AN OCCIDENTALIST FANTASY:
Turkish Radio and National Identity

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PhD Thesis
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2000
ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses radio broadcasting as an area that conveys the complex dynamics of boundary management in the constitution of Turkish national identity. The research dwells on the conceptions, sites of transmission, strategies and programmes of Turkish Radio from its inauguration in 1927 until the end of the 1940s, and the field of force lines it was positioned in, particularly in relation to the BBC Turkish Section during the same period.

The main hypothesis in the thesis is that the historical divide between “the West” and “the East” over-determined the way tensions in Turkish radio broadcasting -between “the elite” and “the people”, and between men and women- were conceived and handled. Every attempt to define, build and demarcate Turkish national identity was shaped with reference to an imagined Western-ness and for the Western gaze, which is called Occidentalism in the thesis. Turkish Radio was regarded as the “voice of the nation” and was imagined to be heard simultaneously by Others, the West and the people. However, the thesis also attends to the reality of the Occidentalist fantasy. Through a comparative analysis of the BBC Turkish Section Radio and Turkish Radio, the thesis shows how fantasies of the Other in both cases were shaped in relation to each other, in a dialogic relationship.

Radio technology with its processes of embodiment and disembodiment, and “mass address” provided the means to produce and sustain an Occidentalist fantasy that both denied and re-defined divisions in the national realm in a dialogic link with the West. Thus, the thesis raises a range of theoretical and practical questions concerning the discursive, technical and psychoanalytical aspects of national identity and “communication” through radio broadcasting.
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PREFACE

...one who goes too far East,
because of geography, arrives in the West.
The reverse is also true.
Ece Ayhan

I did the other way around, I went West to arrive in the East. The process of doing my research and writing this thesis involved frequent traveling between Britain and Turkey. I discovered the many and fragmented selves within me through these voyages. One “self” was speaking in English and enjoying it, while another was feeling alien there, missing the sounds and smells of home. One was scrutinising “the British way of life”, the other was judging the Turkish “mentality”. So, I traveled back and forth between orientalisms and occidentalisms. Yet, the critical distance from both “the West” and “the East” helped me to “pass through” the Occidentalist fantasy. By translating Turkish texts into English, and Western theories into the Turkish context, I could follow the footsteps of the early Turkish national elite, whom I take as an object of analysis in the thesis.

The traveling also introduced me to the realities of the borders. Every time I passed through the customs at the Heathrow Airport I learned once more that I was “Other” -queuing in the line for “Other” and having to account for my journey each time- despite my position of being both a student and a tutor in British universities. So I could, in a mediated way, identify with the “blacks” of Britain. As in the poem of Merle Collins’ “The sheep and the goats”, which reflects the experience of blacks exposed to racism at immigration control, I was puzzled too:

Standing in the queue
at the airport terminal

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1 From a poem by a Turkish poet, Ece Ayhan, Yort Savul: Şiirler 1956-76, Istanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayinevi, p.41.
I tried to decide which were the sheep and which the goats. These experiences informed my research and ways of theorising. On the other hand, the research question held a mirror to the researcher. I realised that in posing questions to a past, I was, in fact, tackling the question of "What is my present?" So, my research, that takes an excursion into Turkish history, is inevitably linked to my present which is semi self-consciously split between my own "native" history and my Western academic formation.

I owe many thanks to all those who supported me through these difficult, sometimes painful, voyages. I feel a deep gratitude to my supervisor, Andrew Barry, who has guided me very gently out of blocks and moments of crisis. Yet I have the full responsibility for possible errors. I feel I was lucky to be in Goldsmiths College where the academic staff and colleagues provided a highly motivating intellectual environment. I would particularly want to thank Les Back, Vikki Bell and Celia Lury, from Goldsmiths College, for their valuable comments. I would like to thank Paddy Scannell (CCIS) and John Keane (CSD) from Westminster University, who with their letters of recommendation made my acceptance to the Goldsmiths College possible; and Ayşe Öncü from Boğaziçi University who recommended me to the MERC Award. Thanks to John Thompson from Jesus College and to Georgina Born from Emmanuel College, helping me to get supervision work in Cambridge University; and to Patricia Cole, John James and Michael Bull from Anglia Polytechnic University who offered me a part-time lectureship in their university. I also appreciate the vital contributions of Overseas Research Students Award Scheme, the British Council, The British Federation of Women Graduates Charitable Foundation, the Ford Foundation (MERC Award) funding my studies and research. Finally I owe more than thanks to my friends, Gabriela, Neils, Claudia, Tevfik, Aslı, Anna,

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2 in *Rotten Pomerack* (1992)
Ahmet, Algün, Selma, Berrak, Bülent, Teresa, Linda, Michael, Hale, Müge, Semih, Ferhan, “here” and “there”, who have generously opened their houses, hearts and minds to support my practical and theoretical traveling. And it was love which, at the end, gathered me safely in. I don’t know a better word, thank you Timuçin.
INTRODUCTION

Turkish Radio, National Identity, and the “Real Thing”

“Of all the nations in the world, Turkey is unique in having failed to forge a consistent image of herself. Is she of Europe or of the East? Is she a modern nation-state or a feudalist association wallowing in the Middle Ages? Is she a popular democracy or a camouflaged group dictatorship? Aware of their lack of articulateness in international discourse, the Turks blame themselves for this confusion.” Eren (1963: 249)

This thesis is about Turkish radio broadcasting starting from 1927 until the end of the 1940s. Yet its aim is not solely to give an account of the history of Turkish radio broadcasting. It addresses the question of Turkish national identity, as it manifests itself in and through radio broadcasting. It also attends to sentiments due to the lack of a “consistent image” torn between the East and the West, and the desire for recognition from an imagined West. The thesis, therefore entails a range of theoretical and practical questions concerning the discursive, technical and psychoanalytical aspects of national identity and communication.

From its beginning until the 1990s radio broadcasting was controlled by the state in Turkey within a legal framework that did not allow private and independent local broadcasting. It maintained a centralised structure based around Istanbul and Ankara. In the 30's

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1 The ban on private broadcasting was waived following a popular demand of both potential private broadcasters and the audience in 1991. Today there are 1056 radio stations all over the country. Still most of them are concentrated in big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Hürriyet, 15 June 1999.

2 The legal decree that envisioned the constitution of radio stations in different provinces was made in 1959. It took some years to put it into practice: Erzurum, Iskenderun, Diyarbakır, Van, Adana, Antalya, and Kars radio stations started their regular broadcasting between 1961-1963 (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 380). Both Kocabaşoğlu (1980) and Mahmut Tali Öngören, whom I interviewed (24 January 1996) and who worked as a programme director in Ankara Radio after 1957, point to the “dependent” programming of radio stations in provinces: most of the programmes were sent from Ankara.
and 40's the radio was considered as the “voice of the nation”. This was not unique to Turkish broadcasting though. It is well documented that radio figured significantly in "building" and sustaining a “national life” mainly until the end of the 50’s in Europe and the United States, although the assumptions of the existing research regarding nation and communication are highly debatable. (Barfield, 1996; Briggs, 1961; 1965; Cain, 1992; Crisell, 1997; Hillard&Keith, 1997; Hilmes, 1997; Scannell&Cardiff, 1991) “Nation” and “communication” cannot be treated as objective facts that simply correlate; they have been configured within the same historical dynamic. What the Turkish case reveals most explicitly is the gap between the imagination attached to the “voice” produced by radio technology and the “reality” into which it traveled. Radio technology of the West allowed experimentations in the domain of the audible to manufacture a “modern nation” in Turkey, but at the same, these oral representations could not be easily matched with the visible; in other words, Turkey could not build itself a “consistent image”: the sound of the West contradicted the vision of the East. There are ample accounts of the contradiction in the history of early Turkish broadcasting which have informed my research. The thesis attends to this gap and aims to account for it by problematising the ways of conceptualising the oppositions of East and West; discourse and technology; and reality and fantasy.

I agree with Michele Hilmes, who has written on American broadcasting between 1922-1952, that we regard “radio not as a collection of wires, transmitters, and electrons but as a social practice grounded in culture, rather than in electricity...” (1997: xiii) But we should not regard radio as solely belonging to a field of culture which excludes technicalities and material arrangements. Radio is, at the same time, “wires, transmitters, and electrons.” It is the technology of radio through which the broadcaster builds a certain political imagination regarding his/her subject position and the audience. As Raymond Williams argues in the case of writing, the technology of a certain medium of expression influences “the conditions of composition: the kinds of “audience” or “reader” in mind or addressed; the available forms and conventions; the state of the language itself.”
Thus the technical aspects such as the setting of transmitters, their location and strength, the quality of radio voices, and the problem of distortions, as well as more linguistic questions such as the composition of radio talks, the correct accent of the presenters, the radio drama form, all were charged with national meanings in Turkish radio broadcasting, similar to others in Europe and the US. These meanings involved the management of boundaries that were to differentiate a national elite from a “mass” audience, a “national” culture from that of “minorities” (in terms of race, religion or ethnicity), and the positioning of the national in face of other cultures. They were played out in defining the national time, the national space, and gender differences. Radio technology, as a technology of transmitting sounds to a wide geographical area, was utilised in defining the masses, a distinctive trait of national cultures in the beginning of the twentieth century. Different from writing, radio played a role in “the twentieth-century transition from a culture based on conservation to one of consumption.” (Hilmes, 1997: xiv) It led to “shifts in relations of power and social distinctions, particularly around race, gender, and ethnicity...” (Ibid)

But how to analyse Turkish radio broadcasting, if it had to deal with the gap between a Western technology and a so-called Turkish culture, designated as Oriental by the West in its past? How to make sense of the anxiety of a prominent Turkish nationalist, Afetinan, who addressed the Turkish on BBC Turkish broadcasts and tried to convince them of Turkish Westernisation after 40 years of Turkish “Westernisation”:

“We Turks have really achieved the radical application of the Westernization movement through Atatürk’s leadership. Atatürk had a wide cultural background and he read not only books connected with his profession but on other subjects as well and he loved to discuss and argue with scientists and scholars of various branches... He did not want the Turkish Nation to adopt a way of life different from

3 Liah Greenfeld makes an important point that apart from other institutional and political traits, the specificity of nationalism, “that which distinguishes nationality from other types of identity, derives from the fact that nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a “people,” which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity.” (1992: 3)

4 An adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal, who had been presented as a model for new Turkish women.
It is also interesting that Afetinan used pieces of Orientalist writing, such as Lady Montague's letters, in her BBC Turkish Service talks to inform the Turkish audience of Turkish genius. She adopted an internalised Orientalist approach to prove that Turkish nation is in fact Western. The question, then, of comprehending the dynamics of Turkish national identity manifested through radio technology gets even more complicated. If one aspect of the question is the way nations are imagined as sovereign units, the other is how different national imaginations are shaped with respect to each other on the basis of power relations and technologies of power. It is a question that addresses issues related with national identity, Orientalism, postcolonial theory, technology, subjectivity and politics. It cuts across a range of disciplines and focuses on a boundary that implies a necessary critical distance to each of them.

Are all “Imagined Communities” Imagined in the Same Way?

The idea that nations are fabricated or invented, instead of being defined by a natural heritage, such as language, race or religion, though not a novel idea, gained significance in the last decade especially with Benedict Anderson’s seminal book *Imagined*
Anderson’s contribution was to introduce the term “imagination” instead of “invention” or “fabrication” which emphasised the role of communication in the making of a national community. While Gellner’s term “invention” (1964) implied a possibility of a true and authentic community, Anderson argued that all communities, apart from primordial villages of face-to-face contact, are imagined:

“It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” (Anderson, 1991: 6)

Anderson attends to institutional and technical aspects of the national imagining, and dwells on the interaction between the capitalistic system of production, the technology of communications, and the fatality of human linguistic diversity (1991: 43). He analyses several cases of national imagination ranging from Europe to India to demonstrate the specifics of this process. Yet, despite the emphasis on historical analysis he remains within a structuralist framework, connecting nation with a certain function, that of meaning of life. In this framework, all communities had to assume a nation form, once their “sacred genealogies” were annihilated by European imperialism (Anderson, 1991:70). Late nationalist imaginings outside of Europe

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8 Benedict Anderson, in his introduction to Mapping the Nation, “maps the terrain” of nationalism stating that there is no political phenomenon as nationalism which remains “so puzzling and about which there is less analytic consensus”. (1996:1) There has been a variety of theoretical stances which explicated the connections between nation and state, nation and economic transformation, and nation and ethnicity represented primarily by Bauer (1996), Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1990) and Smith (1983). There is also some writing on the problematic relation of Marxism to nationalism (Munck, 1986; Nairn, 1977). Yet the scope of nationalism as a political phenomenon was extended by Anderson’s book by attending to the relation between a transformation in consciousness and “sociological” and “historical” factors, thus extending the limits of the political. For a sociological critique of this property of Anderson’s work see Breuilly (1985).

9 Anderson refers primarily to print. However, he also makes reference to radio technology in this context: “Invented only in 1895, radio made it possible to bypass print and summon into being an aural representation of the imagined community where the printed page scarcely penetrated. Its role in the Vietnamese and Indonesian revolutions, and generally in mid-twentieth century nationalisms, has been much underestimated and understudied.” (1991: 54)

10 Anderson pointed to the affinity of national imagining to religious imaginings; and argued that the idea of nation had to replace religious belief, as a “secular transformation of fatality into continuity.” (1991:10-11)
had no choice but to adopt "the model". This was facilitated by a "new consciousness", embedded in "homogeneous, empty time" which "created amnesias and estrangements exactly parallel to the forgetting of childhood brought on by puberty." (Anderson, 1998: 57)

Anderson, despite his psychological descriptions, does not venture into the field of subjectivity in national imaginings, especially of those who had to follow the model. He does not ask the question why, for example, "the young officers ('Turks') produced by new military academies" and who "played significant roles in the development of nationalism" (Anderson, 1991:120) accepted the name "Young Turks" given to them by Europeans (Mardin, 1962). Instead, he emphasises the institutional basis of nationalist ideas. In a similar vein, he detects "the seeds of Turkish nationalism" in "the appearance of a lively vernacular press in Istanbul in the 1870s." (Anderson, 1991:75) but does not inquire about the way an imported technology and medium triggered a national imagining. The technology of communication is treated as an objective factor by Anderson, that travels not only in homogeneous and empty time but also in space.

While Anderson's work deals with the model and its import into the non-West in terms of the objective conditions of national imaginings, other scholars of nationalism, such as Bhabha (1990) and Chatterjee (1993a; 1993b) treat the question of the nation within the terms of subjectivity/intersubjectivity shaped by colonial and postcolonial dynamics. With differing styles of analysis both Bhabha and Chatterjee offer critiques of Anderson's work. Bhabha points to "subaltern voice of the people" that speaks "betwixt and between

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11 Anderson argues, with Hobsbawm that the French Revolution was turned into a 'thing' due to its entrance to the memory of print; "the experience was shaped by millions of printed words into a 'concept' on the printed page, and in due course, into a model." (1991:80)

12 Printing technology was introduced to the Ottoman Empire by Ibrahim Müteferrika and Said Mehmet who brought the machinery and equipment from Europe in 1728. One of the first books they published was a Turkish grammar book designed to teach Turkish to French merchants (Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 1, p. 94). Also the first newspapers were started by the Westerners. They were designed to "guide the Ottoman government"; and had names such as Le Progrès d'Orient, Levant Times, Le Stamboul (Alemdar, 1996:17).

13 As Chatterjee puts it, "the theoretical tendency represented by Anderson attempts to treat the phenomenon as part of the universal history of the modern world." (1993b:5)
times and places" (1990:309) yet without necessarily pointing to a medium for it other than language and its performativity. He dismisses the question of technology in the process of signification. Chatterjee raises a more critical question: “If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?” (1993b: 5) He argues that anticolonial nationalism constitutes a “derivative discourse” which locates the national imagining in the domain of the spiritual -dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains: the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the “outside”, of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology. It is a domain where “the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed.” (Chatterjee, 1993b:6) In this way Chatterjee also renders the problem of technology insignificant; he brackets it off.

Is it possible to repose the question of national imagination without either treating technology as a universal and structural determinant or dismissing it all together in order to stress anticolonial and imperialistic subjectivity? This very question has been a leading one in my research. I argue that the question is especially significant in Turkish nationalism which was imagined to be a blending of an authentic national culture with Western civilisation, mainly seen as a source of modern technologies and techniques.

14 Bhabha says that “(T)he space of the arbitrary sign, its separation of language and reality, enables Anderson to stress the imaginary or mythical nature of the society of the nation. However, the differential time of the arbitrary sign is neither synchronous nor serial. In the separation of language and reality -in the process of signification- there is no epistemological equivalence of subject and object, no possibility of the mimesis of the meaning.” (1990:308-9)

15 The idea is most evident in Ziya Gökalp’s writings, who is considered to be one of the sources of Turkish nationalism. He wrote in the beginning of the twentieth century that national culture and civilisation are two different orders, the former consisting of non-voluntary and essential ties, and the latter of voluntary adaptations of knowledge and technique. He said: “Because the Turkists want to leave the Eastern civilisation, which is Byzantine, and take the Western civilisation, they will succeed. The Turkists are those who want to remain Turkish and Muslim yet are willing to enter into the Western civilisation with no reservations.” (Gökalp, 1994: 39) The idea was taken by Kemalists after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, who sought a balance of Western civilisation and Turkish culture in their modernising reforms.
The “Model” and the “Copy”

Recently, Turkish scholars are more critically engaged with a range of questions regarding the so-called “national history” offering critiques of official discourses on Turkish nationalism and modernisation (Akçam, 1994; Aktar, 1993; Aydin; 1993; Bora, 1996; Ersanlı- Behar, 1992; Göle, 1991; 1997; Kadioğlu, 1996; Kandiyoti, 1989; 1991; 1993; 1996; 1997a; 1997b; 1998; Kasaba, 1997; Keyder, 1987; 1997; Öztürkmen, 1998; Parla, 1985; 1989; 1991a; 1991b; 1992; Yeşen, 1995; 1999; Yeşilkaya, 1999). The recent literature on nationalism and national identity contest significant issues in official history concerning Westernisation, gender, Islam and ethnicity. Yet it is possible to argue that the problem of the Western “model of civilisation” has not been dealt critically enough, that is, by attending to the history of the concept of the “model”. There is a tendency to interpret the making of Turkish nation in terms of “fabrication” from a model. The perspective which privileges fabrication to historical dynamics can be designated as an inversion of the framework of Kemalism. In order to refute the Kemalist theses on nationality, which had emphasised that the Turkish nation as a whole had awakened to their national life under the guidance of a father Turk, Atatürk; the oppositional reading of history underlines the fact that the “national project” was alien to the people. If the former representation sticks to a universal model by way of naturalising the birth and the existence of the Turkish nation, the latter projects an Orientalist outlook back to itself. While the West remains the stage for modernity to play its concepts and institutions, Turkish identity is treated within a problematic of imitation. According to this view, the Turkish “modernising elite” voluntarily adopted Western civilisation and

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16 For example, Kadioğlu who makes use of Chatterjee’s perspective to analyse Turkish nationalism, argues that “the emerging new Turkish identity...was distinguished by its manufactured character.” (1996:188) Despite the fact that Chatterjee insists on the dynamics of imagining the nation in India (1993a; 1993b), Kadioğlu’s statement reflects the exceptionalism that has been so widely internalised by the Turkish people.

17 I make this point because, as Edward Said argues in Orientalism (1995) an Orientalist look would deny any historicity for the so-called Orient; it treats it as a constructed category “with no corresponding equivalent in the Orient itself.”
imposed it on the masses. This approach renders Turkish nationalism as a non-historical and non-sociological phenomenon.

Recent critical readings of modernity and nationalism in Turkey are self-consciously opposed to modernisation theories. As Bozdoğan and Kasaba argue, “(I)n Turkey and around the world today, we are witnessing the eclipse of the progressive and emancipatory discourse of modernity.” (1997:3) Where classical modernisation theories celebrated the adaptation of Western modernity in Turkey, critiques of this approach “publicly debate and criticize the Kemalist doctrine as a patriarchal and antidemocratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural experience of the people in Turkey.” (Bozdoğan&Kasaba, 1997: 4)

Where the former saw a more or less successful example of universal modernity, the latter treats the Turkish case as a failure to achieve a democratic and modern society. While communication technology was considered as essential by modernisation theorists, critiques of modernisation mostly dwell on narratives and projects, and ignore the question of technology and material arrangements.

However both views share the reference point of the implicit model. Whether the history of Westernisation is designated as a success or as a failure, both versions imply that Turkey which “imitated” the West is an exceptional case: an inept vehicle for Western modernisation. It is bound to be a “copy”. Modernisation theorists regarded the process of Westernisation as a spatial movement of Western values and techniques, yet due to be distorted in the end because of the essential particulars of the specific space under consideration. It is not surprising that Bernard Lewis, who

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18 Keyder argues that “Turkish nationalism is an extreme example of a situation in which the masses remained silent partners and the modernizing elite did not attempt to accommodate popular resentment.” (1997: 43)

19 Classical texts of modernisation theory are considered to be Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society (1958); and Bernard Lewis's The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1968).

20 Anthony Smith refers to Lerner's book (1958) to illustrate the link between modernisation and communication: “Modernisation theorists who stress the crucial role of 'communications' and a 'communications revolution' have found in this approach a useful tool for analysing the political changes in societies newly exposed to the impact of the West. Modern Turkey provides a typical case-study of this 'communications revolution’.” (1983:89)
celebrated “the emergence of modern Turkey” (1968) more than thirty years ago, today evaluates the Turkish case as still facing “important choices” between the Middle East and the West\(^{21}\) (B. Lewis, 1997: 48). Turkey is not “there” yet because “(C)atching up with the modern world means more than borrowing or buying modern technology.” (Ibid., 46) The Turkish case can only be found “impressive” when compared to “other Muslim and Middle Eastern countries facing such problems.” (Winter, 1984: 192) Those who are more critical of the dominance of Western values, such as Robins (1996) pursue the same logic to emphasise the evils of the imitation. According to Robins, Turkish culture “has been imitative and derivative in its emulation of the European model.” (1996: 67) He believes that Kemalists sought a simulation of the original paradigm. “But, of course, however good the simulation, it does not amount to *the real thing*.” (Robins, 1996: 67, emphasis added)

So, one is confronted with several questions deriving from the above statements concerning Westernisation in Turkey: the problem of how one might conceive of “impact” and “influences”; the problem of what “imitation” may mean; and of course, the problem of what the “real thing” is. Hence a theoretical challenge for my research: Should I treat my work as an “example” that would be complementary to Western studies that dealt with modernity, and nationhood in specific? Such an approach would follow the work of Anderson or Schlesinger - who has complemented Anderson’s argument by stressing the need to “take account of later, post-Gutenberg media technologies and try to examine their implications for the consciousness of nationhood.” (1991:164) Or, should I perhaps, attend to the nature of the difference of Turkey, treating my research subject as a separate history which has its own peculiarities and patterns?

These questions are especially critical in the historical context of the relations between the West and its others. Modernity is a Western

\(^{21}\) In his recent work he argues that: “Turkey today stands before important choices. It may choose, as some of its leaders would clearly prefer, to turn its back on the West and return to the Middle East, this time not leading but following, in a direction determined by others. It may choose, as other Turkish leaders would clearly prefer, to tighten its ties with the West and turn its back on the Middle East, except for those countries that share Turkey’s westward orientation and democratic aspirations.” (Lewis, 1997:48)
concept, “inextricably linked to the history of European colonialism.” (Osborne, 1995:13) The fact that Europe is already an example, bound with the history of domination over others, inscribes a hierarchy between the examples in Europe and those elsewhere: As Derrida puts it:

"...Europe has the privilege of being the *good example*, for it incarnates in its purity the Telos of all historicity: universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditionality, and so forth;... The empirical types of non-European societies, then, are only *more or less* historical; at the lower limit, they tend toward nonhistoricity." (1992:115)

If one looks at the Turkish case within the terms of Western modernity, one can only see the lack ascribed to it. If one begins “by defining the phenomenon that does not fit into existing conceptual frameworks in negative terms as a society which does not have something we understand” (Gledhill, 1994:12), Turkey would be regarded as “exotic”. In the first approach the Turkish example acquires a resistance to Western critical theory as it falls out of historicity. In the second, one is confronted with excesses of meaning that remain inexplicable within the terms of contemporary social theory. By treating the Turkish case as essentially different from Western modernity, one falls into the trap of a relativistic approach that repeats “a Romantic respect for particulars for their own sake, recoding a discredited Arnoldian ‘culture’ as Third World ‘difference’” (Robbins, 1992:55). The structuring mechanisms or the constitutive principles that delimit and represent the “differences” remain unacknowledged. Furthermore, a relativistic approach does not have any explanatory value in a case where it is obvious that the technologies, such as broadcasting, and even the concepts, such as nation, are Western imports. Therefore a new theoretical conceptualisation is required to comprehend the historical interdependence between Turkey and the West, without either collapsing particular differences into a dubious universalism, or
celebrating particularisms for their own sake.22

This new theoretical conceptualisation is especially significant when one attends to questions of identity and technology in a nation-state that aspires to be an “example” of modernity for its neighbours in the Middle East23 but never manages to be a good one: a national identity that has been signified, both in Europe and in Turkey, to be a bridge between East and West. Turkey has been regarded, since at least the nineteenth century, as an ideal space where East and West meet.24 But it was, at the same time, where the boundary between East and West was demarcated and consequently reproduced. Turkish national identity was constituted and continuously modified at the margin between being a “bad” and a “good” example of modernity.25 Islam has been a very important factor that contributed to the ambiguity. For, Islam was seen to contradict Westernisation and modernity—both by Westerners and Turkish nationalists who aspired to be Westernised. Yet, as Bobby Sayyid argues, Turkish nationalists, Kemalists, “found themselves in a paradoxical situation: to be western, one had to reject the Orient”, but “their rejection of the Orient relied on them being able to articulate and perpetuate an oriental identity... The only way to manage this paradox of westernising and orientalizing was for the Kemalists to fix upon Islam the representation

22 Deniz Kandiyoti has made an important point of how “revolving around two opposed narratives—two sides of the same discursive coin” brings us “full circle to positing notions of lost authentic ‘indigeneity’ and inviting forms of neo-Orientalism that are inimical to an understanding of complex historical processes.” (1997a: 114)

23 “A great deal of intellectual energy in the Muslim world was devoted to discussions of Mustafa Kemal’s reforms and their general applicability in other Muslim territories.” (Sayyid, 1997: 69-70)

24 In the 1830’s, August Comte wrote to the Grand Vizier, Reşit Paşa, saying: “the world has been divided into two oppositional worlds, Asia and Europe, for centuries; that it is time that this opposition should be overcome; that there must be a common civilisation in the world; and he regarded Turkey as the only country with the capacity, in historical and geographical terms, to realise the synthesis between the two worlds; that Turkey should continue its efforts towards this end.” (in Kaplan, 1957: 73)

25 The ambivalence as to where Turkey fits in the world, can be clearly observed in the writings of Western visitors to the Ottoman Empire: In 1854 in a book called *Turkey, its History and Progress, etc.*, Sir George Larpent wrote that Turks “have shown themselves worthy of our support and assistance; they have striven hard during the last few years to improve the internal condition of their Empire... They are allies whom we have not the slightest cause to feel ashamed.” But during the same period, Cardinal Newman could come up with opposite ideas in a book, *Lectures on the History of the Turks*, that “Christianity is synonymous with civilisation; the Turks are not Christian; therefore the Turks are barbarous.” Both cited in (Bowen, 1945: 43)
of orientalness." (1997: 69) Turkish nationalists split between the marker of modernity, the West, and the marker of orientalness, Islam, regenerated the role of a "bridge between East and West".

**Occidentalism and Fantasy**

The entrapment in a "bridge" identity involves a set of discrepancies between official discourses and institutional practices, between aspirations and desire, and frustrating self-assessments in Turkish national history, which I will be addressing in the following chapters. It is true that the national elite sought ways of making the Turkish society "contemporary and civilised" which practically meant adopting Western technology and techniques, ideas, and ways of life which had already penetrated the culture in the late Ottoman period. However this was not a smooth and, as modernisation theorists would claim, a "devoted" process of Westernisation.26 The Turkish national discourse, as regulated and disseminated by the elite, was an eclectic mix of diverse elements: ideas taken over from past generations of nationalists; concepts, tools and techniques borrowed from the West; unique solutions to deal with the pressing current political, ethnic, social and economic problems; and much *post factum* theorising. The consequent national discourse, which is named as Kemalism, was pragmatically positioned in terms of its Others: against the Western gaze which labeled it nothing more than a "copy", and against the heterogeneous people, which was to comprise the unified national population but represented in practice the Orient—in terms of "backward" Islamic and of Arabic influences. The ethnic and religious minorities in the population, such as the Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Gypsies yet established another kind of Other, which posed

26 According to Dumont, Westernisation meant for Kemalists “to devote oneself to the cause of modernization...the adoption of western ways of life, a fight against ignorance and superstition, the import of new techniques, economic development, and in particular, a constant resort to science." (1984: 34-5)
a threat to homogeneous national unity.27

In the thesis I leave aside how the actual policies and boundary management with reference to relations with various Western nation-states, Islamic groups and sects, and ethnic and religious minorities were shaped in the history of Turkish nationalism. Instead I attend to the dynamics of national fantasy which figured in official and literary texts; informed practices of national reforms, and was articulated through the use of technology, including radio broadcasting. At the level of fantasy, the diverse realm of relations with the Western countries was translated into a marker called “the West”; in a similar manner the heterogeneous realm of the population was signified as “the people”. Kemalists’ attitude to both constructs was very ambivalent. On the one hand, the Turkish national elite had to admit the superiority of the West which was most clearly proven in the military and the technological field, yet they had to keep their distance from this “profane” culture. They thought that too much Westernisation brought a danger of loss of identity. So, a pragmatic approach28 was required which would make it possible to adopt a position of being Westernised/anti-Western simultaneously. Civilisation had to come from the West for pragmatic reasons29, whereas the real Turkish values had to be found in the culture of the people. On the other hand, the glorification of the people went hand in hand with a diagnosis of the impurity of the people. Though posited as the source of real culture30, the people had diverse ethnic origins, languages and disparate local traditions; and they were regarded as contaminated

27 “The question of Turkish national identity is a dialectical one. In the case of existing minorities, although they comprise only a small fraction of Turkey’s ethno-religious subcultural population, they have historically and continue today ideologically to play an apparently important role in defining Turkey’s own self-identity and her selfconscious stance in light of world opinion.” (Salamone, 1989: 51)

28 Under claims that Kemalists’ philosophy can best be described as pragmatism against the predominant view that it was positivistic. He argues that pragmatism has been functional in three aspects: it maintains a distance against things that are instrumentalised; avoids internalisation, thus the deterioration of the real spirit; it makes it possible to treat the Western world with contempt. (1996: 40-1)

29 Gökalp made the point that: “We have to accept the civilisation of the West because, if we do not, we shall be enslaved by the powers of the West.” (1981: 266)

30 According to Gökalp, “culture is something which is alive among the people themselves. The elite are those who lack it...The elite are the carriers of civilisation and the people the holders of the culture.” (1981: 259)
with “traditions and precepts that are not grounded in any logical framework.”

Therefore the national fantasy was not a monolithic discourse. It was produced and reproduced by continuous negotiations between the West and the Orient. Also, it was not a voluntarily created set of ideas -as the “imitation” problematic would say. Westernisation and modernisation had been brought on the agenda of the Turkish national elite by means of a threat, “by convincing Turks of past and present inadequacy.” (Davison, 1990: 92) The constitutive lack was there, right at the centre of the national identity. Turkish national fantasy was structured within an encounter with the West which had imposed a “model” for modernity in its colonialist and imperialistic history, and which reproduced itself always against an insufficient “copy”.

Said’s (1995) work on Orientalism illustrates how the Western scholars’ attempt to travel to, to penetrate into, and to represent the Orient produced an objectified and essentialised Orient. The Orient in its “eccentricity”, its “backwardness”, its “silent indifference” and “feminine penetrability” is the essentialised construct of the Orientalist discourse. I read Said’s Orientalism within a different problematic (my critical reflections on Said will be explicated in Chapter 1), and argue that although othered, objectified and dominated by Western forces, the “Orientals” are not just victims of this process. They react to the imposed model by various techniques that enable the construction of their specific and different subjectivity. They do not only become objectified in the process, but they also become subjects. I choose to name the discourse, or fantasy, which is a product of the interrelated process of objectification/subjectification and of being a subject, as Occidentalism. The concept of Occidentalism, as I define it in
Chapter 1, is very different from an idea of internalised Orientalism or a defensive reaction against the West. Instead, it points to both the specific mechanisms that "Orientals" employ to create their subject status, which is not at all a homogeneous entity, but also to the common sky that structures different horizons. Hence the conceptualisation also aims to deconstruct the Western representation of being Western, stressing how "centre" and "periphery" are already inscribed in the representation. This entails, as Parry argues, "breaking into the West's sealed representation of its history as self-generating." (1992:24) I find the perspective of Occidentalism useful to address the dynamics of national imagining in a setting already imagined to be a bridge between East and West.

The concept of Occidentalism is also significant in dealing with issues of technology in connection to national imagining. The "West" was, on the one hand, a reified concept for Turkish nationalists. It was signified in tools, artifacts and goods representing "civilisation". These were, at the same, objects of desire -means for being Westernised. On the other hand, the signifier -the West- was recodified, in the local context, based on class, gender and ethnic differences. Thus, the utilisation of the "West" informed power relations. The way the concept of the West was both reified and mobilised -Occidentalism- denotes a complex relationship between technologies, power and national imagining. Therefore, in opposition to Anderson's objective treatment of communication technology as a basis for national imagination, by using the term Occidentalism, I could address communication technology both as an objective factor that enhanced national imagination, and as an object of desire that involved a commentary on the West. Broadcasting technology constituted a

33 Said, in his "Afterword" to Orientalism in 1995, talks about the reception of his work by some, as signifying anti-Westernism -a position which he disowns. For Said, to criticise Orientalism should not be seized as a pretext for arguing the exact opposite, defending "the Orient". "Occidentalism" may mean in this context seeing the West as an enemy. Kandiyoti refers to Nader who makes use of the term in this sense: "Occidentalism and its related demonology... is used as a mechanism of social control over Middle Eastern women stripping Arab women of their rights." (Kandiyoti, 1993: 385) I argue that this is only one aspect of what the term may denote. In this thesis, "Occidentalism" is used to address both the desire for and the denigration of what is essentialised as "the West", and also the re-codification and operationalisation of a notion of "the West" within power relations.
medium for the Occidentalist fantasy to play itself out.

Occidentalism was a fantasy but had its own reality. Through organising and regulating operations of fantasy it naturalised "the otherwise formless displacements of desire". (Donald, 1992: 69) It involved the mobilisation of sentiments. If it were not for the dissemination and regulation of sentiments one would not be able to account for the "transition from the love of country" which is very localised to the "love of this imagined community that is the nation." (Llobera, 1994: 120) Though triggered by material and clashing interests, by the forceful, and usually violent, dynamics of capitalism; and feeding on medieval realities, the fantasy of nation as a new origin had its own impact. However, in some instances it clashed with "reality" that was not signified (or was repressed) within the fantasy. Yet the clash did not take the form of a binary opposition; instead, the fantasy was projected onto reality, and reality, in turn, provided sources for the problematisation and redefinition of the fantasy. In this way, both were transformed during the course of historical events. The shifting gap between them can be observed in radio broadcasting.

Ankara, Radio Broadcasting and Dialogic Leakage

The national elite could deal with its Others, both the West and the people, through projected images in order to contain the ideal purity of the nationalist project, or the Occidentalist fantasy. The project took the form of an experiment choosing Ankara as its site. The choice had further significance than just being a strategic positioning during the course of the National Struggle. In 1919 some members of the National Struggle had originally decided that their centre of government would be Istanbul to show that Turks cared...
for Istanbul. However others, including Mustafa Kemal, opposed this view; they preferred a place within Anatolia with the argument that that would enable them to “bring civilisation” to those parts of the country (Adivar, 1994: 47). The life in Istanbul was regarded as degenerate and cosmopolitan, highly infused with excessive Western ways of life. A necessary distance from the West and the past regime was inscribed in the final decision that Ankara be the centre of the national government a year later. The members of what would be the national elite mostly came from Istanbul to assume national tasks in the Ankara government. They were very unhappy to be there due to Ankara being no more than a barren village at the time. Against the complaints that Ankara was like a desert, Mustafa Kemal uttered the secret of the national formula:

“A life has to be created from these ruins. What seems so vacant is actually full. There is a strong life in this area which is taken as a desert, and that is the nation, the Turkish nation.” (Abalioğlu, 1955: 97, emphasis added)

Turkishness which was only articulated within the national discourse in a paradoxical relationship to the West35, aimed to bind the national space and set up an origin for those who lived on it. Ethnic and cultural diversity had to be annihilated in the new unitary vision of national and cultural life. The most effective tools for this lay in the realm of cultural signification. The motto of the nationalists reveals the self-conscious effort: “Happy are those who say they are Turkish.”

The national elite had to be creative in imagining the cultural distinctness of the new nation. The “language reform”, the new dress code, the “Turkish history thesis”, the People’s Houses, the archeology of Anatolian folk culture, which I will be addressing in the following chapters, were among those ventures of cultural signification. However, many of these attempts remained limited in the

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35 Tanrıöver, who was the head of the Turkish Hearths, the nationalist associations between 1912-1931, said that “Turks have realised their Turkishness only after they have become a European society.” (cited in Yeğen, 1995: 39) F. Ahmad says that even “as late as 1897 there was a sense of shock when the nationalist poet Mehmed Emin (Yurdakul) wrote with newly-found pride the line: ‘I am a Turk, my faith and my race are mighty’. Even ‘Türkiye’, the name adopted for the newly created country by the nationalists, was taken from the Italian ‘Turchia’.” (1993:78)
extent of their dissemination. This was later regarded as "political elitism" and was associated with authoritarian rule of the nationalist single party, Republican People's Party (RPP), "which made no notable effort to broaden the party's popular base and to enlist the support of the peasant masses; instead it concentrated its attention on the small westernised elite." (Eisenstadt, 1981: 140)

I argue that the nationalist project in Turkey had to attend first to disciplining its own chosen members which represented the nation in Ankara, the newly constructed capital. The articulation of the Occidentalist fantasy - imagining the "modern" national space and time, of the people and their culture, and of the necessary difference from the West - was functional to the self-disciplining of the elite. The nationalists as mediators between the West and the Orient, had to form themselves as a group, or as the ruling class which involved the education of sentiments as well as political, legal and economic arrangements. A "love of nation" had to be manufactured. Romantic visions of folk culture mainly contributed to this end. Domestic life and gender roles were recoded in nationalist terms. The education of children and youth became national concerns.36

In this situation, radio broadcasting had a double function: one was to experiment with sound projections of the Occidentalist fantasy; the other was the self-disciplining of the nationalist elite by making them active in the making of the fantasy. It was one of the arenas in which the elite assumed the task of creating a new culture, a synthesis between the West and the East. Radio broadcasting which started in 1927, in the form of a private enterprise, was nationalised in 1936. In its initial years, radio was seen as something that is alien to Turkish culture. It was, as we shall see, "western" and "cosmopolitan", associated with the culture in Istanbul, the centre of Westernisation during the Ottoman period. In the early 1930's, when the politicisation of the cultural realm gained prominence, the national elite advanced more positive ideas about radio broadcasting. It was regarded as a significant means for educating and modernising the population. It

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36 As Foucault argues, bio-power, technologies that addressed the re-regulation of private life, "was one of the central strategies of the self-constitution of the bourgeoisie" before it was targeted to working classes in Europe (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 186).
was claimed by intellectuals of the period that the state or the party, which were almost identical in meaning, had to have a central hold on all broadcasting facilities so that it could defend the principles of “inkilap”\(^{37}\) both towards “outside” and “inside” with a vengeance and determined boldness.\(^{38}\) The idea was that through radio broadcasting the nation state could inform both the Western world and the people of its presence and progress. Radio was an efficient vehicle to demarcate the boundaries between the “foreign” and the “national”, the past and the present, the elite and the people, the private and the public. It was a means to assert the presence of that national identity, which was regarded deficient by the West; to prove to themselves and to the Others that, as Mustafa Kemal had said; “what seems so vacant is actually full.” Radio tempted the desire to be Western and civilised by its Western technology, and tried to arouse national feelings by its projection of the Occidentalist fantasy.

I claim that the operations of the Occidentalist fantasy are best observed in radio broadcasting, such as the relation of fantasy and reality. Certain discourses are hard to penetrate into since they exhibit monologic characteristics determined by their claim to be directly referring to their objects. Then it becomes difficult to recognise the constitutive outside of discourses. I choose to look at the specific space defined by radio broadcasting to deconstruct the seemingly monolithic expressions of the official discourse. Radio broadcasting provides important clues for this because its use as a medium of totalisation—to reach all through crossing the rigid social boundaries—can contradict its concern to be heard by an actual audience, due to the difference between an idealised totality and a real actuality. One can see in radio both the working of a grand design of power but also the way it is adjusted to speak to an audience, that is its dialogic nature. Radio cannot operate within fixed definitions. It is a medium that cannot easily exalt itself to the level of art; it is contaminated by politics and propaganda but it also has to be creative and entertaining if it is going to have an impact. This leads to a constant problematisation of its output in terms of the desired intentions of the

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\(^{37}\) Which meant ambiguously both restoration and revolution

\(^{38}\) Burhan Asaf (Belge), “İnkillâbımızın Sesı,” Kadro, No.11, November 1932, p.35.
producers and the responses of the audience (both “inside” and “outside” in the Turkish case). Radio has to incorporate sources of ordinary culture, albeit specially processed for radio broadcasting, if it is talking to masses and not to selected individuals. However, the communication thereby produced cannot easily claim to represent a unified national culture since it has to address unknown and absent audiences and has to introduce a plurality of forms if it is going to have an effect on them. In this sense, it is both a form of “mass communication” and a simulated individual communication (Bachelard, 1993: 220).

Radio exists in a temporally redefined space, with a format of always privileging the moment of “now” and “here”, and being located in-between the private and public spheres; art and technology; spiritual and material life; information and entertainment. Radio’s “immateriality” allows it to cross these boundaries (Hilmes, 1997: 15). It is, at the same time, giving life and body to what is in fact a void, that is the studio, and disembodying the sound messages “that are disparate in terms of their location of origin, their cultural purpose, and their form, in order to create a continuous enveloping rhythm of sound and information.” (Berland, 1993: 211)

These properties of radio broadcasting arising both from its sound technology and its common format to address the “mass” audience in their private space, lead to various conflicts and tensions. These include moving the historically masculine public sphere into a private sphere defined in feminine terms; disseminating the norms of “high culture” but, at the same time, using the narrative forms of local cultures; creating a “virtual visibility” that is presented as reality but manufactured using “make-believe” sound engineering techniques in the studio. Finally, the intended control over the masses is difficult, almost impossible, to achieve via radio. The efforts of listeners are always unknown and uncertain. The quality and reliability of radio receivers may have been less or different than was imagined.

39 Michele Hilmes points to the clash of “dignified”, “formal” style - even mandating that the unseen announcers wear formal dress- and populism in the history of American broadcasting (1997: 1).

40 “Radio redefines space and structures time not only in its acoustic movement over distances but also in its format.” (Berland, 1993: 209)
These properties of radio turn it into a significant field which provides rich sources to analyse the diverse and dynamic aspects of the constitution of identities in fantasy and the network of power relations that they are structured in, both in space and time, and across boundaries. Radio has its “dialogic leakage”, in Pechey’s terms (1989) which conveys the efforts of totalisation and their failure. Therefore, the study of radio broadcasting makes it possible to extend the seemingly fixed boundaries of the official discourse.

Research Question

My aim in this research is to analyse the conflicts and tensions within radio broadcasting in Turkey to address the dynamics of the Occidentalist fantasy. I refer to its sites of transmission, its strategies, and specific programmes, such as radio talks and dramas. Conceptually I analyse the boundary management, that occurs in and through radio broadcasting, between what is “foreign” and what is “national”, between the “elite” and the “people”, and between men and women.

I argue that the primary conflict that is shaped by the historical divide between the West and the Orient overdetermine the way other tensions were conceived and handled. My first hypothesis is that every attempt in early Turkish history, in defining, building and demarcating national identity, was shaped with reference to an imagined Western-ness and for the Western gaze. Being Western was associated with certain spaces and groups of people which led to internal divisions within the country: “the people”, women, and individuals associated with liberal Western ideas became, in different ways, the borderlines against which the Turkish-Western identity was defined.

The main paradox of national identity, in this case, was to eliminate the “disturbing difference” from the West whilst maintaining a “necessary difference” in order to define “identity”. “Western” radio technology provided the means to imagine both difference and identity. The disembodiment of sounds through radio broadcasting
made it possible to sample the pure “voice of the nation” with the assumption that it would be simultaneously heard by Others. However the attempt to produce and contain national identity within the boundaries of a pure auditory representation was ridden with failures. All kinds of interferences and transgressions of boundaries contaminated the pure “voice of the nation” which led to frustrations and anxieties for the Turkish elite.

My second hypothesis in the research is that the Occidentalist fantasy was not a mere fantasy of the Turkish elite. It was in dialogue with what was signified as the “model” or the West, and shaped itself accordingly. On the other hand, the “model” could only assert its truth by constant redefinitions of what belongs to the West and what is Oriental. To demonstrate this, I include a chapter on the BBC broadcasts to Turkey at the same period. The analysis of the strategies of the BBC for knowing and influencing the Turkish audience provide sources to assess how the “copy” figures in the “model”. Thus, it gives the means to understand the external limits of the Occidentalist fantasy. The analysis of the BBC Turkish Section strategies shows a similar kind of effort of mediation that occurs in and through Turkish Radio, between the “universal” and the “different” in modernity. The fantasies involved in both cases point to the unequal but “intertwined” histories, in Said’s terms, of the Occident and the Orient. Yet the different techniques employed in the production of the two fantasies provide an entry into the discussion of the production of truth in different contexts.

The period of the research extends from 1927 when Turkish Radio was inaugurated until the end of the 1940’s. I chose to study this period for two reasons: First, in these years radio’s role of being the “voice of the nation” was most significant in Turkey. Many intellectuals worked for radio until the end of the 40’s, with the idea of fulfilling “national” tasks. Efforts of cultural signification to define the national identity were at their peak, as we shall see in Chapter 3. When the Democratic Party (DP) came to power in 1950, Turkey entered a new phase adopting, on the one hand, more populistic internal policies leading ultimately to an Islamic reassertion.
(F.Ahmad, 1993:93), and, on the other hand a new foreign policy, as an ally of the US in the early Cold War. Radio became the focus of internal party feuds and a supporter of US foreign policies (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980). Radio was no longer considered to speak to the whole nation, when internal conflicts within the nation became more visible. In the context of the Cold War, the "national independence" of Turkey also became a dubious statement.

The second reason that justifies the choice of this period has to do with the Second World War. The war years were decisive in defining national identity, and radio was most extensively used for this end in many countries.41 Furthermore, the BBC broadcasts to Turkey were designed, as part of the World Service, specifically for the wartime. I argue that the conditions of the Second World War made the dynamics of the construction of the truth of the "model", which afterwards was taken for granted in Turkey, more apparent. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

The history of communication, and specifically radio broadcasting, has been one of the most neglected subjects in Turkey. Questions regarding communication and national identity remain to be addressed42 while most studies on nationality dwell on what is called the political history of the nation. This may be due to taking the "claims of nationalism to be a political movement much too literally and much too seriously." (Chatterjee, 1993b: 5) Deniz Kandiyoti also makes a similar argument saying that "studies of modernisation in Turkey have generally privileged juridico-political and institutional realms" (1997a: 113). This research takes the challenge to extend the limits of what has been included in the political by connecting radio technology to national imagination in Turkey.

Another challenge comes from Uygur Kocabaşoğlu (1980) at a different level. Kocabaşoğlu's work, which is the only precious record on Turkish radio broadcasting concludes with the argument that the

41 Crisell (1997); Johnson (1988); Lacey (1993); Nicholas (1996); Hilliard (1997); Hilmes (1997); Potts (1989) give accounts of wartime broadcasting and its connections to the national framework in Britain, the US, Australia and Germany.

42 Serif Mardin (1991) pointed, years ago, to the importance of studying cultural signification and communication in the formation of Turkish nationality, but the task has remained unfulfilled until today.
Turkish radio has failed to achieve its aims.\textsuperscript{43} Radio was not able to disseminate national culture, and has not been used efficiently as an instrument to discipline and educate the people. He too, posits a gap from an ideal model, in this case, an ideal model of efficient broadcasting that serves the nation. He imagines the BBC, for example, to be such an ideal model. As I have argued before, this thesis is critical of such a framework, and aims to illustrate that radio broadcasting in Turkey was not a “failure” but has been an efficient medium for experimenting with the elements of the Occidentalist fantasy, as well as disciplining its actors. Therefore, as a working hypothesis, which the research can only partially address, I argue that radio broadcasting maintained a role in the production and reproduction of power relations, justified by Occidentalist strategies, on the borderline of the East and the West.

Organisation of the Thesis

I explore the questions of “Occidentalism and Turkish National Identity” more in depth in the first chapter. Theoretically, I dwell on Said’s \textit{Orientalism} (1995) to interrogate the problems of identity and subjectivity in a setting which has been labeled, othered and objectified by the West. I ask a series of related questions: Are, what is called as the Orient and the Occident merely representations? Or should they be thought as ideological discourses which legitimise existing power relations? How do they connect to reality? The critical reflection on Orientalism and Occidentalism guide the discussion on Turkish national identity. I draw on the historical data pertaining to the relations of Turkey to the West starting from the nineteenth century, to convey how Kemalism, the founding national discourse, was articulated. This points to shifting borders and the complex mechanisms of the formation of Turkish national identity. It also sets

\textsuperscript{43} He gives several reasons: Radio broadcasting was able to reach a very limited audience due both to technical reasons, and to the nature of its programmes. The number of radio receivers remained limited and was concentrated mainly in three big cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Programmes designed for villages were few in number and far from reality in their romantic projections of an ideal village. Most of the talk programmes were targeted at the urban population and addressed their domestic problems.
the historical conditions of the Occidentalist fantasy manifested in and through early Turkish radio broadcasting.

The second chapter, "The Burden of History", is on methodology. The chapter first dwells on the theoretical and practical problems confronted through the research: the problems involved in a comparison between the BBC and the Turkish radio, and the problem of the destructions of archives in the Turkish case. Contrary to the meticulous register of events and debates in the BBC case, Turkish broadcasters have not preserved any substantial archive. Both written and sound archives were either abandoned in storage rooms to decay or willfully destroyed. One cannot remain indifferent to the lack, or rather the destruction of archives if the archivisation "produces as much as it records the event" (Derrida, 1996: 17). The practical challenges in the research inform my theoretical methodology. I draw on theories of discourse analysis (Foucault), dialogic analysis (Bakhtin) and the psychoanalysis of culture (Zizek) to specify my conceptual tools, namely "projection", "translation", "social fantasy" and "surplus", to attend to the subjectivity of the Other as manifested in Occidentalism.

In the third chapter, I analyse the history and the cultural site of "The Studio" giving life and body to what is in fact a void, in Berland's terms (1993:211). The growing "national" importance of Ankara Radio, defended against the ascribed "cosmopolitanism" of Istanbul provide significant data for reflecting on the Occidentalist fantasy. I demonstrate how the "voice of the nation" as a pure representation of nationality was envisaged against Others, the West and the people. Referring to the history of Turkish Radio, and the statements and practices of broadcasters, I discuss the missions attached to radio by the elite and the ideals that were imagined within the process of shaping the broadcasts. Turkish radio was regarded as a mediator to translate the projected essence of people's culture into "modern" terms and for the Western gaze. Music broadcasting sets an important example. I also refer to the way the output was criticised by the elite to point to the complex boundary management involved in the production of the "voice of the nation". I show how the boundaries
between Istanbul and Ankara, between entertainment and national culture, between body and disembodied love of nation were set on an Occidentalist axis, in terms of a projected Western gaze.

Chapter 4, "London Calling Turkey", provides an entry to the reverse side of the projected image of the West, that is, the Western look itself. Referring to the BBC archival material concerning the BBC Turkish Section broadcasts mainly during the Second World War, I discuss the strategies of the BBC, much in collaboration with government, to know and influence the Turkish audience. These changing strategies during the course of the war show, not only how propaganda was coined within a certain regime of truth, but also the frustrating process in which the British conception of Turkish identity was constructed. In this chapter I try to penetrate into the sealed self-representation of the “model”. The fact that Turkish Radio and the BBC Turkish Section were competing for the same audience at that period, reveals the subtle negotiations involved in the dialogic definitions of identities. How the audience remains mostly unknown for both institutions shows the gaps, splits and discrepancies covered up in the representations of the truth. By utilising a comparative analysis of both the strategies and the tactics of the BBC and Turkish Radio with regard to representations of truth, I discuss the dynamics of the construction of different orders of truth.

In the fifth chapter on "Radio Talks" I reflect on the actors of the nationalist project, that is the elite, to analyse how the projectors were shaped within their own projections. I dwell on the pedagogical strategies adopted by radio broadcasts, especially radio talks that were targeted at the elite. Here the mediating concepts, such as children, youth and women, that serve to link civilisation and nature are of utmost significance. I discuss how gender-based definitions of nature present in radio talks were contrasted with Western civilisation in the signification of national identity; and how “national reforms” were conceived as a negotiation of a natural essence of the nation and Western oriented technological imagination.

Chapter 6 is on "Radio Drama: Gender and the Fantasy of the Nation”. Here I expand on the issue of gender distinctions in radio
broadcasts to discuss how women were regarded as the liminal case of the national identity. Women were charged with several duties in the national project, as mothers, as housewives, but also as the frontier soldiers to show the Western world the extent of modernity in Turkey. Thus they signified the "difference" of the national identity; as Norton argues, women "serve both to maintain the body politic and to mark its boundaries by the differences inscribed upon them." (Norton, 1988: 79) I discuss, based on analyses of radio dramas, that the representation of women’s roles was central to the Occidentalist fantasy. The feminisation of culture, the "maternal authority" of radio broadcasting and the gendered concepts of change/stability are some key issues that I attend to in this chapter.

In the "Conclusion", I take up my working hypothesis on communication and power in Turkey. The Turkish case which has remained mostly invisible in its specific configurations of Oriental/Occidental identity, even in Said’s *Orientalism* (1995), provides rich sources to reflect both on the role of communication as a form of government and on its connections to the historical divide between East and West. I hope my research contributes to a new way of thinking on various aspects of the divide. For example the difference, illustrated in the thesis, between the way the Turkish and British truths were structured can be further interrogated in terms of communication and government. The "liberal form of government" that Foucault (1991c) critically studied within Western history, operated on the assumed identity of the "sayable" and the "visible"; while in the Turkish case the "sayable" could clash with what was excluded and repressed in discourse- "reality". The analysis of what is explicit and what is excluded in communication can be fruitful in exploring the dialogic relationship of identities, both Occidentalist and Orientalist fantasies. I hope in future research, new theoretical and methodological perspectives will be developed to account for the "difference". This of course, entails bringing into light diverse narratives of modernity other than official representations of the ruling elite.
CHAPTER 1
Occidentalism and Turkish National Identity

Late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.¹ When the Empire was invaded and partitioned by European-British, Italian, French, and Greek forces after being defeated in the First World War, most of the Turkish nationalists who opposed the policies of the Ottoman government in Istanbul and were “denounced as godless atheists waging war against the caliph” (F. Ahmad, 1993: 48) took refuge in Anatolia where they participated in the National Struggle.² Halide Edip, a rare female figure in the National Struggle, had been assigned the duty to visit different villages and report the violence done by the Greek to Turkish populations. She mentions, in her memoirs, a conversation with an old peasant woman at that time: The peasant woman complained to Halide Edip that her writing reports was in vain. She said, “Why do you write? What could writing mean for a people who have been slaughtered?” (Adivar, 1994: 201). Then she continued: “I have asked for pity from the Greek...They told us that they have been sent by Avrope (Europe, in Turkish Avrupa). So my girl, please tell that man called Avrope to leave us alone, we didn’t do anything bad to him, tell him not to disturb us.” (Ibid)

The old peasant woman’s painful words on Europe gives a sense to what the West or Europe could mean for the people of Anatolia during the imperialist invasion. It represented a threatening force that strove to destroy the traditional order of things, that was

¹ The rise of Turkish nationalism, the debates within its different advocates, and its connections to the rise of other nationalisms in and out of the Empire, such as Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Russian, Albanian and Arab nationalisms are extensively documented, some references are: F. Ahmad 1969; 1993; Aydin, 1993; Heyd, 1950; Kent, 1984; E. Kuran, 1968; Kushner, 1977; Mardin, 1962; Oba, 1995; Okyar & İnalçık, 1980; Shaw & Shaw, 1977, Zürcher, 1984.
² The history the Turkish National Struggle, its organisation, progress, economic and military sources, as well as the memoirs relating to the period, is a vast subject for historians. Some aspects of this period are accounted by Abalıoğlu, 1955, Adivar, 1994; Atay, 1969; Müdderrisoğlu, 1974; Selek, 1970; Timur 1968; Tunaya, 1956.
involved in conspiracies and aimed to take the local people’s lives, and which was embodied in a figure of a man. But for Halide Edip herself, the writer, Europe always was an abstract concept, ambivalent in many aspects. While actually fighting the Western forces, Halide Edip and other Turkish intellectuals discussed and wrote on the possibilities of Westernisation. There was a wide gap between how the intellectuals and the local populations interpreted the “West”. Yakup Kadri, who also wrote on the war years in Anatolia says: “The difference between a person educated in Istanbul and an Anatolian peasant is greater than an English Londoner and an Indian from Punjab.” (1983: 53) According to Yakup Kadri, the “strange” existence of the intellectuals, who considered themselves as part of the Western world, was demonstrated when they went to Anatolia during the National Struggle. The intellectuals felt, that “as they went deeper into the country which they call their own, their alienation from their origins grew bigger.” (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983: 53) In return, the peasants labeled them as “strangers”. Should the national struggle end with victory, said Yakup Kadri, then the intellectuals had “to make the nation” by bridging this gap.  

The Turkish national identity that was propagated as the official identity of the new Turkish State after 1923, had to assume many dimensions that were thought to belong to the nation but were absent: the homogeneity of the “national” population, the existence of common origins, and a common will to the future development of a national state. In these circumstances, the nation had to be imagined.

3 However it could also mean a force that put an end to all misery. In Yakup Kadri’s novel, Yaban, based on the war years, there is also a reference to some peasants’ beliefs regarding “Europe”. The peasants believed that Europe was a Queen who has sent her armies to save the peasants. And they thought that she will convert to Islam after the victory (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983: 141).

4 Anatolia was a land of heterogeneity. Many people did not even consider themselves as “Turks”. In the novel Yaban (which means “stranger”) the intellectual “hero” talks to peasants about Turkishness. He says that all Turks should support Mustafa Kemal, to which one peasant’s reply is that they are not Turks but Moslems, he says “Turks only live in Haymana” -a region in central Anatolia (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983: 173).
first by the national elite.\(^5\) National identity was constructed by displacements, denials and projections: what was considered as the unifying factor of the nation, Islam, only a few years ago\(^6\) was denounced as a political tool\(^7\); the Ottoman legacy, which was taken as a given condition by early nationalist movements was denied; and the desire to be Westernised was projected unto the national territory which was not only suffering the poverty and the damage of the war, but also contained radically differing ideas as to the role of Islam, economy and democracy in the future of the nation\(^8\). Finally, the West that had been a threatening force against the nationalist movements and reforms\(^9\) in the Ottoman Empire was heralded as a natural ally. The national dream was to bridge the gap between the West and Turkey, between the national elite and the local Muslim population, between the economic power concentrated in the hands of non-Muslim communities and the politics centrally controlled by the

\(^{5}\) The term, "national elite" figures almost in all writings on Turkish nationalism. It denotes a group of people, both intellectuals and officials, who assumed positions of power in the new Turkish nation: "Under the Kemalists, the national elite figures with intellectual and official backgrounds dominated the political life of the nation and for some time ran the country in near-model tutelary fashion." (Frey, 1965: 388) Only after the 1950s an alternative elite emerged that was more local in character, "led to a large extent by lawyers and men of trade and commerce." (Ibid) The historical background of the national elite will be discussed later in the chapter.

\(^{6}\) The nationalists had legitimised their struggle in the eyes of the Muslim population by referring to their devotion to liberate the Sultan-Caliph, described as the captive of Christian powers (F. Ahmad, 1993: 48). Even the word nation (millet in Turkish and Arabic) had religious connotations— it meant the religious communities in the Empire.

\(^{7}\) Mustafa Kemal justified the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, in his speech in the National Assembly, pointing to the need "to cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been accustomed for centuries". (cited in F. Ahmad, 1993: 54)

\(^{8}\) Demirel (1994) in his important research on the First National Assembly in 1920, documents the ideas coined by various local representatives in opposition to Kemalists' vision of Turkey.

\(^{9}\) According to Feroz Ahmad, the quest for modernity of the Young Turks after 1908 clashed with the interests of the Western powers: "Not only the capitulations violated Turkish sovereignty and the principle of the unity of law, their very existence made the task of carrying out reform impossible. The Porte could not pass most laws without having them vetoed by the European embassies. Every piece of legislation was carefully scrutinised by the legal staff at the embassies to see that it did not infringe upon the 'treaty of foreigners'". (1993: 41)
national elite\textsuperscript{10}, and between the authoritarian regime in practice and an image of a civilised democratic republic.

