Collective Narcissism: Political Consequences of Investing Self-Worth in the Ingroup’s Image

Agnieszka Golec de Zavala
Goldsmiths, University of London
University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poznań, Poland
ISCTE-IUL, CIS-IUL, Lisbon University Institute

Karolina Dyduch-Hazar
University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, Poland

Dorottya Lantos
Goldsmiths, University of London

This article proposes a new theoretical framework for the reviewed state-of-the-art research on collective narcissism—the belief that the ingroup’s exceptionality is not sufficiently appreciated by others. Collective narcissism is motivated by the investment of an undermined sense of self-esteem into the belief in the ingroup’s entitlement to privilege. Collective narcissism lies in the heart of populist rhetoric. The belief in ingroup’s exceptionality compensates the undermined sense of self-worth, leaving collective narcissists hypervigilant to signs of threat to the ingroup’s position. People endorsing the collective narcissistic belief are prone to biased perceptions of intergroup situations and to conspiratorial thinking. They retaliate to imagined provocations against the ingroup but sometimes overlook real threats. They are prejudiced and hostile. Deficits in emotional regulation, hostile attribution bias, and vindictiveness lie behind the robust link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility. Interventions that support the regulation of negative emotions, such as experiencing self-transcendent emotions, decrease the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility and offer further insights into the nature of collective narcissism.

KEY WORDS: aggression, collective narcissism, emotional regulation, intergroup hostility, populism, self-esteem

Collective narcissism is a belief that one’s own group (the ingroup) is exceptional and entitled to privileged treatment but it is not sufficiently recognized by others. Thus, central to collective narcissism is resentment that the ingroup’s exceptionality is not sufficiently externally appreciated (Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). Any reason can be used to claim that the ingroup is exceptional: incomparable morality, cultural sophistication, competence, economic or military might, protection of democratic values, God’s love, even exceptional suffering and martyrdom (Skarżyńska, Przybyła, & Wójcik, 2012) or the ingroup’s benevolence, tolerance, or trustworthiness (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2019). The reason depends on the ingroup’s
current normative narration about the dimension of its positive distinctiveness from relevant outgroups. Whatever the reason for the claim of the ingroup’s privileged status, collective narcissist belief expresses the desire for the ingroup to be highly positively distinguishable from other groups and the concern that the fulfillment of this desire is threatened.

The concept of collective narcissism extends to the social level of self; the concept of individual narcissism understood as a desire for continual external validation of an inflated self-view (Crocker & Park, 2004; Emmons, 1987; Horney, 1937; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995; Rhodewalt & Sorrow, 2003). The concept of collective narcissism is inspired by the literature indicating that the beliefs people hold about themselves (e.g., such as a belief about their self-worth, that is, self-esteem, Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; self-discrepancy, Bizman & Yinon, 2004; Bizman, Yinon, & Krotman, 2001; or self-serving bias, Hornsey, 2003; Putnam, Ross, Soter, & Roediger, 2018; Zaromb, Liu, Hanke, Putnam, Roediger III, & Páez, 2018) have their parallels on the social level of self. As much as people can demand special recognition and privilege for themselves (as individual narcissists do), they can claim the same for the groups they belong to (as collective narcissists do). This does not mean that individual narcissists necessarily exaggerate their ingroup’s importance. In fact, evidence suggests this is not a very common case (see Tables 4 and 5 later in the article). However, the intergroup consequences of collective narcissism often parallel the interpersonal consequences of individual narcissism: hostility, exaggerated reactions to negative feedback and criticism, or lack of empathy. Understanding collective narcissism as a belief about the ingroup’s position, separate from individual narcissism, is important and necessary for the informed study of the antecedents and consequences of collective narcissism.

The need to understand the dynamics and social consequences of collective narcissism has been recently highlighted by the implication of collective narcissism in the growing popularity of populist (e.g., support for Donald Trump), isolationist (e.g., support for Brexit in the United Kingdom, the rise to power of Euro-sceptic parties in Poland and Hungary), and neo-fascist political movements (e.g., support for the ONR, the National Radical Camp, in Poland; Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, 2017; Lantos, 2019; Marchlewiska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, & Batayneh, 2018). The voting decisions that recently reshaped political landscapes have legitimized collective narcissism as a valid belief about the national ingroup. This is worrisome as in the past, legitimation of collective narcissism inspired not only populism and xenophobia but also atrocities committed in the name of one group against others. For example, Germans under the Nazi regime believed the superiority of their ingroup and its entitlement to a better living space was not properly appreciated by others. Islamist terrorists believed they fought a defensive Jihad against those who did not recognize the superiority of the values and lifestyle promoted by their righteous group (The Guardian, 2002, November 24).

This article reviews the scientific literature on collective narcissism, in support of future research necessary for curbing its destructive societal consequences. First, we differentiate collective narcissism from other variables pertaining to beliefs and attitudes individuals hold towards their ingroups. Next, we discuss collective narcissism as a variable relevant to the psychological study of political behavior. We consider collective narcissism as a factor contributing to the escalation of intergroup conflicts, an independent and unique predictor of retaliatory aggression and prejudice, as well as a core belief driving divisive political choices undermining democratic political systems. Collective narcissism is then related to biased perception of intergroup reality, in which events are selectively seen and remembered in the service of the ingroup’s image, and victimized outgroups are held responsible for the ingroup’s aggression against them. We propose a new interpretative framework that binds together the reviewed findings and helps explain the psychological mechanism driving the pervasive association between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility. Within this framework, we shed a new light on the elusive link between low self-esteem and outgroup derogation expected by the second corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis derived from social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998), writings of the Frankfurt School scholars...
Collective Narcissism (Adorno, 1997; Fromm, 1973) and the status politics theorists (Gusfield, 1963; Hofstadter, 1965; Lipset & Raab, 1973). In addition, we provide predictions regarding interventions that can reduce the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility.

Collective Narcissism: The Origins of the Concept

We propose that consequences of holding narcissistic beliefs about the ingroup may parallel, in the intergroup domain, the interpersonal consequences of holding narcissistic beliefs about the self (Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). The proposition that narcissism may extend to a group level has been previously articulated in several ways. It has been argued that whole societies can become narcissistic because of the relentless spread of narcissistic characteristics and behaviors among individuals (Campbell, Miller, & Buffardi, 2010; Twenge & Campbell, 2009). It has also been proposed that groups can have narcissistic characteristics (e.g., grandiose self-image) and act in narcissistic ways (e.g., aggress against subjectively threatening others; Adorno, 1997; Baumeister, 2002). Finally, it has been argued that narcissism can be expressed at a group level as a specific form of outgroup derogation such as racism, sexism, or nationalism (Emmons, 1987). We examine the consequences of individuals holding narcissistic beliefs about their groups, rather than groups having narcissistic features or individual narcissistic functioning as group members.

Although narcissism as a theoretical construct has its roots in psychoanalysis, the concept of collective narcissism is not derived from the psychoanalytical tradition (cf. Cichocka, 2016). Historically, the term “collective narcissism” was first used, to the best of our knowledge, by the scholars associated with the Frankfurt School, inspired by psychoanalysis, notably Theodor Adorno and Erich Fromm. However, the present account reinterprets collective narcissism and divorces it from psychoanalysis. It does not make assumptions about unconscious roots of collective narcissism, consider it a disorder, or understand collective narcissism as a personality feature. Instead, we consider collective narcissism as a belief that individuals hold about their ingroup with relative stability. Collective narcissism is analogous to collective self-esteem—defined as a set of beliefs individuals have about the ingroup's positive value and importance to the self (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). If people can be characterized by different levels of collective self-esteem, they also can be characterized by different levels of collective narcissism. The study of collective narcissism does not need an assumption about unconscious conflicts or personality dynamics.

In contrast, Erich Fromm (1973, 2010) understood narcissism as self-admiration and overevaluation of one’s own subjective perspective followed by “blindness” to reality, to which one feels superior. His understanding of the dynamics of individual narcissism was basically Freudian. Narcissism was a disorder caused by primary sexual energy turned towards the individual rather than the external reality. Fromm proposed that the object of group narcissism is a group instead of an individual. Similarly, to Theodor Adorno (1997), collective narcissism meant attributing to the ingroup the characteristics its members admire but lack. Both authors suggested that collective narcissism can pertain to many different groups; it arises in situations that undermine self-worth and life-satisfaction and is linked to intergroup hostility. These theoretical propositions inspired our work on collective narcissism, and it is only in this sense that this work is linked to the psychoanalytical tradition.

Collective narcissism has been commonly assessed by the Collective Narcissism Scale, developed by amending the items of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988) and the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (Millon, 2006) to refer to the ingroup instead of the self (e.g., “I insist upon getting the respect that is due to me” was transformed to “I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it”; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). People who score high on the Collective Narcissism Scale believe that their ingroup's importance is not sufficiently recognized by others and that their ingroup deserves special treatment. They insist their
ingroup must obtain special recognition (for a short version of the scale, see Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).\footnote{In an independent effort, the Superiority and Entitlement subscales of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory were similarly transformed to measure group-level narcissism by Lyons and colleagues (Lyons, Coursey, & Kenworthy, 2013; Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010). This 14-item scale has never been directly compared to the Collective Narcissism Scale in empirical studies. However, it is likely that the two measures tap into the same phenomenon that we call collective narcissism in our work.}

**Collective Narcissism and Glorification of National Superiority**

Theory and empirical evidence indicate that people can hold the narcissist belief about various social groups (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Collective narcissism has been assessed with reference to ethnic and religious groups (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), professional organizations (Galvin, Lange, & Ashforth, 2015), football teams (Larkin, 2017), students of the same university (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013a; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013b), and a fictitious nation of Minay in a role-playing game (Keenan, 2016). In all cases, it made similar predictions for intergroup attitudes. Most often, however, collective narcissism has been studied with reference to a national group. In this context, predictions of collective narcissism are comparable to, although independent of, several variables pertaining to assertion of national superiority and glorification of national ingroup. They can be differentiated from predictions made by variables pertaining to national pride and satisfaction. Table 1 presents definitions of several of those variables discussed in detail below.

**Nationalism.** When applied to a national group, collective narcissism makes similar predictions regarding intergroup hostility as nationalism, a desire for national supremacy, and an orientation toward international dominance (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Nationalism refers to support for a dominant stance in international relations, while collective narcissism reflects concerns regarding recognition of ingroup’s exceptionality. The two variables make independent predictions of intergroup behavior as the two concepts tap into discrete mechanisms underlying intergroup hostility.

Central to nationalism is the desire for international dominance. People who support a nationalist stance are openly dominant and deny weakness. They demand actions that serve the purpose of achieving a dominant position in the intergroup hierarchy, actions that demonstrate military, economic, and political power to bend others to the nation’s will (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey, Klink & Brown, 2001; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). Thus, nationalists justify intergroup hostility as a means of achieving national supremacy. Instead, collective narcissists justify intergroup hostility as a means of achieving appropriate recognition for the ingroup (Golec de Zavala, 2018). Consequently, collective narcissism and nationalism predict intergroup hostility for different reasons and in different ways. While nationalistic hostility is actively aggressive and openly dominant, collective narcissistic hostility is subjectively defensive, as it is motivated by the desire to protect the ingroup’s image and assert the recognition that is due to the ingroup. Thus, collective narcissists emphasize the need to assert appropriate recognition for the ingroup’s exceptionality rather than the ingroup’s dominance (Golec de Zavala, Peker, Guerra, & Baran, 2016).

