Migration, Waiting and Uncertainty at the Borders of Europe:

Syrian Refugees in Istanbul

Souad Osseiran

Department of Anthropology

Goldsmiths College, University of London

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

2017
Declaration of Authorship I, Souad Osseiran hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.
Acknowledgements

I would like to begin by thanking the people who agreed to participate in the research and share their lives and stories with me. They introduced me to new ways of thinking and being. I thank the many the people who helped me get the fieldwork off the ground. To all of them, I owe an immense gratitude for their assistance, guidance, and their willingness to engage.

I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Nicholas De Genova and Dr Frances Pine for their immense support and guidance during the research. They have continually challenged me intellectually and pushed me to give more. I thank them for their enthusiasm about the project, and their patience throughout.

I owe thanks to too many people in my life who have endured with me through this. I am immensely grateful to Rana Abdul fattah for her patience and support. I learnt so much from Rana about Syria and Turkey, but most importantly about the wherewithal of life. I would like to thank Ayşe Akalin for her patience the first time I came to Istanbul and her guidance since on matters political and migratory. Şenay Özden offered much-appreciated insight and comments about the project during my first year in Istanbul. I thank Kristen Biehl for the many coffees and discussions. Where it not for the Anthropology department at Goldsmiths College, I would not have met and engaged with so many great and wonderful people. I would especially like to thank Zahira Araguete, Aimee Joyce, William Wheeler, Jasmine Immonen, and Anna Wilson for conversations anthropological, and other, over the years. I would like to thank Anne Marie Sim for her support especially in the final months of the thesis.

I thank the British Institute at Ankara for two student grants awarded during my fieldwork in 2012 and 2013. I would also like to thank the staff, especially Gizem Külekçioğlu, at the Centre for
Migration Research (Göç Çalışmaları Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi) at Bilgi University for allowing me to be affiliated with them during 2015-2016.

But the biggest thanks I owe, is to my family for their emotional and financial support. My parents, Sara and Ali, and my siblings Zeina, Adel and Salem made it possible for me to pursue this endeavour, and they have stood by me through it all; to them, I am grateful beyond words.
Abstract

Based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in two neighbourhoods in Istanbul, this thesis explores Syrian refugees’ migration processes to reach Europe, which are the result of the revolution in Syria and the protracted fighting there. Syrian refugees present in Istanbul are under the temporary protection of Turkish state, and the thesis examines their experiences of the temporary protection in relation to their border crossings. Crossing the border to Europe entails movements and waits. I focus on Syrian refugees’ endeavours to cross the border to Greece or Bulgaria, or arrive elsewhere in Europe by passing through Istanbul’s main airport. Syrian refugees’ migration processes bring the border with Europe into Istanbul, and their attempts to cross the border foreground the effects of the European Union externalising its border management to Turkey. Syrian refugees experience different waits enforced by multiple actors such as Turkish border guards, smugglers, their families and European bureaucracies. Their relations with these actors produce the different spaces of the detention centres and neighbourhoods in Istanbul as spaces of varying temporariness. I focus on the ways refugees endure and counter the waits to argue that the imposed waits influence their subjectivities in particular ways. While temporarily present in Istanbul, they establish ties with fellow refugees to counter the uncertainty they face in their endeavours - ties that give rise to particular ethical acts and tensions. In the final chapter, I foreground the securitisation of air travel and the racialisation of Muslims by looking at the ways Syrian refugees move through the airport in Istanbul.
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK Party</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party (governing party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daesh</td>
<td>Dawlat al-islamiyah f'al-Iraq wa al-Sham, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGMM</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management [T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Generl Müdürlüğü]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>Free Syrian Army (Includes various factions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Migration Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 3
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 5
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 6
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 10
  The Context ............................................................................................................... 11
Guests, Refugees and Questions of Status .............................................................. 16
Border Crossing in Anthropological Debates .......................................................... 24
Transition, Assemblage and Waiting ........................................................................ 27
Bordering .................................................................................................................... 32
States, Syrian Refugees, Smugglers, and Fragile Relations in the Uncertain Present .... 36
On Passing and Performativity ................................................................................... 44
Thesis Outline ............................................................................................................. 46
Chapter 1 ..................................................................................................................... 51
  Setting the Scene: Research Sites, Methods, and Ethics ........................................ 51
    Transit: Space and State ......................................................................................... 51
    Istanbul: A Migrant and Refugee Space ............................................................ 58
    The Research ......................................................................................................... 61
    Aksaray .................................................................................................................. 63
    The Ethical in Aksaray .......................................................................................... 70
    Jazira ...................................................................................................................... 74
    Ethical Engagement in Jazira ............................................................................... 80
    The Migrant Detention Centre and The Refugee Camp ....................................... 83
Chapter Two ................................................................................................................ 87
  Conditional Status: Syrian Refugees in Istanbul and at the Border with Europe ....... 87
    Making Sense of Turning a Blind Eye ...................................................................... 93
    Documenting Presence ......................................................................................... 95
    Limiting Access to Documentation ........................................................................ 99
  Incorporated Regardless of the State ...................................................................... 101
    Labour .................................................................................................................. 103
    Social Assistance ................................................................................................. 106
  At the borders of Europe ......................................................................................... 109
    Sayed .................................................................................................................... 111
**Introduction**

In August 2012 at the start of my fieldwork, I met a Kurdish activist working with the Syrian National Council in Istanbul who agreed to introduce me to some of his contacts for my research. Making fun of me the first time we spoke, he commented, “Syrians have become an interesting research sample.” On a day in August 2012, we agreed to meet in Fatih district to visit a family, a mother and her children, who were his relatives. They had come to Istanbul a few months ago and were sharing an apartment with another family. Vian, his relative, had two teenage girls and a young boy. The eldest was supposed to start university, but that plan was put on hold with the family moving, and her 16-year-old sister was out of school. Their young brother did not go to school either, and he was by his sisters’ admission timid and refused to play outside with the Turkish children on his street even as he watched them from the window. When we arrived at Vian’s a basement apartment, her two teenage daughters were waiting at the door and greeted their relative exuberantly as we took off our shoes and organised them next to the doorstep. They ushered us into the living room, a long room with a big sized television. They were sharing the house with another family, a relative, an older lady and her sons who were at work. Vian and Roken, her younger daughter, spent the afternoon talking to me as Vian’s son played around us.

About two hours into the visit, Vian’s son who had been playing in the room for most of the time came and sat on his mother’s lap. He started playing with a long brown bead necklace she wore around her neck. She commented with sadness and other emotions in her eyes, “This one is from a Kurdish lady from Iraq. When things happened in Iraq, they came over.”

“In 2003 you mean with the Americans?” I asked.
“No! no. A long time ago when Saddam struck the Kurds in the north (in Iraq). The woman and her family stayed in a house my father had… next to our house. She gave me this necklace when they left. Now things have turned, I have left my country.”

The necklace connected her and her children’s reality of exile in Istanbul with that woman’s flight over 20 years ago. The beads line up in a loop, snap, and the world shifts, and now Vian is in exile in Istanbul. Vian’s anecdote bears particular meaning in response to a historical moment she was living. A historical moment related to the Syrian revolution and her presence in Istanbul. Not just her present in Istanbul, but her relative’s political activity, the underlying causes or conditions which enabled them to be in Istanbul rather than elsewhere. Many of the problematics explored in the thesis are based on the context and particularities of the historical moment. The fieldwork provided answers for some of the original problems, offered grounds to dismiss some of them and raised new ones. As such, I begin by explaining the context to examine the problematics the thesis engages with.

The Context

The research project idea emerged from the Turkish government removing the visa restriction on the entry of Syrian nationals in 2009. The change to the visa restriction came as part of the Turkish AK Party government’s move to improve its ties with its neighbours in the Middle East.\(^1\) Removing the visa restriction meant Syrian nationals would be able to enter Turkey for three months in every six months without having to apply for a visa from a Turkish embassy or consulate prior to their arrival. In early 2011 when I applied to undertake the doctoral project, I suggested a project that

\(^1\) Turkey’s changing approach to its southern neighbours were part of the then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s conception of “zero-problems” with Turkey’s neighbours (Davutoğlu 2001). The policies sought to resituate Turkey as a regional power drawing on common ties as Muslims and economic considerations. Syrian nationals, principally those living in the border regions were allowed to cross into Turkey on particular holidays prior to the change in the visa regime.
combined my interest in Turkey’s changing regional role, its position as a European borderland, studies of the state, and migration.\(^2\) In my proposal, I suggested examining Syrian nationals’ perceptions of Turkey’s changing regional role and how its migratory policies enter and affect everyday life. I believed that the experiences of Syrian nationals’ working, studying or transiting through Turkey en route to Europe post-2009 would shed light on the everyday impact of Turkey’s changing regional policies. My choice in focusing on Syrian refugees in Istanbul stemmed from the limited research that had been undertaken at that point in time on Syrian migration to Turkey (Brandell 2006; Rabo 2006). Much of the available literature at that time emphasised Turkey’s shifting policy and government level relations rather than presenting ethnographic interrogations of the effects of these changes.\(^3\) Turkey’s changing relations with its southern neighbours and its shifting regional role could not be dissociated from its position as an EU accession state and its role in guarding and maintaining the EU border. The visa regime in place was intimately tied to its position as an EU borderland.\(^4\) By removing the visa restriction, the Turkish government facilitated Syrian nationals’ presence in Turkey as well as bringing the border to Europe closer to Syria (Devrim & Soler 2010). However, events on the ground took the project in a different direction.

In 2011, following the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, activists called for protests against the regime in Syria in Damascus. The demonstrations did not generate much mobilisation. Following security forces’ detention and torture of several children in a school in Deraa, for writing anti-regime slogans on their school wall, demonstrations broke out in the city known for its many

\(^2\) My interest in pursuing a project about migration was in part influenced by my awareness from a young age about migration and how citizenship differentiates among people based on the experiences of close family members.

\(^3\) See Altunışık and Tür (2006), Altunışık (2010), and Tür (2010) for international relation discussion of the changing relations.

\(^4\) My interest in pursuing a project about migration was in part influenced by my awareness from a young age about migration and how citizenship differentiates among people based on the experiences of close family members. I wanted to undertake research in the region but unrelated to Lebanon to learn about a different context. In 2010, Turkey occupied an interesting position as it turned to its southern neighbours and altered its ties. I was intrigued by its changing regional position.
security force members and strong tribal and kinship ties. The state’s response to the demonstrations in Deraa ignited protests in other provinces and areas, Idlib, Lattakia, Homs, Hama, and Damascus’s suburbs. The protesters came out in support of the people of Deraa and demanded that the regime go. The state began initiating some reforms as demonstrations continued and military action against protestors began. In Idlib province, Jisr Ash Shugur, a town bordering Turkey, people facing regime tanks crossed the border into Turkey in June 2011. As border-landers, many had relatives on the other side, and they crossed seeking protection. The provincial governor allowed them to enter and allowed subsequent entries. Those coming into Turkey were originally housed in a stadium until the state opened temporary camps for those fleeing the violence in Syria.

The Turkish government and the then Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdoğan, in particular, urged President Bashar al-Assad to make reforms and meet protesters’ demands to prevent the situation escalating further. Not seeing the kind of reforms required, the continued protests, the regime violence to put down demonstrations, and the mobilisation of long standing exiled Syrian political opposition figures in Turkey, the Turkish government began supporting the opposition. The government framed the support as standing in solidarity with the people against a regime oppressing them. Regarding those crossing into Turkey, the prime minister announced that they were guests of the Turkish state, positioning Turkey as a generous host standing in solidarity with Muslim brothers from across the border fleeing oppression and violence (Erdoğan 2014; Kıriçi 2014; Chemin 2016). In later speeches, the prime minister used the discourse of Muhajireen

---

6 The Turkish government expected the regime in Syria would fall quickly as it had in Egypt (Kirişci 2014).
7 The AK party sought to strengthen ties based on shared Muslim identity. The Gaza blockade is another example. By the winter of 2012, the Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Council and other opposition figures, organizations and parties had offices in Istanbul or in the southern border provinces.
(migrants) and Ansar (supporters) to describe Turkey’s approach to those fleeing the violence and fighting in Syria. The government announced it was establishing state-run camps in the border provinces to provide shelter and meet the needs of Syrian refugees entering Turkey. The Turkish government not only stood in solidarity with the people’s struggle but provided a safe space of relative security for those fleeing the fighting which other countries such as Lebanon or Jordan were not perceived to offer.

At the time the influx began, the Turkish government was in the process of drafting Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection which was to be Turkey’s first comprehensive law on asylum and migration. At the time the influx started, the government rather than evoking existent regulation initially announced that Syrian nationals entering were guests and then, following civil society pressure, announced that those entering were under the temporary protection of the Turkish state. Turkey did not, however, have a regulation on temporary protection at the time and the government did not release the text of the temporary protection regulation (Yinanç 2013). Temporary protection is an international concept in refugee law that has been used in other cases whether in the USA (Menjivar 2006; Coutin 2000) for Salvadorian refugees or in Europe for refugees fleeing the war in Yugoslavia (Koser & Black 1999). In April 2013, Turkey released Law 6458, which included a section on temporary protection but did not outline the full conditions of the protection. The full details of the temporary protection were not known until the government released the temporary protection regulation in October 2014. The ambiguity and changes in practice placed Syrian refugees present in Turkey in a position of uncertainty regarding their rights,

---

8 Islamic historical reference to the people of Medina who supported the Prophet Muhammad and his followers when they fled from Mecca to Medina due to persecution and violence exacted against them. It must be noted that not only Sunni Muslims but persons of other religions as well came to Turkey.

9 I use Syrian refugee throughout and specify when an interlocutor was a Palestinian normally resident in Syria.
obligations and future in Turkey. At the same time, the influx was neither planned nor forecasted, and the government came up with actions and procedures over time.

In the absence of a visa restriction, Syrian refugees headed to the border crossings or flew to Turkey and entered without restriction. Syrian refugees entered Turkey in different ways; some passed through official border control points such as airports or land border crossings using passports, others were allowed to enter through land border points without documents, and others still were smuggled into Turkey because the border was closed or they did not have passports. While the government announced it was hosting Syrian refugees and it set up state-run camps in the southern provinces, many Syrian refugees chose to live in cities in the south or came to Istanbul or other major cities. The media originally concentrated on the southern provinces locating Syrian ‘guests’ as present there rather than being present in the ‘here’ of Istanbul or other cities, but Syrian refugees moved around within Turkey. Many followed relatives from the Turkish side of the border to neighbourhoods in Istanbul. Some followed family or friends from Syria who were working or studying in Istanbul. Others came to contacts they developed due to their activism in the revolution in Syria. Others yet came to pursue a career in the opposition in exile, and many came without knowing anyone in the city with the aim of moving on to Europe.

As explained above I originally intended to conduct research exploring Turkey’s changing visa policy and regional position, but the start of the revolution in Syria and the influx into Turkey directed my attention to this migration. I sought to combine my original interest in Turkey’s European borders, the effects of the facilitated access to Turkey due to the visa changes to explore how and if Syrian refugees would migrate to Turkey with the aim of moving on to Europe. Although in late 2011 and early 2012 there was little focus of Syrian migration to Europe, I believed that many Syrians would chose to continue onwards to Europe. I based my belief on the ambiguity
surrounding the temporary protection instituted in Turkey, Syrian nationals’ easy access to Turkey, and the fact Turkey is an EU borderland.

In February 2012, I visited Istanbul to identify which sites or locations I might undertake the fieldwork in within the city and to ascertain the feasibility of the project as I was unsure at the time if Istanbul was the best location. By chance, I met several Syrian refugees in Istanbul. Three were intending to move on to Europe, and one was focused on returning to Syria. Their presence and different trajectories encouraged me further to engage with Syrian refugees in Istanbul rather than any other migrant or refugee population group present in the city. Their presence also convinced me of the significance of undertaking the research in Istanbul rather than Turkish border regions with Syria. Pérouse and Aslan (2003) describe Istanbul as, “The Trading Post, The Hub, The Lock, and The Dead End…,” to explain it as a site where diverse and multiple migrants’ and refugees’ desires play out. This space of possibilities influenced my choice of Istanbul as the research site.\(^\text{10}\)

In focusing on this particular historical moment, I do not explore Syrian refugee presence in Istanbul prior to the revolution in Syria. I also do not examine historical and kinships ties.

**Guests, Refugees and Questions of Status**

In the thesis, I use the term refugee for several reasons. Turkish state actors assigned Syrian refugees various titles from the start of the influx including guests, guests under temporary protection, refugees under temporary protection and finally persons under temporary protection (Gümüş & Eroğlu 2015; cf. Agier 2011,18). The official terms highlight the way Syrians refugees have been positioned by the Turkish state first as guests, whose presence is a matter of charity rather than rights (Gürhanli 2014), then as persons who are subject to a particular kind of protection.

\(^{10}\) See Chapter 1 for discussion on research sites.
The various titles never positioned them as persons granted full recognition as refugees\textsuperscript{11} (cf. Agier 2011, 22-23). Charity, much like the humanitarianism called for in Europe, after migrant and refugee deaths in the summer of 2015 (Ticktin 2016), stems from emotions and offers limited political, ethical spaces to act. It shifts focus from the right to protection or safe passage, to this being a form of benevolence. Regardless of official terms designated to them, Syrian refugees expressed and discussed their situation in different ways; some explained that they are refugees who were forced to come to Turkey and they did not come because of a desire to be in Turkey. They took up the concept of refugee and expressed it their way regardless of whether state actors referred to them as refugees or placed them in another category. As Malkki (1995, 8) points out, this creativity is embedded in the “classificatory processes.” Other Syrian refugees objected to being referred to as refugees. They argued that the term has negative connotations (Malkki 1995; Haddad 2007; Agier 2011; Hyndman & Giles 2011, 364), and were angry by international organisations such as the UN appropriating or defining the representation of the term (Malkki 1995, 10-12). However as most of those who participated in the research were forced to migrate I use the term refugee in the thesis. At the same time, I maintain throughout that all statuses must be problematised and unpicked rather than assumed, and where possible I try to highlight how interlocutors engaged with the concept of refugee.

Without legal pathways available to many Syrian refugees to move on to Europe or elsewhere, with no end in sight to the fighting in Syria, and uncertainty about their future in Turkey, many of the Syrian refugees I spoke to complained that they had to arrive ‘there’ to be considered refugees, i.e. gain full protection and rights. Being granted refugee status reverberates with Veena Das’

\textsuperscript{11} Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Convention on Refugee Rights, but it maintains a geographical restriction whereby only persons fleeing conflicts in Europe may seek asylum in Turkey and receive refugee status and the possibility of entering Turkish citizen. Asylum seekers from everywhere else in the world become conditional refugees, protected and allowed to remain in Turkey but they cannot become citizens; see (Law 6458, art. 62).
(2006, 9) comment about potentiality, “… here (it) does not have the sense of something that is waiting at the door of reality to make an appearance as it were, but rather as that which is already present;” albeit denied in the present of Turkey.

Syrian refugees who wanted to continue to Europe, sold property in Syria (if they had any) or borrowed money to pay smugglers or middlemen for their passage. They contacted friends or family who were in Europe to ask which smuggler they used or asked their contacts in Syria for recommendations. They came to Istanbul and met the smuggler or middlemen to begin their journey crossing the border. Most Syrian refugees argued that crossing the border to arrive in Greece or Bulgaria was insufficient to gain status or recognition as ‘refugees’. They approached those countries as an extension of being in Turkey and maintained that they only arrived when they reached a country in northern Europe (Albahari 2016; Garelli & Tazzioli 2013,1014). At the same time that Syrian refugees are granted very limited legal channels to be resettled outside the region, their movement to cross the border is ‘illegal’. State actors, Turkish and European, responded to Syrian refugees’ border crossings as criminal activities that required they secure the border to Europe further. Using the term refugee is also a means of continually highlighting this problem of unequal relations where although Syrian refugees should be able to access full rights as refugees where ever they are, they are prevented from moving to access those rights.

In the event of refugee deaths at the border, EU institutions place blame in most instances on ‘smugglers,’ ‘human trafficking rings,’ and refugees themselves for attempting to cross (Ticktin 2016). Ticktin (2016) explains that blaming refugees or smugglers overlooks the ways EU state policies and laws force refugees to cross using dangerous routes. Underlying the discourse of danger, the negative attitude towards refugees’ movement and ultimately their risk taking is an unspoken discourse that ‘they’ should wait. They are expected to wait for a solution to the conflict or the creation of legal channels to resettle them, but more overwhelmingly is the implication that
they should be waiting elsewhere, i.e. outside Europe. Approaching refugees, especially those who move, as a problem is a means of denying any European involvement in their countries or the ongoing conflict (De Genova et al. 2016, 20). De Genova and his co-authors (2016, 20) argue that images of migrants and refugees arriving to Europe overshadow various western governments’ involvement in the conflicts in countries. For instance, while Syrian refugees have been migrating to Europe increasingly since 2011, the mass migration of 2015 was in part triggered by the intervention of the Global Coalition against Daesh (the Islamic State forces) followed by Russian air force action in Syria. For refugees, the discourse of waiting for selection to move or for a solution to the conflict sets a symbolic boundary and hierarchy that they are a problem that should be externalised (Haddad 2007; Malkki 1995; Agier 2011,18,21) and must endure waiting.

The EU or other western states demanding Syrian refugees wait failed to take into account that Syrian refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria have lived under a dictatorship where they had minimal rights of citizenship. Thus to speak out, march, or engage in an oppositional action even if only minor, is to cross a border, and once it is crossed, crossing another- a territorial border or several borders- is not threatening if at the end of that lies the chance of being granted rights. One example of this action was when Syrian and other refugees in Hungary started walking to the Austrian border in the summer of 2015 (Kallius et al. 2016,29). In the face of slow EU response to their presence and their desire to continue to elsewhere in Europe, they walked to the border rather than wait for authorization. In the process of crossing, marching, or demanding they do the work of recreating the category of refugee and blurring the distinctions state actors make among different refugees. Garelli and Tazzioli (2013,1014) comment that Italy distinguished Tunisians who crossed to Italy after the revolution there from Libyans and others coming due to the war in Libya. They describe

---

12 For example, the British government repeated that the government was sending millions of pounds to the region, so it would only resettle a limited number of Syrian refugees in the UK (Guardian February 8, 2015).
the latter as “agency-driven migrants” and the former as “agency-ridden refugees”. Exploring the Italian government’s different approach to the two groups showed that Tunisians were deemed as demanding and not quite in need of protection as refugees whereas asylum seekers fleeing from Libya- who were not necessarily Libyan- complicated the asylum process. While this second group applied for asylum based on persecution or violence suffered in Libya, their flight from Libya was not deemed grounds to grant them asylum since they were not Libyan nationals.13 State actors marked these two refugee groups as distinct to explain not only the difference in the demands they made of the state but also for state actors to justify the differentiated incorporation of these two refugee groups.

Where patience and deservingness, of protection as a refugee, state-sponsored support, or inclusion within the nation state, are tied to waiting, refugees taking action to speed up or force the process is presented as problematic based on Hyndman and Giles’ (2011) analysis. They compare the representation of refugees who wait in camps in countries close to their countries of origin to those who cross borders to arrive in Europe or elsewhere to seek asylum. They argue that resettlement states, predominantly western state actors, qualify refugees who wait as deserving whether of protection or the possibility of resettlement whereas those who move are suspected of being disingenuous refugees. Tazzioli and her co-authors (2016, 26) take this idea a step further drawing from recent cases in Europe where discourse about refugees has shifted from describing them as deserving protection to qualifying them, or at least the suspicious that some of them, are a source of threat. Refugees waiting is a testament to their endurance and a socially valued action where taking steps to become secure faster or in ways that bypassed state actors were problematic.

13 As Malkki (1995) argues, the asylum and refugee system is based on the idea of national belonging. Asylum seekers fleeing a second country other than their country of origin complicates and limits the possibility of them receiving status, regardless of how long they lived in this second country or if they faced persecution or violence there (Garrelli & Tazzioli 2013).
The politics of differentiation emerges whereby the movement of some is legal and unquestioned (cf. Salter 2007), the movement of some desired and a symbol of the magnanimity of a state (Mountz 2011), and the movement of yet others is qualified as a security and economic threat (Hyndman &Giles 2011; Garelli &Tazzioli 2013).

In the thesis, I do not include estimates of the number of Syrian refugees present in Istanbul from before the revolution or during the time I undertook fieldwork. The decision is based on several factors both practical and theoretical. Agier (2011, 33) argues that it is necessary to explain the classificatory systems which are the basis of the statistics produced. Statistics are “… part of the biopolitical work of population management” (Agier 2011, 33). At the same time producing numbers is about controlling populations, state actors employ statistics as representations, policy makers and politicians for multiple reasons and aims (cf. De Genova et al. 2016,22). Statistics become part of justifying policies or political discourses that entrench the idea of ‘refugees and migrants’ as a problem or as ‘others’. On a practical level, it is necessary to highlight that at the time the influx began the border provinces were the focus, so UNHCR data from 2012 reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered in the southern provinces and state-run camps. In 2013, the numbers slowly changed to incorporate Syrian refugees living in the urban areas in the southern regions. Statistics on Istanbul were not produced until 2014 when identity cards came into use in Istanbul as will be explained further in Chapter Two. As such I argue that the statistics issued, by UNHCR, from the time of the fieldwork do not reflect the reality on the ground in Istanbul.14 The numbers fail to take into account Syrian refugees’ different trajectories as it registers them as present even if they might have moved on to Europe and in some cases even if they have returned.

to Syria. The statistics generated concerning the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been incorporated into Turkish politicians’ and statesmen’s discourses to demand support from the EU or use the numbers to threaten the Europe, and within Turkey to encourage xenophobia (cf. De Genova et al. 2016, 22; cf. Demir 2016).

The mention of events in 2015 highlights that it is necessary to explain that the data included in this thesis are temporally specific and focused on the period from the summer of 2012 to December 2013; in Chapter 2, I partially exceed that temporal limit. I argue that an emphasis on the migration and presence in Istanbul in 2012 and 2013 offers a counter-narrative to the narrative of ‘crisis’ employed in the summer of 2015 (cf. Ticktin 2016). Movement along these routes whether by sea or land was happening long before the summer of 2015, and even long before the conflict in Syria (cf. Hess 2010). The movement has been a constant feature in light of the continued existence of the European border regime. The continuous nature of movement along these routes brings the moral uproar around the deaths of few refugees, paired with the disregard for the many others who died trying to cross, into stark relief (Ticktin 2016). The contradiction prompts questions of why these lives and not others are considered more valid, or worthier of mourning. The thesis does not concentrate on this aspect of mourning further (Ticktin 2016; Albahari 2016; Rygiel 2016; Butler 2004), but the possibility of dying at the border did come up during the fieldwork and fear of dying dictated the routes some refugees were willing to consider.

In the thesis, I explain in most cases why the person or family left, but I do not delve into the specifics of their actual migration from Syria to Turkey. Syrians refugees’ choices to come to Istanbul were affected by the circumstances in their area of residence in Syria, their living

---

15 The state actor practice is to take the Turkish issued identity cards away from Syrian refugees returning to Syria. UNHCR has statistics on ‘voluntary returns,’ but based on some interlocutors’ visits to Qamishli in northern Syria and their return to Istanbul, I would argue that these statistics are not fully representative of the actual number of Syrian refugees present.
conditions and opportunities in the city, and their decision to continue to Europe. In many cases, if not most, I spoke to refugees about their decision to move, and about who, if they were part of a family, was going to move. As Papadopoulos and his co-authors (2008, 163) comment, “migrants never reach the border on their own,” so it is necessary to situate the context and relations that lead to that decision or make it possible.

Many Syrian young men who have not yet served their mandatory military service had to leave Syria quickly to avoid being drafted into the military regardless of whether or not they participated in demonstrations during the revolution, were wanted by the intelligence services for their political activities or joined the Free Syrian Army (hereafter FSA) for a time. While in 2012 and 2013, it was mainly young men who were heading to Turkey because of their military service. Later on, men in their late 20s and 30s started coming as the conscription offices began calling up men for reserve service. Some families especially if they had more than one son close to conscription age accompanied them to Turkey, not wanting the family to be separated. Others brought their families as they feared they might be targeted due to their political actions or their membership in the FSA. Other families, especially those from the Kurdish areas of Syria, explained that while their areas were relatively safe, they came as their livelihoods in Syria disappeared or were disappearing, and they feared they would not be able to feed their families. While some interlocutors had faced persecution and regime violence in Syria, others suffered from the ramifications of war. Regardless of the reasons for their migration, in the thesis I use the term refugee while trying to account for these diverse histories and trajectories.

For many Syrian refugees continuing to Europe was a means of starting over again when they had lost everything in Syria and in Turkey struggled to build a semblance of their lives in Syria. In

---
16 Some families fled following Daesh attacking or taking control of their area.
Europe, many argued, their children who had left school to work to provide for the family in Turkey would be able to study again. Parents and even single men argued that in Europe they would not have to worry about healthcare or paying rent. Many European states provide social assistance to refugees, which meant that for many refugees who had lost their homes, jobs or businesses in Syria, moving on to Europe was an opportunity to begin rebuilding their lives, and possibly regain the existential security they felt in Syria. Even for young men, who in Syria may have depended on their kin to support them to get married and to become economically independent, moving to Europe is a means of moving on with the stages of their lives or achieving their ambitions without worrying about their basic needs. As Lucht (2012, 136) said about the migration of Guan men, “...the journey is a strategy not only for moving physically and geographically but also for moving ahead in life, socially and existentially.” Some interlocutors explained that they believed they would feel ‘safe’ in Europe in a way they did not feel in Turkey or elsewhere in the region. At the same time, some Syrian refugees criticised interlocutors or Syrian refugees in general for wanting to go. Some argued that those going were abandoning Syria and the struggle for freedom, others said that those going to Europe were headed to Christian lands with different values. Others said that Europe, and the West more broadly, since the events of September 11 treat Muslims as an unwanted and threatening ‘other’ (cf. Khosravi 2010, 77; Jasbir 2007).

**Border Crossing in Anthropological Debates**

In discussing academic literature on crossing borders, several questions repeatedly emerge, primarily the question of why is it important across contexts and countries to examine how people cross territorial border(s). Is academic inquiry an endeavour to humanise the experience dramatised by policy makers as ‘trafficking’, ‘human smuggling’, ‘an illegal action’, and in the process counter the criminalization of border crossing? Is it because border crossings are a means of re-inscribing
authority by recognising that state actors’ bordering practices are responses to migrants’ and refugees’ actions (cf. Rigo & Karakayali 2010)? Is it a celebration of human migratory energy in the face of border regimes and increased securitisation? Is it a way to demonstrate how the borders extend into the heart of the nation state through the processes that make border crossers exploitable and deportable (cf. De Genova 2005)? Is it part of the spectacle of the border that like a magician’s trick directs our attention to migrants’ ‘illegality’ and as away from the productive nature of this ‘illegality’ (De Genova 2012)? Is it about the ways crossing the border is part of producing the categories refugee and migrant (cf. Andersson 2014, 15-16)?

Various ethnographic accounts explore the different ways refugees and migrants cross borders to get to Europe, the USA, or Australia. In Khosravi’s (2010) Auto-Ethnography of an Illegal Traveller, he presents his experience and journeys across many borders from Iran to Pakistan, and India to finally arrive in Sweden. The book does not end with Khosravi’s (2010) arrival to Sweden as he continues to examine issues of racism and refugee-ness through his own and others’ experiences in Sweden. The autobiographical narrative is ground to engage with bordering, state and institutional processes that produce migrant and refugee subjectivities in particular ways. One a different border, Spener (2009) focuses on Mexican migrants’ journeys across the Mexico-USA border, the methods and strategies they employ to cross. He situates their migration within a “global apartheid” not only of borders but disparate material wealth. He approaches Mexican migrants’ border practice as practices “of the weak” (Scott 1985) who counter their subordinate position with respect to the USA by crossing the border. Spener acknowledges that these migrants are crossing to enter into exploitative economic relations and face the ever looming threat of deportation. He situates this incorporation of migrant labour as a defiance of the apartheid established that means their families will suffer if they remain in Mexico. While approaching migration as a tool of the weak, he does not situate the ways the border and the securitisation of the border are productive of
this exploitable and deportable migrant labour force (cf. De Genova 2005). Tackling the border in the Sonoran Desert, De Leon (2015) combined examinations of the material belongings migrants left behind in the Desert during their crossings with migrants’ narratives of their crossings and the ways the corpses of migrants who die in the Desert are dealt with by the border patrol and families. In an ethnographically innovative move, he uses the material objects- the corporal traces left on objects such as shoes or clothes and the physical objects left in the Desert to explore migrants’ experiences of crossing.

Other authors focus on the ways migrants’ and refugees’ experiences of the border continue even once they have arrived. Lucht (2012) examined the border crossings of Guan young men to Italy. Lucht frames their journeys as an act of reciprocity giving to the world in anticipation of an existential or material return. Their migration is related to the demise of the fishing industry in their area which is related to EU fishing deals. These men turn to migration to achieve themselves socially where their world in Ghana was not offering the possibility of doing so. He presents interlocutors’ narratives of crossing the desert to North Africa and then the sea to reach Italy. Their border crossing is distinguished as these Guan migrants are sought out by Libyan smugglers to captain the boats. Their migration complicates state discourses on migrants’ relations with smugglers (cf. Sanchez 2015). He explores the risks entailed in the different routes, the countries they pass through and their strategies to survive the journey. The research moves from their journeys to discussing their incorporation as labour in Italy.

These different accounts examine the strategies migrants and refugees used at different points in time to cross different territorial borders. They build on ideas of refugees and migrants discovering their field of action in crossing the border (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 19). All these different ethnographies and accounts influence and affect the approaches I rely on in analysing
bordering and Syrian refugees’ preparations to cross the border to Europe. This body of literature is part of an ongoing debate to understand migration and migratory control.

**Transition, Assemblage and Waiting**

Anthropological discussions of liminality have been used to explore transitional and migratory experiences to limited effect. Liminality has been used to describe persons undergoing rituals (Van Gennep 1960; Turner 1969; Richards 1956; La Fontaine 2004), states (cf. Bayart 2007), places (Agier 2011,46), and institutions (Papadopoulos et al. 2008,175). Liminality has been employed to explore the social positioning of individuals undergoing rituals related to transitions such as puberty, marriage, or childbirth. The ritual serves to reincorporate the individual into the social order in their new status without undermining the social order (Turner 1966; La Fontaine 2004). Much of the literature examines the segregation of individuals undergoing the transition due to the danger they present to others within the group or to themselves. Malkki (1995) draws on this danger associated with the liminal figure Malkki in her discussion of ‘refugee-ness’. She suggests that refugees are threatening or liminal due to their position as outside the nation-state system. They act as threats to the naturalness of the nation-state system. Malkki (1995) draws on Hannah Arendt’s (1951/1973) argument in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* on the right to have rights. Arendt (1951/1973) discusses the ways refugees were dealt with following the Second World War when they were stripped of their national belonging, and how they emerged as persons bearing their humanity only. In using liminality, Malkki (1995) limits herself to this aspect of threat and danger as the analogy cannot be pushed further. In discussions of liminality, individuals undergoing rituals anticipate their eventual incorporation into the social group, but refugees are never sure whether or not they will return ‘home’ or settle where they are or be resettled elsewhere (cf. De Genova 2002,435). Agier (2011,72-73) explains it as a paradoxical condition using the example of
Palestinian and Sahrawi refugees who expected their exile to be temporary and that they would return, but instead face “waiting and absence.” He critiques the ways their status as refugees sets them as if living in a state of constant waiting which also emerges in the material I present in the thesis. For Agier (2011, 79-80), everyday life happens even if the horizon of return remains. The waiting is not only socialised but also has effects on those waiting and may change how they constitute their future or what their expectations are (cf. Brun 2015). He criticises approaches that represent refugees as stuck in a time warp. His arguments resonated with many of the research participants’ practices, although some refugees did describe their time in Istanbul in this way. As the thesis will demonstrate, enduring waiting did not imply passivity or inaction.

Beyond Agier’s critique of setting up refugees as stuck in a liminal time wrap, using rites of passage in migration studies has been analysed for the ways it sets up migrants’ border crossings, their subordination as labour, and their fear of deportation as the effects of a transitional stage (De Genova 2002, 435). De Genova (2002, 435) argues that describing migrants as liminal figures or persons undergoing a liminal experience raises the danger of situating their experiences within an assimilationist framework, that implies that they will become citizens at a future point in time (De Genova 2002, 435). His argument can be applied to the case of refugees where being refugee is expected to be a temporally specific status rather than extending for years. Moreover, refugees are expected to return or to become the citizens of another place and not remain stateless. In using liminality, I avoid deploying it as a characteristic of being ‘refugees’. Rather I approach liminality in a manner closer to Bayart’s (2007, 282) use, “The sole common denominator of the liminal condition is that it manufactures social relations, whether temporary or hierarchical, and that it is irreducible to the idea of ‘disaffiliation,’ even in those places of ‘bare life,’ refugee camps.” Such an approach to transition situates the way daily life continues, is altered and affected by refugees’
preparations and waits to move. Transition, approached as liminal in some cases, can then be explored through relations and the production of particular relationships.

Different states, Syrian, Turkish, and European; state actors, policies, laws and regulations; smugglers, middlemen, guides, and passports; family decisions, finances, and relations with fellow passengers, are some of the multiple and contradictory actors who are part of this field of action. In a bid to analyse Syrian refugees’ relations with these different actors within one frame, I resorted to using the idea of an assemblage (Goldring & Landolt 2013; Sassen 2006; Collier & Ong 2005). To follow Delanda (2006,18), “First of all unlike wholes in which parts are linked by relations of interiority (that is, relations which constitute the very identity of the parts) assemblages are made up of parts which are self-subsistent and articulated by relations of exteriority, so that a part may be detached and made a component of another assemblage.” Assemblage offered a means to explore these relations while demonstrating the nuances and the subtle differences shifts make. As an assemblage, the various actors work at different levels and scales (Goldring & Landolt 2013,16). Assemblage is a way of accommodating the action of persons, institutions, and inanimate objects such as passports. Different actors’ actions and influence is “contingent” rather than coordinated or even minimally related (Goldring & Landolt 2013,16). Goldring and Landolt (2013) adopt this approach as a way of analysing how state actors, state policies and regulations, NGOs and refugees’ actions affect the ways refugees move between statuses in Canada. They demonstrate that as a shift occurs in one relationship, a particular action is taken or a law overlooked or enforced, the other relations may or may not be affected. However, these changes happening at multiple levels affect refugees’ access, lives, and futures. Feldman (2012,15) discusses the migratory apparatus implemented to govern the EU borders. Given the array of actors involved in the migratory

---

17 Persons involved in smuggling use the term passenger (*Rakb* in Arabic) to describe clients, refugees or migrants, hiring smugglers or middle men.
apparatus and its broad geographical reach, assemblage becomes a means of examining policy, regulation and the intervention of diverse actors within one frame of analysis (Feldman 2012, 15). As he explains, assemblage makes it possible to explore the “appropriation and reinvention of dominant forms of organisation by actors in diverse situations” (Feldman 2012, 15). Based on the engagement with these various authors’ formulations of assemblage, I use assemblage as part of the structure underlying the thesis and the discussion of the different relations.

I rely on these various authors’ approaches to use assemblage to explore the ways multiple actors engage in this context. This approach is a means of examining the processes of waiting. By situating different actors in the same frame, it becomes possible to see how they act differently or in the similar ways. It is also a means of countering more binary approaches that situate state actors and smugglers as related but in opposition (cf. Heyman 1999). By approaching them as part of an assemblage, it is possible to explore the ways different processes, imposed by various actors, produce particular refugee subjectivities (cf. De Genova 2016). Assemblage is a chance to manipulate scale given the various levels that the relations mentioned here operate at. Diverse actors may affect refugees’ lives in similar ways, though the waits they enforce are diverse and unrelated. In many instances, the relations or processes are not comparable, but I analyse them in parallel.

The thesis relies in many instances on the differences a change in one or more variable can effect in interlocutors’ multiple engagements. In many cases what is discussed is what changes if one gains money, loses money, has a serendipitous meeting, forces an acquaintance, crosses the border or is caught by border guards among other variations. The shifts are nuanced at times and straightforward at others, but it is this at times minute shifts of focus that illuminate how people wait, how they move and why their actions take particular forms. The vulnerability and fragility of
the situation make these changes significant; minor shifts can affect so much in a situation where other issues are beyond control or domain of action.

“These new ‘floating populations’ – to borrow the expression used in French colonial administration- are in a situation of permanent waiting: waiting for a people-smuggler, a job, papers, waiting to be expelled or returned,” writes Bayart (2007, 272) describing the ways refugees are subject to waits enforced by different actors. In the statement, he articulates the various agents and engagements that form part of the assemblage I discuss in this thesis. For Bayart (2007,274), “Waiting is in no way external to globalisation. It is a constitutive practice of it, now that the border is an ‘institution’ (as Balibar calls it).” Waiting appears in much of the literature on migrant and refugee presence in Istanbul or Turkey (Parla 2003; Danış 2007; Danış et al. 2005), USA (Coutin 2007; Ong 2003), UK (Rotter 2016; Turnbull 2016), and elsewhere. It also enters into so many other contexts unrelated to migration which expand and refine how it is studied; from waiting for medical care in the UK (Day 2015) to waiting as emblematic of class (Auyero 2012) or class and caste relations in engagements with state actors (Corbridge 2004), to a means of analysing migrant and working class citizen relations (Hage 2009b). The connection between waiting and power, making others wait as an exercise of power (Andersson 2014; Auyero 2012; Bourdieu 2000), and the relationship between class or social status and waiting (Corbridge 2004) have all offered insight into the different possibilities waiting presents as an analytical lens. I concentrate on the different ways Syrian refugees were forced to wait or waited out of their own choice before crossing the border or being able to move. In the process, I highlight when and how interlocutors engaged, simultaneously, with different temporal registers. Waiting emerges as both a state of being Syrian refugees experience and as an action they perform. Waiting becomes a means of discussing agency and structure by highlighting Syrian refugees’ relations with the different actors forcing them to
wait (cf. Auyero 2012). In examining these relations and the waits, I focus on the ways changes in variables affected possible action or recourse, influenced relations, prolonged or ended waits.

**Bordering**

A major part of the thesis is concerned with migrants’/refugees’ efforts to cross the border making it necessary to outline an understanding of borders. Border scholars have approached borders through a variety of analytical lenses (Paasi 2011; Donnan & Hastings 2012). They have analysed borders as the site for contestation, meaning, or ambiguity to name a few (Green 2013). Borders have been approached as structures- a fence or a barrier or a connector- to be upheld or overcome (Van Houtoum 2011). They have been studied as relations, produced and reproduced by a multiplicity of actors, and spaces where different actors play out their struggles (Van Houtum et al. 2005; Grundy-Warr & Rajaram 2007, xxix; Papadopoulos et al. 2008). Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) take the border as the launch point from which to analyse economic relations and global labour regimes. Adopting bordering rather than borders is a means of exploring the multifarious and processual nature of borders and countering ideas of the border as static, state-imposed or solely located at the territorial border (Van Houtum 2011; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen 2002).

Border enforcement and the securitisation of the border rather than a given are a response to migrants’ and refugees’ crossings or the problematizing of those crossings (cf. Follis 2012). De Genova (2012,495) remarks “that borders are truly activated though such practices of enforcement and thus are animated in the first place by the mobility of the travellers and would-be migrants themselves (Karakayali and Rigo 2010).” Border crossings are sites of struggle, and subject to continuous rearrangement as refugees and state actors change tactics or bordering processes change. The dialectical relation perhaps is most clearly manifest when observing how migratory
routes shift in response to the securitization of certain borders rendering them difficult to cross (cf. Andersson 2014).

The territorial border captures public and media attention, but borders proliferate within the space of the nation state. Agier (2011,50) explains borders as “invisible” and “impossible to locate” highlighting that borders now intersect with mobile bodies. The border, while located anywhere within the state space, becomes visible in various institutions such as detention centres, and at different moments when refugees are asked to produce documents or verify their right to be present or work (Reeves 2013; Coutin 2011). The spectacle of the territorial border as a space of securitization and border enforcement hides from view the productive nature of this bordering in producing migrants as “subordinate” labour (De Genova 2012, 493-495).

Borders have been approached as institutions that classify those approaching the border determining how they cross rather than if they cross it. Walters (2006,199) explains borders as, “one among many sorting points, nodes within an albeit thinner social space.” Drawing on Balibar’s (2002) analysis of borders, he situates them as highly present within the space of a nation state creating, “several types of alien-ness.” As people cross borders in different ways, distinguishing their subsequent incorporation within the nation state, Balibar (2002, 79) describes borders as having a “polysemic” quality. Drawing on Ranciere’s concept of justice and belonging, Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2007, xxviii) argue that borders are concerned with establishing the divisions of belonging, non-belonging, and the struggle over how the division is marked, passage and presence made. Borders, while appearing to hinder movement, act to affect the conditions under which people cross and under which they remain present once across the border. As Mezzadra and Neilson argue (2013), the border serves to regulate entry, modulating movement, allowing some people to enter quickly, and making others’ movement slow. Those who are kept
out can or will enter but without state ‘authorization’ establishing the conditions and terms for their presence within the nation state as deportable ‘illegal’ labour (cf. De Genova 2002; 2005).

Regarding European borders, Haddad (2007) draws extensively on Mary Douglas’s (1966) conception of pollution to explain the externalisation of European borders as a means to stop the arrival or entrance of refugees given their potential to unsettle the nation state. Bordering and border management, act to deter pollutants from the outside and maintain purity within. Focusing on the issue of refugee admission in particular, and drawing on the authors above and their refinement of how we conceptualise borders I suggest, following Mountz (2011), that the externalisation of the border asserts state sovereignty in choosing who enters and how they enter. Mountz (2011) compares two sets of refugee arrivals to Canada, refugees from the former Yugoslavia selected through a resettlement program and Chinese refugees who arrived by boat. Her examination of the differing state and bureaucratic discourse, and varying action, towards these two sets of refugees, demonstrated that the problematic was not only arrival but rather attempting to usurp the sovereign’s right to select, to give rights. In the very act of crossing the border, moving, lies the threat to the national order of things. It not only subverts the state bureaucracy’s role to choose but perhaps more crucially it may also force the bureaucracy to give rights and extend protection. The intersection of neoliberalism and problems of providing care and protection means that governments would rather accept fewer refugees or asylum seekers regardless of whether or not they are deserving. Agier (2011,34) explains that there is, “a contemporary way in which economic crisis and ideological retreat in the face of global culture make exile into a criminal experience, no longer valued as it has been at other points in history.” His comment can be seen in the ways asylum seeking processes in Europe have been described as producing, ‘bogus refugees,’ who are denied the ability to demand rights or care from the state. I suggest that externalising the border not only
externalises the problem but more importantly denies refugees/migrants the possibility of demanding rights.

The desire to limit protection or restrict who accesses it is not only contingent on neo-liberalism or economic crisis, but also, in this case, on Europe’s constant fear regarding Muslims. Raising the question of what Europe is and who is European, De Genova (2016, 82) touches on the ways Muslims, migrants and citizens, are cast as ‘others’ to formulate European-ness in response. He attributes part of the difficulty Europe faces in dealing with incoming Muslim refugees to the anxiety towards second and third generation Muslims, who grew up in Europe. This anxiety is transposed on those crossing the border or waiting to cross. The tension appeared in particular instances such as the German government’s announcement in March 2013 that it would resettle 5000 Syrian refugees from the state-run camps in southern Turkey, but they would prioritise minors and Christians (European Resettlement Network 2014; Schmidt April 2013). The discourse continues to maintain the spectre of ‘otherness’ afloat as in the summer of 2015 when Poland and some other European states argued that if Germany forced them to accept refugee burden-sharing, they would only accept Christian Syrians to preserve their religious homogeneity (Foy August 2015). Most interlocutors and Syrian refugees I spoke to believed that they would be granted ‘refugee’ status if they made it to Europe regardless of their religion. Interlocutors who went to Europe were aware that they would deal with processes of ‘othering’ on the basis they are Muslim, but they reaffirmed that despite this they would be given refugee status and rights. In the course of moving, they upheld rights and perceived existential security above their anxiety about facing alienation or racism.
States, Syrian Refugees, Smugglers, and Fragile Relations in the Uncertain Present

One set of actors in the assemblage is different states, Syrian, Turkish and European. Mention of the state as an actor raises the question and issue that the state does not exist but is the composite of various actors and their practices. Various anthropologists have taken different routes to speak about the state. Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004, 5-6) explain that social scientists have studied the state through visible institutions, bureaucracies, the effects of policies and actions committed by state actors on the ground in local places; they refer to these as “state sightings.” In an attempt to both counter and complement this approach, they take the margins, or people at the “margins” of the state, as an avenue to explore the idea of the state and reconceive ideas about the state. While not using the margins as his entry point to examine the state, Trouillot (2001) argues that states are a series of practices and processes that have particular effects that might or might not be limited to government or bureaucratic institutions. His analysis is a move towards seeking out how the state appears rather than assuming it or approaching it as emplaced or contained. Legibility is another angle employed to study the state by exploring state actor practices of using documentation or social policies to make populations visible, legible, and governable (Scott 1998; Torpey 2000). This approach highlights an aspect of the state, represented in state actor practices, but as Das and Poole (2004) comment it is one among other aspects of the state. With a growing emphasis on the state as multiple and contingent, Navaro-Yashin (2002) develops the concept of “the faces of the state” as a way of discussing the state as multifarious, fluid, and emerging in a diverse range of situations and different forms. In writing about the ‘state,’ I specify in various instances whether the engagement is with state actors, state policies or with the idea of a state, to avoid reifying the state. By focusing on journeys, movement across borders, and presence in Istanbul, the thesis discusses Syrian refugees’ engagements with the ideas, institutions, and state actors of different
states - the Syrian, Turkish, or European. Their interaction with Turkish state actors especially shows that state actor practices are oriented towards different aims from making Syrian refugees visible to the Turkish state or maintaining the border with Europe.

In Turkey, Syrian refugees’ ethnicity, age, gender, political attitude or affiliation, and religion affected their engagement with Turkish state actors. Their location - in Istanbul, at the border with Europe or in the southern provinces, was an additional factor that affected not only their dealings but also the processes they underwent as will be explained in Chapter 2. European states come into Istanbul through the state bureaucracies in Europe governing family reunification processes, but more commonly through the ideas of different European states. Syrian refugees distinguished European states from Turkey regarding the care they were expected to offer, as well as differentiating among European states on the basis of their policies towards refugees (Garelli & Tazzioli 2013; Kallius et al. 2016).

Smuggling has received much attention in migration research and policy studies as extra-legal relations problematised and criminalised by the state. Researchers have criticised the criminalisation of smuggling and its conflation with trafficking for the ways laws and policies on smuggling affect the refugees being smuggled (Sanchez 2015). The criminalisation of smuggling affects refugees as it raises suspicions that if they can pay for smugglers then they are not truly in need of protection (cf. van Liempt & Sersli 2012, 1034). In a bid to problematise state actor and policy maker discourse about smuggling, some research pieces aim to demonstrate the ways smuggling is not solely “profit-driven” (Sanchez 2015; van Liempt & Sersli 2012). Spener (2009)

---

18 Different research examines how refugees access smugglers, the services provided, and identify the different actors involved in smuggling operations (Reitano & Tinti 2015; İçduygu 2004). Research has engaged with policy concerns about smuggling as ‘trafficking’ (Salt & Stein 1997) or highlighting how smuggling is different to trafficking (İçduygu & Toktaş 2002). Researchers examine migrants’ and refugees’ choices and their relations with smugglers (Van Liempt & Sersli 2013). Other research outlines the role different actors involved in smuggling play (Sanchez 2015; İçduygu 2004). Koser (2008) discusses the financial transactions entailed in smuggling businesses.
concentrates on the processes of coyotaje\textsuperscript{19} which include guiding others across the border rather than focusing on coyotes. His examination shows the ways those crossing relied on others from their hometowns to guide them across. He highlights how the social ties and a common place of origin were a means of countering the danger of hiring strangers. Sanchez’s (2015) ethnographic research examines smugglers’ perspectives of the business, their discussions about relations in smuggling, and their reasons for becoming involved. Sanchez (2015) draws on smugglers’ accounts to show how the different people involved in smuggling situate their actions as a form of help to others or as part of social and communal ties. Her ethnography counters much of the literature which relies on migrants’ and refugees’ narratives and statistics of apprehensions. While she does mention instances where refugees faced violence by those smuggling them, she argues that the overwhelming majority of people involved in smuggling do not harm those who hire them. She foregrounds the long-standing relationships that extend across the border, but as a consequence her ethnography does not offer much insight into how these relations would operate in an environment with greater uncertainty and lacking the security of proximity and long-standing ties. I will examine this issue in a subsequent chapter. Achilli (2017) examines the ways Syrian and Palestinian Syrian smugglers engage with passengers seeking to cross from Izmir to Greece. He highlights the ways morality and kinship emerges in these ties in contrast to European and other state actors’ discourses of the relations as only exploitative or abusive. While diverging from his analysis, I also examine the ways the relations between smugglers and patients are formed and how they play out.

In the thesis, I explore how refugees sought to socialise and personalise their relations with smugglers. In some cases, passengers and smugglers were connected through ties of a common place of origin, but in other cases, they were not. The variation in cases makes it possible to explore

\textsuperscript{19} Spener (2009) explains coyotaje as a process and concept that has meant different things over time. He argues for using the concept to discuss border crossings.
how the personalisation worked and the results it engendered. I focus on the ways the uncertainty of the situation unsettles common or familiar modes of engaging employed in Syria. I examine how refugees learn about smuggling, but only briefly mention how people crossed or the prices they paid. Additionally, by exploring cases where attempts fail, I offer insight into the ways this affected their dealings with smugglers and how they sought to counter the failure of their attempt.

Smugglers, frontmen, and brokers make an appearance in different borderlands and various crossing points including the Mexican-USA border (Coutin 2005; Spener 2009; De Leon 2015), Zuwara in Libya as a crossing point to Lampedusa (Albahari 2016), Indonesia or Malaysia as launch points to Australia (Perera 2009). In many cases, smugglers may occupy a liminal position, as uncertainty surrounds how they will act when lives and money are at stake. Interlocutors approached them as migration experts who possess the knowledge and skills necessary to get a passengers across the border(s) or as persons able to organise and mobilise all the resources, ties and knowledge required to cross the border. While many refugees cross the border alone (Chapter 2), others saw the border to Europe as too difficult to cross alone making them chose to engage with smugglers. In the thesis, I do not focus on the roles of various actors involved in the organising journeys, but on the relations between smugglers and passengers. In relying on interlocutors’ discussions of smugglers, I situate how they positioned smugglers in the relationships, demonstrate the complexity of the ties, the different registers employed, and the ways these relations and histories of social relations from Syria played out in Istanbul.

20 See İçduygu (2004), İçduygu and Toktaş (2002) for Turkey to Greece routes. Reitano and Tinti (2015) for a discussion on Turkey to Greece and other routes. I mention routes in general terms without including specifics about areas. I do not offer the full details about some routes due to ethical considerations.

21 Sanchez (2015) mentions interlocutors saying they told the smugglers that if they were harmed or if any harm came to the person they were bringing over, they would harm the smuggler. The need to threaten, even if as a joke, is a reminder that while the process might go well there is always the possibility that the smugglers will act counter their role.
Trust, confidence, and reputation are all part of discussions of relations between smugglers and refugees. Various ethnographies explore how smugglers may be connected to their clients, and how these ties affect the ways refugees trust smugglers and middlemen (Spener 2009; Sanchez 2015). The thesis examines the ways smugglers perform expected social roles as migration experts, trustworthy persons or as patrons. I look at the conflicts that arise due to passengers’ expectations that smugglers will act according to certain roles when the smugglers do not conform to the role. These exchange relations are marked by their fragility given there is no recourse to state action and other forms of threat yield limited or no results. These relations then become a means to foreground the ways refugees navigate insecure ties in a situation of larger uncertainty.

The thesis demonstrates that the fragility of relationships, and interlocutors’ awareness of this vulnerability, rather than a given was processual. Interlocutors become aware of the fragile and experienced this fragility in their various relations. Das explains that, in the case of migration from India to Pakistan following the Partition, “the fragility of the social becomes embedded in a temporality of anticipation since one ceases to trust that context is in place” (Das 2007,9). Syrian refugees sought to alter this fragility and uncertainty regarding others’ actions whether smugglers or state actors by developing transient ties while in Istanbul, en route, or in the detention centre in Edirne. In the thesis, I use transient ties to describe the relations interlocutors formed with other refugees that may or may not develop into longer term social relations. In many cases these ties ended once the refugees in question crossed the border, but in some cases they chose to keep in contact even after arriving at their destination. Agier (2011,46) argues that in situations of crisis, “provisional communities are formed… whenever the individuals who come together in such a situation share a minimum in the way of moral and political rules.” Here I focus primarily on interlocutors’ transient relations formed in Istanbul.
Refugees and migrants’ relations developed while on the move have been discussed in passing in some research (Collyer 2007,682) and were the focus of certain theorization in other instances (Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2013). Papadopoulos and his co-authors (2008) highlighted that refugees and migrants form ties in detention centres, camps and while en route, but it is only in a later article (2013), that they conceptualised the relations refugees and migrants form while en route as mobile commons. They conceive of the mobile commons as a mode of relating that undercuts citizenship and a way of articulating migrant and refugee politics and movement beyond that frame. For this project, I focus more on their discussion of the relations forming the commons. They propose that the commons are characterised by “shared knowledge, affective cooperation, mutual support and care between migrants when they are on the road or when they arrive somewhere” (2013,179). They argue that the relations migrants establish while en route must be analysed rather than assumed as a “…‘natural’ solidarity ‘reflex’ between migrants” (2013,190). They suggest that the dependencies developed between migrants are contingent on reciprocity. The article offers a critical lens to analyse what is, at times, passed over or ‘naturalised’ as evident; however, their articulation does not provide analytical tools to consider how migrants or refugees might enact discriminatory practices or practices that make the commons exclusive. Refugees may exclude co-nationals or persons of other nationality due to socio-economic differences, religion, or gender. At the same time, it is not only the moments when refugees exclude others that are important but also when they chose not to (cf. Jackson 2013,214). In this thesis, I will examine the ways interlocutors formed or forced relations at times and how they enacted exclusions in certain moments.

The idea of the mobile commons is one approach to open a discussion about transient ties. Relying on migrants’ relations in an inner-city neighbourhood in Johannesburg, Simone (2004) proposes exploring people as infrastructure in a situation of diverse migration and uncertainty. He uses this approach to discuss the ways interlocutors establish relations with co-nationals, co-ethnics
or across ethnic and national lines to access different resources in a situation where familiar forms of solidarity have decreased. Simone (2004,420) situates these relations as conflictual at many times, but that participants “can orient themselves in this conflict and discover profitable opportunities only through constant interactions with real and potential antagonists”. At the same time, he complicates the issue further by explaining that it is not just opportune relations, but actors’ abilities to disguise their “intentions and abilities within complex relationships of mutual dependence” (2004,420). He approaches these ties as interest based while highlighting how they change with circumstances rather than continuing due to shared kinship or ethnicity. Simone (2004) demonstrates that even in situations of antagonism cooperation, of sorts, is possible. While his recognition that migrants might work with others they express hostility towards just because the opportunity arises is insightful, the reality and frequency of such exchanges and connections require interrogation.