The dream manifested itself in novels, dramas and other writings written by the intellectuals of the period, as well as in radio broadcasting, as we shall see in Chapter 3. I address the question of the “West” in Turkish national history in this chapter in the context of a discussion of “making” the Turkish nation. In particular, I discuss how an Occidentalist fantasy was produced within the historical encounter with the West. The subjects of the fantasy referred to a pool of images and attributes attached to the West in the consolidation of their “national” power which either subsumed or silenced the disturbing differences within the national domain.

In dealing with the question of the West and Turkish national identity, I begin with a theoretical discussion of the historicity of the division of the West and the East. My aim is not to assess the “real thing” that is the Orient\textsuperscript{11} as opposed to the Western “real thing”. If Orientalism is a representation, though never a pure, unconditional or nonmaterial representation as Edward Said argues (1995: 23), how the “Orientals” answered back to their representation by the West brings to view a complex field of subjectivity: What is the subjectivity of the Other? Furthermore, if, “the creation of the Orient...signifies the West’s own dislocation from itself, something inside that is presented, narrativised, as being outside” (Young, 1990: 139) then what does the concept of “the West” produced by non-Westerners present and dislocate? Questions of history and national identity, as well the more recent concepts that refer to nation as construction or as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983) require further reflection in the context of these questions.

I argue that the term Occidentalism can be best understood as describing the set of practices and arrangements in and against the idea of “the West” in the non-West. On the one hand, it signifies a

\textsuperscript{10} In 1915 the capital shares of different communities in industrial life were as follows: Greeks 50\%, Armenians 20\%, Jews 5\%, Foreigners 10\% compared to 15\% of Turkish capital (Aktar, 1993:141). See Keyder (1987) for a very good account of the political and economic aspects of the state intervention in Turkey that transferred capital from the “ethnic communities” to newly developing “Turkish” bourgeoisie.

\textsuperscript{11} Said argues that the Orientalist representation or re-presentation “excluded, displaced, made superogatory any such real thing as ‘the Orient’”. (1995: 21)
projective identification with the threatening power of the West. On the other hand, it implies a demarcation of internal and external boundaries: As Carrier puts it "(O)ccidentalisms and orientalisms serve not just to draw a line between societies, but also to draw a line within them...this process is likely to be particularly pronounced in societies that self-consciously stand on the border between occident and orient." (1995:22-3) I have already discussed Turkey's "bridge" identity shaped on the border between occident and orient. Occidentalism, in my view, does not particularly point to a "literary field" that provided the data for Said's Orientalism, but signifies ways of living and a conception of self that are produced in exchange with Western cultural and technological domination.

In the second part of the chapter I give a brief account of the history of Turkish nationalism and the Kemalist regime. I particularly dwell on a debate in that history that concerns the relation between technology and culture in the process of "Westernisation". The debate centred on whether Westernisation should be associated only with borrowing Western techniques or should also mean the import of Western ideas and ways of life. The opposition between "Western techniques" and "Western culture" figured as an important constituent of Occidentalism in Turkey. Here I argue that the central theses of nationalism in Turkey, even the concept of "Turkishness" was constructed in relation to "the West". However, at the same time, "Western technology" was utilised to construct a "national" identity and was functional in defining and justifying the role of "the elite" in relation to the "Others".

1.1. Occidentalism as Opposed to Orientalism?

Edward Said's book Orientalism (1995) played a critical part in opening up the question of the constitution of the relation between "the West" and "the East" in the Western intellectual and political tradition. Said, in his introduction to the book mentions his hope that there will be new research in this field, tackling those questions and data left beyond the scope of his own work. In his view, "(P)erhaps
the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a nonrepressive and nonmanipulative, perspective" (24). Following Said's work Robert Young (1990) poses the question whether there could be another kind of knowledge that escapes the imprints of European domination? However, while Said holds the belief that it is possible to dissolve "the unitary field ruled hitherto by Orientalism, historicism, and what could be called essentialist universalism" (cited in Young, 1990:11), for Young the problem remains unsolved by Said's "distanced" intellectual criticism; Young's question persists: how can the other be articulated as such? (11)

Although what we know as modern "history" exists primarily as a Western inscription articulated through Western conceptions of centre and periphery, history never manifests itself as a monolithic narrative. It entails contestations and encroachments of Western discourses by the subordinated and the colonised, as well as its own splits regarding the representations of the non-West.12 The Other, as the site of either the projection of desire or disavowal plays a crucial role in the constitution of the Western narratives. Then the question as to whether what is posited as the Other can have its own separate history becomes more difficult to answer.13 I find Porter's criticism of Said helpful in reposing the question; Porter (1993) points to Said's failure to take account of how Orientalist discourse reproduced itself as a hegemonic form of knowledge. According to Porter, Orientalism succeeds by replacing an earlier hegemonic principle through a set of novel dynamics "in which power relations are continually reasserted, challenged, modified" (1993: 152). It can be argued, then, Orientalism

12 Moore-Gilbert points to a "persistent inner dissonance" within Western Orientalism (1997:44). He argues that "it is ambivalence rather than a simply dichotomizing and essentializing attitude which more accurately characterizes the Western vision of the East." (1997:61).

13 For Spivak, the Other is reproduced within a theory of the Subject. This does not encompass the heterogeneous Other: "...there are people whose consciousness we cannot grasp if we close off our benevolence by constructing a homogeneous Other referring only to our own place in the seat of the Same or the Self." (1993: 84) Spivak's question: "Can the subaltern speak?" points to specific and heterogeneous positioning of what is called as the Other, which can only express its separate (yet connected) presence by disrupting the representational structure of the Subject and the Other.
is produced within a constantly modified economy of “sameness” and “difference” in its constructions of the Occident and the Orient. It is tempted, again and again “to go through the eye of the needle of the Other” in Stuart Hall’s terms (1991:21), to maintain its hegemony. This implies a categorical space for the narratives of the Other against which the Western subject is redefined. However, the Other is not only represented by the Western subject. The Other's inhabiting the space of the Other and speaking for itself, Occidentalism for example, contribute to the hegemony of Orientalism. Occidentalism, in my view, corresponds to an answering practice to Orientalism and Western domination, within the same economy of signification, the same discursive field that we refer as “modern history”.

Therefore, I would like to make it clear that by Occidentalism I do not mean to suggest that 1) it represents the Other, as such, as a unitary and separate entity, 2) it designates a (libertarian, or nonrepressive and nonmanipulative) alternative to Orientalism, or 3) it is merely a fictive representation of the Other othered by Western domination. I have already dwelt on the first two points but the third point needs further explication. Said’s account of Orientalism presents a contradictory argument as to the existence of the Orient. His most quoted idea that the “Orient” is constructed by Orientalism implies a fantasy that has no counterpart in reality; but on the other hand, when Said speaks of the misrepresentation of the Orient he seems to be referring to an entity that exists exterior to the signification of Orientalism. Said is right to incorporate the two contradictory aspects to his argument, since the Orient is a displaced category that partly corresponds to what exists beyond the boundary that separates the West and the East, and partly represents the imagined Other within the Western identity. It is both a fantasy and a historical reality. However, I do not agree with Said when he says that with “a new kind of dealing with the Orient, indeed if it eliminates the ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’” we will advance in the process of “what Raymond Williams has called the ‘unlearning’ of ‘the inherent dominative mode’” (1995:28). What seems more important to me is not to undo or to unlearn the dichotomy of Orient/Occident, as if they are mere
representations, but to analyse the interconnected historical experiences to understand how subjectivities are constituted and represented, in relation to each other but within the unequal power relations between the two. The Orient and the Occident, although constructed in narratives, are not simply ideas that can be undone. They correspond to a network of significations that creates, reproduces and sustains political regimes. Identities, especially national identities are informed by these regimes.

Said’s Orientalism has been criticised on different aspects. Yet Said’s work continues to be an influential text that opens up new questions regarding the conception of the West and the East. Orientalism cannot be reduced to a simplistic subject/object framework, as some critics would claim, the West being the subject and defining and controlling its object, the East. Said’s most radical contribution was to think of what seems as the subject and the object in modern history in relation to each other. However, one can criticise Said for not going beyond narratives and not attending to complex networks of technologies of power. Furthermore, his work can be criticised for not accounting for the mechanisms of subjectivity that are produced in the East, within the very power structure of colonialism and/or imperialism. I will concentrate on these two problems that I see as important in developing the framework of Occidentalism: one is Said’s primary focus on texts, and the other is his conception of subjectivity within the tradition of humanism.

Said’s account of Orientalism attempts to make the connection

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14 I can only cite few of the criticisms here as they constitute a vast literature. Orientalism was criticised for not allowing any space for indigenous resistance (Fox, 1992); for essentialising the West (A. Ahmad, 1992); for producing an “Orientalism in reverse” (al-‘Azm, 1981); and for not attending to the specific relation of capitalism and Orientalism (A. Ahmad, 1992; Amin, 1989). Said replies some of the criticisms directed to Orientalism in his afterword to the book in 1995.

15 For example Aijaz Ahmad argues that Said “speaks of the West, or Europe, as the one which produces the knowledge, the East as the object of that knowledge. In other words, he seems to posit, stable subject-object identities, as well as ontological and epistemological distinctions between the two.” (1992: 183)

16 I agree with Benita Parry that Said introduced a perspective “of thinking non-synchronous and antithetical experiences together, of reconceiving the encounter between unequal partners as an area of ‘overlapping territories and intertwined histories’ as seen from the perspective of the Western meta-subject, and is an address against western hegemony which refuses its center/margin polarity.” (1992: 24)
between "politics" and "texts". Orientalism is not just a collection of texts, for him, but "a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts". (1995: 12) Texts exist in exchange with political, intellectual, cultural, moral power. Said points to the matrix of Foucauldian knowledge and power to make the connection. However, despite his attempt to include institutions and practices, in addition to texts in the matrix of knowledge and power, Said's formulation of Orientalism remains limited to a certain "field" of intellectual knowledge, which primarily operates in writing. 17 First, I argue that Orientalism, or Occidentalism, cannot be confined to works of literature. Instead they define a horizon of meanings and significations that are employed either to trigger, justify, or make "sense" of certain practices that may not necessarily belong to the intellectual sphere. These are often evoked in connection to practices of government, and discriminatory practices of elitism, racism and sexism in a range of institutions from education to public management. 18 Said allots to texts "a centralizing, affirmative and sovereign power" (Parry, 1992:26). 19 Second, I argue against Said's

17 "Therefore I study Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political concerns shaped by the three great empires -British, French, American-in whose intellectual and imaginative territory the writing was produced." (Said, 1995: 15)

18 Although Said makes a point that his scope of text is wide: "I set out to examine not only scholarly works but also works of literature, political tracts, journalistic texts, travel books, religious and philological studies." (1995:23), he fails to fully acknowledge the importance of institutional practices and techniques in the production of discourses as Foucault does.

19 Said's textualism is criticised by others too. Aijaz Ahmad points to the paradox in Orientalism: "... Said is vehement in his criticism of 'Orientalism' for its highly 'textual' attitude, yet in his own account imperialist ideology itself appears to be an effect mainly of certain kinds of writing." (1992: 181) For Bryan Turner, Said's "textualism" has resulted in "vicious solipsisms in which there can be no distinction between fictional writing and social reality." (1994: 7)
humanistic emphasis\textsuperscript{20} that dwells on “willed human work”\textsuperscript{21} (1995: 15). Although Orientalism conveys the dynamics of subjectivity - as Said acknowledges that Orientalism “has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world” (1995:12)- it denotes a much more complex field that is coloured by mechanisms of dislocation and projection as well as ambivalence and splits\textsuperscript{22}, than what the term “willed human work” evokes. Furthermore, from a Foucauldian perspective, discourses cannot be equated with the “subject”s intentions. Said’s emphasis on texts and authorship, as willed human work, sides him more with traditional humanist scholarship than it does with Foucauldian discourse analysis. He remains within the “European cultural heritage”, in Young’s terms , with his “tendency to focus exclusively on European high culture.” (Young, 1990: 140)

What I attempt to do instead, is to attend to certain instances in history in which various forms of Western domination are incurred as objects of desire and derision for the non-Westerners -specifically the Turkish- , which in turn, inform practices that arrange and sustain power relationships. My study dwells on both texts and practices. I choose to focus on the constitution of political subjectivity in Turkey, in its relation to certain material processes, such as the employment of Western technologies, as in the case of radio broadcasting. I bring together three conceptual frames, namely a theory of governmentality that borrows from Foucault’s notions of technology and the self; a psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity; and a Bakhtinian theory of

\textsuperscript{20} Said’s humanism influenced by Auerbach’s ideas are variously criticised. One strand of criticism points to the contradictions in the way he brings together the anti-humanism of Foucault with traditional humanist scholarship (Clifford, 1988; Porter, 1993; Young, 1990). He was also criticised for treating Orientalism as a “department” of Western humanism while, at the same time, proposing “a reconstituted version of humanism, adumbrated in the work of certain Orientalists themselves in the first instance, as the way forward beyond the disablistically dichotomizing and essentializing vision which is characteristic of Orientalism.” (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 42)

\textsuperscript{21} “In fine, how can we treat the cultural, historical phenomenon of Orientalism as a kind of willed human work - not of mere unconditioned ratiocination- in all its historical complexity, detail and worth without at the same time losing sight of the alliance between cultural work, political tendencies, the state, and the specific realities of domination? Governed by such concerns a humanistic study can responsibly address itself to politics and culture.” (Said, 1995: 15).

\textsuperscript{22} On which most postcolonial theories focus, most significantly Bhabha (1994); Spivak (1987); Young (1990). For an account that maps the terrain of postcolonial theory see Moore-Gilbert (1997).
dialogue which I will explicate further in the second chapter. These concepts enable me to look at the practice of radio broadcasting associated with the constitution of the subjectivity of the Other, in its position of both “inferiority” in relation to the West, and of “superiority” in managing and controlling differences within its so called own national body. In this way I look at differential yet interconnected histories of “the Orient” and “the Occident”. Thus, I do not see Occidentalism as an alternative to Orientalism but as an echo, as it happens in the myth of Narcissus, that chooses to repeat some “lines” of the “model” to construct its own subjectivity. Consequently these lines designate other meanings than those ascribed by Western subjects.

In order to deal with Occidentalism and national identity one must first attend to a contemporary dilemma regarding “identity”, which is: how, if the essentialist notion of identities are to be dissolved, is it still possible to talk of identities? While the “identitarian” approaches to identity - identification with an essential characteristic already existent in the subject- are rightly criticised - theories of “construction” and “ambivalence” regarding identities remain problematic. Even Said, while he criticises the essentialist mechanisms of identity construction, builds his argument using the very “essentialised” concepts of the Orient and the Occident. These refer to hierarchical power relations which do have some kind of “reality”. Carrier’s formulation is significant; he talks of “the visibility of political forces in the generation and use of these essentializations.” (1995:15) Similarly Donald’s emphasis on the need for the “acceptance of the terms of identity; an identification with the polarity rather than with either pole” (1992:181) is meaningful. If we are not going to be indifferent to these “political forces” and the reality of the boundaries, then how are we going to tackle identities, especially nationalist identities, in non-essentialist terms?

Bhabha’s concern is to overcome the given dichotomous (self/other) poles of identity by pointing to hybridity and ambivalence in colonial discourse. Based on his reading of Fanon, he presents
three dynamics for the process of identification: 1) to exist is to be called into being in relation to an Otherness, its look or locus; 2) the very place of identification, caught in the tension of demand and desire, is a space of splitting; 3) the question of identification is never the affirmation of a pregiven identity, never a self-fulling prophecy - it is always an "image" of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image (1993: 117). From such a perspective identities are never self-identical. The operations of desire transgress the defined boundaries between the self and the other (Donald, 1992: 64). In a similar manner Taussig talks of the self as "no longer as clearly separable from its Alter... the self is inscribed in the Alter that the self needs to define itself against" (1993: 252). According to Taussig, mimetic reflections are the source of identities; and mimetic excess, that is the mimetic self-awareness allows new possibilities. Both Bhabha and Taussig dwell on the possibilities opened up by the acknowledgement of hybridity and mimetic excess in identity, especially of the Other. The ambivalence posited in the colonial discourse implicates slippages and dislocations that undermine authority and provide ground for subversive readings of Western domination for the colonial subject.

But does ambivalence, as such, contribute to the disruption of identities or does it, instead, enhance their articulation? The question ties in with my concern to link the reality of political boundaries with the dynamics of identity. Following Zizek's suggestion that the "traumatic, non-integrated character of the Law is a positive condition of it" (1989), I argue that ambivalence and hybridity, that is, the transgression of boundaries is a necessary condition of any identity formation. Ambivalence and hybridity do not make national identities in a colonial setting less solid or less real. The paradox of identity, that it is both fluid and solid, or both totalised and infinite is not resolvable.²³ Identities are always "constructed", always "hybrid" and "ambivalent", but they are, at the same, totalised within boundaries and bear the violence and the burden of history as well as the

²³ Young makes it clear that "both historicism or entirely differentiated histories are in themselves impossibilities: history will always involve a form of historicism, but a historicism that cannot be sustained." (1990: 84)
possibilities for resistance within themselves. These, in a way, constitute their “historical essence”.

Therefore, rather than dissolving the poles of identity, one should address the tension involved, both in its particular manifestations and “universal” relevance. “Only an understanding that recognizes that an irresolvable tension works within the historical schema itself will be in a position to make its contradictory claims productive.” (Young, 1990:83) Occidentalism provides examples of this tension. It describes a setting - a set of practices, ideas and feelings- by which traditions are built against an essentialised and objectified entity called “the West”. But at the same time the projections of the West hover over the universal principles of Western modernity as a deferred echo that challenge and alter its initial “universal” meanings. According to Carrier, Occidentalism is “a projection of one element of the West, linked to the perpetual, unsatisfied desire that is so pronounced under capitalism.” (1995:13) Thus Occidentalism is both particular and universal; it is both a finite representation and an ongoing political intervention in the dialogic relation between the East and the West. But as I have argued before, the intervention of Occidentalism also contributes to the hegemony of Orientalism. It produces a resistance to the Western power, but operates within its discursive terms to maintain a system of government that endorses its hegemony. The desire of the nationalist elite in Turkey to become both Western and Turkish resonates with the Western desire to see Turkey as a “bridge” that never crosses the distance between the West and the East; that becomes Western but never quite like it. The Western desire is marked by the ambivalence to want Turkey to be irreducibly Other yet Western. Occidentalism does not challenge the West but it is nonetheless disturbing. The West constructed within the history of Turkish nationalism gives an

24 Carrier’s collection on Occidentalism includes very interesting research on cultures such as in Melanesia, Japan, and Greece. Lindstrom’s article on Melanesian cargo cults argues that these narratives (the belief that the spirits of the dead bring quantities of the Europeans’ goods for the loyal believers) are both a commentary about the Orient and the Occident, and represent allegories of desire. Lindstrom, especially underlines the “universalisation of desire” here, that is “perhaps peculiar to capitalist society” (1995:55) which seeks material goods and is never satisfied. It is a representation of an essentialised aspect of the West which is circulated to effect both the Orient and the Occident.
account of the subjectivity of the Other.

1.2. "The Western Question" in Turkey

a. Early Turkish Nationalism and Westernisation

It is noteworthy that the concept of the West, replacing that of Christianity, crystallised "in opposition to the Muslim attacks against Europe, and in contrast to the overseas discoveries." (Göçek, 1996: 5) The Europeans used the term "Europe" to refer to themselves in their overseas encounter with other cultures, while the "West" was the term attributed by others (1996: 5). Although "the West" was an imagined and an ambiguous concept, it was fostered by a new physical image. I find Göçek's emphasis on the physical image of the West an important point that is usually missed in Western oriented conceptions of Westernisation. She argues:

"Westernization marked the first stage of Europe's permanent impact on the rest of the world; it evolved to refer to the transformations societies underwent to become like the West. All too often, "Westernization" alluded to an imagined transformation and had at best, as empirical evidence, the adoption of the physical attributes of the West, namely, its mode of dress, aesthetics, or material culture. What was Westernized was simply what appeared Western; what appeared Western in turn was a measure of social change. This was partially the consequence of the expanding role of science and technology in defining the West..." (1996: 6).

Göçek's notion of Westernisation, as the adoption of the physical attributes of the West which already defines what being Western means, is helpful in showing a way out of the usually posited opposition between "what appears as Western" and "what is really Western". The opposition especially figured in the debates on Westernisation and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Empire first encountered the "West" through wars.

25 Göçek refers to Hay (1968) to point to the "image" that was associated with Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In cartography and geographical works Europe was portrayed as "crowned, cuirassed, holding a spectre and orb, with weapons, scientific instruments, a palette, books, and Christian symbols" (Hay, 1968: 104-5).
Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1788, which according to Edward Said was a turning point in Orientalism\textsuperscript{26}, was interpreted by Ottomans as "wildness" that turned human beings into animals (B. Lewis, 1953: 121). The changing interpretations of the West as a superior civilisation in the following years was due to accelerating decline of the Ottoman power, usually described in terms of the relation between the Ottoman Empire and Europe (F. Ahmad, 1993: 23). The first projects of Westernisation was considered to be "shallow" by later reformers because they were confined to the import of European furniture and fashions for the ruling classes (Ibid). Yet these imports demonstrate how the West came to be an object of desire for the Ottomans starting from the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{27} However, the institutional and military reforms in the nineteenth century led to more substantial changes. This was initiated by more systematic contacts with Europe\textsuperscript{28}, and resulting comparisons with the West. The Tanzimat reforms during the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839) aimed to restructure the state and the army taking the West as the "model". Indeed, as Mardin argues even the name Tanzimat (reorganisation or correction) implied a reference to a model (Mardin, 1991:13). In this process, the autonomy of the official class was increased; Janissaries, the standing army, was put under government control and the 	extit{ulema} (religious elite) lost their financial independence. Constitutional arrangements\textsuperscript{29} both put restraints on the absolute power of the Sultan and decreed the sanctity of private

\textsuperscript{26} "...an invasion which was in many ways the very model of a truly scientific appropriation of one culture by another. For with Napoleon's occupation of Egypt processes were set in motion between East and West that still dominate our contemporary cultural and political perspectives." (Said, 1995: 42)

\textsuperscript{27} Göçek cites Enver Pasha's letter to a "lady friend" in Europe in 1911, in which he says: "Your civilization, it is a poison, but it is a poison that wakes one up and one cannot, one does not want to sleep anymore. One feels that if one were to close one's eyes, it would be in order to die." (Enver Paşa, 1989: 186) One can see here that the image of civilisation has connotations of desire, associated not only with goods and fashion but also with women.

\textsuperscript{28} Ottoman embassies were founded in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. Also many members of the ruling class traveled into European countries and came back with analyses of possible reasons of Ottoman decline in face of Europe (Mardin, 1991: 13).

\textsuperscript{29} A charter, known as the Noble Rescript of Gülhane, was issued in 1839. It brought a flood of statues, regulations, ordinances and laws, which according to Mardin caused the conflict between statute law and religious law to deepen (1981: 196).
property. "The significant outcome of these changes was the creation of a new bureaucratic class", which, according to Ahmad (1993: 25), assumed the task of social engineering.

Göçek points to the rise of another social group -partly overlapping with the bureaucratic class- in these years, which she terms as Ottoman intellectuals. This group taught at Western style schools, worked for newspapers and journals, wrote novels and plays. They became conversant in Western languages, especially French. They defined a new Ottoman social vision, which the sultan did not support (Göçek, 1996). However the new vision was not entirely based on imitation. The interpretation of Western ideas was accompanied by the translation of both literary and other, scientific, social and political, texts. The translation chamber of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employed intellectuals who did not only translate texts but made adaptations for the Ottoman public. Adaptations and translations usually altered the original texts and accommodated the meanings in a different epistemology. While altered meanings were attached to Western concepts some Western words were left untouched; they were transliterated to refer to Western ideas, such as "liberte" (liberty) and "nasyon" (nation). The use of foreign words "provided political opponents of the sultan with a means of symbolic resistance" (Göçek, 1996: 128). One can see here the first examples of a boundary management between the West and national. A similar experimentation in defining identity using Western forms can be observed in the fields of journalism and theatre. Ottoman identity and problems of "motherland" were debated through these media.

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30 She connects the rise of intellectuals to a process in which bourgeoisie was formed as part of civil society (1996).

31 New western-style schools, based not on religious but on positive sciences were opened in the field of engineering, medicine, law and military at the end of the eighteenth century and in the nineteenth century (Aydın, 1993: 53).

32 J. Parla points to the distortions in the translations of Shakespeare’s plays in the Tanzimat era. She argues that it was due to two distinct epistemological orders, Western and Islamic, which were incommensurable (1990: 92).

33 Though it was defined in different terms at that time. Motherland and Islam were two keywords in defining the Ottoman identity.
which were first introduced by Western initiatives.\textsuperscript{34} The name of one
the first newspapers published by an Ottoman in 1860, \textit{Tercümân-i Ahvâl} (the translation of the situation) gives a clue to what this meant.

The Western oriented reformist intellectuals and officials, called
the Young Ottomans in the late nineteenth century, blamed the
previous reformers of the Tanzimat era for adopting only a superficial
form of Westernisation confining it only to a style of life. The term
"Tanzimat mentality", still used in Turkey, denoted an alienation from
the authentic Islamic culture. The Young Ottomans were in search of a
synthesis between Western concepts, such as liberty, citizenship,
and Islamic-Ottoman identity. They forced the regime to adopt a
constitution in 1876 which coined the idea of Ottoman citizenship. The
Constitution was shelved for 30 years under the despotic regime of
Abdülhameid II, and most of the reformist intellectuals had to go to
Europe for political exile where they had further contact with Western
ideas and sciences. The Young Turk movement was shaped in the
exile. In 1908 the Young Turks came to power to stay until the end of
the war -with some interruptions in between due to instability caused
by a continuous clash between the Court, the Sublime Porte (the
assembly and the government), the wars, and the inner conflicts
between reformist activists. The Young Turks had "Turkist" nationalist
ideas, that were still in close relation to Islamic identity, but
foregrounded "Turkishness".\textsuperscript{35}

It is not possible to give a full account of the history of the late
Ottoman Empire here. What I want to focus on, instead, is the
conception of nationalism, starting with Young Ottomans but at its
peak with Young Turks, put within a frame that brought together
Western civilisation and Turkish culture. The most interesting example

\textsuperscript{34} For example the discussion of what comprised "true and correct Ottoman" in new
theatres (Göçek, 1996: 130) foreshadows the debate in Turkish Radio about "correct
Turkish" in the 30's which I will be discussing in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{35} It is agreed by many scholars that Ottomanism failed due to the absence of unifying
patterns among the multiplicity of groups that existed in the Empire. Islamism, on the
other hand, lost its appeal because of the emerging separatist movements of the
Albanian and Arab Moslems. The Russian expansion in Central Asia brought Turkish
immigrants to the Empire with Pan-turkist ideas, such as Yusuf Akçura. These ideas
fostered Turkish nationalism organised within the Young Turks and the Committee of
Union and Progress. (F.Ahmad, 1993; Georgeon, 1986; Kuran, 1968; Mardin,
1981;1991)
to look at would be Ziya Gökalp's trinity of "culture", "civilisation", and "Islam". Gökalp was a sociologist, whose ideas are said to inform both Young Ottoman and Young Turk policies, and influenced the later Kemalist nationalists to a certain extent. With his work, "idiosyncratic Westernisms" are thought to be "supplanted by a critical appreciation of the West" (Parla 1985: 22). Gökalp wrote in a period when the attempts of Westernisation were already in practice. Yet the critiques that accused the higher classes for "excessive Westernisation" persisted. The search for true nationalist identity was especially focused on defining the limits of the identity of women (Kandiyoti, 1997b: 134). Gökalp came up with a conceptual frame that comprised an idea of a "unique" true culture and a civilisation that is "international" and "common" to various cultures. Culture, for Gökalp, consisted of "complex rules of language, politics, religion, morality, aesthetics, law and economy which exist on an unconscious level in the life of the nation" (1917a: 166). Civilisation, or specifically "modern" civilisation was "the product of the positive sciences, their methods and techniques" (Gökalp, 1917b: 134). In this formulation the concept of civilisation denoted the "sciences and techniques" of the West but in no way was it reducible to Western culture. Culture was to be found in what comprised Turkishness. Islam had a function in the organisation of the Turkish society as well the development of the national soul.

Gökalp’s ideas, although highly influenced by Durkheim, were original in drawing subtle boundaries between being Western,
Turkish and Muslim identities. He built his theory on absences, deficiencies and projections: First, he started from a state of denial of Turkishness in the Ottoman Empire. Turks were excluded from real loci of power; they could not establish themselves as an economic class. They were mostly peasants and were ridiculed both by the religious and secular elites. But as "sociology has shown, genius is hidden in the people", and Turkishness can be awakened by nationalism. Nationalism was an ideal that would raise the conscience of Turkish people from a subconscious to the conscious level. The origins were based on an utopia: Turkish life long before in Central Asia. The Turkish cultural traits were not those of Oriental origin, such as polygamy, the seclusion of women and their low status, fatalism, and ascetism, or "sickly Oriental music" -imposed upon the Islamised Turks through the infiltrations of the Near East (Gökalp, 1981: 29). Thus, Gökalp denied the present situation of Islamic culture; projected unto "the people" Turkish nationalism that was seemingly absent but was present as an "ideal"; and operationalised the West in terms of "sciences and techniques". He was against "copying" or "imitating" Western culture. By relegating the West to the realm of sciences and techniques he could also oppose it in cultural terms: The new synthesis in Turkey would show that "the foundations of European civilization are worn, sick, and rotten, that they are destined to fall and disintegrate" (Gökalp, 1981: 60). He believed that "the Turkish intelligence is not worn out, its sentiments are not effeminate, its will is not weakened" (Ibid).

Gökalp's theory of nationalism opens up a new space for thinking the dynamics of Occidentalism as part of historical conditions -in relation to the self-definitions of the Ottoman elite in their attempts of both Westernisation and coining national identity. It also provides an important insight to thinking respectively about Kemalism, which has been mostly framed within a paradigm of "imitation" as I have

40 "The old Ottoman elite scorned the peasant as 'stupid Turk'; the people of Anatolia were ridiculed as 'outsiders'; the title given to people was 'vulgar'." (Gökalp, 1981: 260)

41 Gökalp defined the concept of the "ideal" as a force: "Psychological facts, which we call opinion, ideal, belief, are not mere passive ideas and ineffective representations. In them, creative and destructive forces, positive or negative values, are inherent." (Gökalp, 1981: 52)
already discussed.

b. Kermalism and Occidentalism

For more than 75 years Kernalism has been declared as the ruling ideology of the Turkish nation state, which itself underwent significant mutations and employed a variety of policies at different periods, which were not always consistent with each other. Therefore looking back at Kermalism from today, and trying to define it is a difficult task. It involves a set of methodological and ideological problems. For example, Turkish “modernisation” triggered by nationalist Kernalist reforms is often studied at the level of state structures, political institutions, and the industrial economy. Thus, “more penetrating effects on the cultural level, in lifestyles, gender identities and self-definition of identity” (Göle, 1997: 83) are neglected. Also, as I have discussed before, Turkish national reforms were often viewed within a frame of “imitation” with implications of opposing Islam to Western civilisation, that still continues to be a matter of debate in Turkey. Here I will specifically discuss the


43 Against the political arguments that oppose Islamic traditions to Westernisation, Bozdoğan and Kasaba emphasise that “it is sometimes ignored that regardless of how shallow Turkey’s ‘civilizational shift’ from Islam to the West has actually been, institutional, ritual, symbolic, and aesthetic manifestations of modernity have become constituent elements of the Turkish collective consciousness since the 1920’s.” (1997: 5)
conditions of Occidentalist fantasy in early Turkish history, in opposition to both perspectives that primarily dwell on the “objective” institutional and economic changes, and conceive politics and economy too narrowly; and those that render the “subjective” elements as manifestations of imitation. The “question of the West” in Turkish national history can be studied in its wide range of aspects from institutions to psychology. However, it is not my aim here to reconstruct another version of the history of Westernisation in Turkey. Not only because it lies beyond the scope of my thesis, but also due to some methodological problems. I argue that what is called Westernisation in Turkey cannot be understood as an objective process - that can be accounted as a totalised history- in which certain things, including manners, were imported from the West. However, it was neither just a subjective orientation that shaped events in line with the will power of the elite. What exactly lies within my interest, in terms of Occidentalism and national identity, is the stock of images and techniques associated with “the West” that were instrumentalised to define the horizon of Turkish national identity. That is, how the national elite consumed and reproduced the projection of “the West” (and civilisation) to negotiate and consolidate their power in line with their pragmatic interests.

First it has to be observed that Kemalists in early Turkish history were ambivalent about the possible impact of Westernisation. This challenges the idea that the “nation” together with modern industrialism, is “probably the major European contribution to the world at large. Certainly it is the major political contribution of Europe to Turkey’s modernisation.” (R. Davison, 1990:87) In a similar manner it contests a Turkish Kemalist’s assessment: “there is no reason why one should not regard the Westernization movement as the scientific basis of Turkish revolution” (Karal, 1981: 12). However, while Western civilisation was acknowledged as “superior” to the Ottoman heritage of the new Turkish Republic, it was, at the same time, despised for several reasons associated with its morality, the presence of “dangerous” class struggles and the existence of imperialist tendencies, etc. It was seen both as a source of progress and a threat.
The imagery of Western civilisation that appears, for example, in Mustafa Kemal’s speeches in the early 20’s is striking:

“It is futile to try to resist the thunderous advance of civilization, for it has no pity on those who are ignorant or rebellious. The sublime force of civilization pierces mountains, crosses the skies, enlightens and explores everything from the smallest particle of dust to stars...When faced with this, those nations who try to follow the superstitions of the Middle Ages are condemned to be destroyed or at least to become enslaved and debased.” (1959: 212, emphasis added)

“We lived through pain because we did not understand the conditions of the world. Our thinking and our mentality will have to become civilized. And we will be proud of this civilization. Take a look at the entire Turkish and Islamic world. Because they failed to adapt to the conditions and rise, they found themselves in such a catastrophe and suffering. We cannot afford to hesitate any more. We have to move forward... Civilization is such a fire that it burns and destroys those who ignore it.” (1959: 207, emphasis added)

Civilisation in Mustafa Kemal’s words stands out as a fierce force that destroys those who resist or stay indifferent to it; it is aggressive, threatening and all-powerful. The feelings of panic raised by its progress and the fear of “being late” are accompanied by a feeling of inferiority inflicted on those who are not part of the Western civilisation. “The lethargic mentality of the past centuries” should be abandoned, said Mustafa Kemal; the new standards should be based on “speed and movement that define our century.” (1959: 277) In a similar manner Gökâlp had said, “(W)e shall skip five hundred years and not stand still.” (cited in Lerner, 1958 :136)

The impact of the West, therefore, was more than a mere import of concepts and techniques for Turkish nationalists. It was not just a movement of “modernity” in time and space. It was a totally new conception of time which proceeded violently, like a war machine. It was a threat that the Turkish nationalists had to acknowledge and adapt to with “high speed” for the sake of survival. This probably set the ground and defined a complex structure of sentiments for the fast “process of modernisation” after the foundation of the Turkish
Republic. Whether Kemalist reforms were in continuity with the earlier "modernisation" attempts is a much debated one. Mardin who emphasised that "the sensitivity to dimension of time places Kemalist reforms "in a different category from the reformism of early Tanzimat" (1981: 200). Mardin points to a feeling of urgency on the part of Kemalists "to work for something which did not exist as if it existed and make it exist" (209). "Nation" and "Western civilisation" were two fundamental keywords for this (Ibid).

Similarly, whether the Kemalist restructuring of the political and social realms was reformist or revolutionary has attracted various interpretations. The ambiguous word *inkilâp*, which had both connotations of reform and revolution, was functional in fostering a radical image for attempted changes, but at the same time, allowing a space for ongoing negotiations with different interest groups. For example, the abolition of the authority of the Sultan-Caliph in 1922 was an outcome of complex considerations. The majority of the people in the national struggle did not have particularly nationalist visions; they saw the national struggle as a means to restore the sultan-caliph and Islamic constitutionalism (F. Ahmad, 1993: 52). Mustafa Kemal, who had referred to Islam as a unifying force in the

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44 Dumont argues that "there is an unbroken continuity in Turkish modernist doctrine from the ideology of the Tanzimat to the six Kemalist arrows." (1984: 41) Eisenstadt proposes a comparative framework of revolutions along the axis of continuity/discontinuity. He locates the "Turkish revolution" in between the English case where there was a relatively small degree of discontinuity, and the Russian case where the largest of discontinuity was experienced (1981: 140).

45 The adoption of a new script within what was called the "language revolution" is an excellent example for the feeling of urgency. The commission working on the new alphabet came up with two alternative schedules: 15 or a 5 year transition programme. Mustafa Kemal replied that "(T)his will either happen in three months or it won't happen at all." (cited in G.L. Lewis, 1984: 199)

46 It is generally agreed that Kemalists did not attempt a revolutionary change that would cover the whole national territory. Özbudun argues that the attempted changes remained basically within the field of "superstructure" (1981: 93). F. Ahmad (1993) gives an illuminating account of the economic, political and social reasons for Kemalists' divide between reforming and totally changing the society. He also points to how the term was disputed in the Kemalist party, the moderates interpreting it as reformism, the radicals as revolutionism (63). I argue that Partha Chatterjee's use of the Gramscian concept "passive revolution" in the Indian context can be applied to Turkey: "Passive revolution" had the strategy of "molecular transformation" of the state, "neutralising opponents, converting sections of the former ruling classes into allies in a partially reorganised system of government, undertaking economic reforms on a limited scale so as to appropriate the support of the popular masses but keeping them out of any form of direct participation in the processes of governance." (Chatterjee, 1993a: 45)
First Assembly made a point against the sultan-caliph few years later by naming the defenders of the Islamic regime as "conservatives" who wanted to perpetuate the "backwardness of Turkey" in relation to the West. Images of Western civilisation was employed by Kemalists to silence the opponents.\(^{47}\) However, it can also be argued that the British demand that the sultan also sent a delegation along with the nationalist delegation to the Lausanne conference in 1922 (for peace negotiations which ended with the recognition of the new Turkish state) played a role in the decision: the abolition of the sultanate represented a distance from both the imperialist British demands and the pressing oppositions of "conservatives".\(^{48}\) Thus the conservatives vs. revolutionaries frame, duplicated in most simplistic terms in Turkish textbooks on history, require a further analysis in light of specific reasons for each reform/revolution. Mustafa Kemal had to fight various oppositions to his power, coming from rural authorities and landlords who felt threatened by the idea of land reform, mostly non-Muslim tradesmen and businessmen who feared that their links with the international economy would be severed, Islamists who used the figure of the caliph as a symbol for their opposition, and even officers in the army who were against the personal rule of Mustafa Kemal.

Kemalists, who organised themselves as the Republican People's Party, had to develop policies both to silence and to

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\(^{47}\) A debate in 1925 between an Istanbul MP, Hamdullah Suphi, and an Erzurum MP, Ziya Hoca, illustrate how different images of the West were employed in the discussion of "past vs. present". According to Tunaya, Ziya Hoca who represented the past was against excessive Westernisation, which imported corruptions together with good aspects of civilisation. Against this Hamdullah Suphi gave an ironic reply. He argued that the conservatives thought "civilisation would stop at customs when traveling from one continent to the other. We would have a committee and inspect each entering item one by one. What is this? A locomotive. Let it pass. What is this? Dancing. No we don't want it..." (Tunaya, 1996: 108) The debate shows that the culture/civilisation opposition was not easy to resolve for Turkish nationalists.

\(^{48}\) Curiously the term designates not only the Islamic opponents but also Westernised liberals, usually members of what was called the Istanbul bourgeoisie, who had vested interests in restoring the system of economic dependency on the West (F. Ahmad, 1993: 53).
accommodate the opposition. Turkey had to follow a similarly "balancing" international policy which oscillated between abolishing the privileges of Western forces and their collaborators inside, and making new political and economic alliances with Western countries. The complex foreign policies of the Turkish governments until the end of the Second World War point to the influence of the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy on the nationalist political vision, but also the importance given by the government in establishing friendly relations with Britain. There were also tensions in the relations with the Soviet Union; on the one hand, good

49 Kernalists used anti-democratic means to suppress the opposition. The law for the Maintenance of Order in 1925, following a Kurdish rebellion in eastern Anatolia, brought heavy censorship on the press and freedom of opinion. This was an important blow for leftist journals (Tuncay, 1981: 142-6). The opponents of the regime were effectively silenced by special courts founded at that time, known as Independence Tribunals (Tuncay, 1981: 140-1). The opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party founded only a year ago in 1924, was dissolved. However, in addition to harsh measures Kernalists also sought ways to accommodate the opposition. The experiment of founding a token opposition party, the Free Party, with the aim of giving the image of a democratic regime is one interesting example. I will mention about the party's fate later in the chapter.

50 There was a strong sentiment at the Economic Congress of Turkey in 1923, to establish "national economic sovereignty". The idea was to build a national industrial economy by abolishing the privileges that Europeans enjoyed by the existence of "capitulations" in the Ottoman Empire, which was seen by Kernalists as a "colony of foreigners". However, the forced immigration of non-Muslim populations who used to hold most of the trade and industrial enterprises, in addition to the poor condition of the economy after the war, made an isolated economic development impossible. Therefore, Kernalists welcomed, even invited, foreign capital. Between 1920 and 1930 about a third of the companies set up were joint ventures with foreign capital (F. Ahmad, 1993: 72-101).

51 For an account of the foreign policies during the Second World War, and a comprehensive bibliography on Turkish foreign policy before and during the period, see Deringil, 1994.

52 "Fascism...seemed to suit the ideological needs of Ankara. With Kemalism it shared a love of nationalism and a hatred for class conflict which was denounced for dividing and bringing only harm to the nation... But the appeal of fascism was more in the realm of practice and organisation than ideas; and that was the direction in which the Kernalists were moving...the regime began to move in the direction of a mono-party system in which party members assumed state responsibilities, for example a provincial party chairman would be appointed governor of his province." (F. Ahmad, 1993: 62)

53 There was a liberal turn in policies in 1936 as a measure against "the regime's fascist colouring" before the Montreux Convention on the status of Straits. Recep Peker, the representative of anti-liberal sentiments was forced to resign leaving his post as general secretary to RPP. The turn was warmly accepted by Britain and led to Anglo-Turkish rapprochement sealed by the visit of King Edward VIII's to Turkey (F. Ahmad, 1993: 68).

54 Turkey established friendly relations with the Bolsheviks starting from the national struggle. For an account of the history of Soviet-Turkish relations during the Turkish National Struggle see Gökay, 1996.
intrastate relations had to be maintained, on the other hand, all indigenous versions of socialist and communist movements were crushed.

The principles of Kemalism, usually known as the six arrows that symbolised the RPP, were coined in the beginning of the 1930s as Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and Revolutionism/Reformism. In 1937 these principles were incorporated into the constitution defining the nature of the Turkish state. Nevertheless all were controversial issues.\textsuperscript{55} Yet despite all the complexities and controversies regarding policies, informed by both internal and external historical factors, the ideology of Kemalism appeared as a more or less unified discourse towards the end of the 1930s. This was partly due to the anti-democratic laws and measures that crushed or silenced for a period, the opposition. Also by that time, many of the reforms associated with the Turkish national identity had been accomplished: In 1922 the Sultanate, and in 1924 the Caliphate were abolished. In the same year a new Constitution was accepted; the laws of March 1924 put education under the monopoly of the state and banned medrese, the religious schools. In 1926 Civil Code based on Swiss law was adopted in place of Islamic code of law, and in the same year the Gregorian calendar was put into effect and Islamic way of keeping time was replaced with the international clock. In 1927 radio broadcasting was inaugurated. After replacing Arabic numerals with Western ones, a new Turkish-Latin script was introduced in 1928. Women were granted voting rights in 1930, and the right to stand for election in national elections in 1934. In 1935 Sunday was declared to be the weekly holiday in line with the West.

\textsuperscript{55} All these principles had also pragmatic functions. Republicanism, which defined the regime, was coined against the old regime symbolised in the sultanate. Nationalism was the product of the past nationalist movements but it also delineated the Turkish regime from Islamic internationalism. Populism was the legitimation of the power of the national elite who claimed themselves to be the representatives of “the people”. Statism signified the anti-liberal economic and political policies, which treated the nation not as composed of different classes but as a “unified whole”. Instead, the state adopted a paternalistic role in regulating the society and economy. Secularism, or Laicism, that justified the abolition of the caliphate, aimed to dismiss the use of Islam as a political tool. Finally, Reformism/Revolutionism secured the rule of Kemalists by making it certain that the reforms/revolutions are unchangeable (Karal, 1981). All of these principles were contested by different groups, such as the Islamists, the liberals and the landlords - who feared state intervention (F.Ahmad, 1993).
The short time span of the reforms together with their radical nature succeeded to create an effect of revolution which attracted the attention of the Western visitors and/or observers. For example, Arnold Toynbee, one of the architects of the Western partition plan of the Ottoman Empire and who had recorded the “hopeless situation” of Turkey after the First World War (F.Ahmad, 1993: 46-7), praised the “Turkish state of mind” for its revolutionary character: “L’Empire Ottoman est mort; vive la Turquie” (Toynbee, 1925: 558). Harold Bowen, in his “British Contribution to Turkish Studies” identified the recovery of Turkey as a “political miracle”, especially noting the “miraculous restoration” of Anglo-Turkish friendship (1945: 56). Eleanor Bisbee, who admired “the New Turks”, called “everybody interested in trends of civilization, the fate of nations, and the capacity of humans to change their own lives” to turn to the story of the Turks (1951: ix). She made use of the “bridge” identity to emphasise the importance of Turkey. Turkish nationalists surely managed to draw “the attention of the entire world” (Dumont, 1984: 41).

However, it is highly debatable that the reforms/revolutions succeeded in transforming the whole society according to the desired image. Kemalists themselves were aware of the limited reach of the changes. The experimentation with a token opposition party, the Free Party, had some grave results. The party was established by Mustafa Kemal’s will in 1930 to “improve Turkey’s image in Western Europe” (F.Ahmad, 1993: 59), and was thought to be representative of “mild opposition”. However, the party attracted an unexpectedly high interest from the people. There were strikes and demonstrations mobilised around the name of the party, followed by a bloody event; the uprising of the members of an Islamic mystical order in middle Anatolia led by Dervish Mehmed caused a beheading of an officer in the local gendarmerie. The demand articulated in the uprising was to restore the Islamic regime. The Free Party was banned in the same year. Yakup Kadri, the persistent critical voice of Kemalists, wrote that Dervish Mehmed was only a “symptom” of the failure of Kemalist

56 “They are uniquely important people to know in this era of one-world hopes, because they live in a country which is both Asia and Europe, and share the culture and problems of both Occident and Orient.” (Bisbee, 1951: ix)
reforms: "it is as though nothing has happened all these years, as though...the idea of any of our radical reforms has not altered anything in this country" (in Üstün, 1981: 40-1). Yet many Kemalist intellectuals and officials did not raise their doubts. What surfaced instead, was the devotion to create a “new Turk”.57 This figured as part of the principle of populism, especially in the setting up of the People’s Houses in 1932.58

Furthermore, some reforms were interpreted in a rather flexible way. For example, the new dress code that banned the wearing of fez for men, allowed women to continue to wear the veil. On the one hand, the modernity of the Turkish nation was signified through the “icon” of new Kemalist women (Kandiyoti, 1997a), but on the other, there were negotiations with the patriarchal Islamic tradition to keep women in newly defined traditional roles, such as wife and mother. The double edge of the nationalist discourse in giving some rights to women, yet strictly controlling their conduct will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. As a whole, the extent and nature of reforms, and the reaction of the Western audience, set the conditions of the fantasy articulated in the official discourse. The fantasy of “civilised” Turkish identity was projected onto “the people”. Kemalists were aware that

57 The qualities of the new Turk was contrasted to a type of person that existed in the past, whose traits were “undervaluing human life, vagabondage, laziness, poverty, not being concerned about nature, being unable to assess the actual value of any concept, turning one’s back on free thought” (Karal, 1981: 15). One can observe the feeling of inferiority in these descriptions which were derived from a comparison with the West. I will take up this issue when discussing Radio Talks in Chapter 5.

58 These semi-educational and politically charged institutions followed on from the Turkish Hearths that had been active in the reform period in the Ottoman Empire. The People’s Houses were established to maintain closer contact with the people in order to educate and discipline them. The set goal was to “perpetually constitute the bases of national and social life through discipline, education, speech” (words of Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, cited in Halkevleri 1932-1935: 103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasıl Çalıştı, p.2) They were initially designed as sites of cultural exchange and solidarity, where ideally people would bring in their own experiences and learn from each other. However, in practice, the People’s Houses gained a highly centralised structure and were eventually associated with the government (Kirby, 1963; Öztürkmen, 1998; Türkoglu, 1996). Bora draws attention to the non-correspondence of the design and practice in the People’s Houses (1997). I will point to how radio broadcasting fitted into the practice of the People’s Houses in Chapter 3.
the full “modernisation” had to deal with the periphery but the resistant peripheral forces had to be pragmatically manipulated, involving compromises. Therefore, the notion of “full modernisation” could only be incorporated at the level of fantasy. It was produced and consumed primarily in Ankara, the newly constructed site of the nation. “Going to the people” as the essential strategy of populism, was replaced by talking about “the people”. The body of the people was denied through symbolism, as their “spirit” was incorporated into fantasy. Children would hear a song broadcast on Ankara Radio that said “there is a village there far away/even if we don’t go there, even if we don’t see it/ it is our village”. I will point to the role of Ankara for the generation of the Occidentalist fantasy, especially through radio broadcasting in Chapter 3.

Finally, it is possible to argue that Kemalism was not a simulation of the Western model but was an act of creation within a certain structural and historical network, and was definitely a part - quite an old part - of the “real thing”, the West. The Occidentalist fantasy was powerful to the extent that it could fill a void by means of a narration endorsed by Western techniques. The forms of narration produced in the process was neither monolithic nor without

59 Mardin points to the different cultures, including Islamic traditions, of the centre and the periphery in the Ottoman Empire. He argues that Ottomans did not adopt modernisation, in the Western sense, to join the peripheral ways of life in the national culture (1973, 1991) Kemalists, too, could not easily bridge the gulf between the centre and the periphery. The attempts of “going to the people” were countered by the fear of peripheral revolts which would undermine their power.

60 The People’s Houses, with their motto of “going to the people”, constitute a highly significant subject to analyse the dynamics of populism in Turkey. Their operations manifest how the representation of the people had to be denied in practical terms both to secure an ideal image and to sustain a central authority. Yeğen analyses the People’s Houses, from a Foucauldian perspective, as instruments of discipline (1995). However, they can also be studied as sites where a different rationale of government manifests itself. I will take up this problem in Conclusion.

61 The Turkish History Institute and The Turkish Language Institute were founded in the beginning of the 1930s to to create a basis for Turkishness. They came up with national narratives concerning the origins of Turkish race and language. Turkish History Thesis developed by a large group of historians, and which claimed that Turkish race had a determining role in the foundation of all civilisations made references to some Western research (Ersanlı-Behr, 1992). Yeğen evaluates the endeavor in relation to the desire to be part of “Western civilisation” (1995). The role of the “scientific techniques” in developing the racist-nationalist theory should not be ignored. The production of text-books based on the theory, according to Yeğen, was inspired by the discipline of pedagogy. The aim was to foster citizenship consciousness.
contradictions. Yet it made use of the images of the West, both in a negative and positive way, to address the complexity of being, at the same time, both Western and Turkish. "Western civilisation" was operationalised to justify the new regime against the old, but only to emphasise that the Turkish nation would surpass the evils of Western way life. The Turkish national anthem should be interpreted in the light of Occidentalism that opposed the West and yet yearned to be Western: "Fear not, how can that monster called Civilisation/Choke, with the last tooth in its jaw, the faith of an entire nation?"62 The desire and the contempt produced in and around the "Westernisation" process were the key elements that fostered the dynamics of Occidentalism.

In this chapter I explored both the theoretical framework and some historical conditions of the Occidentalist fantasy and its subjects/objects, the national elite, in Turkish national history. In the following chapter I will address the methodological issues in analysing its manifestations in and through radio broadcasting.

62 The lyrics were written by Mehmet Akif, a pious poet, and was accepted as the national anthem after being suggested by Hamdullah Suphi, a determined supporter of Westernisation. Samet Ağaoğlu comments that this is something that is difficult to interpret even today (Türk Yurdu, February 1967, p.128).
The "map" drawn by a former sound engineer, Ertuğrul İlmer, of Ankara Radio as a guide to find the old records in the store room. The archives were officially declared to be non-existent but technically were lying behind the cupboard.
CHAPTER 2
The Burden of History: The Methodological Framework

All too often social theory is used to provide a frame in which empirical analysis is situated. Theory contextualises; history and empirical work exemplifies. This work is informed by theory. But my ambition is less to produce a theoretical framework than indicate the possibility of a dialogue between history and theory. My theoretical framework is in constant tension with the historical data, as it confines itself to a set of critical questions.

My aim in this work, is an intervention to the readings of the political ideology of Kemalism, in early Turkish national history, by shifting the locus of political analysis from official discourses that are based on party politics and the state to social fantasies that figure in and express themselves in radio broadcasting. The concepts that are employed to interpret the highly complex movements in this field come from Western human sciences, such as sociology, psychoanalysis, and linguistics. They are put into work to treat a particular set of practices and texts that come from a non-Western part of the world. This involves a re-narrativisation of modernity extending and transposing its limits, outside of Western parameters (Hall, 1996: 250). Thus the concepts travel out of the tradition of Western sciences in the process. In this way the conceptual metaphors of the human sciences, themselves, are translated gaining other meanings and shades, that may, in turn, shed some light on those temporal zones of modernity unaccounted within the confines of Western scientific inquiry. My research, therefore, is trans-disciplinary in its character that moves in between different “scientific” fields of representation, and focuses on both the principles and limits of the Western human sciences in their attempt to make sense of an “exceptional” non-Western case.

I begin with an account of my research, in the form of a research
diary which reveals certain tensions between “unapplicable theories” and “untheorisable practices”. Then, I move on to develop a methodological framework, that has been primarily data-driven, emerging through historical research. Here I discuss existing theoretical perspectives, namely Foucauldian discourse analysis, the psychoanalytical framework of Zizek, and Bakhtin's dialogic model. These approaches I find capable, although only partly, to support my methodological framework. In this chapter I do not attempt to synthesise these quite distinct theoretical perspectives. Rather I try to assess the relevance of these theoretical tools for the interpretation of my data.

In the third part of the chapter, I deconstruct the concept of the Other as it appears in the theoretical perspectives that I discuss, in order to reconstruct the different planes that the concept figures in within the specific context of my research. I employ the term Occidentalism, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, to analyse the active, imaginative and power-producing political subjectivity of the Other. This entails a reversal of the treatment of the Other from the Western standpoint. The concept of the Other has been “a symbolically marked ‘constitutive outside’” (Hall, 1996: 252) for the West. The modern Western identity is constructed in and through this Other which indicates a series of closely linked categories: race, gender, and class in the history of Western modernity. I attempt to engage in a historical treatment of the Other as it plays a role, and is played on by the political subjectivity of the “othered”, in the “Westernisation” process of early Turkish national history. I will attend to the concept, within the framework of Occidentalism, in its positivity, as a set of experiences, utterances, and practices, instead of adopting the often negative definition of the Other: as non-West, as non-discursive, or as non-visible. In this section I explicate the theoretical tools, namely projection, translation and social fantasy, that I instrumentalise in my analysis of Occidentalism.

Finally, I specify the key analytical objects of this thesis. I pursue different levels of analysis drawing on a variety of sources from archives to memoirs. The specific methods that I employ to analyse
the heterogeneous data are driven from the theoretical-methodological framework that I explicate in this chapter; they will be outlined with reference to specific sources in the final section. The object of the thesis, that is, Occidentalism as conveyed in the history of Turkish radio broadcasting, will emerge in the theoretical space that is demarcated by these analyses. In this sense, my thesis is to construct and define my object of analysis as a product of historical research.

2.1. Research Diary

My initial research question was derived from a concern to relocate Anderson's (1983) argument of "imagined communities" in Turkish national history. My question was: In what ways, did radio broadcasting during a specific period serve to imagine the Turkish nation? The question involved the idea of "modernity as form" in Osborne's terms (1995). I aimed to look for the organisation of certain techniques by Turkish Radio, through which the notion of nationhood was created or invented, and addressed to a "mass" of people, while at the same time, annihilating the temporal differences with other nations in the West. The standardisation of language, the signification of a national present and a national space, the invention of a past, the fixation of national memory all appeared as my objects of analysis in this context. And it seemed to me that the phase of consolidation of the national discourse, which corresponded to the years between 1930-1950 was particularly significant in understanding the role of radio-broadcasting in providing the formats and forms of modernity through a modern medium. However, my initial theoretical framework seemed not perfectly applicable in the actual process of doing the research.

I started my research going first to the library of TRT (Turkish

1 "...modernity is not, as such, a project, but merely its form. It is a form of historical consciousness, an abstract temporal structure which, in totalizing history from the standpoint of an ever-vanishing, ever-present present, embraces a conflicting plurality of projects, of possible futures, provided they conform to its basic logical structure." (Osborne, 1995: 23)

2 TRT was founded as a semi autonomous national broadcasting institution that incorporated the separate organisations of Ankara and Istanbul Radio, in 1964.
Radio Television) to look at the publications on the history of radio broadcasting. I was pretty sure that the librarian could guide me in searching the vast amount of material that I hoped to find. What I found, instead, was a librarian completely uninterested and quite ignorant of the history of radio broadcasting, and possessing very few publications on the subject. The institution seemed to function, without any need for historical documentation. It existed in the ever-present. My venture to get hold of historical archives, further complemented and complicated the picture. Although there existed some “selected” sound recordings of radio programmes, they were not cataloged according to date\(^3\), and none of them belonged to the period I wished to study. I was given the first hint by a higher official in a government bureau: “This institution does not keep organised, neither sound or written, archives; most of the old material has been destroyed either due to neglect or to the obsessive wish of “cleaning” the place by new managers”.\(^4\) The confessional stories of various present or ex-broadcasters, that I talked to, regarding the destruction of archives grew in number in a very short time. What struck me in those, was the taken-for-grantedness of the discontinuity. Everybody seemed to think it was “normal” that the archives were destroyed. Another significant point I noticed was the enjoyment that accompanied the stories of destruction. I heard several stories, told with pleasure, of how the old records of broadcast programmes in Ankara Radio was broken to halves to ease storage; how they were distributed to staff who turned them into objects of decoration, such as wall clocks. It was told that the written archives were abandoned to lie in a “store room” for years, and eventually most of them were destroyed by rats; the remaining ones were destroyed by the military after the coups of 1971 and 1980.

Almost all the broadcasters that I interviewed, most of whom were active in radio broadcasting in the 50’s and 60’s, told me that the past was not that important anyway. They did not hide their “astonishment” about my wish to study the radio broadcasting back in the 40’s. One

\(^3\) The most “outstanding” outputs of national importance were preserved basically for possibilities of re-broadcasting, not for keeping historical records.

\(^4\) The account of the General Director of Press and Publications Bureau, as a reply to my request to have access to the radio archives. January 1996.
person thought that radio, in those years, was no more than an “amateur” venture that reflected only the viewpoints of certain people and was produced in “primitive” formats. According to my informant, there were no good dramatised programmes, even nothing that can be called radio drama, as we understand it today. Only in the 1960s, she said, they could find their way in programming, and that, only by groping. Another person declared that, there didn’t exist any “programming” before the 60’s, as well as no clear norms to define what a broadcaster was supposed to do. When I asked if there was any contact with the BBC in the 40’s to a former radio director, he seemed surprised at the question and said the contacts with the BBC started after the 60’s.

These interviews conveyed a certain indifference to the past of radio broadcasting. They also reflected an indifferent attitude towards organisational history, mostly focusing on personal achievements, or the feuds among people within radio. What I encountered in those interviews was an extremely personalised account. The non-existence of both written and sound archives reinforced the sense of discontinuity, and made the past irrelevant. However, while the present directors of Ankara Radio ensured me that there were no existing archives, guided by an informal “map” of a former sound engineer of Ankara Radio, I found my way in the radio building, almost as a detective, and finally discovered some precious old records of programmes from the 40’s lying behind a cupboard. The director of Ankara Radio was surprised too. But when he kindly agreed to tape them for me, I could see no sign that he was keen to keep them for the institutions’ sake.

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5 This contradicts the information that Kocabaşoğlu gives about radio drama in the 40’s, which he considers as the “golden years of radio drama” in his account of the history of radio broadcasting in Turkey (1980).

6 Serpil Erdemgil, the director of Cultural Programmes, 1964-70. Now the Chief Director of the Turkish Service, BBC. Interview, June 1996.


8 Turgut Özakman, Interview, January 1996. His statement contradicts the information in the BBC Written Archives which show the contacts started as early as 1937: “M. Hayreddin Bey is the Director General of the newly formed Turkish Government broadcasting service, and he is over here on a longish visit to study the working of the BBC”, 1 October 1937,”Circulating Memo”, E1/1258.
How to explain the destruction or the neglect of archives? One clue comes from Marvin's discussion of the double-edged idea of "preservation". She argues that the new technologies and media in the nineteenth century were considered as the finally achieved means that enabled preservation of messages. Guarding culture was tantamount to guarding truth. However, while preservation could reduce heterodoxies of interpretation and enforce right-thinking homogeneity, it could also imperil by introducing uncontrolled variety (Marvin, 1988: 204). One can, then, explain the destruction of archives in the history of Turkish radio broadcasting as an attempt to control the variety of interpretation of the past. By destroying the past, the heirs of the past could fix it in their imagination as an absent constant.