Supporting such interpretations, research (Golec de Zavala, 2019a) indicates that nationalism is uniquely positively associated with grandiose narcissism, while collective narcissism is uniquely negatively associated with grandiose narcissism, that is, an individual sense of agentic superiority over others. In addition, collective narcissism is uniquely related to vulnerable narcissism, that is, antagonistic self-entitlement manifesting as resentment for the lack of individual recognition (Miller, Lynam, Hyatt, & Campbell, 2017). Such findings also provide support for our proposition that resentment driven by the perception that the ingroup’s exceptionality is not sufficiently appreciated is
Collective Narcissism

inherent to collective narcissism. To be sure, its subjective “defensiveness” does not make collective narcissistic hostility more justified. The same atrocities may be motivated by nationalistic belief in the ingroup’s right to dominate others and the collective narcissist’s belief that the ingroup is not receiving special treatment and appreciation. However, it is important to recognize that dominant nationalists may use the rhetoric of lack of external appreciation for the national greatness to mobilize collective narcissists to fight their wars.

Blind patriotism and national ingroup glorification. National collective narcissism overlaps and makes similar predictions for intergroup behavior as two variables pertaining to idealization of national ingroup: blind patriotism and national ingroup glorification. Blind patriotism is defined as an inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 153). National ingroup glorification, the belief in ingroup’s superiority and reverence towards national symbols, is differentiated from the national ingroup attachment which focuses on concerns about the ingroup’s welfare (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006).

Blind patriotism, national ingroup glorification, and collective narcissism overlap in uncritical idealization of the nation. However, while ingroup glorifiers see the ingroup as superior, emphasize the ingroup’s cohesion, and idealize all aspects of the ingroup, collective narcissists see the ingroup’s greatness as constantly undermined, and they emphasize the ingroup’s entitlement to, but lack of, appropriate recognition. While blind patriotism is related to insensitivity to and avoidance of ingroup criticism, collective narcissism is related to hypersensitivity to ingroup criticism. Collective narcissists believe others do not grant their ingroup a sufficiently positive opinion. Thus, collective

Table 1. Concepts Pertaining to Attitudes Towards National Ingroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective narcissism</td>
<td>“Collective narcissism is a belief that one’s own group (the ingroup) is exceptional and entitled to special recognition and privileged treatment but it is not sufficiently recognized by others.”</td>
<td>Entitlement to and resentment for the lack of external recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>“The view that America is superior and should be dominant” (Kosterman &amp; Feshbach, 1989, p. 261)</td>
<td>Asserting international dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>“Feelings of attachment to America” (Kosterman &amp; Feshbach, 1989, p. 261)</td>
<td>Attachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind patriotism</td>
<td>“A rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 153)</td>
<td>Unquestioning positive evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive patriotism</td>
<td>“An attachment to country characterized by ‘critical loyalty,’ questioning and criticism of current group practices that are driven by a desire for positive change” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 153)</td>
<td>Care and loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup glorification</td>
<td>“Viewing the national in-group as superior to other groups and having a feeling of respect for the central symbols of the group (…)” (Roccas, Klar, &amp; Liviatan, 2006; p. 700).</td>
<td>Superiority and internal cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup attachment</td>
<td>“People who are highly identified in this sense define themselves in terms of their group membership and extend their self-concept to include the group. They feel emotionally attached to the group and want to contribute to it” (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 700)</td>
<td>Emotional attachment and contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup satisfaction</td>
<td>“one’s positive feelings about the group and one’s membership in it” (Leach et al., 2008, p. 146)</td>
<td>Pride and liking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
narcissists are preoccupied with validating the ingroup’s positive image and asserting that the ingroup’s exceptionality is properly appreciated by others (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2016).

In sum, collective narcissism is positively associated with variables pertaining to idealization and perceived superiority of the national ingroup. Nevertheless, collective narcissism makes unique and independent predictions about the variance in intergroup hostility and aggression, voting behavior, political conservatism, and conspiratorial thinking. For example, one study compared the relative contribution of various forms of positive evaluation of the national ingroup (nationalism, blind and constructive patriotism, national symbolism, national ingroup satisfaction) and collective narcissism in explaining variance in hypersensitivity to threat to the ingroup’s image and intergroup hostility. Despite nationalism and blind patriotism significantly contributing to explaining the variance in both outcome variables, the relative importance analyses indicated that the contribution of collective narcissism was independent and stronger than the contribution of any other of the compared variables (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016).

This suggests that collective narcissism taps into a unique psychological motivation underlying intergroup hostility that is not explained by the belief in national superiority, blind patriotism, or idealization of the nation. In addition, existing conceptualization of more and less belligerent forms of positive national feelings (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Roccas et al., 2006; Schatz et al., 1999) do not reliably uncover the potential of constructive national feelings such as pride, satisfaction, and attachment to predict positive attitudes toward national minorities and national outgroups. In contrast, collective narcissism reliably suppresses the link between positive ingroup identification and national ingroup satisfaction and positive (or at least neutral) attitudes towards national outgroups (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a, 2016, 2019a). In addition, collective narcissism suppresses the negative relationship between constructive patriotism and outgroup derogation and mediates the relationship between blind patriotism and outgroup derogation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a).

**Authoritarianism.** Collective narcissism is positively associated with authoritarianism, the attitudinal cluster of submission to authorities defined by coercive power, conventionalism, and aggression towards those who threaten the social order (Altemeyer, 1988). Collective narcissism and authoritarianism overlap, although inconsistently, and they have in common the concern with coherence and homogeneity of the ingroup. Their relationship ranges from $r(198) = .02, p > .05$ in Mexico (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) to $r(132) = .56, p < .001$ in Poland (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a). Redefined by Duckitt (2006), authoritarianism can be understood as striving for ingroup’s cohesion and heightened attachment to the ingroup. Crucial for authoritarianism is that the ingroup cohesiveness secures order and predictability of the social environment and reduces undesirable cognitive uncertainty. For collective narcissists, ingroup coherence is likely to confirm that the ingroup’s claim to privileged position is unanimously accepted.

Collective narcissism is associated with (however inconsistently) the dominant aspect of authoritarianism, that is, social dominance orientation, a tendency to support hierarchical organization of intergroup relations (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The overlap between collective narcissism and social dominance orientation ranged from $r(198) = .08, p > .05$ in Mexico (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) and $r(115) = .11; p > .05$ in Poland (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b) to $r(261) = .53; p < .001$ in the United States (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). The two variables overlap, most likely, because they share the preoccupation with the ingroup’s privileged position. While social dominance orientation combines group-based dominance with opposition to equality, for collective narcissists, the persistence of social hierarchies is not likely to be of the same concern. Collective narcissistic belief about ingroup’s entitlement does not have to be based on ingroup’s dominance in intergroup hierarchies. However, as the pattern of correlations in various countries suggests, collective narcissism and social dominance orientation may overlap especially in groups enjoying a dominant intergroup position. In such groups, the reason for collective narcissist claims to recognition may be the intergroup dominance.
Importantly, collective narcissism, authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation predict xenophobia and intergroup hostility independently, and for a different reason. Collective narcissists use intergroup hostility to achieve positive distinctiveness and claim special recognition for the ingroup. People high on social dominance orientation want to achieve and maintain a dominant position for the ingroup in the intergroup hierarchy. Authoritarians want to achieve a homogenous and predictable social environment. In support of those conclusions, research showed that in the United Kingdom, collective narcissism, social dominance orientation, and authoritarianism independently predicted support for Bexit via perceived threat from immigrants (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). In the United States, collective narcissism, social dominance orientation, and authoritarianism independently predicted support for military actions in Iraq in 2003. Only the effect of collective narcissism was mediated by perceived threat from aggression of others (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). In Mexico, only collective narcissism predicted support for destructive actions towards American companies, in response to the construction of the wall along the American-Mexican border that Mexican collective narcissists perceived as an insult to Mexico and Mexicans. Authoritarians rejected destructive actions towards Americans, because they did not perceive the wall as an insult. Social dominance orientation was related to rejection of destructive actions towards Americans via the perception that the United States helps Mexico advance economically (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).

In addition, studies demonstrated that unlike authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, collective narcissism predicts intergroup hostility, especially when the ingroup’s image is threatened. Studies compared hostile reactions to comments and situations that undermined the ingroup’s claims to privilege, among collective narcissists, authoritarians, and people who score high on the social dominance scale. Only collective narcissism predicted intergroup hostility when the ingroup was undermined, after the variance explained by authoritarianism and social dominance orientation was accounted for (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013b). For example, in one study, hostile reactions and schadenfreude (rejoicing in misfortunes of outgroups), in response to perceived insult to the ingroup, were compared among collective narcissists, authoritarians, and people who score high on the social dominance scale. Participants were reminded about a movie that dealt with Polish anti-Semitism during World War II (the account, which is counternormative to the narration about the national greatness) versus a movie that praised the bravery and sacrifice of Polish soldiers during World War II (which is the normative narrative about exceptional national character). Only collective narcissism was related to schadenfreude and hostility towards the producers of the movie that referred to less laudable moments in Polish history. The moderating effect of collective narcissism was significant after the variance explained by authoritarianism and social dominance orientation was accounted for (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016).

Results suggesting that collective narcissism predicts intergroup hostility, especially in response to threat to the accepted narration about the ingroup’s entitlement, are similar to cross-sectional results reported by Feldman and Stenner (1997) with reference to authoritarianism. However, the nature of threat in both accounts is different. The previous studies report authoritarians being hostile in response to threat to political and social order, symbolic threat posed by those who hold different ideological positions, or threat of aggression of others. Specifically, Feldman and Stenner (1997) show that authoritarianism is linked to intergroup hostility, especially in interaction with perceived threat to societal and political order. Our experimental studies showed that collective narcissism predicts intergroup hostility under threat to the ingroup’s claims to exceptional status. Our studies assessed authoritarianism and compared its role to the role of collective narcissism in explaining the variance in retaliatory hostility to such a threat. They indicate that collective narcissism, but not authoritarianism, is related to intergroup hostility when the ingroup’s claims to exceptionality, rather than the social order, are threatened.
In sum, collective narcissism is related to authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Similar to authoritarianism, it predicts intergroup hostility especially under intergroup threat. However, the predictions of all three variables are independent: collective narcissism, authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation predict unique portions of variance in intergroup hostility as they tap to different psychological mechanisms that drive intergroup hostility.

**Ingroup identification.** When writing about collective narcissism, authors (including one of the present authors) sometimes used terms such as “narcissistic ingroup identification” and differentiate it from “nonnarcissistic ingroup identification.” Ingroup identification is defined as the degree to which people’s membership in a social group is psychologically affecting and socially consequential (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). We propose that it is beneficial to think of collective narcissism in less general terms, as a specific belief that the ingroup does not get the recognition it is entitled to. Thus, collective narcissism is not in itself a construal of social identity (cf. Klar & Bilewicz, 2017) or ingroup identification (cf. Cichocka, 2016). Instead, collective narcissism may help explain processes involved in the construal of social identity and ingroup identification.