In discussing transient relationships, I highlight how fragility comes to the surface at particular moments. To explore this, I draw on Lambek’s (2010) engagement with ‘everyday ethics.22’ Everyday ethics are not a question of rights, which arose elsewhere but concern the ways refugees act to help others as fellow humans in a bid to preserve their lives (Jackson 2013,199). I follow Lambek (2010,9) in his description of the ethical as “…referring to the field of action or practical judgement rather than to what is specifically right or good, but the reader has to exercise some discernment.” These incidents were either recounted as first-hand personal accounts or as retellings of others’ ethical acts. As Lambek (2010,4) explains, “The individual incident is located within the stream of particular lives and the narratives that are constituted from them, changing its valence in relation to the further unfolding of those lives and narratives and never fully determined or

22 Lambek (2010) explains that ethics is used as both singular and plural. I follow his use here.
predictable.” I argue that acting ethically was a means of preserving something of Syrian refugees’ past in the uncertain present; insisting on continuity in action or attitude. Bourdieu (1998,142-143) offers alternative conceptualizations of such action, arguing that actors only act according to ‘group’ rules to gain group favour or as part of their struggle to control what actions they characterise as ‘virtuous’. His central premise is that individuals are driven by self-interest in their actions within the field, although individuals may explained and justify their actions in ways which disguise the self-interestedness. In the context of this fieldwork, in many instances, there was no cohesive ‘group’ to sanction or insist individuals act according to certain social rules. I suggest that interlocutors’ insistence on acting ethically came to signify their desire to uphold those familiar social rules even in the absence of a ‘group’. In doing so, they sought to maintain their self-representation or hold on to the familiar in a situation of uncertainty. Jackson (2013,212) writes that individuals are able to tolerate feeling helpless due to the circumstances or others if there is hope that the situation will end or circumstances change. Here I argue that interlocutors spoke about their ethical actions to emphasise that they could control some of their actions in a situation where many of the relations they were engaged in forced them to submit to or follow others.

The thesis does not stop at accepting these actions as the only possible response, and I foreground the moments and instances when Syrian refugees explained how they could not do what they saw as the ethical act or where they reached a cut-off point in their willingness to act ethically. As Lambek (2010,7) explains, part of exploring everyday ethics requires us to “recognise the ethical dimensions- including the uncertainty, polyvalence, or ambivalence-of selfhood, social encounters and action.” The question then becomes how do Syrian refugees justify and position themselves in relation to these multiple demands, their desires to arrive, and their willingness to help others regardless of their motivations to do so (cf. Jackson 2013, 197).
On Passing and Performativity

Performance has been explored by various social scientists from Goffman’s (1956) use of the idea to explain how social actors perform social roles, Turner’s (1987) focus on the performance of symbolic ritual acts to Butler’s (1990) critique of gender identities and her formulation of a theory of gendered performances. Studies of race have equally drawn on discussions of performance to break apart ideas of race as innate (Gilroy 2000; Ahmad 2000). For Goffman (1956) all social actions are performances of particular roles for specific audiences. His focus on the performance of social roles positions performance as not necessarily related to identity in contrast to later conceptions of performance. Turner (1987) employs performance in his discussions of ritual and symbolic acts performed at times of crisis and transition rather than explaining everyday social actions and interactions as performative. While they focus on spheres of social interaction, later theorists drew on performance- albeit in a different manner- to discuss identity performance but also to explain interactions and relations through performances of identity. Identity performance is related to discourse, if not as Hall says (1996, 5) “constructed within, not outside, discourse”. Butler (1990) presents a historical deconstruction of gender as an identity by engaging with multiple theories and philosophies that have discussed the body, sex and gender. In her preliminary theorizing of the issue, Butler (1990) argues that gender is constructed and constituted through the repetition of gendered actions. Gender acts, while repetitive, open the possibility for actions to be enacted in various ways. She acknowledges that the actions do not happen in vacuum but are influenced and in part formed by, responses to temporally specific cultural values. Her theory seeks to counter gender binaries, but ultimately to demonstrate that identities themselves, even those socially conceived as ‘natural’ are imitations of an ideal that does not exist (1990). Hall (1996) discusses different philosophical theories of identity to propose the idea of suturing as a way of
discussing identity. Again, it is the move away from identities as stable but seeking a way of analysing or speaking of identity that accounts for this fluidity without reducing identity to discourse. For Hall (1996, 5-6), suturing is a way of combining the “discourse and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be ‘spoken’.”

Performance emerges in different instances throughout the thesis. In rejecting the negative connotations attached to the term ‘refugee’, interlocutors expressed an awareness of the performance expected of them by institutions or western audiences as persons fleeing a war and persecution. In many instances, interlocutors performed in their engagement with smugglers as a way of securing their money and lives. In other instances, they performed in their engagement with state actors especially when caught trying to cross the border. One of the thesis’ key contributions is its examination of Syrian refugees’ temporary and strategic performances to pass through Ataturk airport on look-alike European passports. Some interlocutors used look-alike passports to move to Europe. By moving on these passports, they appropriate the means of mobility that they have limited access to otherwise. In the airport and before airline staff, interlocutors moving on these passports performed the national identity—usually European—of the passport they were moving on. While focusing on the ways interlocutors altered themselves to move on look-alike passports, I explore interlocutors’ ideas of Europeans as Others which they relied on in making their alterations. Hall (1996, 5) highlights that a key issue is how to analyse or study identity where it is not stable and “constructed in or through difference”. The emphasis on difference—absence or excess—ties identity to specific Others. The difference is in part based on individuals’ ideas of the

---

23 I use the term ‘look-alike’ passport to describe original passports where the refugee using the passport resembled the passport photograph (Chapter 6)
Other. Here interlocutors engage in a reserve process of trying to articulate and perform that difference rather than perform their identity through the difference.

While studies of race have sought to examine multiple topics from the history of racialization (Gilroy 2000) to the racialization of Muslims (Jasbir 2007), for the thesis I focus on discussions of racial passing (Ahmad 2000; Ehler 2012; Hobbs 2014). In addition, I draw on studies examining how migrants, or non-citizen residents, pass as authorised to move or work in various contexts such as Russia (Reeves 2013), the UK (Vasta 2011) and the Occupied West Bank (Kelly 2006). By examining refugees’ performances to pass, I explore the power relations that immobilize some populations and how Syrian refugees respond to these relations to achieve their movement. One mode of conceptualizing this passing is as a form of translation based on Walter Benjamin’s analysis of translation. He suggests that translated texts cannot replicate originals but strive to find cracks and margins through which to articulate the meaning of original texts. Alternatively, Butler (1990) describes gender performances that are not ‘normative’ as subversive since it is in the performed actions that the possibility for creativity and new gendered performances emerges. In the thesis, I draw on these different concepts and approaches to performance and passing to explore the ways some Syrian refugees performed certain identities when they used look-alike passports to move and how they described Europeans as Others in their endeavours to pass.

**Thesis Outline**

The chapters in this thesis deal with Syrian refugee presence in Istanbul, and their efforts to cross the border to Europe. The thesis examines the ways Syrian refugees crossed the border, and their relations with multiple actors from different state actors, smugglers, and other migrants and refugees. The thesis explores the waits imposed on Syrian refugees and how they navigated these
waits, abiding by them or countering them to end waiting. By examining waiting, I look at the ways waiting produces particular subjectivities and enforced waits are made productive.

Chapter one looks at transit as a concept used in studies on migration and Istanbul as a transit space. I discuss the main research sites, the research methods employed in these sites and the ethical issues which arose in each. The two main research sites presented different dynamics in terms of the interlocutors I engaged with, their relations, and practices. In the fieldwork, ethics rather than a set of guidelines emerge in a series of confrontations with interlocutors foregrounding that ethics are processual, and ultimately always dialogical (De Genova 2005, 15-17).

Chapter two explores Syrian refugees’ relationship and dealings with Turkish state actors while in Istanbul. By examining the ways Turkish state actors engaged with Syrian refugees in Istanbul and those caught at the border with Europe, I argue that state actor practices, unintentionally, created two categories of Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees in Istanbul were subjects with some political rights, as labourers, and recipients of state care. In contrast, state actors approached those caught at the border with Europe different in ways based on the temporal moment. From the Summer of 2012 until the Spring of 2013, state actors’ approach changed over time. They went from approaching Syrian refugees caught at the border with Europe as persons who needed to be contained, then as individuals who could be deported, and finally as persons who were incorporated like other Syrian refugees as persons under the temporary protection of the state. The chapter demonstrates that Syrian refugees’ relations with Turkish state actors in these different spaces reflecting the limits of the protection offered. The difference in practice between these two spaces highlights the ways Syrian refugees were situated variously as persons in place in Istanbul or threatening mobile subjects at the border with Europe. While Syrian refugees in Istanbul were
affected by changes in law or policy in Syria and Europe, I do not explore their relations with European or Syrian state actors in the thesis.

Chapter three examines the assemblage of different actors imposing waits on Syrian refugees. Through various case studies, I explore how interlocutors dealt with the wait imposed by smugglers, waiting for other passengers, waiting for institutions, European bureaucracy (cf. Bayart 2007), and Turkish citizenship. The chapter focuses on the underlying power relations and refugees’ struggles to regain control over aspects of their lives and futures through their initiatives to cross the border. The case studies, in turn, demonstrate the ways and moments Syrian refugees end their wait and move to reach existential security.

Chapter four discusses Syrian refugees’ engagements with smugglers and middlemen to achieve their aim of moving on to Europe. The chapter presents some interlocutors’ stories of their dealings with smugglers and other actors involved in the smuggling business to explain how they outlined their field of action (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). These exchange relations highlight the strategies refugees deployed to ensure that smugglers would uphold their end of the bargain. Their manoeuvres happen in a situation where refugees cannot resort to the state, and there is no group to enforce social censure. Interlocutors facing this uncertainty rely on familiar modes of engaging in social relations to varying success. By foregrounding cases where refugees were taken advantage of by smugglers, it is possible to examine the social dimensions of these relations, especially regarding refugees’ expectations of smugglers acting according to particular social roles (Gluckman 1962). Through these stories and refugees’ various encounters, greed, the fragility of social relations, and misrecognition emerge as core themes.

24The thesis does not discuss interlocutors’ engagement with state actors in Syria, but interlocutors did explain about the Syrian state institutions, the intelligence apparatus, or public sector. I make a distinction between the dictatorship in Syria and Syrian state institutions.
Chapter five builds on chapter four by exploring the transient ties Syrian refugees formed with other travellers to counter the uncertainty in their relationship with the smugglers, in dealing with the border regime, and their general uncertainty about crossing the border. The ties enabled them to accumulate knowledge about routes, border guards, and European asylum policies, offering a means to imagine their forecasted movement (cf. De Leon 2012). The extreme fragility of the situation forced them to form ties with those around them regardless of class, religion, or regional differences they would have upheld in Syria. I argue that a travellers’ ethics emerge, mainly en route or while refugees are held in detention centres, which centres around preserving life. These ethics did not only direct actions but interlocutors also recounted their own or others’ stories of their ethical actions. The act of telling these stories showed Syrian refugees insistence that even though social relations are fragile or frayed, they respect life and sacrifice to save it. At the same time, the chapter examines the ways interlocutors dealt with what they perceived as excessive demands made on them by fellow travellers, and how the limits of help emerge. The case studies show that we must move beyond a romanticising of refugees supporting one another en route, to explore the actual tensions the demand to act ethically creates where individual refugees are striving to guarantee their lives and futures.

Chapter six discusses performance, a theme which runs throughout the thesis, by examining the ways Syrian refugees performed to pass in Ataturk airport. They changed their appearance to match the photograph on look-alike passports. But more than imitating an image, I argue that they seek to pass as persons ‘authorised’ to move. The engagement at the airport brings into sharp relief the assemblage of actors operating within airports to classify, verify, and ensure that only authorised passengers travel. Syrian refugees are aware that they are classified as dangerous, ‘insecure’ persons, possible terrorists, and that European states aim to keep them out. This awareness promotes them to perform being ‘secure’ passengers to pass through the airport. Syrian
refugees acted as secure passengers not only by acquiring the right documents, original European passports but also by performing their ideas and understanding of being ‘white’. Their performance is a means of discussing issues of race, gender and class. In preparing to move through the airport, Syrian refugees reveal their understanding of their racialization as Middle Eastern, Muslim and in turn highlight what they think performing being “white” and “European” entails. In discussing crossing a racial boundary, albeit temporarily, refugees speak of race. Ironically, their performance of being secure passengers to pass through the airport aims at achieving their existential security.
Chapter 1

Setting the Scene: Research Sites, Methods, and Ethics

The following chapter begins by exploring the ways transit has been formulated as a category and applied to countries and spaces. Turkey and Istanbul specifically have been designated as transit spaces in the literature on migration. I then give a brief overview of the prior research concerning migrants and refugees in Istanbul, and follow this with a short discussion of the burgeoning literature available on Syrian refugees’ presence. I describe the research sites where I undertook fieldwork, and in each area, I explain the methods used, and the ethical consideration raised. In each of the research sites, different engagements concerning ethics emerged. In the sections on ethics, I will use several excerpts to explore interlocutors’ and others’ engagement with the research and by extension general engagement in research on refugees or ‘illegalized’ movement. In the final section of the chapter, I focus on how refugees approached the detention centre in Istanbul and Edirne, and the refugee camps in southern Turkey.

Transit: Space and State

Where in the introduction, I briefly mentioned transition, here I focus on how transit has been applied to states and spaces. Transit has been used in policy reports and migration studies to describe certain states as ‘transit’ states (Oelgemöller 2011; Düvell 2010). At the same time, people’s relations and actions in them produces certain spaces as transitory. State actors in EU states, the United States or other so-called ‘destinations’ label bordering neighbouring countries or even far away states as ‘transit’ countries since refugees pass through them en route to Europe or the USA (cf. Collyer et al. 2010). By qualifying these states as transit states, state actors in the EU or USA create grounds to intervene in those states. The intervention appears in the form of the EU institutions pressuring those states to sign agreements making it possible to return migrants or
refused asylum seekers to these countries on the basis they are ‘safe third countries’. Other than
the pressure to accept deported migrants and refused asylum seekers, EU pressure focuses on
neighbouring, and not so close states, altering their migratory policies and laws so migrants and
refugees can remain permanently or gain easier access to citizenship (Düvell 2010). For states
bordering the EU or accession countries, the pressure came in the form of changing their laws and
regulations to align with EU acquis (Rigo 2005; Papadopoulos et al. 2008). The issue here is not a
question of whether or not these changes to national policy, practice and law should happen or the
form they take, but more why they happen. By trying to alter migrants’ and refugees’ relations with
state actors in ‘transit’ countries, EU actors seek to change how migrants and refugee approach
these states as spaces of temporariness.25

Turkey’s role as a transit state bordering the EU is the result of particular processes. Oelgemöller (2011) traces the emergence of the concept of ‘transit’ state, examining the intersection of border management and the conceptual tools developed in migration studies. She relates the development of the idea of transit states to the end of the guest worker period in North European countries (cf. Papadopoulos et al. 2008). She examines how the reduced opportunity for persons to migrate to Europe as guest workers was reflected by the increase in the number of people seeking asylum as a way of remaining (Rigo & Karakayali 2010, 129). Some of those who migrated as guest workers may have been fleeing persecution, but they never applied for asylum

25 The autonomy of migration approach was developed to counter discourses within migration studies that analyse migration in terms of ‘push and pull’ factors, trafficking or which take citizenship as the limit. It focuses on migrants’ subversive potential and explores how migrants’ actions counter the controls imposed on them by state and non-state actors (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). Autonomy of migration is one way of moving beyond citizenship in discussions of migration. See Casas-Cortes and her co-authors for an overview (2015:896-897). Sharma (2009) critiques the approach on the basis it does not situate how some people who move do not consider themselves as ‘migrants’. For Sharma, the autonomy of migration approach does not sufficiently situate nuances and differences in people’s experiences of their migration. There are places where the influence of this method is clear, but I do not rely on it as the main directive approach. I examine the variations in interlocutors’ experiences, and how they sought to differentiate themselves from fellow Syrians or other migrants and refugees, or chose not to.
(Oelgemöller 2011). With the increase of cases of asylum seekers, transit states became important in guarding the borders to Europe (Papadopoulos et al. 2008, 165). By assigning Turkey as a transit state, the EU allocated it a role in maintaining the south-eastern borders of Europe. Oelgemöller’s (2011) analysis of the processes of ‘becoming’ a transit space offers a critical lens to approach Turkey’s role guarding the EU’s borders and managing migration into Europe (cf. Danış et al. 2006, 12).

Externalising the EU border is not restricted to neighbouring state but extends beyond neighbouring states adding to the ways borders are discussed as “ubiquitous” and “mobile” (De Genova 2012, 495). Externalising the border raises questions about where the border is located (Andrijasevic 2010, 153). It is a testament to the far-reaching effects of priorities and decisions made in distant centres of power in Europe, USA or elsewhere (Andersson 2014). Writing of the externalisation of the EU border, Casas-Cortes and her co-authors (2015) identify a key problematic that externalising the border continues to move further and further away from the actual EU border (cf. Hess 2010, 453). They give the example of officials in Spain discussing the Spanish and EU measures to reduce migration from Sub-Saharan Africa which necessitated that they collaborate with states along the migrant route rather than stopping at North African states (cf. Andersson 2014; cf. Hess 2010, 453-454; cf. Collyer 2007, 671). Officials in the USA faced the same dilemma pushing the border down to Mexico and then pushing it further to Guatemala’s southern border (Coutin 2005, 199). As one lawyer explained to Coutin (2005, 199), American state actors found that externalising the border to the Mexico-Guatemalan border was insufficient to stop border crossings into the USA, so they extended it further. By assigning these countries as transit states, they are encouraged to protect the space of the EU or USA in return for the possibility of membership (in the case of EU), travel privileges, trade deals, or developmental aid (Papadopoulos 2008, 170; Kiriçi 2012).
Discussions about the externalisation of the border highlight the ways managing migration is changing and expanding. The influence of EU priorities on national migratory policies and laws outside the EU highlights what Papadopoulos and his co-authors (2008, 165) refer to as “stepped zones of sovereignty”. This sovereignty is neither fully national nor adheres to internal EU sovereignty. Taking a different approach, Rigo (2005, 4) explains the “deterritorialisation” of the EU borders as producing “a shared” form of sovereignty. She describes the sovereignty as shared since it involves multiple actors including institutions such as the IOM or UNHCR and not only state actors. Focusing on the southern European border, Andrijasevic (2010, 156) examines the externalisation of the EU border through the case of the island of Lampedusa. She (2010, 156) explains that,

“rather than viewing detention and deportation as mechanisms through which a state’s sovereignty is reaffirmed and its geographical and symbolic borders reasserted, it is more fruitful, in my opinion, to consider them as privileged sites in which we may observe the transformations of sovereignty in Europe arising from the ‘management’ of migratory movements.”

The ways borders are shifting and being reproduced in different places and new ways makes it necessary to alter how sovereignty is analysed.

Using transit state presents methodological dilemmas due to its definitional limitations. The concept ‘transit’ state depends on temporal measurements and therefore contains its means of conceptual undoing. Düvell (2010) engages in a reflexive critique of the rigidity of the concept to reformulate it along lines that do not assess how long refugees remain in a said state but to analyse their relationship with the state based on state laws and regulation governing their presence.26 Hess (2010) and Bredeloup (2010) highlight migrants’ practices to demonstrate the incoherence of the category. Hess (2010, 435-436) critiques the temporal definition of transit by indicating how

---

migrants and refugees make ties in transit that may enter into their considerations of moving or remaining rather than how long they have been present. As Coutin (2005) suggests in the case of Salvadorian migrants living in the USA and hiding their presence for many years, their ‘transit’ continued after they arrived. In most cases, they waited for years to for their presence to be ‘legalised’ (Coutin 2005; Coutin 2000; cf. Lucht 2012) or to feel existential peace where they are (cf. Jackson 2013). In exploring transition without limiting it as a status or to particular nation states, it becomes possible to continue to interrogate how it is lived and experienced as particular and contextual.

Unlike transit state, transit space is a broader concept. It can be used to describe how migrants’ and refugees’ relations with state actors, state regulations or laws, institutions, or other people produce spaces as spaces of temporariness.27 Here I will focus on the ways certain spaces are produced as transitory as part of processes to manage migration, and emphasise the ways transit space is made productive. Various spaces are constructed as transit spaces such as the transit centre described by Agier (2011,47) that acts as a sorting centre concerned with “expulsion or admission, and with contexts of ‘flow management’ that imply for those in movement a more or less prolonged moment of immobility, waiting and multiple constraints” (Agier 2011,47). Agier highlights the multiple simultaneous actions ongoing in the transit centre as part of regulating migration, but does not mention how this space is productive of migrant subjectivities or the ways migrants and refugees might approach these centres. Papadopoulos and his co-authors (2008,193) discuss the role of camps in the Aegean region in Greece. They foreground how these camps are made productive in “regulating migration” rather than trying to stop movement.28 They argue that

---

27 Here I focus on the use of transit space in discussions on migration. See Day (2015) and Reed (2003, 2011) for non-migration related examples.

28 They comment that the camps in Turkey aim to “institutionalise immobility” (2008:193). I will demonstrate otherwise in chapter 2.
migrants are held in the camps, for periods of time, and then released to set up the conditions for their incorporation as ‘illegal’ labour in Greece or elsewhere in Europe. Releasing migrants highlights that the objective of their “temporary immobilisation” is not to stop their migration but to make it productive (Papadopoulos et al. 2008, 196-197; Andrijasevic 2010, 149). Papadopoulos and his co-authors (2008, 198) approach the camps as state actors’ ways of reigning in migrant energy and mobility, and reincorporating it within specific political neo-liberal regimes. Other than their discussion of the ways transit camps are made productive, Papadopoulos and his co-authors (2008,198-199) offer subtle analytical tools to understand the ways regulating migration entails imposing temporal regimes on migrants and refugees. Taking their concept a step further, Andrijasevic (2010,149) uses the idea of “decelerated migration” to discuss the detention centre on the Italian island of Lampedusa. Andrijasevic explains that while state actors deported many migrants from the camp in Lampedusa to Libya, they transferred many more migrants to detention centres in mainland Italy. They were later released, or escaped, and entered the informal economy as migrant labour. Andrijasevic (2010) suggests that approaching detention centres as “political-disciplinary devices of exclusion” requires modification to account for the ways the camps serve the purpose of modulating mobility into the EU rather than excluding migrants (2010,158). Her suggestion makes it necessary to interrogate the ways exclusions and internal borders are redrawn once migrants and refugees are within the EU.

Drawing on Andrijasevic’s study of decelerated mobility, Mezzadra and Neilson (2013,149) focus on detention centres or camps in relation to labour markets. Returning to the productive function of detention, Mezzadra and Neilson (2013,149-150) discuss the ways detention centres slow down migrant mobility and alter the tempo of their migrations. They argue that the varying incorporation adheres to “labour market dynamics.” They compare the delay and prolonging of migrant and refugee journeys to the ways IT workers are “benched” (2013, 150). Processes to slow
down migrant mobility resemble processes in other domains though the IT workers do not experience the same conditions. They highlight how state and non-state actors impose temporal regimes on a variety of subjects including migrants and refugees (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013, 155). Imposing temporal regimes or waits, as will be explored in the thesis, give rise to conflict and tension.

The above case studies highlight particular functions of detention centres, but other investigations foreground other functions as well. Discussing a different borderland, the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, Andersson (2014) examines how the Spanish migratory regime reformulated the detention centre into a space of extended immobility, capture, rather than the temporary immobility migrants expected (2014, 224, 237). He explains how “a politics of containment” was developed contrary to prior practice of detaining migrants temporarily and issuing them identity cards they could use to cross to mainland Spain. The detention centre, or the enclave itself, was transformed from a “springboard” into a “trap.” Similarly, Griffiths (2012) examines a removal centre in the UK where migrants are detained as the UK border agency arranges their deportation processes. She explains how migrants contrasted the removal centre with prison. In prison they argued they know their sentence but in the detention centre they faced ambiguity about the length of their detention. Migrants in Ceuta made similar complaints about the length of time they had been present and that they did not know when or if they would be allowed to go to the mainland. Their time in the enclave was not productive time, but also it did not hint at an approaching change in their situation (2014, 216). While examining different places, these cases show the ways detention centres have varying functions, and that the function can change over time in relation to other considerations. Significantly, their investigations demonstrate how state actors seek to affect refugee time. Andersson commented that migrants were held in the detention centre in Ceuta to slow down migrants’ movement on the basis delaying their migration to mainland Spain deprived smugglers
of their profits. In contrast to this intentional action on migrants and refugees’ time, Griffiths (2012) explained how UK border agency personnel wanted to quickly process and deport detainees but bureaucratic processes slowed this down or made it impossible. In both cases, migrants and refugees are affected by ambiguity about the length of time they will be detained. This ambiguity and waiting affects migrants’ and refugees’ subjectivities. Time and not just labour emerge as sites of conflict (cf. Thompson 1967).

These various cases studies demonstrate that state actors seek to appropriate refugee and migrant time in detentions. Appropriating their time makes the spaces of detention productive in the overall migratory regime. The detentions and delay stall or slow down migrants and refugees’ mobility for subsequent processes of deportation or release to then begin. More importantly, these various authors shift emphasis from approaching the space as merely serving the purpose of detaining, to analyse and situate detention in relation to labour markets and broader migratory regimes. These are some of the themes and issues that I will discuss in subsequent chapters.

**Istanbul: A Migrant and Refugee Space**

Various pieces of ethnographic research on migrant and refugee presence in Istanbul explore diverse themes including gender relations, labour relations, transnational networks among other topics. These studies served as an introduction to the multiple dynamics and migratory trajectories that take place in Turkey but especially in Istanbul. In the following, I focus on a piece research undertaken with different migrants and refugees in Istanbul which engaged with similar themes to

---

those discussed in the thesis. Danış and her co-authors’ (2006) engaged in a detailed and extensive research project with Iraqi, Afghan, Iranian and North African migrants and refugees living in Istanbul in the early 2000s. They sought to counter a gap in the literature by providing qualitative research focused on the ways these different groups integrated into Istanbul and their experiences in Turkey. The research examined the historical incorporation of these groups, and their changing relations with state actors. They situated the ways state policy regarding these groups changed over time with the arrival of more migrants and refugees from these countries. The research highlights the strategies and connections these migrants and refugees developed to counter the uncertainty they face in Turkey, regardless of whether their presence is forecasted to be short or long term. They discuss some of the state regulations which led to the exclusion of these migrants and refugees from seeking citizenship, accessing “work permits,” or stable residence (2005, 15). While they do connect the production of ‘illegality’ to the alignment of state and capital; however, I would argue that one of the shortcomings of their research is that they do not articulate that state actors enforce regulations or laws that create this very exclusion to produce a disposable workforce (cf. De Genova 2002). Similarly, they explain these different migrant and refugee groups as incorporated informally, “integrated in limbo,” but do not connect this experience in ‘transit’ with larger processes of discipline or efforts to influence migrant and refugee subjectivity. Through this integration, these migrants and refugees learn to expect the future waits they will experience once they arrive at their destinations. They expect to wait whether for bureaucratic processes once they reach Europe or the USA by crossing the border or through resettlement processes. They similarly anticipate the longer wait to become authorized residents and citizens. In addition, while discussing migrants’ and refugees’ relations with NGOs and other non-governmental bodies, they do not articulate how these actors contribute to producing migrants and refugees as waiting subjects. In the thesis, I engage with the ways state and non-state actors or institutions, enforce waits.
Much of the research on Syrian refugee presence in Turkey has concentrated on the ways Syrian refugees have been integrated regarding their access to state services and resources, or their incorporation as labour.\footnote{Multi-sited research has been undertaken to explore Syrian refugees’ access to state services, and their relations with Turkish nationals in different cities (Chemin 2016; Gümüş & Eroğlu 2015). Chemin (2016) relates Turkish citizens’ perceptions of Syrian refugees to the government policies that position this refugee presence as temporary. Other research examines Syrian refugee distribution, Turkish nationals’ perception of Syrians, and their incorporation as labour (Erdoğan 2014). Yildiz and Uzgören (2016) discuss Syrian refugees’ experiences in Izmir to call for the implementation of a rights-based approach. The Brookings Institute also published several multi-sited reports investigating the state response and practices towards Syrian refugees, and their incorporation to offer policy recommendations (Dinçer et al. November 2013; Kirści 2014). In addition, several ethnographic research projects are ongoing in Istanbul and elsewhere in Turkey.} Alternatively, research is oriented towards policy makers and presenting data on Syrian refugees’ relations to state institutions or Turkish citizens. An exception is Kılıçaslan’s (2016) discussion on relations between Kurds from Syria and Turkey in a district in Istanbul. She explores these two groups’ relations and the limits to these relations which emerge. Scholarly focus on assessing state actor involvement stems in part from the government’s purported position as a host providing for Syrian refugees in Turkey. In contrast to many previous migrant and refugee presences, Syrian refugees’ presence and integration is not only officially supported but is extremely visible raising different questions and engagements to prior migratory presences. I discuss some aspects of Syrian refugees’ access and engagement with state actors, to highlight the type of relationships formed, and the ways different actors are situated. My primary focus is not why certain services are accessed or why the highest number of Syrian children registered in schools are at elementary school age; although these are interesting questions (cf. Gümüş & Eroğlu 2015). The data offer answers to some of these questions, but the thesis overwhelmingly aims to problematize the relations Syrian refugees form whether with state actors or others, and examine the processes they undergo in a bid to access resources or cross the border. Similarly, I only briefly discuss why Syrian refugees chose to move on from Turkey, but examine in detail the migratory processes they engage in. My aim in doing so, is to counter debates about how or whether Syrian
refugees should remain in Turkey on the basis it is a safe country. I seek to highlight how they actualise their desire to go to Europe.

The Research

At the start of the research, I tried different avenues to access research participants. For the most part, some key central people— not necessarily included in the research— were kind enough to introduce me to other people who were willing to participate. A massive city with Syrian refugees dispersed throughout made it difficult to gain access to people except through their connections, and a limited number of connections were willing to engage. I undertook 15 months of fieldwork from July 2012 until December 2013. I conducted participant observation and structured and semi-structured interviews with 25 Syrian refugees based in the city who wanted to move on to Europe. While I engaged with other Syrian refugees, I focused on these participants in the thesis because they all wanted to move on to Europe. While the sample size is small, some of the participants allowed me to undertake extensive participant observation with them over the few or many weeks they were in Istanbul. For the first six months, I engaged mainly with single refugees in Aksaray. In the second part of the fieldwork, I focused on families living in the Jazira area. I was reluctant to engage with state actors since the research focused on refugees’ attempts to cross the border. I was apprehensive that interlocutors might view me as a police informant. After the fieldwork, I continued to follow changes in regulations and practice by talking to some of the original research participants via Skype and WhatsApp. I met some of my interlocutors during return visits to Istanbul in 2014-2015, but most of the original participants had moved on when I returned to Istanbul to live there in 2015.

See Appendix II for further details.
In many senses, mine was not a traditional fieldwork experience because while I am not still searching for research participants or engaged in fieldwork activities, I have been living in Istanbul for varying periods of time since the end of the fieldwork. Where the temporal boundaries of research projects inflict a particular violence in the form of a researcher suspending their life to undertake the fieldwork and then returning to write up the research or thesis, the boundary was confused in this case as I continued to be present there (cf. De Genova 2005). As I sought to build my life there, beyond the fieldwork, most of the interlocutors mentioned in this thesis who had moved on were building their lives elsewhere in Europe.

I use the past tense when presenting ethnographic material to highlight the temporal specificity of the data, but in some parts of the thesis, especially Chapter 2, I cover a period that extends beyond the temporal boundaries of the fieldwork. I felt it pertinent to do so as it was important to note changes in relations with the Syrian, European, and especially the Turkish state. Incorporating the changes is a means of bearing witness to the nuances and major shifts in the relationship, and the ways these shifts affect Syrian refugees’, and particular interlocutors’, lives. Continuing to follow the changes in Syrian refugees’ relations with the Turkish state and on the ground in Istanbul influenced me and offered alternative ideas for understanding the data. It also placed the Turkish state’s somewhat haphazard steps regarding migration into a larger perspective, altering my initial analysis.

As I followed relations more than focusing on places, research participants’ relations and where they spent the most of their time influenced where I undertook the fieldwork. Here I describe the two areas, Aksaray and Jazira where I undertook fieldwork. I then discuss how each gave rise to a different mode of engagement for me as a researcher and raised different ethical problematics.
In my first visit to Istanbul in February 2012, walking around Aksaray, I was alight as I surveyed the area and wondered what was happening behind the building facades, what deals were being brokered in the cafes off in alleyways. As I walked towards the metro station trying to pretend there was a direction to my walking, I passed a man on the phone who interrupted his telephone conversation to say loudly, “Bekar misin? Bekar misin?” I walked on without looking to see to whom he was directing the question. It took many more walks, alone and with interlocutors, at different times of day and via different routes, to get a glimpse of the diverse activities and engagements taking place within the area. Prior literature highlighted the significance of the area as a place of residence, work, area of operation for smugglers (Danış et al. 2006). As I learned later on, while having a reputation for smuggling, smugglers and middlemen operate all over the city.

Aksaray is a site with multiple and intersecting rhythms and relations. It is perhaps a place most emblematic of Pérouse and Aslan’s (2003) description of Istanbul as it encapsulated all these different qualities of the city. The working day, the multiple modes of transport passing through the area, the various types of activities engaged in in the area made it a difficult place to write about. The area always appeared like it was a swirl of bodies, carts, and products constantly moving into the area and through it. While the rhythm was slowed down for some at certain moments, for other people at the same time the bustle was at its height (Lefebvre 2004). The diversity of these experiences created the space as one that is hard to talk about in terms of only one set of relations.  

32 See Appendix map (5).
33 “Are you single?” His question highlighted the ways the space was one where direct flirting was possible, or that he assumed that the person he addressed, me or whomever else it was, was a sex worker.
34 Other districts or towns described in other cases studies resemble Aksaray (Follis 2012; Khosravi 2010; De Leon 2012).
Beyond its position as a transit node within the transport system, the area is the site for various economic activities. Tourists and traders, from Russia and Central Asia (Yükşeker 2004; Pérouse & Aslan 2003), North Africa (Peraldi 2005), or Iraq (Danış et al. 2006) come into the area to buy from the wholesale shops in Laleli and Kumkapı. They then have their purchases packed into plastic burlap sacks, sealed with masking tape and carted up and down hilly streets to the export office they hired to ship it. Export-Import offices display signs in other Arabic, Russian or Georgian scripts indicating where they ship to and inadvertently their clientele’s nationality. People bustle through the area all day, but towards dusk, as people begin their commute from work, the traffic of bodies increases. Sex workers who are present in parts of Aksaray throughout the day become much more visible towards dusk. Female sex workers and pimps begin to stand in particular corners and along Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa street to pick up customers. Similarly, in another part of Aksaray, at the square of the Unknown Soldier, sex workers would slowly pace back and forth or stand along the street leading to the metro station waiting for customers.

Some of the shops participated in the migration economy, selling backpacks suitable for hiking, shoes and in the summer of 2016, I noticed one shop selling the orange life jackets used by refugees crossing by sea. Much as the Mexican border town De Leon (2012, 483) described from his field, businesses in Aksaray through the products on offer point to the migration and smuggling. As well as the permanent shops are the street seller stands that appear at certain times of the day in different parts of Aksaray. Once towards dusk, I was walking with Adam, a Syrian refugee from Deraa, as he wanted to buy a mobile phone from one of the street sellers close to Yusefpaşa. Street vendors appear on different streets and close to the transport stations. They spread out mobile phones, scarves, contraband cigarettes, or medication on plastic sheets or small portable tables. As we bartered with the mobile phone seller that afternoon two men passed saying, “Hello brother,” and although they continued walking the vendor’s eyes light with fear. He then explained they are
policemen, but apparently they were not concerned with him or his wares that afternoon. On other days, when policemen or a police car appears sellers would gather everything quickly and disappear in a building doorway or alleyway only to reappear when the danger passed. The police station on Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa served as a reminder that the state was present, but did not act as a hindrance to the various activities engaged in in the area.

Some Syrian entrepreneurs seeing the area’s potential as a transport node established a Syrian restaurant in Istanbul in Yusefpaşa at the end of 2012. It expanded and other Syrian restaurants, sweet shops and mini markets opened in alleyways off the main road. The area unlike other parts of Istanbul hosts restaurants with diverse cuisines which are a testament to the diversity of migrant and refugee presence in Istanbul. Uyghur, Syrian, and Iranian restaurants can be found in the area, while Turkey celebrates its regional cuisines, international cuisines or other country’s cuisines are less popular. In early 2013, one of the Syrian restaurants expanded to open a bakery to produce the flat loaf Syrian bread. Syrian refugees all said that the bread resembles the one made in Lebanon which they call touristic bread in Syria, while the one made in Syria is larger. The bread, however, filled a gap as most Syrian refugees complained about the Turkish bread. Slowly other bakeries opened and the bread began to appear across the city in neighbourhoods where Syrian refugees are living. Restaurants or food products were just one line of business that appeared in Aksaray, but other Syrian entrepreneurs opened touristic offices, offices dealing with residence permits and other processes, or informal money transfer offices. Kumkapı, close by, became host to some Syrian businesses which entered the wholesale business in the area competing with Turkish shops. I walked through different parts of the neighbourhood alone and with interlocutors observing what

35 They were in civilian clothing.
they noticed. I noted how the area catered to different migrants and refugees, and the changes that slowly took place as Syrian refugees’ presence in Istanbul grew.

Migrants and refugees also render Aksaray a place of rest. Migrants and refugees favour the area as many of the apartments in the area are rented on a daily or weekly basis facilitating a short stay. For many migrants and refugees living in the area, or in the vicinity, for long durations, the neighbourhood was appealing as migrants and refugees blended in easily and landlords were more willing to rent to foreigners (Biehl 2015). Other than apartments, the streets and public spaces offered spaces of rest. Men sleep on the grass patches close to the tram line, and others relax on the grass or the benches around the square of the Unknown Soldiers. Some sit on large pieces of cardboard they put on the grass to ward off the damp or cover themselves with blankets. Others still sit on the ledge at the base of the clock tower at the top of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa street passing the time. While some rest during the day in these places others seek them out at night to sleep. Other than public areas to relax, Aksaray is host to various cafes and restaurants providing those with the money for it with places to sit. Some of the cafes are traditional, with low tables and wooden and straw stools, serving tea mostly. The waiters move among the stools with a tray of tea cups calling out, ‘Çay? Çay?’ and grabbing empty cups from tables. There are new cafes, and some are part of chain stores. The chain cafes have plastic table and tables, WİFİ, their employees all wear uniforms, they offer sandwiches and snacks, but a glass of tea costs one Turkish Lira, the same as everywhere else.

In Aksaray, I met interlocutors mainly in different cafes in the area. As most of the interlocutors I met were single men who wanted to move out of Istanbul as quickly as possible, it was neither appropriate nor possible to visit them where they were staying. The cafes, some outdoor others indoor, offered varying degrees of privacy. The ways interlocutors engaged with the cafes raised many issues about gender, visibility, and their different engagements with Turkish state
actors. Sitting in the different cafes with interlocutors raised questions about my position as a woman usually sitting with men as interlocutors indicated it is assumed that many of the women frequenting cafes in the area are sexually available or are sex workers. It was quickly established that I am not a sex worker, but as a researcher, I raised questions and suspicions that I might be a police or intelligence informant. A relative of Adam’s who worked as a professional translator confirmed that I am a student after seeing my student card. Also my presence over several months helped to dispel the idea I was a police informant. I was still coming and no harm had befallen anyone who engaged with me. They also raised questions about whether I am Christian or Muslim since I am not veiled and then questions about if I am Sunni or Shiite. Some people refused to talk to me due to my sect, and others because the research was about their migration. Adam, one interlocutor, vouched for me on the basis, as he said, that someone needs to write about the migration and the smugglers. The second time I met with Adam, I happened to call upon two Syrian friends, one whom is from Deraa, to meet him as well. Adam saw me as a connection to other Syrian refugees in Istanbul, and this influenced his willingness to help me with the research (cf. Simone 2004). As will be explained in later chapters, he was looking for travel companions with whom to cross the border to Bulgaria. He facilitated gender issues by allowing me to sit with him in the café, acting as a male protector of sorts so that no one would approach me as sexually available.

In Jeffrey’s (2010, 29) comments about researching the waiting practices of young men in Uttar Pradesh, that he was continuously faced with a sense of his lack of productivity. “I often

---

36 I faced questions about Shiite support for the al-Assad regime, or other questions about difference in practice which I was not always able to answer. By reiterating questions about migration rather than politics, I was able to navigate the issues that arose. Lebanon and Lebanese people were also criticised for the ways they were dealing with the Syrian refugees coming to Lebanon and the exploitation and violence Syrians have faced, from prior to 2011 (Chalcraft 2009), and are facing in Lebanon.

37 Adam became good friends with my friend from Deraa.
experienced fieldwork not as the steady accretion of perspectives and information but as long periods of relative inertia interrupted by moments of tremendous excitement,” I resort to his words as I have always gesticulated to express what he manages to convey. There were many days where all I did was sit in the café, listen and participate in the conversation, and then return home to write what had transpired. At times, a single interlocutor might discuss all the issues I wanted to explore and give me something to think about. Then for weeks almost I would go for daily long walks and review old notes as I waited for the opportunity to interview or engage with someone new for the research. Jeffrey (2010, 29) describes his research as feeling “like a species of waiting,” and perhaps that is the fate of all who study waiting.

In engaging with Syrian refugees in Aksaray, I focused on eliciting their stories about their dealings with *semsars* and middleman to understand how they build up trust in these relations and how refugees counter the uncertainty within these exchange relations. Many Syrian refugees were forced to learn about routes and *semsars* to achieve their aim. Interlocutors told stories of others’ journeys or recounted stories of their own attempts. In the process, they demonstrated their understanding and knowledge about EU migratory policies, fingerprinting, asylum policies and how they perceive of Europe as a space. The ‘Europe’ Syrian refugees spoke of differed from the political and administrative divisions assigned by the EU (Osseiran 2017b). In a similar manner to Jeffrey (2010), I approached the research participants as forming an “interpretative community” pointing me in certain directions. I did not approach my role as an ethnographer as one of finding, but more of learning through refugees or as they learned.

While first-hand accounts of crossing the border offer insight into border crossing processes, De Leon (2015, 12-13) points out how these do not stand in for participant observation. Holmes (2013), for instance, crossed the Mexican-USA border with some of his research participants. The border crossing was part of an extended fieldwork that began in Mexico and continued in the United
States. The border guards caught the group he was with and the border guards held him in a migrant detention centre before releasing him with a fine. Holmes’ (2013) crossing with them made the smugglers the group had hired nervous, and some of the migrants in the group later blamed him for their attempt’s failure. While experiencing detention and being fined, his predicament remained decidedly different to his Mexican interlocutors who were deported back to Mexico (Holmes 2013; De Leon 2015, 12-13). In a similar justification to De Leon’s (2015, 12-13), I did not think undertaking a border crossing with any of the research participants would be a good idea. I found it problematic to consider it an option knowing that I could cross legally. Also while refugees taught me the strategies they were using to get out of detention when they were caught at the border, I did not want to risk those strategies failing and facing deportation which would jeopardise the research.

In discussing their own or others’ attempts to cross the border, Syrian refugees highlighted their connections or engagement with others crossing with them. The attempts also highlighted various information about refugees’ interactions with state actors at the border, and through their experiences, it was possible to understand how the state situated Syrian refugees caught at the border with Europe in contrast to the Syrian refugees in Istanbul. For the refugees in Aksaray, the Turkish state was varyingly present while they were in Istanbul as they found ways of disengaging or avoiding state actors. As the interlocutors I met were focused on moving elsewhere, I followed their directedness, and their understanding of Europe or routes formed my understanding of these issues. In many ways, I stayed in place, present in Istanbul, as interlocutors attempted, returned and tried once more and succeeded. I became the person waiting for the phone call that an interlocutor had moved, had crossed the border or had been caught.
The Ethical in Aksaray

In engaging with Syrian refugees in Aksaray, they raised certain ethical problematics whether specific to the research or more broadly concerning research on migration or migratory regimes. One interlocutor, Amr, from Deraa who was working as a middleman, told me off when he first learned about the research. “Look before you sit here and write about us, include this in your research, write about what they do … See what the UN and these countries do to refugees before you write about us,” he said. The ‘us’ here was a reference to those engaged in the smuggling business. He continued, “They (UN) always have a photo of a woman with a child on her shoulder” … gesticulating a child leaning on his shoulder, “but see how they treat us in the West. They don’t want us in the West. They are different to us. We are good hearted they are not.”

Amr’s gesturing and argument bore a striking resemblance to Lisa Malkki’s (1995, 10) listing of images of refugees used by UNHCR and refugee aid organisations which predominantly included women and children. He voiced a criticism of institutions and my research in that they engage in the representation of ‘refugees’, for him such a representation would strip them of their agency. Amr berated me on the basis I should focus the research at the institutions and organisations that are causing the situations Syrian refugees were experiencing. For him, these institutions should be the object of research to bring to light their corruption examining sensars’ activities (cf. Sanchez 2015). Inadvertently he admitted that they are engaged in a questionable activity, possibly or actually immoral, but their activities were nothing in comparison to actions of western states or institutions. Amr’s claims of something genuine and better in ‘us’ as the Orient emerged to face down or counter claims of the ‘West’ being a site of something better. Amr’s criticism, however, was not just of the genuine residing here in the east or more precisely eastern people, but that the West does not want Muslims. Although he did not say the word Muslim, a reference he made in
other instances, he did not have to say it as it would be stating the obvious to the audience before him. His comment pertains to an asymmetrical relationship, and is a response to a power dynamic with the west. But as a response it falls short as the remark would not change the opinion of any of the people seated with us who all wanted to go to Europe.

On another occasion, I was out with a friend, and she introduced me to two young men from her hometown in Syria who were visiting Istanbul. When I explained my project to them, one of them said, “You know the UN and these organisations why do they treat us like terrorists? Huh?” “I don’t work for UN! I don’t!” I answered. “I know! I know! But you’re coming from there. Like I want to talk to you like you are… just let me talk, they are not treating us like refugees, and so we have to get there before they give us status…”

The man’s criticisms were first an attempt to be heard, to take a stand even if the listener in question- by his own admission- was not related to the institution he was criticising. He was criticising the double standards he perceived as Syrians have to arrive in Europe to be recognised as refugees although the violence and conflict in Syria are well documented. His comment resonates with remarks made by Garelli and Tazzioli (2013, 1017) concerning Libyan refugees demanding that European governments “meet their responsibility for the lives they govern.” The demand for protection or care is part of holding these global powers accountable for the “very vulnerability they contributed to creating” (Garelli &Tazzioli 2013, 1017). Here he made similar demands that Syrians deserve protection due to the violence in Syria. The border he conjures is not just the territorial border, but also one of perception, as it is their being designated as terrorists, insecure and dangerous, which makes it possible to deny them refugee status. As ‘insecure’ subjects, potential terrorists, Syrians can be kept out and acted upon (De Genova 2009).
The man not only situated me as located elsewhere given where I study or what I am researching, but continued by aligning me with those institutions responsible for refugee protection and resettlement. He outlined a field of action where the institution, me as a researcher, the refugee and the terrorist were all located simultaneously. The field he outlined continues to loom as demonstrated in the US government trying to ban people born in certain predominantly Muslim countries from entering the USA, or right-wing discourses in Germany raising concern about the refugees who arrived in the summer of 2015. Also, the man was criticising me for having access to go to Europe and for undertaking research about Syrian refugees’ migration practices while he, a subject who is under threat and has faced persecution, was unable to go. He highlighted an unavoidable power dynamic related to my position as someone able to move easily.

Several weeks after being introduced to Amr, I met someone who was using Amr’s services. He asked me states who want to stop the ‘illegal’ migration will use the thesis. In a bid to dispel his anxiety, I responded that other researchers had written about the issue before before, and some are first-hand accounts of how people moved. Amr interrupted teasing the client, a doctor, “She will write about you with the initials D.A.S.” Amr had a particular relationship with this doctor as the man came from an elite family in Deraa and was well educated. Although Amr came from a middle-class background in Deraa, he was not well-educated and was aware that the doctor would not engage with him if it were not that he provided access to certain smugglers with routes to Europe. Amr used me or the idea of the research to put down the doctor by showing him that he too, in spite of his socio-economic status and class status in Deraa, can become a research subject no different to any other passenger. Amr wanted the doctor to understand that he was a passenger, a refugee and a possible research subject the same as others crossing to Europe. He teased the

38 I always explained that I do not include the specifics of journeys as a way of protecting the ‘route’.
doctor to indicate that even if I anonymised his name by using an alias, it would not change his position in his relations with smugglers or *smears* nor as a refugee once he arrived in Europe.

In a different approach Hamid, an interlocutor from Idlib, asked me the first time we met in Aksaray if I was going to write embarrassing or humiliating things about “them,” referring to Syrian refugees. Hamid highlighted that as a researcher or perhaps just as an author I am capable of speaking about Syrian refugees at their potentially most vulnerable (Behar 1996, 21-22). To speak of humiliation is to voice an imaged worst case scenario and one where I am talking for them, and their voices are silenced. At that time with Hamid, I responded, “I don’t use people’s names,” to which he answered, “We are not afraid anymore.” While he was concerned with protecting his and his people’s collective dignity as he saw it, I got flustered and answered something different to his point, raising another response one of pride and strength; one that embraces the watershed that was/is the revolution. Other Syrian refugees, in other contexts, said the same thing about not being afraid anymore, as if the revolution had broken some of the barriers about authorship or political activism. In subsequent meetings with Hamid, he criticised me more than once, albeit politely, about the research or my position as a researcher and as someone mobile (Chapter 3). As he engaged with me over time, his comments shifted me from the position of someone writing about Syrians to that of someone acting as a witness of sorts. He continued to criticise me as he insisted that even though I am a compassionate witness, I could never truly feel his and other Syrians’ suffering (cf. Jackson 2013, 200). However, I would argue that witnessing can provide important accounts where many different accounts may exist (Khosravi 2010, 6; Das 2007; Behar 1996). I bore witness to part of his narrative and the suffering he endured to reach existential security.
Jazira\textsuperscript{39}

I use Jazira here as a fictional name for the area. I used to take a bus from Yenikapı along the coastal road to reach Jazira, the bus’s last stop, about an hour away. The area is built on several hills leading down to a lake and a vast and expansive coastline cum park area. The bus stop was close to the coast, and from there I would make my way through the main market, down different streets or up certain hills to reach different interlocutors’ houses. Once a countryside suburb of Istanbul, the expanding city reached Jazira and expanded many kilometres beyond it. Remnants of it being a village continue to exist in the stretches of green fields right before arriving at the neighbourhood, some buildings in the area having gardens, and the existence of individual houses. Gecekondus\textsuperscript{40} and older houses were being pulled down for new apartment buildings to spring up, too quickly one interlocutor commented with suspicion of Turkish construction techniques.

On the surface, the area appears residential, but signs posted on street lights such as “\textit{çalı\c{s}ıyan bayan, orta\c{c}i arayorum}”\textsuperscript{41} highlighted that the area is full of different kinds of textile workshops. Walking along alleyways in the spring and summer, I noticed for the first time the entrances to workshops in building basements or the first floor of buildings. “Winter work,” one interlocutor described it, the workshops were too hot in the spring and summer, so the doors or windows would be opened to let in a breeze.

At the time I started fieldwork, families came to the area as their Kurdish relatives from the Turkish side of the border were living there and the rents were cheaper than staying in Aksaray or other areas. As in other parts of the city, Syrian refugees usually settled in areas where they could draw on their social capital to access jobs and housing. Most of the interlocutors from Hasakah

\textsuperscript{39}Jazira is the name of a region in Syria which includes al-Hasakah province, Deir Ez Zor province and part of al-Raqqah province. Some Kurdish interlocutors used the term to refer to their region in Syria.

\textsuperscript{40}Unauthorised houses built in Istanbul by internal migrants arriving to the city in the 1980s and 1990s.

\textsuperscript{41}“Looking for female worker for ortaci”. Ortacıs move pieces between sewing machines in the workshop.
province settled in the area as their relatives, Syrian or Turkish, were living there. Abu Rezan, a
Kurdish interlocutor from Qamishli, explained that many people left Qamishli province in 2006
(De Chatel 2014) when a drought hit the cotton-growing industry in the area. They moved to
Damascus or other parts of the Syria. As fighting started in the areas they lived in, some headed
north to Qamishli. Abu Rezan said that these families might have sold their house in Qamishli or
they faced the fact there are fewer job opportunities in the province so came north to Turkey rather
than remain in Qamishli. Families who came to the area in the spring and summer of 2013,
complained about the economic difficulties they had faced in the province due to the rise in the
price of products and the lack of jobs.

By the summer of 2013, Jazira was hosting Syrian families from different parts of Syria, Kurdish and Arab. Walking through one of the weekly markets or sitting on the coast during the
evening in the summer, I heard the changes as I heard Arabic being spoken more often in the street
and noticed the different headscarves women were wearing. One Kurdish interlocutor walking
through the weekly Monday market returned from her shop recounted with humour, “One man
overheard us speaking Arabic and told us, they are selling it (tomatoes) for 1,50 (Turkish Lira) up
there. I told her (her sister in law), ‘It would seem he is Halabi (from the accent). He answered ‘no
Shami!’” In the summer of 2013, more changes took place as the Syrian bread sold in Yusefpaşa
became available in the area. By 2014, one of the stores in the area was selling bread and other
Syrian products or products known to be consumed by Syrians. During the same visit, I noticed
that a local clinic had placed two signs in the front window reading, “We speak Arabic” and “We
speak Kurdish,” as testaments to Syrian refugees’ presences in the area. Here too like Yusefpaşa,
Syrian restaurants and take away places opened. One called ‘Afrin’ on the main road in the market

\[\text{In Arabic referred to as Qamishli and in Kurdish it is pronounced Qamishlo.}\]
\[\text{Women adopt different veiling practices but some are regionally specific.}\]
area and another further up the hill among houses called ‘Qamishlo’ catered to the Syrian refugee presence in the area.

The workshops in the area hired Syrian refugees to work on machines or work as intermediaries, ortaci, shifting pieces between machines for the next piece of fabric to be sewed on. Other workshops treated fabrics or packed clothes as part of a larger assembly line. Different Syrian refugees explained how they were asked to do different tasks depending on the assignment. Some assignments came without a label or a decorative addition that and the label would be sewn on elsewhere; the workshops are one link in a global chain. Some Syrian refugee women took on jobs outsourced by the workshops such as sewing beads or ribbons or other details onto clothes or cutting the excess fabric from clothes. These jobs were time-consuming and paid a small amount, but the women argued it bolstered the family income. In many cases, Syrian refugees complained about their wages given Turkish citizens sometimes earned much more for potentially less work.

In coming to the area, Syria’s Kurds highlighted the relations which the borders of the modern nation states of Turkey and Syria affected as much as it highlighted Kurdish migration from the south and east Turkish provinces to Istanbul and other major cities (Kılıçaslan 2016). The neighbourhood became an area where Syria’s and Turkey’s Kurds engaged and in some ways became reacquainted giving rise to criticisms and the formation of new ties (Kılıçaslan 2016). The engagement between Kurds from Syria and Turkey in the area raises questions about how Kurdish-ness is changing or influenced.

Most of my meetings for this part of the fieldwork were in people’s houses. Conversations and interviews were held in living rooms over coffee or while children played around us. Interlocutors, mainly married women, did not frequent cafes in the area. Most of the female interlocutors restricted their visits outside of their houses to family or friends’ houses, running errands, or attending appointments. Their husbands, if they did not work, frequented some of the all-male cafes
that can be found all over Istanbul; however, they too tended more often to visit friends in their houses. In the summer as the houses would become too hot to sit in the afternoon, families would head to the lakeside, spreading a blanket and sitting. Extended family and friends would come and go. Their teenage children would go off for walks out of their parents’ sight, and younger children would usually be running around playing. Families would bring watermelon or sunflower seeds to snack on as they sat. The park became a moving crowd of adults and children seeking a breeze.

Although all the Syrians I met were hospitable and generous, Kurdish interlocutors explained it as a cornerstone of their customs. As Abu Rezan said, “Kurds would sell a child to make their guest feel welcome.” Most of the families would insist I stay for evening meals if only to see their children who were working all day. The meals highlighted household rhythms that persisted even as one family member might be planning to move on to Europe. Amira, Oum Rezan, began looking at the clock around 5:30 or 6 before saying she had better start the evening meal. Her two younger daughters finished work at 7:30, but they waited for their older sister who finished work at 8 pm. A cloth was spread out in the living room, and the food was placed on a large tray or several plates. Spoons and bread were handed out, and we ate together. Meat is considered a cornerstone of the diet in Qamishli, but due to its expense in Turkey chicken was added to dishes instead to give food a richer flavour.

Leaving the area in the evening or visiting with interlocutors and their friends or extended family in the evening, the residential streets would usually be empty except for a few pedestrians. Young men might be found standing on the high street corners or in the market. A police car, armoured vehicle, would stay posted in the area. The armour highlighted the tense relationship between some residents in the area and the police, a representative of the Turkish state. Syrian interlocutors developed different relations with state actors depending on their activities in the area. Some spoke about the police arresting Kurds from Turkey living in the area due to their political
activities. While the area held undercurrents of anger or tension, these were far less visible here than in other neighbourhoods in the city where relations between Turkey’s Kurds and Turkish state actors seemed on the verge of eruption.

News of Syria entered families’ lives in certain ways. In Jazira, families kept in contact with kin located in different parts of Syria, so they knew about incidents or changes happening in their province or other areas where their kin were living. They did not follow the news on a daily basis necessarily. Many relied on social media to gain access to news about events on the ground or from family members still in Syria. The Kurdish areas, unlike other parts of Syria, did not face attacks from the Syrian regime forces but from Daesh or in some cases FSA factions. In some instances of confrontation, especially with Daesh, news of the war and victims would circulate and be discussed. In the summer of 2013, the border with Qamishli was especially lax, and many interlocutors crossed into Syria to visit family and then returned to Istanbul. Their visits and return presented an opportunity to talk about the ways their region has changed and the situation in the area.

Many interlocutors in Jazira were concerned with moving on to Europe, but they were equally concerned with their situation in Turkey and navigating official and non-official channels to help them sort out their lives. Some had tried to cross, and they spoke about their attempt, or otherwise spoke about their relatives’, friends’, and neighbours’ experiences. Many of the interlocutors had extended family in Europe already, and their relatives informed them of changes in EU policies regarding asylum or other issues. Discussing European policies on asylum, fingerprinting, and deportation were all significant not only to understand how they imagined Europe but also as part of defining the field they were acting within. They followed changes in European policy as much as changes in Turkey. In Jazira, much like Aksaray, *semsars* and middlemen operated in the area; although it was much later into the fieldwork before interlocutors were willing to speak about the
issue. Unlike in Aksaray, the relations with *semsars* and smugglers in the area were affected by kinship ties, and there was a greater possibility of holding the *semsar* or smuggler accountable.

With the families in Jazira, the interpersonal engagement differed radically from the engagement in Aksaray. The main reason for the difference was that I was engaging with families, and their lives were more settled than the interlocutors I met in Aksaray. I made contact with one family through a friend, and that facilitated my presence. The family introduced me to several other families in the area who were willing to participate in the research. Through repeatedly coming to the area I became a familiar figure, the Lebanese girl doing research. Many of the Kurdish interlocutors had lived and worked in Lebanon for periods of time, and many remembered their time there fondly. In many instances, they had lived in Shiite areas or had Shiite neighbours, so I did not have to deal with some questions or ‘othering’ that arose with some other interlocutors. In Jazira, interlocutors asked me about my family background in a bid to situate me socio-economically, my religion, my sect, my political affiliation, and my relationship status. Participants in Jazira were reluctant at first to speak about their attempts to cross the border for fear that I posed a threat in some way. Over time as they engaged with me for longer, they began to speak about their prior attempts to cross the border. It reached the point that when I visited in 2014, one research participant asked me if I was still gathering stories about border crossing because she had recently tried and wanted to tell me about her experience.

