The Routes of Philosophy:
Paul Deussen, Indian Non-Dualism
and Universal Metaphysics

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Signed Declaration

I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own work.

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Abstract

It is the nature of comparative philosophy to reflect on different orders of knowledge and different forms of discourse. The question of the validity of knowledge is essential to the comparative works of Paul Deussen. By analysing metaphysics into its basic elements, he was able to gather and compare the efforts of many different times and places. This is to say that Deussen endeavoured to use the elements of metaphysics to reconcile the mutually incompatible claims of Reason and Revelation. He pursued this reconciliation in a non-Hegelian manner which did not exclude revelation and which allowed the status of religion, philosophy and science to be preserved, whether eastern or western in origin. While Deussen agrees to an extent with the Hegelian postulate that philosophy only ever emerges in a particular alignment with science and ethics, he insists on including religion in the account of the origin of philosophy. For this reason, he was able to include India's exegetical traditions of the fundamentally theologico-philosophical treatises of the Veda in his comparative and historical work. This was an entirely unprecedented and an untimely philosophical enterprise, and one which remained unparalleled for almost half a century.

My thesis explores the manner in which he articulates and validates a unified, universal science of metaphysics. It examines his transformation of the scientific resources of physiology and psychology into the principle of the Will and follows his elaboration of a metaphysical morality based on the negation of this Will. However I also explore the potential in the most significant text for this thesis, *The System of the Vedanta* (1883), for a non-metaphysical way of thinking and acting. I argue that Deussen's text marks the creation of a singular relation to the Outside of the type of existence ordered by western thought. Deussen's history of philosophy leads me finally to evaluate his project for the renewal of philosophy and culture on the basis of universal metaphysics. From this emerge the suggestions for further work concerning Nietzsche's relationship to the Vedantic concept of 'beyond good and evil' in particular and to Indian philosophy and the revaluation of all values in general.
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Only ideas *won by walking* have any value.

Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*

No path remains for him. His Self is the path.

Sankara's Commentary

Eternal creation is a tree, with roots above, branches on the ground; pure eternal Spirit, living in all things and beyond whom none can go; that is Self.

(Katha Upanishad)
Indien mit der Reiseroute.

Paul Deussen's Indian journey, 1892-93
Introduction

Paul Deussen (1845-1919) is generally known for having been the founder of the Schopenhauerische Gesellschaft and a friend of the young Nietzsche. While his translations and commentaries on the Upanishads are still in circulation among historians of religion, his work has been completely forgotten by the discipline of philosophy. If this is largely due to the restrictive limits imposed by increasing specialisation in academia and the hygienic separation of its schools, to Deussen this would seem both disappointing and unsurprising. He himself engaged in the most radical tactics to break down the artificial barriers between realms of knowledge that he viewed as culturally myopic, regressive and an unhappy result of the colonising mentality. My thesis gives a detailed account of the methods he used and success he achieved within his own lifetime. After the great opening of the archives of humanity in the eighteenth century, comparative disciplines began to flourish in the nineteenth century as the perfecting of translation skills and foreign language printing technology kept pace with the search for territorial expansion. However in the proliferation of comparative studies, Deussen was perhaps the only scholar who pursued the revival of the study of ancient manuscripts from eastern sources not for learned but for practical use. If not for this unique figure, we would perhaps have to discount Schwab's claim that Europe experienced an 'Oriental Renaissance', given the difference between the purely scholarly or purely bureaucratic aims of the Orientalists and the revolution in knowledge inspired by the 'first' European Renaissance.

Deussen, trained as a philologist, became the first European to lecture on Indian philosophy in a philosophy department before the First World War. On one hand, his translations of the Upanishads, the Bhagavhad Gita and the philosophical Vedanta Commentaries were enormously popular and went into several reprints. Philology had incorporated Sanskrit texts into its histories since the mid 19th century. On the other, he was painfully conscious of philosophy's view that Indian thought was 'absolutely alien', 'the childish babbling of philosophical infancy'. The book he had written to accompany his lecture series, The Elements of Metaphysics, initially failed to enlarge the audience for Indian philosophy. Hence his major opus, The Universal History of Philosophy, subtitled with Specific Reference to Religion was written with the specific
aim of elevating the status of Indian philosophy. It overtly argued that the Greek past was no longer in a position to illuminate the history of philosophy and that it was European thought itself which was in need of being illuminated by comparison with India. The profundity of Deussen's study, his unflinching challenge to the future of European and Indian philosophy, the wealth of previously unknown texts he publicised and his intensely personal engagement with Indian thought constituted an unprecedented encounter in the history of philosophy. Later called by Mircea Eliade, 'the first great synthetic history of Eastern and Western thought', it remained unparalleled until the exquisite work produced by Corbin in the 1950's on Islamic philosophy.

This thesis offers a detailed inquiry into the moments of Deussen's encounter with Indian philosophy. Systematicity was a supremely important aspect of philosophy for Deussen and Chapter 1 therefore presents an exposition of The Elements of Metaphysics which he used throughout his pedagogical career as the basis of explaining his own system. I read this text as an attempt to analyse metaphysics into its necessary and universal elements, in a manner analogous to chemical analysis. Reducing thought to its most essential, elementary forms permitted his system to include the metaphysical efforts of all peoples and all times, whether philosophical or religious. He quickly establishes that the main elements of natural, empirical consciousness cannot provide the foundation of their own validity. The basic concepts of matter, causality, forces and bodies point to the need for a supplementary metaphysical explanation. Turning to a transcendental analysis of the Understanding, he investigates those elements of experience which universally belong to the intellect. Using the concept of energia, he then focuses on the intellectual and sensuous work carried out by the Understanding in order to weave the appearance of the world as representation. Although this model is much indebted to Schopenhauerean philosophy, it turns increasingly to evidence supplied by Greek-Sanskrit-Christian conceptual triads. Texts from the Vedanta, Plato and the Bible are used to corroborate the principle that time, space and causality force us to distinguish the world from the Thing-in-itself.

In the second chapter, my reading of the lectures focuses on the elaboration of a philosophy of forces in Deussen's Metaphysics of Nature. This section will pay close attention to the articulation of its astonishing core claim that the Indian Brahman, Plato's Ideas, the Christian God, Kant's Thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer's Will and the forces of natural science are one and the same thing. This leads me to explore Deussen's
complex and sometimes problematic differentiation of (1) empirical ego-individuation from (2) the freedom of the unified Will, and (3) the eternal forces or ideas which shape the Will’s objective manifestation.

The concept of energy returns in the main proposition of the Metaphysics of Beauty that, ‘we un-self ourselves in aesthetic contemplation’. Here the theme of Deussen’s entire philosophy emerges: contra Schopenhauer, he claims that the negation of the individual will is not a ‘painless nothing’ but a different way of being, which is experienced through art as a state of ‘exuberant bliss’. That is to say, negation is positive. The final section on the Metaphysics of Morality will demonstrate how Deussen employs his analysis of the main elements of metaphysics in justification of his ascetic principle of negation as the only way to reveal the divine element of metaphysical freedom in human beings..

Chapter 2’s concentration on the Psyche or the soul as the equivalent of the Will is challenged and expanded by reference to Deussen’s second work, *The System of the Vedanta*. In its attempt to present Non-Dual Vedantin philosophy as a system of metaphysics, it confronts the very foundations of metaphysical thought with a potentially an-archē-ic practice. My analysis of this text in Chapter 3 unravels many of the performative, paradoxical and poetic techniques this philosophy develops in order to release being, thinking and acting from their narrow habitus. This will only have been possible because of Deussen’s commitment to include even what he knows to be unsystematic and what he feels to be confusing in the overall system of the Vedanta. In this sense, his systematicity in fact includes Otherness. I will argue that this is demonstrated by his extended reflection on the Practical Philosophy of the Vedanta. For although it corroborates his defence of asceticism, it also alludes to one who has been enlightened during life, the *jīvan mukta*, as living ‘as it happens’ (*idris a’eva*) and who is ‘beyond Good and Evil’. This sage is not engaged in goal-orientated activity, hence he does not strive to deny the Will. I discuss how Deussen deals with this paradox by importing a distinction between esoteric and exoteric knowledge into the tradition.

Finally, Chapter 4 presents the *Universal History of Philosophy* as the extension of the embryonic comparative project present in the *Elements*. While again positing the universality of the Ideality of time, space and causality, it now also emphasises ‘the moral phenomenon’ of conscience as the *‘a priori of a prioris’*. I examine his
postulation of this metaphysical ‘fact’ as a compromise resulting directly from his reflections on the a-teleological Practical Vedanta. While his ideal definition of philosophy is an inexorable consequence of his Kantian-Schopenhauerean approach, he now argues for the validity of Idealism more concretely on the basis of the history of philosophy. I explore carefully the tropes he uses to shape this nonetheless non-dialectical view of history, such as the geo-philosophical map and the treasure house or temple of past Idealist philosophemes. This massive re-addressing of the question ‘What is philosophy?’ to the history of thought involves him in an important investigation of the origin of religion and philosophy. This is articulated through the emergence of different alignments of science, ethics and philosophy in the three *Kulturkreise* at the basis of the work. A close reading of the volume entitled *The Philosophy of the Bible*, the key text of the *History* will be explored in its connection with Nietzsche’s re-writing of the history of Christianity in *The Anti-Christ*. This sheds new light on the aim of Deussen’s project to excavate the Thing-in-itself by means of inner experience (Psychology). This chapter’s conclusion questions how Deussen intended to employ history to vitalise the philosophy of the past for the living thought of the present. By reflecting on the trajectory of his previous works, it assesses the meaning of Deussen’s endeavour to establish a unified, metaphysical science as a *jnana-kana*, that is, an enlightening, ‘perfect knowledge’. This leads me to outline the questions which my thesis raises concerning Nietzsche’s relationship with Indian philosophy and culture. The suggestions for further work which emerge from this are sketched in a brief section entitled ‘Crossing Points’.
The Elements of Metaphysics

1. Introduction

Conceived as a kind of manual for students, Deussen used the *Elements of Metaphysics* as the basis of his lectures for over thirty years. It would not be underestimating this document to say that it offers a template of his life’s work. Both Wilhelm Halbfass and Roger Pol-Droit stress that Deussen was the first Indologist to teach in a European *philosophy* department before the First World War. This makes *Elements of Metaphysics* an important testament to the manner in which Indian thought was introduced to the west. It also demonstrates a process by which Indian thought was endowed with academic status and ushered into the ‘canon’. The process of institutionalisation, with its ever ambiguous consequences, was achieved in this case by including India in a comparative history of metaphysics. Since the 17th century, Indian thought had been investigated in its religious, legal, mythological, linguistic and literary aspects but before Deussen, its philosophical contributions had been completely ignored. The divisions of the European specialisations in knowledge made it impossible to approach a culture which had no separate words either for ‘philosophy’ or ‘religion’. While in 19th century Germany, it was customary for some courses in the history of philology to begin with India, Deussen was the first to include it in the history of *philosophy*.

He made this integration possible by breaking metaphysics down to its primordial elements, allowing him to include the metaphysical efforts of all peoples and times. It is possible to compare this to Nietzsche’s identification of a will to philosophise as just one of the many affirmative and negative forces which shape a culture. Philosophy as discipline, institution or tradition is momentarily put in abeyance. Deussen’s Universal History is ‘unique amid the literature of this field’, according to Halbfass, for the very reason that it did not segregate religion from philosophy; a view which was not shared by contemporary academic historians. The Idealist definition of philosophy which Deussen applies in that history is prepared and elaborated by *The Elements of Metaphysics*, a work which he sees as indebted to both Kant and Schopenhauer.

Whereas Kant placed enormous significance on organising the distribution or the
architectonic of the faculties in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Deussen was fundamentally concerned with producing a *table of elements* as the basis for the analysis of philosophical compositions, eastern and western. This is how he conceives of the search for universal *a prioris*. Just as the chemical elements are the fundamental building blocks of matter, the *a prioris* exist, according to Deussen, as the necessary elements of all philosophical thought. By the time of writing the Universal History, he was able to refine the list to three essential *a prioris* and one radical element, which he calls ‘the *a priori of a priori*’. (SS, 19) The present work also imposes a hierarchy on the elements of metaphysics, thereby privileging what he calls ‘the radical and metaphysical element: the Will.’ (EFN, 178) Deussen directly compares Lavoisier’s dissolution of water into oxygen and hydrogen to Schopenhauer’s division of the world into Will and representation. Being, even if it seemed essentially unitary, as water had to the ancients, needed to be analysed into its eternal and non-eternal parts. *Scheidung* (separation), Deussen emphasises, is the meaning of Kantian critique.

However Deussen’s ‘Will’ emerges as a particular neo-Kantian conception, incompatible in fact with Schopenhauer’s pessimism. In Deussen’s terms, the world of empirical consciousness needs to be separated from ‘our true supra-individual and *divine* nature’. (EFN, 174: *emphasis added*) It would be wrong to conclude, as Boutout does, that Deussen’s work is ‘in general the prolongation of Schopenhauer’s’.⁴ Deussen’s reconstruction of a practical, impersonal metaphysics through his engagement with Indian philosophy goes far beyond Schopenhauerean limits. Deussen’s commitment to writing a history of philosophy which sought out this universal, supra-individual, divine nature also demonstrates the extent to which he established his own ethical philosophy. As Halbfass writes, it is Deussen rather than Schopenhauer who is interested in ethical principles which could lead to an improvement in the empirical world.⁵

Deussen’s ethical commitments and his view of the Will as radical and divine are absolutely grounded in a philosophy of Non-Dualism. He derives this term from the Indian school of *Advaita Vedanta: ad-vaita* literally meaning ‘not-two’. The work he engaged in immediately after the *Elements* (and which was possibly the main aim of his decision to become an Indologist) was a systematic exposition of this philosophy. *The System of the Vedanta*, 1887 has been seen by some as his magnum opus. It will be the focus of the third chapter. In particular, his work on what was later called ‘Practical
Vedanta' will form the focus for his advocacy of an impersonal metaphysics.

Non-Dualism is not explicated as a doctrine as such in the *Elements*. The closest Deussen gets to a definitive theory of Non-Dualism is through his work on the Vedanta. And yet, as we will see, some aspects of the Indian doctrine will prove to be a challenge to his very conception of metaphysics. In the present work however, while Non-Dualism operates as a latent theoretical presupposition, it has an important function. It brings together the two dimensions – the physical and the metaphysical – into which the heterogeneous elements of philosophy are organised. At the same time, it preserves a distinction between the two. In each of the four hierarchical regions of philosophy which Deussen identifies – the Understanding, Nature, Beauty and Morality – we will encounter a Non-Dual strategy. Its key operation is in explaining the Schopenhauerian Will as a *bi-modal*, i.e. non-dual first principle of Being.

Schopenhauer depended on a logic of opposition to identify the Will with Being and the denial of the Will with non-Being. However the philosophy of Non-Dualism allows Deussen to present a bi-modal Will. The ‘one Will: two modes’ doctrine creates points of intensity in Schopenhauer’s system, permitting Deussen to emancipate himself from it and to arrive at different ontology of action and at a more elaborate ethics. His difference from Schopenhauer becomes most apparent in his use of Non-Dualism to argue that the denial of the Will does not amount to a denial of the world.

As noted, the point of Deussen’s analysis in his first work is to divide and distinguish the elements of metaphysics: the Non-Dualism is in a sense taken for granted here. Nevertheless, the importance of Indian thought emerges in the process by which Deussen supports his theory by referring to the consensus he finds between German, Greek and Indian philosophy. That is to say, the significance of India emerges first of all as an example of Non-Dualist Idealism. However, in his next work, its exemplary status is elevated to the level of an original doctrine. Its increased significance is direct consequence of the triads – ‘Greece-Germany-India’ and ‘Greek-German-Sanskrit’ – which are the leitmotif of this work. We can also see in these triads the ‘seed’ idea of his Universal History of Philosophy.

Having thus introduced Deussen’s relationship to Indian philosophy, before proceeding to an exegesis of the *Elements of Metaphysics*, I would like to situate his contribution to
scholarship within the broader intellectual context of his time. It is important to consider how the area he was working in was already traversed by schisms in science, religion and philosophy. The nineteenth century moreover was an era obsessed by ideas of development, evolution and progress, and the contemporary currents of historical research made the tensions between these cultural forces more visible as well as more contested. These factors conditioned the way in which Deussen’s views on Indian philosophy were received. A brief overview of the diagram of European intellectual forces will help us to understand how he may have organised his ideas in order to address the contemporary audience and to contextualise the emergence of his philosophical triads.

2. The Context of Indological Study in 19th Century Germany

The interests of colonialists and missionaries in the sources of information about Indian thought played no small part in the endurance of the view that it consisted largely of the mythical and soteriological discourses of polytheism or pantheism. Before Deussen, there was no recognition that India possessed a philosophical tradition. It is Said’s thesis that the shift of the centre of power to Europe from the 16th century onwards was the motor force for the consolidation of Orientalism into a positivist form of knowledge.

An unbroken arc of knowledge and power connects the statesman and the Orientalist. The scope of Orientalism (as a manifest institution) matched the scope of empire.6

Whether in regard to academics working within a tradition and discipline, guided by certain protocols and necessary relations to the state or to colonial administrators, bureaucrats, statesmen, diplomats and consular staff, Orientalism was the element of continuity in this spectrum, according to Said. Orientalism was an ‘academic-research consensus or paradigm’ which attributed to Asia a ‘static system of synchronic essentialism’.7 It claimed to identify the essence of the Oriental in a manner supported by scientific positivism but which was nevertheless predominantly organised according an unchanging, simple dualism, apparently beyond all historical situations. Europe is always the superior of the two: advanced, rational, humane, masculine. The Orient is the inferior: backward, irrational, aberrant and feminine. In addition, the Oriental always appeared in a temporal distortion to belong to the distant past. This enormously prejudiced the reception of Indian ideas.

With the ‘opening of the archives of mankind’, as Schwab describes the discoveries and
translations of the Orientalists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, India became increasingly implicated in the establishment of civilisational timetables. In the schema of the development of knowledge devised by Auguste Comte, Indian forms of discourse could be said to have reached neither the stage of abstract reasoning/metaphysics nor the final positivist and scientific stage. *Mythos* had not become *Logos* in India: the form of its discourse could not be recognised as philosophical. Similarly for Hegel, Indian philosophy was inseparable from religion. It had found its way to the One and Universal, which Hegel too saw as the true ground of religion and philosophy, but without finding the way back to the concrete particularity of the world. In India, he saw the universal and the particular, the one and the many related to each other in unreconciled negation and exclusion. All particularisations seemed to fall outside a contentless and abstract One, leading to the other extreme of Indian thought; a rampant chaos of mythological and iconographic details, 'a religion of fantasy'. The lack of dialectical mediation, thus the perceived lack of historical progress towards the enhancement of man and the world, led Hegel to assign Indian thought to the pre-history of philosophy.

It was not until 1875, with Deussen's publication, that a comparative philosophy emerged in which Indian thought was addressed directly as an equal to European philosophy.

It must be remarked that placing Comte and Hegel together like this is in fact problematic for Said's thesis. Said deals exclusively with English and French Orientalist sources. Now although Germany participated in the race for colonies and hence, for Said, in fabricating a hegemonic Orientalist discourse, it is difficult to explain the obsession of German scholars with India considering Germany had no colonies in India. Said argues that Orientalist representations 'respond[ed] to certain cultural, professional, national, political and economic *requirements of the epoch*' (*emphasis added*). How these requirements operated on German scholars has yet to be analysed. There is certainly the German and English colonial and naval rivalry to consider, as well as the fact that the disparity in the balance of trade between Germany and India was growing ever wider, largely due to English monopolies. Boutout suggests that Deussen actually received the title of 'personal adviser' to the Emperor on the subject of India. Deussen recounts in his autobiography that he and ten other Indologists spent two weeks on a naval tour with Kaiser Wilhelm II, but otherwise there is no evidence to suggest he held this special post. In fact, Deussen supported Indian independence and wrote an essay called 'Our Indian Brothers' for an Indian pro-Independence journal in 1912.
Schwab’s work *Oriental Renaissance* certainly paints a vivid picture of the reaction of German scholars to the discovery and translation of original Sanskrit texts from India. He claimed that the publications of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, founded in 1784, ignited a fervent intensity among German scholars.

In philosophy they included Schelling, Fichte and Hegel — not to mention Schopenhauer and Schleiermacher. In poetry, they included Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, Tieck and Bretano. And among the great innovators of the new ideas that were to become Romanticism, a certain Herder passed the word to a certain Friedrich Schlegel.\(^{12}\)

The deciphering of Sanskrit, the arrival of Indian literature and the development of comparative linguistics was greeted with enthusiasm by Herder, Goethe, the Schlegels, the Humboldts and Chezy — and these are only a few of the well-known names. The ‘furore’, Schwab says, moved from Jena, to Weimar, Heidelberg, Bonn, Berlin and Tübingen and endured in their universities and publishing houses. Moreover, the invention of a Sanskrit printing press circa 1815 by Sussex-born printer and Indologist Charles Wilkins (1749-1836) permitted the vastly increased circulation of dictionaries, grammar books and primary texts. Of the two most important Sanskrit dictionaries published in the 19\(^{th}\) century, one was in English (Monier-Williams) and the other in German (Bohtlingkt and Weber).

In 1787, Alphonse-Hercule Anquetil-Duperron finished his famous Latin translation of fifty Upanishads, - the *Oupnek‘h at* so admired by Schopenhauer, - working from a 17th century Persian manuscript which had been requested by Dara Shikoh, son of Emperor Shah Jahan. He included only one Appendix in this seminal work which crucially consisted in an appeal to all German philosophers, to all Kantians and Idealists to attend to its contents. The idea that ‘all German Idealism had an Indian tint’, as Schwab thinks, can be traced to this French pioneer.

Anquetil-Duperron was right in the notes to the Oupnek’hat to compare the Upanishads to Kant’s system which, in attributing all things to the thing-in-itself, became the father of this idealism. When the day comes that a philosopher studies in technical detail the influence exerted by Hindu thought on those who shaped nineteenth century philosophy, he will be surprised that such influence was not recognised earlier.\(^{13}\)
Until Schopenhauer took up Anquetil-Duperron's challenge in 1813, Indian philosophy was ignored. In the nineteenth century, Indian thought was addressed predominantly by the fields of study of language and religion. This encounter had been anticipated and to an extent predetermined by Schlegel's essay on the language and philosophy of the Indians (1808) and Bopp's book on the conjugation system of Sanskrit (1816). This specialisation in the domains of knowledge is explicitly European. The differentiation historically arising between religion, philosophy and science led to the eclipse of Indian thought in the west and fragmented its rich resources into separate studies in linguistics, anthropology and the history of religions. The culmination of this marginalisation of Indian philosophy was reached, according to Pol-Droit in the year the first chair in Sciences Religieuses was inaugurated in Paris in 1887. This pinpoints the exact moment of cultural amnesia which he calls 'l'oubli de l'Inde'. This explains why, early on, Deussen established a direct challenge to the authority of these specialisations.

If...we seek to penetrate into the inner meaning of the various systems, religious and philosophical, we shall come to the conviction that the essential differences between natural science, philosophy and religion originate after all in a misunderstanding which can be removed, and which will give way to a mutual recognition of their right to exist.(6)

The reconciliation of philosophy and religion is achieved in this work by the analysis of common metaphysical elements, as already noted. However in this citation, Deussen also claims to seek a ground of consensus between these metaphysical truths and the natural sciences. This can be seen a part of a critique of representation that arose in the nineteenth century in response to both positivistic and historicist developments in the human sciences. The dominance of scientific-empirical methodologies posed a serious threat to the validity of Deussen's project. His Non-Dualism provided a way of engaging seriously with the types of proof demanded by the empirical sciences which also, on the other hand, 'legitimately' necessitated a metaphysical supplement. This will be the theme of the section below, 'The System of Physics'.

It is interesting to note how Deussen came into contact with oriental thought. 1845, the year of his birth, was also the year Max Müller, future editor of the Sacred Book of the East series, travelled to Paris to learn Sanskrit. Müller's teacher, Eugène Burnouf, had himself been a student of Bopp, had also translated Avestan manuscripts that Anquetil-Duperron had brought back to Paris. Deussen first came into contact with Sanskrit
through reading Schopenhauer. According to Rollmann, Deussen began studying Sanskrit in Bonn under Christian Lassen, who had worked with A.W. Schlegel and published the enormously successful opus *Indische Altertumskunde* in 1861. When Nietzsche left for Bonn for Leipzig with Ritschl in 1867, Deussen went to Berlin to study Sanskrit further under Albrecht Weber, co-author of the Sanskrit-German dictionary. These affinities indicate that a small and relatively close-knit group were engaged in philological work on Sanskrit texts in Deussen’s period. In fact, both he and Müller became friends and were soon involved in promoting and shaping the emergence of two new ‘sciences’: comparative linguistics and comparative religion.

3. Comparative Linguistics, Philology and the Historico-Critical Method

By introducing historicity into the domain of languages, Schlegel and Bopp encouraged a concept of evolution that did not depend on the continuity of modes of being in linear, temporal succession. Comparative linguistics complicated the simplistic, linear histories of civilisational development. A period characterised by ‘a new order of time’ commenced, as Foucault wrote in *Les Mots et les Choses*.

Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and German had to be treated in accordance with a systematic simultaneity; breaking with all chronology, they had to be inserted into a fraternal time-system so that their structures could become transparent and a history of languages could become legible in them....Empiricity...is henceforth traversed by History, through the whole density of its being.17

The introduction of time inside of language placed it on the same level as living beings, treated it as a zoon. Language became one object of knowledge among others. To know language was no longer to come close as possible to knowledge itself. It meant simply ‘to apply the methods of understanding in general to a particular domain of objectivity’18. It was one mode of uncovering the world among many others.

Both Nietzsche’s and Deussen’s rejection of pure philology as insufficient was based on this view of language as a living being. Both agreed that language was a key factor uniting Indian, Greek and German philosophies, yet they disagreed over how this should be interpreted. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche uses comparative grammar to emphasise the historical relation between ideas and language

The singular family resemblance between all Indian, Greek and German philosophising is easy enough to explain. Where there exists a
language affinity it is quite impossible, thanks to the common philosophy of grammar... to avoid everything being prepared in advance for a similar evolution and succession of philosophical systems....Philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (in which the concept of the subject is least developed) will in all probability look ‘into the world’ differently and be found on different paths from the Indo-Germans and Moslems...  

In this example, Nietzsche suggests that the inflated conceptualisation of subjectivity in Indo-Germanic grammar has pre-determined the limits of the growth of its philosophy. Where Nietzsche accepts the historical becoming of language, Deussen insists on referring it to a deeper dimension: a pre-linguistic, immediate presence. Nietzsche brings the historical density of language back to the play of surfaces, returning it to an analysis of the body based on the values of health and sickness. He concludes the above quote by declaring,  

...the spell of definite grammatical functions is in the last resort the spell of physiological value judgements and racial conditions.  

If language expresses the affirmation of life, it is because of the physiological health of the people who use it. In this example, the Self in the Indo-Germanic languages is viewed as hyperbolised, hyper-sensitised and hypertrophied. In contrast to this decadence, Ecce Homo defines Health as a question of nutrition, residence, hygiene and climate, suggesting that these concerns should replace the obsession with the ‘salvation of the soul’ 20. As we will see, Deussen also deals with these concerns, but precisely in defence of asceticism as a soteriological doctrine.  

Deussen sees language as an unconscious production of instinct (EM, 92). He agrees with Nietzsche that linguistic diversity can be attributed,  

...partly to the original physiological race-differences, partly to the deeply moulding influences of climate, soil, occupation, food, etc. (90)  

Unlike Nietzsche, Deussen argues that there is one universal condition for the development of language. Language, he claims, evolved from the body language that is exclusively human. The animal state was passed when man attained a gestural language, corresponding to the increasing intellectual capacity of humans to distinguish among the objects of the ‘surrounding present’ and between these external objects and the subject. ‘Desiring, refusing, pointing at, grasping, seeking, etc.’: the primitive speech of the limbs was man’s response to the alienation from his immediate being, imposed by the
intellect's growing independence. In a Schopenhauerean sense, the body language mimes the inarticulate impulses of the Will.

Thus for instance, the pointing of the tongue, which however was not visible, but as ta (the demonstrative pronoun) became audible and so perceptible even in the dark. (91)

In this way, exchanging visibility for audibility, gestures were able to refer to an object—even in its absence. This is the key to the universal development of language for Deussen, and it forms an important link between his theory of language and his Idealist philosophy.

Speaking in the absence of the object is the same for Deussen as speaking in the dark. This is crucial to his critique of representation: when words are spoken, it is because darkness has already descended. The problem this poses for philosophy, as he says in the Universal History, is that when every philosopher has tried to communicate his most profound insights in writing, he encounters a profound darkness. Specifically, he appears to be referring to Kant's dilemma about the real existence of the Thing-in-itself. Deussen interprets the 'absence' of the Thing-in-itself as its invisibility, its inaccessibility to empirical consciousness. Nevertheless, he firmly believes that it exists, out there in the darkness: just like the pieces of furniture in an unfamiliar, darkened room that Kant once evoked in his essay 'What is Orientation in Thinking?' (1786). In the next sections of this chapter, we will see Deussen's Idealism emerging as the predominant orientation of his thought at this stage.

The developments in comparative grammar and comparative linguistics since Kant seem to offer Deussen a new solution to this dilemma. By analysing the Elements of metaphysics, he is examining the structures and regularities across philosophies, just as Bopp's comparative grammar had compared languages to one another. Deussen examined past forms of philosophical principles in the same way Bopp compared linguistic structures 'without it being necessary to pass through the common 'middle ground' of the field of representation with all its possible subdivisions.'21 As we will see, he bypasses the question of the meaning of different philosophies, in their different times and places, in order to focus on philosophy's epistemological and ontological orderings. Later, he will refer to this as separating the 'traditional' representation from the 'original' thought. Comparing the syntax of philosophies (their ordering principles) enabled him to compare the elements which operated as root, schema, or 'seed'
determining the historical development of different doctrines. In this way he was able to bring Indian thought into the field of the philosophical, and to align it with its European counterpart, thereby presenting Indian *metaphysics* to the west.

In a sense, this kind of formalism is exceptionally well suited to Schopenhauerean pessimism. Bypassing questions of value in this ostensibly scientific style can easily be assimilated to the pessimistic view that the lack of value in human culture is always determined in advance. As we will see however, meaning in the form of value judgements returns with a vengeance in the final section of the text; the 'Metaphysics of Morality'. While dwelling on the scientific paradigm which shadows Deussen's approach, it will be recalled that Nietzsche, in quite the opposite way, always began with questions of value and evaluation.

The fraternal, or rather sororal according to Bopp, time-system of Sanskrit, Greek and German is replicated exactly in *Elements of Metaphysics*, in accordance with the universalist scope of Deussen's thought. Although they are dispersed geographically and chronologically, he maintains that these three cultures evidently evolved similar structures of thought. They are considered in a systematic simultaneity in order that these structures become transparent and a history of philosophy legible in them. (Clearly illustrating Said's complaint about Orientalist synchronic essentialism, this approach remains uninformed by cultural history's concern with the *meaning* of ideas in different contexts.)

This is not to say that the question of meaning is absent from his queries. In a way that would seem much deeper to Deussen than the 'relativities' of cultural history, his investigation is concerned with the profound meaning of historical philosophical thought. Akin to Bopp's comparative grammar, Deussen's comparative philosophy implies that language and thought are empirical manifestations, traversed by time, of *something that comes before or beyond them*. The sentences man pronounces are the manifestations of a non-verbal, primordial perception which is a pure mirror of true Being. In terms of his Non-Dualism, it is the vestige of the original presence of pure Being in man. As Foucault said of this Idealist, mystical or (in his words) 'eschatological' tendency arising from the research of comparative linguistics, it inclines towards,

Something that is not spoken by any grammar or language, but is spoken through words and despite them. God is not so much a region
beyond knowledge as something prior to the sentences we speak.\textsuperscript{22}

In order to pre-empt Deussen's argument, the central statement of the \textit{Elements of Metaphysics} is that Greek, German and Indian philosophy are united by the fundamental principle of the ideality of time, space and causality. Despite the darkness of language, and furthermore despite the obscurcation of generations of western academic tradition, he believes that philosophy is orientated towards the Thing-in-itself. Concomitantly, the doctrine of the unreality of the physical world to be found in this triad of philosophies requires metaphysics as a necessary supplement to explain Being. 'Clearly and incontestably', he writes, '\textit{the great doctrine of Idealism is the very root of all religion and philosophy}.' (EM, 53)

This brings us to a second development in the history of ideas since the time of Kant which is an important context of Deussen's Idealist statements. Schlegel's and Bopp's developments in philology need also to be seen as part of what has been called the second stage of the scientific revolution. What Richardson calls the 'the historical revolution' of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century marked an event,

\ldots when scientific method was for the first time seriously applied to man, not merely as biological organism, but to man and his history, his civilisation, social organisation and so on.\textsuperscript{23}

As history and the human sciences came to exist in their own right as independent empirical disciplines, theology was affected by the application to the Bible of scientific historical methods. Deussen was trained at Schulpforta in this 'remarkable historico-critical method which was applied to the Ancients and then transposed to the Biblical domain.' (EFN,11-12) This was remarkable in the sense that standards of interpretation of profane texts were now applied the sacred. He recalled vividly how his Hebrew teacher, Steinhard, had explained the Song of Songs entirely as a profane wedding song. With the application of historico-critical methods to the literature of the Bible, systematic theology could no longer be regarded as the sufficient summary of the divine revelation. In Richardson's terms, 'The abyss of historical scepticism had been terrifyingly uncovered.'\textsuperscript{24} It eventually affected Deussen to the extent that he entirely abandoned his own religious faith, since the standards of proof and the demands of faith were to him so intolerably incompatible. He later remarked that the year spent in the radical Tübingen seminary was the final straw for him.(AG, II.2,\text{x}) Alive to the challenge of the new historical thinking, the question of Biblical criticism became urgent. In the course of this thesis, it will be seen how often the problems of faith and of
proof preoccupy him throughout his career, building up to the final response of *Philosophy of the Bible*, which I discuss in Chapter 4. This volume was the work he claimed to be most proud of.

A letter to Nietzsche (17th January 1875) demonstrates clearly Deussen's preoccupation with the continuity between the philosophical and religious endeavour of all times and places. He articulates for the first time the trope of *Kern und Schale* which is the most constant expression of his Idealism. There is enough material here, he admits, to happily occupy a whole lifetime.

*Vom Katheder aus die Philosophie aller Zeiten und aller Länder,*

wobi als Grundgedanke die mir gewordene Überzeugung walten wird, daß alle Philosophen (und auch die Metaphysiker der Religion) dasselbe gewollt haben und soweit sie nicht Materialisten d.h. Naturforscher waren, alle miteinander so zu sagen Kantianer gewesen sind; daß also in der Hauptsache überall sich das Nämliche findet, und daß die Differenzen bloß in der bildlichen Einkleidung liegen, welche...im Übrigen aber Schale des Kerns und gleichgültig ist.25

Whether named philosophy or religion, the external vehicle of truth has always been the outward, lifeless shell of the vital seed. Deussen claims that since there was no clear understanding of how physical and metaphysical knowledge could be differentiated until Kant, the attempts to vindicate metaphysical truths from the empirical standpoint natural to man, 'necessarily assumed a more or less allegorical form and fell into seeming contradiction with each other and with the physical sciences'(5). He claims that this lack of clear and justifiable distinction was responsible for obscuring the fact that both religion and philosophy are the 'forms in which from time immemorial metaphysics has manifested itself, bringing to light, especially in the Indian, Greek and Christian world an abundance of imperishable truths.'(5)

Having looked at the fields of comparative grammar and philology in which Deussen was educated, and having surveyed the attitudes to Oriental thought of the 19th century specialists, this concludes the contextualisation of the *Elements*. The early sketch of Deussen's life's work, which he confided to Nietzsche in the above letter, was conceived just before its publication. It provides a good indication of the preoccupations of this work and the kind of questions which lived on in the *System of the Vedanta* and the
The five sections of Deussen’s *Elements of Metaphysics* are divided into two parts. The first deals with the empirical standpoint and functions as a brief slip road into the more important transcendental standpoint. Deussen asserts that, ‘There are two standpoints, and two only, from which the nature of things can be investigated.’ (1) Here the term standpoint is synonymous with method. We are to understand that a standpoint involves an ordering activity, and thus the subject and world are mutually interlocked and co-constitutive. To each standpoint corresponds a world and thus he refers interchangeably to the empirical world and the empirical standpoint.

With regard to the difference between the two standpoints, are we dealing with a phenomenological notion of intentionality? Or, is this to be interpreted as a version of what is called Nietzschean perspectivalism? Positing two different standpoints suggests that Man may turn between two different methods of approaching nature and thus between two modes of being; and indeed everything hinges on this very fact. As the empirical standpoint is natural to man, any attempts to overcome it belong to the counter-instinctual, even the uncanny, *das Unheimliche*. We can see therefore that it is not a simple thing to exit one position and assume another. For Deussen, it is not a question, simple or otherwise, of an intellectual choice or existential decision. His choice of the word ‘method’ implies that he is engaged with questions of proof, justification and authority. In this section, he confronts the indefatigable facticity of present existence. The method must not merely result in an agglomeration of facts, but provide a systematic unity, turning ordinary cognition into science. This section demonstrates that the empirical method leads to the system of physics. This system remains on the level of positivistic, empirical proof, where principles must conform to observable reality. Thus like Schopenhauer, Deussen begins with ‘the object of experience and of science’; the sub-title of Part I of *The World as Will and Representation*.

Despite the differences between the empirical and the transcendental, it is a foundational principle that ‘all our knowledge begins with perception’, i.e. both methods have the
same source. (1) They are derived from the totality of representations originating in
perception, only they proceed in different directions.

We are restricted to the empirical standpoint so long as we regard
things in the form in which they appear to us. That is, as they are
reflected in human consciousness; the result is physics (in its broader
or ancient sense) (1).

In Deussen's words, the empirical world must be 'unhinged' and opened irreversibly
onto the world beyond it, i.e. Being-in-itself. When man occupies the natural standpoint,
the hinge becomes a link in the closed chain of the material world. The circuit of his
thinking operates on an equally continuous and closed loop (instinct, natural
consciousness). At certain exceptional moments of aesthetic and moral experience, the
circuit is broken. A broken link in this continuous chain becomes a door, but what it
opens onto is unintelligible to cognition, so that it is only possible to say that the Being-
in-itself penetrates or breaks through to the empirical realm. The empirical method is
flooded by and then absorbed into this expanded sense of Being, so it no longer makes
sense to speak about a dual standpoint. This first section concludes by revealing what
has been anticipated all along by this section.

Thanks therefore in all future time to those men who succeeded in
unhinging this whole empirical world, after having found the
Archimedean point in our own intellect. (17)

Being, the real, stays still. It is the invariable and is always found in the same place.
Now it is paramount to Deussen's philosophy that the Archimedean point around which
everything turns is not 'out there' in the wilderness of the world, but is to be found in
the voids of the interior. This implies that there must also be something invariable,
 eternal in human consciousness. This is the theme of Part II: the metaphysical
standpoint.

The empirical method takes the entire material of experience as it is given. By
investigating and systematically arranging the data of experience, it arrives at the system
of physics. While modern physics is defined by the study of matter and energy, Deussen
insists that Physics 'embraces all sciences, whether they have their source in outer and
inner experience'. (2) With respect to outer experience, science takes as its object the
interrogation of matter in its transformations: as morphology it deals with the forms of
matter, as aetiology it deals with its changes and their causes. This definition is directly
Schopenhauerean and characteristically prioritises the operation of causality in the
natural world. However, where the latter finishes his discussion of becoming in nature with the external sciences, Deussen extends it to consider the internal sciences of experience, collectively called Psychology. If transformations of matter are the object of external science, then how should Psyche as the object of internal science be understood? While he does not name this object for now, he states that Psychology embraces ‘the whole domain of knowing, feeling and willing’. It is that plasticity which interacts with the fluctuating matter of the world. Consistent with the notion of interaction, Deussen sees Psychology as incorporating a broad swathe of human cultural activity. Psychology covers: ‘logic, including grammar, aesthetics, and ethics’, and is aligned with ‘the history of sciences, arts and peoples’. (2) In the second part, the individual object of the internal sciences is called the ego in contrast to the more extensive and more nebulous term, consciousness. There he uses these terms into order to contest the restrictive explanatory claims of rational psychology. Here in the System of Physics, Deussen’s point is that whether we speak of the Innenwelt or the Umwelt, the focus must be brought back to questions of matter and energy.

Physics is concerned with understanding the sphere of becoming through natural laws. However these laws possess only a restricted validity: they pertain only to the orderly arrangement of phenomenon, not to the natural force which is the ‘inner nature’ of the phenomenon. As Schopenhauer stressed,

The force itself that is manifested, the inner nature of the phenomena that appear in accordance with those [natural] laws, remain for it an eternal secret, something entirely strange and unknown.  

In the empirical realm of unlimited possibility, change and multiplicity, science captures the periodic emergence of consistency and coherency through the concepts of ‘natural law’ and ‘character’. Yet science analyses only the precipitate of time and not the inner and timeless nature of phenomena. In natural science and in Psychology, the system of physics registers only constancies and regularities as surface patterns of natural forces. It is denied access to the underlying forces. The three-fold aim of science is thus restricted to (1) determining and describing phenomena, (2) ascertaining their local causes, (3) deducing which forces of nature are manifested in them. (14) In this third part, the scientist becomes, in a sense, a metaphysician insofar as he identifies forces in nature which are beyond his immediate experience. This is explained in Section Three on the Metaphysics of Nature. In an analogous fashion, the historian explores causality as far as it is possible in empirical Psychology. The historian (1) investigates ‘facts’, (2)
determines the ‘motive’ of each action, i.e. the internal representation of cause in consciousness, and finally (3) ‘portrays the human characters which by motives are manifested in these actions’. This historian, a portraitist of types, will take on a more important role as the historian of the *eidos*, the one charged with the responsibility for initiating the philosophical reader in Chapter 4 on the *Universal History*. There he charges the historian of philosophy with the role of making his readers ‘see with the eyes of the philosophers’ who have been initiated into a vision of noumenal reality.

Since science grasps only the products and traces of the interweaving of forces, not the forces themselves which are the real elements of metaphysics, though it may provide an ever more detailed and accurate representation of the activity of natural forces, science cannot offer total knowledge. It calls attention just as much to what it cannot comprehend as to what it can. Thus, ‘the scientist indicates the necessity of a method which supplements his own and belongs to the province of metaphysics.’ (13) This supplementary method derives from that fact that experience, the Given, ‘is in reality neither more nor less than a series of representations in our consciousness.’ (3) Yet what is initially presented as a supplement will soon take the place of the primary system. Following Kant, Deussen’s ‘supplementary’ transcendental method begins by analysing which part of intellectual experience is inherent and prior to all perception whether internal or external.

