Chapter 1. Rethinking Body, Woman, Sex, and Agency in Medieval Japanese Narratives

1. It is not my intention here to provide a survey of the extensive literature that has burgeoned around the body, nor do I seek to offer a sustained analysis of the body’s enmeshment in webs of discourse and power, and the medical, religious, and material practices within which bodies were produced in the context of medieval Japan, for that would require writing an altogether different book.


4. Caroline Bynum’s work on Christianity in the medieval period, for example, offers a counternarrative to the characterization of all medieval Christian discourse as dualistic. She argues that far from despising the body and wishing to escape from it, Christian theologians in fact “assumed the flesh to be the instrument of salvation…” Medieval uses of gender categories, likewise, she suggests, were complex and took a number of different forms, and there is little evidence to suggest that medieval thinkers conceived of the body as matter or as female. Furthermore, medieval theorists who debated questions of eschatology did not privilege the soul and abandon the body but argued instead that at the end of time, the body we possess in this world would be resurrected along with the soul with which it would be united. Bynum, “Why all the Fuss about the Body? A Medievalist’s Perspective,” in Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 251–255.


6. For a bold argument about how the culture of dissection and the science of anatomy helped produce new conceptions of interiority and self, and how these pervaded every aspect of intellectual thought and artistic practices, uniting disparate figures such as Rembrandt, John Donne, and Descartes, see Jonathan Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).


8. Foucault’s challenge to the commonly held assumption that the body “obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and that it escapes the influence of history” comes from his examination of the multiplicity of regimes to which the body is subjected, such that “nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men.” See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Sherry Simon and Donald F. Bouchard, eds., *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 153.
9. Indeed much of the new work being done on the body today brings together the disciplines of neuroscience and the humanities/social sciences, to overcome precisely the artificial separation between nature and culture that has shaped these disciplinary formations. Of particular interest in this regard is the work being done on affect and emotions, which explores the interplay of the biological basis of emotion with its cultural formation, treating the two as integrally linked, rather than casting them within the binary of nature versus culture. See, for example, Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002). For an overview of some of the major debates emerging in this new line of inquiry, as well as a comprehensive bibliography of work in this field, see Nicole Eustace, Eugene Lean, Julian Livingstone, Jan Plamper, William Reddy, and Barbara Rosenwein, “AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions,” *American Historical Review* 117:5 (December 2012): 1487–1531.

10. When I speak of the “East Asian” tradition, I am referring here to the complex nexus of Daoist, Buddhist, and Confucian ideas that circulated in China, Korea, and Japan in the premodern period. In arguing that the “East Asian” tradition was different from the Western one, I wish to avoid any suggestion that the non-West occupies a position of radical alterity that renders it incommensurably different from and, by implication, wiser and superior to the West. Such idealizations would only serve to reproduce, through inversion, the oppositions familiar to us in Orientalist discourse.

11. Roger Ames, “The Meaning of the Body in Classical Chinese Philosophy,” in Thomas P. Kasulis, Roger Ames, and Wimal Dissanayake, eds., *Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice* (New York: SUNY Press, 1993), 168. As Ames argues, “Since body and mind were not regarded as different ‘kinds’ of existence in any essential way, they did not generate different sets of terminologies necessary to describe them. For this reason, the qualitative modifiers that we usually associate with matter do double duty in Chinese to characterize both the physical and the psychical.” Ames, 163.


16. Ibid., 67.


21. In Japanese Tendai and Shingon formulations, the body, always understood as a mind-body complex, became a particularly prized vehicle for the performance of rituals and practices that were seen as enactments and expressions of an already enlightened state. As William LaFleur puts it, “This ensconsing of truth in physical form was for Kūkai [the founder of the Shingon sect of Buddhism in Japan] never a move downward or an incarnation from some loftier, more spiritual, plane but a natural and in no way condescending articulation of the truth in the physical world. It was also a way of maintaining the radical nondualism of the Mahāyāna tradition; body and mind were not permitted to become separate or opposable realities.” LaFleur, The Karma of Words, 21–22.