In Jazira, I began by gathering data about Syrian refugees’ work, housing situations, engagement with NGOs in the city, and engagements with Turkish state actors. I accompanied some of the research participants to several NGO offices in the city, the main municipal office in Jazira and the local school to understand their engagement with state actors and non-state actors offering services or assistance. With time, they began talking about issues relating to Europe, asylum politics and attempted crossings. Through interlocutors’ discussions of these issues their
conceptions of Europe emerged. Regarding migration to Europe, Jazira highlighted different dynamics that those at play with the single interlocutors I met in Aksaray. In Jazira, families might remain in the neighbourhood as one family member tried to cross the border. While one person focused their energy on moving on, others were engaged in daily rhythms, work and social ties. Uncertainty took on a different shape than it did with the interlocutors I met in Aksaray who wanted to move on as quickly as possible. The urgency to move that created a tension for interlocutors in Aksaray was here slowed down and if anything only visible in glimpses and at certain moments. In Jazira uncertainty was located more in the future rather than the near present. Refugees subsumed their “near future” into the routines and rhythms of the present, but their distant future or that of their children’s lives remained an unknown (cf. Guyer 2007, 410). Most parents did have ideas about what they wanted for their children’s futures, namely, education, stability and the possibility of a different life than that they were living in Turkey. Thus, continuing to Europe even after a year or two in Istanbul was argued to be a sacrifice for children who were working to support their family and out of school (Pilkington 1997).

Ethical Engagement in Jazira

Vian, the woman mentioned at the start of the introductory chapter, said when I asked if I could speak to her for the research, “Ahh so I will tell you your questions, ‘How long have you been here? Do you want to go back to Syria?’” To which I responded laughing, “something like that.”

Vian saw the questions asked to refugees or displaced persons as formulaic. The first question she posed was about time and implied settlement. The question pertained to the duration of her presence in Turkey as a way of asking other questions about connections, labour, and how she

44 While Vian was not living in Jazira, her attitude and approach was closer to the interlocutors living there than to those I engaged with in Aksaray, so I placed her criticism in this section.
situates her presence as temporary or part of a long-term project. The second question she posed was one I rarely asked although interlocutors spoke about wanting to return to Syria. This second question is a standard inquiry made by resettlement and migratory control institutions, a question about intention. It situates the respondent as secure by positioning them as directed towards their home country rather than remaining where they are or wanting to continue onwards to Europe. In posing the question, she highlighted her knowledge of her position as someone whose direction or future-ing is uncertain. It also placed me as a researcher alongside institutions working to direct, control and study migration and refugee situations.

In the spring of 2013, Nisreen, a Kurdish woman in her early thirties from Qamishli living in Jazira, was hosting her brother in law who had migrated to Holland in the early 2000s. Speaking to me about the research, he commented that I should meet simple people who are uncomplicated and talk easily. Not liking his comment about the research, I responded that the research requires seeing and speaking to different kinds of people. His brother, Nisreen’s husband, said after this, “Simple people are always poor.”

Nisreen continued, “Poor people are always used for research!”

Nisreen is an outspoken and strong-willed woman. She has faced many difficulties in her life and repeatedly fought for certain choices she made. Knowing this about her makes me question the critique or the way they made the comments. I would argue that Nisreen and her husband objectified their experience in my presence as a researcher objectifying their experience as refugees in Turkey. Nisreen, her husband and his brother used me or the research to engage or voice criticism of each other which they could not say in a direct manner. Nisreen had been told that this brother-in-law was gossiping about her, and her husband may have been annoyed with his brother since his brother and other family members were not helping him (See Chapter 3). The brother in law was an activist living in Europe. I believe his comment was directed at them and positioned them
as simple people, people who could be researched whereas perhaps it was a way of positioning himself as someone who would not be researched. The way he positioned them was as if they had no agency or choice in the matter. Nisreen’s response while criticising me, representing social science research, was more a criticism of her brother in law than just a demonstration of how she viewed our engagement.

In the autumn of 2013, I was visiting Amira when one of her Turkish relatives came over for tea. A man in his late forties, he had met me more than once, and this afternoon he asked me about the research and whether the British government would not read it and if so could I not help Amira or others in similar situations. While Amira and I explained that the project was in fulfilment of a university degree, he nodded but still did not seem entirely convinced. In making the argument like the doctor above, he drew attention to the fact governments or international institutions are audiences for such research. In part, they were placing responsibility on me that their participation in the research should not go unrewarded. They were reminding me that I have a responsibility in part to make their suffering or difficulties they faced known.

Refugees’ criticism of the research or me raised questions about why they were of interest as a population or sample, if not for the war and their migration, or in Nisreen’s case due to their limited influence. The comments equally focused on questioning the utility of such research in changing Syrian refugees’ actual situations or facilitating their migration by altering state policy. Jeffrey (2010, 31) explains that ethnographers have been criticised on the basis they present “subaltern voice[s]” in ways that speak to their arguments or politics. Similarly, to his and others’ arguments (Schpher-Hughs 1992; Bourgois 1995; Das 2007), I would respond that ethnography offers the means to observe and understand certain circumstances, social relations, and practices with attention to the details and sensitivities of issues. The method enables ethnographers to present
the social situation in a way which, hopefully interlocutors “will find meaningful” (Jeffrey 2010, 31).

In both research sites, ethics was not just about the ethical guidelines set out by the university or the anthropological association but represented part of an ongoing dialogue that emerged as time passed and situations arose rather than a fixed or stable mark crossed and no longer returned to.

**The Migrant Detention Centre and The Refugee Camp**

I briefly discuss how interlocutors spoke about the detention centres and the state-run refugee camps. I did not undertake fieldwork in any of these places, but it is important to mention them as some interlocutors were detained in them. Unlike the descriptions of Aksaray and Jazira, here I focus on the ways Syrian refugees described and situated these spaces. I examine how they distinguished them as well as positioning these spaces with respect to detention centres across the border in Europe.

During the fieldwork, several interlocutors were caught trying to cross the land border to Greece or Bulgaria, and the Turkish gendarmerie took them to the detention centre in Edirne. Refugees referred to the detention centre as ‘el-camp’ (the camp) or *merkez hajiz* (detention centre). They use the English word for camp rather than the Arabic term for camp (*moukhayam*). Refugees used the English term without explaining what the word meant. Only when I asked did someone explain that ‘el-camp’ referred to the detention centre in Edirne. Refugees’ use of the English term highlighted the ways international terminology about migration entered into their discourses. By referring to it as ‘el-camp’, refugees aligned it with camps on the other side of the border- in Greece or Bulgaria or beyond. In contrast, the Foreigners’ Branch, *Yabancı Şubesı*, a detention

---

45 Edirne is officially referred to as a removal centre, but in the cases documented in this research it was used as a detention centre (Global Detention Project 2017).

46 I did not gather any data about other detention centres elsewhere in Turkey.
centre in Kumkapı, was referred to it as ‘el-Yabancı’ or by its complete Turkish name. The Branch is used to detain migrants and refugees who are arrested because they do not have state ‘authorisation’ to be present in Turkey, or are caught trying to leave the country using false documents, among other reasons for administrative detention (Law 6458 art. 57, 68). They are supposed to be held in the Foreigner’s Branch until state actors can organize their deportation process or processes allowing them to remain in Turkey (Global Detention Project 2017). While a place of detention refugees did not associate it with the border in the same way they did ‘el-camp’.

Refugees differentiated ‘el camp’ and the camps in Europe, from the state-run camps for Syrian refugees in the southern Turkish provinces. The state-run camps were established close to the border with Syria in 2011 (Dinçer et al. November 2013). Syrian refugees referred to those as moukhayam. They used the Arabic term for camp to refer to them because they associated moukhayam with refugees, humanitarian relief and aid. Syrians are familiar with refugee camps as the UNRWA ran camps in Syria which were set up for Palestinian refugees who were forced to flee Palestine in 1948 and 1967. The UNRWA camps were humanitarian camps, and many Syrians lived in the Palestinian camps in Syria rather than the camps being exclusively Palestinian or closed off spaces.

Hamid, the refugee from Idlib mentioned above, had crossed the land border from Idlib and passed through the southern Turkish provinces on his route to Istanbul. I asked him why he chose to come to Istanbul rather than remain in the south in one of the state-run camps, since he did not have enough money to pay for accommodation. He said, “They are camps, no matter how great it is, your freedom is limited. You will see the fence every day.” Hamid’s comment recognised the camps in southern Turkey as places of shelter as well as confinement. He constructed them not as places where movement is restricted but as places where there are constant reminders of the limitations placed on people’s presence and the restrictions on their mobility. In the camp, time
and space may come together in ways that are countered by movement. The camps, as spaces of
refuge, are spaces which imply limited timeframes; they are not intended to be places of long-term
presence though as Agier (2011) shows they can become permanent in many cases. The camp fence
is a border, and as a border, it raises the question of when it will be crossed or brought down. The
camp is a space of duration, a reminder of the fact that those living there are (supposedly) waiting
for the war to finish to return (cf. Hyndman & Giles 2011; cf. Agier 2011). In Hamid’s case, the
refugee camps would direct his attention to Syria and the wait for the return when he desired to
move on to Europe.

‘El-camp’ in Turkey is then unrelated to the assistance or humanitarianism associated with the
moukhayam. Refugees constituted ‘el camp’ differently to moukhayam that serves as a space of
shelter and safety. ‘El camp’ is temporary, the place where refugees end up when caught en route.
They linked it to the border with Europe rather than the border with Syria. Refugees also spoke of
detention centres in Turkey as different to the future ‘camps’ they anticipate they will end up in
once they arrive at their destination in Europe. The ‘camps’ in ‘Europe’, especially in Northern
Europe, are considered places of shelter where refugees await their asylum claims to be processed.
They are transitory spaces of rest that are part of the process of building a new life. ‘El-camp’,
while related to camps in Bulgaria or Greece, is different from the camps refugees expect when
they ‘arrive’.

Interlocutors who were detained in the detention centres complained about the conditions, but
they did not fear for their lives while detained. They compared their experience in Turkey to what
they would have experienced in prisons or intelligence detention centres in Syria. Various
interlocutors argued that nothing resembled Syrian prison or detention centre. Syrian refugees
while unhappy about being held were more concerned about the length of their detention (cf.
Andersson 2014).
Syrian refugees’ modes of distinguishing these spaces enter into the ways scholars examine detention centres or refugee camps. Syrian refugees’ formulation of these spaces aligns with certain academic analysis and in some instances adds to it (Papadopoulos et al. 2008; Hess 2010; Andrijasevic 2010). In subsequent chapters, I will discuss how refugees were affected by being placed in these different spaces (Chapter 5). As well as examining the ways the detention centre and camps were used to discipline them, and how they made their time in detention productive.
Chapter Two

Conditional Status: Syrian Refugees in Istanbul and at the Border with Europe

On a sunny, hot Saturday in July 2012, I took my then almost daily walk across Galata Bridge to Istiklal Street. That day was different not only because I was braving the summer sun to walk at 3 p.m. to Istiklal Street, but in a bid to start finding participants for the research, I was on my way to a demonstration a friend had told me about. The organisers were a Syrian youth group based in Istanbul, and as with many such events, word went around via the group’s Facebook page. The demonstration, in front of the Russian embassy, was to protest Russian support for the Syrian regime. I stood to one side of the street in the shade and watched as young men speaking Arabic slowly started to congregate across from the embassy. My friend had shown me the group organiser’s Facebook profile so I would recognise him and introduce myself to him. Distracted with setting things up we spoke briefly, and he said we would speak after the demonstration. Armed with a voice amplifier, some posters, and the revolutionary Syrian flags, the group of mainly young men started to chant songs that had emerged during the revolution. Possibly one of the busiest streets in all of Istanbul, Istiklal Boulevard is regularly used to host protests. As the men gathered and chanted, some passers-by also joined the demonstration. Turkish security police dressed in plain clothes and carrying walkie-talkies stood off to the side to ensure the protest went according to plan and lasted only as long as the time allocated to its organisers. The event, rather than extraordinary, was very ordinary. Other such protests were organised throughout that summer and the winter that followed in Taksim, Fatih district, or in front of the Syrian embassy. By that point,

47 Parts of this chapter are included in Osseiran (2017a).

48 In 2012, Russian support for the regime was focused on sending officers to train Syrian army soldiers and maintaining the naval base in the coastal town of Tartus. The protest was directed at Russia’s political support for the al-Assad regime and its actions in the UN Security Council.
my research had taken me in a different direction, and with the continued fighting in Syria, many people complained that the only point of protesting in Istanbul was to vent. The demonstration was not rare nor can it be taken for granted. While any group can (in theory) gain the necessary permissions to hold a demonstration in Istanbul, or elsewhere in Turkey, Syrian protests— as political acts— were visible in so far as they were directed towards or about Syria rather than Syrians’ presence in Istanbul or Turkey.49

In August 2015, a group comprising two Palestinian men normally resident in Syria, a Syrian man, a French and a German woman organised a protest in Edirne against the border regime.50 The demonstration was unauthorised and demanded the Turkish state open the land border with Greece and Bulgaria as migrants and refugees were having to go by sea to the Greek islands to continue from there to Germany. The organisers were inspired by the marches of other migrants and refugees who were crossing the border from Hungary through Austria to reach Germany or elsewhere in Europe at that time (cf. Kallius et al. 2016). The Turkish authorities arrested the organisers and transferred them to the Foreigners’ Branch in Istanbul. I was outside Turkey at the time and followed the news on Facebook and new from a solidarity network in Turkey. Despite activists’ and lawyers’ efforts the European participants were deported to their respective countries, and the three non-Europeans faced prolonged detention and uncertainty about their future. The Syrian organiser was released, but the Palestinian organisers were moved to a detention centre in the far east of the country. They faced difficulty accessing a lawyer, were told they were going to be deported from Turkey, and suffered isolation in the second detention centre. They were released

49 See Parla and Kasli (2009) for case where the Turkish state regularised the status of Turkish speaking Bulgarians living in Istanbul by granting over-stayers residence permits so they could cross to Bulgaria, vote in the elections there, and be able to return to Istanbul.

50 See Appendix maps (1) and (3).
inside Turkey after two months of detention. They were held under laws that prohibit demonstration without authorisation.

Their protest was political as it happened in spite of state regulation regarding demonstrations, and due to its call for a radical politics of de-bordering. Their actions positioned as a political challenge to the Turkish state, not because they were trying to cross the border but due to their demand that the border be opened. Their demonstration criticised Turkey’s role in maintaining the border to Europe, especially at a time when refugees were crossing by sea and facing grave dangers in the process. It situated them not as border crossers who state actors can act upon but as political subjects vocalising their objection to the border regime (cf. De Genova 2009).

I open the chapter with the two different protests not to discuss protests further but to highlight the ways Syrian refugees’ status in Turkey enabled them to organise certain political actions but not others. The manifestations of a politics of protest, energy directed towards Syria set up a relationship with the Turkish state whereas the Syrian refugees’ migratory energy directed towards Europe was approached differently by state actors. This chapter argues that Turkish state actors engaged with Syrian refugees in Istanbul as economic, social, and to some degree political subjects while engaging with Syrian refugees caught at the border to Europe as another category of subject. For those caught at the border with Europe, Turkish state actors approached them as political subjects acting against state actors’ tasks of maintaining the border, and as ‘refugees’ who should be contained. State actors’ engagements in these different sites highlight differing politics.

In the chapter, I argue that Syrian refugees present in Istanbul were included as labour (albeit for the most part informally), social subjects or political exiles whereas Syrian refugees caught at the border with Europe were challenges to state sovereignty. State actors placed a higher value on maintaining the border to Europe and preventing Syrian refugees from crossing that
border, than keeping them from entering Turkey. As discussed in Chapter 1, various definitions of state sovereignty exist (Rigo 2005; Papadopoulos et al. 2008). With time state actors’ approaches to Syrian refugees caught at the border with Europe changed from containing them, penalising them, to making them legible (cf. Scott 1998) by registering them as present in Turkey. At that border crossing, the mobile refugee body was constituted as a threat in ways the Syrian refugee subject present in Istanbul, working or receiving social assistance was not.

Syrian refugees’ engagement with state actors in Istanbul and at the border highlight how these places were qualified as different spaces, spaces of inclusion, exclusion, or limbo in various points in time (cf. Massey 2005). In focusing on these interactions, it is possible to explore many interlocutors’ experiences who while wanting to move on to Europe did so at different speeds. The duration of their presence in Istanbul or Turkey affected the ways Syrian refugees engaged with the Turkish state. The official statuses assigned to them influenced their presence in Turkey but also by their face to face engagements state actors or service providers. For those who stayed in Istanbul as they waited for a family member to make it across the border or for family reunification processes to finish, these processes or details were significant for their present in Istanbul even as they focused on their future elsewhere. They engaged with the Turkish state institutions and followed changes to the terms underlying their presence or their access to services. For those wanting to move on quickly, they generally only dealt with state actors when they were caught at the border; they usually tried to avoid dealing with state actors otherwise. Regardless of their desire

---

51 This changed after the summer of 2015 when Turkish border authorities began building a wall along the border with Syria. In addition, from 2012 onwards, Turkish state actors treated some parts of the border with Syria, the Kurdish areas of Syria, for instance differently to other parts of the border.

52 Regarding the border with Syria, the temporary protection includes the clause that the Turkish state will maintain an open border policy, but the border has been closed at different periods of time since 2011.
to avoid or engage with Turkish state actors’, Turkish state actors’ engagement with Syrian refugees in Istanbul or those caught trying to cross the border to Europe changed over time.

The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey is a contingent presence which depends on the state continuing to uphold the temporary protection regulation. Syrian refugees’ presence in Istanbul and their mobility geared towards Europe is an opportunity to analyse the ways the conditions underlying their presence appeared. Rather than discuss the regulation on Temporary Protection per se, or fully chart the vicissitudes since 2011, the data presented here examines the ways Syrian refugees engaged with state actors and how the status of persons under temporary protection was formulated over time. I demonstrate how state actors dealt with Syrian refugees present in Istanbul as social, economic and political persons while approaching those caught at the border differently. The Turkish government facilitated their presence in Turkey, but Syrian refugees’ movement towards Europe constituted a threat to state sovereignty. To that end, I explore how state actors approached Syrian refugee presence in Istanbul and at the border with Europe from July 2012 until December 2013 and beyond. Placing Syrian refugee presence in both spaces in dialogue is a means of examining how the conditions of presence became visible and how they varied over time. It also demonstrates how Syrian refugee presence in these different spaces is made productive. Syrian refugees’ experiences, in Istanbul or at the border with Europe, highlight bordering processes and the ways spaces are constituted as exclusive, inclusive, or spaces of limbo dependent on the migrant or refugee in question. The border processes within and at the border are an opportunity to explore the different ways sovereign power operates when faced with Syrian refugees in diverse political and social situations (Grundy-Warr & Rajaram 2007, xix). The variations in the state’s approach

---

to different Syrian refugees’ presence, labour, and migratory force highlight what Grundy-Warr and Rajaram (2007, xix) describe as “the fragmented nature of this sovereign power.” They go on to examine “…how structures of recognition do not centre on and emanate unproblematically and coherently from a managerial state and … suggest that such structures are broken up and fragmented at different points as they are relayed to different migrants” (Grundy-Warr & Rajaram 2007, xix). Their concept offers tools to understand and explore this context characterised by changing state actor approaches and processes to document or deal with Syrian refugees as well as varying practices of bordering. In this case, it is not a total or static system, but one characterised by fluctuations and dissonance. Bordering, as Grundy-Warr and Rajaram (2007), among others, acknowledge (cf. Goldring & Landolt 2013; Rajkumar et al. 2012; Mountz et al. 2002), is not only practised by state actors but by a multiplicity of others as well. The different borders refugees face affect how they are produced as subjects and their lives (Goldring & Landolt 2013, 22-23). Syrian refugees moved and continue to move between various state assigned statuses based on their location, documents, and individual circumstances.

This chapter draws on much of the literature mentioned in Chapter 1 regarding transit spaces and the deceleration of mobility. Mezzadra and Neilson (2013, 149) argue that it is necessary to explore the ways various spaces including but not limited to the camp are used to institute “temporal borders” and affect refugees’ subjectivities by delaying their mobility. They relate processes to prolong migrant and refugee journeys to state sovereignty to act on bodies and persons. They propose

“to highlight the temporal dimension of detention is to reconsider contemporary techniques of migration control in the light of asynchronous rhythms of transit, prolongation, and acceleration. These tempos and timings cross the subjective experiences of bodies and minds in motion and are also key to the inscription of this
motion into labor market dynamics and the social and symbolic fabric of citizenship” (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013, 149).

Following their suggestion, I examine how different spaces, the state-run refugee camps in southern Turkey, the detention centre in Istanbul, and deportation to Syria, are used by state actors to prolong refugee journeys. As they mention, these multiple processes of delay work to affect refugee subjectivity. While decelerating refugee mobility, state actor practices did not prevent refugees from attempting to cross the border again. Therefore, it becomes necessary to discuss the decelerated movement not only in relation to Turkey but also refugees’ futures in Europe. Although the chapter, and the thesis, does not discuss refugee incorporation in Europe, I suggest that the decelerated mobility has the effect of preparing Syrian refugees for later waits in Europe once they arrive.

Making Sense of Turning a Blind Eye

Following the start of the influx from Syria to Turkey in 2011, the Turkish state announced that the Syrian refugees entering Turkey were ‘guests’ of the Turkish state. In response to non-governmental organisations, rights organisation and political parties vocalising their opposition to the status, as an ambiguous and non-legal status, the Turkish state announced that all Syrian nationals entering Turkey fall under the temporary protection of the state (Dinçer et al. November 2013). At the same as the Turkish state was positioning itself as a host to Syrian nationals coming in, Syrian nationals already present in Turkey held different statuses as students, work permit holders, asylum seeker status holders, permanent resident status holders or persons present

54 ‘Guest’ and ‘person under temporary protection’ were both used in official documents until 2014 when ‘persons under temporary protection’ became standard.
55 Due to the geographical limitation on the 1951 Convention, Syrians who applied for asylum in Turkey prior to 2011 would have been granted asylum seeker status. Asylum seeker status means asylees are under the protection of the Turkish state, they are allowed to remain in Turkey and they are given access to certain services but they will not be considered for citizenship in Turkey.
without state authorisation. Alongside these came the status of ‘guest’ or ‘person under temporary protection’. Different statuses existed in tandem and formed a spectrum. As in other cases in the world, it is necessary here too, to move away from the binary of legally and illegally present (cf. Goldring & Landolt 2013; cf. Rajkumar et al. 2002; Chauvin & Garces-Mascareñas 2012). “Through this process, such laws constitute the community of insiders and also spell out degrees of belonging and entitlement through the hierarchical systems they establish” (Dauvergne 2008, 17). All these statuses are related to particular relationships with the Turkish state (government and bureaucracy), and each is produced through specific conditions or terms.

Syrian refugees when they did engage with state actors or actors connected to the state faced different actors’ varying needs for them to present themselves through documentation. For Syrian refugees in Istanbul, from 2012-2015, their presence without Turkish state issued documentation did not engender legal action such as administrative detention or deportation.56 It was possible to be documented though the state actors had not instituted the mechanisms particular to temporary protection yet. In the summer of 2012, for those Syrians arriving in Istanbul and who sought it, a six months’ tourist residence permit was available.57 While some refugees chose to regularise their status and apply for the non-renewable tourist permits others did not because they lacked the necessary documents or funds required for the process,58 or hoped they would return to Syria soon.

Different interlocutors explained that they had been stopped by police in various parts of Aksaray in the summer of 2012 and that the police asked for their passports and seeing they were

---

56 Deportation to Syria was suspended as part of the temporary protection. The condition was announced when the institution of the temporary protection was announced (cf. Özden 2012).
57 Turkey maintained a two tier tourist residence permit system at that time. Syrian nationals were granted six months’ non-renewal touristic residence permit. To get the permit renewed applicants must leave the country for six months and return. Other residence permits existed including student or work permit.
58 Applicants needed to have a valid passport, have entered Turkey legally, have a notarized rental contract, and demonstrate possessing a minimum sum of 500 US dollars (or its equivalent) for each month of residence.
Syrian told them to go on their way.\textsuperscript{59} The police neither demanded they apply for tourist residence permits, although these interlocutors had been present for over six months nor did they call on them to go south to register in the state-run camps. Without the mechanisms or processes to make those falling under ‘temporary protection’ legible to the state, it was easier to turn a blind eye to Syrian refugees’ lack of state authorised documents. Syrian refugees needed residence permits for other engagements, for instance with landlords or to register electricity, water, gas, or internet bills. In many areas in Istanbul, landlords agreed to verbal contracts and did not ask renters to register bills in their name. In the event they insisted on a written contract, Syrian refugees asked (if they had) their Turkish relatives or friends holding residence permits to act as their guarantors or register the bills in their name. Newly arrived refugees activated their kinship networks and connections with those based in Istanbul from before 2011 to start anew. These network members facilitated engagements with both private and public institutions.

\textbf{Documenting Presence}

In November 2012, the Ministry of Interior announced that one-year residence permits would be made available for Syrian refugees living in Turkey regardless of when they entered Turkey.\textsuperscript{60} By making the residence permits available for Syrian refugees living outside the border provinces, the state acknowledged that Syrians refugees were living all over Turkey. The residence permit was a way to document the presence of Syrian refugees living outside of the state-run camps. It made their information accessible to the state (cf. Scott 1998). Applying for the residence permit required applicants to have a valid passport and entry stamp. The need for a paper trail meant that many persons who did not enter ‘legally’ or did not have passports when they left Syria were excluded.

\textsuperscript{59} The interlocutors were Arabic speaking men.
\textsuperscript{60} The residence permit listed that it is based on the Temporary Protection decision distinguishing it from other reasons for residence.
Acquiring the permit, being recognised as ‘legally’ present, depended on the ability of Syrian refugees to fulfil certain conditions.

State actors relaxed the conditions for some Syrian refugees while maintaining them for others. The need to meet the conditions prompted Syrian refugees to pursue strategies to overcome the requirements they did not fulfil. Amira, a Kurdish woman in her late thirties from Qamishli, had come to Istanbul with her family in 2009 prior to the start of the revolution in Syria. Amira’s mother, a Kurdish woman in her late seventies, came to Istanbul in April 2013. She crossed the border ‘legally’ and applied for a residence permit directly. Although her passport was due to expire in one month, the employee issued her the one-year residence permit without any objection perhaps due to her age. Amira’s mother did not face any problems because of the close expiration of her passport, but Syrian young men faced this dilemma either due to the limited validity of their passports or their inability to renew them. The Syrian consulate in Istanbul refused to renew the passport of any Syrian male who had not completed his mandatory military service; effectively rendering a large segment of its citizens as persons without valid documents. The Syrian regime was penalising them for shirking their ‘national duty’.

Different research focuses on migrants borrowing, renting or buying documents such as residence permits (Reeves 2013), social security numbers/national insurance numbers (Coutin 2005; Vasta 2011), or passports (Reeves 2013; Vasta 2011). The list is not exhaustive but it highlights migrants’ strategies to be able to live and work in relative security (Chauvin & Garces-Mascareñas 2012).

More on Amira and her family in subsequent section.

Passport holders are usually denied entry to a country other than that of their citizenship if their passport has less than three months to its expiration. The open border policy meant the validity passports was overlooked at the border. I am uncertain how this practice subsequently changed.

Syrian women, minors and men who have completed their mandatory military service are issued passports valid for six years. Men who have not yet completed their mandatory military service, are granted two year passports.

See Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1951/1973:278). Syrian nationals in Turkey, could in theory, renew their passports through the consulate, but the approval and new passport had to come from Syria. The applications of young men who had not completed their mandatory military service were rejected. Student status was one way to overcome this situation and extend a passport through official channels. Many Syrian refugees were either unaware of this or did not have the funds necessary to do so. Many refugees turned to document forgers who counterfeited extension stickers to counter the Syrian regime policies, and maintain their status as ‘legally’ present in Istanbul. In 2015, the Syrian state announced that consulates and embassies were now authorised to issue nationals new passports and renew them. All Syrian nationals could apply regardless of if they have completed their mandatory military service.
or were about to expire turned in many instances to document forgers to renew their passports or create new ones, and apply for the residence permit. In a bid to meet the conditions, they mixed the formal and the ‘illegal’ (cf. Vasta 2011; cf. Reeves 2013). Many had residence permits issued as the forgeries were not a concern of the Turkish state, but of the Syrian state. The Turkish state conditions converged with the Syrian state policies and politics regarding those who have left the country. This convergence placed Syrian refugees, especially men, in a precarious situation forcing them to engage in ‘illegal’ practices to regularise their status in Turkey.

While many Syrian refugees applied for the residence permit, many families complained that it was useless. Large families complained that given the number of family members getting residence permits issued for everyone would be too costly.66 Within some families, family members had mixed documents; for instance, some family members might have a passport or might have entered Turkey ‘legally’, while their siblings or parents had not. One Kurdish father argued that the permit would change little in their material reality while his brother applied as he hoped that time accounted for by the residence permits might count at some point in time in the future. The residence permits were a means to make Syrian refugees accessible and visible subjects. In return for their accessibility to the state, they obtained access to certain services within the city. The approach did not force the visibility on them but, for the most part, offered it, and Syrian refugees based on their situation and calculations engaged accordingly.

With a means to document Syrian refugees presence outside the state-run camps and border provinces, state actors changed their approach to Syrian refugees when they engaged with them in Istanbul. For instance, Saad, a Syrian migrant from Lattakia city, had been in Turkey for about eight months when in February 2013 he got into a fight with his landlord. Saad’s sister insisted on

---

66 Applicants paid 198 Turkish Lira for the booklet.
calling the police as the landlord was harassing them. Saad said he knew he would be arrested given he did not have a residence permit, but still accepted his sister calling the police. The police arrested him and detained him in a police station for a few days before moving him to the Foreigners’ Branch in Kumkapi. They held Saad because he did not have a residence permit - the landlord and not Saad was at fault in their argument. Saad had entered Turkey legally but chose to remain without a residence permit as he waited for word from the company he works for about his next assignment. He held a dismissive view of residence permits at that time and did not expect to need one. In the Foreigners’ Branch, Saad worried about his fate as other Syrian refugees held at the same time as him who were caught trying to cross the border to Europe were being taken down to the border with Syria and handed over to the FSA fighters holding Tel al-Abyad border crossing. Saad feared he might also be placed at the border, but after a few days in the detention centre, the officers explained that he would be released as long as he signed a paper saying he would attend the residence permit appointment they had arranged for him. Saad faced a problem about his status only when he was forced to engage with state actors. State actors chose to document him as present rather than penalising him by placing him at the border.

The residence permits were replaced in the summer of 2014 with identity cards, ‘Gecici Kurumu Kimliği’ (Temporary Protection Identity Card), that Syrian refugees could apply for at district

---

67 Saad knew that at the time, Syrian nationals could leave and re-enter Turkey through official ports of entry by paying a fine for overstaying without a residency but without suffering a ban on their entry to Turkey. It was an exceptional situation based on the temporary protection. 
68 See Appendix map (2).
69 In another instance, a fight broke out in Jazira between a Kurdish family from Syria and some Kurds from Turkey. The fight became violent and the police were called. They helped the women of the Syrian family to leave their apartment as the fight raged on in the street before their apartment. The family’s Turkish relatives intervened to end the fight. The police did not request they apply for residence permits although some of the family members did not have residence permits. 
70 Deportation to border with Syria will be discussed in a following section.
offices in the different parts of Istanbul. In the beginning, applicants did not need a passport, an entry stamp, and they did not have to pay any sum to get the card. The identity cards could, in theory, include all Syrian refugees regardless of how they entered Turkey or what kind of documents they held. The identification cards did not depend on a paper trail or a means of verifying applicants’ identities. Applicants only presented a bill to demonstrate their place of residence- tying their access to services to their place of residence. The process gradually changed so that by late 2015, applicants were asked to submit a copy of their notarized rental contracts as proof of their place of residence alongside identification such as a passport or Syrian identity card. Gaining access to the identity cards gradually became a matter of fulfilling another series of document requirements putting pressure on Syrian refugees to obtain access to documents such as rental contracts. It created the need for Syrian refugees to mix the ‘illegal’ and formal.

**Limiting Access to Documentation**

Following the same pattern of narrowing access to temporary protection, in November 2015, the process changed once again whereby Syrian refugees were denied identity cards if they had entered Turkey through any official port of entry. In that case, they were told to apply for a tourist residence permit. The move distinguishes between Syrian refugees formalising the state’s relationship with some on the basis they are seeking protection and denying others, defined as tourists, the right to protection. Through shifting state policies, state actors shift Syrian refugees to different positions

---

71 It was moved in 2015 to police stations in different districts in the city. It is a laminated white card with the individuals’ name, date of birth, foreigner identity number, and photograph. Based on the number, the card holder can access free health care in state hospitals, register in school, and open a bank account. They were being issued for refugees living in cities in the southern provinces since 2013.

72 Temporary Protection Regulation No 29153.

73 According to Amnesty International (April 01, 2016) some Syrian refugees who crossed the land border were refused identity cards. See also Mülteci Der report (April 22, 2016).

74 Applying for a tourist residence permit requires applicants to submit bank statements showing they have a set amount of money, notarised rental contracts, and health insurance policies. There are offices that handle the paperwork for a fee and provide ways to get around the requirements, but this requires Syrian refugees to have the
within the same category where these positions are the basis for specific relations with the Turkish state. In turn, the requirements and conditions render a large segment of Syrian refugees as “illegally” present but yet non-deportable.

According to the state directive (Turkish Ministry Foreign Affairs 30 December 2015), persons applying for temporary protection must have entered Turkey by land, which means they were either smuggled or allowed to enter by the Turkish border guards.\(^{75}\) Distinguishing how people arrive marks Syrian refugees based on class, and more particularly based on their place of residence in Syria. For Syrians living in southern or in central Syria, going north to cross the border into Turkey is dangerous due to the bombing, fighting, and different factions’ checkpoints. People from the south and central areas usually come to Turkey by crossing to Lebanon and flying or sailing from there.\(^{76}\) For Syrians living in the northern provinces, persons originally from the northern regions or internally displaced persons from other areas who have moved there,\(^{77}\) journeying by land is easier and less problematic.

In a subsequent move, in January 2016, the Turkish state re-instituted the visa restriction on Syrian nationals entering Turkey. The visa came as part of the Turkish-EU deal where Turkey agreed to restrict onward migration into Europe in exchange for the freedom of movement of Turkish nationals within the EU.\(^{78}\) Due to the visa restriction, all Syrians coming to Turkey through an

---

\(^{75}\) See Turkish Ministry Foreign Affairs press release (30 December 2015). The border with Syria remains closed, so border crossers either hire smugglers or cross alone. There have been incidents where the border guards opened fire on Syrian refugees trying to cross the border into Turkey (Yeung 19 June 2016).

\(^{76}\) The road from Damascus to Lebanon is controlled by the Syrian government and state army.

\(^{77}\) In 2015 and 2016, several ‘settlements’ happened so fighters and civilians left opposition held areas in Damascus, Homs or most recently, Aleppo and went to Idlib province. The shift in the population within Syrian has been ongoing since the start of the escalation of the fighting.

\(^{78}\) The deal was preliminarily agreed on in 201. A draft was formulated in 2015, and it came into effect on March 18, 2016. See EU Press Release 144/16 (March 18, 2016).
official port of entry must first obtain a visa from a Turkish consulate or embassy. Syrian refugees present in Turkey complain that the visa is near impossible to obtain, narrowing the avenues for Syrian refugees to seek protection or enter Turkey via relatively safe routes. The visa not only affects Syrian refugees wanting to enter Turkey but also those within Turkey, as it is impossible to leave and guarantee re-admittance.

The different registration schemes and processes highlight Turkish state actors imposed varying conditions on Syrian refugees. Gaining state actor recognition of their presence was contingent on their ability to meet requirements. The most recent shifts towards categorising Syrian refugees as tourists or temporarily protected institutes conditions that exclude some Syrian refugees. By narrowing down the access to services based on temporary protection and the access to temporary protection, Turkish state actors render many Syrian refugees in Istanbul in a precarious situation. The documents related to the temporary protection have become valuable not just due to the access they offer but due to the difficulty of obtaining them. By trying to make the temporary protection relationship exclusive to some Syrians and not others, the state actors create a system of differentiated incorporation (cf. Mezzadra & Neilson 2013, 157): a system that creates internal boundaries among Syrian refugees in Turkey and outlines a series of varying future temporal horizons.

**Incorporated Regardless of the State**

While Syrian refugees’ presence in Istanbul was ignored or facilitated, different Syrian refugees present in the city approached it as a space of varying inclusion based on their situation and circumstances. They sought to access the services available to them, and their endeavours were

---

79 Persons crossing by land from Syria are considering to be seeking the protection of the Turkish state and do not need a visa. For persons applying for the tourist residence permit and told to exit and re-enter Turkey, the visa restriction presented a major problem as they cannot guarantee they will be granted the visa.
affected not just by the state regulation or policies but also by different actors who influenced their access (Goldring & Landolt 2013,19; Rajkumar et al. 2002). As Landolt and Goldring (2013,23) explain,

… what access means in relation to rights and membership is complicated because the relationship between access to “public goods” on one hand and rights and membership on the other is unclear. Individuals and institutions (e.g., health care providers, teachers, librarians) may facilitate non-citizens’ access to public goods without altering the boundaries around rights or membership. Other actors may associate facilitating access with deeper shifts aimed at redrawing rights and even the boundaries of membership.

Under the temporary protection, Syrian refugees can access healthcare, education, and have some labour rights. The rights while outlined in the temporary protection regulation are accessed on the ground in varying degrees based on the service provider, the refugee in question, the neighbourhood or city the person lives in. At the same time as the temporary protection set forth a new type of status in the Turkish migratory regime, the status was based on suspending other laws or processes used to deal with other non-nationals, refugees and migrants.80 Many Syrian refugees coming to the city were trying to settle by finding housing, registering their children in schools, and figuring what forms of social assistance if any was available to them in the city. They did not wait for the government to issue policies organising their presence. Then state policies to incorporate Syrian refugees were either happening in tandem with Syrian refugees’ own efforts to build their lives in Istanbul or came after they had arranged some of their relations and access. The following examples show aspects of the interplay between Syrian refugee actions to build their lives in Istanbul and state policies to organise their presence, labour, and incorporation as social actors, recipients of state care, etc. Their inclusion may continue under the current form of

80For instance, under temporary protection, Syrian refugees cannot seek asylum in Turkey on the basis of political persecution (cf. Gümüş & Eroğlu 2015); however, some Syrian refugees have been allowed to seek asylum due to severe health concerns or LGBTI status.
temporary protection, or it may in the future become a means for Syrian refugees to remain in Turkey under a permanent status. Until the government in power decides to grant them a more permanent status, Syrian refugees’ continued presence remains dependent on the Turkish government.81

The status of temporarily protected comes with particular access, but accessing services is reliant on a multiplicity of actors. In the following, I present data on labour and social assistance; similar practices took place in other domains of social integration such as access to education or healthcare. In presenting data about these fields, I trace the changes to align them with state actors’ varying practice as well as alterations in the documentation regime available.

Labour

Syrian refugees work in different sectors of the economy in Istanbul, some in their professions but the majority in jobs unrelated to their former work in Syria. Families in Jazira complained that their teenage children who were studying in Syria, some of whom had never worked there, were in Jazira working in textile workshops or other jobs to support their families. As families without teenagers explained, employers prefer hiring younger workers.

Most Turkish citizens working in the textile workshops worked informally and were not registered to receive social insurance or had contracts organising their labour. Even though their labour was as precarious, Syrian refugees always argued that their situation was worse because employers knew they could exploit them. Further, Syrians’ overall situation in the country as newly arrived refugees meant they were less willing to negotiate with employers even if they deserved higher wages due to their prior experience from Syria or work hours. The preferred strategy was to

81 In July 2016, the President announced that the Turkish state was going to begin accepting the applications for citizenship of Syrians under temporary protection (BBC Turkey July 03, 2016). A later announcement clarified that the criteria and number (300,000) (Agence France Presse July 10, 2016). Whether a subsequent move to include others will occur is still uncertain.
earn some money to settle the household and then change jobs or workplaces. In many cases, newcomers found work in the same place as family members or friends who came before. They activated their networks until they learned their way around and had some experience using the machines in textile workshops. Then they would look for other opportunities in the area. Here I mention that all Syrian nationals of different ethnicities were able to find work in the textile workshops, at least in Jazira; access to employment was not exclusive or limited by ethnicity although the area was predominantly Kurdish.

While many interlocutors complained about their low wages, more complained about the long working hours with respect to their pay. Two of Amira’s nephews spoke to me on a Saturday afternoon in February 2013. Both had come to Istanbul several months back without their extended families. They complained saying they had worked in Lebanon and Syria in construction and other jobs, but they had never seen work like what they saw in Turkey. Amira’s three daughters worked to support the family as her eldest son refused to, and her husband was unable to work due to health problems. The eldest daughter commented once, “If we don’t work we can’t eat.” Regardless of the assistance given or the state policies to regulate their presence and labour they had to deal with their daily needs. Amira struggled to get her daughters into workshops with employers who paid the wages they agreed on and did not expect their employees to work overtime. The daughters’ pay, the family’s income, was dependent on their employers (cf. Goldring & Landolt 2013, 19). Amira faced the problem of finding new places of employment for her daughters when the workshop the younger two worked in closed or when her eldest daughter’s employer did not pay her as much as they originally agreed.

In 2012, state actors who found Syrian refugees employed used to fine employers as under Turkey’s law, foreign workers need work permits to work in Turkey (cf. Danış et al. 2006). One interlocutor in his early thirties living in Jazira with his parents and siblings, whom I met in
December 2012, explained that the workshop he worked in was raided by the authorities one day. The employer was fined, and the two Syrian men working there were taken south to one of the state-run camps. The interlocutor, by his admission, was luckily spared as he had not gone to work that day. In February 2013, one interlocutor’s husband working on a construction site in the area jumped over a wall at work in a bid to escape the notice of workplace inspectors and broke his leg.

In October 2013, the state announced that employers hiring Syrian workers did not have to fulfil all the conditions required for a work permit to facilitate the process and encourage Turkish employers to legalise their employees’ statuses. Many employers were unwilling to undergo the process as they were reluctant to pay their Syrian employees social security or were functioning informally anyway (cf. Danış et al.; Kılıçaslan 2016). In the summer of 2013, one interlocutor, a relative of Amira’s who was in her mid-twenties, explained that her employer in the textile workshop told her and the other Syrian employees to get a residence permit issued so they could avoid problems if work inspectors came to check the workshop.

The state policies to regularise Syrian refugee presence as labour facilitated their incorporation as formal or informal labour as employers did not have to fear state sanctions or fines for hiring Syrian refugees. State actors sought to regularise Syrian refugee labour while keeping the temporary nature of their presence, written on the residence permits, at the forefront. As Mountz and her co-authors (2002) argue in the case of Salvadorians in the US present under temporary protection, their status rendered them a temporary and flexible labour force. For Syrian refugees, without mechanisms to negotiate pay or hold employers accountable, the regularisation did not protect them from exploitation or improve their work conditions. It meant they did not have to fear state actors when they came to their workplace. Syrian refugees’ labour, however, did not pave the

---

82 Apply for work permits requires employers submit many documents including their tax records for the past five years and fulfil other criteria.
way for them to become citizens but enabled them to survive in Turkey outside of state-run camps and without state assistance. The shift is towards governing their presence as labour by making them visible rather than penalising them for their unauthorised labour.

Subsequent changes in 2015\(^{83}\) focused on regularising Syrian refugees’ presence as labour incorporated limitations and conditions. The limitations on sector and location restrict Syrian refugees maintaining their precarious situations. The change helps some Syrian refugees in specific sectors to become legally authorised to work, but the limitations on sector and location restrict many others’ possibilities. In the process, some people’s labour will count in the longer term as grounds to apply for citizenship while other Syrian refugees’ labour will never be considered. The changes highlight the ways conditionality is reformulated but remains a core aspect of this status (cf. De Genova 2002).

Social Assistance

Some of the municipalities in different parts of the city offered social assistance to Syrian refugees living in the area. The assistance was mainly a few blankets and a box of dry food products given to the family when they registered with the municipality. Some municipalities distributed coal in the winter for the sobya (coal stoves) people used to heat their houses. Amira explained that municipality gave the same assistance to Turkish households in Jazira and it was not exclusive to Syrian refugees. Other assistance, furniture or household electronics, might follow if a donation was made. Some municipalities in the city gave this assistance and others gave none. The incorporation of Syrian households in the social assistance system at the level of the municipality posed them as deserving assistance. The access was not formalised with the status of being under

---

\(^{83}\) In January 2016, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security announced that Syrian refugees holding identity cards would be able to apply online to the Ministry directly for work permits. Their access to permits depends on the job sector and location (Turkish Labor Law 2016)
temporary protection but different municipalities organised it based on their resources and their areas’ needs.

At the end of February 2013, while visiting Amira, she explained that the local municipality was giving Syrians living in the area 1000 Turkish Lira as a form of social assistance. People who wanted to apply had to go to the local neighbourhood authority, the mukhtar, and get his signature on a paper stating that the person resided in that district. Amira complained about the local mukhtar saying he made things sound more complicated as a way to dissuade Syrian refugees from trying. She heard mixed information from other Syrians in the neighbourhood, some saying that the Mukhtar signs off on a piece of paper from the local police station stating the applicants’ address and others saying a residence permit is enough. Amira’s concern was the mukhtar, as she explained that although the man is Kurdish and the municipality set out the funds, the mukhtar was unhelpful to Syrians living in the area. She argued he was annoyed by Syrian refugees coming to the area as he believed their presence took from him or others (cf. Kılıçaslan 2016; cf. De Genova 2005).

She went to both the mukhtar and the municipality and found the municipality required a residence permit and her passport to give her the money.\(^84\) The employee told Amira she could not receive the money as they needed an official document with her passport number on it, and Amira’s asylum seeker card which did not have her passport number was insufficient. Amira was very bothered that she was unable to receive the money, as she put it, “My children do not make 1000 Lira!” The employee did, however, register Amira’s information.\(^85\)

\(^{84}\) The assistance was only for couples. Husbands applying needed to submit their wives’ passports. Only one of the spouses needed to have a residence permit. The permits listed their address.

\(^{85}\) Amira, as other Kurdish interlocutors, tried to see if the employee she was dealing with spoke Kurdish to facilitate her communication although Amira understood some Turkish. Another strategy was to ask relatives who spoke Turkish or neighbours to accompany them to deal with bureaucrats.
After the first refusal, she returned to the municipality one week later and approached the same employee who had turned her away to find that her name was registered for her to receive the sum. The employee gave her a receipt but emphasised that the bank might not pay. The bank employee refused as Amira did not have a residence permit and Amira went back to the municipal employee to see if there was a way to get the issue sorted. She asked a Syrian Turkman man who was waiting in the municipality to translate for her. The employee eventually spoke to her supervisor who contacted the head of the bank branch and then sent Amira back to the bank. Amira explained, “The bank manager told her (the employee) that it is true they only give people if they have a residence permit; that is the orders they have been given. The employee told the head of the bank she is Syrian like all of the others it would be unfair not to give her the sum. The head of the bank told her to send the woman over. So the employee gave me a paper slip and stamped it with her stamp. I was to go to the head of the bank and not the employee.” Amira headed there and after waiting awhile was allowed into the bank manager’s office, “The bank manager sat me down and told me, we have told everyone time and again that we can only give the money if people have a residence permit.” She then gave Amira the sum from the safe in her office rather than send her out to receive the sum from bank employees. She continued that while she was given 1000 Turkish Lira other families who had applied after she did were only given 500 Turkish Lira. She attributed it to Syrians spoiling things for each other by finding ways around the system so that members of the same family received the sum more than once. Until the summer of 2013, families were still able to obtain the sum, but the assistance stopped soon after that.

These examples briefly highlight some of the changes and dynamics of engagement between Syrian refugees and actors, including state actors, who affected the conditions underlying their presence in Istanbul. As much as the state actors intervened to regularise how Syrian refugees were incorporated, these cases demonstrate the ways Syrian refugees were varyingly integrated not
based on state policies but due to individual strategies or connections. Kılıçaslan (2016) discusses the ways Kurdish networks were activated in one neighbourhood in Istanbul to help the Syrian refugees coming to the district. Turkey’s Kurds stepped in to help the incoming Syrian Kurds offering them blankets, household items and access to jobs. Some of Turkey’s Kurds eventually complained that Syrians coming in had started to act as if it was their neighbourhood. The relations, assistance, and inclusion Kılıçaslan (2016) examines happened regardless of the state. However, state policies affected the terms and conditions of Syrian refugees’ incorporation in Istanbul, standardising it, facilitating it, or hindering it. State actors’ motions to incorporate them focused on situating their presence as labour, as subjects deserving social assistance, as students or patients. The changing documents regime, their inclusiveness or exclusivity, outlined that Syrian refugees in Istanbul have a range of relations with the Turkish state. The cases show that the inclusion remains contingent but marked by different levels and forms of incorporation.

At the Borders of Europe

This section discusses Syrian refugees’ engagement with state actors when they were caught at the borders with Europe. State actors altered how they dealt with Syrian refugees caught at the borders with Greece or Bulgaria during 2012-2013. The changes in practice highlight Turkey’s role in maintaining the EU borders. The focus on this border demonstrates the ways discussions of state sovereignty need expanding as Syrian refugees trying to cross the border, were approached as a threat although they were seeking to leave Turkey rather than enter it or remain in it without state authorisation. The border with Europe was, in 2012 and part of 2013, an exclusionary space. State sovereignty in this situation is not limited to the confines of the territorial state but here lies in part
in the task of maintaining the border with Greece and Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{86} The practices are part of Turkey’s role protecting the EU space and proof of its credibility as an essential EU partner, and future EU member state (cf. Rigo 2005, 9-10; cf. Kirişçi 2012, 74; De Genova 2016, 86-87).\textsuperscript{87} State sovereignty was expressed differently based on the border in question.

State actors and institutions dealt with Syrian refugees in Istanbul on the basis they occupied a particular status. Those caught trying to cross the border to Europe by land, sea or air, represented a problem for state actors about how they should deal with them as they were Syrian refugees who did not want Turkey’s protection.\textsuperscript{88} I explore how attempted border crossers were categorised over time. I suggest that not only was there never a single category of Syrian refugees present in Turkey, but also spaces such as the territorial border with Europe brought to the fore the ways different Syrian refugees were excluded or incorporated under the temporary protection.

The following cases studies show how state actor practices of dealing with Syrian refugees caught at the border with Europe changed over time. Das and Poole (2004, 9-10) explain that they approach the state as multiple in terms of the practices state actors enact. Here state actor practices included containment, deportation, and incorporation. State actors’ practices aimed at slowing down Syrian refugees’ movement across the border altering the terms of their presence in Turkey (cf. Andrijasevic 2010). Syrian refugees learnt of the changes in practice through rumour and news of others’ attempts to cross the border. The practices affected Syrian refugees’ decisions and

\textsuperscript{86}Persons crossing the border from Syria were subject to varying responses from the Turkish state actors represented by the Turkish border guards and military. That border is the object of a different set of concerns than the border with the EU.

\textsuperscript{87}The EU-TU deal cements this asymmetrical partnership, but it is necessary to highlight the ways Turkey uses Syrian refugee presence and its geographical position as a European borderland as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the EU.

\textsuperscript{88}The Temporary Protection Regulation (no. 29153) only mentions processes about those under Temporary Protection entering Turkey.
calculations of how they sought to move. The three case studies examine the different practices of containment, deportation, and finally inclusion.

Sayed

I was introduced to Sayed in October 2012 through a contact, Malik, who had already reached Greece. Sayed was in his early 40s and from Damascus. He travelled to Lebanon and from there came to Istanbul by plane. Malik had arranged for Sayed to move from Izmir, so he never stopped in Istanbul, only changed flights to catch a plane to Izmir. After two weeks waiting in Izmir, he and 40 other refugees from Syria boarded two tourist yachts to make their way to one of the Greek islands. The Turkish coastal guard stopped the yachts. Sayed explained later on that the coastal guards were looking for drugs and were not aware that those on board were trying to cross to Greece. Finding the drugs on board led to the uncovering of their attempted crossing. The refugees who were on board the yacht were held in a police station in a coastal town nearby. After a week, the police transferred them to a state-run camp in southern Turkey. They had all entered Turkey legally, i.e. using their passports. In the camp, their passports were taken away when they were registered, and the camp administration issued them camp identity cards. The following day, Sayed got a permission slip to leave the camp. He boarded a bus to Istanbul and arrived the next day. Malik had sorted out another journey and accommodation for him in Istanbul. I met Sayed in the otogar, the main Istanbul bus station on the European side, to take him to the Aksaray. As I walked around trying to spot a man who met Malik’s description, I noticed two policemen standing to the side of one part of the terminal, and I remembered Sayed had no documentation on him.

89 It is a standard practice in Turkey that persons seeking asylum must hand over their passports to the DGMM—formerly the Emniyat Genel Müdürlüğü. If the asylum seekers are from outside Europe, their passports would be returned when they leave Turkey to be resettled elsewhere or if they chose to withdraw their asylum claim.
Nervously, I made another turn and arrived again outside the metro station stairs to see a man standing there who fit Malik’s description. Unlike me, Sayed barely glanced at the policemen.

Malik had arranged for him to stay with some Kurdish middlemen who worked for a smuggler Malik knew in Athens. These middlemen were supposed to arrange for him to join a rehle (journey) crossing by land to Greece and Malik would pay their contact in Athens after Sayed’s arrival. I accompanied him to Aksaray where he made contact with the Kurdish middlemen, and they sorted out a meeting place. After two days in Istanbul, we met to have breakfast together and just as the food arrived, Sayed received a phone call from one of the middlemen telling him to come back quickly to the apartment as there is a group of people who are going to cross that afternoon. We rushed him to make the rehle as it was not certain when the next journey would take place. The group he moved with were all, by his description, unfriendly Iraqi Kurds. It was raining heavily that day, and the storm continued through the night. Sayed and the group walked through the night in the rain until they reached the Evros river. As they made ready to put the float into the water the gendarmerie\textsuperscript{90} appeared. Sayed threw his shoulder bag at the guide telling him to hold on to it and swam across. He said he made it across the river but turned back as he had no idea how to continue alone without the guide. He returned and was detained with the rest of the group. The group was taken to the detention centre in Edirne. Sayed told the gendarmerie he was Palestinian and gave them a made up name.\textsuperscript{91} He said the Iraqis who were with him said they were Syrian so that they would be taken down to one of the state-run camps and avoid being deported to Iraq. As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, refugees who are Palestinian or claim to be, are usually held for around three to five days and then returned to Istanbul.

\textsuperscript{90} Border guards.
\textsuperscript{91} See Chapter 5 for further discussion of Edirne detention centre.
Several refugees who ended up in this detention centre said the gendarmerie wait till there is a certain number of people in the detention centre before returning them to Istanbul. Sayed said that two or three hours after he arrived, they called out the name he had given them and directed him to a line of people. They placed him with a group of migrants and refugees they were sending back to Istanbul that same night, although he had only been in the detention centre for a limited duration. He explained the next day that as he walked towards the line, he saw two men who had been with him on his first attempt to cross by sea. They had been taken to the same state-run camp and they had made their way back to Istanbul to try and cross again. The men, Abbas and Kassem, started laughing from disbelief when they saw Sayed walking towards the line. When the name Sayed had given was announced they did not know who it was, but when they saw him walk towards the line they started laughing at the coincidence. They were all returned to Istanbul with paper slips giving them two months’ residence in Istanbul. Sayed returned to stay the night with the Kurdish middlemen but he did not want to try to cross the border with them again. When Abbas called him the next day asking if he would like to join them in their attempt, he agreed.92

Sayed was in Turkey for around a month before he moved on to Greece. Sayed’s main engagement with the Turkish state took place at the border, in detention or the refugee camp. In those encounters, state actors sought to slow down his movement and the movement of other refugees who tried to cross with him (cf. Papadopoulos et al. 2008). While held at the police station after the first failed attempt, the group did not know what action would be taken against them. They were unsure if they would be released, if they would be returned to Syria, or if they would be moved to a detention centre. While the police brought a translator to facilitate communication, there was general ambiguity about what measures the police would take. When presented with the

92 See Chapter 3 for continuation.
option of entering a state-run camp or returning to Syria, they chose the state-run camp given the threat to their lives on the Syrian side of the border. In addition, based on their desire to move on from Turkey, being placed on the Syrian side of the border would mean having to cross an additional border. By placing them in the state-run camp, state actors sought to restrict them in a situation where they were acting as mobile bodies and challenging the state’s role in upholding the border. Sayed insisted that the translator did not tell them that they would have to hand over their passports if they agreed to enter the state-run camp. The passports were significant not only as identity documents but also as markers of access to mobility.

In the state-run camp, Sayed waited once again, albeit only a night, to obtain the permission slip to make his way back to Istanbul. In placing him in the state-run camp, state actors made his journey to Europe longer and tried to restrict his movement (cf. De Genova 2016; cf. Andrijasevic 2010). For Sayed and those caught with him, the only way they could be included in the territorial space of Turkey was by accepting to be placed in the physical space of the refugee camp and accepting that they would lose their passports. These spaces, rather than spaces of total governance, are porous and Sayed and the others were able to leave them. They left the camp with documentation that set up the conditions for their presences outside the camps. If police stopped them and found the permission slip on them, they would have taken them back to the camp. By making their way to Istanbul, they struggle against being placed in a category and space that constrained them and limited their migratory ambitions. They struggled against this form of protection and sought to realise their movement to access the type of protection they wanted.

The camp space was supposed to school them in the dynamics or limits of the status assigned to them under the temporary protection. Placing them in the camp was expected to change them from ‘unruly’, mobile, subjects into persons who abide by the limits of the temporary protection (cf. De Genova 2009; cf. Das & Poole 2004, 9). In agreeing to enter the camp, they could be re-
classified as contained and docile bodies, recipients of not only state protection but its benevolence. By entering in the state-run camp, these refugees could be incorporated under the protection given to the Syrian refugees in the camp. This protection differed to that offered to the Syrian refugees present outside the camps. Placing them in the camp positioned them as subjects that need to be monitored or constrained, infantilised, while other Syrian refugees living outside the camp, but in place, did not have to be acted upon in the same way. Their migratory energy directed towards the border with Europe was a threat that required harnessing by constraining them in the camp. In giving them the option of entering the camps, they were made to resemble those already in the camp though they qualified themselves differently based on their perceived and intended mobility.

Sayed accepted entering the state-run camps rather than being deported to Syria. Other refugees did not want to lose their passports and chose to be returned to Syria rather than enter the state-run camps. The following case study examines Adam’s attempt to cross the border and situates his encounters with state actors at the border.

Adam

Sayed lost his passport by accepting to enter the camp. Other refugees aware of that possibility preferred to be placed on the Syrian side of the border rather than lose their passports. Adam was one migrant who made that choice. I randomly met Adam in a café off Istiklal Boulevard in July 2012. He sat on a table next to the one I was sitting at with a friend. We realised that he was an Arabic speaker when he answered his phone and then noticed he was listening in to our conversation. He eventually opened a conversation with us. Adam is Syrian who was in his mid-40s at that time, from Deraa though he had been living in Lebanon for several years. He is married with two children and his wife and two sons were still in Lebanon. Adam came to Istanbul with the intention of moving on to Europe, but without the money to pay smugglers, he sought ways to go
alone or to gain favour with the smugglers from Deraa to make his journey happen. Though he was present in Istanbul for over a year, he never applied for a residence permit. Focused on moving on and unafraid of state actors penalising him if he was stopped without a residence permit, he lived in Istanbul without engaging with state actors. His encounters with state actors occurred at the border.

