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Abstract

This research investigates a possible agency for ‘making art’. It focuses on the convergence of ‘life’ and ‘art’ by comparing two conceptions of self-understanding: the Heideggerian ‘Dasein’, and the Stoic quest for the ‘virtuous act’. These serve as a paradigm for the possible integration of the ‘self’ of the artist and the ‘work’ as an ‘ethics’ of enduring in ‘incertitude’.

The first aspect of the convergence of ‘life’ and ‘work’ is the separation of the ‘instrumental’ and the ‘virtuous’. I refer to Huizinga’s research into the concept of the ‘agon’ and the concept of ‘conversion’ as elaborated on by Pierre Hadot. The second aspect deals with the Stoic therapeutic concept of philosophy, which leads to the third aspect which is the ‘comportment’ within which questioning is guided by the disposition of ‘discretio’, a tact towards the aporia of ‘knowledge’. Giorgio Colli points to the words of the ‘oracle’ as the symbol of language, because it discloses and withdraws (truth) at the same time. The concept of ‘logos’ he develops I relate to Heidegger’s ‘letting-be’ (Gelassenheit) as the originary comportment to beings in the movement of concealment and unconcealment as the site of ‘truth’.

I argue that the necessary conditions for ‘art’ originate in the ‘agon’ as ordeal and action as well as in the psychagogical methodology of ‘awareness’ (prosoche) which underpins the possibility to interrogate the particular mode of constituted consciousness as it expresses itself in ‘comportment’, and the concept of ‘phronesis, which moderates disclosure and withdrawal, concealment and unconcealment. I argue that this mode is itself a ‘poiesis’, which has as its temporal ‘telos’ its own existence as the origin of art itself.
Introduction

This thesis was written within the remits of a combined theory and practice based course, and emphasises therefore aspects of interest rooted in my own practice. These are not related to the particular forms of the work I produce, but to the internal modality which drives such activity in general and accords with my experience. The barriers between art and life have been blurred for some time now but there is still a 'desire' for the 'creative' artist as a 'personality'. To narrow this vast subject to a more manageable size, I have used Martin Heidegger's interpretation of Greek ontology in Being and Time as a starting point and compared it with the Greek understanding of the self and its constitution and formation. Heidegger's 'retrieval' (Wiederholung) of Greek ontological thought and the rejection of Platonic teleology as 'metaphysics' appears in relation to the Presocratics as a reconfiguration of the archaic 'agon' - as a 'judgment by ordeal': the telos is the fate as logos. Virtue is a disclosure of the possibility of disclosure itself and therefore an 'ethos', a comportment.

I investigate certain modes of speaking about the possibility of making art, as they are presented in Greek psychagogy or 'paideia', where the 'self' is revealed in its ethical dimension as a product of 'consideration' and a form of 'aletheia'. The first access to such an approach became, in the progress of my investigation, the writings of Martin Heidegger, while the Greek idea of a 'care of the self' related these insights to the everyday experiences of human actions and exercises. The 'way of life' is central to human beings only. Life is always 'artistic' in this sense, and the Greeks understood their life to be such a 'work of art'. This is therefore a thesis guided by the particular interest of an artist to understand the strange presuppositions of 'creative' forces, which he follows but does not control and which are not a mere 'subjective' fancy, but an ontological inquiry into one's own 'being'. 'Being' is always artistic and not in our control.

The thesis is generally about the concepts of the appearance of a self within its everyday structures and its possibility and parameters. In my own experience, making art is first about one's 'self', how it is fitted into its environment and its sensitivity in questioning incongruencies and contradictions within such an environment. The state of mind which enables proper questioning has to achieve both, the loss of the com-
fort of what is taken for granted as much as unfolding what is around rather than arbitrarily proposing ‘new beginnings’. However, it is also the exercise of the mind (not only of the artist) which I am most interested in and which is expressed by questioning the Greek and especially Stoic practices which are expressly designed to withdraw from a myopic concentration on the things that we take for granted and begin to question: not the things but a ‘self’ which we always already have become in our dealings with beings without consideration about the possibility and the modes of such dealings.

To have an idea is ‘not’ to have the certitude of knowledge. Art can never be the ‘terra firma’ of knowledge. There are ideas, they are neither mine nor are they yours. The artist has an idea. They come into a mind, they are not eternal, they are bound to a particular time. What is the ‘Being’ of such ideas and the mind apprehending them?

The first chapter opens up the question of how a ‘way of life’ and ‘art’ are connected in general. The concepts within which this discourse takes place are drawn from the Greek experience, which still dominates our understanding. The development from the Greek ‘agon’, ‘logos’ and the Socratic expression of ‘arete’ and ‘agathon’ as a transcendent principle devaluing ‘worldly’ goods are the basic elements of this research. From there, the question of production (poiesis) arises as the main question of how ‘existence’ becomes a creation and how agency is attributed by the Stoics, and, alternatively, in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Heidegger’s Dasein is ‘authentic’ when it understands itself as the ‘possibility’ for the site in which beings find their truth. In becoming ‘authentic’ Dasein turns away from its ‘objects’ towards its own Being.

Pierre Hadot is one of the few commentators on ancient philosophy who points out forcefully that philosophy was a ‘way of life’ and not ‘science’ or ‘metaphysics’. Moulding a virtuous character means to live the ‘eudamonic’ life. To do this, the ‘self’ has to understand itself, and its own constituted character. By way of self-‘decomposition’ it has to undo the discourse of mere survival (instrumentality), which tied it to passions and attachments. This procedure is what is called ‘askesis’ or ‘exercise’ and ultimately leads to a ‘con-version’ of the foundations on which the previous understanding was based.
Heidegger's path tries to revert the reflective strategy of the Stoics by placing emphasis on Dasein's always underlying immediate (un-self-conscious) intuition of beings and a reassertion of the 'attunement' (Gestimmtheit) as the originary aspect of 'receiving-perceiving' of phenomena as they 'present themselves'. Artistic practice, in terms of 'poiesis', is important for Heidegger as the agency that forms a collective 'way of life'. This 'poiesis' is 'inspired' in the sense that it is not the self or individual artist but his 'listening' or being the medium of a historic movement. This 'poiesis' takes place in a space antecedent to the constitution of a 'self', which today determines 'Being' as technology and metaphysics.

Coming back to the Greek experience of 'self-improvement' as self-constitution, the concepts of 'poiesis' and the archaic 'agon' supply the notion of transcending the sphere of mere 'survival'. This navigates the difficult path of the Greek concept of 'truth', which lies in discourse and which has the duplicitous character of revealing and hiding (disclosing and withdrawing).

The second chapter is concerned with Heidegger's insights into the constitution of consciousness, which allow us to supplement the Stoic doctrine with an understanding of a historical constitution of a 'self' which is inherent in current artistic practices. The argument here is that if there is anything like a 'critical' practice it is 'critical' in terms of an ontological inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of 'a consciousness'.

The agency of this 'poietic' constitution is 'polemos' or strife, mentioned in 'The Origin of the Work of Art' and translated as 'Aus-einander-setzung': setting apart; meaning differentiation into what is and is not and which is a kind of 'judgement by ordeal' decided by other powers, the 'gods', just as the archaic agon was a 'judgement by ordeal'. Because (scientific) 'reason' is constituted, the 'cosmic reason' appears as a purely contingent rupture.

In the second part of this chapter I will discuss Heidegger's concept of 'poiesis'. In his appropriation of the concept Heidegger introduces the curios distinction between two products of 'techne': on one hand the tool on the other the work of art. I discuss the differences and implications on the mode of techne as production without a 'metaphysical telos'.
The third Chapter looks at the genesis of Stoic doctrines. The Stoics harvest many concepts and methods from Greek thought, from Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and their own immediate predecessors, the Cynics. They put all this to work in their psychagogy. They also develop ‘interiority’ as the human partaking in the universal ‘logos’ but without the ‘modern’ dependence of intelligibility on the internal ‘ego’. The Stoics see their methodology in medical terms.

I follow the discovery of ‘logos’ as the cosmic law, which is open to all humanity as a ‘pharmakon’ and which heals the illness of the mind, meaning the insistence of passions with their own but deficient logic. Giorgio Colli’s instructive book ‘The Birth of Philosophy’¹, investigates the duplicity of ‘logos’, which discloses and withdraws, and Johan Huizinga’s book on the Greek concept of ‘play’ (agon) which describes the route of the devaluation of the world of possessions as the mode of an economy between the divine and the human sphere are important sources here.

‘Agon’ and ‘logos’ constitute an economy of excess by their focus on the transcendent realm of the divine, eternal and perfect in relation to which all finite things are without value. The ‘agon’ is the perfect expression of this economy by subjecting everything to the ‘judgement by ordeal’.

The concept of ‘paideia’, which is introduced by Socrates, is a concept relevant to ‘artistic’ production. The formation of the youth into a responsible and virtuous self, gives him the problem of the ‘techne psyche’: the production is only understandable within the ‘eidos’ which is the atemporal paradigm. The very use of the concept of ‘paideia’ as a making, reveals the difficulty inherent in the Greek concepts of production which Heidegger tries to reformulate to avoid the idea of an atemporal ‘eidos’. Paideia as the art of education is also the art of the constitution of a ‘self’. The teacher however cannot ‘know’ what the ‘eidos’ of one particular soul should be because ‘virtue’ is only intelligible from the particular situation – as is art – as ‘predicament’. Art is for Heidegger the whole constellation of work, artist and audience. This super-subjective happening that determines ‘truth’ is not the action of a subject but rather ‘ordeal’.

¹ I am using the German translation: G. Colli, Die Geburt d. Philosophie, 1975/ dt. 1981, (GdPh hereafter)
From these difficulties the Stoics think the ‘eidos’ of this ‘techne psyche’ as ‘logos’ itself, while avoiding to mention that this ‘logos’ is itself duplicitous, just as the concept of ‘arete’ is in the context of the ‘agon’. Ultimately the ‘production’ of the ‘self’ has to be understood without an atemporal ‘eidos’, which means it has to become equivalent to a phronesis, i.e. having its telos in itself.

I will try to explain Stoic practice by focusing on ‘prosoche’ as their most effective method of exercise. It develops into a second degree ‘consciousness’, ever aware of those ‘pathe’, which drive the rationalisation of acts that do not have their ‘telos’ in themselves. The practice of ‘prosoche’ disrupts the ‘logic’ of ‘pathe’ by becoming aware what one is doing. On the one hand ‘existence’ is brought into the universal, on the other, awareness itself is not aimed at something particular. It is neither ‘the self’ nor ‘the non-self’ who is in control. It is a paradoxical balance of not looking for something and not looking for some ‘thing’, an object, rather being open and ‘letting-be’.

The external world is devalued while virtue is the perfection of intention which cannot be articulated in the particular. Virtue is ‘what has its telos in itself’: it is circular, the perfect form is action and without ‘eidos’. The Stoics see conversation through the concept of ‘virtue’: turning from the attachment to the secular things to the sacred world; a ‘jump’ into the circle of perfection. Conversion denotes this ‘jump’ as an existential turning. It is the formalisation of the ‘way of life’ against the animal life of mere survival. Survival is not enough to be human - because man has access, to ‘logos’ even if limited, i.e. temporal. There would be no existence without time, and so perfection excludes existence. The Stoic is a ‘prokopton’ who is on the way to the event of ‘conversion’. The ‘prokopton’ has not the certitude of disposition of the sage. His ‘intentions’ are not virtuous. With the help of ‘prosoche’ he is on the path to disillusion the false logic of ‘passions’. ‘Conversion’ is lodged within the world of the ‘agon’ and ‘arete’, making the ‘self’ independent of material survival, and preparing the identity of the individual logos with the cosmic logos.

In the fourth chapter I will attempt to align the various concepts I have dealt with in this research and make them operative towards a ‘way of life’, which underpins criti-
cal artistic practice, questioning the constitution of consciousness, within the ‘onto-
logical domain’.

I propose, that the realm of inquiry has to be within the ‘existence’ of the artist with­
out differentiating between ‘work’ and ‘life’. This means making art is a ‘way of life’, as much as is ‘philosophy’. The cluster of attributes, which is called ‘artist’, is
the realm of my inquiry in so far as it is a ‘constituted’ entity and therefore open to
‘ontological’ inquiry. I argue that the making of art as a ‘way of life’ is ‘paradig­
matic’ because the ‘everyday’ constitution of consciousness is taken implicitly as a
symptom of the illness of a non-transparent constitution itself.

The first point, is the ‘turn’ from the ‘instrumental’ to what is ‘arete’ and which is
philosophical ‘conversion’. This ‘turning’ rules the whole discourse from the
Presocratics to Heidegger, who tries to overcome the modern fortification of this di­
chotomy into calculability. Overcoming the animalistic ‘will to life’ is at the begin­
ning and its overcoming by ‘arete’ and ‘logos’ traverses the whole history to its pre­
sent manifestation as modern science by which the demands of certitude have
brought what was liberating in the concept of arete right back into the ‘instrumental’. Art has participated in this discourse by embodying ‘what is not instrumental’, calculable, categorisable and derivative. The ‘agon’ relates to ‘arete’ which is the guiding
concept of the ‘care of the self’ from Socrates to the Stoics but originates in the ar­
chaic time referring to the ‘agon’, which is determined by which action is ‘virtuous’,
and ‘virtuous’ is he, who prevails in the ‘agon’.

Art is not instrumental, it inhabits the realm which is not the external world (the ‘on­
tic’), and thus it is in the realm of ‘ontological’ inquiry, which is the Heideggerian re­
lation to the givenness of Being as excess (Überfluss). As described in the previous
chapter, the act of art has its ‘arche’ and ‘telos’ in itself and these relate it to the phi­
losophical ‘way of life’. ‘Logos’, and by extension ‘physis’ is the ‘arche’ of man, the
way he ‘dwells’. These are concepts of Being in Heidegger’s terms. This does not
mean, however, that the work of art is not constricted within the external world, but
it does mean that the ‘self’ which does perform the act as the original ‘poiesis’ cannot
be determined merely by its instrumentality in the ‘external’ world.
I conclude therefore that, to perform the task of ‘poiesis’, the artist needs a way to become ‘aware’ of the constitution of his own ‘self’ as being affected by – rather than ‘representing’ objects. Only in ‘logos’ (and Heidegger’s "die Sage" is close to this) can this self be composed and thus also decomposed. Within such existence the ‘possibilities’ of ‘Dasein’ are historically unfolded. Such a state of ‘critical’ pre-consciousness is paradoxical and thus only practicable within the realm of immediate experience, and only within a concept of ‘logos’, which discloses and withdraws at the same time. Artists, as philosophers, ‘perform’ this antinomy within the ‘logos’ because ‘awareness’ depends on consciousness but its ‘object’ is what pertains to what constitutes consciousness.

The philosophical conversation leads to conversion, to a different understanding. It is not only a practice, it is also a ‘poiesis’. In the exercises of the Stoa the ‘self’ is also produced according to the ‘eidos’ of virtue and logos, which however are not a proper ‘eidos’. Presocratic ‘dialectic’ and Stoic ‘therapy’ gives us a practice at hand which is similar to those points made by Heidegger about the essence (Wesen) of truth. Art as poiesis sets up the ontological foundation, not because it is a socially privileged production, but because the specific character of its ‘object’ or ‘discipline’, namely the constitution of understanding, has ‘ontological’ character already. ‘Prosoche’ breaks the immanent ‘logic’ of ‘pathe’ - and the passion of ‘certitude’ is such a one too. ‘Prosoche’ makes consciousness open to its own constitution as comportment. That way art is ‘ontological’ research.

Heidegger’s concern for the formative power of Being lacks an investigation how the ‘individual’ effort comes about, how the ‘listening’ to Being is achieved within the ‘self’ or ‘consciousness’ of art The Stoics on the other hand are only concerned with how ‘consciousness’ comes about and analyse it in all their exercises to uncover the motives for actions and by this practice they uncover the whole relation to ‘beings’ which Heidegger calls ‘fallenness’ (Verfallenheit). Both then proceed to find a realm in which beings appear without being immediately understood in an instrumental fashion, for the Stoics it is ‘arete’ for Heidegger the self-understanding of Dasein as care.
The concept of discretion prevents the sage from the insistence of a calculable certainty and is therefore related to the artistic practice. 'Discretio' is the faculty of judgement that produces itself. The philosophical conversation is a logos, which is between perfection and the absence of logos. Philosophical logos is a form of 'tactfulness' toward what is to be distinguished and where not to distinguish, which determines what 'is' truth, in the very act of distinguishing. This 'tactfulness' appears in Heidegger's Anaxagoras essay as 'esteem' (tisin), the 'just' (dike) way in which beings interplay with each other. And this is the way things presence.²

I found the best way to articulate my inquiry, was to repeat aspects of interpretations but each time follow a different line of inquiry. In a line of repetition I will cover the various perspectives that these statements allow, in particular Heidegger's. As an artist I 'collect together' shapes of thoughts and layer them until something is elucidated. In this text I try to find shapes of thoughts and test their possible application to the everyday consideration with which artists disclose - possibly inadvertently - some form of 'truth'. Confusion is certainly at the heart of such a questioning, and there is still as much confusion at the end as there was at the beginning. But confusion and consideration is what drives art and philosophy.

For some of the Heideggerian vocabulary I have used my own translations, but I always indicate the German original to avoid any confusion. At times I found it preferable to use the German original, like Dasein instead of 'being there', Entschlossenheit instead of 'resolve' or the 'Ungeheure' instead of 'uncanny', which resonates too strongly with the Freudian use of the term. Greek vocabulary is used either in the way Heidegger translates it or in accordance with the Liddell and Scott Greek English Dictionary, as currently available on the Perseus website (www.perseus.tufts.edu)

² "Awesen des Awesenden", Der Spruch des Anaxagoras, in Holzwege, (SdA hereafter), p.358
Chapter 1

‘Art and a Way of life’

I will use this first chapter as a launching pad for questions relating to the ‘making’ of art, rather than the artwork itself. My main interest lies in the possible ways a ‘self’ is constituted and re-constituted experimentally by artists as the practice which grounds the work of art. Art, then, would not be a product of a subject, instead, as for Heidegger, the work of art originates from the ‘strife’ (polemos’) between the ‘world’ and ‘earth’. The site of this ‘strife’ he calls ‘Da-sein’. Heidegger and Stoic philosophy seem to be concerned, in complementary ways, with this constitution of this ‘site’ as the site of ‘truth’, out of an interaction between a universal form of the absolute and a particular existence. The Stoics sum up the Greek heritage of Presocratic ‘logos’, particularly Heraclitus and the Socratic ‘care of the self’. Heidegger’s fundamental-ontology, on the other hand, points us to an ‘understanding’ which relates to ‘Being’ and which is always antecedent to all other ways of knowledge, and which is not itself the ‘object’ of a ‘knowledge’. We have always already understood something before we know ‘objects’ and this understanding is ‘absent’, ‘nothing’. These underlying practices of understanding, “die Sage” as he will later come to call them in ‘On the Way to Language’, circumscribe the historical unfolding of Being as ‘aletheia’, the ‘play’ of disclosing and withdrawing. This strategy interprets human ‘subjectivity’ as a process which is constituted in unconscious practices and comportments. On the other hand, the Presocratic concept of ‘logos’ uses the same figure of withdrawing and disclosing, for instance in the words of oracles. The divine words tell the truth but they also hide it from man. There is a cruelty in this withdrawal of the oracle, in which a god reveals fate, but withdrawing it from human reason in the depth of the words at the same time. Greek philosophy is about navigating this ignorance in relation to the divine ‘logos’ and it is brought into view ultimately by the Socratic turn to the ‘care of the self’ as a dwelling in thought and discourse, as a ‘way of life’.

3”Der Gott kennt die Zukunft, er offenbart sie dem Menschen, aber er scheint nicht zu wollen, daß der Mensch auch begreift. Im Bilde Apollos steckt ein Moment von Boßheit, von Grausamkeit, das in der Mitteilung der Weisheit zum Ausdruck kommt. So sagt denn Heraclitus, ein Weiser: »Der Herr, dem das Orakel in Delphi gehört, sagt nicht und verbirgt nicht, sondern deutet an.«” Colli, GdPh, p.16
A ‘way of life’ is the answer to a question. The question is something like, ‘How do we live?’ or ‘How am I?’ and in question is the ‘am’ rather than the ‘I’. This ‘I’ is aware of itself, not as a ‘subject’, but as a work and something that sets itself into being; ‘becoming what one is’. The suggestion is, that we can quite well choose our way of life; we are, after all, in control of ‘something’. There is, after all, life always already before we have asked the question about a way of life. In this way we seem to have already determined the internal space of a ‘self’ as the material, which we can mould according to a fulfilment, a ‘telos’. This ‘telos’ is not arbitrary but linked to a concept of ‘nature’. Only what is already given can be completed. We are what we will be in advance. Philosophy is a transformative way of life because it ‘gives’ form. This form however is not ‘aesthetic’, and it determines the approach to the ‘self’ itself and to beings. The whole of ‘life’ is transformed within a framework of a discourse of intentions, which is the life according to ‘arete’, virtue. Within this context a critique of one’s own life needs to find a gesture of justification; the ‘way of life’ has to be validated in some way. The only validation which used to be available to the Greeks was in the form of tradition (‘nomos’), which means that we ‘always already’ have ‘a’ way of life given to us by gods or tradition. If this ‘nomos’ loses its normative value, a different form of consensus has to be found. The Greek ‘logos’ has opened the space within which a ‘freely’ considered ‘way of life’ can be practised. Life in discourse is a changed life. It is ‘free’, as we shall see, only if it is in accordance with ‘logos’ and ‘physis’. This difference, that wilfulness points at an assertive control, hints already to the problem of control. The ‘way of life’ is a ‘giving’ of form, as is art. It is a ‘poietic’ practice. However, like the form of ‘life’, ‘art’ needs not only freedom but also a validation. Art is not science, which has validation in its mathematical form. Instead, artistic practice operates in the realm which precedes the hiatus between subject and object. ‘Knowledge’ implies control and certitude. A Socratic ‘way of life’ dispels apparent and unsubstantiated ‘knowledge’ and Socrates’ refutes all suppositions with even the most spurious arguments; not because they are ‘wrong’, but because the ‘attitude’ that someone ‘knows’ needs to be crushed to allow the openness for a different, more considered and circumspect ‘way of life’. The origin of artistic practices is therefore a different comportment which is not characterised by control and calculation.

4 “Rather, it means that philosophy was a mode of existing-in-the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual’s life.”, Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, (PhWL hereafter), p. 265:
Heidegger’s writings analyse possible ways of understanding ourselves and ‘under­standing’ as a self-relation but not in terms of a subject. ‘Da-sein’ is the site ‘as’ which meaning takes place in a dynamic temporal way\(^5\). Heidegger (re-)introduces the ‘movement’ and strife contained in the idea of understanding. The concept of ‘polemos’ (Aus-einander-setzung) which appears in key places of Heidegger’s writings\(^6\), is confusing at first because it contains so many possible interpretations. The Greek concept means ‘strife’, but ‘Aus-einander-setzung’ also means ‘differentiation’ and ‘consideration’. I will come back to this later in this chapter. The being of ‘Dasein’ itself is ‘polemos’ as a means by which ‘meaning’ is gathered (‘legein’) anew.

Being on a path which ends abruptly is a "Holzweg"\(^7\). One has to retrace one’s steps and start again. What is more important than ‘arrival’ in a predestined place is the region itself\(^8\). The ‘paths’ of ‘Holzwege’ are not the one ‘way’ or the path of reason, but they mean that ‘being on the way’ is a movement and strife (‘polemos’) of understanding and its originary constitutive character, which is not an object of knowledge. In such a way the human work is driven by synthesis of conscious (and finite) knowledge and the unconscious totality of the sway of ‘Being’\(^9\). In this synthesis art, which is not purely an aesthetic phenomenon any more, is able to inquire into pre-suppositions of understanding.

The Greek ‘way of life’, before Socrates, was ‘theoretical’. Observation of nature and cosmological speculation as much as Sophistic argument, targeted the concept of ‘tradition’ (nomos) with the concepts of ‘logos’ and ‘physis’. Socrates’ inquiries, undermined all this frenzied competition for knowledge. His critique subverts the ideas of the new speculative natural knowledge as much as it dismisses the purely formal arguments of the Sophists. But Socrates does not offer an alternative to this knowledge of ‘mastery’. Instead, he insists on personal responsibility, a ‘mastery’ of the

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\(^5\) “Dynamis and Kinesis are the origin of Heidegger’s term Ereignis. This word describes a moving entity’s disclosive structure, its being” Sheehan, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Mind, in Philosophy of Mind, p.308,

\(^6\) Heidegger. Sein und Zeit, p.384; Einführung in die Metaphysik, p.47 and Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks, p.34.

\(^7\) one can translate a ‘Holzweg’ as wood path leading nowhere, but also as something like being led ‘up the garden path’, a false trace

\(^8\) Heidegger, ‘Holzwege’, in Denkerfahrungen, p.41
'self'. The integrated idea of a 'self' emerges in the insistence of Socrates by making it the only matter of knowledge from which all other knowledge can emerge. The question about the 'way of life' in antiquity was explored by a multitude of competing schools\(^9\), who all called for the transformational-philosophical 'way of life'.

As silent as Socrates was about concrete ‘rules’ of virtue\(^11\), so are the Stoics, who do not propose an edifice of concrete ‘rules’ either. Instead they teach a practice of life which is governed by virtuous motives. There are no ‘given’ rules, which could ever be used to analyse the complexity of a situation; it is not about lengthy deliberation either - how much time do we have to react when a ship capsizes? Immediate action is required. So if there is no time to deliberate or to consult a book or a commission, there has to be a ‘faculty’ that is always with us\(^12\). We usually call it the soul or self, it is the character of the unity of our faculties that is shaped in one way or other to react to the vagaries of life. Therefore the way our soul, as the whole of our faculties, is shaped determines the way of life we lead. Philosophy gives form to life, which becomes a ‘work’ in progress, ‘being-at-work’(energeia). What the philosophies of antiquity proposed was a shape that is flexible and consistent, joyful and considered in all aspects. Just this is a way of life, where the ‘intention’ is always ‘virtuous’, leading to ‘appropriate actions’ (katechonta and kathorthoma) in any given situation. Actions are therefore understood to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’, dependent on the intention, which is the only thing in our control. To be ‘good’ means to be morally good and this also means to be ‘happy’ (eudaimonia), to live a fulfilled life.\(^13\) ‘Virtue’ is more than just a behaviour or an attitude. Instead it is a ‘durable disposition’ of the soul\(^14\), which unfailingly follows the cosmic ‘physis’\(^15\). Virtue seems now to be a form of knowledge which is independent of external ends and is instead the origin of internal intentions. Virtue is a measure of the soul’s alignment with the universal ‘logos’. All

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\(^{9}\) Bowie, Schelling and modern European Philosophy, p.53
\(^{10}\) "In the view of all philosophical schools, mankind's principal cause of suffering, disorder, and unconsciousness were the passions: that is, unregulated desires and exaggerated fears. People are prevented from truly living, it was taught, because they are dominated by worries. Philosophy thus appears, in the first place, as a therapeutic of the passions. Each school had its own therapeutic method, but all of them linked their therapeutics to a profound transformation of the individual's mode of seeing and being. The object of spiritual exercises is precisely to bring about this transformation." Hadot, PhWL, p. 83:
\(^{11}\) the four virtues are: temperance, courage, justice, wisdom
\(^{12}\) like the fist fighter who has his weapons with him all the time, unlike the sword fighter, Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VI.
\(^{13}\) Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.15
\(^{14}\), poion’ is a durable disposition, Foschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.52
actions are performed only because their intentions are in accordance with the ‘lo-
gos’ (katorthoma). This action is also an ‘ontological’ decision about how beings, 
how the external world, affects us.

The Greek term for the ‘way of life’ is ‘bios’, as opposed to ‘zoe’, the ‘biological’ 
life. The Greeks were not only aware of the fact of the difference but they made it 
their most enduring invention: "they invented form-in-itself", as Nietzsche says.16 
Through the radical criticism of the Sophistic schools which utilised the art of rheto-
ric, form has been divorced from the content and became a manipulable entity.17

The ‘way of life’ is separated from the biological life. Life as ‘pure’ – and political – 
form excludes the production of sustenance. Recently Giorgio Agamben has shown 
how deeply this separation has influenced all of occidental thought, by tying this dis-
tinction to ‘good’ and ‘bad’. In ‘Homo Sacer’ Agamben inquires into the classical 
division of ‘bios’ and ‘zoe’: zoe is the ‘natural’ or ‘productive’ life, the biological 
body, ‘bios’ on the other hand is the ‘way of life’ meaning the political, the form and 
structure of life. The Greek ‘bios’ of the polis flourished to the exclusion of the ‘bare 
life’ form the public life. 18

‘Bios’ is a "qualified" life. In the Stoic context ‘quality’ (as the 2. category) is 
‘poion’ - from ‘poiesis’, a form-giving. The form is here already understood as a 
made form, at least distinct and excluded even in a juridical way from the productive 
life of a household. In Stoic discourse, the constitutive ‘poiesis’ is applied to both, 
bios and zoe, the public and private, but under the topic of virtue, which used to be-

15 “kata physin bios”, Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.221,
16 "Die Gefahr der Griechen lag im Virtuosentum aller Art; Mit Sokrates beginnen die Lebensvirtu-
osen, Socrates der neue Dithyramb, die neuere Tragodie, die Erfindung des Rhetors! Der Rhetor ist 
eine Griechische Erfindung der spateren Zeit. Sie haben die "Form an sich" erfunden (und auch den Philosophen dazu). - "The danger of the Greeks is their virtuosity in all sorts; the virtuosi of life 
emerge with Socrates, Socrates the new Dithyramb, the new tragedy, the invention of the rhetor! The 
rhetor is a Greek invention of a later date. They invented the form-in-itself (and also the philosopher)"
Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke Vol.III. Ed. Schlechta p.1045
17 Colli, GdPh, p.89
18 "In the classical world, however, simple natural life is excluded from the polis in the strict sense, 
and remains confined-as merely reproductive life-to the sphere of the oikos, "home" (Politics, 1252a, 
26-35)". ... "It is true that in a famous passage of the same work, Aristotle defines man as a politikon 
zoon (Politics, 1253a, 4). But here (aside from the fact that in Attic Greek the verb bionai is practi-
cally never used in the present tense), "political" is not an attribute of the living being as such, but 
rather a specific difference that determines the genus zoon. (Only a little later, after all, human politics 
is distinguished from that of other living beings in that it is founded, through a supplement of politi-
city [policita'] tied to language, on a community not simply of the pleasant and the painful but of the
long only to the ‘bios’, the public life. Life encompasses everything – it is ‘absolute’ through ‘logos’ but finite and mortal. The concept of ‘qualifying’ is inherent in a way life. There is a decision to be made on the basis of the ‘logos’ which enables this distinction about the conduct of a life. This means effectively that public conduct becomes a ‘form-in-itself’ without the content of ‘life’ as the will to life: survival ("Form-an-sich" as Nietzsche put it). The virtuosity of life itself is for Nietzsche a life which has forgotten bare life. Or rather, the ‘way of life’ is inherently (or the heritage of) the virtuous life of the mythical hero who, to be virtuous, risks the bare life (the oikeios, estate or means of productive life) in order to follow the rules of the virtuous (dis)play (‘agon’). In this sense ‘ethics’ is understood as the application of the virtuous rules of play to the exclusion of the ‘bare life’ - or its complete irrelevance in relation to the life of the soul. Socrates’ ‘care of the self’, after all, is pitched precisely against the pursuit of the private life of riches and indulgence etc., which is part of the ‘bare life’. Virtuosity, as Nietzsche says, denies the ‘bare life’ in favour of the virtuous ‘play’ (agon).

The Greek distinction between phronesis (praxis) and techne (production-poiesis) is concerned with ‘bare life’ as ‘production of life’ and praxis as a ‘way of life’. In this sense the archaic and Socratic ‘arete’ coincide by denying any value to the ‘bare life’, instituting the perspective of the virtuous play in the form of ‘care for the self’ in public discourse. The reversal between the value of the private and public life, ‘bios’ and ‘zoe’, are at the root of the possibility to understand ‘life’ in terms of ‘form’. Nietzsche takes this to be the source of nihilism itself and much of his critique of Socrates is precisely about this division between the Dionysian and Apollo- nian approach. However, Nietzsche ignores that this radicalisation is moderated by a good measure of therapy of the unbearable pain of the naked life. Even the philosopher provides for the necessities of life, but without calling them ‘virtuous’. Just like Socrates, the Stoics understand that it is the intention which makes an act ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but unlike the radical interpretation by the Cynics, they do not play out their ‘bare life’ in public. They nevertheless agree with them about the irrelevance of this

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19 "It thus has its place in a sphere superior to the strictly biological processes of nutrition, reproduction and self-preservation." Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.11
from the point of view of reason. They just abide by common decorum and quietly accept that the virtuous way of life encompasses the private as well as the public life.

In its ‘excess of meaning’, art opens the possibility of a form for the ‘way of life’. This is what Heidegger works out in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. Art grants shape to a ‘world’ which is the unified background of a ‘communal’ understanding. In Greek terms, it enables ‘form as such’, and it is what Nietzsche ascribes to the Greek enlightenment. Work on the disposition of the self uncouples itself from ‘bodily’ necessity and at the same time it becomes ‘ontologically’ virulent. The ‘ergon’ of the act of making art is not just ‘ontic’ it is also ontologically inquiring into historical manifestation of ‘Being’.

Art and ethics are understood to be without (external) purpose, they have purpose in themselves. Heidegger’s ‘present-at-hand’ (“Zu-handenes”), the term describing the network or field of inherent and universal practicability needs art as giving form to tradition: in the ‘excess of meaning’ the ends and aims receive their form. Tradition and rootedness, all the possible relations of a ‘world’, present themselves out of this excess of meaning. In its excess, art is already a paradigm precisely because it is ‘outside’ the utilitarian context of the ‘stuff’ ("Zeug") of the ‘present-at-hand’. Tradition and its language are the trace of the polemos of such a discourse.

A vocabulary of ‘not being in control’ in relation to the production of works of art cannot be sought in the ‘purity’ of ‘law’ and universality. Universality is always poisoned through the denial of its own constitution. 21 To avoid this Heidegger declares in SZ that to make ‘Being’ a question of ‘ontology again, one has to go through the ‘ontic’ practices of Dasein as the “hermeneutic of Dasein”22. This is reminiscent of Hamann’s objections to Kant’s transcendental ambition that it is only expressible in

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22 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (SZ hereafter), §8, p.38
'impure' language (contaminated with experience), i.e. it is governed from a particular historical situation that can never be 'universal', 'pure' etc..

Now, I will try to describe, why I think that 'art' has inherited the philosophical practice to determine a 'way of life'. The way one conducts oneself is a comportment towards things. Art is a skill to query one's own comportment. Comportments determine how we see things and how we let them address us.\(^{23}\) I consider the philosophical 'way of life' to operate on the ontic as well as on an 'ontological' level, by questioning those presuppositions that pertain to the possibility of understanding. In particular, when Heidegger determines the possibility to understand with "pure letting-be-present [Anwesend-sein-lassen] of what manifests itself\(^{24}\), instead of the scientific 'determining in advance the object of knowledge', it is through a comportment (of anxiety or sadness or calculation) that we can switch from the latter to the first. Comportment as 'Stimmung\(^{25}\) is 'plastic' and the Stoic psychagogy was imminently concerned with such 'comportment', because it determined in advance how things present themselves to us. Here 'ontic' form seeks to determine the 'ontological' formation.

One could determine a 'way of life' as 'tradition', what one is 'used to'. 'Dasein' is determined already by an understanding of 'Being\(^{26}\), which means, it always already, in advance, understands what it means 'to be' - all consideration takes place on the foundation of such a antecedent decision about the 'nature' of 'beings', which Heidegger calls 'project'. Nevertheless, this antecedent understanding is historical and thus plastic. Heidegger denies this 'project' to be open to the individual, but in 'The Origin of the Work of Art' he posits the artists (poets) with a capacity to inaugurate a change in this understanding of 'Being'.\(^{27}\)

Art (modern Western art at least) has to do with tradition and discovery. A tradition within which we have always already understood things by taking them for granted

\(^{23}\) Moerchen, Heideggers Satz: »'Sein' heißt 'An-wesen'«, in Merker (ed) Innen und Aussenansichten, p.193
\(^{24}\) Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p.110
\(^{25}\) Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p.211
\(^{26}\) "Seinsverstaendniss ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins." Heidegger, SZ, §4, p.12
\(^{27}\) “Was die Dichtung als lichtender Entwurf an Unverborgenheit auseinanderfaltet und in den Riß der Gestalt vorauswirft, ist das Offene, das sie geschehen läßt und zwar dergestalt, daß jetzt das Offene erst inmitten des Seienden dieses zum Leuchten und Klingen bringt.” Heidegger, Der Ursprung des
in one way or another and a dismissal of such tradition, is this not a ‘polemos’ in a
Heideggerian way? Virtually everything we understand is based on what we presup­
pose without being aware of it. One way to unearth some of these presuppositions is
philosophy. Philosophy, as we know its heritage from Socratic dialogues, is a way of
life which does not pretend to ‘know’ and in its proceedings it forces the participants
to jettison their ‘presuppositions’. It perceives life itself as a work of art. Art – mod­
ern art - has become a procedure which, by operating outside the strictures of scien­
tific methodology, acts as a ‘critical’ faculty, re-opening again those dimensions
which the scientific methodology has closed down and sealed from ‘view’ to exert its
program of self-justification and auto-poiesis ‘ex nihilo’. Therefore it is important to
find a ‘path’ within the play between ‘tradition’ and ‘auto-poiesis’ - the volatile state
of truth each saeculum produces.

I will delimit the development of the idea of a ‘way of life’ as a process of inquiry
into one’s own practices and its development in Stoic philosophy, by interpreting this
practice in relation to the Greek ‘agon’ as the immediate source of the question of a
‘way of life’, which was the ‘virtuous’ life in the archaic age. The Stoics, as the heirs
of Socratic inquiry, saw the purpose of the ‘way of life’ as a consideration of the in­
tention of acts. This exercise shaped the faculties into a new ‘character’ as an endur­ing
‘form’ - constituting a ‘way of life’. ‘Knowledge’ was not to be accumulated in
an abstract sense as a philosophical system, but only as an exercise to mould the
character. This ‘logos’ is still, in its applications, dependent on the idea of ‘wisdom’
of the archaic past. The Stoic sages and their god may have a perfect ‘logos’, mere
mortals however, which most philosophers are, are not sages. Stoic exercises are
mostly directed towards the daily turmoil of living in an apparently unhinged world.
Here the Stoic obsession with ‘passions’ has its justification. Passions are ‘wrong’
j judgements about the occurrences of life. The ‘logos’ of the Greek enlightenment
becomes culture-critical, and virtue is the critical terminus which opens a view on
‘Being’, on the possibilities to encounter beings. But it expresses itself indirectly in
the ‘care of the self’.

Kunstwerks, in Holzwege: (UKW hereafter), p.58
28 kriesein, which seems to me to be also a “setting-apart”, an ‘Aus-einander-setzung’ a ‘polemos’
29 it was never meant to be a knowledge as ‘hard science’ but as exercise or skill – Nietzsche’s verdict
is correct to this degree.
Historic fate, destiny and necessity compete with human assertion of freedom, but for both, Heidegger and Stoa, ‘will’ is dubious and at the same time the essence of man (Dasein). For Heidegger ‘will to power’ is the essence of technology, for the Stoics, the will for security, control of the external world, the control of destiny is precisely the misapprehension which leads to incomprehensible suffering. It is, like the essence of technology, not comprehended because it will not reveal its ‘presuppositions’.

At certain junctures Heidegger’s and Stoic philosophy seem to be almost excluding each other, while they appear so close at others. One has to keep in mind against whom the authors argue and who the interlocutor is. Tendentiously the Stoics strengthen their concept of the ‘logos’ and rationality in almost hyperbolic proportions, while Heidegger, on the opposite side, unearths the genealogy of modern ‘rationality’ of science and locates it in the Presocratics. Heidegger’s dependence on Heraclitus though, matches Stoic reliance on him. Universality, volition, logic are things that the Stoa establishes while Heidegger is busy disenchanting them. But first, it is not the same rationality as that of the modern science and secondly the motivation of the Stoa is to establish a field of mental training, a doxology within which the soul is embedded to make the turn into its ‘way of life’, as a change of ‘character’. Stoic ‘reason’ is therapeutic and therefore defined as human nature. Thought is ‘reason’ already and it is always already present by nature. Stoic practice ‘leads’ towards the ‘non-willing willing’, the will which is not a ‘will to power’, but equally not ‘passivity’. For both, Stoa and Heidegger the most appropriate ‘action’ is to elucidate how things are as they present themselves to make sense of them. Stoic exercises create a character-disposition within which the judgement by which sense is made of things is itself determined. Stoa is still much closer to Heraclitus ‘physis’ than to Cartesian science. This is where there is a closeness between Heidegger and Stoa.

1. What is Socrates’ way of life?

In the mythological archaic age nature as cosmos created a unity with the ‘nomos’, the moral tradition. With the emergence of ‘theoria’ as a philosophy of nature and

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30 “the being of beings is the will [of Dasein]” Heidegger, Poetic, Language and Thought, p.100
speculative cosmology mythical understanding of occurrences is converted into the concept of ‘law’ as ‘logos’, which still governs political-moral order. For Heraclitus ‘logos’ is the unifying normativity of nature and nomos. However, for him it already demarcates the distance to the actual social practices of his polis. In no way does he thus legitimate the actual ‘nomos’, on the contrary, it is a sharp critique of a nomos which is practised without any relation to ‘logos’. ‘Logos’, ‘kosmos’, ‘physis’ and ‘nomos’ are a unified whole and critical of the actual political order. The emergence of this ‘fourfold’ as ‘critical’ concept forces a differentiation in the application of the Greek agon. Agonic ‘arete’ has to be harmonised with ‘physis’, ‘polis’ and ‘logos’. The archaic ‘agon’ is the feudal concept to triumph at any cost. All material considerations are secondary: the ‘bare life’ is indifferent.

In terms of the agon, what is instrumental is not ‘arete’. Once ‘physis’ becomes the critical paradigm and united with ‘logos’, what is ‘outside’ nature is not virtue or the good and rational but the psycho-physiologically unbalanced, a category of ill-health. The concept of ‘physis’ becomes normative through the influence of medical science (Hippocrates), it validates ‘physis’ as what is always conducive to life, a lawful and ‘healthy’ way determining all life. This means that ultimately, for the Stoics, ‘logos’ is ‘physis’ and therapeutic. As the ‘agon’, ‘physis’ is a form of culture critique referencing a natural law as the archaic agon referenced the divine order in the form of a judgement by ordeal. I will come to the ‘agon’ in a later section.

Socrates’ practice is a discourse about being ‘virtuous’. What is most important for humans is to be virtuous, i.e. that nothing but virtue has value, i.e. the ethos of the ‘care of one’s self’ (and not other things or spurious (speculative cosmological) knowledge etc.) A key point here is, that Plato uses the Socratic ‘agathon’ as a paradigmatic ‘form’ (idea) for an ‘ontological’ understanding of ‘being’ itself. This approach integrates the ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’. It is important for my purpose to connect ontology with art to stress this connection between ontology and the ‘ontic’ on which Stoic practices are based.

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31 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.12
32 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p18; Plato, Gorgias 504a-508a
The Stoic therapeutic of the self depends on Socratic practices. His ‘way of life’ was exemplary, even though he was not considered a ‘sage’ in Stoic terms. The literature on Socrates and Plato is often concerned with the validity, logic or otherwise of this argument, or the coherence of a ‘theory of knowledge’. Socrates tricks unsuspecting passers-by into a cumbersome disputes and forces them into admitting their ignorance. Is this the Socratic ‘way of life’? Socrates does not just want to prove his interlocutors wrong and find a ‘true’ definition of ‘justice’ or any other subject. What he does, though, is to "confuse" people, so their apparent ‘knowledge’ is revealed as inadequate.

Thus he shows that there is a different kind of ‘knowledge’, which is grounded in the question of a considered conduct of one’s life. Since ‘beliefs’ are so far unsafe and easily refuted, it is only the objective to live virtuously that is left as the basis for inquiry. Socrates therefore shapes the way of his life, to question the ‘way of life’ of others. Donning the hat of ignorance, his figure becomes the question of his interlocutors’ ‘self’-understanding. The ‘way of life’ in Socrates’ case is the unity of his thoughts and actions. It is the ‘dwelling in philosophy’ thinking (‘dianoia’) about one’s actions by giving account. The Socratic ‘care of the self’ is the ‘good life’ which is ‘eudaimonia’, and later the Stoics understand it as a carefree life, ‘care’ understood as caring for external matters rather than for ones ‘self’. Only then Plato formulates the ‘good’ (agathon) as an ontological concept.

Heidegger takes the opposite approach: we have to know what man is to propose an ‘ethics’. But for this purpose he also refers to the ‘perplexity’ (Verlegenheit) about

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33 in particular Vlastos and the whole analytical school
34 “Socrates is ‘atopos’, without place or out of place. The philosopher is in between worlds, the human and the divine, wise and ignorant, which means he knows about his limits, his life is itself what Socratic discourse points to. "I am utterly disturbing (atopos), and I create only perplexity (aporia)" Hadot, PhWL, p.31
35 “For by nature, my friend, man’s mind dwells in philosophy” (Plato, Phaedrus, 279a) ... Philosophy - what we call philosophy - is metaphysics’ getting under way, in which philosophy comes to itself and to its explicit tasks. Philosophy gets under way only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence into the fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole.” Heidegger, What is Metaphysics, in Basic Writings, Routledge, London 1978, p.112
36 ‘How’ we ‘see’ or understand things; the Good, ‘agathon’, is the possibility to understand; in Besinnung, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 66, p.106; G.Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, p.122
37 “Soll nun gemäß der Grundbedeutung des Wortes ‘ethos’ der Name Ethik dies sagen, daß sie den Aufenthalt des Menschen bedenkt, dann ist dasjenige Denken, das die Wahrheit des Seins als das anfängliche Element des Menschen als eines existierenden denkt, in sich schon die ursprüngliche Ethik. Dieses Denken ist aber dann auch nicht erst Ethik, weil es Ontologie ist.“ Heidegger, Wegmarken, p.187:
what it means to ‘be’. However, it is important to see, that a ‘way of life’ is also a therapeutic unravelling of the constitution of a subjective consciousness from everyday existence (the ‘ontic’) or rather the state of ‘Fallenness’ (Verfallenheit) into ‘Facticity’. Socratic inquisition is a method that invalidates any human ‘knowledge’ just as ‘understanding’ which is at the source of ‘Verfallenheit’ and the forgetting of the ‘question of Being’.

‘Thought’ and (ideal) ‘truth’ are what determines, from there on, the space of metaphysics but within it also the seed of a ‘self’ which is constituted as an ‘ergon’ according to ‘nature’.

The care for thought, truth and soul, which Socrates stipulates as what is more necessary than all else, is equated with a verifiable form of knowledge of virtue, it has to be verified in discourse. What is so confusing is that Socrates insists on an external and absolute truth, while at the same time insisting that we should only behave according to the better argument. If we try to understand it from the point of view against which Socrates put this idea forward, then the answer is: it was clearly natural philosophy and sophistry which pretended to pursue and teach ‘knowledge’ and ‘virtue’. Natural philosophy of the 5th century excelled in medical and cosmological speculation and the term ‘nature’ (‘physis’), became an expression of uncorrupted value opposed to the concept of the ‘nomos’, as the corruption of human nature. If we assume that Socrates criticises the ‘new’ knowledge of natural speculation trying to find the universal laws of nature, like Leukippus, Democritus’ Atomism and the Sophists’ relativisation and critique of tradition and ‘nomos’, then we will also see

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38 “Denn offenbar seid ihr doch schon lange mit dem vertraut, was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn ihr den Ausdruck ‘seiend’ gebraucht, wir jedoch glaubten es einst zwar zu verstehen, jetzt aber sind wir in Verlegenheit gekommen” (Plato, Sophistes 244a) Haben wir heute eine Antwort auf die Frage nach dem, was wir mit dem Wort ‘seiend’ eigentlich meinen? Keineswegs. Und so gilt es denn, die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein ernst zu stellen. Sind wir denn heute auch nur in der Verlegenheit, den Ausdruck ‘Sein’ nicht zu verstehen? Keineswegs. Und so gilt es denn vordem, allererst wieder ein Verständnis für den Sinn dieser Frage zu wecken.” SZ, p.1

39 note the similarity between ‘Seinsvergessenheit’ and the Platonic ‘anamnesis’ in Meno; ‘the ‘idea of ideas’ determines the question of Being, while the for the Stoics the self formulates the question of Being by its attempt to partake in the universal a-temporal logos. The difference to Heidegger is the temporality [perfection] “Ganzheit” of the ‘care-structure’ in SZ, §65, p.328; §72, p.374

40 Plato, Apology, 29d-e.; “Thus, Socrates brought his interlocutors to examine and become aware of themselves. "Like a gadfly," Socrates harassed his interlocutors with questions which placed them in question, and obliged them to pay attention to themselves and to take care of themselves: "What? Dear friend, you are an Athenian, citizen of a city greater and more famous than any other for its science and its power, and you do not blush at the fact that you give care to your fortune, in order to increase it as much as possible, and to your reputation and your honours; but when it comes to your thought, to your truth, to your soul, which you ought to be improving, you have no care for it, and you don’t think of it!". Hadot, PhWL, p.28

41 Plato, Crito, 46c
that Socrates does not teach knowledge at all. All knowledge is only of value if it is grounded on virtue, or at least a dialectical validation of the best possibility. Wisdom, proper ‘knowledge’, is for gods, men can only understand their own ‘not being in control’ i.e. not having ‘wisdom’ - being only a ‘philo’-sophos. Art does not ‘know’ either, it is in ‘dialogue’ and is very good at finding out perceived ‘knowledge’ which is just presupposed without exchanging it for new certainties. This ‘provisionality’, which is also a ‘not being in control’, has to be kept in mind, so as not to make it a ‘knowledge’. Its character is a ‘knowledge’ in suspension, while, on the other hand, the attention to one’s own actions is the shaping of one’s actions as ‘virtuous’. If the shaping of one’s own actions is to be justifiable it also has to be ‘rational’ (‘logos’). The inquiry into the possibility of knowledge is also an inquiry into the ‘Self’ which is constituted by the ‘care’ it is given. By creating “perplexity” Socrates also creates an ontological incertitude.

Socrates is the intermediary between wisdom and ignorance: wisdom is unachievable for humans but: enthusiasm to understand can be inspired; this is the ‘Eros’ of paideia; everyone can take care of his self and discourse helps to disillusion one’s delusions about one’s own knowledge. This awareness of ignorance, or even the provisionality of beliefs, is a different ‘knowledge’ because it is only discernible in one’s own comportment. The eros-inspired enthusiasm does not teach ‘something’, it does not lecture but confuses. Being the ‘a-topos’ between wisdom and ignorance, gods and men, Socrates is in the position of the archaic hero, in that he disregards the (utilitarian) reality in favour of arete. But the ‘agon’ with Socrates is one that no one can ‘win’, because Socrates does not compete for knowledge. He has prepared this trap by the denial of all knowledge. This means that everyone has to follow the inquiry in his own life, as a way of life – life is thought, “dwelling in thought”, without certainty.

Socrates reverses the aims of natural philosophy to arrive at a knowledge of the cosmos. He says, ‘I do not know’ but he means ‘we cannot know’, we are ‘not in control’ (except in taking care of our self, which we can re-construct). Similarly, the Stoics speak about the sage, but no Stoic actually admitted to be such a sage. The wise and always rational sage is a ‘terminus a quo’, which only guides the psychology of
the exercises, as the path of insight. The sage is a model which mediates the divine and human reality.\footnote{Hadot, PhWL, p.147}

Heidegger's "on the way ..." and Socrates' as 'a-topos' reveal a similar structure of incertitude. It is an appeal to careful thought and this means a questioning of the conditions for the possibility of understanding, which means the question about the constitution of understanding.

The Stoa grew out of the Socratic-Platonic connection of ethics and ontology; it is the constant questioning about the "good" and appropriate life according to 'physis' and 'logos'. What is appropriate to human life is the 'way' we understand and from there the 'way of life' is the framework of any understanding; the 'good' therefore is what enables an interpretation in the first instance, the 'way of life' as opposed to the animal-life, which does not have a 'world'.

The Stoics think that life and the world that is 'not in our control' exit within a unifying logos. Man partakes in this logos and is thus able to cope with (apparent) adversity. 'Logos' validates behaviour: the knowledge of behaviour is discerned in philosophical practice, the 'way of life' as dialogue and for the Stoics specifically as 'therapeutic' dialogue – is an 'auto-poietic' figure; constant self-inquiry leads to a constant reshaping of the 'self'. The way of life is 'energeia' setting itself into being (i.e. into its completion). True 'life' ('bios') is the 'practice' of philosophy. The validation of the disposition to 'appropriate actions' lies in the practice of life as philosophy, not in an instruction. Life is the 'ergon' of life [and it is where I seek to position art as a work which is not dissociated from 'life', which is operative as inquiry into the 'way of life']]. This 'appropriate action' is based on the making sense of a situation, and it is this 'way of making sense' that sense is kept open as the source of the virtuous 'life'.

The 'external world', which is not in our control, opposes our 'will'. However, when the 'will' is attuned to 'reason' we will not have need for such 'control'. The first 'will' expresses a 'will to power', the second a 'letting-be'. This illustrates the difference between modern 'scientific' reason and the 'reason' of antiquity which H re-
constructs. Controlled knowledge institutes the subject-object relation of knowledge, while the Stoic practice of awareness (prosoche) does not operate with preconceived understanding. ‘Logos’ as universal law is a critical term against the apparent arbitrariness of gods and fate of myths and as such the ontological foundation, normativity, of a practice of life. The hypothesis of an universal logos denotes a necessity, but only one which we know ex negativo: what happened was necessary but not in the sense that we could understand and extrapolate all future from it.

2. Agon and ‘Reality’

Agon dispenses with ‘reality’ as a value: nothing matters except the right comportment and appropriate action. This agon is a divorce from attachment to ‘things’ and a re-institution of the symbolic in the mythical order. The divine order transcends the life of accumulation. In the pure excess of the ‘agon’ material has no other value than lies in its waste and destruction. In the pursuit of the ‘arete’ all material good becomes irrelevant.

‘Agon’ is ‘play’ in general as competition. It is of archaic origin and pertains to aristocratic-feudal traditions. The competition is divorced from the ‘private’ concerns of life. It is performed more or less according to rules, but not always a ritual (religious). More importantly, it is understood as the judgement par excellence, ‘judgement by ordeal/god’. This point becomes important if we look at Heidegger’s opposition to the synthesis of Hegel’s ‘dialectic’, opting for the concept of ‘polemos’ instead. I will argue that this ‘judgement by polemos’, which gives persistence to a form of Being, is similar in structure to the Greek agon. The Greeks competed in every field, from gymnastics to tragedy, from dialectics to ‘wisdom’ (Colli): it is about ‘arete’.43 What is virtuous cannot be gathered from things, it is not in accumulation but in the excesses. So, when the ‘polis’ exerted its democratic forms, ideas of brute aristocratic ‘agon’ have been transferred (by Socrates) into the individual’s soul according to the measure of discourse and dialectics. ‘Polemos’ and ‘agon’ show certain similarities, by being the determinate and constitutive events of an ontological outlook. But there are differences. Polemos as “Aus-einander-setzung” (setting-apart) introduces a space within which beings can appear. The agon on the other

hand simply withdraws validity from things that appear to us by determining the ‘intentions’ with which we address them. As long as this ‘intention’ stays non-instrumental it is virtuous. This, however, first enables precisely the form of ‘excess’ as possibility (dynamis/kinesis\(^44\)) which is at work in the polemos itself.

The practice of the Sophists was not a question of what is ‘true’, but a question to prevail and to win the ‘agon’, which resembled the mythical conception of a ‘judgement by ordeal’. The opinion which prevails is the right opinion. Against this approach Socrates uses the Presocratic method of dialectics, from which sophistic ‘rhetoric’ itself derived. Socratic dialectic interrupts the Sophistic speech by forcing upon it the method which destroys all ‘positive knowledge’\(^45\). The private ‘askesis’ of the Presocratics\(^46\) which prevented assumptions about possible expressions of truth have become public and thus agonistic displays to curb the excesses of Sophistic ‘relativism’\(^47\).

The Presocratic ‘dialectic’ destroyed all ‘positive knowledge’ - it was an askesis of disillusionment. Socrates introduces this shift of focus, to the practices of the self as a comportment inside the ‘aporia’, where Socrates and his interlocutor do not ‘know’, the ‘absolute’ truth is infinitely deferred. The agon of opinions ends in a blind alley for both, so the agon of knowledge has to be applied within the self as what is in the immediate responsibility of the self, as a way of life to pursue the ‘agathon’. In mystical and archaic times the outcome of the ‘agon’ can be blamed on ‘the gods’. This cannot be said for the ‘agon’ in the Socratic sense, there the solution is to move the ‘agon’ into the place where oneself is entirely responsible by the virtue of partaking in the ‘logos’. Although the Sophists claim knowledge and universal ‘truth’, according to the concept of ‘physis’, they fail the Socratic test of prove their knowledge and are thus discovered as ignorant themselves.

Under these circumstances ‘knowledge’ is in a strange ‘double bind’. On one hand it is supposed to be universal, in the concepts of ‘physis’ and ‘logos’, on the other it is

\(^44\) Sheehan, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Mind, p.308
\(^45\) Colli, GdPh, p.81
\(^46\) the Presocratic dialectical exchanges were not held publicly and were not meant to sway opinion one way or the other as was the rhetoric speech of the sophist, Colli, GdPh, p.92
\(^47\) Buddhism knows the ‘agon’ as the contest of the better ‘discretion’ too. No meeting between two masters passes without an exchange of subtle observations (or actions) pertaining to the ‘proper’ un-
never a concrete human knowledge. The perfect knowledge is purely divine (although the ‘soul’ as partaking in the divine is able to recollect this knowledge; but because it is never perfect it is always lacking and is thrown back into incertitude). The rules of the ‘agon’ then mutate into ‘law’ and ‘nature’, (physis, logos). However, if the rule of the game is a universal law of nature, the consequences of the application of the law can only lead to one ‘truth’. Therefore fate, as the decision of the ‘agon’ gives way to the truth of the universal ‘logos’; humans participating in the play of ‘logos’ are able to make considerate, if not ‘wise’ (and perfect) decisions.