Collective narcissist belief about the ingroup seems to be linked to a specific, narrow construal of social identity. For example, collective narcissism in Poland is associated with religious fundamentalism, misogyny, and homophobia (Golec de Zavala & Mole, 2019; Górska & Mikołajczyk, 2015). Within the narrative accepted by Polish collective narcissists, being truly Polish means being stereotypically male, Catholic, and heterosexual. Such narrowly construed national identity is threatened by homosexual and nonbinary Poles, as well as nontraditional women. Those groups are excluded and blamed for the loss of the national grandeur (Graff, 2010). Research conducted in China pointed to the association of collective narcissism and a narrow construal of national identity in a different way. Chinese collective narcissists disliked Chinese illustrated magazines portraying American celebrities. This was interpreted as their rejection of the American cultural intrusion into the “true” Chinese identity (Gries, Sanders, Stroup, & Cai, 2015). Thus, collective narcissism seems to be linked to a narrow and divisive definition of social identity, in which those who are “true” members of the ingroup are differentiated from those who are less worthy or “the worst sorts” (as those who oppose it are frequently called by the members of the current Polish populist government; *The Economist*, April 21, 2018). The implication of collective narcissism in divisive populist rhetoric further corroborates such a conclusion (Marchlew ska et al., 2018).

The differentiation between collective narcissism and ingroup identification is useful because it helps explain inconsistent findings regarding the link between ingroup identification and intergroup hostility. In this vein, it has been suggested that the strength of ingroup identification should predict intergroup hostility under intergroup threat because high identifiers should be more likely to notice intergroup threat (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns, & Christ, 2007) and they should be more sensitive to anything that can harm the ingroup (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001). However, the meta-analytic reviews indicate that the relationship between the strength of ingroup identification and perceived intergroup threat is inconsistent and rather weak (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). In addition, the relationship between ingroup identification and intergroup hostility averages close to zero (e.g., Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Jackson, Brown, Brown, & Marks, 2001; Pehrson et al., 2009). On the other hand, collective narcissism is reliably linked to intergroup hostility (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 2018). The meta-analytical summary presented below in Table 2 indicates a robust relationship with a small to medium effect size. Our studies clarify that ingroup identification is associated with intergroup hostility only inasmuch as it overlaps with the collective narcissist belief about the ingroup. Once collective narcissism is removed, positive ingroup identification is often related to outgroup tolerance (Cichocka, Dhont, & Makwana, 2017; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a, 2016, 2017, 2019a). This suggests that the current presence of collective narcissism in many national narrations precludes intergroup tolerance and is likely to lead to increased intergroup tensions.
Collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction. Rather than being a form of ingroup identification, collective narcissism should be considered as a specific belief about the ingroup’s unrecognized entitlement that is positively associated with positive ingroup identification. However, collective narcissism is not related to all aspects of ingroup identification. Ingroup identification is conceptualized as a multifaceted phenomenon. Specifically, literature differentiates between its self-definition and self-investment dimensions. Self-definition refers to the perception that the members of the ingroup share commonalities and to attributing oneself with ingroup’s prototypical characteristics. Self-investment refers to solidarity with the ingroup, perceiving the ingroup membership as a central aspect of the self, and positive ingroup evaluation (Leach et al., 2008). Collective narcissism is related to the dimension of self-investment but not to the dimension of self-definition (Jaworska, 2016; Jaworska, Marchlew ska, Golec de Zavala, Bilewicz, & Cichocka, 2018). This indicates that ties with other members of the ingroup and the concern with the common fate are not important for collective narcissism. Instead, the positive evaluation of the ingroup is central to the self-concept of people who hold collective narcissistic beliefs about their ingroup. We suggest that differentiating between collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction (i.e., being proud and happy to be member of a valuable ingroup) is the most theoretically important for understanding of collective narcissism, as both variables pertain to the role the positive evaluation of the ingroup plays for the self.

Collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction overlap, but differ. While collective narcissism emphasizes positive uniqueness and entitlement of the ingroup, ingroup satisfaction emphasizes that the ingroup is of a high value and a reason for one to be proud of. Collective narcissism is preoccupied with the lack of recognition of the ingroup’s uniqueness, while ingroup satisfaction pertains to feeling happy to be the ingroup’s member. The positive overlap between collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction ranges from $r(375) = .24, p < .001$ (Golec de Zavala et al. 2019a, in the United States) and $r(109) = .31, p < .01$ (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016, in Turkey) to $r(568) = .69, p < .001$ (Golec de Zavala, Lantos, & Chester 2019b in Poland). However, collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction are uniquely related to different emotional profiles and different self-evaluations, and they make opposite predictions for intergroup attitudes and perception of intergroup situations. Thus, it is important to clarify what these variables mean in their residual forms, when their positive overlap is statistically removed.

Perhaps it is best to think about the difference between collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction (on the social level of self) analogously to the difference between self-esteem and individual narcissism (on the personal level of self). Residual forms of collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction can be then interpreted analogously to residual forms of self-esteem and individual narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2011). Self-esteem with narcissism partialled out is interpreted as positive assertion of self-worth, independent of external recognition. Narcissism with self-esteem partialled out is interpreted as preoccupation with external validation of self-worth and resentment for the lack of recognition. Residual self-esteem and narcissism have opposite relations with interpersonal aggressiveness (Barry, Grafeman, Adler, & Pickard, 2007; Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005; Locke, 2009; Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004).

Analogously, collective narcissism with ingroup satisfaction partialled out may be interpreted as group-based entitlement—the desire that the ingroup’s exceptionality is recognized by others. What remains in collective narcissism when ingroup satisfaction is partialled out is the emphasis on the demand of privileged treatment and the concern about external recognition of the ingroup. Ingroup satisfaction with collective narcissism partialled out can be interpreted as a positive evaluation of the ingroup, independent of concerns about external recognition and resilient to threats and criticism. Indeed, unlike collective narcissism, residual ingroup satisfaction does not predict hypersensitivity to threat to the ingroup’s image (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016); it is not related to beliefs about outgroup’s hostile intentions towards the ingroup (Dyduch-Hazar, Mroziński, & Golec de Zavala, 2019b; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), revengefulness (Dyduch-Hazar, Mroziński,
In sum, we believe that differentiating collective narcissism from ingroup identity and positive evaluation of the ingroup helps explain the motivations behind a narrow definition of social identity and the inconsistent findings regarding the link between ingroup identification, perceived ingroup threat, and intergroup hostility. Ingroup identification is related to such outcomes only inasmuch as it overlaps with collective narcissism. Collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction pertain to different beliefs about the role of the ingroup’s positive image for the self. They overlap in the positive opinion about the ingroup. However, when their positive overlap is removed, collective narcissism emphasizes the resentment for the lack of recognition of the ingroup’s exceptionality. Ingroup satisfaction emphasizes rejoicing in positive evaluation of the ingroup, whether it is recognized by others or not.

**Collective Narcissism and the Science of Political Psychology**

*Collective narcissism and intergroup hostility.* We believe the concept of collective narcissism facilitates our understanding of previously unexplored mechanisms of intergroup hostility and aggression. Table 3 summarizes the results of studies that examined the relationship between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility, and Table 2 present results of their meta-analytical summary. This summary indicates that the average relationship between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility is small, but significant (with 95% CI [0.18, 0.21]). It is also heterogeneous, which indicates the presence of moderating variables. Indeed, studies show that collective narcissism predicts intergroup hostility, especially towards outgroups perceived as threatening to the ingroup’s privileged status (Lyons et al., 2010), and especially in response to what is perceived as a threat to the ingroup’s positive image (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a; 2016). Recent studies have suggested that this link can also be moderated by experience of self-transcending emotions (Golec de Zavala & Sedikides, 2019; Komorowska, 2018).

*Prejudice.* Collective narcissism is reliably associated with prejudice. Rather than being indiscriminately negative towards all outgroups, people who hold collective narcissist belief about their ingroup are prejudiced towards outgroups that are construed as threatening to the ingroup’s privileged position. For example, Polish collective narcissism is related to anti-Semitism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a; Golec de Zavala & Sedikides, 2019), one of the most prevalent forms of prejudice in Poland (Kroet, 2017). Jewish people are stereotyped as hostile and threatening towards ethnic Poles because they ostensibly want to dominate Poland and the world (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). Collective narcissism is related also to prejudice towards refugees (Dyduch-Hazar et al., 2019b; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a), a new outgroup framed as threatening to Polish values and ways of life since the refugee crisis in 2015 (Hall & Mikulska-Jolles, 2016). However, collective narcissism is not related to negative attitudes towards French or British people in Poland because those groups are not perceived as threatening (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a). In a similar vein, American collective narcissism is related to prejudice towards Arabs, who are the only outgroup perceived as harboring hostile intentions of dominating the United States, in comparison to outgroups such as Asians, Latinos, or Europeans (Lyons et al., 2010).

*Intergroup conflict and intergroup threat.* Collective narcissism is a likely contributor to the escalation of intergroup conflicts. People who hold the collective narcissist belief support military engagement and aggressive stance in international relations. American collective narcissism predicted support for military intervention in Iraq in 2003. This relationship was mediated by the perception that the national ingroup was threatened by the hostility of others (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Mexican collective narcissists wanted to boycott American companies and engage in destructive actions against American institutions in Mexico in response to the construction of the wall by the
United States along the Mexican-American border in 2006. According to the American government at the time, the wall was constructed to protect against terrorist threat, but Mexican collective narcissists saw it as an insult to Mexico and Mexicans (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).

Collective narcissism was also related to confrontational stance in other intergroup conflicts. One study showed that Polish collective narcissists advocated hostile confrontation with a fictitious team of British scientists with whom Polish scientists allegedly collaborated to discover a new chemical element. The British scientist ostensibly disagreed on naming the new element to honor Poland. Polish collective narcissists preferred hostile confrontation with their British fellow scientists, especially after they previously read an article containing critical comments about Poland issued by the British press on an unrelated issue (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b).

Such findings indicate that collective narcissism is related to intergroup hostility when the ingroup is threatened by other groups in conflicts. However, the most aggravating to collective narcissists seems to be not the threat to their ingroup’s welfare, but to the ingroup’s position and image. Collective narcissism predicts hostile retaliation against outgroups that, one way or another, challenged the ingroup’s positive image. A series of studies manipulated this threat by providing the ingroup with a negative feedback and criticism undermining its superiority claims. For example, in one experimental study, American participants were presented with a fictional interview with a foreign exchange student. After reading unfavorable (vs. favorable) comments about their national character, American collective narcissists expressed the intention to engage in hostile behaviors towards all compatriots of the criticizing student. In another experiment, collective narcissists reported that comments undermining their university’s claims to being the most prestigious one in Poland were threatening to them personally. In retribution, they made resource distribution decisions that harmed students of the criticizing university (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b). Such findings extend into the intergroup context the threatened egotism theory, which posits that narcissism, rather than self-esteem, predicts retaliatory aggression after negative feedback (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Similar dynamics also apply to collective narcissism. Collective narcissism, rather than private collective self-esteem (or individual narcissism, social dominance orientation, or authoritarianism), predicted hostile retribution to negative feedback to the ingroup. Studies also showed that collective narcissism was related to retaliatory hostility in response to a wide range of challenges to the ingroup’s positive image including subtle, ambiguous, and imprecise ones (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016, discussed in more detail below).