In early autumn 2012, Adam befriended a young Palestinian man from Gaza who also wanted to go to Europe. The young man invited Adam to stay with him and his friends in their apartment. Some of them worked in textile workshops in the area, and some of them planned to move on. In early October 2012, Adam and two of the young Palestinian men went to Edirne to cross the border to Bulgaria. Different refugees complained that Greece was closed that summer, and Adam insisted that Bulgaria would receive fewer refugees trying to cross. They went to Edirne city and from there hired a taxi to drive them to the border region. They walked during the night but did not cross the border. They contacted a friend in the pre-dawn hours, and he checked their location on Google maps, only to tell them that they were still inside Turkey. The young men, disheartened, insisted on resting in a border village they had arrived at. Adam complained later about the young men with him, saying he warned them that the villagers would contact the police but they ignored him. The village sheikh, seeing them at the mosque door, turned them away from participating in the dawn salat\(^93\) and soon after a villager called the police who came and arrested them. Here the villagers, rather than state actors, upheld the border (cf. Van Houtoum 2011,51). Seeing strangers carrying backpacks the villagers contacted the gendarmerie suspecting they are border crossers.\(^94\)

---

\(^93\) Massad (2015,14) explains the difference between prayers as understood in Christianity tradition and salat in the Islamic religion, and argues that two terms are not synonymous.

\(^94\) Turkish villagers contacted the gendarmerie upon seeing migrants or refugees trying to cross the border or lost in other cases. I am not sure if the gendarmerie asked them to inform them of such occurrences (cf. Perera 2007 for case of Australia) or they were upholding the rule of the state by helping state actors to maintain the border. However, it may be that these villagers would not perhaps inform the gendarmerie about one of their own crossing
In the police station, the police told them off saying they were four kilometres from the border with Bulgaria. Adam concluded from their words and their slowness in preparing the paperwork for the three of them that this part of the border witnessed less migratory activity than other parts of the border. Adam was released that day and made his way back to Istanbul, but the two Palestinian young men were held for around one month in the detention centre in Edirne before they too were released. The police released Adam without telling him to get a tourist residence permit or to go and register in one of the state-run camps. The police’s approach led him to believe the state was actively making procedures easier for Syrians.

Adam returned to Istanbul disappointed because of the young men who accompanied him. He insisted the attempt failed due to them. He eventually gave up on the idea that it is possible to cross alone as he argued that even if he made it into Bulgaria how would he know how to move from there or even how to get to Sofia. He slowly turned to using his connection with the smugglers from Deraa to find a different route. He thought the smugglers would help him, based on their respect for him. From October until the end of December 2012, he befriended the middle man Amr from Deraa who was mentioned before.95

The two sat almost every afternoon in October and November 2013 in the Kitchen, a café in Aksaray. They would sit together and/or with other refugees they knew or who were sharing the rented apartment with them. The café attracted different people, from sex workers, migrants and refugees living in close by Kumkapı to several middle age men who always sat alone.96 Although none of those who sat with Adam, including Adam, were concerned about the police station up the

the border, but migrants and refugees as outsiders are dealt with differently. The distinction of insider and outsider leads to the border being rearranged based on who is trying to cross it regardless of state actor policies and politics of bordering (cf. Joyce 2015).
95 See Chapter 5 for more details.
96 See Chapter 5 for more on the Kitchen.
road from the café, they were attentive to the men sitting alone on tables close by. They suspected that some of these men were police informants listening in to their conversations about routes and crossing the border. To counter the possibility of giving away information they would lean in close to the table, leading the others present to imitate them, or they would lower their voices to speak about the border. At times, Adam raised his voice saying in Arabic how good the situation in Istanbul is in contrast to Bulgaria or Greece, in an attempt to dispel the idea that he intended to move. They feared state actor surveillance thwarting their plans. Even though the Turkish state, as an idea or governing institutions, was absent in other ways, it lurked very close by in those suspected police informants. As Adam and most of the people who sat with him were interested in moving on to Europe, they discussed European border and asylum policies more than talking about the situation in Turkey. Given their forecasted migrations, they did make a point of learning and exchanging information about Turkey’s detention practices. They were concerned with the state actors’ actions towards Syrians caught at the border or those returned to Turkey by the Greek or Bulgarian border guards.

Towards the end of October 2012, Adam moved to Aksaray and stayed in various rented apartments in the area. He remained in the area over the course of the next few months waiting for his planned journey. At one point in time, Amr shared a rented apartment with him, and their acquaintanceship grew. Amr promised to arrange a route for Adam and managed to convince a friend of his from Deraa who worked routes from Greece to elsewhere in Europe to try to move people from Ataturk airport. Adam decided to move on the passport Amr’s connection arranged for him.97 In the fourth week of December 2012, Adam attempted to board a plane using the counterfeit passport; he was arrested and held in the airport detention centre for a day before being

97 See Chapters 4 and 5 for details.
moved to the Foreigners’ Branch in Kumkapı and detained for six days. Adam was allowed to keep his mobile phone with him so the day after his arrest I went to visit him in the branch. The guard outside the Branch looked through my bag, asking me why I had come, before letting me through. The man at the front desk asked me for Adam’s name, and I quickly answered he was my uncle though the policeman did not seem that interested in the details. They called him and directed me to the waiting space next to the entrance. He came through a different door. We sat and spoke for a few minutes. He had asked for a toothbrush, toothpaste, some cigarettes and a telephone charger. We already knew from Sayed’s case and from other Syrian refugees who had been caught trying to pass through the airport that Adam would be given two options either entering a state-run camp or being placed at the border with Syria. He and many other Syrian refugees who were held at the same time as him chose to be placed at the border rather than enter one of the state-run camps.98

On a very cold and rainy day in early January, Adam and other Syrian refugees were taken down to the border and handed over to the FSA fighters who held Bab al-Hawa border crossing at that time. The FSA fighters questioned them briefly and checked their passports, taking on the role of state actors before releasing them. Adam and several other refugees hired some FSA fighters to smuggle them back across the border into Turkey.99 They crossed under heavy rain, wading through mud, on the same night they had entered Syria. Once in Turkey, they boarded a bus headed back to Istanbul. Adam returned to Istanbul with the aim of trying again.

Adam was given the option of remaining under the protection of the state by agreeing to enter a state-run camp. He chose to keep his passport and thus prolonged his journey. He was also by default placed outside of state protection and would be unable to reclaim it again. The state actors

---

98 They signed voluntary return papers.
99 At the time, the factions controlling the border crossing were locally formed, so the fighters knew how to cross back into Turkey. Other non-local groups took control of the border crossing later on.
while excluding him and other Syrian refugees by deporting them knew they would be able to re-enter Turkey. The practice served to change the terms of their presence when they re-entered, and penalise them for trying to cross the border. Disciplining refugees by prolonging their journeys has been used in a variety of contexts as explored in Chapter 1. Adam’s case demonstrates the ways Syrian refugees accounted for the possibility of ending up in a precarious situation with Turkish state actors due to their attempt to cross the border with Europe. They altered their calculations to account for the changing state actor practices to govern their mobility. He accepted the deceleration of his mobility by being placed at the border over losing his documents. In making these calculations, Syrian refugees dealt with a situation where they moved between categories, statuses and degrees of visibility.

Kenan and Rezan

Kenan’s family is from Qamishli in Syria. He and Amira lived in Lebanon for many years before moving back to Syria in 2006 during the Israel war against Lebanon. He owned four shops in Qamishli and had turned two into family businesses while renting the others. One shop was a hairdresser, and the other sold bridal wear. Amira explained that she learned hairdressing and would help Kenan’s sister to run the store while he handled the bridal wear shop. In 2009 following problems in Syria, he came to Istanbul with his wife and children. He wanted the family to continue to Europe, they had attempted once and failed, losing the money they had put forward in the attempt. The family eventually settled in one of the suburbs of Istanbul where Amira has relatives; like many Kurds in Syria, her family has family on the Turkish side of the border. They then applied with UNHCR to seek asylum as Kenan had faced problems with the regime in Syria. They underwent one interview and were waiting for UNHCR to contact them for the other interviews.
granted temporary protection to all Syrian nationals entering Turkey, the family’s application with UNHCR was stalled. UNHCR told them to go and register in one of the state-run camps in southern Turkey as the state would provide for them there.

I was introduced to the family in the winter of 2012. At that time, Amira was in her mid-thirties, and Kenan was in his early forties. They were a family of 8 and depended on their teenage daughters to support the family. Kenan did not want to continue in this way and, after the halting of their asylum application in Turkey, was thinking of crossing and seeking asylum to then bring over his wife and children through family reunification processes. He attempted to cross in February 2013 with Rezan, his 21-year-old son. They were caught while still inside Istanbul hiding in a truck being loaded onto a freighter ship heading to Europe. At first, they were held at a police station close to where they were caught and then moved to the Foreigners’ Branch in Kumkapı. The officers in the Branch were not sure what to do with their case as the family had applied for asylum and they had a file with UNHCR. The officers held them for around four weeks, telling Kenan that news would arrive about their case soon. When I visited her in February, and she explained what happened, Amira had not been to see them in the branch. She could not leave her youngest two children alone, and she was worried the officers might arrest her if she went to the Branch. Amira was anxious about them, as the officials were taking Syrian refugees caught trying to cross to Europe to the border with Syria and handing them over to the FSA on the Syrian side of the border. She explained that whenever the number of Syrian refugees in the branch reached 40 or 45 persons, they arranged their transport south. She worried as her son, stubborn at times, was insisting that if he was taken to Syria, he was going to go to Qamishli and stay there. She did not want that as she knew he would become involved with the factions fighting there. Unlike Sayed and Adam, the Syrian refugees held at the same time as Kenan and Rezan were not given a choice of entering the camps or returning to Syria. They were taken to the border. Kenan and his son were
eventually released from the Foreigners’ Branch because of their file with UNHCR. They were
told to go south to one of the state-run camps and register there. They made their way home to
Jazira neighbourhood.

I saw them the following day. Rezan told stories about being in the branch. According to him,
the officers had not let them leave before because they were using him as a translator given he
speaks Turkish well. While his son boasted, Kenan was greatly bothered by the experience and did
not want to talk about it. Rezan explained when I asked about the officers placing Syrian refugees
at the border that they were crossing back into Turkey. He said, “You will laugh at this story! Some
of the people they (the police) took down (to the border) when the police arrived back at the otogar
[bus station] (in Istanbul) they were already there. The police saw them and asked them ‘how did
you make it back before us?!”’

These refugees were not given the option of remaining protected- being reincorporated under
the temporary protection- by entering the camps. They were placed at the border, outside of
protection. The general condition for their continued presence in Turkey was that they agree to
remain in place. With their refusal to comply with the condition they could enter Turkey again, but
without passing border control or getting an entry stamp. From the time Adam tried to the time
Kenan and his son did, refugees experienced the conditions of their presence more acutely. They
were not given a choice or a path to be re-incorporated but were placed outside of protection
entirely.

The practice rather than preventing refugees from trying to cross again appropriated their time
prolonging their journey and slowing down their mobility (cf. Andersson 2014; Mezzadra
&Nielson 2013; Andrijasevic 2010). Rezan found the story he recounted entertaining because it
highlighted the ways decelerating refugee mobility failed. The story included a temporal or speed
reversal as the refugees in question not only made it back to Istanbul, but they made it back faster
than or at the same time as the police. He was celebrating their ability to overcome state actors’
actions and in ways state actors (apparently) did not imagine possible.

Kenan waited a few months before attempting to cross the border again, by that point, Syrian
refugees caught trying to cross the border were returned to the closest city with a residence permit
appointment. Kenan tried twice more before succeeding the third time in July 2013. He made it to
Germany and sought asylum there.100

Following the availability of the identity cards across Turkey, the practice continued whereby
Syrian refugees caught trying to cross the border to Europe were detained for a short period and
then released with an identity card. The practice meant they were registered as present even if they
managed to leave Turkey. Due to this change in practice, they could if they wanted to remain in
Turkey under the temporary protection since the identity cards signalled their incorporation into
that category.101 The practice shifted from containment and deportation to making them legible (cf.
Scott 1998). Registering them is part of state actor practices that according to Das and Poole
(2004,9) “all intended, in some sense, to consolidate state control over subjects, populations,
territories, and lives.” In this case, I suggest that registering them and releasing them serves a
different purpose one of amplifying the number of Syrian refugees present in Turkey. This
amplification was drawn on, for instance, in the summer of 2015 during the refugee influx into and
across Europe. It was used later on as bargaining tool with the EU. The summer of 2015 reminded
the EU of Turkey’s significant role in guarding and upholding the border to Europe. The continued
threat of 2.7 million102 registered Syrian refugees, other than refugees and migrants of other

---
100 See Chapter 3 for further details.
101 Since the fieldwork, I have not followed the change in practices regarding Syrian refugees caught at the border. Further research is needed to examine the changes since the fieldwork.
102 I argue that the number is not representative as many more Syrian refugees may be present but not registered under temporary protection as was explained in previous sections. Also, there may be many Syrian refugees who were registered under the temporary protection but who managed to cross the border.
nationalities present in Turkey, is a powerful reminder of Turkey’s importance in guarding the border to Europe and containing migrant and refugee energy.

**Conclusion**

The chapter discusses state actor practices and state policies enacted towards Syrian refugees, present in Istanbul or caught trying to cross the border to Europe. The practices and policies formulate an understanding of the particularities of the temporary protection in place. The chapter focused on the interplay between state actors’ practices and state policies, and the ways Syrian refugees navigated these practices, policies and the variations over time. I compared the ways state actors and state policies distinguished Syrian refugees in place in Istanbul from those trying to cross the border to Europe. In the process, I analyse the different subjectivities state actor policies, and practices aimed to produce. In Istanbul, state actors sought to make Syrian refugees legible, and define the conditions of their continued presence. Regardless of state actor policies, Syrian refugees in Istanbul sought to build lives and found ways to ensure their continued presence and access. In contrast, state actors’ responses to Syrian refugees caught trying to cross the border to Europe highlighted a different series of concerns. The response demonstrates the significance of this migratory energy as a challenge to Turkey’s role in maintaining the border with the EU. State actors’ responses to this migratory energy focused on constraining it by relegating Syrian refugee border crossers to the state-run camps, deporting them to Syria, and then finally incorporating them under the temporary protection to re-inscribe the mobility into the Turkish state’s relationship with the EU.

The chapter explores how Syrian refugees’ relations with Turkish state actors constituted different spaces. Various spaces were used to detain refugees. The diversity of the spaces reflects the reformulation of the conditions of their continued presence in Turkey. Drawing on Andrijasevic
(2010), detention and deportation are here productive in the same way. Turkish state actors sought to modulate and alter the speed of Syrian refugees’ migration to Europe. In the process, they imposed temporal regimes on Syrian refugees. Their detention and deportation to Syria served the productive function of slowing down mobility to Europe rather than preventing it. In the chapter, I sought to demonstrate the interplay of oppositional and co-constitutive acts between these actors in a context of continuous change.
Chapter 3

Enforced Waits: Waiting for Smugglers, Bureaucrats, and Journey Companions

Sayed whom we met in the previous chapter decided to join Kassem and Abbas, the refugees whom he tried to cross with the first time and met up with again in the detention centre in Edirne. Once back in Istanbul, they contacted him asking if he would like to join them on their next attempt. They and some other refugees intended to go to Izmir, and they would go from there to one of the Greek islands. Sayed agreed to move with them, and we met them close to Aksaray metro station. They guided us to the rented apartment they were staying with the other people who wanted to move which included a married couple and another woman. They were going to wait awhile that night before moving as one of the people who wanted to move, Mohammad, was waiting for someone to pay him back 100 US Dollars he was owed.

The apartment was a few streets away from the metro station, a blue 1950s style apartment building. We followed Kassem and Abbas up the stairs to the first-floor apartment where they knocked on the door explaining the bell did not work. We took off our shoes at the door and brought them inside, placing them neatly alongside the other shoes lined up next to the door. The front door opened onto a living room with a television and a set of sofas. The light turquoise blue of the walls and high ceilings made the furniture look small. Malak and Soumaya sat watching the television. They greeted us and made room for us on the sofas, and we all sat together.

Malak, Mohammed’s wife, had only been in Turkey for a week and had not attempted to cross yet. Soumaya was a Kurdish woman in her early 40s. She had attempted to cross more than once and was worried as the border guards had explained that if she was caught at the border again, she would be put in prison for a time. They were waiting for Mohammed to return, and based on when he came, they would either move to Izmir that night or the next day. We sat watching television.
and chatting. They recounted stories of their attempts and detentions interspersed with flicking through TV channels searching for something to watch. The evening wore on.

Around two in the morning, Malak asked Kassem to phone her husband to see if they should go to sleep or stay up. She did not dare to phone as he would tell her off for checking up on him. Around two thirty in the morning, Mohammad returned, and they began preparing their things to go to the bus station to go to Izmir. Sayed’s backpack had been next to him all evening. He put it on his lap as everyone else got their things together. Kassem began to fold up a jumper he was drying on the laundry rack close to the kitchen. Abbas went into another room to bring out his backpack and jacket. Mohammed called a taxi driver asking him to meet them at Aksaray metro station to take them to the bus garage. In the midst of the packing, someone turned off the TV. Soumaya went into the bedroom next to the TV room, coming back with her handbag and a small travel bag she could carry in her hands. She stood leaning against the door frame. Malak, Mohammed’s wife, had her handbag on her shoulder and was standing next to the window looking out on the street below. Mohammed asked Sayed, “Will we fit?” Sayed responded referring to me, “She is not coming with us.”

Malak, standing at the window, suddenly said, “wait. Wait.” A police car had just driven up the street and stopped a few buildings away. Her husband, Mohammed, came and stood next to her at the window watching the car. They wanted to see if it would move along. It would look suspicious if they all left the apartment at the same time, with backpacks and bags in their hands. I was sitting on the edge of the sofa, and seeing Soumaya leaning on the door frame of the adjoining room; I offered her my seat. She refused and went to sit on the edge of the bed in the room placing her bags on her lap. We all just paused, looking at each other or avoiding meeting each other’s’ eyes, at the ground, or towards Malak to hear that the car moved on. Mohammed debated aloud the best way for them to move, deciding that each of the two of the men would leave with one woman.
We would leave in two lots, so as not draw attention. The taxi driver called at that point saying that they were waiting for them. We began to leave, three at a time. We headed towards Aksaray metro station walking in the opposite direction to the police car. They did not follow. We reached Aksaray metro station, and they got into the two waiting taxis.

While different refugees’ narratives of their attempts to cross the border and their preparations to do so are included in the thesis, I was very rarely present for the actual time before they set off (cf. De Leon 2015, 12-14). This chapter focuses on waiting and discusses the ways different actors, part of the assemblage discussed in the introduction, impose waits on Syrian refugees. As the introduction argued, Syrian refugees were not passive subjects but navigated and responded to these different waits and changes in variables. They co-constituted themselves as subjects in these processes balancing waiting with the decision to move or end a wait. All the case studies referred to in the chapter except the last one focus on waits prior to moving to Europe. The final case study discusses one Syrian refugee’s wait and efforts to become a Turkish citizen.

**Waiting**

In this chapter, I explore waiting in existential terms, waiting in relation to productivity, and waiting in relations of power. Waiting, to borrow from Hage’s (2009a, 6) analysis, “happens in time in the sense that time and time frames pre-exist the subjects that are waiting within them. On the other hand, waiting *creates* time. That is, various modalities of waiting produce temporalities that may or may not be in tune with other social and natural temporalities.”

Particular relations of waiting create time where time is marked by varying qualities. People experience waiting and assign meaning to their waits differently (Gasparini 1995, 37). By distinguishing different kinds of waits or the temporal horizons implied in the wait, it is possible to explore the spectrum of waits. Waiting

---

103 Emphasis added.
takes on various qualities, and at times individuals experience multiple simultaneous waits (cf. Elliot 2016,104). Waits are classified dependent on the context of the wait, the expected outcome or how long the wait extends for (cf. Reed 2003). While people may wait for the sake of waiting (cf. Schweizer 2008), many waits happen in expectation of specific events (Elliot 2016) or with a particular long-term future in mind (Jeffrey 2010). One mode of describing waiting is as “existential or situational” (Hage 2009,4) where existential waiting might be difficult to pin down, and situational waiting is the product of relations and engagement with others. Moving between situational or existential waiting is not a marked action as the person waiting does not pass a threshold, but rather the distinction serves as a mode of thinking about how waits differ (Dwyer 2009,25). Waiting articulates a relationship between the present and the future given the expectancy implied within it; however, as several of the ethnographic examples that will be discussed here show, the expectation is in many cases delayed to an indefinite temporal horizon.

Refugees wait for smugglers, bureaucrats, and their families, among others, making it necessary to examine not only how people move but also the ways waiting is incorporated into their migratory journeys. Here I draw on Conlon’s (2011,353) comment that refugees’ waits are “a significant facet of (im)mobility.” As examined in Chapter 2, being forced to wait trains subjects to act in certain ways that are productive within a wider migratory regime. In this chapter, I examine the ways refugees’ wait, discuss their waiting, and their responses to being made to wait. It is necessary to mention that I examine waiting in relation to movement and being in place in Istanbul, and not in connection to the war in Syria. The discussion of waiting extends beyond refugees’ relations with state actors. I argue that the different waits highlight the diversity of subjectivities produced. In the chapter, I foreground the interplay of control and movement, and the continuous attempt to subordinate and resubordinate insubordinate refugee energy.
Waiting as part of a relationship implies the hope for or the anticipation of a result or response. Bourdieu (2000, 228) explains waiting within a relationship as based on a predictable framework where participants anticipate that a response or action will happen but without being certain about the exact timing. The anticipation, however, can also be arbitrary where the party made to wait is entirely at the mercy of the actor enforcing the wait. For Bourdieu, waiting can be experienced as the effect of another’s power where that other has the ability to “…defer, delay, raise false hopes or conversely, rushing, taking by surprise” (Bourdieu 2000, 228). Waiting for another’s response or action, or for a result, indicates subjects accept to ‘wait’. To accept to wait is an act of self-discipline; an aspect of self-governance (Jeffrey 2010, 17; Hage 2009b). Jeffrey (2010, 17) uses the idea of waiting as self-discipline to analyse how young unemployed men in Uttar Pradesh are “persuaded and compelled” to wait for a government job they have been raised and educated to expect. Using the idea of self-discipline to approach a different context, Hage (2009b) explores the intersection of existential waiting, governmentality, and migration in the context of Australia. He argues that existential mobility or rather its lack (being “existentially stuck”) presents itself as a crisis as for “white established” Australians. He explains how migrants’ social and existential mobility is envied by their “white established neighbours” given the speed they seem to move at. He likens their perceived speed in accumulating or social mobility to queue jumping. The speed and mobility goes against their white neighbour’s overall sense of being “stuck” and extenuates difference. Migrants’ social mobility stands in contrast to being patient and waiting things out. He explains how waiting out the crisis, ‘enduring,’ is constructed as socially valuable. Hage (2009b, 101-102) describes endurance as a form of self-governance since sticking out a crisis, being patient, aim at preserving an overarching social order and its limitations. His approach highlights modes of othering where migrant actors’ social mobility, their taking and their perceived queue jumping, is constructed as intrinsic to them rather than the result of particular relations. Underlying
Hage’s (2009b) argument are questions of deservedness and who should wait or endure. The chapter will discuss enduring through various case studies highlighting the continuous tension between enduring a wait and taking. I approach refugees’ decisions to cross the border as a form of taking since they are acting rather than waiting for states to select them through refugee resettlement or sponsorship programs.

While various authors discuss waiting as a form of self-discipline, it is necessary to explore interlocutors’ tacit acceptance as much as their actions to counter or end waits. Even if the wait is a form of self-discipline, it is not necessarily a uniform or singular experience, and actors may affect their waiting while still accepting to wait it out. Jeffrey’s (2010) interlocutors expressed a similar sense of the ‘stuckness’ Hage (2009) describes, but they countered it by socialising their waits and building relations. Brun (2015), discussing the case of internally displaced persons from Abkhazia in Georgia, adopts “agency in waiting” as a way of explaining how actors alter their waits within the institutional limitations while still waiting for the future of return to Abkhazia. Her interlocutors continue to project an awaited return and future in Abkhazia, but until then they engage with multiple actors to gain access to rights based on their status as displaced persons. Much as Bourdieu (1976) explains about marriage practices in Béarn, a series of possible actions based on the situation are available, but the actions did not alter the social significance of marriage. Brun’s interlocutors’ actions do not influence the bureaucratic process or the relations but highlight how they pursed different actions within the boundaries of both waiting and the institutional framework. As such the chapter focuses on exploring the ways refugees influence aspects of their wait even if they were unable to end the wait or change the relations of domination.

The chapter focuses on the ways refugees wait for bureaucratic processes, since this was part of their experience these were relations refugees could end or get out of. It then becomes necessary to examine how they influenced their waits and affected the relationship. Discussing liminality,
Bayart (2007, 283) comments, “One might even say that a large part of the experience of waiting constitutes the liminal experience in the product of bureaucratic action… liminal time is bureaucratic, and it secretes bureaucratic imaginings.” While Bayart (2007) does not restrict being forced to wait to relations with the bureaucracy, waiting is a pronounced characteristic of engagement with bureaucracy (cf. Auyero 2012; cf. Corbridge 2004; cf. Day 2015). Auyero (2012) examines the ways Argentinians wait in benefit offices to receive state support. He highlights issues of class and the various actors and situations which force people to rely on state support, and in turn implicate them in relations of power. Waiting becomes a means of examining the power relations that arise between bureaucrats, as representatives of the state, and recipients of state care. He argues that the waiting trains them in patience and draws on Bourdieu (2000) to describe them as “patients of the state.” It is not just state bureaucracies that can impose waits. With a focus on migratory institutions, El-Shaarawi (2015) situates the ways various actors affect the lives of Iraqi refugees’ living in Cairo and waiting for a future elsewhere. The Egyptian state, UNHCR, and her interlocutors themselves, their financial and social capital, all affect the relations they enter and the waits they endure. Her analysis highlights how the Iraqi refugees, in a similar manner to Auyero’s (2012) interlocutors, were trained to be patients but of the refugee institutions on which they depend for their long-term resettlement rather than the Egyptian state. As discussed in the introduction, I use the concept of assemblage to situate the various actors who impose waits on refugees. In a bid to complement these ethnographic studies, I examine the different relations and analyse the waits imposed within a single frame.

**Productivity and Waiting**

Diverse ethnographic examples highlight the relationship between waiting and economic productivity as well as countering it by shifting emphasis away from a focus on economic
productivity. Waiting becomes emblematic of the lack of employment opportunities (cf. Ralph 2008), waiting is approached as a respite from economic rhythms and relations (Schweizer 2008), and it is approached as a sign of individuals’ failure to move ahead in life stages (Bourdieu 2000). Jeffrey (2010) examines waiting in the context of Uttar Pradesh where lower middle-class men enter higher education and continue to study for several years as they wait to access public sector jobs. The young men socialise by hanging out at particular street corners. While most dismissed this waiting as just a way of passing the time, others highlighted that it offered the possibility to gain information or make contacts that would not be possible otherwise. Waiting is reformulated in ways different to gaining jobs or economic productivity for it to be considered socially valuable, or expressed as socially valuable by these men. Similarly discussing waiting, productivity and value, Ralph (2008) examines the tea making practices of Senegalese youths in Dakar. He explores how they refer to the tea making as a means of “killing time” but without it being a reference to countering a wait for a particular anticipated event (Ralph 2008,15). For these youths perfecting tea making becomes a means of countering their wait for jobs and futures promised by politicians but never delivered (2008,24). He comments (2008,17) that

“If we define value as a meaningful consequence of human activity, transformed into social relationships that structure a system of production, we might begin to deliberate at greater length about how youth mold an institution—like attaya [tea making]- that exists apart from wages labor even as it shapes a particular relationship of estrangement from a discernible labor market.”

His observations present the possibility of discussing value and productivity as both tied to labour and economic relations but without the activities being limited to labour relations. He explains these activities as still tied to the economy while serving as a critique of the economic situation (2008,24). Youths in tea houses or street corners whiling their days away appear in Bourdieu’s (2000) discussion of the Kabyle. Their elders denigrated the young men for the perceived lack of
productivity, their idleness as their time was passing without generating anything notable to show for it.

Migration appears, at least in Ralph’s (2008) account, as a means of countering the stagnation and ending a wait, but at a high risk. As Elliot (2016) comments about residents in Tadla in Morocco, migration and waiting to migrate become one way of countering the conflict over time and productivity. By moving elsewhere, the young men created the possibility of moving ahead in expected life stages (Ralph 2008). Yet as Elliot (2016) explains the migration made moving ahead in life stages, getting married or starting a family, possible, but they were not necessarily conducive of entering a new stage of life as a married couple. Many of the couples she discusses were living apart, the husband in Europe and wife and children in Morocco. At the same time, migration may hinder moving on with those stages. Griffiths (2013, 29) mentions how many asylum seekers waiting for their cases to be processed complain about not being able to move on in their expected life stages as they waited, sometimes for years, for the result of their asylum application. Waiting instead of working, with work set up as a means to move on in life stages, become an adult, marry and start a family, then highlights a subjectivity that can only be incorporated as socially valuable with difficulty. The waiter embodies the possibility of other ways of existing for that community, ways that may or may not be included as socially valuable. While this approach focuses on reincorporating refugees into the social group, Sanchez (2015) highlights how migration can act as a form of escape from constraints and social obligations. Drawing on these different interrogations, in the following I focus on the ways migrating is discussed as socially valued. I argue that while not economic productivity, migrating must be approached as a form of labour in refugees’ endeavours to achieve themselves by arriving in Europe. Migration emerges as another form of productivity and one intimately related to refugees’ time. Waiting for many refugees, as will be
shown here, was approached as an appropriation of their time, not as economic subjects but as social subjects.

**Waiting for Others**

As mentioned before, in most of the instances included in this thesis, I was not present while interlocutors prepared to move, even if Sayed’s and the others’ journey that night was just one leg of their extended journeys. For other refugees, the same actions may have been replicated as they waited to board a boat leaving for Kos or a car heading to Edirne (cf. De Leon 2012). At least in others’ narratives of preparing to start the journey to cross the border, the same themes emerged, but the energy and postures were not evoked in the same way. That evening, they waited for Mohammad to send word or return, and yet those last few minutes presented an energy that was markedly different to the rest of the evening. To understand the particularity of that wait, I draw on Schweizer’s (2008) analysis. Throughout the evening no one asked when Mohammad would return or how long they would have to wait (Schweizer 2008,23). Schweizer (2008,21-23) explains that in such waits the waiter is forced to confront him/herself, and deal with the reality that s/he is undergoing changes while still waiting. He argues that a wait that is felt and not thought (in terms of quantifiable time) makes waiters uncomfortable, and waiters seek to evade the feeling by looking at their watches or pacing (2008,24).

Throughout the evening, we were socialising and pretending to be engaged with watching TV to avoid dealing with the lingering question of how long we would have to wait. With Mohammad’s return, it seemed like the wait was over and while no one sighed in relief, they all spurned into action. With Malak spotting the police car came an interruption and the possibility of another wait of unknown length. In this instance, while no one fidgeted or asked the question, it was impossible to avoid feeling this wait or even mask it by socialising as we had done before. Soumaya tried to
hide that she was feeling the wait by refusing my offer of a seat and going inside to sit on the bed as if she could master the wait. The rest of us looked around and avoided each other’s eyes not to see our enduring the wait reflected in those around us. Ironically, nothing happened once they left the apartment building as the police did not stop them. They made their way to Izmir without a problem. The mundane nature of the wait and its end highlight that the mundane has a place in the processes of crossing the border. Perhaps it is a mark of the slow and interrupted nature of crossing the border.

Sayed experienced a series of waits for various people and institutions from the time of his arrival in Turkey. It is an example of the ways migration is a series of starts and stops until refugees arrive at what they consider their final destination (cf. Hess 2010). His waits in the different instances he was detained in the police station, the camp or detention centre resembled the “interstitial” time Gasparini (1995) speaks of where waits are like hyphens or gaps between other times. In this case, time to prepare or move. Sayed approached his different detentions as obstacles to be overcome to then achieve his aimed migration. His detentions forced him to wait with uncertainty when he would be released as explained in the previous chapter. Time moving was more valuable as it signalled that he was closer to achieving the next phase of his journey. Movement also countered the uncertainty about that next stage, as arriving in Greece would be one stage within the longer journey. Moving as an action bringing one closer to one’s aim took precedence over stasis where being in place, settled, may have taken precedence in other instances.

The group intending to move that night highlights the ways crossing the border alters gender boundaries even if only transiently. In this case, social rules making it difficult or suspicious for non-kin women and men to spend time together or even to share the same house were overlooked by those involved. The shifting boundaries highlight the demands of the situation where it was necessary to modify relations. By shifting these social boundaries, the possibility opened to form
these ties. In the absence of extensive social or kinship networks, networks or connections were created to fill the gap. These relations were depended on and drawn on during refugees attempts to cross the border (Chapter 5).

‘Time has its right’

Hamid is from Khan Shakhyun in Idlib province. He was in his early thirties and single when he came to Istanbul. He came to Turkey though his family remained on their farm in Idlib. They grow pistachio nuts, and he loved showing me photographs of their crops. They lived well from selling the pistachios, but he was not sure what would happen with that year’s harvest given the situation in Syria. I met him in early October 2012. The first time I spoke to him on the phone, he was in the detention centre, ‘el camp’ as refugees call it, in Edirne. He had been caught while attempting to cross the border into Bulgaria with three other refugees. I met him a few days later in Aksaray following his return to Istanbul. Over a tea, he explained briefly how he was caught at the border in this attempt. He had not slept the night before and was erratic in his recounting of events. He had already tried to cross once before but had not succeeded. In contrast to these recent attempts, he started recounting in detail how he had crossed to Greek Cyprus several years ago. The recent attempts were perhaps too close to deal with in that moment and the older attempt was easier to talk about. He described crossing into Iskenderun by hiring a smuggler, the boat journey to Turkish Cyprus, the number of men on the board with him, the cold wind hitting them and shaking the boat, the truck that took them from Northern Cyprus to the Greek side, and the reception his friends in Cyprus gave him. He went into great detail conjuring up the general atmosphere of the journey, his postures and bodily status throughout; from the wind hitting the boat to the bumpy ride in the back of a truck from the Turkish to the Greek side. After a year working as a tractor driver,

---

104 The no visa policy between Syria and Turkey was not instituted until 2009 (Devrim & Soler 2010).
Hamid was arrested and deported back to Syria. He said he had not wanted to leave Syria again until the regime started bombing his area after the outbreak of the revolution. Once the regime began bombing his area he decided to go to Turkey.

Hamid is from the south of Idlib province, and he explained on a different occasion how he went north, using a paper napkin and the sugar bowl on the table we were sitting at to clarify the geography of Idlib. He crossed the border into Turkey and went to Reyhanli. There someone told him that it would be better for him to enter on his passport, so he crossed back into Syria and passed through the Bab al-Hawa crossing point to go into Turkey with an entry stamp. He made his way to Istanbul with the aim of continuing to Europe. When he first came to Istanbul, he went to different European embassies to ask if there was a possibility of going through them. He was directed to NGOs and UNHCR but they told him that there is no way to go to European countries, neither through the embassies nor UNHCR. Without a way of moving on legally, he started attempting to cross the border himself. Hamid came to Turkey with 3000 US dollars of which, at the time I met him, only 1500 remained. The sum was not enough for him to hire a smuggler so he attempted to cross with other refugees who were in a similar situation to him.

The first time he tried to cross to Greece, the man he went with had lived in Greece before and had documentation that enabled him to work in Greece. Hamid explained how they had come close to the Turkish fencing at the border. They suddenly heard a dog barking and found themselves being encircled by a dog followed by two members of the Turkish gendarmerie. He said the dog kept circling and barking, so they put their bags on the ground and stood waiting. The gendarmerie, whom he referred to as soldiers, gave them each an apple and told them not to come during the day. They took them to a part of the border close by and showed them the entrance to a tunnel. They took them through the tunnel and Hamid explained that there were blankets in the tunnel, so he guessed that other refugees had passed through it. The tunnel brought them out on the Greek
side. The gendarmerie warned them to come at night because the Greeks watch the other side of
the tunnel. The gendarmerie then returned them to the spot they found them in. Hamid said that he
and his travel companion misunderstood and thought the gendarmerie meant to take them across
that night. They waited and ended up falling asleep in the same place. In the morning, his travel
companion went on to Greece, and Hamid returned to Istanbul. He explained that it is hard to move
on from Greece and this led him to decide to move through Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{105} As such he attempted next
to cross to Bulgaria with three other refugees. This time they had been caught, and he ended up in
Edirne. He did not return with the same men to Istanbul, and he did not want to attempt with them
again.

He and several other men in the \textit{pansiyon} (hostel) where he was staying discussed the options
with each other. Eventually, he found someone with whom he got along. They planned to cross to
Bulgaria and continue from there to Austria or Germany. His companion, Abdullah, was in his
early 20s and from Aleppo. Hamid said the last time I saw him before he moved that Abdullah
made him laugh a lot, but then he would get serious telling Hamid, “Time is running out, and we
are still here.” With their goal of moving on, the passing of time reminded them of where they were
and that they still had to make an attempt to cross the border. Only in crossing the border, moving,
were they making use of time. Another time he recited a proverb, “Time is a sword, either you cut
it, or it cuts you.”

In attempting to cross or searching for routes and travel companions he was making use of
time where time was a limited resource. In fighting time by moving, Hamid mediated the pressing
urgency he felt to move on. He explained that he was afraid of being caught at the border again and

\textsuperscript{105} In 2012, many Syrian refugees maintained that it was difficult to move on from Greece by land, and favoured
moving from Greece by aeroplane. For this reason, many refugees wanted to move through Italy or Bulgaria or to
go directly to their destination by plane.
that he did not know if he could deal with the disappointment. He complained about being anxious and not sleeping well or at all because he was always thinking. “If you are unhappy here, you can go back to Lebanon or Britain. I can’t go back, and I can’t stay here,” he said as we walked towards a bus stop in Aksaray the last time I saw him. “I am thinking all the time, this is the difference between you and me. You can sit there and ask the questions and your mind is at ease. I can’t,” he continued.

Two days after he made that comment, Hamid attempted to cross the border again and succeeded. He and Abdullah went to Edirne and hired a taxi driver to drive them as close as possible to the border with Bulgaria. As they crossed the fence, the Turkish gendarmerie appeared, but they managed to make it across to the Bulgarian side of the border. From the border region, they hired a taxi to drive them to Sofia. They were waiting for a contact there to give them a place to stay before they continued to Austria. The next time I had word from him, he was in a detention centre in Sofia. The following winter he made it to Germany and sought asylum there.

Hamid’s repeated attempts, his failure, detention and consequent return to Istanbul was the norm rather than the exception for most refugees. Hamid’s movement across the border was dependent on no one but himself and his ability to find someone to cross with, organise the logistics of the journey, and undertake the physical act of crossing the border. In waiting for the right person to move with, Hamid like Sayed fostered social ties (cf. Minnegal 2009). Minnegal (2009) argues that by waiting for others, people create sociality. He waited out of choice until he was ready to move although he worried about the crossing and the uncertainty of his success. Hamid’s inability to hire a smuggler was not based on his disdain for their work (Chapter 4), but on the limits of his finances. At the same time, despite his limited funds he did not chose to remain in Istanbul, and look for work, or stay in the southern provinces in a state run camp. His decision to continue to Istanbul and to move to Europe was a means of gaining some control over his present and future.
In the proverb he mentioned about time, Hamid set up time as an actor. In a manner reflected in the section title, time is agential with the ability to take or claim from human subjects (cf. Das 2007,84-85). An interlocutor spoke to Das (2007,95) of time in a similar manner as a violent perpetrator (cf. Bourdieu on Cervantes 2000,228). The time Hamid mentions is swift and violent in its onslaught. Bourdieu (2000,228) discussing waiting and relations of power comments that such conceptualization of time as an agent that affects human life, reified time as being outside of human conception. Hamid did not struggle with middlemen stalling his movement but faced the border and state actors actively seeking to curtail his mobility. Perhaps by setting up time as an actor working against him, time came to step in for the unidentified state actors and border regime. Even as he worried about another unsuccessful attempt, he did not express his anger at or blame state actors for stopping him. It was time that worked against him and not state actors or the border regime.

Hamid faced a situation of uncertainty about whether or not he would cross the border or be able to continue from there to Europe, but he also affected the uncertainty. In every attempt to cross the border, he tried with different people and he did not stay in the same places to rest when he returned to Istanbul. He did not reduce his uncertainty by creating a rhythm or consistency in his actions or the company he kept. Gasparini (1995) explains that waiting with expectation places a measure of control in the hands of the person waiting, but Hamid was waiting for his expected movement without the sure knowledge of the outcome (cf. Reed 2011,530). In speaking of being worried about the failure of his next attempt, he evoked the ways his uncertainty about the future created tiredness and suffering in him. El-Shaarawi (2015,47-49) explains that many of the Iraqi refugees she interviewed in Cairo identified their worries about their situation and future as an additional cause of suffering for them. Hamid spoke about this uncertainty or pain not in a general sense but by comparing his situation to mine. His comments concerned a power dynamic he wanted
to criticise an asymmetry which bothered him. He recognised me as someone who is settled even if not in my ‘usual’ place. For Hamid, I was not settled in place but I was settled in time, whereas he saw himself running or fighting time in an effort to become settled. Here I draw on Martin’s (2010) discussion of “stillness” to conceptualise mobility and immobility en route. Martin (2010, 199-200) argues that migrants’ journeys afford them little possibility of being still or if they are still it is the consequence of the route they are taking, moving by hiding in a truck or ship. While they are still for the duration of the journey they are locked into movement. Hamid was able to rest in Istanbul but with his mind and energy directed towards crossing the border he was unable to experience his presence in Istanbul, a stillness, as a rest. By moving, by crossing the border, he sought to elevate the anxiety he felt. Moving across the border was a way for him to become closer to his goal of begin settled in time and place.

Hamid’s worry about the time he was present in Istanbul highlighted the ways he approached time as a resource running out. Time while present in Istanbul is not valued the same way time elsewhere, whether moving or in Europe, counts. To return to Ralph’s (2008) discussion, Hamid approached time as a resource, something scarce and valuable. Unlike the young men in Dakar, he did not have an abundance of time, but faced a pressing deadline, albeit self-created and self-enforced (cf. Ralph 2008). He did not approach his time as unproductive because he was not working but related it to his migration. Moreover, Hamid did not speak about arriving in Europe to become economically productive or to work, and he was not going to bring over his family. Arriving in his case pertained to his desire to feel settled and regain a sense of security he lost in Syria. Hamid was one of the few people who seemed to approach moving on as a form of escape as he chose to leave Idlib though his family remained behind. His migration was not related to social obligations but a desire to arrive elsewhere.
His travel companion Abdullah connected time and movement, whereby time gained value as a resource only when they were on the move. Biao (2014, 192) comments that for Chinese would-be migrants in north eastern China, there was a sense that the longer they remained in China the more expensive it would be for them to migrate. These would-be migrants set up migration as an opportunity to accumulate enough material wealth in a short period of time to enable them to be secure in the long term future. Migrating was a way of dispelling the uncertainty of the future that was intimately tied to the insecurity they were experiencing in the present. “Migration did not have intrinsic value in itself; it was useful only as a fast way to rush through the present. The present was a burden, and migration displaced the present for the future” (2014, 192). In contrast here, while Hamid spoke about the present as tiring him, the actual process of crossing the border helped him to alleviate that sense. Moving did more than bring the future into the present. It may be argued following Hage (2009a) that as waiting generates time, then moving creates time as well. For Abdullah, the space-time of Istanbul was devalued in the face of a future space-time in Europe that was situated as valuable time or time which counts. Brun (2015) explains in the context of her research with internally displaced persons in Georgia that her interlocutors went about their daily lives and struggled to improve their living conditions where they were; however, they considered the past time in Abkhazia and the possible future of return to Abkhazia as valuable in comparison to a present that never counted in the same way. Bourdieu, (2000, 222) discussing Kabyle young men in Algeria, speaks of the time passed without employment as being considered “dead time, purposeless and meaningless.” Time without work did not count socially and Kabyle young men could not constitute it as a constructive part of a life course. Rather, it was evidence of individuals’ limited accumulation of different forms of capital and hindered any attempt to set up future expectations. Hamid, discussing time running out, highlights that a future elsewhere was valued
over the present of Istanbul. The value of the future of *there* as compared to the present of *here and now* ties in with the expectations of what that future elsewhere will bear.

**Smugglers and Waits**

The various participants in the smuggling business are part of the assemblage of actors who affect refugees and enforce waits. In their relations with passengers who hire them, smugglers adopt a position of dominance obscuring processes and extenuating dependency. In the following vignette the actors in question, Mona and Hussam, a married couple, waited for the middleman they had hired to come through with their journey. Smugglers, middlemen and document salesmen make the refugees who hire their services wait, unintentionally, in many cases. In addition, their processes and dealings are obscure to those hiring them.

Interlocutors set up smugglers as experts on mobility, and in their position as experts, they exercise their dominance over the refugees hiring them. They enforce waits, affect the quality of refugees’ time and positionality (cf. Auyero 2012; Bourdieu 2000). Many male refugees, single or with their families, expressed frustration about being made to wait by smugglers they had hired. They spoke of their independence and ability to act in Syria while here they were being forced to wait. The wait positioned them not as actors but as persons acted upon.

Mona and Hussam, a couple from Deraa, came up to Turkey with the aim of moving on to Europe. I met them in October 2012. They had already tried to cross the border twice by the time I met them. They tried once by sea and another time by land. They wanted to go to Sweden and then bring over their children. Their five children were living in Jordan with their paternal aunt. Mona was in her early thirties and Kurdish from northern Syria. Hussam was in his mid-forties and from Deraa. Mona explained that they were living in Mouadamiya area in Damascus while keeping

---

106 See Chapter 4 for discussion.
a house in Deraa. They had moved back to Deraa when Damascus became unsafe. They then decided to leave Deraa as the regime shelling increased and living expenses rose. They were in Aksaray shopping for a smuggler and sorting out their next attempt. I was introduced to the couple by Adam after he struck up a conversation with them in the Kitchen, a café in Aksaray, one evening (Chapter 5). They started to sit with Adam and the other refugees he sat with. The others were also from Deraa. At that point in time two brothers, Majed and Hani were staying with Adam. Mona and Hussam had made arrangements with one of the smugglers from Deraa. They were waiting for him to tell them when there was a journey to cross by land. For the duration of their presence in Istanbul, they, Adam and the two brothers sat together every afternoon in the Kitchen. A daily routine emerged whereby Adam usually came to the Kitchen around 4 p.m. or a bit later in the day. Some days I would phone him to ask if I could come. I often arrived to find others already seated with him, or they came shortly after me. Mona and Hussam arrived around 6 p.m. They all drank tea and chain smoked together until late in the evening. I usually left at ten, and the others left after me, returning to the places they were staying. Mona and Hussam were staying in a hotel close by while Adam, Majed and Hani were sharing a rented flat.

     By coming every afternoon, they enacted a routine, even if only temporarily. They created a shared time-space with the other refugees they sat with. Refugees similar to the beneficiaries waiting their turn in the benefits offices in Argentina socialise in a bid to counter the frustration and uncertainty that is part of the wait (Auyero 2012,96-97). In the process of their socialising, they made the Kitchen one of their daily focal points. Mona jokingly said after I had been absent from the café for a few days, “We asked about you. We have been here every day, we keep attendance!” She made the comment as a joke given I was part of their ‘sitting’. The comment was

107 Majed and Hani will be introduced in greater detail Chapter 4. They are Palestinians from Deraa who came to Turkey to move on to Europe.
a joke though it implied a consistency that belied the temporariness of the ‘sitting’ we were both participating in (on the ‘as if’ cf. Wedeen 1999). In mentioning attendance, Mona highlighted the anticipation that is part of the routine they were enacting as they waited to move. Her comment brought to the fore the ways attendance mattered as someone’s absence, in this case, might indicate that they had moved on. At the same time, directing the question to me was acknowledging their intended temporary presence without raising the question or accusation that one of the others sitting with them was arranging a journey without giving them forewarning; withholding information about a possible open route. Mona knew I was not moving anywhere, so she could make the joke to me without me interpreting her joke as a disguised accusation.

Mona and Hussam had arranged their passage with a smuggler from Deraa. They wanted to go to Greece by land. They were waiting for news from the smuggler about when they would move. She made various comments throughout the different evenings we sat together about waiting for news from the smuggler. She remarked to Majed and me, “It (the wait) drains you… that is the point almost. It drains you…” A little later she said, “If I were a smuggler I would not let my customer stay more than a day. The longer we stay, the more stories we hear, and our heads get bigger with thinking. I would not let them stay more than a day. Everyone tells us something different. Don't go by sea, don't go by land the Greeks are hard and they beat people even women. Do not go with this guy or that guy…”

Later in the same evening speaking to me she said, “The wait is killing us…if you come here and you have work and something to do, you will be fine, but to come and just wait, that kills. And every day they (the middlemen) tell you tomorrow. The worst thing is waiting. Tell me to wait and I die. If you told me go now but there is a 99% chance you will be caught, I would go.” She continued pointing to her husband saying, “He is like this too. When he says we go out, you know
how long men take to get dressed?” I raised two fingers to indicate two minutes, “Yeah, that is how long I have. Even if I just came out of the shower and my hair is a mess. That’s how long I have.”

“I asked.

“No, he sits back down!”

Waiting is productive of particular subjectivities as Mona’s comments sharply illustrate. Mona’s first comment about the wait draining them as if that is the point of them waiting, makes me ask myself even now whose point did Mona mean when she said it, was she referring to the smugglers and middlemen? States? Borders? While she may have been talking about the smuggler at that moment, her comment has broader interpretations. Her remark draws attention that in waiting to cross the border, refugee experience ‘waits’- durations- that alter them; affects their subjectivities (Auyero 2012; Bourdieu 2000). Waiting as an action that affects refugee subjectivities is not a new concept (cf. Hyndman & Giles 2011; cf. Conlon 2011), but this case highlights that it is not state or institutional actors here who give rise to these subjectivities but middlemen and smugglers. In the process of arranging for refugees to move, smugglers may drain refugees’ energy asserting their dominance over passengers, not only by making passengers wait- an exercise of their power- but also always giving hope that the end of the wait is in sight. Mona’s comment concerns the transformative process of waiting, raising questions that resonate with discussions of liminality, I suggest considering the waits smugglers impose as a form of training or preparation for refugees, a taste of the waits they will endure once they arrive. At the same time that smugglers make refugees wait, they keep refugees in the dark about their dealings, relations, actual successes, enhancing their role as experts who refugees should wait for. Gasparini (1995, 30-31) argues that the anticipation of the occurrence of an event, an expected outcome, can be a source of control

See Chapter 5 for further details about Mona and Hussam.
given the person waiting has a focus or end point in mind. Here refugees have a focus in mind but lack the control or ability, in most cases, to force the smuggler to come through for them as fast as they want. In this relationship, there is the expectation of forecasted future movement, but it is marred with uncertainty about when it will actually occur similar to the uncertainty Iraqi refugees El-Shaarawi (2015) interviewed faced. While the Iraqi refugees who had undergone the resettlement process to the US knew they would travel, they faced uncertainty about when they would actually leave Egypt (cf. Danış et al. 2005). Refugees accept the uncertainty in their relationship with smugglers while complaining about it because it is part of the business of crossing the border—working against a state’s prerogative to maintain the border. While these refugees have the financial capital to go to Europe, they may not necessarily move at the speed they think they should be moving at. Auyero’s (2012) interlocutors spoke of being made to wait as a testament to their socio-economic position, and here smugglers and middlemen affect Syrian refugees by upturning their expectations about the smugglers’ services based on their middle-class status. Refugees with the financial capital to move, experience the waiting more acutely since they have a limited sum of money to live off and use to pay for their passage. The threat or possibility of their money running out as they wait is an always additional concern lurking in the background.

In discussing the ‘talk’ refugees engaged in, Mona criticised it as immobilising. Too much ‘talk’ made it difficult to decide what to choose or whether to trust the decision they took. Refugees share information about smugglers, smugglers’ success stories, and refugees’ ordeals en route to warn and encourage others. The issue, however, as Mona highlighted entails distinguishing the noise from the sound. It was not only a question of the accuracy of the information but her comments highlight that there are many types of information. So how can and how do refugees measure and value different pieces of information? Those processes affect their assessment of the risks entailed in dealing with smugglers or of undertaking the crossing. Information, while in theory
useful for refugees to realise the best way to navigate the endeavour and engagement, seems here to confuse and wear down refugees. Mona’s comment pertained not only to the risks that talk presented as it pointed out dangers or failed attempts. Talk also related border crossing to time, reminding refugees that they were still in place. In passing the time by listening and sharing stories, that time created stress or uncertainty rather than reducing the frustration of waiting (cf. Auyero 2012,96-97). With the delay, refugees remained plagued with the question or uncertainty of their success or the middleman’s abilities. Talk here served as a reminder of the waiting that was being enacted (cf. Reed 2003,79).

In Mona’s final comment she engaged with waiting. She went beyond the specificities of this particular wait and the challenges it presented. Mona focused on waiting, an action happening in time, rather than talking about her experience of this particular time as draining or harmful to her. She identified the act as problematic rather than setting time up as an active agent as Hamid did. Mona then went on to speak about this wait in relation to other more familiar waits. Comparing the two actions, going out and moving to Europe is an exaggeration given the vastly different value placed on these two different mobilities. However, her exaggeration highlights the common denominator between these actions: waiting. She related crossing the border to more familiar ordinary or everyday waits. Mona highlights in her comment that the approach to ‘waiting’ tends to focus on how this everyday experience or engagement is distinct based on the migration or “rupture” refugees experience. Mona brought the different waits, and different scales, into the conversation. Drawing on Das (2007), it is possible to argue that the uncertainty of the war and the normalisation of war may have led Mona to approach this wait as comparable to other everyday waits. She had already experienced continuing her daily routines with the threat of violence and death looming, so why then is not possible to liken this migration and wait to others.
Mona and Hussam changed the smuggler they had hired and ended the wait he had imposed on them. They ended their relationship with one smuggler and began the same relationship with another. The change was possible partially because they were not financially tied to the first smuggler since they were going to pay upon their arrival in Greece. Changing smugglers or deciding to move across the border alone are always possibilities, the issue is more when or why do refugees choose to make those decisions at certain moments and not others. The decision to change smuggler or to continue waiting, are always co-constitutive and contradictory. These two elements are constitutive of refugees’ experiences of the uncertainty they face in their engagement with smuggler. Unlike refugees’ relationships with states or institutions, their relations with smugglers were in many instances relations they could exit. They could choose to change smugglers but not, for example, ask a different European state to handle their family reunification process.

**States, Institutions, and Bureaucracies**

We met Kenan and Amira in the previous chapter. In the following, I focus on the family’s and specifically Amira’s engagement with bureaucracies and state actors in the family’s bid to be reunited with Kenan in Germany. Following Kenan and Rezan’s failed attempt and their detention in the Foreigners’ Branch, he was very bothered about being caught and was not his usual self, but he insisted he would try again. He explained in May 2013 that the family had sought to cross when they first came to Turkey, and they had not succeeded. They had waited for UNHCR to come through with resettlement and nothing had come of it, so he was going to try again. He decided to sell two shops he owned in Qamishli to improve his chances by paying a smuggler for a more
expensive route than the one he tried with his son. He attempted twice before finally succeeding. In July 2013, in Ramadan, Kenan crossed the border in a truck and managed to make it to Germany. Amira, his wife, explained that he had left at night after they had broken fast. She realised towards the morning that he had crossed the border because he had not called her. He did not say goodbye to the children; she explained he had not said goodbye to them on any of his attempts in case the attempt failed.

Kenan reached the point when he no longer wanted to wait. Taking his and his family’s future into his own hands, he sought to change their circumstances and no longer left it to institutions or states to decide for him. Once in Europe, a different wait began. They waited for the state to give him status. After seven months in Germany, Kenan was recognised as a political refugee. Rather than ending their wait, it was the start of a new one. Amira waited for word about the reunification process. They also faced the dilemma of what to do about two of their children who were over 18 and would not be included in the reunification process.

Amira had to gather the documents required to prove her and the children’s relationship to Kenan. She submitted the family book in which all the children are registered and other documents to the consulate. After several months she was contacted by consular staff explaining that they cannot issue a lassie passé for her and the children. They recommended that she reclaim their passports from the Turkish state. They were still classified as asylum seekers, and the state practice is for asylum seekers to hand over their passports to the state body. Amira contacted UNHCR in a bid to get the passports back. They informed her that their passports were in Urfa as it was the

---

109 It is worth noting that while the family had been in Turkey for 4 years by that point, but they had not sold the properties in Qamishli until then.
110 A travel document with the visa for Germany that would be issued on the basis they do not have passports. The document is usually issued by embassies in emergency situations such as a citizen losing their passport abroad.
satellite city they were supposed to move to.\textsuperscript{111} UNHCR staff said they would be able to bring the passports to her and they would coordinate with the Directorate General for Migration Management (hereafter DGMM) to that effect. After two months without news, she was told to go and claim the passports herself. To do so, the whole family travelled to Urfa. Amira’s youngest daughter did not have a passport. Amira was troubled by that as she was not sure if that would delay her process longer. The consular staff informed her in the spring of 2015, after three months, that she must have a passport issued for her daughter for them to issue a visa on it.

Amira began the next phase of sorting out papers and headed to the Syrian consulate in Istanbul to see how to get her youngest daughter a passport.\textsuperscript{112} In April 2015, the Syrian state gave its consulates and embassies the mandate to issue new passports for all Syrian nationals outside of Syria regardless of gender (Pizzi April 2015). We headed to the consulate one morning to find ourselves standing with many other Syrians at the consulate building entrance. The guards were not willing to let anyone through. There was no line and they repeatedly shouted at people to move back- we were standing on the pavement in front of the building. The guard who did speak to us told us and others standing to telephone to receive an appointment from the consulate, and come on that day. Amira wanted to know which number they answer but he had moved on by that point to answer someone else’s question. A family acquaintance had told her about an office nearby that was handling paperwork for Syrians who wanted passports, so we found our way there. They wanted 1,300 US Dollars for the passport- they said it would be more if she had been an adult. She did not trust them. They were dealing with another client before they spoke to Amir and she said later they were approaching the woman as if she were a sheep to fleece. Amira considered crossing\

\textsuperscript{111} Turkey has a satellite city system to reduce the pressure on services in major cities. Asylum seekers are supposed to move to a satellite city assigned by the state as they wait for their resettlement outside of Turkey.\textsuperscript{112} Issuing a passport relies on being able to prove identity using a series of other documents. Insisting that people included in family reunification process have passports is a way of further verifying their identities (cf. Scheel 2013).
the border with her daughter to go to Qamishli or sending her daughter with a relative. She explained that from Qamishli they would fly to Lattakia city where the immigration and passport office was issuing passports. She contacted family members’ and friends inside Syria to reach lawyers in Syria to see if she could hire them to do the process without her having to enter Syria.

She was worried that if the passport was not legitimately issued the German consulate would cancel the whole process. Other families who were waiting for family reunification processes with Germany and other European countries had experienced incidents like this. She related how one woman’s documents had been stamped by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a stamp that clamped the pages together. The translator’s office had separated the pages damaging the stamp. The consulate had supposedly said the papers were forged because the stamp was tampered with. Whether the story is true or the woman’s documents were forged did not matter. To Amira, all that mattered was that the process was mystified, uncertain, and dangerous whereby something small could unravel the whole process and cause her to wait longer. It was out of her control. She ended up going to another office close to the German consulate who she had dealt with before. Her contact there reduced the price for her so that the passport cost 1000 US Dollars. They would get the passport issued for her from Syria and sent over to Istanbul.

Amira continued to feel unsure about what was happening or if the consular staff would demand something new of her. Her uncertainty about their near future appeared in her purchasing habits, buying things for them to use when they go to Germany, but not for them to use them in Istanbul. Also, her two middle children, two teenage girls, were working during this time, but they stopped work at one point as the family thought their paperwork was moving ahead. When it became apparent they were still waiting; they began work again. At the same time, their anticipated future movement to Germany marked them as for instance Amira’s second daughter, 14 at the time,
joking with her maternal cousins that now she is German. She also used to annoy her grandmother by commenting about how she would wear shorts once she was in Germany at her father’s house.

