SOCIAL FORMATION OF JAPANESE SUBJECTHOOD BETWEEN 1868 AND 1905

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Ph.D. Sociology

Goldsmiths College, University of London

2001
For over two centuries prior to 1868, the Tokugawa government consistently refused to have official relations with the outside world, and took a strict policy of isolationism. However, with the ever-increasing encroachment of western naval powers onto its shores, 'Japanese' authorities began to recognise the need to take a different attitude toward its relations with the outside world, especially with the 'West', and began the process of 'modernising' the 'nation'. This thesis will critically investigate what this process of 'modernisation' entailed, by focusing upon the social formation of Japanese subjecthood between 1868 and 1905.

Undertaking a semiotic analysis of advertisements and a genealogical analysis of ethical school textbooks, this thesis argues that the subjectification of Japanese national identity was specifically different from the western one. Through a semiotic analysis of advertisements, it suggests that the operative symbolic system which formed the Japanese subject was one premised upon hybridity rather than essentialism. Through a genealogical analysis of ethical school textbooks, it argues that the subject was constituted through governing the bodily performance of the subject, and one which naturalised the uniqueness of the Japanese race.

These analyses will indicate that the forms of subjectification which may be identified in the process of Japanese modernisation are cognisant of some of the radical models of the subject proposed by some post-1968 theories. These proposals were intended to beget or designate a model of the subject which can resist and overcome the legacy of violence inherent in western thought, particularly of the kind that legitimatated its history of imperialism. However, I argue that since these alternatives bear semblance to those
located in the historical formations that resulted in Japanese imperialism, a critique of thought alone cannot be the basis of social critique, but that thought must be continually apprehended as part of a system of practice in academic activities.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Nikolas Rose, for steering me through my thesis with extraordinary perspicuity and perseverance. Without his guidance, this thesis would not have been.

I would also like to thank Dr. Caroline Ramazanoglu and the other academic members of Goldsmiths College for giving me much needed advice during the making of this thesis. Thanks also to my colleagues, particularly to those whom I had the pleasure of organising the PACSF Conferences with, and also to the various people I met through my involvement with PACSF. There are too many of you to mention by name, but I cannot emphasise enough how important my encounters with you have been.

I would also like to express my appreciation for the financial aid provided by University of London and British Federation of Women Graduates. Doing a PhD is expensive, and the funds were indispensable. I must also mention my relatives and friends for the emotional support they provided me with. Again, too many to name all, but I would just like to mention three: my grandmother, the sweetest grandmother any grand daughter could wish for, Claudia Alvares, one of my first friends here in London and now one of my closest, and Marian Ursu, who deserves full credit for looking after my sanity whilst I've been busy doing a PhD.

Last but not least, my deepest love and gratitude goes to my parents, without whom I would never have embarked on this project.
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The uses of macrons, which indicate long vowels in Japanese language, have been omitted from this thesis. Those who know the language will have no difficulty in differentiating the vowels, while to those without familiarity in the language, macrons are of little use.

On few occasions, I was not able to read parts of the Japanese calligraphy in my primary sources. In such cases, I have indicated this by using the symbol 'O'.

Except for excerpts of Fukuzawa Yukichi's *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline of Theory of Civilization)* (1875), and Document III & Document LXIII, all English translations of primary sources into Japanese are my own, and any mistranslation is my responsibility.
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1.

Meiji Period — Inventing the Japanese Nation and Its Citizens

On 8th of July 1853, two steamers and two sailing vessels anchored off the shores of Urage, Japan. Commanded by Commodore Matthew Perry, a United States naval officer, it was the first time that such a well-equipped western naval fleet had reached the shores of Japan. Perry’s mission was to force Japan to open up its borders, so that it could be used as a seaport. Previous to this moment, Japan had, for over two centuries, shunned the rest of the world and had taken the path of isolationism. Foreign travel was outlawed—no Japanese who left Japan and set foot on ‘foreign’ terrain (accidentally or otherwise) was allowed to return. Both material products and knowledge entering Japan were strictly policed by the Tokugawa government, which had reigned over Japan’s political landscape for over two centuries, and had, in fact, instigated Japan’s isolationist policy. The only official commerce retained in Japan during this period was very limited trade with the Chinese and Dutch, and Japanese intellectuals acquired knowledge through reading in Chinese or Dutch (learnt from the few foreign books found on the black market) (Goodman 1967).
The impact that the arrival of the American fleet made upon 'Japan' was profound, and led to a flurry of internal strifes as well as formation of new alliances. They were confronted with the reality that whilst in isolation, the outside world had changed. The West had superior weapons, superior capacities for warfare, and hence had the strength to subjugate their land. This was received with a sense of awe and anxiety amongst those in authority. The Tokugawa government’s reaction was to refuse relations with the West or to at least procrastinate it. However, there were other samurai clans, especially those from the southern domains, who came to argue that the only resolution to this threat was to import western technology, and quickly, were they not to be colonised as China and India had been. Known in historiography as the period of Bakumatsu-Ishin (End of the Tokugawa Shogunate Government-Beginning of Imperial Restoration), the equilibrium of power was disturbed during the years between 1853 and 1868, leading to a new form of governance coalescing into a new attitude toward its relations with the West. Officiating the dawn of the Meiji period in 1868 was a concretising ritual indicative of this change.

Nevertheless, the nation-state of 'Japan' had yet to be invented in actuality. For one, people living in Japan under the Tokugawa regime had strong regional identities rather than a unified sense of national identity. For two, widespread awareness of the Emperor—a symbol which would come to play such a central part of the Japanese nation—was almost non-existent (Fujitani 1996). Thirdly, not only did the infrastructure of the state not exist, groupings such as the ‘family’ were not properly established as a social institution—between 1881 (the first year that complete data are available) and 1897 (the year before the new Meiji Civil Code went into effect), divorce rates in Japan were higher than those in Europe, with one in three marriages ending in divorce on average. (Ibid: 187-8) Indeed, as Carol Gluck (1985) has observed, it was not until the
1880's or 1890's that the identity of the 'Japanese' authority and its 'citizens' was secured. One cannot therefore assume that 'Japan' already existed at the beginning of Meiji. Rather, the periodisation of the Meiji era as the 'modernising' epoch of Japanese history was, in a sense, a consciousness-raising gesture, which set off the rather ad hoc process through which 'Japan' and its 'citizens' were invented.

1.1 Research Question

There are many aspects of the Meiji period where the argument that 'modernisation' was simply a western import has yet to be substantiated in its specificity. Rather than accept this presumption as a starting point, I want to actively question how it was that Japan's greatest 'modernising' influence came to be known as the 'West', and critically investigate what this process of 'modernisation' actually entailed. In my research, I will ask the following question: did the social formation of subjecthood as Japanese citizens during the Meiji period entail the 'westernisation' of subjecthood? My research will examine the years between 1868 and 1905 for the following reason. The choice of 1868 is due to the fact that this was the year that the Meiji period began. The choice of 1905 is that, in this year, Japan, as a nation-state, won a war against a well-established nation-state, Russia, in the Russo-Japanese War. This event was monumental in that it was the first time an Asian nation-state had won a war against a European nation-state, thereby establishing Japan's status as a nation-state and an imperial power both internally and externally. Central to my research is the question: were Japanese imperialism and western imperialism the result of the same historical process? What is the historical specificity of Japanese imperialism in comparison with how western imperialism has been theoretically understood?
1.2 Methodology

In my thesis, I shall focus upon the emergence of what are now well-established social institutions: the mass media and mass education, to analyse the formation of Japanese subjecthood between 1868 and 1905. More specifically, my analysis will focus upon two archival materials as sources of data: advertisements and ethical school textbooks. I will be undertaking a semiotic analysis of advertisements, and a genealogical analysis of ethical school textbooks. I will be discussing my engagement with these methodologies in Chapter 3 in detail. However, as may already be deduced from the choices of methodologies, inherent to my engagement with these materials is the theoretical assumption that subjectivities are not given, but are created. Let me first make a case for why studying advertisements and school textbooks can tell us how modern Japanese subjecthood was constituted.

Firstly, advertisements. I would argue that advertisement is a medium where subjects attempt to induce other subjects to buy a certain product or service. A necessary part in fulfilling this purpose is to 'bargain' with subjects, such that the 'meanings' of advertisements make sense to subjects, and they answer affirmatively to the question, 'do I want to buy this product?' A minimum requirement in convincing subjects to buy a certain product or service, I would argue, is that they must be able to imagine themselves possessing this product. That is to say, they must be able to connect to or identify with the product. I would therefore suggest that 'advertisements' are a sort of 'communicative space' which speaks to subjects. Moreover, it is the very nature of the market to come up with new or different products and services. Thus, one may argue that what the subject wants, and hence the very constitution of the subject itself is continually reshaped in advertisements.
Similarly, I would also argue that national schooling is a key site of reconstruction of subjecthood, and the ethical school textbook is one of its key elements. Here again, the argument I would make to validate this view is a very simple one. Let us ask the question, what is the purpose of schooling in general? The obvious answer is that they are there for educational purposes, so that teachers can teach, and students can learn. Now, let us now ask a more specific question, what is the purpose of schooling that is organised by the state? I think that the answer here would be that their aim is to build a pool of human resources which can increase the competence of the nation as a whole. In other words, the purpose is to take a group of inchoate individuals and to imbue them with a set of skills such that they contribute to the productivity of the nation. A minimum requirement in fulfilling this end is to convince these subjects that they are willing to work for the nation, because they are 'Japanese'. Therefore, national schooling is a site of construction of Japanese subjecthood.

Obviously, I would not want to deny the possibility of elements of other motives, such as humanitarian ones (i.e., that they are organised according to philanthropic principles), or purely 'innate' ones (i.e., that human beings have some predetermined nature that makes us want to sell and buy, and teach and learn). However, these explanations are unsatisfactory since they do not enable us to understand the historical variances in how the site of 'advertisement' and 'schooling' have been organised, and changes to its very contents. In fact, as we shall see, 'advertisement' and 'national schooling' did not even exist at the beginning of the Meiji. Therefore, we must step away from the comfort of 'transcendental' or 'inherent' assumptions which would foreclose the critical investigation of human activity as historical events. Instead, we must assume that if we are looking at advertisements or school textbooks produced during the Meiji period, they do not tell us what is transcendental or inherent about human beings. Rather, they tell us what was
specific to that historical event, and how their understandings of themselves were specifically constituted through those activities.

There is, however, at least one major difference between advertisements and school textbooks. As stated above, whereas overt entrepreneurial interests drive the primary objective of advertisement, the objective of schooling lies in education. That is to say, the aim of schooling is not achieved through successfully constituting the subject as a consumer, but through constituting a subjecthood of the 'Japanese'. Moreover, whereas the agenda of advertisers is impelled by popular appeal, in schooling, the process of subjectification is of a more authoritarian nature. Unlike advertisements, where, at the end of the day, consumers have some say or choice in buying, at the site of schooling, no such choice exists. One's subjecthood is dictated to. Nevertheless, in so far as those human beings who submit to schooling must heretofore consent to the act of attending school, this submission is preliminarily founded upon consent if not popularity.

Moreover, despite this difference, we shall see (in Chapter 4 and Chapters 5 & 6, respectively) that both of these mediums were directly implicated in the emergence of 'Japan' as a nation-state. Through carrying out a semiotic and genealogical analysis in the two spheres of social life which emerged as a very part of the 'modernising' process in Japan, we shall be able to estimate the extent to which the formation of the modern Japanese subjecthood was shaped and reshaped during the Meiji period.

1.3 Summary of Thesis Structure

There are seven chapters in this thesis, including this chapter which serves as the introduction. The following is a brief outline of the contents of the rest of the thesis.
In Chapter 2, I will present my literature review. This will be an overview of post-war developments in 'Japanese Studies', followed by my critical engagement with some of the post-1968 literature surrounding the formation of modern subjecthood. In the first half, I critique what has been a dominant feature of 'Japanese Studies', namely, the constitution of knowledge about Japanese subjecthood as the particularistic other to the universal West. In the second half, I identify two central features of how subjecthood has been theorised within the post-1968 knowledge-field. The first of these concerns the critique of the western imperial subject as the very product of Hegelian metaphysics; the second arises out of this critique, and has fuelled the academic pursuit for conceiving an 'alternative' model of the subject which does not commit violence unto the other. In this second theoretical development, not a few western theorists have suggested 'Japan' as offering a means of superseding a western ontology and epistemology. I argue that these two developments in post-1968 theory do not merge well with the endeavour of my thesis, which seeks to discern the historical formation of the Japanese imperial subject. In the conclusion, I will present a set of questions or themes regarding the Japanese subjecthood which my thesis will investigate.

In Chapter 3, I will outline the methodologies utilised in this thesis: semiotic analysis and genealogical analysis. My discussion of semiotic analysis will consist of my critique of Judith Williamson's version of semiotic analysis, where I argue against her reliance upon Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. I suggest a way of using semiotic analysis which does not fall back on the universalism of Lacan, but in fact, makes a more dissident use of the Lacanian model. My analysis of genealogy will consist of a discussion of the works of Michel Foucault, particularly focusing upon the methodology he proposed, genealogy. I argue that the most important contribution that Foucault made to social criticism was to enable the apprehension of thought as practice. Despite this, however,
I argue that because Foucault's own concerns were informed by the critiques of western metaphysics—in particular, the reliance on the notions of 'truth' and 'subject' in 'thought'—his model of genealogy, while it effectively analyses the historical changes to ethical practices, still seems to accord 'thought' an autonomous realm to 'practice'. I argue that Nikolas Rose improves the genealogical method through suggesting a more contextualised formulation of genealogy.

Chapter 4 will consist of my execution of semiotic analysis of Meiji advertisements. I argue that until the mid-1880's, the symbolic was that of 'naturalistic culture', one based upon continuum and sameness. However, from about the mid-1880's, as the medium itself made the transition from 'hikifuda/ebira' to 'advertisement', I argue that a 'new' symbolic based upon division and difference between, e.g., 'nature' and 'culture' began to make its appearance. Nevertheless, simultaneously, there were many advertisements which, within the same period, took this more 'scientific' and 'truthful' symbolic, and inserted it into a relation of equivalence with the 'traditional' symbolic. I therefore suggest that meaning was made meaningful to a Japanese subject through a hybrid fusion of both 'traditional' and 'new' symbolic.

In Chapters 5 & 6, I will carry out a genealogical analysis of Meiji schooling. Chapter 5 will focus upon the years between 1868 to the end of 1870's. In this chapter, I will particularly consider the phenomenon which in historiography is known as Bunmei Kaika (Civilization and Enlightenment). Bunmei Kaika is generally identified as encompassing the years between 1872 and 1877, and indicates the time when 'Japan' took the policy of embracing all things western. However, as quickly as the fever for the West arose, it rather quickly died away. I want to reflect upon why 'westernisation' was initially proposed as a strategy for state-building, and then subsequently abandoned. In
order to understand this change in direction, I shall be carrying out a genealogical analysis of the text, *Taisei Hanzen Kunmo (Western Enlightenment and Instruction on Promoting Goodness)* (Mitsukuri 1871) and *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization)* (Fukuzawa 1875). I argue that the 'universalistic' framework of the 'West' was initially seen as a way of encompassing the particularistic differences within the sparring groups of authorities in 'Japan', such that the unification of 'Japan' could be achieved. However, I argue that from the beginning, what was upheld as the 'West' was a particular translation of the 'West', and does not necessarily correlate to the West's self-perception of themselves as the 'West'.

In Chapter 6, I move on to the next era, examining the years starting from around 1879 to 1905, which coincides with the beginning of the about turn in the government's policy, from that of 'westernisation' to one founded upon a veneration of the Imperial lineage. To investigate this period where national elementary schooling was consolidated and actually implemented and enforced, I will be following Rose's rendition of the genealogical method, and will be arguing that Japanese subjecthood was constituted through a very precise prescription of the performance of the Japanese body, such that systems of 'thought' were not central to the forms of subjectification as have been identified in the processes of western modernisation.

Chapter 7 will give a comprehensive analysis of my findings. I will return to the set of questions which I will have set out earlier in Chapter 2, and will be answering each in turn. In so doing, I hope to highlight the specificity of the social formation of the modern imperial Japanese subjecthood in contrast to the western one, and will also be linking my archival analyses back to some theoretical issues which will have been raised in
Chapter 2, to propose some themes or directions for further research on Japanese subjecthood.
2.

Locating a Study on Japanese Subjecthood

As I was undertaking my research, I was often asked by my family and friends, 'but WHY do you have to go to Britain to do a study on Meiji Japan? (i.e., As long as you're in Britain, why don't you do a study on Britain? and/or i.e., Why don't you stay in Japan and do your PhD?) And this French philosopher, FucO, did you say his name was? What does a French person know about Japan? Why is he so important for your work?'.

Unfortunately, although I had an interminable list of reasons justifying my choices, they existed in my mind only as a labyrinth, and I could never manage a spur of the moment response that would satisfy my interrogator. However, the purpose of this chapter will be to do just that: to provide a comprehensive answer to these questions. It will explain why it is that I am doing research on the emergence of Japanese subjecthood in Britain, and why I believe that a Foucaultian perspective can open up theoretical space for research on Japanese subjecthood, through suggesting a way of reframing our understanding of 'Japan' as a historical formation. This chapter will provide the rationale for the location of my study on Japanese subjecthood.
One of the central precepts, which arose in the post-war era amongst European thinkers, was that social theory was social practice, in itself invested with power and inexorably associated with the warp and woof of social history. In section 2.1, I will explore the legacy of 'Japanese Studies' as thinking practice, to seek a more historically embedded understanding of our understanding of Japanese subjecthood. I will particularly be focusing upon post-World War II developments in and between the United States and Japan, which still continue to be the two major academic 'centres' of Japanese Studies, and will trace the historical development of 'Japanese Studies', which led to the emergence of the Nihonjinron (Japanese-ology) phenomena in the 1970's. Nihonjinron is notorious for having served as a legitimating discourse for the 'trade war' between Japan and the United States, especially during the mid-1980's, and has come under much fire within Japanese Studies. (Cf. Mouer & Sugimoto 1986) Nevertheless, the problem of how one may achieve an equitable analysis of the Japanese subject remains open to debate.

I want to suggest that given the lack of study which investigates how an imperialistic subject was constituted in the Meiji period, it is useful for me to carry out such a project, to complement the recent works done on the constitution of the imperialistic subject in the West. In section 2.2, I will present an overview of post-1968 developments in European theories concerned with the subject, thereby mapping out my own engagement with this literature. I believe that this kind of approach is useful because it enables me to mount an argument which does not fall into the pitfall of being simply descriptive—i.e., having no theoretical thrust—and neither are the theoretical inferences which it leads to too monolithic in their claims, a problem all too familiar in Japanese Studies.
Nevertheless, due to the specific historical context within which post-1968 philosophical debates in Europe developed, there are some theoretical incompatibilities in simply applying them. That is to say, post-1968 revision of western theory began as an attempt to overcome the residues of Hegelianism in their own thought, leading to a conceptualisation of the West's relation with its colonies in binary terms—i.e., dominant West vs. subaltern Other. This remains problematic when one is attempting to understand Japanese imperialism, since it does not share the history of metaphysical thought which was dominated by Hegel, and is not part of the 'West' per se. Concomitantly, some contemporary thinkers have attempted to theorise an 'alternative' epistemology or ontology which overcomes the theoretical problems which are seen to be specifically-inherent in Hegelianism, as well as in western metaphysical thought in general. I shall be considering some of these 'alternatives', and consider their implications upon theorising Japanese subjecthood, to propose a rather different engagement and approach to these theories.

In short, in this chapter will do two things. Firstly, it will present a general overview of how knowledge about Japanese subjecthood has been constituted in the post-war period, to argue for the validity of engaging with post-1968 European theories regarding the subject. Secondly, it will present a general overview of how the modern western subject has been theorised in the post-1968 era, vis-à-vis the history of imperialism and colonialism. This discussion will generate my own speculations regarding the specificity of Japanese imperial subjecthood, and in section 2.3, I will conclude the chapter with a set of questions which the rest of my thesis will endeavour to answer.
2.1 Post-war Developments in Japanese Studies

Admittedly, no 'nation-state' can lay claim to exclusive ownership over the academic knowledge produced within the genre of 'Japanese Studies', or, for that matter, to 'knowledge' in general. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to argue that certain nation-states have had, and continue to have a more privileged position in the production of 'knowledge', in so far as 'knowledge' is understood to be an effect of power relations. Given the 'special' relationship forged between United States and Japan in the post-war period, then, it is not surprising that 'Japanese Studies' as an academic discipline has flourished mainly in the United States and Japan. The present discussion will therefore focus upon the post-war developments of 'Japanese Studies' in Japan and United States.

I will argue that in the decades following the end of World War II, certain conventions about the 'truths' concerning 'Japan' came into formation via the academic activities and realisation of 'Japanese Studies' as a discipline, one of the most significant being in the

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1 This is not to say that 'Japan' did not exist in the western imagination prior to the post-war period. The most famous citation of the earliest recorded encounters that the 'West' had with 'Japan' is the Italian publication of Marco Polo's travels to the East in the 13th century. Here, 'Japan' is mentioned briefly as a 'very rich island, so that no one could count it riches' (Polo 1958: 244). However, a more 'organised' contact between the 'West' and 'Japan' would only come to take place in the mid-16th century, when Christian missionaries established outposts in southern Japan. Although the presence of Christian missionaries upon 'Japanese' soil would come to an end less than hundred years after St. Francis Xavier first reached the shores of 'Japan', in 1549 (cf. Boxer 1974, Moran 1993), this was the occasion when 'Japan' became established in western knowledge. According to Bibliotheca japonica (Cordier 1912), the first (known) account of 'Japan' in English was published in 1577. (An exact reproduction of the section on Japan, 19 pages in length, may be found in England and Japan: the First Known Account of Japan in English (Paske-Smith 1928).) Indeed, it was only in 1579 that Ralph Newbury published an English translation of Marco Polo's travels to London. Thus, by the early 17th century, when Japan closed its borders to outside contact, some sort of 'public' knowledge about 'Japan' was already available in the West. Indeed, even during the period of sakoku (close country), there was minimal commercial intercourse between the West and Japan, for one seaport in southern Japan was kept open to Dutch and Chinese trading ships (cf. Goodman 1967). Nevertheless, these accounts of 'Japan' cannot be said to have constituted 'academic' knowledge per se, for they were personal accounts or letters by traders and voyagers giving accounts of their experiences in Japan. (See, for example, Purchas his Pilgrimes (Purchas 1625). This text includes an English translation of the letter the King of Netherlands wrote to the 'King' of Japan, dated 1611.) For a comprehensive overview of pre-war literature on 'Japan', see A
establishment of 'Japan' as the particular 'other' to the universalistic identity of the 'West', or America, as the case would be. This is already a well-established thesis, and hardly needs to be re-substantiated by myself on this occasion. (Cf. Miyoshi 1991a, Sakai 1997a, Mouer & Sugimoto 1986, Rosenberger 1992) Nevertheless, I would like to rehearse the argument here once again, with a particular focus on the historical context within which 'truths' about the constitution and theorisation of the Japanese subject took place, and how practitioners from both sides of the Pacific Ocean were implicated in the politics of constituting these 'truths'. The purpose of my doing so is to highlight the very historicity of the contemporary predicament that Japanese Studies practitioners find themselves in, which further attests to the continued relevance and importance of questioning the politics of knowledge.

2.1.1 Starting Point: Identifying Particularity and Universality

It is generally recognised that the definitive moment when 'Japan' became an established object of a 'professional' gaze of the American academia was in June 1944, when the American government commissioned the cultural anthropologist, Ruth Benedict, to undertake a fieldwork research on their erstwhile enemies, the 'Japanese', to understand how they behaved and thought. It being wartime, Benedict could not travel to Japan to carry out her fieldwork. She therefore undertook her research in a community of expatriate Japanese who had been incarcerated in prison camps in America.

What resulted is now largely recognised as a 'classic' text, still regularly read not only amongst academic circles but also by members of the general public. Called

_Bibliography of the Japanese Empire_ (Wenckstern 1895) and _Bibliography of the Japanese Empire_ (Wenckstern 1907).
Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Benedict 1946, 1967), despite the political motivations of the project, the text did not 'demonise' the 'Japanese' but, in keeping with Benedict's anthropological principles, accounted for 'Japanese' patterns of behaviour as being entirely intelligible when understood in their culturally-unique context. Mainstream anthropology in that period was dominated by the functionalism of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown which advocated a holistic approach to understanding cultures. Benedict also took on board the functionalist postulate that even strange social practices are rendered intelligible when understood in terms of their contribution to a social whole. However, whereas functionalists assumed the existence of an underlying motivation that was universally the same, no matter how different their manifestations might be, Benedict argued that different cultures had different motivations. (Cf. Yoshino 1992: 32-3)

Thus, Benedict depicted the Japanese as having culturally-unique ways of being and understanding the world, which could not be reduced to sameness in the last instance. What is perhaps one of the most well-known thesis which arose from Benedict's work regarding Japanese culture is the rendition of Japan as a 'shame culture', which '[relies] on external sanctions' (Benedict 1946, 1967: 223) to regulate good behaviour, as opposed to the 'guilt culture' of the West, where morality is a matter of 'internalized conviction of sin' (ibid: 223). Thus, Benedict set the precedent for conceptualising the Japanese subject as a particularistic entity, completely different from western subjecthood.

In contrast to Benedict's project, in the aftermath of World War II, the central aspiration amongst Japanese intellectuals was to indigenise the universal ideal of democracy, which they found lacking in Japan's political culture. Led by Maruyama Masao [1914-
96], debates about how Japan could cultivate a culture of political activism founded upon autonomous subjectivity were the rage in Japan, especially between 1947 and 1948. Known as the shutaisei (subjectivity) debate, Marxist thought defined the parameters for how the role of the subject in history was theorised. The introduction of Marxist theory in the Japanese academic scene had come about in the 1930's—the first complete collection of Marx and Engels' works to appear anywhere in the world was published in Japan in 1933—but the particular prestige of Marxism in the shutaisei debate was also due to the well-known fact that it was only the small group of Japanese communist intellectuals who had risked imprisonment or exile to voice their protest of Japan's wartime regime, while other intellectuals, including Maruyama, had kept a low profile, and some, of course, had even endorsed it. It has therefore been suggested that this guilt conscience served as the impetus for the shutaisei debate, and even defined the scope of their discussions. (Cf. Miyoshi 1991b)

Although Maruyama was sympathetic to many aspects of Marxist thought, he favoured an 'idealistic' reading of Marx. That is to say, Maruyama argued that democracy was a 'universal' value (thus disassociating the notion of 'modernisation' with 'westernisation' and equating 'modernisation' with 'democratisation') and further, that the prerequisite of a democratic society was the prolific existence of politically-informed citizens who had the capacity to take active part in political decision-making processes. For Maruyama, therefore, social change was entirely dependent upon an agency in possession of rationality and individualism. Kirsten has observed that 'the shutaisei debate in Japan should be seen as a extension of the European debate, as it is concerned with the same philosophical issues of idealism and determinism.' (Ibid: 91) Thus, the concern for finding universalism(s), and not particularism(s), was the mode of language adopted by Maruyama and his peers.
To be sure, it should be noted that despite the universalistic undertones of Maruyama's political project, prospects of Japanese particularity were not ignored by him, and it was precisely through his investigation of Japan's past modernisation history that he came to be such a staunch advocate of the universal subject. Maruyama harked back to the Meiji period, and argued that Japan's involvement in World War II was the outcome of flawed 'modernisation'. He argued that in order for history to not repeat itself, it was of utmost importance that Japanese citizens should now undergo 'true modernisation', through cultivating a 'democratic' culture founded upon rationality and nurturing individualism. (Cf. Kersten 1996) Thus, Maruyama saw the future development of Japan's political culture treading the universal path to autonomous subjecthood, but in so far as past wrong-doings were concerned, Maruyama put the blame on the particularistic failures of the Japanese to modernise during the Meiji period. (Maruyama 1963)

Of course, Maruyama must be criticised for this aporia in his thinking, for although Maruyama called for the cultivation of a political agency in Japan, his could not be a historical agency, since his own frame of analysis foreclosed such a possibility (cf. Miyoshi 1991b). Rather than seeking out the reasons for why the war had occurred and what had caused it, he sought out the reasons for why Japan had failed to prevent the war. Moreover, in seeing the 'modernising' process of the Meiji period as a 'failure', he failed to note that Meiji authorities had, in fact, all too successfully, produced a national subject which could and did participate in World War II. The problem he should have perhaps asked was how Meiji modernisation had effectively produced a nationalised subjecthood. However, although this critique is an important one to make for my own research, it is besides the point which I want to make here, which is that the project of Japanese intellectuals such as Maruyama was of a qualitatively different nature to the
stance found in, *e.g.*, Ruth Benedict, and those academics who chose to follow her lead. For Maruyama, universalism was the language of the day, and for Benedict, particularism.

This rift in theory was not helped by the fact that in the years immediate to the end of the war, there was a state of segregation between American academics interested in Japan and Japanese intellectuals such as Maruyama. One of the contributing factors to this schism could have been a matter of practicality, such as the language barrier, or geographic distance. It may also have been an institutional difference. In America, the purpose was to produce academic knowledge about Japan, whereas for these Japanese intellectuals, the purpose was not only to produce academic knowledge, but perhaps more importantly, to educate the Japanese public. Thus, the *shutaisei* debates took place within mediums such as popular journals or televised roundtable discussions, which were not recognised as legitimate academic platforms by western academics. It may also well have been that given the historical context—that Japanese intellectuals were seeking an autonomous subjectivity despite and against American Occupation, American academics would have been seen as the 'enemy', and they did not want to 'collaborate' with them.²

Nevertheless, from the 1960's, there began moves to create a communication link between Japanese and American scholars. In retrospect, it may be said that 1960 was a turning point in the development of Japanese Studies, due to some economical, social and academic convergences. Events in 1960 paved the way to the entrenchment of the view of Japan as a particularistic entity in the 1970's, through the emergence of

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² Harootunian (1993) has referred to the American Occupation as a 'bourgeois wedding between the United States and Japan, the actual intent of the coupling was to transform the bride [Japan] by bringing her into the groom's [United States'] household' (ibid: 199). Perhaps Maruyama and his peers were the few who wanted a divorce.
In the following, I will discuss the ‘resurrection’ of the Japanese economy, the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, and the Hakone Conference of 1960, in turn.

2.1.2 1960: The ‘War’ Between Capitalism and Marxism

1960 was a momentous year in Japanese history. Events of this year highlighted the discursive ‘war’ between two ‘value-systems’: on one side were the forces of capitalism, and on the other, Marxism. In actuality, the conflict between these two opposing camps had been simmering since the end of the war, but 1960 saw the eruption of this conflict developing into an all-out ‘war’, where the platform of ‘academic knowledge’ served as one of its battlegrounds. I will tell the story of this ‘war’ in the following.

Despite the economic rubble that Japan had been reduced to by the end of World War II, by 1960, Japan was well on its way to economic recovery. The ‘Korean War Boom’ of 1951 had jump-started this rapid pace of recovery; in the words of Takafusa Nakamura, the effect of the Korean War on the Japanese economy was ‘nothing short of prodigious.’ (Nakamura 1995: 43). Indeed, the expenditures of the Korean War lifted the world economy from recession in general, and in particular, Japan’s foreign exchange income, as a result of the tokuju (special procurements—i.e., expenditures of the U.S. Army and military personnel) between 1950-1953 was 2,225 US million dollars. Since all other export income stood at 4,723 US million dollars during the same period, 32% of all export income came from tokuju income. (Cf. Nakamura 1995) Indeed, it must be remembered that this was the period of the Cold War, and the United States

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3 Until the oil shock of 1973, the average growth rate of post-war economy in Japan was 10% per annum.
4 The percentile was calculated according to figures in table 2.7 in The Post-war Japanese Economy (1995: 44).
placed high strategic value on Japan as the geographic fortification against the spread of communism; from the point of view of nations advocating a 'free-market economy', there was political interest in revitalising and stabilising the Japanese economy. Thus, it is important to note that the swift re-emergence of post-war Japan as a 'first-world' economy was deeply enmeshed in the politics of Cold War, and that Japan, from the beginning, was reaping the economic benefits of being America's 'Prodigious Son' of the Pacific.

The so-called 'Security Treaty Crisis of 1960' was symptomatic of these affairs of the state. In short, when the American Occupation Period had ended in 1951, the American and Japanese government had signed a security alliance pact which said that the United States would continue to have a military presence in Japan through the establishment of military bases on Japanese territory, which would be outside the jurisdiction of the Japanese government. This security alliance pact was a ten-year contract, and in 1960, a revised version of the security treaty was in the midst of negotiation. LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), the ruling party of the Diet, headed by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, wanted to ratify a revised security treaty with the United States. From an economic point of view, the security alliance was advantageous for both nations, since it greatly released Japan from the financial burden of rearmament, and secured Japan as a military base to contain the spread of communism for the Americans. The 'crisis' erupted because Maruyama Masao and his peers opposed ratification, as did a significant portion of the Japanese population; it was a portentous 'battle' between those who attached greater importance to economic affluence, and those whose design was to inculcate a 'new' form of 'shutaisei (subjectivity)' into Japan's political culture.
As stated earlier, when the war had ended, Japanese intellectuals went through a period of self-recrimination for not having effectively resisted the war. Their experience of the war led them to argue that the pre-war Japanese citizens had been ineffectual in preventing the war because the existence of an autonomous shutaisei (subjectivity) was missing in Japan’s political culture. In addition, since the 1950’s, the theme of democracy and autonomous subjecthood had come to be increasingly affiliated with the anti-nuclear peace movement, and it was in this period that ‘democracy’ came to be represented as the pristine renunciation of warfare. That is to say, Maruyama and his peers came to believe that in order for Japan to become a truly democratic society, Japanese people needed to advocate universal peace, and that indeed, post-war Japanese subjectivity must be founded upon it.

On the face of it, this was a principle which would seem to have been guaranteed by article 9 of the post-war Japanese constitution, which had been legislated under the tutelage of American Occupation decision-makers. Nevertheless, the security treaty of 1951 had directly negated this principle, for it clearly stated the expectation that Japan would ‘increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence’, which was reiterated in the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of 1954 and in the Kishi-Eisenhower Joint Communiqué of 1957. Given such a chain of events, and given their political stance of advocating universal peace as well as participatory politics, Maruyama and his peers came to believe that it was only right that they should personally lead the anti-government movement against the ratification of the revised Security Treaty with the United States. (Cf. Kersten 1996)

5 Article 9: ‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dispute…. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
However, in the end, despite widespread opposition for ratification, just after the midnight of 19th May 1960, the Kishi government managed to pass the treaty bills, in the absence of opposition party members whose votes were not counted. Although what the Kishi government did was not illegal strictly speaking, in the absence of a public referendum, the ratification was considered to be an infraction of due democratic processes, and a nation-wide protest movement followed:

...to Maruyama Masao, the pacifist intellectuals, the labour unions, the organised left (communists, socialists and students), significant sections of the ruling party, housewives and other previously apolitical sections of the Japanese community, it was nothing short of a flagrant disregard for the principles of democracy. So heinous were the events of those fourteen hours⁶ that for the month between 19 May and 19 June, the streets of Tokyo surrounding the Diet building were not free of demonstrators for a single day. (Ibid: 206-7)

However, despite popular condemnation for what was seen as a breach of the principles of democracy, the deed was done, and nothing could be done to revoke the ratification.

Maruyama and his peers saw this as a major defeat. In a major battle which could have determined the future of Japanese 'democracy', economic interests had won. They saw these events as a confirmation that Japan had yet to cultivate a political culture founded upon autonomous subjectivity, and further, believed that since their utmost efforts to control political decisions in Japan had ended in failure, there was little reason to try any further. After their highly publicised and prominent participation in the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, Maruyama and his peers, as if to admit defeat, were to thereafter increasingly surrender their public voice, isolating themselves in the academic 'ivory tower' once again.

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forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.’ (Quoted in Horsley & Buckley 1990: 17-8)

⁶ The 'fourteen hours' here refers to the 14 hours during which Kishi 'sneakily' managed to pass the treaty bill.
It was at such a time, when the first major indication that the social experiment of instating Japanese autonomous subjectivity had largely seen to have failed that 'modernization theory' descended upon the scene, at the Hakone Conference in August 1960. Maruyama was called upon to fight once again, but this time, the battle was not fought on television or on the streets, but at a resort hotel at the foot of Mount Fuji; this time, the 'battle' did not involve political practice as such, but centered on theory.

'Modernization theory' was a group of American post-war sociological theories which took a functionalist approach exemplified by Talcott Parsons to understanding society. It prescribed that all societies made a similar historical transition from 'traditional' to 'modern', where 'society' was modelled as a close-circuited system. The degree and amount of structural differentiation and integration within a society was the measure for a given society's rank of advancement within this evolutionary blueprint. (Cf. Yoshino 1992: 88) Thus, like the orthodox version of Marxism, it offered a universalistic explanation to society. However, against the backdrop of the Cold War, proponents of 'modernization theory' rejected the Marxist view that social change was the result of overcoming conflict between social classes, and instead advocated a liberal democracy model where freedom and equality were the 'value-free' outcome guaranteed by the affluence of successful industrialisation. (Cf. Mouer & Sugimoto 1986: 47-8) Thus, from the point of view of modernization theorists, 'economic success' and 'autonomous subjectivity' were not each other's foe.

Although the stated aim of the conference had been to: one, try and explain the rapid progress of Japanese industrialisation, and two, provide a forum to facilitate collaboration between American and Japanese scholars (cf. Mouer & Sugimoto 1986: 47), clearly, 'modernization theory' was a convenient 'bargaining tool' for both Japanese
and American authorities (who had seen to the ratification of the Security Treaty), an attractive alternative to Maruyama's, since it furnished a narrative where autonomous subjectivity was not sacrificed as a result of economic success. But Maruyama et al., still with vivid memories of the Security Treaty Crisis, protested that a subjectivity born from the wedlock of economic success could, at most, only be an illegitimate child, as it were, or more likely to result in a miscarriage. At the conference, Maruyama staunchly argued that true modernisation could only be premised on the prolific existence of 'value-conscious' citizens in society. For Maruyama, 'modernisation' was not reducible to material change, and rather, its most crucial component was in harbouring autonomous agency.

In a sense, although there were irreconcilable differences between the particular version of the universalistic perspective expounded by 'modernization theorists', and Maruyama's vision of fostering a democratic society founded upon the 'universal' principles of democracy, both had shared a common aspiration to graft a general/universal framework to explaining 'Japan'. Nevertheless, in hindsight, the most enduring views on Japanese culture and economy presented at the Hakone Conference were neither those of the 'modernization theorists' nor Maruyama et al/s. Even as the 'modernization theory' perspective was being introduced into Japan at the Hakone Conference of 1960, some American scholars, including Edwin O. Reischauer$, were already voicing a dissenting viewpoint that 'traditional' and 'modern' were not necessarily exclusive qualities, but in fact could complement each other, and that 'traditional' cultural

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7 Edwin O. Reischauer [1910-1990]: Began his academic career as a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Harvard University until his appointment as U.S. Ambassador to Japan in 1961. Retired from ambassadorialship in 1966 and returned to teaching at Harvard University. Is the founding father of Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University, and is also the namesake for The Edwin O. Reischauer Centre for East Asian Studies at John Hopkins University (website address: http://www.sais-ihu.edu/depts/asia/reischauer/ (2000c)). For further information on Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, see website address: http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~rijs/eorbio.html (2000d).
and religious mores may in some cases [as in Japan] actually assist the modernisation process’ (Kersten 1996: 112). Ironically, it was the subsequent rebuttal of ‘modernization theory’ which saw ‘Japan’ as a particularistic entity, which would come to dominate the field of ‘Japanese Studies’ thereafter, as exemplified by the emergence of *Nihonjinron* in the 1970's.

### 2.1.3 1970's-: Constitution of *Nihonjinron*

...it might be possible to capitalise on the Japanese feeling of racial and social superiority to the Chinese, Koreans and Russians, and to convince them that as part of the free world they would be in equal fellowship with a group which is superior to the members of the Communist world.

— John Foster Dulles, 1950 (Quoted in Dower 1975)

Twenty years after John Foster Dulles, the American negotiator to the Security Treaty made this remark, the literary genre known as *Nihonjinron* (Japanese-ology) appeared upon the scene. Why did *Nihonjinron* texts sell so well, and how had this literary genre come about in the first place? In other words, what was the politics which necessitated the designation of a group of texts as *Nihonjinron* texts, such that it gave rise to *Nihonjinron* as a visible textual object? This section will offer an explanation to these questions.

*Nihonjinron*, generally translated into English as a 'discourse of Japanese uniqueness', has typically been described as 1. Referring to the vast array of 'non-fiction' (*i.e.*, 'truths'-telling) literature produced by a society's elite groups (including those belonging to academic institutions) which have offered various stories about the uniqueness of the Japanese identity; 2. Academic studies which have studied *Nihonjinron* have traced its ancestry to the 1930's (cf. Mouer & Sugimoto 1986; Kawamura 1980). While this may be a fair description of what qualified a text as a *Nihonjinron* text, and while it may be
true that discourses about Japanese identity have utilised notions of cultural uniqueness since the 1930's or perhaps even before, these definitions alone do not adequately explain the emergence of Nihonjinron as a literary genre in the 1970's. That is to say, it does not adequately convey the politics of Nihonjinron as a phenomenon specific to the 1970's, and in fact veils the moment of novelty in the emergence of Nihonjinron as a textual object.

For Nihonjinron went beyond a group of texts which tried to define the uniqueness of the Japanese character. It was a social phenomenon, undergirdled by a publication industry which invented the literary genre of Nihonjinron, selected certain texts to be advertised as such, and re-cast certain texts which were written at a time when the literary genre of Nihonjinron did not exist, as its 'classic' texts. Benedict Anderson (1983, 1991) has shown that a persistent strategy of identity-building is to create an image of themselves as being 'old' through 'reversed ventriloquism' (ibid: 198), that is to say, through ascribing an ancestry to an object or an event which, during its actual lifetime, did not possess such an identity. Therefore, to accept any text written before 1970's as a Nihonjinron text is to accede to what is already a discursive manoeuvre, and one must maintain vigilance on this point. Even the more so, since the typical truism is that 'Nihonjinron texts began to diminish from the mid-1980's, and now, there are no more Nihonjinron texts'. Were we to not differentiate between the literary genre of Nihonjinron from the more general discourse of Japanese uniqueness, one would be led into thinking that discourses which constitute the cultural uniqueness of Japanese identity no longer exist, since, technically speaking, it is true that texts advertised as Nihonjinron are no longer published. However, if discourses which have cultivated the notion of Japanese uniqueness have had the tenacious presence which can be traced back to the 1930's (as have been claimed), then surely it is doubtful that they could have
'suddenly' started to disappear in the 1980's. All that could be construed from the above statement is that texts which are advertised as *Nihonjinron* texts no longer exist. But this does not necessarily mean that the discourse itself may continue to live on under a different name or in another form. For this reason, I think it is important to see *Nihonjinron* as a phenomenon which began in the 1970's, and ended in the mid-1980's, and that it was the specific result of specific convergence of specific configurations of power, which disseminated certain 'truths' about Japanese national identity through the invention of a textual object known as *Nihonjinron*.

Indeed, as we may construe from Dulles' comment quoted above, as well as from the events of 1960's, when *Nihonjinron* made its appearance, the problem that faced Japanese and American authorities was that of constituting a post-war Japanese identity which took pride in itself as a free-market economy. Given such a political climate, it may be argued that the invention of the literary genre of *Nihonjinron* and the 'truths' it subsequently created was directly implicated in governing the subjecthood of the 'Japanese'. Let us examine the dominant 'truths' about the Japanese subject which were constituted through *Nihonjinron* texts. As we shall see, what remained constant was the utilisation of Japan's cultural uniqueness to explain its economic activity, at first as a success story with America's blessing, and then as its dangerous and backward economic adversary. However, the nature and the use of the notion of Japan's 'cultural uniqueness' would change dramatically between these two periods, as I discuss below.

**First Period: Japanese 'Culture' as a Timeless Entity**

As mentioned earlier, the continued rise of Japanese economy was situated as a theoretical counter-example to 'modernization theory'; 'modernization theory' assumed that 'tradition' and 'modern' were mutually exclusive stages of industrial development,
but the case of 'Japan' was exhibited as evidence that this was not necessary the case. It was argued: 'here is Japan. It is not 'modern' (i.e., it is not like western societies), and yet it is industrialising very successfully, even more successfully that some societies in the West. Since Japan is not as 'modern' as western society, this must mean that sometimes, 'traditional' practices can bolster processes of industrialisation.'

It is important to note that such a viewpoint called for a conversion of thought, for 'economy' alone could not provide the basis for an adequate explanation. That is to say, because the notion of 'economy' in itself is assumedly a neutral one, even a 'universal' one, so to speak, as 'economy' was assumed to exist anywhere where human beings existed—i.e., since the notion of 'economy' could not discriminate according to geographic location—it could not account for Japan's economic success as an 'anomaly'. Since the realm of 'economy' could not account for cases of economic exception, an innovation in 'understanding' an economic fact was required: the introduction of the realm of 'culture' as an interchangeable concept to 'tradition'. This coupling of 'economy' with 'culture' was the moment of creativity. Indeed, the plausibility of Nihonjinron texts as 'true' was crucially dependent on the fine line drawn between the realm of 'culture' and 'economy', and it is this that marks Nihonjinron out from all other previous discourses about Japanese identity.

Given such a context, it should be clear how strange it was that e.g., Ruth Benedict's text, which was published in 1946, when Japan was, in fact, moribund in economic terms, was suddenly redefined as a 'classic' Nihonjinron text in the 1970's to explain Japan's economic accomplishment. Indeed, the luxury of hindsight may now allow us to realise the fundamental peculiarity of such a discourse, since the separation between 'economy' and 'culture' is a very arbitrary one. Thus, to explain economic success
through cultural norms was a dubious project in the first instance. Even if, for argument's sake, one could justify the separation between the realm of economy from culture as an explanatory procedure, the abductive nature of *Nihonjinron* (i.e., that it took an 'economic' fact, made some assumptions about Japanese culture based upon it, and then inferred back from the 'economic' fact that their assumptions about Japanese culture were 'true') would point to the basic unsoundness of *Nihonjinron* explanations. Nevertheless, these 'truths' had wide currency, and were accepted as reasonable explanations for Japan's economic success. Indeed, texts designated as *Nihonjinron* texts sold very well, and were widely read by members of the general public; research has indicated that they had a pivotal effect on how e.g., Japanese educators and businessmen defined their identity as a 'Japanese'. (Yoshino 1992)\(^8\)

Since the 'individual' is the smallest unit of economic activity as well as the possessor of culture, Japanese subjecthood became the nexus for explaining Japan's economic anomaly. In these texts, the Japanese subject was constituted as having a natural proclivity to be group-consensual, conformist, valuing harmony over personal achievement, having a holistic approach to life, not having fundamental values but making judgement decisions based on the specific context (as opposed to the individualism of the West, where judgements about right and wrong are founded upon universal principles). Moreover, it was argued that these characteristics were the timeless or 'natural' characteristics of the Japanese subject.

Chie Nakane's *Tate Shakai no Ningen Kankei* (*Interpersonal Relationships in a Vertically Structured Society*) (1967) (later published in an English version as *Japanese

\(^8\) A survey published by Nomura Research Institute (1978) is often cited to provide empirical proof for this. According to the survey, approximately 700 books were published between 1946 and 1978 on the theme of Japanese peculiarities. Out of these, 58% were published after 1970 of which 25% between 1976 and 1978.
Society (Nakane 1970)) is a case in point. An anthropologist trained in London, who later returned to Japan to hold an academic post at University of Tokyo, Nakane was also appointed as a member of the advisory committee to the Prime Minister in making social and cultural policies during the 1980's. In her book, which by 1982, had sold over 760,000 (63 editions), Nakane depicted present industrialised Japanese society as free of social conflict, because Japan continues to be the 'homogeneous' culture originating in the prehistoric Jomon period, and was founded upon an 'inherent mentality' (ibid: 150) valuing group consensus, where each individual defined him/herself in relation to others. Nakane further elaborated that unlike Indian or Western social systems where social conflicts are laterally-induced through caste or class divisions, Japanese society was founded upon vertical division, e.g., between large corporate companies, and that because social harmony was a valued cultural norm, many meetings were held within business firms to ensure that decisions were founded upon maximum consultation.

Another example is Doi Takeo's Amae no Kozo (Anatomy of Dependence) (1973). Takeo also held an academic post at University of Tokyo, and his book had sold over 1,250,000 copies (128 editions) by 1981. Taking a psychological approach, Takeo argued that Japanese cultural practices sanctioned the everyday expression of the desire to be passively taken care of and indulged, a condition, that is, of one's childhood experience. Doi argued that all people (regardless or culture) have this desire, but where in the West, this desire is repressed upon entering adulthood, Japanese society allowed the manifestation of such a desire into adulthood, and to have their desire (for indulgence) be fulfilled. This, Doi argued, was 'the basic emotional urge that has fashioned the Japanese for two thousand years.' (Ibid: 82)
While Nakane and Doi were perhaps correct to argue that Japanese subjecthood was specifically different from a western one, their works ignored the view that if the constitution of the Japanese identity was different from the West's, it was only because the regime of power in 'Japan' was different from the western one. Instead, they essentialised the 'Japanese subject' as an ahistorical (or, from their point of view, a transhistorical) and particularistic entity. Indeed, it was due to the power of these texts and many other Nihonjinron texts which embedded the concept of 'Japanese subject' which used 'culture' to explained away the fact of Japan's economic success, that an ahistorical conception of Japanese 'culture' became rooted as a 'truth'.

Second Period: Japanese 'Culture' as an Impermanent Entity

During the height of the Cold War, Nihonjinron 'truths' about Japanese culture and subject had been highly lauded by mainstream Japanese and American opinion leaders as a basis for explaining Japan's economic success. However, from the mid-1980's, the platform began to be used in another matter. That is to say, while it continued to contribute to knowledge affirming the excellence of Japan's timeless culture for many of the Japanese, additionally, it began to be used to criticise Japan's 'unfair' business practices by a significant portion of the American opinion makers. This was, of course, a reflection of a shift in the political landscape; the era of the Cold War was coming to an end, 'Reaganomics' had suffered a prolonged period of recession, while the Japanese economy appeared to be doing dangerously well. Under these circumstances, the United States began to treat 'Japan' as not its disciple, but as a potentially dangerous adversary, and the contents of Nihonjinron texts would reflect this change. Let us first begin this discussion by citing one infamous example of how Nihonjinron was implicated in politics.
On 22nd September 1986, then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro gave a party speech addressing members of his Liberal Democratic Party. Ivy (1989) sums up the speech as follows:

Nakasone's speech, in its entirety, is a delirious sweep through historical time and cultural space. His ostensible theme is the place of an international Japan in the world today and the Liberal Democratic party's role in attaining that place. But along the way he makes an excursus not only through Japanese history, but also through global space, invoking a theory of parallel development proposed by the anthropologist Umesao Tadao, director of the National Museum of Ethnology. Not only is feudal Japan compared to France and Germany (Japan emerges with a vastly superior literacy rate), but Nakasone traces as far back as Africa and Australopithecus to assert a polygenic theory of human origins. There is talk about Asia, about the world's oldest pottery (Japanese), about the impact of marauding Central Asian nomads on the Chinese and Holy Roman Empires, about SDI, nuclear power, about monsoon Buddhism and desert monotheism, the high-level information society, and talk about Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and American blacks. He ends his speech with an appeal to search out the racial origins of the Japanese: only by knowing their self-identity can Japanese know their "difference" from the rest of the world. (Ibid: 22)

In effect, Nakasone made the dubious claim that the Japanese are superior precisely because of its homogeneity and racial pureness. This speech understandably led to a torrent of protestations expressed in the international media, and given that many Nihonjinron texts corroborated Nakasone's view of Japan's superior homogeneity, it sparked off a spate of publication, also categorised as Nihonjinron texts, which again used the concept of Japanese cultural uniqueness to denounce 'unfair' Japanese business practices.

A critique of these so-called 'Japan Bashing' texts has been carried out elsewhere (cf. Miyoshi 1991a), and I do not want to dwell on their contents too much at length here. However, we may give Karl Van Wolferen's The Enigma of Japanese Power (1989) as one prime example. Wolferen argued that Japanese cultural norms valuing group

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9 A full transcript of the speech is published in Chuo Koron (Central Review), 101, November 1986, 146-62.
conformity had created a political system which is not capable of taking political responsibility. This system of irresponsibility, Wolferen argued, penetrated the very fabric of how Japanese society is organised, including the educational, religious, and business institutions, and that the 'System' has yet to turn 'Japanese subjects into citizens' (ibid: 433). Wolferen was to conclude his assessment of the Japanese system with a rather patronising prediction that 'the System will muddle on, after having come to some modus vivendi with the Western world and the United States in particular. But this will require wise policies in the Western capitals.' (Ibid: 433)

In effect, by the 1980's, a dominant feature of Nihonjinron was that it actively participated in producing a discourse which was convenient for both Japanese and American political interests, but in very different ways. From the American perspective, Nihonjinron provided the 'proof' that the Japanese were too particular and that they did not have the appropriate maturity to be responsible citizens of the world, thus providing the rationale that the United States was the mature vanguard of universalism. From a Japanese perspective, Nihonjinron provided the rationale for asserting Japanese racial and economic superiority. However, I do not want to magnify this confrontation within Nihonjinron too much, since actually, this 'Japan Bashing' period of Nihonjinron only lasted for a very brief period—perhaps until the early 1990's when Japan's 'bubble economy' burst—and was always heavily contested by other Japanologists. Indeed, within the broader landscape of Japanese Studies, the significance of 'Japan Bashing' texts was that it acted as a catalyst for Nihonjinron to take an 'introspective' turn, and to critique the ahistorical conceptions of 'Japanese culture', which it had actively cultivated in the previous decade. Indeed, there would be a complete inversion of the definition of 'Japanese culture.'
 Whereas previously, the essence of 'Japanese culture' had been defined as timeless, now the very essence of 'Japanese culture' would be characterised by its fleetingness. Thus, Harumi Befu (1992)—a Japanese American scholar working in an American institution, and also a well-known Nihonjinron writer himself—would self-reflexively suggest that the literary genre of Nihonjinron came to replace the 'symbolic vacuum' of post-war Japan, when the major symbols of national pride—the flag, emblem, and the national anthem—were no longer viable because of their pre-war militaristic connotations, and as the emperor himself had become more a symbol of Japan’s defeat and loss than anything else.

In addition, Befu argued that Nihonjinron was a discourse which offers a linguistic explanation of what a national identity consists of and why one should be proud of one’s nation, and that it was characterised by its mutability:

The convenience of Nihonjinron is that its contents can be readily altered. The Nihonjinron of the war years is not the same as that of the 1980s. Its contents have been altered. Yet discursive means of national identification live on, and have gained an importance they never had before. (Befu 1992: 43)

This view that ‘modern Japanese nationalism never achieved, either before or even amidst World War II, a stable certain perception of Japan’s proper relationship with the world outside it’ (White 1990: 1), and that ‘the Japanese are … uniquely retrospective’ (Umegaki 1990: 261, my emphasis), fuelled by the desire to ‘make their country less a Japan of the past’ (ibid: 262) would thus become the norm in this second period. Moreover, it was this indeterminable quality of Japanese identity which would come to be simultaneously mourned and celebrated within Nihonjinron discourses. So the narrative went: 'On the one hand, Japan suffers because of its lack of a solid historical narrative of its own past. On the other hand, it is this changeability of Japaneseness
which makes Japan *solely unique*, making it incomparably *different* from and *beyond the comprehension* of Westerners and other Asians.'

Two things need to be said here. Firstly, a question: what nation has ever had an unchanging national identity, and what nation has ever managed to achieve a stable and certain perception of itself and its relation with others, and what exactly is a 'proper' relationship? I would simply say that no national identity has ever achieved such a state of stasis, and to argue that instability makes the 'Japanese' identity unique is a dubious claim. Secondly, it should be noticed that this idea that *Nihonjinron* has continuously been discontinuous in their definition of Japanese 'identity' is 1. a self-defining and 2. a self-negating one. That is to say, it firstly assumes the self-evident 'fact' of its continuous existence since the 1930's. However, as I have already argued, *Nihonjinron* is a phenomenon specific to the 1970's, and conceiving a continuity between 1930 to 1970 is only possible because of a prior discursive manoeuvre which posits a textual object called *Nihonjinron*. Secondly, this understanding of Japanese identity as being defined by its changefulness *negates* the previous generation of *Nihonjinron* 'truths', which defined Japanese culture as unchanging. The irony of the situation is all too clear. If one could anthropomorphise *Nihonjinron* as a single entity, then, by the end of the 80's, it had effectively driven itself into a cul-de-sac, by self-abrogating the very foundation upon which their legitimacy as a 'truth-telling' discourse stood.