From the transcendental standpoint we try to discover what things are in themselves, that is independent of, and apart from, our consciousness in which they are represented; the result is metaphysics. (4)

This brings us back to the question concerning the source of all knowledge. The first step is therefore to isolate and analyse the innate *a priori* functions of the intellect. The remaining part is that which has been appropriated by means of internal and external perception.

As already stated, the purpose of the System of Physics is to investigate and systematically arrange what is given. However for Deussen, the *a posteriori* ‘must consequently be regarded as partaking in the nature of things in themselves’. (3) This conclusion is reached through the strict, methodological application of the logic of opposition. It sharply distinguishes his method from Kant’s *critical* philosophy. It is a move which Kant deemed illegitimate since it cannot be carried out with any *necessity*. I
will reserve examining how objects of experience can be at the same time both physical and metaphysical for the next section.

Assessing the *a posteriori* by the empirical method, Deussen arrives at three 'propositions, demonstrations, and corollaries' on space, time and matter. These are summarised in the following grand statement.

The world is a purely material structure, which, interwoven by causality, exists in infinite space, through infinite time. (46)

No justifications whatsoever are offered in support of this particular system of physics, in contrast to the following section which multiplies the deductions of the *a priori*. An example of his style of discourse is given below, in the proposition concerning matter. The argument seems to be constructed from tautologies, but this in fact reflects the level of *de facto* 'proof' of this section. It suffices that the empirical system is self-coherent, non-contradictory, and conformable to given facts.

Proposition: - In space and time exists nothing but matter alone.

Demonstration: - (1) That which operates in space and time we call matter. To exist is to operate in space and time. Consequently all that exists is material. (2) We call possible that which can be represented by us as existing. Only material objects can be represented by us as existing. Consequently there can be nothing but material objects. (8)

The argument concerning matter has been selected because it is one of the two 'elements' forwarded by this section. The definition of matter as that which operates in space and time is not a straightforward proposition, in spite of the tone of the passage.

Conflating the concepts of substance and matter, Deussen posits out that while substance endures, it perpetually changes its qualities, forms and conditions. The law of causality states that every change in matter is called an effect and takes only place after another change, called a cause, precedes it. This follows regularly and inevitably, whence its necessity. (9) However the law of causality applies only to changes of matter but not to 'the substratum of all conditions, forms and qualities'. (10) (This distinction is analogous to the mutations in grammar and root-forms of verbs over time, which do not affect the pre-verbal region of primordial perception which might be thought of as prior to all language.) As space and time are without limits, the net of causality is without beginning or end in so far as each effect is inextricably linked to a nexus of other effects. Where history is concerned, it is thus seen as a realm of limitless possibilities,
and not necessarily subsume-able into an ultimate meaning. *Causality*, in the guise of science (internal and external), emerges as the explanatory key to the system of physics. In fact, in both systems, much space is devoted to the attempt to explicate this concept.

In this section, causality has been interchangeably referred to as a net or chain; a metaphor which demonstrates both its inter-relationality and its necessity. The network of cause and effect has three different ways of operating, or three forms of causation, of which 'the equality of action and reaction' is but one form. (11) The symmetrical law of the conservation of energy governs all changes outside of organic nature. As the simplest form of synthesis, it is called *cause* in the narrower sense. 'The causal agent undergoes a change equal to that which it communicates to the effect. Increase of the cause here always produces increase of the effect.' (11) We can see that Deussen introduces quantification into thinking about causality without hesitation, perhaps because it is a quintessential part of scientific discourse in physics. His attitude towards the qualification of causes remains relatively underdeveloped. In contrast, for Nietzsche, the main question was the type of causality, i.e. whether it sprang from an active or reactive origin. Deussen does deal with the concepts of active and passive, but only in a marginal way (in the 'Appendix on Reason').

Deussen identifies two other forms of causality, but sees them as partaking in a more perverse economy of energy than the simplicity of the first form. It becomes obvious that the multiplication of the concepts of causality substitute in part for the loss of the polyvalency which the concept had in Kantian philosophy. There it was only one of three different concepts of relation. Kant not only combined it with different rules of employment, concerning most importantly the different ways which it might combine with time (the analogies of experience), he also expanded the concept into discussion of mechanical and organic teleology in the final critique. The only thing common to both treatments is the mystery which the concept of causality ultimately generates, by which it seems to elude swift definition. It must nevertheless be noted that Deussen's definition is elaborated consistently in terms of *energy* and *force*. It is also noticeable that he diverts the differences in causality to a scientific classificatory device, which connects each causal operation with a class of natural function. The first was concerned specifically with inorganic nature. The three classes of causes therefore appear to be simply a natural phenomenon which the system of physics records and analyses 'as it is given'. He proceeds with two further explanations.
Stimulus or irritation is the term for causation governing vegetative life, whether in plants or in the animal organism. It requires contact and duration, and frequently intussusception. ‘By augmentation of the cause here the effect often turns into its contrary (over-irritation).’ (11) This differentiates between quantity and quality in causality. Beyond a certain limit or economy, the quality of cause might change, as for example increasing quantities of sunlight prove to be a stimulus to plant growth or a cause of over-irritation and desiccation.

Motive is the causal term allocated to the domain of animal functions, that is, all voluntary movements, and which thus produces changes in the life of animals and men. For Nietzsche, the analysis here of active and reactive forces would be paramount. However, the volition that is referred to here could not be considered ‘active’ in the Nietzschean sense. As we will see, it will be analysed in terms of the Schopenhauerean Will. According to Deussen, the motives of human beings are the most inscrutable of all forms of causality, given the inequality between the human and animal faculties of cognition. (Again naturalism predominates in the analysis of the concept). Limited to perceptual representations, the animal is immersed in the present and its action confined to perceptible and immediately present motives. In terms of the energy in action/reaction sequences, in man stimulus and simple cause are combined in an unknowable way with the economy of motives.

The action of man ... can proceed from abstract representations, acting as motives, in consequence of which his deeds are often enigmatic and inscrutable, but never free from that necessity with which the law of causality sways all that is finite. (12)

It is the role of historian, rather than the scientist, to analyse motive. And yet the historian can only seek patterns and regularities in the chronicle of all possible human behaviour which history offers. Only the metaphysical view can offer a more comprehensive interpretation of motive, as Deussen explains in the section on Morality.

The law of causality is a corollary of the principle that matter is what operates in time and space. Yet despite its ceaseless activity, nature does not appear as a chaotic and formless flux of transitional matter. By deduction from what is given in perception the empirical method also identifies laws in nature. As already noted, these ‘laws’ are really only the regular expressions of invariability since all that can be empirically perceived
are phenomena, i.e. 'states and changes of matter'. However Deussen proceeds to relate these laws to fundamental, invariable forces underlying them. Force is defined as follows. Groups of phenomena bearing a common character are deduced to be varied manifestations of an 'inner unity':

This inner unity is termed force, natural force, an expression borrowed from the observation of our inner self (instances: Gravity, Impenetrability, Electricity, Crystallisation, and all Species of plants and animals). (13)

This definition seems to be derived from an original experience of the body. There is no other explanation for the facility with which Deussen makes this analogy: following Kant, he takes the unity of the body as a simple concept. In order to account for the synthesis of recognition in the concept, Kant wrote:

Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it. 28

Hence it is by analogy with the body that repetition and regularity in nature is thought to reflect an inner unity. Just as voluntary gesture is considered to correspond to a single act of will, over time, the accumulated activities of the body may be seen to express the single force of a unified personality. Similarly, over time, the repeated downward motion of falling bodies is attributed to the single force of gravity. When the scientist 'determines the forces' manifested in phenomena, he is not generating a mere abstract or hypothetical concept for instrumental purposes. This kind of abstraction is found in the letters of algebra or, we might say, in concepts such as the unity of the legal personality. The distinction is important for Deussen. Force is a dynamic concept, or as he later explains, an Idea.

Matter itself is produced by a conflict of active, operational forces. Every event, whether cause or effect, is the manifestation of a force. Thus the law of causality merely declares that no manifestation of force can take place without another manifestation of force preceding it.

Every state in nature is a tension of conflicting forces, every change is a temporary subjugation of certain forces by others, which by the aid of causality, have become the stronger (- instances: a building, a chemical union, the human body in the states of health, disease and death). (13)
There is an important change here from representing the identity of phenomenon in terms of numerical unity to conceiving of it as a dynamic, even precarious, equilibrium of forces. It brings Deussen closer than Schopenhauer to an explanation of the *principium individuationis*. The unitary phenomenon is in fact a combination, a swirling commotion or temporary stratification. Even the body in the empirical standpoint is not such a stable unity as Deussen’s analogy would like to suggest.

The problem of how the scientist carries out his task returns. If science analyses causality, how is it supposed to consider forces which remain secret and unknown? The answer is that, ‘empirically speaking, they do not exist at all’: yet the whole of nature is their manifestation. Forces shape and form matter, but do not enter into the nexus of causality.

The scientist cannot get rid of them and …[thereby] he indicates the necessity of a method which supplements his own and belongs to the province of metaphysics. (13)

‘Supplement’ is a vital word in this argument. It maintains metaphysics in a relation to science, in which it would be the faithful completion of the latter, rather than, as materialists see it, being an incompatible opponent. This slyly suggests that Materialism is itself a type of idealism, reprising Lange’s position in his History of Materialism.29 Though scornful of philosophy and religion, and truncated in the aesthetic and ethical spheres,

Materialism is the only true and consistent view of things, and so the ideal at which the empirical sciences aim, and to which in time they will more and more attain. (17)

The empirical standpoint insists on the ubiquity of matter, and therefore cannot admit any kind of dualism. It is impossible to propose that, in the system of physics, there are two substances, extended and thinking, blended in man as soul and body and separated by death. As surely as it proceeds from the ‘natural’ consciousness of men, materialism is irrefutable according to Deussen, even to the point of identifying the intellect with the material brain, as section two demonstrates.

This ends the system of physics. I mentioned earlier that the two ‘elements’ which it proposes are matter and energy. Causality is the key to understanding both of them. With these two elements, Deussen undertakes the analysis of the objects of experience and science. What he has given us, is a world ruled by necessary laws of time, space and
causality, which yet exists in an unstable state of strange inter-relationality. At the same time as providing a discrete analysis of the laws of empirical manifestations and behaviour of objects, he invokes a maelstrom of invisible forces, churning below the surface of things. The remarkable Kantian notion that ‘a body is a force-filled space’ is the stamp he has placed on Physics. Yet if I hesitated using the term ‘elements’ here, it is because Deussen is pursuing the elements of metaphysics. From the transcendental standpoint, more remains to be said about these metamorphic bodies and about matter, causality and energy.

5. The Transcendental Standpoint: (II) The Theory of the Understanding

That the System of Physics necessitates a supplement in order to provide a complete explanation of nature is indicated by two major inadequacies in its articulation. Materialists endeavour to show that all phenomena - even the mind - are physical; and rightly so, according to the empirical standpoint. Yet even the scientist must recognise that eventually, through causal regression, he reaches primordial forces which are inexplicable and inscrutable in origin. The important question of how these forces belong somehow to the system of physics and metaphysics is investigated in Chapter Two. The second inadequacy also belongs to a transition point, specifically between the empirical and transcendental standpoint. It consists in the problem of perceptual knowledge for the materialist perspective. Is my representation the thing-in-itself or is it not? Hence in this section Deussen constructs a theory of the Understanding which ‘deals with the origin, essence and connection of all our representations’. (18) This is essential for what he calls Psychology as such.

The previous section deduced the forms of time, space and causality from empirical experience, but it did not explain how the perception of objects in general was possible. The question of how is it possible to perceive objects of the external world by the senses is answered in two ways. Firstly, echoing Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, Deussen presents a deduction of the a priori forms of the intellect. Then after examining the formal elements of perception, he turns to the immediate and mediate application of the Understanding. Here, Reason and the Understanding are explored in terms of the (material) body. As can be seen, this involved a radical re-writing of the Kantian faculty of judgement as a quasi-biological faculty of reactivity.

The empirical method explains how objects affect the nerves, either directly or
indirectly by means of sound waves or light rays, and hence affect the brain. Yet:

I perceive the objects and incidents lying outside me directly and without being aware of a medium....It is not rays of light, not subjective reflections which enter into my consciousness, but the objects themselves directly which yet are distant from me.(22)

Beholding something, one does not perceive the inverted likeness of the object on the retina, but sees the external object itself. No empirical explanation can remove this contradiction. The only thing that can be known with certainty is that this image is representation.

If this world which visibly and palpably surrounds me, really exists, if it is not perhaps a mere dream of my imagination, an illusive phantom of my senses, - there is one truth which I cannot doubt; it is : The world is my representation. (22)

To support his claim, Deussen has recourse to the exemplarity of the triads; the first reference of many in this lecture series. Alternative responses to materialism have long been expressed by Indian, Greek, and Christian philosophies.

Indian sages teach that the root, out of which springs the varied world is ignorance (avidya), nay they conceived this whole world as an illusive phantom (maya). Greek philosophy (Parmenides, Plato, etc.) accuses the senses of deceiving us, whilst Christianity teaches that from the moral depravity of mankind comes a darkening of the intellect. (25)

The first use of the term Maya is important since although Schopenhauer gave great prominence to this term, the Non-Dualism of the Vedanta refers to Maya only in the most practical way. The empirical world is not an illusion for this philosophy: it is admittedly the ‘real’ reality for one in an unenlightened state. All of the above examples however submit the validity of empirical consciousness to evaluation by criteria exterior to its self-articulation. This is the essence of the transcendental method.

The question is: Are things in themselves the same as I represent them, i.e. material in space and time, or do they exist in this form merely for my intellect, which perhaps by nature is not able to reveal the real and true essence of things? The only means available for deciding this question are to be found in an analysis of the intellectual faculties. (25)

The forms taken by the intellect constitute the limit or hinge between the senses and intellectual representation. This idea is initially presented in Kantian terms: ‘Now
nothing exists for me but representation, therefore also no subject without an object, no object without a subject.’ (26) However Deussen investigates this relationship through the body since the body is the immediate actualisation of the limit between representing subject and represented object.

Sensations are the only things which come to the intellect from without, i.e. which are independent of the intellect. ‘Thus all data by which I attain to a knowledge of the external world are restricted to these affections of the nerves which are given as immediate objects.’ (26) That which separates external nature from ‘scanty affections of the nerves’ must, Deussen concludes, come from within; that is, it must originate in the intellect itself. He imagines the represented perceptual world as the warp and woof of a textile. All that is objective, independent of the self, a posteriori given, is limited to nervous affections, and is comparable to the thin, isolated threads of the shuttle. The warp is stretched out in advance, a priori, to receive these interweaving threads and work them into a fabric; it is the natural, innate forms of the subject, i.e. the Understanding or brain. This metaphor already conveys the sense of reality as fabric, as something which is made (fabricare), hence linking it to questions of activity and passivity, actualisation, energy and forces. If reality is made or fabricated, it will need to be understood in what way this differs from the sense in which one says (optimistically) that one ‘makes’ a cake or any other object.

He insists on the two-fold (or Non-Dual) relation of the subject to the world. This relation is mediated in so far as it is perceived through the formal constitution of the intellect, the Understanding. On the other hand the subject himself is immediately part of the world in virtue of his corporeal existence. In a posteriori experience therefore, ‘we partake in the nature of things-in-themselves’. (24) Unlike Kant’s limitation of metaphysics to the pure concepts of reason, Deussen uses the Schopenhauerean argument that the foundation of metaphysics ‘must certainly be of an empirical nature.’ While metaphysics’ task is not the observation of experience, yet it must offer ‘the correct explanation of experience of a whole’. It was Schopenhauer and not Kant who asserted that the metaphysical could be reached through the physical. The World as Will and Representation stated that ‘because the task of metaphysics is to give the most complete explanation of the empirical world, its foundation must certainly be of an

* It should be remarked from the beginning that although Deussen reprises Kant’s terms for the intellectual faculties, his definitions are very different.
Deussen's method essentially proceeds in the opposite direction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Whereas the latter focused on isolating the a priori architectonic of the intellect, Deussen's aim is to extract the innate forms from experience 'in order to retain, as remainder, the things-in-themselves'. (The supplement appears again.) The transcendental method Deussen employs unmakes the fabric of reality. It proceeds by unpicking the threads of jangling sensation from the pre-prepared warp of the mind. Once this Scheidung or separation has been completed, on the one hand we will have the a priori functions of consciousness, but on the other hand, we will be able to discern the Thing-in-itself. That is, it will reveal itself once experience has been purified from the distortions of the Understanding.

In lieu of the transcendental deduction, he uses six criteria to distinguish the Understanding's a priori functions from the Given. Why multiply these arguments? His declared aim is to defend from all angles the 'scientific (wissenschaftlich) basis' of the transcendental structure of cognition. Since Kant was the first to give it this basis, 'The appearance of Kant therefore will remain for all time the turning-point of history'. (66) Deussen claims to want to make the demonstration 'more systematic and more comprehensive' than that of any past metaphysics — whether it be Indian, Greek, Christian or Kantian. (32) Perhaps for this reason he mixes both transcendental and metaphysical deductions, i.e. investigating the conditions of possibility of objects, and abstracting from judgements in general.

Six arguments are marshalled to prove that the three elements which form the framework of nature — time, space and causality — are innate forms, which together constitutes the totality of the intellect. The next stage separates the necessarily subjective from the 'remainder': the Thing-in-itself. In this way, a solution is provided to infinite causal regression which marked the inadequacy of the system of physics. In what follows, I will outline only the structure of his reasoning. In a revealing metaphor, the six deductions are compared to magnets capable of extracting 'the iron of a priori experience from the mixed ore of experience'. (28) This metaphor makes the forms of
intuition seem akin to powerful natural forces.

1. Argumentum ex antecessione. Whatever is necessary to transform perception into perceptual representation, and which consequently precedes all experience, cannot originate in experience.

2. Argumentum ex adhaesione. Whatever comes to the intellect from without has the character of contingency. Yet certain elements cannot be thought away, so it follows that they do not belong to external experience, but must 'adhere to' the intellect.

3. Argumentatum e necessitate. All data given from without suffice to indicate what is there, but not that something is necessarily so. All determination of things with which the consciousness of necessity is associated must originate not in perception but within myself.

4. Argumentum e mathematicis. Sciences which have doctrinal apodictic certainty cannot have obtained it from perception. The part of the perceptual world to which they refer must belong to the elements originally inherent in my intellect.

5. Argumentum ex infinitate. Perception can never embrace infinity, therefore representations of the infinite must come from the forms of the intellect. E.g. Time is infinite in both directions. Whether in the depths of the past or the distant future, 'time was and will be'. (39)

6. Argumentum e continuitate. The faculty which unifies the manifold of perception and so creates coherence between my representations must be a priori. (37)

All these affections of my ego have, as such, no relation to each other, but only a relation to me. The thread therefore on which they are strung together to the unity of perception is not in the affections themselves, that is outside of me, but only within me. This thread...is time. It must consequently be given a priori.' (39)

This argument is interesting because it attributes to time the function of unity that Kant assigns to the transcendental unity of apperception. He unfortunately elaborates no further on this 'temporal self'. Like Schopenhauer, he defines time simply as infinite succession. That time has its own inner unity, which is 'outside of time' as it were, is a latent thought in Deussen's work. It is never theorised or developed but it is present nevertheless. (It was however taken up by the next generation of philosophers, e.g. by Bergson, as durée as well as by the modernist writers who were inspired by Deussen, e.g. by Borges and T.S.Eliot.)
Using these six ‘touchstones’, he argues that Space, Time and Causality are the three elements which constitute the totality of the essence of the intellect. Space is the constituent element of the perceptual world by means of which all objects are determined in relation to each other. Time is that constituent element by means of which all conditions and changes, whether belonging to outer or inner experience, are determined in their sequence with respect to each other. Causality is the order of things according to their action. It is the general possibility of action. Filling space and persisting in time, causality appears as that which remains after all manifestations of forces have been separated from things, and which in contrast to forces is called matter or substance.

Adding Causality to the forms of intuition of Time and Space, and thereby suppressing the table of judgements, was the key to Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant. Causality is displaced from its function as a category of the Understanding and assumes the universal, apodictic necessity of the forms of intuition. For Kant, the intuitive forms of time and space could include only relations in general: it was impossible for them to apprehend objects. Following Schopenhauer, Deussen sees causality as the form of intuition which determines the relation between objects and representation. That is to say, both posit the possibility of empirical intellectual intuition. Illegitimately for Kant, this makes the very form of objectivity, the transcendental object $x$, into an a priori form of cognition. It impermissibly imputes content to the forms of intuition, where there should only be relations. As a result, causality is concretely identified with the law of causality: a necessary form of all awareness, rather than one category among the twelve which for Kant need to be synthesised in a judgement of the Understanding in order to determine how it will apply to objects. By eliminating the other concepts and by making causality an a priori form, Deussen makes all judgement entirely determinative, excluding the possibility of reflective judgement. I return to this issue in analysing his explanation of the transcendental perspective on matter.

Before leaving the question of the inherent forms of the intellect, it must be noted that the multiplication of proofs surrounding the deduction of the a prioris will have been crucial to the final extension of his argument. Deussen not only states that the Ideality of Time, Space and Causality is the ‘core of Kant’s doctrine’, but he contends that it is universal.

It is the fundamental truth of all metaphysics that it is these three
which distinguish the surrounding phenomenal world from that of being-in-itself (das an-sich-Seiende). Therefore it appears again and again, pronounced at least indirectly and as inference, in all the various stages of metaphysics’ development. (emphasis in text) (30)

To support this claim, he turns again to a comparative triad. In the Vedanta, ‘the thing-in-itself appears as the Brahman, [which] is not split by time and space (dekaklanavacchinnna), and [which] is free from all change (sarva-vikriy-rahita).’ (Ibid) Plato’s distinction between Being-in-itself and ‘the Becoming and Perishing, but never really Being’ also denies Causality, Space and Time to be fundamental principles of reality. Finally, he writes, even if the Bible conceives of Being-in-itself as a personality, it nevertheless retracts the limitation this implies by attributing to God timelessness, omnipresence, and immutability. (31)

6. The Form of Causality and the Forces of Nature

Although Deussen follows the Schopenhauerean move of abolishing Kant’s concepts of the Understanding, something must link the forms of intuition to sensuous content. The transcendental elements of cognition must therefore be analysed alongside the forces of nature, given that the functions of the Understanding become active only upon the stimulus of external affection (59). The discussion of the immediate and mediate applications of the Understanding expands on the role of the innate functions of the brain. Deussen’s transcendental method responds to the problem of the perception of objects by interpreting the a priori forms as reactive power. They consist in ‘the power of reacting upon the incoming affection in a threefold direction, whereby the perception of the external world arises as follows.’ (52) This interpretation permits locating the reactive power of the mind on the same ontological plane as the forces of nature.

Physiology shows how the brain is connected via the nervous system to the organs of sense. However, it is unable to explain how the brain ‘manufactures its sensations into representations’ (to make, fabricare). (52) Alternatively formulated, it is unable to explain a priori synthetic judgement. The Kantian question is now subsumed entirely under the question concerning forces. Deussen begins, like Kant, by articulating the Understanding’s ‘synthesis’ of the manifold of sensation in three moments. (52) Firstly, the Understanding ranges the sense affections it receives into a coherent series on the thread of time. Secondly, by means of its inherent causality, it takes each external affection as an effect, which it refers to its conditioning cause. This involves neither
intention nor reflection, he contends, hence the suppression of Kantian aspects of the faculty of judgement. Thirdly, it projects this cause into space, where it appears as the material object. The automatic employment of causality in the second moment renders the differentiation between reflective and determinate judgement impossible. In a sense, the condition of possibility of the object in general is the form of causality, traversed by time and space. Speculative thought in the act of judgement is submitted to the necessary relation of cause and effect, a relation governed by energetics.

Even the Indian philosophers of the 4th century C.E. Sankhya-Karika tradition had grasped that ‘the eye without union with the mind is unable to perform its function’. (54) It is not the senses which see and hear, etc., but the Understanding represented as the brain. Indian philosophy, it is claimed, is permeated by a primal comprehension of this process. It describes how the brain:

...send[s] five differently formed offshoots to the sense organs, stretches itself towards the five states of aggregation of things, (which in the main are the bhutani, stoicheia, elements of the ancients)...and adapts itself to them.(52)

The offshoots are comparable to the three a prioris of the Understanding. Metaphorically they resemble little hands which reach out and grasp objects. For Deussen, this is a figurative expression of a truth for which Kant provided the ‘scientific basis’.

In this overall theory, the synthesis of the manifold of sensation can be reduced a single thing: ‘the passing from the effect within me to its external cause,’ i.e. the immediate application of the Understanding. (56) Yet the objects of existence are not only related to the subject, but are related to each other as well. The mediate application of the Understanding traces out the spatial, temporal and causal relations of objects to one another. Here it passes from a state of receptivity to one of spontaneity. Nevertheless the essential aspect of mediate and immediate understanding remains rooted in the same reaction to the sensuous affections.

Deussen reduces the difference between receptivity and spontaneity in the Understanding to a difference in the degree of ‘energetics’ in reaction processes. Indeed, he writes, the intellectual faculties of all living beings differ only in degrees of energy. Energy is measured in terms of the reactive power of the intellect in relation to ‘the
pressing and bewildering world of forces’. (48) The impulses behind intellectual reactivity are metaphorically compared to the hunter and hunted, i.e. the mind and sense impressions.

In perceiving, the reacting Understanding is passive: it is so to speak on the defensive. It contents itself with repelling the attacks of the affections by projecting them in time, space and causality. (57)

As a result of the enlargement of the brain and its power of reaction in the higher animals and man, the Understanding passes from the defensive to the offensive. That is to say,

It not only repels the attacks of the affections, but pursues the aggressor to its farthest retreats, that is, it apprehends things not merely in relation to itself, but in the most distant relations of their spatial, temporal and causal connection with each other. (57)

Raised to the offensive, the Understanding’s reactive power becomes the basis of a function unique to man: Reason. Deussen deals briefly with the faculty in an appendix tacked on to the theory of the Understanding. Already the comparison with a hunter suggests that it a skilled yet primordial faculty: technical yet somehow instinctive.

- The Appendix on Reason

In the System of Physics, we saw how stimuli and motives were correlated with the ‘natural’, biological differentiation between animal and man. The transcendental standpoint analyses how reality apprehended by human beings and the animal differs in the intensity of the relations perceived in it. The animal is completely absorbed by its immediate surroundings. This can lead to a keen sensibility: ‘Animals often perceive more sharply the similarity and dissimilarity of things, as the hunter can appreciate’. (71) Yet animals also react to perceptual motives and not just irritation/ stimulus, as is the case with plant life, i.e. they are capable of voluntary motion. However this also means that animal Understanding is not sufficiently independent of things to distinguish them from those relations in which its will is momentarily interested. In man the effect is no longer confined to the presence of the cause. Humans have the ability to decompose perceptions into their elements and retain these in a changed order: they are capable of abstract representation (102).

Deussen hypothesises that this results from the general fact that the brain develops on a scale parallel to that of the nervous system. He acknowledges Reason, not only in
relation to embodiment, but also in relation to natural forces (energy). The more
'perfectly formed' brain has more 'powerful' reactions to outside stimulus.

Consequently represented things are more distinctly detached from the
knowing subject and gain greater objectivity and independence. (81)

Since it proceeds according to negation and detachment, abstraction involves a great
loss and even the destruction of perception. It grasps the elements of repetition in the
fleeting present and re-imposes them in consciousness, thus destroying the nimbus of
percepts in which abstraction operates. Reason in this perspective, apart from possessing
an ultimately eschatological function as Hegel thought, maintains mankind in its
alienation from Being. In this demotion of Reason as abstraction, the influence of
Schopenhauer's anti-Hegelianism is obvious.

Deussen is nevertheless less polemical than Schopenhauer on this topic. Whereas the
latter saw Reason as the pure 'tool' or 'slave' of the Will-to-life, Deussen recognises the
constructive potential even in instrumental Reason. Man's increased power of re-
activity, channelled into the different functions of Understanding and Reason, enlarges
and intensifies the activity or actuality of his world. He actualises, perhaps it can be
said, more of the potentiality of Being. Elaborating on his theory of language, he
believed that abstractive expression was soon developed out of quasi-gestural language.
This conceptualisation frees man from the immediate present, and in the schema of
things this increases the freedom of his deliberative decisions. Allowing him to reckon
with the future, he may be guided by consideration of 'the totality of things' and build
communities. 'Again, all planned action of one or of several individuals in co-operation
is only possible through the faculty of concepts.' (87) The connection between a concept
of totality and the future-oriented process of building a community resembles a Kantian
Idea of Reason. Deussen frames the interests of Reason as life-preserving instincts, and
ignores the speculative or dialectical impulses of Reason. Where the main focus is on
the innate illusion of phenomena in general, man's voluntary, rational illusions appear
insignificant. Nevertheless Reason accords man a final important advantage over the
animal.

Reason is assembled as a 'storehouse' of concepts economically constructed in the habit
of representation and anticipation of events (causality). This significantly increases
man's potential of interacting with his environment.

By means of concepts we control the narrow circle of the perceptual
present, the immeasurable totality of the absent and reckon with it in all our thinking and acting. Through concepts we anticipate nine-
tenths of the future. (86)

This is contrasted with the less powerful re-activity of the animal, completely absorbed by its immediate environment. It has neither the human capacity of instrumental reasoning, nor evidently his capacity to extend technological control over nature. Many echoes of Nietzsche's will to power and premonitions of his critique of ressentiment can be recognised in this twist on Schopenhauer's theory of the Understanding. Deussen sees abstraction and conceptualisation as instruments of the Will's control over the present and the future. The latter considers this power to be much less important than Nietzsche. Deussen posits that the rational representation of control has only an extremely limited effect in relation to the Will and the metaphysics of nature. The essential point for him is that Reason is utterly powerless to intervene in the play of metaphysical forces. This will be the basis of his 'Metaphysics of Morality'.

-Conclusion: Energeia

Having isolated the transcendental forms of consciousness, attention is now turned the remainder of experience, the Given. The empirical method produced the axiom that 'to exist is to operate in time and space'. This is replaced in the transcendental method with the statement that 'To exist or to be real means nothing else then to be able to be represented by the senses'. (53) This analysis of subject/object relation now leads directly to the problem of forces. On the most fundamental level however, the question relates to the status of Causality as both a physical and a metaphysical element. By examining forces through the concept of energeia, this final section has formed a transition from the Understanding to the Metaphysics of Nature, where up to now the stepping stone between the two has been the incontrovertible materiality of the intellect as the brain.

Never would the senses accomplish the wonderful work of perception, if the action exerted by external objects on the thin nerve threads and expanded in our sense organs were not met from within by the reaction of the nervous matter of the massive and so ingeniously constructed brain.(54) (emphasis added)

The language he uses in these propositions — the work of perception, to operate in space and time — can be traced back to his employment of the Aristotelian concept of energeia. This is difficult to translate, since it is rendered as meaning 'activity' or 'actuality'. The
ambiguous meaning fits well into Deussen's schema.

_Energeia_, he states, is the product of the combination of the _a priori_ forms with the Given in sensation. I have stressed that this conception is opposed to Kant's characterisation of Understanding as the faculty of synthetic judgement. _Energeia_ is not an intellectual, abstract concept, but an aspect of ontology. Thus the Understanding is portrayed as a force or power of reactivity, rather than a discursive faculty. It necessitates rethinking the Kantian _a priori_ forms of intuition as forces.

He advocates a thought experiment to explain the concept of energy, one which again involves separating sense and cognition. If all forces are deducted from objects, that is, 'if I deduct from bodies all that by which they affect me', what then remains? According to Kant, nothing would remain but empty space and yet, Deussen vouches, this is an argument based on abstraction. After the decomposition of matter into space and forces, others 'imagine they still retain the representation of a dark, confused mass, which ... is neither visible nor tangible nor in any way perceptible, and yet persists as a certain something before their intellect.' (62) For Kant, this would amount to making the understanding intellectual, and inadmissibly imputing content to it. Deussen tries to evade this problem by stating that the content is unrepresentable. The persisting certain something is matter devoid of all quality. Thus Deussen takes his scissors to reality and cuts out a circle. Since with the removal of force, all reality falls away, as he says, 'the remaining matter' can only be a subjective phenomenon, ensuing from the forms of the intellect. This subjective phenomenon arises in the following way:

Now just as the Understanding continually projects all concrete effects (all effecting _energeia on_) as causes in space, so it continues even when I set these aside to perceive the general possibility of effecting (the effect _dynamei on_), that is causality itself, as filling space and persisting in time, where it then appears as that dark phantom of matter or substance. (63)

Filling space and persisting in time, Causality is what remains after all the manifestations of force have been separated from things. Matter or substance is simply the name we give to this. In perception, the Understanding unceasingly projects all 'concrete effects', all active or actual existents (_energeia on_), by means of causality, into space and time. The product arising from the continually exerted reaction of the intellectual forms upon the thronging affections is, Deussen writes, 'actually (_kat_')
energeion) in each moment a limited and narrow circle of ideas, but potentially (kata dynamian) it constitutes the whole aggregate of empirical reality'. (53) Actual, active being arises from potential being: first as the being of energeia arises from dynamis. Thus the phenomenal self constitutes his world in subjective forms out of the dark shadow of the possibility of Causality.

It is in the effects of forces that the elements common to experience and to the objects of experience are found. Forces communicate an essence of what the things are in themselves by the traces they leave in the phenomenon world.

Bodies are through and through nothing more than affection, that is, force, represented as filling space. Material objects are, according to Kant's excellent expression, force-filled spaces. (62: emphasis added).

Before continuing the discussion on matter, it will have been noticed that the description of bodies as force-filled spaces contradicts the principle which employs the body as the basis of the concept of unity. Earlier on the inner unity of a force was even compared to that of the body, which now appears as nothing more than a knitting together of multiple forces. This embedding of alternative views inside each other is a sign that Deussen has struck upon an issue that he cannot resolve: the basis of the unity of the body and by extension the individual consciousness. In Chapter 2, he will argue that all teleological unity is foreign to organisms since the original basis of their unity is the metaphysical Will. Yet he also goes on to describe the two modes of affirming and negating Will.

Returning to the question of Matter, Deussen asserts that it therefore has no proper reality, as Aristotle recognised when he defined it as dynamia on. It is spectral, dark matter which is dynamis, i.e. potentiality or the general possibility of causality. The claim that 'the same susceptibility to causal influence inhere[s] in everything that exists' (101) is his first step towards positing a single power, the Will, at the base of all existence. Matter, he concludes, is the combined totality of time, space and causality perceived objectively. The same totality perceived subjectively is the Understanding. Matter is therefore the objective reflex of the Understanding itself. As the Understanding essentially adds the function of causality to the intellect, the following analogy is offered: Matter is to the Understanding, what space is to the space-function, and what time is to the time-function.

Thus he describes how external forces act on the nervous system of the body, itself a
web of forces, and are projected into space as representations by the brain, itself only matter, i.e. a coagulation of forces. This presents reality as a ceaseless, living and ever-changing activity. But perhaps most importantly, conceiving of representation as *energeia* permits Deussen to explain that while (empirical) activity is necessarily limited, the potential from which activity emerges is entirely unlimited, which is perhaps to say that it is ‘free’. In this context, bringing *energeia* and *dynamis* together is a way of bringing the systems of physics and metaphysics together, or alternatively expressed bringing necessity and freedom together. Metaphysics, like *dynamis*, begins as a supplement to what is actual, i.e. to the system of physics, whereas it turns out to be in fact its foundation.

The supercession of the original by the supplement is first mentioned in a statement which summarises the aim of this Section.

Clearly and incontestably appears, as a result of our inquiries so far, the great doctrine of *Idealism*, this very root of all religion and philosophy: The whole of nature, immeasurably extended in space and time, exists only under the presupposition of the forms of our intellect and has, apart from them, that is in a metaphysical sense no reality; for it is nothing more than the unceasingly generated product of the sensuous affections and the mental forms. (53)

*emphasis in text*

The material world in space and time is only the form in which the nature of things-in-themselves appear to us. It will disappear when we penetrate, by the only way possible, to the knowledge of Being-in-itself and pursue in earnest how this Being, distorted through the medium of time, space and causality, appears as that which is called nature. This appears to be a distinctly Dualist position, as it clearly prioritises the metaphysics and declares the empirical to be an empty null set, a chimera. Nevertheless, it can be considered consistent with the non-dualist doctrine that Being-in-itself is immanent in all things. We will see how he deals with this by a metaphysical approach to the whole of nature, which treats of the real significance of objects in their relation to the Will.31

The fundamental question of the transcendental method is therefore, and according to Deussen has at all times been, ‘what are things in themselves (*auta kath’ auta, atman*), that is apart from the form which they assume in our mind?’ (3) From the transcendental standpoint we try to discover what things are in themselves, that is independent of, and apart from, our consciousness in which they are represented: the result is
metaphysics. (4) This question is the starting point of Chapter 2’s philosophy of forces.
2. The Philosophy of Forces

1. Bodies are Force-Filled Spaces.

The previous section examined how the ideality of Time, Space and Causality constitute three universal elements of Metaphysics. While the transcendental analysis of subjective forms was able to provide a supplement to the objective analysis of empirical reality, an answer has not yet been found to the 'simple, fundamental question of all philosophy': what is the World? (93) Suspending the transcendental forms of the Understanding switched Deussen’s focus to the *a posteriori*, which he understands as that part of the *Noumenon* which is given in nature. This chapter now turns to the transcendental view of that which combines with the *a priori*; i.e. it examines matter and causality from the transcendental viewpoint. The Metaphysics of Nature explains the being of the World in two ways which are distinct but not different: firstly, with reference to the Schopenhauerean Will as the first principle of Being and secondly, as a coalescence of primordial forces through which the Will objectifies itself. Although this response is modelled on the second part of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation, Deussen does not directly import the explanatory resources of ‘the Will’. Rather his inquiry continues in the style of a chemical analysis, dissecting nature’s doubly physical and metaphysical elements.

The table of forces which he subsequently presents is comparable to the Mendeleevian Periodic Table of Elements. Just as Mendeleev analysed the universal and necessary building blocks of the material universe, Deussen analyses the metaphysical structure of the world. In this manner, he extends the discourse of positivistic science to a realm of Ideas in a way which had been prepared by chemistry itself. It is worth briefly remarking that in the year Deussen prepared the lectures for publication, Mendeleev’s table was the subject of intense debate. The discovery of a new element anticipated by his work publicly led to the acceptance of Mendeleev’s table and the defeat of his rival, Meyer, who had not included any predictions. Moreover the as yet unknown elements had been given Sanskrit names by Mendeleev; thus in 1875 Germanium (Ga) replaced eka-silicon (*eka*, one or beyond). This in a sense echoes what Deussen is trying to do, by bringing to presence (in representation) metaphysical elements which are unknown in the system of physics.
His major argument in this section is that the forces of natural science, the Kantian Thing-in-itself and the Schopenhauerean Will - not to mention the Brahman of the Hindus - are the same thing. The key to this demonstration is the confluence Deussen observes of both physiological and psychological forces in the body. This elaborates on his theory of understanding by attempting to find an original synthesis of the forces which the body senses inarticulately in perception (the jangling nerves) and the reactive forces which are the essence of the intellect/ brain (the ordering by time, space and causality).

Whereas Schopenhauer's work was dedicated to emphasising the ultimate domination or Macht of the Will, Deussen, following in his footsteps, engages in a much more exploratory task, which seems to be better defined as a philosophy of forces rather than a philosophy of Will. This undertaking perhaps is more akin to Kant’s constant reflection on the concept of force throughout his career. Caygill has demonstrated that even Kant’s Opus Postumum, as well as his early works, endeavoured to analyse the continuity of the physical and metaphysical properties of force. Kant’s first work, Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces (1747) proposed ‘essential force’ as a vis activa rather than a vis motrix in the Aristotelian sense.¹ This force could not be known mathematically, since it included the internal vis activa of material and intellectual substance and not just the external appearance of motion. Thus it required metaphysical knowledge:

The latter move permits Kant…to extend the range of the concept of force from physics to psychology, using it to ‘solve’ the Cartesian difficulty of the relationship between body and soul.²

Deussen’s switch from the empirical to the transcendental viewpoint of forces is intended to solve exactly the same difficulty. His investigation however follows the Schopenhauerean line of dissecting the voluntary movements of the body, and thus he is led along the line of the latter’s ‘way in’ to the secrets of nature. To trace the path of Kant’s reflections on force would necessitate a lengthy diversion. I would therefore like to note only two things. Firstly, aside from the progressive revisions Kant made on this point, his conception of force contained many limitations - partly reflecting the contemporary discourse on physics - culminating in his recourse to the concept of ether in order to explain the unification of force and matter.³ While Deussen, writing a century later, takes a different route in his investigations and abandons the concept of
ether, he still encounters some of the same problems as Kant, notably questions concerning the unity and the time of forces.

Secondly, it will become clear that Kant's 1756 treatise had an important influence on Deussen, whose familiarity with the pre-Critical works on natural philosophy is obvious from his extensive assessment of Kant's output in the *Universal History*. The crucial proposition for Deussen that 'bodies are force-filled spaces' is taken from Kant's *The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry*, of which *Sample I contains the Physical Monadology*. We will see how Deussen uses this idea of bodies as force-filled spaces to explain how the 'active' forces of man's intellect and his 'passive' autonomic bodily processes are both one and the same Will. This citation is extracted from a discussion in which Kant introduces a distinction between attractive and repulsive *grund*-forces.

The body's existence is sustained by the interaction (*Zusammenspiel*) of the two....Internally attraction dominates; externally, repulsion. Repulsion works from inside to outside, attraction from outside to inside. (AGP II.3,189)

The interplay of forces described here is central to Deussen's account of the natural world. However, his claim that all forces are unified in the Will clearly contradicts Kant's view that all stable forces are mutually determined through both attraction and repulsion. (Ibid) Kant's distinction generalised the action applied by one solid body to another to internal 'active force' and was extended by him to moral activity and political phenomena. This dualist account of force becomes the Non-Dual philosophy of the two modes of the Will: affirmation and denial. This is to say that freedom (denial) is a disposition of the Will. This bi-modality of the Will is also the ground on which Deussen extends morality into the sphere of metaphysics. They may be polarised opposites, but in aesthetic experience and moral action the mode of necessity is transformed into the mode of freedom. In this way the metaphysics of nature led directly to the metaphysics of beauty and of morality.

