels in Europe.

The Civil Society Platform for Intercultural Europe appears to have played a central and valuable role in the preparatory phase of the Year. The range and diversity of the target stakeholder community for the Year has made it challenging to achieve uniform coverage across all sectors and interests. Much of civil society activity takes place at the local level, and while the Year led to some progress on making the link between policy and the grass-roots level (largely through the Platform), this challenge remains.

(ECOTEC, 2009)

Although, the evaluation of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue is not in the centre of this research, and it is not analysed deeper here, it can be used as an example of the top-down approach to the topic of intercultural dialogue at the EU level. It illustrates how problems and solutions to certain topics are defined by EU administrations and relatively closed circles of experts. This type of approach alone does not have enough potential to influence the ‘silent majority’ to actively engage in a culturally diverse society of a contemporary cosmopolitan Europe.

3.2.2 Cultural policy academic community

The issues of four main international academic journals dealing with cultural policy and arts management (Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society; International Journal of Cultural Policy; International Journal of Arts Management; ENCATC Journal
of Cultural Management and Policy) for the period 2008-2013 were analysed, with the goal to map the debates and/or research in relation to cultural policy and intercultural dialogue. The idea was to see how developed the intercultural dialogue discourse was in the specific academic community. At the same time, to understand how the focus on intercultural dialogue by the EU through the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue influenced international academic circles in the field of cultural policy and cultural/arts management.

During the period 2008-2013 the International Journal of Cultural Policy did not have any article directly reflecting, inspired by or initiated by the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. On the other hand, there were a certain number of articles that dealt with the relationship of cultural policy, culture/arts and cultural diversity (rarely however was intercultural dialogue used as a term of reference).

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25 This period was chosen because of the publishing rules and procedures of academic journals. Because of the peer review and editing procedures, sometimes even two years may pass until an article is published.
February 2008.
Saukkonen, P. and Pyykkonen, M. "Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity in Finland". Vol. 14, Issue 1, p.49-65

February 2009.

March 2011.
The whole issue dedicated to the relation between cultural policy and religion.

November 2011.

January 2012.
Lahdemaki, T. "Rhetoric of Unity and Cultural Diversity in the Making of European Cultural Identity". Vol. 18, Issue 1, p. 59-75

September 2012.
Bodirsky, K. "Culture for Competitiveness: Valuing Diversity in EU-Europe and the 'Creative City' of Berlin". Vol. 18, Issue 4, p. 465-473

November 2012.
Pyykkonen, M. "UNESCO and Cultural Diversity: Democratisation, Commodification or Govermentalisation of Culture?". Vol. 18, Issue 5, p.545-562

These facts can be approached in different ways. First of all, there are number of academic journals in the fields of anthropology, sociology, political sciences, philosophy, etc. which have published texts dealing with issues such as cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, and even some academics from the field of cultural policy have published their research there. On the other hand, the four selected journals are the most relevant international journals from the field of cultural policy and cultural/arts management. The fact that the topic of intercultural dialogue in relation to cultural policy has almost no impact on the editors or authors of the texts in these journals is a signal of the lack of debate around this topic at an academic level in Europe. Although being probably one of the crucial issues of contemporary European society, it is almost completely ignored by the academic community.

3.3 Methodological cosmopolitanism vs. methodological nationalism

As an effect of this double segregation, nationalism appears as a force foreign to the history of Western state building. Instead, it is projected to others, to bloodthirsty Balkan leaders or African tribesmen turned nationalists. Western state building was

\textsuperscript{26} ENCATC Journal of Cultural Management and Policy was founded in 2011.
reimagined as a non-national, civil, republican and liberal experience, especially in the writings of political philosophers such as Rawls (Sen, 1999). Segregation and dislocation are thus closely related. The ethno-nationalist wars and violence suppressed from the history of one’s own state reappear in the contemporary scenery of far-away places.

However, what we nowadays call ethnic cleansing or ethnocide, and observe with disgust in the ‘ever troublesome Balkans’ or in ‘tribalistic Africa,’ have been constants of the European history of nation building and state formation, from the expulsion of gypsies under Henry VIII or of Muslims and Jews under Ferdinand and Isabella to Ptolemy’s night in France or the ‘people’s exchange’ (as it was called euphemistically) after the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and Greece. Many of these histories have disappeared from popular consciousness – and maybe have to be forgotten, if nation building is to be successful, as Ernest Renan (1947/1882) suggested over a hundred years ago.

Wimmer and Glick Shiller, 2002: 307

The field of social and humanist sciences is not free from “methodological nationalism,” which was first recognized as a problem by Anthony Smith (Smith, 1983: 26). It is a framework that considers the nation-state as a “natural social and political form of the modern world” and appears in the variants of ignorance, naturalization and territorial limitation (Wimmer and Glick Shiller, 2002: 302). This approach is not sufficient to follow the opening of the European society.

There is a need for the re-conceptualization of the “modern society,” where one of the notions which could be followed is methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2005: 50). As long as we
are still in the concept of “methodological nationalism” and “as long as we think in the frame of culturally integrated nation-state, we will not be able to understand the current situation” (Delanty, 2003: 486).

First, it is necessary to explain contemporary perspectives on cosmopolitanism and ‘methodological cosmopolitanism,’ which are not linked as a term to the notions of ‘cosmos’ or the ‘globe’ and it does not include ‘everything’ in itself (Beck and Szneider, 2006).

In the 18th century, Christoph Martin Wieland stated that a cosmopolitan person “means his own country well; but he means all other countries well too, and he cannot wish to establish the prosperity, fame and greatness of his own nation on the outsmarting or oppression of other states” (Wieland, in Brender, 2003: 105). Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande are trying to place this perspective in the contemporary perspective, focusing on Europe (European Union) as a society that has the potential to develop as a cosmopolitan community.

From this perspective, it is a question of a specific approach that “calls for neither the sacrifice of one’s own interests, nor an exclusive bias towards highest ideas and ideals, accepting that for the most part political action is interest-based. Rather, it insists on an approach to the pursuit of one’s own interests that is compatible with those of a larger community.” (Beck and Grande, 2007: 71). They named this approach - “cosmopolitan realism.” In an ideal situation, it calls for a simultaneous achievement of own and the goals of others, individual and collective, national and European (Beck and Grande, 2007: 71). This kind of generalized concept of cosmopolitanism may be part of a solution to the tensions
between the national and supranational forces in Europe today. The only problem is that, according to The World Value Survey of the University of Michigan, national and regional identities dominantly prevail over cosmopolitan identity (Norris, 2000; Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart et al., 2004).

The culture of cosmopolitanism, made at the intersection of communalism and globalization, is supported by a minority of the world population, those that see themselves as citizens of the world (Beck, 2005). These “citizens of the world,” are often members of the “Super-Creative Core of the Creative Class” (Florida, 2012: 38), and live in the “space of flows,” compared to the ‘locals’ that live in the “space of places” (Castells, 2009: 50). They are mostly well-educated, open and young members of various communities (Inglehart, 2003). Although influential, this group has not been powerful enough so far to change the old and impose a new paradigm. This new paradigm, a fusion of communalism and identification, would recognize multiple identities in a world of diverse cultural communities (Castells, 2009: 120).

The “methodological cosmopolitanism” calls for re-thinking of the social sciences, humanities and culture/arts, confronting them with the “cosmopolitanization of reality” (Beck and Sznaider, 2006). It is the understanding of cosmopolitanism that acts within society, dismissing the onion model of globalized society, where globalization forms only the outside part of the onion, and acts from the outside. This neo-cosmopolitanism or “realistic cosmopolitanism” or “cosmopolitan realism” (Beck and Sznaider, 2006) calls for a trans-disciplinary redefinition of the perception of cosmopolitanism in different scientific and practical fields. According to Beck and Szneider (Beck and Sznaider, 2006), this redefinition would mean committing to three basic values:
• critique of “methodological nationalism”, which means that we do not take for granted the notion of society which is equal to the notion of national society;

• shared understanding of the age we live in as the age of cosmopolitanism;

• shared assumption of the need for “methodological cosmopolitanism.”

The need for “methodological cosmopolitanism” should not be understood as some kind of academic and scientific trend, but as one potential answer to the need for understanding processes happening in reality (and “real virtuality”) in the cosmopolitan world. If it still seems too distant and utopian as a concept, we should be reminded that the process of forming nation-states in the 19th century was also seen as something that was soulless and artificial, something that was not ‘natural.’ Local identities and territorial units were considered to be basic, ‘natural’ communities. Only after certain time and the acceptance of national narratives (rituals and symbols), the sense local was ‘overcome.’

Methodological cosmopolitanism is a multi-perspective approach to the problem of identity in an interconnected world, which tries to overcome the either/or (inclusion/exclusion) logic of nationality with the logic of cosmopolitan vision (Beck and Szneider, 2006). It opens the space for the plurality of interdependencies between different political actors in different dimensions, avoiding the domination of connections between nation-states in the process of communication between the communities (Grande, 2006).
However, methodological cosmopolitanism does not call for the end of the nation, as it could be superficial understanding of this process, but for its transformation (Beck and Szneider, 2006). While questioning the borders of methodological nationalism, we need to be aware of the elusive aspects of methodological cosmopolitanism, avoiding the traps of universalism.
4 Cultural networks reconnecting communities with cultural policies: case studies

The chosen case studies present European networks and platforms that demonstrate the interplay of practice and policy, while trying to achieve a very difficult goal - to be relevant to grass roots practices, and academic and cultural policy. Although not perfect, and not always successful, these organizations can be considered as examples of “good practice,” which can be defined as a “creative and sustainable practice that provides an effective response based on the idea of direct knowledge utilisation, with the potential for replication as an ‘inspirational guideline’ and can contribute to policy development” (Sekhar and Steinkamp, 2010). Banlieues d’Europe was not a typical cultural network when it was founded; however, after some time it entered a “bureaucratic/aristocratic” period, and is now entering in a new development cycle. While Clubture is one of the best examples of a new, active and flexible cultural network that learns. Transeuropa festival is an alternative platform/network based on European values and cosmopolitanism, which can be used as an important model for the future of EU cultural organizations.
4.1 Banlieues d’Europe: Taking dialogues from the suburbs to the centre

4.1.1 Introduction to Banlieues d’Europe

Yes, we call for a coalition of the forces of culture and the social domain, and those of education and science to combat this terrible drift that question the values of equality of people, respect of affiliations and cultures that are the basis of Europe. For the last 22 years, Banlieues d’Europe, has been carrying out a permanent combat for the recognition of the equality of dignity of people and groups, victims of economic, social and cultural exclusion. Yes, with additional partners, we will intensify even more our action for a Europe of solidarity and the sharing of cultures.

Jean Hurstel, President of Banlieues d’Europe (BE e-letter, n°216 / May 2012)

The network Banlieues d’Europe (meaning the outskirts/suburbs/peripheries of Europe) was founded in 1990 in Lorraine (France) with the objective to “exchange practices and information and to get away from isolation in order to valorise cultural action projects in deprived neighbourhoods with excluded communities”.27 Initiated by Jean Hurstel, it was founded with the help of artists, associations, cultural operators, city representatives, experts and researchers interested in working on the projects and initiatives relating to the life of deprived communities in Europe.

Today, it represents a “resource centre of cultural and artistic innovation in Europe, bringing together 300 active international partners and 10,000 contacts in Europe - cultural actors, artists,

activists, social workers, local councillors and researchers.” BE gathers all these actors in a network of projects with common values, but also plays the role of a platform that has the goal to connect the grass roots level with academic reflections and policy. The values uniting individuals, organizations and public bodies which participate in the network, according to Sarah Levin, director of BE, are the belief in the strength of participatory artistic projects in tackling social inclusion and cultural diversity, with all the nodes in the networks believing in the important role culture has in European society. It is also her impression that the members of the network share this maybe utopian idea that these principles can be defended at the same time on European, regional and local political levels.

The network organizes meetings, seminars and training courses, and publishes meeting reports and books covering local, regional and European topics. The first administration office was set up in Strasbourg in 1996, and the current office in Lyon was set up in 2007. It is important to note that in 2004, initiated by Silvia Cazacu, one of the network members from Romania, the network branch, Banlieues d’Europe’ Est., was founded in Bucharest. This eastern part of the network was not active enough or effective, and although this was a very important strategic direction, it was unfortunately never used.