However, this was an all too easy solution to the problem, as I have discovered, stepping into the BBC Written Archives. My initial reason of visiting the BBC Archives was to find some documents that could provide me with information on the history of Turkish Radio. The vast amount of material I found there regarding the activities of the BBC Turkish Service, radically changed my view. The archival documents, neatly kept in files, contained highly "subjective" material: such as views on Turkish people and life that can easily be described as "Orientalist"; explicit political concerns of propaganda; detailed accounts of strategy building to capture the Turkish audience; and endless worries regarding the efficiency of strategies. The BBC archives, far from providing me with "information" on Turkish radio, opened up a domain of politics. My initial reaction, after having contemplated on the destruction of archives in the Turkish case, was: Why should the BBC keep such documents that express overt political concerns? The documents could, one imagines, make the institution accountable for critical investigation. But by whom and for what end? The archives, for the time being, rest there peacefully while the BBC ponders on new ways of addressing and containing

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9 Scannell and Cardiff also point to the vast amount of records in the BBC Written Archives: "At present the Written Archives, in the grounds of the BBC Monitoring Service at Caversham Park, Reading, contain at least 200,000 files on all aspects of broadcasting from the early twenties through to the early sixties." (1991: xiii)
multiculturalism. The truth, manufactured within a dominant paradigm of power, Britain still being a model-setting representative of Western modernity, has its value as long as it is not challenged from within its own procedures of construction. The truth guarded by the BBC archives is the still valid truth of the "humanistic" discourse of British modernity. In the Turkish case, however, truth has been a product of ongoing negotiations that were structured by the Western gaze. In the former, archives are merely "history" with no connection to the present, while history is denied in the latter. A conclusion that follows from this: The BBC employed quite different strategies of manufacturing and guarding the truth than Turkish Radio. The inscription of historical records (the "empirical") demonstrates a technology of government peculiar to the West, in particular to Britain; while it is reckoned to be useless in Turkey where government must be operating within a different logic. Nonetheless, one may ask: are these two logics independent from each other? The intertwined history between the West and Turkish nationalism that I have illustrated in Chapter 1 makes one think that they are not.

The experience of doing the research and the data itself, forced me to rethink my initial research question. "Modernity as a form" was not universal, but was a representation which both produced and displaced historical experience. While the representations manufactured and disseminated by the BBC, for example claimed a full historicity and contained within its identity all the possible differences; Turkish Radio had to present its logic of progress in nonhistorical terms -modernity, akin to the logic of commodity, being an ever-present present to Turkish political subjectivity. In the case of the BBC, the recording of historical time affirmed political subjectivity.

10 Georgina Born's unpublished research points to the recent concerns of the BBC on multiculturalism. Seminar, SPS, University of Cambridge, March 1998. Multiculturalism is a problematic concept that aids policies, which usually fail to address the continuing hierarchies of power. Therefore, multiculturalism remains "within the political logic of assimilationism. And historically it plays a role to "endorse the claims to tolerance and inclusiveness of English national culture and the British state." (Donald & Rattansi, 1992: 2)

11 Heidegger's comment is relevant here: "every report of the past... is concerned with something that is static. This kind of historical reporting is an explicit shutting down of history, whereas it is, after all, a happening. We question historically if we ask what is still happening even if it seems to be past." (1967: 43)
while in the Turkish case, through the annihilation of "historical time" the gap with the West was bridged, and identity was constructed by the denial of any difference. So, instead of covering up the problem, and building up a research on the material available, I felt that, however ironic it may sound, the lack of knowledge and absence of memory had to be incorporated into my research question. Hence, I reformulated my research question: What historical dynamics do radio broadcasting, in Turkish national history, convey in terms of the articulation and representation of political subjectivity, on the boundary of identity/difference with reference to the West?

Pursuing such a question, means that one cannot deal with self-identical units, such as national identity. One has to attend to the boundaries that differentiate certain representations, and the history of the experiences that shape the boundary management, which are not usually represented in sealed representations. The status of archives, as an historical symptom, provides an entry to the question. If an archive document "draws its value from its place in a chronology and a relationship of proximity and legality with the past event" (Agamben, 1993:70) then the destruction of the archives indicates an attempt to be free from the burden of history. The burden of history, in the Turkish case, implies an "inferior" position with reference to an assumed universal model. If an archive document registers a discourse of power, the absence of the register points to an articulation of power behind and beyond discourses. Finally, if an archive document registers the self in relation to its others in a fixed form, then the absence of the register draws one’s attention to pragmatical definitions of the self and the other on shifting planes.

The absence of the archives in Turkish radio broadcasting, is, I argue, indicative of a surplus -invested with an abundance of symptoms and effects- a surplus which manifests itself as an absence, and which resists analysis in a Western framework of doing historical research. The surplus is the realm of the Other that has

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12 It is interesting that in Turkey, while the Ottoman archives are open to scholarly view, the national archives, in general, are non-existent, either kept from view or destroyed. Recently it is discovered that the archives of the Senate between 1961 and 1980 have been destroyed. The directors of the archives of the National Assembly claim that this was due to a "mistake". Radikal, 29.7.1999.
been denied subjectivity and historicity in the representations of Western modernity. Hence, in the second part, I critically discuss some theoretical perspectives that, I believe, can address the various aspects of the analytical problems that figure in my research.

2.2. Theory and Methodology

a. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

Foucault’s critical analysis, provides a theoretical perspective that unsettles the universalised categories of Western humanism. Therefore it provides a method to analyse the particular configurations of political subjectivity in a case, such as Turkey, which raised on the translation of Western models of government but produced a critical difference. Informed by a Foucauldian discourse analysis one can start by analysing the historical conditions of existence of certain statements and practices in Turkish nationalist discourse; and how they figure as constituents and by-products of political technologies. In the same manner, the truth that emerges on Turkish nationality would not be treated as given, but would be analysed within the history of its production (Foucault, 1988).

It is also significant that a Foucauldian perspective extends the limits of the analysis of politics. Instead of addressing what are called as political institutions or political ideology, Foucault chose to attend to other, less central fields, such as pedagogy and sexuality, to study the production of political technologies as discursive practices. These are, according to Foucault, “embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms, which, at once, impose and maintain them.” (Foucault, 1977:200) Political technologies as discursive practices are not just what produce discourses, but they

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13 Bhabha, based on Foucault’s theory of “repeatable materiality” in the The Archeology of Knowledge (1972), points to “the process by which statements from one institution (or enunciative context) can be transcribed in the discourse of another...any change in the statement’s conditions of use and reinvestment, any alteration in its field of experience or verification, or indeed any difference in the problems to be solved, can lead to the emergence of a new statement: the difference of the same.” (Bhabha, 1994:22)
link to bodies in space and time, and to sensations, such as pleasure. In this way, Foucault analyses the production of “truth” through techniques that lie across and beyond the conventional boundaries of disciplines.

Foucault’s method of doing theory, informed by a historical practice of analysis, is relevant to my work. First of all, my research question that focuses on the boundaries of the nationalist discourse that is reproduced in radio broadcasting and that tie with a political subjectivity, is justified by a Foucauldian perspective. I treat radio broadcasting as a site of discursive practices which are linked to a whole range of complex modifications outside of its domain, such as social relationships and political institutions; but also to inside factors, such as its techniques for determining its object, the adjustment and refinement of its concepts, and its accumulation of facts (Foucault, 1977: 200). Secondly, the “problem of reason” as it appears in the absence of archives in Turkish history, can be treated historically and not metaphysically in a Foucauldian perspective. It draws attention to the specific manifestations of truth, as “the connection between ways of distinguishing true and false and ways of governing oneself and others” (Foucault, 1991b: 82). This justifies my treatment of the specificity of the discourse that informed radio broadcasting in Turkey, not as a less perfect form¹⁴ of the Western model but as a distinct practice which has its boundaries, its rules of formation, and its conditions of existence (Foucault, 1991a: 62). Such a perspective guided my comparative analysis of the BBC Turkish Section and Turkish radio broadcasting. Thirdly, in connection to the displacement of absolute models, it is also significant that Foucault’s theoretical perspective has provided the tools for analyses of Western power in the non-West, such as Said’s work on Orientalism. Said uses Foucault’s concepts to show how the “Orient” is the essentialised construct of the Orientalist discourse (1995).

However, looking closely at Foucault’s categories at work in

¹⁴ Foucault warns us against not assessing things “in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they play within them, because it’s true that ‘practices’ don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality.” (1991b: 79)
theory, I see certain interconnected problems in relation to my research. Foucault's analysis of discourse dwells on the "exteriority" of discourses, that is, their manifest appearance. Foucault has dealt with the limits and the forms of the sayable; and argued against the excavation of "implicit meanings". This links to Foucault's interest in analysing discourses from the viewpoint of the forms of inscription and circulation of knowledge. One of his most important questions is: "how can scientific discourses be objects of a political practice?" (1991a:69) His method of inquiry employs tools that are mostly borrowed from the tradition of Western sciences, such as diagrams, schemes, and grids used to demonstrate the operations of discursive practices. His emphasis lies on the scientifically demonstrable techniques of power or government. In this context, the problem of reason is treated in a universe which is assumed to be intelligible within a certain rationality. It is a universe where the meticulous attempt to register the social, and a will to truth exists as the dominant mode of power. The "antagonisms of strategies" that he studies within this universe exist only to make the already inscribed forms of rationality visible. Therefore a Foucauldian perspective does not help one to reflect on the historical conditions of the articulation of reason as part of the Western history, in which the Western power over non-West has been the structuring principle. Although Foucault makes it clear that: "Even if the Aufklärung has been a very important phase in our history and in the development of political technology, I think we have to refer to much more remote processes if we want to...

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15 Foucault argues in his seminal article, "The Subject and Power", that what describes his methodology is: "(R)ather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies." (1982: 211)

16 Foucault often uses texts and documents as his sources; his "battlefield was at the same time the world of archives and manuscripts." (Kritzman, 1988: xviii)

17 Derrida's critique of Foucault centres on the assumptions of a "history": "A history, that is, an archaeology against reason doubtless cannot be written, for, despite all appearances to the contrary, the concept of history has always been a rational one. It is the meaning of 'history' or archia that should have been questioned first, perhaps. A writing that exceeds, by questioning them, the values 'origin', 'reason', and 'history' could not be contained within the metaphysical closure of archaeology." (Derrida, 1978: 36)

18 The Western representation of modernity is "inextricably linked to the history of European colonialism, and as such bound up with the politics of a shifting set of spatial relations..." (Osborne, 1995: 13)
understand how we have been trapped in our history” (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 210); his historical imagination does not go as remote as the non-West. 19

Keeping on mind C.L. R. James’s warning that the postcolonial critics must remain alert to “domains of social practice that are not governed by textual/communicative rules” (Henry & Buhle, 1992: 140), I argue that the nationalist discourse in Turkey is not merely legible in terms of the forms and the limits of the sayable. What was considered as “not sayable” and remained unrepresented, but which continued to shape the discursive practices should be addressed too. The translation of Western discourses of government in Turkey overdetermined the split between the sayable and the non-sayable, and consecutively the tension between the inscription of knowledge and the destruction of archives. Foucault’s theoretical perspective does not attend to those experiences and practices that are not articulated in a discourse, that remain fragmented and unrepresented. Discourses or discursive practices, in Foucault’s genealogical analysis, appear as sites, or “logical spaces” in which objects, subjects, concepts and strategies are articulated in a specific configuration enacting power, and producing truth. Foucault argues that in order to arrive at “a grid of intelligibility of the social order... one needs to be nominalistic.” (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 187) Actors pursue a logic regarding their practices, although they are not the subjects of their actions. The problem, however in my case, is how to make sense of those practices that do not seem to fit into a logic (what is manifest as the logic) but informed by other factors that remain implicit. Or to put in more general terms, how do we understand the temporal and spatial zone of modernity that has not been illuminated by the Enlightenment framework, that escapes its own reason-critical reflection, yet that has historically contributed to its structuration.

19 Foucault’s interpretation, for example, of the revolutionary struggle of the people in Iran appears as an exception to his method of analysis. Young criticises Foucault for his fantasy of “a collective will, as pure being, screens the historical relation of the revolution to its colonial adversaries” (1995b: 57). Because it happens elsewhere, in a non-Christian, non-Western environment, the revolution in Iran does not fit into the historical diagrams of the modern regime of power according to Foucault. It seems to transcend “what might appear as the ‘prison house of discourse’.” (Kritzman, 1988: xxii) Foucault’s depiction of the political upheaval in Iran comes close to a form of Orientalism.
by its repression or displacement in the Western representations? That “dark” zone where reason meets its counterpart, where discourses are in a dynamic link with non-discursive practices. The question ties to my concern, in the research, to interpret various non-discursive practices in the Turkish national history as part of the history of modernity. Thus, going through Foucault, I try to reach to “much more remote processes” that may lie beyond, or alongside, modern discourses and modern technologies, in order to analyse the historicity of those practices produced in relation to modern discourses and technologies, but as something in the realm of the Other.

b. Zizek and “non-knowledge”

I have argued that the destruction of archives in Turkish Radio can be treated as an historical symptom. I have discussed how a Foucauldian perspective can open a path to attend to the procedures of production of truth in the specific circumstances. But I also pointed to the blind-spots in Foucault, that a Foucauldian perspective cannot say much about the non-existence of a register of knowledge, in its connection to power. At this point, I want to introduce a psychoanalytical perspective, specifically one that is formulated by Zizek.

Zizek, a post-Lacanian thinker, pursues a method of psychoanalytical critique of culture and ideology. Arguing against structural readings of Lacan, he shifts the focus of analysis from language to social fantasy. The emphasis made by Zizek, in this context, regards the position of the subject, not as a predetermined position in a discourse but as an empty space, a void, that has to be filled by identification. Thus, he ascribes fantasy an important role as a link between individual psychic life and the social context. He says, “(F)antasy is basically a scenario filling out the empty space of a fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void.” (Zizek, 1989:)

It is a central theme in Bhabha’s argument that “the role the non-Western world played in the constitution of modernity has never been properly acknowledged.” (Moore-Gilbert, 1997:129)
I find Zizek’s treatment of social fantasy useful in my analysis of the political subjectivity of Kemalist elites, as it manifests itself in radio broadcasting.

I resort to psychoanalysis to make sense of the splits and gaps in the nationalist discourse that often appear in my data. The way “us” and “them” figure in early Turkish nationalism, especially in radio dramas and talks are stricken with an ambivalent attitude to the West: “The West that has denied and ruined our history” versus “the West idealised as the civilisation”. The ambivalence has been treated by the elite in the realm of social fantasy and was thought to be superseded in the conception of “Turkish national identity” which combined the elements of both Western “civilisation” and “authentic Turkish culture”. However, despite the attempts to define and fix the “Turkish national self” embedded in a unique national culture, the self still appears as split in most of its articulations. The self-conscious effort to overcome the split can be observed in an interest, among the elite, in psychology, especially Freud’s psychoanalysis in the 1940s. However, the emphasis in this interest lay more on interpreting away the splits rather than on Freud’s analysis of the self, “split and fractured by unconscious desire, to be forever thrown off-center from itself.” (Elliott, 1992: 24) It dwelled on psychological explanations of “social vice” that could be eradicated by further commitment to Kemalist principles, as I will discuss more in detail in Chapter 5. Therefore, psychoanalysis, figured and employed in this context, helped to endorse the political regime, instead of leading to a radical analysis. Hence the process of adaptation of Freud’s theory, which can be designated as “psychologism” in early Turkish national history is itself worthy of analysis, as well as the objects of analysis that are indicated within it. In a very interesting series of articles, “Social Neurosis in Turkey”21, dated 1937, Şadan compared Turkish society to a “sick” individual referring to Freud. He said:

“It is not unusual that a social community that has been drifted into war and poverty for long years; that has only been treated by hostility by all nations, both Islamic and Christian, gets sick just as an individual who has been

21 Dr. İzeddin Şadan, “Türkiye’de Maşeri Nevroz”, Yeni Adam, N.198, 199, 200. 14,21, 28 October 1937, pp. 8,8,8.
subject to traumas."

Although the article itself is not exempt from an internalised Western judgment that had labeled the Ottoman State as "sick man", it dwells on the problem of Westernisation and its effects on Turkish society. Şadan's concern was to both diagnose the problem and to develop forms of treatment. The article classified the members of the elite according to the different categories of neurosis that Şadan defined. The categories ranged from "defeatism" to "infantilism", from "narcissism" to "revoltism". Thus, they gained highly political overtones in the context of the nationalist discourse, which was treated as the "norm". However the thread that underlined the analysis of the political symptoms of social neurosis, was the "inferiority complex".

"A feeling of inferiority has been corroding us for hundred and fifty years. To see ourselves inferior, and to always lament that the West, or rather the Christian world, is superior to us is one of our most pathetic habits."22

Şadan explicated the primary "pathetic" trait of the Turkish society by referring to Freud's concept of hostility: namely, the historical hostility against the Turks. But he believed that this was "nonsense" at the present moment, as there was no reason to denigrate the present "psychological formation" of the Turkish nation. In contradictory ways, the analysis both diagnosed and denied the problem at the same time. In other words, it wished it away. What this rather non-reflexive and "ideological" interpretation of Freudian analysis crucially brings to view, is the split between the narrative of the "civilised" self and social "reality" in the Kemalist political subjectivity.

The split recurs in almost every account of the nationalist project, and becomes more apparent within the domain of discursive practices pertaining to radio broadcasting due to its fragmentary nature as a less totalised and less theorised domain. Furthermore, "the voice of the nation" that disseminates from radio, is already a product of a split, in the sense that it is loosely attached to the political subject. Radio technology produces a voice "without bearer, which cannot be

22 Dr. İzeddin Şadan, "Türkiye'de Maşeri Nevroz", Yeni Adam, N.199, 21 October 1937, p.8.
attributed to any subject and thus hovers in some indefinite interspace." (Zizek, 1991: 126) A psychoanalytic framework that addresses this indefinite space is useful in theorising the splits of the "national" self in its various aspects in the Turkish nationalist discourse which constitute the objects of analysis in my thesis. These include: the denial of history, the denial of the heterogeneous experience of the people, the ambivalent attitude toward the West, the feminisation and infantilisation of popular culture. Furthermore it can illuminate some historical aspects of Occidentalism, that is, the relationship between the self and the Other in modernity, seen from the Other's position.

Psychoanalysis unsettles the Western notions of self-identical selfhood. The unconscious desire, according to Freud, splits the human subject, and makes it non-identical with itself. Freud's theory is a "challenge to Western thought on power of reason and rationality, of reflective and conscious control over the self." (Elliott, 1992: 17) Given that the Western notion of the self is contested by psychoanalysis, it is not mere coincidence that postcolonial criticism, dating back to Fanon, has made some use of psychoanalytical concepts to address the splits in the colonised subject as structured by the conditions of colonialism. For Fanon, for example, the "inferiority complex" that the "Negro" experienced in colonised Algeria had nothing to do with family dynamics or the Oedipus complex but to do with "epidermalization" of social inferiority (Kruks, 1996). It is also

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23 Postcolonial theory makes use of psychoanalysis by not focusing on "individual psyche" but addressing the dynamics of subject-constitution and identification in the realm of experiences in a colonial situation extending to the postcolonial period. Fanon's original writing on "black identity" in Algeria, emphasised that self-consciousness requires recognition by the Other (1993: 216). Bhabha's rereading of Fanon, explicates the concept by employing Lacan's notion of the Other as a necessary element of subject-constitution. He says that he is engaged with the "foreign" element that becomes the "unstable element of linkage" between cultures (1994: 227). For both Fanon and Bhabha, the seemingly monolithic identities constructed by colonialism, such as Negro or native, are produced through a complex relationship with the "foreign" and can become sites of both mimicry and resistance. Ashis Nandy, in a similar manner, attends to splits in Indian identity which has been produced through colonialism. He, too, uses concepts of psychoanalysis but claims to shift "the locus of criticism from the purely psychological to the psycho-political" (1994: xix) Another postcolonial critic, Spivak adapts classical psychoanalysis for the study of colonial relations (1987; 1993) but she warns against the use of universal categories of psychoanalysis. She introduces the concepts of gender and race into the study of classical psychoanalytical discourse, as can be seen in her essay "Feminism and Critical Theory" (1985).
significant that Fanon contrasted the appeal to reason in the Western context to the temptation of the colonised to escape reason. The psychic economy that produced "pathologies" in this context was generated by the conflict between the "lived experience of the black", and the linguistic imposition of an "education to whiteness". (Stevens, 1996:206) While Freudian analysis is confined to the operations of the individual psyche, despite its dynamics that relates it to an "other"; postcolonial critics offer mediating concepts, such as ambivalence, resentment, mimicry, to account for the interconnections between individual experiences and historical processes.

Nevertheless the analyses of these interconnections remain problematic and have been subject to criticisms. The employment of both Freud's and Lacan's theories in the analysis of the colonial situation have been problematised in terms of their shortcomings regarding the acknowledgement of the colonial history but also gender, race and class. Spivak has extensively dealt with these problems and suggests that both Freud and Lacan's work need to be situated within the history of "the institutionalization of psychoanalysis...and its imposition upon the colonies" (1987: 261-2). The problem is further complicated in my case where I attend to the psychoanalytic mediations, between lived experience and the historical processes, that are specifically produced through the medium of electronic mass communication which could alter their "original" conceptions in other mediums, such as in face to face interaction. There is always the danger of collapsing specific individual dynamics into the operations of the social and the technological or vice versa. Therefore, keeping all these problems

24 Fanon says: "I had rationalized the world and the world had rejected me on the basis of color prejudice. Since no accord was possible on the level of reason, I threw myself back toward irrationality...I wade in the irrational. Up to the neck in the irrational. And how my voice vibrates!" (1993: 123)

25 The criticisms directed to the use of psychoanalysis in the study of colonial relations cover a wide range from the use of inappropriate tools to the problem of applicability of these tools in a colonial context. Kruks criticise Fanon for not providing tools with which to theorise "the interconnections between the realm of existential experience, in which the dynamics of non-recognition and self-affirmation are played out, and the broader world of political and historical processes in which the dynamics of oppression they (Fanon and Sartre) describe are enmeshed." (1996: 132-3). Young's criticism of Bhabha dwells on a more general problem concerning the "applicability" of "the transcendental categories of psychoanalysis for the analysis of the historical phenomenon of colonialism." (1990:144)
and limitations on mind, I choose not to focus on the study of the unconscious when I resort to psychoanalysis. Instead, I follow Donald’s question: “How do you analyse the dynamics of culture differently once you recognise the centrality of the unconscious?” (1991:3)

Zizek offers a psychoanalytic approach to deal with the symptoms of the unconscious in a cultural framework. He dwells on the objects of social fantasy that the subject of the signifier in language attempts to incorporate into its virtual identity. Zizek points both to the process of subjectivisation, and to the object-cause of desire in this context. The significance of this conceptualisation bears upon two points that I want to make in my analysis: 1) the process of identification of the Kemalists with the West, and the objects of desire that are incorporated in a social fantasy; yet 2) the elements that escape the discursive network, that “falls out” from it, that are produced as its “excrement” or “remainder” (Zizek, 1991: 131). I use the two concepts of Zizek’s to interpret the symptoms (the coded messages in Zizek’s terms) of these dynamics in early Turkish national history in its relation to the West; they are: “the virtual viewpoint of the Ego-ideal” and “non-knowledge”.

Zizek posits, with Lacan, that

“the status of the subject itself (the subject of the signifier) is that of just such a ‘virtual image’: it exists only as a virtual point in the self-relating of the signifier’s dyads; as something that ‘will have been’, that is never present in reality or its ‘real’ (actual) image. It is always-already ‘past’, although it never appeared ‘in the past itself’; it is constituted by means of a double reflection, as the result of the way the past’s mirroring in the future is mirrored back to the present.” (Zizek, 1996: 15)

The double-reflection complicates the identification process. In Lacanian analysis identification is normally conceived of in terms of an imaginary mirror relationship. But in Zizek’s account it is linked with Ego-Ideal, being located in the symbolic realm. The Ego-Ideal that emerges out of this process can be paraphrased as: I am what I think how the others (that are symbolically significant determined by the hegemonic discourse of signifiers or the “master-signifier”) see me.
Then, both the subjective identity and the viewpoint of the other are virtual. Symbolic truth emerges via "imitation of imitation" (Zizek, 1996: 13). Because the subject can never bridge the gap between the "actual" and the "virtual" points, it is forever trapped in the impossibility of achieving self-identical identity. The self is both displaced and constituted by the non-knowledge that arises out of the virtual circuit of the self’s relation to the other. The self imitates an object it can never know.

Non-knowledge is a functional non-discursive entity in Zizek’s model. It does not necessarily indicate the implicit or unconscious meaning that can be revealed by excavation. According to Zizek, “the unconscious must instead be conceived as a positive entity that retains its consistency on the basis of a certain non-knowledge.” (1992: 44) In the same manner, for “reality to exist, something must be left unspoken.” (45) Zizek, in this way, links “non-knowledge” to the process of identification whereby subjects assume a certain identity in a social reality structured by the social fantasy of suture which narrates itself as having origins and laws of development. He talks of a kind of reality, “whose very ontological consistency implies a certain non-knowledge of its participants- if we come to ‘know too much’, to pierce the function of social reality, this reality would dissolve itself.” (Zizek, 1989: 21)

I argue that Occidentalism, as the primary object of analysis in my thesis, can be posited through the processes of identification of the Turkish elite with the West. This would mean that the West is constituted as a virtual viewpoint of the Ego-Ideal for them, and consequently the social fantasy constructed by the appropriation of the Western objects of desire constitutes the subjectivity of the elite. The non-knowledge, as the remainder of the circuit, corresponds to the gap that is necessarily produced by but which also secures the process. The gap, therefore, is not necessarily disruption as Bhabha implies.

Zizek’s model allows me to connect social fantasies, the elements of which can be traced in radio dramas, for example, with the conditions of subjectivity. It enables me to locate not only,
following Foucault, discursive practices, but also the remainders, in Turkish national history, which exist as effects and manifest themselves as symptoms such as the destruction of the archives. However, the psychoanalytic model does not provide the tools to interpret the historical differences, such as the difference between the strategies of the BBC and the Turkish Radio. It only points to the general dynamics that paradoxically sustain the symbolic order while also condemning it to failure (Elliott, 1992: 191). It dismantles the supposed fit between culture and subject\textsuperscript{26}, which paves the way for a critical analysis, but the model turns out to be too static in its emphasis on the necessity of the “lack of fit”. For Zizek, the failure is functional for the maintenance of a social order both in its discursive and non-discursive aspects. In this framework, non-identity is the condition of identity, and non-knowledge is what makes the discourse of truth possible. Zizek does not attend to the historical configurations in which the discourse of truth as well as its remainder emerge. He does not study the interaction between different possible models of subjectivity and truth as observed in actual cases, such as the difference between the subjectivity of the coloniser and the colonised in the colonial history.

To the extent that Zizek does not address the problems of historical subordination and power, some of my questions cannot be approached within this model. For example, what makes the Turkish elite more aware than the British of the “split” that is, the “lack of fit” between culture and subject, as can be seen in the psychologism of the elite in the 40's? Why is “imitation” a problem for the Turkish modernisers and constitute an important theme in writings on Turkish nationality, while Western modernity can be treated as the “real thing”? (Introduction, Chapter 1) Why was the “voice of the nation” that was disseminated from Turkish Radio associated with a display for the West? (Chapter 3) Why did the BBC Turkish Service and Ankara Radio adopt different strategies for constructing “truth”? (Chapters 4) Why did the works of social fantasy on radio, specifically radio dramas, fail to construct a convincing popular address?

\textsuperscript{26} According to Donald (1991) the most disconcerting question that psychoanalysis poses to cultural studies is the “lack of fit” between culture and subject.
These questions lead me to deal with non-knowledge more closely, not only as a functional remainder, but as a form of boundary management. What I mean by boundary management is the continuous historical struggle—which is informed by power relations—to distinguish the discursive field of truth from what contests it. Non-knowledge refers, in this context, to a functional and invisible remainder but which is historically produced, transgressed and contested. The discursive practices orientated towards defining “the people” as an object in radio broadcasting, and the non-discursive effects that circumscribe these practices provide a ground for this conceptualisation. The analysis of the boundaries, and of consequent boundary management that has been part of the articulation of political subjectivity of the Turkish elites seems to me crucial in order to grasp the historical aspects of Occidentalism. Zizek’s functional treatment of non-knowledge implies a boundary which he fails to address. Therefore, I introduce a third dynamic constituent of my analytical framework, a dialogic analysis.

c. Bakhtin and Dialogic Analysis

In my analytical framework Foucault provides a theoretical perspective to understand the constitution of subjectivity through discursive practices. Zizek offers a model for the analysis of structural dynamics of the relationship between the self and the Other. I argue, Bakhtin’s dialogic approach gives me the tools to interpret the specific historicity of practices and utterances that occur within my data.

Bakhtin’s contributions are not limited to the field of linguistics. He offers an innovative methodological outlook to comprehend the
social and historical attributes of utterances. He is against both a relativist and a structuralist approach, treating history neither as random nor as completely ordered, and regarding social entities as aggregates rather than systems. According to him,

"(T)he world clusters and unclusters. Particular elements interact with existing aggregates; particular elements are also continually detached from aggregates, cluster anew, and form the basis for yet more unforeseen interactions. Unfinalizability characterizes the whole as well as particular parts." (Morson& Emerson, 1990: 45).

Bakhtin attends specifically to boundaries to analyse the historical articulation of identities. According to him, neither individuals nor social entities are locked in their boundaries, they are partially "located outside" themselves. So cultural entities are all determined at the boundary, through an interaction with another. There is no sovereign internal territory: when one looks inside, one looks "into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another" (Morson& Emerson, 1990: 51). Then one must not imagine the realm of culture as some sort of spatial whole having an internal territory; "it is entirely distributed along the boundaries, boundaries pass everywhere, through its every aspect... Every cultural act lives...

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27 Bakhtin’s Russian texts which had remained fragmented and untranslated for a long time, had a big impact on Western social theory after the 1980s with the English translation of The Dialogic Imagination (1981) (French translation in 1978). On the one hand, it appealed to Marxist literary critics, such as Tony Bennett (1979); Terry Eagleton (1981); David Forgacs (1982); Fredric Jameson (1981); Graham Pechey (1983); Allon White (1984), as a historical and materialist approach to the study of literary texts. For Marxists Bakhtin provided a "sociological critique of structuralism, as well as the materialist theory of language" (Young, 1986). On the other hand, Robert Young (1986) also discusses how Bakhtin has been celebrated by post-structuralist thought, following Kristeva’s much earlier essays, in the 60’s, on Bakhtin (1981). Bakhtin’s work provokes "intertextuality, the denial of univocal meaning, infinite interpretation, the negation of originary presence in speech, the positioning of the subject in and by discourse, the breaking down of the identity of the subject, of all inside/outside oppositions, of the semantic identity of the sign, and ‘the crumbling away of the representational system’ as such" (Young, 1986: 87). Young argues that Marxists too easily adapted Bakhtin’s ideas to their framework to offer an alternative to post-structuralism and confuse "dialogism" with "dialectics". He also offers his own criticisms to Bakhtin. Young’s criticism was replied by Allon White from a Marxist point of view: According to White (1988) Bakhtin unsettles the simple opposition between post-structuralism and radical humanism; “he becomes their active break as well as their conjuncture” (241) In discarding Bakhtin, “Young simply aligns him with existing conservative appropriations and misses an important opportunity to enrich the debate between radical humanists and post-structuralists on the left” (Ibid). I agree with White that the “struggle over Bakhtin” shows that Bakhtin’s work provides a rich and provocative source for social theory.
essentially on the boundaries: in this is its seriousness and significance; abstracted from boundaries it loses its soil, it becomes empty, arrogant, it degenerates and dies." (Morson& Emerson, 1990: 51) Bakhtin speaks of cultural entities that resemble oscillating "fields", that is, a play of force lines rather than an assembly of objects.

Bakhtin defines the term "dialogue" to grasp the play of force lines which exist in a "tension-filled environment". The significance of this approach lies in its capacity to bring in the situatedness of the word as it relates to its object, which happens not in singular way nor in a vacuum:

"...between the word and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, alien words about the same object...It is precisely in the process of living interaction with this specific environment that the word may be individualized and given stylistic shape. Indeed, any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist -or, on the contrary, by the 'light' of alien words that have already been spoken about it." (Bakhtin, 1981: 276)

A dialogic conception of truth reveals the historical, social and political interaction that plays a part in its production; the moment of utterance is ordered by the interaction of past words yet in its 'presentness' it bears the potential of unfinalisability. It could have been otherwise, but once it has become it is irreversible and enters the field of interaction of future utterances as a constraining element. However most discourses on history tend to codify the words by way of masking their dialogic character, that is killing their once live and unfinalisable context. Codification is based on the separation of the elements of the historical interaction fixing them in a closed context, hiding their relationality and the tension of force fields involved.

On the other hand, Bakhtin's emphasis is on how utterances are shaped by a real or imagined listener from the outset. This approach radically differs from the ethnographic approaches in media studies
that privilege the meanings produced actively by readers/listeners. While it may be so that meanings vary in different contexts Bakhtin's approach points to readers/listeners as shaping "the utterance as it is being made." (Morson & Emerson, 1990: 129). Voloshinov, who belongs to the same circle of linguists as Bakhtin in Russia, says that a word is a two-sided act. "It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant...it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, speaker and addressee..." (1973: 86). There is also a third party in the dialogue that Bakhtin names as the superaddressee who is a posited imaginary listener, "whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time." (Bakhtin, 1986: 126) Superaddressee has been personified in various ideological expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science, and so forth) (Ibid). The "superaddressee" is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance and one that can be revealed under deeper analysis.

The theoretical approach of Bakhtin and Voloshinov provides significant points of departure that I make use of in my analysis. There are two interconnected axes in my research that dialogic analysis specifically bears upon: The play of force lines 1) on the boundary between "the people" and the elite in the practice of radio broadcasting, 2) on the boundary between the West and the East, especially in the context of the BBC Turkish Service transmissions and Turkish Radio. Thus, I follow the guidelines provided by dialogic analysis, to interpret the utterances and texts that constitute my data:

1) Extralinguistic forces are constitutive of utterances and their history: so a metalinguistic or a sociological perspective is required for

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28 A Bakhtinian approach can also be utilised to criticise the rather static encoding/decoding model of Hall (1980). Hall's idea of messages being first encoded by producers, then decoded by receptors, albeit within a different scheme of reading, implies two separate horizons, that of production and reception. Bakhtin's approach, on the other hand, emphasises the unity of these processes: how production is always already shaped according to an imagined receptor, and how reception is realised according to an imagined sender of messages. Hall's approach is reworked in the ethnography of media audiences by Ang (1985), Fiske (1987), Morley (1980; 1989), Radway (1987).
the analysis of them. 29

2) Language, cultural norms, personal history are given but an utterance or an action is never just the product of what is given. “It always creates something that never existed before, something absolutely new and unrepeatable” (Bakhtin, 1986: 119-20). So “presentness” of each moment of and creativity in each utterance and its novel effects must be acknowledged.

3) Utterances are shaped in a dialogue between the speaker and the addressee, though not in a direct or singular way. They are shaped by the anticipation of a response- by the “not-yet-spoken”; they are also shaped by previous utterances about the topic- the “already-spoken” (Morson & Emerson, 1990: 137). So one must seek the imprints of a continuous struggle- a historical and a social one-, of the play of force lines that shape each utterance while being internalized/interpreted within it. Each utterance is a value judgment, a stance with reference to past, present and future words, thus each utterance should be treated as a political act.

4) The ideological expression of the superaddressee structures the utterances. So, utterances should also be linked to the level of more systematic “discourses”; the way specific utterances talk to more general discourses should be analysed.

5) “The ideological sign must immerse itself in the element of inner, subjective signs; it must ring with subjective tones in order to remain a living sign and not be relegated to the honorary status of an incomprehensible museum price.” (Voloshinov, 1973: 39) So I shall not only look for the ideological signs emerging out of the tension filled environment of dialogues, but also attend to the dialogic character of ideological signs, that is how they are dressed in personal and subjective tones.

The dialogic analysis of utterances, texts, and discursive practices also sheds light on the remainder, on what falls out of discourses, and what belongs to the unknown realm of the Other. Because it draws attention to the play of force lines on boundaries as constitutive of identities, the Other, in a dialogic analysis, can be

29 As against a Sausserean account of semiotics which would divorce discourse from sociology (Hodge & Kress, 1988: 15-21).
conceived as a structuring principle of identity. This resembles Zizek's statement that non-identity is the condition of identity. However, rather than leaving non-identity out of the scope of any theoretical inquiry, as a necessary and functional entity, a dialogic analysis attends to possible transgressions on the boundaries between self and Other. Language, in this sense, comprises the imprints of a continuing struggle; it is "heteroglot" from top to bottom. Bakhtin wrote that he heard "voices in everything and the dialogic relationships between them" (cited in Shukman, 1983). Therefore, a dialogic analysis makes use of the "excrements" that reside in language to grasp the Other theoretically. In return, it acknowledges that the boundaries which demarcate the Other bear upon Identity. In other words, in this framework, the content of differences are reinserted into the analysis. According to Pechey, a "dialogue cannot be misrecognised as 'communication'." (1989: 62) Dialogic analysis is designed to "theorise otherness" and not only to theorise "the metropolitan practice of 'othering'...but also the answering practice of Europe's 'others' in which the 'otherers' are themselves othered." (Pechey, 1989: 62) This means that Bakhtin not only provides me with tools for the interpretation of specific historical material, but it also becomes significant for theorising Occidentalism as an "answering practice".

### 2.3. The Conceptual Tools in the Analysis of Data

By going through these three theoretical approaches I formulate the conceptual tools of my analysis. However, at this point, I must make it clear that this is not an attempt to synthesise these theories, which may contradict each other at several points. What I attempt to do in my thesis is, by holding in suspension the "contradictions" between these approaches, to open up a theoretical space for

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30 It can be noted that although, in general, Foucault was critical of psychoanalysis, that Bakhtin was critical of Freud, and Bakhtin's dialogic analysis, as well as, Foucault's theory of subjectivity fall out of scope of Zizek's approach; there do exist theoretical accounts which bring together, though not without problems, some aspects of these theories in the context of a specific analysis, such as, theories of Foucault and Zizek (Donald, 1992); Foucault, Freud and Lacan (Forrester, 1990; Rajchman, 1991); and of Bakhtin and psychoanalysis (Kristeva, 1981). See also Young (1986) for a discussion of Bakhtin in relation to Foucault and Freud.
formulating new questions and attend to them with new conceptual tools— which the encounter of these approaches give life to. These concepts will be put to work in the historical interspace between West and non-West, namely, in the analysis of Occidentalism.

As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the term Occidentalism, in my thesis, indicates a set of practices and discourses that are shaped, structured and reproduced within the historical context of dealing with the power of the West. It involves the psychological dynamics of constructing a national identity that is, at the same time, “Western” and “authentic”. Therefore, it points to the operations of desire, projection, and disavowal. Secondly, Occidentalism designates the way the social reality was imagined by the Turkish elites in dialogue with the projected gaze of the West. It brings into view the contradictions of the two orders of reality, that is of social fantasy and social experience, which is most apparent in handling of the category of “the people” by the elite. Thirdly, the term is operational in material processes in which the elite adopt “Western” techniques and know-how to develop a solution to the problem of Turkish government. The analysis of various moments of radio broadcasting convey these different but interlinked processes that draw the contours of Occidentalism.

Within this framework I study the spatial, temporal, technical and discursive variables of political subjectivity that bear upon radio broadcasting. To analyse the forms and the shifting boundaries of a political subjectivity that has been ascribed the role of the Other by the representations of Western modernity, I employ three conceptual tools: Projection, Translation, and Social Fantasy. In addition to these concepts, I refer to the concept of “surplus” as a field of unknown that rests in the interspace between West and East, and points, both, to the limits of my analysis and to a set of variables for further possible inquiry that may engage in re-narrating the history of modernity.

The concept of “projection” takes on different meanings in different fields, such as psychology, geography, management, and technology. It involves diverse processes such as relocation/dislocation, planning, imagination, prediction, and movement in space and time. I employ the term in its rich
Projection operates both as the displacement of what is intolerable inside into the outside world, thus as refusal to know; and as introjection of what is threatening in the external world so as to contain and manage it. Therefore, it designates, at the same time, what the subject "refuses to be" and "desires to be". Projection, in its double process, figures in the conceptions of "popular culture" and "the people" on one hand, and in the conception of the West, on the other, in Turkey. The elite constitute their identity through a projection of certain attributes to the "national" population. By doing this, they introject the imagined nation into their subjectivity. But they displace what is disturbing in them by attributing it to the "less civilised" and heterogeneous population. They seek purity and distinction in the process. The elite, also, engage in projection by internalising what is thought to be the Western values and techniques. However, in the same process, they attribute impurities to the West from which they distinguish themselves. The virtual viewpoint of the West, which is the product of a double projection disturbingly oscillates between recognition and rejection, and leads to a series of gaps and splits.

Projection also plays a role in spatial and temporal descriptions of the nation, such as, in defining a national landscape and national time which becomes evident in building Ankara as a laboratory for the national project. Furthermore, the projection of the national ideal to

31 Projection designates, for example in neurology and geography, "a point-by-point correspondence between, say, a figure in space and a figure in a plane." (Laplanche&Pontalis, 1973:350). Another use of the word drives from this but specifically implies a movement from centre to periphery - as defined in "eccentric" projection: "localisation of a sense datum at the position in space of the stimulating object, rather than at the point of stimulation on the body." (Laplanche&Pontalis, 1988: 350) Freud linked "projection" with paranoia: the paranoiac projects his intolerable ideas outwards, whence they return in the shape of reproaches. It also designates in Freud other meanings such as "refusal to recognise" (the subject recognises in others precisely what he refuses to acknowledge in himself), or "not wishing to be" (the subject ejects something he does not want and later rediscovers it in outside reality). The former indicates a state of illusion, while the latter points to a division between subject and outside world. It is possible to argue that, whatever the connotations are, the processes of projection and identification are similar in operation. Klein speaks of "projective identification" in children, either as phantasised projection of the self into the interior of mother's body, so as to injure and control the mother from within, or as introjection being experienced "as a forceful entry from the outside into the inside, in retribution for violent projection." (cited in Laplanche&Pontalis, 1988: 356) This closely links, in Klein, with the way an agency such as the ego-ideal may become external to the subject.
the children, and the projection of “authenticity” to women are analysed as moments of Occidentalism in the thesis. The fact that all these moments were articulated within radio broadcasting blends the technical meaning of the term with its other meanings. The projection of “the voice of the nation” through the technology of radio circumscribes and makes apparent the other processes of projection. The analysis of projection at various levels reveals, both, the dynamics of identification and frustration that shape the political subjectivity of the Turkish national elite.

The concept of “translation” lies at the core of the Westernisation process in Turkey. I have discussed in Chapter 1 that starting as early as the nineteenth century, the works of Western, specifically French authors such as Hugo, Rousseau, Voltaire, Bergson, Comte were translated into Turkish. I have also noted that the Translation Chamber founded in Istanbul in the late nineteenth century produced both translations of Western texts and their adaptations. It is important to reemphasise the two significant historical processes that accompanied the translation of the Western texts. One is the adaptation and recontextualisation of certain ideas in translations which involved an adjustment to the specific historical problems and to an epistemology of a different order (J. Parla, 1990: 92). The second is the translators' acquisition of power in the fast pace of reform/revolution in the beginning of the twentieth century: those people with the cultural capital of foreign languages, converted their intellectual capacity to gain power positions (Göçek, 1996) in a society where Westernisation was not just an ideal but had become the practical axis of the national project. Therefore, the concept of translation designates, both, the shifts in the meaning systems and the material processes of Occidentalism.

Translation, in a broader sense, is also significant for an understanding of the dynamics of identity and difference. Translation or mediation can be regarded as the medium of identity, by enabling the representation of the self in relation to otherness. The self or the identity is the embodiment of “difference”, produced in translation.

32 "(t)ranslation is the materialization of our relationship to otherness, to the experience - through language- of what is different." (Simon, 1992: 161)
and temporarily enclosed in boundaries. Thus, identity is an unstable product of translation. However, an act of translation also crucially brings to view the existence of a field of ambiguity and the ever changing borderlines. The uncertain space indicated by translation corresponds either to a surplus of meaning which cannot always be contextualised and individualised, or to a non-knowledge which allows subjectivity as a separate domain -though non-coincident with itself- to appear. I locate my analysis of Occidentalism, in the uncertain space that is produced by a range of acts of translation. In this sense it is neither an emic analysis, that tries to "see things from the actor's point of view" (Geertz, 1993: 14) nor an etic analysis that looks at things from an imposed frame of reference, such as theoretical frameworks based on Western representations. I pursue, rather, the analysis of contradictions and mismatches that are produced on the boundaries of the interconnected acts of translation which, primarily, are: 1) the translation of Western discourses on nationality and civilisation by the Turkish national elite, 2) the translation of supposedly "essential" popular-national culture by the Turkish elite, 3) the translation of national discourses into the technology of sound in radio broadcasting. The translation indicates, in this context, both spatial and temporal adjustments and movements that are not only verbal but also embedded in the use of techniques and technologies. It is a discursive practice that produces "truth" and links to bodies in a specific time and place; and enables a boundary management between what is to be excluded and included in the national project. It is framed by a dialogic relationship between the virtual viewpoint of the West and the virtual point of political subjectivity of the Turkish national elite. And as it centres on the borderlines of these acts, it indicates both identity and otherness in historical terms.

My third conceptual tool is "social fantasy" which played an

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33 According to Blanchot translation is the sheer play of difference: "it alludes to it constantly, it dissimulates this difference, but occasionally in revealing it and often in accentuating it; translation becomes the very life of this difference..." (1997:58-9)

34 This is akin to an immanent critique which strives to grasp discursive phenomena "through the analysis of their form and meaning, the contradiction between their objective idea and that pretension. It names what the consistency or inconsistency of the work itself expresses of the structure of the existent....it seeks to derive them (inadequacies) from the irreconcilability of the object's moments." (Adorno, 1981: 32)
important role in the constitution and reproduction of power relations in early Turkish history. However, I do not mean to suggest by this that the concept indicates mere illusion or simply is an ideological apparatus of the state. It, rather, indicates the field of utterances and practices assembled by the material and discursive processes of projection and translation. Social fantasy, in this case, evokes the political subjectivity of the Other in its relation to the West. The analysis of Occidentalism as it manifests itself in radio broadcasting in early Turkish history reveals how the actual reality of “the people” had to be denied and displaced in social fantasy, because it was not concordant with the discourses on modernity. The Occidentalist fantasy evokes a “lack” in “the people” upon which it organises the “desire” to fill it. This is in close connection to the lack projected unto the Turkish by the Orientalist fantasy. They function in the same economy of identity and desire. The interconnection becomes apparent in my analysis of radio drama and talks disseminated through a non-visible “mass” medium - radio broadcasting. It is also apparent in the assumptions that both the BBC Turkish Service and Turkish Radio made with regard to their audiences.

In line with my concern to re-embody and historicise the concept of the Other, I argue that the concept of “the people” stands out as a significant leverage for the production of social fantasies in Turkey. The diverse experiences of what is called “the people”, as such, was denied by modernisers; nevertheless, it was in and through the concept of “the people” the representations of modernity were constructed and generalised. The concept remained invisible, as the Other, in the representations of modernity, compared to those categories of race and gender which were stigmatised as differences in a hierarchy of power. Therefore it is possible to say that “the people” is the generalised and absent structuring principle of

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35 Mladen Dolar points to “the Real of the fantasy: the fantasy stands in the place of an impossible Real, a void which it disguises and discloses in one and the same gesture. This is why fantasy is never simply a ‘hallucinatory satisfaction of desire’, as it has frequently been described.” (1998: xxii)
otherness in modern national societies. Its ultimate symbolisation lies in the term "mass" culture and communication. It functions as a quilting point, in Zizek's terms (1991:16), to make all other differences, such as race, ethnicity and gender, marginal and less significant in their link to power. This is possible by pointing to "nation as a unified cultural community" (Gilroy, 1993: 53) in which "the people" are thought to be the silent, "natural" and complacent partners. These generalised attributes, consequently, endorse the reinscription of other differences, such as gender and ethnicity, in a naturalised way. My analysis of the inscription of women in radio drama, in Chapter 6, derives from and supports this perspective. In my treatment of the social fantasies of the Other, therefore, I take "the people" imagined by the Turkish national elite, in its relation to the West, as the shared discursive realm of modernity. This points to an

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36 The disembodiment of "the people" makes the representation of "the people" possible. Specifically inherent to modernity, is the leveling off of the diverse experiences to incorporate them in rationally constructed universal representations. What is significant about "the people", as it is converted into the general category of "everyman" or "anyone" in the discourses on modernity, is that it provides a generalising principle of a particular knowledge, it furnishes the reality that is true for all. It becomes, in de Certeau's words, a common place, a philosophical topos within which representations are constructed (1988). The displacement or disembodiment of the people "that lead toward the common place where 'anyone' is finally silent" (de Certeau, 1984: 5), can be traced on the borders of the modern discourses on the people.

37 The concept of "mass" indicates a certain way of looking at the "people" which, historically was regarded as a natural category and thought to be validated by the technology of "broadcasting" in the West. The use of the concept "mass" both refers to a possibility of a unity of culture in the social realm (by educating the masses), and to a recontextualised differentiation between the "high" and the "low" culture. So it represents a point in the history of modernity when the broad assumption of "common culture" was taking the place of segregated lifeworlds and cultures of classes and groups. When Raymond Williams referred to culture, as 'a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period or a group' (1983:90), he took a stand against the association of culture with 'high' values of the elite. He attacked the idea of a divided culture, which opposed the cultivated tastes to those of the 'vulgar and ignorant masses'. For him, to define people as "masses" was just a way of othering them. "There are in fact no masses; there are only ways of seeing people as masses" (Williams, 1958: 289). So, his conception of culture entails the representation of 'common' in both senses, that culture is ordinary, and is not divided as 'high' and 'low'. Yet his stance can be read within the "structure of sentiment" that emphasised a common national culture: "The making of a society is the finding of common meanings and directions, and its growth is an active debate and amendment under the pressures of experience, contact and discovery, writing themselves into the land". (Williams, 1993:6)

38 Gilroy argues that we should focus on "race" and racism "not as fringe questions but as a volatile presence at the very centre of British politics, actively shaping and determining the history not simply of blacks, but of this country as a whole at a crucial stage in its development." (Gilroy, 1993: 51)
aspect of Occidentalism which bears the imprints of intertwined histories in modernity.

These three conceptual tools, namely projection, translation and social fantasy enable me to address Occidentalism 1) as processes of identification with the West and “the people”, 2) as an “answering practice” to the West, 3) as a complex set of techniques for boundary management, and, 4) as a social fantasy that constitutes a base for the enactment of power and political subjectivity in the shared discursive realm of modernity.

The analysis of Occidentalism reveals the dynamics of the political subjectivity of the Other, as well as, some significant elements in the shared discursive realm of modernity. This is possible, first, by pointing to the historical boundaries of a modern identity, represented by the humanistic discourse of truth of the BBC as it is reflected upon in the context of an “answering practice”. Secondly, it points to the boundaries of the modern discourse on nationality, by bringing into light a range of adjustments in the same discursive realm. This can be traced in the strategies employed by Turkish Radio to address the “new man”. Thirdly, it indicates a non-discursive realm of the Other that fall out of representations. This can be observed in the limits of the representations of the audience of the BBC Turkish Service and the Turkish Radio. A comparative analysis of the practices of the BBC Turkish Service and of Turkish Radio provide data to analyse the absent topos of the representations of “the people” and its shifting borderlines.

Finally, I would like to introduce the concept of “surplus” to attend to the constitutive outside of my analysis which is partially captured in the immanent critique of the various aspects of Occidentalism. A form of radio broadcasting that assumes it is possible to talk to the “masses” is one significant area in which the fluctuating dynamics of clustering and unclustering of the reality, of suture and dissolution, of conscious strategies and non-knowledge can be observed. For example, the analysis of historical data shows that the social fantasy in Turkey could not be congealed and fixed since it was constantly disrupted by external events. The surplus that cannot be fixed in
discourses or rationally framed in representations reveals itself in symptoms. I have treated the destruction of the archives as one symptom of the surplus. The surplus also corresponds to unaccounted tactics that act against official discourse; to forms of violence or enjoyment that secretly sustain visible arrangements. I will refer to a tactic of distortion practiced by Turkish broadcasters in contradiction to the officially declared openness to receiving foreign radio transmissions, in Chapter 4.

Symptoms have a significant place in my thesis, in the sense that they have triggered the formulation of key questions that are new to the field. However, these symptoms are not accommodated fully in the analysis of Occidentalism. They remain resistant to analysis as scattered and discrete signs sporadically appearing in anecdotes and memoirs. The full analysis of these symptoms, as in psychoanalysis, waits for new narratives, new versions of history narrated by those subjects silenced and disembodied by official discourse. Therefore they link to new possibilities of future research.

I believe, the historical analysis of Occidentalism, shows not only how the specific arrangement of various elements, in a certain context, is sustained and becomes functional, but also, the unfinalisability of the arrangement. The deconstruction of the Other corresponds, in my view, to the task of evoking other voices that were silenced (but never absolutely) in the process of codification of official representations. Finally I argue, with Bakhtin, that this is possible from a distance in time, in space and from the grip of the centripetal forces in culture. In DuBois’s words, “those who are obliged to negotiate both ‘margins’ and ‘center’ are somewhat better placed to deconstruct dominant or narrowly national discourses.” (cited in Shohat&Stam, 1994: 48-9) So, the deconstruction of the Other is also a political act.

2.4. The Research Question and the Methods of Analysis

Informed by the methodological framework that is outlined in the previous parts, my research question can be formulated specifically
as: how the discourses, strategies and techniques of Turkish radio broadcasting can be linked to Occidentalism, through which Turkish national identity was articulated both as part of and in opposition to the “West”? My research dwells both on early Turkish radio broadcasting and the analysis of the field of force lines it was positioned in, in particular, in relation to the contemporary BBC Turkish Section broadcasts. I have given my reasons to include the case of the BBC Turkish Section in the Introduction. To summarise: First, given that the BBC was regarded as a model by Turkish broadcasters the case provides data which constitutes an “outside” to the utterances on Turkish radio, and historically contextualises the Turkish radio broadcasting, specifying the ongoing struggles and conditions in which it attempted to address both the nation and the West; second, the BBC Turkish Section broadcasts can be treated as almost a “control” case which brings a comparative perspective to the critical analysis of the conditions of production and manifestation of “truth” on radio. I argue that the dialogic analysis of contemporary Turkish Radio and the BBC Turkish Section broadcasting is significant in deconstructing the Occidentalist fantasy in Turkey, which operated by reference to an imagined West, but nevertheless was shaped by extralinguistic forces that figured in the history of the Western domination over non-West. The analysis of the BBC Turkish Section broadcasting provides clues to understand both, the imagined character, the “fantasy”, of Occidentalism, and the “real” conditions of its production as a discourse.

My thesis employs data coming from various sources and is based on the analysis of a wide range of material from archives to memoirs; from legislations to journal articles (see the list of sources). I put to work a combination of methods, that are informed by my methodological framework, to analyse the diverse material. First, I draw on various sources to map out the institutional history of Turkish Radio, using Foucauldian discourse analysis to attend to the conditions of discursive techniques. I study the strategies and the sites, bodies and the forms of significations on radio that were articulated in the discourse on nationalist identity. I study how radio
was connected to the conception of the West, as well as to centre of
government, to the ruling elite, to other institutions, to cultural reforms,
and to governmental policies, such as legislations and regulations in
Turkey. Hence I draw the discursive contours of the Occidentalist
fantasy to the extent that it relates to radio broadcasting.

Then I pursue a Bakthinian dialogic analysis to treat the BBC
Turkish Section archives in link to the concept of “communication” as
government. The dialogue with an imagined audience, Turkey, that
has shaped the utterances on the BBC Turkish Section enables me to
rethink the connections that the Occidentalist fantasy, manifested on
Turkish Radio, had with the ‘West’. The BBC material points to the
intertwined constellations of Orientalism and Occidentalism. The
conception of the “audience” that figured in both the BBC and Turkish
Radio broadcasts is significant here. I draw on both dialogic and
psychoanalytical methods to show the limits of the sayable within the
discourse of nationalism, by making references to both the non-
knowledge regarding the audience, and the invisible tactics that act
against the official nationalist discourse. Thus, I try to depict the
reason within what seems as “irrational” in Turkish Radio’s resorting
to “fantasy”, and its denial of “reality”, in the representation of the
people.

Finally I dwell on certain radio programmes, namely talks and
drama, to show how the fantasy of the nation was articulated in
narratives with the aid of radio technology. The perspective that
guides me in analysing the radio talks and drama is again informed
by a combination of methods. I use discourse analysis to point to the
conditions in which these programmes were produced and how they
link to other discursive practices. Psychoanalytic treatment of the
material shows me the blind spots within these texts that remain
unaccounted by their apparent narrative logic; and gives clues
regarding what has been excluded from the explicit national
discourse. Bakthinian textual analysis enables me to attend to the
different levels of meaning that are shaped in dialogue with various
imagined audiences. Therefore, I do not confine myself to mere
textual analysis but introduce other variables, such as the dichotomies
of the West/Turkey, people/elite, nature/civilisation, women/men, to grasp how desired changes in the national life expressed in these narratives were conceived in Occidentalist terms. Here Occidentalist refers to the setting and management of the boundaries within the nation between what is foreign and what is authentic. Furthermore, I use these texts to show how nature, culture, and civilisation were operationalised in gendered terms in the nationalist discourse; and how this was informed by the Occidentalist fantasy, especially endorsed by the technology of radio broadcasting.
Announcers in the studio of Ankara Radio just before the broadcasting started. (Radyo, 8/87: cover page, March 1949)
CHAPTER 3
The Studio

In this chapter, I draw on the history of Turkish radio, its institutional organisation, the nature of its programmes and the debates around them, to discuss the shifting boundaries of Turkish national identity, imagined through radio. I will dwell on three aspects: First: I will show how specifically Ankara Radio gained prominence in the 1930s and became associated with the national culture as opposed to Istanbul Radio; and how this is linked to the boundary management between the past and the present; between what was foreign and what was national. How the spaces of Istanbul and Ankara are opposed to each other in this context is especially significant. Second: I will dwell on the space of radio itself to depict the way the radio technology was perceived and used to create a “pure national voice”. I will discuss the significance of the attempts of mediation between the people’s culture and the Western civilisation. Third: I will attend to the frustrations and anxieties involved in the experiment; the failures, both in technical matters and in terms of achieving a “pure” voice of the nation on radio, due to interferences coming from other spaces, such as the West. I will show how the projected Western gaze has been a source that triggered problematisations on the issue of national culture.

As a form of technology radio both provides a specific kind of space for an experiment on the national, and also stands as a key symbol of modernity and universal progress, as it did in other peripheral nations.¹ One can see in the Turkish venture of

¹ Lesley Johnson’s account of the early Australian radio bears some resemblance to the Turkish case, in terms of the perception of radio as a marker of universal modernity (1988). The examples of radio in opposition to power -for national struggle, for guerrilla warfare, or for workers’ struggle- although vested with oppositional meanings, also make allusions to universality and progress (Fanon, 1970; Godfried, 1997; Ignacio&Vigil, 1995) Fanon’s account of Algerian Radio, “The Voice of Algeria”, points to how radio became a symbol during the national struggle: it “created out of nothing, brought the nation to life and endowed every citizen with a new status, telling him so explicitly” (1970: 80).
experimentation -in being national and modern- via radio broadcasting, both an incredible effort of creativity and a lack of knowledge; very strict rules of control and transgressions of boundaries at the same time. However, the process of experimentation, although it fails to sustain its sterile laboratory conditions, gives a portrait of modernity, shaped under certain conditions of Western domination, and which bears, in itself, the elements of an ongoing dialogue with the Occident.

3.1. Radio and Turkish National Identity

National identity is at once very real and ambiguous; it is difficult to set the boundaries of a national identity as it can only be articulated through its differentiation. The existence of the nation depends on the existence of the international order. The "origin" of the nation is dependent on "a differentiation of nations which has already begun." (Bennington, 1994: 241) However, national identity is not signified through a single opposition between "us" to "them". The nation is also a temporal construction, a form of temporality, that is split in itself. The signification of national identity refers to past and future, to pre-modern as well as modern elements, to an "authentic essence" and to a radical break with tradition at the same time. "(N)ation' designates at one and the same time the instance by means of reference to which traditional 'organic' links are dissolved and the 'remainder of the pre-modern in modernity'....The crucial point is again to conceive both aspects in their interconnection". (Zizek, 1991: 20) And the problem of legitimacy, that is a result of the incongruity between the claim of a radical break with tradition and the reality of history (Osborne, 1995), can only be settled in the "present" time. The "present-ness" is the principle that articulates, orders and justifies, although not without problems, the contradictory references in a national discourse.

The temporal character of the signification of national identity can best be observed in an institution that continually emphasises and displays its "present-ness", such as radio broadcasting. Radio broadcasting not only alters the perception of space but also time. It
annihilates the gap between past and future - by juxtaposing them in the moment of now. Radio stages a play of sounds, that is always now and here; that bridges the gap between its source and its projection; “has impact both outwardly and inwardly at once - destroying the illusion of difference between exterior and interior, perceiver and perceived.” (Dyson, 1994: 170) Radio becomes a mediated location, “a social/temporal location joining source and listener in the instant of a sound” (Berland, 1994: 35).