The authorities in Germany told her husband that the two adult children would be excluded from the family reunification process. Amira had submitted their passports with the other children’s, and she hoped that maybe the embassy would give them a visa despite the German state’s decision. In the end, they did not wait. A middleman whom her son worked with and who provided look alike Europe passports found them a passport that her eldest daughter could move on. Her daughter travelled to Germany through Ataturk airport in the June 2015. She arrived in Germany and joined her father. Following her arrival, her WhatsApp profile read something along the lines of ‘Thank God for everything, and may my family join us soon.’ Amira waited two more months before their visas arrived and the rest of the family were able to move.

She explained over the phone after arriving in Germany that they had booked tickets and had obtained their permission to leave from the Foreigners’ Branch. They went to the airport on the day, but the personnel at the desk where foreigners pay fines before leaving Turkey explained that their name was not in the system yet. They were not allowed to travel that day. Amira explained that she had paid over a 1000 Euros in plane tickets. She took her eldest son and returned to the Foreigners’ Branch. She got the employee there to put them into the system again, and Amira asked her to print out the permission slip. Amira said the employee joked with her son about Amira’s behaviour jesting about how serious Amira was about having all the papers printed out. Amira moved and left her son in Istanbul for him to make his way to Germany by crossing to Greece and

---

113 It became standard practice after the Gecici Kurmu Kimlgi (Temporary Protection Identity Cards) became available in Istanbul that all identity card holders must obtain permission from the Foreigners’ Branch before they can travel through a legal port of entry-exit. In the airport, the cards are taken away by the border guards and the card holder is informed that they cannot re-enter Turkey for five years on the basis they are giving up the Turkish state offered temporary protection by leaving Turkey (cf. Regulation no. 29153, art. 45).
moving from there. In the end, he crossed with his grandmother, his uncle and his uncle’s family in September 2015. They crossed to Greece by sea and boarded trains from there to reach his family in Germany after a week on the road.

Kenan and his family were from the start of their presence in Turkey oriented to an elsewhere in Europe. The initially waiting for UNHCR to come through with a political status for them as refugees. With the announcement of temporary protection, their processing with UNHCR was halted due to wider political actions although the result of the larger political actions did not change their material or future orientations. Applying for asylum involves waiting (cf. El-Shaarawi 2015; Daniş et al. 2006). In this case, state and institutional actors halted their wait as part of the asylum process. The family were confronted with ambiguity about the future of their asylum application and there was no guarantee it would be continued. With the halting of their case and no clarity about their future, Kenan ended his and his family’s wait by moving (cf. Hage 2009). Kenan was able to make that decision in part since he owned the two shops in Qamishli. His access to the financial means to pay for a smuggler for a better route was a variable that changed the options available to him. By selling the property in Syria, Kenan and Amira gave up on capital in Syria to access the possibility of moving and arriving in Europe.

With every failure of an attempt, Kenan returned to his family and the house they were renting in Jazira. Hamid, Sayed, Mona and Hussam, like many other refugees, returned to Aksaray and had to figure out where to stay or who to stay with. Kenan was ready to move, engaging in a ‘disruption’ which affected him and his family while continuing to participate in their activities and rhythms. While I draw on Lefebvre (2004,28) in recognising the multiplicity and simultaneity of rhythms occurring, I explore one aspect of the intersection of dissonant rhythms and persistent rhythms. In Kenan’s continued participation in his family’s wait and their ‘everyday’ activities, his wait differed to that of other refugees mentioned in this chapter, but not to other refugees in a similar
situation. With every failed attempt, he returned to his family, a somewhat stable home, a sense of continuity, and pressure for him to change their situation. Drawing on Lefebvre’s (2004,27) suggestion that to understand rhythms it is necessarily to take a distance from them, Kenan’s case foregrounds not only his family’s rhythms but the practices of other refugees not in his situation. Mona and Hussam or Hamid sought to create the familiar by engaging with other refugees, frequenting the Kitchen or hanging out in the pansiyon. They socialised their wait, even as they experienced their presence in the city as being solely about their forecasted mobility. At the same time, other refugees staying Jazira shared Kenan’s experience. Within the same household, different members were enacting various temporal rhythms and directing their energy towards different temporal horizons.

Following his arrival in Germany and seeking asylum, Kenan and his family began another wait. They waited for him to be given refugee status so that he could start the family reunification processes. Where Kenan took control over his and his family’s future by moving, in arriving he returned to another relationship of dominance as he waited for the German state bureaucracy to decide if and when he would receive status, and what type of status. When he received political refugee status, the family started another wait, this time for the reunification process to be complete. In that process, Amira dealt with ambiguity and changing regulations regarding what documents were needed and how long the process would take. Throughout the process, she feared the consular staff might say a document was forged or problematic and refuse their application. To draw from Auyero (2012,74), “Together, veiling, confusing, and delaying or rushing snare poor people into uncertain and arbitrary waiting time. This blowing hot and cold, raising expectations and then mutely crushing them, inducts poor people into a process they can neither understand nor control.” Amira faced consistently changing bureaucratic requirements and the inability to ask or question the authorities responsible why the process was taking so long nor when it would end. She also
contended with meeting not only the German’s state’s bureaucratic requirements but also changing Turkish state regulations concerning how Syrian refugees could exit Turkey. Amira, unlike Mona and Hussam, could not change the relationship she entered as she could not change the state she was dealing with for the family reunification processes. Amira’s process highlights the ways different states continued to affect refugees’ lives even when they are living in a different state-Turkey- or have left their state- Syria- or have not yet entered the state- in this case, Germany.

Amira and her family while facing ambiguity about when they would travel to join their father, expected that the event would happen at some point in the future. Elliot (2016,110) explains that the wives of migrant Moroccan men waiting in Tadla with the hope of one day joining their husbands in Europe were seen locally as connected to the ‘outside’, tied to Europe. Amira while worried about when they would move saw her future and her children’s future in an elsewhere. Based on that belief, she put aside clothing for them to use once in Europe. She prepared for that event, or time, not only by readying documents but rearranging their material world to account for the anticipated event looming on the horizon (cf. Elliot 2016). In a similar manner, her children, as her daughter’s jokes show, pointed out the ways the family’s future was distinguished as being a future that will be lived there. For Amira unlike the women Elliot speaks about who remained with their families in Tadla, remaining in Turkey in the event the family reunification process failed was an unbearable possibility, migrating held an imperative as a necessary future event. The imperative to move was in part based on their unsecure present in Turkey.

Faced with the German state’s refusal to include their adult children within the reunification process, Amira and Kenan sent their daughter ahead of the family. It is that action of taking the decision away from the state or disregarding the state’s decision which state actors constitute as dangerous and a security threat (cf. Hyndman &Giles 2011). For Amira and Kenan leaving their daughter alone in Turkey posed a greater threat to their family and their daughter’s future.
A family’s decision on who will move, when they move, and who will wait depended on a number of factors. Factors such as the family’s capital (social and economic), the ages of the family members, how the family would support itself in the absence of that family member, the situation of the routes at the time they wanted to move, and family reunification processes in the different European Union states. Many families staying in Jazira sold property they owned in Syria to fund their attempt to move on to Europe, and some families borrowed money from family members already in Europe. Families who came to Aksaray had usually undertaken similar actions whether of selling a property or borrowing money from family. The families coming to Aksaray usually intended to move together, although situations changed with time or failed attempts. Families’ abilities to draw on kinship ties and the economic capital of extended family facilitated their movement. The social capital also highlighted the limits to their powers as agents (cf. Bourdieu 2000,216). In many instances, they had to wait for the sum required to be gathered or complete, enforcing a wait. Additionally, the amount collected might be sufficient for only one family member to move, requiring others to continue waiting. In deciding who should migrate, families considered the funds available to them, the route, and the family reunification processes. A parent would be able to request family reunification for his/her spouse and children under 18. By sending a child under 18, families anticipated the child would be able to apply for family reunification for his parents and his siblings under 18. Families with children over 18 (such as Amira and Kenan), faced the dilemma of what to do about those children and how to ensure the family would remain united. In the event of sending an adult, a parent, the family staying in Turkey needed to have other members able to sustain them. In Amira and Kenan’s case, his adolescent daughters and adult son were working to support the family, meaning his movement would not affect the family negatively. Similarly, families sending a child under 18, might not lose the labour power needed to sustain them in the presence of other family members. In addition, different EU states have different
regulations concerning family reunification processes affecting both refugees’ choice of destination and their lives after their kin sought asylum. Family reunification regulations in various EU states changed over time making it necessary for family members in Turkey to follow news about the regulations whether by asking family settled in Europe or friends who were similarly waiting.

Following the decision on who would cross the border to bring the rest of the family to safety, the family then waited out their kin’s asylum-seeking process and the family reunification process. While the one family member or member of the household (at times it was relatives who were waiting to move on) dedicated their energies to their attempt to move, the rest of the family continued in their daily routines and rhythms (cf. El-Shaarawi 2015). They awaited the end of the working day, weekends and payday while another member of the household waited for a middleman to call or returned home following a failed attempt and started the process all over again. Different actors within the same household enacted different waits, some occurring simultaneously.

**Waiting for Citizenship**

Nisreen was in her early 30s when I met her in 2013. Kenan took me to meet her and her family one evening in January 2013. They were living up the hill from his house in Jazira neighbourhood, and we climbed the six flights of stairs to reach the house they were living in at the time. Nisreen’s three younger sisters came to greet Kenan, hugging him as an uncle. He was joking around with the youngest of the sisters and told me to remind him to tell me a story about her later. I had shuffled my way inside, and Nisreen’s sister sat me down next to her. Nisreen is married and has three sons. Her youngest son was three years old at the time, and the oldest was 11. Everyone was sitting in the living room to crowd around the sobya heating the room. They had put thin mattresses on the
floor on top of the carpets, and everyone sat on them or the thick carpets covering the entire floor. One of the sisters brought out sunflower seeds and local Cola brand for everyone to drink. Nisreen started talking to me, explaining the situation of a family staying with them and then spoke about her family situation.

Nisreen’s mother is a Turkish citizen, and her siblings have been living in Istanbul for several years, but she did not have Turkish citizenship. She explained how they would come every summer to Istanbul to visit her family here. Nisreen’s husband had come before her to Istanbul to work in the family textile workshop, but he had suffered a work-related injury that left him wearing a cast and limping for several months. He had returned to Qamishli following the injury to recover there, and after several months without an income, they decided to move to Istanbul. They were living with her unmarried siblings who were of varying ages - from 24 to 14. Their mother has a motor reflex disorder, and their father had migrated to Germany many years ago. In coming to Turkey, Nisreen brought her family together. She was taking care of her mother so her siblings could go to school and work without worrying about their mother. Nisreen said her relationship with her mother had been difficult, and she had left home at an early age as a result. Her husband was working in Lebanon with Nisreen’s father, and when she was in her early twenties he asked to marry her, and they moved together to Lebanon. He was working at a petrol station in a predominantly Christian area in north Lebanon. Every time I saw her, Nisreen would reminisce about their home in Lebanon. She explained that Lebanon had been the first place where they made a home together, and she repeated every time how they built the home up piece by piece. She and her sons were visiting family in Istanbul in 2006 when her husband was threatened in Lebanon. He left the area they had been living in and was unable to take anything from the house with him. She said more than once that her fondest memories were of the time she spent in Lebanon; although their lives had been difficult she had been happy. During their time in Lebanon, she managed to
save enough money to buy a supermarket in Qamishli, so when they moved back to Qamishli, they worked in and lived from the supermarket. In 2010 her husband went north to Istanbul to work with her brother in the textile workshop he was running, but after his injury, he returned to Qamishli. They were unable to keep the supermarket and came to Istanbul to start over again.

Nisreen explained when I first met her that they were going to apply for citizenship based on her relationship with her mother. A police officer who was a friend of one of her brothers had directed them to a lawyer who would undertake their case for free. Then in February 2013, Nisreen learnt that her cancer had returned. Nisreen is a cancer survivor, and she had received treatment for the disease twice before. In early 2013 she became worried cancer had returned. Through an NGO in Istanbul, she was able to run tests and found out that there were indeed abnormal cells on her liver. The doctors did not want to operate as the cancer was on her liver. She complained a lot about Turkish doctors being incompetent and compared them with the doctors she had been treated by in Syria. One of those doctors was in Turkey but he, as all foreign doctors, are not allowed to practice medicine in Turkey. Nisreen continually bemoaned that situation, sure that a Syrian doctor could help her. The NGOs in Istanbul were willing to cover part of the cost of the operation but given the doctors would not operate on the precancerous cells in her liver she did not see a point in doing the operation. One Syrian NGO in Istanbul told Nisreen to go to one of the southern Turkish provinces as the state would cover the cost of any operation done in the southern provinces. She considered various options before deciding to return to Qamishli to undergo treatment there. Despite the reduced number of doctors and facilities, she had greater hope of the treatment she would receive there.

Nisreen had started the process of applying for Turkish citizenship. She said after she found out she was ill again that if she had citizenship then if she died her children would become wards of the Turkish state. She thought her husband would remarry if she died and her siblings needed to
take care of themselves and would be unable to look after her children as well. The lawyers the family friend directed her to warned her that she would have to submit all the paperwork as they would only appear with her in court when the case is brought before a judge. Nisreen, her husband and second son, crossed the border to Qamishli in the summer of 2013 leaving her two other children with her newly married sister. She travelled to Qamishli hoping to find a doctor there willing to take a chance and conduct the operation. They had to cross with the help of a smuggler as that part of the border was heavily monitored by the Turkish army. She explained in October 2013, following her return, about the lack of doctors and facilities. In the end, they found a doctor who was able to take on her case. She complained that there was no food shortage in the city nor a lack of clean water or diesel fuel, but everything was so expensive. Those choosing to leave Qamishli area were not leaving because of violence or bombing for the most part, although incidents happened, but more because of the exorbitant prices and their inability to sustain their livelihoods.¹¹⁴

I returned for a short visit in February 2014 and contacted Nisreen to see her and her family. They had moved house once again, and she gave me the directions to get close enough to it for her to come and pick me up. The family had opened up a textile workshop headed by one of her younger brothers. His siblings were all working with him in it, and she brought some of the work to their home to help them as well. She spoke about her health, her siblings, and their new neighbours. She had gone before a judge for her case to claim Turkish citizenship. She explained how a lawyer approached her outside the court door and said she was to go in with her as the law firm had promised. They had brought over an old man from their village on the Turkish side of the border to testify that she was her mother’s child. The judge had made fun of the man, annoying Nisreen.

¹¹⁴ Others were leaving the province due to attacks on or around their towns or villages.
because she thought the judge had high expectations of an old person’s memory. The court required her to undertake medical tests to show her age to confirm the documents she had submitted and the man’s testimony. A medical board studied the test results, and Nisreen was very surprised to find she was born in 1981. She had always thought she was older, and the x-ray of her bones showed her to be younger countering some of her ideas about her personal history. The case was still being processed when I saw her that last time. In acquiring Turkish citizenship, Nisreen’s treatment would be provided by the Turkish state.

Nisreen and her family had repeatedly crossed different borders over the years. Varying reasons marked each border crossing, and they crossed in various directions. They moved to Lebanon in search of better economic opportunities, they joined her family in Istanbul after facing difficulties in Qamishli, and they returned to Qamishli for her to receive treatment. Nisreen had commented once that the border had been drawn between Turkey and Syria separating her family. In many ways, she did not find their border crossings anomalous or strange based on the imposed nature of the border (cf. Joyce 2015).

Her repeated engagement with cancer meant she and her family were uncertain about her health situation and whether she would survive. Her health affected their application as if Nisreen died their chance of gaining citizenship would disappear. Her movement to Syria to seek treatment reflected the dilemma the cancer posed. She was unable to remain in place in Turkey if she wanted to survive cancer. Moving back rather than moving ahead to Europe was her attempt to survive cancer and secure her family’s future. While Nisreen knew they would be able to gain Turkish citizenship, they were unsure how long the process would take.

---

115 Nisreen was sympathetic towards refugees moving on to Europe but she did not voice any desire to pursue this option. Her father had had a difficult life in Germany and her siblings where all in Turkey.
Unlike the others mentioned in this chapter, but like many other Syrian refugees in Turkey, she sought to alter her relationship with the Turkish state from a position of temporariness, potential permanence, to one of permanence. In becoming Turkish citizens, she and her family would be able to gain access to the services of the Turkish state not in the conditional forms it is offered to Syrian refugees, but in the more permanent form it is provided to Turkish citizens. While Nisreen applied for citizenship, she did not approach it as an imperative to remain in place.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to explore the different waits imposed on Syrian refugees and how they responded to these enforced waits. Waiting is productive of particular subjectivities. It manifests as an example of a relation of power that trains waiters to endure the wait and be patient. The case studies demonstrate the ways Syrians experienced the imposed waits and the moments and instances when they countered the wait. The case studies highlight the tension that is inherent in accepting the imposed wait or working to alleviate it. Interlocutors’ actions show that enduring does not mean passivity or inaction, but may in most cases signify an inability to alter their position of subordination. Syrian refugees worked to influence their waiting even when they could not end the relationship with a particular state in case of family reunification processes. Some of the case studies focus on debates about time, waiting and economic activity. I argued that moving as a socially valued action in this instance is approached as a counter to waiting. At the same time, migrating is not productive as a counter to economic stagnation, but due to the positive returns it brings to Syrian refugees seeking stability and future security.

By discussing the different waits enforced, I drew attention to intersections and similarities while maintaining the distinctiveness of the relations that give rise to the waiting. Through this strategy, I sought to demonstrate the ways Syrian refugees enacted different rhythms while in
Istanbul. Households or families witnessed and engaged with multiple rhythms simultaneously as one family member moved and others remained in place. The chapter discusses enduring, as a form of engaging, to highlight the strategies and decisions made to shore up some of the uncertainty or achieve other aims. In the process, it explores moving as an act of taking. Taking from European states by crossing the border and demanding protection; taking from the world by striving for a life different to that possible in Turkey (cf. Hage 2009; cf. Lucht 2012).
Chapter 4

Smugglers, Passengers and Outlining the Field of Moving

“Kil Nafr biqoul llimuharb: wa’Allah ana irtihtilak... W baadi fi 10…. Bas zabitli alsaer [Every nafr says to the smuggler: By God, I feel comfortable with you… and there are ten more coming after me… just fix the price for me].” (Lukman Derky Facebook 06/06/2015)

This chapter focuses on the exchange relations between muharbyn\(^{116}\) (smugglers) and the refugees who engage with them or hire them. Most Syrian refugees enter this field of relations or exchange without prior experience, and they have to map the relations and make difficult decisions in a situation of overwhelming uncertainty. Here I discuss how the relations are initiated and play out, the position of smugglers and passengers, the ways smugglers’ reputation are developed, and how passengers seek to safeguard their right in this context. In exploring the ways Syrian refugees spoke of smugglers, I draw attention to issues of morality, religion, respect, or equality. Moving from the stories of smugglers, the chapter discusses the ways refugees try to secure their interests in this relationship. In the chapter, I focus more on stories of failure or breakdown of the exchange relations than on stories of successful arrival. The failures or fractures offer insight into the ways small variables affect the outcome and highlight the moments or instances when disguised interests appear counter to what the actors involved believe.

This chapter is a discussion of the risk Syrian refugees face in a situation where there are very limited means for them to censure smugglers and they cannot enforce their rights. Mary Douglas (1992, 31) discussing risk states that it, “is not only the probability of an event, but also the probable magnitude of its outcome, and everything depends on the value that is set on that outcome.” Syrian refugees place a high value, understandably, on arriving quickly and safely. To achieve their aim,

\(^{116}\) Muhrabyn (plural for muharp) was the term the majority of interlocutors used to refer to the smugglers they dealt with.
they hire smugglers, fearing that the border is too difficult to cross alone. Syrian refugees engaging
with smugglers fear they will be taken advantage of. In an effort to counter this fear they seek to
personalise their relations with smugglers or mentioned shared histories. Most interlocutors found
that where they invoked the history of relations from Syria, or even a more recent shared history in
Istanbul, in their encounter with smugglers, smugglers’ responses to the ties invoked varied. In
many instances, they disregarded the relations brought up and treated refugees as mere clients,
while in other cases, smugglers acted in ways considered socially appropriate to the ties evoked.
Speaking about risk, Caplan (2000, 6) explains, “…the modern concept of risk colonises the future,
which thereby determines the present, whereas previously, it was the past which was seen to
determine the present; such a view of time is also one which has little place for history.” Her
analysis highlights a situation where relations and connections past may no longer influence
interactions in the present; and where rather the present is affected by the uncertainty of the future.
The case studies explored here show how interlocutors brought history into the present, and when
or how it was effective in countering the uncertainty entailed in the relationship. The ways
interlocutors brought the past into these relations and the varying response to that action
demonstrate the continuous tensions in these relations.

Making Contact

Some Syrian refugees head to Aksaray upon their arrival in the city as they have been told that they
can find many smugglers there. Others stay with friends, relatives, or alone and then begin
contacting smugglers and setting up meetings. Refugees usually come to Istanbul with smugglers’
or middlemen’s names and telephone numbers which they acquired from family, neighbours, or
friends who have already reached Europe. Their ability to access smugglers and whom they access
is then contingent on their ties or their families and extended networks’ connections to people who
moved through Istanbul. Smugglers are connected through former clients now in Europe to people in Syria and others coming to Istanbul (Lucht 2012, 131). Sorting out passage to Europe through smugglers requires refugees to learn about how *tahryb* 117 (smuggling) in Istanbul works (cf. Hart 1988, 191). They discover the terms smugglers use, the names of different smugglers, and they become acquainted with stories of crossings and European migratory policies (Khosravi 2010, 32). Refugees pick up the terms and stories to figure out how to navigate relations and organise a successful journey. The following section briefly explores who the different people involved in smuggling are, and the different terms used to refer to their various roles. It then examines how refugees discover the connections that exist between different people involved in smuggling.

Refugees found out or contacts directed to cafes where smugglers and middle men sit with clients or offices they run. Refugees spoke openly about smugglers and *ṭrq* 118 (routes or ways) while in Aksaray. Frequenting the Syrian restaurants that opened in Yusufpaşa in 2013, I would overhear refugees talking about their attempts or even telling the restaurant manager their plans. Similarly, in cafes in Yusufpaşa or Aksaray, Adam used to point out middlemen or smugglers sitting with clients on tables neighbouring ours. Smugglers based in and around Aksaray use the various cafes in Aksaray, Kumkapı or Yusufpaşa as meeting places. At times smugglers meet potential clients in one café and ask them to move to another café that was more private or at least had fewer middlemen or fellow smugglers looking on or listening in. Hiding their meeting with potential clients is one way of deferring attention from the fact the people are clients. Smugglers try to secure the clients and prevent competition from competing for them. 120

---

117 It means smuggling whether of people or objects. The root of the word is the verb *harb-* escape or run away from.

118 The word has several meanings, it is plural for route or way. It is also used as to refer to Sufi followings.

119 Smugglers based elsewhere in Istanbul use cafes in those areas. See Wissink and her co-authors (2013) for similar area in Izmir.

120 See Sanchez (2015) for case where other smugglers not seen as competitors.
Refugees can find a variety of smuggling services available in Aksaray offered by people of different nationality. Most of the interlocutors I spoke to engaged with smugglers who were Syrian, Palestinian, or Iraqi; a few were Kurds from Turkey. People from other countries also worked out of Istanbul, but Syrian refugees usually preferred to deal with someone who spoke Arabic or Kurdish if they were Kurdish speakers. Smuggling in Istanbul is not the monopoly of one particular set of people or one particular nationality; I never heard of any female smugglers. The interlocutors mentioned here spoke only of smugglers who were Muslim; there are most likely others who are of different religion.

Smugglers present smuggling as a package of services involving various people. The package varied depending on whom refugees spoke to if they had entered Turkey legally, and on their buying power. While refugees come to individuals, those involved in smuggling use ‘we’ when talking about organising journeys. In some cases, they explain that they do not work a particular route but know someone who does. The people involved in smuggling highlight the involvement and efforts of others needed in the process. Some refugees come with the numbers of semsars (agents or frontmen) while others come to a waset (intermediary) who has the numbers and information of different smugglers. The intermediary sets up meetings and accompanies passengers to ensure they will not be taken advantage of. Both parties pay intermediaries a commission. Some refugees come without any contacts in the city. They are approached by intermediaries while sitting

---

121 Prices varied in the summer of 2012 as crossing to Greece by land cost around 2000 Euros. Crossing by sea depended on the boat used and the price ranged between 2000-4500 Euros. To go by boat to Italy cost 6,000 Euros. To arrive at their final destination in Europe, smugglers in Istanbul were asking for sums ranging between 7000-10,000 Euros. The prices asked for in Istanbul changed over time. The prices asked for in Izmir or Edirne may have differed.

122 Semsar, middleman, is used in other contexts such as to refer to people working as estate agents. Here it extends to acts of gathering contacts and information to sell a journey.
in cafes or hotel lobbies. These men promise refugees routes, collecting passengers for smugglers.  

Smugglers are distinguished from *semsars*, middlemen and intermediaries in that they have routes, knowledge of how to cross the (perspective) borders and the means to do so. Most refugees refer to the person whose services they are hiring as a ‘smuggler’ (muharb). Adam and other refugees referred to certain men in Aksaray as smugglers based on his belief they had routes into Europe, but other refugees countered their reference, explaining that the men who meet passengers in Aksaray are *semsars*. These Kurdish interlocutors insisted that refugees rarely arrive to a smuggler but rather they all come to *semsars* who know various smugglers. For instance, Rezan, Amira’s son, argued that the only smugglers are the *rehbers* (guides) who take refugees across the border, the sea, or through the airport. He distinguished *rehbers* from all the other people involved in smuggling based on their knowledge and ability to cross borders. He relegated those collecting to passengers in Aksaray to the position of frontmen, or “connections” as with the case of Guan migrants moving to Italy from Libya (Lucht 2012). The *semsars* sell their access and knowledge of smugglers to those who hire them. At the same time, they play a role in organising the logistics of journeys as they connect different people involved in the operation, and do not solely collect passengers (cf. Sanchez 2015).

*Rehbers’* knowledge and experience of the border is only made accessible through the smugglers refugees hired. *Rehbers* given their knowledge and refugees dependence on them are in

---

123 Refugees might engage with others such as document salesmen, or counterfeiters depending on the route they want to move on.
124 *Rehber* is the reference Arabic and Kurdish speakers apply to the guides who take them across the border. The word is used in Turkish and Kurdish. Arabic speakers pronounce it as ‘rayber’. It means guide or pathfinder in Turkish.
125 Since other interlocutors used the term *muharb* (smuggler) I stick to their usage and where possible I indicate if the person they dealt with was a middleman or a frontman.
a position of power with respect to the people crossing with them. Refugees are at a disadvantage in their dealings with smugglers as they appraise the smuggler they are engaging with, but they cross with a rehber whom they may have never met before. They are fully dependent on the rehber while en route. One interlocutor explained that rehbers have been known to ask for sexual favours from female refugees in return for not abandoning them if something goes wrong while en route. Adam complained that some hit young children to keep them quiet while crossing by land. Other rehbers have been known to demand money from refugees even though they have already paid the smuggler and some left the refugees they were guiding while they were en route. Rehbers, given their knowledge of routes, can abuse and take advantage of refugees if they want to. In many instances, refugees are faced with a situation where they are in a subordinate position in the power relations with the rehber (cf. Lucht 2012).

Some refugees use (abuse) their connections or networks in their endeavour to meet smugglers’ financial demands. “They (the smugglers) work together, and they end up selling you to each other without you knowing it… they ask you to sell the person with yous. Meaning if I were to take you now to one of them, they would probably let me go at your expense, that I can go with you,” Adam commented in September 2012 (cf. Khosravi 2010, 39). He criticised smugglers on the basis they promised passengers who could not afford to pay for their journey that, if the passenger collected a certain number of other passengers, the passenger would be allowed to move without paying. The passenger would be paid for in effect by the other refugees s/he managed to

---

126 Similar to the Guan migrants who captain the boats from Libya to Italy (Lucht 2012) and the Senegalese fisherman sailing to Canary Islands (Andersson 2014). The migrants on board with them were completely dependent on them and their ability to guide them to safety (Lucht 2012). They might not have met them before. In contrast Spener (2009) explained how the Mexican interlocutors he met crossing the Mexican-American border, cross with fellow migrants from their home towns and avoid crossing with strangers.  
128 No one ever recounted a positive story about a rehber although they could not all have harmed the passengers they were guiding as many people arrived crossing by land.
convince to join the journey.\textsuperscript{129} The issue is not unusual, as Lucht (2012) highlights in the case of Guan migrants sought out by Libyan smugglers for their seafaring knowledge. The Guan migrants do not pay to cross by agreeing to captain boats heading to Italy; a hazardous endeavour. Counter to Adam’s approach, Sanchez (2015, 75,78) discussing smuggling across the Mexican-US border highlights migrants’ activation of their relations more positively showing how it makes migrants part of the process rather than solely victims acted upon. Despite the possible positives, for many refugees recruiting them to travel for free hinted of their friends or acquaintances commodifying them to achieve their aims.

Smugglers, like their clients, rely on a wide network to move people or make a profit. Adam highlighted in his comment that smuggling relies on both visible and hidden connections. Smugglers’ connections can span across Turkey or across the border. İçduygu and Toktaş (2002) explained in the case of Iranian refugees that many are smuggled across the border into Turkey by someone connected to a smuggler or middlemen in Istanbul. Similarly, many smugglers based in Istanbul are connected to smugglers in the south-west of Turkey who take people across the sea to one of the Greek Islands or Italy.\textsuperscript{130} The network ends there for many and following Lucht (2012) it is necessary to highlight that these networks are loose rather than tight-knit, and while one operation might be coordinated or well-organised others are not.\textsuperscript{131}

Other than the connections across the country, various smugglers working in Istanbul may send passengers to the same smuggler to guide them across the border to Greece or Bulgaria.

\textsuperscript{129} Sanchez (2015,75, 78) discusses this in a more positive light and highlights how it counters state distinction between smuggler and smuggled showing degrees and possibilities for cooperation.

\textsuperscript{130} In late 2013 onwards, refugees began heading straight to Izmir or other cities along the south western coast of Turkey and contacting smugglers there.

\textsuperscript{131} There is extensive discussion on the organization, lack of and degree of which mostly aim to counter or problematize state discourses approaching smuggling as the acts of organized criminal groups. See Papadopoulos et al. (2008); Sanchez (2015); Liempt& Sersli (2013) among others.
Different interlocutors explained that passengers sent by a different smuggler joined them at the start of their journey to Edirne.\textsuperscript{132} Smugglers combine their passengers in journeys, sharing the vans that take refugees to the border region or the boats that take them to the Greek Islands or Italy (cf. İçduygu 2004,300-301). Some refugees were also joined by passengers of different nationality, expanding the potential connections linking different people involved in smuggling in Istanbul.

The arrangement and combining of passengers indicates that those involved may be frontmen arranging the logistics but dependent on smuggler for the resources.

**The Passenger**

In the context of Istanbul, and elsewhere in Turkey, smugglers and others involved in smuggling use the term *nafr*\textsuperscript{133} (noun individual) to refer to passengers. I only learnt the polite term *rakb*\textsuperscript{134} (passenger) towards the end of my fieldwork. In the case of the Mexico-US border where smugglers are referred to as ‘coyotes’, refugees are called ‘chickens’ (Coutin 2005). Turkish fishermen who used to smuggle people to Greece in the 1980s and 1990s referred to them as ‘sheep’ (Hess 2010). From the animal associations that are used to refer to refugees the image of refugees as bodies that can be herded by smugglers or hunted by border guards emerges (Coutin 2005, 199; Khosravi 2010,27). Adam, for instance, and other interlocutors took great exception to smugglers using the term *nafr* although one meaning for the term is individual; a neutral meaning. He considered it an insult to refugees implying they are not fully qualified persons. He saw it as an example of the way smugglers approach refugees as numbers and solely sources of profit. In contrast *rakb*, passenger, as a term highlights their position as customers or clients seeking a service and does not imply a

\textsuperscript{132} Refugees move from Istanbul by van or truck to Edirne the border region with Greece and Bulgaria. See Appendix map (3).

\textsuperscript{133} *Nafr* (noun) here is both singular and plural, but the middlemen and smugglers in Istanbul used *nafarat* for plural. *Nafr* is also a verb and as a verb means to flee, escape from, turn away from; hate.

\textsuperscript{134} It is used in Arabic and Kurdish.
negative or subordinate position. Smugglers using the term *rakb* positions passengers as clients drawing attention to their engaging in an exchange relationship.

In the exchange relation, smugglers remain distinct as individuals, identified by their names or titles whereas they referred to passengers by a general term. Smugglers using *nafr* indicates the temporary nature of passengers’ participation in the exchange relationship. Refugees might speak badly about different smugglers or curse them in private, but they do not bother to come up with nicknames for them. They usually want to move on quickly whereas smugglers are, usually, engaged in this business for an extended period (Achilli 2017). Refugees are not in a position in the relationship to give them a general name beyond their occupation (Bourdieu 1991,56). *Nafr* is a way of condensing the changing landscape of passengers into a singular identity.

Amr was working as a middle man in Istanbul. He was in his late thirties at the time. He had participated in the uprising in Deraa but left Syria in 2012 leaving his wife and three children behind. He went to Egypt when his younger cousin who had been working in Istanbul as a smuggler for many years told him to come and join him in Istanbul. Amr started working in Istanbul as a middleman offering his services to refugees. He set up meetings for them with the different smugglers he knew and sat in on meetings as a way of guaranteeing their rights and then received a commission from both parties if the clients chose to move with one of the smugglers he introduced them to. He lived with Adam during the winter of 2013. He used to sit with Adam and others in the Kitchen\textsuperscript{135} in Aksaray. He was looking for a way to become a smuggler and develop a reputation of his own. Adam insisted that Amr would eventually move to Europe himself although he was always criticising Europe and the west. He enjoyed making the criticisms as a way of putting down refugees’ desire to go to Europe.

\textsuperscript{135} A café in Aksaray. See Chapter 5 for more detail.
One evening, sitting with Adam and other refugees in a café in Aksaray, he explained to us the hierarchy of passengers. He pointed to the wrapped individual sugar cubes in a small wooden basket on the table saying, “These are nafrs (persons/passengers). They come in levels like a pyramid…” He then took the ashtray that was on the table saying, “This (ashtray) is the muharb [smuggler].” He then placed one cube on top of the metal ashtray and explained, “This (cube) is a taaban (tired) nafr,” he then put a cube next to the first one, “This is a nafr without money.” He placed a cube on top of the first two, “This is a mourtah (comfortable) nafr… they sit like this, and the smuggler shakes and the one at the top of the pyramid arrives, the tired one moves, the one without money gets caught.” He pushed the final cube into the ashtray as he explained.

While it is only his view of the hierarchy smugglers use in their appraisal of clients, it offers insight into the classification of customers in the exchange. Smugglers differentiate passengers not as persons but according to their financial situation. Many refugees explain about their financial situation when they first meet smugglers. They may say how much they are willing or able to pay, so the smugglers only gives them options that are within their budget. While some refugees give out this information willingly, they are unaware of the other pieces of information smugglers read from them. Smugglers and middlemen adjust prices based on refugees’ clothes, shoes, cigarettes, where they are from, and who accompanies them to meetings. All these aspects add to the details refugees share with smugglers and middlemen about themselves. These details constitute passengers beyond their claims about the amount of money they have at hand or their socio-economic status in Syria.

136 Amr explained the way smugglers classified passengers. Cigarettes are taxed in Turkey making them expensive. Many smokers buy kaçak (contraband) cigarettes that are available all over the city. The contraband cigarettes are identifiable from the script that is usually Cyrillic, English or Bulgarian. The type of cigarettes refugees smoke offers information about their financial situation as Marlboro with Turkish writing is very expensive in contrast to Viceroy for instance.
The Product

Refugees and smugglers meet to discuss routes and possibly ways of moving; part of the discussion concerns the risks involved in moving. Interlocutors explained that smugglers describe the risks in terms of a route’s qualities. Refugees hire smugglers as experts with a particular set of services and skills. In their meetings with refugees, smugglers present their services, prices, and modes of payment with refugees asking questions along the way. They explain where they can get refugees to, whether the refugees’ end destination or Greece, Italy or Bulgaria; after that refugees continue on their own or hire another smuggler. Interlocutors commented on the way smugglers’ presentations are interrupted repeatedly by one or several of their phones ringing. A typical meeting might last thirty minutes or longer, but ten minutes at least are spent waiting for the smuggler to finish his phone conversations. They subsequently try to negotiate the prices or discuss further specifics of a ṭaryq or khat\textsuperscript{137} (line) they prefer. Dependent on how busy the smuggler is, he might offer information about possible options given refugees’ budget and desired destination country. Some explain how refugees can move once they are in Greece, Italy or Bulgaria. Alternately smugglers describe what happens in Greece if the police or gendarmerie stop refugees while they cross. They answer refugees’ questions about fingerprints and seeking asylum. Refugees note the information and rely on it in making their decisions and acting as the words of experts engaged in smuggling. In hiring them for their services, refugees reaffirm their positions as experts and the difficulty of crossing the border alone. While Hamid, whom we met in the previous chapters, and other refugees in similar situations, cross the border alone because they do not have the financial means to pay smugglers, most refugees prefer hiring smugglers to increase the likelihood of their arrival.

\textsuperscript{137} Khat was also used by Iranians according to Khosravi (2010:42).
Refugees pay smugglers to use their access to ṭrq (routes) into Europe; effectively buying a smuggler’s access to these routes. They buy the possibility of being guided on a taryq (route). Smugglers are said to ‘have ways’ (andou ṭrq) and the possessive ‘andou’ (have) is a means of distinguishing them from others whether middlemen or smugglers or con-artist. For refugees preparing to move, ṭrq are partially formed through mappings of their predicted movement, stories exchanged about other refugees' journeys on certain routes, and the descriptive terms smugglers and refugees use when talking about different ṭrq. Refugees and smugglers talk about ṭrq (routes) as uniform objects although they are composite of various elements such as rehbers’ knowledge, vehicles, documents, contacts or access.

Smugglers attach different qualities to ṭrq (routes) affecting refugees’ choices of which ṭrq to move on. Smugglers attach different qualities to ṭrq relating to the risks entailed in endeavours (cf. Boholm 2003,167). The qualities reflect the effects of climate, season, and the changing securitization of a border (cf. Collyer 2006,138). The qualities are flexible and changing. Smugglers and others describe some ṭrq as saab (difficult) to convince clients to take others which are said to be shl (easy). The degree of difficulty pertains to the level of physical exertion whereby passengers walk many hours for several days, sit in crowded boats or trucks for many days. Alternately, the difficulty refers to the level of policing along the border that increases the chances of passengers being stopped or returned to Turkey. Smugglers and refugees describe some ṭrq as mafītwḥ (open) or mskar (closed) referring to the migratory flow via that route, much as Andersson (2014,74) described an interlocutor’s journey from Morocco to Spain as the “VIP commute” given he arrived quickly before it became a heavily patrolled crossing point. For instance, in the summer of 2012, the land routes into Greece were 'closed' due to an increase in border control; refugees were crossing the border but in low numbers. The closure prompted many refugees to decide to move by sea to one of the Greek islands, sail to Italy, or cross by land to Bulgaria as those routes
were qualified as 'open'. Following Keane’s (2003) discussion of the qualities assigned to objects over time, routes being open or closed- particular qualities- took precedence over all other qualities attached to a certain route at any point in time.

The qualities refugees and smugglers attach to ṭrq affected the prices smugglers asked for. The closure of a sea or land ṭaryq drove up the price of other 'open' ṭrq. In the summer of 2012, I asked Adam if the revolution in Syria and the large number of people fleeing the country drove up the prices of going to Europe. “The Syrians have made the prices a bit higher, but more so it is the closure of ṭrq into Greece… This is not a stock exchange. The prices are affected like you are saying by the fact Syrian passports are now gold. But actually the ṭrq closing is more important, it is harder to get in,” he explained. Adam related the increase in prices to the scarcity of the resource, in this case ‘open’ routes, rather than Syrians or Palestinian Syrians being able to seek asylum in Europe. He based his analysis on the various pieces of information he was receiving in his questions to other Syrian refugees, other Arab migrants and smugglers. With the closure and scarcity of 'open' ṭrq, the chance of being caught crossing the border or not making it across increased. Refugees’ demands are thus quite specific, not just any route, but an open route. The qualities of ṭrq conjure it as an object while still maintaining the fluidity or flexibility of its qualities.

Given the pressures and the risks refugees face, they place a greater emphasis on smugglers’ reputations as a way of guaranteeing their futures. Refugees decide on which smuggler to hire based on the routes the person has access to and their appraisal of the smuggler. Their appraisal depends in part on the smuggler’s reputation and the testimonies of those who directed them to the smuggler (cf. Sanchez 2015,57). Reputations are thus important aspects of the business and refugees’ means of situating smugglers and other actors involved in the smuggling.

138 In the summer of 2015 the price to cross to Greece was very low as the routes from Greece to elsewhere in Europe were ‘open’.
Reputation

“These guys want people to arrive. It is a way of creating something for themselves - a *sum’a* (reputation). Someone arrives, and then other people contact them and ask how they got there and who got them there,” Adam said in August 2012. Adam’s comment resonated with what Lucht’s (2012,131) interlocutors explained to him about the men they call ‘connections’ who found them passage to Italy. Smugglers become known to refugees through their reputations and the stories refugees and others tell of them. Reputation (*sum’a* or *cyut*) is the good and bad known and said about someone within a collective or community (cf. Bailey 1971). In this instance, smugglers’ reputations developed from their ability to get refugees to their destination and the way they treat clients. Smugglers’ reputations are circulated among refugees who arrived in Europe, others in Istanbul wanting to move on, and people in Syria or elsewhere who are planning their journey. Reputations circulated between various places and the recommendations offered affect refugees’ choices of which smugglers to approach and hire (cf. Munn 1986,117). Reputations are generated within the transactions and are a form of symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1991). Refugees add to or detract from smugglers’ reputations by speaking well or ill of the smuggler they hired. For smugglers having a good reputation brings the possibility of further transactions (Lucht 2012,131).

Reputations are valuable in and of themselves as well as aiding in the exchange process (Bourdieu 1991; Pardo 1996; Keshavarzian 2007). Reputations distinguish the holders, as Rabo (2005,72) explained in the case of the traders in Aleppo. Only some of the traders had an *ism* (s. name) or a reputation. The traders argued that an *ism* like a *sum’a*, loses its value if all the traders have one. The exclusivity of *isms* or *sum’as* constitute part of their value. Similarly, in this context, not everyone working in smuggling has a name and newcomers have to build up their name to attract clients.
For refugees coming into Istanbul, there are many potential smugglers to hire, but interlocutors explained that they rely on referrals and reputations as a way of ensuring their lives and money. Smugglers’ reputations are not only constituted through their ability to get refugees to their destination but also through their treatment of clients and modes of self-presentations. Refugees depend on the references as evidence of smugglers’ past performances and actions; they anticipate that the smuggler will be able to replicate his prior success (cf. Dasgupta 1988, 53; Balmer & Greyser 2003, 225). Recommendations, beyond highlighting a smuggler’s prior successes, offer insight into the smuggler’s demeanour and manner of dealing with passengers. Granovetter (1992, 61) explained that people prefer to engage with someone who is recommended to them personally as they are unwilling to “rely on generalised morality or institutional guarantees.” Interlocutors explained that recommendations from people they know about their dealings with a particular smuggler are more valuable than general knowledge of smugglers’ success, as they set up expectations of how the smuggler will treat them (Sanchez 2015, 62).

Former clients’ recommendations were also a means of personalising the relationship. Some refugees try to personalise their engagement with the smuggler in a bid to guarantee their interests. They may mention the names or connections that led them to the smuggler or mention the names of friends or relatives from the smuggler’s town or city. Even if they come from different cities, they might have connections in the smuggler’s hometown or city. Refugees highlight their social class through their connections as well as clarifying their reach and proximity to the smuggler. Many refugees considered recommendations more important than coming from the smuggler’s town or city. Thus refugees from Damascus or Aleppo or elsewhere might hire a smuggler from Deraa or another area. Some refugees, however, insist on moving with smugglers from their town, city or neighbourhood, as they consider the social proximity a form of security.
Smugglers do not only build their reputations through successful arrival, but also the ways they handle crises such as the failure of a journey. Smugglers’ responses to setbacks, whether placing passengers on another journey or returning their money preserved their reputations or added to it by portraying them as just or honest. In the event smugglers refused to return refugees’ money, ignored or blamed them for the failure of the attempt, refugees responded by speaking badly of them or trying to harm them. Refugees circulate stories about harm or abuse they incurred from their engagement with a particular smuggler to warn other refugees thinking of hiring him. Through the negative referral, they hope to detract from the smuggler’s custom or possibly shame him. They may potentially affect his reputation; though smugglers usually deflect the comments by blaming clients for their failure to arrive (cf. Pardo 1996,143-144). Refugees who come from the same town or city as the smuggler may circulate stories about his treatment to shame him and his family (Keshavarzian 2007,120). They believe that some hearsay or gossip would shame his family and force them to reprimand him to fix the situation. While relying on shaming the smuggler and his family in Syria might work, the same mechanism of social sanction is ineffective in Istanbul as there is no connected community to uphold the social sanctioning. Some refugees argued they could still act the smuggler’s family even while present in Istanbul, but they had varying results. Keshavarzian (2007,122-123) discussed a similar situation in the context of the bazaar in Tehran. Traders in the bazaar explained that social sanction and shaming used to be a means of disciplining traders; however, as the traders in the bazaar changed these mechanisms of social censure were weakened and became unreliable. From the 1980s onwards, the state played a greater role in guaranteeing traders’ rights than traders relying on a generalised morality guaranteed by the trading community. In Istanbul, the state cannot serve as an arbitrator given the nature of the exchange relations. Refugees thus rely on other forms of coercion to affect smugglers as will be explained in a subsequent section.
Smugglers’ reputations were not only formed by successful arrivals but also by anecdotes and personal traits which refugees incorporated into stories about them. In the process, refugees individualise smugglers and render their names (ism) significant. In the following, I focus on the stories about three smugglers. Refugees told these stories as part their preparation to go to Europe. They told the stories to explain why they wanted to move with a particular smuggler. In the stories, they developed the smuggler’s role as an expert and highlighted symbolic aspects of the smuggler’s performances. The three smugglers drew customers due to their record of getting refugees into Europe. The stories about them move beyond that to draw attention to socially valued traits.

Abu Nabek
Adam insisted on meeting Abu Nabek in September 2012, as he originally believed that all the other smugglers or middlemen worked with Abu Nabek. He later let go of the idea as he started to meet with different smugglers. He came to see how they collaborated or acted alone. Abu Nabek is a Palestinian man born in Deraa who was in his mid-forties at the time Adam met him. He had been working in Istanbul for over 13 years. Adam was also interested in meeting him as they were both members of Fatah and had fought in Lebanon during the Civil War when they were teenagers. He wanted to know who Abu Nabek had fought under and who he was connected to. He described Abu Nabek as a thin wiry man who was casually dressed and apologised to Adam because he did not tell him his real name as a security measure. Haris, a Palestinian man in his 20s whom Adam had befriended and was living with during the summer of 2012, introduced him to Abu Nabek. Adam met him in the café under the stairs in a side street in Aksaray and called me after to talk about his meeting. He referred to the café as the café under the stairs since it was built under a staircase leading on to an alley way in Kumkapı and very small. To compensate for the lack of space, its owners placed tables on the sidewalk before the cafe. The road it looked on to was paved
and used only by pedestrian making it a pleasant place to sit. A great vine tree covered most of its roof and offered customers shade. The vine tree uncannily hid the café from the main street above it. Adam explained that many of the smugglers came to this café as well, so they chose to meet Abu Nabek there. Haris had introduced Adam to Abu Nabek and he commented to me, “This guy [Abu Nabek] is known. His people make it. Once there was a ship of his and it sank, they knew it was his and he went to jail for six months and when he came out he had to pay a lot, like 70,000 (US) Dollars. He had to start over again from scratch. He puts his own money forward.” Haris left out how the authorities linked the ship to Abu Nabek or how he was apprehended. For Haris, speaking about Abu Nabek, it was important that Abu Nabek was held accountable and punished for the loss of life. He served time and paid compensation, so he could then return to smuggling without being labelled as a bad smuggler. The story of decline and ascension posed him as resilient and able to overcome adversity. Another interlocutor spoke to Abu Nabek asking about his routes, and he explained that Abu Nabek said when asked if his *ṭrq* are guaranteed that all *rhla* are only 90% guaranteed. The 10% left up to chance fit in with the story told of him (cf. Lucht 2012, 131-132).

During his conversation with Adam, he supposedly interrupted the conversation several times to answer his phone. Adam explained to me as we sat in the same café that after one telephone conversation, Abu Nabek said that he used to say he had people in Greece, but now he considered he had no one. He had explained to Adam that he had placed people in Athens in the past to move refugees onwards from Greece, but he said to Adam “*rasn kbr w nmrw alay* (their head grew big and they sabotaged me)”. His comment to Adam is formed of two criticisms. His former associates' 'heads' grew big' which is a metaphor for putting on airs and self-aggrandizement. Rabo (2005, 61) found that traders in Aleppo were critical of others 'making themselves big', and distinguishing themselves from the other traders. The traders sought to maintain a level of solidarity in the *souq*
(market) by socially sanctioning performances of grandeur or even open aspirations to grandeur. The negative association with becoming ‘big’ extends to other contexts. In this instance, Abu Nabek’s former associates sought to create a situation of inequality by insisting on their aggrandisement at his expense. The former associates had forgotten that he had put them in their positions and that they owed him the success or any capital (symbolic or material) they acquired. In its second part, his comment evoked an image of competition, greed, and arrogance where trusting associates is difficult. The associates not only grew ‘big’ but sought to damage Abu Nabek’s business. They harmed him in their endeavour to develop their names and reputations. His comment reflected onto him positioning him positively as someone who was neither self-seeking nor harmful to others. He made the effort to invest in others and trust them, but they took advantage of him.

Adam told me several months later that every time he ran into Abu Nabek in the Kitchen, Abu Nabek always came over and shook his hand. Adam interpreted the gesture as a sign of respect from an esteemed smuggler. Abu Nabek in all Adam’s encounters with him performed humility. He downplayed his position in relation to Adam. He highlighted through his actions that putting on airs or self-aggrandizement due to the success of his business is socially unacceptable. His actions may have been a means of accessing further clients and maintaining his reputation.

Ahmad

Ahmad was a smuggler in his early thirties who had been working in Istanbul for seven or eight years in 2012. He ran a tourism office off a side street in Aksaray. On the outside, the office appeared to be what it advertised. It was clean and new with an electric security blind and security cameras monitoring the shop front. Its location off a side street in Aksaray indicated activities other than tourism might be under way. The interior is plush, clean, and air-conditioned, giving the
impression of professionalism and a successful business. Malik, a Syrian refugee from the Eastern Ghouta of Damascus hired Ahmad in the summer of 2012. Malik explained after meeting Ahmad that Ahmad said he owned the building and had converted the flats above the office into studios to rent to tourists and traders coming to the area. He offered Malik a place to stay until he moved. The office and the apartments were a means of conveying his economic and professional success. Malik made fun of Ahmad’s attempted professionalism as every time he saw him, Ahmad was wearing a t-shirt, calf length tracksuit bottoms and flip flops. For Malik, who was involved in the pharmaceutical business in Syria before he left, dressing in this manner did not conform to his ideas of business or how businessmen should act.

Malik explained that he found Ahmad trustworthy for several reasons. Ahmad had agreed from their first meeting that Malik could leave the money with a money holding office¹³⁹, so he would only be paid upon Malik’s arrival. Malik said Ahmad was honest and straightforward because he agreed to this although Malik chose not to take this precautionary measure. Ahmad’s office added to his credibility. Unlike the other smugglers he spoke to, Ahmad had a stable address where Malik could reach him and not just a telephone number which he could easily replace. Malik also found Ahmad's supposed ownership of the building encouraging as it meant Ahmad invested in his business and would not abandon it suddenly or put it under threat by harming his passengers.

Malik eventually decided to move with Ahmad to Athens after meeting with other smugglers. He decided to pay Ahmad the 2000 Euros for the journey upfront. I saw Malik the same evening that he paid Ahmad and asked if Ahmad had invited him out for a drink. I asked because Maher, a

¹³⁹ Money holding offices are officers were refugees and smugglers agree that refugees can place the smugglers’ fees. The office takes a small fee from both parties to hold the money. The smugglers can only claim the money after the client arrives in Europe and contacts the money holding office. Some interlocutors refused to use this method as they feared that the smuggler might have an agreement with the office or that the money might be seized by the police.
document salesman Malik had dealt with previously, had repeatedly offered to take him to bars and clubs. He answered, “No! This one doesn’t seem like that. Even if he doesn’t talk about Allah he fears Allah.” He explained that while he was sitting with him, Ahmad got a phone call from his sister in Deraa. Malik could hear what she was saying as her voice was loud on the telephone, and she was asking for forgiveness. “She was telling him we are sorry and we will return your haq (right) to you. Ahmad responded you are forgiven in this life and the next… It is good to hear these things which are unrelated to the issue. It puts me at ease, ino hw emharb bkhaf Allah (that he is a smuggler who fears Allah).”

Malik firstly insisted that Ahmad did not advertise his drinking or nightclub lifestyle and he understood that as a sign of discretion. To drink or go out to nightclubs was not an issue, Malik drank, but to advertise such behaviour was not acceptable in the context of the transaction they were engaged in. To advertise such a lifestyle would highlight practices that as a client, Malik or others, did not want to know about. Speaking of drinking or clubbing would situate him as untrustworthy in this context rather than demonstrating his masculinity. Malik also witnessed Ahmad forgiving his sister and interpreted the act as an expression of Ahmad’s fear of God and belief in judgment in an afterlife. Malik’s appraisal of Ahmad as faithful led him to have confidence in Ahmad as a person. Rabo (2005) explained that traders in Aleppo also gave weight to other traders’ performances of faith. Traders who were said to fear God would not deceive customers or overcharge them as doing so is a sin in Islam (Oka &Kuijt 2014, 40). Malik believed that Ahmad’s

---

140 Boasting about going to clubs, drinking or insinuating about sexual relations are part of demonstrating certain forms of masculinity (Bourgois 1995). Gilmore (1986) mentions the emphasis in the Mediterranean on proving masculinity through virility and advertising sexual abilities. In this instance though all those actions do not demonstrate the traits or characteristics desired from a smuggler. Smugglers as the case studies show try to prove their trustworthiness, competence and stability.
fear of God would influence his actions towards others. Even if Malik could not threaten Ahmad to ensure his rights, Ahmad’s fear of God would prevent him violating the rights of others.

In November 2012, I asked Adam if he knew of Ahmad. He said he had heard about him. Adam explained he had heard that Ahmad had returned to Syria to fight with the Free Syria Army. He had been wounded and captured by the regime’s fighters who executed him. Adam’s story of Ahmad, whether accurate or not, fed into Malik’s appraisal of him. His heroism in returning to fight for the cause was praiseworthy. He chose to give up on the capital he acquired and could acquire in the smuggling business by joining the fight for the revolution. His actions are framed as an act of faith in the cause and trying to achieve ‘right’.

Wael

Wael was in his late twenties in 2012. He was from Deraa and had gone to Sweden in 2003. He had been working over the past few years in moving people from Greece to other European countries. Amr, the middle man Adam had befriended, asked him to come over to Istanbul as there were possibilities of work there too. Wael provided refugees with original European look-alike passports and got them through Atatürk airport (Chapter 6).\(^1^4^1\) In the winter of 2012, he was asking for 6500 Euros for a look-alike passport and sorting out the airline bookings. Amr had asked him to come over partly as a favour to Adam and several other refugees. Adam had helped Amr, paying his share of the rent for the flat they and several other refugees were renting together for about two months. Amr wanted Wael to provide Adam and other refugees he knew with look-a-like passports for them to move on.

Adam explained that Wael said he only took 6500 Euros per passenger because he did not want only wealthy people reaching Sweden. Moving on an original passport is usually more

\(^1^4^1\) Some interlocutors used look alike passports, original European passports, where the refugee using the passport resembles the passport photograph (Chapter 6).
expensive than crossing by sea or land. The price also fluctuates based on the seller and the type of passport. The method is more expensive as it is quicker than going up by boat or crossing by land to Greece or Bulgaria or Italy. Wael not only took less than other smugglers for the service but also insisted that the price was standardised. Adam said that Wael had explained that he did not want poor people who really need to go to Europe to get stuck in Turkey spending their money on failed attempts while wealthy people arrived at his doorstep in Sweden. From his comments to Adam, it appears Wael relied on ideas of social justice to build up his reputation as a smuggler by insisting that poor refugees deserve to arrive and in particular arrive through a safe and quick taryq. Wael made a taryq that is the most expensive with other smugglers accessible. He reduced the exclusivity of moving by aeroplane which is partially maintained by the high price of using this route. By reducing the price, he made the taryq available to a different set of refugees. Wael focused on the differences between passengers based on their socio-economic and financial capabilities. He reduced the differentiation by making the taryq available to passengers who would not be able to afford the prices demanded from other smugglers. He also promoted himself and refugees praised him by repeating that his prices were standardised regardless of the client. Standardising his price belied the idea that he was greedy whereas other smugglers changed the prices based on the client they were dealing with.

Wael’s presentation indicated that greed did not motivate him and empathised with refugees. Wael himself added to it by explaining that he worked in smuggling out of boredom. He claimed he had no need for the money as he was provided for by the state in Sweden, but he felt a need for a more exciting life. His boast, while an exaggeration, aimed at convincing those present to hire his services based on his disinterest in financial gain. In addition to boasting about why he was

---

142Based on information from several interlocutors, the price of a look-alike passport varied between 7000-10000 Euros, so Wael was asking for less than other smugglers making his services more attractive.
involved in smuggling, he spoke about Sweden in a way to portray it as a heaven. While he made the claims, Adam explained to me that Amr had told him that Wael had faced legal problems in Sweden to the point he was only allowed to see his daughter on supervised visits. Adam, however, focused on Wael’s self-representation as not greedy and that he promoted a form of social justice in his dealings with passengers.

Reputations are circulated and developed not only through successful crossings but also smugglers’ engagement with their passengers. Being qualified as God fearing, humble or just become part of the reputation and singled smugglers out. At the same time, these qualities are socially valuable. Abu Nabek presented himself as a humble man and through his performance censured the arrogance or self-aggrandizement of others. Ahmad’s piety or faith convinced Malik that he would not deceive him. Ahmad’s relationship with God, whether his fear or faith, would prevent him from abusing others for fear of damaging that relationship. Meanwhile, Wael presented a discourse and actions built upon ideas of social justice. These men’s reputations entered into the transaction process. Refugees came to them as their routes were known to work, but more importantly what convinced refugees to hire them was the social values they highlighted in their performances. Refugees were trying to mitigate the risks entailed in the exchanged and the endeavour. Smugglers’ actions influence refugees’ decisions and readings of them.

**Risks, Dangers, Routes and Thiqa**

Even with recommendations and smugglers’ desires to maintain their reputations, there is always the possibility that they will take advantage of refugees. The danger of this happening is another consideration other than the dangers refugees face while undertaking their journey to Europe. Refugees develop ways of guaranteeing their money and lives to counter this happening, but with varying success. Seligman (1997,63) explains that people trust others in situations of risk where
they are uncertain about how the other they are engaging with will act. Actors have expectations that those they engage with will act according to certain roles based on the requirements of their profession or social obligations. Expectation and confidence that the other will act according to the prescriptions of the role does not mean that they will necessarily. Actors then must trust that the other party will act according, and this trust highlights that there is a measure of uncertainty about the other’s actions. Trust then “... is a form of belief that carries within it something unconditional and irreducible to the fulfilment of systemically mandated role expectations” (Seligman 1997,45). In this situation, refugees must trust the smugglers they are hiring as there is always the possibility smugglers will deceive their clients.