The Annual Meetings of BE have been organized in various European cities (Brussels, Glasgow, Belfast, Antwerp, Munich, Lyon, Turin...), hosted by local network members. They have discussed themes such as Culture and Conflict; Nomad Communities; Culture in Movement; Cultural Diversity in Action; Urban

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28 Ibid.

29 Sarah Levin decided to step down from the position of Director of BE in February 2013.
Transformations and New Cultural Practices in European Neighbourhood; The Role of Culture Faced With the Rise of Nationalism in Europe. Topics such as New Urban Festivals; The Relationship Between Cultural Venues and Inhabitants in a Given Territory; Hip Hop Dance, History and Perspectives; The Intercultural Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Space, were discussed during many seminars. Various arts and cultural projects were initiated as a result of the connections made through these seminars.

Since Banlieues d’Europe moved to Lyon, the last Monday of each month is reserved for a meeting/debate of some of its European partners or actors from the Rhône-Alpes region on topics such as urban renewal, memory, immigration. The network publishes a bi-monthly electronic newsletter in French and English with information on network projects, news, calls for partners, pet projects. It participated in different research projects at European level, identifies innovative artistic and organizational practices and tries to connect them to university research. BE is recognized as a network of experts at European level, collaborating with DG Education-Culture, DG Social Affairs and DG Research.

The administration of BE consist of four permanently engaged professionals - Sarah Levin, Director; Myriam Bentoumi and Marjorie Fromentin, Project Managers; Charlotte Bohl, Head of Development, and Jean Hurstel, founder and President. The strategy of the network is determined by the 15 members of the Board, which include representatives of some of the member-

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30 Since Sarah Levin stepped down, Mr Pierre Brini joined the team, which will now go through a period of re-structuring and probably a new model of functioning will be introduced.
organizations and distinguished academics, experts and practitioners from Europe. Although consisting of mostly prominent cultural operators, researchers and academics from Europe, it is the impression that the Board of BE does not have any substantial power connected with the governance of the network. This is probably one of the weakest points of BE – the governance of the administrative center of the network, and the network itself is most often in the hands of one man, the President.

The founder and President of BE, Jean Hurstel, was trained at the École Nationale Supérieure d’Art Dramatique of Strasbourg (TNS), where he mostly focused on philosophy and theatre. Early in his career, he was interested in the relationship between local communities, public space, and theatre, and engaged in theatre experiments at the Alstom Factory in Belfort and in the working-class areas of Montbéliard Peugeot and the Bassin Houiller Lorraine. Parallel to his involvement in BE, he directed la Laiterie (a former dairy) - the European Centre of Young Creation in Strasbourg (1992-2003). He has been active as an expert on the Urbact programme of the European Commission since 2003 and since 2006 as a Chairman of Les Halles de Schaerbeek in Brussels.

Sarah Levin became Director of BE in 2002, and started to guide the network towards research projects, activities and expertise throughout Europe on questions of artistic practices and cultural innovation in excluded communities. She is trained as a specialist practitioner in international cultural exchanges, and has also worked for the Dance Biennial and the Contemporary Art Biennial in Lyon. Before her enrolment in BE, she gained significant experience by working at the French Institute of Rabat (Morocco), for the Pays de Savoie Chamber Orchestra, Chambery and for the Laura Tanner Dance Company (Geneva).
4.1.2 Cultural policy, networking and intercultural dialogue

Since its beginning, Banlieues d’Europe had its administrative centre in France, but it always insisted on being a European cultural network and an exchange platform on different levels. The first layer of Banlieues d’Europe’s specificity is its connection with the term banlieue (suburb/innercity). The term has its origin in the middle ages, coming from “lieue du ban,” where lieue was an old measure representing a distance between the place where someone was and the place from which the Lord was controlling his territory. It can also be connected with the term “mise au ban” meaning - excluded, marginalized. If not only used in a literary sense, the term can be connected to the theoretical notion of a non-place (Auge, 1995). The philosophical notion of banlieue gives a transnational and transcultural dimension to the activities of BE, which constantly tried to be active on the social, cultural, identity borders, referred to in some of BE documents as an “outlaw territory,” questioning the links between dominance and culture, especially in deprived neighbourhoods.

In an interview, Jean Hurstel explained:

“Suburbs have many meanings. One of those is exclusion. Suburb is always not only suburb; it is districts in a town. In English some people translate “banlieue” with wall of inner cities. It’s not only a periphery of the city but it can be in the centre of the city. So, it means much more”… “In the beginning of BE we were in Lorraine, and in the suburb of France, but from the other, German side, we were also on the periphery of the centre of that country. So we had to explore also the periphery suburbs of national countries and to look and to go out from the closure of France to go to open
toward the other countries in Europe.”… “Banlieues d’Europe is not Banlieues de France. It’s Banlieues of Europe! So you have to explore the culture not only of neighbourhood, but of the countries you are acting in. In all the projects we participated in, it is always the project that is in the centre, not the region, not the building. It was network of projects. Because projects are in the centre of cultural dialogue between population and artist.”31

The idea of placing the organization on the periphery, in the symbolical suburb, in a philosophical non-place, was a very significant starting point concerning the positioning of the network. However, BE never placed the emphasis on dialogue in the non-place, but it connected the organizations and individuals which are active in places of conflict and excluded communities, through a network which had the idea of promoting a constructive dialogue, often through arts and with artists as mediators.

BE works on projects that have a “sensitive relationship with inhabitants and excluded communities,” through the perspective of cultural democracy, cultural diversity and social links. It believes that the neighbourhoods are places of creation and creativity that should be more visible. Since the network was founded, it promoted an opposing concept to Andre Malraux’s32 concept of democratization of culture, which actually represented the dissemination of elite culture to the poor. Instead of this top-down approach, BE tried to promote a more participatory concept of cultural democracy, acknowledging every citizen as a potential creator and recipient of cultural and artistic content. BE functions on different levels however, “the ground is local level, with the

32 Andre Malraux was a French writer, art theoretician, and first Minister of Cultural Affairs in France during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1959-1969).
projects being located in a place and linked to a history of the place, people, partners, and from the local, it goes to national, regional and European level” (Levin in Brkić, 2012b).

The second important aspect of the term banlieue, and BE’s practical work, was decentralization, working outside the centre, in the periphery, with people and organizations which are outside of the central cultural, social and political cycle. Again, this did not mean being active on the periphery only in the territorial sense of the term, but working on the decentralization of power and the empowerment of individuals, groups and organizations which are in different ways excluded from main stream society. From the perspective of BE, constant movement and circulation of people, ideas and projects represents the real decentralization. Jean Hurstel would define this as a “specialist network on questions of participation in the fields of arts and culture.” It is certain that BE brought to the surface, or at least helped to open the space for a debate around certain topics in the European context. However, like many cultural organisations, it started to become self-contained, without a real interest to substantially influence the changes connected with the topics it covered during its conferences and seminars.

What made BE different from other networks in the field of culture is that they defined themselves as a network of projects when they started, rather than a network of places or people. This created a potential framework for dialogue between people who are active, around issues that were important at that moment, instead of nurturing a database of people and organizations could end up being a collective of passive members. BE did not always manage to fully accomplish its goal of being this type of active network, eventually falling in the same trap it wanted to avoid. However, this founding concept left space for a new organizational/network cycle grounded in good values, which may be implemented with
the help of some different people and new energy.

One of the values of BE is that they and the members of the network, are at the same time partners in large European projects and in smaller, regional and local projects. Some of the recent European projects include: *Accept Pluralism (Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe)*, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Research Framework Programme; *Laboratory of Hip Hop Dance in Europe* which involves young artists from different European countries, but now already became independent.33 Amongst local projects are The International Soup Festival in Lille together with Attacafa; and the photography competition My Neighbourhood, My History bringing together different local and media partners.

Sarah Levin, Director of BE, admitted that BE very much works with on the ground projects:

“There is a project with The International Munich Art Lab, one of our members, working on session with young people that are excluded and do not have work, working with them on integration through artistic practices. So, we are more involved in ground projects now. I don’t know in which way we will be able to follow this kind of project, but I think we have to be more involved in

33 In 2008 when this project was initiated inside the network, BE administration was the only actor within the network that had the capacity to apply for EU funding. In a way, BE nurtured the project until Lezarts Urbain, one of the member-organizations decided to take over the administration of the project and applied for a new cycle of EU funds support. In February 2013 it received 2-year support from the European Commission under the name “European Network of Urban Dance.” In a way, one network nurtured the creation of another one.
reality projects.”… “There were really interesting ideas and new ways of thinking of how to do research with people in a social/economical society with this kind of project. In a way, we try to participate in this kind of projects.” 34

The results and experiences of these projects are reflected upon with members of the network, researchers, policy experts and decision-makers at BE meetings and seminars. The importance of BE lies in the links it creates. It makes isolated people and organizations more visible, learning from the local context, cooperating and creating new bonds between the inhabitants of disadvantaged communities. And, although it is far from being the only organization in Europe working with similar methodologies, it nurtures the culture of cooperation and collaboration on different territorial, political, sectorial and expertise levels, fostering respect and supporting spaces for intercultural and interdisciplinary intersections.

The role of arts and culture in the process of social and cultural mediation, “art in the struggle against exclusion,” was one of the main emphases of BE’s activities in the first 15 years of the network. Later on, the vision of the network was redefined as “the development of participative and innovative cultural and artistic practices,” avoiding the term “exclusion” which was often used subjectively. The network has supported and initiated innovative artistic and cultural practices with people from excluded communities, in spaces of conflicts, throughout its existence. The network has therefore also played a role in changing the meaning of the word culture, avoiding its narrow use, as only arts. Sara

34 Brkić, A. (2012b) Interview with Sarah Levin, Director of Banlieues d’Europe, November 21st 2012.
Levin’s opinion is that the importance of culture and arts are often taken for granted, whereas they should be promoted, especially through investment in cultural education and Jean Hurstel similarly added:

“Everybody has culture. If you speak you have culture. You are in a city, you are in a generation, you are in a centre, and you have culture. In each neighbourhood, in each district, you have culture. In each country, each region, you have culture. So, the people have culture. The artistic field is another sense of culture. So you have to bridge the two main definitions of culture. In France, when you say culture, people mean art; it’s a main understanding of culture. You have to bridge the two definitions of culture.”

BE’s strong belief that artistic interventions can have an important influence in the social development of communities, that they can be tools in the fight against nationalism, racism and xenophobia, is based on practice, but also research by some of the members of the network, such as François Matarasso (Matarasso, 1997):

“The principal conclusions of the first part of this research (Matarasso, 1997) can be summed up in a simple manner:

- artistic interventions have an important contribution to make to individual and community sustainable development;
- positive social impact is linked directly to the act of participation;
- this impact is clear, demonstrable, and can be attributed to the aims of social policy.

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If we want to summarise the various benefits of these initiatives in one single idea, it is that they contribute to the formation of active and committed citizens, who are ready to assume responsibility for their personal development as well as that of the community in which they live.”

One of the roles of a network in the field of culture is to make the voices of its members louder, to advocate for their wider interests. BE tried to address values shared by its members, but it was not always successful. Hurstel sees one of the reasons for this is the lack of network capacity itself, as well as in the tendency of committees, ministries, municipalities and cities to look at cultural policy as arts policy. One more problem comes from the fact that BE acts at the crossroad of social, political, economical and cultural policies, and the challenges of cross-sectorial advocacy are enormous. At the same time, he sees hope for a more effective change in the fact that national levels are losing their power, and in the energy of the new people in the administration of the network.

BE sees the current economic and at the same time social crisis in Europe as an opportunity: Europe driven by the economy and as a peace agenda, without dealing with the development of society is a crisis project waiting to happen.

“When you say economy... there is none at all. No success. You can speak much more with the EC about the creative industries. Creative industries in the future will be the password for economy. But when you look at the creative industries, they are mostly very small enterprises. But handicrafts are not industries, and there is no possibility to get from those little enterprise to a large field of industries. The success of BE will be to have much more projects in
Europe in the field of culture. Europe has a bad relationship, or no relationship with the citizens of Europe. I think the projects we do can be a tool, if you multiply, get much more of them, to have relationships with other countries of Europe, through local territories, neighbourhoods.”36

Regarding connections with explicit cultural policy, BE represents only one of the voices today. There are many more organizations now working on similar issues. BE considers this to be a positive change. Most of them are interlinked in formal or informal networks, which make it easier to head towards their long-term goal - to stay close to the ground and to be respected by public policy bodies and decision-makers at the same time. To have been recognized by the European Commission (DG Education and Culture and DG Social Affairs) as a partner in two project cycles (6 years) confirms on one level that BE is a relevant stakeholder in public policy circles.