**Summary of Nihonjinron**

In sum, we may make the following inferences about *Nihonjinron*, and the 'truths' it has propagated regarding the Japanese subject, bearing in mind that *Nihonjinron* is a historically-specific literary genre of the 1970's and 80's. Firstly, the 'truths' of *Nihonjinron* was founded upon the assumption of a relation of co-dependency between
the realms of 'economy' and 'culture'; conversely, it appears to have remained unreflexive about the relationship between 'economy' and 'politics', and even more unself-reflexive about the role it has played between these two spheres. Secondly, as we have seen, *Nihonjinron* can roughly be divided into two periods, the first, which, against 'modernisation theory', defined Japanese identity as a particular entity based on an ahistorical continuity, and the second, which, against 'Japan Bashing' texts, defined Japanese identity as a particular entity of continuity based on discontinuity. Thus, *Nihonjinron*, as a 'truth'-constituting discourse about the 'Japanese' eventually developed into a self-implosive discourse which denied the very premise of their 'truths'. Thirdly, it should also be noted that despite the contradictory definition of 'Japanese culture's it produced, what did remain relatively constant was the notion of Japanese culture and subject as particular or unique (versus the West). Moreover, it should not be overlooked that in both periods, one may identify an intimate parity between the 'truths' it constituted and the corresponding political exigency or climate. With this in mind, let us now turn to the more recent literature on Japan.

### 2.1.4 Recent Directions in Japanese Studies

Since the mid-1980's, there has been a growing awareness amongst 'Japanologists' of the extent to which their academic knowledge has been implicated in re-configuring post-war national relations. With the business of 'knowing Japan' being so central in recent discussions, it would be hard for Japanese Studies' practitioners to not practice knowledge-making without some apprehension of their positionality. It is, however, complicated business, since there are two levels which need to be addressed, one at the level of ethics, and the other, at the level of theory. At the ethical level, one needs to be aware of the politics of why Japan has been theorised as the particular other to the
West. At a theoretical level, it is necessary to negotiate a way of explaining the difference between Japan and the West, without either universalising or particularising. Moreover, this is further complicated by the fact that there is the need to operate with an awareness of the relatedness between these two realms. Japanologists have responded in different ways to coping with this issue—i.e., how to explain the difference between Japan and the West without falling prey to the master-slave paradigm. In the following, I will discuss some of the ways in which the politics of 'Japanese Studies' have been negotiated through the production of knowledge.

**Deconstructing Western Theory**

Many western academic practitioners have been eager to admit their repentance for constituting Japan as the 'other' to the West, and have made it their enterprise to let 'Japan' speak for itself, with the aim of correcting the universalism implicit in western theory. As we have seen, such an approach was a precedent set by Ruth Benedict, and is not a novel one amongst practitioners of Japanese Studies. Although this kind of approach has been 'tainted' through its association with Nihonjinron, it still continues to have tenacious presence, since the problem of universalism in western theory continues to be a contemporary one. Such works range from those which are still trying to seek out a valid basis for universal knowledge through rigorous academic studies (cf. Hendry 1998) to those which view universalistic assumptions with suspicious, arguing that 'Japan' can be a source for deconstructing westerncentricism in theory (cf. Rosenberger 1992, Suzuki 1996). In some extreme cases, it has been argued that the West should imitate Japanese epistemology and ontology, because it is better (cf. Clammer 1995).

While there is no doubting that these works are well-intended, such a project is a contradictory one, since, in positing 'Japan' as a source for deconstructing western
theory, the implicit assumption is that Japan is, indeed, the 'other' of western theory. Moreover, there is a basic theoretical problem of these studies in that they uncritically advocate a 'holistic' approach to understanding Japan (cf. Bremen 1986), thereby disregarding the possibility that a 'holistic' worldview or approach, in itself, may be a specific construct or view of knowledge.

Engaging with Marxist Theory

As we have seen, 'Marxism' has also held a place in the history of knowledge about Japan. Here, I would like to discuss the effects that Marxist-affiliated knowledge has had upon the contemporary academic scene, both in Japan and in the West.

In so far as Marxist theory in Japan is concerned, after the retreat of 'Marxist' academics such as Maruyama Masao from the public sphere in the 1960's, Marxist theory was to increasingly come under attack within the Japanese intellectual world, one of its major disputant being Yoshimoto Takaaki. Although one of the factors contributing to the discrediting of Marxist thought was the unfortunate and partial association that was made to the so-called 'lynch killing' (1972) by allied red armies in Japan, or the incidents after 1970's of the murders of dissident members amongst sect organisations (some of whose members had participated in the disastrous student revolt of 1970), it must surely be the case that there were theoretical problems within the particular version of Marxism that e.g., Maruyama advocated (as discussed earlier in p. 31). (Cf. Seiji 1984)

In the mid-1980's, in the aftermath of Marxism, there emerged a new group of academics—labelled by the Japanese mass media as nyu akademizumu (new academism), and they began to introduce and apply 'poststructuralist' theory into Japan. In particular, the theoretical viewpoint endorsed by some 'poststructuralist' theorists such as Judith Butler (1990), namely, that 'performance' can subvert power relations,
was one of the earliest versions of 'poststructuralism' to enter Japan. First introduced by Asada Akira, in *Kozo to Chikara (Structure and Power)* (1983), Asada argued for a redefinition of 'knowledge' as a matter of 'style' or sensibility, rather than having any investment in truth claims. That is to say, he argued for a view of 'knowledge' as 'play' rather than 'metanarrative'. (Cf. Ivy 1989) Asada's stated intention for such a project was to liberate 'knowledge' from the traditional constrictions of either being a form of myth, or a 'bourgeois tool of advancement', which the Japanese educational system had been prone to doing. His book was an overnight success, selling over eighty thousand copies, and immediately popularised Asada's version of 'poststructuralism' within the 'trendy' segments of Japanese society.

Asada has continued to elaborate upon his argument by suggesting that the Japanese subject is an 'empty space' which is 'an extreme form of idealist perversion' (1989: 278), and that parody, through play-acting, is an act of resistance. However, while Asada's proposal for such an approach to 'knowledge' may well be intended to act as a form of opposition, given the social context that it was inserted into, it is questionable whether it achieved this end. Indeed, publication of Asada's text coincided with the so-called 'postmodern' debate within the wider academia. Put simply, in 1983, Japan's 'bubble economy' had not burst yet; 'Japan Bashing' had yet to commence, and cultural commentators were voicing the opinion that Japan was the most exemplary instance of 'postmodern' society. However, as Wolfe (1989) has argued, this was:

...very much part of a political as well as an aesthetic discourse which feeds into (and is generated by) two persisting metanarratives: of an unrepentant modernization paradigm, on the one hand, and of a premodernist nativism with atavistic overtones, on the other. (Ibid: 224)

and that 'postmodern' narratives are 'dangerous narrative ploy designed to defuse the potential or political struggle' (ibid: 231). Indeed, Ivy (1989) has criticised *Structure and*
Power by arguing that such a rendition of 'knowledge' played into the hands of politicians, through constituting the fantasy that 'knowledge' can be acquired painlessly and pleasurably, as one acquires clothes or cars. Thus, rather than providing a theory of resistance, Asada and other theorists who have celebrated the paradigm of 'postmodern Japan' have been criticised for having had a depoliticising effect.

Japan's legacy of Marxism amongst 'Japanese Studies' practitioners in the United States has taken a rather contrary trajectory to the one in Japan. As mentioned above, in Japan, even after Maruyama went into 'hiding' from the general public in the 1960's, 'academic' interest in his works did not abate until the early 1980's. In the United States, on the other hand, Marxist thought in Japan has been a largely ignored area, and it is only quite recently that US-based academics have slowly begun to explore their legacies. Indeed, despite the large number of publications on Japan which have come out over the years, there are only two books which have surveyed the history of post-war oppositional politics in Japan: Koschmann's Revolution and Subjecthood in Post-war Japan (1996), and Kersten's Democracy in Post-war Japan (1996). Western academic's apparent lack of interest in Japan's version of 'universal' theory could be construed as a form of prejudice, that perhaps, because until quite recently, since 'Japan' was a way of knowing 'particularity', it would have seemed 'unreasonable' to look for 'universality' there. However, there now appears to be more interest in pursuing the history of 'Marxism' in Japan, as is exemplified by Vera Mackie's Creating Socialist Women in Japan (1997), where she focuses upon a small group of socialist feminists who were active between 1900-1937.

Of course, the examination of the history of Japanese Marxism is different to the application of Marxist theory onto understanding Japanese history. But here again, it is
only quite recently that western academics have attempted such a project. Carol Gluck's *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (1985), when it was published, caused a small sensation amongst 'Japanese Studies' practitioners, because this was the first time that a western academic had undertaken a comprehensive analysis of Japanese late-Meiji history using Marxist insights. Her analysis, however, was not based on the view of 'ideology' as the result of a top-down process of mystification, but showed the development of Meiji national identity as a process that involved not only the officials of the state (*kan*), but also those who claimed to represent the "the people" (*min*). It is now recognised as one of the breakthroughs in how 'Japan' is theorised, and has initiated a spate of publications which, rather than premising one's understanding of Japanese modernization upon an ahistorical notion of 'tradition' or 'culture', critically examine the historical linkage which can be found between economy and politics.

**Historicising Japanese 'Culture'**

As I described above, another problematic aspect of the legacy of 'Japanese Studies' has been that explanations about Japanese modernisation were founded upon an ahistorical notion of Japanese 'tradition' or 'culture'. Much of the recent academic works on Japan have devoted its labours to deconstructing the 'myths'—*e.g.*, Japanese homogeneity, Japanese selfhood as naturally harmonious—constituted through *Nihonjinron*. These literatures may be roughly divided into three categories: firstly, those which investigate the historical relationship between economy and politics, secondly, those which investigate Japan's history of military expansion, and thirdly, those which challenge the 'myth of homogeneity' by looking at the internal differences within Japan.
In the first category belongs those works which have investigated the historical relationship between various social institutions and the state. In the area of education, for example, Marshall (1995) provides a comprehensive overview of the developments of education in Japanese history, covering a 130 year period beginning with its inception in the Meiji period, with particular focus on the political context. Lincicome (1995) has also examined the role that nationalism played in education, through focusing upon the introduction of western teaching methods, particularly Pestalozzianism, or kaihatsu shugi (developmental theories) as it was called, during the Meiji period. In the area of media, Huffman (1997) has examined the emergence of modern press in Japan from the Tokugawa period through to the 1920's. He argues that the press took an active role in turning subjects, who were previously largely oblivious of politics, into citizens. In the area of geography, Wigen (1995) looks at the changing relationship of the Shimoina valley (a narrow agricultural basin in southern Japan Alps), from the mid-Tokugawa period to the 1920's, and argues that an essential part of making the modern Japanese nation-state was the transformation of Shimoina valley from a localised region to that of the periphery of its centre, Tokyo. Other studies, such as Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600-1945 (Brownlee 1997) or History and the State in Nineteenth-Century Japan (Mehl 1998) have looked at the utilisation of local myths in the making of the Japanese nation-state. These works demonstrate that ‘Japan’ is not a natural entity, but is the result of a conscious and historically-specific activity which produced it.

Others have embarked on a much overdue investigation of Japanese militarism and its relation to its colonies. These may be separated into works that question the role that philosophical or religious institutions or thinkers played in Japan’s militarism, and those which carry out a more empirical analysis of Japan’s expansion into its colonies. In the
area of philosophy and religion, the Kyoto School's collaboration with Japan's military regime has been the object of much concern. Here, one may cite such works as *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism* (Heising & Maraldo 1995), *Zen at War* (Victoria 1997), *Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan: Kuki Shuzo and the Rise of National Aesthetics* (Pincus 1996), and *Translation and Subjectivity* (Sakai 1997). In the latter category, we may cite such works as *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Myers et al. 1984), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945* (Duus et al. 1996), and *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (Duus 1995). Given that the legacy of Japanese imperialism has been a long neglected area of research in Japan, these works make important contributions, and demonstrate that Japanese economic success is, again, not the result of some innate superiority of the 'Japanese', but is the result of the exercise of power. There is, however, much work to be done, and it may be said that much of the work in the former category has tended to focus on the works of Japanese philosophers of the 1930's to the exclusion of other historical periods (there is a further theoretical critique of some of this literature on page 72); in the latter category, it may be said that there is still, as of yet, very little comparative analysis of Japanese imperialism against western imperialism (cf. Gann 1984).

Finally, there are various studies which deconstruct the 'myth of homogeneity' in Japan by focusing upon the differences within Japan. Maher & Macdonald (1995), for example, have edited a collection of essays which highlight the existence of various marginalised minority groups (such as Ainu, burakumin, and Korean residents) within Japan. Likewise, Dennon *et al.'s* *Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern*

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10 Kyoto School: a group of Japanese philosophers, including Nishida Kitaro, Suzuki Daisetsu, Nishitani Keiji, Tanabe Hajime, Watsuji Tetsuro, Miki Kiyoshi, and others, whose most active period was before WWII.
(1996) and Weiner's *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity* (1997) are both attempts to throw into question the image of 'Japan' which is characterised by uniqueness and holism. There is also much work published which focuses on gender relations in Japan. Buckley (1997), for example, has edited a collection of interviews and translations of excerpts of works by Japanese Feminist scholars and activists. Tamanoi (1998), as well, has attempted to redefine the image of the Japanese woman by focusing on the constitution of the identity of the rural Japanese women (as opposed to upper or middle-class Japanese women).

It may therefore be said that much work has been done of recent years, which do redress the legacy of *Nihonjinron*. However, these works do not directly address the question of subjecthood as subjectification, and do not explain how a unified notion of Japaneseess was constituted where there was none. That is to say, these studies have broken down such myths as *e.g.*, that Japan is a homogeneous nation, or that the Japanese are peace-lovers valuing harmony over personal gain. Nevertheless, they do not explain why it is that so many Japanese people believe these to be the 'truths' about who they are. It does not explain how it is that we have come to think of ourselves as having the natural proclivity to be group-consensual, conformists, valuing harmony over personal achieving, having a holistic approach to life, not having fundamental values but making judgement decisions based on the specific context. That is to say, these studies do not explain the historical genealogy of how these 'truths' have come to have an actual hold on how the 'Japanese' think and behave today. This is the focus I would like to retain in my thesis.
2.1.5 'Japanese Studies' as Power/Knowledge

As we have seen, 'Japanese Studies' practitioners have had to deal with the reality that it has all too obviously not maintained an autonomous realm from politics. Moreover, an endemic problem of theory in 'Japanese Studies' has been the issue of particularism and universalism. As we have seen, until quite recently, there have been two tendencies in our understandings of 'Japan': culturally-unique explanations, or universalistic explanations. The pitfall of culturally-unique explanations is that it is premised on the sentiment that Japan is so unique it cannot possibly compare to any other cultures, and from this, it is difficult to engage in a dialogue between Japan and its others, e.g., the West. The pitfall of universalistic explanation is that because it is premised upon the notion of 'history' as a monolithic process culminating in a teleological endpoint, it is difficult to negotiate a way of explaining the differences between the West and Japan.

It is for this reason that I believe a genealogical perspective may provide a different framework for understanding our understanding of 'Japan'. Moreover, while recent academic studies on Japan have done much to try and redress the various theoretical as well as political problems of Nihonjinron, not much comparison has been done in the study of colonialism and imperialism between Japan and the West, and it is for this reason that I would like to approach my study on Japanese subjecthood with such a perspective. For this purpose, I will particularly be engaging with the studies which have been done about western imperialism and colonialism in the post-1968 era in Europe, particularly since these works have given a new way of understanding that history. Moreover, they are particularly suited to looking at the constitution of subjecthood for the following reason.
It has been suggested that Marxism tended to privilege power struggle at the level of economy and class struggle (McNay 1994: 73, 91, 99), and presumed 'the notion of the subject, both [as] individual agent and class subject' (Barrett 1991: 138). In Japan as well, Myers (1984) has noted that previous research on Japanese imperialism and colonialism have been grounded within a Marxist framework, and thus the constitution of the modern Japanese subjecthood is a particular area where previous research is scarce (in any era, be it Meiji, Taisho or Showa).

Barrett has suggested that analysis of the:

question of subjectivity.... in some ways, is a massive lacuna in Marxism, and one which not only has had its effects in terms of a crude understanding of political agency and consciousness but has stood in the way of a broader consideration of experience, identity, sexuality, affect and so on. (1991: 110)

arguing that the contributions of theorists working within poststructuralism, and Foucault in particular, have attempted to fill this gap. This is why in my work, I will utilize Foucault's method of genealogy to discern how subjecthood was constituted in the Meiji Era. (For my discussion on Foucault and the genealogical method, see Chapter 3).

In order to fully engage with the knowledge-field of 'poststructuralism', I would now like to contextualise and identify some general arguments which have been made about the western modern subject, particularly in relation to the history of colonialism/imperialism in the following. Since 'poststructuralism' is an ambiguous term, I will begin with a discussion of my understanding of 'poststructuralism', and then I will locate my own particular stance to some of the issues raised in 'poststructuralism'.

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2.2 Post-1968 Debates Surrounding the Modern Imperial Subject

In 1978, Michel Foucault was asked in an interview how he and his generation of post-war intellectuals had experienced the political situation of their lifetime. This was his answer:

For me, politics was essentially a way of testing how much I was maturing in my theoretical reflections. An opportunity to have an experience à la Nietzsche or Bataille. For anyone who was twenty right after the World War, for anyone who had endured rather than participated in that tragedy, what on earth could politics represent when it was a matter of choosing between the America of Truman or the U.S.S.R. of Stalin? Or between the old French S.F.I.O. and the Christian Democrats, etc.? Many young intellectuals, including myself, judged that it would be intolerable to have a “bourgeois” professional future as a professor, journalist, writer, or whatever. The very experience of the war had shown us the necessity and the urgency of creating a society radically different from the one in which we have lived; a society that had accepted nazism, had prostituted itself before it, and then had come out of it en masse with De Gaulle. In the light of all of that, many young people in France had had the reaction of total rejection. One not only wanted a different world and a different society, one also wanted to go deeper, to transform oneself and to revolutionize relationships to be completely “other.” It’s clear then, that the Hegelianism which I have spoken to you about, and which was proposed as an answer for us at the university with its model of “continuous” intelligibility, wasn’t capable of responding to our needs. Even less so phenomenology and existentialism, which firmly maintained the supremacy of the subject and its fundamental value, without any radical breaks. (Foucault 1991c: 47-8, my emphasis)

Within the academic field, there has been an ever-increasing engagement with issues related to the formation of modern notions of the subject vis-à-vis the historical processes of colonialism and imperialism. As the above remark by Foucault would indicate, this trend may be historically-located as that which emerged after the 1960’s, and involved a move toward reconceptualising the notion of an unified subject located within a totalising thought system.

Robert Young (1990) has pointed out that the sustained critique of modernist knowledge, especially of the ‘Hegelian model, and particularly of a historicism which
presupposes a governing structure of self-realisation in all historical process’ (ibid: 3) 
arose out of ‘self’-critique, out of a historical context where the French academia was 
dominated by ‘Hegelian Marxism from the thirties to the fifties’:

Here it is not a question of suggesting that Hegel is somehow answerable for the 
excesses of capitalism or even socialism in the past two hundred years: rather 
what is at stake is the argument that the dominant force of opposition to 
capitalism, Marxism, as a body of knowledge itself remains complicit with, and 
even extends, the system to which it is opposed. Hegel articulates a 
philosophical structure of the appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge 
which uncannily simulates the project of nineteenth-century imperialism; the 
construction of knowledge which all operate through forms of expropriation and 
incorporation of the other mimics at the conceptual level the geographical and 
economic absorption of the non-European world by the West. (Ibid: 3, my 
emphasis)

Accordingly, the knowledge constituted by human sciences could never be understood 
to be 'innocent' bystanders providing impartial explanations about human activity. 
European philosophers began to ask themselves if knowledge, produced and sustained 
through philosophical activity, was not, in fact, a continual refinement of abstraction 
which could withstand the forces of history, but in actuality, had a history of its own, and 
therefore had to be a product of historical contingency.

To be sure, this self-reflexive turn in philosophy, which questioned the historicity of their 
a priori assumptions, was not exclusive to post-war French philosophy, but had been 
initiated much earlier, in the early nineteenth century, and was the very characteristic of 
'modern' thought (Foucault 1970). Nevertheless, what was 'new' about the 
philosophical debates of post-war French philosophy was the thematic focus on the 
historical relationship between western thought and the violence it had wielded over its 
colonies, and further, the recognition that language plays an active role in the 
constitution of 'reality', via incorporation of Ferdinand Saussure's linguistic model into 
social analysis.
According to Saussure, meaning is constituted through a system of differing terms, and not in reference to an absolute presence which transcends language. Saussure’s understanding of language enabled the investigation of how *a priori* truths were constituted by language rather than constituting the use of language (cf. Culler 1976). This emphasis on the role of language as constitutive of socially induced processes radically challenged the foundations of idealist thought, in particular, the notion of a unified subjectivity, as well as the assumption of a teleological view of history.

Coward & Ellis (1977) have described how the incorporation of Saussure’s linguistic model was first undertaken through ‘structuralism’. Structuralism, in its radical versions, aimed to salvage the notion of dialectics from crude versions of Marxism, such as a humanistic version of Marxism or an economically deterministic Marxism, which still operated under the legacy of idealism. In particular, the positing of free agency in Marxist humanism depends on the concept of a ‘human essence’ which transcends and brings about changes to social system, whereas economically deterministic Marxism is founded upon the logic that economy is the transcendental force which determines history. The aim of structuralism was to come up with a social theory which neither depended upon a transcendental logic nor a human essence as such, but would explain how man is both a product of sociality and yet can act as a revolutionary agency—through dialectical materialism. This was done through incorporating Ferdinand Saussure’s linguistic theory into social analysis, and also by synthesising Marxism with Freudian theory.

More concretely, in this synthesis of Marxism, linguistics and psychoanalysis, Althusser and Lacan’s theoretical innovations were attempts to refine the notion of dialectics, such that social change could be explained as occurring at the site of tension between
contradictory or oppositional forces without recourse to idealist presumptions. Althusser re-read Marx, and argued that whereas the Hegelian notion assumes that history is a process of overcoming contradictions between ideal concepts, Marx's notion of dialectical materialism deals with history as practical movements occurring at multiple points of contact, where each contradiction is in a relationship of overdetermination to the others. Therefore, it does not assume that there are just two contradictory forces of history, which are overcome at each stage. Likewise, Lacan's re-reading of Freud through Saussure led to the theoretical proposition that the notion of a unified subjectivity is an ideological construct, and that fragmented subjectivity is the very condition of being. Thus, the foundations of crude Marxism (which still relied on idealist notion of totalising history and unified subjectivity) were rejected.

However, the incorporation of Saussurean linguistics led to an unforeseen blind spot, for the question was then asked, if social change cannot be attributed to a free and conscious agency, nor a transcendental and irrevocable logic of history, then how was dialectics possible? Some thinkers in this tradition argued that the structure of language was what produces meaning, and thus would provide the impetus for dialectical change. However, if the structure of language pre-determines meaning, this would lend support to the view that the author, who determines the structure of the language of the text, is the absolute consciousness which determines meaning of the text before it is read and consumed.

Thus, the structuralist attempt to discharge idealism from Marxist theory ultimately led to 'a mechanistic theory of the action of the structure' (Coward & Ellis: 4) which either naturalises language or equate language with ideology, occasioning a surreptitious return to idealism:
Either the system was considered to be imposed on the subject who is then only its support: such is the foundation of mechanical materialism. Or else meaning was seen as produced in the structure by the transcendental consciousness which always already intends that meaning. This is the foundation of idealism. (Ibid: 4)

However, the examination of poetic texts by e.g., Bataille or Joyce, eventually dethroned such a simplistic view, and the relationship between the author and his/her text was recognised as being far more multi-faceted. Thus, it was recognised that meaning was not simply pre-determined by the structure of language, but that the production of meaning in signifying practices was more complex than structuralism would assume. (For further discussion on the methodological consequence of the 'universalism' in structuralism, see Chapter 3.)

One of the insights brought on by the recognition that meaning is neither pre-determined by the meta-structure of language nor by the speaking subject was that subjecthood was only wrought into being through the process of signification, at the very site of its production. This led to a renewed interest in the investigation of discursive formation of subjectivities, as well as allowing for possibilities of contestations at its sites. Historically speaking, the beginnings of this shift in philosophical interest—commonly identified as the transfer from structuralism to poststructuralism—roughly coincided with 1968, the year of student unrest and general strikes. Until then, philosophical critiques had been waged against particular versions of Marxism—i.e., humanistic Marxism such as that strongly influenced by existentialism, or an economically deterministic Marxism. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the general aim of 'structuralism' had been to hail semiotics with Marxist and Freudian theories such that the notion of 'dialectic materialism', as way of explaining society as both structure and process, would be illuminated. However, in the years following 1968, the philosophical project was
radicalised, and the notion of 'dialectics', or any kind of meta-narrative for that matter, was to become the target of critique.

As Plant (1998) has argued, in the post-1968 years, the very ideas underpinning revolutionary politics was transformed. Previously, social change was supposed to be instigated by a subject which identified the repressive elements in its material conditions. Now, however, power was redefined as productive. Previously, social change was supposed to occur dialectically, through a structured process of negating the contradiction involved in lived conditions. Now, however, social change would be modelled as a series of disruption and dispersion, and where there was some structure before, now there were only flows. Whereas previously, revolutionary politics was assumed to belong to the site of tension and stress (between stasis and change), it was now understood as self-mutations. That is to say, poststructuralism does not assume that social change occurs as a result of overcoming the contradiction between disparate forces or elements. Rather, change is intrinsic, and not external, to any force or element; each flow or text is necessarily changeful. Thus, social change is not assumed to occur through encountering and synthesising with an 'other', but through self-subversion.

Given these recent and radical developments in philosophical thinking, it would appear to be that there is no longer a place in philosophy for the presence of the 'other'. But in actuality, nothing could be further from the truth, and the question of how one relates to otherness, both as a philosophical concept and an ethical issue, remains a key area of concern. For instance, Lacan has argued that the subjectivity is founded upon fragmentation and otherness. So, despite dispensing with binary oppositions in how social change occurs, a more fundamental question remains to be answered, which is,
'isn't identification only possible in conditions of differences?' Moreover, although 'modern' thought has, in theory, allowed for the presence of the 'subject' in its own thought, Post(-)Colonial Studies has shown that historically, the 'subject' of investigation has always been the colonialised 'other', while the 'subjectivity' of the dominant has remained beyond the pale of philosophical scrutiny. Thus, the task of investigating the constitution of western subjecthood has just begun, and is still in an inchoate stage. Finally, there are some academics who are involved in a philosophical project of trying to produce 'new' theory, which affirms otherness as otherness outside the sphere of mastery and beyond the scope of traditional knowledge. Thus, the presence of 'otherness' is in fact, central to contemporary thought at the moment.

Given the centrality of 'otherness' in contemporary thought, and given that the project of understanding the presence of 'otherness' in knowledge is still at a stage of development, I believe that it remains crucial to ask if unheeded remnants of 'othering' still lurks in theory. Indeed, through my discussion, I will be raising what the implications of 'otherness' in poststructuralist theory are when examining the case of 'Japan'. In section 2.1, I will firstly consider how the critique of Hegelian history has been applied to the understanding of the history of western imperialism and colonialism, through a discussion of Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978, 1995). In section 2.2, I will then move on to consider some of the alternate forms or strategies of 'resistance' which have been proposed in lieu of the recent critiques of Hegelian thought and western metaphysical thought in general.

### 2.2.1 Said's Orientalism

As mentioned above, the central impetus of post-1968 European philosophy has been to redress the 'violence' seen to be inherent in Hegelian metaphysics. In Post(-)Colonial
Studies, for example, the view that the logic of Marx’s historical dialectics is akin to the logic underpinning and legitimating western colonial expansion has been the centre of critique. The motivation of Post(-)Colonial Studies has been to understand how the West has historically wielded power through claims to superiority over other geographic regions. Debates in this area of study centre upon the notions of ‘difference’ and ‘othering’. It is argued that imperialism and colonialism has entailed instating social notions about racial ‘difference’, and then subsequently silencing the voices of what has previously been designated as its inferior ‘others’. Thus, it is argued that ‘othering’ is a process of exclusion founded upon a logic of difference.

Edward Said has been particularly influential in this field, and in his pioneering work, *Orientalism* (1978, 1995), Said investigates the legacy of colonialism as a binary pre-figuring and re-figuring between the dominant West and the subaltern East, and argues that the ‘Orient’ was a socially-constructed designation which was posited as the invisible and inferior opposite of the ‘West’ by the ‘West’. However, Said also points out that the representation of the Orient was characterised by vacillation ‘between the West’s contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in - or fear of novelty’ (ibid: 59) which meant that ‘the Oriental was always like some aspect of the West.’ (Ibid: 67) Thus, according to Said, the ‘Orient’, for the West, meant a location that bordered on being dialectically incorporated into the West. Thus, the process of western imperialism and colonialism has been analysed as being founded upon a ‘universal’ theory (akin to Marx’s notion of historical dialectics) which, in practice, was never accessible to all, but excluded ‘others’ through creating ‘differences’ which legitimated exclusionary practices. Moreover, it has been argued that the crucial differentiation which legitimated exclusion was founded upon the notion of reason and rationality. It is argued that the qualities of rationality and reason were essentialised; in opposition to colonial ‘others’ seen as
irrational, unreasonable, primitive, etc., the West was constituted as the possessor of civility, and thus rightfully had privileged claim to power."

Although there is no doubting the academic and theoretical importance of Said's pioneering work, questions remain as to the applicability of the thematics of 'difference' and 'othering' to the instance of Japanese colonialism and imperialism, which could not define itself as being 'West' or racially 'white'. Indeed, what has struck me most is the very absence of the instance of Japanese imperialism and colonialism in the development of Post(-)Colonial Studies. Let us examine Said's treatment of 'Japan' in Orientalism (1978, 1995) as a case in point. It can be said that Said's construction of the relationship between the 'Orient' and the 'West' is insufficient on several counts, as I enumerate below.

First of all, despite his comprehensive claim to studying the construction of Orientalism as a discourse, the geographical regions in the Far East Orient receive only few mentions in his book. Indeed, it should be recognised that the brand of Orientalism Said discusses (as he himself later pointed out) is most pertinent to the West's perception of Islamic Orient. I would argue that other 'Orientals'—e.g., Japan—have experienced different discursive relationships with the 'West'.

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11 This theme, in particular, has had widespread resonance not only in Post(-)Colonial Studies but in feminist criticisms of philosophy as well, which have critiqued the seemingly neutral subject of philosophy as a masculinist construct which excludes women (Gatens 1991). The impact of feminism on social theory has opened up a new area of research interest often referred to as men's studies. Here again, the feminist critiques of the gender-prejudices of social theories have been largely accepted. Seidler, for example, has argued that:

Ever since the Enlightenment, men have sought to silence the voices of others in the name of reason. Men have taken control of the public world and sought to define the very meaning of humanity in terms of the possession of reason. (Seidler 1989: 14)

Indeed, Said makes some very basic mistakes regarding his presentation of Japanese history:

Islam excepted, the Orient for Europe was until the nineteenth century a domain with a continuous history of unchallenged Western dominance. This is patently true of the British experience in India, the Portuguese experience in the East Indies, China, and Japan and the French and Italian experiences in various regions of the Orient. There were occasional instances of native intransigence to disturb the idyll, as when in 1638-1639 a group of Japanese Christians threw the Portuguese out of the area; by and large, however, only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented Europe with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and for a time, economic level.’ (Ibid: 74)

The above passage, which is one of the few where Japan is specifically mentioned in this text, is unequivocally wrong. It was not Japanese Christians who threw out the Portuguese. It was the Tokugawa government, and they were not Christians.13 Neither does Said consider the fact that Japan, subsequent to this incident, undertook a policy of isolationism for the next two centuries and a half, officially closing its borders to outside contact, except for the limited trade with the Dutch14, and that when it did open up its borders in 1868, it did not submit to colonialism but immediately began its own importation of western knowledge and technology, and that by 1905, had defeated Russia, a Western power, in the Russo-Japanese War.15 Thus, Japan’s relationship with the West can hardly qualify as ‘a continuous history of unchallenged Western dominance.’ Indeed, it seems that Japan has always managed to not quite be dominated by the West.

The oddity of Japan’s subject-position is perhaps most clearly exemplified by the position they have been conferred under Apartheid South Africa. Looking at the history of difference in the position that the Japanese were given by the South African

13See The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650 (Boxer 1974)
14See The Dutch Impact on Japan 1640-1853 (Goodman 1967).
government in comparison to the Chinese, Yap and Man (1996) have argued that despite the declaration of 'universal' application of immigration laws to all 'Asiatics', the Japanese were given special privileges not given to other 'Asians' as early as 1910. (Ibid: 248) Yap and Man illustrate that in the history of race relations in South Africa, the Chinese were consistently discriminated against, while the Japanese, except during the few years of World War II, have consistently been treated as 'honorary whites' (see pp. 248-262, pp. 375-382).

Thus, tracing the (e)strangely-privileged subject-position of Japan is not a black or white process. Although Japan is in the geography of the Orient, its subject-position can neither be seen as the producer of the dominant discourse, nor can it be seen as the supine and silent Other. It's subject-position is rather a strange one, in that historically-speaking, after over 200 years of isolationist policy, it entered the world scene as a technologically-ignorant nation, yet still managed to become the only non-western imperial nation in the early 20th century, only to be annihilated in World War II, and then, in 50-years, to regain a 'first-world nation' subject-position again, this time as an 'economic and technological superpower'. Thus, the swift cycle of rise and fall of Japanese nationhood in the international political arena further makes 'Japan' an awkward subject to position.

Which brings me to address a separate but also related theoretical critique which could be made of Said's representation of the West's relation to its others. In Orientalism, Said's discussion mainly concentrates on how the West constituted otherness as an act of domination. However, I think an encounter between I and the Other involves two actors. He does not ask how the Other understood the West, or how the Other

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10See The Modern History of Japan (Beasley 1963, 1973)
understood the West's understanding of them.\(^{16}\) However, as mentioned earlier, Japan has always somehow managed to simultaneously resist and comply with the western gaze. Indeed, given my recent discussion of *Nihonjinron*, it is possible that Japanese subjecthood has always been constituted through a process of negotiation with its others.

Indeed, it is conceivable that, as Stoler (1995) has argued, the creation and specification of the western bourgeois self was constituted in its encounters with its colonies, at the site of its colonies which were then taken back to Europe. This would suggest that the constitution of the West's self-identity is not necessarily founded upon an essential core which precedes its identification, but in actuality was constituted through a process of negotiation. That is to say, one could perhaps suggest that the constitution of the thought system which underpinned imperialism was never the result of a uni-directional gaze of the West upon its colonies, but was always founded upon a more reciprocal gaze. One should therefore probably question, to what extent may the structures of Hegelian thought be blamed and serve as an explanation for the history of western imperialism. Particularly in my case, where I am analysing Japanese imperialism, it becomes even more tenuous to point the finger at Hegelian thought as the 'culprit', so to speak.

In this respect, I must draw a line between my theoretical stance and some of the recent critiques on Japanese imperialism that have focused upon a critique of thought system. In particular, Sakai Naoki, who is one of the foremost thinkers in engaging with the question of the relationship between Japanese thought and imperialism, has argued that the discipline of "Japanese thought" has been developed such that:

\[\text{16 This is, in fact, a point that Said later addressed in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993).}\]
...an epistemic arrangement has come into being, according to which to insist on the particularity and autonomy of Japan is paradoxically to worship the putative ubiquity of the idealized West. Not only could "Japanese thought" not overcome the framework of modernity, but it also meant to continue to think within such a framework, thanks to this arrangement. (Sakai 1997b): 50)

That is to say, Sakai argues that all intellectual activity inevitably sustains itself through presuming an object of study whose task it is to inquire how it was born, without asking how it was presumed to exist in the first instance. It then follows a logic of 'schema of configuration' (as Sakai puts it) where a certain geopolitical area is designated as the universal centre and them subsumes other geographic areas as its particulars. Sakai further argues that the West, Europe first and then America (through 'modernisation theory') and Japanese prewar intellectuals of the 1930's, have all more or less taken to this pattern. However, I think that in subsuming Europe, America and Japan's intellectual activities as Hegelianism, Sakai really does not do justice to the specificity of the difference between these three historical entities.

Moreover, I think the problem with this kind of analysis is that it does not allow one to historicise thought as practice, with specific power effects, for 'thinking' itself has a history of its own. That is to say, Sakai fails to note that the configurations of Japan's relationship to the West may particularly be the case, simply because the act of 'thinking' in itself, is a western invention. As Foucault has shown, 'thinking' as a technology of 'knowing oneself' only came into being during the developments of the 18th century in the West, and prior to that historical development, 'thinking', i.e., delving into one's inner-self to seek out the 'truth', was not how 'truths' were created. Previous to modernity, 'truths' were not attained not through 'thinking' about one's identity, but through e.g., seeking for order in nature through cataloguing. As such, 'thinking' could be understood as a technique through which 'truths' are created, and thus as a disciplinary practice first developed and initiated in the West.
It is then possible that the notion of ‘thinking’ in Japan, as something prior to bodily action, as a way of ‘knowing oneself’ was the result of ‘modernising’ Japan in the 19th century, and that this particular technology was imported from the ‘West’. If this is the case, then it is inevitable that ‘Japanese thought’ would have to enter into a particular power relation with the ‘West’, because the conception of ‘Japanese thought’ is actually an attempt to apply western disciplinary practices onto the instance of ‘Japan’.

Moreover, it should also be noted that this particular facet of Japanese modernisation, which attempts to graft a western disciplinary practice, might have been a particularly elitist experiment, and one needs to ask if the more ‘common’ ‘Japanese’ individual was disciplined accordingly. (My contention would be that they were disciplined through other means and other forms of technologies.)

However, let me return to a discussion of Orientalism, because there is another issue which I would like to address. As pointed out before, according to Said, the West regarded the Orient as ‘always like some aspect of the West’—i.e., different but similar at the same time. However, I would contest Said’s view that the colonial other was necessarily seen as a potential for incorporation into dialectics (i.e., incorporation into the same). I think that in the case of Japan, it was more that they saw it as an exotic place which was so out of this world that it couldn’t possibly be incorporated into the same. To introduce one exemplary view of Japan around the turn of 20th century, let me quote the opening lines of Ernest Satow’s autobiography:

My thoughts were first drawn to Japan by a mere accident. In my eighteenth year an elder brother brought home from Murdie’s Library the interesting account of

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17Ernest Satow [1843-1929]: A British diplomat who lived in Japan from 1862 to 1882. The autobiography which I quote above was banned in Japan until the end of World War II. A well-recognized Japanese specialist himself at the time, he was also colleagues with the likes of George Aston, the translator of Nihongi (1972), a text which has been designated as the oldest-known written ‘record’ of Japanese history.
Lord Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan by Lawrence Oliphant, and the book having fallen to me in turn, inflamed my imagination with pictures verbal and coloured of a country where the sky was always blue, where the sun shone perpetually, and where the whole duty of man seemed to consist in lying on a matted floor with the windows open to the ground towards a miniature rockwork garden, in the company of rosy-lipped black-eyed and attentive damsels—in short, a realised fairyland. But that I should ever have a chance of seeing these Isles of the Blest was beyond my wildest dreams. (Satow 1921: 17)

This surely is not any indication that the Orient was in anyway like the West, but that it was considered to be a complete alterity to the West.

However, it is worth noting that at one point in his book, Said points out that in the late-18th century, the scientific discourses of classification and historicism entered the knowledge-field of Orientalism, and this had the effect of ‘secularising’ knowledges on the Orient, which had hitherto been seen as a site of Biblical origin by the Christian West:

One, the expansion of the Orient further east geographically and further back temporally loosened, even dissolved, the Biblical framework considerably. Reference points were no longer Christianity and Judaism, with their fairly modest calendars and maps, but India, China, Japan, and Sumer, Buddhism, Sanskrit, Zoroastrianism, and Manu. Two, the capacity for dealing historically (and not reductively, as a topic of ecclesiastical politics) with non-European and non Judeo-Christian cultures was strengthened as history itself was conceived of more radically than before; to understand Europe properly meant also understanding the objective relations between Europe and its own previously unreachable temporal and cultural frontiers. (Said 1978, 1995: 120, my emphasis)

It is unfortunate that Said does not further expand on the suggestive remark above, and returns rather to tracing how Orientalism as a Western political doctrine legitimated colonial domination over the weaker (Islamic) Orient. However, if late-18th century was when modernist notions about ‘time’ and ‘space’ arose, in other words, if late 18th century was the time when the notions of secular history (the calendar) and secular geography (the map) was born, and if at that time Japan entered the Western
imagination as a ‘previously unreachable temporal and cultural frontiers’ for the first time, then the West must have conceived Japan as a place beyond ‘time’ and ‘place’, or at least the nearest imaginably possible to this state of beyond time and space at its inception. Said overlooks his own suggestion that 18th century saw a new development in the discursive relationship between the West and Far East—it was a time when West saw Japan as not the opposite but rather beyond any frontiers of the West.

Thus, I would argue that Japan has, from the moment it entered the Western imagination, been regularly constructed as an exotic place ‘beyond’ any understanding of western common sense. Said, in assuming that all ‘Orientals’ have been socially-constructed as ‘different but similar to the West’, does not provide any critique for the colonial imagination called the ‘beyond’, and above all, does not allow us to question why the West would want, indeed, perhaps may even need ‘Japan’ to remain ‘beyond’ the grasp of western understanding. I would like to elaborate upon this point later on, in section 2.2.3. However, before doing so, let me first turn to a discussion of some of the recent theories of ‘resistance’ which have proposed a ‘radical’ re-formulation of the ‘subject’.

2.2.2 'Decentred' Subjectivity as Resistance?

In the previous section, I outlined how a critique of Hegelian thought system had been applied to understanding the history of western imperialism and colonialism, through a discussion of Said’s Orientalism. While Hegelianism has been one central focus of the poststructuralist critique of western philosophical thought, other essentialising features of western metaphysics have also been the object of recent critical comment. Roland Barthes, for example, in his critiquing the western symbolic system, has remonstrated against the two a priori of western philosophical thought: the privileging of speech in
human communication, or what Derrida has critiqued as phonocentrism—'the privileged notion of speech [over writing] as the voice of 'presence' of consciousness' (Barthes 1970, 1982: 148), and logocentrism: the reliance on the 'metaphysics of presence' (i.e., the belief that there is a transcendental presence which precedes words) as an absolute validator of the Truth. Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari (1987), in their critique of the State Apparatus, have argued that the State operates with two 'universals': 'the Whole as the final ground of being or all-encompassing horizon, and the Subject as the principle that converts being into being-for-us.' (Ibid: 379) That is to say, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the State constructs a totalizing and teleological view of history within which the 'universal thinking subject' is realised.

Such critiques have given rise to a new development in scholarship, which attempts to theorise an alternative form of radical subject which can somehow escape colluding with state power (i.e., imperialism) and can perform as an ethical agency. Since critiquing essentialisms has reigned supreme, it is its opposite, a 'decentered' form of the subject which is frequently proposed as a better alternative to the old model. In the following, I would like to discuss three rather disparate texts which are relatively prominent for having offered a model of the radical subject as a source of resistance. Firstly, I will discuss Roland Barthes' Empire of Signs (1970, 1982), where he proposes an empty self consummated through aestheticsation. Secondly, I discuss Homi K. Bhabha's 'DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation' (1994), where he proposes a hybrid or ambivalent subject as a strategy to disturb the uniformity of national identity. Thirdly, I discuss Deleuze and Guattari's 'Treatise on Nomadology' (1987), which proposes the notion of the 'war machine' to combat state power.
In the following, I would like to reflect upon how their theories might impact on our understanding of 'Japan', and to suggest a rather different engagement to these theories with respect to the question of Japanese imperialism. That is to say, while the above proposals were designed with the intent to surmount the legacies of western metaphysical thought which is seen to be at least partially culpable for the machinations of the state which exercised imperialistic power, I will be arguing that their most radical theoretical utility lies in engaging with them as explanatory models of Japanese forms of state power.

**Roland Barthes: Japanese Symbolic System**

As many of us do, I profoundly reject our [western] civilisation, *ad nauseam*. This book expresses the absolute revindication of a complete alterity which has become necessary to me and which alone can provoke the fissuration of the symbolic order, of our symbolic order.


Thus replied Roland Barthes, when, in 1970, he was asked during an interview to explain why he wrote *Empire of Signs* (1970, 1982). During the same interview, Barthes was to further explicated that according to his views, western civilization had been ‘hampered for more than two thousand years by the development of monotheism’ (ibid: 84) and that in comparison, in Japan, he identified an ‘art of living’ (ibid: 83) which had ‘indisputable superiority over our Western societies’ (ibid: 83). To avoid any misunderstandings, Let me reiterate at the onset that the purpose for citing Barthes’ words here is not to argue that Japan is in any way superior to the West. The objective which I set forth here is of a completely different nature. It is to question, and indeed, to problematise how such a perspective might foreclose the critical investigation of the operations of power in Japan.
This book was Barthes' critique of the western symbolic system, where he states that he used his memories of ‘Japan’ as a source of inspiration from which he could “entertain” the idea of an unheard-of symbolic system (ibid: 3) to ‘imagine a fictive nation’ (ibid: 3) called ‘Japan’. He thus counterposed the ‘real’ western symbolic system against his own ‘imagined’ Japan, with the motive of suggesting the possibility of an existence of a new symbolic system, which could somehow overcomes the problematic legacy of western thought.

To be more precise, through a comparison of various cultural practices such as the theatre, flower arrangement and culinary experiences, Barthes argued that his ‘Japan’ is a symbolic system where phonocentricism and logocentricism virtually do not exist — where communication entails the displaying of the whole body rather than a privileging of the voice in speech (Barthes 1970, 1982: 9-10), where articulation means expressing an impression rather than voicing an affidavit (ibid: 7) and where orientation (e.g. of a city) is ‘by walking, by sight, by habit, by experience’ (ibid: 36), a visual and a gestural practice, rather than ‘in a word, by printed culture.’ (Ibid: 36) He thus suggests that within this fictive symbolic system called ‘Japan’, the notion of meaning itself, or what one might call the notion of ‘meaningfulness’, holds a different meaning from the context of a western symbolic system — that his fictive ‘Japan’ does not base meaning on an essentialised notion of truth or subjectivity.

More specifically, Barthes argued that the notion of the ‘person’ in the West is a form of mythology:

Topologically, Western man is reputed to be double, composed of a social, fractious, false “outside” and of a personal, authentic “inside” (the site of divine

18 Other examples he gives to contrast how orientation is attained differently include ikebana vs. book (ibid: 45) and culinary experience (ibid: 26).
communication). According to this schema, the human "person" is that site filled by nature (or by divinity, or by guilt), girdled, closed by a social envelope... (Ibid: 63)

In contrast, Barthes argued that within the Japanese symbolic system, there exists no notion of a 'natural' savage self; nor is there any 'metaphysical appeal' (ibid: 55) for an 'expressive means of an inwardness' (ibid: 61) as in the West. 19 Rather, the aesthetic pleasure is encoded through the 'dismiss[al of] the concept which is hidden, behind all animation of matter..."the soul".' (Ibid: 60)

Thus, in contrast to this Western binary model of a 'person' with inside/outside, body/soul, form/content, Barthes sees the Japanese 'person' as a notion which precludes inwardness, soul, content. He cites the example of the gestural practice of 'politeness', comparing how this practice holds different meanings within the western and Japanese symbolic systems. Barthes suggests that the scrupulous rituals involved in politeness in Japan are, in the final instance, simply an 'exercise of the void' (ibid: 65) and can be 'withdrawn from any humiliation or any vanity, because it literally salutes no one' (ibid: 68). In other words, Barthes suggests that in the West, the construct of the 'person', the 'self', the 'individual' is conceptualised on the assumption that there is an inside/soul and an outside/body to a 'person' (and the outside is supposed to reflect the inside and vice versa), whereas in Japan, there is no assumption of a soul, and the material and physical revelation of the outside/body all ultimately signify this void or emptiness, which, in the West, has been filled with the notion of the soul.

Thus, Barthes suggested that in his visit to Japan, he detected and sieved out the traces of what he calls 'a happiness of signs', a 'semantic luxury', and suggested that rather

19 Barthes elaborates on this particular difference — one which makes an assumption of an animalistic instinct within human beings (West) versus one where human existence is performative (Japan) — in his
than a language which presumes logocentrism, in Japan, the language diffraacts the subject to emptiness, and in so doing purges the fullness of civilisation and allows for a state of permanent newness. He encouraged the West to try and adopt the Japanese symbolic system which is ‘never naturalized (they show themselves off as sign systems), and on the other hand, they never refer to ultimate signified, to stable, closed signifieds.’ (1981, 1985c: 158-9)

However, I would argue that in treating Japan as an ahistorical fantasy which at the same time is real, Barthes fails to analyse how the actual ‘Japan’ is embedded within a specific historical context and how its cultural practices are fraught with power relations. For example, most of the cultural practices that Barthes utilises are those belonging to the middle class, whose origins can be traced back to the samurai culture of the Tokugawa era. Kinmouth (1981) has substantiated that the Meiji Restoration entailed a process of enforcing the hitherto exclusive samurai culture onto the general population. If this is the case, then the cultural practices Barthes extols are the product of the Meiji Restoration, which I would argue, produced Japanese imperialist subjects. It may therefore be that the very symbolic system Barthes celebrates as a way out for the Western imperialistic symbolic systems is that which has been tainted with the history of imperialism and colonialism in Japan. Thus, I would argue that a perspective which presupposes the iniquity of universalism and essentialism and proposes an aestheticisation of the subject forecloses the critical investigation of operations of power in Japan. In my thesis, I would like to engage with Barthes’ description of ‘Japan’ as a possible form or strategy that Japanese state power employed in constituting its subjects.

discussion on the notion of ‘rawness’ in ‘Food Decentered’ and in the context of the usage of violence in the student movement in ‘The Writing of Violence’.
Homi K. Bhabha: Double-Narrative Movement

Homi K. Bhabha is another theorist who is prominent for having proposed another version of 'decentred' subject as a possible site of resistance. In 'DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation' (1994), Bhabha argues for an adoption of a notion of time and space in social theory which sees 'time-space' in perpetual tension—a double-narrative movement—between a notion of national identity whose legitimacy is 'based on the pre-given or constituted, historical origin in the past' (ibid: 145)—what he calls the 'pedagogical', and 'a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation—people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity' (ibid: 146)—or what he calls the 'performative'. Bhabha argues that a split in the representation of the pedagogial national identity and the performative creates a space of ambivalence which disintegrates the homogeneous, unified identity of a nation from within. Thus, the site of contestation occurs within a nation and not vis-à-vis an Other of the Outside (ibid: 148), that is, the 'other' which is posited to be outside the nation.

**Diagram**

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  pedagogical       split               performative
    people as 'image'    signification as a differentiating sign of self
                       the iconic image of authority  the movement of the signifier that produces the image
                       referent                                      sign
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Bhabha argues that in so doing it will become possible for the sign to interrupt 'the succession of plurals that produce the sociological solidity of the national narrative' (ibid: 154) and create new possibilities for identity politics:
It is in this supplementary space of doubling - not plurality - where the sign supplements and empties nature, that the disjunctive times of Fanon and Kristeva can be turned into the discourses of emergent cultural identities, within a non-pluralistic politics of difference. (Ibid: 154)

However, Bhabha can be criticised for the theoretical assumption he makes of the discrete division between Image and Sign. What if the difference between the Image and the Sign was of a more precarious nature? What if no such discrete split is conceivable? What if ‘the iconic image of authority’ is ‘the movement of the signifier that process the image’? Our recent discussion of Barthes would indicate that such forms of significations are entirely possible, and that they can be the basis for creating a national identity.

For instance, Buruma (1984) has argued that the Japanese media institutionalise the ambivalence of Japanese male identity. He analyses post-war Japanese cultural products, i.e., films, comics, plays and books, to discuss what they reveal about the collective Japanese mentality. He argues that in Japan, order is maintained through social decorum and discipline for its own sake and does not base itself on any universalistic notion of sin or justice (as found in Christian morality). Thus, its makers or its audience does not imbue the frequent portrayal of violence, especially that of sexual violence in Japanese cultural artefacts, with moralistic meaning. In place of the discrete and permanent categories of good versus evil, the more mutable notions of pure and dirty are the measure utilised, where aesthetic considerations have more weight in matters of judgement. In other words, as long as it is beautiful or is aesthetically pleasing, and serves to satisfy the Japanese audience’s fantasies and imaginations, it is not considered problematic. However (and of course) the blatant scenarios depicted must and do remain just that—in the realm of fantasy and imagination, which does not spill over into social actuality. Buruma’s observations demonstrate that the
representations of sexuality in popular cultural products are used as a site where discontent of an individual toward society finds expression, but in such a way that it discharges personal frustration—tension is expelled and society continues to function as it is. Thus, sexual expression in popular culture serves to contain social dissent so that it does not lead to structural or social changes real in its consequences.

Buruma’s analysis of Japanese subjecthood demonstrates well how an ambivalent identity can work adversely politically as well as cause ontological conundrum at an individual level, and can contain dissent rather than express it. In other words, Bhabha’s model is not so radical, because what he aspires to may, in fact, have been the exact model of subjecthood endorsed by power in Meiji Japan.

Thus, I cannot help but be doubtful of Bhabha’s espousal of the double-narrative identity politics as necessarily better than politics premised upon a unitary model of the subject. Moreover, Bhabha’s theoretical model would seem to suggest that ambivalence is not part of our everyday lives, and must be consciously introduced and implemented, which does not concur with how I experience my identity-formation. I think that what still needs to be investigated is how language functions to legitimate authoritative discourses and constitutes particular selves and subjects. In the context of my thesis, therefore, Bhabha’s model of the ambivalent subject will provide the model for explaining Japanese imperialistic subjecthood.

Deleuze and Guattari: War Machine

Let me now move on to a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s article ‘Treatise On Nomadology’ (1987), where they propose the notion of the ‘war machine’ as a way of destructing the thought-system of the State Apparatus.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the political sovereignty of the State Apparatus is maintained through both repressive and regulatory means. They argue that the State always has, at its disposal, a physical force whose function is to police, or prevent combat or uprising amongst its population at large. This is the first, a repressive or external means of controlling society. The second way in which the State maintains its hold on power is through regulation. This is actualised through the existence of the Law, the juridical code which its citizens are bound to adhere to. These laws must be internalised and upheld by its citizens, or else they will be subject to punishment. Both function to stabilise and strengthen the sovereign powers of the State, and furthermore, these two aspects of the State Apparatus function as a pair, in a complementary manner. They form the two poles of the State Apparatus.

Deleuze and Guattari further argue that the State Apparatus is normative. It constructs what we, as its citizens, take for granted as being 'true', 'natural', 'just', etc. for the sake of maintaining social order through the existence of nation-states. This is done by giving 'thought a form of interiority' or internal logic, and further, by legitimating it through a discourse of universalism.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that philosophical thinkers like Hegel, Kant, and even Husserl have served the interests of the State. This is noology: that which constructs a worldview which stabilises and strengthens State power. Moreover, noology is distinct from ideology in that it is the 'study of images of thought, and their historicity.' (Ibid: 376) For example, Deleuze and Guattari critique Kant as follows:

Common sense, the unity of all the faculties at the center constituted by the Cognito, is the State consensus raised to the absolute. This was most notably the great operation of the Kantian "critique," renewed and developed by Hegelianism. Kant was constantly criticizing bad usages, the better to consecrate the function. (Ibid: 376)
They also critique Husserl for also privileging the existence of the State, or rather State science, over the nomad science\(^2\) of the war machine, though they note that Husserl is more sympathetic to the existence of nomad science. (Ibid: 367)

In opposition to these State thinkers, Deleuze and Guattari argue that ‘private thinkers’ such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, or even Shestov (ibid: 376) and also Kleit and Artaud (cf. ibid: 377-8) destroy the interiority of thought, destroyed the Image, and thus release thought from the control of the state apparatus. Theirs is a project which seeks to destruct thought rather than to construct. Deleuze and Guattari are arguing against a Freudian notion of desire which refers back to a universal thinking subject with feelings, with interiority. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is an ever-changing quality or ‘affection’. In a sense, it is more appropriate to say that for Deleuze and Guattari, there is no desire as such. Just desirings.

Deleuze and Guattari’s politics lies in unsettling the stasis that the State apparatus covets and seeks to maintain. In order to combat again the normalising violence of the State apparatus, Deleuze and Guattari argue for a conception of the ‘war machine’, a rebellious element which has always co-existed in tension with the State and that which ‘escapes or stands against’ (ibid: 361) it. It is antithetical to the State objective of ‘structur[ing] centralized societies’ (ibid: 358). It constantly unsettles the stasis that the State apparatus seeks for itself.