‘Considered life’ is not a ‘life according to the law of (scientific) ‘reason’, instead it is a life under ‘supervision’, considerate but also experimental, inquisitive and attentive to what is ‘hidden’ in the argument. ‘Logos’ as consideration maintains the character which reveals and hides at the same time. ‘Truth’ as perfection (virtue (-osity)) is therefore always deferred.

The ‘harmony of opposites’ originates movement. "Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an harmony of opposites\textsuperscript{48}, like that of the bow and the lyre."\textsuperscript{49} This ‘happening’ is in constant flux of a ‘polemos’ (‘Auseinandersetzung’ = setting apart of a frontier, or ‘Riß’ (‘peras’)) moving the ‘Riß’ as the frontiers between concealment (withdrawal) and unconcealedness (disclosure); world and earth.\textsuperscript{50} Heidegger used the Heraclitus fragment 53 to expound his concept of ‘polemos’ and under his hand ‘polemos’ becomes the concept of movement of ‘Being’ itself, expressing the same idea of a judgement by ordeal as the archaic ‘agon’. ‘Polemos’ is ‘production’ in the interpretative sense – it bestows the possibility of meaning, which Heidegger calls “worlding”\textsuperscript{51} which is the place of Dasein: “Polemos is Dasein”\textsuperscript{52}. The interpretative movement is also what drives Stoic consideration which is the power that constitutes the ‘durable disposition’ of the converted self. The fact that arete and agathon are the ‘termini a quo’ only means that these are non-instrumental – transcendent and in such a way the ‘logos’ is also “polemos” as an

\textsuperscript{48}i.e. the “Fuge” which Heidegger later uses in terms of ‘dike’ justice.

\textsuperscript{49}Heraclitus, fragment. 51

\textsuperscript{50}‘Riss’, ‘peras’, ‘limit’, ‘form’: is basically the shape, that which gives form and without which there is no distinction, in Zollikon Seminars p.184; see also: Sheehan, Heidegger, Aristotle and Phenomenology, in Philosophy Today, XIX, Summer, 1975 p.93

\textsuperscript{51}“die Welt weltet”, Heidegger, VA, p.179

\textsuperscript{52}Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, p.16
“ontological concept”, which “describes our relation to Being as what Heidegger calls Dasein”\(^{53}\).

Properly understood there are two ‘events’ of Being, the first (Seyn) opens ‘the open’ and the second, the Being (Sein) of Dasein determines the its possibilities in a constant polemos (Aus-einander-setzung). This is the determination of the interpretative action which has in its eyes ‘Being’ as the perplexing question of the ‘presencing’ (Anwesen) of beings.

3. Art as a ‘Way of Life’

The function of philosophy as a ‘way of life’ in antiquity has a confusingly similar structure to Heidegger’s movement of Being and Dasein. Both are poietic, constituted in ‘agon’, or ‘polemos’ respectively, manifesting themselves in the virtuous ‘self’ or the ‘authentic Dasein’. Polemos is poietic by deciding the durable form in which Dasein and Being interact, and this is ‘manifest’ in the ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’\(^{54}\), where the ‘work of art’ determines the form of Being of a people. Conversely the Stoics use an agonic ‘arete’ as their ontological terminus of ‘polemos’, which registers the ontological situation and in such a way moulds the individual character through the use of ‘logos’ which is equally ontologically determinant in Heidegger’s ‘polemos’.

If, according to Heidegger, the work of art constitutes the emergence of a historical mode of Being in terms of the ‘polemos’, as an emergence of truth, then the ‘poietic praxis’ of the individual artist has to be accounted for in some form. Obviously, Heidegger limits the scope of the horizon to the factual “Geworfenheit” of Dasein into a pre-existing form of Being. The ‘enowing’ defines the epoch of the unfolding of the shape of Being that has been granted and the individual just colours in one or the other aspect. Alternatively, it may be that what Heidegger has in mind, at least in his essay ‘Gelassenheit’, is the awareness which leads to a natural interpretation of this inescapable destiny. In any case, the individual cannot be responsible or the author of such movement, it has to be the ‘people’ or collective ‘Mitsein’ which gives form to Being. But if ‘Gelassenheit’ is individual in the sense of a dialogue like the consid-

\(^{53}\) Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, p.15
eration of philosophy, 'letting-be' as 'Anwesen'\textsuperscript{55} that means that beings are not interrogated in the form of their being but let-be in their own 'being-as' what they are disclosed as. The 'thinker' accepts the predestined emerging truth, but at the same time he is aware of the danger of withdrawal from view of the 'true' roots of this emergence, i.e. Being.

If it is possible for artists and philosophers to "listen" to Being, in a comportment of "Gelassenheit" as defined by Heidegger: "non-willing willing",\textsuperscript{56} it should be possible to describe this "listening" in terms of the Stoic 'prosoche' which is itself the essence of the 'way of life' that has an inherent 'awareness' of the ambiguity of contexts within which we 'always already' operate, i.e. it is ontological in its direction.

'What we take for granted' ('das Selbstverständliche') is a form of truth that is impressed on us and which is discernible in the attentive 'way of life'. 'Prosoche' in the terms of a "non-willing willing" is an activity that is beyond active and passive, subject and object. It is important to keep in mind that it has nothing to do with a passivity such as scientific 'detachment', nor with Meister Eckhard's 'Gelassenheit' as a non-willing and surrendering to God.

'Prosoche' is an action of thought (dianoia), although it is not an argumentative thought. It is an exercise of things coming into thought. Equally this does not mean that this is volition. "Willing - non-willing", in a way is already 'prosoche', because it is not focused 'on things', but instead on one's 'reaction' to them and by extension one's 'self'. Equally, Heidegger's 'meta-discourse' of a prehistory of thought and 'logos' as the outcome of a historical 'polemos' is beyond the scope of Stoic inquiry.

What Heidegger calls "Epoche", the 'epoch' as derived from the Greek 'epoché', a withholding, within which a specific mixture of disclosure and withdrawal constitutes truth, mirrors the method of the individual exercise in antiquity. The purpose is not to be misled, through a wrong opinion into an action, or more radically, not to be governed by wrong judgements. In Heidegger's ontology, the 'strife' of withholding

\textsuperscript{54} UKW hereafter
\textsuperscript{55} Moerchen, Heideggers Satz: »'Sein' heißt 'An-wesen'«, in Merker (ed) Innen und Aussenansichten, p.193 p.192
\textsuperscript{56} Heidegger, Gelassenheit, 1959, p.51,
and disclosing’ results in an enduring situation (of Being and Dasein), of an ‘interpretation of beings’.

Therefore the practice of the artist has necessarily to follow, knowingly or not, a path that encompasses a mode of existence within which he successfully or not, practices the particular attention (‘prosoche’) to how his and the epoch’s mode of understanding, that, which is necessarily invisible as ‘what is taken for granted’ ("selbsterständlich") opens up in contradictions, within which things disappear in their ‘as-structure’. Art on the other hand is not part of this ‘as-structure’ as Heidegger shows in the UKW, art is that which makes beings appear in the comportment of ‘letting-be’ as the “Anwesen”57. Things ‘address’ us – “an-wesen”, and this is the non-representational, non-calculative ‘being’ of things. ‘Prosoche’ is the Stoic tool, with which they perform a similar task. Virtue is non-instrumental, non-calculative and only in the virtuous intent do things appear ‘as what they are’ through the act of judgement of the ‘sage’. In Heidegger’s analysis the historical provisionality of knowledge as ‘energeia’ is reappropriated. This latency, the provisional, the feeling of ‘not being in control’ that is similar to the unpredictability of skidding over a wet surface, enables the possibility to an awareness of what Heidegger would call "listening".

4. The Possibility of ‘Making’ Art

For the Greeks the work of art was production in the sense of labour. This is part of ‘production’ in the sphere of the ‘zoe’ and not ‘bios’, in which ‘free men’ did not engage; the labour of material production is called ‘poiesis’ while the ‘free’ activity is ‘praxis’, i.e. political (public) practice. Aristotle distinguishes three species of knowledge (sophia, phronesis and techne) but the primary is sophia as that knowledge which is not applicable to the production of anything. ‘Phronesis’ is the knowledge of (political) actions that are performed for their own sake and ‘techne’ the knowledge of actions which produce material works, or works of art, which is still one and the same thing for the Greeks.

In Heidegger we find some overlap, if not an identity, between an originary ‘poiesis’ and ‘praxis’ while ‘theoria’ seems to have been sublimated into both, but this is not quite true. In The Zollikon Seminars he describes ‘theoria’ as the original and highest mode of comportment: self-reflection. Heidegger describes ‘theoria’ as the form of access to ‘comportment’ and thus defines comportment as what gives access to ‘Being’ itself as “letting come to presence of presencing itself”. At the same time energeia is, according to Aristotle, as Heidegger writes, that what has fulfilled its becoming into presence.

Energeia is Aristotle’s concept of ‘actus’, ‘reality’ (completion or perfection). In Heidegger’s interpretation energeia expresses the totality of the ‘work’ in its process of being (Anwesen and Ab-wesen). His translation of energeia as “Sich-im-Werk-und-Ende-haben“ is a setting into work of truth itself “without machination”. The work of art presents the originary form or shape of an ‘epoch’ of Being, as the temporal shape of the horizon of all possibilities of ‘knowledge’ which is then unfolded into all its possible manifestations. The work of art is therefore, in its ‘essence’ (Wesen), that which engenders the ‘truth’ of the epoch – just as the Stoic ‘life according to physis’ is a self-poiesis, manifesting ‘physis’ as a living truth. The work of art is here understood as what sets itself into work as ‘energeia’. The work of art has almost the character of a force of nature – art becomes an auto-poietic process in the strife between Being and Dasein, world and earth.

On the other hand, the Stoa has also developed away from the original Aristotelian differentiation. The production of the durable disposition (hexis or diathesis) is understood as a ‘poiesis’ (in terms of ‘physis’ too, but it remains unclear how far this has turned to an integration of the region of ‘zoe’, into the praxis of philosophy. I think one could risk the interpretation that the ‘praxis’ of philosophy is also a ‘poiesis’, ‘labour’, as a ‘refurbishment’ of the soul, a rewiring the disposition of the self. This then would receive the character of ‘life’ as an auto-poietic work (of art); it

58 “Theoria is the highest form of energeia: the highest form of ‘putting-onself-to-work’ (without machination) letting come to presence of presencing itself... comportment [Verhalten] - wohnen – being-absorbed by something is original way of existence.” Zollikon Seminar, p.160
59 “Die ‘energeia’ erfüllt das Wesen der reinen Anwesung ursprünglicher, sofern sie besagt: das Sich-im-Werk-und-Ende-haben, was jegliches “Noch nicht” der Eignung zu ... hinter sich gelassen, ja besser gerade ‘mit vor’ in die Erfüllung des voll-“endeten” Aussehens gebracht hat.” Wesen und Begriff der ‘physis’ ..., Wegmarken, p.356
60 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p. 116, 180
would encompass the public and private, 'bios' and 'zoe'. The normative 'eidos' as a 'telos' is then 'recovered' in Stoic practice via the normative concept of 'physis' itself, but tempered by the concept of 'logos' which, at least at the edges, remains that which not only reveals but also hides. The idea of living according to 'physis' is 'auto-poietic, if we take Aristotle's definition of 'physis' – that which has its telos in itself. As much as the Stoics Heidegger's sees the interaction between 'physis' as the original 'Being', 'logos' and human action – 'energeia' as the site that determines 'Da-sein'.

Since those Stoic acts which are performed to shape the 'disposition' are performed for their own virtue, the poietic 'techne' is reflexive. Virtue causes sophia. In this way virtue is a virtuous act which 'produces' an 'eudaimonic' life. 'Virtuous life' in the form of 'hexis', the durable disposition is itself 'energeia'.

Art production is a shaping of external material, but the act is performed for its own virtue. Like the virtuous act of the Stoic, art is cause and telos in itself. The form of human disposition is 'logos' which means that having 'logos' lets humans know the virtuous, i.e. non-instrumental way of life. One could say that life traverses the ontic and the ontological, because Dasein has a concept of Being in one way or other and modern art is the only occupation which does not predefine its disciplinary realm in terms of objects. This is important, because according to Heidegger, Dasein's existence is not an object, nor a subject manipulating objects, instead it is 'site' of a setting-into-work-of-truth. Existence, life and its mode is truth-setting in the same form as the work of art.

In the UKW Heidegger dismisses conventional approaches to the work of art. Here he already defines the "work" of art as ontologically superior to the mere 'thing' by virtue of its function within the 'polemos', which gives form to Being. His conclusion is that the work of art allocates a form of 'Being' to a people. A 'polemos' has taken place which establishes an enduring form which "first makes beings visible". 'Being' is the unfathomable totality of the 'Absolute' which the work of art only 'hints' at (Wink). The work of art is not a representation – 'Being' cannot be repre-

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61 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p. 181... 'poietika' can be main and auxiliary cause of eudaimonia, "Eudaimonia ist ... ein Produkt von Tugenden und besteht aus tugendhafter Tätigkeit".
62 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p. 175 f.
sented since it is not an ‘object’. But it is also not ‘created’ by an artist as such. Never­
theless, Heidegger gives to the artist - the poet and thinker – a particular relation­
ship to “Being’. The artist is an exemplary and prophetic figure, who does not draw a
design from his own ‘mind’. Instead, it is this motive of an attentivity to ‘Being’
which inspires his pursuit of a ‘polemos’, or the ‘other inception’, to come forth in
his work. His work has to be reciprocitated by the audience. The tentative fourfold
of art, artwork, artist and audience enables together the ‘bestowal’ of ‘Being’. Heideg­
ger minimises therefore the artist as ‘individual’. Nevertheless, the position of the
someone who ‘listens’ to ‘Being’, is not desperately alien to the ‘inspired’ genius of
the Romantics. Works of art are not related to objects but to the “coming to presence
of presencing itself”.

Artist and audience are already involved in a ‘world’ (Being-in-the-world), they al­
ready have an understanding of Being. Art conceives a paradigm-shift which some­
what changes the ‘comportment’ to beings of everyone. This is the ‘polemos’ which
connects Dasein and Being in a reciprocal relationship (‘Kehre’). Dasein is always in
this relation to beings and only in this ‘strife’ is ‘Being’ unfolded’. It has to come
into ‘question’, it has to be ‘perplexing’ that there ‘is’ (Being).

The Stoics see their own life as a ‘being-at-work’, ‘energeia’, their acts are created
(poiesis) and the cause of this creation is virtue. This virtue is not comprehensible as
an external thing, instead it has already an ontological character insofar as it deter­
mines the comportment in the act itself, which reveals beings in one way or other.
Arete’ and the related ‘agathon’ are transcendent. The work of art operates not in the
realm of ‘beings’ and instrumentality but in the ‘ontological’ realm of ‘logos’, which
itself is transpersonal.

Trying to root any practice in an ‘understanding’ other than everyday practices, as
Heidegger shows (in SZ), will not be able to find its ground in any discourse (be­
cause the very idea of grounding itself is a secondary effect of discourse in the first
place). Dasein is always already ‘in-the-world’, i.e. it has a understanding of Being,
which means that it is possible to reveal the “meaning of Being” by a hermeneutic
process going from the most basic ontic understanding to the ontological analytic of
Dasein. This is the thesis of SZ. The Stoics, as I have mentioned above have a simi­
lar theory termed ‘oikeiosis’. It is the idea of a natural development of the human be­
son', which changes the ‘meaning’ of external things. Therefore we can see that the access to the ‘ontological’ inquiry of ‘art’ is perfectly legitimate because the ‘aesthetic’ object does not ‘represent’, instead it ‘hints’ at the ‘absence’ that is ‘Being’ but is related to it by the ‘polemos’ of the ‘care for the self’.

5. ‘Awareness’ (prosoche)

Pierre Hadot, my main reference for ‘philosophy as a way of life’, which is the title of an English translation of his essays, lays the emphasis of understanding ancient philosophy on its practical and therapeutical application to everyday life. In particular the exercise (‘askesis’) of awareness channels all the other, technical exercises into a constitution and ‘conversion’ of the self.63

‘Prosoche’ is the most fundamental of all Stoic exercises.64 Vigilance is meant as the flexibility of spirit, not to be misguided by whatever presents itself, not to be swayed into false assent. ‘Prosoche’ is the ‘techne’ of the considered life. It is the skill to discriminate situations and not to act in pursuit of something else than the ‘appropriate act’ itself. But this is not mere quick-wittedness of thought. It is necessary for the philosopher, but it goes further, because it also pertains to the mental hygiene of ‘affects’. It is a habituation towards a mediation of affects (pate), and the rational part of the soul. Although the Stoa technically understands the soul not to be divided, it nevertheless still needs to talk about the parts of the soul to explain its practices. ‘Rational’ disposition or comportment reveals the ‘irrational’, inadvertent drives’, with rational judgement. This is Aristotelian heritage, which the Stoa expands into a ‘psychagogie’, in which the ‘rational’ disposition is exercised to interrupt involuntary actions and reduces their immediacy. The Stoics think that we are carried away by ‘pa-

63 "According to the Stoics, Ariston was right to consider philosophy as a practice, but the logical and physical parts of philosophy were not purely theoretical. Rather, they too corresponded to a lived philosophy. For them, philosophy was a unique act which had to be practised at each instant, with constantly renewed attention (prosoche) to oneself and to the present moment. The Stoic’s fundamental attitude is this continuous attention, which means constant tension and consciousness, as well as vigilance exercised at every moment. Thanks to this attention, the philosopher is always perfectly aware not only of what he is doing, but also of what he is thinking (this is the task of lived logic) and of what he is - in other words, of his place within the cosmos. This is lived physics. Such self-consciousness is, above all, moral consciousness, which seeks at every moment to purify and rectify our intentions. At every instant, it is careful to allow no other motive that one which has its ‘telos’ in itself’?. Yet such self-consciousness is not merely moral; it is also a cosmic and rational consciousness. Attentive people live in the constant presence of the universal Reason which is immanent within the cosmos. They see all things from the perspective of this Reason, and consent joyfully to its will." Hadot, PhWL, p.138

64 Rabbow, Seelenführung, 1954 p.241-57
the’, and thus we lose control over what is closest to us, our ‘way of life’. ‘Pathe’ lets beings appear in an “as-structure” because they have their end outside themselves, we are afraid ‘of’ something, we desire ‘something’ etc., there is always something which we understand ‘as’ a ‘being’ from these affects. There is a scope to understand these in terms of Heidegger’s ‘attunements’ (‘Befindlichkeit, Stimmung’) which are a preconceptual understanding of ‘beings’ in SZ. On the other hand virtue is solely for itself, it is totally circular and transcendent by turning from the ‘as’ of things to the (non-objectivising) ‘as’ of the ‘self’ (Dasein). This turn shifts the ground of ontology – at least implicitly – from ‘beings’ to ‘Being’ which ‘gives’ through ‘Dasein’ and the Stoic soul which partakes in ‘logos’ respectively.

This is another ‘ontological’ aspect of ‘prosoche’. Socrates abandoned the notion of a factual knowledge precisely because it appeared spurious in the face of not knowing anything about ones own self. If we can not give account of our own action then the ‘factual knowledge’ of "What ‘is’ x..." will become so far removed (from certainty) and questionable, so that the knowledge of one’s ‘self’ appears the only possible course of action. What the Stoa performs is on one hand a habituation (‘ethos’), on the other, it is the Socratic inquiry into the ambiguous character of any knowledge. The Stoa fortifies against the possible failure of (external) actions by intensifying the process of interpretation (of a situation) and queries deeper into the ontological realm by questioning judgement and intent as being at issue. Intentionality is to understand something ‘as’ something in advance, as it is described by Heidegger in ‘Being and Time’ too. This ‘what’ we ‘know in advance’, in various strata of interpretation is also a work.

6. Way of Life and the Sway of Being

In a late text Heidegger introduces a traditional term into his vocabulary: “Gelassenheit”. It is difficult to entangle what is the ‘ontic’ behaviour of the individual and what is ‘ontological’ inquiry. Heidegger clearly states that we detach ourselves

65 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.136
66 SZ, §34, p.160 f.
67 SZ, §32, p.149 “... als-freies Erfassen ... ”
68 Heidegger’s Gelassenheit is probably best translated as “letting-be”, otherwise ‘repose’ would be better than the confusion with ‘detachment’
69: „Aber wir können auch Anderes. Wir können zwar die technischen Gegenstände benutzen und doch zugleich bei aller sachgerechten Benützung uns von ihnen so freihalten, daß wir sie jederzeit
from the attachment to technical objects and 'let them be' as something which is not of our innermost concern.\(^{70}\) In the comportment of such repose, things will touch us in a different way, ontic repose has an ontological consequence: technology cannot bend and confuse our 'essence' (Wesen). In the following dialogue between three 'characters' Heidegger considers “Gelassenheit” as a concept that gives access to human ‘essence’ (Wesen) by way of understanding the essence of thought as “Gelassenheit”, as an alternative to ‘will’ (to power) i.e. a non-representational thinking,\(^{71}\) which he calls “letting-be”. “Letting-be” is the comportment towards beings, but it appears also from the text that it is in some way ‘teachable’ as an attitude of the individual observer. The distance between ontic and ontological seems blurred but its similarity to ‘prosoche’ seems to become clearer. Both are activities which let appearances emerge in their own way, without being deceived and forced into a particular comportment. In both cases the ‘will’ (to power) which is in Stoic terms a ‘pathē’ is a comportment without proper consideration. This consideration is to the Stoics’ not yet a re-presentation before a ‘subject’, so still not a ‘will to power’. As giving account, ‘prosoche’ does not predefine objects. Although the Stoic process of making judgements is always accompanied by what we got used to call a ‘propositions’ (axiomata)\(^{72}\), the underlying concept of ‘logos’ still encloses the deceptive form which the Stoa inherited from Heraclitus: logos is duplicitous, it reveals as much as he deceives. Truth resides either in the (immaterial) proposition of a ‘lekton’ (and is changeable, i.e. can become false) or the hypokeimenon and is thus an attribute of the self, and is only present in the sage in connection with virtue. In short, it is a physical attribute of the ‘pneuma’ and as such a ‘disposition’ (but dependent on virtue).\(^{73}\)

The Stoic way of life is therapy to live in a “state of truth”, which is part of the disposition of the ‘hypokeimenon’, that, which is later translated as subject, expressing what lies before something, which ‘grounds’. From there the step to modern subjec-
tivity is evident. Truth resides in the subject: but only the virtuous subject. This is then translated as the transcendental subject, i.e. a subject which is identical with the logos. ‘Being’ and ‘Dasein’ form the movement within which ‘truth’ is fought out into its persistent manifestations. Originally, this was a question of virtue – a way of life.

I hope I have at least touched upon some traces of similarity between classical ‘comportment’ and Heidegger’s conceptualisation art. Philosophy as a ‘way of life’, from its Socratic inception, was the attempt to reconcile the ‘physis’ (and ‘logos’), the (critical) concept of a universal atemporal ‘law’, and the individual, concrete actions of life. Today, according to Heidegger, it is science and technology which are under critique by a way of life (tradition), precisely because science gathers its strength through its assertion of a universal law that eternally constitutes all truth.

Superficially Heidegger at times seems to favour ‘tradition’. ‘Tradition’ is what Dasein always already operates inside as Geworfenheit and ‘facticity’, while at the same time it breaks open this tradition in the strife for a new interpretation and technology par excellence is precisely what makes its ‘tradition’, its ‘genealogy’, invisible. In a way, this is a new qualitative feature of technology. The ‘missing’, or withdrawn access to the ‘tradition’ of technology makes it impossible to grasp its essence and break its surface in a strife for a new, appropriate interpretation. Technology hides its origins to appear ‘universal’, instead of being constituted historically in a ‘polemos’. This means that man as Dasein, the site of interpretation and meaning, is unable to open up its possibilities to interpret beings in a different way, instead it is dragged along by one single totalising interpretation, which appears to persist indefinitely. The full view of tradition is therefore necessary for a proper assessment of technology. In later writings Heidegger thinks that the absence of Being (and the invisibility of tradition) is what points into the new interpretation. The work of art as non-technical or scientific does not ‘represent’ something. Although it is an object in a ‘technological’ sense it operates in a different realm. Its only ‘gesture’ is to point towards something ‘absent’ from the particular discourse of technology.

The dark reign of myth, that has been the target of criticism by the Presocratics, has been replaced by a dark reign of technology, being constituted by the absence and withdrawal of access to its modalities, and its historical mode of Being. One could say that the critical thrust of Socratic and Heideggerian inquiry has the same direction. Heidegger sees, following Nietzsche, that the atemporality of Platonic ‘idea’ is part of the ‘commencement’ of technology. On the other hand, the Socratic tradition, other than the Platonic, i.e. the Cynics, has picked up the anarchic and critical side of Socratism, which is the ‘care of the self’ as an ‘ethical’ auto-poiesis (production of law and law of production folded into one). As for Heidegger the “as-structure”, the concept of ‘oikeiosis’ is the Stoic concept of what we are close to, and familiar with, it is the web of traditions that give us hold from which the philosopher will step back in conversation and conversion. But that which appears initially close is the furthest away and what is the closest appears furthest away (i.e. Being). What is really the closest to us is the question of our own ‘Being’, which the Greeks only touched on with the concept of ‘physis’.

Stoic ethics (like the Socratic) works as a disclosure of ignorance. The constitutive moment is the enlightenment by ignorance. Although Stoa presents the Stoic sage as the model character who has an unfailing judgement, this judgement is not just based on some universal perfect knowledge by partaking in cosmic ‘logos’, but instead on the perfection of his ‘character’. The Stoic is interested purely in a situation for action and this means for a ‘moral judgement’, not a judgement about the essence of a thing. All things partake in the universal logos and as such, they are not in question as in regard to an opposition to the self.

The similarity of outlook between Heidegger and Stoa, even if for different reasons, is to "become what one is" (i.e. energeia), i.e. according to ‘physis’ or ‘Being’ and neither is possible without self-understanding and ‘strife’. The departure for the Stoics is ‘oikeiosis’ and for Heidegger the immediate ‘ready/present-at-hand’ (Zu/Vorhandenheit) of the ‘Vor-structure’. Both, the Stoics and Heidegger, then proceed to overthrow what is familiar by interpreting it as being mediated by ‘logos’ and in Heidegger’s case by the ‘understanding of Being’ of ‘Dasein’, which is the ‘closest’

75 ‘closeness’ as ‘present-at-hand’ which constitutes the ontological-existential realm, Zollikon Seminars, p.83
the clarification of one’s own ‘Being’. Ultimately for both, this is ‘language’, a ‘language of Being’ which governs tradition and discourse and as such mediates ‘Being’. The Stoics provide an ethical interpretation which founds inadvertently an ontology, while Heidegger attempts an ‘fundamental-ontology’ which never gets to the ethics and thus for its purpose the making of art by an ‘individual’ who is somehow separated from the collective ‘Mitsein’ is irrelevant. Still, the ‘poietic’ character who listens to ‘Being’ is an individual after all. I will attempt to find a path navigating these various connections between ‘life’ as a ‘being-at-work’ and art as a catalyst in which the strife of ‘world and earth’ is manifested in a temporal being in more detail, to recover a meaning for the ‘individual’ artist, in the following chapters.
Chapter II

Heidegger's Authenticity and Work

In this chapter I will try to highlight the pertinence of some of Heidegger's key concepts for artistic practice, without exhausting their function within Heidegger's work. Equally, as it is not my aim to analyse the work of art but, instead, the actions of the 'artist' and his 'poietic' function, which is not identical with being a subject or 'author'. I will concentrate on the process of self-disclosing of Dasein which Heidegger calls the 'Entschlossenheit', usually translated as 'resolve'. One should keep in mind that it is a 'disclosure' (Erschlossenheit) but instead a disclosure of Dasein itself. In this form of self-disclosure Dasein becomes 'poietic' in terms of, and within its limited possibilities which are contained in the forms of 'traditions' or 'heritage' (Erbe); as its apriori horizon of facticity.

To show how the mode of Being is produced – in the manner of a work of art – by Dasein in an entirely non-subjectivistic way, I describe how Dasein discloses itself as described in 'Being and Time' first and then shift the perspective to the UKW (in its standard version of Holzwege) to explain Heidegger's concept of 'poiesis' and its relation to artistic agency. There needs to be a form of author-ity which is disclosive of its own constitution. Dasein is the Heideggerian operator of the making of sense in general. It is a field within which meaning happens in time. Understanding has a mode which is primarily inherited but which has also a possibility of change. Form 'is given' to Dasein by its heritage but its possibilities are not at its disposal while only it can step into a 'polemos' by which possibilities are unlocked for it which have already been given in the 'arche' of 'Seyn'.

Dasein is a pure performance of meaning. This performance cannot have a 'telos' or 'eidos' which then would already have determined a rule of historical development. For Heidegger Dasein is free in the sense that a metaphysical telos (of ideality) cannot be discerned. It is self-disclosure and does therefore not disclose an 'eidos' but rather the structural disposition of disclosure which is only guided by tradition and project.

It appears to be important to describe the way Heidegger realises a self-disclosure of Dasein and its importance to the later in UKW as a balancing of action and authorship as a freedom within the heritage of Being.
Heidegger frames the self-disclosure of Dasein in terms of existence rather than an ideal essence. All existence is conditioned and cannot expect to create a tabula rasa for a new re-construction in an ideal image. On the other hand, to be compelling the conditional position of truth has to appear to be unconditional. It is in the very structure of Dasein's self-disclosure as care-structure – and this means as constituted in a hermeneutical process, that both, poiesis as production and phronesis as the right action begin to merge by allowing 'poiesis' to produce without an 'eidos'. I will argue that the formation of Dasein in and by its existence is later in the UKW transformed along the lines of a 'poiesis' without 'eidos' in effect becoming a phronesis which is poetic.

The figure of the artist does not 'know' what it is doing because what it is doing is not only grounded in this 'facticity' and possibilities (Spielraum) contained in it but it also inquires into its constitution. Therefore it is so difficult to speak about 'it', and to find a form of language to describe the process of appropriation of these 'possibilities'. These possibilities precede and determine all 'intentionality' which is possible for Dasein but they are at the same time themselves constituted.

In this chapter I will therefore describe Heidegger's concept of Dasein as the 'existence' who's form is conditioned historically, and equally re-constituted by the (feedback) actions of this existence as performance. Dasein and Being are the two aspects of this unified performance. Authenticity is then interpreted as self-disclosure which enables the productive movement as agency of art. Therefore it should be possible to use this structure to make more explicit the artistic workings beyond mere 'authorship'. Thereafter I will look at Heidegger's concept of 'poiesis' in which he attempts to capture the Greek concept of human agency which is involved in the 'emergence' of a world as truth and which is the 'constitution' and condition of such a truth within the limiting factor of human finality. The 'openness' of Dasein to the event of Being is the only human agency, it is never 'passive' but equally not authorial. The comportment which Heidegger calls 'letting-be (Gelassenheit) is a way of disclosure which does not challenge beings into re-presentation but instead lets them address Dasein by their own presencing. Dasein's activity of 'letting-be' is the non-intentional agency which is 'poietic' of the forms of meaning. It is therefore possible to grasp Heidegger's movement of artistic production within his concept of 'polemos' within the authentic self-revelation of Dasein as that which brings beings forth.
I will compare this self-revelation as the possibility of production with the Greek concepts of ‘agon’ and ‘arete’ and in particular with the Stoic ideal of self-improvement as an autopoiesis of the ‘way of life’ in terms of a work of art in the next chapter. To make the relation to the Stoics clearer, I will insert some anticipatory explanations about the relationship between Heidegger’s text and Stoic doctrine throughout this chapter.

A scientific theory already ‘knows’, as a discipline, what it is looking for. It looks for whatever is apprehensible as an object of knowledge by a method. What is a possible object has been already determined, it is already there as a being (Anwesendes). Heidegger’s thinking tries to understand ‘how’ these ‘beings’ came to our ‘understanding’ before we ‘knew’ them in a scientific way. The how of understanding beings, is ‘Being’. Beings ‘are’, they are present to us (Anwesend) without us knowing how this ‘presence-ness’ (Anwesenheit) is given to us. Art as such does not employ methods. Instead artists, if I may generalise, pick up what presents itself and try to question ‘that’ it appears in one way or other. And this is the actual ‘domain’ of art, if it has any ‘domain’ at all, it is the ‘what is taken for granted’ which is ‘truth’ as an ‘a priori’ givenness. The question of how practices of meaning are constituted by tradition and by ‘what we take for granted as self-evident’ (‘das Selbst-verständliche’) is artistic without immediately understanding art as a practice which determines these practices in a founding gesture as Heidegger suggests in UKW. When Heidegger describes the function of ‘the work of art’ as a material catalyst for the appearance of a ‘world’\(^\text{76}\), art and artistic ‘poiesis’ (Dichtung) has become a paradigm for a human ‘bringing forth’ which is appropriate, rather than the contemporary way of ‘challenging’, which is technology. This ‘poiesis’ is not the bringing-forth of an object, but of ‘truth’, as the ‘a priori’, the condition of the possibility of all understanding. Heidegger also counts statecraft, sacrifice, thought, etc., but excludes ‘science’, as founding gestures of ‘truth’\(^\text{77}\). However, I will concentrate on the possibility of artistic ‘poiesis’. The work of art ‘functions’ as a constitutive event by bringing about an unconditioned ‘open’ as a different way to understand ‘how’ things are understood to be meaningful to us. The ‘openness’ (Offenheit) or ‘clearing’ (Lichtung) is ‘made’, set into the work, ‘by’ and ‘as’ truth. ‘Truth’, is ‘subject and object’ of this activity\(^\text{78}\).

\(^{76}\) like the Greek temple in UKW, p.27  
\(^{77}\) UKW, p.48  
\(^{78}\) UKW, p.63
What is an acceptable explanation is determined as the ‘form’ (Riß or Gestalt), of this ‘open-ness’ (Offenheit). The ‘open-ness’ (Offenheit) which is set into the work is what encompasses all possibilities of understanding. It is transcendent in the sense, that as Dasein we cannot assume an ‘outside’ view. The actual fact of ‘open-ness’ (Offenheit) as such is not controllable by ‘method’. Heidegger describes the historical differentiation within the concept of ‘making’, the Greek ‘poiesis’ as ‘physis’, which gradually shifts towards the agency of this ‘making’ until this agency founds and grounds the whole of the ‘objective’ world as ‘subjectivity’. What is lost in this concept is the un-conditioned (Unvermittelte), Un-geheure excess (Überfluß).

I will attempt a short description of Heidegger’s concepts, with a focus on the complex possibilities of ‘poiesis’ within the various layers of disclosure. Intermittently I inserted some remarks which relate to the next chapter on the Stoa, to highlight particular junctions of conceptuality which explain the course of interpretation of Heidegger’s texts I have chosen. I will concentrate on ‘Being and Time’, where Dasein is presented as condition of the possibility of self-disclosure as ‘care’. ‘Care’ (Sorge) itself is the interpretative effort which is tied into the undisclosable facticity of existence. In the second part I will describe the functions of ‘poiesis’ in relation to this facticity, the enclosed possibilities and the ‘incalculable’, as it is presented in the lecture UKW and further essays on technology and science (in VA) which contain Heidegger’s considerations on the process of how truth comes about and his critique of technology and the character of “oblivion” which operates in science.

Discovery (Entdecken) of beings is based on the disclosure (Erschlossenheit) of Being in the ‘Being-in-the-world’. This is the ‘a priori’ structure which determines the Being of Dasein, and makes it open to beings and disclosing ‘as’ something, in terms of ‘in-order-to’ (Um-zu) and ‘for the sake of’ (Umwillen) which determines the present out of the future (project). ‘Open’ means disclosure (Erschlossenheit) for discovery (Entdecken). Disclosure (Erschlossenheit) is the intuitive understanding of the copula ‘is’ on which all discovery is principally based. All actions of Dasein are disclosive within ‘Being-in-the-world’, in all aspects of discovery, explication, under-

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79 UKW, p.40
80 UKW, p.61
standing of 'something as something'. I use 'disclosure' for both, the 'Entdecken' and 'Erschlossenheit' (of Dasein as being-in-the-world, Befindlichkeit u. Verstehen, finally 'as 'Sorge")

Heidegger’s concept of understanding is guided by the immediate intuitive understanding in the act of 'circumspection' (Umsicht), which is always intentional in the horizon of Dasein’s ‘project’ (Entwurf). The work of art is always outside this 'circumspection' (Umsicht), as we will see, because it is inceptive and incommensurable within the previous context. However, it is more related to Dasein’s self-disclosure as 'care-structure', and so as ‘interpretative’ in essence. The ‘enowning’ (Ereignis), in terms of inception of a new ‘paradigm’ out of the ‘excess’ (Überfluß) can only come ‘upon’ Dasein that is itself ‘open to the way beings appear by themselves. Only such a Dasein will be able to be receptive enough for the change in the sway of Being.

1. The constitution of a Self in Being and Time

Dasein ‘exists’, by way of some form of understanding (‘fore-structure’ - Vorstruktur) which allows it to operate in a totality of meanings which constitute its world. Dasein is ‘in-advance-of-itself’ in a ‘world’ by ‘being-in-the-world’, it has ‘existence’ only by having a ‘world’. This means, Dasein is ‘Da’ (there), as the time of the possibility of its understanding. It has duration by way of understanding and exploring beings, which are accessible to it only by way of meaning within a ‘being-in-the-world’. To ask a question about the meaning of ‘something’, there has to be some understanding in advance, ‘a priori’, to be able to formulate it in relation to what ‘is’. Dasein therefore ‘knows’ about the ‘Being of beings’ to which it relates and which it investigates. Beings appear to Dasein by virtue of Dasein’s Being as ‘openness’.

Dasein is not a ‘being’ although it exists in a being called ‘human’. In ‘Being and Time’ Heidegger discloses the ontological, or ‘a priori’ structure of such a being. Since this investigation happens from ‘within’ this ‘being’ as Dasein, it is based on what Dasein already takes for granted about itself. Dasein has to make its own Being transparent to itself by an ontological disclosure. To do this Heidegger describes at length the ‘everyday’ understanding of Dasein in relation to beings. Then he goes on to describe how Dasein’s disclosive activity has to turn onto itself as the site of this disclosure. Dasein realises itself as individual ‘self’, with individual ‘possibilities’ of

81 “ontisch-ontolog.Bezug zur Welt”, SZ, §18, p.85
disclosing beings. The mode of the Being of Dasein determines ‘truth’ in the sense that, if we look at things, we ‘know’ about their ‘truth’ already - because their Being is determined by our own Being as disclosing beings, i.e. Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. It turns in circles: Dasein is what has Being and Being is only as the ‘existence’ of Dasein. Realising the possibilities ‘given’ to Dasein is the mode in which Being manifests itself in time. Dasein is in ‘strife’\textsuperscript{83} with Being to realise the possibilities hidden within the inaccessible ‘ground’ of ‘facticity’. The appropriated possibilities then alter the ‘project’ (Entwurf), within which the totality of the limited and finite ‘totality of purposes’ (Bewandnisganzheit) is acted out.

It is curious that Dasein is still a some‘-thing’, which has to disclose itself to itself ‘as’ itself, just as Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. The way to this ‘self’ however is individual because of the finality of Dasein and its ‘understanding’ of its own death as part of itself in its ‘authentic’ ‘project’ (Entwurf). The self discloses itself as ‘being-in-the-world’. Being ‘is’ only when beings appear ‘as’ something, have ‘meaning’ within a totality, which is the intentionality, the relatedness, which is always already ‘there’, i.e. ‘existence’. The self understands itself as that in which ‘Being’ is operative in a way that gives truth. This is what Heidegger means when he speaks about Dasein being ‘handed over to Being’, or ‘es gibt’ (is given) only ‘as’ that which makes the establishment of truth possible, the ‘openness’ itself.

a. Being and Dasein

We always already know something. Somehow we find our way around without knowing how. The fact that we understand ‘is’ something. This ‘is’ is Being. It is in this ‘that’ we have always already disclosed something, before we understand something ‘as’ something. Dasein is “ahead-of-itself” in a ‘world’ which makes it possible for beings to be. Being is only as the Being of beings\textsuperscript{84}, because Dasein understands beings, it also understands, i.e. discloses, Being first\textsuperscript{85}. Disclosure constitutes Dasein and Being.

But an account of the ‘that something is’ is difficult and historically philosophers

\textsuperscript{82} “..die Entdecktheit des innerweltlichen Seienden gründet in der Erschlossenheit” SZ, §44, p.220
\textsuperscript{83} UKW, p.34; Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, p.63
\textsuperscript{84} SZ, §1, p.9
\textsuperscript{85} “Sein aber “ist” nur im Verstehen des Seienden...” SZ, §39, p.183
have privileged beings, rather than to ask about the mode of 'Being' as such, which enables a cohesive totality of meaning within which we always already operate. The Being of beings is the question of metaphysics, the question of Being as such is Heidegger's ontology. According to him, we do not even have a language to speak about Being other than to say that it 'is not' since it 'is' not a 'being'. This lack in language, however, also leaves a trace\(^{86}\) by which Heidegger hopes to follow what cannot show itself as being but what makes it possible to understand something at all. Heidegger's approach is to go from the given 'everyday' understanding of human beings to the transcendental structures which make human history possible as a history of Being. Being and Dasein are not simply two entities, rather, they are forces within which a form of consciousness constitutes itself as a 'disclosive' (Erschlossenheit) function of its own 'existence'. Ultimately Dasein has to disclose (Entschliessen) itself to itself in its ontological structure. This movement 'discloses' Being as the historicity of Dasein's intercourse with Being. Heidegger insists on the unity of Being and Dasein as one determines the other. Being 'is' not, and Dasein cannot 'be' without 'Being'. He goes on to analyse the most general possible ways how Dasein takes care of its own Being.

One question which Heidegger avoids, and has to avoid, is the question of 'agency' which is important to the question of 'art'. He attempts to describe a structure which precedes and constitutes the object and subject, the temporal and eternal. By doing this, the 'eternal' becomes historic but it is still inescapable 'fatum'. 'Temporality' is not 'time', it gives time, within it the possibilities of Dasein are realised and among them is the measurable time. Human action is restricted to the slow 'unfolding' of the 'given' Being. Art is an action, and action is in need of an actor. Commonly the actor has a 'knowledge' of the matter. But this is not the case, neither for art nor for Heidegger's understanding of the movement of Dasein. The 'matter' of art is questioning, and it questions the constitution of possibilities of such 'knowledge'. Therefore the movement of the 'actor' as 'autor' is different from those who have a purely 'technical' knowledge. This questioner cannot rely on the safety of the unquestionable presence of beings, nor on his own integrity as the grounding subject of knowledge. The movement of Being and Dasein is historical, which means that it persists and changes. The tension between persistence and change expresses itself in Heideg-

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\(^{86}\) Heidegger, SdA, p.360
ger’s use of the word ‘Streit’ (strife) to describe the movement between ‘earth and world’\textsuperscript{87} or Being and Dasein\textsuperscript{88} This is the old problem of all ontology since Plato and Aristotle: how to understand identity and change in time\textsuperscript{89}. Heidegger sets out to find a different solution by investing humans with ‘Dasein’ in ‘existence’, as the site of the movement of the ‘poiesis’ of ‘meaning’, which is constituted in the temporality as change and persistence but at the expense of human ‘mastery’. Temporality enables the possible modes (Seinsmodi) of Dasein.\textsuperscript{90} Being is only through Dasein by virtue of its temporality (Zeitlichkeit) because it has been redefined as ‘meaning’. What has been the a-temporal ‘essence’ is enclosed in the temporality of existence, because temporality is not ‘time’, but the cohesion of ‘Geworfenheit’ and ‘Entwurf’ within the horizon of past, future and presence. The facticity of Dasein which has been ‘thrown’ into a form of Being ‘inherits’ the ‘project’ (Entwurf), which projects meaning onto the temporal horizon, the finite limits of the concrete Dasein. Therefore, Dasein has always a Being and Being finds always Dasein; This Being is ‘a priori’ to Dasein. Nevertheless, since Being is invested into time of Dasein’s existence, it is in change. So agency is divided between what is always already and the interpretative efforts of Dasein - as Mitsein, as a community (or collective) of a ‘Volk’, a people which share a tradition of interpretation. Being has always been given in advance to Dasein as the sense that gives meaning through the ‘project’ and as the finite field of possibilities open to Dasein as the future being-able-to-be (Seinkönnen) as it is the for-the-sake-of-which (Worum-willen) of Dasein’s actions\textsuperscript{91}. What this does not explain is the (artistic) inception of the un-conditioned (Unvermittelte) from the excess (Überfluß) of the foundation (Stiftung, Schenkung)\textsuperscript{92}.

In traditional ontology, humans are beings among other beings, they share one Being. Heidegger on the other hand insists that the specific difference is that humans as ‘Dasein’, have access to the ‘is’ and that in philosophical history this was interpreted in various but erroneous ways. In ‘Basic Problems of Phenomenology’ Heidegger discusses the four theses about Being\textsuperscript{93}. What has been omitted according to Heideg-

\textsuperscript{87} UKW, p.34 f.
\textsuperscript{88} Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, p.75
\textsuperscript{89} hyle and morphe, essence and existence, subject and object, etc
\textsuperscript{90} “Die Grundmöglichteiken der Existenz ...”, SZ, §61, 304; “Zeitlichkeit zeitigt ...”, SZ, §65, 328ff
\textsuperscript{91} Dasein is futural in this sense, governed from the sense which is bestowed by its ‘project’
\textsuperscript{92} UKW, p.61f.
\textsuperscript{93} “1. Kant’s thesis: Being is not a real predicate; 2. The thesis of medieval ontology (Scholasticism) which goes back to Aristotle: To the constitution of the being of a being there belong (a) whatness,
ger is the question of what such Being actually means in the first place and "from which antecedently given horizon - do we understand the like of being"94. In 'Being and Time' Heidegger has already differentiated between Dasein as the temporal horizon in which beings can appear in one way or another and the movement of the originary disclosure of beings as it precedes all other forms of possible disclosure and thus gives persistence although not 'eternity'. Existence is finite temporality and therefore it has limits which cannot be set by Dasein but the persistence of the mode of Being is expressed by 'facticity and 'thrownness' which determine the 'project' (Entwurf) within the temporal horizon.

In UKW this relationship is brought into sharper relief. The terms Dasein and Being belong together in a mutual movement of production. In Dasein Being finds a temporal manifestation. Being 'gives' Dasein the 'project' (Entwurf) and all finite possibilities contained in it to disclose. Disclosing means Being. The relationship between Dasein and Being is one of effort and strife ("polemos", "Aus-einander-setzung"). In this fateful movement it is the whole of the 'world' (of Dasein as 'being-in-the-world') which is determined by the outcome. There seems to be little room for the individual action. Quite apart from the fact that such action is performed by an individual 'constituted' as a 'subject', it can always only repeat a past and inauthentic tradition. Nevertheless, Dasein is acting, it is wrestling 'meaning' from Being, even though this Being determines all that is 'given' to Dasein. This interaction is the 'ontological' possibility of Dasein 'having a world' ('being-in-the-world'). It is not enough that Being gives to Dasein possibilities, Dasein equally has to act out all the possibilities given to it95. Truth, as 'aletheia', is defined by the interaction of Dasein and Being. This 'strife' reveals 'truth' which is temporal and constituted in the practices 'given' by Being. 'Truth' in Heidegger's terms is not correspondence but in-

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94 Heidegger, BPPh, p.16
95 Here we find a dual Being (Seyn and Sein): the first 'gives' as a beginning, the inception, which then unfolds as Being which is unfolded by Dasein and thus brought into its truth; "... he employs the archaic spelling Seyn to distinguish this truth of Being from the Sein investigated in Being and Time, the sense of Being. Heidegger sees Seyn as more primordial than Sein, because the former determines the givenness of any particular articulation of the sense of Being that Dasein grasps in its historically located understanding of Being; the truth of Being (Sein) first grants the parameters of Dasein's Being-in-the-World." Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, p.73.
stead the original ‘being-in-the-world’ as the form in which beings can be disclosed. All other understanding is based on this original process of disclosure. Truth is first, it is the ‘a priori’ of any understanding. However, ‘truth’ is also a result of ‘strife’ (Streit, polemos) and thus it is ‘historical’ in Heidegger’s terms. Essence and truth are joined together as the historical shape of existence in Dasein. Existence is the sum of Dasein’s actions by which it discloses aspects of Being: existence is ‘strife’ for possibilities. This ‘strife’ is action. Only in such a performative mode can any inception occur. The ‘agens’ of Dasein is its existence in all its disclosive modes.

The question which concerns the mode of ‘production’ of this ‘truth’ is at the centre of Heidegger’s ontology. Dasein is, what is ‘concerned’ with Being, and thus the locus of a ‘world’ in which beings appear ‘in truth’. Accordingly the individual Dasein is not a creator ex nihilo of such a world. It is always already there, Dasein is thrown (geworfen) into a mode of existence, and “Verfallen” (fallen) into a relation with beings, and thus ignorant of ‘Being’. The ‘concern’ with beings makes Being ‘invisible’. Only through the concern with beings can Dasein interact with Being. Therefore the work of art gathers beings into a world – the Greek temple discloses a world. It needs to be ‘there’, in the ‘world’, on the ‘earth’ and from ‘earth’. So, in the fact of the world is Being itself revealed. The Greek temple is a ‘total work of art’. It determines how a people understand. It is ‘material’ which through its form defines what ‘matter’ means. I will expand on this in the second part of this chapter.

Since it is the ‘individual’ who, although born into a ready-made ‘world’, still ‘produces’ or ‘re-produces’ the way in which things ‘appear’, this ‘appearance’ (‘Anwesen’)) of beings in the ‘world’ of Dasein, is what is produced between Dasein and Being in the ‘polemos’, i.e. in temporality. This is what Heidegger tries to tell us: that only the ‘mode’ of production of meaning really ‘is’, in that it is that, which ‘gives’ the possibility of presence (Anwesenheit) through Dasein, which not only interprets beings, but at the same time is aware of its own ‘Being’, its relationship to ‘Being’, in an interpretative way; which is what Heidegger calls ‘polemos’: “Aus-einander-setzung”. The ‘polemos’ is about the Being of Dasein and from this ‘decision’ the Being of beings is determined.

In his critique of modern science and technology, Heidegger locates the root problem of the possibility of understanding in the Greek interpretation of ‘Being’ itself, the
‘first beginning’. The Greeks were aware of the possibility of appearance itself, but more concerned with the appearance of beings, the Being of beings. Being and Time is an attempt to reopen the question of the “presencing of presencing itself”\(^96\). Dasein is aware of its faculty of interpretation. Heidegger means the whole framework which ‘gives’ the possibility of interpretation, which makes the meaning of things possible as “Anwesen” and which he calls ‘world’. Therefore it is not the ‘individual’ Dasein but the ‘world’ which operates in Dasein, and “worlds”\(^97\). This world however is determined in the ‘strife’ between Dasein and Being, guided by the ‘givenness’ of the ‘first beginning’, the ‘first inception’\(^98\).

Production is ‘poiesis’, original poiesis ‘happens’ in the relationship between Dasein and Being. The two models of production which Heidegger describes in his later lectures, are the Greek (Aristotelian, ‘physis’ and ‘techne’) and the modern technological. Both modes ‘bring-forth’, but in different ways. What is important is, that ‘agency’ has been fractured into a structure of movements to dispel the idea of an acting subjectivity, be it human or divine. The term “Da-sein” is a ‘place-holding’ name determining the site of a process. Nevertheless, this name is deceptive in the sense that it appears as if Heidegger is speaking about an individual ‘Da-sein’ in Being and Time, but it becomes clear that the function of Dasein as ‘care-structure’ is ontological - or rather replacing Kant’s transcendental subject.

b. Existence

The essence of Dasein is existence\(^99\). Existence is based on Dasein’s ‘project’ (Entwurf). The ‘project’ discloses Dasein’s Being in its possibilities.\(^100\) Dasein is able to grasp its possibilities as its existence; in an unreflective and unthematic way, the act of executing its possibilities is the existence of Dasein. Disclosure is the existence and essence of Dasein and thus constitutes the ‘open’ (das Offene) within which beings can presence themselves. The term ‘existentials’ is therefore Dasein’s equivalent of the term of ‘categories’; they describe the condition of the possibility of Dasein as a being that is concerned with Being, i.e. the ‘How?’ beings presence

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\(^96\) Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p.160
\(^97\) UKW, p.30
\(^98\) “uneruehbar” SZ, §65, p.330
\(^99\) "...Wesen des Daseins ... die Existenz." SZ, §45, p.231
\(^100\) "Das Dasein entwirft als Verstehen sein Sein auf Moglichkeiten" SZ, §32, p.148; v. Hermann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.8
(Anwesen) themselves in the totality of possible relations. They are not ‘properties’ of a (eternal) ‘being’ (hyle, hypokeimenon) but ‘possibilities’ of Dasein’s existence itself (i.e. disclosing).

‘Being’ is the “transcendens schlechthin”\textsuperscript{101} - Being is the ultimate “universality”. The ontology of human Being begins with the insight that humans have an understanding of their own ‘existence’. Heidegger calls it ‘world’ and Dasein is always already in a world, it is ‘in advance of itself’ (Sich-vorweg-sein)\textsuperscript{102}. “Being-in-the-world” is the ‘grounding constitution’ (Grundverfassung)\textsuperscript{103} of Dasein, its “dwelling in” in its ‘existential’ form in a world, ‘Being’ and ‘Being-in’(a world). The ‘being-in-the-world’ of Dasein is not explicable within classical ontological categories which only apply to beings which are not-Dasein and do not have ‘world’. Dasein is, always already in a ‘world’. To have a ‘world’ from which beings can emerge is an ‘existential’ as a form of category without which Dasein cannot be articulated or made sense of\textsuperscript{104}. The ‘Being-in-the-world’ takes place as ‘aisthesis’, ‘noein’ and ‘logos’, speaking and understanding of world, but it is misunderstood and becomes ‘invisible’ as an ‘existential’ (Daseinsverfassung)\textsuperscript{105}. ‘Existence’ already means to be in time, to exist as actuality from birth to death but not as a succession of moments\textsuperscript{106}. Dasein is temporality and any self is grounded in it\textsuperscript{107}. This means, by its very existence Dasein has disclosed its world in some form. Dasein has no existence without some form of disclosure. When Heidegger says that Dasein is concerned with its Being, he means that Dasein discloses along the finite possibilities ‘given’ to it in its ‘throwness’ (Geworfenheit) into undiscoverable facticity (Faktizität) which Heidegger calls ‘project’ (Entwurf).

The question of Being can therefore be only asked out of this ‘existing’ of Dasein. Dasein’s ‘difference’ is to be concerned with its existence, and this means to care about its own constitution (“Seinsverfassung”\textsuperscript{108}) which determines its existing. The most important qualification of Dasein is therefore the thesis that ‘existence’ is the

\textsuperscript{101} “Sein ist das transcendence schlechthin.” SZ, §7C, p.38
\textsuperscript{102} “Das sich-vorweg-sein ... charakterisiert als In-der-Welt-sein.” SZ §41, p.192
\textsuperscript{103} SZ, §13, p.59
\textsuperscript{104} SZ, §12, p.54
\textsuperscript{105} SZ, §12, p.59
\textsuperscript{106} “Momentanwirklichkeiten” SZ, §72, p.374
\textsuperscript{107} SZ, §66, p.331 f.
\textsuperscript{108} SZ, §4, p.12
“Substanz des Menschen” (substance of man)\textsuperscript{109}. Existence is temporality within which understanding takes place as the disclosing ‘project’ (Entwurf)\textsuperscript{110}. The ‘projection’ (Entwurf) onto the temporal horizon\textsuperscript{111}, i.e. Dasein’s finity (‘being towards death’) makes Dasein ‘futural’ in the sense that it has finite possibilities-to-be (Seinkönnen) within the horizon, but it has the possibility to discover all its possibilities within this finite temporality as its ‘not-yet’ (noch-nicht). Existence is the ‘becoming what one is’ from the futural ‘being-in’ possibilities which are governed by the inception (arche).\textsuperscript{112} In short, the form of the ‘project’ (Entwurf) makes ‘inner-worldly’ beings comprehensible to Dasein\textsuperscript{113} in a historical form which changes only at a glacial speed.

That Dasein exists means: it has a temporal horizon, determined by its ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit), which is the ‘a priori’ of understanding and also determines the ‘project’ (Entwurf) which then guides discovery (Verstehen, Befindlichkeit and Rede). Dasein’s always already ‘Being-in-the-world’ (In-sein, In-der-Welt-sein) as disclosure of the totality of the world enables the ‘discovery’ (Entdecken) of the relations of beings. Heidegger uses the examples of nature and tools as ‘present-at-hand’ (Vor-handen) and ‘ready at hand’ (Zu-handen). ‘Attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) is ‘equiprimordial’ (gleichursprünglich) with understanding (‘Verstehen’). ‘Verstehen’ is constituted by the existential of the ‘project’ (‘Entwurf’). Understanding has the character of a ‘project’ (Entwurf) which means, it is governed by ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit)\textsuperscript{114}. Dasein ‘projects’ itself onto its own possibilities, it ‘is’ its possibilities\textsuperscript{115}. ‘Attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) and ‘understanding’ (Verstehen), which are both ‘equiprimordial’ with ‘speech’ (Rede), and form the way Dasein ‘discovers’ the meaning of beings and structures their possibility to appear ‘as’ beings in its (Dasein’s) ‘world’. These are modes of understanding within ‘Being-in-the-world’. I will come to Heidegger’s critique of technology and science later in relation to his

\textsuperscript{109} “Die Substanz des Menschen ist die Existenz.” SZ, §43, p.212
\textsuperscript{110} “Entwurf ist der Spielraum des Faktischen Seinkönnens.” SZ, §31, p.145
\textsuperscript{111} BPPh. p.xxv.
\textsuperscript{112} “...werde, was du bist!” SZ, §31, p.145
\textsuperscript{113} “Das Seinende “hat” nur Sinn ...” SZ, §65, p.324?
\textsuperscript{114} “Das Verstehen ist, als Entwerfen, die Seinsart des Daseins, in der es seine Möglichkeiten als Möglichkeiten ‘ist’. ... Und nur weil das Sein des Da durch das Verstehen und dessen Entwurfscharakter seine Konstitution erhält, weil es ‘ist’, was es ‘wird’ bzw. nicht wird, kann es verstehend ihm selbst sagen: “werde, was du bist!”” SZ, §31, p.145
\textsuperscript{115} “Die Geworfenheit ist aber die Seinsart eines Seienden, das je seine Moeglichekiten selbst ist...” SZ, §39, p.181
lecture UKW. ‘Speech’ (Rede) is dividing and composing (Gliedern), becoming statement, assertion and judgement exerting increased control about the network and relations between beings (Bewandnisses), and thus determining the ‘Being’ of beings (Zuhandendes and Vorhandendenes). The process of ‘unveiling’ itself is not in view as such because beings are unveiled ‘as’ something, i.e. within an instrumental function. All such disclosure uncovers (Entdeckt) beings in terms of being-at-hand (Zuhandenheit = Bewandnis)\textsuperscript{116}. But all such disclosure is founded on ‘totality of purposes’ (Bewandnissganzheit) and an anticipatory self-understanding of Dasein’s ‘for-the-sake-of’ (Worum-willen) and ‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen)\textsuperscript{117}. The understanding of beings is always secondary to the original disclosure of existence as ‘being-in-the-world’.