“I had someone from the EC on the phone and she told me “You are not any more an interesting project, but a partner!” So, we are sometimes invited to some high level meetings now... it can have an influence.”37

This is at the same time a potential threat, which could detach the network from its roots and members, replacing activism with an administration role.

36 Ibid.
37 Brkić, A. (2012b) Interview with Sarah Levin, Director of Banlieues d’Europe, November 21st 2012.
The important role BE played, was to continuously deal through projects, conferences and debates with some of the major issues of European society today - the rise of nationalism, racism and xenophobia. All of these activities had the goal to influence the redefinition of the process of dialogue between different communities and the restructuring of society that is now racially, nationally and socially more mixed than ever. This is where artists and cultural operators have its place. In a rather idealistic way, Jean Hurstel would present this role through a poetic concept of “imaginaire” (imaginary world):

“Everybody has an “imaginaire” made from representations from his mind and everyone creates his “imaginaire.” When you see the results of nationalism, racism and xenophobia, you see that it is in the mind. It is not a reality, it is in the mind, in “imaginaire.” Artists work with “imaginaire”, with fiction, with theatre fiction... so they should be the best creators of the “imaginaire.”)”  

4.1.3 Summary of Banlieues d’Europe case study

BE was not successful at all. Perhaps in the local field there was some success. But we keep trying. We do not look for success. We look to be there, and to work with people. Success was not our aim at all.

Brkić, A. (2012a) Interview with Jean Hurstel

There are five important dimensions to Banlieues d’Europe as a

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case study, which are connected with the goals of this research:

- BE’s perspectives on networking;
- BE’s transcultural and at the same time local approach;
- BE’s focus on the role of culture and arts in the process of intercultural dialogue;
- BE’s active networking based on projects and;
- BE’s belief in Europe as a practice rather than just an idea or ideology.

People who work in the network’s administration have a background in artistic or cultural studies. They are motivated by the idea and need to connect their primary, cultural and artistic interests with social activism, and the goal of achieving a more sustainable and creative society. BE tries to play the role of a social change network through culture and arts, and constantly and sometimes stubbornly uses its inter-sectorial connections to help European society reach some of it’s complicated goals.

The approach of BE to networking is deeply rooted in socialist and left intellectual French movement of the 1960’s, and based on the idea of multiculturalism, openness and cultural democracy. France was a good starting point for the network’s development, because of its tradition of decentralization and of networked local and regional identities. BE has always been aware of its local base, “the place they were born in” (Strasbourg or Lyon), nevertheless, all other community levels are of equal importance to it - micro regional (Alsace or Rhône-Alpes), national (France), macro regional (Western Europe or Balkans) and supranational (European or cosmopolitan). BE acknowledges the existence of borders, only because it wants to work with them, not ignore them, or pretend that they do not exist and hope that as a consequence they will disappear.
BE’s recognition of South East Europe and the Balkans as an important region to work with, in the context of the idea of the European Union can be considered its value as a network, since the Balkans is one of the last parts of Europe not yet fully integrated into the EU space. BE was one of the first networks to recognize the importance of this issue, to connect artists, cultural operators and researchers from the Balkans and the EU and to create the conditions for various collaborations. On the other hand, Banlieues d’Europe l’Est, with its centre in Bucharest (Romania), became only a symbolic node in the network because of its inactivity, but it can play a significant role in the future of the network if it redefines its strategies, goals and means of functioning.

Intercultural dialogue was more than just a phrase or key word for BE when it was founded. From its beginnings, the network worked on or supported concrete cultural and artistic projects which dealt with the issues of divided communities in Berlin, after the fall of the wall; in the Balkans, during and after the civil war; in Belfast, after the peace treaty; in the suburbs of French cities, before, during and after protests of young French citizens of mostly Maghreb origins. Through this approach, BE tried to show that the European Union, as an idea, is not something that can be taken for granted but is a project that continuously needs to be reaffirmed, questioned and debated. It is questionable to what extent they succeeded to make any significant changes in more than 20 years of their existence. What is a legacy of BE are its founding values and the history of social engagements as well as the connections it made between artists and other representatives from the cultural sector, politicians, academics and the researchers.
4.2  Clubture: Culture as a process of exchange

4.2.1 Introduction to Clubture

I remember when I went to Banja Luka (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 2008 to give a workshop to some NGOs about network operations. I was there with the representatives of 6-7 organizations from Bosnia, all functioning in the field of contemporary arts, but no one speaks with each other! But, they all came there, and kept saying to me - ‘It’s easy for you to talk about cooperation, because for you guys from Clubture it is something normal.’ And then I told them: ‘But it was not normal!’ And it really was not normal. And Emina, Teo, and other people around spent so much time and energy to re-educate people, artists, cultural workers.39

The Clubture network40 was founded in 2001 as an initiative of 15 civil sector organizations from the field of culture in Croatia. It was the time of “sluggish and traditional production within cultural institution and non-recognition of new, innovative, independent cultural and artistic practices” (Višnič, 2007: 39). The first initiative came from the Multimedia Institute, one of the most developed cultural NGO’s in Croatia, for a platform of independent cultural organizations, initiatives and non-profit associations from Zagreb (Mama, Moćvara, ATTACK! and KSET).

Organizations from Zagreb connected with the 10 largest cultural NGO’s from other parts of Croatia, and these first 15 organizations created the initial programme for cooperation and defined key goals, activities, models of collaboration and decision-making. This

39 Brkić, A. (2012c) Interview with Dea Vidović, former President of Clubture, October 26th 2012.
40 Savez udruga Klubtura is the formal, official name in Croatia.
initiative received three-year support from the Open Society Institute Croatia. In May 2002, the first formal Assembly meeting of the Association of NGO’s Clubture was held in Zagreb. In the beginning, most of the projects were organized in Zagreb but in the second part of 2002, an event called “The Week of Clubture” was organized in the cities of Rijeka and Split, initiating new collaborations, involvements and a real decentralization of the network. This influenced the process of redefining Clubture networking goals and creating a collaborative programme policy. Emina Višnić, former President of Clubture added that this became known as:

“tactical networking in Clubture. We came up with strategic goals, but the structure is flexible enough to adjust tactically in certain situations. On the other side, the process of forming Clubture was led in a way that people really participate in it - we had millions of meetings, quarrels... until we came to a common ground. And we, who moderated that process, insisted that all the interests are put openly on the table, to be able to come up with the common interest.”

...“A basis of 15 organizations was formed, with the strategy to move forward in “concentric” circles. The common mistake in networking is to aim to have a huge number of members. How will you communicate with 500 people in IETM!? You will not, but you will pretend that you will. I think that the Clubture’s membership limit is always somewhere around 30-35 organizations.”

In 2003, the role of Clubture in the Croatian cultural environment became more visible. That year was marked by the exhibition Clubture: Data in partnership with other organizations and as part of the project Zagreb - Cultural Capital of Europe 3000, as well as

41 Brkić, A. (2012d) Interview with Emina Višnić, former President of Clubture, October 28th 2012.

42 Not directly connected with the European Capital of Culture (ECOC) project.
the direct involvement of Clubture in the work of the POLICY_FORUM platform. This platform was an important step for the whole independent cultural scene in Croatia, representing a “floating,” non-formal and independent space for discussion and initiatives related to cultural policy, with the goal to have more influence on explicit cultural policy measures. The occasion, which proved the strength of Clubture and the whole network of different independent, civil sector platforms, initiatives and organizations, was the inappropriate and non-transparent attempt of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia to change the Act on Cultural Councils and make the whole decision making process in culture more centralized. Clubture reacted immediately and organized a response from more than 50 organizations from all over Croatia.

A highly visible debate was initiated, which influenced the Ministry of Culture to change its decisions. What is more important, documents drafted by the POLICY_FORUM as constructive proposals to the Ministry of Culture for the regulation and evaluation of cultural activities were later accepted by the National Council for Culture and implemented by the Ministry of Culture. This is a first important case in the history of relations between the civil sector and the Ministry of Culture in Croatia. It also demonstrated the long-term effect of a bottom-up cultural policy initiative on the system. This action paved the way for future successful and sustainable cultural policy initiatives from the independent cultural sector in Croatia. Dea Vidović, former President of Clubture added that one benefit of Clubture was its inclusive approach:

“Clubture is the voice of those who do not fit into the dominant paradigm, the one that prevails. It is rather a gathering
place of those who are marginalized but not necessarily in the sense of their human rights but in the cultural policy sense. Outside of that cultural system which in its centre has public cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{43}

In the period between 2005 and 2007, Clubture started a process of transition based on the conclusion that some of the assumptions of the network were wrong. One of the first assumptions was that more quality programmes with a higher level of visibility would bring more strength and stability to the network and its members. This proved not to be feasible due to the capacities of network members at that time.

Evaluation brought to the surface some important facts: the organizational capacities of the network members were mostly under-developed, which had a serious effect on the type and quality of shared programmes; the existing operational model of the network proved too demanding for some of the members; in spite of aspirations, there was still a lack of interest amongst the public outside Zagreb for the programmes shared through Clubture; there was also a need to share programmes with the communities outside Croatia and finally; lack of planning, especially strategic planning in the organizations; influence of the organizations from other parts of Croatia, excluding Zagreb, on the local cultural policies, were still weak, in spite all the efforts of the network (Višnić, 2007: 42, 43).

Some outside factors also influenced these results such as, the main focus of the cultural sector in Croatia tended to be on large, stable and inert public cultural institutions and there were almost

\textsuperscript{43} Brkić, A. (2012c) Interview with Dea Vidović, former President of Clubture, October 26th 2012.
no strategic cultural policy changes so the network initiated its own redevelopment process in 2005. These changes took several directions:

- visibility - publishing a monthly magazine 04 and creation of the web portal Kulturpunkt.hr;
- regional perspectives - more focus on programme exchanges in the SEE region;
- public engagement strategy and changes to the public space;
- monitoring and advocacy activities directed towards official cultural policies.

This process of change made the member organizations of Clubture focus on redefining their own identities. It pushed them towards more collaboration and an expansion of their field of activities. They “realised that the insistence on their own fundamental activities and improving their own artistic excellence is the best guarantee for their survival and of securing quality action, as well as for achieving recognition throughout the wider community” (Dragićević Šešić and Dragojević, 2005: 17-18). Member organizations started developing more relevant educational programmes and in the context of the development of their organizational capacities Clubture initiated the Strategic Management educational programme, which resulted in a 3-year strategic plan created for Clubture. The network changed its organizational structure, expanded its circle of collaborators, enhanced and documented its rules and procedures, and diversified its financial resources.

The period 2005-2007 was important because of a strategic focus on regional cooperation, which started with Clubture’s Regional Initiative, which connected more than 100 organizations from
Croatia with organizations from Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia (Clubture calls this region ‘Western Balkans + Slovenia - Albania’), through various programmes, projects, seminars, conferences and events. The idea of the regional cooperation programme was to re-connect the independent cultural scene in the ex-Yugoslav countries through Clubture operating principles.

Because of the positive pilot initiative and because of lack of sustainable funds to support its further development, the main focus of the Clubture network from 2008 was to lobby decision makers in the region and in Europe for support for independent cooperation initiatives in the region (Pavić, 2011). This process was named Exit Europe and was based on the idea to connect experts and academics with artists and cultural workers in order to work with the public and influence cultural policies in the region for a common vision of an integrated, interconnected regional cultural environment. In November 2009, the regional conference Exit Europe - New Geographies of Culture was held in Zagreb, and resulted in policy recommendations. These were promoted in October 2010 in Brussels as part of The Time is Now conference.

*The real stabilization, long-term sustainability and advancement of programmes, as well as the development of international competitiveness, cannot be achieved without relevant interventions both within a total (national) cultural model and within the implementation of local cultural (and other relevant public policies). To advance the conditions for more intensive participation in European cultural cooperation is definitely an adequate answer to the situation.*

Višnić, 2007: 46, 47
The latest and the most important activity of Clubture is the regional platform Kooperativa. It is founded on the four largest regional networks that gather independent cultural organizations: Clubture in Croatia; Society Association in Slovenia; Association Independent Cultural Scene in Serbia, and Association Independent Cultural Scene -Jadro in Macedonia.