2. (III) The Metaphysics of Nature: 'the way in'
At this stage in his lectures, Deussen has not yet mentioned the Will. This section announces a different approach by switching from a consideration of the sources of knowledge to its structure. Every philosophical system must address two questions, he
states:

(1) what principle of the world it establishes, and
(2) how from this principle it explains the world. (94)

This breaks down philosophy into questions concerning the ground of being and the reason for knowing. Strictly speaking, the system of physics, like all rational-empirical systems, is only ever concerned with the first question. As the previous chapter explored, natural science envisages the world as a perpetually changing material totality. Yet it also recognises that both the changes in matter and the material objects themselves are finally 'only a sum of effects'. In so far as they make us conscious of the existence of things, effects are called sensations or affections. However these are effects of that which does not exist in time, space and causality. Force is the name given by science to this unknowable essence. (95) The scientist can indicate how force is manifested but not what it is in itself.

Philosophy meanwhile explains the world from this principle, this force. The crucial role Kant played in the history of philosophy for Deussen is due to his success in distinguishing the above questions and demonstrating how pre-Critical philosophers erred by transferring the reasons for knowing to the ontological principle of the world. ‘Kant proved that it is just by means of these innate functions of our Understanding that the principle of the world, which he called the Thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich) is presented to our eyes as the universe extended in time, space and causality.’ (94) From this, it is concluded that the same entity which philosophers seek as the principle of the world is that which is presupposed by Kant as the Thing-in-itself and by natural science as forces, and by both given up as unknowable. By excluding the possibility of knowing the Thing-in-itself ‘so long as we are human beings’, Kant, he says, thought to have overthrown metaphysics forever.

If however the problem of philosophy is not absolutely insoluble, there must be some point from which the thing-in-itself is accessible and immediately known. Kant's conclusion would hold good if his 'subjective method' were the only way to reach things. Like Schopenhauer, Deussen argues that another 'way in' to the Thing-in-itself exists:

More intimately known to me indeed than this whole world is the intellect in and through which all its manifestations are presented to me; but there is one thing still more intimately known to me than my
intellect and that is myself. (97)

This statement elides the complex meaning of the concept of 'intimacy' by positing it through the simple 'there-ness' of the body. The quiddity of the body speaks in a lucid and familiar language so that 'knowledge' of it is assured and reassured. Furthermore, here the body and the personality are linked in a relationship which is unspecified but which nonetheless indicates the possibility of identity and identification. This is the relationship which Deussen now examines on the basis that the 'self' provides a self-evident model of unity which is corroborated by the unity of the organism. He will do so by analysing the voluntary movement of the body, a move which gathers up many questions concerning passivity and activity, inherent and surface forces, physiology (physics) and psychology.

He noted three different types of causes in his review of causality in the system of Physics. In inorganic nature, cause and effect had a simple, symmetrical relationship. The case of irritation/stimulus for plants and animals was more complicated: there the increase of cause could produce the opposite effect. Changes in the effect could take place without corresponding changes in the cause. Deussen draws the important conclusion that due to the gradually increasing susceptibility or sensibility of being, the effect gradually overwhelms the cause, becoming more and more 'dissimilar, mighty and independent'. This distancing process also fascinated Nietzsche throughout the period of the Free Spirit trilogy. Yet what was most inexplicable to Nietzsche was the fact that anyone could deduce absolute unfreedom from the law of causality when Nietzsche could see that it was not even certain this law even existed. Furthermore the believed that the incomprehensibility of man's actions did not permit them to be interpreted as free, i.e. unconditioned by cause. Deussen, contrast, uses exactly this discrepancy to conclude that a singe force underlies all effects in nature.

Whereas irritation/stimulus is always conditioned by contact in space and a certain duration in time, in the voluntary movements of animals these two are sundered. Between the motive and the effect as bodily movement, the intellect insinuates itself as medium. While the previous Chapter posited time, space and causality as the functions of the Understanding, it also describes its constitution in a single organ, the brain. This organ was characterised by its singular reactive power, an increase in the susceptibility to causal influence which inheres in every living thing. (101) As man is guided by
abstract motives and not only perceptual stimulus, here the transparency of the nexus between cause and effect vanishes. Thus it is only by accident, he writes, that:

...the philosophising intellect itself forms here a link in the secret chain [of cause and effect] and is thus initiated into the mystery of Nature at the very point where it appears in its highest development.

(102)

Therefore although the intellect is a ‘darkening medium’, inner experience may still be utilised to open up the external world. In the intellect, the embodied self is the only thing which is apprehended not only from without like everything else but from within.

(98)

The statement Deussen makes concerning this sole exception employs a Sanskrit term at an important moment.

This exception is my own self (atman), which I am able to comprehend firstly, like everything else from without and secondly, unlike everything else from within. (103)

The metonymy of body and self is complicated here by the equivalency which is introduced with the Sanskrit word, atman. This word is generally translated as the true self and derives from the Sanskrit for breath, cognate with the German word Atem. However for the Vedanta, the meaning of the word can only be determined through meditation on the identity of every living entity with the all-pervading cosmic soul, Brahman. In this context, he appears to be using the ‘self’ to refer to the internal awareness of a mutable yet enduring coherency. Implicitly, the unity of the organism is pre-established. He acknowledges this by referring to a transcendental justification of selfhood, i.e. one which requires positing the self first in order to ask what its conditions are. The outer and inner world lie as affectations (effects) in our consciousness, he writes, and for the intellectual ego, both are non-ego; something ‘foreign’ and other. Nevertheless the external impressions given by the senses are considered ‘alien’ and are ‘expelled from us by means of causality’. (104) The internal, subjective feelings of volition, pleasure and displeasure receive ‘rights of citizenship’ and remain untransformed, belonging to our ego. This vocabulary of rights and belonging implies that somehow a judgement is made unconsciously on these border decisions; a process far more elaborate than autonomic process of respiration. Not only that, the idea of a unity and bodily integrity must proceed these ‘decisions’. The only explanation he can find is that the intellectual ego is not the final point of the self’s unity but must
recognise a higher origin from which internal sensations spring.

In one sense the internal and external experiences of the ‘self’ are the same. ‘In both cases that which comprehends is the intellect, woven of time, space and causality, and that which is comprehended is sensation given to the intellect as nerve-irritation.’(104) The one great difference between the affections coming from within and those from without is that the affections coming from within are free from space and causality. They are reflected in the intellect only in the form of time. Yet the affections given to the external senses are construed in space through causality, by which process the self appears in perception as a material body. Thus the ‘I’ is an embodied self in which a variety of natural forces converge, but also ‘the inner self’ which exists only in the form of time.

Unfortunately Deussen does not dwell on the notion of this ‘time-self’ since he construes it only as the final form through which a primordial, ubiquitous force manifests itself, and the pursuit of this force is his final aim. However reflections on the nature of this ‘time-self’ are found everywhere in the work of Borges who was directly inspired by this enigma. In Borges’ reading of Deussen, he remarks that the problem of the inner self inevitably suggests Aristotle’s ‘third man’ argument. If the transcendental self can only be known through the empirical self, and the empirical self only known in the forms of time, space and causality, only a third man can have knowledge of what both truly are in themselves. For Borges, Deussen resolves this conundrum by demonstrating conclusively that the self can never be an immediate object of knowledge. If Deussen speaks of an investigation of the inner self, therefore this must not be confused with the charms and reserves of narcissistic ‘looking inwards’. The time-self is only one remove away from Being-in-itself. For Borges, this insight effects a ‘a radical negation of introspection’. This supports Borges’ consistent advocation that the enigma of individual existence can only be understood correctly from a metaphysical perspective.4 His stories dramatise the Non-Dualist perspective that the inner self, the individual time-self can only be explained from the point of view of the cosmos (eternity), and not vice versa. As Deussen writes, ‘Time is the only barrier which hinders me from knowing by the inner view what I am as Thing-in-itself.’ (104) There remains only the form of time in which expanded inner experience is reflected in the intellect. The question is whether it can be surmounted.

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To prove that a higher condition of unity must ground the intellectual self, Deussen follows Schopenhauer’s example of analysing the ‘synthesis’ that is voluntary physical activity. A physical gesture provides an immediate demonstration of response to a motive/cause e.g. to dance, to eat. It illustrates both traits of voluntary decision and conscious activity.

When I move any limb of my body, this process regarded from without appears as a bodily change in time, space and causality; regarded from within, as a volition, that is, as Will, expanded in time. (104-5)

This particular example also reprises Kant’s extension of the external vis motrix to an internal vis anima in his early works. Proceeding along the lines of the analysis of cognition, the single action is broken down into three different moments: a bodily movement, the volition accompanying it, and the Will manifested in it. These moments represent three different relations to the intellect; in themselves however they are not different. (1) Physical movement is always extended in space, time and causality. (2) The accompanying volition appears in the form of time. This has a certain duration yet it does not lie in space. On the one hand, volition is causally determined in so far as action is determined by a motive. Yet on the other the action is in a sense “self-originating”. ‘I do not conceive inner like outer affection as an affect which I refer to its external cause.’ (105) The third moment explicates this paradox.

(3) A distinction arises between what is willed at this time, in this place, in these circumstances and the fact that I will in general. The whole inner nature of willing is inexplicable from a law of motivation (causality) which determines only the phenomena of the will at each point in time. It does not condition the unity or the form of willing. Only by removing the last obstacle, time, from the internal experience of the Thing-in-itself, can the true and real mode of Being be uncovered. Grasping the totality of possible experience, Deussen takes his scissors again and removes the part which is determined by the intellectual forms. He eliminates the tiny reality of the ego, i.e. of the actual (energeia), or that which is at work in the present moment, and searches for what is necessary and universal in the general form of possibility which remains (dyamis).

Despite his claim that Kant provides the incontrovertible wissenschaftlich foundation for this metaphysical system, the deduction of the Will by suspension of intellectual cognition leads Deussen to some very obvious abuses of the critical philosophy. Kant asserted that the a prioris were only the forms in which Being necessarily appeared and
that it was impossible to draw conclusions from this according to the law of contradiction. This application of the law of contradiction - Being-in-itself is what the being of appearances is-not was unjustifiable to Kant. He argued that whether or not Being-in-itself enters into this logic, it is beyond the capacity of the human intellect to comprehend this. Apart from the transcendental deduction of a priori forms, nothing of apodictic certainty can be inferred from experience. Despite this, Deussen proceeds to derive negative statements about the Will from the law of contradiction, thus in practice imputing content to the Thing-in-itself. This method is supported by the Schopenhauerean axiom that the bridge on which metaphysics passes beyond experience is nothing but just that analysis of experience into phenomenon and thing-in-itself. The Will, in conclusion, is the name which is given to that which necessarily accompanies all action, no matter what accidental 'motive' occasions it. The bodily movement and the act of volition are in-themselves Will, as it appears to the external and internal senses. In conscious, voluntary movement, we intuit not only changes in matter, but we also sense the parts of the body as material objects. Taking this further from the transcendental perspective, these limbs are themselves only sensation construed as bodies in time, space and causality. '[N]ot only the movements of my limbs, but also the limbs themselves of which the body is composed, are intrinsically and in themselves Will.' (106) The truth that not only the limbs but also the movements of the limbs are intrinsically Will is hard to grasp since voluntary movement seems so natural (so 'intimate') that it escapes signification. Normally one is not aware of the body in a state of equilibrium, the internal and external forces balanced and the integrity of the organism secure. Proprioception arises the moment an outward influence affects the body, making itself inwardly felt as sensation. This sensation is either pleasure or pain, that is, a willing or a non-willing imposed on us by the corresponding impression. From this it appears that not only the movement of the body, but also the body itself, as far as I am at all conscious of it, enters into my consciousness as Will. (106) That this exceptional material object and its changes are both the manifestations of an ultimate internal force called Will leads to the question concerning the conscious and unconscious Will. Before turning to this, it should be noted how pleasurable affects are here immediately indexed to Will and produced automatically in the body. Pleasure is
defined as the sensation produced when the subject is able ‘to master the influences he receives’, permitting the Will to operate freely. (Ibid) Displeasure is felt as the result of an impediment to striving of the Will for material presence. Thus when pain is represented in the mind, as a result of a paper cut for example, the material cause and effect might be obvious but the real source of the sensation as painful stems from the revolt of the Will against the infringement on its uninterrupted presence. All of the emotions and passions, Deussen argues, arise from the universal Will and not from individual consciousness.

He concludes from this that it is Will which, mirrored in the intellectual form of time, appears extended as volition. (105) It is neither the imaginary isolation of the ego nor the mastery of the instincts. It is both of these and more, since the Will absorbs the individual existence. It first appears to consciousness:

...in performing externally any movement of our limbs, or in experiencing any influence on our body (hunger, thirst, pleasure, pain, etc.). Inexplicable by anything else, it underlies all inner emotions, all desiring, striving, wishing, longing, craving, hoping, loving, rejoicing, grieving, etc. (106)

The present continuous verb form in this sentence translates the German infinitive and emphasises the identity of the metaphysical Will with the presencing actualisation of the agency, emotions and ‘free will’ of the individual. Yet identifying a continuity between the survival instinct and cerebral life devalues the transgressive power of the latter, i.e. its freedom. As he ultimately states, the spring and source of the affections, volition and feelings of pleasure and pain remain untransformed by intellection. The higher unity which synthesises the intellectual and the corporeal is not individual autonomy, but a unifying force. From the transcendental standpoint, our ‘will’ is simply the extension in time of essential force. Hence my own will is the manifestation of this ubiquitous force, the Will.

Deussen has shown that the unifying essential force is immediately present in consciousness in voluntary movements. It is only necessary to deduct the share of the intellect from experience in order to retain ‘the inner impelling principle of our whole life’:

...which not only perpetually sustains...the integrity of our body, heals its wounds, combats foreign forces intruding as diseases and...subdues
them, but which also produces all growth...with that impetuosity,
characterising the manifestation of all forces of nature. (111).
Thus the Will/my will also ‘accomplishes’ the involuntary functions of my body which
serve life, e.g. repair and growth. This is proved from the fact that inside and outside the
body, at its very limits, the organism maintains its existence within a tumultuous tension
of forces (physical, chemical, etc.): yet there is also a sense in which it is pervaded by
an immanent unity. In a state of health, physical and chemical forces are continually
active in the service of the organism. This is an enigma for the empirical method which
finds only multiplicity of conflictual forces in nature. Notwithstanding the diversity of
the parts and the variety of the efforts, ‘a higher central force...manifests itself in the
unity of the whole’. (108) To this end, voluntary and involuntary vital functions co-
operate in perfect harmony. Thus the body cannot be the temporary subjugation of all
forces but must be one force which manifests itself in different ways.

The unity of conscious and unconscious life is apparent even in the parts of the body.
The function of each organ and part must be determined by the whole structure. ‘For
example, that which uses the hand cannot be only accidentally related to that which
forms, heals and renews it.’(108) This would however be the case if the forming power
and the employing power were fundamentally different. Thus the ‘higher unity of the
Will’ explains the blind adaptation of vegetative functions. The example of the hand has
fascinated many philosophers. Here it is a powerful image of man’s innate potential for
working to serve life, a tool ‘pre-conceived’ by the Will. It is a indication that what man
actualises – in his body and in his work – is a synthesis of energeia and the a priori
condition of his being. At this stage, the definition of the Will is still vague. Here the
focus remains the individual’s relation to the general Will and the argument that the Will
is the very centre of man. Earlier on, Deussen defined existence as that which operates
in time and space; thus to understand individual will, we need to understand the deeper
meaning of man’s fabricare and in terms of an unconditioned Will-force.

The main point of these arguments is to prove that both the conscious and unconscious
processes of life are one and the same force manifested through two diverse but
harmoniously co-operating phenomenal forms. This is a long way from the scientific
conception of force as a dynamic influence on movement and rest. He extends force to
the very soul of man, stating that:

It is this force which has been called by physiology and
psychology (in their best moments) vital force and soul respectively. (110)

By making a force into the ground of the synthesis of intellectual and embodied self, he is preparing for a key point. Firstly, he is devaluing the contribution of acroamatic, discursive knowledge which in his terms means the faculty of reason. But most importantly, he postulates that the fulcrum of man’s being is Will, not knowledge. That is, he is arguing in fact that man’s soul is Will. The ‘soul’, he suggests, is purely an abstraction term invented by psychology and is in fact ‘this force as far as it appears in voluntary conscious movements and which is better known to us than anything else in the world under the name Will.’ This absolutist approach to existence reduces to profane Will all the forces, moods and distractions of which the subject is conscious. It seems to exclude all possible heterogeneity, whether of the sacred or the unknown. We might say that at this stage in the lectures, Deussen risks transforming an ostensibly Kantian-derived philosophy of forces into a dogma.

As if to further neutralise all notions of the spiritual soul, Deussen invokes the image of a ‘muscle man’ such as illustrated in the work of Vesalius. It is not that the soul/Will breathes life into an articulated skeleton: the muscles themselves and the vis motrix plus the central co-ordinating organ, the brain, are manifestations of the one essential force. Every organic movement is physiologically speaking the contraction of a muscle. No muscle can contract without being irritated by the nerves ending in it, and this holds whether the affection comes from outside or inside. In the case of voluntary movement, nerve-irritation springs from the cerebral system, in the unconscious processes of the body, it springs from the sympathetic system. (109). What is common to both is the effect, the muscle contraction; the conditioning cause is accidental. He considers it a ‘secondary and unimportant difference’ whether the nerves stimulating the muscles to contraction should pass through the brain or through the ganglia. Conscious and unconscious activity are simply different manifestations of the same higher central force. In the case of voluntary movements, it is only by chance that the intellect forms a link in this chain. Self-consciousness is an accidental link in the secret chain of nature.

By-passing the intellect is fundamental to the idea that reason cannot change the moral element in man, the seat of his feelings, passions, volition: the Will. The images of man as wholly sovereign subject or wholly animal being succumb to an examination of essential force. In this, the intellectual ego is forced to recognise above itself another
higher unity, which is the origin of these internal sensations. Will is not the acquired sovereignty of the reason over the claims of desire, nor mere intentions, resolutions, or decisions. As Deussen says, decisions are nothing but calculations of motives provisionally concluded in the intellect, but irrevocably originating in the Will. The 'outward, artificial, mechanistic productions' of the conscious Will are to be opposed to 'inward, natural, organic creations' of the unconscious Will. For the Intellect is nothing but a material organ with which the Will provides itself for the sake of regulating its relations with the outer world.

The impossibility of conscious volition instigating a change in the Will is a consequence of the equivalence of essential force and Thing-in-itself. The self emerges as a kind of Non-Dual entity, both phenomenon and Thing-in-itself, like everything else in nature. All becoming, all arising and perishing is possible only in time by virtue of causality. The same entity which appears externally as the body moving in time, space and causality, when viewed from within is also the entity which inheres in consciousness as volition, or when the veil of time is removed, as the Will. 'My Will', the soul as Thing-in-itself, is independent of these limitations and thus although the body has a beginning and end in time, 'as Soul, that is as Will, I am on the contrary uncreated and immortal.' (116) While the empirical self divides time into infinite future, infinite past and extensionless present, these distinctions have no meaning for the Will, 'whose sole form of existence is the present'. (231) Deussen is clearly aware that he draws a conclusion refused by Kant when he writes the immortality of the soul is the 'inevitable consequence' of the ideality of time, space and causality. 'Properly speaking, it is not real continuance of life beyond death, but an indestructibility without continuance in time.'(232)

On this point, his triads betray him and he contests directly the common tendencies of Indian, Greek and modern philosophy to conceive of the soul as essentially a knowing being. He argues that 'facts of psychic life' prove that the centre of man is to be sought not in the head but in the heart, in willing. (112) In what follows he enumerates instances of the fluctuations of consciousness in sleeping and waking or the youth and senescence of the body in contrast to the perpetual vigilance of the Will: 'Desire does not grow old.'(112, from the Mahabharata) This is to say that the soul's relation to the body is the same as that of the Will to man's actuality.
This elision of the individual soul and universal force complicates the issue of subjectivity and autonomy. The identification of the Will and soul is fundamentally linked by Deussen to the assertion that ‘Every man is in the deepest sense his own work’. (111) He insists that:

Each is through and through the objectivity of his own Will, which
...in unconscious wisdom shapes from the beginning all organs of the
body in conformity to its original aims. (111-12)

The term ‘work’ is used here in the unusual sense of something achieved unconsciously. I understand it in the light of his earlier discussion of *energeia* to mean that man’s corporeality and his acting and operating in time and space belong to his actualisation. The ambiguity surrounding the properness or own-ness of this work remains. The adjectival qualification is perhaps inserted in order to attach this universal concept of Will to the universal yet subjective experience of self-conscious existence. Deussen locates the feeling of essential vitality right inside the internal experience of being: that which I feel as my own volition, my will/ the Will accomplishes my growing. The ‘I’ myself, unified with the impetuous growth of the organism, accomplishes my life. I am ‘responsible’ for my own operating and acting in time, space and causality. He returns to this feeling of responsibility and inchoate ‘awareness’ of oneself as Thing-in-itself as an important aspect in the later section on the Metaphysics of Morality.

3. The Will in Nature and its Modes
Having found the secret ‘way in’, Deussen established that the forces of nature, the body which is their manifestation, the soul and the Thing-in-itself can all be intimately identified as Will. He now turns to consider the Will-in-itself, its modes and its manifestation in *Naturkräften*. We might say that the main theme of this section, which nevertheless prepares his defence of ascetic negation, is a question of the One and the Many. Discussing the Will in nature confronts Deussen with complex issues of differentiation and development. His first priority is to establish the unity of the Will-to-life as the first principle of all natural phenomena. Whereas for physical science, all is matter, for metaphysical science all is Will.

The only instance in which the being of force becomes apprehensible is in the self as ‘our inner apprehension as Will’. Deussen now argues that if all forms of appearance are deducted from the self, which is to say all consciousness and all ordering of the world is
suspended, then:

[W]e shall retain in the unconscious, inanimate, inorganic Will that
which is manifested as inner impelling principle in all forces of
inorganic nature. (124)

While he demonstrates that the animal and vegetative processes in man are both
manifestations of the Will, like Schopenhauer, he must admit that no transcendental
proof exists for extending the Will to all other beings. He can only assert that it is
impossible not to extend it to all men and animals. The solipsist's argument belongs to
the mad house, as Schopenhauer remarks. Deussen supports this claim by observing that
the different animal species are identical as regards that which they will, although
externally they appear diverse.

All animals from the highest to the lowest are embodiments of the Will
to life which in all stages strives equally to conserve itself. (118)

These exertions are everywhere directed towards preserving the individual by
nourishment and the species by propagation. The fact that the Will furnishes itself with
consciousness only in the limited sphere of animal life proves that it is essentially and
originally unconscious. Descending in the hierarchy of organic beings, the extinguishing
of conscious, voluntary movement marks the transition to the plant kingdom. 'In the
plant unconscious life serving the purposes of nourishment and propagation fills
therefore the whole sphere of its existence.' (121) The striving of roots after soil and
moisture, branches after light and air are inexplicable without an inner principle of
vegetable life, 'a desiring, craving, striving, in short a willing, albeit an unconscious
one.' (122)

Next, these mechanisms of survival and endurance characteristic of living being are
further reduced to the barest force, the Will-to-life.

In all effects, whether belonging to the sphere of animate or inanimate
nature, that which manifests itself is a force. (Ibid)

The Will-to-life crosses the sharpest boundary in nature between organic and inorganic
forces, i.e. between living organisms and the physical and chemical processes of
inanimate nature. Zoë seems to become an effect of phenomenal individuation through
time, space and causality, as will be confirmed by the 'table of forces' below.
Importantly, this indicates that Deussen's Will does not seem to be a vital force. It is
always one step removed from Zoë maintaining its heterogeneity from the struggling
mass of life. This distinct dimension is instrumental in securing the ground of freedom.
in the Will's noumenal nature. It is worthwhile noting that in contrast to Deussen, Schopenhauer increasingly identified the Will as a vitalist principle. He compared it to Bichat's concept of *l'animal existant au-dedans*, whose life Bichat defines as 'organic' and which is merely the repetition of blind and unconscious functions. Schopenhauer explicitly aligned himself with the French physiologist's conclusion that, as the seat of the passions and source of motives, the organic element was the sole moral element in man, and not 'rational' animal life. Hence Schopenhauer's morality was restricted to the negation of the Will-to-life and expressed in the three virtues of aesthetics, ascetics and attendance of Grace. Deussen's reconceptualisation permitted him to develop a positive doctrine of negation, as he calls it, in which negation of the individual Will-to-life is to bring about the unconcealing of man's radical, divine element. It is given a positive sense despite its impenetrability to the intellect. This doctrine is the subject of Section 8.

The discussion of the Will as noumenal Thing-in-itself leads Deussen to the doctrine of its two modes. In accordance with the principal decision of Idealism, he chooses to privilege the intemporal and intransient over ephemeral becoming, and because of this implicit decision deduces the noumenal nature of the Thing through opposing it to the realm of nature. The Will must be unified and indivisible, he concludes, because the world of representation is differentiated and fragmentary. "[E]ach thing contains it wholly, just as each of the thousand images of the sun in water reflects the entire sun." (126) For a third time, he refers to India and Greece to support this 'Kantian' notion, citing the Parmenidean doctrine of the One and All, and the Gita's description of Brahman: 'undivided he dwells in beings and yet as it were divided'. The fact that these ideas were 'felt' rather than scientifically explicated proves to him that truth is, as Schopenhauer asserted, universally accessible in intuition. 'Everyone finds and feels himself to be the entire, limitless Will to life, the totality of all that is real'. (126-7)

This distinction between noumenon and phenomenon allows Deussen to postulate that two kinds of knowledge separate being. It is the culmination of his process of defining the two different standpoints, the empirical and the metaphysical. In the first:

The natural man, as his deeds shows, restricts all reality to his ego. He knows everything in himself. (127).

This knowledge is defined neither by its object or content. By including a reference to 'deeds' in this statement, knowing and acting are grasped as modalities of disclosing the world. The natural man is identified as the individual involved in the flurry of life-
affirming behaviours. His actions are the results of the innate character 'expressed in
corporisation,' so the necessity that belongs to them is that of being immersed in the
variously repetitive, indomitable forces of nature.

Everything and nothing changes in the second type of knowledge:

The regenerate man (in the Christian sense) extends his ego to all reality; he knows himself in everything. He celebrates solemnly (in the Communion) his unification with all creatures as a member of the body of Christ, and Nature thousand-tongued greets him with the 'great word': 'tat tvam asi' (This thou art)....while from his inmost being re-echoes the consciousness: 'Aham Brahma asmi' (I am Brahman). (127)

This is the first instance where the famous tat tvam asi of the Chandogya Upanishad is used in Deussen's text. It is significant that he introduces it for the first time in the Metaphysics of Nature as a prelude to the doctrine of the two modes of Will. Schopenhauer had explained this formula as the recognition of the pervasive unity of the Will-to-life 'which bursts forth as compassion'. As Halbfass comments on this interpretation, the compassion inspired by 'tat tvam asi' is a natural spontaneous occurrence not an application or consequence of a theoretical insight, not an execution of duty. For Schopenhauer, philosophical ethics is essentially descriptive, even contemplative.

Accordingly Schopenhauer did not teach or propagate the ethical, practical application of this insight into the unity of reality; nor did he claim that ethical behaviour would follow from such insight.7

This contrasts strongly with Deussen's use of the tat tvam asi formula and his endeavour to elaborate a positive ethical doctrine from it, an enterprise which is the impetus for his System of the Vedanta. I turn now to the relationship he outlines between this formula of pervasive unity and the ground of the freedom of the Will. More than with Schopenhauer, there is an effort to posit a positive ground of the freedom of the Will, a problem for the latter given his positing of the Will as a singular ubiquitous, omnipotent and cannibalistic force. However as Chapter 3 shows, the direction Deussen takes is challenged by the Vedanta's ambiguity, where it appears that there is no single, theoretical foundation of ethics in Vedantin practice.

Tat tvam asi is given an explicitly Christianised sense in the quotation above, one which
recalls the sermons of Boehme. It is immediately followed by the final conclusion drawn through the principle of contradiction on the nature of the Will. Since all phenomena of the Will to life are subject to the law of causality and thus to necessity, the Will which as thing-in-itself does not lie in causality is consequently uncaused and free. (127)

Here is the meeting point of two great truths, that of the freedom of the Will and that of the necessity of all its manifestations. (127)

The same intersection takes place in man as physical-metaphysical doublet. On one hand, what is necessary in actuality (activity, *energeia*) is inextricably bound up with corporisation. On the other, man’s self-difference is always felt in or around the quiddity of the body and its there-ness. Deussen's view is that man is also constituted of traces of his metaphysical essence. Hence the 'voice of conscience' still intersperses the inevitability of activity with its strange tractions and volleys.

We cannot get rid of the consciousness of responsibility for our actions which is called conscience: and rightly so: for this innate character is after all our own work and our whole life is only the empirical and therefore necessary development of our in itself free willing. (127)

The notion of conscience as a silent witness, beyond the time of the ego and the space of the body, gives a sense of the existence of a living supplement to the lived. The concept of the witness (*saksin*) is strongly developed in the Vedanta, where it is no longer a moral censor but an awareness of the fact that the metaphysical Self and natural self do not coincide, although they may inhabit the same body. Again Deussen turns to evidence from Indian and Greek philosophy to support this interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. He mentions the Platonic theory that the soul freely chooses its fate before birth and refers, without naming it, to the Indian doctrine that our destiny is 'the consequence of our own actions in a previous life, and so dependent on ourselves'. (128) As we shall see in Chapter 3, the investigation of this doctrine of karma plays an important role in the System of the Vedanta.

And yet this particular triad is not just another example. It seems to substitute itself for a sustained analysis of the relationship between 'in-itself free willing' and the negation of the Will-to-life. It is possible to read the working through of this problem both in the practical philosophy of the Vedanta and the Universal History, where Deussen pursues the ethics of *tat tvam asi*. For now, the assertion that the Will has 'two possible modes
and two alone', affirmation and negation, is presented almost completely through evidence from the historical expressions of this truth, whether it appears in mythical, religious or philosophical form. He only comments at this stage that the section on the Metaphysics of Morality will undertake the demonstration that in reference to empirical existence willing appears as the affirmation of the Will-to-life, of which the whole world is the manifestation.

Comparative Philosophy is set to work here to demonstrate the *philosophia perennis*, which is the same in all times and countries: there is nothing but Will and its true state is denial.

Not-willing [appears] as the denial of the Will to life, the manifestation of which has been called by religions in their figurative language, bliss, *unio mystica*, Kingdom of God, Kingdom of Heaven, etc., but which apart from its breaking through in every moral action remains completely unknown...To the intellect therefore it appears as the negation, the extinction (*nirvanam*) of all existence (128).

If he presents a panorama of diverse doctrines, it is perhaps done partly to gather further explanation for this ineffable, unrepresentable truth and partly to justify it. The affirmation of the Will readily unfolds itself in language but the non-Willing, which is the only other 'possible mode' of the Will, is absolutely inconceivable to the intellect. It even appears to cognition, externally, as the extinction of all existence. Yet since the Will is changeless and eternal, it is present in all the philosophies of the past, which have 'penetrated beyond the *principium individuationis*, the *maya* of empirical life; that is, those philosophies that have gone beyond the antinomy of being and becoming in nature.

The Will is now inserted into a metonymic chain: it is the Deity, the Brahman, the Thing-in-itself. (Ibid) On the basis of historical consensus, he dramatises the principles of the Will's modalities in a section entitled 'Mythical Representation of the World Process'. At this stage, affirmation and denial are discussed in the 'mythic' discourse of concepts of the Fall, sin, guilt, evil on one hand and redemption and salvation on the other. The main points that he makes here are reprised in a systematic way in the Metaphysics of Morality and fleshed out in the comparative philosophy of the Universal History. Therefore in lieu of a summary I will simply note that the three doctrines he
discusses are that of (1) 'Indian metaphysics', (2) the New Testament and (3) Parmenides and Plato. What he presents here is in fact an embryonic form of his later Universal History of Philosophy. His historical, 'synthetic' move stands in contradiction with the analytic method of the Elements of Philosophy and its lack of explication is problematic, despite the clarity of his aim. This method is given a definitive explanation in Chapter 4, in a reading of his *Einleitung* to the Universal History. The account he presents here is extremely foreshortened, precipitously summarised and formulated as a single declaration:

The world of denial, viewed from the highest standpoint, unknown to us, yet transparent in every moral deed, is that which really and truly is. (129)

At this point, only history reveals the highest standpoint in various ways. It is the task of the Metaphysics of Morality to explain why this is the apogee of transcendental knowledge.

4. The Table of Forces

Before the principle of negation can be demonstrated, a table of the forces appearing in nature completes the explanation of affirmation and the world of the Will-to-life. We are already forewarned that these *Naturalkräfte* are identical to Will, to Brahman, to God and to the Thing-in-itself. Since Deussen has concentrated on proving the pervasive unity of the underlying, impelling force, it remains to be explained:

...how the one, free and existence-denying Will...appears as a plurality of beings, subject to the constraint of causality, separated by space and time, and (in so far as they do not penetrate the illusive nature of the order imposed by the intellect and its forms) persisting in mutual hostility' (140-141)

The affirmative mode of the Will is that state of its fragmentation through the forms of time, space and causality. The Will itself however is absolutely unformed and therefore he says that it must 'adapt itself' in order to appear.

This the Will does in shaping itself to a series of operative forms of existence, through which, in self-combat, it forces its way into time, space and causality, and comes to appearance in all individual existence. (141)

The operative forms of existence are the forces through which nature is composed. Again the term 'operative' indexes these forces to degrees of the Will's activity. They
are called the grades of objectification because through them the Will manifests itself with ever-increasing distinctness. The plurality of the forces, like the ‘dark phantom of matter’, appears to lie somewhere between representation and the Thing-in-itself. While competing with each other for possession of matter as manifestations of the Will, it is assumed that as pure forces they are harmoniously interconnected, given that their transcendental existence is beyond space and matter.

The Metaphysics of Nature established the congruence between the overall aim of the Will for eternal presence and the individual *energeia* of the objects and bodies in which the Will is manifested. The mutual correspondence and accommodation of the harmony of Ideas depend on the Will. As the fundamental activity of the cosmos, the Will is the formless matrix of these forces in which all forms are gathered. This arrangement, he admits, is heavily influenced by Plato. Platonic Ideas were not conceived as a universal abstraction from particulars: they followed phenomena ‘upstream’ to their original source as it were. Later Goethe and Schelling, for example, had perceived this source as an original productivity which was hidden in the products of nature. It is therefore doubly concealed in the manipulations of abstract logic which abound in the purely rational-scientific approach to nature. Plato is seen as elaborating on Parmenidean philosophy when he discovered a series of constant forms in the phenomenal world of ceaseless arising and perishing. As eternal types of things, they find expression in all that exists, but are themselves untouched by the flux of becoming. These prototypes of things lying beyond time, space and causality, each of which is manifested as a formative principle of being, in a plurality of similar individual things, were called by Plato ‘Ideas’, or ‘perceptual forms’. In Deussen’s interpretation:

What he sought under this name can be nothing but the series of formative forces through which the Will finds expression in all manifestations of nature. (141)

Since the Ideas are so inextricably linked to the actualisation and activity of existence, all attempts to amalgamate them with conceptual abstractions are resisted. Plato succumbed to this tendency in positing the Ideas of the Good and the Beautiful. Kant also missed the point by identifying Ideas as ‘constructs of reason transcending the possibility of experience’. (Ibid).

Deussen’s Ideas are the grades of objectification through which the Will to life brings its being to appearance with ever-increasing distinctness. Every physical, chemical and
organic force is a Platonic Idea, that is, one of the primary forms through which the Will participates in the *energeia*, the activity of the universe. He draws up a tentative list of such forces with the aim of enumerating the total content of the *a posteriori* in nature, i.e. what remains after the subtraction of the *a priori* elements. The list makes visible these invisible forces. The reader has - 'before his eyes' - the whole apparatus of Ideas in which the Will-to-life affirms itself 'in penetrating through these into time, space and causality and appearing in all changes of bodies as well as in the bodies themselves.'(146)

**The Table of Forces**

A. Physical Forces:
- Impenetrability
- Gravity
- Cohesion
- Adhesion
- Heat
- Light
- Magnetism and Diamagnetism
- Electricity

B. Chemical Forces:
- Each of the 66 Elements
- Every Chemical Combination

C. Organic Forces
- Each Species of Plant
- Each Species of Animal
- Man

The task of metaphysics, as Schopenhauer had specified, is to provide a correct explanation of the totality of experience. This table is intended to assist the understanding of everything as Will. He writes:

> One should accustom oneself to see in every process of nature a mutual interpenetration of forces and to regard that which alone is operative in these forces as identical with what works and strives in us as Will. (144)

The use of the verb 'should' reveals a moral concern: man should also refer the motives of human behaviour to the underlying interconnectivity of forces and therefore to the 'undeniably teleological constitution of nature'. It indicates that the completion of the world-picture is intended to provide an impetus to the turning of the Will to denial: sudden comprehension followed by spontaneous renunciation.

5. Teleology

The table in fact serves two purposes: to illuminate nature where science had failed and to establish Man as the highest of the Will's Ideas. Ultimately they are important steps leading up to the doctrine of the turning of the Will to denial. I will first treat the
continuing explication of the Will’s affirmation in nature through the plurality of forces, and then consider the privileging of Man in the hierarchy of Ideas.

The forces are restricted to matter as their place of appearance. Hence it is the struggle of the forces to take over matter which is said to lead to the warlike nature of the relations of empirical phenomena. Like Schopenhauer, he gives significant explanatory power to the Hobbesian concept of the *bellum omnium contra omnes*, but his ultimate recourse seems to be empirical evidence. In a quasi-gnostic formulation, Deussen describes the ‘series of operative forms’ as demiurges of matter, and consequently as harbingers of evil.

They all, as phenomenal forms of Will to Life, possessed by the mania of existence, as by a Daemon, force themselves with impetuosity into being, in mutually disputing matter and therefore perpetually combating, hindering, supplanting and suppressing each other. (159)

To conserve their form, they continually need a supply of new materials: hence the struggle for existence. In order not to lose matter forever, when abandoning it in death, they require a means to perpetuate their existence beyond the individual: hence the fundamental impulses of all organic beings towards nourishment and propagation. (153)

In a sense, we are left to conclude that individuation and differentiation result solely from the multitudinous imperfections in the manifestation of the Ideas. Part of the force striving for manifestation is everywhere consumed in the combating and subduing of opposed forces. The explanation of difference seems certainly to be a stumbling block for this philosophy, as the mysterious operation of the *principium individuationis* was in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Deussen attempts a get-out clause by claiming that the Table of Forces is only ‘an imperfect attempt to make conceivable to us, what is in its nature inconceivable’. It ‘passes our comprehension’ as to how the unity or non-plurality of being-in-itself is reconciled with the differences of the phenomenal world rooted in it. Like the possibility of a plurality of Ideas, he says, ‘it is a transcendent question’.

Physical, chemical and organic forces combine according to a hierarchy in which the organic are the most complex, subtle, powerful and also the most differentiated. By contrast, the omnipresence and immortality of all physical forces is irrevocably linked to the indestructibility of all matter. If I think them away, I abolish all matter. These forces
master the others through their superior power of differentiation. The Will manifests its being in physical and chemical force, 'almost only in a simple and (apart from differences in degree) identical manifestation.' However:

As organic forces, the Will expands itself, for the clearer expression and unfolding of its being into a plurality of parts in space as organism, and into a plurality of conditions in time as life. (152)

The hierarchy of Ideas, it seems, is based on this intensification of the Will explained as an increase in the power to transform – or perhaps master – material. The Will-to-life in plants concentrates its whole being in reproduction, it has at this stage the power of transforming inorganic materials into organic ones. In correspondence to its more complicated aims, the Will as animal furnishes itself with voluntary movement and intellect. (Darwinism, for Deussen, is essentially the question of how to represent the first entrance of organic Ideas into the phenomenal world. As it remains on the level of empirical representation, it is only a secondary question for philosophy.) The animal intellect reaches its highest possible development in man.

Beyond him it needs no further development, since in man the Will attains to turning, to denial, to salvation and with that to the really ultimate aim of natural creation. (155-56)

Thus, against Darwin, he argues that the production of the higher out of the lower species is not chiefly due to external mechanical influences ("the struggle for existence"), but to the internal principle. Natural selection presupposes a selector: the struggle for existence presupposes that which struggles: this is the Will to life, objectified entirely and undivided in every species of the plant and animal kingdom. (154) Variation is unimportant as 'fitness for the aims of life' is present in every Idea because the Will is present undivided there. Deussen presumably sees in this reading of Darwin an overcoming of the obstacle it might present to the truth of the Christian religion. Like all of the fundamental contradictions of natural science, religion and philosophy, Darwinism and Christianity, he claims, are reconciled in Schopenhauerean philosophy. (155)

Yet his imputation of a teleological principle to the Will - beyond what Schopenhauer deemed the striving for its own existence - seems highly problematic. On one hand, it strives for eternal presence and the forces in which it objectifies itself combat each other for mastery over matter. Yet on the other hand, he states that the Will strives for its own negation. This is why it is said to evolve self-consciousness in Man: just in order for
him to achieve a denial of the Will.

This is the Will-to-life, which, striving after deliverance, has in accommodation to external circumstances risen from grade to grade, from Idea to Idea. It sprang in a favourable moment from the lower to the higher grade, by the agency of intermediate links which, as hybrids, were dropped after they served their purpose. (154-155)

This seems problematic because there is absolutely no relation possible between the two drives and goals of the Will. There is an absolute lack of dialectic between affirmation and negation. The turning to negation in man, it appears, occurs spontaneously. Deussen solves this problem by referring to the two modes of the Will which, as previously stated, is not a Schopenhauerean distinction. The modes have been consistently posited from the perspective of the only point in nature where the Will is accessible: through the analysis of man’s inner experience: hence the supplementing of the empirical with the transcendental system. However, he now needs to examine more closely man’s ‘experience’ of affirmation and denial (although, technically, the negation of the Will cannot be subjectively experienced). In the next section, this is carried out as a systematic analysis of aesthetic experience and in the final section, as an inquiry into the two sources of morality.

The war in nature is the opposite of the harmony of Ideas necessary for the teleological constitution of nature; an opposition echoing, as Deussen remarks, the contradictory doctrines of Heraclitus and Plato. Nevertheless, this simply corroborates for him, the fact that that since the Ideas-forces lie beyond empirical reality, 'where nothing is to be found but the thing-in-itself', they must be fundamentally identical with the Thing-in-itself. Their transcendental existence is harmonious because they are unified in the Will. This, he declares, had already been ascertained in the Vedas which described all beings as the embodiment of the same Thing which governs the body from within, the 'immortal part' of the self. The connection of the natural forces with the pervasive unity of the Will now receives its most substantial argument from comparative philosophy. In fact, it could be said that the following sentence summarises his entire comparative philosophy:

Thus apart from errors in details, the Brahman of the Indians, the Ideas of Plato, the Creator and Saviour of Christianity, the Thing-in-itself of Kant, the forces of natural science and the Will of Schopenhauer constitute an indissoluble totality of metaphysical truth. (148)
On the one hand, this synthetic display is both dazzling and 'audacious' as Mircea Eliade commented. Yet its metonymic play appears to lend it a dizzying tension. Once gathered together, can these doctrines be grasped once and for all, systematically, in the same idea? As his lectures have so far explicated the equivalence of the Will, the Thing-in-itself and the Naturkräfte, Deussen still has to illuminate this consensus which unites the Indian philosophy of Brahman with the philosophy of Plato and Christianity. All three, as will be seen, lead down to the innermost and divine metaphysical element of all.