Syrian refugees in Istanbul face a situation similar to that which migrants from Ghana’s hinterland faced in coming to Accra in the 1960s (Hart 1988). The Ghanaian migrants had to re-evaluate how they conducted their social relations because the situation was uncertain and they were unable to enforce social censure based on kinship obligations or turn to the state to attain their rights. Hart (1988) describes them as trusting those they dealt with their knowledge that the other party might act against their interest (Hart 1988,188). While Syrian refugees must trust the smuggler or others they hired, they also express their confidence in the smuggler’s ability to deliver the desired results and their ability to guarantee their rights.

The situation is one entailing both trust and confidence. Syrian refugees use the term thiqa which indicates trust or confidence, or both, depending on how it is used when discussing their relations with smugglers. In this section, I explore the ways thiqa is deployed to outline how trust and confidence emerge in this context. Refugees’ trust or confidence in smugglers highlights their underlying fear that all those working in smuggling are greedy. Moving from the ways trust emerges in the relationships, I examine how greed is distinguished from profit and classified as a danger.
Refugees’ use various tactics to guarantee their lives and their money when engaging with smugglers. They meet with different recommended smugglers to decide which one they have thiqa in. Thiqa indicates trust or confidence in Arabic depending on the context as Rabo (2005,62) explains in her ethnography with traders in Aleppo. She qualifies thiqa as incorporating trust, confidence, and faith. While acknowledging Seligman’s (1997) differentiation between the three, she found elements of them all in the way traders discussed thiqa. They expressed their thiqa that a trader would act according to an Islamic morality that distinguishes right from wrong (halal and haram), especially regarding making profits. As Oka and Kuijt (2014,39) comment drawing on Salahud Din and Amer Atta’s (2011) discussion, “Islam made a distinct differentiation between the virtuous accumulation of unlimited wealth and riches as long as it was done legally and by an honest and generous individual and the vices of hirs (greed as excess desire and indulgence), tama (avarice for wealth and opulence), and bulkh (miserliness).” Syrian refugees and smugglers, are familiar with these distinctions or at least shared an understanding of halal and haram that extends beyond use solely by Muslims and is used by non-Muslim Arabic speakers.143 Even if neither party was a fully practising Muslim, they shared an idea of general morality that they had learnt growing up.

Refugees usually express their thiqa in smugglers’ abilities to get them to their destination; they base this thiqa on their reputations and the arrival of others that refugees know. Seligman (1997,25) differentiates between confidence and trust, explaining that people have confidence in institutions and people to perform their roles and obligations. People have confidence that systems and social orders are effective and present ways of holding institutions and people accountable.

---

143 While halal and haram are used to indicate ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, they have other layers of meaning so I use the Arabic here. See Massad (2015) for discussion on Arabic words have multiple meaning and use by of terms associated with Islam by non-Muslims in the Middle East. As mentioned before, all the interlocutors I knew dealt with smugglers who were Muslim.
Refugees thus have confidence in smugglers’ performances as experts on how to cross borders and their ability to meet refugees' expectations. At the same time, refugees arriving safely benefits smugglers, as it adds to their reputation and draws more passengers their way (in theory at least). As already mentioned, they thus have an interest in refugees arriving (cf. Dasgupta 1988,56). Refugees count on this common interest as they have confidence that smugglers invest in their reputations and livelihoods. Some refugees play on this shared interest and promise that others will follow them. Smugglers, however, can never be sure refugees will actually send others their way. Beyond refugees' confidence in smugglers as experts and their aligned interests, refugees' explained that they had thiqa (confidence) the smuggler would not take advantage of them or deceive them. They outlined different forms of coercion whether social or physical that made them confident. They depend on these forms as the state is outside of these relations given the nature of the activities. Refugees explained that they had thiqa (trust) in this or that smuggler as the smuggler was their relative, he swore an oath before Allah to get them to their destination, and some said they had ways of reaching the smuggler’s family in Syria. Interlocutors expressed their thiqa (confidence) based on their perceived ability to hold them accountable, through social censure or the threat of physical violence to their families. Even with measures to sanction smugglers, refugees must still trust them as there is always a possibility the smuggler will act counter to refugees' interests.

Greed

Jiwan, a Syrian refugee, approached his engagement with the smuggler he hired as a business deal. Jiwan, a relative of Amira, is a Kurd from Syria who was in his mid-forties in 2013. He had been managing a supermarket in Mardin for several years. His mother was born on the Turkish side of the border, so he was entitled to Turkish citizenship. He had applied for it, but his claim was still
pending. He believed it was taking a long time because he is Kurdish. As acquiring Turkish citizenship had not yet been granted, and there was a possibility to seek asylum if he went to Europe, he decided to move on. He came to Amira and her husband in April 2013, asking Kenan to introduce him to some of the smugglers Kenan knew. Kenan made the introductions and Jiwan made arrangements with one of them. Talking to me and Amira about this a few weeks later in Amira’s living room, he explained that he told the smuggler that just because he came through Amira and Kenan did not mean the man should make a concession for him. The smuggler had responded that he would not lie; he wanted to make a profit from Jiwan. Jiwan appreciated the smuggler’s honesty. Two weeks later, at the time we were talking, the smuggler still had not come through and Jiwan was getting annoyed. The smuggler had asked him for his photograph which Amira said meant things were moving. Jiwan believed it was the smuggler’s attempt to get some money from him. He complained to Amira and me, “… the man is now saying he wants 1000 Euros before. Even if the man does not ask, I will give him his ikramiyat (tip). It is not an issue of 1000 Euros or 2000 Euros.”

For Jiwan an agreement had been brokered, and the smuggler’s profit was not only assured but also a given, so the smuggler’s attempt to get more money from him signalled the man’s greed. Jiwan was annoyed by the smuggler’s masked attempt to get more money from him, but he was not concerned that the smuggler would deceive him. Most refugees fear smugglers’ desire to accumulate and that this desire is grounds for smugglers to deceive them. In the process, they highlight that the problem is not smugglers’ profit, but rather smugglers or others taking refugees’ money and not delivering any services or the promised result; acting contrary to the expected role for which they were hired.

Refugees’ fear of smugglers’ greed was an intrinsic part of their relations. Passengers feared that smugglers were disingenuous and would take advantage of them for financial gain. The issue
was not smugglers making a profit for providing a service or the successful arrival of a refugee but concerned them deceiving refugees and taking their money. Rabo (2005) explained that the community of traders in the bazaar in Aleppo censured traders who are greedy. Here, in many cases, interlocutors had no such community to draw on and they could not turn to state actors to ensure their rights. Yet as Parry’s case study (1980) of the priests carrying out the death rites for deceased persons in Benares demonstrates, even with the existence of a community to criticise the priests’ for being greedy, the priests found ways to justify their actions. In that case, families must give a sum of money or goods, dan, to the priests for the priest to absorb the deceased sins. Priests knew they can only take one sum from the families, so they bargained to get the highest amount possible. Their bargaining earned them a reputation as being greedy. The priests, in turn, argued that they absorb others’ sins at the expense of their health (Parry 1980).

Parry’s discussion prompts the question of how greed operates in this context; And when could smugglers afford to deceive passengers? For many smugglers, refugees’ promises that others will follow them were mere talk as the quote at the start of the chapter illustrates. Some smugglers, like the Benares priests, try to gain as much as they can from a single passenger because they can never be sure that the passenger will send others once they arrive. As Sanchez (2015) commented about the case of smugglers on the Mexican-US border, some complained to her that after bringing people over they did not pay them for their services, leading the smugglers to reconsider working in the business. refugees’ promises and their insistence that they can send future customers to the smuggler remain a claim that smugglers have no reason to trust. Beyond their attempt to gain the most from passengers, many refugees were unconnected to the smuggler. While many refugees insisted they could coerce or harm smugglers, their actual ability to carry out their threats remained limited. Smugglers could thus take advantage of certain refugees without incurring damage or harm to their reputation or persons.
Personalizing relations

Refugees attempt in different ways to influence their relations with smugglers and mitigate their position of inequality or disguise it. Exchange relations are socially embedded (Granovetter 1992; Keshavarzian 2007), this section explores the ways refugees seek to guarantee their position by resorting to personalising the relationship or appealing to smugglers’ compassion. These relations take on different forms and here I highlight the nuances and subtleties in how these relations alter and how they are performed.

Refugees depend on their relationship to others who moved with the same smugglers they want to hire. They mention those people to the smuggler to position themselves as someone connected to the smuggler through his previous transactions. Beyond mentioning prior passengers who arrived, refugees try to find common ground with the smugglers. They explain where they are from, mention people they know from the smuggler’s hometown if they are from a different area, and explain why they left Syria. Refugees attempt to constitute themselves as persons beyond their position as passengers or sources of profit. They also try to counter their position in the relationship by approaching smugglers on the basis that the smuggler they are dealing with is a moral person. At the same time that refugees used morality or the common ground of Islam as a means of affecting smugglers, they often spoke negatively of some of the smugglers as immoral persons who trade in lives and sell people; but still as necessary since they were the only means to reach safety.

As part of the conversations, passengers may position themselves as vulnerable to dissuade the smugglers from taking advantage of them; although vulnerability or appealing to smugglers’ compassion never elicits a guaranteed response. In general, smugglers act respectfully towards possible customers or their passengers even though they do not necessarily have prior knowledge of or connection to them. Their respect puts passengers at ease, even though it is not necessarily
genuine, but merely politeness. Refugees only find out through a longer engagement and particular situations if smugglers genuinely respected them, or they have misread their position.

In some cases, smugglers make concessions for certain passengers and allow them to move for less than the price they are asking from others. The concession is based on the passenger’s personal relationship with the smuggler or social standing in their common place of origin. Of importance here is that the concession is posed by the smuggler, the refugee in question, and onlookers as a matter of respect (cf. Gilsenan 1996; Keshavarzian 2007). Making a concession for certain refugees sets them up as entitled to the concession, as their due, in a similar manner to the entitlements peasants demand from local patrons in Scott’s analysis (1976, 183). The concession does not alter the refugee’s position as a client or dependent on the smuggler, but it requires we shift how we speak about the relationship in this instance. Recognizing a passenger’s position as a client based on their relations in Syria makes the relationship closer to a patron client relationship. The shift means relations or history from Syria are valued and acted upon in the present of Istanbul. By making concessions for these refugees, smugglers develop their position, and reputation, in their hometowns in Syria. Not only as men who have access to means of mobility, but also as persons able to act as local patrons. As Waterbury (1977, 330) explains the inequality between the actors involved marks patron-client relations, but the degree of this inequality varies based on the context or situation. The inequality in the relationship between smugglers and these refugees is not alleviated by making the relationship a patron-client relationship, but rather smugglers treat passengers with the respect owed to clients. In that light, the concession made for them, is posed by the refugees and others involved in it as a matter of respect. Respect establishes the concession as their due as persons, clients, situated in longer term and extensive relations of reciprocity with the said smugglers. Discussing it as an issue of respect enables these refugees to mask their position as vulnerable, as recipients of a charitable act. It also reframes the issue to highlight their
importance within the reciprocal relations as clients who will and can offer a return of some kind in the future beyond the financial sum they pay.

In the following cases, both of the interlocutors in question used respect as a motif to discuss their relationship with the smugglers they dealt with. The cases demonstrate the possibility for refugees to misrecognise their position. While some relations can be approached as solely exchange relations, others have the possibility of becoming somewhat similar to patron client relations. The relations could move in other directions, but here I will focus on these two instances.

Adam formed ties with different smugglers and middleman mainly from his hometown in Deraa. He used these ties to sort out his passage to Europe as he did not have the sums required by the smugglers to pay for their services. By personalising the ties, he altered his position as an unreliable exchange partner. Personalising ties is not only a way for refugees to guarantee smugglers will not take advantage of them, but also possibly a means to improve their standing in the exchange relationship.

Amr had asked Wael to come over to Istanbul as there was a possibility to work from there. Adam explained that he also asked Wael to come over to arrange a solution for Adam and several other refugees. Wael and Amr promised Adam a look-a-like passport and agreed that he would pay less than Wael’s usual fare. Amr asked Wael to make a concession for Adam so that Adam would pay only 3500 Euros for his passage. Adam explained that lowering the sum was a special concession made for him, because of the smugglers’ respect for him and his economic situation. Adam had no income while in Istanbul and survived by borrowing money from relatives and friends. His brother in law in Germany agreed to pay for his journey, but only once he arrived. Wael had agreed although Amr was reluctant, and convinced that Adam’s brother in law was not going to pay.
Amr’s reticence highlighted that he was afraid he would not earn any money even after Adam’s arrival. If his only concern was building up his name and becoming a smuggler who would not have been as concerned with the loss one passenger would cause. He was trying to guarantee his position and did not want to be taken advantage of because of his familiarity with Adam. Amr posed the issue as a question of Adam’s relative’s respect for Adam deflecting the issue onto Adam to obscure his moves to guarantee his interests. He complained that if the brother in law did not pay, he would lose face with Wael. He was facing a situation where Wael or other smugglers might not consider him a reliable business partner if he let his personal ties with Adam direct his actions. In addition, how he handled the situation would offer Wael and other smugglers insight into how he would navigate or deal with future relations who were friends, relatives or close to him socially. He acted on the basis, Adam or his relative taking advantage of him would undermine his position as a middleman and his aspiration to become a smuggler.144

They eventually agreed, and Adam waited for around two months as Wael went back and forth between Istanbul and Sweden. Wael and Amr initially said that they would provide Adam with a look-a-like passport. They then changed the offer at some point during the two months and said they would make him a counterfeit Swedish passport. Adam agreed to the offer and eventually Wael came over with the passport. Adam went and booked his flights himself, and they accompanied him to the airport. He wanted to go to the UK and had repeatedly said so to Amr before Wael gave him the passport. He said Wael and Amr were surprised by his choice when he told them again the day before he moved but they reluctantly agreed. They argued that a Swedish passport amongst all the British and Turkish passports would draw attention and perhaps scrutiny. They said it was his choice in the end, and he went ahead. He was caught as his boarding ticket for

144 Other modes of responding or acting were possible as the issue could be framed as a sign of his generosity or integrity in standing by his word that he would help Adam.
the flight was not stamped with an exit stamp. Wael and Amr blamed Adam for the failure of the attempt. By blaming Adam, Amr tried to deflect his responsibility in setting Adam up. Amr, later on, told Adam that Wael had deceived him without Amr realising it. He wanted to maintain his relationship with Adam. It seems likely that they wanted to see if Adam would make it through with the counterfeit passport, and thus open another taryq through the airport. They lost very little when his attempt failed, only the cost of making the passport.

Adam framed Wael’s concession and arrangement as a matter of respect for him. He continued to portray the arrangement this way even after they changed their offer to a counterfeit passport. For any refugee or migrant, moving on a counterfeit passport entails more risk than a genuine look-a-like passport. Adam’s insistence on respect being a crucial element marking his relationship with the smugglers positioned him as different to other clients or customers. It was an insistence on his part to see the relations as one of equals or patron-clients, where the client is secure in their position as needed or valued by their patron. By acting according to codes of respect, he tried to convince Wael and Amr of his sincerity as a client given he was not sure if his relative would pay for his journey even after his arrival; he was dependent on his brother in law’s word. Bourdieu (1997/2000,218-219) comments that observing the interaction between certain parties and the results of their interaction, highlights the disconnect between actors’ expectations of what would happen and what actually happened. That gap is the element of uncertainty that factors and features as part of any relationship. This uncertainty may go unnoticed or as in this case become pronounced. Adam was not sure if he would successfully pass through the airport, but he did not back out of trying since these were the social ties he had invested in and developed to sort out his migration.

145 It is common practice in Turkish airports for border guards to stamp the boarding passes for passengers on international flights when they stamp their passports.
In contrast to Adam’s engagement with the smugglers from his hometown, two Palestinian brothers had a different experience. Majed and Hani are Palestinians living in Deraa. They came to Istanbul after travelling through Syria and crossing the border into Turkey. They were wanted by the regime in Syria for their participation in the uprising in Deraa. Their wives told them to stay in Turkey or continue to Europe because the situation was only getting worse. Majed was a famous local football player. He had a large Sony phone which he was always tapping on, using Facebook, searching Google, or playing games. He had a sense of humour and enjoyed making fun of his brother. His brother, Hani, worked in laying marble and tiles. Hani was more subdued than his brother. For most of the time they were in Istanbul, he was worried that their money would run out. The brothers had 6000 Euros together to arrive at their destination. Hani was concerned about money and asked me about work possibilities in case they stayed longer in Istanbul than they anticipated.

He and his brother soon met a smuggler from one of the villages surrounding Deraa who agreed to give them passage to Greece. The smuggler knew of Majed and knew about the brothers’ economic situation. He agreed to lower his usual price for them. Adam explained that the smuggler lowered the price for them out of respect for Majed. Majed due to his local fame was in a different position to Adam. He is relationship with the smuggler was closer to a patron-client relationship where the smuggler approached helping Majed as an investment. Other people from Deraa would hear that Majed crossed with him, and they might seek him out because of this news. Moreover, his concession would also make news in Deraa as evidence that he was not only

---

146 Palestinians normally resident in Syria had to apply for a visa to come to Turkey although the temporary protection supposedly extended to all persons normally living in Syria, citizens and non-citizens. The brothers had applied for a visa in the Turkish embassy in Lebanon, but their application was denied so they travelled by land to northern Syria and crossed the land border to enter Turkey.

147 Majed was a well-known local figure as I will explain in Chapter 5.
respectful of social obligations, but able to act as a patron. He chose to act according to the Majed’s position in Deraa highlighting that that history and the relations within the town were valued even in the uncertain context of Istanbul.

Inequality and its manifestation

Refugees and the smugglers whom they decide to hire, enter into an exchange relationship, which entails a power imbalance (cf. Bourdieu 1991). They are in an unequal position given their limited ability to guarantee themselves in the relationship. Some smugglers downplay the inequality to create a situation of greater confidence. In other instances, smugglers point out refugees’ unequal position whether to warn refugees or draw their custom away from another smuggler they want to hire. Amr, the middleman mentioned before, made a point of highlighting how a certain smuggler was taking advantage of one of the refugees living with him and Adam. By making explicit the inequality in their positions in the exchange, Amr sought to further his interests as the smuggler was not one he recommended or could make a commission from.

One evening as I sat in a café in Aksaray with him, Adam and other refugees in the winter of 2012, he made fun of one of the men sitting. The man, a doctor, was Palestinian, a recent graduate from Hama who left Syria to avoid his military service. He had been outside of Syria for several months and tried to cross to Greece by land repeatedly without success. He was in Istanbul trying to find another ṯaryq. That evening, Amr criticised him for looking into more than one ṯaryq at the same time. The doctor maintained that it was better to have a backup in case what Amr was trying to sort out for him fell through. Amr continued making fun of him, turning to me without waiting for a response and asked, “The doctor over here, a smuggler told him there is a way with a passport, for 7000 (Euros). Then the next time he saw him he told him there is another way by truck, and he wanted 8000 (Euros) for it, what do you think? I could not believe it, so the passport and a two-
hour flight were cheaper than two days in a truck?! W zalami b’il ino tla nas [and the man says that he has gotten people up].”

Amr had reason to criticise what this smuggler was offering as it went against his interests given he was trying to arrange a route for the doctor. Amr downplayed what the smuggler was offering, and pointed out how he was approaching the doctor. The doctor did not negotiate the price of going by plane, so the smuggler assumed the doctor was able to pay the amount and asked for more while effectively offering less. Amr blamed the doctor for failing to recognise his position in the exchange or question what the smuggler was offering; effectively blaming him for his gullibility and lack of shrewdness in guaranteeing his own interests.

Malik and Ahmad

Malik, the refugee from Eastern Ghouta, introduced earlier, hired Ahmad, a smuggler from Deraa, as mentioned before. He asked Ahmad to include him on a trip going to Greece. He planned to go to Athens and move from there on a counterfeit passport. Two days after paying Ahmad, he went to wait at Ahmad’s office for the time to set out. He sat in the office or outside chain-smoking and chatting to the men who worked with Ahmad. Other refugees who had hired Ahmad arrived and then refugees who hired a different smuggler arrived. They got into a van in the afternoon and were driven to the border region. They left so quickly Malik complained that no one had time to buy water or food for the journey. After a few hours driving, they were dropped off in some fields with a rehber. The car drove away leaving them alone with the rehber in some fields close to a woodland area. Malik commented that the rehber was wearing flip flops which annoyed him greatly as they are supposed to be walking for many hours to cross the border. The rehber, who was Turkish, gestured that he wanted money. Malik phoned Ahmad to understand why the rehber wanted money. The phone calls went back and forth with Ahmad calling the rehber’s boss and calling
Malik back. He only asked for money from the refugees who had hired Ahmad. He wanted the 
money to buy them train tickets, Ahmad explained to Malik. The rehber was going to cross the 
border, buy the tickets, and then come back to take them across. Malik argued with Ahmad that 
they should all cross together and then the rehber buys them the tickets. The rehber and Ahmad 
insisted so they paid up. “What choice did we have?” he said back in Istanbul. The rehber took 600 
Euros and gestured for them to hide in the overgrowth close by. He repeated, ‘Muhammed, 
Muhammed, Muhammed’ as if a signal and gestured that they stay low. He went off. Ahmad had 
said the rehber would take about an hour to cross and return. They waited. An hour later they 
phoned Ahmad asking where the rehber was and he assured them on the road returning to them. 
He repeated that the rehber was coming back to them for another hour after which he admitted that 
the rehber had left them. He promised to send back the van that had dropped them off. They 
continued phoning him asking what was happening and if the van driver had returned. The van 
driver supposedly turned off his phone at some point that evening making him unreachable. Ahmad 
promised to send someone else with a van, water and blankets as no one had brought water with 
them and it was very cold. They phoned repeatedly throughout the night asking what was 
happening. They had no one else to turn to at that point. Towards dawn, Malik warned Ahmad that 
they would be discovered as it looked like the land they were on was agricultural land. Ahmad said 
the person he sent would get to them soon. Around 6 am, Ahmad turned off his phone, and they 
were unable to reach him.

Malik had confidence in Ahmad because he appeared pious and invested in his business in 
Istanbul. Ahmad had however set up Malik and the other refugees who had hired him. They had 
all paid him already for their passage, though Malik had paid more than the others. Malik had no

---

Lucht (2012:143) explains that guides taking Sub-Saharan migrants through the desert purposefully take them 
through routes were robbers are present to force them to pay a fee to pass.
connections in Istanbul to coerce Ahmad. He had come to Ahmad as people Malik’s brother in law knew had moved with Ahmad, so Malik was not directly connected to any acquaintances or contacts of Ahmad’s. Malik valued his ability to judge people, and he did not understand his position in the relationship. He had trusted Ahmad even though there was always a possibility Ahmad might act contrary to Malik’s interests, as in eventually he did. Given Malik’s limited connections, Ahmad was able to deceive him without repercussion.149

From Aksaray to Aksaray: Coercion

Refugees face a situation where shaming or verbal sanctioning that might have been productive in Syria are unsuccessful in Istanbul. There is no community or collective body to make these tactics effective measures of social sanction (Keshavarzian 2007). Similarly, where refugees might have turned to the state to arbitrate while in Syria, there is no legal or state body in this situation to perform that role (Hart 1988). Refugees are thus forced to find other ways of enforcing their rights and securing their interests in the exchange relationship. Refugees usually expressed their confidence in certain networks or bodies such as kinship ties or the Free Syrian Army to step in to guarantee their position. The extent to which refugees could draw on these varied based on the person’s reach and network.

In the event a smuggler was related to his passengers, their *thiga* is based on his obligation to his kin, and their ability to subject him to social sanction in the event he takes advantage of them. Smugglers swearing oaths before God were risking damnation and punishment in an afterlife if they lied or betrayed their oath. By swearing an oath, they are performing according to wider social prescriptions, but an oath ultimately pertains to an individual’s relationship with God. Within individuals’ relationships with God, is the possibility of sanction and justice even where worldly

149 Malik’s account will continue in the following chapter.
justice is unattainable. Refugees depended on that fear of God's justice and punishment in an afterlife when they explained their *thiqa* in a smuggler.

In a situation where refugees have paid up front, and the smuggler has not delivered it becomes necessary to find ways or people to get the money back. Without recourse to the state, there were other ways of governing and coercing smugglers and returning refugees’ rights. Refugees resort to or draw on certain relations or connections in their attempt to return their money. They capitalise on certain relations to people who can act as coercers and force smugglers to give back the money. At other times, refugees pressure smugglers through their family relations or get someone from the smuggler’s family to mediate for them.

Refugees who were caught trying to cross the border returned to Istanbul after a failed attempt with the aim of arranging another journey and/or making the smuggler return the money. Malik and some of the people in his group were caught by the gendarmerie and sent to Edirne detention centre. He was released after a few days and returned to Istanbul with the intention of finding another *taryq* and getting back his money. 150 Malik and some of the other refugees who were with him on that attempt tried to get their money back from Ahmad, but to no avail. Malik wanted to find someone in Istanbul who could pressure Ahmad into returning his money. He repeatedly commented that he knew people in Damascus, his turf, who handled such issues. He repetition was a way to confirm his self-presentation as someone capable. Jeffrey (2010, 20) comments that social actors’ success in different fields of action gave them the “ability to project their lives into the future.” Here somewhat in contrast, Malik’s previous success in various fields in Syria meant he was unable to comprehend how to act in a situation that upturned the familiarity of the fields of action.

150 See Chapter 5 for further explanation.
Malik presented the problem as a lack of connections rather than evidence of his inability to judge people. In the process, he deflected that he had been positioned insubordinately in the relationship. While exploring a different situation, Gilmore’s (1986) discussion of masculinity can offer some insight here. Gilmore (1986, 11) examines existent literature on masculinity in the Mediterranean region.\(^{151}\) He remarks about the shame men feel of being bested, publicly, by other men. Letting another ‘get the best of you’ so to speak implied “more than loss of social prestige; it also implies loss of male social identity, of masculinity.” Without a community to notice or comment on his shame, Malik could downplay his shame; however, it was difficult for him to do so with me since I was a witness to engagement, and the way Ahmad positioned him. He was unable to turn his position around or re-inscribe it in Istanbul as he was unable to dedicate the time to sort out the issue and turned his attention to arranging his next attempt. After a few days in Istanbul, Malik left for a town along the southwestern coast of Turkey to try to go by boat to Greece. While he gave up on getting the money back from Ahmad, he spoke to me when he was in Izmir explaining that he met a smuggler there who had also dealt with Ahmad. The smuggler told Malik that Ahmad had taken advantage of him as well. It reconfirmed to Malik that he was not the only man whose masculinity was threatened by Ahmad’s actions or who had misread their interaction with him.

While Malik did not succeed in pressuring Ahmad, other refugees managed to force smugglers to give back their money. One woman from Qamishli recounted how she waited for about a month in Aksaray for a smuggler her brother had hired to come through with a ḥaryq. By the end of the month, she realised he was not going to deliver his services. She had already paid him, and he was

---

\(^{151}\) I do not use the discourse of honour here as Malik did not speak about being taken advantage of as an affront to his honour. I would argue that his discourse is better understood by relying on anthropological discussions of masculinity and male identity (cf. Herzfeld 1985; cf. Bourgois 1995; cf. Gilsenan 1996)
refusing to return the money. Her brother in Switzerland who had hired the smuggler went to the smuggler’s sister’s house in Switzerland. Her brother then phoned the smuggler threatening him, either he returned the money or he would harm his sister’s family. The smuggler paid up. Her brother knew the smuggler well enough to know where his family in Switzerland were living. The smuggler took the threat seriously enough to respond and return the money.

Different refugees took precautions to avoid smugglers deceiving them, but where these failed, many insisted they have means to force smuggler to return their money. It was only after the failure of their attempt that they were forced to actualise their connections and were faced with the limits of what they were able to achieve.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the relations between smugglers and Syrian refugees. I outlined how Syrian refugees learnt about the smuggling business, the various actors involved, and the different qualifications of routes. Syrian refugees become familiar with the ways smugglers positioned them as customers in the exchange relations. Some of the interlocutors mentioned in the chapter dealt with the smugglers as they would engage with any exchange partner in Syria, others tried to personalise the ties, or draw on shared ties from their place of origin. These strategies had varying success. The encounter with smugglers brought up issues of thiqa, reputation and greed. In presenting narratives about three smugglers, I explored the ways passengers develop their reputation, and how it influences their interaction with customers. Reputation and thiqa lead us to a discussion of smugglers’ greed and their deception of passengers. Smugglers’ greed was the answer to why they deceived customers, but passengers also distinguished greed from smugglers’ financial profits from smuggling. Refugees interpreted smugglers’ different actions as signs they were not greedy and would not deceive them. At the same time, many refugees claimed that they
had ways or access to persons who could coerce smugglers in the event they were taken advantage of. While they made the claim, their actual ability to accomplish that aim was limited. The chapter highlighted the ways past modes of engaging based on experiences in Syria had varying results when brought into the context of Istanbul. Where the familiar modes of dealing with others are brought into question in this chapter, the subsequent chapter demonstrates how refugees sought to uphold and maintain the social order.
Chapter 5

Altering Insecurity: Transient Ties and Forms of Help

Mobility is always embedded in certain ties which make it possible to move. Social networks existent in Syria brought refugees to Aksaray or Jazira neighbourhoods in Istanbul. Refugees arrived to join others whether friends or family who want to travel or arrange passage with a recommended smuggler. Individuals’ social networks brought them into Istanbul and possibly enabled them to organise their movement onwards. Despite existent contacts or members of a social network facilitating refugees’ arrival and presence in Istanbul, many still sought to develop other ties and relations once in the city. They socialised as part of their practices of waiting. Some refugees chose to go out and frequented cafes, either seeking out other refugees to make connections or just socialise. Others kept to themselves, remaining in their hotel room or rented apartment and only going out when they had business with the smuggler they hired or for their daily needs. As I met interlocutors in cafes through contacts and connections, Syrian refugees who kept to themselves are absent from this chapter and the thesis in general.

By engaging with strangers or people who come from the same town, province, city, or neighbourhood, Syrian refugees relied on these ties to reduce their social and existential insecurity in the endeavours they are undertaking. Following Peleikis (2009,176), “… ‘places’ should not be understood as areas with surrounding boundaries but rather as articulated moments in networks of social relations (Massey 1994,154). These articulated moments have the power to create feelings of security and continuity in migrants and refugees, despite the uncertainty in their lives.” Syrian refugees related to others and created ties not only in Istanbul, but also en route, in the detention centre in Edirne (if they are caught while en route), or elsewhere in Turkey if they decided to move from the southwestern Turkish coast. In continuously seeking out others and building ties, albeit
temporarily, refugees achieved a sense of security and were better equipped to handle the uncertainties they faced. As explored in the previous chapters, they faced uncertainty in their various relationships with smugglers, while undertaking crossings, or with the Turkish state actors when they were discovered at the border to Europe. In the process of creating ties, refugees become co-implicated in each other’s biographies to varying degrees and in different ways (cf. Day 2007). Where the common goal of moving on brought refugees of different socio-economic, religion, or place of origin together, these differences emerged in some relations and were downplayed in others. I suggest that refugees performed being ‘same’ when developing these transient ties rather than emphasising equality or commonality. Syrian refugees performing ‘sameness’ was a means for differences of class, region, religion to emerge without threatening refugees’ shared ambition.

In the following, I explore the transient ties Syrian refugees formed. Drawing on the problematic Papadopoulos and Tsiano’s (2013) raise, I will examine how these relations formed and the ways refugees dealt with each other rather than assume the relations based on refugees’ shared predicament.

The Kitchen

The Kitchen, which we have already caught glimpses of in previous chapters, was a café along one of the main streets of Aksaray. The café ran lengthwise from the street, and at the street level, a chicken shawarma (döner) stand was located next to the entrance. As the café was long rather than wide, the covered tea garden towards the back was hidden from the street. The two parts of the café were separated by glass panels and a sliding glass door. The tea garden, while called a garden, had

---

152 I use socio-economic and class as categories where socio-economic status is an element of class. I use socio-economic to discuss how refugees presented themselves in terms of their financial capital. I employ class when discussing a dialogue among Syrian refugees about social hierarchy. I relied on interlocutors’ self-representation of their socio-economic status or class position.
no plants save for some plastic flowers in pots lining the wall at the far end of the cafe. The tea
garden area was open air, and it was covered with an electric retractable ceiling blind. The blind
protected customers from the sun in summer, keeping the area cool, and retained the heat from the
ceiling gas heaters in the winter. The cafe owners only allowed smoking in the tea garden relegating
Adam and other smokers to sit there rather than inside. Upon entering the cafe, customers pass
glass cabinets on their right-hand side showcasing the pastries the cafe offers. Behind the counter
were several employees taking orders or making tea. Most of those behind the counter were women
though the male waiters frequently acted as cashiers. Next to the counter is a tea stand where
customers wait to be served the tea they had paid for. Waiters also took tea glasses on trays and
walked around the cafe stopping at tables offering tea to customers and collecting empty glasses
and cups. The waiters going around the tables were usually men in their late teens and early
twenties, especially towards late afternoon and evening. The arrangement highlighted the
manager’s preference that waitresses and female employees maintain a distance from customers.

Like all cafe spaces the way people enacted their relations in the cafe rendering it varyingly
intimate and public. Some of the customers watched how others seated move around the space,
commented on them or on their orders and potentially listened in to their conversations. Others sat
relaxed talking, drinking tea, or smoking nargileh or cigarettes without paying attention to those
around them. At certain moments people leant in towards those seated with them, lowered their
voices, and gave furtive glances to those seated at tables around them before speaking. The layout
of the chairs and tables also affected how customers moved and engaged in the space. Inside the
cafe, the tables and chairs were set up like benches while the tea garden had square tables and
individual chairs. The ones in the tea garden seat either two or four people, so customers and waiters
rearranged them according to their needs. The table arrangement made it easy for large groups of
customers to sit together. As they could rearrange the tables, they were able to make the space more
private or public according to their needs. The customers coming to the Kitchen varied from migrants of different nationality to nationals or tourists, and both men and women frequented the café. Syrian refugees sat there in the evening whether to meet with smugglers or hang out with their friends and smoke nargileh. Other times, smugglers brought customers to the Kitchen to discuss their business. Many middle-aged Turkish and Kurdish men also came in and sat alone on tables prompting Adam and others to suspect they were policemen or police informants. After several months, Adam said he believed they were just there to meet women. Various women sat in the café, some alone and with friends or male companions. Adam, Amr and other men sitting with them scrutinised the women sitting in the tea garden around them. They made speculations about their relationship with the men they sat with (if they sat with men) or their line of work or nationality. They assumed some women were sex workers and they paid more attention to them. The men paid less attention to other women sitting in the café either because of who they were sitting with or due to the women’s performances as they sat. It was clear from some women’s performances that they were sitting with their spouse or family and this marked them as less interesting to Adam or others seated. Other women sat with different men on different days or sat alone in the café frequently, so Adam and the others noticed them and at times commented on them.

**Musical Chairs**

Adam used the Kitchen and other cafes he sat in as a means of meeting other Syrian refugees and other Arabic speaking migrants. He would listen in to conversations of the others sitting around him and if they spoke the Arabic dialect of the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan or Palestine), he would open a conversation with them. He relied on this method to meet people to live with, gain information from and at that time in October 2012 to find a potential travel companion to move
with. Adam began sitting in the Kitchen in October 2012 after one of the smugglers he knew took him there. He was pleased he had been taken to the place as many other smugglers also brought their customers there. By sitting in the café, Adam sought to open a conversation with smugglers from Deraa or customers also frequenting the place. He commented to me as we sat one afternoon in October that one of the smugglers from Deraa, Abu Kathem, was sitting in the café as well. He pointed him out discretely, and I sat watching Abu Kathem moving around the café. He went from sitting with two men on one table to sitting with another two men on a different table. He left and then returned with a party of five men. At the same time, another man was going from one table to the other, a man, in his early thirties, was wearing a red tracksuit and holding a string of worry beads in his hand. Yasser, a young Palestinian man from Gaza, was sitting with us. He was one of many Palestinian men whom Adam had befriended that summer. The man greeted Yasser while passing to sit on a table near us. Yasser explained in a low voice after the man had passed that the man is from Syria, but he did not know which part of Syria and that the man worked as a middleman. The man in red had sat down in the meantime with a group of men on a table near us. From his table he continued to look over at our table, obviously listening in to our conversation at various moments.

Two days later, Majed and Hani, the brothers mentioned in the previous chapter, arrived in Istanbul. A friend from Deraa who knew them well asked me to meet them in Aksaray and take them to Adam as they needed a place to stay. I met the brothers in the square for the Unknown Soldier in Aksaray close to the metro station as it was an easy landmark and they did not yet know Aksaray. We sat for a while on some benches in the square talking. They explained that they had spoken to two smugglers so far, and had the numbers of others. They were considering which option was best for them given their budget. Adam’s phone at the time continuously went haywire, and so after trying to reach him a few times by phone I eventually suggested we walk to the Kitchen
with the hope of finding him there. Adam was sitting outside the café with some of the men who were sharing his rented flat because he thought we might come looking for him. He was living in a rented flat in Aksaray at the time; it was rented on a weekly basis. We all moved inside and shortly after his co-renters left and he started talking with the brothers. As they spoke, we were joined by Yasser. Majed explained to Adam that they are wanted by the regime in Syria and cannot return. They came to Istanbul to go to Sweden, and they wanted to hire a smuggler to that end. Adam, in turn, told them about his plan to cross to Bulgaria by map and move from there. They asked him to sit with them when they meet smugglers. He agreed but insisted it could be done without the smugglers. Then the middleman in red turned up. Adam pointed him out to the brothers because he is Syrian. Mona and Hussam, the couple whom we met in Chapter 3, soon came and sat with the middleman in red on the table behind us in the same row of tables. He sat with them for about ten minutes before getting up and dragging his chair behind him. He sat down with four men seated on the table in front of us (closer to the separation glass of the tea garden). Majed was sitting closest to the couple and leant over to ask the man (Hussam), “You are from Deraa?" He replied he was. Adam then asked where they wanted to go to and got up and sat with them at their table to talk. Yasser in the meantime regaled Majed and Hani with stories about Athens. He had gone to Greece, but was unable to continue from there and returned to Turkey to go back to Palestine. He spoke about the poverty in Athens and the high visibility of drugs. He asked them questions about the Palestinian camps in Syria. He then started talking about routes, commenting to them, “I have never heard of anyone who got through that way (Bulgaria).” I asked him what he meant, and he explained that the route through Bulgaria must be closed since he has never heard of anyone getting through to elsewhere in Europe that way. The brothers listened to his warning

153 Adam made their acquaintance then, and I was introduced to them the following day.
but did not comment. His comment dismissed Adam’s claim that it is possible to move from Bulgaria to elsewhere in Europe.

Majed then turned to me saying, “See?! I asked the man if he is from Deraa and he is. I recognised him. We know each other. I know everyone, individual by individual- nafr, nafr.” The man in red got up from his second meeting, and Majed stopped him as he walked past, “You are a footballer too? Come talk to us.” They started to exchange names and common connections, and he took Yasser’s seat at the table as Adam had called Yasser over to speak to the couple because they wanted to go to Greece. Adam asked for my notebook to take down their number and then handed it back to me when he returned to sit with us. Bahaa, the middleman, and Majed were remembering people from Deraa and Majed filled him in on where people were. Bahaa, in turn, talked to them about the Turkish-Greek border. He had left Syria over a year ago because he had a death sentence in Syria and had been working in smuggling in Istanbul since then. He said had been caught twelve times at the Greek-Turkish border, and explained that every time he told the gendarmerie he was Palestinian and he got out of the camp (the detention centre) after a few days.

He encouraged them not to worry if they were caught at the border. Bahaa then phoned some of his friends so they could come and say hello to Majed. From his excitement, it was evident that Majed was famous in Deraa. The guys came and shook Majed’s hand as Bahaa introduced them. Bahaa in the meantime told Majed to register his two phone numbers. He then returned to the couple as Yasser came back to sit with us. Adam warned the brothers after Bahaa left, “Don't seem too eager,” but they were smiling.

---

154 He was probably working as a rehber (guide) taking people across the border into Greece. When he met the brothers he was working as a frontman collecting passengers for a smuggler.

155 I explain in subsequent section about the detention centre.
Majed, Hani, and Adam’s trajectories were all affected by their engagement with each other. By connecting and engaging with certain people, options became available and relations were formed. They enacted different forms of reciprocity and developed relations marked by degrees of proximity or distance. The brothers needed to share their time and space with other refugees to facilitate their stay and make it successful. Adam and the other people they met in Istanbul helped them to manage the uncertainty they faced in Istanbul at that moment. The brothers came to Istanbul with the numbers of several smugglers and a contact who was their neighbour in the Palestinian camp in Deraa. By befriending Adam, they sought to expand their connections in Istanbul and meet other refugees who could help them navigate their situation. Adam gave them access to the rented house he was sharing at the time, facilitating their stay. He also provided them with information about routes, smugglers and how to manage themselves and their money while waiting to move. By engaging with other refugees whether in the Kitchen or the flat they shared with Adam, they gained information and insight from the experiences of others. By opening a conversation with the couple or Bahaa, Majed found there were familiar people in the city. His claim that everyone in Deraa knows each other is an extravagant suggestion given the population size, but his aim was to highlight the familiarity possible there in contrast to the unfamiliar of Istanbul. Hart (1988,190) described it as “pretension of familiarity” in the case of rural Ghanaian migrants moving to Accra in the 1960s. The familiarity is based on their common place of origin, and in the instance of Bahaa that they both were football players playing with teams in the same province. The common place of origin meant that they had avenues to acquire knowledge about each other and find out information about the other’s reputation or standing in Deraa (cf. Bailey 1971). Their ability to do

\[156\] According to the state 2011 census, 1,027,00 people were living in Deraa province (City Population 2016).
so domesticates the unfamiliar, not only in terms of what others know of them, but also how and if one should deal with them.

The common place of origin served Majed and Hani well as it meant that others knew of Majed and were willing to deal with him because of his reputation and standing in the city; people from other parts of Syria might not have responded in the same way. As explained in the previous chapter, it situated Majed as a possible client, in the sense of a patron-client relationship, who could be depended on in the future. Despite Majed’s respected position in the community, his interaction with Bahaa highlight that relations in Istanbul could be precarious.

Bahaa offered to help them arrange their passage through the smuggler he collected passengers for. Amr, the middleman mentioned in the previous chapter, ‘intervened’ on their behalf. The day after the brothers met Adam and Bahaa, Amr saw Majed in the Kitchen and introduced himself as he recognised Majed. Majed was at the time sitting with Bahaa and Amr wasted no time threatening Bahaa that if he did not leave the brothers alone, Amr would supposedly ‘take Bahaa to his boss!’ Amr insisted that Bahaa was going to take advantage of the brothers in the name of the smuggler he collected passengers for; regardless of whether or not this was true, it affected the brothers’ dealing with Amr and Bahaa. Majed while continuing to meet with Bahaa did not depend on him to arrange passage for them. He started spending time with Amr. Their relationship affected Adam. Adam had already met Amr once, but following Amr’s intervention he spent more time with him and they shared rented apartments together during the winter. As we saw in previous chapters, Adam used Amr to arrange passage for him though it was unsuccessful.

These relations while socially embedded can be used instrumentally. The brothers needed to make connections in a bid to figure out their situation and arrange their forecasted movement in an optimum way. Adam was trying to find people with money who would be willing to cross the border into Bulgaria with him. He did not have the funds to continue from Bulgaria and so teaming
up with other refugees might offer a way for him to arrive. He explained it as him guiding them and thus offering them an alternative to dealing with the smugglers, and in return, they would help him complete the journey. Bahaa was seeking customers, and he drew on the familiar connections from football and a common place of origin to build rapport with Majed. Amr similarly was looking for customers as he made a living in Istanbul by introducing refugees to the various smugglers he knew. They initiated the ties for strategic reasons since they were each trying to achieve a particular goal but they did not openly advertise their interests by emphasizing the social nature of the relations they were forming.

**Class and Distinction**

Mona and Hussam whom Bahaa was sitting with and to whom Adam introduced himself, sat with us the following day. I was sitting at the time with Majed, Hani, Adam, and Amr in the Kitchen. Mona jokingly said as we were being introduced that they thought I was a smuggler because they had seen me sitting more than once with these men. She sat next to me for the evening and spoke to me as well as participating in the wider conversation.

Mona was thirty at the time, of average height with wavy hair she had dyed a dark red. She had a full figure and while her clothes were not revealing, they showed her figure. She took care of her appearance, wearing make-up and maintaining her nails. She is Kurdish from northern Syria. They had met in Damascus and married several years back. Hussam was in his mid-forties and from Deraa. He was large man, tanned with black rings under his eyes. He worked in construction contracts, and they were well off in Syria. She explained that they were living in Moadamiya al-Sham in Damascus suburbs while maintaining a house in Deraa. She emphasised the location, Moadamiya, as a way of indicating that they were living in a well-off area given she was telling someone (the researcher) who did not know Damascus. The geographical location was a sign of
their socio-economic status. They had moved back to Deraa when Damascus became unsafe. They then decided to leave Deraa in 2012 as the army was shelling the city and living expenses had become very high. Mona complained about the expenses and growing shortages in goods whether food or gas. Without an end in sight, they decided to leave.

Mona explained about their prior attempts to cross the border, going into detail about their attempts to cross by land and sea to Greece. They had planned to cross by sea, but Mona became afraid of crossing by water, so they decided to cross by land. Mona said the smuggler had told them they would walk for only 20 minutes, so she had worn open-toed sandals on the day they tried to cross. They ended up walking for several hours, and her feet were badly hurt as a result of walking in unsuitable shoes. As the group approached the Evros/Meric River, the gendarmerie to appeared. Despite their previous experience, they were going to cross by land once again. They were supposed to be included on a journey the following day. She had prepared herself for the journey this time by buying proper walking shoes and suitable clothing.

They wanted to go to Sweden and then bring over their five children who were in Jordan with their paternal aunt. Mona said they would suffer so their children could come to them by plane. She posed it as a sacrifice they were making for their children’s futures (von Benda-Beckmann 2000, 9). Their aim in going was not moving towards a position of greater existential or physical security, given the children were safe in Jordan, but more that she wanted to secure their futures and provide them with opportunities that she saw as currently limited. She explained that part of the reason they wanted to go to Sweden was that they wanted to send her eldest, a teenage boy, to England to study for his undergraduate degree, and it would be very expensive. By moving to

---

157 De Leon (2015) explained that smugglers repeatedly lied to passengers hiring them about how long they would walk to cross from Mexico to the USA. In contrast, Sanchez (2015) said that migrants she spoke to told her the smugglers they hired warned them about how they would walk and the difficulties of the terrain.
Sweden now, they could put into effect their plans for their children. The idea of sending their child to the UK for his undergraduate degree also indicated their socio-economic status; she made the comment without being pointed about it as if it were ‘normal’ to make such a plan for her son. She also explained that her children were all attending private schools Jordan, highlighting their financial ability to send them to private educational institutions. Similarly, by commenting that they wanted to send her son to study in England, I inferred she was referring to the hierarchy of educational institutions and systems where she was aiming for an international institution rather than a regional or national one. Watching and listening to Mona, I saw how she distinguished herself from those seated effortlessly and without appearing to do so (cf. Bourdieu 1984, 282).

Mona made other references to their social class. She complained to me at one point, when Hussam was talking about Lebanon to the men, that they had money in bank accounts in Lebanon, but the bank had frozen their accounts. Hussam explained to us all that the banks had told him to come over in person to sort out the matter. Mona brought out a bundle of documents from her handbag to show me their bank cards. She had tied their passports and bank cards together neatly with a rubber band and wrapped them in plastic. She indicated the gold and platinum coloured cards tapping them with her finger, saying “They do not give these to someone who has put 10,000 (US) Dollars in their account.” Mona directed the comment to me at the time, but the others seated

---

158 Mona and Hussam like the majority of Syrian refugees I met in the summer of 2012 wanted to go to Sweden and seek asylum there. Many Syrian refugees insisted that going to Sweden was best because the Swedish government, had at that time, started to give Syrian asylum seekers 3-year temporary protection or political refugee status. Other European countries were giving Syrian asylum seekers status but interlocutors said they did so at a slower rate. While Mona and Hussam wanted to reach Sweden, Sweden is not known in the Middle East for its educational institutions whereas the UK is famous for its educational institutions. Mona’s comment about sending her son to England although they were intending to seek asylum in Sweden highlighted the different registers upon which the couple based their decisions.

159 Having a bank account is not common in Syria due to suspicion of banks and the fact that the socialist state restricted the banking services for many years. Many families preferred to keep money in their houses in safes, as gold or invested it in properties.

160 The covering would protect the documents from water.
heard the comment. Mona brought out the cards as a way of proving through material evidence that their financial wealth existed. She directed the comments to me, the sole non-Syrian and outsider to Deraa. Her performance was for my benefit as an outsider potentially unaware of subtleties and differentiations of socio-economics and wealth in Syria. It was important for Mona that I understand her socio-economic status and treat her accordingly. By extension, she was trying to establish her difference from others seated there, although they shared the common goal of wanting to move on.

Around ten in the evening, they decided to move, as Mona wanted to buy a handbag to use when they cross. She explained quietly to me that she wanted something big enough to carry at least a change of underwear for each of them. We had been sitting for around three hours. After they had left, Majed and Amr began debating about them. Amr insisted that they had left Syria because the FSA was asking them for money. He always explained people’s reasons for leaving Syria in terms of persecution by the regime or extortion by the FSA or gangs claiming to be FSA. His comment about their politics with regard to the revolution validated his and the smugglers’ attempts to take their money. By presenting them as unwilling to give or sacrifice for the cause, he justified approaching them as customers. Majed did not engage in Amr’s speculation but commented on the way Mona had spoken about the credit cards. “See how she said about the bank cards that they do not give the platinum (card) to someone who has put 10,000 (Dollars) in the bank.” For Majed, Amr’s speculation might have substance given the unnamed amount of money Mona indicated they have in their accounts. Amr was unconcerned with their money in terms of how it distinguished their socio-economic class but focused on discrediting their story to justify treating them as customers.

161 He still offered his services to them and made introductions for them.
He then began insisted that they were liars because according to him Mona did not look like she was a mother. “Is the wife really a mother? Does she look like she has borne children? Not that she is a sight. The Arabs\textsuperscript{162} they dress their wives in a headscarf. Look at her!” He did not explain why she did not look like a mother. Adam replied to his comment, saying they have money as a way of countering Amr’s argument, but Amr did not let him continue saying, “Yes, yes, but I don’t buy into this secular modern talk. I know them (Arabs). If I married a foreigner would I want the whole area to see her? I would have them [the town’s people] stopping outside the house walls on their motorbikes.” Majed who was playing on his phone at the time burst into laughter at this point although it did not look like he was listening.

Amr identified the husband’s family as having once been part of a nomadic population living in the province who settled sometime in the past forty years in Deraa city. Amr’s family are landowners in the Hawran region, and he referred to the formerly nomadic people as ‘Arabs’ distinguishing them from Hawrani people. He said he did not believe the couple’s story to be genuine and questioned various parts of their performance. He undermined Mona, focusing on her appearance and then her self-presentation as an unveiled Muslim woman. Where Adam related Mona’s self-presentation to their socio-economic status, as newly moneyed or bourgeoisie, Amr understood the reference but rejected it. Adam interpreted Mona’s appearance as being within the bounds of what Wedeen (2013) describes as the “politics of the good life.” Wedeen (2013) used the concept to discuss the rise of a new bourgeoisie and middle class through burgeoning private businesses and their connections to the ruling regime in Syria. The ‘politics of the good life’ was performed by the al-Assad family, by promoting themselves as modern, secular, and adopting certain lifestyle choices. Members of the new bourgeoisie then imitated them (Wedeen 2013). Amr

\textsuperscript{162} Adam later explained to me what Amr meant by Arabs. He said that in Hawran, certain people who were in previous generations nomadic people are referred to as Arabs.
understood Adam’s reference and his response highlighted the association between ‘modernity’ and ‘secularism’ to these lifestyle choices. He rejected the concept by bringing Mona’s self-presentation back into the local politics of Deraa.

While he did critique Hussam, his focus on Mona highlights the importance of women’s presentation and their behaviour as reflecting on their husbands’ public image. Mona’s appearance reflected on him as a man and the respect owed to him in his hometown. Salamandra (2004) referred to a Syrian proverb that a wife is the shop front of her husband as a way of situating the relationship between wives’ performances and their husbands. Where I saw a performance and dress code that emphasised their wealth, Amr saw it as contradictory to socially accepted modes of dressing and engaging in Deraa. As much of the literature on the Mediterranean highlights, male honour is tied to the women in a man’s family (Gilmore 1986,10). Women are set up as a man’s weakness, a point through which to undermine him within the community by questioning the chastity of his women, and by extension his masculinity and ability to protect them. By focusing on how Mona looked and on her self-presentation, Amr raised questions or suspicions about Hussam’s honour and by extension the respect owed to him in Deraa.

He emphasised the public-private divide by explaining, albeit mockingly, how people in Deraa would respond to Mona’s appearance or presence. Amr insisted that Mona would attract attention not only because she was not from Deraa, but also as she was not veiled. His comment pertains to the ways private and public spaces are maintained as separate by women veiling. Though as various research shows there are many different ways of veiling and it is used differently to marks spaces as public or private based on local context, family circumstances or other considerations (cf. Goddard 1994,66). By commenting that local men would stand outside the house to look at her, he highlighted another way Hussam’s honour or masculinity could be targeted. Since Mona was visible wife then Amr did not need to go as far as speaking about her sexually available, and, in
this situation, how was Hussam able to maintain his honour in the community (Bailey 1971; Campbell 1964).

In a sense at hand are two diverging registers of honour that unlike Amr’s comment might or could co-exist. Amr highlighted the restrictions, relations and modes of positioning people in the social order in Deraa. Mona and Hussam through their discourse and presentation of their socio-economic status, their social mobility presented in their owning a house in Damascus and Deraa, pointed out that they were participating in different relations extending beyond the confines of Deraa. These relations while still placing a great emphasis on Mona as a reflection onto Hussam’s social standing were not necessarily expressed or manifest in the same way as the register operating in Deraa. Whether in Moadamiya or in Deraa, women bear the burden of performing their gender roles in certain ways to boost or preserve their men’s gender roles. Amr problematized the situation as for him, it was not possible for Hussam to mix up the two registers while engaging in Deraa. For Amr, Hussam’s social mobility achieved in his move and work in Damascus was insufficient to shift his position in the social hierarchy of Deraa where he was still, at least for Amr, ‘an Arab.’

The other present though dealt with him differently, relying more on his engagement with them than the social order Amr evoked. There are several reasons for it; the brothers are Palestinian and that influences how others from Deraa position them within the social order. Majed explained that they married Hawrani women and Hawrani men married Palestinians to show that people in

---

163 Gilsenan (1996) discusses the status honour of different social components of a village in Akkar in Lebanon. He explains how the beys and the aghas had different status honour, and the fellahin (peasants) as a subordinate social stratum who were dominated, they were not considered to have honour. Relying on various narratives he examines how honour status was performed.

164 Goddard (1994) critiques the ways discussion on honour and masculinity in the Mediterranean region focus on these themes without articulating the intersection with anthropological studies of gender.

165 Other people from different parts of Syria might have appraised and responded to Mona and Hussam’s self-presentation in other ways.
Deraa view them as social equals within the social order. He focused more on Hussam and Mona’s flaunting their financial capital than their position in the social order. Adam as someone who had both lived and moved around a lot in his life, and who was part Hawrani and part Palestinian held a different outlook to Amr. He focused more on how people engaged with him than on their social status in Deraa.

Mona and Hussam were supposed to cross the border the following day, but they did not as the smuggler postponed their journey. They remained in Istanbul for a few more days and continued frequenting the Kitchen during this time. They were unhappy with the smugglers they had met so far, although they did not say so directly. They had hired Abu Kathem a smuggler from a town in Deraa province whom they had met through Amr. Amr had also introduced Majed and Hani to Abu Kathem, and he had made a concession for Majed and Hani agreeing that the brothers could move for less than he normally required from passengers. That afternoon, Majed, Hani, and Adam were sitting in the Kitchen when Mona and Hussam joined them. Majed was angry with Amr as he believed Amr had told Mona and Hussam that Abu Kathem had made a concession for the brothers. Mona and Hussam insisted that Amr did not tell them. She spoke to Majed, saying to prove their point, “He (Amr) is not here, and we are telling you he did not tell us.” By making the point with Amr absent, she sought to clear Amr of that accusation and mend Majed’s relationship with him.

Majed was bothered as he did not want everyone knowing about the concession. He was concerned it would affect his relationship with Mona and Hussam as it distinguished him as someone in a position to demand a concession from the smuggler as explained in Chapter 4. Adam as someone who knew about the arrangement saw the smuggler granting Majed a concession as an act distinguishing Majed from other passengers such as Mona and Hussam. Amr may have told them about the concession to make them aware of this distinction, and highlight how the smuggler approached them in contrast to Majed and Hani. Majed was able to bring his position and relations
from Deraa into the present of Istanbul while the smugglers did not offer the same possibility to Hussam. Majed and Adam posed the concession as a matter of respect owed to Majed, but as an outsider and knowing their situation, I would argue that someone from Deraa familiar with the brothers’ situation may also interpret the concession as an act of charity due to the brothers’ financial situation. Majed’s anger with Amr for telling the couple may have been related to his concern that Mona and Hussam might interpret the concession as an act of charity. He would then be positioned as someone in need or vulnerable.

Mona and Hussam moved a few days later to Greece. They did not tell any of the people they sat with in the Kitchen that they were going. They phoned Adam from Greece and asked him to give their regards to everyone and apologised because they had not said goodbye. Adam recounted to me that when he passed on their regards to Amr, Amr began swearing at them and saying he did not wish them well. He was angry they had not hired any of the smugglers he had introduced them to and deprived him of a commission.

**Tension, Time, and Ties**

Various customers made the Kitchen, other cafes, or hotel lobbies productive spaces by through their different social relations. For some refugees, these connections were a way of coping with the uncertainty of the situation. The ties aided them to navigate the risks they face in undertaking the endeavour, as other refugees offer advice and news of routes and smugglers. Their presence in Istanbul and their desire to move on provided common ground for these refugees. At the same time, it is necessary to highlight the ways differences of class, religion, region or gender entered into the interaction. These differences did not disappear, but refugees did not emphasis them in their interaction with each other, or they found ways as Hussam and Mona with Majed and his brother, to gloss over them.
In the Kitchen or elsewhere, they created different ties, some close and others distant, depending on persons involved. Some refugees thus participated in others’ biographies and affected their lives or journeys. Their choice of opening a conversation, and regularly sharing time-space together, opened an avenue for refugees to influence each other’s lives in un-forecasted ways. The relations had the possibility of shifting from a superficial acknowledgement of their participation in each other’s daily routines to become a more influential relationship. Although those involved may characterise the relations as temporary, individuals defined ‘temporary’ differently in this situation. Some refugees were temporarily in Istanbul for several months or longer and some for a few days (Chapter 3). Even when they anticipated moving on quickly, refugees still chose to engage with others.