Kooperativa is a regional platform and has two main goals: the creation of a long-term and sustainable cooperation framework with the development of independent cultural organizations in the countries of the Balkans, and the development of contemporary artistic practices, critical public discourse and innovative organizational models (Radosavljević et. al, 2013: 24). Kooperativa was registered in August 2012 in Zagreb as a regional NGO which has 21 founding organizations from the region. The first official Assembly of Kooperativa was held 2-4 November 2012 in Ohrid, Macedonia.

This platform is an example of one of the ways to avoid divisions that will inevitably come up again because of the unbalanced and asymmetrical process of European integration and of economic and cultural development in the region of the Western Balkans.

4.2.2 Cultural policy, networking and intercultural dialogue

Clubture is an important actor for independent cultural production in Croatia. Its members contribute with their programmes in the fields of urban and youth culture, interdisciplinary artistic and cultural projects, activist and socially engaged programmes. The network connects actors who cover local, regional and wider
international communities through their collaborative projects. Members of Clubture act in a decentralized manner, with exchanges between larger urban centres and smaller places in Croatia, while constantly trying to improve the visibility of the independent cultural scene in Croatia and promote audience development. The network created a special model of cooperation and exchange, gathering organizations and non-formal initiatives based on their active participation in the production and distribution of programmes. This means that the programme activity, based on socio-cultural relevance, is the only criteria for membership.

The former Clubture President, Emina Višnić, when talking about participation noted:

“I do not believe, nor did I ever believe in the absolute participatory processes or other various forms of direct democracy. That is, I do not believe that they can always produce good results... I think it is also a question of some kind of social leadership. Clubture was always a combination of participatory approach and leadership. It is important that leadership is set to allow opening of the space for those who want to participate. To have mechanisms, procedures and processes which allow people to get involved, but not to rely on the involvement of all. Those who have the wish can invest. The possibility to be involved in the decision making process is a right, but it goes with certain initiative, activities and responsibility. Without them, your right does not mean anything. This does not mean that as a leader you sit and wait for the people to get involved, but you have to try to motivate them, not depending on everyone being involved in every moment.”

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The members of Clubture are organizations rather than individuals. They do not have to be formal organizations, but they must be a “team, group of people which connects through collaborative work on programmes and projects and becomes some kind of community which has a feeling of coherence, belonging and connectedness” (Vidović in Brkić, 2012c). Talking about the decision-making processes adopted by Clubture, Emina Višnić said:

“To allow for suggestions to come from the bottom is a principle of Clubture. The network installed this kind of decision-making mechanisms in its basic programme. This is the exchange programme, which not only allows but also requires collective decision-making. Without that Clubture does not exist. This is probably not the happiest system, because sometimes some programmes go through which are not that good according to these or those criteria, but I still think that this was the absolute value that has kept Clubture alive and active for so long.”

Programmes are always developed through direct cooperation between organizations, which do not have to have a history of involvement in Clubture initiatives. And when the programmes are developed, one of the most important operational elements in the network is the participatory decision making. The Assembly, formed by the representatives of the member organizations, is the formal decision making body. Every applicant that proposes programmes, whether he is a network member or not, simultaneously evaluates all other programmes. This is how the Clubture network decides which programmes will be financially supported, keeping in mind that socio-cultural and non-aesthetic values have priority. This type of network operating procedure makes Clubture one of the rare truly decentralized and participatory cultural networks in Europe, a “horizontal project

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45 Ibid.
collaborative platform of operational type” (Dragojević, 2007: 8). Emina Višnić saw these decentralising processes as an important part of Clubture’s philosophy:

“Clubture always saw decentralization through two processes: one is the process of connection, and the second is the process of sharing. What we always tried, and succeeded to avoid in the network, is touring - pushing something from the centre to the periphery. What is more important than the model are peer relationships - the sharing of knowledge, information and some sort of feeling of mutual support.”

Emina Višnić also had some interesting insights on local development and working in the periphery:

“Clubture succeeded to create a structure in which most of the programmes happen in smaller environments. I think that only 20% of the overall content happened in Zagreb. When you look from the outside, you don’t in fact have an impression that it really functions. Common values, feeling of community, half-syndicate ideas... especially for the people from smaller communities, those things represent some concrete tools. I mean - queer festival in Pakrac!? In the middle of nowhere, conservative environment... That would never have happened without Clubture. And that was never just an export of some performance or something that was made somewhere else. There was always some local group, a Clubture member, which was able to recognize what will function for their community."

As regards to cultural policy and the network’s advocacy roles, Kultura Activa was a programme directed towards the development of local cultural policies and implemented by individual activists at a local level, while the second policy focus of Clubture, youth culture, was practised through participation in the

46 Ibid.
work of the Council for Youth of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, and as a member of the Croatian Youth Network. All the leaders of the network always emphasized that the advocacy accomplishments were never only about Clubture, but about the whole independent cultural scene in Zagreb and Croatia, and in recent years - about the whole region. The whole scene is interconnected through various initiatives, and it was always wider than just Clubture.

Even if it lacked focus, or was not recognized at the national level, Clubture, together with other independent cultural organizations in Croatia, managed to advocate for the creation of Foundation Kultura nova. Kultura nova operates as an arm’s length foundation, founded by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia, with the goal of developing civil society organizations in the field of contemporary culture and the arts. Led by Dea Vidović, one of the former heads of Clubture, Kultura nova started in 2012 with the operational money secured from the Croatian lottery.

Dea Vidović, another former President of Clubture, had the following to say about Kultura nova:

“Kultura nova has happened as a consequence of an idea which came out from the independent cultural scene, and then it squeezed into the Ministry of Culture through the members of the Council for New Media Cultures. This only shows how the actors from this scene are capable to come up with different tactics, approaches and mechanisms to push one idea from the beginning to the end.”47

47 Ibid.
The creation of Kultura Nova Foundation presents a rare success story demonstrating the influence of a civil society initiative in Europe towards a public policy body in the field of culture. It is one of the indicators of the success of Clubture and other civil society organizations in the field of culture in Croatia, and a potential example for other similar organizations and networks in Europe.48

4.2.3 Summary of Clubture case study

The case study of Clubture highlights several aspects of cultural networking which could prove to be very important for future models or the redevelopment of existing ones in a European context: notions of the “bottom up” approach to networking; the link between participation, leadership and responsibility; the “project based” active membership; the multidimensional approach to spaces which the network tries to cover - local, national and regional; social awareness and “artivism.”

Clubture as a network managed to fill the term ‘bottom up’ with real meaning. ‘Bottom up,’ from the perspective of Clubture, functions on two levels - internal and external. On the internal level, “bottom up” means that the organizations which are the members push the topics important to them and do not wait for the administration to do so, and through a well developed participatory system they decide and share responsibility (and financial grants) on a daily basis, not only once a year during the Annual Assembly (which in other cultural networks is often just a representational event, without real participation by members).

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48 Brkić, A. (2012d) Interview with Dea Vidović, former President of Clubture, October 26th 2012.
Externally, “bottom up” for Clubture represents the initiatives and actions defined by the network members, which are directed at decision makers and cultural policy developers, and represent the interests of a large number of representatives of the independent cultural scene in Croatia through their “common denominator” goals. In this way, Clubture succeeded in pushing a number of important cultural policy decisions through the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia or some of the local municipalities. It has acted as the unified voice of an important community from the field of culture, “communal spiders... working in harmony in striking contrast to its individual cousins” (Ali, 2009: 2).

It is not by chance that the idea of Clubture has been conceived and realized in Croatia, one of the countries with heritage from the former Yugoslavia, i.e. of an attempt to create a socially more equal state, of socialism, multiculturalism and self-management. These legacies stayed in the social space through some sort of culture of memory. Although more often completely forgotten in the countries of former Yugoslavia they left significant traces in the post-civil war generation in the whole region. In Clubture,
this aspect of Yugoslav heritage\textsuperscript{49} was reflected in the organizational model of the network, which supports decentralization, participatory democracy with an emphasis on the responsibility of each member organization to be active, and regional cooperation based on connections with the most representative networks of the independent cultural sectors from the countries of former Yugoslavia.

It must be emphasised that the regional cooperation initiative that evolved into a form of regional network (Kooperativa), does not have anything to do with nostalgic feelings for Yugoslavia. Rather it is based on the common denominator interests of all its members, and the interpretation of what the European integration process could mean in practice. From the perspective of the independent cultural organizations from the Balkans, this regional network means a step forward in the process of cultural re-integration of the Balkans in the European cultural space. Since this recently formed regional network will be based on the values and model of Clubture, it is already evident how influential the work of Clubture was, not only at a local and national level.

One of the most important values of the network is that it managed to function in an equally efficient manner at local, national, regional and European level simultaneously, and avoid the model of traditional network hierarchy. This means that each member organization can decide to act locally and/or be active more on the regional than the local level, or to be active only at

\textsuperscript{49} ‘Yugoslav heritage’ as a notion is used here more in a context of the representation of some of the values and legacies of the former socialist state which are revisited and critically re-contextualized from the perspective of Clubture, without any need to be nostalgic, sentimental or similar.
local and national level etc., and any approach chosen by the organization will be acknowledged, supported and valued through the network.

In developing its organizational model, Clubture did not copy any existing networks but developed its own combination of participatory democratic decision making, with the principle of active membership but also with the leadership role of democratically changeable network coordinators. Leaders, network coordinators, such as Teodor Celakoski, Emina Višnić, Dea Vidović, Davor Mišković and others, were all more or less recognized in local, national and regional scenes as important figures, in spite of their limited formal responsibilities and power due to real participatory character of the network. This demonstrated that participatory democracy does not have to dispense with leaders, just that their rule is limited.

“Project based” active membership avoids the trap of the network deceasing even before becoming fully functional. The system does not close the doors to anyone, as long as they share the common denominator values of the network and want to be active.

What is very important to underline is the importance of the values shared by the network members. Clubture is not only a network of organizations which work in the arts and culture but, a network in which member organizations are all socially engaged in their contexts using arts and culture as tools of mediation and share a vision of being a social change network. A number of projects which were produced by or under the support of Clubture proved that culture and arts projects can influence the local, national or regional social environment, if they are deeply rooted in their context and deal with burning social issues, as well as collaborate with partners from different sectors.
4.3 Transeuropa Festival: Alternative idea for a supranational identity

4.3.1 Introduction to Transeuropa Festival

“The aim of the festival is to create Europe from the bottom-up.”\(^{50}\)

Transeuropa Festival is an artistic, cultural and political event, “challenging physical and conceptual borders, creating a collective transnational space,” which happens simultaneously in 14 cities across Europe.\(^{51}\)

Often using new technologies, it creates a series of linked practices, events and discourses, in a mission to promote “an alternative idea of Europe.”\(^{52}\)

It is organized by European Alternatives (EA) and the Transeuropa Network. European Alternatives is a network that has the promotion of democracy, equality and culture beyond the nation state as its primary objective. Their belief is that the “nation state is no longer the appropriate political form in which to define democratic decision-making and active citizenship, equality between people, the respect and extension of rights.”\(^{53}\)

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\(^{52}\) The official web site of Transeuropa Festival http://transeuropafestival.eu (accessed on 8 April 2013).

\(^{53}\) Ibid.
EA organises research, public events promoting active citizenship, youth projects, campaigns and publications, at different levels - local, regional, transnational. The festival would not be possible without the Transeuropa Network - “a horizontal network of activists from throughout Europe working together for the emergence of a new and genuinely transnational European politics, culture and society,”54 which functions as an attempt at a bottom-up democracy. All the members of the EA have a chance to develop the political and cultural position of the organization, through the participatory process in the network.

European Alternatives, the organization that is behind the festival, is co-founded by Lorenzo Marsili and Niccolo Milanese. Lorenzo, as one of the founders acts as a current co-director of European Alternatives, part of the Transnational Board and the coordinating editor of the Editorial Board. He is mainly responsible for the development of the political positions of EA. Niccolo Milanese is co-president of European Alternatives, dealing mostly with the poetical and philosophical aspects of the organization. Segolene Pruvot is the coordinator of the Transeuropa Festival, while also being responsible for the activities of EA in France. She studied political sciences and urban planning in France, Germany and the UK, with previous experiences in the fields of urban planning and European Affairs.