Dasein is always concerned with beings. The ‘way’ it ‘discovers’ (Entdecken) beings is constituted by ‘being-in-the-world’, and the ‘being-in-the-world’ as disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) grounds the possibility of understanding (Entdecken) as ‘unveiling’, i.e. truth. Dasein is not before ‘attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) and ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) but only ‘in’ and ‘as’ it, and thus in the disclosure (Erschlossenheit) of ‘being-in-the-world’. These ‘existentials’ are the ‘a priori’ of the existence of Dasein. Otherwise Dasein would be just a ‘being’ and not Dasein.

On the ontological level the ‘condition of the possibility’ of ‘Dasein’ to understand its own ‘Being’ beyond being a ‘being’, lies in its withdrawal from beings with which it is concerned and which are present- or ready-to-hand. The description of this withdrawal begins with Heidegger’s use of the concept of ‘anxiety’ (Angst) in Being and Time, Chapter 6 and continues in Section 2. In encountering beings, Dasein has always already understood its own Being but not thematically. Every form of disclosure which Dasein performs is only possible within the ‘being-ahead-of-itself’ of Dasein in a ‘world’ within its own possibilities (Seinkönnen) as the horizon of its ‘project’ (Entwurf). Without this ‘becoming’ as possibility there would be no Dasein\textsuperscript{118}.

c. Anxiety

For Dasein to recognise its Being, i.e. what it means, to itself, to exist, it has to re-

\textsuperscript{116} “... Seinsart der Bewandniss (Zuhandenheit) ...” SZ, §18, p.87
\textsuperscript{117} “Die Struktur der Weltlichkeit ... worumwollen es existiert.” SZ, §67, p.334
treat from its care for beings (‘Besorgen’) which are not Dasein. Heidegger describes
this moment as ‘Angst’, anxiety, within which the ‘obvious’\textsuperscript{119}, the interconnections
of meaning, the intelligibility as the framework within which things made sense, dis-
integrates, thus forcing Dasein to confront its own Being which is different from the
Being of beings.

Dasein has to ask what it means to exist ‘as’ Dasein and not as a thing. Dasein has to
disclose its ‘way of life’ by which it determines the way beings ‘appear’ to it within a
totality of meaning. This inescapable totality is the aspect of ‘existence’, ‘thrown-
ness’ and ‘fallenness’. The possible historicity of this aspect is authenticity and ‘po-
lemos’ to unfold all possibilities. Authenticity has to begin with a disclosure. This
disclosure begins with the ‘attunement’ (Stimmung) of anxiety. This anxiety dis-
closes the question of ‘being-in-the-world’ but unthematically, i.e. not in a discourse.

‘Anxiety’ is a mode of ‘attunement’ (Befindlichkeit), and related to ‘pathe’\textsuperscript{120}. For
the Stoics, ‘pathe’ are disclosive of beings, in the way we ‘care’ about beings, be-
cause ‘pathe’ have an object (of fear or desire etc.). Heidegger’s anxiety, however,
goes further in so far it is ‘being-in-the-world’ as a whole which is in question and
not something ‘innerworldly’ (innerweltliches)\textsuperscript{121}. Anxiety discloses the uncannyness
of the everyday familiarity of ‘being-in-the-world’)\textsuperscript{122}. ‘Unheimlich’ means ‘un-
canny’ but also ‘not at home’, ‘outside’; Dasein is ‘outside’ itself ‘with’ beings.

‘Attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety discloses Dasein as ‘fallenness’ (‘Vefallen-
heit’) to the inauthentic disclosure of its (Dasein’s) Being.\textsuperscript{123} Dasein ‘is’ only ‘as’ its
relation with beings, and this also means that it ‘is’ this relation, since ‘beings’ do
not have Being beyond Dasein.

According to the Stoics, ‘pathe’ are disclosive of things. However, pathe, like anger,
fear, etc. disclose things in a way which causes suffering. It is not virtuous to ‘be’
angry although the sage may act in an angry way if it is appropriate. Just as he eats if
it is appropriate. However, if the intention of the self is constituted by anger, it is not

\textsuperscript{118} SZ, §46, p.236
\textsuperscript{119} “... die Fragwürdigkeit alles Selbstverständlichen.” SZ, §67, p.334
\textsuperscript{120} SZ, §29, p.138
\textsuperscript{121} SZ, §40, p.187f.
\textsuperscript{122} “die Unheimlichkeit des alltäglich Vertrauten ‘In-der-Welt-seins’” SZ, §68, p.342 f.
\textsuperscript{123} SZ, §38, p.175f
virtuous. What does this mean? It means, that the ‘pathe’ disclose unthematically, intuitively but by giving a certain ‘logic’ to their disclosure. In this intuition things become what they are not. The Stoics exercises seek to disrupt this logic – a case of Heidegger’s broken hammer – by virtue of which, the context of purposes is opened to inquiry. However, the Stoic sage also has a ‘pathe’, it is called ‘eupatheia’, and grounded the intuitive disclosure in the Stoic ‘logos’.

Dasein is in its ‘world’ until the substantial cohesion of this world becomes questionable in the ‘attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) of ‘anxiety’. The object of anxiety is not an innerworldly being but the “‘Being-in-the-world’ itself”. What was disclosed as the totality of the ‘present- and ready-at-hand’ loses its relevance. The ‘Meaninglessness’ (Unbedeutsamkeit) of the ‘world’ points to the ‘groundlessness’ (Nichtigkeit) of the Being of Dasein itself. The ‘groundlessness’ will turn Dasein’s ‘project’ (Entwurf), which has been hidden in the ‘They’ (Man) until now, as the ‘received’ disclosure, into an authentic ‘project’ of ‘self-disclosure’ in which Dasein discloses itself (Entschlossen) as ‘nullity’ (Nichtig) and thus as ‘care’ in terms of absentiality. From this point onwards a different way of self-thematisation begins. Dasein’s ability to have a ‘world’ becomes an immediate issue for Dasein. Dasein is anxious about nothing in particular, which Heidegger translates as being in the attunement of ‘unheimlich’ as a ‘not-being-at-home’, Dasein is “un-homely” (un-zuhause) in the ‘world’ which is disclosed by the ‘They’ (Man), and which determines the mode of ‘fallenness’ (Verfallenheit). Dasein tries to avoid this anxiety by ‘fleeing’ into its engagement with beings, which gives familiarity to Dasein. ‘Being-in-the-world’ is all-encompassing belonging and being at home-ness, while the more “primordial” state the ‘not-being-at-home’ is: the “Un-zuhause”. Anxiety discloses to Dasein its ‘Being-in-the-world’, in the elements of ‘existence’, ‘facticity’ and ‘fallenness’.

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124 “... wovor die Angst sich aengstet ist das In-der-Welt-sein selbst.” SZ, §40, p.187
125 “Die innerweltlich entdeckte Bewandnisganzheit des Zuhandenen und Vorhandenen ist als solche überhaupt ohne Belang ... Welt hat den Charakter voller Unbedeutsamkeit.” SZ §40, p.186
126 “Die Angst benimmt so dem Dasein die Möglichkeit verfallend sich aus der ‘Welt’ und der öffentlichen Ausgelegtheit zu verstehen.” SZ, §40, p.187
127 “... Flucht ‘in’ das Zuhause der Öffentlichkeit ...” SZ, §40, p.189
128 “Das Un-zuhause muss existential-ontologisch als das ursprünglichere Phänomen begriffen werden.”, SZ, §40, p.189
What is really disclosed is the ‘precarious’ position of Dasein as a ‘being-in-the-world’ which is disclosed as ‘groundless’ in anxiety. This is why Dasein recognises itself as a being which has a ‘world’, but that it has this world only in the continuous disclosure of its possibilities which are finite through its thrownness (Geworfenheit and Entwurf) within a temporal horizon. It is ‘precarious’ precisely because it has no ‘substance’, but rather creates its own persistence in time by being concerned with its own Being. Conversely this also means, as said before, that it has already understood its ‘Being’ by virtue of ‘having a world’ and the process of ‘being-in-the-world’ means to have a project, possibilities, and finity. By this we see that there is no foundation or grounding to Dasein other than its comportment towards things. The mode of the Being of Dasein is put into question by ‘anxiety’. In such way anxiety discloses Dasein as ‘being-in-the-world’ as its own product. The agency of this production, however, cannot be consciousness or subjectivity, since Dasein always precedes (a priori) such constitutions.

**d. Turning away from Beings**

We should pause here for a moment and recapitulate. The ‘attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety makes Dasein aware of its ‘Being-in-the-world’. Dasein is ‘anxious’ not about some ‘beings’ but about its ‘Being-in-the-world’ as the framework which makes beings visible. This makes Dasein aware of itself as the locus of its ‘world’, it becomes aware of its Being as different from the Being of beings. Dasein is anxious about its Being as ‘disclosing’ (Erschlossenheit).

This turn of Dasein from beings to its own state of affairs, reveals this relation as different from its relation to things to which it, until now, tended with contention. ‘Attunements’ (Befindlichkeiten) are various ‘comportments’ which disclose beings in one way or other. ‘Attunements’ identify beings in particular ways - for instance ‘fear’ discloses its object as ‘fearful’. This comportment validates external objects in their meaning. We could go through the Stoic quadriga of ‘pathe’ and recognise that these equally define ‘things’ in their meaning. However, things themselves as objects of ‘pathe’ define the ‘self’ of the Stoic, who wishes to escape this involvement and

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130 BPPh, p.xxv.

131 "...sondern die Angst erschliesst als Modus der Befindlichkeit allererst die Welt als Welt." SZ, §40,
'change' his ‘self’. Heidegger’s ‘beings’, with which Dasein is concerned, determine Dasein’s self-understanding and thus its comportment to ‘beings’. Dasein is the ‘other’ to beings, by enveloping them in its ‘world’ and opening them up in meaning. Dasein is affectible by beings only according to its ‘project’ (Entwurf). The Stoic and Socratic ‘arete’, defines the human self - and its Being - in opposition to things that are desired (in pathe). The Stoic ‘pathe’ defines things, and makes the ‘self’ to understand itself out of its relation to things and beyond them. This is precisely what happens in Heidegger’s ontology. In ‘attunement’ (Befindlichkeit) and ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) we address ‘beings’ in one way or other without being aware of the ‘being-in-the-world’ which determines this possibility. Stoic ‘arete’ is the human comportment that directs the view from external affairs towards the constitution of a self as ‘work’. Only the self-disclosure as partaking in ‘logos’ discloses the self as the moral subject who’s intentions and moral choices at once need beings as material for judgement and transcend these beings in a virtuous act. As Heidegger says in UKW about the ‘work of art’: in it, truth sets itself into work and it is set into work by the work of art. Truth is both, the subject and object of such a ‘work’132. The truth needs the material ‘being’ of the work. Truth works in beings and thus Dasein has ‘access’ to Being through beings. Heidegger describes what precedes agency. Truth is both, subject and object, it creates what will make it possible to divide subject and object. But truth still needs the material work, made by an agency, which has already been constituted by a truth.

The ontological possibilities of Dasein are still dependent on the individual existence and the way of life becoming thematic in it and in its ‘works’. Because this thematisation does not mean that the way of life, the form of existence is taken as an ‘object’ itself, access to this realm is categorically different from the approach to beings. This turn, therefore, from external attachments to self-understanding, is the point in which the ontological possibilities become fluid and accessible. ‘Understanding’ of these cannot be objectifying, it can only be performed ‘in’ and ‘as’ existence. Thus the individual existence becomes a ‘work’ of an ontological movement, which does not have authorship but is brought about within the movement, which Heidegger calls ‘strife’ or ‘Aus-einander-setzung’. Life, for Greek philosophy, is a ‘work’ of art, just

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132 UKW, p.63
as art is a ‘work’ for Heidegger. It is brought about by a ‘poiesis’, which does not take its measure from ‘beings’, but from its own partaking in the universal ‘logos’, which is itself Heidegger understands as “a word for Being”. ‘Being’ is never ‘produced’, nor is ‘Dasein’ as the site of the clearing; in a technical way, but it ‘Da’ is produced in the ‘strife’, which sets and grounds the ‘world’ of Dasein. In the same movement ‘truth’ as ‘aletheia’ emerges in a historical ‘form’ (Riß, Gestalt etc), unconditioned and yet not arbitrary.

e. ‘Care-structure’ (Sorgestruktur)

It is an unenviable task to describe Heidegger’s ‘care-structure’ in just a few paragraphs. So I will try to highlight the main aspects, which lead Heidegger to understand ‘care’ in terms of temporality. ‘Care’ does not mean care. Instead it describes how sense is established a priori but still remains historical instead of an eternally unchangeable ‘substance’, from which everything else derives. That Dasein ‘exist’ already means that it exists ‘in time’. However, to make sense of beings, it needs stability. Tradition provides this stability in the shape of facticity. Dasein is ‘thrown’ into a mode of disclosure already. It does not need, and indeed would be unable to establish sense out of itself alone. Dasein has to be outside itself existing in a world already. The sense it is thrown into makes Dasein ‘open’ towards beings, they can then ‘appear’ as beings within Dasein’s ‘world’. Dasein exists only as what dwells in disclosure, which it has not chosen, but with which it understands beings. Therefore Dasein is ‘with’ beings and concerned with them because they appear in Dasein as the ‘openness’, which makes them visible in meaningfulness (Bewandnis). This ‘care-structure’ constitutes the condition of the possibility of disclosure.

The ‘care-structure’ (Sorgestruktur) is the Being of Dasein, which is constituted by ‘existentiality’ (Existentialitaet; “sich-vorweg”), facticity (Faktizität; “Schon-sein-in”) and ‘fallenness’ (Verfallen “Sein-bei”)135. ‘Care’ (Sorge) is the ‘sense’ of the

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133 ‘work’ in Heidegger’s sense as the ‘Urstreit’ set into the earth (material or ‘dust’) of the body of Dasein. As the ‘work’ in UKW is ‘productive’ of truth and produced by truth (by truth setting itself into work) ‘life’ as ‘work’ is productive of truth just as the Greek temple is.

134 Heidegger, SdA, p.360 f.

Being of Dasein, it gives Dasein the possibility of disclosure (Erschlossenheit) (which is its Being). The possibility of disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) lies in the ‘care-structure’ itself Dasein discloses (erschließt) its own Being, through the structure of its involvement with beings.\textsuperscript{136}

Although the ‘care-structure’ precedes Dasein’s involvement with beings, Dasein has to interpret backwards from beings towards its Being to disclose its own Being thematically. ‘Care’ names the temporal and ‘a priori’ structure of intentions (projects), which govern Dasein’s existence by opening it to beings.\textsuperscript{137} ‘Care’ (Sorge) is not a particular relation, it is what enables a relation, but always based on the particular situation within which Dasein factually ‘exists’, is ‘thrown’ and ‘fallen’, which then determines the limits of ‘possibilities’ from which Dasein can choose. There is no clean slate on which Dasein could constitute itself. It is always already ‘thrown’ (Geworfen) and this means that it also lives within a ‘project’ (Entwurf), which determines its possibilities (and who’s constitution it cannot disclose). To disclose this to itself authentically, however, Dasein has to recognise itself as being-in-the-world and thus understanding itself from its ‘world’, and this means through ‘beings’ alone.

Dasein ‘is’ (‘exists’ by virtue of) ‘care’ (Sorge) because it is concerned in the various aspects in relation to beings, ‘world’ and its own Being. It is not the purpose of this chapter to trace the many aspects of Dasein’s self-disclosure. ‘Self-disclosure’, however, put the ‘agency’ of Dasein’s disclosing on a different level. The disclosure of Dasein itself demands a different nomenclature from the disclosure of beings. It is the moment that Dasein grasps itself not as a being, but, by disclosing (Erschliessen) itself ‘authentically’, it opens itself up to the possibilities of its own future disclosing as its Being. It opens these possibilities not in a ‘discursive’ manner, but as the finite future, which governs its presence by virtue of being possible. Heidegger’s point of departure has been the ‘everydayness’ of Dasein’s understanding and he finishes with Dasein’s ‘authentic disclosure’ as ‘resolve’ of its very own possibilities. Heidegger calls the authentic self-disclosure of Dasein ‘Entschluss’, an commonly translated as


\textsuperscript{137}“Die Sorge liegt als ursprüngliche Strukturganzheit existential-apriorisch "vor" jeder, das heißt
‘resolve’. The main issue is Dasein’s turn from its relation with beings, to a relation with its Being-in-the-world, which it is always already within, and finally to its own ‘individualised’ and that means mortal and finite self in the process of ‘resolve’ (Entschluss).

This authentic disclosure is Dasein’s “very own Being-able-to-be” (“eigenes Seinkönnen”)\(^{138}\). Dasein is always already within its possibility of the ‘for-the-sake-of’ (Umwillen)\(^{139}\). In the ‘for-the-sake-of’ (Umwillen) the present is determined by the future ‘project’ / intention. The authentic self-disclosure of Dasein means that it also discloses possibilities, which are not disclosed by the inauthentic disclosure of the ‘They’ (Man). The ‘They’ is the average unchallenged disclosure within the chatter of the innerworldly purposes of the community in which no ‘self’ is established. The ‘project’ does not reveal real future possibilities because Dasein has not yet disclosed itself as a ‘being-towards-death’. Therefore it is still unable to disclose ‘care’ as its very own Being and its disclosure is still tied to the concern with beings as a surrogate for the ‘authentic’ understanding. The difference lies in Dasein’s self-disclosure as finity and thus the limit of ‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen). Only the ‘authentic’ Dasein achieves this dislocation of disclosure as finity, which changes Dasein’s relation to beings and ‘Mit-sein’ with other people.

The Being of Dasein is its self-disclosure as ‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen)\(^{140}\). The ‘for-the-sake-of’ (Umwillen) of Dasein is the disclosure meaning the sense, which governs in form of the ‘project’ (Entwurf) this ‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen)\(^{141}\). These possibilities are obscured by the ‘fallenness’ (Verfallen) to the ‘They’ (Man), the received inauthentic ‘project’ (Entwurf). The disclosure which depends on the average ‘They’ (Man), however, prevents Dasein from understanding its ownmost ‘for-the-sake-of’ (Umwillen) to which it is able. It is captured by ‘projects’, which are inauthentic because they are not rooted in Dasein’s disclosure of its own death. The ‘projects’ of the ‘They’ (Man) are diversions, which let Dasein avoid disclosing its world and its possibilities authentically because it would have to disclose its own

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\(^{138}\) SZ §41, p.192

\(^{139}\) “Diese Seinstruktur des wesenhaften ‘es geht um ...’ fassen wir als ‘Sich-vorweg-sein’ des Daseins.” SZ §41, p.192

\(^{140}\) SZ, §41, p.191

\(^{141}\) “Diese Seinstruktur des wesenhaften ‘es geht um ...’ fassen wir als das ‘Sich-vorweg-sein’ des
nullity’ (Nichtigkeit) (the fact of not being grounded in an eternal essence, to put it in the language of metaphysics). Dasein’s authentic self-disclosure reveals possibilities as aspects of sense. Dasein is able to exhaust these possibilities. In the gesture of its self-disclosure, Dasein produces a change of its comportment. This gesture will be described (in UKW) as the disclosure of possibilities, which are contained in the ground, which the work of art sets up. Dasein is not to be understood as agency - disclosure always happens to Dasein and is not the volition of a consciousness. Nevertheless Dasein has to be productive of possibilities as a strife between Being and Dasein, to appropriate its ownmost ‘being-able -to-be’ (Seinkönnen) in which Being can manifest itself. There is neither subject nor object in the work of Dasein and Being. What is still possible under Heidegger’s interpretation, is, that the ‘polemos’ between Dasein and Being is the originary ‘agency’ and artistic production. And because Being is never without Dasein and Dasein always has a Being the ‘polemos’ is an auto-poiesis of the historical mode itself. This historicity expresses the relation of persistence and change. Although incalculable, it unfolds within its possibilities, and this means within some form of necessity. Care (Sorge) therefore expresses the persistence of Dasein in a mode of Being, its predicament, but also – in authenticity – its propensity for a poietic unfolding within it.

The ‘care-structure’ describes Dasein as an event mediated by the ’project’, which is based on Dasein being ‘outside’, or ‘not-at-home’ (Un-heimlich); being thrown into a world and concerned with beings. Although its understanding is based on a previous disclosure, this disclosure is not disclosed as such in understanding innerworldly beings. By becoming ‘authentic’ Dasein realises its ‘ownmost’ possibilities as rooted in facticity. These possibilities are disclosive as a ‘for-the-sake-of’ (Umwillen) giving basically the ‘sense’ or ‘intention of the project as the ‘ground’ of meaningfulness to Dasein, but they continue to be determined by ‘tradition’ (i.e. facticity) and the finite possibility of the future. Dasein does not only have possibilities, it ‘is’ nothing else but its possibility. Dasein ‘as’ its possibility-project-sense is the Being of its own ground. Dasein is ‘through the mediation (and acceptance) of tradition (thrownness and facticity) and the ensuing ‘project’, which bestows sense, its own

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142 "Das Seinkönnen ist es, worum-wollen das Dasein je ist, wie es faktisch ist." SZ, §41, p.193
143 "Dasein ist nicht ... Grund seines Seins ... wohl aber ist es als Selbstsein das Sein des Grundes." SZ, §58, p.285
ground. It is a mediated auto-poietic event of meaning of Being.

For Heidegger the ‘care’-structure is decisive, because it explains Dasein and Being in their unity as persistence and change, and thus overcoming the original Greek hiatus between the temporality of the world and the divine a-temporality. Furthermore it makes it possible to understand this complex as the process of making sense, without involvement of subject and object. Meaning is produced without subject and object of ‘knowledge’.

**f. Authenticity of Dasein and ‘Being-towards-Death’**

Dasein has to become ‘authentic’ by its own self-disclosure as ‘care-structure’. This is to recognise itself not only in its ‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen), which means in its ‘not-yet’ (noch-nicht) exhausted possibilities in which Dasein persists in its Being by ‘being-disclosive’, but also in its temporal finity as ‘being-towards-death’ (Seinzum-Tode/Ende). Dasein is able to disclose its own death, unlike the death of others, by anticipating it as the ultimate and ‘ownmost’ (eigenste) ‘possibility’ because it is originally ‘in-advance-of-itself’ (Sich-voraus-sein) as ‘existence’. Death is the ultimate impossibility of the ‘Da’ of Dasein. ‘Being-towards-death’ discloses Dasein’s ‘nullity’ (Nichtigkeit) - not being an ‘eternal’ substance - and precisely because it discloses itself as finite, it also defines finite temporality as the hidden ground of Dasein’s ‘historicity’ itself.

Heidegger defines death as the loss of the ‘Da’ of Dasein. Dasein could not make ‘sense’ of its death, if not for the above mentioned fact of its anticipatory existence. The experience of the death of another human being fails in the sense that death is always ‘mine’ (jemeinig). Because death is what makes Dasein ‘complete’ (...)

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144 “... Sein zum Tode als der eigensten Möglichkeit.” SZ, §62, p.307
145 SZ, §50, p.251
146 “Die Sorge ist Sein zum Tode. ... Möglichkeit der schlechthinigen Unmöglickeit des Daseins” SZ, §65, p.329
147 Dasein as groundless ‘nullity’ - i.e. not a being - is also the disclosure of ‘being-guilty’ (Schuldigkeit), i.e. as being a cause.
148 “... ist der verborgene Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins.” SZ, §74, p.386
149 “Das erreichen der Gänze des Daseins im Tode ist zugleich Verlusts des Seins des Da.” SZ, §47, p.237
150 “Am sterben zeigt sich, das der Tod ontologisch durch Jemeinigkeit und Existenz konstituiert wird.” SZ, §47, p.240
zsein), by bringing it to an end, it is necessary to experience death as ‘mine’ (je-meinig). It is the ultimate ‘possibility’ because the understanding of death as possibility also discloses the being-able-to-be (Seinkönnen) as Dasein’s ‘ownmost’ (eigenste) possibility. The ‘completion’ of Dasein as temporality has a beginning and an end. It’s finality of the ‘between’ birth and death, constitutes the authentic self-disclosure as ‘care’ which is ‘temporality’. It turns disclosure back onto the structure, in which disclosure and understanding is possible as ‘existence’, i.e. being-in-advance in the world: ‘existence, facticity and fallenness.’ In the ‘fallenness’ to beings and the ‘They’ (Man) death is dealt with only as the death of others – it is avoided.

Dasein is ‘being-towards-death’ but the ‘authentic’ way to understand its ‘own’ death is necessary to a finite ‘completeness’ - or ‘perfection’ - which is usually not possible for ‘temporal’ beings. To be ‘complete’ Dasein has to disclose its finality in a way in which it is not ‘deficient’, but is embraced as that futural form of ‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen) in which Dasein can become ‘complete’ in the ‘not-yet’ of ‘being-in-advance-of-itself’ by disclosing ‘death’ as its ‘ownmost’ ‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen). Heidegger seeks the possible structure of ‘Dasein in its totality’ (for Ganzsein read ‘perfection’). Death, then, can be experienced through the ‘authentic’ being-in-ahead of Dasein because ‘care’ is Dasein’s ‘grounding constitution’ (“Grundverfassung”). However, ‘care’ (Sorge) is always related to something else, while ‘death’ is the concept of ultimate non-relationality (unbezüglich). This has an implication on the form of the ‘project’ (Entwurf). If the sense of death is the totally non-sensical, how could Dasein have a relation to its ‘ownmost’ possibility of death? This most radical possibility is necessary for Dasein’s self-disclosure as ‘nullity’ (Nichtigkeit) in which Dasein is brought before its own groundlessness. This then ‘turns’ Dasein around in its comportment to beings and ‘Mitsein’. In a relational sense, Dasein could not understand its own ‘death’. Therefore, Dasein’s structure

151 implicitly a ‘telos’ in Aristotle’s sense
152 “... Flucht vor ihm ...” SZ, §51, p.254
153 I follow Sheehan’s interpretation, Sheehan, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Mind
154 SZ, §52, p.259
156 Das bisher über den Tod Erörterte läßt sich in drei Thesen formulieren: 1. Zum Dasein gehört, solange es ist, ein Noch-nicht, das es sein wird - der ständige Ausstand. 2. Das Zu-seinem-Ende-
has to be supplemented further with the possibility not to understand its death in terms of the ‘They’ (Man). Being-towards-death discloses Dasein’s orientation as being addressed from the future, which is essentially what the concept of ‘project’ (Entwurf) says: it is a ‘not-yet’ - and if it should ever become complete, it will not be a ‘Da’-sein, because for existence there needs to be movement and time of the ‘Da’ (There-). If the ‘Da’ of existence is missing there is no Being and when Dasein is dead there is no Sein’ (Being), which could be ‘Da’.

‘Authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ are modes of ‘existence’.\(^\text{157}\) They describe Dasein’s mode of disclosure in relation to the ‘They’ (Man). The disclosure of the ‘ownmost’ (eigenste) possibility of death is a necessary condition for Dasein to disclose itself authentically, outside the ‘They’ (Man). Only when Dasein has turned from ‘fallenness’ (Verfallen -to beings and the ‘They’) will it disclose its own Being as the ‘care-structure’ and assume a disclosive comportment to beings and ‘being-with’ (Mitsein).

g. ‘Willingness-to-have-consciousness’ (Gewissen-haben-wollen)

Dasein has to disclose its own ‘Who’ as a ‘Self’\(^\text{158}\). Until now it has understood its ‘death’ solely from a “Man-selbst” without even an awareness of its ‘being-lost’ (Verlorenheit) to the ‘Man’, which has made those decisions of its ‘Being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen) invalid. Dasein’s own ‘Being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen) is not a ‘new’ possibility but Dasein already ‘is’ this possibility, which has been obfuscated by its ‘being-lost’ to the ‘They’ (Man). ‘Gewissen-haben-wollen’ is the ‘ownmost’ form of disclosure of Dasein, and is constituted by understanding (Verstehen), attunement (Befindlichkeit) and speech (Rede)\(^\text{159}\). The ‘call’, Heidegger says, is the ‘call of care’\(^\text{160}\), out of the ‘Unheimlichkeit’ (of thrownness - Geworfenheit), which brings Dasein to face its ‘nullity’ (Nichtigkeit)\(^\text{161}\) - i.e. Geworfenheit, meaning, the ‘that Dasein is’, has not brought itself into its ‘Da’\(^\text{162}\) and that it is not ‘itself because it is

\(^{157}\) SZ, §12, p.53
\(^{158}\) SZ, §54, p.267
\(^{159}\) SZ, §60, p.295 f.
\(^{160}\) SZ, §58, p.286
\(^{161}\) “Der Rufer ... ist das Dasein in seiner Unheimlichkeit ... das nackte ‘Daß’ im Nichts der Welt” SZ, §58, p.286 f.
\(^{162}\) SZ, §58, p.285
‘fallen’ (Verfallen). The ‘call of conscience’ has the mode of ‘care’\textsuperscript{163}. ‘Nullity’ (Nichtigkeit) however, also constitutes ‘thrownness’ and thus ‘care’\textsuperscript{164}. Nullity (Nichtigkeit), we see now is Dasein not being a ‘being’. Dasein is the opposite, it ‘is’ nothing, except what is ‘not-yet’, but equally, it has no ownership or control over its possibilities-to-be (Seinkönnen) of its ‘project’ (Entwurf) because it has been thrown into facticity. Its ‘self’ is spurious and precarious because it is pure temporality of existence without essence.

Heidegger’s solution is the ‘call of conscience’. Commonly (in the ontic realm) the ‘voice of conscience’ is a form of ‘understanding’ (Erschlossenheit) something.\textsuperscript{165} Conscience discloses some-‘thing’. ‘Conscience’ is a science, a ‘knowledge’ of something.\textsuperscript{166} However, in an ‘existential-ontological’ aspect, this ‘call’ (Ruf) does not disclose any-‘thing’, instead it calls back into the own-self of Dasein out of the “Man-selbst”\textsuperscript{167}. The ‘call’ is the opposite of ‘chatter’ (Gerede) of the ‘They’ (Man), it is ‘silence’, a pure happening of ‘transport’ from ‘Verlorenheit’ to the ‘Man’ into Dasein’s ‘authenticity’, which calls itself back into its ‘own-ness’. The ‘call of conscience’ is complemented by a ‘willingness-to-have-conscience’ (Gewissenhabenwollen) as the specific ‘listening’ (hören) of the ‘call’. This choice to hear and to choose one’s ‘self-being’ (Selbstsein), Heidegger calls ‘Entschlossenheit’\textsuperscript{168}.

The ‘call’ discloses what has been closed from Dasein’s view\textsuperscript{169}, namely, that Dasein is thrown and exists as a being, without being in the way of the (innerworldly) ‘present-at-hand’. The ‘Who?’ of the ‘call’ is no innerworldly concrete being and thus makes Dasein aware of its ‘Being’ as ‘care’. The ‘caller’ is a pure ‘that’ of ‘being-thrown’ and ‘not-being-at-home’ (un-zuhause), “das Dasein in seiner Unheimlichkeit”\textsuperscript{170}. The ‘attunement’ of ‘anxiety’ reveals Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world’ as ‘not-being-at-home’ (un-zuhause) and tears it out of its ‘self-forgotten being-lost’ (“selbstvergessene Verlorenheit”). In other words, the call of ‘conscience’ (Gewiss-
sen) enables Dasein to disclose its ‘self’ and assert its ‘ownmost’ (eigenstes) ‘pro-
ject’ (Entwurf) and ‘possibilities-to-be’ (Seinkönnen). However, it is still in the
form of the project (Entwurf) as determined by Dasein’s ‘Geworfenheit’, in which
Dasein finally grasps its ownmost ‘possibilities-to-be’ (Seinkönnen). The ‘project’
(Entwurf) of Dasein’s ownmost ‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen) is therefore the
‘free’ choice of these possibilities into which Dasein has already been thrown, It has
disclosed the pure ‘that’ of its existence as ‘care’, as the nullity (Nichtigkeit) of the
undisclosable facticity of its existence.

What does the ‘call-of-conscience’ do? Heidegger says, it is a ‘thrust’ (Stoβ). We
will come across it in UKW again as one function of the work of art. It ‘thrusts’ the
viewer out of his slumber into a different ‘truth setting itself into work’, a trajectory,
which cannot be ‘deduced’ from the past trajectory. It is the incomprehensible
change from one mode of truth into another, which is operative in the work of art.

h. ‘Being-guilty’ (Schuldigsein)

Like death, ‘being-guilty’ (Schuldigsein) is what ‘is’ not and points to a mode of the
Being of Dasein. In another context Heidegger interprets the category of ground
(cause, Ursache), aitia) as ‘Schuld’. To be ‘schuldig’ means to be the ‘ground’ of
something “... ursprüngliches Schuldigsein.” means to be a reason of... not of
‘something’, but of the ‘nullity’ (Nichtigkeit) of Dasein. As ‘care’ Dasein is not un-
der its own control, it is thrown into existence and ‘fallen’ (Verfallen) to beings.
Dasein is the ‘ground’ for its own ‘there’ (Da) - and ‘projects’ itself only within the
possibilities it has been thrown into. Dasein has to become the ‘cause’ (Ursache) for
what it has been thrown into. In this sense Dasein has to ‘accept’ its ‘guilt’ of not be-
ing in control of its Being while being the ‘cause’ of its manifestation in ‘care’
(Sorge). Dasein’s possibilities are solely within the ‘Geworfenheit’ - facticity, which
is given to it (by tradition) and undisclosable to it.

171 “Der durch die Angst gestimmte Ruf ermöglicht dem Dasein allererst den Entwurf seiner Selbst
auf sein eigenstes Seinkönnen.” SZ, §57, p.277
172 “Das Gewissen offenbart sich als Ruf der Sorge’: der Rufer ist das Dasein, sich ängstigend in der
Geworfenheit (Schon-sein-in...) um sein Sein-können. Der Angerufene ist eben dieses Dasein, auf-
erufen zu seinem eigensten Seinkönnen. (Sich-vorweg ...).” SZ, §57, p.277; §68, p.348
173 “Aufruetteln” §55 p.271; “Stoss” is also used in UKW to describe the poietic work of art.
174 VA, p.15 f.
175 “Schuld haben an” ... “das Grundsein fuer...” SZ, §58, p.283
176 “... ‘nicht’ von ihm selbst in sein Da gebracht” SZ, §58, p.284
As ‘care’ (Existenz (Entwurf), Faktizität (Geworfennheit) and Verfallen (Uneigen-
lichkeit)) Dasein can not but appropriate the limited possibilities for itself, by dis-
closing itself (‘Entschliessen’) as ‘Grund’ (cause) of its own Being\textsuperscript{177}. Dasein is the
‘being-able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen) as ‘care’\textsuperscript{178}. By disclosing its not being in control
Dasein can be ‘authentic’ and appropriate its given finite possibilities, by not being
deceived into the deception, by ‘beings’ and the ‘They’, that it does not have ‘limits’
because it cannot disclose ‘death’ without destroying the ‘They’.

‘Being-guilty’ is therefore not a ‘deficiency’ as the ‘call of conscience’ may have
suggested. Heidegger calls ‘being-guilty’ (Schuldigsein) a ‘being-ground for’
(Grundsein fuer)\textsuperscript{179}. It is essentially the ‘ground’ of existence as the ‘not-yet’ (noch-
nicht) but in terms of the ‘own’ rather than ‘They’ (Man). Only when Dasein makes
the transition from the being-lost (Verloren) to the ‘They’ (Man), to being its own-
most self, can it authentically disclose its own Being as care. It is the authentic self-
disclosure (Erschlossenheit) of Dasein in its ownmost possibility of being (Seinkö-
nennen) as being ‘guilty’. The ‘call of conscience’ is the ownmost ‘being-able-to-be’
(Seinkönnen) of Dasein in its ‘being-guilty. ‘Guilt’ as ‘cause’ is more originary than
‘care’ and constitutes the possibility of ‘care’. Dasein is grounded on ‘facticity’,
which is the ‘heritage’ (Erbe).\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{i. Resolve (Entschlossenheit) as ‘Care’}

‘Entschlossenheit’ means the ‘authentic’ disclosure of the Being of Dasein as care in
its ownmost ‘possibility-to-be’ (Seinkönnen). It also modifies the ‘discoveredness’
(Entdecktheit) of ‘world’ and disclosedness of ‘Mit-sein’ of others\textsuperscript{181}. Dasein in its
Being-towards-death as the ultimately authentic ‘projection’ (Entwurf) of the ‘being-
able-to-be’ (Seinkönnen) constitutes the completion of the authentic disclosedness
(Entschlossenheit) of itself. At the same time, its revealed mortality enables the facti-

\textsuperscript{177} “Schuldigsein konstituiert das Sein das wir Sorge nennen.” SZ, §58, p.286 ‘Grundsein’ is ‘Ursache-sein’ (cause) SZ, §58, p.282 f.
\textsuperscript{178} “Die gemeinte Nichtigkeit des Entwurfs, i.e. ‘nicht durch es selbst’ (p.284) gehört zum Freisein des Daseins für seine existentiellen Möglichkeiten. Die Freiheit aber ‘ist’ nur in der Wahl der einen, das heisst im Tragen des Nichtgewählthabens und Nichtauchwählenkännens der anderen.” SZ, §58, p.285
\textsuperscript{179} SZ, §58, p.283
\textsuperscript{180} SZ, §73, p.383
\textsuperscript{181} “Diese eigentliche Erschlossenheit modifiziert ... in ihr fundierte Entdecktheit der “Welt” ...” SZ, §60, p.297
cal existence as the ‘being-in-the-world’ and temporality of Dasein.

Dasein discloses itself as a ‘self’ - as opposition to the ‘They’. Not only does this mean, that it has a more appropriate understanding of its own Being, it has also a grasp of the difference to the average and everyday opinions, which prevent better self-understanding. Facing the ultimate possibility of its own death, its ‘ownness’ becomes the reason of its ‘nullity’. It is itself, but has no control. All attempts at ‘securing’ control emanates from its concern with ‘innerworldly’ beings and the ‘They’ (Man). So this ‘disclosure’ is a form of ‘ontological’ understanding which effects Dasein’s relations in its ‘Being-in-the-world’ itself. ‘Being’ is only comprehensible in the passage through beings. Somehow though, it is accessible by the ‘silence’ of the ‘call-of-conscience’, without ‘consciousness’ present.

j. ‘Care’ and ‘Oikeiosis’

I would like to insert a few anticipatory remarks regarding the Stoic doctrine. This will give a perspective on the next chapter on Stoic psychagogy and help to connect it with Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein’s process of disclosure. Both begin with an intuitive involvement with beings, a ‘natural’ understanding which is mediated by custom. The natural state of humans for the Stoics is a similar dwelling in the midst of things, which they call ‘oikeiosis’. It concerns human development as general anthropology. But it also involves this separation between the absorption in the external world and the slowly emerging possibility to understand one’s understanding (disclosure) as constituted, as ‘work’ itself - and I think it is an ontological understanding - as what can also dissociate itself from the immediacy of the external by partaking in the universal logos. It draws a hiatus between things and virtue. This hiatus is governed by the relations to things which emerge naturally in their usage on the one hand, and the question of the virtuous ‘intent’, which is itself defined as having its ‘telos’ (end) in itself, outside and beyond the immediately present things. Not to use external things in a habituated way, but radically considering the framework in which they ‘appear’ as desirable or otherwise, gives the Stoics access to an ‘ontological’ approach to the structure of the self - and simultaneously - this freedom enables them to change the ‘habituation’ by way of ‘askesis’. The ‘detachment’ from

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182 "Was sich das Dasein dergestalt zu verstehen gibt, wäre dann doch eine Kenntnis von ihm selbst.” SZ, §58, p.287
things, questions the whole framework within which external things appear 'as' something or other by leaving all external things in an ethical 'limbo'. The Stoics see the 'oikeiosis' as 'inauthentic' in terms of the assessment of the relations to external things. So the idea of 'oikeiosis' overlaps with Heidegger's 'being-in-the-world'. But people are too busy interacting with beings, through the discovering 'pathe', which makes us blind to the 'real' nature of humans.

Heidegger is quick to deny the possibility that there is an originary possibility of detachment from 'being-in-the-world'. Dasein becomes aware of its very own Being 'as' having Being by 'Being-in-the-world'. Dasein exists originary only in the way, that it is 'affected' by beings, and this means through 'being-in-the-world' as the horizon of possibilities which enable the care (Besorgen) of things. The 'care'-structure underlies the 'concern with' (Besorgen) by making Dasein aware of its Being as 'openness', which is able to have a relation to beings, but in the limited way of 'existence', 'thrownness' and 'fallenness'. This is not the point the Stoics try to make. But it is the 'fallenness' (Verfallen) to the opinion of the 'They' (Man) and this means 'inauthenticity', which is the Stoic target too. However, what they make explicit is the effort of 'authentic' understanding, which takes place inside of and as existence - as a way of life and not as theorising about life. The 'for-the-sake-of' (Um-willen) is for Heidegger the 'strife' in which Dasein’s possibilities are disclosed. The 'for-the-sake-of-itself' is equivalent to the 'telos-in-itself' of the Stoic virtue. It is the absolute, and therefore transcendent site, which grounds - 'a priori' - the ontological structure in terms of 'giving' sense: the form of truth.

The Stoic exercises to live 'in accordance with nature', disclose the 'self' as 'thrown' into the world. Its facticity is equally inaccessible, but the Stoic receives consolation from the detachment from beings. This, I think, is a marker, which expands on Heidegger. The Stoic concept of 'living in accordance to nature' is an 'absolute' and transcendent, as it coincides with 'virtue'. However, it also indicates 'health of the soul'. Therefore truth is linked to a 'good' which is contained in actual living, 'existence'. Without 'existence' no 'virtue'. No 'thrownness' can make people deny the possibility of a redemption from suffering. Any definition of 'suffering' is always a critique of a form of 'being-in-the-world'. It is therefore not necessarily the 'drive' to

\[183\] "als-freie Erfassen" SZ, §32, p.149?
assert consciousness or certainty and security. The Stoic ‘certainty’ lies in ‘virtue’. Virtue is rooted in the appropriate intention towards things. It therefore apparently operates in the realm where Heidegger’s ‘in-order-to’ (Um-zu) and ‘for-the-sake-of’ (Umwillen) operate. However, virtue is not a ‘material reason’, it is in the compartment of interpretation which is precisely ‘outside’ the external things. The Stoic turning understands beings from ‘Being’ - from ‘physis’ and ‘logos’; just as Heidegger’s ‘turning’ (Kehre) (or one of its aspects) attempts to find the way back from Being to the ‘being-in-the-world’ of Dasein. Whatever is understood to be a ‘good life’ (eudaimonia) will define the transcendent itself. Virtuous life is the most general concept (unbestimmt) so much so that it becomes an ontological concept for the Greeks.\(^{184}\) The ‘health of the soul’, is both a philosophical-transcendental category as much as a medical and therefore it functions as a definition of ‘human nature’ in relation to ‘physis’ and ‘logos’. This is what Heidegger rejects: the eternal ‘nature of’ is what caused all the contradictions within modern metaphysics. ‘Suffering’, the ‘awareness’ of ‘suffering’ are ‘philosophical’ terms which relate to a definition of what it means to be human. ‘That’ man suffers is the result of his nature: he is ‘in-between’ ‘life’ and ‘logos’. In ‘logos’ his pains of life are revealed as an animalistic drivenness. Philosophy as a ‘way of life’ is a therapy of the logos to alleviate this human position of being ‘in-between’. This ‘in-between’ or ‘on-the-way’ is an attribute of philosophers, of Socrates but also a staple expression of Heidegger himself giving us an indication about the ‘work’ of the constitution of understanding. I will return to the topic of ‘in-between’ in the next chapter.

In Being and Time the term ‘possibility’ has a temporal function by being the ‘for-the-sake-of-self’ of Dasein’s ‘project’ (Entwurf) which gives Dasein its ‘futural’ structure. Dasein is determined by its ‘possibilities’, which it chooses for its future, in its present and its past. This particular structure resembles the Aristotelian concept of ‘kinesis’ or ‘dynamis’ by understanding the ‘arche’ with its ‘telos’ as a form of ‘becoming what one is’\(^ {185}\) instead of relying on an external ‘unmoved mover’ as Aristotle does. Dasein, in its “ek-static temporality”, is becoming what it always already is, by virtue of its ‘project’ which emanates from its ‘possibilities’ into which it is grounded by is facticity and not from a metaphysical substance. However, these

\(^{184}\) Platonic ‘Good’ is the idea of the ideas, Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development, p.127

\(^{185}\) Sheehan, Dasein, in A Companion to Heidegger, p.204 ff.
'possibilities' are limited by the 'first inception' (arche) and finite, through Dasein's 'being towards death'. This temporal construction of 'presence' in 'absence' gives Dasein the ability to encounter beings 'as' something but more importantly also to be itself as the site of such encounters, which Heidegger calls "being-able-to-be" (Seinkönnen). "This Being-able-to-be is that for the sake of which any Dasein is how it is." This also describes how Dasein is 'ahead of itself' as 'becoming what one is' by the determination of the first inception in finite possibilities.

Dasein is 'ek-static', standing out into temporality which is not just past, present and future, but is the temporal ground of the whole 'care-structure'. One aspect of Dasein's 'ek-static' temporality is to determine Dasein's finity not as something 'deficient', but instead as fulfilling its perfection in its overarching fulfilment of being the possibility of Being in its historical materialisation: 'becoming what one is' via the 'project' and temporality. Despite 'existence', 'facticity' and 'fallenness' (Existenz, Geworfenheit, Verfallenheit), Dasein achieves the 'perfection' of its finite existence by being the 'site' of Being. In disclosing itself, as the temporal site, of 'care-structure', Dasein is the 'openness' to beings as being 'meaningful'. This structure seeks to overcome the dichotomy between matter and knowledge, the finite and infinite. On the other hand, 'repentance' (Kierkegaard) is the "natural relation of man to God"; which can not be borne out of deficiency but of identity. 'Repentance' and 'guilt' are the relation to something more original and authentic than a relation to 'beings' as Zuhandenes.

k. Self and Guilt

But why should Dasein have to become 'authentic' (i.e. self) when it could persist in the 'Man-sein'? Heidegger seeks an existential-ontological foundation for the possibility of understanding the being which cares about its Being. Being is something Dasein already understands to having by its actions (Umsicht), but the question remains, how this Dasein itself is constituted differently from other beings. To have Being, Dasein needs to exist in-the-world already, otherwise it would not have the 'projects' necessary to encounter other 'beings' and other 'Dasein'. It has to be 'in-

186 Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.91
187 Kierkegaard's concept of guilt is not a deficiency either. in Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development, p.30
188: Opposition to God means identity with God = atheism. Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt-
advance-of-itself in its understanding - 'ek-static'. Being precedes Dasein in facticity, although it cannot be without Dasein’s existence. Dasein cannot constitute itself - it is made what it is ‘by’ being ‘thrown’. This self is not the transcendental ‘I’ of Kant or Husserl, it cannot be ‘separated’ out of its involvement in its own ‘world’. On the contrary, it has to ‘choose’ the Being into which it has been ‘thrown’ already. Nevertheless, this ‘choice’ seems to constitute a point of transcendence within which Dasein is a ‘self’ and is able to disclose itself in a particular situation; thus ‘being-able’ not to take control, but to have awareness of ‘nullity’ (Nichtigkeit). This ‘nullity’, or ‘absence’ usually points towards a ‘transcendence’, something which is not a ‘present-at-hand’ or ‘ready at hand’ (Vor- and Zuhanden), but nevertheless, can be disclosed in some sort of ‘purpose’: “Worum willen...”. There has to be a ‘project’ (Entwurf) to make sense, and this ‘Entwurf’ is always ‘given’ by Dasein being ‘thrown’. The reason Heidegger seeks Dasein’s ownmost “Seinkönnen” as ‘care’ (Sorge) is a temporality independent of the ‘vulgar’ concept of time. Dasein and its involvement cannot be understood merely in the ‘They’ (Man). Instead, every Dasein in its care-structure has to reach a totality (Ganzsein) of its own. It has to be a self-constituting being which has its ‘telos’ in itself, ‘becoming what one is’ means being ‘perfect’ at each moment of its own becoming.

It is the same figure of thought of Dasein’s thrownness in which the Greeks discover ontology: by pushing concepts to their limits of ‘perfection’; which then become transcendent as terms of ‘purity’. These absolute terms like Being, the Good, or virtue, become foundational grounding of a way to ‘be’. But - for the Stoics the virtuous is a material act which forms the shape of ‘life’. So, to come back to the original question of a ‘way of life’, Heidegger’s relation between ‘Dasein’ and ‘Being’, the temporal place and the ‘transcendent’ mirrors the Stoic instruction to virtuous acts, in language and in gesture. Not what is material being, what is ‘concern with’ (Besorgt) but what ‘is not’ in the modern sense, what is absent is what is foundational. The absent and nothing, ‘is’ not, but gives meaning to beings and thus first makes them appear. So too for the Greeks: the judgement of the Stoic in a situation is either ‘virtuous’ or not; i.e. beings appear within a world of judgements only. We will see, that the Stoic ‘pathe’ are particular ways to understand beings which are particularly unhealthy in terms of ‘virtue. These judgements are poietic, not only is it poietic to

consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development, p.32
make judgement, the judgements themselves are poietic of the objects they pertain to. Therefore the poiesis of judgements is that, which ‘discloses’ that the being, which cares about its own Being, cannot understand itself in terms of ‘present-at-hand’ (Zu-handenes) etc.

1. Fate and History

The Stoics understand fate as whatever happens which we are not in control of. This is everything except one’s own virtuous acts. All the relations of the sage towards the ‘physical’ world - and the Stoics are very materialist - are determined by external causes. The only ‘ownmost’ acts of the sage are to actively ‘follow’ fate and to act ‘virtuously’ - being virtuous however means a self which partakes perfectly in the universal ‘logos’. This means for the sage: not to ‘complain’ about whatever happens to him and which ‘is out of his control’. Fate is what is outside ‘our’ control - virtuous acts are under our control. The sage is ‘impersonal’, as is Dasein, but both are ‘self’ in their ‘authentic’ self-being in temporality. The Stoic doctrine is totally devoted to the personal philosophical practice which is therapeutic, none of this therapeutic thought is left in Heidegger’s Being and Time. It does however creep back in with the term ‘Gelassenheit’ as a comportment of not to be taken over by the usage of technology

To Heidegger ‘history’ (Geschichte) is ‘Geschick’, fate, what has been sent and which is not a succession of points in time. ‘Geschick’ happens in the ‘polemos’ between Dasein and Being. This ‘polemos’ is not a ‘logic’ but it is a ‘trial by ordeal’.

Heidegger and the Stoics encounter the same difficulties in defining precisely the scope of human freedom. Ultimately, both choose to formulate freedom as ‘authentic’ interiority on one hand determined by the ‘ownmost being-able-to-be’ (eigenstes Seinkönnen), on the other, by ‘being virtuous’. Both comportments contain a relationship which opposes all ‘ready- or present-at-hand’ relations, all ‘innerworldly’ aspects of human comportment. What is not ‘ready- or present-at-hand’ is ‘nothingness’ or ‘virtue’. Therefore these terms become ‘ontological’. Even the Stoic ‘virtue’ is originally ontological out of its opposition to the ‘external goods’.

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189 Heidegger, Gelassenheit p.22
190 Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, p.103
m. Conclusion

In Being and Time Heidegger does away with traditional conceptualisations of ‘Being’ in terms of substance, consciousness and subjectivity. Instead persistence derives from the ‘a priori’ understanding of beings and the ‘project’ (Entwurf), which determines the finite possibilities of understanding of ‘Being’. This Being dwells in the persistence of thrownness and facticity of Dasein as the interpretative temporality (i.e. existence) which is the finite totality between birth and death. The ‘presence’ (Anwesen) of beings is not supported by an eternal ‘essence’ nor a transcendental subjectivity, instead Dasein ‘is’ only in the pure ‘disclosure’ as existence. The original disclosure (Erschlossenheit) is the self-disclosure of truth in the process of the ‘projection’ (Entwurf) of possibilities onto the finite temporal horizon of Dasein. The whole complex in which Dasein is tied into ‘conventional’ understanding (thrownness, facticity, fallenness) constitutes Dasein as the limited process of understanding something ‘as’ something, i.e. from the future of the ‘in-order-to’ (Um-zu) and ‘for the sake of’ (Umwollen) which determines the present from the future ‘not-yet’ (noch-nicht). Only after this original (a priori) revelation is there room for discovering (Entdecken) innerworldly beings as objects of science. But Dasein turns also on itself as an object of interpretation to gain ‘authenticity’ and ‘Self’. The self-disclosure of Dasein as ‘Sorge‘ modifies Dasein’s relation to beings and other Mitsein, without evading the ties of ‘thrownness, facticity and fallenness’\footnote{“Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden.” SZ, §3, p.9}. This means that all meaning has to come through the manifestation within beings and within the ‘world’ of ‘being-in-the-world’, who’s form (Riß) changes historically. Heidegger’s trick is to conceive of the inception of Being as the Aristotelian ‘arche’, which contains its ‘telos’ already in itself and thus governs existence from the futurality of this ‘telos’. This temporality (Zeitlichkeit) then governs the limited ‘possibilities’ which are contained already in this arche until they are all exhausted to trigger a new inception. The ‘predicament’ of thrownness is the temporality which allows change with persistence in time. In this temporality the modes of existence reveal ‘beings’. Heidegger calls this ‘zeitigen’ (bringing about into presence in time).
2. ‘Poiesis’ and ‘Challenging-forth’

In ‘Being and Time’ Heidegger has so far defined Dasein in its relation to its own ‘Being’. All our uses of the word ‘is’ are disclosures of the Being of beings. All such disclosure ‘is’ the existence of Dasein. In its temporal structure this existence is by definition incomplete. This incompletion in relation to some ‘absolute’, that is complete and timeless is what enables existence. Dasein is constituted by the temporal structure of ‘care’ to be able to understand ‘Being’ as ‘happening’ (Ereignis). This originary ‘knowing-one’s-way-around’ constitutes consciousness, not the other way round. So, all existence performs the hermeneutic of beings ‘as’ whatever they appear as, to Dasein. Therefore “Being” as such ‘is’ not - Dasein ‘performs’ Being in the comportment of its own ‘existence’, its ‘ownmost Being’ and in its ‘Being-with’ (Mit-sein). Its relations, therefore, are temporal and determined in a ‘project’ (Entwurf) which it has not ‘created’ but which it performs unknowingly until it faces its ‘being-guilty’ and ‘authentically’ ‘chooses’ what it has been already ‘given’. How does Heidegger then accounts for the change of paradigms of ‘ontology’ i.e. of the ‘way’ in which beings ‘appear’ to us as ‘an-wesend’. ‘Anwesen’, in German, means being present, but also ‘being-towards’¹⁹²: ‘an’ means ‘to’, like sending a letter ‘to’ Mr. Heidegger. One can see the sense; it is not about being hit by a raw sensory information, instead the ‘project’ (Entwurf) of Dasein reveals, and this means that we are open to beings which present ‘themselves’ within this site meaningfulness. Depending on the form of such ‘project’ (Entwurf) beings appear differently in the occidental way of ‘presencing’. In Heidegger’s terms, the way beings ‘appear’ into presence has turned into a ‘challenging-forth’, the ‘Ge-stell’.

In such a ‘challenging-forth’ beings do not ‘presence’ themselves as ‘An-wesen’. Beings which are calculable are mere resource (or stock, Bestand). In the challenging-forth beings have already been disclosed (Entbergen) as what ‘is’ calculable and resource for production. Their ‘Being’ is ‘representation’ to the subject. This is at the heart of Heidegger’s critique of technology and science. Technology is the way we encounter ‘beings’ today, and by extension we encounter ourselves as beings and this means also as mere ‘resource’. ‘Production’ in the sense of ‘re-presentation’ ex-

presses the drive for control. Beings are turned into disposable ‘objects’ - ‘stock’ or ‘resource’ (Bestand) - which can be ‘ordered’ (bestellen). The only relation the object has is its disposability to ‘representation’. We hear people speaking about ‘human resources’ without any hint of irony. ‘Humans’, when considered to ‘be’ resource can only understand beings ‘as’ resource, and all other possible meanings are frozen out, ‘concealed’ (Verbergen) into what is inaccessible and not ‘presencing’ (Anwesen).