Table 2. Meta-Analytical Summary of the Relationship Between Collective Narcissism and Outgroup Hostility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective narcissism</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>$k$</th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>$SD$</th>
<th>$Q$</th>
<th>$I^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup hostility</td>
<td>14 592</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>245.20**</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $N$ = average sample size per study × $k$. $k$ = number of studies. $r$ = summary correlation coefficient. $Q$ = heterogeneity. $I^2$ = proportion unexplained variance. Some of the studies presented in Table 3 measured hostility towards various social groups. We included only the results pertaining to hypothesized outgroups in the meta-analytical summary. The meta-analyses were conducted using Version 3 of the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis software (Borenstein, Rothstein, Hedges, & Higgins, 2009). The effect size was calculated from correlation coefficients and sample size for each study. When there were more than one measure of outgroup hostility per study, the correlation coefficients and reliabilities were averaged.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CN Measure</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>Intergroup Hostility Measure</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>$r$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cai &amp; Gries, 2013</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>Prejudice towards the Chinese people</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative attitudes towards the Chinese government</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative attitudes towards China policy</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.46*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>Prejudice toward the American people</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative attitudes towards the American government</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative attitudes towards the American policy</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.49*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unwillingness to purchase American products</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combined prejudice toward Jews, Russians, Vietnamese, Germans and Gypsies</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cichocka et al., 2017</td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>Combined hostile behaviors towards Czechs, French, Germans, Greeks, Russians and Slovaks</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cichocka et al., 2018</td>
<td>Study 4 T1</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Combined hostile behaviors towards Czechs, French, Germans, Greeks, Russians and Slovaks</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 4 T2</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>Combined hostile behaviors towards Czechs, French, Germans, Greeks, Russians and Slovaks</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dyduch-Hazar et al., 2019</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>Symbolic aggression against Jews</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dyduch-Hazar et al., 2019b</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>Rejection of Syrian refugees</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>Willingness to harm Syrian refugees</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Golec de Zavala &amp; Cichocka, 2012</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>Combined negative feelings towards Jews, Germans, Arabs and Chinese</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>Combined cold temperature of feelings towards Germans and Belgians</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Combined social distance towards Germans, Jews, Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Gypsies and Vietnamese</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Combined negative feelings towards Jews, Germans and Russians</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b</td>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>Combined cold temperature of feelings towards students from other universities</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>Hostile behavioral intentions against British</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>Hostile behavioral intentions against British</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>Aggression against students of University of Warsaw</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Study</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>CN Measure</td>
<td>α</td>
<td>Intergroup Hostility Measure</td>
<td>α</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golec de Zavala et al., 2009</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>Support for the war in Iraq</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>Anti-Semitic prejudice</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>Destructive actions against American companies (one item)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a</td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>Social distance towards Jews</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.08†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>1059</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>Positive attitudes toward Syrian refugees</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>Symbolic aggression against Muslim</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 7</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>Symbolic aggression against excluding outgroup</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golec de Zavala et al., 2016</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>Schadenfreude towards the European Union</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Retaliatory hostility against Germans</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>Direct hostility against makers of the offensive movie</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>Direct hostility against makers of movie</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>Direct hostility against Polish actors</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Schadenfreude towards Polish actors</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golec de Zavala &amp; Sedikides, 2019</td>
<td>Study 4b</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>Prejudice toward Jews</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaworska, 2016</td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>1007</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>Positive attitudes towards Ukrainian immigrants</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>Larger social distance towards minorities</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyons, Kenworthy, &amp; Popan, 2010</td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>14 items Group Narcissism Scale (Lyons et al., 2010)</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>Positive attitudes towards immigrants: Arab</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.19†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>14 items Group Narcissism Scale</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>Money allocation Arab</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murteira, 2019</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Hostile feelings towards Muslims</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Hostile feelings towards Muslims</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>Hostile feelings towards Muslims</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Nine items CNS — nine items Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009); five items CNS — five items Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala, 2011). Relations included pertain to attitudes towards relevant outgroups as identified by each entered study. †p = .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
or, somewhat paradoxically, to aggress in retaliation for the incurred pain of exclusion (Chester & DeWall, 2017; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001). The effects of exclusion are more severe when exclusion is seen as perpetrated by a group rather than an individual, and especially when being excluded is attributed to one’s group membership (van Beest, Carter-Sowell, van Dijk, & Williams, 2012; Gaertner, Iuzzini, & O’Mara, 2008; Goodwin, Williams, & Carter-Sowell, 2010; Wirth & Williams, 2009).

It has been postulated that groups excluded from intergroup interaction may radicalize towards violence as a means of attracting attention (Schaafsma & Williams, 2012). Since being ignored by other groups threatens the ingroup’s position, collective narcissists are likely to experience intergroup exclusion as distressful and threatening and retaliate aggressively towards the excluding outgroups. These expectations were supported by studies that explored the consequences of collective narcissism in the context of intergroup exclusion. Results of one study showed that Turkish collective narcissists held hostile attitudes towards the European Union because they perceived the Turkish delay to become a member of the EU (approximation of intergroup exclusion) as an insult to their group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016).

In experimental studies of intergroup exclusion, we used the adapted Cyberball paradigm to ask participants to observe a situation in which their ingroup is excluded (vs. included) by another group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019b). Typically, in a Cyberball game, participants are led to believe that they play an online ball-tossing game with two other participants. In reality, avatars are preprogramed to include or exclude participants (Williams & Jarvis, 2006). We adapted the Cyberball paradigm so participants could observe their national team of three players play the ball-tossing game with a national, stereotypically nonthreatening outgroup. The ingroup was either included or excluded during the game. Collective narcissism increased after seeing their ingroup excluded from the game. In addition, collective narcissists reported more willingness to harm, attack, and offend the excluding outgroup. Such findings offer initial support for the expectation that collective narcissism predicts hostile retaliation in response to intergroup exclusion (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019b).

Intriguingly, studies that used the intergroup Cyberball paradigm to manipulate intergroup exclusion showed that, although collective narcissism was related to hostility (after intergroup exclusion), collective narcissists reported feeling that the ingroup was excluded mostly in the inclusion condition. In fact, in this condition, participants saw their national team being treated fairly and receiving half of the ball tosses. In the exclusion condition, the ingroup received only two throws in the beginning of the game (5%) and was then ignored. In this condition, the link between collective narcissism and perceived exclusion became significantly weaker or nonsignificant. Moreover, collective narcissism was related to exaggeration of the perceived percentage of ball throws to the ingroup in the exclusion condition (on average 12% in comparison to the actual 5%). Those results were specific to collective narcissism (which was compared to individual narcissism, self-esteem, and ingroup satisfaction). Thus, collective narcissists complained their ingroup was excluded when it was treated fairly, but when their ingroup was in fact excluded, they denied witnessing exclusion.

A similar process reflecting concurrent hypervigilance and avoidance of ego threats was observed on the personal level of the self. Experimental studies show that individual narcissists unconsciously engage in vigilant scanning for ego-threatening information, which they subsequently repress (Horvath & Morf, 2009). A longitudinal study showed that individual narcissism was related to lower negative reactivity to negative life events in self-report, but not to increased well-being (Zuckerman & O’Loughlin, 2009). This suggests that narcissists may deny noticing or being affected by negative events but remain affected by them nevertheless. This conclusion is further supported by findings that indicate that individual narcissists overreact aggressively to interpersonal exclusion (Twenge et al., 2001). They do not report being distressed by exclusion, but their physiological reactions and brain activation patterns suggest increased distress while experiencing exclusion.
Collective Narcissism

(Cascio, Konrath, & Falk, 2015; Cheng, Tracy, & Miller, 2013). Thus, it is likely that when excluded, collective narcissists reinterpret the observable facts in a way that protects their perception of the ingroup’s privileged position. A similar process may be in place among collective narcissists from groups that are chronically disadvantaged in intergroup relations. Such groups base their claims to special recognition by nobilitating exceptional suffering, thus redefining their disadvantage in positive terms (Skarżyńska et al., 2012). The next section examines in detail other findings pointing to biased-information processing associated with collective narcissism that leads to a strategically partial perception of intergroup reality.

Collective narcissism and biased perception of intergroup reality. In his interpretation of narcissism, Erich Fromm (1973, 2010) suggested that narcissism is a form of cognitive egocentrism. In his opinion, narcissists judged their understanding of reality as superior and were impermeable to any corrective feedback from others. In the case of group narcissism, he argued, such perceptual blindness was even more pronounced because the biased perception of intergroup situations was confirmed by others.

Empirical findings provide support for the expectation that people who hold collective narcissist belief about their ingroup have a biased perception of intergroup reality, which may be difficult to change. Collective narcissist belief is likely to be rigid as indicated by the association of collective narcissism and high need for cognitive closure, a variable pertaining to a preference for certain, and definite, knowledge and avoidance of uncertainty (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). High need for cognitive closure manifests as a desire for predictability, preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and close-mindedness (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). This finding suggests that collective narcissist belief may be unlikely to change, even in the face of disconfirming evidence. Thus, it is important to understand what perception of intergroup reality collective narcissism is associated with.

The findings discussed above suggest that crucial to collective narcissism is the resentment that privileged (rather than fair) treatment is not granted to the ingroup. Apart from situations that unambiguously disadvantage their ingroup’s position (such as ostracism), collective narcissists maintain the perception that their ingroup is deprived of what is due to it. Perhaps not surprisingly, empirical findings suggest that collective narcissism is associated with the belief that the whole world is against the ingroup. In this vein, research has linked collective narcissism to the perception of the ingroup as threatened by hostile intentions of others (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). In addition, research shows that (1) collective narcissism is related to conspiratorial thinking and a conviction that certain outgroups secretly plot against the ingroup, as well as (2) the tendency to attribute hostile intentions to outgroups, whether secretive or not.

Conspiratorial thinking. Conspiratorial thinking is a predisposition to believe that a small group of people uses secretive means to usurp power and cause harm (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; Uscinski, Kolfstad, & Atkinson, 2016). Conspiracy theories are explanations for events that assume secretive, malevolent plots involving multiple actors: a mysterious “them,” who “run” things and work against “us” (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Goertzel, 1994). Thus, conspiracy theories usually presume an intergroup dimension (van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014).

Collective narcissism is related to a predilection towards conspiratorial explanation of intergroup reality. For example, studies linked collective narcissism to anti-Semitism in Poland via the conspiracy stereotype of Jews. According to this stereotype, in addition to being perceived as alien to the national ingroup, Jewish people are perceived as dangerous, ostensibly motivated by a common intention to dominate the world. Allegedly, those dominant intentions are executed by means of indirect and deceptive methods, in both hidden and nonobvious ways (Bergmann, 2008; Cohen & Golub, 1991; Kofta & Sędek, 2005). Thus, Polish collective narcissists rejected Jews because they believed Jews were conspiring to overtake Poland by secretive means (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012).
Studies also showed that Polish collective narcissists believed in conspiratorial explanations of the 2010 crash of the Polish presidential plane on the way to Smolensk, Russia (Cichocka, Marchlew ska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 2017). The crash killed the president and 95 prominent Polish politicians on their way to commemorate Polish officers killed in Russia during World War II. Conspiracy theories of Russian involvement in the crash have been popularized by right-wing politicians and contributed to the rise to power of the ultraconservative, populist Law and Order (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) (Sieradzka, 2018). Polish collective narcissism predicted also the support for government financing the investigation into the foreign involvement in the crash (Golec de Zavala, 2017).

Polish collective narcissism was also related to the belief that Western countries conspired to undermine the significance of Poland as a major contributor to the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes. Poles believe the collapse began with the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s, followed by the Round Table negotiations and the first parliamentary elections won by the Solidarity in June 1989. However, it is the fall of the Berlin Wall (which happened almost six months later) that is commonly regarded as a symbol of the end to the Communist era. According to Polish collective narcissists, Germany conspired with other countries to deprive Poland of its due recognition for its role in Communism’s collapse (Cichocka et al., 2016).