23. In the medieval scientific tradition, “all human exudings—menstruation, sweating, lactation, emission of semen, etc.—were seen as bleedings; and all bleedings—lactation, menstruation, nosebleeds, hemorrhoidal bleeding, etc.—were taken to be analogous. Thus, it was not far-fetched for a medical writer to refer to a man menstruating or lactating, or to a woman emitting seed.” Caroline Bynum, “The Female Body and Religious Practice in the Later Middle Ages,” in Michel Feher, with Ramona Naddaff and Nadia Tazi, eds., Fragments for a History of the Human Body, pt. 1 (New York: Zone Press, 1989), 185–187.


25. As Laqueur puts it, “Nature [here] is not therefore to culture what sex is to gender, as in modern discussions.” See Making Sex, 29.

26. Kenan Malik argues that race discourse became particularly vocal in the nineteenth century, when science and evolutionary theory, in particular, were harnessed to support the idea of a natural order underlying social and economic inequalities. See his The Meaning of Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society (New York: New York University Press, 1996).

27. See Laqueur, Making Sex, 149–150.


29. In her influential book on a feminist reading of Buddhism, Rita Gross defines her own project as a “feminist valorization of Buddhism.” The task of valorization, as she sees it, is to recognize that a religious tradition, however sexist or misogynistic, may not be “irreparably so” and hence can be returned to its “original state” before it became tainted by patriarchy. The search is thus on for a “usable past” in which stories from within Buddhism that have hitherto been sidelined or ignored in male-centered accounts are returned to the center and re-presented as viable models for the empowerment of women. Rita Gross, Buddhism after Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Analysis and Reconstruction of Buddhism (New York: SUNY Press, 1993), 3–4.


32. Denise Riley, for example, argues that ‘‘women’ is a volatile collectivity in which female persons can be very differently positioned, so that the apparent continuity of the subject of ‘women’ is not to be relied on; ‘women’ is both synchronically and diachronically erratic as a collectivity, while for the individual, ‘being a woman’ is also inconstant, and can’t provide an ontological foundation.” And lest we despair that the feminist cause is irrevocably lost if we jeopardize the stability of the category “women,” Riley insists upon its indeterminacy, arguing that “this instability has a historical foundation, and that feminism is the site of the systematic fighting-out of that instability . . .” Denise Riley, “Am I that Name?” *Feminism and the Category of “Women” in History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 2–5. In a similar vein, when Joan Scott considers the status of “experience” in the practice of history writing, she argues that those who privilege experience as incontrovertible evidence “take as self-evident the identities of those whose experience is being documented and thus naturalize their difference. . . . The evidence of experience then becomes evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world.” See Joan Wallach Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” in Gabrielle Spiegel, ed., *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 202.


34. Ibid., 7.

35. *Onna* often refers to a young woman. *Otoko*, like *onna* also often signifies a young man, or at any rate one who has yet to retire from the secular world. *Otoko* can also mean a manservant or attendant.


38. For a comprehensive and authoritative account of the complex ways in which nature works as a metaphor in *waka*, and particularly in the ways in which animals and plants are associated with both particular seasons and genders, see Haruo Shirane, *Japan and the Culture of the Four Seasons: Nature, Literature and the Arts* (New York: Columbia University Press,

39. Tani Barlow makes the same point when she talks about the ways in which new conceptions of the modern Chinese woman entailed a reconfiguration of the category woman whereby, in line with the sexual discourses that emerged in the West, her identity came to be grounded in her sexuality. See her “Theorizing Women: Funü, Guoja, Jiating,” in Angela Zito and Tani Barlow, eds., Body, Subject and Power in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 266.

40. Through a close textual reading of waka poetry, Michel Vieillard-Baron argues that it is the stance that the poet adopts in the composition, rather than his/her biological sex, that renders the work masculine or feminine. See his “Male? Female? Gender confusion in classical poetry (waka),” Cipango—French Journal of Japanese Studies 2, English selection (2013): 1–23.

41. The “five obstructions” (itsutsu no sawari) refer to the impossibility for women to attain rebirth as a Brahmā, Indra, Māra, Cakravartin or Wheel-turning King, and, most significantly, Buddha.