6. The Transcendental Standpoint: (IV) The Metaphysics of the Beautiful

The important argument to emerge in this section is that in aesthetic experience the subject (this self-of-forces) activates reality in a different way from the natural warfare of existence. Art sets things free. The previous section unravelled how the Will as Thing-in-itself could be deduced from man's consciousness of the causal antinomy that occurs whenever the self 'wills' an action. Now he moves to an exceptional experience of the Durchbruch of the metaphysical. Aesthetic experience, he claims, involves 'knowing' the Ideas immediately in-themselves, rather than by the traces they leave in nature as bodies, actions and events, i.e. by mediate subject-object relations. While philosophical aesthetics reifies this experience into concepts, in art the Ideas become a primordial form of perception.

Both [Art and Metaphysics] dwell in the contemplation of Being-in-itself, which by metaphysics is apprehended by concepts and by art in immediate intuition. (194)

The absolute impossibility of a relation between affirmation and negation is expressed here as the impossibility of a dialectic between representation and force/ Idea. The quintessence of aesthetic experience is the immediacy of Being-in-itself. In a sense, art is a superior activity to philosophy since the artist breaks down the barriers between time, space and causality in immediate intuition, whereas philosophy does so only through abstract thought. The final section advances the claim that morality is superior even to art since it collapses these barriers through practical activity.

This is a much stronger statement on ethics than can be found in Schopenhauer. However it is far from suggesting a 'moralising' of art, as we can see from Deussen's argument against Plato. The latter devalued art as a mere imitation of the phenomenal world, itself an imitation of the Idea and art. He blames this serious 'error of judgement'
on the influence of the ‘Socratic striving after concepts to be realised in the action of
man’. (163) Guided by these moral considerations, Plato’s endeavour to produce a
concept of the State hence took priority over his earlier interest in the highest
productions of art. In a way, this reading turns Plato into Hegel. It is important for
Deussen to clarify that the realisation of a State concept would be scarcely significant
for the ‘highest aims of mankind’, since the State is an edifice of legality only, not of
morality. Thus the political sphere would remain heterogeneous to the moral element in
man, as it would be incapable of fundamentally altering the Will. As the Metaphysics of
Beauty aims to establish, only aesthetics and morality intersect with and alter the
fundamental sphere of Being.

Socrates’ use of universal and constant concepts to designate mankind’s goals was a
‘fatal tum for philosophy’. It replaced living forces with abstract and artificial a
posteriori reifications. Thereby ‘the useful is the good’ became the principle for ethics
and ‘the serviceable is the beautiful’ that of aesthetics. The use of abstract
generalisations to guide and regulate conduct ignores completely the underlying motive
for action. It is the Will which effectively compels action, dissolving the motivational
strength of all weaker images. Prescriptive morality, human law (there is no other kind
for Deussen), social norms imposed by a reward/ punishment policing system belong
only to the realm of the intellect. As he has already stated, the intellect is essentially an
instrument of the Will’s survival – ‘destined to work in the service of its aims’ - and thus
belongs to man’s natural ‘sinful’ existence. (170) However it is noteworthy that, on the
side of the senses, Aristotle also misrecognised the emotions the artwork aroused by
confining attention to the empirical world. He decoded merely the difference in the
practical results of the emotions stirred by art and those of everyday life. This prevented
him from seeing that, ‘these aesthetic emotions differ toto genere from those of practical
life, that their relation to these is that of the supramundane to the mundane, of the
metaphysical to the physical.’ (166) Deussen insinuates a connection between e-motion
and motion as energetic activities or actualisations of man’s reality. Paradoxically the
moral tum in aesthetic experience is first approached through the feeling of enjoyment in
the beautiful: ‘an unearthly bliss’. As the Will is the seat of all emotion, this
demonstrates that delight in the beautiful is not conditioned by a removal of Will.
Disinterested delight results from the Will being raised above the state of individuality.
From the ‘individual’s’ point of view, there is a mitigation of willing. The experience
remains an ‘earthly’, albeit exceptional one.
This is developed in an interpretation of Kant’s disinterested beauty as an extraction of the subject from the energetic relations of the empirical standpoint. Kant’s definition of disinterested delight, Deussen claims, is the only philosophy in two thousand years to challenge Aristotle’s aesthetic views. In ‘natural’ experience, subject and object are always connected by nearer or remoter relations of space, time and causality. ‘The consciousness of these relations is called interest (according to its etymology from inter-esse “to take part in”) which we take in an object.’ (167) Hence the address of matter to individual sensibility is projected as a net of relations corresponding to the interest of the Will. The translation of ‘inter-esse’ emphasises the individual subject’s participation in the activity of the affirmation of life. A disinterested relation is only possible if these connections or even, he claims, the consciousness of them is removed. In the disinterested mode, aesthetic contemplation releases existence from its servitude to the Will-to-life by unhinging the intellect.

Hence the subject of aesthetic delight is not the Will so far as it is individualised in time, space and causality, but the Will only in so far as it feels itself raised above the individuality as which it appears. (168)

When the self ceases to approach things with the intentionality characteristic of the ego/Will, the Will’s expressions of pleasure or displeasure are withdrawn, so that subject and object face each other transformed. The modus operandi of the will to life is dropped. In this anamorphic way of viewing, the ego is reconfigured from individual to expanded (metaphysical) ego. For as the pure subject of knowing, as the subjective correlative of the Idea, ‘we unself ourselves in aesthetic contemplation’ (180).

This is also to say that when the pure subject of knowing contemplates the pure objective being of things, a change simultaneously takes place in the contemplated object. In aesthetic experience only the Idea occupies the mind, affording an insight into that which continues to exist outside of all relationality. The instrumentality of the intellect fades away. It now faces things ‘as a clear mirror’. (171) In aesthetic contemplation, ‘things are regarded for what they are in themselves, apart from time, space and causality, that is only so far as they are embodiments of Being-in-itself, of the Idea present in them.’ (172) As the things pass out of all external relations, it is the Idea that is known, not the particular thing but the eternal form, i.e. the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade.
7. Energy and the Aesthetic Experience

Deussen explicitly links the conditions of aesthetic experience to energy. An exceptional, incommensurable increase in the subject’s ‘innate energy’ is the necessary, subjective condition of all aesthetic experience. In his words, the intellect is ‘raised by innate energy or by a sudden spring tide of its powers.’ (174). The increase in *energeia* endows the intellect with the capacity to conceive the external world in intensified clarity, ‘so that its more energetic light chases at once all shadows of personal toil and trouble from our consciousness.’ (Ibid) He compares the dissolution of consciousness of the Will in aesthetic contemplation to the way in which the pulse of the heartbeat disappears in co-ordinated activity.

No longer hindered by illusory desires, the intellect stands in more immediate connection with the pure forms of Will. As Schopenhauer says about the normal level of perception, one usually manages the manifold given to sensation by seeking the swiftest and most efficient synthesis, ‘just as the lazy man looks for a chair, which then no longer interests him.’ When the whole mind is devoted to perception, so that consciousness is filled by the contemplation of the present object, intellectual synthesis is bypassed as the mind is filled by a single image. The Idea only appears when subject and object reciprocally fill each other completely, whence they become indistinguishable. This postulate is borrowed directly from Schopenhauer, who had used parallel quotations from Byron and the *Oupnek'hat* to illustrate the mutual revelation of subjective and objective Ideas. Byron’s question asks, ‘Are not the mountains, waves and skies a part/ Of me and my soul, as I of them?’ To which the Upanishads respond, ‘I am all this creation collectively, and besides me there exists no other being.’

To be absorbed in the image of the object, in nature or in art, is therefore to be inundated by the force of pure, primordial, pre-representational perception and to be exposed to the original productivity of nature.

When the Idea appears,....subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely. In just the same way, the knowing and the known individual, as things-in-themselves, are likewise ‘not different’. (180)

Aesthetic ‘knowledge’ releases being from representation, by liberating subjectivity from the ego, and objects from the chains of cause and effect.
The aesthetic phenomenon is subjectively attained by the contemplating subject withdrawing from the consciousness of his individuality. Freedom from individual volition favours the perception of things as emissaries of the Ideas. However aesthetic experience is necessarily equally joined to objective conditions. Provoked by the contemplated object, it invites the forgetting of all that is finite, imperfect and limited, in which case the object is called beautiful. The more of the Idea that is presented in the object, Deussen claims, the nearer it is to the Thing-in-itself and the more beautiful it is in contradistinction to the realm of fragmentation. As this force/Idea crossed the threshold into time, space and causality it maintained its 'potency' to a greater degree than ordinary objects. Beauty in this objective sense is the distinctness of the manifestation of the Idea. An object is beautiful in proportion as one of the Ideas attains a complete and unchecked visibility in it.

The approximation of objects to the Ideas calls the mind away from its individual cares. This redemption is described in terms of energy.

Only so far as this deliverance [from individual willing] is determined by the energy with which the Will manifests itself through the Idea, can we speak of an objective beauty. (183)

Perceptual knowledge in which the energetic impression overcomes colourless concepts is the very opposite of rational abstract knowledge guided by the principle of the ground of knowing. There is a concrete seizing of the living activity of the Idea rather than a rational reconstruction of its image through common traits. Aesthetic experience could never become the Socratic contemplation of the useful as the beautiful. Subject and object positions are cancelled in the pure presence of a form and thus relations necessary for the Socratic orientation towards being are suspended. The forces of nature which had disappeared behind the form of the object are once more revealed. The discrete form of the object fades into eternal form.

The Beautiful - or disinterested delight for Kant - is redefined as delight in the absence of relations to the beholder's Will. All calculation, manipulation and interest is relinquished. One would imagine that the pleasure of this appropriateness in nature's original vitality would produce an increased feeling of vitality, of Gemut. In Deussen's Schopenhauerean account, even the vertigo of the Sublime, which should arouse in man the feeling of destitution, is reversed by this awareness of the ubiquity of the Will.
Feeling himself to be one with everything, 'how could the person who feels this regard himself as absolutely perishable in contrast to imperishable nature?' The pure subject is after all exposed in the aesthetic experience to the purest forms of the vital forces of nature. This suggests the subject reaches here the zenith of its affirmation of existence.

This is not at all the conclusion Deussen reaches. The disinterested pleasure in the apprehension of a pure and perfect Idea, and thus of the expansion of the limited circle of consciousness, is only one aspect of the aesthetic experience. This aspect carries ‘the hue of affirmation’. There is also a more important second aspect grounded uniquely in denial. And in the point is found the intersection between aesthetics and morality.

The aim of morality is the negation of individuality, that of aesthetic intuition the temporal forgetting of it. The positive delight of aesthetic contemplation is to us a warrant that beyond individuality there is not a painless Nothing, but a state the exuberant bliss of which cannot be compared to any earthly feeling of delight. (176-77)

The ‘negative’ aspect is found in the serenity of a pure knowledge free from all willing, individuality and pain. Release from suffering is valued above the ardour of the feeling for life, since this only tends towards the further affirmation of life, and therefore Will. Aesthetically, it is only the Idea of man which can adequately embrace these two aspects.

The ‘unearthly bliss’ precipitated by aesthetic contemplation reveals an important aspect of Deussen’s own principle of negation. On the grounds of this emotion, he differentiates between negation of the Will-to-life and negation of the world. For Schopenhauer, on the other hand, the principle of negation relates to the Will purely and simply. Here he is developing his modal theory of Will by positing that the individual negation of the Will releases existence to another possibility of Being. This mode of Being is for the ego-intellect unrepresentable; that is, it appears to be the negation of the world. However what is concretely intuited in aesthetic contemplation is that the overcoming of the affirmative mode of Will instigates a change in the way that Being-in-itself manifests itself. This allows the metaphysical and radical element in man to be revealed.

It is just that super-individual, blissful, godlike ego, dwelling entire and undivided in each of us, which is transitorily manifested passing from its latent state in aesthetic contemplation and permanently in the
The aesthetic experience in this way supplements the taxonomy of forces outlined in the last chapter. Deussen speaks here of ego rather than energy, but his vocabulary has suggested that a supplementary force added itself to the limited *energeia* of man’s being (his actuality and activity). This changes the mode of Will from affirmative to ‘negative’: i.e. man is released from the ‘natural’ general economy of the Will-to-life with renewed resources.

_Energy and the Hierarchy of Ideas_

Much depends on whether the intuitively grasped idea is of a higher or lower grade of the Will’s objectivity. The energy present in the material manifestation of the Idea establishes continuity between the different experiences of beauty, whether in nature or in art. The differences in energy distribution are once again referred to the hierarchy organising the table of Ideas/forces. The Metaphysics of Nature linked the three different types of causality (cause, irritation, motive) to three types of reactivity or ‘susceptibility to causal influence’ depending on whether physical, chemical, or organic elements predominated in a thing. The same classificatory system is maintained for aesthetic experience. This is done in order to convert the supposedly subjective response to beauty into a universal account of the activity and reactivity of forces. The aesthetic effect of physical Ideas is said to increase the more _intensively_ they appear in the substance to which they are bound. The Idea of gravity appears more distinctly in stone than in wood; a fact of great importance to architecture and its aesthetic effects. The effect of chemical Ideas upon the individual depends on their _extensivity_. Thus: ‘The feelings inspired by the ocean are very different from those aroused by a specimen of seawater in a glass.’ (189)

In the more complex case of organic Ideas, he returns to Kant’s formulation that beauty is conformity to an aim even where the aim remains unknown. In the organic Ideas, Deussen explained how the Will manifested itself as a series of spatial parts and temporal functions which co-operate for the unity of its aims. It is not just their perfection which delights, but also their teleological harmony. The un-selfed soul feels a disinterested pleasure in the appropriateness, the purposiveness of this order, even though it is unconscious of the aim of this form.

Organic beauty is conformity to aim, not referred (as in anatomy and
While plants are restricted to the beauty of form, animals and men are supplemented with the beauty of motion. Grace as an expression of man's activity consists in adaptation of all movements to their aim, 'in the swiftest, simplest and most natural way'. (192) Thus man's activity embodied in the objects he fabricates himself reveals the Idea of man, and not as Plato saw it, the Idea of a table or bed. Art should take as its highest Idea the Idea of man. Thus the products of human artistry, industry and of art, claims Deussen are important in contrast to nature because they exhibit the highest Idea of Man; it is the highest idea because it is only in man that the overcoming of the Will to life is achieved.

Despite the continuity in the aesthetic experience, described above, something distinguishes the creativity of art from nature, i.e. distinguishes the Idea of Man from that of other organic Ideas. Art is capable of isolating the Idea from all contingency and repeating it using all the creative powers of memory and imagination. The aim of all art is to gain a voluntary perception of the Idea in order to frame it and present it. (200) It is not clear whether what is presented to the gaze is the very movement, the elevation of thinking to the universal, or the inundating objectivity of the Idea itself. The only thing Deussen states with certainty is that it is the imagination which accomplishes in art the idealisation of reality. Through the addition of the work of the imagination, nature is supplemented. Thus Art becomes 'more instructive' than reality.

Elevation beyond individuality means leaving behind the phenomenal world as the bearer of all sorrow, suffering and death. When the higher grades of Ideas are the object of contemplation, this type of emotion is said to predominate. For Schopenhauer, the higher grades reveal most completely the essence of the Will, 'whether in its violence, its terribleness, its satisfaction, or its being broken, finally even in its change or self-surrender, which is the particular theme of Christian painting. The Idea of Man, Deussen agrees, is art's 'worthiest and proper theme' since the Will first arrives at a complete unfolding of its objectivity in the mind of man. Yet because Man is the highest level of the Will's objectification, he is also the most obscurely related to his underlying 'metaphysical essence'. Man is the most receptive to casual influences, i.e. man is capable of the greatest intensity of relations with the elements of forces. Rather than arrest his vision at a representation of Man, the artist endeavours to capture the essence
of Man’s Wesen beyond the phenomenality. He contends that the potential revealed when free subjectivity contemplates the Idea of Man is enough even to reverse the direction of the Will, to deny the affirmation of egoistic life.

Before moving from aesthetics to the higher peak of morality, I would like to draw attention to the way in which the discourse of energy turns away from the discourse of the intellectual faculties. ‘Energy’ in the aesthetic experience stands for Man’s increased power to perceive Being-in-itself through the pure objectivity of Ideas. Perhaps we can say that the mitigation of individual willing which accompanies this increases Man’s powers of actualisation. The reality brought forth in aesthetic contemplation, it is argued, is fundamentally different from that of the general economy and hostility of forces organising natural consciousness. The discourse of energy unites all the different forms of art, from architecture to music. For this reason, while Deussen corroborates the Schopenhauerean hierarchy of the arts, he has difficulty justifying the privileged position of music. It is again a question of the relationship between representation and forces. Schopenhauer deemed music to be closest to the Will because it is non-representational. What sets music apart, he writes, is that it alone sets the perceptual forms of the Ideas aside.

[It] makes its way through the ear, past the intellect, immediately to the heart, to unfold as an objective spectacle its revelations directly in the feeling of the hearer. (215)

While all art supposedly leads to ‘perceptual knowledge’ of the Will, music does so through feeling. Poetry and all other art forms are said to take ‘the way of cognition’ in ‘seizing and portraying’ the Will in its Ideas: the very form of objectivity itself. Music does not present particular forms, scenes or events but a complete ‘picture’ of the Will’s tempestuous relationship with the two elements with which it reckons and struggles, the a priori and a posteriori. Above all it is the dynamism and the non-representational nature of this medium which makes it the most perfect mirror of the Will.

The poem is also a dynamic medium, i.e. one with a temporality of its own. While it is classified with other ‘cognitive’ artistic media, the poem reaches far beyond the representation of its functional language. Like a continually overflowing fountain, hearing it and interpreting it contribute to the poem’s continual emergence. The genius of the poet, according to Deussen, is to engage the imagination of the hearer by the aid of various artifices in a manner which is more adaptable to the individual and more
'intimate' than pictorial arts. Although the poet employs concepts, he obliges the listener to extract, by the use of allegory for example, 'the closer and more concrete apprehension of concepts from images, to which he refers, either in place of, or for the illustration of, concepts.' (206)

The poem's defining aspect therefore is that it tries to render visible the Idea from the point of view of 'its pure and unimpeded development'. It tries to seize and articulate the impossible relationship between the thing's becoming and it essential, eternal being.

Poetry, by idealising reality, writes in a whole that which in life appears as fragmentary, therefore bringing together that which in reality is separated by time and space. (209)

In its idealising movement, the poem reveals a world of eternal forms that are otherwise obscured by the imperfect debris of phenomena. It thereby elevates subjectivity beyond the Will's instrumental nexus of cause and effect, uncovering another way of being. The aesthetic experience seems to attest to this movement of thinking, the elevation to the pure will-less subjectivity of knowledge, as a universal capability.

This dynamic, quasi-musical view of poetry assists Deussen's translation of the Upanishads which themselves fall between poetry and music as a means of philosophical expression. There he is confronted with language as the opening where things appear, or rather are disclosed, in a way that is not representational. The Upanishads blur the established categories of philosophical discourse and aesthetic expression in several ways. Before they were transcribed as a text, the Upanishads were sung. As chants and incantations, they ascribed intense significance to the use of meter and the pronunciation of the syllables, e.g. the 'sacred' syllable Aum/ Om. In addition to their conceptual and cognitive 'artistic' content, the Upanishads are also extremely technical, and contain many unusual performative and gestural aspects and meditational and mnemonic devices. That is, as an artistic and discursive form, they fall outside of the European tradition. Deussen's view of the dynamical mode of music and poetry as an 'intimate' expression of the Ideas and the Will permitted him to approach the Upanishads without many of the prejudices of their previous translators and to decipher their underlying Idealism as he interpreted it.

Another concept which crosses over from his aesthetic philosophy to his comparative
and translation work is the idea of the 'unconscious metaphysician'. The artist, he suggests, possesses an awareness of the true status and value of phenomenal forms. He is conscious that the products of consciousness belong to a vacillating order and have only provisionally suspended validity as reality. Because the presence of objects also reveals an absence, it spurs the artist on to rescue and restore the Idea.

The Artist not only conceives the individual thing as representation of the Idea, but also proceeds further to infer from the imperfect to the perfect, to restore the Idea from the individual. (181)

Through the imagination, the artist purifies the mixture of partial objects, germinal entities and petrified fragments that constitute the chaotic flux of matter. The artwork gathers the fragments of existence into the Ideas, rescued and restored from the debris of time. In contradistinction to the memory, 'the storehouse of Reason' or the web of the Understanding, the imagination detaches representations from their spatial, temporal and causal relations, and isolates these 'from their connection with reality and its control. In other words, art releases all the abstract superfluity of other types of knowledge by abolishing the individual in the knowing subject. Thus the artist is said to be an 'unconscious metaphysician' who intuitively understands the 'half-uttered words of nature'. (182) This permits Deussen to legitimise the project of rescuing metaphysics from what others had rejected as 'mythical' systems. As regards the 'unconscious' part, the metaphor that Schopenhauer uses to describe the artist in this sense is one that Deussen employs repeatedly in the *Universal History*: 'The artist lets us peer into the world through his eyes'.

Yet ultimately the elevation of man's *energeia* or way of being in aesthetic experience is only a transitory state. Man is seen as lacking the strength to dwell beyond the ego for long, to maintain the position of Atlas. The function of art is unveiling and interpreting the innermost being of the world: beyond this the artist cannot go. Oscillating between phenomena and perceptual forms to describe man's exceptional aesthetic knowledge, Deussen now refers to the swaying of consciousness between sleeping and waking states. Having attained a suspension of the commerce and commotion of the empirical world through either nature or art:

The beholder awakes like a captive who, slumbering in his dungeon, dreamt of freedom. He is granted a satisfaction without measure, not
by the fulfilment of wishes, but by the temporary removal of the entire possibility of such. (218)

The metaphysics of the beautiful which has been superadded to the metaphysics of nature now indicates the necessity of a final supplement.

8. The Transcendental Standpoint: (V) The Metaphysics of Morality

At the end of this final section, the reader is put in the position of a lone traveller who, having ascended a granite mountain, is surveying the terrain beneath him. The path of metaphysics has taken him through the ‘firm and rocky ground of experience’ to the first mountain peak. From the vantage point of the Metaphysics of Nature, it is possible to recognise the unity of all being and how this one Will is distributed below as the infinite variety of the world. (317) From the second summit -the Metaphysics of Beauty- the traveller contemplates the world of eternal Ideas above and their imperfect shadows in nature below. The highest point is the Metaphysics of Morality, but from here the traveller’s gaze turns upward:

Here, if anywhere, we might hope to cast a glance into the eternal realm from which this whole world proceeds as the place of probation and healing. (317)

This moral trajectory repeats the claim made in the metaphysics of nature that the Will evolves until it has reached self-consciousness in Man, as the condition for the turning of the Will to denial. However as can be seen from this culmination, the end point remains elusive. The representation of the hero, with whom the reader is invited to identify, is not extended to reveal the attainment of the eternal realm. There he remains, standing ‘in the spot nearest the light’ – glowing like the final blank pages of the book. He may be closer to the light but he is also surrounded by darkness, revealing ‘the eternal stars [which] light our way through the night of existence’. (317) This is not to suggest that Deussen is a pessimist. His reference to the world as a ‘place of probation and healing’ stands in stark contrast to Schopenhauer’s assertion that the living lead purely a penal existence and that their only solace before death was to attain to an inertial nirvana-like state.

This section indeed takes up the theme of Schopenhauer’s final part of World as Will

* The path taken here is revisited again in the methodology of the Universal History of Philosophy which presents itself as a map of the terrain of the history of thought.
and Representation and deals with the attainment of self-knowledge and the affirmation and denial of the Will-to-Live. However it is also here that Deussen's most radically diverges from Schopenhauer over the question of the freedom of the Will. He rejects Schopenhauer's assertion that man's consciousness is only a delusion. What is more, Deussen sees in this very consciousness 'nothing less than the ever-open path of salvation.' (240) This is consistent with the main impetus behind Deussen's life-work: to prove that negation is in fact positive and that denial of the Will does not entail denial of the world. The Elements of Metaphysics being Deussen's first work, the positive philosophy of negation has only begun to be sketched. As will be seen, this section still relies heavily on the logic of negation rather than an elaboration of the positive. He repeatedly protests that the denial of the Will is beyond all representation, perhaps beyond the resources of philosophy. Exploring the System of the Vedanta in Chapter 3, I will claim that the Indian philosophy of Advaita Vedanta offered Deussen greater resources for understanding this 'positive negation'. For the moment, he approaches the enigma of negation by concentrating on how practical philosophy can operate in the sphere of the ego.

Although the chapter looks ahead, like the traveller taking in the panorama, it also takes in the previous chapters from a higher point on the path of metaphysics. In terms of energy, the theory of the Understanding explained consciousness as the actualisation of only a small circle of the greater potential of Being, i.e. the phenomenal world and the Will as energeia and dynamis. The Metaphysics of Nature gave us a table of the elemental forces in which the Will is manifested. The Metaphysics of the Beautiful showed how the fragmentary nature of the imperfectly actualised thing was superseded by the intuition of the complete and perfect form/ Idea. This was achieved by an increase in Man's energy (a 'spring tide') provoked by art's quest for beauty. The supplement of energy did not, as was evident, correspond to an intensification of the subject's feeling of vitality or Gemüt. It elevated the individual beyond the subject-object relation to a position where it was possible to feel 'the essential forces of being', as it were, in a disinterested, non-egotistic way.

The subject's ability to create the world as representation and the forces' ability to manifest the Will are energetic abilities, i.e. the capacity to actualise possibilities, to 'do work' or to operate in space and time. Once the aesthetic experience is ended, the harmony of the forces reverts to hostile competition to operate in matter. In this section,
the capacity of the subject for the freedom of the Will (to speak in very crude terms) will depend on its denying the affirmative Will-to-life. Firstly, it is recommended that the subject maintain its life at the lowest energy level possible, i.e. without risking incursions in the spheres of other beings. Secondly, Deussen advocates the suppression of the ‘I-making’ and ‘world-making’ ego, i.e. of the desiring subject. Accordingly, the whole task of metaphysics is to show:

...how the truer, better, more real consciousness of the metaphysical order without space, time and causality...comes to light in the three departments of thinking, perceiving and acting and how from these there spring like three stems from one root the three metaphysical phenomenona of Philosophy, Art and Morality (which, if one only understands it deeply enough, coincides with Religion). (223)

These three ‘metaphysical phenomena’ correspond to three functions of the system of physics, i.e. functions which presuppose the reality of causality, time and space. Under this supposition, thinking is empirical and leads to materialism. Perceiving is individual and apprehends things in their causal, temporal and spatial relations to the beholding subject. Finally, acting is egoistic. Since the restrictions of the empirical standpoint index the Will’s interests to individual pleasure and displeasure, ‘all motives for action are egoistic, affirmotive of the individuality.’ (222)

Like thinking and perceiving, acting also can be considered according to two aspects. Deussen points out, however, that ‘transcendental’ actions appear to be externally indistinguishable from the egoistic affirmations of the Will-to-life. The difference lies solely in intentionality. The inward motivations of physical and metaphysical acting are said to be as diametrically opposed as ‘magnetic poles’, a metaphor which also perhaps implies their reversibility. (224-5) While this vocabulary compares human striving to the unconscious forces of inorganic nature, freedom is in fact the urgent theme of the final section. For the question of freedom and necessity, the way Deussen defines the force which opposes affirmative Will-to-life is important. It has been defined in various ways, he writes, as ‘good, moral, holy, Christian, etc., but [it] is more fittingly described as a denying of the Will to individual existence.’ (225) To act from the metaphysical standpoint means to ‘sacrifice’ the limited, individual experience by expanding the ego and recognising one’s self in others. (Ibid) This figurative language refers to a way of being which actualises beyond egotism new relations of temporality, spatiality and
causality. In affirmation, only relations rooted in the Will’s interest are possible. Negation implies the creation of a new set of relations. As the previous section asserted, aesthetic contemplation offers the possibility of the subject re-orientating himself to the mysterious co-existence of being and non-being. It can release in consciousness an experience which is not framed by the time and space of the ego. According to Deussen the moral agent also succeeds in:

...breaking through the barriers of space, time and causality in a practical respect as does the artist in an intuitive and the philosopher in an abstract way. (225)

Art, philosophy and morality ultimately serve the same purpose. Intuitively, abstractly and practically, they present alternative possibilities to man’s natural existence. For Deussen, the most radical possibility they reveal is the possibility of denying the very Will to life. In order to approach this limit of negation, he decodes once more the nature of acting in general.

Embodied existence fills a particular space, as a lifespan fills a particular time and thus every existence is of necessity a limited one. On either side of this existence, space and time extend infinitely.

It is exactly the consciousness of this distinction between ego and non-ego which makes egoism. (251)

Both Man and animal are aware of the ego-distinction but the animal is only subjectively conscious of it. Deussen associates egoism with force (the Idea of man) and with a particular spatialised metaphor: every ego commands a certain ‘circuit’ called ‘the sphere of egoism.’ (259) Although the ego is psychological term, he locates it in all three categories of Ideas identified in the previous section. Thus inorganic bodies possess the place they occupy in space, and plant species greedily stretch their roots downwards or their branches upwards. Creaturely life manifests its egoism over a wider more mobile range. Man’s increased independence from his existence in the present leads him to develop the concept of property and the force to realise it.

But first in man is associated with superior force the conception of property and consequently the capability of possessing. He declares all other beings in nature...as things for his use. Accordingly men have appropriated the whole earth and divided it amongst themselves. (259)

Before we examine the theory of law and natural right which these notions imply, an important aside seems to be demanded by Deussen’s turn of phrase. Man’s force is
directly associated with property, mastery and expansion. It is as if Deussen is comparing colonial expansion over the entire earth to the voracious nature of the unified Will. It cannot be a coincidence that the century in which the philosophy of forces, Will and Will to power emerged was also a century marked by the consolidation, expansion and competition of European nation states and colonial wars. Even latently, the link between spatiality and force is inherent in the rest of the section. On the other hand, it focuses a special attention on the third form, time, as the final barrier between the subject and the Thing-in-itself.

9. Legality and Morality

As regards the spatialisation of a sphere of force, egoism is said to have a threelfold range. (259) It extends to what man is, to what he has and to what he represents. In the first place,

...everyone has a primary right to his own body and his life, as also to the (intellectual and physical) forces of his body and the work produced by them. (260)

The empirical realm individuates energy as the property of individual bodies. This directly connects the right to life with the body and its forces or its work. In addition to this, the ego extends its sphere over ‘a circle of objects’ which it claims as its own. For Deussen, whether the right of property is derived from cultivation or first seizure is inconsequential. In reality, he argues, even seizure demands work (exertion of force) and even the cultivation of a thing is often restricted to taking possession of natural resources. (260) Finally, egoism is not only comprised of forces but also incorporates representation. ‘Honour, rank and fame’ depend on how the self is represented for others and are counted as ‘possessions’ of the ego, however intangible they are.

The finite limitations in space and time of the individual would appear to form the basis of property and natural rights. The right of the individual to his own energeia - whether in terms of his embodiment or the products of his activity – seem to come down to the fact that he competes with other individuals to bring the Will to presence. Right, he asserts, originates in wrong-doing defined as ‘the invasion of the territory of another’s egoism’, whether it is by force or cunning. (262) The ego has the right to defend itself and ward off others. In one sense, in order to define the singular individual, he seems to
rely on the visibility of these rights as reflected in the institutions of law. In his view, the whole aim of legislation is to protect against wrong-doing. It regulates competition on the level of natural, egoistic consciousness. Parallel to the three spheres of the ego, the law forbids: (1) wrong to the body including the ‘unlawful appropriation of its powers (slavery, forced service, withholding of pay),’ (2) wrong to property and (3) wrong to honour. Yet recalling his comment on Plato’s, and perhaps Hegel’s, concept of the state, he continues to insist that law is entirely a social phenomenon unconnected with the metaphysics of morality. The respect due to the sphere of another’s egoism is due largely ‘to convention’. (262)

The point of drawing this conclusion is to reserve the concept of freedom for the transcendental standpoint and moral actions. Freedom cannot be organised by law. It seems to be in order to oppose Hegelian philosophy that Deussen includes a putative theory of the State at this point. Deussen’s theory of language in Chapter 1 linked the development of abstract, instrumental language and human communities. Now he postulates the political community on the lines of a Hobbesian style contract in which subjects ‘purchase’ freedom from suffering wrong by renouncing the practice of it. Such a union of men can never be more than ‘an institution for protection against wrong’. (274) It undertakes purely protective duties: guarding the state from without, from within (the penal system) and protecting it against the protector (a constitutional monarchy). Apart from the cultivation of civility, the state is finally in charge of the only other temporal measure against wrong: education. Whether it is a question of state institutions in the form of the penal code, education or even social norms of civility, honour or politeness, the threat of punitive or overpowering force is the only way of introducing or imposing ‘motives’ on the egoistic subject (the diagram of the ‘disciplinary society’).

While such acts which meet the criteria imposed by the law may manifest themselves as moral, they do not affect the source of motivation. The Law can constrain but never eradicate egoistic pre-determination. The innate intensity of the affirmation of the Will to life is untouched by the calculated benevolence of social law. All deeds proceed from the inborn determination of the Will as its reflection in time, space and causality, ‘as necessarily as from the tree its fruits’. (279) Because of this predeterminism, Deussen deduces that even good deeds which conform to the law are just as worthless and reprehensible as bad ones as long as ‘they spring from the soil of our natural existence’.

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In this view therefore, 'all vice and crime, and honest work and moderate enjoyment of legitimate course of life' must be regarded as egoistic. (284) It is not the act which is bad, he concludes, but the nature of the affirming Will. Since good and bad efforts are equally condemned, it appears to incontestably follow that if moral improvement is possible, it is only by a transformation of the innate character, by a renewal or 'a new birth of the whole natural man'. (The 'innate character' is another problematic concept which seems to refer to the particular force/ Idea which an individual actualises in body and deeds.) There is nevertheless a lack of reciprocity in determining influence between innate nature (Will) and the individual personality (the Intellect). All motives - whether external influence by others, or self-determined resolutions of improvement - have their limits in the inborn character. Motive causes may develop this character in actions and so reveal it, but they can never change it. (285)

10. The Metaphysical View of Acting

What does it mean for the agent to break through the barriers of individuation in a practical respect? In contrast to the external, legal view of empirical actions, 'miraculous' Will-denying actions also appear in the empirical realm, i.e. miraculous because impossible and yet real. (248) Viewed externally, actions are always related to a cause, even if it is entirely dislocated from the effect and thus perplexing to the understanding. The subject is not free because his action is conditioned by a cause beyond him in the past, yet inexorably determining the present. This determinism is countered however by an internal analysis of action to which is added an appeal to the fact of the moral conscience.

If I look inwards, I find myself free and equally capable of willing an action or its opposite. In this consciousness of freedom is rooted the responsibility for what I do or leave undone, the nature of which can give me qualms of conscience. (242)

Turning the gaze inward divests the Will of the form of space and causality, so that it appears only expanded in the form of time. This conclusion from the 'Metaphysics of Nature' is now amended in a crucial way. Here he recalls the three-fold analysis made of a voluntary physical movement in Section III. One gesture incorporated (1) the physical change, (2) the accompanying volition, (3) the Will manifested in it. He showed how the second moment, volition, lies both inside and outside of causality, in that it is 'self-caused' and not referred to an external cause. In this antinomy is located the possibility of acting otherwise. Contra Schopenhauer, Deussen argues that
This consciousness of the freedom of the Will cannot possibly be explained ... (as by Schopenhauer) as a self-delusion, due to the intellect becoming acquainted with the resolutions of the Will first in their execution and before that considering contrary decisions equally possible. (240)

The subject experiences incontrovertibly the coherent relation between thought and action and thus construes its cognitive choices with realistic potential. In this second moment, the self identifies the possibility either 'of willing an action or its opposite'. A shadow of a doubt, a strange breath of air enters the otherwise impenetrable system of the Will. That is to say that although the desiring subject is irrevocably engaged in the field of illusory objects, in the consciousness of a process of selection accompanying his desire, he becomes conscious of a free will. Without referring overtly to temporality, Deussen in fact describes a kind of hesitation which steals something back from the relentless forward-motion of the time of the organism. Hesitation occurs even while respiration, palpitation and all the other silent and invisible functions continue to assert the presence of the Will.

Freedom is defined here not only as autonomy but also as responsibility. Freedom depends solely on the subject's choice to will thus or otherwise at every moment. He pits the recognition of the freedom of the Will as a 'fact' of inner consciousness against merely syllogistic deterministic proofs. As concluded through opposition in the section on the metaphysics of nature, only the deeds of affirmation are necessary while those of denial are free. 'The contrast between phenomenon and Thing-in-itself is finally nothing but that between the affirmation and the denial of the Will to life.' (243) Only time, space and causality separate the phenomenal self from Being-in-itself. The 'knot', as he says, which joins the two worlds is internal to every subject. Deussen admits that these two opposed 'currents' or 'modes' of the Will - one egoistic, affirming, mundane and the other ascetic, denying, supramundane - are often indistinguishably blended in human action. (The inconsequential use of the word 'often' downplays the difficulty of confirming his proposal.) The deeds of denial are just as much incomprehensible as they are free. These works nevertheless 'appear on the stage of this world', even if it is with the hue of affirmation. It is the final and the highest task of philosophy, according to Deussen, to distinguish the two.

As the intellect is an organ of affirmation, the denial of the Will is inconceivable to it. It
is impossible for cognition to reveal whether a realm of non-willing really ‘exists’ in opposition to the world of affirmation, although philosophy postulates its theoretical possibility.

And yet denial must rather be the really positive and existent in comparison with which the great and glorious world is a dream, shadow, breath, nothing. (293)

Philosophy might stop its inquiry here, if it were not for the existence of a series of actions which are absolutely inexplicable by the natural principle of affirmation, ‘being diametrically opposed to this world and its laws, contradicting these in every sense and, as it were, totally unhinging them.”(247) The internal voice of conscience is for Deussen, like Kant, the irrefutable challenge to the necessary unfreedom of the ego-self. Like Schopenhauer, on the other hand, he also points to ‘experiential evidence’ of instances of a change of Will, e.g. the death-bed conversion, adding ‘religious claims urging moral improvement’ to these demonstrations. This reprises his assertion that religion contains the same truth as metaphysics disguised in mythical and figurative discourse.

The essential point is the interruption of the natural empirical consciousness by a radically heterogeneous element. Thus at the heart of morality lies the paradox that:

It seems as if we were drawn to good by a power lying outside of ourselves...and yet that good would no longer be good if effected in us by another than ourselves. (285)

This conundrum stems from his reflection on the relationship between the force manifested through the Idea of Man and the Will which is objectified in it. Again the reference to a power (Macht) brings us back to the terminology of energeia and dynamis and to the problem of the One and the Many or the singular and universal. This cluster of questions is characteristic of any Neo-Kantian thought which rejects the dialectic and Hegelianism. Deussen has argued that each individual organism contains the Will whole and undivided, although it may manifest its own type/ Idea imperfectly. How then is metaphysical acting achieved through the individual? Is the good effectuated by the individual or through the individual?

Deussen deals with these questions in a fundamentally different way from Schopenhauer. The latter insisted that denial, abolition, turning of the Will are also abolition and disappearance of the world, its mirror. Absolutely no positive knowledge
is possible of what philosophy can only express as the denial of the will. It can only be denoted by names such as 'ecstasy, rapture, illumination union with God', but these mask the fact that beyond the denial of the Will 'there is certainly left only nothing'.\textsuperscript{13} The expression of this nothingness is supported by mixed references to Hinduism and Buddhism. We must freely acknowledge, he writes, this truth of the turning of the Will:

\begin{quote}
We must not even evade it, as the Indians do, by myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in \textit{Brahman}, or the \textit{Nirvana} of the Buddhists.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Moreover, the final 'nothing' is qualified by the explanation that it is identical to the \textit{Prajna-Paramita} (beyond all knowledge) of the Mahayana Buddhists, 'in other words, the point where subject and object no longer exist.'\textsuperscript{15} We have already encountered Deussen's argument that the denial of the individual Will-to-life does not entail a negation of the world. In the previous section, Schopenhauer's pessimistic assumptions were disputed using the evidence of 'unearthly bliss' or disinterested delight in beauty. Now the universal fact of the moral conscience is added: in a sense the most fundamental metaphysical element of all, which retains its importance throughout Deussen's oeuvre. The development which emerges around this element is in the search for the metaphysical ground of freedom, which is signified by the moral conscience. From the quotations above, it is clear that this elaboration belongs entirely to Deussen, given that Schopenhauer denies the positive nature of negation.

The ideas Deussen explores here, around the \textit{Macht} (power) of good and man's potential to effect moral actions, anticipate the doctrine of Monergism he posits at the core of Christianity in the \textit{Universal History}. While it is not extrapolated as a key to his own work, I would like simply to draw attention to the concept of Monergism as an explanatory framework for his transcendental perspective on action. In Christian theology, it is often associated with the Augustinian position that human will does not participate in salvation, which is purely a work of God's grace. Deussen on the other hand sees the promise of reconciliation of the age-old conflict between Augustine and Pelagius, between necessity and free-will, between the work of grace and self-improvement, in Schopenhauerean philosophy. (254) Monergist doctrine in Deussen's work certainly centres around divine agency, which is maintained as absolutely heterogeneous to empirical, egoistic actions and yet existing latently in Man as his most radical, supra-human element. In the philosophy of forces of his first text, the Will is often adapted to the Monergistic interpretations. In aesthetic experience, the mitigation
of willing in the direction of life corresponded to a ‘spring-tide’ in Man’s energy, extracting him from the tensions of existence. Now morality is also posed in terms of *energeia* and the ability to actualise, to effectuate non-egoistic way of being. Deussen posits that it is not man’s individual works, his acting or his life that invites the suspension of limited reality of the ego: a complete ‘regeneration’ of man is demanded. This implies that the natural manifestation of the Idea of man has insufficient resources of energy for supra-individual, moral action, and that in the breaking through of the Will the necessary supplement is provided. He does not directly name this doctrine here and also in his later work declines to develop a conceptual vocabulary of Monergism, but it is nevertheless an important ulterior concern of his investigation of acting and non-acting in the practical philosophy of the Vedanta in Chapter 3.