\(^2\)According to Deleuze and Guattari, the characteristics of royal or state science are that they deal with the ‘theory of solids (treating fluids as special case)’, seeking out the ‘stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant’. However, in nomad or war machine science, ‘flow and flux is reality itself’, and ‘questions becoming and heterogeneity’. In the ‘metric’ space of state science, which ‘plot[s] out a closed space for linear and solid things’ space is ‘counted in order to be occupied’. However, in the ‘vectoral, projective, or topological space’ of nomad science, the model is ‘vortical’ - ‘an open space throughout which things-flows are distributed’ and space is occupied without it being counted. Finally, state science is ‘theorematic’ (i.e., it seeks ‘essence’) as opposed to nomad science which is ‘problematic’ - figures are considered from viewpoint of affections - it proceeds from the ‘event’ to the accidents that conditions and resolve it.’ (see esp. pp. 361-71)
Deleuze and Guattari give various specific examples of the differences between the worldview as set forth by the State Apparatus and that of the war machine. The differences are most often defined in terms of space, where the State Apparatus segments, quantifies, and occupies space — codes and decodes space, whereas the war machine occupies space without defining it — it continually territorialises and deterritorialises space. In fact, the war machine functions to demark space, and this is why the war machine is so subversive for the State.

In describing the ‘war machine, Deleuze and Guattari make significant amounts of reference to the Orient, or the ‘primitive’ to define that which is not the State apparatus. For example, they liken the ‘subject’ in the ‘rational order’ of the State Apparatus to a chess piece, whereas the counterpart of the war machine is likened to a Go piece. The Go piece, they argue, is an ‘anonymous, collective, or third-person function: “It” makes a move.’ (Ibid: 352-3) “It” is a ‘non-subjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic qualities, only situational ones’ (ibid: 353). They also make the following statement regarding Kleist (one of the war machine thinkers):

This element of exteriority — which dominate everything, which Kleist invents in literature, which he is the first to invent — will give time a new rhythm: an endless succession of catatonic episodes or fainting spells, and flashes or rushes. Catatonia is: “This affect is too strong for me,” and a flash is: “The power of this affect sweeps me away,” so that the Self (Moi) is now nothing more than a character whose actions and emotions are desubjectified, perhaps even to the point of death. Such is Kleist’s personal formula; a succession of flights of madness and catatonic freezes in which no subjective interiority remains. There is much of the East in Kleist: the Japanese fighter, interminably still, who then makes a move too quick to see. (Ibid: 356)

I believe that there is a very problematic streak to Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of the war machine. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the war machine ‘does not ally itself with a universal thinking subject but, on the contrary, with a singular race’ (ibid: 379, my emphasis). In other words, alliances in the war machine are legitimated not through
positing universal ideals which presuppose the supremacy of rationality but through privileging loyalties to blood relations. Deleuze and Guattari are aware of the fascism inherent in their assertion, for they ask themselves:

We immediately see the dangers, the profound ambiguities accompanying in this enterprise, as if each effort and each creation faced a possible infamy. For what can be done to prevent the theme of a race from turning into a racism, a dominant and all-encompassing fascism, or into a sect and a folklore microfascism? And what can be done to prevent the oriental pole from becoming a phantasy that reactivates all the fascisms in a different way, and also all the folklores, yoga, Zen, and karate? (Ibid: 379)

Their answer to this is that only the oppressed can utilise the notion of singular race:

The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers: there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no dominant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. (Ibid: 379)

This, I think, is a very dangerous claim to make, for one must then ask, what are the standards by which one may judge what is 'oppression'? Who is to decide which tribes are 'truly' oppressed, on what grounds? And yet, would Deleuze and Guattari's ethical sensibilities (i.e., that of the war machine) not make the very proffering of such questions impossible?

Finally, I think there's an assumption in Deleuze and Guattari that the war machine is essentially exterior to the State apparatus, as a 'non-subjectified machine assemblage' which is 'a pure form of exteriority' (ibid: 354). Nevertheless, they also argue that the war machine is located:

between the two heads of the State, between the two articulations, and that it is necessary in order to pass from one to the other. But "between" the two, in that instant, even ephemeral, if only a flash, it proclaims its own irreducibility. (Ibid: 355)
Deleuze and Guattari are, I think, aware that the war machine is continually being appropriated by the State apparatus. However, they also argue that at the moment the war machine is appropriated by the State apparatus, it becomes something qualitatively different. And I have to really question, how valid is this kind of claim—that the war machine is the exteriority which disturbs the interiority of the State apparatus?

There are some Japanese radicals who claim that World War II should actually be called the 'Great Eastern War'. Their argument is that Japan, on behalf of the oppressed East, fought against the West who were colonising them. I am quite sure that if people with this frame of mind were to read Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis, they would proclaim themselves to be the war machine. From my point of view, I see that episode in Japan as a history of imperialism and colonialism. However, if the claim is made that their aggression was born out of 'oppression' (and they could indeed make a pretty good case that this was so), they are, indeed the 'war machine', and thus, Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis could be used to legitimate Japanese imperialism.

In addition, I am also concerned with the ahistoricity of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the war machine. Deleuze and Guattari make the claim that the State Apparatus and the war machine is not a modern invention but has always existed not just in the West but everywhere—i.e., 'universally'. However, the many references to the East and the 'primitive' as the defining characteristics of the war machine would indicate that the State Apparatus is actually a modern western rationality. In my opinion, it was unethical for them to have claimed the 'universal' existence of the State Apparatus and the war machine. It would have been less problematic for me had they acknowledged the historical specificity of their own situation—i.e., that their proposal for
the notion of a war machine arises out of a critique of Hegelian thought in state thinking, and that it is, in fact, modern western rationality they are critiquing.

Summary
In this section, I have reviewed three rather disparate theories which are, nevertheless, common in that they aim to propose an alternative version of subjecthood which can surmount the problems of western metaphysics. Having reviewed their proposals, I would argue that in each instance, Barthes, Bhabha and Deleuze & Guattari posit an alterity which is again essentialised. While these attempts may appear to be ethical (in that they are tackling the violence of western thought), they are problematic because they do not allow how power operates within that exoticised space. I am not saying that the critiques of essentialisms are wrong, or that the alternative forms have no utility. They may be right, and they may be better alternatives. However, it is possible that while these might get rid of the essentialisms specific to western imperialism, they are operating through positing another essentialism—i.e., exotic otherness, so decentering, while it may get rid of older, recognised forms of essentialism, may only reinstate new ones.

Despite this problem, I would still like to retain these 'decentred' models of subjecthood as explanatory tools in my thesis, but not as those that may potentially overcome the legacy of imperialism and colonialism, but as those which may explain it. In the context of my thesis therefore, these models will be the source from which I derive theoretical conjectures that my analysis will seek to test.
2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have given an interpretation of some of the central themes which have been debated in two areas of academic knowledge, first in 'Japanese Studies' and second in 'poststructuralism'.

In section 2.1, I argued that the theoretical as well as political stance of universalism and particularism was an endemic problem of 'Japanese Studies', and further, given that knowledge about 'Japan' has mostly been produced for explaining Japan's post-war economic success, there was as yet much work to be done in understanding how Japanese imperial subjecthood was constituted. I therefore argued for engaging with poststructuralism which has created the theoretical grounds for questioning the constitution of the subject, and further, argued that posing this issue through a comparative approach, that is to say, to pose my conjectures by asking how the constitution of Japanese imperialistic subjecthood was specifically different from the western one, was a useful approach to take.

In section 2.2, I moved on to a discussion of how the western imperial subject has been theorised in recent academic discussions. I noted that in thinking about western imperialism, Hegelianism was the starting point of their critiques, and was seen to be symptomatic of this history. I argued that one of the problems with Post(-)Colonial Studies has been the lack of consideration for the instance of 'Japan' in its theoretical development, and that Said's understanding of orientalism as a process of 'othering' has not considered the possibility of various 'othering's, and that Japan might be better understood as not the 'other' of the West, but its 'beyond'. I have also problematised the western use of 'Japan' as an epistemological and ontological alternative to go 'beyond' traditional western metaphysics. Finally, I suggested that in engaging with these
theories for understanding the actuality of Japanese imperialism, these theories of 'resistance' might be understood as the thought/practice that underpinned it.

To summarise, in my project of looking at how the Japanese subjecthood in the Meiji period was socially constructed through discourses of modernisation/westernisation, the historical context within which my work is situated is different from that of the context of western imperialism. The notion of a unitary, rational subject at the centre of social theory is not the focus of my theoretical critique. A thought system founded upon a unitary subject such as Hegelianism cannot be seen as the founding discourse of colonialism and imperialism in Japan. In my project of looking at how Meiji subjecthood was socially-constructed, I will treat the alternative forms of the subject as explanatory models for understanding the Japanese subject.

I want to emphasise here that I do not deny that e.g., Ruth Benedict could well have discovered a different 'culture' to the West, amongst her 'Japanese' informants. What I deny is that they are the timeless or 'inherent' characters of Japaneseness; rather I would suggest that they are the very effects of power. I do not deny that there may well be a legacy of discourse founded upon some sort of notion Japanese national identity as being unique. What I deny is that this discourse of 'uniqueness' is really unique to the Japanese. I do not deny Roland Barthes or the validity of any of the other theories of 'resistance'. I'm simply pointing out the imaginative powers of these texts, particularly given Japan's tendency to internalise the western gaze, these texts may contribute to enforce rather than challenge or undermine systems of knowledge that support imperialism.

In undertaking my research, the following will be the guiding questions which will inform my analysis, and I will return to discuss them in my conclusion, Chapter 7:
1. Was the creation of 'difference' such an integral part of Japanese imperialism? Did it entail the creation and specification of the western bourgeois self, at the site of its colonies where were then taken back to Europe?

2. Was Japanese Imperialism legitimated by a worldview of historical dialectics and founded upon an epistemological premise of totality and universalism?

3. Was there a presumption that Japan was the progressive nation which possessed the quality of civility (as in the West), and were the notions of rationality and reason the organising principles legitimating Japanese imperialism?

4. Were Japanese subjects disciplined through the encouragement to self-regulate the inner-self through the use of reason?

5. Was the Japanese subject constituted as a binary model: made from an essentialised inside and an outside?
3.

Toward a Methodology for Analysing Japanese Subjecthood

Before carrying out my analysis on Japanese subjecthood, I would like to address some methodological issues in this chapter, particularly since such a discussion will not only bring into focus some of the theoretical problems which were addressed in Chapter 2, but will also prepare the grounds for my own analysis, and further mark out the issues which I will be dealing with in my analysis more precisely.

My archival research was undertaken in two phases. Because the social constitution of Japanese subjecthood is an under-researched area and there was not enough adequate literature to fall back on, it became necessary for me to execute a 'pilot' analysis of an appropriate archival materials from which I was able to derive theoretical conjectures relevant to my research. The archival material I chose for this purpose was advertisement posters and I undertook a semiotic analysis. In the second phase of my research, I undertook a genealogical analysis of ethical school textbooks, utilising the conjectures that emerged in the first phase of my research as theoretical guidelines.
Therefore, my research was undertaken in two phases, where I utilised two distinct methodologies to analysing two distinct archival materials. Nevertheless, there is a historical linkage between them, in so far as 'genealogical analysis' has generally been considered to be the 'successor' of 'semiotic analysis', and signifies the move from 'structuralism' to 'poststructuralism'. Bearing this in mind, I would like to discuss my approach to both semiotic analysis and genealogical analysis in this chapter.

Section 3.1 will be my discussion of semiotic analysis. My primary understanding of 'semiotic analysis' was informed by Judith Williamson's work, *Decoding Advertisements* (1978). My own use of semiotic analysis will therefore be carried out by locating my position to 'semiotic analysis' with and against her's. My critique of Williamson will highlight some of the methodological problems inherent in 'structuralism', and I will be challenging the universalistic assumptions underlying Williamson's project, by critiquing her Marxist assumptions, and her uncritical acceptance of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory.

Section 3.2 will be my discussion of the genealogical method. My delineation of genealogy will not derive from one source, but will be a combination of various primary and secondary sources on Michel Foucault and his works. The significance of genealogy is that it provides a methodological framework which is not dependent upon a normative or universal foundation of thought. Indeed, I argue that its most important contribution is that this methodological approach enables the discernment of thought as a part of system of practices. Nevertheless, I argue that due to the specific politico-historical context within which Foucault worked, his own deployment of genealogy still tended to privilege the very metaphysical foundations of thought he critiqued, to the exclusion of other important issues. My discussion will develop this argument, and
propose Rose's version of genealogy; I argue that Rose effectively reinstalls the genealogical approach such that it may be more usefully applied to the investigation of Japanese subjectification.

3.1 Semiotic Analysis

Judith Williamson's text, *Decoding Advertisements* (1978) is a signpost text in many respects. The publication of this text occurred within the heightened popularity of structuralist theory within the academic environment. One of its manifestations was the trend in British Cultural Studies of employing structuralist theory in the form of semiotic analysis to embrace 'non-classic' texts—ranging from women's magazines, youth fashion to even physical gestures—as valid textual materials for social analysis. (Cf. Turner 1990, 1992, 1996) Williamson's analysis of advertisements arose out of such a context; in analysing how production of meaning in advertisements ingrained processes of alienation, she brought together Saussurean linguistic theory with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory on the subject. In the following, I will outline her methodological framework and argue for an engagement with semiotic analysis and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory which I find most useful, and will critique the Marxist undertones in Williamson's undertaking.

Firstly, although I argue for the validity of utilising advertisements as textual materials to discern the social formation of the subject, I will divorce myself from the Marxist rationale of Williamson's semiotic undertaking. Williamson's position is that the medium of advertisements is a prime site of mis-/representation through which ideology functions. However, my own engagement with advertisements presumes that advertisements tell 'truths' about what the 'popular taste' was in Meiji Japan. I argue
that since it is in the very nature of advertisements to sell, and this cannot be induced through force but through appeal, the subjecthood inscribed in advertisements manifest the constitution of the subject’s ‘personal desires’.

Secondly, Williamson argues that the efficacy of the ideological function of advertisement is premised upon a subjectivity, which, for her, is universally explained by Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. In contrast to Williamson, I argue that subjecthood is constituted in a culturally specific way, and that, at best, what Lacanian theory can provide is a general model of what western subjects are encouraged to constitute as their ‘selves’. In my own work, I will utilise Lacanian psychoanalytic theory as comparative material to discern the specificity of the social formation of Japanese subjecthood.

Thirdly, the utility of semiotic analysis lies in answering the questions to: 1. how the ‘subject’ is supposed to ‘understand’, and 2. what the ‘subject’ is supposed to ‘know’. That is to say, semiotic analysis looks at how social conventions, in and through language, are established, by identifying 1. the linguistic conditions that make ‘meaningfulness’ possible, and 2. the foundational linguistic signs upon which ‘meanings’ are established. I will argue that the Marxist references in Williamson’s semiotic undertaking detracts from what semiotic analysis as a method for understanding the social formation of subjecthood can offer, by consistently privileging processes premised upon difference as being truthful, and viewing sameness as being false.
3.1.1 Advertisement: Site of Alienation of the Subject?

Williamson holds the view that the production of advertisements, as a site where structures of meaning are created and perpetuated, has alienating effects on one's subjectivity. She is sympathetic to the Marxist view that 'the fundamental differences in our society are still class differences' (Williamson 1978: 13), and that in modern industrialised societies, workers are alienated from their labour and the products of their labour. She, however, takes the analysis a step beyond the traditional Marxist ground by arguing that although actual social distinctions are 'created by their [subject's] role in the process of production, as workers, it is the product of their own work that are used' (ibid 13, my emphasis) in the ideological processes of advertisements. In other words, for Williamson, the prime site of ideology is at the site of representation (rather than production) which produce 'the meaning made necessary by the conditions of society while helping to perpetuate those conditions.' (Ibid 13) She thus argues that people have a real need for a meaning to their lives, and that advertisements have replaced art or religion in the modern era as the site through which 'structures of meaning' (ibid 12) are created, and furthermore, perpetuated.

Thus, for Williamson, implementing a semiotic analysis of advertisement is to cut away the mystification of representation so that we may aspire to know our true relation to the world. I, however, do not subscribe to this view. Firstly, I do not believe that semiotic analysis 'reveals' mis-representations. I would argue that what semiotic analysis can achieve is to delineate what it is that is being represented as 'true'. Secondly, I do not ascribe as much importance as Williamson seems to do in the social role of advertisements. I am not convinced that advertisements are the alternate textual forms of modernity which have replaced the role that art or religion have traditionally played in society. Nevertheless, I would still argue that advertisement is a particularly relevant
form of text when one's aim is to apprehend the social formation of subjecthood for the following reason:

The function of an 'advertisement' is to convince the viewer to buy a certain product or service. In order to fulfil this function, each advertisement must, at the very least, 'make sense' to its targeted audience. This act of 'making sense' necessarily presumes the existence of an *a priori* subject which carries out the act of 'making sense'. Therefore, the maps of meaning called 'advertisements' function through inscribing a *relationship* between the subject, which carries out the act of 'making sense', and what is being made to 'make sense'. That is to say, the viewer must be able to 'recognise' where s/he, the subject, stands in relation to the map of meaning. Therefore, in order for an advertisement to fulfil its function, an inherent part of the text is that the viewer must be able to 'recognise' how his/her own subjecthood is being constituted.

Of course, this is not to say that *all* advertisements 'make sense' to *every* individual to which it is addressed. Nevertheless, producers of advertisements must strive to be as inclusive as possible, and to try to 'make sense' to the widest possible range of audience. Otherwise, it would not be successfully fulfilling its function—to sell. Therefore, I would argue that if we were to examine a set of advertisements of a certain period, one would be able to discern the 'meanings' that were 'recognised' by the subject as being addressed to them. Moreover, since this 'recognition' takes place in a medium which ostensibly functions, not through coercion, but through seduction, I would argue that 'advertisements' are manifestations of what the 'subject' is prepared to internalise positively, as a personal desire, rather than as an injunction.

**Social Formation of the Subject**
Premised on the understanding that advertisements are sites of alienation of the subject, Williamson further argues that a theory of the social formation of the subject is provided by Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. One of the most contentious aspects of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is, of course, that it purports to offer a universal account of the formation of the subject, arguing that fragmentation of subjectivity (upon entrance into the symbolic order) is the very condition of our existence. In the following, I will offer a brief summary of the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory on the formation of the subject, and then move on to my critique of Williamson's application of Lacanian theory, through which I will define my own use of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory.

**Lacanian Psychoanalytic Theory**

When a child is born, it is a mass of sensations and has no clear sense of its own self as an entity separate from its surrounds. This primary state of the 'homlette' is known as the realm of the *Imaginary*.

![Diagram 1. The Imaginary](image)

Lacan argues that the first time the 'homlette' sees its image in a mirror (called *Image-I*), it departs from the initial state of amorphousness, and recognises itself as an elemental entity. The significance of this development, called the mirror-stage, is that the 'homlette' learns to *equate* its subjectivity to an objectified image. However, at this point, the image in the mirror is just that, an image, with no social values associated with it — *i.e.*, the 'homlette' does not *know* that it may be *e.g.*, 'black', 'middle-class' 'girl'. It
is simply an empty sign devoid of social meaning with which the ‘homlette’ (because it is oblivious to social values) feels at one with. This state, where the ‘homlette’ (the referent) is in unity with its mirror-image (an empty sign) is known as the ideal-ego.

However, soon the ‘homlette’ acquires language and learns that it is a ‘child’ and not e.g. an ‘adult’ or a ‘teenager’ and is e.g. a ‘girl’ called ‘Sarah’ as opposed to ‘William’ who is a ‘boy’, and is ‘white’ because she’s not ‘black’. In other words, the ‘homlette’ learns to fill its previously hollow image with social meaning, and becomes a social-I within the symbolic system of signs. Lacan argues that this entrance into the symbolic, where the very nature of existence is to exist as fragmented subjects, is the very condition of our existence. The possibility of being cannot be otherwise:
Moreover, Lacan argues that once the 'child' learns to construct its identity in relation to other differing signs, it can never return to the ignorance or unawareness of the Imaginary state. S/he cannot unlearn what s/he has learnt. It is at this juncture that the function of ideology is inserted into the social; ideology socialises the subject to deny its true state of being as a fragmented subject, and to desire a 'regressive tendency towards the Imaginary unity of the Ego-Ideal' (Williamson: 15):

Once the boundary between the Imaginary and the Symbolic has been crossed, it is impossible to return. But though the fictional totality of the Ideal-Ego is broken, the subject is haunted by its ghost. Lacan calls this the *Ego-Ideal*, which implies the restoration of a previous unity but with the paradoxical aim of keeping the new, social identity and that former unity. The desire to become reunited with his mirror image once the subject has entered the realm of language, the Symbolic, is a desire than can never be fulfilled since the image is now a symbolic representation and such, irreconcilable with its referent. (Ibid: 63)

Williamson, in compliance with Lacan, argues that any notion of a 'unified self' or 'consciousness' is an ideological construct, suggesting that fragmented subjectivity is our true state of being. She argues that advertisements mis-represent our true relation to the world, through socialising a desire for unity within him/herself: 'This is as it were the supply of power that drives the whole ad motor, and must be recognized as such.'
In other words, successful ads are successful because they convincingly and seductively promise what is an impossible unity within a subject.

Upon this Lacanian premise, Williamson identifies various techniques through which the desire for the 'regressive tendency towards the Imaginary unity of the Ego-Ideal' (ibid: 65) is socialised. They include 1. Inviting the consumer to fill in a gap or absence in the ad, whereby the consumer becomes a complicit part of the ad (see pp. 77-84), 2. Attracting the reader to 'interpret', by the use of puns and puzzles in the language of the advertisement (see pp. 84-91), and 3. The ultimate method is the use of calligram in advertisement, whereby the referent and the sign are collapsed together:

The masking of the absence of the referent in its represented presence is clearly the furthest you can go in a one-to-one relation of the signifier and signified, sign and referent: their conflation must be imaginary and thus a denial of their symbolic function. (Ibid: 91-2)

Thus, for Williamson, identity premised on difference is the subject's true relation to the world, and identity premised on sameness is a falsification of the subject's relation to the world. That is to say, ideology functions by erasing the true differences which define our existence.

However, one might ask, could it not be that the process of creating 'differences' could also have an ideological function? This is indeed a view already well-established in post-colonial studies (see Chapter 2 of this thesis), which have illustrated how imperialism was founded upon defining itself against the colonial 'other'. Moreover, one might also wonder, since acquiring language is always a social act, how can one legitimate arbitrarily splitting the acquisition of language into categories of truth and falsity? Why is it that the entrance into the symbolic is true, and other aspects of
language use, such as the return to the imaginary, is false? Could it not be that other language systems which do not necessarily fit the Lacanian model do exist?

Through an ethnographic research of work practices in small firms in contemporary Japan, Kondo (1990) has argued that the constitution of the Japanese self is not premised upon essentialist notions such as the 'soul', but rather, is relational. (Ibid: 36-7) She argues that Japanese language is structured such that grammatically, the construction of the self, the 'I', is relational to the social context of the 'I's' utterance (ibid:29), and that there are 'other, culturally specific possibilities for domination and for the coercive, disciplinary production of selves' (ibid: 32) in Japan. She suggests that whereas in the West, the cultural ideal is that one should be 'true' to one's inner (essentialist) self, in Japan, the cultural ideal is that an individual should be sensitive to the needs of others and formulate one's self to contribute to social harmony (ibid: 108):

Indeed the notion of happiness is unthinkable without others. We must live in harmony, in a community where people are sensitive to each other's desires and wishes. To make people in our lives happy is to create happiness for them and for us. A basic law of human life is that other people are our mirrors (Hito wa waga kagami). Whatever a person does will inevitably be reflected in the behaviour of others. Accordingly, cheerful greetings and smiles will serve to smooth social relationships and in so doing, create happiness for all concerned. (Ibid: 106)

Therefore, practically speaking, if one's outer form (soto/omote/tatemae) conforms to society, then as far as society at large is concerned, the 'self' has served its social obligation by maintaining outer harmony. Of course, ideally, one's interior (uchi/ura/honne) should be in harmony with the needs and conveniences of the larger society, but again, practically speaking, this is understood to be quite difficult, and is not so expected.
Kondo also argues that given such a premise of subject-formation in Japan, disciplinary modes are different from those found in the West. Whereas in the West, disciplinary acts seek to 'discover' what is internal to the subject and to be 'true' to oneself, in Japan, the process of disciplining entails the inculcation of strict conformity to the external form. Moreover, the process stands on the assumption that if one applies oneself rigorously enough to this disciplining, one's inner self will become harmonised with one's outer self:

Like the Zen arts and other methods of learning and self-cultivation, one first learns through imitation. Stereotyped movements are repeated endlessly; for example, as a student of tea ceremony, one begins with seemingly simply tasks such as how to walk properly, how to fold a tea napkin, how to wipe the tea utensils. Unlike similar movements in everyday life, these are precisely defined, to be executed “just so.” Later these learned actions are orchestrated into a ceremony that is the epitome of “natural” disciplined grace. The martial arts, also arts of movements are inscribed in muscle memory. In a sense, for these arts, content is secondary to repetition of form. (Ibid: 106)

This would suggest that Japanese language, as an imperative for entrance into the social, is organised differently, and in many respects, resembles the 'mirror-stage' rather than the western 'symbolic'. Meaning is passed on from one signifier to another, where sameness, through a process of equivalence, is the basis for creating meaning, and not difference:
Indeed, Allison (1994), through her fieldwork study of how contemporary Japanese corporate masculinity is constituted at the site of hostess bars, alludes to Lacan's notion of the mirror-stage as an explanatory tool. She argues that the constitution of the male identity was dependent on the hostess who would mirror back the image that flattered them. (Ibid: 183) These studies would suggest that unification has a far integral role in the social formation of Japanese subjecthood than is suggested by the Lacanian model.

However, I want to emphasise here that in suggesting that the process of equivalence has a far more pivotal role to play in the Japanese symbolic than in the West, I do not want to collude with the Marxist narrative that Japan is therefore less progressive than the West. Neither do I mean to deny the potential for ethics or violence in either of these forms of language. What I am arguing for is the recognition of the specific difference between the two. Moreover, I also do not mean to suggest that the above model of language is 'unique' to the 'Japanese' sign system, or that every 'Japanese' person, in every instance, speaks in this form of language. What I am saying is that this is
apparently the socially-constituted model of Japanese language, where language in its totality as a sign system produces 'truths'.

### 3.1.2 How are 'Meanings' Made Meaningful to a Subject?

In analysing advertisements as sites where truths are produced, semiotic analysis is especially utilisable in identifying how the subject comes to 'recognise' meanings. There are two processes through which the subject recognises meanings: through relations of difference and relations of equivalence. In setting forth the method of semiotic analysis, Williamson implies that relating through difference is the true nature of our relation to the world, whereas relating through equivalence is the falsification of our true relation to the world.

In explicating the truth of difference, Williamson adopts a Saussurean understanding of language, and argues that there is no absolute meaning or God-Given Truth prior to its expression through language, and that truth is realised in and through its linguistic expression. In Saussurean linguistics, it is argued that the correlation between the physical representation of the sign, called the signifier, and the meaning it invokes, called the signifier, is arbitrary, and that the bond between the two is a very fragile one. Given that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is so arbitrary and fragile, Saussure argued that the meaning of a word is not intrinsic to itself, but is determined by its systematic difference from other existent signs. Thus, for example, the signifier 'f-r-o-n-t' does not hold any inherent meaning of its own; its meaning is determined by its difference from other signifiers, such as 'b-a-c-k'.

In the case of advertisements, Williamson illustrates how this functions by taking up the example of cosmetic advertisements. She points out that each cosmetic brand markets
a certain type of femininity which derives its own character by means of differentiating itself in a range of feminine-types. That is to say, a 'classical' femininity becomes distinguishable as such, not because it is in itself 'classically' feminine, but only in juxtaposition to other types of differing femininities, such as 'liberated' or 'aggressive' femininity (see pp. 24-31). Thus, a semiotic analysis entails looking at images to see how a sign is given meaning through a process of differentiation.

Furthermore, Williamson argues that within this arena where meaning is primarily determined by what it is not, meaning is passed on from one sign to another through exchange, in a process very much akin to a monetary system. In other words, the value of signs are arbitrarily deemed equal or comparable and then exchanged, as products are exchanged for currencies. For Williamson, this is the prime site where the subject's true relation to the world is shrouded in a veil of myth. According to Williamson, one is able to grasp the workings of ideology by looking at how a product, which in itself does not mean anything in particular, is given meaning by equating it to something else. For example, Williamson points out that in a cosmetic advertisement, a woman with a certain image of femininity is equated with a bottle of cosmetics, as if this equation is a 'natural' one:

Thus once again we see that the form of advertisements is a part of ideology, and involves a false assumption which is the root of all ideology, namely that because things are as they are (in this case, because certain things are shown as connected in ads, placed together etc.), this state of affairs is somehow natural, and must 'make sense' simply because it exists. (Ibid: 29)

Williamson thus argues that what remains the unquestioned act of equivalence upon which meaning is made to 'make sense' must be made obvious, in order to unravel the ideology of an advertisement.
The *link* (which Williamson calls the 'objective correlative') made between formerly disparate signs, such as that between a 'woman' and a 'perfume bottle', is induced by several techniques. Williamson gives such examples as the colour scheme, layout, linguistic manipulations such as the use of a pun, or replacement of one for the other in the narrative, and so forth.

Although I find the distinction made between processes of differentiation and equivalence useful, I do not accord status of truth to only one of the processes, differentiation, and I do not presume that equivalence is a process of falsification. That is to say, unlike Williamson, I do not make the assumption that differentiation is the true nature of our subjectivity, and equivalence a falsification of our subjectivity. For me, both differentiation and equivalence are processes through which the 'truths' about how a subject 'understands' are produced. Thus, in my semiotic undertaking, I will regard signification in both terms of differentiation and equivalence as *processes producing 'truths'*. 

### 3.1.3 What 'Meanings' Are Made Meaningful to a Subject?

The above has discussed the process of *denotation*, the workings of signification within a *sign* (between the signifier and signified) and how meaning is passed on from one sign to another. However, as mentioned earlier, Williamson also premises these signification practices within an ideological system, or a framework of a *referent system*. The understanding of the *referent system* entails looking at a plane of expression termed *connotation*. This entails apprehending what 'forms' of knowledge are used as the *referent system*, the connotated level of meaning, as opposed to looking at how 'forms' of knowledge are created in the process of denotation. Therefore, in a semiotic
analysis, not only does one investigate how 'meanings' are made meaningful to a subject, one also investigates what 'meanings' are made meaningful to a subject.

Williamson argues that ideology functions at the level of connotation by misplacing our relationship to our spatial and temporal environment, and to 'refer to this misplacement as...an inevitable and natural fact.' (Ibid: 102)

The signifiers of connotation...are made up of signs (signifiers and signifieds united) of the denoted system.... As for the signified of connotation, its character is at once global and diffused; it is, if you like a fragment of ideology.... These signifieds have a very close communication with culture, knowledge, history, and it is through them...that the environmental world invades the system. (Ibid: 101)

In discussing how ideology functions at the level of connotation, Williamson argues again that it is through a process of shrouding differences that truth is denied to the subject. She proposes some of the key 'forms' of knowledge through which differences are denied. She separates the referents which ideology is premised upon into two categories: those that primarily involve the manipulation of space through the referents of 'nature' and 'culture', and those that primarily involve the manipulation of time through the referents of 'magic' and 'history'. In the following, I will explore her exegesis, and will be arguing that in both cases, Williamson is unreflexive about questioning her own criterion of truth and falsity, and despite admitting that ideological systems are 'historically-specific' (ibid: 99), she implicitly accords a status of universal truth to her own categorisations, thus failing to note how culturally specific they may be.

**Ideological Manipulation of Space**

Williamson suggests that the true definition of space is founded upon the discreteness of 'nature' and 'culture', and the gesture of collapsing or eliding these true differences is
the ideological moment in advertisement. In this referent system—what she calls "cooking" nature—meanings of 'nature' are elided with meanings of 'culture' through a transformative process of 'cooking' (see 'Chapter 4. "Cooking" Nature'). Thus, 'Nature', the fundamental spatial environment, is appropriated in advertisement as an empty form to be transformed and inserted into a system of 'signification' of 'culture'.

Moreover, this process of eliding 'nature' and 'culture' can occur conversely, through significations of 'science', as a 'cooking' process which changes 'nature' to 'culture' (ibid: 110). Here, the relationship between 'nature' and 'culture' is reversed, and 'science' (as a product of 'culture') becomes the primary referent for 'revealing' the natural order. However, Williamson emphasises that what 'science' 'reveals' is not the raw wilderness of 'nature', but 'the natural', or nature tamed:

'[T]he Natural' though ideologically located with 'nature'...is absolutely irreconcilable with it, for the simple that one is real, the other is symbolic. 'The natural' signifies nature, but sign and referent can never be conflated, however much advertisements try to convince us of the opposite. Thus culture never relates to nature directly, never looks at it 'raw'.... (Ibid: 135-6)

Williamson argues that these two ideological manoeuvres establish a symbolic system of seeming seamlessness between nature and society, where what society is or does becomes the natural order of things:

![Diagram 5. Ideological Manipulation of Space (Williamson 1978: 135-6)](image)

The above diagram bespeaks of the circular process through which our relationship to space is negotiated. Moreover, fundamental to Williamson's assumptions about the true
nature of the world is that nature and society stand in binary opposition to each other, whereas any act of collapsing the two together is an ideological act. However, I would argue that in assuming that the true worldview of the 'subject' is founded upon a dichotomic split between nature and society, and that it is through an ideological process of the imaginary that falsely reduces this 'true' separation into one, Williamson fails to question whether or not the categorisation of 'nature' and 'culture' are in themselves socially-constituted 'truths'.

Haraway (1989), in her comprehensive study of primatology as a constructed body of knowledge, has argued that the study of monkeys in Japan in post-World War II is markedly different from that of the West. She argues that the founding framework of Japanese primatology does not 'depend on the structure of colonial discourse—that complex search for the primitive, authentic, and lost self, sought in the baroque dialectic between the wildly free and subordinated other' (ibid: 245). It does not, in other words, depend on an epistemological division made between nature and culture; monkeys were not used to designate a 'nature' which 'cultured' man had 'lost'. She suggests that in Japanese primatology, the monkey was used as a 'figure of the two-sidedness of the structure of life, person, and society' (ibid: 246): "[n]ature [itself] was made into an object of study in Japanese primatology, but it was nature as a social object, as itself composed of conventional social processes and specifically positioned actors, that intrigued early Japanese monkey watchers.' (Ibid: 246, my emphasis) Haraway thus argues that in Japanese primatology, the boundary between human and animal was not 'culturally crucial', and that other concerns, of constructing a 'discourse on superiority and inferiority ... couched in a code about unity' (ibid: 257, my emphasis) which was more central to Japanese primatologists. Haraway's work suggests that the conceptualisation of the rational and the natural in Japan are different from those of the
West. It suggests that the notion of the 'natural' is privileged over the 'rational' in ways not seen in the West, and that there is no assumption of a discrete split in these two terms as in the West.

Although my citation of Haraway's work may seem out of context, in that her work is situated in a different historical period from my own and does not directly deal with sign systems, her work indicates that discourses surrounding subjecthood are distinctive even in the post World-War II era in Japan, and that this would suggest that when 'modernisation/westernisation' was 'imported' into Japan in the Meiji era, this took form in a discursive context, as well as in a manner and shape, quite different from that in the West. It indicates that the 'modern' worldview which is founded upon the split between nature and culture may not have become an established 'truth' during the modernising processes of Meiji period.

**Ideological Manipulation of Time**

In the same way, Williamson assumes that there is a real difference between 'magic' and 'history', the two referents that Williamson identifies as involving the manipulation of our temporal relationship to the world. Here again, Williamson argues that the ideological manoeuvring of time entails a misrepresentation of time and space through a process of equivalence, where they are compressed together.

According to Williamson, 'magic' refers to the manipulation involved in convincingly telling a lie about the relationship between 'space and time of production' (ibid: 141). It is a 'transformational referent system' (ibid: 140) which 'always involves the misrepresentation of time in space, or space in time' (ibid: 140). Furthermore, its logic is self-referential:
Magic is the production of results disproportionate to the effort put in (a transformation of power—or of impotence into power).\textellipsis They assume a system of transformation where such disproportionate results appear, miraculously, but precisely because of this miraculous quality, we do not feel we need ask for an explanation, since this is the definition of a miracle...the less sense it makes, the more sense it must 'really' make, and the deeper this sense must lie. The more amazing results advertisements offer us, the more these come within the non-explanatory system of 'magic', and the less amazing they thus seem, because it is not amazing for magic to be amazing. (Ibid: 141)

Thus, 'magic' is a referent system which twists the subject's relationship to time and space, and, according to Williamson, its persuasive powers actually increase the more fantastic misrepresentation involved is. In other words, the more unreal it is, the more the subject is likely to believe the ideology of the message as being 'true'.

Williamson further argues that 'history', on the other hand, is different from 'magic' in that it 'aim[s] at an illusion of "reproducing reality"'. (Ibid: 153) It constitutes myths through 'evok[ing] the past, promis[ing something in] the future, or tell[ing] a story which encompasses both past and future.' (Ibid: 152) That is to say, they misrepresent the subject's real historicity by representing time in space, according it a synchronic status, by drawing 'events out of time and into a sort of eternal moment.' (Ibid: 152)

Thus, in both 'magic' and 'history', Williamson argues that it is the ideological process of erasing or masking differences which denies the subject access to its real state of being. The difference between 'magic' and 'history' is that 'magic' is obviously false, whereas 'history' masks its falsity as truths.

However, paradoxically, Williamson also argues that representations involving 'time' in advertisements are always false, because 'it [time] is given a position in space, while beings denied its temporal materiality' (Ibid: 153):

A real historicity is denied as history is either condensed to a synchronicity, or appropriated in the notion of memory or projection. Memory and anticipation
become our only access to time outside our own, and they are emptied of any real content and completely absorbed by the constitution of the subject; the past and future are deliberately represented as vaguely as possible so that we may insert ourselves there. Paradoxically, our real past, history, is appropriated by the advertisement to be filled by the product, or to become represented by a single subject.... (Ibid: 155)

I think there is a contradiction in Williamson's exegesis. To sum up her argument, Williamson argues that the representation of subject's relationship to time and space in advertisement is always false. She also argues that the subject always believes this mis-representation to be the 'true' relationship of time and space. She also identifies two referent systems, one which is obviously false: 'magic', and one which maintains the façade of 'truth': 'history'. However, one must ask, what would be the valid basis for maintaining the distinction between 'magic' and 'history', since both 'magic' and 'history' are false representations of our relation to time, and since both 'magic' and 'history' convincingly pass off lies as 'truths' to the subject? This distinction would make sense if one were to assume that the 'subject' does actually have the capacity to judge what is true and what is false. However, this is impossible, because according to Williamson, whatever is represented in advertisements, despite its falsity, is always believed to be 'true' by its subject.

If the subject does not have this ability, then who does? The answer one would be lead to make is that, in fact, Williamson (or any other analyst carrying out a semiotic analysis) does. Williamson implicitly assumes that the analyst is able to make an objective judgement on what is really true and what is really false, and in so doing fails to recognise the precariousness of the distinction between 'magic' and 'history'.

I think that this contradiction in Williamson's thought is caused by her assumption that the medium of advertisement is primarily a map of meaning which falsifies 'knowledge' and covers up our material existence which is real. She, I think, also assumes that this
'covering up' functions through a self-referential logic in advertisements which make truth-claims. That is to say, she assumes that the criterion of 'truthfulness' or 'reality' is doubly consequential; according to her, the intention of 'advertisement' is to cover up our real relationship to 'time and space of production', and the method used is to claim it to be a 'true' map of meaning.

However, I would suggest that analysing Meiji advertisement through this double-glazed filter of 'truth' is misplaced. As we shall see in Chapter 4, especially in the initial stages of Meiji, one of the overriding characteristics of advertisement images was that they almost always belonged to the realm of imagination in a most obvious way, and made no effort to appear 'truthful'. In the case of Meiji advertisements, truthfulness of the images appears to have been secondary to its primary characteristic to perform as a good 'fantasy'. I would thus argue that there are processes of signification where the measurement of 'truth' is not necessarily valued, and in fact, can be a matter of irrelevance, or even be disagreeable. In fact, there is an argument to be made for the conjecture that the more fantastically magical the scenario, the more realistic is the function it served.

It is widely accepted that the three centuries of Tokugawa rule which preceded the Meiji Restoration was characterised by very tight social control. Society was separated into rigidly maintained social classes, where the possibility of mobility was very slim, and control pervaded every aspect of everyday life:

At the local level, gonin and junin gumi (five- and ten-family groupings) were organized for mutual surveillance, leading to a situation where "there was little confidence between man and man". While the Tokugawa regime allowed peasants to petition against the more egregious abuses of local authorities, villagers had no recourse at all against the most common and serious offenses, since direct appeals to higher authorities regarding taxes or land surveys generally were illegal. Indeed, when an individual peasant decided that he could
take it no longer, that tax or land abuses had become unbearable enough to warrant a direct petition to higher authorities despite the prohibition on such appeals, he knew that he likely would pay with his life, even if his cause was upheld and the abuses corrected. (Huffman 1997: 14)

Under such a rigidly managed society, it is likely that improvements in one's standing in life would have been perceived as a remote possibility. One could surmise that under a society where taking on board the goal for 'real' change meant consigning oneself to martyrdom, or, at the very least likelihood of it, a text whose messages contained reference to changes to reality would not have had mass appeal. It may well have been that escapism in the form of fantasy was, in fact, a more realistic method for coping with reality.

Indeed, Buruma (1984), whose works I mentioned earlier, has argued that consumptions of media products are sites were the 'citizens' play out their social discontent in such a way that it dispels frustrations, such that they are able to cope with their present situation. Likewise, Kondo (1990), whose work on the Japanese subject I have also mentioned earlier, has observed that there were socially-sanctioned occasions when people were allowed to play out their frustration through play-acting, as a form of coping mechanisms until an opportunity to bring about real changes to society came about. This would indicate that fantasy is a way of coping with reality in Japan.

Of course, from Williamson's point of view, the above would be taken as clear proof that advertisements are sites of ideology. However, I think that one must be very wary of passing judgement, and pressing one's own interpretation of truth and falsity to bear upon another. Instead, I think that it is better to assume that these advertisements tell us the recognisable 'truths' of those who consumed them.
Therefore, I think that the distinction between 'magic' and 'history' can be kept, but should be defined differently. I think that 'magic' should refer to referent systems where appearing to be 'real' is an immaterial priority, and 'history' should refer to referent systems where appearing to be 'real' is deemed consequential, where in both cases, the 'subject' recognises his/her own 'truth' reflected in the meaning constituted. In my own analysis, these will be the definitions of 'magic' and 'history' that I will be utilising.

3.1.4 Summary

Despite the fact that I find the inferences that Williamson draws regarding referent systems as valid tools to explain the West, because Williamson views advertisement(s) through the filters of Marxism, her understanding of 'reality' accords differences with the status of truth, and equivalence or sameness as a strategy of ideology. I, on the other hand, would not want to privilege either difference or sameness in this way. I would argue that both strategies founded upon difference or sameness involve the construction of socially constituted 'truths'. In Chapter 4, I will be presenting my own analysis, through which I hope to give sustenance to the ideas I have presented above. However, before moving onto my analysis, I would like to discuss the other method which I will be utilising in Chapters 5 & 6.

3.2 Genealogical Analysis

As a way of introduction, it should be noted that both semiotic analysis and genealogical analysis are similar in that they both hold the view that the production of knowledge is not innocent, but has a sort of economic investment (cf. Williamson 1978, pp. 20-40 & Foucault, 1976b, pp. 87-92). However, in semiotic analysis, it is assumed that the
structure of language produces what the subject understands and indeed, the very constitution of the subject. 'Truth' and the 'Subject' therefore, in semiotic analysis, is guaranteed by the structure of language, and arriving at the truth (or true meaning) entails focusing on a text and analysing the meaning it produces. My analysis in Chapter 4 will accept this theoretical premise, and I will attempt to ascertain the meaning that Meiji advertisements produced through a textual analysis.

The purpose of genealogy, on the other hand, is contextual analysis. In a genealogical analysis, it is not assumed that the bedrock of truth lies in the structure of language. Rather, truth itself is held in abeyance, is bracketed, and is interrogated. In genealogy, it is assumed that 'truth' is produced immanently and contingently, in the very process of its circulation, and is insinuated through its very execution. Thus, in genealogy, deciphering the 'truth' is not a matter of ascertaining the meaning it produces through the structures of language, but of apprehending how and by whom 'truth' is produced and propagated.

Therefore, it may be said that genealogy overcomes the theoretical dependency upon the universalistic model of subject formation which I critiqued regarding Williamson's version of semiotic analysis in the previous section. In this section, I will be discussing the methodology proposed by Michel Foucault whose significance lies in that it made 'possible to conceive of the subject as a site of independent conduct without relapsing into a humanist framework' (Dean 1994: 175) and also think 'about political norms without recourse to a foundation in a universal system of values' (ibid: 175). Nevertheless, Foucault's formulation of genealogy does, I will argue, privilege certain aspects of truth-formation, which, although theoretically addressed by Foucault in the later stage of his career, was nevertheless attendant in his methodological model. I
argue that Nikolas Rose's rendition of genealogy effectively redresses this problem, and I will also be presenting his version of genealogy. In the following, I will outline my understanding of and engagement with the genealogical methodology, which I will employ in Chapters 5 and 6, to carry out a contextual analysis of Meiji schooling.

3.2.1 Rethinking the Foundations of Identity Politics

Probably, no other theorist of recent times as so radically challenged the very foundations of identity politics to the extent that Foucault has done, this being indicated by the varying 'labels' that he has been accorded. Amongst many others, Foucault has been denounced as a 'nihilist' by those who would see themselves as 'rightist', and a 'neo-conservative' by those who would see themselves as 'leftist'. The theoretical critiques which have been made of Foucault are as contradictory as the 'labels' he has been given. On one hand, it has been argued that Foucault '[proposed] that subjects are entirely constituted by operation of power' (Dews 1984: 82), thus disallowing a politically-empowered subject position from which subordinate groups can speak (ct. Ramazanoglu 1993). On the other, it has been argued that Foucault advocated an 'aestheticized discourse of autonomous self-creation' (Norris 1994: 41) where subjects freely choose the discourse they want to embody, an interpretation which has been presented (albeit in a sympathetic manner) by James Miller (1993) as well.

One of the standard defence against both of the above charges has been to argue that Foucault's works are politically-utilisable, in so far as they enable the analysis of the essentialisms that underpin knowledge formed by power relations, such that we may come to understand 'knowledge' as 'a partial truth, a naturalised understanding or a universalistic discourse' (Barrett 1991: 168). Such a view of Foucault's works has had wide currency, as can been seen in Said's engagement with Foucault (as we saw earlier
in Chapter 2), where he critiques the history of western thought as a form of 'Orientalism' (Said 1978, 1995).

While such approximations of Foucault's works are entirely possible, it is important to register that the above viewpoints are founded upon a premise of 'thought' which Foucault was at odds with. That is to say, these viewpoints preserve the belief that politics require universalistic or normative grounds for social criticism, 'identity' being one of its most privileged notions. However, as David Owen (1994) has argued, the foundation of Foucault's philosophical project was precisely to do away with this philosophical mirage. Instead, Foucault argued for an understanding of philosophical activity as 'agonism', as 'permanent provocation'. Indeed, Foucault argued that 'the permanent political task inherent in all social existence' (Foucault 1982: 223, my emphasis) was to constantly bring into question how we are produced within a certain configuration of power, and how e.g., we have come to 'think' of 'freedom' as a possible condition of humanity. Moreover, it is important to stress that Foucault himself never thought that the insights attained through carrying out a genealogical analysis would necessarily guarantee an 'improvement' in society. Rather, his aim was of a more modest nature—his was not a project of surpassing the limitations of today's existence for something 'better' or 'freer', but of knowing our limits, so that we may 'refuse what we are' (Foucault 1982: 216) and perhaps contemplate the possibility of a change:

I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in a solution of another problem raised another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not a history of solutions, and that's the reason I don't accept the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. (Foucault 1984c: 343)
Given that Foucault's works have been the focus of such controversy for contemporary social critics across the spectrum, and more importantly, has largely been reincorporated into identity politics in the manner that it has, I would argue that apprehending Foucault's proposal for a new method for analysing society, which he called 'genealogy', must be founded upon an engagement with Foucault's views on western metaphysical thought and its relation to social criticism. However, this is by no means a straightforward process, and before we address this issue, I would firstly like to introduce the four-dimensional methodological model which Foucault proposed, and give examples of how he applied them.

3.2.2 Foucault's Four-Dimensional Model

Dean (1994) argues that from the later 1970s, Foucault developed a way of looking at the relationship between the domain of ethics and politics, or between 'practices of the self' and 'practices of government', which 'weaves them together without reduction of one to the other' (ibid: 174). He observes that there were two related transmutations in Foucault. One, the earlier concern for 'the microphysics of power' becomes a 'genealogy of governmentality', which is concerned with 'political rationality and technologies of government, the emergence of liberalism and the analysis of neoliberalism' (ibid: 174). Two, the earlier project of looking at the history of sexuality becomes a 'genealogy of desiring subject', which is concerned with 'ethical practice, techniques of the self, and the aesthetics of existence' (ibid: 174).

Dean argues that Foucault established a common approach between these two domains through applying a common methodology. This method was used to study the ways in which human beings have been made into subjects in three domains: as a
subject of knowledge, as an object and target of power-conduct of conduct, and as a subject of ethics of techniques of the self.

In concrete terms, a genealogical inquiry comprises the historical examination of how we are made into subjects through looking at the following four aspects. Firstly, one begins by identifying the ethical substance—i.e., the material that is worked over by ethics, which is accorded the status of 'truth' and is privileged within the discourse as ethically salient. Secondly, one would also need to identify the mode of subjectification attached to the privileged ethical substance. That is to say, one would need to identify 'the ways in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligation.' (Foucault 1984c: 357) Thirdly, in a genealogical analysis, the effects of 'truths' are actual; they mould our everyday practices. Therefore, one would need to identify the self-forming activity which is accorded as legitimate, through what techniques of instruction. Fourthly, one would also need to ask what the telos of the whole project would be. In other words, one would need to ask: which is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way? What 'forms of life' is it designed to constitute? (Cf. Foucault 1984c)

In the interview piece, 'On the Genealogy of Ethics' (Foucault 1984c), Foucault outlined how this methodological model could be used to discern the differences in ethical practice between classical Greek, late-Stoic and Christian philosophies as follows:

In regards to the classical Greeks, Foucault argued that their ethical substance was aphrodisia, which involved a concern for linking pleasure and desire to acts in their unity. Their mode of subjectification was conceived to be a politico-aesthetic choice which was personal; that is to say, their acceptance of their obligations to others was rationalised as for the sake of beauty or glory of personal existence. In order to achieve
this, this, at the level of practice, of self-forming activity, involved a submission to various techniques involving bodily acts, in order to observe moderation in sexual or dietetic acts, or the use of pleasure (aphrodisia) in their acts. Finally, the telos was to be a master of oneself.

Later on, during the late-Stoic period, Foucault argues that although the ethical substance remained the same—i.e., aphrodisia—the mode of subjectification and the self-forming activity changed, involving the introduction of the notion of universal being founded upon rationality. Whereas previously, the mode of subjectification had been a personal choice, it now becomes a rational rule; the prescription is founded upon an understanding of oneself as a rational, universal being. Moreover, whereas previously, self-forming activity did not entail any sense of reciprocity or sense of responsibility to act for the other—only for oneself, now the practices are defined in terms of its relation to the other. That is to say, how one behaves in one's role in society as e.g., husband and father, becomes the locus of attention. Thus, whereas previously, the telos was to aspire to become master of oneself in order to justify one's rights to be the master of inferior others, one now must master oneself because one is a rational being, where one has relations with others who are also masters of themselves.

With the introduction of Christianity, Foucault argues that the ethical substance changes to concupiscence, one 'based on finitude, the Fall, and evil.' (Foucault 1984a: 239)

Foucault sums up the difference between aphrodisia and concupiscence as follows:

If, by sexual behaviour, we understand the three poles—acts, pleasure, and desire—we have the Greek "formula," which is the same at the first and the second stage. In this Greek formula what is underscored is "acts," with pleasure and desire as subsidiary: acts—plaisir—[désir]. I have to put desire in brackets because I think that in the Stoic ethics you start a kind of elision of desire; desire begins to be condemned.... The Christian "formula" puts an accent on desire and tries to eradicate it. Acts have to become something neutral; you have to act
only to produce children, or to fulfil your conjugal duty. And pleasure is both practically and theoretically excluded: \([désir]\)–\([acte]\)–\([plaisir]\). Desire is practically excluded—you have to eradicate your desire—but theoretically very important. (Foucault 1984c: 359)

In other words, whereas *aphrodisia* requires an account of ethics as both practice (\(i.e., \)acts) and thought (\(i.e., \)desire), concupiscence firstly precludes the site of practice (\(i.e., \)acts) as the fundamental source for how one defines ethical practices, but rather, focuses upon thought, or 'desire' as the material that is worked over by ethics, *but* in order to eradicate it. Moreover, here, the *mode of subjectification* changes as well; it is neither a personal choice nor founded upon rationality, but is divine law. Accordingly, the *self-forming activity* one must submit oneself to 'implies a decipherment of the soul and a purificatory hermeneutics of desires.' (Foucault 1984a: 239) These indicate that the *telos* of personhood has undergone a fundamental change; now the aim is no longer to try and 'establish as adequate and as perfect a relationship of oneself to oneself as possible' (Foucault 1984c: 365) nor of oneself in relation to others in one's role as husband or father. The aim is to establish one's relationship with a transcendental Other, God, and this requires one to purify oneself, through acts of 'self-renunciation.' (Foucault 1984a: 240)

Thus, we may now see that Foucault's genealogical method enables one to engage with how we are made into subjects without recourse to a monolithic or normative notion of ontology or epistemology. Rather, one's understanding of the formation of subjecthood is historicised, such that we are, at the end, left with the possibility of conceiving a different way of engaging with one's subjecthood. There are, nevertheless, certain aspects of subjectification which Foucault's model of genealogy does not fully address. This issue is closely linked to how Foucault developed his criticism of 'modern' forms of
knowledge, and its manifestation in relation to the management of the state, which I would now like to discuss.

3.2.3 Foucault's Modernity

As has been comprehensively outlined by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), one of the major impetuses in Foucault's philosophical endeavour was derived from his engagement with, and an attempt to resolve the two opposing legacies of western metaphysical thought. That is to say, on the one hand, Foucault sought to question a school of thought which tries to unearth scientific or objective laws governing human activity (i.e., truth in depth), and on the other, he also sought to question a school of thought which attempts to root meaning or truth in the subject (i.e., anthropological subject). As outlined in the previous section, Foucault's eventual solution was to propose a way of investigating how a subject is constituted through prescriptions of ethical acts, by looking at the four dimensions of ethical substance, mode of subjectification, self-forming activity, and telos. In this section, I would like to retrace some of Foucault's footsteps through which he came to propose the above method. We shall see that Foucault's views and stance to the legacy of western metaphysical thought changed as well as developed throughout his career.

In the 'Introduction' to The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1972) (originally published in 1968 as 'Réponse au cercle d'epistemologie'), Foucault notes that the business of doing history has been and still continues to be undergoing an 'epistemological mutation' (ibid: 11). He argues that one sees two opposing trends in recent historiography, one which seeks out new totalities, and one which seeks out discontinuities. These, Foucault argues, are the two sides of the same coin: they are both part of the attempt to establish historical 'truth' through depth, through establishing
intrinsically defined 'series' and further, relations between these 'series'. Thus, this new
mode of historiography continues to have an investment in preserving the notion of
'truth'. Nevertheless, Foucault argues that whereas in 'classical' historiography, the
business was to 'reconstitute' historical events through 'interpreting' documents of the
past as 'traces' of the past, contemporary historians make it their business to define
'history' itself:

...history, in its traditional form, undertook to 'memorize' the monuments of the
past, transform them into documents, and lend speech to those traces, which, in
themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in silence something other than
what they actually say; in our time, history is that which transforms documents
into monuments. (Ibid: 7)

The consequence of this has led to the importance of seeking out or determining the
most legitimate relations between intrinsically defined 'series', that is to say, through
being self-reflexive about the criterion for establishing the most legitimate historical
'series', and to define the relationships between these 'series'. Foucault locates himself
within this 'new history' or 'history of discontinuities', where the notion of 'discontinuity'
'no longer plays the role of an external condition that must be reduced [the role it
traditionally held], but that of a working concept.' (Ibid: 9, my emphasis)

Foucault warns that despite the fact that this 'epistemological mutation' can be, 'no
doubt be traced back to Marx' (ibid: 11-2), the transformation is not complete, it being
hampered by the desire to 'preserve, against all decentrings, the sovereignty of the
subject, and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism' (ibid: 12). This indicates
that residues of traditional thought still remains strong in historiography, for '[m]aking
historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human consciousness
the original subject of all historical development and al action are the two sides of the
same system of thought.' (Ibid: 12)
One may identify two theoretical manoeuvres on Foucault’s part here. Firstly, he locates his own endeavour within the recent move in historiography that is mindful of discontinuities, but is nevertheless concerned within finding some sort of ‘intrinsic’ historical relation. Secondly, this history of discontinuity is targeted toward ‘throw[ing] off the last anthropological constraints’ (ibid: 15) in knowledge. Thus, he claims ‘new history’ or ‘history of discontinuities’ as the legitimate upholders of ‘truth’ over traditional thought, and further, that his version of ‘truth’ (produced as a result of doing a history of discontinuities) is opposed to the ‘anthropological subject’.