I argue that radio in Turkey served as a mediator between the conflicting concerns of the national elite, as they worked to create a national identity. Its significance can be listed in five points. Radio enabled mediation between the seemingly unbridgeable fields, being at the intersection point of: a) Culture and Civilisation. Radio represented Western modernity and progress in its very technological form, but was also the means to disseminate the cultural “messages” that uniquely belonged to the nation; b) Education and Entertainment. It was seen as a vehicle for “mass” education but had to be entertaining if it was going to have any impact; c) Elite and the People. In the definition of broadcasting it was implied that radio talked to “masses”, yet the elite were keen on disseminating their own values and ways of living, as markers of modernity; d) Absence and Presence. The national unity envisaged through the technique of radio broadcasting meant talking to citizens, that were absent in the national project yet represented in the very address of radio; e) Private and Public. Radio was perceived as an apparatus to reorganise the public domain of national life by implanting modern values to the society, yet it had to address people in their private realm, in their intimate domestic setting.

These five points provide a framework to interpret the debates around Turkish radio, and in its strategies to bridge the gaps between past and future, between the West and Turkey; between the serious and masculine image of politics and the more feminine and more sentimental field of “popular” culture; between the pre-modern essences ascribed to the nation and modern ways of living.

Although a late comer, the history of early Turkish radio until
1950s bears some resemblance to the practices of radio broadcasting in their early years, in "liberal" regimes of power, such as the UK, USA and Australia which basically employed “the appropriate techniques for managing a population in democracy”\(^2\) (Donald, 1992: 78) and “setting up of and legitimating of distinctions between the culture of the elite and the culture of popular tastes.” (Johnson, 1988: 4) On the other hand, it shares some elements with Italian and German radio broadcasting systems that functioned within totalitarian regimes starting from the early 30's.\(^3\) Yet Turkish Radio has its unique characteristics which are embedded in the Occidentalist experiment of imagining a nation in relation to the West. Turkish Radio followed a different path, being invested with national and public meanings only in the mid 30's, which challenged the existing conceptions of radio broadcasting that the cultural elite had when radio started in 1927. The entertainment oriented broadcasting of, specifically, Istanbul Radio was criticised in its link to the city of Istanbul, which was regarded as “foreign” in many aspects. Istanbul was thought to be a corrupted space due to its multi-cultural make up, ethnic diversity, “foreign” and too much Westernised ways of living.\(^4\) The critique was also a self-challenge. It implied the need for the elites to curb their cosmopolitanism and excessive modernism and to engage in a process of self-disciplining. Then, radio created both the means and the space to build up a self-image; to make the necessary distinctions not only between the elite and the people, but also between the cosmopolitan and the national elite, between Istanbul and Ankara, between a Western and a Turkish national modern.

Turkish Radio, after 1936, was interested in its audience only as a projected image. Contrary to some other cases in other countries, it resisted popular demand, avoided audience participation and

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\(^2\) Burhan Belge wrote in the radio journal that “Radio is a very democratic machine. It is as if it was invented for the people...” *Radyo*, Vol.3. No.28. 15 March1944, p.1.

\(^3\) For example, in Italy radio was invested with pedagogic and moral missions in order to raise an “awareness of ethical and national values” (Richeri, 1980:4) which resembles the Turkish concerns in nationalising the radio. I will make some references to similarities with German radio broadcasting when discussing radio talks in Chapter 5.

\(^4\) F. Ahmad makes the point that Istanbul was also associated with “conservatives”. “Such was the bitterness between Ankara and Istanbul...that Kemal refused to visit Istanbul after its liberation and went there only in 1928...” (1993:54).
populist strategies that would give in to differentiated needs and
tastes.\(^5\) It took its serious self-image seriously, experimenting with the
mix of elements of national identity. The only nationwide survey
concerning radio programmes was operationalised in 1948, the
results of which were published in *Radyo*. It is said in the introduction
to the results, that the survey "illuminated" Turkish Radio to a great
extent, and that it will be "useful" in shaping the future programmes.\(^6\)
The results which reflect the opinions of 6639 people were published.
Some of the responses were highly specific, such as "demanding a
story from Suat Taşer", "that Hikmet Münir talks more", "that Nurettin
Artam avoids coughing in his talks." On the other hand, some of the
responses reflected attitudes on more critical issues, such asking for
chanting of *Koran* to be included in radio broadcasting, or demanding
more domestic news.\(^7\) (Neither of these influenced future
programming.) Yet there was no systematic evaluation of the results. It
was as if the "survey" itself, not its content, signified a "scientific"
confirmation of radio's close contact with the people.

A few months later, an article published in *Radyo* gives a better
clue for understanding the attitude of Turkish Radio to audience
research. The question that is asked in the article is: "How can one
measure the performance of a social institution, such as radio?" The
article tackles the question from various aspects. The dominant theme

\(^5\) Whereas in Australia, for example, the broadcasting which started in the beginning of
the 1920s, had already adopted "a special style of radio performance" in the beginning
of the 1930s, which was friendly and intimate in its style and avoided talking and lecturing
to an unseen audience. Appropriate ways of addressing the segmented audience were
developed (Johnson, 1988). In Germany, a similar shift occurred when Nazis came to
power. There was more interest in the audience in the Nazi period compared to self-
acclaimed strategies of radio in the Weimar period, more audience research in order to
better target the listeners (Lacey, 1993). The process in which "the BBC softened its
paternalism of its early days" started in the late 1930s, "in the increased awareness,
demanded by producers and supplied by the first research, of the differentiated needs
and tastes in the audience." (Lewis & Booth, 1989) Ethnic speech patterns were essential
in the entertainment programmes of the American NBC, despite their emphasis on
"general American speech" in the 40's (Barfield, 1996). According to Browne who did a
comparative study of broadcasting systems of "six industrialized nations", in the Soviet
Union there was little need to assess audiences until the 1950s since "those in charge of
broadcasting naturally would have the best interests of the public in mind" (1989: 286).
It could be interesting to compare the Turkish broadcasting system to the one in the Soviet
Union.

\(^6\) *Radyo*, Vol. 7, No. 78-79-80, June/July/August 1948, p.3

\(^7\) Ibid., 42-43.
of the article is:

“At first glance, it may seem that public opinion is a perfect and adequate criteria in a democracy. But a deeper inspection will reveal that public opinion research, although a fundamental criteria, cannot by itself be considered as the true criterion... Whether the product is of high quality or not is very important.” 8

So, the “true criterion” was monopolised by broadcasters.9 Radio projected images of the people to the people without attempting to adopt their way of talking, that was, in reality, highly diversified in terms of class, gender, ethnic origins, and locality. Radio’s address was determined by the voice of the “centre”. But what was excluded and included in this central discourse on nationality derives from a complex field of negotiations. For example, radio avoided talking to women in feminine forms and, instead broadcast talks addressed at the whole family. On the other hand, it employed women to present the news, as part of its modern window to the outside world. Radio broadcast serious talks on the national history and on the national war against the Western forces; but it also broadcast talks on daily matters, such as “how to spend a weekend”, or “the problems with domestic servants” in order to educate the wealthy urban people in the Western ways of living. Radio, also, took local forms of culture, such folk music and traditional dramas, and altered their content and form to make them modern and Westernised. The space of radio became a field of boundary management against the burden of history, the Western desire/threat, and the diversity of local cultures. At the crossroads of all these differently set boundaries and their management occurs the discourse on nationality.

Yet Turkish radio’s basic concern, after 1936 when it was

8 Radyo, Vol. 7, No. 83, November/December 1948, p.1
9 This resembles other cases in which “high culture” and “quality” were privileged over the “low tastes” of the “masses”. For example, Reith, the first director of the BBC had said “…we are apparently setting out to give the public what we think they need -not what they want...” (McDonnell, 1991: 12) But as I have discussed before the BBC had to come to terms with the differentiated needs and tastes of the audience in the late 30’s, at least by implementing audience research, which implies that the BBC used more “rational” methods to justify its production whereas Turkish radio could not devise the means to evade the accusation of “arbitrariness”. This has been a matter of debate between broadcasters themselves best illustrated in Muzaffer Şerif’s criticisms to Turkish Radio, in 1939, which I will be picking up in Chapter 5.
nationalised due to growing concerns of building a “national culture” in the 30’s, was to imagine and retain a pure image of modernity, the purity that was thought to be at the core of the national identity and was to be represented to others. However, despite all attempts of purification and synthesis, which I will be addressing later in the chapter, Turkish radio was afflicted with all kinds of failures in its experiment ranging from technical problems to the problems of organisation. The technical failures accompanied by the “non-serious” attitudes of the broadcasters, and the ambiguous “ideological” content of broadcasting that was somehow to find a balance between national and Western values posed all kinds of problems and frustrations for the elite. The purity of the “voice of the nation” produced through radio remained a problematic issue until the 1950s when radio was no longer the voice of the nation, but the voice of the political party in government.

In its experimental character the early Turkish radio manifests a significant trait that dominated the realm of politics. A question from the Koran best expresses it: “Why do you say that which you do not do?”10 The significance of this trait can be better understood with reference to the machinery of the political in Turkey, that brought certain people together in a certain space, and composed them as the national elite.

3.2. The National Elite and Ankara

I have discussed before, in Chapter 1 how Westernisation proceeded “under the continuous ‘assault’ of Western nations”: the Ottoman Empire had no choice, if it wished to survive, but to adopt Westernisation (Karal, 1981: 31). The process of reforms based on the Western forms introduced a divide between the religious elite (Ulema) and the new elite who were familiar with the Western texts, forms and techniques. Translation of Western texts became one of the most important activities that distinguished the new elite, who were located

10 “Lime Tekulune Ma la tef’alun”, Koran, “Suara”. Used by Hilmi Ziya Ulken, an early Turkish philosopher, as a sub-heading for the section on Politics in his book that was reviewed in the Turkish Press published in Vienna in 1931 as a book that reconciles “Idealism with Realism, the individual with society, man with humanity”. (Ulken, 1971)
and thus disciplined in some government bureaus in Istanbul, one of them being the Translation Chamber. But the course of the national struggle (1918-1923) against the Western plans of partitioning the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, and later the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 dramatically altered the conditions of the Westernised elite, as I have previously pointed out. The task of building a nation on the ruins of an empire brought forth two new concerns: defining a national homeland as opposed to the Ottoman Empire (which covered different lands and populations); second, time-sensitivity: Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the national project began thinking in decades, whereas Ottoman intellectuals had been thinking in millennia (Mardin, 1981: 200). In this new context there was also a need to form a new avant-garde cadre to combine the political and the cultural, to create and communicate the content of the attempted reforms.

The new elite was formed, in this context, of those people who took charge of government activities under the authoritarian and charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal and those intellectuals who sided with Mustafa Kemal and were devoted to tackling the questions of nationality and Westernisation with the concerns of “homeland” and “time-sensitivity”, in different fields, such as history, law, architecture, and language. This group of people, more or less coincided with the members of the single party, the RPP. I have discussed before how the political regime was shaped under the single party rule and the strict control of politics and economy by the state, and how the liberal versions of modern society were rejected. In practice this meant banning all forms of political opposition. Here I will be concentrating more on the spaces and the social network within which the elite, who had shares in the centralised power, were initially connected to each other as a group. This will entail looking at Ankara, and at the Çankaya Villa of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, where all the important decisions were made and the appointments to different governmental and bureaucratic posts were determined -a practice that continued

11 Some parallels can be drawn to the experience in the USSR, where “the conjunction of political and cultural revolution with the new view of technology “ and associated with the vanguard party became evident in avant-garde institutions of art and culture. (Huyssen, 1986:12)
until the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938.

I will give a brief picture of the meetings in the Çankaya Villa that both nurtured the vision of national life as seen from Ankara, and that practically served as an institution through which the people were recruited to become part of the national elite.\textsuperscript{12} The meetings in the Çankaya Villa, which were usually held in the evenings and which sometimes lasted until dawn, were both social - eating, drinking and entertainment- and political in character. It was during the course of these meetings that national issues were debated, ideas regarding the social and cultural reforms were examined, speculations over possible forms of the cultural synthesis between the East and the West were considered.\textsuperscript{13} Mustafa Kemal's tastes of entertainment and drinking, and his paternal supervision over issues determined the atmosphere of the meetings. Atay says, in his memoirs, that these meetings were so important that the people in Ankara, when invited to them, often declined from other invitations, those, for example, from the foreign embassies. "They did not want to lose the opportunity" (Atay, 1969 : 414) of being involved in the central network of power. I will come back to the significance that the discourse on modernity and its interpretations within that network of relations, had for decision making, specifically those decisions regarding radio broadcasting, later in the chapter. The network of people established in Ankara created a group, comprised of politicians, military officers, literary men, journalists and academics who declared their allegiance to the charismatic leader and to the cause of the national project. Most of these people were from Istanbul, who have moved to Ankara after the foundation of the Republic. They had good command of foreign languages, especially French. So, in a way, they were the heirs of the

\textsuperscript{12} Görçek argues that in the Ottoman period, the Sultan's household was the basic organisational unit of the society. It cut across formal organisations and class boundaries and contained within it diverse activities including economic and political administration. She, then, makes the point that this system was countered by the process of Westernisation and the emergence of new voluntary organisations, in which the new "civilised" elites organised themselves (1996). Çankaya Villa bears a strange resemblance to Sultan's court. In order to assess the similarity, of course, further research and reflection are required.

\textsuperscript{13} Mustafa Kemal was a keen amateur in many subjects, language being one of them. The Turkish language reform and the adoption of the Latin alphabet were shaped in these meetings in his villa, where he and others played with different options in a "game" of speculations (Heyd, 1954).

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new elite in the Ottoman Empire. Yet the “new Turks” (Bisbee, 1951) of the Republican era had to be disciplined in their cosmopolitan tastes and ways of living to prepare themselves for the tasks of the national project. This was only possible through certain institutions among which was radio.

The conditions of life in Ankara, at that time, were very discouraging, as narrated by Karaosmanoğlu in his novel Ankara. The first “revolutionaries” coming from Istanbul during the war were labeled as “alien” by the local population, which were partly Christians and Greeks and partly Muslim peasants (Şenyapılı, 1985). Ankara was a barren village. There was no running water, no electricity. The avant-garde (both in military and cultural terms) elite who were the first habitants of Ankara, and who were very few in number, chose Çankaya and its surroundings to settle. They had difficulties in adapting to local ways of living in Ankara; they even found difficult to understand the language spoken by the local people. Therefore they mostly socialised with each other, but they kept the dream alive that one day, “they will mingle with an anonymous crowd” (Atay, 1969: 352). However, they were also nostalgic of their days in Istanbul. When viewed from Ankara, Istanbul seemed like Paris (Atay, 1969: 352). The burden of the poor conditions combined with the fact that Ankara was not an attractive place for the Westerners. For example, the foreign embassies were against the idea of Ankara being the capital, and did not want to move their offices from Istanbul to Ankara (Şenyapılı, 1985: 18). Istanbul was one of the big harbours of the world trade and, with its ancient history of religions and civilisations had been a city of “desire” for many “foreigners”, such as travelers, pilgrims, and diplomats. There were foreign -Italian, French, Russian- communities in addition to non-Muslim Ottoman communities -Greeks, Armenians, Jews- settled in Istanbul.

The national elite who chose Ankara as the space for the national government, despite their longing for Istanbul, rejected
Istanbul in their national discourse.\textsuperscript{14} Istanbul was regarded as impure in many aspects: It was full of "foreigners, Armenians, Greeks".\textsuperscript{15} It was a place where the undesirable remnants of the empire had combined with cosmopolitan ways of living and international commerce. It was a symbol of the past traditions from which the new elite wanted to break. It was also a chaotic place inhabited by the "unemployed and trouble causing mobs" (Atay, 1969: 417).

In the first years of the national government, to build a modern city in Ankara, as opposed to Istanbul became an exciting project for the elite. To silence the dissident voices that claimed Ankara can only be a transitory capital, "scientific" reports were prepared. The reports, referring to foreign experts' views, "proved" that Ankara was not a "barren land" but a "plateau" suitable to be a modern city. The reports made use of world statistics about temperature, humidity, and other natural factors to compare to Ankara's values. Ankara's climate, though unfavourable in many respects -dry and cold- was regarded as helpful for the struggle for civilisation. Professor Piery from Lyon University had said for Ankara, "(T)he climate here is good for disciplining people to struggle against hardship and pain, thus it makes a unique school in that sense" (cited in Atay, 1969: 419). In the beginning of the 1930s, a new urban plan was designed -a German planner, Jansen was commissioned for this- to make Ankara a modern city. The desire was to create a "clean, beautiful, green, magnificent, organised and civilised" city\textsuperscript{16} (Şenyapılı, 1985 : 49). But in reality, Ankara was only a "draft". "Life in Ankara was a draft." (Atay, 1969: 415)

The elite lived in segregated neighbourhoods. Peasants were forbidden to transgress the boundaries (Sertel, 1968). The Westernised forms of entertainment, concerts, balls, and theatres that

\textsuperscript{14} Ideas against Istanbul was overtly stated in the proclamation of Ankara as the capital: "Istanbul (noted the deputy Celal Nuri) was the capital of the Ottoman Empire, a multinational state formed of peoples of various religions and ethnic identities. Ankara, on the other hand, will have a different meaning as the capital of a national state, a young state still growing up." (cited in F.Ahmad, 1993: 91)

\textsuperscript{15} Yeni Adam, Vol. 2, No.59, 14 November 1935.

\textsuperscript{16} Şenyapılı's study of planning in Ankara gives a comprehensive account of how this plan eventually failed (1985).
the elite enjoyed in Ankara were strictly isolated from the rest of the population. The novel *Ankara* points to the dilemma of the elite in this atmosphere. On the one hand, "to dress like a European, to live and enjoy life like a European, to dance like a European, and to succeed in these in the eyes of the Europeans seemed as important as winning a big victory" (Karaosmanoğlu, 1994: 112). But on the other hand, the anxiety of the artificial life troubled the elite: "As I was climbing the stairs to the ball room I felt dizzy. I felt, as if with every step I was moving away from them, as if the gap with the people widens ever more. I had a sudden impulse to jump into this abyss and mix with them, so that I can watch our world, this artificial world from their eyes." (119)

Turkish Radio’s broadcasting was shaped by the members of the elite in such a space, and in such a structure of sentiments. The life envisioned in Ankara nourished the strategies of Turkish Radio. And the complexity and heterogeneity of a built environment was reflected in the discrepancy between the performances of the broadcasters and the projected images via radio. Nevertheless it is significant that Ankara was chosen as the site of the national discourse. Contrary to what happened in nineteenth century Europe, that put society - instead of city and territory- at the centre of the concerns of political rationality, Turkish political ideology took the city as “a model for governmental rationality that could be applied to the whole territory”. For the Turkish state the newly founded capital Ankara was an utopian project that encompassed the core of the nation -its architectural, social, scientific and technical design.

### 3.3. The Early Years of Turkish Radio: Istanbul vs. Ankara

An exhaustive history of Turkish Radio still waits to be written.

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17 What Foucault says for eighteenth century France bears some resemblance to the Turkish case. “The model of the city became the matrix for the regulations that apply to a whole state.” (Foucault, 1986: 241) This was quite different from governmental rationality that has “to deal with a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations and as well as its possibilities of disturbance.” (Foucault, 1986: 242)
The limited research that has already been done on this subject provides a general outline of the legal framework of radio, the dates of important events, some figures concerning the number of listeners with radio sets, and the schedules and contents of broadcast programmes. Yet this research does not give any sense of the internal culture of the institution, its efforts to make links with other institutions. Nor does the existing research give any sense of the broadcasters themselves. Archives of the broadcasters’ correspondence with each other and with other institutions do not exist. Yet some understanding of the performances of the broadcasters, their experience of this remarkable national experiment, is possible from the personal memoirs -either written or expressed in interviews- and, also from the debates that were held about radio in certain cultural journals of that period. While giving a brief account of the history of Turkish radio here, I will try to link statements with performances, hence, to situate the discourses on nationality as they were produced and articulated in practice and in relation to the spaces I have described before, Ankara and Istanbul.

The introduction of radio to the new Turkish society was a source of awe and fascination. In 1923, when there was still no radio broadcasting in Turkey, İlikin tells, in his memoirs, how he witnessed a demonstration in the lecture room of Istanbul University. The demonstration was to show to a large number of guests, how a concert in a nearby building could be relayed live to the lecture room in the university. İlikin’s description of the experience is focused on the technological artifact, the radio set, which was a huge black box placed on a wide table in the middle of the room. There were huge black speakers that “looked like trombones” on each side. He says, “we listened to the explanations with excitement. We awaited the experiment with excitement...I can still remember the sound that came out of the speakers, though what we heard was mostly atmospherics.”

The radio set described in this passage resembles a monument.

18 Who became the General Director of Press and Publications Bureau in 1945.
The usage of the metaphor, "monument", in people's general account of their early experience of radio sets in their domestic environment is quite common in Turkey. Similar to Fanon's (1970: 53-79) account of Algerian Radio in the 1950s, the perception of radio as an object and as sound, though mostly unintelligible, acquires special meanings in specific contexts. In the Turkish setting of the 1920s, in which modernisation attempts were being introduced and carried at a high speed, radio signified an alien object representing other worlds, yet something magical and empowering.

The first radio station was established in 1927, which was built by a French firm. The legal decree of 1926 delegated the rights of radio broadcasting, normally belonging to the state, to a private company. By starting radio broadcasting Turkey was to be cited among "other civilised countries":

"...operation of the transmitter stations in Ankara and Istanbul in the name of the Post, Telegraphy and Telephony Institute (PTT) is adjudged to the above mentioned company for 10 years; which would serve the general interests within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic with the aim of transmission and propagation of political, economic, social and scientific news, talks, conferences and concerts, and information about weather conditions and other issues that wireless telephone stations take up and transmit in other civilised countries to people, with the advent of science."20

The radio company which enjoyed the broadcasting rights for a set period, was financed by license fees. But it was mostly funded by state organisations, with 70% of its capital coming from the state. It also had the right to keep the revenues of tax on the radio sets imported to the country. The same company was also active in the trade of radio sets.21 The journal published by the company, Telsiz, included some advertising to sell radio sets, which were called "wireless telephone receivers" at the time. It was Telsiz which started the first advertising campaign in Turkey, promising a free receiver for

21 The founding of this company was part of the policy of the state to create some private entrepreneurship. Some of these private companies, sponsored by the state, were notorious for fraud. Private entrepreneurs, close to government, especially enjoyed the financial facilities of İş Bank to make easy money (Atay,1969:456).
5 coupons to be collected from the journals. The journal’s mission was set as to promote radio listening as well as educate the listeners and to spread the “magic” around.

The first director of the Istanbul Radio, Hayreden describes the first days as follows:

“I was already interested in wireless as an amateur when they asked me to join the company....Then we organised a group of people for broadcasting...Everything was ready except that there was no audience. Then, I gave training classes on radio in a room above the post office, for three weeks. Our aim was to make people understand what the wireless is so that they could tell friends and neighbours about it.”

Hayreden and others in the company, hoped that some “avant-garde” people would spread the desire of the new technology through their network of social relations. Some of the political elite were against radio broadcasting at that time, thinking that people, because of their “backward state”, were not ready for it. However Mustafa Kemal’s attitude towards radio determined the course of events. Hayreden tells about taking a radio set, that he himself made, to Mustafa Kemal:

“They told me that he had said, ‘let him bring the machine, so we shall listen to it’. I took a receiver that I have made myself to him in Ankara. While searching for stations, just by chance we had the Russian Radio. Atatürk, who stayed in Sofia as a diplomat could understand some Russian. He listened and listened, then all of a sudden he hushed everyone: ‘Efendiler’ he said, ‘look they are doing propaganda’. And then he ordered that the radio station be built.”

This example illustrates the process of decision making that took place in the Çankaya Villa, which I have described before. It was common that entrepreneurs would go to Mustafa Kemal to sell some of their bright ideas. And they knew how to refer to the discourse of “civilisation” to convince him. So the legitimation of the inauguration of

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23 A public address to men, that Atatürk much used in his speeches in the National Assembly.
radio broadcasting, whatever the personal hopes of the entrepreneurs were, stands out as: "If other civilised countries are using radio, we, too, must do it." The discourse on modernity provided the necessary justification. It was important that Turkey started broadcasting, the rest-including the programmes, the audience-would follow.

The programmes of Istanbul and Ankara Radio, in their first years, mainly consisted of music broadcasting, news bulletins prepared by Anatolian Agency, and stock exchange and cereal market news. There were some talks on new Turkish reforms, on the new Turkish family, or on the national campaign for the use of domestic goods. But these remained marginal in comparison to music broadcasting.

It is interesting that the opening and closing announcements were made in two languages: Turkish and French. Radio employed announcers only if they were fluent in both languages. The programme schedules were also published in two languages in Telsiz. This led to some rumours that the company disguised its original French ownership under a Turkish name. While Kocabaşoğlu rejects this view (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 14), a report prepared by the American Embassy in 1927 claims that, even though the transmitter company has a Turkish name (Türk Telsiz Telefon Anonim Şirketi) "it is known that it is supported by a prominent French company, "Compagnie Française de Radio", and it is understood that most of the devices and equipment are provided by this French company."27

Although it is not possible, given the available sources, to verify either view about the origins of Turkish radio, the image of an "outsider" attached to radio is significant in itself. One reason for this could be the fact that prior to the foundation of the Republic all means of communication, like telegraph and telephone were in the hands of

24 Radio's service to "the conditions and exigencies of the financial world" is a trait that is common to many countries in the beginning of the century (Marvin, 1988: 225). James Carey links this to the formation of the national markets (1992).
525 Between 1927-1936, music broadcasting amounted to approximately 84% of the transmissions of Ankara and Istanbul radios (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980:72).
26 An advertisement for announcers to be hired by Istanbul Radio, Vakit, 3 February 1927.
"foreigners". The policy of the new government was to "remove foreigners from various positions". Yet there were suspicions that some Turkish businessmen collaborated with foreign investors (Atay, 1969: 456). However what is more significant in terms of this research, is the perceptions of the radio technology in the national context. The boundary management of what is foreign and what is not gains interesting meanings within the space of the radio broadcasting. This is best illustrated by the differences between Ankara and Istanbul Radio, which were set in completely different environments. Here we see a twist in the definition of the foreign. The multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan heritage of Istanbul which was reflected in the transmissions of the Istanbul radio in the 30's, was opposed to a purer version of national culture to be constructed in the "void" of Ankara, and specifically Ankara Radio.

Both Istanbul and Ankara Radio, between 1927-1936 broadcast "Western" music. This was mostly "classical" music but also included some dance music. However an almost equal space was given to "Turkish" music, inviting musicians working in clubs and cafes, especially in Istanbul, to perform live concerts in radio. In this sense Istanbul radio was more lively because it could rely on the sources of music and entertainment in the city. All famous musicians of the time, Safiye Ayla, Hamiyet Yüceses, Zehra Bilir, could be heard on Istanbul Radio. Also most of the saz players in the town were employed by Istanbul Radio. Whereas, for its music programmes, Ankara Radio had to be mostly dependent on "Riyaseticumhur Müzik Takımı", a

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28 Which created some concern, for example, for the British. Correspondence from R.H. Howe to A. Chamberlain, 8.7.1925, PRO (FO371/10865)
29 Mete Tuncay discusses the frauds during the single party regime. According to him, these were possible because those in power positions could use their unaccountable power for their economic interests, usually by helping foreign companies to have business contracts with the Turkish government and being illegally paid by the companies (1981: 206-208).
30 The approximate proportions were: "Turkish music" (a total of 30.3%) and "Western music" (a total of 40.28%) (Kocabaoğlu, 1980: 72).
31 A special musical instrument used both in folk and "classical" Turkish music.
32 Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar in a text on Istanbul, refers to the diminishing life in the Turkish cafes in the late 1920's, which were once prominent as spaces for public interaction (and which according Hetherington (1997: 14) inspired the coffee houses in England and France, in the middle of the seventeenth century) because the musicians were increasingly employed by radio. (Tanpinar, 1979)
military band officially organised by the state and which performed both Western and Turkish music. The director of the band, Veli Kanik was also the director of Ankara Radio. Both Istanbul and Ankara Radio were directly connected to their urban environment. It was Istanbul that was more privileged in terms of entertainment.

Istanbul Radio, which enjoyed generally longer hours of transmission and was regarded as more important than Ankara Radio (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980:58), was a candidate to replace the rich entertainment life of the city. It was considered as a medium for entertainment, that is “civilised and, by all means, contemporary”, that is also “pleasurable, inexpensive and aesthetic”. In a technical booklet about radio it was written:

“There is a beat to the big studio of Istanbul wireless telephone studio every evening. Why go to far places, and spend lots of money to listen to saz?...Why sit in polluted theatre halls and suffer trying to get some pleasure and amusement? It is intolerable isn’t it?”

The meaning invested to radio, as a modern apparatus in this context, is not very different from that emerged in the pre-national forms of modernisation in the Tanzimat period. In effect, the importing of pleasurable ways of living and consumer goods for the elite in Istanbul. Radio broadcasting in Istanbul, in a similar manner, fitted into the existent “pleasurable life” as another object of pleasure. Istanbul’s urban space populated with “foreigners” was already associated with Western ways of living that had been, at the same time, enmeshed with the “high culture” of the Ottoman. Through radio the cosmopolitan space of Istanbul could be connected to the Western world non-problematically. For example, in 1928, the national newspapers gave the daily programmes of Istanbul Radio, together

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33 Hours of daily transmission were unstable and varied in time. Ankara sometimes had to stop its transmissions. The average time of daily transmission for Istanbul was 4,5 hours, whereas for Ankara it was 3 hours (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 57-8).

34 Telsiz, No.1, 30 June1927, p.2.

35 The word used in Turkish is ahenk which also has connotations of entertainment life.

36 Şems, Gençlere Telsiz Hocası, Istanbul, 1927, p. 4.

37 What is called as “excessive modernisation” by Serif Mardin (1991). He is critical of the process arguing that it was mostly the consumer goods and certain styles not the Western values that was adopted by the rich people, which, in turn, was caricatured by some populist writers.
with those of Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Milan, and Bratislava while not mentioning Ankara Radio at all! Istanbul was, in this way, a cosmopolitan European city.

The fact that, in 1927, there were only 2000 people with radio sets in Turkey—only half of them registered—and that most of them were either foreigners or "minorities" concentrated in Istanbul could justify the nature of broadcasting by Istanbul Radio. The supply was justified by the demand, though far from fully satisfying it. There were criticisms that radio was not satisfactory in its entertainment since it broadcast the same songs over and over again (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 60).

The radio directors replied to these criticisms by making it clear that they "were only tradesmen" and gave "what the clients want". But "a song only lasts three minutes. How many new songs, do you think, are produced in Turkey in a year? Let's say 100, then it would amount to 300 minutes. How can we fill the long four hours with this?" 38

The scarcity of sources, the poor technical quality of the broadcasts were admitted by the directors. In that sense, the broadcasters were not in an effort to present their performances in a form that made it different from what it was. The radio was not yet invested with meanings that would serve the signification of nationality. The civilising mission that was loosely attached to it in the beginning, could not gain a transcendental meaning, surpassing the performances of the broadcasters linked directly to the conditions and sources available in their own spaces. The memoirs of broadcasters from this period are full of "silly" events that convey the poor conditions of broadcasting then. How the noise from the street or the hotel—in which Ankara Radio's studio was set for a while—interfered with broadcasting; how they stopped the main flow to broadcast the news of the fire in the next door building; how they leaned out of the window to give the weather report; how they had to put a stocking over a microphone to improve the quality of sound; and how they erred in their words while they were presenting programmes 39 ... It is

38 Cevat Fehmi, "Radyo Stüdyosunda Bir Saat", Cumhuriyet, 22 October 1932.
striking that the memoirs from later periods of radio, though full of similar irrational and comical elements, are coloured by a different structure of sentiment. If a tone of enjoyment and pleasure dominates the former, a sense of mission and above all a “love of mission” are emphasised in the latter.\textsuperscript{40} Also one can see in the latter accounts, a modern concern to detach the product from the conditions of production, which implies a denial of experience and body, and the growing impact of mediation in the representation of subjectivity.

3.4. Radio as the “Voice of the Nation”

In the period after 1930 the elite was “more systematically geared” towards creating a new ideology (Kadioğlu, 1996: 187). The six principles of Kemalism -Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and Revolutionism/Reformism- that I have talked about before, were launched in 1931. This pointed to the attempts of treating the national matters, which had been embedded in personal networks before, within a discipline. Culture and the daily life of people were among these matters.

“By 1930, it was generally agreed by the Republican elites that the reforms that were undertaken in the course of the 1920s had not taken root. This problem was to be remedied with further reforms from above that were geared towards creating a new Turk.” (Kadioğlu, 1996: 188)

Culture was regarded as a field through which a “new man” could be created. Baltacıoğlu, who was publishing a journal called \textit{Yeni Adam} (New Man) describes the “new man” in opposition to the “old”: “The old man thinks first of himself, and then his family. The new

\textsuperscript{40} Most people working in Ankara Radio in the late 30’s emphasise that it was like a school. However, a school meant not only discipline and control but also play. Broadcasters talk of the childish games they played with each other in their memoirs: how one musician scared another in a dark corridor, how they played songs with special meanings for themselves, how a sound engineer pretended to be a dog walking on the floor during a live performance of a radio drama, how someone slept while reading the long news bulletin for the press at night... But it is also often emphasised that they “loved” their job. Ankara Radio Sound Archives, “Türkiye Radyolarında Yarım Yüzyıl”, Yücel Ertugay, 1975; “Günün İçinden”, Sezi Ergün & Zehra Kurttekin, 1997, TRT Radio Programmes.
man thinks first of his nation, then his family, and then himself." The new hierarchy prescribed here, according to writers on national culture, could only be achieved by new moral standards, by new language, and by new history. These areas were being turned to fields of experimentation by the elite. The growing concerns with "cultural nationalism" were practiced in institutes, such as the Turkish Language Institute, the Turkish History Institute, and the People's Houses which were busy creating theses on language, history and folklore. But there were others who claimed that "the new man" will also be a product of disciplining the sentiments via cultural means, such as theatre, film, radio, books, journals and newspapers. After all, Mustafa Kemal had said "You should be able to transform the great ideal that we are working for, in the heart of the people, from an idea into an emotion." It is in this emphasis on culture and on the emotions that radio was invested with new meanings, and a new significance.

_Yeni Adam_ emphasised the need for further development of radio as a medium:

"The brief history of radio introduced it as a medium of entertainment to us. We are used to hear dance tunes at certain hours in the evening. But it is not that difficult to understand that radio cannot be confined to the dissemination of musical sounds. It can also broadcast lectures, monologues, interviews, dramas, lessons, radio journals."

The middle of the 1930s witnessed harsh criticisms coming from intellectuals -journalists, writers- of the broadcasts of the "company radio", especially, Istanbul Radio. Kocabaşoğlu argues that the use made by radio in the USSR had also been influential in the

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41 _Yeni Adam_, No.10, 5 March 1934, p.10.
42 A declaration on culture in _Yeni Adam_, demanded that all cultural means be under the control of state authority. The demands listed were: 1. We want the city theatre to be a stage for culture; 2. We want cinema to become an organ of revolution; 3. We want radio to be public university and a music academy; 4. We want newspapers purified from their pornographic content and become a social and a political school; 5. We want journals to be freed from the dictates of the market; 6. We want the book publishing to be designed according to the ideals of knowledge and culture. No.81. 18 July 1935, cover page.
43 cited in And (1983:3).
44 _Yeni Adam_, No.92. 3 October 1935, p.8.
formulation of new ideas on radio in Turkey.

"The experiences in Russia, Germany and Italy have shown us that radio can raise the standards of culture, it can teach anything; in short, radio can be the fastest and the most industrious worker of the new revolution."\(^{45}\)

"It is a big deceit to regard radio as a medium of entertainment, but a private company does not have either the financial or the cultural means to turn it into an appropriate instrument of culture...While we have been able to Westernise in every other matter, why are we so bland in the case of radio?" \(^{46}\)

"At present radio fails to achieve the ideal to work for the national culture. Its musical broadcasts corrupt the discipline of culture and music."\(^{47}\)

The criticisms against music broadcasting focused on the unwanted effects of *alaturka*\(^{48}\) music. *Alaturka*, which supposedly was the Turkish music, as categorised and named by the Western sources, constituted a vast field of debate on national identity. *Alaturka* music, even in the last days of the Ottoman Empire, had a degrading connotation for the pro-Westerners. \(^{49}\) The Westerners had named this music "Turkish", but the Turkish nationalists were disturbed by the inferiority imposed upon it, in comparison to the Western music. So they denied that it was "Turkish". It was Eastern but not Turkish music.

Gökcalp had argued that it was essentially Byzantine and "Eastern".\(^{50}\)


\(^{46}\) Nüvit Osmay, "Radyolarımız!", *Yeni Adam*, No.88. 1 September 1934, p.9.


\(^{48}\) The term *alaturka* is derived from *alla turca* (in the Turkish way) opposed to *alafranga* (in the Western way). Tekelioğlu demonstrates that *alaturka* had degrading connotations for pro-Westerners both in Ottoman and Turkish societies (1996).

\(^{49}\) Even Sultan Abdülhamit II, in the beginning of the century, had said: "To tell the truth, I am not especially fond of *alaturka* music. It makes you sleepy, and I prefer *alafranga* music, in particular the operas and operettas. And shall I tell you something? The modes we call *alaturka* aren't really Turkish." Bülent Aksoy, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Müzik ve Batılılaşma", *Tanzimat Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol.5, p.1215.

\(^{50}\) He interestingly argues that *alaturka* music borrowed from the ancient Greek music in the Middle Ages, as the Western music did. But the Westerners overcame the "mistakes" of this music and gave rise to "civilised" music. However the Eastern music -which was "depressingly monotonous - played in the Ottoman lands, continued its "ill" state (1994: 126-8). It is possible to see, in this account, the internalised Western look. In the West the Ottoman Empire had been called the "sick man" in the nineteenth century.
In the 30's the national elite were unhappy with both the technical and moral standards of alaturka, in the form that could be heard on radio. It was said to be stricken with "alcoholism"51. It provoked "lustful feelings"52 and it was unbearable to listen to its "wailing".

There are two sets of specific concerns that mingle with each other in the criticisms towards radio broadcasting, especially its music broadcasts. One concern pertains to the role that radio must play in disciplining the people in order to create a "new man" equipped with national sentiments; and the other concern relates to the image projected to the Western world as can be seen in the words of an early Turkish poet:

"Every evening on radio, I suspect
A yob belches towards the face of the West"53

The demand that radio should be controlled by the state and thereby, produce the vital elements of a national culture have to be situated in larger framework that concerns the problem of forming of new national identity. Here we witness a dilemma: Culture was the only field where national identity could be imagined, since the distinction between "culture" and "civilisation" in the constitutive discourse on nationality, that Gökalp and other nationalists vehemently argued, implied that only technology and certain forms could be borrowed from the Western civilisation. Culture had to be distinctly Turkish. But on the other hand the existing culture that the institutions, such as radio, could feed on was regarded as "sickly Oriental", in Gökalp's words. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the principles contradicted the sentiments. Most of the members of the elite, including Mustafa Kemal, in fact, liked alaturka music. Mustafa Kemal "liked alaturka music but believed in Western music. He listened to alaturka music at home all the time, but defended the place of Western music in national education...He was

52 Used by Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Internal Affairs then, in his criticism of radio broadcasting. His basic criticism was that state should play a more efficient role in processing those sounds that directly come from the coffee houses. Ayin Tarihi, No.6. 1-31 May 1934, p.32.
able to crush the rebellions of his heart by his brain.” (Atay, 1969:410)

The dilemma and splits led to a period of confusion and contradictory practices. Mustafa Kemal’s interview with a foreign journalist, in 1930, conveys the pain associated with the contemporary conditions of national music. Mustafa Kemal says:

“You see with how much care we treat our musical affairs... How long did it take Western music to reach its present standards? 400 years.. We cannot wait that long. You see that we are trying to adopt Western music.”

The tension filled attitude of Mustafa Kemal to make the Westerners “see” that Turkey is on a rapid move toward modernisation also implies the internalised Western gaze that has pushed the elites to problematise their own culture, made them ready to judge themselves in the most severe terms. The attitude is not a simply defensive one that clings to its own culture; but it is defensive in the sense that it internalises the lack projected to its “self” from the Other, and tries to make it up to the Other’s “reflected” standards. It points to the unstable boundaries of a national identity that is shaped in a continuous dialogue with the West. The West, here constitutes a “virtual viewpoint of the ego ideal”, in which reflection itself is reflected back into “reality”. (Zizek, 1991:15) The ideals of modernisation are assessed in terms of a reflection of the West (its music being developed as opposed to alaturka) which is reflected back to render the “Turkish music” poor. The Turkish elite saw their culture not with the eyes of the West, but through an Occidentalist projection of the West. They were split, in the sense that they could never identify with the Western gaze. They had to build or create their own identity against a projected Western gaze which remained uncertain and open to changing interpretations; and always a source of frustration because of its uncertainty and arbitrariness.

The complexity of the mediation between West and national identity can be traced in the anxiety stricken and arbitrary attempts to define the boundaries of the national culture in the mid 30’s. A speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal in the National Assembly was taken as a warning against broadcasting alaturka music on radio. His statement

that Turkish music was not in a state "that would make us proud" was taken as an "inspiration" to ban alaturka on radio. Mustafa Kemal's words were:

"Today the music that we are made to listen is not in a state that would make us proud. We should openly admit this. It's necessary that national, refined feelings and ideas are expressed; elevated forms of speech and phrases be compiled and these are processed according to the general rules of contemporary music now. Only then, Turkish music can be exalted and find its place as a universal music."  

These rather general words on Turkish music were interpreted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as follows:

"...taking an inspiration from the enlightening speech of the noble Gazi on alaturka in the National Assembly today, it is declared to those in charge that alaturka music should be totally removed from radio broadcasting as of this evening, and only those pieces of music that have been composed by Western techniques and played only by musicians that have a knowledge of Western techniques, are to be broadcasted."  

So, a mastery of Western techniques were made as a precondition of production of national music, while the Western labeled "Turkish music" was rejected. The reversal of the meanings of foreign and national, in this context, is striking. We see, at the same time, both a revolt against the Orientalist Western categorisations, and a desire to assert subjectivity, reducing the Western civilisation to a technique that can be mastered or to an object that can be appropriated.

However, the ban on alaturka was not there to stay. It lasted only two years. There are several versions of the "story" regarding the

55 Zabit Ceridesi, Vol.25, Period 4, Meeting 4, p.4.
56 Mustafa Kemal was generally addressed by his inferiors as Gazi, which means a warrior who has been hurt in a holy war. It is curious that such an address was used in a society whose secularism has been accentuated so distinctly.
57 A supplement to Müzik ve Sanat Hareketleri, January 1935.
58 Which resembles the case of Greek Occidentalism where everything local was despised as foreign, and ironically the West became the Greek tradition (Herzfeld,1995:248).
reversal of the decision. Kozanoğlu, who has played Turkish music on radio, tells his version of the story: Mustafa Kemal who liked listening to Osman Pehlivan's saz and chanting has invited him to his villa in Çankaya one evening. Osman Pehlivan went there without his saz. And he complained that "the noble Gazi" loved this music yet was being harsh on others who loved it too. Then it is said that Mustafa Kemal became sentimental and sent Osman Pehlivan to Ankara Radio to play saz to the nation. The split, illustrated in this story, that afflicts national identity seems incurable. The split was between body and mind, between pleasure and mission - the love of the nation.

The radio stations' strategies after 1936 were oriented towards imagining a space that would be freed from splits. The antidote for the split between pleasure and the love of the nation, between the Western and the national modern was to recreate a nationalised popular culture, process it through radio and try to make, first, the elite, and then the people love it. These strategies were grounded both in the artificial space of Ankara and in the purified sound of radio. Radio, was already regarded as the voice of the nation, the voice of the revolution that should be heard by others, both in the national and Western space.

"Ankara Radio should not be broadcasting "hicazkârî-kürdî" gurgling that has risen from its grave still carrying its sarcophagus, or canned jazz music that is sickening. Instead, it should make the voice of Ankara's revolution heard. So that an Emil Ludwig who hears this voice, would be dazzled with astonishment and come running to Ankara, and crave for a few more interviews. We are a nation that has made the most manly revolution. It is time that we raise our voice and made it heard."

3.5. Ankara and the Problems of the "Pure Voice"

In a similar manner to the earlier decision regarding the

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59 Cevdet Kozanoğlu, Radyo Hatıraları, p.11.
60 A special makam, a set rhythm in alaturka.
61 The name of the foreign journalist whom Mustafa Kemal had given the interview on Turkish music.
62 Burhan Asaf (Belge), "İnkılabımızın Sesi", Kadro, No.11, November 1932, p.37.
development of radio, the nationalisation was put into practice as a result of an “inspiration” from a speech by Mustafa Kemal at the 4th General Assembly of the RPP in 1935. For Mustafa Kemal, “it would be very appropriate” that the issue of radio, “which is vital for national culture, but also of highest importance in terms of international concerns, be given care.”63 In the RPP’s programme it was written that, “(T)he party considers radio as one of the most valuable tools for the cultural and political discipline of the nation. We will establish powerful transmitters. We will provide easy and inexpensive access to radio receivers.”64

A year later, it was decided that the contract with the private company for its transmission rights was not going to be renewed and radio will be nationalised. The operation of transmitters was put under the responsibility of the PTT. In 1937 a new law was passed regarding radio transmitters and broadcasting rights. The government also commissioned Marconi to build new transmitters and a new station for Ankara Radio, which was completed and started operations in 1938.

The transition period between the date of nationalisation and the date the state radio started its official broadcasting did not introduce major changes in the make-up of professional teams or in the internal organisation. However new ways of producing a “national culture” were developed. One of the most significant among these, was the organised effort of radio, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and the State Conservatory, to research and compile examples of folk music.

In the previous period, what is called “the people’s music” or folk music was only represented on radio by few local songs that were known by musicians who happened to work for radio. Ankara Radio, after 1936 started broadcasting programmes of folk music in a more “scientific” way. The first programme of this kind was called “Folk music with explanations” which included explanations about the music broadcast, specifying the region and the sources of various

63 Zabit Ceridesi, Vol.6, Period 5, Meeting 1, Session 1, p.3.
pieces of music. Then Sarısözen, who was a music teacher in Sivas and who was appointed to take part in the folklore research of the Ministry and the Conservatory, prepared a programme for Ankara Radio, called “Tunes from Homeland”. The aim of the programme was to introduce “the people’s music” to the nation and to the world. Sarısözen says:

“Old and young, peasant and urban, ignorant and wise, musician or not, those who are familiar with alaturka or with alafranga, everyone is deeply attached with love to the folk songs that are the most beautiful examples of our traditions. Therefore, folk music today is not just the affair of certain institutions or individuals but of ‘the whole nation’.”

The attempt entailed a representation of the national space, processing diverse sources of folk music and stripping them of their ethnic and local characters to include them in the unitary voice of the nation. However these programmes also had another function. They were educating the pro-Western elite in the national culture, teaching them the “values” of their homeland that were different but still belonged to the Western civilisation. The new task was not just to be Westernised but national. Too much Westernism was as dangerous, for a sense of national identity, as sticking to oriental forms. So the hidden target audience inscribed in these programmes was the elite situated in Ankara who did not know about folk music and who had to learn it in order to keep away from the immoral effects of alaturka. Ankara had to be saved from the immoral attraction of İstanbul through the mediation of the imagined national space.

There is a disembodiment involved in the process of compiling folk songs. All local colours were removed, local accents were evened out, different languages were transformed into Turkish (for

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66 The elite in Ankara had very little knowledge of the conditions of living and of culture in the Eastern and Southern areas of Turkey. Handan Uran, who played in radio dramas in the 40's, says it was common in Ankara at that time, that people only thought of Anatolia as an image. She tells how she was really shocked when they first went on a tour to Mersin by train. Interview, 16 November 1996.
67 “The only kind of human being, who does not understand serious issues, and then unceremoniously sets aside the seriousness to make a caricature of these issues that he has been unable to understand, can only be found in a single city of Turkey: İstanbul. “ Şevket Süreyya, “Yarı Müneverler Kulübü”, Kadro, No.8. August 1932, p.42.
example Kurdish songs were sung in Turkish), and the songs were performed by musicians who were under the strict education of directors both in the Conservatory and in Ankara Radio. The songs were stripped of the actual bodies that produced them in certain local ways of living and traditions. In this sense, the body and its expressions, once again, were opposed to a transcendental idea of love of the country and the nation. Love was to be a product of discipline.

The folk music broadcasting of Ankara Radio continued in its later years, eventually institutionalising it as a genre of music that has continued. There was also an attempt to give alaturka a classical status under the name of “Classical Turkish Music”. Music, that was compiled from different sources was transcribed into notes. A classical Turkish music choir was established and many musicians were brought to Ankara from Istanbul to participate in it. The activities of disciplining the field of music were also extended to Western music. Several orchestras of symphonic music, dance music, “salon” music were formed which performed in the studios of Ankara Radio. The military band “Riyaseticumhur Műzik Takımı” continued its performances. All these bands had the function of education besides performance. “Students” were expected to master the Western music techniques and the classical repertoire. The director of “Riyaseticumhur Műzik Takımı” Zeki Üngör’s speech to his students conveys the structure of sentiments within which disciplining activities took place. “You are my bacteria” he said to his students, “you will spread the Western music in Turkey.” (Sun, 1969) I will further reflect on the metaphor, that evokes both a sense of illness associated with

68 Radife Erten, who is a folk singer, tells in her memoirs about the long hours of practice and education they had in Ankara Radio: “It was like a school. We were put in a studio for three or four hours to practice. Then our teacher Nuri Halil Bey would come to check us, also other teachers would come and check who is working and who is not. They would pull the ear of those who is not working.” Ankara Radio Sound Archives, “Türkiye Radyoların Yarım Yüzyıl”, Yücel Ertugay, TRT Radio Programme, 1975.

69 For example, the traditional music of tarikats (religious orders) was dealt a major blow and it essentially vanished except for the mystical music of Mevlevi origin, as all tekkes and zaviyes (religious lodges and cloisters) were abolished after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic (Tekelioğlu, 1996:198).

70 In this process too the traditions were altered. A certain form şarkı (song) was picked from the more sophisticated old tradition in which a number of musical forms followed one another in a consecutive order, and was popularised (Tekelioğlu,1996:209).
the word “bacteria” and the desire to fill the lack projected to “the people”, later in the chapter.

By the end of the 1930s Ankara Radio was getting far ahead of Istanbul both in terms of the variety of its programmes and its significance for the nation. From 1936 onwards Ankara Radio organised separate units for Turkish and Western Music, and for Drama. Talks addressing mostly domestic issues, such as new forms of entertainment, health, family affairs, child education were integrated into the broadcasting of Ankara Radio, and a children’s programme was designed.

After two years of a transition period, Ankara Radio officially began its transmissions in its new building on 28 October 1938, the fifteenth anniversary of the Republic. The opening of the new Ankara Radio was announced by a claim to represent the whole nation: “This is the Turkish Radio”. Istanbul Radio was soon closed down and could broadcast on and off during the 40’s until it was reopened in 1949 in its new building. The first speech on the inauguration of Ankara Radio was made by the prime minister, İnönü, in English. Then, the Minister of Public Works spoke:

“It was a necessity and a mission that Turkish Republic benefited from radio, which is one of the highest products of science of the nineteenth century and of global importance in the twentieth century.”

He continued his long speech thanking the English Marconi Company which “was a company established by Marconi who had invented radio, a company which is exemplary of the high developed English science and art”. The Minister believed that the radio will adjoin “our existence to the people, and inform other civilised nations of the degree of our progress and developments.”

Radio was regarded both as a defender of national values against the world, but also as a technology that provided the necessary means to unite the nation. The two transmitters built by Marconi -one medium wave transmitter of 120 kW power and one

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71 Cemal Yorulmaz, “Bizde ve Öteki Memleketlerde Radyo”, unpublished manuscript, 1945, p.32.
72 Ibid.
short wave transmitter of 20 kW power- were allocated for internal (Central Anatolia) and external (Central Europe, Balkans and Near East) transmissions respectively.\textsuperscript{73} When radio was nationalised there were 6175 subscribers; the number reached 25,510 in 1937 and showed a steady increase in the following years. However, the percentage of radio sets to population was still very low.\textsuperscript{74} Yet, it was thought that the physical boundaries, “the mountains, the sea, the deserts, the distance, these material and geographical reasons that are barriers to the integration of the units of the nation”\textsuperscript{75} can be surpassed now, not only by actually “going to the people” via the People’s Houses, but more easily through radio waves.

Radio was conceived as a new medium to implement the national principle of populism. Radio broadcasting altered the previous metaphors of “the people”. Early nationalists had talked of “the people” as the “body” and of the elite as the “head” in the society.\textsuperscript{76} The difference between the elite and the people had been translated into spatial terms: consecutively Istanbul and Anatolia. However, the old metaphor of the head and the body was refigured through radio broadcasting. In 1942, the Prime Minister’s speech on Ankara Radio stressed that:

“The Turkish nation...is a body that has a head made of light. The body functions, the head inspects and protects. All the world believes, trusts in, and is proud of this living example.”\textsuperscript{77}

The metaphor of “light” employed to signify power also points to the ascending importance of more scientific and less tangible

\textsuperscript{73} Although the medium wave transmitter was quite powerful (one of 36 transmitters of the same power in Europe), Eastern and Southern Eastern regions of Anatolia and Thrace, including Istanbul, had reception difficulties (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 150).
\textsuperscript{74} The number of sets for 1000 people in 1940, for example, was only 4.1, while it was 234.7 in Denmark, 223.7 in the USA, 196.2 in Britain, 169.4 in Germany, 14.1 in Algeria, 12.1 in Bulgaria (Cemal Yorulmaz, “Bizde ve Oteki Memleketlerde Radyo”, unpublished manuscript, p.110).
\textsuperscript{75} İ.H.Baltacioglu, Yeni Adam, 5 March 1934, p.10.
\textsuperscript{76} It was written, in 1916, in the journal Türk Yurdu, that “Istanbul has been neglecting Anatolia. Our struggle was that Istanbul, the head of the country, got interested in the body...Our aim was to force those gentlemen in Istanbul to take some interest in ‘the people’, in ‘Anatolia’.” ( cited in Toprak, 1995:45)
metaphors\textsuperscript{78} in interpreting away observable differences in the national territory. The messages disseminated by radio, were assumed to reach all those listening, without altering their conditions, without “busying the eye, without disturbing the body”.\textsuperscript{79} Radio programmes were as immaterial as the actual waves. “Radio presents to people, not the real scientific or artistic events, but a replica -which is very similar to the real; almost a sap, a preserve of the real.”\textsuperscript{80} Radio was seen as an echo and a replica of the real while letting the power of imagination free. “It leaves you free to imagine the people as beautiful as their voices.”\textsuperscript{81}

This is why the so-called institutions of the people sought help from radio when they could not deal with the reality in their local settings. The People’s Houses, in some districts, such as Silifke, Malatya, Mardin, and Muğla, “that realised that the local potential was not suitable to get people interested in music, called help from radio, from the mature and enlightened musical arts of the big centres...”\textsuperscript{82} They were connected to Ankara through radio; “so leaving the responsibility to Ankara, which with its refined choices does its best to attract large numbers of people, and make them listen to broadcasting diffusing from the big speakers in the yards...In this way the people will have the possibility to connect not only their hearts but also their minds and ears to the Centre. Radio plays the role of the most smooth and untiring educator in musical discipline.”\textsuperscript{83} (emphasis added)

The radio made the Occidentalist fantasy, that the “imagined” people can be incorporated into the “modern” national culture, possible. It also provided a sense of reality to the fantasy. The elite were hearing their voice as an echo, as a replica of a certain reality which they could take as reality. Therefore the “voice of the nation” on radio had to be carefully crafted. This is best illustrated by the importance attached to presenters and announcers’ perfection in

\textsuperscript{78} “It is the technical realization of new scientific imaginings, a realization that itself materializes their improbable possible worlds.” (Beer, 1996: 153)
\textsuperscript{79} Nurettin Arta\,m, \textit{Radyo}, Vol.3. No.29. 15 April 1944, p.1.
\textsuperscript{80} Burhan Belge, \textit{Radyo}, Vol.3. No.27. 15 February 1944, p.1.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Halkevleri 1932-1935: 103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasil Çalıştı}, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
speech and to the quality of their voice.

"Radio is basically a box of voice, a box of beautiful voice. .. Beautiful voice is the essence of the policy in radio. Everything on radio, music, talks, drama, news, are disseminated via this beautiful voice. A voice that is not beautiful kills both what it is and the things that it is not."84

The way Baltacıoğlu describes the beautiful voice on radio manifests how technology was conceived in this context: “Radiophonic voice means a voice that is beautiful, that becomes beautiful when filtrated through electrons.”85 However the “filter of electrons” combined with strict control over broadcasting did not result in producing the desired “beautiful” voices of the nation. Although Ankara Radio’s announcers and presenters were tutored in pronunciation, Turkish language, literature and grammar by experts,86 the elite were never happy with the performance of the radio, in this and other respects. Even towards the end of the 40’s, the Turkish language used by Ankara Radio were still being criticised. One criticism went far to say, “that we are in no position to criticise the language of the London Radio (the BBC Turkish Service)” since we, on our own radio, are no better”.87

Ankara Radio became a modern laboratory in which different experiments took place and were problematised. For example, after Mustafa Kemal’s death, the sound engineers in Ankara Radio tried to produce a sound record of Mustafa Kemal’s speech on the tenth anniversary of the Republic which had been filmed by the Russians. They sampled the soundtrack from the available copies of the film by using “electrical filters”. After working two months, the speech was broadcast on Ankara Radio. However, the quality was far from being satisfactory. There were complaints that the voice of Atatürk cannot be

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84 I.H.Baltacıoğlu, Yeni Adam, No.600, 27 June1946, p.7.
85 Ibid.
86 The announcers were employed, after 1940, if they passed an exam. They were further trained by special tutors in “Turkish language, grammar, literature, and pronunciation” (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 199). The broadcasters that I interviewed also emphasised that there was a big concern that announcers spoke “correct Turkish”, they were trained by tutors from the Conservatory. Mahmut Tali Öngören, Interview, 24 January1996; Turgut Özakman, Interview, 25 January1996.
87 Yeni Adam, No.611, 4 December 1947.
that "bad". That pointed to the paradoxes of recorded voice. "Mechanisms for recording and reproduction on the one hand provide a technical body, a framework for representations, and on the other hand, by presenting themselves as a double, constitute a simulacrum of power, destroy the legitimacy of representation." (Attali, 1985: 86)

It is also interesting that some of the experiments were known to bear elements that were alien, even dangerous, to the culture of the people as the metaphor “bacteria”, used for Western music, reveals. This manifests the second-order nature of constructing a national identity in Turkey. Many attempts to create a national culture were experienced in a self-conscious way, concentrating on the constructed and projected images. The lack reflected from the West caused anxieties that had to be compensated by the image. Yet the image did not sound authentic and real enough.

Ankara Radio adopted a stricter control and censorship over its products during the Second World War. The content of broadcasting became highly centralised. In 1940 Ankara Radio was directly adjoined to a department of government, and operated under its direct control. The texts of the “radio journal” were written by the members of the government bureau, the General Directorate of Press and Publications. It is only in these years that Ankara Radio established its own news unit. Ankara Radio was proud of its “neutral and truthful radio journalism” during the course of the war. Its duty was, according to the broadcasters, “to tell the nation the truths, whether they are sweet or bitter, and by doing this, to be the ear of the nation and the mouth of the government.” Yet the criticisms of the elite continued

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89 Attali’s (1985) point shows the need for studies on “voice” in media studies, within which mostly textual and visual analyses are privileged.
90 Before then, news would reach radio in an itemised form from the Anatolian Agency just before the news programme started. The presenters had to list them in order and compose them as a news report few minutes before the time of broadcasting. Ankara Radio Sound Archives, “Radyo Anıları”, Elçin Temel, TRT Programme; Mahmut Tali Ongören, Interview, 24 January 1996.
both in relation to language, and to the content of news and drama.\textsuperscript{92} There was a gap between the actual representation of the voice of the nation and the ideal one. The voice of the nation, in Bhabha’s terms, kept “stumbling over itself, its obligations and its limitations” (1991: 95). Between what the elite said by “the mouth of the government” and heard by “the ear of the nation” falls a shade of atmospherics, of “non-beautiful” voices, the “non-serious” performances of the broadcasters. But also the interference coming from the space of the West, such as the broadcasting of the BBC Turkish Section. While the Turkish broadcasters boasted with their “truthful” news, the BBC claimed that Turkish radio duplicated the material that was already put by the British.\textsuperscript{93} But as I will be showing in the next chapter, the BBC, in fact, shaped its news programmes according to the concerns of the Turkish. The disturbing voice that infiltrated the space of the national identity and which had to be denied in order to construct a representation of truth requires further analysis. I argue that the representations of truth constructed, on both sides, were based on a hidden dialogic link. The analysis of the BBC Turkish Service in the next chapter, gives an account of the common sky that structured the interconnections between the Turkish case and the “West”, which includes not only representations but also temporality, space and bodies.