This “Anwesen” does not mean some ‘external’ object as a ‘thing in itself’ - things are only insofar they are ‘phenomena’. Heidegger describes the ‘phenomenon’ as ‘what reveals itself’ (“das Offenbare”)\(^{193}\), not as ‘appearance’, nor purely as “forms of intuition”\(^{194}\), but as the meaning of Being as the “Being of beings”\(^{195}\). The term derives from ‘phaino’: “bringing to light”, “reveal” or “mentally apparent”\(^{196}\) and ‘phantasia’, the faculty is the faculty of ‘imagination’, is the verbal noun of ‘phainomai’. The ‘phenomenon’ is what appears without all presuppositions from which we understand beings, therefore it has to be recovered from these presuppositions. Phenomenology is therefore the method of ontology - it is ‘philosophy’ proper- the method to investigate ‘Being’ as such. In the context of ‘Being and Time’ the ‘phenomenon’ in question is ‘Dasein’ itself\(^{197}\). ‘Being’ is the “transcendens schlechthin”\(^{198}\) and in particular the transcendence of the ‘Being’ of Dasein”. ‘Presencing’ only happens when there is a Dasein which has a ‘project’ (Entwurf) within which beings are disclosed by a meaning. If this overarching ‘sense’ of beings develops into ‘resource’, beings are still disclosed, but only ‘as’ this resource while all other possibilities of meaningful presencing are withdrawn from view of the ‘open’ (das Offene). ‘Openness’ is the happening of Being, Heidegger’s question is about Being (Sein) itself, as what ‘gives’ Being - not beings. However, for Heidegger this original ‘openness’ of Being is hidden by the disclosure of the ‘Ge-stell’. The ‘openness’ (Offenheit) has to be ‘recovered’ in its original ‘givenness’.

In ‘Being and Time’ beings appear only in the context of some ‘purpose’ or ‘in-
volvement' (Bewandnis), which constitute in ontological-existential terms 'care'. We grasp 'beings' in terms of what they are for, a usage or as 'intentionality'. This 'intentionality' precedes the actual encounter with beings - because it lets it come into the 'actual' presence (Anwesen).

If we think about Heidegger's description of the technological 'challenging-forth' we understand how hard it is not to think about things differently than in 'scientific' terms or about trees as 'carbon traps': even the idea of 'saving the planet' is couched in the terminology of 'resource', just like its pendant 'human-resources'. In terms of the Stoics, we are 'psychopaths' who gave their soul over to 'pathe', the pathe of 'control' in particular. This is at the root of the difference between 'poiesis' and what Heidegger calls 'challenging-forth'. Although already contained as a possibility in the 'Greek inception' 'bringing-forth' turned into 'challenging-forth' only through a number of reinterpretations of Greek terminology. In particular, the self-assertion of the subject as the ground of all objects. We are victims of the insidious assertion of certainty and security of what is 'present'. To secure this 'present', beings have to be set and grounded into a structure of availability, which then turns out to be what Heidegger calls the 'Ge-stell': the 'essence' of the disclosure as resource is 'Ge-stell'.

In his lecture on technology and his essay on Aristotle's concept of 'physis' as well as UKW, Heidegger is concerned about 'poiesis' in general. 'Poiesis' is the general term for 'bringing-forth': 'Her-stellen'. All 'bringing-forth' is 'poiesis' in principle, but there are differences. I will seek to extract Heidegger's concept of that 'poietic', which he uses to underpin his concept of the work of art.

The work of art is neither 'matter' nor 'thing', it fits into a different existential-ontological category than things. The reason for this is, that works of art are outside the terms of usage, they are outside the context of innerworldly 'totality of purposes' (Bewandniganzheit). The 'work's' 'in-order-to' (Um-zu) is therefore in a different relation to Dasein's 'care-structure' than Heidegger's famous 'hammer'. The hammer has meaning by way of the 'project' as it is determined by 'thrownness'.

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199 'Intention' is also the key to Stoic doctrine. It needs to be turned from beings to 'virtue' and 'logos', which then become synonyms of 'Being'.
200 'Die Frage nach der Technik' in VA
(Geworfenheit), on the other hand, a work of art receives its meaning only through Dasein’s authentic ‘being-guilty’. Death, conscience and guilt are those concepts which transcend the ‘present- and ready-at-hand’ and the innerworldly ‘in-order-to’ (Um-zu). If consciousness is the intentionality of consciousness, what is the consciousness without the intentionality which always has an object, the pure intention?

Nevertheless, the work of art persists in a ‘on-account-of-which’ (Worum?) which provides Dasein with a ‘project’. Because Dasein is a being to which its Being is of concern, its ‘project’ has to transcend its ‘care’ and disclose itself as such a being which is constituted by ‘care’. This disclosure, which Heidegger called ‘Entschlossenheit’, is a necessary supplement for the possibility of a ‘success’ of the work of art. The work of art has to go beyond the ‘on-account-of-which’ (Worum), the ‘project’ that governs an ‘epoch’ to touch its constitutive limits, and by doing that, unfold another part of the possibilities that are ‘given’ to Dasein. Meaning as truth is ‘unveiling’ because it is based on ‘withdrawal’\(^{201}\) - ‘withdrawal’ is what enables the temporality of ‘Da’ and ‘sein’. Therefore the work of art must consist of a surplus of unveiling in relation to its own time, which forces the unfolding into another way of Being. This surplus exists only in relation to the ‘on-account-of-which’ (Worum?), which defines the horizon in which the epoch has established itself. The work of art is therefore able to challenge procrastinated traditions which run the danger of losing Dasein’s existence, losing its concern for Being. The work of art is a compelling disclosure of beings in an intuitive unmediated way.

The work of art is outside and surplus to the ‘purposefulness’ of Dasein’s activities (‘Worum’, ‘Um-zu’ and ‘Besorgen’ etc), without being meaningless. Therefore, it has to address in some way Dasein’s knowledge of itself, as self-disclosed Dasein. Dasein can only ‘understand’ what is limited\(^{202}\) - the Absolute is ‘nothing’ for it (Hölderlin) - so the work of art does not ‘represent’ the absolute nor is it the absolute, but points to it as what is absent. In the Romantic manner it invokes the ‘absence’ of the totality - the ruin and the fragment (as metaphors) are Romantic inventions. Along this line the Heideggerian work of art is - functions as - what is non-

\(^{201}\) withdrawal is more originary than unveiling: “Zum Wesen der Wahrheit als der Unverborgenheit gehört dieses Verweigern in der Weise des zweifachen Verbergens. Die Wahrheit ist in ihrem Wesen Un-wahrheit.” UKW, p.40; Das Seiende wird der Verborgenheit entrissen.” SZ, §44, p.222; VA, p.19

\(^{202}\) Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Thought, p.26 f.
representable, has limits and temporality, and gives access to the excess. Unlike the everyday care (Besorgen), the work of art operates beyond the limit of what is recognisable in terms of beings. It is product and producing without ‘intentionality’ or ‘instrumentality’. But Heidegger goes further than the Romantics by including the ‘Absolute’ as the excess of the possible into the temporality of Dasein and the work of art, as the limited possible. The work does not point to the absolute, it is the uncontrollable machine of production of production in ‘epochal’ terms.

a. The Origin of the Work of Art

In his lecture ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ Heidegger uses art and the work of art to elucidate the operation of an ‘a priori’ truth (i.e. Being) generating itself in a form of ‘being’, which is itself a work of Dasein. The metaphysical truth has to come as truth into the innerworldly things. The work ‘opens up a world’. Things have to be present as beings but as works they also generate the openness itself within which they are present (Anwesen). Again, it is a circular figure which gives form to something which then gives another form back. Dasein ‘creates’ (Schaffen) art which then ‘creates’ (Schaffen) a compelling ‘Gestalt’ of Dasein’s truth.

The definition of the ontological position of the work of art being beyond the mere instrumental is traditional. Art does not dwell in the instrumental. “Wege, nicht Werke” (ways, not works) is Heidegger’s motto for his ‘Gesamtausgabe’; what is under way is the work, it is on the way ‘at work’ towards its ‘telos’. The work is the labour of truth putting itself into ‘a’ work – as a being. The thinker - or artist - is a work of his work insofar as it is truth that sets ‘itself’ into the work of art. This work of art is a ‘Gesamtkunstwerk’: by setting truth to work in the work, producing the total work of truth ‘as’ which beings are ‘brought-forth’ into the ‘open’ the artist or thinker is drawn into this truth in his actions. The artist falls into the path of a truth which is first emerging. He is drawn by his ‘work-ing’ his activity, not his ‘theory’. How can one ask a question about what is an unconditional (unvermittelt) inception of truth? Any question is conceived through a ‘pre-understanding’ (Vor-griff) our ‘knowing-our-way-around’ (Sichauskennen). But there is no such advance knowledge in terms of the work of art. It cannot emerge in such a question.

203 UKW, p.62
What does Heidegger do in the lecture on UKW? First he dispels the common understanding of art as the thing made by an artist. He suggests, that the ‘origin’ (Ursprung) of the work of art and the artist lies in ‘art’ itself, and that this art itself is a form of disclosure as self-disclosure of truth - the object and subject of the disclosure\(^{204}\). He calls art ‘Dichtung’. Art is the ‘origin’ (Ursprung) from which truth leaps out\(^{205}\). It is an activity of Dasein and most essentially in “das entwerfende Sagen” (the projecting Saying)\(^{206}\). This ‘Sage’ contains what is disclosed and what is ‘not-yet’ disclosed, so in its ‘happening’, art as truth, designs the shape of the disclosing ‘open’ (das Offene). Therefore it is the ‘origin’ of the work and the artist.

In the first part Heidegger asks for a concept of that which confronts us in some material form as a work of art: What is its essence (Wesen)? The work of art reveals something other than itself\(^{207}\), some other truth. This is the traditional understanding of the work. It is some ‘thing’ like all others. Heidegger goes through the classical definitions of beings to question their suitability for his question about the essence of the work of art. Is it an attribute, the unity of sensible perception or formed matter? The matter is governed by the ‘idea’ of the item and this means by its ability to perform a task - this is not the case for the work of art since it is not governed by instrumentality. Neither is able to explain the otherness of the work to instrumentality and the natural object. The work of art is therefore neither a ‘thing’(natural object) nor ‘equipment’ (Zeug, i.e. man-made object for some use). As an example Heidegger discusses van Gogh’s painting “Peasant’s shoes”. He sees the painting of the shoes ‘disclosing’ how ‘equipment’ (Zeug) – shoes in this case - are determined within the peasant’s ‘world’, enabling the ‘world’ as the totality of relations with things which - imperceptibly - reveal their own essence in their ‘usefulness’ (Dienlichkeit) within this peasant’s ‘world’. Van Gogh’s painting reveals the essence (Wesen) of ‘equipment’ (Zeug) as ‘usefulness’ (Dienlichkeit). In the painting the shoes reveal their ‘truth’, the Being of beings\(^{208}\). Therefore Heidegger introduces a new category of beings: the ‘work’ is neither a ‘thing’ nor ‘equipment’ because, although it is ‘made’, it does not have the ‘usefulness’ in which its Being (Wesen) is obscured by functionality. As a consequence the work reveals its own Being (Wesen) as show-

\(^{204}\) UKW, p.63
\(^{205}\) UKW, p.63 f.
\(^{206}\) UKW, p.60
\(^{207}\) UKW, p.4
ing the Being of beings - and this is its proper function. In the work disclosing happens.\textsuperscript{209} As a result of the questioning of the classical understanding of ‘things’ Heidegger finds, that they use a too general concept of thing, which is unsuitable for the work of art due to the work being in progress of informing the Being (Wesen) of beings, and thus ‘being’ (wesen) itself in a different way.

In the second section, Heidegger speaks about the agency of this revelation of truth in a work. The complex interdependence between the work and truth is not the work of Dasein or artists in terms of conscious acts. On the contrary, the work of art has a double structure in which the setting of truth is set into a being, the work, which then discloses the ‘world’ around it. Heidegger describes the opposition between ‘world’ (in terms of the disclosed) and earth (in terms of ‘bergen’: safe-keeping, withdrawing) as a ‘strife’ (Streit). This strife (Streit) is based on the ‘Urstreit’, of ‘unveiling’ as truth that opens the ‘open’, the ‘clearing’ into which the ‘strife’ sets up truth as a polarity of absolutes in which a shape has to be secured in which truth can become a form (Riß) uniting both. In his example, the Greek temple as the work of art is dis-closive but set back into ‘earth’. The temple discloses (as a persistent but not permanent action) in a way which makes disclosure of the ‘earth’ possible without ‘exhausting’ it\textsuperscript{210}. This points to the immaterial action of meaning instead of the material actions of ‘equipment’. The temple in its materiality constitutes a framework of relations which lets beings appear in a meaningful way\textsuperscript{211}. The disclosure is ‘held’ open, it can close or shift anytime. At the same time, this ‘work’ is made from a material\textsuperscript{212}, from the ‘earth’, and is thus set back into it: it makes earth ‘visible’ as the ‘undisclosable’ (Unerschließbare)\textsuperscript{213}.

The work is a world-disclosing happening without which there would be no ‘world’. As the ‘strife’ (Streit) this happening in the work of art reveals the togetherness of the two poles of the world and the earth, which both belong into the same ground and

\textsuperscript{208} UKW, p.20 f.
\textsuperscript{209} UKW, p.24
\textsuperscript{210} UKW, p.28 f.
\textsuperscript{211} “Das Werk hält das Offene der Welt offen.” UKW, p.30
\textsuperscript{212} which is not ‘matter’, as in morphe and hyle: earth, as Gadamer points out in his introduction to Heidegger’s lecture, UKW, Reclam edition, p.117
\textsuperscript{213} “Wohin das Werk sich zurückstellt und was es in diesem Sich-Zurückstehen hervorkommt läßt, nannten wir die Erde. Sie ist das Hervorkommend-Bergende.” UKW p.31 ... Das Werk hält die Erde selbst in das Offene einer Welt Das Werk läßt die Erde eine Erde sein. ... Offen gelichtet als sie selbst erscheint die Erde nur, wo sie als die wesenhaft Unerschließbare gewahrt und bewahrt wird.” p.32
generate the ‘open’ (das Offene) of a ‘world’\textsuperscript{214}. The work not only embodies this strife, it ‘incites’ (anstiften) and ‘accomplishes’ (vollbringen) this ‘strife’. The ‘strife’ is a happening of ‘truth’ in Heidegger’s sense\textsuperscript{215}: not as correlation but in terms of ‘alethteia’, as ‘Unverborgenheit’ (unveiling or disclosing). Truth is the very possibility in which one can make a decision about what is or is not correct. That there are beings, has at its ground the fact of ‘disclosedness’ (Entborgenheit) itself, which Heidegger calls ‘the open’ (das Offene) or the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung)\textsuperscript{216}. Along with this it also means that there is ‘concealment’ (Verbergen in the two ways as Versagen and Verstellen)\textsuperscript{217}. The ‘strife’ as a happening, as change, can shift ‘the open’, and thus beings are disclosed and withdrawn. Each time the comfortable familiarity withdraws from the ‘open’, it becomes unfamiliar (das Un-geheuere)\textsuperscript{218}. This strife for ‘the open’ is the production of truth out of untruth as that which is ‘not-yet’ disclosed\textsuperscript{219}. The immediate perception - aisthesis - of the work of art ‘gives’ immediate ‘truth’. It is intuitively ‘there’ and valid, but only in a historical sense.

In the final section Heidegger works out the relation between ‘truth’ and ‘art’. Art is the origin of the work of art (and the artist) but what is the essence (Wesen) of art itself? We can gain access to the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of art only through the work itself and by way of the question of how it can come about: Is the ‘work’ made in the same way as ‘equipment’? Heidegger agrees that the Greeks use the word ‘techne’ for both, but goes on to amend the meaning of techne\textsuperscript{220}. Accordingly the mode of ‘techne’ is dependent on the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of the work in hand. So ‘techne’ in relation to ‘equipment’ is called ‘Anfertigen’ (making) while the work of art is ‘Geschaffen’ (created)\textsuperscript{221}. ‘Creating’ (Schaffen) is a mode of the ‘happening of truth’,\textsuperscript{222} ‘Truth’ is the mode of the ‘not-yet’ disclosed becoming ‘openness’ (Offen-

\textsuperscript{214} UKW, p.34
\textsuperscript{215} “Die Wahrheit ist der Urstreit, in dem je in einer Weise das Offene erstritten wird, in das alles hineinsteht und aus dem alles sich zurückhält, was als Seiendes sich zeigt und entzieht.” UKW, p47
\textsuperscript{216} Lichung and das Offene are not identical. The ‘clearing’ (Lichtung) is the originary happening of truth in opposition to ‘concealment’ (Verberung), only within this ‘clearing’ the world opens the ‘open’ (das Offene) in which Beings can appear. For the limited purposes of this text, I will not further go into this distinction. For an elaboration on this see. v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, §25, p.207 ff.
\textsuperscript{217} UKW p.40
\textsuperscript{218} which is more original than the familiar; “Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Unwahrheit.” UKW, p.40, and again p.46
\textsuperscript{219} UKW, p.47
\textsuperscript{220} UKW, p.45
\textsuperscript{221} UKW, p.46
\textsuperscript{222} “Das Werkwerden des Werkes ist eine Weise des Werdens und Geschehens der Wahrheit.” UKW,
heit); therefore there is a dynamic in which ‘truth’ as a happening is a disclosure and a withdrawal. This happening establishes itself in beings (Seienden). A being in which truth is established cannot be a mere ‘thing’ (Zeug) which purpose ends in its ‘usefulness’ (Dienlichkeit) and reliability (Verlässlichkeit).

The ‘creation’ (Schaffen) of a ‘work’ is therefore different from the ‘making’ (Anfertigen) of ‘equipment’ (Zeug), the first discloses the essence (Wesen) of the latter. Heidegger argues the difference from a proper interpretation of the Greek word for both ‘makings’: ‘techne’. Techne is a form of knowledge (Wissen) but not a form of ‘making’. Techne is a ‘bringing-forth’ out of the withdrawal into disclosure (Unverborgenheit) and in the Greek context this means into view. ‘bringing-forth’ is a bringing into view, into the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung). Heidegger states expressly that the creation (Schaffen) of a work is not understood from the perspective of craft but from the essence of the ‘work’ as the happening of truth: becoming of the work is a happening of truth. The work brings-forth out of concealment (noch-nicht, (Un-) Entborgenen) into the disclosure (presence, Anwesen) of the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung). Truth in Heidegger’s sense is an event or a happening of creating within beings. The existing work is the site of truth within which is decided the strife for the ‘open’ (das Offene) as ‘clearing’. Truth, as ‘clearing’ persists in ‘the open’ in the persistence of beings (Aufstellen).

The dynamic of this becoming of ‘truth’ as a whole is set into the ‘work’ as ‘strife’. The ‘creating’ (Schaffen) is not the creation of an artisan subjectivity nor consciousness; the ‘work’ is not “N.N. fecit” but a “factum est”. The ‘that’ of disclosedness, ‘that’ it has happened, is all one can say about its happening. It is more a ‘receiving’
But it is not just an incessant movement. Truth has persistence as the shape it won in the strife between 'world' and 'earth'. In this 'unity' of world and earth the 'strife' is the shape (Um-Riß) as measure and contour (Riß). The work is the very structure of the 'Riß' as 'strife', in which truth gains temporal persistence as the "Gestalt" as which truth is visible. The "factum est" of the work is the 'thrust' (Anstoß, Stoß) 'that' the work has been 'created', not by the 'artist, but in terms of a 'receiving' (Empfangen). The 'that' of its emergence is inexplicable unlike the 'making' of 'equipment'. The 'thrust' which emerges is not derivative and continuous from anything else. The 'being-created' (Geschaffensein) of the work of art is therefore the 'strife' as truth set into the material of the 'work' itself, which is the 'earth'. This very difficult structure means that the work of art first 'opens up' a world - as the Greeks temple does - by 'setting itself back' into the earth disclosing the 'earth' as what 'conceals' (Verbergen) itself but also holds and grounds everything else and thus 'opening up' (Eröffnen) everything around the temple. In a second step, by inciting the strife of world and earth, which is embodied in its materiality (meaning: 'set back' (Zurückstellen) into the work of art's 'earth') the work brings this strife into the earth by opening it up into the 'open' and holding it 'open' for the setting in - or establishing (Einrichten) of truth in the 'open'. Heidegger replaces the concept of matter with 'earth' to underline its independence and impenetrability. He also changes its character from the unformed eternal to the process of hiding the un-disclosed. The earth is the withdrawn which (in the terms of 'physis' discloses itself in the clearing as 'truth' (aletheia). In fragment 123, Heraclitus' says: "physis likes to hide itself" and Heidegger adds, that what is unsaid in this sentence is, that it also 'unveils' itself : a-letheia. Therefore, the two moments of hiding and unveiling of 'physis'- earth - are the 'clearing'. "Im Wesen der Wahrheit liegt der Zug zum Werk", says Heidegger. The essence (Wesen) of aletheia is the attraction (Zug) into the work. This means into setting itself out into beings. Physis as truth needs disclosure or even is disclosure only in its operation within a work. Not in beings like tools or things but in works. Only works, can set up, into the open and as

231 UKW, p.48
232 UKW, p.49
233 UKW, p.50
234 UKW, p.50; v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.264f.: "Die Gestalt als das in die Erde des Kunstwerkes Festgestellte sein des Streites (als des Risses) ist das 'Gefüge' das der Streit als Riß annimmt, wenn er in die Erde der Kunstwerk es festgestellt wird."
235 Heidegger, GA55, Heraklit, p.132
truth the Being of beings. But at that stage the Being of beings is twice derivative. Still, it determines Dasein’s truth.

The term ‘Stoß’ (push, thrust etc.) is how Heidegger describes the effect of the ‘that’ of the work of art. The ‘that’ is related to the ‘createdness’ (Geschaffensein) of a work. The ‘creating’ is a setting up (thesis) in the ‘open’ as ‘truth’ and mediated by the ‘Riß’ by which world and earth is drawn together into a unified relation, an ‘in-between’ (Fuge), within which beings appear and disappear. All appearance is governed by the ‘as’ by which beings become something. All ‘as’ is governed by the being-in-the-world of Dasein, the original inception of a ‘world’ is ‘aletheia. ‘Aletheia’ as ‘unveiling’, or ‘clearing’ is the non-arbitrary but unconditional play of disclosure and withdrawal.

The ‘that’ of work is a ‘thrust’ which pushes Dasein out of its familiarity (geheure). The ‘thrust’ is truth immediately validated. The force of the ‘Un-geheure’, the uncanny or unfamiliar suddenly invalidates the familiar but only those who are ‘open’ to the disclosure of truth itself, the Dasein in its ‘Ent-schlossenheit’ is ‘willing’ ‘stand-in’ (innestehen) the uncanny (Ungeheuren) of the happening truth. To endure this ‘standing-in’ (innestehen) as the disclosure (Entbergung), means to be open to the ‘Ungeheure’ not only as some new truth, but as the revelation of the truth: from one unconditioned into the contingency of some other unconditioned. This form of ‘knowledge’ and ‘willing’ is therefore of the quality of a ‘receiving’, namely of the ‘thrust’ (Stoß) of the work. What is received is the happening of truth as the openness of beings (des Seienden) within which Dasein as the ‘Bewahrenden’ endures (innestehen).

The work of art is an ‘event’, as the ‘thrust’ topples the familiar, which has been before. As such an unmediated ‘event’ it cannot depend on some subjective ‘experience’ (Erlebnis) or any set rule. The event of truth overthrows all the ‘familiar’ (geheure), because it is not instrumental or a subjective experience (Erlebnis). Instead it is Being itself, which happens in the event of truth. As we saw in ‘Being and

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236 v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.286
237 "... Instaendigkeit im Ungeheuren der im Werk stehenden Wahrheit." UKW, p.54
238 v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.290
239 Gadamer in UKW, Reclam edition, p.117 ff.
Time’, Heidegger seeks the ‘Sinn des Seins’ (sense of Being), but ‘sense’ is Being in the form of the ‘project’ as truth. In UKW Heidegger develops a process in which truth sets itself into ‘beings’ as ‘aletheia’: unveiling. This unveiling has always already happened when there is sense at all. It can never be ‘made’, it comes by itself on ‘doves feet’\(^{240}\).so to speak We do not know how: the ‘je ne sais quoi’ of originary production is not ‘economic’, it is the excess of plenitude and contingency.

Keeping in mind Heidegger’s reminder, that this ‘setting’ (Setzen, Stellen) is always understood from the Greek ‘thesis’\(^{241}\) we see that truth is set up in ‘the open’ by way of a ‘setting into work’. As Heidegger explains in the later ‘Amendment’ (Zusatz)\(^{242}\), ‘thesis’ is meant as a setting into disclosedness, (Aufstellen im Unverborgenen), and bringing into presence (ins Anwesende bringen). The word ‘Feststellen’ into a ‘Ge-stalt’ then means to bring a contour (Riß, ‘peras’) into visibility. Because only if there is a contour, ‘something’ is visible. And this ‘feststellen’ as ‘Riß’ is the work: an ‘ergon’ in its ‘essence’ of ‘energeia’, the ‘being at work’ of truth. Heidegger then makes explicit that the account of agency is ‘indefinite’ but ‘determinable’ (unbestimmmt aber bestimmbbar) but hidden in the relation between Being and human beings, which is still not adequately formulated.

Heidegger suggests that the movement, the dynamic of the whole complex of the work of art, artist, ‘art’ and the ‘Bewahrer’ (guardian/audience) is the historical mode of the emergence of truth itself. He rejects clearly the notion of the a-temporal, absolute truth in favour of the concept of ‘strife’ (polemos). As a happening it is also an ‘inception’, a ‘beginning’; the work has persistence in time as truth and as such this truth makes the ‘world’ to ‘world’ (Welt “weltet”)\(^{243}\) and brings it into the action of meaning. Heidegger has then determined the ‘work’s’ position as being an object in the ‘world’, but by its essence not being part of the ‘world’, neither a ‘thing’ nor ‘equipment’. By essentially determining the ‘shape’ or horizon of the ‘world’ as a result of a ‘strife’ between ‘world’ and ‘earth’, it reveals the truth of the ‘Being of beings’ not as absolute and atemporal but as temporal and ‘poietic’ truth. This ‘strife’ manifests itself in the ‘work’ not because it extends into the ‘absolute’ but because

\(^{240}\) FN, Zarathustra, Werke Vol.II, Ed. Schlechta, p.675
\(^{241}\) UKW, p.47
\(^{242}\) UKW, p.68
\(^{243}\) UKW, p.30
its finity and limits (peras) enable truth to appear in the ‘there’ of ‘Da-sein’, which is always limited by ‘thrownness’ and ‘death’, etc.\textsuperscript{244}.

The mode of production of the work of art is never the ‘creation’ of a subject\textsuperscript{245} but “das Festgestelltsein des Streites durch den RiB in die Gestalt.”\textsuperscript{246} The work of art is not an ‘opinion’ of the artist. The artist’s relation is a receiving (Empfangen)\textsuperscript{247}. He does not ‘set up’ the truth out of a selfhood - not ‘fecit’; instead it is ‘given to him as a ‘factum est’\textsuperscript{248} - it simply ‘happens’. Heidegger’s terminology around the word ‘stellen’ is based on the Greek term ‘thesis’. So, not only does he sees the term ‘techne’ related to ‘thesis’ as a ‘bringing-forth’ ‘her-stellen’, ‘setting into work’ (ins-Werk-setzen) and ‘ascertain’ (feststellen) the setting into a Gestalt, but also his term ‘Schaffen’ (creating) and ‘Geschaffen’ (being-created) are dependent on ‘thesis’, including the terms ‘Gestalt’ and ‘Riß’, since this is the form in which beings are brought into the openness of truth. The agency is the strife between Being and Dasein. But on which pre-conscious or pre-subjective level is this strife performed? It can only be the Dasein itself in its ‘resolve’ (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) and thus open to its ownmost possibilities which can wrestle these possibilities from Being. This ‘wrestling’ would in some way be the ‘creating’ (Schaffen) as ‘receiving’ (Empfangen) a granting from Being.

Heidegger says, that the work does not only need the ‘creators’ (Schaffenden) but equally the ‘Bewahrenden’ (guardians). The term is curious because it relates to ‘truth’ (‘Wahr’-heit and ‘wahren’ keeping safe, but also ‘bewahr-heiten’ turning out to be true) on the one hand and is defined by Heidegger as a ‘knowledge’ (Wissen) which is a ‘willing’ (Wollen). This ‘knowledge’ of the work concerns its unfamiliar (ungeheuer) character, which goes beyond mere ‘experience’ (Erlebnis), and ‘understands’ the ‘truth’ being made in the work of art. Heidegger relates this ‘knowledge’ directly to the concept of ‘Entschlossenheit’ in Being and Time, in which Dasein dis-

\textsuperscript{244} Art and thought but also the founding of states are modes of receiving the inception of Being, however, not ‘science’, which is already based on a ‘disclosure’ but not originary disclosure itself. UKW, p.48
\textsuperscript{245} UKW, p.25, 54, 63
\textsuperscript{246} “Das Geschaffensein enthüllte sich als das Festgestelltsein des Streites durch den Riß in die Gestalt.” UKW, p.52
\textsuperscript{247} UKW, p.49
\textsuperscript{248} UKW, p.51
closes its Being by turning away from beings to Being\textsuperscript{249}. The ‘Bewahrer’ are therefore not mere ‘audience’ having some aesthetic experience, instead they are those who are open to be affected by the ‘thrust’ of the emerging ‘unfamiliarity’ or the ‘uncanny’ (Un-geheure) of the work\textsuperscript{250}. The unmediated and contingent which the work opens up needs Dasein to ‘stand in’ (innestehen) the open. This together with the reference to Being and Time and ‘resolve’ (Entschlossenheit), renders Dasein capable to experience the disclosure of truth in its uncannyness (un-geheuer) precisely because ‘resolve’ (Entschlossenheit) opens Dasein to disclosure as the disclosing of what is unmediated with the familiar. Dasein grasps truth’s unfamiliarity intuitively and unmediated as it ‘appears’ and addresses it in the ‘thrust’.

In the last passages Heidegger then proceeds to pinpoint the work of art and the artist, in their mutual production of each other into the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of ‘art’ as the ‘setting-into-work-of-truth’. The ‘poietic’ (Dichtung) is ‘art’ in general as the origin of the ‘work of art’. The ‘work’ is the ‘setting up’ (herstellen, Geschaffensein) of the temporal persistence of truth\textsuperscript{251}. If it is a ‘work’, it is foundational and in its inception it already contains its end, its telos, as ‘energeia’ the ‘being-at-work’, like the ‘project’ (Entwurf)\textsuperscript{252}, the work ‘projects’ into the future and determines from this future, thus making truth persist in time the ‘Da’ of the ‘clearing’ of Dasein\textsuperscript{253}. The ‘creators’ (Schaffende) cannot be seen in isolation: art, artist, work of art and the ‘guardians’ (Bewahrenden) belong together into the happening (becoming) of truth\textsuperscript{254}. ‘Poiesis’ (Dichtung) is the word for the particular ‘Geschaffen’ of art itself. The idea that the totally contingent work of art comes about out of ‘nothing’\textsuperscript{255} means ‘nothing’ in terms of Being which is ‘nothing; this ‘nothing’ are the possible but (yet) undisclosed ‘projects’ of Dasein which it can access in its ‘resolve’ (Entschlossenheit). This is the ‘strife’ between Dasein and Being for the disclosure of the yet (noch-nicht) undisclosed possibilities, which are the essence (Wesen) of Dasein (having projects).

\textsuperscript{249} UKW, p.53
\textsuperscript{250} v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.287
\textsuperscript{251} “Fest-stellen” UKW, p.68
\textsuperscript{252} UKW, p.59 f.
\textsuperscript{253} “Dieser Verrückung folgen, heißt: die gewohnten Bezüge zur Welt und zur Erde verwandeln und fortan mit allem geläufigen Tun und Schätzen, Kennen und Blicken ansichhalten, um in der im Werk geschehenden Wahrheit zu verweilen.” UKW, p.52
\textsuperscript{254} UKW, p.57
Dichtung as ‘poiesis’ is for Heidegger language. For this purpose he makes a distinc­tion between the language of ‘communication’ (Mitteilung) and the disclosive ‘nam­ing’ (Nennen). He understands this language as a ‘project’ (Entwurf) in which ‘dis­closedness’ (Unverborgenheit) is send (schicken) unto beings. The ‘strife’ of ‘world’ and ‘earth’ happens in the concrete historical language of a people (Volk).

‘Dichtung’ as such he calls: ‘die Sage’ (saying), meaning the form of the disclosed­ness (Unverborgenheit) itself. In ‘die Sage’ of language the ‘open’ (Offene)\(^{256}\) has already happened, and the arts and even poetry are governed by this original disclosure (Unverborgenheit).

The work as ‘poiesis’ (‘Schaffen’) is a ‘bringing-forth’ of a form of the ‘open’ in which beings stand out in truth (Fest-stellen). This truth is always the truth of the work, and all other possibilities of truth being set up have their own mode of truth. The form of the ‘open’ is the form of truth which Heidegger then describes a ‘Riß’. The ‘Riß’ is form, shape, ‘peras’, or “Gestalt”\(^{257}\). Since truth needs un-truth (‘noch­nicht’\(^{258}\)) for there to be truth there needs to be a shape, a horizon within which things can appear. The main point is, that the disclosure itself as a happening is visible in the work of art as the happening of truth itself in a visual immediacy of validation. This happens by the work of art not being instrumental, i.e. not disappearing in its ‘usefulness’ (Dienlichkeit). Truth for Heidegger is bringing-forth, ‘poiesis’, only if its production is transparent as an originary process and not a ‘technical’ making. The ‘bringing-forth’ precedes science in that the sciences can only challenge what has already been disclosed in the ‘bringing-forth’ of truth\(^{259}\).

Truth as ‘bringing-forth’ is auto-poietic\(^{260}\): This image of truth setting itself into its Gestalt by virtue of the work of art and the artist is precisely the unique mode of production which is different from the mode of production (anfertigen) of ‘equipment’ (Zeug). Truth is the absolute setting itself into temporality of the happening of truth - as fate. The unmasterable ‘strife’ replaces dialectics as the controlable movement of the absolute spirit. Like the ‘agon’, ‘strife’ and ‘polemos’ are concepts resembling a

\(^{255}\) UKW, p.62
\(^{256}\) UKW, p.60
\(^{257}\) UKW, p.50
\(^{258}\) UKW, p.47
\(^{259}\) “Das wissenschaftliche Vorstellen vermag das Wesen der Natur nie zu umstellen, weil die Gegen­ständigkeit der Natur zum voraus nur eine Weise ist, in der sich die Natur herausstellt.” VA, p.62

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higher form of judgement, a judgement by ordeal, rather than according to a rule. ‘Strife’ sets up the rule - by setting-up truth within beings - and therefore ‘has’ no rules. ‘Art’ (Dichtung) as ‘poiesis’ is ultimately truth setting itself to ‘work’. The inception of such work contains its fulfilment and ‘completion’ already as ‘energeia’. But as a beginning, it is ‘un-geheuer’ (uncanny, unfamiliar) because it is not deducible from what has preceded it. Therefore it is foundational (Stiften als Gründen), a ‘gift’ (Schenkung) and ‘excess’ (Überfluss). It is the excess of the possible as ‘onset’ (Einbruch) of otherness.

The modes which are the products of this ‘strife’ are ‘given’ by fate, the ordeal of ‘strife’, which is law-giving instead of playing itself out according to a ‘law’. As the limit, or ‘Riß’, the formation of the work of art constitutes the ‘order’. “Giving” means that the inception is in no relation, cannot be deducted or inducted, from anything else. The other aspect of this inception is that it also contains its own ‘end’ (telos). It is like the Aristotelian ‘energeia’, ‘being at work’ as a process according to the ‘law’ set by the ‘work’ towards its end.

The ‘work’ of ‘Dichtung’, of all ‘poiesis’ is a founding event. All ‘poiesis’ originates, for Heidegger, with language, but language is here conceived as what imposes ‘limits’, it does not differentiate between the various art forms. Poietic is the foundational event. The essence of ‘poiesis’ (Dichtung) is ‘founding’ (Stiften). “Schöpfen” is not ‘creation’, instead Heidegger points to the meaning as ‘drawing’, like drawing water from a well, which simply ‘gives’. The well is ‘overflowing’ (Überfluß) of the founding of “Stiftung”. Nevertheless, to ‘appear’ as ‘truth setting itself to work’, it has to have a shape (“Gestalt”) which means it has to be in the temporality of Dasein as the site in which the ‘open’ can be established, as is described in ‘Being and Time’. There is no subjectivity - there is only the possibility within time to found a world within the strife of disclosure and withdrawal - which then establishes forms of self.

260 UKW, p.63
261 UKW, p.63
262 “Die Stiftung ist ein Überfluß, eine Schenkung.” UKW, p.61
263 “aus dem nichts” UKW, p.62
264 Fuge is ‘dike’, SdA, p.350 f.
265 it is the ‘Un-geheuer’
266 UKW, p.59
267 “Stiftung ist ein Überfluß, eine Schenkung” UKW, p.61, “sich-ins-werk-setzen der Wahrheit”
Forms of self are not ‘at the disposal’ of Dasein. In thrownness, facticity and fall­
ness Dasein is limited and this means it is given a ‘shape’, “Riß” already. There are
two figures which are in some conflict. The inception which is non-derivative and
unmediated\textsuperscript{268} and Dasein that is always already within a ‘world’. The inception as
‘arche’ contains and governs the End (telos)\textsuperscript{269}. Art as originary inception is there­
fore not just self-identity, it is also the continuous reassertion of this originary incep­
tion in its possibilities\textsuperscript{270}. So, the ‘discontinuous’ in the work of art is still contained
in some way in the originary ‘arche’ of the original inception. The ‘Urstreit’, of
clearing and withdrawal is the origin of truth which only is only then set into the
strife which is set as the happening of truth into the work, setting (thesis) itself into
the work\textsuperscript{271}.

In various notes from around the same time he wrote his lecture UKW and which
were published in GA66 Heidegger characterises art in his acerbic way as ‘techne’ in
terms of technology and its falleness\textsuperscript{272}. Art has become a vessel of the ‘experience’
(Erlebnis) of subjectivity, reaffirming its control over its truth\textsuperscript{273}. However, in the
same text he also affirms that even if the work of art is ignored and outside the public
and private space (Spielraum), it is this ‘unrelational’ (Bezugslos) character which is
the guarantor of its essential historicity and which will leave the ‘clearing’ of Being
in its wake. The character of ‘un-relationality’ (Bezugslosigkeit) to other beings also
guarantees its relation to the ‘creators’ (Schaffenden) who, beyond all biographical
relations will “sacrifice their Dasein”\textsuperscript{274}. This ‘un-relationality’ (Bezugslosigkeit) of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item UKW, p.21
\item UKW, p.61f.
\item UKW, p.62
\item having ‘Geschichte’, UKW, p.63
\item Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth, p.98
\item “Kunst als ‘techne’ in der Gestalt freilich der neuzzeitlichen Technik u. Historie. Sie ist eine Ein­
richtung der unbedingten Zustellung der Machbarkeit des Seienden in der Gestalt ihrer Eingepflicht
in die Machenschaft d.h. in ihre Gefallenheit.” GA66, Besinnung, p.30
\item “Deutung der Kunst als ‘Ausdruck’ des Lebens als Subjektivität...” UKW, p.34
\item “Das Werk ist weder sinn-bildlicher Gegenstand noch Anlage der Einrichtung des Seienden, son­
dern Lichtung des Seyns als solchen, welche Lichtung die Entscheidung zu einem anderen Wesen des
Menschen enthält. Die Kunst hat jetzt ‘Da-seins’charakter: sie rückt aus allen Bemühungen um “Kul­
tur” heraus, gehört weder vollzugs noch aneignungsmässig dem Menschen, sie ist eine Entscheidung­
stätte der seltener Einzigen; das “Werk” ist die Sammlung [logos] der reinsten Einsamkeit auf den
Ab-grund chaos] des Seyns; das Schaffen wird weder vom “Ruhm” noch von der Nichtbeachtung
berührt; es bleibt dem Wesen nach der “Öffentlichkeit sowohl wie dem “privaten” Spiel entzogen und
gehört einzig in die Instandigkeit im Untergang, der allein wesensgerechte Geschichte werden kann,
die eine Lichtung des Seyns zurücklässt. Die völlige Bezugslosigkeit des Werkes zum Seienden und
seinen Gewohnten Einrichtungen verbürgt in sich eine Zusammengehörigkeit mit dem Schaffenden,
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the work of art, its relation to the ‘abyss’ (Ab-grund – the Greek ‘chaos’) its standing outside social recognition make it more operational in ‘ontological’ terms than the well integrated art which has ‘fitted’ (Eingepaßt) itself into the machinations of technology’. The ‘un-relational’ of the work of art to audience (culture) and the artist keeps its space (Spielraum) which becomes the site of the ‘decision’ which is the ‘clearing’ in which the ‘un-related’ truth comes about ‘on dove’s feet’. This is the ‘gift’ (Schenkung) out of the ‘excess’ (Überfluß)  

The work of art is not ‘of’ this world, it sets up a world and a new or different truth. It is a new paradigm, which as a ‘thrust’ (Stoß) opens a new ‘open’, the contour of what appears and what does not, out of the plenitude of all that is disclosed and undiscovered alike (Being is both). The ‘thrust’ of the work of art comes out of the plenitude of Being, a Being which encompasses the disclosed and the undisclosed. ‘Refusal’ (Versagen) is a mode of ‘concealment’ (Verbergen) which is equally a character of beings. They are not just what appears in the ‘open’ of the ‘clearing’; the things that are ‘set’ (thesis) into the ‘open’ are the sway of Being that persists, but as the truth at work beings appear and disappear in a movement. This movement of truth ‘refuses’ (Versagen) itself to the mode of ‘representation’ (Vor-stellen).

Heidegger sees the work of art as the inappropriable residue which refuses to become ‘equipment’ (Zeug); and precisely by its irreducibility to ‘equipment’ (Zeug) it can not become mere resource. Even the ‘art-trade’ which rages all around it, appears like a great potlatch, some form of excessive asymmetrical exchange. The economy of excess cannot be understood in terms of resources, except as a meltdown of its calculability. The total reification of modern technology is, according to Heidegger, rooted in the drive for a secure grip on beings, first discovers subjectivity as agency. The calculability, usevalue - resource which Heidegger roots in the Greek ‘techne’ (and its unfolding as ‘making’ and ‘machination’) and ‘energeia’ as ‘actualitas etc., cannot appropriate art other than as ‘equipment’ with meaning, but not, in the last resort, as ‘refusal’ (Versagen). What is crucial for Heidegger is, that the ‘work’, which ‘is’, is a being and not transcendental, not only resists appropriation by modern techn-

die diesen nicht biographisch an das Werk knüpft, sondern sein Dasein als “Opfer” in den Abgrund wirft...” UKW, p.37  
275 UKW, p.61  
276 Gadamer, in UKW, Reclam edition, Stuttgart, p.120
nological and scientific understanding, but brings about, by a ‘thrust’ (Stoß), what is
‘incalculable’ and ‘unsecurable’ and by definition outside the ‘subject-object’ rela-
tionship. Any ‘self’ which deals within this realm of incertitude, cannot expect the
self-certitude of subjectivity. Production of the work of art then, may not be a handi-
craft. Production (‘Wirken’ as Heidegger calls it) is the autonomous agency of pro-
duction - the movement of truth, Being, to which the artist ‘listens’ attentively not as
a ‘separate’ subject, but as ‘production’ itself in the form of a ‘Dasein’, ever again
affirming its own Being by its very own ‘existence’. Dasein’s existence is the ‘life’ it
leads in all aspects (including deception - like the deception of the ‘certainty’ of ac-
cess to a resource), life is production who’s agency is its existence as thrownness
(Geworfenheit) (unhintergebar), which, as ‘care’ (Sorge), is its Being.

In his epilogue to UKW Heidegger recalls Hegel’s statement that art is not the high-
est way, in which truth obtains its existence277. Heidegger leaves this question point-
edly unanswered. The reason is, that truth, has been translated into ‘reality’, (actuali-
tas) and thus has lost the Greek character of ‘energeia’, as ‘presencing’ (Anwesen-
heit). In ‘actualitas’, truth does not happen, it is ‘challenged’ into the control and cer-
tainty of resource, while the ‘un-relational’ (Bezugslosigkeit) comes from the uncon-
trolable excess. My interest lies in the relation of Dasein - and the artist in particular
- to this excess, which is beyond control, and only ‘given’ as a ‘gift’ (Schenkung).

b. Poiesis and Mastery

What does Heidegger mean when he speaks about ‘poiesis’? In UKW Heidegger
does not strictly use the term ‘poiesis’. It occurs in the late ‘addendum’ (Zusatz)
from 1956278. Although he speaks about ‘techne’ and exercising techne is ‘poietic’,
in his terms ‘disclosive’, he refers to the word ‘thesis’ as the word for ‘setting up’:
truth. In fact ‘poiesis’ is a form of ‘creating’ (Schaffen), which belongs to ‘techne’ as
does ‘thesis’. Heidegger brackets ‘logos’, ‘thesis’ and ‘poiesis’ into the same cate-
gory of the Greek experience of presencing by making a few remarks about their role
in the development of ‘Ge-stell’ as the essence (Wesen) of modern ‘technology’279.
‘Poiesis’ and ‘thesis’ are a ‘bringing-forth’ and a ‘setting-up’, which only in the mod-

277 “Uns gilt die Kunst nicht mehr als die höchste Weise, in welcher die Wahrheit sich Existenz ver-
schafft.” Hegel, Ästhetik WW, X,1,p.134
278 UKW, p.69
279 UKW, p.69
ern transposition become a ‘challenging-forth’ (Herausfordern) within the securing (Sicherstellung) of the reign of technological reason\textsuperscript{280}. When Heidegger speaks about poetry (Dichtung) as the essence (Wesen) of art, he refers to ‘poiesis’ in its ‘Greek’ sense rather than a modern one. However, he makes perfectly clear, that even the modern ‘challenging-forth’ is at its core is still dependent on the originary disclosedness (Unverborgenheit). The disclosure of the ‘Ge-stell’, has obliterated this ‘Greek’ mode of disclosing. Instead disclosure persists in the unconditional securing of the challenging-forth, in which beings can only appear in the form (or ‘Gestalt’) of ‘resource’.

I will present Heidegger’s ‘diagnosis’ of modern ‘machination’, its difference to artistic production, and Heidegger’s solution in thinking ‘Gelassenheit’ (releasement) as antidote to the power of technological thinking and scientific oblivion of its conditionality (of antecedent disclosure)\textsuperscript{281}. ‘Gelassenheit’ here means a ‘non-representational thinking, which is the opposite of the re-presentation (Vorstellen-des Denken) of an ‘object’ (Gegen-stand). It is always necessary to keep in mind, that what ‘disclosing’ (Erschliessen, Entbergen) refers to is the Aristotelian conception of the operation of ‘physis’, in which the individual being is disclosed by the anticipatory understanding of Being\textsuperscript{282}.

In the essay ‘The Question of Technology’\textsuperscript{283} Heidegger understands ‘poiesis’ as the originary Greek understanding of ‘Being’ as ‘bringing-forth’ (Her-vor-bringen) into presence (Anwesen) as ‘unveiling’ (Entbergen) from ‘concealment’ (Verborgenheit)\textsuperscript{284}. ‘Poiesis’ is 'bringing-forth' (Her-vor-bringen), and ‘challenging-forth’ (herausfordern) is one way of ‘bringing-forth’. ‘Ge-stell is the essence (Wesen) of the technological mode of the ‘presencing’ of beings. Dasein is thrown into this fate


\textsuperscript{281} “das Vorgängige”, VA, p.66

\textsuperscript{282} Wegmarken, Vom Wesen und Begriff der ‚Physis‘ Aristoteles Physik B, 1, p.314; “... ‘Epaogoge’ bedeutet die Hinführung auf Jenes, was in den Blick kommt, indem wir zuvor über das einzelne Seiende weg blicken, und wohin? Auf das Sein. Nur wenn wir z.B. das Baumhafte schon im Blick haben, vermögen wir einzelne Bäume festzustellen. Das Sehen und Sichtbarmachen dessen, was dergestalt wie das Baumhafte schon im Blick steht, ist ‘epagoge’.”

\textsuperscript{283} Die Frage nach der Technik, VA, p.13-44
not out of individual choice. That beings are disclosed ‘as’ this or that by Dasein does not change the fact that they are disclosed in advance in their Being as ‘resource’ and in addition as ‘tree-ness’ or ‘crude-oil-ness’. When we ask about ‘technology’, in question stands the ‘condition of the possibility’ of this anticipatory disclosedness as ‘resource’. It is clear that Heidegger considers the ‘challenging-forth’ as a symptom of decline. Although, it is also a consequence of the Greek inception of Being. ‘Being’ (Sein) we should remember ‘is’ not a being, it ‘is’ strictly speaking not, but brings everything else into presence (Anwesen). ‘Poiesis’ is therefore never ‘production’ in a material sense, but the production of ‘intelligibility’ itself. This ‘intelligible-ness’ precedes and is the condition of the possibility of ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ as correlation. What is produced by the Greek ‘poiesis’ is truth: Being (of beings), not beings themselves. Heidegger asks about the truth of Being itself, not the Being of beings. How does Being come about or ‘is given’?

Heidegger develops the instrumentality of technology as the fundamental and epochal decision in relation to ‘presence’ (Anwesen). What presences itself has to fit into the framework of a ‘cause and effect’. The Latin ‘causa’ is the Greek ‘aitia’ which Heidegger translates as ‘Schuld’ (guilt). Heidegger argues that the Aristotelian understanding of the four ‘aitia’ is not an instrumental concern, instead it aims to describe how the mode of a persistent presence (Anwesen) can be accounted for. The “play” of the ‘aitia’ which brings-forth (Her-vor-bringen) into presence (Anwesen) is not ‘effect’286. ‘Bringing-forth’ into presence is ‘poiesis’ as much in terms of ‘physis’ as ‘techne’287. However, technology operates in a different mode. It’s relation is more than merely ‘instrumental’ and the way it ‘challenges’ nature forces nature into a structure of questioning in terms of the ‘causes’ and excludes all else. It is important that ‘we’ are always already ‘thrown’ into this ‘mode’ of ‘disclosure’ (Entbergen) as ‘fate’ (Geschick)288.

‘Techne’, as Heidegger has described it in UKW, is not ‘making’ but a form of

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284 VA, p.37 f.
285 "Als der so Herausgeforderte steht der Mensch im Wesensbereich des Ge-stells. Er kann gar nicht erst nachträglich eine Beziehung zu ihm aufnehmen." VA, p.31
286 VA, p.17 f.
287 VA, p.19
288 "Allein die Unverborgenheit selbst in der sich das Bestellen entfaltet, ist niemals ein menschliches Gemächste sowenig wie der Bereich, den der Mensch jederzeit schon durchgeht, wenn er als Subjekt sich auf ein Objekt bezieht." VA, p.26; also “Er kann gar nicht erst nachträglich eine Beziehung zu
knowledge about the 'bringing-forth' into presence. Unlike the 'bringing-forth' of 'physis' (nature), the 'technites' is the cause (aitia) of such 'bringing-forth' of 'equipment', by virtue of his knowledge. But for Heidegger the 'technites' is not an 'agency' which makes something, instead the technites discloses, out of the undisclosed (Verborgenheit) which is there already as 'nothing', he brings-forth into visibility (a-letheia), he unveils. Therefore 'techne' is a mode of the disclosure of truth. The disclosure of truth, the disclosedness itself, is not a property of Dasein. 'Techne' is for Heidegger disclosure and not 'making'.

Technology discloses itself as 'efficacy' and with that as 'mastery'. The 'efficacy' is a necessary element of a techne as 'making'. To 'make' things we already suppose a 'matter' and a 'form' which transforms the matter. This is why Heidegger rejected this schema in his lecture UKW. Techne as the bringing about by way of 'making' needs an agency. This agency, apart from securing its own integrity and independence has also to secure the 'material' it needs for its 'making'. The identification of matter as the underlying substance and form as its classification and taxonomy, is the process by which technology turns beings into resource. The (underlying) drive of this movement is security and this means the assertion of an agency in relation to objects. The modern self-assertion is 'subjectivity' as 'hypokeimenon' ("das Zugrundeliegende"), which grounds all beings in their secured availability in 'representation'. The drive for certitude of access to the world drives both, the securing of the 'agency' as consciousness and subjectivity and the understanding of beings in terms of resource. Under the auspices of the 'aitia' as efficacy, beings are challenged to reveal themselves along the question of availability and duration which gives the unconditional mastery over beings to technology.

Heidegger describes, in the lecture on Aristotle's 'Physis', how 'hypokeimenon' becomes what 'lies before us' (Vorliegen), which is 'ousia' (beständige Anwesung) as...
the eternal and unchangeable, but also ‘arythmos’, ‘formless’ (Verfassungslose)\textsuperscript{293}. In this step, the original Aristotelian concept of ‘kinesis’, Being as a ‘movement’ turns into motionless ideality, and changing appearance into ‘pseudos’. From here the way is open into the separation of ‘hyle’ and ‘morphp’ etc. What Aristotle had in mind according to Heidegger, was that ‘physis’ (Being) is the ‘arche’ (ausgangliche Verfügung) of the ‘kinesis’ (Bewegtheit) inherent within whatever stands by itself in presence (Anwesen)\textsuperscript{294}. Aristotle already complains about the misconception of the temporal status of the ‘proton arythmiston’ (Verfassungslose Anwesende). Taken outside time this ‘hypokeimenon’ will become the formless ‘hyle’\textsuperscript{295}. And we know Heidegger’s critique of this schema in relation to the understanding of the work of art. This schema cannot express the status of the work adequately because its goal is a universal concept of thingness who’s ultimate aim is mastery and certitude.

‘Poiesis’ is the founding happening of truth (“event of truth”) as the ontological way of bringing into ‘presence’. In technological ‘poiesis’ the ‘presence’ (Anwesen) of beings is manifests as ‘resource’ (Bestand). Although this is only one mode, it denies and excludes all other modes and presents the essence (Wesen) of technology as the ‘event of truth (“Ereignis der Wahrheit”)’\textsuperscript{296}. The essence of technology is “nothing technical”\textsuperscript{297}, it is the ‘Ge-stell’ as the mode of ‘disclosure’ (Entbergung). However, this ‘challenging-forth’ hides Being itself as the happening of disclosure as such\textsuperscript{298}. Technology and art are different “constellation[s] of disclosure and concealment in which truth happens”\textsuperscript{299}. The ‘danger’ of technology is that it disguises the possibility of another mode of disclosure, a different ‘constellation’, out of the drive for security of resources (no ‘transsubstantiation’ here, thanks to Luther) and certitude of the self\textsuperscript{300}.

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\textsuperscript{293} Vom Wesen und Begriff der 'Physis' Aristoteles Physik B, 1, in Wegmarken, p.337 f.

\textsuperscript{294} “Die 'physis' ist ausgangliche Verfügung über die Bewegtheit ('kinesis') eines Bewegten ('kinoumenon'), und zwar ist sie das 'kath auto kai me kata symbebekos'. Das von der 'physis' verfaßte ist an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her und auf es selbst zu solch verfügender Ausgang der Bewegtheit des Bewegten, das es von sich aus und nie beider ist. Dem von der 'physis' verfaßte müßte daher in einem betonten Sinne der Charakter des von sich her Ständigen zugesprochen werden. Das von der 'physis'; her Seiende ist 'ousia' Seiendheit, im Sinne der 'Liegenschaften', des von sich her Vorliegenden.” Wegmarken, p.341

\textsuperscript{295} ibid. - Aristotle, Physics, III. 200b 12-15

\textsuperscript{296} VA, p.43

\textsuperscript{297} “So ist denn auch das Wesen der Technik ganz und gar nichts Technisches.” VA, p.13

\textsuperscript{298} “So verbirgt denn das herausfordernde Gestell ... Wahrheit ereignet.” VA, p.35

\textsuperscript{299} VA, p.41

\textsuperscript{300} For the Stoics, it should be said, the certainty of the self is the ‘physis’ itself: self-identity is the identity with the logos and that is not the modern common and garden identity.
Heidegger’s principal argument is that, because art (Dichtung) is also ‘techne’ and thus a ‘poiesis’, but its mode of disclosure is a ‘bringing-forth’ (her-vor-bringen) instead of a ‘challenging-forth’, it has the capacity of ‘saving-power’ (“das Rettende”) according to Hölderlin’s verses “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst / Das Rettende auch.” The ‘danger’ of the essence (Wesen) of technology is, that it ‘disguises’ (Verstellen) the site of disclosure where truth ‘happens’ (sich ereignet). The incomprehensibility of art’s mode of ‘bringing-forth’ increases with the growth of the ‘Ge-stell’ as ‘challenging-forth’ but because of its subterranean connection through ‘techne’, art does have leverage onto the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of technology.

What then is ‘poiesis’? ‘Poiesis’ is not a ‘making’, on the contrary, it is the binding (validating) mode in which ‘truth’ happens out of plenitude (Überfluß), although it also means the possibility of withdrawal (Verstellen, Versagen). However, in still existing practices art survives in a different mode of truth-event, although increasingly incomprehensible, which understands the poietic happening of truth and withstands - as pure habit and tradition - the movement within the essential event of truth which is never, even when the ‘Ge-stell’ achieves total planetary control, under the control of men. Technology is ‘fate’ (Geschick), not because it is inherently evil or because of its essence as ‘securing’, but because it cannot and does not ‘secure’ ‘disclosedness’ (Entbergung; aletheia) but ‘hides’ (Verstellen) it. The existential anxiety (Angst) has turned into ontical ‘fear’ (Furcht) desperately ‘securing’ its access to beings, which happens only at the expense of the appropriate access in form of ‘disclosure’. For the Stoics, this is clearly ‘pathological’. The work of art, on the other hand, is not securable, it has its own activity which is not controlable, neither by the artist nor by any other economy.

301 “But where danger is, grows / so does the saving(-power) too”, VA, p.43
302 VA, p.35
304 “Allein die Unverborgenheit selbst in der sich das Bestellen entfaltet, ist niemals ein menschliches Gemächste sowenig wie der Bereich, den der Mensch jederzeit schon durchgeht, wenn er als Subjekt sich auf ein Objekt bezieht.” VA, p.26
305 “Soverbirgt denn das herausfordernde Ge-stell nicht nur eine vormalige Weise des Entbergens, das Her-vor-bringen, sondern es verbirgt das Entbergen als solches und mit ihm Jenes, worin sich Unver-
c. Poiesis and Science

"Securing" is the aspect of technology which is fed by the modern scientific method. Calculability is just the outward appearance of this, as the immediately following essay in the ‘VA’ explains, which follows the transformation of ‘theoria’ into the more assertive ‘sciencia’. Calculability secures the ‘Bestand’, the disposable ‘resource’ which is open to indifferent manipulation. One could also add that the indifference to the ‘external world’, as envisioned by Socrates and Plato, actually leads to the idea of ‘Bestand’ which is ‘indifferent’ (adiaphora) to the sage. Anyway, calculability is just the expression of mastery because technology hides and disguises the fact of truth (aletheia) as the movement of ‘disclosure and concealment’ (Entbergung und Verbergung), and its ‘constellation’. Modern science feeds into this by way of certainty, without realising that presence (Anwesen) had to have been established already for sciences to determine their ‘domains’ of knowledge.