Findings (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018a) also indicate that apart from being associated with a belief in hostile conspiracies of particular outgroups, collective narcissism is linked to conspiratorial thinking in more general terms, an essentially content-free tendency to believe that secretive “them” conspire against “us” (Uscinski et al., 2016). Particular ingroups and outgroups featured in such thinking can be redefined, depending on current need and normative ingroup’s narrative. Conspiratorial thinking fits the general tendency of those high in collective narcissism to adopt a posture of intergroup hostility across multiple group distinctions. Moreover, such thinking provides a focused, simple explanation for why others fail to acknowledge the ingroup’s uniqueness. It justifies constant vigilance to threats to ingroup’s exceptionality and provides a reassurance that the ingroup is important enough to attract secretive plots from others. However, the belief in hostility from others does not need to have the conspiratorial aspect to appeal to collective narcissists and inspire and justify their intergroup hostility.

**Hostile attribution bias.** Studies independently tested the proposition that collective narcissistic intergroup hostility is driven by the intergroup hostile attribution bias, a tendency to perceive outgroups as hostile towards the ingroup (Dyduch-Hazar et al., 2019b). In a study conducted on a nationally representative sample, Polish collective narcissists rejected Syrian refugees because they perceived them as “aggressive,” “dangerous,” and “hostile towards Poles.” Such a perception mediated the link between collective narcissism and social distance and cold feelings towards the refugees. Those results were replicated in a large sample of Polish adults with a more direct measure of intergroup hostility. The same hostile attribution bias mediated the link between Polish collective narcissism and behavioral intentions of harming, injuring, offending, and humiliating Syrian refugees. The same pattern of results was also obtained in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Portugal, with respect to Muslims. American collective narcissists believed that Muslims were angry and hostile. This perception partially, but significantly, mediated the link between American collective narcissism and feeling displeased, furious, irritated, and angry when thinking of Muslim people. In the United Kingdom and Portugal, the link between collective narcissism and hostile behavioral intentions towards Muslims was mediated by attributing Muslims with hostility and anger (Murteira, 2019).

Collective narcissism is associated not only with hostile attribution bias, but also with a prescriptive belief regarding appropriate and rewarding reactions to hostility of others. Studies show that collective narcissism in associated with the belief that hostile retaliation is emotionally rewarding. In one study, Polish participants were allowed to express their aggression towards Jewish people
in a symbolic way, by stabbing a virtual voodoo doll representing a Jewish person with a chosen number of virtual pins (Dyduch-Hazar et al., 2019). This well-validated measure of symbolic aggression is based on the human tendency to bestow objects with magical properties. It asks participants to imbue an inanimate doll with features of actual individuals. This task has shown excellent reliability over time, corresponding to other measures of aggressive behavior and exhibiting appropriate responsiveness to laboratory provocations (Chester, Merwin, & DeWall, 2015; DeWall et al., 2013). The responses to the voodoo-doll task do not signify “actual” aggression because the victim does not experience direct harm. Instead, the task captures symbolic aggression. However, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral overlap exists between actual and symbolic forms of behavior, and this task brought about results similar to actual aggression (Chester & DeWall, 2017).

Before engaging in the voodoo doll task, participants were asked to what extent they believed stabbing the doll with virtual pins would improve their mood. Collective narcissism was related to symbolic aggression via the expectation that stabbing the pins in the symbolic representation of the threatening outgroup would improve their mood. The same pattern of results was replicated among American collective narcissists who reliably chose to stab a voodoo doll representing a Muslim person with pins. This relationship was also mediated by the belief that symbolic aggression would improve participants’ mood. In addition, a longitudinal study clarified that collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction have opposite unique relationships with the hedonistic belief about revenge, the conviction that getting back at those who hurt us is emotionally rewarding. This belief mediated the link between collective narcissism and aggression towards Syrian refugees among those collective narcissists who believed that Syrian refugees threatened Polish values and economic welfare (Dyduch-Hazar et al., 2019).

Such findings suggest that collective narcissistic intergroup hostility may be subjectively defensive and justified. People who hold collective narcissist belief about their ingroup may see their ingroup’s hostility as justified protection of the ingroup’s position. In addition, collective narcissists seem to believe in the palliative function of aggressive revenge against the allegedly hostile outgroups. They expect to be relieved of the negative emotional effects of intergroup threat by aggressing against the threatening outgroups. Together with results that indicate that collective narcissists are unable to forgive others for wrongs done to the ingroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Hamer, Penczek, & Bilewicz, 2018), such results link collective narcissism to revenge seeking in intergroup relations.

_Hypersensitivity to insult._ Further evidence corroborates the conclusion that collective narcissistic intergroup hostility may be subjectively justified as defensive. Findings indicate that collective narcissism is linked to intergroup hostility because it is associated with a perception of outgroups as _provoking_ retaliation by undermining the ingroup. Results of several studies converged to indicate that collective narcissists retaliated with direct or indirect hostility (in the form of schadenfreude) even in situations that require a stretch of the imagination to be perceived as an intentional, deliberate provocation of the ingroup.

For example, in Portugal, collective narcissists rejoiced in the possibility of an economic crisis in Germany and preferred hostile actions against a German person because they felt offended that Germany’s position in the European Union was more appreciated than the Portugal’s position. Stretching the definition of provocation even further, in Poland, collective narcissists wanted to punish the producers of a movie (Aftermath) because the movie alluded to one of the least laudable moments in the national history: Polish anti-Semitism during the World War II. Another study showed that even after a transgression as petty as jokes made by a Polish celebrity actor about the country’s populist government, Polish collective narcissists threatened physical punishment to the actor and engaged in _schadenfreude_, openly rejoicing in the misfortunes of their “offender.” They supported and cheered the politician who trolled the actor with offensive and hurtful remarks pertaining to, among other things, the actor’s father’s terminal illness (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016).
Thus, collective narcissism is related to a tendency to exaggerate the perception of insult to the ingroup's image. Collective narcissists do not have a sense of humor as far as their ingroup is concerned. They are disproportionately punitive in responding to what they perceive as insult to their ingroup even when the insult is debatable, not perceived by others, nor intended by another group. Such findings are important in the light of analyses suggesting that feeling humiliated in the name of one’s own group is one of the most frequently reported motives for political radicalization and violence (McCaulley & Moskalenko, 2008). Indeed, studies showed that collective narcissism mobilized support for terrorist violence in radical social networks in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Morocco. In radicalized social contexts, either due to past involvement in political violence (LTTE in Sri Lanka), a current ideological climate (Morocco), or explicit ideological agendas (Islamists and Jihadists in Indonesia), collective narcissism predicted support for violent political extremism (Jaško, Webber, & Kruglanski, 2017).

Avoiding unwelcome truths about the ingroup. Studies support our proposition that collective narcissism is a tendency to assert that the ingroup has exceptional characteristics and a tendency to resent the lack of external recognition of the ingroup. Collective narcissistic belief is associated with a tendency to protect the ingroup’s positive image, which is not limited to monitoring and punishing imaginary offences, criticism, or insults nor changing the uncomfortable interpretation of observable facts. Collective narcissism is also related to biased and selective construction of the ingroup's past. Specifically, collective narcissists promote the ingroup’s positive image, and they do not identify with the ingroup’s transgressions. Accepting responsibility for the ingroup transgressions threatens the positive image of the ingroup (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Research showed that group members who uncritically glorify their ingroup find reasons to justify the ingroup’s transgressions and reject collective responsibility for crimes perpetrated by the ingroup against another group (Roccas et al., 2006).

Similarly, studies suggest that collective narcissists have difficulties reconciling ingroup past transgressions with the psychological function the ingroup serves for them. Unlike individual narcissists (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2008), collective narcissists cannot distance themselves from their ingroup when it is found to be at fault in previous transgression. Instead, they distance themselves from or distort the problematic ingroup's past. For example, in one study, Polish participants watched trailers of movies that alluded to crimes perpetrated by ethnic Poles against their compatriots of Jewish descent during World War II (Aftermath and the Oscar-winning Ida). Participants were then asked to evaluate the artistic value of the movies and respond to scales measuring the extent to which they believed Poles should feel responsible and guilty for the crimes perpetrated by their ancestors. Collective narcissists rejected their ingroup’s responsibility for past transgression and did not see why they should feel guilty for the ingroup’s past crimes. Moreover, collective narcissism predicted negative evaluation of the artistic value of the movies. The opposite was found for people who were satisfied, but not collective narcissistic group members. They felt responsible for past transgressions of their ingroup, and they evaluated movies accepting referring to those transgressions positively (Dyduch-Hazar, Mroziński, Simão, & Golec de Zavala, 2019a).

Similar results were reported by Klar and Bilewicz (2017). In studies they reviewed, collective narcissism uniquely predicted biased negative perception (as less competent and credible) and anger towards historians who analyzed and reported crimes perpetrated by ethnic Poles during World War II. Distancing from the unwanted past was also observed among collective narcissists in Germany, where collective narcissism was related to distancing from memories of the Holocaust as well as decreased collective guilt and intentions to compensate the victims (Imhoff, 2010).

In sum, collective narcissism is related to specific distortions in perception of the intergroup reality. It is associated with conspiratorial thinking and belief in specific conspiracy theories, explaining how malevolent outgroups conspire against their ingroup. Collective narcissism is associated with hostile intergroup attribution bias, perceiving other groups as harboring hostile intentions.
Collective Narcissism

Collective Narcissism

towards the ingroup. Collective narcissists is associated with unwillingness to forgive the outgroup’s transgressions and the belief that revenge against threatening outgroups is rewarding. In addition, collective narcissism is related to biased interpretation of ambiguous intergroup situations as an insult to the ingroup’s image. However, when the ingroup’s image is indeed undermined, collective narcissists refuse to see it and are willing to distort the perception of observable facts to protect their ingroup’s claim to exceptionality. Similarly, they remember the ingroup’s past selectively and reject the ingroup’s connection to its past transgressions. Thus, in order to uphold the belief in their ingroup’s exceptionality, collective narcissists see what is not there and sometimes they do not see what is. They see threat from those who are unlikely to pose it and when it is questionable, their ingroup is indeed threatened. However, they undermine threat which is unquestionably there. This later tendency may help explain why collective narcissists may support politicians who, using slogans of reviving the group’s greatness, lead their groups into fights they are not prepared to fight or projects that undermine their groups’ welfare.

Collective Narcissism and Voting Behavior

Populism, Trump, and Brexit. Collective narcissism has been implicated in recent voting decisions that profoundly changed the known political reality. American collective narcissism was the second, after partisanship, strongest correlate of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; see also Marchlewska et al., 2018). Its role was compared to other factors such as economic dissatisfaction, authoritarianism, sexism, and racial resentment that were mentioned while explaining the startling support for Trump’s candidacy. Collective narcissism was associated with the voters’ decision to support Donald Trump over and above those variables (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018). In the United Kingdom, collective narcissism was associated with the vote to leave the European Union (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018). Analyses indicated that the rejection of immigrants, perceived as a threat to economic superiority and the British way of life, were behind the association between collective narcissism and the Brexit vote (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). In addition, collective narcissism was associated with support for the populist governments and its particular policies in Poland (Cislak, Wojcik, & Cichocka, 2018; Golec de Zavala, 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018) and in Hungary (Lantos, 2019).