\textsuperscript{92} News programmes were criticised by some intellectuals for being dependent on Western sources and giving no domestic news. Mahmut Tali Öngören, Interview, 24 January 1996. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, in his correspondence to Hasan Ali Yücel in 1939, complained of getting no news from Ankara (being out of Ankara): “You may say that there is radio now. But this radio does not give any domestic news. Just talks about China or other faraway countries, because Anatolian Agency does not have any network for domestic news, it only disseminates what Reuter and Havass News Agencies give as news.” (Eronat, 1996: 50) I will point to criticisms about radio drama in Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{93} BBC Written Archives, 31 October, 1941, “Turkish Broadcasts”, E9/37.
CHAPTER 4
London Calling Turkey

In this chapter I analyse the dialogic character of the BBC Turkish Service policies in its relation to its constructed object - the Turkish people- primarily from 1939 to the end of the 40's, referring to the BBC written archives. I address the historical context and the changing strategies of the BBC Turkish Service in defining, knowing and influencing its object. However, the reactions of the constructed object, through which a subject position is evoked, can also be traced within the same material. Therefore, the analysis does not only point to the specific role of radio broadcasting in the government of distant masses, but also reveals the processes in which claims to truth and its justifications were made. One can see the work of subtle calculations based on information, as well as sweeping generalisations based on assumptions and anecdotal evidence in this process. The truth, in contradiction to the "rational" framework within which it is usually presented, is not always based on "objective knowledge". It is a product of on-going negotiations and power relations. Thus, my analysis aims both to deconstruct the "discourse of truth" of the BBC and to show its connection to the truth produced in and out of the Occidentalist fantasy. The answering practice of Turkish Radio to London and other foreign stations during the war demonstrates two distinct orders of truth in operation: one is the truth produced in a dialogic link with the West and articulated in discourse, the other is the repressed order of truth that revealed itself in symptoms, such as the tactic of distortion used by Turkish broadcasters.

The period I will be studying corresponds broadly to the years of the Second World War. These years represent the crystallisation of tendencies for both the BBC and the Turkish Radio. The efforts of sophisticated propaganda during the war, "swept away the last
remnants of that peculiar brand of comfortable English parochialism.” (Mansell, 1982:188) Therefore issues of direct or indirect propaganda, such as influencing Turkey’s alliances in the war, predominate in the transmissions of the BBC Turkish Service in those years when compared to seemingly more indirect cultural issues that came to the fore in the post-war years. While it was openly declared in the 40’s that propaganda and the possible ways of manipulation were of paramount import, and even found extreme expressions such as in Miss Benzie’s inquiry in the name of the Ministry of Information (M.O.I.) directed to the BBC in 1940: “Could you give me some idea of the range of the Ankara long-wave situation? I am thinking of what games we could most usefully play with Turkey if the political situation so changed that she was willing to play!”¹ The aims of the Turkish Service envisaged for the post-war years were not that innocent either. The policy that was projected in 1944 for the post-war years was thought to produce “goodwill towards the British export trade”.² Of course, in a few years anti-communist propaganda was to become another declared concern. Overt political targets were never absent in the aims of the Service. However, it may still be argued that the period covered here is an extraordinary one determined by the war conditions and especially coloured by being against the fierce Axis propaganda, and as such, is not representative. While I believe that there are some differences in the emphases and organizational structure of the BBC Turkish Service between its war and post-war years, the war years are especially significant to study for two reasons: to convey how culture is problematised for propaganda objectives, and how a certain universal “humanistic” discourse of “truth” is constructed to fulfill particular national interests which were more visibly articulated through a network of correspondence among several government institutions - the BBC, the Ministry of Information, the War Office, the Foreign Office (FO), the British Council - during the war years. The strategies of the BBC also generated a significant response from the Turkish national elite and the Turkish Radio in

¹ The BBC Written Archives, 25 October 1940, From Miss Benzie (Broadcasting Division, Ministry of Information) to L.W.Hayes (BBC), E1/1256.
² The BBC Written Archives, 20 October 1944, “Post-War Broadcasting in Turkish”, E1/1259/2.
those years, as we shall see later in the chapter.

Furthermore the logic I pursue to defend that this period is as "representative" as the more "normal" years is similar to the one used by Bauman in his argument regarding the Holocaust and modernity. 3 Similarly, I treat the war years of the BBC in general, and the BBC Turkish Service in particular as a kind of "laboratory" in which the concepts such as "impartiality" and "truthfulness" are tested, and hidden tendencies, strategies as well as weaknesses and failures are revealed. Thus, the choice of the period for this case analysis coincides with the choice of my main topic - the study of Turkish Radio in its efforts to construct a national identity in the 30's and 40's when everything had to be defined and redefined in what may be called "laboratory conditions" - not only for chronological but also for methodological reasons.

4.1. The Historical Context of the BBC Turkish Service

There is not much account of the BBC World Service in the written history of the BBC. 4 Moreover, the few accounts of the World Service do not go much further than praising the "credible, effective and influential" broadcasts of the Service. The history of the BBC World Service remains both invisible and out of the scope of critical theory. My archival research of the BBC Turkish Service, of course, only partially, contributes to filling this gap; and contests the usually

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3 "I propose that the experience of the Holocaust, now thoroughly researched by the historians, should be looked upon as, so to speak, a sociological 'laboratory'. The Holocaust has exposed and examined such attributes of our society as are not revealed, hence are not empirically accessible, in 'non-laboratory' conditions. In other words, I propose to treat the Holocaust as a rare, yet significant and reliable, test of the hidden possibilities of modern society." (Bauman, 1989: 12)

4 Both Asa Briggs (1961; 1965; 1970; 1979) and Scannell&Cardiff (1991) who have produced detailed histories of the BBC do not dwell on the specific history of the World Service. The existing records of the BBC World Service are usually based on memoirs of those who have themselves worked in the service. Among those, Mansell's account stand as the most detailed one, albeit its lack of critical perspective (1982). John MacKenzie emphasises the need to analyse the ideological content of BBC's domestic output within its relation to the Empire (1986). See also Taylor (1981) on propaganda and the Empire.

5 John Tusa refers to the World Service as "strong, independent, credible, effective and influential". It is due to the reason that it is part of the BBC, "an institution which takes its stand on editorial independence and impartiality..." (1992: 15). Andrew Walker in his A Skyful of Freedom: 60 Years of the BBC World Service regards the World Service as a champion of "freedom" (1992).
taken for granted general statements on the World Service. First, I will give a brief history.

The BBC's first venture into international broadcasting started with the Empire Service beamed at Australia and New Zealand in 1932. The BBC had been very cautious in stepping into international broadcasting due to fears of technical incapacity. There was a tendency to wait for the "perfect thing" (Mansell, 1982:3). On the other hand the US foreign transmissions set an example and brought into limelight the concerns and ambitions that were attached to international radio broadcasting by the British. Eckersley, the Chief Engineer of the BBC talked of the "Empire consolidation by wireless"; Beadle, who at the time became the BBC Station Director at Belfast after his return from South Africa, regarded communism and nascent nationalism in the empire as a grave threat to civilisation. He saw the import of broadcasting not in its ordinary propaganda functions but claimed that "(I)t is a means of intercourse which will bring about familiarity with the everyday affairs of the empire." (Mansell, 1982:9) However the meaning of broadcasting, at that time, was still narrowly conceived. The BBC had a vision of broadcasting only to the white and the British through the Empire Service:

"The exclusion of people of other colours is justified -at least at present- by the fact that the field of appeal of European-type programmes is substantially limited to Europeans and also by the fact that, in proportion as native populations develop an interest in broadcasting, the local service (in the colony concerned) will provide the natives with programmes of their own type."6

The formula that was preached in the above statement was bound to be defunct in a few years. The technology of broadcasting, and broadcasting to long distances brought with it the capacity to "carry culture" to broad masses, broad yet difficult to segment and differentiate. This meant a challenge to self-referential British superiority but also a possibility for new techniques of government. The relativisation of cultural issues and differences necessitated by international broadcasting first led to a confusion in Britain. The initial

6 "BBC Memorandum" (cited in Mansell, 1982:12-13).
strategies of the Empire Service were on shaky grounds, caught between old traditions and fresh capacities. In Mansell’s words, “there was not enough hard evidence on which to base any firm conclusions. Decisions about what immediate steps to take would have to be a priori and speculative.” (Mansell, 1982:14)

When the war began, radio broadcasting was raised, all of a sudden, to a status of an extremely important vehicle for propaganda. Hitler was known for his belief that “in war words are acts.” He has written in Mein Kampf, “(O)ur strategy is to destroy the enemy from within, to conquer him through himself. Mental confusion, contradiction of feelings, panic- these are our weapons.” The techniques of German propaganda, despite its harsh overtones, were quite sophisticated since they were enveloped in psychological mechanisms. One should note that the strategy of “conquering the enemy through himself” is a particularly modern technique. The British were more hesitant in reconciling the “discourse of truth” and the direct targets of propaganda, which led to seemingly contradictory performances, to splits between appearances and intentions, to indirect ways of achieving goals. Lots of energy and knowledge had to be put into this complicated task. While on one side the British “black” radio broadcasting based on the use of “deceit and fabrication” continued - only as a “fringe activity” in Mansell’s words (1982:55) - there was a debate concerning the role of radio, and of the BBC, in the war. Many believed that “no effective propaganda policy can in the modern world be based on lies” (Mansell, 1982:56). Moreover, radio in Britain, was considered a service to the public as well as an art, even if a minor one, but definitely not an instrument of state (Ibid). The British, as a nation “regarded propaganda as suspect and were instinctively averse to the deliberate perversion of truth as a policy to be publicly adopted by Government in the pursuit of national ends.” (Ibid). So the British seemed to stick to the policy of “truth” instead of “lies” of which the Axis propaganda made ample use. The policy of truth had wide effects all around the world, as well as consolidating the image of the “the truthful humanistic British” through and after the war. The image still remains with us, even in some

relatively critical assessments. Mansell who himself has worked in the BBC World Service writes, retrospectively, that:

“The BBC itself, by its steadfast and consistent attachment to the truth, often against considerable pressure and in spite of the irritation it caused and the attacks it attracted, played a decisive role, not just in securing that moral victory, but in winning for Britain the gratitude and respect of those it had addressed throughout the war.” (Mansell, 1982:56)

Barry has referred to the BBC World Service, from a different angle, in his discussion concerning the role of free and active participation in the internal cohesion of national and international community. He argues that “the function of the BBC World Service was to advance the cause of freedom and liberty not through propaganda, but by simply telling the truth, thus making it possible for individuals to judge for themselves.” (Barry, 1996:131) It is highly significant at this point to contextualise the strategy of “telling the truth” to see how and why the performance was knitted and presented. The expansion of the international broadcasting services provide some material to look at the issue from another perspective.

There was a sudden growth of overseas broadcasting following the outbreak of the war. This had to be coupled with changes in the conception of the potential audience. “Old ways and the old self-sufficiency were swept aside as solutions to the problems of swift expansion had to be improvised and fresh minds addressed themselves to the new task of speaking to foreign audiences.” (Mansell, 1982:96) The first foreign services, apart from the Empire Service, were Latin-American and Arabic Services, followed by French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish all founded in 1939. One year later the BBC World Service was broadcasting in 34 languages, including some dialects. Despite the fast expansion there were still some reservations within the BBC concerning foreign broadcasting. Cecil Graves, who was the founder of the Empire Service and a successor of Ogilvie as the general manager, in his correspondence with the Ministry of Information, stated his concerns of “risk of reprisals”, for example, that the German audience may consider the BBC transmissions as propaganda (Mansell, 1982:97-8).
The British had to build an image that was clearly different from German propaganda giving it a "very careful thought" in Graves' words. Nevertheless the opportunities that radio broadcasting provides for the solution of "colonial problems" were more clearly understood by that time. The head of the African Service Grenfell Williams talked of "Africa being born" and pointed to vast untapped audience coming up. He believed that the experience of the people in Britain in tackling some of their own problems may be of some use to the people of the colonies tackling similar problems (Mansell, 1982: 195). This fitted in with the context of nationalist awakenings in the colonies, and corresponded to the will of the British to influence their development. The British now were aware that they had to be attentive to what was happening outside their territory; their attitude now radically differed from the early days of the Empire Service. Anyway, the term "empire" was to be dropped soon and replaced by "commonwealth". In those years the BBC monitoring service rapidly developed keeping a close eye on all that was broadcast by other countries. There appeared a novel concern to know the listening habits of foreign audiences in order to be able to address their sensitivities. Also the image of the BBC broadcasters was carefully tailored. For example German Jews were not accepted to the German Service because the BBC was anxious not to give the image that foreign language services were "run by émigrés and were pursuing émigré rather than British objectives." (Mansell, 1982:107) So varying concerns had to be creatively combined and presented within a unitary image.

On the other hand the problems of autonomy of the BBC had to be balanced with the growing need of government control. The M.O.I was set up on the outbreak of the war with intentions to bring broadcasting under a more strict control. Several formula for changes in the internal organisation of the BBC were debated at this period causing tension, worries and criticisms by some BBC staff. Yet the BBC was very cautious not to declare its loss of autonomy to the third parties, keeping, at least in appearance, its independent and impartial image despite institutionalized government control within the
BBC, ranging from "guidance" to "editorial supervision".

The Turkish Service was founded in such an atmosphere, on 20 November 1939. When it first started, the transmission consisted of a single 15 minute news bulletin each day to grow in due time, both in scale and scope. The significance of the Turkish Service probably lies in its being one of the most problematic of foreign services. While there was already some accumulated knowledge which availed setting up policies for the Arabic Service, the Turkish Service had to start from scratch. It meant "broadcasting to a country which was more remote from the war than the Arab states of the Middle East and with policies less close to those of Britain." (Mansell, 1982:205) Turkey's position was considered to be more similar to the Persian case. Yet it was suggested in October 1939 by the M.O.I. that the envisaged news service should be handled by the Arabic Public Relations Officer. The Turkish Service had a long way to go before coming near to grasping the differences between Arabic and Turkish audiences. Of course it also had to address several other confusing specific cultural problems, sometimes causing turbulences within the department and tension with other government institutions.

4.2. Debates and Strategies

a. Propaganda

The concept of propaganda was a matter of debate all throughout the war for the British. The issue was problematised to a great extent and was mingled with all sorts of cultural and technical issues such as the interests of the local audience, the proper use of the Turkish language, the image of the BBC broadcasters, the right topics to be chosen for talks, the significant target group to be addressed, the quality of reception, the level of penetration etc. But most important of all, "reliable" news was considered as a hook for propaganda items. The Monthly Intelligence Report of the BBC Overseas Intelligence Department, in its evaluation of the situation

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8 BBC Written Archives, 8 October 1939, "Interview with Professor Rusbrook Williams", R13/204.
regarding the Middle East in 1940, states that the Axis propaganda has led to suspicion among the local audience while in the British case

“there seems no reason to fear that our policy would be the object of such suspicion. Relying upon the excellence of our news to attract a considerable number of listeners, we could confidently hope that a considerable number would continue to listen afterwards to our propaganda.”

So the news was the main field around which propaganda was organized. The term “positive propaganda” -as something versus “negative propaganda” used by the Axis forces- was coined by the British to denote the techniques involved for presenting information in the news. The news was designed to be heard as objective, cool and straightforward; they were not supposed to be populated by unnecessary editorial comments; not to exaggerate the victories of the British; neither be aggressive towards the enemy. The policy found its legitimacy and gained strength by the voluntary complicity of the target populations as a result of their willingness to take the “truthfulness” as granted. The British were basically content with this kind of policy for the Turkish Service until when “the Turco-German Non-Aggression Pact” was signed in 1941, which caused worries and further debates between the BBC and the Government, concerning the policy of propaganda. In July 1941, the BBC Monthly Intelligence Report touched on the issue of “BBC Propaganda and Policy” and referred to a need of change of policy. It was noted in the report that, “It was, in fact, agreed with the Ministry of Information that arrangements should be made for ‘a more vigorous (propaganda) line to be taken without undue sacrifice of objectivity.’”

On 20th of August 1941 a meeting was held at the FO with the participation of the members of the FO, the M.O.I, and the BBC. The agenda consisted of two items: 1. To consider the present state of our Turkish propaganda in the light of recent disquieting developments in Turkey; 2. To decide what measures can be taken to improve our propaganda.

11 BBC Written Archives, 20 August 1941, “Propaganda to Turkey”, E1/1259/1.
Rice from the M.O.I stressed in the opening of the meeting that there was not enough supply of information coming from Turkey "to enable them to counter German propaganda effectively and promptly." Her remark was significant since it pointed to the dialogic character of the produced truth. The objective truth had to be built on the subjective sensitivities of the addressee. Professor Williams, again from the M.O.I. brought up a similar point:

"... hitherto the most effective propaganda in Turkey had been done by the Turks themselves and it had not been considered necessary for us to set up elaborate machinery in Turkey. But the recent developments in Turkey now rendered additional machinery essential and it was most important that we should have someone energetic in Istanbul to entertain editors, organise listening groups, obtain information and report it rapidly, and promote the distribution of British films, etc."  

Kirkpatrick from the BBC complained that "the BBC was not being kept informed sufficiently." So it was agreed that a telegram should be drafted to "Angora" to incite further organisation for providing the flow of more information.

It is worth noting that the seemingly rational efforts to gain more information, at the present situation, concerning Turkish sentiments were coupled by sentiments on the British part. There was frustration as well as resentment towards the current Turkish attitude. The September Monthly Intelligence Report of 1941 covered this issue under the topic "The 'Ivory Tower' of Neutrality", with strong words against the heedless Turks:

"....there can be no other country where people, at least those in government positions, have such confidence in being able to remain outside the war. The result is that, when anything happens which might threaten their complacency, the rulers of the country and the press get hysterically indignant and behave as if the German invasions of the smaller European countries during the last two years had never happened at all."  

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12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
The report blamed the Turkish people for their "prevalent hysteria" and lack of "realism".

Whatever the sentiments were, the British Government Departments and the BBC were not in a position to act sentimental on the issue. As part of a hegemonic imperial policy, they had learned now that they have to deal with differences with utmost care. They could not afford to be parochial anymore. So a range of strategies, dwelling both on general and specific points, were developed by the M.O.I and were debated with and within the BBC. The letter that Rice from the M.O.I wrote to Stephenson (BBC) in October 1941 is full of new suggestions for the Turkish transmissions.\textsuperscript{16} The need for criticising enemy propaganda in broadcasts, thus stepping into the realm of "negative propaganda", is emphasised among several other suggestions which range from psychological to linguistic issues. The suggested new perspective was supported by a letter arriving from Edison Swan Cables Ltd. representative in Turkey, stressing that

\begin{quote}
\textldots a higher note of offensive and aggressive spirit with more dynamism would be under the circumstances, of greater propaganda value. Neutrals and nationals of young and recently awakened national life are likely to be more impressed with this kind of propaganda than with the less aggressive though more subtle in character.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

The argument was in favour of a change in the propaganda policy. Given the fact that Turkish people were more prone now to take the German propaganda as seriously as the British one, therefore not in a position to take the "truthfulness" of the British news for granted in their position of "ivory tower of neutrality", the BBC had to advance new and more realistic tactics to influence the addressee. They had to shape their utterances with regard to other words about the same object and to an anticipated response of the Turkish audience. Therefore the suggested new tactics were not just subjective and aggressive. They were based on a comprehensive (as far as possible) analysis of several aspects, which almost acquired a social scientific nature and led to serious debates. Rice's suggestions

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[16] BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37.
\item[17] Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
were debated within the BBC and then reported back to the M.O.I to be commented on. The report bearing the title “Notes on BBC Comments on M.O.I Suggestions for Turkish Broadcasts” by Rice came with a long paragraph concerning the problem of propaganda. The paragraph opens by further problematisation of the issue: “The question of the relative merits of negative as opposed to positive propaganda is not easy to establish. Nevertheless, at the moment, the following reasons seem to favour the inclusion of a certain amount of so-termed ‘negative’ propaganda in the BBC broadcasts.” 18 The listed reasons are worded with a gusto for analytical thinking:

“(i) Since we have up-to-date only met with a relatively small number of important military successes, too much positive propaganda is likely to savour of ‘boosting’, and may fail to impress new listeners.

(ii) We are debarred from using anti-Axis material in our printed propaganda, and in our films, since references detrimental to our enemies are banned by the Turkish censors. We are thus only able to refer to positive propaganda in our printed and visual propaganda, and it would therefore seem desirable for the BBC to fill the gap created by Turkish censorship regulations, and devote a certain amount of space to showing up the enemy.

(iii) Intensive positive propaganda - which I referred to as ‘boosting’ in my memorandum should perhaps be reserved until the turn of the tide; though at present we should, of course, avail ourselves of every event and opportunity likely to keep our achievements well in the eye of the Turkish people. Nevertheless our achievements not be unduly exaggerated, and should be combined with an aggressive spirit vis-a-vis the Axis.” 19

Another interesting point which was debated between the BBC and the M.O.I was the need for a charismatic figure to symbolise Britishness. Rice suggested devoting “some space to the Royal Family. (Since) Hitler figures quite prominently in the German broadcasts, and İnönü in the Turkish.” 20 The BBC’s reply was not very supportive, they suggested instead that Churchill should be the equivalent of such a figure. Rice insisted on her previous point

18 BBC Written Archives, 18 November 1941, “Notes on BBC Comments on M.O.I Suggestions for Turkish Broadcasts”, E1/1259/1.
19 Ibid.
20 BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, “Turkish Broadcasts”, E9/37.
arguing that Churchill should not be depicted as the equivalent of Mussolini or İnönü. “Surely to do so is not only contrary to accepted policy, but also falls in with the German picture of Churchill”.21 In all these discussions we see the painful effort to carefully delineate boundaries, for example in the case of the image of Churchill; to counter current policies of other forces and to leap over the obstacles set up by the Turkish; yet to impress the Turkish people by disguising the inherent particular concerns and struggles and by adopting a universal image of impartiality and truthfulness. We see that the speaker shapes his/her utterance from the outset according to envisaged needs and conditions of the addressee, but also by referring to a superaddressee, “the truth” which has been a given for that moment yet something which has to be reproduced and reorganized within each moment. Each utterance, namely each argument advanced by either the BBC or the M.O.I. are simultaneously interactive with each other, with the “enemy” and with the imagined addressee, in its reference to the superaddressee.

In 1942, the M.O.I. produced a “General Editorial Guidance for BBC Turkish Service”22 full of “do's” and “don’ts” for future transmissions. I quote the whole report for its outstanding value in conveying the techniques of the fabrication of “truth”:

1. When reporting successful military operations emphasis should be given, whenever possible and in the light of official information released, to the factors of precise timing and excellent equipment. Such operations should be presented as cumulative proof of our growing strength.

2. In presenting news of the Russian war, care should be taken not to substitute in the minds of listeners- Russia for Germany as the imperialist aggressor. Accent should be on ‘continued German reverses’ rather than on ‘continued Russian victories’, though this injunction will apply more forcibly if and when Russian troops advance beyond their own frontiers into enemy territory.

3. If occasion should demand the news-reporting of awards for heroism in any way connected with an Allied withdrawal or other reverse, care should be taken not to present such exploits in the light of attempted extenuation for the reverse. The general course of the war may be assumed to have left

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21 BBC Written Archives, 18 November 1941, E1/1259/1.
22 BBC Written Archives, 7 May 1942, “General Editorial Guidance for BBC Turkish Service”, E1/1259/1.
listeners sceptical and prejudiced in this respect.
4. News of Allied war production should always be based on official figures as and when published. The impression given should be one of solid achievement.
5. In presenting to Turkey news of neighbouring or Mediterranean countries (in itself a desirable object) meticulous accuracy must always be ensured: Turkey is clearly in an advantageous position to obtain cross-checks on such news. In particular, reports of troops movements, etc. in neighbouring countries should never be given when official confirmation is lacking.
6. Every opportunity should be taken of giving emphasis to (favourable) news tending to throw importance on Turkey's status as a friendly neutral.
7. The activities of Turks resident in this country may be regarded confidently as of interest to one or another section of our listeners.
8. Every opportunity should be taken of giving 'London date-line' reaction to major domestic events inside Turkey.
9. It is important to project the uninterrupted progress of 'peaceful' scientific and cultural development in this country. We should establish our lead as a 'humanistic' nation.
10. It is important to maintain our stand as a nation absolutely united. When leading personalities make statements or appeals on this theme, it should usually be possible- excluding unforeseen developments- to present these in the light of reiterated affirmation rather than in that of an appeal necessitated by deterioration of public opinion. Such treatment should not be allowed to exclude recognition of the fact that many other sources of news, apart from the BBC, are available to Turkey."

Some of the techniques suggested here are worthy of further attention. First it should be noted that emphasis is laid on factors of "precise timing" and "excellent equipment" to convey the "growing strength" of Britain. Here strength is operationalised in terms of scientific and technical superiority. The military contest between the forces are translated into a war between the "civilised" and the "others". The stance is furthermore supported by techniques of empiricism relying on "official figures" and "meticulous accuracy" to produce an "impression" of "solid achievement". Yet the empiricism involved is based on subjective and relative factors more than on self-referential essential facts. Within this context, differences, such as
between Russia and Germany are carefully demarcated; the location and the situation of Turkey is carefully analysed with reference to neighbours and to Britain. "Meticulous accuracy" is needed not for its own sake but because "Turkey is clearly in an advantageous position to obtain cross-checks on such news." Psychological factors regarding Turkey are also considered. The desired outcome of the suggested techniques finds its perfect expression in the statement that , "It is important to project the uninterrupted progress of 'peaceful' scientific and cultural development in this country. We should establish our lead as a 'humanistic' nation." (emphasis added) The inverted commas for the words "peaceful" and "humanistic" cast a doubt on their usage, though they may have been used to accentuate the meanings of the words. But they nevertheless point to a constructed image that Britain, amidst the present factors, had chosen for itself and had carefully and "scientifically" fabricated in interaction with other forces.

So "telling the truth" was the name of the basic strategy for the British propaganda. Yet the listeners, especially those "nationals of young and recently awakened national life" were never left alone to judge for themselves. They were given the impression of doing so by the employment of techniques, which, though manufactured according to partial interests, produced an effect of truth. Thus "truth" was fabricated as a result of a certain paradigm of government which had to be different from the German one for many reasons. The German propaganda was shaped according to a paradigm of "opposition" employing strategies of "criticism", "provocation", "debasement". For example, the German propaganda to India was asking why Indians should die for Britain if they remained to be a subject nation (Mansell, 1982:206). Similarly, an instance of German propaganda to Turkey implied that Turkish nationalism was artificially instigated by Britain.23 The German propaganda, as reported by the British Information Office in Turkey, was full of critical remarks towards the Turkish, such as "insult to the Turks about the state of their roads."24 I think these examples point to a different kind of strategy for

24 BBC Written Archives, 1940, British Information Office to the BBC, E9/37.
propaganda which aims to produce alarm and discontent. On the other hand, the British adopted the all encompassing hegemonic status of “government” in their propaganda conveying a picture of progress and solid achievement of civilisation. They claimed to represent all differences, while carefully manipulating them, within the scope of universal humanity. They used the techniques of “cool objectivism” instead of “aggressiveness” to represent their identity; and used “flattery” instead of “criticism” to represent the other. The image thus produced, was highly successful – partly due to the outcome of the war. Turkey, has yet never been in a position to challenge the dominant codification regarding the British policy in broadcasting during the war.

b. Strategy of Flattery

As the strategies of propaganda were being discussed with the participation of government departments and the BBC there appeared the need of a better “flow of information” from Turkey. The desired information included the reaction of the Turkish audience to the BBC broadcasts as well as to German and other broadcasts. Professionals and scholars were mobilised around this need. For example, Prof. Arnold Toynbee, known for his interest in Turkey and the Middle East was corresponding with the BBC sending press cuttings to the Turkish Section on items of the German broadcast in Turkish and also of German propaganda by some Turkish newspapers.25 The British Information Office in Turkey has been reporting back the reactions of Turkish people to the BBC programmes, mainly regarding the news. One of the reports was that Martland, a British man, after his recent trip through Anatolia, “was impressed with the way Turks tuned in to London at 6:55 pm local time at every small village he stopped in.”26 While the positive reports aroused feelings of success for the British for a brief period of time, it could not stop them from being puzzled and bewildered soon again on certain issues including the reactions

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25 BBC Written Archives, 17 January 1940, From Prof. Arnold Toynbee to the BBC, E9/37.
26 BBC Written Archives, 1940, From British Information Office to the BBC, E9/37.
of the audience. The questionnaire that Lawrence from the BBC had
designed generated some information though not very clear. It gave
the impression that “listeners follow all the war news with
enthusiasm”, that “radio listening is very extensive in Istanbul both in
private hours and coffee shops” that “the BBC is appreciated on
account of the pure Turkish accent of the announcers” compared to
non-Turkish accents of German and Italian broadcasts.27 It was also
known that “Turkey is ready to accept a good deal of material from us
(Britain) for use in their local broadcasting service” and that the
newspapers were willing to publish talks broadcast by the BBC
(home or overseas services).28 This willingness was what Williams
later referred to: “...hitherto the most effective propaganda in Turkey
had been done by the Turks themselves and it had not been
considered necessary for us to set up elaborate machinery in Turkey.”
Few months before the need arose to revise or set up the machinery
of propaganda in Turkey, the British could somewhat rely on the
prevailing Turkish attitude: “There is therefore no need to devise
means of persuading the Turks of the justice of the British cause; they
take this for granted.”29 However, even in 1940 (before things were
more complicated with the Turco-German Non-Aggression Pact),
Burton from the British Information Office admitted that they have no
facilities there “for any kind of systematic listener research.”30 There
were always problems, concerning the “perfect thing”, such as the
lack of precise information, the proper use of language or the
presence of “atmospherics” that barred a clear reception.

The idea of expanding the transmissions in Turkish, and the
content of new programmes had already been put on the agenda in
that context. Every new suggestion concerning talks, features, music
broadcasts, although initially regarded as less important and basically
situated around the news to accentuate the effects of propaganda,

27 BBC Written Archives, May 1940, “Answers to Questionnaire from Mr. Lawrence of the
BBC on Turkish News”, E9/37.
28 BBC Written Archives, 27 May 1940, “Broadcasting Material for Turkey”, R13/204.
29 BBC Written Archives, 13 February 1941, “Monthly Intelligence Report”, 13 February,
part II, para.17, E2/425.
30 BBC Written Archives, 27 April 1940, From H.M.Burton (British Information Office) to
J.Lawrence, E9/37.
opened up a new field of debate; and introduced a new problématique which could not be reduced to mere propaganda. The idea of extension came with a package of cultural issues. So every suggestion to expand the transmissions had to be problematised within the context of culture and cultural differences. It was enveloped with the desire to know more, and even be able to understand, the “target” but the frustration of not being in a position to know it all. I will be analysing the problems of “translation” and “non-knowledge” in this context in the following part; here I wish to point to how culture was defined as a realm of struggle and what strategies were involved.

The introduction of English lessons for the Turkish was one of the significant examples within which technical problems had to be translated into cultural ones. In 1940, there was an opinion that “the desire to learn English is pretty general in Turkey now.”31 Yet English Lessons for the Turks was a problematic issue and generated a long lasting discussion among the British executives. The problem of cultural standard was a difficult one. Comparisons with the Arab listeners produced more confusion. The initial question was: Whether English lessons produced for the Arabic audience would be acceptable in Turkey?32 A year later, in 1941, the BBC was still unable to answer the question. Hillelson, then the Director of Near East Services to which the Turkish Service belonged, wrote to the M.O.I. that they “still have to decide whether the lessons (English) should closely resemble given in the Arabic programme.”33 The Ambassador in Turkey was also involved in the debate suggesting that series of English lessons should be produced specifically written for Turks using Turkish names. He also suggested some names which were not easy to transcribe for the BBC members when they had to report them to the M.O.I. (“Can (Jan), J (?i)han....”).34

31 BBC Written Archives, 14 March 1940, From British Embassy to M.O.I, E9/37.
33 BBC Written Archives, 23 July 1941, From S.Hillelson (BBC) to H. Hurst (M.O.I.) with a reference to “BBC Internal Circulating Memo”, 2 April 1940, E9/37.
34 BBC Written Archives, 29 July 1941, From S.Hillelson (BBC) to H.Hurst (M.O.I.), E9/37.
conventions, etc.- and the differences of it from the seemingly more clear object of the Arabic culture had a big impact on previously established frameworks. The Orientalist framework could, according to Said, essentialise the Orient as a unified object (1995). But now the framework had to be extended and diversified according to the needs of the BBC foreign broadcasting services, dwelling not on common points but on differences within the Orient. This did not only mean the necessity to be more specific about indigenous cultures but to be able compare and relativise them according to each other and according to the central space of the transmissions. The BBC Internal Circulating Memo, dated 2 April 1940, stated the problem quite clearly; it warned against the "impairment of the service to Arab listeners for the sake of those in Turkey." The argument advanced in the report is significant: "A shot fired simultaneously at two targets usually hits neither."35

1942 was the year when the heated debate around cultural strategies regarding the specifics of Turkey took place. The debate was closely associated with propaganda matters. Rice had already posed the most important question for the Turkish case, in October 1941, in her letter of suggestions to the BBC. She had pointed to a complex situation. The Turkish Radio and newspapers, despite their more distanced present attitude to Britain, continued to quote extensively from the British sources including official British war bulletin. Thus "by repeating this sort of information", she argued, the BBC Turkish Service was perhaps not putting its "precious time to its most valuable use, but are instead duplicating material put out by the Turks, or already put out by us."36 The vicious cycle in the duplication of news pointed to the limits of the efficiency of the production of "objective" facts. There had to appear a subjective viewpoint to connote the British identity. The BBC Turkish Service could not assert its identity if it did not establish its difference from the Turkish sources and Turkish identity. But to complicate the matter even more, it was not all among the intentions of the British to talk directly about or to declare officially their subjective viewpoint. It had to be embedded in

35 BBC Written Archives, 2 April 1940, "BBC Internal Circulating Memo", E9/37.
36 BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37.
a style which should be heard as the truth by the Turkish, yet have a
positive impact on their viewpoints and feelings while marking the
difference of the British identity. The suggested strategy by Rice was
“to say more about the Turks themselves.” A month later, the BBC
management with reference to her suggestions quoted the argument
as “the desirability of echoing (for flattery purposes) cultural and other
local events in Turkey.” Thus the phrase “flattery” was coined as the
name of a new strategy, and culture was introduced as an important
realm for propaganda.

Culture as a realm of propagandist strategies proved to be more
difficult than it seemed. Immediately a dispute over “Turkish ‘flattery’
items” followed. First of all it was now admitted that related
departments such as the Turkish Service and the M. O. I. had lacked “a
knowledge of Turkish and Turkey” before. This was going to be
compensated by the addition of new staff, such as Lamb in the M. O. I.,
who claimed to have a satisfactory knowledge of Turkey. This was
also a reply to a recently asked question: “Are Englishman with a
firsthand knowledge of conditions in Turkey?” which was “entirely a
new idea” with which the BBC had to deal. Still, the BBC was more
reserved than the M. O. I. about the use of “flattery” items. According to
Hillelson, the main object had to be, “to give instances of Anglo-
Turkish cooperation; to mention major internal events where ‘reaction’
from London might legitimately be expected; and to introduce flattery
items with an Anglo-Turkish rather than a purely Turkish
background.” Bowen, from the M. O. I., disagreed with the point. He
instead argued that “the fact that we notice purely Turkish events
should indicate in a flattering manner that we are interested in their
domestic affairs.” The assumption was that the Turks wanted to hear
more about themselves, especially seen in the eyes of the British,
which pointed to a sophisticated psychological mechanism. The
assumption had, again, been already worded by Rice: “Foreigners’

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37 BBC Written Archives, 22 November 1941, “Mrs. Talbot Rice’s suggestions”, E1/259/1.
38 BBC Written Archives, 3 March 1942, From M. O. I. to BBC, E9/37.
39 BBC Written Archives, 19 May 1941, “Turkish Intelligence”, R13/204.
40 BBC Written Archives, 7 March 1942, From BBC to M. O. I., E9/37.
41 BBC Written Archives, 7 March 1942, From M. O. I. to BBC, E9/37.
impressions of one's own country, though frequently weird, are invariably fascinating, and Turks are probably as amused by such accounts as most nationals."42 But in the new context the reference to local culture was something more than reporting a foreigner's impressions of the native country. The strategy of "flattery" had to make use of the local culture which was going to be broadcast in Turkish by the Turkish announcers in the service, while it should retain its British context. That was the reason why the strategy was difficult to formulate and implement.

The attempts of "flattery" that followed, such as broadcasting special talks on Turkish national anniversaries; of broadcasting "Halkevi"43 celebrations in London; the use of a Turkish comic character "Tombul Teyze" in a BBC programme were all grounded on the principle of "convincing the Turks" that the British "look upon them as a people of integrity and distinction."44 In terms of news, the M.O. I. formulated suggestions regarding broadcasts to Turkey and Iran. As a result of various considerations and comparisons, Turkey was finally grouped with Iran to be discussed together in terms of new policies. Because it seemed evident now that Turkey should not be treated in the Arab context. A comparative analysis showed that:

"...by broadcasting news items of Arab origin we appeal to the legitimate interest which each Arab country takes in the affairs of the sister countries; and that it therefore becomes comparatively easy to combine 'flattery' values with 'news' values. In the case of the Turkish service the editor is bound to be more critical in regard to the appropriateness of a London dateline, in order to ensure that the object of 'flattery' is not defeated by presentation in an unsuitable context."45

The first point in the suggestions for the BBC broadcasts to Turkey and Iran was that they should reflect "a well-informed and

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42 BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37.
43 People's Houses, which were established in 1932 in Turkey were to have a London branch in the beginning of the 40's.
44 BBC Written Archives, 1942, From Controller Overseas Publicity to Ivone Kirkpatrick (BBC), R34/904.
sympathetic knowledge of local events and personalities."\textsuperscript{46} But the report made clear that this did not mean a "mere rebroadcasting of local events". The BBC should be provided with comprehensive information on political, economic and social developments in order to project Turkey to Turkey. In cases where "direct" broadcasting of local news takes place, the object should not be "to give information about events but rather to flatter the audience by showing British interest in their affairs and, in the case of items of political significance, to reflect British reaction." The strategy of flattery that should be implemented in the broadcasting of news to Turkey and Iran was underlined by defining a technique: "A profitable method of exploitation, therefore, is that of the 'advertising' technique." An example cited in the report for the technique was to draw the attention of listeners to, say, a coming important orchestral concert in Turkey and perhaps to "invite them to listen to a brief gramophone extract of one of the pieces".\textsuperscript{47} In this way Western music would be signified as something originally British, since British would successfully give the impression that they already possess an original recording of a future performance in Turkey. On the other hand it would flatter the audience, especially the "modernising elite" by supporting their effort in cultural progress. It would refer to a local event and flatter them by showing the interest of the British yet would be a way to assert the British point of view.

The "advertising" technique is worthy of further discussion in terms of its impact on the construction of Turkish national identity. It is known that the Turkish \textit{avant-garde} at that period had adopted a mission to disseminate the values of the "Western civilisation". The Western way of life, as it was mediated by the Turkish elite, was advertised to the Turkish people. One significant medium for this was the Turkish radio broadcasting. For example, Ankara Radio allotted a considerable broadcasting time for either live or recorded Western "classical" music to improve the tastes of the public. But the "Western-ness" involved was associated with the central space of the Turkish elite, therefore it was part of Turkish identity. On the other hand they

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

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had a similar strategy as the British to bring out the “local” colour in Turkishness. For this end, they referred to “folklore” and processed folkloric material to project the “authentic” culture of the Turkish people in Anatolia to themselves as seen from the eyes of the elite. This could also be called a “flattery” technique. So as the Turkish elite were in an effort to mark their own identity (or difference) in relation to the people, as the “essence” of Turkishness; the British were developing techniques to project the image of the Turkish elite to themselves but only to mark their own difference (and identity). Therefore a contestation between the two identities which were being formed on the boundaries was inevitable. This led, in few years, to uneasiness on the part of the Turkish elite regarding the BBC broadcasts, while leading to a feeling of contempt in the British authorities towards the Turkish elite. Culture, now despatialised and respatialised via broadcasting technology, was a common realm of struggle for both parties.

The BBC was aware that the dominant character of broadcasting of the foreign services should be metropolitan. For example, the Arabic service from London was regarded working “in harmony with the Arab urge towards the strengthening of their common nationhood” yet it “never lost sight of its role as a British station speaking to Arabs.” (Mansell, 1982:204) Therefore the spatial aspect of culture transmitted through broadcasting was important. The BBC Foreign Services always tried to signify the space of their broadcasting through various signs associated with Britain, and specifically London. Various sounds were used to signify and define the space. The broadcast to Germany made use of the sound of the nightingale in Bagley Woods as a token of Britain’s peaceful intentions (Mansell, 1982:98). The programme called “London After Dark” which was beamed at the United States broadcast sirens and then the unhurried footsteps of the crowd “to convince Americans that Londoners took their air raids without excitement.” (Mansell, 1982:191) The news programme in all services always started with the time signal of the Big Ben. All of these spatial signs -though essentially simulations - were implemented to connote the distinct space of the broadcasting,
that is the space of the speaker, therefore the directionality of the utterance. However in most cases, the directionality was not "directly" conveyed. "London Calling Turkey" was an interesting programme in this sense. The scene was laid in "Stamboul" Restaurant in London where a number of Turkish guests gave brief messages to their friends. The scene corresponded to a British reproduction of Turkishness in London. Therefore the messages of Turkish people to Turkish people mediated by the reconstructed space -a metropolitan space that internalises both the centre and the local- played an important role in the projection of Turkishness to Turkey. The local was reprocessed through the eyes of the metropolitan culture and transmitted by the local people -dislocated local people- to listeners in their private sphere. This leads to a dislocation and respatialisation of the local culture; whereby the local or native people are driven (by their flattered sentiments) into a confrontation or a dialogic relationship with the metropolitan (and hierarchically superior) version of their own story. A similar mechanism applied when, for example, the BBC broadcast a concert by a Turkish violinist.

It was also inevitable that the identity of the Turkish announcers be determined within the context of respatialisation of identity. The Turkish Service had a British editor and the Turkish announcers' autonomy was confined to reading the translations of edited scripts (originally written in English). Although they enjoyed some freedom in participating in some live broadcasts, their output was strictly controlled. Indeed most of the policy debates took place without their knowledge and involvement, as was true for all the foreign services. As Mansell states, most of the "native" employees in the services, "had little awareness of what went on beyond the confines of their own service." (1982:94) However, they were given the impression that they were the ones to define the tone of the service. Their identity, in this context, was highly critical for the BBC executives and also for the addressed public. It was not only the language used in the foreign services but the identity of the speaker as well, that mattered. The Portuguese Service is known to experience a significant problem in this sense. A Brazilian employed in the Service caused huge
problems in Portugal. The BBC had to learn from its mistake. "The sort of ridiculous thing we do! It would be much better to have a Portuguese broadcasting to Brazil than a Brazilian broadcasting to Portugal for obvious reasons."48 The "obvious reasons" belonged to the logic of identification within power relations. So when a suggestion was made by Rice, that one of the senior Turkish announcers, Kartal, could write and broadcast a leading article, the problem of identity had to be thoroughly debated. The BBC opposed to the idea arguing that it was neither "practicable nor desirable" for Kartal to write and/or broadcast such scripts. Since a leading article should "tell the audience what London thinks about the topic of the day, not what is thought by a Turk resident in London. It is in the latter capacity that Kartal has always been projected."49 Here we see the critical edge over which the projection of identity was designed. It was desirable to project a Turkish announcer's identity as "independent" to offset any suspicion in Turkey that Kartal merely says what he is paid to say. The BBC believed that they "set great store by maintaining his reputation as an 'independent' commentator." On the other hand, he would not be allowed to speak in the name of London. He was there to deliver "a carefully edited report which itself reflects the tone of our official directives."50 Paradoxically his "reputation for independence" was the condition of carrying out the British viewpoint. This was made possible by his carefully trimmed identity. His identity was a "Turk resident in London". He was a Turk based in London, speaking from the space of the metropolitan culture. While his difference had to be carefully constructed, his Turkishness had to be reconstructed through a mediation and respatialisation (through his residency in London).

The subtle technique of identity/difference wisely implemented by the BBC probably seemed too subtle to the members of the government departments, in the case of urgent concerns due to the war. In fact, the suggestion raised by the M.O.I. was based on the

49 BBC Written Archives, 15 November 1941, "Comments on Report on Turkish Service", E9/37.
50 Ibid.
Turkish authorities' worries that a "high degree of liberty is afforded to Kartal by the BBC". The Turkish Ambassador had reported to his government in the fall of 1941 that the broadcasts of the Turkish Service bearing criticisms towards Turkey’s pact with the German forces "had been made without the knowledge or the approval of the BBC or the British government." The impression was a result of an important misconception. It was due to a misconception of Kartal, regarding his own role in the service, which had, in fact, been created by the BBC executives. Kartal taking his image too seriously had "given the Ambassador an exaggerated idea of the part which he plays directing our Turkish broadcasts." The M.O.I. thought that the worry due to a misconception could be compensated by bringing Kartal closer to the "centre", an idea to which the BBC opposed pointing to Kartal's carefully tailored image. On the other hand, it is in the documents that Kartal's father had asked him to return to Turkey after his talk on the signing of the Turco/German Pact. This reaction seemed to reflect more about the truth since it demanded the alteration of his space of utterance, his status as a "Turk resident in London". In the following years the Turkish authorities' worries about the Turkish people working in the service continued. There were attempts mediated by the Ambassador to "handle recruitment problems in collaboration with the Turkish Government" which did not go beyond being mere attempts. The BBC was mostly successful to keep the attempted interventions of the Turkish authorities at a distance and keep up the image of "independence" within the service while employing techniques of "stricter control" over Turkish announcers’ output.

The debate around Kartal conveys important things: how identities are constructed on the boundary of play of force lines; how they refer to a certain signified space yet being partially located

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51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 BBC Written Archives, 9 October 1941, From Neville Barbour (Near East Intelligence Officer), E1/259/1.
54 BBC Written Archives, 9 July 1941, "Overseas Divisional Meeting", R13/204.
55 BBC Written Archives, 5 August 1942, "Staff Recruitment for Turkish Service", R13/204.
outside themselves; and how they involve necessary misconceptions and gaps via interpretation. Turkish authorities' attitude is especially significant for the latter point. The Turkish authorities' mistrust of their own people, determined by the rationale of their way of government, sets the context of their interpretation of the British policies. They tend (or seem) to forget the enmities with the British, only two decades ago during the national liberation, and choose to act as if they are ready to believe in the "objective" stand of the British. They willingly lend themselves to be the object of the strategies of flattery. In this context the inauguration of London broadcasts had been regarded as "an act of courtesy".  

In the same manner the British have employed strategies of flattery by denying, in appearance, the sentiments of the recent history, for example by broadcasting a translated message on 30th of August, the anniversary of the ceremony at the tomb of the unknown soldier in Turkey (a victory against British aspirations). However, the recalcitrant elements and the gaps within the dialogic relationship persisted and caused, despite being a condition of identity, uninterpreted resistances and uneasiness on the side of the Turkish. Similarly the British fell prey to misinterpretations and were frustrated in achieving "perfect" results from their painfully debated strategies. Culture as a realm of struggle becomes, in this context, also a realm of unmanageable differences embedded in history, and of "non-knowledge" involved in any act of translation.

### 4.3. The Tricks of Translation

The BBC, while trying to make a sophisticated use of local culture, was not exempt from having feelings toward that culture. For example the use of "Tombul Teyze", a Turkish comic character, seemed to be a bright idea at first but also arose feelings of disgust. Stephenson, the Assistant Director of Near East Services, in his reply to Rice (who seemed to be full of creative suggestions) said that he regretted "the somewhat obscene tendency in Turkish popular periodicals."  

Feelings of disgust were soon coupled by feelings of

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56 BBC Written Archives, 5 December 1939, From M.O.I. to BBC, E9/37.
57 BBC Written Archives, 25 March 1942, From BBC to M.O.I, E1/1257.
frustration. The BBC had always been keen on getting feedback from Turkey whenever possible, even just after the opening broadcast on 20 November 1939. The reported reactions were generally positive but there were criticisms concerning the language and the style of delivery in the transmissions. The translation of phrases was found to be problematic by the Turkish. These initial reactions foreshadowed the persistent future problems in the Turkish Service. The problems concerning translation -not only in terms of language but also in terms of interpretation of cultural standards, values, conventions, desires, demands, etc.- persisted all through the war years and even after, despite all the efforts to know more on Turkey.

The BBC, while it had to make use of every useful cultural material to support its policies, especially the strategy of flattery, was afflicted with problems of interpretation. In 1942, Rice informed the Director of Near East Services about an important cultural “discovery” of hers. She provided the BBC with “a poem on Turkish soldiers of the IXth century” written by “Ibn er Rumi” to be quoted should Turkey become involved in the war. The poem described “Turkish soldiers of the Caliphate” with phrases such as:

“...They have tongues of which the mouth never returns to health, it is as if the saliva of death kept dropping from them. They seem to be thirsty for blood, the place where they go to drink is not that by which they leave.”

Rice, probably influenced by an Orientalist framework could not distinguish the “modern” Turks from those (and they would not call themselves Turks anyway) in the ninth century. She had difficulties interpreting the changed context of the modern Turkish identity which was based on a selective appropriation of its supposed historical heritage. Hillelson’s reply was again based on an interpretation but on a firmer ground:

“I do not think that it is really suitable for quotation in a propagandist context. The poet does not mean to be complimentary to the Turks whom he describes as ruthless, irresistibly and destructive in terms applicable to Hulagu’s Mongols and to the popular conception of Nazi Panzer troops. If the Turks fight on our side we shall do well to insist on their ‘invincibility’ but it is a far carry from the

58 BBC Written Archives, 30 March 1942, “Ibn er Rumi’s Poem on the Turks”, E1/1257.
slave troops of the Abba'sid Caliphate to the modern Turkish army."\(^{59}\)

There were also other instances in which, whether "Attila and Tamurlane" were Turkish national heroes had to be discussed.\(^{60}\) In all of them one can see the efforts (and failures) of translation of Turkishness.

But the use of proper Turkish was especially a difficult matter. Stephenson argued that "the question of style of language to be used in translation is exceptionally difficult in Turkish, as the language is in such a state of flux."\(^{61}\) This was part of a debate whether Ottoman words are proper to use, and if not, then what was "modern Turkish"? The debate also addressed the question if criticisms were due to failures of the service or the ambiguity of the Turkish language. In a meeting about the conduct of Turkish Service, with the participation of the BBC and the M.O.I., "criticisms of language" were raised as a topic. It was believed that some of the criticisms "reflected the different outlook of 'old Turks' and 'young Turks'". But it was admitted that the "standard of linguistic presentation and announcing was not as high as could be desired."\(^{62}\) However, the members in the meeting were still perplexed with regard to the nature and severity of criticisms. The criticisms ranged from the use of too archaic and long sentences, alterations of meaning due to the choice of words, the grammar of the language used to the accents of the announcers. It was reported that some Turkish journalists had to refer to the English translations in order to understand the meaning of broadcasts.\(^{63}\)

The BBC was keen to solve the problem. The initial reaction to criticisms was to solve the problem by gathering more information. In 1942 a questionnaire was designed for travelers from Turkey. One of the questions was: "Were any comments heard on the language, accent and subject-matter of BBC transmissions in Turkish?"\(^{64}\) The

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\(^{59}\) BBC Written Archives, 5 April 1942, From BBC to M.O.I, E1/1257.

\(^{60}\) BBC Written Archives, 17 June 1941, From The British Council rep. in Ankara, E9/37.

\(^{61}\) BBC Written Archives, 5 December 1939, BBC Internal Circulating Memo, "Turkish Broadcast Reactions", E9/37.

\(^{62}\) BBC Written Archives, 14 July 1942, "Turkish Service Meeting", E1/259/1.

\(^{63}\) BBC Written Archives, 28 June 1942, From M.O.I. to BBC, E9/37.

\(^{64}\) BBC Written Archives, 19 May 1942, "Questionnaire for Turkey", E9/37.
questionnaire did not prove to be of much help. There was also the need to diagnose the reasons leading to the problem. One idea was that the Turkish people, especially the publishers were guilty because they "have never troubled to produce any really comprehensive dictionary." 65 It was suggested that the British officials in Ankara should send a copy of the chart of the new words, issued by the Language Institute. A year later, it was suggested that a small library should be installed in the Service for the use of "all those connected with the Turkish Service, with a view to keeping in touch with the developments in the intellectual and public life in the country." 66 Three years later, in 1945, the BBC was still busy with language criticisms. Hillelson had to state the problem once more:

"The real point, however, is whether we are dealing with occasional lapses due to the rapid pace of news translation, or with general lack of competence, and I feel that no case for the latter assumption has been established." 67

This was followed by a decision to contact a Turkish scholar, Fahir Iz from SOAS as critic and adviser for translations. But in 1948 there was a growing doubt whether the language criticisms can be evaded at all. The report called "Language of Turkish Service" asserted that the main problem was "the fluidity of the Turkish Language". And argued that it was not possible "to conform to the standard of 'correct Turkish' as envisaged by some critics. It seems improbable that any station outside Turkey itself could keep in day to day touch with the neologisms of the language." 68 The report also talked of an "anxiety" of the British authorities to be "as up to date and as correct as is possible". Still, the attempts to ridicule the language reform in Turkey did not relieve the anxiety. It is interesting to see that a service which was basically set up for propaganda purposes had to busy itself with such detailed problems of linguistic precision; but it was inevitable since its basic medium was language and culture. It is also striking that the whole process was afflicted with gaps in the

65 BBC Written Archives, 5 October 1942, "Criticism of Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37.
66 BBC Written Archives, 13 April 1943, From BBC to M.O.I, E1/1257.
68 BBC Written Archives, 7 May 1948, "Language of Turkish Service", R13/204.
translation activity. The British were split between two considerations: to control the output as strictly as possible, therefore, limit the participation of Turkish people in the editorial process and use basically translated material; but on the other hand, to be able to influence the audience, therefore, the necessity to know more and take the criticisms seriously. There was a split between the will to know and the impossibility of perfect knowledge.

Another concern was about the announcers' style of delivery. It was reported that Özbekkan, a female announcer, was disliked by "educated Turks" because of her tendency to overstress her verbs at the end of her sentences. Rice had spared some space for the problem in her report on "Turkish Broadcasts". She said that she was "more than surprised by these adverse criticisms" since she had "always admired her language and her diction." However, Rice felt that she, herself, had to come up with a comment on the problem and suggested that the last sentence in the final item in the broadcasts should end "with a flourish." She was not sure if "modern Turkish" could easily lend itself to "sonorous endings" but believed that "the effectiveness of the BBC broadcasts would be increased if they could be achieved." Rice's confusion regarding the matter, and her frustrating inability to master the proper use of accents in a language that is basically alien to her is significant here. On the other hand, it was obvious that the criticisms could not be easily evaded, especially when they came from the most pro-British people in Turkey. Sertel was one of them. He was the editor of the newspaper Tan known for its pro-British attitude. Sertel had been vigilant in his criticisms not only about the language of the BBC broadcasts, but also about the content such as the news:

"With reference to the manner of working there certainly seems to be something radically wrong but I do not venture to say anything, that is really the internal workings of the BBC. As I understand the subject matter is being given out according to measure and items are being added to fill the gap...the most essential thing to be followed in this measuring is the quality of the substance which should be

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69 BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37.
given in a clear language free from propaganda." \textsuperscript{70}

For the British authorities the solution lay neither in improving their knowledge (since it seemed impossible) nor in introducing a radical change such as replacing translated material with material originally produced in Turkish (there were some attempts toward this end but had to remain very limited). The solution lied in the interpretation of the problem. Tristram, a British official in Turkey, had already formulated a key problem in 1942. He had argued that it was “the ‘intellectuals’ who object not only to the style and, even, grammar of our Turkish transmissions, but also to the announcers’ delivery. The less cultured man in the street appears satisfied with both style and subject matter.” \textsuperscript{71} The distinction made between the “intellectuals” and the “man in the street” became a guideline for the solution of many problems related with cultural translation, especially in deciding the subject matter of talks and the kind of music to be broadcast.

However, the distinction was a tricky one. It was again related with problems of identity/difference. Tristram knew that the British could not “disregard the views of the ‘intellectuals’: they run the country.” \textsuperscript{72} The BBC broadcasts had to address the ruling people if they sought any impact on national policies. But on the other hand, the British were now aware that there was no easy reconciliation with the aspirations of the Turkish elite. There was a competition between the two parties. The Turkish elite had to dislike the BBC transmissions, continuously problematising and obscuring what is “modern” in Turkey, if they wanted to have a distinct power. They claimed to be the only source of “modernity” in the national project. They opposed to any translation of Turkish modernity by the Western world since it could deny the significance of their agency. They had already translated Western modernity as a component of Turkishness, and it was a distinct object now: the Turkish identity. Therefore, though stricken with the desire to know how the Western world saw

\textsuperscript{70} BBC Written Archives, September 1942, “Remarks passed by Turkish journalists on their visit to the BBC Aldenham”, E9/37.
\textsuperscript{71} BBC Written Archives, 14 September 1942, “Turkish Service: Tristram’s note on language difficulties”, E1/259/1.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
them, they would not want to adopt the image produced by the British. This is perhaps why the Turkish Ambassador had not been in favour of the decision of the Turkish Service to expand cultural items "to vary war news", for "some incomprehensible reason." 73 Something had to be left unspoken, in Zizek's terms, for the Turkish reality to exist. But, of course, the Turkish authorities could not oppose the BBC Turkish transmissions directly since they regarded it also as an approval of their existence in government. So they were split in their reactions.

There are striking examples associated with the splits and gaps within the field of translation of cultural values. Music proved to be one of the difficult ones. Broadcasting of Western music, at first sight, seemed more suitable for the purposes of the BBC Turkish Service. However the proliferation of strategies due to arising difficulties, led to certain reversals. Turkish music gained prominence as time went on, with the intention to appeal to the tastes of laypeople, in the case of severe criticisms from the intellectuals. In 1947, it was decided to play less Western and more Turkish music in the Turkish transmissions. 74 Of course, though paradoxically, this led to further criticisms from the Turkish "intellectuals". They were against an image of Turkishness represented by Turkish music. But at that time, the British could interpret away the problem by a new policy. The Turkish "intellectuals", though they run the country, were regarded as snobbish who were "apt to show off their education and social origin"; and it was believed that "the standards they set are not generally acceptable". 75 The BBC justified a more populist policy: Mango, who was employed by the BBC Turkish Service in 1947 (Service Director in 1959) states retrospectively that the Turkish Service gained a distinct reputation, in these years, by playing the kind of music that Ankara Radio banned for being "tasteless". 76 Of course, one has to note that the war was over then, and the impact on the ruling group

74 BBC Written Archives, 11 July 1947, from Valerie Gordon Smith to all Turkish announcers, E1/259/1.
75 BBC Written Archives, 1948, "Memorandum on Standards of Language and Translation in the Turkish Service of the BBC", R13/204.
76 8 February 1995. Interview.
was a lesser consideration. So the BBC could invest on a certain
dynamic in the Turkish society, on what was denied in the
representation of the Turkish national identity by the elite and what
was reckoned to be liked by the people. Yet Mango, at the time,
seemed more sceptical about the use of populist policies: “The
inauguration of Istanbul Radio (1948) will probably mean that we
shall lose many of our ‘lighter’ listeners who are mainly attracted by
our two weekly programmes of Turkish music....we cannot compete
with Turkish state broadcasting in the fields of Turkish as well as of
Western music.”77 The populist policy also had its drawbacks and
limitations.

I have been arguing referring to several examples that the history
of the BBC transmissions in Turkish, particularly during the war and
immediately after, entailed a complex dialogic interrelatedness full of
uncertainty and ambiguity; and that the techniques and mechanisms
of projection of identities were shaped within the obscure field of the
play of force lines. It is clear that the translation of culture, within this
context, was not less complex. However, one should not think that the
historical process evolved from ambiguity to clarity with time. All the
efforts for more knowledge in this process have been rendered
problematic by the intrusion of various factors, especially by
antagonistic interests. It was only the changing circumstances, the
changing context that induced the search for new strategies. Then
how did certain codifications, such as the discourse of truth, emerge
and were consolidated? Perhaps, for this, the positive functions of
“non-knowledge” in the production of “reality” have to be acknowledged.

4.4. Normalisation and Representations

Keyder argues that national identities have been consolidated
only after the Second World War, not only in peripheral countries but
also in Europe.78 The post-war period has witnessed an attempt to
reinstitutionalize the functions of the state within national boundaries,
equipping the state power with effective tools of government. Keyder refers to welfare states within this context. It can be said that the cultural realm was reorganised along these lines. The dialogic character of relationships between cultures, as can be seen in the transmissions of the BBC World Service during the war, gave way to more monologic presentations of national identities. This was accompanied by more fixed definitions. It can be noticed that in the post war period, the BBC Turkish Service also adopted a more clear cut and seemingly a more consistent definition with regard to its functions and its target. This was not due to its improved state of knowledge, but to a reorganisation of knowledge in a different context.

Hence I argue that the discourse of truth emerged as an efficient discourse only after the war. The reasons were manifold. First, as I have said above, the reestablishment of national boundaries and of the international order, with a new role for Britain, was an important factor. Second, this had to be accompanied by a certain loss of memory, a certain “non-knowledge” with regard to past positions and struggles. And third, the circulation of technical equipment and knowhow, although not overtly charged with any ideological meanings, contributed to the consolidation of certain identities within an hierarchical order, giving support to certain discourses.