‘Poiesis’ is thus more originary than the technological challenging-forth although the latter is also ‘poiesis’. This aspect is important for that reason: although Heidegger appears to claim that technology is a mode of Being independent from the actions of humans, and thus should be indifferent according to the ‘historic’ Being of a people, he does make a judgement according to the transparency of beings towards ‘Being’. And he also repeats that ‘mindfulness’ (Besinnung) is an option for keeping this transparency of beings to Being open. We can glean from this that at least this comportment of Dasein, in its ‘auto-poietic’ authentic self-transcendent self-assertion, is able to hold out against the total sway of ‘Ge-stell’.

Aristotle’s ‘poiesis’ as ‘bringing-forth’ is, according to Heidegger, a ‘setting up’ into ‘presence’ (Anwesen). It is truth, ‘aletheia’ as a movement. What is set up endures and persists in the movement of ‘presence’ (Anwesen). ‘Energeia’ as ‘thesis’ sets up into ‘presence’ (Anwesen; as movement). It is not to be understood in terms of the Latin ‘causa’. ‘Thesis’ is setting into a shape the way of the appearance into ‘presence’. This movement constitutes (Anwesen) as kinesis. One can say that the thetic ‘work’ reveals this movement, unlike the ‘Zeug’ which dissembles its ‘truth’ in ‘Di-
enlichkeit' and Verläßlichkeit. The 'work' reveals the 'that' of (Geschaffenheit)\textsuperscript{308}. 'Kinesis' (and 'dynamis'), movement, is the key aspect which Aristotle adds to the bringing-forth as 'presence' (Anwesen), by which the process becomes a temporal (zeitigen) presencing. In Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's 'energeia', it is then, as we have seen in the work of art, 'truth setting itself into work' not in a static way but in 'kinesis', but being 'perfect' at each point of its unfolding within its future 'possibilities' (dynamis)\textsuperscript{309}. The 'kinesis' has the character of 'possibility' (dynamis) which is the 'not-yet' and keeps Dasein to 'be' a Dasein, which still has not exhausted its possibilities 'to be'. Dasein's existence is the concrete life 'in the midst of things'. In it, it experiences beings and through the experience of beings 'Being'. Being is the 'that' of beings, which becomes 'thematic' to Dasein only, once it has turned away from the immediacy of beings.

The work of art is 'poietic' in terms of its persistence within an audience (Bewahrenden) to which it gives its shape of Being. The individual who comes up with a new shape, which then prevails, is part of the discourse of 'die Sage' within a 'being-with' (Mit-sein) with others. At the same time the individual breaks away from the preconceived understanding of the 'They' (Man). Dasein's 'resolve' (Entschlossenheit) enables a 'polemos' as commencement of 'poiesis'. The individual as consciousness is not the origin of this poiesis. The 'subject' is only a recent construct and the agency, for want of a better word, is, what 'gives' Being to the 'They' (Man)\textsuperscript{310}.

What then is 'poiesis' if it is not consciousness or subjectivity? For Heidegger the Aristotelian figure of presence as 'energeia' is evidently the key to his concept of 'truth' setting itself into work as 'at work'. 'Energeia', as Heidegger interprets it in 'The Question concerning Technology' and 'Aristotle's concept of 'physis'', is the 'movement' (kinesis) from the 'arche', the inception, which contains its end (telos) already. 'Physis' is therefore the 'movement' of 'energeia' into 'presencing' (Anwesung)\textsuperscript{311}. 'Physis' is 'poiesis' and so it is the 'arche' (and 'aitia\textsuperscript{312}) of kinesis\textsuperscript{313}.

\textsuperscript{308} 'thesis' is "Her-ins Unverborgene ... bringen" UKW, Zusatz, p.68
\textsuperscript{309} "It [dynamis] does not mean "mere possibility" but rather "imperfect presence" or "movement into presence"." Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind, p.307
\textsuperscript{310} "... wo der Mensch zum Subjekt geworden ist ... ", Wegmarken, p.316
\textsuperscript{311} "Wir Heutigen müssen ein Doppeltes leisten: ... sehen lernen, wie für die Griechen die Bewegung als eine Weise des Seins den Charakter des Herkommens in die Anwesung hat." Wegmarken, p.319
The transformation of ‘poiesis’ and ‘techne’ into production (in terms of the ‘Ge-stell’) lies in a misconception of Aristotle’s ‘aitia’ as ‘effects’ instead of the Greek understanding of ‘techne’ as a knowledge of disclosing. ‘Poiesis’ is to ‘bring forth’ out of non-presence into presence in general. It applies to ‘physis’ as much as to the ‘technites’. ‘Techne’ is a mode of ‘truth’ of disclosure and not ‘making’ as mastery. The assertive ‘efficacy’ of technology discloses beings as ‘resource’ including humans themselves. Heidegger’s ‘Ge-stell’ is derived from “Be-stellen” (ordering), and the “Herausfordernde Stellen” (challenging setting up, deriving from ‘thesis’). Heidegger says clearly that this is not ‘poiesis’ but it is also a form of disclosure nevertheless and as such ‘essentially related’ to the disclosing work of art. The ‘danger’ of ‘Ge-stell’ is, that it conceals (Verbergen) the ‘poietic’ disclosure, and more radically, it dissimulates the ‘event’ of ‘disclosure’ as that within which ‘truth’ happens into mastery. The ‘disclosure’ (Unverborgenheit) itself however, the ‘clearing’ is never a human machination (‘niemals ein menschliches Gemächte’) and cannot be ‘secured’ as a resource. Therefore the ‘Ge-stell’ governs as ‘Geschick’ - what has been sent (schicken) as fate in a virtually blind way. What governs is what dispenses the mode of disclosure (Entbergen), be it ‘poiesis’ be it ‘Ge-stell’. The highest ‘danger’ is the total oblivion of the event of disclosure (truth) and its dissimulation into the ‘challenging-forth’ persisting indefinitely. Therefore the ‘origin’ of the work of art, as origin of the event of disclosure persists as the remainder of a different ‘disclosure’. Heidegger’s ‘Besinnung’ on technology uncovered that the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of technology is rooted in ‘disclo-
sure’ and that the arts share this ‘region’ (Bereich), while still ‘totally different’ (grundverschieden) from the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of technology\textsuperscript{325}.

To return to the UKW, we see why the ‘origin’ of the work of art is so important as the opposition to the ‘essence’ of technology. ‘Poiesis’ as ‘Dichtung’ discloses ‘disclosing of truth’ as ‘disclosing’ (Entbergen) of beings into truth. The work, as introduced in UKW, is “truth setting itself into work” and this is ‘disclosure’ (Entbergen) not just of the being which is the work itself, but the way it is brought-forth as disclosure itself. This ‘disclosure’ of a ‘disclosure’ is the setting-up of a ‘world’, which, as we have seen in ‘Being and Time’ is that which is seen before beings can appear. It comes about as ‘Geschick’ not as the ‘action’ of man, but it comes through man as ‘givenness’ (Being). Again, we see the figure in which human actions become the ‘energeia’, the ‘being at work of truth’, but they are not ‘intended’ actions of subjectivity or consciousness, but a ‘self’ in authenticity (of Entschlossenheit) which ‘is guilt’ (Schuldigsein) and which Heidegger translates as ‘aitia’ and ‘arche’. Just as in the form of the Greek ‘logos’ and ‘physis’, the appropriate way of life was the identity with the ‘logos’, i.e. living in ‘accordance’ with ‘physis’ the Heideggerian Dasein becomes identical to itself by becoming what it already is in the ‘resolve’ (vorlaufender Entschlossenheit) and ‘authenticity’.

d. Art and the Artist

I have to come to my central interest: the artist. Heidegger does not see the artist as the master of art, precisely because ‘art’ in his terms is not something that can be mastered. He derives, in a somewhat obscure way, the work and the artist out of the event of art itself\textsuperscript{326}. Art dwells in the works and the artists and it addresses us from there. The artist is acted upon by ‘art’ (as a mode of truth setting itself into work). But what is ‘art’? The lecture UKW goes from the discussion of the possible concepts of things, and dismissing them as insufficient for the work of art. Art cannot be captured in terms of ‘made’ objects because all such concepts are modes of mastery of the external world. Heidegger’s definition of a work is its unintelligibility which ‘gives’ intelligibility. If the works and the artists depend on each other in the inter-

\textsuperscript{325} VA, p.42
\textsuperscript{326} “Künstler und Werk sind je in sich und in ihrem Wechselbezug durch ein Drittes, welches das erste ist, durch jenes nämlich, von woher Künstler und Kunstwerk ihren Namen haben, durch die Kunst.” UKW, p.1
play of art, then art itself is the ‘creating’ (Schaffen) happening of truth. Artists and works are mere moments of this truth. This nevertheless means, to take actively part in the excess of the ‘Un-geheure’, the ‘un-mediated’ etc; to draw from this excess of the possibilities of inception. By virtue of this excess, the ‘work’ as opposed to the ‘Zeug’ is not hidden by its instrumentality (Dienlichkeit) and reliability (Verläßlichkeit) but exposes the ‘drawing’ (“like water from a well”\textsuperscript{327}) from the excess of possibilities in the inception of Being.

The happening (sich ins Werk setzen) of truth, however is still bound up with a ‘material’ making. Such making is part of the poietic making of ‘truth’. As much as Heidegger attempts to see the material and truth aspect as a counterplay of the opposites of ‘world’ and ‘earth’ in his appropriation of Aristotelian terminology, what has to be central is the understanding that these opposites are “unified” and in essence the temporal forms of something complete at all stages. Truth ultimately is ‘kinesis’ (as ‘dynamis’), which ‘gives’ the movement as ‘possibility-to-be’. Dasein performs this movement in its inexhaustible existence which ‘is’ its ‘not-yet’. I have discussed this point in the section on ‘Being and Time’.

In UKW Heidegger deals with the essence of the work of art. The essence of the work of art is art as ‘Stiftung’, which means as ‘giving’, ‘grounding’ and ‘inception’. The artist is part of this (early form of a fourfold) of art, artwork, artist and the ‘guardians’ (Bewahrer) which form the force-field in which the ‘world’ is set into the ‘earth’. This form of the ‘energeia’ as dwelling and persisting in presence (Anwesen) by virtue of Dasein and its world. The activity of artists is never a subject-object relation of knowledge. The term ‘knowledge’ which Heidegger uses in the UKW is ‘techne’ as the knowledge of appearance into ‘Anwesen’, a ‘bringing-forth’ of something into persistent presence as. The difference seems to me that Aristotles’ movement relates to the completion of the ‘telos’ in its ‘eidos’, say: of a tree. What Heidegger has in mind seems that bringing forth means to keep and linger temporarily within the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung), which itself is the result of the strife between Being and Dasein. The ‘telos’ on the other hand is the historical exhaustion of the possibilities within such a movement. What Heidegger implicitly assumes is that what does not ‘appear’ is still there in the withdrawal, absence as ‘possibility’. Being is at all

\textsuperscript{327} UKW, p.62
times ‘complete’ but inaccessible. This is another meaning of ‘earth’. It is not only withdrawal but also harbouring and grounding the clearing of truth. This originary ‘safe-keeping’ (Bergen) is also the originary ‘withdrawal’ to which all clearing must be derivative. This means, ‘earth’ is also the primary form of ‘physis’, Being as ‘aletheia; coming into appearance, ‘unveiling’. ‘Physis’ as earth therefore also needs the open, without the open there would not be aletheia, there would be only withdrawal.

To make art is different from making shoes. Shoes disappear in their ‘usefulness’ (Dienlichkeit) and reliability (Verläßlichkeit). This way, what is forgotten and out of sight is the happening of bringing-forth into presence. This is the ‘knowledge’ (well, not really something that can be ‘knowledge’ but we do not have a word for this) which is specific for the making of art. The work of art is not only brought into presence (Anwesen), it brings itself into presence as truth bringing itself into work as the ‘open’ (das Offene). In the work of art, its particular specificity, is its being brought about un-mediated - out of ‘nothing’. This un-mediated is visible as the ‘Geschaffensein”, which is also an aspect of Romantic art, which points from the finite work to the Absolute. This is why the artist cannot ‘will’ such a form - if all willing returns to a subject-object relation, what is to be willed has to be ‘known’ and therefore cannot be in any way absolute. Such “non-willing willing” then returns with the ‘Gelassenheit”.

Turning the ‘unmediated’ (Unvermittelte) and un-measured (“Un-maß”) into measure and rule means to draw from the excess of the well and bring it forth into the temporal frame of Dasein. Just as the Greeks performed the first inception, the following ‘art’ keeps this inception going - unterwegs - to its end. As ‘energeia’ which contains its principle (arche) as that which determines the telos (end and ‘work’) as completion. Truth as ‘energeia’ is therefore always complete at all times of its development and this is ‘presence’ (Anwesen). This figure of completeness at any stage of the movement also operates in the ‘authentic’ Dasein as ‘Entschlossenheit’. Dasein is ‘perfect’ in its temporality and finality, because only in this finality does it have truth

328 Haar, Song of the Earth, p. 57
329 “Dann entsteht die Wahrheit aus dem Nichts? In der Tat, wenn mit dem Nichts das bloße Nicht des Seienden gemeint und wenn dabei das Seiende als jenes gewöhnlich Vorhandene vorgestellt ist, was hernach durch das Dastehen des Werkes als das nur vermeintlich wahre Seiende an den Tag kommt
and form (otherwise it would be absolute and not ‘be’, because ‘existence’ only happens in time).

The work of art is different from 'equipment', setting (feststellen) into being(s) the strife (Streit) between world and earth but is itself based on an original strife (Urstreit\textsuperscript{330}), in which truth (aletheia) opens up (eröffnet) a clearing as the original disclosing event. Only in this original truth, as the ‘open’ can truth set itself into a work. The strife is ‘set back into’ (Zurückstellen) and safe-guarded (geborgen) in the ‘materiality’ (earth) of the work, not as a sign, but in its ‘efficacy’\textsuperscript{331} as ‘strife’. Disclosure as ‘truth’ is ‘set back into’ the ‘beingness’ of the work of art as ‘earth’.

For the ‘earth’ to be ‘visible’ as the work it has to be mediated by the work itself. In this circle, world is set back on the earth and sets the earth up in the work to be ‘at work’ as truth. The ‘earth’ is disclosed as concealing and sheltering withdrawal. If we consider ‘earth’ as what is outside the order of intentions, then it makes sense that everything reposes onto the earth as the ‘ground’ (hypekeimenon etc) out of which the world emerges in terms of ‘physis’. Both, ‘earth’ and ‘world’ are not distinct but united in their opposition. Earth is opened up by the world but not totally and it always remains opaque to all calculative approach\textsuperscript{332}.

It has become clear why it appears so difficult to speak about artistic agency in the archaic event, which precedes all comprehension. But this may be the point. The excess of possibilities is always tied to Dasein and its hermeneutic powers. Part of this power is the ‘leap’ into the ‘hermeneutic circle’. This ‘leap’ into the hermeneutical circle is always unmediated and a risk\textsuperscript{333}. It represents the leap into the abyss which founds truth and which retrieved by ‘poets’ as the originary or authentic comportment of Dasein.

“Wissen” means ‘knowledge, means ‘techne’, means poiesis, means making, but not the identity of subject and object. The knowledge of what is to be made is what determines the mode of ‘poiesis’. In the case of the ‘work’, the ‘Schaffen’ as

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{330} UKW, p.58
\textsuperscript{331} VA, p.15
\textsuperscript{332} Haar, The Song of the Earth, p.57 and the decontexualisating function of the earth, p.59
\textsuperscript{333} “Das Entscheidende ist nicht aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondern ... in ihn hineinzukommen.” SZ, §32, p.153}
‘Schöpfen’ is a drawing from the “Überfluß” (excess) of the “Un-geheure” that, which is unfamiliar and not at our disposal. What then is the ‘knowledge’ of the artist in relation to the ‘strife’ of world and earth which sets “itself” into the work as a ‘being’? On page 43 of UKW Heidegger defines the origin of the work and the artist to be ‘art’ itself. Since truth is ‘at work’ in the work, it cannot be understood in terms of mere thingness. The work is ‘created’ (Geschaffen), as that, which itself brings-forth. Because the ‘work’ determines its “Schaffen” from the future, so to speak, of the work as ‘truth setting itself into work’, the artist is in no way a subject and his actions are not the actions of a subject. Truth itself is “subject and object of setting into work...” and because art itself is this action of truth the artist himself creates ‘ontologically’: he brings about into a being (work) that which is the un-precedented truth of the inception (Anfang). But the artist is governed by ‘art’ as truth and the work is only ‘truth’ if it has a audience which keeps this manifestation safe (die Bewahrenden). This ‘audience’ (die Bewahrenden) refers to ‘Being and Time’ and more concretely to Heidegger’s concept of ‘Entschlossenheit’ of Dasein. This means Dasein’s self-disclosure as the site of Being. As ‘audience’, Dasein is concerned with its ‘disclosure of Being’ “aus der Befangenheit im Seienden ...” The ‘willing’ of the ‘audience’ (the ‘guardians’ - die Bewahrenden), is equivalent to the “Schaffen” of the artist in relation to the work. Both times the work itself, as the ‘at-work’ of truth, ‘grounds’ Dasein in its collective ‘Mit-sein’. Not only the artist but also the audience is brought into the truth ‘setting-itself-into-work’. “Schaffen” and “wollen” operate out of the disclosure of ‘Being’ which happens in the ‘Ent-schlossenheit’ of Dasein to its own ‘Being’ as ‘care’ and this means its ‘Geworfenheit’, ‘Verfallenheit’ etc. including ‘Mit-sein’.

334 UKW, p.61
335 “Das Werkwerden des Werkes ist eine Weise des Werdens und Geschehens der Wahrheit.” UKW, p.46
336 “Kunst ist das Ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit.” UKW, p.63
337 UKW, p.63
338 UKW, p.53
340 which is a ‘knowing’, UKW, p.53
341 note the ‘wahr’ as in ‘Wahrheit’: truth
342 “Die Bewahrung des Werkes vereinheitlicht die Menschen nicht auf ihre Erlebnisse, sondern rückt sie ein in die Zugehörigkeit zu der im Werk ge-schehenden Wahrheit und gründet so das Für- und Mit-inander-sein als das geschichtliche Ausstehen des Da-seins aus dem Be-zug zur Unverborgenheit.” UKW, p.54
343 UKW, p.53 f.
Artist and work depend on each other. In this unity they ‘leap’ out of ‘art’ as their origin. The artist, so to speak, is made by the work as much as he makes the work. He is the image of the work. If the work is the inception of the setting itself to work of truth, so the artist has to find his work equally governed by the event of truth. However, it is not ‘in’ the artist that truth will ‘work’. What does he need to leave truth to set up itself? He has to be ‘not’. His ‘absence’ and one may guess the absence, which is authentic Dasein, makes ‘artistic’ poiesis (Dichtung), possible.

‘Ontic’ practices are foundational if they prevail and persist in ‘Anwesen’. Like the ‘agon’ as the ultimate ‘judgement by ordeal’, the polemos decides the mode of ‘bringing-forth’ (Entbergung). Foundational is the ‘work’ which transcends the mere ‘thing’ (Ding) and ‘equipment’ (Zeug) because it is beyond predictability, outside the rules of the current truth; the foundational work is a work which decides other rules, like the judgement which creates the by action. But why should it be possible to consider individual discipline in terms of ‘asksesis’ etc. as ‘ontologically’ foundational? As P. Tillich mentions, the most general ideas, like Plato’s ‘Good’, or ‘virtue’, ‘logos’, ‘physis’, etc. are transcendental and by extension ontologically normative concepts. Therefore Stoic psychology, the more hyperbolic it becomes in terms of ‘logos’ and ‘physis’, defines the mode of disclosure in one particular way. If the ‘way of life’ - the philosophical life - is ‘poietic’, just as its judgements are ‘poietic’, it is also ‘foundational’ in terms of ‘presencing’. This ‘life’ is consciousness. Consciousness of any sort is ‘produced’ but also produces the conditions of disclosure if we take the circle as a guiding ‘Gestalt’ of Being. If the Dasein of the artist is ‘authentic’ its mode of truth also changes. This means, the ‘willing’ as ‘knowing’ of the work of truth becomes open to the work of truth by virtue of the ‘willing’ of the artist being a work of truth too. This truth is the operation which discloses what is sheltered and withdrawn into the order of a world but not as an atemporal whole. So the ‘creating’ (Schaffen) of the artist is a letting come into presence of truth, the Being of beings itself as active living existence. The consciousness of the artist has to make the work of art possible, by opening to a hitherto undisclosed truth, which he cannot master or calculate. The Stoic ‘living in accordance with physis’ is ‘arete’, virtuous, but not virtuosity of mastery. Instead it too is a letting-be of ‘physis’: of Being.
Heidegger’s concept of this turning away from beings to Being changes throughout. He picks up a word of Meister Eckhart to denote a form of thinking which has turned away from things. Meister Eckhart uses the term ‘Gelassenheit’ (detachment), not only in a moral sense but equally in an ontological sense to cleanse one’s thought. For Heidegger this turning does not mean total blanking out of things, instead he uses it in relation to ‘re-presentational’ thought which is the phantasm of technological ‘mastery’. ‘Gelassenheit’ is related to ‘essential thinking’ instead of ‘re-presentational’ thought which is the will (to power) of man to ground his world in his own subjectivity. Heidegger criticises Meister Eckhart’s ‘Gelassenheit’ as merely moral extirpation of ‘self-will’ and ‘self-love’, but Caputo shows that Meister Eckhart does indeed include very similar elements as does Heidegger’s interpretation of ‘Gelassenheit’. Furthermore, the distinction between the ‘Gelassenheit’ of ‘morality’ and ‘thought’ seems rather questionable, since the ‘turning away’ from concern with beings is a question of virtue at the same time, it is ‘ascetic’ in origin, as is ‘ausdauernde Besinnung’ (persisting meditation). The very idea of ‘Being’ can only come into view when there is an ‘arete’ (virtue) which invalidates the value of beings. Artists therefore exercise, in the lucky moment, ‘Gelassenheit’ as the proper ‘work’ on their ‘life’, their ‘existence’, they ‘sacrifice’ their ‘re-presentational thinking’ i.e. ‘willing’ and ‘mastering’. I consider this ‘ascetic’ ‘poiesis’ of one’s own existence, as part of the possibility of the artist to ‘receive’ from Being the work which he brings into form. ‘Existence’ has to become a ‘work of art’ first.

e. Art and the “Unzugängliche” (the non-accessible indispensible)

The distinctive mark of science is its application of ‘method’. Method determines its objects. Every discipline has its area which is defined by its method. Although science is ‘theory’ in terms of a ‘grasping’, it is not technology in the sense that it ‘manipulates’ objects. However, science does define reality in terms of its disciplines and thus in terms of its varying methods.

Heidegger points out that science always relies on the presence of ‘nature’, of beings, which it then interrogates according to its discipline and method. What science does

345 Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, p.178; Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p.15
not ask is what or how this presence comes about in the first place\textsuperscript{346}. Heidegger inter-
prets this in a way that science not only does not have access to what lies at its
ground, for this reason it is also inaccessible by the methodology of the sciences
themselves\textsuperscript{347}.

Dasein as ‘openness’ is ‘affectable’ by beings. ‘Temporality’ is the condition of the
possibility to be affectable as ‘it gives’ persistence in time\textsuperscript{348}. This then is the ‘clear-
ing’ (Lichtung); Dasein, temporality, openness is this clearing. The ‘world’ constitu-
tes all understanding from its intuitive, pre-conceptual understanding of beings
right to the scientific discourse, while the original condition of the possibility to un-
derstand anything is forgotten precisely because beings are always already (i.e. a pri-
ori) disclosed in some way. In the progress to different modes of understanding,
technological and scientific, this primal access is misunderstood. One of the major
misunderstandings lies in the translation of ‘energeia’ as ‘actualitas’ (actus, agens,
agency) and as ‘reality’\textsuperscript{349}. Heidegger interprets ‘energeia’ in terms of a persistence
in presencing (Anwesen) but not a presence in terms of ‘re-presentation’\textsuperscript{350}. Being is
not the highest most general ‘being’ but the totally different, which discloses itself
not ‘as’ a being in presence (Anwesendes) but only as a “Spur die in der Sprache, zu
der das Sein kommt, gewahrt bleibt”\textsuperscript{351}. Being is based in a being, which is Dasein.
Dasein is therefore this particular being which ‘is’ only in relation to Being and not
coeextensive or identical with ‘human’.

Being ‘is’ not, refuses itself as a being, Dasein is pure self-transcendence: in advance
of itself, in a world with beings, i.e. ‘care’. This is the structure of absence in which
the world presences ‘beings’. Presence is only through absence. The self of Dasein is
not a ‘being’ it is always without a self as being: this means, if Dasein is authentic, it
is aware of itself ‘as’ absence from itself. ‘Presence’ appears as something being for
someone and so Dasein understands itself first as this someone. Things appear to
someone by virtue of affectability, ‘openness’, i.e. in ‘temporality’. The ‘essence’ of
something appears in ‘existence’. Heidegger says that one cannot make the beings

\textsuperscript{346} “Wissenschaften ruhen ihrerseits im unscheinbaren Sachverhalt wie der Fluß im Quell.” VA, p.67
\textsuperscript{347} VA, Wiss. u. Besinnung, p.52 f.
\textsuperscript{348} BPPh, p.16
\textsuperscript{349} “Wirklichkeit”; wirken = having an effect, causa
\textsuperscript{350} SdA, p.366
\textsuperscript{351} SdA, p.360
which appear and that being to which these beings appear identical. The latter is Dasein, which is only in an ‘existence’ who’s essence has the structure of temporality itself. Heidegger goes on to outline the possible structure of such a being in which Being enacts itself as a ‘gift’ (es gibt). In ‘Der Spruch des Anaximander’ Heidegger finds the most ‘originary word for Being’ (“Anwesenheit des Anwesenden”), in the term of ‘chreion’ which he translates as ‘Brauch’ (tradition, usage) which ‘gives’ meaning, disclosing the ‘disclosure’ (Anwesen, Unverborgenheit) itself, as the ‘coming into disclosedness’ (Unverborgenheit).

Heidegger points out that Anaximander meant the same as Heraclitus’ ‘logos’ and Parmenides’ ‘moira’; what ‘gives’ this ‘presence’ (Anwesen/Unverborgenheit) is not identical with what is present, i.e. beings (ontological difference) but it ‘founds’ the temporary disclosure of beings as ‘world’ and into ‘persistence’ or ‘durability’ (Weile). It brings about truth and untruth separating them in the Gestalt of the ‘Riß’, peras, horizon etc., which exists only as Dasein in its temporal horizon on which Dasein projects its ‘project’ in its ‘thrownness’ and ‘fallenness’ (i.e. Sorge). However ‘to chreion’, logos and moira (and Aristotle’s ‘energeia’) do not mean efficacy and actuality of the bringing about of something. In an almost contrary way Heidegger constructs this event of ‘giving’ as what is the complete otherness, incalculability, unconditional ‘dishing out’. Is this ‘Ereignis’ an ultimate agency? No, because Dasein’s existence is the necessary condition for any Er-eignis to take place and ‘appropriate’ it. What Heidegger describes is not and cannot be understood in terms of efficacy and therefore of ‘agency’ and any form of subjectivity. Subjectivity, however, is necessary but only in a secondary step.

Beginnings and ends: Heidegger’s diagnosis of technology is that it is the final state of the Greek beginning to think Being in terms of ‘techne’ and ‘poiesis’ which is then interpreted as agency. Nevertheless “disclosure needs the Da”. So, truth to come into work needs a being, Da-sein, which is not just a being but has ‘a world’, i.e. understanding of Being. This Dasein has to be aware of its Being, and this is in Heidegger’s terms, ‘outside itself’ by which it already is open to Being. The question

352 Entwurf = understanding, BPPh, xxxv.
353 BPPh, p.155; also p.xxx.
354 Subject as producer BPPh, p.xxx.
355 BPPh, p.xxvi.
of agency - and subjectivity - as grounding has become impossible to ask. This means for the UKW, that the ‘artist’ is never a figure of agency but a happening within the self-happening of ‘art’ as ‘truth setting itself into work’.

“Besinnung” is a concept Heidegger developed as an opposition to “Betrachtung”. In the essay ‘Wissenschaft und Besinnung’ (VA) it is opposed to “Betrachtung” as the modern challenging (‘trachten nach’) of what presences itself. However both are translations of theoria and Heidegger uses them to mark the differences which led to the transformation of Greek theoria into modern science. The difference is, that modern science takes what is present (Anwesend) for granted and then stipulates a method of challenging and questioning it. The method defines then the discipline and the scope of reality. But, whatever method is employed, science is always based on the unexamined ‘Anwesen’ of its objects. Science cannot question the conditions of how its object came into ‘Anwesen’, it can only understand what is already and challenge it with its inquisitive method.

‘Besinnung’ relates the Greek concept of ‘theoria’, the view of the coming into ‘Anwesen’ of beings. Similar to the concept of ‘letting-be’ as ‘Anwesen’ it belongs to those words H, uses to denote a non-mastery. At the same time, ‘Besinnung’ allows to follow the essence of art as an originary mode of disclosure. Heidegger calls it ‘knowledge’ (Wissen). This ‘knowledge’ cannot master Being, it cannot force about the work of art or ‘truth’, as ‘Betrachtung’ thinks it does.

It is not by chance that the first text of the ‘Holzwege’ is UKW and the last is the Anaximander text. When considered in relation to Heidegger’s lecture on the work of art the text describes the lost terminology of the concept of Being as the movement into and out of the ‘open’. Unconcealment is first ‘dike’, which Heidegger translates as ‘Fug’ which he describes in its function as: “weilend die Fuge des Übergangs aus Herkunft zu Hingang besteht”, the important word is ‘Übergang’ (=going over), in and out of presence, while ‘to chreon’ as what has been handed out,

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356 "Was sich jedoch bei diesem Wandel von der geometrisierend-klassischen zur Kern- und Feldphysik nicht wandelt, ist dies, daß die Natur zum voraus sich dem nachstehenden Sicherstellen zu stellen hat, das die Wissenschaft als Theorie vollzieht.” VA, p.61; “Vorrang der Methode”, VA, p.59
357 UKW, p.64
358 SdA, p.352 f.
contains both, what is not ‘in’ and what is ‘in’ (the clearing). ‘Tisis’ (achten)\textsuperscript{359}, which can be ‘esteem’ or ‘value’ - or ‘tact’ towards each other (of what comes into and out of presence, out of the ‘apeiron’ of ‘to chreon’)\textsuperscript{360} in the process of coming into presence (Anwesen). ‘To chreon’ denotes the relationship between Being and beings, the relation between beings is order (Fug) and esteem (Ruch). Why does the ‘Anwesen’ in the ‘clearing’ or ‘open’, need ‘esteem’ apart from order? ‘Order’ should be sufficient. ‘Esteem’ (Ruch) is the ‘tact’ towards beings in the sense of ‘non-mastery’ it relates to Dasein’s relation to what appears. What appears in the ‘between’ appears only due to ‘Fug’, and thus within the ‘projects’ (Entwurf) of Dasein. But there is a proviso attached: ‘esteem’, tact towards beings also means not to overstretch their presence in the ‘between’. What is of such interest to Heidegger, but not quite brought into light is that one can understand this ‘esteem’ also in terms of a warning, not to seek ‘persistence’ within the ‘open’ other than the ‘that’ of the ‘open’. If the movement of beings in and out of the open is turned into a atemporal (assured) presence, then the movement as Being itself becomes hidden\textsuperscript{361}.

‘Poiesis’ (Dichten) is not something beyond Dasein, it is always performing it by interpreting the Being of beings and changing the way they appear. However, since primordial disclosure does not happen directly in assertoric sentences, but intuitively in various comportments, these interpretations are not under the control of a ‘self’ or subject. Nothing which is not founded on the intuitive disclosure can claim any originary disclosure at all. Therefore we have to think the activity of the artist as a paradigmatic ‘openness’, which is capable of the internal action of shifting these constructs to explore the routines which attempt to hide the original mode of all disclosure\textsuperscript{362}.

f. Conclusion

In his epilogue to UKW Heidegger poses Hegel’s question again: does truth still manifests itself in art? Is the shining of art still an ‘active’ (working) expression of

\textsuperscript{359} SdA, p.354 f.

\textsuperscript{360} SdA, p.363

\textsuperscript{361} ‘Tisis allelois’ would stand for the basic relationship of the one persistent, ‘Dasein’, toward the other persistent, the ‘Seiende’, that makes the presence of the ‘Seiende’ possible by fusing the ecstasis to form the thing.” Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger: A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology, p.152.

\textsuperscript{362} “Das Denken aber ist das Dichten der Wahrheit des Seins in der geschichtlichen Zwiesprache der Denkenden.” SdA, p.367
truth today? Heidegger says that this has not been decided yet. In the work truth appears, it is appearance (Erscheinung – Scheinen), and ‘beauty’ (Schoenheit) is not a sufficient reason to demand to be true. There was a time when ‘beauty’ was considered to be the appearance of truth as disclosure, and this was the time of Greek civilisation. However, when this appearance turns into ‘representation’ (Gegenständlichkeit) it becomes merely an ‘experience’ (Erlebnis) of a subject. In such a relation beauty is not sufficient as truth, art can therefore relate to truth only as an object in the ‘Ge-stell’.

In UKW Heidegger develops the way in which truth sets itself into a work of art. Truth is not the correspondence of propositions of which we can say they are true or false, the truth Heidegger has in mind is the ground on which such a distinction can take place at all. This lies in the intuitive understanding of the world, which is ‘given’ and ‘valid’ ‘a priori’, because it is already validated in actions of comportment rather than in ‘theory’. In his analysis of Dasein, Heidegger shows, that the ground of Dasein is its ‘care-structure’, that means that it ‘is’ as transcendence, its being beyond itself - Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl’s ‘intentionality – its ‘truth’ is not to be as a thing but to ‘exist’ outside ‘itself’ in a ‘world’ in intentionality as ‘project’ (Entwurf) and in a relation to beings. This relation is Dasein's Being and without this relation there would be neither Dasein nor Being. The temporal structure is expressed by the fact that Dasein has to have a ‘world’, a whole of relations, to be able to relate to the individual thing in an intelligible and even in an un-thematic, way. This is the Being of Dasein and not beings. Dasein cannot be understood in the manner of other beings in terms of categories. Dasein’s truth is grounded in its ‘existence’ – its ‘purposeful’ activity. Such a truth is ‘unconditional’ – it is a ‘predicament’ of Dasein to always already be in such a relation (In-sein). This also means that Dasein has no mastery about the ground on which the decision about what is true and what is false takes place. This ground is not ‘made’ or effected but is ‘given’ in the ‘event of enowning’ (Ereignis). Dasein is only insofar as it produces meaning, but the meaning it produces is not in its power because consciousness only emerges in the happening of such intentionality towards something (the ‘Wo-zu’ and

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362 UKW, p.66
364 UKW, p.67
‘Umwillen’ etc.). The ‘Ereignis’ (enowning) is Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Physics. Heidegger reinterprets Aristotle’s concepts of ‘kinesis’ and ‘dynamis’ as the moving foundation of Dasein and Being itself as its possibility and temporality. Thereby he avoids the conflict between the eternal and temporal of the ‘ergon’ as either lacking or being complete and outside time. Dasein’s world is then not based on some static atemporal ‘hypokeimenon’ or ‘hyle’ etc, but it is an ‘open’ (das Offene) within which beings can appear. In terms of its kinetic character, beings not only appear but also disappear from this ‘open’ (das Offene). Being however, then, is not only the ‘world’ but also what does not appear in it at one time or other, what is, so to speak outside the meaningful context of this ‘world’. Being ‘is’ also what ‘is’ not what withdraws in one way or another. This ‘concealment’ (Verbergen) is a ‘safe-guarding’ (Bergen) of the possibilities that Dasein has in its finite future in terms of a possible Being. The concept of ‘earth’ which suddenly appears in UKW as the opposite to the concept of world, creates, in the Heraclitean ‘union of opposites’ the possibility of ‘emergence’ as the temporal or kinetic structure in which truth becomes possible as form (Riß) and in beings (work). Without form (‘Feststellen der Wahrheit’) there would be neither Dasein nor Being. Both are dependent on the limiting powers of temporality (Zeitlichkeit / Weile).

‘Earth’ has many possible interpretations. Its main one, I think, is as a non dualistic replacement for the concepts of ‘hyle’, ‘hypokeimenon’ and ‘hypostasis’: substance, the eternal ground which comes into appearance in form, in beauty and art. It is also the ‘arhythmos’ which has no form and is not yet in the ‘in-between’ (zwischen), which ‘gives’ order (dike). ‘Esteem’ (tisis-Ruch) is the qualification of how beings appear in the ‘in-between’ formed by ‘dike’ (Fuge). ‘Tisis’ relates to how beings persist (weilen, sich zeitigen) in the ‘in-between’ as the temporal ‘open’ (das Offene). Beings persist for a ‘while’, they come and go from the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung) but they try to persist for ever: become eternal: like the eternal ground of ‘hyle’ and ‘hypokeimenon’ etc. ‘Tisis’ may also be translated with ‘consideration’ for each others emergence into the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung). ‘Consideration’ comes from what has ‘esteem’ for each other. What Heidegger interprets in Anaximander, is that the whole of what presences itself persists without the one’s or the other’s par-

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366 see the four senses of ‘Earth’ in Haar, The Song of the Earth, p.57 ff.
367 “Zwischen” = Fuge; “Hervorkommen und Weggang” SdA, p.350
368 SdA, p.355
ticularity persisting inconsiderately\textsuperscript{369}. Everything has its time, because it is not ‘challenged-forth’. It is let to appear by itself ‘showing’ itself. Here we already see the importance of ‘Gelassenheit’ as the ‘letting-be’. Again the reference is Aristotle’s concept that beings ‘appear’ at first and originary by ‘themselves’ as what they are and that all other ‘understanding’ is secondary\textsuperscript{370}.

The ‘in-between’ or in another word, the ‘open’ (das Offene) emerges out of the ‘strife’ of the ‘world’ and ‘earth’. The ‘earth’ however is the ‘excess’ (Überfluß), the ‘well’ out of which the world draws everything. The temporal form of Dasein enables a ‘peras’ – the shape within which truth can emerge as the ‘Gestalt’ of truth. The form or shape does not ‘lack’ in any way but because it is in Dasein, its finity limits the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung). This ‘clearing’ changes its shape, as the horizon (‘peras’) of Dasein’s ‘projects’ (Entwurf). The word Heidegger translates out of Anaximander is ‘esteem’ or ‘consideration’. Beings keep each other as the whole in temporal lingering appearance, instead of insisting on themselves and disperse into particulars. The consideration to maintain the whole is summed up by Rilke’s verse about the angels:

"The living, though, are too ready to posit a border
between two states of being: a human mistake.
Angels, it’s said, are often uncertain
whether they traverse the living or the dead.\textsuperscript{371}

The main line of interpretation of ‘earth’ I pursued is the way it provides ‘excess’ (Überfluß), from which the new ‘inception’ draws, without being deducible from the previous. This inception is given to Dasein, but it is the artist (or thinker) who brings such an inception into the ‘material’ of the work to give it the ‘Gestalt’ of truth. This ‘event of enowning’ however, precedes all subjectivity, all consciousness, all truth and falseness. And, what art is, is not even defined except as a material work. Therefore the artist has also to begin before the material he applies himself to. The beginning of art is at the point of the formation of a ‘relation’ to beings. Art is not con-

\textsuperscript{369} “Das Anwesende im Ganzen zerstueckt sich nicht in das nur ruecksichtslos Vereinzelte und zersteut sich nicht in das Bestandlose.” SdA, p.355
\textsuperscript{370} Sheehan, Hermeneia and Apophansis, The early Heidegger on Aristotle, p.79 f.
\textsuperscript{371} Rainer Maria Rilke, Excerpts from the Duino Elegies, translated by John Waterfield, (http://www.jbeilharz.de/poetas/rilke/) “Aber Lebendige machen / alle den Fehler, daß sie zu stark un-
cerned with beings in the sense that it doesn’t have a method with which it describes its ‘objects’. The artist has to begin in advance of any ‘relation’, and as he is projected by ‘art’ as the setting itself to work of truth, the artist is not a subject either. Art, in terms of truth is the agency which the artist only performs without being its author. It is not his mastery. Dwelling in incertitude the artist ‘poetises’ (Dichten) the inception of truth. ‘Techne’ and ‘poiesis’ is a ‘bringing-forth’ is not mastery of disclosure unlike the challenging. There is no ‘virtuosity’ of Being available to Dasein. The Stoic poiesis of judgement is also thought as a bringing forth and not virtuosity as ‘mastery’. Only in a stepping back into ‘physis’ as the originary ‘Being’ does the Stoic judgement become proper. This ‘logic’ of ‘physis’ has nothing to do with the ‘logistic’ of technology.

This process is unlike the process of theorisation in Being and Time. As long as the everyday activity of circumspection is undisrupted there is no need for a theoretical ‘Rede’ about activity. All comportment is practical. Any disruption, like the broken hammer’ make such a consideration necessary. And disruption is what drives all mastery. The unexpected is the dysfunctional, and uncanny which brings ‘fear’ and ultimate ‘anxiety’ to Dasein. Unmanageability is always part of all understanding, insofar it drives the ‘theoretical’ comportment of mastery and eternity. But Art is neither ‘problemsolving’ nor ‘theorising’ in such a way. Instead it makes something stand up in the ‘open’ filling it with the truth manifesting itself in the work (setting-itself-into-work). Therefore, Heidegger can say it is not a ‘relational’ or ‘deducible’ form what has been before.

The ‘truth’ which sets itself into work, as we have seen, does not have falsity (pseudos). Heidegger follows Aristotle, who defines only the apophantic logos to be able to be correct or incorrect. Heidegger’s whole theory of truth is not based on this secondary possibility of knowledge but on the preceding ‘intuitive’ disclosure (aisthesis and noesis). The intuitive disclosure sees always what is ‘true’ because the false is ‘not-seeing’.372 The immediacy of intuition cannot be questioned in the way that statements can be. In ‘Being and Time’ Heidegger lays out the structure of Dasein in relation to beings, disclosing the ‘Being’ of these beings in various intuitive and

372 Sheehan, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Mind, p.298
mostly unthematic ways. Intuition is always unthematic, as is, for instance, the disclosure which takes place in 'attunement' (Befindlichkeit). Only in higher forms of language is thematic disclosure possible, which brings falsity into the equation. Without previous, originary intuitive disclosure there is no secondary apophantic disclosure. All disclosure is concerned with the Being of beings. Heidegger is concerned with the 'How?' of the Being itself, that which gives the truth itself and how it comes about in a kinetic way. The concept of 'work' (ergon, energeia, poiesis and techne) are tied together by Heidegger with movement (kinesis, dynamis), so they become almost indistinguishable. The 'work is a 'being at work', and not-yet complete. Movement (kinesis) demands incompleteness; it is an 'On the Way to...'. Heidegger attempts to think this movement which necessarily has to be incomplete at every single point of its way, as determined by an 'arche' as a 'telos', by which it becomes what it is.

The way 'emergence' of beings appears is form: 'order' and 'esteem'. Order is understandable; it is a logos which 'synthesises' and 'diairesis' which analyses, but what would 'esteem' be? Is it really, as M. Eldred writes the missing relation of Mitsein, between human beings? Or is it the relation of Dasein to beings? 'Esteem' may be such a relation which does not divide and synthesises, but governs the unity of whatever 'appears' in the 'in-between' in its intuitive and originary way. 'To chreon' of Anaximander 'hands out'; it divides into what is disordered and what is ordered into intelligibility. In this 'handing out' into the 'joint' (Fuge - dike) of the 'in-between' the relation is a harmony of appearance and withdrawal.

The Stoic practices may give us a hint at such a relation. One such important practice is 'discretio' (distinguishing or right judgement). One may object that this relates already to the sphere of true and false, whereas Heidegger talks about its ground. Yes, this is true, but its relation is to 'virtue'(arete). Virtue is not a skill, a virtuosity in a particular field, instead it is a virtuosity of life itself. Judgement is therefore not the following of a known rule but the discovery of a rule, a 'poiesis'. Originally 'discretio' answers to the question – is this a moral question? – if not, this thing in hand is 'adiaphora'. It is much more than that. In the next chapter I will attempt to show that

373 Michael Eldred, Questioning 'Die Frage nach der Technik', http://home.tiscali.de/artefact/untptlc1/chniply.html
this relation to ‘situations’ which is based on the exercise of ‘awareness’ (prosoche) in the Stoa lets beings emerge as they are, precisely in the way Heidegger tries to capture them with the ‘back to the things themselves’ slogan. Such an ‘awareness’ is equivalent to Dasein’s ‘authenticity’ – which changes the ‘appearance’ of both, beings and ‘Mitsein’. - and so does the ‘Stoic’ ‘conversion’. In their approach to beings the Stoics not only apply rationality, but also give the respect and esteem to what things ‘are’. This is the opposite of mastery, and I will attempt to show, that the view we have about the ‘virtuosity of life’ is wrong, if we see it merely as a attempted mastery. What it really is, is a tactful relation to beings, in whatever way they appear. All appearance is part of logos, and fate: ‘Being’ determines in a way which we do not choose, as Heidegger also sees it, but we can follow ‘authentically’ as Heidegger suggests or ‘joyfully’ as the Stoics suggest; in both ways we give ‘esteem’ to beings instead of asserting the phantasm of mastery over them.
Chapter III

Antiquity and the Way of Life

In the previous chapter we have seen how Heidegger’s vocabulary is more concerned with the movements of intertwining forces rather than with antinomies of totality or individuum, object or subject. Reality appears like the distorted space between different gravitational forces. The question of the forces of persistence and change, already a question for Plato and Aristotle, is reformulated to return to a Heraclitean unity of opposites. For Heidegger the force of human life as hermeneutics guarantees both possibilities of persistence and change. To interpret, to question something we have to have understood something already. But this understanding is also what is questioned in Heidegger’s phenomenology as what is continuously changing. We are “stirring under our own feet”.

The hermeneutical circle avoids a disintegration into some absolute a-temporal Being and a temporal changeable being. It creates an unavoidable immanence of all possible interpretations, without allowing this creativity to be totally arbitrary. This creativity, variously called ‘Auseinandersetzung’, ‘polemos’, ‘creativity’ (Schaffen), ‘poiesis’ or ‘Dichtung’ is the movement originary to Dasein in its relation to Being and both are determined by this movement. It precedes all selfhood, identity or subjectivity and in fact constitutes their particular historical form. This chapter looks at the Greek form of constituting a virtuous ‘self’. The Greeks too have understood that interpretation is everything. Interpretation is a form of artistic endeavour of making, a ‘poiesis’ of the interpretative character. To create one’s own character, one has to have some form of disposition already which disposes to the intention to be virtuous. In effect this is a form of auto-poiesis. We see the same figure we saw in Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle: To be the agency of poiesis, there has to be a self already which changes itself, its disposition by with it understands and interprets. Heidegger is right when he denies some individual subjective agency, but at the same time there is an agency ‘at work’ (energeia) in the production of the work of art through the individual. When the philosopher sees his disposition as the material of his effort to interpret things virtuously, this matter is at the same time the agency of his effort. This is ultimately a ‘polemos’ deriving from the agonic character of Greek life itself.

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1 “...stirring under our feet...” Foucault, The Order of Things, 2001, p.xxix
the following chapter I will describe how this sense of self-constitution emerged in Greek culture and how the Greeks formulated philosophy as the ‘way of life’ in terms of an ‘auto-poiesis’ of the ‘self’ as a ‘work’ (of art). Stoic philosophy appears to be a paradigmatic example of a praxis of changing the disposition of one’s self because it not only develops the theoretical structure but also practical exercises, ‘aske-sis’, to achieve this transformation of the soul.

The Stoic doctrine is tightly knit and encompasses all possible aspects of reasoned discourse. From cosmology and physics, language, ontology and aitiology to logic and dialectic. Every aspect has been covered, as it has been in all other Hellenistic schools with which they were in competition. I will follow Pierre Hadot by interpreting the effort of systematisation as a necessary exercise to undo preconceptions, presuppositions and traditions and not as the attempt to explain the cosmos.

Authority was not as important as in the Epicurean school for instance, and one could say, that in the Stoic school one had to live on one's own wits. Therefore, in spite of the rich literature, they did not see scripture as a solution, meaning that if you have a problem, you cannot simply read up on it in some authoritative volume by one of the main Stoics and expect salvation without changing your life - Seneca and Epictetus both deride such attempts. They refer to Plato's Phaedrus, where Socrates sets out the advantages of discourse and the disadvantages of the written word. He does not do so by claiming that the written word is in any way different but that it fails to come at the right moment. The living discourse, the situation and the immediate reaction of the interlocutors enable them to choose the right or appropriate words at the right moment ('eukairos'). The right moment, is a necessary part of the sage's virtuous action, which is obviously impossible if relying the written word. The emphasis was on the direct encounter. One could call this encounter therapeutic, like the medicus visiting the sick, who needs to examine the patient. This analogy is very common but 'doing philosophy' is, a 'techné psyche', a 'technique du soi' and Nussbaum points out quite rightly that the Stoic recourse to logic, reasoning and discipline seems much the same as the one used by political 'powers' Foucault criticises. For the Stoics this 'reason' was 'critical' at all times. It is never possible to restrain the powers of reason, except one falls into the trap to see it as the answer itself and not a

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2 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a way of Life (PhWL) and What is Ancient Philosophy? (WiAPh)
3 Hadot, PhWL, p.108; Epict. Dis. 3,21,7-8
5 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.54; on Foucault see also Hadot p.206
therapy. There were many other ways than philosophy to shape one's soul in the ancient world, much as there are today, such as religions and their various sects or astrology, sooth-saying and sorcery. Philosophy sets itself apart by reasoned argument and virtue (as opposed to religious obedience). Why is reasoned discourse (critique) subversive? To answer this question we have to turn to the methods Socrates uses to debunk the imagined knowledge of his interlocutors. He uses all the sophistic tricks of argument, but not to impose his own view. He leaves his interlocutors 'in aporia'. This is not meant to be the end though. 'Not-knowing' is the opportunity for reasoning. We have to note therefore that the Stoic exercises in logic and dialectics are only meant as an examination of the state of the soul and not to impose an authoritative form of doctrine.

There is a second strand to the argument which I pursue in this chapter. The question of how far the concept of virtue and the classification of all external things is to be understood as an unfolding of the archaic 'agon' and 'arete'. Philosophical praxis turns the values of their disciples upside down. The highest 'good' (agathon) is 'arete' and the value of external things ephemeral, just like in the archaic 'agon', and I mean the 'agon' between 'sages' as the predecessors of the philosophers (Colli, Huizinga). Wisdom, sophia, was absolute - divine knowledge.

1. The Concept of 'Agon'

The Greek 'agon' is much more than play or competition. It is deeply rooted in the archaic Greek understanding of virtue. Although these concepts originate in an aristocratic society they envelop the whole of the Greek understanding of life; one could even say that life itself is an agon. This has consequences for our understanding of the concepts of 'virtue' and 'logos' and their position within Greek understanding of the world. To compete one has to have skills and 'arete', virtue, is the expression for any skill that is necessary to compete. This is not only any military skill but also quick-wittedness, and all other Greek virtues like justice, temperance, piety and courage, or simply 'wisdom'. To be wise is to have all the virtues, because the sage can judge all situation. This is to become the Stoic position, centuries after the Ho-

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6 "Theory is never considered an end in itself, it is clearly and decidedly put in the service of practice." Hadot, PhWL, p.60
7 I am using the German translation: G. Colli, Die Geburt d. Philosophie, 1975/ dt. 1981, (GdPh hereafter): "Denn indem sich das Rätsel vernimmt, nimmt es eine agonistische Gestalt an, und andererseits entsteht die Dialektik aus dem Agonismus." Colli, GdPH, p. 72
meric age. It amounts to an ontologically grounded ‘phronesis’, applied wisdom in accordance with cosmic ‘logos’.

In the age of seers like Kalchas, Theiresias and Homer, who were in competition with each other, the agon has already a human affair. Oedipus or Theseus were involved in the original agon with a god, Apollo who set the Sphinx at the gates of Thebes, or in the struggle with the Dionysian figure of the Minotaurus. The original threat of the agon comes from the challenge and temptation of the god for men to overreach themselves and thus to lose the measure of what is human.\(^8\) The whole Odyssey has the form of an agon between Ulysses and the gods supporting him and those seeking revenge. The whole Iliad and Odyssey is couched in the language of aristocratic agon. One notes, that this agon takes place across the divide between human and divine sphere. The agon, links these spheres, through the will to ‘win’.

But it is not the question of ‘justice’ in our sense that is played out in these epics. In the Iliad Zeus is weighing the fate of the heroes on his scales, throwing lots into each. The lot is what is allotted to men, their fate is thrown onto the scales. This fate is decided by chance played out by Zeus.\(^9\) Justice manifests itself in the agon as the allotted fate. Agon is the very possibility of the highest justice, the ‘judgement by ordeal’. This agon persists in the courts where rhetors compete for the jury’s vote. Justice was understood to be chance from the very beginning and therefore it did not appear offensive to use rhetoric and sophistry to one’s advantage. The process was a judgement by ordeal once removed from the gods. To win this agon basically means: “I’m right, you’re dead”. This form of justice is then questioned by Plato’s Socrates. What is just has to be ‘said’. The truth has to be proven. This approach fractures the agonic understanding of justice. Socrates asks ‘What is justice?’ – to be just one has to have a definition by which to judge. Truth has to be there explicitly in a definition. Judgement has to be based on knowledge. It does not matter who wins - Socrates refutes the knowledge of others while claiming not to know anything himself. Truth is not proven by winning. Socrates wants the truth to be said clearly and unadorned.

The method of dialectic, practised for quite a while before him, created a way to disprove all positive knowledge. So the resulting ‘aporia’ leaves the truth unsaid. Socrates’ agon with Apollo, trying to prove the oracle wrong and to show that he is not the wisest man in Athens\(^10\) is, however, decided by the old justice: Socrates is dead and

\(^8\) Colli, GdPh, p.30
\(^9\) Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.79
\(^10\) Colli, Nach Nietzsche, p.102
therefore he was the wisest: but he prevailed against the god according to the ‘new’ justice: his death has become the paradigm of ‘injustice’.

The Stoics take this critique further. To them the whole cosmos moves according to a ‘logos’, a universal reason, which determines the equal distribution of good and bad. This does not mean a scientific necessity, nor ‘providence’ for the philosopher to not be affected by the external world. Instead the visible agon which brought about the ‘judgement by ordeal’ has been internalised. The virtuous cannot ‘suffer’ defeat from fate, because it is not relevant to ‘virtue’. To be virtuous means not to be affected by external things. Virtue is not only self-discipline, it is the irrelevance in the public display of the agon. The internal agon now takes place on a different level. It is the agon with oneself, or rather one’s self that has to be overcome. The self, as the product of the techne of the self becomes the more or less public work of art. To become virtuous the self has to change and it does so by exercise. These exercises are a techne, in the sense that they mould the self, but the techne is not a knowledge like the knowledge to make shoes. At the same time it is not comparable to ‘physis’ either. The knowledge what virtue is, is ‘essentially’ different from the current state of mind so it cannot be known without a ‘rupture’. It is ‘un-canny’ in Heidegger’s terms.

The Stoic wants to become a sage so the ‘ordeal’ cannot ‘disprove’ him. If his disposition is according to logos, what happens externally to him is neither good nor bad but indifferent. The real as ordeal of the agon proves the participant to be right or wrong, good or bad. Chance is a ‘judgement of god’. What kind of ‘chance’ is this judgement? Is it made according to a universal law? It certainly is for the Stoic. The divine logos contains everything that happens. Human freedom does not lie in changing this allotted fate but not to judge any such fate as ‘morally’ bad. Even if inconvenient, this fate is not utterly ‘irrational’ it is only human reaction to such events that can be irrational. But the ‘agon’ to attain this disposition also means to know one’s own (Socratic) ignorance in relation to fate, chance and ordeal. The change that has taken place for the sage is, that the universal logos and thus the allotted fate is not a pure game of chance any more where he could possibly lose his virtue.

‘Logos’ distinguishes (critical) and unites (universal). It is the space of all intelligibility without this space itself being object of such intelligibility. The logos in the shape of fate is not something that could be controlled by the sage. Intelligibility is ‘given’, just like Heidegger sees it. The sage ‘poietically’ creates his self in the im-
age of this logos. The judgement about failure is what the Stoics understand as being completely under human control. The agonic ‘judgement by ordeal’ has been turned into the universal law of the logos. Men, not even the sage, ‘understand’ the logos, but the sage does not suffer from the idea of an injustice in regards to his ‘ordeal’ because his self is identical with the logos. In a strange way the uncontrollable ‘ordeal’ is turned into a metaphysical certitude. The real is the good, and wisdom is the durable knowledge of this as a basis of moral judgement. The Stoic exercises ‘discretio’, or ‘phronesis’, with which he manoeuvres in intelligibility is another synonym of wisdom and virtue. It is also a definition of the ‘self’ as the agency of ‘poiesis’. This self consists in the critical process of auto-poiesis.

Understanding is what humans as Dasein ‘are’. It is their ‘Being. To understand in a different way than the current self allows, and to interpret in a way that this self changes essentially is a process that we have already seen in Heidegger’s description of UKW. Neither the artist nor his audience, neither art nor the work of art bring about the truth that is set up in and around the work. Instead truth sets itself into the work of art. Truth is agency and its work, the audience and the artist. Just like the self of the Stoic is only agency insofar as it performs ‘logos’ by interpreting its own situation and thus changing itself into another truth of logos.