In light of findings linking collective narcissism to intergroup hostility, it comes with little surprise that the presidency of Donald Trump has seen a rapid increase in hate crime (Levin, Nolan, & Reitzel, 2018). In the United Kingdom, postreferendum increase in hate speech and discrimination against immigrants and foreign workers further supported the conclusion that the Brexit vote expressed xenophobic sentiments (Agerholm, 2016; Payton, 2016). Similarly, Poland (Flückiger, 2017; Sieradzka, 2016) and Hungary (Wallen, 2018) noted an unprecedented rise in xenophobia under their populist governments supported by collective narcissists. In line with these observations, evidence suggests that American collective narcissism was related to support for attackers in the hate crimes perpetrated against Muslims and schadenfruede towards the victims (Hamer, Paterson, Drogosz, & McFarland, 2019).

Implication of collective narcissism in voting for populist politicians and parties suggests that collective narcissist belief is at the core of populist rhetoric. Moreover, collective narcissist beliefs may be a response to a social change that the growing appeal of populism seems to reflect. Namely, the increased presence of national populisms may be interpreted as a response to a situation in which privileged position of certain social groups is questioned by empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups. Core to populism is a backlash against groups such as immigrants, ethnic and cultural minorities, women, and the LGBT+ community (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2016).

A closer look at the defining characteristics of populist rhetoric indicates that it is constructed around the collective narcissist resentment that the ingroup’s entitlement to privilege is (no longer)
granting by other groups. In addition, populist rhetoric favors a narrow and exclusive definition of the ingroup that is entitled to special treatment. The populist rhetoric emphasizes the privileged status of the ingroup and those within the ingroup vigilant enough to see that its greatness is no longer recognized by others. Populist rhetoric evokes the concept of “heartland,” an idealized conception of the ingroup’s past, the “chosen” plan to restore, blaming others for the loss of its grandeur (Mols & Jetten, 2016; Taggart, 2004). Populist rhetoric follows the logic of a melodramatic jeremiad: lamentation over the lost purity of the ingroup, recollection of its greatness, and a call for its renewal combined with the unshakeable belief that the ingroup is unique and chosen (Bercovitch, 1978). Jeremiad as a rhetorical tactic demands conversion to the “true” ways indicated by the “chosen” who lead the ingroup’s reformation. Importantly, the populist rhetoric emphasizes the division between the “chosen” or “true” members of the ingroup and their internal opposition and outgroups seen as threatening to the plan of the ingroup’s rebirth (Mudde, 2007; Muller, 2016; Sanders, Hurtado, & Zoragastua, 2017).

Empirical evidence corroborates the expectation that uncertainty regarding personal significance and exposure to populist rhetoric increases the tendency to hold collective narcissist belief about the ingroup. Results of a longitudinal study showed that the association between collective narcissism and conspiratorial thinking increased during the Trump presidential campaign. As the campaign evolved, the belief in conspiratorial explanation of political events that this campaign offered aplenty became more strongly associated with collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018). An experimental study showed that collective narcissism increased after an exposure to the populist narrative promoted by the Leave Campaign regarding the United Kingdom’s history versus a neutral short account of the United Kingdom’s modern history. After reading a paragraph commenting about the United Kingdom’s “compromised power” due to the long-term EU’s “strong influence” over British policy, participants reported higher levels of residual collective narcissism (without the positive overlap with ingroup identification) and higher support for Britain leaving the European Union (Marchlewska et al., 2018, Study 2).

Political conservatism and neo-fascism. Another notable political association is the link between collective narcissists and political conservatism. In the United States, collective narcissism is positively associated with self-definition as politically conservative and a support for the Republican Party (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018). In Poland, collective narcissism is related to self-definition as conservative and right-wing as well as support for right-wing political parties. Collective narcissism explains variance in political conservatism and right-wing preference independently of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, robust predictors of political conservatism (Golec de Zavala & Mole, 2019). Moreover, in Poland, collective narcissism is associated with a strong support for the neo-fascist organization called the Radical National Camp (Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR; Golec de Zavala & Mole, 2019). This political organization has its roots in a pre-World War II fascist organization, which was delegalized by the Polish prewar government because of its radical anti-Semitism and xenophobia (Goettig, 2018).

Studies indicate that collective narcissism is related to binding moral foundations important for political conservatives (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2019). In this vein, research indicates that political conservatives differ from liberals with respect to the relative weight they give to five basic moral foundations while making moral judgments. Political liberals place a primary emphasis on individualizing moral foundations such as harm-avoidance and fairness. Those moral foundations support the rights of individuals and curb the consequences of self-interest. Conservatives value those concerns as high as the binding moral foundations of group loyalty, obedience to authority, and moral purity (which are not as important to liberals). Binding moral concerns emphasize the importance of group cohesion over individual needs and rights (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). In Poland, collective narcissism was related to high regard for the moral foundations of group loyalty, authority, and purity, but low regard for harm-avoidance. The unique combination
Collective Narcissism

of high regard for binding moral values and low regard for avoiding to harm others associated with collective narcissism may explain why collective narcissists do not shy away from harming others to protect their ingroup's image. In addition, collective narcissism but not ingroup satisfaction mediated the relation between binding moral foundations and the rejection of refugees in Poland.

In sum, collective narcissism has been implicated in phenomena important to scholars of political psychology. It is reliably associated with intergroup hostility, especially in the contexts that undermine the privileged position of the ingroup that collective narcissists claim. Collective narcissism is associated with hypersensitivity to threats to the ingroup's position and prejudice towards outgroups perceived as threatening this position. Collective narcissism is associated with hostile retaliation after negative feedback to the ingroup as well as to subtle or imagined signs of lack of sufficient external appreciation. Collective narcissism is related to retaliation against excluding outgroups, although collective narcissists deny seeing that their ingroup was ostracized. Collective narcissism is associated with biased perception of intergroup situations. Collective narcissists live in the world in which their ingroup is threatened by the hostile intentions of others and is not responsible for its own past wrongdoings but, rather, is justified by blaming its victims for provoking its aggression. Collective narcissists do not forgive the transgressions of outgroups and believe revenge is sweet. This belief drives the association between collective narcissism and aggression towards outgroups perceived as threatening. Collective narcissists value binding moral foundations but do not value avoiding doing harm to others. Collective narcissism lies at the core of populist rhetoric of political organizations built around the resentment for ingroup's lost grandeur and xenophobic sentiments.

Collective Narcissism and the Dynamics of Self-Worth

In one of his essays, Theodor Adorno noted:

Collective narcissism amounts to this: individuals compensate for the consciousness of their social impotence . . . by making themselves, either in reality or merely in their imaginations, into members of a higher, more comprehensive being. To this being they attribute the qualities they themselves lack, and from this being they receive in turn something like a vicarious participation in those qualities. (cited in Bernstein, 1994, p. 123)

He suggested that collective narcissism is a response to the perceived lack of desirable personal characteristics. Adorno (1997) and Fromm (1973, 2010) saw collective narcissism as a strategy to enhance the undermined sense of self-worth (see also Arendt, 1971; Vaknin, 2007). The possibility that individuals exaggerate the importance of their ingroups to compensate for their own diminished sense of self-worth has been also suggested by status politics theorists (Gusfield, 1963; Hofstadter, 1965/2008; Lipset & Raab, 1973). These authors suggest that exaggeration of the ingroup's importance is likely to emerge in social and cultural contexts that diminish positive self-evaluation.

Empirical evidence supports this proposition. According to recent findings, collective narcissism is associated with negative emotionality and lack of life satisfaction. It is also linked to low self-esteem. The negative emotional profile associated with collective narcissism is particularly visible when collective narcissism is considered in contrast to ingroup satisfaction.

*Emotional profile.* Studies suggest that collective narcissistic intergroup hostility may be an aspect of a general predisposition towards negative emotionality associated with collective narcissism. A series of studies indicate that collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction are uniquely associated with distinct emotional profiles (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019b). Collective narcissism is uniquely associated with self-criticism and negative emotionality. On the other hand, ingroup satisfaction is uniquely associated with positive emotionality. In addition, collective narcissism is
uniquely associated with low social connectedness, while ingroup satisfaction is uniquely related to high social connectedness and experiencing self-transcendent emotions. Self-transcendent emotions, such as gratitude and compassion, are positive affective states that bind people together and link them to something larger than their individual selves (Stellar, Cohen, Oveis, & Keltner, 2017). Finally, collective narcissism is associated with sensory-processing sensitivity, which is a genetically determined elevated responsiveness to environmental stimuli involving deeper cognitive and sensory processing, including exaggerated experience of pain (Aron & Aron, 1997) and exaggerated responsiveness to negative stimuli (Jagiellowicz et al., 2011). Highly sensitive people are more vulnerable to negative stimuli and to negative experiences undermining their psychological well-being (Belsky & Pluess, 2009; Booth, Standage, & Fox, 2015).

Importantly, ingroup satisfaction suppresses the link between collective narcissism and negative emotionality and the link between collective narcissism and low life satisfaction. In addition, collective narcissism is positively associated with social connectedness, compassion, and gratitude via ingroup satisfaction. Thus, as long as they feel proud to be members of a valuable group, collective narcissists may feel socially connected and experience positive and self-transcendent emotions. Such results corroborate previous findings, linking ingroup satisfaction to positive emotionality, prosociality, and psychological well-being (Amiot & Aubin, 2013; Yampolsky & Amiot, 2013). They also suggest that people who are genetically predisposed to greater perceptual sensitivity and negative emotionality may be more likely to end up upholding the collective narcissist belief. According to the two factors theory of affect (Diener & Emmons, 1984) and behavioral genetics research (Zheng, Plomin, & von Stumm, 2016), positive emotionality is shaped by environmental experiences, whereas individual differences in negative emotionality have dispositional aetiology and are genetically driven. Thus, negative emotionality may predispose people to be swayed towards collective narcissist belief. Exercising positive emotionality may not only eventually increase life satisfaction but also decrease collective narcissism.

Self-esteem. Studies suggest that collective narcissists may exaggerate their ingroup’s claims to exceptionality to compensate for low self-esteem. For example, research shows that collective narcissism and positive ingroup identification have opposite unique relationships with personal control, the belief in one’s ability to influence the course of one’s own life (Deci & Ryan, 2000), and a reliable correlate of high self-esteem (Judge & Bono, 2001). Results of a cross-sectional study indicated that when the positive overlap between collective narcissism and positive ingroup identification was partialled out, collective narcissism was negatively related to personal control, whereas ingroup identification was positively related to personal control. In two experimental studies, temporarily lowered personal control resulted in an increase in collective narcissism, whereas heightened personal control resulted in an increase in ingroup identification. Finally, a longitudinal study showed that lower personal control uniquely predicted collective narcissism measured six weeks later, whereas higher personal control was related to an increase in ingroup identification six weeks later (Cichocka et al., 2017). These studies suggest that people may be more likely to uphold the collective narcissistic belief when they feel out of control over the events of their lives. Such experience undermines their sense of self-worth.

In other studies, self-esteem was assessed directly. Results of cross-sectional, longitudinal and experimental studies consistently indicated that collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction had opposite unique relations with self-esteem (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a). Two out of six of those studies included measures of personal control and concluded that collective narcissism was uniquely linked to self-esteem, while personal control did not have a unique relationship with collective narcissism over and above self-esteem. Instead, low self-esteem (trait, state, and threatened by social exclusion) reliably and uniquely predicted collective narcissism, while high self-esteem (trait, state, and boosted by social inclusion) reliably, uniquely predicted ingroup satisfaction. Moreover, low self-esteem was related to various forms of derogation of various outgroups (including social distance,
Collective Narcissism

hostile behavioral intentions, and symbolic aggression) via collective narcissism. Low self-esteem predicted anti-Semitism and prejudice towards Syrian refugees in Poland and symbolic aggression towards Muslims in the United States, uniquely via collective narcissism. Experimentally decreased self-esteem was also linked to outgroup derogation via collective narcissism. In all studies, high self-esteem was uniquely linked to ingroup satisfaction. The positive overlap between collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction obscured the negative relation between collective narcissism and self-esteem. When this overlap was statistically removed, the negative relation between self-esteem and collective narcissism emerged.