One of the important facts of the post-war period recognised by the British, was the Turks' desire to be accepted as part of the European world. Consequently it was advised by the government that the Turkish Service should become part of the European Services in the BBC World Service:

"Turkey now regards herself more as a European country than as an Arab country and has recently been admitted to the Council of Europe. The FO in their organisation also treat Turkey as a European country. It is therefore considered more appropriate for the Turkish Service to become part of the European Services, where it will be possible for the Service to be more effectively operated in the European environ." 79

Also the separation of Turkish and Persian section, which have

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79 BBC Written Archives, 19 October 1949, R13/204.
hitherto been combined under one Programme Organiser was suggested. The BBC opposed to the idea. The Assistant Head of Eastern Services wrote that he could see the chief argument for attachment to Europe is “Turkish amour-propre”. However he advanced the following arguments for retaining the present organisation:

“1. From the point of view of geography Turkey is overwhelmingly Asiatic. 
2. Turkish outlook is still largely based on Eastern and Islamic and not on European and Christian tradition. 
3. Linguistically, historically and, to a great degree, culturally Turkey is still to a large extent, part of the Asiatic world, e.g. the popularity of the Turkish service is largely due to its use of Oriental (Turkish) music. The Turkish language still has, and is likely to retain, very strong traces of Arabic and Persian vocabulary and ways of thought....”

Nevertheless, as from 18 June 1950 the Turkish Service was transferred from “Eastern” to “East European” Service. It was clear that the new political concerns around building an anti-Soviet bloc, and Turkey’s position within that context, played an important role in this decision. Yet the British officials could separate the political concerns from cultural evaluations more distinctly now. The anxiety producing love/hate relationship with the Turkish object had given way to more clear cut distinctions. Turkey, though not essentially regarded a modern European nation, could be integrated to the European Service for political reasons. The realm of culture that was problematised for political reasons in the beginning of the foreign transmissions could be handled as a relatively separate object now. The adoption of populist policies in the Turkish Service was already a sign of that. The relativisation of culture that has started with foreign transmissions led to a relativistic attitude toward culture. Only then, the disturbing contestation between the Turkish elite and the British authorities in terms of the representation of the Turkish national identity in broadcasting, could be transformed into a competition for an audience. This meant normalisation of the relationship between

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80 BBC Written Archives, 5 July 1949, E1/1259/3.
81 The decision could also imply that “Slav” countries were being “orientalised” and were positioned half way between the Orient and Europe.
the two parties.

The normalisation of the relationship entailed codified ways of looking at each other. The British could finally assume that they know the Turks. John Mair, Turkish Programme Organiser, produced a report on his visit to Turkey in 1951. In this report, Mair evaluates the Turkish situation more freely and with less anxiety, compared to previous reports. He mentions "...the Turks' fierce desire to be thought modern". But he feels free to name it as a "pathological desire". According to him, Turkish people are, in many ways, far from being modern. The only tradition "of which they are still openly proud is a military one." And they seem to lack taste for arts. "Imagination does not seem to be one of the main Turkish characteristics, and the lack of it is reflected in a low level of artistic activity." So without the need of problematising culture and ways of knowing it anymore, he formulates the aims of the Turkish Service:

"....to keep the Turkish public informed of world events, as seen from Britain, by means of an accurate and efficient news service; to help strengthen the existing friendly relations between the Turkish and British peoples; to explain and if possible secure support for British Foreign Policy, and to try and familiarise the Turkish audience with British ways of life and thought. But to do this we obviously have to sugar the pill, and I think in general we must keep our programmes lighter, improve presentation, and relate everything possible, even to the point of exaggeration, to the Turkish outlook." 82

We see that all the previous strategies, those related with news and flattery were integrated in the new formulation. However the BBC could adopt a lighter attitude now, without being torn by the need to know more about "modern" Turkey. "To sugar the pill" seemed enough. In this context non-knowledge, as to the origins of its own splits and gaps, played an important role. The BBC Turkish Service, once regarded as one of the most problematic services83, codified its own history after the war in terms of the assured superiority.

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82 BBC Written Archives, 14 July 1951, “Turkey: Report on a visit from 23 May 1951 to 19 June 1951 by John Mair, Turkish Programme Organiser”, E1/1260.
83 The Controller of Overseas Services wrote in 1942: "I wonder if there is any service over which there has been so much vacillation, in both policy and practical fields..." BBC Written Archives, 4 June 1942, E9/37.
Moreover, the BBC could easily deny, perhaps even without deliberate intention, the themes of struggle that have busied a series of government departments in recent history.

In 1967, the BBC could advise Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) that they should not plan their output in the light of other people's practice. "Broadcasting after all is a tool to help you solve your own individual or national problems of communications, and Turkey's are obviously quite different from ours."84 Or in 1955, the reply to the London Military Attache's question about "independence", assured him that

"...there is a safeguard against any Government attempting to use the BBC as an instrument of propaganda for its policies...In short, the Government does not control the BBC; the Corporation acts not as a moulder of public opinion but rather as a reflector of the views and opinions of all substantial sections of the community."85

Both of these comments openly contradict the earlier practices of the BBC, which had been so keen to interfere with other "national" broadcasting systems, itself being under strict government control. But in terms of the new codifications, the BBC could act as if these did not happen. Communication with Turkish broadcasters could continue on the basis of the newly constructed representations.86 The discourse of truth was a product of such a process. The Turkish broadcasters, being in a situation to negotiate both "margins" and the "centre" retained slight suspicions regarding the self representation of the BBC. But, since this representation became a social fact in the new world order, they had to identify themselves with some mastersignifier to guarantee their place in the symbolic network. So they continued to look to the BBC as a model for their own practices, asking for technology, know-how, training etc., in the post war period.

A slight suspicion, for example, was about "independence". The Turkish broadcasting system was to be based on the British model but

84 BBC Written Archives, 12 December, 1967, E1/2,432/1.
86 Representation serves as a means for making sense of life world, in Rabinow's terms (1986:257) and it becomes a social fact.
the Turkish authorities had difficulties in interpreting the model of independence. They did not really believe that the BBC was independent. Therefore they posed questions about independence to the BBC. The BBC Acting Chief Publicity Officer consulted government departments before he drafted a reply. The words of Camacho, regarding the issue, bear elements of truth, of the truth that had been excluded from the discourse of truth: "It is extremely difficult to persuade anybody at all outside the Commonwealth and, up to a point, the United States that the BBC is, in fact, independent."87 Looking back to the history it is not difficult to guess why this has been so!

The new representation of the British identity masked all previous attempts of propaganda and manipulation, as well as nasty, even racist remarks that had been uttered about other people. For example, the phrases in a report from the British Information Office in 1940, concerning a Turkish man, that he is a Jew but "he is a very good type, and one would not suspect, from his personal appearance, that he was either a Turk or a Jew!"88 had to be buried in the archives. In the same manner, the Turkish Ambassador's words, in 1942, about the series of talks on "British Democracy" in the Turkish transmissions, being boring and unnecessary89 was never interpreted later, either by the Turkish or the British. All the failures of interpretation of the British in the realm of culture had to be projected as the failures of the Turkish, in the hierarchical symbolic network. So it was the Turkish, who, with their "characteristic resistance"90, have made things difficult for the British.

The Turkish on the other hand, built a representation of their identity on the denial of previous and present inequalities in the relationship with the British, and left their "characteristic resistance" uninterpreted, which was in fact an important constituent of their identity. In 1956 Naci Serez, Programme Director of Ankara Radio, offered the BBC a suggestion of a programme that he himself had

87 BBC Written Archives, 26 July 1955, E12/974/1.
88 BBC Written Archives, 1940, From British Information Office to BBC, E9/37.
89 BBC Written Archives, 7 August 1942, "Interview with Turkish Ambassador", E9/37.
90 BBC Written Archives, 4 September 1959, "Relations with Turkish Radio", E1/2,432/1.
designed, “in return for the most helpful co-operation we always had, especially from the Turkish Section”. The BBC had no intention of taking a programme suggestion from the Turkish but did not neglect to “enquire for further details, thereby showing some interest.” The Turkish broadcaster had a self image built on denials and misconceptions, while the BBC could be politely indifferent to the suggestion - whereas it could not have been that easy a decade ago- denying its former craving for every material related with the Turkish culture. The non-knowledge, at the end, of the constitutive dynamic of the dialogic interrelatedness, has contributed to the consolidation of identities, thus the discourse of truth that the British long before referred to as a superaddressee.

I wish to conclude this section by commenting briefly on the third point, that of the supposedly neutral field of technology and know-how. It is known that the relations between the British and the Turkish broadcasters have started before the foundation of the Turkish Service. The broadcasting transmitter in Ankara had been built by Marconi. Marconi had written to BBC in 1937 to forward a request of Ankara Radio, which asked for records that the BBC no longer uses. In the same year Hayreden, the director of Istanbul Radio visited the BBC. He had several questions to ask to the BBC, concerning the methods for arranging the payment of copyrights, performing right fees; the methods of contact between the BBC and the listening public and the press; the use that was made of regional contributions in the London programmes and vice versa. During and afterwards the war, requests of the Turkish for technology, broadcasting material and skills continued. This was evaluated by the British as part of a general plan of export and marketing to Turkey. In 1944, it was envisaged that Turkey will become a big potential market for our capital goods industries. I think that a big part could be played by the BBC in drawing attention to the efficiency of British industrial

91 BBC Written Archives, 30 January 1956, From Naci Serez, Ankara Radio to BBC, E1/2/432/1.
92 Ibid.
93 BBC Written Archives, 1 July 1937, BBC Internal Circulating Memo, E1/1256.
94 BBC Written Archives, 1 November 1937, BBC Internal Circulating Memo, ?.
95 BBC Written Archives, 9 November 1937, BBC Internal Circulating Memo, E1/1258.
scientists and designers and in impressing on the Turkish listener that Britain can and does deliver the goods."^{96}

The contacts concerning these issues formed an "ordinary" trade line between the two parties that has not been problematised as much as the cultural issues. The contacts seemed to be based on simple interests and needs.

However, goods and technology, themselves, were vested with meanings which have to be analysed as part of "ideological" constructions. I will give two examples, coming from the experiences of those people who were not in any position to determine policies. Yet they bestowed meanings and identity to their radio sets. One example is from a Turkish village. A radio-dealer selling English Ferranti sets reported in 1941^{97}, that the villagers were very unhappy because of poor reception; unhappy "because although the sets are English, they cannot get the London station on them." The villagers had felt the sets that they use in their local life had a distinct and, probably, a superior identity. The other example is again from an experience in an Anatolian town, this time lived by some British engineers in 1942. While they were in Sivas, they purchased "a magnificent, spot new, Marconi 7-valve set". The Forces programme was "the most pleasant and the easiest to tune." With their set they could get "at least three times the volume" that they normally required. They "reserved 'full-blast' with the windows open for 'God Save the King', 'Land of Hope and Glory' and 'There'll always be an England', just to give the locals a treat."^{98} It is clear that the nationalistic aggression felt in the above passage is very much attached to the technology. In both examples we see a translation activity, that attributes meanings to a technological equipment within an hierarchical order. Cultural translation occurs, in this case, within both a discursive and a non-discursive context.

Thus London called Turkey in various, though not always consistent, ways to which Turkey has replied by a complex set of

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^{96} BBC Written Archives, 20 October 1944, "Post-War Broadcasting in Turkish", E1/1259/2.
^{97} BBC Written Archives, August 1941, Monthly Intelligence Report, E2/425.
^{98} BBC Written Archives, 24 September 1942, E1/1257.
reactions. However, the dialogic nature of the relationship, finally, remains hidden in the monologic representations of national identities.

4.5. The Dialogism of Truths

We have seen that the BBC Turkish Service worked hard to implement a policy of "truth" during the war, which was to be identified with the British cause in the aftermath of the war. But as can be observed in what may be called the normalisation period after the war, the codification of representations masked the previous anxieties and fantasies of the BBC Turkish Service regarding its object of knowledge. The BBC Turkish Service had relied on preformed images of Turkishness in handling its audience. The new sources of knowledge, on the other hand, were provided from discrete experiences of those who visited Turkey; from those who claimed to have some sort of understanding of Turkish culture and psychology. A statement like, "Mr. Lubin said a Turkish friend asked him what 'spitfire' meant in English and showed great satisfaction when he was told" could lead to a programme suggestion. However, the strategies of truth, not always based on "objective" knowledge, did not produce a distance to the truth itself for the British subjects. Fantasy and knowledge were bridged and presented in a "rational" framework; as Agamben notes, they were non-contradictorily united in the assumed rational subject.

In opposition to this, the Turkish elite could not easily produce and sustain a single truth. There were two contradictory

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99 BBC Written Archives, "Conversation with Mr. Lubin of Imperial Chemical Industries", 23 September 1940, E9/37.
100 "A talk on the types of machines used by the British and the meaning of their names might it seems go down well in Eastern Europe and the Levant." Ibid.
101 There is a predominant claim in Britain that the World Service served, and continues to serve humanistic purposes (Mansell, 1982; Tusa, 1992; Walker, 1992); and it gained "a golden reputation" during the war (Walker, 1992: 12). A handbook, BBC at War, written by Antonia White and published by the BBC, emphasises the "scientific" way the listeners' interests were investigated during wartime (25).
102 Agamben points to the changing role of "mediating imagination" in history: "For Antiquity, the imagination which is now expunged from knowledge as 'unreal', was the supreme medium of knowledge..." (1993:24) But in the modern world, "the function of phantasy is assumed by the new subject of knowledge: the ego cogito." (1993:25)
considerations: one was to produce representations to convince the West that they too were Western, the other was to defend the distinct identity of Turkishness against the West. Imagination and fantasy attempted to bridge the gap between these considerations, but second-order reflections, due to the projections of the West which always evoked a lack, led to splits in the subjects. The accounts of Ankara Radio during the Second World War demonstrate the split quite clearly.

It was always emphasised that the Turkish nation presented an exemplary role in the war: an example of truth, peace and civilisation. Ankara Radio's broadcasting during the war was shown both by the government and the broadcasters as an evidence of this. However, the marginality of Turkish Radio and its pragmatic attitude to various "truths" articulated by foreign radio stations also manifested itself in statements about Turkish Radio. Sarper, in his article, called "If they would have listened to us, too", put it clearly:

"...for three years we have been listening to transmissions from Germany, United States, Bulgaria, Palestine, Croatia, Britain, Iran, Italy, Rumania, Russia, and Syria. We must admit that in the first days we felt a bit dizzy. How could we not feel dizzy? The way all those big communities that we have felt ourselves close to because of their contributions to civilisation and humanity, in science, technique and arts, contradicted and differed from each other in explaining the "right" and the "truth" did not fit into any standard that we believe in and know of. The experience of those three years has awakened us. ...equipped us with a critical faculty that can assess the difference between explanations and events. .. But there is also Ankara Radio in the world. It has been transmitting its modest and courageous voice to the world; if they would ever listen to us, too....We give news regarding ourselves, those who want to know us should listen to us; our domestic news are modest and sincere. And we give world news to the world, and we give the news by distancing ourselves from hatred and fear." 

One can see, in the above statement, all the features of a

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103 Koçak argues that the Turkish modernists had “an uneasy consciousness that attempted to hide from itself its very pretensions” (1996:20).

pragmatic approach to “truth” in Ankara Radio’s self-positioning during the war. Turkey, by its “distance to hatred and fear” was considered as pure and exemplary, and uncontaminated by the West. On the other hand, Turkey which was open to the West, never stopped listening to those that contributed “to civilisation and humanity, in science, technique and arts”. Similar to Western objects that were appropriated and utilised in everyday life, the various “truths” were also objectified and put into a hierarchy according to emerging needs; they were utilised to secure the power of the ruling elites in Turkey. The ongoing negotiation of truths made the Turkish discourse on truth very elusive. This was one of the things that the BBC Turkish Service found so difficult to deal with in developing appropriate strategies.

The discourse on truth was also elusive due to the existence of a wide range of tactics\(^{105}\) that sustained it, albeit remained invisible. Turkish Radio resorted to certain tactics while propagating an openness to the West. It was announced to the Turkish audience that they were free to listen to the “foreign” radio stations during the war:

“It is both curious and permissible to listen these transmissions. Curious, because a Turk has a habit of liking games of wit. Permissible, because a Turk’s awareness has developed to an extent that he can differentiate those messages that are against our national interests from others, and he has the capacity to read off the danger in them.”\(^ {106}\)

The message conveyed by this announcement did not only contradict the policy of heavy censorship on domestic news\(^ {107}\), for example; but also was refuted by certain tactics. Suat Osmanoğlu’s, a

\(^{105}\) I use the term “tactic”, referring to de Certeau, as “a calculus which cannot count on a ‘proper’ (a spatial or institutional localization) distinguishing the other as a visible totality.” (1988: xix). A tactic is fragmentary and fluid, by contrast to a strategy which is associated with an institution, refers to an other in a discourse, and connects to power in a more stable and consistent manner.


\(^{107}\) During the war, the Turkish government maintained strict control over the press. A number of laws and press regulations imposed fines and jail sentences upon writers who published articles designed “to disrupt public confidence in the State, or in one or a few of the officials of the State”, as it was put in the press law. The newspaper editorialists emphasised world affairs in their writings because “criticizing the national leader (İnönü), the government, and the CHP (RPP) was strictly forbidden” according to Nadir Nadi, one of the leading journalists of the period (Weisband, 1973: 72-3).
technician in Ankara Radio, account of the war years is very interesting to compare:

"Italians transmitted Turkish programmes. They now and then made an audience requests programme, reading names from the letters that they received from Anatolia, Central Anatolia or Eastern Anatolia. We were upset when we listened to those programmes. Then an investigation was made to find out those names and addresses announced by the Italian Radio. And it was found out that they were fake. Then, seeing that it can be dangerous, we looked for a way to distort these transmissions. By making a small transmitter and using a small aerial we started producing atmospherics every night, a minute to six o'clock. We heard from people that they liked the music transmissions on Bari Radio, but sometimes could not listen to it because of the atmospherics. Whenever I heard this I would feel a big joy inside, though I would say to them 'God knows who is jamming it'."  

Turkish Radio did not only try to minimise the harmful effects of propaganda when it employed its tactic of distortion. The messages of propaganda, both from the Axis and Allied fronts, already made their way easily to Turkey, especially in the form of world news. Anatolian Agency news, that Ankara Radio was dependent on, were generally taken from the German DNB (25%) and the British Reuter (50%) agencies (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 247). Furthermore, the BBC sources point to the fact that the British viewpoint was extensively quoted in Ankara Radio's transmissions, and most of the BBC talks were published by the Turkish newspapers. Osmanoğlu's memoirs, also, reveal Ankara Radio's "cooperation" with the USA, by taping significant talks, such as Roosevelt's speeches on American Radio, and distributing them to the Turkish newspapers. On the other hand, some foreign transmissions of Ankara Radio, that would count as counter-propaganda, were prepared by foreigners! The programmes targeted to Britain, for example, were made by the British Council officials up until 1945 (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 244). All these examples point to the technical limitations of Ankara Radio in compiling world news and in preparing foreign programmes. But they

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109 Ibid.
also indicate the economic and technical dependency of the Turkish regime on the West. Therefore, the permissive policy of Turkish Radio can be interpreted as giving in to the demands of the West. However if one accepts the argument that Turkey used its negotiating powers, especially that arising from its specific “geopolitical” position, in the arena of politics during the war, and could afford a relative independence from the West (Deringil, 1994), then the strategy of openness should also be thought as a way of relating to the adopted truth of the Westernised Turkey. Which means that Turkey had to design its external reality according to the projected expectations of the West. The tactic of distortion, in this context, can be interpreted as an attempt of distancing oneself from that truth, and as a symptom of another order of truth.

The one order of truth belonged to the supposed “internal essences”; while the other belonged to the external forms. Against the assertion of the West that only the West was rational and capable of modernity, the nationalists responded by demonstrating that “their own nation was perfectly capable of replicating the Western experience” (Gülalp, 1997: 56). Those forms that replicated the Western experience, as a replica of the real, belonged to the domain of the external and the visible. This was endorsed by the West, for example by the strategies of flattery of the BBC that I have discussed before. It was both constructed as a display for the West, which was recognised and processed by the West. For example, the decision to open a branch of a People’s House in London can only be explained as a display for the West, since these institutions were initially designed to “go to the people” in Turkey. Yet, the BBC was keen to
use it as an item of flattery, therefore affirming the reality of the display.

However, the "essence" of the nation, translated into Turkishness, could not be articulated and signified as easily. The form went against the "essence", the outfit against the inner self. The elites wanted to believe that these were non-contradictory:

"...the outfit does not kill the self! Wearing hats did not change the Turkish head that thinks in human but also in Turkish terms; the Western culture did not kill the Turk's humane but Turkish feelings."

The belief, that the truth replicating the Western experience did not contradict the inner truth of the self could only be grounded in fantasy since there was ample evidence that they did contradict each other in practice. The elite imagined that they could mediate (that was the raison d'être of their power) between the two orders of truth as long as they used cultural and technological means creatively, to produce and sustain a nationalist fantasy. Yet, the dialogic analysis of truth(s) in this chapter shows that fantasy could count as real within the British regime of power and truth, whereas in the Turkish case the fantasy could not be accounted and legitimated in a "rational" framework. In the next two chapters I will attend to the works of fantasy on radio, radio talks and drama, to analyse the elements that

110 For example, Brigadier-General Sir Wyndham Deedes made a special speech on the BBC on the day the London People's House opened. He included in his speech all the points he thought the Turkish wanted to hear: "It would not, I think, be an exaggeration to say that there is no example in history -at all events I know of none- in which a country has carried out such radical reforms in so short a space of time -a bare twenty years- with, let me add, so little domestic disturbance..." He talked about how Ankara represented a break with the past, how the new dress code introduced a Western style, and how women were emancipated. He especially dwelt on the role of the People's Houses: "So typical is it of modern Turkey that we got permission a year ago to open one here in London." BBC Written Archives, "Turkey Today", broadcast on Eastern Service Red Network, 23 January 1943. Wyndham Deedes was very popular with the Turkish audience. He received letters from Turkish people who spelled his name the way it sounded in Turkish: "Dim diz efendi". Interview with Andrew Mango, 8 December 1995.


112 I have cited several examples, in this chapter, to demonstrate this. John MacKenzie also notes that the BBC operated in a political climate, between 1923-1953, that would not tolerate anything that attacked "Britain's complacent sense of superiority" (1986: 187). In the mid-forties, the BBC propagated the idea that "England is the single country in the world that, looking after its own interests with meticulous care, has at the same time something to give to others." (cited in MacKenzie, 1986: 177)
were employed to make sense of the social fantasy. The gendered conceptions of nature and civilisation stand out as significant devices.
Photograph of a “traditional” family listening to the radio.

(*Radyo, 1/3: 34, 15 February 1942*)
In a comic strip published in Radyo in 1942, a man asks another man: “Haven’t you found a woman to marry yet?” “No”, says the other, “I have bought a radio set instead; it gives me all the gossip from the world, takes care of my health problems, entertains me with music, satisfies all my interests in various areas from sports to theatre. Furthermore, I can shut it up whenever I wish to.” The comic strip points to the attempt to position the radio in everyday life. The radio is shown as man’s best companion in the private sphere, which will even act as a substitute for women. But what produces the humour in the strip is the operation of language which substitutes the machine with a human being while referring to a widely acknowledged “problem of control” of men over women in the men’s world. The idea is that the machine can be controlled by men; it, finally, gives them the desired freedom in addition to “feminine” pleasures. But only in the alienated form of an apparatus. The radio does not possess any meaning in itself. The radio set is a technical artifact which can only be made sense of in a metaphorical way. The metaphor here, radio as a compliant woman, brings to view the contrasts of the natural and the technical; of the body and the ideal in Turkish national discourse which both circumscribed and was produced by radio broadcasting in the mid-30’s and the 40’s.

In this chapter I concentrate on radio talks to show how the elite defined themselves as representatives of the nation in their accommodation of various contradictions and divisions, regarding time, space, gender and language. I shall argue that there is a link between the questions addressed in radio talks and the kind of authority the national elite (predominantly men) pursue.

I begin by talking about the format, the “radio talk”, that featured significantly in the broadcasting of Turkish Radio since its

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1 Ramiz, Radyo, Vol. 2, No.13, 15 December 1942, p.23
“nationalisation” in 1936. The “immediacy” and “directness” of the format appealed to many intellectuals of the period who contributed to talk programmes. Along with certain named individuals some associations, such as the Red Crescent, were also allotted air time on Ankara Radio. The subject matter of such talks covered a wide range from “technical inventions” to “legal” matters. What I specifically discuss in this chapter, are the talks delivered by “intellectuals”, mostly male doctors, on everyday life. The education of children, family life, the position of women, sports, love, discipline and entertainment were among the themes covered by these talks. In the second part of the chapter, I look at these talks more closely to demonstrate the intricate, sometimes problematic, mediations between the body and the nation. This involves the redefinition of “modern” forms of everyday life as opposed to past traditional forms. These new forms were discussed on radio within a new paradigm of authority, which was pedagogical and “scientific”.

Thirdly, I take up the mediating concepts or the “operators” (Strathern, 1995) that regularly figure in these talks, such as the child, the youth, and the women (who were employed to ground one discourse in another) to analyse the dynamics of projection that the elite engaged themselves in to fix the supposed origins, unity and superiority of the nation. The boundary management between the elite and the people; Turkey and the West; and the public and the private are revealed through certain metaphors that instrumentalise certain images of civilisation in a matrix of nature and culture. However, here, we see that the links between nature and culture are handled differently from what is considered to be the Western “conventional symbolisation”, in Strathern’s terms. Primarily, I refer to her argument (1995) to contrast the way that the distinction between nature and culture is figured in Western and Turkish national discourses. Occidentalism, I argue, accounts for the differences.

5.1. The Radio Talks

Prior to the nationalisation of Istanbul and Ankara Radios, music
programmes dominated Turkish broadcasting.\textsuperscript{2} I pointed to the problems attached to this fact by the elite in Chapter 3. The perception of radio as a “music box” was severely criticised while the educational and disciplinary functions of the radio were emphasised. These functions were automatically linked with “verbal programmes” among which radio talks figured with other forms such as dramas, news and radio journals. The percentage of these kind of programmes increased significantly after radio was put under state control.\textsuperscript{3}

In the preparatory period before the official inauguration of the national Ankara Radio in 1938, we see a growing emphasis on the proliferation and variety of “verbal programmes”. Starting from 1935 new subjects which were delivered in verbal forms were introduced. A weekly programme based on newspaper news came in addition to the regular news report (which only lasted for 10 minutes and attracted the least attention from the broadcasters until the Second World War); teaching foreign languages (German and French); programmes to promote certain institutions such the Red Crescent, the State Monopolies Department; and programmes to inform on recent developments in science and technology (”The Pilot Speaks”, the “Technics Hour”) were among “educational” verbal programmes. Art and literature were covered in programmes such as the “Literature Hour” and the “Poetry Hour”. Children’s programmes were introduced (the “Children’s Hour”, “Advice to Children”, “Tales to Children”). Programmes that addressed peasants (“Agricultural Office Hour”, “Meteorology Hour”, “Beekeping Hour”); and health and domestic life (“The Doctor Speaks”, “The Dentist’s Hour”, “Child Care”, “Advice to Housewives”) were produced. The latter gained particular prominence. “Economics”, “Legal Information”, “Savings and National Goods” and “National Epics” were among other verbal programmes that went on air in these years.

The radio, therefore, was transformed from a “music box” into a box that talked. The assumed immediacy of speech was privileged in

\textsuperscript{2} The percentage of the so called “verbal programmes” were very low between 1927-1936, approximately 14%. Koçabaşoğlu compares the fact with some European stations, such as Viennese Radio and the BBC in which the percentage of “verbal programmes” was never below 25% (1980: 73).

\textsuperscript{3} It reached approximately 30% of total air time (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 165).
its association to education and discipline. The general principles and aims of the verbal programmes, formulated by the Director of Ankara Radio in the beginning of the 40’s, were: “To give the best examples of Turkish language in terms of both pronunciation and delivery”; “to give positive and helpful information in an entertaining way - avoiding snobbery, to have educational influence, and to avoid matters that can be harmful for the moral health and the tastes of the youth and the people”, and “to raise the level of artistic appreciation (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 223). These principles showed the determination to regulate the content and the form of the “verbal programmes” which had featured sporadically and in an unorganised way before in radio broadcasting. The transformation of the radio’s mission, and the definition of its main function by “talking” brought into focus, more clearly, the question: Who is listening? Echoed in a prominent Kemalist journalist’s words the question was raised for discussion: “Whom are we going to inform? Whom are we going to entertain?”

The question was answered in different ways. There were people like Baltacıoğlu, who insisted that radio had to be transformed into a people’s university with 70% of its programmes allotted to courses such as philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, geography, the history of Turkish revolution, child education, health, agriculture and theatre. Most members of the elite agreed that the radio had to address the people, that is the people in the towns and villages, with specific emphasis on children’s education. The radio, it was argued, had been oriented in the past mostly for the rich people in the big cities. This had to change if the new mission of discipline and education was going to be fulfilled. The newspaper Cumhuriyet’s questionnaire on the same question raised similar concerns from the

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5 Yeni Ses, November 1939, p.23; Sefer Aytekin, “Köy Radyolarından İstifade Edilemiyor”, Yeni Adam, No. 252, 26 October 1939, p.5.
readers. The new need to address “the people” was conceived as a
general problem of content and form. Radio talks and radio dramas
were thought to be forms that had special educational value.

It’s significant that the worries concerning whom the radio
broadcasting should address were confined to what the elite had to
do: how they had to make the talks more interesting and higher in
“educational value”. The question of what “the people” may want or
need remained mostly absent from the discussions. Şerif’s argument,
for example, for a more “scientific” diagnosis of audience reception
remained marginal. He, in an article on the social psychology of radio,
said:

“...the people addressed to is not an empty gramophone
disc to be recorded on; it is not a passive machine that
absorbs things; it is not “a slippery kind” of organism. It has
its own tastes, own conception of life. Therefore, it has a
certain kind of receptivity for incoming effects, which
consequently determines the eventual reaction. This is why
it is not enough just to address the people in transmissions.
It is also necessary to investigate how they receive these
messages, where they positively react or where they do not
react at all, scientifically and seriously; and take these
results into consideration when designing programmes.”

The “scientific method”, however, was interpreted quite
differently by those who actually delivered the radio talks. They were
mostly convinced that the “popularisation” of certain essential
subjects made them accessible to a larger audience. Therefore,
issues regarding the use of language were more central to the
debates on radio talks. The audience, against Şerif’s warnings, was
posited as a passive entity. The activity attached to the elite in

6 Most of the readers’ concerns were around radio’s former status serving the rich. They
thought that radio had to address the people, that is the poor and the rural population in
Turkey, if the new mission of the radio was going to be achieved. The populist concerns
were coupled with concerns to put radio in the service of the Turkish revolutionary
principles. One reader said, the radio must be active in “kneading the society with the
principles of inkilap, spreading around the Turkish culture and making the world hear of
the Turkish voice.” Cumhuriyet, 12 January 1937. The association of popular concerns
with the idea of reaching the “world” was a common feature of the period.
8 Journals such as Yeni Adam and Yeni Ses raised criticisms of language used in the
radio programmes, arguing that it was not accessible to those with lower levels of
education.
defining and achieving the goals in radio broadcasting, and the centrality attached to "verbal programmes", make them, especially radio talks and radio drama significant for analysis. In them, I argue, one can look for the mechanisms of political subjectivity which posited a subject and an object, separate yet through mediations were linked to each other in the assumed unity of a national discourse.

The format of the radio talk, curiously stands in a tension with these mechanisms at work. Radio talks are usually designed to be part of "everyday life". The "dailiness" of broadcast talks which constitute the "background and foreground of our everyday dealings with each other in a common world" (Scannell, 1996: 5), however, clashed, in the case of Turkish Radio, with the inscription of "another world" that was usually regarded as standing above or alien to the ordinary people. The simple and "chatty" style of radio talks on Turkish Radio, were blended with authoritative inserts that aimed to teach the audience what is good and desirable. The chat was meaningful as long as it upheld a distinct, and usually alien, voice associated with authority. The ordinariness of the talk was disrupted by the insertion of "foreign" examples and names. The talks aimed to be "natural" and popular but were trapped in an "artificial" world.9

The spatiality of radio talks was especially problematic. Spatiality raises the issue of direction. "It asks, towards whom do programmes point?" (Scannell, 1996:11). What Scannell calls the "normalisation" of output in broadcasting requires an understanding that conceives of the audience's being in a separate space. For example, Scannell says, a "growing sense of talking into the void contributed, in the BBC, to the creation of listener research to answer such basic questions as who is out there listening, when can they listen and do they like what they hear?" (1996: 11). In the case of Turkish Radio, however, not only the listening habits but also the reactions of the audience were absent from the "meaning" of the programmes. The audience was assumed to be there although "absent". On the other hand, a sense of talking to the void did not lead the elite to know more about their

9 The artificiality of the talks - the subject matters, language and the style - were criticised by intellectuals of the period, among whom Baltacıoğlu was a consistent critic. Yeni Adam, No.252, 26 October 1939, p.2, 5.
target; instead, the disturbance of the act (talking to the void) was projected back on to the talk itself, problematising its style, its form and content. It was the talking subject who had to develop himself in order to come close to an idealised form of speech. The space of talking as well the space of listening were denied and replaced with an idealised space of the nation which the voice of the radio signified. In this sense, the communication model, of talking and listening, was fractured. The timeless and spaceless subject who talked without hearing was, at the same time, the object; the nation itself. The elite's obsession with self-discipline led it to adopt the ideal form of speech, that in principle embodied the people. This points to the critical role of the radio talks in Turkey in expressing the national ideal. Yet it also indicates the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of it.

5.2. The Language, the Body, and the Nation

In this section I will be looking more closely at some radio talks that featured regularly for certain periods on Turkish Radio, from the 1930s to the end of the 1940. These talks do not only take very similar topics, but also employ similar strategies for securing an authoritative voice. I will be referring here, to talks delivered by Selim Sirri, Kazim Nami Duru, Dr. Behçet Kamay, Dr. Galip Ataç, Dr. Celal Ertuğ.10 What makes these talks significant for my analysis, as I have noted before, is the "dailiness" in their subject matters, as opposed to rhetorical or jargon-ridden "Economy" or "History" talks. The former are addressed to the so-called ordinary people in their domestic settings. They talk to the family, both men and women, and sometimes children. In this sense, they are also different from talk programmes targeted specifically to "housewives".

Before I go into the recurring themes in these talks I would like to comment briefly on two of the programme producers: Selim Sirri and

10 Also published as books: Selim Sirri, Radyo Konferanslarım (My Radio Talks), 1932; Kazım Nami Duru, Ankara Radyosunda Söylediklerim (What I have said on Ankara Radio), 1937; Dr. Behçet Kamay, Radyo Konferansları: Sağlık ve Sosyal Bahisler (Radio Conferences: Health and Social Issues), 1941; Dr. Galip Ataç, Radyoda Evin Saati (The Home's Hour on Radio), 1943; Dr. Celal Ertuğ, Radyoda Pazar Sohbetleri (Sunday Chats on Radio), 1945.
Dr. Galip Ataç. These brief background stories provide an entry into the links between the radio talks and other practices and discourses of the period covered here.

Selim Şirri gave talks on Istanbul Radio starting from the beginning of the 30's. These were, according to Kocabasoğlu, exemplary of what was called the “talks of educational value” (1980: 99). They were easy to understand, and employed a language that was “appropriate to microphone” (Kocabasoğlu, 1980: 99). Selim Şirri was a late Ottoman intellectual, a Young Turk, who had discovered the importance of “national culture”, especially of “folk dances” in his years in Stockholm from 1907. He went there to study physical education after completing his degree in engineering. Impressed by the preservation and reappropriation of folk culture there in Sweden he became active, and continued after the foundation of the Republic, in research on folklore and folk dances. He believed that a dance based on folk dances in the Aegean part of Turkey zeybek could be adapted to “salon” life in modern cities and be turned into a modern “national dance”. His emphasis on getting rid of vulgarity and ending the exclusion of women in zeybek were attempts to give the dance a “civilised” and refined character. Selim Şirri’s interest in “physical” education and national culture set the framework and the tone of his radio talks.

Dr. Galip Ataç was the General Director of Haydarpaşa Emrâz'ı İhtaniye Hospital. His talks on Ankara Radio from the beginning of the 40’s were presented with the name “Home’s Hour”. It was a programme which touched on “various subjects” (not only those that interested women but the whole family) in an entertaining and simple style (Kocabasoğlu, 1980: 238). When his radio programme started in 1941, he was still living in Istanbul as a practicing medical doctor and had to send his talks by post to be read on Ankara Radio. But a year later he moved to Ankara and was recruited by Ankara Radio as a

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11 In 1925 he himself performed his zeybek with a female student of his on the stage for Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal appreciated the dance, asked him to perform it once more with his dinner jacket. After the performance Mustafa Kemal spoke to the audience: “Ladies and Gentlemen! Mr. Selim Şirri gave a civilised form to zeybek as he revived it...We can now say to Europeans that we have a perfect dance and we can perform it in salons and on stage. Zeybek dance can and should be performed in every social setting together with a woman.” (Tarcan, 1948: 3)
member of its staff. 12 His talks were very "popular" although he never read them himself. The reason for the popularity was explained by Tör, the director of Ankara Radio, as due to his "mastery of the technique for writing for radio" which did not address "only a small group" but was interesting for "young girls and boys, mature and old people, the illiterate and intellectuals, officials and other professionals". 13 Tör introduced the concept of "vulgarisation" (a term used by Westerners14, he noted) to account for the success of his talks. This meant treating a subject in a way that is accessible to all. But, he added, in order to achieve this one had to have a "universal culture". 15 In an interview with the presenter of the talks Ataç said that he tried to cater for different tastes and interests in the talks he wrote:

"I receive telephone calls after each talk. The listeners calling one after another tell me their opinions on the talk. Some are critical, others praise it. Some even threaten me. Sometimes they come to the hospital I work to talk to me. I had some idea of how difficult it could be to please people from different levels of culture and life styles before. But after I started producing for radio I realised the full extent of the problem. If you compliment plumpness in a talk, the slim women will feel susceptible; if you compliment dark complexions those who are fair will be upset...."16

The account on Ataç's talks conveys some important points that shed light on the circumstances of production and reception of radio talks. The technique of "vulgarisation" was regarded as one necessary condition of reaching the people. The talking person had to deal with the "level" of the audience. However by doing this, he stood above them since the technique required a "universal culture" which was synonymous, in this case, with Western culture. Here we see how a certain kind of authority was envisaged and implemented through radio. Ataç had a "fatherly" attitude, in Tör's terms, which

12 His weekly talks were first broadcast in the mornings (8:15) but later were moved into the evening band (21:00), and after 1944 were broadcast 3 times a week until his death in 1947.
14 The term means popularisation in French and does not have the negative connotations it has in English.
15 Ibid.
attended to the needs of the public in an understanding way, without snobbery. Yet he, by his “vast knowledge” of “various topics”, stood as an authority figure. He knew everything from hair care to child care! In this way, the matters of everyday life were redefined in the light of a new quasi-scientific knowledge which was informed by “civilisation”.

The other important point in Ataq’s account, concerns the reception of the talks. We see that the abstract concept of the people -the ideal audience-, in practice, came to mean those people either in Istanbul or in Ankara who could telephone or visit Ataq, other than a few who wrote to him. He was quite sarcastic about them in the interview, he mocked the trivial questions asked by them. The sarcastic attitude which also set the tone of his talks points to the unbridgeable gap between the ideal and the actual. The notion of the people, which functioned as a justifying principle of the elite’s activities, for example in radio broadcasting, was despised wherever the audience expressed itself. In fact, the triviality mocked in the audience reactions is no different than the triviality of the topics in the talks. The technique of “vulgarisation” translates into the feminisation and infantalisation of culture through radio broadcasting which I will be commenting on in the third section.

The two cases, that belong to two different decades, of Selim Sırrı and Galip Ataq present the problem -of the talk and the audience- in its diverse aspects. Selim Sırrı grounded his talks in the ideal national culture which, in turn, provided him with a policy for disciplining the bodies. Ataq took the triviality of bodies as a starting point and arrived at a sarcastic quasi-scientific discourse on them. In both of them the body was posited as the site of “national construction”. If the former is an example of the embodiment of the ideal, the latter regards the disembodiment of the actual, both of which was made possible by the symbolic voice of the radio. Both processes are linked to the fetish object of the nation incarnated in the voice. According to Zizek, the formula of fetishism is “I know, but nevertheless...” (1996: 245). The formula is differently interpreted in

17 He said, “You would be amazed by those letters that came from the listeners. All kinds of complaints, from their husbands, sons or mother-in-laws...Some would write pages just because of a pimple...Some complain of their landlords or neighbours...” “Evin Saati Muharriri Dr. Galip Ataq’la Bir Saat”, Radyo, Vol.1, No.9, 15 August 1942, p.9.
the two cases above. Selim Sirri's attitude seems to fall within, what Zizek calls, a totalitarian framework of authority which would say:

"Although 'we know very well' that we are people like others -at the same time consider ourselves to be 'people of a special mould, made of special stuff' -as individuals who participate in the fetish of the Object-Party, direct embodiment of the Will of History." (Zizek, 1996: 252)

On the other hand, Ataç preserved and expressed a distance towards the symbolic fiction of the Other by his cynical attitude (also by not reading his talks himself). His distanced attitude puts the symbolic fiction of the Other (the notion of the people) under question. The actual audience that he despised stands in contradiction to the idealised image of the audience. Yet, what was never put into question is the idea that the elite was made of "special stuff" (in having access to Western culture), in Zizek's words. This points to the slippery ground of political subjectivity in the Occidentalist framework, which oscillated between a serious faith in the national ideal and a sarcastic distanced attitude towards it, which nevertheless made of itself a fetishistic object expressed in the "voice" of radio. More importantly, it points to the nature of the self-disciplining activity of the elite that treats its own subjectivity as a national object; that attempts to curb the lack of faith in itself but paradoxically finds pleasure in its expressions. It is no surprise that "vulgarisation" and "glorification" were simultaneous strategies and were praised by the same people, at the same time. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the kind of authority that emerges, in this case, stands detached from its subject. It nurtures both its subject and its object. It is pedagogical - it understands, forgives, mocks and educates. Although regarded as "fatherly" it resembles a maternal authority that attends to the bodies and all the "trivial" topics associated with it. 18 The maternal authority resides in the voice; encompasses and transforms all the conflicts, all the divisions and splits of both the subject and the object. It alludes to

18 Lacey argues that the history of radio "had been the history of a development away from intellectualism to maternalism" which resonates in dialogue, drama and human interest. She also links this to the location of radio in the home, its intimate address, its sensory appeal, which grounds radio in the female realm. In Nazi Germany radio's true spirit was Muttergeist. (Lacey, 1993:118-9).
the symbolic fiction of the nation but retains, within itself, the prelinguistic immediate and “pure” enjoyment (not always making meanings but sometimes playing with the words, as a child will play with objects of pleasure). This I argue, is linked to the inability of the elite to recognise their “true” place in the world, to the disavowal of reality which is full of threats, to being forever trapped in youth. The content of the radio talks endorse the above argument.

I will now look at the recurring themes in the talks. These can be grouped in categories such as: the family, the body, the child, the youth/ideal, joy, and women.

a. The Family

The nuclear family was promoted in several talks in opposition to the traditional forms of extended family. Thus, the roles of the women and the men were redefined through radio talks. While the role of the new women were put in more ambivalent terms, which will be analysed in more detail under the heading of “women”, the tasks awaiting the new men were set more clearly. Selim Sirri reminded men that the age of the “dictatorship” of the father was over. In the old times, men were absent in the private sphere leaving many duties, such as child care to women; “children could put their demands to their father only through the mediation of the mother” (1932: 212). Now this had to change, the new family should be based not only on respect but also “love” among its members. According to Duru, both men and women had “duties” in the family, which was directly linked to the nation. While women “naturally” had more compassion for their children, and men lacked it, men had to educate themselves in order to become good fathers. “We” he says “lack the art of fatherhood” (43). A good father was one “who thought of the child more than himself; who wanted the child to be better than himself; and who tried to learn his duties and fulfilled them.” (Duru, 1937: 8) (emphasis added) In the same manner, the mother had to learn to combine her “instinctual motherly love” with “virtues of social motherhood”. Because Duru continues, “the family is the smallest cell of the society”, and the
“health of the nation” rises upon the health of the family. Turkish society, according to him, lacks a “scientific and civilised” family. The same theme rebounds in Ataç’s talks: “What we call the people is made up of families. If we compare the people to an organism, families are the cells.” (1943: 52)

It is interesting that fatherhood as well as motherhood were redefined as objects of national discipline in the radio talks. It is known that totalitarian regimes, such as Nazis, invested mothers with national duties through radio broadcasting (Lacey, 1993) which in turn contributed to a “science” of motherhood. But Turkish Radio also put emphasis, sometimes more distinctly, on men’s duties. Men, it was argued, should assume their role in the private sphere as part of their public duties. The most explicit challenge in this is to the Islamic traditions which privileged men’s duties in the public community, which gave them rights to marry up to four women as well as entrusting the responsibilities of child care and domestic life to women. The segregation of women and men, and consequently of the public and the private were to be reorganised in the ideal “civilised” national life. The first thing to be attended for this end, was correcting the indulgent sexual behaviour of men, orienting and re-educating them for family life.

Men had to be made responsible for family life. “Men and women have duties for the family, for each other as well as for the country.” (Ertuğ, 1945: 29) In the Turkish family (the re-invented tradition against the Ottoman family) “the proud, influential man cares for his wife, for the children...puts all his effort in them.” (Ertuğ, 1945: 35) This does not mean “a henpecked husband” adds Ertuğ, which had been a fearful label for men in Ottoman life. The justification of the new role lies in a “civilised” family. Although, many radio talks insisted on the changes that men had to undergo in family life, the change was essentially linked to the stable figure of women. Women who just had

19 In the first decades of the Turkish Republic, certain aspects of Ottoman patriarchy were condemned; “the remote, authoritarian father figure began giving way to a new intimacy and paternal involvement.” (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 123) Kandiyoti adds to her previous point in a recent text: “We have to entertain the possibility that defining responsible social adulthood in terms of monogamous heterosexuality may not only have been a matter of proscribing co-wives, concubines, and child brides but may also have been about taming other, unruly forms of male sexuality.” (1998:280)
to integrate the social and national duties to their already positive “sacrificial, compassionate, giving” roles, were entrusted the duty to look over men’s new roles. “If women did her best at home, took care of its cleanliness, its order, and trusted her husband, supported and motivated him in his efforts, then why should a man go astray?” (Ertuğ, 1945: 37) The man was put under women’s supervision in his transformation.

Dr. Ertuğ in his “Sunday Chats” also presented psychological explanations for the ongoing problems in the family. He contrasted a notion of love in men which sought “unattainable” objects and found expression in old Ottoman poems with the more mature love in the family life. Love in the new family life meant order and integrity. It was blended with the national “mission”. He referred to Freud to account for the common “bride” and “mother-in-law” conflict. He argued it was due to “subconscious” reasons that the wife and the mother competed for the same man. He suggested that they should not live in the same place. This was a suggestion that went against the tradition of big families. Dr. Ataç provided another “scientific” framework to argue that love between man and wife was the most developed form of love. Against the “superstitious belief in Turkey that love brings bad luck to marriages”, he claimed love between man and wife, although different from “great love” or “sexual love” was nevertheless love: a social bonding which rises upon natural laws. He referred to the role of “hormones” which may, due to their “complexities”, cause problems in a marriage. For example, the reason for extramarital tendencies of men was their hormones were too complex (1943: 97).

In both cases, we see that new “scientific” discourses were employed to explain traditional ills. The new family life was linked to principles, different from traditional and religious ones, concerning individual psychology and biology. However, the new discourses did not envisage radical changes in the society but just a revival of “Turkish family” life with new roles for men and additional tasks for women. The treatment of the “family” in radio talks can be summarised in three points: 1) radio was thought to intervene in the private sphere, re-defining the boundaries between the private and
the public; 2) men were entrusted with new duties in the private sphere as part of their public mission, 3) women were called to duty to take care of men, to understand and support them in their difficult task of change.

b. The Body

Selim Sirri's many talks were devoted to the importance of "body" in national education. He used several metaphors for the human body. One was "machine". He talked of the "motor" in the child. In a similar fashion, he saw old age caused by the "improper working" of the machine (1932: 70). At other points, he mentioned the body resembling a plant. "A child is like a plant", he said, while "the school is the garden, and the educators are the gardeners." (14) Another metaphor for the body was "army". He talked of the army of the body with the head as commander and other organs as officers (68). All these contradictory metaphors made sense only in the context of educating and disciplining the body. Whatever the metaphor, the body was something to be constructed -to be built, to be grown up. It was an instrument that aided the struggle for civilisation. "Physical education is both a social and a national issue, a vital one. To take care of the education of the body is a national duty for those who love their country". (116)

He talked of the importance of "food", "air", "water", "sunshine" and "sports" as basic elements that nurtured the body. He gave several examples from Western life styles and Western thinkers to support his points. For example, he referred to Europeans and Americans who, because they had understood the value of fresh air, kept their windows open all the time, did sports and went on walks. "They do not stay inside, at home or at coffee houses, spending all their time talking". (73) The relation to nature, fresh air in this case, was articulated in terms of a life style; the Western one was praised and the Turkish one was denigrated. Selim Sirri thought that the Turkish life was "artificial": "We have moved away from nature. It is necessary to return to nature and know how to benefit its blessings."
So even natural life had to be constructed in the Turkish life together with the body.

Taking up a similar theme, Duru also talked on the importance of nature. He posited it as the source of all knowledge against "superstitions". Nature, according to him, provided the better means for education: "When we were children we were not very much interested in life. The children of today are closer to life and nature. They go out of their classrooms to have a walk in the green." (1937:67) Sports were something that all radio talks dwelled on. Using a "scientific" language, words such as "oxygen", "carbon dioxide", "ultra-violet" and "infrared" rays, Dr. Kamay made ample reference to the importance of sunshine and sports. The stadium was, according to him, the most valuable kind of school. He said that the spread of sports activities in a nation was its "measure of civilisation and progress", and this was "a scientific, positive fact and principle." (1941:48) In a similar manner, he took eating habits to be a measure of "civilised" life. He talked about the role of vitamins, of fresh fruit and vegetables for healthy and efficient bodies. This, too was linked with a life style, the exemplary case being the Western one. In comparison with examples of Western cuisine, he argued, "(W)e too have to simplify our food which means that we have to make a revolution in our kitchens." (70)

The body appeared in these talks imbued with meanings: 1) The body was set as the site of the construction of national life; 2) the body was the smallest unit of discipline, and 3) the body was the measure of civilisation.

c. The Child

Child care, child education and pedagogy were the most common topics of the radio talks. The child became a special focus of attention in these years. This was in accord with the demands of the age: "never in humanity before children have attracted such attention". (Selim Sirri, 1932:11) This was the "age of the child". Selim Sirri referred to Rousseau's Emile and several pedagogues in Europe
who had taken the child as an object of analysis and discipline. Therefore, he argued along with the “question of economics” and the “question of women” there is a “question of the child”. Selim Sirri's talks concentrated on the examples of institutions for children, such as kindergartens in Germany, France, Italy and Hungary; on methods of discipline and education such as “boy scouts” developed in Britain. His primary arguments were: that “we do not give enough importance to children” (28); that children have a world of their own; and “we should stop making children like ourselves”(195). The third point is especially an important theme in his talks. In a talk called “The Future Children”, he referred to a questionnaire directed to some French pedagogues and published in the journal Les Annales. One of the questions inquired about the specialists’ own experience of childhood in comparison with the envisaged education of future children. While the French thinkers evaluated their childhood primarily in positive terms, Selim Sirri said, if he were to reply the question, he would be critical of the form of discipline he experienced in his childhood: “I would definitely not give the same kind of education and discipline to my children. The old kind of discipline made people hesitant, timid and helpless.” (53) The harsh methods of older forms of discipline had to be replaced by dialogue and understanding; “to talk and to make children talk”: “verbal communication” was the most powerful instrument. The fantasy that concerned the power of “talking” is a theme that recurs in other radio talks, and needs further comment in its connection to the medium of radio, which I will come back to later in the chapter.

The pedagogical methods that were suggested in child care and discipline made it clear that this was a “national” issue. “Every child” said Duru, “is a national being.” He, too, referred to Rousseau’s Emile and to other philosophers, such as Montaigne's and Spencer’s works. He claimed that the best of contemporary European pedagogues were, at the same time, medical doctors. 20 His diagnosis, as a doctor, of the “child problem” in Turkey pointed to the lack of institutions and means that would secure a “separate world” for

20 Dr. Ertuğ, in his talks, also mentioned the importance of the medical doctors in “seeing through” people (1945).
the child; and to the harsh and authoritarian methods of discipline which were heritages of the old regime. Hence the new methods symbolised the new order in Turkey. He suggested that the People's Houses could be the locations for bringing together the Turkish mothers and creating a new atmosphere for children. At some points the notion of the child was equated with the new nation itself, which found its expression in statements such as: “The victory of humanity will be completed by the victory of the children.” (Duru, 1937: 16)

The idea that child care is, by itself, a new science was a common theme in the talks. The child was redefined as a new object of discipline: 1) it was regarded as a symbol for the future with a clear break from the past, 2) it was treated as a symbol of the nation, 3) “scientific” child care and discipline were posed as the necessary conditions of civilisation.

d. Youth

Another common theme in the talks was the emphasis on “youth” and related themes such as resisting old age, preservation of health and beauty. These themes were significantly linked to the national ideal. As opposed to the Islamic ideas of fate, and the mortality of man in relation to God, nationalist discourse praised the values of youth and the will power to stay young. In his talk, “The Hints for Staying Young” Selim Sirri said that “youth is a privilege, an honour” as well as being “the happiest stage of life” (1932: 64-65). Before revealing the secrets for staying young in his talk, he reminded the listeners to make their pen and paper ready to note down “important” hints, but what followed was an abstract argument instead of practical hints. “To get old means dying little by little each day. Then what does one should do not to die?”(66) The answer was:

21 It is interesting that it was one of the principles of the People's Houses not to admit little children to meetings: “There will be no little children in the meetings and performances in the People's Houses. Since the goal of the People's Houses is the high ideal of development (training, growing up are other meanings of the word used “yetişme”), children who would disturb the silence and the order should not be given place in our Houses”. CHP Haıkevleri Öğrengi, 1935, Ankara, p. 22. Real "children" and the idealised notion of the child contradicted each other in practice.
"a continuous struggle". He introduced the "army" as a metaphor for the body in that context. In his subsequent talks he finally mentioned the "essential" factors that contributed to staying young: fresh air, food, water, sunshine, and sports. It is striking that the emphasis on youth had a naive implication that death can be avoided. Old age meant, according to him, that the body (the machine) was not working properly. Therefore, if the machine was taken good care of, old age, and consequently death could be avoided. He cited a phrase that "people do not die but they slowly commit suicide". (70)

Dr. Kamay took up the same question, a decade after, in his talk, "Youth and Old Age": "Is it possible to stay young and not get old?" (1941:60) He argued that it was: "Science and experience have shown us that it is possible to postpone old age; stay young for a long time; and when finally old age arrives, to be still robust by abiding to the principles of health, by disciplining the soul and the body, by avoiding debauchery and bad habits, and by practicing rules of hygiene. It is even in our capacity to make life longer." (60) This was possible just by resisting the intake of "poisons". His definition of old age was the slow and constant poisoning of the blood. He, too, believed in the maxim that "Human beings don't die but they kill themselves". (61). If people could say no to alcohol and tobacco, if they took care of their bodies, if they could be happy, and if they could keep their "psychology strong" by keeping away from "psychological ills and deficiencies" (63) then they could stay young. The desirable examples were to be found in Europe and America; the Westerners, by the help of the "progress of civilisation", and of the "progress in health" specifically, had been able to reduce the "death rate" (61).

The idea of staying young found its most absurd expressions in Dr. Ataç's talks. After receiving a letter of complaint from his female listeners that he primarily talked on issues concerning the young people, he devoted some of his talks to the particular "problem of staying young" that most women had. However, instead of the naive belief that old age can be postponed, he adopted a sarcastic style which made references to "appearing young" instead of actually "staying young". He said, "women should make themselves appear to
be at the age that they want to be...A life struggle for women is to resist old age". (1943: 33) He talked about the role and the history of make-up in civilisation as an antidote for old age. "It is a denial of civilisation" if one considered make-up as "artificial beauty". (34) He suggested to women that they should have their portraits painted around the age of 30. Keeping that on the wall of their grooming rooms, they should, by the help of make-up, try to create the same image on their faces in the years to come. Ataç, in this way, subtly mocked the women's so-called obsession of staying young. But he combined his mockery with some actual medical hints for hair and dental care. In his talks, like the others, youth was praised but it was expressed in a language that stood on the brink of "reality" and "nonsense". Therefore it is difficult to assess the seriousness of some of his hints, such as "you should not eat fish because then your skin will be like fish skin" (91), or "women who take arsenic will have a beautiful complexion and long and healthy hair" (92). He, like others, pointed to the importance of fresh air and a natural setting for beauty and youth, but his suggestion that people should live in villas in suburban areas, or if that was not possible, on the top floor of high buildings -so that they will have beautiful complexions and strong hearts- reflects an attitude that mocks both the issues touched upon and himself talking on them. Some topics that he chose to talk on, such as sneezing and the gender differences in sneezing, enhanced this ambivalent attitude.

Ataç's emphasis on youth provides another perspective in thinking about the youth and the ideal. Selim Sırrı talked about the ideal as a force that shaped the present. Youth had to have an ideal which will in turn give it a desired form. The analogy was with the sculptor carving out a piece of stone to bring out the idea or the ideal. He elaborated, in his talks, on the path to the ideal whose subject was the young people who stayed forever young. Ataç, on the other hand, mocked the ideal by trivialising or "vulgarising" it. The ideal was a desired, but once popularised and feminised, also a disturbing theme in nationalist discourse that needs further reflection in relation to women's roles.
We see that in many talks there was a common emphasis on staying young. Youth was treated as 1) the present stage of the nation as well as the desired stage of life, the ideal, 2) death was denied in link to it, and 3) the methods of staying young were associated with the "progress of civilisation".

e. Joy

Turkish Radio often talked of the need to be happy and joyful in the period that I have researched. This was usually coupled with a diagnosis of a lack in Turkish society. "We Turks", said Selim Sırrı, “are usually quiet, reserved, proud and a little melancholic. These characteristics are due to the kind of discipline and education that had been given to us." (1932: 189) The nation, therefore, had to learn how to be joyful. “Joy” was a matter of “discipline and determination” (193). It had also beneficial effects on health and youth of the body.

Dr. Ertuğ, in his talk, “Be Joyful!” referred to the same deficiency in Turkish culture: “The real Turkish self, its happy, honey-tongued, optimistic characteristics had been deteriorated by those bigots who churned up the country in the name of religion.” (1945: 123) So, as opposed to the ills of the recent past, the present and the future had to be constructed on the basis of different sentiments. Serious and sober faces had to be replaced by those with a big smile. He admitted that the task was not that easy. The Turks were “constructing a new building on the ruins of the old.” (125) The stones for the new building were there; it was only a matter of creating the new cement that would glue them to each other. New sentiments, such as joy and optimism, were regarded as the cement of the society. This also made reference to the national cultural policies which despised alaturka music: “Don’t try to entertain yourself,” said Ertuğ, “with those songs that are full of sighs (ah, of, aman)” (127). Ertuğ's positive examples came, non-surprisingly, from the West. Americans, for example, could even find joy in risks, they were imbued with courage and initiative which brought them success. Ertuğ also linked joy and laughter with long life.
Ataç was more specific in his suggestions. He talked, in a mocking way, of the religious rites on religious holidays (which were boring and gloomy). He suggested, instead, that people should go to a theatre or a vacation on religious holidays. He advised secular forms of entertainment which were "civilised". However, he also warned against the dangers of the new forms of entertainment. According to him, movies, for example, could be harmful to children, therefore the potential dangers of the cinema should be countered by adults talking to children after seeing a movie.

We see that while contemporary forms of entertainment (predominantly for men) such as sitting in coffee houses, drinking alcohol, listening to *alaturka* songs were denigrated in radio talks, instead, joy and happiness were praised as new national sentiments. However, the general absence of concrete suggestions for entertainment in the talks, gives these sentiments a symbolic character. They link to the ideal that is set in terms of a comparison with the West: in terms of what "we" lack and what "they" have. The construction metaphor used by Ertuğ makes it clear that the judge who will assess the desired changes will be those looking from outside: "Only those watching us from outside will see the difference (the difference between the past and the present)." (1945: 125)

The new ideal sentiments of the nation, specifically joy, represented a change in the character of the people which was opposed to past characteristics ascribed to Turkish culture. Joy was regarded as, 1) an ideal sentiment of the nation, a sign of "civilisation", 2) as a signal of unified cooperation in the construction of the nation, 3) as a disavowal of reality that was stricken with problems and divisions.

f. Women

As I have shown in the section on the "family", the "problem of women" was the most complex issue addressed by the radio talks. There were a number of twists in handling the issue. On the one hand, women were seen to be a guarantor of "civilisation", in for
example Selim Sirri's argument that women should take place in public life, thereby correcting the ills of the past order. Women, on the other hand, were vested with "essential" duties in the private realm, the most important of which was motherhood. The two aspects had a critical balance. It is not mere coincidence that Selim Sirri referred to the image of the "double edged sword of civilisation" when he was talking on women and sports: "One should not forget that the arms of civilisation have double edges; using them is subject to knowledge. Otherwise they cut one's hands." (1932: 142) It is also significant that he, who had preached European life styles regarding several other subjects, was cautious on the issue of women's public activities: "The worst thing in the world is to imitate others. 'American women do this, British girls do that...so we have to do it...What is our difference from them?'. I totally disagree with this claim." (145) There appeared to be a dislike for a comparison with the West if it concerned women.