(While the ‘regeneration’ and the ‘re-birth’ of man can be read as a Christian theme of the New Testament, similar ideas are also echoed in gnostic and sufī philosophies which envisage the regeneration of the organs of man in preparation for an elevated and renewed co-presencing of the divine and the spiritual element in man: for example, the generation of ‘new eyes’ through the divine aspect in man to reflect spiritual light. In this respect, Corbin considers Alaoddawleh Semnani (1261-1336) to be one of the greatest Sufī philosophers:

> Thanks to his doctrine, the connection finally becomes clear between visionary apperceptions...and the ‘physiology of the man of light’, that is, the physiology of the subtle organs whose growth is nothing other than the ontogenesis of the resurrection body*.^{16}

I have added this minor resistance to an overly Christianised interpretation of Deussen’s work since, as his *Philosophy of the Bible* will later demonstrate systematically, we cannot straightforwardly accept his use of Christian referencing. This doubt or hesitation will also be prompted below by his discussion of the name of God but has perhaps already been introduced by his attraction to the uncanny doctrine of Monergism.)

11. The Two Springs of Morality

Morality, as Deussen has argued, is the reverse of legality. When the Law looks at the external action, it perceives only the symptom of the moral disposition from which it springs. Morality considers solely the intention, the aim pursued on the basis of the latter. As he sees it, there can only be two springs of action: affirmation or denial. Thus according to the dual systems of the empirical and transcendental standpoints, he
produces a classification of the four types of motive (249):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims:</th>
<th>Springs of action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Another’s ill</td>
<td>malice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. One’s own well-being</td>
<td>egoism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Another’s well-being</td>
<td>compassion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. One’s own ill</td>
<td>asceticism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This classification is in keeping with his focus on the aims and intentions rather than the consequences of moral action. He does not yet recognise the contradiction inherent in his moral teleology, i.e. that it risks confusing the conscious representation of an intention with real origin. As will be seen in Chapter 3, this practical concern with aims is transformed into a more challenging and yet more elusive eschatology. For the moment however, he concentrates on the fact that the Will unceasingly strives after its own well-being since its inner nature is to struggle unceasingly against all restraints. Thus on the restricted, individual level, ‘Affirmation in its entire nature is nothing but willing.’ (287)

Yet some actions ‘miraculously’ contradict this order of things: deeds in which another’s well-being or one’s own ill are pursued voluntarily. What they all have in common, in his view, is a genuine element of renunciation, resignation and denial of the self. ‘We have to recognise as a principle of these actions, a removal of affirmation in which all sinfulness consists, a denial of the Will to life.’ (288) Since these deeds break through the egoistic, empirical sphere, this accords them a ‘more than earthly value’.

To these aims of morality – the welfare of others and self-abnegation – correspond two practical ‘paths’ of negation which Deussen calls the way of virtue and the way of suffering. The path of suffering refers to acts of renunciation and asceticism in relation to the self. The compassionate path which pursues the welfare of others also in fact includes an ascetic as well as a eudemonistic element. In this process, he claims, one always denies or sacrifices one’s own welfare. The path of virtue attains the turning of the Will when the ego adopts the suffering of others as its own. Here Einfühlung, the sensed perception of individual sufferings, is converted into ‘knowledge’. Compassion is defined as ‘the appropriation of another’s suffering by knowledge.’ (297) This choice of vocabulary is intended to confirm the transition from empirical to transcendental consciousness.
Thus despite negation being unconceivable to the intellect, suffering emerges in all cases as the ‘the great guide to salvation’.

In the first case, it is the known suffering of another which becomes as compassion the source of all virtue. In the other, it is the felt suffering of ourselves which breaks at last even the hardest Will.(292)

The ‘Metaphysics of Nature’ traced the root of all pain to the hindrance of willing, given that the body itself is only objectified Will. Hence theoretically, the more vehemently the Will is expressed in an individual, the more intensely the hindrance is felt, and the harder is this second path. Yet Deussen declares that the tribulations of an individual may lead him to a ‘knowledge of the nothingness and suffering of existence,’ and therefore to prefer ‘that not-being which is only attainable by denial’.(308) Turning against the Will-to-life, the pain caused by obstacles to the ego disappears. The Upanishads compare this state to the continued rotation of the potter’s wheel after the vessel is removed. When the body is free from willing, ‘even physical pain will be felt only as a faint echo’. (306)

Curiously, these explanations tend to emphasise the fact that compassionate and ascetic actions still belong to an egoistic general economy. They are even measured in terms of material suffering. In Deussen’s terms, this is morality ‘seen from the outside’. It is strictly in the fact that the ego is now changed by ‘knowledge’ that this morality differs from affirmation. In externalised morality, he writes:

This egoism is no longer an individual one, restricted to the sphere of the empirical and limited ego, but one which expands itself over our neighbour, over our fellow-creatures and lastly over all being.(295)

In moral action, there is no sense of ego-consciousness outside of the action. It is thus also a Non-Dual action, in which for example the subject-object relation is suspended. There is a loss of all tension and dualistic effort, a relaxation of the whole being. The get-outaries of the ego-self, which distinguishes self from others, would simply dissolve as the mind was realised to be not something separate from the world but a ‘focal point’ of the world. In Deussen’s system, this is the deepest comprehension of transcendental action that is attainable by the intellect.

For the final time, he refers to Indian philosophy to justify this claim. The achievement
of this conception of 'holiness' – as an egoism which recognises itself in others – he attributes to Indian philosophers. He quotes from the *Dharma* (Laws) of Manu: 'Recognising himself in all beings and all beings in his own self, he, kindling the sacrifice to self alone, enters into absolute freedom.'(296) Every striving against one's own nature without an egoistic motive attests to a kind of asceticism. This condition can be fulfilled in any situation or position. The *Manavadharmasastra* states:

The asceticism of the learned class is knowledge, the asceticism of the military class is protection, the asceticism of the merchant class is labour, the asceticism of the shudra class is service. (303)

The defence of asceticism that this citation confirms, relates not to cruelty or suffering but is associated solely with the 'spring of morality' from which the action originates. The essential elements of self-sacrifice and the expansive transformation of the ego through suffering can be practised, it seems, in all the activities of men. It will be remarked that the idea of 'ennobling' mankind through ascetic practise is absolutely contrary to Nietzsche's project of affirmation. Nietzsche directly critiques the implications of this doctrine in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, where even the labour of science and technology and the busy-ness of the modern world are traced to the ascetic ideal and its hostility to life.

Compassion as 'knowledge', as Deussen expresses it, is 'recognising one's self in all living beings, as teach the Indians, in feeling their suffering...,' -something which also entails- '...assisting in its alleviation by deeds of virtue.' (303) It is knowing and acting. Compassion in the 'practical and not poetical sense' which Deussen uses is inexplicable in empirical consciousness since it is a metaphysical phenomenon.

*Compassion* removes *practically* and *unconsciously* the barriers of space fixed between ego and non-ego, just as the philosopher removes them by abstract knowledge, the artist by immediate intuition. (297: *emphasis added*)

The dissolution of the intuition of spatial form in compassion where 'the ego is expanded by transcendental knowledge' is now made the condition of possibility of

* It is an accepted fact that Nietzsche himself 'discovered' the *Manudharmasutra* in French translation in Spring 1888. (Cf. Smith, 2004, p.39.) In Nietzsche's letter to Koselitz (31 May 1888), he writes: 'I confess to having the impression that everything else that we have by way of moral lawgiving seems to me an imitation and even a caricature of it... even Plato seems to have been well instructed by a Brahmin.' However its inclusion in the *Elements of Metaphysics* provides evidence that Nietzsche discovered it through Deussen as early as 1875. Nietzsche was re-reading the *Elements* while writing the *Genealogy of Morals*, and probably discussed it with him during Deussen's visit to Sils-Maria in September 1887.
three degrees of morality. Either the subject refrains from wrong-doing and from infraction of another's sphere, or he sacrifices himself to help another; or finally he strives to renounce the pleasure principle. This is how Deussen defines the only virtues which are available to intellectual conception: Justice, Love and Asceticism.

The definition of justice refers back to the spatialised schema (seemingly based on calculated selfishness) which aims to prevent wrong-doing externally by emphasising the ego's 'natural' boundaries.

Just is he who does no wrong to another, in that he refrains from breaking into the sphere of another's Will, in giving, in respect of body, property, honour to everyone his own due (suum cuique). (298)

When this behaviour proceeds from egoism - from the fear of retribution, of the temporal authorities or the hereafter, or from pure habit or indolence - its moral value is nullified. When it is practised out of compassion - by imagining the injury, or anticipating the pain that would befall the other - it proceeds from 'the spring of all genuine justice'. In this case, the expanded ego of the just overcomes the barriers of individuation. Nevertheless, Deussen derives proof that the basis of justice is an ultimately unintelligible negation from the feeling of culpability that arises even when one's unjust actions remain undetected by others. This is to say that justice only appears to the Understanding as compassion.

Love, it might have been thought, could not be premised on the same minimal schema of restraint advocated above. Yet philosophy, it is contended, should distinguish between three kinds of love, which in reality are often blended. (1) Eros, or any love dependent on instincts, even maternal love. (2) Philia, the love of friends, 'which makes sacrifices, accepts them and which rests moreover on the needs of communication, amusement, consolation, advice.' (298) As the needs of the ego are a feature of both, Agape, the third type of love, is alone a moral phenomenon.

Agape is stimulated by compassion (the reverse and negative complement of which is joy in another's joy) to aid the sufferer, without distinction of person, a love extending to all that suffers, therefore, of course, to animals also. (299)

This parenthetical reference is the only instance of a reference to joy in the metaphysics of positive negation. This indicates how otherwise Deussen depends in this text entirely, not only on the language of negation, but on negating mechanisms (despite the
unintelligibility of denying Will). *Agape* ranks as a step to denial because it combats eudemonistic striving in order to further another's welfare. This balancing of *Agape* on a precarious point between affirmation and denial is reflected in his comparison of love to the fire snatched by Prometheus, 'a small portion of which serves to sustain the world, while the whole would consume it'. (300) Because for Deussen only the negation of the Will can ennoble humanity, he withdraws from all affirmation, even the qualified affirmation of love. Beyond love, he writes, if a man recognises himself in other to the extent of including enemies hostile to himself, love passes into the complete denial of the self; it becomes the third and highest virtue: asceticism.

Thus asceticism intensifies the two previous steps towards denial, justice and love. Compassion may reach a degree at which the recognition of one's own ego in another embraces all that live, 'so that a man now lives in and for others as formerly as he lived in and for himself.' (301) But his embodied existence continually risks tearing him away from the serenity of this way of being and substituting the illusion of individuation for 'the heights of this knowledge.' The never-quite-conquered ego drives the perpetual struggle to repress the body and its illusory objects of desire. He cannot refrain from mentioning that the repressive measures range from simple abstinence to 'the most fantastic feats of Indian ascetics'. However the essence of asceticism must not be seen in cruelty but in renunciation. It renounces the making, controlling and promoting of egoistic reality. In this sense, Deussen tries to break Schopenhauerean pessimism.

For just as it is the final aim to deny not life, but rather the Will-to-life, so also it is no kind of external work which marks the ascetic, but the inner spirit alone. (302)

His emphasis is on the fact that moral action is totally unconcerned with the result of moral actions. On this note, in his essay on Nietzsche, Deussen writes,

Negation is always ascetic: it is hard and bitter, as Nietzsche wanted it, and if this severity and this self-sacrifice take the form of pity towards others, this pity which horrified Nietzsche so much, it must be remarked that this form has no importance for the value of the action, since the moral value resides not in what it is for others but what it is for ourselves. (EFN, 177)

In explaining the path of suffering, Deussen identified the motive forces of the three virtues in compassion and asceticism. He has argued that, on one hand, every moral deed is an ascetic one in so far as it suppresses affirmation. On the other, the virtue of
asceticism was derived from compassion. Suffering and virtue are however two sides of the very same thing, whose dualism results solely from being viewed by different standpoints. Regarded from within, which as we have seen means regarded from the point of view of an ontology without subject-object relations – from the transcendental standpoint, all morality is denial, its ‘moving spring’ is always denial.

The final question he poses relates to this mysterious ‘moving spring’, the source of the turning of the Will to denial. He formulates it as follows,

By what means is wrought in the Will, the fundamental character of which is the clinging to life, that mighty transformation and turning away from life which is, as we saw, the source of all virtue and holiness, and which is appointed, as last and highest aim, to each of us?(311)

The Will has continually been located outside of causality and deemed to be unconditioned and free. Freedom is the only explanation he sees for the turning of the Will lies in its own freedom, which renders it impossible to provide a cause for the process. (312) If the freedom of the Will is to be anything at all, he writes in a later essay, ‘then [it is] a proclivity of determination of the Will.’ (SS, 21) Yet he himself identifies what is unsatisfactory about this. Freedom from causality is only a negative definition of freedom, yet he insists that the negation of the Will is in fact something positive. To assist in the search for an answer, he refers to the transformation at the heart of Christianity where the turning of the Will, described as ‘the new birth of the inner man’, is said to be wrought by faith. ‘The question is what is to be understood by this?’ (312) In his view, only two minimal conclusion can be reached by deciphering Christian ‘mythology’. Firstly, faith is ‘the sufficient cause of morality’ and (2) it is an ‘intellectual phenomenon’ completely distinct from empirical knowledge,

Indian ‘theology’, he argues, goes further in answering this question. It defines empirical knowledge summarily as ignorance (avidya) and opposed it to the principle of denial as knowledge (vidya). (Ibid) In India, questions of faith are never discussed; but only questions of knowledge. However, we will see for ourselves in his exposition of the Vedantin philosophy that it will be necessary to enter into an entirely other philosophical discourse in order to understand what it means in Sanskrit to say ‘jnana mokshah’ (from knowledge comes deliverance). In the next chapter he discusses at length the distinction between the jnana-kanda (the path of knowledge) and the karma-
kanda (the path of action). For the moment however, he interprets a technical term, vidya (knowledge, as opposed to avidya or Ignorance, meaning ‘Maya’ or empirical knowledge) as follows.

By this is understood the metaphysical knowledge of the unity of being from which flows naturally the annihilation of the individual state, as also virtue and morality, since these are only a recognising of our own ego in others. (312)

Deussen clearly understands this metaphysical vidya as an anamorphic type of knowledge which alters the subject as much as it does the object. The metaphysics of morality are for this reason, not only beyond prescription, as Schopenhauer asserts, but even beyond description. They refer to a complete ‘regeneration’ of Man, which is also to say, a regeneration of the world. As Deussen says, the Indian vidya provides the best doctrine of pistis (faith, proof, trust) since ‘it contains the deepest conception of denial attainable by us.’ (313)

- The Two Traces of the Divine

Yet even this, he concludes, retains the hue of affirmation in as far as it derives the works of denial from compassion, that is from egoism expanded by knowledge which, motivated by the suffering of the world, produces the phenomena of virtue and holiness with necessity. Not-willing remains ‘a speculation of egoism’. (313) For this reason, if ‘the most significant thing be given the most significant name; the most obscure thing, the most obscure name, the principle of denial might be designated by the name of God.’ (Ibid) Nevertheless he dissents from all theistic explanations of this name/principle. Attributing ‘personality’ to this God, Deussen protests, would be to impute to it limitation and sinfulness. Rather, as befits the philosophy of forces he has elaborated, Deussen describes the denial of the will (God) as a power higher than all natural forces.

It is far rather a supernatural power (Macht), a world-turning principle, a something which no eye sees, no name denotes, no concept reaches nor ever can reach. And this Being in the last and profoundest sense are we ourselves. (314)

He returns for the last time to the physical-metaphysical nature of man. One part of him is intertwined with the world’s forces and subject to becoming, while the other part is ‘immortal’. Somewhat cryptically, or precipitously, he says that it is from this metaphysical substratum of man’s being that ‘those elementary forces spring forth which, changing the unchangeable, lead from the death-darkness of sin by virtue and
holiness to the light of denial.' (314) While this transformative event is no further elucidated, it is clear from this statement that Deussen 'in this sense, rejects all synergism' (314), i.e. in Christian terms denies that 'in the act of conversion the human will can co-operate with the Holy Spirit and God’s grace.'

As no sound or gestural language or abstraction can name this power, he finally turns back to the interpretation of experience. The power of the Will's freedom cannot be comprehended in itself but only through its traces, in the same way as Naturkräfte can only be perceived through forms and their becoming ('bodies are force-filled spaces'). The super-individual force, incommensurable with the scale of the ego, manifests itself only as traces 'in our inner being, where they appear in both spheres, in that of willing and in that of knowing.' (315)

In the Will, the divine is manifested as that power which accomplishes the turning to denial. Unsure of describing it, Deussen says that this may happen little by little or all at once. Surely this contradicts the necessity of the empirical character and its motives, but again we are told that this contradiction only means that 'we have no intellectual form by which to conceive it,' but that external observation testifies to its truth (315) In itself, it remains nonetheless entirely concealed from the subjective point of view, operating invisibly and unconsciously. It is impossible to conceive of this transformation and of the 'overwhelming strength of this power of turning'. Here he defers to the imagination to invoke this inconceivable 'power of turning' through the idea of 'force which would be strong enough to stop the earth in its course and to set it in motion in its opposite direction'. (Ibid) The measure of this force is beyond the individual. While this example refers only to a physical force, it denotes the turning of the Will, of which, he says (and here he re-writes the ending of The World as Will and Representation):

... this whole universe, with all its suns and planets, is the mere phenomenon, and which yet dwells whole and undivided in each one of us, and in each one of us will turn to salvation. [Compare: 'But also conversely, to those in whom the Will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is – nothing.'] Ultimately, it seems that the proof of divine traces in willing Deussen offers here consists of little more than the 'observation' of altruism and self-sacrifice in others. In this account, the strongest argument to emerge concerns the unknownness of this supernatural power,
incommensurable and indomitable by human *energeia*. For this reason, his search for this universal, immortal part extends into the *Vedanta* and the *Universal History*.

The same is true for the second trace of the divine which is found in knowledge and which is also a supplement to the intellect’s ways of simplifying the dim, massive complexity of our feelings for the universe. This ‘knowledge’ in fact manifests itself as conscience. Freedom, the possibility of another mode of existing, is deduced here by the irruption of ‘the inner voice’. The ‘voice of conscience’ is a trace of an Other existence, demonstrating in experience that the subject does not exist in absolute congruity with itself.

In his conclusion, Deussen understands this voice, on the one hand, as the voice of a judge. ‘Here it shows itself as that inner voice which sits in judgement, even against our will, on the good and bad deeds, as well of others as of ourselves.’ (316) In the next chapter however he is confronted by the Vedantin view that the voice of judgement is only a mythic aspect of the exoteric doctrine. For the wise who exist as the Veda says, ‘beyond good and evil’, this voice becomes a silent and passive ‘witness’ to the present’s relation to eternity. The changed direction which appears in his thinking on morality, after the Vedanta, is more compatible with the second manner in which he considers this ‘voice’:

[The voice] comes over us after good actions, performed often with heavy personal sacrifice, as that satisfaction with which no attainment of selfish ends, no possession of earthly happiness can compare – as the peace of God which passeth all understanding.(316)

In the final instance the ‘voice’ is transformed into an overwhelming feeling of serenity, which accompanies ascetic self-denial and the elevation of man through the divine, immortal part in him. This echoes the ‘unearthly bliss’ he invoked as the result of disinterested delight in beauty. This is a direct refutation of Schopenhauer’s ‘nothing’ insofar as the end of negation here leads to serenity and joy.

- **Conclusion**

Deussen’s earlier lectures analysed the universal elements of time, space and causality and their corresponding modes of manifestation as matter and the time and space of the ego. In terms of energy, the theory of the Understanding explained consciousness as the activation/ actualisation of only a small circle of the greater potential of Being, i.e. the
phenomenal world and the Will as *energeia* and *dynamis*. The lectures covered in this chapter present a vision of the world as a heaving morass of forces which converge momentarily and then disperse and reform. Hence Deussen provided a table of the eternal forces of nature to enable man to accustom himself to seeing in every process in nature the mutual interpenetration of these forces. This analysis of Will and intellect was intended to lay the foundations on which to build a hierarchy of metaphysical disciplines. Philosophy, Deussen argued, could only break down the barriers of time, space and causality through abstract thought. Aesthetic experience and moral acting however ennobled the Will in man in immediate ways, whether in intuitive or practical respects.

The Metaphysics of the Beautiful showed how in aesthetic experience the ego was extricated from the forces, stimuli and motivations that obey the Will’s desire for eternal presence. This ‘un-selfing’ corresponded to a mitigating of the Will and an increase in man’s energy: a ‘spring tide’. The supplement of energy did not, as we noticed, correspond to an intensification of the subject’s feeling of vitality or Gemüt. It elevated the individual beyond the subject-object relation to a position where it was possible to feel ‘the essential forces of being’ in a disinterested, non-egotistic way. The final peak of the 'Metaphysics of Morality' pointed to a ‘supernatural power, a world-turning principle, this Being we are ourselves in the last and profoundest sense’. Impenetrable to the intellect, this divine power was discerned through two kinds of traces; in the observable case of the turning of the Will to denial, little by little and then all at once and secondly, in the irruption of the inner voice. Thus in the closing sections of the text, the ‘moral phenomenon’ emerged as the most radical element of metaphysics.
3. The System of the Vedanta

1. Background to the Text

Deussen's *System of the Vedanta*, published in 1883, is according to some, his *magnum opus*. Both its content and its reception give substance to this claim. The work offered a unique exposition of Indian Non-Dualist philosophy, and its widespread publication achieved great success in Germany, England, France, Poland, America and India. To an extensive readership, it presented an entirely different philosophical discourse, one based on hymns and cryptic *sutras* (verses or aphorisms, which would have originally been chanted, sung, or committed to memory as an inherent part of their 'reading').

As a philologist, Deussen was fascinated by the material and its poetic qualities. Unique in the literature of the world for its 'richness and warmth', he asserts solemnly, is the passage of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad which describes the conditions of the soul in life and death. It compares the state of deep sleep, for example, in which the travail of individual consciousness is united with the essence of all Being, with 'the falcon, after he has hovered in yon space, who sinks to rest', and with 'the embrace of a beloved women, so the Spirit has no consciousness of what is without or what is within'.(190-191) Having finally reached the highest goal and highest bliss of man, the Upanishad relates:

> He stands in the tumultuous ocean as beholder, alone and without a second, he whose world is the Brahman. (191)

Yet there is often in 'The System of the Vedanta' no time to linger and turn over these gleaming pieces. Its tone and speed, in comparison with later works, is dictated by the weight and laborious burden of shifting so much material from one place to another.

The Schopenhauerean, Monergist philosophy Deussen elaborated in *Elements of Metaphysics* operates now as the ground from which he proceeds to open up Indian philosophy to the West. The work had already been sketched at the time of his Habilitation at Berlin in 1881, but much additional labour and primary sources were added to it later. As an exposition of the Nondualist Advaita Vedanta, it contained much previously untranslated and unpublished Sanskrit material. Indeed he followed it up in 1887 with a translation of the primary source of this religious-philosophical tradition, *Sutras of the Vedanta: the Carika-Mimamsa of Badarayana, and the Commentary of*
The historian of ideas Hans Rollmann sees this text as a ‘breakthrough’ for the study of Indian philosophy in the West. He identified the work as a crucial formulation of Deussen’s entire project, his life’s work.

Advaita Vedanta, as found in its classical exponent Śāṅkara, is witness for Deussen of the unity of thought between East and West, a unity of thought which connects Advaita-Vedanta and the Upanishads with German Idealism and Schopenhauer.¹

This unity of thought, as we have seen, was sketched out in the Greek-German-Sanskrit triads of the *Elements of Metaphysics*. In this book, Deussen has the space to investigate its complete system rather than simply expediting similar ideas in a telegrammatic fashion. His aim, as the title expresses, is to study Vedantin ideas and their interrelationships in the most systematic way possible.

For Nietzsche, it was his emphasis upon this unity of thought that made Deussen’s work so valuable. The opinion of the former was that Deussen’s apprenticeship in philosophy with Kant and Schopenhauer charged his exegeses of Indian thought with many polemical sparks for the Western audience. In a letter to Peter Gast, soon after its publication, Nietzsche wrote

He is a speciality; even the most gifted English language scholars (such as Max Müller) who follow similar goals are, next to Deussen, asses, since ‘they lack the faith’, the coming out of Schopenhauerean – Kantian presuppositions.²

Similar encomia for Deussen and his sympathy towards Vedantin philosophy are voiced in letters to Franz Overbeck in 1887 (‘He knows the Indian philosophy from the inside because of his Kantian-Schopenhauerean preparation,’³), to his sister⁴, and to Von Gersdorff.⁵

At the very least, Deussen removed the cloud of ‘dust and sand’ that clung to so many Orientalist texts, according to Schwab, namely, the subtle naturalising and neutralising of their meaning as allegedly ‘primitive’ or ‘exotic’ texts. Fusing Indian concepts with those of German Idealism had the potential to produce disturbances in the discourse by which the latter validated and ordered itself.
By this time, Deussen has achieved his goal of becoming an academic and was teaching philosophy in the mornings at the University of Berlin. He had been living there since 1880 on the sum of money he had earned as a private tutor. In 1882, he was nominated Privatdozent and in 1887 became a professor. However it was only on accepting a position as Professor of Philosophy Kiel in 1889 that his financial difficulties were relieved by a full-time salary. Here he remained for the rest of his life. Michel Boutout remarks of this trajectory that Deussen began his university career at the very moment when Nietzsche resigned definitively from Basel in 1879. The 1880s were thus for the two friends the very opposite of the previous decade. Nietzsche was engaged in a modest, wandering existence, just as Deussen had once been a tutor. The latter now rose in recognition and notoriety (not least through many impressive interventions at the Oriental Congresses of the decade), as Nietzsche had in Basle. The very different frameworks in which they pursued their work had a crucial impact on the form and content of the writing they produced.

Yet they followed each other’s progress attentively. In Nietzsche’s letter of 16th March 1883, he thanks his friend profusely for sending him a copy of his latest work System of the Vedanta. Nevertheless, after recognising Deussen’s immense labour, Nietzsche clearly rejects the underlying tenets of the Vedanta philosophy.

That’s beautiful old friend! That’s how it should be done: unfolding one’s seven strengths together and finally driving with seven horses to one goal. Much had to come together in one man in order to be able to reveal such Vedanta doctrine to us Europeans; and I praise not least of all old friend that you have not forgotten to work industriously...It is of great pleasure to me get to know the classical expression of this thought-form which is foreign to me. Your book achieves this. Everything that I already suspected in regard to this type of thinking comes to light in it in the most naive manner. I read page after page with complete ‘malice’; you cannot wish for a more thankful reader, dear friend. Accident wills that at the moment a manifesto of mine is printed, which says approximately with the same eloquence, Yes! where your book says No! This is laughable, but perhaps it hurts you, and I have not yet decided if I will send it to you. In order to be able to compose your book, you had not to think about all things as I; and your book had to be made; Ergo...
When Nietzsche writes that 'much had to come together' to achieve this book, it is probable that he is referring to the amount of research in the fields of philology, history, religion, law, philosophy, anthropology, etc. which would have been necessary for the presentation of a 'complete system' from the non-European tradition. His phrase 'for us Europeans' draws our attention to Deussen's translation, not only of the idiom and concepts, but also of the Vedantin way of thinking into a recognisably metaphysical framework. However some comparative philosophers working today, for example Graham Parkes, see the value of non-European philosophy in the very fact that it is non-metaphysical. Finally, it must be noted that much has been and can be read into Nietzsche's Nay-saying in this letter, e.g. Mervyn Sprung interprets it as 'a blunt rejection'. However, caution should be exercised if it is recalled that the Nietzschean rhetoric of 'Yes' and 'No' are complex and ambiguous. In the Introduction to Beyond Good and Evil, he refers to the Vedanta as a kind of decadence that prepares great health: a 'promise across millennia'.

It seems that in order to inscribe themselves in the hearts of humanity with eternal demands, all great things have first to wander the earth as grotesques: dogmatic philosophy, the doctrine of the Vedanta in Asia and Platonism in Europe for example was a grotesque of this kind.

It is possible to get a clearer picture from Nietzsche's later writings, such as Twilight of the Idols, that a consideration of the Vedantin and Indian philosophy played a key role in his analysis of the history of culture and the revaluation of all values. (For example, 'How the 'Real World' at last became a myth.') The reference that seems most appropriate to the current study however is surely Nietzsche's dramatic remark to Overback in 1883:

Deussen's Vedanta work is excellent. By the way I am practically the evil principle for this philosophy.

Sprung would most likely infer from this an outright rejection of Vedanta on the part of Nietzsche. Clearly, Nietzsche viewed this as a philosophy of eternal Being beyond life, with a concomitant instinctive hatred for life and the very opposite of his own philosophy of Becoming and amor fati. However, it would be wrong to conclude that for this reason, he did not take any interest in it. Despite his rejection of the Vedantin position, Nietzsche's divergence from Deussen's view in fact provided him with much material for the works he prepared while reading, and re-reading the System and Sutras.
of the Vedanta, as Brobjer has shown. An analysis of Indian thought remained crucial to his genealogy of the ascetic ideal and to the project of revaluation. Writers like Deussen who first brought Indian philosophy to a western audience were responsible for shaping the way this philosophy would be understood. It remained to be seen how Deussen with his Schopenhauerean education would establish the entrance of Indian themes and traditions into European culture.

2. The Philosophy of Non-Dualism

The word Vedanta refers to the philosophico-religious texts that were appended to the ritual and theoretical manuals of which the Veda is composed. It is comprised of the Upanishads, e.g. Chandogya, Brhadaranyakya, etc., the Bhagavad Gita and the Vishnu Purana. Advaita Vedanta refers to a tradition based on a particular ‘non-dual’ exegesis of these Upanishads. Ad-vaita means literally ‘not-two’. Its foundational doctrine was developed by Badarayana, the second century B.C.E. author of the Vedanta Sutra, a text which is also known as the Brahma Sutra, indicating that ‘its major concern is not ritual, but understanding what the Upanishads have to say about Brahman, the ground of the cosmos.’ The second founding figure in this tradition was Sankara, author of a famous Commentary on the latter work, an eleventh century abbot and proselytiser from the Ghandahara province.

Non-Dualism is a kind of ‘monist’ ontology which states that all that exists is Brahman, the unchanging, ultimate reality. Some theistic versions of Vedanta exist which understand Brahman as a personal God whereas for the branch associated with Sankara, which Deussen presents, Brahman is an impersonal principle. The famous axiom ‘atman is Brahman’ stems from the understanding that everything is Brahman, thus one’s own self (atman) is also Brahman. (As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Schopenhauer’s interest in this expression arises exactly at the point where he is explaining his ‘way in’ as the point in which the physical and the metaphysical self coincide.) All plurality and all becoming are only apparent, not real. As Hamilton articulates succinctly,

This does not mean, however, that it is correct to state that the plurality of the empirical world is absolutely unreal or non-existent. Rather, it is [for Sankara] only ‘conventional reality’.

In Sankara’s most frequently cited analogy, a snake perceived through semi-darkness reveals itself to be a coiled rope on closer inspection. The false sighting is ‘real’ to the observer when it occurs and has ‘real’ effects. The rope remains unchanged throughout,
just as a magician (mâyavín) remains unaffected by the illusion he conjures. Thus the appearance of plurality does have conventional reality even if it is not ultimately real. Proving the unsubstantiality of the empirical realm is not however Sankara’s main point. ‘It is knowledge of the existent Brahman that is the ultimate experiential goal for man.’¹⁶

What differentiates Sankara’s Vedanta from other exegeses of the Veda is its choice of texts. Other traditions concentrate on what is known as the ‘action section’ rather than the ‘knowledge section’ of the Vedas, which concerns duty and the cosmic order: ‘what one should do’. Vedanta postulates that what one should ‘do’ is ‘know’ Being profoundly as Brahman. The ‘One-ness’ of Brahman involves a synthesis of heterogeneities: of (a) the canon of perception and (b) the canon of inference, (reflection/speculation/ethics). Their heterogeneity stems from the fact that (b) cannot validate itself through (a). This synthesis can only occur in a ‘knowing’ of the essential Being, Brahman. Deussen refers to this as a ‘transcendental knowledge’, indirectly opposed to faith. It is his conviction that Indian philosophy has uncovered ‘knowledge’ of the hidden, inner essence of Being, which therefore obviates the need for faith and specifically for the Christian faith in salvation. This is a question he only begins to address in the final section on eschatology. He finally confronts this issue of faith and knowledge directly in 1911, in the fifth volume of the Universal History, discussed in Chapter 3.


Problems of synthesis and unity seem to lie at the heart of Non-Dualist ontology. Deussen makes the transition to these questions by revisiting the notion of Ideas in German philosophy. The book is divided into five parts, three of which correspond to the classifications of metaphysics specified by Christian Wolff, i.e. Theology, Psychology and Cosmology. The final parts deal with samsara and moksa, or transmigration and liberation.

Kant found the explanation for this division of metaphysical thought in the object of the Idea, each category being centred around God, Self or Soul, Universe. Although unpresentable as objects of experience, the Ideas were necessitated by the faculty of reason’s ineluctable interest in totality. For Kant, Ideas had various different functions. They presented syntheses where none were available to human cognition, in order that
the judgements of the Understanding might follow an intelligible and purposeful orientation in their application to experience. In his second Critique, the Ideas also made possible the imperatives of practical philosophy. In the *Critique of Judgement*, the aesthetic ideas allowed the faculties of imagination and understanding to enter a new and harmonious alignment, as the condition for a kind of autarkical creative and purposive activity. In addition, the unity represented by the rational Ideas is complicated by the concepts and purposes of mechanical and organic causality, creating much disturbance, but also perhaps greater potentiality for the Ideas.

As we have seen, Kant's three transcendental Ideas of reason are demoted to 'abstract concepts' by the Schopenhauerean philosophy expressed in *Elements of Metaphysics*. Deussen elevated 'Platonic Ideas' of nature, dwelling on their teleological aspect and comparing them to the 'living organism, developing itself, endowed with generative force'. Like Kant however, he invested them with a unifying function, indicating the pure subject of knowledge as the correlative of the Idea. As postulated in the previous section on 'The Metaphysics of Beauty', the Idea gathered the fragments of the temporal and imperfect thing into the unity of its eternal form. In a radical distortion of Platonism, we saw how Deussen identified forms with the eternal forces which he enumerated in the Table at the heart of the book. As we also saw, he diverged most radically from Kant by claiming that these Ideas are immediately intuitable, by attributing to them the form of being-object-for-a-subject. Ideas may lack the stamp of time, space and causality, yet they are still the 'pure objectivity of the Will'.

Regarding the concerns of practical philosophy, Deussen's evacuation of the faculty of reason as the faculty of judgement concentrated his attention on the rapport of the diodes, subject and object. The condition of 'transcendental acting' is that these two positions must change at the same time because the perception of the Ideas requires an existential change in the desiring subject. The transformation expands the individual ego to comprehend all beings until it eventually turns the affirmation of the Will to life of the individual into a denial of the Will and its ceaseless striving, its insatiable striving and incitements to war.

The framework of *System of the Vedanta* reveals the fact that it is still governed at a distance by the older metaphysical divisions of Wolff and Kant. The Wolffian importation imputed a wider significance and gravitas to the Indian ideas. It brought
them directly into the field of German Idealism and the dispute over the legacy of Kant and Hegel. Deussen's commitment to the contemporaneity of the issues he explored in the Vedanta was immediately clear to Nietzsche. In Deussen's translation of Sankara's Commentaries, which represented both the Vedantin view as well as arguments against its opponents such as the Carvaka Materialists, Nietzsche recognised that

...the clarity of thought of the most modern European systems (Kantianism, atomism, nihilism, etc.) is anticipated already by several millennia (there are pages which sound like the Critique of Pure Reason, and not only sound so).17

The connection between Kantian and Indian philosophy had been established from the beginning, as it were, in Anquetil-Duperron's translation of the Oupnek'hat. He had added an appendix to this Latin translation of the Upanishads which called on the philosophers of German Idealism to engage with the ancient Vedic texts. Nietzsche evidently agreed with Deussen's opinion that Kant's philosophy intersected fundamentally with that of Sankrara. Deussen specifically believed that Kant provided a systematic, wissenschaftlich (scientific, epistemological) foundation to the thought which Sankara had elaborated. As will be seen, the alignment between the Ideas of the Self or Soul, the Cosmos, and God forms the core of Vedantin philosophy. However the comparison with Kant's Transcendental Dialectic must be qualified since we find these themes in constant and uncertain motion between empirical and metaphysical discourses.

Within the framework of System of the Vedanta, Deussen repeatedly justifies his structure by referring to the confusing intermixing of philosophy and theology in the commentaries of Badarayana and Sankara. Deussen projects this distinction onto the higher and lower doctrine (param vidya, aparām vidya) which the exegetes refer to. Yet in the text, these are not kept systematically separated: the Sutras operate as a kind of hypertext. Yet other terms relate them through a principle of negation, as 'the attribute-free higher Brahman' and 'the attribute-possessing lower Brahman' (nirgūnam brahma, and sagunam brahma). Deussen imports the distinction between exoteric and esoteric Vedanta. While he classifies the esoteric theology as philosophy, he asserts that up to this point, the 'full being of the God-head' has not been fathomed, despite the sublimity of the ideas.

Because this was felt, to the theological part of the Brahmasutras is added a supplement, which has as its subject the esoteric Brahman,
and, along with two other (psychological) supplements, is found...after the Cosmology, Psychology and the doctrine of transmigration. (205)

What is remarkable about this problem in the order of thought is that the esoteric doctrine could easily be discussed as a return to ontology from the forgetting of Being in man's relations to the appearances of the world. However, this is not an option that Deussen ever entertains, and this is possibly because of his cautious contestation of the 'materialism, atheism and nihilism' of his contemporary culture. Elsewhere, he calls Empiricism, Realism, and Materialism, 'the perverted and pervasive spirit of our age'(EI, i), which has overthrown religion and philosophy.

It should finally be remarked that Sankara does not, as Deussen notes, utilise the ideas of exotericism and esotericism to distinguish the two doctrines. As this explanation is entirely imported by Deussen, it sometimes seems that he is confused by the relationship between the two and the function of their differentiation. For example, in his conversations with Vedantists in India, he was puzzled by their overtly theistic tendencies since according to his own schema, theism should belong to the lower, exoteric doctrine and yet these beliefs were held by highly specialised Sanskrit scholars and sages. His lack of understanding however should not (solely) be attributed to his own subjective blindness: his work on the philosophy of the Vedanta and the translations of Sankara, it will be recalled, was an entirely pioneering study.

In the concluding movements of the work, it is clear that his attention is increasingly occupied with the positive elaboration of a metaphysics of morality which parallels that found in Elements. It appears that he found in the Vedanta a corroboration of his proof that morality did indeed belong to the metaphysical sphere. It provided him with an even more profound expression of this principle, and not only this but with a wider ontological investigation and application of this understanding – for example, the indexing of the ego to the cosmos as merely the first step in a meditation on Being. I now look at the five parts of the text in turn. As I have said, they are organised around the Ideas of Brahman (Theology), the world (Cosmology), the soul (Psychology) and what I refer to as practical Vedanta, the doctrines of Transmigration (Samsara) and Liberation (Moksa).

4. (I) Theology or the Doctrine of the Brahman

Deussen sometimes refers to this section as 'Theology: the doctrine of God or of the
philosophical principle’. (El, ii) Postulating an equivalence between ‘God’ and ‘Brahman’ recalls Max Müller’s theory that originally all conceptions of God expressed the same Thing, as demonstrated by the homonyms ‘Sanskrit Dyaus Pitar = Greek Zeus = Latin Juppiter = Old Norse Tyr’. 18Deussen’s move is confusing for it nevertheless becomes clear that what he means by ‘God’ is something entirely different from Müller and from the Christian God of the New Testament or the Judaic god of the Old. As he had emphasised in the closing chapter of Elements, God, the most mysterious name of all, must be reserved for the most mysterious ‘world-turning force’.

Another complication arises from the fact that, in the Vedanta, Deussen equates ‘the philosophical principle’ with Theology. This deviates from a general consensus of western scholars that the doctrine of Brahman is an ontology. As Max Müller has concluded,

> The really important point is that on which all scholars agree, by assigning to Brahman the final meaning of to on, to ontos on, to proton kinoun, though even of those terms as we shall see, not one corresponds fully and exactly to the character of Brahman as developed in the history of the Indian mind.19

As emphasised by the descriptions of Hiriyanna and Hamilton, among others, the Vedanta is fundamentally an ontology with the latitude to accommodate theistic tendencies. David Loy, author of Non-Duality, a comparative study of Buddhism and Vedanta, remarks that:

> unlike Buddhism, Advaita is able to find a role for God in Sankara’s distinction between Saguna and Nirguna Brahman. The transcendental Nirguna Brahman (without attributes, completely empty of any phenomenal characteristics) is inactive and immutable, whereas the former [Saguna Brahman, without attributes] is not immanent in the world, but is the world as the totality of Brahman’s self-luminous manifestations.20

The Brahman-of-attributes is often worshipped as the deity Lord Isvara, as opposed to the Brahman reflected in ‘ignorance’, avidya who is the ego-self or jiva. Both Isvara and the jiva-self, Sankara implies, participate in delusion albeit on different levels. At least, with Isvara, the idea of unity is reached and the principle of individuation denied.

The oscillation between conceiving either ontology or theology as the principle of
philosophy disturbs Deussen’s attempt to construct a system. His response, I will show, is to impose a strict division between exoteric and esoteric Vedanta which is not present in the original. There the transition between the two is much more flexible. The difference between the ‘religious’ and the philosophical – a difference impossible to define here, if it is possible at all – is neither regimented nor particularly visible in Vedanta thinking, although of course it was necessary for ritual practice to be rigorously organised and regulated.

Deussen opens with what he believes is an important correction to the popular misconception that Vedanta deals with a kind of Pantheism. Only the lower doctrine, he claims, should be described as Theism, as shown by the following expressions for God: *Isvara*, the Lord; *Purusha*, the Man or the Spirit; *Prajna*, the wise. The higher doctrine on the other hand escapes western conceptualisation: it ‘resists all attempts to include it [Brahman] in the accepted schemas’ for distinguishing between religion and philosophy. (120)

It is important to note the use of the neutral pronoun for Brahman, a word whose etymology indicates a transcendence of personality. It is derived from:

... *barh*, swelling, that is ‘prayer’ conceived not as a wishing or wording (*orare, precari*) or demanding or softening or offering incense, but as the will of man striving upwards towards the holy, the divine.(120)

This etymology of Brahman connects praying, ‘swelling’, ‘*der zum Heiligen, Göttlichen emporstrebende Wille des Menschen*’ with the ‘expanding’ of the ego to include all others which Deussen postulated in the Metaphysics of Morality. This interpretation is a hallmark of Deussen’s Indological work. Müller, for example, reluctantly disagreed with him that Brahman had a ritualistic origin and that from its original sense of prayer, it came to mean ‘he who is prayed to’, the *Urgrund der Welt*. Müller preferred to derive Brahman from *Brih*, meaning word or speech, aligning this with another sense of Brahman meaning ‘that which utters or drives forth (*Prachyavayati*) or manifests or creates that which is the universal support (*Skambha*) or force (*Daksha*)’.21 These two definitions reveal what was at stake for each of the scholars in the system of the Vedanta. For Müller, it was the revelation of the creative power of language, which according to him, had been investigated by the Indians much more than by Greek philosophy, despite or perhaps because of their hesitation to identify thought and
language in a single concept such as the Greek *Logos*. For Deussen, what is paramount is the victory against the illusionary ego of the desiring subject and its release into the Being of all beings.

