Taiwan’s Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Policy:
A Case Study Focusing on Performing Arts (1990-2014)

by
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Declaration of Authorship

I, Chun-Ying Wei, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: ________________________________ Date: 05 October 2017
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Abstract

This thesis examines the implementation of cultural diplomacy through the perspective of cultural policy in Taiwan (Republic of China). It elaborates how the policy-making and practice have progressed in response to the changes of Taiwan’s domestic cultural politics and foreign affairs, including its relations with China (People’s Republic of China). As an empirical study, the research focuses on Taiwan’s cultural policy in the timeframe of 1990-2014 and more specifically on the promotion of the performing arts.

The research identifies three crucial elements of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. It complements traditional diplomacy, acts as an outlet in the process of cultural identity formation, and showcases cultural and creative industries. Each element is prioritised at different phases of policy practice. However, a long-term and continuous strategy is absent. The research reveals that Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy emphasises more on its self-presentation than creating mutuality. The unsettled issues of cultural identity have its profound influence on cultural diplomacy.

Meanwhile, the projection of soft power is not necessarily reinforced by the market-driven policy orientation and the quantifiable policy objectives. The research also illustrates the interaction among the government, artists, and other actors from the private sector. The key finding indicates that the government is constrained by bureaucracy and its own contested political status. Civil society at the individual level participates in cultural diplomacy with a sense of enthusiasm, while corporations in general are less motivated.

The research provides empirical evidence on communicating soft power through cultural diplomacy without much hard power. In this case, the promotion of soft power is limited and does not necessarily compensate for the deficiency of hard power.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Asian Cultural Council</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Council for Cultural Affairs</td>
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<td>CCI</td>
<td>Cultural and Creative Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
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<td>GIO</td>
<td>Government Information Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHICC</td>
<td>Kwang Hwa Information and Culture Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
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<td>MOEA</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCAF</td>
<td>National Culture and Arts Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPAC</td>
<td>National Performing Arts Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTCH</td>
<td>National Theater and Concert Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China (Taiwan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAAC</td>
<td>Taiwanese American Arts Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBFF</td>
<td>Taipei Book Fair Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECO</td>
<td>Taipei Economic and Cultural Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Taiwan New Cinema</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRO</td>
<td>Taipei Representative Office</td>
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**Translation of Chinese names:**

For the names of Taiwanese Government Institution, cultural organisations, and individuals referred in this thesis, I follow their preferred English names used in public when they are mentioned in the text. The accuracy is reached at my best effort.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Research topic

This thesis explores how in Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) the spheres of cultural diplomacy and cultural policy are linked in the pursuit of an international presence for the country. It investigates the external promotion of Taiwanese culture since the 1990s with a focus on the performing arts. The work is theoretically situated in the fields of enquiry of public and cultural diplomacy and also makes use of Joseph Nye’s (2004) concept of soft power, whilst remaining critical of it. The recognition of the importance of culture in international relations predates the popularisation of the soft power concept, which includes culture as one of its sources, and has intensified with the growing importance of public diplomacy as part of the foreign policy toolkit of many countries. As Mitchell (1986) indicated, culture is an expression of national identity and, therefore, a factor in international affairs. No external cultural policy is conceivable without recourse to the products of internal cultural policy (ibid.). In other words, culture can be representative of a country in its global presence as an expression of national identity and cannot be separated from internal cultural policy. Through relevant programmes and activities, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations can facilitate conventional diplomacy and serve as a vehicle for international understanding.

While cultural diplomacy gains recognition in a country’s foreign affairs, its connection to cultural policy is also worth investigation. As noted by Figueira (forthcoming), cultural diplomacy is often understood as the use of culture by governments to achieve their foreign policy goals and a prime activity for achieving ‘soft power’ as a relational outcome. In this thesis, the connection between foreign and cultural policies is examined through the case of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.

The research adopts a two-dimensional approach, specifically focusing on public policy areas pertaining to cultural diplomacy. While one strand analyses policy formation, the other stresses its implementation. In terms of the Taiwanese government’s policies, this thesis looks at major transitions of discourses of cultural policies. In what concerns the practice of cultural policy and cultural diplomacy, the research focuses on its operation in the Ministry of Culture (MOC, formerly Council for Cultural Affairs, CCA) in Taiwan, as the main government department in charge of cultural policy and relevant affairs of cultural diplomacy, including the budget and policy implementation. The analysis of this governmental department considers the ways in which the authorities attempt to achieve their mission, especially through the development of policy plans, their implementation and evaluation.
From the different perspectives of Taiwanese cultural diplomacy, the promotion of the performing arts and artistic companies’ engagement was selected as the main strand for investigation in this thesis. This was chosen because the author identified clear and continuous governmental support of performing arts within the remit of cultural diplomacy programmes since the 1990s. In the case explored in this thesis, the justification of subsidies for artistic companies’ overseas tours is connected to rationales that clearly indicate a link between cultural policy and cultural diplomacy and between the internal and external public policy environments. The government’s support has been particularly visible after it set up grant schemes such as the Scheme to Foster International Performing Groups and the activities ensuing from the establishment of overseas cultural centres, both taking place in and after 1991. The influences of foreign policy and trade strategy are also included as contextual information.

The bilateral relation between Taiwan and China (the People’s Republic of China, PRC) provides a crucial context for the analysis of Taiwan’s cultural policy and cultural diplomacy. Despite disputes over sovereignty, the countries’ historical links and contemporary interactions are defining elements for Taiwan, both in the way it can establish relations and operate in the international sphere and set policy objectives internally. In fact, Taiwan is a political entity of contested sovereign status, with which few states maintain formal diplomatic relations. It is a country excluded from membership of the United Nations since 1971, while maintaining formal diplomatic relationship with a mere 20 countries (as of June 2017) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). At internal level, the concern with the development of a distinguishable Taiwanese cultural identity has been an important policy that connects intrinsically with the process of nation building. Both externally and internally, China has a major impact on Taiwan at various levels, including those of cultural policy and cultural diplomacy.

Fundamentally, the research aims to address the following question: how do Taiwan’s (the Republic of China) cultural diplomacy and cultural policy operate to fulfil the political objective of making the country internationally visible through policy implementation? Additional questions are developed to capture complementary aspects. First, why is cultural diplomacy considered important in Taiwan’s foreign affairs? Secondly, how do cultural diplomacy and cultural policy link in Taiwan? Thirdly, what are the crucial challenges faced by the government when implementing cultural diplomacy? And what are the potential solutions? Finally, does the existing policy practice serve the intended policy objectives?
This research is a longitudinal case study on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy through the analysis of government-supported programmes, particularly the examples of performing arts. The case study method enables detailed examination of how the government develops its aims and objectives leading to the formulation of policies and implementation strategies. It is also considered Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy that correlates to its particular international status. The empirical data for this study were collected through qualitative methods from multiple sources of evidence that reflect the changes in Taiwan’s cultural policy.

The thesis addresses the period 1990 to 2014. As the main theme of analysis is cultural diplomacy in relation to cultural policy, this research started by investigating relevant policy initiatives of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA). The CCA was established in 1981 and was responsible for ‘cultural affairs’, which included cultural heritage, literature, cultural citizenship, cultural exchange and visual and performing arts. The government division responsible for cultural exchange was then set up in the CCA (now the Department of Cultural Exchanges in MOC). The establishment of the CCA in Taiwan in 1981 marked the beginning of centralised policymaking for cultural affairs at the ministry-level in the Executive Yuan, the central government executive branch, in Taiwan. Before the CCA was established in 1981, the administration and cultural policies and cultural diplomacy had transitioned through several departments, and some of them ceased to exist. These departments included the Ministry of Education (MOE), Government Information Office (GIO, 1947-2012), Bureau of Cultural Affairs (under the MOE, 1967-1973) and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement Committee (established in 1966); none of them was in charge of the formulation of cultural policies. The so-called cultural policy was under the control of Kuomintang (KMT) (Hsia, Ling, & Chen, 2012). However, during the administration of Chen Chi-lu (1981-1988), the first Chairperson of the CCA, no concrete orientation on cultural policy was proposed (C.-y. Su, 2001). The framework of a cultural diplomacy strategy started to be realised following the first National Cultural Conference (Quanguowenhua huiyi) in 1990, and the opening of two cultural centres in 1991 and 1994. Related policies prior to the establishment of the CCA are also covered for contextual background. Although some earlier research considered the Bureau of Cultural Affairs in the Ministry of Education as the first government institution responsible for nationwide cultural affairs (Rau, 2008), this unit only served for six years and was not at the ministry level. These transitions and discontinuations of policy also increased the inaccessibility of information and difficulties for data collection, which I discuss in Chapter 3.
The course of this research (2010-2015) coincided with some important transitions of government institutions responsible for cultural diplomacy in Taiwan. In 2010, the government launched a series of projects to expand its cultural network, such as the establishment of the new cultural institute, the Taiwan Academies. This study examines the framing of these activities in relation to the changes in Taiwan’s foreign policy, and whether its implementation delivers the policy objectives. Furthermore, it is investigated how policies on the development of cultural and creative industries in Taiwan influence the development of cultural diplomacy; this is discussed in Chapter 5. In 2012, the CCA was upgraded to the MOC, and combined with some departments of the former Government Information Office (GIO). The influence of reorganisation and upgrade of the CCA and its impact on cultural diplomacy practice, including the expansion of overseas cultural outposts and integration between government departments, are also discussed in this thesis. The data collection concluded in 2014 and incorporated the policy plan proposed by the first Minister of Culture, Lung Ying-tai, despite the fact she stepped down prematurely in that year. In 2016, Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen from the DPP as its first female president. Further developments on cultural diplomacy in Tsai’s administration are not included in this research.

As the scope of this research primarily considers the cultural affairs of Taiwan, the analysis focuses on the policy implementation of CCA and MOC. Relevant policies in other government ministries, such as educational programmes in the Ministry of Education, are also part of cultural diplomacy. The support of Taiwan studies and academic exchange are also part of the cultural diplomacy activities that the Taiwanese government promotes internationally under the MOE, but are not the main focus of this research. However, significant cases of Taiwan’s educational exchange, such as those involving Mainland Chinese students, are included as part of the cross-Strait relations in the research findings in Chapter 4.

In addition to the political action of government officials, another strand of analysis explored in this thesis is the private actors’ motivation to engage in cultural diplomacy, especially in relation to identity building. For this purpose, the research also explores the parallel processes of nation building and nation branding affecting the construction and projection of a positive image of Taiwan (by means of the implementation of cultural diplomacy). In this thesis, I argue that the process of promoting an international image is crucial for cultural identity building and shaping in Taiwan. However, it is also essential to question what image is being portrayed and who decides and engages in this process. Relevant policies encouraging various participants to engage in cultural diplomacy,
especially artists and corporations, are explored. The rich experience of the performing arts companies’ is particularly analysed. The notion of ‘make Taiwan visible’ is evident in the advertisements of private actors (Chapter 6). I am particularly interested in examining their motivation and attitude in participating in cultural diplomacy, and analysing the challenges they face from the perspective of arts administration. The relations between government and private actors, including artists, non-government organisations, corporate sponsors and philanthropists, are discussed. In this context, I also explore how government policy influences these actors’ motivations and contributions to cultural diplomacy.

It is important to stress that this study places great importance on the dynamics between cultural diplomacy and cultural identity. This is visible when observing Taiwan building its own cultural identity as an imagined community, as Anderson (1991) illustrated. Through this process, cultural diplomacy represents a reiteration between ‘seeing oneself’ and ‘being seen.’ The research provides an insight into this process, which is ultimately viewed as helping to shape and strengthen Taiwan’s cultural identity and nationalism.

1.2 Main themes of analysis
This study examines Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy in a cultural policy framework, and explores three dimensions in detail. First, it is important to understand how Taiwan’s disadvantages in foreign affairs (i.e. the issue with international recognition of its political status) influence the discourse of cultural diplomacy. As it is difficult for Taiwan to maintain formal diplomatic relations with most countries, cultural activities provide opportunities for government to present the country to the international community. The research traces how changes in Taiwan’s foreign affairs have influenced cultural diplomacy. It also examines how the image of Taiwan has transformed from being part of the government’s informal diplomacy and propaganda to being incorporated within a structured promotion of cultural products overseas. This reflects the change in Taiwan’s cultural policy, which is examined in detail in the following chapters. The emphasis on the transition in Taiwan’s cultural policy is particularly important, as I subscribe to the theory that external cultural policy cannot be separated from internal cultural policy (Mitchell, 1986). Thus, this thesis belongs to the field of cultural policy research, as it is heavily influenced by the contextual considerations of the chosen case study. In Taiwan, the official ‘national culture’ and the cultural products selected are heavily correlated with changes in cultural policy, which I further discuss in Chapter 5.

Secondly, the research explores how Taiwan’s cultural identity has changed and how it correlates with the national image the government wishes to project as part of a nation
building process (Chang, 2006). The complexity of Taiwan’s cultural identity can be attributed to its history (Hsiau, 2012). These issues are not only the consequence of the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, but also long-term political disputes with China over regime legitimacy and territory since 1949. While China and Taiwan have highly similar cultures in terms of language, customs and values, the complicated historical background and political developments have resulted in controversies over the promotion of Taiwanese culture and its uniqueness. An analysis of the historical background is presented in Chapter 4. The cultural diplomacy strategy thus reflects heavily the issues underlying Taiwan’s bilateral affairs.

Thirdly, the bilateral relation with China plays a unique role in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Despite the complicated political issues mentioned above, Taiwan and China have close ties as regards trade, business and tourism. Through frequent communication at individual and organisational level, there are cultural exchanges through education and tourism. The similarity in language provides great benefits for, among others, trade in cultural products, and the relevant policies regarding the latter are also examined in this study to understand their impact. In addition to the bilateral relations, another issue addressed is the impact of China’s ambition to project ‘Chinese’ culture by setting up overseas cultural institutions, the Confucius Institutes, and Taiwan’s response to it.

Whereas these three aspects constitute the overall strategy of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, the actual practices include the structure of the government, the involvement of cultural organisations and the engagement of non-state actors. I investigate how external cultural policy has been positioned in overall policymaking, and how internal cultural policy influences the cultural diplomacy strategy. In this analysis, I include policy-makers, government officials and cultural professionals and practitioners, who actively participate in the cultural diplomacy projects. Within this strand of analysis, I consider the interaction between government and non-state actors, such as artists, non-government organisations and the private sector. This choice is based on observing private actors engaging enthusiastically in cultural diplomacy programmes. In addition, this discussion sheds light on how cultural identity formation and cultural diplomacy influence each other.

1.3 Literature review and theoretical framework
In this section, I briefly outline the theoretical framework of the study – which is further detailed in Chapter 2 – and explore the literature on the cultural diplomacy of Taiwan demonstrating need for the research.
In the field of public and cultural diplomacy, the concept of ‘soft power’ plays an important role in the discourses of political players and analysts. Taiwan is not immune to this trend. Considering Taiwan’s particular status internationally, examination of its use of soft power to create influence is particularly appealing. American scholar Joseph Nye (2004) originally coined the term ‘soft power’ to indicate the ability to ‘shape the preference of others’ and ‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want.’ Nye also identified that a country’s soft power rests on three elements: culture, political values and foreign policies. He emphasised that the use of soft power depends on the context, especially when converting the resources into behaviour power (ibid). In the case of Taiwan, I am interested in analysing how the concept of ‘soft power’ is used in government documents on cultural diplomacy, such as the vision of the Ministry of Culture. It is important to make sense of what Taiwan’s soft power actually means to the government, especially when culture is heavily emphasised. This is examined in detail in Chapter 5 when discussing policy implementation.

Whilst Nye (2004) focused on the foreign policy of the United States, other studies provide a regional perspective on East Asia (e.g. Lee & Melissen, 2011), or focus on bi-lateral relations, such as Japan-China (Vyas, 2011) and Taiwan-China (Y.-h. Chu, 2011; deLisle, 2010; Rawnsley, 2012; C. Su, 2009). However, there is limited research on how the idea of soft power is translated into policymaking and practice. Detailed analyses of China’s soft power, including its weaknesses, also provide background knowledge of Taiwan-China bilateral relations. This is the bigger picture of soft power in the region. As far as Taiwan’s soft power is concerned, Taiwanese scholar Yun-Han Chu (2011) provided a domestic perspective on the cross-Strait relationship with China. In addition, the studies of Chu (2011) and Rawnsley (2000) are helpful in understanding Taiwan’s soft power and international communication. However, the practical issues of cultural exchange between Taiwan and China were not discussed by Chu (2011). Rawnsley (2000) provided a detailed analysis of Taiwanese informal diplomacy and propaganda. Later, Rawnsley (2014) further explored Taiwan’s public diplomacy and soft power. I agree with some of his observations on Taiwan’s informal diplomacy, such as the advantages that unofficial organisations have over their official counterparts. While his research covered the GIO’s overseas activities, his research did not consider the work of the CCA. Further, in this research, I examine how ‘soft power’ is interpreted by the Taiwan government and realised in its cultural policy implementation to translate the idea of soft power into actual policy practice. This research develops another strand of Taiwan’s informal diplomacy and its relation to cultural policy.
In this research, I examine the implementation of cultural diplomacy from the perspective of cultural policy. Although Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, such as the establishment of the Taiwan Academies, is mentioned in the literature, the studies are mostly from the perspective of international relations and not from a cultural policy perspective. In order to explore further the link between cultural diplomacy and cultural policy and to determine how the concept of soft power was interpreted in Taiwan, I situate the present study in the research realm of cultural policy, which concerns, according to Schuster (2003) ‘the ways that the state assists, supports, or even hinders the cultural life of its citizens’; furthermore, ‘a state’s cultural policy can be usefully thought of as the sum of its activities with respect to the arts (including the for-profit cultural industries), the humanities, and the heritage’ (p. 1). This is a broad field of research, as I do not subscribe to the narrow definition of cultural policy as, for example, the administration of ‘the arts’ (McGuigan, 2004). Cultural policy in Taiwan has extended beyond the administration of arts and heritage, and it has evolved to include the development of cultural and creative industries, and the policy objectives of cultural diplomacy have reflected the developments.

Increasingly, a government’s external cultural policy cannot be separated from its internal cultural policy (Mitchell, 1986). However, the links between external cultural policy and internal cultural policy are commonly obscured by the formal division of power in government, as the former often falls into the competence of foreign ministries and the latter within a domestic remit governed by a ministry of culture or a similar department (ibid). When tracing the development of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, one can establish a clear connection with the promotion of performing arts and visual arts dating from the early days of the CCA. It was also the MOC (formerly CCA) that set up the division designated to deal with external cultural affairs instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I return to this topic in Chapter 5 to discuss how government structures influence the development of the idea of cultural diplomacy in Taiwan.

The representation of a particular national culture to other nations can be clearly an important aspect of cultural policy as well as of foreign policy, as Williams (1984/2014) observed. He related cultural exchange to cultural and foreign policies, and pointed to the benefit of ‘equal sharing’ of cultural experiences which all peoples need. Thus, in establishing the connection between cultural policy and cultural diplomacy, the present study focuses on the idea of soft power in government structures, how it has been institutionalised and how this rationale has influenced policymaking and implementation.
While stressing the links of cultural diplomacy and cultural policy, it is worth noting that the scope of cultural diplomacy is wider than the promotion of arts internationally. In this respect, the study does subscribe to a broad understanding of cultural diplomacy in line with the oft-cited definition by Cummings (2003) as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art, lifestyles, value systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding’ (p. 1). This definition includes various aspects of culture, regardless of its tangibility or forms of presentation. It also includes different actors in the process of cultural diplomacy, whether it is initiated by the state or the people. However, the terminology of ‘cultural diplomacy’ has multiple usages under different contexts and is hence difficult to define, as detailed in Chapter 2.

For the purpose of this study, it is also important to consider cultural diplomacy as part of public diplomacy, which Sharp (2005) defined as ‘the process by which direct relations are pursued with a country’s people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented’ (p. 106). Cultural diplomacy can have similar objectives, as the term was ‘used to refer to the processes when diplomats serving national governments took recourse to cultural exchanges and flows or sought to channel them for the advancement of their perceived national interests’ (Isar et al., 2014, p. 19). Although these terms may refer to comparable policy initiatives and cultural programmes, they differ depending on whether the cultural activities are undertaken with policy objectives or supported by the government, and whether reciprocity is established.

For the scope of this research, I use the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ to refer to government-supported policy initiatives. In the official cultural policy documents published in Chinese in Taiwan, the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ can be directly translated into wenhua (culture) waijiao (diplomacy). The term ‘cultural exchange’ (translated into wenhuajiaoliu) is also used while naming the department that is in charge of related cultural affairs in the MOC. ‘Cultural diplomacy’ and ‘cultural exchange’ are often used interchangeably in government documents.

It is worth noting that ‘cultural relations’ is seldom translated into Chinese and its literal meaning used in Taiwan. I would suggest that this is because of the multiple and complicated meaning of ‘relations’ (guanxi) in Chinese. However, as Mitchell (1986) pointed out, ‘cultural relations’ has a broad reference beyond the actions of governments and agencies. He also suggested that ‘cultural relations’ can be conducted on the initiative of either private or public institutions. In comparison, the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ is
essentially the business of governments. Therefore, in this research, I refer to the activities of cultural diplomacy carried out by the government and public cultural institutions through policy plans irrespective of the varied terms used in government documents.

Furthermore, when it comes to the cultural policies in China-Taiwan relations, ‘cultural exchange’ (wenhuajiaoliu) is used rather than cultural diplomacy. I argue that the choice of terminology reflects the sensitivity in bilateral relations. Whilst the ROC and PRC claim to be the legitimate representative of China and do not recognise each other’s sovereignty, it would be problematic to place the cultural exchange in the context of diplomacy. The term ‘exchange’ also downplays the authority and politics that may be implied in the term ‘diplomacy’, especially when the Taiwanese government supports various cultural exchange programmes between Taiwan and China. The use of ‘cultural exchange’ reflects the history and practice in which private foundations and actors are actively engaged and commissioned by the Taiwanese government in cross-Strait relations. In this research, I use ‘cultural relations’ as an umbrella term that also covers the communication that develops organically without government intervention in China-Taiwan relations. In addition, as the Taiwanese government seeks to project a positive image abroad and promote its brand, food and tourism, the concept of ‘place-branding’ can be identified in policy documents. Place branding and nation branding are also discussed in terms of government strategy and its weakness (section 5.7).

In addition, non-government actors can play a vital role in the process of cultural diplomacy. For instance, citizens can be considered stakeholders in their national brand, as they present a country’s values to the rest of the world (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2006). Besides professional diplomatic agents, diplomacy is also carried out through different channels (Berridge, 2010), which leads to considerable change. La Porte (2012) noted that the engagement of non-state actors in public diplomacy highlighted the importance of ‘legitimacy as factual support’ by the citizenry. A new understanding of ‘legitimacy’ means that political actors are required to gain support from the general public through transparency and dialogue. It is important to know how the non-government actors are motivated to participate in cultural diplomacy. How does the government maintain its relations with civil society organisations? I explore particularly whether there are challenges when engaging non-government actors in this process. The participation of arts organisations in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy has been significant. However, according to Nisbett (2015), there has been little exploration of the meaning of cultural diplomacy, particularly in reference to arts organisations, managers, artists and audiences. These actors might be able to present
Taiwanese culture in countries with which the government does not have much diplomatic relations. By presenting their work overseas, the artists can potentially have profound influence. In this research, I analyse what cultural diplomacy means to the Taiwanese arts companies and the challenges they have. From a policymaking perspective, I also discuss how the government can help to build their capacity. Relevant analysis is presented in Chapter 6.

1.4 Research contribution
This research offers a case study of cultural diplomacy and soft power. Soft power, despite the controversy surrounding it, is an important concept to understand and evaluate in relation to various issues examined in this dissertation. A review of the literature indicates that much soft power studies focus on global superpowers. However, Taiwan is an under-recognised country attempting to project its soft power through cultural diplomacy. It is significant that this thesis contributes to eliminate such a gap in knowledge and the development of cultural diplomacy studies focusing on less powerful actors in international relations. Thus, I seek to understand how Taiwan, which lacks powerful relations with international organisations and allies, constructs meaningful strategies of cultural diplomacy.

This thesis provides additional evidence of existing practices in the area of cultural diplomacy. Additionally, as primary data were collected from policymakers, cultural attachés and artists, the dissertation provides an insight into actual policy implementation and reflects the changes in Taiwan’s cultural policy. The strength of the case study method employed enables investigation of how government formulates policies and plans and delivers implementation (see Chapter 3 for the methodology and a detailed analysis of the advantages of case studies).

The empirical findings illustrate the implementation of cultural diplomacy initiatives. I examine the feasibility of the practice to fulfil policy objectives. Additionally, the study points out the limitations of policymaking and practice. In so doing, it identifies the problems and provides potential solutions from the government’s perspective. Furthermore, the findings could benefit future policymaking. The nature of cultural diplomacy research is trans-disciplinary, and the aim is to contribute to the theoretical framework of cultural policy studies and international relations. Finally, the point of departure of this thesis is my reflexive research interest in cultural identity and the promotion of arts overseas. Combined with my career in the National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) and the CCA, two important
institutions in Taiwan, it is my objective to find out whether cultural diplomacy is a feasible solution to promote Taiwan’s presence internationally.

This research aims to understand how cultural diplomacy is practised by the government, and further examines what has been achieved and reasons behind any perceived instances of under-achievement or lack of success. It critically evaluates the rationales behind cultural diplomacy and the limitations of current practices in Taiwan. Thus, the study not only extends the assessment of soft power in a country that does not enjoy much diplomatic strength, but also provides an insight into cultural policymaking and arts management. Furthermore, it explores the promotion of Taiwanese culture overseas. This research is beneficial for cultural professionals who wish to engage in cultural diplomacy programmes, and provides a reference for further understanding and preparation.

1.5 Overview of the chapters
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. This first chapter introduces the subject. Chapter 2 presents the relevant concepts in the areas of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and nation branding, which constitute the theoretical orientation of this research. There is also a review of the literature on the concept of soft power. The research design and chosen methodology are presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides a general understanding of Taiwan’s foreign affairs, and cultural relations with China. There is also discussion of the historical background of Taiwan and a selection of studies on Taiwan-China relations. In Chapters 5 and Chapter 6, I present the research findings on the Taiwan government’s implementation of policies, and the engagement of non-state actors in cultural diplomacy. This is followed by an in-depth discussion and the conclusions in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Background

This research focuses on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and cultural policy. Cultural diplomacy, the primary theoretical field of concern, is often examined from the perspective of international relations and associated with public diplomacy. Cultural policy is examined to a lesser extent, with focus on theoretical insights into how the Taiwanese government develops its cultural diplomacy.

In this chapter, several key concepts of cultural diplomacy are examined to build the theoretical framework of analysis. It is organised in five sections. In the first section, I discuss the concept of soft power in international relations, in terms of public and cultural diplomacy. The ideas of public and cultural diplomacy are analysed in the second section. In the third section, I review the literature on cultural diplomacy, and nation and place branding promotion in Taiwan. Furthermore, this provides understanding of the policy objectives and questions that may rise in the process.

2.1 Soft power in international relations

Soft power is a key concept in this study as it plays an important role in the official discourse of the Taiwanese government, which seeks to present and justify policy developments and to enhance the image of the country internationally. The concept was first coined by the American political scholar Joseph Nye in the 1990s. Nye (2004) illustrated ‘the second face of power’ as ‘the indirect way to get what you want’ (p. 5). Rather than coercing others as hard power does, he suggested soft power could convince people to want the outcomes that you want. Soft power is thus the ability to shape the preferences of others. In short, soft power is the ability to attract, and the attraction often leads to acquiescence.

To understand further the concept of power, I present a discussion of theories of international relations. Despite the assertion that power is the currency of world politics, its definition remains contentious (Mattern, 2007). Different versions of realism (classical, structural, neoclassical) share the view that states continuously compete for power, but they disagree on the factors that account for this perpetual struggle. In a realist conception, power also means ‘the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what they otherwise would not’ (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, pp. 39-40). This reflects the realist’s view on international relations that the state is the main actor. Rather than define the power of a certain state based on its ability to influence or control the action of another state, the realist prefers to consider the possession of material resources (Schmidt, 2007). Schmidt (ibid.) also
pointed out that realists have not reached a consensus on the appropriate criteria for measuring power. The constructivist’s view offers another understanding of the concept of power. Guzzini (2005), for instance, highlighted that constructivist analysis questions what the concept of power ‘does.’ Guzzini (ibid.) illustrated three characteristics of constructivism. The first is the epistemological claim that meaning, hence knowledge, is socially constructed. Secondly, the constructivist claims ontologically that the social world is constructed. Thirdly, it is stressed the reflexive relationship between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality.

Given the commitment of meta-theory, there is not one conception of power that would be shared by all approaches. Therefore, how do countries possess the material resources first? And how they employ them? Nye (2004) identified three sources of a country’s soft power: culture, political values and foreign policies. They are intangible and are not the same as material resources. Although these resources can be identifiable, it is important to determine how they can be employed influentially.

What Nye conceived as soft power is far from new. For example, in 1974, Lukes (2005) proposed a three dimensional view of power. The one-dimensional view of power focuses on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues with an observable conflict of interests. These behaviours can be seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation. Furthermore, Luke’s two-dimensional view of power involves a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the first view. The second view allows consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues where conflict can be observed (ibid). To a certain degree, Nye’s conception of ‘soft power’ could be considered as similar to Lukes’s third dimension of power, which is to shape, influence or determine others’ beliefs and desires, thus further securing their compliance (2005; 2007). Moreover, Nye made no distinction between modes of persuasion or ways of ‘shaping preferences’ (Lukes, 2007). Alternatively, the third dimension of power can be considered as a form of hegemony, especially the purpose of securing compliance by shaping and influencing others’ beliefs and desires. Hegemony can exist internationally; as Gramsci (1971) stated, ‘[e]very relationship of “hegemony” is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations’ (p. 350). Hegemony in international relations was later elaborated using Gramsci’s approach. It is understood not in terms of coercion, but consent, shared beliefs and common-sense without diminishing the importance of material power and dominance over
material resources (Antoniades, 2008). As Antoniades (ibid.) pointed out, hegemony is equal to common-sense – the establishment within the sphere of universally accepted values. Thus, the process of ‘shaping and influencing others’ beliefs and desires,’ and possibly further establishing universally accepted values, can also be challenged as a form of hegemony.

Furthermore, Foucault’s view on power can provide an insight into international relations. For instance, Foucault advocated a nominalist’s view of power. Instead of something concrete, power is everywhere and spread throughout the social system. Foucault rejected the state-centric view on power, and observed that it is exercised, but never possessed (Paolini, 1993). Paolini (ibid.) considered Foucault’s ideas as not easy to explain. The relations of power internationally are not as the realist discourse holds invested with coherence, totality and logic. Furthermore, in the study of international politics, Foucault’s observation helped shift focus from a mono-power and allowed other issues such as culture, discourse, identity and self/other constructions to move to centre stage.

Given the different perspectives of power, several questions can be posed. First, can soft power be possessed, or can it only be practised? What if a government wishes to invest in its culture as part of its soft power sources, but lack opportunities to present it to others? As mentioned above, the relations of power are not as coherent and logical as the realists suggest. Hypothetically, if a country has the resources of soft power, as Nye (2004) suggested, but does not have the opportunity to exercise it, then it may not be effectively received. From the constructivist’s point of view, the definition of soft power itself is also an exercise of power. Furthermore, it would be problematic to consider soft power as a tangible asset that can be possessed. The way Nye (2004) conceived of this idea is often criticised, that is, in much the same way as hard power, it is a tangible tool that can be deployed through concerted effort (Mattern, 2007). As a result, attempts to ‘stockpile soft power’ or ‘wielding soft power’ suggest that it is an tangible weapon (Rawnsley, 2012). In terms of Taiwan, I argue that intangibility is a characteristic of soft power, which is often overlooked by the government in its policymaking. In addition, the sources of a country’s soft power may be enriched by government policy, but it is more important for the government to create opportunities to practise it. That is to say, the Taiwanese government has a realist view of soft power, but there is little discussion of how relational it can be. Also, the constructed aspect of the concept of power is missing.

Nye is aware of this problem of attempting to stockpile soft power as a tangible asset. There is further indication of the confusion between behaviour and the resources that produce it (Nye, 2010). Even though soft power rests primarily, but not entirely, on a country’s
culture, political value and foreign policies, it also depends on relationships in different contexts to convert the resources into behaviour power. It can be further asserted that soft power is not practised according to a formula. The context in which the resources are converted can be complicated depending on the relationship, which can never be static. In other words, there are multiple elements that determine how a country can translate the resources into power. This statement provides a reference point for examining the case of Taiwan, which lacks formal diplomatic recognition and access to international organisations. How, under the circumstances, does the government wish to influence others? This requires a detailed discussion.

It could be argued that soft power has become an all-encompassing concept. The problem is its vague definition. Nevertheless, the notion is hugely attractive to governments of all kinds (Hocking, Melissen, Riordan, & Sharp, 2012). The vagueness may also provide flexibility for practitioners to ‘get what they want’ (Hayden, 2012). Although Nye (2004) identified three sources of a country’s soft power – culture, political values and foreign policies – it is necessary to specify the elements of each source to provide more concrete understanding. When it comes to culture, Nye (2004) defined culture as ‘the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society’; he broadly distinguished between ‘high culture’ and ‘popular culture’ (p. 11). However, this may be only partially representative of a society’s set of values and practice. As Nye (ibid.) pointed out, it is a mistake to equate soft power behaviour with the cultural resources that sometimes help produce it. In other words, it is unrealistic simply to export either high culture or popular culture to other countries and expect the reward of soft power behaviour in return. For instance, what is considered a country’s culture? Bennett (2013) argued that given the complexity of the idea of ‘culture,’ it may be better to break it down into its component parts, such as beliefs, ideas, art and traditions. How can these components be presented? And how does the international audience receive these assets of a country’s soft power? These are crucial questions for strategy-making. Hall (2010) argued that actors should focus on the types of international reactions to their soft power strategies that provide positive feedback, whilst rationalising evidence that does not support their strategies. In the case of Taiwan, with its special political and international status, I would suggest that the government’s soft power strategy might have more real influence in internal affairs. That is to say, through the process of projecting the values that are approved of domestically, it contributes to the formation of collective identity. However, whether the audience appreciates the projected values or images is a question seldom investigated.
Further limitations of the implementation of soft power have been highlighted in research. First, soft power is difficult to implement as an effective instrument of foreign policy, as Lee (2011) cautioned. Secondly, when analysing related practices of soft power, it is better to understand how presupposed resources are put to use or are imagined to be of certain value in strategic discourse and policy initiatives (Hayden, 2012). Thirdly, the limitations of soft power implementation result from the mismatch between what a country believes to be an effective projection of soft power and what is actually perceived by the audience in other nations (McClory, 2011). McClory (ibid.) also underlined two relevant challenges to soft power’s intellectual integrity. One is the overuse of this term, which has seen its meaning develop over time; and the other is policymakers trying to use soft power before fully understanding its constituent parts. The problems highlighted reveal the hastiness commonly seen in the policymaking process. If policymakers attempt to use soft power before fully understanding it, they may risk the time, budget and effort for an illusionary target. Also, it would be too easy to set up false targets for soft power projection without knowing the reasons. The difficulty of measuring soft power in terms of returns on investment was also noted by Rawnsley (2013). He pointed out that the accumulation and exercise of soft power capital is a long-term process and a business model cannot be used as a soft power strategy. Governments, as Rawnsley (2013) argued, cannot expect immediate or short-term returns. In my view, these arguments represent a blind spot, which occurs when governments attempt to employ soft power. The illusionary and false targets may never be achieved, and the government might cease to invest in relevant policy programmes before any actual returns take place. I argue that a blind spot might more easily be seen in parliamentary politics and time-limited administrations. This correlates with my observation on policymaking in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Long-term returns are difficult to justify in the design of annual budget review by legislators and short-term government administrations. Thus, a quantifiable and measurable index is often applied when setting targets, such as the number of audience members. Even if the problem mentioned above might arise during the policymaking process, the question concerns what the government can do to change it.

To gain a clear understanding of the influence of soft power requires observation and assessment over a period of time. Given there may be no instant outcome, governments could find it difficult to incorporate soft power in their strategy when politicians and the public become impatient for results (Nye, 2011). In addition, the assessment can be difficult and complicated. Indeed, a measure for the performance of a country’s soft power is yet to be
developed. Even if a standard scale exists, the huge cost of collecting feedback would probably also constrain any follow-up surveys.

Despite the difficulty in measuring a country’s soft power resources and reception, understanding them better remains an objective. The Elcano Global Presence Index (Olivié & Molina, 2011), in particular, takes exports of audio-visual services as its measurement (Olivié, Gracia, & García-Calvo, 2014). In other words, the measurement focuses on cultural products that can be massively reproduced. However, McClory (2010) considered that mass production does not necessarily link to mass influence. For the policymakers, they must be aware not to make the mistake of equating soft power behaviour with the cultural resources that it sometimes helps to produce (Nye, 2004). The export of culture is arguably the easiest way to quantify a country’s soft power assets. However, the numbers need to be treated with caution, as they do not necessarily translate into soft power behaviour. Simply to link them together or to pursue higher numbers of cultural exports could be paradoxical. Although Taiwan is not listed in either of the rankings, the arguments and index provided in these two studies help to shed light on relevant policies of exporting cultural products as part of soft power strategy.

From an East Asia perspective, soft power is increasingly perceived as possessing strategic value. Jhee and Lee (2011) noted the tendency to emphasise normative soft power rather than affective soft power in East Asian countries. Jhee and Lee (ibid) further argued that citizens in these countries have communal or collectivist orientations and prioritise community and social cohesion more than individualism compared with their counterparts in Western countries. The normative dimension of soft power corresponds to its origins, namely, legitimacy (ibid.). The authors illustrated how the differences in social values and orientation influence perception of other countries’ soft power. Furthermore, the construction of soft power resources and national identity are particularly important for countries that were once colonised, such as Japan’s former colonies South Korea and Taiwan. As regards correlation between postcoloniality and cultural politics and policymaking, postcolonial societies seek to create their own cultural distinctiveness and to reclaim a voice in telling their own stories (Mulcahy, 2010). This is particularly important in relation to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy programmes and the building of cultural identity. It is relevant to the promotion of Taiwan’s image internationally, as emphasised in the policy statement of President Ma Ying-jeou’s White Paper for Culture in his 2008 election campaign.

The regional dimension of soft power in East Asia has developed more in policymaking in recent years. As Hall and Smith (2013) argued, the logic of appropriateness
was the motivation for some Asian governments to pursue public diplomacy, as they saw other states doing so as well. It is evident the cultural export strategy of South Korea, such as drama and food, in government documents, for example, the Flagship Project on Television Contents, Film, and Popular Music (Government Information Office, 2009). Hall and Smith (2013) also pointed out that states might invest in public diplomacy because the associated norms are considered increasingly appropriate. Also, states might invest because this could be interpreted as consistent with their identity or role within the international system. Similar logic of appropriateness can be found in official documents in Taiwan, such as the Global Outreach Plan published by the MOC in 2013 (Ministry of Culture, 2013a). This stressed the importance of participating internationally through cultural activities and following in the steps of the United States and the European Union. The development of Taiwan’s soft power strategy matches the characteristics of East Asian countries discussed in the literature.

### 2.2 Current understandings in public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy

Further to discussion of soft power, I present and review the literature on public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy in this section, as they represent fundamental fields of enquiry for the thesis. Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are two related concepts. ‘Public diplomacy’ was first applied to the process of international information and cultural relations in 1965 by Edmund Gullion (Cull, 2009). It is broadly considered as a country’s engagement and communication with foreign publics, and further establishing long-term relationships and trust (d’Hooghe, 2011a). Public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods (Leonard et al., 2002). This can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions. While traditional diplomacy is about relationships between the representatives of states or other international actors, public diplomacy targets the general public in foreign countries, such as non-official groups, organisations and individuals (Melissen, 2005). Although the general public has been clearly defined as the target of public diplomacy, the role of the states and other actors that may be involved in the practice has not. Although public diplomacy is generally accepted to be an instrument of governance, it is not exclusive to governments.

In Cull’s (2008) taxonomy of public diplomacy, the involvement of government also influences different elements. Depending on each element’s nature and its source of credibility, the connection to the government does not necessarily help. For instance, there may be occasions when keeping a distance from government is an advantage. The relation between government and public diplomacy, as Gregory (2008) illustrated, is as follows:
an instrument used by states, associations of states, non-governmental organisations, and individuals to understand attitudes, cultures, ideas and media frames of events and issues; engage in dialogue between people and institutions; advise political leaders, policy-makers and practitioners on public opinion and communication implications of policy choices; influence opinions, behaviour and social practices through communication strategies, actions, narratives with message authority; and evaluate the impact of activities over time and adapt. (p.243)

Gregory (2008) emphasised the interaction between states and other groups engaged in the process of communication, and further provided details on strategic communication. Furthermore, this definition includes an evaluation of the impact of activities over time. As an instrument to enhance a country’s soft power, governments cannot gain full control of the use of public diplomacy. First, non-governmental actors’ interests may not fully match that of governments. Secondly, from the perspective of receivers, there is guaranteed neither positive feedback nor instant results (Leonard et al., 2002; Gregory, 2008). As Gregory (ibid.) indicated, disagreements or conflicts of interest may not be overcome by shared understanding. Moreover, flawed policies and weak political leadership will not be trumped by public diplomacy. In other words, public diplomacy is not a remedy of the existing problems of a country’s governance, nor can it disguise the problems in its domestic politics. In an era when communication technology is rapidly evolving, public diplomacy can be beyond the government’s control.

The concept of ‘new public diplomacy’ has also emerged with the development of information and communication technology. According to Melissen (2005):

the new public diplomacy is no longer confined to messaging, promotion campaigns, or even direct governmental contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. It is also about building relationships with civil society actors in other countries and about facilitating networks between non-governmental parties at home and abroad. (p. 22)

With the advent of the Internet and the development of social media, the creative use of technology challenges how officials frame their communication strategies. Gregory (2008) suggested that it is important to recognise especially that the Internet forum has structured a virtual public sphere in which ‘boundary spanners’ and ‘boundary maintainers’ contest ideas. Other than the Internet forum, the emergence of social media has become a powerful tool to
mobilise ‘netizens,’ not only to post their opinion online, but also to demonstrate on the streets. Despite most of the world’s authoritarian governments’ attempts to limit the use of social media, it has become a tool coordinating nearly all political movements (Shirky, 2011). One such example is the #Occupy movement initiated in 2011. In the case of Taiwan, the use of technology in the Sunflower Movement in 2014 provided real-time broadcasts from students who participated and further contributed to connect overseas Taiwanese students hosting related events and showing their support. Combined with the emergence of citizen journalism through extended platforms on traditional media, such as the iReport on CNN and the Guardian witness, social media can amplify the voice of the public. These examples show that in a time when traditional mass media is no longer as significant, leaders and governments need to reconsider methods to engage with their target public. It also raises questions in this research: how do Taiwanese government officials recognise the use of social media? And is it a feasible way for the government to communicate with the public in the home and host countries?

Culture is essential when a country tries to engage and communicate with another. It intersects almost every juncture of public diplomacy, from vision to policy and practice. In the process of engaging with the public in foreign countries, culture can link people and further increase communication. Although ‘culture’ is arguably the most complicated word to define in English (Williams, 1983), Nye (2008, p. 96) suggested that ‘culture is the set of practices that create meaning for a society.’ This definition covers, for example, information, art, lifestyles, value systems, traditions and beliefs (Cummings, 2003). The goal of cultural diplomacy is to enhance mutual understanding. Through position and explanation, dialogue and debate, culture provides meeting points for people to understand each other and further generate mutual understanding (Bound, Briggs, Holden, & Jones, 2007). In the progress towards mutual understanding, culture can serve as a medium to link up people, which reates opportunities for contact and engagement.

In international relations, culture’s role in conflict resolution, security studies and traditional diplomacy first emerged in the 1990s (Zaharna, 2012). Both public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are key instruments of soft power and have historically associated with propaganda. The concepts of propaganda, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations can be seen to occupy different places in the international relations spectrum on affa, as suggested by Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008). On the spectrum of available approaches to exerting influence, as suggested by Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008), ‘listening’ is on one end, whilst ‘direct messaging (telling)’ on the other.
Cultural diplomacy is situated between these points and its emphasis shifts from listening increasingly towards the promotion of a particular perspective. It is, in fact, 'the act of presenting cultural goods to an audience with the attempt to engage them in the ideas the producer perceives to be represented by them' (ibid, p. 28). In other words, the process includes both activities of telling and listening.

In academic study, concept and structure are two areas of significance for understanding cultural diplomacy. The conceptual approach focuses on motivations, while the structural approach addresses the establishment of cultural diplomacy. The former focuses on what nations, rules, governments and citizens desire to achieve by familiarising others with their culture and the content of their programmes, and the latter seeks the responsible agents of cultural diplomacy, and how they correlate with state interest (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). The two approaches are applied in this research. I examine the programmes and policies pertinent to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and discuss how responsible agents act in relation to the government’s interests. Through these two approaches different countries’ motivations and cultural diplomacy can be analysed. For instance, according to Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010), France was the first nation to develop an official organ of cultural diplomacy and the motivation was to improve its image abroad. This provided some conceptual illustration of France’s cultural diplomacy. Details of its structure are available through tracing the Alliance Française’s history, mission, programming and funding resources. Through consideration of conceptual and structural variables suggested by Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (ibid.), it helps to create a framework to analyse each country’s cultural diplomacy approach. Although the programmes are similar (e.g. artistic exchanges, setting up cultural centres, exhibitions), significant differences in each country’s emphasis can be found. Countries, therefore, may have specific consideration in their strategy of cultural diplomacy, which could be based on its political and historical background.

Different manifestations of culture are employed in the process of cultural diplomacy, as Nye (2008) suggested. For example, he distinguished between high culture, which appeals to the elite, such as literature, art and education, and popular culture focused on mass entertainment. The export of high culture has been fostered especially in diplomatic circle. As Mitchell (1986) argued, diplomatic staff seek to impress and present a favourable image. In his (ibid) illustration, typical activities include government dispatch of its national opera company or presentation of image-building lectures that are followed by lavish diplomatic receptions to serve political or economic purposes. Similar example can be found from my
interviewee’s account that Taiwan’s cultural centres host receptions after performances to create opportunities for diplomats to interact with each other. That is to say, the choice of exhibited culture is in favour of the elite, which has direct benefit to the work of conventional diplomacy. As Taylor (1997) noted, government activities of cultural and educational exchanges, such as participation in international exhibitions and sponsorship of cultural tours, are an attempt to increase international understanding and appreciation. In spite of the potential aid in foreign policy in the long-term, Taylor (1997, p.80) argued that cultural diplomacy is very much ‘an adjunct of conventional diplomacy,’ and further stated that ‘if the latter fails, the former suffers.’ Although cultural diplomacy could hardly thrive if conventional diplomacy is under threat, this does not mean the former is entirely dependent on the latter. Taylor (ibid.) suggested that cultural diplomacy is important to facilitate the workings of conventional diplomacy. This statement provides a reference for Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy development, as the country does not enjoy much advantage in conventional diplomacy. In these circumstances, how the government frames its cultural diplomacy strategy despite the disadvantages is an issue worth considering. Whether cultural diplomacy can facilitate conventional diplomacy is also of note; for instance, realising cultural diplomacy programmes when there are no formal diplomatic relations between two countries, and diplomats and cultural attachés taking advantage of opportunities.

Furthermore, cultural diplomacy was categorised as one of the elements of the practice of public diplomacy (Cull, 2008). Cultural diplomacy is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment. It can be realised through ‘making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad’ (Cull, 2008, p. 33). In addition, Cull (2008) identified listening, advocacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting as other elements of public diplomacy, and that coordination between these elements is needed. He especially emphasised the importance of listening in successful public diplomacy. In each constituent practice of public diplomacy, attending to an audience and opinion research has been a crucial element. Moreover, Cull (2008) stated that sources of credibility for each element are not exclusive to itself. For example, the aspect of mutuality and two-way communication within exchange can be subordinated to the drive to project national culture when housed within a cultural diplomacy agency.

However, some practitioners of cultural diplomacy have different opinions of the relation between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy. The empirical findings of Pamment (2013) suggested that governments seek collaboration with other organisations that have overlapping objectives, but do not necessarily share or support identical goals.
Furthermore, despite the fact that these components of public diplomacy can be differentiated from each other in theory, in practice, the fundamental differences in goals and methods of public diplomacy actors, such as between foreign offices and cultural bodies, may not be sufficiently clear. Actors do not consider their work as a government activity, while public diplomacy is one of them (Pamment, 2013). Thus, cultural diplomacy should not automatically be placed on the spectrum of public diplomacy, and there is a clear distance between academic and practitioner discourse (Pamment, 2013). It is relevant to consider, in the current research, whether the government and the actors share goals, and whether interpretation of their work reflects their view on the governance of cultural diplomacy. I elaborate more on the practitioners’ views in the research findings and discussion.

As observed above, the concepts of public and cultural diplomacy overlap or are distinguished depending on different interpretations. Similarly, other concepts such as (international) cultural relations and cultural exchange or cultural engagement, which are often used interchangeably, add to the terminological and conceptual confusion surrounding the theoretical field in which this thesis is grounded. This section seeks to provide clearer definitions. I start by restating an idea at the heart of this dissertation: the understanding that cultural diplomacy follows the rationale of public diplomacy, which is encouraging public opinion to influence a foreign government’s attitude towards the sender country (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). For the actors, in practice, cultural diplomacy, in its narrower scope, refers to the ‘business of governments’, and there are two levels of meaning. First, there is the inter-governmental negotiation of cultural treaties, agreements and exchange programmes, either bilateral or multilateral, to facilitate or prescribe cultural exchanges. In other words, this is one of the areas of international affairs governed by negotiations and agreements between governments. The second-order meaning refers to the execution of these agreements and the conduct of cultural relations flowing from them (Mitchell, 1986). I suggest that the inter-governmental negotiation of cultural treaties is the irreplaceable function of government as it represents government authority and sovereignty. Mitchell (ibid.) further suggested that the execution could not be exclusive to governments, although it may be seen as their extended responsibility. From this illustration, cultural diplomacy is the governance of cultural affairs in its international relations. Although the execution can be delegated to agencies or cultural institutions, essentially it follows the government’s direction. In the glossary provided in the final report of the Preparatory Action Culture in EU External Relations, it is suggested that civil society and private sector agencies may consider the cultural relations they promote to be a form of cultural diplomacy (Isar et
Mitchell (ibid.) noted that as the execution of cultural diplomacy is in its second-order, cultural institutions and agencies can be delegated by governments. However, Mitchell did not state whether agencies have authority beyond government delegation, and how much.

The use of terms of cultural diplomacy also reflect different ideas of practice in each country. For instance, a preference for ‘cultural relations’ rather than ‘cultural diplomacy’ is evident in a number of national cultural institutes and some governments in the European Union. The British Council describes its work as ‘cultural relations.’ Also, Germany has long used the term ‘external cultural policy,’ which is closer to the idea of cultural diplomacy (Isar et al., 2014). For the EU institutions or related state ministries, the term cultural diplomacy is not clearly defined. Various terms, such as cultural relations, external cultural policy, international cultural relations and cultural exchange, are used interchangeably in the field of culture and international relations. The term ‘cultural relations’ has been preferred by representatives of cultural and private sectors over ‘cultural diplomacy’, as a recent study for the European Parliament found, in order to avoid confusion or belief that all activities are government-led (Smits, Daubeuf, & Kern, 2016). Furthermore, Rivera (2015) attempted to distinguish between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy, and he suggested that these two terms diverge in important ways, in terms of meaning, objectives and motivations. He further observed that these differences could be traced to the particular role of government. While ‘diplomacy’ is usually associated with states, cultural diplomacy can be considered as states liasing with other states or people through the medium of culture. Furthermore, as Rivera pointed out, relevant state institutions can be accountable and instrumentalised to support policy objectives. This correlates to my research on how Taiwan’s public-funded cultural institutions play a role in cultural diplomacy programmes. In Taiwan, museums and theatres can participate in international professional networks or global events as part of the country’s cultural diplomacy. I present more details in Chapter 5.

Although the presence of government may be the major differentiation between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, this distinction remains vague. For instance, cultural programmes initiated by private actors may receive funding from the state or national cultural institutions. To what extent is this kind of financial support considered to represent a government presence? Rivera (ibid.) suggested that government could financially support cultural relations only if these activities are free from political influences and independent of policy objectives. He did not rule out the possibility that cultural relations support national
interest. However, such support can only be the byproduct of trust and understanding developed through cultural relations.

Cultural diplomacy may be characterised as the employment and involvement of formal diplomats supported by the national interest. However, the term ‘cultural relations’ can indicate a wider and possibly spontaneous process. For example, it can grow gradually by transactions of trade and tourism, student flows, communications, book circulation, migration, media access and intermarriage. These are daily cross-cultural encounters (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). The characteristics of cultural relations focus on its engagement with foreign audiences, mutuality and the establishment of stable relationships. Although these activities can be enhanced by government policy, ‘cultural relations’ provides a function beyond propaganda or nation branding; rather than selling messages and policy-driven campaigns, long-term relations and building trust are more appreciated (Melissen, 2005). In addition to the activities carried out by diplomats, the wider policy implementation for enhancing cultural relations is also important. For instance, domestic cultural policy that encourages artists’ exchange, or education policy which welcomes international students, can have an impact on the development of cultural relations.

The terms cultural diplomacy or cultural relations can have historical baggage associated with propaganda, as Rod Fisher and Carla Figueira (2011) have indicated. To differentiate these ideas, Mitchell (1986) illustrated the spectrum of activities by placing ‘cultural propaganda at one end of a scale that passes through cultural diplomacy to cultural relations at the other end.’ He (ibid) further explained ‘the progression is from the use of culture as a force to advance national ends, through the association of culture with current diplomatic aims, to an open collaborative relationship.’ From this understanding, cultural propaganda is the use of culture as a force to advance national interests. Culture serves as a medium that can be part of a systematic scheme, or concerted movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine or practice. Despite the growing negative association with the term ‘propaganda,’ Mitchell (ibid.) suggested that the element of propaganda, such as the desire to convince partner institutions, might be at any point on the scale regardless of how big or small. In other words, even in cultural relations activities, the elements of propaganda may still exist. However, the main difference, as Melissen (2005) indicated, lies in the pattern of communication. Despite cultural propaganda, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations both desire to present cultural goods, convince their audience and deliver values, but it is the approach to communication and engagement that differentiates these activities. In terms of the projected national image, a difference between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy is
that the former generally presents a more ‘rounded’ picture of a country, whilst the latter tends to emphasise the presentation of positive images (Isar et al., 2014). The national interests cannot be ignored in the message being conveyed, either through direct messaging or cultural diplomacy. Nonetheless, it is the credibility and the purpose of messaging that is being questioned and challenged by the audience.