Such findings elucidate why previous studies found little empirical support for two relationships postulated by the literature: the link between low self-esteem and collective narcissism (Adorno, 1997) and the link between low self-esteem and outgroup derogation (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Our findings clarify that indeed, low self-esteem predicts collective narcissism. This relationship can be observed after the positive overlap between collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction is partialled out. Such results are in line with the claims of Theodor Adorno (1997) and Erich Fromm (1973) that collective narcissism compensates for “ego fragility.”

In addition, findings linking low self-esteem to outgroup derogation via collective narcissism support the second corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis, derived from social identity theory. It posits that low self-esteem should motivate outgroup derogation (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). According to social identity theory, people compare their ingroup with salient outgroups on relevant comparison dimensions to achieve positive ingroup evaluation, which boosts their self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; cf. Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Indeed, empirical evidence supports the expectation that outgroup derogation elevates self-esteem because it increases the chance of achieving positive evaluation of the ingroup (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). However, evidence regarding the second corollary has been so far inconclusive (Brown, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). It has been postulated that the self-esteem hypothesis overimplicates self-esteem in intergroup behavior (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner & Reynolds, 2001) and that the second corollary may be true in a more specific formulation (Martiny & Rubin, 2016; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Indeed, the findings linking low self-esteem to outgroup derogation via collective narcissism suggest one way of specifying the second corollary. They suggest that low self-esteem motivates outgroup derogation when people invest their self-esteem in the belief about their ingroup’s threatened entitlement. Such belief is likely to be salient in times of social change when privileged position of some social groups is questioned. Members of such groups for whom the ingroup serves to advance their sense of self-worth are more likely to derogate outgroups to enhance the ingroup’s positive image because only via this image can they participate in psychological characteristics they desire, but lack.

**Individual narcissism.** Our research also elucidates the links between collective and individual narcissism. Evidence indicates that holding collective narcissist belief about the ingroup, rather than possessing narcissistic individual characteristics, predicts intergroup behaviors (Cai & Gries, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016; Lyons et al., 2010). In addition, studies show that collective narcissism correlates more reliably with vulnerable rather than grandiose individual narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019b). Below we discuss how the two aspects of individual narcissism differ.

Both grandiose and vulnerable narcissism are defined by self-entitlement and interpersonal antagonism. However, grandiose narcissism manifests as a tendency to self-aggrandize, and it is associated with high self-esteem. Vulnerable narcissism manifests as distrustful resentment for lack of personal recognition, and it is associated with low self-esteem (Miller et al., 2017). Vulnerable narcissism correlates with neuroticism. Vulnerable narcissists are described by others as shame-ridden, shy, envious, hypersensitive to criticism, harboring feelings of inadequacy and insecurity, complaining, bitter, and anxious. On the other hand, grandiose narcissism refers to a belief in one’s
own exceptional skills, superiority, and dominance. Grandiose narcissism is associated with agentic extroversion, self-enhancement, self-confidence, and forceful assertion of one’s own worth, as well as with the exploitation of others. Grandiose narcissists are described by others as aggressive, hard-headed, and immodest.

The findings presented in Table 4 and their meta-analytical summary in Table 5 indicate that collective narcissism is associated with vulnerable narcissism in all studies in which this aspect of individual narcissism was assessed. The average effect size for this association is moderate, significant (with 95% CI [0.22,0.27]), and twice as strong as the average association between collective and grandiose narcissism, and it is less heterogeneous. Analyses also confirmed that across different countries, collective narcissism was associated with low self-esteem via vulnerable narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2019b). Thus, the belief that the ingroup’s exceptionality is not sufficiently recognized by others is associated with a similar belief about the self.

The meta-analytical summary suggests that the average small, significant (with 95% CI [0.10,0.15]) association between collective and grandiose narcissism is heterogeneous. The size of this association increases to moderate (with 95% CI [0.25,0.33]) and becomes less heterogeneous when we consider this relationship only in the United States and the United Kingdom. The average association between collective narcissism and grandiose narcissism becomes nonsignificant (with 95% CI [−0.01,0.06]) when we consider this relationship in Poland, Russia, and China. Such findings suggest that only in certain groups, most likely those characterized by high-status and dominant international position, does collective narcissism overlap with grandiose aspect of individual narcissism characterized by forceful demand for recognition of one’s own exceptionality.

Emotional deficits associated with collective narcissism may be better understood when collective narcissism is contrasted with the way grandiose narcissists approach their ingroups. Crucial to grandiose narcissism is self-aggrandizing. Although it is entirely possible that grandiose narcissists identify with social groups and remain their loyal members, as long as they can bask in the ingroups’ glory, it is also likely that they leave the ingroup as soon as they can no longer use it to self-aggrandize (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2008). Grandiose narcissists are not concerned with their ingroups’ welfare. In this, collective and individual narcissism are similar. However, the undermined self-worth and its investment into the belief in the ingroup’s image crucially differentiates collective narcissism from grandiose narcissism. People who hold collective narcissists belief about their ingroup cannot leave the ingroup, in whose image their self-esteem is invested, because only by the virtue of their membership in this group can they partake in the grandiosity they desire.

Thus, the focus of collective narcissism is by definition the ingroup, not the self. Crucial to collective narcissism is the ingroup’s image enhancement. Collective narcissists are preoccupied with recognition of the ingroup’s entitlement. However, on the personal level of self they feel vulnerable and undermined in their sense of self-worth. The analyses performed on longitudinal data also indicate that collective narcissism is an unsuccessful compensation for low self-esteem. Low self-esteem is related to an increase in collective narcissism four and eight weeks later, but collective narcissism is not related to an increase in self-esteem four and eight weeks later. The relationship between collective narcissism in Time 1 and self-esteem in Time 2 is not significant and still negative (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a). Thus, the extensive investment in the protection of the ingroup’s positive image does not seem to improve the undermined sense of self-worth.

In sum, collective narcissism is uniquely related to negative emotionality and the lack of pro-social emotions. This suggests that deficits in the ability to regulate negative emotions may be associated with likelihood to uphold the collective narcissist belief about the ingroup and intergroup hostility. This conclusion is further supported by results indicating that collective narcissism is associated with low self-esteem and vulnerable narcissism, characterized by the resentment for lack of external recognition of personal entitlements. Collective narcissism mediates the link between low self-esteem and outgroup derogation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CN Measure</th>
<th>α</th>
<th>GN Measure</th>
<th>α</th>
<th>rGN</th>
<th>VN Measure</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>rVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cai &amp; Gries, 2013</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>NPI-15</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>NPI-15</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cichocka et al., 2016</td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>NPQC</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Golec de Zavala et al., 2009</td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>NPI</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Golec de Zavala et al., 2016</td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>HSNS</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a</td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>HSNS</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.07***</td>
<td>HSNS †</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.13***</td>
<td>HSNS †</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3</td>
<td>Study 6</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>HSNS †</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3</td>
<td>Study 6</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>HSNS †</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3</td>
<td>Study 6</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>HSNS †</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>HSNS</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Golec de Zavala, Lantos, &amp; Chester, 2019b</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>HSNS</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>HSNS †</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Golec de Zavala &amp; Sedikides, 2019b</td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>NPI †</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>HSNS †</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Golec de Zavala, 2019b</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Five items CNS</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>HSNS</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Nine items CNS</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>NPI-16</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>HSNS</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Lyons et al., 2010</td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Group narcissism scale</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>NPI-40</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Nine items CNS — nine items Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009); five items CNS — five items Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala, 2011); NPI — Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Emmons, 1987); NPI-15 — 15-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Schutz, Marcus, & Sellin, 2004); NPI-16 — 16-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Ames et al., 2006); NPQC — Narcissistic Personality Questionnaire for Children (Ang & Yusof, 2006); HSNS — Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale (Hendin & Check, 1997). † Analysis of variable not reported in the article. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Implications for a Theoretical Framework

Findings regarding its personal-level antecedents suggest that collective narcissism may reflect a process of compensating for low self-esteem by investing it in the belief in the ingroup’s exaggerated image and its entitlement to special recognition. Scholars of the Frankfurt School describe the increase in collective narcissism in Germany after the great economic crisis of the 1930s, which may exemplify such a process. Adorno (1997) and Fromm (1973) argued that the rapid expansion of capitalism and the Great Depression undermined the traditional bases by which people assessed their self-worth. Collective narcissism increased in response to those conditions. A similar process could be observed in the first decades of the new millennium. Collective narcissism was implicated in the widespread support for populist politicians and politics after the financial crisis of 2008 (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marchlewksa et al., 2018). Those examples suggest that in times of uncertainty about personal significance, collective narcissism increases, accompanied by xenophobia and outgroup hostility. In line with those examples, empirical evidence reviewed here indicates that low and undermined self-esteem is associated with outgroup derogation via collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a).

Deficits in Emotional Regulation

Findings linking collective narcissism to low and vulnerable self-esteem, self-criticism, sensitivity to negative environmental stimuli, and negative emotionality suggest that dispositional deficits in emotional resilience and the ability to constructively self-soothe and regulate negative emotions in the face of adversity may be associated with collective narcissism. Such deficits are related to specific weaknesses of the parasympathetic nervous system associated with low vagal tone (Porges, 2007). They may explain the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility. Given that their sense of self-worth is tethered to a group, collective narcissists invest energy in protecting their ingroup’s image, monitoring whether their ingroup is properly acknowledged and distorting the perception of uncomfortable truths about the ingroup. When the ingroup’s image is undermined, their self-esteem is destabilized. Given that their emotionality is mostly negative, their sociality is low and their perception of intergroup situations biased, their reactions to ingroup’s image threats are hostile: anger, contempt, and aggression (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a, 2016). Unless they can partake in the benefits of feeling happy to be members of valuable ingroups, collective narcissists are not well-equipped to stabilize their negative emotions in the face of adversity, and they respond with hostility to small, and often only imagined, provocations.

Table 5. Meta-Analytical Summary of the Relationship Between Collective Narcissism and Individual Narcissism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>k</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>I²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grandiose narcissism —</td>
<td>overall relation</td>
<td>6171</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>133.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandiose narcissism —</td>
<td>USA and UK</td>
<td>2290</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>22.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandiose narcissism —</td>
<td>Poland, Russia, China</td>
<td>3885</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>6.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable narcissism —</td>
<td>overall relation</td>
<td>5256</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>62.11***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = average sample size per study × k. k = number of studies. r = summary correlation coefficient. Q = heterogeneity. I² = proportion unexplained variance.
Benefits of Association With Ingroup Satisfaction

Ingroup satisfaction seems to tap into different psychological processes than collective narcissism. A positive and stable sense of self-worth does not have to depend on the ingroup’s image. It may be achieved in different ways. However, people with high self-esteem tend to project their positive self-evaluation onto groups they belong to. Thus, high self-esteem inspires positive ingroup evaluation (Amiot & Aubin, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a; Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; van Veelen, Otten, & Hansen, 2011). Moreover, people whose self-esteem is high are often motivated to use their personal strengths to benefit their ingroup (Amiot & Sansfaçon, 2011; Jans, Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2011; Legault & Amiot, 2014). In this respect, they differ from both grandiose and collective narcissists. A historical example of such a process may be the successful change in the concept of national identity brought about by the leaders of the Solidarity movement that hastened the overthrow of the Communist regime in Poland. Leaders of this movement, “entrepreneurs” of a new national identity (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005), exhibited stable self-esteem and autonomy, resisting the regime’s retribution in the name of improving the group they held in high esteem (Kurowski, 2011).