Segolene Pruvot, coordinator of Transeuropa Festival, noted that:

“The concept of the logo of the European Alternatives has been built on the idea that Europe is not something that is pre defined and that exists somewhere written in stone. It is at the crossroads

54 Ibid.
of different influences, so you can draw lines in the open shapes. You see that it is a meeting, like a crossroad of different influences and also can be related to the myth of the rape/hijack of Europe. Our idea of Europe is not the one that is defined by territory, by national borders, but is defined by these crossroads, by influences, but also to its relationship to the other parts of the world and the Other in general.\footnote{Brkić, A. (2013) Interview with Segolene Pruvot, coordinator of Transeuropa Festival, April 5th 2013.}

The Festival started in 2007 in London, initiated by a group of intellectuals, with the same goals that the festival promotes today - values, principles and alternative ideas of Europe beyond the nation state. Inspired by the success of this initiative, the first truly Transeuropa Festival took place in 2010 in 4 cities\footnote{London, Paris, Bologna, Cluj-Napoca.} and it continued in 2011 with 8 more cities\footnote{Berlin, Lublin, Prague, Bratislava, Sofia, Amsterdam, Edinburgh, Cardiff.}. It was a bottom-up initiative from the beginning, involving in a participative process a large number of enthusiastic young volunteers from all around Europe, but also creating links with artists, thinkers, institutions and academics\footnote{The initiative is since its beginning supported by Zygmunt Bauman, Hans Ulrich Obrist, Stefano Boeri, Saskia Sassen, Franco BIFO Berardi, Oliver Ressler, Can Altay, Tania Bruguera, Sandro Mezzandra, Genevieve Fraisse and Kalypso Nicolaidis.}. Since 2012, it extended its borders outside the European Union, including Belgrade (as a representative of one of the EU candidate countries).

The Festival functions throughout the year through the process called “Festival before the Festival,” which is organized in all the participating cities. More than one hundred activists meet during
the year, for discussions, brainstorming, activities and campaigns, connecting groups online from other cities in the network, through this process creating Transeuropa Festival. Each edition of the festival presented new themes, such as “the economic crisis and possibility of alternatives to austerity measures; the new forms of political mobilisation and their potential for rethinking democracy; migrations and movements as an essence of Europe and a way to rethink citizenship.”\(^{59}\) These are chosen by a democratic online voting system. This process is seen as the “building of shared visions and proposals on the urgencies and priorities challenging Europe,”\(^{60}\) and a way of proposing a different view on democracy in Europe.

Segolene Pruvot feels that the ability to move across space is an important part of the working process:

> “What is also interesting in the festival concept is that we do it across area. We always try to have a cultural and artistic approach and not only discursive and political and that is a challenge.”\(^ {61}\)

The festival usually begins with ‘transnational walks,’ a symbolic walking performances simultaneously happening in all the participating cities. These walks have a symbolic meaning and objective such as to see the neighbourhoods from the eyes of the ‘Others,’ to experience how immigrants feel and live in our cities, etc. Other activities are always connected with communication which has the aim to transcend borders, either physical, cultural, economical, psychological, through programmes like “living


\(^{60}\) Ibid.

libraries,” engaging in discussions, screening documentary films, and all the time being in contact with people from other cities in Europe or internationally via various live communication technologies. European Alternatives activists are travelling around festival cities, closing the festival at the end with a Transnational Agora, a place of debate and action, where most of them are present. This is a place for evaluation of what the festival has accomplished, but also for the conceptualisation of future actions.\textsuperscript{62}

4.3.2 Cultural policy, networking and intercultural dialogue

“We involve people who share general ideas on how societies could/should work, how Europe could help us tackle different issues, what it brings to local practices. They do not have the same political views or background, but there is a kind of preliminary community, pre-conception understanding of the world somehow.”\textsuperscript{63}

Transeuropa Festival (TEF) is a specific attempt in cultural practice in Europe to experiment with the applications of supranational identity in public and political space. Although having also tangible results (books, films, magazines, performances, exhibitions, etc.), it is mostly about process and experience, involving a large number of volunteers and young professionals from all around Europe and internationally. It involves regular cycles of thought provoking meetings, debates, campaigns and working visits to different cities. An expensive process of high-end

\textsuperscript{62} The Transnational Agora happened in Rome at Teatro Valle, 2-3 June 2012.

\textsuperscript{63} Brkić, A. (2013) Interview with Segolene Pruvot, coordinator of Transeuropa Festival, April 5th 2013.
artistic production is not the way the members of the European Alternatives practice culture. They foster and support small networks of local activists in different cities in Europe and empower them to come up with their own answers to the themes set by the whole network. Those small networks initiate connections with networks in other cities, creating programmes which have both local and wider, transnational goals. They recognize the constraints of national frames as one of the main problems of the festivals and representational cultural platforms in Europe.

Talking about nationality, Segolene Pruvot observed:

“I actually think it’s extremely important to recognize the fact that artworks, artists and cultural actors do not necessarily have to be linked to a nationality. It is something we really face often in calls from European Commission. It is always like: “Oh, where do the artist come from, where will the art piece be shown, what kind of cultural minorities does it tackle and who is involved?” So, it means people really think about culture in terms of which nations they come from. And if you really look at the way it is made and how the artist work and the cultural actors work - they move from one country to another, they move in kind of transnational arts scene that is not that linked to nationality.”

She then, went on to explain what she meant by transnational:

“It is basically creating something that is made to be not national and not local but made to be transnational. When we have been trying to explain that, it was mostly because we have to refer to funders, and sometimes its difficult to explain what we do. When you say you are going to do something transnationally, 

64 Ibid.
simultaneously, that you are going to relate to a space that is not tangible, that people can not understand, they are asking you: So, what is the local impact, what is the local context and how do you relate with them? It is difficult to explain that its possible to both relate to a local context and have some form of impact locally, but still try to conceive something that is not national or local.”65

This attempt to ensure the role and practice of culture is grounded on different perspectives and views on identity, is not always easy to explain. At the same time, it is not easy to evaluate in which way the audience and participants perceive this transnational aspect of the TEF programs, and where do they see the difference from the programs of other festivals or organizations not claiming to be different in this way. It is obvious that there is a need to additionally communicate and make everyone aware of the existence of this additional space/identity. Because of its non-direct connection with the physical aspect of the space, it is more elusive than people are used to. Segolene Pruvot explained:

“I think its possible, first of all because we explain the context and how we intend to do it. Just the explanation would not be enough, but we always try to have in our organizations people who come from other countries and other cities. When it is totally simultaneous it is difficult, but we make contact through phones, internet, using new technologies, having speakers who are on Skype. We also have people who go and speak in different cities. We try to always have an individual link with a person being able to kind of embody the process.”66

Intercultural dialogue, and the relationship with ‘Other,’ are in the
core of how the idea of Europe is perceived from the perspective of the Transeuropa Festival. It is part of every program and activity of the festival and the European Alternatives network, since it is seen as an inherent part of what European identity is, and something that needs to be protected, supported and promoted. Talking about European identity Segolene Pruvot added:

“I think we have as a starting point Europe that sets the challenge of reinventing itself constantly, accepting new people, new countries, producing something new. That is one of the ideas of Europe we have. We say that cultural equality, democracy is beyond the nation state and we really think the role of art and culture is fundamental in thinking societies and the future of societies. I think Europe is a society of people that should find its own way of working. We can not only rely on politicians, economic structures, to make this society function.”67

There is always scepticism, from the point of view of the researcher following the work of various NGO’s in Europe, concerning the level of true belief and honesty of some of the statements and views concerning their activities. This is especially true when their statement fit with some of the visions or views expressed by European Commission administrations and programmes, or some other European funding organisation. On the other hand, it is certain that some aspects of Transeuropa Festival’s work, as well as their specific approach to some of the topics they are dealing with, do not fit into frameworks set by the European Commission and other bodies and organizations dealing with culture at a European level.

One of the areas where TEF shares synergies with European programmes is in the field of citizenship, Pruvot explained:

67 Ibid.
“We have been involved in the dialogues about cultural policy as a part of the structure dialogue of EU on citizenship. We have always been attending the meetings organized by the European Commission. Recently we have put together an appeal concerning the application procedures, to say that criteria that we were judged on, were basically not respecting the values Europe represents. We are also trying to push some points of discussions, for instance the moment of the opening of the new foreign affairs of the EU, where they started the new regional commissions. We were trying to push with MPs and with different institutional actors the idea that foreign policy should also include cultural policy and cultural exchange. We are trying to be involved in the debates and discuss that with parliamentarians and institutional actors. I would say we do that less at the national level, because we are more active within the European institutions, trying to remind, recall and call for different understanding of what European culture is. From this stage, I can not clearly say if we have an impact on the way institutions think about culture and arts.”

The orientation towards a bottom-up approach, both at grass root (working with volunteers and young activists) and organizational level (collaborating directly with a large number of local organizations) has some evident results. They are mostly seen at a local level, or more precisely to say - the level of individuals and organizations. Pruvot gave an example:

“We did a project together with a foundation dealing with social diversity in Poland. They worked to have a centre for migrants and we made a project together in which we had videos about how people perceive their own space, the local space made by migrants for migrants. Our partners have a base in Poland and work in a
Polish context, but we invited them to different activities we organize. They have built all the contacts outside of us as well, with other organizations in France who created a network on anti-racist movements and they are now completely part of this process. They are now involved in this transnational action and common dialogue. So, by the mere fact of saying it is possible to cross borders and we do share common ideas and ways of working, we have seen that people are changing the way they work. And the way they think about the space they can relate to.”

Transeuropa Festival (TEF) from its beginning stood behind the concept of culture which is not hermetical but rather interconnected with different sectors. Programmes and activities of TEF have a strong activist component and do not have any problem connecting with areas of economy and politics. This way of positioning culture, not isolating it from other aspects of social life, amplifies the messages they are trying to share with the citizens, administration, policy makers, politicians, economists and artists. Pruvot explained how they began talking to other sectors:

“The idea of crossing the different sectors was always there. I think it comes from the frustration we had with the EU and with the way the institutions function somehow, the fact that it is really thought as a political construction and acts mostly in economic fields. I mean, it is not true as a whole, but that is society, that is now a political-administrative institution that ensures that the single market works well. It has activities in other fields, fundamental rights and so on, and that is why we are also defending it. It is not only a community of communities that have legal relationship between each other, but they share also a common imagination and a common vision of what a future is. Our

69 Ibid.
conception is that it is not possible to create a vision of what we want in the future if there is not a part that is dedicated to culture and arts. Helping imagine and not only with words and political discussions on how we are going to protect environment for the next 20 years. As artists have kind of decisive role in helping us, helping everyone to get beyond the borders of usual imagination and usual field of action. It was very important from the beginning that art is in the centre of what we were doing. I think it was also because it is another way of thinking about Europe that it is not often there.”

4.3.3 Summary of the Transeuropa Festival case study

“We are trying to propose real alternatives. We are saying: we do not necessarily agree with the way this or that is being built in Europe today, but we know that it is by working together with others, by dedicating time, thought, reflection and energy, by involving as many people as possible, that one has a chance to make Europe, its construction and even the idea of Europe evolve.”

A “quest for a bottom-up Europe” seems like a too naive and utopian statement. However, if it is presented as a vision, toward which we would like to strive, it can create a positive and constructive space, open to dialogue and changes, differences and inclusion. It is an impression that Transeuropa Festival created a system that involves (young) people more deeply in their activities, generating enthusiasm and emotions, so often forgotten in the institutions of the European Union.

70 Ibid.
The idea of TEF is to re-enter the space of a more open Europe, re-connecting citizens to basic values, while debating, questioning and improving those values permanently. In the case of TEF this debate is encouraged simultaneously in public and political spaces. We could connect this to the need for a more active citizenship and democracy that needs to be practised more often in Europe, as a permanent activity not an event. One of the strengths of TEF lies in the fact that one cultural organization/a festival placed these processes in the centre of its activities.

In a practical sense of the “fight for Europe” statement, TEF is permanently questioning the connections between the vision and statements of EU institutions and, the criteria and indicators that are evaluating the European cultural projects. It became obvious through their experience that, although they fit the vision, they do not fit some of those evaluation criteria, which do not follow the spirit of transnationalism and supranational idea.

Transeuropa Festival is actually a network. The festival would not exist in this way if it were not for a Transeuropa network in its core. A network connecting small units/groups of mostly young enthusiasts and activists from different cities in Europe, that have a knowledge of local needs and potentials, but also a need to connect with people with similar interests in other local environments around Europe and internationally.