Women were regarded as both the sign of change, and as the most stable factor in the society. A woman had to change without actually changing her primary position and roles. She had to show the world the "superior" civilised state of the Turkish nation, but she also had to be altruistic, in Selim Sirri's words, to be willing to give up, to sacrifice her individual ambitions. Selim Sirri, in his talk "Women in the twentieth century", argued against European feminists, and warned the Turkish women against the dangers of "becoming like a man". If women competed with men, it could be detrimental to national life. However, he also argued for the education of girls. It was necessary for them to be good mothers and educators. In connection with this role, he praised womanhood: "Woman is like a sun which warms, illuminates and makes life." (271) The woman was both a fearful and glorified figure.

However, the boundary between the private and the public was

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22 For example, he linked the "sick" alaturka music to the fact that women were absent in the community life (Selim Sirri, 1932: 271).

23 According to Baltacioglu, the rights given to women by the Turkish Republic symbolise the authenticity of the "Turkish Revolution"; it shows that it is not a mere imitation of European societies. Ismail Hakki Baltacioglu, "Yeni Devletin Kültür Programları", Yeni Adam, Vol.2, No.66, 4 April 1935.
not a simple line dividing motherhood and the public activities of women. The boundary was constantly problematised and re-drawn within the national project by the male elite. The private duties of women usually transcended the private domain. Women as mothers were treated almost like a collective political subject and given the national duty of realising the project of “Turkish motherhood”. “Unite Turkish Mothers!” said Duru, “If you unite, your love will become a sacred power to which the whole world will bow.” (1937: 31) Public duties, on the other hand, were fashioned after the model of motherhood. Women were regarded as suitable for posts such as school teachers and nurses, since they had the “natural” characteristics of compassion and care. The “real” woman, in Ertuğ’s words, was a dependable and powerful figure in the national life both as a mother, a wife, and a professional which could safeguard and nurture the nation.

Sexuality, especially the sexual desire, of women was never mentioned in the radio talks. The subjectivity of women was denied. Nevertheless most of the radio talks addressed “feminine” issues such as hair care, beauty of the complexion and problems in the domestic sphere. Everyday life, which the radio talks felt that they had to touch upon, had a “feminine” character.

“Women” figured in the national discourse conveyed by the radio talks as a complex and contradictory issue. 1) Women were glorified for their capacity for the “natural” national tasks, 2) women were set as objects to be kept under control against the “excesses” of “civilisation”, 3) women became the “matter” of the radio talks, thereby contributing to the “feminisation” of culture.

5.3. Nature, Culture and Civilisation

The themes taken up by the radio talks between the early 30’s and the late 40’s in Turkish Radio provide rich material for thinking about the Occidentalist fantasy in Turkish nationalism. It becomes clear that Occidentalism did not simply mean, for the elite, a division between “us” and “them” (the West). The civilisation, represented by
the West, was imagined and linked to the Turkish nation in the most intricate ways. Several metaphors and operators were implemented in order to imagine and assume a homogeneous nation which was “genuinely” Turkish, and which rapidly bridged the gap with the West. The assumptions were enhanced by the medium of radio which talked to “the people.”

“Talking” was regarded as an efficient vehicle for making things happen. The emphasis on “talking” as one of the disciplinary methods of the new order, especially in the disciplining of the child, had analogies to radio as a talking apparatus. When Dr. Ataç suggested to parents to talk to their children after they had seen a movie to “correct and counter the harmful effects”, the hidden reference was to his own talk which aimed to give the “correct” interpretations on matters of everyday life. Or when Dr. Ertem talked on the need to be joyful, he imagined the medium carrying the waves of joy: “I would very much like to send you effects through radio waves that would make you smile, that would make you forever happy.” (Ertem, 1945: 124) In a similar manner, Duru believed if radio transmissions had a wider reception, “thousands of Turkish mothers would be activated by his words and take the initiative” for the “sacred unity of the Turkish mothers” (1937: 31). Selim Sırri ended his series of talks by a talk devoted to the question of “how to talk”. He dwelled on the technique of talking, the articulation of words, pronunciation, style of delivery to make the point that talking should aim at “clarity, truth and beauty”; it should “convince, excite and make people think” (1932: 345). These concerns reflect a self-conscious attitude to the medium. Talking on radio (an ideal example of talking24) was thought to have automatic effects transforming the audience (except in the case of Ataç who had a less idealised vision of the audience). In this way, radio technology was conceived as an “extension” or an “apparatus” that constructed

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24 Dyson argues that “the ideal radio voice represents the world for the listener from the anechoic space of the studio - a space which acoustically is, in the jargon of sound technicians ‘dead’... Distortion and interference, on the other hand, suggest a reduction of presence through contact with the external world, by aurally evoking another place and time, the illusion that the voice is ‘present’ with the listener. Sound technology echoes these beliefs. In fact, the success of microphone design is measured in terms of the credibility of the presence it simulates, indicated by the clarity, the central stereophonic perspective, the volume, crispness and articulation of the voice it amplifies.” (Dyson, 1994: 178, 179)
and aggrandised the political subjectivity of the elite. The elite imagined themselves creating the nation in their own image by talking on radio.

However, talking also conveyed “disturbances” which were produced at the points of contact with reality. Ataç knew that in a fifteen minute talk, the basics of child discipline could not get across to the audience (1943: 51). It was evident in Ertuğ’s and Duru’s comments that radio broadcasting was limited both in its capacity to carry “joy” and in its geographical diffusion. “Disturbance” found its best example in Ataç’s talks, which mocked both its subject matter and himself talking on them. There were mismatches, that forced its way into the language, mismatches between the subject and the object of the nation despite the attempts to unify them in the act of talking.

The mismatches usually surfaced themselves in the form of contradictions. Selim Sirri, who was an admirer of subtle techniques of the Western discipline argued, in one of his talks that referred to German methods of education and discipline, that propaganda was not the best means of influencing children. “You are not supposed to lecture to children on how to love and defend their country. It is the nature of acts that they learn from. Children go around their country, visit its mountains, forests, rivers... and they love the beautiful country they have liked so much, and because of this love they undertake the mission of working and fighting for it.” (1932: 61-2) However, in his only talk that directly addressed children, he did just the opposite. He talked on the love of country and lectured on ways of conceptualising it (246). Hence, he couldn’t bridge the gap between the act and the word. Primarily talking to the children in the big cities, he did not himself believe that they would ever go visiting around the country. And against this fact he chose to talk on the subject as a way of compensation, as a way of constructing the required “love”.

The most apparent mismatch was in the case of women. The discourse that praised “civilisation” contradicted the discourse on harnessing the excesses of civilisation in the case of women. In a similar manner, the youth that was so praised in the talks was in no
way linked to the participation of young people in power. Children, who were posited as the future of the nation were, in practice, barred from many public activities, for example in the People's Houses. Therefore the most favourite subjects of the talks, children, youth and women, had more of a symbolic value than pointing to the actual objects of discipline. They acted as "operators" that linked the concept of "civilisation" to the Turkish national ideal.

The "unity" posited in the ideal regarding the origins and the future of the nation was constructed in opposition to existing divisions. The divisions of ethnicity and language; the divisions between "the people" and the elite; between men and women; between the past and the present; and between the West and Turkey were to be handled and covered up in the assumed "unity" of the nation. Yet these divisions made their presence felt by forcing their way into the talks. The radio talks had a dialogic character, in this sense; since they also talked to those concerns -regarding the divisions in the social- which the elite themselves were aware of but wished them away through their own activity. It is possible to point to several examples in the talks which were dialogically produced.

Ethnic divisions were countered by the idea that the new principles of discipline and education could produce a "national character". Thus, "those remainders of communities, which lack history and culture, will be discouraged to stick to different identities...then those people, whatever their origins are, will be united under the banner of Turkish nationalism." (Duru, 1937: 72) The promotion of the best examples of Turkish language, for example on radio, would contribute to this end for it would change the "souls" of the people.

The division between men and women were handled again in a dialogic manner. Selim Sırrı responded to the "feminist" arguments

25 Rose talks about the "moments of excess" in the case of "disavowal" which "always has something of the overstatement about it." (1984: 37).
26 Duru talked about "talking Turkish" that would not only influence "those remainders of other communities" but even "the foreigners, who would come running to learn our language, to know our culture. Then Turkish land would be the centre of the civilisation in the world." (1937: 73) This links with the concerns of the elite, specifically regarding radio, of "making the world hear our voice." It also links with the BBC Turkish Section's strategies that invested on this need to be heard and complimented.
that insisted on the equality of men and women. Arguing against these, he insisted on the “special” condition of women in Turkish society which gave a particular importance to motherhood. Indeed, Selim Sirri responded to several hidden worries and questions in his talks. The concern that “some say that we are not capable of progress”, which pointed to the division between the West and Turkey, was answered by examples from the West: “Great men” such as Edison, Wilson, Faraday or Rousseau who had a deprived childhood had succeeded through their will power (1932: 226, 231-4). In this way, the internalised Orientalism, and the consequent feelings of inferiority of the Turkish people, were addressed.

The comments on Turkish nationalism in the talks were also geared to respond to and interpret the “Western gaze”. Duru argued that Turkish nationalism was not “monopolistic” like Western nationalisms, and this was a fact “whatever the foreigners and the enemies said” (1937: 71). Duru’s words on Turkish national character, that it praised truth and reality, that it did not fall prey to mere illusions, sound defensive. And when he said that the Turks do not boast of their national characteristics at a point when he was boasting, his discourse becomes contradictory. This attitude, split between the internalised negative values ascribed by the West or by the projected Western gaze, and the positive values attached to Turkish nationalism was reflected in the ambivalence toward the West. The West, which had recently been an enemy in the national war was, at the same time, regarded as the model of civilisation. Duru’s attempt to handle the ambivalence is significant:

“Once, I too read that nationalistic poem against the West that went, ‘I am a Turk and an enemy to you even if I were left alone in the world’... It was the Western imperialism that strove to destroy us, not the absolute West; but, who could, in those days of immense pains, differentiate the silent Western humanity from the mean Western imperialism? Today we are powerful; the imperialists who have failed to destroy us compete with each other to be our friends.” (1937: 74)

The “Turk”, against all pains and difficulties, created and empowered himself, according to Duru. The reference to the “Turk”
here reflects back on the talking subject. The elite, defined themselves as those who could create the “genuine” Turkish nation through their mastery of Western techniques and through their creativity. However, in order to project their self-image to the nation, by containing its divisions and assuming a purity, they had to go through several mediations. So that they can make themselves believe in the project, and be convinced to love their new missions. The point that I have made before, that the radio talks were mainly addressed to the elite themselves finds support in Selim Sırrı’s statement: “...excitement is an electric power that agitates the whole nation. But that current should, first, be wound around the spool...In order to convince others one should first be convinced himself.” (1932: 197-8)

The mediating concepts or the operators were necessary to postulate the “unity” of the nation, in time and space. The elite traveled through these to arrive at the equation of the subject and the object, that is, their own political subjectivity and the nation. The images of civilisation, culture and nature were deployed to link the real and the ideal. As I have shown, the body was regarded as the site of construction of the nation in the radio talks. However the body was paradoxically both a natural and cultural territory. It provided a natural resource which had to be culturally processed in order to be “naturally” linked to the nation. The nature of the body was conceived in cultural metaphors, while culture was fixed in imaginary “natural” origins. The nation, therefore, was both a given (a natural resource) and something to be constructed. Construction was set in terms of education and discipline. This resembles the formula that Rousseau has presented in Emile (which was often cited by the radio talks in Turkish Radio). Rousseau saw education as something that gives back to culture the nature it has destroyed (Rose, 1984: 44). But the paradox of Rousseau’s work lied in the fact that “the recreation of a natural man can only be a highly artificial process”, which meant that nature “is not something which can be retrieved, it has to be added.” (Rose, 1984: 44)

The “natural” supplement to culture came through the categories
of the child, youth and women in Turkish national discourse. These categories were treated as essential and natural depositories of truth which could by-pass the contradictions and divisions of the existing culture. Curiously, they symbolised the origins, the present and the future of the nation at the same time. They symbolised the ideals of the elite (immortality, joy, innocence, love and care), and were regarded as an antidote to the degeneration of the past order (since they belonged to nature and therefore existed partly out of culture).

The way culture was contrasted to nature, however, significantly diverges from "the conventional Western symbolisation" (Strathern, 1995a: 189). According to Strathern, the Western symbolisation of culture and nature indicates an opposition that works within a logic of control and colonisation. Nature is regarded as something to be acted upon, while culture is an artifice. But culture is legitimised by being grounded in nature and natural differences. Gender, according to Strathern, plays an important role in this legitimisation. It acts as an operating agent that grounds culture in nature.

But the Turkish national discourse, conveyed by radio broadcasting, articulated a different matrix. Culture as the domain of national "authenticity", and embodied in the elite was fixed and could not be dealt with in a reflective attitude. The artificiality of culture, including the arbitrariness of language (even more so because of the new language imposed by the elite by the Language Reform) was treated as non-problematic. Rousseau's skepticism toward language "as a flaw on the world which breaks up the essential continuity of nature and damages our relationship to it" (Rose, 1984: 46) was not shared by the Turkish elite. They considered language and talking as efficient means of constructing the ideal. On the other hand, the concept of nature was problematised. Turkish nature had to be reconstructed upon a new model; hence, the references to the body and Turkish characteristics. Nature was seen through the eyes of the Western civilisation, which had ascribed and fixed "natural differences and deficiencies" in it. Turkish nature had to be cultivated along the principles of the Western civilisation. Therefore, what was contrasted to each other was not nature and culture, but nature and civilisation.
Civilisation was treated as a technique, as an apparatus or a leverage that would trigger the dynamics of change and transform the natural realm, the children, the women, and the youth, bridging the gap with the ideal. Culture, on the other hand, lacked any kind of inherent dynamic. It was reduced to the activities of elite, to talking, to will power. It lacked any spatial or temporal dimensions, especially in the case of radio. It was thought as immediate and directly embodied in the subjectivity of the elite.

But from another aspect, Turkish national discourse operated within Rousseau’s paradox. If nature was something to be constructed it could not be retrieved. It could only be added to legitimise culture, to encompass and absorb what is arbitrary within a universal system. The “natural supplements” that mediated between the subject and the object of the nation stood paradoxically as the images of the ideal. In this way, the culture was distanced from the elite’s immediate actions, and were infantilised and feminised as an outcome of the maneuver that contrasted nature and civilisation. The elite, unwillingly (against their assumed authority positions) identified themselves as “forever young” sons of the nation which was a mother to all.\(^{27}\) In their projection of the “mass” and the “ideal” in radio broadcasting, they inserted “female characteristics” into the activities of the public domain.\(^{28}\) This was coupled by the “feminine” iconography of the regime.\(^{29}\) A parallel national iconography was

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\(^{27}\) I use the term “unwillingly” here, because contrary to Renan’s welcomed idea of the “will to nationhood” in Turkey, the national identity was a product of a complicated process. In Bhabha’s terms, “identification of the subject of cultural discourse is dialogical or transferential in the style of psychoanalysis. It is constituted through the locus of the Other which suggests both that the object of identification is ambivalent, and, more significantly, that the agency of identification is never pure or holistic but always constituted in a process of substitution, displacement or projection.” (1990:313)

\(^{28}\) Lacey points to a very similar process in German Radio, starting from the Weimar period. (1993: 35)

\(^{29}\) “In the first decades of the republic, the modernity of the new state was most eloquently signaled through images of women that became central to the iconography of the regime.” (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 125)
centred around the children. The infantilisation and feminisation of culture were determined by the Occidentalist framework that circumscribed the process of the identification of the subject, and the definition of the object of the nation with reference to a Western model. The national ideal, through the aid of the techniques of the Western civilisation, was invested in the symbols of the child and the woman. This gave radio its distinct maternal authority. In the following chapter, I will analyse some examples of radio drama, especially those labeled as “domestic drama”, to further explicate the connections between gender and the nation, and the maternal authority of the Turkish radio in the Occidentalist fantasy.

30 Not only the day the national parliament was founded was turned into a national children’s holiday (23 April), and children were symbolically linked to the nation in many other events and performances, there was also an analogy of the child and the nation in the national discourse. Nafi Atif said in an article on discipline and education, in the People’s Houses’ main journal Ülkü, that the new pedagogical views treated the child as separate from the adult, and not as a “smaller version of the adult”. He argued that this perception implicated an analogy to Turkish nation. “Turkish nation, by severing itself from all the ties that hindered its survival and growth, is getting ready to show the originality of its body (constitution).” “Terbiye Anlayışında İlerleme”, Ülkü, Vol.1, No.1, February 1933, p.127. It is interesting that the originality of Turkish nation was fixed in its childhood, which was nevertheless inferior to adulthood.
The "magical door" of radio drama in the studio of Ankara Radio.
(Radyo, 1/8: 14, 15 July 1942)
CHAPTER 6
Radio Drama: Gender and the Fantasy of the Nation

I have pointed in the previous chapter to the conceptual matrix within which radio talks figured as part of the highly valued “verbal programmes” on Turkish Radio. Drama was another important, if not the sine qua non, feature of Turkish radio broadcasting since its nationalisation. Drama was regarded as especially an advantageous form through which national ideas could be transmitted in a “lively” style. But to the extent that radio drama moved “between dream and reality, the inner world of the mind and the outer world of concrete objects” (Esslin, 1980:184) they have led to “framing errors” (Crisell, 1994:162). This not only occurred on the part of the audience, as it happened in Britain or the USA such as “sending flowers to the studio after the death of a character in a soap opera” (Crisell, 1994: 162), but also on the side of the radio staff in Turkey. An actor’s memoir¹ from the beginning of the 1940s is striking. During the broadcast of a radio drama when, in the opening of the play an officer starts criticising the army in a bar, some “men” rushed to the control room of Ankara Radio to stop the transmission. Despite the fact that the play had been submitted to the control of the Ministry of Press and Publications, and even to the General Staff before, those in charge of censorship in Ankara Radio could not wait to see the twist of the story which was about an officer who pretended to be in opposition to Turkish army to trap some secret agents. So even the radio staff had “framing errors”. Fiction and reality came closest to meeting in radio drama.

If the BBC Turkish Service saw news programmes as essential² to its manufacture of “truth”, Turkish Radio, on the contrary, resorted to fantasy as a means of representing and safeguarding the national

² In a document called “Post-War Broadcasting in Turkish”, Mitchell stresses that “the primary appeal of our broadcasts will continue to lie in their news content.” The BBC Written Archives, 20 October 1944, E1/1259/2.
truth. It is interesting that the BBC only repeated what was obvious for Turkish broadcasters in 1966, in its reply to the Turkish broadcasters' request of information on "educational programmes". The BBC advised the dramatic form: "A good deal of the Drama output presents contemporary social problems in a way calculated to lead to discussions." The BBC, in the previous years, though aware of the appeal of dramas for Turkish broadcasting, had been skeptical about their quality. Nevertheless, whatever their quality was, radio dramas and the dramatic form were at the foreground of cultural and educational programmes, since the beginning of the 40's.

Then the question arises: Why was fantasy privileged to "factual" output -such as the domestic news and features programmes or documentaries- in Turkish radio broadcasting? Or to put it in other words, why was the tendency to take fantasy for reality? In this chapter I analyse the dramatic form of representation on Turkish Radio to reflect back on the questions raised before. That is: what do the fantasies staged in radio dramas convey about the elite's conceptualisation of the nation and the West? And how are these to be linked to the gendered representations of "civilisation", regarding technology, bodies, space and time? Finally, what do they tell us about Occidentalism and governmentality?

I have shown that the format of the radio talk allowed its "author-speakers" an extended authority -supplemented by the technology of sound production- which equated talking with making things happen. The body was posited as the site of national construction in a matrix of

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3 Although the news and the news programmes consisted approximately 60% of verbal programmes in the 40's, the amount of domestic news, features and documentaries were negligible in comparison to foreign news (Kocabasoglu, 1980: 224).

4 In 1949, the BBC had sent a copy of "The Right Way to Radio Play Writing" (as it appears in the archive document. The name of the book should be How to Write Broadcast Plays, 1932) by Val Gielgud (with the author's autograph on the first page) to Ankara Radio upon its request for information on radio dramas. The BBC Written Archives, 24 November 1949, E1/1258.

5 The BBC Written Archives, 21 March 1966, From: Donald Stephenson, To: Adnan Oztrak, E1/2,432/1.

6 An audience research of the BBC Turkish Service in 1948 stated that there was "some demand for plays, although the vagueness of the suggestions shows that many listeners are not accustomed to this form of entertainment." The suggestions ranged from "village and family plays" to "vaudevilles, comedies" and Hamlet. These reflected, according to the BBC, the nature of the drama output on Turkish Radio. BBC Written Archives, 15 March 1949, "BBC Eastern Services Bi-Monthly Service Report", E1/1257.
nature vs. civilisation. The national ideals that portrayed “a union with the world” were grounded in “natural” categories such as children, youth and women. I have discussed that the outcome of this was the infantilisation and feminisation of culture to the extent that the elite positioned themselves as the “sons of the nation”. Here, I investigate more deeply both the institutional and psychological aspects of this subject-position of the elite in relation to the fantasies of the nation.

First, I discuss the specific characteristics of drama on radio, which give the dramatic form a special status in comparison to stage drama: a soundscape that substitutes a landscape, and which also evokes an imaginary public. This I position within the institutional framework of Turkish Radio which privileged the dramatic form in educational and cultural programming during the 1940s. The accounts of the production of plays and the regulation of their subject-matter in these years provide a general framework within which the fantasies, both in their form and content, can be interpreted.

Then, I go on to analyse the gendered characteristics of the dramas, especially what Turkish broadcasters called “family” or “domestic” drama. Here I discuss the centrality of women for national signification, discussed by several contemporary social researchers in its various aspects (Armstrong, 1982; Chatterjee, 1993b; Enloe, 1989; Kandiyoti, 1989; 1991; 1993; 1996; 1997a; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989; Jayawardena, 1986). Women symbolised the “border guards” (Armstrong, 1982) or were treated as the “liminal case” of national identity (Norton, 1988) in Turkey. They were incorporated to the national project both as part of the national iconography and objects of control, but were excluded as subjects. Thus, Occidentalism made a significant reference to the role of “the woman” in its boundary management.

Third, I link the constructions of gender in drama to the gendered constructions of change and stability. In this section, I analyse two radio dramas which are significant examples of “realistic” portrayals of man and woman in family life, as opposed to the naive symbolism often seen in other radio dramas of the period. These convey the role of women in a more complex dramatic action. They also bring to view
the splits of men in relation to women. Here it is possible to detect the significations of stability and change, imagined in terms of dichotomies -man/woman, urban/rural, past/present, Western/Turkish, in their link to the national discourse.

The dichotomies represented through gendered terms and conceived within the immediate "national time" bear on the subjectivity of the elite. The representation of women, as well as the more general representation of the people, tell us more about those who produce these categories than the referent of the categories themselves. What Jordanova argues for the Enlightenment dichotomies of women and men, and nature and culture in the West, in terms of their significance for expressing the "interests of the small but influential elite which generated the literature"\(^7\) (1995: 64) holds true for this case too. Therefore, through the analysis of gendered dichotomies I arrive at the dynamics and tensions that make-up the subjectivity of the national elite given the lack of fit between experiences and representations. Radio technology, in this context, appears not as a means of a communication system but as a tool that facilitates the reproduction of political power. This also bears on the rationale of governmentality in early Turkish history which makes reference to a modern discourse of power but, at the same time, dialogically situates itself in opposition to the sway of modern organisational or "communicational" forms, on which I will be commenting in the concluding chapter.

6.1. The Blind Medium of Radio Drama

Radio drama was seen as a problematic form when it was introduced in the initial years of radio broadcasting in many countries. It took classical stage drama as its model but actually fell short of the model, for it lacked the visual elements and the public audience that characterised stage drama. In Britain, for example, radio drama did not acquire the status of art on its own for a long time, and was not

\(^7\) Jordanova treats the Enlightenment in Europe as "a programme of reform to create a universe which did not yet exist. Nor did it or could it ever exist. The normative intentions and the stereotyped categories bore little relationship to the messiness and programmatic complexity of lived experience for the majority of the population." (1995: 64)
taken seriously by literary and art critics, partly due to its “blind” medium, and partly because it belonged to “popular culture” as opposed to the high culture of theatre (P. Lewis, 1981). Lewis argues that the importance and the original possibilities of radio drama (not radio drama) were not acknowledged until the 60’s in the BBC. But he notes, “once we place the BBC in a world context we immediately recognise how fortunate we have been and still are.” (1981: 4) The BBC, according to Lewis represents “the strongest traditions of radio drama in the world...perhaps even the best.” (7) So, although the BBC did not experiment with the possibilities of the medium for a long time, unlike the German development of Hörspiel (which privileged the aural instead of the visual and freed itself from the theatre) (Priessnitz, 1981: 32), the BBC is still considered to have set the canon of radio drama.8

A comparative look at the BBC and Turkish Radio in the 40’s shows that the BBC was exclusively dependent on “classical” drama for its radio drama output9, whereas in Turkey, in the same years, radio drama was treated on its own within the Drama Department producing a large number of plays specifically written for radio besides a number of adaptations or broadcasts of stage dramas.10 Furthermore the dramatic form was “applied” to “educational verbal programmes” which ran as series and centred around domestic and

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8 Peter Lewis reminds us that the BBC is not the norm and we should look for other experiences, for example, North America and Australia, but it is implied in his complaints about the lack of interest for studying radio drama in Britain that the BBC is the canon: “None of the people one might expect to be sufficiently enthusiastic about the subject to research it and write about it - dramatic critics, literary scholars, cultural historians, sociologists of the mass media - have shown much interest in it, especially in Britain, even though BBC Radio has serious claims to provide the best radio service in the world and is the envy of many countries. It is therefore extremely ironic that scholars from Germany, which also has very high standards of broadcasting, should have not only spearheaded the academic study of British radio drama but also virtually monopolised it until very recently.” (1981: 1)

9 The BBC Drama Department mostly broadcast stage plays with the aim of “taking the theatre to the people.” It acted, in Priessnitz’s terms as a “National Repertory Theatre of the Air”. (Priessnitz, 1981: 32).

10 Radio dramas consisted up to 80% of all cultural programmes of Ankara Radio in the 40’s. They were subject to heavy censorship before they went on air. Between 1941-1942, of 654 plays that arrived only 75 were considered as proper for radio broadcasting (Kocabasoğlu, 1980: 231).
everyday subjects. At this point, the comparison with the BBC indicates another significant aspect. It was the Features Department, not the Drama Department in the BBC which experimented with the dramatic form in the medium of radio (Priessnitz, 1981: 34). Much of its output was in the form of "imaginative documentaries" (P. Lewis, 1981: 7) rather than radio plays. In Turkish Radio, however, there is no data to show the presence of documentaries in the 40's; most of the dramatic output was in the form of radio drama or educational dramatic series or "sketches" which were based on fiction. So the contrast which singles out in the medium of radio seems to be between reality as fiction in the BBC and fiction as reality in Turkish Radio. Known that during the war the feature was regarded as a "publicity weapon" the same contrast can be observed in the strategies of the BBC Turkish Service and Turkish Radio.

The dramatic form that is peculiar to the medium of radio exhibits some characteristics that are worthy of interest. The long debates on the problems of the specific genre of radio drama conveys how closely drama has been associated with spectacle or with "ostention", in Crisell's words (1994). Ostention seems impossible in radio drama which, in resorting to words and sounds only, codifies the visual through the auditory. This situates radio drama in the realm of make-

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11 "Kimgil Ailesi" and "Rektörün Odacısı" were two prominent dramatic series of "educational" character. The former was a 20 minutes series broadcast every Sunday at 21:00. It was based on a life story of a large typical middle class family (written by Neriman Hizir, a psychologist educated in the USA and also the producer of children's programmes on radio) and dealt with everyday problems of family life. The latter, written by Vâlâ Nureddin, took as its hero an uneducated porter which worked for a president of a university and represented the "authentic", intuitive, simple and true knowledge of the "ordinary" people in an environment of "high" culture.

12 The Features Department of the BBC set up an experimental studio to explore the specific expressive possibilities of radio. This was stimulated by the Columbia Broadcasting System's Columbia Workshop (Priessnitz, 1981: 34).

13 For a detailed account of features and social documentaries on the BBC, see Scannell&Cardiff (1991: 134-152). It shows how the novel concept of "actuality" and the stress on the "factual" are linked to the representation of "reality". In 1932, an article in Radio Times emphasised that "(N)ew techniques are needed, that do not rely simply on commentators, not to come between the real stuff and the listeners, but to help reality out." (cited in Scannell&Cardiff, 1991: 145) However, the authors also demonstrate the procedures through which "reality" was processed according to a certain design.

14 "We soon realized that one of the first jobs of the feature programme in wartime was to explain the enemy, to shake off the polite fictions of diplomacy, and to convert in the public mind 'leading figures of a friendly state' to the gangsters and assassins of a well-armed foe" Laurence Gilliam, "The radio documentary in wartime", BBC Yearbook 1945.
believe more so than stage dramas. Radio drama renders "a dream world without a consistent solid reality" (Gray, 1981). Thus the distinction between fact and fiction is blurred, which in turn gives the medium its original capacity to play with the fluidity of the concepts. What is evoked in radio drama is the imagination of the audience which attributes meanings more freely to what is heard compared to what is seen. Furthermore, the soundscape of the radio drama invades the private realm and can be more easily interiorised within the temporal and spatial confines of an everyday setting. Thus, the symbolic and indexical signification of sounds is immersed in a process of cultural familiarisation15 (Crisell, 1994).

The producers in Turkish Radio were well aware of the characteristics of the "blind" medium. Both radio drama and "radiophonic" dramatic series were designed with an aim to encompass all those subjects on the national agenda ("literary, historical, social, moral, economic, hygienic, psychological, geological, etc..")16 and render them intelligible for the mass audience in a non-pedantic style. Yet the ascribed "educational" values shadowed the artistic considerations in the production of radio drama. The subject-matter was of utmost importance and under strict control and censorship.17 The elements that were censored varied from political opposition to obscenity, but also themes of suicide, anxiety, and all pessimist feelings were forbidden (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980:231).

The second concern was to make sure that radio drama addressed a mass audience. The "mass" character of the audience, in a way, justified the selection of topics for drama. It was announced in the contests organised to motivate play writing for radio around the country that the authors were free to choose their topics, but they had to keep in mind that they were addressing a large mass, both in the

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15 According to Goffman, "sound substitutes become conventionalised for what would ordinarily be conveyed visually" (1980: 163).
17 Baltacıoğlu complained that some of his plays were turned down by Ankara Radio because of their subject-matter. "...those who control the content of radio drama have fallen prey to suspicion...Is this obscene? Is there a suicidal theme? Is there an anti-regime sentiment?. I know because few of my plays have been rejected because of this suspicion." Baltacıoğlu, "Radyo Programı", Yeni Adam, No.502, 10 August 1944, p.2.
cities and in the villages. "The broadcast plays, whether of social, ethical, military or cultural character, are to be written in a style that aims to address directly the mass, not a specific group of people."18 This meant that the topics had to be oriented towards the nation. Tözem, the head of the Drama Department in Ankara Radio believed that radio dramas were very important to educate the people; they fostered the unification of the nation's accents and lexicons; they presented all national, social and factual subject-matters19 much more vividly and to a larger mass (compared to other media, such as theatre, books, press). He said, "If people get used to listening to radio plays, then there would be a modern stage in each living room, which is rich in its setting and props to the extent of richness of imagination; and which would make the listeners laugh and think at the same time." 20 (emphasis added)

The "blind" medium of radio drama was certainly regarded as advantageous in its capacity to evoke the "national" imagination, but there also existed views that expressed the limitations of radio drama as an art. Similar to the British case, theatre critics did not and do not take radio drama seriously. Books written on "Turkish Theatre" (Akgül, 1968; And, 1983; Ertuğrul, 1989; Halman, 1976; Nutku, 1976; Şener, 1971) do not give space to discuss radio drama. For example, And mentions radio drama only in a sentence stating that although "radio is an effective medium, radio drama has not reached a mature state due to lack of interest". (1983:34) Haldun Taner, a famous and successful playwright, when expressing his doubts about "opening the doors" to "local" writers gave radio as a bad example; he believed that this would degrade theatre and reduce it to the "level of radio or local film" (cited in And, 1983: 400). Catering to the tastes of the "mass" (a concern for radio dramas) was a problematic concept fo

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19 The aim that instrumentalised radio drama for national unity and education was different from the BBC Radio Drama Department's in 1942, which was, by broadcast production, "to maintain interest in classic plays, British and foreign, and especially those of Shakespeare; to provide...theatrical entertainment for lovers of drama cut off by circumstances from the theatre itself; and finally -perhaps most important of all- to encourage the writing of new plays specifically designed for the medium of broadcasting. In the last activity one may reasonably include the adaptation for broadcasting of suitable novels and short stories." "Radio Drama", BBC Yearbook 1942, p. 40-1.
theatre which strove to maintain its status of “high art”. 21

Actors, on the other hand, who mostly performed both on stage and “on microphone”, found radio drama frustrating. 22 Actors, said Tözem (the director of Radio Drama Department) need and long for costumes, make-up, gestures and, most importantly, applause for their performance. In this context, he thought that their “sacrifice” in radio drama, which relied only on sound and words and lacked the direct response of the audience, should be specially appreciated. 23 The only compensation for the “lack” in a radio drama was its capacity to reach the “mass”, as an actor expressed in an interview: he found acting in radio drama unsatisfactory but “radio has its own characteristics...It addresses a larger mass of people.” 24

But Turkish broadcasters, generally, were defensive of the form of radio drama. It is argued in a more recent booklet, that includes clues for writing radio plays, that radio drama is a new art form; “the fact that it is not performed on stage does not relegate it to the status of non-art.” 25 However, as I have emphasised before, the main task of radio drama, in early Turkish history, was seen in its propagation of national ideas, which usually contradicted the idea of “authenticity of

21 The political emphasis on taking theatre to the people in Turkey usually contradicted with the theatre as an icon of modernity and Western way of life. The vanguards responsible for establishing a “modern theatre” in Turkey had difficulties in finding enough people to watch the Western plays. (In the beginning of the 30’s a play by Strindberg had to be performed to only three people in Istanbul). Turkish playwrights were newcomers into “modern drama” and had difficulties with the form. Another problem concerned the behaviour of the theatre audience. People had to be educated for proper theatre attendance. A booklet prepared by Muhsin Ertuğrul in 1924 -the long term famous director and administrator of National Theatre Company- warned the potential audience that “theatre is not a mere entertainment but a school for adults; people should dress up when going to theatre; they should be quiet all through the play; they should not smoke during the performance; the breaks between the acts have a set duration -impatience does not help; whistling, banging feet, unnecessarily clapping hands are not the proper ways of appreciation.” (And, 1983: 46)

22 Robert Mott also talks of “pains” of actors taking part in radio drama in early American broadcasting. Actors experienced difficulties in adapting their ways of acting for an “unseeing audience”. (1990: 3)

23 Kemal Tözem, “Alkısa Hasret”, Radyo, Vol. 3, No.29, 15 April1944, p.12. Tözem tells that he was surprised to see one day that the actors were in full costume in the studio, and demanded to perform “as if” they were on stage. Radyo journal published those photographs of the production of the fantastic play called “Tarihin Kaybettigi Kiz” (The Girl that History Lost). So the gap between the auditory and the visual was temporarily bridged both for the actors and for the audience.


art". In this sense radio drama was primarily thought of in instrumental terms; it was useful as an effective weapon. An earlier version of “How to Write Radiophonic Plays?” made this clear: "...each word, in a radio drama, must be used in its proper place so that a specific idea is realised in the imagination of the listener."26 (emphasis added) Broadcasters believed (or wanted to believe) that words or signs in a radio drama were in direct correspondence with the signifieds. This was also evident in the set of rules for censorship that dramas were subjected to before they went on air.27 Dramas or dramatic sketches were given the mission of realising the reality as seen and desired by the writers or producers.28

Radio drama, therefore, stood at the interstice of reality and fantasy. Fantasy was reckoned to be representing the desired reality, and usually was taken as reality. However, given the specifics of the medium, fantasy had to rely on the organisation of sounds and words only. The production of sound effects, for example, was very important in creating the reality of the fantasy. Temren, remembered by later

27 A set of rules was published by TRT after the 60’s. Radyo Oyun Yazarları için Kısa Bilgiler, TRT Basılı Yayınlar Müdürlüğü Yayınları, p.24. They give an idea of how the “ideal” reality to be represented was linked to the content of radio dramas. The prohibitions regarding radio dramas were:
1. They cannot promote disrespectful attitude towards the law.
2. They cannot violate social and ethical values.
3. The facts cannot be altered in the treatment of historical events.
4. The name of God cannot be mentioned in a disrespectful manner.
5. The political climate of the country cannot be reflected.
6. Segregationist thoughts cannot be included.
7. Pessimistic events cannot be chosen as a subject.
8. Physical disabilities of people cannot be ridiculed.
9. There can be no underrating of any professional group.
10. Suicide should be rarely touched upon, and if so, handled with utmost care.
11. The guilty should not run away from penalty.
28 This does not mean that the actual radio dramas on radio were wholeheartedly accepted as representatives of reality by all the members of the elite. There were several criticisms, as part of general criticisms to radio broadcasting, concerning the language, style and performance quality of radio dramas. Reşat Nuri Güntekin, a famous novel and playwright, criticised the language of the radio dramas, while Baltacıoğlu was critical of the artificial tone in them. Baltacıoğlu said that, “instead of that idealistic verbalism that portrays the purity of villagers, or the self-sacrifice of women, there must be a more vivid and realistic literature that finds its source directly in the ambition for industrialisation and struggle.” (cited in Kocabaşoğlu, 1980:181) Nevertheless the assumption that words could directly signify, thus, construct reality was not contested. The mediation of language and of reception was not acknowledged.
broadcasters as “an institution by himself”, was the first sound engineer of Ankara Radio. He did “miracles” using simple devices. İmer, first an apprentice to Temren then a long term sound engineer in Ankara Radio, tells amazing stories of their invention of novel sound effects. İmer also developed certain norms that guided him when doing soundtracks. He used “international” music for urban love stories, while he selected “folk music” for rural settings. He resorted to recorded music in doing this. “Folk music” was already being processed by a systematic effort of Ankara radio and other institutions, so he used these samples. Thus a whole national landscape was simulated in the “void” of the studio. Even the sounds of nature supposed to represent Anatolia, which was glorified in the dramas, came from the studios in Ankara, or the recordings made around, for example, İmer produced the sound of a stream in a village from the gutters in Ankara. İmer took very seriously the make-believe world he created for the audience; sound effects in radio drama, according to him “replaced the setting, the space, the accessories, the emotional atmosphere.” In this way, sounds acquired both symbolic and indexical characters which became conventionalised and naturalised by repetition. This explains why, as Crisell argues, “studio simulations of sounds can often sound more ‘real’ than the actual sounds themselves would.” (1994: 47)

The national feelings invested in sounds and words, and reproduced by radio technology made possible the construction of an imaginary national space and a homogeneous national time. Most of the radio dramas broadcast by Turkish Radio exhibit the evident signs of effort to construct a unified national space and time. However, despite the instrumentalist treatment of radio drama, it would be wrong to find a monolithic meaning in them. Drama, which uses

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29 The dramas were either broadcast live or recorded on “stone” records. İmer told me of some tactics that he applied to create a soundscape “from nil” in those productions, such as walking backwards to give the effect of climbing the stairs; rubbing starch in his hands to give the effect of walking on snow, etc. He even “barked” for thirteen weeks to create a dog in a children’s series. The critics thought it was a real dog. Interview. 25 January 1996.
30 According to Crisell, the spirit of radio resides in the fact that studio is a void, an acoustic canvas on which anything can be painted (1994).
31 Interview with Ertuğrul İmer. 25 January 1996.
dialogue to make its meanings often conceals the dialogic character of languages, rendering it invisible by using manifest dialogue "in the frame of a mere conversation between persons." (Morson & Emerson, 1990:316). Drama, written in a style that is confined to its "author's ultimate semantic authority"32, in Bakhtin's words, (such as "national" radio drama in Turkey), appears "direct", "unmediated", and "referentially oriented" so that "it recognises only itself and its object, to which it strives to be maximally adequate." (Morson & Emerson, 1990:148) It is the author which imposes from outside the "finalisation" on the life of the characters who speak "unself-consciously".

Yet in radio drama the finalisation is never final. The "hidden speech centre" in radio drama, that is the author's semantic authority, is challenged by the medium which is geared to reach to masses; and which defines the drama not as an "authentic art" but as an instrument of reality (which goes against the author's artistic autonomy and authority). The significance of the specific text is immersed in the significance of the mass impact. The technologisation of drama, if we may call it that way, make them less of a monad by introducing exterior political "voices" to the text (produced by the effects of reality). While, in Simmel's words, the "actor's portrayal keeps us apart from the world of reality" (1973: 306) in the spectacle of stage drama, radio drama insert fantasy into reality, thus making the fantasy character of reality more evident. It is this character of radio drama that lends itself to an analysis of political subjectivity. I will now look at the technological imagination, revealed in radio drama, that strives to "change" reality. Instead of analysing the seemingly fixed content of these dramas, I try to bring into view the processes of the texts -the cracks and gaps in the dramas (the limitations of the author's semantic authority as far as it cannot account for the acts of the characters within the "logic" of the text)- to detect the hidden dialogic character of the national investment in dramas. The treatment of "women" in radio drama provides a rich source for my analysis.

32 "In drama, for example, the author's ultimate semantic authority is to be found in the whole work, but may not be expressed by any character." (Morson & Emerson, 1990: 148-9)
6.2. The National Struggle in the Private Sphere

Women figure centrally in representations of modernity and of the nation. This has raised attention from researchers both in the West and in the context of "Third World" nationalisms. Yuval-Davis states that "it is women—not just (?) the bureaucracy and intelligentsia- who reproduce nations, biologically, culturally and symbolically." (1997:2) However, an analysis of "women" as the subjects of the nation differs from a perspective that dwells on the representations of women produced by (mostly) male elite. Jordanova's argument that treats the Enlightenment in the West as a set of mental and practical activities of male elite "who gained influence because of their ideas and 'knowledge'" (1995: 64) and whose concern was "to establish the validity of their vision of the world" (64) convincingly makes clear that these activities were "sexual" in their character. She points to the "historical importance of science, medicine and technology in the promulgation of myths of femininity" (65). Women, from this perspective, appear as the absent subjects of modernity who have been totalised within a category and ascribed several characteristics as well as missions by a group of men who attempted to dominate and regulate the realm of nature (and women). Jordanova discusses various gendered aspects of the Enlightenment process: the control of women's sexuality for the maintenance of the social order, the unveiling of women before science which turned them into objects for "secular and rational" male domination; and the positing of an ahistorical, natural power of ailment in women as an antidote for the ills of civilisation.

The analysis of gender developed by researchers on "Third World nationalisms" (Chatterjee, 1993b; Jayawardena, 1988; Kandiyoti, 1989; 1991; 1993; 1996; 1997a; Nader, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989) points to similar patterns of signification of gender relations. Women are absent subjects in this context too. For example, Kandiyoti, referring to Graham-Brown (1988), discusses how women, represented as the icons of modernity in Turkey, were...
linked to a “symbolic evocation of the dynamism of the ‘new’ nation” (1993: 380). The process, according to Kandiyoti, implicated the control of the conduct of women as well as interpellating them as “national” actors. It also involved the “unveiling” of women as part of secularisation of government\(^3\); treating them as ‘tools’ for social progress and as boundary markers for what is modern. Yet the production and signification of gender in the so called “Third World” cannot be simply treated as part of “universal” history. The specific history of Eurocentrism, paradoxically, defined the universal concept of history and modernity (Young, 1990). The research on women and nationality in the “Third World”, thus, attends to the differences from the West, introducing both structural and historical differences, such as the role of religion, patriarchy, state, private/public spheres and colonialism, in order to understand the historically specific processes of signification of gender.\(^3\)

In Turkey, the signification of gender can be studied in relation to the translation of “modern” discourses which operated within an economy of subjectivity that strove to emphasise its difference/identity and power in relation to Western domination. What I mean by the economy of subjectivity denotes not only the discursive aspects of language, but also techniques and technology that aid the imagination of the self. The national elite regarded Western technology as instruments that can be acquired to endorse and extend their power both against the West and upon the Others in the national realm.

Radio technology, among other technologies of the early twentieth century, allowed an imagination of wider and less solid dissemination of the effects of power. In comparison to writing for example, radio was employed in the control of the “mass” due to its apparent capacity to encompass and smooth out differences in the

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\(^3\) "Islamic regulations of the body and social space were increasingly being encroached upon by a new discourse that removed the body from the realm of the sacred to medicalize and secularize it." (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 116)

public address, thus enabling the maintenance of "a certain universalising account of the modern". (Huyssen, 1986: 56) But radio, in its articulation of a "mass culture", also brought into view the processes of the construction of the "mass" in modernity as a repressed and gendered category. Huyssen points to the coupling of the mass with women in the feminisation of mass culture: "the fear of the masses in this age of declining liberalism is always a fear of woman, a fear of nature out of control, a fear of the unconscious, of sexuality, of the loss of identity and stable ego boundaries in the mass." (1986:52) The masses, according to him, were described in terms of a feminine threat.

The radio technology of the twentieth century put the elite in Turkey in a different position, in imagining and representing their modern identity, from the Enlightenment elite. The Turkish elite were already in an age that came to know the "threat of the mass", represented by revolutionary upheavals in Europe, especially the October Revolution of 1917. Therefore, in Chatterjee's word (1993a), one "derivative" aspect of modernity for the Turkish elite was to take the "best" of modernity while rejecting the consequences of possible frictions between classes and ethnic groups. The technical was opposed to the social. Technology, as I discussed in Chapter 1, was categorised as a neutral weapon of Western civilisation in Turkey, which was considered, pragmatically, to be in the service of national tasks -national unity in the political and economical fields. The discourse of modernity was translated into a mechanical vision of progress which was combined with an organicist vision of society. Change was celebrated in the realm of techniques while the social was protected against the evils of change. The elite, therefore, by appropriating "the most advanced techniques of civilisation" (a phrase that justified the introduction of radio broadcasting for example) could envision themselves as the carriers of civilisation given that society remained stable.

The empowering vision of technology was gendered. As I have shown in the analysis of radio talks, the mass which was regarded as a passive entity was gendered as feminine, while the active shapers
of culture could identify themselves, with the aid of “modern”
technology, as the protagonists of Western civilisation. But, as I have
argued before, the identification was not without problems. The
contradiction that can be phrased as a “change without change” in the
national framework that opposed the active will power of the elite to
the passive docility of the mass, or in a similar logic, the contrast
between civilisation and nature found its most complex expressions
around the “issue” of women which in turn bore upon the subjectivity
of the elite.

Women, both as markers of modernity and carriers of natural
traditions in Turkey, stood both at the borderline of the West and the
non-West and, at the same time, at the borders of the public and the
private spheres. The contradictory nature of investment in women in
Turkish national discourse could only be reflected upon in depth
following the feminist narratives of the 80’s, which pointed to a split
between the public and the domestic personae of women (Tekeli,
1995). As it is a huge topic, here I will not venture into the field of
women and nation in Turkey, but limit my analysis to certain

35 The civil rights given to women in Turkey were regarded as a “proof” of civilisation. The
nationalist propaganda portrayed women as active participants of society. But these
images were reserved for urban women. Women in rural hinterland were depicted as
naturally traditional and immobile (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 117-8). A prominent spokesperson of
Kemalism, puts this rather bluntly in his memoirs: “Mustafa Kemal did not force the
peasant women to change. Maybe this was the only exemption from his revolutions. He
even tolerated polygamy in the rural areas.” (Atay, 1969: 412). The ambiguity concerning
women as markers of modernity was based on a division along class and regional lines.
This accompanied the material processes of recruitment for establishing a “ruling class” in
which higher class women were recruited instead of lower class men. The concerns of
class consolidation replaced the concerns of gender in that context (Öncü, 1981).

36 Kandiyotı says that “a sphere marked out as ‘private’ at one stage of nation-building
may reappear with the full trappings of the ‘public’ at another, their boundaries being fluid
and subject to redefinition.” (1993: 378)
37 There is a widely accepted opinion in Turkey that the secular Turkish Republic gave
many rights to women leading to their emancipation. This was contested by feminist
militants and scholars after the 1980s. While Deniz Kandiyotı describes the state of
women in the early years of the Turkish Republic as “emancipated but unliberated”
(1987), Arat argues that Kemalist reforms did not even intend to make any changes in
women’s lives. “By reforming some institutions that already included women (e.g., family)
and expanding women’s roles in others (e.g., schools), the Kemalist regime was able to
reconstruct and legitimize patriarchal structures.” (1994: 72) For the earlier situation of
women and women’s movements in the Ottoman period, see Çakır (1994).

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representations of women on radio, and specifically radio drama, which give clues regarding the gendered technological imagination of the elite. The radio dramas centring on the “family” provide data to analyse the intercrossings of the public and the private. They also give evidence to the complex configurations of gendered conceptions of change and stability -the core problematic of Turkish national discourse.

“Family” dramas were based mainly on the everyday life of fictive, “representative” families both in urban and rural areas. These are mentioned under different categories in articles covering broadcasts of dramas in Radyo journal: primarily, social and ethical dramas.38 There appears to be no clear distinction between them in the categorisation. It is possible to say that dramas on Turkish Radio were categorised in terms of content rather than form. If the “family” was the one, “national” dramas comprised the second big group. The latter were about the “revolution”, the heroic performances of the national leader, or about prominent figures and events in the national struggle. They were treated as epics of a newly born nation. “Family” dramas, on the other hand, dwelled on imagining the “new life” in Turkey. Thus they addressed the present and the future, while “national” dramas were mainly engaged with the recent past.

However, “family” dramas were also linked to the nation in many aspects. Their first and most important mission was to educate families in new patterns of living.39 What Mustafa Kemal had said about “removing myths from minds, eradicating the established power of the old regime” in the context of Turkish “revolution” was already

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38 The audience survey of Ankara Radio in 1948 included some comments on radio drama. In reply to the questions, “Do you like radio drama? Which topics do you want to be covered by them?” out of a total of 6639 people, 1056 said they liked them, 162 didn’t like them, 417 demanded more radio drama, 4 demanded less radio drama, and 12 wanted no dramas at all. In terms of subject-matters, 1810 wanted “ethical, social, family tragedies and emotional subjects”, 1609 wanted “national subjects”, 106 wanted just “drama”, and 513 wanted “comedy”. Radyo, Vol. 17, No. 78,79,80, June, July, August 1946, p.45. The ambiguity of the responses give an idea about the lack of regulation of drama in terms of form in Ankara Radio. However, content-wise “family” and “national” dramas were privileged.

39 Mustafa Kemal said that “the essence of civilisation, the ground for progress and power reside in family life.” (cited in And, 1983: 3)
linked to drama as a form. Mustafa Kemal, according to And, was the first "dramaturgist" of the Turkish Republic. He personally edited the scripts of the plays written for National Theatre performances. He was especially sensitive to issues regarding women. The portrayal of women on stage needed, according to him, special attention. Family drama, therefore, assumed the task to introduce new "civilised" images for women, as well as, attending to the crises in domestic life. The post-imperial "national" identity was struck by "crises of gender and domestic organisation." (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 116) These crises, according to Kandiyoti, were centred around establishing a heterosexual marital etiquette with special emphasis on the child-centred conjugal family, which was supposed to put an end to the diversity of sexual preferences, to the extreme differences in family life between Istanbul and rural hinterland, and to the existence of non-familial sexual conduct of men in the Ottoman regime. There was also a concern to promote the transition from the dictates of Islamic law to those of the secular family code in early Turkish history.

Ankara Radio in the 30’s and 40’s, in its mission to talk to the nation, employed drama as a form of education and discipline to change both the "extravagances" of Istanbul and the "backwardness" of Anatolia in terms of domestic organisation. What was directly

40 Drama was regarded by the People’s Houses, for example, as “the best means to suggest to the people all those beautiful, good, and true feelings and knowledge”. Halkevleri 1932-1935: 103 Halkevi Geçen Yillarda Nasil Çalıştı, p.15.
41 Mustafa Kemal edited the language of the plays, in particular, to make sure that it was “new” Turkish. But he also had remarks on content. For example, he made some alterations in the script of “Taş Bebek” which portrayed a woman as “doll-like”. He emphasised that “We cannot think of women in this way any more! The existence of women constitutes the infrastructure of the nation in many aspects! From now on the conception of women as pretty objects should change.” Also he disliked the idea that “love is entertainment”. He said: “We should take love seriously.” (cited in And, 1983: 9)
42 Duben and Behar (1991), in their comprehensive research on family life from 1880 to 1940 in Turkey, argue that against the Orientalist depictions of harem life as typical of Turkishness, family life showed a great diversity both in Istanbul and between Istanbul and other regions. The nuclear family among the Muslim population was already a growing fact in the nineteenth century Istanbul. Western codes were increasingly becoming influential in families which belonged especially to bureaucratic professions and trades. However there was a huge gap between Istanbul and other regions in terms of family codes which persisted after the foundation of the Republic. The demographic evidence shows that in the 1930s and 1940s Istanbul stood out as a different social entity. The people in Istanbul not only married at a later age, but also practiced birth control to have less children. While the average number of children was 7 in rural areas and 4 in small towns, it was 2 in Istanbul (Shorter & Macura, 1982).
expressed in radio talks, found its fictive examples in radio drama which was thought to have more of an emotional “hook” on people than the pedantic talks. Given all these considerations regarding “family” radio drama -their instrumentalist use, their educative content, their special sensitivity regarding depictions of women, and the technology of sound used for simulations of reality- I will now look closely at two dramas which portrayed families with special emphasis on the role of women in national life.43

6.3. Stability and Change / Women and Men

The woman was an essential signifier for a number of concepts associated with Turkish nationality. Women symbolised nature, truth, stability, and imagined origins. “The very language of nationalism singles women out as the symbolic repository of group identity.” (Kandiyoti, 1993: 382) There are also ample references to women as symbols in radio dramas.

The drama, “Tarihin Kaybettiği Kız” (The Girl Whom History Lost) can be cited as one naive example of the use of symbols. In this play, the girl Saadet (meaning happiness) whom History had lost, and who has taken refuge in Istanbul was captured by some men in the the black-market. History (who is a man) comes looking for the girl and saves her from the black-market. The article on the play says, “(H)istory could not let Saadet (happiness), who has run away from the hell of the world and could only take refuge in Istanbul, to be a victim of the black-market.”44 The highly symbolic character of the play is decipherable with its obvious references to the Second World War, to the “peace” in Turkey but also to the activities of black-marketers in Istanbul. First it is symbolic that the “happiness” who was in danger in the world comes to Istanbul (Turkey being not in the war). Then History (which symbolises an exterior element, the Western civilisation) saves her from deterioration in Istanbul. It is possible to

43 These dramas selected from a number of dramas which have been accidentally kept either piled in a store room in Ankara Radio or published as a book are significant in their “realistic” attitude in dealing with the crises of the family. They differ from those naive and symbolic dramas in which women are treated only as a symbol.
argue that the exteriority of the rescuer symbolised both “pure” national power in Ankara and Western civilisation which, in the same equation, were linked to each other. It is also noteworthy that Ankara was the space of national broadcasting, in particular, the space of the drama. Purity and happiness were embodied in a young girl’s body which symbolised the “best” of Western civilisation which could not survive in the West but was redeemed by Ankara Radio.

Another example is the drama “Vadiye Dönüş”\(^\text{45}\) (Return to the Valley) in which a romantic encounter of urban and rural lives was symbolised by a love story of an urban man (educated in Switzerland and blinded due to some illness) and a village woman (who spoke proper Turkish and represented the high essence of Turkishness in her pure character). The woman Ayşe is a village teacher who works for the prosperity of the beautiful village, to which the blind man Nedim was blinded at first. However, love shows him the truth. The sound of Ayşe’s piano playing reveals to him the real essence of Turkey which he could not see. He comes to love and to celebrate the place he really belongs. Nedim says that he envies the beautiful life there which becomes even more enviable due to the opening of a new village school. The village is transformed by this act into a modern city, but into one without the ills and impurities of actual city life. In this play, Ayşe symbolises the stable truth of national life (which evokes itself through sound, very much like radio) which transforms the blinded Westernised intellectual to create a desired synthesis.

In both of these dramas women lead to certain changes without themselves changing. Their natural and pure characters are deployed abstractly as a concept which has no body, no self and no contradictions. They are mere symbols. It is the men who have to act, choose between good and bad. But it is also men who are susceptible to deception either by “evil” forces or by their own “blindness”. In the following two dramas these themes persist. However in them women are portrayed as more developed characters, not just as mere symbols of a concept or entity (purity or rural life). Therefore the

\(^{45}\) Written by Kemal Sönmez; directed by Oğuz Bora; sound effects by Tahsin Temren. I have found the soundtrack of the play, which was recorded in 1951, in the store room of Ankara Radio.
mechanisms involved in the representations of women and the subjectivity of men in relation to those representations can be observed in its complexity.

a. “The Enthusiasm of Reconstruction in a Turkish Town”

This drama depicts a series of fantasies and interweaves them with elements of the national discourse. Space, time and gender figure as significant factors in these interconnected fantasies. The play starts in a coffee house in an “Anatolian province”. (The author notes in the beginning that “the local dialects inform the audience that the place of action is not Istanbul”). The conversations of local people in the coffee house, with the accompaniment of a “traditional” local poet, introduce a problem on which the dramatic action is based. The problem is: The elder brother of Attar (a local man) has run away with his money (that he had raised in his own town) to Istanbul, leaving behind his wife and children. He has a relationship with a “mademoiselle” there in Istanbul and lives in an “apartment” in Beyoğlu (a district of Istanbul famous for its night life, also for its multi-ethnic population). But the rumour goes that he had recently lost all his money and is on the verge of bankruptcy. The action starts with the elder brother Tüccar Mehmet (Mehmet the Tradesman) turning up unexpectedly at the coffee house. The crowd asks him of Istanbul, of the “green eyes” of the “mademoiselle”. But they also blame him for what he did. Tüccar Mehmet, in the position of the guilty, wants to go back to his family seeking forgiveness. As the horse-carriage takes him home with his brother and the poet he looks around the town with amazement:

Tüccar Mehmet: What in earth has happened here?...How much it has changed... I would not have recognised the place even though I was born here.

Attar: But I had written to you about it.

Tüccar Mehmet: I did not take it seriously then. You know I have

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been to Europe too...This place is just like Europe.

Coachmen: God forbid! ...Don't talk inauspiciously...(The coachmen speaks in a dialect of Thrace)

Tüccar Mehmet: Yaa, you are right...Europe now is an ashtray...
Coachmen: Yaa, there it is an ashtray, here it is a rose garden.
...See the asphalt road starts here.

Poet: (playing his saz)
Don't talk inauspiciously!
What is Europe anyway,
No error in the metaphor
It is a donkey compared to deer...
(They laugh) (p.72)

The coachmen and Attar go on telling about all the big changes in the town during the journey. They talk about how swamps have been dried, how new roads and houses with pools were built, how new housing has been developed for nomadic people. Tüccar Mehmet thinks the town now looks like Nice in France. The analogy with the French town is immediately tied to "Atatürk Square" and "İnönü Park" which make the Turkish town resemble Nice. The reconstruction along the coast is described by using terms such as "modern arrangements". Tüccar Mehmet learns from his brother and the coachmen that new schools, an institute for girls (teaching domestic arts) and a People's Room\(^{47}\) have been opened in the town. He discovers that his own son works for the Union for Embellishment of the Town while his daughter attends the Institute for Girls. He is surprised to hear that the coachman's son, has played the role of Hamlet in the People's Room, that his daughters play the piano and paint pictures. It is mentioned in the conversation that all Turkish young people are very talented, even a young person from Yozgat (one of the remotest towns in the Eastern part) had shocked the English in his London exhibition. However, the new changes, it is said, are not only confined to the realm of "fantasy". New technological and industrial developments also had taken place. The secret to this lies in the "cooperation of the people with the

\(^{47}\) A form of the People's Houses in small towns and villages.
government”, which meant that people without means voluntarily worked for the projects while the rich people made financial contributions. They have not let black-marketers to get involved in the finance of the projects. They have organised creative events, such as camel wrestling, to collect money (“of course not new year parties... or festivals, or garden parties” says Attar. It is stated that those garden parties etc. had ruined Tüccar Mehmet. ) Above all, the new Governor who had initiated this zeal for change is praised.

Tüccar Mehmet, although struck by all these changes, oscillates between admiration and disbelief. Nonetheless all the doubts raised by him are replied by either the coachman or his brother in a convincing way. They assure him that they know what they are talking about, that they have learned so many new things, either from their children in the school or from radio. (The coachmen says he does not own a radio set yet, but he hears about things broadcast from his daughters.) They argue that the war years had been particularly beneficial for Turkey which stayed out of the war. Tüccar Mehmet accepts the arguments with the conclusion that “this country has fallen into a romantic passion for reconstruction” (p.82). The conversation is often interrupted by the poet’s singing songs relevant to the topic.

When finally they arrive home Tüccar Mehmet is even more surprised to see his house renovated. A young woman servant, with her clean dress and apron, who meets them at the door strikes Tüccar Mehmet, who says that his house has been “modernised”. It doesn’t stink and the toilets are new. Attar goes in to see the “housewife” (she doesn’t have a name but is mentioned as the “housewife”. She speaks with a “rural accent”). He tells her that they have a guest from Istanbul. She suggests that she prepares some local food to which Attar objects: “Let your daughter cook so that she can show her new skills that she has learned in the Institute” to a person coming from Istanbul (p.84). (Young girls were introduced to Western cuisine there.) Then Attar implies that her husband wants to make up with her. To his question: “Can you forgive him?” the “housewife” answers humbly that she is in no position to judge him since he is the father of her children. She adds that his misbehaviour was due to “illness”: 

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Housewife: I always believed that Mehmet Bey has fallen prey to some illness. We are a big family...if one of us gets ill, do we have to be angry with him?...In fact, the disease he caught is a contagious one...Didn't you see in Istanbul? Those people who raise some money end up in Europe instead of spending their money for their country... Immediately to Europe...As if there cannot be good things in our country (p.84).