Ingroup satisfaction is associated not only with high self-esteem, but also with positive emotionality, prosociality, and emotional resilience (Amiot & Aubin, 2013; Amiot & Sansfaçon, 2011; Golec de Zavala, 2019b). Moreover, as long as collective narcissists are also satisfied and proud members of their groups, they may experience positive and self-transcendent emotions (Golec de Zavala, 2019b), and they are less hostile (Golec de Zavala et al., 2018a, 2019a). This is analogous to findings from the personal level of self, suggesting that individual narcissism is related to psychological well-being, only inasmuch as it overlaps with high self-esteem (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004; Zuckerman & O’Loughlin, 2009).

Findings reviewed here indicate that the less collective narcissists participate in emotional benefits of ingroup satisfaction, the more they are unable to regain balance after drawbacks and the lower their sense of self-worth. However, as long as they are also satisfied ingroup members, they may have access to psychological resources to help them regulate negative emotions. This suggests that experiencing positive and self-transcending emotions may address deficits in emotion regulation associated with the tendency to uphold the collective narcissist belief. If deficits in emotional regulation are behind the association of collective narcissism with intergroup hostility, interventions that address those deficits should be able to reduce this link.

Interventions to Fortify Emotional Regulation

Although emotionality is a relatively stable way of relating to the outside world (Lee & Robbins, 2000), sustainable change over time is possible (Williams & Galliher, 2006). Positive emotionality not only signals, but also produces well-being (Fredrickson, 2001). Particularly important is experiencing self-transcendent emotions, which helps regulate negative emotions and refine the physiological and neural mechanisms of emotional regulation (Kok et al., 2013; Stellar et al., 2015). Two initial investigations examined whether experiencing self-transcending emotions weakens the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility. They looked at the role of gratitude, feeling thankful for and appreciative of positive aspects of experience (Fredrickson, 2001), and kama muta, being moved or touched by love, the sudden feeling of oneness with another person or entity (Fiske, Seibt, & Schubert, 2017). Their results are encouraging, and they support the proposed interpretative framework of collective narcissism as an investment of undermined self-worth into the belief in the ingroup’s greatness and entitlement.

Specifically, results of two correlational studies indicate that the link between collective narcissism and prejudice is weaker among grateful people. Additionally, results of one experimental study
showed that a 10-minute-long, audio-guided, mindful gratitude meditation, which increased state gratitude and mindfulness, significantly decreased the link between Polish collective narcissism and anti-Semitism. After participating in the mindful gratitude meditation, Polish collective narcissists were twice less likely to hold negative attitudes towards Jews in comparison to the control condition or mindfulness without gratitude content (Golec de Zavala & Sedikides, 2019).

Another study focused on kama muta, a sudden sense of deep communal sharing, experience of “togetherness” with others (Fiske et al., 2017). Experiencing kama muta is characterized by a “heart-warming” sensation, goose bumps, feeling choked up by emotion, tearful with joy, and uplifted. Results of an experimental study showed that momentary induction of kama muta decreased the link between collective narcissism and behavioral intentions to harm Syrian refugees in Poland. This reduction was particularly pronounced among collective narcissists who perceived refugees as a threatening outgroup (Komorowska, 2018).

Conclusions

The research on collective narcissism has recently experienced a surge of attention. Collective narcissism explains variance in phenomena, pertinent to scholars of political psychology, such as voting for populist and ultra-conservative politicians and parties, support for neo-Nazi organizations, support for violence among radicalized groups, prejudice and intergroup hostility (Golec de Zavala, 2018). Collective narcissism has been legitimized as a way of discussing national identity by recent voting decisions such as the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom or the election of populist governments in Eastern Europe. The increased presence of collective narcissism in public life makes this belief about the position of the ingroup in the intergroup relations seems legitimate. Consequences of legitimization of this belief can be delineated based on the research findings reviewed in this article.

Collective narcissism is associated with the tendency to engage in and escalate intergroup conflicts. Thus, one can expect further intensification of international tensions, particularly since alliances formed by collective narcissists are likely to be short-lived due to their distrust and biased perception of the outgroups as harboring hostile intentions towards the ingroup. The inclination towards conspiratorial ideation is likely to give prominence to conspiracy theories in political discourse as collective narcissism becomes more pronounced among elites. In domestic affairs, legitimization of collective narcissism is likely to lead to aggravation of intergroup tensions, since collective narcissists rely on a narrow definition of who exactly is the “true” member of the nation. In particular, minorities become the targets of collective narcissistic hostility and derogation because they threaten the privileged status of the “true” nationals. Divisions are also likely to deepen between those who support the collective narcissistic vision of the nation and the internal opposition. Thus, the need for better understanding of the reasons people sway towards collective narcissist belief about their ingroup seems pressing. Notably, understanding what factors may alleviate the negative societal consequences of collective narcissism seems important.

In this article, we propose to interpret collective narcissism as an investment of undermined sense of self-worth into the belief about the ingroup’s entitlement. Findings suggest that collective narcissists feel entitled to special treatment and resentful for the lack of recognition at the same time. Collective narcissism is related to low self-esteem, low sense of personal control, and vulnerable narcissism. Thus, the sense of personal vulnerability underlies their investment in the ingroup’s exaggerated image and may be the reason why collective narcissists interpret intergroup situations in a biased way, seeing their ingroup as constantly threatened by outgroups. Since their self-esteem is invested in their ingroup’s image, it cannot be dissociated from the ingroup. Therefore, collective narcissists are hypersensitive to signs that their ingroup’s entitlement is undermined such as negative feedback, criticism, or exclusion. Since their emotionality is predominantly negative, they seem
driven to the reinforcing function of retaliatory aggression as a method of down-regulating the negative effects of such threats.

Interventions that support the ability to regulate negative emotions seem to reduce the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility. The positive overlap between collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction mitigates collective narcissistic intergroup hostility, arguably because it gives collective narcissists access to positive and self-transcendent emotions. This suggests that emphasizing their ingroup satisfaction, feeling proud to be a member of a valuable ingroup, and a willingness to work for the ingroup’s welfare may decrease the appeal of collective narcissism and decrease the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility. Thus, the findings reviewed in this article suggest that acting on President Kennedy’s famous proposition “ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country” could serve to mitigate the intergroup hostility associated with collective narcissism.

**Future Directions**

The theoretical framework on collective narcissism we propose in this article allow for the interpretation of existing findings as well as formulating novel predictions. Below, we outline several research questions that are important for future researchers to study. In previous studies, collective narcissism was differentiated from individual narcissism both on theoretical and empirical levels. However, the present review indicates that although collective narcissism was not related to grandiose aspect of individual narcissism in Poland, Russia, and China (where it correlated only with vulnerable narcissism), it was related to both vulnerable and grandiose aspects of individual narcissism in the United States and the United Kingdom. Future studies should explain why collective narcissism is associated with grandiose narcissism in some countries but not in others. Such studies would do well to look to political and cultural factors affecting the link between collective narcissist belief about the ingroup and grandiose aspect of individual narcissism.

Future studies should also explore the situations that affect collective narcissism. We conceptualize collective narcissism as a belief about the ingroup and its intergroup position that characterizes people with a degree of stability. However, collective narcissism is likely to be affected by situational factors. In our research, we failed to change support for collective narcissist belief by manipulating the sense of relative deprivation (Guerra, Golec de Zavala & Louceiro, 2018) or personal uncertainty (Golec de Zavala, 2010). However, we found that collective narcissism increases in response to situations that lower self-esteem: social exclusion (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019a) and undermined personal control (Cichocka et al., 2017). Future studies would do well examining the predictions of the Frankfurt School scholars suggesting that collective narcissism should increase in response to situations that undermine certainty of self-worth. In such conditions, salient rhetoric that stabilizes the undermined self-esteem by investing it in the ingroup’s image is likely to produce higher levels of collective narcissism.

Researchers should also explore in more detail the relationship between collective narcissism and political conservatism in different political contexts. The findings reviewed here suggest that collective narcissism is related to political conservatism and preference for right-wing parties and politicians. However, political conservatism is a multidimensional phenomenon, and it takes different forms in different political contexts. Different subtypes of liberals and conservatives were differentiated based on individuals’ preferences for specific arrangements that correspond to the “fiscal” or “economic” dimension versus the “social” dimension of political conservatism (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Feldman & Johnston, 2013; Weber & Federico, 2013). Future studies would do well to explore how collective narcissism corresponds to different subtypes of political conservatism in different political contexts.
In a similar vein, reviewed studies showed that collective narcissism uniquely explains variance in political conservatism over and above such robust predictors as social dominance orientation and authoritarianism. Future studies may explore whether collective narcissism corresponds to a unique dimension of political orientation, independent of preference for equality versus inequality (corresponding to individual difference in social dominance orientation) and to preference for openness versus conformity (corresponding to individual difference in right-wing authoritarianism; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Perhaps this dimension is defined by the emphasis on individuals contributing to the welfare of the ingroup versus a group serving the needs of an individual.

Initial studies examined collective narcissism in the context of intergroup exclusion. Those studies point to the phenomenon of biased “blindness” to intergroup exclusion associated with collective narcissism. Specifically, collective narcissists see intergroup exclusion when their ingroup is in fact fairly treated and included, but they do not see exclusion when their ingroup is in fact excluded. Future studies should examine this phenomenon in more depth. Studies examining whether collective narcissists experience distress in the face of intergroup exclusion and use intergroup aggression to reduce this distress would also provide a very good test of the compensatory nature of collective narcissism.

Studies pointing to the role of self-transcending emotions in reducing the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility provide an initial support for the proposed interpretative framework that sees collective narcissism as a response to undermined self-worth. Future studies could further explore such effects. So far, studies have only looked at the role of gratitude and kama muta. Perhaps similar results can be obtained by inducing other self-transcending emotions. However, one issue needs to be considered by future studies. Namely, some of the self-transcending emotions such as compassion, a need to ease somebody else’s suffering, seem to be parochial: They are more likely to be experienced towards ingroup members rather than towards outgroup members (Stellar et al., 2017). Thus, future studies would do well to examine whether all self-transcending emotions are equally suitable as interventions reducing collective narcissistic intergroup hostility.

In this context, kama muta as an intervention offers particular hope. It not only reduced collective narcissistic intergroup hostility, but also collective narcissists were more prone to experience it (which may suggest they had particularly low previous experience with this emotion). Kama muta is not felt in response or towards another person or a group, but it stems from and increases commitment to the communal sharing relationship with other people, an experience of shared “togetherness” beyond boundaries (Fiske et al., 2017). Experiencing kama muta may dissolve and undermine the intergroup boundaries—ingroup versus outgroup divisions along which prejudice and intergroup hostility are formed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The work on this article was supported by Grant 2017/26/A/HS6/00647 from National Science Centre (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) in Poland. The authors would like to thank Carla Murteira for her initial work on the meta-analytical summaries and Stephen Reicher, the anonymous reviewer, and Debra Helmer for their helpful comments that helped us improve this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Agnieszka Golec de Zavala, Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, 8 Lewisham Way, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, UK. E-mail: agnieszka.golec@gmail.com

REFERENCES


rodek Karta. Kuro


Collective Narcissism