42. That this association of woman with sex has become commonplace in interpretations of medieval poetry and literature in general is reflected in the translation by Helen McCullough of Ki no Tsurayuki’s description of Ono no Komachi’s poetry in the Japanese preface of Kokinshū. The original text says tsuyokaranu wa onna no uta nareba narubeshi (the fact that her poems are lacking in strength must be due to the fact that they are women’s poems). In Helen McCullough’s translation the weakness of her poem is attributed to her “sex.” There is little reason to assume that Tsurayuki attributes the weakness of Ono no Komachi’s poems to something inherent in the female condition that derives from her biologically determined sexual makeup. That poems written in the male as opposed to the female voice are different is not in question. My argument is that these differences are based on certain stylized poetic performances rather than on immutable sexual characteristics. Kojima Noriyuki, ed., Kokin wakashū, Shin nihon koten bungaku taikei, 5 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989), 4. Helen Craig McCullough, trans., Kokin Wakashū: The First Imperial Anthology of Japanese Poetry (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985), 7.


45. See Vanita Seth, “Difference with a Difference: Wild Men, Gods and Other Protagonists,” Parallax, 9:4 (2003): 75–87, for an analysis of the development of racialized understandings of the body in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in which “Nature, be it the physical body or the physical environment, was no longer an agent with volition and intent, but a mute and passive object for study and classification” (85).

46. This is Thomas Laqueur’s description of the sexed body in the nineteenth century. Laqueur, Making Sex, 51.

47. Yoshida Kazuhiko argues that the principle of modori or “return” (used in Kabuki and Bunraku theater) in which, through a dramatic performance, a character’s true character is revealed after several twists and turns, is not dissimilar to the strategy used in the Devadatta
story to achieve its rhetorical effects. See his “The Enlightenment of the Dragon King’s Daughter in the Lotus Sutra,” in Ruch, Engendering Faith, 303.

48. Bernard Faure, for example, recognizes the problems of treating “woman” as a unified category and of treating gender as the only prism through which to read medieval texts, and yet the question of women’s victimhood or agency looms large in his work. He claims that “women were full-fledged historical actors, and we should not be too quick in concluding that they were passive victims” and that “some resisted with more or less success . . . while others seem to have been ‘active’ victims, wilful agents of their own victimization (or of that of their ‘sisters’).” See Faure, The Power of Denial, 331–332. Citing the case of Kumano bikuni, for example, Faure argues that while purporting to work “on behalf of women,” they “contributed, albeit unwittingly to their debasement . . .” (53). A little later, returning to the subject of Kumano bikuni, he writes, “They tried to conceal the sexist nature of the dogma by presenting their message as one of feminine emancipation . . . these nuns contributed to the subjection of women to Buddhist male ideology” (78). Keller Kimbrough follows Faure’s approach, arguing that “while Kumano bikuni and other female proselytizers were obviously and perhaps unavoidably complicit in propagating aspects of traditional Buddhist misogyny, they were simultaneously engaged in its subversion. . . . Kumano bikuni were pro-woman within an overwhelmingly misogynistic context.” Kimbrough, Preachers, Poets, Women and the Way, 215.


50. I am drawing here on Saba Mahmood’s work on a women’s piety movement in contemporary Cairo, which offers particularly valuable theoretical insights into how we might think critically about women’s agency, oppression, and resistance. See her “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival,” Cultural Anthropology 16:2 (May 2001): 202–236.

51. Ibid., 206.

52. This is what Judith Butler seeks to do when she argues that power has to be understood not as something that dominates the subject but rather as something that brings the subject into being. Subjectivation for Butler is produced through performativity, that is to say, through the iteration of particular modes of conduct and bodily comportment that reinforce gender and other social norms. See Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 220.