However, in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (Foucault 1984b), which was published 4 years later in 1971, we see a shift in Foucault’s formulation. He still holds on the notion of discontinuities, but rather than doing a history of discontinuities, here, he advocates ‘effective history’ as conceived by Nietzsche. Foucault argues that Nietzsche, ‘beginning with the second of the Untimely Meditations, always questioned the form of history that reintroduces (and always assumes) a suprahistorical perspective’ (ibid: 86) and that the task remains at hand to ascertain how ‘humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.’ (Ibid: 85) More concretely, Foucault’s apprehension of Nietzsche’s notion of ‘genealogy’ marks itself out against ‘Platonic modalities of history’ (ibid: 93) in three different ways, through opposing itself to the notions of ‘reality’, ‘identity’ and ‘truth’, which are essentialised in ‘Platonic modalities of history’. That is to say, ‘genealogy’ sets its goals upon displaying the very precariousness of what we assume to be real, through disassociating and displacing our identification to history ‘as continuity or representation of a tradition’ (ibid: 93) and instead, [revealing] the heterogeneous systems which, masked by the self, inhibit the formation of any form of identity’ (ibid: 95).
Thus, in a sense, we may see that the notion of *discontinuities* is even more radicalised in this article by Foucault. Whereas previously, Foucault had tended to side with a form of historiography which attempts to produce a truthful account of the intrinsic relations between different discursive formations which is opposed to the anthropological subject, 'effective history' has no such constructive ambitions, but is 'relentlessly descriptive'. In so doing, whereas previously, Foucault still maintained that he (and others doing a history of discontinuity) had privileged access to 'truth', now both 'truth' and the 'anthropological subject' are consigned as belonging to the legacy of Platonic thought. We may see that what was previously posited as the aim—to establish the legitimacy of social analysis which is truthful in its intrinsicalness, has now become the object of analysis.

This change in how the relationship between the theme of 'truth in depth' and 'anthropological subject' is defined coincides with a shift in Foucault's field of analysis, from the realm of knowledge to the management of the state, and it may be argued that it was this shift which enabled Foucault to eliminate the previous theoretical reliance upon the notion of 'truth'. Indeed, it is generally recognised that Foucault's focus did shift from knowledge to practice during his thinking career, from looking at *epistèmes*—regimes of knowledge—to focusing upon technologies of power which regulate social practices (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982).

Practically speaking, this shift has been understood by Stoler (1995) to be a change in Foucault's focus from looking at 'normalisation of power' to 'power of normalisation'. In other words, Stoler makes a certain distinction in Foucault's analytical approaches—that Foucault not only examined the ways in which authorities established themselves as authorities through constituting certain regimes of power—through 'normalisation of
power', but also looked at ways in which once authorities had established themselves as authorities, penetrated the social fabric more pervasively through instituting various social procedure—*i.e.*, Foucault looked at the effects of power on the social body in the latter stage of his career.

Theoretically speaking, it has been argued that it is not appropriate to see 'archaeology' and 'genealogy' as coherently different methodologies (cf. Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Rather, the 'recursive folds' (Stoler 1995: xi) in Foucault's theoretical developments should be recognised, and that 'both are concerned in different ways with biopolitics and normalization' (ibid: xi). Nevertheless, it is, I think, important to recognise that it was only through a shift in vantage point, from the field of knowledge to that of the phenomena of the state, that he was able to overcome the theoretical reliance upon the notion of 'truth' which was present in the earlier stages of his career. Moreover, it should also be noted that in re-addressing the issue of 'truth in depth' and the 'anthropological subject' from the point of view of the state, Foucault was able to theoretically connect the relationship between the two, and to propose what is perhaps one of his most well-known concept, that of 'bio-power':

In 'The Subject and Power' (Foucault 1982), Foucault argues that around the eighteenth century, the exercise of power, which 'implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it' (ibid: 214) begins to be taken up for the organisation of the state. Originally institutionalised by the Church, the state begins to use 'pastoral power', a form of technique which encourages its citizens to 'know' their inner selves. He argues that the deployment of 'new pastoral power' by the state is different from the one inherited from the Church in that whereas previously, the practitioners and techniques of 'pastoral power' were relatively limited to the ecclesiastical institution of the Church, now the
'officials of pastoral power [increase]' (ibid: 215); concurrently, its presence spreads more comprehensively to cover the whole social body, and '[finds] support in a multitude of institutions.' (Ibid: 215) Finally, Foucault argues that:

...the multiplication of the aims and agents of pastoral power focused the development of knowledge of man around two roles: one, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the other, analytical, concerning the individual. (Ibid: 215)

Thus, we may see here that, in line with Foucault's shift from knowledge to technology, there is now more emphasis and focus upon disciplinary technologies. Moreover, the previous concern surrounding the question of 'truth in depth' and the 'anthropological subject' has also been reincorporated and redefined, where they are now seen to be the savoirs underpinning 'bio-power', which is 'both an individualizing and totalizing form of power.' (Ibid: 213, my emphasis) Thus, here, the relationship between 'truth' and the 'subject' is no longer seen in opposition, but are defined as complementary components of each other.

The intimacy of the relationship between 'truth' and the 'subject' was further developed in 'Governmentality' (Foucault 1991). Here, Foucault argued that between late sixteenth/early seventeenth century and eighteenth century, there was a transformation in the exercise of power. Throughout the Middles Ages and classical antiquity, princely sovereignty was legitimated through a constant attempt 'to draw the line between the power of the prince and any other form of power...to explain and justify [the] essential discontinuity between' (ibid: 91) the prince and his principality, through ascribing a divine and transcendental quality to the prince. However, the emergence of the 'state', concomitant to religious dissidence, heralds a new form of power, the art of government. The art of government is founded upon the principles of rationality, which operates through establishing a continuity between the created spheres of the state, such as
'morality', 'economy' and 'politics'. Thus, there is a transformation in the very aim of power; whereas previously, the 'primary aim of the prince was to retain his principality' (ibid: 95) and to ensure, 'in sum nothing other than submission to sovereignty' (ibid: 95), now the 'finality of government resides in the things it manages and the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs.' (Ibid: 95). That is to say, whereas previously, the aim of the sovereignty did not, in essence, change, and this 'self-referring circularity' (ibid: 95) of its legitimisation precludes the possibility of it changing in nature, now the very objects of governance is potentially mutable, according to objects it aims to regulate and dispose of.

Foucault further argued that up until the eighteenth century, the proliferation of the operations of the government were hampered due to its initial fusion with the rule of sovereignty through the employment of the metaphor of the 'family', and it is at the moment when the concept of 'population' came to supersede the notion of the 'family' as the central organising principle (in the mid-eighteenth century) that the art of government begins to wield its technical hold on power in full. Foucault is at pains to point out that the question of sovereignty and its relation to power does not disappear completely, (nor do disciplinary modes of power). Indeed, he argues that the emergence of the question of government makes these questions more acute. However, he is nevertheless asserting that the mid-eighteenth century saw a qualitative transformation, through the ascendancy of governmentality in western forms of power.

Needless to say, the account I have given above of Foucault's development on the relationship between the two themes of 'truth in depth' and the anthropological notion of the 'subject' is a rather schematic one. Nevertheless, it does give credence to the assertion which I want to make here. Namely, that for Foucault, accounting for the
relationship between these two issues did have a sustaining importance. Moreover, one may now see that his views surrounding this issue changed dramatically. Before Foucault located his analysis in the state and a focus on technology, 'truth in depth' was placed in opposition to the theme of the 'anthropological subject'. In the latter half of his career, however, he saw both savoirs as the two complementary poles which intensified the insinuation of power onto our everyday conduct.

3.2.4 Rethinking the Relationship Between Thought and Practice

Foucault is all too famous for having once proclaimed 'Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same' (Foucault 1972: 17), and this has been a source of much reproach amongst his commentators. I, however, do not think that there is anything censurable about the fact that he changed his mind so much. Indeed, I would argue that in so far as the question of savoir was concerned, he did not change his mind enough, and that as a result, he left us with historical analyses which are rich in the description of ethical practices, but gives a rather static account of the role that 'knowledge' had in the history of subjectification.

For example, in his account of the Greeks, late-Stoicism and Christianity, which was outlined earlier in section 3.2.2, he argued that the moral codes remained quite consistent, and that one could identify three constant moral 'themes': one surrounding the body, two regarding one's relation to women, and three regarding one's relation to boys. So the realm of 'thought' is substituted with 'moral codes', leading to an underdeveloped understanding of thought as practice. Moreover, when taken together, it appears as if he is extracting the ancestry of the emergence of 'modern' form of subjectification which centres upon the two figures of the Subject and Truth. Indeed,
when we look at how he describes contemporary forms of subjectification, his accounts clearly privileges these themes. For Foucault, the *ethical substance* of subjectification is 'desire', which alludes to the theme of anthropological subject; the *mode of subjectification* is medical/scientific and juridical framework, which alludes to the theme of penetration of surface or truth in depth; the *self-forming activity* is psychological and psychoanalytic techniques and knowledges, or pastoral power; *telos* is the emancipation of the self, or liberation of desire. (Cf. Foucault 1984c) Read in this way, one would almost be tempted to see Foucault as having seen thought as being autonomous to the realm of practice.

Moreover, it may be said that the associations made between the Greeks, Christianity and modernity is not so relevant to the examination of Japanese modernity. Fujitani (1996), for example, has argued that Japan's coming into being as a nation-state was specifically different from the West, in that while Foucault 'sees the rise of this modern society coming in conjunction with the decline of the monarchy, or at least of "monarchical power," I [Fujitani] describe both sorts of power as coming together at the same historical moment in Japan.' (Ibid: 26) Fujitani argues that the formation of the imperial body corresponded to the formation of two capitals, Tokyo and Kyoto, in the national landscape and that:

...Tokyo, the centre of progress, prosperity, military power, and Civilization, corresponded to—that is to say, was homological to—the masculinized, human, and politically engaged emperor, while Kyoto, the official representation of the past and Tradition, corresponded to the largely invisible, divine, timeless, and transcendent emperorship. (Ibid: 28)

It may therefore be said that 'Japanese modernisation' did not necessarily involve a supersession of princely sovereignty to the art of government, but, from the beginning, was meted upon a *hybrid* fusion of both.
In my analysis, it will be difficult for me to distinguish between regimes of knowledge (archaeology) and its technological application (genealogy), and indeed, my work would attest to how coterminous these two aspects of power are. It seems to me that the invention of regimes of knowledge through which potential candidates of authorities authorised themselves was simultaneously a strategy to create and convince the 'citizens' to understand themselves as 'citizens' and to take up certain practices befitting a 'citizen'. Thus, although my archival research will chronicle how the programme at the site of schooling changed, from looking at how regimes of knowledges were initially utilised to legitimate authority—i.e., normalisation of power, and then changed to enforcing certain modes of subjectification—i.e., power of normalisation, the relationship between knowledge and practice is a symbiotic one.

Given the extent to which Foucault's views upon the question of savoir changed, it is entirely possible that he might have changed his formulation again had he lived longer. Indeed, it should be emphasised that by far, the most important contribution Foucault made to social criticism was to make possible the apprehension of thought as practice. When, in 'What is Enlightenment?' (Foucault 1984d), he defines it as a certain 'attitude' one takes to oneself, he is, I think, arguing for a form of social criticism where one is not necessarily attempting to 'know' the limits of our 'thought', but is posing a far more important question in terms of practice. That is to say, he is not arguing for a form of social criticism which asks, 'what am I thinking today, so that I can think differently tomorrow?' but seeks to pose the question, 'what am I doing today, so that I can conduct myself differently tomorrow?' This, for me, remains the most important legacy of Foucault's insights into academic practice.
3.2.5 Rose's Five-Dimensional Model

Nevertheless, the question remains to be answered: how exactly may one carry out an analysis that acts out Foucault's definition of social criticism? Given that I have pointed out the incompatibilities of applying Foucault's four-dimensional model to the analysis of Japanese modernity earlier, I have yet to spell out a methodological model which I do find viable. It is for this purpose that I would like to introduce Nikolas Rose's (1998) rendition of 'genealogy of subjectification' in the following. Although Rose follows the verve of Foucault's project, his approach, converging around the five focal points of problematizations, technologies, authorities, teleologies and strategies, differs from Foucault's in several respects.

Firstly, as I suggested earlier, Foucault's deployment of genealogy produced a rather static understanding of 'ethics' which privilege the western metaphysical concepts of Subject and Truth. Rose, on the other hand, suggests that:

...one needs to extend an analysis of the relations between government and subjectification beyond the field of ethics, if by that one means all those styles of relation to oneself that are structured by the divisions of truth and falsity, the permitted and the forbidden. (Ibid: 30)

His approach therefore does not become one of tracing the emergence of a particularly western version of the modern subject, as Foucault's approach did.

Secondly, Rose's approach does not privilege 'knowledge' over 'practice' in the role that they both play in the way subjecthood is governmentalized. This, he does, by expanding the focus which Foucault tended to have, on how contemporary ethical regimes have 'encouraged human beings to relate to themselves as the subject of a “sexuality”, and to “know themselves” through a hermeneutics of the self.' (Rose 1998: 30) Rather, he suggests that the field of analysis can be extended to looking at other
forms of power, such as, e.g., how 'intellectual techniques' such as reading, memory, writing, and numeracy are organised, and also by looking at how corporeal regimes of the body are organised (ibid: 30-1).

Thirdly, his model brings to the fore more clearly the heterogeneous and ad hoc nature involved in processes of subjectification. As he states:

It is not a matter, therefore, of narrating a general history of the idea of the person or self, but of tracing the technical forms accorded to the relation to oneself in various practices - legal, military, industrial, familial, economic. And even within any practice, heterogeneity must be assumed to be more common than homogeneity. (Ibid: 33)

Moreover, this emphasis on the heterogeneity involved in subjectification, that we are, at any one time, being encouraged to adopt a variety of subject-positions rather than one, has a rather ingenious side-effect. It enables Rose to explain social change without recourse to any normative notion of 'resistance'. As he argues:

Human beings are not the unified subjects of some coherent regime of government that produces persons in the form in which it dreams. On the contrary, they live their lives in a constant movement across different practices that subjectify them in different ways.... Thus the existence of contestation, conflict, and opposition in practices that conduct the conduct of persons is no surprise and requires no appeal to the particular qualities of human agency, except in the minimal sense that human beings - like all else - exceeds all attempts to think it; while human being is necessarily thought, it does not exist in the form of thought. (Ibid: 35-6)

In effect, Rose's approach allows for a more contextualised understanding of subject-formation, and most importantly, links the government of self to others more clearly, by suggesting that a subject is a constant part of a process of subjectification where it moves between being in the position of 'othering' 'others' and being the 'other's. Given the various problems I discussed earlier in Chapter 2, and that Japan's subject-position
is the result of a reciprocal gaze, this insight is particularly important for me. In the following, I will give an overview of Rose's five-dimensional model.

1. Problematizations

Rose stipulates that a 'genealogy of subjectification takes ... [an] understanding of what it is to be human as a site of a historical problem, not as the basis for a historical narrative.' (Ibid: 23) It is therefore apt that the first question he poses is:

Where, how, and by whom are aspects of the human being rendered problematic, according to what systems of judgement and in relation to what concerns? (Ibid: 25)

This opening question clearly shows the difference in approach between Foucault and Rose. Whereas Foucault's investigation focused upon the material that is worked over by ethics, Rose firstly focuses upon sites of everyday practices as sites of investigation, such as 'asylum management, medical treatment of women, advisable regimes of child rearing, new ideas in workplace management, improving one's self-esteem' (ibid: 26). Of course, it may indeed be argued that this perspective was implied in Foucault's historical analysis. However, I think that affixing this into the methodological model has the effect of clearly affirming that everyday practices takes precedence over metaphysical questions in a genealogical investigation.

2. Technologies

The second question Rose poses is the following:

What means have been invented to govern the human being, to shape or fashion conduct in desired directions, and how have programs sought to embody these in certain technical forms? (Ibid: 26)

Here again, we see the emphasis put on 'practice' as 'technical forms'. Furthermore, it should be noted that Rose defines 'human technologies' as 'hybrid assemblages of
knowledges, instruments, persons, systems of judgement, buildings and spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by certain presuppositions and objectives about human beings.' (Ibid: 26, my emphasis) Therefore, there is an emphasis on the idea that subjectification occurs in multitude manners and areas of social life, and it is not necessarily underpinned by 'knowledge' alone. Moreover, the question of self-forming activity is, from the beginning, contextualised within the program or the technology through which the subject is formed.

3. Authorities

The third focus of investigation involves a series of question about the 'authority':

Who is accorded or claims the capacity to speak truthfully about humans, their nature and their problems, and what characterizes the truths about persons that are accorded such authority? Through which apparatuses are such authorities authorized - universities, the legal apparatus, churches, politics? To what extent does the authority of authority depend upon a claim to a positive knowledge, to wisdom and virtue, to experience and practical judgement, to the capacity to resolve conflicts? How are authorities themselves governed - by legal codes, by the market, by the protocols of bureaucracy, by professional ethics? And what then is the relation between authorities and those who are subject to them: priest and parishioner, doctor and patient, manager and employee, therapist and client?

(Ibid: 27)

In contextualising the various aspects of the identity of the 'authority', Rose is in fact arguing that there is no unified or monolithic power or authority, but that there are plural 'authorities', who are also subjected to the modes of subjectification that those who are not in authoritarian positions are subjected to.

4. Teleologies

Fourthly, Rose asks:

What forms of life are the aims, ideals, or exemplars for these different practices for working upon persons?] (Ibid: 27)
followed by a variegated possibilities such as:

the professional persona exercising a vocation with wisdom and dispassion, the manly warrior pursuing a life of honor through a calculated risking of the body, the responsible father living a life of prudence and moderation, the laborer accepting his or her lot with a docility grounded in a belief in the inviolability of authority or a reward in life to come, the good wife fulfilling her domestic duties with quiet efficiency and self-effacement, the entrepreneurial individual striving after secular improvements in 'quality of life', the passionate lover skilled in the art of pleasure. What codes of knowledge support these ideals, and to what ethical valorization are they tied? (Ibid: 27-8)

In so doing, Rose, again dismisses the notion that there is one force or subject of history, but that in fact, 'unification of subjectification has to be seen as an objective of particular programs or a presupposition of particular styles of thinking, not a feature of human cultures.' (Ibid: 28)

5. Strategies

Finally, Rose asks:

How are these procedures for regulating the capacities of persons linked into wider moral, social, or political objectives concerning the undesirable and desirable features of populations, work force, family, society? (Ibid: 28)

This fifth question is the most significant addition to Foucault's genealogical model. This question was, again, a central concern for Foucault, an issue that he developed in the latter stages of his career particularly through his article, 'Governmentality' (1991), as was discussed earlier. However, it is through posing this question as a part of the analysis that it becomes possible to consider that there may be other strategic fields of governing a state to that described by Foucault regarding western forms of government.

Summary

In sum, Rose's approach to understanding processes of subjectification differs from Foucault's in that there is much more emphasis on practice rather than 'thought' as a
site of domination, where 'thought' is seen as merely another form of practice. Following from this, whereas Foucault tended to privilege the emergence of the 'subject' underpinning western metaphysical thought, Rose looks at various ways in which we have been subjectified, and suggests that we are, at any one time, being subjectified in various ways. That is to say, for Rose, carrying out a genealogy is not a means of understanding how we have come to think of ourselves as the Subject of History. It is to understand how we are, at any one time, a patchwork of various subjects-positions produced through social practices. Moreover, the addition of the fifth question or element, 'strategies', allows us to throw into question the very nature of 'modern' governments in the way that Foucault's methodological framework did not.

3.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I outlined the two methodologies that I will be employing in my thesis, semiotic analysis and genealogical analysis. Let me now conclude with a brief explanation of how I will be employing these methods in the following chapters.

In Chapter 4, I will undertake a semiotic analysis, but as I discussed, it will be different from Williamson's version of semiotic analysis in that I will utilise Lacanian version of the symbolic system and its model of the subject as a source of comparison. That is to say, I will assume that Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is a descriptive model of a western version of language and subject. As such, the various denotations and connotations that Williamson identified in her semiotic analysis of western advertisements will also be understood by myself as the comparative material from which I will attempt to derive the specificity of how and what the Japanese subject constitutes meaning through language.
In Chapters 5 & 6, I will be carrying out a genealogical analysis of schooling. Given that I have upheld Rose's model over Foucault's as an 'improved' version of genealogy above, it would seem to be a matter of course that I would be following Rose's approach throughout this part of my thesis. In fact, this is not the case. For Chapter 5, I will use Foucault's four-dimensional model, and for Chapter 6, I will use Rose's five-dimensional model. In order to legitimize this, I must explain that my decision was made only after I had considerably informed myself of the history of Meiji schooling. Therefore, my decision was based upon practical as well as considerations specific to the historical emergence of Meiji schooling.

In Chapter 5, I will be dealing with a period where the establishment of schooling remained much debated and discussed, but impracticable. In Japanese, there is the idiom 'kijo no kuron', which means 'desktop theory'. National schooling in this era was very much about authorities sitting at a desk and writing various texts on how schooling should be organised. Going back to Stoler's characterisation of Foucault's works, it is akin to a period where the authorities tried to establish themselves as authorities, and engaged with the west and its theories in various ways to do this, but in practice, national schooling remained unrealised during this period. Moreover, I found that during the historical period under consideration in Chapter 5, Japanese authorities primarily took a policy of 'westernisation', so the ethical procedures which were advocated did not diverge from western ones in significant ways—certainly not to the extent that cannot be accommodated through Foucault's four-dimensional model. Given such a historical background, I decided to retain Foucault's four-dimensional model as an organisational methodological framework for Chapter 5.
Chapter 6, on the other hand, deals with an era where schooling does enter a period of actualisation, and the various techniques surrounding schooling begins to be elaborated upon. Moreover, I found that in this period, Meiji schooling diverges from the western one to the extent that the very relationship between knowledge and practice is different from the one represented in Foucault's genealogical model. I could not overcome the limitations of Foucault's model, without sacrificing what I saw as the specificity of the constitution of Japanese subjecthood. I therefore decided to use Rose's five-dimensional model to analysing how subjecthood was governmentalised at the site of schooling in the latter period of Meiji schooling.

Now that I have laid out the groundwork of my analysis, let me turn to the task of rendering them.
4.

Site of Consumer Culture —
Semiotic Analysis of Meiji Advertisements

Following the methodological protocols set out in Chapter 3, I will now undertake a semiotic analysis of advertisements which were in proliferation between 1868 and 1905, focusing upon the constitution of the 'modern' Japanese subject. I shall be examining formal changes to how and what meanings were constituted, to question whether 'modernisation' of Japan transformed the language system which forms the subject.

More specifically, I will examine the level of denotation—i.e., how meanings were constituted—by looking at colour schemes, layout, linguistic manipulation (use of pun), and replacement of one term for another in the narrative. In addition, especially in relation to the illustration of the characters, I will pay heed to the direction of the gaze.

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22 As I am not a specialist in the field of advertisement posters, I have taken the liberty of depending upon one source, *Nihon no Posutah-shi (The History of Posters in Japan)* (Bank of Nagoya, Ltd. 1989), a full-colour, 317-page volume comprising representative commercial posters in Japan between 1800's to 1980's. The committee that organised this volume includes a three-member Advisory Committee, six-member Planning Committee, as well as twenty-two staff members. I have thus deferred to the expertise of others to vouch for the question of how legitimately representative the particular posters I take up in my discussion are.
dress codes, and body shapes & sizes. The following is a tabular summation of the
general changes I will identify between early and later Meiji period as to how meaning
was constituted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Early Meiji: 1868-1880's/90's (Section 4.1)</th>
<th>Later Meiji: late 1880's-1905 (Section 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colour scheme</td>
<td>Bright colours</td>
<td>Colourful but more nuanced, giving a 3-D effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layout</td>
<td>Haphazard (i.e., having many centres)</td>
<td>Usually has one centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic manipulation (i.e., punning)</td>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>Less frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement of one for the other in the narrative</td>
<td>Proliferating from one to another</td>
<td>Between Japan and West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaze</td>
<td>Not infused with hierarchy</td>
<td>Infused with hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dress code</td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td>Military uniform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will illustrate that during the early Meiji period, processes of equivalence eclipsed how meanings were signified to a subject; there was no hierarchical centre to how meanings were created, this being discernible in the 1. haphazard layout, 2. frequent use of pun, 3. frequent replacement of one for the other in the narrative, 4. direction of the gaze, and 5. body shapes and sizes. In the later years of Meiji, processes of differentiation comes to dominate how meanings are made to be meaningful to a subject. Moreover, a hierarchical centre begins to organise meaning, this being indicated in the 1. centred layout, 2. military dress code, and 3. through the narrative of the advertisement.

Based upon these changes to how meanings were made meaningful, I argue that connotative meaning—i.e., what meanings were made meaningful—also changed. I will argue that during the early Meiji period, meaning was premised on the referent of
'naturalistic culture' and 'magic'. That is to say, I argue that in early Meiji advertisements, space was understood in terms of unity, and that reality was not a crucial quality. This argument will be developed in section 4.1, where I cover the years between 1868 and 1880's-90's. However, in the later Meiji period, 'nature' comes to be differentiated from 'culture'; moreover, the concern to be 'realistic' or to ascertain the 'truth' emerges as central themes, and the referents of 'science' and 'history' appear, through the adjoined representations of biological familyhood and Japanese citizenship. This will be discussed in section 4.2, where I cover the years between late 1880's to 1905.

In section 4.3, I will address the question of whether or not 'modernisation' of Japan did, in fact, transform the language system which forms the subject. I question whether or not the symbolic system of the subject came to be constituted as the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory would dictate (see Diagram 6, below, for graphic representation), or if the social formation of subjecthood retained its 'traditional' format, and imported 'modernity' through amorphous assimilation (see Diagram 7, below, for graphic representation).
Diagram 6. Modernisation of Social Formation of Japanese Subjectivity (Model 1)

Diagram 7. Modernisation of Social Formation of Japanese Subjectivity (Model 2)
I will argue that semiotic analysis of Meiji advertisements indicates that what and how the subject makes meaning did partially change, but does not enable conclusive insights as to whether or not the constitution of the 'subject' itself (assumed to be constituted by the structures of language) did change, and will suggest that hybridism rather than essentialism was the operative symbolic system.

4.1 Medium of Hikifuda and Ebira

The use of mass-produced pictures in selling products was still a relatively novel notion at the inception of the Meiji period. Although the technique that made such a medium possible—\textit{i.e.}, woodblock printing—had been in development in Japan since the late-8\textsuperscript{th} century, it was only in the late-Edo period\textsuperscript{23} that the technology of woodblock printing was used to produce something akin to commercial advertisements. Called \textit{hikifuda} ('pulling card') and \textit{ebira} ('picture bill'), \textit{hikifuda} could be understood to be the precursor to the leaflet of today, and \textit{ebira}, a form of poster. In practice, however, no exact distinction was made between the two at the time. (Bank of Nagoya, Ltd. 1989: 22-5)

Although these \textit{hikifuda} and \textit{ebira} could be likened to commercial advertisements to the extent that shops commissioned them to publicise their existence in a favourable light, the process through which they were produced was dissimilar to the way commercial advertisements are made today. In fact, the advertisement industry did not exist as such. Rather, a shop owner would order them from the local printing shop, most often for the purpose of commemorating New Year's, but also perhaps for an anniversary or a fortuitous event in the family. While a unique woodblock print could be commissioned, this was an expensive endeavour, and smaller shops would more likely opt to choose

\textsuperscript{23} Edo Period: 1603–1867
an image s/he liked out of a catalogue of already prepared samples. These samples would have a picture with an adjacent space (see Advertisement 9, 15 & 18, for examples) where the name of the shop and some text would be printed. Thus, unlike modern advertisements of today, where there is a correspondence between the picture image and the company product or brand, the picture would be equated with the local shop.

Moreover, the distribution of *hikifuda* and *ebira* was not in the form of advertisements as we know now. There were no billboards, and mediums such as the newspaper or magazine where companies could buy advertising space did not exist. Rather, a customer who was passing through the shop might be handed out a copy of *hikifuda* or *ebira* as a token gift. In a period when decorative handiwork of any kind was relatively scarce, they would have been appreciated. Even the more so, since, these 'posters' served the function of a talisman—somehow deemed to be able to 'pull' luck or bring fortune to its owner. Therefore, people would be inclined not to just discard them, but to keep and take good care of them as lucky charms. It was quite possible that they would be taken home and hung up on the wall in a customer's home, not as an 'advertisement', but as a graphic art of sorts.

This would indicate that *hikifuda* and *ebira* were, compared to 'modern' advertisements, of a more private nature, and moreover, the whole distribution process had yet to become embedded as a socially-institutionalised industry. Indeed, it may be argued that *hikifuda* and *ebira* were a sort of an alternative or 'beyond the law' forms of medium. Until 1883, law strictly prohibited production and distribution of calendars by the general public. However, this caused considerable inconvenience in everyday life, and privately made calendars were frequently circulated in discretion, and tradesmen would have a
calendar imprinted as a part of the advertisement as a New Years gift to customers (see Advertisement 22, for example).

Thus the conditions under which hikifuda and ebira were produced, distributed and consumed would indicate that the process of signification was of an altogether different nature from that taken by 'modern' forms of advertisements.

4.1.1 Shichifukujin: 'Naturalistic Culture'

That the nature of hikifuda and ebira included their 'role' as a talisman would suggest that certain images signifying the quality of 'luck' would likely be patronised. Perhaps this would explain the frequent appearance of the Shichifukujin, The Seven Gods of Luck, in Meiji advertisements. Since the late-Edo period, these characters had been one of the most prolific characters in woodblock-printed advertisements. These gods, though they were gods, were not the almighty presence which functioned to inhibit the behaviour of mortals, as is often the case in Judeo-Christianity. Rather, their nature was to protect mortals from the hazards of bad fortune, and to facilitate the enjoyment of life. They may be likened to a jolly and benevolent version of Merlin the Magician, or Cinderella's fairy-god mother. Thus, they were ideal figures for shops to be associated with. Especially in an age where mass media and communication routes were still relatively underdeveloped, these figures were enduringly popular.
Advertisement 1 shows the seven gods languidly strolling through a culturally abstracted representation of nature. Notice that there is no apparent discipline or hierarchy to the relationship between the gods. Each god is his/her own master, this being reflected in their individualist dress codes, most befitting the specific aspect that they are known to be guardian protectorates of. *Fukurokujin* (A), with the long head, typifies the kind of fortune which brings longevity and wisdom. He is said to have been a Chinese philosopher and prophet in his earthly life. *Daikoku* (B) is the guardian of farmers and is also the god of wealth. He is known to be good-natured and cheerful, and carries a mallet with which, like a magic wand, he can grant wishes made by mortals. He is often depicted with rice bales, and carries a sack of treasure slung over his back. Here, he is
also shown to be smoking and carries a warning sign against fire hazards. Benten (C) is the only female god of the seven, and represents the arts and general feminine deportment. She is also strongly associated with the sea and music. In this particular advertisement, she is seen riding a stag, but she is also often depicted riding or being accompanied by a sea serpent or dragon. Bishamon (D) represents missionary zeal and the warrior attributes. He is always shown dressed in full armour, carrying a spear in one hand and a miniature Buddhist pagoda in the other. Jurojin (E) is the god of longevity. He has a white beard and generally carries a *shaku* (a sacred staff or baton on which is fastened a scroll known to contain the wisdom of the world). A crane, tortoise or stag always accompanies him, and in Advertisement 1, he is seen greeting the cranes flying above. Hotei (F) has a protruding abdomen, which represents contentment and good nature. He is known to have acquired serenity through Buddhist wisdom. Finally, there is Ebisu (G), who is the patron of tradesmen and fishermen. He is conventionally depicted carrying a fishing rod and a sea bream. He is an exemplary hard worker and symbolises honest labour. (Piggott 1969: 59-60) Thus, the sign of 'Shichifukujin' is a cornucopia of auspicious denotations, conveying a general sense of well being and spacious times. This is further enforced through the body shapes of the gods, which appear to be corpulent and soft. Compared to the stereotypical images of Jesus Christ, who is often represented as emaciated and suffering, these gods are bursting with life—too much life, it may even be said, according to the contemporary standards of slimness and physical fitness.

Moreover, signs denoting 'good luck' are also inclusive of the 'natural' elements in the advertisement. In the background appears pine trees—symbolic of longevity and fortune, Mount Fuji, the tallest mountain in Japan—symbolic of beauty and fortune, and
the sun—a symbolic of rising glory. Animal-lifes as well, hold meanings of luck. The sea bream that Ebisu carries might be equated to how champagne might typically be regarded in western culture, and is especially symbolic of affluence and good luck. Both the stag that Benten rides and the crane (as well as the tortoise that Jurojin is known to be accompanied by) is a symbol of contented old age.

Indeed, the twelve animals of the Chinese zodiac signs—Rat, Cow, Tiger, Rabbit, Dragon, Snake, Horse, Sheep, Monkey, Cock, Dog and Boar—were also frequently used to signify good luck. In Advertisement 2, for example, a group of rabbits are engaged in making rice cakes. rice cakes are akin to the role that Christmas pudding traditionally plays in England. The abundant amount of rice cake that is being prepared indicates that it has been a good year. In the foreground, a rabbit dressed in fineries is already celebrating New Year's. He frolics in the arms of a beautiful woman, and next to them, the traditional New Year's fare (including an enormous display of rice cakes—red on top and white on bottom) is swankily offered. It is a prosperous scene, full of denotations of good luck and fortune.

As is widely known, the design of the sun was appropriated for the national flag of Japan. Commonly known as the hinomaru 'rising sun' flag, documented adoption of the flag in an official capacity may be traced back to 1673, when the Tokugawa government instructed government ships to raise the flag as its marker to differentiate it from commercial or private ships. After Japan opened its borders to foreign trade and diplomatic relations, it became necessary to distinguish Japanese ships from foreign ships. In July of 1854, the Bakufu established the hinomaru as the authorised symbol to be carried on Japanese ships. It was further deemed to be the national symbol in 1859. After Meiji Restoration, the new government instructed the hinomaru flag to be raised on Japanese merchant ships in 1870. (www 23-01-2000a)
Moreover, in both Advertisements 1 and 2, there is no hierarchical distinction made between animals and human beings. The animals are not objectified, and the gaze between animals and mortals or deities is not uni-directional. In Advertisement 1, the smiling stag looks upon the gods in a friendly manner, and the cranes flying above also regard the gods with anthropomorphic interest. Likewise, in Advertisement 2, the rabbits are manifesting the capacity to behave as humans do, and it is the rabbit that gazes at the beautiful woman. This would indicate that animals were not seen as what human beings were not; there was no distinction made between animals as natural creatures and human beings as rational creatures. Indeed, there does not seem to be any differentiation made between animals, mortals and deities, or, in fact, between beings which may have claims to a consciousness (such as animals, human beings or gods) and vegetation:

Here, Ebisu is in a celebratory jig with vegetable spirits. Ebisu holds a fan with the logo 'Good harvest: pine, bamboo, plum'. Pine, bamboo and plum are, in general, signifiers of 'good luck', especially when placed in conjunction with one another as in this instance. The fan held by the bamboo shoot spirit says 'reduction', and the mushroom spirit holds a fan which says 'cheap sales'. Besides the fact that Ebisu is carousing with the vegetable deities, a telling sign that the difference between the deity and vegetables is insubstantial may be inferred from the relative lack of size difference between Ebisu and the vegetables in the illustration.
The above examples tell us that mutability and continuum are the defining characteristics of this sign system. The meaning of 'good luck' does not originate in one source, but each image is packed with many signifiers, all denoting 'good luck'. Moreover, denotations of 'good luck' are ambulatory in the vehicle that it rides. They can take the shape of gods, human beings, animals, vegetation, and so forth. The assumption of the distinction between 'nature' and 'culture' is not substantiated here. Instead, this sign system presupposes the actuality of a naturalistic culture.

4.1.2 Japanese Constitution of Language

The referent of 'naturalistic culture' is also indicated by another oft-seen image in early-Meiji advertisements: that of *Ebisu* and *Daikoku* with 'money-trees'.

![Advertisement](https://example.com/advertisement.jpg)

In Advertisement 4, Ebisu and Daikoku are in a room, in the midst of a horticultural exercise. The room looks like the *ima* (a room reserved for use in special occasions such as for receiving guests or for parties) of an affluent household. The *ima* usually contains the *butsudan* (a household shrine venerating familial ancestors), and next or near it is usually a space adjacent to a wall which is slightly elevated—as illustrated in the advertisement—where typically, a scroll is hung and some decorations are bedecked. So Ebisu and Daikoku are in the midst of preparing some plants which will soon adorn the *ima*. On the wall behind Daikoku hangs a large scroll with a picture of Mt. Fuji, cranes and a sun together (similar to the background of Advertisement 1). Behind tree B, there is also a display of large rice cakes. One of the tree (C) is already bedecked, and from its flourishing colour, it is clear that it has taken root very well. Daikoku is ensuring that it will continue to grow by watering it. Ebisu, on the other hand, is in the midst of planting a new tree (B), and finally there is another tree (A) which has recently been uprooted and is quickly dying away. It is evident from the illustration that the earth is composed of gold coins, and that the trees are growing money. That is to say, they are 'money-trees'. Since money is a symbol of 'culture' and tree is a symbol of 'nature', this would indicate that the referent system here does not conceive of 'nature' and 'culture' in terms of binary oppositions, but that they are collapsed into one.

Moreover, an ethical discourse is inserted at the *interstice* of 'nature' and 'culture'. The writings of Tree A read as follows:

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That tree C has just been uprooted suggests that these are the qualities that the gods want to dispel. They may be generally categorised as either anti-social behaviour or greed. The attached banner advocates having a worldly view, and also encourages reproduction and starting things afresh in general at the site of the family. Tree B, on the other hand, is a list of 'new' values which the gods want to plant into Japan:

The emphasis here is on sincerity coupled with loyalty. The banner urges that one should carry out one's conduct according to what is constituted to be the social norm. Finally, tree C represents the worthy 'traditional' values which are already installed in the society:
The emphasis of this tree is mostly on advice on everyday conduct or practical matters. Notice also the item which says 'no blockage'. This indicates that flow and flux are the principles advocated here. Moreover, although I cannot manage to translate it into English, in the original text of the banner, there is a pun on the word *amaterasu*, which can mean 'light up heaven' but also refers to *Amaterasu Omikami*, the Sun Goddess, the deity from which the Imperial Family is said to have descended. From this, the text can also be translated as: 'honesty is the foundational ethical code of the Sun Goddess, *Amaterasu*.' According to the tree, this will lead to a comfortable but not excessive lifestyle. All in all, the ethical message of the text is that one should be humble and follow the example set by society.

The allegorical meaning is this: grow money, and it will nourish you, and moreover, *make you into a good person*. However, this is ridiculous, because money in itself does not nourish, and it certainly does not have inherent qualities which make a good person. So, we are seeing a myth, a lie that money is life sustaining and ethical. Money is just paper, or gold, at that time. Its only value is in the exchange value that society gives it. So money is an empty signifier. Thus, the reference here is an empty signifier.
The process of signification described above is oddly reminiscent of Baudrillard's critique of the symbolic system of capitalist society as a form of violence, which I would like to briefly discuss here, particularly since it ties into the recent debate about 'Japan' as either the exemplary 'postmodern' nation or the irresponsible 'system' (as was discussed in Chapter 2). Baudrillard argues that capital, the creation of currencies as a signifier of corporeal activities and substances, brings about a system of hyperreal, where nothing is 'real'. Money, first of all, reduces 'the real' to uniformity in the form of numerical value, until, progressively, money exchanges amongst itself without direct reference to what it signifies. This process Baudrillard termed 'the structural revolution of value', and saw it as a paradigmatic sign of 'end of labour, end of production and the end of political economy' (Baudrillard 1988: 127), an end of an era where meaning and knowledge is attained through dialectics, and the dawn of an era where symbolic violence pervades all signs:

The sign form has appropriated labour in order to empty it of all its historical and libidinal meaning, and to absorb it in the process of its own reproduction: the function of the sign is to redouble itself behind the empty allusion of what it designates. (Ibid: 130)

Thus, according to Baudrillard, a symbolic system with an empty referent does not enable 'real' ethics.

However, the irony is that Baudrillard's exegesis is turned on its head, so to speak, and here, exchange itself is deemed to be the principle of ethics. One must ask, how could this be? Either Baudrillard is too pessimistic, or if he is correct in his analysis, positing ethics within such a symbolic system is literally impossible, since the quality of 'literal' does not exist. However, there is another way of explaining this incongruence.
What if 'Japanese' language (at least within Advertisement 4) was organised not like the symbolic order (as has been argued about 'western' languages) but like the mirror-stage? What if the subject is not premised upon differences but on the assumption of sameness? In the mirror-stage, the model is that the subject and the object are the same. Therefore, if one is good to the other, one is good to oneself.

Indeed, this would appear to be the organising principle here. First of all, as I mentioned before, Ebisu symbolizes honest labour and Daikoku, besides being the god of wealth, is known to be the most cheerful and benevolent god, so the narrative is not simply about being greedy, but money is good only when it's earned through cheerful and honest labour. Moreover, if one examines the text of the money-trees, anything that is too egotistical, any behaviour that is premised upon the assumption of difference between one and the other is condemned. Instead, one should be 'open-minded', 'cut down' anything that 'the world despises', 'pay heed to others' conduct', and behave as others do. One's 'duty' is to be 'loyal' to others and reciprocate favours.

So there is meaning, in this case, ethical meaning. But, unlike the West, where ethics refers back to e.g., a monotheistic god, or some normative or universal concept, in Japan, rules about ethics are found in the very signs, the very network of society, and not rooted in some absolute notion in the referent. Whereas in the West, meaning must be rooted in some foundation or origin, in order for meaning itself to exist, in Japan, there must be exchange. Meaning cannot exist otherwise. Thus, as Kondo (1990) (whose work I summarised earlier in Chapter 3) has argued, meaning in Japanese language is created relationally.
4.1.3 Fantasy Child Heroes: *Momotaro* and *Kintaro*

Despite the fact that 'ethics' was an integral component of the 'Japanese' sign system, it appears to be the case that 'reality' was not an issue. In other words, the scenarios illustrated in advertisements did include an ethical message, but the setting tended to be 'fantastic'. The characters conceived in the advertisements, for example, were not 'factual' beings, but were spirits, talking animals, etc. or if they did 'actually' exist, they tended to take on fanciful identities such as a *geisha* or a tragic *samurai* hero. The worlds depicted belonged to the realm of the imagination, and there was no pretence to be 'real'.

Perhaps this would explain the absence of 'biological' identities in Meiji advertisements. To give an example which demonstrates this, I would like to discuss *Momotaro* and *Kintaro*, folkloric heroes of children's tales, which frequently appeared in Meiji advertisements, in the following. These instances demonstrate not only that there was no boundary between human beings and animals, but also shows the lack of a notion of biological family in pre-modern Japan. There are slight variations in the stories as different storytellers and regions have passed them down the generation. However, the basic plot and theme of the stories are quite standard. I introduce one variation of each, *Momotaro* and *Kintaro*, below.

**Momotaro: The Tale of Peach Boy**
The story typically begins with 'Once upon a time, there lived an elderly couple who lived in a small village in a remote mountain. The elderly woman would go to the river everyday to do the washing, and the elderly man would go into the mountains everyday to collect firewood....' This indicates the frugal and barren nature of their existence. However, one day, when the elderly woman goes off to do her daily washing, she sees a very large peach floating down the stream, which comes to shore up next to her. Feeling quite excited by her good fortune, the elderly woman takes the peach home to share it with her husband. Once home, the peach cracks open of its own accord, and out pops a little boy whom they name *Momotaro*, 'Peach Boy' (*Momo* means 'peach', and *taro* is the archetype of a boy's name in Japanese. It is a complete name on its own, but can be used in combination, as in this case). The elderly couple are overjoyed by Peach Boy's appearance and raise him as their own child. They discover, that like magic, the more he eats, the quicker he grows. Thus, they give him plenty of food, indicating how much they dote on him. Soon, Peach Boy becomes a very strong lad, until one day, rumours reach that the ogres living on *Onigashima*, 'Ogre Island', have recently come to a nearby region on a looting spree. Upon hearing this, Peach Boy announces that he will go to Ogre Island to subjugate the bad ogres. The elderly couple tries to dissuade Peach Boy from going, for fear of losing him (which means that they will return to the joyless and unmagical existence they led before his appearance). However, Peach Boy's sense of righteousness is steadfast, so the elderly
woman tearfully makes some premium millet dumplings as food for the journey, and he sets off on his crusade. Along the way, Peach Boy meets up with a singing dog, monkey and pheasant, who all agree to accompany him to Ogre Island to fight besides him in exchange for a millet dumpling. When the troop arrives at Ogre Island, they successfully defeat a group of loud and slovenly ogres who promise to behave more modestly and orderly in the future. Peach Boy also gets a shipload of treasures to take back home. Thus, Peach Boy returns to his native home, having successfully brought order and peace to Ogre Island, and in exchange attains material wealth. (Akaza 1991)

The significance of Momotaro is, of course, that he is magically born out of a peach and grows at a superhuman pace. He is also an ethically good person. In exchange for being a superhuman man who uses his magical powers to bring order to society, he attains wealth.

*Kintaro: The Tale of Golden Boy*

Similarly, *Kintaro*, 'Golden Boy' (*kin* = 'gold'), is a story about a little boy who lives in a remote village in the mountains. Golden Boy's mother is *Yamanba*, a mountain spirit who takes the appearance of a haggard old woman, and his father is a thunder lightning spirit that resides in the sky. From the moment of his birth, Golden Boy evinces precocious and uncontrollable physical strength. He lives in the company of animals and spirits, and does nothing but run wild all day. However,
one day, an owl relays a message from his father, the thunder lightning spirit, that he should use his physical strength for a good cause. Golden Boy's destructive tendencies are thus directed toward a more constructive outlet, and thereafter, he uses his strength to bring order and peace to his mountain.

One day, a group of samurai comes to the mountain, and Golden Boy promptly challenges them to a sumo wrestling dual. He beats all the samurais but one, who is a renowned ogre exterminator. The master of the samurai group invites Golden Boy to become one of his vassals. Golden Boy is hesitant at first, but his mother, the Yamanba spirit, tells him that red clouds appeared in the sky when the samurais came to the mountain, and that it must be a sign from his father telling him to go. Thus Golden Boy duly agrees, leaving his mountain to achieve fame as a samurai strong enough to exterminate ogres. (Sanetou 1996)

Compared to Peach Boy, Golden Boy does begins his life as an unruly child, but learns to discipline himself and channels his magical powers to bring harmony to society, and in so doing attains social success by becoming a samurai. Moreover, as in Peach Boy's case, Golden Boy has superhuman powers, and he does not have biological parents. His parents are not mortals but spirit-gods.

Advertisement 5 (p. 162) shows a scene from the story of Peach Boy, when he has successfully returned from his mission and is sharing the reaping of the treasure with a group of monkeys. He is flanked by the pheasant and the dog, both which are clothed and stand on their hind legs in a human-like manner. The sun in the background is an additional sign of good fortune in the image. Similarly, in Advertisement 6 (p. 163),
Golden Boy is depicted riding a carp\textsuperscript{25}. In the image (as well as in the original stories) there is no clear distinction between human and animal. The animals are human-like, or humans are considered to be animal-like, and this attitude is very much akin to Haraway’s (1989) depiction of Japanese primatology that I introduced earlier in Chapter 3. This again, would support my argument that Japanese symbolic system is not founded upon a dichotomic split between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ as has been identified about western discourses.

4.1.4 Western ‘Science’ as ‘Magic’

Although the Seven Gods of Luck were, as a group or singly represented in commercial posters in their ‘indigenous’ context, they soon began to be depicted partaking in western technological gadgets in conjunction with ‘traditional’ signifiers of good luck.

In Advertisement 7, for example, \textit{Daikoku} is depicted happily listening to a gramophone. This is an advertisement for a store that sells fuel such as charcoal or oil. Thus, there is no apparent reason why a gramophone would figure centrally in such an advertisement. However, if we are to assume that the form of Japanese language remains intact, an ‘educated guess’ would be that the gramophone, a product of western science, is being imported into the system of meaning as an

\textsuperscript{25} A popular children’s yarn claims that the islands of Japan were created when a gigantic carp woke from a deep slumber and thrashed the water causing both tidal waves and the appearance of the islands. (Piggott 1969: 13)
equation to good luck. Similarly, in Advertisement 8, an advertisement for a shop selling dried goods, depicts a scene of Ebisu and Daikoku talking on the phone to each other:

![Advertisement 8](image)

Advertisement 8. Ebisu and Daikoku having a telephone conversation. Advertisement for a dry goods store. Meiji Period (258 x 372mm)

Indeed, this advertisement is full of western signifiers. Both Ebisu and Daikoku are in a western-style room with carpet and western doors. Besides the telephones, there is a clock, an electric light, and a telegraph. Daikoku, to the left, is calling from 'Seven Luck PLC'. Ebisu, to the right, is calling from 'Bank of Lucky People'. The space in the middle, which literally is a depiction of space—blue sky with a telephone pole peeking from the rim—indicates that telephone has the magical property of compressing time and space, just as two edges of a paper can be brought together by rolling it. However, what is perhaps a comical detail is that both Ebisu and Daikoku have the same telephone number—whether this was an intentional joke or happened from lack of
knowledge about how telephones practically worked is not something that can be determined here.

Indeed, the Seven Gods seemed to have taken on board an ambassadorial role for introducing the West to Japan.

Advertisement 9. Board game-type leaflet sample. Meiji Period (373 x 516mm)

Diagram 11. Commentaries on Advertisement 9

Game Route (in red):

1. Start
2. Train
3. Calling Upon Billy Ken
4. Water Fall of Promotion
5. Automobile
6. Difficult Passage
7. Airplane
8. Welcome by Crane and Tortoise
9. Wind God Thunder God
10. Money-Growing Trees
11. Finish: Treasure Mountain
Advertisement 9 is children's board game called sugoroku, where, like Parcheesi, the players roll a dice and attempt to be the first to reach the end (this, along with the inclusion of calendars, was a common functional format of advertisements). The name of this particular version of sugoroku is 'Mountain Expedition for Lucky God's Treasures (A)'. The game starts from the lower right hand corner, where the Seven Gods of Luck are being seen off on an expedition. There is a Japanese man dressed in western clothes—probably a diplomat or politician—who is saying, 'We look forward to the great success of the Lucky Gods Coalition! (B)'. Another well wisher utters 'I wish you an auspicious journey (C)' whilst others in the crowd simply shout 'Bansai! Bansai! (Hurrah, hurrah!!) (D)'. The goal of their expedition is to find Money-Growing Trees and successfully Finish their expedition to the Treasure Mountain.

However, before the seven gods can obtain their riches, they must go on a journey to the West. Thus, they get on the ship Takaramaru (E), cross the sea and shore off at the 'Welcome Gate (F)' of the West where one of the gods declares 'Using the clever gadgets of civilisation is the best way to make money (G)'. From there, they continue their journey on a Train. It is probably the first time that the seven gods are taking a train, and there is a comical scene where Fukurokujuin is having difficulties fitting his long head into the train. The other gods tease him, saying 'Oh how funny looks getting on the train! (H)', but he takes this jest with good humour, replying 'A long head is a sign of perseverance! (H)'.

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26 The word bansai, which, translated literally, means '10,000 years' was invented after a month-long deliberation amongst government officials in 1889, as the appropriate laudatory cry to commemorate the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution. [Source: Dictionary of the Origin of Meiji Things] (Yumoto 1996: 88-9) This would indicate that this advertisement was made sometime after 1889.

27 Names of Japanese ships are often suffixed with the word maru. Evidently, the use of the word maru can be traced back to the Nara Period [710-784AD], when the custom was to suffix the name of valuable objects and entities—such as names of human beings and ships—with the word maru. (www 23-01-2000b)
Shortly, they disembark and call upon Billy Ken, the western god. They seek his alliance, saying 'If we join forces with you, all the gold in the world will be ours! (I)' Billy Ken is a naked figure, rather obese, with no hair except for a small portion at the top which is gathered into a knot. Despite the fact that he is supposedly 'western', his facial features—e.g., his eyes are thin and are slanting upward—look more stereotypically Chinese rather than Caucasian. One way of summing up Billy Ken's image as a whole might be to say that he looks like a Chinese man impersonating a cupid. He is hardly a solemn or awe-inspiring figure, but, like the seven gods, is depicted as being jocose. Like the seven gods, he is also kind-hearted. Fukurokujin commits the faux pas of colliding into him, but he generously replies, 'I am the lucky god of the west. Your head is very long so you must have lots of wisdom. Welcome! (J)'.

Having joined forces, the troop makes a pilgrimage to the Waterfall of Promotion, which will ensure that the rest of their journey will be blessed with good luck. The seven gods also learn the lesson that 'hydraulic electricity is good too (K)' and observe that 'it seems that there is a lot of gold dust as well (K)' to be had at the waterfall.

They now set off on their expedition to find money-trees, which entails going back to Japan with Billy Ken. The first part of their journey is facilitated by an invention of western technology, the Automobile. The seven gods are very impressed with its speed, saying 'So this is what it feels like to cut through the wind with one's head! (L)' They are very satisfied with their progress, saying with glee 'It goes just as we wish! Ahead, ahead, success, success! How delightful, how delightful! (M). However, soon the automobile breaks down, and the gods repent their overconfidence, saying 'Oh, no! Like a 000, letting our guards down backfired! (N)'. This is the Difficult Passage where hardship must be endured. However, even as the gods struggle to push the car
up a hill, their droll humour is not lost, as they remark '[It is said that hardship refines us into gems, but our sweats are literally the size of gems! (O)].'

However, another western technology soon makes their journey easier: the Airplane. As they joyfully remark 'Look, look! There is Japan! (P)', their return is welcomed by a group of Crane and Tortoise (known to be animals of longevity and luck). A tortoise ponders 'Oh crane, oh crane. Here come the Seven Gods of Luck and another god unknown! (Q)' to which the crane replies 'That's the western god and his name is Billy Ken (Q). Their return is rejoiced with the cry 'Look fast they come! The lucky gods of the 00. Hurrah, hurrah for the Eight Gods of Luck! (R).'

Having made their way back to Japan, the (now) Eight Gods of Luck set off to the mountain. The mountain is inhabited by the bad Wind God and Thunder God. However, Jurojin, the warrior god pulls his weight, saying 'At times like this, I'm most composed (S)' and the bad gods soon surrender, crying 'The powers of the lucky gods are too strong! We give up, we give up! (T).'

Finally, the gods reach the Money-Growing Trees and they celebrate their achievement with a feast. Jurojin, Fukurokujin, Hotei and Bishamon settle to enjoy the food, saying 'It's quite good! It's quite good! (U)' and prepare to 'Drink lots! Drink lots! (V). Ebisu and Benten dance away, singing 'Mountain of ten billion gold! Happy ending! Happy ending! (W)', while Daikoku sits with Billy Ken, serving him sake and encouraging him to 'join in on the singing (X). So finally, after many discoveries (about the West) and travails, the eight gods happily enjoy the successful Finish to their Treasure Mountain expedition.
What this indicates is that the referent system of magic is retained, but the 'natural' signifiers associated with magic are augmented by modern gadgets, signifiers of 'science'. Thus, it is now the western technological gadgets which are imbued with magical properties. So, compared to a more sinister connotation of technology and science—such as that found in Mary Shelly's Frankenstein, for example—'science' and 'technology' here is depicted in a more positive light. Compared to the West, where, when the notion of 'technology' first entered western popular discourses, there appears to have been the idea that now man was going to take over from god, and control nature by using science and technology, here, 'technology' or 'science' has been emptied of the Christian connotations, and expresses a more happy-go-lucky sort of attitude.