The ties refugees formed were affected by the duration of time they spent together and length of time they stayed in Istanbul. The transient nature of the relations presented a dilemma of how best to understand and conceptualise them. Schutz describes “we-relationships” as being characterised by varying “degrees of immediacy, different degrees of intensity, or different degrees of intimacy” (1932/1967,168). They are characterised by face to face interaction and participation in each other’s lives (Schutz 1932/1967,164). At the same time, the participants might appear as peripheral to each other’s lives rather than as central participants (Schutz 1932/1967,168). Schutz described these relations as characterised by sharing of time and space, but to varying degrees and in various ways. As Day (2007,33) explains, “Schutz distinguished relationships among contemporaries and consociates in terms of the degree to which time was shared and, indeed, made reciprocally.” Day (2007,33) commented that Schutz might not have agreed with her description of London sex workers as consociates, even though they shared time-space and became implicated in each other’s biographies. Day (2007) described them as superficial ties that still included elements of the familiar and intimate. She suggested that his conceptualization of relations offered
the best tools to understand her interlocutor’s relations. Wolf (1966,81) presents another model to understand these relations. He explains relations forming among persons, in the cases he studies peasants, who have multiple shared interests as self-reinforcing. The shared interests across various domains generate other circumstances and opportunities to relate, work together or offer assistance. Actors become implicated in performing roles and tasks. At the same time, these expectations set up the modes to sanction them for failing to live up to expectations or denying reciprocity. He marks these ties as ‘inflexible’ and resistant to participants trying to alter or change how they are involved in one sphere of action. In contrast, single stranded relations are one off relations between two actors, usually economic and most likely not transferred as action or participation “in many other life situations” (Wolf 1966,81). Wolf’s model offers insight into how to discuss these relations which while temporary in many cases, show how a single stranded relationship may become complicated and perhaps even multi-stranded but with less permanence than the cases Wolf considers.

All those mentioned in the previous section chose to connect with and become involved in others’ lives, even if that engagement did not continue after they crossed the border. Their engagements included the characteristics Schutz (1932/1967,168), immediacy, intensity and intimacy. Yasser, the young Palestinian man, was acquainted with Bahaa, but they did not interact beyond greeting each other. In contrast, Bahaa became involved with Majed as they shared common relationships as a result of their involvement in football in Deraa. Amr interfered in Majed and Bahaa’s relationship, supposedly saving the brothers from being deceived, but effectively opening up avenues for him to form new relations. Amr introduced them to smugglers and managed to get them a concession. Amr’s engagement with the brothers prompted his subsequent longer engagement with Adam which continued for several months and prompted them to become implicated across several spheres as they shared food and residence, with Amr even influencing
Adam’s future. Those wanting to move and sharing the same space-time, measured their movement and presence in relation to those others sharing the space-time. By keeping in touch and up to date about each other’s news, they measured the speed and realisation of their movement, against others who share their space-time (cf. Reed 2011,528). Reed (2003,78-82) explains how some inmates in the Bomana prison in Papua New Guinea described it as a bus stop where short-term inmates moved in and out quickly and those serving long-term continued to wait. Those coming in disrupted long-term prisoners’ rhythms and attempts to create the prison as their place of being (Reed 2003,79). The short-term inmates reminded them of the world beyond the prison. While the cases discussed in the chapter are not situations of incarceration, the movement of others where an individual was unable financially or physically to make the journey acted as a reminder of ‘still’ being in place.

Socio-economic status, place of origin, and gender entered into these relations. All those mentioned in the previous case study were from Deraa or (in Mona’s case) had a strong connection to Deraa. The common place of origin was not, necessarily, enough grounds for them to engage. Adam and Amr, for instance, had met before but had not dealt with each other extensively until Amr intervened for Majed. Common place of origin did not dispel the workings of class as Mona’s comments and Amr’s subsequent remarks highlight. Mona’s ontological security depended on her highlighting their socio-economic status, and Amr’s depended on him reaffirming class hierarchies in Deraa. In the process, he reaffirmed his position within the hierarchies in contrast to Hussam. Whereas she embodied a politics of new money or bourgeoisie, Amr brought in class dynamics of Deraa where his family are landowners and Hussam’s family are newly moneyed. These distinctions entered into the interaction. The relations maintained the differences and persisted due to the common desire to migrate to Europe.
The cafes are places to prepare for the soon-to-be embarked on journeys or return points. Refugees come back after a failed attempt. Refugees chose to frequent the café every afternoon to remind smugglers or middlemen of their presence, to capitalise on their connections, or just to socialise by sharing time especially with others who were in a similar situation. In the process, they created peers in Istanbul (cf. Schutz 1932/1967), some of whom became implicated in their journeys and attempts. Others acted as witnesses to people’s attempts and in turn relayed those experiences to other refugees coming into Istanbul. By seeking out others who share the same goal of moving, refugees’ altered their experiences of waiting. Their actions socialised the wait and at times affected their movement or facilitated it.

Sustaining the ties was also a choice, but most refugees do not choose the passengers with whom they attempt to cross. From moving together or attempting to move together, refugees also formed relations at times. They may maintain the relations if they are caught at the border and sent to the detention centre in Edirne or if they succeed in crossing to Greece or Bulgaria. Refugees might choose to continue their engagement with each other after crossing the border or end it there. Unlike the way refugees chose to frequent the café and form ties, ending up in the detention centre in Edirne, ‘el-camp’, is not a choice. Refugees however still decide to socialise while there and thus alter their enforced detention and immobility.

Making Connections

Refugees who hired the same smuggler might not know each other, and when they gather to start their journey to the border, they are joined- in many cases- by refugees or migrants who have hired other smugglers (cf. Lucht 2012). The result is a group of strangers who have to move together for the duration of the journey. They might cross the border and each goes their own way. Alternately, some refugees form ties with others who are crossing with them, continue their journey with them
or just keep in touch. Malik, the refugee from Eastern Ghouta introduced in the previous chapter, was taken advantage of by the smuggler he hired. He and the other refugees who were with him on the journey were driven to somewhere in Edirne’s countryside where the rehber left them. The group waited all night for the smuggler to send someone to take them back to Istanbul. The day after they were brought to Edirne, two people decided to continue on their own to Greece in the morning. Malik, four other men, and a family composed of a husband and wife, their two children and the wife’s brother decided to wait so they could return to Istanbul. Malik described how they waited in the cold with insects biting them. They had no water or food with them. The temperature dropped in the night and the children complained of the cold and animal noises they heard around them. In the early morning, Malik and Basel, the father of the family present in the group, decided to walk to the nearest village to buy some water and food. They planned to return to the group and then figure out how to get to Istanbul. They left Basel’s wife and children in the care of the four other refugees and walked until they found a village. They were in a store buying bread when a villager came in and started asking them where they were going. Malik realised that the man had called the Turkish gendarmerie. The gendarmerie arrived soon after and they managed to explain to them that Basel’s family were still out in the wilderness. The gendarmerie took them in search of the family. Malik said they purposefully led them in the wrong direction hoping that either he or Basel could get away and return to Basel’s family. After walking for several hours, the gendarmerie took them to the police station in the village. In the meantime, Basel’s wife, children, her brother and two other refugees of the four who were waiting with them made their way to the

---

166 All the people in the group were from Syria, but from different parts of Syria.  
167 Malik explained that he “humiliated” the man by telling him that he is like “Israel” because he called the gendarmerie and that he is not a Muslim. He tried to rearrange the boundaries of his position as an outsider by pointing out their common ties as Muslims. Malik did not know Turkish, so the interaction was based on him gesticulating and using key words from Arabic or English that are also used in Turkish.
village and asked for the gendarmerie. They were reunited with Malik and Basel that night. The other two refugees continued to Greece. During the night, more refugees who had tried to cross the border and were stopped by the gendarmerie joined Malik and the others. The next day they were all moved to the migrant detention centre in Edirne.¹⁶⁸

The camp brings together people who want to move and are dealing with the frustration of a failed attempt. There, refugees discuss and exchange stories, routes, telephone numbers and information (cf. Papadopoulos et al. 2008). Malik returned after a few days to Istanbul as will explained further along. I met him upon his return in Aksaray were we sat in a chain café close to the watch tower in Aksaray which was more comfortable and private than other cafes in the area. Sitting outside in the afternoon, we sipped coffee and he chain smoked as he recounted the full events of his attempt. Conscious of my mobile phone on the table recording his story, he narrated in detail what happened. He explained how he and the other refugees who joined them in the police station spent their time singing and talking. He described it as a party but went on to explain that their singing and joyful behaviour was not the norm. He knew he was presenting their actions as counter to the aims of their incarceration and went on to explain that their action did not alter the asymmetrical power dynamics of their relations with the gendarmerie. He explained that some of the women were harassed by the gendarmerie when they moved to the detention centre, but he and the other men present were unable to stop this happening. He said, “We sat in the same nazara (police station). We were all together. There were two guys (who had been on the route with us) who had gone to Greece. When those ones [Basel’s family and their two companions] went down and handed themselves over the others [who had waited with them] did not want to give themselves up. They went in the direction of Greece. They arrived [to Greece].”

¹⁶⁸ See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the literature on detention centres.
“How did you know they arrived?” I asked.

“They arrived. They were not imprisoned, and they phoned someone and told him ‘we are now in Athens’. People started to come [to the police station]. In time there was a daafa (group or class). See those guys I said hello to? [referring to two men who he said hello to in passing in Istanbul as I walked with him in Aksaray] They came after we arrived. These are guys from Deir, Hasakeh and Qamishli,¹⁶⁹ and other places I don’t know. We were around 25 people, young men and women. In detention, we met many people. We found out what ways are right from the wrong ways, why we got caught, and how not to get caught. We were caught because the border is closed. Everything that is police, whether Turkish, Greek or Bulgarian, is at the borders. Why? Because there was a group of Afghans who went to Greece through smuggling, they grabbed a girl of Greek origin, young. They killed her. Did you hear about the story? It is all over the place! They are such lowlifes.¹⁷⁰

“What are the right ways?”

“Ehhhh by boat it is best, to Greece we are talking for now, but at the same time there is danger, and people are dying.”

Malik described a situation where he was forced to keep company with others and he, like many other refugees, took that opportunity to form relations and exchange information. He had until then avoided socialising with other Syrian refugees while in Istanbul. Being en route and in the camp forced him to interact with other refugees, given his strategy until that point had failed him. He described the group that slowly formed in the police station as ‘daafa’, identifying them as peers who are all seeking to move on. He learnt the supposedly right ways of moving on from

¹⁶⁹ Deir Ez Zor is a city in the province of Deir Ez Zor. Hasakeh and Qamishli are cities in Qamishli province.
¹⁷⁰ Different people recounted the same rumour to me although the nationality of the perpetrators changed as did the crime. Here it was killing the girl, but in another version the crime was rape.
these peers or contemporaries (cf. Schutz 1932/1967). After the failure of their attempts, refugees trust each other more than the smuggler they had hired. They set each other up as knowledgeable of the border similar to the ways they set smugglers up as experts on mobility. In talking with other refugees about right and wrong routes, Malik engaged in conversations concentrated on the risks entailed in endeavours. It was both a shift in how he assessed routes and the results of his evaluation.

Malik continued describing the reasons he was unsuccessful in crossing the border. He explained that the border was highly policed at that time, and attributed his group’s failure to the high securitization of the border; however, his party was caught by the gendarmerie because the rehber left them and Ahmad, the smuggler, took advantage of them. Malik adopted the metanarrative, which was at best a rumour, that the other refugees who were caught were repeating to explain the failure of their attempts. He participated in denigrating another refugee group and blaming them for the increased securitization of the border. He chose to repeat the rumour and say it was the reason for the failure of his attempt to cross the border. In doing so, he tied his experience to the rumour other refugees were repeating. I argue that in doing so, he tried to make his experience similar to the other refugees he met in the detention centre. It was a way of presenting himself as ‘same’ as the other refugees by adopting the same metanarrative and racism towards another refugee group. Malik’s choice also deflected from the fact that he was unsuccessful because he had given his thiqa (trust) to Ahmad and Ahmad had deceived him.

Malik spoke well of the people who were with him in the detention centre though in other instances he had used derogatory terms to speak about people from areas such as Deir Ez Zor.
Syrians refer to people from Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa as *shawa*\(^{171}\) (Rabo 1986). She explained how the term was used in Raqqa during her fieldwork in the 1970s by people coming into the area to work on a government project along the Euphrates River. They used the term in a derogatory manner as they considered the people of Raqqa “uncouth” and “backward” (1986,18-19). *Shawa* was a reference to people working in sheep rearing (1986,19). She highlights that the term was also used by the people living in the town of Raqqa and not only outsiders, but states that they used it to distinguish themselves as “Raqqawis” from villagers coming into the town. Depending on how it is employed it can be used to indicate class or regionalism. Rabo (1986, 19) explains that in the 1970s the term was not necessarily used outside of the Jazira\(^{172}\) area, but still Syrians elsewhere believed Raqqa to be backward and provincial. Outsiders to these provinces slowly adopted *Shawa* as a reference to people from Raqqa or Deir Ez Zor. The terms are part of the politics of regionalism in Syria which people enact whereby they distinguish between people based on the region, city, or even neighbourhood, people come from (cf. Salamandra 2004, 34). “Class distinctions are increasingly relevant, yet they crosscut and intersect rather than replace those of region, religion, and ethnic group” (Salamandra 2004,34). Malik considered himself to be from Damascus although his family had moved from Damascus to Eastern Ghouta (Damascus Countryside) before he was born. Many families in Damascus followed the same pattern given the limited spaces available within the city walls (Salamandra 2004, 27). Malik attributed the change in their location to the Baath regime seizing property they owned in al-Amara in Damascus rather than their need for more space. Although he grew up in al-Ghouta, he still identified himself as being from Damascus. He thus expressed a particular identity politics as urban and belonging to an urban centre of power.

\(^{171}\) Plural; the singular is *shawi*. The term has no meaning in formal Arabic. It vernacular from the Jazira area. See Sahli (1989:272-273) where he discusses the ways self-identity developed in Europe during the 19th century relied on the development of a counter identity.

\(^{172}\) Raqqa, Deir Ez Zor, and Qamishli form the Jazira area (Rabo 1986).
Deir Ez Zor or Hasakeh, in contrast, are Northern provinces, and while they have urban centres, they are not centres of cultural or political power in Syria. People from other provinces would not necessarily visit these provinces unless they were assigned to work there or possibly had family there (Rabo 1986, 19-20). The main way other Syrians are familiar with these areas is from their engagement with people coming from them to Damascus or Aleppo or other cities whether to study or work. The exposure increased following drought in the northern provinces of Syria in 2008 that affected livelihoods and prompted families to move to major cities to work. People from Damascus or Aleppo distinguish themselves from others coming into their cities. In the case of Damascus, Salamandra (2004, 11) related it to the rise of Alawites in the form of the Assad family, the increase of Alawites applying for civil service or army positions in Damascus, and the arrival of others people from different cities to Damascus. In addition to, the growth of a class of newly moneyed people who are connected to the regime (Wedeen 2013). Rabo (2005) in her ethnography of the Aleppo souq (market) highlighted similar practices though the newcomers were Kurdish or coming from the rural parts of Aleppo. The traders’ focus on names and lineages was a way of distinguishing those from Aleppo to others coming into the city. Malik at that moment in time was in the same situation as people coming from Deir Ez Zor and Hasakeh. He chose to make contacts and acquire knowledge while ignoring the regional politics and distinctions that he brought up at other moments. In ‘el camp’, there is a possibility for sameness to prevail due to the shared experience of having been caught, their shared disappointment due to their predicament, and their desire to attempt again. That sameness manifested itself as antagonism towards another refugee group, as Malik’s case highlighted.

As explained in Chapter 1, there are many kinds of detention centres. Regardless of state actors or border regime actors’ purposes of using the camp, here I concentrate on the ways refugees made their presence in the camp productive. Refugees used their presence in the camp to make ties and
connections (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). Refugees viewed their time in the camp as a setback, but the experience did not prevent them from attempting again. The camps paused migratory energy for a time rather than entirely blocking movement across the border (Andrijasevic 2010). For the refugee held in Edirne, they knew they would be allowed to leave eventually, and they made plans to continue or attempt again. More importantly, they knew or learnt strategies to enable them to leave quickly. Despite the short period of their detention and the ties they made in detention, some refugees were affected negatively. These refugees were discouraged by their repeated capture and detention and worried about how another unsuccessful attempt would affect them.

Refugees’ experiences of time were influenced by their detention as their journeys were postponed as they were temporarily immobilised. On another level, refugees were affected legally by their time in el-camp. By claiming they were Palestinian nationals to ensure their return to Istanbul, refugees were issued documentation, a white paper, with their name, the issuing authority, the date of its issuance on it, and the duration of its validity. The paper granted the holder two months’ residence in Turkey. In this way, the detention centre changed their legal status as well as affecting them emotionally or temporally.

**On the Absurd: Becoming Palestinian**

The nation-state system creates a situation where certain bodies’ belonging or assigned to a particular polity renders them non-deportable. In many other instances, refugees destroy their documents or adopt other national identities to hide their own to avoid being deported (Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2007,166; Ellermann 200; Griffith 2012). Rygiel (2011,158) describes it as “strategy of de-identification”. Palestinian, Somali and Burmese nationals are considered stateless persons and they cannot be deported (Rygiel 2011). As part of the temporary protection,

---

173 See Global Detention Project Turkey profile (2017).
Syrian nationals cannot be deported from Turkey; however, as discussed in Chapter 2, at that point in 2012, refugees who said they were Syrian nationals were sent to one of the state-run camps in the southern Turkish provinces.

Syrian refugees were in 2012 told by smugglers or other passengers to say they were Palestinian if they were caught at the Greek-Turkish or Bulgarian-Turkish borders whether the sea or land border. In Turkey, Palestinian nationals, or refugees claiming to be Palestinian nationals, caught trying to cross the borders to Europe are held for a few days in a detention centre and then released in a city close to the detention centre. Refugees used this piece of information to exercise control over their situations affecting a form of control into their “politics of migration” (Rygiel 2011,158; cf. Andersson 2014).

A certain irony was not lost on Palestinians who heard of non-Palestinians saying they were Palestinian to remain in Turkey. It is Palestinians’ displacement from Palestine which gives them and others who claim to be Palestinian the chance of remaining in place in Turkey. Hani, for instance, remarked to Bahaa, “So now you are all using the Palestinian cause!” when Bahaa reassured them that nothing would happen to them if caught at the border with Greece and used his experience as an example. He said he had been caught 12 times and he got out of the detention centre each time by saying he is Palestinian. Hani’s comment was meant to tease Bahaa in that he and others are (mis)using the Palestinian cause. At the same time, it highlights the absurdity of the situation where Palestinians’ cause is based on their exile and displacement, and it is that very exile that makes being Palestinian desirable in this context. For refugees seeking to go to Europe, claiming to be Palestinian was a means of remaining in Turkey, and avoiding deportation.

---

174The practice changed from April 2013, after which refugees who said they were Syrian were released from detention after a few days.
Palestinians, in turn, have been fighting for the right to return as people forcefully removed from their land.

Refugees adopt various tactics to substantiate their claim of being Palestinian. Claim to Palestinian nationality is particular to crossing by land or sea as it would be difficult to claim Palestinian nationality when passing in the airport. Many refugees crossing by land or sea do not take their documents with them, preferring to leave their documents with someone they trust in Istanbul or elsewhere. Refugees fear the documents may be lost or stolen while they are en route, especially given that their asylum claim in Europe depends in part on their ability to prove their nationality (cf. Griffith 2012, 718). Even while not having documentation to substantiate their claim of being Palestinian, refugees still try to perform being Palestinian. Here refugees, temporarily, become Palestinian. Malik explained that he and the other refugees, who were part of the group he was caught with, sat in the police station memorising the Palestinian flag colours and the national anthem to substantiate their claim of nationality. He did not specify who taught them, but someone present must have known this information. Adam told Mona’s husband to say they were Palestinian if they were caught trying to cross the border. Following his suggestion, Mona started searching on Google for street names in a Palestinian town to corroborate their claim. Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2007, 167) argue that becoming is intrinsic to migration and that refugees become many things in response to state and migratory regime attempts to control their mobility.

For Syrian refugees, as part of becoming Palestinian they had to erase or destroy material objects that are evidence they are Syrian nationals, to insist on their authenticity as ‘Palestinians’.176

---

175 They usually asked whomever they left the documents with to send them once they arrived at their destination.
176 Griffith (2012:720-721) discusses the inverse of this situation where migrants face a problem of proving their identity in the face of bureaucratic insistence on certain forms of evidence and documentation.
The window of opportunity to do this was quite small and refugees described destroying possessions or erasing information with urgency. Malik said that after he realised that one of the villagers had called the gendarmerie, he told Basel to erase all the numbers and messages on their phones just in case the gendarmerie looked through them. Malik was worried they would find evidence connecting either of them to Syria. “I told Basel to erase all the phone numbers you have as he (a villager) has called the police. I knew directly. I told him to erase anything that can prove that you are Syrian. And I was doing the same. I had understood from someone by way of a coincidence that if you are caught the best thing to say is what?”

“Palestinian,” I respond.

“Palestinian, we would be held for a few days and then released. Ok? Ok. He started to erase and I started to erase. He gave me his mobile, and I searched it and he had forgotten some Syrian numbers, I erased them for him. I had erased everything. There was still the flash disk and the pepper spray. I told the guy (the villager who phoned the gendarmerie) ‘toilet’. He told me no toilet. I told him toilet, what no toilet?! I gestured that I was holding it in, and then made as if I was going to unbuckle my trousers. He told me no! no! toilet! He took me to a toilet. I threw the flash disk and the pepper spray in the toilet (Turkish style toilet), and then I threw water and water. And I started to throw garbage as well, whatever I found, I threw them into the toilet. Enough. I was very sad about the flashie (USB).” The flash disc had files, videos, and images from demonstrations in Syria which he wanted to use to support his asylum claim.

As explained in prior chapters, Sayed was also caught at the Greek-Turkish border. He and the group he was with were directly taken to the camp in Edirne. He explained, “I remembered that I still had the permission slip from the camp (moukhayyam) and I went to the bathroom to get rid of

---

177 The term in Turkish is pronounced the same as in French.
it... the police they kept calling after me as I passed them, ‘Suriyeli (Syrian), Suriyeli (Syrian),’ trying to trick me into answering... There are even people from Africa, and they only say one word when asked: Palestine (Filistine).” As explained in Chapter 2, Sayed was registered in one of the state-run camps in southern Turkey, and he had obtained a permission slip to leave the camp for five days. He had to destroy the permission slip as it was proof he was Syrian and registered in one of the state-run camps. The gendarmerie knew that he was lying, but unless he fell for their trick they were unable to exert the effort to disprove his claim of being Palestinian. His point about the various African migrants who also say they are Palestinians is that these migrants were not African Arabic speakers but from African states where Arabic is not a national or commonly spoken language. He highlighted that they too are trying to exercise control over their situation by adjusting the information they give and how it is used as evidence of their belonging to a particular nation-state.

Beyond refugees’ performances to convince the gendarmerie were some gendarmeries’ acknowledgement that they knew and understood refugees’ tactics. One of the gendarmerie in the camp in Edirne who spoke English talked to Malik, “He asked me what the population of Palestine is? They must be at least a million, right? I told him something like that. He then said, ‘but man there are two million of them here in Turkey!’” Malik recounted laughing. The gendarme acted in a similar manner to a border guard mentioned in *The Wherewithal of Life* (Jackson 2013) who encouraged the migrants who they were processing to deport back to Mexico not to give up and attempt to cross the border again. The gendarme made it clear that he and others knew what refugees were doing to overcome the possibility of their deportation or the prolongation of their journey. He was joking about it with Malik, performing another role to that of his role as a state actor. In the process acknowledging that he knew they would try to cross again.
Refugees had to perform being Palestinian to be able to continue their journeys and exercise control over the duration they of their immobilisation. In doing so, they were not only returned to Istanbul, but they were also given a permission slip granting them two months’ legal residence in Turkey. They return to Istanbul legalised and potentially legalised under a new name. From April 2013 onwards, the practice changed and refugees saying they are Syrian meant they were given the same treatment as Palestinian nationals. Syrian refugees, and any migrant claiming Syrian nationality, caught attempting to leave Turkey ‘illegally’ from any border or port of exit are held for a short duration, a day or a few days, and then released. The state took this course of action as part of the temporary protection offered to Syrian refugees in Turkey although the temporary protection had come into effect in 2011. The exchange of knowledge such as saying one is Palestinian to avoid deportation and be returned to Istanbul altered refugees’ experiences. It emerged through their interaction with other refugees, and actively seeking out information and ways of securing themselves through the knowledge.

**Help**

Social security emerged in different forms or moments as acts of help including physical assistance, financial, sharing information, offering shelter, or access. Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (2000,15) describe social security as taking multiple forms whereby it is a characteristic of social relations, relations with establishments or part of relations to distribute material means to alleviate uncertainty. In this context, refugees called on those they formed ties with or even strangers they were moving with to help them. From the assistance given relations formed in some instances and in other instances the engagement ended refugees considered the assistance demanded too much or

---

178Interlocutors explained that they invented a name rather than give their real name, so the permission to remain was issued to them under the false name (cf. Rygiel 2011).
too burdensome. Refugees in Istanbul or at the border deal with strangers, in many instances, and the obligation to help cannot be taken as a given. Refugee recounted the assistance they gave or were given and interpreted it within already existent frames of moral references (Von Benda-Beckmann 2000,8).

Help, as an action within social and moral frameworks, was related to the ways people think about the past, present and future (Von Benda-Beckmann 2000,13). The assistance refugees gave or received brought up issues of reciprocity and obligation. In this context, help given at one time or place connected refugees across space and time. The following case studies examine refugees assisting others with whom they were on the move. The instances highlight particular nuances that show how refugees helped others moving with them because of their shared predicament as well as exploring the ways they spoke of this help. The instances are a means of interrogating how help was rationalised and constituted, the ways it became reciprocal or alternately the ways some refugees reached the limits of their willingness to help and how they rationalised this (Jackson 2013,202).

I suggest that refugees helping others who are strangers while en route, in the camp or Istanbul can be understood as ethical acts by drawing on Lambek’s (2010) constitution of ethical action. Lambek (2010) argues that ethical acts are not bound by rules of obligation and are manifest of the tension between freedom to act and social obligations to act. Using ethics rather than morality as a mode to understand the actions is due to “its possibly greater association with action than propriety and with ‘the good’ than ‘the right’” (Lambek 2010,9). In the context of the fieldwork, I examine the acts of assistance because there is no social or communal group to enforce obligations or censure individuals for not upholding the ‘rules’ (cf. Bourdieu 1998,142-143; Agier 2011,46). I am not suggesting that this applies to all cases. In many instances, refugees move with kin or close friends, but when moving with others who are not kin or friends the acts of assistance cannot be
interpreted merely in terms of upholding social ideals. I propose examining the help offered to fellow refugees through frames of preserving the familiar and valuing human life. The help constitutes part of a moral landscape of migration. The landscape involves ordinary ethics and everyday actions such as staying behind to help someone unable to continue walking (cf. De Leon 2015). Others, non-refugees may also participate in this landscape. The activists and volunteers who drove refugees to the Austrian border in the summer of 2015 are one example of others who participate in forming this landscape (Kallius et al. 2016,32). Similarly, Jackson (2013,217) writes of a family who offered the mother of one of his interlocutors, who was trying to cross the border into the USA, shelter for a time before she earned the money to cross again.

Refugees recounted their personal experiences or told stories about other people, as a way of outlining the moral landscape. In some instances, they narrated the stories as part of larger narratives of attempts or in others the individual anecdote was told with certain purposes (Cruikshank 1998). Pine (2007,105-106) remarks about memories of places transmitted in Podhale in Poland that the persons remembering moved between the personal significance of the place and broader historical or political importance. More significantly, the memories recounted “address most clearly moral precepts and contradictions, and as such they both evoke and retain the most powerful emotions, and carry the most force” (Pine 2007,113). Refugees spoke about other attempts to cross the border and what happened, but the detail and insistence on recounting stories about ethical action highlighted the value of these actions (Cruikshank 1998,43-44). The stories interlocutors told about assistance in moments of need were relevant beyond the time they happened in or the form of the help given.

Malik explained that before he and Basel set off to look for a village to buy water and food, Basel asked the other four refugees with them to look after his family. “What did he (Basel) say to
the guys from Hama? ‘Allah obliges you; they are entrusted to you (Amanat bi rak’bitkoun\(^{179}\))’.” Basel did not know the men he entrusted his family to but took the chance. Basel used the phrase, ‘amanat bi rak’bitkoun’, and the reference was understood as it is a familiar reference in Syria. He expected them to stand by his family, even though the situation was uncertain.\(^{180}\) Following Joseph Massad’s (2015, 14) explanation, I use ‘Allah’ to indicate ‘God’ while recognising that the term is employed by Muslims, Christians and non-Christians in the Levant area, and cannot be interpreted solely as a Muslim reference. Basel and his family were Christian, so it was not a situation of shared Islamic moral reference between those involved. Moreover, I would argue that the reference is social in that it cuts across boundaries of religion, class or gender. Regardless of the stakes at hand, the lack of a community to censure these men if they had reneged on their promise to Basel, the men chose to protect his family. Malik recounted the story to emphasise the possibility of ethical action despite the uncertainties and the lack of connections between those moving.

After they were caught and ended up in the police station, Malik explained that “Basel sat… He only wants his children. He was willing to tell them he is Syrian. He was going to tell them he is Syrian more than once… He wanted to tell them more than once. I told him you will waste my chance and your own. I told him you will not only hurt yourself but also your children. The children, it is not right to waste their chance with your behaviour. I started to convince his god.\(^{181}\)” Malik presented his convincing as preserving the children’s possibilities as much as his own. He played on the idea of securing the immediate future by stressing the children’s future and that their chance

\(^{179}\) The literal translation is ‘entrusted in your necks’.

\(^{180}\) I am uncertain why Basel chose to go with Malik instead of sending one of the other refugees with Malik and remaining with his family.

\(^{181}\) It was the summer of 2012, so if Basel had said he was Syrian, he would have been taken down to one of the state run camps in southern Turkey. I use ‘god’ in lower case as his words in Arabic were ‘rabu’ (his god) a reference to a god rather than a specific Christian or Muslim term for ‘God.’ By using the phrase “I started to convince his god” Malik was exaggerating to indicate how hard he was trying to convince Basel.
of reaching safety depended on Basel’s actions at that moment. He highlighted in the process the way he reminded Basel of his parental duty to take care of them, present and future.

Similarly, the refugees Basel asked to watch over his family had done so, and two of them accompanied his wife, brother-in-law and children to the village where they asked for the gendarmerie. They all joined Basel and Malik in the police station that night. While those two refugees stayed with the family, another two who were part of the group had continued to Greece. Malik explained that he could have done the same. He said could have left them the first night they were waiting, and stressed that he did not have to help the family, and then said “but we did not start the revolution to betray our principles at this point.” He framed his actions and those of the two refugees who stayed with and accompanied Basel’s family as ethical actions based on principles of solidarity enacted in the revolution. He framed his actions in ways that resonate with Lambek’s (2010,19) comments that “Acts percolate from or disrupt the stream of practices, and they have consequences for subsequent practices.” Malik posed his actions as part of a stream of other previous actions. He made a point of highlighting that he acted in this manner without expecting a future reciprocation. He also situated his actions as related to a previous act of solidarity based on a perceived injustice. He did not evoke religion when discussing his participation in the revolution, but ideas of ‘nakhwi’ (brotherhood- solidarity), ‘haq’ right, and ‘fazaa’ (to spring up in response, to scare and in the case of revolution to protest in solidarity). The terms are universal rather than regional, national or religiously specific.

His decision to stand by the family came up once they returned to Istanbul. Basel’s sister who lives in Germany came over to Istanbul to help her brother sort out a new route for himself and his family. She found them a route and contacted Malik asking him to go with Basel’s family. She planned to travel back to Germany and await their arrival there. “She told me, ‘look man I don’t trust anyone with me’,” he said repeating her words to me when met the evening before he travelled
to Izmir. He continued explaining her comment to me, “The husband Basel is a coward. The wife’s brother is very childlike.” He then repeated the rest of his conversation with her saying, “She told me, ‘Look you stood by them and I don’t trust anyone here. Come with us.’ I told her, ‘I have 2000 Euros on me now, but I don’t have the rest of the sum.’ She said she would see what the smuggler would say; if he would lower the price. She phoned me back, the smuggler did not accept and told me to let her see what she could do. She phoned again and told me, ‘the wife and I have sold some gold, you only live once, come down as quick as you can’.”

His help was reciprocated by them helping him to move again. While Malik framed it as an honour since Basel’s sister singled him out from among the other refugees who had been in her brother’s group, he omitted that by paying for part of his journey, they obliged him to stay with them until they all arrived. Malik chose to validate his self-presentation as someone capable and responsible and disguised these elements.

Malik’s choice to remain with the family placed his migratory plans on hold. Other refugees recounted similar stories where refugees put their plans on hold to help others. A theme emerges from these instances that refugees value the lives of others, their safety and wellbeing above their individual migratory projects. Mohammed, a refugee from Homs, was in Istanbul to sort out passage for himself, his wife, and three young children. They were waiting for a smuggler to come through for them with a route. Amal, his wife, quietly complained the three times I saw her that the smugglers kept postponing them and telling them they would move, “Today and tomorrow”. The first evening when I sat with the family in the Kitchen after explaining about my project, Mohammed said, “There are some guys I met in the hotel. They told me about going to Germany by truck. They had an old man with them. The smuggler put them into the truck, and they stayed in it for three days. The old man died. They couldn’t take it. They had crossed into Bulgaria. They
got out and they got the police. They were like we have to be human beings, so we reach our destination but what of this man? No, better we hand ourselves over.

I find the story a powerful one. The protagonists of the story Mohammad recounted valued the man’s life by respecting him in death. By recounting the story, he illustrated how some refugees value and respect human life. This respect stands in contrast to the treatment he and his family were receiving from the smugglers they had paid. Those men were making them wait with void promises, disrespecting their lives and existential security. The refugees in the story, placed their existential and material security as well as their safety on hold to give value to the deceased passenger. The engagement with smugglers presented problems of how refugees secured themselves and their ambitions to move as explored in Chapter 4. Malik and Mohammad recounting these stories do the work of reaffirming that life preserving acts or acts respectful of life, as ethical acts, are not only possible but real (Jackson 2013,214). By acting in this way those refugees may have felt human in a context that is overwhelming and creates feelings of ontological insecurity.

In the instance mentioned above, those involved chose to help at different moments. Refugees never framed the help negatively nor with did they expect a return in the present or future, even though as in Malik’s case a return did follow his assistance. While refugees do not outline in a straightforward manner the limits to the help they were willing to give, they articulated the limits in particular instances (cf. von Benda-Beckmann 2000,9). The limits to the help refugees were willing to offer, emerged in situations where others were demanding or expecting more from them than they were able to give (Lambek 2010). They might question assistance they gave in one sphere

---

182 Mohammad met the men in Istanbul where they were preparing to cross the border again. He did not offer more details about the story, so I am not sure why they all handed themselves over to the police or why they did not continue their journey.
in another moment or instance. Refugees continuously balanced their desire to help and achieve their ambition of arriving. This tension raises the question of when does someone decide they have given enough and turn to themselves and their project? When is the demand too much?

Sayed tried to cross by yacht from the southern Turkish coast to Greece, and the group was stopped by the Turkish gendarmerie while in Turkish waters. In the group with him were a 17-year-old girl and her 12-year-old brother. All the refugees caught on the two yachts that day were from Syria. They were moved to a police station in a neighbouring town and held there for a week. They were then moved down to one of the state-run camps. The two children were held with Sayed and the other refugees in the police station and then moved down to the state-run camp. Their father was in Izmir when the children attempted the crossing, and he spoke to Sayed on the phone and asked him to look out for them and pay for their expenses. Their father promised to repay Sayed at a later date. Sayed said he constantly asked or gave the young boy money as he thought the young woman might feel embarrassed to approach him even if she needed something. The migrants would give the policemen money to buy them their daily needs. Sayed continued to give the children money until police sent the whole group to the camp in the south. The morning after they arrived in the camp, Sayed wanted to leave and come to Istanbul, so he gave the young boy 200 Euros and told him he was leaving. The father later complained to one of the people from the original group whom Sayed met up with in Istanbul that Sayed did not take care of the children. Sayed responded that their father was in Izmir and he could have come and gotten his children out of the camp. The duty to help others or the choice to do so is messy, and at times there is a cut-off point when self-preservation, looking to oneself, takes precedence. In denying that Sayed helped his children and telling others who might pass on the information, the father denied or deflected the reciprocity expected of him. He denied Sayed the opportunity to ask him for assistance at a later date or even expect that he would repay the money Sayed had given the children. He prevented Sayed from
depending on a return at any point in the future. Sayed’s response of stating the father could reach his children absolved him of any wrongdoing or the accusation of shirking responsibility, by highlighting that the children were not in any danger.

Helping is not necessarily straightforward in any situation. Refugees balance the obligation and desire to help with the difficulty of achieving their ambition. Mona and Hussam, the couple mentioned before, had tried crossing by land to Greece once before. Mona recounted their attempt in detail, explaining about her shoes and the environment they walked through. She explained how there was a woman in her sixties crossing with them and the woman asked them as they were being driven to Edirne if they would watch out for her en route. Mona and Hussam agreed as the smuggler had told them they would walk for only 20 minutes. They walked for several hours before getting close to Evros River. Mona described how they were walking, “We agreed to help her (the old woman), but she was putting all her weight on me. She was in her sixties. There were people from Africa with us and they walk really fast. In the end, the raber (rehber) got two guys to come and carry her between them. There was a bend in the road and at the end of it was the water. The Turkish gendarmerie was waiting there.” Mona and her husband threw themselves into the forest to escape the gendarmerie. They were willing to help the woman while they were ignorant of the circumstances awaiting them. They agreed as an obligation to an older adult and woman who was moving alone. Faced with a difficult terrain, their ill-preparedness (Mona’s shoes), and the speed at which the other passengers were moving, they were unable to handle the added pressure of helping the woman. Mona described the way the woman’s weight felt and how it impeded her movement at a time when she was most conscious of the need to move quickly. In other instances, refugees placed their whole migratory plan on hold and in this case, in the then present of Edirne and the pressure to keep up with the group, Mona and Hussam tried and were unable to act ethically.
While crossing the border or in detention, refugees faced situations that placed them before a decision of offering assistance or focusing on their own plans. The tension remained as some interlocutors helped abit and then withdrew while others managed to balance their own projects and assist others. Interlocutors rarely framed the help as selflessness, but either related it to previous acts based on revolutionary or religious principles and most importantly as valuing human life.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the transient relations Syrian refugees formed in Istanbul. The chapter examined how they initiated the relations highlighting the varying degrees of proximity that emerge in this context. In discussing different interlocutors’ relations, I tried to show how issues of socio-economic status or regional differences were situated. In a bid to achieve a successful crossing, many refugees dismissed the differences they would have otherwise depended on in their decision on whether or not to engage with others. They chose to form ties regardless of these issues due to the uncertainty they experienced in Istanbul and when faced with crossing the border. The uncertainty of the situation called upon Syrian refugees to help other en route at the cost of their own mobility. While it is necessary to situate the ways assistance was given in this context, the chapter also highlights the ways refugees reach the limit to the help they are willing to offer. The help given is particular as there is no community or social group to sanction refugees if they did not assist. I sought to show how the help is framed as related to previous actions from Syria and framed in terms of ethical actions.

The chapter examined the ways the detention centre in Edirne was approached by Syrian refugees. In the process, I sought to add to prior conceptualisations of the detention centres in the Aegean area which situated them sites where refugees are temporarily immobilised. To be able to move again and avoid the Turkish state taking other measures against them, Syrian refugees learnt
what strategies to use to get out of the camp. Syrian refugees perform being Palestinian to pass and leave the detention centre quickly. This performance leads us to the final chapter which is focused primarily on refugees’ performances to pass through Ataturk airport.
Chapter 6

On Passing, Performance and Becoming a Passenger

Mousy haired, blue-eyed, 18-year-old Khalid was going to move on a Belgian passport the smuggler he hired had found for him. He had come to Istanbul to avoid conscription into the Syrian army. A friend of the family put him in touch with the smuggler, and after two months waiting in Istanbul the passport was ready and the plan prepared. Everyone who saw the passport said it was a 90% likeness, and then they usually commented that he was lucky his eyes were blue and he would not have to wear contact lenses. Although he is a Riyal Madrid fan, he got a haircut like Messi’s since it was more popular. On the day, he woke up early in the rental apartment in Aksaray he was sharing with the smuggler and several other passengers. He performed the morning salat like his mother had asked him to do the night before when he spoke to her. She had prayed to God at the time to open the path before her son to deliver him to safety. He dressed in skinny jeans, a t-shirt, a new jacket and sneakers. He styled his hair with some gel and picked up his carry-on suitcase and backpack to look like a young traveller in Istanbul on a short visit. He said good-bye to the other passengers at the door, and they wished him good luck. He and the smuggler took a taxi to Ataturk airport. The smuggler gave him instructions along the way explaining what to do once past passport control. Khalid would still have his phone with him, but the smuggler wanted to tell him before they got to the airport as no one could listen in on the conversation in the car. As they approached the airport, the driver asked, “Yurtdışı gidiyor musunuz?” The smuggler said Turkish, “Evet abi” for the driver to head to international departures bypassing the turning for domestic flights. They got out and entered the airport to join the queue waiting to pass through the

---

183 I do not include the full details of how this route functions as a protective measure.
184 “Are you going abroad?”
185 “Yes, brother.”
first set of security. Khalid had not been into the airport before since he came to Turkey by land. He watched how people ahead of him took out their laptops and placed their bags on the counter to be x-rayed, and he imitated them. The smuggler had warned him not to wear a belt as it made the process longer at the x-ray stations, but Khalid had ignored him. He passed through the metal detector and gathered his things, putting his belt back on as he followed the smuggler into the check-in area of the airport. Then things picked up. The smuggler told him to sit and wait for a few minutes before returning a short time later with a boarding pass. Khalid then went to check himself in for the flight heading to Brussels. The smuggler spoke to him for a few more minutes reiterating his instructions before sending him into the queue for passport control.

Once he got to the start of the line, he waited for the border control guard at the desk before him to gesture for him to approach the counter. He did and handed over his Syrian passport. The border guard sat in a booth encased in transparent glass. Khalid had to raise his hand to give the guard his passport as the desks are elevated for employees to look down at passengers approaching the desk. The border guard’s actions were hidden from Khalid’s view as he entered the passport details into a computer. Khalid heard the thud of a stamp once and then twice before the employee handed him back his passport and boarding pass. He went forward for the second round of security checks and x-ray machines. This time the personnel, border guards, made him take off his sneakers and put them through the x-ray machine. With that over, he was in the Duty-Free area. He went to the food court as the smuggler had instructed him, bought something and sat down at one of the tables. The smuggler said he would draw less attention to himself sitting there than walking around the duty-free as there are undercover border guards throughout the airport. He spoke to the smuggler every half hour as he waited for the call to go to the gate. The smuggler had told him to wait and not head directly to the gate, so he waited for the cue from the smuggler. At the gate, he found the other passengers already queuing to board. He joined the moving queue with a beating
heart and tried not to look nervous. The airline personnel looked at the look-alike passport, and at him, handing him the passport and the part of the boarding pass with his seat number on it. He was elated as he walked down the jet-bridge to the aeroplane door; it was working. He entered the plane and was looking down at his seat number and scanning the numbers above the seats when a steward approached him. The steward spoke to him in French, and Khalid looked at him trying to mask his confusion and nervousness. The steward tried again, and then switched to English, but when Khalid still looked at him blankly with panic, the steward asked Khalid for his passport. Khalid stood frozen as the air host took the look-alike passport from his hands. Looking it over the steward called out to an air hostess, and within minutes Khalid was taken off the aeroplane.186

The starting scene incorporates several stories recounted to me about trying to move to Europe through Ataturk airport. The chapter discusses the ways Syrian refugees went to Europe by going through Ataturk airport. Refugees relied on original look-alike European passports to “pass” in the airport. I use ‘passing’ to refer to performing an identity with the aim here of securing access to mobility. Interlocutors spoke about imitating ‘Europeans’187 and the look-alike passports by changing their appearance and dress, though their performances were to imitate persons ‘authorised move’ to Europe (Rygiel 2011,155; cf. Amoore 2006,338). The chapter examines the changes they underwent to pass and the ways they performed to pass. Focusing on the space of the airport and the ways Syrian refugees passed requires analysing the ways airports are structured, how passengers are constituted as secure, and scholarly discourses on passing. Various scholars have examined the ways passing threatens identity and the stability of identity whether gender or racial

---

186 One comment made by an interlocutor was that even well-travelled passengers may be caught. Luck plays a part in the success of any attempt.

187 While I use ‘European’ with quotation marks sparsely throughout the chapter, I acknowledge that there is not one idea or representation of ‘European’ or ‘Europe’ (cf. De Genova 2016). Only some of the nuances and differences will be explored here.
(Butler 1993; Ahmed 2000; Larsen 1929; Benson 1981). Passing highlights that identity is never ontologically certain (Ehlers 2012,9). Passing foregrounds the ways all acts of identity are performances. A focus on the ways refugees’ pass in and through the airport provides an opportunity to analyse the ways all passengers pass to move within this space (cf. Lisle 2003). Syrian refugees’ performances are strategic and for the most transient, but necessary to overcome the gaze and surveillance of the state, airlines and other actors in the airport (cf. Hobbs 2014,29). As a result of their passing, Syrian refugees work the cracks and chinks in airport, airline, state-national and international- security measures which depend on documentation, electronic data, and identity performances.

Syrian refugees moving through the airport chose a route that is more difficult in certain ways than other available routes but if successful then more effective. Refugees who succeed in passing on original look-alike passports arrive quicker than other refugees moving by land or sea (cf. Khosravi 2010,14). Those moving on this route also face the most intense waits, although this route posed the least risk to their lives. At the same time, this route is risky for refugees as they could be discovered at any point in time during their attempt. Where refugees crossing by land or sea seek to avoid engaging with state actors, Syrian refugees moving on this route must engage directly with state actors and others who can affect their movement and potentially halt it. Moving through the airport is another and yet very different encounter at the border. It is an encounter that vividly highlights racial boundaries and the right to move.

The airport space is governed not only by state actors but also by airline personnel and private security firms that are hired by airports or airlines to facilitate managing the space (cf. Rigo 2005,10). Salter (2008, xii) explains that “Airports are not total institutions but rather nodes in a network of networks that include social, economic, and political actors with differing preferences, goals, logics, intentions, and capabilities.” The different and multiple actors Salter (2008) mentions
enact various forms of governance on passengers moving through airports. Das and Poole (2004,10) say of the checkpoint, “a site where assumptions about the security of identity and rights can become suddenly and sometimes violently unsettled.” While there is less suddenness in the case of the airport, identity and the right to move are glaringly subject to question in this site. This chapter draws from various approaches that recognise the multiplicity of actors affecting the mobility of passengers and their movement through airports (Salter 2007; 2008; Adey 2004; Lisle 2003; Lyon 2008). These approaches help to situate the ways refugees passing on look-alike passports engage with the airport space and those governing it.

**Mobility**

As mentioned in the thesis introduction, Syrian refugees face a situation where the majority of Syrian refugees have few legal means to move to Europe or further west if they so desire and this has led people to pursue other ways and routes to move. Capital (social and economic), class, religion, gender and sexuality all affect the access different Syrian refugees have to countries and their ability to move freely. Certain Syrian refugees can move with ease to many countries while others can only enter a handful of states without needing visas. As Salter (2007) explains, a hierarchy of passports and nation-states operates whereby some people of certain nationalities can move with few hindrances and others cannot or their movement is heavily restricted. Nation-state belonging, represented acutely in passports, affects the ways people move legally. While some Syrian nationals have been granted visas to go to Europe or resettle in Canada or the US, many other people seeking to reach safety cannot and resort to other methods such as look-alike
Passports. For Syrian refugees, moving on look-alike passports is a means of accessing the right to go to Europe among other forms of legalized border crossing (cf. Ahmed 1999, 92).

Passports are statist tools for identification, and Torpey (2000) focuses on the ways states and the nation-state system rely on passports and other mechanisms to render populations visible, legible and thus controllable. Passports facilitated the job of gatekeeping nation-states (Lisle 2003, 10). The history of passports as tools of control partially informs the ways refugees use look-alike passports in this context. Refugees moving through the airport on look-alike passports counter state control over the means of movement, and state actors’ uses of passports as a means of “knowing” passengers, thus subverting states’ roles in authorising movement. Refugees using this method attempt to force themselves into the heart of the nation-state uninvited and without pre-selection in the form of visas, refugee resettlement programs, or family reunification processes. I say ‘try to force themselves’ as all travellers even those trying to enter their nation state may be denied entry at the border; admission is never guaranteed. Using look-alike passports to access the right to move is part of refugees’ relations with the states they are moving to. Passing here is not an independent action but one that occurs as part of particular relations (Ahmed 1999, 93).

Simultaneously, refugees’ use of look-alike passports reaffirms the role of states as the sole authorities producing the legitimate means of movement—manifest most clearly in the form of passports. Refugees preferred to move on original passports as the authenticity of the passports partially enabled them to pass. This mode of moving recognises the authority of states in giving the right to move. Refugees’ acts of passing, while transgressive, are then limited in their political

188 I never asked how passports were acquired to reaffirm that I am not a police informant. Adam and I speculated that the passports were not stolen but bought as reported stolen passports would not be valid for use.

189 Counterfeit passports are also available. Alternatively, document salesman replaced or glued a page onto the biographical data page of an original passport. The new page had the refugees’ picture on it (cf. Khosravi 2010). It was not possible to do this with all passports due to the paper quality and printing methods. Biometric passports cannot be forged.
effects. By passing, refugees alter their condition of restricted mobility, but their actions fail to affect the power relations and systems of classification that govern mobility (Ahmed 2000; cf. Ellermann 2009). Refugees using this route adhere to the system of categorization in place and perform ‘acceptable’ and ‘normative’ identities as secure passengers while in the airport. Salter (2008, xii) explains that the various actors and modes of control they institute in the airport outline prescriptive “un/acceptable” and “ab/normal” actions and “safe/dangerous mobility”. Amoore (2006,338) explains that this governmentality means passengers cross multiple borders not just the “territorial border”. Air travel incorporates a series of boundaries that passengers must cross to move so that they shift from being considered insecure to become safe passengers. In this case, that entails overcoming the suspicion that they are ‘illegal’ migrants, so that the border guards and airline staff consider them “legitimate travellers” (Amoore 2006,338).

Passage through the airport requires refugees perform the identity of the passport on which they want to move but more importantly to act as secure passengers. At the same time that refugees comply with these forms of governance to pass, their actions work upon the very ‘identities’ they perform. Rygiel (2011,155) explains the acts as those of “unruly bodies” that transgress disciplinary measures to control their movement or presence. She describes refugee actions, whether of crossing borders, borrowing papers, burning fingertips, or demanding rights as modes of resistance; I suggest including passing among these. At times refugees operate within the framework in place due to disciplinary forces. In the process, they generate new ways of being, performing, and rearticulating rights and belonging (Papadopoulos &Tsianos 2008,167).

190 The discourse on passengers as ‘secure’ reached its height following the September 11 attacks. Various authors including Adey (2008), Amoore (2008), and Amoore and de Goedo (2008) highlight how risk calculation and security have become operative terms.
Beyond the ways passengers are expected act in airports to pass, are the various pieces of information that are collated to enable passengers to access the airport, aeroplanes, and enter nation-states. I begin by focusing on identification documentation and then discuss other information that enters into calculations of passengers’ security (Amoore 2009). Passengers must have the necessary documentation, whether travel documents, passports, visas, or boarding tickets, to pass border control or board an aeroplane. Passports, visas, and certain travel documents situate passengers as able to access the space of particular nation-states. The information in passports or visas is dependent on other documents (cf. Scheel 2013, 596-597 endnote 109). The information on passports or visas stands in for passengers’ histories, stories, and relations, and hides these from view (Adey 2004, 19; Scheel 2013). Adey (2004, 19) explains that passports espouse stable identities and information where subjects themselves repeatedly question or negotiate the very information passports stabilise. In turn, the information on passports generates a pressure on passengers to perform their passport when they are at the airport or border control. Adey (2004, 19) quotes Löfgren (1999), who argues that “as a traveller, you now had to live up to your passport identity to be able to prove your identity”. States “squash” or flatten various details or experiences of passport holders or persons with visas to create a legible surface that can be read in the airport according to terms of security and belonging. Caplan and Torpey (2001, 8) discuss the history of passports and identity documents, and describe how identity documents while unique in being created to represent a single individual rely on a classification system that “reduce individuality to a unit in series.” The documents disrupt the premise of individuality, “…and helps to explain the uneasy sense that we never fully own or control our identity, that the identity document carries a threat of expropriation at the same time as it claims to represent who we ‘are’.” Similarly, e-borders and biometric controls shift passengers away from their personhood or experiences to focus on their bodies as surfaces that can be read or revealed using biometric technologies (Caplan & Torpey
The body becomes an “anchor” for biometric data as biometric data is inscribed in ways that are considered inalterable (Amoore 2006, 339, 344). Passengers’ bodies act as a surface that various actors in the airport read as secure (cf. Kelly 2006). In the process, e-borders render passengers as bodies “authorised to move” rather than as “political subjects with rights to movement” (Rygiel 2011, 148; cf. Caplan & Torpey 2001, 10). Passengers, whether they pass through biometric borders or regular border control, are faced with a need for their bodies to perform the passport they are holding. This performance happens at surface level as well as in their postures, movements and gestures.

The airport space is governed through the differentiation between passengers and the classification of persons. Passengers’ movements through the airport are modulated depending on their nationality, class, religion, gender or sexuality (Lyon 2008, 34; Salter 2007, 52-54). Rygiel (2011, 144-145) argues that passengers’ positions within relations of power affect the ways they move in general and their passage through airports. State actors and airlines rely on passports, passengers’ performances, and other information about passengers such as their choice of airline, their selection of seats or class, when they booked their ticket, and how they paid for their ticket. They use this information to categorise passengers into types such as tourists, business travellers, citizens or migrants (Cresswell 2006, 223). “Travellers are reduced from citizens, foreigners, and refugees, with complex identities and claims to home into objects of danger or benefit, which perhaps afford entry or exit into the national population” (Salter 2007, 59). More specifically discussing airports, Salter (2007, 54) explains that airports are spaces of consumption, facilitating the presence of particular types of citizens or mobile bodies, namely tourists or business travellers, while excluding others from participating in the consumption or, if participating, then doing so

---

191 I do not focus extensively on biometric data as most of the research participants used non-biometric passports. Biometric passports cannot be forged.
under scrutiny. The categorization of passengers then affects their passage through the airport, where passengers considered risky (whether by state actors or airlines) are subject to greater scrutiny and others deemed trustworthy are favoured with speedy movement through the airport (Adey 2008, 146). Risk pertains not only to passengers’ country of origin but also their ability to perform in ways airlines and border guards consider ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ (Salter 2007). As part of assessing passengers in terms of risk, airlines and border controls subject passengers to processes “of disassembly and reassembly” (Adey 2008, 146; cf. Rigo 2005). Adey describes the processes as necessary to enable passengers to board aeroplanes, but these same processes hinder or prevent others from being able to board. “Without this disassembly, we cannot pass” (Adey 2008, 146), and due to it, some people will not move. Amoore (2006, 339) discusses it as “enacting a series of dividing practices in which the subject is broken up into calculable risk factors”. In this context, refugees moving on look-alike passports play on this very process of objectification that happens in airports. They position themselves as passengers who when disassembled by state actors or airline staff can be reassembled as secure passengers; passengers who can “pass”. Syrian refugees present themselves as bodies able to move, hiding from view any trauma or violence they may have experienced, and their right to demand protection and refuge.

The process of disassembly is dependent on various pieces of information not only passports or visas. State actors collect multiple pieces of information ranging from credit card purchases to telephone records (Jasbir 2007, 161-162). Amoore (2009) explains these data as forming data pixels that offer an image of the traveller before the traveller even enters the airport. This image is part of the flattening of persons since it entails a denial of particular connections or relations and applies a security lens to all the data. She argues that the processes of pixelation incorporate racial

192 Amoore and de Goede (2008,8-9) explain that following the September 11 attacks the focus in security policies which affect mobility not only in the US but across the world, shifted from a focus on safety to security.
considerations but reframe them as a matter of security concerns (Amoore 2009,20). Discussing racialisation, Jasbir (2007, 161-162) touches upon these processes of ‘disassembly’ and calculation practised in the airport

“Racialization has become a more diffuse process, not only informed by the biological body, what it looks like and what it can do, but also disassembled into subhuman and human-as-information. The dance between the profile that is racialized and the racial profile… informative bits and pieces encountered randomly or deliberately (the tapestry of the hand, the patterning of the iris, the motions of one’s gait, the isolation of various traits and mannerisms of the body to discern trusted from untrusted: any body can be untrustworthy until prove trustworthy, but not vice versa) interacting with the numbers and facts that matter (visa status, place of residence, country of origin, student activity, Social Security number, traveling risk status, criminal record, consumption habits, and any evidence of non-assimilative behaviour”).

Border guards and airlines consider all the pieces of information Jasbir mentions in their assessments of passengers as risks. As Amoore’s analysis (2009) shows, border guards approach passengers as untrustworthy before becoming trustworthy. Lyon (2008,35) for instance argues that Colin Bennett’s account of the processes that occur when passengers book a flight might have differed if his name was Arabic or Muslim or Israeli. These authors highlight the intersection of databases and using them “to profile and encode people according to degrees of riskiness,” (Amoore 2006,340). The categories and profile built up then becomes grounds to govern passengers’ mobility preventing it or allowing it.

While the types of data mentioned above are significant, border guards may also use other more basic techniques at the border. Heyman (2009,370-371) explains that in the case of the US border guards on the Mexican-US border, despite state actors’ use of formal systems of classification whether passports or biometrics, border guards still relied on other informal modes of reading persons crossing the border (cf. Reeves 2013). In this instance, refugees who are passing on look-alike passports are aware that particular passengers receive greater scrutiny due to their
country of origin or appearance. As will be explored in the chapter, they seek modes of presenting themselves as trustworthy, non-threatening and European to avoid the scrutiny.

The constitution of certain passengers as risks due to the various reasons mentioned above highlights the ways all passengers perform to pass in the airport whether or not they reflect on their actions as performative. Passengers enact various performances for instance class based as business travellers whose passage is expedited by ‘fast lanes or queues’. Alternately, the performance may as Lisle (2003,22-23) explains, be a performance of nationality as passengers tend to enact national stereotypes in airports. Alongside these, other passengers act docile to pass through the airport. Performances always pertain to the audience at hand and performance is a relational action (Kelly 2006; Hobbs 2014; Ahmed 2000).

**Airport, mobility, consumption, security and space**

The airport has been studied as a site of non-sociality and potential sociality. It has been explored in terms of different mobilities, securitization and analysed as a border crossing point i.e. a space where expression of state sovereignty is elevated and as a space that has to be securitized to enable heightened mobilities (Virilio 1986; Auge 1995; Cresswell 2006; Lisle 2003). Airports are spaces through which multiple flows occur, movements of persons and objects, periods of waiting, and particular forms of sociality while debilitating other types of sociality. Airports elicit scholarly attention as they are peculiar spaces in comparison to other transport terminals or spaces of waiting. Auge (1995) approaches airports as places of consumption through which persons pass and in which they consume, but which cannot become places of sociality. Gottdiener (2000) highlights the ways airports are places of sociality, namely for those working in them, beyond the ways passengers moving through them experience their time there. Virilio (2006) discusses airports in terms of mobility and the overlap between consumption practices associated with airports,
movement and speed. Adey (2008,150) focuses on the multiplicity of emotions airports evoke in passengers, from excitement to boredom or discomfort. These approaches offer insight additional insight into how the different relations produce the space and the experiences it engenders.