The transnational character of the festival means that the question of ‘Other’ is in the centre of Europe, and at the same time in the centre of the Transeuropa Festival. The idea of Europe is perceived as the idea of the relationship with ‘Other.’ There is, of course, a question of the practical application of a transnational character of any particular programme of the festival. It is a
difficult task to mediate to an audience a message that is intended to have a transnational character. However, if it is placed in a position of an experiment, with the goal to explore alternatives to communities that have a nation-state as a primary unit, TEF is an attempt worthy of support.

TEF left an impression that it functions through a strong social leadership connection between Lorenzo Marsili, Niccolo Milanese and Segolene Pruvot, people with a different professional and personal backgrounds, sharing the same vision. Although only an impression (because more time and a deeper insight is needed to evaluate the leadership of an organization) TEF is trying to balance the participatory process which is in its core and a strong leadership which has a coordinating role.

Positioning cultural programmes in a non-hermetical and non-elitist environment, where they are interconnected with other sectors and areas of social life, gives a much wider perspective to the goals TEF wants to accomplish. Since these goals could be seen as overambitious, it is better to place them in another context, where TEF is in the company of other organizations and civil society groups striving towards a new system and re-definition of basic values in Europe. What TEF is doing is far from flawless. However, it is an inspirational example and could be used as a model for other transnational and European initiatives and as an example of an alternative approach to the promotion of a supranational and transnational identity.
5 Methodological cosmopolitanism and cultural networks in Europe

5.1 The power of cultural networks

“While cosmopolitanism accepts and actively tolerates otherness, it does not turn it into an absolute (as does postmodern particularism). It also seeks out ways of making otherness universally compatible.

This implies that cosmopolitan tolerance has to be based on a certain amount of commonly shared universal norms. It is these universalistic norms which enable it to regulate its dealings with otherness so as not to endanger the integrity of a community.

In a nutshell, cosmopolitanism combines the tolerance of otherness with indispensable universal norms; it combines unity and diversity.”

The place where a network is created inevitably influences their character. It usually reflects both the local and national level
where its administration is located (like Banlieues d’Europe with its offices in Strasbourg or Lyon). However, in recent years, the space in which networks are created and in which they operate is increasingly virtual. This raises questions about the character of a network based on territory when the location of its administration is becoming less important (as in the case of Transeuropa Festival). Ever since the first European international cultural networks started in the 1980s and when cultural operators started thinking about the supranational in a practical sense there was a question - what does it really mean to be a European network?

The crucial problem with most international cultural networks in Europe is that, although they have a vision of being supranational or European, they still, mostly unconsciously, function in the framework of methodological nationalism. Like the cultural institutions in the XIX century that built the national identities of Europe, European cultural networks are supposed to be the main identity pillars of the supranational Europe. Considering the elusiveness of something like European identity, it is understandable that such expectations are levelled at European networks.

However, in spite of the constant threats to cultural diversity and strengthening of nationalism, communication is globally becoming more open and cosmopolitan (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Cvjetićanin, 2011: 262). Limitations of the spaces in which networks now exist create the conditions for the creation of “cultural domains that transcend limitations of class, gender, race, nationality, politics, religion or even geography” (Blackshaw, 2010: 91; Turner, 1973). And because of their multimodal, diversified and pervasive character, they are more open to cultural diversity than any other public space that existed before (Castels, 2009: 302).
The consequence of living in the globalised world filled with “networked” communities makes these changes a step closer to reality. Networks are fuelled by imagination and communication, constructed on the interaction between individuals, which means “they are only kept alive as long as their individual members deem them important” (Bauman, 2008: 120, 121). At the moment when the “timeless time” prevails, with no past and no future (Castells, 2009: 50), we will have the preconditions for a new paradigm, a new cultural diversity, a new society to re-emerge. This is where the individuals as networks themselves (“actor network”), grouped around their projects and interests, will have the power (Castells, 2009: 45; Latour, 2005). This power comes from the efficiency of the networks that are flexible, scalable and survivable (Castells, 2009: 23). From the moment when communication technologies started evolving, the potential of networks was rising. They gave the ability to members/nodes to have relative autonomy in the relation to centres of power, and in that way opened a space for a wider democratization of communities.

There is also a question of “the privatisation of sociability” (Castells, 2009: 128), representing the characteristic of the network society in which individuals directly communicate between each other, without mediation or control by the community. This communication is practised mostly in the virtual reality, where anonymity became the norm of the behaviour. Anonymity in the virtual world is a way for alter egos and avatars to say or do something that they do not feel able or comfortable to do in the real world. Often these actions are aggressions without responsibility towards someone else, but this anonymity can be also used to withdraw from conflicts without any consequences, which is not so easy in the real world.
Multiculturalism, cultural diversity and openness are the norms of the elite of the “network society” of today, with a hope that they will represent the meritocratic norms of the Creative Class of the future (Florida, 2012: 57). And most recent economic research provides powerful arguments supporting the shift towards a new society, proving that diversity and openness influence economic growth (Page, 2007). It is therefore important to identify the “multiple, overlapping and interacting socio-spatial networks of power” that constitute one society (Mann, 1986: 1) and to be able to influence them.

5.2 A cultural networking model in Europe from the perspective of methodological cosmopolitanism

There are four active and overlapping layers that are represented through the cultural networking model in Europe from the perspective of methodological cosmopolitanism:

- European community;
- Cultural policy;
- Academic reflection;
- Artistic creativity.

Methodological cosmopolitanism shifts the cultural network and places it at the center of a multilayered and multi-perspective communication and cultural production process. At the same time it moves the network away from the hermetrical, top down system of ‘closed professional cliques.’ It also calls for a non-hierarchical approach to network communities, in the sense that members of the network are empowered to communicate with different types of communities at the same time (supranational, macro-regional,
national, micro-regional, local), so “ensuring the presence of different regional and local specificities in an international context” (Cvjetičanin, 2011: 264). This process can be connected to the way of functioning of the network state - “in a network of interaction between national, supranational, international, co-national, regional and local institutions, while also reaching out to organizations of civil society” (Castells, 2009: 40; Castells, 2000: 338-65).
Brkić (2013), Model of cultural networking in Europe from the perspective of methodological cosmopolitanism.
To act like social change networks is a precondition for cultural networks to reach their potential and achieve more concrete results. In order to become social change networks they need to have a democratic structure, transparent and balanced internal power relations; diversified members and member contexts; a dynamic space which generates innovation through concrete performances, projects and other results of the network, and a leadership that is democratic, adds value and does not rely only on the top down approach (van Paachen, 2011: 160).

Social leadership by social actors is needed for this networking model to be functional. Above all, the precondition that a social change network should meet “to be organized around a political purpose and have defined strategies on how to achieve the envisioned social or political change” (van Paachen, 2011: 161).

Cultural diversities and intercultural competences should be used together with the aesthetics, arts practices and frameworks such as ecology, biodiversity, social justice or economy to engage people in more sustainable communities of interests, creating a more sustainable European society (Kagan, 2010). Academics and experts should be the “corrective factor” and create a space for reflection from the perspective of human and social sciences.

Cultural policy in Europe needs to be rethought (Matarasso, 2010); it is usually set as an overarching level, being on the top of the imaginary pyramid, while it should be intertwining with other public policies. It should not only give directions, but work together with actors from the cultural sector, listening more closely, following developments and opening up to different communities.
The most important step forward for European cultural networks could be their adoption of a paradigm of “methodological cosmopolitanism” (Beck and Sznaider, 2006). The strategies for practicing cosmopolitanism as well as interculturalism in Europe seem like they were designed for non-places. They were often too rigid and theoretical, not based on grass roots experience, still with methodological nationalism as an implicit ontological base.

A new starting point could be the vision of Europe as a network society of elective communities. A space where needs connect with different desires and beliefs, and not only via local tradition and culture. It could be a reconstruction of a democracy, return of the active citizen, with social instead of self-centred leadership, and Eros which drives the sentiments of citizens, that does not to have be connected only with the national identity. This is where the potential of contemporary, socially engaged culture and arts lie: questioning and connecting, engaging the citizens and adding irrational elements and emotions to the European supranational framework. The Banlieues d’Europe, Clubture and Transeuropa Festival are chosen case studies for their recognition and practice of some of these elements.

Cultural networks need to leave the outdated concept behind, which frame the networks as spaces that exist just to share information and create a space for colleagues to meet and discuss. Cultural networking should be practiced without the bullshit cultural policy rhetoric (Belfiore, 2009). If the cultural sector wants to remain important in solving large social and civilization problems, including the relation to Other, it will have to transform its ‘notworking’ into effective networking” (Soros in Mercer, 2011: 31). The concept of Culture 3.0 emphasises the change in paradigm, with non-market mediated exchanges allowed by various online
platforms, where it is now “increasingly difficult to distinguish between cultural producers and users - they become interchanging roles” (Sacco et. all, 2012).

It is not enough to follow the idea of methodological cosmopolitanism only theoretically or rhetorically, but to go beyond the ethnic and national perspective. In practice, this would mean that the organizations running European cultural funding programmes (Culture/Creative Europe; ECF’s Collaboration grants, etc.), which have cosmopolitan values in their guidelines, should rethink procedures for matching funds that beneficiaries must raise.

It is mostly very unrealistic to expect that matching funds will be raised from private companies. Their CSR (Corporative Social Responsibility) programmes are a fundraising option in theory, but in times of crisis, they are little practiced by companies. For these reasons, cultural organizations seek matching funds mostly from their national Ministries of Culture or local governments, and these authorities decide on their support based on criteria that often do not correspond with the criteria of the primary European funder. A cultural organization that went directly to the supranational level for support is taken down again to the national level and this creates problems because the visions and strategies of these levels are often different. There is a need for cosmopolitan criteria and evaluation indicators for programs and projects that are applied both by the EU, and other co-financing levels of governance. For example, those should be some of the elements of the agreement that Ministries of Culture of European nation-states need to sign with the European Commission to be able to participate in the Creative Europe programme.
A large number of networks internationally and in Europe still function as coordination bodies of their national sub-networks. In this way, they reinforce the notion of a hierarchy of communities, which is an obstacle to the practice of cosmopolitan values. A large number of European cultural projects, especially those supported by the Culture Programme 2007-2013 of the European Commission, showed that organizations coming from various countries, levels of governance or sectors can come together as equal partners exchanging knowledge and experience in a way which goes beyond borders. Networks should invest energy in restructuring themselves and in creating their organizational nodes based on spatiotemporal formations, which are global and local at the same time - strategies, programmes, interests, rather than nodes based on national representation which are losing the frame of reference of power relationships (Fraser, 2007).
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations

6.1 “Us and them” paradigm: Different approaches to intercultural dialogue

There is a Mr. Hyde in each one of us. What we have to do is prevent the conditions occurring that will bring the monster forth. Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, 2003.

Without denying the importance of the symbolic representation of “intercultural Europe,” the current state of relations between the different national communities in Europe shows that sustainable replacements for the “us and them” paradigm, including the questions of identity and diversity, have not been found.

Since EU authorities do not engage with the grass roots, or even express the need to do this, they missed the early warning signs of the rise of nationalism, especially at local level. The democratization of culture paradigm is usually used to promote products of elite culture from the top-down, whereas the process of bottom-up cultural democracy and the needs of citizens are neglected, especially those which could be called “a silent majority” because they are not strong, constant and passionate supporters of any of the extreme political and social movements.
Intercultural dialogue, as one of the crucial challenges of globalized culture, is too often addressed by cultural elites with in-effective cultural policy measures or mostly hermetical cultural projects with small visibility and limited participation (i.e. European Year of Intercultural Dialogue). If we want to see the cultural sector contribute more to the sustainability of cultural diversity in the European society, culture and arts will have to be practiced much more on the ground with and by the silent majority, “the little man” (Reich, 1974). The strength and weakness of ethnonationalism lies in the silent majority, or the “epidemic ethnonationalists” (Kecmanović, 2006: 20), not in extreme right-wing groups.

A much explicit clarification of some concepts and phrases must be made by the European Commission and Council of Europe, as a precondition for future actions on intercultural dialogue in Europe, based on qualitative empirical research. This is to be followed by a permanent “monitoring of the impact of new nationalism and development of counter-strategies to prevent its harmful effects on cultural and identity policies in Europe” (Duelund, 2011: 8).

There is also an issue to do with the hermetical character of some of the projects created and supported at European level, which are not reaching enough people, while often the target groups they reach are already “believers” in the ideas those projects are promoting.