The striving beyond individual will is qualified in a second respect as Atman, meaning ‘Self’ or ‘Soul’: ‘that which also points us towards our inner life’. The multiple definitions offered of this word reflect the difficulty of translating it into a western concept - despite what Nietzsche says about the destiny of the Indo-European philosophies being determined by their grammar, e.g. their ‘I-making’ tendencies. The axioms ‘Atman is Brahman’ and ‘*tat tvam asī*’ (This thou art) form the core of the Vedantic doctrine according to Deussen. We read in these principles, firstly that there is some distinction between the empirical form of existence and the divine and secondly, that both are yet ultimately ‘identical’. This constitutes the essence of the theology.

Badarayana’s Brahma Sutra, as noted above, transferred the focus from ritual practice and cosmic order (*dharma*) to the contemplation of Brahman. In its first part, it mixes descriptions of the attributeless and the attribute-possessing Brahman. This is because it intends to prove by exegesis that only the attributeless highest self, Atman, rather than the individual self, is the chief addressee of the Upanishadic verses. The scope of Badarayana’s arguments include several discourses on the nature (*Wesen*) of Brahman: the explication of Brahman ‘in-itself’ as the unknowable origin of the existent; as the principle of the cosmos and psyche; as the Soul of being; and as highest goal of man. Deussen continues to pursue these themes, but only after introducing them by a discussion of ‘proofs of the existence of God’. Unlike Badarayana, he also introduces a definite schism between exoteric and esoteric doctrine. Admitting his artifice, he consciously distinguishes the two in a manner ensuring that philosophy or the esoteric doctrine is seen as the elevation and purification of religious teaching or the exoteric.

The significance of this primary theological proof for western readers - as emanating from a specialised, and technical theological discourse - eclipses perhaps the degree to which the Vedanta Sutras formulated an entirely new principle of internalisation of the ritual sacrifice and the divine order. It has even been referred to as a kind of ‘Reformation’. That is to say, that it is not certain that logocentric ‘proof’ of God’s existence is important or relevant to the tradition of Non-Dualism. It might also be said that this particular inaugural move sidesteps the opportunity to begin with ontology:
“the mystery of Being which is said in many ways”, although ultimately the ontological question is crucial to Vedanta philosophy. It might therefore be explained by Deussen’s apparent intention to relegate theological questions to the lesser, exoteric doctrine so that they might be jettisoned by philosophy.

However, the three ‘proofs of the existence of God’ in fact operate as legitimations of the doctrine of the higher Brahman in opposition to the older doctrine of exoteric theism. Deussen recognises them as having ‘a certain likeness to the modern pre-Kantian philosophy’. (123) The closest match is a Physico-Theological proof of an intelligent purpose in the organisation of nature. The Vedantin Cosmological proof is most akin to the Parmenidean demonstration that the origin of the Existent is impossible. 22 ‘For Brahman is pure Being’, therefore it cannot arise as a modification without an infinite regression.(124) This clarifies for Deussen, not only the affinity of the Indian and western cosmological proofs, but also their inadequacy. He believes there is no reason not to conclude that this means the idea of infinite empirical regression was thoroughly acceptable. There is one element of this particular proof however which articulates succinctly the overwhelming idea of Unity which is the essence of the Vedanta. Brahman is the essence of all things because ‘we see that from homogeneity differences arise, for example, vessels from clay, but not that homogeneity arises from differences.’ (124) The origin of being cannot be multiple. Unity and difference are unified by essential Being, which is One in-itself, and in which neither contradictions, differences nor limitations exist.

While these debates seem familiar, the Vedantin ‘Psychological proof’ on the other hand is new. In it the concept of God is blended with that of the soul. (123) Asking ‘Is the Brahman to be investigated, known or unknown?’, it is remarked that if Brahman is known, it does not need to be investigated, while it is unknown it cannot be. Then the Sutras interpret the term Brahman as meaning eternal or pure, as in bahr (to separate). The main proof is as follows:

But the existence of Brahman is demonstrated by the fact that it is the Self (Soul, Atman) of all. For everyone assumes the existence of himself, for he cannot say: ‘I am not’. (126)

This demonstration of the Brahman is also linked to the postulate that Brahman is the ‘Seer’ or ‘Knower’ that cannot be seen or known by the subject.
Despite encountering it as new and unfamiliar, Deussen gives this exposition the Cartesian title ‘Cogito, Ergo Sum’. (127) Since the Self, as expanded Self, the Atman, is the basis of the action of proving, it pre-exists this proof and cannot be denied. Is it thereby known? it is asked. This Self, according to the Carvaka materialists, is only a body invested with intelligence. Others say it is the individual soul, or that it is the omnipotent, omniscient Lord Isvara. Others still say it is the Void, or only the perishable intellect. The conflicting nature of these accounts fails to capture the One-ness of the ultimate reality and leads away from the truth. How can the Self be known?

The response of the Vedanta is to turn to the eternal and sacred texts of the Veda because it is not only knowledge that is at stake, but also a means to salvation. Sankara and Badarayana recommend the investigation of Brahman through the Upanishadic texts and meditation, accompanied by ‘non-contradictory reflection’. (127) This additional specification is necessary because of the Vedanta’s choice of texts. Brahman is not to be found in the Vedic canon of works, it is argued, but only in the canon of knowledge, the jnana-kanda. This opposes the duties, devotions, moral and ritual acts advocated by the karma-kanda, the canon of works. As Loy remarks,

\[
\text{Jnana} \text{ breaks the mutually reinforcing pattern of thoughts, so nondual nature can be recognised; thoughts spring not from my mind but ‘the mind’.}
\]

It is here that the argument for the continuity of the Self is found. The Commentaries state that ‘even when the object of knowledge alters, the knower does not alter, because he is past, future and present.’ (128)

As regards actions, the point of the jnana-kanda is perhaps to not change the basic energies but to alter the way in which they manifest themselves. ‘Knowledge’ as jnana is not organised along the lines of subject-object relations, but the ‘non-dual experience of immutable omnipresent ground’. It refers to a kind of equanimity, spiritual impartiality, regarding things with an equal eye, and which is yet not indifference. Sankara’s critique of the karma-kanda contrasts the non-duality of such jnana, which is free from all distinctions and from any need to act, to karma, which presupposes plurality and assumes that the atman is an agent. According to Lay, this argument fails to consider the possibility of nondual actions with non-differentiation between agent and act. I will come back to this question in the section on Moksha or deliverance, as there is more to be considered than Loy indicates.
The problem of determining what Brahman is in-itself follows on from these questions of proof, since beyond what is stated in the jnana-kanda of the Vedas, meditation and reflection is necessary in order to arrive at the understanding of oneself as not-different from the immutable ground of being. Deussen seems to acknowledge what Müller stated overtly, namely that the question of the relationship between mind and language, between knowledge and concepts is one of the central themes of Indian philosophy in general and Advaita Vedanta in particular. Perhaps it could be said that an unstated critique of knowledge as logocentrism runs as an undercurrent throughout this book. It returns to the surface most strikingly in the final statements on soteriological knowledge in the final chapter. In this section, what must be confronted is that the Upanishads contain many conflicting and contradictory positions, as we have seen in the different understandings of the Self that are possible. Deussen claims that in order to resolve this, the Vedantin scriptures therefore distinguish between two forms of Brahman: In-itself Brahman is therefore without attributes, forms, differences and limitations; and this higher Brahman becomes the lower when Ignorance for the purpose of worship ascribes to him the limitations or Upadhis. (456)

What must be kept in mind as we follow Deussen's path through this philosophy is that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish his version of the exoteric/ esoteric philosophy from the orthodox Vedantin distinction, which as I have suggested is less rigorous. It is important because in some instances it is possible that Deussen resolves the paradoxes and aporias of the Vedanta simply by assigning them to the lesser doctrine or by exporting them to the higher, esoteric doctrine. In this first case, this confers on difficult ideas the status of populist myth and in the second, it maintains that they are either secret doctrines or they are ineffable and beyond human comprehension. This brings the exploration to a halt. This strategy is somewhat comparable to the facility of Schopenhauerean philosophy in distinguishing between the empirical and the transcendental realms. It is rewarding to persist in asking questions of Sankara even where Deussen claims that something is esoteric and hence beyond comprehension.

Thus according to whether the higher or lower teaching is intended, there are multiple determinations of Brahman. The Vedantin exegetes interpret the different sutras as referring to Brahman: now as Non-Existent, now Existent; or as the cosmic
macanthropos; or divinised chthonic essence, e.g. Brahman as primordial light; or even as Bliss and Intelligent Spirit. Whatever allegory they choose, they consistently perform two operations. Firstly, their aim is to prove it impossible that Brahman might reductively designate primordial matter or individual soul. Thereby they refute materialism and dualism. Secondly, they identify these passages as a command to go beyond the indexicality of the language and to ‘think’ the referent of the text as the source of all thinking and acting. The student of the Vedanta must ‘internalise’ the unconcealing movement of the language. For example, this aphorism contains the injunction to think the Brahman as the source of all light, which is not itself a “light-element” such as the sun:

There shines not sun nor moon nor stars, nor shines this lightening, far less earthly fire: after Him the shining One, all shines, from His light is lighted the whole world. (130)

This is the quotation with which Deussen chose to conclude his *Elements of Metaphysics*. Sankara interprets it as follows. All of the known sources of light are mentioned in the sutra: therefore Brahman cannot be among them. However, it can be counter-argued that ‘a borrowing can also take place in the case of things of different kinds, as a glowing ball of iron burns after the fire and as dust blows after the wind.’ (Ibid) Nevertheless according to Sankara, the highest source must be thought of as different from these earthly lights and yet inside the world.

Proceeding with this analysis, Sankara collects numerous descriptions of the nature of Brahman under the wide mantle of the exoteric theology, the Saguna-vidya (doctrine) of Brahman, i.e. the doctrines of the form-possessing Brahman. Each of these is fashioned, according to Deussen’s theory, as an approach to the eternal being by way of worship, and contrasts with the path of knowledge expounded by the higher doctrine. Each particular form of devotion yields a particular, corresponding consequence for the destiny of the individual. The different outcomes which unfold according to the individual relation to Brahman are stipulated by the doctrine of transmigration (*samsara*).

The lower forms of understanding Brahman as an eternal being with-attributes include those given by Deussen in the following list.

Brahman is the all-pervading ether (space, *akasa*), he is the man (*purusha*) in the sun, the man in the eye; his head is the heaven, his
eyes are sun and moon, his breath is the wind, his footstool the earth; he is infinitely great as soul of the universe and infinitely small as the soul in us; he is in particular the Isvara, the personal God, distributing justly reward and punishment according to the deeds of man. (El, ii)

He interprets these purely as prayers and personal devotions. In this, he is perhaps rather hastily reducing these Vedic citations to their literal meaning in order to exhibit them as facets of the exoteric doctrine. This semantic interpretation would be contrary to the exegetical method exemplified above, where Sankara denies that ‘the source of light’ must be understood literally. Deussen contends that ‘the metaphysical truth is for the few ones, rare in all times and countries who are able to understand it.’ (El, ii) For all others, the external popular or mythical form of religion is sufficient, in which devotion rather than knowledge is the principle.

Unequivocally however, it seems to Deussen that the invocation of the deity Isvara, as lord and judge, indicates an exoteric petition. As mentioned above, Deussen repeatedly emphasises that the conception of God as a personal being, Isvara, belongs to the exoteric and popular religion and does not lead to knowledge in the esoteric, and philosophical sense. In summary, his overall analysis indicates that the richly developed ideas of the lower Brahman can be divided into three groups:

(1) Brahman is regarded pantheistically as the world soul. The Mundaka Upanishad describes the sun and moon as his eyes, the wind his breath etc. Brahman is, ‘all-working, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, embracing the All, silent, ungrieved.’ (458) That is to say, Deussen writes, the pantheistic Brahman is the principle of all action and sensuous perception.

(2) In the Chandogya Upanishad, Brahman is regarded psychologically as the world soul. To the expansive dimensions of the pantheistic world soul, it contrasts ‘the smallness which belongs to Brahman as the psychic principle.’ (459) As the microcosmic soul, he is said to dwell in the city of the body, in the lotus of the heart, as principle of life, as onlooker, etc.

(3) Brahman is regarded theistically as personal God. According to Deussen, this idea is rarely found in the Upanishads and yet is important in the Vedanta. ‘It is Isvara, by whose permission Samsara is conditioned and by whose grace saving knowledge is granted.’ (459)

Deussen reads all of the texts describing the Saguna Brahman as exoteric litanies, which
focus on a particular attribute for some premeditated purpose. In the later chapter, he clearly recognises some of the propadeutic properties of other texts as means to esoteric knowledge. There are clearly 'metaphysical' Upanishadic verses where the referent necessarily resists and exceeds the law of speech. He excludes the discourse of the Brahman with-attributes from this possibility. However, sometimes the content he classifies as exoteric is not unequivocally rogatory, which is to say that it is not simply involved in the karmic economy, as he interprets it, of obedience and transgression, reward and punishment. These verses can equally be seen as propadeutic, poetic, philosophical, imaginative, at least exceeding the functional nature of language.

In the second category above, where Brahman is understood psychologically as the world soul, we encountered the philosophical device of imagining Brahman as the smallest measure, as small as 'the point of an awl'. This is intended to produce a sublime and incommensurably overwhelming apprehension of the vastness of the cosmos as Brahman, which furthermore continues to oscillate between depth perspectives: a sublime apprehension. Brahman is the whole universe and yet is also to be found in its entirety in the smallest point of the heart. This is a technique for suspending both the natural-physiological and conscious-analytical reaction to the Being of the world. These are only individual reactions of the ego in the scheme of things. What Deussen calls the 'religious' doctrine reduces Non-Dual knowledge to a single relation between the subject and godhead. The 'philosophical' doctrine raises or expands (barh) the individual to the point where the 'self' is lost, and its interest is transferred to much wider coordinates.

These are some of the differences of form between the lower and higher doctrines, which Deussen keeps these sharply distinguished in order that the system of Vedanta thought may emerge in clear outline. Clearly, he has identified a dominant tendency in the tradition; the continuous search for the highest understanding of Nirguna or attributeless Brahman. Nevertheless, the Vedantin texts often resist reduction to such binary elements as ritual/contemplative, normative/spiritual, etc., in adherence to the overriding principle that it is impossible for Brahman to become an object of knowledge. This produces a slight tension in the book between the system and what exceeds it, but which seems entirely congruent with the truth of the Vedanta teaching.

The esoteric Nirguna-vidya (the doctrine of the undifferentiated Brahman) stands in the
sharpest contrast to the exoteric cults. Contra Müller's theory of the creative power of language, 'Its fundamental tenet is the absolute inaccessibility of God to human thoughts and words.' (El ,iii) In the scriptures, therefore, the higher Brahman can only be approached by the via negativa. In the classical formula, it is said to be neti neti, 'not thus and not thus'. To Deussen, this expresses that that 'no shape and no idea correspond to the real being of Brahman'. (456) It can become neither an object of experience - 'it is not to be heard, not to be felt, not formed, imperishable' (Kathaka Upanishad), nor the object of an idea - 'words and thoughts turn back from it and find it not' (Taitt. Up.). Deussen explains that knowledge of Brahman's true form consists in the fact that all forms are denied to it. (210) This is in a sense reminiscent of Plato's chora, the formless matrix of all forms that is itself outside space and time.

With the zeal of the philologist, he is sometimes tempted to convert this logic and its expressions into the law of non-contraction in order to produce positive statements to present the 'unknowable' Brahman to the (western) reader. This technique was crucial for negotiating between empirical and transcendental viewpoints of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For example, Schopenhauer asserts that, from the point of view of non-willing, the universe in its infinite extension is 'assuredly nothing', whereas from the point of view of willing, it exists in its full extension and plenitude. This move bases its conception of the Thing-in-itself simply on the opposite of present existence, thereby precluding the necessity for further questions. Deussen seems to draw his conclusion in a similar fashion:

Therefore all objective existence is negatived (sic) of Brahman and only its non-objective existence as the inner Soul remains. This negation of all distinctions in Brahman means however [as Brahman alone is true being] a negation of the whole phenomenal world falsely imposed on Brahman...Accordingly, Existence remains as the sole characteristic of Brahman, an existence opposed to all empirical Existence. (211)

Importantly however in contrast with Schopenhauer, Deussen does not conclude that the opposite of empirical existence is 'nothing', but a different existence, that of the 'inner Soul'. It should be pointed out that the existence, non-existence, mode, or modes of existence of Brahman are ever-recurring questions in the Vedantin tradition, on which there is no unanimous agreement. Several passages can be cited for example, from the Bhagavad Gita or the Upanishads, where Brahman is referred to as 'neither the Existent
nor the non-Existent'. (211) In many instances, the Indian tradition suspends judgement - on the question of the Existent or non-Existent - where Deussen is eager to systematise and round out the argument for the sake of disseminating this philosophy. On the other hand, he does not eschew encounter with these contradictory verses or erratic statements, and in principle includes them as much as possible for the sake of greater thoroughness and breadth in the 'System'. The fundamentally unresolved question concerning ontology in this school of thought thus sometimes gives the 'system' in Deussen's work an experimental quality.

The exoteric doctrine in general imputes to Brahman the positive characteristic of essential Being and defines it moreover in certain passages as Bliss and Intelligence. Bliss, in Deussen's interpretation indicates only the negation of suffering: he can only associate positive dispositions with the embodied subject of the Will. Sankara however insists that Intelligence must be understood positively. Brahman cannot be Existence without Intelligence, for this would contradict the scriptures. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says:

The undifferentiated Brahman is pure intelligence...Intelligence is its exclusive nature, as the salt taste is of the lump of salt. (212)

In this citation, the absolute nature of the Brahman is manifested as Non-Dual because it completely incorporates 'my' consciousness as well. Elaborating on this omniscience, Loy articulates it as the postulate that to experience Brahman is to forget the self to the extent that 'one becomes aware of a consciousness pervading everywhere and everything; oneself becoming fully what one has always been.'

The issue of intelligent spirit continues to confound Deussen, who is exasperated by its status as an idée reçue in Vedantin philosophy and which is therefore afforded little explication. How, he wonders, can we explain the unanimity with which, in Indian, Greek and modern philosophy, Intelligence is ascribed as an essential attribute to 'the Thing-in-itself, considering how weak and frail man's intellect is?' (134)

He connects this instantaneously with the psychological Cogito proof but also refers to it as a general impetus within metaphysics to seek a fixed, immobile point of certainty. Metaphysics must above all seek a firm and immovable point of certainty, in order to attack the subject, and this can only be found in the consciousness of the philosophising subject; hence the Cartesian: cogito ergo sum, and the corresponding statement of our work. (134)
This claim epitomises the decision made by all Idealism. It is this: the unchangeable must be the basis of the changeable. According to Deussen, this conviction is most clearly expressed by the Vedanta in calling the principle of Being, the Atman, i.e. the Self. (135) In the Vedantin search for the unity, continuity, coherency and even eternity that might be associated with the Self-hood of the world, he sees a similar method to the process of elimination employed in his book, where he took his scissors to all the elements of the phenomenal world and subjective consciousness in order to arrival at Being-in-itself. Brahman is reached, he says, 'by gradually separat[ing] from our ‘I’ everything which is ‘not-I’.' The rest is silence, for as Deussen points out, what remains should only be spoken of as ‘unconscious’. But to go so far would remove all trace of the knowledge of Brahman and therefore it can be observed that ‘intelligence’ still remains behind after the process of elimination, namely as the ‘terminus’, which may permit Brahman to remain in the region of perceptibility. As remarked above on the sutra comparing the permeation of the One intelligence to that of salt, the individual consciousness is said to be absorbed into Brahman on the attainment of the transcendental knowledge or moksha, deliverance.

On the question of the intelligibility of perception and intellectual reification, probably the sutra that found the greatest echo in Deussen’s imagination is that of the silence of the sage who was interrogated by a king. He cannot help recounting it at least once in each of the works.

Therefore the wise Bhava, when asked by the king Vāshkalin to explain the Brahman, kept silent. And when the king repeated his request again and again, the rishi (‘visionary’ or ecstatic) broke out into the answer: ‘I tell you it – but you don’t understand it; cānto ‘yam ātmā, this Atma is silence!’(210)

The ‘performance’ of silence by Bhava the sage dramatises, through external personalities, the positions encountered on the higher path of knowledge. The performance expresses fully that the identity of individual self and the principle of Being cannot be thought through the subject/object relation. It also announces a ‘truth’ that turns away from the industrious and authoritative will to knowledge. In the context of the caste society, it is extraordinary that Bavha does not refer the king to sacrifice, ritual or austerity, as would have been prescribed by the older Brahmin priests. He instructs something else: direct self-seeing, or meditation, if one had to name it. The story of this sage represents a thread one can follow throughout the Vedanta which
refers to Brahman as *sakshin* or witness (or Brahman as 'the onlooker' as the English translation has it). I will come back to this again later, as an important alternative to the phenomenology of the subject-object and as a conceptual tool by which to imagine the elusive 'transcendental' being, acting and knowing that Deussen seems always on the verge of addressing.

This tableau remains indissolubly associated in Deussen's mind with the incontrovertible truth of the Kantian philosophy. Invariably he continues:

> We know it now by the Kantian philosophy that the answer of Bahva was correct, we know it, that the very organisation of our intellect (which is bound once for ever to its innate forms of intuition, space, time and causality) excludes us from a knowledge of spaceless, timeless, Godly reality for ever and ever. (Ibid)

The 'world of names and forms' is, in Vedantin cosmology, homologous with the world of *advīya*, or Ignorance. The exoteric popular religion of the Saguna Brahman remains within this word in its naming of the attributes of Brahman. Only silence is appropriate to knowledge without subject or object, name or form. But to lead from Kant's critique of reason to the silent witness, *sakshin* and path of esoteric knowledge is a singular leap. There is a world of difference between the Kantian doctrine of the ideality of time and space and the Vedantin statement that 'The Brahman cannot be perceived because it is the inner Self of all.' (457)

To understand how Brahman is at the same time the psychic and cosmic principle is the key to understanding the Brahman which is described as the Existent, Bliss, Intelligence. Deussen elaborates two major explanations of the doctrine of identity. Firstly the 'psychological proof' of God, the Indian *Cogito*, presents the teaching that Brahman is the inner Self of all and the greatest certainty of all. The self that wishes to prove pre-exists all proving. 'No man can get out of his own Self', writes Deussen, observing that everything that affects us must somehow enter into the sphere of the 'I' and become part of us. In a sense therefore, our own Self with its content is the 'first and in a certain sense the only object of philosophical investigation'. (172) If, according to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishads, everything serves only the purpose of gratifying the Self, then this means for Sankara that it is necessary to ask, what is the true and real Self?

> Here the Indian consciousness is led quite of itself by the word *Atman*
(Self, Soul, God) to find in God our own real 'I', and in a withdrawal
to him the satisfaction which we seek in all relations of life. (173)

What this real 'I' is can only come from a deeper philosophical insight. As we have seen
in *Elements of Metaphysics* by ‘God’ Deussen means the most mysterious of all things.
The thought that everything in the world must be related to the subject, indeed only
exists for the subject, is only the first step in the understanding of the Brahman as
Atman or Self.

It is exactly because he is the inner Self of all that the higher Brahman cannot be
perceived, just as it is said that 'one cannot see the seer'.

He [sic] is not to be perceived because in all perception he is the
Subject (*sākshin*) and therefore never becomes the object. (457)

Brahman is nevertheless beheld by sages who withdraw their relation to external things
in meditation, thereby reaching a state of *Samrādhana*m (perfect, or accomplished,
satisfaction). Lecturing in India, to a ‘Hindu’ audience, Deussen expresses this second
conception of the cosmic and psychic identity of Brahman in the following way:

And here when returning from the outside and apparent world to the
deepest secrets of our own nature, we may come to God, not by
knowledge, but by *anubhava*, by absorption into our own self,
...where subject and object coincide in the same. (IR, iii)

Whereas Deussen understands the exoteric, Saguna Brahman to be perceived
objectively and worshipped as a symbol or judge by the lower theological doctrine, this
path to the Thing-in-itself seems to involve immediate intuition: ‘absorption’ of the
subject and object in Deussen’s words. Naming the state of perfect/accomplished
satisfaction as *Vertiefung*, absorption recalls W. Von Humboldt’s use of this expression
to translate the term Yoga into a European language. It is worth noting that on Hegel’s
reading of Humboldt’s essays, the former recognised that, ‘Therefore we may
legitimately consider what is called Yoga as the general centre of Indian religion and
philosophy’.  

Hegel defined *Vertiefung* as ‘absorption or immersion without content or object’. He
claimed that the ultimate goal of this ‘abstract devotion’ was isolation from the world
and complete withdrawal into the empty unity of Brahman. Halbfass explains succinctly
Hegel’s reluctance to consider this suspension of dialectics as philosophy.

[Yoga] negates what Hegel calls ‘mediation’ (*Vermittlung*), the
dialectical interplay of subject and object, and the creative self-explication of man in history. It aims at immediacy, 'pure unity of thought in itself', involution instead of evolution.28

There is certainly an implicit and unwritten anti-Hegelian tendency in Deussen’s work around the subject of negation and the dialectic. As has been pointed out, he endeavours to show how the negation of Will, or rather the negation of the individual Will to life, is positive in that it uncovers the real Being of the world. This undertaking finds more and more resources as Deussen moves through the cosmological and psychological sections of the Vedanta to the final eschatological doctrine. In the next part, the discourse on the identity of psychic and cosmic Self turns Deussen’s attention again to the ‘unconcealing’ process. The Vedanta, Deussen acknowledges, connects the state of liberation with a cessation of craving, or, as we might put it, of the desire for the deferred supplement. Indeed, in the state of Samrâdhanam, he writes, ‘what might he desire, who feels and knows himself as the sum and totality of all existence!’ (EI, iii) The context and idea of ‘absorption’ and satisfaction is also more fully explained in the section on psychology and moksha, or liberation.

5. (II) Cosmology or The Doctrine of the World

The cosmology is not only the doctrine of what the world is, but also the theory of the origin of the world. One of its main themes is the creation and thus it involves Deussen in a renewed consideration of cause and effect, of forces and (creative) power. This is complicated by the fact that the Upanishads gives numerous different accounts of the creation of the world. In the Taittiriyanâ Upanishad, it is said,

Non-Existent was this in the beginning, thence the Existent arose.
(Tatt. 2.7)

While on the other hand the Chandogya Upanishad states:

Existent only, dear one, was this in the beginning, alone and without a second. Some, verily, say: non-Existent was this in the beginning, alone and without a second; from this non-Existent arose the Existent. But how could this be, dear one? How could the Existent arise from the non-Existent? (Ch.6.2.1)29

However, the flourishing of ‘confusion’ in the cosmological section is, to Deussen’s mind, no more than a deliberate and unsubtle ruse. Frustratingly, it impedes his attempts to sustain the two-fold scheme which he had applied to Vedantin theology. It seems to
Deussen that the Vedantin authors begin by giving a general sketch of the creation and, thereby involve themselves in a series of contradictions which they resolve by appealing to the higher doctrine.

Then [they] go on quietly with their empirical picture of the universe, just as if nothing had happened, while the whole realism on which this picture rests has been again and again overthrown and exposed in all its inadequacy. (221)

The frivolity of this treatment of reality - of the Real, the Innermost Essence - is a scandal, and mind-boggling to Deussen. To act 'as if nothing had happened' when 'the bolt has been pulled back' (Ch. Up. 6), when one has crossed from one land into the next, from night into day, is inconceivable. This reveals a great deal about his expectations of the final liberation, and the ensuing transformation or 'rebirth'. (404)

For explanation, he turns to the interrogation-and-defense structure of the text - its 'highly developed taste for dialectical disputation' - and the deference to the sacred scripture of the Veda. (220) These polemical and dogmatic elements distort the exposition: since important statements are sometimes glossed over as self-explanatory. Crucially, the lower doctrine of creation is treated fully and regarded as real, while at the same time it is repeatedly asserted that the imagistic, scriptural account of creation has only a propadeutic purpose. It is ostensibly a means of teaching the Brahmanhood of the world.

From Deussen's point of view, the problem that results from such inequality in the argumentation is that there is no soaring affirmation of the metaphysical doctrine over the popular, empirical one. The created world of 'names and forms' with its plurality of individual souls is simply posited as another version of existence. This narrative of the creation of the unreal world lacks the sense of a Fall and the urgency of setting the world right again. These are consequences that might well be expected from the Non-Dualist perspective. It is true that later on, once resigned to these contradictions, Deussen favourably compares the Vedanta's defence of external reality to the nihilism of the Buddhists, who allege the total unreality of everything impermanent. He relates their position to Kant who asserts the compatibility of the the relation of empirical reality to transcendental idealism and defends the former against Berkeley.

Deussen aims to prove that the higher theological and eschatological knowledge (para
vidya) are inseparable from the cosmology and psychology viewed from the standpoint of the highest reality (vyavahara-avastha). This knowledge and this standpoint together form 'an inseparable unity of metaphysical doctrine.' This is to say that the understanding of the Oneness of Brahman provides a point of departure for a being, acting and knowing which is beyond the time of the ego and the space measured by the body. On the other hand, the lower knowledge (apara vidya) of God and of transmigration should connect with cosmology and psychology viewed from the practical, empirical standpoint (paramartha-avastha). This is the basis of the popular religion for those who cannot 'raise themselves to the standpoint of identity'. For them, therefore,

The exoteric cosmology according to innate but erroneous realism (avidya) considers this world as the reality and can express its entire dependency on Brahman only by the mythical way of a creation of the world by Brahman. (IR, iii)

Cosmology of the lower doctrine can only be concerned with the visible, palpable, manifest world of plurality. It contemplates man's Dasein within the principle of individuation.

Only the lower Saguna Brahman can be conceived a creator of the world because the act of creation, as the Vedanta repeatedly insists, requires a plurality of powers. Furthermore, no motive can be found for the creation since this would impute a limitation to the All-powerful. The Vedic speculations concerning the 'sport' of Brahman remind Deussen of the Heraclitan game of the gods. (222) The scriptures posit Brahman as both the efficient and the material cause of creation: both the potter and the clay. Sankara often calls the Brahman who is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of worlds by the title Lord Isvara, the quasi-theistic personification of the Saguna Brahman. Pre-empting the section on Brahman as the psychological principle, McEvilly's succinct description is helpful:

This is brahman ... whose body is the finite universe, and who has a supermind and a superpersonality analogous on a vastly larger scale to human ones. Individual souls are part of his soul.30

The individual soul - with the qualities and limitations (upādhis) which determine its individuality - has existed from all eternity and migrates from one body to another for all eternity, unless liberation is achieved. The 'beginninglessness of the migration of
souls' is an important Vedic doctrine, which seems to be retained in the Vedanta only out of devotion to the revealed text, although the theory concerning the plurality of souls thereby threatens to compromise the doctrine of ultimate identity of psychic and cosmic Self. The latent germinal force of the individual is, for Vedantins, inherently Ignorance (avidya), a deep sleep produced by glamour (maya) in which lie those wandering souls, who have not yet awakened to the knowledge of their real nature. (228)

This syncretism of revealed Vedic text and Vedantin commentary is problematic for Deussen. He considers the seed forces, i.e. the different essences and the cycles of return as problems of causality. There is also the problem of the One and the Many souls to be resolved in the postulate of the apparent pre-determinacy of a plurality of individual souls. Finally, this account also raises for him the problem of the creative and causal power of Brahman and the moral problem of evil.

Indeed in the creation myth, there is no question either of an existence of individual souls before the creation, or of a periodically repeated creation.

Existent, alone, dear one, was this in the beginning, one alone and without a second. It conceived the idea: 'I will become many, I will propagate myself'; so it created fire, ...water, ...food. That deity conceived the idea: 'Verily I will enter into these three deities (fire, water, food) with this living Self and spread forth names and forms. (Ch.Up. 6, 2.2-3.2)

The Taittiriya Upanishad gives a more detailed list of the transformation of elements: from the Atman come forth akasa (ether or space), air, fire, water and earth. The Chandogya Upanishad assumes that the first two are already contained in the three elements it mentions. In his reading of Deussen's Upanishads, Thomas McEvilly describes this as a process of condensation. The invisible becomes ethereal, and then more and more substantial. He claims it is identical to the transformation of elements in the metaphysical theory of Anaximander. These elements and substances are all conceived as proportionate mixtures, each one having a preponderant element. While this might provide the explanation for material bodies, it does not explain how the number of individual souls in the universe is multiplied and sustained in dissemination.

1 That exactly the same elements occur here in exactly the same sequence inspires McEvilly to argue that, even if the vectors of influence are hazy, the very least that can be said is that a 'thorough and detailed parallelism' exists between Indian and Greek monism. If any diffusion hypotheses concerning monism were to be made as a consequence, 'it is diffusion from India or elsewhere to Greece that is most likely to be its form, not the other way around'. (McEvilly, 2000, p.61)
Deussen points out that not only is it ‘against the demands of human reason and natural science’ that the material world could be created by an immaterial cause at a singular moment, after an eternity has fruitlessly been traversed, but it also controverts the important doctrine of the ‘beginningless of the migration of souls’. He is full of praise for Sankara’s solution to this problem: ‘Here the expedient of Sankara is very clever and worthy of imitation’. (El, iv) The Vedanta posits that the world is not ‘created’ once, as it were, but that it periodically emanates from and is alternately re-absorbed into Brahman. That is, it posits a doctrine of eternal return. The original Vedic doctrine of the singular creation of the world is completely transformed. The souls and the elements continue to exist potentially during the eclipse and emerge unchanged at each new dawn. The change effectively safeguards the authority of the scripture, despite the obvious argument in the doctrine of identity for an eternal duration rather than a creation of the world. Hence the cycles of waxing and waning of the universe.

It may seem rather strange that the doctrine of periodic emanation and the doctrine of transmigration should be later additions rather than part of the original philosophy. Is not emancipation, the release from the cycle of samsara, the aim of the Vedanta tradition? It is certainly Albrecht Weber’s thesis that the doctrine of emancipation is necessitated by the dogma of migration. Thus as Deussen comments, ‘the destruction of the entire individual …which in the olden time was reckoned as the severest punishment appears as the supreme reward of all endeavour.’ (PU, 340) As we will see in the final section of this chapter, it is one of Deussen’s essential theses that the doctrine of emancipation is older than that of transmigration. As he states in the Philosophy of the Upanishads, ‘the doctrine of emancipation [is] entirely the necessary consequence and final consummation of the doctrine of the atman.’ (PU, 342)

The consciousness of the Vedantin adept is dominated by the idea that from eternity to eternity the world periodically emerges and returns to itself innumerable times. In the Veda, ‘the past and future world-periods (kalpa) are measureless.’ (227) In a different analysis, this verse might indicate the idea of the sublime. That is, it communicates the sense of the incommensurability of creation with the rest of history and that of the creative-force with the deployment of natural forces. Borges describes beautifully how the notion of the kalpa is designed as a technique to present the infinity of the universe as an object of experience rather than an idea, as something which is cognitively impossible. A kalpa is a span of time which transcends human imagination. One should
try to imagine, writes Borges, the time it would take for a high iron wall to be eroded, should an angel fly past brushing a fine sheet of muslin against it every hundred, thousand years. This is the time each cycle of the universe takes to resolve itself. The universe returns to itself as it emerged, and during the long eclipses of time only the words of the Veda remain, which contain the seeds for the renewal of the essential elements and individuals souls. As section IV shows, this endless renewal of the world is a moral necessity connected with the central and most valuable doctrine of the exoteric Vedanta: Samsara.

The cosmological doctrine decrees that a plurality of individual souls have always existed throughout eternity. Their difference does not consist in their derivation from singular ‘Platonic ideas’ or from originally difference ‘seed forces’, but rather derives from karmic works and the limitations, upâdhis, or ‘vestments’ with which the soul is clothed. These consist of the intellectual and sensual faculties and are born by the subtle body, composed of ‘a material finer than particles of dust’. They also contain the seeds of the material ‘gross’ body, the only part that is annihilated by death. These are the only things which do not accompany the soul on the celestial carousel of transmigration. Everything else - even the psychic organs - emanate from Brahman at the beginning of each kalpa through a process of condensation, analogous to the unfolding and immiscing of the primary elements. Everything is composed of these basic substances: the subtle body becomes the gross body (somewhat mysteriously in Deussen’s description) ‘by the addition of homogenous particles from the coarse elements which surround it.’ (259)

Nevertheless the Upadhis cannot be said to have a determinate a priori structure since they modulate continually as a function of one variable limitation: the moral Upadhi. It is because of this, that the Veda states that the world is created anew with each rebirth. Even the body is referred to as ‘a complex of the organs of work (karma) formed of names and shapes’. (272) The destiny of the individual, the qualities and sense of the occasions of his life, his ‘weal and woe’ are all determined by karma; that is to say, they are determined by the good and evil deeds performed in his previous life. ‘Without works, no human life is conceivable.’(462) On this point, there is a very close affinity with the metaphysics of nature in his Elements, which asserted as a fundamental truth, that ‘every man is essentially his own work’. According to this perspective, despite the pre-determination of the empirical character by the needs of the Will, man is at every
moment responsible for his actions and may choose at every moment to turn against the Will to life.

Work is a concept in Vedanta and in Deussen’s metaphysics which is as significant as it is difficult to define. What Deussen calls ‘the practical, empirical standpoint’ (vyavahara – avastha) is also literally translated by him as ‘the standpoint of worldly-action’. It is difficult to know whether to prioritise the viewing (the standpoint) or the acting in this expression. It is to be opposed to the paramartha-avastha, which Deussen indeed translates as the ‘standpoint of the highest reality’.

From the latter standpoint the Scripture teaches the non-existence of all worldly actions by sentences like: “but when all has become his own Self for anyone, how could he see anyone else?” (271)

The former standpoint, it seems clear, emphasises worldly-acting, which seems to mean the mode of acting that reveals the empirical world and not individual agency ‘in’ the world. Instead of referring back to a first philosophy of intellectual certainty about the nature of reality, activity orders and defines the universe at every moment. The karmic order is not only aligned with past deeds, but is also plotting out the world of the next birth. ‘The wandering soul’ is further accompanied by the works, ritual and moral, performed by it during life, and it is just these which prevent Samsara from coming to a standstill. The consequences of worldly-action exceed those of ‘discourse’, that is, the mere representing to the self of action and the understanding of causality. For every deed demands reward and punishment not only in ‘the Beyond’ but also in the form of another existence, sometimes several existences. This determines the infinitude without beginning of the cycle of Samsara. There the Karma doctrine should not be seen primarily as a form of personal morality, but is inherently part of the Vedantin cosmological doctrine. The moral Upadhi, which is determined by works and to which the works cling during the eclipse of the individual life, determines the creation of the universe anew with each new birth.

By influencing the array of soul’s Upadhis or limitations, karma effectively constructs the dimensions of the world-scenography in which the consequences of good and bad actions are played out. The spatial extension of the sense-world is directly the fruit of works. Akasa is not material space nor a medium which things are ‘in’: it is a relational space, continuously defined and transformed by the willing, desiring subject. The ‘I’ clings to these changing forms and reifies them erroneously into things that exist
objectively. Brahman as the ‘space-less’ Thing-in-itself is here a metaphor for ‘something’ which has no qualities.

Space is enjoined on the soul ‘as a burden’, Deussen says. This instance of pessimism seems to be carried over from the Elements of Metaphysics. The economic drive at the heart of the ‘war of all against all’ of forces, is something which he perhaps sees recurring in the karmic nexus of exchange and equilibrium. There is in each case always a supplement, a remainder, which keeps the whole economy viciously or virtuously, automatically cycling and returning. His pessimism is in this case obviously not without philosophical foundation; but it is possible to see the later Nietzsche as arguing or even warning against, not this cosmological form, but the fact that this cosmology is based on negativity, i.e. on the pessimistic appraisal of the world of becoming as a penal realm.

The remainder of karmic works demands a rebirth after each lifetime and a renewal of the creation after each kalpa. When Deussen writes that the only purpose of the universe is ‘to be the place of this atonement’, (268) he is deliberately using a punitive concept which suppresses the Vedic doctrine that felicitous compensation is also repaid on earth for good deeds, sacrifice and correct ritual practice. It seems that, even in praising the valour of this morality, his understanding is dominated by its pessimistic overtones. This is detectable, for example, when he says

I need not point out, in particular here in India, the high value of this doctrine of Samsara as a consolation in the distresses of life, as a moral agent in the temptations of life. (IR, iv)

He does not appear to hesitate over the Nietzschean alternative of seeing in creation an ‘overflowing’, an excess of strength and affirmation, or an event of felicitous chance. A different interpretation is offered by McEvilly. Deussen wants to connect the Vedantin account of creation and the karma doctrine with the lesser, exoteric doctrine. The exoteric theology of the previous section focused exclusively on the invocation of the Saguna Brahman of-attributes and/or religious devotion to the personification of Brahman in Lord Isvara. However, McEvilly demonstrates that it is not necessary to connect the lower doctrine of ‘the standpoint of worldly-action’ with a premeditated, calculated economy of reward and punishment. The ‘healthy human relationship’ of the individual souls to the world soul of Lord Isvara – of which they are somehow Non-Dual ‘parts’ – is Iscara pranidhan - submission to the Lord, comparable to the Stoic amor fati, love of what is allotted by Zeus.133
He describes the similarity in terms of the pantheistic Stoic view that the world is identical with the manifest Zeus. Yet on the other hand, Zeus functioned at the same time, as a somewhat separate guiding principle to the world, a Providential Mind which human beings should relate to with awe, submission, and love. (Ibid)

This allowed for the opportunities of a direct individual relation to the deity as the creator and lawgiver and of understanding the world pantheistically as identical with the Universal Soul. For McEvilly, this also helps to explain the Non-Dualism of Sankara’s lower doctrine.