Moreover, the referent of 'naturalistic culture', where ethics is insinuated at the site of exchange is also very much present in this example. The message is that although western technology is amazing, perseverance is necessary, as is indicated by the Difficult Passage. Moreover, the Seven Gods of Luck share the treasure, 'money-tree' with the western god, Billy Ken, so the message, again, is that wealth must not lead to personal greed, but must be shared, to be enjoyed by all.

4.1.5 Summary

In sum, we may argue that in the early Meiji period, Japanese language constituted meaning through a logic of sameness, where meaning is created through association and through exchange. This, I argued, could be seen by the dominant presence of Shichifukujin, the Seven Gods of Luck, who seem to represent the actuality of 'naturalistic culture' as the referent of the Japanese symbolic system. I augmented this through giving the examples of Momotaro and Kintaro, which not only attests to the actuality of 'naturalistic culture', but showed the centrality that the referent of 'magic'
had, as well as the general lack of concern for biological truths during this period. Finally, I showed how the magical figures of Seven Gods of Luck were used to introduce modern, western technological gadgets into feudalistic Japan. I argued that the Seven Gods of Luck signified magical luck, and through association, western technology also became a signifier for magical luck. I also pointed out that within this symbolic system founded upon exchange, ethics was not absent, but that in fact, exchange was the very basis of ethics. Let us now turn to the latter period of the Meiji period, to discern whether meaning was constituted differently.

4.2 Medium of Advertisement

As I stated earlier, at the dawn of the Meiji Restoration, modern forms of advertising as such had not existed. Indeed, there were no mass-produced daily publications such as newspapers or magazines, where advertising space could be procured. To be sure, pirate editions of yomiuri (translated literally, 'read sell') or kawaraban (translated literally, 'tile plate') had frequently been produced and sold on the streets during the Tokugawa period. Usually a page long in length and woodblock printed, they would sensationaly recount a gossipy 'event' likely to stir mass interest. However, Tokugawa authorities strictly prohibited the production of these mediums, and they were only produced and sold on a one-off basis using guerrilla methods, by entrepreneurial individuals out to make a quick profit. Moreover, these precursors to newspapers did not include advertisements in them.

However, with the official edification of the Restoration, Meiji authorities began to recognise the need and necessity of creating a popular medium such as the 'newspaper' which would regularly disseminate information to the burgeoning 'citizens'
of Japan. The first 'newspapers' were thus instituted under the patronage of the new government as a means of creating a 'national consciousness'. Therefore, unlike the yomiuri or kawarabon whose main objective lain in making profit, the 'newspaper' was overtly conceived as a political vehicle at its inception. However, by 1873, the government began to withdraw its sponsorship, as their initial experiment had shown that the medium of newspaper was not the most reliable method for controlling 'public opinion', and the new government was also now having to deal with financial difficulties. It therefore became necessary for newspapers to seek other means and sources to continue their activity.

One of the tactics taken was for the nature of the newspaper to supplant their 'political' function with a 'commercial' one, and to sell advertising space for revenue. This innovation was first implemented by Fukuzawa Yukichi, who in 1st March 1882 had launched the newspaper Jiji Shinpo. Unlike his more Confucianist-minded contemporaries, Fukuzawa advocated merging the interests of commerce with politics, and in 1886, the practice was launched. The first page of the newspaper was given entirely to advertising, the rationale being that 'rain and delivery agents sometimes damaged the first page, and it was better to ruin ads than news; [and of course] it did not hurt that page one ads sold well' (Huffman 1997: 180) as well. Other newspapers would soon follow suit. By the 1890's, newspapers would come to increasingly depend on advertisement as a source of revenue.

'Modernisation' was to have its effects at a technical level as well. Lithography came to be commonly used in Japan after an Austrian lithograph engraver Ottoman Smolick taught the technique to Chokoku-Gaisha, an engraving company founded in Tokyo in 1875. Compared to woodblock printing methods, where the image had to be engraved
onto wood, lithography was made on a flat piece of limestone and depended on the mutual repulsion of grease and water for reproduction. This technical innovation enabled the production of more complex compositions with less labour, and more copies of the original could be circulated as well.

Moreover, in the same year that they had launched the practice of selling space for advertisement purposes, Jiji Shinpo had established the advertising agency, Sanseisha. Western products such as Nestles (see Advertisement 17, p. 184) were also beginning to advertise in Japan, as were some of the larger Japanese shops which were beginning to re-organise itself into corporations\(^{28}\). Thus, conditions for 'modern' advertising industry were rapidly being established. In the following sections, I will consider how systems of meaning came to operate under the 'modernised' format.

4.2.1 The Spectacle of the Circus: 'Nature' Versus 'Culture'

As argued above, pre-modern sign systems did not strictly differentiate between animals, human mortals and gods, and 'science', in the form of 'technology', was not seen as what 'nature' was not, but essentially the same, as possessing magical qualities. Advertisement 10 is a noteworthy indication of this:

\(^{28}\) For example, the ancestry of Mitsubishi Corporation can be traced back to the beginning of the Meiji period. Yataro Iwasaki (1843–1885), the founder of Mitsukawa Shokai (established in 1871, later renamed Mitsubishi Shokai), provided transportation for supplies to the government army during Seinan (West-East) War of 1877, the uprising of discontented former warriors led by Saigo Takamori. Profit grossed for this contract amounted to ¥1,210,000. (Ishinomori 1998: 43)
Here, two rabbits dressed in western cycling gear are raising their caps in a friendly greeting to a steam train. Above the rabbits are lanterns that typically dressed the streets during Japanese *matsuri* festivals. There certainly is no distinction between science and nature here. The rabbit (one of the animals of the Chinese zodiac and therefore associated with good luck) functions very much in the manner of the Seven Gods of Luck. The message is that if rabbits, the signifier for magical luck, are on friendly terms with western technology, then western technology must have magical luck as well.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the effects of modernisation can be felt in this advertisement in that along with the festival lanterns are the Japanese flags and the more imperialistic version of Japanese flag, as well as what is probably a misconstrued version of the Union Jack. It is the kind of naïve mistake akin to the misconception of
the use of telephones seen earlier in Advertisement 8 (p. 166), when 'Seven Luck PLC' and 'Bank of Lucky People' both had the same telephone numbers, or the misunderstanding of a 'western god' in the form of Billy Ken.

However, around the same time or perhaps just a few years after this poster was in circulation, the spectacle of the circus was also being imported into Japan. The motif of the circus was widely expropriated by artists, and utilised in package designs of all sorts, including advertisements. (Bank of Nagoya 1989) I would like to discuss how the 'circus', as a spectacle defining a certain relationship between human beings and animals, was first introduced into Japan, to argue that this phenomenon is an indication of the impingement of the 'nature' vs. 'culture' worldview into Japan.

Advertisement 11 is the publicity poster of Chiarini Big Circus Troupe, one of the circuses that came to tour Japan in 1886. The sensation it caused in Japan was so great that it is said that the name Chiarini became synonymous with circus for a time in Japan (Bank of Nagoya 1989):
The poster is a catalogue of the members of the circus. The animals are anatomically correct, and the scales of their sizes are correct as well. Factual commentaries are provided by such labels as e.g., 'Dance of Six-year Old Elephant' or 'Exercise of Horses'. At the centre of the poster, lions, bears and tigers are confined in cages. In the cages of the lions and the tigers, moreover, there is a man inside whipping them into subjugation. Elephants and horses are also being made to perform tricks, including standing on their hind feet. Unlike the animals that e.g., accompanied Peach Boy to Ogre Island, they are being made to do human-like tricks by man, under the threat of pain. In this poster, there is a clear distinction between man and animal. Man dominates animal, or culture dominates nature. The traditional connotation of 'naturalistic culture' is being challenged here.

4.2.2 'Modernising' Kintaro and Momotaro

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Indeed, the portrayal of boy characters and their relationship to nature would be changed. In Advertisement 12, a Kintaro-like little boy is dressed in a military uniform riding a cannon, and in Advertisement 13, a Momotaro-like little boy is petting a dog on a leash. The cannon has replaced the carp (of Advertisement 4, p. 163) as the riding object, and the dog is no longer portrayed as a mate or a friend, but is a pet. In other words, a signifier of western technology, 'science' has replaced a traditional signifier of 'nature' as the riding object which brings success, and 'natural' objects are no longer posited as a friend of man as 'culture', but is different and inferior to cultured man. Here again, the schematic relationship between 'nature', 'culture' and 'science' emulates the 'western' model.

Furthermore, the effects of 'modernisation' may be felt in the additions of signs referring to 'nation-state'. In Advertisement 12, behind the boy riding the cannon is a large flag of imperial Japan, under which are arrayed inaccurate versions of the British and American flag. The cannon has just been fired, and has claimed three victims, who are falling in the air, whilst the young boy regaled in military uniform raises his arms triumphantly. Conquest here occurs in units of 'nation-state'.
4.2.3  Emergence of the Biological 'Mother'

Another significant addition in the themes of the advertisements in the latter-half of the Meiji period is the presence of biological mothers. Previously, images of beautiful women had been popular, but they were not 'mothers'. 'Women' usually took on the form of a geisha or a courtesan, having the characteristics of Benten, the female god of Shichifukujin—beautiful and artistically talented—almost like a piece of living art. It should also be recalled that in the original stories of Momotaro and Kintaro, Momotaro was born out of a 'natural' object, a peach, and Kintaro's mother was not a mortal but a mountain spirit. However, next to the Momotaro-like and Kintaro-like figures in the 'modernised' posters stands a beautiful woman who is presumably the mother (See Advertisement 13 above, for example).

This indicates the introduction of the concept of the mother as the primary nurturer of children, whereas previously, nurturing characters had typically been Ebisu or Daikoku, the male Buddhist gods of luck.

A typical example is Advertisement 14, where Daikoku benevolently beholds a scene of little fukusuke, or 'luck urchins', engaged in sumo wrestling matches. An essential difference therein is the claim to reality. In Advertisement 14, differentiating between reality and fantasy is not an issue. What the
'real' relationship between the nurturer, Daikoku, and fukusuke, is outside the realm of concern. What matters is that it is a picture carries the message of 'good luck'. However, with the commencement of modernisation, 'reality' becomes a criterion of concern. Just as in Advertisement 11 previously, where the animals were illustrated 'realistically', the depiction of the nurturer and the dependent becomes a 'realistic' relationship of a biological bond between the mother and a child. Moreover, in Advertisement 15, for example, the mother figure gazes up into the sky with a pair of binoculars in her hand. The bigger boy is throwing his hands up into the air, in a hailing posture. She and her two children are admiring the airplane, a 'scientific' object, flying above. The binoculars in her hand indicate that she is concerned with 'seeing' the airplane in its true form. To teach her children the knowledge attained by the eyes of science is an important task for her as a mother.

4.2.4 Emergence of the Imperial Subject

The following advertisement, which is an advertisement for the tobacco brand, Chuyu ('Loyal and Brave') would lend support to the assessment that the 'nature versus culture' distinction, and simultaneously, the importance of 'science' not as 'magic', but as a way of establishing 'reality', was to increasingly become important in the latter-half of Meiji.
An army troop marches to the war front. The motley crew of the seven gods languidly strolling through lucky nature (of Advertisement 1) is now replaced by the disciplined march of militaristic men in uniforms. No one is smiling now. It's time for serious business. One of the higher-ranking soldiers in the front is using a pair of binoculars to scrutinise us, the viewer, objectively. Compared to the representation of the stag (in Advertisement 1), the horse is no longer represented as being anthropomorphic. It has been domesticated. Whereas previously, Mount Fuji signified good luck, now nature is represented as untamed wilderness which man is out to explore and conquer. The style of the scenery is also quite 'realistic'. The transfer from a sign system modelled like the
'mirror-stage'—one premised on the logic of sameness—to one modelled like the 'symbolic system'—one premised on the logic of difference, appears to be complete.

4.2.5 Summary

In sum, we may argue that in the latter-half of the Meiji period, there are more instances where meaning is constituted upon a logic of division. I have illustrated how the relation of dichotomy between 'nature' and 'culture' was introduced into Japan, through a discussion of the spectacle of the 'circus'. Moreover, as opposed to the fantastical setting that child heroes such as Momotaro and Kintaro were inserted into in the early Meiji period, now, little boys are depicted in a position of dominance over animals, and their primary caretakers, the 'mother', are now defined through biological ties. In addition, I also pointed out that the image of Japanese militarism, through the adjoined representations of biological familyhood and Japanese citizenship emerged as central themes. I therefore argued that 'reality', most particularly in the form of 'science' and 'history', came to dominate the field, not through equating 'science' and 'history' with 'magic', as in the previous period, but by equating 'technology' with 'science', signified within the trappings and within the connotations of imperialistic expansion. We may therefore conclude that 'modernisation' of Japan did entail a certain emulation of what was seen to be the 'West'.

4.3 'Westernising' the Japanese Symbolic System?

From the previous section, that the desire to become like the West increasingly came to play a large part in the Japanese imagination is evident. However, the question remains to be answered. To what extent did 'modernisation' of 'Japan' mean 'westernisation' of
'Japan'? Assuming that there is one symbolic system that is 'western', and one that is 'Japanese', did the system of meaning itself change to a 'western' one? Did 'Japan' adopt 'western' language (which forms the subject)? I suspect not, since, no matter how strong the desire to become like the West may have been, the Japanese nation did not adopt 'English', 'French', or any other language for that matter, but invented a language called 'Japanese'.

Thus, in this section, I would like to suggest that the language system which heralded 'modernisation' into 'Japan' may perhaps have been a hybrid fusion of two language systems, one founded upon the logic of sameness and continuum between differing terms (see Diagram 7, p. 147), rather than one founded upon the logic of difference and division (see Diagram 6, p. 147).

4.3.1 Mirroring the West

Firstly, though it may be superfluous to reiterate this point again, a large part of imagining the 'modernisation' of 'Japan' meant to be like the West. The following two advertisements are clear demonstrations of such a desire, where there is a complete mirroring between 'Japan' and the 'West':
In Advertisement 16, for example, an accurate version of the British flag (this time) and the Japanese flag cross is at the top. To the left stands a Caucasian adult male dressed in a naval uniform. To the right stands a Japanese adult male, slightly smaller than the western officer, dressed in the same outfit. The slogan to the left reads: 'This milk makes wholesome allied citizens.' The slogan to the right reads 'The best tonic food for children and the diseased.' On the can, it is written in large red print, Switzerland.

Similarly, in an advertisement for 'Happy Cigarettes' of the Imperial Tobacco Company, two goddesses stand arm in arm on a cloud of smoke, above the globe of the world. The goddess to the left is Amaterasu Omikami, the Sun Goddess. The other goddess to the right looks pseudo-Romanesque and looks like Britannia. She wears a head armour and carries a shield with the British flag. The logic expressed here is the logic of sameness: Japan wants to become strong as the West.
wants to rule the world as the West does. Japan wants to become like the West. Therefore, Japan is equal to the West.

4.3.2 Polyvalent Nature of the Sign

However, other advertisements demonstrate a more ambivalent process of signification between the relationship between 'Japan' and the 'West'.

Advertisement 19. Advertisement for an eye medicine called Gofuku Ganso sold in China. Late Meiji Period (1089 x 787mm)
Advertisement 19 is an advertisement for a Japanese eye medicine for one of its colonies. The grim and unhealthy-looking man on top is Marshal Oyama Iwao, under whose leadership Japanese Army took control of a part of what used to be under Chinese control during the Sino-Japanese War [1894-5], and who was also instrumental in combat with Russia in the Russo-Japanese War [1904-5]. Even his name, Oyama, which means 'big mountain', is suggestive. General Big Mountain is on top and he is God. Beneath him are the administering woman and the colonial subject. General Oyama is depicted in a 'realistic' manner, whereas the colonial subject and the administering women are depicted in a style seen in woodblock printing. This is indication of internalised colonialism—that the codes of representation of the West are superior to the codes of representation of Japan.

However, an intriguing detail is the fact that the brand name of the eye medicine is called Gofuku Ganso, or 'Five Luck Eye Medication'. That the signifier 'luck' remains, even if residually (at least in this example), would indicate that here, we are not witnessing a simple replacement of the 'traditional' symbolic with the 'modern' one, but a more disordered hybrid of the two. An aspect of these representations that cannot be disregarded is the polyvalent nature of the transition to the 'modern'. Indeed, although the dominance of Shichifukujin did begin to wane from the latter-half of the Meiji, they have, in fact, never completely disappeared from Japanese 'culture', and continue to survive in contemporary Japan as a cultural icon representing 'folkloric tradition'.

29 Sutematsu Yamakawa, one of the five girls who took part in the Iwakura Mission, was to marry him after her 10 year stay in America.

30 My grandmother has told me that when she was a child, she and her schoolmates were instructed to initiate running competition with the English phrase, 'On your mark, get set, go!' However, they did not speak English, and did not understand what the words actually meant, so instead of pronouncing it 'correctly', they would say 'Oyama Gessan Don!' In other words, they altered it to a phrase that was more phonetically familiar. When I asked my grandmother what 'Oyama Gessan Don!' meant, she told me she did not know. However, I was struck by how similar Oyama Gessan is to 'Oyama Gensu', which means,
4.3.3 'Modernisation' as Hybridism

A clearer example which attests to the hybrid nature of the 'modernising' process in Japan is given by the next example:

This advertisement, produced in 1905, is a rather odd amalgamation of tradition and industrialization.

Marshall Oyama. This is all conjecture, but Gessan could be a mix of the word Gensui, 'Marshal', and Gassen, meaning 'battle'.

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*Ebisu* and *Daikoku* appear in the upper left-hand box. *Ebisu* has an abacus in his lap, a traditional calculating tool. Surrounded by bales of rice, *Ebisu* and *Daikoku*, happy as they ever are, are going through the accounts. To them, counting money brings them joy. Diametrically opposite is shown a group of men receiving official recognition in a stately commemoration ceremony. It is a rather bureaucratic scene. The man standing at the front, who is *giving* the award is dressed in western clothes, and the man bowing to *receive* the award is dressed in Japanese formal wear. Plantations frame both pictures; *Ebisu* and *Daikoku* are framed within an outline of a turnip, and the commemoration scene is framed within an outline of a rose.

At the bottom, there is a bird's eye view of factory buildings. At the bay, there are black ships arriving to deliver goods from the West, and they will be transported to the inland on the steamship, which is taking off into the distance. By today's standards, a miserable picture of industrial wasteland, but from the point of view of Meiji Japan, a pretty picture of progress and westernization.

The bottom right-hand box contains both the solar and lunar calendars, so even the notion of 'time' is different between the two languages. The other thing I would like to point out is the outline of the whole poster, which looks like waves. So, again, this is the emphasis of knowledge, or western products coming over the water.

However, in the centre is an image of a *matsuri* festival, where people are dancing in happy abandonment. So compared to the previous posters where you saw, for example, gramophone without any meaning except that it was a lucky, here, a modern narrative is beginning to form, that let us import western technology and products, and ways of being, *i.e.*, the referent system, and we can all be happy.
Here, western 'knowledge' is being incorporated into 'Japanese' ways of life, but I would argue, at the level of the signified. In other words, knowledge at the level of connotation, of the referent in the West, is being put into the level of denotation of the signified in Japan at this point. I think that the referent still remains quite empty.

Given that we may find these varying advertisements in such close proximity temporally, I would suggest that what we are seeing is a transformation of the symbolic system which does not simply progress from one to another, but exists in hybridity.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced how 'Japanese modernity' was introduced and invented in several stages. I argued that in the initial stage of Meiji, the constitution of the 'subject' and what it 'knows' was premised on a worldview of 'naturalistic culture', where there was a relation of continuum between vegetables, animals, human beings, gods and machines. Signs of the 'West' in the form of technological gadgets already appear in the initial stages of Meiji, but I argued that the subject locates or comprehends these 'western gadgets' as it being part of 'naturalistic culture'. Thus, what the 'subject' 'understands' is defined through the process of equivalence. In the latter period of Meiji however, the 'subject' is 'modernised' to the extent that its worldview is now founded upon a dichotomic split between 'nature' and 'culture', and is founded upon a relation of division between man and other objects, such as animals or machines. Moreover, images of militarism organised by the nation-state as well as those of modernised industry, coupled with the emergence of the 'family', come to be promoted in the latter

31 The government adopted the solar calendar on 1st January 1873.
part of Meiji, such that they have claims to representations of 'reality'. That is to say, processes of differentiation appear with more frequency in the latter half of Meiji.

Nevertheless, I also argued that simultaneously, there were advertisements which took this new symbolic, which is more 'scientific', more 'truthful', and inserted it into a relation of equivalence with the 'traditional' symbolic. I have therefore argued that one should perhaps see the symbolic(s) represented in Meiji advertisements as a process of hybridization, and therefore, the introduction of militarism into Japan as a very product of hybridity.

In conclusion, all the forms of languages which I have discussed above—some which are 'traditional', others which are new western imports, and others which are various combinations of old and new—were occurring within the same time span, Meiji, and do not necessarily follow from each other in strict chronological order. Indeed, Shichifukujin continues to thrive in contemporary Japan as a cultural icon representing 'folkloric tradition', and Momotaro and Kintaro are still a part of everyday culture, as, of course, are 'western' imports.

Thus, it is difficult to argue that any one code or form of sign system governed all instances of signification. What I am able to say through my research is that the basis of language before Japan came in contact with the West appears to have been different, and that after 1868, as Japan re-organised itself as a nation-state, there were instances where the sign system seemed to have emulated the 'western' model.

Ultimately, I believe that language is socially-constituted, but it is used by individuals, and I am not willing to say to that one code or form of language could have mastery over every instance of its usage. What I do agree with is the argument that certain
forms of languages could be enforced at certain periods for certain purposes. For although I have identified a clutter in terms of languages (in advertisements), I do not necessarily think that there was a clutter in terms of objectives. It must be remembered that the perceived imperative of the leadership in Meiji was that it needed to modernise/westernise quickly so that they would not be colonised. It could be that to achieve this objective, any medley of various languages were put together and used.

In the next two chapters, I will focus upon a location more directly organised by power, the site of schooling, as means of determining what kinds of 'knowledge' and 'practice' were enforced in the process of inventing the nation-state of Japan.
In 1868, Japan was in the very midst of constituting itself as a modern nation-state. The order of things was visibly unsettling, as events unfolded themselves dynamically and disjunctively. It was as yet unclear who would be the authority, through what means, and how—compulsory education system organised by the government did not exist as such, and thus, ethical school textbooks could not have said to exist either. In winnowing through what might be denominated as ‘the field of ethical school textbooks’ of the Meiji period, it becomes immediately apparent that at the beginning of the Meiji period, a ‘field of ethical school textbooks’ did not exist as such in its actuality. Thus, my study of ethical school textbooks from 1868 has as its starting point the non-existence of a ‘field of ethical school textbooks’, and it becomes my task to not simply chronicle the changes within the field, but to illustrate how that ‘field’ came to be.

However, it would also be erroneous to suppose that the notion of teaching ethics at the site of school through the use of texts was completely new to the Meiji educators. Since the mid-Edo period, feudalism had been in slow decline, and mercantilism had come to
dominate social power. During a period of prolonged peace, cities grew in size\textsuperscript{32}, and as warfaring skills became redundant, it became a matter of necessity for the samurai class to acquire administrative skills in order to maintain its status as a ruling class. Thus, in the late-Edo\textsuperscript{33} period, the majority of children with warrior backgrounds attended schools either run by the Bakufu\textsuperscript{34} or their partisan Han\textsuperscript{35}, to the extent that there were more than 200 domain academies\textsuperscript{36} in existence by the end of Edo Period.\textsuperscript{37} (Dore 1965) In these schools, Confucianist textbooks such as Shogaku, Kokyo and Shisho Gokei\textsuperscript{38} were used to instil moral principles upon which the samurai identity was constituted. Briefly put, the educational ideal of Confucianism was to nurture individuals imbued with:

\ldots correct attitudes in the five human relationships; that is, love on the one hand and filial piety on the other in relations between parents and children; just dealings on the one hand and loyalty on the other in relations between master and servant; a proper distinction between their respective spheres and mutual respect in relations between husband and wife; due respect of the younger brother for the elder and affection of the elder for the younger; and mutual trust between friends. (Dore 1965: 36)

Moreover, increase of mercantile activity in Japan had shifted financial power to the merchant class. Thus, many merchants had the resources as well as the need to send

\begin{footnotes}
\item[32] According to Beasley, ‘perhaps one-sixth of all Japanese were town dwellers by 1850’ (1963, 1973: 15).
\item[33] Edo period: 1603–1867
\item[34] The central government located in Tokyo then known as Edo.
\item[35] The regional government. In pre-Meiji Japan, land was partitioned according to feudal domains known as han, where each domain was administered by a daimyo (feudal lord).
\item[36] See Chapter 3, ‘The Fief Schools’ in Education in Tokugawa Japan (Dore 1965), for a comprehensive overview.
\item[37] Indeed, Dore argues that the level of literacy among all classes was higher than that of European countries of the time (Dore 1965: 294), and Passin (1965) estimates the level of literacy of the time at 40 to 50 percent amongst male.
\item[38] Refers to the canonical texts of Confucianism: shisho (four texts) denotes Rongo, Moshi, Daigaku and Chuyo; Gokyo (five sutras) denotes Yokyo, Shikyo, Shokyo, Raiki and Shunka.
\end{footnotes}
Commoners' education during the Tokugawa period centered on moral education based upon the doctrines of Chu-tzu (shushi-gaku). In fact, moral education developed simultaneously with the teragoya schools. As the Japanese society became more commercialised in the middle of the Tokugawa period, teachers of moral education such as Ishida Baigan (1685-1774) offered a moral philosophy in which the common citizen could find comfort and that related to his everyday life. Baigan taught a code of moral behaviour devised to complement the social atmosphere of the time.

The approach to moral education was to devise lessons that applied to the life of the commoners, using the vehicles of native Japanese parables, poems, and lullabies rather than classical Confucian-style lectures and meditations. Social education through moral teaching incorporated all sorts of traditional thoughts including Confucianism and Buddhism, which thereby filtered into the lives of the common people. (Khan 1997: 55)

In these schools, Kyokunshō such as Jitsugo-kyo, Doshi-kyo, and Sanjikei were used as ethical textbooks. It was thus that ethics was already conceived as a school subject in these precursors of modern schools in the Edo period. (Cf. Kogi 1985)

However, there is a crucial difference between these private schools of the Edo period and schools established during the Meiji period. Schools of the Edo period did not intend to mass-produce 'citizens' who would be deployed for the sake of nation-building. That is to say, the Meiji schooling system came to be organised by the state, for the purpose of nation-building, while private schools of the Edo period had catered to feudal needs of offspring of e.g., merchants or warriors, and not for the nation.

In Chapters 5 & 6, I will undertake a genealogical analysis of Meiji schooling between 1868 and 1905, and trace the emergence of schooling as a state apparatus which

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39A private elementary school of the Edo period, generally run by one teacher and located in the prinicpants of a Buddhist temple, hence its name, teragoya, which translated literally means 'Temple hut'.

40Proverbiai textbooks which instructed moral teachings through aphorism and/or parable.
constituted the modern Japanese subjecthood. However, before embarking on my analysis, I would briefly like to contextualise my study within the broader arguments which have been made about modern schooling in the western instance first.

5.1 Debates Surrounding the Modern Subject in Schooling

As I have outlined in Chapter 2, recent studies on modern western subjecthood have indicated that the modern western subject was constituted upon an essentialised premise, *i.e.* that discourses on the modern subject presumed the existence of an originary ‘core’, an unchanging inner-self. The Christian notion of the ‘soul’ or notions such as the ‘will’ or ‘conscience’ are examples of such a constitution. They presume the existence of an authentic self in possession of transcendental values.

Foucaultian research in the area of modern schooling has also lent sustenance to such an argument. Ian Hunter (1988), for example, has argued that the emergence of modern literary education in popular schools in 19th century Europe emerged as an apparatus of pastoral surveillance where ‘the playground in particular...was deployed as ‘the principal scene of the real life of children’, and as ‘the arena on which their true character and dispositions are exhibited’.’ (Ibid: 18) That is to say, he argues that ‘modern’ European subjecthood itself *is the artefact and outcome of the pedagogical apparatus* (ibid: 26 my emphasis) deployed as a ‘discipline in the government of populations’ (ibid: 5).

This ‘modern’ subjecthood which was constituted at the site of schooling was, Hunter argues, characterised by having a ‘pre-theoretical consciousness and a certain ethical incompleteness’ (ibid: 28). In other words, he argues that ‘modern’ subjecthood was
located within a historical narrative which presumed that this subject would eventually come to achieve its state of promised completeness either through a dialectical process of reconciling 'the two sides of 'man's' ethical being: intellect and emotions, culture and society' (ibid: 21), or through a 'theoretical rupture in empirical subjectivity that reveals the latter's unthought social, psychological or linguistic being' (ibid: 15).

Although Jones & Williamson's archaeological study (1979) of English popular schooling in the 19th century does not specifically address the issue of subjecthood, their argument would apparently corroborate Hunter's description of the model of modern subjecthood. They also argue that 19th century schooling existed 'as a means for forming a population' (ibid: 60), and inform us that moral instruction was derived from Christian religious teachings, and that the main texts utilised in schools were the Bible, Catechism, or texts which summarised or consisted of extracts from the Bible (ibid: 76-7). Moreover, they illustrate that for these 19th century moral educators, it was not enough that students could mechanically repeat the words of the texts. Rather, what was more important was that students 'truly' understood and absorbed the principles of the texts. They thus argue that the 'form of exercise of the specific mode of effectivity of education as constituted in this period, was through the whole tissue of internal discipline' (ibid: 89 my emphasis).

Both of these studies therefore show that the disciplining of modern subjecthood at the site of 19th century European schooling was not only founded upon a presumption of universalism, but also entailed the encouragement of self-regulation of the inner-self through internalising transcendental values or principles.

Nevertheless, Jones & Williamson's argument diverges from Hunter's in one crucial way. Whereas Hunter argues that practices of self-aestheticism previously confined to
society's privileged minorities were redeployed 'as a discipline in an apparatus aimed at the cultural transformation of whole populations' (ibid: 5 my emphasis). Jones & Williamson suggest that particularly in the latter period of 19th century, schools began 'to exist specifically as a means for regulating the relations between the classes of the population by forming an instrument which is able to modify a class's moral topography, that is the very conditions that were perceived to define a class in its essential traits.' (Ibid: 60) That is to say, whereas Hunter suggests that modern subjecthood was a process of propagating a hitherto exclusive caste practice of self-aestheticism onto the whole population, Jones & Williamson argue that schooling re-defined class relations, and inscribed new differences between the classes.

In both Chapters 5 and 6, I shall be contrasting my own findings with these arguments which have been made about the constitution of modern subjecthood in Europe. We shall see that the constitution of modern Japanese subjecthood was specifically different from that described above in various detailed ways. For the moment, however, I would like to preliminarily proffer a rudimentary prognosis of the specificity of Japanese modern subjecthood which will emerge from my own archival research, through a simple comparison of a Table of Contents of two ethical school textbooks from two different periods:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Introductory Outline</th>
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<td>Chapter 2</td>
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<td>Moral View</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Emotional View</td>
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</table>

**Document I.** Table of Contents to *Chugakko Shihangakko Kyokasho: Rinrisho* (Junior High School/Teacher’s College Textbook: Book of Ethics) (Ministry of Education & No 1888)

Document I is a translation of a table of contents from an ethical school textbook for junior high school & teacher’s college students, published in 1888. As the table of contents indicates, the intention of the text is to establish a general founding framework or ‘outline’ (chapter 1), with a clarified view to a goal or ‘objective’ (chapter 2). The last three chapters are allotted to carrying out this task: chapter 3 is dedicated to establishing the ‘origin’ of action, appetite, desire, emotion, association, habit, chapter 4 is devoted solely to defining what a ‘will’ is, and chapter 5 tries to set up a ‘standard’ for action. One may therefore deduce that this text puts emphasis on grounding ethical acts upon a general framework of knowledge or principles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>His Majesty the Emperor</th>
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<td>Chapter 5</td>
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<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Enterprising Spirit</td>
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<td>Chapter 8</td>
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<td>Chapter 9</td>
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<td>Chapter 10</td>
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<td>Chapter 11</td>
<td>Hold steadfast to aspirations</td>
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<td>Chapter 14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Document II.** Table of Contents to *Koto Shogaku Shushin-sho: Dai Ichi Gakunen* (Upper Elementary School Textbook to Conducting Oneself: First Grade (Ministry of Education 1903))

In comparison to the abstract nature of the first table of contents, the quality demonstrated by the second table of contents, which comes from an elementary school textbook published in 1903 is very different. The text begins with the establishment of the Imperial bloodline as centripetal to defining ethical practices, and each chapter thematises upon a specific and/or conduct-related topic, such as ‘work hard to do duty’ (chapter 4), ‘etiquette’ (chapter 15), ‘habit’ (chapter 16), and so forth. Therefore, here, the emphasis on general knowledge or principles is relatively sparse, and is replaced by descriptions of how to perform as a good Japanese citizen. Indeed, the difference is indicated in the very titles of the textbooks: the first text is called the *Book of Ethics*, while the second text is called the *Book to Conducting Oneself*. The task of this and the
next chapter will be to chronicle how this transition occurred, through what means, through what changes in circumstances. In the remainder of this chapter, I will be focusing upon the years between 1868 to the end of 1870's.

During the first decade of the Meiji period, when Japan began the process of opening its borders after over two centuries of isolation, there was confusion as to who would be in authority, and initial efforts concentrated on the creation of the identity of the 'elite', through establishment of elite educational institutions, including those whose function would later become that of administering national schooling. In section 5.2, I will discuss historical developments in the first five years of the Meiji period. As I describe below, in the first five years of Meiji, the political situation in 'Japan' was so precariously fraught with discord that no one, including those in positions of authority, could have foretold the future course that 'Japan' was to take. I argue that it was precisely because of the felt-sense of excess of disunity between various factions within Japan that made it so imperative for a strategy which would enable the unification of 'Japan'. The only commonality which existed was their preoccupation with the 'West', and it was this that led them to choose a policy of 'westernisation' from around 1872.

In section 5.3, I will turn to a discussion of developments in the years between 1872 and 1879. This period is generally known in historiography as the period of Bunmei Kaika (Civilization and Enlightenment), when Japan is said to have embraced all things 'western'. During this time, members belonging to an intellectual society known as Meirokusha (Society of Meiji Six) took command over defining educational policies. Founded by Mori Arinori (who would later be appointed the first Education Minister in 1886) upon returning from America in Meiji 6 (1873), Meirokusha was composed of a group of prominent intellectuals who endorsed 'enlightening' the Japanese populace.
with 'western' ideas. Members included government scholars such as Kato Hiroyuki, Tsuda Masamichi, Nishi Amane, and famous educators in the private sector such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nakamura Masanao and Mitsukuri Rinsho.

In this section, I will undertake a genealogical analysis of *Taisei Hanzen Kunmo (Western Instruction and Enlightenment on Promoting Goodness)* (1871) and *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization)* (1875). These best-selling texts were respectively written by Mitsukuri Rinsho and Fukuzawa Yukichi, both of them leading *Meirokusha* members. Through an examination of these texts, I argue that for these Meiji enlightenment thinkers, 'modernisation' through 'westernisation' was primarily a means to building a strong nation *like* the western nations, and entailed the constitution of a Japanese 'citizenship'. However, this, I argue, did not necessarily entail a form of subjectification which emulated the 'western' model of subjecthood. That is to say, I argue that Meiji enlightenment thinkers' understanding of the 'West', and how it was used, was an appropriation of the West, and from the beginning, the use of the 'West' in a Japanese context was a *translation* of the 'West', and therefore a misunderstanding, or perhaps more simply, another understanding of the 'West'. That is to say, the 'westernised' Japanese subjecthood was specifically different from a 'western' model of subjecthood, and I argue that Japanese modern subjecthood was constituted through a hybrid mixture of universal and relational discourses, and was founded upon an assumption of 'naturalisation'.

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41 The publication of the society's journal, *Meiroku Zasshi*, began in Meiji 6 (1874)—hence the society's name—on 2nd April and continued until Meiji 8 (1876) when the society was dissolved. In all, 43 issues were published, and on average, 3200 copies of each journal was sold, which, given the conditions of the time, amounted to phenomenal selling success. (Cf. Inuzuka 1986: 161-74)
5.2 Meiji Restoration—Caesarean Birth of the Japanese Nation-State (1868-)

From the point of view of ‘today’, we ‘remember’ 1868 as the year of the Meiji Restoration, the year that modern Japan was born. However, if we were able to take a time machine, slip back to the year of 1868, and ask people then living in ‘Japan’ whether they knew this ‘fact’, we would probably be presented with a very different impression. In reality, given the lack of media infrastructure, only a few would even have been aware of the birth of the Japanese nation-state, a decision made on their behalf but without their consultation, by a small group of lower-ranking samurais from the southern domains and some court aristocrats. And later, when they did eventually find out what some men living far, far away had done, it would hardly have been relished as welcomed piece of news.

Although Tokugawa feudalism had been symbolically terminated when Tokugawa Yoshinobu, the last Shogunate, had formally surrendered his rights to sovereignty to the Emperor on 14 October 1867, die-hard daimyo lords, in whose interest it was to maintain the Tokugawa feudal system (in order to retain possession of their han fiefdoms), continued to wage a campaign of war against the new government. The last of such organised rebellions was to take place in the Tohoku (Northeast) region of Japan, and government forces did manage to bring it under subjugation by November of Meiji 1 (1868). However, this did not mean the ipso facto end to the antagonism. It only meant that the new government, now more than ever, would have to keep a watchful eye over the resentful groups of samurai that were left dispossessed by defeat.

Moreover, the emerging government had yet to attain the consent of the general populace who were not willing accomplices in the ‘modernising’ processes of the new
government's undertaking. Indeed, when the new government took over, they were witnesses to a significant increase in peasant discontent, which was due, in part, to the financial burden incurred by the cost of modernisation and foreign relations. The rise in inflation was exorbitant; between 1859 and 1867, 'wages rose by an average of 50 percent in Edo [the old name for Tokyo], while prices rose by almost 200 percent, four times as much.' (Motoyama 1997a: 23). According to tabulations compiled by Kyoto University, in the eight years between 1852 and 1859, there were 75 peasant riots, whereas between the eight years of 1860 and 1867, the number had nearly doubled to 132 riots. (Ibid: 19)

The blame for these straitened conditions were put, in part, to the trade treaties that Japan had signed with European nations and the United States between 1858 and 1869. These trade treaties stipulated the following. First, basic provisions would be provided to ships anchoring in certain ‘open ports’ or ‘open cities’ where non-Japanese nationals could reside. Second, extraterritoriality rights were agreed upon such that they would be shielded from Japanese judicial control, while on the other hand, it also made stipulations for generous financial compensations for offences that the Japanese might commit to them. Third, Japan’s foreign control would be conducted under an agreed tariff mostly fixed at 5 percent:

The arrival of the foreigners imposed new strains on an economy already near to dislocation. The Bakufu had long since dissipated the financial reserves built up by the early Tokugawa, and its currency manipulations, undertaken in a series of desperate attempts to reduce the annual deficit, had done nothing to improve the position in the country as a whole. After 1853 the cost of defence works increased by leaps and bounds. The opening of the ports, moreover, pushed government expenditures higher still. The revenue that could be raised through customs duties was limited by the restrictions embodied in the treaties and was more than balanced by the cost of importing foreign ships and guns. In addition

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there was the cost of maintaining installations and officials at the ports, of sending embassies overseas, and (much the largest item of all) of indemnities for the attacks made on foreign ships, citizens and legations. These new burdens brought the government to the point of bankruptcy. (Beasley 1955: 48-9)

Hence, 'modernisation' was not being experienced as an improvement in the quality of life by most of the population. There was still quite a strong degree of public sympathy and support for a return to the 'traditional' way of life—*i.e.*, three centuries of Tokugawa feudalism—both from the commoners and from the former vassals of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

The initial task of the new government was therefore to define its own identity in such a way that their claim to power was legitimated to both the *daimyo* class (and the samurai who remained loyal to them) and the unwilling commoners, still favouring a return to Tokugawa feudalism. Because of its strong associations to Tokugawa feudalism, Confucianism was obviously not a choice for the new government to legitmate its claim to power. The new government needed to erect a new symbol or figurehead which was convincingly more 'legitimate'. It was partly for this reason that the new government turned to Shintoism.

Shintoism, an 'indigenous' assemblage of worship consisting chiefly in a general idolatry of natural forces and reverence for the Imperial bloodline, was convenient for the following reasons. Firstly, there already existed the mythical materials and trappings which could be mobilised to perpetuated the myth of Imperial rule. According to *Nihongi* (English translation 1972), a classic text compiled sometime in the 8th century, the Imperial family was a descendant of the Sun Goddess *Amaterasu* who had ascended from the sky to rule the land of Japan (see Advertisement 20 in Chapter 4 for pictorial representation). Thus, the new government could claim that the Imperial order of Shinto was older and more 'traditional' than Tokugawa feudalism. Secondly, although the
Imperial Court had continued to be the vanguard of the ruling class' cultural taste throughout the Tokugawa period, it had, since about the 8th century, lost real political power and had been kept in virtual captivity by the successive line of actual political rulers of Japan. Indeed, it was the case that at the beginning of the Meiji period, most of the commoners did not even know of the Emperor's existence. Thus, the Emperor was, to all effects, an empty signifier which the new government could fill with the meaning they would find expedient.

The Emperor was therefore upheld by the new government as its symbolic representation, but there was some dispute as to what it was to mean—i.e., there was a general agreement to the signifier, but not what it would signify, and there was no agreement as to who and how power would operate in the signifier's stead. Initially, there were two conflicting views within the new government: Iwakura Tomomi represented the interests of the court aristocrats, and Okubo Toshimichi and Kido Takayoshi represented the interests of the lower-ranking samurai. Iwakura wanted a return to the ancient imperial polity where the court aristocrats had exercised power with the Emperor as the ruler. Okubo and Kido, on the other, believed that 'the emperor should not be a religious figure in the traditional mould of unity of rites and regimen. Rather, he should be an enlightened despot on the model of the West.' (Motoyama 1997b: 94) Thus the emerging government also had yet to find a way to negotiate the internal divisions within itself.

Yet, until the recalcitrant portions still loyal to the Tokugawa regime were subjugated, these two conflicting factions were united as a caucus. Moreover, even after the threat

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43 For example, Susaki Bunzō, a centenarian who was interviewed in the 1960's, recalled that the elderly women in his village were saying at the time 'even though it's said that the emperor's taken the place of the shogun, what kind'a person is he (dōgen hito ja)? Must be the one in the kyōgen play who wears the gold crown and the full-sleeved robe with gold brocade.' (Fujitani 1996: 7)
of Tokugawa feudalism had ceased to exist, there still remained good reasons for these conflicting parties to work together (and for the daimyo class and the commoners to eventually consent to their governance), for there still loomed what appeared to be even a larger threat: western colonialism. Thus, the new government was made up of factions which chose to unite with lesser enemies, for the sake of fighting against greater enemies.

Diagram 12. Political mishmash of Japan at the beginning of Meiji Restoration

It is then clear that the consensus on whether or not Japan should wish to have any relations with the 'West' and should wish to partake in 'modernisation' at all was still yet to be reached. Thus, the following is, in a sense, a chronicle of the various trials and errors that various Meiji authorities executed in their attempts to resolve their double dilemma of ‘how do we stop the West from colonising us?’ and ‘how do we convince a motley group of people that they should obey us and “modernise”?’—a process through which a unified discourse would eventually be negotiated.
Under such embroiled interests and circumstances, by and large, initial attempts to set up ‘modern’ schooling was deployed for the sake of simultaneously defining and constituting the ‘leadership’ of a modern nation-state. This necessarily meant that schooling in the initial years did not target elementary-age children as much as the education of adult men. That is to say, there was more attention paid to establishing the identity and legitimacy of the authority who defined ‘truths’ and creating what these ‘truths’ were, rather than enforcing ‘truths’ (which had yet to be created and established) in practice.

5.2.1 Establishing Kuge Schooling

Initially, when the new government’s most pressing objective was to present their governance in such a way that their deposition of Tokugawa feudalism was legitimated, it was imperative that the new government should highlight the ubiquity of the court aristocracy. It was for this purpose that when the Dajokan (Grand Council of State)\(^4\) was reinstated as the supreme administrative body of the government in January of Meiji 1 (1868), the appointment of top positions were reserved for members of the Imperial family, court aristocrats, and sympathetic daimyo lords, thus maintaining the façade that the actions of the new government was the will and pleasure of the Emperor. The new government also undertook a publicity stunt of sending court nobles to lead the military feat against remnants of the Shogunate in the Northeast region, though few of the aristocrats had the actual skills to manage a military campaign.

(Motoyama 1997b: 88-9)

\(^4\) The administrative body set up by the Imperial Court in the 8\(^{th}\) century; in interim since the 12\(^{th}\) century when they were overthrown by the military family of Taira.
This policy of keeping up the appearance that court aristocrats led the sedition against the Tokugawa regime was followed through in educational policies. The Meiji government initially prioritised the establishment of exclusive schools for courtiers in Kyoto, appointing three Shintoist scholars of Kokugaku-ha (National Learning Faction), Hirata Kanetane, Tamamatsu Misao and Yano Harumichi, on 2nd February 1868, as superintendents to design an educational structure.

This appointment was largely due to the political clout of Iwakura Tomomi, who held the office of Fuku-sosai (Deputy Chief Executive Officer) and was one of the most powerful political figures with courtier background to dominate the Meiji political field. Iwakura's motive was to 'restore' the court aristocrats to fulfil their rightful position as the actual political leaders of Japan:

Iwakura was convinced that a true restoration required a return to the ancient imperial polity that had existed before the ascendancy of the military class—of samurai or bushi. In those days, the emperor had ruled with the assistance of court aristocrats, who exercised government in his stead. If that polity was indeed to be restored, then it was essential to train the nobles to be capable of leadership as samurai, and to do so as soon as possible. (Motoyama 1997b: 85-6)

However, before the three superintendents could submit their proposal, the new government announced in 12th March 1868 that Gakushuin, a court aristocracy school established in 1845, would be re-opened for the purpose of educating the nobility. Because Gakushuin's educational philosophy was based in Confucianism and was strictly opposed to Shintoism, this conflicted with the three superintendents' politics, causing disarray in the execution of establishing schools and exposing the lack of coordination amongst the policy makers.

As a gesture of compromise, the new government announced the creation of two new schools, one for the Confucianists and one for the Shintoists, in 16th September 1868,
respectively called Kangakusho (Chinese Studies Institute) and Kogakusho (Imperial Studies Institute). The regulation issued to the two institutes indicated the attempts to negotiate a spirit of compromise between the two factions:

*Item.* The national polity shall be clarified; duties and designations shall be rectified.

*Item.* Western science and Chinese classics are the two wings of the Imperial Way. Since the Middle Ages, when the military usurped sovereignty, duties and designations have been deranged in many ways. Be keenly aware of this.

*Item.* Frivolous rhetoric and empty theory are forbidden. Training shall be practical. Instruction shall combined Arms and Arts.

*Item.* Kogaku and Kangaku shall not engage in doctrinal conflicts or contests of prestige.

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**Document III.** Regulations Issued to Kangakusho and Kogakusho on September Meiji 1 (1868) (Quoted in Motoyama 1997b: 105)

However, by the time Kangakusho and Kogakusho were established, the most intractable adherents of Tokugawa Shogunate were finally being vanquished, the conclusive moment being when the feudal lord of Aizu han surrendered in November 1868 to government forces. Having procured the first steps to realising the unification of ‘Japan’ under its governance, the new government now began the process of transferring the nation’s capital from Kyoto, which symbolised the ascendancy of the aristocratic culture, to Tokyo, which symbolised the ascendancy of warrior culture. As a part of this plan, the Emperor had already made his first visit to Tokyo in October 1868. In Spring of 1869, the Emperor re-enter the new capital of Japan, Tokyo, this time to take permanent abode. Thus, the geographic attribution of the new government’s signifier was transferred from the aristocracy to the warrior class, and the Kyoto schools, which were seen to be too particularistic and out of tune with the requirements of unification, fell into neglect.
5.2.2 Establishing Warrior Schooling

Moreover, once the immediate threat of Tokugawa insurrection was expelled, the new government's priority changed from upholding token aristocrats to that of procuring resources from the former Tokugawa forces as means to implement unification. They now turned to channelling their efforts to cultivating talent amongst the warrior class.

It was for this reason that the first experimental attempt to establish a 'modern' elementary school was made in the first year of Meiji (1868) at Numazu Heigaku Fuzoku Shogakko (an elementary school attached to the Numazu military school). Although the school curriculum was modelled after those of western elementary schools, the school textbooks utilised in ethics class were Shogaku, Rongo, and Moshi, which were typical Confucianist text utilised in the teaching of ethics during the Edo period in schools for the warrior class. The curriculum manual specified that students must, every Sunday morning, face the direction of ethics based on these texts, through attending a course called koshaku chobun (translated literally, 'interpretation listen hear'). A similar experimental school was set up in Aichi prefecture in the Meiji 4 (1871). Though here, the teaching of ethics was not specified, for the teaching of reading and writing, Kokei, Rongo, and Moshi, again Confucianist textbooks used during the Edo period by the warrior class, were named as requisite texts. (However, we may detect the impending direction that schooling would take, discussed in the next section, in that in the upper grades, Taisei Hanzen Kunmo (Western Instruction and Enlightenment on Promoting Virtue) was specified as the text to be utilised.)

Concomitantly, the new government carried out further political reforms designed to bolster unification. In June Meiji 2 (1869), the new government had procured the agreement of the daimyo lords to give up their rights to control their fiefdoms to the
Emperor. In its place, the government introduced new administrative and geographic units, replacing the *han* (domain/fiefdoms) with *todofuken* (prefectures) as regional administrative bodies of the Meiji state. Although the *daimyo* lords, in being appointed as governors, continued to hold control over his land, unlike the old domanial lordships, the position was not inheritable. The new government thus re-organised the geographic distribution, producing a new geographic language to describe the space of 'Japan' as a nation-state, thereby cutting its ties from Tokugawa feudalism. In addition, on August Meiji 2 (1869), there was a reshuffle of the members of the Grand Council of the State, and the token aristocrats were removed, thereby putting real power in the hands of a small group of samurai belonging to the former southern domains of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen domains (cf. Beasley 1963, 1973: 102).

As a part of these overarching administrative changes, the new government re-organised the three former *Bakufu* schools, *Shoheiko* (the main Shogunal college), *Igakusho* (Shogunate’s medical institute), and *Kaiseisho* (Shogunate’s institute of Western studies), into the *Daigakko (Universal School)* which were designated as the paramount educational institution of the government, and its highest agency for educational management. However, the factionalism between the Shintoists and Confucianists again emerged to impede the administrative efficacy of *Daigakko*, and it was not able to assert control over decisions made in educational policies. In order to remedy the situation, the Grand Council of State announced on 15th January Meiji 3 (1870) that *Daigakko (Universal School)* would be changed to *Daigaku (University)*, and began to put forth a policy of 'universalistic' approach to education, and to direct that serious attention be given to Western studies, thereby attempting to supersede the particularistic divisions between Shintoism and Confucianism. However, since the rendition of the domanial registers to the throne, local samurai leaders had begun to
assert their particular interests, and this further impeded the centralisation of educational policy. Under such conflicting interests, rather than attempt to enforce its authority, thereby giving the insurgents a reason and an opportunity to organise another revolt, the Grand Council chose to dissolve the nascent institutionalisation of education altogether, announcing on 12th July Meiji 3 (1870) that the Daigaku would be temporarily closed for purposes of reform.

5.2.3 Encountering the 'West'

Despite having subdued the most powerful forces against their governance, it was clear that considerable negotiations would still have to be undertaken before the identity of the new authority could stabilise and coalesce. Given such a state of instability, two overriding concerns continued to perturb the government: one, how to negotiate the internal divisions within itself, and two, how to seek the revision of the unequal trade treaties that the Tokugawa government had made with the western powers. The pursuit for a solution to these two issues impelled the new government to adopt a policy of 'knowing' the 'West' for the following reasons. Firstly, not only could the West offer a encompassing framework which would override the particularistic differences within Japan, secondly, in order to get the West to revise the treaties, it was also important for the new government to know more concretely who and what they were dealing with.

Thus, an expedition lasting 1 year and 8 months⁴⁵, known as the Iwakura Mission, was organised by the government in November of Meiji 4 (1871). As extraordinary as it may seem now, members included over half of the senior leadership—including Iwakura Tomomi, Okubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi and Ito Hirobumi. During this 20 months

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⁴⁵ The travel itinerary included America (6 months), Great Britain (4 months), France (2 months), Belgium (1 week), Germany (1 month), Russia (2 weeks), Sweden (1 week), and Italy (3 weeks).
expedition, the management of the 'nation' (if it could be called that) came to a halt, and all major decisions about domestic policies were suspended. The stated objectives of the Iwakura Mission were as follows: 1. To negotiate revision of trade treaties in such a way that sovereignty rights of the Japanese nation was honoured, 2. To collect information on how western societies operated, 3. To project Japan's image as a modern state worthy of equal diplomatic relations with the West. (Cf. Nish 1998)

Their first objective, of meeting Western leaders in order to seek revisions of the trade treaties, was not achieved. In fact, excepting Bismarck of Germany who informed them that treaty revision was premature, western leaders refused or simply ignored their requests for a meeting. However, on the mission, knowledge about the West, including cultural knowledge as well as technological skills, were avidly collected by the 50 emissaries and about 60 ryugakusei (students studying abroad). It is also worthy of note that included within this clique were five girls of good family background—the youngest being Tsuda Ume, who was 5 years old at the time of crossing—which the government considered to be worthy demonstration that gender relations in Japan were comparable to the West's and indeed 'modern'.

The Iwakura Mission, although the biggest, was not the only one of such expeditions organised during this period, and Japanese authorities made great investments in sending promising young talents overseas for educational purposes. Between the years of 1870 to 1871, the number of Japanese students sent overseas to study increased dramatically: ‘[i]ncluding students, members of inspection missions, travellers and others, the total rose from 170 at the end of 1870 to 411 at the end of the first quarter of 1871’ (Minoru 1985: 167-8). In financial terms, between 1872 and 1873, the Education
Department was investing 10.6 percent of its expenditure to financing Japanese students studying overseas (ibid: 170).

However, by far the biggest investment that the new government made during this period was to invite and hire ‘foreign’ teachers to teach at the ‘experimental’ elite schools: ‘In 1873 total expenditures of the Ministry came to about ¥1,300,000; a total of ¥270,000 was being spent on foreign teachers; students abroad were costing ¥250,000.’ (Ibid: 158). Thus, all in all, 40 percent of the Ministry of Education’s total expenditures were invested in either paying ‘westerners’ to teach at the newly-established ‘modern’ Japanese schools, or sending Japanese students abroad to study.

Given these facts and figures, we may infer that to become like the West, or at least to learn selectively from the West, was thought to be an imperative by the Japanese authorities. Indeed, the new government was to soon take an open policy of ‘westernisation’.

5.3 *Bunmei Kaika*—Embracing the ‘West’ (1872–77)

The years between Meiji 5 to around Meiji 10 (1872–77) is known as a period when Japan whole-heartedly embraced all things western. The national slogan was *Bunmei Kaika* (Civilisation & Enlightenment).

Although we may infer from this that to become something like the ‘West’ was the objective of Japanese authorities, it should again be emphasised that this ‘desire’ to ‘westernise’ was not motivated by a simple admiration for the superior ‘West’, but that there were practico-political circumstances which made such an undertaking desirable. Although the new government had managed to barter its way out of the initial confusion
and dissonance of the previous years, its claim to power still hung in a balance. Still as yet, there lurked the real potential of insurgency and uprisings, whilst the possibility of re-negotiating the trade treaties with the West appeared to be in the distant future. It was for these reasons that the strategy taken by the authority was to actively introduce the 'universalistic' frame of western knowledge to Japan, as a means of integrating and assimilating the differences within itself, and also to import material technology from the West, in order to build a strong nation (like the western ones). In the following, I would like to examine the effects that these elements had upon the site of schooling, and analyse the modern form of Japanese subjecthood which was invented and endorsed during this period.

5.3.1 Institutionalising National Schooling

As early as the first year of Meiji (1868), Kido Takayoshi, said to be one of the three 'masterminds'\(^{46}\) of the Meiji Restoration, had expressed his views that:

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\text{... In essence, a nation's prosperity and strength is that of the people's, and if the general citizens cannot breakout from a state of ignorance and poverty, the renown of the Imperial Restoration can only be an empty reputation, and the objective of confronting the world's strong and prosperous nations can definitely not be achieved. Therefore, [we must] enact the advancement of the general citizen's [level of] knowledge, by selectively choosing from the policies of the enlightened nations, and it is imperative that [we] gradually erect schools nation-wide; that is to say, [carrying out] this task is of foremost urgency.}
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Document IV. Kido Takayoshi's proposal for education policies, submitted on December Meiji 1 (1868) (Reprinted in Yamazumi 1990: 3)

\(^{46}\) The other two are said to be Okubo Toshimichi and Saigo Takamori.
As prescient as Kido's views were deemed to be, given the more critical problems that the new government had had to address in the first five years of the Meiji period, the implementation of national schooling had, in fact, hardly begun. However, being all too aware that there could be no 'nation' without 'citizens', government leaders now set about the task of enacting national schooling, particularly elementary schooling, as a top priority.