In addition, ‘international cultural relations’ appears in studies that refer to a broader concept. This umbrella term refers to the fostering of understanding between countries and especially their peoples, seeking to engage in dialogue with a much broader public than is the case with cultural diplomacy. International cultural relations may include a wider range of activities, which can be initiated by certain government programmes or may grow organically without government intervention (Isar et al., 2014). Thus, the term refers to the fostering of activities regardless of the actor who initiates and executes them. Furthermore, ‘cultural exchange’ is sometimes utilised in quango or non-government institutions, and is occasionally seen in official documents. The use of the term was identified by Fisher and Figueira (2011) as one aspect of cultural diplomacy. By using the keyword ‘exchange,’ it implies the reciprocity in the movement of cultural organisations and artists between countries, either formally or informally. The primary difference between ‘exchange’ and ‘diplomacy’ is also argued to be their respective power dynamics. Reciprocity and a symmetrical relationship characterise exchange, whilst cultural diplomacy is significantly characterised in presentation and one-way communication (Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008). The terms discussed above can be differentiated depending on the actors, the motivation and the messaging patterns. However, the lack of agreement over definition and the various government choices of terms add to the complexity of understanding.

In the case of Taiwan, the translation between Chinese and English in official documents can add more variation in its usage. In Taiwan’s official documents, the idea of promoting ‘Chinese culture’ can be found in the Bureau of Culture’s records (Rau, 2008), and the term ‘international cultural exchange’ appeared in the 1998 White Paper for Culture (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). Later, in the 2004 White Paper for Culture in Taiwan, ‘cultural diplomacy’ was used to describe cultural activities in countries that do not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004a). Particularly, in Taiwan’s government documents, the term wenhuawaijiao (‘cultural diplomacy’) is commonly used to denote officially-supported activities, which can be government initiated or financially supported. In addition, ‘cultural diplomacy’ can be found in arts organisations’ documents that refer to their engagement in either government-sponsored activities or
invitations to tour overseas, although the latter may come under the wide-ranging initiatives of ‘cultural relations.’ As mentioned previously, the literal translation of ‘cultural relations’ (wenhuaguanxi) is not widely used in Taiwan. The term guanxi means a ‘connection,’ and a system of social networks and influential relationships which facilitate business and other dealings (Oxford University Press, 2015). This may explain the rare usage in Taiwan of cultural relations programmes. In addition to the multi-layered meaning of ‘guanxi,’ the term ‘relations’ may cause confusion and does not necessarily reflect the meaning in English.

It is worth noting that ‘cultural exchange’ (wenhuajiaoliu) has been used by the MOC (formerly Council for Cultural Affairs, CCA) in Taiwan to identify the department that is responsible for managing the affairs of cultural diplomacy. In the case of cross-Strait relations, ‘exchange’ is often used instead of ‘diplomacy’; the choice of terminology reflects the political reality of Taiwan and China. In this thesis, I also use the term ‘cultural relations’ to refer both to government activities and the cases of people-to-people cultural encounters, which occurred especially after the beginning of Chinese tourism and student programmes in 2011. The people-to-people communication between Taiwan and mainland China has in fact a longer history, such as marriage and immigration; the recent tourism and education programmes created more opportunities for exchange. I consider that government treaties and agreements can attribute to the communication of culture, but it does not necessarily need to be formal or sponsored by the government. It can occur organically.

However, the most appropriate umbrella term for discussion is ‘external cultural policy’ to cover Taiwan’s official cultural exchange strategies, which include the policies towards mainland China and other countries. This term can reflect the special status of mainland China in the affairs of Taiwan’s government, as it is located neither in foreign nor domestic issues. Instead, as regards relevant cultural affairs, the Taiwanese government set specific regulation, such as the entry control for Chinese tourists. By using the term ‘external’ rather than ‘international,’ this can include the often-unresolved disagreements between Taiwan and China.

In addition, it is important to note the case of ‘international co-operation’ of the cultural institutions in Taiwan. The glossary provided in the final report of the Preparatory Action Culture in EU External Relations refers to ‘collaboration and encounters between cultural operators and/or organisations, whether or not supported by their governments or their agencies. It is not usually conditional on reciprocity’ (Isar et al., 2014, p.135). The practice of ‘international co-production’ in Taiwan is defined by the characteristics illustrated in the glossary. For example, theatre co-production can mean creative teams participating in
exchange programmes, or being invited to tour overseas. It is also evident in the Ministry of Culture’s funding allocation, which supports public cultural institutions to carry out theatre productions or exhibitions. It can also refer to private arts companies that are invited to tour overseas and artists’ residencies. One particular case of international co-operation is the Flagship Production of the National Theatre and Concert Hall in Taipei. The practice of international co-operation can be considered stimulating and generating more encounters for artists and cultural operators, which fosters creativity.

2.3 Criticism of cultural diplomacy
Cultural diplomacy is the main theoretical framework of this dissertation. However, this conceptual grounding is not without issues, as cultural diplomacy faces criticism at different levels. In this section, I discuss the criticism of cultural diplomacy in theory and practice. Cultural diplomacy is not a new idea. The use of culture as a form of promotion and propaganda may result in some negative perceptions of cultural diplomacy. The term is not always favoured as it implies the close relationship with national government objectives and its promotion of national interests overseas (Holmes, 2012). It has been argued by Cull (2008) that cultural diplomacy can be supported if there is perceived distance from government, Holmes (2012), nevertheless, highlighted the difficulty of distancing cultural diplomacy from government if it is the funding source. The projected image might be under suspicion and a more ‘rounded’ image preferred by the state.

Despite the many positive connotations, as illustrated above, cultural diplomacy, in terms of its practice by governments, has also been challenged by academics. Isar (2010) argued that the true actors in cultural diplomacy are neither nations nor people, but governmental agents and envoys. He further questioned whether artists and arts organisers are interested in singing the government-led tune. Furthermore, Isar (ibid.) noted that despite the aim of cultural diplomacy to engage with the masses, it often preaches a form of high culture to the converted, namely, cultivated and influential individuals. Considering the way in which governmental agents carry out cultural diplomacy, this may not reach the majority as desired. The reasons behind prioritising high culture include strategies that particularly favour elite in both the sending and receiving countries, as they are considered the persuaders and influencers. Similar characteristics can be found in Taiwan’s programme of strategic international communications (Rawnsley, 2014). However, it can be a blind spot for the policymakers to seek only to reach people who are like them, or those who are already
familiar with the sender’s culture. Also, this reflects the existing structure of social class in their choice of cultural activities.

Furthermore, the relationship between artists and government in cultural diplomacy can be a sensitive issue. For example, would the artists be censored if they received funding from the embassy? One can cynically argue that artists are exploited for government propaganda. Nonetheless, as Holmes (2012) indicated, today’s global audience would not necessarily accept any kind of overt propaganda. He also argued that it could have a more positive effect when artists express criticism of aspects of life in their own country on overseas visits. That is to say, the tolerance and freedom of speech truly expresses a country’s political value and soft power. However, whether the government and the cultural representatives think the same or can be persuaded is another matter. It may also be questionable whether artists’ ‘edginess’ can be maintained towards authority when the government sponsors them. Similar questions were raised as regards the Taiwanese government’s support for independent musicians’ participation in overseas music festivals.

In practice, cultural diplomacy is not a solution for existing conflicts. The underlying problem caused by the exercise of hard power needs to be tackled first (Holmes, 2012). I argue that the support from governments and institutions may potentially backfire on cultural activities otherwise. This is illustrated in the Taiwan-China cultural exchange, in relation to the European Association for Chinese Studies Conference in 2014 (section 4.4). It can be argued that the conflict in politics and military could backfire in cultural activities. Despite the power of cultural activities to transcend barriers and prejudices, they can become targets of protests due to the institutional support.

In addition, as individuals are empowered by the Internet to engage in the digital age, cultural diplomacy can operate beyond the top-level arena of policymaking by government actors. This change also enables powerful disseminators of information to work from below. However, the established national media conduits of the most powerful countries economically still enjoy the highest forms of technology to generate and disseminate information on the international stage. This advantage, it is often argued, can easily lead to perceptions that practitioners have become agents of cultural imperialism. It was also pointed out that even if a range of strategies were mobilised, they could only generate soft power when they are seen as attractive (Topić & Sciorinto, 2012). The authors adopted the definition of ‘cultural imperialism’ as ‘the use of political and economic power to exalt and spread the values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a native culture’ (Tomlinson, 2002, p. 3). Nonetheless, Tomlinson (ibid) suggested that ‘[…] the practice of
watching television cannot be deemed to be straightforwardly imposed, that the intention of
the broadcasters may not be directly to exalt and spread values and habits.’ He argued that the
notion of the process being at the ‘expense of a native culture’ is extremely ambiguous. This
perception of linking cultural diplomacy to cultural imperialism might be the baggage that the
former cannot easily discard. However, this can serve as a reminder to examine the process
and intention of cultural diplomacy, or even the changes of cultural relations over a period of
time. In this research, the intention is to determine what objectives are claimed in government
documents.

In addition, as part of government activity, cultural diplomacy can hardly be
exempted from the bureaucratic institution. The issues raised above relate to policy- and
strategy-making processes in each country in terms of its research and evaluation
mechanisms. Government needs to have knowledge of the country-specific context. Despite
the criticism of cultural diplomacy, the existing literature still provides a background for
examining Taiwan, although, as Holmes (2012) suggested, it is often easier to identify what
has not worked than that which has. Also, the public sector is bad at recognising its failures.
As the impact of soft power and cultural diplomacy often takes a long time to present itself,
how a government chooses to review its policy and strategy also reflects its strength in
encompassing the country’s political values.

By reflecting a country’s political values, the policy and strategy of cultural
diplomacy are intertwined with existing strategies in foreign affairs and internal cultural
policy (including education policy). The responsibilities of cultural policy, foreign affairs and
education policy are commonly decided by several government departments, but need to be
integrated to generate a coherent cultural profile. As Mitchell (1986) argued, without the
product of internal cultural policy, such as the artefacts or performers who make up a
country’s cultural profile, the external cultural policy is not conceivable. To elaborate, the
existing problems in internal cultural policy, or the domestic politics, would constrain the
development of external cultural policy. The existing problems can be more complicated
when it comes to cooperating with other government departments, or when cultural
representatives work overseas. If a country is inconsistent in its foreign policy, then it can be
difficult to project a coherent and positive national image to other countries.

2.4 Studies on nation branding
In parallel with public and cultural diplomacy, it is important to examine nation branding and
the Taiwanese government’s promotion of the country’s image abroad. The field of nation
branding has also drawn the attention of policymakers, who aim to promote their national image, and the Taiwanese government is no exception. The promotion of Taiwan’s manufacturing products, tourism and food are among the subjects of overseas advertisements. Here, I address the differences of ideas in public diplomacy and nation branding and how they are applied to my analysis in the case of Taiwan.

Nation branding and propaganda, as with public diplomacy, are about the communication of information to foreign audiences (Melissen, 2005). The expectation is to change foreign attitudes towards the originating country or to reinforce existing beliefs. Nation branding is not a novel concept, but a new term for image management. In academic research, the concept of nation branding emerged from the combination of country-of-origin studies and interdisciplinary studies on national identity (Szondi, 2008). Similar strategies can be found in cultural diplomacy programmes or in employing culture as part of the nation branding process. In this section, I discuss relevant literature about nation branding as a context for examining Taiwan’s strategy to promote its national image through designed programmes. The British scholar Simon Anholt produced several studies on relevant concepts of nation branding. However, his arguments and theories, including those of nation branding, are open to criticism.

Nation branding can be defined as the result of the inter-penetration of commercial and public sector interests to communicate national priorities among domestic and international populations for a variety of interrelated purposes. According to Szondi (2008) nation branding is ‘the strategic self-presentation of a country with the aim of creating repetitional capital through economic, political and social interest promotion at home and abroad’ (p. 5). Szondi’s definition is quite useful for my analysis as it sets concrete objectives for government strategy-making and reasoning. Nation branding can operate both externally and internally – the promotion is not limited to the foreign audience, people at home are also included. Citizens in the home country are both the audience and the stakeholders in the process. Domestic consensus, pride and patriotism can be fostered by positive foreign opinion ‘boomerang’ back home, as some national leaders wish (Aronczyk, 2013). Therefore, nation branding can help the construction of national identity and generate social and political capital. I would suggest that the ‘boomerang effect’ and the pride generated might encourage more citizens to participate in nation branding as stakeholders. In the process of nation branding, the identity of a nation or a place can be mutually reinforced. This is particularly interesting when analysing the participation of private actors in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.
The engagement of citizens in nation branding can contribute to nationalism. Anderson (1991) famously referred to ‘nation’ as being an imagined political community – it is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. Smith (1991, as cited in Guibernau 2004) defined ‘nation’ as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights for all members. Subsequently, Smith (2002, as cited in Guibernau 2004) further developed this definition to include ‘a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs.’ If the commonness is key to the imagined community, then it can be questioned what is shared in the process of nation branding. Citizens might feel proud about their national image, but they share less common myths and historical memories. If that is the case, the making of a shared national image and pride can also be questioned. In the case of Taiwan, how would the contested national identity influence its nation branding?

When branding the nation, it targets both the internal and external audiences in foreign and domestic markets. The state can strengthen its bond with the population. As Castells (2010) noted, ‘[o]nce a nation became established, under the territorial control of a given state, the sharing of history did induce social and cultural bonds, as well as economic and political interests, among its members’ (p.333). This represents the process of identity. The sharing of economic interests may link to actual benefits that citizens can enjoy through successful nation branding. When discussing nationalism and nation branding, Bolin and Ståhlberg (2010) referred to a shift in the efforts to construct nations. This shift directed the traditional nationalistic rhetoric towards a domestic audience, to unify and build social solidarity. In comparison, the new rhetoric is directed towards an international audience of investors, whilst the old nationalistic rhetoric can sometimes be used as a resource.

Economically, the ‘country-of-origin’ (i.e. where the product is made) effect in nation branding may bring pride and confidence for people in the homeland. It is argued that the ‘made-in’ mark is also an evaluative indicator for customers, who link the products of that country with its image. That is to say, if there is a positive national image associated with a brand, it is more likely to be accepted by the customers (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2006). However, there can be challenges if not all the people from different sectors of society agree with the approach for nation branding or financially support it. In international business, to brand a product with a national image may impress consumers with the country’s culture or vice versa. For the consumers, their perception can influence the image of a nation. It should be noted that in a global supply chain, the brand’s country of origin is not necessarily where
the product is made. In the case of Taiwan, the business model of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) plays a role in the supply chain that produces parts or system of end products. Under the circumstances, as the brand is not necessarily Taiwanese, the consumer does not easily link it with the country’s culture or vice versa. I argue that this is a deficiency for the overall strategy of national image building, which has an impact when arts companies seek sponsorship for their touring.

Anholt (2010, pp. 96-97) discussed the link between public diplomacy and place branding, arguing that ‘if the purpose of public diplomacy is simply to promote or attempt to excuse government policies, it is likely to be superfluous or futile, depending on the good name of the country and its government at that particular time.’ He further observed that the reputation of a country much depends on how it is perceived in other countries. For instance, the current government of a country may be held in higher or lower esteem than the ‘brand image’ of the nation. If the nation has a better brand than its government, there might be less harm to the country’s overall long-term interests. In comparison, an internationally unpopular government might irreversibly damage a nation brand. Anholt’s viewpoint may serve as a reference when observing some countries’ foreign policy in different administrations, especially in their attitude towards immigrants or human rights issues including same-sex marriage. These issues would easily draw the attention of people in similar situations worldwide. Nonetheless, Bolin and Ståhlberg (2010) argued that the concepts of ‘nation branding’ and ‘public diplomacy’ should be differentiated. ‘Public diplomacy,’ they asserted, refers to the activities a government embarks on in promoting a certain image of its nation-state and using it as an instrument of power. Moreover, it can influence international political relations; ‘nation branding’ is directed primarily towards the global market rather than political actors, but could be a proper asset to public diplomacy.

A further criticism is that there is little empirical evidence to credit the success of enhancing a nation’s image to so-called nation branding strategies (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). Anholt (2010) also asserted that he had not seen any promising evidence that marketing communications techniques could influence the international perceptions of a country. The awareness of a country might be raised by slogans, but that is not equivalent to a power to alter people’s behaviour and opinion towards it. He stated that ‘[g]overnments need to help the world understand the real, complex, rich, diverse nature of their people resources: to prevent them from becoming mere brands’ (ibid, p. 3). However, Anholt’s arguments and suggestions appear contradictory, although he attempted to clarify the myth of ‘nation brand’ by reiterating his position on this issue. Nations may have brands that have reputations, and
the reputations of corporations show their progress and prosperity in a modern world. This does not mean a nation; a region or a city could be branded in the same way as products. The governments may simply think it is workable to brand places by using the best PR and marketing strategies. Bolin and Ståhlberg (2010) also argued that political actors might promote and initiate nation branding skillfully, but commission their campaign to commercial consultancies, not to intellectuals and artists. They also pointed out a trend in which nation-states today are increasingly acting in the same way as commercial enterprises. Unlike product branding where companies have a high degree of control over the product image, there is less control for the states over place branding. Controls over propaganda and communication can only work in closed societies, not in a constantly communicating international arena.

It is important to note that ‘branding’ itself does not necessarily benefit mutual understanding. On the contrary, it is closer to a one-way image projection. The process of nation branding can easily become a snapshot of a country image, but it is difficult to change existing stereotypes. The complexities of a place, a city or a nation cannot be understood in such a short time. Nor can a country’s efforts in nation branding easily neutralise negative news reports that are being broadcast. It is easy for government to fall for the myth of image branding and marketing, but fail to recognise the restrictions beforehand; for instance, when governments develop their ‘competitive identity’ as ‘the synthesis of brand management with public diplomacy and with trade, investment, tourism and export promotion’ (Anholt, 2007, p. 3). The strategy might be good, but still have no effect because governments may forget to make it a good policy. The branding might fail when the process is not fully democratic, fully transparent and fully inclusive, and this may be problematic. Unfortunately, a similar problem occurred in the case of Taiwan’s gastronomy promotion. As I illustrate in Chapter 5, this example of nation branding did not receive equivalent support at home.

**2.5 Cultural diplomacy and cultural policy**

Having briefly examined the link between cultural diplomacy and cultural policy in the Introduction, I now further investigate relevant work analysing the relationship between the two areas. However, the studies focusing on this relationship are scarce. The literature review identified disagreements in placing cultural diplomacy research in the domain of foreign policy or cultural policy (Nisbett, 2011). There are two types of positioning as regards the placing of cultural diplomacy in relevant disciplines. On the one hand, cultural diplomacy is considered an instrument and part of a broader foreign policy, while, on the other hand,
cultural diplomacy is an explicit cultural policy instrument (ibid.). However, as mentioned earlier, the presentation of a national culture to other cultures could be examined in relation to both foreign policy and cultural policy (Williams, 1984/2014). To separate cultural diplomacy from either foreign policy or cultural policy would be to neglect equally important perspectives.

The complexity of defining cultural policy and conducting relevant research has been mentioned in several studies. This is partly due to the difficulty of defining ‘culture’ when attempting to set the limits of the research field. The overuse of the word ‘culture’ to denote ‘everything’ has raised methodological and political problems for the analysis of cultural policy (McGuigan, 2004). Decisions on methodology in the area of cultural policy should be made on a case-by-case basis, by applying the theoretical approaches of different disciplines (e.g. cultural studies or anthropology) to the problems cultural policy researchers are investigating. In this study, I adopt the qualitative research method from the social sciences and I further elaborate on my methodology in Chapter 3.

In terms of placing cultural diplomacy within the context of cultural policies, two approaches are available for discussing its significance: concept and structure. As Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) suggested, the former looks at motivations, whilst the latter addresses the setup of cultural diplomacy. Regarding the organisation of cultural diplomacy, they question who are the responsible agents of cultural diplomacy, and how they correlate with state interests. What needs to be stressed is that the main concern of cultural policy changes over time, and that it is highly contextual. To establish offices and institutions for the purpose of exporting culture, as the authors pointed out, reflected governments’ unease with any direct and official involvement in cultural affairs (ibid.). Thus, an understanding of structures of cultural diplomacy in different countries can reflect the government’s attitude towards cultural affairs and its response to the changing internal and external environment. In the case of Taiwan, this is particularly significant historically and politically when tracing the changes of cultural diplomacy programmes.

When it comes to analysing cultural policy implementations, the policy cycle stage model can be a useful reference. The model (Paquette and Redaelli, 2015) illustrates four stages of policymaking: Emergence (agenda-setting), Formulation, Implementation and Evaluation. The authors (ibid.) indicated that in the agenda-setting stage, the enabling forces are often related to politics, current events and available solutions. Subsequently, policy goals and objectives are defined in the Formulation stage and policymakers determine the best instrument and measures to achieve policy goals. Then, in the Implementation stage, policies
become reality and this involves several parties, such as artists, public servants, professionals and stakeholders. Finally, in the Evaluation stage, policies are assessed by several parties: policymakers, media, broad artistic community and the general public. The policy Formation and Implementation process can be seen in Taiwan’s cultural policy and cultural diplomacy. For instance, a new proposal or a transition of existing policy might relate to an event or changes of government, such as the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, which started in 1966 (discussed in Chapter 4). In this research, the goals and objectives of a cultural diplomacy project, and how evaluation operates, are explored in the research findings.

The primary concerns of cultural policy have shifted from the civilising influence of the high arts to a broader concern with a variety of modes of expression and entertainment. Furthermore, there are differences according to geography; ideas can have different understandings depending on each country. It is crucial that cultural policy is determined through politics (Bell & Oakley, 2015). I argue that changes in domestic politics could have an impact on cultural policy, especially when the ruling parties have different ideology towards cultural policy. When placing cultural diplomacy as part of cultural policy in Taiwan, the context of political change is particularly important to the analysis. The primary concerns of cultural policy evolve over time and are also reflected in the policy objectives of cultural diplomacy, themes that are examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

Furthermore, the development of cultural industry is worth addressing in cultural diplomacy. The international trade of cultural products has been an important element of globalisation and has become a significant aspect of cultural diplomacy; this is indicative of a recent development in cultural diplomacy, beyond the traditional role of supplementing conventional diplomacy. David Throsby (2010) considered international cultural exchange and cultural diplomacy as areas where culture engages with the economy internationally. He alluded to areas of international cultural exchanges such as tours by performing companies, the circulation of artworks and artefacts on loan between museums and galleries. The activities illustrated by Throsby have been a part of the Taiwanese government’s cultural diplomacy programmes and are often supported by public subsidy. Considering the transactions generated by these activities, such as ticket sales and artists revenues, cultural diplomacy cannot be seen solely as a political activity, but also as an area of economic value. Often, from the arts organisations’ perspective, it is the economic incentive that encourages them to engage in cultural exchange and the political effect of cultural diplomacy is a by-product (Nisbett, 2015). The economic aspect of Taiwanese arts organisations
participating in cultural diplomacy programmes is examined in Chapter 6 including their motivations and challenges during the process.

As policies on creative and cultural industries have gradually become the main concern of cultural policy, the role of government in cultural trade is increasingly important. Cultural products are not only representations of national culture but actual goods in trade. According to Bell and Oakley (2015) cultural goods are often the more problematic aspects of international trade negotiations. The problems are not restricted to the conflict between economic values and cultural values; cultural products are often entangled with and expressive of localised identities, beliefs and sense of place. In the case of Taiwan, the problematic aspects are significant, as can be seen by the impact of international trade negotiations on the development of Taiwan’s film industries (see section 5.7). Additionally, these issues are crucial for the formation of cultural identities connected to government attempts to promote Taiwanese cultural products, which I examine in detail in Chapter 5.

In this chapter, a theoretical framework was presented for understanding the concept of soft power and its application in public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and nation branding. The literature review, furthermore, provides the basis to analyse critically Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and policy implementation, and to understand how, for example, the idea of soft power has developed and its limit in international relations. Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy have been used by governments as tools to communicate with international audiences. The problem that governments face is the difficulty of measuring their impact. The reinforcement of pre-existing beliefs in the process of policymaking is relevant to examining the strategy-making process of communicating Taiwan’s soft power through cultural diplomacy. Whilst linking the study of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy to cultural policy, this research examines how the changes in domestic cultural policy influence the overall external cultural relations. In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology employed in this research for data collection and analysis.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology

This chapter details the research methodology of the thesis. The study of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy employed a case study approach and data were collected through qualitative methods. The chapter consists of six sections. In the first, I present the research questions, objectives and the framework for analysis. Subsequently, I explain the research assumptions and research design. The methodology and data collection process are discussed in the following sections. In the last section, I consider the practical constraints of data collection.

3.1 Research questions and objectives

The research is designed to examine the policymaking process of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy from the perspective of cultural policy. It seeks to answer this principal question: how do Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and cultural policy operate to fulfil the political objective of making the country internationally visible through policy implementation? The research investigates the reasons why cultural diplomacy is considered crucial in Taiwan’s foreign affairs, examining also how it has been incorporated in Taiwan’s cultural policy.

Taiwan presents a specific case of cultural diplomacy where an under-recognised country seeks to become more visible via cultural activities. While the majority of existing country-specific studies focus on important players in international affairs (e.g. US and China), this is a case of soft power as Taiwan has limited foreign affairs resources. The promotion of its own culture is restricted without much diplomatic recognition. How does the status quo influence its cultural diplomacy? Furthermore, does cultural diplomacy complement Taiwan’s formal diplomacy, and vice versa?

The research reveals how cultural diplomacy is incorporated in Taiwan’s cultural policy. Cultural diplomacy is commonly considered part of foreign affairs and operated as a sub-category of public diplomacy. In the case of Taiwan, however, the government department in charge of cultural affairs has been the main authority in charge of cultural diplomacy programmes. In other words, the division of tasks in the administrations emphasises the ‘cultural’ side, namely, cultural diplomacy as part of cultural policy. The research traces the historical context for relevant government operation and analyses the advantages and disadvantages. By contextualising cultural diplomacy as a cultural policy of ‘display’ (Williams, 1984/2014), the research also evaluates the types and reasons of the cultural products on display. It is a part of the government’s attempt to exhibit the chosen cultural images in order ‘to be seen’ and further to be appreciated by the external audience.
The different actors in cultural diplomacy represent several powers in the process. When the government organises events and allocates funding and subsidy for various projects, it is not down to one person or two to decide whom should receive the funding. In conducting cultural diplomacy projects, the initiatives could involve several departments, and levels of authority in Taiwan. In the institutions, the cultural centres and cultural attachés are at the frontline of government projects and engage with local networks in the host country. However, as they are at the far end of policy realisation, I am interested in determining the extent to which they have authority and autonomy in the organisation, and whether they are sufficiently trained. Furthermore, it is essential to find out the reason why the private actors are motivated in cultural diplomacy projects. How does their motivation evolve throughout the political changes? Do they have any conflicts of interest? These are the questions I address in this research, to identify whether there is a gap between the government rationale and the practice of cultural relations.

Based on the process of projecting the curated image overseas, the study analyses the relationship between the exhibited image and domestic cultural identity. The correlation between Taiwan’s cultural identity formation and its curated programme of cultural diplomacy is also traced. Why is ‘being seen’ so important to Taiwanese people? Is it also important to the Taiwanese government and influential in policymaking? Does cultural identity influence people’s support for cultural diplomacy? I consider some Taiwanese artists’ participation in cultural diplomacy and analyse how this participation differs among various actors and in the private sector.

In terms of policy realisation, I investigate the challenges encountered by the government when practising cultural diplomacy and suggest potential solutions. The research examines how policy objectives are set, and how they reflect the actual practice of cultural diplomacy. Through analysing the policy objectives, I trace the changes of cultural policy over time and its influence on the desired outcome in cultural diplomacy programmes. Moreover, I illustrate the challenges from the perspectives of funding, personnel and administration. By pointing out the problems faced by the practitioners across the sectors of cultural diplomacy, I identify the difficulties Taiwan faces when carrying out its cultural diplomacy.

I consider how Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy projects its image internationally through policy implementation; the principal research question is whether the current strategy of cultural diplomacy successfully portrays a positive image of the country overseas. However, the research topic has limitations. First, there is no consecutive and long-term survey on the
reception of cultural diplomacy, i.e. the reactions of the target audience of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy programmes. Secondly, even if surveys were available on long-term trends of image perception, it is extremely difficult to justify the results and prove a policy initiative successful. Due to time and resource restraints, the research did not attempt to survey the receptions of the Taiwanese image from the perspective of foreign audiences. However, although accepting that it is a complex task for a researcher from the outside to evaluate the outcome of policies, it may be questioned how internally the government assesses its own implementation and formulates and reviews policy plans. This research question looks at the policy formation and its realisation, as it seems more plausible and allows for feasible operationalisation.

My analysis of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy is mainly based on Wyszomirski, Burgess and Peila’s (2003) categories of cultural diplomacy programmes and Schneider’s (2003) typology of cultural diplomacy. This multi-country study provides a set of questions for evaluation and five major dimensions are used in the comparison. The set dimensions in the research are the following:

1. Terminology and Role: how does each country refer to and regard what we call ‘cultural diplomacy’?
2. Goals and Priorities: what are the stated goals and purposes of cultural diplomacy? Are there any explicit regional priorities?
3. Structure: how is cultural diplomacy managed? Which departments/ministries or agencies are involved in policy development and programme administration?
4. Programme Tools: what are the programme tools employed in each country’s cultural diplomacy efforts? A preliminary examination of cultural diplomacy programmes in a number of countries revealed a fairly common repertoire of nine kinds of programme activities. Few countries employ all nine types, but most countries do have a varied repertoire of programmatic activities.
5. Indications of Scale and Support: how much does each country spend to support cultural diplomacy activities and how much activity is involved? (Wyszomirski et al., 2003, p. 3)

Wyszomirski et al. (ibid.) further categorised the main activities and programmes in the selected countries according to these criteria:

1. the exchange of individuals for educational and cultural purposes.
2. sending exhibitions and performances abroad.
3. sponsoring seminars and conferences both in-country and abroad that include international participants.
The work of Wyszomirski et al. (ibid.) is important for analysing Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy practice. The cultural activities supported by the Taiwanese government abroad generally fall into the categories, although the focus is on the performing arts programmes. The index provides an overview of the potential cultural dimensions governments could sponsor. Despite various other terms governments employ to describe their supported activities and policy orientation, the objective remains to trace the allocation of resources and funds for different cultural projects. The strategy of different countries regarding foreign cultural policy can be highlighted through distinguishing the types of cultural activities relevant to cultural exchange and diplomacy, as it demonstrates the prioritisation and underlying logics of respective governments.

Another typology of cultural diplomacy was proposed by Schneider (2003). With reference to the United States, she suggested several characteristics of successful cultural diplomacy initiatives from the aspects of diplomatic function, content, mutuality and legacy. On the sender’s side, these characteristics can be: communicating the country’s values; opening doors between the diplomats and their host country; providing another dimension to the official presence in the host country. For the receiving countries, those characteristics are: catering to the interests of the host country and offering pleasure, information or expertise with mutual respect and the spirit of exchange. Furthermore, successful cultural diplomacy initiatives, as she pointed out, are creative, flexible, and opportunistic. In addition, a successful initiative can form part of a long-term relationship. Schneider’s analysis placed much emphasis on the mutuality between the home country (the United States) and the host country, but remained an alternative reference for examining the cultural diplomacy initiatives. By analysing the function the initiative serves, the mutuality it has with the host country, and the legacies it creates, these aspects help to put into perspective how Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy has been practised.
3.2 Research assumptions

The choice of subject partly rests on my experience as a Taiwanese who lived and studied abroad. This provided an opportunity to observe how Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy programmes are carried out in host countries. Despite the claim of the Taiwanese government that the country’s cultural diplomacy could be a vehicle to project its soft power, there remains some challenges. The challenges include the identification – not to mention finding the sources – of Taiwan’s soft power in the first place. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is doubted whether soft power is a tangible tool that can be amassed and deployed through concerted effort (Mattern, 2007). I have also hinted that it is questionable whether cultural diplomacy could realistically open more doors for Taiwan when considering its deficits in formal diplomacy. It is my contention that cultural diplomacy is not the solution to existing diplomatic problems. By contrast, the weakness in formal diplomacy would potentially restrict the government’s ability to practise cultural diplomacy.

In this context, I was especially keen to explore how the government projects Taiwanese culture overseas through institutional power, and how the process connects with the formation and projection of cultural identity. As a Taiwanese, I am particularly interested in presenting the ‘self’ image throughout the process of cultural diplomacy and how the image is received by ‘others.’ Combined with my roles as a researcher and an arts professional, I expected to find some limitations to the realisation of cultural diplomacy programmes. For instance, this may be bureaucratic. However, I remained hopeful that Taiwan’s soft power could be appreciated. In addition, there could be a gap between the knowledge produced in academia and practice.

It is worth noting that the course of this research (2010-2015) coincided with several important events in Taiwan, including the introduction of education programmes for Chinese students in 2011, and the Sunflower Movement in 2014. In the former, it is possible to observe the changes in cross-Strait relations and how Taiwanese people responded to it. Despite not being a main subject of this research, the Sunflower Movement and corresponding events involving Taiwanese oversea students served as an opportunity to see how private actors could actively participate in public diplomacy.

3.3 Research design

The case study approach was chosen to research Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. With the characteristics that Robert K. Yin (2014) illustrated, this case study is an in-depth empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-world context, and
tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result’ (p. 110).

At an early stage of this research, I considered including other countries’ examples for comparative purposes. However, the special political status of Taiwan made it difficult to find other cases suitable for comparison. In the context of Taiwan’s foreign relations, its cultural diplomacy may not be easily generalised for other settings.

One of the reasons for the specificity of the Taiwanese case is the China factor and the bi-lateral relations between Taiwan and China. Therefore, in this research, I explore China-Taiwan cultural relations, and how the China factor influences other aspects of cultural diplomacy. Internally, I explore how the current policy contributes to the construction of cultural identity and how it is differentiated from that of China to external audiences.

Despite the special context of Taiwan, the engagement of private actors in the process, the administration of overseas cultural institutions and the role of government or corporate support can be generalised as an issue that may exist in other countries. Also, from the perspective of cultural policy, the development of cultural industries in Taiwan and the related overseas promotion can be compared with cases in other countries. This study focuses on the performing arts, especially government policy and private actors’ participation. The decision was made based on the government’s continuous support for the performing arts in cultural diplomacy programmes and the actors’ active participation.

Although this is a single case study focusing on only one country, there is discussion of several sub-categories that are part of the policy implementation. By analysing cultural diplomacy in relation to policy, the thesis covers different aspects of policy realisation through subordinate cases. The analysis includes the public sector and its sub-organisations and the private sector. This matches the methodological characteristics suggested by Yin (2014) as the result relies on multiple sources of evidence, and data collected from these actors. While the case is significant in terms of Taiwan’s political status, it has implications for the interaction between government and artists. It is examined the degree to which government should subsidise arts and cultural organisations, and whether corporate sponsorship is beneficial for artists.

3.4 Research methodology
Grounded theory was adopted to process the research data (Bryman, 2012), beginning with a general research question. After coding the data, the concepts could be generated, and categories generated through a constant comparison of indicators and concepts. Later, the
categories were saturated during the coding process. In my research on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, the steps of grounded theory frame the research questions to explore relevant theories.

The topic of cultural diplomacy is based on relevant theories of soft power and public diplomacy. Additionally, in the case of Taiwan, it is important to include theories about cultural identity as a reference for the formation and transition of cultural identity. Through the process of coding data and generating categories, concepts related to cultural diplomacy are iteratively reviewed to frame the sub-questions of the main research question and further refer to other theories, such as nation branding and place branding.

The theoretical contexts for this research are mostly generated from English publications, while literature in Chinese provided materials to understand the context of cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s foreign affairs. There is a considerable number of English language publications produced by both Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese scholars, which helps to position the case of Taiwan in a broader context. Although the majority of the Chinese sources are from Taiwan, some were published in Hong Kong and mainland China. The issues of language differences in the literature and policy documents are discussed in Chapter 2.

Concerning the process of coding data and generating categories, concepts related to cultural diplomacy were iteratively reviewed to frame the sub-questions of the main research question. Based on the nature of my research question and existing constraints, I decided to use a qualitative research method. There are two reasons why the qualitative research method helps achieve credibility and validity in this study. First, the number of actors in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy (policymakers, cultural attachés and cultural professionals) is relatively small, and thus might constitute a problem of sampling if quantitative methods are used. In comparison, qualitative methods can offer an in-depth understanding of their engagement. Secondly, their participation constituted different approaches to realising cultural diplomacy projects. Therefore, it was difficult to process a standardised questionnaire or a large-scale survey. Instead, a qualitative research method was considered appropriate for exploring the actual process of policymaking and for different actors to give detailed accounts.

In the practice of cultural diplomacy, public reception is important. However, it is beyond the capacity of this research to conduct a survey of the general public or to trace audience members for all cultural activities hosted by Taiwan’s cultural centres. Therefore, in I chose to conduct recorded interviews of government officials, cultural attachés, cultural professionals, representatives of arts organisations and private foundations that engage in
cultural diplomacy. In their participation in organisations and various projects, they provide different perspectives. With careful process tracing and textual analysis, the interviews allow understanding of policy narratives, and how national or international narratives constrain the way political actors conceive the realm of the possible (Roselle, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 2014).

The chosen research methods provide traces of narrative from different actors of cultural diplomacy, namely, the policymakers and the practitioners. In the case of Taiwan, this includes actors in the government, cultural sectors and the artists. Only a few interviewees were selected, 12 in total. The research aims to fulfil the criteria of a good qualitative study. The four criteria for trustworthiness, as suggested by Bryman (2012), are credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. The choice of interviewees was considered to ensure they were as representative as possible in the process of policy formation and implementation. The method of selecting cases was purposive sampling. Also, my study in London and fieldwork in New York and Paris were great opportunities to observe how cultural diplomacy programmes were implemented.

To ensure the credibility of the research, different accounts between the collection data with grey literature and news reports were triangulated to approach a relatively authentic picture of reality. Furthermore, official documents, press releases and news articles were sources for data collection. After coding the data, I expected to generate categories by constant comparison of indicators and concepts. Through the examination of these documents, I attempted to understand the cycle of policymaking and implementation; for instance, the Administration Plan released by the MOC, the policy address and relevant reports and news coverage of the policy plan. The policy plans chosen for reference and analysis were mainly mid-term or long-term lasting more than one year. Other than official documents, events that raised controversy or contrasted with policy objectives were also included for analysis.

3.5 Data sources, collection methods and analysis

The research was designed with a qualitative approach to collect evidence of policy formation and implementation. First, the overall strategy published by the government provides a general orientation of policymaking. It also requires cross-examination and reference to other policy plans and legislation.

The data collection started with research on the public sector in Taiwan, the MOC (formerly CCA) and its sub-organisations, which generated the official statements and insights into strategy-making in cultural diplomacy and relations. Important government
documents provided the basis, including the White Papers for Culture published in 1998 and 2004. Project plans for international cultural exchange, and grant guidelines were included in the primary data. The proceedings from Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan and policy addresses from both MOC and MOFA were analysed. Most of the documents are published in Chinese and their corresponding English versions are cited where available. Nonetheless, it was necessary to translate certain official documents from Chinese into English when the English version was not available or not comprehensive. I am responsible for the translation of quotes from interviewees and some newspaper articles, and every effort has been made to render these accurately.

Based on the collected materials, I interviewed officials in the MOC as to why and how the strategy was decided and the cross-departmental communication. Subsequently, I focused on the operations in overseas cultural centres. Understanding the works of cultural centres enabled me to investigate how the government engages with public audiences in host countries and its priorities. As the key actor in cultural diplomacy, I emphasise the significance of the cultural attaché in these centres. I am aware that cultural diplomacy programmes are cross-departmental in Taiwan, especially between the MOFA and the MOC. Data from the former were mainly derived from official documents, as I experienced difficulty attempting to gain access for one-to-one interviews.

Content analysis method was applied for analysing the qualitative data. Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry (2004) defined this as a technique for analysing the content of communications. The process is to summarise and interpret the information when one perceives a body of communication. Furthermore, Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry (ibid.) suggested that the researcher establishes the topic or hypothesis for investigation, and the importance of the content is determined by the researcher’s judgement, which includes the intrinsic value, interest and originality of the material. By utilising the content analysis method, the advantage is to process the documentary or other communication material in a precise and systemic way. Additionally, it fits well with the research topic on how cultural diplomacy and cultural policies change over time.

The primary data of my research were mainly collected through fieldwork in Taipei, Paris, London, Edinburgh and New York. The main part of the fieldwork was carried out in 2013 and 2014. The formal interviews were in Mandarin (one in English) and in person, except for one, which was conducted through Skype. By choosing to visit Taiwan’s overseas cultural centres rather than simply interview by phone or email helped to contextualise the local situation and to conduct more detailed interviews. The field trip enabled me to visit the
premises of a cultural centre and to understand how the spaces were designed to fulfil its mission. By actively participating in the work of cultural diplomacy, I could observe and record social interactions that relate to cultural diplomacy and nation branding. As a researcher, participating in these events visualised the real interactions between people in cultural relations. The interviewees included Ms Tchen Yu-chiou, former Chairperson of the CCA, who served in that office from 2000 to 2004, and actively initiated cross-cultural productions during her service as Board Director in the National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) in Taipei. Former Artistic Director of the NTCH, Ms Ping Heng also provided an account of her experience executing intercultural productions. In addition, Director Susan Yu of the New York Cultural Center and former Director Dr Chen Chih-cheng of the Paris Cultural Centre gave insights into regional strategies. One other government official in the Ministry of Culture and two cultural attachés also discussed their professional experiences, but did not wish to be identified in this thesis.

Some of the interviewees were found through snowballing method, using my personal network of contacts from my career as an arts administrator in Taiwan. These interviewees were chosen because of their professional experiences with the government policymaking process. The choice of government officials matched the definition of ‘expert interview,’ as specified by Meuser and Nagel (2009). It is the researcher who decides who she or he wants to interview as an expert, in accordance with the research objective, but this is not an arbitrary choice. It is related to the recognition of a person as an expert within his or her own field of action. The authors also indicated that the process should focus on the individual expert’s action strategies and criteria of decision-making connected to a particular position, but not biography (ibid.). In other words, what deserves more attention is the institutional role of the expert. The interviewed government officials and cultural attachés were chosen as their work plays a significant role in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Although they may change job, the information provided is treated as accurate based on their professional work.

The research focuses on the performing arts programmes. The choice was made partly due to the continuous government support for this art form in cultural diplomacy. Also, it is an area that I am more familiar with because of my professional experience. The cases, moreover, of artists’ and arts companies’ engagement in national showcases and festivals provided opportunities for in-depth observation of the policy implementation. With the exception of the performing arts, some cases of visual arts and films promotion are also included in this research for a wider understanding of cultural policy. Several cases of artists’ participation in cultural diplomacy concerned the OFF d’Avignon, which, supported by the
Paris Cultural Centre since 2007, is a long-standing programme of the MOC. The arts organisations’ website and social media accounts provide a new form of self-promotion, and also serve as a source of primary data. The interviewees were chosen for their participation in OFF d’Avignon or touring abroad.

In addition, financial support from the private sector and its influence is an important part of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. The research found several modes of private sponsorship, including philanthropy, private foundation and crowd-funding. Among the private actors, the Asia Cultural Council of the Rockefeller Foundation is a special case for its collaboration with the Taipei Cultural Centre in New York. Their collaboration is an example of how cultural centres can engage with local networks and build partnerships with private organisations. All these cases provide an in-depth understanding of the whole process of cultural diplomacy, with the aim of exploring the dynamics between several sectors.

Furthermore, secondary data were sourced from government commissioned research reports and degree dissertations published in Taiwan and the UK. The findings of professional conference proceedings on arts management and cultural policy are also included. Newspaper articles, whether in hard copy or online versions, were used to analyse certain important cultural diplomacy events. Again, I attempted to find the English versions wherever possible; however, I had to translate when these were not readily available. As regards the media coverage of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy programme, reviews from art critics are not only an indicator of programme outreach, but they also provide evidence of how these activities are perceived in the host countries. Online archives from Taiwan’s cultural centres are also valuable resources for my research. I am aware that certain contents in media coverage are from press releases produced for promotion purposes; therefore, the source of the information is verified and taken into consideration when analysing the data. Tertiary data, such as encyclopaedias and dictionaries, are occasionally used.

3.6 Ethical issues and practical constraints
Several practical constraints affected the data collection. First, government re-organisation started in 2012, and this process provided an opportunity to observe how cultural diplomacy evolves because of such change. By the time the research concluded in 2014, the influence and impact of this remained to be seen. Nevertheless, it also increased the difficulty when I attempted to access archived documents. For example, some of the documents were removed from the government database, and whilst the old department’s website was no longer active, this did not appear on the new website. Fortunately, certain documents reappeared after a
fellow researcher’s request. Some archived documents once moved to the new department are no longer classified as open to the public. The fact that cultural diplomacy projects are carried out with several government ministries also reflects the confusion and difficulties in requesting information. It is sometimes unclear whether information on cross-ministry projects can be provided, and which ministry has the authority to release it. When the primary sources were not available, I tried to access the related material where possible or refer to secondary sources.

In December 2014, Taiwan’s cabinet resigned en masse after the ruling party was overwhelmingly defeated in the island’s biggest-ever local elections, and the cabinet entered a care-taking period (Agence France-Presse in Taipei, 2014). As Taiwan’s first Minister of Culture, Ms Lung Ying-tai was among the cabinet members who resigned. Thus, 2014 marked the end of the first minister’s administration of the MOC. Nonetheless, several government projects are ongoing and may require longer observation for their impact. Other cases occurred after the completion of the research and may be included in future study plans. As a further presidential election took place in early 2016, and the DPP returned to power, further investigation will be required of the development of Taiwan’s foreign affairs, cultural diplomacy and bilateral relations with China.

Furthermore, as part of the GIO merged with the new MOC, several former GIO overseas offices became new outposts of the MOC. Despite the increasing number of outposts, several of them were still in the preparatory stage of opening a new cultural centre. In this research, New York and Paris are the two cultural centres mainly under study among the outposts of the MOC. The two centres were selected because they have a longer history and established networks. I also took advantage of the opportunity to observe the projects of the MOC UK office in London at their preparatory stage. Further follow-up study is required of the developments in more recent offices and how these influence the regional strategies.

The interviews with government officials and cultural attachés were expected to provide professional perspectives on strategies and evaluation. However, it is not always easy to interview experts, especially when certain negotiations are ongoing and need to be kept confidential. In terms of choosing interviewees, it might be easier to go further down the organisational hierarchy. As Hoffmann-Lange (1987) argued, people who participate more intensively in individual decisions may sometimes be more important than those in the top stratum. To gain access to interviewees from a certain hierarchy is challenging, so it might be easier to contact the gatekeepers first.
In the case of interviews with some Taiwanese officials, I sought to find a connection for the contact information. Writing e-mails was the first step. However, most of the replies I received were from their secretaries or assistants. There was also rejection of my interview requests when attempting to seek connections. I was told that the person was either preoccupied to accommodate an interview request or unwilling to provide assistance to an academic researcher. Nonetheless, I was advised to refer to the published proceedings from the Legislative Yuan as government officials are obliged to provide information. Other advice I received included writing a formal request to the ‘Minister’s mailbox,’ which is the general public service contact to retrieve undisclosed information.

Professional links proved helpful for my data collection. From my previous experience in the public sector in Taiwan, I assumed that interviews would be mostly semi-structured, although ideally the data should be collected from the experts in open interviews, and questions based on general topics, and closed questions or pre-determined guidelines avoided. However, to introduce topics, the interviewer must be well prepared and have understanding in that specific field (Meusser & Nagel, 2009). As expected, several government officials requested an outline of questions in advance as they prepared for the interview. When carrying out the interviews, one of the government officials admitted that on account of the heavy workload, there was no time to prepare more detailed answers. Also, I was asked by one of the interviewees to clarify the outlines I had provided before switching on the recorder. This experience revealed the conservative and cautious side of bureaucracy.

Interestingly, the preparation of an outline added credibility to the research as the questions showed sufficient background knowledge. Thus, it was easier to be considered an ‘insider’ in addition to my previous work experience. A set of guidelines requires preparation and extensive knowledge of the actual area of expertise to indicate competence to the interviewees, which is of particular importance as experts hold a higher degree of interpretive power (Littig, 2009). It is beneficial to be recognised as acquainted with the public sector for building connections with the interviewees. While my previous work in the public sector added credibility, it was also a challenge, as a researcher, to remain objective when analysing the collected materials. For instance, when my interviewees referred to the bureaucratic restrictions of their jobs, it was important to reconsider carefully the information rather than take it for granted.

In addition, several government officials requested to remain anonymous as some content may be considered sensitive and it would be inappropriate for them to give unauthorised interviews. The requests were mutually agreed before the interview and
carefully observed when processing data to maintain anonymity. Other than the government officials, several artists who participated in this research also requested to remain anonymous and the personal information was treated accordingly. In addition, despite the promised confidentiality, they still requested not to be included in the thesis some of their personal opinions or criticisms of government policy, including parts of the conversations considered sensitive by the interviewees. Although this information is not presented as raw material, the sensitive parts still helped to analyse the data.
Chapter 4: Research Findings: The Historical Context and Cultural Exchange in China-Taiwan Relations

In this chapter, I provide in brief the historical background of Taiwan-China cultural relations, which facilitates understanding of contemporary developments in Taiwan’s foreign affairs, cultural identity and cultural policy. In order to explicate the issues in the bilateral relations, I trace the changes of regimes on the Taiwan Island from the Qing dynasty, to the Japanese colonisation, and current Republic of China (ROC) government. This sheds light on the territorial disputes between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China governments. The political changes had a huge influence on the formation of Taiwan’s national and cultural identity, and this is reflected in the images that the ROC government has attempted to project overseas. In the hope of clearer understanding of history and political disputes, the names of the ruling regimes of China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC) are used in this chapter.

As a political entity, the political status of Taiwan is often disputed. Taiwan can be regarded as a state without being a nation, as Castells (2010) stated. According to Castells (2010), nations are ‘cultural communes constructed in people’s minds and collective memory by the sharing of history and political projects’ (p. 54). He further illustrated that this definition varies with context and period, and how much history must be shared for a collectivity to become a nation. The elements that predispose the formation of such communities vary as well. In the case of Taiwan, the ambiguous national identity, contentious political status and complicated cultural and historical background further influenced the issues of cultural identity, and the ideologies of cultural policymaking.

This chapter examines the history of Taiwan and its external relations and the presentation of arts and culture in foreign affairs, with the aim of explaining how the cultural policy and cultural diplomacy have evolved over time. Although cultural diplomacy after the establishment of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) is of prime concern in this thesis, it is important to recognise the historical antecedents of Taiwan’s contemporary cultural diplomacy and cultural relations with China.

The chapter is divided into five sections. First, I briefly discuss the history of Taiwan-China relations and Taiwan’s external relations and international status. Then, I introduce the development and specific issues regarding Taiwan’s cultural identity. In the final three sections (4.3, 4.4 and 4.5), I illustrate how the concept of soft power has developed and has been adapted in the cross-Strait relations, and the cultural exchange between both
sides. Addressing such contextual issues helps to illustrate the complicated relations that Taiwan faces externally.

4.1 Brief history of Taiwan and its external relations

Geographically, the island of Taiwan is just 100 miles southeast from mainland China. In the history of political establishment, the Dutch and Spanish had brief occupation of parts of Taiwan in the seventeenth century. The Dutch settlement lasted from 1624 to their expulsion in 1662 by Koxinga, a general of China’s Ming dynasty, who resisted the Qing conquest. Opinions on Koxinga’s victory differ depending on which side of the Taiwan Strait they originate. In Beijing, Koxinga is the man who made Taiwan an unalienable part of China. Before that, mainland China made no claim to Taiwan (Manthorpe, 2005). The period in which Taiwan became ‘part of China’ is debatable. However, it was not until the Cheng family’s submission to the Qing dynasty in 1683 that Taiwan came under the control of China. Despite this, the Qing dynasty did not acknowledge the military strategic position that Taiwan occupied. In recognition of the importance of the island after the Sino-France war ended in 1885, Taiwan was made a province in its own right in 1887, and so began its modern development, such as the construction of a railway and in-land administrative system (ibid.). In a purely legal sense, the assimilation to the Qing dynasty in 1684 can be considered as evidence of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan (Hughes, 1997). However, Taiwanese scholar A-chin Hsiau (2012) described this incorporation as in fact an invasion of Taiwan. These historical events have different and even contradictory interpretations in the Taiwan-China relations.

One of the decisive turning points of Taiwan’s history was the First Sino-Japan War from 1894 to 1895, which had huge impact on political development. In 1895, Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japan War and colonised the Taiwan Island until 1945. When the ROC regime was established in 1912 in mainland China, the Taiwan Island was a Japanese colony. Although the Chiang Kai-Shek government made claims over the sovereignty of Taiwan in 1942, it was not until the Cairo Conference with Great Britain and the United States in November-December 1943 that this finally received international recognition (Hughes, 1997; Hsiau, 2012). From most accounts, Taiwanese people welcomed the ROC government in 1945, but were soon disappointed with the corruption, coercion and economical chaos that followed under the KMT rule. This dissatisfaction led to government repression on 28 February, 1947, of Taiwanese who sought to hold talks with the government to gain
democracy. This incident is considered the source of developing Taiwanese self-awareness and the concept of ‘Taiwan independence’ (Fleischauer, 2011; Hsiau, 2012; Jacobs, 2005).