There is a large unused potential for interventions in the space of traditional, popular and amateur culture that could strongly communicate the values of a diverse, intercultural society. Strategies for intercultural dialogue in Europe are designed inside closed circles of experts, academics or cultural operators, rarely
tested or debated with grass root level organisations. Without implying that culture and arts are central to intercultural dialogue in Europe, they can make a more important contribution to the development of a democratic process by re-entering the public and political space currently conquered by extreme nationalist forces.

Traditional or folk culture traditions have community codes implanted in their core, which are often used as inspiration, symbols, metaphors, even as programs of extreme nationalistic movements. This is the reason why social actors which aim to influence intercultural dialogue need to work also in the spaces of traditional culture, to try and re-appropriate at least part of this space from the groups which are misusing it.

Amateur cultural organisations support the participation of people in creative processes and engage them to think more openly with their artistic side. Importance of amateur arts lies in the fact that both nationalist ideologies and the arts work with emotions, with ‘imaginaire.’ The character of the cause to which this ‘imaginaire’ is directed can be creative or destructive.

The space for popular culture and media is the ideal space for artistic, social and political subversions, because of the wide scope of the audience it covers and the influence it has. On the other hand, this subversion is only efficient if it is framed and brief, applied through “bite and retreat” tactics (Brkić, 2011), because of the large appropriation capacity of the forces in the space of popular culture. If not retreated on time from the space of popular culture, the power of subversion will fade away, and turn around in another direction. The subversion will be appropriated by the original system it was trying to subvert, loosing its critical edge. It
is much more effective to influence the perceptions of the people relating to intercultural dialogue, through media and popular culture then through any other space for expression (i.e. high arts). Although mobility programmes are already one of the highest priority at the level of European institutions and foundations, regional, national and local levels should be also encouraged and pushed to invest in mobility schemes that can be seen as “practical interculturalism” (Torch, 2012). Movement of cultural operators is deeply connected with notions of change, and decentralization, as the important elements of EU identity (Brkić, 2010).

Levels of ethnic, national, racial, gender and other prejudice are still high in Europe because mobility is not spread equally enough amongst social groups. Macro-regional cultural networking initiatives between small/midsize networks on lower levels, like “Kooperativa” in the Balkans, should be strategically supported, especially in terms of mobility, exchange and collaboration.

Cultural networks, with their “democratic and non-discriminatory approach to culture and cultural diversity, openness towards other cultures, a widening space for dialogue and cooperation” (Cvjetićanin, 2011: 262) have the potential to be the agents of effective, efficient and sustainable intercultural dialogue between European communities. The comparison between Yugoslavia and the European Union had as its goal the aim to present the consequences of the development of inert supranational communities that over the years develop strong administrative structures, a top down “nomenclature,” but leave bottom-up initiatives mostly in the margins. These excluded communities, or metaphorical suburbs, which exist all over Europe, and which could also be found in Yugoslavia (i.e. mixed marriages, immigrant communities, soft borders - with members of nations living on
both sides of the border, etc.), are the spaces which reveal the transnational and transcultural dimensions of a supranational community. Without these suburbs, outskirts, outlaw territories, the supranational identity of the EU does not exist, and therefore could easily slide towards the same destiny as Yugoslavia.

6.2 Artivism: Bridging the two definitions of culture

The difficulty facing art, in the broadest sense of the word, has always been to distance itself from a society that it has to embody, nonetheless, if it wants to be understood, Art has to express society (meaning nowadays the world), but it has to do it deliberately. It cannot be simply a passive expression, a mere aspect of the situation. It has to be expressive and reflective if it wants to show us anything we do not see daily on TV or in the supermarket.

Auge, 1995: xxi

If all art is political (Vander Gucht, 2006; Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997 [1947]), does that mean that all artists are socially engaged? Most representatives of the sociological school of the 20th century claimed that it is not enough to want to do something good but “it supposes the knowledge and awareness of the social mechanisms that define what we think and how we feel” (Vander Gucht, 2006: 39).

The culture/arts were never there to rule, but in a metaphorical Shakespearean way to act as a “fool“ (Brkić, 2011) - they are there to suggest, reveal, discover, juxtapose, and not to take over power, since having culture/arts in that position “always results in totalitarianism” (Vander Gucht, 2006: 43). A socially engaged hip hop artist Axiom claims that “the idea of a-political people is a
myth... they are political even if they do not talk of the world of politics"72 in the same way like sociologist Daniel Vander Gucht when saying that “even ‘art for art’s sake’ is already a political statement” (Vander Gucht, 2006: 41).

We are all part of various “collective moulding” processes, and the only question is to what extent we will be aware of this, with humanities and social sciences helping us to liberate ourselves from this illusion of freedom (Vander Gucht, 2006: 39). In the same way, everything done as a process of artistic creation, as a way to influence the cultural codes of society, is political. It is just a question of the level of awareness of the creator/artist concerning the inside and outside processes he/she is part of, as well as the question of mediation processes between creator and audience/patron. This is even more highlighted in a world that is intensely interconnected, mediated and socially networked.

Networks, as well as the whole cultural sector in Europe, have to accept networking as a standard and embrace the wider definition of culture. Culture as ‘a way of life’ would mean a space that includes much wider scope for actors and interactions at many different levels of social life. This means that networks must practice heterogeneity and work actively as “networks of projects” with a wide range of perspectives and partners, a clear social or political vision.

This is a great challenge for cultural networks in Europe, since most of them were not created for the purpose of reflection, learning, advocacy, or some sort of shared vision, but out of the

72  http://www.intercultural-europe.org/site/content/newsbulletin/1234 (accessed 30 April 2013).
practical needs of various cultural operators to find international partners (Klaić, 2006), and as a result, many have become closed circuits of ‘professional friends.’

Isar suggests a list of seven imperatives for the effectiveness and impact of cultural networks - realism, reflexivity, articulation, amplitude, autonomy/audacity, adaptation and anticipation (Isar, 2011: 48, 49). Here it is worth underlining the importance of articulation and amplitude, as they emphasize vision and meaning, as well as cooperation “with a broader range of institutions and people, beyond its own sphere” (Isar, 2011: 50). This means “to open up, become far more porous, contaminated by and contaminating other sectors, whether social, enterprise, science, technology or politics” (DeVlieg, 2011: 250).

There is a need to offer alternatives to the “imaginaire” of nationalism, xenophobia and racism, with the “imaginaire” of artists and the creativity of economists, educators, academics, scientists and others, as Jean Hurstel of Banlieues d’Europe phrased it poetically. Because nationalism, as well as the process of (artistic) creation are ways to satisfy the human wish to be immortal, to overcome the fear of death (Kecmanovic, 2006: 118).

6.3 From the margin of public space to the centre of the political space

Or again, it can be argued that no unbiased outlook is possible, that all creeds and causes involve the same lies, follies, and barbarities; and this is often advanced as a reason for keeping out of politics altogether. I do not accept this argument, if only because in the modern world no one describable as an intellectual can keep
out of politics in the sense of not caring about them. I think one must engage in politics — using the word in a wide sense — and that one must have preferences: that is, one must recognise that some causes are objectively better than others, even if they are advanced by equally bad means.

George Orwell: ‘Notes on Nationalism’ 2000 (1945)

In spite of the apocalyptic predictions of those who oppose processes of globalisation, instead of a homogenous global society, we have a simultaneous process of “resistance identities” with fragmentation as a result, and the homogenous global culture developed through dominant networks (Castells, 2004c). Even those “resistance identities” create a paradoxical situation, creating their own global resistance networks as tools of opposition to the homogenous global society (anarcho-syndicalism movements).

This attitude could transform to a new “post-national model of democracy that ceases to disenfranchise citizens and instead, give them an active role in European decision-making processes” (Beck and Grande, 2007: 72). Reconstruction of a democracy, revolving around a set of processes and procedures, could be initiated only from within civil society, which could find the strength to break through barriers of societal image making (Castells, 2009: 12, 298). A cultural transformation of this kind would evolve around two bipolar axes: opposition between globalization and identification and cleavage between individualism and communalism (Inglehart, 2003; Castells, 2004c).

The bottom up approach is closely connected with the notion of individual and organizational responsibility. If individuals and organizations do not take responsibility, develop initiatives and
actively participate, then the bottom up approach remains a romanticized ideal. Active participation means engagement in the political space as an act of co-creation in the decision-making processes, and not only the act of passive participation (Ali, 2012; Sacco et. al, 2012).

Mechanisms should be put in place to identify local cultural activist groups and support their grass root work, while creating more easily accessible spaces for people with less knowledge of cultural management, but that have the energy to create or participate in socially engaged projects through arts and culture. The Step Beyond programme of the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) is a positive example of support for easier access to (in this case) a mobility programme, with simplified guidelines, rules and forms.

Observing the contemporary perspective, all domains of human activities are politicized to a certain degree. There is no serious dilemma about important intersections in public and political spaces, there is only a question “who is the real owner of the public space” (Dinulović et. al, 2011). In the “society of spectacle” (DeBord, 1968), public space is always a space of drama, which needs to be placed in the referential system in relation to identity and ideology (Dinulović et. al, 2011). The public space takes on the role of “a space for demonstrating an attitude - yet also a space for usurpation/deprivation” (Dragićević Šešić, 2011b).

The spaces for cultural use are often located in the centres and designed “by politicians, cultural and urban planners are often remote, inaccessible, monopolized by the elite institutions or simply too rigid and pre-programmed to work for the benefit of grass-root actions in the quartier” (Klaic, 2005: 85). Instead of
allowing the centres of power to create the spaces that reflect that power, new spaces should be created, re-developed or converted “as part of the talent development process and with the mobilization of community resources” (Klaic, 2005: 85).

There is a need to continuously try to re-claim ownership of the public space, because those that own the pubic space, control its content. The same can be applied for the political space. The difference lies in the fact that “demos” has given up the political space when it was made to believe that it is “too dirty” to interact with it.

There is a need to focus on “shared spaces” that need to be framed, clarified and mapped, and after some period of observation, a process of mutual transformation should be initiated (Torch, 2012). One of the tasks of cultural policy is to “create conditions for sharing space” (Torch, 2012).

The idea of Europe should be intensively debated in public, criticized but also defended at European, and especially at the local levels. This debate should be organized like interplay of practice and policy, connecting marginalized groups in society with majority groups/communities. The dialogue should be initiated within the communities, with the communities, not “above” communities or “for” communities. The borders between different community groups should be the central topic of these debates, where these borders are recognized and discussed, not abolished.
6.4 Cultural policy from the bottom up: Pledge for a new European value chain

Had they invited me I would have told them a few things. I would have told them to be careful with their mechanisms of political correctness. For years before it collapsed, Yugoslavia believed it had all the necessary tools for lasting peace, reconciliation and prosperity and brotherhood and unity. Everyone pretended they loved everyone else. And then one day a strongman came and banged his fist on the table and said: “Gentleman, the game is over. Fuck off!” And that was all it took for the whole house of cards to slip into civil wars.


Before we even start thinking about change in cultural policy frameworks, there is a need for change in the mindset of public policy decision makers in Europe, or more precisely in the European Union. A need for “an alternative reality in a world gone wrong” (Robins, 2000: 87). This mindset has to move towards “a Europe looking beyond its frontiers, a Europe critical of its own narrow mindedness and self-referentiality, a Europe struggling to reach out of its territorial confinement, with an urge to transcend its own and by the same token the rest of the world’s condition; a Europe with a planetary mission to perform” (Bauman, 2004: 34).

Change would be a step towards an autonomous society, with the preamble from the Athenian agora - “edoxe te boule kai to demo” (“it is deemed good by the council and the people”) always in front of our eyes (Bauman, 2004: 128). So far, in European Union development, the embodiment of the idea of Europe, as well as in other countries in Europe that strive to become members of the EU, “the council” and “the people” are far away. The democratic
process stopped being a process, with the elections being the only “event” where people express their opinion. The distance between representatives and the people they should represent became too large. There is a need for redevelopment of the democratic process in the European Union.

Even if we know that the globalised society relativizes the importance of all human values, it is more than ever a question of responsibility for “the people” to say and “the council” to listen what is good and what is not. This could lead to the process that produces decisions that can influence this change. And then evaluate their effects, continue the debate, listen again, decide again. As soon as this interaction between “the council” and “the people” is alive, there is a hope. When the process is numb, like today, it leads to autocracy and rise of extreme political movements on all sides of ideological scale (if one really exists any more in Europe).