As mentioned earlier, the new government had closed down the Daigaku on July of Meiji 4 (1871). Almost simultaneous to its closure, the Monbusho (Ministry of Education) was established as the governmental organ which would undertake decisions concerning educational policies and organisation thereof nation-wide. The influence of 'westernisation' may be clearly detected in the policies and decisions that were undertaken, and the personalities that were employed to carry out these tasks.

**French Infrastructure**

In Meiji 4 (1871), the Ministry had engaged the services of Mitsukuri Rinsho, a Meirokusha member and a pioneering specialist on the French legal system, and twelve others to draft a proposal for a nation-wide schooling system. In the following year, on 5\textsuperscript{th} September Meiji 5 (1872), the Gakusei (Education Act) was issued, which unveiled the government’s master plan to establishing state educational institutions.

The aim presented in the Gakusei was the establishment of a modern education system modelled after the French one. Following its highly centralised and hierarchical infrastructure, the plan was to divide the nation into 8 university provinces, which would each be divided into 32 junior school counties, which would each be divided into 210 elementary school districts (\textit{i.e.}, 8 universities, 256 junior schools, and 53,760 elementary schools nation-wide). Duration of elementary schooling was set as 8 years.
(kato [lower] elementary schooling of 4 years [6-9 years of age] and joto [upper] elementary schooling of 4 years [10-13 years of age]). Junior high school was set as 6 years (3 years of lower junior high school [14-16 years of age] and 3 years of upper junior high school [17-19 years of age]). There was no age limit set to the attendance of university.

The educational principle of Gakusei was clarified in the proclamation, Gakuji Shorei ni Kansuru Osedasare-sho (Bequest Regarding Scholastic Promotion) (Ministry of Education 1872), which had been issued a day earlier. Largely a reproduction of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s book, Gakumon no Susume (Encouragement of Learning) (1872; English translation in Dilworth & Hirano 1969)—an enormous bestseller at the time—the Bequest echoed Yukichi’s views regarding the importance of education, criticising the previous educational tendencies to base moral teachings on Confucianist and Shintoist principles. It stated that henceforth, education should be founded on the western principles emphasising individualism and practical learning, and further stressed equal access to education regardless of family background. (Cf. Sato & Aiba 1985: 128-33, Okuda 1985: 5)

This line of policy was reflected in the government’s efforts to prioritise the actualisation of elementary school system, where elementary schooling was defined as ‘the basic level of education and thus must be learnt by all people-citizens’ (article 21 of Gakusei). In contrast to the first few years of Meiji where schooling was reserved for the privileged minority, elementary education was now if not compulsory, at least strongly encouraged to all.

Honyaku Ethics Textbooks
We may also detect the nascence of the teaching of ethics or morality as a school curriculum during this period. In September of Meiji 5 (1872), the new government issued a guideline on how the teaching of ethics should be implemented as a school subject in *Shogaku Kyosoku (Guideline for Elementary Teaching)*. This document states what the teaching of ethics should be called, appropriate allocation of class time, textbooks, and teaching methods:

**8th grade**
- *Shushin koju* ('oral instruction to conducting oneself')
- Two classes per week, in other words, one class every two days.
- The teacher should utilise the texts, *Minke Domo-kai*, and *Domo Oshiegusa*, and orally instruct its contents thoroughly and ceaselessly.

**7th grade**
- *Shushin koju* ('oral instruction to conducting oneself')
- Two classes per week
- Same as prior year

**6th grade**
- *Shushin koju* ('oral instruction to conducting oneself')
- Two classes per week
- The teacher should utilise the texts, *Hanzen Kunmo*, and *Shushin-ron*, and give lectures as in the prior year.

**5th grade**
- *Shushin koju* ('oral instruction to conducting oneself')
- One class per week
- Lecture on the general meaning of *Seiho Ryaku*.

Accordingly, the new name for the teaching of ethics was termed *shushin koju* (*oral instruction to conducting oneself*). In 8th and 7th grade (i.e., equivalent to 1st grade), ethics was to be taught two hours a week through teacher’s ‘thorough and ceaseless oral instructions’ based on the texts, *Minke Domo-kai* (two volumes, published in Meiji 7) and *Domo Oshiegusa* (five volumes, published in Meiji 5). In 6th grade (i.e., equivalent to first six months of 2nd grade), *Taisei Hanzen Kunmo* (fifteen volumes, published in Meiji 4), and *Shushin-ron* (three volumes, published in Meiji 7) were to be utilised as
texts upon which the teacher was to orally instruct the pupils two hours a week. Finally, in 5th grade (i.e., equivalent to latter six months of 2nd grade), shushin was to be orally taught one hour a week based on the text Seiho Ryaku (one volume, published in Meiji 4). All the texts designated in this directive were the so-called honyaku textbooks, or Japanese renditions of European or American texts. (Cf. Naka 1962: 568)

Indeed, this period is often referred to as the 'period of honyaku shushin school textbooks'—i.e., 'period of translated ethics school textbooks'—in Japanese historiography. Out of the 42 honyaku school textbooks published in Japan, 31 were published before Meiji 10 (1877). In the period before Meiji 10, Meiji 6 (1873) and Meiji 7 (1874) were years where relatively large numbers of ethics textbooks were published. In Meiji 6, out of the 21 ethics textbooks which were published, 13 were honyaku. In Meiji 7, 3 out of 17 were honyaku. From Meiji 12 (1879), the publication of honyaku textbooks began to decrease, and by Meiji 15 (1882), they had disappeared. (Naka 1962: 573) This indicates that the popularity of honyaku textbook was a phenomenon indicating the seeming espousal of the West characteristic of this period.48

Teaching Method: Pesstalozzism

47 While the guideline which specified these 'translated' texts as those to be used in shushin classes in the new schooling system was issued in Meiji 5, the actual publication of Minke Domo-kai and Shushin-ron took place two years later in Meiji 7. Thus, one must assume that the preparation of these two texts were already underway when the promulgation was issued, and it was based on their anticipated completion that they were included in the government's official list of textbooks. However, not all the publications were completed as planned. It is written in the preface of Minke Domo-kai that the text is made up of five volumes, but in actuality, only the first two volumes were published.

48 One of the most influential western texts of this period was Francis Wayland's Elements of Moral Science. There were 10 Japanese versions of Wayland's text published in this period. The popularity of Wayland's text may be attributed to Fukuzawa Yukichi's endorsement of Wayland's economic as well as ethical writings, who had them especially sent from America. Moreover, Wayland's exposition on ethics was novel in that it saw morality as a scientific system, in contrast to Confucianism which was the prevailing discourse of the Edo period. Wayland saw morality as originating in the conscience of human being. He furthermore put forth the notion of individual rights, which fitted into the discourse of modern nation-statehood, which, needless to say, was a crucial project of those in power. (Naka 1962: 574)
The onset of westernisation is also apparent in the teaching method sanctioned during this time. The Ministry of Education employed the American Education specialist Marion McCarrell Scott [1843–1922] to teach at the Tokyo Teacher's College (opened in May 1872), and Japanese educators came up with 'child-centered' theories emulating Pestalozzi's teaching theories. In comparison to the 'traditional' understanding which saw the 'child' as 'a passive receptacle into which knowledge is poured in' (Lincicome 1995: 34), the modern Japanese educators now saw the 'child' as 'as an active, autonomous being whose intellectual faculties are not fully developed, but who nevertheless possesses an innate capacity and attraction for sensory learning' (ibid: 34). The role of the teacher was therefore to entice the child to cohere and make apparent to the 'child' him/herself the 'truth' which s/he already possessed 'inside'. In addition, the practical method designed to implement this was called mondo (question-answer sessions) where questions on particular topics were put to the child using real objects, drawings, and other visual aids, in order to make the lessons more interesting. In other words, the role of the teacher became one of inducing 'truths' from the child through asking the 'child' simple questions in such a way that the 'truths' which the child already possessed as a sensory perception would mature into conscious thought.

**Summary**

So, in terms of the infrastructure that was proposed (French), the texts that were designated as proper shushin school texts (honyaku texts) and the teaching method (Pestalozzism) adopted, it would seem that the Japanese authorities were attempting to graft a 'western' form of governance to build the nation-state of 'Japan'. However, adopting 'western' forms of governance is not quite the same as adopting 'western' worldview or being. So this brings us to the question, what did 'modernisation' of the subject mean to these enlightenment thinkers? Did it mean, as it meant in the West, to
uphold universal qualities founded on the existence of an inner, rational self? At least in form, it would appear to be the case that universal discourses were introduced to subsume the particularistic differences within Japan. However, a closer examination is required to determine if the act of honyaku, translation, did not in fact introduce a difference as to how 'westernisation' was conceived. It is to this issue I would like to turn to next.

5.3.2 Analysis of Taisei Hanzen Kunmo

In this section, I will carry out a genealogical analysis of Taisei Hanzen Kunmo (Western Instruction and Enlightenment on Promoting Goodness) (1871) (hereafter THK). Written by Mitsukuri Rinsho, THK was published over the four years between Meiji 4 (1871) and Meiji 8 (1875). Comprised of 15 volumes, they were categorically separated as follows: volumes 1 to 3 are called the ‘First Half’, volumes 4 to 8 are called the ‘Second Half’, and volumes 9 to 11 are called the ‘Sequel’. In the preface, it is stated that the ‘First Half’ is a ‘translation’ of an elementary school textbook published in Paris, France in 1868, written by a French academic by the name of Bonne⁴⁹, but specific details are not given. The ‘Second Half’ is a result of ‘consulting’ several western texts, including Winthrow’s Moral Philosophy published in America in 1866, and the ‘Sequel’ is a partial summation of theories on national government found in Lawrence Hitchcock’s System of Moral Science, published in New York in 1868. The ‘First Half’ is the text which was one of the prolific ethics textbooks during the Bunmei Kaika period of Meiji, and the following is an analysis of the ‘First Half’.

Ethical Substance

⁴⁹ The French version of the text has never been identified.
There are two main ethical substances through which ethics is constituted in the ‘First Half’ of TSK: ‘zen (goodness)’ and ‘mu (duty)’. These two ethical substances function as the referential substances, and the other ethical substances (ryoshin (conscience), toku (virtue), goshi nanshi (strong will weak will), ken (rights), etc.) are subsumed beneath them. From the very beginning of the text, the referential substances, ‘goodness’ and ‘duty’ are simultaneously presented as a unit, in a conjunctive statement. The very first tenet of the text states:

*Hanzen-gaku* (Goodness promoting-ology) is the teaching of the duties (mu) of human beings and its principle lies in human being doing goodness (zen).

**Document VI. 1st tenet of THK**

The 3rd tenet further elaborates that *Hanzen-gaku* is founded upon ‘indisputable’ and ‘unexcludable (kakuzen fubatsu)’ rules which ‘all people (banmin)’ should ‘revere (totom)’ and ‘learn (manabu)’ (ibid: 85). Moreover:

A French scholar ‘Racine’ says the way of goodness (zendo) is that which everyone from divine individuals to commoners should follow, that which should not change regardless of the times or of nation.

**Document VII. Part of 5th tenet of THK**

Therefore, ‘goodness’ is constituted as a universalistic substance which is ‘indisputable’, ‘unexcludable’, as well as unchangeable.

‘Duty’, on the other hand, is not only an unchangeable substance but is also a relative one:
There are two types of duties toward human being. The first is that which, regardless of whether that person is of high or low quality, one should carry out for all human beings. The other are the duties one should do for one’s family members, duties one should do for the nation, and duties one carries out according to one’s occupation and social status, and these duties differ from person to person.

Therefore, ‘duty’ is not only a universal substance, but is also a relational and situational substance as well.

In short, there are two ethical substances operating in this text, ‘goodness’ and ‘duty’. ‘Goodness’ is defined to be a purely universalistic substance which is absolute regardless of time and space, while ‘duty’ is defined to be partially universalistic and partially relativistic. Moreover, these two oxymoronic substances are, from the very beginning of the text, juxtaposed in conjunction within the text.

Furthermore, throughout, the text operates a constant slippage between these two substances by way of approximation. For example, the notion of universal human rights, ken, is equated with the notion of ‘duty’. The 15th tenet states: ‘where there is rights (ken), there always exists duty (mu), and where there is duty (mu), there always exists rights (ken)’ (ibid: 109). The text also states that ‘rights’ to ‘freedom (jiyū)’ to one’s ‘body (shintai)’, ‘being true to oneself (honshin)’, ‘will (ishi)’, ‘publication (shuppan)’, ‘language (genshi)’, ‘material object (bukken)’, ‘offering oneself as a political representative’, and ‘election’ are guaranteed by national law. However, the text also immediately states that these ‘rights’ to ‘freedom’ are only rightful only if they do not impede upon others’ ‘rights’ to ‘freedom’, and it is the case that if the exercising of these individual rights are found to ‘harm’ others, the government will ‘chain’ the offender to
'jail' (goku ni tsunagi) and take away these rights. Given such qualifications, the exercise of these universal rights is impossible unless one has no relation with other human beings and lives in virtual isolation from society. However, if one practices Hanzen-gaku, this in itself is already not allowed because one does have and must perform 'duties' to others:

A person is not born into this world to serve oneself. A human being has duties to the nation, duties to others, duties to family members, and furthermore, has a place to fill. Thus, all human beings have duties which must be performed toward human beings.

Document IX. 61st tenet of THK

This indicates that the practice of 'duty' as that which is other-regarding is prioritised over upholding universalistic ethical substance such as human rights. Rather, universalistic ethical substance is utilised to legitimate relational ones.

When placed in its historical context, this text, Western Instruction and Enlightenment on Promoting Goodness, could be understood as a deliberate attempt to utilise the 'universal' framework of the 'West' to overcome the 'feudal' differences threatening to impede the unification of 'Japan'. It should be remembered that until the process of 'modernisation' was initiated, power relations did not have recourse to utilise universalistic notions to legitimate social management. Rather, the predominating discourse of power in pre-Meiji Japanese society was Confucianism, and the basis of this form of management was founded upon social segregation according to occupations, where the basic hierarchy of the social ranks, from the top, were warriors, farmers, craftsmen, and merchants. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the below
excerpt, where the word *jinmin*, meaning ‘human being - citizens’, is replaced, or rather *slips* into the word *shimin*, meaning ‘warrior - commoners’.

It is the duty of all *jinmin* ('human being-citizens') to not do those [misdeeds which thwart the carrying out of ‘goodness’] mentioned so far. However, there are also other duties which *shimin* ('warrior-commoner') should also carry out according to their occupational status. In the end there is only one path of *Hanzen* and they should not change from person to person. Therefore, what is meant by the different paths according to occupation is an application of the principle morals to each.

**Document X. 212th tenet of THK**

We should note here the rather conflicting message given above. It first states that there are two kinds of duties, one which is universally the same, one which is different according to occupational status. It then states that there should be no difference in the path to goodness that one takes; in other words, the path to goodness is universally the same. This second statement therefore contradicts the first statement. In order to explain this contradiction, the text finally states that the universal principles of goodness can be applied differently according to occupational positions. In other words, ‘goodness’ is used to legitimate ‘duty’, but ‘duty’ is not used to legitimate ‘goodness’—i.e., a purely universal and absolute ethical substance is utilised to justify a partially universal and partially relational/situational ethical substance.

**Mode of Subjectification**

Given such a relationship between ‘goodness’ and ‘duty’, where ‘duty’ is privileged over ‘goodness’, the mode of subjectification does not necessarily entail the submission to some sort of absolute value or authority. Rather, whilst the text does state that we should:
...increase the intellect gotten from heaven and slowly come to be able to discern between good and bad on one's own.

Document XI. Part of 5th tenet of THK

A close reading shows that although universal authorities are firstly presented in the text, in its midst, relative and situational authorities slip into the primary role of authority, and the 'universals' function to legitimate the authority of the relational and situational ones.

The 'absolute' authorities that the text constitutes begin with the very subject of the text, *hanzen-gaku*, by alluding to its 'scientific' status. *Hanzen* means 'promoting goodness', and *gaku* means 'knowledge of'. As an adjunct, *gaku* can also be translated as 'ology'. For example, the Japanese word for 'math' is *su-gaku*, which, in more literal terms, would translate into English as 'number-ology'. Similarly, if the Japanese translation of 'psychology', *shinri-gaku*, is translated into English, it would literally be 'emotion [shin] reason [n]-ology [gaku]'-i.e., *shinri-gaku* signifies 'knowledge of emotion and reason'.

A more straightforward example is 'shakai-gaku'. *Shakai* is conventionally equated with the English word 'society'. Thus, *shakai-gaku* is 'sociology'. Furthermore, the signification, *Hanzen-gaku*, is therefore indicative of its stature as a scientific body of knowledge, as a 'goodness promoting-ology'.

Moreover, within the text, 'Ten (Heaven)' is given as the absolute guarantor of moral principles:

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50However, the equation of the word 'shakai' with 'society' is not in fact as straightforward as it would seem. *Sha* signifies 'the deity of the land', and *kai* signifies 'the lid of a rice-maker'. Therefore, the word *shakai* signifies 'the land which is under the protection of the local god'. Traditionally, Japan was a rice-growing, agrarian society. If the rice crop did not harvest one year, this meant that people would starve and even die, and if the rice crop did particularly well one year, then the community would enjoy a prosperous year of ease. Because rice was and still largely continues to be the main staple food of Japan, rice is a privileged signifier - thus the reference to rice in the word *kai*. (The definitions of *sha* and *kai* are taken from Obunsha Kanwachu Dictionary)
1. There is no beginning and end in 'heaven' and neither is there any change.
2. 'Heaven' is almighty and what it wishes may never be denied.
3. 'Heaven' is magnanimous and bestows all charity.
4. 'Heaven' is always just and thus its judgement is never wrong.

Document XII. 25th tenet of THK

The text further states that the 'state law' is the expression of 'Heaven':

The laws of hanzen teach the various duties of being human; laws of the state further clarify [these duties]. Thus, in things related to benefit, honour and reverence, do not go against that which is established by state law. They are the duties of human being as given by hanzen.

Document XIII. 19th tenet of THK

Thus, an assemblage of three modes of 'absolutes': science (i.e., hanzen-gaku), transcendental existence (i.e., ten), and law (as an expression of ten) are given as the 'universal' authorities within the text. However, these 'universal' authorities do have a very specific earthly origin—the 'West'—since, though not explicitly stated, the text is littered with 'quotes' from a catholic range of western figures including Racine (see Document VII), Plato (see Document XXVI), Augustus, St. Thomas, Aristotle, Seneca, Cicero, Solomon, Socrates, Benjamin Franklin, etc. and many others whose names I do not recognise. There are also many references to the Spartans, Egyptians, Athenians, Bourbons, etc.

Having done so, the text proceeds to substitute and equalise the 'universal' authorities with relational and situational authorities. The first in line is the existence of the fubo (parents):
Heaven gives us with life, protects us, and bestows us with happiness. Thus we come to venerate it. Parents teach us, nourish us, and are beneficial to us. Thus we also come to venerate it.

**Document XIV. 159th tenet of THK**

That parents have right to instruct us in place of Heaven is laid down by Way of heaven and by national law. Thus we come to respect it.

**Document XV. 160th tenet of THK**

Therefore, parents are the earthly representations of the will of heaven, and serve as proxy 'heaven'. Next in this line of equations are shifu, or 'teacher', who are like proxy parents:

Teachers instruct children to proceed in the way of "goodness" in place of parents. Teachers instruct us in good teachings and good norms, and also teach us scholarship, which is materially profitable for us. Thus, as with parents, we love and respect it and obey it and we must not forget that we are morally indebted to it.

**Document XVI. 166th tenet of THK**

From heaven to western figures to parents to teachers, universal authorities are therefore counterpoised with relative ones, through a serial process of equivalences.

Moreover, it should also be noted that the mode of subjectification is founded on a relation of reciprocity. That is to say, the rationales or incentive given for obeying or following these authorities is that they are good to us, so we should be good to them. For example, 159th tenet says (see Document XIV) that 'Heaven gives us with life, protects us, and bestows us with happiness' and 'parents teach us, nourish us, and are beneficial to us'. Likewise, 166th tenet says (see Document XVI) 'teachers instruct us in good teachings and good norms, and also teaches us scholarship, which is materially profitable for us'. Thus 'we come to venerate it' and 'we love and respect it and obey it'.

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Nevertheless, there is one category of authority which does not quite fit into this equation, and its authority is expressed quite independently: that of government officials. Out of the 218 tenets comprising the 'first half' of THK, the authorities of 'heaven', 'parents' and 'teachers' are established quite early on in the text, and in equation with each other. However, the appearance of government officials and scholars as the privileged occupation of hanzen-gaku comes at the very end of the text:

Because the occupational status of government officials and scholars is constituted by teaching human beings "goodness" and punishing human beings "badness", compared to other persons, they must have even more insurmountable aspiration to comply to "goodness", and even the smallest of mistake is not to be made because of the occupational path it is accorded. Thus, when government officials make a mistake in conducting their occupation, they must take their punishment even if the deed, if committed by a common citizen, would be considered to be a light mistake. If a common citizen reveals a secret sealed with an oath, it will not be punished by law. However, if a government official reveals state secrets or litigator's secrets, then it will be severely punished by law.

Document XVII. 213th tenet of THK

Thus, although the text states that those representing the 'nation', 'government officials', must submit to the laws of 'goodness', it is they who ultimately stand above hanzen-gaku, since they are the ones who take decisions about 'state law', which are the 'expressions of ten'. Moreover, the text also states:
A person should love and revere the nation as one loves and reveres one's parents. Since the nation is young, it will do unreasonable things, but we must not hate it and do harm towards it. An old aegis said the anger of the nation should be dealt with in a manner akin to the anger of a father. It must not be opposed. The anger must be consoled with docility and perseverance. Anyone who encounters the anger of a young nation and does not apologise for one's sins and inflicts harm unto the nation is a big sinner. Under French law, anyone who serves a foreign nation without governmental permission loses the rights of the citizen, and anyone who fights as an enemy of the nation will be punished and will be executed.

Document XVIII. Part of 199th tenet of THK

In other words, the text is stating that although 'government officials' might do 'unreasonable things', we must love and revere it as one loves one's parents, who are good to us. It also states that if we do not follow it, it will 'punish' us, and we will be 'executed'. That is to say, our relation to 'governmental officials' is not founded upon a relation of reciprocity as was the case with the authorities of 'heaven', 'parents' and 'teachers'. We must obey 'government officials', even if they make mistakes and act badly toward us, because if we don't, they will kill us. Thus, our relation to the authority of 'government officials' is one of domination.

Self-forming Activity

The text states that:

The old doctrine only taught, Carry out one's occupation honestly, do not harm people and return things that one does not own to their rightful owners; furthermore, do not act upon others as one would not wish upon oneself.

Document XIX. 124th tenet of THK

It next states that:
Therefore, the modern doctrine adds [to the old doctrine] to the duties of human being that of *jinai* (charitable love). Incorporate the dictum:

Love and act upon people as one would wish for oneself; love [other people] as one loves oneself.

**Document XX. 125th tenet of THK**

Thus, it would appear that a Christian virtue of universal love is being linked to Tokugawa feudalistic codes of conduct, such that the discrimination between occupational status is overcome. However, it is questionable whether this 'love' is as 'universal' as is claimed, since for the most part, the practical activities that we must submit to is founded upon the tenet of reciprocity. Indeed, it appears that the principle of reciprocity must be acted out in the most mundane aspects of our everyday conduct:

Always return favours to heaven, parents and nation—not returning favours is equal to not returning borrowed money.

**Document XXI. 102nd tenet of THK**

Therefore, as the 120th tenet states, we must 'mutually venerate and mutually aid' each other, and not let our 'personal satisfaction/desire harm' other people:

Do not harm people; do not steal people's property, do not keep people's goods, do not damage people's things, do not play with people's things without permission; do not slander people, do not carry jealousy in stating people's virtues and paying respect to goodness; in doing everything to people as one would wish for oneself is the required duty of one who tries to protect public rules.

**Document XXII. 65th tenet of THK**
Moreover, when it comes to those individuals who do not carry out their 'goodness' through their conduct accordingly, the text tells us that we are obliged to reciprocate their badness by ignoring them. The 15th tenet encourages us to that one should only 'have esteem for those who keep to the michi (way) [of hanzen], and punish those who go against the michi (way) [of hanzen] and follows one's greed'. The 131st tenet also states that we should be 'discriminant' in who we choose to confer our 'charity' to, since if we act well towards 'bad' people, then we are partaking in their badness. Furthermore, it also states that if we encounter 'bad' people who do not follow the ways of hanzen, we should consider them as unlucky people, and ignore them.

At the moment, there is no legal punishment for those who forget to return favours. However, the populace should regard these non-good people as ill-omens, and should slight them.

Document XXIII. 117th tenet of THK

That is to say, whilst those who are deemed 'good' according to the laws of hanzen should be valued by the public, in so far as those who are 'non-good' are concerned, we are not obligated to be good to them. Instead, we are actively encouraged to not forgive them, but to pretend as well as we can that they do not exist. Hence, we are encouraged to participate in a collective act of consigning 'non-good' individuals to social invisibility.

Therefore, codes of conduct based on 'universality' of charitable love is superseded by a more Confucianist code of conduct based on reciprocity of favours, and it is, again, 'governmental officials' who possess the right to decide what is good and bad:
The main aspect of duties toward mankind is not to harm mankind's life and autonomy. Therefore, a person does not have the right to cause suffering unto others, stand in the way of autonomy of others, not imprison others; these rights should only be exercised by governmental offices who punish bad people according to the legislative decree of the nation, or by parents and teachers who admonish their children or students. If the young who have no such rights indulgently exercise them, governmental offices will rebuke and punish them.

Document XXIV. 66th tenet of THK

Since 'governmental officials' are mostly former samurai, in actuality, the feudal class system is not challenged as radically as it would first appear. However, it could perhaps be argued that although the notion of 'universality' is not as universal as it would appear, the model of reciprocal favours does strongly resemble the discourse of social responsibility found in western liberal democracies found in such thinkers as Mills, this being supported by the fact that the legitimacy of 'governmental officials' is founded upon state law.

However, again, I would want to qualify this semblance by pointing out that while strategies of governing founded upon universality of 'law' is cited, the practices which one must submit to is more Confucianist in likeliness than Western. It should also be noted that by far the most attention and space that THK devotes itself to is on various specific advise on conduct. The following gives a list of the motley and sporadic nature of these advises, roughly in the order they appear:
- Be hygienic (38th tenet)
- Have moderation in eating and drinking (39th tenet)
- Don't avoid military service (40th tenet)
- Do not commit suicide (41st tenet)
- Work, because physical labour is good (48th tenet)
- Don't get drunk (53rd tenet)
- Do not read obscene writings (54th tenet)
- Do not waste time but use wisely (57th tenet)
- Exercise moderately for relaxation (58th tenet)
- Read good books for relaxation (59th tenet)
- You must develop habits of study and diligence from an young age (60th tenet)
- Do not commit betrayal (71st-77th tenets)
- You must deliver lost articles to its rightful owners (78th-81st tenets)
- Always keep promises (82nd-90th tenets)
- Don't slander or make false accusations (91st-93rd tenets)
- Don't break oaths because they're sacred (98th-103rd tenets)
- Be cautious (104th-106th tenets)
- Do not get angry when admonishing children (150th tenet)
- Fathers are prohibited from being violent onto children (151st tenet)
- Pay taxes (193rd-196th tenets)
- Work hard and don't squander your hard-earned money away (210th tenet)

Document XXV. Summary of exhortations given in THK on various aspects of everyday conduct between 38th-210th tenets

Therefore, whilst the notion of 'law' is taken from the 'West', when it comes to the actual practices and technologies through which we are formed, they are more Confucianist in their formulations rather than 'western'. However, it should also not escape our attention that what is 'new' here is that what THK instructs upon are that which make up the duties of a 'citizen', including 'don't avoid military service' (40th tenet) and 'pay taxes' (193rd-196th tenet). Also worthy of note is the 41st tenet, which specifically instructs us not to 'commit suicide'.

Telos

It should be clear by now that THK is a product of the political and historical climate of its times, and what, in fact, is being negotiated through the text is the validity of the Japanese nation-state, against the backdrop of much discontent and dissension.
addresses a group of readers who are mostly from the samurai class, encouraging them to become 'governmental officials' (rather than carry through their loyalty to their daimyo lords by committing suicide), to regard the commoners as 'citizens', and for the commoners to become 'citizens'. That is to say, it encourages the readers to submit their allegiance to the nation-state of 'Japan', and be willing to give one's life to it:

A famous scholar from ancient times, "Plato" said one is not born into this world for the sake of oneself only; one is born for the sake of one's nation, for the sake of one's family members, for dear friends, for the populace. Thus, during military service the nation is what must be loved the most. Thus, when unavoidable, one should throw away one's life for the sake of the nation. "Glessy" says

One's property, one's life does not belong to one. In actuality, they all belong to one's nation.

Therefore, warriors and the commoners must all devote one's loyalty to the nation, and during times of peace, obey the law and amend it. When there is an external enemy one should not fear death but protect it. As the nation is organised through the family structure, in order for the warriors and the commoners to protect one's family, one must always defend the nation. Those who do not devote one's filial loyalty to the nation are spiritless and lacking in self-control. Thus, soldiers whose courage is aroused to fight in defence of the nation or die in war for the sake of the nation will all receive remuneration and the people of the nation will revere this. The name will remain inscribed in history and will be told to later generations.

Document XXVI. Part of 197th tenet of THK

Summary

In sum, a genealogical analysis of THK indicates the following. The ethical substance of the text is 'goodness' and 'duty', where 'goodness' is defined as a universal substance and 'duty' is a defined as a partially universal and partially relational substance. The mode of subjectification is that of relation of reciprocity to 'heaven', 'parents' and 'teachers', except for 'government officials' where subject must submit to a relation of domination. The self-forming activities are a combination of submission to Confucianist
codes of practice and submission to state law. The telos of the project is to constitute our subjecthood as a Japanese 'citizen', and to serve the nation devotedly.

5.3.3 Analysis of Bunmeiron no Gairyaku

A close reading of THK reveals that 'modernisation' of 'Japan' entailed using the 'West' to re-locate 'ethics' and the 'subject' from a feudal to a nation-state context. Moreover, we have seen that although the 'universalistic' framework of the 'West' was adopted, this was only for the sake of legitimating the authority of the new government. In this section, I would now like to discuss Fukuzawa Yukichi's text, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization) (1875) (hereafter BG), which will further highlight what was meant by a 'westernised' Japanese subjecthood, and how, in the act of translating the 'West', a very selective notion of the 'West' was invented.

Ethical Substance

According to Fukuzawa Yukichi [1834–1901], he sees Japan facing a problematic situation where Japan is firstly, a 'semi-developed' (Yukichi 1875: 13) nation, secondly, that Japan has 'blind attachment to the outdated practices of the past' (ibid: 28) and thirdly, that recent historical developments have brought about an 'illness' into Japan which he names 'foreign relations' (ibid: 180). He argues that in order to address these problems, Japan must attain an ethical substance called 'civilization'.

For Fukuzawa, 'civilization' is characterised by fluidity and relativity. 'Civilization is an open-ended process' (ibid: 15) and 'there are many roads to [attain] it' (ibid: 44). It is a state of 'utopia' where there are no social 'structure' (ibid: 14) or 'accepted [social] rules' (ibid: 14) or 'old customs' which '[govern] human intercourse' (ibid: 14). It is a state where the future is ever planned in the present, where '[t]oday's wisdom overflows to
create the plans of tomorrow.' (ibid: 14) Hence, for Fukuzawa, 'civilization' is not founded upon any notion of dialectics, teleology or transcendental concept. It is a state where men's spirits 'enjoy free play' (ibid: 14).

If 'civilization' cannot be represented through abstract or metaphysical concepts, what might 'civilization' be characterised as? Very many things it seems. For example, Fukuzawa states that 'civilization' is like a 'great stage':

Civilization is like a great stage; the institutions, laws, commerce, and so forth are the actors. These actors each play their specialized roles and thus contribute to the sentiment which the whole play attempts to express. If each plays his role effectively, the play receives the plaudits of the spectators, and the actors are considered good. But if the actors err in the timing of their entrances and exits or miss their cues, or they are not convincing in their portrayal of emotion, the play as a whole will not hang together and the performance of the actors will be branded as clumsy.

Document XXVII. BG, pp. 35-6

Having characterised 'civilization' as artifice or performance, Fukuzawa also likens 'civilization' to an 'ocean', and then within the same paragraph, to a 'warehouse':

Civilization is also like an ocean, and its various institutions, literature, and the like are the rivers which feed into it. They are both great and small rivers. Civilization is also like a warehouse. Everything goes into the warehouse—daily necessities, capital, human energies. The world of man contains much that ought to be abhorred, but if a thing contributes to advance in civilization, abhorrence are set aside with no question asked....

Document XXVIII. BG, p. 36

Therefore, for Fukuzawa, 'civilization' can also be likened to a product of nature or society. It can also be likened to the phenomena of a 'hunting party':
[If we may liken civilization to a deer, politics may be termed the hunting party. The hunting party is, naturally, composed of more than one person, and the method of shooting arrows will differ from person to person. However, they all have one objective, to shoot the deer and take it home....]

**Document XXIX. BG, p. 45**

Therefore, whilst 'civilization' is like a *performance*, it is also *nature*, as well as *social*, as well as a state of *dichotomy between nature and culture*. To complicate things further, 'civilization' can also be likened to a 'steamship':

Conditions within a country are like steamship under way, and the man in charge of the country is like the navigator. A thousand-ton boat with a 500-horsepower engine, traveling a little over 12 miles an hour, can cross an ocean almost 3,000 miles wide in 10 days. This is the speed of this steamship.

**Document XXX. BG, p. 55**

So besides being a metaphor for a *performance, nature, social*, as well as *nature versus culture*, 'civilization' can also mean *technology*. That is to say, 'civilization' is understood by Fukuzawa to be an assemblage of part man, part animal and part technology, and does not define itself through opposing terms. Thus, 'civilization', for Fukuzawa, is more like an endless process of change, rather than a substance as such:

...when it [civilization] is nourished it grows to embrace the myriad things of the earth; if repressed or restrained, its external manifestations will also vanish. It is in constant motion, advancing or retreating, waxing or waning.

**Document XXXI. BG, p. 17**
So what exactly defines the identity of this every-changing manifestation called 'civilization'? What delineates the boundaries of this boundless process? Fukuzawa continues:

Let us now call this [civilization] the 'spirit of a people'. In respect to time, it may be called the 'trend of the times'. In reference to persons, it may be called 'human sentiments'. With regard to a nation as a whole, it may be called a 'nation's ways' or 'national opinion'. These things are what is meant by the spirit of civilization. And it is this spirit of civilization that differentiates the manners and customs of Asia and Europe. Hence the spirit of civilization can also be described as the sentiments and customs of a people.

Document XXXII. BG, p. 17

So at last, we begin to see a rather distinct formulation of 'civilization'. 'Civilization', at the end of the day, is characterised by its national boundaries:

...civilization is not a matter of the knowledge or ignorance of individuals but the spirit of entire nations.... This "spirit" is a manifestation of the knowledge and virtue of the entire population. It goes through cycles of change and is the source of national vitality at any given moment.

Document XXXIII. BG, p. 47

Therefore, 'civilization' is inseparable from the 'spirit of an entire nation'. In fact, 'civilization' is 'the spirit of an entire nation'.

Mode of Subjectification

Fukuzawa admits that at 'this juncture in history' (ibid: 15), the West is the most 'civilized' of the nations, and that Japan must '[assimilate] European civilisation' (ibid: 18). However, Fukuzawa also states that Japan must be 'selective in applying foreign civilisation' (ibid: 16) to itself. Therefore, the mode of subjectification appears to be one
of qualified *emulation* of the 'West'. And what does it mean to emulate the West? It means to appreciate and allow for a plurality of opinions by valuing individualism:

The point of difference between Western and other civilizations is that Western society does not have a uniformity of opinions; various opinions exist side by side without fusing into one..... Each goes its own way, each maintains its own position. Although they vie with one another, no single one of them ever completely wins out. Since the contest never is decided, all sides grudgingly are forced to live with the others. Once they start living side by side, despite their mutual hostility, they each recognize the others' rights and allow them to go their ways. Since no view is able to monopolize the whole situation and must allow the other schools of thought room to function, each makes its own contribution to one area of civilization by being true to its own position, until finally, taken together, the end result is one civilization. This is how autonomy and freedom have developed in the West.

Document XXXIV. BG, p. 125

Thus, for Fukuzawa, 'basis of argumentation' should be founded upon 'relative terms' which are neither good nor bad in themselves. The aim of discussion should be to 'see the other fellow's merits' (ibid: 9) and to see the 'good points' (ibid: 8) of each others' position. In order to 'reconcile the two sides' (ibid: 6) and to assess the 'relative advantages and defects' (ibid: 6) of a particular point of view, one must keep an 'open mind' and to try and see how each other 'original premise differ' (ibid: 7). If the parties involved in the discussion do not make the effort to understand the other sides' views, each will 'irrationally' (ibid: 7) reject the other. This 'disharmony' (ibid: 8) is 'mutually inimical' (ibid: 9) and will 'produce great harm in society' (ibid: 8), leading the 'uneducated' (ibid: 8) to resort to use of 'physical force' such as 'assassination' (ibid: 8). 'Throughout history, the above type of misunderstanding between people has produced many regrettable situations.' (Ibid: 10) 'Such evils will naturally be eliminated' (ibid: 9) by 'acquiring civilization' (ibid: 11), and this can be brought about by 'constant social
intercourse'. It is only through this process, by 'seeing each other in a friendly light' (ibid: 8) that the 'true selves' (ibid: 9) of all will be revealed:

Let those points which do not merit acceptance run their course, and wait for the day when both positions can be reconciled, the day when the basis of argumentation will be the same. Do not try to pressure others into your own way of thinking, or try to induce conformity in every discussion, everywhere.

Document XXXV. BG, p. 11

Fukuzawa further argues that one of the great mistakes that even great men such as 'Confucian, Napoleon III, Washington and Wellington' have made is that they were not able to adjust to changes: 'that great men failed to come along at the right time simply means that they somehow did not jibe with the general spirit of the age in which they lived.' (Ibid: 60) He argues that the Japanese nation and its people must learn to contextualise their situation properly if they are to reach a state of civilization:

The times and places must be considered when discussing the merits and demerits of things. A cart is convenient on land, but it does not make much headway on the sea. Things that were convenient in yester-year are no longer convenient today. Again there are many things which are most useful in our modern world which would have been useless in earlier ages....There is nothing whose merits or demerits will not become clear when it is put in its temporal and spatial context....There is no single way that embraces all things in the universe. Progress can only be made by harmonizing with the times and places.

Document XXXVI. BG, p. 107

In short, for Fukuzawa, to emulate the 'West' means to do the following: 1. Increase 'social intercourse', 2. Learn to assimilate and respect difference, and 3. Learn to contextualise and appreciate function. Thus, the 'West' is seen to be assimilatory and
harmonial in quality, rather than being discriminatory or divisory, and is transiental in quality—changing from one situation to another—rather than transcendental.

However, as Fukuzawa is of the mind that even the West has not achieved the 'spirit of civilization' in its finality (ibid: 15), so the emulation of the 'West' can only be a temporary measure, so to speak. What mode of subjectification should we submit to if and when Japan were to overtake the West in the civilizing process? A more permanent answer that Fukuzawa implies is that we do not even need to think about it, but just let it happen, as it should naturally:

**Document XXXVII. BG, p. 19**

That is to say, since '[m]an is by nature a social animal' (ibid: 35), if we 'respect the natural inclinations of man and eliminate evils and obstacles' (ibid: 18), attainment of 'civilization' will be automatically attained, since, according to Fukuzawa, reason and rationality in themselves are natural:

**Document XXXVIII. BG, pp. 24-5**

Thus, the mode of subjectification is a submission to *naturalisation*. We need not question or determine what the foundation of civilization is; it will become apparent *naturally*. We need not ask ourselves what makes us essentially 'civilized'; we already
inhere the qualities that will make us 'civilized' naturally. We need not consciously direct ourselves to achieve 'civilization'. In fact, what we need to do is to direct ourselves from not achieving it. We need to rid the unnatural obstacles that may prevent us from achieving the natural state of 'civilization'. We need to simply let things progress as they would happen naturally if we only let it.

**Self-Forming Activity**

In terms of practice, Fukuzawa suggests a variety of activities which will make us achieve this 'natural' state of 'civilization', which are mostly to be learnt from the 'West'. Although Fukuzawa characterises 'civilization' as a boundless progress, it appears that creating a bounded entity called the 'nation-state' is also a natural stage of reaching 'civilization', since this is what he recommends.

Firstly, since, for Fukuzawa, 'civilization' is equal to the nation's sentiments, one needs to 'take all the human sentiments in the land en masse, compare them over a long period of time, and draw conclusions on the basis of empirical observation.' (Ibid: 50) In order to carry this out, Fukuzawa argues that we need to take up a 'method' which 'is called "statistics" in the West.' (Ibid: 52) Fukuzawa therefore exhorts the interpretation of national sentiments to be measured in terms of 'population'.

Secondly, whilst Fukuzawa admits that regulations are 'so impersonal' (ibid: 121) and 'may be despicable' (ibid: 123), they are 'drawn up to protect the good' (ibid: 121), and the 'advantage of having them far outweighs the catastrophe that would attend their absence' (ibid: 123). Hence, he encourages the adoption of regulating through laws, since they will 'function for the benefit of civilized progress' (ibid: 123).
Thirdly, Fukuzawa states that although we are not 'innately stupid' (ibid: 168) nor 'innately evil' (ibid: 168), we have not been educated to know the principles of 'finance'. Moreover, he states that tradition has wedged a chasm between the 'upper and lower classes' (ibid: 170), and that there is 'pressing economic necessity that we fuse these two parts' (ibid: 170) such that we will be able to know how to deal with 'Japan's wealth' (ibid: 170). Thus, he counsels us to 'accord the accumulation and the expenditure of the national wealth, each of which is equal in value, the equal esteem they deserve' (ibid: 165).

Finally, Fukuzawa stresses the importance of influencing public opinion. However, it should be noted that he has a very particular view of 'public opinion'. He argues that 'national or public opinion is, in reality, the views of the intelligent minority; the ignorant majority simply follow behind like sheep and never give free rein to their ignorance' (ibid: 64). For example, Fukuzawa says, 'those who engineered this [Meiji Restoration] revolution were perhaps a mere ten percent of the 5 million within the samurai class' (ibid: 70). He thus argues that the government should allow for 'freedom of press...[such that they may listen] to the opinion of learned men' (ibid: 71).

Thus, Fukuzawa suggests that the nation-state of 'Japan' should be more thoroughly managed through introducing and finding the spheres of 'population', 'law', 'economy' and 'press'.

Telos

For Fukuzawa, the telos is to reach the spirit or state of 'civilization'. However, as stated earlier, 'civilization' is synonymous to the 'spirit of an entire nation'. Furthermore, 'the essence of a nation is in its national polity' (ibid: 28). Thus, though the 'tranquility of civilization' (ibid: 115) may be achieved 'many thousands of years' (ibid: 115) from now,
the immediate objective is to 'preserve Japan's national polity' (ibid: 28). According to Fukuzawa, the following is the character of Japan's national polity:

> Japan's uniqueness lies only in the fact that she has preserved national polity intact from earliest antiquity and has never been deprived of her sovereignty by a foreign power.

**Document XXXIX. BG, p. 27**

Therefore, the telos is to maintain the uniqueness of Japan's national polity by preserving her antique (which would have been 8 years old at the time of publication) sovereignty.

**Summary**

In sum, a genealogical analysis of BG indicates the following. The *ethical substance* of the text is 'civilization', which, rather than it being a 'substance', is more of a never-ending process that is an assemblage of part man, part animal and part technology; moreover, at the present, it is equal to national independence. The *mode of subjectification*, for now, is relation of emulation to the 'West', and this means to take on an assimilatory and transiental discourse; at a later historical date when we have overcome the 'West', it is naturalisation—in a sense, Fukuzawa assumes that the very process of *mode of subjectification* will become obsolete and disappear. The *self-forming activities* are to introduce social spheres such as 'population', 'economy', 'law' and 'press' to manage 'Japan'. The telos of the project is preserving our national independence.
5.4 Conclusion

As we have seen, the conception of 'Japan' was not an immaculate one. It was a laborious process entailing much strife and tribulation, and during the first decade, schooling was a site for creating the identities of the authorities that would parent it. Japanese government soon took a policy of 'knowing' the 'West', and further, to introduce the 'West' into 'Japan'. There were two facets to taking such a decision. One, the 'West' could provide a 'universal' framework within which the internal differences within 'Japan' could be negotiated. Two, 'Japan' wanted to build a strong nation-state like the western ones.

However, this did not mean that modern Japanese subjecthood was constituted through internalising and imitating the western model of the subject. Rather, it may be said that in the act of translation, the 'West' was reinvented, and that the 'westernised' Japanese subjecthood which was invented was specifically different from the 'western' subjecthood. In THK, Japanese subjecthood was largely constituted through an exhortation to carry out our duties as Japanese national citizens, much in the way of Confucianist code of ethics, where 'universal' existence and principles were cited to legitimate the relativistic and situational authority of the government. In BG, Japanese subjecthood was, again, instructed to recognise itself as a 'citizen', through initially imitating the assimilatory and transiental ways of the 'West', and then to become civilized through allowing ourselves to become what is our natural wont.

However, it should again be emphasised that between 1868 and 1877, the 'Japanese citizens' had yet to be persuaded to become 'Japanese citizens' and to conduct themselves accordingly. What has been described in this chapter are the attempts that were made by various factions of power to create and legitimate their authority at the
site of schooling, and to simultaneously create and define the identity of the 'Japanese subject'. In the following chapter, I shall now turn to a discussion of developments in national schooling between the years of 1879 and 1905, a period when the subjectification of Japanese subjecthood would become actualised.
Site of Education Part II — Governing the 'Japanese' (1879~1905)

I wish I were able to do Japanese ways altogether, or else all foreign. I have the mixture, but it is impossible for me to do so, and so I am afraid that I shall neither wear foreign dress or do foreign ways well after I get out of the habit, and that I shall never do Japanese ways. I can't do everything in Japanese ways. Thus I am placed in a peculiar situation. Father says it is surprising now, how sudden a reaction is now taking place in Japan. A few years ago everything foreign was liked, and the cry was progress. Now, Japanese things are being put ahead, and everything foreign is not approved of, simply because it is foreign. There does not seem to be so much desire to study English as there was, and there is much ill feeling against the foreign population. Even in music, people are taking up and learning the koto and samisen [musical instruments popular during the Edo period, somewhat akin to harp and guitar] more than ever. If we wish the government to endow for us an English school for girls, we have come home at a bad time. Japan is poorer than ever, and this going back, as it were, which we hope is only a necessary reaction, makes the thing difficult. I don't mean Japanese are ever going back to the old ways of twenty years ago, but they don't want any more of foreign ways than they have now. Oh! Mrs. Lanman, I can't be of any use. I feel very discouraged and bewildered, and sometimes think and say that as I can't help anything here, perhaps it were better for me had I never left Japan—only grown up contented and with no thought of a better condition. But then I know I ought not to think that....
So wrote Tsuda Ume to her American foster parents, the Lanmans, under whose care she had experienced life in America between the ages of 5 to 15. Having made the crossing to America as the youngest *ryugakusei* member of the Iwakura Mission in 1873, Ume's life abroad had been financed by the Ministry of Education, and she had returned to 'Japan' with a sense of mission that her lifework was to disseminate western ways and knowledge to 'Japan'. However, the 'Japan' she returned to in 1883 was quite different from the one she had left in 1873, and Ume was to find herself in a rather perplexing and lamentable position of being regarded as something of an impropriety.\(^{51}\)

And yet, as jarring as this experience may have been for her personally, one should stop to wonder if, from a 'patriotic' point of view, Ume should have mourned the 'return' to the 'Japanese' way that she was witnessing. On the contrary, perhaps she should have rejoiced it, for this—that the 'Japanese' people were now willingly inventing a 'past' which they could 'return' to—is the clearest indication that by 1883, some notion of being 'Japanese' was in circulation. Thus, while the government may initially have encountered a rather unenthusiastic reception for their notion of 'Japanese citizenship', it would appear that by the 80's, they had managed to attain initial acceptance to the notion of the 'Japanese'. The task now was to further nurture and give form and content to this budding national identity.

In this chapter, I describe some of the techniques through which the 'Japanese' were subjectified between 1879 and 1905, through focusing on developments in state elementary schooling, particularly the curriculum of ethics. I will be arguing that Japanese subjecthood was constituted through the detailed policing of their everyday

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\(^{51}\) At least, for a while that is. Ume would begin a private women's school for learning English, which is now the Tsuda Juku University. In fact, many private schools started by prominent Meiji intellectuals are now prestigious universities, including Keio University, originally established by Fukuzawa Yukichi in 1863, and Waseda University by Okuma Shigenobu in 1881.
conduct or performance as Japanese citizens, and that less emphasis was put on cultivating their inner essence through ‘thought’. In fact, we shall see that their essence as a ‘Japanese’ was provided by the notion of themselves as a unique race, and thus required no cultivation through ‘thought’, but was given as ‘natural’.

### 6.1 The Problem of Not Governing

As described in Chapter 5, Meiji authorities had first made a very ambitious attempt to introduce the infrastructure of a French schooling system into Japan. However, given the actuality of the situation in Japan, the plan outlined in *Gakusei (Education Act)* of 1872 was not a practicable one. For one, besides the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic, the school curriculum set forth had included the ‘new’ knowledge of the West, such as geography, physics, geometry, chemistry, and so forth, but being far removed from the everyday needs of the general public, they were not immediately useful. In addition, the imperative for the instantaneous transformation of Japan from a feudal to modern society gave rise to a number of financial burdens on the public, including school tax and even coercive donations to schools for some, and all else aside, the tuition fee was very expensive; given their standard of living, this alone was too heavy a burden to shoulder for the average ‘citizen’. (Cf. Sato & Aiba 1985: 133)

Moreover, it was difficult to prevail over the ingrained values of Tokugawa feudalism, which viewed education as an aspiration exclusively for men of samurai class or above, and not as a matter of necessity for those with farmer, artisan or merchant background, or for women. Indeed, the phenomena of labouring children was regarded as a 'normal' state of affairs during the Edo period, and it was difficult to convince their carers that it was their responsibilities as ‘parents’ to finance their studies. As a result, for the most
part, national schooling tended to be regarded as a rather unnecessary and expensive
endeavour, and all but a minority would not or could not even attend elementary
schools.

Indeed, it was the case that school attendance rates at the end of the *Bunmei Kaika*
period were still well below 50%:

<table>
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<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
<th>Average (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Meiji 10 (1877)</td>
<td>55.97</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>39.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 15 (1882)</td>
<td>66.99</td>
<td>33.04</td>
<td>50.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 20 (1887)</td>
<td>60.31</td>
<td>28.26</td>
<td>45.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 25 (1892)</td>
<td>71.66</td>
<td>36.46</td>
<td>55.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 28 (1895)</td>
<td>76.65</td>
<td>43.87</td>
<td>61.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 30 (1897)</td>
<td>80.67</td>
<td>50.86</td>
<td>66.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 33 (1900)</td>
<td>90.35</td>
<td>71.73</td>
<td>81.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 35 (1902)</td>
<td>95.80</td>
<td>87.00</td>
<td>91.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 40 (1907)</td>
<td>98.53</td>
<td>96.14</td>
<td>97.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 45 (1912)</td>
<td>98.80</td>
<td>97.62</td>
<td>98.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chart 1. School Attendance Rates between Meiji 10 (1877) and Meiji 45 (1912) (Sato & Katsumata 1985: 139)*

In fact, it is questionable to what extent schooling of the early Meiji period, even when
they were actually attended and held, effectively carried out the objective of educating
'good citizens'. For example, Uchida Roan\(^2\) gives the following account of his childhood
memories of attending *shushin* classes sometime around Meiji 10 (1877):

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\(^2\) Uchida Roan: A Russian literature specialist and pioneering author in the genre of 'social literature'. Literary works include *Shakai Hyakumen-so* (*One Hundred Faces of Society*) and *Baku no Shita* (*Tongue of a Tapir*).
At that time the Kyoiku Chokugo (Imperial Rescript on Education) didn't exist. Shushin classes were held once a week, usually one hour on Saturdays, but since there existed no appropriate standards of ethics, we were repeatedly told cliché ethical stories.... Our teacher at that time liked to tell stories. On Sundays, when we would visit the local storytelling stall, our teacher was sure to be there. Enjoying it so much, he used to be inventive and tell us stories based on Taiko-ki [: a feudal tale concerning the rise of Toyotomi Hideyoshi from his humble birth as a lowly retainer to the most powerful man in Japan] or Gishi-den [: a feudal tale concerning the 48 loyal retainers of Akaho domain, who gave up their lives to redeem their daimyo lord's honour]. Because the climactic moments told in the Nanryu style of non-non zui-zui [: a traditional storytelling protocol or convention] was so engrossing, the students used to get so absorbed, with our arms on the desk propping up our chins, and our mouths wide open. Had these stories been of the same ilk as The Seven Spears of Sengatake or The Sake Bottle of Akagaki Genzo [i.e., stories that endorse the Confucianist ethics of loyalty and filial piety], probably even today's Ministry of Education would not have objected. However, by the end, we were getting stories about Nezumi Kozo [: an infamous spy and thief of the late-Edo period jailed in 1832] or Kunisasa Chuji [: (1810–50) a masculine archetype of the late-Edo period who was crucified for treason] during shushin classes. Shushin classes had the reputation of being boring in every school and were detested, but at our elementary school, Shushin classes were pretty popular.

Document XLI. Uchida Roan's recollection of attending shushin classes as a child around Meiji 10 (1877).
(Quoted in Endo 1985: 465)

This indicates that despite the government's awareness that their eventual aim must be to invigilate the site of schooling more pervasively, and to educate the commoners to become good 'Japanese citizens', their aim had hardly been actualised in the first decade of Meiji.

However, on the other hand, as a result of Bunmei Kaika, Japanese enlightenment thinkers' translations of 'western' forms of knowledge and subjecthood had begun to make an impact—rather adversely, from the from the point of view of the government—on the adult segments of the samurai class and rural landowners. The 1880's saw the upsurge of Jiyu Minken Undo (Movement for Free and Popular Rights). This movement had begun shortly after the Meiji Restoration and had coalesced in 1881 to form the Jiyu-toh (Freedom Party). Members called on the government for the formation of an
elected national assembly and the promulgation of a constitution which upheld democracy. This movement therefore employed the discourse of self-autonomy and democratic rights of 'western' texts. Thus, although the 'West' had previously been utilised by those in authority to surmount the differences within itself, now, the discourse of 'westernisation' was now threatening to disintegrate the very togetherness of the authority.

These were the two facets to the problem that the new government faced. On the one hand, most of the population did not possess the 'modern' practical skills of a good 'citizen'. On the other, a significant portion of the upper echelons of the society had taken 'western' discourses too much to their heart—from the point of view of the government that is—and were deemed to be too far too 'western'. Common to both of these problematic was that the new government had yet to invent the means through which they could properly govern both of these segments of society.

6.2 The Emergence of Shushin as a State Apparatus

In addressing this problem, elementary schooling, and, the curriculum of ethics in particular, was to become one of the main sites where there was a convergence of various techniques for shaping and fashioning the Japanese subject—a subject which could effectively act as good Japanese citizens and lucratively contribute to the profit of the nation. That the curriculum of ethics, termed shushin (conducting oneself), would come to hold a paramount position within the elementary schooling system is one major indication as to how it was contrived and implemented, as I shall be discussing in the following.
Shushin in Elementary Schooling

At the beginning of Meiji 13 (1880), the government had yet to clarify wherein the objectives of elementary schooling lain and to specify curricular and attendance requirements. In fact, during the Bunmei Kaika period, when the central government did issue edicts regarding education, they had been issued in the form of 'guidelines' rather than as strict laws, indicating that the central government did not possess the actual means to enforce their volition. Thus, the local administrative bodies could make decisions independently, and each prefecture did, in fact, issue a far greater amount of 'teaching guidelines' than did the central government.

For example, although the central government had issued a guideline in 1872 directing the installation of shushin koju (oral instruction to conducting oneself) as a school curriculum (see Chapter 5, p. 218), a survey of the prefectural teaching guidelines issued before 1880 would not suggest the presence of such a course. Rather, most often, honyaku ethical texts were given as materials to teach dokusho (reading and writing) classes, or less frequently, given as teaching materials in a subject course titled mondo (question and answer)\(^5\). (Cf. Naka, 1962: 571) This indicates that shushin, as a site for subjectifying the 'Japanese citizen', had not concretised itself as a singular subject to be taught for its own sake.