53. Both Tomiko Yoda and Thomas LaMarre make the same point about the limits of understanding agency through the liberal model of subjectivity. In talking about poetics in the Heian period, Thomas LaMarre argues that “it is not uncommon for scholars to treat poetics as the site of political contestation and to analyze poetic exchanges in which poets air their grievances in a competitive arena. Such competition is often construed by contemporary scholars as a form of resistance—usually to the ruling elite—and is interpreted in terms of the individual versus the group; in effect, they presume a modern apparatus of resistance.” He chooses to read poetic exchanges not “as a form of resistance but rather as a mode of participation in a poetic order of things.” See his Uncovering Heian Japan: An Archaeology of Sensation and
Inscription (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), 7. Yoda argues that “the Genji offers a highly intricate and multilayered portrayal of interpersonal conflicts—especially in what is expected to be among the most powerful forms of affective bonding—without constituting the agents who think and speak as autonomous, heroic, and psychological subjects” and that “the tensions and negotiations between lovers that the poetic dialogues articulate, in other words, cannot be understood through the modern binary between individualism and collectivism or resistance and conformism.” See her Gender and National Literature: Heian Texts in the Construction of Japanese Modernity (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), 145.


57. As Christina Laffin argues in her study of the nun Abutsu, “Abutsu’s transitions between some form of tonsure to a return to sexual life show the fluidity of the categories of ‘lover,’ ‘nun,’ and ‘wife’ . . . ” See her Rewriting Medieval Japanese Women: Politics, Personality, and Literary Production in the Life of Nun Abutsu (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013), 83.


59. For a brief discussion of the many texts that proliferated around the question of the sinfulness of Murasaki Shikibu’s Tale of Genji, see Haruo Shirane, ed., Envisioning the Tale of Genji: Media, Gender, and Cultural Production (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 17–19.


61. More nuanced readings have attempted to restore something of the historical and cultural contexts within which women writers positioned themselves as narrating subjects in sexual encounters. See Royall Tyler, “Marriage, Rank and Rape in The Tale of Genji,” Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context 7 (March 2000): 1–10, who argues that coercion was an acceptable strategy for men in a culture where to accede to men’s sexual advances too readily was frowned upon, and furthermore, that it was the initial coercive overture that ensured the long-term commitment and support of men within a polygamous world. Margaret H. Childs argues that vulnerability and passivity were regarded as highly valuable traits in women in the Genji because they served to enhance women’s appeal, arousing in men feelings of protectiveness and love. See Childs, “The Value of Vulnerability: Sexual Coercion and the Nature of Love in Japanese Court Literature,” Journal of Asian Studies, 58:4 (November 1999): 1059–1079. Hitomi Tonomura considers how Lady Nijō recasts her coercive sexual encounter with Go-Toba as something emblematic of her sexual allure that allows her to con-
62. Kimura Saeko reviews feminist readings of the *Tale of Genji* to argue that reading Genji as a rapist muddles the distinction between literary narratives and reality and goes against the basic principles of literary analysis, and that such readings are an application of modern discourses of sexuality onto Heian texts. She suggests that greater reflection is required on the relationship between literary analysis and feminism. See her “Genji monogatari to feminizumu,” *Kokubungaku kaishaku to kanshō* 73:5 (2008): 72–81.

**Chapter 2. The Erotics of the Body in the *Tale of Genji***

*Epigraph. GM*, vol. 3, 338.

1. As Robert Brower observes, Japanese court poetry is not interested in “either the identification of the people in love or a description of them.” It is unimaginable, he says, for a medieval European romance with “its interminable descriptions of the woman from top to toe.” See Robert Brower and Earl Miner, *Japanese Court Poetry* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961), 452.

2. Daud Ali points out that embracing, kissing, scratching, biting, coitus, slapping, moaning, oral sex, and so on constituted the well-defined and elaborate rituals necessary for the production of desire, and the proper consummation of sex in *Kāmasutra* and classical Sanskrit poetry. See Daud Ali, *Courtly Culture and Political Life in Early Medieval India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 213–214.


4. Speaking of French libertine literature of that period, for example, Peter Cryle writes, “The moral (or social) requirement that sexual scenes not be described in full, coexists, and often happily cohabits, with the pleasure of suggestive understatement.” See Peter Cryle, *The Telling of the Act: Sexuality as Narrative in 18th and 19th Century France* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2001), 184.


7. John Berger sees the story of Adam and Eve as central to the creation of the concept of nakedness. Nakedness comes into being when the body becomes the object of the gaze of the other, and in European art, he argues, it is the figure of the nude woman that is singled out as the object of the male gaze. What is more, the nude woman so internalizes this gaze that she only recognizes herself as someone being viewed. See John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 45–64.