Despite the victory over Japan in the Second World War, the KMT government soon lost to the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war. Following defeat, the ROC government retreated to Taiwan Island in 1949. The ROC, which was once the legitimate regime of China and recognised by the international community, soon began to lose its allies to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although the ROC was democratic in its constitution, the KMT government enforced martial law from 1949 to 1987. The lifting of martial law in 1987 marked the beginning of political democratisation in Taiwan. As Huntington (1991, p. 25) observed, the democratisation was due to ‘Taiwan's spectacular economic development…[which] overwhelmed a relatively weak Confucian legacy.’ In response to the pressures produced by economic and social change, two leaders of Taiwan in the late 1980s, Chiang Ching-kuo (in office 1978-1988) and Lee Teng-hui (in office 1988-2000) gradually moved to open up politics in the country (ibid.). As the successor of Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee had been consistently supportive in the process of Taiwan’s democratisation (Wachman, 1995). In 1996, Lee Teng-hui became the first directly-elected president. The KMT remained the ruling party of Taiwan until Chen Shui-bian (in office 2000-2008) from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the election and formed the first non-KMT government in 2000. This was a significant milestone in Taiwan politics as it was the first party alternation since 1949. The state power transferred peacefully from one party to another once again in 2008, while Ma Ying-jeou from the KMT won the election. President Ma Ying-jeou finished his second term in office in 2016. His successor Tsai Ing-wen from DPP was the first female president of Taiwan, and this marked another party alternation. On the whole, these peaceful party alternations signified the steady progress of Taiwan’s democratisation.

Since the PRC was formed by the Communist Party in Beijing in 1949, territory and legitimacy issues have arisen. The PRC claimed sovereignty over Taiwan as a breakaway province. It ratified the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which is designed to clear up any uncertainty over whether China is willing to sacrifice peace to preserve territorial integrity. It also establishes an explicit national mandate to use force if necessary for unification (Lieberthal, 2005). The PRC government rejects the claim that two Chinas – PRC and ROC – exist de jure today. Nonetheless, the ROC is considered a de facto independent country, which ‘fulfills all criteria for statehood but has not been recognised by the international community as a state’ (Kaczorowska-Ireland, 2015, p. 187). With a vague and uncertain
national identity, Taiwan’s cultural identity is substantially related to the political and historical narratives.

The political disputes are especially complex when it comes to foreign affairs, as the ROC has not officially given up the claim to be the legitimate government of China. This situation is more complicated under the ‘One China Policy’ – recognising the PRC government as the sole legal government of China. However, the PRC has never ruled Taiwan and other islands as it has been under the control of the ROC government (Kan, 2011). Gaining official recognition from other international organisations has become a competition between the ROC and PRC. For the ROC government, ‘chequebook diplomacy’ was the notorious practice of using secret slush funds to bribe nations into offering diplomatic recognition, and this was hardly transparent (The Economist, 2011). As reported in The Economist (ibid.), there were accusations that former presidents of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were involved in similar political bribes. When Ma Ying-jeou succeeded Chen Shui-bian in 2008, he wanted to end ‘chequebook diplomacy’ (or dollar diplomacy). Under President Ma Ying-jeou, in 2008, a ‘diplomatic truce’ was tactically agreed between PRC and ROC. That is to say, the PRC would not establish official diplomatic relations with the 23 allies of the ROC, whilst the latter would not seek new ones. Both the PRC and ROC recognised the diplomatic truce and would maintain the status quo whilst improving bilateral relations (Alexander, 2011). Instead of chequebook diplomacy, President Ma Ying-jeou (Office of the President, 2015) declared that he would promote ‘viable diplomacy’ (huoluwaijiao). Unlike chequebook diplomacy, which competed for allies with China, the ‘viable diplomacy’ aimed to promote Taiwan’s business and trade, national image and soft power. However, his idea was not new as the DPP embraced the idea of soft power as well (Rawnsley, 2014). In Ma’s foreign policy, ‘viable diplomacy’ could increase practical cooperation with other countries based on the political status, and the importance of cultural diplomacy was particularly stressed from the start of President Ma Ying-jeou’s first administration in 2008.

Despite the ‘viable diplomacy’ policy proposed by Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan still lost another ally during his administration. The Gambia severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2013 in a surprise move, and it was considered as a sign of China’s rising influence in Africa (Smith, 2013). The number of Taiwan’s allies decreased to 20 in June 2017 as São Tomé and Príncipe and the Republic of Panama ended their diplomatic relationship with ROC in 2016.
and 2017 respectively. In countries that have official diplomatic relations with China, the Taiwanese government set up representative offices as an alternative embassy or a consulate. Several names are used for the representative offices, such as Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO), or Taipei Representative Office (TRO). The representative offices serve to enhance trade, investment, education and cultural exchange. The name ‘Taipei’ downplayed disputes over Taiwan’s sovereignty. The overseas cultural centres were named in accordance with a similar principle, though there are more variations.

Nonetheless, Taiwan has been prevented from participating in international organisations as a sovereign state, as the PRC government claims the island as part of its territory. The ROC government lost its legal representative status of China to the PRC in the United Nations in 1971, and some clever devices are employed by the international community to allow Taiwan to participate in multi-lateral treaties (Kaczorowska-Ireland, 2015). As regards the few existing memberships, such as Taiwan’s participation in the International Olympic Committee, ‘Chinese Taipei’ is used instead of ‘Republic of China’ or ‘Taiwan.’ In international trade and economic organisations, Taiwan’s membership of the World Trade Organisation has been under the name Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) since joining in 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). This compromise in the usage of names not only lowered the level of the government from state to city, but also weakened the authority of the state.

Furthermore, as Taiwan is not a member state of the United Nations, it has participated in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) as a founding member since 1991. The UNPO is an international, nonviolent and democratic membership organisation. Members of the UNPO include indigenous peoples, minorities and unrecognised or occupied territories. The mission and work of UNPO cover issues of human and cultural rights, environment and nonviolent solutions to conflicts that affect its members. The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, a quango heavily funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has represented Taiwan in the UNPO since 2006 (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 2008). Despite the long-term participation in the UNPO, the Taiwanese government does not proactively participate in cultural diplomacy with members of the UNPO. This reveals the differentiation of Taiwan’s strategy in foreign affairs.

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1 As of June 2017, the 20 allies are (Asia Pacific) Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Republic of
In this section, I briefly discussed the historical and political background of Taiwan’s international status and external relations, which also have an impact on the formation of Taiwanese cultural identity. Despite the fact that its status as a political entity remains uncertain in the international community, Taiwan still tries to seize opportunities to participate in global affairs. The Taiwanese government has sought for a long time to take alternative measures in diplomacy, including public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and foreign aid. In the next section, I further illustrate the changes and different discourses of identity politics, and how these changes have influenced the image that the Taiwan government wishes to project overseas.

4.2 Cultural policy and changes in Taiwanese cultural identity

The political and cultural relationship between Taiwan and China provides the context for the analysis of issues that influence Taiwan’s internal and external cultural policy. Important cultural policy initiatives in relation to cultural identity were introduced in different periods. One significant example was the Cultural Revolution in China in the 1960s. With the wish to reclaim mainland China, the Chiang Kai-Shek government emphasised Chinese culture as part of the formation of its legitimacy. In May 1966, the full force of the Cultural Revolution severely destroyed cultural heritage. To counter this and re-affirm the legitimacy of the ROC government, the KMT authority decided to begin an initiative to resist the destruction of traditional culture. Consequently, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was launched to counter the Cultural Revolution in the same year (Chang, 2002; Wang, 2005). The national policy turn, as Chang (ibid) pointed out, shifted from anti-communist to preserving traditional culture. The purpose of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was twofold, as Fu-Chang Wang (2005) suggested: to show the world that Chinese culture was well preserved in Taiwan and to restore people’s confidence in the superiority of their cultural inheritance. Therefore, the KMT portrayed itself as the legitimate heir and defender of Chinese cultural tradition and hence of the Chinese nation. This can be considered as the ROC’s early attempt to differentiate itself culturally from the PRC.

Despite the KMT’s effort to promote the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, the ethnic issue in Taiwan cannot be ignored. Taiwan was six times more populous than the mainland in the time of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (Fu-Chang Wang, 2005). The dialects thus could be preserved despite the government’s imposition of Mandarin as the official language. After the government became aware of the popularity of television programmes broadcasted in Taiwanese dialects, more rigorous actions were taken, such as
measures to counteract the resurgence of Taiwanese regionalists among school children (ibid.). Nonetheless, the prioritisation of Traditional Chinese also faced its challenges from Taiwanese society. The top-down Chinese cultural identity construction policy was challenged by the emerging Taiwanese identity awareness in the 1970s, and further had tremendous influence on Taiwan’s cultural policy. In the late 1970s, particularly, the democratisation of Taiwan was increasingly evident in the context of pressure both internally for further reform and externally to move away from isolation (Jacobs, 2005). Taiwanese scholar A-chin Hsiau (2005) illustrated the shifts of historical narrative identity and how the indigenisation paradigm influenced the development of literature. This development enhanced the awareness of tracing the development of literature and local history. The proponents and critics in Taiwan started to address questions in a ‘historicised’ way, such as ‘what is the literature developed in Taiwan?’ and ‘what should it be?’ Hsiau (ibid, p. 131) argued that both proponents and critics of the indigenisation paradigm ‘have relied on narrative modes that embrace the past, the present, and the future of the Taiwanese people in addressing these questions.’ The paradigm shift in historical narratives had a strong influence on breeding the emergence of Taiwanese awareness both culturally and politically. Consequently, the awareness and historicism started to have an impact on films, popular music and the performing arts. These cultural products further strengthened the distribution of Taiwanese awareness among the general public and framed collective identity.

Cultural identity and cultural politics in Taiwan changed dramatically in the 1980s. Along with democratisation after the end of martial law, a new national identity developed (Hsiao, 2002). As Hsiao (ibid.) observed, the changing political landscape facilitated and inspired Taiwan’s cultural reconstruction and re-vitalisation. This process was a move to establish the cultural foundation for the new nation-building process. He noted that there was a movement among political and academic circles toward ‘de-Chineseness’ and ‘re-Taiwaneseness’ in the effort to review the last four hundred years of Taiwan’s history, since the Han Chinese first emigrated to the island (Hsiao, 2002). This academic and political movement enabled Taiwanese people to re-examine the complicated issue of identity and history. As Rigger (2011, p. 133) observed, this is inevitably related to the ‘China inside’ – encompassing both Taiwan’s ancestral heritage and its recent history – and ‘the China outside’ – the China that exists on the other side of the Taiwan Strait and is recognised today as the PRC. In other words, the attitude towards the PRC could also affect the identity of Chinese heritage. If the Taiwanese people wish to be distinguished from the Chinese, it is inevitable they will face the challenges of self-identity. Indeed, the term ‘Chinese’ can be an example of
the challenges of identity. It can refer to an ethnicity, a language, or the citizenship of ‘China’, whether it is ‘People’s Republic of China’ or ‘Republic of China’. For Taiwanese who wish to be distinguished from Chinese, the multi-layered meanings of this term represent the complicated issues of Taiwanese cultural identity.

The shared ancestral heritage and cultural ties between Taiwan and China are often described as a ‘brotherhood.’ Nonetheless, such a description could disguise hostility. One of the best examples was in 1996, when Beijing carried out a missile test to intimidate Taiwan in the run-up to its first direct presidential election. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman once described China as an 800-pound gorilla in Taiwan’s living room, and Jason Hu, a Taiwanese politician, who is famous for his humour, replied to him that it was even worse as that gorilla happens to think he is the brother of Taiwan (Rigger, 2011). The huge gorilla – the PRC government – next to Taiwan implied the uncontrollable danger in the early stage of Taiwan’s democratisation. This anecdotal episode provided evidence of how the attitude towards ‘the China inside’ related to ‘the China outside.’ Whilst the obvious threat to Taiwan’s national security was also in contradiction of the PRC’s claim of ‘brotherhood,’ it was inevitable that resistance would emerge to relations with China. When the Taiwanese started to resist the discourses on shared cultural heritage or so-called ‘brotherhood,’ it provided an opportunity to re-think and re-frame the cultural identity of either being ‘Chinese’ or ‘Taiwanese,’ or maybe accept that both coexist. From the annual research of the Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan as part of important political attitude trends distribution conducted by the Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University, the percentage of its respondents that identified themselves as ‘Taiwanese’ instead of ‘Chinese’ or ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ had risen significantly since 2007 (Election Study Center, 2016) (see Appendix 2). I would suggest there is a correlation between the DPP policy and the research results. The construction of identity has played a significant role in motivating private actors to participate in cultural diplomacy. This approach roused the enthusiasm of the general public in Taiwan to contribute to cultural diplomacy, such as artists’ participation in theatre festivals and their crowd-funding projects. Relevant examples can be found in theatre companies’ fundraising appeals (see Section 6.3).

In domestic politics, the desire in Taiwan to be distinguished from China became stronger in the second administration of Chen Shui-bian (2004-2008), the first president from the DPP. A cultural identity discourse of multiculturalism and consequent policymaking developed during this period. The multiculturalism of different ethnic groups was proposed by the DPP in 1992, whilst the party was in opposition. Its notion of a ‘multicultural Taiwan’
holds that Taiwanese culture consists of ‘the Four Ethnic’ groups – Hakka, Haklo, the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese indigenous people. The proposed cultural identity discourse of Taiwan is conceptualised as harmonious, democratic and tolerant towards the four main ethnic groups with the aim to create a liberal nation (Kaeding, 2011). The Hakka and Haklo, who speak different dialects, are mainly early emigrants from South-eastern China from the second half of sixteenth century (the time of the Ming and Qing dynasties) (Hsiau, 2012). The mainlanders are the emigrants who arrived in Taiwan with the Kuomintang government in 1949. However, the proposed multiculturalism is mostly Han-Chinese-centred. Li-jung Wang (2004) pointed out the two main objectives of the policy of multiculturalism. One is to create a new political legitimacy and social justice based on ethnic equality. And the other is to present a new national identity in an attempt to resolve the conflicts between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness. Three out of the Four Ethnic groups – Hakka, Haklo and the Mainlanders – are actually Han-Chinese. The multiculturalism in Taiwan is unlike the multiculturalism in Europe, which includes diverse ethnic groups, such as White, Asian, African-origin and Muslim (ibid.). That is to say, Han culture is actually the dominant majority in Taiwan’s cultural identity, but the proposed ‘multicultural Taiwan’ discourse can resolve the existing conflict between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness.

In the discourse of ‘multicultural Taiwan,’ the increasing awareness of the indigenous people’s rights is also worth noting. The Taiwanese indigenous peoples were marginalised partly due to previous cultural policies that tried to assimilate them into Han ethnicity. Li-jung Wang (2004) noted that a series of movements in search of indigenous identities emerged in the 1980s with growing awareness. Indigenous culture is a vital reference point to distinguish between Chinese and Taiwanese culture. It is said to be ‘native’ to Taiwan, whereas the other three ethnic groups have origins from mainland China. The importance of indigenous culture has been recognised not only from institutionalising relevant affairs and legal rights; it has subsequently been promoted overseas in both the Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou administration. However, controversies arose in some cases of presenting Taiwanese culture with indigenous costumes and dances, misunderstanding of the costumes and the occasions to wear was criticised as cultural appropriation. A more detailed discussion on the controversies continues in Chapter 5.

The process of cultural identity formation entered another phrase when the KMT returned to power in 2008. During his first administration, President Ma Ying-jeou, with his mainlander origin, proposed a new interpretation of Taiwanese culture. He elaborated his statement of Taiwan’s cultural identity in his President’s Address on the National Day in
2009, marking the sixtieth anniversary of the ROC government retreat to Taiwan (Office of the President, 2009). President Ma Ying-jeou stated that the six core values of ‘Taiwan spirit’ are integrity, kindness, diligence, honesty, ambitiousness and tolerance. These values can also be found in Chinese culture (zhonghuawenhua), but they are appreciated and practised further in Taiwan. This also enriches Chinese culture, which, over the past 60 years, people in Taiwan have defined with Taiwanese characteristics. In addition, Taiwan spares no effort to preserve the fundamentals of Chinese culture, for example, Traditional Chinese language characters.

The discourse proposed by President Ma Ying-jeou, to define Taiwanese culture as ‘Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics,’ denotes a key transition in the politics of cultural identity. The president’s statement defined Taiwanese culture as part of pan-Chinese culture. Interestingly, in comparison with the emphasis on ‘Taiwanese awareness’ during the previous Chen Shui-bian administration from 2000 to 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou emphasised the cultural link between Taiwan and China. Although the new identity seemed politically correct, the actual content in the ‘Chinese culture with a Taiwanese characteristics’ was not clearly articulated except in vague spiritual concepts. By emphasising the preservation of Traditional Chinese characters, in contrast to the Simplified Chinese characters used in mainland China, the president’s statement not only maintained the link to Chinese culture, but also differentiated it from China. However, I would suggest President Ma Ying-jeou’s interpretation of Taiwan’s cultural identity is a safe choice and may be politically correct. It did not entirely contradict the DPP’s cultural identity discourse and refrained from triggering radical disagreement. In the next section, I illustrate how the government develops cultural relations with China and the related issues.

4.3 Soft power competition between Taiwan and China
The notions of soft power and peaceful uprising were aspects of the Chinese government under the leadership of Hu Jintao (in office 2003-2013). The concept of soft power has constantly appeared on the political agenda of both governments in China and Taiwan. The President of China, Hu Jintao, declared his wish to enhance culture as part of China’s soft power initiatives (Nye, 2011). President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan also believed that soft power was crucial in cross-Strait relations (Chu, 2011). Whilst existing studies in cross-Strait relations have focused on politics, defence and economy, Taiwanese scholars, such as Su Chi (2009) and Yun-Han Chu (2011), have analysed the use of soft power in the bilateral relations within the context of domestic governance. Furthermore, Wang and Lu (2008),
deLisle (2010) and Rawnsley (2012) examined the similarity of Taiwan’s and China’s soft power strategy in diplomacy. Other than the focus in the literature on mutual relations, discussion can be found on soft power in either of the two states (Kurlantzick, 2007; Rigger, 2011). As the Chinese government ambitiously promotes China’s soft power abroad, there are also a considerable number of publications addressing its strengths and weaknesses (d'Hooghe, 2011b; Li, 2009; Wang, 2011). Two main themes are evident in the analysis. One concerns the bi-lateral communications with China, and the other compares the strategies of the two states.

Rawnsley (2012) pointed out that in most soft power and public diplomacy strategies, including those designed by Taiwan and China, there is a notable emphasis on outputs rather than impact. Rawnsley (ibid.) further argued that any attempt to ‘stockpile soft power’ or ‘wielding soft power’ suggests that it is as tangible as weapons. This relates to some of the issues surrounding soft power already discussed in the theoretical background of the research. The concept is beginning to lose its relevance for two reasons. First, if the term describes everything, it becomes meaningless and its value as a conceptual tool diminishes rapidly. Secondly, Rawnsley (ibid., p. 124) questioned: ‘where does hard power end and soft power begin?’ These issues are similar to those found in Taiwan’s official documents. The term ‘soft power’ is used in government mission statements, such as the Ministry of Culture’s (MOC) policymaking, but the content is not yet clearly articulated. Thus, Rawnsley’s arguments also concern the use of soft power in policy documents. Arguably, the term ‘soft power’ has become jargon and is losing its relevance in Taiwan’s policy documents.

Both sides of the Taiwan Strait want to practise soft power, not only in relation to each other, but also the rest of the world. As deLisle (2010) observed, the PRC and Taiwan have sought to develop and deploy soft power sometimes in similar ways despite their different positions and agendas. When it comes to projecting their soft power to other audiences, the similarities become more obvious, a mirroring in strategy-making. A similar case can be found in relation to the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in Taiwan versus the Cultural Revolution in China. Taipei’s soft power resources and tactics in many respects mirror Beijing’s, such as the political and ideological contrast to the self-proclaimed communist regime across the Strait (ibid.). The contrast has been a principal weapon in Taiwan’s soft power arsenal and a key to maintaining support from the United States. Thus, the proclivity of the United States made itself a key audience and motivation for cross-Strait soft power competition (ibid.).
The fact that both Taiwanese and Chinese governments adopt the idea of soft power represents the influence of United States soft power in its own right. It shows how this political value influences Taiwan and China. The consideration of soft power resources represents and influences the different strategies the Taiwan and China governments employ. In terms of culture, unlike the emphasis on American popular culture in the United States soft power (Nye, 2004), China highlights traditional Chinese culture in its strategy (Wang & Lu, 2008). The focus on different cultural products reflects domestic cultural policy and the target audience of cultural exports. The prioritisation of traditional culture over political value in the soft power strategy of China is worth discussing. The inconsistency in China’s ambition, rhetoric and behaviour, especially regarding human rights, could undo any positive achievements in the soft power domain (Rawnsley, 2012). In comparison, Taiwan’s achievements in democracy were recognised by the government. For instance, President Ma Ying-jeou stated that soft power was crucial in cross-Strait communications, especially the emphasis on democracy and freedom in Taiwan (Office of the President, 2011). Furthermore, Taiwan has soft power resources in its economy model, transparency, legal system and respect for intellectual property. Additionally, Taiwan shares values with the United States and other developed countries (deLisle, 2010). Thus, the promotion of Taiwan’s soft power also provides a separate identity to confront China for the domestic audience (Wang & Lu, 2008). In other words, the promotion of soft power helps identity formation among the public in Taiwan, and to differentiate themselves from mainland Chinese.

Despite the different prioritising of soft power resources, China and Taiwan follow a similar route in cooperating with higher education institutions overseas: both have set up dedicated bodies to establish these partnerships. Since 2004, China’s Confucius Institutes have rapidly expanded worldwide, and this speed of growth could be considered as a success of China’s soft power. Nevertheless, there remains suspicion that the Confucius Institutes are propaganda machines despite their declared intention to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries (Nakagawa, 2011). As the number of Confucius Institutes grows, so does concern among Western academics. They are considered a serious threat to freedom of thought and speech in education, and calls have been made to universities to stop hosting them (Sudworth, 2014). Even if the growing number of Confucius Institutes can be considered as a success in promoting soft power, how they are received in Western universities can be very different.

Similarly, following President Ma Ying-jeou’s cultural policy plan, Taiwan has also established Taiwan Academies in the United States to ‘promote Traditional Chinese language
and Taiwanese culture’ (Taiwan Academy, 2011). There are Taiwan Academy contact points in various universities to help the promotion of scholarships for study in Taiwan. The first Minister of Culture of Taiwan, Ms Lung Ying-tai (in office 2012-2014), emphasises that the Taiwan Academies are for purely cultural diplomacy reasons without political intention (Chiu, 2014). It is interesting the statements Ms Lung made, specifically, the dynamics of Taiwan Academies and their self-differentiation from Confucius Institutes. I would interpret her statement as attempting to make the Taiwan Academy apolitical, and to refrain from casting doubt on the Confucius Institutes. I also suggest that she does not wish to oppose the Chinese government. However, despite the attempt by the Taiwanese government to demonstrate a softer appeal in its cultural diplomacy by promoting culture and making friends, whether this approach is feasible remains in question. It may be challenged when there are conflicts of cultural diplomacy. Notably, at the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) in Portugal, in July 2014, Xu Lin, the Director-General of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, issued a mandatory request regarding the removal of pages from the Conference Programme as it presented information about the long-term EACS conference sponsor Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation from Taiwan (Greatrex, 2014). It was reported that the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan protested to China over this dispute (Tsou, 2014). This is a case of conflict in cultural relations. When it comes to funding and sponsorship, the political factor can remain regardless of how ‘soft’ a cultural relations activity can be. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether measures are available to the Taiwanese government other than expressing discontent to the Chinese government if similar clashes are unavoidable.

Furthermore, Minister Lung Ying-tai (Wang, 2012) stated that the setting up Taiwan Academies was not to compete with the Confucius Institutes. However, I would argue that comparisons are unavoidable especially when both education centres intend to promote Chinese culture and employ similar strategies. For instance, whether to study Chinese culture in Taiwan or China can be considered a personal choice, but the resources which a government offers can be a decisive element. One example of this unavoidable comparison is the recruitment of overseas Chinese students. For scholars interested in studying Mandarin and Taiwan Studies, the Taiwanese government advertises the island as a destination. Scholarships from the government, through the Ministry of Education (MOE) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), are available along with funding from Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund or Chiang Chingkuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (Study in Taiwan, 2014). Overseas ethnic Chinese students (qiaosheng) are a special target of recruitment. According to the Taiwanese government’s definition,
*qiaoosheng* are students with ROC nationality, who have lived abroad since birth, or obtained the permanent residency of another country they have lived in for over six consecutive years. Students from mainland China are not categorised as *qiaoosheng*. Students from Hong Kong and Macau were considered *qiaoosheng* before 1997, and identified as a separate category afterwards. The Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) in Taiwan also set up bursaries for these students (Overseas Community Affairs Council, 2016a). According to Kurlantzick (2007), the ROC government provided funding for ethnic Chinese students across the world attending universities in Taiwan from the 1960s to the 1990s. This became a traditional source of soft power as they studied Chinese language, culture and other disciplines at Taiwanese universities. However, as Kurlantzick (2007) pointed out, in the 2000s, the government in Taipei became worried about tight budgets, leading to subsidies for foreigners to study in Taiwan being cut. The number of overseas Chinese students enrolled annually in the universities and colleges in Taiwan fell between 2000 and 2003. Compared with 1999 when over 3000 overseas Chinese students enrolled, the number declined over three consecutive years. In 2003, there were only 2,588 students enrolled. However, the number started to increase after 2011, to over 4000 in 2015 (Overseas Community Affairs Council, 2016b). Compared with the figures provided by Kurlantzick (2007), the decline in the number of overseas Chinese students was most pronounced during Chen Shui-bian’s first administration. The cut in subsidies could be one reason for the decline.

In addition to the cut in subsidies, Kurlantzick (ibid) suggested that, with the economic emergence of China, the current generation of overseas Chinese would probably choose to study in Beijing and Shanghai rather than Taiwan. Thus, arguably, the decline in Taiwan’s economy weakened the strength of its soft power. However, economic reasons are not the only reason for cutting funding for ethnic Chinese students. Damm (2011) argued that Chen Shui-bian’s administration made a distinction between overseas Taiwanese and overseas Chinese. The OCAC had a ‘three grade theory,’ which distinguished, first, the overseas Taiwanese, who held an ROC passport and emigrated from Taiwan, secondly, the overseas students who had studied in Taiwan, and, thirdly, the traditional Chinese overseas who had ethnic Chinese lineage. Damm (ibid.) pointed out that the developments in policy and the attempt to distinguish between the overseas Chinese communities raised criticism from traditional overseas Chinese organisations. Instead of transferring loyalty to the DPP, these organisations were attracted to China with its improved economic prospects. Shambaugh (2013) observed that winning the hearts of the Chinese diaspora, and further
garnering political support for the regime and for the ‘motherland,’ has long been the case in Beijing and Taipei’s diplomatic war.

Although a ‘diplomatic truce’ was proposed in 2008 between both sides, that Beijing would not poach Taiwan’s allies and Taiwan would not seek new ones (Alexander, 2011), there remains competition in terms of the recipients of their soft power, such as seeking cooperation with higher education institutions abroad and the recruitment of ethnic Chinese students. Whilst the Chinese government tries to attract students from other countries with larger grants, Taiwan is gradually losing the ability to support foreign students financially. I suggest that the link established through overseas study could last over several generations. There will be profound consequences, thus further weakening the link between Taiwan and students from overseas, although the impact may not be felt in the short term. In addition to the strategies practised internationally, the Taiwanese government introduced programmes in cross-Strait communications in the hope of exercising soft power. In the next section, I illustrate the issues that the government faced in the process.

4.4 The hard and the soft issues in cross-Strait cultural relations

Despite the growing cultural exchange, tourism and trade, the close relationship with China is not without concern in Taiwan. Since 2008, when Taiwan opened its doors to Chinese tourists and, subsequently, to Chinese students in 2011, the cultural exchange from both sides has intensified. The communication of culture, business and trade is frequent between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, despite political and territorial disputes. Regarding soft power strategies on both sides, Hu Jintao declared his intention to develop China’s soft power whilst reorienting China’s cross-Strait policy from reunification to anti-secession (deLisle, 2010; Nye, 2011). Taiwan remains the issue on China’s soft power and broader policy agenda, which is clearly not in favour of the status quo (deLisle, 2010). For the Taiwanese government, the goals of soft power practice are to encourage exchange and enhance trust on both sides. However, intensive communication does not necessarily bring mutual trust. As China and Taiwan have been separated for nearly seventy years, the differences in ideas and lifestyles are difficult to ignore. The existing disputes between the two governments and potential hostility cannot be eliminated overnight.

Cross-Strait cultural relations were considered optimistic by Taiwanese scholar Yun-Han Chu (2011), who noted several resources of Taiwan’s soft power in cross-Strait relations. He asserted that these were exercise of democracy, cultural heritage and linguistic affinity with the mainland. In terms of the current policy, Chu (ibid.) stated that the Ma
Ying-jeou government had recognised the importance of soft power, but still chose not to take an explicit role in coordinating cross-Strait cultural exchange. The preservation of Chinese social customs and culture was interpreted as an example of the blending of modernity and tradition in Taiwan. Nonetheless, Chu (ibid.) warned that the relationship between both sides must remain smooth, as the attraction of Taiwan might gradually decrease if it continues to estrange itself from China both culturally and politically. This type of argument supports President Ma Ying-jeou’s strategy of seeking a closer relationship with mainland China. However, Taiwan faces a difficult task when projecting its soft power – maintaining ties with and, at the same time, being differentiated from the PRC. To borrow Rigger’s (2011) description again, it is the confrontation of both ‘the China outside’ and ‘the China inside.’

To deal with ‘the China outside’ relationship is not easy for Taiwanese authorities. Since direct flights between China and Taiwan began in 2008, bilateral ties have been strengthened in economic and cultural terms. Chinese tourism and the student recruitment programme are two examples of the development of cross-Strait relations. As Taiwanese scholar Su Chi (2009) argued, if the cross-Strait relations are roughly divided into five categories – military, diplomacy, politics, economy and culture – the last two are considered ‘soft,’ whereas the rest are harder. An unprecedented phenomenon has materialised in cross-Strait relations since 2000. Su (ibid.) illustrated that the hard measures became harder and the soft measures became softer. In terms of ‘soft,’ he pointed out that the economic and cultural exchanges in the private sector intensified immensely. On the other hand, the military and diplomatic standoff also deepened. He considered this inner contradiction as the first-ever in this bilateral relationship, and also rare in modern international relations. I agree with this observation that the economic and cultural exchanges in the private sector have intensified. Since the open-door policy started in 2008, some significant cultural differences have been revealed between the Chinese and Taiwanese. Other than governmental or institutional contacts, Taiwan's open-door policy towards mainland Chinese tourists has provided not only business, but also communication opportunities for the public. The number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan increased rapidly. In 2008, there were only 329,204 Chinese visitors; the number grew to 972,123 the following year, over 1 million in 2010, and 2 million in 2012. By 2014 and 2015, the number had grown to over 3 million (Tourism Bureau, 2016).

Although the number of Chinese tourists soared, the Taiwanese government welcomed them with caution. The similarities between mainland China and Taiwan in
ethnicity, culture, language and religion significantly influenced cross-Straits tourism (Chung, 2012; Guo, Kim, Timothy, & Wang, 2006). The excursion tours in Taiwan are carefully designed so that Chinese tourists enjoy the scenery and shopping experience. However, tourists need to meet strict criteria in terms of finance guarantees, budget and itinerary plans for visa approval from Taiwan. These regulations reveal the specific concerns about the security risks from mainland China. It was not until 2011 that the Taiwanese government loosened the regulations for Chinese tourists. Strict visa regulations are still in place, but tourists from Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen can travel independently in Taiwan (Foster, 2011). I would suggest that the cautious welcome is inevitable as long as the political tension between Taiwan and China exists. Although the students and tourists are welcome, the strict criteria for visa approval are revealing of the government’s suspicion. The numbers of Chinese tourists from 2008 to 2015 increased over thirty-fold and brought business to Taiwan. However, the situation started to change after the DPP administration came to power in May 2016. According to a news report in June 2016, group permit applications from the mainland fell 18 percent year-on-year in May 2016, after dropping 23 percent year-on-year in April, and this downturn were expected to continue in the next few months (Lin, 2016).

Furthermore, Taiwan welcomes students from China in its universities. According to statistics published by the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, there were 7,813 Chinese students enrolled for degree courses in Taiwan’s universities and colleges in 2015, and 34,114 students for short courses or exchange programmes in the same year. The total number of Chinese students taking degree courses from 2011 to 2015 was over 20,000 (Department of Statistics, 2016). The welcome is not without conditions. These students are restricted to receiving public funding from the Taiwanese government or to working part-time (Liu, 2011). Compared with other destinations for overseas study, it is doubtful whether Taiwan remains a popular choice for Chinese students. Additionally, there were disputes about whether Chinese students were eligible to be covered by the National Health Insurance system in Taiwan. For overseas students in Taiwan and those resident more than six months, they are eligible to take health insurance. This includes overseas Chinese students (qiaosheng), who hold dual nationality of the ROC and another country, and international students (waijisheng), who are not nationals of the ROC. For students from mainland China, their obligations and rights are defined in a special bill – the Act on Government Relations Between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area’ – but they are neither categorised as international students, nor overseas Chinese students. There were
disagreements in government and publicly about whether students from mainland China have the same obligations and rights as other international students. The situation started to change in 2016 as the legislative caucus of the ruling DPP moved to revise the National Health Insurance Act (Yeh, Chen, Hsu, & Wu, 2016). However, this case shows the problem facing the Taiwanese government in relation to mainland Chinese students. If it wants to attract more students from mainland China to study in Taiwan, the fair treatment of non-Taiwanese students is an important issue that it should consider carefully. The young generation can be the best recipients of soft power and maintain links with the countries they have studied for a long time, as, for example, the overseas Chinese students in Taiwan in the 1960s. Their connection with Taiwan may last for a lifetime. The limitation imposed on Chinese tourists and students arguably undermined the efforts to attract them to Taiwan.

With increasing opportunity to interact with Chinese people, it would be interesting to determine whether this changes Taiwanese people’s view on China. In research by Wang and Cheng (2017), based on surveys in 2013 and 2014, the empirical results show that casual or random encounters with Chinese tourists have no effect on Taiwanese citizens’ general perception of China. When Taiwanese have serious interactions with Chinese citizens in the form of friendship, it moderates their unfavourable feelings towards them, but has no effects on their perception of a hostile Chinese government. The authors suggested that frequent interactions do not have transformative effects on individuals’ political views unless these contacts elicit genuine feelings and social bonds. To elaborate, arguably, it takes a long time to change people’s views, and personal contact does not necessarily negate negative feelings towards a hostile government. Furthermore, in the case of cross-Strait relations, I suggest that the negative feelings could affect citizens’ attitudes towards government strategies.

The negotiation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) can serve as an example of how negative feelings towards the Chinese government were not changed by citizens’ contacts. The ECFA is a preferential trade agreement between Taiwan and China signed in 2010. In this agreement, both governments agreed to reduce gradually or eliminate barriers to trade and investment and further advance cross-Straits trade and establish a cooperation mechanism beneficial to economic prosperity and development (Bureau of Foreign Trade, 2010). The signing and honouring of the agreement particularly raised controversy in Taiwanese society. The scepticism regarding cross-Strait cultural affairs stems not only from political disputes, but also from the lack of confidence in the Taiwanese government. Following the ECFA signed in 2010, the governments in China and Taiwan initiated the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA, also dubbed the Trade in
Service Agreement, TiSA). The CSSTA was negotiated by representatives from both countries in 2013, and awaits confirmation from Taiwan’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan. In the pact of this agreement, Taiwan opens several service industries to Chinese investors. Printing, publishing and the management of entertainment venues are in the categories of cultural and creative industries in Taiwan. They are also the most controversial businesses in the agreement. One of the major concerns is censorship in China, and the CSSTA could potentially undermine the freedom of speech in Taiwan. Also, it is questioned whether the agreement would attract economic growth as the government claimed.

When the Taiwanese government failed to provide an assessment of the impact of the CSSTA, concerns were raised among academics and opinion leaders from different walks of life, which, consequently, triggered a massive demonstration, the Sunflower Movement. On 17 March, 2014, the Legislative Yuan was scheduled to review the CSSTA. However, legislators from the KMT Party tried to force the confirmation despite breaching the procedure regulations in the Legislative Yuan. On the following day, university students and social activists gathered at the Legislative Yuan and further occupied the main legislature chamber. The protest aroused Western media attention and the movement lasted 23 days. Taiwanese students studying abroad also supported the demonstration by organising demonstrations in New York, London, Brussels and Paris. The Sunflower Movement is symbolic of the cross-Strait relations in terms of its scale and the attention received. Furthermore, I suggest it showed that the dissatisfaction of the grassroots cannot be ignored. Following the demonstrations, the negotiation of the CSSTA was suspended. By the time of completing this thesis in 2017, the CSSTA had not been enforced.

4.5 Challenges in the cross-Strait cultural exchange

Despite the unsolved political issues in the China-Taiwan relations, the cultural similarities enhance communication on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. As previously mentioned, it was not until martial law was lifted in 1987 that Taiwanese people could visit mainland China for family reasons or tourism. These changes in cultural exchange affairs in cross-Strait relations can be seen embodied in Taiwan’s cultural policy. Cross-Strait cultural exchange was included in the 1998 White Paper for Culture. The CCA stated in the White Paper that it was considered appropriate to start from culture and education exchange to enhance the mutual understanding between the people in China and Taiwan. Therefore, the CCA subsidised private foundations to host cultural exchange activities. The government wished to loosen gradually the restrictions on cultural exchange. Based on the principles of rationality, peace,
equality, and reciprocity, the government wished to establish a democratic and prosperous society in the unified China (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). At this stage, government officials were more passive and encouraged cultural exchange between private actors by providing funding. Furthermore, the goal of enhancing mutual understanding through cultural exchange was to prepare for future unification.

Consequently, in the DPP administration between 2000 and 2008, the CCA took a more proactive approach to cross-Strait cultural exchange. Rather than just being a grant provider, the CCA decided to seek actively opportunities to contact the sub-organisations of China’s Ministry of Culture. In the 2004 White Paper for Culture, it was stated that only through face-to-face contact between government officials that the barrier, which has existed between both sides for over half a century, could be demolished. The aim of these interactions was to express Taiwan’s democracy and human rights. In the 2004 White Paper, it was claimed that cultural diversity could only exist in a democratic country. Culture could provide leverage in cross-Strait affairs (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004a). A transition in the discourse of cultural identity was evident in this era. To conduct cultural exchange between China and Taiwan was not based on the similarities of culture. Rather, it was emphasised the subjectivity and the political values in Taiwan. Thus, this approach was to identify the differences between the cultures of China and Taiwan instead of the similarities. In addition, it was expected that the government would gain more right to speak if actively engaging with Chinese government officials.

After President Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration in 2008, official cultural exchanges reached an unprecedented level since the PRC government was established in 1949. First, in 2010, the Chinese Minister of Culture, Cai Wu, visited Taiwan to meet with then Chairperson of the Council for Cultural Affairs, Emile Sheng. Although the proposal from China for a ‘Cross-Strait Cultural agreement’ was postponed, the event represented a high level of mutual cultural exchange. Cultural affairs were considered the next important agenda in cross-Strait relations after the signing the ECFA (The China Post, 2010). Another significant occasion was the reunion of two halves of the ancient painting ‘Dwelling in the Fuchun Mountains’ at the National Palace Museum in Taipei in 2011. It became an iconic event that demonstrated improvements in cross-Strait cultural relations (Jacobs, 2011). ‘Dwelling in the Fuchun Mountains’ is a work of the Chinese painter Huang Gongwang (1269-1354). The painting was burnt into two pieces in 1650, one belonging to the National Palace Museum in Taipei, and the other to Zhejiang Provincial Museum in Hangzhou. The reunion of the two pieces in 2011 was the first time since their separation over 350 years ago. It not only attracted a
considerable number of visitors to the Museum, but also marked a new form of official cultural collaboration between Taiwan and China. Further collaboration was proposed after Taiwan’s National Palace Museum Director Feng Ming-chu’s visit to the Palace Museum in Beijing. Although the Palace Museum in Beijing has shown great interest in borrowing artefacts from Taipei, two conditions are required to be fulfilled. First, the title of the National Palace Museum needs to be displayed in full. Secondly, China needs to pass laws regarding the Immunity of Judicial Seizure of artefacts (Tsai & Wu, 2013). For the Chinese government, the term ‘national’ in certain state-funded organisations is particularly sensitive, as Taiwan is always claimed as part of its territory. As long as the word ‘national’ is required to be omitted upon request from China, this compromises cross-Strait relations, and makes it nearly impossible for the National Palace Museum in Taiwan to loan any of its collection to its counterpart in Beijing. This asymmetric relationship remains an obstacle for further cultural exchange.

Furthermore, the postponed cross-Strait cultural agreement was expected to bring both sides together, whilst the Chinese government wished to promote Chinese culture together with Taiwan. It was not the first time that a cross-Strait cultural agreement was proposed. In 1997, the CCA convened the second National Cultural Conference and invited recommendations and opinions nationwide. Signing a cultural agreement between Taiwan and China was first mentioned in this conference. The proposal was based on the agreements signed after the Wang-Koo summit in 1993; a cultural agreement could regulate cultural exchange and possibly normalise the relationship between both sides (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1997). However, a cultural agreement between Taiwan and China is yet to be realised. I would suggest two reasons for this: first the changing of the political landscape in Taiwan that further influenced cross-Strait relations, as the DPP administration (2000-2008) had a different approach towards cultural affairs; secondly, the constraints imposed by this cultural agreement needing to be signed in circumstances in which both sides were regarded as having equal status.

In fact, the ECFA can be a means to engage with the Taiwanese government’s existing cultural and creative industries policy to stimulate new modes of cultural production (Chung, 2012). Former Chairperson Sheng confirmed that the CCA was seeking the possibility of establishing a semi-official office or private organisation in China (Ko, 2010). An intermediary organisation can facilitate cross-Strait collaboration, especially in commercial television programmes and pop music. Although there were plans to host a forum on cross-Strait cultural affairs in 2014, these were later dropped. If the forum had been
realised between both governments, the MOC in Taiwan was expected to formalise some regulations for creative and cultural industries. However, it was reported that the National Security Council in Taiwan had concerns over the content of the potential agreement that would be signed after the forum. According to the news reports, the National Security Council cautioned that this agreement could help the PRC to unify Taiwan through shaping a common cultural identity of Chinese culture (Chiu, 2014). It may be suggested that cultural affairs between Taiwan and China could hardly be apolitical when there are concerns over national security.

For Taiwanese cultural professionals, cultural communication between Taiwan and China has become more frequent since direct flights began in 2008. The convenience of direct flights significantly decreased the cost of travelling time. Whilst Taiwan wishes to develop the creative and cultural industries exports, the advantages of a shared language makes China or overseas Chinese communities the primary target market. The Chinese market is massive, but to negotiate its regulations and hidden rules can be challenging. One of the most significant examples was in 2000, when the aboriginal singer A-mei sang the National Anthem at the inaugural ceremony of President Chen Shui-Bian (of the DPP). Soon afterwards, A-mei was blacklisted in China and the reason was because her performance at the ceremony suggested that she was an independence supporter (Guy, 2002). This case demonstrates that politics remains a sensitive topic, and might have an impact on cultural business.

In addition to A-mei’s case, similar controversies have surrounded theatres, especially under the PRC government censorship. Based on their shared language, China is a prospective market for Taiwanese theatre companies. With the aim of encouraging cultural exchange, the MOC in Taiwan has also provided grants for theatre companies to tour in China – the ‘Classic China Tour.’ From 2009, a selection of works received public funding to tour mainland China. However, despite the potential revenue of touring, there are bureaucratic drawbacks. The ‘administrative examination and approval system’ (shenpizhidu) in China is a regulation that all theatre productions must have approval from the government before staging a performance. Theatre companies must be aware that sensitive topics (e.g. sex, violence and politics) are prohibited. The ‘administrative examination and approval system’ censors performing arts productions and issues permission for ticket-selling performances. Failing to obtain permission prior to the ticket sale could result in a loss of revenue. However, the ‘administrative examination and approval system’ is often a mystery for Taiwanese companies, mainly because the Chinese government does not provide a reason for banning.
certain works (Lin, 2012a). The approval is not merely based on legal regulation, but also on unspoken consensus ('hidden rules'). Despite the potential revenue that can be generated from touring in China, passing the ‘administrative examination and approval system’ has become part of the business risk that companies need to consider when entering the Chinese market (Wu, personal communication, 31 May, 2013). Censorship has become a major issue for opening the Chinese market for theatre companies. How to abide by the rules and not risk financial loss is a problem.

Consequently, the approval system has also raised issues of self-censorship among Taiwanese artists. For instance, when in 2012 Performance Workshop was touring its play The Village in China, an actor went on strike and protested the company’s decision to amend the script to omit a scene in which the national flag is raised and the national anthem of the ROC sung (Chao & Ling, 2012). The case of The Village also raised concerns that the market-driven cultural exports to China would eventually damage the creativity and freedom of speech in Taiwanese cultural industries. Freedom of speech was also one of the main issues raised in the protest against the CSSTA in March 2014. In this proposed agreement, funds from China can be invested in Taiwan’s theatres, but restricted to less than half of the share. In the official statement from the Taiwanese government, Chinese investors are not allowed to control the programming. Nonetheless, the promise from the Taiwanese government did not convince Taiwanese artists and social activists.

The difficulties that Taiwanese theatres face reflect the dilemma of cross-Strait cultural exchange. First, the sensitivity of governmental communication resulted in a lack of official regulation and support. Even if there is a shared culture and language, touring a show in China still requires insider knowledge and an understanding of the ‘hidden rules’ in its bureaucracy. Secondly, censorship in China challenges the freedom of speech that Taiwanese companies have enjoyed since the lifting of martial law. This also creates a barrier to cultural exchange. Despite the desire for better understanding, the ideological disagreements remain important issues. When up against strong government in China, it raises doubts that soft power can make up for the shortcomings of Taiwan’s hard power.

The legalisation of cross-Strait cultural exchange reflects the sensitive political issues in Taiwan-China relations. The primary agents have been Taiwan’s private actors, influencing mainland China with little assistance and much less guidance. This is unlike the typical public diplomacy conducted by the state (Chu, 2011). Additionally, in comparison with normal state-to-state relations that are always lateral arrangements, neither Taiwan nor China is empowered to conduct public diplomacy when dealing with relations across the
Strait, and the primary agents influencing the Chinese public are Taiwan’s private agents (ibid). This similarly applies to the negotiation of cultural affairs in cultural exchange. However, an official representative office is yet to be established in either China or Taiwan, and, in 2011, the government-funded platform ‘bravo.net’ was set up by the Quanta Arts Foundation to support arts companies running businesses across the Taiwan Strait. The establishment and maintenance of the platform were commissioned by a private foundation. The website also responded to a growing demand for information on the cross-Strait cultural industry. For example, essential information such as regional regulation and China’s ‘administrative examination and approval system’ was provided to Taiwanese companies. However, the project was discontinued after three years. This, nevertheless, seems hasty when the existing information was not properly stored.

During fieldwork, my interviewee, who works for the Taiwanese government and wished to remain anonymous, shared a personal view that even if the government did not offer funding to Taiwanese performing arts companies to tour China, the companies would go anyway (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). In the past, the Taiwanese government encouraged theatre companies to engage in cultural exchange; nowadays, they would go because of the potential business revenue in the Chinese market. Whether to subsidise the theatre companies to tour China is an interesting issue. If the government considers touring a profitable business that does not require public funding, then it leaves the companies to assume the financial risks. Thus, they may choose to take the path of least resistance. In this context, it can mean avoiding anything that might be intimidating to the Chinese authority, and this may not be beneficial in the long-term. My interviewee also mentioned that self-censorship can be found among Taiwanese filmmakers to avoid being barred from working in the Chinese film industry. This could mean that a more market-leaning approach for cross-Strait cultural relations might undermine Taiwan’s soft power in the process, if the freedom of speech cannot be observed in these cultural productions.

Another issue concerned formalising regulation to solve problems brought about by bureaucracy in China, such as the potential financial loss due to failing to obtain permission prior to ticket sales. If the Taiwanese government wishes to negotiate with the PRC, then it must be conducted on equal terms, which is difficult. The dilemma of the lure of a large market and lack of regulation is a risk for Taiwanese cultural professionals to consider when wanting to operate their business in China. This remains a grey area and awaits future negotiation between the two governments.
For both governments in Taiwan and China, soft power practice has become essential in external relations and cultural relations. From commercial to official communication, cross-Strait cultural exchange has reached a peak since 1949, under Taiwan’s Ma administration. The examples of cultural exchanges in the context of theatre and museum exhibits show that several problems need to be solved before further collaboration is possible. From asymmetrical political relations to bureaucratic constraints, there are several unsolved issues in cross-Straits cultural relations. For official and non-governmental actors from both sides, knowledge and experience are essential. In terms of official agreement, cultural affairs appear to be more delicate to deal with for the Taiwanese government. Moreover, the Taiwanese government faces objections domestically regarding disagreements in the CSSTA and the welfare of Chinese students. Although the strength of a shared language has made China a major market of opportunity for Taiwanese cultural productions, politics still poses a barrier to further development. However, the lack of credibility of Chinese bureaucracy still brings difficulty to cross-Strait cultural relations, such as the operation of the ‘administrative examination and approval system.’ The potential for cultural exchange between both sides of the Taiwan Strait is not as great as it might appear. In the next chapter, I discuss the Taiwanese government’s cultural diplomacy strategy and how it has changed over time.
Chapter 5: Research Findings: Placing Taiwan’s Cultural Diplomacy in Cultural Policy

In the previous chapter, I discussed the historical background and contextual issues of the China-Taiwan cultural exchange. In this chapter, I present the findings on the Taiwanese government’s policy development regarding cultural policy and cultural diplomacy. It consists of six sections analysing how cultural diplomacy has evolved in relation to changes in cultural policymaking by the Taiwanese government. Subsequently, I examine different regional strategies of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, I investigate the outreach of cultural centres. In the final section, I consider how other public cultural institutions can contribute to the development of Taiwanese cultural diplomacy and maintain international cultural networks despite little official recognition of the country internationally. Finally, I discuss the combination of cultural products and nation branding, which is aligned with the cultural and creative industries policies in Taiwan.

5.1 The central government strategy of cultural diplomacy prior to the period 1981-1990

In this section, I present my findings on the central government’s cultural diplomacy strategy. The programme content reflects the changes of cultural identity and policy in the Taiwanese/ROC government. Hosting a successful artistic overseas tour can improve significantly a country’s reputation among both domestic and foreign audiences. The introduction of performing arts tours and arts exhibitions abroad predates the ROC government’s loss in the civil war against the Communist Party in 1949. One notable example was Mei Lanfang’s tour in 1930 to the United States. Mei Lanfang, the legendary Peking Opera actor, was famous for his unique style and interpretation of female characters. As a result of his extensive performances abroad, and especially his tour of the United States, Peking Opera obtained international recognition. Government officials soon started to explore the potential diplomatic uses of this art form and, consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) hosted private performances for foreign guests and dignitaries (Guy, 2001). Furthermore, as Guy (ibid.) pointed out, Mei Lanfang’s tour was significant as it was launched at a time when traditional culture was under attack in China. China was perceived as weak at home and abroad. Improving China’s international reputation was among the fundamental aims of this tour, suggesting the long-term engagement and functional aspect of performing arts in cultural diplomacy and propaganda. The performing arts continued to play an important role after the ROC government retreated to Taiwan.
The case of Mei Lanfang and Peking Opera illustrated how the performing arts could communicate with a foreign audience and serve as a supplement to traditional diplomacy. A critic of the New York Times, J. Brooks Atkinson, described his reaction: ‘[y]ou can appreciate something of exquisite loveliness in pantomime and costume, and you may feel yourself vaguely in contact, not with the sensation of the moment, but with the strange ripeness of centuries’ (as cited in Carter, 1930, p. 832). Mei Lanfang had an unexpected success at the box office and defied the prediction of not being able to fill a theatre for even a week in Broadway. He was also enthusiastically received because of the universality of the art form, which the foreign audience could appreciate (ibid.). In addition, the function of intermediate actors, such as the cultural broker (Guy, 2001), played an important role in the process of communicating the art form. In Mei Lanfang’s case, I suggest that the cultural broker might have taken risks when the local audience was less familiar with the art form. Acknowledging the attraction of Peking Opera, the ROC government took advantage of Mei Lanfang’s popularity to showcase Chinese performance to diplomatic circles (ibid.). The practice of employing the performing arts remained a government strategy, which I discuss later.

Mei Lanfang’s example highlights how Peking Opera was selected to showcase one art form to represent Chinese culture. Both Taiwanese and Chinese governments supported the Peking Opera companies in the 1950s, and sanctioned overseas tours. This also demonstrated how the performing arts communicated with foreign audiences. The China National Peking Opera Company established in 1955, and which Mei Lanfang served as director from 1955 to 1961, was fully funded and supported by the Chinese government and had frequent tours abroad (China National Peking Opera Company, 2011). On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the Kuomintang (KMT) government continued its support for Peking opera especially after its popularity. After retreating to Taiwan, the KMT government was keen to earn recognition from the international community through various forms of propaganda to project the ROC as the authentic and legitimate guardian of traditional Chinese culture. Through extensive international tours, the KMT government portrayed itself as the guardian of traditional Chinese culture, in order to support its claim over the whole of China. The government-supported Peking Opera troupes’ overseas tours can be traced back to 1957 (Guy, 1999). Peking Opera had such ‘ancient’ and ‘traditional’ characteristics that the KMT regime recognised the potential benefits of manipulating these symbols to promote itself worldwide (ibid.). This represented the competition over cultural authenticity between PRC and ROC regimes. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, as Guy (1999) illustrated, the
KMT government’s self-portrayal as ‘the preserver of Peking Opera’ was persuasive as it was banned in China. I argue that both governments chose Peking Opera not only because of its unique art form, but also the established reputation the company enjoyed overseas. Both the PRC and ROC regimes believed that they could obtain greater recognition of their claim to cultural authenticity. For the KMT government, the success that Peking Opera tours enjoyed was particularly important in domestic politics. Despite the diplomatic deficiency, the exhibition of cultural authenticity and the success of Peking Opera troupes was beneficial for nation-building.