\(^5\) The most frequently named text as reading material in the teaching guidelines issued by the prefectures was Taisei Hanzen Kunmo (Western Instruction and Enlightenment on Promoting Goodness). To a lesser extent, Domo Oshiegusa (Children's Enlightenment Storybook) and Issopu Monogatari (Aesop Tales) were also preferred texts, and so were Shushin-ron (Theory on Shushin), Saikoku Risshihen (A Compilation of Western Nation's [Expositions on] Self-Help), and Kancho Zatsuwa (Miscellaneous Stories of Exhortation). (Naka 1962: 571-2)
Recognising the inadequacy of the educational policy carried out under Gakusei, in September of Meiji 12 (1879), the Kyoiku-rei (Education Ordinance) was issued, where shushin was designated as one of the courses that should be taught at elementary school. Article 3 of the document stated:

Shogakko (Elementary School) is a place where children receive ordinary education; its curriculum include introductory lessons in dokusho (reading & writing), shuji (calligraphy), sanjutsu (arithmetic), chiri (geography), rekishi (history), shushin (conducting oneself), and so forth. According to the situation of the area, classes in keiga (drafting), shoka (singing), taiso (exercise) may be included, as well as general introduction to butsuri (physics), seiri (physiology), hakubutsu (cosmic things), and so forth. Moreover, for girls, classes such as saiho (sewing) should be established.

Document XLII. Article 3 of Kyoiku-rei (Education Ordinance), issued on September Meiji 12 (1879) (Quoted in Okuda 1985: 6)

Whereas the Gakusei had been modelled after the French educational system which was highly centralised, Kyoiku-rei imitated the American education system which delegated an extended degree of autonomy to the provincial or local authority. The minimum school attendance was brought down from the eight years specified in Gakusei to four years, at four months a year. In fact, there was even an article which stated that those who had other means of receiving an education equivalent to elementary schooling would be exempt from attendance, thus making elementary school education more of a personal choice rather than an obligation.

However, the Kyoiku-rei was immediately criticised within the government as being far too freehanded, and in the following year, Kyoiku-rei Kaisei (Revised Education Ordinance) of Meiji 13 (1880) was issued. Like the Gakusei, the goal of the Kyoiku-rei Kaisei was again to achieve centralised control over the education system, but it took a
different strategy for doing so. Whereas Gakusei had aimed to centralise education through introducing a structural framework to the education system, the Kyoiku-rei Kaisei tried to centralise through giving miscellaneous directions on administrative as well as classroom procedures. Revisions included various stipulations to ensure that local authorities would comply with the central government's decisions regarding educational policies. It also specified that those who wanted to be exempted from attending elementary school needed to seek permission from the local administrative authority. Moreover, it also dictated the terms of minimum and maximum attendance of elementary school: minimum attendance was 3 years, the maximum was 6 years, where each school year was specified to be above 32 weeks. It also verified for the first time that the duration of each school day should be between 3 to 6 hours.

In addition, this time, shushin was listed first as a requisite school subject before reading/writing and calligraphy. Moreover, it increased the required time that should be designated to shushin classes from 4 years to the full duration of the 8 years of elementary school, at one and a half hour per week. This indicates that not only was the notion of shushin as an independent school subject to be taught for its own sake established, but that shushin was now understood to take precedence over other school subjects.

Furthermore, the Shogakko-rei (Elementary School Ordinance) issued on 7th October Meiji 23 (1890) stated:
The object of elementary school is in ethical education and basic education as a national citizen, as well as ordinary knowledge and techniques necessary to livelihood, the level being appropriate to the physical development of a child.

Document XLIII. Article 1 of Shogakko-rei (Elementary School Ordinance), issued on October Meiji 23 (1890) (Quoted in Okuda 1985: 7)

Thus, whereas until then, the objective of 'elementary schooling' had only been specified as 'receiving ordinary education' (see Document XLII above), it was now specified as primarily a site of ethical education and then additionally, where basic education is taught to 'national citizens'.

This view of elementary schooling was reiterated a year later in article 1 of Shogakko Kyosoku Taiko (General Outline of Educational Rules for Elementary Schools), issued on 17th November of Meiji 24 (1891). The second article also specifically stated the following in regards to shushin education:
The objective of Shushin, founded upon the purports of the Imperial Rescript on Education, will be to nurture the ryoshin (good sentiments) of children, foster their tokusei (virtuous characteristics) and teach the methods of practising jindo (path of human being). In ordinary elementary school, methods of practising kotei (respect for elders), yuai (friendship/brotherhood), jihi (charity), shinjitsu (sincerity), reikei (decorum), giyu (heroism), kyoken (humility) will be taught, and in particular, cultivation of a conviction for sonno aikoku (reverence for the Emperor and patriotism) will be its charge; moreover, a summary of the responsibilities and duties toward the nation will be instructed, combined with a direction of what society emphasises as reprehensible, as righteous, as shameful; children must be guided and exhorted to pursue the purity of fuzoku (manner and customs) and hinii (dignity). In upper elementary school, the gist of the previously stated items must be propagated and the reinforcement of the value of cultivation will be executed. For female children especially, there should be particular attention paid to nurturing the value of chastity. In teaching shushin, familiar sayings, proverbs, exemplary stories of good conduct, etc. will be imparted, thereby elucidating dis/encouragement; teachers must themselves be an exemplar to students, exerting steady influence upon students.

Document XLIV. Article 2 of Shogakko Kyosoku Taiko (General Outline of Educational Rules for Elementary Schools), issued on November Meiji 24 (1891) (Quoted in Naka 1962: 697)

Thus, we may conclude that between 1880's and 90's, the contours of elementary schooling was gradually taking shape as a state apparatus, defined primarily as a site for teaching how to become good Japanese citizens, particularly through attending shushin classes.

The Emergence of Compulsory Education

Indeed, from the late 1880's, the notion of 'compulsory' education was slowly being introduced into the education system. First introduced in Meiji 19 (1886) in Article 13 of the Shogakko-rei (Elementary School Ordinance), it stated 'it is compulsory for parents, guardians and such to procure ordinary education for the school age children [under their care]', thus introducing the notion of 'compulsory education' for the first time. However, in practice, this policy was hardly implemented at the time, and it was not until August of Meiji 33 (1900), with the issuing of Shogakko-rei (Elementary School
Ordinance) that 'compulsory education' actually became just that: compulsory. The ordinance specified that compulsory would last for the duration of 4 years, clarifying the necessary requirements for attaining a compulsory education degree, and stripped the school curriculum down to four essential subjects. (Cf. Okuda 1985: 8) Finally, in 1907, with the issuing of Shogakko-rei Chu-kaisei (Intermediary Revision to Elementary School Ordinance), compulsory education was made into 6 years. Thus elementary schooling was designated as compulsory to all, where they would be taught to conduct themselves ethically as national citizens.

**Institutionalisation of Textbook Publication**

Moreover, the government increasingly came to take direct command over the contents and publications of textbooks as well. Broadly speaking, the institutionalisation of the authority over the publication and usage of school textbooks can be separated into three periods. They are:

- **1886**
  - Before the existence of the *Kentei Seido* (Textbook Authorisation Board)

- **1886-1903**
  - The era of the *Kentei Seido* (Textbook Authorisation Board)

- **1903-**
  - The era of the *Kokutei Kyokasho Seido* (State-Compiled Textbook System)

![Chart 2. Changes to Institutionalisation of Publication and Usage of School Textbooks (cf. Naka 1967)](image)

In the first period, before the school textbook authorisation system was initiated, neither the publication nor the usage of school textbooks was licensed as such. That is to say, there was no existence of an institutional organ that systematically wielded power over the usage of school textbooks. Teachers were free of formal/official constraints in choosing textbooks, and the publication of textbooks was an autonomous field.
uncensored by an official organ. However, the Kentei Seido (School Textbook Authorising Board) was established in 1887, and this meant that publishers now had to submit their textbook to the authorising board of the government to attain its approval before it could be published and sold—school textbooks on ethics, in particular, began to be under its jurisdiction from the Meiji 20's. However, particularly because of the so-called 'textbook scandal incident' where it emerged that some of the publishing companies were bribing the officials in order to acquire publication approval, members of the Diet demanded stricter control. Thus, the Shogakko-rei Shiko Kisoku Chu-kaisei (Intermediary Revision to Enforcing Elementary School Ordinance) of 1903 introduces the Kokutei Kyoiku Seido (State-Compiled Textbook System). Under the State-Compiled Textbook System, textbooks were standardised to the extent that a single version of school textbook compiled by appointed members of Ministry of Education was distributed to all elementary schools, and in 1904, the first state-compiled textbooks were published.

These broad changes are clearly indicative of the ever-cumulative abilities of Meiji authorities to increasingly invigilate the site of education for the purpose of state-building. In the following, I would like to discuss some of the forms of techniques through which Japanese subjecthood was constituted.

6.2.1 The 'Transformation' to Jingi Chuko?

In August, Meiji 12 (1879) the government issued the Kyogaku Seishi (The Sacred Principles of Education) (Ministry of Education 1879) which outlined the government's policies on education. The first part of the Kyogaku Seishi, titled Kyogaku Taishi (The Great Principles of Education), stated the following:
The central creeds of education are thus. To clarify jingi chuko (duty and filial piety), master knowledge and virtuosity, upon which to render service to jindo (path of human being), according to the great principles of the national canons of our ancestral teachings, which are to be followed by all, above and below. At the beginning of the Meiji period, founded upon the fine idea which, in the main, was to break bad habits and spread knowledge to the world, [we] temporarily followed the lead of the West, and although [the intent was to] blend the efficacy of old and new, this has clogged [our way]; jingi chuko was left behind, and since western ways are in conflict with this, it is feared that in the end, it is possible that moral obligations between sovereign and subject, father and child will be forgotten. This goes against our national teachings. Therefore, from now on, founded upon ancestral guiding texts, [we will] devote [ourselves] to clarifying jingi chuko; dotoku (virtuous) teachings will refer to Confucianism; people will value seijitsu hinko (sincerity and good conduct), and each curricular subject will be taught to develop [these qualities] according to their adequate level of learning; [if we] implement [the teaching of] morality and virtuosity properly, and spread the right teachings throughout the world, our nation, founded upon an independent spirituality, will have nothing to feel shameful of inside as well as outside the nation.


This text therefore clearly disclosed a shift in the government's educational policy from that undertaken during the Bunmei Kaika period, and reinstated the Confucianist ethics of 'duty and filial piety' as the 'central creeds of education'. Moreover, there was a particular opprobrium for the 'fine idea' endorsed during the early Meiji period, 'which in the main, was to break bad habit'. This was a direct quote of a part of article 4 of Gokajo no Seimon (Five Articles of the Imperial Oath) (see inside Document LXV, p. 292 below for the translation) which had been issued by the Meiji government in 1868, and had been particularly quoted by figures involved in the Freedom and Rights Movement. Thus, the previous emphasis on '[blending] the efficacy of old [i.e., traditional Japan] and new [i.e., West]' was now replaced by a primacy put on the 'moral obligations between sovereign and subject, father and child'. That is to say, whereas previously, the government had upheld a policy of establishing relations of emulation
between 'Japan' and the 'West', now the emphasis was to strengthen and endorse a relation of reciprocity between Japanese subjects.

Furthermore, in the first of the *Shogaku Jomoku Niken (Two Clauses on Elementary Schooling)* which followed *Kyogaku Taishi*, it was stated:

The kokoro (heart or feeling) of jingi chuko (duty and filial piety) is something that everyone possesses, but this has to be sensitised and cultivated in the nozui (brain) from a very early age. In order to achieve this end, present-day elementary schools are using pictures. Therefore, this method should continue to be employed. That is to say, pictorial representations of historical figures known for embodying qualities of jingi chuko should be displayed, and their deeds should be exhorted upon with an emphasis on qualities of chuko, such that this is embedded in their brains. Through following this procedure of firstly cultivating the kokoro of chuko, and then explaining various things later, education will be carried out in its proper order.

Thus, it was neither rationality nor civility that would be the 'natural' given of the Japanese subject. Instead, it was the 'feeling' of 'duty and filial piety' which 'everyone possesses'—*i.e.*, 'naturally'—which should be cultivated at the site of elementary schooling.

This text is frequently cited as an important turning point in how educational policy of the government was re-defined. However, while it may be true that there was an overt shift in the stated principles of the government—a rejection of the 'West' in favour of 'duty and filial piety'—it is debatable whether this shift was as radical as it would seem. For the two premises of subjectification clarified in *Kyogaku Seishi*—that of relation of
reciprocity and the assumption of the inherent nature of 'ethics'—was, as I analysed earlier in Chapter 5, already detectable in the *Bunmei Kaika* texts written by the Japanese enlightenment thinkers such as Mitsukuri Rinsho and Fukuzawa Yukichi. Moreover, we may state without equivocation that the political motive of both the policy of 'westernisation' and the advocacy of *Jingi Chuko* were the same—to create a strong nation with willing citizens called 'Japan'. Thus, I would argue that the 'transformation' to *jingi chuko* was not a fundamental one, but can be mapped out along a continuum in the project to create and govern the 'Japanese citizen'.

6.2.2 The Performance of the 'Japanese Citizen'

However, that the starting point for speaking about 'Japanese citizens' could no longer be provided by transcendental or normative concepts or values in 'thought' did mean that the use of certain self-forming activities—such as delving into the 'inner' self, appealing to one's rationality—for disciplining the subject was foreclosed from use to the Meiji authorities. A different mode for disciplining the Japanese subject was required—those which assembled at the site of the 'body' and instructed its performance. That is to say, 'thought'—*i.e.*, the 'inner self'—would not be the premise upon which 'truths' would be established. In its place the 'body' would be the basis and the starting point for founding 'truths', and it would be through disciplining the performance of the 'body' that 'truths' would be created. In this section, I would like to discuss how such a disciplinary mode was manifested in the format of the ethical school textbooks endorsed by the government between 1879–1883.

On 4 May Meiji 14 (1881), the government had issued the document, *Shogakko Kyosoku Koryo* (Outline of Educational Rules for Elementary Schools), which further
enumerated the specifics of how elementary schooling should be carried out. Article 10 in particular stated the following regarding the curriculum of shushin:

In elementary years, simple proverbs and true stories, and in junior and high school years, more difficult proverbs and true stories will be utilised in order to cultivate the tokusei (ethical characteristics) of children. In addition, teachings of etiquette are required.

Document XLVII. Article 10 of Shogakko Kyosoku Koryo (Outline of Educational Rules for Elementary Schools), issued on May Meiji 14 (1881) (Quoted in Yamazumi 1990: 240)

This text therefore designated that lessons in shushin classes should be administered in two modulations, one, teaching 'simple proverbs and true stories', and two, making 'etiquette' a required part of shushin teaching. According to the above-stated policy, two types of ethical school textbooks were compiled and edited by the Ministry of Education between Meiji 16 (1883) and Meiji 17 (1884):

1. Shogaku Shushin-sho (Text on Shushin for Elementary School) (Ministry of Education 1883, 1884), and

2. Shogaku Saho-sho (Text on Etiquette for Elementary School) (Ministry of Education 1883).

In the following, I would like to discuss some events and texts which precipitated these publications, and informed its contents.

Learning by Rote Performance

In so far as the composition of Shogaku Shushin-sho (Text on Shushin for Elementary School) (Ministry of Education 1883, 1884) is concerned, we may say that the prototype
was provided by Nishimura Shigeki [1828–1902]. The first man appointed to managing the Ministry of Education’s Editorial Office which was established in Meiji 13 (1880), and also an imperial tutor at that time, Nishimura had never agreed with the policy of ‘westernisation’ executed in the first decade of Meiji. Rather, Nishimura argued that educating the kokoro (sentiment) of filial piety and loyalty was ‘akin to nurturing the growth of the root and trunk of a tree’, and knowledge and technology were merely ‘its branches and leaves’. (Naka 1962: 587)

In order to implement a 'nurturing' of the sentiments of filial piety and loyalty through shushin classes, Nishimura argued that students should read out loud and memorise proverbial sayings and excerpts from western and eastern thinkers and texts. Given that ethical school textbooks which would suit such a teaching format did not yet exist, Nishimura needed to furnish an example. Thus, in April Meiji 13 (1880), he compiled and published Shogaku Shushin-kun (Maxims of Elementary Shushin) (2 volumes) (Shigeki 1880), a text which prosaically listed various proverbial sayings and excerpts taken from Japanese, Chinese and Western cannons. While these excerpts (including those of Rongo, Moshi, Newton, Pestalozzi, Confucius, etc.) required a level of literacy which could not be expected in elementary school children, no explicatory texts were attached to help the children to actually understand its meanings. In fact, in the first item in the 'Explanatory Notes' which precedes the text, Nishimura stated:
The text of a shushin learning should be carefully read and memorised by the student. Since they are very meaningful, even if there are words that young students cannot understand, if one memorises them and does not forget them, as one grows older, one will slowly come to understand the meaning. It may be that [for some] even if one diligently seeks the meaning throughout one's life, one may not reach an understand.

Document XLVIII. The first item in ‘Explanatory Notes’ in Shogaku Shushin-kun (Maxims of Elementary Shushin) (2 volumes), published in Meiji 13 (1880) (Reprinted in Kaigo & Naka 1962: 7)

From this, we may infer that from the early 1880's, in shushin classes, the students were to repeat the proverbs and excerpts of canonical texts, regardless of whether they 'understood' it or not, and memorise the words. That is to say, this text conceived shushin classes as a site where students are subjectified through memorising the words of the text, and not as a site where they come to 'understand' transcendentnal or normative values in 'thought'. Hence, rather than characterise it as rote memorisation, it is more appropriate to say that the students were to be subjectified through a process of rote performance of uttering words, which they did not necessarily need to understand.

Teaching Etiquette

The antecedent of Shogaku Saho-sho (Text on Etiquette for Elementary School) (Ministry of Education 1883) may be found even earlier, with the very commencement of the government's efforts to introduce a 'modern' elementary schooling system into 'Japan'.

As discussed in Chapter 5, although schools for children had existed during the Edo period, the introduction of the 'modern' schooling format in itself was something of a novelty. In the case of teragoya, for instance, one teacher would preside over a room where children of various ages would carry out their lessons individually. However,
under the 'modern' schooling system, 'students' would be spatially and temporally organised in such a way that one teacher would preside over a group of children of the same age for a set duration of time. But such a schooling system had never been in practice before, and very few pupils and teachers knew how to conduct themselves within the 'modern' schooling system. This must have been immediately apparent to the government, for in Meiji 6 (1873), the government had published a manual on how teachers and students should conduct themselves in a modern classroom. The following is a translation of the manual:
1. Get up early in the morning; wash face and hand; wash out the mouth; brush the hair; pay respect to parents; after completing things related to breakfast, get ready to go to school; firstly, put in order writing brush, paper, reading materials and such, and make sure that nothing has been forgotten. Moreover, never forget to give greetings to parents when leaving and when returning.

2. Always arrive in school well before the commencement of class time.

3. When arriving in school and taking seat, pay respect to the teacher.

4. Having taken seat, do not let the mind wander but give full attention to the teacher’s lessons, and when sitting, not even for a moment, do not look outside or engage in conversation or such.

5. Do not enter the classroom freely without the teacher’s permission.

6. When the time for lesson comes, take a seat at one’s designated desk and wait for teacher’s instructions.

7. If one arrives in school tardy, do not enter the classroom freely but tell the teacher reasons for tardiness and await teacher’s instructions.

8. When entering or leaving, open and close shoji, fusuma (sliding paper door) and such quietly; when handling reading materials, be as careful as possible and do not damage it; when turning a page in a reading material, do not damage the paper with one’s nails, and do not use saliva to turn the page.

9. Daily come to school with face, hand, clothing and such kept clean.

10. Those of students should embrace the teacher’s words, and in everything receive instructions thereof; laws which the teacher lays down are completely unimpeachable; there is no leeway to display selfishness or arrogance in this.

11. During class, if one wishes to state one’s opinion, raise one’s hand and make this known; after receiving permission from the teacher, one may thus speak.

12. Do not have slanderous discussions or have unprofitable disputes with old friends. Moreover, practices of academic discussions should not be awkward but words must be respected and do not lose courtesy; do not speak obnoxiously; do not use words which are insolent or haughty.

13. When meeting an elder or a friend and any other acquaintance, greet them, making effort to be polite; if wearing a hat, take it off.

14. If there is need to go to the toilet, take heart not to dirty the toilet or clothing.

15. Enter someone’s room only after seeking permission.

16. Needless to say, within school precincts but also in other places as well, relations with each other should be conducted with kindness; greetings, receptions and such should be conducted with humility; conduct must not be rude or insolent.

17. Do not dally around or loiter aimlessly on one’s way somewhere; do not see things which are of no use; do not scurry around; if coming upon a carriage drawn by a young horse and such, quickly move to the side and get out of its way, and make sure that one does not get hurt either.

As can be seen, the text gave detailed instructions on how a student should conduct him/herself, from the moment s/he gets up in the morning, to how s/he should prepare
to go to school, how to conduct him/herself in a classroom setting, to how s/he should make his/her way back from school to home. Little was left to the imagination as to how 'modern' pupils and teachers behave within a 'modern' classroom.

At the time that it was published, though, this manual was not conceived as an 'ethical' textbook per se, but was simply a practical measure taken by the government to inform how group teaching occurs in 'modern' schooling system. However, from the 1880's, the sorts of practical advise on conduct described above would be inserted into schooling as *ethical teachings*, as a part of a technology that governs through instructing the performance of the Japanese body. Thus, *Shogaku Saho-sho (Text on Etiquette for Elementary School)* was, in style as well as content, approximately the same to those of *Shogaku Seito Kokoroe (Instructions to Elementary School Pupils)* (Ministry of Education 1873), though it additionally had a section on how to conduct one's relation with the Emperor, and also gave more detailed instructions on conduct not directly related to school, such as how to eat, receive guests, and so forth.

In sum, we may see that from the beginning of the 1880's, the Japanese citizen was disciplined at the site of elementary school through two ways, both of which convened at the site of the 'body': one, through the rote performance of uttering words, and two, through instructing the everyday conduct of the Japanese citizen through lessons in etiquette.

6.2.3 'Modernising' the 'Japanese Body'

Now, let us take a moment to briefly recap the argument I have made thus far. Firstly, I argued that the educational policy of the Meiji government from the 1880's was to endorse the Confucianist notions of 'duty and filial piety'—*i.e.*, relations of reciprocity
between Japanese subjects, rather than finding it on transcendental or normative conceptions in 'thought'. Secondly, I argued that such form of subjecthood entailed developing disciplinary techniques which convened at the site of the 'body' rather than 'thought', and I illustrated how this was done—through detailed instructions on conduct and enforcing rote performance.

However, this should beget us to ponder over a rather important theoretical point. That is to say, if 'Japanese citizenship' was not defined through basing it upon a 'modern' inner-self which 'thinks' of itself as rational or civil (as in the West), how could it define itself as a 'modern' entity? Of course, my previous discussion should already suggest an answer to this query. The 'body', just as 'thought', has a history of its own, and it was the 'Japanese body' that was 'modernised'. In this section, I would like to discuss how the 'modern Japanese body' came to be defined within elementary schooling.

In addressing this issue, I would like to recall the analysis done by Hunter and Jones & Williamson on European schooling (which I reviewed earlier in Chapter 5, p. 196) as a way of framing my discussion. That is to say, in this section, I would like to address the following two questions in turn: One, did modernising the Japanese body entail a process of redeploying exclusive practices of self-aestheticism unto the whole population, as Hunter (1988) has argued regarding European schooling? More specifically, did the form of governance that the government made as its policy—that of rote performance and instructing conduct—have any 'ancestry', so to speak, in any particular 'class' originating in Tokugawa society? Two, did the 'modernisation' of the 'Japanese body' inscribe new 'class' differences, as Jones & Williamson (1979) has argued? Or, to frame the question in a manner more relevant to my own field of
analysis, were 'new' differences of the 'body'—be it 'class' or not—instituted under the new schooling system? I shall offer my answers to these questions in the following.

**Teaching the Etiquette of the Oraimono**

Firstly, let us note that well before etiquette was officially declared to be an integral part of the curriculum of *shushin* in Meiji 14 (1881), publications of etiquette books, or books of instruction, known as *oraimono*⁵⁴, had been a flourishing trade in the Edo period. These books, which offered practical advice and instructions on how one should conduct oneself in everyday life, were widely read by the middle to upper strata of the samurai and rich merchant classes, who could afford to buy books and were literate. (Okazaki-Ward 1995) Hence, for those belonging to the middle to upper strata of Tokugawa society, the form of governance which disciplines through bodily instruction was nothing new. It was only new to those segments of society who were illiterate or had not been able to afford such books.

Secondly, let us also note that coinciding with the government's declaration that etiquette should be made an official part of *shushin* class, the Tokyo administrative government commissioned two prominent *oraimono* 'specialists', Ogasawara Kiyomu and Mizuno Tadao, to write a book on etiquette, called *Shogaku Onna Reishiki (Elementary Departments for Women)*, published in Meiji 14 (1881). The prevalent influence that this particular text had on how 'etiquette' in general was conceived may be inferred from the fact that although the government had termed their book of etiquette 'saho-sho', many of the etiquette books published in the 1880's followed the convention set by this book, and were termed 'reishiki' or 'reiho'; only later, would

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⁵⁴ It is rather difficult to translate this word, but the closest approximation would be something like 'passage things'. In other words, it may be translated as 'manuals for finding one's way' or 'important matters related to how one traverses (through life)'.
etiquette books come to be unified under the collective term of 'saho-sho'. (Naka 1962: 591-2) Thus, this would indicate that the tradition of oraimono had a great impact on how etiquette was conceived in modern Japanese schooling system.

With this in mind, let us take a look at the table of contents of Shogaku Joreshiki (Elementary Forms of Feminine Department (1882), which was also commissioned by the Tokyo prefectural government, and is a simplified version of Shogaku Onna Reishiki (Elementary Departments for Women):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing-Staying-Advancing-Receding</th>
<th>Proper Observance in Advancing and Offering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• How to stand up</td>
<td>• How to serve first course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to walk</td>
<td>• How to serve second and third course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to sit</td>
<td>• How to serve relish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to bow</td>
<td>• Re-offering rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to change direction while</td>
<td>• Re-offering fluid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sitting</td>
<td>• How to serve tray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to pass in front of or in</td>
<td>• How to serve alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>back of people</td>
<td>• How to serve broth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to open and close sliding</td>
<td>• How to serve appetiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doors</td>
<td>• How to remove first, second, third</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to give greetings when</td>
<td>course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standing</td>
<td>• How to serve hot water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to receive guests</td>
<td>• How to serve <em>maccha</em> tea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offering and Removing Things</th>
<th>Proper Observance in Drinking and Eating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• How to offer and place tobacco</td>
<td>• How to have tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tray</td>
<td>• How to have sweets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to offer and place brazier</td>
<td>• How to receive food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to offer and place sweets</td>
<td>• How to receive alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to offer and place tea</td>
<td>• How to hold chopsticks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to offer and place books,</td>
<td>• How to drink broth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volumes and such</td>
<td>• How to eat rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to offer and place writing</td>
<td>• How to drink fluid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>papers and ink-case</td>
<td>• How to eat in turn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to eat rice</td>
<td>• How to use a toothpick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to receive <em>maccha</em> tea</td>
<td>• How to receive hot water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attending-Intermediating</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• How to handle a candle holder</td>
<td>• Do not step on or step over things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to dress <em>kosode</em>-type</td>
<td>in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kimono and gown</td>
<td>• Discretion in words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to dress <em>hakama</em>-type</td>
<td>• Discretion in leaving with someone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kimono</td>
<td>else</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How to handle a hanging picture</td>
<td>• Discretion in blowing nose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• As regards to eating round things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How to use a fan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Discretion when smoking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Be moderate in politeness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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As can be inferred from above, the text gave very laborious directions to the conduct of the body, down to the minutest detail. For example, on the performance of standing up alone, the text gave the following advice:

**How to Stand Up**

Put right hand on the thigh, put the fingertips of the left hand closely next to the thigh, raise the hips and simultaneously put up the toes of the feet. Raise the right thigh a little bit, and as the body rises, draw the left foot together and stand up.


Interestingly enough, in this text, the 'body' was not overtly defined as the body of a Japanese citizen, but only as a 'body' which performs the prescribed gestures, perhaps indicating that the authors of the text, oraimono specialists, were not themselves in possession of a national identity. Nevertheless, that it was commissioned by the Tokyo administrative government for the purpose of using it in modern elementary schools, and that some of the items listed above, such as how to eat or how to receive guests, were incorporated into *Shogaku Saho-sho (Text on Etiquette for Elementary School)* (Ministry of Education 1883) would lead to the following conclusion. It indicates that such forms of discipline were carried over from Tokugawa culture to the site of the nation-state, and that the exclusive caste practice of self-aestheticism of the middle to upper strata of Tokugawa society were redeployed for the management of the 'Japanese citizen'. In a sense then, we may argue that 'modernising' the 'Japanese body' entailed erasing the feudalistic class differences inscribed at the site of the 'body', and inscribed a uniformity to 'Japanese bodies' such that they all performed according
to the gestural codes of the upper to middle strata of the Tokugawa society. In short, modern 'Japanese bodies' were not intended to have 'class' identities.

Differentiating the Japanese Body

So if not 'class' then, how was the 'modern Japanese body' differentiated? What differences were inscribed within the 'Japanese body'? What 'bodies' perform the ethics of loyalty and filial piety? In order to answer these questions, let us turn our attentions to the contents of Yogaku Koyo (Introduction to Elementary Learning) (1881), an elementary ethics textbook written by Motoda Eifu55. The text was structured such that each of its chapters deliberated upon a principle which represented the ethics of filial piety and duty, with 20 chapters in all:

55 Motoda Eifu [1818-91]: Originally born in the Kumamoto domain, Motoda worked in the Imperial Household Ministry for 4 years, and served as the Jiko (palace official and Confucianist tutor to the Emperor) for 8 years.
Document LII. Chapter Headings of *Yogaku Koyo* (Introduction to Elementary Learning), published in Meiji 14 (1881) (Reprinted in Yamazumi 1990: 164)

Each section began with a definition of the 'principle' in question, followed by various excerpts and quotations of Confucianist stories, written in classic Chinese style. In particular, the first chapter began with the opening statement:

> Between heaven and earth, there is no person who does not have a father and mother. From the moment of conception and birth to after growth, in terms of depth of affection and cultivation, parents are peerless. Always remember what is owed to them, be humble, and do one's best to serve them; it is the right *michi* (path) of a child to be devoted to revering them. Thus, *koko* (filial piety) is the foremost principle of *jinrin* (human ethics).

Document LIII. Chapter 1 'Koko (Filial Piety)' of *Yogaku Koyo* (Introduction to Elementary Learning), published in Meiji 14 (1881) (Reprinted in Yamazumi 1990: 164)
In other words, the foremost principle for carrying out the duties of filial piety is for a 'child' to revere his/her 'parents'. I shall be discussing the significance of Chapter 2 below (see p. 291), and for now, let us inspect what the third chapter states:

Since there are men and women in human kind, there is always a husband and a wife. Where there is a husband and wife, there is a father and child, brothers, and these make up the family. The husband manages its outside, and the wife balances its inside. If the husband and wife are in wajun (harmonious order), then the family will be properly ordered. So-called jinrin (human ethics) begins from the husband and wife relation. This, along with chuko (filial piety) is the foremost principle of jinrin (human ethics).

Document LIV. Chapter 3 'Wajun (Harmonious Order)' of Yogaku Koyo (Introduction to Elementary Learning), published in Meiji 14 (1881) (Reprinted in Yamazumi 1990: 180)

This indicates that 'Japanese bodies' were prescribed to perform the ethics of 'duty and filial piety' through their 'family' identities. From this, I would suggest that the 'Japanese body' was defined in terms of their familial position, e.g., as child, mother, husband, older brother, and so forth.

Simultaneously, the hierarchy between these 'familial' subject-positions was also defined through age differences or in terms of degrees of inexperience and experience. For example, one of the first tasks that the Ministry of Education's Editorial Office (established in March of Meiji 13 (1880)) set about was the investigation of what should be deemed 'appropriate' school textbooks, and from August of the same year, they began to issue lists of undesirable texts which were banned from further use.

Understandably enough, given the change in the government's educational policy, many of the ethics textbooks which were banned from use as school textbooks from Meiji 13 (1880) onward were honyaku texts, which, in the first decade of Meiji, had been
authorised by the government.\textsuperscript{56} However, there was another group of textbooks—not honyaku texts but 'traditional' ones—which were also banned. For example, Hagiwara Yutaka's Jokun (Counsel for Women), which comprised 'traditional' ethical ideas, as well as Doshi-kyo (Teachings for Children), a very popular text of the Edo period, were banned. Likewise, Meiji Kosetsu-roku (Meiji Chronicles of Duty and Chastity), which, in Meiji 7 (1874) had been published by the Imperial Household Ministry with the inscription that it had been written with the private approval of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress, was also banned. This book was a compilation of exemplary historical figures that embodied qualities of koshi seppu (children who serve their parents well, women who are chaste). However, some parts of these texts were deemed 'inappropriate', for the reason that they introduced the 'adult world' in a manner too explicit for 'children'. This would indicate that notions of 'children' as being different from 'adult' was being socially-constituted through the organisation of school textbooks. That is to say, 'school textbooks' were now being organised according to the concept that social beings develop according to stages of immaturity to maturity, and that school textbooks should be organised accordingly.

Indeed, this was a view officially formalised in 1891, when the government issued a guideline for how textbooks should be edited and organised:

\textsuperscript{56} The banned honyaku textbooks included Taisei Hanzen Kunmo (Western Instruction and Enlightenment on Promoting Goodness), one of the most widely used ethics textbooks in the first decade of Meiji, and Shushin-ron (Theory on Shushin), which had been one of the first five textbooks authorised and issued by the government in Meiji 5 (1872). The government also prohibited the use of Chishi Kakun (Family Precepts of a Sage) as well as Ishi Shushin-gaku (The Study of Shushin of a Dignitary), for the reason that they introduced American or European conceptions of democracy. Likewise, Fukuzawa Yukichi's texts, Tsuzoku Kokken-ron (A Layman's Guide to the Theory of National Sovereignty) and Tsuzoku Minken-ron (A Layman's Guide to the Theory of Civil Rights), as well as Kato Hiroyuki's Kokutai Shinron (New Theory on National Polity) were also banned due to its emphasis on constitutionalism.
1. The contents of *shushin* school textbooks should be concurrent with article 2 of *Shogakko Kyosoku Taiko* as deemed appropriate.

2. The contents of *shushin* school textbooks will be divided into two: teacher's and student's, and the teacher's school textbook should be such that it is suitable to teach according to the student's school textbook.

3. The contents of *Shushin* school textbooks will be divided into two levels: ordinary elementary school and high elementary school, in high elementary school, textbooks for boys should be separated from that for girls as much as possible; however, in cases where boys and girls will be placed in the same classrooms, the textbooks utilised should not impair the running of the class.

4. The contents of the *shushin* school textbooks should be such that each year, the content should conform to the general framework of *dotoku* (ethics), and with the increase of school year, the content should slowly progress from easy to difficult.

5. The exemplary stories which are printed in the *shushin* school textbooks should be the achievements of the Japanese and be goodness-promoting as much as possible.

6. The texts of *shushin* school textbooks for students should be simple and should match the level of comprehension of children.

7. The pictures in *shushin* school textbooks should be colourful and should augment the promotion of *dotoku* (path of virtue).

Thus, we see differentiation emerging within the notion of the 'Japanese citizen'. They are primarily defined in the position they have within the 'family'. Moreover, this view also comes together with the idea that 'children' or 'pupils' who are young, are different from 'parents' or 'teachers', and must be taught differently. Thus, they are differentiated according to age, education and gender differences. Moreover, these 'family' subject-positions were already part of the samurai culture, so again, we may say that adopting these differences was, in a sense, to adopt the form of subjectification that had been exclusive to the samurai class during the Tokugawa period.
6.2.4 Teaching & Learning Through Embodiment

Based on this notion of the 'familial' Japanese body as being differentiated according to levels of maturity, the late 1880's and 90's saw further development and a form of discipline which converges at the site of the body, and subjectification was to increasingly hone in on the body, and ethics would be seen as embodiment. In this section, I will be discussing developments in pedagogical practices.

Teaching Through Emulation

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the importation of Pestalozzian theories on education had begun during the Bunmei Kaika period, and these had originally been a means to incorporate a way of being which emphasised the existence of a inner-self, where educational methods were means of cultivating the inner-self. However, although the 1880's is known in Japanese historiography as the 'Golden Age of Pestalozzianism', 'western' theories on education were, in fact, utilised to govern conduct, and not as a means of inculcating a 'westernised' form of being.

Let us, for example, examine Kaisei Kyoju-jutsu (The Revised Art of Teaching)—a well known teaching manual published in June Meiji 16 (Wakabayashi & Shirai 1883). The text states in the Preface:
The application of psychological principles to education was first founded by Pestalozzi. It was further developed and introduced by Fröbel and Agassis. Of recent times, Spencer, Bain and such have thoroughly proven that the foundations of education should be provided by psychology. Thus, the efficacy of Pestalozzi has become more apparent, and all expositions on education in Europe and America, though there may be slight differences in opinions, are provided within this framework.

This type of influence has greatly stimulated the minds of our national education thinkers, and swept away the tradition of empty recitation and memorisation, but sufficient time has not passed to inculcating a tendency develop the sentiments in teaching methods.

Thus, the text clearly stated that the 'psychological principles' of Pestalozzism must be implemented through the refinement of appropriate teaching methods, and at the beginning of the text, the nine principles of Pestalozzianism are given as follows:

1. Animation is the inborn nature of a child. Train him through activity. Train him through hand.
2. Develop the power of sentiment in accordance with the natural order. First, create the sentiments, and afterward, give it sustenance.
3. Begin with the five senses. What is possible for the child to discover [through the use of his own faculties] should not be explained [by the teacher].
4. Each subject should begin with the teaching of basics. One lesson per class.
5. Proceed step by step. Follow through thoroughly. The aim of teaching is not to teach what the teacher can teach, but what the pupil can learn.
6. Whether directly or indirectly, each lesson must have a point.
7. Introduce the concept first, and provide explanation [of the concept] later.
8. Proceed from known to unknown, from particular to general, from concrete to abstract, from easy to difficult, from near to far, from simple to complex.
9. First be comprehensive, then analyse later.
However, on the use of these teaching techniques in shushin classes, the text stated:

Needless to say, the education of shushin requires the co-operation of the parents, and its objectives cannot be achieved by the sole efforts of the teacher. Nevertheless, the influence of schooling is immense indeed, so teachers must be particularly aware of this and make utmost effort to improve the morality of students. Following Monbusho Kyosoku Koryo (Ministry of Education Outline of Educational Rules) [: this refers to Shogakko Kyosoku Koryo (Outline of Educational Rules for Elementary Schools), issued in May of Meiji 14 (1881)] we will introduce this curriculum first before any others; [teachings] must not go outside of this.

In order to improve the virtues of all children, kyokun (instruction), mohan (exemplar) and renshu (practice) are required.

In the main, kyokun (instruction) means to explain the path of jingi gojo (five duties [consisting of the Confucianist principles of universal love, justice, gratitude, knowledge, truth]), or to teach the principles of cleanliness, reception and behaviour. Accordingly, all students must be taught the knowledge and etiquette of shushin (how to conduct oneself).

In the main, mohan (exemplar) means that the teacher must carry out the right path, master etiquette, and show the student what conduct they should follow.

In the main, renshu (practice) means that the students must follow kyokun (instruction) and mohan (exemplar) and conduct oneself likewise and do the duty of attaining good habits....

Document LVIII. The Section of Shushin in Kaisei Kyoju-jutsu (Revised Art of Teaching), published in Meiji 16 (1883) (Reprinted in Yamazumi 1990: 240)

Thus, despite the fact that Pestalozzi's teaching methods were to carry out teaching according to the insights of 'psychological principles', what this text really endorsed was a teaching method based on emulation of teachers by students.

Moreover, from the 1890's, Pestalozzi's teaching methods, in the distinctive form of 'developmental theories' was taken over by the teaching methods emulating Johann Friedrich Herbart [1776–1841] of Prussia. Here again, as in the case of utilising Pestalozzi's teaching methods, Herbartism was utilised to endorse a form of teaching based on emulation of the old by the young. The following is an example that the text gives of how a shushin class should be conducted:
Title: Duty
Maxim: Follow the command of parents.

1. Preparation
   1. Put together legs.
   2. Put hands on top of thigh.
   3. Close mouth.
   4. My, you all are so well-behaved. Whose command is it to act in such a way? (Answer: The teacher’s command)
   5. Therefore, is it a good thing or not to follow the command of a teacher? (Answer: A good thing.)
   6. Are there others who command you as your teacher does? (Answer: Grandfather, grandmother, older brother, older sister...father, mother.)

2. Arrangement (Presentation-Specification)
   7. Therefore, we will now discuss your parents.... Show pupils a drawing of them abiding the commands of the parents.... Either by textbook or hanging a picture....
   8. Who resembles this figure which is showing deference? (Answer: Mr. Yamada, Miss Nakagawa, Mr. Mita.... point to some of the children in the class.)

Document LIX. An Excerpt of Godanbo Jicchi Kyōju Rei (Examples of How to Conduct Teaching According to the Five Level Method), published in Meiji 31 (1898) (Quoted in Hashimoto 1985: 206)

Thus, in short, the utilisation of the ‘western’ methods of ‘Pestalozzism’ and ‘Herbartism’ was a means of legitimating a pedagogical practice where ethics is taught through emulating the conduct of ‘teachers’, founded upon the notion that the more immature, i.e., ‘children’ or ‘pupils’, should emulate their more mature counterparts, i.e., ‘parents’ and ‘teachers’.

Refining Practices of Pedagogical Significations

That the teaching of ethics was now firmly located in the notion of emulation of the more ‘mature’ by the ‘immature’, was also apparent in the textbooks which were endorsed and edited by the government. Although ethical school textbooks championed by the government in the early 1880’s, such as those of Nishimura and Motoda, had been
edited according to the ethics of filial piety and duty, and this policy in itself was not to change, in terms of the way these texts were written and presented, it was recognised that they were too difficult for the comprehension of elementary school children. Thus, as item 7 of Shogakko Shushin Kyokayo Tosho Kentei Hyojun (Guideline for Elementary School Shushin Textbook Materials) (see Document LV, p. 279) specified, from the 1880's, elementary texts began to use pictures more frequently, particularly for the first years. In this section, I would like to introduce two prolific elementary school textbooks edited for those in their first year of elementary schooling, published between 1886~1903, during the Kentei Seido (Textbook Authorisation Board) era.

**Tokumoku (Virtue-Indexed) Period (1897~)**

The 'first' period of the Kentei Seido era, until 1897, is usually referred to as the Tokumoku (Virtue-Indexed) Period, and this is because textbooks during this time was organised according to 'virtues'. Let us take a look at the first few pages of Higashikuze Michitomi's Shogaku Shushin-sho (Elementary Ethics Textbook), published in Meiji 26 (1893) as an example:
Beginning from the upper right-hand corner, the first lesson is based on a picture (covering two pages) which shows a group of 'Japanese citizens' bowing reverently in front of a Shinto shrine, demonstrating their 'chusetsu (loyal devotion)' to the Japanese nation. The second lesson is based on a picture (far lower right) of two children bowing to their parents, thus demonstrating their 'chuko (filial piety)'. The third lesson is based on a picture (lower second picture from right) showing two children helping their grandmother with household chore, thus demonstrating their 'kotei (respect for elders)'. The fourth lesson is based upon a picture (upper second picture from left) of an older and younger brother on their way to school, thus demonstrating their 'yuai (friendship/brotherhood)' for each other. The fifth lesson is based on a picture (far upper left) of a child helping his mother with sewing, thus demonstrating 'koko (duty)'. The sixth lesson is based on a picture (lower second picture from right) where one of the
child is giving his grandfather his walking stick, while the other one is placing his shoes in front of him, thus demonstrating their 'kotei (respect for elders)'. The seventh lesson is based on a picture (far lower left) where two children who have met an adult (most likely the 'teacher') on the streets and are bowing to him, thus demonstrating 'reiki (decorum)'.

In short, lessons in this text are organised according to 'virtues' such as 'chuko (filial piety)' or 'yuai (friendship/brotherhood)', which all more or less extol the relations of reciprocity between sovereign and subject, parents and children, and so forth.

*Jinbutsu (Biography-Indexed) Period (1897—).*

However, such a format or organisation of textbooks became increasingly unpopular, since it was organised according to 'abstracted' virtues, and it made it difficult for children to understand. Thus, from Meiji 30 ~ (1897~), textbooks began to be organised differently, and to be mainly composed to stories and figures which embodied the 'virtues'. Hence, the latter half of the Kentei Seido era is called the 'Jinbutsu (Biography-Indexed) Period. One such example is Fukyu-sha's *Shin-hen Shushin Kyoten (New Edition of Ethics Cannon)*, published in Meiji 33 (1900). The following is the table of contents and the first few pages of the text:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Onono Tofu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Turtle and Rabbit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Peach Boy (1)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Urashima Taro (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Peach Boy (2)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Urashima Taro (2)</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Peach Boy (3)</td>
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<td>Benevolence</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Greedy Old Man (1)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Kinichi Buys a Book (1)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Greedy Old Man (2)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Kinichi Buys a Book (2)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Greedy Old Man (3)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Sparrow Story (1)</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Matsudaira Yoshifusa (1)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Sparrow Story (2)</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Matsudaira Yoshifusa (2)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Sparrow Story (3)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Affectionate Siblings (1)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Find Good Friends</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Affectionate Siblings (2)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Honest Otake</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Affectionate Siblings (3)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Rappa Sotsu</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Affectionate Siblings (4)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Imperial Palace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Here, lesson one and two are conducted according to scenes of children at school. The first lesson shows a classroom scene where the children are obediently attending to their study; the second shows the children harmoniously playing with each other and their teacher. Third and fourth (as well as fifth, although it is not included in the above) lessons are scenes from *Momotaro* (see Chapter 4, p. 161- for the story). The first picture shows the grandmother doing her washing and the peach is floating next to her. The second is a scene where *Momotaro* is popping out of the peach. The third is one where *Momotaro* is preparing to go on his crusade; the grandfather is helping him with his clothes, and the grandmother is making some millet dumplings in the front. The fourth picture shows *Momotaro* on his way to the Ogre Island, with the anthropomorphic dog, monkey and pheasant following him.

That is to say, in this textbook, the 'virtues' of 'filial piety and duty' are taught not through presenting the 'virtue' first and giving an example of everyday life after. Rather, the 'virtues' are displayed through giving examples of characters that embody these virtues. We should notice here that in the process of embodiment, whether they were 'true' or not was not deemed important. Rather, it was the fact of the embodiment that took precedence.

In the next section, I would now like to turn my attention to the character of the 'authorities' which produced such 'truths' about the performance of Japanese bodies.

6.3  'Familial' Authorities of the 'Japanese Nation-State'

In the first decade of Meiji, members of the *Meiroku-sha* such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Mitsukuri Rinsho had largely formulated educational policies, and the 'West', and
transcendental or universal concepts had authorised the 'truths' about Japanese subjecthood. However, the society was dissolved in 1876, and we saw in the previous sections that from the 1880's, there was a revival of Confucianist ethics. While I argued that the form of subjectification employed thereafter was not so fundamentally different from that employed to govern the upper and middle strata classes during the Tokugawa era, it is also important to notice that what was reproduced was not a social structure of feudalism, but that they were redeployed in order to invent the 'nation-state' of 'Japan'. Moreover, the authority of the 'nation-state' of Japan was distinctive in the introduction of the monarchical power as a part of the modernising process, and this meant that the authority endorsing the ethics of relations of reciprocity was founded upon a progenitive identity of authority. Such is clearly outlined in the *Kyoiku Chokugo (Imperial Rescript on Education)* issued on Meiji 23 (1890):
Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo)

Know ye, Our subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors (waga kōso kōsōō) have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly planted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty (chū) and filial piety (kō) have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire (kokutai no seika), and herein also lies the source of Our education (kyōiku no engen). Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State (gyūkō ni hōshi); and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects (gyūkō ni hōshi); and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects (chūryō no shinmin), but render illustrous the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.

The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meiji (1890)

Document LXIII. Official translation of Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo), issued on Meiji 23 (1890) (Reprinted in Gluck 1985: 121)

In other words, that the 'Japanese' have 'virtue' was guaranteed by the unique privilege of being born 'Japanese'. Thus, the rationale for the authority of the Meiji Emperor is provided by blood ties, just as the authority of parents, for example, is legitimated by blood ties. It is therefore no accident that in Yogaku Koyo (Introduction to Elementary Learning) (which I discussed earlier in p. 276), between chapter 1 and 3 the following was inserted:
Within the universe, although all nations each have different *kokutai* (national polity), there is no group of people which does not have a leader. In the main, one who is a subject should revere one's sovereign, love one's nation, carry out one's job, fulfil one's position, thereby returning one's indebtedness to it; this is the *jodo* (standard path). This is even more so in the case when one has been conferred with an unbroken line of Emperors and is eternally the imperial subject. Therefore, a subject's *chusetsu* (loyal devotion) [to the Imperial Family] is on par with a child's *koko* (filial piety) [to parents] as the foremost principle of *jinrin* (human ethics).

Document LXIV. Chapter 2 'Chusetsu (Loyal Devotion)' of Yogaku Koyo (Introduction to Elementary Learning), published in Meiji 14 (1881) (Reprinted in Yamazumi 1990: 171)

Thus, the notion of the singularity of the Japanese subject as having 'been conferred with an unbroken line of Emperors and is eternally the imperial subject' is the foundation of the authority, and the relationship between all 'Japanese citizens' is defined in terms of blood relations, that 'Japanese subjects' are part of one big family. Thus, what is designated as unchanging, 'infallible for all ages and true in all places', is not universal God, not universal law, not reason or rationality, or science, but the Japanese race itself, and it is the very uniqueness, the singularity of the Japanese race that is constituted through this text. Therefore the legitimacy of the authority is not founded upon a universalisable 'thought' substance, but upon a progenitive identity which is singular and unique.

In the following sections, I will be discussing the manner in which this identity of this singular 'authority' was deployed, but before going on to my discussion, let me firstly present a translation of a section in a *shushin* textbook which all school children in their final year of elementary schooling would have read:

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17. His Highness the Emperor (Part 1)
His Highness the Emperor, who took up his reign at the age of 16, deposed the Bakufu, and personally saw to the running of his sovereign powers. He first promulgated the following Gokajo no Seimon (Five Articles of the Imperial Oath):

Item. Widely promote conferences and make decisions based upon frequent public debates.
Item. [Those of] above and below should act with one heart, and take part in governance enthusiastically.
Item. From officials and warriors to commoners, each must fulfil one's ambition and it is required that the sentiments of the people must not discourage each from striving for it.
Item. Break bad habits of the past and base [oneself] on the public path of heaven and earth.
Item. Seek knowledge of the world and greatly rouse the Imperial origin.

Our nation is in the midst of an unprecedented revolution, and I, myself, ahead of the people, swear by heaven and earth that I shall greatly establish the nation and make the path for the well being of the whole nation. The people should co-operate and make effort according to these aims.

18. His Highness the Emperor (Part 2)
His Highness the Emperor always took great interest in education, and in Meiji 5, had the Education Act (Gakusei) promulgated, and in Meiji 23, promulgated the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyoiku ni kansuru chokugo). Moreover, he took great interest in military matters, and in Meiji 6, had the Conscription Law (Chohei-rei), and in Meiji 15, the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (Rikukaigunjin ni chokuyu) promulgated. Hence, our nation's military was able to display military success in Meiji 28 during the war [i.e., Sino-Japanese War], and also in Meiji 33 during the Sino-Nation Disturbances [i.e., the Boxer Rebellion], and to glorify our nation's honour to the world.

19. His Highness the Emperor (Part 3)
In Meiji 22, His Highness the Emperor promulgated the Great Japanese Empire Constitution, and erected the Great Congressional Diet from Meiji 23. This was an unprecedented great achievement of our nation of all times. Since the Meiji Restoration, our nation's relation with each foreign nation gradually became more intimate, and from Meiji 27, the treaties were revised, and we came to achieve an equal relationship with each foreign nation. That our nation Japan's national fortunes have thus greatly advanced is largely due to His Highness the Emperor's vast virtues. Being born into such prosperous times, and bathing in such deep imperial favours, we, the subjects, must fulfill our duties and obey High Highness the Emperor's great heart.

This excerpt encapsulates the identity of the 'authority' that will be discussed in the following, and I will be referring to it throughout my discussion.

6.3.1 Meiji Restoration: Re-Instating Monarchical Power

As was discussed in Chapter 5, 'modernisation' of 'Japan' first took place as a mutiny against the Tokugawa Bakufu by a motley clique composed mainly of lower-ranking samurai from the southern domains and some court aristocrats. In the first years, the presence of the Emperor functioned to legitimate the extrication of power from three centuries of Tokugawa rule. Thus, the importance of stating in the above that His Highness the Emperor 'deposed the Bakufu and personally saw to the running of his sovereign powers'.

Moreover, in order to secure their claim to power, it was important for the mutineers to dismantle the social fabric of Tokugawa rule. This, in the main, meant to remove a system of authority based upon feudalistic class differences, and the Gokajo no Seimon (Five Articles of the Imperial Oath) which is quoted in full above, was a declaration of such intent. As we have already discussed, the Gakusei (Education Act) of 1873 was implemented to enforce such a policy at the site of education, stating the intent to remove the feudalistic class barrier which had precluded most of the people from aspiring to attain education. What Gakusei did for education, the Chohei-rei (Conscription Law) did for warfare skills. Announced in December of Meiji 6 (1873), it stated that:

...all men reaching the age of twenty might be required to serve three years with the colours and establishing the peacetime force at 36,000 men. The result was to deprive the samurai of their monopoly of arms and military skills, and of the claim to privilege based on it. As the government announcement of the measure said, 'all are now equal in the empire and without distinction in their duty to serve the nation'. (Beasley 1963, 1973: 112)
Thus, the introduction of monarchical power in the first years of Meiji was part of the publicity campaign to justify the overthrowing of the Tokugawa government, and it was the monarchy which sanctioned the obliteration of class differences.

6.3.2 Inserting the Emperor in the 'Nation-State'

However, within few years of the Meiji Restoration, the symbolic meaning of the monarchy took on another dimension altogether. As soon as the most intractable adherents of the Bakufu were put down, the new government moved the symbol of monarchical power, the Emperor, from Kyoto (meaning 'Capital Metropolitan'), which had been the centre of the ancient polity until around the 8th century, to Edo, the city from where the Tokugawa Shogunate had ruled. However, the project of the new authorities was not simply to usurp power from the Bakufu, but to create the 'nation-state' of 'Japan'. Hence, they renamed Edo (meaning 'River Opening') to Tokyo ('Eastern Capital'), and simultaneously removed the feudal geographical identification of domain fiefdoms, and introduced 'modern' districts called todofuken (prefectures), such that the 'national' landscape of 'Japan' could be created. Hence, monarchical power was used to create the 'modern' domains of the 'nation-state'.

Indeed, the very foundations of the nation-state was credited to the 'unprecedented great achievement' of the monarchy. It was, as the above excerpt clarifies, His Highness the Emperor who 'promulgated the Great Japanese Empire Constitution, and erected the Great Congressional Diet', thus installing the political trappings that were required for 'Japan' to call itself a 'nation-state'. Hence, the Emperor was conceived as a constitutional monarchy.
However, this was not the only identity that was allocated to the Emperor, and he was given the role of speaking as a transcendental 'god' outside of politics as well. Such a distinction of the Emperor was a conscientious one for at least one member of the Meiji leadership, Inoue Kowashi, 'whose hand touched nearly every major document that the Meiji state produced.' (Gluck 1985: 54) When, for example, a draft of the *Imperial Rescript on Education* was being circulated amongst government officials, Inoue argued that:

[b]ecause “the principles of a constitutional system dictates that the monarch does not interfere with the freedom of conscience of his subjects," Inoue argued first that the Rescript "must be distinguished from a political ordinance and regarded instead as the written pronouncement of the monarch in society (shakaijō no kunshū)." Just as he had accommodated nativist views of the imperial line by construing the emperor's ancestral rites as the private affair of the ruling house, Inoue proposed that the Rescript be issued as the personal moral utterance of the emperor and not as a law of the state. Indeed, he later suggested that it be delivered as a speech by the emperor to avoid the governmental connection with the Ministry of Education. (Ibid: 121-2)

Thus, although the Emperor was conceived of as a constitutional monarchy, his identity was conceived in such a way that he could also speak to the people through a 'personal voice', the format being in the form of a *chokuyu*.