The difference between agon and Heidegger’s ‘polemos’ appears in his emphasis on Heraclitus and the continuity of strife while the agon appears to be a ‘game’ which produces a winner. The agon on the other hand is more general as a fundamental trait of the whole of Greek culture and is more general and persists in all aspects of philosophical discourse. Polemos cannot be thought without agon.

In archaic agon winning was justification, it created justice and thus truth. With Socrates the term ‘good’ (agathon) is added to this equation. In the new relation winning does not make something good and just. Socrates demands ‘proofs’ (pistis), instead of ‘winning’. Maybe this is the irony: nobody can defeat Socrates because he does not propose a knowledge. This however, puts the ‘agon’ on a different level. To be good or right depends on the soundness of one’s soul, independent of winning. This is the continuous labour of the self to change itself, to become wise and virtuous, within the human possibilities of logos, which are limited. ‘Logos’ is what unites the formless and manifold into the ‘one’ that is open to understanding, it is intelligibility itself. But there can never be total understanding. ‘Logos’ is duplicitous: it discloses and withdraws at the same time, as we shall see in the next section.
2. The Concept of 'Logos'

The Greek concept of the 'logos' has a confusing breadth of meanings and functions which are difficult to untangle. 'Logos' is 'word' and 'language' but also 'law' or 'principle' or 'individual' and 'cosmic nature' and 'pharmakon', a cause in itself. I rely on Giorgio Colli's book 'La nascita della Filosofia'.

It guided my research by relating the archaic 'agon' to the Stoic 'logos' as the strife for interpretation and at the same time making me aware of the dual character of 'logos' as what makes visible and what hides. The riddle is the striking symbol of logos. It is what hides and reveals at the same time. I will briefly outline Colli's main statements about the development of the Greek concept of 'logos' to underline this duplicitous character, duplicitous, because the divine words are obscure, but also, because language hides itself behind what it means and is never itself 'visible' or 'sayable'. I think it is important to understand 'logos' in its duplicity even when used by the Stoics. The efficacy of a 'word' and of 'reason' can only be properly understood on the background of the archaic roots of the 'logos'. Equally, the 'state of mind' which surrounds the 'logos', its relation to the 'divine', is very different from our own contemporary experience. 'Inspiration' and 'enthusiasm' mean that the 'individuality' fragments in such a way that it interacts with the divine. It is not closed off, instead it provides an openness or surface on which reason can act. The 'divine' here means access to 'language' as the site of the ontological determination, or to Being. This is the function of the sage – and also of Socrates, which is 'in between' the divine and the human. Colli maps the development of the concept of 'logos' back into its pre-history, back to the mythical age of Daedalus and the Minotaurus. The labyrinth is the first symbol of the emerging 'logos'. It is the product of reason and art on the one hand, the Apollonian, and it is governed by Minotaurus, the Dionysian 'life force' on the other. The reason build into the labyrinth is divine and incomprehensible to man, only the thin thread of Ariadne saves Theseus (the human). But there is also the Dionysian part, the animalistic impersonal rapture of the thread of reason. The surrender of this heritage of immediate (unconscious) life (the private production, poion) is therefore hidden from view in the Greek polis. Theseus defeats Dionysius in form of the Minotaurus. Reason, kills the animalistic but leads to the recognition of 'pain', the suffering of 'life' itself; but it also teaches how to defeat this pain: by denying the will of life.

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11 Giorgio Colli, Die Geburt der Philosophie (GdPh)
12 "All das läßt sich in den Begriffen Schopenhauers ausdrücken: die Vernunft steht im Dienst der
The Greek 'logos' is not only enlightened, it is also much darker than we understand it today. In the next stage of the history of the 'logos', the gods pose riddles\textsuperscript{13}: The Sphinx poses the question under the threat of death: reason is the way out, but the words hide it by being metaphorical. Then the Delphic oracle becomes the dominant stage of the development of reason: the Pythia speaks in tongues and a translator interprets her words in dark riddles. The Pythian 'mania', the divine madness is a constitutive part of 'logos' as is the interpretation which is 'measure' and intelligibility and which brings light into the dark words.\textsuperscript{14} These are the two forms of 'logos' which are one within the Apollonian domain. In both cases language constitutes itself from the inspiration of the god. Truth comes to men from outside\textsuperscript{15}. The divine language says what will happen but men do not understand. The logos is dangerous and incomprehensible, it is malicious and tempting as is the god of the oracle. The form of truth is a riddle. Riddles are the form of the further development and final secularisation of the 'logos' in the form of a competition between the seers\textsuperscript{16} up to Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno, whose paradoxes become a last form of the riddle competition, but which is neither divine nor deadly. In addition the sages, and Parmenides was a sage, were dialecticians who could argue both ways, the word was able to show that both (contradictory) thesis are false, whichever thesis the interlocutor chooses. The antithetic contradiction is always wrong as Heraclitus already points out in fragment 98.\textsuperscript{17} But it is agonic; the agon between two opinions is not a question of 'truth'. Truth is not in words.\textsuperscript{18} Only in the situation when the speakers are present can experience be shaped by dialectic (presence is a condition of 'agon' for Huizinga). This is also its 'truth', insofar as the divine word is incomprehensible to man, language has always the character of danger - the 'agon' as a 'judgement by ordeal'. Within 'logos' is the 'cruel' god Apollo (the one who strikes from a distance, ...
through arrows and words). The words of his oracle reveal themselves only after the facts, then they become crystal-clear. The divine logos is a revelation of what has always been there.

Drawing on Colli's analysis, we therefore have to frame the concept of 'logos', even as used by the Stoics, in a different light from how we would understand it today (i.e. after semiotics etc.) Language cuts the immediate access to 'life', and at the same time it reveals the pain of 'life' i.e. imperfection of the human condition. This 'logos' does not describe a 'method' or an instrument but the basic human ontological situation. This is also Heidegger's conclusion. Being dwells in language, or, quoting Plato Heidegger says that 'man's thought dwells in philosophy'.

This 'thought' is the place of individuation. All 'dianoein' is knowledge and a way of dwelling. Equally, if we understand the 'mania' and the loss of individuation, the roots of wisdom are in the transgression of this individuations. The pursuit of 'logos' therefore is never purely the action of an individual self but in a way it demands its ritual destruction in the ek-stasis of mysteries. Plato and Socrates still knew about the inherent duplicity of the word and therefore they gave primacy to the spoken discourse, the back and fore of arguments and consideration, which was meant to shape the soul - it should bring about a revelation but not as positive knowledge. As the words of the riddle refuse to reveal their logical evidence, so the new form of dialectic entangles preconceived understanding and reveals its failure. The Stoics also took on board Heraclitus' hints, dark by themselves, that there is 'withdrawal' ('nature likes to hide...') Heraclitus, fragment 123). Words can hide as much as they disclose. Nevertheless the Stoics are optimistic, their cosmos is. The Stoa supposes that whatever happens is necessary in the overall schema of things. We simply misunderstand external events, if we categorise them as good or bad. But in discourse the 'logoi' still have the power of healing the disturbed soul - philosophy is solace - 'boethia'. The 'pathe' in the Stoic doctrine are 'logoi' too. They follow a reason and therefore they are so devastating and dangerous (e.g. Seneca's Medea), to some extent they reveal anew the Dionysian connection which Colli points to.

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19. Heraclitus describes the duplicity of Apollo as the harmony of opposites. Bow and lyre have the same shape but opposite purposes, both are symbols of Apollo

20. "Sofern der Mensch existiert, geschieht in gewisser Weise das Philosophieren." Wegmarken, p.19 also,"It is Dasein itself. ... 'Physai gar, o phile, enesti tis philosphia te tou andros dianoia' ["For by nature, my friend, man's mind dwells in philosophy"] (Plato, Phaedrus, 279a) Basic Writings, What is Metaphysics?, p.112

21. "Götter sind frei von Notwendigkeit Durch das Orakel nötigt Apollo den Menschen zur Mäßigung, während er selber maßlos ist, fordert ihn zur Selbstbeherrschung auf, während er sich durch ein unbe-
belong together like mania and logos. The pain of life and reason, these two seemingly incompatible principles can be reconciled by the mediating faculty of the well and timely spoken word - which cannot be a written word. The word disrupts the logic of the ‘pathe’, because it is related to this logic, just as irrationality is related to rationality by virtue of it being its ‘opposite’. The words are there in front of our eyes: we do not understand; this is the form of the riddle and the oracle: being there and not there at the same time. Words are absence and presence at the same time: like the arrows of Apollo the words move from one point to the other, they reveal their truth in the distance of time. Words need time to ‘arrive’ (Greek tragedy: the disaster has already happened, but we don’t know it yet). There is another form of absence within the Apollonian, the visibility and invisibility of revelation of the oracle and the riddle. Language itself is not accessible. And in language life ‘itself’ is not accessible. Understanding of the Apollonian ‘hints’ is not open to man (only to the sage), and at the same time the ‘individual’ has to be transcended to participate in an (anamnestic) unity with the divine immediacy itself. The reason which produced the labyrinth is itself incomprehensible in its foundations and this is its symbolic value. Although man participates in 'logos', he is lost in the labyrinth, precisely because of the 'absences' which constitute it. Presence at a distance, in the absence, is very much an Apollonian character of reason, it is not 'immediate' - it is in front of our eyes but not understood. We have to follow the path, make our path, and the path of reason becomes more important than the ‘end’. 'Logos' mediates between the (invisible) divine and the (visible) human, so it is consequent for Plato to dismiss the sensible in favour of the invisible which is accessible through a (divine) 'logos'. The word is not an ‘autonomous’ area. Words disclose otherness not identity of

herrschtes »pathos« manifestiert: damit fordert der Gott den Menschen heraus, provoziert ihn, verleitet ihn beinahe zum Ungehorsam. Diese Zweideutigkeit schlägt sich im Wort des Orakels nieder und macht es zum Rätsel.” Colli, GdPh, p. 44
22 Agamben, Potentialities, p.31; “Denn das Wort, wodurch die Wörter zum Wort kommen, vermag ein Wörterbuch weder zu fassen noch zu bergen.” Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p.192,
23 ‘Beauty’ is related to ‘truth’ and as Socrates was utterly ugly in Greek eyes, he could not have been neither virtuous nor telling the ‘truth’. (Symposion) Therefore it is a paradigm change when Alcibiades explains that Socrates is like the figure of a Silen, ugly on the outside with golden deities inside.
24 „Die Weisen jener archaischen Zeit - und bis Platon sollte ihre Haltung bestimmend bleiben - sahen in der Vernunft eine »Rede« über etwas anderes, einen »logos«, der eben nur »sagt«, etwas Verschiedenes, Heterogenes ausdrückt. Was wir über die Wahrsagung und das Rätsel festgestellt haben, läßt uns diesen Zusammenhang leichter begreifen: es ist eben jener religiöse Hintergrund, jene mystierenhafte Verzückung, die die Vernunft durch die Vermittlung des Rätsels in irgendeiner Weise auszudrücken sucht. Später ist dieser ursprüngliche Impuls der Vernunft vergessen worden, ihre Funktion als Anspielung, ihre Aufgabe, eine metaphysische Distanz auszudrücken, hat man nicht mehr ver-
knowledge and the known. We are too much used to the appropriating aspect of lan­
guage, its objectifications and its hollow opposites. But most of all language cannot
reveal its own foundations. Words are just the traces of the immediacy and totality of
life. Man must therefore be aware of the duplicity of words and their agonic malice
(as he should beware of the Sophists) by considering what they do not reveal. Only
when the arguments of the Stoic therapy change the state of the soul, has their truth
been 'recognised'. However, on the other side, this change has to be open to scrutiny,
it cannot be simply said to be a gift of 'faith'. The Stoics develop a practice that in­
volves dialectic and 'awareness' of nothing in particular (prosoche) as its exercise, al­
though neither of them is sufficient on its own. The Stoic exercises of giving account
of one's actions turn the unconscious act into the conscious reality of words. The Sto­
ics see reasoning as the basis of actions. As the Cynics did not let go of reasoning ei­
ther: even the most anarchic practical jokes had a reasoned point even if it was not
always expressed. The actions of the Cynics were like riddles of the Sages: they
acted apparently confused and counterintuitive to surprise the questioner with a per­
fectly reasoned answer.

Our knowledge is always incomplete. What we know are only the 'membra disiecta'
of Orpheus or Dionysius; it is like reading a dictionary in alphabetical order (like
Sartre's autodidact) and not being able to reconstruct (the meaning of) the text,
which was still available to the Seers and Sages of the past: the unity between word
and the immediate experience (an immediacy the Stoics try to reconstruct in their ac­
tions in any (contingent) situation) This decline of sophia is build into the construc­
tion of the new 'philosophical' way of knowledge as absence and ignorance. Philoso­
phy begins with a loss of sophia.

The philosophical concept of the 'Good' and 'Virtues', the whole Socratic 'moral
turn', is not 'moral' in our (Christian) understanding. The 'Good' is an internal 'telos'
(final end), it does not mean being nice to everyone. It functions like the self referen­
tial symbol of the virtuous actions in the archaic 'agon'. Once 'dialectics' has made
'positive' knowledge impossible (except mathematical knowledge) knowledge has to
move from the external to the internal, the comportment, which is independent of the

25 "Aller Ausdruck ist Suche nach Totalität." Colli, GdPh, p.53
sensible. The 'Good' is beyond the reach of dialectic and eludes definitions. In its self-sufficiency (autarkeia) it appears to function like a figure of absence, the invisible focus of actions redeeming them from the temporal external world into an a-temporal eternal and impersonal of 'logos'. It tames contingence by rendering it indifferent and gives structure to the incertitude of ignorance.

The Socratic 'elenchos' (teaching through inquiry), is not an instruction but a cooperation to dispel false knowledge and it leads to ‘aporia’, an acceptance of ignorance. This is why philosophy has never been understood as a mere instruction in abstract knowledge. In Stoic terms, understanding is an experience where 'logoi' act upon the very fabric of the soul. Giving account inquires into one's own actions in the absence of certitude, it is by no means a mathematical guide to right actions. (Inquiry is the knitting together the 'membra disiecta' of one's own dual nature between reason and the animalistic.) When one inquires well enough the inquiry opens one's eyes to what one has been looking at without seeing it. This is the understanding or comportment which the philosophers are looking to elicit. The Stoics, unlike the Epicureans, did not teach a merely static doctrine. As a difference from other ‘ways of life’ they thought that a philosophical approach is that one has to experience the turn of habit oneself. They would not offer a ready-made revelation (like the Christians and to a degree Epicureans) of what the different view has to be. Instead they practised the inquiry into one's preconceptions so one can repeat the inquiry for oneself and live the considered life (i.e. inquiring about what one is doing and why). Like the oracle, the revelation comes in the experience of the sudden understanding.

'Man dwells in thought'. The divine and unfathomable (unhintergehbare) ‘logos’ determines how the world appears to man: “language is the house of Being”. Language makes not 'things' intelligible, it is intelligibility itself. In this intelligibility, which he is not in control of, 'man dwells'; intelligibility itself cannot be founded in something other than intelligibility.26

The Stoic judgement is similar to Heidegger's 'resolve' (Entschluss). Both operate in the contingent -indeterminate situation of ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit), breaking out of the preconceived meaning of the ‘They’ (Man), which is always a repetition of what one has not thought (or rather fought – ‘polemos’) for oneself. In the constitu-

26 Agamben, Potentialities, The Thing Itself, p.35; Bartleby, or on Contingency, p.251f.
tion of all rules lies invisibly a judgement and a decision about the whole of thought and thus intelligibility, which Heidegger calls 'Being'. The un-canny, the incalculable and what the Stoics still saw in the incomprehensibility of the cosmic reason, are the remnants of what the Greek 'logos' was at its inception, namely an unbridgeable essential difference (Wesensunterschied) between human and the divine. Giorgio Colli describes the duplicity of the words and also their dark relation to the animalistic and Dionysian immediacy of life. He also shows the price for the pain of this duality to be overcome: the amnesia of the 'will to life', the animalistic unidividuated part of human nature. This repressed aspect comes then back in the form of certitude, the rational will to control everything even to control the very matrix of life itself is fueled by the suppressed will to live and the pain it causes.

Colli describes two factors responsible for the decline of wisdom. First Zeno and then Gorgias take dialectic to a self-destructive level: every positive statement was sure to be refuted. And secondly the emergence of the public realm as the space of agonic discourse which turned into unrestrained rhetoric. The originally private circles of discussion were held between people of similar understanding of the matter, they had no doctrine or texts and relied on an unexpressed consensus of wisdom. In public engagements where anyone could listen in, the audience was of different levels of understanding and so the speakers had to adapt by becoming rhetorical. Rhetoric itself led to the argument being resolved not by a logical refutation but by the silent audience reacting according to emotions. Rhetoric and its reliance on written text lead to philosophy as literature. In Plato's case, the literary text itself already states that a change has taken place. The time of 'sophia' has passed and the wise have disappeared. What Plato is writing about are the lost connections of words which had 'proper' meaning only in the discussions of the sages. This form of communication has already been lost and the nostalgic look back only confirms it. It is the hint at an 'object' that has never been 'in' language.

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27 The 'calculable' of Heidegger does not mean the 'logos' but the mathematical, the Stoic 'logos' is incalculable.
28 "Die Form des Rätsels will dagegen einen Sprung »andeuten«, eine unaufhebbare Wesensverschiedenheit zwischen dem, was dem Gott, der Wurzel von Vergangenheit und Zukunft, angehört, und dem Leben, wie es dem Menschen mit seinen Gestalten, seinen Farben und seinen Worten eigen ist. Die Zweideutigkeit Apollos drückt den Abstand zwischen Gott und Mensch aus, ihre Unvergleichbarkeit." Colli, GdPh, p.44
29 "So wird die Philosophie geboren, eine Schöpfung, die allzu inhomogen, allzu vermittelt ist, um neue Möglichkeiten aufsteigenden Lebens in sich zu enthalten. Die Schrift, ein wesentlicher Helfer bei dieser Geburt, löscht sie aus. Und die Emotionalität, die als zugleich dialektische und rhetorische noch in Platon vibriert, ist dazu verurteilt, nach kurzer Zeit zu verdorren, sich im systematischen Geist zu sedimentieren und zu kristallisieren." Colli, GdPh, p.105
Plato gives hints about the wisdom that has been lost and his Socrates is a figure of that transition. Still half sage but already half philosopher and still trying to recover something from a past wisdom. What has been lost is not expressible in the secularised form of dialectics nor in the emotional storm of rhetorical machinations. The impossibility of a positive proof (Zeno and Gorgias) becomes catastrophic when the connection to the inexpressible divine background of the riddle and the duplicity of 'logos' (as reason and madness) has been forgotten. The Platonic doctrine of 'anamnesis' is a methodical reversal of this forgetting. What has been lost in the new concept of language is the dimension of riddle and oracle, the dimension of the divine mania and mysteries. Plato interprets this loss as a fall into temporality. If 'logos' as language becomes autonomous, its dimension is immutable and a-temporal and its heterogeneity becomes misunderstood as something in need of identity or a mere 'mirror of a rational object'. Instead, the language of the (archaic) sages only hints indirectly to something heterogeneous. Heraclitus still uses the form of riddles and he also says “The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives signs (hints).” (fragment 93). It is the distance that becomes unbearable even to Plato himself. That language ‘is’, is only a ‘hint’ and is not expressible in a statement itself but only in the form of a riddle or oracle, which in itself is opaque and withholds its truth precisely because its truth is not in the words but in its absence from the words as the divine 'otherness'. This ‘otherness’ is a force that is in control of language and thus it is ‘Being’ itself, which ’dispenses’ (es gibt) Being to man, by determining understanding and ignorance, disclosure and withdrawal. Greek wisdom is an ‘askesis’ of mediation between the totality and individuation, divine and human, madness and reason. Heidegger recovers here the constitution of individuality and subjectivity. Both look towards the in-between within which wisdom lies and which artistic practice explores precisely because it ventures into the in-between which precedes individuation. Only after this experience can art solidify itself into an ‘object’. 

Socrates' use of dialectics is different from those previous sages by being directed at the ‘ethical’ or the comportment to knowledge rather than a purely theoretical prac-

30 Colli, GdPh, p.89 f.
31 Colli, GdPh, p.90
32 Colli, GdPh, p.90
33 Colli, GdPh, p.100 ff.
One could object, that the speculations of the theoretical sphere have already been destroyed by the practices of Zeno and Gorgias. In the ruins of positive knowledge there was nothing to rebuild and the only 'positive' action could be directed at the comportment towards knowledge itself. Into this gap Socrates inserts the method of 'elenchos' (inquiry leading to aporia), a form of dialectic as a co-operative examination and begins to inquire about the constitution of 'knowledge'. He maintains the qualitative difference between human knowledge and divine wisdom. The knowledge Socrates seeks is not technical skill, but a knowledge of judgement of knowledge itself. 'Ethics' evades positive statements and is therefore the space dialectics cannot destroy. Socrates shifts dialectic inquiry towards the ethical, under the topic of 'virtue', the classical 'arete' and the 'good' (agathon). It is 'action' (praxis) which is scrutinised and not positive 'theoretical' knowledge which has already been destroyed. Actions cannot be true or false, they are good or bad. The original background of the divine is still remembered in the Socratic 'daimon' and 'mania' (madness).

The Stoics may have had an inkling of this history but by then their 'logos' has already become an autonomous region, the abstract principle of the cosmos itself and the dimension of the riddle and oracle (as the originary realm of reason) has been wiped out of memory except in the sphere of ethical education. There the difference between 'understanding' a text and the way of life was still at issue. This gap between an intellectual understanding of a logical twist and the living understanding seems to mirror the idea of the 'living word' of the archaic sage who lived with an understanding of both dimensions of the 'logos', reason and mania. The ethical education did still take place in public and schools, but the original form was the dialogue. A dialogue is always a 'krisis', the moment in which something is decided which is not part of language itself; one has to 'seize this moment' and find the appropriate word. A text does not offer such a moment, it does not stop and does not change its words in the moment. The basic idea of a dialogue is that it does not express clearly, instead it can only point towards something heterogeneous which in the end can accomplish the change of the state of the soul.

The background of the riddle is 'religious' inspiration and enthusiasm, which itself

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34 Colli, GdPh, p.103; Socrates as Dionysius.Figure Hadot, PhWL, p.170
35 Plato, Phaidros 244.
36 Understanding the heterogeneity and distance of language, Colli, GdPh, p.90
37 Colli, GdPh, p.89 f.
is impersonal through the union with the god (Apollo or Dionysius in the mysteries) or through the union with the universal 'logos' respectively; the surrender of individuality and surrender of the sensible. In both cases language has its normativity, its access to 'truth' not in the relation to an object (or an 'objective') but in its transcendental function of supra-individual normativity. Therefore the early Stoa too is determined by the 'good' as the empty never positively defined space of pure 'decision' (of the sage). The Cynics, however, seemed to have gone further than Socrates by putting into practice their access to reason as the only acceptable normative standard for their actions. This is why the question of proper justification hits the Cynics hard and ultimately forces a 'theorisation' in the Stoa. Nevertheless, the Stoics saw Cynicism as a "short cut to virtue".\(^{38}\)

This leads us to the question of the voluntary and involuntary character of actions. It seems odd to us to understand the 'enthusiastic' (impersonal) form of reason (knowledge) to be identified with 'volition'. The subjectivity capable of this has to be, as Plato would see it, already 'dead' to the sensible world so that its volition can be understood as impersonal anamnesis of the divine image of the 'good'.

Wisdom, as knowledge, must have a criterion, at least if the analogy with 'techne' is to hold. Here we find the 'aporia' of wisdom, as normative knowledge, searching for its own 'normativity'. The Stoics proposed a 'way of life', within a language of inquiry about its own presuppositions. Giving account is ultimately what Socrates did. Later the Cynics saw themselves in opposition to the polis and its laws and taboos which appeared to be even more arbitrary than their own actions for which they could give account. The Stoics' cushioning of the bare decision of the Cynics prevents us from seeing the source of action itself. Against the background of the archaic sage the Cynics could still reasonably claim a supra-individual source of all reason and oppose it to the laws and customs of the polis (particularly sexual taboos etc.), while placing their decision into the semidivine space of reason and wisdom, and 'logos' and 'physis'.

The origin of the volition of the sage has to be understood in terms of the divine enthusiasm, which makes the 'individual' volition taking part and unifying with a form of divinity. This is also the proper understanding of the origin of 'autarkeia'. Not only is it the independence of the sage from the opinions of others, but also the independence from his own individual preferences i.e. 'pathe'.

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\(^{38}\) Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p.64
Stoic practices are, in all their divergence, tailored to this principle. While their doctrines vary (to a degree) their focus on 'bringing into language' what has been outside consideration, and ennoble it as 'a way of life', is still precisely what Socrates demanded. Compared to the confusion around them, the uncertainty of life, their 'considered' life was certainly therapeutic. At the same time it was not a therapy to maintain the status quo. Later Stoics did see their action in terms of a betterment of the whole of society, everybody could profit from 'philosophy', but was tailored to individual practice first and foremost. The individual has to turn around his, or her, life first. In this sense language as an instrument discloses a new horizon. There is no judgement outside language and only within language can there be 'good' or 'bad'. The Stoics did understand reason as 'physis' itself, reason was 'natural' and therefore there is no nature to man outside language. The concept of language and reason is the sphere of virtue but virtue also needs material to its actions. This material are the 'indifferent' objects. They are the material of the sage's decisions, like the divine riddles are the material of the archaic sage.

3. Socrates' Care of the Self

Stoic ethics roots its normativity in a doctrine of cosmic reason but its ethics, the change of one's way of life is primary. Man is partaking in the cosmic determination through 'logos'. In this turn to Socratic teachings, the Stoic edifice extrapolates Socratic questioning of the constitution of the self to the constitution of the cosmos. It developed the ontological vocabulary necessary to turn Plato's 'mythological' arguments about the cosmic idea of the 'good' into a coherent doctrine of 'physis', 'logos' and 'ethos'. The archaic ideal of 'arete' means to be virtuous in skills and this means in judgment. The sage and 'arete' coincide, and the good emanates from an increasingly transcendent concept of 'arete' and 'agathon', which – as 'idea' - become an ontological foundation of normativity for human behaviour.

Socrates initiates a reassessment of the dichotomy between 'physis' and 'nomoi' and Plato grounds his ethic in ontology. The Socratic gesture destroys imagined knowledge 'doxa' / tradition and opens life to the risk of failure which is itself borne out of the Greek agon. His public display is therefore equally based on a disregard of "reality". Instead he re-establishes a realm of action which is based on the wit of 'phroneme-

39 Phaidon 99e; Gorgias, 508a; Timaios 29d; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.17-19
40 Phaidon 95e-99
sis' and the distinction between the (temporary-perceived) 'real' and the ethos of human action (instructed by the daimon). The established reality of human action in 'play' ('agon') is therefore different in quality from all other 'realities'.

Socratic 'logos' collects the faculties into an united 'soul' (self/hypokeimenon), which constructs forms of reflection and responsibility. However, at the same time, as 'human-temporal' this unity is not self-sufficient and needs the 'daimon' as that wondrous un-canny ('Un-geheure') and immediate 'access' to the divine. The daimon provides 'wisdom' which is not human at all and beyond human discourse. This and his claim of ignorance provides Socrates with the position of an intermediary between the divine and the human. Socrates does 'not know' and this is what makes him different from all other people. It also makes him closer to the divine, because only the divine has the knowledge proper to wisdom. The daimon gives Socrates a link to this divine sphere.

Socratic irony appears as a self-separation. Dissimulation of the self is a hiatus (Riß), which brings the divine and the human into a sharp relief. Socrates' irony divides him between the two worlds, between the human and the gods. He is on the way. The one who is 'on the way' is the bridge to the unity of essence and existence, Being and becoming. Socrates as this 'bridge' tells us something important about the perspective of reflection. The reference point of 'self' is incomprehensible if the self does not take measure from the divine. The divine aspect, which was present in the riddles and oracles of the Presocratic time is still palpable in the Socratic persona. The mediation towards the divine in terms of the 'agathon', replaces the danger and menace of the divine oracle. On the one hand Socrates re-enforces the split and division between our judgement and the desire for a secure world without surprises, on the other he also opens up the hiatus between essence and existence. But maybe this is necessary because the security that is demanded is not 'human', not 'real', like Socrates' ugliness, which hides his divine inside. Maybe, it is an ironic hyperbole to warn of the incertitude of human knowledge.

To be at home on the way, in the 'in-between' of man and the gods, as Heidegger puts it, is to be between two different ways of thinking. Thinking has been put on the way, this is its (temporal) 'care-structure'. For Heidegger, the two ways of thinking

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41 Hadot, PhWL, p.90
42 Hadot, PhWL, p.152; Plato, Symposium, 221e
43 "Das eigentliche Wesen des Denkens könnte sich uns zeigen, wenn wir unterwegs bleiben. Wir sind unterwegs. Was meint dies? Wir sind noch unter Wegen, inter vias, zwischen verschiedenen Wegen."
today, are the 'calculative' thinking and 'Seinsdenken'. Socrates has to be understood from the 'contemporary' critique of Sophists and Natural Philosophy. It is also an investigation into the human comportment necessary to scrutinise such apparent 'knowledge' (doxa) of the cosmos itself. How one conducts one's life, the 'way of life' determines ultimately what appears 'real'. Socratic consideration seldom reveals another 'truth', instead it ends in 'aporia'. What is left in the state of aporia? It is the 'self' as the place of thought which is left. The character of a soul is how it seeks out 'what' is real and what is not and this is what Socrates sees as the duty of everyone to care for. The character or 'hexis' or disposition is the material which the Socratic discourse attempts to shape. This 'psychagogic' seduces the soul to its introspection, but the measure of introspection is the 'divine' of which Socrates is the messenger.

The way Hadot describes Socrates as the intermediary, the atopos, is similar to Heidegger's 'on the way' (unterwegs), the in-between the 'calculable' and 'thinking of Being' (Seinsdenken). We find the character of the intermediary in Socratic irony. Socrates uses this self-separation to encourage his audience to get on the way themselves. On the way, during the dialogue he guides only to the point where there is no way out, 'aporia'. Here he leaves, he does not give answers. Everything is apart and up in the air. Irony forces the interlocutor to follow into the movement of the logos. Socrates' self-separation opens up the space within which this movement is possible.

This 'on the way' does not tolerate security: Like in the 'play' (as agon) everything is at stake. This is also how Heidegger understands the "on the way" as 'strife' (polemos) but in Socrates' dialogues the competitive aspect is very much palpable.

There is never the security of arrival and self-identity. Irony separates and makes the place of dwelling an in-between: Apollo’s arrows (thoughts). This is why man dwells in thought.

The intermediary seem to signify the 'on the way', the risk of failure is a necessity to find a "way out" of the 'aporia', while the imaginary security of identity and knowledge necessarily fails in any case. Socrates plays a game that both parties have to lose. Taking care of the self means to give to the human 'soul' (psyche) an

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Heidegger, Was heisst Denken, p.60
44 But will 'Seinsdenken' be the vantage-point, like Adorno’s "Erloesung", from which everything will be comprehensible? Adorno, Minima Moralia, §153
45 In addition we should remember the Peloponnesian War and the state of civil war within Athens itself (Rule of the 30 etc.) as the driving force for such inquiries
46 Hadot, PhWL, p.162
autonomous place. This place can only be in ‘logos’ (language, thought and discourse). The Greek natural speculation did not thematise the place of knowledge, did not connect the ethos to the forms of knowledge. Socrates turns this around by dialectic destruction of apparent knowledge. This places the discourse about the possibility of knowledge into the realm of the soul. The shape of the soul, its goodness, is the analysed. To be virtuous the soul has to ‘know’ what the ‘virtue’ is. Socrates then dialectically disposes of all ‘positive’ statements about what various virtues may be. The result is, that the ‘logos’ which could express this knowledge is not at our disposal. The ‘method’ that Socrates uses is indirect. Through the destruction of ‘doxa’ he attempts to ‘kindle the fire of Eros’ for proper knowledge. The ‘Eros’ is not human, it is one form of the divine ‘mania’ in which the god dispenses truth to humans.

The Socratic gesture is as destructive to the structure of knowledge as Diogenes’ club. Diogenes does not even allow dialogue any more, his staff-blow interrupts instantly the logic of the questions: the question itself is put into question. He shows how easily and unpredictably sense turns into nonsense, how logos is cleverer than the questioner (excess of meaning). The vigilance of the philosopher is therefore not a pre-meditation, it is reason coming to pass in the moment, being there suddenly (with the help of the Socratic daimon). This is why it is an 'embodied' art like the art of drawing. There is practice to a degree but there is also an understanding how things come to pass that is intuitive and somehow outside the teachable and calculable. Neither Diogenes nor Socrates do teach - they point out, deictic, like language that is the intermediary, 'lekton'. (kindling the flame of...). Language is not autonomous. Diogenes’ ‘performances’ and Socratic dialectic do not express a positive doctrine, instead, through disillusionment they prod their interlocutors into self-critique (metastrophe) and conversion (metastrophe).

4. Stoic Doctrine

In Heraclitus' own time 'physis' is a normative cosmic principle. This was understood to be a critique of the contemporary moral and political praxis. Heraclitus sees 'logos', 'physis', 'cosmos' and 'nomos' as a (normative) unity. The Stoics appropriate the very same critical use of this 'fourfold'. Although they differentiate between universal and (individual) human nature, (koine and idia physis), the 'idia' is always di-
rected towards the 'koine', cosmic 'logos' ('physis' and 'logos' are synonymous for Chrysippus) Partaking.

The Stoic school emerged from Cynicism in the succession of Socratic inquiry about the self and virtue. Zeno, who was trained by the Cynic Crates, practices a less anarchic and less 'performative' form of Cynicism, but is still dependent on the Socratic concept of virtue being grounded in the 'care of the self'. Performing a practical 'critique' was the Cynics' basic tool of education, and sometimes rather embarrassing for the student. So the Zenonian direction was a more measured method of reasoning but with the same 'disillusionment'-value. The Stoics try to upset all those 'unconscious' little presuppositions on which most, if not all, of our judgements are based, especially the 'pathe' (passions), which are also understood to be 'judgements' ('krisis'). Ultimately, under reasoned scrutiny all presuppositions must appear incongruent. 'Pathe' are based on deeply held irrational presuppositions about the opinions of other people and our assumptions about what is 'a good' (agathon) and what is not. The basic Socratic argument is, that the only 'good' is virtue (arete) and everything else is not, or is only insofar as it supports virtue. The Cynics follow Socrates and radicalise his dialectic to some kind of 'deictic' performances in public, without much argument. The disciple is left on his own to 'understand' what has happened to him and was given only the shortest of 'explanations'. The Stoics use 'explanation' but give up on the educational performace of the Cynics. These 'performances' seem quite similar to those stories about Zen-masters preying on their disciples to kick them out of complacency and the worship of authority. Stoa cloaks itself in the mantle of 'reason', while at the same time trying to keep its attention on the 'knowledge' that does not come from books but from the active experience of each individual. Every situation is different and there can be no general answer to each single situation. Therefore the Stoic has to exercise his 'understanding', his 'discretio', of any situation and his response has to be genuinely made for this particular situation, at this particular time. Philosophy is the way to this frame of mind. Therefore all systematic explanations are not selfserving authoritative doctrines but tools in the hands of the teacher and the disciple to exercise and achieve their respective dispositions of the soul. This 'end', or 'telos' of philosophy is called 'eudaimonia', a 'happy life'. It would be probably better to call it a 'well-lived life', since 'happiness' is today commonly used to describe precisely what the Stoics argue against: material (external) goods.
The "pursuit of happiness" as written into the American Declaration of Independence has been, according to a brief paragraph in Nussbaum, due to those who wrote it been educated on Epictetus and Seneca.\(^{47}\) Whatever the reasons, it would be difficult to see these words meaning anything else but the classical 'eudaimonia', particularly in the context of "freedom" etc... A constitution which promotes 'eudaimonia' is rare. Freedom and eudaimonia are the highest ends of the philosophical life, they cannot be given a market value. An 'eudaimonic' life therefore does not depend on external goods, since they are not 'good' (agathon) in themselves rather it depends on the disposition of the soul. It is tempting to understand this 'disposition' in terms of "authenticity", ("Eigentlichkeit") and I will try to argue that this is a quite legitimate temptation.\(^ {48}\)

In the previous chapter I attempted to describe Heidegger's conception of the process of Dasein's self-understanding (resolve) in terms of self-analyses of preconceptions – 'thrownness'. I will try to support this with a, necessarily, rather narrow interpretation of basic Stoic practices. My argument is that Heidegger's claim, that the 'Daseinsanalyse' is a purely ontological investigation, tries to distract from the fact that a classical philosophical tradition is implicitly used to explain a form of embodiment of the temporal-historical sway of Being. The reason the Stoics could insist on reasonable arguments is that they had close contact with their interlocutors and the danger of 'reason' being pursued for its own ends could be prevented. Not so obviously in the age of technology, where reason has become what the Stoics feared, namely the means to secure access to external goods: resources. They nevertheless would have argued that philosophy in their sense, as a 'techne psyche' is precisely not a case of 'metaphysics' and 'Seinsvergessenheit', but the proper use of language under supervision, because nothingness (or Being) is restored by the 'revaluation of all values' (i.e. of external goods); in Stoic practice of philosophy the world becomes transparent to Being.

To gauge what the Stoic are talking about when they discuss passions, it is very instructive to read some of Seneca's tragedies, and some of his contemporary history was not any less violent, What they see as the everyday cruelty of man against man is far beyond our experience, and they ascribe it purely to the reign of passions. They see the soul being gripped by the raging passion without the means to escape it. The tortured soul is the soul in the grip of passion: it is passively enduring its rage. Phi-

\(^{47}\) Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.5
\(^{48}\) On G.Nebel, Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.202,
losophy is the 'way of life' in accordance with 'logos', the 'homologoumenos bios' is
a life that uncovers the falsehood (pseudos) which brings about the impulse of this
madness. The soul is a plastic material and by nature (i.e. by the ability to speak)
open to change and so the ability to 'not act like this'. The ability not to be passive to
one's passions means to consider one's actions. And consideration means 'knowl-
edge', not in a scientific sense but in the sense of having the skills to uncover what
lies in a situation. It is a difficult - and possibly unresolved - question how the Stoics
intend to deal with passions; extirpating them or just observing and not giving in to
them. Their exercises were quite clearly the permanent self-awareness of 'emotional'
responses. Epictetus in his laconic way to nail down his points is exemplary for this.
Like a mantra he repeats the ultimate Stoic question: "Is it in my power or not?" - if
it is not: what do I have to do with it? Always following the traces of passions which
turn our lives upside down the Stoic discovers their deceit through 'awareness' (pro-
soche). I am interested in those exercises of the disposition to a hesitation within the
impulses to actions. The Stoic may not rid himself of passions but he is not pushed
into inappropriate actions by their impulse. The Stoa is a practice of the 'self' or 'psy-
che'. It combines education, exercise and doctrine to develop reasoned actions in an
unfathomably complex but luckily 'logical' cosmos. But Stoa is a practice first and
foremost. Its doctrines are a support-structure.

In Stoic doctrine, all technical concepts are fundamentally realigned to (cosmic)
'physis' and 'logos'. Only in this overarching causality is the Stoic ethics sufficiently
plausible. The deterministic cosmos constitutes the fundamental problem of human
freedom, which remains unresolved. The 'arche' of matter ('hyle') and spirit
('pneuma'), the passive and active principle (and their four elements (stoicheia): fire
(or ether), water, air, earth) constitute the cosmos. The causes (aitiai) describe how
things effect each other. Therefore, in a materialist cosmos, everything has to have a
reason ('aitia', Grund). The four categories are the fundamental questions by which
the state of affairs can be described. Stoa quietly supposes a relation between thing
and predicate. In language the predications of a thing can be analysed by thought, but
the 'thing' remains an indissolubly mixture of pneumatic and hyletic 'matter' which
cannot be separated. So the analysis that takes place in thought only does not impact
in a material way on the thing itself.49 According to this the 'self' can be subjected to

49 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.81
such an analyses too. One can say that the Stoic semantic was not a naively representational language theory.

Stoic physics is based on the two arche of hyle and pneuma (as the 4 elements), but one should not 'ontologise' these elements. They are merely differentiations in thought and do not have any 'reality' in themselves.\textsuperscript{50} Everything consists of individual mixtures which are not separable except in thought.\textsuperscript{51}

The cosmos is a dynamic (tonike kinesis) unity\textsuperscript{52}, like a living organism. All things happen providentially from the perspective of the cosmic logos who is aware of all the causal connections in all time. The human partaking in logos, meaning that in consideration man can see and understand aspects of this reason which governs all aspects of life, supposes this unitary rule of the cosmos and an equivalent understanding on behalf of man.

Theoria is not the paradigmatic reference of human understanding as it was for Aristotle. For him 'sophia-theoria' is the primary form of knowledge. It is not instrumental knowledge and only concerned with eternal laws while phronesis-praxis is a knowledge about actions and poiesis-techné the knowledge to produce something other than the act itself. The Stoics seem to shorten this division in that phronesis becomes the paradigm of knowledge. Praxis is then founded on the eternal logos, on the right disposition of the soul that partakes in the universal 'logos'. The disposition of the soul is produced and produces, and the results of this knowledge, judgements as actions (‘to poiein’) are ‘poiesis’.\textsuperscript{53} The assenting or dissenting judgement or act is an action in the sense of poiein.\textsuperscript{54} The impulse (horme) necessitates the action itself. It becomes therefore difficult, almost impossible to distinguish assent (krisis/judgment), impulse, intention (horne) and poiein. However, 'krisis', the judgement itself is an act of 'poiein', and the internal durable disposition, the second category, 'poion', the product of 'poiesis' insofar it is a change in the ('material') disposition. The Stoic 'phronesis' extends from the pure knowledge of virtue towards the virtuous action, which appears to unite sophia and phronesis into a single item which is, for the Stoics a durable disposition.

\textsuperscript{50} Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.31
\textsuperscript{52} Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.80
\textsuperscript{53} phantasia - synkatasthesis - horne - poiein
\textsuperscript{54} Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.116
The aim of ethics is the appropriate action (katorthema) in any particular situation. The Stoic exercises and theories are moulded to help this task. Although the Stoic system prides itself to be the most coherent, in the background is always the Socratic 'care' of the own soul. "...the only things which are intrinsically good or bad are the conditions of the self".  

As far as I can see, the Stoic 'doctrine' does not intend to be 'law' or rule, rather it is the training of 'awareness' ('prosoche'); practical wisdom does not lead to 'laws' like 'theoria'. Instead, 'phronesis' is the activity in the realm that is not understood and without fixed rules. Every situation needs an immediate appropriate response which is virtuous.

a. Oikeiosis as Familiarity

Oikeiosis connects Stoic claims about reason and determination with a basically pragmatic view of experience and intelligibility of the world. Oikeiosis is the originary understanding, similar to Heidegger's Dasein understanding things through usage. It is a pragmatic 'always already' understanding, a pre-understanding of oneself and relation to beings. Within this familiarity we already have the experience of understanding things and being able to act with consideration.

The 'prote horme' the primal drive (and not pleasure or desire - hedone) discloses the natural understanding of the world. Therefore it is 'natural' and 'instinctive' for human beings to care for their survival and children etc.; it desires what is good and avoids harmful things. Such a being which seeks to protect and enhance its own existence knows always already what is good for it or otherwise. In its choice it defines the 'telos' of its existence. This strive determines the self-relation of beings.

In addition to this comes the human propensity for the use of 'logos' as the 'technites hormes', technician of these drives. Reason enables man to conceptualise from experience but not in an abstract way. It is the ability to structure and use experience in relation to external goods (relating to the animal nature). This increase in planning and understanding leads to an extension of the purpose of the 'horme' to not only take care of its physical survival, but to the survival of the faculty of reason itself. In the

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56 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.146
57 Cicero De finibus III,5,16 sensus sui: defines the 'own' and the other; and accounts for the animal nature, and the 'life according nature'. (Seneca, Epistulae 121,5)
58 Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VII. 86
development of a human being, it recognises that the use of reason is natural to its existence and worth being cared for. At this point the faculty of reason becomes more valuable (desirable) than external goods.\textsuperscript{60} The doctrine of oikeiosis, explains why men strive for certain things and how these interests change by age etc. This incorporates instincts and sociability but for men also the 'logos' as the mediating force of the adult. This force expresses itself in a considered judgment about what is good or bad, as a distinction which is completely in his control independent of external facts.\textsuperscript{61} Oikeiosis as a natural social bond does not only hold for the city of the state one has been borne into, but is expanded to the whole of humankind. Interestingly it is not an instinctive social drive but is developed with the development of the logical faculty itself. Although 'logos' is 'natural' it transcends what is naturally given (and what happens by itself)\textsuperscript{62} by the freedom of moral choice of the reasoning subject.\textsuperscript{63} Oikeiosis and prolepsis, describe the universal and common starting point of undifferentiated, general (including ethical) knowledge which is present of itself and which becomes the subject of methodical reflection.\textsuperscript{64}

b. Categories

The categories are questions with which a 'being' or a state of affairs can be described in a meaningful way. The four categories are: 'hypokeimenon' (substance), 'poion' (qualified), 'pos echonta' (disposed), and 'pros ti pos echonta (disposed in relation to something else). The last three are participles\textsuperscript{65} and intelligible only in relation to substances. "ontological aspects" of beings as mixtures of bodies. 'Poion' is a durable disposition, while 'pos echonta' are more temporary alterations (hand-fist). The 'pros ti' as a external 'relation to' is a 'quality' with regard to the whole of the cosmos (e.g. obligations towards other people etc.);\textsuperscript{66} 'Poion', the category of 'qualified' substances (hypokeimenon [that later becomes the 'subject' as Heidegger points out]), comes from the same root as 'poiesis', the activity

\textsuperscript{59} no 'dihairesis', meaning the classification of genus and species etc. (DL, VII 52)
\textsuperscript{60} Cicero DeFin. III. 6.20-21; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.152
\textsuperscript{61} Wrong judgements (i.e. evil) is then explained with the doctrine of the various causes by which 'logos' can be mislead.
\textsuperscript{62} Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.159
\textsuperscript{64} Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethics 1195 a 1 ff.
\textsuperscript{65} Jacques Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, p.228
\textsuperscript{66} Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics, p.231
of a techne. The 'poion' expresses "a dispositional state, not necessarily permanent, but highly durable; such features require the presence of a causally active 'poiotes' in the subject (for example, prudence in the prudent man)."\textsuperscript{67} The disposition of character therefore needs a material cause unlike the hand making a fist, which is merely a momentary 'pos echon'. The category of 'poion' is important because it secures a being's identity within time, without which no individual freedom could be maintained.\textsuperscript{68} The 'poion' is open to 'poiesis', to production or in this case education. Such a production does take place for its own end, which according to Aristotelian distinctions would make it a 'praxis'. In Stoic materialism and causality, however, this distinction is less clear.\textsuperscript{69}

Chrysippus criticises Aristo and argues against a plurality of virtues. Instead, for him virtue is a 'poia',\textsuperscript{70} a durable state or quality of the soul. As such, it is a body mixing with another body to achieve the mixture of a virtuous person. As a stable mixture it defines the individual quality of a soul. This durable state, or disposition of the soul determines its actions (the motivation of actions). This state is not 'given', instead it is possible under conditions. There are exercises, ('askesis') which change the quality (poion) of the hypokeimenon (substance or "Zugrundeliegendes", i.e soul, which has not yet become 'subject').

c. Fate (heimarmene) and Determinism

Stoic determinism was the preferred target for their contemporaries, saying that it is incompatible with human freedom. In fact it would make any ethic irrelevant (lazy argument etc.). Fate (heimarmene) is the cosmic logos in past, future and present. Therefore, if the doctrine of causality is taken seriously, teleological determinism is a necessary result. Apparently this determinism is a mixture of Platonic, Aristotelian and atomist thoughts. (1) Platon (Nomoi 10) connects 'physis' and 'tyche' with 'logos' and 'telos', physis is not itself a principle of order, it needs a cosmic pneuma or 'nous' as an ordering force. (2) Aristotle's concepts of chance (automaton) and fate (tyche) do resist the concept of a universal reason of the whole cosmos. Aristotle, like Plato differentiates the 'telos' of a contingent reality from a divine reality of eter-

\textsuperscript{67} Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics, p.230, The relation of Stoic categories to their grammar is also discussed in Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.47
\textsuperscript{68} 'idion poios'= individual qualities and 'koinos poion' = qualities of a genus) Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.48
\textsuperscript{69} Assent/judgment is cause of actions (to poiein); Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.116
\textsuperscript{70} Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics, p.232
nal laws which is perfectly determined.\textsuperscript{71} (3) Leukipp and Demokrit: developed atomism as a causal determination instead of a teleological one; a materialistic, mechanistic and causal cosmic process.\textsuperscript{72}

The question of free will is the question if 'one could have acted differently'. The theory of actions (judgement - phronesis), however, is a psychology. It is concerned with the material state of the soul. This means the Stoic solution of this question lies purely in the internal state ('Gemüt', Stimmung), as an 'attitude' or disposition. Therefore the sage is able to avoid 'confrontation' with the uncontrollable external world of things. The view of the sage is turned inside, not only because it is the source of the logos, but also because this internal logos is part of the cosmic logos, which mirrors the order of the external whole. What is not in our control cannot be predicted and whatever happens is 'adiaphora' in relation to the virtue of the sage. The contemporaries of the Stoics were not convinced, but the argument is neat and puts the Stoic focus on philosophical praxis as the exercise of the soul to become virtuous (and thus partake in the 'logos') into the foreground. What is important is the method of disillusionment of one's own actions, making one's own actions transparent will eventually lead to an 'understanding' of the way things happen in the external world. i.e. that they are not in our control an no reason to bother us.

Stoic determinism is a template to all disputes about human freedom. Everything is determined by providence. To act virtuously means to act appropriately in any given situation, not following a law that is imposed, but following a 'natural state of mind'. Happiness (eudaimonia) means to follow (cosmic) nature which "requires living in accordance with virtue".\textsuperscript{73} If cosmic nature 'physis' is also rational 'logos',\textsuperscript{74} it holds that this disposition is 'rational' in the Stoics view. The connecting point between nature and virtue is reason. To live according to nature means to live according to reason, which again means according to virtue. This however does not mean a 'mathematical', calculating, character of reason as we have become used to. For instance: It is unreasonable to mourn for ever after someone close has died. The emotional disturbance leads to an unreasonable disposition which leads to suffering. Suffering is not reasonable. This does not mean the Stoic sage does not have pain, this means that

\textsuperscript{71} Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.101 ff. (three causae, 'aitiai' in Aristotle, Physis, 196 b 10-29); physis moves according to 'telos'.

\textsuperscript{72} Still, there is latent determinism in Plato and Aristotle: the realm of actions is influenced by inborn and acquired habits. Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.104 f.

\textsuperscript{73} T.M. Irwin, Stoic Naturalism and ist critics, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, p.346

\textsuperscript{74} Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.217

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his judgement or belief is never impeded by it, i.e. he does not start blaming or complaining about humans being mortal. But importantly he does not judge what happens as morally ‘bad’. Suffering lies in the ‘logos’ about the pain, not the pain itself. For the Stoics, reasoning is not only about determining what the appropriate action is, but also an exercise to effect a ‘material’ change of one’s own disposition. What is our ‘own’, is the ‘self’ as ‘soul’. In this play of cause and effect the Stoic determinism is in a way a necessary counterbalance of the freedom of the soul. Freedom is to follow the flow of the cosmos: ‘eurheua’. Exercises in reasoning and contemplation act on the soul, and change materially its 'hexis' or disposition\(^\text{75}\) in such a way, that it becomes more 'homologoumenos bios', similar to the universal logos. It is therefore understandable that, whatever happens externally, the internal agency always has the possibility to act one way or other because in alignment with the cosmic logos, it partakes in the whole ('koine physei') of the cosmos. The sage therefore always follows the ‘logos’ and will not try to act against it (i.e. wish something that is not in his power). The 'reasoning' and 'hexis' of the sage has the form of a disposition of mind and is synonymous with phronesis.\(^\text{76}\) This way the Stoics extend the reach of 'phronesis' into what would have been seen as theoretical wisdom (sophia). This happens, if virtue is made the highest telos and the measure of all external things. Be it as it may, it is certain that the connection of phronesis with the cosmic logos in the phrase 'homologoumenos bios' means that its actions are somehow justified by recourse to those universal rules, i.e. everyday actions (at least of the sage) are directly authorised by the cosmic logos.

The 'highest end', the ‘telos’ of Stoic philosophy, is therefore not separated into different kinds of knowledge (sophia, phronesis, techne) here all knowledge is measured by the concept of virtue. And furthermore, it is not an examinable knowledge but manifests itself solely in the intention of the act rather than in the act itself. Intentions are not subject to fate, they are solely in the power of the self in depending on its mode or disposition. Since the disposition is susceptible to exercise, it is in the responsibility of every individual to form the mind in a way in which it can follow physis / logos, which itself melts into indistinction with virtue.

Fate and determinism, from the point of view of philosophy, are the necessary baseline to develop the concept of internal freedom, independent of the external world,

\(^{75}\) disposition as 'diathesis' (reasoning) Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.213
\(^{76}\) Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.205
just as the remit of reason is extended with the purpose to disrupt orthodoxies of every kind just as Socrates used of all tricks of rhetoric to set himself and his interlocutor up in the aporia of knowledge.

d. Pathe

The most discussed subject within Stoic ethics are emotions or passions (affects or 'pathe'). The alleviation of suffering needs a theory of 'suffering' and passions are the cause of suffering. One should always remember that the Stoan tries to rationalise those practices and exercises that it has developed rather than developing an ontology and deduce rules for life from it. One should also take into account that even in classical times there has been a shortage of 'sages', so if everyone is irrational except the sage most people are irrational. The Stoic discussions of the psychology of impulses is always a practical exercise within a particular situation (ad hominem).

Pathe, pachein, passive and passion come from the same root and mean 'passivity' as in 'suffering an illness'; 'being acted upon', rather than being active. The sage may be ill, because this is his fate, but he will not submit to the impulse that this is a moral 'bad', because he 'knows' that it is morally indifferent. In the Stoic doctrine of 'pathe', the aspect of differentiation is that they are all directed at an external good which can never be a moral good. The pathe which make us think that something is good are pleasure and desire, and those that make us think of something as bad are pain and fear.

A perception is always a 'phantasia' and an ('proposition-like') 'axiomata', image and proposition. 77 This means whatever we 'see' we have immediately with it its 'meaning'. Now I have the choice to assent with this impression ('synkatasthesis') or not. We assent to it or not. But how do we? Usually, we do not deliberate, the impulse is the belief that drives our actions. Equally, doubt inserts itself within a fluid series of actions without our deliberation. These are not lengthy conscious 'deliberations' about the probability of the perception being true or not. Therefore it is not necessarily clear what kind of hesitation there may be that could interfere between a perception and a 'pathe' making us assent and act in one way or other. The doctrine of passions is dependent on the possibility of accurate perceptions. Not only sensual and cognitive, but particularly the perception of the internal psychical life which comes under the scrutiny in Stoic exercises. Deliberation can therefore exercise the faculty

77 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.68 f.
of judgement but the immediate and correct intuition of the situation is dependent of
the sage's immutable disposition. We perceive something including its accompanying 'axiomata', and guess its correctness. This works fine as long as we encounter
things in a relationship which Heidegger would call 'being concerned with' (Be-
sorgen). What the Stoic's assent is about, in my opinion, is that it is not only that our
judgement can establish a correlation between the perception and a world, a mere
correspondence or "correctness" but it is a judgement about the 'agathon' the good
or otherwise of this perception. Although 'correctness' is presupposed, its realm is re-
stricted to the question of 'virtue' only. Passions determine the familiar relation to
things. If we are hungry food is 'good'. Not so the Stoic, for him only the intention
with which we utilise food is good or bad. The sage does not have passions in this
sense because he is always aware which things are indifferent, and which actions are
good and which are not. His passions are called 'eupatheiai', which are: joy, volition
and caution (in respect of perceptions which are unclear he withholds his judge-
ment).

Impulse, ('horne') "is the necessary condition for action", it is a motion of the soul
and a mental event as a reaction to an impression. It can be articulated as the 'move-
ment' of the soul towards something. 'Dianoia' is thought and consideration, it is the
application of 'logos' in one way or other, but it seems impossible for men not to use
it perfectly, except for the sage. The guiding question of the Stoic discussions is how
to act appropriately = rationally (in the absence of gods and sages). "Pathe" are 'im-
pulses' based on wrong evaluation which lead irresistibly to actions. Therefore 'pathe'
are judgements since only a judgement of assent can lead to an action.

This leads to another sort of impulse in the non-sage: the 'selection'. Stoic education
is about the right choice of action. There is however, a class of objects, which are in-
different, which are nevertheless beneficial or not, like food or health or illness etc.
Therefore it is not bad to have a meal, but because it is never sure one can attain a
meal when one expects it, one should therefore limit one's expectations too. This
"impulse with reservations" (B.273) is a purely practical advice, for training 'aware-
ness' ('prosoche') to one's actions. Stoic philosophy is interested mostly in this 'tech-
nical' side. Therefore its terminology is also determined by its application in the tui-
tion of their followers.

78 Heidegger, Wegmarken, 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit', p. 76 f.
79 Tad Brennan, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, p. 265; impulse = assent, Brunschwig,
Stoic Metaphysics, p. 110, fn3
This namely, not control-freakery and pathological extermination of 'passions' is the aim of Stoic exercises, it is a disposition of the soul to evaluate things differently. Stoic freedom lies in the possibility of 'apatheia' or 'ataraxia', which means not acting on wrong impulses which are determined by the external things. Tranquillity of the soul regardless of the external state of affairs is only possible if the value of things has been understood properly as indifferent. It is the possibility to act otherwise, other than assenting to the (irresistible) impulse of the passions.