National cultural affairs in Taiwan were not centralised at a ministry-level government department until the establishment of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA). Relevant cultural diplomacy programmes were introduced by different ministries or departments, such as the Government Information Office (GIO), which was responsible for international film promotion. The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement Committee and the Bureau of Cultural Affairs in the Ministry of Education closely collaborated to promote Chinese culture worldwide. In Szu-Ching Chang’s (2006) study of international tours of Taiwanese dance companies between 1949 and 1973, she argued that under martial law, it was difficult for Taiwanese people to obtain permission to travel overseas unless for study abroad or business. Dance companies could only apply for permission to travel either by receiving an invitation from overseas Chinese communities or other performing arts companies, or being chosen to do so by the government. As the author also pointed out, there were groups that applied for permission to travel overseas only for the purpose of tourism. Thus, the Taiwanese government set up committees to ensure that those who applied for overseas tours met artistic standards in accordance with government policy. Furthermore, to perform ‘authentic’ Chinese dance and to present the national characteristic were the mission. Also, it was essential to establish the identity of the ROC as the cultural motherland of the overseas Chinese community.

It can be argued that the cultural diplomacy programme was highly orchestrated and functional at this stage, and the overseas Chinese community was the target audience. However, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the need for overseas promotion was greater, but more difficult to accomplish. I suggest that one of the reasons was because the ROC lost its seat in the United Nations to the PRC. Due to the diplomatic isolation, many Taiwanese cultural tours were restricted to local community centres, university halls, or local gatherings. This brought into question the impact the programmes could have (Chang, 2002). As official diplomacy changed, gaining recognition from the Chinese community overseas
and maintaining visibility in other countries through cultural programmes became more important. This was a strategy to compensate the disadvantages of diplomatic isolation that the Taiwanese government faced.

Subsequently, the government noticed the unexpected exposure of professional arts companies who received invitations to tour overseas. Privately funded arts organisations began to receive invitations to tour overseas in the 1970s, whilst fewer performances were government-orchestrated to promote Taiwan (Chang, 2002). The success of private arts companies was based on their merit rather than state promotion. It is also notable that private arts companies’ engagement in cultural exchange mutually enhanced Taiwan’s cultural identity. The ‘Taiwanese awareness,’ which emerged in the 1970s, inspired more artists to search for their own identity. Thus, the works they presented showed new phases of Taiwanese culture. One example is the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan. Established in 1973 as the first professional dance company in the country, the company had its first overseas tour in Singapore in 1975 (Cloud Gate Foundation, 2013). The company is a pioneer of cultural diplomacy, which first carried out overseas tours and developed a systematic professional administration. In addition to the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, American conductor Henry Mazer founded the Taipei Philharmonic Orchestra (TPO) in 1985. The Orchestra was privately funded by enthusiastic music-lovers. Since their first overseas tour to North America in 1990, the TPO has travelled extensively throughout Europe, Russia, the Baltic countries and Scandinavian countries. As an experienced conductor, Mazer’s expertise in orchestra management helped to establish the orchestra’s administration and international reputation. Even after his death in 2002, the existing professional network has remained active in TPO’s international connections (Yu, 2010). The participation of these arts companies as private actors in cultural diplomacy is analysed in Chapter 6.

The emergence of professional arts organisations gradually shaped the cultural exchanges that were not fully government-orchestrated, and relevant public subsidy or policy enhancement appeared afterwards. A dedicated division for cultural exchange was set up in the new Council for Cultural Affairs in 1981. The first Chairperson of CCA, Dr Chen Chi-lu (in office 1981-1988) laid the foundations and working focus of this organisation (Chang, 2002). Although during Chen Chi-lu’s administration the CCA did not propose cultural policy orientation, cultural affairs had gradually shifted to the development of arts and culture from the function of social education or political purposes and propaganda (Su, 2001). The framework of a cultural diplomacy strategy started to be realised in the 1990s. The first National Cultural Conference (Quanguowenhuahuiyi) convened in 1990, in response to the
rapid growth of the economy and the need for development of culture. The government recognised this issue and sought recommendations from society (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1991). In the conference, then Chairperson of CCA, Kuo Wei-fan (in office 1988-1993), raised the issue that products made in the ROC had been exported worldwide, but not the culture of the ROC. He suggested this distorted the image of ‘free China’ and neglected the need to enhance understanding and support from international society (ibid.). It is evident that to promote the ‘ROC’ instead of ‘Taiwan’ was the main theme of cultural diplomacy, and seeking support and recognition of ‘free China’ internationally was the policy goal. A blueprint of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy was included in the proposal of the Six-Year National Development Plan in 1991. Objectives included establishing overseas Chinese Information and Cultural Centres (CICC) and cultural institutions, to encourage international cultural exchange exhibitions and performances (e.g. International Performance Troupe Cultivation Plan), and plans to translate Chinese works into foreign languages. The proposal represented the authorities’ ambition (Su, 2001). Consequently, following the passing of the Culture and Arts Reward Act in 1992, the government could subsidise cultural organisations (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1992). The earliest plans for subsidising arts exhibitions and performances, and establishing cultural centres were initiated in the 1990s, and continued even after the CCA upgraded to the MOC in 2012.

In the 1990s, notable Taiwanese private arts organisations, which had gained professional recognition and invitation internationally, represented change in the country’s cultural diplomacy. As Taiwanese artists became more visible, their talents were more easily recognised by professional networks, such as curators, critics and festival programmers. Subsequent invitations for further tours followed, which turned into more opportunities. In addition, compared with the performances in community centres and local gatherings, those in professional venues are usually ticketed events with more critical audiences. This brought cultural diplomacy to another stage as artists could engage with a larger number of people in the host country, whilst at the same time earning a professional reputation overseas. That is to say, the audiences are not restricted to diplomatic circles or overseas Chinese communities. Potentially, such cultural activities could reach a wider public in the host countries, and their artistic achievement recognised by cultural professionals. Publications, such as media reviews, could also enhance artists’ reputation. For these art companies, gaining exposure could draw attention to Taiwan.

Despite recognition of where artists come from, and the impressions that foreign audiences have of Taiwan, it remains uncertain whether consuming a cultural product leads
to an increase in support or sympathy for the source (Rawnsley, 2012). In other words, even if the audiences know where the arts companies come from, this does not necessarily translate into support for Taiwan. Although the problem of insufficient formal diplomatic relations remains, a new approach in cultural diplomacy has developed. Unlike the Peking Opera, which toured overseas in the 1950s, and was fully funded by the government, the international tours of these private arts organisations received only partial public subsidy. Their participation in cultural relations encouraged other types of performing arts and enlarged the cultural network of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.

Examination of the trends in cultural diplomacy before and in the first decade of the CCA provides the trajectory of government funding policy, and the beginning of private arts companies’ activities. Several characteristics remain in the current cultural diplomacy programmes of Taiwan. First, the performing arts constitute one of the predominant art forms that receive government support in cultural diplomacy. It is important in policy implementation as the government support continues in the form of subsidy or international co-productions. Secondly, recognition from professional culture networks, including media reviews, is still considered a major achievement. This is discussed further in Section 5.6.

5.2 Cultural diplomacy strategy in 1998, 2004 and Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 White Papers for Culture

In this section, I trace the discourses of cultural diplomacy in Taiwan’s White Papers for Culture. There are three relevant documents examined in this section, which are the 1998 and 2004 White Papers for Culture of the CCA, and the 2008 White Paper for Culture published in Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential campaign. The 1998 White Paper for Culture was published during the Lee Teng-hui administration (1988-2000) of KMT, and the 2004 White Paper for Culture was published in the first term of Chen Shui-bian’s administration (2001-2004) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Although the CCA (later MOC) did not officially publish a new White Paper for Culture during the Ma Ying-jeou administration, the vision of cultural diplomacy that Ma Ying-jeou proposed in his presidential campaign had an influence on the subsequent strategy-making in cultural diplomacy. Other than the White Papers for Culture, policies for cultural diplomacy in Taiwan commonly materialise into ad hoc grant programmes, which are generally more flexible and can be easily stopped if the government changes policies. I discuss below the core policy plan of the White Papers for Culture.

Important discourses regarding cultural exchange and promoting Taiwanese culture can be found in both White Papers for Culture published in 1998 and 2004. In 1997, the CCA
convened the second National Cultural Conference with the aim of finding consensus of cultural construction between government and society (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1997). Following the second National Cultural Conference the previous year, the 1998 White Paper for Culture stated that the principle of the Council for Cultural Affairs should be to ‘nourish new culture, establish the new Central Plain, re-construct new society’ (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). The slogan ‘establish the new Central Plain’ (jianlixinzhongyuan), created by then president Lee Teng-hui, refers to the lower areas of the Yellow River, which is considered the cradle of Chinese civilisation. This slogan demonstrated enduring recognition of Chinese culture. In terms of ‘cultural exchange’ (wenhuajiaoliu), the CCA also claimed that the arts and culture should be the means to participate actively overseas. Therefore, the main objective was to introduce Taiwanese culture to international audiences, and foster understanding among Taiwan’s allies. The aim of cultural exchange in the 1998 White Paper for Culture was to speed up and fulfil the overall objectives of national development. Its vision was also to strengthen Taiwan’s ‘national competitiveness’ by ‘fostering international cultural exchange and enhance cultural diplomacy’ (ibid.).

At the end of the 1990s, cultural exchange was embedded in the context of the Six-year National Development Plan proposed by the government in 1991. To showcase Taiwanese fine arts and performing arts on the international stage was one of the main objectives of the cultural exchange strategy. As mentioned earlier, the International Performance Troupe Cultivation Plan (1991-1996) was an important programme of the CCA that encouraged performing arts companies to tour nationwide and overseas. In the 1998 White Paper for Culture, the CCA broadened the existing plan and created a new Outstanding Performance Troupe Award Plan for nourishing more performing arts companies (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). However, the vision of the 1998 White Paper for Culture to establish Taiwan as a so-called ‘cultural hotspot in Asia-Pacific’ region might not have materialised as expected, and it has not been restated in other official policy documents. The rhetoric of ‘national competitiveness’ mentioned in the 1998 White Paper for Culture implied that culture could be an asset enabling Taiwan to ‘compete’ with others. I suggest that although the term soft power was not used in this document, the government recognised culture as an important asset. The rhetoric of ‘competing with others’ was similar to the intention to use power over them. The idea of soft power was visible in this document.

A significant transition occurred after the presidential election in 2000. In that year, KMT lost the presidential election to the DPP. The cultural policy in Taiwan shifted to recognising the importance of establishing Taiwanese cultural identity. With increasing
Taiwanese self-awareness in the 1990s, the discourse of Chinese culture lost its favour in government cultural policies. The DPP government called the third National Cultural Conference in 2002, and addressed the challenges and opportunities to cultural industries, such as film and television, after Taiwan joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2002a). The 2004 White Paper for Culture was published near the end of the first term of the Chen Shui-bian government (2000-2004). There were three aspects of the DPP’s cultural policies: emphasis on the economic value of the culture industries, the theorisation of Taiwanese subjectivity and branding Taiwan as a cultural product (Chang, 2004). These were apparent in the 2004 White Paper for Culture and were mutually related.

First, the promotion of ‘cultural and creative industries’ (CCI) was included both in the 2004 White Paper for Culture and the overall national development project (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004a). In addition, the 2004 White Paper underlined the need for arts companies to expand overseas due to the limited market size of cultural activities in Taiwan. This statement encapsulated the major national project, which commenced in 2002, to develop cultural and creative industries in Taiwan (The Executive Yuan, 2003). Thus, the goal of promoting Taiwanese culture overseas was not only to increase recognition of Taiwanese culture, but also to add economic value to the cultural and creative industries.

Secondly, in terms of theorising Taiwanese subjectivity, it can be found that instead of ‘Chinese culture,’ the term ‘Taiwanese culture’ is commonly used in the 2004 White Paper. In this document, the formation of cultural identity was from the perspective of Taiwan. The wording was significant, indicating that Taiwanese awareness had become an official notion. Compared with the slogan ‘establish the new Central Plain’ in the 1998 White Paper for Culture, the transition of cultural identity was highlighted in the 2004 policy document. Ms Tchen Yu-chiou, the first CCA Chairperson in the DPP government (2000-2004), was especially enthusiastic to establish the discourse of subjectivity in Taiwanese culture. She believed that it was difficult to identify the essence of Taiwanese culture before 2000. During her administration, from 2000 to 2004, a study was undertaken to re-interpret the history of Taiwan (Tchen, personal communication, 28 May, 2013). This research on Taiwan’s music, fine arts, theatre, history, literature and traditional art was later published to enrich Taiwanese culture (Tchen, Lin, & Fang, 2013). The CCA also provided materials for further study. Yu-chiou stressed the importance of cultural diplomacy for Taiwan, since the country is not a member of the United Nations, and thus does not have opportunities to make its voice heard.
Thirdly, according to Yu-chiou’s plan (personal communication, 28 May, 2013), it is essential to promote ‘Taiwanese subjectivity.’ This is to establish and prioritise Taiwanese cultural identity. She suggested that cultural diplomacy is crucial in this regard. After stepping down from her position as chairperson, she continued to work in other cultural institutions, such as Chairperson of the Board in National Chiang Kai-Shek Cultural Centre (National Theatre and Concert Hall, NTCH). This also influenced the strategies of international productions of the NTCH (see Section 5.7). From the work carried out at the CCA in the following years, Yu-chiou published various materials, and produced DVDs, documentaries and movies, which were completed during her duty as the ambassador-at-large from 2004 to 2008. In addition, cultural diplomacy in the DPP administration aimed at proactively promoting Taiwanese performing arts companies abroad and encouraging collaborations among artists. The initiative intended to gain more exposure for Taiwanese culture and balance the ‘import’ and ‘export’ of cultural works. I consider the awareness of balance as partly in response to Taiwan’s new membership of the WTO. The need to establish the subjectivity of Taiwanese culture was not merely to counter Chinese culture, but also indicative of another wave of globalisation. Entering the WTO opened the Taiwanese market to more cultural products from other countries, and so nourishing the newly-established Taiwanese cultural identity and local cultural industries was a challenge for the DPP government.

After the 2004 White Paper for Culture, neither the CCA, nor the upgraded Ministry of Culture published a White Paper for Culture. The leadership of the CCA was also unstable as four chairpersons served in the position, but none of their terms of office lasted more than two years. In 2008, when the KMT president Ma Ying-jeou ran his first presidential campaign, he prioritised the cultural diplomacy strategy as part of his proposed cultural policy White Paper. This document provided a policy outline for Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. In his ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ (wushiwaijiao) strategy, culture is the prime asset of foreign policy (Liau, 2012). It is considered the key asset of Taiwan. In Ma Ying-jeou’s White Paper for Culture, it was stated that Taiwan must strive to be seen as a cultural exporter instead of a troublemaker. This was an attempt to turn ‘chequebook diplomacy’ into ‘viable diplomacy,’ which focused on culture. Also, in the White Paper for Culture, it was asserted that ‘by employing culture as soft power, Taiwan can be a part of the international society’ (National Policy Foundation, 2008, p. 1). This assertion can be problematic. Ma’s statement stressed the importance of employing soft power in Taiwan’s international relations despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations. Furthermore, it was
declared that cultural exchange would play a central role in cultural policy. He proposed to strengthen relations with Europe, Southeast Asia, South Korea and Japan (National Policy Foundation, 2008). However, in this document, he did not explain how and why these regions and countries should be prioritised. In terms of policy plans, Ma proposed to set up a ‘Cultural Diplomacy Endowment’ dedicated to cultural diplomacy for Taiwan’s participation in international cultural organisations, international scholarship and artistic activities. The plan to set up the endowment was postponed due to low financial interest rate (Central News Agency, 2011), and when Ma Ying-jeou ended his presidency in 2016, it was yet to be realised. The establishment of the Taiwan Academy was also in Ma Ying-jeou’s blueprint of cultural policy. Compared with the 1998 and the 2004 White Papers for Culture, the designated endowment and Taiwan Academy were two of the new policy proposals in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.

Culture in Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy was prioritised to accompany the intended ‘diplomatic truce’ with China and to ease the tension over official recognition. Despite Ma’s ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ strategy, it would be false to expect cultural diplomacy to compensate fully for the shortcomings of Taiwan’s formal diplomacy. The proposal to promote culture as an element of soft power and a further means of participating in the international community might be a step too far.

In addition, I suggest that the expansion of the Confucius Institutes of China was also the main device of Ma’s proposal to promote Taiwanese culture actively. The establishment of the Taiwan Academy was also in the blueprint of cultural policy. It was reported during his presidential campaign in 2008 that Taiwan Academies would be set up to ‘contend’ with the Confucius Institutes (Li, 2008). Through the establishment of the Taiwan Academies, the government would be able to promote the Traditional Chinese language used in Taiwan, which differs from the Simplified Chinese used in mainland China. Thus, the strategy attempted to place Taiwanese culture within the broader context of Chinese culture and to differentiate between them. Ms Lung Ying-tai, the first Minister of Culture in Ma’s administration, later clarified Ma’s statement. She reiterated that the establishment of Taiwan Academies was not intended to ‘compete’ with the Confucius Institutes (Lin, 2012b). Nonetheless, comparison between the Confucius Institute and the Taiwan Academy was probably unavoidable despite Minister Lung’s effort to downplay the tension.
5.3 The new Ministry of Culture and the Global Outreach Action Plan

The upgrade from the Council for Cultural Affairs to the Ministry of Culture (MOC) has long been suggested in both White Papers for Cultures (1998 and 2004). It was first proposed in 1987, in the plan of re-organisation of the Executive Yuan, the central government of the ROC. The legislation process eventually finalised in 2011 (C.Chu, 2011). It was not until 2012 that the Ministry finally inaugurated and proposed a new policy strategy. There was no White Paper for Culture published with the upgrade. However, four core policy objectives were declared in 2012 (cited from the English website of the MOC) (Ministry of Culture, 2014):

1. To ensure that every village and township in this nation, regardless of its geographic remoteness, has an equal chance to achieve its full cultural potential. (*Nituhua*)
2. To contribute to the nation’s soft power by promoting Taiwan’s unique blend of modern and traditional cultures on the international stage. (*Guojihua*)
3. To enhance the overall output and value of the nation’s cultural and creative sectors. (*Chanzhihua*)
4. To offer the nation’s citizens equal accessibility to cultural resources by harnessing the power of cloud computing. (*Yunduanhua*)

These four government policy objectives covered the trends of cultural policies, including perspectives of cultural citizenship, cultural diplomacy, creative economy and digital development of cultural industries. In terms of ‘internationalising,’ the policy statement described Taiwanese culture (*Guojihua*) as a unique blend of ‘modern and traditional cultures.’ However, the statement itself does not specify what exactly the uniqueness of Taiwanese culture is and leaves plenty of room for interpretation.

To achieve the goal of internationalising Taiwanese culture, the Ministry further explained its strategy (cited from the English website of the MOC) (ibid.):

The Ministry will strive to achieve this goal through its international promotion policies — i.e. to create more opportunities for Taiwan-based artists and groups to showcase their works to a global audience. By offering consultations and sponsorships as well as tapping into overseas networks, the Ministry hopes to continue nurturing Taiwan’s growing cultural influence in the international sphere.

In terms of the MOC’s strategy for its international promotion policies, the statement illustrates that it plays the role of facilitator offering consultation and sponsorships and
assistance in overseas networks. The MOC acted as a platform and adopted a rather passive strategy by offering consultation. It did not specifically indicate what kind of consultation it could offer in the process, while maintaining government subsidy of artists and companies. It also raises the question of what kind of consultation the government can provide in cultural diplomacy, and whether this should be a main aspect of the strategy. However, other than sponsoring artists, the MOC’s role is ambiguous. While private actors can also fulfil the job of networking and sponsorship or similar functions, such as foundations and artistic agencies, the MOC should reconsider its role in cultural diplomacy. All in all, the Ministry as policymaker has the power of governance, which is to control the laws and affairs of state. Therefore, I argue that using the power of governance should be the central role of the MOC in cultural policymaking and practice. It should utilise this power to act beyond the roles of offering consultation and sponsorship.

As mentioned above, the government intended to offer consultations and sponsorship, and thus to tap into overseas networks. Analysis of the historical view of government involvement in cultural diplomacy clearly indicates that the ROC government has shifted from heavy-handed diplomatic push to a more passive role of grant giving. However, this is not the most important function of the MOC. In terms of cultural diplomacy, the government has a role providing a legal framework by signing treaties and agreements with foreign governments. In addition, the government can exercise its state power in multinational organisations as part of cultural diplomacy.

However, the function cannot be fully practised by the Taiwanese in, for example, cultural relations with China, as the two governments cannot negotiate as equal partners (see section 4.5). Additionally, in relation to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy with non-allies, agreements for cultural collaboration cannot be signed with full official status. Negotiating and signing formal agreements with other governments are often conducted by the Representative Offices, the de facto embassy of Taiwan. For example, the Taipei Representative Office in the UK signed the Agreement on Educational and Cultural Matters with the British Trade and Cultural Office (BTCO, now British Office), the de facto embassy of the UK in Taiwan in 2005, and renewed it with a Memorandum of Understanding on Collaboration in Education in 2011. The British Council has been assigned to implement the Agreement on Educational and Cultural Matters between the British Trade and Cultural Office in Taipei and the Taipei Representative Office in the United Kingdom (The British Council Taiwan, 2015). This example shows the constraints of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy when it comes to signing agreements and treaties, and the legal status of the Taiwanese
government remains a sensitive issue. Furthermore, the role of the British Council in the cultural relations between Taiwan and the UK provides a potential framework to implement cultural diplomacy. A designated cultural institution may be established following the model of the British Council – a non-departmental public body operated according to “the arm’s length” principle, which allows this public body to receive state funding, but operate independently without the perceived disadvantages of direct control (Hetherington, 2017). This would probably be a solution to the diplomatic difficulties that Taiwan faces in cultural diplomacy.

Although the issues on government representation remain, agreements and memorandums are beneficial for developing mutual collaboration between Taiwan and its counterparts. For instance, the memorandum mentioned above can serve as a foundation for further collaboration between Taiwan and the UK (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). An effective memorandum can prevent the collaboration from being interrupted when ministers step down or government changes. These agreements are more powerful than project-based collaboration and leave more legacy than short-term one-off programmes. Such legacy can be found in the agreement signed during Tchen Yu-chiou’s term of office (2000-2004) for cultural collaborations between Taiwan and France. For example, the annual Malraux Seminar invites French cultural experts to Taiwan to broaden cultural professional networks and provides an opportunity for professional training. Since 2001, the CCA (now MOC) has collaborated with the French government (Ministry of Culture, 2015). For Tchen Yu-chiou, signing agreements should be the most important job when a minister conducts a foreign visit, and is a factor in the evaluation of his or her performance. Thus, the most efficient way to build connections is not to carry out foreign visits per se. Staff in the Ministry should implement the negotiation and the drafting of agreements before embarking on the actual visit. When the minister visits foreign partners and officials in person, the meetings should not be an occasion to initiate a negotiation for agreements. On the contrary, the agreement should be finalised and signed (personal communication, 28 May, 2013). Of course, an official’s foreign visit and face-to-face encounter can be symbolic. However, as regards an institution’s personnel, signing agreements would help to maintain the relationship even if the leadership changes. Thus, instead of establishing connections through foreign visits, the most important task should be to formalise cultural diplomacy in legal documents with other countries.

Furthermore, there are more issues with the MOC’s stated strategy in cultural diplomacy. To begin with, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy was more a one-way ‘promotion’ of
Taiwanese artists and groups, instead of creating dialogue with others. As earlier noted, Cummings (2003) emphasises cultural diplomacy because of the mutuality of ‘exchange’ and ‘mutual understanding.’ The so-called cultural promotion and ‘Taiwan’s growing cultural influence’ focused on promoting Taiwanese culture *per se*. The mutual understanding from other members of the international community was not prioritised in the strategy.

The ambivalence in the MOC statement may also cause confusion, whether the Ministry of Culture deems ‘cultural diplomacy’ equivalent to ‘artists diplomacy,’ as in the statement of its strategy offering opportunities for Taiwan-based artists and groups. When ‘cultural diplomacy’ includes, especially, other cultural assets in its definition and practice, the specific reference to artists could raise doubt about narrowing the scope of cultural diplomacy. The exclusiveness of focusing on artists may originate in the old mission of the CCA. The CCA was formerly responsible for cultural affairs in fine arts, performing arts, literature and cultural heritage. The statement did not mention cultural heritage and museums, but specifically the arts. Neither did it include the film industries, which were formerly overseen by the GIO, but currently under the MOC. By offering sponsorship, the strategy facilitated existing programmes by providing grants for performing arts troupes touring abroad. Certainly, the MOC can continue to sponsor arts organisations; however, this statement raised questions as to whether the MOC overlooked other aspects of Taiwanese culture when designing its overseas strategy.

The strategic statement, moreover, has prioritised the artists, especially those based in Taiwan, as the means to showcase works to a global audience. However, there are doubts on this particular strategy-making. For instance, in the Guidelines for Subsidising Cultural Exchange Overseas and in Mainland China, the eligible applicants are either ROC nationals or organisations registered in Taiwan (Ministry of Culture, 2005). There are several issues related to the statement. First, ‘global audience’ as a collective term appears to be too general to be reached through the policies. Secondly, is it necessary to restrict grantees to Taiwanese nationals or Taiwan-based artists? In a time when artists can develop their mobility through overseas study and immigration, lifting the restriction might further enhance the network internationally. Although the government prioritises Taiwan-based artists in its policy, paradoxically, the restriction does not seem to accomplish the policy objective of showcasing their works to a global audience and nurturing Taiwan’s growing cultural influence globally.

Following the policy strategy, the MOC launched its first integrated policy plan on cultural diplomacy since its upgrade in 2012. The four-year ‘Global Outreach Action Plan,’ from 2013 to 2016, aimed to enhance Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. According to the
Ministry of Culture (2013a), the Action Plan was based on President Ma Ying-jeou’s White Paper for Culture when he campaigned for his second-term of presidency (2012-2016). His objective was to utilise cultural diplomacy to compensate for Taiwan’s weakness in traditional diplomacy. This meant promoting ‘the Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics’ and strengthening Taiwan’s national image and influences (ibid.). The four-year action plan coincided with the second term of President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. However, it was not intended to continue beyond 2016, as the whole cabinet would resign and reassemble. In the Prediction of Future Environment in the Global Outreach Action Plan, the MOC forecasted that culture would be Taiwan’s special identity in the new wave of globalisation. Internally, international cultural exchange would be the driver for cultural integration inside Taiwan, especially involving new immigrants (ibid.). The MOC suggested that international cultural exchange provided an opportunity to understand different communities in Taiwan and to restate the importance of culture in building Taiwanese identity. For instance, to establish relations with the home countries of immigrants would benefit the integration of Taiwanese society. Cultural diplomacy could also compensate for the difficulties in Taiwan’s formal diplomacy and prevent the country from being marginalised. In this action plan, the intention was to make Taiwan the ‘cultural pioneer’ in the Chinese-speaking world. However, this policy goal is ambiguous. The weakness of Taiwan’s external cultural exchanges was identified, including the lack of coordination of government strategies, combined with the shortage of staff and outposts in the MOC’s global branches. However, the data collection of this research shows that the weakness exists in Taiwan’s bureaucracy and it is problematical when the government puts its cultural diplomacy plans into practice.

Furthermore, in the Global Outreach Action Plan, the promotion of cultural and creative industries was once again an important strategy in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. This Action Plan included promotion and cultural exchange projects, such as literature, heritage, crafts and museums. Among them, promoting popular music, television and film industries were also important projects. The MOC wished to create channels to introduce these products to the global market. The promotion of cultural products overseas is related to the existing MOC policy to develop the cultural and creative industries. In Act 20 of the Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries, passed in 2010, the CCA/Ministry (2010) stated its objective to open overseas markets (cited from the English version published by the MOC):
To encourage Cultural and Creative Enterprises to establish their own brands and actively cultivate the international markets, the central relevant competent authorities in charge of and enterprises concerned may coordinate with each of their overseas offices to assist the Cultural and Creative Enterprises in establishing international brand image, attending reputable international exhibitions and performances, competitions, expositions, cultural arts festivals, etc., expanding the related international markets, and promoting sales.

One of the main objectives in the Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative industries is to foster international cultural exchange and collaboration. With the development of cultural industries, the activities held abroad can now focus on seeking more collaboration through local networks in the host countries. They are also expected to expand into international markets and promote sales. Therefore, in addition to promoting cultural products and fostering a global exposure, potentially enhancing mutual understanding, generating sales of cultural products in foreign markets is also part of the government’s action plan. Notably, unlike the performing arts supported by the CCA and the film industries previously supported by the GIO, popular music and television industries were not included in government cultural diplomacy programmes. This marked a change in cultural diplomacy programmes, which started to consider the potential of economic revenue. Although the organisational change – the CCA upgrade to MOC – was not yet realised, it reflected preparation for the integration of cultural affairs. Nonetheless, it remained unclear as to what kind of role the government should play in opening markets for mass cultural products and how the MOC could fulfil its policy objectives.

In addition, whilst indicating the limitations of policy goals in the Action Plan, the MOC recognised the uncontrollability of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Despite the government’s effort to export Taiwanese art and culture, there are multiple factors to be taken into account for foreign arts organisations to collaborate with Taiwan, such as their own programming and funding. The uncontrollability of cultural diplomacy has been identified in the literature on cultural diplomacy. As illustrated in Chapter 2, governments cannot gain full control of the use of public diplomacy, as the non-governmental actors’ interests may not entirely match those of the government. There is also no guaranteed positive feedback (Gregory, 2008; Leonard et al., 2002). However, the MOC did not propose solutions to this limitation.
Interestingly, the Action Plan raised the concerns over the lack of full control when collaborating with foreign arts organisations. For example, Taiwan is not distinguished from other East Asian countries, e.g. China, Japan, and Korea. This issue is linked to Taiwan’s cultural identity. In the Action Plan, it stated that in order to be set apart, Taiwan’s programmes must have high standards and strong cultural characteristics of diversity, whilst combining tradition with innovation (Taiwan, ROC Ministry of Culture, 2013a). If this suggestion were to be taken literally, I would argue that ‘to combine tradition with innovation’ does not settle the issue of cultural identity but makes it more confusing. Moreover, when collaborating with foreign arts organisations, the organisers are likely to include Taiwan as part of their Asian programme instead of singling it out. It would be extremely difficult if the MOC’s goal was to have always a designated showcase. I suggest placing Taiwan back in the East Asian historical and geographical context, which could be a more effective way to present its culture to a foreign audience. I further elaborate this argument in Chapter 7.

5.4 The strategy of the Taiwan Academy

In addition to the Global Outreach Action Plan, the Taiwan Academy is a current policy initiative of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. This policy first appeared when President Ma Ying-jeou published the Cultural Policy White Paper during his 2008 election campaign (National Policy Foundation, 2008). The first three Taiwan Academies were set up in 2011 in New York, Houston, and Los Angeles. In the government strategy, there are three ideas regarding the functions of the academies. First, it is a cross-departmental platform contributing to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, as described in the Global Outreach Action Plan, which aims to bring sources from other ministries to coordinate. Secondly, it is a brand name for some overseas branches of the MOC. Thirdly, the ‘Taiwan Academy’ is a digital platform to be utilised for Chinese language learning. The missions of the Taiwan Academies include presenting the cultural diversity in Taiwan, encouraging Taiwan/Sino Studies and promoting the Chinese language (Ministry of Culture, 2013a). In addition to the academies, there are also several ‘contact points’ set up in collaboration with higher education institutions in foreign countries. The Taiwan Academy was considered a special cross-departmental platform chaired by a Minister without Portfolio to integrate the resources of several departments. However, the platform was not a permanent organisation and did not serve as the headquarters of the Taiwan Academy or cultural centres. The MOC remains the main ministry in charge of the Taiwan Academy.
The multiple layers of meaning of the Taiwan Academies can lead to confusion when it comes to understanding the actual tasks and missions. If the MOC attempted to brand this new policy initiative, it did not make clear to the potential audience its different functions. The mission and operation of the Taiwan Academies remained under construction after the reshuffle of cabinet organisations and the establishment of the Ministry of Culture in 2012. The first Minister of Culture, Ms Lung Ying-tai (in office 2012-14) declared that Taiwan Academies would be ‘compact and beautiful’ (xiaoermei), in contrast to the larger Confucius Institutes (Su, 2011). As reported, Minister Lung Ying-tai described her ideal Taiwan Academy as a salon to introduce Taiwanese culture in host countries. In her vision, the academies should be easily connected to public transport, and provide literary talks, performances, film screening, etc. The main mission is to encourage foreign audiences to appreciate Taiwanese culture (Lin, 2012b). Although Minister Lung Ying-tai expressed her intention to name all the overseas branches of the MOC as Taiwan Academies in 2012 (ibid.), this was not realised after she resigned from her position. For instance, the Cultural Centre in Tokyo opened in 2015 as the ‘Taiwan Cultural Centre’ (Chao, 2015).

The model of the Taiwan Academy is often compared with that of the Confucius Institute. Since the Confucius Institute was established in 2004, the speed of expansion has been unparalleled. By the end of 2016, there were already 512 Confucius Institutes in universities in 140 countries and 1073 Confucius Classrooms, which are set in secondary schools or equivalent educational institutions (Confucius Institute Headquarters, Hanban, 2017). The PRC Chinese government aims to establish 1,000 Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms by the year 2020 (Shambaugh, 2013). Compared with the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes, the Taiwanese government established in 2011 the brick-and-mortar Taiwan Academies in New York, Houston, and Los Angeles, three cities in the United States. The difference in scale and speed between the two governments is significant. The number of Taiwan Academies is considerably smaller and the speed of expansion is much slower. It might be considered that the Taiwanese government carefully develops this scheme of cultural diplomacy. However, it might also be due to comparatively smaller budget and manpower to open more Taiwan Academies.

Clearly, the Taiwanese government attempted to differentiate the Taiwan Academies from the Confucius Institutes. Minister Lung Ying-tai asserted that the Taiwan Academies and the Confucius Institutes have different missions, and there is no need to compete (Lin, 2012b). This, however, is debatable as both aim to promote language. Despite the minister’s statement that there is no competition, it cannot be ignored that the Taiwan Academy and
Confucius Institute promote Mandarin and attempt to attract foreign students. The emphasis on ‘preserving Traditional Chinese character’ was already a preference for students. When it comes to language learning, the promotion of the Traditional Chinese writing system has been prioritised in the academies. While China’s Confucius Institutes have rapidly become large-scale Mandarin language providers, it remains unclear how the Taiwan Academies set themselves apart. With shared Chinese cultural heritage and similar missions and strategies, competition is very likely to arise between Taiwan and China for authenticity in the interpretation of ‘Chinese culture.’ However, as the Traditional Chinese writing system is not as widely used as the Simplified Chinese invented by the Chinese government, attracting students can be an important task for advertising and marketing. It would provide understanding, for promotion purposes, as to what incentivises people to learn the Traditional Chinese writing system instead of Simplified Chinese. If the government does not know the reasons, then its strategies might not help it reach the intended target.

In terms of the different roles in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, it can be confusing to distinguish between the Taiwan Academies and Taiwan Academy Contact Points in Higher Education institutions. Whilst the Confucius Institutes are set up in universities overseas, the Taiwan Academies also seek to strengthen partnerships with universities. The Taiwan Academy Contact Points scheme is mostly based on memoranda of understanding signed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the universities. Although the Taiwan Academy is primarily an initiative of the MOC, to establish the contact points was partly MOFA’s job. To a certain degree, it caused confusion as regards the cross-departmental cooperation of the academies. Unlike Confucius Institutes, the contact points do not have premises on university campuses. Their functions are mainly student exchange and granting scholarships to study in Taiwan (S. Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). How do these ministries coordinate their partnership with the contact points? According to interviewee Susan Yu’s account, the main job of contact points is not largely related to MOC, but the MOFA or Ministry of Education (MOE). This matches the problem I discussed in relation to Mitchell’s (1986) argument in Chapter 2. The development of external cultural policy would be restricted by existing problems in internal cultural policy or overall domestic politics. The existing problems can be more complicated when it comes to collaborating with other government departments, or when cultural representatives work overseas.

However, in the first years of establishing partnerships with Taiwan Academy Contact Points, most of the memoranda of understanding were signed with schools that taught Taiwan Studies. In other words, these schools already had some knowledge of Taiwan.
As of 2015, there were 213 contact points in 64 countries across North America, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Europe, Inner-Asia and Africa (Public Diplomacy Coordination Council, 2015). Despite the efforts to establish partnerships with these institutions, the details of such collaborations and the full list of contact points are not made public. I suggest the fact of not making the information publicly accessible could diminish the efforts to set up the contact points. As the information remains undisclosed, it is difficult to assess whether the partnerships fulfil their mission.

I suggest that Minister Lung Ying-tai’s effort to distinguish the Taiwan Academy from the Confucius Institute was due to the latter’s controversies in North America. She emphasised that there is no political agenda as the Taiwan Academy only serves the purpose of cultural diplomacy and ‘makes friends with the world in a compact and beautiful style.’ I argue that the metaphor of friendship – making friends with the world – is vague and arguably naïve when considering the role of cultural diplomacy in international relations. Moreover, what does ‘make friends’ mean in the context of Taiwan’s special political status? This would unlikely be formal diplomatic relations. To fly the flag of ‘friendship’ can be viewed as a colloquial form of promoting soft power in other countries. Minister Lung Ying-tai also mentioned that the Confucius Institutes were being criticised for their lack of academic freedom in several North American universities, leading, in some cases, to the termination of such agreements (Chiu, 2014). This statement can be corroborated as two American universities decided to close the Confucius Institute on their campus (Foster, 2014).

I would suggest that differences between the Confucius Institute and Taiwan Academy were asserted to eliminate any possible hostility towards the latter and to reduce confusions about the status of the two institutions. However, if there is truly no political intention, it is also unnecessary to reiterate the point. The claims that Minister Lung Ying-tai made might serve as a disclaimer without provoking competitiveness and sounding intimidating to China.

To interpret the establishment of Taiwan Academies as an apolitical scheme is problematic. Despite emphasising the distinction between the Confucius Institute and Taiwan Academy, the defensive character and cross-Strait focus behind the action are unmistakable (Chan, 2011; deLisle, 2010). Similar findings were made by Alexander (2011) in research on Taiwan and China public diplomacy in El Salvador. He pointed out that ‘[i]t cannot be said that a country conducts public diplomacy without an agenda, just that the agenda is not publicly revealed’ (p. 281). Likewise, it is unlikely that a government conducts cultural diplomacy without an agenda. Following this argument, efforts were to prevent Taiwan Academies from appearing intimidating in their presence.
Furthermore, I argue that the strategy that Minister Lung Ying-tai proposed was to avoid Chinese interference in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. The contents of Taiwan Academy’s programme proposed by Lung were literature talks, performances, film screening, and sensitive political topics were not included. Interestingly, as Rawnsley (2012) argued, democracy could be Taiwan’s unique selling point and may help to distinguish it from China. However, this strength is not emphasised enough in Taiwan’s current strategy. Rawnsley (2012) stated, ‘one explanation for Taiwan’s reticence in taking advantage of this theme is the electoral volatility which dominates the political landscape, and the polarisation of political parties which revolves in part on issues of Taiwan’s identity and relations with the PRC’ (p.129). I agree with promoting Taiwan’s democracy, but I suggest that there are reasons why the Taiwanese government does not emphasise it. Moreover, Liu Shun-ming of the MOC (2013) suggested that Taiwan Academies could address more of the issues that Confucius Institutes do not currently cover, such as ecology and human rights. This would not conflict with promoting Taiwanese culture. Through introducing cultural products, the focus on such issues could also provide channels of communication and understanding with foreign audiences.

The strategy that the MOC adopts might be safer if it does not raise identity issues or provoke any ideological disagreements with China. Thus, the statement that the Taiwan Academies are apolitical may be naïve and contradictory with other official policy plans. It is also a fallacy that culture and politics can be perfectly separated, even though Minister Lung Ying-tai wished to describe the Taiwan Academy’s main objective as ‘cultural relations,’ instead of ‘cultural diplomacy,’ and to downplay its official role to prevent comparison with the Confucius Institute.

Furthermore, what cannot be ignored is the fact that Taiwan Academies are actually funded by government. The Government deliberately downplayed the political intention of the Taiwan Academies, but, interestingly, there are private actors enthusiastically bearing the responsibilities as ambassadors of cultural diplomacy. However, compared with their passionate engagement in cultural diplomacy, the Taiwanese government has hidden its objectives behind political rhetoric. When promoting the Taiwan Academies as a new cultural diplomacy initiative, the government was cautious. This might have been due to the sensitive nature of Taiwan’s international relations. In the long term, I suggest this could convey mixed messages from the government to the private actors wishing to contribute to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.
After reviewing the proposed strategy for the Taiwan Academy, in the next section, I discuss more findings on the regional strategies of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.

5.5 Geographical priorities of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and strategies for cultural centres

The geographical priorities to set up the overseas offices of Taiwan’s cultural centres reflect the political interests in Taiwan’s foreign affairs and development. North America and Europe were among the regions chosen to open the first two cultural centres. Following the establishment of the CCA in 1981, the first two cultural centres in New York and Paris opened in the 1990s. I suggest the close relation between Taiwan and the United States was the primary reason for opening the first cultural centre in New York. Also, Paris was considered a strategic location because of its own reputation as a place of culture, and from which connections could be made with other parts of Europe (Centre Culturel de Taiwan à Paris, 2013).

Except for economic considerations, the limitations of Taiwan’s foreign affairs further reflect external cultural affairs. The disputes over Taiwan’s sovereignty restrict the country from joining some super-international organisations as a member state, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thus, Taiwan does not have the power to speak in the international cultural arena, nor to enjoy the resources and network these organisations can provide. However, the proactive establishment of state representatives in the international organisations is not currently viable. Thus, I argue that the cultural diplomacy strategy becomes contingent due to the isolation of international affairs. It is, as a consequence, difficult to have a coherent strategy.

In addition to revealing Taiwan’s foreign affairs interests, the geographical priorities also correlate with economic development. For example, in the 1998 White Paper for Culture, the government proposed to broaden cultural exchange beyond Europe and North America and further expand into Asia-Pacific, which would enable Taiwan to become a cultural hotspot in the latter region (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). This matched the economic and trade policy of the 1990s, which aimed to make Taiwan the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre. However, as the economic policy faded, the plan to establish Taiwan as the Asia-Pacific cultural hotspot was forgotten.
This same pattern of relating cultural development to economic agreements can be found in the Economic Agreement between Taiwan and New Zealand in 2013.² The agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Cooperation (ANZTEC) was signed under the framework of the WTO, which regarded Taiwan as a separate customs territory. In this agreement, exports of cultural products and cultural exchange plans were included. For the film industries in Taiwan and New Zealand, special preferential treatment was also part of the agreement. There were, in addition, planned cultural relations programmes on indigenous literature and academic research. In the agreement, it can be seen that cultural relations not only enhance mutual understanding, but also provide a visible cultural product as part of trade. According to my interviewee in the MOC, the ANZTEC might help Taiwan to gain more exposure in New Zealand and potentially benefit Taiwanese filmmakers in their post-production. However, it requires further follow-up for evaluation (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). Despite the Economic Cooperation Agreement signed with New Zealand, which included cooperation on the film industry, there is no plan to open a cultural centre in either New Zealand or Australia. The choice of location follows the policy formulation from the White Paper for Culture in 1998 and 2004, i.e. to have cultural centres in global cultural capitals. However, it is arguable that without a MOC outpost in New Zealand, it might be difficult to establish new cultural collaboration based on the existing ANZTEC agreement. In terms of government administration, it might not be the most efficient way to foster bi-lateral cultural relations.

Interestingly, there are no cultural centres in Taiwan’s 22 country allies. This reveals a specific strategy-making consideration. I suggest that one of the reasons is the Taiwanese government’s attempts to maintain cultural presence in the powerful countries with which it does not have official diplomatic relations. In comparison, public diplomacy, including foreign aid and student exchange, are the activities in Taiwan’s allies. From existing research, it is evident that cultural diplomacy was not the main objective in the relationship between Taiwan and its allies, as the Taiwanese government’s presence can be perceived from other policy initiatives. Alexander (2011), who studied both Taiwan’s and China’s diplomatic efforts in El Salvador, illustrated that the maintenance of diplomatic ties with as many states as possible has two benefits. On the one hand, Taiwan’s formal allies help to keep discussions of Taiwan on the agenda of the UN and other international bodies; on the other

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² The details of ANZTEC can be found here: http://www.nzcio.com/webfm_send/59
hand, it remains popular among Taiwanese voters, as they believe it ensures the island’s sovereign legitimacy and boosts national self-confidence. Alexander (ibid.) also traced the history of Taiwan’s public diplomacy in Latin America back to the 1960s. Through the Operation Vanguard project, Taiwan exported agricultural technology to African and Latin American countries. Alexander (ibid) also pointed out that the legacy of the Operation Vanguard project remains despite the fact Taiwan has expanded its operations over the years to include medical missions, aquaculture, handicrafts, highway construction and other aids. Cultural programmes are curated in some state visits as part of the formal diplomatic relations rather than independent programmes.

In terms of promoting the arts, the Ministry of Culture (MOC) and its cultural centres are the key actors overseas. Besides the two long-established cultural centres, new branches of the MOC overseas were established in the 2010s, as part of the re-organisation and upgrade of the Council for Cultural Affairs to the MOC. The majority of the new offices were branches of the Government Information Office (GIO) previously responsible for foreign communication and propaganda, which were split up and merged into the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The expansion following the upgrade of the MOC could extend the reach of Taiwanese culture overseas.
Table 5.1: Overseas offices of the MOC  
(as of June 2017³)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Setup in</th>
<th>Established by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>Taiwan Academy Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Houston</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>CCA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Taiwan Academy Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Los Angeles</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>CCA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Taiwan Academy in Washington, D.C</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>MOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Taiwan Cultural Centre in Paris (Centre Culturel de Taiwan à Paris)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>CCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Cultural Division, Taipei Representative Office in the U.K.</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>MOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Kulturabteilung der Taipei Vertretung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Cultural Division in Taipei Representative office)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>MOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Oficina Económica y Cultural de Taipeh, Madrid, España</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>MOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Cultural Division of the Taipei-Moscow Economic and Cultural Coordination Commission</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>MOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Information Division Taipei Economic and Culture Office (Kwang Hwa Information and Culture Center)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>GIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Taiwan Cultural Center in Tokyo</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>CCA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Cultural Division, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Malaysia</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>MOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently, the cultural centres are not known by one name despite former Minister Lung Ying-tai’s hope that all overseas offices of the MOC would be ‘Taiwan Academies’ (S. Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). In order to open a new cultural centre, the Taiwanese government must obtain permission from the host country, including the name of the cultural institution. The MOC must cooperate with the MOFA in terms of overall  

³ The table is based on information accessed from the MOC and Cultural Centre’s website.
budgeting and staffing. The *de facto* embassies are set up in countries without official diplomatic relations, where Taiwan has a Taipei Representative Office or Taipei Economic Cultural Office. Similarly, cultural centres are not set up in the official name ‘Republic of China.’ The Taiwanese government does not have sole power to decide the name of its overseas cultural institutions.

The need for compromise and negotiation resulted in naming inconsistency. Even if the foreign cultural centres are all under the authority of the Ministry of Culture, their names vary. For instance, it is called the Taipei Cultural Center of Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York, whilst in Paris the name is *Centre Culturel de Taïwan à Paris*. The cultural centre in Paris joined the *Forum des Instituts culturels étrangers à Paris* (the forum for foreign cultural institutes), and it was necessary to change its name to distinguish it from the Chinese cultural centre. The latest cultural centre in Tokyo was originally named Taipei Cultural Centre (台北文化センター) when the preparatory office was set up in 2010. When the Cultural Centre in Tokyo opened a new office in 2015, the name changed from Taipei Cultural Centre to Taiwan Cultural Centre (台灣文化センター) and under the affiliation of the Taipei Representative Office in Japan. At the launch of the Taiwan Cultural Centre in Tokyo, because it was reported that the former name could be mistaken for the Cultural Centre established by the Taipei city and not Taiwan, the Ministry of Culture negotiated with the Japanese government for the new name (Chao, 2015).

As overseas branches of the Ministry of Culture, the different names of the cultural centres and the newly established Taiwan Academies could be confusing. However, there might be less controversy over the name ‘Taiwan’ in cultural centres in China, so this could be an opportunity for the Taiwanese government to acquire an identity to differentiate itself from China and not be confused as a sub-organisation of the Taipei City Government. Moreover, whilst the *de facto* embassies are mostly named after Taipei instead of Taiwan, the overall external image of Taiwan could remain confusing when communicating with foreign countries. When naming the overseas cultural institutions, Taiwan still faces the restrictions of a diplomatic conundrum. From the viewpoint of organisational identity, the naming does not project to visitors a consistent image. To use the name ‘Taipei’ to represent Taiwan is a diplomatic compromise, and to use the name ‘Taiwan’ when placing culture in foreign affairs can be considered as a small breakthrough. However, it is not yet known whether the MOC will eventually unify the names of the cultural centres. If the MOC can achieve a uniform
label for the promotion of Taiwan abroad, this can create a consistently recognisable image for foreign audiences.

When it comes to promoting an image of Taiwan, one of the limitations identified in the Global Outreach Action Plan is the difficulty of being distinguished from other East Asian cultures, especially when the curating and programming are decided by the arts institutions in the host countries. According to my interviewee (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014), an integrated national image is absent. In the Global Outreach Action Plan published by the MOC, an appeal was made for an integrated and more efficient approach with limited resources. There was a call for a special committee to develop an overall strategy with consultation involving professionals, the third sector and representatives from civil society (Ministry of Culture, 2013a). However, it remains unclear whether the committee was created or the opinions of civil society taken into account in government policymaking. It is a common practice to include Taiwan as part of Asian cultures. Therefore, individual art works from Taiwan would be understood within the context of Asian culture. It is easier to gain publicity by being part of ‘Asian Culture,’ but it also makes it difficult to stand out. Director Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) of the New York Cultural Center reflected on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy on the macro level and noted differences between several Asian cultures:

From the macro-perspective, the South Eastern Asian countries may have similar cultures, and Japanese culture is unique. We have many parts (of culture) overlapping with mainland China because of the shared roots. Although there might be some difference in the development of contemporary art, when you use the Taiwanese element, that’s pretty much the same, especially in traditional arts. For example, the difference between your folk dance and their [Chinese] folk dance, the foreigners could not tell. When we promote Taiwanese dance, this is an obstacle. That is to say: what’s our speciality? […] except for cases like Cloud Gate, they already became a Taiwanese brand, that’s fine. So what I meant was…we need to strongly persuade them, why we are better than mainland China. For example, the ink and wash painting…in what way is Taiwan better than China? In contemporary arts it might be different, but in terms of traditional arts, it’s pretty similar. Especially when China is rising; they are rich, and they spare no effort to create a soft image of a cultural nation.

Director Yu is clearly anxious about the challenge of finding and promoting the unique strengths of Taiwanese culture. The challenge can be traced back to the formation and
reinterpretation of Taiwanese cultural identity. Despite the Taiwanese awareness movement, the anxiety of distinguishing Taiwan from China, or the rest of Asia, still exists. It is particularly interesting when Director Yu mentions the need to persuade others ‘why we are better than mainland China.’ The competitiveness might be deliberately underplayed in the official statements that Minister Lung Ying-tai made, but they remain in the mind of some government officials. Furthermore, what does it mean to ‘be better’ in the arts? It is also worth considering whether Taiwanese culture could be understood out of context. Another interviewee shared her perspective (Anonymous#2, personal communication, 17 December, 2013):

For example, I know the Taiwan History Museum in Tainan, they would like to have international collaboration, too. But, I can’t see the possibility. Because……if we do things like marine culture, indigenous culture, we need something very specific. Themes like this in foreign museums, they would not just focus on Taiwan. For them, they would like to set the topic to Asia-Pacific, and Taiwan is just a part of them. [The opportunity] to just focus on Taiwan is something which can only be found, not pursued.

These concerns not only imply the cultural contexts within which to position Taiwanese culture, but also identify its uniqueness. It is essential to examine how Taiwan can position itself in the global cultural context. It may also be the reason why cultural diplomacy would be difficult for Taiwan before a clearer cultural identity emerges. If the anxiety of being distinguished from others no longer existed, then the Taiwanese government could confidently present Taiwanese culture. Therefore, the real question is: could this confidence be established in Taiwanese culture? This might explain why gaining cultural presence is important for Taiwan. That said, probably the only way to establish confidence in culture is to see oneself through the eyes of others. The existence of Taiwan is confirmed through the process of ‘being seen’, and the anxiety would probably be alleviated.

The uncontrollability in cultural diplomacy is apparent. In the attempt to collaborate with local arts organisations, the cultural centres may not have the final decision. This raises the question of whether government should be more prescriptive. Whilst collaborating with foreign cultural organisations, the content and approach of an exhibition are the decision of curators or other cultural professionals, depending on the results of negotiation. Can the cultural centres have a voice? Or should they simply be funding providers? Furthermore, it may be questioned how much freedom cultural centres can operate in the host country. There
is a balance to be maintained by the government should it engage with arts and cultural organisations, and this represents the fundamental difference of mindset and intention of cultural diplomacy (Holmes, 2012).

These are key questions for the overall operational strategy of the centres. Of crucial importance are the objectives of collaborating with cultural organisations in the host countries. The centres introduce Taiwanese artists, provide them with funding and resources and usually sponsor the events. However, the centres might not have the desired outcome of promoting Taiwan’s cultural image. If that is the case, to what extent can the cultural centre negotiate with the artists and their partners? This can be a question of bureaucracy in Taiwan, and how cultural officials understand their role in cultural diplomacy.