6. The Higher Doctrine and the Esoteric Cosmology
Deussen is rather inclined to connect Indian cosmology emphatically with incompleteness, that is with its soteriology. The exoteric doctrine looks entirely towards the esoteric: the reality of the world is, according to the esoteric Vedanta, only the means by which the identity of Brahman and Atman, of being and the soul, is realised, whereupon reality is dissolved as is a dream on awakening. The whole reality of ‘worldly-activity’, the whole extension of names and forms, is from the highest standpoint of Vedanta ‘caused, produced and laid as a burden upon the soul, by Ignorance’. (466)

This universe of multiplicity and becoming originates entirely from two factors:

1. the bhoktar (he who enjoys), ‘the subject of enjoyment and of sorrow’
2. the bhogyam (what is enjoyed), the fruit of previous works. (267)

The world is created out of the activity which relates the agent to the past. Now in the transition to the esoteric cosmology, a discourse of ‘knowledge’ and relativistic perspectives replaces the certainty of the fabrication of reality through karmic activity. The division into enjoyer and fruit is true only from the empirical, practical standpoint. It is no longer true from the metaphysical (literally: absolutely real: paramarthika) point of view. For the latter, the whole worldly-action is one with Brahman. The lower cosmology – mythological, imagistic – is purported to arise from false knowledge. It is an illusion just as a snake perceived through semi-darkness reveals itself to be a coiled rope on closer inspection. Deussen is sometimes seized by the possibilities which this furnishes to creativity and the imagination. The simile which best illustrates the
chimerical character of this world, he says, is Sankara’s comparison of life to a long dream. Even the accounts of Pindar, Sophocles, Shakespeare and Calderon de la Barca, he enthuses, are insipid next to this.

And indeed, the moment when we die may be to nothing so similar as to the awakening from a long and heavy dream; it may be, that then heaven and earth are blown away like the nightly phantoms of the dream, and what then may stand before us? Or rather in us? The eternal reality, Brahman, which was hidden to us till then by this dream of life! (El, v)

Sankara sometimes explains Advaita Non-Dualism with reference to the real physiological changes undergone by the body responding to the events of a dream, including the experience of realistic emotions. Deussen is evidently at times enraptured by the possibility of what Being would be uncovered were ‘heaven and earth blown away’. This is the central difference between his philosophy and Schopenhauer’s. At times, this sets him in opposition to Vedantin Non-Dualist doctrine that the ‘non-existence’ of the empirical world is only relative. Of the manifold phenomena, names and forms, the Vedanta states, ‘One cannot say that they are Brahman (tat), nor yet that they are different from Him.’ (Ibid) They are considered distinct but not different from Brahman. This is sometimes referred to as the utilitarian aspect of Vedanta: it helps people to orientate themselves with regard to lived reality. Such oscillation is not easily adapted to the project of systematising the Vedanta.

It seems to be necessary for the higher doctrine to return the interpretation of the creation myth to the ultimate identity of the world and Brahman. The world is maya but, or rather and, it is not different from Brahman or existing apart from Brahman. ‘It is identical with Brahman who appears in the form of existing nature.’ (255) On this point, Deussen’s System of the Vedanta makes a radical change to Sankara’s Commentary. Sankara first of all presents the theological proof of the identity of Brahman and the world and then, as a corollary, ascertains the logical evidence of the inner identity of cause and effect. Sankara’s justification depends entirely on his reference to the Veda. This version of the doctrine of identity is based, as Sankara says, on the sacred texts which declare that change depends only on words. The passage he refers to is the sixth chapter of the Chandogya Upanishad, a passage which Deussen entitles ‘Tat tvam asi – This art thou’.
This frustrates Deussen's attempt to maintain the distinction between the religious and the philosophical doctrine. He encounters the strange fact that the philosophical derivation of the identity of Brahman and Atman, 'the chief position of the whole system of the Vedanta, appears as a mere supplement'. (261) It is an addition to the same proposition previously brought forward on a theological basis, in which Sankara attests:

The effect is the manifested world, beginning with Akasa; the cause is the highest Brahman. With this cause, in the sense of the highest reality, the effect is identical, having no existence beyond it. (Ibid)

Sankara's approach implies a version of the doctrine of the effect pre-existing in the cause. It is a denial of the natural, commonsense law of causality which observes the changes between two separate and discrete entities. According to the interpretation of David Loy, for Sankara, the effect (maya) has a different kind of being from the cause (Brahman).

Sankara's account of causality constitutes part of his more general maya doctrine ...[He] decides that the true cause of all effects must be Brahman, which provides the permanent substratum that persists unchanged through all experience. All effect-phenomena are merely illusory name-and-form superimpositions upon Brahman, the substance-ground.34

Thus we can see that in the Commentary, the identity of cause and effect follows necessarily from the identity of Brahman and the world. However, Deussen argues that the logical order should rather be the reverse:

From the identity of cause and effect follows the identity of Brahman and the world, and not only does this follow of necessity but it is plainly expressed at the end of section p.471, 2 [in Sankara's Commentary]. (255)

The difference is that a convincing 'technical' and logical proof of the identity of cause and effect becomes the basis for the more speculative doctrine of the identity of the individual Dasein with the permanent substratum of Being that persists unchanged through all experience. It seems as though Deussen's view of what 'knowledge' of the higher Brahman should consist of differs from the kind of 'knowledge' the Vedantin sages have in mind. Simply put perhaps, the first kind is systematic and principial: the second is 'speculative', where the identity of Atman and Brahman is not the
foundational archē (first principle) of being, knowing and acting but concerns their orientation, i.e. it is a ‘non-archē-ic’ and non-goal-oriented practice such as that realised by the Vedantin sage who lives idris a’eva, ‘as it happens’. This will be discussed in the theme of the higher doctrine of activity in the final section on moksha or liberation.

However natural it may be, Deussen argues, to conceive of a causal relationship between Being-in-itself and the phenomenal world as one of cause and effect, it is false to view God as the cause and the world as effect. Causality exists only as a form of intellectual organisation and nowhere else. While it connects the phenomena of empirical consciousness, it does not bind the phenomenal world to that which is manifested in it. Between Being-in-itself and the world there is only identity, not causality: ‘the world is the Thing-in-itself as it displays itself in the forms of our intellect.’ (256) Deussen takes this opportunity to refer to one of the Greek-German-Sanskrit triads which has achieved its most perfect articulation in Kant’s philosophy. The same doctrine, Deussen claims, recurs in Indian, Greek and German metaphysics.

The world is maya, says Sankara; it is a world of shadows, not of realities, says Plato; it is ‘appearance only, not the thing-in-itself’, says Kant...But the scientific proofs of it are not in Sankara, not in Plato, but only in Kant. (El, vi)

One of the reasons why the proof cannot be attributed to the Vedanta is directly because of its theistic tendency. In Deussen’s view, it perpetuates the ‘old error’ of seeing God as the cause of the world and then tries to reconcile this position with the doctrine of identity, thereby ‘form[ing] too wide a concept of causality’.

7. The Doctrines of Causality and of Identity

There is firstly, Deussen explains, a changeable element in things (their form, qualities and conditions) and secondly, an element of continuity (substance) which is not subject to this law.

It is only by neglecting this difference and by including the whole complex of ‘preceding and succeeding existence’ under the idea of cause and effect, that Sankara was able to deduce from the persistence of the inner nature of things that cause and effect are fundamentally identical. (261)

This is the point in the system where empirical and metaphysical theories are most
completely merged. In order to move from one to the other, the hierarchy that causality constructs must collapse into an interpenetration in which each event is equally conditioned by the whole and manifests that whole as the only reality in the universe. This is demonstrated by the frequently recurring analogy of the clay:

Just as by one lump of clay everything which consists of clay is known and the change is dependent only on words, a mere name, it is only clay in reality. (262)

So all the transformations of the world are Brahman alone and beyond this have no being.

As the space in a vessel is identical with cosmic space, as the mirage is identical with the salt plain, so that it disappears when we examine it more closely and in itself is not perceptible, so too, the world-extension of enjoyer and enjoyed has no existence beyond Brahman. (268)

If the separate existence of the soul is refuted, the whole worldly action which depends on it and on account of which a plurality was assumed for Brahman is refuted at the same time. Then it cannot be said that the self of empirical consciousness ‘weaves a never-ending death’. (269) If both unity and manifoldness were real, the Vedanta could not claim that deliverance comes from knowledge. Only unity exists, while plurality does not. This statement abolishes not only the empirical means of knowledge, perception etc. but also the Vedic canon of command and prohibition: the action canon, the karma-kanda. (270)

The most important parable on identity occurs in the sixth chapter of the Chandogya Upanishad, which Deussen translates in full in the section dealing with the doctrine of identity. In summary, in verse thirteen, the initiate Cvetaketu is asked to divide in two a fruit of the nyagrodha tree. This tree is in itself symbolic in that its branches grow down into the ground appearing to form a circuit with its roots. Inside, Cvetaketu find a small seed. He is then asked to open up the seed from the fruit to find out what provides ‘the seed of the seed’. The guru says to him that the tree has grown from the subtle essence, imperceptible to the eye, which is revealed by breaking down the seed,

Believe me, dear one, that which is this subtle essence, of its being is the universe, that is the Real, that is the Soul, that art thou, Tat tvam asi, O Cvetaketu! (265)
Vedantic psychology is treated as a particular aspect of the universe. As will be seen, translating the Sanskrit vocabulary of this section with the words Psyche, Soul, Ego or Subject risks diverting the sense in which the individual soul needs to be understood as part of the vast world soul. In fact, in Badarayana's Vedanta Sutra, the psychology was located in a miscellany supplementing his cosmological doctrine. It promised to deal with 'that most important cosmic phenomenon: the soul' in its own nature and its two states: of wandering and liberation.

Deussen has slightly different priorities. One of the most important questions which shapes this section on Psychology is, 'Which part of the individual self is to be regarded as the clearest expression of the thing-in-itself: unconscious or conscious life?' (321) We also find him returning to the question of the potentiality and power of the individual to escape from the limited reality of his ego. In the Vedanta, so much seems predetermined in the life of the individual by Ignorance, Avidya and Illusion, Maya, that it must be asked whether it can be free or not in this state? And depending on what its freedom consists in, how does the opportunity of achieving perfect knowledge arise?

Deussen opens with an image of the cosmos as a theatre. Inorganic nature - space, air, fire, water and earth - is 'the stage in this drama of cosmic evolution'. (327) Organic nature - the souls who have entered into the elements and wander as plants, animals, men and gods - furnishes 'the players who appear on it'. Submitted to the doctrine of identity, players and stage are ultimately resolvable into the One and eternal Being. The previous section explained plurality as illusion, but now the deception is described more as a part of the structural composition of the universe. It is no ordinary theatre of illusions: even the senses, the intellectual faculties, the muscles and nerves of the actors, even their life-breath, belong to the theatre.

In the drama of world-development, ...the elements form both the scenery (stage and wings) and the organs of life the costumes which the actors put on.(326)

One of the aspects the psychological doctrine must deal with is the entrance of the players onto the stage; that is, it must explain how the unity of the cosmic soul becomes differentiated into a myriad of individual souls. Deussen's account allows us to see how familiar psychological questions appear in different form in the Indian philosophy. Many questions that are evoked by the Schopenhauerean principium individuationis
recurr in the Vedantin doctrine of identity and its problem of the One and the Many.

The fundamental axiom of Advaita Vedanta is that there is nothing else besides Brahman alone. Yet as will be seen, the individual souls are neither a transformation nor a division of Brahman. The extension of the world and the plurality of wandering souls, ‘this hybrid which is neither Being nor non-Being and comparable to a hallucination or a dream’, is produced by Ignorance by virtue of the Upadhīs or limitations. While these shape existence for the subject, the Upadhīs do not affect or change Brahman, as the classic analogy put it, ‘just as little in fact as the crystal [is changed] by the red colour with which it is painted.’ The Upadhīs which condition bodily existence have their foundation only in false knowledge which is innate, and not explained further by the authors of the Vedanta. The organs of sense and activity, the mind and the vital breath, the material and subtle body are reifications of the unenlightened state. ‘The whole bodily existence is a complex of the organs of work’ intended to produce requital.’ The cycles of the life of a soul continue to take corporeal form as long as a residuum of karmic works continues to create and disclose a universe for itself. All of the Upadhīs are agents: the five organs of sense perception, the five organs of activity, and Manas, the ‘controlling, central organ’, called mind. When the soul is born in a process of condensation into the elements, it may eventually find itself combined with the organs of the body – the eleven Upadhīs – in a human form. Thus when it arrives, the array of tools which will disclose the world to it is already predetermined by the works it has performed in its previous being.

So too the soul, in its exertions with regard to the organs, Manas etc. is an agent, but a non-agent in regard to its own self. The soul as opposed to the carpenter has not like him limbs with which it could take up the organs, Manas, etc. or lay them aside, as the carpenter with his hands takes up and lays aside his tools, for all these organs belong to the Upadhīs which are attributed to the soul only by Ignorance.

The reference to ‘tools’ emphasises how much the world is disclosed to the subject by his own activity. As tools, the organs of sense and activity construct the environment. Avidya (Ignorance) consists only in the hiddenness of the soul’s true nature by the Upadhīs. The soul by its connection with the Upadhīs becomes an agent and enjoyer, and by these latter qualities its entanglement in Samsara is conditioned, demanding requital ad infinitum. The potentialities, the functions, all these powers are possessed
by the individual debtor or creditor, but not by the One-ness of Brahman.

While the whole of being is said to be found inside the individual soul, the relationship is asymmetrical: it does not constitute all of Brahman. Three things are proved by Sankara in the Commentary, namely (in Deussen’s words):

(i) firstly, the soul cannot be different from Brahman, because there is nothing ‘Existent’ outside it.

(ii) Neither must the individual soul be regarded as a transformation of Brahman, since Brahman is unchanging.

(iii) Finally, it cannot be a part of Brahman, since Brahman is indivisible and has no parts. (467)

One major difference between Advaita Vedanta and other Vedic meditations on the holism of Being is that Sankara goes further than other interpretations in attributing what is said of Brahman directly to the individual soul, rather than saying only what the individual soul is not. In this way, everything established by the cosmology is reprised by the psychology. As Brahman, from the highest standpoint, the individual atman must also be whole, indivisible, changeless. It necessarily exists without limitations or attributes, as pure spirituality or caitanyam, intelligence.

Therefore the soul is, like Brahman, (1) omnipresent, or, as we should say, spaceless, (2) omnipresent and omnipotent, (3) neither agent nor enjoyer, nor sufferer. (468)

If the true nature of the soul lies in these characteristics, it follows that anything which contradicts them is ascribed to it only by Ignorance.

The best explanation Deussen proposes of the relation between the highest Brahman and the Upadhis is the comparison with ‘vessels which limit cosmic space locally’. That is to say that the omnipresence of the soul is hidden by its connection with the body. The limitations emerge from Brahman unchangingly, like the elements, throughout all eternity. Yet as regards the highest soul however, the Chandogya Upanishad states that apart from the connection with the Upadhis, the soul in itself needs no receptacle but in its non-difference from Brahman reposes in its own majesty. (349)

Three stable ‘vessels’ or limitations, unaffected and un-evolved throughout all eternity, constitute the structure of the individual self/soul. These are (1) the subtle body, (2) Mukya Prana (the vital breath) and (3) the psychic limitations which include the ten
powers of the senses and activities, and the controlling organ, Manas, which Deussen calls ‘mind’. This apparatus, this costume possesses of course in addition a changing limitation - the moral Upadhi - contingent on the individual reserve of works. Frequently only those things that return in transmigration are termed limitations, but the definition fluctuates, and sometimes parts of the material body, such as veins and pericardium, are considered receptacles of the Upadhis. (305) Finally, to these are occasionally added external objects and sensation. Sometimes, however inconsistently, nature itself in its entire extension is said to be an Upadhi of Brahman.

The first limitation of the universal Nirguna Brahman in the individual soul is the subtle body. In death, the soul is said to absorb the central organ and its powers along with the seed of the body itself, in the form of ‘the subtle body’. This is purported to be construed of a material so fine that it is invisible. All heat and thereby all energy is understood to depend on this material (which is external to the eternal soul). The volatility of these subtle particles recalls the Upanishadic demonstration of ‘tat tvam asi’, where the nagrodhya tree is reduced to its fruit, and its fruit is split into the seed which when, split in turn, is indicated to contain the omnipresent, magisterial and invisible essence of the universe. The relation of subtle to coarse body remains unaccounted for, apart from the proposition that the insubstantial motes fuse with the elements, consolidate and accumulate mass.

There is a whole hierarchy of ‘veils’ or ‘shells’ enclosing the pure soul in the individual subject. As I discuss shortly, the change in the order of importance of the vital breath, the Mukhya Prana in this hierarchy is unique to the Vedanta philosophy among the orthodox Vedic traditions. The Mukya Prana is considered to be the central organ of unconscious life. In the recurring myth of the contest of the Upadhis for primacy, the quarrel often resolves itself by the admission of all to the Breath: ‘In truth without thee we cannot live.’ (334) The other limitations cannot produce the phenomenon of life.

The external mechanism of the soul consists in the ten Indriyas or powerful ones of the psychic limitations. Deussen refers to these as ‘the organs of relation’ and ‘the system of conscious life’. There are five ‘powerful ones’ of sense-perception: sight, hearing, smell, touch, taste. There are five Indriyas or powers of action: the functions of speech, the hands, the feet (sometimes rendered as ‘grasping’ and ‘moving’), evacuation and procreation. The phrase ‘organs of sense’ or ‘organs of activity’ is slightly misleading as
the Vedanta separates functions from their embodiment. Since the body has five organs of perception and five of action, the soul has five faculties of perception and five of action. For example, the hand is one such embodiment or ‘tool’ of of the powers of the soul. This is reflected in the division of the mortal and immortal elements of Man:

While the gross body and its material organs, such as feet, hands, eye, ear, etc. perish at death, their functions regarded as separate entities remain united with the soul for all time. (469)

The process of emanation and absorption to which the the Indriyas succumb is sometimes compared to the spider’s construction of its web. Or they are referred to as ‘feelers’ which the soul extends and then withdraws in death. As in the previous metaphor, these are also referred to as the hands, or the tools of the soul.

These ten Indriyas are commonly subsumed under the name Manas, which refers to the central organ Deussen calls ‘mind’. Manas is not the soul, but the final shell surrounding the highest seed. He plots his conception of Manas directly onto the Schopenhauerean frame of reference elucidated in Elements of Metaphysics:

[This] on the one hand works up the data of perception into ideas, and on the other by the faculties of action causes what is willed to be executed; it is therefore at once what we call understanding and conscious volition. (331)

This definition follows Deussen’s observation that Manas has various other names among which are terms designating it as the faculty of decision, or the faculty of reflection, as self-consciousness, as the Ahamkara or ‘the word I’, ‘the idea of the Ego’ whose object is the individual soul. (330) The Ahamkara therefore, unlike the highest soul, continues to act and function using the forms of perceiving subject and perceived object. This Manas is deduced with necessity by Sankara from the very fact that a mediating organ must be assumed between the between the vigilant ‘eternal cognition’ of the Brahman and the different states of the senses and faculties. The soul’s attention and non-attention, apperception and non-apperception results from the Manas. (331)

Thus it can be likened to a kind of switch in the circuitry of the limitations. Closed in the waking state, it allows the circuits of the unthought Avdiya (Ignorance) to operate undisturbed. Open, breaking this current, Manas opens onto Brahman as Being as the eternal essence of the cosmos. In concealing the highest soul, preventing it from achieving ‘self-knowledge’, Avdiya is said to interpose itself between the soul as subject and the soul as object. It is all the same whether this appears as subjective intellectual
limitation or objective perceptual limitations.

So far Deussen regards Manas in a manner analogous to the Understanding and conscious will of the subject, due to its directing (or perhaps synthesis) of the organs and powers of perception and activity. However, to use his vocabulary, he finds the Vedantin distinction between the empirical and the transcendental elements of the subject confused. There do indeed seem to be multiple approaches to determining the body’s material organs, its powers and capacities, its gross and subtle elements, in a specific way. He contends that the ideas of the Manas and Upadhis are imperfectly conceived by Sankara. For example, Sankara discusses the mind, Manas in an existential fashion, recognising it as possessing the following faculties:

- the ability to differentiate and distinguish; doubt; craddha, i.e. the belief or the perception of the existence of invisible objects, e.g. the gods, by their effects; disbelief; honour; sexual desire; stamina; laxity; shame; cognition; fear. (331-332)

Such an unsystematic list of facets of the Manas brings the physiological and pathological into proximity with the logical and rational categories of the intellect. It seems impossible to isolate the transcendental a priori forms of cognition in such a miscellany. On the one hand this heterogeneity supports Deussen’s alignment of the exoteric doctrine of Samsara with the theory of the egoistic Will-to-Life. However, it also renders it difficult to argue that the Manas is the ‘way in’ to the vast soul of the esoteric Brahman, so thoroughly does it seem suffused with the Advidya of the pluralist world of names and forms. As will be seen, it makes it difficult for Deussen to champion transcendental knowledge and the mind over formulaic or theistic devotion if the mind is so easily swayed by moods, inclinations and palpable cravings.

In general, the Vedanta separates the whole apparatus of perception from the soul and merges it with the physical part of man. This part is yoked to samsara until liberation through ‘perfect knowledge’ can be attained. In the doctrine of transmigration, we can see that the Vedanta must inconsistently maintain the persistence of the soul in its individual character beyond the dissolution at its death. It would have been expected that, according to the exoteric view, the soul would be simply absorbed into Brahman after the death of the body. ‘Immortality of the soul’ is maintained because the Veda establishes a continuity throughout the arising and perishing of singular bodies,
recognising 'a part of man that reaches beyond the body': his karma, his works. When the organism is scattered to the elements, that which does not fall away from a being is the account of his actions. The fact that the soul is the point where the holistic Identity of Being is revealed, 'is above all', in Deussen's words, 'the metaphysical significance of human action, reaching as it does beyond the grave'. (291)

Deussen insists that identifying the difference between the soul and the different powers of individual mind and body is one of Sankara's most important questions. This is most notably achieved by determining the location of the different parts in relation to each other and to the omnipresent, omniscient Brahman. The powers of the Indriyas are said to suffuse the whole body. The controlling organ, Manas or 'mind' is located, not in the brain, but in the heart. It is here that the soul also dwells, in the closest connection with Manas, which is only fractured by liberation. The fact that the soul in Samsara is not omnipresent, but rather 'dwell in the heart, its size being limited to that of the Manas' is a consequence of the constituent moral, physical, intellectual limitations. (306). Omniscience and omnipotence remain dormant in the soul nonetheless 'just as the light and heat of fire in wood, in which it is hidden and slumbers.' (468)

This soul is the Sakshin, the 'passive, onlooking soul'. Sankara states that activity cannot be the real nature of the soul, since then no release, no liberation would be possible. (307) The Witness is conceived as a kind of 'pure apperception', so that despite its immersion in worldly action, it remains essentially immune and untouched. A discussion of this idea of the Witness needs to be examined in the context of the question of agency and whether the Vedanta differentiates between an esoteric and exoteric agent and the actions belonging to the latter.

Given that Sankara suggests that the 'world' revealed to the subject depends very much on the residue of karma that accompanies his rebirth, this implies that the moral Upadhi decides the strengths and intensities of all others, including even the central, controlling organ. The moral Upadhi seems to be sovereignly powerful in determining the 'costume' of the actor in the cosmic drama. On the other hand the soul, which is identical with Brahman, is said to dwell in the heart and not in the moral Upadhi, the Manas or the 'conscious mind'. Then again, the Upanishads also at time identify living breath or mukya prana as the most powerful part of the individual by reference to myth.
concerning the conflict of the gods represented as the correspondent organs and functions of the macanthropos. In principle, the Vedanta refers the ‘directorship’ over the organs to the co-operation of the gods. The macanthropic body again provides the model on which this harmony is organised.

At this point, Deussen reproduces Aitireya Upanishad’s description of the gods arising from the primitive man, and entering into human being in the desire for a fixed abode. Reflecting the oral transmission of the cryptic doctrine, this form of the creation myth begins with fire-speech:

Fire entered as speech into the mouth, wind as breath into the nose, the sun as sight into the eye, the cardinal points as hearing into the ear, herbs and trees as hair into the skin, the moon as Manas into the heart, death as Apāna (absorption) into the navel, and water as seed into the generative organs. (337-8)

In this account of creation, the soul is originated *ex nihilo* but depends on the ingress of the highest Brahman into the elements. Sankara explains that therefore organs cannot act of their own accord, but only insofar as they are guided by their ruling deities. Though they possess the requisite ‘strength’ or ability to perform actions, they require the gods to actualise their potential.

Inside the cycle of transmigration, the individual-atman-soul only acts and suffers through the limitations of the intellect and sense perception. Folded into the ‘dimensions’ of the intellect, because it is in the state of Samsara, the individual soul is said to be the ‘nucleus’ for the qualities of the limited intellect such as love, hate, pleasure, pain, etc. (311) (By contrast, the *Elements of Metaphysics* considers these affects to originate in the Will.)

This suggests that the complex of organs said to surround the soul is conceived as an ‘in-itself lifeless mechanism’ which needs a special, supplementary ‘principle of motion’. (338) As the soul *itself* is neither agent nor enjoyer, activity is referred partly to the exoteric Brahman, the ‘inner ruler’ (*antaryamin*), and partly to the gods, who are in other respects redundant. The gods play only a subsidiary role. They do not partake in the enjoyment and suffering of the individual soul, who is also the only one affected by good and evil.
The antaryamin is that 'which inwardly rules this world, and the other world, and all beings'. By antaryamin, Sankara means, not the individual soul, but the highest Saguna soul (soul with-attributes):

...for it is his quality to rule all that exists from within; he has the power to do this because he is the cause of all that exists, and in this he makes use of the organs of the beings in question. That he is different from beings is evident from the fact that these beings do not know him. (149)

In this quotation from the Commentary, the Inner Ruler seems to have a mode of being similar to the Will as that which is the basis of all motives which individuals represent to themselves for their behaviour. Yet the Inner Ruler is supposedly not real in the highest sense, but only the work of Avidya which mediated perception of the highest soul by means of ascribed limitations, Upadhi, so that the Inner Ruler retains all the qualities of an individual sovereign. The basis on which he is perceived is therefore still the ground of the separation of subject and object, the empirical means of knowledge, Samara (transmigration) and the Vedic canon. ‘In truth’, writes Sankara, ‘there is only one inner soul and not two.’ (150)

There is a quintessential distinction in the Vedanta between the intelligent (caitanyam) being of the highest soul in man and the whole apparatus of perception, which is united with his physical nature and with Ignorance. This is why it is only an illusion to attribute relational and calculative intellection to the soul. (315) Passages such as ‘there is no seer besides him’ project the understanding of this caitanyam, or sentience, into the notion of the Witness. The highest Brahman as Sakshin is neither agent nor enjoyer: it is the witness of Being. It has neither hands nor tools, as it were: it is pure intelligence or pure spirituality. The concept of witnessing implies a strange ontological movement between presence and absence. It marks a hesitation in experience between an unfolding scene and the potential object of testimony. For above all, when the soul is released from the limited reality of the individual it is said to become the witness of itself as Being, the witness of its own Being.

Therefore, the Witness contrasts with the conception of the Inner Ruler as esoteric, attributeless Brahman is contrasted to the exoteric, Saguna Brahman. What is definitive for the Sakshin is that it is never an agent and has thus been extracted from the state of Samsara: it neither suffers nor enjoys. Given the distance of the Witness-soul from the
rest of the subject, the original animation of the self’s activity is referred to the exoteric Saguna Brahman, who we have also seen appears in the form of the Inner Ruler, as well as in theistic form as the life-giving Lord and judge, Isvara.

It is a fundamental principle of the original Brahman doctrine that everything existing is absolutely dependent on Lord Isvara, who causes both the fate and sufferings of the soul, and its actions. However,

The Vedanta has violated this principle in both directions by referring both the action and sufferings of man to a cause inherent in himself.

(322)

Both are in a sense dependent on the Saguna Brahman, but only in a particular, indirect way. Isvara is only a prime mover insofar as the rain is the common cause of seed growth, ‘because without rain their differences in respect of sap, blossom, fruit, leaf, etc. could not develop.’ (323)

On the other hand, we have seen that the seed of the sufferings and destiny of this life is to be found in the works of a previous existence, which demand atonement. Works are the products of the natural disposition (destructible only by perfect knowledge) to activity and enjoyment: a product of the motives and of the chakti, power or character. As Sankara wrote,

And without the Brahmanhood of the soul having been brought to consciousness by the way of knowledge, the soul, whose nature it is to act and enjoy, cannot reach liberation for it cannot renounce its own nature any more than fire can cease to be hot. (113)

Sankara anticipates the objection that evil lies only in acting and enjoying ‘as effect’ (in actuality), not in their potentiality, so that liberation is possible even while potentiality remains in existence as long as ‘the effect’ (the actual deed) is avoided. (Deussen renders the Sanskrit word chakti as potentiality or sometimes power, to which he also adds parenthetically, ‘chakti (that is, the will)’. (Ibid)) Nevertheless, Sankara denies categorically that liberation can be achieved in this way. Once the potentiality endures, he argues that it cannot possibly be prevented from producing its effect. It cannot remain latent, and therefore prevent transgression. A rather strange translation of his text reads,

The causal moments are always connected [with the potentiality] by a connection referred to the potentiality. (Ibid)
Sankara focuses on the ontological manifestation of the individual soul: its powers and its deeds. Potentiality, power (the Indriyas perhaps) are already attributes, already participating in the illusionary world of names and forms. But in doing so, Deussen thinks that Sankara misses the point.

Real guilt lies in the quality of the chakti (will), it being all the same whether the will instigated by the change occurrence of motive, unfolds its being in deeds or whether this unfolding remains latent.

This returns the consideration of individual power and agency to the two modes of the unified, transcendental Will: as affirmation and denial of the Will-to-Life.

In contrast, the Saguna Brahman appears to maintain a relationship to the individual soul. Lord Isvara does not act arbitrarily: he is ‘bound by a certain regard’ for the good and evil works of each creature in an earlier birth. Therefore it is thought that each man is invested with the potential to change his own destiny through the two-fold moral doctrine delineated in the final section: the path of actions and the path of knowledge. As Deussen reveals in his later research, this change in the Brahman theory transferred power from ritual practices to the moral Upadhi (first path) and the mind (second path) in each individual, thereby giving him the power to intervene in his own destiny. From the judicial-deity Isvara, attention is turned to the composition of the self's powers and constituent elements, and the passive and silent Witness that overlooks them.

The question of how the individual might himself intercede in his own destiny is seen by later historians as fundamental to the development of the Vedanta tradition. It is this which Orlan Lee, a historian of religions, capture by referring to the Indian ‘Reformation’. With the further unfolding and formalisation of the Vedantin tradition, the interventions made by the ritual officiants, the Brahman priests and the pater familias, or the sponsor of the sacrifice came to be replaced, with more meditational and introspective practices. These are outlined in Vedantin eschatology as two ‘paths’ to Brahman.

Another way of appreciating this change is to re-examine at the myth of the dispute between the gods/ organs as to which is the most powerful. This parable also turns the question away from a direct interest in causality. In earlier times, Brahman had principally been identified with Prana (breath, life). To this corresponded the theory that
the individual entered into Brahman in deep sleep. There all of the faculties, Manas and Indriyas, withdrew their feelers, and it appeared that all organs were absorbed into breath, the only remaining Upadhi. Later, an inclination to view the Atman in ‘the subject of cognition within us’ manifested itself, generating characterisations of the Brahman as prajna-atman i.e. the self of knowledge. The entrance into Brahman in deep sleep then tended to be construed rather as ‘an unconscious because objectless cognition’ or even a kind of mystical experience of ascent to the highest light. Originally dreamless sleep expressed only the simple idea that conscious life is extinguished in the unconscious. However, according as the soul came to be regarded as an ‘essentially intellectual potency’, a separation of it from the Mukhya Prana as principle of the unconscious life and a closer connection with the organs of conscious life, i.e. Manas and Indriyas, became necessary. (346) This led to an initial polemic of the younger school against the older and an attempt at reconciliation in the Kaushitani Upanishads,

...until finally the extreme intellectualism of the system of the Vedanta was reached, for which Brahman is pure intelligence, while the Prana in the shape of the Mukhya Prana sinks to a mere Upadhi of the soul.

(339)

This statement refers to the elevation of the ‘knowledge’ of the Brahman/Atman doctrine over the older (ritual and perhaps yogic) practices. The prajna-atman, the self of knowledge, takes over as the point at which the individual self is to be regarded as the clearest expression of the Thing-in-itself. (321) The difference, in Deussen’s mind, is the elevation of the conscious life unique to Man over automatic and unceasing unconscious life. The thinkers who followed the approach of Badarayana in the Brahma Sutra of Badarayana agreed on interpreting the injunctions of the Veda as a call ‘to acquire knowledge of the essence of the cosmos, Brahman, rather than the performing of rituals.’ 37 The key to liberation had to be seen as the overcoming of Ignorance, Avidya. The intellectualism Deussen mentions appears to be coherent with the ‘Reformation’ thesis articulated by Lee concerning the internalisation of the Vedic rites in the mind of the supplicant.

In the final arrangement of the system, the connection between the Mukhya Prana and the soul is quite tenuous. Its activity is without influence on the state of the soul, and its repose is not necessary for the repose of the soul. In Deussen’s words, the vital breath is ‘the antipodes’ of the soul in the life of the organism. As the gathering point of the
Upadhis, he sees it as the central point of all that individualises the soul. This recalls his previous gnostic suggestions that the soul's connection with the body obscures its original divinity. Nevertheless the interior state, he says curiously, has 'evolved politically' from its original state:

[The] Mukhya Prana is not, like the Manas and Indriyas, servant of the soul but its prime minister with whom the sovereign is not on the best of terms: the weal of the land is committed to his care, but his Highness prefers to reside in the castle of a favourite (the Manas, mind) whom he prefers, but who is subject to the minister. (340)

The vital breath as the Prime Minister is acknowledged as having the highest mastery over the instincts of the subject. The soul is not to be found in the company of such a practical retainer. Detached from the main thoroughfares, the soul resides in that inner room of a tower in his favourite minister's castle which has the widest view over his estate. Watching and brooding, the soul's closest companion is the strangest of the Upadhis, the mind, observable in various changing states: now sceptical, now inspired, virtuous, concupiscent, indolent, ardent, shrewd, remorseful.

The Sakshin or Onlooker-soul remains unchanged by these impressions in all his three states: waking, dreaming and profound sleep. In the first, in connection with the limitations in the state of waking, the soul is said to 'apprehend sensuous objects and examine their difference'. (342) When the senses repose and only the mind is active, '[the soul] sees dream-pictures'. In the state of sleep, when the material and subtle parts repose, and the differences conditioned by the limitations cease to operate, the soul is 'as it were dissolved in its own self, and it has entered into itself', as it says in the Chandogya Upanishad. (343) Without 'I-maker', subject, self-consciousness or perception, the soul exists in pure freedom. What happens in the fourth state, in death, is examined in the final sections of this chapter. The Vedanta foresees two paths lying before the soul in death, and for some wicked souls it warns of 'the third place'. Yet apart from these, there is also the eschatology of the esoteric doctrine, which is no path but which promises a release from the never-ending carousel-existence of transmigration.

The I-maker and actor is resolvable into identity with the essence of the universe, with Brahman. Once the existence of the individual Atman is grasped as the sole certainty of philosophy, then the consciousness of the identity of the ego with Being-in-itself is a
'logical consequence'. (290) Deussen describes the identification, 'not so much as an absorption of the Self in the All, but rather (if we may speak spatially of the spaceless) as an absorption of the all into the Self.' (Ibid) There the realisation of the identity of individual and cosmic soul is the catalyst for the release of the soul from Samsara and into eternal freedom. Yet this does not occur by a pacifying process in which the subject reconstitutes himself as object in reflection, as though in a mirror, in order to identity himself as part of the vast soul of the cosmos. The identity of the soul with Brahman demands that the subject be dispossessed of his being, of his certainties, until the last mirages have been consumed. All is absorbed into the Self once ephemeral and manifold reality itself becomes unconscionable and unreal. Sticking with the text's metonymies, the self/soul/ego becomes a point of transparency whereby two points are made congruous. The entire extent of space and time is travelled in the process of their mutual identification.

The soul is the point of the universe where the veil (woven of time, space and causality) that covers 'Being-in-itself' becomes so transparent that we perceive facts through it, which protest against the cosmic laws of Realism and oppose themselves to the logical elaboration of it. (291)

We can see from this statement that Deussen considers the esoteric doctrine of identity as Idealism, and the exoteric doctrine of the creation of the world as Realism. The correspondence of the esoteric doctrine to Idealism is of the highest significance to Deussen, as we can see from the number of times he alludes to the congruity between the Vedanta and the philosophy of Kant. The crucial point seems to be the transcendental subject. As Deussen writes in their praise, 'The Indians attained the knowledge that the key to the enigma of the world is to be sought in the Self, Atman.' (339) The Self is the one point in the universe at which Avidya (Ignorance), the illusion of names and forms, has no application.

The Vedanta diverges from Deussen's own philosophy in one essential respect. The Vedanta does not 'see in the Will the final origin of Being.' (315) It does not see the Will as 'an eternal, absolutely inseparable determination of the soul.' Brahman, it can be concluded, is not Will. Although Deussen does not explicitly say as much, it seems that Vedanta would consider the Will only as a lower, exoteric version of Brahman in that the Will has attributes (above all its needs, its striving and its power). That Advaita Non-Dualism should prove to be incompatible with his Schopenhauereanism on this point
would seem to be a serious challenge to his philosophy. Nevertheless, Deussen claims that this makes no difference. Although Brahman is not perhaps the Will, the soteriological direction of the Vedanta is entirely congruent with the aim of the metaphysics of morality to deny the Will.

The denial [of Will as the final origin of Being] however, as will be shown, comes to this, that besides the Velle another state of the soul is possible, viz. a Nolle; and it makes in the end no great difference for us, whether this quite incomprehensible state is characterised in our fashion as a Negation of all volition, or in the Indian manner as an imaginary cognition, which, as may be seen by the sketch of the Akamayamana (he who desires not), presupposes this Negation of all volition. (315)

The important philosophical point of intersection is found in the doctrine that ‘another state of the soul is possible’. For Deussen, this state is strictly determined by the via negativa since it is inaccessible to representation: thus as opposed to the life of the individual Will, he can only conceive this state as a not-Willing. In a similar way, the esoteric Vedantin doctrine can only approach the attribute-less Nirguna Brahman through the neti, nett (not thus, not thus). Deussen uses the Latin terms Velle and Nolle here, perhaps in an effort to suggest that Willing and not-Willing are self-evidently universal. In India, by contrast, he suggests that the state of negating the Will is imaginatively filled out with content — ‘the sketch of the Akamayamana’. In alluding to ‘imagination’, Deussen is perhaps referring to a meditative state of absorption or perhaps mystical experience. The point is that the imagination of non-Willing is isolated from agency and from the other faculties. While we have understood that Deussen insists that negation of Volition is positive, it is possible that his insistence on the annihilation of the individual Will, and presumably the body which is its manifestation, leaves him with few alternatives to offer. The only solution he does offer is a practical philosophy based on asceticism. Yet in the sections on aesthetics and morality of Elements of Metaphysics, he sometimes seems to refer to positive forms of ego-less experience. At other times, he appears to suggest that not-Willing implied not-acting, not-knowing and not-being. This raises the problem of implying that Akamayamana, he who desires not, ‘exists’ in a kind of ‘Non-Being’ (i.e. the opposite of Willing). However it is possible that the Vedanta also offers resources for uncovering a different kind of ego-less existence. According to Loy, Sankara states overtly that ‘It is not
possible to negate the empirical world without the acceptance of another reality.\textsuperscript{38} This reveals the possibility that there are resources in the Indian doctrine — affirmative, positive, speculative, creative, or dialectical possibilities (it is difficult to describe them univocally) - which are occluded by the polar oppositions adhered to by Deussen.

9. (IV) Samsara or the Doctrine of the Transmigration of the Soul

In covering the theology, psychology and cosmology of the Vedanta, the consistency with the Schopenhauerean philosophy of the world as will and representation has remained clear. That atman is Brahman, that the individual self is identical with the cosmic self, expresses both the identity of the individual will with the undivided, metaphysical Will and the illusionary nature of all phenomenal existence. It is in the following two sections that Deussen diverges most radically from the framework of Schopenhauerean ethics. As we saw in the \textit{Elements of Metaphysics}, Deussen attempted to make the negation of the Will into something positive: denial pertains to the overcoming of the life of the ego but not to the negation of the fundamental reality of Being. Copleston in his work on Schopenhauer as pessimist emphasised that the latter conceived of a final salvation, if there is one, as 'complete extinction, the abyss of nothingness'.\textsuperscript{39} In Schopenhauer's words,

'Before us there is certainly only nothingness';...which we must not evade like the Indians, 'through myths and meaningless words, such as re-absorption in Brahma or the Nirvana of the Buddhists.'\textsuperscript{40}

For Schopenhauer, the ultimate goal of mankind is not union with God or even unconscious identity with the impersonal Will, but absolute nothingness.

In the section on \textit{Samsara} and especially on \textit{Moksha} or release, Deussen finds many resources for his conviction that there can be a positive ethics of negation. As is immediately noticeable, his philosophical vocabulary of oppositions poses enormous problems for his interpretation of the Vedantin doctrine of deliverance. The difficulty lies not only in his conceptual inflexibility, but also in a certain reticence to accept the full implications of his own position. The problem he faces in proposing a positive ethics of negation is that of determining the ground of freedom, given the absolute omnipotence of the (Schopenhauerean) Will. Where can he find a foundation for the practical philosophy of moral action? He retains the Schopenhauerean strategy of referring to ascetic and meditational techniques which break down the voracity of the Will-to-life and eventually conquer it. However, he also retains the project of
constructing a metaphysics of morality, which requires a first principle of metaphysical freedom to qualify action. What he evades definitively is the possibility that the Vedanta proposes an ethics without a first principle. As Deussen recognises himself, in the Atman/Brahman doctrine, man's highest goal, is to conceive the 'creative principle of the universe' to be the self, the atman. (PU, 342) This is the ultimate expression of the absolutely natural idea, in his view, for all philosophies in which 'men regard that which for them is the ultimate principle of all things and the ultimate basis of the universe as at the same time the highest aim of personal endeavour.' (Ibid) That which is the telos of moral existence is also the basis and foundation of existence itself. In this way, the Atman/Brahman doctrine excludes the western tradition (after a certain Aristotelian vision) of basing ethics on a science of first principles. The ethical sage, the jivanmukta or the 'one who is released during his own lifetime' is the one who has realised the identity between individual self and World self. If this 'realisation' begs comparison with the Hegelian concept of 'recognition', how will we read the Upanishadic assertion that the jivanmukta continues to live, think, know and act 'as it happens', idris a'eva.?(PU, 362) What is 'as it happens'? An apparent affirmation of the inhuman neutrality of existence? The Upanishadic formulations tell us that the jivanmukta is said to be 'beyond Good and Evil' (an expression which Nietzsche makes much of in the Genealogy of Morals (III.17). For Deussen, the enigma of the 'as it happens', idris a'eva, is a barren question, a confirmation of all the Orientalist suspicions that 'Hinduism' is a religion of quietism if not of outright amorality. To live 'as it happens' does not correspond well with Deussen's idea of man 'raising himself up' to the divine. This is perhaps an echo, even in Deussen's reading of these Indian texts, of Hegel's aporetic use of the verb aufheben.