Eupatheia is the opposite of pathe. Suffering does not only mean discomfort, it most of all means that one's soul is determined by external things (desire for -, or fear of something). Eupatheia, means to be able to live in tranquillity of the soul, because external things do not cause disturbance. It does not therefore mean to be in control of what is outside oneself, but to be aware of how the soul considers and accords value to things that occur. Internal consideration determines the 'ontological' status of things, i.e. the way they 'presence' themselves. The Stoics define this space in the mind of an individual, constituted by the ability to 'select' through a consideration of arguments or by disposition, as the space where a human is independent from the external state of affairs. The Stoics stipulate therefore that virtue is a state in which the self-forgotten relation to things is disrupted. This means man is revealed as obsessed with things and has to be dis-illusioned from their 'reality' (if he suffers enough to want to do so). The human is here disclosed as the site of judgement which is neither identical with being absorbed by its relation to beings nor dispassionate atemporal spirit. On the contrary, the whole procedure leads back to the involvement with the things but on a 'different level'. Heidegger describes the effect of 'resolve' (Entschlossenheit) in precisely in the same way. In 'Gelassenheit' he describes the possibility to change the comportment towards technical things, and not to be governed by them. Later in the text he calls it a 'letting-be'. This 'letting-be' is based on the Aristotelian idea that things appear to us before we inquire into their being, they 'presence themselves'. This 'presencing' is more originary than the inquisition, the court of reason. It is concerned with an intuition of beings which is originary but has been forgotten, just like the virtuous intuition is natural and has to be recovered.80

80 Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind, p.303

Suffering is what lets people contemplate the state of affairs. This is already the point at which we hesitate to take things for granted and to withhold judgment, and we
hesitate to assent to the 'phantasiai hormetikai' (passions). This is what ancient 'eupatheia' and 'eudaimonia' mean more than anything else: 'not to be driven like that', to have the ability not to act on (misunderstood) desires or (wrong) beliefs. The Stoics understand their 'project' in terms of emotional health rather than seeking absolute certainty. So, although their 'project' is a 'critical' epistemology, they would not have understood the desperation for a certainty other than a moral one, since all else takes place in a causal cosmos of destiny which is morally neither good nor bad but indifferent and not worth of certainty. However, what is equally implicit is that human beings are not 'naturally' without suffering, depending on their individual dispositions that result from the 'natural' mixtures. Naturally people desire pleasure and fear pain and all subsequent passions like jealousy, regret, mourning etc. and they make a judgement that this is a good or bad action. What causes 'suffering' is in Stoic terms the wrong judgement. The judgement or belief implicit in an passion (due to it being an impulse to action) has to be educated, otherwise it causes suffering. The human soul has enough plasticity in this system for it to be altered. Ethics is not "natural", it is consequence of reflective understanding, of proleipsis ['prolepsis' 'scheme' of (natural) pre-conceptions are a priori tendencies or impulses common to all people]. 'Prolepsis' is the necessary 'pre-conception' of the morally good and bad that is part of human universal nature ('koine physis') but it needs to transcend the mere natural horme by following the 'natural' faculty of reason. 81

e. Unity of the Soul
Implicit in such a practice of judgement is a mental unity of the acting agent. Although the Stoics talk about parts of the soul, it is made clear that it is a conceptual or rather functional separation only. 'Logos' in this sense is the unifying force within the human being, which enables it to 'will' and to change its disposition. Without this, there would be no agent of such a volition. Nevertheless, the 'logos' is part of Stoic conception of 'physis', nature; 'physis' and its two principles are the normative forces for all actions. 82 The mixture of matter and pneuma, and 'tonike kinesis', or 'tonus' control the principles of all individuation. Movements in the 'force-field' determine the disposition of the individual. 83 The Stoic soul, 'hegemonikon' unites all internal

81 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.155
82 'logos' as a 'force-field', Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.58
83 Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics. p.29
faculties of the mind (imagination, impression, assent, desire and reason are the possible states of the hegemonikon ('pos echon', in a relation). From this it becomes clearer, that the structure of Stoic physics and categories is tailored towards the explanation of reasoned/virtuous acts. The soul is suspended in the force-field and distribution of the natural logos, and only within the soul the logos acquires the particular function of thought - 'necin' ('dianoia'), as a unifying force of the individual itself. Only a unified self can have responsibility. In other words, human nature is disposed to reflection, which means it considers by natural disposition not by an external reason. The internal qualities ('poiotes') are therefore more important for the realm of good or bad, rather than the resulting (external) acts themselves.

f. Exercises (askesis)

Historically the Stoa has developed on the basis of the individual 'care of the self' as it was proposed by Socrates and the Cynics. It also adopted a mixture of systematisation from Platonism and Aristotelianism. However, these systematic parts were rather didactical and developed under the critique of competing schools.

Judgment, selection and assent are events, not states: the disposition of the soul is a 'state', which guarantees the 'appropriate actions' (katechonta). 'Selection' is central to Stoic practice: (1) the sage's: choice/volition is always virtuous ('hairesis'); (2) the disciple's ('prokopton') selection of preferred indifferents ('ekloge') always vicious. Stoic practices strengthen the (Socratic) 'self' in its 'autarkeia'. Something that was alien to Socrates who depends on a personal daimon, as the intrusion and interference which supports but also limits the 'self' and connects it to an external divine. In a way, the Stoics appropriated the Socratic 'daimon' into their concept of individual and cosmic 'logos'. The way man is able to partake in the universal logos becomes his 'daimon' guiding him to make a right judgment. The whole cosmos is a continuous material-spiritual mixture of which principles can be discerned, but which form

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84 "Gesundheit oder Krankheit der Seele, d.h. Tugend oder Laster und ihre Ausserungen lassen sich dann bestimmen durch die Kategorien 'poion' und 'pos echon', des dauernden und voeruebergehenden Zustands des Logos in den einzelnen Funktionen in die er eingelassen ist; es gibt Teile der Seele; in sie ist der Logos der Seele eingelassen; und es gibt eine bestimmte Verfassung im Logos; und die Seele ist schoen oder haesslich entsprechend dem herrschenden Teil, der sich so oder so verhaelt in seinen eigenen Teilen". (Anm. 59: SVF II, 471a Galen) Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.60
85 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.132
86 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.62
87 "Mit der Bestimmung der Tugend als 'hexis' ('diathesis') bzw. 'poiotes' ist der begriffliche Rahmen fur jene Verinnerlichung der Stoischen Ethik bereitet, die den sittlichen Habitus des Subjekts unabhangig von jenen Haltungen und Betatigungen denkt; die an die Gegebenheit von Umstanden und den
an inseparable unity. The disposition of the sage is a localised durable mixture. His ability to intuitively suspend judgement is based on the exercise of ‘awareness’ (prosoche). The choice of the sage is based on these two things the disposition and awareness.

There are various examples of exercises, but the main thrust pertains to two themes. The discretio between "what is in our power and what is not" and the complex issue of 'pathe', emotions. What is exercise in discretio? It is a practice of producing a judgement on whether to assent to an impression or not. Awareness ('prosoche') to what presents itself - the situation as far it is discernible - is at the heart of both, the art of judgement and the question of pathe. The application of the judgement to any situation, is a practice of reasoning. But this reason means first of all taking account of the own position and dis-position. It is not just the external situation but equally the internal, psychical situation that is opened up in the practice of 'prosoche'. 'Pathe', understood as (wrong) judgement, is put under observation form another point or perspective. But this perspective is not just a further point of view at all. If we do not mistake the insistence on 'logic' or 'reason' as a scientific 'objective' reason, but as a process of re-considering what one has just thought, instead of following it 'blindly', 'prosoche' is a mode of 'consideration' and a standing apart of thought. Within the gap inside the immediacy of consciousness the Stoic philosophical practice takes place as a production of the disposition of the 'soul', the character, that itself produces judgements.

Ethic is not a list of rules. Instead, through these exercises the character changes the understanding of a situation and the appropriate action follows intuitively. (The right judgement is given to the self of the right 'disposition', and this disposition is attainable in exercise (askesis). This disposition is based on a 'logos', which itself has, as we saw, itself its roots not just in 'reason' but also in a divine 'mania'. Stoic providential and causal cosmos positions human freedom as a practice of the self, which is separated from the rest (autarkeia). This way the ethical is the only 'real' and secure possibility of the soul. The 'ethical', if understood from the 'agon' is precisely what comes as fate from the divine (daimonia) as divine judgment, i.e. the 'un-canny'. Stoic determinism means, whatever happens universally (cosmos as one whole organism) and locally is fate (heimarmene) in the sense of logical but incomprehensi-

Besitz äusserer Mittel gebunden sind." Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.66
ble causality. Virtue is here more than the Aristotelian measure, it is a concept of transcendence which relates men to a totality.

'Choice' or 'selection' however is an individual responsibility. I may judge food to have value, but it is not a 'good' ('agathon') in any ethical sense; whether it is ethically good or not lies purely in the way my judgement has been made, i.e. in the intention. This makes me think of the judgement of the Stoic less as a judgment, applying a given rule to a situation (following nature/'kata physin'), than a decision about the applicability of a judgment. As long as the object is external to the selection itself, this object is adiaphora. Virtue is self-referential and is not dependent on the external object's 'value'. Nevertheless, these external things are the 'material' to which the judgement or discretio of the sage is applied. The sage's relation to the 'adiaphoron' is virtuous too, so his impulse - judging it 'adiaphoron' - is virtuous. Virtue is the virtuous impulse from the virtuous disposition itself. The sage however is able to use the adiaphoron in any way he sees fit (virtuous) because he will not be seduced to ascribe any moral value to it.

The Stoics regard the production of a judgement as 'poiesis'. In any given situation a decision is taken anew (an event) but it is based on a durable state of the soul. The decision ([pro]hairesis) about the assent / action to what presents itself, is a material creation of the soul (but in accordance with 'logos', 'homologoumenos bios'). Even if the non-sage performs the same action in the same situation, his action will not be virtuous, because his disposition is not virtuous and he does not have virtuous impulses. The assent / action is always new ('fresh') because it is the event in the momentary situation. The judgement has to be made anew each time in accordance with the phantasia and axioma. The sense is, that the sage's assent to the situation and the virtuous act seems to be the same, cutting short the process of consideration because it is already hard-wired into the sage; to him virtue is immediate intuition. Then the sage might just be a robot? The 'prokopton', the philosophising adept struggles and for him each situation is new. In the practice of 'consideration' he does not understand the situation perfectly nor does he understand completely his own presuppositions - he will become aware, however, of all the ignorance and his incertitude in any

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88 Chrysippus, Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.195
89 The immediate virtuous intention is based on the enduring disposition. It makes the judgment immediate and intuitive and thus indistinguishable from Heidegger's concept of truth which is 'a priori', but still historical.
90 "Situationsethik" Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.194
91 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.194 ff.
situation. If the sage can be certain, the 'prokopton' can never be certain. As the common situation, incertitude is the place of philosophising. Ariston for instance, a contemporary of Zeno, was still closer to the Cynical roots of the Stoa and he saw the freedom from external goods itself as the licence to do anything which he judged to be virtuous. This more anarchic strand of Stoa has been subdued in the systematisations of the later time.

The Cynics, still within the safety of the polis, did take at times a rather ironic view of the laws of the state. Diogenes is said to have been mocking laws which he perceived as 'unreasonable', but he still did obey them even if 'ironically'. But what is the quality of understanding when the Stoics cannot show an actual sage with perfect judgment? It lies in the continuous practice to shape the disposition of the soul. Being 'on the way' ('prokopton' means 'in progress') in the temporality of our finite possibilities, as Heidegger would put it. Which means the struggle (polemos) for the (re)assertion of meaning from an ossified (traditional) meaning of the past into the 'project', the 'futural understanding' and unfolding of the 'given' Being. However, for Heidegger this is mediated within the 'kairological' structure of 'care' which gives access to what is 'given' - as the possible. In the 'blink of an eye' (Augenblick) the normative event delimiting the possibilities which are given to us is revealed (=becoming what one is). This determines the perspective of understanding on one hand and at the same time the struggle to renew the way to make meaning. The closeness of the kairological event and thought, present in 'Being and Time' points forward to 'On the Way to Language', where Heidegger proposes to a 'language of Being' transcending the language of metaphysics. This is a language of 'decision', it is normative by being beyond the 'subject-object-relation', it partakes in the 'universal logos', which is the 'polemos', the strife between world and Earth on the one hand and Dasein and Being on the other (as a judgement by ordeal). Stoa insists on 'logos' as 'consideration' as human nature and Heidegger seems to put his concept of 'polemos' ('Aus-einander-setzung': setting-apart) into this tradition. Heidegger's 'deconstruction' as such a 'polemos' seems to be a successor of 'consideration'. Scrutinising the presuppositions of one's judgements. But can virtue reveal itself in a calculative discourse? Here the Socratic heritage prevails, although there is a universal logos, there is no insurance for it to be intelligible to everyone at all times (i.e. certainty). But, philosophy itself, the practice of what one can achieve, is the appropriate exercise to progress ('prokopton') in understanding and faculty of judgment. This means
philosophy changes the disposition of the soul and this in turn makes a discourse possible which is not mere ' sophistry '. This training of 'logos' entails also necessarily the investigation into one's own 'intentions': why do I desire this thing? indulge in such activity? Considering these questions in a 'reasoned' manner will dis-illusion the hopes and investment I put into these desires. (fetishism) The Stoics always insist that factual knowledge or mere skill of argument is not enough, this is a constant refrain in Stoic literature. The threshold between language and soul, which the Stoa has so easily overcome with the argument of partaking in the logos, always resists mere language and 'consideration'. There has to be more than just 'understanding'. The Sto-ics call it 'conversion', when mere words transform themselves into a different understanding of things. In dialogue language and experience coincide to such degree, that 'something is understood' differently than mere memorisation and it effects a material change in the disposition of the 'prokopton'.

g. The Virtuous Choice

When one considers a thing to be useful, it begs the question about the 'intention' of this use. According to the intention the process of decision itself is judged 'good' or 'bad', and this is what is meant with ' homologoumenos bios '.

The use of reasoning in most classical philosophy however, needs to be understood in its context of, on the one hand in discussions with other schools, on the other in the education (psycha-goge) of the disciples. Logical dissection should not be performed for its own purpose. Dialogue is always meant as the way of questioning traditions and preconceptions. Although the theoretical edifice of the Stoics is complex and coherent, it is not there to convey ossified doctrines. The Stoic non-sage, questions his own impulses, in the analytical language of the passions; he also ques-tions those who care to talk to him about them. This resembles the Socratic method (of ' elenchus ') employing 'logos' to 'kindle the fire' of the love for wisdom.

The Stoic doctrine of actions is based of the differentiation of good and bad, virtuous and vicious actions relating to goods which are in themselves 'indifferent' (adiaphora). In this division the 'indifferents' (adiaphora) are the 'material' of the sage's judgment. Men act in accordance with nature, 'physis' (idia physis = human nature, which means human social live, family, politics, life in the state and community etc. i.e. ' kathechon ') and 'logos' (as in the partaking in 'logos', as part of cosmic

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92 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.34 f.
nature), the faculty of 'consideration of 'good' and 'bad' ('katorthoma'). Consideration presupposes a motivation and the highest motivation is virtue. ‘Logos’ and ‘physis’ are normative and critical concepts that relate to human actions. The Stoics separate two kinds of right actions. The ‘katechonta’ are actions which are justifiable by reason in relation to a probable good, but can never be a good in themselves. This means that they are not ‘virtuous’. Only when it is chosen 'for its own end' is it virtuous and thus ‘katorthoma’. The final end of all actions is coextensive with the 'autarkeia' of the sage, because of its independence from the series of causes (means and ends).

Humans act in accordance with nature (‘physis’). For instance, they love their children; but they are also able to do so in accordance to the rules and morals of a community.93 However, it is important to understand the distinction between 'katechon' and 'katorthoma' properly. The Stoics differentiate between things and actions, the first are 'adiaphora' and indifferent at all times, while acts are either good or bad, meaning the intention of an act is what is virtuous or not. Thus even things to which we ascribe a value in our life 'in accordance with nature', are not the proper locus of a decision. The locus of Stoic 'autarkeia' lies entirely in the motivation (impulse, horme) of an act. This obviously means that the distinction of 'good' or 'bad' is never applicable to things. These can never be good (agathon) or bad (phaulon) in themselves. Instead our motivation of their use is either good or bad. 94 In short the 'adiaphora' are not a third class between good and bad. Good and bad are the quality of actions in respect to adiaphora, at least as long as adiaphora are there to be acted upon, these two things do not exist on the same level. This is the source of the idea of 'autarkeia': all external objects are adiaphora because what matters are the motivations of actions, i.e. 'arete'.

From the point of view of a 'prokopton', the act of choosing is purely a reasoned and considered one. He does not have a permanent disposition of virtue but his reasoning may be more durable than others. Nevertheless he has to operate in a situation of total incertitude of choice because he is totally vicious. However, because he is 'in progress' he is already aware of this incertitude. His awareness is what carries his whole behaviour. He does not take things that are presented to him as proven facts. Traditions, habits, expectations and his 'status' among his community are only superficial.

factors in his considerations. Therefore 'what is preferred' amongst the 'adiaphora' is not only that it can be argued that they are 'natural' but also appropriate in the situation which he finds himself in. He has to understand his own surreptitious desires (i.e, fetishism) which express themselves in arguments to meet their external ends and consider whether his choice is guided by such a motivation rather than to find a virtuous motivation. Here the question of the 'natural' becomes important insofar as what is natural to humans is not only survival but also discourse (i.e. reason). What guides the 'prokopton' is logos as that which is 'natural' to humans in terms of consistency within confusion. The Stoic therapeutic discourse is a purgative which progressively dis-illusions presumptions and presuppositions which (mis-) guide the prokopton on his way. The discipline of 'prosoche', and discourse in terms of 'giving account' is the praxis of such a 'poietic' understanding of individual 'autarky'.

The philosophy of the ancient world 'educates', one way or another to lead a good life. For the Stoa this eudaimonic life was founded on the cosmic unity which expressed itself in virtue. Stoic cosmology and ontology underpins the form of 'reason' as normative without spelling out all rules for all cases. The virtue the Stoics speak about, is not is not a means to some external 'benefit'; the only benefit is virtue itself. It is the image of some hilarity to see the Stoic seem tranquil in situation of pain and anguish.\(^5\) Brennan\(^6\) points out quite rightly, that if Stoicism were just a way to put on the mask of indifference on one's face to keep up appearances, the Stoic school would not be of any interest other then as an art of acting. If it would really be an external appearance of the Stoic which is at the heart of these practices then people like Foucault would be right to understand it as an aesthetisation of the self; a fashion, a fancy costume and every time we realise how shallow it is we swap it for a new outfit. By reducing human freedom to 'virtue', to look at life 'sub specie virtutis' so to speak, everything else that happens becomes really indifferent. This is where the archaic 'agon' and its 'arete' return in an internal setting; all external things, all attachments and desires cannot rationally justify the virtuous act, it has to come from elsewhere. This becomes clearer if we understand why the Stoics point out, that virtue cannot be found 'where we' are not in control' (i.e. anything external to the soul),

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\(^{95}\) (".. er trägt kein zuckendes und bewegliches Menschengesicht, sondern gleichsam eine Maske mit würdigem Gleichmasse der Zuge, er schreit nicht und verändert nicht einmal seine Stimme: wenn eine rechte Wetterwolke sich über ihn ausgießt, so huldet er sich in seinen Mantel und geht langsamem Schrittes unter ihr davon."); walking away under a cloud of rain...FN Werke, Schlechta, Bd III. p.1030

\(^{96}\) T. Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate, p.4 f.
precisely because only virtuous acts, as understood from the 'agon', can have their motivation solely in themselves. External objects create an external motivation which is never ‘virtuous’. The ‘askesis’, ‘measure’, that we do not desire anything but ‘virtue’ is circuitous and therefore so hyperbolic. Who has no attachment has ‘everything’, which is the totality immediacy is regained, through de-individualisation by ‘homologoumenon’ with ‘logos’ and ‘physis’, life according to the divine ‘reason’.

The philosopher does not 'fight' with others, he struggles within his own soul for 'virtue', which is always only related to the internal 'motivation' of acts. This does not mean that the Stoics do not eat or do not have homes, or would not fight for them, it describes solely the state of attachment towards these things, a comportment or attitude. The ancient Greek idea of 'arete' and 'agon' describe this point perfectly.97 'Arete' consists in a different way of evaluation.

The conclusion is that knowledge and virtue are inseparable, the first leads necessarily to the other. Knowledge can only be virtuous because it circumscribes all which is a 'flourishing' life ('eudaimonia', 'a well lived life'), and therefore it is 'virtuous'. 'Eudaimonia' is defined through the motivation, or impulses ('horne') of acts, which means that, since all virtuous acts are performed for their own ends, 'eudaimonia' is not an external motivation for virtuous acts (as Kant would have it) but instead perfectly coextensive with virtue and knowledge.

As said above, 'agon' and 'arete' describe a different 'reality' in which what counts are not earthly goods but 'the Good' ('agathon'). One can understand all the examples of potlatch and excess, mutual gift giving etc. as forms of archaic 'agon'. According to Huizinga, the exchange of gifts is a 'agon'. The excess of giving reflects the irrelevance of (accumulative) 'value'. There cannot be any value in 'earthly things' i.e. in their accumulation as 'resource' (Bestand). I am comparing the structure of the 'agon' with the Stoic concept of intent. My suggestion is that this 'turning' of what is valuable (='real value'), this ‘conversion’, is 'the way of life', the 'bios', which is over and above the mere 'production' of 'zoe'. It has however been 'rationalised' by the Greek and Hellenistic philosophy into a 'private', i.e. 'poietic' praxis of the self. This way the originally public display of the 'agon'98, has become a private and 'individual' struggle.

97 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.9, also on “potlatch”, p.58
98 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.64
h. The Therapeutic Aspect of 'Logos'

Everything appears to move according to the cosmic law, but this just points to a
genral distribution of events. The Stoics tend to exaggerate the necessity governing
the cosmos to explain the realm they consider the proper place of human freedom,
which is the intention - no cosmic law can determine 'human intentions'. We are al-
ways 'free' to understand which things are virtuous and which are not (this is a cate-
gorical difference to the knowledge about the external world). This ability is not de-
pendent on external affairs but only on the individual disposition. The intent gives
meaning and organises the 'appearance' in which beings are understood 'as' some-
thing.

The Greeks insisted on actions, not just 'knowledge'. Knowledge has to be 'embod-
ied', and become one's nature, rather than being a disembodyed 'vessel of knowledge'.
The Greek experience of 'knowledge' and in particular 'ethics' was therefore a 'dig-
ging under our own feet', they first developed the wherewithal of psychagogic argu-
ment and consideration. This is not only a freedom of scrutinising arguments per se,
but scrutinising one's own way of thought and life in general.

The embodiment of virtue in the disposition of the sage, gives him the intuitive cer-
tainty of judgment, while everyone else has to 'master' the incertitude by 'considera-
tion'. 'Poetic' practice receives its abundance from the side of the incalculable but
also from the strife which comes from the blindness of the calculable. This happens
as an event, judgement is the singular which is encapsulated in the work of art and
momentarily sheds light on both, the singular and the general, as long as the judge-
ment is "fresh"99 in the Stoic sense.100

What is the relationship between the general (law) and the particular (case)? The
analogy with medicine shows that each particular case is based on exceptions which
can modify general rules. General rules cannot be applied to the individual without
taking account of the particular case.101 The complexity of any possible situation
(labyrinth), pure contingency which occurs within reason, i.e. language, make it nec-

99 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.381
100 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.51: logoi (non-religious and non-poetic) are pharmaka as in
Gorgia's Eukomium of Helen or Sophia rids the soul of pathe (Demokritus (Diels/Kranz B31)
ecessary for medicine to try to understand every case as a special case. Aristotle tells us, that "the person who is good at deliberation without qualification is the one who improvises according to reason and the best for a human being in the sphere of things to be done" (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethic, 1141b13-14); he associates this ideal closely with the observation that practical wisdom is concerned with particulars and not with general rules alone (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethic, 1141b14-16). "Wisdom is concerned with particulars": this may not mean it is outside all rules, but it evades the subsumption to a degree. This degree is 'what is human' in the sense, that the necessary complexity is incomprehensible and 'indeterminate ('aoriston').

General rules therefore do not encapsulate the whole of the ethical situation, there is a substantial surplus, excess, which determines the situation and has to be elicited in the singular: this is wisdom and not knowledge, if knowledge is only the ability to apply general rules. Wisdom however concerns itself with the particular. We already know that in the age of philo-sophy 'sophia' is what has already been lost; philosophy is the labour of mourning which seeks to overcome and translate this loss or absence into an new form of discourse. "In the context of love and friendship, it is possible that Aristotle may recognise particularity in a yet stronger sense, recognising that some valuable forms of ethical attention and care are not even in principle generalisable." ... "Situations must be grasped with an "eye" for all their complexities: in short Aristotle twice remarks, "the discrimination lies in perception" (EN 1109b18-23; cf. 1126b2-4).... But the ability also requires a resourceful imagination, and an ability to confront the new case, picking out its salient properties. This ability, Aristotle plausibly insists, must be learned through experience - for only experience of particulars yields an eye for what is salient and an ability to seize the occasion (kairos 1096a32), where medical imagery is used again.

The medical analogy however, does not hold in one particular case. The theory of medicine is not necessary for the patient (asymmetrical relationship) but necessary for ethics (autarkeia). Philosophy is not an asymmetric relationship and finding out the theory of ethics as a goal in itself will be beneficial for the patient. The use of 'logoi' is already necessary for the effectiveness of 'logoi' as 'pharmakon'.

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102 Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethic, 1107a29-32; 1137b17-19; 1103b34-1104a10
103 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.67
104 Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethics, V. 1128a 25 ff.
105 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.67
106 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.68
tient has to understand the arguments for their efficacy. Since man 'dwells in thinking', at least in his normal state, he is accessible through words. There is a necessary condition of 'order' in the 'patient' itself which makes him susceptible (or not) for the study of ethics. However, there is a 'logos' for every (or most, i.e. severe disorders are expressly excluded) conditions of the soul. Since every human acts in accordance with a motivation (=impulse) and such a motivation is open to 'logoi', it is in principle possible to clarify the motivation and guide a person to the 'good' = virtuous motivation for his actions with arguments. Equally, there is a suspicion of pupil's own statements which could be deceiving (need to be analysed in terms of 'denial' etc.), even if unknown to the pupil itself.

There is a certain ambiguity about the universal law and exceptions or individual cases. The underlying argument is on the side of the law but the individual case is always particular and exceptional. As in medicine, the judiciary is guided by the individual case. Every case has its own merits or exceptional circumstances (occasio) which cannot be decided purely according to a law. Instead the 'law' has to be decides in each case. This decision is based on the case (exception) and the law. The individual does not move according to the 'laws of nature', it is exceptional. This Stoic 'situationism' satisfies the archaic incomprehensibility of the 'logos' (labyrinth) and the principle access to it (riddle). For the prokopton the situation is the same as for someone who has received his oracle from Delphi: everything is before his eyes, but he has not understood yet.

"Life is a carefully crafted work of art to the sage." For the sage life is the material for his judgment. This is the agon for the sage. Although this judgement is his, its normativity flows from its partaking in the cosmic logos. Between these poles he creates his life like the artist (technites) creates a work of art. His life is 'produced' like the work of art. The term 'poietika' used by the Stoics in relation to the 'moral goods' again relates to a causality within the strife for virtue. They are things which will be supportive causes for the enhancement of a virtuous state of mind without causing the conversion themselves. This effectiveness is not, something external, but a relation of the whole to the part. The Stoic concept of 'eudaimonia' is not some external telos (end) of virtuous actions, but is integral to the virtuous disposition it-

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108 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.70
109 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.26
110 "Dem Weisen wird sein Leben zum planvoll gestalteten Kunstwerk." Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.206
Therefore the class of objects called 'poietika kai telika' (e.g. virtues) are not simply an external means but ends in themselves.

i. Virtue as Wisdom

I have been using the words 'good' and 'virtue' a lot without clarifying these concepts. What is virtue? The four Greek virtues are justice, piety, courage, temperance and their totality is called wisdom, but it also means any form of excellence and success in human actions. Anyone could be said to have 'arete' in the sense of a skill, which is based on a knowledge of the matter. For Socrates the question of this 'knowledge' becomes a question of definitions: knowledge is the ability to give a definition. The realm of arete is political-moral action (courage, piety, temperance (sophrosyne), justice (dike) and wisdom (sophia)); whereas 'techne' is used as an analogy in the sense of its ability to 'give account', and then he asks about the possible 'knowledge' of such actions in terms of a definition which would withstand dialectical questioning. Many dialogues inquire into the relations of these virtues, whether they are the same and how they relate to the 'good' ('agathon') as the general term for the virtues and whether they are teachable. This question remains unanswered and therefore the knowledge of virtue remains on the border between the human and the divine.

Virtue is the 'knowledge' of the 'good' (agathon), manifesting itself in the virtuous act flowing from the virtuous disposition. In Socratic terms however, it is unattainable to humans in a perfect form of 'episteme', except in the negative way of 'knowing not to know', which is Socrates' starting point - 'known unknowns' so to speak. After his trial Socrates argues about the act of evading the sentence, saying that he would flee if someone could make an argument which he could not refute. This means, that 'virtuous' has to be found within dialectical argument. The Stoics hold on to this idea in the form of the term 'homologoumenos' which means that the sage's decisions are 'consistent' in terms of discourse, virtue equals reason equals nature.

Socrates revaluates values in a conversation; he questions the reasoned account of virtuous actions. The interlocutor has to admit not only that he is wrong but also that the opposite is not true either, there is no knowledge of a matter at all. Socratic ignorance opens the realm of 'being on the way' as dialogue between people who progress.

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111 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.180 f.
112 Plato, Crito, 46.b
more or less on this path to the knowledge of the 'good'. The Stoics hold that the sage is possible, but nobody admits to be the sage. The sage is a reminiscence of the Presocratic past and appears as the divinely inspired figure, of measure and 'possibility'. The original Presocratic enthusiasm of logos, language as riddle, keeps open the realm of language which prevents a merely 'objectifying' understanding. Plato's dialogues leave the question of whether virtue is teachable or not open. His attempt at answering this question is the doctrine of anamnesis (Meno), where Socrates elicits geometrical knowledge from the uneducated slave boy by asking him questions. In analogy, the knowledge of the 'good' is already in our soul, and it means it is not taught as something unknown but it is taught as something which is there by the nature of the soul itself. The doctrine of anamnesis works as a surrogate concept of 'human nature', as this nature will be expounded by the Stoics later. Virtue is of an essentially different category to the knowledge of external objects (techne), it can evaluate other kinds of knowledge, i.e. according to 'good' and 'evil' instead of useful not useful, correct or incorrect. Virtue is not a specific knowledge and therefore Socrates can claim that he does not teach 'anything' (particular) other than knowledge itself, and therefore it cannot be instrument to something else. This means virtue is the measure of all else. Virtue is the 'intent' or 'telos' in respect of actions. This is why the Stoic sage is 'self-sufficient' (autarkeia); which means that he is arche and telos. He lives to be able to apply his virtue.\textsuperscript{113}

It marks the decline from wisdom to 'philosophy', when 'wisdom' as virtue has become public argument\textsuperscript{114} or even entertainment\textsuperscript{115} and Socrates draws the consequences by turning the view 'towards the 'inside', the soul or self (so away from the 'sensible' as the revelation of 'truth'. The link between the divine and human has turned into the nature of the soul, as partaking in the spiritual universal sphere like the gods themselves. Wisdom as a knowledge which is not instrumental to something else, is not technical knowledge, but is able to judge other knowledge. If it consists of a 'recollection' of non-sensible (divine) knowledge then it is more akin to original human nature.

In the 'Apology', Socrates does not claim to teach anything; he does not claim to have the virtue of wisdom, he therefore explicitly denies to have any knowledge (i.e.

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{113} Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p.9 f.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Colli, GdPh, p.92
\item \textsuperscript{115} The question of 'What is ...?' is a common form, Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.111
\end{footnotes}
to be wise); however, he claims that to be able to evaluate knowledge(-claims) it is necessary to have virtue and this means to have wisdom, as an ability to judge 'good' and bad' and he proves it by debunking the Athenian's false claims to knowledge. He may not be 'wise' but as philosopher he is wiser than the others. Is what is 'good' sayable in clear definitions? It appears as an ultimate goal, but Socrates does not come any closer to it. His aim is solely to 'kindle the fire of the love of wisdom', to put people 'on the way' and to examine their (perceived) knowledge. This enthusiasm for wisdom oscillates between the analogy of technical 'knowledge' and the divine 'wisdom' represented by the Delphic oracle. The Stoa explored these problems by formalising them into a structured system of therapy. Chrysippus saw that the virtuous disposition to virtuous actions is 'virtue' itself. Virtue is the action which has its end in itself and which is not directed at external ends. Virtue is the impulse (horme) to do 'good' actions. What is the relation of virtuous disposition, virtuous impulse, to the 'good' (agathon)? The 'good' is not external to the virtuous action in the sense that virtues are instrumental to the 'good'.

The Stoic equation is: what is in my control is the possibility to act with 'arete'. Virtuous is what is 'logical' i.e. 'natural' according to the cosmic principle. The 'good' (agathon) is the virtuous choice which is not motivated by external objects. By virtue of partaking in the 'logos', the human soul can 'live in accordance with nature'. This would have been alien to the archaic Greek understanding of 'arete', which appeared not to be 'natural', on the contrary, the 'rules' were what was man-made, in a way the 'nomos' (custom, law), as tradition. This 'aristocratic' Homeric age of heroes and sages, has disintegrated by the time of Heraclitus and the connection to the world of the Presocratics was based on the link between 'physis' and 'nomos'. If one sees it from the analogy of medicine, which is probably the most common explanation of philosophic activity at that time, common to most schools, the normative baseline is 'health', which is itself not an abstract concept we could define with any certitude. Rather, it is a pragmatic attitude which is always hard to question and harder to define precisely. So the methods of all the different schools are not meant to define ontological categories of 'health'. Instead they are only useful insofar as they have the desired effect in the particular moment of the dialogue with the teacher (or therapist). The question is only: does it work? and the apparently coherent theory around becomes nothing more than a mental support for those not yet completely accustomed
to the necessary therapeutic habits. Probably because the Stoics were much less exclusive than other schools and continued the Socratic Eros of 'paideia', this mental support was considered acceptable. Plato grounded the health of the soul on his ontological system. We will see, that this 'ontology' has to explain the possibility of understanding as a movement, which not only generates understanding, i.e. knowledge, but at the same time it constitutes the self of the 'knower', and is thus reflexive. The knower knows that he knows. What happens to him if he admits not to know? He has to take 'care of his self'.

I hope it has become clearer what the Stoic development consists of: the archaic 'arete' has been turned into the universal 'nature' of the cosmos; physis, 'logos' and human partaking in 'logos', ontologises 'arete', and roots it firmly in a 'consideration', which, again, is not vacuous arguing, but is meant as a way of changing the disposition of the soul, is a material change of the soul (following Stoic 'materialism'; therefore their sophisticated theory of causation within the cosmos as fate etc. follows their ethics, by confirming the 'logical' unfolding of the world. The cosmos is an organism, so good and bad are balanced in the overall picture, even if not in every particular locality.). There is an ontological connection between virtue, physis and logos, a form of necessity which renders actions good or bad, depending on the disposition of the soul. This is not an ethics of commandments but a logic of embodiment, because discourse and reason do not provide the 'good' virtuous decision, it is the virtuous disposition of the agent that performs the action of a judgement.

The highest knowledge is the knowledge of virtues. The knowledge of virtue is wisdom (Plato, Polit.3). It does not occur just as 'theoretical knowledge' it is also always embodied in the sage's actions. Wisdom determines or rather constitutes the 'self' of the sage. His character, or disposition becomes 'durable'.

i. Virtue and Conversion

The 'quality' of the sage, his 'hexis' or disposition, has to be durably virtuous because a temporarily virtuous intention would allow vicious intentions which would not be very sage-like. He is able to differentiate (discretio) in any given situation 'what is and what is not under his control', which is another way to say that what 'is' ontologically is only our intention, the Heideggerian "as". There is an equation between knowledge and disposition. The disposition is produced by exercise, and the one who decides to exercise has to have already understood suffering. The disposi-
tion of man is the way how things appear, what the 'sense' of beings is. It is the formulation of the essential hiatus between logos and human 'life' and therefore the necessity of 'strife;' for a way of life as an interpretation of its 'how?'.

What does the sage know? He is able to distinguish what is a moral question and when to apply his judgement. So not only is he able to distinguish but also to perceive the situation on which he decides in the 'right' way. There is therefore more to the virtue of the sage than the 'knowledge' what is one's own. The Stoics simply describe this in the form of perception, but obviously this is more complex than the structure phantasía / axioma (appearance and proposition expressing it)- synkatasthesia (assent) - horme (impulse); the process of 'consideration' as the 'critical' faculty (logos) is the analytical tool providing -the 'natural' way of also being able to act otherwise. In his ability of distinction and choice, the sage is durably disposed to be virtuous. He judges intuitively because his Being has qualitatively changed. I think it should have become clearer, why I argue that the Stoic theory of judgement, although talking about eternal law (of the cosmos), is in effect a theory of the constitution of law and judgement as intuition and thus a self, which resembles Heidegger's Dasein. The Stoics (Chrysippus insisted on this) see the passions as parts of the rational soul. There are no rational and irrational parts of the soul, on account of the passions being judgements too. This is interesting in so far as it makes 'passions' not something that is innate but something acquired like a disposition. What is acquired is the form of judgement which expresses the 'horme' the drive or desire in relation to survival and the social sphere. I think this is important for human behaviour in the void of uncertainty. Passions are always already present in the 'Man' ('They') of the people the Stoics live with.

The Stoics claim that the human drive towards reason, by virtue of his ability to speak, is also the drive for virtue itself. The value of virtue and the indifference of external objects in relation to it is therefore innate to human beings through their ability to speak. This is the 'homologoumenos bios'. We do not live in the immediacy and necessity of not only 'animal life' but also keep traditions open to scrutiny. Traditions are also the ways we use 'passions' - and thus always fall back into the (pleasurable: "sweeter than honey") logic of, for instance, 'anger', a common topic for the analysis of passions in Stoic literature. Just anger and vengeance are part of (Roman) culture but not innate and therefore they make people behave worse than wild beast
because they are unable to withhold themselves from the logic of vengeance and go
to extremes. Seneca probably knew what he was talking about having lived in the
age of Caligula and Nero.

What is the 'prokopton' to do? The Stoic thesis is that since passions are 'rational' as­sumptions, they are open to rational consideration, but first one has to become aware
of one's inner movements (i.e. judgements). Philosophy is the practice of this aware­ness and of change. The whole theoretical edifice of philosophy is aimed at making
this practice, this 'embodiment' or habituation intelligible to someone who wonders
whether and how one might improve one's life. What we need to do is to become
aware of what we actually do/think as we perform everyday tasks. 'Discretio'
(phronesis) is only possible in this duality of self-awareness. The falsity of judge­ments lies not in their effects but in their intention, the intention (horne, impulse) is
based on assumptions that do not withstand consideration of what is in one's own
power.

5. Conversion

Conversion is a U-turn; a turning around of the whole of one's life with all its habits
and the presuppositions on which these are based in everyday life. Conversion means
turning what we think of as real into what is not real and what we think of as not real
into what is real. What we think as real is what is familiar in the way of animal sur­vival, therefore to turn the eye on one's self means to turn away from the outside to
the inside without becoming one's object. This resembles Heidegger’s turn from 'be­ing concerned with' (Besorgen) to the resolve (Entschlossenheit) or Dasein’s self­disclosure. For the Stoics all habits, indiscriminately, are wrong if they are not per­formed with reason, i.e. a consideration which is itself embedded in disposition. The
lack of perfect wisdom means that arguments are needed to find the best possible ap­proach.

The paradigm of conversion (peri- or meta-strophe) is Platonic. "Training for 'death'
is training to die to one's individuality and passions in order to look at things from
the perspective of universality and objectivity". It invites the philosopher into the
immortality of thought. The inverted reality of everyday life shows the faint similar­ity, or sublimation, of the archaic riddle and the risk of death. Here the risk is build­in as the trade-off for the admission into the timeless kingdom of 'logos'. The riddle

116 Hadot, PhWL, p.95
has become internalised and embodied, insofar as the drive of survival and individual life are afflictions and error which need to be overcome by the eternal logos. Temporality is a sign of falsehood. Being 'dead' to the temporal is the liberation into the eternal logos. "Nothing in human life is worthy of concern ...".\textsuperscript{117} Conversion then is the turn to the eternal 'logos', away from the sensible world. The soul which is unaffected by the sensible will turn to the 'Good' by itself.\textsuperscript{118}

The divine 'logos' is thought thinking itself. To be dead to the sensible means to return into the permanence of the universal logos. This would however deny the temporality of life itself. Thought and understanding then, must be guided by this universal thinking. This thinking as virtue is the thinking of the 'one' the unity that the 'logos' gives to men. Thinking is division and union and the highest and virtuous is to know that all separation of beings and all classification roots in the 'one'.

Conversion involves this nexus between thought and one's own life, like a medicine that is swallowed and incorporated, so the soul is acted upon by 'logoi'.\textsuperscript{119} The use of words, as deliberation or inner dialogue is an exercise which liberates us from the tyranny of passions.\textsuperscript{120} The body as the sensible is full of desires, but it has to make them felt in perceptions which come together with 'axiomata' (statements), desires are always also words. These words however are not the desires themselves, they are so to speak displacements of desires, they are not what they seem to be. This is where Psychoanalysis sets up its tents. Stoics were aware of these deceptions, they were also aware of necessity of the 'kairos', the right moment for actions and words, if these words were to achieve their best therapeutic effect.

Although conversion is often described as a sudden enlightenment, it is a passage and mostly a long one, from one state of the soul to another, in the Stoic case it is a 'material' change in the state of the soul. The stages are: 1) ignorance, 2) suffering (through reason-life dichotomy), 3) recognition of suffering (through reason), 4) understanding of the causes of suffering, 5) eudaimonia. Conversion as a passage between two worlds of realities refers back to the archaic age of Heraclitus. His critique of common beliefs about the world and the 'real' knowledge of 'wisdom' about the world is still audible in 'philosophy'. It has however changed some aspects.

The passage of conversion is like the Delphic oracle, everything is said but one has

\textsuperscript{117} Plato, Politeia, 604 b-d
\textsuperscript{118} Plato, Meno, 81e
\textsuperscript{119} For the Stoics the soul is also 'substance', and as such part of the body, but not a subject as (hypokeimenon).
not understood the message yet. After the event the message is crystal clear. The prokopton learns in this passage how to understand the riddle, which he himself is. To the conversion belongs the end (telos), a method and a 'natural' disposition. Since the 'being on the way' means not being the one nor the other, i.e. being the in-between, man is always somewhere 'not'. Socrates is here the paradigmatic intermediary because his 'not-knowing', or ignorance, has progressed from the phantasma of knowledge, the ignorant ignorance to a cognoscent ignorance.

One can say that all philosophies describe the life of desires as a 'mad' life, driven by things which are open to the contingency of fate, and passions. Being driven in such a way, is a disease of the soul, an unbalanced state. Such a state is recognisable by its unreasoned judgements. Appropriate actions cannot flow from a confused soul, and a soul is confused when it is not consistent (disposition) and thus rational in its choices. Rationality in this sense is a calculation, an optimisation of my psychical state, assuming that I wish to be in a tranquil and considered state. One should not mistake it for a state of mind itself. Consideration is a tool and exercise, but the state of mind which the philosopher seeks is one of openness - being attentive but not focused on an object. To solve a riddle one has to listen to all the meanings of the words, not just to the superficial, but to the metaphorical and hidden meanings. The metaphorical meaning is a diversion, the distance across which Apollo's arrows are hitting their target. His ways are indirect and surreptitious (arrows, disease etc.).

When the god invents a metaphor it is still in some reasoned but indirect way connected to what is hinted at. The sage's wisdom is able to follow these serpentine paths and connect the seemingly disparate. How does he do it? He is versed in 'prosoche', awareness to what presents itself and is able to follow and understand the thread of thought which is invisible to others. Equally, the philosopher learns through the exercise of awareness to the contingent situations which present themselves to him and considers the right judgements and actions appropriate to them.

The image of death goes two ways. The sage is threatened with death by the riddle while the philosopher seeks 'death' by exercise. We can interpret this now better. The death for Plato is a 'being dead to this (perishable) world', as to this 'sensible and temporal' world; a sense eagerly taken up by Christianity. The death of the sage is the game he has to engage in to be a sage: he lives under the rule of the agon and one

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120 Hadot, PhWL, p.95
121 Colli, GdPh, p.18
cannot refuse the offer of an agon without losing his life: because one's life is irrelevant. Philosophy takes up this idea metaphorically by saying that if one is to be able to follow these invisible threads one has to be dead to the superficial appearance which deceives the view of the underlying connections.

The 'conversion' is a disclosure of Dasein to itself (in its temporality and possibilities). In Heidegger's case, it is the 'nullity' (Nichtigkeit) of Dasein, i.e. its Being, as the 'Open' or the 'clearing while in antiquity it is a virtuous comportment, that makes beings be seen as they present themselves. If conversion is the letting go of attachment to external objects then the care for the self is ethical too. This however means, if we interpret it through the 'agon', the irrelevance of anything except the virtuous comportment and disposition of the self. The result is the same: man is a surface, within which things appear as meanings (judgements). Beyond all 'as' is the hermeneutical situation itself, which constitutes the 'self' of the philosopher. The strife (polemos) of interpretation, of thought is the original movement that creates, "setting truth into work". The work of the Stoic is a letting-truth set itself into the work which is the sages comportment, his 'way of life'. The very own of the Stoic sage is, that he does not confuse external things with what is his 'own' and thus does not identify himself with external things.

Although the Stoa points to people who are obsessed with becoming rich, seeking public offices and fame etc., it does not say that all external things are bad, instead they only point out that one should 'not to be taken over' by the desire for the one or other. The Stoic 'indifference' goes further than just avoiding 'being driven', by taking up the concept of the 'self', as an individual, as the self-responsible actor whose authority comes from an universal 'logos'. The self is constituted by the movement of thinking, and this means it is had ('echo') by logos.

Conversion is a turning to my 'own' being possessed by logos. What is in my 'own' power means to look at the 'self' not as a body but as a process of thinking. This is a process, a way of approaching things with 'consideration'. This consideration, however, although innate as a faculty of 'logos' has to be exercised like a craft, as techne, but this does not mean that there is a 'techne' of the self and that it can be 'said'.

\[122\] \text{"...der, der die Wahrheit kennt, soll sie auch }\text{» sagen» ...".Colli, GdPh, p.185}
The 'self' itself is a techne of thinking. ... 'Biou techne', the 'art of life'123 describes the knowledge of a pharmakon that furthers psychic health through internal exercises.

'Conversion' can be understood as a 'turning' ('Kehre'), precisely from thinking Being as the 'Being of beings' to thinking from Being itself (Seinsdenken). Because thought turns to itself, as recognition of temporality, possibilities and authenticity the own 'way of life' comes into view not as a 'being' but as what is the locus of the 'giving' ('es gibt'), which gives a 'way of life'. Heidegger's 'language of Being' is the language of 'Seinsdenken' and therefore cannot be the language of common metaphysics. This 'turning' is a complex process of contradictions weaving themselves together. On one hand the oblivious taking for granted of the presence of 'beings' and, on the other hand, the way Dasein turns its gaze onto itself by way of 'Seinsdenken'. The third aspect is the "Auseinandersetzung" (polemos-logos), which is the 'turning' between Dasein and Being, in which Dasein's possibilities are unfolded historically.

123 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.5
Chapter 4

Heidegger and the Stoics

The question of the thesis was how art comes about. What kind of self is necessary to produce a work of art, which has turned in Heidegger’s inquiry into an ontological foundation. This question has now shifted to the concept of the ‘author’ of such a work, which changes and institutes practices which change the modes in which Being is comprehended. Heidegger uses the Aristotelian concept of techne to understand how Being materialises itself in the work and then ‘works’ out of this work as the a priori truth into which Dasein is thrown. The Stoic concept of paideia and conversion is equally grounded in the idea of techne (techne psyche), by which the ‘self’ is re-constituted in a conversion. This too is a poietic process, and has necessarily to find some ‘a priori’ from which it is constituted. This is ‘arete’ or ‘agathon’ as the ‘telos’ of ‘human nature’. ‘Human nature’ is the truth of the human self which sets itself into work in the exercises of the Stoics.

The guiding question of this thesis has therefore now become: how is any agency of change possible? The Greek answer was that change is explained by movement, thought and possibility while persistence is explained by eternal perfection of the ‘idea’ or ‘telos’. Heidegger uses Heraclitus’ fragment 51: ”People do not understand how that which is at variance with itself agrees with itself. There is a harmony in the bending back, as in the cases of the bow and the lyre.“ to undermine the metaphysical dualism between persistence and change, Being and becoming. The relation between Dasein and Being constitutes change and temporal persistence as one single and unified movement of fate (Geschick) and this fate has to be achieved in strife (polemos). ‘Geschick’ is ‘ordeal’ or predicament. In ‘Being and Time’ Heidegger takes the step to determine human existence as Dasein, that which makes ‘meaning’ out of its essential absence (ek-static), out of not being self-identical totality and thus atemporal. According to Plato and Aristotle that which has possibilities has also a soul, a self has the possibility of choice. ¹ This means that thinking has possibility ‘not to’ (dynamis) because it is ‘essentially’ a ‘not-yet’. The thinking that has choice constitutes a self as Dasein: it has a world that gives meaning to what presents it-

¹ Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III. p.152
self: conversely, Dasein is thrown into its world which gives meaning to beings, it is not its choice: thought constitutes a ‘self’ out of the givenness of its mode of Being. Dasein’s active interpretation forms and changes its world and its ‘self’. Aristotelian ‘phronesis’, the knowledge of active life and ‘techne’, the concept of productive knowledge, are two aspects of human existence Heidegger accepts, while ‘theoria’, the pure contemplation of the eternal disappears out of this picture because the perfect and eternal cannot be part of Dasein, it would be the end of Dasein as polemos and logos. Therefore the Greek’ concept of ‘eternal’ ideas, logos, morphe is brought back into a temporal setting, but without loosing ist teleological character as that which is ‘a priori’.

Hermeneutical interpretation is the movement of thought that discloses its possibilities in the reinterpretation (Wiederholung) of tradition. Thought has always to think ‘something’ which is outside itself (just like Heidegger’s Dasein is outside ‘itself’ as the ‘care-structure’). Heidegger explores the essence (Wesen) of such a being that is not a ‘being’ but that makes beings ‘presence’ themselves in an ‘as’- structure. The productive knowledge of techne is at the basis of all ontology of the Greeks.\(^2\) The techne has a knowledge of the ‘telos’ of the movement, it is a specialist knowledge, like medicine. ‘Phronesis’ is the knowledge of judgement without the specialist knowledge of production.\(^3\) The production of ‘techne’ is the fundamental conceptualisation of Greek ontology: ‘Bringing – forth’ is a knowledge of how to bring into ‘presencing’ (Anwesen). The movement of such ‘bringing-forth’ ‘as’ something determines all possibilities of Dasein. However, all such production is dependent on the knowledge of the ‘telos’ or ‘eidos’ which is the truth or essence of what is to be brought into ‘presencing’ (Anwesen). As we have seen in the previous chapter, the ‘telos’ or the ‘idea’ of the ‘good’ or ‘arete’ is the highest (and eternal) form of knowledge of human actions. This ‘technical’ understanding’ of all bringing-forth also applies to one’s own soul. Within this dynamic arc between ‘arche’ and ‘telos’, the self is ‘on the way’, as ‘energeia’ or in the Platonic term as ‘paideia’ of the self. The self changes and with this change its Being changes too. The question how the ‘telos’ changes is then answered: with a new inception (‘arche’) which comes from the transcendence of ‘Being’.

\(^2\) The Platonic demiurgos is a ‘technites’ too.
\(^3\) Jaeger, Paideia, Vol.2, p.87
Heidegger and the Stoics agree that change of the self is not only possible but necessary. It takes place as the movement of logos, as ‘polemos’⁴, the tension between the transcendent Being and Dasein which exists only insofar as it performs the ‘polemos’. The Stoic life is a considered life. Thinking as polemos and logos are forms of ‘consideration’, forms of giving account. In consideration the disposition, or ‘hexis’ of the soul changes. The Stoic idea of virtue and wisdom implies, that such a thinking is not disengaged from the everyday as Aristotle’s ‘theoretikos’ may be considered to be. On the contrary, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the everyday is the ‘material’ of the sage’s virtue. Without the everyday the sage would not be a sage. He is therefore not a divine figure outside temporality, he is a Socratic figure which is ‘atopos’ (inbetween), knowing what is in his power and what is not, the ‘known unknowns’.

1. Conversion and the Self

The Stoic exercises for a conversion are a struggle for the constitution of an ‘authentic’ self; ‘authentic’ ‘according to nature’(kata physis). According to Heidegger, it is the state of anxiety, when the unity of a world from which all things receive everyday meaning disintegrates to become ‘questionable’ and to give way to a process of essential self-disclosure (Entschluss) of the self. Conversion then would be the constitution of the ‘authentic’ self that understands its essence (Wesen) as ‘care-structure’. The Stoic reasoning has the purpose to bring about such a state too: for the Stoics ‘according to nature’; for Heidegger according to the temporality of Dasein and its ‘project’ (Entwurf); for both this means according to ‘logos’, as that in which all beings receive their mode of presencing (Anwesen). The ground of such a ‘presencing’ (Anwesen) is the ‘techne’ as bringing forth, whether as ‘physis’ or a human ‘techne’, both operate according to the same model of ‘arche’ and ‘telos’.

Involvement with beings is necessary, but at the same time it is part of an illusion about one’s self. For Heidegger, proper ‘care’ is the care of the ‘self’, as the ‘awareness’ of the process itself of ‘making meaning’ through the ‘care-structure’. The originary human involvement is the ‘decision’ (Entschluss) about the form of such involvement and its preceding ‘inception’ or ‘arche’. For the Stoa, as for Heidegger, man has to turn away from attachment to things, towards himself as the happening of

⁴ “Polemos und logos sind dasselbe.” Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p.47
meaning. Dasein is the process of 'making meaning' in its strife for disclosure, while for the Stoics man 'partakes' in logos; in both instances human actions 'reveal' a world as well as the way by which they are revealed and which 'comes over' man from the 'Ungeheure' (uncanny). The Aristotelian 'echon' in the phrase 'zoon logon echnon', goes both ways: logos has the zoon, as much as the zoon has logos. Partaking is a form of 'echo' (having and being possessed). The 'polemos' comes over Dasein and determines a 'self' as the way things 'presence' themselves.

'Gelassenheit' ('letting-be') is for Heidegger a version of the 'polemos', in a muted terminology, but still a strife for meaning as a movement of 'presencing' (Anwesen).\(^5\) The strife for meaning which takes place as the action of the 'poets and thinkers' is an 'agon' and as such it is a 'judgement', a 'decision' about what persists as tradition and constitutes the essence of Dasein. 'Agon' is a 'trial by ordeal' or the 'judgement of god', which decides the form and path that the unfolding of a particular way of disclosure (i.e. Being) takes and this is Heidegger's superior agency of 'history'. Was there to be no strife, be it as 'polemos' or 'Gelassenheit', meaning would disappear and so would Dasein. The 'agonic' character of 'polemos' is rooted in the strife for the self because this self is always the product of a disclosure of Being, of that original 'setting apart' of 'polemos' (Aus-einander-setzung). Such creative (schöpfen) 'thesis' (setting) is not action of a self but action which constitutes the self and its essence (Wesen). The 'agon' is the 'habit' (ethos) of 'partaking' in the cosmic 'logos' which is impersonal because it precedes the constitution of the soul itself. Detachment or 'letting-be' (Gelassenheit) means the freedom from being occupied by things, and turning to what makes these things 'visible' in the first place: the self which is that from which all disclosure is possible. In the process of conversion the 'self' as the basis of judgement is 'thrown up' into the air redefining (unfolding) the action of thought and disclosure itself. The whole self 'turns around' towards itself. The judgement that constitutes the self also first establishes the way we encounter the particular, a situation, observation etc.

The 'poiesis' of the Stoic disposition describes the constitution of a self in the first place. As Gadamer points out in his essay 'Vorformen der Reflexion\(^6\) that to have choice, in the form of possibility (dynamis), is only possible for a self that is aware

\(^5\) Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.81 f.
\(^6\) Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III
of itself. In Aristotelian terminology self-movement (auto-kine
esos) and possibility (dynamis) make temporal human existence thinkable. The possibility to change, to have a choice, the 'polemos' of Heidegger, is Dasein itself. And, Dasein is only itself if it makes 'authentic' choices. The work of the 'self' is 'energeia', the 'being on the way' within its possibilities (dynamis). These possibilities are not arbitrary but determined by the concrete situation, the polis, birth, everything that is not in our control. Conversion as a turning around and away from the external world thus thematises the constitution of self and the modes of disclosure as much as of 'self'-disclosure.

2. The 'Ungeheure' (uncanny) and the Self

Heidegger translates the Aristotelian 'daimonia' as 'das Ungeheure' (uncanny, literally 'monstrous').

It is 'uncanny' because it is the 'withdrawal' of Being and does not 'emerge' itself as do all the other 'beings'. In Aristotle's Ethics, the demonic (divine) is the subject of the philosopher, the life of 'theoria', as the acme of 'eudaimonia'. For Heidegger it is an indication of the merely latent awareness of the 'question of Being' (Seinsfrage). "But the uncanny appears 'only' in the form of the 'un-uncanny' (i.e. everydayness)." It is not accessible in the form beings presence themselves and therefore the way we understand beings does not give us a clue about their constitution. Socrates has no 'access' to the divine, instead it 'comes over' him. This means he is not the 'author', but he has ears to hear. He is appropriately 'attuned' to divine wisdom by discerning its 'telos'.

Socrates uses two aspects of such a 'daimonia'. On the one hand his 'personal' daimon who warns him not to do something, on the other hand the 'Eros', which, as a god, seduces his listeners to educate their 'self', before they act on others. Meno compares Socrates with the sting of a sting-ray to describe the effect of paralysis that Socratic elenchos (examination) has on his interlocutor. At the same time Socrates offers to share the effort of argument and continues with his examination until some form of 'aporia' appears and the discourse comes to a halt. Hadot follows the myth of 'Eros', and describes the attributes of Eros as thrift and cunning. I have pointed this out in the previous chapter. This is a much more complex image of Socratic investigation and closer to the ways Socrates uses dialectics to disarm his interlocutors.