To be able to have this democratic process alive again in Europe, we need to reanimate the autonomous citizens with their individual liberty and individual responsibility (Bauman, 2004: 128). Democratic process is not only connected with politics and politicians, it is crucial for all the social processes that are giving content within apolitical framework. Cultural systems are in the same system of numbness as the political systems - separation between cultural nomenclatures and the audience/participants is the same. Sometimes civil society has lost its connection with the word civil, creating a society of self-referential cultural stakeholders that select topics and respond to them without wider consultation.
Culture of “old and wise” as the only relevant community representatives still prevail, undermining the potential of young people and their roles as active citizens and factors of change. Conceptualising and executing cultural policies at community levels, below national, could initiate bottom-up socio-cultural interventions, which reflect more closely the real interests of those communities (Blackshaw, 2010: 205). This would also have influence on the effectiveness and efficiency of projects that have the goal to influence a more open dialogue with members of diverse communities.

Taking into consideration that mediation is placed as one of the main phases in the process of intercultural dialogue (Dragicević Šešić and Dragojević, 2004), cultural networks and platforms can be seen as a good base for the promotion and use of artistic activism (“artivism”), socio-cultural animation and media projects linked to intercultural dialogue. Cultural development should be connected with programmes of community development, where the space in which it intervenes is not only a space for arts, but also for popular culture, leisure and sport.

Artists and cultural operators could take on the roles of community development practitioners (Blackshaw, 2010: 164), facilitating, intermediating, animating, enabling new dialogue. Their role could be to create awareness of different positions in the existing conflicts in communities, and to initiate mediation processes. These processes would not mean taking someone else’s responsibility, but empowering members of the community, working with them (instead of to them) to deal with their conflicts using arts and creativity as tools.
As Ledwith states, “there will be no sustainable change unless communities themselves are given the power and responsibility to take action” (Ledwith, 2005: 19). Of course, one of the first problems that arise in this process is the question of community participation. In post-ethical and over-egoistic time, it is difficult to generate a common interest in the ‘shared spaces,’ where community participation became a ‘minority sport’ (Blackshaw, 2010: 174).

Participative approach should be supported and encouraged at the level of project conceptualization, when it comes to the needs of target groups, as well as during project development and the engagement of audience/participants. The participative character of projects should be one of the important indicators for the evaluation of projects applying for support from European funds. This would go some way to creating a better communication and interaction between citizens and policies, mediated through arts and cultural projects.

The preconditions for a new European cultural value chain would preferably include:

- activating citizenship and democracy through co-creation rather than passive consumption;
- striving for a balance of top-down and bottom-up approaches to cultural policy-making;
- applying the idea of “methodological cosmopolitanism” in cultural policy frameworks;
- bringing marginalized groups in from the margins of public space and into the centre of the political space;
- supporting cultural networking in the core of the cultural system in Europe;
• engaging cultural networks/platforms at different community levels (local, micro-regional, national, macro-regional, supranational);
• working actively at a grass roots level (with individuals, communities or organizations) to influence cultural policy;
• encouraging cultural networks to be social change networks with activism as a central component;
• nurturing active networking based on projects and not on passive membership;
• building a balance of participatory approaches to culture and social leadership.

A new value chain for cultural policy in Europe would include elements that would function as a precondition for a more cosmopolitan, intercultural and socially engaged cultural sector that could contribute to a more open and democratic European society.

However, the main precondition for a new value chain will always be real and metaphysical questions of ownership of the space (Dinulović et. al, 2011), either public or political. It is a matter of the relation to powers that are trying to control these spaces. Are the networks of cultural policy-makers, academics, experts, researchers, artists and other cultural activists together with other members of civil society capable to enter and influence this space? As a believer in the rule of dramaturgy that states all narratives need to have a message of hope at their core, in the network society the real power lies in communication power.
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List of CPRA 2011
Jury Members

Lluis Bonet, Jury President of the Jury (Spain)
Eleonora Belfiore, Jury member (United Kingdom)
Jacques Bonniel, Jury member (France)
Milena Dragićević Šešić, member (Serbia)
Mikhail Gnedovsky, Jury member (Russian Federation)
Therese Kaufman, Jury member (Austria)
Ritva Mitchell, Jury member (Finland)

Lluis Bonet, President of the Jury (Spain)
Lluís Bonet is Professor, at the University of Barcelona, and former
President of the European Network of Cultural Administration
Training Centers (ENCATC). Vice-President of the European
Association of Cultural Researchers (ECURES), board member of
the Association of Cultural Economics International (ACEI ) and
member of the Board of Trustees of Abacus (the largest Spanish
cooperative on education and culture). External advisor in cultural
policies, statistics and economics for the Council of Europe, the
European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, UNESCO
and the Organization of Ibero-American States for Education,
Science and Culture (OEI). Director of a large number of research
studies in cultural economics and cultural policies. He lectures
and is Director of the Graduate Programmes on Cultural
Management at the University of Barcelona. He is also Professor
for undergraduate courses at the same university (Schools of Law,
Economics, Documentation and Librarianship) on Political Economy, Cultural Economics, Cultural Industries, Cultural Management and Policy. He is a Research Fellow and Assistant Professor on Cultural Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1991-1992) as well as a Guest Professor in different graduate programmes on arts and heritage management, and lecturer in more than 20 countries in Europe, Latin America and the USA.

Eleonora Belfiore, Jury member (United Kingdom)
Eleonora Belfiore is Associate Professor in Cultural Policy at the Centre for Cultural Policy Studies at the University of Warwick, UK. Her research interests revolve around the notion of the ‘social impacts’ of the arts, and the effect that the transformational rhetoric of impact has had on British cultural policy. In particular, Dr Belfiore has been researching the challenges posed by impact evaluation and assessment in the context of a growing trend towards evidence-based policy making in the cultural sector. Part of this work was published by Palgrave in 2008 as a monograph entitled “The Social Impact of the Arts: An intellectual history,” co-authored with Oliver Bennett. Most recently, Dr Belfiore’s research interests have focussed more specifically around the often unacknowledged role of deeply held beliefs and cultural values in the process of policy-making, despite the professed reliance on empirically acquired ‘evidence’ as a basis for decision making in the policy sphere.

Jacques Bonniel, Jury member (France)
Jacques Bonniel is Maître de Conférences in Sociology at the University Lumière Lyon 2 France. He is also Director of a post-graduate (Master) in cultural project management at the same University and co-organizer of a post-graduate course on “Cultural
management and policies in the Balkans” together with the University of Arts in Belgrade and the University of Grenoble II. He conducts research for different regional and national departments on cultural policies and has published a number of books, articles and research reports in the field of sociology, cultural policy and management. He participates in various national and regional working groups. Jacques Bonniel has been leading lecturer in sociology at the University of Lyon Lumière 2 since 1990. He was also Dean of Faculty of Anthropology and Sociology (University Lumière Lyon 2, 1995 - 2005) and he is a member of the Scientific Council of the university.

Milena Dragićević Šešić (Serbia)

Milena Dragićević Šešić is Professor at the Faculty of Drama of the University of Arts in Belgrade (Cultural Policy and Cultural Management, Cultural studies, Media studies); Chair-holder of the UNESCO Chair in Cultural Policy and Management, University of Arts Belgrade; President of the Orientation Board of the European Diploma in Cultural Project Management (Marcel Hicter Foundation, Brussels); Board member of ELIA (European League of Institutes of the Arts, Amsterdam). She is the Former Rector of the University of Arts in Belgrade; Member of the Art & Culture Sub Board, Open Society Institute (Soros fund), Budapest. She is a lecturer at Moscow School of Social and Economical Sciences, MA-AMEC, Utrecht School of the Arts, CEU Budapest, Lyon II and Jagiellonian University, Krakow. She is an expert and consultant in cultural policy and management for the European Cultural Foundation, Council of Europe, UNESCO, Marcel Hicter Foundation, Pro Helvetia and British Council. She has published 15 books and more then 100 essays, translated into over 10 languages all over the world.
Mikhail Gnedovsky, Jury member (Russian Federation)
Mikhail Gnedovsky has been Director at the Cultural Policy Institute, a Moscow based NGO, since 2003. During these years, he has led or supervised, various projects aimed at the promotion of innovative agendas in the cultural field in Russia. He has been involved in research and capacity-building projects, as well as in the development of strategies focused around issues related to the creative industries, arts and business collaboration, social implications of the arts, the role of cultural heritage in the regional economy. He has worked internationally as an expert on various cultural projects, including the programmes of the Council of Europe. In 1998–2002, he worked as Director for the Arts and Culture Programme at the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation) in Russia. In 2000-03, he was also Member of the Arts and Culture Sub-board at the Open Society Institute in Budapest. In 2009, he was elected Chair of the Board of Trustees at the European Museum Forum. In 2005, he was awarded the Golden Cross of Merit of Poland.

Therese Kaufman, Jury member (Austria)
Therese Kaufman is Co-Director of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies (eipcp) in Vienna and one of the editors of the multilingual web journal transversal. She coordinated the multi-annual research project Creating Worlds (2009-2012) on the relationship between art and knowledge production and she has worked on projects connecting visual arts, debate and theory production. She coordinated the transnational arts and research project translate - Beyond Culture: The Politics of Translation (2005-2008) and took part in the project team of republicart (2002-2005) the latter two co-financed by the EU Culture Programme. Therese is a member of the editorial board of the journal Kulturrissé. She lectures regularly on cultural policy
and cultural theory. From 2003 until 2006 she was a board member of EFAH (now Culture Action Europe). In her writing and research she currently takes a specific interest in postcolonial studies and critical migration studies.

**Ritva Mitchell, Jury member (Finland)**

Ritva Mitchell is Director of Research at CUPORE (Finnish Foundation for Cultural Policy Research) and a lecturer at the University of Jyväskylä, Faculty of Social Sciences. She is a former President of the Cultural Information and Research Centres Liaison in Europe (CIRCLE) and the European Research Institute for Comparative Cultural Policy and the Arts (ERICArts) and member of the Orientation Board of the European Diploma of Cultural Project Management (Marcel Hicter Foundation, Brussels). She is a lecturer at the Sibelius Academy of Music (MA Programme in Arts Management) in Helsinki. She is involved in a number of research projects in Europe and is member of the editorial board of the Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidsskrift (Nordic Cultural Policy Journal). She has published articles and papers on youth cultures, artists, cultural policies, new technologies and European issues in Finland and in Europe.
Authors’ biography

Aleksandar Brkić (BA, MSc, MFA, PhD) is a lecturer for the Arts Management Programme, LASALLE College of the Arts in Singapore, and a Guest Professor at the Scene Design Department at the Faculty of Technical Sciences, Novi Sad. Prior to his engagement in South East Asia, he worked for more than 8 years as a teaching assistant, lecturer and researcher at the University of Arts in Belgrade. His research interests are interdisciplinary and cover the areas of creativity, innovation and interdisciplinary arts projects, as well as cultural policy and intercultural dialogue. Aleksandar has significant practical experience as both an arts manager and trainer in project, events and strategic management in a number of European and Asian countries.

Aleksandar co-edited, with Radivoje Dinulović, the book Theatre-Politics-City and regularly publishes texts in academic journals. He is also a Compendium (Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe) expert and co-author of the Serbian entry. He has participated in many collaborative scientific and academic projects and he is a Board Member of ECURES and coordinator of ANCER network (Asia Pacific Network for Cultural Education and Research). He is a founder of Eighty Ten (80 10), an arts production organization and a member of the Executive Board and Vice President of SCEN (OISTAT Center Serbia).

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“During a time when the idea of Europe, and the EU in particular, is tainted with economic crisis and democratic decline, Aleksandar Brkić’s analysis of the role of cultural networks in helping Europe serve people is both a wake-up call for European authorities which support cultural networks and a tool for cultural networks themselves to check that they are fulfilling their European and intercultural remit as well as they should. By analysing and comparing the ‘old’ and (initially ‘Western’) European cultural network Banlieues d’Europe with the ‘new’ Balkan network Clubture, Brkić puts flesh on dry considerations of how different kinds of identities (national, supranational, fixed, fluid ...) are formed and relate to each other. Above all, the paper reaffirms the cosmopolitan vision of Europe as a ‘network of evolving identities where new knowledge is produced and new values are formed’ and where people can find a complement to the strictures of local belonging and allegiance.”

Sabine Frank
Director, Platform for Intercultural Europe