The operation and vision of overseas cultural centres were also mentioned in the 1998 White Paper for Culture. Both cultural centres in New York and Paris were regarded as a window to showcase Taiwanese culture (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). In its early stages, the New York Cultural Center consisted of two cultural institutes: Taipei Gallery and Taipei Theatre. The two venues rented space and operated in the Rockefeller Center as theatres and galleries between 1991 and 2002. From my fieldwork, I discovered that the projects had been discontinued, as the CCA decided not to renew the tenancy when it expired in 2002. In the report *Sounding the Horn of International Cultural Exchange: a record of Chinese Information and Culture Centre in New York*, published by the CCA in 2002, it was stated that the space could not fulfil the needs of large-scale arts activities, and human and financial resources were required to maintain the two venues (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2002b). The Taipei Gallery hosted six to seven exhibitions every year in its 2,800 square foot venue, and the Taipei Theatre hosted 10 to 12 programmes annually (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004b). Taking the figures published in a report for the period May 2000 to June 2001 as an example, the average number of audience members was 200 in each performance in the Taipei Theatre, and 68 visitors each day for the exhibitions in the Taipei Gallery (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2002). The 2002 CCA report on the work of the Taipei Theatre included in the appendix a newspaper clipping of a review of the Chinese opera production *Rashomon: the Musical* in the *New York Times*. In the review of Tuesday 26 February, 2002, James R. Oestreich praised the performance of Huang Yu-Lin as being ‘lovely, fetching and, when necessary stouthearted, a worthy fall to the villain.’ He also wrote about the audience that night: ‘[...] the small house was full, and the audience was largely English-speaking, a shift from a few years ago, when audiences were mostly Chinese. New Yorkers of all stripes have evidently been drawn to Chinese opera, in part by the Taipei Theatre’s high quality
presentations over the last decade’ (ibid.). This review article not only publicised the performance, but also recognised the quality of production of the Taipei Theatre. As the cultural centre did not include demographic information about the audience members, this observation provided only a glimpse into Taipei Theatre’s work and audience. The fact that audience members were not simply Chinese was an achievement recognised by the author. That is to say, the cultural centre’s work reached beyond the overseas Chinese community; it was not merely a case of preaching to the converted. The inclusion of this review from the New York Times in the published report further suggests that the cultural centre valued recognition from reputable media, which could help project Taiwan’s cultural image.

Following the closure of the two venues, the New York Cultural Center took a different approach to cultural diplomacy. Whilst renting space was not considered cost-efficient, the cultural centres chose to function as a platform and collaborated with local organisations. Instead of renting separate spaces, they shared the office building with the Taipei Economic Cultural Office (TECO), which is the de facto consulate on 42nd street, near Fifth Avenue. The building is the property of the Taiwanese government in New York City. The centres hosted film screenings, small-scale performances and talks. Interestingly, the function of Taiwan Academies proposed by Minister Lung Ying-tai as salons to host small-scale activities echoed the idea of a cultural showcase on the premises. With the space and equipment to host small-scale activities, I consider the cultural centres and Taiwan Academies to have more say in the contents of the programmes they wish to present. However, they may still face challenges to attract audiences.

The cities chosen to set up foreign offices represent the strategic geographic planning in different regions. As for regional strategies, Director Susan Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) of the New York Culture Center explained their tasks. Besides the two Taiwan Academies in Houston and Los Angeles, the MOC has three offices in the United States. Among these offices, the boundaries are divided by longitudes. For example, the Taiwan Academy in Los Angeles also covers some activities in Vancouver, Canada. Although the Taiwan Academy in Houston should cover the cultural activities in Central and South America, it lacks resources and manpower for such vast areas to strengthen cultural connections with Taiwan’s allies. Furthermore, due to the physical distance and huge travel expenses, few Taiwanese performing arts companies tour in Central and South America. For

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4 In late 2016, the MOC established the Taiwan Academy in Washington, D.C. Due to the scope of the present research, the establishment and operation of this MOC outpost is not included.
performing arts, there is also insufficient information for Taiwanese companies about cultural activities in those countries (Ping, personal communication, 17 June, 2013).

In terms of the cultural diplomacy in the United States, the New York Culture Center still covers the majority of policy delivery. With its vibrant arts scene, New York is a city where cultural relations could take place at every street corner. It is also the headquarters of the United Nations. This could be competitive in cultural relations practice. As Director Yu (personal communication, 2013) observes, South Eastern Asian countries are particularly ambitious newcomers in New York. She also indicated that it is not easy to find audiences as there are too many cultural activities in New York. This again is indicative of the uncontrollability of cultural diplomacy. It is true that the audience has many choices in such a big city, which made the promotion of cultural programmes difficult. From another perspective, it also means that the cultural centres need to know their target audience. As Rawnsley (2012) argued, it is necessary to define with whom one wishes to communicate, why and how. If this is not done, the promotion of cultural programmes can be a random exercise and not efficiently executed. The same may also apply to other cultural centres in megacities where there are tremendous choices of artistic activities. I argue that this is an inevitable dilemma of setting up cultural centres in megacities. Although there are huge populations in New York, Paris and London, there are also various entertainments. The cultural centres are among the cultural institutions that compete for people’s attention and participation. If the cultural centres do not have sufficient knowledge and an effective strategy, it is not easy to establish a presence in these cities.

The function of cultural diplomacy as a facilitator is particularly visible in the New York Cultural Center. As Director Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) stated, government officials in the United States would not visit the physical premises of the TECO, and cultural activities could serve as an occasion for informal meetings. Whilst hosting the receptions for cultural activities, it is easier to invite officials and diplomats. For the TECO, these are opportunities for Taiwanese diplomats to meet important diplomats. As Mitchell (1986) noted, in analysis of the significance of cultural relations, activities arranged by cultural agencies create a favourable impression on foreigners in leading positions. In this case, the cultural programme works as a supplement to traditional diplomacy. The practical function largely serves as a networking event for diplomats. The practice follows the example of the ROC government, which promoted the Peking Opera with diplomatic purpose (see section 5.1), and partly compensates for the disadvantages of lacking official diplomatic relations.
The main mission of the New York Cultural Center is to promote Taiwan’s performing arts and visual arts, which follows the function of the CCA. With limited funds and manpower, the centre aims to build and maintain a local professional network. In the interview with Director Susan Yu (2013) of the Taipei Cultural Center in New York, she presented the main strategy as follows:

The centre’s strategy is to become a platform, a bridge. We go out and look for institutions, bring DVDs of previous [collaborated] companies, or some documents of the artists. That is to say, based on connections. Either we invite guests to visit Taiwan, for example, someone in Lincoln Center, or Joyce Theater, or curators in Queen’s Museum. We invited the key person in institutions to visit Taiwan. Then, Taiwan [institutions] would make arrangements to see some exhibitions, visit artists’ studios, or watch rehearsals and performances of arts companies. When they return, they might have some ideas, and we can select some [programmes] for their reference. So, we make strong contacts. Someday, they might think of inviting a certain company to tour, or to curate an exhibition. This is one of the modes. Others, like someone we had invited or we know, could be able to introduce someone else, or some organisation might be interested. Thus, we expand the network.

It can be understood that the main strategy of the New York Cultural Center is to be a facilitator and seize opportunities for collaborations. The main strategy is to build connections and networks with local cultural professionals. This marked a change in the centre’s strategy after closing the Taipei Theater and the Taipei Gallery. With limited budget and manpower, rented space is not cost-efficient, especially when the centre would like to attract a larger audience. Maintaining the network is the key to potential collaboration and to reach new audiences. When collaborating, the local cultural institutions usually organise these projects, whilst the cultural centre plays a more supportive role. I learnt in my fieldwork that Cloud Gate 2, the associate company of Cloud Gate Dance Theater, which targets a younger audience, went to New York and performed in the Joyce Theater; the Taipei Cultural Center provided a list of all Chinese schools in the New York area for promotion, along with the resources for advertising, hosting a press conference and lectures by the choreographer. This promotion helped to push ticket sales and introduced the less-known choreographer Bulareyaung Pagarlava to the audience in New York. Although the cultural centres have provided funding and support for networking for programmers and curators, further contacts still need to be made by the administrative staff in each company.
Despite making invitations for cultural professionals to visit Taiwan, there are no guaranteed follow-up offers or collaborations. For example, one of the collaborations between the New York Cultural Center and Joyce Theatre was initiated partly due to serendipity. One of the curators in the Joyce Theater was invited by a Taiwanese arts foundation to be part of its judging panel for an arts competition in Taiwan and was impressed by the choreographer. The cultural centre took this opportunity and collaborated with the Joyce Theater. All involved benefitted: the Joyce Theater, the New York Cultural Center and the choreographer. The work was recognised by the curator, and with support from the cultural centre, it was performed at the Joyce Theater. This was an opportunity to present Taiwanese culture in a well-known venue and to increase its reach. Although partly due to serendipity, Director Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) explained that it was also owing to one of the cultural attachés in the centre, who was keen to maintain the network and connection. Thus, I argue that serendipity is not purely luck; it requires someone to take the initiative.

It was also a case of serendipity when the Asian Cultural Council (ACC) collaborated with the New York Cultural Center. This project was mentioned by Director Yu (ibid.). The ACC, one of the foundations established by the Rockefeller family, is dedicated to promoting cultural exchange between East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Several Taiwanese artists are Asian Cultural Council grant recipients and reside in the United States. Based on the existing link with Taiwanese artists, the New York Cultural Center supported the presentation of their works at the ACC’s fiftieth anniversary programme (see section 6.5). This can serve as an example of collaboration between the Cultural Centre and private foundations.

The analysis of New York Cultural Center’s strategy reveals limited staff numbers and budget, and suggests that its role as a facilitator is probably the most effective way to engage with the local community. However, the project-based partnerships might be ad hoc and difficult to continue in the long term. It depends on whether there are Taiwanese artists whose works are good enough for local arts institutions. Only when they are repeatedly invited to collaborate with these organisations will their works be seen and a vivid impression made.

Like the New York Cultural Center, the platform-making and bridge-building strategy is also applied in the Paris Cultural Centre. Taiwan enjoys close links to France established by former Minister of Culture, Tchen Yu-chiou. As a Paris-trained pianist herself, Tchen already has personal ties to France, which enabled her to cooperate with the French
government. In her administration as Chairperson of the CCA between 2000 and 2004, she signed several agreements to facilitate exchanges between scholars and government officials (Tchen, personal communication, 28 May, 2013). In other words, the close relationship between Taiwan and France is partly an outcome of her personal connections. The agreements signed between the CCA and the French government formalised the cultural exchanges, which was beneficial for maintaining the collaborations after Tchen Yu-chiou stepped down from the job.

The directorship of the Paris Cultural Centre was significant among all the cultural outposts of the CCA/MOC. The directors of the New York Cultural Center are mostly government officials assigned by the CCA, but this is not the case in Paris. The CCA often sought scholars or professionals who had close personal connections with France to work as directors of the Paris Cultural Centre. The ability to speak the language and familiarity with French culture were among the main selection criteria. This provides an interesting example of appointment for overseas cultural centres. Whilst the term of directorship can be as short as four years, knowledge of culture and personal links in the host country further benefit the operations of cultural centres.

My fieldwork also reveals that the Paris Cultural Centre is more creative in promoting Taiwanese culture and enhancing cultural exchange. Former Director of the Taiwan Cultural Centre in Paris, Dr Chen Chih-cheng (personal communication, 29 November, 2013), stated its vision to create a ‘three-tier of excellence platform for international exchange.’ On the first platform, he focused on some ‘spotlights,’ namely, cultural institutions in France and the European Union. On the second platform, he highlighted the arts festivals and biennials. These events are not affiliated to a certain institution. Finally, the director suggested creating a third platform for schools, artistic residencies and young artists. In summary, the three platforms link industry and enable the centre to understand and arrange their works accordingly. Dr Chen Chih-cheng (ibid.) mapped out the centre’s strategy in the European Union as France is at the centre, and covers the Francophone area. He considered Western Europe is the ‘hinterland’ because of the existing cultural industry chain. If opportunities appear, the centre can collaborate with Central European and Scandinavian countries. However, it would be very difficult for the centre to cover Eastern Europe, or the countries close to Russia. One activity per year and roll-out in the long term, as well as closer partnership is more viable for the centre. Given the various cultures and languages in the EU, it is difficult to reach out to all countries with equal administrative support and resources.
Although Dr Chen Chih-cheng indicated that the Paris Cultural Centre had projects in the majority of EU countries, its presence could not have the same impact due to the manpower and resource issues. However, with the forthcoming opening of the cultural centres in Berlin, Madrid and London, I expect the outreach of Taiwanese culture to be enhanced in a few years.

The Paris Cultural Centre has significantly benefited from continuous participation with other foreign cultural centres, which is notable among Taiwan’s cultural outposts. The *Forum des Instituts culturels étrangers à Paris* consists of over 50 foreign cultural institutes and organises annual events. As Dr Chen Chih-cheng observed, the collaboration and competition between the member institutes is beneficial for the Taiwan cultural centre’s development. Since its establishment in 1994, the Paris Cultural Centre has been the only CCA overseas office in Europe before the MOC was created in 2012. To promote Taiwanese films in the major European film festivals is another project of the Paris Cultural Centre. In addition, an important annual project is to assist Taiwanese performing arts companies to participate in the OFF Avignon festivals. In relation to promoting Taiwanese culture in Europe, Dr Chen Chih-cheng suggested that the CCA could recruit more cultural attachés in more countries. It is difficult for other departments to cover cultural projects in representative offices. The cultural attaché could be based in the representative office to lessen the cost of separate premises. For Dr Chen Chih-cheng, this person can act as a ‘cavalryman’ in each country for project programming and maintaining connections. However, the Council did not accept his idea, and he assumed that this was because of accounting constraints and personnel regulations.

Compared with France, the cultural relations between Taiwan and the UK have not developed as well as its education exchange, and I raised this issue during my interview with Tchen Yu-chiou in 2013. Whilst the cultural diplomacy with France enjoys strong personal links and formalised treaties in cultural affairs, I found that the CCA’s work in the UK was more ad hoc. Tchen Yu-chiou (personal communication, 28 May, 2013) stated that she also made an official visit to the UK during her administration and tried to initiate collaboration, but it did not develop as she expected. In view of the limited resources and her personal connections with France, priority was in that country instead. The CCA, moreover, did not seek to enhance cultural diplomacy with the UK after Tchen Yu-chiou stepped down as chairperson of the CCA in 2004. In terms of educational affairs, the Taipei Representative Office in the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Collaboration in Education with the British Council in 2005 and renewed it in 2011. In this Memorandum of
Understanding on Collaboration in Education, language teaching and educational exchange are identified as the main activities that both parties promote. However, arts activities are not among the listed cultural activities. Furthermore, it is the Cultural Division (now Education Division) of the Taipei Representative Office in the UK that enforces the MoU. The CCA was not involved in this agreement. Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy in the UK, as opposed to France, was not formalised in treaties or agreements between the governments.

Thus, I suggest that the lack of formalisation and continuous cultural exchange made it difficult for the MOC to expand further its cultural diplomacy in the UK. The plan for establishing a new cultural centre was in the spotlight again in 2013, when former Minister of Culture, Lung Ying-tai, visited London. With new offices in Berlin and London under preparation, the Paris Cultural Centre could expect to share some workload with the new offices. In the press conference held in London prior to Minister Lung Ying-tai’s departure, she stated that the Taiwan Academy would not provide language-learning. It would be a not-for-profit organisation and serve as a salon to promote all genres of Taiwanese art. However, to set up a Taiwan Academy, including the finalisation of its title requires consent from the UK government. Before that, the Ministry will continue to seek partnership with local arts organisations in London (BBC Chinese, 2013).

Despite administrative limitations in finding a property and delayed opening, staff members at these centres seek to develop initiatives with the resources available to them. Whilst the opening of a cultural centre is uncertain in the immediate future, the preparatory office in London is active in seeking collaboration opportunities. The London office invites universities to become Spotlight Taiwan project partners (see section 6.4) and participate in film festivals hosted by Asia House or the British Film Institute. In addition, the London preparatory office organised a Taiwanese showcase at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival in 2014, following the Paris Cultural Centre’s example of promoting Taiwanese performing arts companies in the OFF Avignon festival. This enables Taiwan to continue to engage with foreign audiences and thus maintain a presence in key cultural and political contexts.

As one of the newest offices, the preparatory office in London takes part in the cultural diplomacy programmes of the MOC. This includes organising showcases in festivals in the UK. From my observations, it would be beneficial for staff in the preparatory office to familiarise themselves with the local networks. Apart from the showcasing of performing arts at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the OFF Avignon festival, the MOC subsidised music bands to attend international music festivals and started, in 2014, to promote Taiwanese music bands under the name ‘Taiwan Beats’ at events such as at the Glastonbury Festival. As
Chia-Chen Chang (2014) indicated, the showcase is part of the government’s international promotion programme, the Popular Music Industry Development Action Plan (2010-2015), and the GIO (now part of the MOC) has hired agencies to help promote Taiwanese independent music overseas. Through these agencies, Taiwan’s music troupes can participate in overseas music festivals without worrying about the cost and gain publicity. In Taiwanese scholars Miaoju Jian and Kai-Tong Cheng’s (2012) research on the international promotion of Taiwan’s independent music, they questioned the strategy, as the impact is hard to evaluate, and the reach is also limited since the subsidy has been allocated to only a few music troupes. The largest beneficiaries are arguably the cultural intermediaries (e.g. the agencies hired by the MOC), but not the musicians. Furthermore, Jian and Cheng (ibid.) argued that being funded by the government would impact their independence from government. In other words, independent musicians should remain distant from government and public funding even for the sake of attending international festivals. Whether such funding has really helped is difficult to judge, and the aim to promote cultural industries abroad through government support would eventually undermine the strength of the arts. Nonetheless, the strategy of promotion of cultural products needs to accommodate the economic logic. There might be quantifiable outcomes related to increased sales, but this does not necessarily translate into soft power or resources.

After discussing the cultural centres and their strategies in North America and Europe, I now turn to the centres in Asia. Compared with the long-term establishment of cultural centres in North America and Europe – where gaining recognition for Taiwanese culture is a priority – the MOC did not engage as much in countries close to home. In Asia, the CCA set up a preparatory office in Tokyo in 2010. The cultural centre shares a space with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Tokyo. Director Chu Wen-Ching of the Taipei Cultural Centre in Tokyo stated that there is great understanding of Taiwan’s film, music and fine art because of the historical ties between Japan and Taiwan (Chiang, 2014). Taiwan was Japan’s colony from 1895 to 1945, and Japan remains a popular travel destination for Taiwanese. For instance, Japan was the most visited country by Taiwanese; in 2015, the total number was 3,797,879.5 I suggest the historical connection and the colonial legacy are among the main reasons for Taiwanese interest in Japanese culture. Despite the relatively recent establishment of the Cultural Centre in Tokyo, the cultural exchange between Japan and Taiwan has a long history. As an illustration, the influence of Japanese

drama, popular music and manga is most significant in Taiwan. Although there are still territorial disputes between China, Taiwan and Japan regarding the senkaku/diaoyu islands, relations between Japanese and Taiwanese people remain frequent and friendly. One example was the generous donation of Taiwanese people after the North-eastern Japan earthquake in 2011. To a degree, it is revealing of ubiquitous cultural relations and citizen diplomacy in both societies. The Taiwan Cultural Centre in Tokyo officially opened in June 2015. The use of Taiwan in the name was agreed by the Japanese government with goodwill during the negotiation, as then Minister of Culture Hung Meng-chi revealed (Chiang, 2015). However, the issue of naming inconsistency of cultural centres remains, which does not help the Taiwanese government to establish a brand for promoting Taiwanese culture overseas. This serves as an example that disadvantages in conventional diplomacy have an impact on cultural diplomacy.

One of the significant efforts of the MOC was to strengthen the cultural connection with Southeast Asia after its upgrade in 2012, and the establishment of a new cultural centre in Malaysia. Historically, overseas Chinese students are entitled to study in Taiwan. Students from Malaysia, Myanmar and Indonesia constitute the majority of the overseas Chinese students. Taiwan has already built connections with overseas Chinese students from these countries and they have become valuable links in cultural relations with Southeast Asia. Additionally, Malaysian-Chinese literature is a specific genre of Chinese literature, and covers a range of topics of the diaspora. Based on existing foundations, Taiwan can develop closer ties in cultural exchange with Southeast Asian countries. On account of familiarity with the Chinese community, there were successful exports of Taiwanese culture. My interviewee in the MOC took the 2001 privately-produced Taiwanese television soap opera Meteor Garden as an example. It was popular among the overseas Chinese community, especially in Southeast Asia. After seeing the success of Meteor Garden, the MOC planned to promote more Taiwanese television in Southeast Asia (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). Therefore, the potential market for exporting Taiwanese mass communication products plays an important part in the MOC’s Southeast Asia strategy.

Another significant link is created by the migrant workers from Southeast Asia who have been working in Taiwan since the 1990s. In addition to cultural industry exports, the most important task is to extend beyond Chinese communities and foster mutual understanding. Migrant workers from the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam work in domestic care and the construction industries in Taiwan. There are also immigrants from Southeast Asia settled in Taiwan through marriage. The ‘New children of Taiwan,’ that is,
the children of Southeast Asian immigrants, were included in former President Chen Shui-bian’s ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ (Wang, 2004). Despite the intention to include the Southeast Asian migrants in Taiwan’s cultural identity discourse, it was not in the CCA’s priority to work with Southeast Asian countries. It was until 2013 that the MOC launched projects to strengthen cultural exchange. The project Emerald Initiative: Taiwan x Southeast Asia aims to invite artists from Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. The invited artists can collaborate in curating, performance, playwriting, fieldwork, etc. (Taiwan, ROC Ministry of Culture, 2017). In my opinion, this initiative in cultural relations with Southeast Asia is long overdue, as the government should have recognised the cultural links between the immigrants and their countries of birth earlier.

There are several reasons for this delayed cultural relations initiative. First, cultural and artistic affairs were not the priority of the government in terms of migration. It was the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Interior that were in charge of the Mandarin language teaching for immigrants. Secondly, whilst the marriages conducted by agencies are often commoditised and transnational, most of the female immigrants are married into families of lower social class. Thus, it became a priority to help immigrants learn Mandarin and integrate into Taiwan society. There are fewer resources allocated to the cultural exchange with the immigrants’ home countries. As transnational marriages became common two decades ago, and the ‘New Children of Taiwan’ are now adults, more attention should be paid to their link with the countries where their mothers are from.

The late start building cultural exchange between Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries was indicative of a new strategy to engage with less privileged audiences. As Rawnsley (2012) illustrated in his research on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy strategy, this may attract the elite who already know something about Taiwan, its history and culture, and with whom Taiwan already enjoys soft power success, especially in terms of political lobbying. The Emerald Initiative: Taiwan x Southeast Asia collected the stories of immigrants in Taiwan and gained further awareness of their cultures. Nonetheless, the forms of cultural relations are limited to the domains of literature and performing arts. It remains to be seen whether these projects reach the target audience and empower the immigrants.

Furthermore, the Kwang Hwa Information and Culture Centre in Hong Kong provides a model for programming and collaboration with local cultural organisations. Since its sovereignty transferred from the UK to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, Hong Kong has been the ‘Special Administrative Region’ of the PRC. The political system of Hong Kong was established under the principle of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ which was agreed prior
to the transfer of sovereignty. Compared with people from mainland China, residents in Hong Kong can enjoy more freedom travelling to Taiwan. With relations between Hong Kong – including ethnic Chinese students – and Taiwan and the long history of cultural communication, the Taiwanese Kwang Hwa Information and Culture Centre (KHICC) enjoys more strengths compared with other cultural centres. The common language, in particular, makes it is easier to promote Taiwanese literature. The KHICC was a former branch of the Government Information Office (GIO) of the Taiwanese government. Several of its directors were writers and cultural professionals in Taiwan instead of civil servants. As the GIO merged into the new Ministry of Culture in 2012, the KHICC also became one of the overseas cultural centres of the MOC. Since 2008, the KHICC has showcased every year Taiwanese art, film and literature in the programme ‘Taiwan Cultural Festival.’ The KHICC also invites Taiwanese cultural professionals to give talks in Hong Kong. As Hong Kong is an international hub, the KHICC could target international audiences without being restricted to Hong Kong citizens. From my interviews, I learnt that the reputation of the Taiwan Cultural Festival has enabled the KHICC to establish successful partnerships with local venues to host events (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). The operational model is ideal for overseas cultural promotion, as the KHICC has established partnerships with local organisations and engaged with the local communities. Furthermore, a continuous cultural festival can help in building the brand image of the cultural centre and further maintain its exposure in the host country.

To explore KHICC’s programming, the promotion of Taiwanese literature can serve as an example of the MOC’s different regional strategies. Inviting writers for a talk or a book signing session can be the most achievable for literature-related programmes. As indicated by my interviewee (ibid.), the KHICC regularly hosts literature events and introduces Taiwanese writers to Hong Kong audiences. From her observation, some Taiwanese works are published in Hong Kong, and several directors of the cultural centre are famous Taiwanese writers. The development of the programme has been facilitated by the relative advantages of a common language. Traditional Chinese is widely used in Hong Kong and the encumbrance of translation is minimised. As a consequence, the cultural centre is able to promote more literature. The case of the KHICC shows that the existing strengths and knowledge in the host countries can affect the cultural centre’s programming and development. Also, the expertise and reputation of the cultural centre’s director can be beneficial for promoting Taiwanese culture.
However, in non-Chinese speaking countries, promoting Taiwanese literature presents challenges. One of them is insufficient high-quality translations. The government has recognised the importance of translation, and the CCA (now the MOC) has allocated funding for the Plan for the Translation of Taiwanese Modern Literature into Foreign Languages since 1990. After the CCA upgraded to the MOC, the sub-organisation National Museum of Taiwanese Literature continued the translation project. It launched the Taiwan Literary Translation Centre in 2012. Besides English, translations in French, Japanese, Korean, German, Russian, Dutch, Swedish and Czech are available from the Translation Centre. Nonetheless, there are not many books available and the budget is tight. Except for the overseas Chinese-speaking market, Taiwanese literature does not have as wide a readership in other languages. Compared with the long-established reputation of the performing arts, Taiwanese literature is considered difficult to promote in non-Chinese-speaking markets. Taking the United States as an example, Director Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) of the New York Cultural Center highlighted several factors that make literature promotion difficult. First, there are few high-quality translations. There are also few Taiwanese writers well known in the United States, and even if they live in the country, their works are mainly written in Chinese, and not many are available in English. Director Yu (ibid.) noted that in non-Chinese speaking countries, it is rare for Taiwan’s overseas cultural centres to host relevant programmes for Taiwanese literature. For example, unlike the performing arts, literature is not a priority of the New York Cultural Center.

It is interesting to consider whether literature translation projects achieve their goals. There are two important features of this in cultural policy. On the one hand, they are exports of culture for ideological purposes; on the other hand, trade is initiated through image development and management. The two contexts overlap, and translated literature was generally included in the first (von Flotow, 2007). From the perspective of government funding allocations, I consider the two contexts have a purpose and audience. In terms of exporting cultural products, I argue that translated literature can be a starting point for further cultural product output. For instance, fiction can be used to attract a foreign readership, and an audience can be found for theatre and film production. The most successful stories include Harry Potter in the UK. In the case of promoting Taiwanese literature and subsidising translation projects, it reveals an incompatibility between Taiwan’s cultural policy programmes. Ideally, the translated works can be promoted in overseas markets where the cultural centres can provide assistance in promotion. However, from the research findings, it reveals that the translated works of the Taiwan Literature Translation Project are not widely
publicised and the cultural centres do not find works available for promotion. This reveals a mismatch in the MOC’s strategy.

Furthermore, to make literary works widely available requires knowledge of overseas publishing markets. Although the public-funded translation centre could fill the gap not covered by the market, certain efforts should be made to make translated literature more accessible. Nevertheless, it still relies on professional networks and channels of publishers to introduce works into copyright trades and make them available to a foreign readership. To unlock the potential of literature translation and achieve ideological objectives and trade initiatives, the MOC allocated funding for both. Despite this, the current working model limits its impact to intellectuals and academics. The translated works vary from novels to poetry and have only a small circle of readers. However, in 2011, circumstances began to change. One of the examples is Wu Ming-Yi’s novel The Man with the Compound Eyes. As in the pamphlet published by the Ministry of Culture, Books from Taiwan, Sterk (2014) stated that unlike previous English translations of Taiwanese fiction, which mostly circulated through university or boutique presses, Wu Ming-Yi’s work was the first to be taken on by a major English language trade publisher. This case represents a new method of promoting Taiwanese literature. However, I also question whether the government’s role in the translation of Taiwanese literature needs to change. Simply providing subsidy to encourage publishers to translate and introduce Taiwanese literature overseas might be a more efficient strategy. I continue the discussion of non-governmental organisations’ engagements in cultural diplomacy in section 6.5.

5.6 An administrative perspective on the cultural centres

Having discussed the issue with naming, which, as a consequence, is of diplomatic disadvantage to Taiwan, I now turn my attention to operations in the cultural centres in this section. I examine the administration in the MOC and these cultural centres to determine whether the policy objectives are realised. First, I explore the methods of communication, including information and knowledge collection on cultural exchange. Secondly, I discuss the training and professional skills that cultural attachés receive in the current bureaucracy to fulfil their job. In order to understand the role of cultural attaché personnel, interviews were conducted in the MOC and Cultural Centres. The questions focused on their personal career path and the training they received. Several interviewees who work in management also shared their thoughts on the characteristics of a cultural attaché. By analysing these questions,
I aim to show how Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy is practised on the frontline and the challenges it faces.

To illustrate this, I examine the case of the long-anticipated cultural centre in London. However, the opening has been long overdue. In addition to obtaining agreement from the host country to establish a cultural centre, there are more administrative restrictions in Taiwan. The legislators in Taiwan are critical of the high rental cost of newly established cultural centres (Chen, 2013). As the rental and maintenance costs are high, the amount of money left for subsidies and activities is comparatively small. Thus, concerns are raised that not enough Taiwanese cultural programmes could be presented despite London’s strategic location.

This issue of the Cultural Centre in London is not unique. In fact, it is relevant to cultural centres in other megacities. In the ideal plan, the location needs to be strategic with easy access, convenient public transportation and, preferably, with links to other tourist spots to attract footfalls. The strategic location could benefit from attracting both casual visitors and audiences to the cultural centre. A location that meets these criteria is likely to be expensive in an international city. Moreover, property renovation may be required as not all venues meet the standards for professional artistic performances. Whether it is worthwhile to maintain a physical office for a cultural centre with limited budget is still debated. It remains a complicated challenge to utilise a space, attract audience, and engage with the local community.

Nonetheless, finding a location is not the only challenge in preparation to open a cultural centre. As the Taiwan’s Government Procurement Act regulates public expense, service providers for the public sector must be decided via public procurement. Take the Cultural Centre in London as an example. The estate agent for property management in London needs to be chosen based on Government Procurement Act regulation. This makes the process even more complicated to find an appropriate agent, who is familiar with the housing market in London and Taiwan’s Government Procurement Act. Given that the brick-and-mortar cultural centre has been delayed, it provides an opportunity to think of alternative methods of operation. I suggest following the examples of New York and Paris, by acting as a bridge-builder and collaborating with local curators. This may be the most efficient way in London as well, and would allow the Cultural Centre in London to be more flexible to tap into the vibrant and diverse local cultural network.

These administrative limitations and challenges raised questions about the best organisational structure of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Currently, as the cultural centres and
Taiwan Academies are outposts of the MOC, its finance and personnel apply the same regulations of expense and recruitment in the Taiwanese government. Under the restraints of bureaucracy, it might result in unnecessary waste of time in administration and inflexibility and inefficiency. The challenges of policy implementation are further discussed in Chapter 7.

Another important aspect is the cross-departmental collaboration in Taiwan’s overseas cultural offices. The main government department that is responsible for cultural diplomacy is the MOC. Moreover, the primary responsibilities of the Public Diplomacy Coordinating Council and Department of International Information Services in the MOFA are media relations and publications. Compared with countries like France and Austria, where the MOFA directs international cultural relations, the structure in Taiwan is different. In this case, the main ministry taking the lead in cultural diplomacy is the MOC, which is closer to the model in Singapore, where the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (which includes the National Arts Council) handles international cultural promotion and exchanges (Wyszomirski, 2003). Despite the fact cross-departmental collaboration was expected when the Taiwan Academy was launched, it remains unclear as to how it can function as a platform to operate among departments.

In the Taiwanese representative offices or embassies, the representatives or ambassadors in each country are in charge of the expatriates appointed by different ministries. When it comes to promoting Taiwanese culture abroad, the ambassadors or representatives play a crucial role in deciding which area to prioritise. Thus, the priority can be exchanges in higher education, tourism, or Taiwanese cuisine (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2014). Cultural attachés appointed by the MOC are either under the authority of the cultural centres or the cultural divisions in representative offices. This is similar to France and Mexico, where the cultural attaché is housed within the embassy structure. The focus is on long-term relationship building, not trouble-shooting particular policies (Schneider, 2007). In Taiwan’s larger embassies and representative offices, there is sufficient staff allowance for most government departments to send their staff to cover different areas of work of the Taiwanese government. Therefore, the division of work can be clear and the ministries can directly communicate with their staff appointed to the host countries. Several government departments deploy officials to representative offices to cooperate with the MOFA. For instance, the Ministry of Education (MOE) is responsible for recruiting foreign students and collaborating with other international higher education institutions. Additionally, the Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) works with Taiwanese and Chinese emigrants. These departments promote Taiwan’s public diplomacy through mass media and the
Taiwanese communities overseas. Government officials are under the same roof of representative offices. As Rawnsley (2000) observed, as regards government practice, the representative offices have a confusing structure; it is their respective head offices in Taipei, rather than the representatives themselves, who control the different divisions. In 2012, a new government regulation was passed allowing the ambassador or representative to supervise the expatriate officials from different government departments. In this way, the act enabled the ambassador or representative to have more power over all affairs in the host country. This can potentially reinforce an integrated cultural diplomacy strategy.

However, cultural diplomacy projects are not exclusively realised by cultural attachés due to staff shortages and the limited numbers of cultural centres. In a smaller embassy or representative office, diplomats from the MOFA would need to cover projects initiated by other governmental departments. Whereas different departments need to negotiate with each other across the platform in Taipei, the ambassador or representative in the host country oversees the work of each cultural centre as part of the embassy. According to one of the interviewees, the ambassador is the most important person to decide the strategies in each country, thus building on local knowledge (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2014). The cultural attachés that the MOC deploys to each overseas office are also under the authority of the embassy. Therefore, the cultural attachés need to report to both the ambassador and the MOC in Taipei. I also learnt from my interviewee (ibid.) that when the government officials work in the embassy or representative offices, the ambassador or the representative oversees their administrative work in the host countries. In smaller representative offices, the cultural officers may need to share more day-to-day administration rather than focus on cultural projects, and this increases their workload. Therefore, it becomes a challenge for cultural attachés to manage thoroughly their projects. That is to say, the officers need to report to both the ambassador/representative and the MOC. Regarding project management, the current organisation is inefficient in terms of project execution.

The complicated administration structure to execute cultural diplomacy may result in presenting a confused national image overseas. Take gastrodiplomacy (see section 5.9) as an example; the effort to promote Taiwanese food was undermined by the food safety scandals. There is no integrated cross-departmental action for crisis management. Whilst the MOC only has 12 overseas offices (as of June 2017) and not in all the embassies, policy initiatives may not necessarily be carried out by the cultural attachés that it appoints. This also limits the efficiency of policy implementation and is unhelpful for to the MOC’s aim to broaden its reach in more countries.
Discussion of the challenges facing the implementation of cultural diplomacy abroad, serves as a context for examining similar administrative challenges in Taiwan. Even inside the MOC, there was a major change in cultural diplomacy personnel during the re-organisation in 2012. Subsequently, the rapid expansion in the number of overseas offices presented new challenges, especially for the staff that were transferred from the Government Information Office to the new cultural centres. First, the main objective of Taiwan’s diplomacy shifted from propaganda to cultural representation (as mentioned in section 1.1), which caused clashes between organisational cultures. Whilst the GIO was responsible for media relations and propaganda, the practice in CCA and GIO were distinctly different. For new cultural attachés who had previously worked in the GIO, the transition meant needing to acquire knowledge and skills for their new role. The core function of the GIO was international advertisement and propaganda, and the office works closely with central government in Taiwan. Although there was some overlap in cultural diplomacy work between the GIO and the MOC, such as communication with the media, their strategies were essentially different. From my fieldwork, I learnt that instead of contacting media for advertising, the new cultural attachés from the former GIO may need to build connections with museums, galleries, and theatres. To introduce a new artist from Taiwan to a gallery in the host country, they need to familiarise themselves with the local culture and have some knowledge of arts administration. In the Ministry of Culture, the Department of Cultural Exchange is responsible for communications with the cultural centres. The Department also needs to incorporate former GIO officers and CCA staff, in order to expand its professional skills during the employees’ service in the cultural centres. The employees appointed abroad would need to spend some time on a placement in the Department of Cultural Exchange in Taipei prior to their service overseas (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2014). This also relates to the question of what professional knowledge and skills a cultural attaché should possess to fulfil his or her job, and whether the training from the MOC meets these requirements.

Despite the large number of staff in the MOC, the problems of language deficiencies were identified. Whilst it is relatively easy for the MOC to find English and French speaking employees, it is difficult to find candidates in other languages. As the number of cultural centres expanded in 2012, there were challenges to fill the new vacancies. As a result, the Taiwanese government included senior vacancies in the civil service examination with the aim of recruiting cultural affairs officers specialised in other languages, such as German and Spanish. I also found in my fieldwork that the numbers of local staff in the cultural centres
are few and mainly responsible for subordinate functions (Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). It was suggested by Mitchell (1986) that local language skills would be strength in representation. However, such strength was not deployed in Taiwan’s cultural centres. To have the Taipei-appointed staff perform representational duties and seek collaboration and partnerships is the usual practice in the cultural centres. This work model can be less effective when engaging with the local community in the host countries, as there may be gaps between the staff rotation. The continuity that local staff provide can be beneficial for maintaining networks and compensating for the disadvantages of staff rotation.

The media exposure of cultural activities plays an important role in the validation and evaluation in cultural centres. Staff members collect and archive newspaper or magazine clippings of reviews. In a list provided by the New York Cultural Center during my fieldwork in 2013, I noted several interesting facts. For instance, media coverage for each activity, including television reports and interviews, is categorised by language. Some prestigious media outlets are highlighted in the report, such as the *New York Times* and *Financial Times*. Take the opening of the Taiwan Gallery in the Queens Museum as an example. The New York Cultural Center recorded that there were over 20 news items in both Chinese and English media. In a clipping of the review by Holland Cotter in the *New York Times*, he praised the Taiwanese artist Chou Yu-Cheng as the ‘stand out’ in the exhibition – and this was highlighted by the staff (Cotter, 2013). I suggest that media relations and information gathering are important activities in a cultural centre’s daily work, not only to gain exposure, but also to establish a record of the work completed. It can also be observed that opinion leaders, such as reputable media, receive more attention from cultural centres. Their reviews and coverage carry more weight than others, and they represent recognition and a wider readership.

Whilst receiving positive reviews for cultural activities overseas is important, it should also be reported in Taiwan. The news is not only collated by the cultural centres, but also released by the MOC in Taipei. For instance, in a press release published on the MOC website, it was reported the triumph of the Taiwan Season showcase hosted by the MOC in the Edinburgh Fringe Festival (Ministry of Culture, 2016). Particularly, Judith Mackrell of *the Guardian* recommended the Taiwan Season as one of the ‘three of the best……dance performances of this week,’ and commented ‘[t]he once insular culture of Taiwan is beginning to fizz with interesting dance energies’ (Mackrell, 2016). Again, it shows that reviews from reputable newspapers are much valued. In addition to the article in *the Guardian*, positive reviews from *the British Theatre Guide* and *the Scotsman* were also
mentioned. The news released by the MOC helped the cultural centres to publish their works in Taiwan. This not only creates a sense of participation for the Taiwanese audience, but it is also beneficial for the companies involved in the showcase to enhance their reputation back home.

The communication between the MOC and cultural centres is crucial in their work promoting Taiwanese artists overseas. It is also essential for cultural attachés in the overseas cultural centres to keep up to date with Taiwanese cultural news. When the cultural centres operate abroad, regular meetings are held with the MOC in Taipei to familiarise both with the projects. For example, Director Susan Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) of the New York Cultural Center revealed that the MOC would collate news and pass the information to them. However, the materials are often from traditional media, such as newspapers. As regards the Internet and social media, it often relies on individuals, especially younger staff members’ motivation and ability, to gather information and familiarise themselves with Taiwanese domestic cultural news.

However, it also raises the question of whether the MOC provides sufficient information for directing and suggesting strategies for cultural centres. Director Chen (personal communication, 29 November, 2013) of the Paris Cultural Centre stated that the MOC should focus more on policy and strategy-making, especially based on scientific research. I would suggest the relations between the MOC and cultural centres can be more dynamic. Other than providing assistance to the day-to-day operation, the MOC can be more active in data collection and analysis for framing strategies. Also, it would be ideal for the cultural centres to build a database for further research. However, in the case of the Paris Cultural Centre, Dr Chen revealed that the manpower is insufficient to maintain a database.

I found that in order to understand the artists and networks, the MOC relied on traditional journalism as the main source of information. The newspapers gathered by the MOC staff in Taipei remain the main source of information transmitted to cultural centres. As for social media, it depends on individual staff members’ own interests to facilitate the interaction with artists and companies (Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). Thus, the cultural centres have not fully utilised social media. There is no evidence of official accounts on Facebook or Twitter engaging with existing and potential audiences. I argue that the inability to facilitate this interaction fails to respond to the need for immediate communication. If audience participation in certain cultural diplomacy activities can extend to discussion exchanged on social media, the effect can last longer, even after the programme
There is further assessment of how social media can motivate individuals to participate in cultural relations in Chapter 6.

Further to the operation in the cultural centres, I now turn to the issues of recruitment and the training of cultural attachés. In linking two cultures and fostering mutual understanding, the cultural attaché can serve as an inter-mediator, and such a job can be challenging. I would identify the key role of cultural attaché as an actor knowledgeable of cultures in both the home and host countries, and willing to build long-term relationships (Schneider, 2007). Therefore, he or she should have a vision not limited to short-term benefits or troubleshooting policies. However, it is important to determine whether the current recruitment and training procedure of Taiwan’s cultural attachés is able to identify and provide the skills needed. In the Global Outreach Action Plan, the shortage of ‘cultural translators’ and interpreters was considered a problem in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. It was illustrated the importance of ‘cultural translations,’ as it is important to render the content of Taiwanese culture into languages that foreign audience can understand and relate to in their daily lives. Therefore, I argue, to be a ‘cultural translator’ requires skills in cultural diplomacy with knowledge and vision. Although some diplomatic training might be helpful, such as acquiring knowledge on international relations, the job of cultural attaché is more complex.

In the day-to-day job, the cultural attaché can be more like an arts administrator coordinating and negotiating between artists, partners and the institution he or she represents. Whilst the cultural attachés are serving in overseas cultural centres, they are expected to increase their work skills and competences. However, due to the rotation of cultural attachés and diplomats, there may not be sufficient time for them to become familiar with the host country. However, the interviewee in the MOC raised the concern that staying abroad for too long might result in becoming distant from domestic culture in Taiwan. Thus, a posting back in Taipei is better for cultural attachés’ professional skills (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). To be closer to Taiwanese artists and cultural professionals can help the cultural attachés understand how to introduce them overseas. Careful consideration of their deployment is therefore needed.

To review the professional skills required by a cultural attaché, the recruitment process should first be considered. In the foreign cultural centres, the job vacancies and appointments for cultural officers from the MOC need the approval of the MOFA. The MOFA also decides the number of head counts allocated to each cultural centre to recruit cultural attachés. However, the MOC alone could not resolve the shortage in staff numbers.
Dr Chen Chih-cheng, the Director of the Paris Cultural Centre, expressed the view that the shortage was problematic for them to improve the administration process. For instance, he suggested the insufficient head count staffing results in work overload (Chen, personal communication, 29 November, 2013). The work overload prevents staff members from working to their full potential and leads them to follow a path of least resistance. Gradually, motivation for innovation withers. Nonetheless, this problem cannot be solved solely by the MOC and requires cross-departmental negotiation.

Discussion of the recruitment criteria of cultural attachés reveals the knowledge that the MOC expects in the institutionalised process of staff training. To be qualified as a cultural attaché for appointment by the MOC to a cultural centre, the candidate needs adequate knowledge of the bureaucracy. First, he or she needs to have worked in the MOC over a set period (at least one full year as of 2015). The candidate can either be a civil servant, who has passed the civil service examination, or a contract employee with relevant academic and professional background. Candidates who hold an academic degree in the same language of the host country are preferable. Upon applying for the job, the candidates must have satisfactory work performance and language skills to work in the host country. The successful candidates will have placements in the Ministry and its sub-organisations, such as the National Museum of Taiwan History and National Museum of Taiwan Literature, to familiarise themselves with each department’s projects, along with language courses in Taiwan’s Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs. Ideally, it is an opportunity for the candidates to discover potential projects of cultural exchange. However, the placements in the MOC’s sub-organisations are only for one day each; hence, this only provides an impression of these organisations and building connections.

It is noteworthy that the training courses provided are mainly for understanding how the MOC and its sub-organisations operate. The knowledge of Taiwanese arts organisations and the culture in the host countries are not included in the course, nor is it required in the selection criteria. In other words, it is down to the individual candidates to gather information to prepare for their new job (Anonymous#2, personal communication, 17 December, 2013). As a result, how the cultural attachés perform in their job depends on motivation to engage with the culture in the host country. The training provided is at best elementary. The training in the MOC, I would argue, is not sufficient for cultural attachés.

In addition to the MOC designed training sessions, the professional background of the cultural attachés and self-motivation are also important. Dr Chen Chih-cheng (personal communication, 29 November, 2013) recognised the benefit of the placements that the MOC
arranged, but he commented that it still depends on individual cultural attachés to utilise the training they have received. He stressed the need to understand the context of history and culture when carrying out the job (ibid.). Former Director Ping Heng of the National Theatre (personal communication, 17 June, 2013) also addressed this problem of not contributing beyond administrative roles. The assistance provided by the Taiwanese government’s overseas offices is sometimes criticised as mere icing on the cake. This, she observed, is mostly due to the neglect of individuals’ strength and potential. Except for the familiarity with the MOC, to inspire cultural attachés in their mission can be an important task of training.

To establish relationships, information gathering and research skills are often essential. However, not all government officials are capable. Director Ping further suggests that the cultural attaché needs to play the role of an arts administrator or curator to make cultural diplomacy work. For the desired characteristics to fulfil the job, establishing a personal knowledge base and networks are also important (Tchen, personal communication, 28 May, 2013). It is also essential to link other resources, such as networking with people and venues, which requires proactivity and imagination (personal communication, 17 June, 2013). Ping further remarked:

I think in terms of arts administration, it is at least 30 per cent ‘art’ and 70 per cent ‘administration.’ You cannot work without the perspective of art. You probably work merely as ‘getting things done’ if you do not have it at all. Because in arts (administration), it means you need to work with people. Therefore, I think the understanding towards the company and to the person decides whether you have a successful collaboration or not. So imagination is important. If you talk to people and have in-depth understanding, it is very important.

An ideal cultural attaché should have professional knowledge besides the requirements set by the MOC for selecting candidates. I was intrigued to realise the degree of autonomy a cultural attaché could have in the bureaucracy, their influence and how proactive they can be. Despite the limited number of staff and the workload of each employee, it also enables the cultural attaché to work closely with the director and to have more freedom to take initiatives on new projects with local organisations (Anonymous#2, personal communication, 17 December, 2013). In other words, the smaller organisation provides more flexibility to take initiatives. Once the project is approved by the director, the cultural centre reports back to the MOC and requests a budget allocation. This example illustrates the role a
cultural attaché could play to realise a project. Furthermore, such freedom and flexibility could further enhance confidence, whilst working on projects in cultural centres can be relatively organic compared with the projects in the MOC. Personal qualities are very important in staff members’ evaluation. The right person with passion, vision and professional skills could act as translator and connect two cultures together.

5.7 Controversies surrounding the Flagship Production of the NTCH and Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial

As a de facto sovereign country, Taiwan has limited access to participate in international cultural organisations as a member state. Nonetheless, the sub-organisations of the MOC, or other government-funded arts organisations, can still participate in professional networks as an institution. For example, the National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) is a member of the Association of Asia Pacific Performing Arts Centers (AAPPAC), and the National Palace Museum is a member of the International Council of Museums (ICOM). Generally, these institutions enjoy more freedom in professional networks and festivals. Their presence is sometimes regarded as national representation. Examples of this are the Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial and the NTCH, both promoting Taiwanese art worldwide. Nonetheless, they provoked disagreements among artists, especially regarding their interpretation of Taiwanese culture. On the one hand, the two examples above have revealed concerns over public resource allocation. On the other hand, whether these institutions should decide how to represent Taiwanese culture became the focus of debate.

The public funded or subsidised organisations can, nevertheless, be actors of international cultural engagement, either on their own or through participation in networks. The NTCH in Taipei participated in several major arts markets and networking, such as the Association of Performing Arts Presenters (APAP) in the United States, and helped to promote Taiwanese performing arts productions. Professional networks provide understanding of the latest trends in the arts market. Professional performing arts agencies and theatres facilitate the exchange of information and opportunity to seek potential programme buyers. This increases the cultural presence of Taiwan through professional networks. For instance, such programmes can be staged at local arts venues and thus reach greater audiences.

The Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial has differed from other national pavilions. Taipei Fine Arts Museum (TFAM), the municipal arts museum of the Taipei City Government, has curated the Taiwan Pavilion since 1995. After the first participation in the
Venice Biennial in 1995, Taiwan was added to the official pavilions under the name of ROC Taiwan-Taipei. However, due to China’s objections, the Taiwan pavilion was forced to abandon national pavilion status and was listed as a ‘Collateral Event’ in 2003 (P. Lu, 2013). I found that even in international cultural activities, the disputes over Taiwan’s sovereignty remain. Although the Taiwan Pavilion was curated by the municipal government instead of central government, the use of Taiwan’s official name and the pavilion’s status were objected to by the Chinese government.

This special status of the Taiwan Pavilion also related to its curation. Schoeber (2009), in a study of the curating of the Taiwan Pavilion in the 1990s, pointed out that unlike other single nation pavilions, which tried to present the strongest or at least most famous artist of a given country, the Taiwan Pavilion had a tendency to recreate a complex microcosm of Taiwanese identity within each show. The model of national representation established in the mid-1990s at the Venice Biennial represented a mix dictated by local political correctness. That is to say, the curating deliberately included a mix of artists from the south of the country, and artists representing different trends and media. This pattern continues to be applied in the new millennium. Pei-Yi Lu (2013) also observed that ‘Taiwan’ had been highlighted at the three Taiwan Pavilions of the Venice Biennial in 1995, 1997 and 1999. She further pointed out that the Taiwan Pavilion used artworks to illustrate the characteristics of Taiwanese culture and society. Thus, as Pei-Yi Lu (ibid.) suggested, the Taiwan Pavilion is also meant to recall the consciousness of Taiwan and to construct the imagined community of the ‘New Taiwanese’ for domestic audiences in Taiwan. To extend Pei-Yi Lu’s analysis, I regard the national pavilion as constructing channels of Taiwanese cultural identity. For the external audience at the Venice Biennial, the Taiwan Pavilion has served as a showcase for curated Taiwanese art. Also, through this presentation, the government delivers the message to a domestic audience that part of Taiwanese culture can be visible and recognised in the international cultural arena.

However, as a public-funded pavilion, there are some responsibilities of curating. The representation of an impartial image of Taiwan requires a subtle political correctness in the curating of the Taiwan Pavilion. The political correctness observed by Schoeber (2009) could be analysed from several perspectives: the distribution of public resources and the idea of creating a widely-approved cultural identity. The former can be the budget allocation and the latter can be interpreted as the image of Taiwan. To select only a single strongest artist as the representative of the national pavilion would not be the image that TFAM wants to project, and might be criticised as too partial for government funding allocation.
The burdens of political correctness and funding distribution were significant aspects of the controversy of the Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial in 2013. The curator, Esther Lu, who proposed the title ‘This Is Not a Taiwan Pavilion,’ attempted to incorporate the ambiguity of the Taiwan Pavilion in its content. As Pei-Yi Lu (2013, p.43) noted, ‘the Taiwan Pavilion shifted its attention from promoting Taiwan via the idea of “Taiwaneseness” to displaying its uncertain international status.’ The ambiguity of Taiwan’s international status has become the subject of curating. To emphasise the negotiable identity and further address the main concerns of the dialectic process of the paradoxes of the ‘stranger and us,’ Esther Lu invited foreign artists to represent the Taiwan Pavilion. In a statement on the curatorial concept, she indicated that the title of this project suggested a new proposal for the Taiwan Pavilion’s repositioning, and a break from incoherent and impotent national representation (E. Lu, 2013). Esther Lu confronted the ambiguity of Taiwan Pavilion’s status at the Venice Biennale as it had no official account and did not qualify for the Golden Lion prize. The hierarchical structure of the Biennale, as she noted, corresponds to the international power network. I would suggest this challenged the official strategy to frame and present Taiwanese cultural identity internationally, and the curating did not follow the pattern of two-way identity construction.

Esther Lu’s choice confronted the delicate complexity of Taiwan’s cultural identity framing. Nonetheless, the choice of artists triggered controversy not only because two of the three artists were not Taiwanese nationals, but also the selection and administration process. The use of public funding for the Taiwan Pavilion, whether it is a showcase of Taiwanese art, still can be examined within the domain of government resource distribution. The question ‘what is a Taiwan Pavilion?’ can certainly be de-constructed from multiple perspectives, aesthetic, ideological, or political. The mission and impact of the Taiwan Pavilion remains unknown except for the exposure and participation in the Venice Biennial. My observation is that when resource allocation decisions are challenged, there is a tendency for the Taiwanese government to be more conservative to avoid controversy. The case of the Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial suggests that the overall operation procedure was restricted to avoid risk. Also, the decision-making in public funding allocation can be too superficial by simply providing a bursary, therefore failing to engage and communicate.