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7 Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethics, 1141b,7; GA54, Parmenides, p.150-54
8 GA54, Parmenides, p.151
It also shows the aspect of being determined to the ‘care of the self’ as a thrifty determination and not a ‘surrender’ to fate. Socrates is a hunter of beautiful souls (Jae­ger), he ties them with the bond of Eros to himself to shape them (paideia) to the love of wisdom. From loving Socrates they progress to love the ‘good’, ‘arete’ itself. As the mediator of the divine, Socrates ‘leads’ pedagogically the soul of the youth to the love of the ‘divine’ arete, without ‘teaching’ arete itself. He is ‘thrifty’ in mediation, not in the techne of arete but in the ‘techne psyche’, the seduction to the care of the self as a service to the divine and transcendental virtue.

The Socratic use of the daimon appears like a faint parody of the original conception which Aristotle describes as something of an ‘essential’ difference between the world of the humans to the divine and eternal. Heidegger uses this concept as an absolute otherness and alienness to the ‘Geheure’, the realm of our everyday explanation and understanding. The ‘Un-geheure’ is the exception by way of origin: The everyday comes from the exception. It is that from which all ‘un-uncanny’ (Geheure) originates. We have seen this process described already in UKW, where truth originates in ‘untruth’. The concept of redemption is rather alien to the Greeks anyway, the essence of Greek life lies in innerworldly ‘virtue’. As we have seen this concept is rooted in the agon and thus in the continuous ‘risk’ of death. This submission to a divine ‘ordeal’ is also a submission to the ‘Ungeheure’ which governs from outside of the ‘Geheure’ and is thus acknowledged in the agonic ritual.

Attunement (Stimmung) as a disclosive affect ‘comes over’ Dasein; it is a ‘given’ disclosure. Fate (Schicksal) is dispensed by the ‘arche’ of the inception of Being. The ‘shine’ from the ‘Ungeheure’ comes equally ‘over’ Dasein. Everything ‘is given’ and overwhelms Dasein that dwells in the (Geheure). But Dasein dwells in ‘dianoia’, in thought, in its disclosive action and in a movement in which it is never itself, but always changing by thinking something and thus making meaning. Dasein is affected by the (Ungeheure), by (the possibilities of) Being. In UKW Heidegger uses the term ‘Stoß’ (thrust) to explain the way in which the ‘Ungeheure’ affects Dasein and changes its ‘truth’. The notion of ‘polemos’, as that human activity that wrestles a measure from Being is better understood as ‘respect’, ‘tact’ towards what discloses itself and is related to ‘dike’ (justice) which Heidegger interprets as ‘Fug’ (joint) in the Anaximander lecture.

9 “Die Wahrheit ist in ihrem Wesen Un-wahrheit.” UKW, p.40
10 “divine judgement”, Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.81
11 SdA, p.352 f.
To ‘dwell’ is an expression that focuses all of Heidegger’s main concepts: Dasein and Being, world and earth, thought, logos, polemos and polis, existence, facticity and fallenness (sich-vorweg-sein; schon-sein-in, sein-bei). To dwell already supposes a site. Not in a geographic sense, but as an unthematised grounding, a knowing-one’s-way. This site (Ort) as thought and logos also means the possibility to fail, to lose the agon or polemos, utter non-meaning, withdrawal and death.

Heidegger equates dwelling (wohnen) with a pastoral way of Dasein ‘to be’. He makes the point which he prepared in his Pannenides lectures (GA54) by thinking ‘dwelling’ as the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of Dasein from the creation of a ‘site’: the ‘polis’ preserves a fragile and temporal habitation which can turn into ‘a-polis’ at any time.

Heidegger sees the difficulty of the incomprehensibility of the totally different and uses the (Greek) metaphors of light, shining and visibility emanating from the divine: ‘theao’. This visibility is also the Greek conception of techne. ‘Bringing-forth’ (Hervorbringen) means to ‘let something appear’ (Erscheinenlassen) not to ‘make’ it, but to give visibility and a place and ‘site’ to dwell which has borders, and limits (‘Ein-friedung’). ‘Poiesis’ which is the act of techne and is therefore thought from the realm of visibility is enabled by the Un-geheure, the transcendent, and that which is not under the control of Dasein. The ‘possibility of ‘poiesis’ of judgements is then essentially linked to the Un-geheure.

3. Consideration, Decision and Volition

The Greek concept of thought is directional movement: life is kinesis. To think ‘something’ takes thought out of itself (ek-stasis), as Heidegger rephrases it and ‘boulesi’ (decision and volition) are synonyms of thought as the process of life,
Thought as movement is also a ‘production’ to perform self-constitution of truth. The priority of ‘techne’ serves as the model to the Being of beings in toto. This ‘production’ into visibility is the ‘bringing-forth’ of ‘techne’. ‘Techne’ is a knowledge of bringing into. The Stoic doctrine calls the constitution of a ‘self’, its ‘pneumatic constitution’ of ‘hexis’, which is the disposition of the soul through logos, the living according to logos (logoumenon). ‘Bringing-forth’ (poiesis) is always tied to a form of ‘knowing’. And this ‘knowledge’ stems from the vision of the telos, the eidos. In Heidegger’s terms it would be that Being dispenses a mode of ‘logos’, a temporary emergence of limited practices and possibilities that inhere in these practices and calls them ‘die Sage’. If the polemos – logos determines the ‘mode’ in which beings are disclosed, then the measure between disclosure and withdrawal is dependent on the human action within this logos. The self is a product of the application of this logos, thought, and therefore care of thoughts is the way to virtue, to the constitution of the self understanding its own constitution in its own ‘thoughts’. To change the soul one has to change thinking. The Stoic exercises happen on the individual level of thought. Thought is logos and therefore connected to the transcendent (Being).

Consideration shapes the pneumatic constitution of the soul. If Socrates is wisest in Athens, as the oracle said, and only knows that he does not know, his mode of thinking is to acknowledge the essential gap between the divine and transcendent. Therefore Heidegger calls Being the transcendent itself as what is hidden behind beings. That the self ‘is’ care-structure, means that it is ‘in-between’, the ‘unheimisch’ (unhomely) that which dwells in thought of something and not itself. The temporality of human existence as Dasein is rooted in what Aristotle describes as desires (horeksis) as absence: basic needs. These define human nature as deficient in relation to what is perfect. Metaphysics runs into the problems of the possibility of such perfect non-deficient eternal being of a self-thinking thought. How can what is perfect at all times have movement, thought, and make meaning? All answers end in an aporia

Need as absence is what is not in control. Incertitude is based on the human nature of need and absence. What is absent is not only food or shelter, absence is the absence of ‘telos’, that human condition always means to be ‘on the way’. The Stoa answers

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16 Jaeger, Paideia Vol.2, p.95
17 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.64
to this with education, an active process to fulfil the ‘arche’ of human beings. This does not mean to become divine, but to dwell perfectly in incertitude, and this means to have ‘arete’ and ‘phronesis’ because only when one is ‘human’ and is not in ‘control’ does one need ‘phronesis’.

‘Presencing’ (Anwesen) is a process based on something absent. Unlike the perfect and eternally present, the ‘idea’ or ‘hyle’, temporal beings disclose and withdraw themselves to and from humans. Heidegger ‘wrestles’ this processual character of disclosure and withdrawal from Aristotle to avoid the metaphysical bias between a perfect a-temporal and temporal imperfect. The processual imperfection of Dasein is Dasein’s ‘perfection’. This also opens the possibility for the phenomenological question how beings appear by themselves: it turns around the question of ‘things in themselves’ because beings are only revealed by the measure of their temporal disclosure in the ‘clearing’ (i.e Dasein). Therefore the phenomenological question is not about the absolute eternal present of beings in the intentionality of transcendental consciousness, but about the always already temporal presencing in the existing everyday consciousness.

To think is to think ‘something’: to be turned towards some ‘being’. This way a being is disclosed ‘as’ this or that. Without such intentionality there is neither thought nor logos nor a self. The self discloses itself to itself first ‘as’ something. But it is not a ‘thing’, it is an ‘absence’ that enables the setting up of the ‘clearing’ in which beings appear. This ‘setting apart’ (thesis, Aus-einander-setzung, polemos) is logos which gives measure to the ‘apeiron’ or the abyss (Ab-grund, chaos). Thinking is to address beings ‘as’ something. Thought gives them a place in its ‘world’, the world it has been thrown into. Thought as ‘polemos’ re-trieves (Wieder-holen) the tradition from the ‘arche’ of the first inception (Anfang) and re-interprets and unfolds it until it has arrived at its ‘telos’, either to dispose of Dasein or to initiate another inception. Heidegger’s ‘polemos-logos’ is a thetical setting-apart of both, the ‘apeiron’ in the inception and of the ‘world’ Dasein has been thrown into. This ‘world’ is the model, the measure from which beings disclose themselves to us. Like Plato’s demiurg, who, as a cosmic ‘technites’ (demiurgos) creates the world

18 Sheehan, Heidegger’s Philosopy of Mind, p.303
19 a kind of temporary ‘idea’.
by taking measure from the eternal ideas (which he did not produce)\textsuperscript{20}, so Dasein
takes measure from the historical mode of Being it has been thrown into. However,
this Dasein is just the possibility of a self, it changes with the change in the mode of
Being. Dasein is a dynamic force which constitutes itself in the process it itself is.
Not only in terms of its own mode as the process of interpretation (volition), but also
in terms of the world it is thrown into, i.e. its ‘care-structure’, Dasein has to exist in a
given situation, and this situation determines the way it understands itself and the
situation. As the historical self, Dasein thinks polemically and in this process it does
not only change its interpretation but by extension also itself as it unfolds its possi-
blilities.

Heidegger describes the end of consideration, of polemos, as ‘death’, as the ultimate
limit of the possibility of ‘meaning’. Humans are aware of death only as the death of
others, but their own death as finality of possibilities is not the bodily death but the
end of meaning. In its ‘agonic’ traces consideration is a ‘polemos’, an inquiring dis-
course and effort, testing the limits of what is sayable and what is unsayable, disclos-
able or undisclosable. For the Stoics consideration is not just logic, rhetoric and dia-
lectic, but an account that inherently changes the disposition of the soul as it changes
the ‘appearance’ of things. Logos is a ‘play’ (agon), and in this play beings are sepa-
rated and unified in thought, without assuming that these separations are a ‘real’ ac-
tuality. Stoic consideration, understood through the lens of the Presocratics, is ‘ago-
nic’. Truth is disclosed by, and as, something that ‘comes over’ us, or ‘is given’. We
have ‘choice’ (hairesis) by way of ‘arete’ to follow this predicament as our own..

Of course, it is questionable to call the Stoic exercises an 'auto-poiesis' - 'therapy', as
seen in the previous chapter, is more appropriate since it is concerned about some-
thing that is brought back into balance rather than something that is created. This
rests on the question of 'human nature'. As we have seen, the process of 'considera-
tion' is, in the Stoic doctrine, 'natural' to humans. It is natural only if one can recon-
cile nature and reason. The continuity of cosmos-nature and human nature (thought)
appears to be 'natural' to the Greeks but it feels odd to us, even if we read about it in
Heidegger. Heidegger’s critique, that disclosure is thought only in relation to beings
rather than itself as Being dismisses that this Being was thought, at least since Socra-

\textsuperscript{20} ‘Phytourgos’ Politia X, 597d
tes, in terms of 'arete' and 'agathon' and later in the Stoa, as a detachment from beings and therefore did thematise a form of existence which reflected on logos as the source of possible modes of Being even though it took place in a teleological fashion and grounded on an apparently atemporal 'logos'. Nevertheless, in the strife and effort of a change of 'hexis' of the soul, the individual begins to shape questions about the way of understanding which reflect modes of creation (Schaffen) which Heidegger expresses in UKW. For Heidegger 'energeia' is the model for the union of opposites, of Being and becoming. At its root is the ontological structure which determines how beings can become or emerge into their 'Being' (Wesen). For Heidegger the process of 'physis' is 'Being', in so far as it is the way in which 'beings' come into view or 'emerge' (energeia) into disclosure. This Aristotelian concept of Being as becoming (energeia) gives Heidegger the model for his own ontology in UKW. The question what actually 'is' and in what sense, or in terms of what logos it 'is', can only be accessed in the temporality of a becoming that also persists as 'truth' (aletheia as a 'process' of unveiling). 'Truth' as 'unveiling' (aletheia) is immediate and intuitive and not open to 'discourse', only to collective practices. The Stoic consideration does not 'explain' truth, on the contrary, it is a poietic action in relation to the disposition of the soul with the aim of creating a 'hexis' which intuitively understands beings i.e. is 'open to Being' by being 'fitted into' (Einfuegen) by its life in 'accordance with nature'. 'Arete' means to be overcome by 'physis' and 'logos' and thus being able to take one's measure from the openness.

The Stoa, inspired by the Socratic-Cynic tradition, understands men to 'dwell' in logos, meaning in argument. To "dwell" is more akin to a 'being possessed ('echon') by' language rather than 'having' (like being in control of) language. For Heidegger forms of understanding are 'existence' and humans exist only in so far as they perform the 'as'-structure. This dwelling itself is unthematised unless the disclosing also discloses itself as such and not as some other 'as' in the wholesome world of the 'ready-at-hand' (Zuhanden) and 'circumspection' (Umsicht) etc..

The guiding principle is the turning away from the value given to objects to the value of actions which then give value to things. Therefore transcending the factual reality of external security of the 'ready-at-hand' by actions which consider the external as indifferent, such actions become the paradigm of a new self-understanding of the es-

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21 Heidegger, What is Metaphysics in Basic Writings, p.112
22 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p.132, 134
sence of Dasein as the process of the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung) as the locus of disclosure. It is evident that this attitude is based on the archaic ‘agon’, its ‘virtuosity’ and the superi­ority of ‘virtue’ to ‘production’.

To inquire about the agency in art is to ask about the possibility of change: change means to have possibilities, and by extension a self which thinks itself thinking. To have such reflexive awareness constitutes the possibility to apply thinking to thinking itself, and thus to change the self. Does this mean, that the self has ‘control’ over itself? is ‘arche’ and ‘telos’ in one? This would mean that there is no possibility of the self to change, it means to be a foundational subjectivity which itself is not subject to such change nor to the agon of understanding.

4. ‘Agon’, ‘Polemos’ and ‘Logos’

The Greek ‘agon’ (play) has a wideranging meaning. The most important of those is the juridical aspect of ‘ordeal’, which leads to ‘arete’ as the necessary condition for the proper agon. On the one hand it is the decision as justice and truth, on the other the archaic alignment to the ‘arete’ as the transcendent to external goods. But ‘agon’ also meant social entertainment. Huizinga describes the Socratic question “What is x?” as a common ‘agon’, a form of play and jest. Plato’s literal form, a comical dialogue makes this plausible: what is said in jest may have a serious ground. Socrates asks what ‘is’ virtue and expects a dihairetical answer. This is a game too: to demand a particular form of explanation. Why such a form and not another? It is a game and its rules are arbitrary or customary. Socratic dialectic and dihairesis are customary. What appears to be new is that this game becomes more ‘serious’ than before. Socrates appears to want to know what virtue ‘really’ is in terms of a definition. Virtue is the central concept of Greek thought. Although it comes from aristocratic archaic society, it is tied to the ‘agon’ which permeates the whole of Greek society. So to define virtue in terms of a set of skills, of virtuosity, appears to be a sensible endeavour. But Socrates goes further: In Plato’s Politia any one ‘arete’ is clearly understood to be a form of wisdom. Wisdom is the ability to think correctly and thought gives account. It has the form of the right answer to the question: Like Oedipus’ answer to the Sphinx. It is clear and unequivocal. This, however, is the form of agon. Socrates takes his interlocutors for a ride into an unwinnable agon. The question

23 “farce” Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.149 f.
24 Arete and ariston have the same root (according to Werner Jaeger, Paideia Vol I, 26 f.)
‘What is x?’ does not ask who’s opinions prevail but ‘What is the (divine) truth of virtue?’ Socrates examines where someone can express this truth in accordance with dialectical distinctions, but nobody can. So the oracle was right that Socrates is the wisest in Athens and dies. The ‘agon’ was not between Socrates and his interlocutors but between Socrates and Apollo.  
In this process the form of the agonistic answer becomes a necessary and sufficient form of ‘knowledge’. It certainly is an agon, a game, and it only appears that the answers shall ‘really’ express ‘virtue’ or by extension ‘wisdom’. The Presocratics have practised dialectic as an ‘agon’ to prove and disprove any thesis. This display did not prove anything about reality. On the contrary, it showed the labyrinthine character of ‘logos’ which shows while it hides. It showed that the ‘real’ things were hidden by ‘logos’. The sages knew that one would overstretch ‘logos’, if one demanded from it ‘to tell the truth’, but they had enough discretion and tact not to do so. Only the Sybil can ‘say the truth without fragrance’ (Heraclitus) and this logos is the expression of divine mania. The wisdom of the Presocratics is reflected in their right judgement about the possibilities of logos.

If conversion is a turning in the thinking of Being instead of a thinking of the Being of beings, and the philosophical conversion a turning to the 'daimonia' (Un-canny), then the mediating concept is the 'agon' of this 'un-canny'. In 'play' (agon), all that 'is', in the sense of beings, loses all meaning; because all such meaning is constituted in the process itself. The outcome of the 'agon' is, in philosophical, terms the manifestation and unfolding of Being, from which meaning is given to beings. The disposition of 'arete’ is the ‘fitting into’ (Einfügen) in terms of a dike (Fug, joint).

Philosophical 'conversion' creates what Huizinga understands as 'play': the attitude of not taking for real the ‘realities of life’ (beings and ‘production'), not taking it ‘seriously’. This is a change of the whole ‘self’ and the ‘agon’ determines the “real” itself by ordeal. Logos as agon is the strife for intelligibility by which what presents itself in these rules (of visibility) is intelligible and necessary because it is also Fug (joint). Although everything is determined (by fate/universal causality) in its possibilities, ‘decisions’ are "real" insofar as there is an 'agon' of the right judgement, which then persists and ‘comes over’ the individual unthematisably (a priori).

25 in Plato’s Politeia, Gadamer, Vorgestalten der Reflexion, in Kleine Schriften III., p.2
26 Colli, After Nietzsche, p.102
The 'agon' of antiquity is therefore the origin of the philosophical comportment insofar it introduces a specific distinction into human involvement with things. One distinction is determined by things, objects ('production' or what we may call 'obsessive' attachment) and the other is 'free' from this attachment to things by virtue of 'consideration' ('logos'); it is irrelevant to have or to lose anything, including one's life ('being dead to the world'). This is the original pattern not only for philosophical relation to the 'world' of things, but also to Heidegger's implicit 'ethics' in Being and Time, when Dasein falls into anxiety and the web of meanings and values, that have been constituted by Dasein's 'struggle' with Being ('polemos'), disintegrates and Dasein confronts its essential emptiness which is the ontological ground within which Being determines the mode in which the world appears to Dasein. Philosophy of antiquity sees the self, emptied of attachment to things, as the space of human freedom. The figure of conversion is: to go away from things, practising for death and returning to a new relation with beings; similarly Heidegger describes Dasein's self-disclosure (authentic resolve [Entschlossenheit]) as a turning away from things towards itself and turning back towards things in a different awareness of them and a different mode in which they appear in relation to Dasein. In the mode of 'thinking of Being' (Seinsdenken), the certitude of presence and beings is exchanged with the inaccessible, un-canny, in-calculable 'Ereignis' of Being. In both cases it is an 'epoche', a withholding of involvement which institutes the difference in perception. The agency of thinking, of change and possibility, cannot be thought of in a mechanistic sense. To think the possibility 'not to' one has to have thought something already. There has to have been a movement (kinesis) already. Thinking is always already in motion (auto-kinoun)\textsuperscript{27}. This thinking is the soul, which knows 'ideas' as a distant memory.

Ancient wisdom is a mode of 'disclosure' of the 'self' as interpreting according to a cosmic impersonal 'logos'. This logos 'comes over' man by way of 'arete'. Thinking and interpretation of a situation and soul are the same as process. One constitutes the other within the process of intelligibility. Aristotle's divine 'unmoved mover' (kinesis akineseos) is pure thought thinking itself. Equally the soul can think itself as thinking.\textsuperscript{28} The soul is a more originary self when it applies thought to the thinking which it itself is. Therefore it realises itself as having possibilities in relation to the

\textsuperscript{27} Gadamer, Vorgestalten der Reflexion, Kleine Schriften III, p.9
\textsuperscript{28} just like hearing and seeing are reflexive Gadamer, Vorgestalten der Reflexion, p.5 f.

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thinking ‘of something’. To realise these possibilities to think something otherwise is a ‘polemos’ of the self as Dasein, with its Being, which is what it has been ‘thrown’ into.

Heidegger uses Aristotle’s concept of ‘energeia’ to explain Dasein’s existence as a self-generating process. Although Dasein is not ‘physis’ and it does not have a biological ‘arche’, Heidegger interprets Dasein’s Being as determined by an ‘arche’, the first inception according to which all the polemical unfolding of that Being takes place until a new historical inception ‘is given’ by a more originary Being (Seyn). The movement, the thinking that first constitutes Dasein and its Being is an ‘arche’ from which Dasein interprets its Being. This interpretation is the ‘polemos’, and it takes place in logos. This logos determines what is self, identity and difference. It resembles the Presocratic agon between the sage and the questioning god: the sage navigates the labyrinth of reason while the god knows all the unfolding of the ‘arche’. Dasein is ‘on the way’ between the ‘arche’ and its ‘telos’. If Dasein would arrive at its ‘telos’ (exhausting the possibilities of its Being, without receiving a new arche, it would cease to be ‘Dasein’.

Dasein itself moves in thought of beings but it understands Being because it can thematise its own essence (Wesen). Thinking changes the ‘pneumatic constitution’²⁹ of the soul. It is therefore ‘on the way’ moving according to its ‘arche’ which determines its possibilities. Thinking cannot achieve the perfection of the ‘unmoved mover’, it is in motion (energeia) to its ‘telos’. Heidegger’s Dasein can only be ‘energeia’, but not an ‘ergon’, it cannot achieve its ‘telos’ without ceasing to ‘exist’ as Dasein. Thinking is therefore auto-poietic, a self-constituting movement, without essence, without a completion in perfection. ‘Psyche’ (soul) in Heidegger’s terms is “the ground and modus of the relation to beings” while “when Being itself comes into view, the demonic, the transcendent exuberance makes itself felt through shining into the ‘Geheure’”.³⁰

5. Conversion and Enthusiasm

Conversion flows from a certain way of life into a qualitatively different way of life. It is a process in which the world becomes visible in a different way. How does this

²⁹ Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.64
³⁰ GA 54, Parmenides, p.147
chime with Heidegger’s critique of world-views ("Weltanschauung")? Heidegger’s argument is that world-views are just part and parcel of the particular manifestation of Being in the modern world. They are all based on one single decision about what it means to ‘be’, namely modern ‘re-presentation’ (Vor-stellung). The world has become an ‘image’.31 He does not see a possibility to ‘calculatively’ change this underlying status of ‘Being’ within the historical framework of ‘Ge-stell’. In particular, access to the underlying form of Being is obstructed by the ‘world view’ itself. On the other hand, there is a ‘poietic’ input by Dasein into the manifestation and into the unfolding of such a form of Being. The ‘poets and thinkers’ who first bring such a form into play have a practice and listen well to Being, precisely within the very possibility of authenticity in their existence. If such poets and thinkers bring about a manifestation or unfolding of a current mode of Being, then their work is aligned with a ‘cosmic’ logos, that form of arche which governs such unfolding. This ‘authenticity’ allows them access to the temporal (limited) possibilities of their age. Within the modern age the governing Being manifests itself in the form of technology and ‘Ge-stell’. This is a mathematically reduced form of understanding. It is a ‘deficiency’ within the understanding of the working of language and Heidegger pins down this deficiency to the exclusive use of the mathematical method within modern scientific discourse. Conversion can therefore only take place in the realm in which words are related to things, which is what the ancient philosophers did in their exercises, as far as they were able to hold on to the Presocratic duplicity of ‘logos’ as both, reason and mania (Un-geheure, in-calculable).

The Stoics understand perception (aisthesis) as ‘phantasia’ (from phainomenon, what presences itself) accompanied by an ‘axioma’ (proposition). They presuppose the intelligibility within which judgements can take place. Unlike for Heidegger, this is not in question for the Stoa. Things appear in various stages of clarity, and the sage asserts or does not. The receiving soul has not been divorced from the appearance, from the presencing. World and soul are tied together by the logos which gives and guarantees intelligibility. But equally ‘reason’ is not an inquisition in which what appears has to justify itself. On the contrary, the inquiry into objects refers back to the self as the carrier of logos and ‘good’ or ‘bad’ actions.

31 “Sobald die Welt zum Bilde wird, begreift sich die Stellung des Menschen als Weltanschauung.” Heidegger, Die Zeit des Weltbildes, in Holzwege, p.91
We have always understood judgement to mean that there is an existing rule to which the fact is subsumed. In the Stoic teaching of ethics however, we do not find these positive rules. On the contrary, the Stoics refer to the sage as the paradigm who makes appropriate judgements about the world but they do not spell out the laws which would subsume all particular cases. I understand this to be a Presocratic heritage. Dialectic is the art of the negative; no positive statement can withstand its destructive power. So virtue is to not hold on to what is dialectically indefensible.

Heidegger's pursuit of a 'language of Being', empowers itself to be beyond the (dialectical or) scientific 'reason' of philosophical discourse. Heidegger’s struggle for a new language is in his mind the unfolding of the possibilities of current being or a struggle (polemos) for the advent of a ‘new’ inception.

The Stoic exercises use the notion of 'pathe' to justify the efficacy of 'logoi' as a 'pharmakon' of the soul. Philosophy uses language as therapy to dispel any positive statements of knowledge and to keep the 'being on the way' as a kind of management of incertitude within reasoning. Gods make neither judgements nor choices because they are a-temporal. Only humans can make choices because they are in time and therefore they do not see the whole. Therefore the sage can be perfect by being overcome by ‘logos’ and make virtuous choices. The doctrinal 'explanations' of Stoic doctrine are subservient to their use as a therapy of the soul. Therefore the direct interaction is important to them. The right word (logos) at the right moment (eukairos) is therapeutic, the word on the page is not conducive to the right moment. I think Heidegger’s approach is comparable to the Stoic practices insofar as their ‘therapy’ severs the conditions of the possibility of 'beings' being in a particular way, which is oppressive (as a withdrawal of the access to Being) in the sense of Heidegger’s description of technology. The Stoic exercises give the ideas of ‘openness to Being’, ‘authenticity’, ‘Entschlossenheit’ and ‘Gelassenheit’ a more intuitive character.

32 "Die Konsequenzen dieses Mechanismus sind verheerend. Jedes Urteil, an dessen Wahrheit der Mensch glaubt, kann widerlegt werden. Aber das ist nicht alles; sondern weil die ganze Dialektik das Prinzip des ausgeschlossenen Dritten für unumstößlich hält, das heißt davon ausgeht, daß, wenn eine Behauptung als wahr erwiesen wird, die Behauptung, die ihr widerspricht, falsch ist und umgekehrt, ergibt sich für den Fall, in dem man zuerst eine Behauptung und dann die ihr widersprechende Behauptung als wahr erweist, daß beide Behauptungen wahr und falsch zugleich sind, was unmöglich ist. Diese Unmöglichkeit bedeutet, daß weder die eine noch die andere Behauptung etwas Wirkliches bezeichnet, nicht einmal einen denkbaren Gegenstand. Und aus der Tatsache, daß kein Urteil und kein Gegenstand sich der dialektischen Sphäre entziehen kann, folgt, daß jede Behauptung hältlos, widerlegbar ist, daß jede Lehre, jeder wissenschaftliche Satz, ob er nun einer reinen oder einer experimentellen Wissenschaft angehört, unterschiedlos der vernichtenden Kritik ausgeliefert ist." Colli, GdPh, p.79 f.

33 "Auf dem Grunde dieses eingeführten Aufgangs und Aufschlusses seines Wesens in der [arête] ist
Ancient philosophy had still the inkling of the scope of reason, its connection to the incomprehensible (Ungeheure) and the intuitive, so that it was able to see it as the language of therapy. It used the force of dialectic to destroy the everyday notion of the control of the appearance (Anwesen) of beings. The ‘logos’ is not simply something ‘ready-at-hand’ (Zuhanden). After dialectic has done its work, nothing will be left, except what has value in itself, this is the openness to Being as a grounding. (That this self-grounding has been unfortunately re-interpreted at the beginning of the modern age, as the self-assertion of subjectivity is another matter)

Heidegger attempts to recover the originary understanding of 'reason' (logos), which has an understanding of the limits of the possibility of intelligibility and can ‘respect’ them. At the beginning of the enlightenment the critique of this 'reason' has set in too, with Hamann it has found an expression worthy of Socrates, and it continued throughout the ages of which Heidegger’s critique was only one expression. That reason is always part of the deception of language is the thread running through all these texts. Recollecting the scope of original 'logos' is a practice which exceeds science and technology. Such a practice lacks the drive for certitude.

Stoic conversion differs from Christian conversion: the faithful knows the solution already; the revelation is there in faith. The Stoics had to bear the incertitude of not being sages but knowing that a different understanding is possible and necessary. But they prepared the ground for being 'dead to this world', meaning that one does not take seriously the distinctions and separations without understanding the unity of the whole of intelligibility as what ‘is given’ in the divine logos. They prepared the psychology of turning one’s whole life around by way of argument and exercise, and they made this way of life a possible goal for everyone. Christianity had the certitude of revelation, and the modern age wanted to keep this certitude without the faith by way of mathematics. Certitude is the only thing the Stoics did not have. Their whole being was kept in the incertitude of consideration. The everyday riddle was how to act appropriately, this was a test and they gave account of this struggle. This exercise of giving account is the considered life – and not a ‘mathematical’ ethic. The ‘calculation’ of the sage is not what Heidegger calls calculative thinking.

By giving account, the everyday understanding of what is desirable, is turned around:

der Mensch “entschlossen”, aufgeschlossen, entbergend-entborgen zum Seienden.” GA54, Parris, p.111

conversion changes the ‘Being of beings’. Reason does not pertain to the things in this world but to what it is 'not': the ‘Being’ that reveals beings. That is what ‘arete’ means for Heidegger because of his recovery of the Greek concept of Being.  

'Nothingness' is the withdrawal of the original reality of the logos and its incomprehensibility. Nevertheless, man 'dwells in dianoia', it is 'natural' for man to live in intelligibility. Discourse is therefore not about expressing 'what is' as a positivist fact. Discourse is always a community of those who are maintaining a certain constitution of meaning. The Stoic’s discourse is a conversation of conversion. This conversation is a reassessment of the meanings of the worldliness of the world. The ultimate end of this struggle is to change the intentionality of the philosopher; for virtuous intention has a different concept of Being (and not only of a 'Being of beings').

The path to change this perspective is for Heidegger ‘authenticity’, which emerges as the 'anthropological' concept of 'virtuous' existence. The comparison with Stoic conversion has been made by Hadot and others. For an ontological conception of ‘authenticity’, there needs to be some form of human agency which Heidegger calls existence. Without human existence there is no 'Being' either. Irrespective of the differences in the concept of language and 'Being', those 'techniques of the self' seem to have persisted and the one most employed technique is 'prosoche' (awareness).

Authenticity and conversion develops through access to the 'particular' and the exception, the ‘Un-geheure’ is transcendence in the sense that it provides the possibility of Dasein to reflect on its own 'structure'. The sense that governs disclosure springs from the exception and not from the (pre-conceived) mathematical model as method of certitude, which dissimulates the access to Being by laying claim to totality itself. Awareness (prosoche) does not work to the rule, it is not attention to one object (or its knowledge – 'as'-structure), but attention in general to one's thoughts in which beings disclose themselves. From the very mechanics behind everyday and unreflected judgements, which are made purely on the basis of what we take for granted, emerges the possibility of inquiry (into what is not perceived but at the basis of judgement) in the form of 'prosoche'.

Knowledge cannot be "placed "ready-made" within the soul". Knowledge of the 'good' is never abstract knowledge of the good without any desire or conviction to-

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35 GA19, Sophistes, p.111
36 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.202
37 Hadot, WiAPh, p.65
wards the 'good' itself. To be virtuous knowledge needs to have the 'disposition' or comportment to be so. To 'know' the theory of how to swim will not save you from drowning. The desire (horexis) and love of this knowledge of virtue therefore is virtue itself when it occurs. Kindling the fire of this 'desire' (horexis) for virtue is what Socrates did, instead of teaching something that one cannot express as knowledge: openness to Being.

The question of what the 'Good' actually is, is not to be answered because it cannot be positively encased in language, it can only be lived by exercising one's actions and scrutinising them in logos. Socrates still asks whether the 'just' is actually also the 'good' (agathon) itself.\(^{38}\) Aristotle places the 'good' into the realm of his ethics and politics as a question of means, ends and measure.\(^{39}\) The 'good' seems the general concept for what everything aspires to, or strives (horexis, horme) for by nature. This is the terminology of the Stoics: to live according to nature, while 'nature' (physis) is equivalent to reason ('logos') as the underlying cosmic law of 'appearance' (Anwesen) through 'universal' intelligibility.\(^{40}\) The 'good' (telikon agathon) is therefore the 'end' (telos) itself in relation to which everything else is a means and which is itself never means to something else, and this delimits a qualitative difference of the human logos to all other beings. For human beings this 'telos' is 'eudaimonia': itself a rather empty and formal concept of human 'perfection'. The Stoic life is focused on the actualisation of all human possibilities qua nature (physis). The essence of 'eudaimonia' lies in actions emanating from a durable disposition of the soul and not performed under the duress of traditions or fate.\(^{41}\) The state of such a disposition comes about in a sudden 'qualitative' conversion (metastrophe, metabole, [Umschlag: Heidegger]). The sage is 'qualitatively' different from the fool.\(^{42}\) The sage is not entrapped in his relation to external objects by thinking of them as a 'good', instead he only pretends, 'as if' they are of value. Conversion then is the paradigm of change and of agency itself.

Heidegger calls 'physis' Being (Aristotle's physis) because it describes the possibility of 'emergence' (presencing) and not the eternal 'presence'. Being is only in

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38 kalon or dikaion; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.172
39 Ari: Nicomachian Ethics, A1, 1094 a 3
40 Although the cosmos is not eternal, the original cosmos ends in 'ekpyrosis', and the remaining 'logos spermaticos' then inaugurate a new inception.
41 hexis, diathesis; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.174
42 "Mit 'poiotes' bzw. 'hexis' wird eine Beschaffenheit des Subjekts bezeichnet, die nicht abhaengig is
Dasein's existence. The dynamic, the drive (horexis) towards an 'as-structure is natural to humans. Therefore there is an underlying anthropology in Heidegger. Human beings 'want' to understand and not not understand.

Dasein's 'authenticity' occurs when the view of Dasein is turned from the investment with beings towards one's own way of engagement with them. This means that the meaning that appears to have been so self-evident before has collapsed because it is not supported by beings but by one's own directedness. To have a world and to elicit meaning from the world is therefore a human activity which does not come to man from beings but originates within the human condition itself.

For Plato the demise of the archaic sages brought the loss of 'sophia', which was the innerworldly presence or access to normative 'logos'. As much as these wise men preferred to express themselves in riddles and hone their skill of destructive dialectics, they still constituted a (privileged) link between the divine 'logos' and the human sphere. They retained the duplicity of 'logos', it's depths and incomprehensibility and danger, which cannot be retained in a brief chat at the agora. Nevertheless, Plato is still aware of this loss, and the dynamic of such a separation as he sees the result in the form of the Sophists. His and Socrates' point is that it is very well to teach a particular 'techne', knowledge, but that the knowledge of the sage is not particular in that sense but is general so as to inquire about the claim of any knowledge. The 'ethical' aspect appears as a concept of a general faculty of judgement, 'phronesis' which in itself then becomes a form of ethical disposition.

The shift from wisdom as human participation in the divine logos to self-education is in Greek culture rubricated in terms of disease and health. The healthy soul strives for 'wisdom' as its end. Wisdom is not the exception but it is imperative to strive for it by virtue of its being 'natural' to human beings. The wisdom of the archaic sage was bestowed by inspiration and enthusiasm and not the result of 'volition' (in the modern sense). For Socrates it was still demonic inspiration but already connected to the educational effort.

Human discourse is always second best to the knowledge of the sage, but without

43 Plato's insistence on normativity as expressed by the 'ideas', is new and radically different to the Presocratics. They did not have any investment with 'society' with the polis (almost to the contrary e.g. Heraclitus, who lived as a recluse and a critic of contemporary mores). Plato has to insist on a 'te­los' which also grounds political ethics. Heidegger does the same when he speaks about 'Volk'.

44 habit = 'diathesis' (hexitis in Ari); also = phronesis; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik.,p.205 "nach
discourse there would be no consideration and no soul at all, only immediacy and forgetting. Logos as consideration is connected with divine 'inspiration' and the 'Ungeheure' as some form of otherness, non-individual and partaking in cosmic logos with its 'agonic' dangers. Heidegger desired to be inspired and enthused by 'listening' to Being, to be open to the novel sway of Beings, or rather the unfolding to its last conclusion of nihilism and thereby wrestling a new language from Being itself. This enthusiasm authorises for Heidegger the daring 'breaking open' and re-gathering of tradition. Gadamer called Heidegger's wrestling with language "Sprachnot": it is an emergency of language, an 'emergency' which called for exceptions.

6. ‘Arete’ and Poiesis

Arete is a concept of transcendence. It comprises wisdom and phronesis which give measure to human Dasein. It gives a point of access to Being. This access is the measure of disclosure and withdrawal. In his lectures on Parmenides Heidegger writes that ‘arete’ is ‘Entschlossenheit’. Dasein is disclosed (Entschlossen) to itself as a hermeneutic ‘process’. The access of Dasein to Beings is Dasein’s disclosure (Aufschluß) and ‘being fitted’ (Einfügung) into its ‘essence’ (Wesen). It is a similar process as is ‘dike’ (Fug) as ‘joint’. Man is ‘fitted’ into his essence, Dasein is given over to Being, it is ‘fate (Schicksal). But ‘arete’ is something that man ‘desires’ (horexis). This gives it the movement which is an inescapable ‘natural’ effect and which constitutes the originary ‘truth’ in the Heideggerian sense of the intuitive ‘knowing one’s way around’.

Here Heidegger also mentions an etymological relation between arete and ars or techne. This does make sense, if we remind ourselves that art is the ‘setting’ (thesis) of itself into the work of truth. This ‘thesis’ is then not a ‘subjective’ form of arbitrary opinion, but connected to the ‘essential’ fitting (Einfügung) and disclosure of Dasein itself, it is the ‘truth’ of Being. The ‘being fitted’ into one’s own Wesen is ‘arete’ by way of ‘dike’ which Heidegger translates as ‘Fug’ or ‘fügen’ (Joint, jointing, jointure, but also the verb ‘fitting’) Dasein into its ‘essence’ (Wesen) as fate (Schicksal).

festen regeln” ; eutaxia = knowlwdge how to act; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.207
45 GA 54, Parmenides, 109ff.
46 GA 54, Parmenides, p.111
47 GA 54, Parmenides, p.137, "... einfuegen ins Schicksal ..."
‘Phronesis’ is the authentic ‘fitting-into’ (sich fügen) the historic ‘essence’ of Dasein. This is possible through Dasein’s authentic resolve (Entschlossenheit), which Heidegger calls ‘arete’. The measure between disclosure and withdrawal is no total disclosure (outside temporality) and no total withdrawal (without world). ‘Discretio’ is the sage’s ability to discern what is ‘in my power’: it asks about the ‘Fug’ (joint) into one’s ‘essence’ (Wesen). Discretio is a phronesis about how to inquire and interpret: for Heidegger it is the measure that its ‘polemos’ gives to Dasein.

The Stoics deal with this relation of control directly and it would be a misinterpretation of their concept of logos to interpret it as a form of control. On the other hand they do not subscribe to an Aristotelian idea of the mean or average between two extremes. The change lies in the aligning of logos and disposition, ‘life according to logos’ means that soul and logos coincide. ‘Arete’, virtue lies in the intent of actions according to logos. Actions are governed by an original insight into the essence (Wesen) of Dasein (GA 54, Parmenides). The presencing of beings is governed by this essence of Dasein. If Dasein’s intentions are ‘vicious’ they force the beings that presence themselves into an interpretation that is determined by an inauthentic Dasein that is not discloses to itself (not Entschlossen). ‘Arete’ therefore is a necessary step to gain ‘phronesis’ as the measure of how far to inquire into the Being of beings, how to disclose without dissimulation (Verstellen) the access to the ‘Ungeheure’, that from which we receive fate (Schicksal). This measure depends on Dasein, it happens in its ‘polemos’ with Being that Dasein’s involvement with beings (existence) is governed by the idea of certainty, control and (subjectivised) agency today. There was no ‘necessity’ in the first inception for this to happen but it was the possibility, as Heidegger showed in his texts on technology and science.

If we look back to the UKW, we see Heidegger dividing the ‘bringing forth’ (Hervorbringen) of tools, and the sphere of the ‘ready-at-hand’ (zuhanden), and ‘creation’ (Schaffen) of art, although both are different from the challenging forth (Her-vorstellen) of the modern ‘Gestell’. All are forms of ‘thesis’ (in its original meaning of ‘to set up’, or ‘to bring to stand’ in the ‘open’). All three are variants of techne, the knowledge of the ‘brings forth’. The bringing-forth originates in the circumspect ac-

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48 GA 54, Parmenides, p.111
49 UKW, p.68 f.
tivity of Dasein within its being-in-the-world. The creative bringing forth is different for two reasons. The first is the relation to the ‘material’, the earth, which is ‘set-up’ within the work rather than ‘used-up’ by the tool. (UKW, 33) The earth is ‘set-up’ into the open and therefore the tool that is made is ‘used up’ and disappears within the context of its use (Dienlichkeit) and is not visible as the ‘bringing-forth’ itself that is set-up in the work. Art is the production of truth itself. It sets itself into the work and therefore the work is not fecit (made by a self or subject) but ‘factum est’. Furthermore, artistic creation (Schaffen) is a ‘foundation’ (Stiftung), which stresses its transcendent relation to the everyday (Geheure). Foundation (Stiftung) as gift, grounding and inception ‘comes over’ to Dasein and hands Dasein over to its truth as essence (Wesen). The foundation comes directly from the aforementioned ‘Ungeheure’. What arrives and stands up within the open ‘presences’ (Anwesen) temporarily within its truth and its shape (Riß, peras). The agency of this ‘setting-up’ (thesis) into the ‘open’, or ‘clearing’ is not a subject but it is that of Dasein as its possibility, which is the ‘openness’ to Being and that is ‘arete’. Virtue is the ‘ontological’ activity of humans to be open to the historicity of Being. Arete is art as a ‘way of life’, or conversely ‘bios’ is the art of Dasein. Arete as the Stoic ‘life in accordance with nature’ is a ‘gift’ like the ‘foundation’ or ‘creation’ of the work of art. What Heidegger calls ‘Dichtung’ is the ‘awareness’ which enables the ‘Ungeheure’ to spill into the (Geheure), the plenitude from which the finite Dasein attains the limited disclosure of its Being. Being is another word for truth. The artists have to be equipped with awareness: with ‘phronesis’ and ‘arete’ as the measure and openness to the dispensation of Being, which then persists in its works as does the Greek temple in UKW. I am not so much interested in the ‘bringing forth’ or ‘setting itself into the work’ of works, but rather in the ‘phronesis’, the disposition to act appropriately in a contingent situation, which is the result of ‘arete’ the authentic self-disclosure of the self as constituted by its own thinking and decision (bouleo) which is dispensed by and from the demonic (Ungeheure) plenitude, of all possible disclosures, of which we only see a fraction each time.

Why does Heidegger call such an agency polemos (or logos or Being or letting-be)? It is obvious that it denotes a non-personal, non-subjective action. The result of ‘po-

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50 "Aber das Geschaffensein des Werkes hat gegenüber jeder anderen Hervorbringung darin sein Besonderes, daß es in das Geschaffene mit hineingeschaffen ist." UKW, p.51
lemos’ as agon is an ‘ordeal’ (Schicksal, ‘ananke’) and thus handed out, given etc. Change and persistence turn without one overwhelming the other and without therefore becoming self-identical. Persistence is always ‘totalitarian’ in its resistance and change is never redemption. Phronesis is ‘knowing’ that the measure of differentiation is a question of certitude. Conversely certitude is only imaginary when the differentiation is inappropriate. What Heidegger thinks as ‘Volk’ is a Mitsein of where those who do the differentiating know when to stop, as ‘tisin’ in the Anaximander fragment.

The Stoics exercised their ‘discretio’ of ‘phronesis’ in relation to the divisions of the logos. The power of ‘setting-apart’ (Aus-einander-setzung) is not itself a measure: Presocratic dialectic is purely destructive when not practised among the sages, because the sages knew that they did not ‘know’ in one particular way, they only knew that they know their way around ‘logos’. The agency therefore lies in a constituted soul, constituted by being obsessed by ‘logos’, which is on the way changing itself to achieve or rather to receive ‘discretio’, a tactfulness towards the disclosure, or having the right judgement how much to disclose and what to leave undisclosed.
A Conclusion

It is not easy to sum up this long investigation. The focus was on the artist as agency, in an age which has squarely disposed with such an autonomous concept. Ironically there are more ‘artists’ then before. Through Heidegger we have seen how closely connected artistic production is with Greek ontology and how such an ontology is connected with the idea of an eudaimonic life.

To reflect on one’s ‘way of life’ already means to have thematised one’s unacknowledged presuppositions and practices. To ‘choose’ a ‘way of life’ according to logos, means precisely not to lead a life that is unquestioned, it means a ‘considered’ life. And for the Greeks it does not only mean a consideration in the ‘apophantic’ language, but in a deeper and immediate form of intuition. All this however, takes place under the topic of ‘techne’ and poiesis, which, as we saw are ‘ontological’ categories of ‘emergence’. The Greeks did not drag beings in front of the court of reason, reason made beings emerge without force. Although they valued acting higher than being acted upon, their action was a ‘considered’ one with sufficient respect for the ‘emergence’ itself. The disclosure of beings was letting emergence happen. And in this agency they know themselves in agreement (teleologically) with the cosmic logos.

The mode of ‘production’ as a universal ontology, however, tempts to apply misleading questions about action and control. When we speak about art we imply an agency which makes it. What we mean is an intentional activity of an agency. Agency, from ‘agere’ doing, ‘actus’ action, can be just a force of nature like gravity. Art however needs a different activity. To act there needs to be a subject or self which ‘knows’ what it is doing i.e. intention precedes action. This intentionality is consciousness of something that is not (yet). There needs to be a desire (horexis), a need or want which constitutes a movement (kinesis) towards the fulfilment of such desire. The knowledge of the end also means the choice ‘not to’. To have choice means to have a self in some way which can reflect on itself as one that is ‘lacking’ or that ‘has’ an absence.

We have inherited a vocabulary of ‘being’ which we apparently cannot escape. The activity of art is a particular example of the various concepts of the artist – from a mere craftsman to a ‘genius’, connected to a divine sphere – to Heidegger’s expression of the work of art being a ‘factum est’ without any agency of an artist. What the
artist has ‘lost’ the work of art has gained: it is now a foundational gesture, which determines a whole age in the way it discloses beings. Art has become, not a ‘mirror’ but the foundation of a mode of Being. But within Heidegger’s concept of Dasein also dwells an ‘artist’. Dasein as what ‘acts’ represents the space of the possibility of ‘self’ in relation to its mode of Being. Any ‘self’ is dependent on the mode of Being. This ‘existence’ means the labour of interpretation, of making sense of beings in all possible ways.

In the history of metaphysics the knowledge of the means and methods leads, according to Heidegger, directly from the Greeks to modern technology. The Greeks concept of ‘Being’ as presence, is expressed in terms of ‘poiesis’, a techne of matter and a form. This process of emergence of beings by themselves, is not something that the Greek ‘observer’ is in control of. On the contrary, the Stoics repeat that man is not in control except of his own judgements. As we saw in the discussion of the ‘agon’ in chapter 3, such judgement about what is right was a question of fate and ordeal. Such public display of justice was then internalised as the judgement of the self. With the Stoics the question of ‘control’ is radicalised, into the paradigm of ‘physis’ and ‘logos’ as an inescapable cosmic causality which is ‘certain’ but unknowable, while in our soul we find the certitude of the ‘logos’ of judgement. Life is separated into this certainty and total uncertainty (fate). The Stoic sage lives in the uncertainty of cosmic causality, but in the moral certainty of his ‘logos’ and discernment. This certainty is not based on rules and laws but on the detachment of the soul from a ‘logic’ of ‘pathe’. The sage discloses beings from the (dis)position of self-disclosure as (partaking) in the universal ‘logos’. The average Stoic (prokopton) however, does not have such ‘disposition’ and has to use the ‘logos’ of consideration and argument to repeatedly disillusion his illusions of certitude. Such therapeutic considerations, the ‘considered life’ are a strategy to dwell in incertitude, and this means to ‘modify’ or ‘poietically’ produce one’s own ‘self’ through the therapeutic logos, or ‘paideia’. Therefore this ‘self’ can never turn into an institution of certitude in relation to external objects, as it does in the Cartesian meditations. The Stoic ‘knowledge’ concerns the purely ‘moral’ question of our comportment to beings, which flows from our ‘psychical’ constitution. The ego is ‘poietic’ in both senses, it is a work of art that produces itself as art: auto-poiesis. Certitude is a function of an agency that takes itself too seriously.
According to Heidegger there is always a horizon of understanding, within which a self is constituted in terms of its possibilities and possible choices. The horizon determines the way of the disclosure of beings. It determines what is ‘true’. It is always a communal and inescapable ‘truth’ and not an individual deliberative truth. The self is possible only within this a priori horizon within which it acts. The movement that changes the horizon is not open to the self of individuals because the self is a secondary manifestation of truth. Truth manifests ‘itself’ in cultural practices as the a priori horizon. The horizon is dynamic. It shifts and is constant at the same time. However, according to Heidegger, certain people can influence a change through their practice of ‘poiesis’. This Heidegger calls ‘polemos’ between Dasein and Being. Dasein and Being are not independent agencies, but according to Heraclitus’ word they are a ‘unity of opposites’. This opposition is both movement and limit of the a priori truth.

What would be necessary for such a poietic self to be agency of art as truth? One is the understanding of self-constitution and secondly the origin of truth, of the ‘a priori’ itself. Both are linked by the same ‘arche’ or ‘inception’. The self as secondary manifestation cannot view what comes into its view as ‘real’ in the same way as it does when understanding the ‘world’ from its self-positing as that which produces (Vorstellen) its objects of knowledge to itself. Once Dasein discloses (Entschliessen) its own constitutive character it questions the being which appears to it in a different manner. The manner of such questioning changes the ‘presencing’ of beings as much as the ‘self’ itself. In this sense art is not just a reflection on our ‘way of life’ but actually the unfolding of our ‘possibilities’.

The self then cannot be understood outside its relation with beings, and this means it has to be understood as a ‘poiesis’, as being constituted in the process which it itself ‘performs’. Since the self is thought of as the agency of need and movement, the self is always in relation to what it needs and therefore in ‘logos’ (what enables relations, ‘legein’ - collecting together)

Logos, accordingly, is what gives to the self its own unity. It is only in logos that a world can be for Dasein. Heidegger therefore develops the being-in-the-world as the
a priori horizon in which beings are disclosed in their 'as'. This does not disclose logos and the self as that which discloses. To turn around and look at itself, the 'self' has to lose its world, all the totality of (purposeful) relations (Bewandnissganheit) in what Heidegger calls 'anxiety'. It is in anxiety and in its being-towards-death that Dasein as the proto-self loses its context and is thrown back onto its own possibility to be and this is its structure, which Heidegger is then able to describe as the 'care-structure'. In this process of self-disclosure Dasein detaches itself from its involvement with beings and discloses itself as being 'essentially' different, i.e. 'being' purely as disclosing, i.e. its 'project' (Entwurf) within the [purposeful-pattern/ totality of (purpose) relations] (Bewandnisganheit). Dasein's 'freedom' is therefore the (re)interpretation of the possibilities within the conditions it has already been 'thrown' into. If Dasein discloses itself in such a way its comportment (to beings and to itself) necessarily changes. This description is very similar to the classical 'conversion' (metastrophe, peristrophe).

The Stoia interprets human beings as 'zoon logon echon' too. The logos is an active logos but it also deceives in terms of the 'pathe', which are modes of reason. Pathe and eupatheiai are disclosive on account of their directedness. Thought is always outside itself and therefore it is in the intentions towards beings and the ends which determine actions, that this relation manifests itself. The Stoics see pathe (Stimmung) as disclosive, just as Heidegger understands it as disclosive. The therapeutic logos is that which carefully dismantles this horizon of understanding, in Heidegger's terms 'anxiety' (Angst). In the Stoic discourse, anxiety is not 'thematised' but the 'aporia' in which Socrates and his interlocutor find themselves, is the same situation. Socrates, as the therapeutic agent, points from the aporia to the 'agathon' as the original 'telos' of 'human nature'. Arete and agathon describe a comportment to things that is equally detached from its involvement with beings as is 'authentic' Dasein and is therefore a disclosure of Dasein to itself as that which consists of its comportments to beings, but especially to other Dasein as 'being-with' (Mitsein).

This however is also the point at which the question of agency becomes crucial. Greeks did not experience the necessity to justify such internal 'agency' because in the archaic agon the concept of (public) display of 'honour' was a sufficient form of

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51 and also stops to be a self since the 'self' is part of such 'world'
justification. With Socrates this changes. Public display becomes an introspection, even if not a self-reflection. The self is clearly a product of a ‘techne psyche’, a care of the self, not in an ‘aesthetic’ sense but the ontological sense of the question of what ‘human nature’ is. The agency of the self constitutes itself out of the pressures for (self-)justification which the drive to internalisation after Socrates has produced. Just as the destruction of the polis as the determining site of social interaction has disappeared into the vast expanse of the Roman empire.

The ‘self’ therefore is the possibility of a comportment to beings. If a practice changes a comportment, it also changes the being (Wesen - essence) of Dasein. The Stoics express it in the Aritsotelian concepts of ‘poiesis’. The human disposition is change through ‘education’ (paideia) to achieve its ‘telos’ (human nature) of being one with the ‘logos’. This logos is one of those miraculous word for everything. It unites and separates, it is the reason through which beings ‘presence’ themselves, but as language itself it is unsayable. The figure of thought is clear: logos and self are the carriers of meaning. If the self ‘partakes’ in the universal logos (i.e. Being), it has, so to speak, the same position as the ‘authentic’ Dasein as the ‘care-structure’, past all attachments to beings and its comportment has radically changed.

There is a remnant of teleological thought in Heidegger’s concept of ‘authenticity’. It is the point of human achievement, of a heroic strife for such achievement. Although it ‘comes over’ man in the experience of anxiety, it is the voice of the ‘authentic’ Dasein as ‘Gewissen’ which calls itself out of its fallenness (Verfallen) to itself. The difference to Aristotle and the Stoa is that Heidegger does not think ‘human nature’ to be an ‘essence’ (a being, ‘zuhanden’) and therefore the ‘therapeutic’ aspect of Greek logos is not expressed in terms of the poiesis of a (material) disposition. Nevertheless, in UKW Heidegger offers an interpretation of poiesis which determines the change of the a priori horizon of understanding. On one hand poiesis is concerned with a bringing-forth into visibility, a material production, which is radically different from the technical production of ‘stuff’ (Zeug). On the other hand there is a ‘poiesis’ of ‘truth’. The poiesis of art draws from the plenitude of possibilities which are given to Dasein from the transcendence of Being. This appearance can never be under ‘control’ but it is always part of a practice. These practices are the subject of the Stoic exercises. The virtue of the sage lies in his discernment, his ‘discretio’, or
'phronesis', which determines his 'intentions'. The 'intention' is 'a priori' because thought has always something 'in mind'. How this is then understood, depends on the individual comportment. Such a 'conversion' in disclosing beings is a change in that comportment. More than that, it changes the 'self' which is not given 'essentially'. The 'authentic' Dasein is only certain in its difference to the beings it discloses. It cannot be other than in 'logos' i.e. in some 'relation' to beings, disclosing beings.

The terms 'agency' and 'certitude' are presuppositions of 'production' (techne). As soon as things are understood in their essence as product the questions we ask are directed onto a wrong path. If we ask the wrong question we get lost. Therefore the concept of 'phronesis' and 'discretio' are more than just forms of a rational life. Not being 'techne' means that the judgement is not based on a 'specialist' knowledge, but on a unfathomable 'good' judgement that reflects the constant 'view' of the 'good' (agathon) itself. The virtue, as the measure of actions is not just a method but a logos, that 'comes' naturally, and not calculatively. Such a disposition is the work of the soul itself. The 'techne psyche' is the artistry to achieve such disposition. And this is defined by an alignment to the cosmic logos, meaning that it is not a 'personal' but a 'universal' (a priori) disposition, which 'comes over' the sage, as much as the work of art is a 'factum est'. Autonomous agency here is a wrong aspect of action, because actions of the sage flow from the impersonal logos which discloses.

Agency and the autonomy of the 'author' of art is then shifted away from subjectivity and its self-certitude. If we can still call such a movement 'agency', or the result 'art'. What is left is art as self-disclosure of Dasein in its thrownness. If art has become a form of the 'prima philosophia', and its object is the condition of the possibility of disclosure, then it also has to question its own agency by which it is constituted and part of it is to understand itself in terms of 'a work of art'. Once the self is not just 'bracketed', but seen as an artifice, we can be more charitable and approach art and the self with a more 'therapeutic' agenda. It will also open the way to real 'wonder' which is at the beginning of all philosophy54 and of art.

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54 "Soc: I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumas (wonder)." Platon, Theaetet, 155.d
Abbreviations

Martin Heidegger

GA Gesamtausgabe: with Volume number and page
BPPh Basic Problems of Phenomenology
EiM Einführung in die Metaphysik
SZ Sein und Zeit
UKW Der Ursprung Des Kunstwerks
VA Vorträge und Aufsätze
SdA Der Spruch des Anaximander

Pierre Hadot

PhWL Philosophy as a Way of Life
WiAPh What is Ancient Philosophy

Giorgio Colli

GdPh Die Geburt der Philosophie
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