She even suggests to help him financially when told he had lost all his money. When she hears that he finished his relationship with the "mademoiselle" her comment is: "What else would you expect from that woman?" (p.86). In the end of the play, the housewife finally learns from the brother that her husband is there in the house, and it was a false rumour that he has lost all his money. Tüccar Mehmet, in the next room with his son, already busy in dealing with the finances of the Union for Embellishment of the Town, has heard his wife's tolerant words. He says: "Oh, my woman...My woman who is full of true and high feelings...I have heard all you said." (p.88)

The play ends by the poet's song:
Camels wrestle
Nomads have a home
Hand in hand they work
The state and the people
Embellishes the town
It is everybody's goal
To stay here forever

It is interesting that the play based on a simple dramatic action touches upon so many fantasies that become linked to nationalistic aspirations. The prominent theme of reconstruction involves almost a magical change in the town. Both nature and culture are acted upon to be transformed into a dream like "Turkish" town where everybody is happy to work together and with the government, to educate themselves, to build the most advanced "technological" enterprises
such as a big common "ice factory" where different tradespeople, butchers, grocers keep their goods) as well as a green natural landscape. The change also involves Westernisation not only with its "modern arrangements" but in actual modernisation of the people who play the piano, paint pictures, dress like Europeans (the servant, for example), know Shakespeare etc. Thus the play renders the fantasies of change desirable in comparison to Europe. However, the comparison with Europe also brings to view the undesirable elements of civilisation such as the war (which makes Europe an ashtray). So the dream-like Turkish town represents a better world in its Turkishness. The better world is described in terms of "traditional" elements which are saved from changing: the cooperation of people (the word imece is used here which denotes the long tradition of solidarity in villages of Anatolia), the coffee house where people meet and discuss things, the local poet which continues the oral tradition of culture, and the ascribed desire of people to stay there "forever".

The juxtaposition of elements of change and stability involves no dynamic element of time. The "forever" and timeless national time brings together past and future in its empty form. There is no dramatic "collision" in Lukacs's words. Neither is there an action that "moves forward with each phrase of the dialogue" (Lukacs, 1973: 284). Even Tüccar Mehmet's "awakening" to the changes in the town is timeless (doesn't move forward) since he has already chosen to come back to his town with his money, as we discover at the very end. The restrained action of the drama which avoids collisions, and by which I mean that there are no dynamics (except from a "romantic passion for reconstruction") and no consequences of the change (except from an indefinite harmony and happiness), is best represented by the "housewife".

She represents the traditional values that changes have not (and perhaps could not) alter. She stills cooks local foods and speaks in a rural accent. At the same time, she is praised as the heroine of the

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48 He says, "in drama everything must serve to support the basic possible attitudes and concentrate upon one central collision"... He argues that "the historical character of drama thus concentrates round the historical character of the collision itself in its pure form...Whatever will not be absorbed directly and completely by the collision will spoil or even ruin the flow of the drama." (Lukacs, 1973: 288, 294, 295)
drama with her capacity to understand the "ills" of the society, almost in terms of sociology and psychology, and to forgive and cure them. The author's semantic authority, therefore, cannot account for the terms of her "tolerant" behaviour. She stands exterior to the dramatic action: she has been such a character all her life and she will be like that forever. In the same way, in signifying the good in the play by this "timeless" passive and forgiving woman, the author cannot account for the dynamics of change. Change is linked back to stability in a circular manner, conveying a drama of "change without change".

I argue that neither the elements of modern change nor traditional stability are absorbed in the dramatic action. The only dynamic element in the play, and that figures and refuges within the time of the drama, is the sexuality of Tüccar Mehmet. The "green eyes" of the "mademoiselle" echo in the people's talking. The "crowd" in the coffee house says: "Come here tomorrow Tüccar Mehmet...They say she has green eyes. Come and tell us what she thought about you..." (p.71) Even the housewife acknowledges the desire for the green eyes. She remembers that when she was briefly together with her husband in Istanbul he had a crisis one day: "He was trembling and repeating the same words, 'that green-green paradise'. First I thought he was praising the beauties of Prince's Islands in Istanbul... but then I realised what that green green paradise meant..." (p.87) To which the brother Attar replies that "now" it has changed, now the "green green paradise" only represents the beauties of his town for Tüccar Mehmet. The sexual metaphor of the "green green paradise" is a traveling one, it first represents the beauty of a woman instead of a landscape, but then it comes to represent a landscape instead of a woman. However, the persistent and multiplying reference to the metaphor conveys the underlying sexual character of the national discourse in its relation to the West. The real passion is the passion for the French woman whose eyes which look back at the subject constitute the object of desire.

Here we see an Occidentalist construction of the national self through the projected eyes of the "foreigner", which in an oscillating way represents both the West and the Turkish land. The subject is
split between the desire for the West (whose space is Istanbul) and the call of the "homeland" which has changed to come close to the West but not quite like it. The split is cured by the "good" woman who has, in fact, no sexuality (no jealousy for example) and who understands all and embraces the naughty boy. The national identity, after all crises and changes, is vested in the stable figure of the housewife who stands exterior and anterior to the significations of national change but who, in her stability, makes change redundant.

b. "One Has to Struggle" 49

This radio drama written by a woman author engages more deeply with a woman's character and with her problems. Yet the dramatic action takes place within a very similar logic, that cannot account for changes both in the characters of the play and consequently in the national life that they signify. Ironically, the concept of "struggle", which has strong connotations in terms of "national struggle", in this context, becomes interchangeable with "complacency".

Let us look at the characters in the play:

Fûruzan: A young housewife and a mother. She is sensitive, kind and good tempered. She attaches great value to her family life. But she is also a "modern" woman and keeps up with the standards of "new life" in her child care practices.

Macit: A young man married to Fûruzan. His character is variable. He takes on different characters in different situations throughout the play. While he can be a loving and honest man at times, he is also capable of being careless and selfish, or of easily being carried away by his lustful feelings.

Mother-in-law: An elderly woman, mother of Macit, living with the family. She is troublesome. She complains all the time and wearies out Fûruzan by her bitter comments. She is a traditional woman in many ways, yet she is intrigued by "modern life".

49 "Mûcadele Etmeli", a radio drama written by a woman, Mûkerrem Kamil Su and broadcast in 1949. I have found the soundtrack of the drama in a store room of Ankara Radio.
Fatma: The servant in the house. Her husband is a factory worker. She is not educated but has “common sense”. She cannot get along with the mother-in-law but likes Füruzan.

Ümit: The little girl of the family. She is a sensitive child, closer to her mother than to her father. She takes piano lessons, and becomes a great pianist at the end. Her name means “hope”.

Rezzan: A minor character in the play. She is a “modern” and an immoral woman, who is into extra-marital relationships. She admits enjoying these “immoral games”.

Aunt: Also a minor character. Yet she has a great influence on the course of events. She is an educated, urban, “modern” woman. She is wise and experienced.

The play starts by a description of a “crisis” in Füruzan’s life. She sits in the dark living room waiting for her husband, who has developed the habit of going out almost every night. She dreads this but cannot do much about it. Her feminine insight tells her that there is another woman in Macit’s life. The mother-in-law cruelly teases her about the situation, almost enjoying the possibility that his son, like most other men, has a life elsewhere.

Mother-in-law: How many times have I told you, don’t keep the dinner table waiting like this. The angels get disturbed...It is almost midnight, he must have eaten somewhere else.

Here we witness a typically traditional comment. The traditional stance of the mother-in-law, in terms of what to expect from a man, is fortified by her superstitious belief about angels. Füruzan keeps quiet and imagines their first days with Macit, as lovers. The indexical music of flashback takes us back in time to a romantic conversation in a wood. We hear the birds singing as the young couple dream about their future marriage. They wish for a suburban house, a bicycle, a fireplace in the house, a radio...The shared dream depicts an ideal marriage: the things to be owned, the things to do (picnics on weekends, fishing, cycling, dancing to the music of the radio), the division of labour between the spouses (she will prepare the food, embroider the table clothes, wait for his arrival in the evenings, while
he will earn money). The dream also portrays how quarrels should proceed and end peacefully:

Fûruzân: Shall we quarrel when we get married?
Macit: No, I won't do anything that upsets you.
Fûruzân: But quarrels happen in a marriage.
Macit: Then, we will quarrel but make peace afterwards.
Fûruzân: Yes...I will bring your coffee when you are reading your newspaper.

Strangely this flashback does not foreshadow the present situation in which Macit has forgotten all his promises. The flashback stands as an appendix that portrays the ideal. The only element in the dream that can be linked to the present of the dramatic action is “a bird in a cage”. (When Macit mentions a pet bird in a cage in their future home, Fûruzân suddenly gets sad and tells her fiance that she doesn’t like birds in a cage, she wants them to fly freely.) The author doesn’t make any analogy between the figure of a bird in a cage and Fûruzân sitting at home while his husband is having fun, but the analogy forces its way into one’s mind as soon as it is mentioned. Moreover, it remains unaccounted why Fûruzân chooses not to fly away to her freedom but retains her waiting position in the present crisis. When Rezzan calls her late that night to hint that Macit may be having an affair with a woman -this is a mean game to hurt Fûruzân since Rezzan is the woman having an affair with Macit- Fûruzân replies serenely: “A woman does not lose anything by being tolerant”.

Macit, on the other hand, does not reflect on the situation. In his secret affair with Rezzan which is referred to even when they are together in the family setting, he seems passionate. When Rezzan and Macit are alone in the living room while Fûruzân is in the kitchen cooking the dinner, they lead a highly erotic dialogue. He seems to have forgotten all about his family. He does not respond to the question raised by Rezzan as to whether he sees his wife as menace. To her question about his relationship with his daughter, he replies

50 Of course, this is my reading and different readings can make different meanings out of this. However, there is no apparent reason in the text why Fûruzân’s emotional reaction to a bird in a cage is mentioned in the flashback. This can be treated as a clue for “something” given the highly symbolic structure of the text.
that he likes her but not more than Rezzan. He seems to be in a state of "passionate illness" (a recurring theme that I have touched upon in the analysis of the previous radio drama) which hinders any reflection on the situation.

One day the Aunt comes for a visit. First there is the conversation of the two elderly women, the mother-in-law and the aunt. Although they share the painful symptoms of old age, they do not agree on the interpretation of the present "crisis" in the family. The mother-in-law believes that it is only natural for a man to have an extra-marital relationship, especially if he is handsome and prosperous (which she thinks his son is and is proud of that). The aunt does not believe that all men (should) cheat their wives, to which she gives her late husband as an example. The mother-in-law, in her mean attitude replies: "Men walk on snow and never leave a trace" which echoes a traditional truth in women's world.

The aunt then talks to Füruzan. Her advice is simple:

The Aunt: It is the woman's role to work for the survival of a marriage. Most of the times she will have to make sacrifices. A wise woman manages to lead the family out of a crisis. To forgive is part of the honor of womanhood. After all, Macit is your husband. And you also have to think of your child.

Füruzan: I wish sometimes fathers also thought of their children.
The Aunt: Men are like children. You have to manage them.
Füruzan: What is considered shameful for women loses its significance when men do it.
The Aunt: What can you do about it? It has always been like this. So, don't busy yourself with these profound questions. And don't forget that being sad and nervous can be detrimental to your health and beauty. You need strength for your struggle.

Füruzan: Struggle?
The Aunt: To struggle is one of the rights or rather duties of a woman. But this struggle should aim for happiness and salvation. I will be with you in your struggle.
The conversation is significant for the meaning of the word “struggle”. I will come back to it. In the dramatic action itself, the “struggle” of Füruzan is nothing more than her demand to talk with her husband, “to talk about everything openly”:

Füruzan: Can’t you stay at home tonight?
Macit: No, I have things to do...
Füruzan: I want to talk.
Macit: No, I don’t have time...
Füruzan: You can’t do that...
Macit: Why? Don’t I have the right to enjoy myself?
Füruzan: What about me? Don’t I have the right too? Don’t women and men, both have the right?
Macit: Either you accept the situation or...
Füruzan: Be careful Macit. If it was not for my child I would have left but I have a child...(we hear the sound of the piano played by Ümit). To be a mother means responsibilities...
Tell your lover that the struggle has started. We will all play the game openly now.

We as listeners don’t know whatever forms the “struggle” takes in Füruzan’s life. What we know at the end is the happy family reunion. The voice-over tells us that Füruzan’s “struggle took less time and energy than she initially thought”. “Now” it is ten years after the crisis. Füruzan and Macit are listening to radio together. There is, on radio, a live relay of a music festival in Europe, in which their daughter performs a “classical” piece. The parents are extremely happy that their daughter has proven her talent in Europe. Macit praises his wife:

Macit: She is a product of yours, your achievement. You are a wonderful woman and a wonderful mother. I owe my honour, my professional status, and my daughter’s success to you. You are a hero. If it was not for your maturity, I would have led astray. Your aunt was right: “A woman who can forgive is a complete woman.”

Füruzan: There are many women who do this.
Macit: But you are special and dear to me.
We have several definitions of womanhood throughout the play. The basic opposition is between a "traditional" and "modern" woman, which are represented by the mother-in-law and the aunt. They are types rather than characters with a name. The mother-in-law despises the modern way of life, which can be heard in her several comments about new ways of child raising, taking them to cinema and theatre, and to seaside. She cannot understand why a girl should take piano lessons. She assumes an authoritarian position over other women in the family, over Fûruzân and the servant Fatma. She represents an old style of authority, typical authority of elder women in family life. On the other hand, the Aunt represents a new type of authority. She is wise and understanding; she practices her authority through "communication". She symbolically assumes a role very similar to radio. Her authority wins against the traditional one since her comments are more influential in the resolution of the "crisis". However, a closer look at the content of the controversy makes it apparent that, in fact, they are not saying anything different with regard to the "crisis". The mother-in-law claims that women should be tolerant; the aunt says that women should struggle. But the struggle means for a woman, according to her, to forgive a man.

This is a very interesting replacement. The traditional significance of womanhood is converted into a modern one through a replacement of words. However, the limits of the "new" is set by the limits of the meaning of "struggle", which evokes a new discourse but also an acceptance of established roles for women. The boundary management that employs the concept of "struggle", both with its associations to national reforms, and its restrained and confined meanings, points to the ambivalence in the national discourse on women. It provides a perfect example for a "change without change".

The play also sets up "lessons" in modernity: a model of an ideal marriage and child care with reference to the new techniques and objects (such as radio) in everyday life. However, the most important lesson is about "crisis management" for women. Traditional knowledge, represented by the mother-in-law for example, is
transformed into a modern discourse, on how to manage a husband, as it acquires an almost scientific character. Here we see a disembodiment of traditional knowledge which is then processed by the techniques of pedagogy and psychology and presented as “new”.

While the role of women is problematised both practically and conceptually, the role of men remains constant in the play. The shifts in the character of Macit are not accounted for. His oscillation between “sexuality” and “family duties” (which are opposed to each other) is not reflected on. He shifts from one to the other without any inner contradictions or responsibility for his decisions. Hence the dynamics of his personality remain unknown. While he is the only person who is really active in the play (in so far as he does things that changes the course of events), there is no reflexivity that would make us know more about him as an acting subject. To the extent that the male subject does not know anything about himself he is led by different women. He is a weakling, a “child”. (“All men are like children” said the Aunt). He becomes a blind spot in the text.

The play defines the contours of the duties and rights of women in “modern” life. It exhibits dialogic references to other discourses on women, such as feminism (which is evoked by the sentences that stress the equality of men and women) but contains and refutes them in its dramatic action. There are also references to being accepted in the West -the “hope” that contributes to the resolution of the “crisis” and which is represented by Umit’s “success” in Europe. Yet the semantic authority of the author cannot account for the blind spots, namely Fûrûzan’s close resemblance to a “bird in a cage” or Macit’s non-knowledge of himself. As the drama tries to walk on the tight rope set by the word “struggle”, it gives unintended or surplus clues to reflect on gender and nationality. The fact that the play was written by a woman manifests itself by going more deeply into the internal world of women, which remained untouched in many other radio dramas that treated women merely as symbols. Nevertheless the author speaks from a hegemonic male perspective on the roles of women.

Both radio dramas, that I have analysed in this chapter, are significant in their “restrained” character. Contrary to several stage
dramas of the period\textsuperscript{51}, they avoid collisions and conflicts. The final harmony envisioned in their portrayal of gender relations have to be thought in the context of radio broadcasting. The make-believe fantasy of radio, that substitutes sound for the reality of the bodies, implies the role of technology in the Occidentalist boundary management which goes against the existing divisions in the social and redefines them in the more flexible soundscape of national imagination.

But these dramas also bring to view the splits and gaps in the imagined gendered identities which cannot be accounted in terms of the fantasies. The surplus of meanings evoked by these fantasies gives clues to understand how change and stability were conceived of in Turkish national discourse. While change was associated with words and talking -and the technology of talking- it was made redundant by the stable figures of women which stood exterior to the discourse of change. The male subjectivity in power, could not reflect back on itself. Finally it rendered itself as a child which avoided contradictions and mature sexuality, and sought forgiveness and harmony in the mythical mother figure of the woman which signified national virtue. The male power in early Turkish history that denied reality which seemed to obstruct its unlimited creativity and power could only signify itself in its submission to the all-encompassing mother figure.

I have argued before that in early Turkish nationalism the fantasy of the nation could not be accounted and legitimised in a “rational” framework. The analysis of radio drama on Turkish Radio shows that imagining the nation meant the disavowal of both the past and the present. The Occidentalist fantasy articulated itself by imagining an origin anterior to time and social change which was symbolised in the figure of the woman. Psychoanalytically, this denotes the narcissistic illusions of the elite -based on the denial of any differences with the

\textsuperscript{51} And (1983) gives an account of almost all plays staged either by National Theatre or by other groups, from 1923. These plays showed a great variety. They were either adaptations of Western plays or specifically written for stage by Turkish authors. Their subject-matters also varied. Many dramas on family life portrayed “devilish” figures of women who cheated their husbands, became prostitutes etc. And the plays usually had tragic endings such as suicide or murder which were not allowed on radio.
West and the people, and also on the denial of the paternal significance of the past regime. Radio voices, in this context, on one hand experimented with the instruments of modern-Western technology to stage the fantasy of the nation. However, the ego boost that was partially availed by the fantasy work, was undermined by its pale images that failed to construct a reality of its own accord. Thus, on the other hand, the elite sought shelter in “eternal” origins. They attempted to ground their projections of a Westernised truth in the “essential” truth of the mother.

52 Lasch argues that “(T)he absolute reign of the son implies, as its latent content, union with the mother – a union, that is, that acknowledges no impediments, in the form of paternal prohibitions or even in the form of a paternal presence, to its consummation....In the modern world, groups seem to find their dominant fantasy not in submission to the father but in collective reunion with the mother.” (1985:xiii, xv)
CONCLUSION
The Instruments of Occidentalism

I have argued in the previous chapters that every attempt to define, build and demarcate Turkish national identity on radio was shaped in reference to an imagined Western-ness and for the Western gaze. This is the fantasy of Occidentalism. Furthermore, becoming Western was associated with certain spaces and groups in power and endorsed internal divisions based on gender, region and ethnicity. Radio technology provided the means to produce and sustain an Occidentalist fantasy that both denied and re-defined divisions in the national realm. Occidentalism was the product of, and figured in, the processes of subject-constitution of the non-West, which was labeled by Said as the “silent Other” in Orientalism (1995).

I have attended to various aspects of radio broadcasting in early Turkish history and the BBC Turkish Service, mainly during the Second World War, to demonstrate the dialogic link of the fantasies of the West and the East. I explored some instances of these encounters, especially by examining the relation between the audio significations of national identity on radio with accounts of the truth of national identity that were manifested in statements and practices.

My research focused on a period when the concern to both join “Western civilisation” and, at the same time, to create a distinct Turkish identity was most intense. However, the “reality” that could not be signified within the Occidentalist fantasy was a disturbing factor for the national elite. The gap was made more evident by radio broadcasting that operated with sound images and produced “immaterial” effects. Today in Turkey, there are several private and local radio stations. The announcers and DJ’s speak in various styles and accents, ranging from “American” to “Anatolian”. The anxiety of producing a “correct” and “unified” Turkish seems to have vanished. Yet the audio significations of what is considered as Western today
still are not in perfect harmony with those "Oriental" audial or visual images. One can hear the Islamic prayer, in Arabic, coming from the mosques five times a day, together with Western pop music songs rising from shops, cars, and personal music sets. Or one can hop on a bus driven by a "traditional looking" male (women bus drivers are very rare) and hear information recorded by a "civilised" woman voice. The struggles of identity\(^1\) are more vivid in the Turkish soundscape today. Still the desire to be Western—in all its complexity of contempt/idealisation, self-denigration, and gendering the national and the Western—persists. It is possible to observe several instances, especially in a political climate where the relations of Turkey with the European Union are most strained, in which the Occidentalist fantasy still manifests itself against the reproduced and redefined Orientalness. The much awaited synthesis between the Orient and the Occident has not materialised.

I had to draw on a wide range of sources and disciplines to formulate the framework of the thesis which brought to view a series of problematic areas that are worthy of further research. Yet despite the fact that my research had to exclude in depth analysis of some areas, especially the historically specific configurations of politics and economy, I believe it contributes a new perspective to deal with the dynamics of Occidentalism. This is significant in face of persistent theories that still argue for independent histories of the West and the Orient; or a synthesis of the two in Turkey as if the constituents of being Western or Oriental are independent and movable elements in history.\(^2\) Or against those, both in Turkey and in Europe, that see

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\(^1\) Kadioğlu states that following the military coup in 1980, "a trend was set in Turkey towards challenging the early Kemalist principles. Such a trend was set in the aftermath of the 1982 Constitution which curbed the number of categories of the state elites, that is, the appointed rather than elected bureaucratic and military elites...The political climate that prevailed in the 1980s and the early 1990s has opened the Kemalist Pandora’s box out which have emerged multiple identities..." (1996: 189). The late 80’s and all of the 90’s have witnessed a struggle of various identities, in movements such as “feminism”, “political Islam”, “Kurdish liberation” and “Alevi opposition”, which contest the limits of the “national culture” defined by the early Kemalists. The identity politics is manifested in listening to music whose “appropriation and control is a reflection of power, that is essentially political” (Attali, 1985: 6).

\(^2\) For example, Andrew Davison (1998) concludes his recent article on Gökalp praising the culture/civilisation conceptual frame for offering a better alternative for the future of humanity. According to him, a “different” culture can be accommodated within the same “civilisation”, read Western civilisation.
“local culture”, coloured by Islamic fundamentalism, as an element that hinders “full Westernisation”. I hope to have shown by now that the signifiers of the Orient and Occident cannot be posed in a binary opposition. They shift in a political context determined by power relations, and re-produce the political discourses of Orientalism and Occidentalist, as well as bearing on being a subject. There is no “real thing”, be it the West or the East. I have also shown that the culture/civilisation frame of the Turkish nationalists was not independent from the imposed Westernisation, or the tide of capitalism and nationalism. The Western discourse of universalism advanced subtle negotiations of “sameness” and “difference”, as can be seen in the BBC Turkish Service strategies. Thus the need for the deconstruction of the divide between culture and civilisation, and consequently between values/ideas and technology must be apparent.

Furthermore, my research brought to view an understudied realm -that of voice and sound- in thinking about identities. This is especially significant due to the often cited and criticised equation of the West with “voice” and the East with “silence” (Moore-Gilbert, 1997:104). Yet Occidentalist was not silent. As I have shown, the speaking “national subject” on Turkish radio, which was regarded as the “voice” of the nation, provided rich sources to demonstrate how Occidentalist was articulated and exercised, and what instruments, conceptual or technical, were made use of. Occidentalist manifested itself in the very act of talking of what Said called the “silent Other”. The Turkish elite imagined that by talking, on radio in particular, they could build a unified nation in the idealised image of “Western civilisation”. “Civilisation” and “Western culture” were operationalised by electrical technical means in contrast to nature -the essence of Turkishness- which was mainly associated with children and women.

3 A group of people who call themselves “laicists” in Turkey today argue against “Islamic fundamentalism” which they think takes Turkey “backward” in modernity. Bernard Lewis puts it as a choice between “democracy and fundamentalism” which has a direct bearing on another choice between “inward and outward modernisation”. “Outward modernisation means accepting the devices, the amenities, the conveniences provided by Western science and industry while rejecting what are seen as pernicious Western values...outward modernisation means buying and firing a gun. Inward modernisation means learning to manufacture and ultimately design one.” (1997: 46)
This conveyed the gendered link between a certain projection of the West in the Turkish national imagination and the actual Western instruments that were employed to facilitate and disseminate an "authentic" national voice on radio. The voice had attributes of a "maternal voice", as I have shown in Chapters 5 and 6, that fulfilled the longing to belong to an "essential origin" for those who have denied their fathers (the past) and set foot on bewildering, rapid changes.4

However, the emphasis on "voice" does not represent a "coming to voice" of the subaltern (Spivak, 1993). Nor does voice, as Göçek and Balaghi argue, be directly connected to the experience of the subject by advantaging "the text of the subject over that of the interpreter" (1994: 1). To the extent that Turkish radio assigned itself the task of governing the masses, educating and shaping their conduct in the newly emerging "national life", radio broadcasting actively took part, or at least presumed to, in the consolidation of an authoritarian power regime in Turkey which paradoxically silenced a large proportion of the population. Therefore, the sound images of national identity and the specific procedures of embodiment and disembodiment, such as sound effects and music through radio broadcasting are important questions to tackle further in future research. The production and perception of voice - intonation, elocution, tone, inflections and rhythm- need to be addressed. This should also involve theoretical questions on the registers of the subject5, which, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, has been theorised mostly at the level of the specular ignoring the audible (1989).

Turkish Radio's complicity with, and its link to a highly centralised and non-democratic power regime also complicate its representative status as being simply the Other of the West. The Orient, that figures in Said's Orientalism as a constructed and unified Other appears in this context as a site of struggle which does

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4 It could be interesting to think if "the West" represented an aspired father figure for the Turkish national elite.

5 Roland Barthes writes on the "voyage of body" through language, in its different registers. He points to a "difficult voyage" of speech in broadcasting that is "at the same time original and transcribable, ephemeral and memorable", and which brings "a striking interest" (1985: 7).
not only challenge, displace and modify the hegemony of the West by its own practices, but generates and names its own Others within its specific regime of power. So one problem that my thesis centres on but which needs further reflection in terms of the scope of postcolonial theory is the power-stricken area of boundary management within Turkish nationalism which is engendered by the historical division of the West and non-West. This is especially significant since the Turkish case which fails to fit into a neat category of either belonging to the East or to the West (and is reckoned to be a bridge between East and West) has remained invisible both to Western scholarship and to postcolonial criticism. Although Said's account of Orientalism has been criticised by some later postcolonial critics, such as Bhabha (1994), Pathak et al. (1991) and Young (1990), for its too monologic conceptions of both the West and the Orient, not much account has been taken of how a combination of internalised Orientalism and Occidentalism established the very basis of power in the Turkish case. While most postcolonial critics, such as Bhabha and Spivak dwelled on the dynamics of "interruption" of Western hegemony by the narratives of what is called the Orient; the "dedication" to Western modernity in Turkish nationalism was taken for granted by many scholars.

The Turkish case has attracted mostly the attention of modernisation theorists and not of the postcolonial critics. This ties in with the primary reason of its invisibility which is based on the idea that Turkey was Westernised without being colonised. For example, Gellner argues the Turkish case is unique in the sense that "Turkey ...can claim that its commitment to modern political ideas owes nothing to alien imposition, and everything to an endogeneous

6 Although Turkey does not really fit into a postcolonial model due to the fact it was never overtly colonised, and also because of the complications of its own colonial past; it is still possible to argue that it is more or less a proper object for postcolonial criticism if we accept Moore-Gilbert's broad definition: "In my view, postcolonial criticism can still be seen as a more or less distinct set of reading practices, if it is understood as preoccupied principally with analysis of cultural forms which mediate, challenge or reflect upon the relations of domination and subordination -economic, cultural and political- between (and often within) nations, races or cultures, which characteristically have their roots in the history of modern European colonialism and imperialism and which, equally, characteristically, continue to be apparent in the present era of neo-colonialism." (1997: 12)
development. Turkey chose its destiny. It achieved political modernity: it was not thrust upon it.” (Gellner, 1994:82) For Gellner the commitment to elective and constitutional government testifies for this. The military coups, in his view, although signs of not an “easy ride” in liberal democracy, were just necessary lapses in democracy since they have always ensured that democracy is eventually restored. In this approach, the compromises in democracy, and a whole history of suffering that accompanied them, are shadowed as negligible while the commitment to Westernisation is privileged. However, as I have tried to argue so far, “Westernisation” is a discourse that is generated by unequal power relations, not only between the West and Turkey, but also between the Turkish elite and its Others. Western scholars’ either easy celebration of Turkey’s modernising potential or their neglect of the particular conditions of translation of Western discourses in Turkey erect an invisible barrier against questioning some conditions and consequences of Western modernity itself. The Turkish “replica” of Western modernity is either taken too literally or is regarded as not worthy of comment. By this thesis I hope to draw some future attention to the material, discursive and psychoanalytical aspects of the production of the “replica” in Turkey, as well as to the intricate link between the “original” and the “replica”.

The status of Turkey is further complicated by the fact that Ottoman Empire was itself a colonising force. The power regime in the Ottoman Empire was highly centralised but flexible enough to hold different ethnic and religious communities over a large territory from Balkans to the Arabic peninsula under control by allowing some cultural autonomy to each community. The peculiar mechanisms and rationale of Ottoman rule in its colonies is a vast subject for Turkish and Western scholars. The major challenge to the Ottoman rule came from the West starting from the eighteenth century. The invasion of Western sciences, know-how and artifacts, which contested Islamic

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7 An Italian theorist, Boccalini, wrote back in the sixteenth century that “Turkey brought to life and exemplified what the political thought of the Renaissance had always been striving after: an artificial construction which had been consciously and purposely built up, a State mechanism which was arranged like a clock, and which made use of the various species and strengths and qualities of men as its springs and wheels.” (in Gordon, 1991:11)
and traditional ways of life and invoked the existence of a “lack”, was accompanied by actual Western enterprises that established and monopolised certain trades and industries.\(^8\) Thereafter Ottoman rule underwent a period of decline which can be described as the colonisation of the coloniser. The impact of this period, either the Western colonisation of Ottoman life or the problem of the Ottoman colonies, were not openly addressed in the Kemalist discourse\(^9\) that reigned after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The Kemalist rupture that tried to set a zero point in time has contributed to the predominant ambivalent attitude towards both the West and the Ottoman past in Turkey. Akin to the manoeuvre of the Kemalist tradition which rendered the dynamics of the colonisation of the coloniser Ottoman invisible, Western scholarship has also not fully addressed the complexities involved.

It then becomes worthwhile to ponder on Said’s omission of Turkey in *Orientalism* given his critical investigation of Western conceptions of the non-West. Said does not only skip the long Ottoman history which has been an object of Orientalist visions of desire and derision which can be depicted in many areas such as

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\(^8\) I have discussed in Chapter 1 that the Western capital infiltrated the Ottoman social, economic and political life starting from the nineteenth century. The low tariff rates in trade during the Tanzimat era led to a flood of imported European goods which dealt a blow on local small craft industries (Mardin, 1990: 89). Economic capitulations given to Western powers and the treaties that endowed European merchants with economic privileges reduced the Turkish government to the status of “the gendarmes of foreign capital” (F.Ahmad, 1993: 93). In addition to economic colonisation, the social life was also colonised due to factors such as the constitution of Western schools and organisations, the invasion of Western technologies and ideas (Davison, 1990), and the political power enjoyed by Western embassies (F.Ahmad, 1993: 41). Tuncay makes the point that, despite the nationalist struggle against foreign privileges, the position of “foreigners” in economic, social and political life, in the first ten years after the foundation of the Republic, was not dramatically altered (1981: 198).

\(^9\) The only exception to this is a group of Kemalist intellectuals around the journal *Kadro*, which began publication in 1932 and was forced to suspend publication in 1934. According to F.Ahmad, their aim was the creation of “an ideology original to the regime” (1993: 65). They dwelled on the economic and political aspects of colonialism and reckoned their ideology to be useful for all colonies and semi-colonies (a term they used to define the Turkish past). They emphasised the “original character” of the Turkish revolution (Ibid). One of the prominent members of *Kadro*, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, whose comments I have cited in the thesis, has continued to be an almost haunting critical voice of Kemalist reforms through his novels and essays.
philosophical essays, travel-writing and art\textsuperscript{10}, but also does not address the complications of “the defeat of Turkey and the West’s appropriation of its former imperial possessions” (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 52) after the First World One, the period which Said considers to be one when the Orient increasingly “appeared to constitute a challenge...to the West’s spirit, knowledge and imperium”. (Said, 1995: 248) Said primarily sites the “Oriental” Other in the Arabic world to where he partially belongs, and his omission of the Turkish case implies that Turkey stands in a very problematic relationship to the Arab world, the Ottoman Empire being the former colonial power in Palestine. This may reflect Said’s own ambivalence to the history of Ottoman colonisation of Palestine: the Ottoman Empire disrupts the binary oppositions of East and West, Coloniser and Colonised that informed his analysis. Yet Said refers to Turkey in a later text (1983) on Auerbach; but only to emphasise the extreme conditions of Auerbach’s exile in Istanbul in the 40’s which made his work, \textit{Mimesis}, possible\textsuperscript{11}. In this passage, the non-Occidental traits of Turkey gain more prominence than the fact that it was an object of Orientalism\textsuperscript{12}, leaving one with the afterthought that maybe in this work, Said is looking from the point of view of the West. Said’s approach to the “Orient” seems to have been split between feelings of belonging to and a Western look of denigration of the “Orient” which becomes more apparent in his account of Turkey. This brings Said closer to Occidentalism, rather than what Sadek al-‘Azm called as “Orientalism in reverse” (1981).

\textsuperscript{10} Alain Grosrichard studies the European fantasies of the East focusing on the seventeenth and eighteenth century writings on Ottoman Empire. He analyses the Western image of “Oriental despotism” in terms of the Lacanian concept of fantasy. Mladen Dolar, in his introduction to the English translation of the book, states that “Said consciously limits himself to the Arab world, the Near East, while Grosrichard’s sources mostly treat the Ottoman Empire (still a very real threat at that time).” (1998)

\textsuperscript{11} “The book owed its existence to the very fact of Oriental, non-Occidental exile and homelessness.” (Said, 1983: 7-8)

\textsuperscript{12} “Throughout the classical period of European culture Turkey was the Orient, Islam its most redoubtable and aggressive representative. This was not all, though. The Orient and Islam also stood for the ultimate alienation from and opposition to Europe, the European tradition of Christian Latinity, as well as to the putative authority of ecclesia, humanistic learning, and cultural community. For centuries Turkey and Islam hung over Europe like a gigantic composite monster, seeming to threaten Europe with destruction. To have been an exile in Istanbul at that time of fascism in Europe was a deeply resonating and intense form of exile from Europe.” (Said, 1983: 6, emphasis added)
While Turkey appears as the perfect example of non-Occident for Said in the above passage, it has other connotations. Turkey represents the West for the Arabic world while the Arabic world represents the East for Turkey which is itself the East of Europe. Thus, Arabic culture has been an inferior Other for Turkish national identity. The equation of being Western and Turkish at the same time was only possible by the existence of a third variable, that of being against the Arabic culture. A Kemalist spokesperson Atay wrote in his memoirs that "...to be Westernised meant at the same time to escape from being Arabised; it meant being Turkified." (1969: 446)

The hidden and inferior Other for Turkish "nation", Arabisation⁴, still plays itself out in contemporary Turkey, for example in the denigration of popular arebesk music.⁵ The long and complex history of the emergence of national identities and othering in the Middle East is a huge and separate topic which lies beyond the scope of my thesis. However it is still possible to argue that the blind point in Said's account, as well as Atay's peculiar definition of Westernisation are symptoms of a masked interdependency of Orientalism and Occidentialism which unsettles easy identifications of power positions. The complication can be partly addressed by an account of Occidentialism in Turkey, which was, and still is, a

13 According to Sayyid, Kemalists could only westernise by repressing the oriental within themselves. The principles of Kemalism show how they "operated vis-à-vis the opposition between the West and its other -and on which side of this 'violent hierarchy' they wanted to position themselves" (Sayyid, 1997: 68)

14 The concept of Arabisation here represents not only the influence of the actual Arabic culture(s) but refers to the culture(s) of the "uneducated masses" whatever their origins were. I have pointed to examples of this replacement in the thesis in Chapters 3 and 5 in debates on "national" music and family life respectively. Koçak argues that the "internationalisation" of Turkey was an escape from East to West in order to guard against "Arabisation/Calibanisation". (Koçak, 1995:239). One can also argue, in reverse, that in order to deny its cultural colonisation of the people, Turkish nationalism disavows the history of subordination by the West. By its too quick identification with the West, it nurtures and consolidates its power over the "inferior" or "dangerous" others.

15 Martin Stokes argues that arabesk music is associated with the southern border of Turkey -the border that separates Turkish territory from Syria. However the myth of the "South" has little to explain about the history of the genre. It has more to do with centres of cultural production in Turkey. Yet the way arabesk is positioned points to the complex history of the border area, especially Hatay -annexed to Turkish territory in 1936- where Arabs and Turks have close encounters, and to the often gendered significations of the border. Stokes demonstrates how arabesk "has a vital role to play in bridging the gap between nationalism and its all too visible limits" (1998: 284). Stokes also gives an account of the "arabesk debate" in Turkey in a previous book (1992).
discourse in which Western power was both contested and established within a complex relationship to the West.\textsuperscript{16}

Occidentalism functioned as an answering practice against a projected West, but also contributed to a form of government of the domestic population warding off against those “inferior others” defined by ethnic, regional and gender divisions. My thesis focused on the idea that Occidentalism that manifested itself in the specific conditions of radio broadcasting was itself instrumental in imagining a modern form of government, as well as defining the identity of the governors and the governed. “Westernisation” in Turkey was an effect of creating new ways of addressing and managing the population in addition to the actual employment of Western artifacts. Yet the modern form of government envisaged by the Turkish elite and practiced by Turkish radio diverges in many respects from Western case as manifested in the comparison of the BBC and Turkish Radio. The truth manufactured by the BBC, although itself based on a play of force lines, was taken to be the natural truth, while the Turkish broadcasters were in a position of negotiating various truths which led to an apparent split in the manifestation of what was called the truth on Turkish nationality. The divergence is critical and can only be meaningfully addressed if it is contextualised within the history of the Turkish “nation” in relation to its Others, both the West and the East.

The particular logic of nationalist discourse that informed radio

\textsuperscript{16} One can refer to several examples in Turkish national history up to date that point to the tension stricken relationship with Europe: When Turkey joined the NATO alliance after the Second World War a Turkish statesmen said that this “filled Turkish hearts with pride and exaltation. They were no longer ‘outsiders’. They were at least part of the West.” After the military coup of 1980, the general who seized the political power, ironically, commented that “Turkey is an integral part of democratic and free Europe and intends to remain so.” When Greece was accepted to the EEC, a Turkish newspaper wrote: “They have become Europeans and we have remained Asians.” The feeling of inferiority triggered by Greece’s membership was addressed by a Turkish academic and politician in a significant remark: “This is the most opportune time to rid ourselves of the complex of ‘being considered European’...We are Turks from Turkey. Turkey is a country with one bank in Europe and the other in Asia. The same thing can be said of our geography and culture. We must realise this and accept this as such and we must turn this embarrassment into a sense of superiority.” (all cited in Kushner, 1984: 234-40) (emphasis added) Finally the remark of Turgut Özal, the prime minister of the first elected government after the 1980 military coup and a president afterwards, who has been regarded as the architect of market economy in Turkey reflects on the tension in an interesting way: “Turkey is not alien to Europe, as is the popular belief, but is her alter ego, her complementary identity.” (cited in Robins, 1996: 80, emphasis added)
broadcasting in early Turkish history, which often was assessed in terms of an absolute (the West) and was found to be lacking as I have discussed through the thesis, can only be derived from the set of crises it went through. The Turkish national elite tried to compensate the historical “lack” projected unto them by the West, by appropriating the means of Western civilisation, which meant techniques and artifacts. This was to be combined with “authentic” Turkish culture which found its grounding and legitimacy in an “essential” Turkish nature. However, there were a set of crises involving the use of techniques and technological means. Technology, including radio broadcasting, was not neutral. Technologies were designed by and attempted to incorporate a certain vision of social relations. What is at stake, for example, in Turkish broadcasters’ interaction with microphones is not a direct and unmediated link with a technological apparatus. The microphone linked the body to the world, while at the same time translating it into a codification of voice and language. Speaking to the microphone was reckoned to be a new discipline which had to be taught to the broadcasters. In “the age of radio”, a new “radio language” had to be crafted, and for this usually Western examples were taken as models. Speaking on radio was not a natural thing, it was different from both writing and speaking in everyday life. The new language that was developed, modified and problematised for and on radio also altered the meaning of the speaking subject and his or her addressee. Radio was meant to speak to a mass of people. This

17 I use Deleuze’s statement as a starting point here: “...the logic of a thought (pensée) is the set of crises it goes through.” (From Pourparlers, cited in Rajchmann, 1991: 5)

18 Deleuze says that “the machines are social before being technical. Or, rather, there is a human technology which exists before a material technology.” (1988: 39)

19 “Talking to the world through the microphone” is a phrase repeated in many memoirs of early Turkish broadcasters. For example, one of the first announcers of Istanbul Radio in 1927, Eşref Şefik says: “I was very tense in the first announcement because my voice was going to be heard in the world, because everybody was going to hear it. It was just going to be like what happens when we listen to the Rome or Paris Radio.” Ankara Radio Sound Archives, “Türkiye Radyolarında Yarım Yüzyıl”, Yücel Ertugay, TRT Radio Programme, 1975.

20 Nurettin Artam wrote in the radio journal that the British had mastered in this art of speaking to the microphone: “In Britain there are approximately 28 different kinds of speaking. Now a 29th has been added to this: Speaking on radio.” Radyo, Vol.2, No.16, 15 March 1943, p.1.
closely ties in with the idea of “mass communication” through which the formation of the audience as a single totality occurs. What we might call the “totalisation” of the audience through radio enhanced the notion of the nation as a unified and homogeneous entity as has been discussed by commentators on the history of mass communication.\textsuperscript{21} The employment of radio broadcasting for this end was problematic in Turkey. Radio technology, one hand fostered the imagination of speaking to the nation, but it introduced fears of “vulgarisation” on the other. Technological imagination - the imagination already implied by the design of the technological apparatus- was to be modern/Western. However, the “social diagram” in Deleuze’s term (1988)\textsuperscript{22}, in which the technology was deployed was not congruent with the imagination.

Therefore, I wish to further reflect on my working hypothesis: the connection between communication and government. Similar to Foucault’s description of modern government - a government which is simultaneously “totalising” and “individualising” (in Gordon, 1991:3) - radio broadcasting addresses all and each at the same time; it both totalises and individualises the audience.\textsuperscript{23} In this there lies a significant crisis of early Turkish radio broadcasting. The

\textsuperscript{21} Scannell argues that the definition of broadcasting as a public utility in the form of a national service came from the state in Britain. Broadcasting aimed to construct a unified national space and time. For example, the live relay of national ceremonies and functions aimed to foster national unity. The first time the king was heard on radio in Britain was reckoned by the BBC to be a step in “making the nation as one man” (Scannell, 1990:14). The subordination of the local to the centre, of the specialized departments to the central authority, can be clearly observed in Scannell’s research about the music policy of the BBC (1990). Schlesinger also discusses the role of communication in national integration, mapping out different perspectives on media and nationality (1991). Hilmes gives an account of American radio broadcasting in a framework that relates media to national imagination, not only in terms of integration but of discrimination along race and gender (1997).

\textsuperscript{22} Deleuze defines “social diagram” as “a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its informal functions and matter and in terms of form which makes no distinction between content and expression, a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation. It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak.” (1988: 34)

\textsuperscript{23} The hints for presenters on radio, in a section called “A to Z of Presentation” in a recent book on radio broadcasting make this point clear. For example: “K: Do not forget to have a positive attitude to communicating on the radio. You have to enjoy talking to people and listening to people. You must be interested in what you are talking about, or people will switch off...P: Why do people listen to voices on the radio? What are they hoping for? What do they appreciate? And how do they listen? You need to understand that listening is an individual experience.” (Crook, 1998: 114-5).
technological imagination that radio broadcasting made available to its speaking subjects, that is of speaking to the world, speaking to all and each, was constantly interrupted by the avoidance of communication with certain groups in the social make-up. I have shown in Chapters 5 and 6 that the talks and dramas on Turkish radio were geared to address an imaginary audience modeled on the idea of a "Westernised society" and avoided a "realistic" portrayal of the complexity of the history and culture of the population, as well as the cultural heritage of the Ottoman past. The representation of the people as a nation on radio was deliberately based on fiction rather than documentation, in contrast, for example, to the contemporary broadcasts of the BBC. In connection to this, the audience survey never assumed a significant role for Turkish broadcasters, while it made it possible for the BBC to build up a representative fantasy of all and each of the audience which could be taken as reality, however imperfect this was in practice. In Turkey, the technological imagination inhered in and produced by radio broadcasting could clash with "reality" and was self-consciously regarded as a contradiction, or at least as a problem, by the broadcasters.

24 I demonstrated the imperfections of the representative fantasy of the BBC in its encounters with Turkish audience, in Chapter 4. Scannell & Cardiff point to how in day to day output of the BBC in its formative years "the issues of national identity and culture posed problems which, on the one hand, arose from divisions within the supposed unity of British life and culture and, on the other, from the impact of foreign cultures and their perceived threat to traditional national values." (1995: 324) In Hilmes's words, "a need to contain and moderate sites of social tension establishing a hierarchy that promises to hold chaotic forces of difference and instability" (1997: 23) in radio broadcasting is bound with conflicts. However, to the extent that these conflicts are not surfaced in the fantasy, the fantasy of "true communication" can be functional in defining a truth.
themselves. The fantasy of “true communication” that provided a basis for understanding Western societies, was already disrupted by the specific social diagram in Turkey.

Therefore, the problem that manifested itself in Turkish radio broadcasting should be thought in relation to the problem of communication as a form of government. A prominent Turkish sociologist, Serif Mardin, has extensively dwelled on the split between fantasy and reality in early Turkish history (1991). The significance of his comments, for my argument, lies in the novel perspective that he introduced to make sense of the contradiction. Whereas other scholars of Turkish nationalism mostly confined their object of analysis merely to texts of official nationalist discourse, Mardin treated the problem as a problem of “modern communication”, as a specific link between statements and practices. Inspired by a Weberian approach, Mardin takes communication to be the total of instruments -political, economic and social- that makes the government of a group of people possible. “…a new business ethic, organisational reforms and the market network can be regarded as a cumulative of the means of communication which establishes and promotes the continuity of autonomous mechanisms of rational capitalism.” (1991:202) He argues that this operational network has not been established in Turkey. The apparent resistance against liberalism in Kemalism, which denied class and ethnic divisions, and the autonomy of economic and social life, which I have discussed in

25 The fantasy of “true communication” is a highly significant subject that requires further reflection. I have developed my methodological standpoint in Chapter 2 against the idea that communication can be regarded as an objective process of sending and receiving messages. However, a genealogy of the concept of communication is yet to be done. Many Western essays on nationality and communication assume that “true communication” is possible. Karl Deutch, in the 50’s, developed his thesis on how “processes of communication” constitute the “basis of the coherence of societies” (1966). A more recent example, is of course, Anderson’s thesis that communication is the objective basis of national imagination (1983). Giddens argues that “(T)he extension of communication cannot occur without the ‘conceptual’ involvement of the whole community as a knowledgeable citizenry.” (1985: 219) Yet he does not attend to the fantasy of the “concept” of communication. Habermas seeks the sources of a true rationality in a “non-distorted” communication (1984). A. Ahmad makes what is critical in upholding a notion of “true communication” more evident in his criticism of Said: “In relation to the knowledge of history, then, this image of human communication as a ruse of illusory subjectivity precludes the possibility of truthful statement on the ground that evidence, the criterion of truthful statement in history-writing, is always-already prejudiced by the very nature of language itself.” (1992: 194)
Chapter 1, supports Mardin's ideas. Early Turkish government had its sole emphasis on the centre of government, Ankara. The concept of communication was taken to be a static notion in this sense, through which certain messages were conveyed and disseminated from the centre to the population. The effects of radio were thought in a "visible grid of communication" (Gordon, 1991: 20) that traveled from the centre to the unknown object, the people. Whereas, "(L)iberalism...affirms instead the necessarily opaque, dense autonomous character of the processes of population." (Gordon, 1991:20). It is evident that the population was never an autonomous force in Turkish government as can be seen in the practice of the People's Houses. The people were seen as something to be moulded, as passive objects, with no dynamics of their own. Or to put it in other terms, the dynamics of the population were contrasted to the ideal of Western civilisation and were reckoned to be dangerous for the ideal. The People's Houses, though based on the idea of autonomy of the people, shunned in practice from entrusting the government of individuals to themselves. This led to the failure of the People's Houses as efficient instruments of modern government, which was partly acknowledged by Kemalists themselves.

However, one should not describe this situation simply as a problem of inefficiency. The crises of communication meant more that. The reforms that aimed to put "Western civilisation" in place of the Ottoman way of life created a gap between what was lived as reality and what was constructed as fantasy but presented as the reality in official discourse. For example, the adoption of Latin alphabet together with the "Turkification" of language, led to a crisis in schools in the 40's where not only the students but also the tutors could not understand the schoolbooks (Mardin, 1990: 210). However, says Mardin, the education went on "as if" they could use the book as an instrument for education. (1990:210). The "as if" involved in the process points to the Occidentalist fantasy. The self-conscious disavowal of reality, including the reality in which the elite themselves operated, came in contradiction to the technological imagination that the Western instruments, such as a book in Latin alphabet, enhanced.
The communication in this context paradoxically meant the blocking of communication.

The people, the presumed objects and would-be subjects of the new technologies were, in practice, excluded from the visible grid of communication if they did not participate in the fantasy of Occidentalism, if, for example, they demanded to talk in their own languages. The rural population of different ethnic and religious backgrounds in Turkey was transformed in the Occidentalist fantasy into a single image: the “ideal Turkish peasant”. The rationality of government in Turkey was confined to the operations of the “avant-garde”26 elite which dealt with the heterogeneous domain of the people as a projected image in order to contain the purity of the image. But the confinement itself inverted the rationality that the adopted Western techniques were designed for, such as talking to all and each- and constituted the source of the crises in government. The Turkish national elite, in the fashion of colonialists, never fulfilled their role in the normalisation of power, because the premise of their power was the preservation of their alienness from the people, having grounded their reason of being in the Occidentalist fantasy.

There were some critics of early Turkish history -usually of Anatolian origins- who criticized the imaginary construct of the people by making the necessary distinction between the people as an object and would-be subject, and the people as an image. Tonguç, in 1938, said: “In order to teach something to peasants, first we have to learn from them...In this way the vast and difficult 'village problem' will become more vivid in our eyes losing its present misty landscape.” (Tonguç, 1938:x) He proposed ways and techniques for dealing with the problem stressing that this was only “a matter of discipline”. He emphasised in his books that the “imaginary village”, constructed by a view from outside and by means of theoretical conceptions, was totally different from “reality”. Nevertheless his voice is not included in the official history of the Turkish Republic. The “village problem” was never handled within a liberal paradigm. The political power in

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26 National elite can be likened to “avant-garde” both in the sense that they were “ahead” of the society and they were the warriors defending various borderlines, such as between the East and the West, and themselves and the people.
Turkey did not depend on knowing society nor on the self-knowledge of the elite. It was based on a necessary "non-knowledge" that produced inverted or projected images. Non-knowledge nurtured the national epic while denying the autonomous processes of the population and the possibility of using "communication" as a technique of government. But "non-knowledge" was also a source of frustration and splits for the elite, and paradoxically produced an endless obsession with "reality".

On the one hand, the Occidentalist fantasy justified and maintained the logic of the "passive revolution" by putting limits and determining the forms of "the sayable" in the nationalist discourse (Foucault, 1991a). On the other, it was not normalised as a discourse of power, and stood exterior to "reality" which, in practice, continued to contest the limits of the sayable. In other words, what was excluded was not totally silenced. The Occidentalist fantasy had a strange loop: "it itself fills the lack which it itself opens up and perpetuates. It opens it by filling it, and can fill it only by constantly evoking it." (Dolar, 1998: xxii) Therefore, I have argued in the thesis that Foucault's method of analysis - the study of the "explicit" programmes for the analysis of discourses (1991a) - is not wholly applicable to the Occidentalist fantasy. One has to attend to the dialogic link between the "explicit" and the excluded to make sense of the "explicit" in Turkish nationalist discourse. This is why I have introduced psychoanalytical concepts such as "non-knowledge" to account for the surplus, that is, for what was excluded but was evoked by the fantasy. As Adam Phillips puts it, "(I)f the aim of a system is to create

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27 This was a critical element of the Occidentalist fantasy. Mladen Dolar argues that fantasy is a "useless tool to explain its object". Yet it "can shed light upon its producers and adherents. It projects unto the screen of this distant Other our own impasses and practices in dealing with power, and stages them." (1998: xiv) This can also be connected to Chatterjee's comment on the "inherent contradictoriness" of nationalist thinking in a postcolonial setting, because "it reasons within a framework of knowledge whose representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power nationalist thought seeks to repudiate" (1993a: 38).

28 I have previously referred to this concept, which originally belongs to Gramsci, and is used by Chatterjee to account for Indian anti-colonialist nationalism. He argues the logic of "passive revolution" was to promote change without the risk of mass mobilization, the object of which was "to contain class conflicts within manageable dimensions to control and manipulate the many dispersed power relations in society" without transforming them (1993a: 214).
an outside where you can put the things you don't want, then we have to look at what that system disposes of -its rubbish- to understand it, to get a picture of how it sees itself and wants to be seen." (1995:19) In these terms, the connection of communication and government introduces a fruitful perspective to reflect on the specific rationale of Turkish government.

Scannell and Cardiff argue that “(B)roadcasting mediates a seemingly unmediated reality, but the world that is organized in programme output is not a reflection, a mirror of a reality that exists elsewhere.” (1991: x) It creates its own universe. Any broadcasting is based on assumptions and projections of “absent” audiences. Yet, broadcasting mediates the “commonsense knowledge, the practical experience and the everyday pleasures of whole societies” (1991:xii). Broadcasting production does have a mediated referent: audiences. Therefore, the concept of “audience” has not been problematic for Scannell and Cardiff in their account of the “social history of British broadcasting” although they point to its constructed nature. Most Western media scholars tend to imagine that audiences can be known by some kind of “scientific method”. The imagination of

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29 It is possible to argue that various trends in media studies, though differing vastly on the methods applied to know the response of audiences, assume that audiences can be known in some way. Audience research has come a long way from perspectives of “media effects” (Lazarsfeld&Stanton, 1944; Lazarsfeld&Berelson&Gaudet, 1948) and “uses and gratifications” (Blumler&Katz, 1974) in which processes of influence were transformed into graphical and statistical models. More sophisticated methods were informed by literary criticism and cultural studies, among which the “encoding/decoding” model of Stuart Hall (1980) stands as most important. Both Hall and Morley’s (1980; 1983; 1986) “incorporation/resistance” paradigm emphasised the possible different interpretations of messages by audiences. They were only influenced media but they were active in their reception. The ethnography of audiences that followed dwelled on how different audiences, according to their class, race, ethnicity and gender, made different senses of media messages (Ang, 1985; Herzog, 1987; Radway, 1987; Silverstone, 1990). The ethnographical registers of audience activity found its most radical expression in “active audiences” theory (Fiske, 1987; 1991; 1993) according to which audiences enjoyed almost a boundless semiological freedom in their interpretations, which was criticised by James Curran (1990) as “new revisionism”. What all these radically different perspectives share is the attempt to make sense of audience reaction, whether it manifests itself as affirmation, resistance or free interpretation. Therefore I agree with Ettema&Whitney who argue that a conception of communication still captures most mass communication research, “with its tidy separation of ‘elements’ and its unidirectional progression of ‘actions’. The predominant theoretical function of audiences is still to receive (i.e., ‘selectively attend to’, ‘process information from’, ‘make sense of’, ‘be gratified by’, ‘be socialized by’, ‘be subjugated by’, ‘offer resistance to’, ‘ritualistically partake in’ or just ‘veg-out with’) media messages.” (1994: 3)
scholars completes the circuit of “true communication”. In the case of early Turkish broadcasting however, the relation of production and reception was not accounted by any “scientific method”. People, in their middle ages now, talk nostalgically of the “magical” radio - especially radio drama and children’s programmes- at least in the big cities. However, there was never any audience research to “measure” or “interpret” either the moulding of or the resistance of audiences. This does not mean that radio did not have any effects on the unknown “masses”. One can “imagine”, though only partly, how that “magical box” was conceived, and how the “remembered sounds” contributed to the constitution of various subjectivities. But what is of “scientific” concern here in this thesis is the way the “impact” of radio broadcasting itself was problematised by the broadcasters.

It is highly interesting that the significance of the public address on radio was made a matter of debate in the journal *Yeni Adam* in the 40’s. The question was: “Do you approve of the personalised style of address, such as greetings, directed to a non-visible, unknown public on radio?” The replies from readers varied, some were against it thinking it was insincere, while others approved it arguing that it was part of civilised behaviour. But one reply from Sivas (a rural Anatolian town) gave an important hint concerning the significance of the form of public address on radio. According to the informant: “Hearing a good night greeting from Ankara, the centre of the state, in a far away town gives one pleasure and peace.” This is one evidence that radio broadcasting created an effect of truth through its “voice of power” that talked to everybody, that was disembodied, and triggered sensual mechanisms, but without altering the material conditions of life.

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30 Lacoue-Labarthe, in support of his argument that to each individual or subject there corresponds a rhythm, cites a poem by an American poet, Wallace Stevens. A line from the poem reads: “The self is a cloister full of remembered sounds” (1989: 207)
32 Ibid.
33 According to Hilmes, radio’s “space-transcending qualities” makes an “escape from the usual mechanisms of control” possible. She makes the point that it constitutes “a different kind of mechanism of control” (1997: 16). Although Hilmes does not elaborate the point it is worthy of further reflection.

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to the world of fantasy. Radio simulated the voice of a maternal authority that was reassuring, and which gave enjoyment, fostering the fantasy of the nation in Occidentalist terms. However, it also provoked a sense of “modern longing”. In a letter to his son, the father of an announcer wrote:

“You have become a dream. But a dream that is comprised only of sound. When I hear you talk, as your existence -that I cannot see in the living room where we used to sit all together- comes to life only with words, I feel that my eyes hurt. I cannot name this as separation. It is not, either, what we know as longing. But this is a modern longing.”

Although reckoned to be a failure in its “actual effects” in governing the masses (Kocabuşoğlu, 1980), radio triggered the never satisfied desire to be modern. I have shown in this thesis that radio played a significant role in the production and reproduction of the Occidentalist fantasy in early Turkish history. I hope the thesis opens a path for future research that advances not only new evidence but also new ways of connecting the past records to the present fantasies of the future. After all, the struggle over the representation of the past in theory and in practice is a struggle for redemption from the burden of history.

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b) Public Record Office, Surrey, UK.
Files: FO371/10865; FO371/12333; FO371/25173

c) Ankara Radio Sound Archives, Ankara, Turkey.

“Radyo Anıları”, Elçin Temel, TRT Radio Programme, (no date and record number).


d) Old Records
Found in the store room of Ankara Radio, including records of various radio drama, talk, entertainment and music programmes some with no date, some produced between 1949-1955. The ones I used for analysis are:

“Müşadele Etmeli”, (radio drama) written by Mükerrer Kemal Su, recorded in 1949.

“Vadiye Dönüş”, (radio drama) written by Kemal Sönmez, directed by Oğuz Bora, sound effects by Tahsin Temren, recorded in 1951.
e) Interviews

Abdullah Yılmaz, 26 June 1996
Started to work in Ankara Radio in 1973 as a producer of “village programmes”; had to leave because of political reasons after 1980.

Andrew Mango, 8 December 1995
Started to work in the BBC in 1947; became the Director of the Turkish Service in 1959; worked as the Director of the BBC South European Department until 1986.

Ertuğrul İmer, 25 January 1996

Faruk Yener, 24 July 1996
Started working in Istanbul Radio as the Director of the Discotheque in 1949; became the Director of Programmes in 1950; starting from the late 1960’s worked as a producer of classical music programmes.

Handan Uran, 16 November 1996
An actress, took part in several radio dramas, including “Kimgil Ailesi” in the 40’s.

Mahmut Tali Öngören, 24 January 1996
Became the Director of Ankara Radio in 1957; started working for TRT Television in 1968.

Serpil Erdemgil, 21 June 1996
Started working in Ankara Radio in 1962; became the Director of Verbal Programmes in 1968; was employed by the BBC Turkish Section in 1971; became the Director of the BBC Turkish Section in 1996.

Turgut Özakman, 25 January 1996
Started working in the General Directorate of Press and Publications in 1957; from 1961 to 1970 worked in Ankara Radio in different executive posts; also a playwright.

Turhan Erdemgil, 30 July 1996
Employed by Ankara Radio as both announcer and producer in
1965; worked in TRT Foreign Broadcasts from 1972 to 1980; then worked in the BBC Turkish Section until 1994.

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