Given such an identity of the Emperor, it is important to note that throughout the 'modernising' proceedings of the new government, the function of the Emperor was to guarantee the *separation* between different domains of the 'modern' nation-state. For example, in the case of the *Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors*, the Emperor enjoined his military to "neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics... but with a single heart fulfill your essential duties of loyalty" (Ibid: 53). Indeed, the very fact that this was a *Chokuyu* pronouncement meant that they were the *personal* decrees of the Emperor, and not necessarily a *political* decree of the government, thus indicating that the Emperor could serve the role of a presence *exterior* to politics.
Thus, in each instance, it was the Emperor which guaranteed the maintenance of the autonomy between politics and military (through *Imperial Rescript to Sailors and Soldiers*), and between morality/education and politics (through *Imperial Rescript on Education*). The presence of the Emperor tread the fine line between being a constitutional monarchy and a 'transcendental' presence which legitimated the autonomy of the domains of modern 'nation-state'.

6.3.3 The Successful Management of 'Imperial Japan'

Thus far, I have discussed the emergence and nature of the authority of the Emperor, and his authority was guaranteed as being absolute and beyond reproach by the very fact that he was a living god. Other authoritarian bodies, *i.e.*, those in government who carried out authority in his name, however, did not have the luxury of staking their claims to power on such godliness. In this section, I would like to focus upon what the legitimacy of the authority of the Meiji government leaders were dependent upon.

In theory, the criterion for the government's claims to authority was a simple one: to successfully manage the running of the 'nation'. However, in practice, things were not so simple, since this 'criterion' was defined in starkly different manner by at least two groups of judges which the government needed to attain the approval of. On one hand, the government needed to appear to be 'modern' to the western powers. On the other, they needed to appear that this 'modernisation' was not 'westernisation' to the Japanese public. And yet, on the other hand, the Japanese public wanted 'Japan' to be a strong nation, like the 'western' one and become an exemplary imperial nation. A part of this meant that the government needed to seek approval from and forge alliances with 'western nations'. Thus, although somewhat contradictory in their individual make-up, fulfilling each led them to be circuitously related to each other. Somehow, in this
balancing act of meeting all these disparate criteria, the government did a remarkable job of fulfilling all ends. Let us unravel how this, in history, transpired.

From the very beginning, the revision of trade treaties was a top priority on the government's objective. For one, the system of extra-territoriality, by which foreign persons residing in Japan came under the jurisdiction of their own country's consul, meant that the government had no legal say over their activities in Japan, and this came to be a source of internal criticism regarding the government, i.e., that they were not protecting the sovereignty of the nation. Secondly, that the rights of adjusting Japan's tariffs on foreign goods were mostly fixed at 5 percent by the treaties was a major contributing factor to the weakness of Japan's economic activities. The prerequisite that the western nations had assigned, in order for them to come to the bargaining table to renegotiate the treaties was that the Japanese government had to prove that they were managing a 'civil' and 'modern' nation-state. Thus, the initial incentive for 'Japan' to modernise and become a 'nation-state' was given by their relationship to western nations.

Thus, throughout the 1880's, simultaneous to carrying out various 'modernising' projects which brought about changes to all facets of how Japanese society was organised, the government made repeated overtures to renegotiate with the 'West' over the treaties. Indeed, the government even made attempts to appear to be 'westernised' through investing in an entertainment venue, known as the Rokumeikan, 'Hall of Braying Stag'. During the 80's, ballroom parties were held where Japanese men and women, dressed in European clothes, would socialise with western diplomats and residents. However, the experiment only provided the westerners with occasions to ridicule. Moreover, increasingly, from the 1880's, the government needed to heed the opinions of the
Japanese public, who were against 'westernisation', and saw the Rokumeikan as a kow-towing to western ways. Thus, it was abandoned in 1887.

With the opening of the Diet in 1890, the issue of national sovereignty became even more hotly debated in Japan, and the opposition party challenged the authority of the government for not having negotiated the treaties. Ironically enough, it was this that gave the government the ammunition to finally renegotiate the trade treaties. When Mutsu Minemitsu, the Foreign Minister at the time, resumed treaty negotiations with Britain in 1893, he was able to argue that the Japanese people would not be satisfied with nothing less than complete abolition of extra-territoriality, and the trade treaties were successfully renegotiated throughout 1894.

However, the deal that was settled upon was not popular with the Japanese public, since in exchange of abolishing extraterritoriality rights, the agreement was that western residents would be given rights to free access to Japan outside of treaty ports, and this was seen by the Japanese public as a form of western expansion into Japan. Moreover, this coincided with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, where Japan had declared war on China over the question of dominion over Korea. The war ended in decisive victory for Japan, and Japan had negotiated a very advantageous war settlement with China. This was met with a fervour of patriotic approval by the Japanese public, but at the last minute, Russia, with France and Germany—who had their own agenda to acquire a piece of China—stepped in, 'advising' Japan to return Liaotung peninsula to China. The Japanese government, having no resource to engage in warfare with these nations, had no choice but to bow down to their demands, and thus, the sweet taste of victory quickly soured, and the Japanese public were again left feeling their sense of inferiority to the West. It was made worse by the fact that Russia,
France, Germany and Britain, between 1896 and 1899, proceeded to acquire a piece of China which came under their jurisdiction.

However, the occasion for becoming a more a recognised member of the Imperial Club came in 1900 with the Boxer Rebellion. This was a series of uprising organised by a grassroots group of Chinese known as 'Boxers', who, angered by the expansion of imperial powers into China, began to attack and destroy railroads, churches and embassies—sites of imperial expansion—in Peking, thus making it necessary for an immediate military reprisal. However, the western nations did not have military troupes at their disposal in the area, and Japan provided nearly half of the military troops in the operations which followed (22,000 soldiers out of the approximately 70,000 deployed), and carefully observed all proper military and diplomatic etiquette. In fact, it was the only military force which refrained from looting in the aftermath, and to borrow a phrase from the excerpt above (in p. 292), glorified Japan's 'honour to the world'. It also gave Japan a share in the indemnities that was demanded from China by the imperial powers.

Moreover, this also gave them a chance to forge an alliance with Britain, and paved the way for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. During the Boxer Rebellion, Russia has mostly stayed aloof from military involvement in Peking, instead deploying 80,000 soldiers to Manchuria to ostensibly protect the Chinese Eastern Railway, which ran across Manchuria to link Vladivostock with Russian territory farther west. However, in reality, this was only an excuse for Russia to occupy Manchuria completely. This was a source of concern for Britain, since it saw Russia's permanent occupation of Manchuria as compromising their own sphere of influence in China. Thus, after many negotiations,
a pact was agreed upon in 1902, whereby Japan and Britain became allies. This provided the guarantee that other western powers would not interfere again, as they had done after the Sino-Japanese War, and in 1904, Japan declared war on Russia over territorial control in Manchuria.

We may argue that the moment of victory in the Russo-Japanese War was the crowning achievement of its modernisation, a moment where they truly manifested the ignoble base of their virtues, a moment whereby it fulfilled the requirements of appearing both 'modern' to the 'West' and not 'westernised' to itself, and also appearing to be strong like the 'West', and though by no means a complete one58, some sort of recognition from the 'West'

6.3.4 Establishing 'Elite' Educational Institutions

The above account of what the authority of the government was dependent upon indicates that they were equally subjected to the code of conduct that they enforced upon their 'citizens', the bottom line being to act as a 'good Japanese'. Since those in government were equally human, equally the subject of the Emperor, there necessarily had to be some sort of process or method for selecting the individuals who would, relatively speaking, have more claims to carrying out authority. In this sense, educational institutions played an important part in the reproduction of authority. From the mid-1880's, the site of education came to be defined not only as a place for teaching

57 The joint forces included armies from Great Britain, America, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Russia and Australia.

58 Japan approached the American government to mediate war settlement negotiations with Russia, but the American brokers refused to seek indemnities from Russia on Japan's behalf, and the deal they agreed to seek was a very insubstantial one. In any case, given the nature of power, realistically speaking, such a 'complete' recognition could not and can never be expected.
the basic know-how of being a 'good Japanese', but as a site where the better 'good
Japanese' were chosen.

The awareness to elaborate the utility of education as a state apparatus may be
detected in the doings of Mori Arinori [1847–89], who was appointed the first Cabinet
Minister of Education in 1886. Mori saw junior high school, especially upper junior high
school (junior high school was institutionally divided into ordinary or normal junior high
school and upper junior high school) and all institutions above—*i.e.*, Teacher's College
and Imperial University, as elite educational institutions. That is to say, Mori asserted
that the role of educational institutions above the level of junior high school was to
educate the future leaders of Japan, as opposed to elementary school education whose
objective was basic education. Thus, in 1886, he did away with the *Kyoiku-rei*
(*Education Ordinance*) and instated four separate ordinances for four different kinds of
schools: *Shogakko-rei* (*Elementary School Ordinance*), *Chugakko-rei* (*Junior High
School Ordinance*), *Shihan Gakko-rei* (*Teacher's College Ordinance*), *Teikoku Daigaku-
rei* (*Imperial University Ordinance*).

It might be of interest to note how Mori intended to educate the 'elite' segments of the
'Japanese' by recalling *Junior High School/Teacher's College Textbook: Book of Ethics*,
a text whose Table of Contents was presenter earlier in Chapter 5 (see Document I, p.
198). Personally conceived by Mori (and written by No Narishige [1852-95], who served
as the headmaster of teacher's colleges in Fukushima and Nagano prefectures)
(Yamazumi 1990b: 505), Mori's intention was to distribute the text to students attending
junior high school and teacher's college for this purpose.

As we saw earlier, this text clearly intended to inculcate a form of subjectification of the
'West', that is, a cultivation of the 'inner-self', where selfhood is founded upon a 'thinking
Indeed, the particularly friendly affiliation this text had to Western powers is indicated by the fact that this ethical school textbook was especially sent to Sir Ernest Satow, a British diplomat residing in Japan at the time, as an official gift by Mori Arinori. Thus, despite the fact that the ostensible educational policy of the government from the beginning of the 1880's had been to turn away from a policy of 'westernisation' and to imbue a more Confucianist-based sense of subjecthood, there still remained a significant portion of the ruling stratum which urged that if not for the whole population, at least the elites should be inculcated with a 'westernised' form of subjecthood.

This is not to say, of course, that his 'westernising' views did not meet with strong resistance amongst the other members of the ruling stratum which saw the adoption of a 'western' model of being was inimical to state-building, and that a more 'traditional' view based on Confucianism should be its foundation. However, it does highlight the point that the views of the 'authority' was not a unified nor a monolithic one, a perspective which I have not been able to do justice to in my account of Meiji schooling thus far.

Moreover, the circumstances surrounding Mori's death might also shed another light on the nature of the authority of the authority. On 11th February Meiji 22 (1889), the day that the new Constitution was to be promulgated, as Mori was leaving to attend the ceremony, he was murdered for allegedly having showed disrespect to the Imperial house during a visit he made to the Ise shrine over a year ago:

Members of the government, men of opinion, and the foreign community were appalled at what they viewed as the assassin's act of imperial fanaticism. But as the press printed each sensational detail, a portion of popular sentiment soon went over to the youthful killer. For a time in February and March, Mori, the

59 The original copy is housed at Cambridge University Library, where most of Sir Ernest Satow's collection of Japanese books was donated upon his death.
apostle of "civilization," was eclipsed in the public eye by his murderer, Nishino, the emperor-revering Chôshû samurai, who so lived on in print that the Home Ministry suspended newspapers and banned publications for appearing to encourage his sort of disruptive behavior. (Gluck 1985: 45)

In a short period of 20 years, things had really changed. When the new government had first invoked the Emperor to legitimate their deposition of the Tokugawa government, people's awareness of the Emperor had been so faint as to liken him to a fictional character in a Noh play (see footnote 43, p. 205). Now, authorities themselves could be killed, and their deaths lauded by the public for not having behaved as a 'good Japanese'. Once having convinced them that they were 'Japanese', public sentiments took a life of its own. The authorities could no longer be immune to it, and heed its authority in exercising their authority.

Hence, more than ever before, the authorities themselves were governed by their ability to perform the ethics of 'filial piety and duty', where the hierarchy of the relationship between the authorities and those who are subject to them was secured through mastering the subjecthood exhibited at the site of schooling, a measure of their mastery being in the level of education they had achieved.

6.4 Teleology: Acting as a 'Good Japanese'

So what forms of life were the aims, ideals, or exemplars designated at the site of shushin elementary schooling? In order to answer this question, let us again refer to what a shushin school textbook said. The following is a translation of the final chapter in an elementary textbook published under the state-compiled textbook system in 1903:
To become a good Japanese, have the \textit{kokoro} (sentiment) of \textit{chugi} (obligation).

Be dutiful to father and mother, get along with your siblings, be kind to friends, have pity on servants, and have good relations with your neighbours.

In everything, be honest, do not do things that give you qualms, have courage, be patient, and do not get alarmed in things, look after oneself, and endure hardship. Also, make your body healthy, be frugal, and work hard.

Also keep to etiquette, don't boast, if you receive on (favour), do not forget your moral indebtedness to it, don't be envious of people, have a big heart, and respect other people's property.

As above-stated, have discretion in your conduct, mix well with other people, and on top of that, take care to do service for the good of the public, for the good of the people, and you will be a good Japanese.


As can be seen, the form of life endorsed in the above is to be a 'good Japanese', and there are no codes of knowledge which support this ideal. That is to say, it does not recourse to the existence of a universalisable or transcendental law. In other words, the text does not say, 'behave like so because you are a modern person endowed with reason'. It just say, 'because you are Japanese, conduct yourself in such a way which embody the virtues of filial piety and duty, and you will be a good Japanese.' Thus, the teleology and the ethical valorisation they are tied to is to simply let the truth of their Japaneseness emerge in their acts.

6.5 \textbf{Strategy: The Invention of 'Modern Japanese Nation-State'}

So, what was the general strategic field of the program of the Meiji government, and how might they differ from those of the 'West'? Fujitani (1996), for example, whose
work I discussed earlier (see Chapter 3, p. 134), argues that Japanese modernity was specifically different from Foucault's description of modernity as a transference of princely sovereignty to the art of government (see Chapter 3, p. 131), and that both princely sovereignty and the art of government emerged at the same historical moment. I would not disagree with this description of the specific difference between the rise of modernity between the West and Japan. Indeed, I have been arguing that the programs of subjectification in the West and Japan were specifically different. It has been argued that western modernities subjectified their 'forms of life' through privileging the 'thinking I'. But in Japan, the 'thinking I' was not the key to subjectification; it was primarily through acting upon the performance of the body that Japanese subjecthood was constituted.

However, on the other hand, there may also be similarities. These are evident if we were to limit our definition of modernity to that which brought about the creation of nation-states. Let us approach the question from this point of view.

Firstly, let me provide some definition of the strategy of 'modern western nation-states'. Rose has described it as follows:

Typical of those rationalities of government that consider themselves 'liberal' is the simultaneous delimitation of the sphere of the political by reference to the right of other domains - the market, civil society, the family being the three most commonly deployed - and the invention of a range of techniques that would try to act on events in these domains without breaching their autonomy. (Rose 1998: 28-9)

Although 'modernity' is not mentioned in the above quote, let us assume that what Rose means in the above by 'liberal' governments are 'western modern governments', and that the general strategic field of all programs of western modern government is to define the internal characteristics of each domain so that these domains can relate to
each other without breaching their autonomy. Secondly, let me adduce some of the recent critiques of western modernity which have argued that in the 'West', while the principles of civility and rationality were conceptualised as 'universal', in practice, they were seen as the exclusive and unique qualities of 'white men' (cf. Gaten 1991) or the 'West' (cf. Said 1978, 1995), and legitimated their particular exercise of power.

Taking these works together, it could be argued that the rise of western modernity was founded upon citing the transcendental concepts of 'reason' and 'rationality', in such a way that these concepts would guarantee the autonomy of different domains of governance, and that what such forms of governance gave rise to what was an exercise of domination in its name.

Is this not similar to how Japanese modernity transpired? As was discussed earlier, the introduction of the 'Emperor' was important because he made possible the construction of the 'nation-state' of Japan. Moreover, it was through citing the transcendental presence of the 'Emperor', which guaranteed that the autonomy of the domains of e.g., military and morality, were not breached by the domain of politics. Thus, although there are specific differences between the identity and terms of transcendentalism—in the 'western' case, a thought-based 'conceptual' substance represented by the words 'civility' and 'rationality', in the 'Japanese' case, a performance-based 'progenitive' substance represented by the words 'duty and filial piety'—in so far as the manner in which such 'transcendentalism' was deployed to build the nation-state, there are distinct semblances as well.

Seen in such a light, one wonders if the view that Japan has yet to 'modernise' because its subjectivity is not founded upon the principles of civility or rationality (e.g., Maruyama), or the argument that the 'Emperor System' is a unique Japanese product
demonstrating the inferiority of Japanese modernity (e.g., some of the Japan Bashing literature), is founded on a superficial view of what modernity actually entailed. Of course, although it may be argued that the actuality of how such a transcendentalism was deployed is similar—i.e., to create a nation-state and to dominate from such a position, it may be argued that there is a very crucial difference between the assumption of the location of these transcendentalisms. Whereas terms like 'rationality' do not necessarily preclude the possibility that it can be possessed by those other than the 'West', in so far as notions of 'duty and filial piety' are founded on progenitive identification, this would mean that those who are not born 'Japanese' cannot possess the virtues of being 'Japanese'. And yet, even with this argument, I would want to investigate further before making any conclusive judgements about the uniqueness of the Japanese case. Is it not possible, for example, that one can become a 'naturalised' Japanese citizen? That is to say, is it not possible that the very notion of 'progeny' may not be so strictly defined by who the biological parents are, or which land one is born in? Further investigation would need to done on how the 'natural' is conceived in 'Japan', and allow for the possibility that this 'progenitive' identity may not be conceived through strict biological definitions per se, but are, for example, more performance-based and 'cultural' in its identification.

Thus, I would concur that as with 'modern western nation-state', the general strategy employed in the creation of the 'modern Japanese nation-state' was to create different domains of 'modern' life, and delineate the relationship between each in such a way that they do not breach each others' autonomy. However, unlike 'modern western nation-state', in the case of 'Japanese modern nation-state', the transcendental presence in whose name this autonomy is upheld was not transcendental or universal concepts of 'thought', but the progenitive presence of the monarchy—i.e., the Emperor.
6.6 Conclusion

In sum, from the 1880's, the Meiji government discarded the previous policy of 'westernisation' they had endorsed in the first decade of their governance. However, this did not mean that the government discarded their policy of constituting the 'nation-state' of 'Japan' and its 'citizens'. Rather, the Meiji government continued to make various efforts to enforce their management over the 'Japanese citizens', particularly through establishing the organisation of national schooling, and more specifically the curriculum of *shushin*, as a site of disciplining the Japanese citizen's body. Thus, they decided to advocate a form of ethics premised upon a relation of reciprocity, where 'truths' are a natural given and need not be questioned or defined. Their rejection of normative or universal concepts of thought led them to inscribe 'truths' through invigilating the performance of the body, where the 'body' (and not e.g., the 'soul') was the substance of the 'Japanese citizen'. Some of the techniques through which the 'Japanese' body was disciplined was through further refining the very definition of the 'Japanese citizens' through creating differences within the 'Japanese body'; and to define the relations of reciprocity between differing 'Japanese bodies'. Moreover, ethics was inserted between the exchange or relations of the differing 'Japanese bodies', firstly told by categories of virtue, and then later, told by embodiment.

In effect, the very worthiness, so to speak, of the body of the 'Japanese citizen' was not to be located in their ability to be true to their 'conscience', or to be true to an abstracted principle of 'thought', such as 'justice' or 'rationality'. Rather, their value was to be found in their bodily participation in the performative acts of exchange, where the process of exchange itself was defined as 'ethical'.
7. Japanese Subjecthood as a Social Formation

This thesis began by identifying some key developments in post-war 'Japanese Studies'. As was discussed in Chapter 2, until at least the late 1980's, the textual genre of Nihonjinron largely steered academic discussions in 'Japanese Studies', where 'Japan' was regularly theorised as the particularistic 'other' to the universal 'West'. Although the more recent scholarship in 'Japanese Studies' is more discerning of 'Japan' as a historical formation, I argued that much of the specificity of 'Japanese imperialism' had yet to be theoretically understood, and in particular, the question of subjecthood was an area where previous research was scarce. I therefore argued for an engagement with some of the themes and methods developed in structuralism and poststructuralism with a view to redressing some of these problems, and I made it my goal to discern the specificities of how the 'modern Japanese' subjecthood was wrought into being amidst the historical processes of building the 'nation-state' of 'Japan'.

It is now time for us to return to the set of questions which were presented earlier at the end of Chapter 2 (see p. 93), and I would now like to begin the task of answering each
in turn. Through answering each question, my aim is two folds. One, I hope to highlight how the emergence of ‘Japanese’ subjecthood which participated in the processes of colonialism and imperialism was specifically different from those of the 'West's'. Two, I hope to link back my findings to some of the wider theoretical debates I have discussed, and suggest some themes or directions for further research on the Japanese imperial subjecthood.

7.1 History of Creating Difference?

As was discussed in Chapter 2, theoretical explanations regarding the historical processes of western colonialism and imperialism have primarily been dominated by the thematic of 'difference' in one way or another. Stripped to its sheerest components, one may identify two basic developments in the question of 'difference'. Initially, Said's (1978, 1995) argument that the identity of the 'West' was constituted through differentiating itself through positing and excluding the colonial 'other' provided the backbone of discussions about 'difference' (see Chapter 2, p. 67–). However, more recent debates have developed the thesis that the 'West's' self-identity was the very product of its encounters with its colonial 'other', and led to the creation of differences internal to its self-identity (Stoler 1995) (see Chapter 2, p. 72–). Thus, whether external or internal, 'difference' has been the focal point of discussions about the historical processes of western imperialism and colonialism.

Moreover, as was discussed in Chapter 3 (see p. 96–), particularly during the 'structuralist' phase, this general concentration upon the thematic of 'difference' was predicated upon and enhanced by a methodological approach which privileged conditions of 'difference' as 'true'. Judith Williamson's version of semiotic analysis, in
particular, accepted the conceptual premise of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, and presupposed that a relation of 'difference' and a state of internal 'difference' (\textit{i.e.}, fragmented subjectivity) are 'true', and processes and presuppositions of 'sameness' are 'false'.

However, I criticised such a distinction made between 'difference' and 'sameness' into categories of 'truth' and 'falsity', arguing that in so far as semiotic analysis is founded upon the premise that the structure of language produce 'truths', it was inconsistent to arbitrarily split language into 'true' and 'false' usage. I therefore argued that both the state or relation of 'difference' and 'sameness' have the potential to have an effect upon ourselves as being 'true' and can be 'true' to the extent that they are taken to be 'true' by a particular group of people at any particular point in time. Moreover, I argued that language systems are culturally-specific products, and that it was possible for the very structures of language to be conceived differently according to different 'national' languages.

In Chapter 4, I developed this proposition by suggesting that the Japanese language could be structured more like the mirror-stage rather than the symbolic (see Diagram 4, p. 106) and that \textit{e.g.}, Japanese language presupposed the actuality of 'naturalistic culture'. Based upon this assumption, I argued that the prelude of 'modernisation' entailed \textit{equating} 'modern' elements such as 'western technology' with the 'magical' properties of the \textit{Shichifukujin} (Seven Gods of Luck). In the latter decades of Meiji, although differentiation between \textit{e.g.}, 'nature' and 'culture', or 'fantasy' and 'history' did appear, I made a case for seeing this as a process of \textit{likening} 'modern Japan' with the 'West', such that the installation of the 'modern' symbolic was more of a hybrid fusion of both western and Japanese symbolic.
Let us take a moment to compare my findings in Chapter 4 with Bhabha's model, the 'double-narrative movement', which was outlined earlier in Chapter 2 (see p. 82-). First of all, if one were to theoretically accept the possibility of a language system which is shaped like the mirror stage, as I argued regarding the Japanese language system, this in itself would invalidate Bhabha's suggestion that a 'double-narrative movement' can provide a model for resisting or disintegrating the solidity of national identity, since the assumption of a discrete split between the 'pedagogical' and 'performative' would become theoretically unfeasible. However, let us accept this split for a moment, and apply Bhabha's model to analysing Meiji advertisement.

According to Bhabha, the 'performative', as an irreconcilable element to the 'pedagogical', can function to introduce a moment of ambivalence in the unity of an identity, and this allows for the emergence of a new or alternative identity, where the 'pedagogical' is defined as that founded upon certain notions of 'reality' and 'history' required for the cohesion of national identity, and the 'performative' is characterised as the 'prodigious' and 'contemporaneous'—i.e., the capacity to live in and for the moment. However, my analysis of Meiji advertisements would indicate that the 'pedagogical' was what upset the unity of the 'performative', since, as we saw earlier, the characteristics of the 'pedagogical' only appeared in the latter period of Meiji, and the characteristics of the 'performative' were strongly present in the earlier Meiji period. Thus, one may argue that the relationship between the 'pedagogical' and the 'performative' is reversed when we examine Meiji advertisements, and that it was the introduction of the 'pedagogical' which provided the moment of ambivalence.

Moreover, I suggested that it was ultimately the combination and the doubling of the 'pedagogical' and the 'performative' in their hybridity that brought about and solidified the
establishment of Japanese nation-state. Thus, it could be argued that the process
described by Bhabha's model of double-narrative, which is supposed to induce the
dissolution of nationalised subjecthood was what formulated Japanese national
subjecthood. However, rather than becoming convinced of my own deductions, my
experimentation with semiotic analysis led me to the conclusion that it was not really
sufficient to base one's analysis on the structures of language alone, since, above all
else, my analysis would indicate that the structure of language could not be assumed to
be immutable and absolute. Rather, when one's aim is to discern the social formation of
subjecthood, I argued that language has to be located in its context, that is to say, within
the very social fabric of which it is a product.

This propelled me to carry out a genealogical analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, particularly
by focusing upon the emergence of shushin in elementary national schooling. Despite
this methodological shift, in so far as the issue of 'difference' and 'sameness' was
cconcerned, my findings in Chapters 5 & 6 did not negate what I argued in Chapter 4,
and in fact substantiated it.

Firstly, my analysis of the site of schooling would indicate that a constant motivation of
the Japanese authorities was to assemble and enforce the existence of 'Japanese
nation-state' and its 'citizens', and in order to do so, they made continuous efforts to
adopt the organisational format known as 'nation-state', and in so far as the first 'nation-
states' did emerge first in the 'West', whether the Japanese authorities chose to openly
state it as such or not, it may be said that 'western' prototypes of the 'nation-state'
largely provided the working model. Such a disposition, to 'selectively [choose] from the
policies of the enlightened [i.e., 'western'] nations' (see Document IV, p. 215), was
apparent from the beginning, and can also be registered in the government's decision to
adopt a German-style Constitution in 1889 and the opening of the Diet Congress in 1890 (see p. 294). This indicates that Japan's primary 'other', the 'West' was not conceived as that which should be excluded but that which should be emulated.

Moreover, it should also be noted that the invention of the 'Japanese nation' was, from the beginning, provoked by its encounters with the 'West' and that whether 'Japan' was a proper 'nation-state' or not was always to a significant extent dependent on the 'West's' judgement of 'Japan', without whose approval it could not have become an imperial power. Thus, as discussed earlier (see p. 298), the first obstacle that the Japanese authorities had to overcome was the re-negotiation of the trade treaties. Even after this was eventually accomplished in 1894, after experiencing European intervention after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), Japanese authorities were very aware that they had to prove to the European nations that they were worthy of claiming colonies. Such an awareness could also be observed, e.g., during the Boxer Rebellion, and in the decision to ask the Americans to mediate the war settlement negotiation with the Russians after the Russo-Japanese War. Thus, 'Japan's' identity as a 'modern nation-state' could only be conceived through its relationship with the 'West', and was only possible if the 'West' would hold up a mirror to the 'Japanese' with the image of the 'Japanese' as a 'modern nation-state'.

However, it must also be remembered that the reason why 'Japan' needed to emulate the 'western' organisational format called 'nation-state' was not to become the 'West' per se, but to resist western colonialism and come into its own identity as a 'modern Japanese nation-state'. Thus, e.g., during the Bunmei Kaika period, the primary use of the 'West' was to overcome the particularistic differences within itself, such that the 'nation-state' of 'Japan' could be established, and as soon as the policy of
'westernisation' came to threaten the self-unity they were attempting to achieve, it was discarded. But this did not mean that the underlying intent, *i.e.*, to *create* the 'Japanese nation-state' was abandoned. Indeed, the Japanese authorities continued and even intensified their endeavour further by *e.g.*, organising the geography of 'Japan' by abolishing feudal domains (see p. 209), and erasing the visible class differences cultivated during Tokugawa feudalism by redeploying the minority caste practices of the upper and middle strata of Tokugawa culture to govern *all* 'Japanese' uniformly as 'citizens' (see p. 271–). Thus, *emulating* the 'West', and *effacing* internal class differences was a way of creating and maintaining 'Japan's' modern identity.

Thus, I would argue that rather than achieve its self-identity through differentiating itself from its others, Japan's self-identity was only achievable through *emulating* or *conflating* itself with at least one of its 'others', the 'West'. Moreover, in order to do so, internal class differences that existed prior to the moment of meeting its 'other', the 'West', were consciously erased, and the *very condition*, the *very possibility* for achieving Japan's self-identity was crucially dependent on winning recognition from the 'West', that 'Japan' was *equally* 'modern' as the 'West'. Given such a historical background, I would suggest that when one is investigating Japanese 'modernisation', the question of 'sameness'—be it in the form of reciprocity, equivalence, conflation, effacement, mirroring and so forth—is as important, perhaps even supersedes the salience of focusing upon 'difference'. That is to say, one would perhaps need to ask who the external 'other' that one needs to be equated with is, through what processes does one attempt to fashion ourselves into the 'same' to our 'other', and what is at stake?

Thus, the answer to the first question, 'Was the creation of 'difference' such an integral part of Japanese imperialism?' is that Japanese 'modernisation' was an ambivalent
process of identification with its external 'other', the 'West', and one which involved effacing internal class differences through instating a uniform Japanese national identity.

7.2 Metaphysical Thought as Imperialism?

Of course, taken on its own, the scope of the above argument is a very limited one, and is only one aspect of the specificities involved in discerning the social formation of Japanese subjecthood. Moreover, especially if 'Japan's' 'modernising' project was to become the same as its other, the 'West', one must examine how the 'Japanese' conceived the 'West'. Especially if one aims to discern the specificity of 'Japanese modernisation', of particular relevance here is to examine the role that metaphysical concepts have had in the constitution of Japanese subjecthood, since, as discussed in Chapter 2 (see p. 61–), this has been another central feature of how western imperialism and colonialism has been critiqued by some post-1968 thinkers (cf. Young 1995). This was an issue I focused upon in Chapter 5, through an examination of how the translation of forms 'western metaphysical thought' into the 'Japanese' context occurred during the Bunmei Kaika period, and I argued that 'westernisation' did not necessarily entail adopting the metaphysics of the 'West' as much as it played a functional role in legitimating the erection of the 'Japanese nation-state'.

For example, through a close reading of Taisei Hanzen Kunmo (Western Instruction and Enlightenment on Promoting Goodness) (see p. 221–), I argued that the universal substance of 'goodness' was subsumed under the relativistic substance of 'duty', where universal authorities of 'science', 'transcendental being' (i.e., ten) and the 'law' were adduced to legitimate the 'relativistic' authority of 'parents' and 'teachers'. Moreover, I argued that whilst these series of 'authorities' were presented through equivalence, the
pre-eminent authority given in the text was that of 'government officials'. Thus, in this
text, it was the presence of 'government officials' and not the existence of metaphysical
notions that legitimates the project of nation-building. That is to say, it was not so much
'thought' that informed 'practice', but 'practice' that utilised 'thought'.

The same could be said of Fukuzawa's text, *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline of
Theory of a Theory of Civilization)* (see p. 236-), where the ethical substance of
'civilization' was equated with the 'spirit of the nation'. Indeed, Fukuzawa admitted that
the 'western' nations were the closest to reaching the 'spirit of civilization' over other
nations, and encouraged the 'Japanese' to adopt the 'modern' domains of nation-states
which was existent in 'western' nation-states, such as 'statistics', 'regulation', 'finance'
and the 'press'. Thus, for Fukuzawa as well, 'westernisation' was primarily a means to
constituting the 'nation-state' of 'Japan', and did not necessarily entail founding the
subject upon metaphysics. Indeed, Fukuzawa described 'civilization' as an endless
process of change which is an assemblage of part man, part animal and part
technology, and since Fukuzawa saw 'civilization' as a 'natural' state of affairs, he also
prescribed that after initially emulating the 'West', 'civilization' was a state that would be
achieved naturally.

Let us take a moment to consider this mode of subjectification that I have dubbed
'naturalisation' in comparison to the ethical substance which Foucault identified in the
'West' (see Chapter 3, p. 124-). Let us recall that according to Foucault, in both the
Christian and 'modern' periods, the identifiable ethical substance was 'desire'. Now
'desire', as he explained, focuses upon 'thought', but with the aim of *eradicating* 'desire'
from 'thought'. That is to say, the purpose of subjectification is to not only to refrain from
acting out one's desires, but to stop oneself from *thinking* about 'desire'. In contrast, in
the case of 'naturalisation', one may argue that the realm of 'thought' which motivate acts is, from the very beginning, taken out of the equation altogether, since Fukuzawa argued that there is no need to think about 'civilization' to achieve it—i.e., there is no need to act upon subjects through moulding 'thought'. Thus, it may be said that the realm of 'thought' is removed from consideration altogether in the first instance.

So clearly, the Japanese enlightenment thinkers' translations of western metaphysics were distinctive in their understanding of the 'West'. While some post-1968 thinkers have argued that Hegelian metaphysics has systematically underpinned the exclusionary practices of imperialism and colonialism (cf. Young 1995), when translated into the Japanese context, they did not have this role. Given such a background, particularly when we are looking at Japanese modernisation, it is even more important to apprehend 'thought' as a part of a system of 'practice', and to even consider the possibility that 'thought' has no crucial role in the systems of practice that underpinned imperialism. Indeed, in so far as a particular use of 'thought' is, in itself, an outcome of a historically specific development of the 18th century in the 'West' (as Foucault pointed out), it is quite possible to contemplate the possibility of a different utilisation of 'thought' to promote the project of nation-building.

Thus, to answer the second question that was posed earlier, 'Was Japanese imperialism legitimated by a worldview of historical dialectics and founded upon an epistemological premise of totality and universalism', I would argue that it was the presumption of the very naturalness of the process which justified Japanese imperialism.

With this in mind, let us recall Roland Barthes' espousal of Japanese subjecthood as a way of overcoming western imperial subjecthood, which was discussed earlier in
Chapter 2 (see p. 78-). Barthes argued that 'Japan' has a symbolic system where phonocentrism and logocentrism virtually do not exist, and through its practices or gestures, actually confirms that there is no such thing as inwardness provided by metaphysics. There is, therefore, a distinct semblance between the strategy of 'naturalisation' in Fukuzawa's text and how Barthes depicts the Japanese symbolic system. Thus, although Barthes specified that what he describes as 'Japan' is a figment of his own imagination invented from a short visit to 'Japan', I would argue that what Barthes did was to accurately depict the actual 'Japan', and as misplaced as this comment may be, I am in awe of Barthes for having had the capacities to read 'Japan' with so much depth in such a short while.

However, the problem still remains that Barthes suggested that this 'Japanese symbolic system' was a better model to the 'western symbolic system' and encouraged the 'West' to partake of this aestheticisation of the self in order to overcome the stagnation brought about by e.g., Judeo-Christian monotheism. And in this sense, the fact that Barthes wrote so seductively only adds to the problem, for this text has the rather narcotic effect of aestheticising this particular form of subjectification, thereby completely passing over the opportunity to analyse it as the very product of Japanese imperialism.

7.3 Governing Through Reason and Rationality?

The above discussion would highlight the fact that 'modernisation' in 'Japan' was primarily achieved through adopting the organisational format of 'nation-states', but not necessarily by legitimating it in the same way that it was in the 'West'. Hence, within the confines of my thesis, the notion of 'modernisation' has a very limited definition, and is equal to the constitution/process/emergence of the 'Japanese nation-state' and a
'Japanese national' identity. Thus, in order to discern the specificity of the very nature of 'Japanese modernisation', we would need to apprehend the very nature of 'modern' as a historical formation.

Such a realisation led me to discard Foucault's four-dimensional model in Chapter 6, where I began the task of analysing events and processes that took place from the late 1870's, when the formation of the Japanese national identity was actually accomplished. More specifically, Foucault argued that 'modernity' was the outcome of an 18th century transformation of power from that of princely sovereignty to the art of government, where the 'population' supersedes the 'family' as the object of governance (see p.). However, this historical narrative cannot fit the case of 'Japanese modernisation', since 'modernisation'—i.e., the creation of the 'Japanese nation-state'—occurred approximately hundred years after the process had begun in the 'West'. Since the specificity of such a historical phenomena was not something that Foucault's four-dimensional model did not allow one to consider, I adopted Rose's five-dimensional model in Chapter 6, which I argued was a more contextualised model from which I could better identify the specificity of Japanese imperialism as an outcome of 'modernisation'.

As was discussed in Chapter 6 (see p. 260-), the latter-half of the Meiji period saw the visible ascent of the notion of the 'Japanese' as associated to each other by family blood ties, and that they had reciprocal obligations to serve each other and the nation because of it, as could be observed, e.g., in Kyogaku Seishi (The Sacred Principles of Education), issued on August of Meiji 12 (1879). Moreover, this definition of 'Japanese' citizens as bound to the ethics of 'filial piety and duty' was accompanied by the endorsement of the Meiji Emperor as the 'natural' leader of 'Japan', who, because he
was a descendent of an uninterrupted lineage of gods, was the progenitive and transcendental presence which further enforced ethics founded on racial relations.

However, despite identifying these specific differences between the very nature of 'modernity' between 'Japan' and the 'West', I also argued that in so far as the godly presence of the Emperor was cited to guarantee the creation and separation between different domains of the nation-state—such as those between 'politics', 'military' and 'education'—this was analogous to the 'western' strategy of marking out the separation between different domains of the 'nation-state'. The only difference was that the transcendental quality in question was localised in the case of 'Japanese modernisation', and rather than basing its legitimacy upon the universal qualities of reason and rationality, it was based upon the notion of the Japanese race as singular and unique.

Thus, to the third question, 'Was there a presumption that Japan was the progressive nation which possessed the quality of civility, and were the notions of rationality and reason the organising principles legitimating Japanese imperialism?', we may say that it was based upon the progenitive identity of the 'Japanese' as singular and unique, and it was the very naturalness of the Japanese race that legitimated Japanese imperialism.

Bearing this in mind, let us recall Deleuze and Guattari's discussion regarding the 'war machine' (see Chapter 2, p. 84–). Their argument was that the 'war machine' is that which resists and dissembles state power legitimated upon the universal thinking subject in possession of reason and rationality (as the 'western nation-states' did). Moreover, they describe the 'war machine' as a 'non-subjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic qualities, only situational ones', and that alliances in war machines are formulated upon a 'singular race'. Since these qualities are precisely those which I have
argued characterised the emergent 'Japanese nation-state', and since the 'Japanese' did amply resist western colonialism, I would agree to Deleuze and Guattari's argument that the 'war machine' can effectively resist western rationality.

However, Deleuze and Guattari also argued that the 'war machine' is a rebellious element or a 'pure form of exteriority' which acts to dissemble the interiority of 'thought' that the State Apparatus requires in order to maintain its hold on power. That is to say, for Deleuze and Guattari, the 'war machine' is all that remains outside of the State Apparatus and is antithetical to it. It cannot centralise, it cannot create normativities, and it cannot strengthen state power. However, my analysis of 'Japan' should enable us to argue that where Deleuze and Guattari are wrong is in their assumption that the 'war machine' cannot possess state power, since the manner in which the race tribe of 'Japan' resisted was to organise itself into a 'nation-state'. Therefore, the qualities that they ascribe to the 'war machine' can be the basis for creating a 'nation-state'.

7.4 Disciplining Through Pastoral Power?

Given the specific differences that I have already discussed above, it should not be surprising to find that the sanctuary of the 'inner-self' would not be the basis for disciplining the Japanese subject, since such a disciplinary measure is the outcome of a 'western' historical context which does not fit the 'Japanese' one. Indeed, particularly since such a disciplinary mode of subjectification has been understood as the redeployment of Christian 'pastoral power' to discipline the whole of the social body (see Chapter 3, 130–), it would be even more unlikely that Japanese authorities would have employed such a method, since extreme vigilance against the arrival of Christian missionaries in late-16th century had been the reason for the Tokugawa government's
decision to take up an isolationist policy. Instead, as was discussed in the previous section, what the Japanese authorities did was to create their own 'god', the Emperor, and whereas the authorities of Judeo-Christianity had made a business out of caring for the 'soul', this 'god' would hone in on the 'body' as the site of discipline, and from the 1880's, there was an increasing elaboration of techniques that centred on bodily performance.

As I outlined in Chapter 6, between 1879 and 1883, Japanese citizens were disciplined at the site of elementary school through enforcing the rote performance of uttering canonical texts, and by making etiquette a required part of ethical teachings. These formulations were further enhanced during the 1880's and 90's through ascribing hierarchical differences to Japanese bodies according to levels of maturity and experience, and compounded into a form of subjectification where exchanging performative acts embodying 'duty' were defined as ethical.

Thus, to the fourth question, 'Were Japanese subjects disciplined through the encouragement to self-regulate the inner-self through the use of reason?' we may answer that disciplinary modes converged around the 'performance' of the body, and given that performance has played a central part in disciplining the Japanese subjecthood during the Meiji period, we may assume that Butler's suggestion that performing one's identity may act to subvert identity formed by power must, whilst entirely possible, be taken with a pinch of salt when considering its potential within a Japanese context.
7.5 Problematising Japanese Subjecthood

From all that has been discussed in the above, my thesis should therefore propose several directions that an analysis of Japanese subjecthood could take. Firstly, rather than looking at it as a history of creating difference, we should also focus upon sameness as a crucial component in analysing it. Secondly, we should also look at how western metaphysical thought was translated by Japanese thinkers. Thirdly, we should focus upon how it was put into practice and see 'modernity' not as a static concept but a historical formation. Fourthly, in the case of Japanese modernity, we should consider the 'body' and not the 'thinking I' as a prime site of discipline.

Thus, to answer the fifth and last question I posed, 'Was the Japanese subject constituted as a binary model, and made from an essentialised inside and an outside?', my answer would be to say that in so far as meaning does not recourse back to a 'thinking I' or essential notions in 'thought', and in so far as Japanese subjecthood was primarily formed through directing the performance of its body, one could suggest that Japanese subjecthood was constituted more holistically.

If there is a kernel of validity to what I have proposed above, then we can critique certain schools of thought within Japanese Studies which have proposed to find an alternative theoretical framework which rejects theory founded upon a binary model of the subject and proposes that which is founded upon a holistic model of the subject. Instead, the very notion of holism as the truth of the subject must be apprehended as an outcome of a specific historical formation. This has been the chief critique that I have attempted to formulate throughout my thesis not only regarding Japanese Studies, but regarding some of the theories of resistance which have proposed a radical model of the subject, and I have utilised the theoretical debates regarding western modernity as comparative.
material, which in itself, I argued, should be historicised as having a certain relation to Japanese subjecthood.

To be sure, these theoretical movements are ostensibly aimed to oppose a theoretical framework founded upon western rationality, and the ethos of such a project is not in itself objectionable. But rather than attempting to formulate an alternative theoretical model which is not 'westerncentric', I would argue that it is more important to embed theory within the social and historical processes of which it is a product of. Indeed, the attempt to come up with a theory of 'resistance' assume two things. They assume that 'resistance' has to be 'thought' about (i.e., underpinned by 'thought') before it is implemented, whereas I don't think 'resistance' has to be thought about. 'Resistance' is already part of our everyday lives, and is a possibility in every act, every thought that we do. Moreover, I think that theories of resistance do imply that there is some way of achieving pristine autonomy or sovereignty from western influence, colonialism, 'power', 'repression', etc., and I think that such a state of freedom is already impossible for any of us, including the 'West'. Thus, I would argue that these theories of resistance are paradoxical. They, on the one hand, underestimate life form's capacities to resist, and on the other, overestimate their influential capacities to come up with theories of resistance.

Moreover, I would suggest that a form of strategy which seeks to challenge universality by positing a singularity can not fundamentally challenge universality of thought, for Saussurean linguistics has shown the extent to how e.g., the notion of 'universality' can only have meaning through differentiating itself from the notion of 'singularity'. Thus, rather than oppose and destroy each other, 'singularity' and 'universality' need each other to give it meaning and identity. Hence, I would suggest that this general strategy
of positing a singularity to oppose universality is a reactionary act and cannot supersede and does not fundamentally challenge universality.

Thus, I would suggest that if one aims to overcome the legacy of western thought in theory, it is more important to historicise thought again, and ask, *e.g.*, why certain prominent theories of resistance would foreclose the opportunities for enabling a critique of Japanese subjecthood as a product of Japanese imperialism. And also ask what appeal is there and what is at stake such that rather than fashion ourselves as having an internal diversity, one would wish to think of ourselves as having a coherent and unified subjectivity. The task remains at hand to continue and intensify the exercise of apprehending thought as practice.
### APPENDIX A

#### Gakusei (Education Act) Article 27 (Meiji 5 [1872] 5th September)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Elementary School Curriculum</th>
<th>Upper Elementary School Curriculum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Teiji (Composition)</td>
<td>• Kato Shogaku Kyoka (Lower Elementary Curriculum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shuji (Calligraphy)</td>
<td>• Shigaku Taii (Outline of Historical Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tango (Vocabulary)</td>
<td>• Kikagaku Keiga Taii (Outline of Geometry and Drafting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kaiwa (Conversation)</td>
<td>• Hakubutsu-gaku Taii (Outline of Knowledge of Cosmic Things)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dokuhon (Reading)</td>
<td>• Kagaku Taii (Outline of Chemistry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shushin (Ethics)</td>
<td>• Gaikoku-go Ichii-Nii (Foreign Language One-Two)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shotoku (Writing)</td>
<td>• Kibo-ho (Accountancy Skills)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bunpo (Grammar)</td>
<td>• Ga-gaku (Study of Designing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)</td>
<td>• Tenkyu-gaku (Study of Celestial Sphere)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Yosei-ho (Cultivation Skills)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chigakku Tai (Outline of Geography)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kyuri-gaku Tai (Outline of Study of Investigation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Taijutsu (Skills of the Body)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shoka (Singing)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Ministry of Education Proposal: Shogaku Kyosoku (Meiji 5 [1872] 8th September)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Elementary School Curriculum</th>
<th>Upper Elementary School Curriculum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Teiji (Composition)</td>
<td>• Kato Shogaku Kyoka (Lower Elementary Curriculum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shuji (Calligraphy)</td>
<td>• Saiji Shuji (Small Lettering Calligraphy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tango Dokuho (Vocabulary Methods)</td>
<td>• Shotoku Sakubun (Writing &amp; Writing Composition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)</td>
<td>• Shigaku Rinko (General Lectures on Historical Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kokutai-gaku Koju (Oral Instruction to National Learning)</td>
<td>• Saiji Sokusha (Quick Copying of Small Letters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shushin Koju (Oral Instruction to Ethics)</td>
<td>• Keiga (Drafting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tango Ansho (Vocabulary Recitation)</td>
<td>• Kika (Geometry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kaiwa Dokuho (Conversation Methods)</td>
<td>• Hakubutsu (Cosmic Things)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tango Kakitori (Vocabulary Writing)</td>
<td>• Kagaku (Chemistry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dokuhon Dokuho (Reading Methods)</td>
<td>• Seiri (Physiology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kaiwa Ansho (Conversation Recitation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chiri Dokuho (Geography Methods)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Yosei Koju (Oral Instruction to Cultivation)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kaiwa Kakitori (Conversation &amp; Writing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dokuhon Rinko (General Lectures on Reading Books)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bunpo (Grammar)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Butsuri-gaku Rinko (General Lectures on Study of Physics)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shotoku (Writing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kakka Onshu (Revision of Each Subject)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Teacher's College Proposal: *Shogaku Kyosoku*

#### Lower Elementary School Curriculum
- Dokubutsu (Reading Material)
- Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)
- Shuji (Calligraphy)
- Kakitori (Writing)
- Mondo (Question & Answer)
- Fukudoku (Review of Reading)
- Taiso (Exercise)
- Akubun (Writing Composition)
- Shoka Fukushu (Revision of Each Subject)

#### Upper Elementary School Curriculum
- Dokubutsu (Reading Material)
- Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)
- Shuji (Calligraphy)
- Rinko (General Lectures)
- Anki (Memorisation)
- Sakubun (Writing Composition)
- Taiso (Exercise)
- Keiga (Drafting)
- Shoka Fukushu (Revision of Each Subject)

#### Middle Elementary School Curriculum
- Shushin (Ethics)
- Dokusho (Reading and Writing)
- Shuji (Calligraphy)
- Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)
- Chiri (Geography)
- Rekishi (History)
- Zuga (Sketching)
- Hakubutsu (Cosmic Things)
- Butsuri (Physics)
- Shoka (Singing)
- Saiho (Sewing)
- Taiso (Exercise)

#### Ordinary Elementary School Curriculum
- Shushin (Ethics)
- Dokusho (Reading & Writing)
- Sakubun (Writing Composition)
- Shuji (Calligraphy)
- Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)
- Taiso (Exercise)
- Zuga (Sketching)
- Shoka (Singing)
- Hosai (Sewing)
- (Eigo) (English Language)
- (Nogyo) (Farming)
- (Shuko) (Handicraft)
- (Shogyo) (Trade)
### Shogakko no Gakka Oyobi Sono Teido
- (Meiji 19 [1885] 25th May)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinary Elementary School Curriculum</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>· Shushin (Ethics)</td>
<td>· Shushin (Ethics)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· Dokusho (Reading &amp; Writing)</td>
<td>· Dokusho (Reading &amp; Writing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· Sakubun (Writing Composition)</td>
<td>· Sakubun (Writing Composition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Shuji (Calligraphy)</td>
<td>· Shuji (Calligraphy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)</td>
<td>· Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· Taiso (Exercise)</td>
<td>· Chiri (Geography)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· (Zuga) ((Sketching))</td>
<td>· Rekishi (History)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· (Shoka) ((Singing))</td>
<td>· Rika (Science)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>· Zuga (Sketching)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Shoka (Singing)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>· Taiso (Exercise)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Hosai (Sewing)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>· (Eigo) ((English Language))</td>
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<td></td>
<td>· (Nogyo) ((Farming))</td>
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<td></td>
<td>· (Shuko) ((Handicraft))</td>
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<td></td>
<td>· (Shogyo) ((Trade))</td>
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### Shogakko Kyosoku Taiko
- (Meiji 24 [1890] 17th November)

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<td>· Shushin (Ethics)</td>
<td>· Shushin (Ethics)</td>
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<td>· Dokusho (Reading &amp; Writing)</td>
<td>· Dokusho (Reading &amp; Writing)</td>
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<td>· Sakubun (Writing Composition)</td>
<td>· Sakubun (Writing Composition)</td>
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<td>· Shuji (Calligraphy)</td>
<td>· Shuji (Calligraphy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)</td>
<td>· Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· Taiso (Exercise)</td>
<td>· Taiso (Exercise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· (Zuga) ((Sketching))</td>
<td>· Nihon Chiri (Japanese Geography)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· (Shoka) ((Singing))</td>
<td>· Nihon Rekishi (Japanese History)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Gaikoku Chiri (Foreign Geography)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Rika (Science)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Zuga (Sketching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Shoka (Singing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Saiho (Sewing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (Kika Shoho) ((Introductory Geometry))</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (Gaikoku-go) ((Foreign Language))</td>
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<td>· (Nogyo) ((Farming))</td>
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<td>· (Shogyo) ((Trade))</td>
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<td>· (Shuko) ((Handicraft))</td>
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### Shikko Kisoku Meiji 33
- (Meiji 33 [1899] 21st August)

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<tr>
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<td>· Sanjutsu (Arithmetic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>· Taiso (Exercise)</td>
<td>· Nihon Rekishi (Japanese History)</td>
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<td>· (Zuga) ((Sketching))</td>
<td>· Chiri (Geography)</td>
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<td>· (Shoka) ((Singing))</td>
<td>· Rika (Science)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· (Saiho) ((Sewing))</td>
<td>· Zuga (Sketching)</td>
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### Chart 3. Changes to Designation of School Curriculum.

Subjects in (brackets) were designated as optional courses.
### CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Jan 1868</td>
<td>Meiji Restoration Edict: abolition of feudal rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1868</td>
<td>Dajokan (Grand Council of State) reinstated as supreme administrative body of the new government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb 1868</td>
<td>Iwakura Tomomi appoints three Shintoists and scholars of National Learning (Kokugaku)—Hirata Kanetane, Tamamura Misao, Yano Harumichi—directing them to “examine structures and regulations” suitable for aristocratic schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mar 1868</td>
<td>Gakushuin reopens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Apr 1868</td>
<td>Gakushuin promoted to status of proxy Court College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sept 1868</td>
<td>Government announces the creation of Kangakusho and Kogakusho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Oct 1868</td>
<td>Emperor enters Tokyo Castle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Nov 1868</td>
<td>Aizu domain surrenders - end of Tohoku (Northeast) Boshin War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1869</td>
<td>Fuji ken Shise Junjo (Administrative Procedures for Metropolitan Districts and Prefectures) issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1869</td>
<td>Tokyo becomes new capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1869</td>
<td>Rendition of domanial registers to the throne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1869</td>
<td>Re-organisation of the three former Bakufu schools, Shoheiko (the main Shogunal college), Igakusho (Shogunate's medical institute), and Kaiseisho (Shogunate's institute of Western studies), into the Daigakko (University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan 1870</td>
<td>Grand Council of State announces that Daigakko will be changed to Daigaku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 July 1870</td>
<td>Closing of the Main University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of 1870–73</td>
<td>Ryugakusei/yatoi teachers increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July 1871</td>
<td>Abolition of the han</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1871</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (Monbusho) established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn 1871</td>
<td>Taisei Hanzen Kunmo (Western Instruction and Enlightenment on Promoting Goodness) published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sept 1872</td>
<td>Gakushi Shorei ni kansuru Osedasare-sho (Bequest Regarding Scholastic Promotion) issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sept 1872</td>
<td>Gakusei (Education Act) published and promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sept 1872</td>
<td>Shogaku Kyosoku (Guideline for Elementary Teaching) issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>Meiroku-sha (Society of Enlightened Six) founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873–78</td>
<td>Era of honyaku school textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation) published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 1878</td>
<td>Okubo Toshimichi assassinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1879</td>
<td>Kyogaku Taishi (The Great Principles of Education) written by Motoda Eifu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Sept 1879</td>
<td>Kyoku-rei (Education Ordinance) promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Dec 1880</td>
<td>Kyoku-rei Kaisei (Revised Education Ordinance) promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1880</td>
<td>Monbusho establishes an editorial office for school textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 1880</td>
<td>Shogakko Kyosoku Koyo (Outline of Educational Rules for Elementary Schools) promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Aug 1881</td>
<td>Yogaku Koyo (Introduction to Elementary Learning) issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Dajokan (Grand Council of State) abolished and Naikaku (Cabinet System) initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Mori Arinori appointed first Cabinet Minister of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Apr 1886</td>
<td>Shogakko-rei (Elementary School Ordinance) promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May 1886</td>
<td>Shogakko no Gakko Oyobi Sono Teido (Elementary School Curriculum and Its Degree) issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>School/Teacher’s College Textbook: Book of Ethics published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>Mori Arinori assassinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>Meiji Constitution promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct 1890</td>
<td>Shogakko-rei (Elementary School Ordinance) promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Oct 1890</td>
<td>Kyoiku Chokugo (Imperial Rescript on Education) promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Nov 1891</td>
<td>Shogakko Kyosoku Taiko (General Outline of Educational Rules for Elementary Schools) issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>Motoda Eifu dies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1894</td>
<td>Retirement of Inoue Kowashi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894-5</td>
<td>Sino-Japanese War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Revision of Trade Treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 1900</td>
<td>Shogakko-rei Kaisei (Revised Elementary School Ordinance) promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Apr 1903</td>
<td>Shogakko-rei Shikoku Chu-kaisei (Intermediary Revision to Enforcing Elementary School Ordinance) issued</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>School textbooks edited under kokutei seido (state-compiled textbook system) published</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904-5</td>
<td>Russo-Japanese War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Mar 1907</td>
<td>Shogakko-rei Chu-kaisei (Intermediary Revision to Elementary School Ordinance) issued</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Primary Sources
(In Chronological Order)


Secondary Sources


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