The case of the Taiwan Pavilion shows that the relationship between resource allocation and the engagement of foreign artists can be sensitive. A relevant example is the ‘Flagship Production’ of the National Theatre and Concert Hall in Taipei. Unlike Taipei Fine Arts Museum or the Ministry of Culture, the National Theatre enjoys more flexibility in
finance and personnel decisions. The National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) was formerly known as the National Chiang Kai-Shek Cultural Centre, but renamed as the National Theater and Concert Hall as part of the National Performing Arts Centre in 2014. The NTCH was formerly a government-funded cultural centre established in 1987. During the past decades, the National Theatre fulfilled multiple functions as a production house and a venue. In its programming, the NTCH often co-produces works with arts companies, or simply rents the venue out to arts agencies. Due to the changes of government policy and short-term directorship, there were few long and continuous projects. The role of the NTCH was often debated. With the aim to increase flexibility in recruitment and programming, the cultural centre became the first administrative corporation (xingzhengfaren) in Taiwan when it underwent organisational reform in 2004. Financially, the administrative corporation system was designed for the organisation to receive partial funding from government and to seek sponsorship from the private sector. In terms of programming and project execution, the NTCH could adjust its organisational structure and have effective budget control (Tchen, 2010). Thus, compared with other public arts organisations with full funding from government, the NTCH has enjoyed more freedom for programming and curating.

The key person of the NTCH’s international production was Tchen Yu-chiou. Following her position as chairperson of Cultural Affairs, Tchen Yu-chiou became chairperson of the board of directors in the National Theatre and Concert Hall in 2007. With her professional background as a pianist, she organised large-scale international co-productions in the late 2000s. Her strategy was to collaborate with famous Western artists, such as Robert Wilson and Suzuki Tadashi, to produce works with local Taiwanese. In her opinion, inviting foreign companies to tour in Taiwan or vice versa is nothing more than superficial cultural exchange. In order to encourage deeper cultural exchange, she instead chose to create opportunities for artists to produce works together. Tchen Yu-chiou considered mutual understanding essential when collaborating; this was the key difference in changing others’ views. She coordinated the Flagship Production and insisted on incorporating elements of Taiwan, either stories or actors. When encouraging collaboration, she would show the foreign artists around and let them discover potential collaborators. A good working relation is vital, and this could not be spontaneously achieved by simply selecting individuals to work together (Tchen, personal communication, 28 May, 2013).

According to the National Theatre’s report, the Flagship Production aimed at producing a large-scale project to enrich cross-national and multidiscipline arts, to present the core value of Taiwanese culture, and to establish a Taiwan brand (National Chiang Kai-Shek
Cultural Centre, 2010). Whilst collaborating with foreign theatre directors, the Flagship Production provided opportunities for Taiwanese artists, arts companies and the theatre itself to participate in large-scale international co-productions. Between 2007 and 2011, nine productions were staged. The famous artists and the financial scale drew much attention in Taiwan’s theatres.

However, the Flagship Production was not without criticism. The project was innovative and ambitious, whilst the nature of international co-production is challenging and expensive. It was not possible to predict whether the production would be well received. With the hope to ‘establish a brand of Taiwan,’ the ‘Flagship’ was expected to tour other countries. The collaboration model between the National Theatre and foreign artists raised doubts after the Flagship Production in 2011. The theatre staged *La traviata*, directed by Suzuki Tadashi, in which Taiwanese popular songs were incorporated for the new production. This production was fiercely attacked by Taiwanese critic Yang Chong-Heng and received unprecedented media attention about the purpose of the Flagship Production and its impact. Furthermore, it was questioned whether the Flagship Production absorbed too much of the National Theatre’s budget. In response to the criticism, the National Theatre hosted a roundtable forum to discuss the future of the Flagship Production. In the forum, several key issues were raised. Some questioned the ideology behind the production: Can foreign artists help to establish the identity of Taiwanese culture? Do the productions represent Taiwanese culture? Some questions focused on the overall theatre management and administration: Did the National Theatre favour foreign artists instead of local Taiwanese artists? What kind of role should the National Theatre play in cross-cultural production? Did the theatre have the capacity to be a production house for the Flagship Production? (Gao & Tsou, 2011). This not only challenged the objectives of the Flagship Production, but also raised the fundamental question: How can Taiwanese culture be presented? These debates again focused on how Taiwanese culture should be promoted. The conflict was between the internal cultural institutions of Taiwan. Who has the power to interpret or invent Taiwanese culture? The large-scale institutions with power and budget have more chance to frame the discourse, but fellow artists may not agree.

Although the NTCH could achieve its set goals with more financial flexibility because of its corporation status, there are challenges in its administration. As long as it receives government funding, its spending is under scrutiny from the public sector. In the roundtable forum after *La Traviata*, it was suggested that the process of an intercultural/cross-cultural production should count for more than the final work. As an
institution, the NTCH could act as a platform, rather than a producer. The Flagship Production is considered innovative and experimental, and an opportunity to assemble the best practitioners. However, due to their specialisation, it is unlikely for the production to tour or to have an extended run. Although business value in the productions might not be the major concern of a subsidised theatre, a limited run in the NTCH does not unlock the full potential of these productions.

The discussion above is indicative of what has been achieved, and what it means for the artists and arts organisations in the process. First, in terms of cultural exchange, the international collaborations between artists have an impact on both sides. For cultural professionals working internationally, some distinct advantages include gaining knowledge (Nisbett, 2015). These advantages are beyond the economic value of the final product of international collaboration. However, it would take long-term and continuous observation to evaluate their impact.

Secondly, while heavily subsidised by the government, the international collaborations of the NTCH have more financial freedom to be innovative. To encourage the artists from different cultures to collaborate with each other, the NTCH allows them to exchange ideas without having financial concerns. I argue that these encounters between artists can bring positive changes for both sides, and benefit their creativity.

Thirdly, the idea of ‘serving as a platform’ has been proposed for the role of Taiwan’s overseas cultural centres and the NTCH. Both institutions can provide resources for artists to collaborate with each other. Instead of producing one-off productions and events, it is more important to establish a network and empower artists and companies. However, if international collaborations are deemed as innovative and experimental, the final product is hard to predict, and most probably would not please everyone. With the aim to establish mutual understanding, it is essential to provide an opportunity for artists to break boundaries. Overall, it nurtures Taiwan’s arts and culture, but the effect may not be observed instantly.

The idea of boundary-breaking was echoed by one of my interviewees. Former Artistic Director of the National Theatre and Concert Hall, Ms Ping Heng, shared her views on co-producing inter-cultural projects. She argued that the National Theatre could seek more opportunities for co-production with foreign artists or arts companies, in which Taiwanese artists could participate. Therefore, Taiwanese artists can have more cultural exchange with their counterparts. She illustrated the advantages of cross-cultural co-productions (Ping, personal communication, 17 June, 2013) as they provided opportunities for artists to communicate and try something different. She believed it beneficial for both parties. The
important tasks in the process include learning to share ideas and compromising in the process. Such a process would be the starting point for new developments and learning.

Building connections and engaging in networks is important but also challenging. Ms Ping Heng (personal communication, 17 June, 2013) observed that collaboration with the global networks exist not only between organisations, but also networks. It would be very difficult for a single organisation to develop networks by simply reaching out. It takes a long time to build trust and further cooperation. An intermediate organisation can provide a platform to introduce and recognise opportunities. With this platform, it is easier for potential collaborators to know each other and further arrange performances, co-productions, etc. Both sides can also benefit from enlarging their networks.

In addition, it takes time to build and maintain a network, and constantly changing the director makes this difficult. In the interviews with Ms Ping Heng and Dr Chen Chih-cheng, they both mentioned that in Europe it is common for the directorship in a theatre or cultural centre to extend more than a decade; in contrast, it is extremely rare in Taiwan. For example, both the term of directorship in the NTCH and overseas cultural centres is four years. Under such circumstances, it is a challenge for the directors to maintain or even expand the networks within their limited and comparatively short term in office. On the other hand, as the directorships are relatively short-term, it is Ms Ping’s observation that senior members in the organisation are key to maintaining connections. Therefore, I suggest that the institution needs to incorporate networking into its operation planning and further sustain its connections.

As the NTCH and cultural centres aim to serve as platforms, it is worth noting that the choice of directors can introduce different approaches to facilitating cultural collaboration. Although the short-term directorship has disadvantages, the limited contact with bureaucracy can maintain momentum for new ideas and expertise. For example, both Ms Ping and Dr Chen worked in academia prior to their appointment to the NTCH and Paris Cultural Centre respectively. Combining their academic training and expertise into the operation of these organisations was helpful in generating new ideas for cultural collaboration and networking.

5.8 Combining nation branding with the film industries

In Section 5.2, I briefly discussed the Taiwanese government’s plan to develop the cultural and creative industries (CCI) in Taiwan. This is an important policy initiative attempting to generate add-on values for Taiwan’s cultural industries. Whilst Taiwan has enjoyed economic success in technology and production, to foster and promote its CCI can be
considered a transition. Although the performing arts and visual arts have long been prioritised in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, Taiwanese literature and the film industry also receive government funding for overseas promotion. However, the two cultural products can be more widely distributed and serve as a powerful means of communicating Taiwanese culture. In this section, I examine how the strategy of official policy implementation in cultural diplomacy has changed with the introduction of CCI policies and the incorporation of nation branding. The case of ‘Gourmet Taiwan,’ which promoted Taiwanese food worldwide, is illustrated as an example of government policy implementation, combining nation branding with food culture.

In terms of projecting the national image overseas, Taiwan’s international propaganda started as early as the 1950s. Different themes featured in external communications reflecting how the government wished to be recognised. Established in 1947, the Government Information Office (GIO) had been the primary government department responsible for international communications and advertisement. Taiwanese scholar Cheng Tzu-Leong (2007) studied Taiwan’s overseas propaganda and marketing. Firstly, foreign communications in the 1950s focused on anti-communism and retaining the ROC’s seat in the United Nations. As Rawnsley (2000) noted, during the late 1950s and 1960s, there was an identifiable shift in opinion in favour of Beijing worldwide, and support for the People’s Republic of China to be the representative of China in the UN. Secondly, in Cheng’s (2007) analysis, consequent to ROC’s exit of the UN in 1971, the political message of these campaigns was to project the ROC as the ‘Free China’. Cheng (ibid.) also illustrated that maintaining relations with the United States was the main goal of the political advertisements in 1970s.

Besides the political appeals, the perceived image of Taiwan products was not entirely positive. For example, in the Hollywood movie Fatal Attraction (1987), the ‘Made in Taiwan’ umbrella failed to do its job in a theme in the movie. However, the situation seemed to improve in another American movie Armageddon (1998) as Taiwan became the real country-of-origin, i.e. where the product comes from, for the machine components of the space stations deployed from different countries of the world. Although there were still some problems with the machine, it was eventually fixed and the world was saved. In my view, these examples from Hollywood movies are interesting because they reflect how Taiwanese products were received in the 1980s and 1990s. Also, with its worldwide distribution, it helped to shape an image of Taiwanese products for a global audience – although it may not have been beneficial for selling products.
Nonetheless, from labour-intensive products to the development of Information Technology manufacturing, a strong and vivid brand image of Taiwanese products was absent. One of the reasons for not having a strong brand was the business model of Taiwanese manufacturing. Although Taiwan was renowned for its economic success of the 1990s, most of the manufacturers are Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM). Rapid industrialisation has increased the strength of Taiwan’s small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and further contributed to the ‘Taiwan Miracle’ (Chung, 2012). The industries fit into a business-to-business model rather than business-to-consumer model. By manufacturing and providing parts to other brands’ end products, many industries do not need to invest much in brand recognition. However, as Anholt (2010) pointed out, Taiwan did not accomplish the decades-long task of developing the capacity to produce world-class consumer goods, and to distribute and market them worldwide with sufficient customer service capability. It is not yet seen as the powerful country of origin of such goods. On the contrary, only a handful of Taiwanese firms have ventured into brand-name marketing in Taiwan’s computer manufacturing industry (Amine & Chao, 2005). Although technology equipment manufacturing represents a large share of Taiwan’s economy, few are international brands despite the scale of the industry. In the case of Taiwanese consumer electronics brand Acer, Amine and Chao (ibid.) discovered that it is difficult to serve the OEM clients whilst creating the brand-name market simultaneously due to possible conflict of interest. In other words, the OEM clients would consider the brand-making companies as competitors. Whilst these companies prefer to remain as anonymous manufacturers, it is difficult for worldwide consumers to appreciate the quality of Taiwanese products. As few Taiwanese brands are visible in the global consumer market, it is also difficult to associate them with a stronger national image. In addition, the companies may not partner with government to enhance their brand image if they choose to stay in the OEM market.

Campaigning and advertising for business have been part of Taiwan’s international communication for several decades. However, there are few, if any, follow-up surveys or opinion-polls for understanding Taiwan’s image overseas. To change a nation’s image is neither easy nor quick; the process is like ‘a drop in the ocean’ (Anholt, 2003). However, the problem of not having the data to understand the perceived image might be worse, as there is no evidence for verifying whether the advertisement works. One exception was a research project in 2005, which was commissioned by the Taiwanese government with the aim of understanding how Taiwan was perceived overseas. The Gallup organisation conducted a multinational (United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) survey for
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York. The research aimed to find out whether Taiwan’s strong participation in the global economy had fostered considerable goodwill worldwide towards the Taiwanese. The survey consisted of approximately 1,500 respondents and 200 opinion leaders in each country. The opinion leaders were from religious groups, labour organisations, government, academia, business and media (Crabtree, 2005). In the published report, Made in Taiwan: Positive Global Impressions, it was reported that ‘respondents in the five countries are most likely to agree Taiwan is "technologically developed" and "has good food, interesting attractions, and beautiful scenery”’ (ibid.). Furthermore, the political relationship between Taiwan and China was included in the same survey. The respondents were asked whether they understood ‘Taiwan and China are two separate countries’ or ‘Taiwan is part of China’ (Crabtree, 2006). In this report, the original set of questions was not disclosed; therefore, it is not possible to know whether questions about Taiwanese culture were included, or the respondents were aware of the activities of promoting Taiwanese culture overseas. Except for the public report, other documents relevant to this survey were not accessible.

To further promote products made in Taiwan, the Taiwanese government stepped in and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) launched the Branding Taiwan Campaign. The MOEA has worked with British business consulting company Interbrand and conducted brand valuation for Taiwanese brands (Industrial Development Bureau, 2013). According to the MOEA data, ASUS, Trend Micro, ACER and HTC were listed as the top five most valuable Taiwanese brands between 2007 and 2014. However, whether these companies recognise themselves as a Taiwanese brand is not entirely clear. The founder and Chief Executive Officer of HTC, Ms Cher Wang publicly said that HTC is a brand ‘created by Chinese (zhongguoren),’ in 2010, when she gave a talk in China. As Wang herself was born in Taiwan and HTC is also headquartered in Taiwan, her declaration raised controversy. As many Taiwanese companies own plants or sub-contract companies in mainland China, the relationship between business and politics is intertwined. Wang’s brand position could be interpreted from multiple perspectives: her personal identity, political orientation, the HTC brand identity, or simply the rhetorical statement. This was a sensitive issue in Taiwan as it raised questions about national identity, and the complicated relations with China.

The previous discussions reveal that structural issues of corporation scale and industry supply chain were weaknesses that prevented national brand-building. As well-known brands in Taiwan are mainly in the IT industry, not many products or services are easily related to end-users. In addition, most Taiwanese manufacturing businesses are either Original
Equipment Manufacturers or small and medium-size enterprises that would not have the capacity to manage their own international brand images. Most important of all, there might be political or strategic concerns for the companies to avoid self-identification as a Taiwanese brand. Although the Ministry of Economic Affairs continuously invests in image advertising overseas, the actual impact of the campaign remains uncertain.

The government’s main reason for commissioning this research was to know more about Taiwan’s image in terms of politics and economy. Whether political and economic achievements are factors of attraction, or how perception influences respondents’ actions, such as choice of tourist destination and consumption, remains unknown from the report. There have been no government-commissioned follow-up surveys since this Gallup research project.

Moreover, it is difficult to know whether the government advertisement campaign motivated people to visit Taiwan or buy Taiwanese products. Kotler and Gertner (2002) illustrated that country names can help consumers evaluate products and make purchasing decisions. Despite the scholarly literature in support of the theories of place branding, there is little evidence to verify this also applied to Taiwan, or whether the consumers know the difference between ‘Made in Taiwan’ and ‘Made in China’. In addition, a country’s image in people’s mind can be difficult to change, as they are more likely to pay attention to information that confirms their expectations (ibid.). People might not feel inclined to look for information about a country, and whether the government can successfully motivate them to learn about places requires marketing skills (Anholt, 2007). Therefore, it is difficult to know whether the marketing strategy of the Taiwanese government is effective.

In addition to manufacturing and political campaigns, culture became one of the themes of Taiwan’s nation branding in the 1990s. For instance, the government’s promotion in 1991 praised Chinese culture preserved in Taiwan (Cheng, 2007). This corresponds to other campaigns, such as that concerning ‘the Potential World Heritage Sites in Taiwan,’ which began in 2003, and tourism in the 2000s, ‘Taiwan Touch Your Heart,’ which emphasised the hospitality of the Taiwanese people towards tourists. Cheng (ibid.) pointed out that there were also advertisements featuring technology and culture in Taiwan, which matched the policy plan on cultural and creative industries launched in 2002. Tracking the changes of government campaigns also shows that the Taiwanese government put more emphasis on the promotion of tourism and cultural industry after 2002.

Besides literature, the government also provided financial aid for content-generation in the film industry. Taiwanese films have played a significant role in cultural diplomacy and
gained more attention as a cultural product. As an art form, cinema reaches both literate and illiterate members of a community as it combines visual images and the spoken word. This also makes cinema more exportable across cultural borders (Yip, 2004). In relation to the early agenda of cultural diplomacy, Yip (2004) explained that the Taiwanese government gave considerable support to films. The film industry, which has been hugely influenced by government policy, is an important part of Taiwan’s foreign cultural relations.

In the early 1990s, Taiwanese films enjoyed success at world-famous festivals and nominations for important film awards. One significant change in the GIO grant occurred as a result of Ang Lee’s family trilogy (Pushing Hands, The Wedding Banquet and Eat Drink Man Woman). Despite the fact that the films were chiefly funded by the Central Motion Picture in Taiwan and represented Taiwan in several major film festivals, Lee’s family trilogy had a global audience, with a multinational crew, storyline and marketing strategies (Ma, 1996). Lee gained opportunities to direct Hollywood films and, consequently, won several major awards and generated business revenue. His model of working with a multinational crew and global marketing strategies also applied to his later works, despite some films being based on Chinese stories (e.g. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon in 2000 and Lust, Caution in 2007) (ibid.).

To reach communities both locally and globally, moviemakers need to engage in a vast array of commercial networks, including arrangements between financial institutions, elaborate systems of production, distribution and exhibition. The networking also includes the political activities of the nation-state, such as complex international trade agreements, and questions of import and export quotas (Yip, 2004). Following the successful award-winning period of Taiwanese movies, the GIO and the current MOC still provide funding and assistance for film producers who are willing to participate in overseas festivals. One of the most recent examples was Hou Hsiao Hsien’s The Assassin, which won the Best Director award at the 2015 Cannes Film Festival. Other than film festivals, the MOC designed a Taiwanese Film Toolkit for schools and universities to screen films for education or not-for-profit uses. The Taiwan Academy in Los Angeles often hosts film screenings with talks from the filmmakers. Compared with a large-scale commercial release, this kind of screening engages with small groups of audience, who wish to interact with the filmmakers.

For Taiwanese filmmakers, they are motivated to enter international film festivals not simply to raise their profile, but also profits. In terms of international promotion of Taiwanese film, the government provides funding and cash awards for award-winning productions as encouragement. The financial support for participating in major film festivals
also lowers the entry barrier for film companies to establish connections with foreign networks. Notable Taiwanese film directors, such as Hou Hsiao Hsien and Edward Yang, have been recognised in international film festivals for years. According to Wei (2008), Hsien’s experiences are an example of Taiwan’s film industry. As one of the central figures of Taiwan New Cinema (TNC), since its emergence in the early 1980s, Hsien’s Golden Lion Award at the 1989 Venice Film Festival confirmed his status both at home and worldwide. As Wei (2008) illustrated, to obtain a prize from a major international film festival can be important for filmmakers as they receive a reward from the Taiwanese government and this increases their chances at the domestic box-office. Although the returns can be unpredictable, aiming at overseas markets or film festivals has become normal practice and a profitable strategy for some art film directors.

Despite the number of prizes won by Taiwan films at festivals in the 1990s, the film industry did not enter a prosperous era. Although the TNC could not expand its popularity, other film directors similarly orientated themselves towards the international art film market and freely explored their own artistic objectives, but kept a distance from local audiences in Taiwan (Wei, 2005). However, Wei (ibid.) also pointed out a blind spot for promoting Taiwanese art films overseas, as international film capitals and markets do not need so many art film directors from a single place. In other words, despite the artistic achievement of these film directors, they may not enjoy personal popularity in either the art film market or in the domestic market in Taiwan. Thus, the strategy has raised the artistic reputation of Taiwan’s art films, but not necessarily resulted in business success.

It can be argued that despite government financial support for filmmakers to participate in international film festivals or to make new films, these do not necessarily enjoy much market success in Taiwan. There were similar issues, as Davis and Yeh (2008) pointed out, in mainland China, Taiwan and South Korea. As government is not immune to the forces of globalisation, it is playing multiple roles in the market. It is no longer just a regulator, monitoring corporate behaviour and the progress of marketisation. The change often results in contradictions and ambiguities. There are two aspects: one is the content of the film itself. First, if the film is aimed at film festivals, it may intentionally deal with issues distant from a domestic audience. On the other hand, with little or no regulation of the number of foreign films shown in Taiwan, locally-made films may not be able to compete with major Hollywood productions. The government could not regulate foreign film imports due to trade agreements and this fact could undermine its efforts to support Taiwanese film. Since Taiwan’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2002, the issue is more obvious. As
Berry (2009) showed, the industry has been absorbed and integrated into the global film culture and economy. Hollywood’s share of the global box office has risen steadily as the result of successful lobbying and breaking down protectionist measures, and Taiwan is no exception. With these disadvantages, the Taiwanese film industry faces challenges not only in domestic but also global markets. Although there were occasions when Taiwanese films enjoyed rare economic success in the domestic market or positive response from the audience afterwards, they did not attract much attention in film festivals or foreign markets for selling distribution rights.

In addition to promoting the Taiwanese film as a cultural product, branding cities through film has become part of the place-branding strategy. Nation branding is considered similar to public diplomacy, as it also communicates ideas to foreign audiences (Melissen, 2005). However, Anholt (2010) argued that place branding is not about communication but policies. He also suggested that in order to enhance reputation, the formation of a national image must be coupled with strategy and frequent symbolic actions. In Taiwan, Taipei City and Kaohsiung, for example, both hosted large-scale sporting events for self-promotion in 2009. In relation to the government’s dedicated strategy, Hsien’s A City of Sadness boosted the tourism of Jiufen in Keelung County in Northern Taiwan. Jiufen has become a popular tourist spot following the release of A City of Sadness in several international film festivals in 1989. However, Hsien once expressed his guilt at the changes in the city landscape because of the film’s success. He lamented that the considerable growth in tourism turned the once quiet town into a tourist hotspot and subsequently it lost its beauty (Lin, 2008). Increased tourism in Jiufen was not the original intention, but it showed the effect of place branding in films.

A more recent example of city branding in filmmaking was Ang Lee’s Life of Pi, which provides a new model of collaboration between government and filmmakers. With Lee’s international reputation, the Taiwanese government spared no effort assisting his shoot in Taichung. A decommissioned military airport was transformed into a temporary studio for the film production. Lee’s Hollywood production team also cooperated with local companies in Taiwan (Poon, 2013). The government expected that Lee’s film would attract more foreign directors and film companies for shoots and post-production (Hau & Lin, 2015). I argue that the example of Life of Pi demonstrates that place branding in films developed as a new approach in Taiwan. In addition to tourism, film production is also considered an important element in the overall strategy of city branding.
Further to the example of *Life of Pi*, cities also aspire to cultural branding. The successful collaboration helped the post-production industry in Taichung. In addition to Taichung, the municipal governments of Taipei and Kaohsiung also set up designated departments to help film workers and to feature cities in productions. Instead of a top-down policy implementation, municipalities have their own city-branding strategies. In terms of global cultural diplomacy, cities could have more flexibility, whilst it may be difficult to participate as a country. Other than nation branding in different cultural industry categories, cities such as Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung also aim to promote themselves in major events and film productions. The promotion of Taiwan has shifted from ‘through film themes’ to ‘through filmmaking,’ which places the country in the global supply chain of the film industry. As with other place-branding projects, it is difficult to determine whether the strategy brings the desired outcome in the short term.

However, the strategy of incorporating Taiwan in the film production supply chain can be problematic. As reported by Chun-Shao Lin (2012), in Taiwanese magazine *Business Weekly*, one of the strengths of Taiwan has been low cost and efficiency. For instance, the scaffolding needed in a production made in Taiwan could reduce cost by one-third without compromising quality. This, however, raises doubt about the advantage of cheaper labour and whether the film industry is duplicating the manufacturing industry. In other words, if other Hollywood film companies would like to move their post-production process to Taiwan because of cheaper labour, then the generated job opportunities are not necessarily as great as the government expects. For local film workers, it is not beneficial in terms of increasing either their skills or income. As regards outsourcing different parts of a film production to Taiwan, the filmmakers enjoy the advantages of globalisation, but this may not be an ideal practice for related cultural industry workers.

The incorporation of film production and place branding marked a shift in subsidising filmmaking to recognise the economic value of the film industry. From the perspective of filmmaking, a film cannot be made without government funding. However, the way in which government subsidy is allocated reflects fundamental government policy. To subsidise a famous director’s work could help increase its exposure on a larger scale; nevertheless, it is debatable whether funds have been allocated to the best recipients. Undoubtedly, providing subsidy or equipment would attract filmmakers to Taiwan and potentially generate more job opportunities and tourism. However, there is a lack of information to justify this assumption. In the context of subsidising film directors, this may have relevance to the Flagship
Production of the NTCH (see section 5.7). When it comes to resource distribution, it may be argued that instead of providing funding for internationally recognised directors, government could give funding to emerging young Taiwanese filmmakers. Although it takes time for place branding to take effect, the government still needs to be aware of whether the subsidising strategy benefits local tourism and related industries.

5.9 The Gourmet Taiwan food promotion project and its counter-advertisement

In addition to filmmaking, gastronomy has become part of Taiwan’s place-branding strategy. With the expectation to promote tourism and boost exports, food has also been used as a distinct strategy for branding Taiwan internationally. In 2010, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) launched the ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ four-year action plan to promote Taiwanese food globally. According to the government-released ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ plan, the Taiwanese government planned to invest 1.1 billion New Taiwan Dollars (23.5 million pounds) in branding Taiwanese food from 2010 to 2013 (National Development Council, 2010). The MOEA intended to assist Taiwanese master chefs to further expand their gourmet business in the host country. This was a cross-departmental project coordinated by the Executive Yuan, including the CCA (now the MOC), to use Taiwanese craft tableware for overall presentation.

To promote Taiwanese food globally, the diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would act as the key players to promote food and gastro-diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). The promotion of Taiwanese cuisine was part of Taiwan’s soft power and nation branding. According to the MOFA, these diplomatic activities are to take advantage of the nation’s cultural soft power and to boost the positive image of Taiwan. The Gourmet Taiwan action plan was expected to benefit the tourism and service industry in Taiwan. Also, it was expected to generate revenue from both global and local markets.

Although diplomats included the gastronomy of Taiwan as part of the overall project, I would argue that the overall policy goal was to generate economic values and stimulate the export of Taiwanese food. The economic-orientated policy can be seen in the Gourmet Taiwan action plan. The MOEA stated that the aim was to ‘globalise’ the Taiwanese food industry, which involved providing assistance and training for opening shops overseas and promoting Taiwanese food (National Development Council, 2010). In the original action plan, it was expected to open 3,500 new shops both inland and overseas. Also, 10,000 new jobs would be created and 50 international food brands promoted. The action plan also aimed to host training courses with a total attendance of 1,000. Overall, the plan
would match 500 investors and enterprises and invest in total 2 billion New Taiwan Dollars. These objectives are quantifiable; however, the number of new shops and brands does not necessarily justify the goal to ‘globalise’ the Taiwanese food industry. Furthermore, the implication of ‘globalising’ a country’s food is vague. For instance, it remains debatable the extent to which a dish, a food company, or a restaurant can be ‘globalised.’ Furthermore, in the government action plan, there was no indication of research on consumer behaviour in different countries. Therefore, it was questionable whether the strategy proposed by the Taiwanese government was feasible in the ‘global’ market.

Whilst developing strategies for promoting Taiwanese food, there were also some existing disadvantages in this government-initiated programme. First, everyday food such as bubble milk tea, beef noodle and steamed pork dumplings have become a unique selling point for Taiwan. Nevertheless, when put in a global context, Taiwanese cuisine is often confused with other Chinese cuisine by those who do not know the difference. Secondly, Taiwan has not been at the centre of international cuisine. Most of its well-known brands are mainly consumer electronics as mentioned above. It would be interesting to consider whether food and tourism could be added.

The study of Anholt (2003) on national brands is relevant to a discussion of Taiwan’s cuisine promotion. He suggested five key elements of national brand strategy: promoting tourism, presenting culture, attracting investment, foreign policy and exporting brands. Among them, culture plays an important role, enriching a country’s brand image. In the case of Gourmet Taiwan, food can be a powerful and effective medium for understanding a country’s culture. From how food is consumed to preparing dishes for special occasions, the connection between country and gastronomy is strong. Moreover, the food of a country can easily encourage its own people to engage in the process of branding. Anholt (ibid.) also pointed out that in addition to the external effects, the influence of successful branding can be seen from different perspectives. As regards the brand itself, the company can become popular at home. If a government is ambitious to promote national brands, it must seize the initiative to find domestic products that have the potential to become internationally well-known. However, as Anholt (ibid.) pointed out, a hasty approach may not lead a country to where it would like to go. In any case, the process takes a long time.

When promoting food, there is still a missing link between food and culture in Taiwan. The gastronomist, Rockower (2010), suggested highlighting exotic tastes and flavours as the strategy to incorporating culinary and cultural diplomacy. This would help under-recognised national brands to gain more popularity with engagement in non-traditional forms of public
diplomacy. Whether to brand the culinary arts and attract investments from the private sector, or to engage in gastro-diplomacy, this remains a challenge for government. Gastro-diplomacy can be government sponsored food promotions through the embassy, either targeted at the general public or in diplomatic circles. It can benefit the investment and food trade. However, only if the general public in the host country can easily purchase and consume dishes would the ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ campaign be successful. It requires careful marketing to enlarge the Taiwanese food and trade industry.

To promote food culture, it is crucial to identify the uniqueness of Taiwanese food. In the government action plan, it was noted that the lack of food identity was the first issue to tackle in the project (National Development Council, 2010). Besides tourism, gastronomy is an important export, both in terms of products and culture. Throughout history, Taiwanese food has been influenced deeply by Chinese culinary arts and Japanese cuisine. In relation to everyday meals, Taiwan is not resistant to globalisation. Western food, such as pizza, hamburger, can be easily found in the urban areas. Other than global chain restaurants, small-scale entrepreneurs in Taiwan also contribute to food innovation. This vital energy can be found especially in many night markets in Taiwan. Although the small-scale food entrepreneurs often have interesting business ideas and can be very creative when it comes to new products, the lack of professional management can be an issue when the government wishes to standardise the quality of food and service.

However, food scandals resulted in negative publicity for Taiwan’s food and led to setbacks for the government. In 2011, British businessman Assad Khan opened the bubble teashop ‘Bubbleology’ in London. His love for bubble tea and the growing popularity of the Taiwanese-invented drink became news in Taiwan (Central News Agency, 2011). Consequently, the opening of the shop helped increase sales of bubble tea in the UK and the rest of Europe (Townsend, 2014). Nonetheless, right after the opening of this shop, a food safety scandal broke out in Taiwan, as it was discovered that DEHP, a plasticiser for industrial usage, had been added to certain beverages including bubble tea. DEHP was used as a clouding agent in food and beverages, which caused serious public concerns, as the chemical is believed harmful for hormones, especially in children. The scandal was reported internationally. In the countries to which Taiwan exported, such as China, Hong Kong, South Korea and the Philippines, the contaminated food was withdrawn from supermarkets (“Plastic unfantastic”, 2011). Unfortunately, this is not the only case of food scandals in Taiwan. In 2013, tainted starch was found in potato starch widely used in Taiwanese street food. These poisoned food products were removed from the shelves not only in Taiwan, but
also Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. The food scandals seriously damaged the credibility of Taiwan’s food safety control. The concerns over food safety in Taiwan were especially serious in 2013 and 2014, from powders used in Taiwan’s famous street food to domestic cooking oil. Scandals arose one after another. Due to inadequate regulations and inspection, large-scale food manufacturers were involved in unethical production processes. Not only were the ingredients not properly disclosed, but also the manufacturing process was contaminated with recycled raw materials. If the problems of food safety regulation persist, the effort to promote Taiwanese food overseas will probably be in vain.

At the end of the ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ campaign, according to the government report published in the National Development Council, there were over 2,000 attendees for the training course on restaurant management, and 4,494 new shops or restaurants opened over the timespan of the project from 2010 to 2013. In terms of economic development, the government claimed 29,495 jobs were created, 19.63 billion New Taiwan Dollars generated and 24 Taiwanese brands promoted in markets internationally (National Development Council, 2013). Except for this quantitative performance index, there was a lack of evidence to evaluate whether the project helped market Taiwanese food worldwide. In London, the most promoted food item remains bubble tea. Although the number of bubble tea vendors increased, most of them remain in the neighbourhood of China town. It raises questions about what and where the ‘international markets’ are, and how the products were received in the target markets.

The food scandals mentioned above might have undermined the efforts of the government’s Taiwanese gourmet campaign overseas, not least because it was necessary to ban contaminated food at the same time. Considering the impact of these food safety scandals, such as food withdrawn in some countries, it raises doubts about whether the proclaimed achievements of the ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ campaign accurately reflected the reality. Unfortunately, the government did not publish a more detailed evaluation report or any follow-up research. There is an absence of detail of the execution and funding distribution and how these numbers were calculated. Even if the government achieved its policy objective, I remain doubtful of the beneficiaries of the government action plan. Considering the amount of budget spent on this single action plan, I suggest there should be a full evaluation and review process on the impact.

The issues raised in these food safety scandals revealed the difficulties of place-branding. There are several actors in the gastrodiploacy strategy: government, food provider and consumer. The actors do not always respond to government initiatives. As
Anholt (2007) argued, in developing ‘Competitive Identity’, which he used to describe the synthesis of brand management and public diplomacy with trade, investment, tourism and export promotion, the strategy might be good but still have no effect. He suggested that unlike commercial brands, the ‘Competitive Identity’ strategy was composed of genuine people and places. Therefore, branding might fail when the process is not fully democratic, transparent and inclusive. Foremost, multiple actors are involved in the practice, and government is unlikely to have full control over all the actions taken in the process. In a time when media coverage can be easily shared and spread, it is difficult to block all the information. Additionally, after losing the consumers’ trust, it is difficult to reestablish a reputation. The uncontrollable manufacturers could undermine the efforts of a government’s campaign. Arguably, the Taiwanese government underestimated the risk of food safety and overestimated food control in Taiwan.

The Taiwanese government carried out nation branding projects to convey the country-of-origin effects and place-branding. These projects included providing assistance in film shoots, gastrodiplomacy and manufacturing products in Taiwan. Several difficulties can be found as the private sector may not necessarily cooperate with government or have other ideas to brand itself as Taiwanese. Despite these government projects, it is still reliant on other stakeholders in brand ‘Taiwan’ to make the overall nation branding possible. In the next chapter, I discuss how actors from the private sector participate in government policy implementation.
Chapter 6: Research Findings: Engaging Private Actors in Taiwan’s Cultural Diplomacy through Cultural Policy

Following analysis, in the previous chapter, of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy from the perspective of governmental and public cultural institutions, I discuss the involvement of the private sector. I consider the motivations of various actors, and how the government’s cultural policy influences their engagement. Therefore, I start from the perspective of internal cultural policy and how it can facilitate the role of the private sector in exporting the arts overseas. Relevant policies include government subsidy, organised showcases and incentives for corporate sponsorship. In terms of the artists’ participation, I take as an important example the government’s support for performing arts companies and the national showcase at the OFF d’Avignon organised by the Taiwan Cultural Centre in Paris, as it has been one of the longest continuous projects in cultural diplomacy. I trace policy implementation from the Ministry of Culture (MOC) to the Cultural Centre. In this chapter, I also explore the development of partnerships between private foundations and the MOC and the cultural centres.

6.1 Subsidising performing arts organisations in cultural diplomacy and the First Lady’s engagement

Arts organisations, particularly performing arts companies, played an important role in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. As mentioned in section 5.1, their participation can be dated back to the 1950s. In addition to the government-funded Peking Opera Theatre (now Guo-Guang Theatre) that carries out cultural diplomacy programmes, such as performances overseas, several of Taiwan’s large-scale private arts organisations are among the pioneers of cultural diplomacy. The Cloud Gate Dance Theatre has been one of the most notable examples.

Two main approaches have been identified in my research on performing arts companies’ international engagements. In the first case, companies with an already established international reputation are regularly invited by foreign arts organisations. The MOC often provides bursaries to make tours possible, but most of the administration is left to the event organiser. In the second case, the MOC and cultural centres proactively organise national showcases in arts festivals and provide subsidies to companies, enabling them to participate. By organising national showcases, the cultural centres assist the artists to connect with local networks. The arts organisations’ foreign tours provide an opportunity to raise or strengthen their profile and potentially open more doors for further collaboration. The major
difference between the two approaches mentioned above is often related to the scale of the companies. For large-scale companies, it costs more to tour abroad and, therefore, more subsidy is needed. Although the foreign event organisers usually provide fees and accommodation for their stay, the large companies in Taiwan, such as the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, still require a government bursary to cover the transportation costs. For MOC-supported showcases at festivals, this is particularly beneficial for smaller arts companies. Participation in festivals provides an opportunity to be visible; the Festival d’Avignon, for example, provides an audience, possibility of recognition by the press and touring opportunities (Wehle, 2003).

Whilst the government encourages cultural exchange projects, the MOC has aimed to prevent large companies taking the lion’s share of resources so not to disadvantage the small companies. In 2013, the MOC launched a new funding project for ‘Taiwan Brand’ companies with large-scale productions (Ministry of Culture, 2013b). The newly allocated budget allowed the recipient companies to undertake more international tours or new productions. Bigger companies hire more professionals for their production and administration. In turn, the companies are more likely to develop new works and establish a brand name. Thus, with an established reputation and portfolio, it is easier for these companies to apply for funding and have more credibility when seeking corporate sponsorship. However, as the ‘Taiwan Brand’ companies have already established their reputation overseas and most of their tours are on the basis of invitation by foreign cultural institutions, government subsidy may not be essential, but it will help to reduce financial risk. If the government allocates funding to the most prosperous companies and expects a larger impact in return, companies may be able to accept more invitations and gain greater exposure as ‘the company from Taiwan.’ This policy initiative helps to differentiate the government’s policy, matching subsidies to customise the arts companies’ needs according to scale.

From the perspective of public resource distribution, different scale arts organisations have an impact on securing grants. It is common in Taiwan for smaller companies to lack the financial resources to hire professional administrative staff for the bureaucratic paperwork. Thus, these companies are less likely to apply for the grants, which inevitably results in a shortage of funds. In terms of their development, this is to the detriment of smaller-scale companies. The existing policy of ‘Taiwan brand’ might be considered as a cherry-picking strategy in favour of large companies. The argument is that if large companies can afford more overseas tours, they would gain greater exposure for Taiwanese culture. However, if the
purpose of exhibiting a variety art and culture is considered, then the government needs to think of other means of assistance in addition to distributing grants.

In terms of providing other assistance, it is a common practice for cultural centres to host receptions for government supported companies after the performances. For the companies, it can be an occasion to tap into local cultural networks and further establish connections. For cultural centres and the representative offices, these receptions can be an alternative diplomatic occasion. For instance, the involvement of the First Lady Chow Mei-ching, wife of President Ma Ying-jeou (in office 2008-2016), is particularly worth considering. Whilst President Ma Ying-jeou seldom visited countries with which Taiwan has no official diplomatic relations, the First Lady Chow Mei-ching occasionally toured abroad with performing arts companies as the honorary president. Her engagement as honorary president of arts companies could combine, and reinforce, cultural relations with first-lady diplomacy. Several large arts organisations in Taiwan, such as the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, the Ju Percussion Group and the Contemporary Legend Theatre, had Ms Chow as their honorary president in their foreign tours. With their established reputation and frequent foreign tours, they were also recipients of the ‘Taiwan Brand’ grant. As Director Susan Yu of the Taipei Cultural Center in New York (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) mentioned, hosting receptions after performances creates unofficial networking opportunities for the First Lady or diplomats. In such circumstances, cultural diplomacy serves as a supplement to traditional diplomacy enabling the first lady to present herself among the diplomatic circle.

In the pursuit of cultural diplomacy, Taiwanese arts companies often visit countries that the president is unlikely to visit officially. Taylor (1997) suggested that cultural diplomacy is still worth trying to facilitate the workings of conventional diplomacy. Combined with first-lady diplomacy, it could increase the impact of cultural diplomacy. The importance of the first lady’s role has been recognised in relevant studies. For example, one of Chow’s predecessors, Madam Chiang Kai-Shek (Meiling Soong) charmed a generation of Americans in the 1930s and 1940s (Wang, 2014). First-lady diplomacy can serve to create a meaningful and supportive context for countries to pursue constructive relationships (ibid.). Serving not only as the companion of a president, as Hastedt and Eksterowicz (2006) have argued, modern-day first ladies can also develop their own activism. This is determined by several factors, such as personal attributes, ambition, vision and ideology (ibid.). To a certain degree, it establishes a partnership between the government and the arts organisations. One of my interviewees, who works in a performing arts company that once toured with Ms Chow
Mei-ching, discussed their partnership with the First Lady. She is a regular theatregoer, and the arts companies who have been motivated to engage in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy have happily welcomed her as their honorary president. The company’s director invited the First Lady to join them. However, these invitations were often kept secret until their departure, and the reasons why Ms Chow Mei-ching accepted were not made public (Anonymous#4, 14 June, 2013). From my interviewee’s account, her participation in their overseas tours was initiated by the company and not by the government. The reason for keeping the First Lady’s itinerary secret, I would suggest, was to avoid possible intervention from Chinese government officials on the company’s tour. Despite the less-official status of the First Lady’s engagement in cultural activities, similar intervention occurred during the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) in Portugal in July 2014.

Ms Chow Mei-ching’s involvement in cultural diplomacy overseas was described by Chinese scholar Xu Qing (2013) as ‘Madame diplomacy,’ and further characterised as low-profile visits those which served as ‘ice-breaking’ events. Interestingly, as Xu (ibid.) stated, the Taiwanese government claimed that Ms Chow Mei-ching’s foreign tours with these arts companies was not for reasons of diplomacy, but were purely for the sake of the arts. In other words, the Taiwanese government did not wish to link Ms Chow Mei-ching’s company with a political purpose and no press interviews were arranged. Unlike the practice of official state visits, the itinerary was kept secret until the performance or the company’s departure. Although the decision not to disclose Ms Chow’s involvement can be interpreted as ensuring it did not overshadow the arts company’s performance, this was also an awkward position for the First Lady in her role as honorary presidency. I would argue that concern about overshadowing the touring company would not be an issue if the invitation had not been accepted in the first place. However, it is true that the attention generated by the First Lady’s involvement might have raised awareness of these arts companies and their work among the local audience.

Arguably, the government contradicted itself about the First Lady’s role in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. As Ms Chow Mei-ching served as the honorary president of several arts companies only when they toured abroad, it is not unreasonable to link her participation to other purposes. Furthermore, if Ms Chow’s patronage did not help to raise the profile of the arts companies, why would she embark on the trips in the first place? For the sake of argument, if there were indeed no political purpose in her involvement, why would she need to keep a low profile? However, despite all the necessary protocol to make her journey possible, it remains to be seen what ‘Madame Diplomacy’ has accomplished.
Despite the government’s effort not to politicise Ms Chow’s honorary presidency of arts organisations, her involvement remained an important political gesture. However, a controversy arose when the Tokyo National Museum organised an exhibition of ancient Chinese artefacts on loan from the Taiwan National Palace Museum in June 2014. The scale of the exhibition was unprecedented, as the Jadeite Cabbage, the most famous artefact of the National Palace Museum, is rarely on loan for an exhibition abroad. Nonetheless, it was reported that controversially the word ‘national’ was omitted from some promotional materials by the media in Tokyo, which violated the agreement made between the two institutions. The Taipei representative office in Japan protested this omission and warned that the exhibition may be cancelled unless the full name of the National Palace Museum was used (Kyodo News, 2014). Also, as Ms Chow served as the president of honour, the Presidential Office of Taiwan planned to cancel her visit to Japan due to the naming row. Although the problematic promotional materials were removed in time before the exhibition commenced and an official apology was made by the Tokyo National Museum, the First Lady did not attend the opening ceremony as the confirmation came too late (Shan & Wang, 2014). Whilst the proper timing to address a public institution using its title with or without ‘national’ could be an issue, unfortunately, it revealed the awkward position of the government in international relations. In addition to the case of the National Palace Museum, similar problems also surfaced regarding naming in cultural diplomacy events or overseas government outposts (section 5.5). As the legal status of Taiwan remains uncertain, it would not be realistic to overlook this issue in its cultural diplomacy.

More importantly in this context, it illustrates that Ms Chow’s honorary presidency was essentially tokenistic. For diplomats in the host countries, the effect of her visit was limited only to the traditional diplomatic circle. The avoidance of media attention was in contradiction of Wang’s (2014) illustration of the First Lady’s role as facilitator of constructive relationships. I would argue that the Taiwanese government missed the opportunity of powerful public diplomacy to utilise fully her visit. However, the practice of a low-profile honorary presidency once again represented the awkward situation that the Taiwanese government faced in cultural and international relations.

6.2 Collaboration between cultural centres and artists at festivals

After discussing the government subsidy and the first lady’s engagement in large companies’ overseas tours, in this section I illustrate small companies’ participation in cultural diplomacy. The showcases of the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the festival OFF d’Avignon are
particularly relevant to consider as part of the MOC’s promotion scheme for small companies. Unlike the Edinburgh International Festival (EIF) and the Festival d’Avignon (the ‘IN’ Festival), in which the organiser curates the programme and invites the artists, the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the festival OFF d’Avignon (the ‘Off’ Festival, hereafter, OFF d’Avignon) allows the artists to participate as they wish if they can afford to do so. With an audience already drawn to the EIF and the ‘IN’ Festival, there are also more opportunities to be seen by the press. In other words, the arts companies have more autonomy to join these fringe festivals. Nonetheless, with unpredictable box-office income, smaller companies often find it difficult to balance the books if they join the fringe festivals without other sources of income. Aware of this issue, the CCA (now Ministry of Culture) subsidised companies to participate in these festivals. The funding covers partial expenses for participating in the festivals, such as transportation, accommodation, venue hire and production costs. The subsidy could ease some of the financial burdens of the companies and lower their financial risk. The autonomy provided by the fringe festivals also allows the Taiwanese cultural centres to host national showcases that promote Taiwanese performing arts to programmers and curators. It can fulfil its mission as a platform to enhance cultural relations and promote Taiwanese culture. As the MOC covers travel expenses, there are few additional costs compared with companies invited by large international festivals. Also, the cultural centres can have more control over the selection of arts companies to present Taiwanese culture.

Furthermore, the government subsidy could motivate more companies to attend these festivals as it lowers the financial barrier to their involvement. With theatre directors seeking further invitations to other venues and festivals, a trip to Avignon or Edinburgh can bring potential business and collaboration opportunities for these companies. In 2014, five companies were funded by the MOC to participate in the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, whilst another four groups were involved to the OFF d’Avignon. From the experience of showcasing Taiwanese performing arts in fringe festivals, there are several benefits. First, having a national showcase is an efficient way to provide assistance to and maximise the potential of these companies. From the theatre companies’ perspective, they are motivated to participate because they have the full support of the cultural centres, whose local knowledge can help them become familiar with the festival. Ideally, for ambitious companies who wish to gain international experience, this information should be made widely accessible and transferable to other companies. The know-how gained from international tours should enable them to prepare for future opportunities. I would argue this is the best way to optimise the use of public funding.
However, the situation is not completely positive for the participating companies. Compared with the EIF or the Festival d’Avignon, the Fringe Festival and the Festival OFF d’Avignon present a more diversified programme. These festivals are flooded with programme choices for tourists from all over the world. To stand out and capture the attention of the press, and to avoid competition between Taiwanese companies, the cultural centres in Paris and London attempt to create a national showcase. The Paris Cultural Centre started its programme at the OFF d’Avignon in 2007 (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2009), whilst the London Cultural Centre initiated its Taiwan Season showcase at the Edinburgh Fringe in 2014. In addition to the sponsorship that covers transportation and travel expenses, the cultural centres chose a more proactive approach to enhance the promotion of Taiwanese theatre companies.

There are several challenges for the participating companies. Based on Director Chen’s (personal communication, 29 November, 2013) account of his experience at the OFF d’Avignon, language is a barrier. He also recognised the difficulty for companies to stand out from all the performances. As for selecting the Taiwanese theatre companies, Director Chen pointed out that it is unlikely to collaborate with companies that require high production costs. On the contrary, he aimed to make available more resources for young artists and help them to link with professional networks for subsequent tours. Furthermore, even if the cultural centres have assisted the theatre companies, there are limited places they can offer for each year’s national showcase. This makes selection competitive and rules out opportunities for some companies.

Furthermore, the cultural centre works as a curator in the showcase and needs to be very clear on its influence in the overall selection and presentation. It may act as a filter in a sense, which would not necessarily become censorship. However, the cultural centres should choose companies that fit the collaboration model they expect. In the festival OFF d’Avignon 2015, Taiwan’s Minister of Culture, Mr Hung Meng-chi met Olivier Py, the director of the Festival d'Avignon when he visited France. Minister Hung quoted Py’s observation that the Taiwan showcase in OFF d’Avignon emphasises too much on tradition and national identity, therefore blurring the artistic expression (Yang, 2015). If Py’s observation was correct, then it raised the question whether political correctness overrides artistic expression when the cultural centre and the MOC select the programmes in the national showcase.

The national showcase at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the festival OFF d’Avignon demonstrates problematic issues of cultural democracy. Cultural democracy in some societies means everyone should have access and every individual should be
encouraged to create (Mitchell, 1986). In terms of external cultural policy, the question is how far cultural democracy should be stressed, as to present it as a social phenomenon is different from the inclusion of products in a programme of artistic exports. I would argue that whilst the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the festival OFF d'Avignon appear to realise the principle of cultural democracy in their strategy, the practice of a national showcase somewhat contradicts it. In response to Py’s criticism, former Minister Hung claimed that ‘Taiwanese identity’ and ‘artistic expression’ are not mutually exclusive, and the Ministry has a clear position that artists’ freedom must be guaranteed. The Ministry will ensure Taiwan maintains its strength of being ‘the most liberal region in the Chinese-speaking world’ and ensure the artists fully unlock their potential (Yang, 2015). Hung suggested that when the artists express their creativity through the arts, they express their own culture. This claim corresponded to the paradox Mitchell (ibid.) addressed. It is the MOC’s internal cultural policy that would ensure the artists enjoy the cultural democracy and freedom of speech. However, whether the MOC would be able to embody such principles through presenting the arts festivals is another matter.

Instead of being selective for a national showcase, I argue that it would be better to include as many presentations of Taiwanese theatre as possible. These festivals are already competitive due to the large number of productions presented there. The MOC could best help the theatre companies not by creating another competition among Taiwanese theatre companies in advance, but providing general support; for instance, press and public relations support for participation in these theatre festivals regardless of funding status. The assistance does not have to be financial. It is crucial for the government to facilitate bridge-building and to establish platforms for information exchange for all artists who wish to participate in these festivals. It seems self-contradictory to have the arts companies compete with each other for subsidy, making it difficult to justify the funding distribution, and raising questions as to whether this serves the original policy objective. Arguably, if a programme is inferior, should the MOC support it anyway? From observations at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, I would suggest that if a show is indeed inferior, then it would not enjoy much success at the box office and reviewers can be unsatisfied. In other words, it is not for the MOC to judge the programme’s quality.

For the companies participating in the national showcases, what do they expect in return? In addition to the warm reception from audience members, whether a production is artistically recognised by potential programme buyers is important to cultural centres. It is also understood by the theatre companies that the MOC’s main goal is to establish
connections with local theatres and curators in the hope of leading to invitations for tours. When Taiwanese theatre companies are presented in showcases at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival or the OFF d’Avignon Festival, the cultural centres have a clear procedure in place to serve the press and curators that the theatre companies are expected to follow. For example, the Paris Cultural Centre collects the professional contacts of the curators or the press. The companies must prepare press releases and supplementary information for their reference. Therefore, the companies are required by the MOC to keep in contact with the curators (Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 September, 2013). Whilst some of the audience members may be just one-off theatregoers at the festivals, maintaining connection with press and curators is the focus of the administrative work.

From the experiences shared by my interviewees, it appears that the work of foreign cultural centres largely focuses on opinion leaders (e.g. press) and the professional who has power and resources (e.g. producers and curators). Furthermore, it is questionable whether the government should host national showcases at these festivals with a market orientation. Should the MOC be selective and create a national showcase with generous financial support to a handful of companies? I argue that instead of offering financial support to a few companies, the MOC and cultural centre should provide assistance to all Taiwanese theatres regardless of their public funding status. This is a better way of presenting a more diversified Taiwanese culture not confined to a small number of companies. A showcase certainly helps to shoulder the financial burden of theatre companies and present some of the best productions the cultural centre could sponsor. In order to do so, the government needs to be selective to justify public spending, but it may not be the best way to encourage different artists to engage in cultural exchange if the interests of the host country are based on the predilections of programmers or producers. From this approach, it is at least necessary for the overseas cultural centre to provide general information and local knowledge for Taiwanese artists who wish to engage in the community. As this dissertation was nearing completion in 2015, there were several arts organisations spontaneously initiating forums and workshops to share their experiences of participating in the national showcases. This demonstrates how private initiative is ahead of government; nevertheless, I still consider it important for the MOC and the cultural centres to act beyond the grant provider and become the facilitator of cultural exchange between Taiwanese artists and the networks in their host countries.