The airport is a space of differentiation and exclusion operating at multiple levels. The airport as a space of perceived heightened mobility has been explored in terms of global connectivity (Salter 2007, 52), but Salter (2007,53) criticises such approaches for failing to situate the ways different passengers move through the airport or ways airports are exclusionary spaces. The airport as a hierarchized space and exclusionary space, “… has the inverse effect of rendering mobility entirely problematic, shattering notions of sovereign space, and complicating the assumptions of stable identities upon which the nation rests” (Salter 2007,63). Beyond the focus on mobility is the ways airports have been approached as an intersection of politics, economics, and security (Adey 2008,147). Adey (2008) analyses how airports are designed and governed to balance the intersection of these concerns. States thus face the dilemma of balancing the ways airports are spaces for mobility, consumption and at the same time borders and sovereign spaces (Salter 2008, xiv). “Here again, the twin and apparently contradictory aims of the airport are made clear: to maximise but to regulate mobility” (Lyon 2008,34). The duality hinges on the airport organising the mobility of certain persons and capital while preventing or limiting the movement of others. States, airlines, private security firms hired by airlines all participate in modulating the movement of persons and objects through the airport (Adey 2008; Salter 2008). These various actors operate within the same space and discipline passengers in particular ways without necessarily coordinating their modes of control. Moreover, and with growing significance, airports are no longer about a single nation state but highlight interdependence and relations across national considerations. These various discussions offer insight into the different ways the airport space has been approached, and inform the way I conceptualise refugees’ performances to pass through the airport.
Ataturk Airport

Ataturk Airport is an international transport hub with international, transit, and domestic flights. In this chapter, I focus on Ataturk airport as the refugees whom I knew used this airport to go to Europe. While some considered going to the smaller airport on the Asian side, no one I knew used that airport. Refugees and smugglers favoured Ataturk airport because of the high volume of flights, the variety of destinations that it services, its size, and its location on the European side of Istanbul. The variety of destinations and their volume meant border guards and airline staff had to deal with many passengers. Smugglers and passengers relied on the volume of flights and destinations while coordinating flights or deciding which flights to take.

As the story at the beginning of the chapter showed, bordering processes in Ataturk airport happen at different points in time and parts of the airport. Several actors perform bordering practices not only state actors (Salter 2007,53). As shown in the story, passengers engage with multiple actors who all scrutinise passengers as part of maintaining the air travel as secure and a sovereign process. All these actors can affect the ways passengers move through the airport, whether they will move or be granted entry, and the speed of their movement. Control or regulation is not abstract but takes on practical/visible forms, and in Ataturk airport, there are various surveillance nodes that passengers must pass through. As the story showed, passengers are sorted even before entering the airport building as domestic and international flights are in separate but connected buildings. Once they enter the building, people and their luggage are checked using x-rays and metal detectors. The personnel manning the stations at the airport entrances are all private security. Adey (2004,505) explains that securing airports through the use of x-rays, cameras, and

---

193 All the interlocutors I know who used this route were living on the European side.
194 They have the words private security, Ozel Güvenlik, written on their outfits.
other technologies influences the ways passengers and other persons coming to the airport act within the space. From the moment passengers enter the airport, they are aware of the scrutiny of the state and other actors. This surveillance, in turn, prompts passengers’ self-discipline in airports diminishing the need for state actors to display weapons as a means of control (Salter 2008; Foucault & Rabinow 1984).

After the preliminary checks, passengers proceed to the check-in desks or directly to border control. At the check-in desks, dependent on the destination and airline, some airlines have hired private security companies to assess and scrutinise passengers while they queue to check-in. These personnel act as gatekeepers guarding the check-in desks. They verify that passengers’ documents are genuine and belong to the passenger (cf. Löfgren 1999). After obtaining their boarding passes and checking in their baggage, passengers go through passport control. Border control is technically their first interaction with state actors in the airport though other actors have acted for and as the state until then (cf. Das and Poole 2004). Lisle (2003,10) describes border guards as gatekeepers entrusted with the job of securing the nation-state, but their roles is more nuanced. Border guards are concerned with preventing the exit or transit of persons who are unauthorised to travel or who are considered insecure passengers. Their role is not just to protect the nation-state as they also participate in protecting other nation-states, especially in this case EU states. Border guards enter passengers’ passport information into their database and stamp both their passports and boarding tickets with the border gate stamp. Some passengers are subjected to greater scrutiny at border control due to their destination and country of origin. They might be asked to step aside and be taken to a different row to be asked questions to verify their identity or

---

195 Some airlines institute this measure, and others depend on the airline staff to assess passengers’.
196 An airline flying to the UK depends on private security to verify passengers and their documents. I experienced on several occasions their mode of scrutiny and practices.
197 It lists the name of the border gate and the date.
their purpose in travelling to their destination. The engagement at border control highlights the ways passengers’ positions within national hierarchies and relations of power are made visible and are experienced more acutely than elsewhere within the nation-state.

Once past border control, passengers cannot access any of the airport exits alone, affecting how they experience, act and pass within the airport space. Passengers can only leave the airport by turning to state actors to escort them through particular doors/exits. Passengers’ inability to access exits is another means of influencing passengers’ behaviours within the airport space (Adey 2004). The controlled movement is another tool alongside cameras or other surveillance technologies that lead passengers to discipline themselves while within this space (cf. Jeganathan (2004, 71).

At boarding gates, airlines that hire private security firms to verify passengers’ documentation station the same personnel at the entrance of the boarding gate area to scrutinise passengers’ passports again before allowing them into the waiting area. In other instances, airline staff verify passengers and their documents before allowing them to board the flight. Some airlines make staff go around the boarding gate area checking passengers’ passports, their boarding passes and marking the passes as a way of confirming passengers before they start boarding.198 State actors are close at hand to question or verify any passenger airline staff or private security personnel consider suspicious. Various actors secure the space of the airport and verify passengers’ as bodies with authorisation to fly. The responsibility of checking passengers and securing flights is distributed between the multiple actors participating, given the different occasions and the number of times passengers are required to show their documents. For those attempting to pass, the multiple actors involved in maintaining the border, and the different moments when they must show their

198 Airlines and other transport carriers risk being sanctioned if it is discovered they allowed unauthorized refugees to enter the EU (Rigo 2005:10; Papadopoulos et al. 2008:170).
documents give rise to many instances when refugees may be discovered. The securitisation of Ataturk airport and flights leaving it is multifarious rather than the responsibility of a single party (Salter 2007, 51; cf. Lisle 2003). Each actor or element contributes to constituting passengers as secure bodies authorised to move.

**Materiality and Securing Passengers**

State actors, airlines, and private security personal in Ataturk airport not only judge passengers as secure or risky based on their documents, country of origin and their destination but also render them ‘safe’ passengers by using material marks. The focus on e-borders and electronic data do not preclude a discussion of the materiality of passing through the airport. Stamps (ink), documents, and stickers are all part of passing through Ataturk airport. These material forms constitute passengers as ‘secure passengers’ who can move. At border control, staff stamp passengers’ passports and boarding passes. The action creates a system of double verification as airline staff at the boarding gate for the stamp, and passengers without the stamp on their boarding pass will not be able to board the aeroplane.

Here the stamp, an ink mark, stands in to confirm that passengers and their documents have passed through all the necessary security processes. The exit stamp is transient. While some ‘risky’ passengers might find ways around the issue so that they pass, airlines and state actors rely on its transience to render it an effective measure preventing the movement of un-validated persons. Salter (2007, 63), discussing the difficulties passengers face in resisting control in the airport explains that “it is the particular ethereality of the surveillance assemblage (in the airport) that makes resistance such a challenge.” In this instance, the stamp aligns the ticket with the passport and by extension the passenger. It serves as proof (in theory) that the same person and documents that passed through border control is at the boarding gate and will board the flight. The exit stamp
is an additional layer of data added to the existing data of passport and boarding pass. However, as Salter’s comments make clear, the security assemblage in place in airports is innovative and flexible generating new and other means of verifying passengers as secure. For instance, one airline flying to the UK, employs private security to validate passengers before they check in. They use sticker marks to distinguish passengers on its flight. The private security personnel place a small colourful sticker on the back of the passport and scribble letters on it. They check passengers’ passports for the sticker at the boarding gate. The stickers and letters change for every flight making it near impossible to replicate the stickers. Temporally specific material markers become part of the process of verifying passengers alongside technology based methods of checking passengers.

**Performing to Pass**

Syrian refugees in their bid to pass on look-alike passports perform being bodies authorised to move to Europe. To successfully present themselves as permitted to move, Syrian refugees perform an idea of ‘western-ness’ or being ‘European’. As they rely on look-alike passports, they approximate an image of both a specific ‘other,’ the passport holder’s photographer, and perform a more general idea of being ‘European’. What was meant by European might differ between individuals and how they chose to perform it varied based on gender, age, or class. Hobbs (2014) discusses passing in different stages of American history. She explains that slaves running away in the late nineteenth century, passed not necessarily as white but as free men/women and thus as persons with the right to move. Many of the slaves used old or forged ‘passes’ to confirm that their owners had authorised their movement. Contemporary practices, resonates with their practices to escape slavery (Hobbs 2014; Reeves 2013), pass through a checkpoint (Jeganathan 2004; Kelly

---

199 Based on my experience from February 2014 when flying back to the UK. The same security practices were not implemented for flights going to Lebanon, for instance, highlighting the varying security concerns and hierarchies of states.
The Palestinians in Bayt Hajjar used various strategies to pass through the Israeli checkpoint outside their town in the occupied West Bank (Kelly 2006). Some people relied on the make of the car they drove, having a foreign passport, dressing in trendy manner or their ability to speak Hebrew well (Kelly 2006, 97). In the West Bank context, the performance and documents are negotiated due to the changing security considerations. Reeves (2013) focuses on Kyrgyz migrants in Russia attempting to pass by performing a legal status (cf. Vasta 2011). To pass successfully, Kyrgyz migrants would buy, borrow, and share certain documents such as Russian passports. Kyrgyz migrants, when forced to engage with Russian police, had to perform the authenticity of their documents by demonstrating they had sufficient knowledge about the information recorded on their residence card. Police asked migrants details about the address listed on their residence permit. Migrants’ inability to validate the document by knowing these details gave them away as performing a status they did not hold. Passing is not only employed to move but also insist on being authorised to remain or be present. Srivastava (2012) explores how residents living in an informal settlement in Delhi approximate official documents in their bid to prove their presence and rights as residents. By passing as authorised to be present, the community residents sought to gain access to services.

Passing brings to the fore questions about identity itself as a category and performance. Ahmed (1999) and Butler (1990;1993) amongst many others all move from the premise that all identities are performances and “recitation of norms” (Ehlers 2012, 9). Passing is a means to examine possibilities for innovation within the norm boundaries of an identity performance (Ehlers 2012,12). Taking all identities as performance highlights that passing is an act of “becoming, one that never assumes the fixed status of ‘being’” (Ehlers 2012, 9; Jasbir 2007, xxiv). In this context, refugees’ use of look-alike passports, renders identity whether of belonging to the nationality they are moving on or being ‘secure’ passengers into “a fetish” and “an object that can be known, seen,
approximated” (Ahmed 1999, 98). In the process of objectifying identity as replicable, Syrian refugees highlight their positionality in relations of power.

Refugees moving on look-alike passports try to approximate part of the information that is on the passport namely the passport photograph which is an incomplete image as it is only a face. Smugglers and passengers look for similarities in features to assess how great a match the photograph is. Smugglers or document salesmen working with passports take pictures of the passports using their smartphone and go through their collection when they have a customer. Smugglers, middlemen, and document salesmen use smartphones with high-resolution cameras that enable them to showcase their collection of passports without having to carry them around. They use the passport copies or images as tools to match refugees with passports. They send customers the photographs too so that they can change themselves according to the image. More than once I was shown a picture of a passport on someone’s smartphone and then asked, “How much of a likeness is it?” Refugees and people who work with documents use the word shabah, likeness, to discuss the degrees of likeness and the possibilities of refugees using a particular passport. They spoke of likeness as a matter of percentages. They looked at the shape of the face, the mouth, the nose, and the eyes to discern the degree of proximity as well as the distances between different facial components. Refugees and smugglers’ discussions about likeness outlined the ways the face and features had to change to match with the passport photograph. Refugees and smugglers’ focus on similarity renders the body a surface: a surface of possibility that can be altered to increase the percentage of approximation. As refugees were working to imitate an actual image, Ahmed’s (1999,101) analysis that subjects labour to narrow the gap and “approximate an image” can be interpreted literally.

The gaze of the state is permeated by the gaze of multiple actors who judge and reassure refugees about the likeness. Deciding the degree of similarity and the possibility of refugees
passing on a particular passport requires refugees, documents salesmen, and smugglers to scrutinise the passport and the passenger. Smugglers, document salesmen, refugees and anyone they trust is asked to assess the degree of likeness. The need to look and compare posed a particular situation for veiled women. In most instances, veiled women moving on a look-a-like passport had to unveil. Female refugees had to unveil for the middle man or smuggler selling them the passport to gain their expert opinion about whether or not the passport matched. Amr, the middleman mentioned in the previous chapters, once told Adam and me an anecdote about the matter. Amr explained how he was sorting a couple out with passports to move on. The wife was veiled, so he gave the husband the passport and told him to see if his wife resembled the passport image without her veil. He warned the man that it was his responsibility to decide, and they (Amr and Wael) would not take the blame if she did not pass with the passport. The husband went to his wife who was in another room and returned a few minutes later asking Amr to come and see if the likeness was good. Amr recounted the story to show how he as a middleman who arranged others’ mobility could negotiate the boundaries of others’ personal space. He would never insist on seeing the man’s wife unveiled, but the man called upon him. The couple made the boundaries of their personal space fluid to accommodate Amr’s gaze as he stood in for the gaze of the state in this instance. Amr was not the only person to take on this role, as Amira’s son and the smuggler he worked with called on her to judge if a passport was a good match. For Amr however as a man, he perceived it as crossing boundaries. Much as many people temporarily performed being white to pass to escape, women who might unveil to “pass through” the airport might veil once they arrived at their destination (Hobbs 2014,29; cf. Griffin 1961). The temporariness of the act of ‘passing through’ further undermines the idea of the stability of identities.

200 In majority of instances I was told about when women wanted to use look-alike passports, they had to unveil.
201 As explained in Chapter 5, Wael and Amr provided look-alike Swedish passports for refugees to move on.
Approximating an image through facial changes and changes in dress are aspects of moving on a look-alike passport. Refugees also rely on stereotypes of Europeans to realise their ambition to move. Refugees have to depend on general ideas about Europeans as they have minimal background information about the original passport holder to compliment the passport photograph. They interpret certain generalisation and incorporate them into their performances to pass. They interpret the flattened categories of the passport and the passport photograph to produce a person they can perform to pass through the airport. In a way, refugees engage in a form of the pixelating Amoore (2008) discusses. Where she focuses on how US state actors use digital information to construct an image of ‘potential’ terrorists but not a “temporally specific image” of the person, refugees do the reverse. They take the different pieces of information at their disposal, the most important being the image, to form a temporally distinct person. When states authorise passports, they hide from view the history, stories, and relations underlying the passports (cf. Adey 2004,19). Refugees using look-alike passports are faced with the invisible or hidden history of the passport holder. As a result, refugees moving on look-alike passports perform an interpretation of the identity of the passport holder and create another identity. Their situation contrasts to those mentioned by Hobbs (2014) were many racially ambiguous persons at different points of history were able to pass as ‘white’ because they were familiar with the postures, gestures, and the modalities of speech. The gestures, comportment and speech are supposed to evoke a particular response from airport staff and border control (Goffman 1956,2); the conviction that the person is authorised to move.

Through media and television, refugees are exposed to certain performances of ‘European-ness’ or ‘western-ness’ or stereotypes of being European. Syrian refugees’ interpretation of how to perform the identities on the passports relied on their prior conception and understanding of what being ‘European’ or ‘Western’ meant. Interlocutors explained that they based their conceptions to
some degree on physical differences and assumptions about how different ‘Europeans’ look (Spanish versus Scandinavian for instance), but more so on actions, modes of being, sociality, and value systems. To quote Ehlers (2012,9) in her discussion of racial passing and identity in the US,

“Regardless of the form of passing- those in line with or in defiance of racial status-we see that subjects never occupy the site of identity. The significance of such a claim underscores one of the key points of this inquiry: acts rather than corporeality are the means through which racial identity is produced, and this identity is only ever a (passing) phantasm devoid of ontological security.”

Refugees face the task of matching a passport image, but effectively ‘acting’ a version of European-ness based on the nationality of the passport they were moving on to achieve their aim of passing, as it is in their actions that confirm belonging. In a similar vein, Kelly (2006,97) while not discussing performing being ‘European’ explained how younger men in Bayt Hajjar, were more likely to pass through the Israeli checkpoint than older men. The younger men passed as Israeli in many cases because they wore trendy clothes, they were able to speak Hebrew like Israeli youths, and they played certain music in their cars. Khosravi’s (2010,63-64) recounted how he used a counterfeit (photocopy) passport to move from India to Sweden. He observed backpackers in Delhi to learn how to move and comport himself like them. He had to effect or enact western backpackers’ mannerisms and body language. He focused on an image or stereotype of westerns coming to India and by recreating that he was able to pass. To draw on Ahmed’s (1999, 98) analysis of the labour and effort that enters into an attempt to pass, “The labour that is hidden in the assumption of identity as self-presence is re-created on the surface of the subject who passes through hybridity”. Ahmed argues that attempts to pass highlight the effort that goes into performing any identity. Here the surface information that is the passport and listed in the passport comes to affect the ways refugees approach their bodies as surface and alter them accordingly to

202 Emphasis added.
match the passport image, performing an embodied belonging to the nation-state of the passport holder. All these examples highlight the creative energy to overcome boundaries or limits by supporting the performance, while also insisting on the ways these performances aimed to confirm ideas of “authenticity and essence” (Newell 2012,140). Here I would argue that interlocutors’ objectives were not to destabilise the identity they were performing but to rework the possible performances within the broad constraints of the identity at hand.

**Passing and its Audiences**

In October 2013 Manal, a single Kurdish woman in her late twenties, attempted to move through Ataturk airport on a look-alike European passport. I met Manal at Amira’s house when she stayed there for two days as she prepared to move on the passport. She and her sister had come to Istanbul from Qamishli so they could go together to Switzerland. They had hired a smuggler to arrange their route, but after a month of waiting he still had not come through, prompting them to arrange passage with another smuggler. They hired the smuggler whom Rezan, Amira’s adult son, worked with. He dealt mainly with passports and had routes through Ataturk airport. Manal explained that his price was too much for both her and her sister to make the journey, so her sister was staying with family members in Istanbul and would return to Qamishli. Manal wanted to go to Switzerland as her brother and his wife were living there. Rezan and his boss took Manal to the airport the day before, but the smuggler was unable to get her an airline ticket, so they had decided to postpone her attempt to another day that week.

As we sat in the living room, Rezan brought out the passport she was going to use and handed it to me asking me, “Does she look like her?” referring to the woman in the passport photograph.
“Yes,” I replied looking back and forth between Manal and the passport photograph. She gestured half-half with her hand. I looked at the issuing date and commented, “It was issued in 2009, so it could be like you have lost weight.”

Rezan teased me for the rest of the day for making that comment, saying that I smuggle people. Manal explained about her attempt to move on the passport the previous day and how the smuggler had been unable to get her a boarding ticket (hence she had come to stay with Amira’s family until she tried again). She explained, “I was wearing this jacket (she gestured to the jacket she was wearing) and a short dress. The muharb (smuggler) said that I have to dress like this to look French.”

“So, you were pulling it down every few minutes, right?” I asked as it had been cold and rainy the previous day.

“Yes! It kept rolling up, and no European pulls it down. It was cold, and I was wearing very thin tights too, and everyone was wearing jeans, even I was looking at myself! At the metal detector, they made me take off the manto203 (jacket), and the dress is (she gestures sleeveless) and short, so the person behind me said in Arabic ‘niyalou al matar yali bi shalih!’ (Lucky is the airport that undresses!). I couldn't say anything because I am French and I am not supposed to have understood!”

The next day around noon, Rezan brought her the boarding pass and she got ready. His sister did threading to make her eyebrows even thinner and raise her hairline further to make her brow longer. Amira helped her put on blue lenses, and did her make up for her. She came into the living room where we were sitting, wearing a tunic-style camel coloured dress, thin beige knit cardigan, camel coloured high heeled ankle boots, and brown tights. She had commented before that she

203 The term is usually used to refer to thigh length or longer jackets.
bought thicker tights for this attempt. I asked her if the dress was from the bazaar, open market, but she explained the boss took her shopping, “it has to be marka (brands) because Europeans wear brands.” She was wearing some necklaces, a brown watch, and a faux bijou ring, all of which she chose for the outfit. The outfit was colour coordinated, with the bag, dress, shoes, and trench coat jacket all matching. She had changed her hair colour, cut it, and styled it to resemble the picture in the passport. She sat on the sofa with us and lit a cigarette saying, “See?! And the tights were even thinner before, so it looked like my skin, and I wasn't wearing this (she gestures to the light knitwear cardigan she was wearing) so it was sleeveless. Niyalou al matar yali bi shalih? Rezan practised with her the only line she needed to say in English at the airline check-in desk, “no baggage”. She had a small carryon suitcase to complete the look. She made it through that day.

Manal’s anecdote highlights multiple aspects that are intertwined. She was afraid of being discovered as a subject trying to pass and judged as not quite passing (cf. Ahmed 1999). Her narrative highlights the ways state actors’ gazes are deployed in the airport and the relationality that enables people’s mobility manifested here various people’s labour who made Manal’s attempt successful. Manal described her clothes as part of the performance. They had to be high street brands (marka) as she said ‘Europeans’ would not wear knockoffs or bazaar clothes. Her clothes were colour coordinated, plain and simple (maybe more about class than place). De Leon (2012) discusses the ways migrants crossing the Sonora Desert to enter the US use their clothes and travel accessories to aid their crossing. Some migrants wore new sneakers and got haircuts before crossing mentions, on the basis, it will enable them to “blend” in once in the US (De Leon 2012,487). He explains the haircuts and sneakers as migrants’ attempt to “not look poor”. Where the migrants he worked with used their gear and clothing functionally to increase the likelihood of

204 The phrase is very catchy in Arabic and Manal may have repeated it given she was nervous about her approaching attempt.
their success (2012a,483), here Manal used her clothes in a similar manner but with an eye for the gaze of the airline staff and airport security.

The clothes were also revealing, sleeveless and short. Lisle (2003,22-23) discussing particularities that emerge in the airport, explaining that the space prompts subjects to announce their identity. “The indeterminate status of the subject at the airport produces opposing effects: a desire to announce one’s identity by embracing national stereotypes, and the contrasting desire for anonymity.” The smuggler chose Manal’s clothing based on his understanding, or conception, of French people. While Manal found the clothes uncomfortable for various reasons, they perhaps fit with Lisle’s analysis (above) of announcing the wearer’s identity. Manal found the clothes uncomfortable commenting that “no European pulls it (the dress) down,” as a way of qualifying ‘Europeans’ as not feeling self-consciousness or ashamed or insecurity about revealing skin. At the same time, she had to perform this body language to announce her belonging and her being a secure and genuine passenger. Manal situates her feelings of discomfort as different from the idea or body she was trying to imitate by wearing these clothes while at the same time, she was exaggerating and homogenizing the “European” she spoke of. She said within the same sentence, “even I was looking at myself,” she was alert to how she stood out as her clothing was somewhat unsuitable for the weather. She expressed both her self-consciousness about wearing the outfit and her alertness as someone trying to pass to the ways she fits in or does not. Hobbs (2014) discussing different individuals’ passing, shows subjects’ fear of being discovered as “not being” quite the identity as which they are trying to pass (cf. Ahmed 1999). Manal’s alertness to herself and the observations of those around her whom she was trying in effect to approximate highlighted her fears about her attempt to pass.

Manal’s anecdote about the man behind her in line at the security entrance to the airport brings to the fore other issues about both passing and the airport. The man’s comment points to the gaze
or surveillance that is part of moving through or even entering, the airport. The surveillance in this instance took the form of private security personnel who request passengers remove their jackets to have them x-rayed before entering the airport space. State actors’ surveillance agenda meant Manal had to take off the trench coat jacket she wore, and the man commented about the state’s ability to reveal her in that manner. Alternatively, his comment may have been a way of signalling to her that he recognised her as a subject trying to pass as ‘other’. He may have intended to signal his recognition, thus challenging her to respond and show herself to be passing or possibly to alert her to an inconsistency in her performance. Manal understood his comment as that of a male commenting on a female body. She insisted that she could not respond to his comment either to silence him or to show her understanding as part of her performance. By responding to him, she risked someone noticing or suspecting her; again testifying to the surveillance in place in the airport and the ways passengers discipline themselves within the space (cf. Salter 2007). She chose to remain in role and conceal her knowledge of Arabic. Her comment that she could not respond to the man’s comment is a way of showing her discomfort at his ability to make a comment—she provided an opening to be commented on by a male actor. She interpreted the events and interaction in this manner. At the same time, many of Manal’s comments show an exaggeration of the situation and the constraints she felt. Many Syrian women might dress as she did that day, and many European women might be uncomfortable in the clothes she wore. She homogenized the identity of the Other she was performing and focused on a very specific idea based on some European citizens’ practices. While she said she was unable to respond to the man since she was ‘French’, there are French Arabic speakers showing that her comment is an overstatement. I suggest that Manal’s anxiety about moving made her exaggerate these elements due to the overwhelming nature of the situation.
Various people participated in making Manal's performance possible. The smuggler provided the passport, and he took Manal shopping to ensure she dressed the part. A hairdresser in the area dyed and cut her hair to match the photograph, Rezan’s younger sister shaped her eyebrows, and ultimately Amira allowed her to stay with the family giving her the space to rest and get ready for her next attempt. The coincidence that the smuggler postponed her attempt, gave her more time to prepare enabling her to perform a much more extreme embodiment of this other identity, and perhaps was the element which enabled her to succeed in her performance. Ahmed (1999,94) explains that passing is threatening because it shows the “the time, the labour and the crisis” that are hidden from view when people perform an identity. By revealing these hidden aspects of identity, passing uncovers the “the conflict and antagonism that determines the ‘work’ needed to be done to reproduce a given sociality” (Ahmed 1999,94). Passing brings to the fore the labour that is part of enacting any identity. Manal laboured in her preparation and performance on the day to pass as a secure passenger and others contributed to her performance.

**Presenting Self as ‘Other’**

Other Syrian refugees undertook similar measures to what Manal underwent to alter themselves. Their actions aimed at matching passport photographs and passing as European, ‘white’, or Christian. Adam and the refugees with whom he lived during the winter of 2012 and who moved on look-alike passport all changed their physical appearance to be able to move. They changed themselves to match the passports as well as adopting practices, donning certain clothes or other accessories to pass. With the men more so than with Manal, the fact that they were male Middle Eastern bodies entered into their calculations of how to alter themselves to pass. No one ever said that this reasoning drove their choices, it remained unspoken, but their actions qualified the ‘other’ as taking specific imitable forms. The men knew much as Rygiel (2011,148) explained that as
young male bodies, state actors would scrutinise them more than other bodies. She said young male bodies have “…Historically been subject to targeting at the border for reasons of race, nationality, religion and/or class—and with an emphasis now on terrorism”. Particular bodies are profiled, racialized, and identified as problematic beyond others. Of those bodies, passengers from the Middle East or from a Muslim background are subject to greater surveillance than others (Rygiel 2011,150, 155; Holmes & Castaneda 2016,18; Amoore 2009,20). Nationality, country of birth, and names can all indicate that male passengers are Muslim (cf. Khosravi 2012), and beyond these, choice of clothes such as wearing Muslim hats (skullcaps) or sharia trousers\textsuperscript{205} can signal that passengers are Muslim. Without these actions, it would be impossible to read a passenger as being Muslim or belonging to any other faith. Jasbir (2007,160) says on the racialization of Muslims, “The population ‘Muslim terrorists’ comes to light not only through the Orientalist metonymic linking of Muslim and terrorist within the economy of meaning and representation. This population is made up of those caught in the violent chaotic shuttling back and forth between the statistical informational ontologies deemed ‘Muslim’ and those that begin to bleed into ‘terrorist’ We can say that this process of informationally creating bodies goes far beyond forms of neo-Orientalizing or racialization of religious affiliation. “The Muslim,” summarily dismissed from its place as one subject of multiculturalism, is an emergent, incipient Race, the Muslim Race.”

Actors mark their bodies through and as part of their religious practices, but she highlights the connection made between Islam and race which forgoes the element of practice (cf. Sharma 2006,123). Hall (1996), Gilroy (1987), Benson (1981), Butler (1993) among others all argue that subjects produce race; it is not a given or part of an individual’s essential characteristics. Race is attached to subjects’ skin rather than resulting from their skin or features highlighting hierarchy and relations of power. Subjects as ‘raced’ negotiate what race means, the ways they are raced and

\textsuperscript{205} Specific type of baggy trousers.
their performances of race (Hall 1996; Gilroy 1987; Ehlers 2012). Where religion is not a marker, Syrian refugees face not dealing with their phenotypical markers as much as having to use objects and accessories to counter the convergences of race and Islam as a category. Syrian refugees work on their bodies by changing their hair colour, its thickness, thinning their eyebrows or wearing coloured contact lenses in a bid to approximate the passport and adhere to an idea of being ‘white’. At the same time, some refugees went beyond this to done secular or Christian markers to pass. The doctor mentioned in previous chapters, who was living with Adam and Amr, was the first of the group to travel on a look-alike passport. He and Salah, another man living with them at the time, went together to Sweden. They went to a hair salon in Aksaray to change themselves. The men underwent the changes as part of the labour of performing the passports they were going to move on. They had their eyebrows plucked. The doctor who had blond hair had his hair dyed reddish-brown to match the passport photograph. Adam commented that he also underwent a facial treatment to brighten his skin. Adam later described him as having such a shiny face that people were probably so star-struck (yinbihr) by him in the airport and did not look at the passport. Salah, on the other hand, had dark hair and the photograph in the passport he was moving on the person had dark hair. Changing his hair colour would not assist him in passing, so he chose to wear a cross pendant around his neck to help him pass. By wearing the cross, he tried presenting himself as Christian, and thus a (supposedly) unthreatening male. He believed that wearing a cross would serve as evidence that he is European and a secure passenger. Following a similar logic, an interlocutor explained that one of his friends got a large henna tattoo of a cross painted onto his

206 While I was there as Manal prepared before going to the airport, I did not see the doctor nor his travel companion before they travelled. I was told they underwent these changes by Adam.

207 Kelly (2006) mentioned a story recounted him by his interlocutors in Bayt Hajjar of some men from the village dressing in Orthodox Jewish clothing including hair extensions and caps to successfully pass through the Israeli army checkpoint.
neck before he attempted to move on a look-alike European passport. By sporting such a symbol on a highly visible part of his body, that man believed he was presenting himself to airline staff and border control as unthreatening. The interlocutor recounting his friend’s actions to me, did not see that some people might consider such a visible tattoo threatening and explained that the tattoo made his friend appear “that he is of them”. Another male interlocutor wore an earring to present himself as distinct to Muslims or the Middle East and as a result pass. Refugees such as Manal underwent physical changes as one possible mode for passing, but other refugees chose to adopt religious or secular symbols to counter suspicion that they are unsecure passengers. In all three cases mentioned, the refugees in question focused on a particular idea of Europeans and based their self-presentation based on that idea. Their ideas homogenized European identity and approached it as monolithic. For these refugees homogenizing Europeans may have made it easier for them to deal with the lack of information about the passport owner’s practices or self-presentation. A monolithic and very specific idea of Europeans- donning a cross, a tattoo, or wearing a short dress- were all ways to limit and identify practices that can be imitated.

In the process of these moves to pass, refugees sought to make themselves similar to a perceived, albeit homogenized, Other. Jasbir (2007) explains how after the 9/11 attacks several American Sikhs were targeted on the basis of being Muslim. The Sikh community in the US launched a campaign to educate Americans about Sikhism, the significance of the turban, and how the Sikh turban differs from Muslim male clothing. Jasbir (2007, 187) explains the two actions, attacks and response, in terms of “sliding”. She argues that “sliding” is the act of bringing different Others closer due to their difference to an imagined ‘us’ (Jasbir 2007, 187). The campaign to teach Americans about Sikhism sought to counter this sliding and make the boundaries or distinctions clear. From the abovementioned quote, it is possible to interpret her analysis as situating the category ‘Muslim’ as a spectrum that includes a wide range of people practising Islam in different
ways. The figure or category of terrorist is neatly inserted at one end of the category spectrum. Through that incorporation, it becomes possible to ‘slide’ all Muslims closer to that figure or end of the spectrum. Manal’s short dress, the cross, or the ‘Mondial’ haircut were then all ways of dressing or re-inscribing the body to dissuade the idea the body is that of a Middle Eastern or Muslim subject let alone one that border guards or airline staff may perceive as a terrorist.

**Speech as a Give Away**

In the opening story, Khalid knowing English or having had previous experience travelling by aeroplane might have prepared him better for his attempt, speech and language ability are part of passing. In attempting via this route, refugees faced two dilemmas that they might not know English and their lack of experience travelling through airports might reveal them even after they boarded the plane. Performing an identity may fail where the subject was unable to back up the performance with linguistic competence or knowledge of travel cues. Kyrgyz migrants in Moscow explained to Reeves (2013) that many times it is the newly arrived “whose feet give them away”. The newcomers walk and look around differently as they are still figuring their way around the city, so they are stopped more often by police. Goffman (1956, 20) comments on presentation requiring the subjects demonstrate the effortlessness of their performance by the speed of their action or words. In this context, to hesitate was to indicate doubt or thought which undermined their claim to their right to be there. Some refugees were caught due to their inability to communicate using the language of the passport they were moving on or alternately English. Rezan practised with Manal the only line he said she would have to use, ‘no baggage’ for when she

---

208 The formulation of the combination Muslim-terrorist is a formulation of a constellation of processes and events. The term terrorist has been attached or used in other contexts and attached to other identities e.g. the Irish Republican Army or Hindu extremist groups in India. The issue or problematic becomes the inherence of the terms association with the term Islam rather than situating its historical construction.
engaged with the airline staff at the check-in desk. He believed she would be able to remain silent after that. Manal luckily passed without having to speak, but passengers were called on at other stages to talk.

Travel cues is another barrier that refugees might face despite smuggler preparing them ahead of time. Relying on archival case studies, Hobbs (2014) shows that many racially ambiguous slaves were able to pass as free and escape their masters in part due to their ability to speak “like gentlemen/ women” or write. Being able to speak like white middle-class people, and knowing the cues while travelling, made their attempts succeed. In this case, it is not only physical changes or figuring out how to comport oneself to perform being western, but also being able to perform minimum linguistic competence. Refugees are not certain until they pass the boarding gate that they have succeeded. Even then as Khalid’s story showed, refugees might be discovered after they board the flight.

**Conclusion**

Passing has been explored in a multitude of contexts and analysed with different lenses whether with a focus on gender, race, religion or class. By examining the ways Syrian refugees pass through Ataturk airport, I examined the intersection of airport securitization, identity securitization and the airport space as processes which Syrian refugees subvert in their passing. Syrian refugees pass on European look-alike passports by performing being persons with the right to move. The performance while dependent on their gestures, knowledge of airport cues, and perhaps linguistic abilities was overshadowed by the physical changes they underwent to match the passport photographs and perform their idea of certain ‘European’ nationals or a version of being ‘white’. Faced with perceived racialization as Muslim or at least as Middle Eastern, Syrian refugees
travelling this route not only altered the appearance but some chose to adopt Christian or secular symbols for their pass to succeed.

In Chapter 1, I mentioned a criticism made to me about European states treating Syrians as terrorists. The practices discussed in this chapter touch on this issue of being classified as a terrorist. The research explored in the chapter shows the while all passengers are for the most part suspect, certain bodies and persons are always subject to greater scrutiny due to their apparent Muslim background and place of origin. In performing to pass, Syrian refugees perform their right to move, but ultimately they are enacting their right to demand the right to protection due to them as refugees.
Conclusion

“… In addition to reminding us that we must feel humiliation. And the nafr hates that feeling above anything else. I mean he crosses the sea and five countries, smuggled, and he is taking a selfie with the victory sign. This victory sign even bothered some European journalists. As in why are these people raising the victory sign. On what basis are they using this sign. It means they must be liars. They have not fled from war, and they have smartphones as evidence of their wealth. They do not know that smart mobile phones are part of the nafr’s toolkit, and they cannot appreciate the nafr’s relationship to his smartphone… they only pay attention to the material aspect of the issue. That the mobile is expensive and the nafr is poor. And they start making accusations,” Lukman Derky Coming to you in the Bilim… Without an Agreement (April 19, 2016)

The thesis explores Syrian refugees’ migrations and the uncertainty they faced in Istanbul as they prepared for their journeys to Europe. Several historical circumstances distinguish this movement. While Syrian migration to Istanbul or Europe had taken place before, the post-2011 migrations are connected to the revolution in Syria, the protracted nature of the conflict in Syria, Turkey’s position bordering the EU and the governing party in Turkey ‘welcoming’ Syrian refugees. Throughout the thesis, I sought to foreground questions about the right to move by discussing the marked absence of this right from the ways the majority of Syrian refugees moved. The thesis has focused on how Syrian refugees crossed the borders to Europe by exploring the relations with state actors, smugglers and fellow refugees who influenced their migration. In the various processes and relations discussed in the thesis, what remains constant throughout is the underlying desire of refugees to actualise their migratory projects. The migration is their way of achieving a life worth living regardless of how different individuals may define such a life.

In the introduction, I posed a series of questions about why border crossing was and remains a topic of research and interest. I argue that Syrian refugees’ preparations to cross the border and their waits in Istanbul influence their subjectivities. Refugee migratory energy and the controls

209 My translation.
enacted upon them are examples of ongoing relations of subordination and re-subordination (cf. De Genova 2010). The perseverance of refugees’ desires to move is an effect of and response to the global inequality that calls on refugees to remain in place or wait at a distance. In crossing the border to Europe, Syrian refugees engaged in an act of resistance demanding the right to refuge and protection (cf. Sanchez 2015, 5). The protection and refuge they demanded were not contingent on the agenda of a particular government nor did the protection have an ambiguous temporal horizon as in the case of Turkey’s temporary protection. The demand for protection and rights is part of the tension that runs throughout the thesis, that while ‘safe’ in Turkey, Syrian refugees choose to move on to demand the possibility of a different life and future. In the process, the thesis highlights the ways refugees’ waits to move are representative of an underlying wait for the right to have rights (Arendt 1951/1973). Migrating was then an act to gain “not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action” (Arendt 1951/1973,296).

I began the conclusion with the excerpt from Lukman Derky (2016) for many reasons. His comment highlights some of the issues relating to the right to move and crossing borders. At first glance, his remarks draw attention to the ways this migration to Europe is an action or space for generating humour, satire and recognition of resistance beyond discourses of ‘crisis’ (cf. Tazzioli &De Genova 2016). ‘Nafr’, ‘bilim’,210 and muharb are rising figures, or objects in the case of bilims, in a growing Syrian “culture of migration” (cf. Khosravi 2010,14). ‘Nafr’ then becomes a mark of this time and situation. The post-revolution passengers are international figures found at the borders of Europe, affected by state border practices, but who continue to arrive, “without an agreement” (Derky 2016). Derky’s comment about the victory sign is not to dissuade us that many Syrian refugees suffered humiliations as they crossed borders. As I explain in more detail in a

---

210 An Arabized term for the dinghy boats refugees used to cross from Turkey to one of the Greek islands.
subsequent section, posing with the victory sign comes to insist that there remains something to be proud of, a rebellious action to celebrate; a demand articulated in spite of the regime in Syria, the denial of refugee status, and the loss of home.

**Uncertainty and Social Relations**

Times of crisis or insecurity foreground the ties and relations that individuals depend and draw on for support. Relationships developed on the move pose a particular concern as they are based neither on shared long-term ties nor fictive or real kinship ties. The overlap of a situation of uncertainty and mobility increases the impetus to examine the relations formed. Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013) argue that the relations are part of mobile commons accessible to all migrants, while Simone (2004) explores the temporary and strategic relations activated across national and ethnic lines. In this research, I sought to examine how refugees form relations while on the move or preparing to move, and how their prejudices emerge or are altered given the uncertainty of the situation. My research shows how social boundaries may be realigned or shifted due to the circumstances - as discussed in Malik’s relations with Basel and his family, where he acted differently to social distinctions he had previously made, or Mona and Hussam’s engagement with Adam, Majed, and Hani, which highlighted social boundaries (Chapter 5).

These relations were productive of an ethics of moving. Refugees, while speaking about everyday (ethical) actions they did while moving, also highlighted the ethical engagements as sites of tension and conflict. I suggest that these ethical actions cannot be described as social or communal obligation. These actions emerge as decisive acts that demonstrate the ways human life is valued. Acting ethically as Jackson (2013) mentions is not always easy, and it is the space between what individuals believe they should do and their actions that must be explored. Approaching ethical actions as a site of tension is a means of countering the reduction of ethics to
prescribed codes (Jackson 2013,199). In Chapter 5, we saw how various interlocutors faced decisions to either help others or focus on their individual migratory projects. The decision to continue helping was always in process, and in many cases refugees withdrew their help to focus on their own migration. A discussion about changing social relations or the tension of helping builds on the possibility of refugees acting just as human beings to preserve human life. I argued that their actions were a means of confirming that humanity or humane action existed in situations of overwhelming uncertainty. It also represented interlocutors’ hope that where existential security had been taken away, it would be regained with their arrival in Europe. In crossing the border, refugees articulate not just a demand for protection or rights but embody a demand for a future where life is valued. While perhaps not every life is valued in Europe, interlocutors argued that their lives would still have more value in Europe than they did in Syria.

**Temporalizing the Border**

Forms of temporary protected status combined with border policies and practices to keep refugees out of Europe raise questions about protection. The protection owed to refugees fleeing conflict, in particular, is brought under fire as various forms of protection are developed in Turkey, European states and elsewhere which are contingent and temporary. The externalisation of the EU border is one aspect of these processes to keep refugees out. Turkey and other countries take on the role of maintaining the EU space by keeping refugees out of Europe, and in the case of Syrian refugees holding them in Turkey. My research shows how Turkish state actors sought to constitute Syrian refugees as people ‘in-place’ while subject to an ambiguous temporal horizon.

The EU-Turkey deal (effective March 18, 2016) affects not only refugees trying to cross the border to Europe but also Syrian refugees within Turkey. The deal introduced exclusions into Istanbul, as state actors restricted some Syrian refugees’ access to status and services. The
exclusions influence refugees even as they find ways to continue their lives, become part of communities, find jobs or access healthcare or education services. The exclusions relate to how and which Syrian refugees will be included as future citizens or under another form of permanent status (cf. Goldring & Landolt 2013; cf. Bailey et al. 2002). The formalisation of varying forms of temporary status renders protection, in the shape of long-term security, more elusive and conditional. It leads us back to questions of how lives are valued and which lives are valued as worthy of being included under conditions that make it a life worth living.

Without even discussing time, temporary protection offers no doubt of the temporal boundaries implied. The protection incorporates the wait for another status or form of protection or return as its fundamental aspects. Other than the ways Syrian refugees’ presence is formulated, institutionally as temporary is the ways Syrian refugees experience waits while in Istanbul. The thesis explored the effects of institutionalised temporariness on Syrian refugees’ relations with state actors, but focused in greater detail on Syrian refugees’ experiences as they organize their migrations to Europe. The research examined the ways a variety of actors impose waits on Syrian refugees. I approached those actors as an assemblage where their actions may not be coordinated or related but still affect refugees in similar ways. Assemblage was a way to conceptualize how making an acquaintance, changing smugglers, engaging with state actors, ending up in the detention centre affected interlocutors’ actions and lives. The various actors mentioned as part of this assemblage, made Syrian refugees wait for different things whether smuggling services or bureaucratic approval in the case of family reunification. At the same time, Syrian refugees themselves are part of the assemblage and it was necessary to highlight the instances interlocutors made others wait or chose to wait. The thesis draws on and contributes to a burgeoning literature focusing on the intersecting themes of waiting and migration.
By exploring waiting in relation to border crossing, I suggested that refugees’ time is a site of contention. State actors’ bordering practices had the effect of delaying interlocutors’ crossings rather than preventing them from migrating. The varying state practices are all components of migration management regimes that seek to externalise the EU border, keep migrants and refugees out of the EU space, and determine how they will be incorporated once and if they enter. For various authors, making refugees and migrants wait, delaying their movement, relate to wider processes of regulating refugee movement based on labour market needs (cf. Mezzadra & Neilson 2013; Andrijasevic 2010; Papadopoulos et al. 2008). But the imposed waits not only relate to using migrant and refugee labour energy effectively in the service of capital. As I argued, waiting is, unintentionally at times, productive of particular subjectivities, subjects who expect to wait. The waits in Istanbul prepare refugees for the future waits they will experience once in Europe. Refugees contend with interrupted journeys until they reach their destinations due to smugglers imposing waits in Istanbul, the failure of an attempt, and the general fragmentary nature of their onward migration once across the border in Greece or Bulgaria. But once they arrive, they also have to undergo internment in processing centres, waits for asylum application procedures and family reunification processes. As we saw in Chapter 3, Amira and her family dealt with several waits between Kenan’s attempts to cross the border and subsequent waits for bureaucratic processes after he arrived in Germany. Moreover, as some Syrian refugees found, even after they arrived at their destination in Europe, they were only granted temporary protection which may or may not be renewed at a later time dependent on the situation in Syria. While different European states grant different forms of protection to asylum seekers depending on the various factors, granting some Syrian refugees subsidiary protection in Europe sets them up for further and future waits when they appeal their status or wait for a new status that enables them to apply for family reunification.
While not the direct focus of the thesis, these waits evoke questions of racial boundaries and internal borders, which have been explored elsewhere in depth (cf. De Genova 2005; cf. Mezzadra & Neilson 2013). The waits raise the question of when, if ever, these refugees will be considered to belong (beyond citizenship) in the countries where they arrived. Mezzadra and Neilson (2013,155), discussing internal borders, quote a young French writer from the Parisian banlieue commenting on integration and the predicament of continued ‘othering’. Mezzadra and Neilson (2013,155) explain that Djouder (2006,89-91) denigrates the discourse of integration asked of him and others, as the children, grandchildren or even great-grandchildren of migrants and refugees who came to France. “The question of how long a migrant remains migrant- which is to say of how long the migrant remains an object of difference and hence a target of integration – is intimately related to the question of temporal borders” (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013,155). Waiting, then, is not just a matter of modulating the availability of labour for markets or regulating migration into the EU, but lies at the heart of the crisis of contemporary “democratic” societies. Here I draw on Bonnie Honig’s (2001) formulation that democracy is the acceptance of ‘others’ without demanding they become like the society they are joining. Then the waits implied and othering across generations comes to symbolise a crisis in democracy. Thus, the waits presented in the thesis, while focused on refugees’ experiences in Istanbul, have ramifications beyond Istanbul. These waits are connected to broader questions about the conditions under which refugees, and their descendants, remain and will be present once they arrive at their destination.

Passing, Race and Protection

Different actors performed various roles and enacted statuses and identities throughout the thesis. Syrian refugees pass as Palestinian in the detention centre in Edirne, the Turkish state performs as a host, smugglers perform as mobility experts or pass as God-fearing. Beyond these strategic
performances and acts of passing, is the way passing takes us back to questions of exclusion and inclusion. The questions direct us to the racialisation not only of Syrian Muslims but of ‘refugees’.

In the processes of producing and reproducing the categories of migrant and refugee, these types emerge as having set or particular qualities (cf. Malkki 1995; cf. Khosravi 2010; cf. De Genova 2005). As Derky’s (2016) opening comment highlights, since Syrian refugees used smartphones during the migrations, then they must be wealthy. Derky’s (2016) remark identifies key markers of this movement: the middle-class status of many of those crossing, but equally, European assumptions about refugee-ness, war and what it means to flee. He demonstrates the ways Syrian refugees move beyond the category limits, and explains it as incomprehensible to those who have not, due to their privilege as EU citizens, had to cross borders in this way. Equally, in his comment that nafrs hate to feel humiliated, he articulated refugees’ refusal to perform according to expected categories. Refugees, while at times performing the categories of refugee as expected, predominantly reformulate these categories in their performances, demands, and border crossings (cf. De Genova 2009; cf. Garelli & Tazzioli 2013). At the same time, refugees’ border practices and efforts to reach Europe to seek asylum and protection situate the continued importance of the asylum system. The question then becomes, how will Syrian refugees’ relationships with the asylum system and their position as refugees in Europe change with time and their longer-term presence? While the data presented in the thesis does not help us to answer this question, it can aid us in formulating these questions in sensitive ways that account for the nuances of this migratory experience and the current global circumstances.

Passing is not only a means of interrogating these categories but raises other questions about grounds for exclusion. Passing’s potential as an action to overcome certain boundaries presents it as an avenue to pose questions about exclusion and inclusion. These issues were and remain significant as we witness the ongoing reconfigurations of global inequalities. The recent USA
government attempt to ban the entry of people from certain predominantly Muslim countries, even if they have citizenship in another so-called ‘friendly’ state, institutes new boundaries and rearranges borders. The rearrangements, while justified under the catch phrase of the fight against terrorism, focus on Muslim subjects, drawing the border and presenting threat in the now familiar pattern adopted since the events of September 11. Regardless of the opposition to the entry ban imposed in the USA, it alters the perennial question of who is free to move to acknowledge that it is/was always a question of who is authorised to move and under what conditions. The question of under what conditions people move, especially people fleeing a situation of persecution, is a key driving issue explored in the thesis.

The EU on the other hand while avoiding openly announcing the racial imperatives of its bordering processes has in the EU-Turkey deal found a means to reconfigure Europe’s borders (cf. Tazzioli & De Genova 2016). The deal came following the 2015 mass migration into and through various European states. The migration shifted EU borders, in effect bringing European “institutions” into crisis, rather than it being a migrant or refugee crisis (cf. Tazzioli & De Genova 2016, 3). The EU-Turkey deal renders Turkey a safe country to which refused asylum seekers and migrants can be deported. It establishes the externalisation of the border formally and rearranges the ways refugees can demand protection in the EU. In return for accepting deported refugees, Turkish citizens will be granted freedom of movement within the EU space, a still anticipated event. The deal situates refugees as bargaining chips, appropriating their statelessness and insubordinate migratory energy for political manoeuvres. It unintentionally demonstrates the power of this defiant energy, and the EU response serves a blow to future refugees who will be forced to find new routes and other ways to arrive. By exploring the ways Syrian refugees crossed the borders to Europe, this thesis has examined Syrian refugee migratory energy at one of its points of mobilisation. I argue that in the face of shifting border controls and exclusions preventing refugees
from demanding the protection they desire, Syrian refugees’ mobility emerges as an insurmountable energy not only in the face of border controls but also the war and violence that has taken from them. As shown in the thesis, Syrian refugees repeatedly tried to cross the border despite Turkish state actors’ measures to deter and contain their mobility. Others endured the waits smugglers imposed or took action to end their waits and cross the border. Beyond the border crossings were people like Amira, who struggled to get all the documents necessary for the family reunification application process. Others, also like Amira, sent their adult children to Europe, countering regulations that exclude those children from being included in family reunification processes, in an effort to keep the family together.

The research, while focused on refugees’ preparations to move, raises questions about how borders are being reformulated and continue to be reconfigured. It brings to the forefront the ways citizenship and asylum are being reorganised in Europe and Turkey. This reorganisation makes it possible to ask how the migratory energy will affect changes and realignments in EU states’ bordering politics. The EU-Turkey deal is but one response, and others will follow. Beyond Europe, Turkish society is changing due to Syrian refugees’ visible, state-approved presence. The presence has opened avenues for Turkish engagement with Syrian refugees at a scale that was inconceivable otherwise, although not all the engagement is positive (cf. Gürhanli 2014; cf. Demir 2016; Chemin 2016). And yet for those making a life among their Turkish neighbours, school friends, or fellow labourers, the future temporal horizons outlined by state actors and policies are of paramount importance. At the same time, the conflict in Syria continues despite different settlements and ceasefires, and for many who have fled, these measures will not make Syria a safe place to return to as the settlements legitimise their exclusion and exile. The thesis is thus a launch point to pose familiar, and perhaps old, questions about exile, migration, conditional presence, bordering and citizenship. While familiar questions, they are being raised under more precarious circumstances,
amid heightened fear about terrorism in Europe and the USA rearranging its borders. The answers may demonstrate shifts in bordering processes or the development of new processes that are not, or cannot be, forecasted at present. However, in light of the processes discussed in the thesis, I would suggest that the changes to border practices and asylum processes will incorporate more conditionality and nuanced exclusions.

**Future Works**

Following the EU-Turkey deal and Turkey’s declared role protecting the EU border, it is possible to ask how and if refugees’ border crossing practices have changed. In addition, Syrian migratory culture has expanded since the time of the fieldwork as was seen in the migration in 2015. A comparison between the practices included in this thesis and more current practices would be a way to explore the variation in the relations formed, the ways refugees deal with smugglers, and how they formulate their knowledge of Europe and border crossing.

Another approach to the processes discussed in the thesis would be to compare them to other places within Turkey such as Izmir (or elsewhere along the southwestern Turkish coast) or Edirne (cf. İkizoğlu & Kash 2016). As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Istanbul has a long history as an economic and migratory hub. Izmir and Edirne are better known for their close geographical proximity to the border with Europe than their economic possibilities. A comparison of these different sites would generate other data about the ways migratory processes enacted in Istanbul are replicated in these areas or enacted differently. Such a comparison would offer a broader perspective of the diverse migratory practices and trends enacted across Turkey.

Another question based on observations from the fieldwork would be to examine changing Syrian relations in exile. It is possible to explore Syrian refugees’ relations with each other rather than with their Turkish hosts as I have touched upon already, with regards to refugees’ changing
and tense relations with each other. Such a research project would help to counter monolithic accounts of Syrian refugees and would address the ways migration and presence in Turkey have affected social relations and networks. Such a research project would contribute to the existent literature about Syria and would open new avenues by examining Syrian cross-regional relations made possible by the migration, rather than focusing on relations in particular places, as much ethnographic research about Syria has done (cf. Salamandra 2004; Rabo 1986, 2005).

The suggested future research draws impetus from my ethnographic endeavours, using my findings as a launch point to other ethnographic inquiries. My thesis has sought to engage with diverse anthropological studies concerned with the anthropology of migration, borders and waiting. This thesis is influenced by many diverse ethnographic texts including, but not limited to, De Genova’s (2005, 2010) work on migration, race, and deportability; Papadopoulos and his co-authors’ (2008) seminal text on autonomy of migration and migratory regimes; Jackson (2013), who writes about migration and striving for a life worth living; Hage’s (2009) edited volume on waiting; and Andersson’s (2014) discussion of the migration industry and border crossing in West Africa and Spain. The thesis draws on these and other writers to focus on a site where multiple actors’ interests overlap and intersect: from Syrian refugees seeking to move to Europe; to Turkey performing its role guarding the border to Europe while balancing its regional ambitions; to the EU striving to limit the protection it offers refugees and determine how to incorporate those arriving. The fieldwork incorporates all these changing and conflicting relations in a bid to understand migratory processes, how waiting is incorporated to affect and alter refugee subjectivities, and to highlight the continual shifts in bordering and border practices.
Appendix I

Map (1): Turkey, Greece and Syria (OpenStreetMap contributors 2016)
Map (2): Syria and Turkey (OpenStreetMap contributors 2016)
Map (3): Turkish, Greek, and Bulgarian border region
(OpenStreetMap contributors 2016)
Map (4): Aksaray, Istanbul (OpenStreetMap contributors 2016)
Appendix II

A note on language and style:

In the case of both research sites, the interviews were conducted in Arabic, as most of the Kurdish interlocutors I engaged with spoke Arabic. I used a tape recorder in some cases, but it was not always appropriate. I usually wrote my notes once I returned home at the end of the day. I wrote the field notes in English for the most part, but where interlocutors phrased something in a compelling manner, I wrote it in Arabic. I wrote the notes of conversations in keeping with the ways things were said in Arabic. Therefore, in some places in the chapters, the phrasing of a sentence in a quote from an interlocutor may appear strange or contain grammatical errors. Interlocutors were speaking vernacular rather than formal Arabic so certain words alter as a result. I tried to highlight in certain places how a sentence was said in Arabic as the phrasing was significant and in others, I focused more on what was conveyed (cf. Cruikshank 1998).

It is necessary to note that in some cases I provide a detailed biographical portrayal of an interlocutor in other situations such detail is sparse. The varying presentation of detail partially reflects my short or longer term engagement with different interlocutors. It ultimately reflects how some refugees passed through Istanbul leaving minimal traces of their passing. In addition, I use the term interlocutor in the thesis as the Arabic term informant mukhbir is used to refer to state security and intelligence informants. I chose to avoid the term due to the negative associations.
References


Ahmed, Sara. 1999. "'She'll Wake Up One of These Days and Find She's Turned into a Nigger' Passing through Hybridity." *Theory, Culture & Society* 16 (2):87-106.


Duke University Press.


Chalcraft, John T. 2009. The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford General.


----------, Elena Fontanari, Fiorenza Picozza, Laia Soto Bermant, Aila Spathopoulou, Maurice


Derky, Lukman. 06 June 2015. “Kil Nafr biqoul ilimuharb: wa’Allah ana irtihtilak... W baadi fi 10…. Bas zabiti alsaer [Every nafır says to the smuggler: By God, I feel comfortable with you… and there are ten more coming after me… just fix the price for me].” Facebook. Accessed 06 June 2015, <https://www.facebook.com/lukman.derky>

-------- 09 April 2016. "Bi el-bilim Jayikum... Bila Itifakiyet [In the Bilim Coming to You... Without an Agreement]." *Adar Press*. Accessed 29 November 2016, <http://www.adapress.net/2016/04/19/%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8% D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A8% D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7% D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9/>


310


Goldring, Luin, and Patricia Landolt. 2013. "The Conditionality of Legal Status and Rights:


Gürhanlı, Halil. 2014. The Syrian Refugees in Turkey Remain at the Mercy of the Turkish Government. The Turkey Analyst 7 (23).


----------. 2009b. "Waiting Out the Crisis: On Stuckedness and Governmentality." In Waiting,


---------, and Deniz Yükseker. 2010. "Rethinking transit migration in Turkey: reality and representation in the creation of a migratory phenomenon." *Population, Space and Place.*


Karabayali, Serhat, and Enrica Rigo. 2010. "Mapping the European space of circulation." In The
Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement, edited by
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
----------. 2012. "White masks/Muslim names: Immigrants and Name-Changing in Sweden."
Refugees in Istanbul." New Perspectives on Turkey 54:77-95.
Kirişci, Kemal. 2012. "Turkey’s New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It?" In Turkey,
Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Seçil Paçacı
----------. 2014. Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality.
La Fontaine, J. S. 2004. The Interpretation of Ritual: Essays in Honour of A.I. Richards. London:
Routledge.
Lambek, Michael. 2010. "Introduction." In Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language, and
London.
Law on Foreigners and International Protection Numbered 6458, 04.04.2013. The Official


Cresswell and Peter Merriman, 255-269. Farnham: Ashgate.


Paasi, Anssi. 2011. "A Border Theory: An Unattainable Dream or a Realistic Aim for Border


The Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime.


International Political Sociology 1:49-66.

Schmidt, Khalid. 2013. "Almanya Taarud Istikbal 5000 Laj'e Souriy[Germany Proposes to Welcome 5000 Syrian Refugees]." Aljazeera. Accessed 10 February 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2013/4/10/%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%8450000%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A>
--------- . 2006. “White Nationalism, Illegality and Imperialism: Border Controls as Ideology” In


Tazzioli, Martina, and Nicholas De Genova. 2016. Europe/Crisis: Introducing New Keywords of "The Crisis" In And Of "Europe". Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of "the Crisis" in and of "Europe": 2-7.


<http://www.multeci.org.tr/haberdetay.aspx?Id=60>