However, both the cultural centres and the artists need to be aware of the limits of the resources that government could provide. Although the Paris Cultural Centre has hosted the showcase in Avignon for several years, the current working model still has shortcomings. As
Pai (2014) argued, even though the showcase has gained exposure for Taiwanese theatres, it would be ideal to have an agent who has long-term local connections and knowledge to help promote Taiwanese theatre companies. Not every company would have the ability to follow up contacts with programmers after returning to Taiwan due to the heavy administrative load of the theatre. Therefore, given that connections to the curators and programmers may not be maintained by all the theatre companies after participating in the festivals, the engagements in such fringe festivals gradually became one-off events and do not necessarily bring the desired invitations or touring opportunities. Moreover, as the Ministry of Culture curates two national showcases each year at the OFF d’Avignon and Edinburgh Fringe Festival, this may be too frequent to present productions and can place unmanageable burdens on the theatres and cultural centres. Take the British Council’s showcase at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival as an example, which is organised every two years as it is considered a natural cycle of renewal to ensure that enough new works are coming through to make up a convincing programme (Mackey, 1998). If the function of a national showcase is international exposure, then the most important concern should remain quality, and whether there is enough time to attract enough good productions.

Although there is no guaranteed reward, the artists and arts organisations may still wish to gain some experience of cultural exchange through participating in government-funded showcases. It would also be beneficial for showcasing participants to share their know-how with other companies. One of my interviewees expressed her frustration (Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 September, 2013):

I always hope the Ministry of Culture can host a press conference to share the fruit of the OFF d’Avignon with all the arts companies participating in it. But, the Ministry of Culture, well dare I say, they are rather lukewarm about it. The response I received was: ‘we hope to see your final report about your achievements and your prospect of receiving invitations from curators then to consider it.’ But, in terms of contacting the curators, we could not report exciting news like: ‘yes, we are invited to somewhere right after the showcase.’ Yeah, we could not instantly achieve the goals the Ministry wants to see. They probably think hosting an [experience] sharing event is pointless. For the companies, it seems like you fight to go abroad for one month, then it ends in silence. Probably, it’s a shame.

From my interviewee’s account, the MOC is more performance-driven, as the desired outcome of the project is based on whether there are invitations. When it comes to media
exposure, it is best to share exciting coverage with the public. For the arts organisations, completing the project and having some experience to share is crucial. In terms of nurturing the creative industries in Taiwan, all kinds of experience sharing, good or bad, can be beneficial for future participants. It is also valuable to consider cases that may not have been ‘successful,’ in order to make strategic adjustments. Furthermore, to have invitations immediately after a showcase or event is exciting, but it is not always the reality. Whilst international events can take years to plan ahead of the actual opening, curators do not necessarily present certain programmes until there is a suitable opportunity or theme. The goal of achieving immediate invitations from programmers, venues, festivals, etc., seems a false and unprofessional expectation from government officials. As emphasised by Rawnsley (2013), to exercise soft power capital is a long-term process. If the showcase is considered a means of exercising Taiwan’s soft power, then it requires a longer investment to see a possible return.

Furthermore, it is important for the artists to consider carefully their main objectives for participating in national showcases. It is certainly beneficial for the theatre companies to be fully prepared, especially if they are on their first tour overseas. As there are only limited resources and budget, it would be more efficient to invest in enhancing the overall professional skills for international cultural exchange, instead of providing grants for one-off events. It is also important to take advantage of the collective experience and expertise in Taiwan’s professional networks. Whilst, arguably, the overseas cultural centres should not be merely agencies for artists, both parties need to develop a more sustainable strategy for further international engagements. Surely a well-received showcase can create more opportunities for future international tours and invitations. Whilst these activities can be initiated in commercial channels and without government support, it is crucial to reaffirm constantly the policy objectives of a national showcase.

6.3 Arts organisations’ motivation for participating in cultural diplomacy and their experience

To cooperate with arts companies on official visits is also a common approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For instance, the Ju Percussion Group was invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to accompany President Ma’s official visit to Taiwan’s allies in Latin America in 2009. In the MOFA’s official reports, the Ju Percussion Group’s participation in the tour represented the cultural diplomacy that Ma would like to promote (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). In this case, the cultural programmes complemented the
official visit and served as a supplement of traditional diplomacy. Also, many Taiwanese arts organisations take pride in fulfilling such a job and being proclaimed as ambassadors for Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. For example, in the foreword of Taipei Philharmonic Orchestra’s 25th anniversary celebration publication, the president Lai Wen-fu proudly stated: ‘the TPO is enthusiastic in its support of Taiwan and spares no effort to promote its sophisticated culture to a global audience. The TPO always stands on the frontline of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy’ (Yu, 2010). This shows the commitment that the orchestra has made to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, echoing the government’s objective, as announced in the 1998 White Paper for Culture, to nourish arts companies, and to broaden their international outreach (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). In addition, it is beneficial to organisations to gain an international reputation and to be recognised by domestic audiences after they return to Taiwan.

The engagement of artists and privately founded arts companies flourished more after the ROC government started to subsidise artists touring abroad. After the CCA became the main government department in charge of cultural diplomacy, providing subsidies or encouraging artists’ residencies became part of the cultural policy (ibid.). It is either project-based funding or annually-funded to support core operations in these companies. Since the Taiwanese government began losing official diplomatic relationship and seats in international organisations, the discourse of ‘make Taiwan visible’ and ‘citizen diplomacy’ has also been adopted by arts organisations. The desire to ‘make us seen’ has been a principal slogan among Taiwanese since the 1970s’ diplomatic defeats. In terms of culture, it has always been the ‘dialogue’ that creates and articulates an ideal identity to the ‘significant others’ with the aim of breaking through the PRC diplomatic blockade and avoiding direct conflicts (Chang, 2006, p. 197). The ‘significant others,’ as I would argue, were countries and organisations that were able to appreciate Taiwanese culture, but did not necessarily have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

The proactive attitude from arts organisations to engage in cultural diplomacy is worth analysing. In a recent study of cultural diplomacy, Melissa Nisbett (2015) took an arts administration approach. She demonstrated that the arts organisations in her research were more concerned with pragmatic objectives, such as developing partnerships and generating income, rather than achieving explicit political goals. Quite differently from my research on the arts organisations participating in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, the political rhetoric can be more explicit. Interestingly, the notion of ‘let the world see Taiwan’ is also used in theatre companies’ fundraising campaigns for participation in arts festivals. Two examples could be
found from the advertisements of two theatre companies’ crowd-funding page prior to the Edinburgh Fringe Festival in 2014 (Jade & Artists Dance Troupe, 2014; Tjimur Dance, 2014). Despite government financial support of their involvement in the showcase, they needed to make up the deficit in their budget. The phrases quoted below are translated extracts from their crowd-funding projects:

‘Send Egg Blessings to the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and let the world see Taiwan’ – the title for Jade and Artists Dance Troupe’s crowd-funding project for their trip to the Edinburgh Fringe Festival

‘Kurakuraw Dance Glass Bead Edinburgh Fringe Festival Crowd-funding Project: Let the world see the new dance aesthetics of the Payuan in Taiwan’ – the title for Tjimur Dance Theatre’s crowdfunding project.

Not only is the wording used as a catchphrase for marketing and public relations purpose, it also reveals another aspect of cultural diplomacy. Instead of adopting the political rhetoric of cultural diplomacy to lever government funding, as Nisbett (2015) found, arts organisations use these appeals to target members of the public. I would argue that the underlying assumptions of such wording were sufficiently powerful to attract public support for the fundraising campaign. In the case of Tjimur Dance Theatre’s campaign, which set the target at 250,000 New Taiwan Dollars, it received 260,400 on the crowdfunding website FlyingV between April and June 2014 (Tjimur Dance, 2014). Whilst people in Taiwan are usually unable to attend the actual performances overseas, the reward to the funders would be showing their gratification. Except for the material rewards sent by the arts companies, I suggest the main appeal is the ‘feel-good’ factor for the funders who support Taiwanese arts organisations’ overseas tours. By doing so, the campaign could be successful in terms of achieving the target funds, and generating a positive image of the company. Also, if the funders endorse the cause, it can reinforce their connection to the company, as both parties belong to the imagined community that supports the initiative to ‘make the world see Taiwan’.

Thus, instead of letting the world see the companies on their own, the intention of the selected wording is to embed them in a larger context, i.e. Taiwan. They are presenting not only themselves, but also a part of Taiwanese culture. Therefore, the self-exposure was to make the company visible, and to represent the country as well. However, instead of representing the Republic of China, the identity has shifted to the land rather than the regime. This may be part of the transition of cultural identity formation.
Furthermore, some of the artists’ reasons for participating in the national showcases differ. Although the slogan ‘let the world see Taiwan’ was used in several companies’ fundraising campaigns to participate in fringe and OFF d’Avignon festivals, not all artists are in agreement. Participation in the showcase can have different meanings for the development of a company. Baboo Liao (Liao Jiun-cheng), theatre director of the Taiwanese theatre company Shakespeare’s Wild Sisters Group, has presented his work at the festival OFF d’Avignon on several occasions. The showcase at the festival OFF d’Avignon has been one of the longest running projects that the Paris Cultural Centre has organised since 2007 (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2009). In the interview, Liao (3 July, 2014) shared his view on the company’s participation:

I don’t think it really matters that much unless you have been selected in the IN festival. So I think it is an exaggeration to say ‘send this company to Edinburgh or Avignon.’ It’s merely a showcase. If there are four or five different shows in a venue on each day, you must minimise the technical requirements, so the audience are seeing the best you can present with minimal technical effort. So, I merely think it’s a platform leading to the international market. […] I just never see Edinburgh [fringe festivals] or [OFF] d’Avignon festival as the final destination. No, it’s not the destination; it’s just a starting point.

As Liao (ibid.) mentioned, from a market perspective, the main purpose of joining a showcase for theatre companies is to be introduced to an audience. It is possible that there will be good revenue from the box office, or further tours or collaboration opportunities. Government subsidy could be considered either as a recognition for being part of Taiwanese culture, or merely a contribution to funding resources. Liao judged participation in the showcases from a pragmatic perspective and did not connect it to political imperatives.

Compared with the exposure that might be gained from attending the national showcases, the financial challenges that arts organisations are seldom considered. Despite the public funding and the overall assistance provided by the cultural centres, a balanced book is not guaranteed for theatre companies. It is different from the Edinburgh International Festival or ‘IN’ Festival in Avignon, in which case the organisers cover most of the production costs. The theatre companies participating in a showcase need to be realistic about the situation. If their work receives good reviews or is attractive to venue owners or curators, it is easier to be invited to tour or to return to the venue. It is also what the Paris Cultural Centre anticipates from these showcases and the policy objectives to promote Taiwanese artists overseas.
Despite the Paris Cultural Centre’s assistance in public relations, the companies still need to manage their own advertisements and promotion. Ultimately, it is the theatre companies that must take the risk and be ready for the challenge. Cultural centres can play the role of bridge-builder, but this does not equate to acting as curator or commercial agent. Therefore, the companies could not rely on the cultural centres to take care of everything they need at a festival. As Liao (ibid.) mentioned: “[o]f course the more assistance the better, as with money. But, I think you can never just rely on others. Yeah, if you decide to do this, I think they [Paris Cultural Centre] are doing their best. The rest lies in us.”

Liao emphasised the importance for the company to be independent. The experience of Shakespeare’s Wild Sisters Group at the OFF Festival demonstrated the model anticipated by the MOC and Paris Cultural Centre. The company joined the OFF Festival in 2009 and received critical acclaim. This was helpful for the company when applying for participation again in 2013, and the company adventurously presented a new work and premiered it at the OFF Festival. From Liao’s viewpoint, the work itself is the most important after all. The showcase on its own does not guarantee a positive reception from the media or generate a huge amount of revenue. Notwithstanding the effort made to promote and advertise, critics and curators are focusing on the work itself. It is the substance that matters. The companies can take this opportunity to show their works on an international stage with an international audience. This would widen a company’s horizon beyond Taiwan (Liao, personal communication, 3 July, 2014). This viewpoint was shared by another interviewee, who believed that showcases at either the Edinburgh Fringe Festival or OFF d’Avignon provided an opportunity for the artists to perform in a different environment in front of a different audience (Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 September, 2013). Simply put, arts companies can try out works in a foreign market and develop their future creative output.

What have arts companies gained from their experience in cultural relations programmes? I further examine whether such outcomes are evident. I suggest the practice of hosting a national showcase or being invited for overseas tours has several characteristics that Schneider (2003) illustrated as essential in a successful policy initiative. For example, the programmes can potentially communicate values, to cater to the interests of the host country or region, to offer pleasure, information or expertise in the spirit of exchange and mutual respect. Whilst the impact of cultural relations may take longer to emerge from the companies’ experience, their interaction with the audience, and the feedback received through the practice, may still provide a snapshot of the encounter with different cultures.
The atmosphere of intimacy between the artists and the audience can be found in their face-to-face interaction, as I learnt from my interviewees. Some more spontaneous cultural exchanges take place through the performance, even beyond the language barrier in non-Chinese speaking countries. The encounter between audience members can be affective. One of the artists I interviewed shared his experience (Anonymous#4, personal communication, 14 June, 2013):

Some of the Taiwanese audience members are very kind. They worry for us and ask: ‘Can the foreigners understand your work?’ I would say our foreign audience can understand it without a problem. One of the works we perform might relate to the Taiwanese religion, but it can also be rooted in folklore. Once, when we performed abroad, I met some elderly women saying their ancestors were comforted. They might not figure out where the rituals come from, and they don’t necessarily know the Mid-Summer Ghost Festival in Taiwan. But, as they see it, they can see love, war, death, comfort, and the changes in life. I think that’s universal.

The experience mentioned above can be an example of mutual understanding. Also, when two cultures meet, their beliefs might communicate with each other. To the same artist’s surprise, the experience may extend to another dimension. He recalled a production in Spain where the theatre was located on an ancient battleground and the theatre company members experienced some unexplainable situations during rehearsals. In the end, local venue crews suggested having a blessing from a priest. After the company finished their Buddhist prayer, the Spanish priest invited them to say Catholic prayers with him. Whilst the priest prayed in Spanish, the company prayed in Mandarin. The cultural exchange experience was special to the artists and he recognised the power of shared spiritual empathy.

To some extent, the shared human experience and emotion is the key to mutual understanding. From Baboo Liao’s (personal communication, 3 July, 2014) observation, foreign audiences are more open to sharing their emotions. Some patrons like to hug the theatre company members right after the show. After the performance of his work Absente: rendez-vous avec Sophie Calle, a psychiatrist approached him and said that Liao’s work visualised the unspoken grief of loss, whether that is losing something, a family member or a lover. The loss was portrayed in Mandarin with subtitles, but there can be empathy through the emotion generated.

However, these experiences of cultural exchange are not always documented in arts organisations. Due to the small scale of administrative staff, neither the theatre companies nor
the overseas cultural centres have been able to carry out longitudinal research across years. Thus, it is difficult to trace the long-term trajectory of the overall reception of Taiwanese theatres in foreign countries. When it comes to recording audience feedback, guest books left in the front of house provide the audience with an opportunity to leave feedback (Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 September, 2013; Liao, personal communication, 3 July, 2014). Instead of conducting a questionnaire, a guestbook enables a company to keep a record of audience feedback. However, this does not provide demographic data to understand the composition of audience members. It is also difficult to collect data to trace audience-purchasing patterns to adjust future marketing and advertising strategy. From the experience in the OFF d’Avignon, Liao observed that there are many tourists interested in performances, who have not seen before, or are attracted to a certain show because of on-street promotion resulting in impulse buying. From the perspective of arts administration, these observations can provide a reference, albeit limited, for understanding the audiences of productions and showcases.

6.4 Corporate sponsorship in cultural relations

After analysing the artists’ and arts companies’ motivations for participating in cultural diplomacy, I now turn to explore the reasons behind the corporate engagement in relevant activities. To sponsor arts and cultural activities can be beneficial in cultural relations programmes. Business sponsorship benefits external cultural policy indirectly as it strengthens the home base of the arts as well as directly contributes to the cost of cultural exports. In return, there is the publicity and the prestige of attending first-class events (Mitchell, 1986). Beyond the prestige that corporations can enjoy from participating in the events and ‘hobnobbing,’ it is also a great opportunity to build a brand image when opening in a foreign market. From the consumers’ perspective, according to Anholt (2007), this is illustrated when creating a country’s ‘competitive identity’ (see section 2.5). He also suggested that culture is self-evidently ‘not for sale,’ but established the essential base for a nation’s competitive identity. Furthermore, a country’s reputation does not merely influence consumer-purchasing choices; it also affects bigger decisions (ibid.). The image of a product’s nation of origin can be influential in all kinds of decision-making.

The concept of ‘competitive identity’ envisions business and culture complementing each other when building a country’s brand identity overseas. To encourage more business sponsorship, the MOC initiated policy plans offering tax exemption for corporations. In 2010, the Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries came into force and
included incentives to encourage corporate sponsorship. This law also provided the legal basis for tax exemption on corporation expenses resulting from charity work. There are several reasons why the desired outcome did not materialise. First, corporate social responsibility is not yet widely adopted in Taiwan. It is, as defined by Carroll, Lipartito, Post and Werhane (2012, p. 7) ‘the idea that the corporation exists in society and has rights and responsibilities as a member (or citizen) of that society.’ Thus, I further discuss whether Taiwanese corporations would be equally committed to ‘make Taiwan visible’ and sponsor arts organisations overseas tours.

From my fieldwork, I realised that arts organisations in Taiwan find it difficult to obtain sponsorship for domestic activities, let alone programmes abroad. Whilst the host usually covers the transportation and cargo cost for foreign artists when they are invited to Taiwan, one of my interviewees considered it unfair that Taiwanese do not have much bargaining power in cultural exchange (Anonymous#4, personal communication, 14 June, 2013). However, bargaining depends on which party has more power. This viewpoint is debatable as there are multiple causes for the negotiation of invitation arrangements. Nonetheless, another interviewee further suggested that transportation cost is high because it is relatively expensive to travel to Europe from Taiwan (Liao, personal communication, 3 July, 2014). Director Yu at the New York Cultural Center also identified the absence of corporate sponsorship in cultural exchange programmes. Despite available grants from the MOC or National Culture and Arts Foundation, which periodically open for applications, it remains a financial burden for artists and arts companies to travel abroad. For international cultural exchange programmes, related service providers can be the best partners to make the projects possible. As the arts companies often struggle to afford transportation fees, it can also be a great partnership for airlines to sponsor the artists. However, as there are only a few carriers based in Taiwan, potential supporters are limited. The carriers occasionally provide special offers, such as discounted tickets (Ping, personal communication, 17 June, 2013; S. Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). It can be found that most of the transportation cost is covered by public grant as part of the essential expense of touring abroad.

In reality, corporate sponsorship for cultural exchange is not widely practised in Taiwan. Dr Chen Chih-cheng, former director of the Paris Cultural Centre, stated that entrepreneurs have mostly established their enterprises in Taiwan within just a few decades. There are many first-generation business owners, and it is his observation that after the second generation succeeds in the business, the idea of corporate social responsibility begins.
However, it is not until the third generation that these corporations start to recognise the spirit of corporate responsibility (personal communication, 29 November, 2013). Dr Chen (ibid.) suggested that large-scale corporations would support arts and culture whether the government encourages them or not. However, most of the enterprises in Taiwan are small-scale companies, and there are few large corporations. From Dr Chen’s viewpoint, it is the overall structure of the industry and corporation scale that correlates to the behaviour of sponsorship in the arts.

In recognition of the difficulties of obtaining corporate sponsorship, Taiwan’s National Culture and Arts Foundation (NCAF) aims to foster potential sponsorship between arts and corporations, and establish a platform to serve this purpose. However, corporations have not proved as enthusiastic as the NCAF had hoped. It commissioned research on corporate sponsorship in Taiwan, identifying that over half of the corporations sponsored at most one or no arts activities each year (Chen, Tsai, & Yu, 2000). For those who had supported the arts, the main motivation was to contribute to society and recognition of the benefit this had for the image of the business. Over 70 per cent of the surveyed companies did not have a regular budget for supporting arts and culture. The research also revealed that most of the interviewed corporations considered it government duty to improve arts and culture and the public sector should play a more active role. Despite the spontaneous support for the arts from some corporations, it is neither an obligation nor a responsibility of a corporation to fund arts activities. The research also found that most of the participating corporations did not consider tax exemption for sponsoring the arts sufficiently appealing. The research illustrated a certain mindset of corporate sponsorship in Taiwan and the lack of motivation for companies to do so. Despite the work of the NCAF since 2006, the successful partnerships between arts and business are mainly project-based rather than long-term.

Regarding the development of corporate sponsorship, Director Ping Heng (personal communication, 17 June, 2013) of the National Theatre and Concert Hall observed that corporations prefer to select the programmes that match their own identity and image. Usually, the companies willing to support the arts prefer to choose the more renowned artists and organisations in Taiwan (Liao, personal communication, 3 July, 2014; Anonymous#4, personal communication, 14 June, 2013). Some arts organisations perform more frequently abroad than at home, so they are relatively unknown to the corporations. Furthermore, as sponsors do not target overseas markets but the domestic market, there is no promotional benefit in supporting cultural diplomacy events (Anonymous#4, personal communication, 14 June, 2013). Thus, it is even more challenging for arts companies to seek sponsorship when
touring abroad, as corporations prefer the big names in the arts with established reputations and administration. These are more likely to gain trust from the sponsors. As my interviewee (ibid.) suggested, a new mechanism is required to encourage the corporations to support the arts.

Tax exemption is one of the main benefits of supporting the arts. However, even if the large corporations intend to give support, setting up a private foundation is preferred in practice. Instead of looking for image-matching arts companies, its own foundation would have greater control over image and reputation. More importantly, the foundation can be a sub-organisation for the business to be legally exempt from tax. Other than setting up foundations, many entrepreneurs have established cultural organisations responding to their own interests, such as the Chimei Museum (Chi Mei Corporation) or Evergreen Symphony Orchestra (Evergreen group). With sufficient financial support from the corporation, their operations are influenced by government policy orientation to a lesser extent. Thus, the corporation may prioritise its own cultural establishments in philanthropic practice. As my interviewee (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014) pointed out, the required initial funds to establish a private foundation are 30,000,000 New Taiwan Dollars (approximately 600,000 British Pounds in 2015), which is easily affordable for these corporations. They can help promote corporate identity and enjoy tax exemption. For the founder, it is easier to serve his or her own charitable interests and purposes. Few strong incentives exist for them to provide grants to other arts organisations. Consequently, it requires strategic planning from the arts organisations to establish corporate sponsorship.

In terms of cultural diplomacy, the Taiwanese government and the quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation (quango) are also eligible to receive donations from the private sector. The National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) is one of the actors in cultural diplomacy (as illustrated in section 5.7). Although the NTCH became the first administrative corporation in 2004, and has more experience in fundraising, Director Ping Heng (personal communication, 17 June, 2013) revealed that its sponsorship is usually project-based. For corporations, sponsoring the NTCH is eligible for the same tax exemption as donating to the government. However, it was also Ping’s observation that companies and their foundations are more enthusiastic in supporting charitable works other than arts and culture.

Despite the legal eligibility to receive donations, little financial support from the private sector flows into the MOC’s cultural diplomacy programme. The most recent and significant example was the Taiwanese tycoon Samuel Yin’s funding of the Spotlight Taiwan programme. In 2013, the MOC launched the Spotlight Taiwan programme with funds from
Yin (Yen-Liang). The Spotlight Taiwan programme aims to encourage and support partnerships with foreign universities and cultural organisations to promote Taiwanese culture. The programme is a four-year project with a four million US Dollars budget. Each year, one million US Dollars will be granted to successful proposals by universities or cultural organisations invited by the MOC. The funds can be used to host cultural and academic activities. This programme is a rare exception of philanthropy in arts and culture as the money is directly given to the government. Nonetheless, as the funds from Yin are only for four years, it requires further financial resources to maintain the partnership with the cultural organisations and academic institutions. One solution might be to establish a designated fund for the purpose of sustaining private sponsorship towards cultural diplomacy. Although the importance of sustainability in establishing foreign partnerships has been recognised (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014), further legislation is needed to encourage more donations from other private actors.

Additionally, financial flexibility for overseas cultural institutions might be helpful to establish partnerships with institutions and corporations in the host countries. During my fieldwork, I proposed the idea that the future Taiwan Academy or cultural centres could be transformed into Administration Corporations, which allows the institution more freedom for fundraising. This idea, according to my interviewee (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014), is unlikely to materialise as government income and expenses must be transparent. As cultural centres are set up overseas, it would be difficult to scrutinise the procedure. To sum up, there are several reasons for the absence of corporate sponsorship in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and relations practice. First, few motivations exist for businesses to sponsor art in cultural relations. Culturally, the idea of corporate social responsibility is still new in Taiwan, and arts and culture may not be the priority if corporations attempt to fulfil this obligation. It also depends on where the corporation’s target market is located, as the sponsorship must match its business interests and marketing purpose. Secondly, larger business brands may remain an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) supplier, or not seek to be identified as a Taiwanese brand (see section 5.8). Moreover, the scale and the reputation of arts organisations would also influence the potential for fundraising in the private sector. The current fundraising mechanism is not the best working model for arts and business, and it requires adjustments to increase sponsorship. It would be beneficial for the cultural organisations to form long-term partnerships with business for more cultural exchange opportunities. It is also crucial for the public-funded administrative
corporations, MOC and the cultural centres to re-think the current project-based fundraising model in order to form long-term partnerships.

6.5 Collaboration with NGOs and private foundations
In contrast to the absence of Taiwanese corporations in cultural diplomacy, Non-Governmental Organisations’ (NGO) international participation has played an important role in Taiwan’s public diplomacy, as the government has limited space to manoeuvre due to the political situation. Their engagement once again represents the importance of private actors in public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. Actors from civil society who participate in public diplomacy can enjoy more credibility and trust among audiences when they are detached from the government and its political agenda (Rawnsley, 2014). In Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, there are many cases of NGOs and private foundations participating in the process, and their relationships with the government vary. For instance, they can be recipients of MOFA subsidy for international exchange activities, and the MOC can also provide subsidy either annually for core operational expenses or on a project-basis. In this section, I discuss three different cases of their engagement. In addition to receiving government subsidy similar to the arts organisations’ international tours, the NGOs and private foundations can become partners of the MOC and further extend the reach of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.

In the first case, Not-for-Profit Organisations (NPO) and NGOs in Taiwan are often partnered with government in cultural diplomacy with the advantage of professional networks. For instance, through the outsourcing process, the government can call for bids from these organisations to execute governmental projects. These organisations can have more flexibility and efficiency compared with the bureaucracy. Also, it might be easier to access their worldwide professional network. One example, the Taipei Book Fair Foundation (TBFF), was established in 2004, by a group of publishers in Taiwan unsatisfied with the then operational strategy of the Taipei Book Fair (Taipei Book Fair Foundation, 2014). The group of publishers began their lobbying and urged the Government Information Office (GIO) to set up a designated organisation for the Taipei Book Fair. Instead of establishing a new government department for the Taipei International Book Exhibition, eventually, it became a non-governmental organisation initiated by the private sector to continue hosting this event. As the foundation is an NGO, funding to fulfil projects can only be assigned through standard government procedures developed on the basis of the Government Procurement Law. Although the TBFF has hosted the Taipei International Book Exhibition every year since
2005, their partnership must be renewed annually. The TBFF not only hosts the Taipei International Book Exhibition, but also acts as a government partner. In terms of hosting and attending international book fairs, the TBFF receives funding from the GIO (now part of the MOC) and is responsible for hosting professional training and travel arrangements for attending book fairs in other countries. As the government encourages Taiwanese publishers to sell copyright for book translation, the TBFF is also responsible for organising the ‘national pavilion’ in international book fairs, such as the Frankfurt Book Fair, or the Bologna Children's Book Fair. In short, this kind of partnership is outsourcing government projects to private foundations. The TBFF shares part of the work of the MOC and cultural centres in promoting Taiwanese books abroad.

From an administrative perspective, there are advantages for outsourcing cultural diplomacy projects to NGOs. For instance, the management of manpower can be more flexible and adjustable for project execution. However, I suspect this practice does not necessarily benefit policymaking in the long term, if government officials have not obtained knowledge and experience of actual project implementation. Furthermore, under existing government regulation, the bidding needs to be carried out periodically (mostly annually). Without establishing a long-term contract, frequent bidding procedures simply for the sake of fulfilling regulations can be a waste of administrative resources.

In the second case, the NGOs can be important actors in the cultural exchange between Taiwan and China. However, the partnership might be short-term and unstable. As discussed in Chapter 4, the primary agents in Taiwan-China relations have been Taiwan’s private actors (Chu, 2011). This is also the case in the cross-Strait cultural relations. Without contested official status, it is more convenient for NGOs to engage in relevant projects. As previously mentioned, in 2011, the Quanta Arts Foundation of Taiwan was commissioned by the government to establish the website ‘Bravo.net’ with the aim of providing information for cross-Strait cultural relations. In order to enhance cross-Strait cultural relations, the Quanta Arts Foundation has already acted as a facilitator for relevant activities. Whilst the Taiwan government is unable to establish offices in mainland China, the Quanta Arts Foundation has its Beijing office and has provided legal consultation for arts companies (Wu, personal communication, 31 May, 2013). Through the project of Bravo.net, the Foundation collected administrative information for theatre companies that can be easily referenced. However, there was no further maintenance and update of the website contents after the project terminated in 2013. By the time of writing in 2015, the website was no longer active.
The case of Bravo.net serves as an example of the disadvantage of outsourcing a government project to NGOs. Although private foundations can be more flexible in realising government projects, the sustainability remains in question. As these partnerships are often on a project basis, once the contract ends, the government might need to seek new partners. In the case of Bravo.net, there was no subsequent maintenance or update of the website and the collected data are not accessible for the general public. In my opinion, the lack of sustainability can be both a waste of effort and money. The practice of outsourcing projects to NGOs can be convenient in terms of flexibility; however, there might be shortcomings in the long-term development of cultural diplomacy.

The third case is through the NGOs; Taiwan’s overseas cultural centres can engage with the local cultural network in the host country. The case of the New York Cultural Center’s collaboration with the Asian Cultural Council (ACC) was significant. The collaboration not only showcased the Taiwanese artists, but it also represented mutuality. For the New York Cultural Center, it catered to the interests of the partner in the host country, and created opportunities for engaging with the local community.

The collaboration between the ACC and the New York Cultural Center was the result of long-term cultural relations. I learnt from my interviewee, Cecily Cook, that as part of the Rockefeller Foundation, the ACC set up an endowment for Asian artists to visit the United States. Notable Taiwanese grantees included Lin Huai-min, the founder and artistic director of the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre in Taiwan. Besides the main office in New York, there are regional offices in Hong Kong, Taipei, Manila and Tokyo. When the ACC started its 50th anniversary celebrations, the New York Cultural Center proposed to collaborate and staged Dance Taipei in 2013. In the Dance Taipei programme, four Taiwanese dancers and choreographers who were recipients of the ACC grants showed their talents on stage. For both parties, it was a great opportunity to present their work. The performances not only invited the patrons of the ACC, but they were also open to the general public. With the aim of enhancing US-Asia cultural exchange, the ACC provides grants for artists, arts companies and academics from Asia who wish to visit the United States or vice versa. Taiwan has been included in its grant programme since 1953 and over 300 Taiwanese individuals and organisations have been grant recipients (Cook, personal communication, 16 December, 2013). This event showcases the ACC’s work and the artists in Taiwan, and represents the US-Taiwan cultural connection.

The collaboration between the ACC and the New York Cultural Center was at an opportune time and involved the right people. I learnt from my visit to the ACC that it had
been approached by the cultural centre and proposed the programme. Many Taiwanese contemporary dance artists who either receive their training or have residence in the United States, thus there are individual cultural links between both countries. As Schneider (2003) noted, this is important to successful cultural diplomacy initiatives, as it forms part of a long-term relationship and the cultivation of ties. Through this programme, the cultural link can be promoted. For the cultural centre, it was an opportunity to enhance its engagement with the local community.

The scale and curating of this programme may be a unique opportunity; however, there are several key factors to examine in this collaboration. First, the ACC maintains a close relationship with its alumni. It follows the latest works or exhibitions of grantees and facilitates promotion. It is also beneficial for the artists to establish their reputation. From the perspective of the cultural centre, it requires knowledge of the artists in Taiwan with sufficient credibility to work with. The artists’ reputations are also enhanced through the grant-making process. Overall, it is based on mutual trust. Through the working process, the collaboration and partnership is renewed and reinforced.

The case of the Dance Taipei presented by the ACC and the New York Cultural Center might not be easily replicated. Unlike some performance showcases or touring, this performance would not necessarily bring future invitations or business opportunities. However, it shows how many years it may take for organisations to establish cultural relations. As a private-funded foundation, the ACC has more freedom to make unconditional grants. As the overseas cultural centres are obliged to follow government fiscal restrictions, it would be very unlikely for the cultural centres to be able to distribute grants in the same way as the ACC. However, knowledge of existing cultural connections in the host country and attempts to facilitate them will be the task of current and future cultural attachés. Maintaining information on recipients of government grants for cultural exchange, either to or from Taiwan, should be a fundamental task for the government to trace carefully the long-term influences of cultural relations.

6.6 Engaging individuals in cultural diplomacy
In this section, how individuals participate in government policy implementation is examined. The importance of citizen diplomacy was recognised by Mueller and Rebstock (2012). The authors indicated that the result of citizen diplomacy could be profound. There are two types of citizen diplomacy. The first is spontaneous citizen diplomacy; those opportunities to affect others’ perceptions of the country lie in people’s daily activities. The second is intentional
citizen diplomacy, which means individuals deliberately choose to participate in programmes designed to build positive relationships (Mueller and Rebstock, 2012).

I discuss first how the Taiwan government has engaged with young students through the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission and the Youth Ambassadors scheme. The schemes, which can be considered as intentional citizen diplomacy, recruited college students to perform in foreign countries. Subsequently, I illustrate how enthusiastic overseas based Taiwanese proactively engage in government projects and collaborate with cultural centres, as well as discuss the case of overseas Taiwanese support of the Taiwan Gallery in the Queens Museum in New York.

After the Republic of China (ROC) government lost its seat in the United Nations to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1971, maintaining ‘friendship’ and links with foreign countries was still crucial for the government. As detailed by Chang Chuan-Yi (2009), as part of a public diplomacy strategy, the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission members were selected by the China Youth National Salvation Corps every year from 1974 to 1999. After intensive choreography and rehearsals, the members were dispatched in groups to tour in different regions. The purposes of the project were twofold. The first was to enhance the collaboration with other higher education institutions, and, secondly, to foster relationships with the Chinese diaspora. The Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission carried out its mandate of cultural diplomacy through dance. Their performances presented traditional Chinese culture and established friendly links between the host country and the Republic of China. In the home country, it increased awareness of members from different universities and appreciation of culture in Taiwan. Chang Chuan-Yi (ibid.) illustrated how the scheme both served the purpose of cultural diplomacy and further contributed to the establishment of cultural identity. I suggest that the engagement of young students not only shaped cultural identity, but also made them aware of their power as individuals to contribute to public diplomacy.

The conclusion of the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission also reflected the changes in domestic politics. The scheme was inactive during the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration between 2000 and 2008. It was not until 2009 that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a new project called ‘International Youth Ambassadors Exchange Programme’. The mission of the project, as the MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015) stated, includes the strengthening of friendship with people in countries that recognise Taiwan. The aim is to promote the image of Taiwan’s ‘viable diplomacy’ and the ability to contribute to the international community. The programme is also expected to communicate
Taiwan’s soft power and introduce the college students to international affairs. Through this project, MOFA wishes to honour Taiwan’s role as the promoter of cultural exchange. In other words, this programme remains a government-sponsored activity aiming to facilitate public diplomacy. The impact of the International Youth Ambassadors Exchange Programme was recognised in Rawnsley’s (2014) study on Taiwan’s soft power and public diplomacy, as it has developed close personal relationships between the students engaged in the scheme and their counterparts in other countries. I agree that the strength of direct person-to-person communication is realised in the programme. For young students from Taiwan and its allies, the relationship can have profound influences on their views of each other’s country.

Despite the significant impact the International Youth Ambassadors Exchange Programme can have, the programming of indigenous dance raised controversy over cultural appropriation in 2013. Performances are the core activities in both programmes of the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission and International Youth Ambassadors Exchange Program. The Youth Ambassadors project also signalled a change in the type of cultural activity selected for presentation to foreign audiences. Compared with the previous Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission, which trained its members in traditional Chinese folk dance, the Youth Ambassadors rehearsed Taiwanese indigenous tribal dances and performed these abroad. This indicates a certain degree of openness to presentation of cultural diversity, which relates to internal cultural policy developments fostering multiculturalism. Unlike the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission, which viewed overseas Chinese as their main audience (Chang, 2009), choosing Taiwanese indigenous tribal dances for non-Chinese audiences was an attempt to distinguish Taiwan from China. Nonetheless, the appropriation of indigenous culture and mismatched garments from different tribes and rituals were the main source of controversy. For instance, certain ornaments are only allowed on senior members in the tribe, or some colours are for funerals only (Kunaw, 2013). Former member of the International Youth Ambassadors Exchange Programme, Mr Yi-Chen Wu (2013) suggested that the project is implemented hastily each year and lacks adequate knowledge and research about ceremonies and rituals in different tribes in Taiwan, resulting in the mismatched outfits for performing aboriginal dances abroad. In addition, as Wu (ibid.) pointed out, the Youth Ambassadors consisted of mainly ethnic Han Chinese and did not have enough time to explore and research the indigenous culture in Taiwan. He further argued that the root cause of the controversy was the long-term neglect of indigenous culture in Taiwan’s cultural development. I would consider this as another example of how internal cultural policy can influence cultural
diplomacy. It also reveals the confusion that may arise when Taiwanese youngsters have to seek cultural identity whilst trying to differentiate themselves from mainland Chinese.

As illustrated above, dance performances and cultural presentations in this programme constitute a more relaxed and entertaining format. Both the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission and the Youth Ambassadors function in the realm of youth and public diplomacy, and the performances served as ‘icebreaker’ for their visits. Nonetheless, the hasty planning and touring are not an effective and accurate way to communicate Taiwanese culture. Arguably, as in the example of appropriation of indigenous culture in 2013, the presentation of traditions out of context merely creates and reinforces stereotypes.

Furthermore, other important, albeit implicit, private actors in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy are the Taiwanese diaspora. Maintaining the relationship with Taiwanese expatriates and emigrants is important in Taiwan’s foreign policy. Historically, the overseas Chinese supported the work for establishing the Republic of China. Overseas Chinese have been the target audience of the government’s foreign propaganda, even second or third generation, with the attempt to maintain their identity as Chinese and recognise the ROC government. In addition to propaganda, cultural and community centres and arts festivals are among the methods to engage the overseas Chinese community (Rawnsley, 2000). The Overseas Chinese Affairs Council (OCAC), formally established in 1932, is responsible for overseas Chinese guidance, immigration, educational guidance and cultural affairs. In 2015, there were 17 OCAC culture centres, including those in the United States, Canada, Brazil, the Philippines, and Australia (Overseas Community Affairs Council, 2014).

However, it is my observation that the MOC in Taiwan has different views on engaging emigrants. When the Taiwan Academy opened its first branches in Houston and Los Angeles, the chosen locations were former cultural centres set up by the OCAC and their main function was to serve overseas Taiwanese. The MOC sketched another strategy for the Taiwan Academies. It would be transformed into a cultural hub with the main mission to serve non-Taiwanese visitors. The two tasks of working with Taiwanese emigrants and attempting to serve visitors from other backgrounds do not conflict. That said, the affairs related to overseas Chinese/Taiwanese are not the responsibilities of the MOC, and it may be difficult for two government departments to coordinate their efforts.

The overseas Taiwanese remain active supporters of Taiwan’s cultural relations projects. With local connections in the host country, expatriates and emigrants can be potential volunteers for cultural exchange. Some of the expatriates in New York are artists and cultural professionals well-known to the cultural centre. They are also willing to help
promote Taiwanese culture. On certain occasions, the emigrants would sponsor or donate to individual artists for their stay in New York.

Taiwanese expatriates or those with personal connections to Taiwan also assist in broadening the network of the MOC. For example, when the New York Cultural Center attempted to establish partnerships for the Spotlight Taiwan project, the proposals submitted were usually from schools with Taiwanese faculty members (Yu, personal communication, 12, December, 2013). Taiwanese academics are usually more enthusiastic about the projects despite the goals of the grant not being directly linked to research output, but to host extracurricular seminars, conferences and film screenings. In addition, some non-Taiwanese teachers who studied Mandarin in Taiwan are willing to participate as well. If there are no faculty members with links to Taiwan, it is difficult for Taiwan’s cultural centres to establish new connections. Therefore, to launch a new project such as Spotlight Taiwan also relies on existing networks of overseas Taiwanese, or former recipients of Taiwan’s public diplomacy. Whilst the newly launched project aims to strengthen the partnership with foreign institutions, the intended effect is based on previous efforts of public and cultural diplomacy.

The existing network of overseas Taiwanese also helped the New York Cultural Center to connect with organisations and to promote Taiwanese culture. Director Susan Yu (ibid.) of the New York Cultural Center mentioned the case of the Taiwan Gallery in the Queens Museum as an example. The museum is located in Queens, New York, where Taiwanese are a large part of the multi-ethnic community. The Queens Museum of Art underwent $73 million expansion and renovation, and the Taiwanese community, the MOC and the MOFA jointly contributed $250,000. In acknowledgement of this grant, part of the new gallery is named the ‘Taiwan Gallery.’ When the museum reopened as the Queens Museum in 2013, the Ministry of Culture and the Taipei Cultural Center in New York also funded the opening event, the sixth Queens International Biennial. Taiwanese independent curator Meiya Cheng collaborated with Hitomi Iwasaki, Director of Exhibitions at the Museum. In this biennial, the exhibition showcased a variety of Taiwanese contemporary artists in the Taiwan Gallery. As a legacy of this event, the Taiwanese American Arts Council (TAAC) was established in 2014 to carry forward the mission of the Taiwanese Art Endowment Fund, which made the Taiwan Gallery possible. Nevertheless, there is no permanent collection in the Taiwan Gallery, nor is there a dedicated space for the Taipei Cultural Center to use. In 2014, the newly established TAAC hosted a launch programme in the Queens Museum, the ‘TAAC Recognition-Taiwanese American Artist’ (Queens Museum, 2014). The Taiwanese American Arts Council invited both Taiwan-based artists and
Taiwanese American artists to their exhibition and played a part in furthering Taiwan-US cultural relations.

The Taiwan Gallery in the Queens Museum can be regarded as the result of the long-term relationship with the Taiwanese diaspora and the specific engagement of cultural centres in local communities. The two founders of the TAAC, Dr Lung-Fong Chen and Thomas Chen, are immigrants from Taiwan and both are successful professionals. Unlike public funding prioritising Taiwanese-based artists, the Council sponsors Taiwanese American artists. Both the TAAC and the artists can strengthen their existing connections in the United States. Furthermore, the Queens Museum has a significant role in the community in Queens, New York. Unlike the major museums, the Queens Museum is not on the Museum Mile in Manhattan. It is dedicated to presenting visual arts and educational programming, especially for the culturally and ethnically diverse residents of Queens. As a review by Holland Cotter (2013) in the New York Times illustrated:

> the United Nations of voices we encounter on Manhattan’s streets is global but transient: Visitors from abroad come to town and they look, they shop, they leave. By contrast, the same range of accents we hear in Queens is global but local: People land from everywhere and stay, in one of the most ethnically diverse patches of residential real estate in the nation.

The engagement of the TAAC or the Taipei Cultural Center with the Queens Museum may be a piece of the mosaic of multi-ethnicity in New York.

Nonetheless, it could be argued that collaboration with arts organisations located in a residential area far from the city centre would not really raise the visibility of Taiwan. It may be considered that having an exhibition in world-famous museums with many international tourists would generate more visitors and expand the reach of Taiwanese art and culture. However, it is difficult to estimate whether it has more long-term influence on cultural relations. Gaining the naming rights of the Taiwan Gallery in the Queens Museum could be a start for future collaboration. The enthusiasm of the Taiwanese immigrants and expatriates can be beneficial for building local networks for cultural diplomacy. Additionally, as long as the Taiwanese diaspora still recognise Taiwan as their motherland and are willing to help promote Taiwanese culture through their existing local network, the benefits of cultural diplomacy are evident.

From the collaboration between the New York Cultural Center and Asian Cultural Council, it can be seen that cultural relations take a long time to flourish. To collaborate with local organisations and to engage with the local community requires connections and
knowledge of cultural spheres in both host and home country. However, a knowledge base for either the cultural centres or artists and arts organisations is yet to be established in Taiwan. In terms of passing on experience or understanding and reflecting on the reality of cultural diplomacy, it will be necessary to establish a knowledge base for strategy-making. In this chapter, I examined how the government strategically engaged private actors. In the next chapter, I carry out a detailed discussion of my research findings and conclude the thesis.
Chapter 7: Discussions and Conclusions

In this chapter, I discuss and evaluate the research findings and consequently conclude the thesis. I analyse a series of themes: the links between cultural policy and cultural diplomacy; challenges to the practice of cultural diplomacy; and the relationship between nation-building and cultural diplomacy. I revisit the research questions presented in the Introduction and provide my main conclusions.

The discussion on research findings focuses on specific themes. First, I examine the problems of Taiwan’s strategy regarding its overseas cultural promotion. Secondly, I explore the links between Taiwan’s cultural identity and diplomacy. Thirdly, from the perspective of policymaking and implementation, I analyse the objectives of cultural diplomacy and its influence on cultural policymaking. Fourthly, the motivation and setbacks of the participation of the private sector are discussed. Finally, I conclude my thesis and make suggestions for future research.

7.1 Discussion on issues of cultural diplomacy and policy implementation

The link between cultural policy and cultural diplomacy in Taiwan, as examined in Chapter 5, has undergone several significant transitions. Historically, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy role was to support conventional diplomacy. This was clear in the examined cases of Peking Opera in the 1930s. In that period, the main objective of cultural diplomacy was to support traditional diplomacy and create opportunities for networking and socialising. Nowadays, although this function remains important, others have been added following the establishment of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) in 1981 as a government authority dedicated to cultural policy and affairs, and policy objectives having evolved not only in relation to changes in foreign affairs, but also in terms of internal cultural policy. Thus, in addition to supporting conventional diplomacy, the overall government strategies include grant-making and active promotion of cultural products as part of place-branding. The changes in policy goals are woven into official policy, such as the White Papers for culture in 1998 and 2004.

Cultural diplomacy promoted the Republic of China (ROC) as the preserver of traditional Chinese culture, especially during the Cultural Revolution in mainland China (1966-1976). As analysed in Chapter 5, the intention of the KMT government to present the curated programme for the Peking Opera in the 1950s was to reassure audiences about the authenticity of Chinese culture presented in Taiwan and further reassure the legitimacy of the regime. Even though the claim of ‘legitimate representation of China’ subsided after the rise
in Taiwanese cultural identity awareness in the 1970s, the need for differentiation from the People’s Republic of China persisted in cultural diplomacy discourses. Relevant evidence can be found from the policy objective to establish the ‘subjectivity of Taiwanese culture’ during Tchen Yu-chiou’s term of office in the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) between 2000 and 2004. Similar discourse can also be found in Minister Lung Ying-tai’s statement on the difference between the Taiwan Academy and the Confucius Institute (section 5.3) in opposition to China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Although Tchen Yu-chiou and Lung Ying-tai served in different party administration and their views of Taiwanese culture differ, distinguishing Taiwan from China was an important message each sought to convey.

The intention underlying the discourse of ‘let the world see Taiwan’ (or ‘make Taiwan visible’), which was also a slogan of arts companies (as discussed in Chapter 6), was the wish that international society acknowledged the existence of Taiwan and, at the same time, this recognition could be enacted through culture. However, achieving this goal would prove more difficult than expected. As Taylor (1997, p. 80) stated, ‘cultural diplomacy is very much an adjunct of conventional diplomacy. If the latter fails, the former suffers; but the former is considered worth trying in an attempt to lubricate the workings of the latter.’ It is arguable whether the cultural diplomacy would survive regardless of the obstacles the ROC faces in conventional diplomacy. Furthermore, the notion of soft power is also present in Taiwan’s cultural policy goals when promoting Taiwanese culture internationally. However, following Taylor’s (ibid.) argument, this goal is not easily achieved. As Wang and Lu (2008) argued, many in Taiwan consider soft power as ‘the weapon of the weak’ in the pursuit of security. When facing the complicated political relationship with China, the use of Taiwan’s soft power is rather an instrument for primarily pressing back against the PRC’s soft and hard power efforts to deny Taiwan statehood or to marginalise the country internationally (deLisle, 2010). With its mismatched hard power resources, soft power serves as a second-best substitute in pursuing the security that Taiwan cannot achieve. I agree with deLisle’s viewpoint. In relation to the examples found in the research, cultural diplomacy is considered a means for Taiwan to exhibit its soft power. However, there remain pragmatic limitations that prevent the government from effectively achieving its goal.

One of the examples comes from the restrictions of setting up overseas cultural centres. The analysis of regional planning in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy shows that the goal is to be recognised and to gain exposure in developed countries. This was particularly obvious when the CCA upgraded to the Ministry of Culture (MOC). Strategically, the new cultural centres are mostly in large global cities and in countries with no official diplomatic
relations with Taiwan. The negotiation of opening official cultural diplomacy cannot be separated from the existing diplomatic framework. One of the examples is the naming of cultural centres in different countries (see section 5.3). In the case of Taiwan, the names of cultural centres cannot be unified but need to be negotiated with individual countries. Although President Ma Ying-jeou proposed culture as an important asset in ‘viable diplomacy’ during his presidential campaign, I would argue that cultural diplomacy could not be the substitute proposed. On the contrary, the diplomatic deficiency restrains the impact of cultural diplomacy.

Moreover, whilst the PRC spares no effort in its soft and hard power, the attempt to marginalise Taiwan also takes place on occasions of cultural relations; for example, the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) conference in Portugal in 2014. Despite the ‘softness’ that an education exchange occasion suggests, there remain sensitive issues when it comes to Taiwan. At the EACS, the ROC government protested the removal of the publication on the conference proceedings following a request from the PRC. This may have been a small disagreement, but such interventions by China can be considered a gesture of intimidation.

In the internal strategy-making in Taiwan, the approach of prioritising culture can be a limitation in projecting Taiwan’s soft power. Rawnsley (2012) argued that the achievements in democracy could benefit Taiwan’s soft power capacity, but it is limited by the government’s prioritising of culture. It can be problematic to view culture as a premise of soft power, particularly when adequate evaluation is not in place. As Rawnsley (ibid.) pointed out, it is easy to measure outputs, but extremely difficult to measure impact. This equally applies to the indicators and factors in Taiwan’s plans of cultural diplomacy, such as the Global Outreach Action Plan. The government can measure output by using quantitative indicators, such as size of audience and events. However, the impact remains difficult to assess and evaluate.

Furthermore, even if Taiwan’s democracy can benefit its soft power capacity, it is challenging to find a feasible method to advertise its achievements. In the 1990s, political advertisements published by the GIO featured the achievements of democratisation (Cheng, 2007). However, as a young democracy emerging from martial law in less than 30 years, democracy in Taiwan still has room to mature. This is evidenced by the outbreaks of violence in Taiwan’s parliament (the Legislative Yuan), which have often featured in foreign media since the 1990s. The heated debates can sometimes turn into mass brawls. For instance, it was reported on the UK’s MailOnline in 2013 that the legislators exchanged punches and
threw water at each other before a vote on a national referendum to decide whether to finish building the fourth nuclear power plant on the island (Tomlinson, 2013). To some extent, this example also reflects the fact that government advertisements may fail to deliver the desired outcome as the audience has multiple sources of information. Messages that government advertising intends to promote are not necessarily received by the audience.

Democracy in Taiwan might not be fully communicated through current policy implementation, or strategies of cross-Strait relations. For example, Chinese student exchange could be an opportunity to understand Taiwan’s soft power democracy. Taiwanese scholar Yun-Han Chu (2011) considered that Taiwan could serve as a Chinese model of social and political pluralism, and, most importantly, of media and individual freedom. Students witnessing party-politics and elections, whilst living in Taiwan, can gain a unique first-hand experience of the workings of democracy even if relatively young. However, the disputes over allowing Chinese students healthcare in Taiwan and restrictions on their length of stay and work allowances after graduation may undermine the effort to promote Taiwanese soft power. Moreover, the development of market-orientated strategies for exporting cultural products, especially when aiming for the mainland China market, also communicates Taiwan’s democracy through cultural relations. Issues of self-censorship in Taiwan’s theatre companies touring in mainland China have raised concerns about diminishing freedom of speech. Despite the potential of broadening the market of Taiwanese theatre, film, and popular music in China and generating considerable revenue, unresolved problems of Chinese censorship and controversy over the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement cannot be ignored. There remain difficulties regulating and normalising cross-Strait cultural communications and exports. To seek commercial success may benefit the industry itself; however, it may not have more impact on Taiwan’s soft power in the long term.

My research findings indicate that the formation of cultural identity correlate with cultural diplomacy and vice versa. Through tracing the cultural policymaking process in domestic politics, the recognition of ‘others’ has been particularly important in cultural diplomacy. Therefore, to be seen by ‘others’ in the international community is crucial, especially in relation to the formation of Taiwan’s cultural identity. This connection was evident in Tchen’s term in office at the CCA (2000-2004). Her policy approach aimed at developing ‘Taiwanese subjectivity’ as a way of distinguishing Taiwan from China. Here, I consider the formation of cultural identity as a process of seeing ‘through others’ eyes.’ Tchen’s approach to promotion overseas was replaced when President Ma Ying-jeou (in office 2008-2016) attempted to brand Taiwanese culture within the wider context of Chinese
culture (see section 4.2). However, with the tensions brought about by the Ma administration’s cross-Strait policies, I argue that the relations with the ‘China outside’ (mainland China) also affected the attitude of ‘China inside,’ which I refer to as the shared Chinese cultural elements. President Ma Ying-jeou’s cultural identity discourse was difficult to justify, as evidenced by annual research of Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan; the percentage of respondents that identified themselves as ‘Taiwanese’ instead of ‘Chinese’ or ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ had risen steadily after 2008.

In terms of identity formation, the campaigns to generate more exposure for Taiwan – to become visible – remain a powerful motivation for Taiwanese to support cultural relations programmes. Issues related to soft power are closely linked to a nation’s domestically-contested self-perceptions or government-initiated constructs of identity (Melissen, 2011). In line with these arguments, the domestically contested self-perceptions can be part of the process of creating cultural distinctiveness. Societies seek to voice their stories to find their audience and to be heard. In the case of Taiwan, contested self-perceptions have long influenced domestic cultural politics. In the context of diplomatic isolation, distinguishing Taiwan and making the country visible is also an important part of national identity construction. The domestic audience gains a sense of participation in cultural diplomacy, acknowledges the arts companies’ international engagement and take pride in the work as part of Taiwanese culture. The connection between the arts companies and domestic audiences can be strengthened through fundraising projects. This sharing is an important element for cultural identity formation. Both the company and the audience are part of the imagined community in the sense proposed by Benedict Anderson (1991). In the fundraising campaigns (illustrated in Chapter 6), the arts organisations heading to the Edinburgh Fringe Festival used the phrase ‘let the world see Taiwan/the new dance aesthetics of the Payuan in Taiwan’ to strengthen the connection between the funder and the company. This fundraising appeal publicised the benefits the company tour could bring. The company was not only campaigning for itself, but also for Taiwan. In this respect, it can inspire the funder to support a company, and to help send them abroad. This generates a sense of pride.

However, the imagined community can sometimes be challenged in cultural exchange projects. It can be seen from the cases of the Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial and the Flagship Production at the National Theatre (see section 5.7), that the engagement of foreign artists in cultural projects pertaining to the representation of Taiwan abroad has aroused debate and controversy. It is reasonable to argue that the ideology of nationalism still matters
when the government plans to promote Taiwan, especially in terms of resource allocation and the interpretation of culture. The disputes over interpretation of Taiwanese culture reveals that projecting ‘national’ culture remains the main objective of cultural diplomacy. In other words, rather than seeking mutual understanding with others, the self-presentation remains the main concern in the process.

Nonetheless, the case of Flagship Production at the NTCH demonstrated the attempt to build mutuality, co-operation and exchange. The cultural identity of Taiwan remains an issue, whilst the dispute over Director Suzuki Tadashi’s interpretation of Taiwanese popular songs and his alleged cultural appropriation raised controversy among cultural professionals in Taiwan. This case revealed the anxiety of self-definition and concerns over how Taiwanese culture was interpreted by others. Moreover, I suggest that potential problems of cultural appropriation or misinterpretation are concerns as the cultural elements are incorporated into the production. How Taiwanese culture is understood and interpreted becomes an issue in a production intended to serve the purpose of cultural exchange.

To a certain degree, this issue of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy mentioned above reflects a question that Rawnsley (2012) raised about the fundamental issue of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy: who has the power to define Taiwan’s culture, and why? This question is not unique to Taiwan, especially when it comes to promoting a country’s culture overseas. If the government decides to promote the high arts by targeting the elite and opinion leaders, it remains questionable whether the cultural product would be appreciated by the middle or working classes. This might be a top-down process that is not fully democratic.

I suggest two ways to analyse the disputes. First, does the government have the power to ‘define Taiwanese culture’? In the case of the Taiwan Pavilion of the 2013 Venice Biennial, the administration had the power to decide whom and which projects received public funding by allocating resources for curating a national pavilion. In this case, the curator Esther Lu had to contend with political correctness in her decision to showcase foreign artists’ work in the Taiwan Pavilion. However, the controversy raised by the choice of artists showed that disapproval of the administration’s decisions was possible. In the case of the Flagship Production at the NTCH, artists and cultural professionals were the first to express their opinion and question the decision. In my opinion, these controversies represented democracy in the process of cultural identity formation. If the government seeks to define ‘Taiwanese culture’ single-handedly, it can be difficult to gain support. It is unlikely for a single government official or institution to define Taiwan’s culture without being supported by fellow citizens.
Furthermore, the controversy surrounding foreign artists’ engagement in the Taiwan Pavilion was confusing and contradictory. It was in sharp contrast to the acclamation of Taiwanese companies when touring abroad. Although both approaches have a similar intention, to ‘let the world see Taiwan,’ being viewed by foreign audiences and being presented by foreign artists led to different reactions in Taiwan. This may be explained by the anxiety of losing the power of interpretation over cultural identity in the division of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ The unsettled issues of cultural identity in Taiwan are embodied in different aspects of cultural diplomacy. The fundamental questions of who has the power to decide what Taiwanese culture is, which part is worth promoting, and who presents it, relate to controversies involving several cases of cultural promotion in the public sector. Whilst cultural diplomacy became an outlet of cultural identity, the collaboration with foreign artists also became a sensitive issue. Potential cultural appropriation and inappropriate resource allocation were the main concerns raised by Taiwanese artists. The government needed also to ensure that its promotion of a national image was not the sole objective of cultural diplomacy.

The collaboration between famous artists and the NTCH remains an opportunity for cross-cultural production. This is an occasion to re-think and re-create a cultural identity. Cultural identity is not static, as argued by postmodernists. Quite the opposite, it can be fluid or reshaped over time (Preston, 1997). Through the two-way process in such cross-cultural production, the cultural elements can be revisited and developed further. This process may not only inspire artists, but also reflect their views on cultural identity.

From the perspective of resource distribution, who is eligible for funding in cultural diplomacy is an issue of funding allocation. I discovered that most of the Taiwanese artists funded by the New York Cultural Center were ROC citizens and based in Taiwan. Although understandably the resources are reserved for Taiwanese artists who do not have existing connections to work internationally, this raises the question of whether ‘Taiwanese culture’ needs to be confined to ‘culture made in Taiwan.’ Considering the government’s aim is to showcase Taiwanese culture to a global audience, collaboration with Taiwanese artists based in countries with cultural centres may be an effective strategy worth more consideration. This can be developed, for example, by actively linking the different networks that the artists are familiar with, which could be beneficial to foster collaborations among cultural institutions and the cultural centres. Such new approaches may generate more opportunities to showcase Taiwan-based artists and expand professional networks. Moreover, in terms of increasing cultural influence internationally, to collaborate with foreign artists who have resided in
Taiwan would introduce another viewpoint of Taiwanese culture. I would suggest it can enhance mutual understanding between Taiwan and other countries, and have an impact beyond ‘let the world see Taiwan.’

In parallel to the issue of cultural identity in the domestic sphere, Taiwan faces another challenge: situating Taiwanese culture in a wider historical and geographical framework. From my fieldwork, I learnt that to ‘distinguish Taiwan’ either from China or neighbouring Asian countries was a serious concern, which was very visible when the New York Cultural Center promoted Taiwanese culture (see section 5.5). Often, when curating exhibitions in galleries or museums, professionals include Taiwan in an Asian context. However, to distinguish Taiwanese culture from that of other Asian countries is a challenge. The culture has been heavily defined by colonisation, so it is difficult to ignore the influence of China and Japan. If the government searches for a cultural product as a recognisable icon of Taiwanese culture and seeks to establish a new identity, a quick fix will not suffice. In the search for a ‘representative work’ to define the distinctive characteristics of Taiwanese culture, the government must avoid falling into the trap of subsidising established artists instead of new work and vice versa. The strategy should be more holistic and nurture both traditional and contemporary.

Furthermore, when seeking to find a ‘representative work’ or a ‘representative cultural element’ of Taiwan to showcase, the government needs to be aware that this is not a one-way process. The findings also raise the question of who has the power to choose what is ‘representative’ of a country, and according to what criteria the selection is made. From examining the strategy of hosting a showcase in the OFF d’Avignon since 2007, and the Edinburgh Fringe since 2014, it is questionable whether this fits the purpose of the festival. In 2015, at the festival OFF d’Avignon, Olivier Py, the director of the Festival d'Avignon was reported to have shared his observation with the then Minister of Culture Hung Meng-chi that the Taiwan showcase emphasised too much tradition and national identity, therefore blurring the artistic expression (Yang, 2015). In my view, the biggest challenge is showcasing the art itself without the burden of presenting ‘Taiwan.’ Despite several arts organisations acting as the cultural diplomats of Taiwan, this does not mean that the artists who receive subsidy for cultural relations must be flag-bearers. The works of those who have a strong artistic agenda may not sit well with the representation of the nation. Under such circumstances, the government needs to re-think its cultural diplomacy strategy and develop policies beyond national self-presentation.
In addition to projecting Taiwan’s national image, government supported participation in arts festivals also reflects shifts in international cultural policy and internal cultural policy. In 2002, the DPP government started to promote the cultural and creative industries, and it became an important part of domestic policy that was included in the 2004 White Paper for Culture. In the Ma administration (2008-2016), overseas cultural activities, such as exhibitions, do not merely serve the function of propaganda or supplement diplomatic occasions, but are also hosted with the expectation of access to foreign cultural markets. Compared with the overseas cultural activities that the CCA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) used to support, which emphasised mainly the performing and visual arts, cultural diplomacy and cultural export have extended to cultural products, such as popular music. I suggest that the Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries, passed in 2010, and the Global Outreach Action Plan in 2013, reinforced this change of strategy. The Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries allows the MOC to coordinate with its overseas offices to assist relevant enterprises in establishing an international brand image, attending well-known international exhibitions and performances, competitions, expositions and arts festivals. In other words, it enables cultural products to gain more exposure with the aim of expanding the related international markets and promoting sales. Business and market are thus included in the MOC’s cultural diplomacy strategy.

As far as developing creative industries is concerned, the broadening of overseas markets is essential and beneficial for the policy objectives of the MOC. In my opinion, the strategy is not entirely beneficial for the promotion of cultural products overseas. The government’s assistance has made it easier for cultural entrepreneurs, such as publishers, to participate in overseas business exhibitions and arts festivals (as illustrated in sections 5.5 and 6.5). To promote the sales of cultural products is the expected outcome of the government subsidy, and, ultimately, to assist entrepreneurs. However, my research findings indicate that most of the grants provided for accessing overseas markets were on an annual and project basis. Arguably, it requires a more long-term strategy for grant giving. I also found that a long-term study of how the image of Taiwan is perceived in foreign countries is absent. The lack of research and analysis makes it impossible to frame and adjust a strategy based on the reception of Taiwan and difficult to trace the impact of policy implementation.

Further to the lack of a long-term strategy, the use of quantifiable indicators in setting policy goals reveals a blind spot in Taiwan’s policy. As the findings presented in Chapter 5 show, the issues of quantifiable indicators can be found in some government projects, e.g. the
Gourmet Taiwan Action Plan accounted for the number of attendees in its activities. By setting a quantifiable index, it is easy to rely on numbers and measurable factors to determine whether the targets are achieved. However, it remains unclear whether the policy objectives can be achieved through such numbers. For example, it takes more than simply calculating the audience numbers to understand the demographic characteristics of the audience. It is a flawed way of determining whether a policy goal has been achieved, as this does not reflect the actual situation. The efforts are likely to be futile without knowing who the attendees are and their qualitative feedback. The research findings indicate that it is most likely beyond the capacity of cultural centres to carry out qualitative research with their current resources.

In terms of setting policy goals, the MOC is aware of the issue of quantitative indicators. In the evaluation of policy objectives, the Global Outreach Action Plan published in revealed that the evaluation methods of the MOC are almost all quantitative measures, such as the number of audience members, or the number of visitors to exhibitions and webpages. Moreover, the number of collaborative projects carried out by the Ministry and its sub-organisations is also an indicator of evaluation. These numbers, however, can only reflect a certain aspect of public engagement in the projects. In the interviews conducted with officials from the MOC, they admitted the absence of more detailed surveys or qualitative research to assess further the performance of these projects. This is partly due to the shortage of staff in overseas outposts. As for foreign collaborators, such as the Spotlight Taiwan partners in overseas universities, it is difficult to obtain follow-up surveys because of limited resources (Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). Possible performance indicators might include media exposure and publication as alternatives to assess foreign public relations. Being reviewed by major publications, especially prestigious newspapers such as The New York Times or The Times of London, is considered a success by the cultural centres. This finding also reflects the difficulties of the government to evaluate the long-term effects of its own cultural diplomacy projects.

However, much of the media exposure is often the result of public relations operations. The credibility of different media is taken into consideration when selecting media coverage in the research analysis. In terms of media types, the Taiwanese government especially values the opinion leaders or critics from reputable newspapers. Thus, the publicity generated from these cultural events may increase awareness of Taiwan. If the programme or artist could attract the attention of professional networks, especially curators and theatre producers, opportunities might also arise for the artists to be invited to tour or to perform in large festivals. In order to evaluate the policy action plan and reports, the number of
successful cases is considered an indicator of effective government implementation of policy. For instance, the New York Cultural Center has collaborated with the Joyce Theater to stage contemporary dance works from Taiwan. The performance of the box office in each production is also an indicator of the centre’s success. However, it remains debatable what it means for a cultural diplomacy project to be successful. To be defined as ‘successful,’ from my reading of the existing criteria, a project must be linked to a famous art institution, and all tickets must be sold and excellent reviews received from the critics. The standard may be too uniform for every project to achieve; nevertheless, it reveals another blind spot of policymaking – the interests of Taiwanese culture do not necessarily translate into tangible soft power outcomes, as Rawnsley (2014) argued. Although Rawnsley (ibid.) suggested that to understand the audience and to determine with whom one wishes to communicate is essential in such programmes. However, this is difficult to achieve due to practical constraints, such as limited manpower and budget. This might lead to a pessimistic outcome, as the government cannot better understand the audience of cultural diplomacy projects due to limited manpower and budget; thus, such resources cannot be invested properly. In the long-term, the government’s work might be in vain.

There is yet to be an integrated policy in different government departments that coordinates activities in Taiwan. Indeed, this lack of coordination was one of the weaknesses identified by the MOC in the Global Outreach Action Plan. During the CCA era, cultural affairs in cultural exchange was categorised as a sub-division of the department. This demonstrated the rationale of placing cultural diplomacy within the realm of cultural policy. The difficulties of inter-departmental convergence have been recognised, and a structure of advisory committees is considered an effective way of achieving a degree of integration between internal and external cultural policies, as Mitchell (1986) suggested. In practice, cultural diplomacy programmes are carried out under the administration or public funding of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture, and Science and Education. According to the multi-country study of cultural diplomacy conducted by Wyszomirski et al. (2003), it was common for a number of ministries, departments, subordinate agencies and third party agents (or non-governmental organisations) to be involved in terms of responsibilities and funding. This was similarly the case in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, as language and scholarly exchange programmes are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education (MOE), whilst the development of cultural products and promotion of arts is overseen by the MOC. It was also recognised in the Ditchley Foundation report of 2012 that getting other policies right is vital to enabling individuals and civil society to engage in cultural diplomacy (Holmes, 2012). A
point made in the report is that only governments could have the overall vision to unify policies, such as visa regimes, intellectual property rights, tax policies, insurance programmes, etc. This level of integration is yet to be seen in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. For example, as illustrated in section 6.4, current policies on tax exemption in Taiwan do not provide sufficient motivation for corporations.

Given the problems of coordinating strategies across different departments in Taipei, it is important to explore how this issue affects the delivery of cultural diplomacy in the host countries. Diplomatic work abroad is usually under the control of the Representative Offices, which are the main bodies to sign agreements and treaties with foreign countries. A cross-departmental body to coordinate the affairs of cultural diplomacy is a solution. Wyszomirski et al. (2003) noted that countries such as Sweden and Australia employ a variety of interdepartmental task forces or councils to coordinate international cultural relations within government. Although the Taiwan Academy was designed as a cross-departmental platform for coordination, it faces obstacles regarding cross-ministerial communication, limited budget and constraints in personnel recruitment (Ministry of Culture, 2013a). The issues that the Taiwan Academy faces reveal the weakness of Taiwan’s bureaucracy in promoting cultural diplomacy. First, an efficient mechanism for cross-departmental communication and coordination is absent. Secondly, issues with the recruitment of staff and budgeting are also drawbacks in its administration.

This is disappointing and represents a missed opportunity; the Taiwan Academy could have been a new institution to integrate different targets in cultural diplomacy. In addition, the Taiwan Academy has the potential to employ an interdepartmental task force. I argue that the overall operation plan for the Taiwan Academy should look beyond the setting up of a ‘salon,’ as former Minister Lung Ying-tai suggested, and be more ambitious. As illustrated above, the policy implementation of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy has constraints because of the inefficient cross-departmental design. The bureaucracy also limits the cultural centres from having more freedom in terms of personnel and budgeting management and allocation.

The design for a cross-departmental body for cultural diplomacy could be an ‘administrative corporation’ organisation, which already exists in Taiwan’s legislature. The ‘administrative corporation’ structure was first adopted by the NTCH (now part of the National Performing Arts Centre, NPAC). With this structure, the Taiwan Academy can fulfil the role of a cultural organisation that serves a public function but operates at arm’s-length. The design is in reference to the ‘arm’s-length principle’ that originated in the UK for organisations such as the Arts Council England. The British Council also traditionally has
this kind of relationship with the government. It is sponsored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office whilst operating with a semi-independent status (Pamment, 2013). Following the example of the British Council or the NPAC in Taiwan, the Taiwan Academy should be more efficient and flexible in funding and employment decisions. Without the restriction of engaging only civil servants or contract employees, as for example the MOC, the Academy can recruit candidates with a wider range of expertise. With more freedom hiring and recruitment, the Taiwan Academy can collaborate with local staff and broaden their knowledge in the host countries. Therefore, it can be beneficial for enhancing cultural relations in the host countries. Financially, the ‘administrative corporation’ status allows the Taiwan Academy to receive corporate sponsorship as in the case of the NPAC. In addition, the MOC could consider establishing an endowment dedicated to cultural exchange to sustain the operations of the Taiwan Academy, as proposed in the Ma administration. The government could provide the initial funding to set up the endowment, and decrease the amount of funds in subsequent instalments.

To achieve this potential under the current framework, I enquired about the possibility of establishing a new institution adopting the ‘arm’s-length principle’ when interviewing the MOC officials. One of my interviewees identified several restrictions that this proposal might face. First, it is not in the central government’s plan to have another administrative corporation institution (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). In addition, the auditing procedure was considered an issue. Due to the complexity of missions that the Taiwan Academy is expected to fulfil, there are strict fiscal regulations in its operation. As most of the funds are primarily for spending in foreign countries, the idea seemed less feasible under current government regulations. Nevertheless, since the Taiwan Academy is a government initiative in its infancy, it is worth pursuing the possibility of setting up new government regulations or modifying existing ones.

However, the issues of cost efficiency remain a concern for the government. Considering the impact of the structure of cultural centres and current government fiscal regulations, a drastic transformation to enhance cultural diplomacy is unlikely to happen. Any structural decisions will also depend on where the MOC and the MOFA place cultural diplomacy in the development of their strategies, or if a more integrated approach could be adopted. I argue that if cultural diplomacy remains largely the facilitator of conventional diplomacy and a means to generate connections with countries that Taiwan does not have official diplomatic relations with, the government is likely to retain its control over cultural
diplomacy rather than establishing an arm’s-length cultural institution to realise the function of cultural diplomacy.

Despite the bureaucratic restraints from the public sector, enthusiastic arts organisations and overseas Taiwanese have been motivated to participate in overseas cultural promotions. From artists participating in government-subsidised showcases to philanthropic donations, the interest of the private sector can be observed. However, there are also conditions that might prevent them actively joining the programmes. In terms of participating in an international tour, being invited by curators or self-registering in theatre festivals, this requires administrative skills in each arts organisation. In the case of Taiwanese artists, it would not be feasible for cultural centres to act as agents for individual artists, not to mention larger companies. The companies would require the development of more professional administration. Through participating in international activities and tours, the experience and expertise can be developed in each company. It is also a challenge for companies that are short on full-time administrative staff. In some cases, manpower can be hired on a project-basis, but not long-term. Flexibility is considered appropriate to enable organisations to adjust the personnel costs; however, the instability of staff numbers does not benefit the company to develop its administration. In the long term, it may not be the most efficient way for overall administration and development as some knowledge could not be passed on and updated regularly.

The research findings have highlighted that the shortage of experienced administrative staff has more impact when a company aims to broaden its international engagements. Often, the particular skills required for international exchange, such as language competence and familiarity of overseas markets, also correlate with a higher wage, which obviously puts additional pressure on budgets. Alternative solutions include the company opting to hire project executives only covering the touring period, but there remains administrative work to be done before and after the actual tour. The follow-up contacts build upon the tour and the reimbursement for the expenses also takes time to process. In the end, appointed office staff who are accustomed to these processes would be better for the administrators across companies to maintain the capacity for international engagements.

Among companies that wish to gain international experiences, sharing knowledge and experiences with other experienced companies could be helpful. The Cloud Gate Dance Theatre is arguably the busiest touring arts organisation in Taiwan, and shared its experiences of international tours in the MOC-organised conference in 2013. In addition to Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, four other ‘Taiwan Brand’ companies have also shared their experiences in
several cities in Taiwan. Besides the conferences, the NCAF also published articles discussing overseas networking and connections, and, in general, provide information for organisations wishing to step into foreign markets. Sharing knowledge between arts managers has become easier through social media and professional networks. The shared knowledge can help other companies to have a general idea of how to initiate an international tour, but this may not be possible because of the heavy workloads of companies.

Having identified some difficulties in building capacities for the arts organisations, in Chapter 5, I presented how the government policies and cultural centres could provide assistance to artists when touring in the host countries. The cultural centres desire invitations or other collaborations between Taiwanese and overseas arts organisations. Whilst the government aims to promote Taiwanese culture globally, enhancing the infrastructure of the domestic cultural environment can have a long-term effect that lasts longer than grant-giving. Although opportunities for international tours can open the door for Taiwanese arts organisations, it can also be a huge challenge for the company to conduct follow-up work by itself. From analysing the implementation of cultural diplomacy programmes, I argue that changes in cultural diplomacy strategy are not able on their own to overcome existing shortcomings regarding cultural policy. On the contrary, unresolved problems in cultural policy and development can affect the export of culture and arts. The government’s role should be more than as a grant provider and support the development of arts companies who wish to participate in international cultural exchange. For instance, establishing a knowledge base for international development for government officials, cultural professionals and artists can be a precious resource for those who wish to expand further their expertise. Instead of promoting Taiwanese culture on a project-basis, a thoroughly planned development strategy is essential for long-term external cultural relations.

In addition to administration capacity, financial risk is another main reason why artists are discouraged from engaging in international events. In cases of overseas invitations, where the host venue or festival can provide hospitality, it remains common for Taiwanese companies to seek additional financial support from the government, grant-providing foundations, or corporate sponsorship to cover the transportation cost. Public funding can be considered the most reliable source of income for arts organisations, as the MOC, following the example of the CCA, continues its grant-scheme. Nonetheless, it reveals an overlap of funding allocation. Although the NCAF was founded on similar principles to the National Endowment for the Arts in the United States, the MOC still directly distributes and allocates funding to the arts organisations. There are also a variety of project-based grants available.
Public funding provides a steady income for arts organisations and covers part of their operation cost. However, my research tracing the funding trends shows that it remains project-driven. The strategy on promoting cultural industries through policy initiatives remains heavily reliant on grants allocation. From the cases of promoting Taiwan’s independent music through participation in international festivals, it remains debatable whether the government should sponsor the activities regardless of the characteristics of the cultural product per se. It also raises the fundamental question of the government’s role in cultural products promotion; when different cultural genres require different professional knowledge in cultural promotion and exchange, it is impossible have a single working model.

The analysis of the current funding distribution strategy of the MOC suggests that among the arts organisations, the largest and the smallest companies have the most resources for international cultural exchange. For instance, the ‘Taiwan Brand’ grants scheme focuses on large-scale performing arts companies who have more productions and performances each year. They also enjoy the advantage of having more knowledge and experience of grant applications. With more administrative knowledge, it is easier for them to produce relevant documents that fulfil the institutional procedures. The small companies could also benefit from the showcases at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival or the OFF d’Avignon. Nonetheless, the medium-sized arts organisations, which are not large enough to be eligible for part of the ‘Taiwan Brand’ grant, nor small enough to present their works in showcases at fringe festivals, need to seek other forms of international engagements. To design a mechanism accessible for all arts organisations that wish to gain more international experience remains a challenge for governments to consider.

Moreover, timing is a problem when applying for government grants. The grants from the MOC are often announced and granted on an annual basis, and need to be used within the fiscal year under the scrutiny of the benefactor. With such short notice for funding application and processing, it is often difficult for arts organisations to have long-term planning and financial arrangements. It is particularly unrealistic for overseas tours as the required preparation time is often longer than one year. Restrictions on funding add to the difficulties of companies’ operating with long-term arrangements. It is possible that the companies learn that they have not been awarded public funding when the tour approaches and do not have time to find alternative financing. As a result, the company could face a deficit. Thus, there is a potential financial risk. In the long-term, it also reduces the appeal to engage in international cultural exchange. An interviewee (Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 September, 2013) observed that this undermines the artists’ enthusiasm
for international projects. Thus, an identifiable problem in the current government strategy is that despite the allocation of funding and encouragement from the MOC, the restrictions of such funding can act as a disincentive for artists.

Also, it is questionable whether artists can receive government funding whilst remaining independent. This is an important question rarely raised in Taiwan. Nonetheless, to provide funding to encourage cultural exchange activities can ease some financial pressure for arts companies to carry out projects. If the arts organisations can be financially independent, the cultural exchange projects can proceed with more freedom.

However, due to the high cost of travelling abroad and lack of large corporate sponsorship in cultural relations, it is inevitable that arts organisations will apply for government funding. Philanthropy from individuals in the fields of arts and culture in Taiwan is not as widely practised as in the United States or even the United Kingdom. There is a lack of motivation for private corporations to sponsor the arts in general, not to mention overseas cultural relations projects, which are not commonly referred to as branding opportunities. Taiwan’s industrial development has yet to develop an overseas brand management (see section 5.7). Furthermore, the ideas of corporate social responsibility and sponsorship have not been widely disseminated and practised in support of the arts by large corporations. Interestingly, contributions from passionate overseas Taiwanese and small donations can be found in occasional projects. Assistance from private individuals seeks to link Taiwanese arts with local cultural organisations in the host countries, such as the Queens Museum in New York. The engagement from overseas Taiwanese shows the energy of civil society and requires further long-term research to understand how this model can be sustained.

In terms of new methods of fundraising, crowd-funding campaigns have emerged in recent years among some arts organisations. For supporting companies’ overseas tours, the crowd-funding sponsors act more like donors. Unlike some crowd-funding projects that propose their ideas online and look for initial funds for their start-up companies by providing the products as rewards, the crowd-funding projects for touring abroad tend to provide company souvenirs and promotion materials in return. The actual final products – their performances – take place abroad and cannot necessarily be enjoyed by the sponsors. This kind of crowd-funding campaign can be categorised as donation/reward. It is because people believe in the cause that they invest and rewards can be offered such as acknowledgements and free gifts. Except for the possible intangible return of ‘feeling good’ about helping, donors have a social or personal motivation and expect nothing in return (UK Crowdfunding, 2015). Evidently, the ‘make Taiwan visible’ factor works in such campaigns, as it is easy to
instill a sense of identity to motivate donors to contribute to the cause. Crowd-funding creates a sense of community and vice versa. Its success shows the enthusiasm and support that individuals can provide in cultural relations. For the companies, it is also a great way to publicise their works to a domestic audience in Taiwan.

With the rise of social media, crowd-funding campaigns that mainly operate on the Internet could further increase awareness of the company. The power of social media in politics has been recognised by Shirky (2011, p. 29), who remarked that ‘the networked population is gaining greater access to information’ and ‘an enhanced ability to undertake collective action.’ The collective action that brings the general public together is visible also in these crowdfunding projects. Examples include Jade and Artists Dance Troupe’s and Tjimur Dance Theatre’s crowdfunding campaigns to attend the Edinburgh Fringe Festival in 2014. The crowd-funding platforms allow these companies to roll out their fundraising project in a very short time and the process is easy to monitor. Combined with social media, word can be spread quickly, an advantage when there is a limited budget for advertising. However, as the companies only receive the funds when they reach the fundraising target within the set schedule, there are also risks in raising funds through these platforms.

The analysis of the deficiencies in policymaking illustrated the administrative difficulties of the government, which prevent a more efficient strategy-making and policy implementation. I also discussed the financial challenges that discourage artists and cultural professionals from engaging in cultural diplomacy projects. The lack of continuous financial support can be an obstacle for the organisations wanting to maintain stable numbers of administrative staff for overseas tours. From the perspective of policymaking, this problem is difficult to solve by providing more funding. In the next section, I conclude and present my contribution to knowledge in this field of research.

7.2 Conclusions
In this thesis, I examined the formation and the implementation of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy strategy from the perspective of cultural policy. The main research question was whether Taiwan’s (the Republic of China) cultural diplomacy and cultural policy operate to fulfil the political objective of making the country internationally visible through policy implementation. Additional research questions concerned the policy practice in terms of several interrelated aspects. First, I analysed the importance of cultural diplomacy in Taiwan’s foreign affairs. Secondly, I traced how cultural diplomacy has been incorporated in Taiwan’s cultural policy. Thirdly, I investigated the crucial challenges faced by the
government when practising cultural diplomacy and the potential solutions. I also examined how private sector actors participate in the process and the difficulties they face. Finally, I questioned whether the strategy in place fulfils the policy goal.

With the limited formal diplomacy available to Taiwan, it is questionable whether cultural diplomacy could help promote the country internationally by resorting to the use of soft power assets. From the empirical evidence collected in this research, I analysed several main challenges for Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, including the long-term isolation in international affairs, the bureaucracy of the government structures, and existing issues in national and cultural identity. The research identified three main conclusions regarding Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy: cultural diplomacy complements traditional diplomacy, showcases cultural and creative industries and acts as an outlet in the cultural identity formation process. Each element is prioritised at different phases of policy development and practice, though they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

In all three aspects mentioned above, the ‘China factor’ has played a significant role in strategy-making and political discourse. The complicated political relations between the two countries influence heavily Taiwan’s cultural politics. Using Shelley Rigger’s (2011) term, both the ‘China inside’ and ‘the China outside’ have deeply influenced the cultural diplomacy strategy. First, in the external official diplomatic environment, the establishment of Confucius Institutes by China has been for the Taiwanese government an important element to consider and respond to. It was a significant challenge in the Ma administration to differentiate and promote the so-called ‘Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics.’ Secondly, as cultural diplomacy serves as an outlet to promote cultural identity, the existing issues of shared cultural heritage and language inevitably influence the strategy. That is to say, the anxiety to differentiate Taiwan from China is evident in policymaking. Thirdly, the similarities of language and demographics make China a potentially large market for Taiwan’s cultural exports.

Despite the unresolved political problems, the cultural exchange between both sides of the Taiwan Strait recently reached a high point with the arrival of Chinese tourists and students in 2008. However, the political stalemate remains an obstacle that prevents further advancement in bilateral cultural relations. Both Taiwanese and Chinese governments refuse to recognise each other’s legal status, which makes negotiation and agreement on legal affairs for cultural exchange extremely difficult. In addition to the political recognition problems, censorship in China has become a major concern for promoting Taiwanese cultural products there. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to project Taiwan’s soft power, its democracy
and freedom of speech in China. In parallel, although universities in Taiwan have opened their doors to Chinese students, the restrictions placed on their healthcare and job prospects potentially undermine the effort to attract them to Taiwan and to appreciate its culture. At the same time, there are concerns over self-censorship when Taiwanese cultural professionals produce works targeting the Chinese market. Cases of omitting political and sexual materials in the cultural products have emerged in recent years (as I have argued in section 4.5). Whilst there are no clear rules on overcoming China’s censorship system and the two governments cannot negotiate on equal terms, the Chinese market remains attractive if uncertain for Taiwan’s cultural professionals. The political issues will still have impact on the cultural relations between Taiwan and China.

The contested political status of Taiwan and its complicated relation with China make the country a unique case to examine in terms of cultural diplomacy and foreign affairs. However, Taiwan is not alone in wishing to exercise its soft power through cultural diplomacy. In practice, the changes in Taiwan’s bureaucracy have influenced the strategy-making of cultural diplomacy. Although cultural diplomacy can serve to complement conventional diplomacy, interestingly, the government department responsible in Taiwan operates mainly in the realm of cultural policy and less so foreign affairs. The research identified that, in terms of cultural diplomacy, performing arts and visual arts were the main cultural activities programmed by the CCA (the MOC after 2012) and presented in the overseas cultural centres. The programmes have extended to other cultural products, such as films and popular music. The MOC in Taiwan is the main government department that drafts and frames the overall cultural diplomacy strategy, and its reshuffling and re-organisation in 2012 has had an influence on the strategy-making and implementation. The MOC faces challenges from the integration of staff previously working in different departments and rapid expansion of numbers of outposts. This organisational change also reflects on the cultural diplomacy programmes. With staff from the GIO, the Ministry was still in the process of integration and adaptation at the time of writing. Whilst its work focuses mainly on propaganda and media relations, the former GIO staff require professional skills training and overall strategy planning to familiarise themselves with the new roles. For cultural attachés from the former GIO, knowledge of arts administration is crucial to engage with arts activities overseas.

If we consider that one of the objectives of cultural diplomacy is to present a national image, the research showed that the target audiences of the Taiwanese government are generally not countries with which it has diplomatic relations. Concerning diplomatic allies,
public diplomacy and foreign aid were the main missions carried out. On the contrary, countries and cities with frequent cultural activities and which do not have diplomatic relations are prioritised for Taiwan to establish a cultural presence. This reflects the differentiation in diplomacy strategy. It also raises a question about the popular slogan ‘let the world see Taiwan.’ Which part does Taiwan want to be visible to the rest of the world, and why? The Taiwanese government’s geographical priorities combine diplomatic consideration (e.g. the United States as a priority of foreign affairs), enrichment of existing personal connections with cultural ministers (France) and the organisational change of cultural affairs authorities. In addition, several of the MOC outposts are established in capitals or large cities, where rich cultural activities take place and can provide more opportunities to engage in diplomatic circles. Furthermore, international cultural festivals (e.g. the Edinburgh Fringe Festivals and the festival OFF d’Avignon), fairs (e.g. the Frankfurt Book Fair) and international arts exhibitions (e.g. the Venice Biennial) are cultural activities that the Taiwanese government actively engages in to make Taiwanese culture visible. These cultural activities allow Taiwanese artists to present their works to a global audience and gain recognition from cultural professionals, such as curators, critics and the media. Through these cultural professionals, the Taiwanese artists can benefit from the global and local networks and become more visible. Nonetheless, when reviewing the government’s cultural diplomacy strategy, it is evident that the changes in the population are not being taken into account in policy developments regarding cultural diplomacy. This research revealed that, in spite of a considerable number of immigrant workers and marital immigrants from Southeast Asia, the Taiwanese government did not engage with their home countries in cultural relations until very recently.

Another explanation of the elite-orientation of Taiwan’s cultural strategy is its role as a facilitator in diplomatic relations. As illustrated in Chapter 5, since Mei Lan-fang’s Peking Opera toured the United States in the 1930s, cultural activities have played a role in the Republic of China’s foreign affairs. These supplements of conventional diplomacy remain, especially considering that Taiwan neither has official diplomatic relations with most countries in the world, nor membership in international organisations. Cultural activities provide an opportunity for establishing connections with diplomatic circles, politicians and opinion leaders. Such a tendency can be found in the First Lady’s honorary presidency of arts organisations’ overseas tours. The cultural centres can take advantage of such opportunities to host receptions with cultural activities to connect with politicians. This helps maintain relationships, as the politicians do not necessarily set foot in Taiwan’s representative offices.
However, I argue that if Taiwan seeks more influence in terms of projecting its soft power, the challenge for the government is to broaden its audience to include the general public. In this respect, despite government initiatives, such as the Spotlight Taiwan programme, the target group remains the universities. In practice, most people who are attracted to these initiatives are already familiar with Taiwan. Although there have been advertisements for branding Taiwan, these publicity materials are mainly one-way communications and it is difficult to evaluate their effect. The empirical evidence collected in this research indicates that though cultural centres and theatre companies have sought audience feedback, it is either small-scale data collection (e.g. guestbooks) or not achievable due to limited staff numbers. In other words, a large-scale and continuous understanding of the audience is yet to be achieved. I argue that this constrains the government’s evaluation of its programming and the development of a long-term strategy.

In terms of cultural diplomacy as a showcase of cultural and creative industries, Taiwan’s strategy has incorporated place branding. The promotion of Taiwan through film, publication and tourism is evident. The trend of incorporating cultural industries into cultural diplomacy as part of the promotion was connected to government polices on developing the creative and cultural industries. Among all the cultural activities involved in cultural diplomacy, the performing arts have had a long history, although different forms of government sponsorship reflect changes in domestic cultural policy. Subsidising the production of cultural industries has become a major government policy to encourage Taiwan’s cultural and creative industries. With the aim of promoting Taiwan’s film industry, the MOC subsidises film productions in Taiwan, and city municipalities also allocate resources to assist film shooting and post production. In addition to promoting tourism, the expected returns of these promotional programmes include publicity and job opportunities that might emerge during the production period. However, the difficulties that prevent products from being sold overseas do not always concern funding. Take China as an example, legislation, treaties, and agreements between governments are essential for facilitating exports. This requires more inter-governmental negotiation beyond grant-giving strategies to gain long-term benefit for the cultural industries.

The promotion of art and cultural products overseas is an extension of domestic cultural policy. The former cannot succeed if the latter fails to address existing problems in policy practice. The close relationships between the Taiwanese government and artists are especially evident in showcases. Financial and administrative challenges exist in both the public sector and cultural organisations. Issues such as a lack of human resources, lack of
professional training and restrictions on budgets and subsidies are considered potential factors preventing cultural professionals from engaging in international cultural exchange. Furthermore, the shortage of foreign language staff in the public sector is a disadvantage for cultural promotion. To realise cultural diplomacy in Taiwan, certain hurdles must be overcome including a bureaucratic system with budget and recruitment limitations. This not only constrains the operation of the MOC and cultural centres, but also has an impact on the arts organisations receiving public funding.

In its strategy for cultural exports, the government’s principal role is being a grant provider. Concerning further formalising of long-term relationships, signed treaties and agreements in bi-lateral or multi-lateral cultural relations are beneficial, but less part of the government’s agenda. I argue that it demonstrates the difficulties the Taiwanese government is facing in formalising cultural affairs agreements with other countries and international organisations. The role of the government in cultural diplomacy should be in developing and strengthening legislation regarding cultural export and relations. However, this is not a priority of the Taiwanese government, partly due to the ambiguous political status of Taiwan. Also, this obstacle to cultural diplomacy affects the planning needed for the development of activities in the overseas cultural centres. Most work plans proposed each year are project-based collaborations with local cultural organisations. Long-term and integrated collaborations are unlikely. Such deficiencies are obstacles to the establishment of a continuous cultural presence overseas.

Although showcasing Taiwan’s cultural and creative industries enables Taiwanese professionals to gain more international experience, I suggest that the government is gradually developing the role of a market-orientated ‘cultural-agency.’ When subsidising arts companies to attend festivals, receiving subsequent invitations and touring opportunities are the key performance indicators for both the government and theatre companies. Other indicators include media exposure and reviews by established art critics. These raise awareness of Taiwan, but do not necessarily reflect the reality. As regards communication with other cultures, this occurs in multiple forms of cross-cultural activities. For artists and companies, the experience can be beneficial, but it does not necessarily guarantee financial success. It is debatable whether the government and the artists should be more market-orientated when developing a cultural diplomacy strategy. Although it can be part of cultural diplomacy to provide assistance in exporting cultural products, the government needs to reconsider its role and resource allocation. If the Taiwanese government cannot fulfil its
mission of governance and legislation, the financial and administrative support of cultural exports may be ultimately ineffective.

Regarding cultural diplomacy as an outlet in the process of cultural identity formation, this dissertation concludes that the arts demonstrate different phases of cultural identity in Taiwan. The image of ‘guardian of traditional Chinese culture’, which used to be presented during the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (see section 4.2) was challenged with the rise of Taiwanese cultural awareness in domestic politics. It is difficult to have a ‘settled’ Taiwanese cultural identity bearing in mind the complicated historical relations with China and Japan, and especially considering that the formation of identity operates in the long term and is ultimately not a fixed category. Cultural identity is in the making, and Taiwan gradually frames itself through gaining recognition in cultural relations.

In discussion of the interaction between ‘self’ and ‘others’ in the process of cultural diplomacy, the research reveals that the slogan ‘let the world see Taiwan’ has, perhaps not coincidentally, appeared in both government official documents and arts organisations’ fundraising campaigns. The desire to be visible, as I suggest, was the result of the long-isolated international status of the Republic of China/Taiwan. The cultural products being exported overseas also reflect shifts in Taiwan’s cultural identity. As the mainstream culture of the majority Han Chinese in Taiwan is very similar to that in China, to distinguish Taiwan from China as an independent collection of cultures is an essential process of nationalism. The emphasis on presenting indigenous culture overseas is indicative of the shift in culture representation and interpretation. Nonetheless, without thorough understanding, cultural appropriation may occur if the indigenous culture is not properly presented and the differences between tribes in Taiwan are ignored. This can be seen in the controversy over misinterpretation of the indigenous people’s clothing at the International Youth Ambassadors Exchange Programme in 2013. This case also reveals the issues of domestic cultural policy that do not enhance understanding of indigenous communities.

Furthermore, when using the ‘let the world see Taiwan’ as a slogan in fund-raising appeals, it is intriguing to see the artists or companies place the home country before themselves. The process of ‘to be seen’ and ‘seeing that happens’ has become an important element of community, gaining support, and further contributing to identity construction. From the research findings, it is evident that the encouragement of private actors to engage in public and cultural diplomacy is deeply rooted in government programmes such as the Chinese Goodwill Mission and the Youth Ambassadors. The motivation for supporting Taiwanese cultural promotion overseas is also found in overseas Taiwanese sponsorship (see
section 6.6). The enthusiasm of the Taiwanese American Arts Council in New York was notable in its sponsorship of Taiwanese artists.

The enthusiasm from the private sector to promote Taiwanese culture is illustrative of the need for recognition and cultural identity. The urge to seek and re-think the cultural identity formation can also be found in the cases of cultural relations that raised controversies. The controversies surrounded the entitlement to present Taiwanese culture, and are an opportunity to revisit some fundamental questions. What exactly does ‘Taiwanese culture’ mean? Can it be defined as ‘Made by Taiwanese’ or ‘Made in Taiwan’? This idea is challenged when cultural collaboration and exchange is practised between artists from different cultures or residents in different countries. The anxiety of cultural appropriation – in which Taiwanese culture is not presented properly – can be seen in two foreign artists’ cultural collaboration projects (see section 5.7). These cases concerned the issue of entitlement to interpret and represent Taiwanese culture and further allocate resources.

Demonstrating pride in one’s culture and recognition by others are important elements of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and nation-branding initiatives. Nonetheless, it should be noted that cultural diplomacy and cultural relations are not restricted to ‘self-presentation.’ However, mutual understanding as a goal of cultural relations is not widely found in policy documents in Taiwan, nor raising awareness of shared causes, such as climate change or humanitarian issues. Appreciating Taiwanese culture is part of the process of mutual understanding, and the objective beyond that is rather vague. Government goals are to gain a presence in foreign media or the cultural sphere and to promote further Taiwanese culture. In other words, the cultural communication with others is rather a one-way process without achieving mutuality in the long-term. In general, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy focuses on self-presentation instead of seeking mutuality, thus weakening the outcome of communication. If the issues of cultural identity remain unsettled, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy strategy will still prioritise the representation of Taiwanese culture instead of mutual understanding.

Regarding misunderstanding in culture or cultural appropriation, I consider the role of ‘cultural translator,’ which was suggested in the MOC Global Outreach Action Plan, should be evident at an institutional level. Under the current structure, this can be within the cultural centres and the MOC. The MOC can further re-design the training course for cultural attachés. If the collaboration between MOC and other academic institutions achieves understanding in cultural diplomacy, its knowledge base could be of benefit. Therefore, the importance of
providing appropriate training for the cultural attachés should be officially recognised as a necessary prerequisite.

A crucial objective of this study was to understand whether cultural diplomacy could compensate for the disadvantages of Taiwan’s conventional diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is a means to exercise soft power and further establish relationships. Simply carrying out cultural activities would not meet the objectives *per se*. Nor can cultural diplomacy be considered a simple solution to Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. Moreover, I argue that the weaknesses of conventional diplomacy already had an impact on the strategy-making of cultural diplomacy. Due to the ambiguous political status, the Taiwanese government continues to find it difficult to negotiate and formalise cultural relations into treaties and agreements. Also, Taiwan is prevented from joining international cultural organisations, such as UNESCO. Despite the participation of public cultural institutions in professional networks, the impact is comparatively limited.

An additional finding related to policy implementation aiming to justify public spending. The policy objectives are often evaluated using quantifiable indicators. Whether these outcomes reflect the policy goals is difficult to determine, especially when the indicators focus on numbers of attendees or events. The projection of soft power is not necessarily evidenced in the current market-driven policy orientation and the quantification of policy outcomes that does not truly identify change.

The existing policy implementation has encouraged the general public to participate in cultural relations. The research also explained why corporations are less motivated to participate in cultural diplomacy. In terms of place-branding and the promoting of Taiwanese products, there is clearly a gap between what the policy is intended to achieve and the reality in Taiwan. Despite the enthusiasm among the general public, the concern is that this will not be sustainable in the long-term.

In this study, alternative models were proposed to solve the bureaucratic difficulties in the practice of cultural diplomacy. One possibility is the adoption of the existing ‘administrative corporation’ model developed by the National Performing Arts Centre, and the UK’s arm’s-length principle. If the MOC can incorporate the cultural centres and the Taiwan Academy into an arm’s-length system, it might fulfil its function with financial and administrative flexibility. However, the proposal may not be feasible under the current system. Without drastic change in the organisations, it is likely that future policy implementation will still be restricted.
7.3 Research contribution and issues for future research

The research focused on a single case study of a country with limited hard power and its efforts to obtain soft power by means of cultural diplomacy. The research provides empirical evidence on how cultural resources can be used to establish relationships based on soft power without possessing much hard power assets. In the case of Taiwan, the use of soft power assets is limited by deficiencies of hard power. The theoretical background examining the concept of soft power provided the context to understand the relevant areas of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. First, the term ‘soft power’ is contentious and can be interpreted as having multiple meanings, especially when defining culture as one of the soft power resources of a country. The complexity of understanding ‘culture’ leaves room for interpretation when the government attempts to incorporate cultural diplomacy as part of the strategies to project soft power. Therefore, soft power has several operational definitions in policy implementation.

The development of soft power promotion in Taiwan is similar to that of other countries in East Asia. As Melissen (2011) suggested, the issues related to soft power are closely linked to domestically-contested self-perceptions or government-initiated constructs of national identity. Despite the inconsistent interpretation of soft power, the concept has been widely used among policymakers. Identifying and promoting soft power can be considered part of national identity construction, but it cannot solve the long-existing problem of Taiwan’s sovereign status. President Ma Ying-jeou wished to include cultural diplomacy as part of his ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ strategy and to promote Taiwan’s soft power overseas. Although culture is one of the resources of a country’s soft power, it can hardly exist on its own without powerful foreign policies and clear political values. The cross-influence among the three sources needs to be addressed to foster the desired cultural diplomacy. However, instant changes in Taiwan’s sovereign status are unlikely in the near future. The ambiguity in Taiwan’s international status could remain, and, therefore, limit the impact that cultural diplomacy can create.

While Taiwan is not admitted to decision-making international organisations, such as the United Nations, the use of cultural activities is considered an alternative way to create an international presence. However, whether the presence could turn into further resources remains uncertain. On the one hand, there is no research or surveys to trace the perceived image of Taiwan; on the other hand, the set programme goals mostly concentrate on quantifiable indicators that do not really evaluate change. Whether other sets of indicators could reveal a larger and more complex picture of Taiwan’s international presence remains
unknown, and could be explored in further studies. However, if the policymakers fail to realise that it depends on the receiver rather than the sender to control the perception of a country, policies aiming to boost and promote soft power can be ineffective. Also, it is unrealistic to evaluate the changes of a country’s soft power based on individual short-term cases, as the impact only emerges in the long run and is affected by a broad range of variables. Thus, although promoting Taiwan’s soft power has appeared in many relevant policy documents, it requires long-term observation and research to verify whether the policies have achieved the goal.

Ultimately, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy strategy needs to be modified. As demonstrated in the research findings, the current strategy focuses more on the sender’s side, and the evidence is lacking on how existing practice has been perceived. Currently, the government has little or no knowledge about how its use of soft power resources is being perceived or how the activities are affecting the perceptions of its foreign (and internal) audiences. Government thus lacks information to be able to plan, develop and implement an appropriate strategy. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that appreciation of culture will be translated into actions in favour of Taiwan.

In the case of Taiwan, the government aims to promote culture as part of soft power despite the deficiency in its conventional diplomacy. This study concludes that the existing practice of cultural diplomacy does not serve as an appropriate channel for soft power assets to have influence in other countries. It would be unrealistic to promote its soft power without considering the shortcomings in hard power and foreign affairs, which resulted in disadvantages for Taiwan in the first place. Furthermore, external cultural policy is an extension of internal cultural policy. The existing issues in the domestic cultural politics also impact on the cultural diplomacy and vice versa. The three elements of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy – as a complement to traditional diplomacy, the outlet in the process of cultural identity formation, and the showcase of cultural and creative industries – can interact with each other if the strategy is designed carefully. However, more needs to be done if government envisages developing cultural diplomacy from a one-way to two-way strategy. To accentuate mutual understanding, as I would recommend, is the way forward.

My research also fills the knowledge gap in the existing literature on cultural diplomacy from the perspectives of arts administration and cultural policy implementation. As Nisbett (2015) stated, what cultural diplomacy means for arts organisations, managers, artists and audiences has not been widely studied. This research provides a detailed account on the artists’ engagement in cultural diplomacy. I found evidence that the arts organisations
and individual actors are highly motivated to participate in international cultural exchange. Interestingly, some of the artists proclaimed themselves cultural diplomats, whilst some considered exposure as a by-product. In the area of cultural policy studies, this research contributes a detailed case study of policy implementation in and reception of a country that is under researched.

I discussed the formation of cultural diplomacy strategy from the perspective of policy implementation. I examined the reasons of policy formation and actual practice considering the historical and political background. Some follow-up research can be developed in cultural diplomacy projects. Initially, I had the intention of collecting data from the audiences of cultural diplomacy activities. However, this idea was soon abandoned due to time and resource constraints. It remains an unsolved problem for policy evaluation and for understanding how Taiwan’s national image is received after government initiatives. The analysis of public opinion is a major area for research relating to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.

The development of this research project also coincided with particular changes that caused important adjustments. One was the upgrade of the MOC and the other the expansion of Taiwan’s overseas cultural centres in 2012. The preparatory period of opening new cultural centres was longer than expected. Despite the initial disappointment, the situation provided an opportunity to see the practical challenges of government administration. The subsequent work on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, and the operation in the new cultural centres can be topics for future research.

I uncovered several interesting cases of private actors who spontaneously participated in cultural relations. In addition, several artists provided interesting accounts regarding the process of engagement in cross-cultural production supported by cultural diplomacy incentives. Their motivations and the actual process of cultural exchange are worth further exploration. The mutuality generated through cultural relations and how understanding and trust are enhanced are also important topics for future research.

Furthermore, social media has drastically changed the way information is spread and opinions are expressed. At the early stage of this research, I considered analysing data from social media to understand the communication of Taiwan’s cultural image. The plan was later sidelined as it required substantially more resources to collect and process the data than what was evaluated as realistic within the required timeframe of this PhD research. Nevertheless, in the process of research, I discovered that social media was not the main channel that the MOC or the cultural centres chose to communicate with the public. It may have been
considered informal and only used by the younger generation. However, the situation started to change after the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and the local election in 2014, when the government began to recognise the importance of communicating with social media users. The effects of the change may take some time to become visible, and I hope there will be opportunities to conduct further research on social media, public opinion, and cultural diplomacy in the context of Taiwan.

(88,276 words)
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Appendix-1

List of interviews

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tchen Yu-chiou</td>
<td>Former Chairperson of the Council for Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>28 May, 2013</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Derjk Wu</td>
<td>Personal Assistant to the Chief Executive Officer of Quanta Arts Foundation</td>
<td>31 May, 2013</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chen Chih-Cheng</td>
<td>Director of Taiwan’s Paris Cultural Centre</td>
<td>29 November, 2013</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Susan Yu</td>
<td>Director of Taiwan’s New York Cultural Center</td>
<td>12 December, 2013</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ping Heng</td>
<td>Artistic Director of National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (National Theatre and Concert Hall)</td>
<td>17 June, 2013</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Baboo Liao Jiun-Cheng</td>
<td>Theatre director in Shakespeare's Wild Sisters Group</td>
<td>03 July 2014</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cecily D. Cook</td>
<td>Senior Programme Officer in Asian Cultural Council New York</td>
<td>16 December, 2013</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Anonymous#1</td>
<td>Official in Ministry of Culture</td>
<td>02 July, 2014</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 July, 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Anonymous#2</td>
<td>Cultural Attaché of Taiwan</td>
<td>17 December, 2013</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Anonymous#3</td>
<td>Cultural Attaché of Taiwan</td>
<td>13 December, 2013</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Anonymous#4</td>
<td>Artist in a Taiwanese arts company</td>
<td>14 June, 2013</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Anonymous#5</td>
<td>Arts Administrator in a Taiwanese theatre company</td>
<td>28 September, 2013</td>
<td>Over Skype</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Appendix-2

Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan (1992/06–2016/06)