There is an uncertainty in Deussen's texts about how to interpret this problem of the ultimate stage of enlightenment without linking it firmly to the principle of the negation of the (egoistic) Will-to-live as a first principle. He points out himself that this creates the paradox that the desire to overcome egoism perpetuates desire. As the Vedanta acknowledges, to strive after enlightenment is to perpetuate oneself in the realm of illusion and reveal that one has not yet been enlightened. This aporia remains in place: Deussen continues to imagine an untimely eschatological moment in which enlightenment or grace would come little by little and yet all at once.

In the final two sections, I will add material from Deussen's Philosophy of the
Upanishads, the second volume of his Universal History. The Vedanta philosophy is only one particular school of interpreting the Upanishads and their later commentaries, and there is a risk that my explanation of the system of the Vedanta will at some points merge with generalisations about Upanishadic philosophy. My reason for doing this is to explore Deussen's reaction to what he calls 'the practical philosophy' of the Upanishads. The latter text (1897) includes not only sections on 'Samsara or Transmigration' and 'Moksha or Release', but concludes with a separate section devoted to 'The Ethics of the Upanishads'. This material draws out many themes that Deussen could only hastily incorporate in the present work for the sake of systematicity. One of the interesting things it expands on, is that both works and asceticism occupy only a secondary role in comparison with the importance of the 'knowledge of Atman' and the question of what such 'knowledge' really consists of.

One of the main points of the preceding section was that the soul is entirely neutral. Even the limiting Upadhis are 'vessels of universal form': universally rather than individually determined principles. (374) Therefore despite the fact that the soul is 'clothed' with visceral, sensible and cognitive organs, in itself it remains neutral. Partly due to its very identity with Being, the soul bears no moral distinction This is consistent, Deussen remarks:

...with the Indian standpoint, and indeed every other standpoint like it,

which places the essential nature of the soul in Knowing and not Willing. (374)

From his own standpoint, for which the soul is the Will, the soul cannot exist neutrally in the empirical world. Once the Will-to-live is manifested, it is fallen, egoistic. It becomes uncertain that there is a clear analogy to the Will in the System of the Vedanta. He states at a key moment later on that 'Christianity sees the essence of man in Will, Brahmanism in Knowledge', i.e. that Atman is Brahman. (403) This Knowledge that constitutes the 'soul' of man is 'beyond Good and Evil' as the next chapter explains: this chapter focuses on works, karma, the moral Upadhi and the retributive system of transmigration. Soteriological Knowledge belongs to the esoteric doctrine; reward and punishment, Samsara, belongs to the 'popular' exoteric doctrine.

Given the primary assertion that nothing but Brahman exists, thus guaranteeing the soul's essential neutrality, the question of the principium individuationis arises once more. If the soul and qualifying Upahis are neutral, what is the condition of
differentiation?

But whence then the moral determinations, which condition the differences of character, the differences of Paths in the Beyond, the contrast of reward and punishment in the other world, and the form of the subsequent rebirth in this world? (375)

Sankara’s response is to expressly distinguish in the departing soul an elemental substratum, (*bhuta-acraya*) described above as the subtle body and a moral substratum, (*karma-acraya*). At the core of this section is the inextinguishable continuity of the moral, karmic Upadhi after death. It is the only individuating factor which does not remain entirely neutral during the course of a lifetime. Death, according to the Vedas, is ‘the revealer of the fruit of all works (*i.e.* karma).’ (388) Sankara has one particularly polemical idea concerning the degree of continuing individuality in the moral Upadhi, or substratum, as he calls it. Apart from this, the general Vedanin approaches to the immorality of the soul, the doctrine of karma, transmigration and the after-life are relatively orthodox, and thus incorporate the Upanishadic elements I will now discuss. However, it is important to observe from the beginning, that transmigration does not mean animal possession or transmigration into other bodies. Deussen stipulates that it signifies essentially that, ‘Our existence is continued after death in other forms, other conditions of space and time.’ (PU, 315)

10. The Origin and Infinity of Transmigration

The doctrine of samsara, transmigration only first appeared in the Upanishads, although Deussen discerns a latent germ of the idea in Brahmanas (ritual manuals of the priests). In contrast to the very ancient Vedic conception of an indiscriminate felicity of the pious, the idea of ‘recompense’ is formulated and different degrees of compensation, proportionate to knowledge and actions, are measured out. Deussen interprets this as the idea of an equalising justice developing out of a primitive doctrine of retribution. (PU, 325) The theory rests on the conviction of due recompense awarded to good and evil works, at first conceived as futural. This early Brahmanic religion taught only of ‘rewards in heaven and (somewhat later) punishments in a dark region.’ (El, vi)

The idea of an economy of action-and-consequence was established in the Brahmanas, and was implanted into the rituals and sacrifices designed to maintain the order of the cosmos.

The chief aim of the Brahmanas is to prescribe the acts of ritual and to
offer for their accomplishment a manifold reward and at the same time sufferings and punishments for their omission. (PU, 324)

Actions were thought to manifest themselves in unique temporalities, rather than through an immediate, observable cause-and-effect model. The perpetual maturing of the fruits of work was synchronous with the cycles of nature, e.g. the waxing and waning moon, the seasons. The great clock of nature turning, accompanied the duration of these deeds and events. Some acts might produce an immediate return, such as in a harvest ritual while others were thought to be rewarded in the afterlife. Once the doctrine of transmigration was introduced, there was added the possibility the impression that an act might be retained by the soul and further manifest its fruits in a future incarnation on the earth.

The calculation of the just measure and repayment for works is complicated even to the extent that disagreement is found inside the Vedanta tradition. Disagreement in general stems from the fact that it is often not the Vedic texts but rather sacred tradition, Sruti which identifies the degrees of 'fair and foul conduct'. Commentaries on the Vedanta believe this to be taken into account during the solidification process which brings the individual soul back to the earth. Sruti teaches that after recompense or retribution has taken place,

it is through a residue that difference of re-birth in respect of country, caste, family, form, duration of life, Vedic study, destiny, wealth, desire, and intelligence is conditioned. (388-89)

Differentiation in the allotment of earthly goods from birth onwards, argues the scripture, compels us to admit, that it is this fateful supplement, unconsumed in heaven or on earth, which conditions rebirth.

Already, the early Brahmanic religions had imagined resurrection and repeated death in the other worlds. Deussen's argument is that it was only necessary to transfer that renewed death from an imaginary future world into the present in order to arrive at the doctrine of transmigration. (PU, 327) Before the doctrine of transmigration, the soul departing the body could be reborn anywhere as anything.

In proportion as a man consists now of this or that, just as he acts, just as he behaves, so will he be born...as men, fathers, gods, Prajapati, personal Brahman... He who does good will be born good, he who does evil will be born evil. (PU, 331)
This passage does not yet recognise a two-fold retribution, in a future world and again upon the earth, but only one by transmigration. Immediately after death, the soul departs from the body, 'as a caterpillar, after it has reached the tip of a leaf, makes a beginning on another, and draws itself over towards it.' (PU, 330) The worlds and the paths of the Fathers and the Gods are not yet differentiated as in the later theory.

The Upanishadic doctrine of the Five Fires recounts how the attributes of a man slip back into the elements of the cosmos on dying, but that an immortal part gathers the residual effects of his acts. Thus the sage Yajnavalkya declares 'Verily, through good work one becomes good, through evil work, evil.' (375) Deussen connects this with the pre-determinism present according to Schopenhauer in man’s empirical character. Man's inborn character is the fruit and consequence of his previous action. (PU, 330) The Upanishad continues by saying of the soul after death:

then the knowledge [of Good and Evil] and the work which is ready or accomplished and the newly gained experience take him by the hand.

(376)

The karmic seed that accompanies the soul after death apparently has a memory. What has been acquired by the past contains the seeds for what the future will unfold for the reborn soul. Thus apart from the retributive aspects of transmigration, Sankrara explains that 'newly gained experience' can even refer to the 'impressions which things leave behind in the soul', which he says may bloom into inborn gifts for artistic work or moral conduct. Sankara's particular belief/understanding of continuity of the individual soul goes beyond what is generally posited by the Upanishads.

Sankara also posited an additional idea about the manned in which the preceding works predetermining every new life could also bring about the changes in the soul’s destiny. At the beginning of a life, a new moment is interposed: the apurvam, 'literally, the moral merit, something which was not there before'. (378) Since the apurvam is not spiritual and requires something spiritual in order to be moved to act, Sankara expresses this idea at the level of Theism. Volitions and deeds ultimately come from God. [At least, this is how Deussen understands the articulation, i.e. as a level or style of discourse, suitable for a particular degree of understanding. In Sankara's Commentary, apurvam or moral merit appears directly in the argument as an idée reçue connected with Lord Isvara.]
In his argument concerning transmigration, Sankara identifies works of two kinds; ordained and prohibited, good and evil, which accordingly bear also two kinds of fruit, namely pleasure and pain, which in order to be experienced demand a body. (402)

This body may be that of a god, man, animal or plant. The moral reserve is separated from the body 'like the stake from a bulrush' only by death. Once it is reborn in another material body it applies its dimensions to both physical and psychical limitations. (As previously mentioned, Sankara allows for more continuity in the individual soul that other Vedic systems.) In determining the ontological ground of individual existence, moral Upadhi connects the unconcealing of the world, the embodiment of the self and fate. This emphasises how closely allied morality is to physiology in this aspect of the system. (A question with which Nietzsche was extremely preoccupied in another form.) Deussen makes only one or two allusions at most to Indian anatomy and medicine, but rudimentary sketches of the body sciences are present in many parts of Sankara's commentary. How the macanthropos, the cosmic self or the world 'maps' onto the individual body is a frequent theme of the Upanishads. There are sustained discussions of the heart, the 'thousand veins' and 'hundred and one arteries'; an extremely complex account of the respiratory system; and the frequent deployment of analogies of the digestive and generative systems in the sutras reflecting on the identity of self and cosmos. In death, the spirit is thought to retract all of the Upadhis into itself. Breathing ceases and the soul is said to quit the body either by one of the 'veins of the heart', or through the hundred-and-first artery in the head. (379) The first path leads to the world or the fathers or the Gods. The second leads directly to Brahman: according to the Kaushitani Upanishad; 'I am more ancient than the shining Gods. I am the first-born of being. I am the artery of Immortality'.

In the case of each kind of works, good and bad, it is true that existence as an agent and enjoyer on earth has as its inevitable result the mechanical accumulation of works which have to be atoned for again in a subsequent existence.

So that the clockwork of atonement in running down always winds itself up again; and this goes on for ever; unless perfect knowledge is attained. (354)

There is no exit from this system without moksha, enlightenment or release, since the 'causes' of activity are always potential in the soul, as chakti (powers) and faculties, as long as the natural disposition to action and enjoyment persists. Samsara is premised on
an ‘accursed share’, a part of the life’s works that are never integrated, maintaining the soul in a cycle of returns. After atonement in earthly existence, after reward or retribution in the other world, a residuum is left over. Anucaya, literally residuum, is referred by Badarayana to the concept of sampata in the Chandogya Upanishad: ‘the sediment of any liquid, which runs together at the bottom of the vessel’.

This residue keeps the circulation going, which Deussen interprets as a reason for lamentation. He consistently imagines a process of atonement in a world of suffering, even though in this ‘economy’, the balance of good works must obviously be felicitously and joyfully consumed. One suspects that this unusual adoption of pessimism on the part of Deussen responds to the necessity to extol gravely on the consequences of evil karma to counteract an orientalist fantasy that the Hindu doctrine of the afterlife was full of sensuous enjoyment. Deussen is more than diplomatic in avoiding this topic, but this is in order to present a serious case for the ethics of the Vedanta. There was an all too prevalent tendency in Europe to view Indian religions as quietist, and even lacking in an ethics. Therefore Deussen insists on an utterly (orthodox) moral form of Samsara as eternal return.

It is important to note that Nietzsche of course read and re-read the System of the Vedanta several years after he had been struck by his insight into eternal recurrence. It does not seem to be the case that, as Daniel Smith claims, Nietzsche ‘ignore[d] the obvious parallels in Indian philosophy to his Ubermensch and the Eternal Return, in the sage released from the suffering of the world and in Samsara, or the doctrine of repetition or ‘epochal cycles’. It is more probable that Nietzsche rejected these doctrines as not going far enough in the unconditional affirmation of the world. The morality of Samsara would have been by contrast far too calculated and prescriptive. This is all the more suggested by Deussen’s association of transmigration with Kant’s postulate of immortality, which was derived from the ‘practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the perfect fulfilment of the moral law’.

The well-known argument of Kant also, which bases immortality on the realisation of the moral law implanted in us, a result only attainable by an infinite process of approximation, tells not for immortality in the usual sense, but for transmigration. (PU, 315)

The idea that the eternal return exists in order to actualise the Kantian Categorical Imperative would have been an anathema to Nietzsche’s philosophy of amor fati and
eternal recurrence.

The Vedanta philosophy connects Samsara with the doctrine of the two Paths, which teaches a double retribution; once by reward and punishment in the other world, and again by rebirth upon the earth. The two Paths are identified as leading the soul through the interval, during which the world disclosed through corporeal activity is eclipsed, and to this world they lead back. The double expiation is different for those who perform good works, going by the Pitriyana, the Path of the Fathers, and those who worship the lower Brahman, going by the Devayana, the Path of the Gods. By the word 'Path' is to be understood that on cremation, the soul on the Path of the Gods, for example, enters the flame, the day, month, moon, year etc. The ever-increasing brightness leads towards the Brahman, the 'Shining One'. Deussen writes that, 'The use of periods of time as divisions of space occurs elsewhere also and needs in India no further remark.' (PU, 335) What is meant perhaps by this conception is that the spatialised notion of 'going towards' or 'Beyond' is kept deliberately ambiguous. This serves the purpose of reinforcing the temporal notion of rebirth in the lower doctrine. For the higher doctrine, this conception removes the barrier of space between the individual and the cosmic Self. It emphasises the immediate identity of both by removing the literal interpretation that the individual somehow 'enters into' Brahman.

The Pitriyana is associated through its criteria with the Canon of the Law.

Those who only practise sacrifices, pious deeds, and almsgiving...these enter into the smoke of the funeral pyre, into the night, the days of the waning moon, the winter....[They] pass directly into the world of the Fathers, then into the Akaça, into the moon, where they are the sustenance of the Gods.(363)

This path is open to even to those who have not studied the Veda. The virtues leading to this path are simply 'good works'. Deussen implies that they correspond to an external catechecism which retains elements of the former cultic worship. The 'sacrifices' mentioned in the quotation possibly refer to the traditional rituals, e.g. the Soma, or the horse sacrifice rather than individual ascetic practice. As a result of these good works, the soul 'joyfully consumes' the fruit of its accumulated karma in communion with the gods, before descending and seeping back into earthly existence.

On the Path of the Gods, the soul is said to enjoy the hospitality of a series of bright
spheres, in contrast to the darker path through the night, before entering Brahman. The soul on the paths of the Gods no longer returns to the earth. However even those on the Path of the Gods are still inured to the division of subject and objects; attribute-less Being remains concealed from them. The Brahman of attributes, Lord Isvara has been the object of worship for those on this path. These souls still remain in the intermediate world of heavenly lordship. Their stay is spent ‘consuming and communing with the Gods’ proportionate with their karmic reserve until the end of the kalpa, when the universe is absorbed back into Brahman. Thus it is assumed that they attain progressive liberation.

The perfect knowledge, samyagdarcanam, is communicated to them in the Brahman-world, and that thus at the destruction of the world, when the lower Brahman also perishes, they enter with Him into the ‘eternal, perfect Nirvana’. (474)

The Devayana is associated with the Canon of Knowledge, albeit knowledge of the lower doctrine, and leads to gradual liberation from Sankara rather than return to earth. Those now who know this, and those others who practise faith and penance (or Truth, according to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad) in the forest, enter into the flame of the funeral pyre, into the day, into the days of the waxing moon, the summer, into the year, and the sun, the world of the Gods, to the moon and into the lightening – there is indeed a man, who is not as a human being, he leads them to Brahman. (362-63)

By ‘penance’ is meant ascetic practices or tapas, which formerly had been undertaken only by the priests or sponsors of a sacrifice. In the Vedantin tradition, this is no longer limited to the Brahman caste. They were originally conceived, not as the mortifications some Europeans thought they were, but as a purification process prior to performing a ritual. Orlan Lee explains that tapas, (literally ‘heat’) operated on the principle that suppressing desire would induce ‘a great inner fervour, creative heat and exhilaration, conveying special strength to the sacrifice.’ It is notable that the tapas or ascetic practices belongs to the higher path of the Gods, and not the rogatory path of the Fathers. This would lead to the conclusion that this ‘penance’ is something other than ritual performance.
Given also its juxtaposition in the quotation with 'faith', these two things can be seen instead as part of the process of internalisation of ritual that emerges through the Vedanta. In Lee's analysis, abnegation takes on a psychological sense in Vedanta, which replaces the external signs of ascetic practice performed by the Brahmins. In this psychological sense, the tapas is directed towards the cancellation of desire, since this also cancels 'the motive root of action'. (To give it a Schopenhauerean term, it cancels the 'Will'). What is thereby extirpated is the very thing that commits the agent to his particular form of existence. Ascesis is calculated to reverse the causal process involving karmic works, imprisoning the agent in the cycle of samsara.

Faith, although undoubtedly an internal phenomenon, is more difficult to define in the Vedantin context. It might obviously refer to the Non-Dualist belief/understanding that, while they might be distinct, there is no difference between the empirical world and the underlying reality of Brahman. However the meaning of this 'faith' becomes more complex in the Universal History, where Deussen claims that the principle task of modern western philosophy is to reconcile 'Glauben und Denken', faith and knowledge. The schism between them, he says there, arose from the failure of the Indo-German culture in Europe to find its source of renewal in Indian philosophy rather than Christianity.

In an ambiguity in the translation, faith or craddha is sometime rendered as 'piety'; the same word used by Deussen to mean yoga or meditation. Deussen traces craddha etymologically to 'the conception of knitting together'. (He claims it is wrongly compared to the Latin religio43) In the section on Psychology, craddha belonged to the group of qualities or powers of the central, co-ordinating organ, the Manas. There it referred to a kind of phenomenological belief; the accreditation of the invisible by its effects.2 In this context he explains it as 'a link between man and the Beyond, thus appearing to require a moral explanation'. (378) The invocation of a link to the Beyond recalls his understanding of barh (Brahman) as 'der zum Heiligen, Gottlichen emporstrebende Wille des Menschen'. In Sankara's definition of this 'link', the craddha inheres in the form (the Apurvam) of the subtle body 'cloth[ing] the souls which bring the sacrifice and lead[ing] them to receive their reward into the other 'world". (379) Deussen resolves the contradictions over the question of faith, which he attributes to

2 In his memoire on India, the term Craddham appears translated as 'a sacrifice for the dead', an event from which Deussen was prohibited, on account of his foreignness, and therefore his status as an untouchable (El, 150)
Sankara, by referring to one statement in particular in which the latter relates craddha to the karmic Upadhi.

For it is quite natural to understand by Craddha the works of man produced by faith, as they condition his weal and woe in the Beyond.

(378)

This is to say that the link between man and the Beyond requires a moral explanation. The Vedanta signifies that the soul of the work that ascends as the sacrificial vapour from the pyre is the faith (craddha) which is offered. According to the Upanishadic doctrine of the Five Fires, it ascends to heaven and is five times offered up by the gods in the sacrificial fires of heaven, ether, man, woman and embryo.

While all of these definitions agree that craddha is a link between the individual soul and Brahman, the indecision around the terms faith and religio is disorienting. The notion of 'faith' seems to be a black spot in Deussen's vision of system of the Vedanta. This is partly due to the unfamiliar mobility in the Vedanta between the levels of ontology, theism, cosmology and psychology. Its mobile discourse transgresses any attempt to view religion and/or philosophy within limits, whether of reason alone or otherwise. It is also due to his own strenuous resistance to what he calls Kirchensglauben, the demand for faith as a condition of salvation, and which is expressed in his Philosophy of the Bible, examined in my final chapter. In his view, this is inextricably connected to the 'legalistic' religiosity of reward and punishment and Old Testament Realism. Above all, Deussen wants to remove the difference between faith and knowledge as different types of 'proofs'. He wishes to reconcile them in a way that their validity might be universally accepted. For this reason, he endeavours to bring these concepts as far as possible into a cogent and coherent system, so these separate 'epistemological dimensions' can both be integrated into a universal Wissenschaft. His search to combine faith and knowledge is based on the question of validity, of proof. This is why, as we will see in the next chapter, the Universal History is compiled on the basis of the history of philosophical principles.

Finally, the Vedanta goes so far as to stretch its critique of innate Ignorance to include the question of the reality of both these doctrines. These various fortunes belong nevertheless to the 'exoteric, theological, lower doctrine'. These paths are considered true, as true as this world is, but not more. That is to say, meditation, charity, piety, prayer and asceticism still do not amount to the revelation of the identity of self and
For the whole world and the whole way of samsara is valid and true for those only who are in the Avidya, not for those who have overcome it. (El, viii)

While the Path of the Gods does not cling to the canon of works which served the old Vedic religion, it has still not attained that vision which would see through the transparency of nature to the identity of Brahmanic Being. Consequently Brahman is not known as the self, but as the Godhead opposed to the self and accordingly venerated. Yet the path leading to divinities overlaps in the Vedanta teaching with the ‘esoteric, philosophical higher doctrine’. (438) The former led to ‘gradual release’, while with perfect knowledge, liberation was immediate.

Therefore all priority in the eschatology in invested in the attainment or discovery of the inner identity of self and Being. In the esoteric doctrine, as we will see, everything else retreats from the ultimate goal and is reconfigured as preparatory steps.

11. (V) Moksha or the Doctrine of Liberation

Deussen’s definition of moksha demonstrates how significant this concept is to a Schopenhauerean philosophy. Moksha can first of all be translated as liberation, emancipation, release or deliverance. Deussen renders it in German as Erlösung, which has strong connotations of redemption and salvation. A Schopenhauerean interpretation reads moksha as liberation from the Will-to-life which is, as Deussen puts it, the strongest of all human instincts. ‘Our entire empirical existence depends on the craving for Life.’ (PU, 338) It is therefore a challenge to explain how a philosophy comes to regard emancipation as a release from life, and not from death (as in the Christian view). How can it come to be regarded as something which ought not to be? Deussen sees this rarest of all changes of inclination traced nowhere more clearly than in India. There,

deliverance ...appears not as a ransom, an atonement, a propitiation, etc. but merely as a release from empirical existence with all its desires, these last being regarded as fetters, bonds, which bind the soul to the objects of sense. (PU, 339-40)

This is possibly the major resource that India has to offer to a renewal of philosophy. The philosophy of the future, Deussen claims, will be indebted to this insight from
India. In this section, I will examine the resources of Indian practical philosophy which he deems crucial to present to a western audience in order to prompt such a renewal.

The two ways of conceiving the immortality of the soul - the path of the Fathers and the path of the Gods - which were delineated in the previous section provided an insight into Deussen’s views on Vedantin ethics. The path of the Fathers was opened by pious deeds, alms-giving and practise the old Vedic cult of sacrifices. The path of the Gods was opened to those who undertook penance (tapas) and who adhered to the Brahman doctrine, but yet were unable to rise to perfect knowledge of identity, thus worshipping the Brahman of-attributes: sometimes this is associated with faith (craddha) or ‘the practice of Truth in the forest’. These two paths are consistent with the virtues of Denial which Deussen outlined in Elements of Metaphysics. The good deeds of the first path correspond to compassion, ‘the good of others’: the latter path corresponds with asceticism, ‘the ill of the self’. This final sections now shows how the Vedanta goes beyond the bounds of Deussen’s morality of Denial, without proceeding immediately to the mysterious movements of Grace. Neither of the two paths lead to the Perfect Knowledge which constitutes emancipation or moksha. The path of the Gods leads to ‘gradual, stepwise liberation’, Krama-mukti; i.e. the soul dwells with the gods until knowledge of identity is achieved or until the end of the kalpa when all worlds are absorbed back into Brahman. However, emancipation through Perfect Knowledge may also be achieved during the course of a lifetime. Jivan-mukti is the name given to liberation during life, jivan-mukta, the living liberated.

The virtues incorporated in the two paths already display to Deussen a high degree of self-negation, which inclines him to classify the ethics of the Vedas in general as based on subjective worth. By contrast,

European are wont to estimate the merits of an action above all by its
objective worth, that is by the resultant profit for neighbours, for the
multitude or for all men. (PU, 364)

The problem with objective value, he protests, is that it is unjust. The maximising, utilitarian view of ethics is overly dependent on ‘accidental factors’ - such as intelligence, social status, or the economic conjuncture - to be capable of serving as a moral standard. Deussen claims that moral value can only be measured by the actor’s consciousness of the degree of his personal sacrifice. Again he asserts that the west has
much to learn from the Indian tendency to emphasise over ‘external work’, undivided attention to the internal. He now provides three examples to support his argument that ‘the ethical system of the Upanishads concerns itself especially with the subjective interpretation of moral action and less with their external results.’ They are interesting for the reason that one in particular seemed to resonate with T.S. Eliot, despite the fact he eventually considered Deussen rather disparagingly as an ‘oriental romantic’ like Schopenhauer. The first example discusses the Chandogya Upanishad 3.17 in which life is regarded allegorically as a great soma festival, in which a ‘miniature ethical system’ is interwoven, naming as the reward of the sacrifice: ‘tapas, liberality, right dealing, ahimsa or no injury to life, and truthfulness’. (PU, 365) The most prominent example was integrated into Eliot’s ‘What the Thunder Said’:

In India also...men believed that they heard the voice of the moral law-giver (Prajapati) in the roll of the thunder, whose Da! Da! Da! is explained ...as Damyata! Datta! Dayadhvam! (be self-restrained, liberal, pitiful). (PU, 365)

From these subjective values, two fundamental ideas emerge ‘around which the ethical thought of the Upanishads moves’. One Upanishad discusses all virtues as tapas or ascetic practices. However, further developments tend to see the ‘lower mortifications’ surpassed in nyasa, or self-renunciation. Isolated expressions of this trend (end up in the fact) that in the course of time, two additional stages were added to the ancient traditional life stages of the Brahmin priest, which incorporated these two ‘supreme virtues’, tapas and nyasa. (PU, 367)

The Upanishads eventually recommended that the life of every Brahmin should include four stages or ashramas, translated by Deussen as ‘places of mortification’.

The whole of life should be passed in a series of gradually intensifying ascetic stages, through which a man, more and more purified from all earthly attachment, should become fitted for his home (astam) as the other world is designated as early as Rig Veda 14.8. (PU, 367)

That life should be lived as gradual, ascetic purification from egoistic, empirical consciousness in order to uncover ‘Man’s hidden divine nature’ is the purest form of morality for Deussen. ‘The entire history of mankind does not produce much that approaches in grandeur to this thought’.
This is the kernel of the ethics of the Upanishads. Advaita Vedanta, while being an orthodox Vedic philosophy, proposes its own account of emancipation. As previously discussed, it insists upon the internalisation of the external practises of the ancient Vedic cults, opening it to every devoted individual and not just the Brahmin caste. This applies also to the four life-stages of the Brahmin – the student, the householder, the anchorite and wandering beggar. Lee’s reading of this alteration explains that while the Vedanta rejected the orthopraxy of the Vedic religion, its ‘psychology’ was retained. A brief glance at the four life-stages reveals how some of the practices and values were incorporated into the two paths, while the overall scheme (and the social organisation it implied) were abandoned.

(1) Firstly, as Brahmacaryin, the student was to spend twelve years studying with a teacher, learning the sacrifices and tending the sacrificial fire. (2) The imperative duty of the Grihastha, or householder was to establish a family, while continuing to perform sacrifices and training for the village. (3) The third stage was added, Deussen claims, as the value of tapas became more important. The stage of the Vanapratha or hermit was established gradually.

Originally the solitary life in the forest existed as a special “kind of vocation” side by side with the position of householder. Later it may have become usual to retire into the solitude of the forest on the approach of old age, after the obligations of the householder had been satisfied. (PU, 372)

As already mentioned tapas, literally meaning heat, refers directly to an intensification of spiritual energies through withdrawal and concentration. This interpretation contradicts Deussen’s concern with extinguishing and denying the Will-to-life. Thus in his view, the life of the forest-dweller enshrines the pure virtue of asceticism.

(4) The fourth stage is that of the Sannyasin, so called because he “casts off everything from himself” (sam-ni-as)’ and wanders homeless and without possessions, begging for food. It demands such a complete separation from life, that it requires the same purification ceremony and final sacrifice that are performed as the last rites. This ritual also signifies the sannyasin’s renunciation of ritual sacrifice. He no longer maintains the sacrificial fire. ‘The sacrificial fire he takes up into the fire of his belly, the Gayatri (sacred Vedic metre) into the fire of his speech.’ (PU, 376) Sacrifice is now replaced or rather ‘taken up into’ nourishing the body. ‘That which he eats in the evening is his
evening sacrifice...' (PU, 380) Tapas or self-mortification is also abandoned or only performed 'in spirit or by means of words'. Instead bathing, purification, silence, meditation and yoga are enjoined on him.

It is confusing that Deussen calls the Sannyasin, the fourth life-stage of the Brahmin because he also refers to it as a rejection of the entire Brahmanical mode of life with its three ashramas. Over time, the rejection assumed the position of a fourth and highest ashrama, as if the whole point of training in the Brahmin rules of conduct and sacrifice was to repudiate them and to wander as a beggar. Originally, the renunciation of all possessions and ties was an apparent consequence of reaching perfect knowledge of the Atman and emancipation. As the fourth ashrama, in the later Upanishads, 'it now became a final and most certain means by which it was hoped to attain that knowledge.' (PU, 374)

As we have seen in the paths of the Gods and the Fathers, the Vedanta does not demand that the supplicant undergo these four stages of purification. However, its doctrine of emancipation in this life, jivan-mukti, has much in common with the renunciation – of rules just as much as property – of the Sannyasin. Knowledge of the identity with the Brahman is the focus of both. For the Sannyasin, as for the living liberated,

there are no longer Vedic texts, or meditation, or worship, or visible and invisible, or joined and disjoined, or I and thou and the world...The motions of every impulse have been stilled, be abides only in knowledge, firmly founded in the atman. (PU, 382)

'This knowledge does not effect emancipation, it is emancipation.' (PU, 346) Deussen previously identified the instigation of this last ashrama as a sign of the elevation of 'self-renunciation' over asceticism, which is undertaken in order to remove all obstacles to Perfect Knowledge. Apart from this, there is no longer a goal or a telos to the esoteric Vedantin 'practical philosophy'. By contrast, the Brahmin stage of the Sannyasin seems to have been instituted as a means to Perfect Knowledge. The Vedanta adopts its 'psychology', as Lee says, but internalises the goal-orientated techniques of Brahmin inculcation. There are no 'paths' leading to emancipation proposed by the Vedanta. As a passage from the Taittiriyana Upanishad says, 'The self (atman) is his pathfinder.'

The rejection of (good) works and asceticism, the emphasising of knowledge and the suppression of desire are proofs that this passage
has in view emancipation as a union with the Atman. (PU, 343)

There was an extremely important reason behind proving that emancipation, both specifically in the Vedanta and in general in the Upanishads, was envisaged as identity with the Atman/Brahman. Prior to Deussen’s work, it had been argued, most notably by Albrecht Weber, that the doctrine of *moksha* had been necessitated by the dogma of transmigration. Moksha, as conceived by the latter, was an escape from the eternal retribution of samsara: salvation by ‘cutting the knot’. (PU, 340) For Schopenhauerean philosophy, this would have been tantamount to an increase in the egoistic desire to avoid suffering, whereas moksha is the abrogation all desire. It is true that sufferings are removed in the enlightened state but, Deussen claims, Buddhism was the first to make the removal of sufferings the aim. (PU, 341) This is the reason behind his despair at the ‘overinflated’ value of Buddhism in Europe. Moksha must rather be seen as the necessary consequence and final consummation of the doctrine of the atman.

It is to be regarded only as a personal and so to speak practical application of the Upanishad view of the universe as a whole. (PU, 342)

This view takes on an extra significance when, in the context of his universal history, he approaches considering Man’s vocation for emancipation as the universal narrative of all cultures. In the universal anthropology he appears to offer there, he states that Man is innately conscious that ‘release from existence’ is not to be attained simply through death. (PU, 339) The notion that the discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal, being from becoming leads ‘naturally’ to this doctrine of emancipation forms the principle for Deussen’s practical philosophy.

It is a natural idea that finds expression in all the systems of philosophy when men regard that which for them is the first principle of things and the ultimate basis of the universe, as at the same time the highest aim of personal endeavour. (PU, 342: emphasis added)

Since a theological principle formed the basis of the ancient Vedic religion, union with gods after death was considered the highest aim. Later in the Upanishads, the impersonal Brahman was exalted above the gods, and this became the final goal; the gods were only the ‘doors’ by which Brahman was attained. The final step was taken before the doctrine of transmigration was introduced.

In the final step, the creative principle of the universe was conceived to be atman, the self, and...union with the atman became the aim of all
endeavour and longing. (Ibid)

The doctrine of the identity of Atman (self) and Brahman thus becomes the ‘principle’ of the esoteric Vedanta. In Sankara’s view, it is only for those who have not been able to attain this Perfect Knowledge on the first attempt, that the doctrine is elaborated ‘in empirical form’. In this representation, the natural world is said to be absorbed by consciousness as an illusionary reality of things and relations. ‘The self thereby comprehends all else as non-Self, non-Ego, non-Being’. The subject must break its circuits and ‘come back from absorption in contemplation of the external world’. This dialectical expression would suggest that the move to identity with the Brahman is made through sublation. However, while external nature is apparently negated, it is impossible to concede that anything has been preserved in the transitivity. The individual self recedes and expands into the unrepresentable self-consciousness of Brahman, pervading everywhere and everything. Much will be determined in this section by how this negation is played out. Deussen has outlined before that the negation of the Will denies egoism as a way of being in the world, but does not deny the world itself. The one who has been enlightened during his lifetime, the jivan mukta, can be said to have denied the will in this sense.

12. The Enlightened State of the Jivan Mukta
If the body is necessary so that the soul might experience and live out its karmic destiny, liberation implies a being ‘untouched by pleasure and pain’. For Sankara, liberation from Ignorance and transmigration cannot possibly be produced by works, since these inevitably demand corporeality for further atonement. Works are both transitory and differentiated, i.e. having multiple and dispersed effects. They stand in contradiction to the conception of liberation ‘as an eternal and paramount condition (admitting neither less nor more)’, which is absolute and thus without a supplement. (403)

As Deussen understands it, the Vedanta refers all action to an agent’s ‘will’. In the Vedanta, the will corresponds to the individual way of deciding and acting, ‘responding to the invitation of beings’ as it says, which always narrows the field of possibility down to ‘one way’. Thus an action is said to result in a necessary way from the chakti or potential of the individual. And as it always produces consequences, every deed implies recompense, reward or expiation. (This is reminiscent of Deussen’s axiom in the Elements that ‘to exist is to operate in space and time’.) Distorting a reference to St.
Paul, Deussen asserts that in Sankara’s view the law - ‘whether it be the Vedic or the Mosaic law’ - can unquestionably be fulfilled. However, it brings only reward on the path of transmigration, not liberation. (432) Deussen also agrees that it is possible to fulfil the law, ‘but in consequence of our innate egotism, [it] can be fulfilled only from selfish motives: hence its fulfilment has no moral value.’ (424) It is without value because it does not transform the innermost Will. Once identity with the unchanging, omnipresent, omniscient, eternal Brahman is achieved, there is no more individual ‘acting’, but only the consciousness of the self as the consciousness of all of Being. The restlessness of self-realisation and perpetual becoming cease: as Loy articulates it, ‘Actions are not mine, but Brahman’s.’ The highest Self, according to Vedantin philosophy cannot be an object of action, ‘since an action cannot realise itself otherwise than by altering the object to which it relates’. (403) No activity relates to the Self as object, so it can neither be influenced nor improved.

Beyond works, the liberated soul, ‘free, pure and wise’, is in an important expression also said to be beyond good and evil. Liberation can neither be attained by the morality of good and evil, which is to say through calculation, nor through pre-meditation by merit or law. Nor does any process of moral purification advance its aim. It is only achieved by perfect knowledge, samyagdarsanam. The expression ‘beyond Good and Evil’ in the Vedanta refers to the idea that the enlightened one’s actions are no longer subject to the chains of cause-and-effect, reward-and-punishment. Actions are released to a different type of causality, which could no longer be called a ‘law’ or a regime. It might be possible to consider that these actions no longer succumb to a telos: they are a-teleological. As regards karma, the future, hiding in the seeds of volitions and actions, becomes immediately other; and it is the same for the past, and the present, which consist of all of self’s limitations. Once it receives perfect knowledge, the self becomes other. This is why the Vedanta says that ‘through the power of knowledge’ , future works no longer cleave to the subject. He is no longer an agent, and the former works performed under this false delusion are also annihilated through its dissipation.

Nietzsche’s thought roams around this perimeter of the Vedanta in his Genealogy of Morals. Paraphrasing Sankara, he writes

‘What is done and remains undone’, says the believer in the Vedanta, ‘causes him no pain; as a wise man, he shakes off good and evil; his domain suffers through no further deed; he goes beyond good and evil,
The conclusion he draws from this is directly influenced by the comparison of Vedanta and Christianity which closes the work. It is highly significant that this connection is made with Nietzsche's praise for this aspect of the Vedantin philosophy. He endorses 'the realism' which, in the Indian and Christian system, denies the possibility of redemption through 'virtue, through moral improvement, regardless of how high the hypnotic value of virtue is set.' The passage continues: 'We ought then to respect the notion of 'redemption' in these great religions.' Given the refutation of concepts of Good and Evil, by both esoteric Vedanta and Nietzsche, this casts in a different light the remark attached to the letter to Overbeck, which was quoted earlier:

Deussen's Vedanta work is excellent. By the way I am practically the evil principle for this philosophy.

Reading Deussen's and Nietzsche's later work in juxtaposition would thoroughly reveal the joyfulfulness of Nietzsche's Zarathustran philosophy of affirmation being the 'evil principle' for exoteric Vedanta. Sankara's philosophy maintains that there is only Brahman, unconditioned, self-effulgent, unoriginated, all-pervasive, devoid of any modifications, ever-content. Anything different from this is illusion. This aspect of Non-Dualism has strong Monist tendencies, reducing everything to eternal Being. Thus for Nietzsche, this represents a philosophy that is hostile to life, becoming, the double affirmation and the love of fate. The most positive aspect of this 'Monist' doctrine might be the fact that it has an evil principle which ever seduces the sage back to the illusionary world of heterogeneity, where ephemera, imperfections, fragments, chance and destructiveness mix inevitably with the Ideas, the virtues, the eternal returning of samsara, compassion and non-egoistic ways of being. The 'Bataillean' side of Nietzsche would derive hope from being the evil principle of a doctrine that appears to aspire only to the eternal Being of the Beyond. Nietzsche mischievously dropped hints to Deussen in his letters that he read with glee the 'naïve' and innocent passages of the Vedanta which venerated eternal, attribute-less Being. In the classical expression of its doctrine,

Es kommt darin Alles auf's Naivste an's Licht, was ich in Hinsicht auf diese Denkweise geargwohnt habe; ich lese Seite fur Seite mit vollkommener 'Bosheit' – du kannst Dir keinen dankbareren Leser wünschen, lieber Freund!

13. The 'Practical Philosophy' of Moksha

However the operations and performative injunctions of the Sanskrit texts become
rather more elusive as he attempts to systematise the Vedantin 'morality'. This seems inevitable considering his task would ultimately consist in communicating the nature of the approach to total metaphysical knowledge; the soteriological doctrine of the Vedanta. Yet:

This knowledge does arise as a matter of fact; but we cannot inquire into its cause because it is not within the sphere of causality. (410)

This makes it all the more difficult to communicate using functional rather than poetic language. If Brahman is truly One without a second, it cannot be experienced as One. And this is suggested by the much emphasized claim that the atman of Vedanta is not self-conscious in the Cartesian sense:

He is never thought of, but is the thinker; He is never known, but is the knower. There is ... no other thinker than He, there is no other knower than He. (213)

In this section, I will examine Deussen's endeavour to present systematically the way in which moksha is achieved. He has already asserted that, according to Sankara, enlightenment cannot be achieved by the gradual stages of purification of the Brahmin ashramas. Neither is it to be found via the paths of the Fathers and the Gods. In Loy's aphoristic expression, for Non-Dualism, 'No-path is the path,/ No-path is the path.'

Brought down into the realm of representation, Moksha is said to be immediate; in Deussen's eyes, an immediate change of Will. In exploring Sankara's statements concerning the 'no-path' to Moksha, I will first discuss his rejection of both works and knowledge. There is no possibility of a gradual progression towards liberation in the course of a lifetime. In this sense, striving for gradual moral purification is rejected: works cannot be 'meritorious' in the search for deliverance. The Vedanta posits the identity of man and the 'creative first principle' of being. Its ethics is a-teleological because it considers that there is nothing futural about enlightenment; the identity of self and Brahman already exists. It becomes necessary to reconsider the question of works from the metaphysical perspective', as it were. Deussen encounters a side of the Vedanta which includes an exhortation to 'auxiliary works' and the notion that works continue in a certain sense for the enlightened one.

Sankara's rejection of works seems be aligned with the Protestant emphasis on 'faith alone', and echos Kant's denigration of rogatory cults in his Religion Within the Boundary of Pure Reason.
Sankara devotes much effort to refuting the Mimamsa view that the
purport of the Vedas is to inculcate dharma, ‘that which, being
desirable, is indicated by Vedic injunction.’

Sankara allows no comfortable refuge in any technique of salvation to be retained.
Thought-constructed dualism between practice as means and enlightenment as goal
objectifies the nondual Self into something, insofar as separate from the self can never
be attained. Practice becomes sharply concentrated into the simple need to realise,
which can only happen now, which does happen when liberation ceases to be objectified
into an effect that will occur. While later Advaita came to incorporate yogic practices
that cultivate meditative absorption, ‘Sankara does not recognise the necessity for any
practice, except perhaps for those of inferior intellect.’ What Deussen refers to as the
esoteric doctrine of moksha severs all possible means from any ends. No religious
practice can ever lead to enlightenment, since it maintains the very present/future,
cause/effect dualism that it is trying to escape. ‘It loses the Now which is the only
possible locus for liberation.’

It is in this sense that Sankara rejects knowledge as a means to liberation. This is quite
difficult for Deussen to integrate into the System of the Vedanta given that he claims
that knowledge is the essence of Man’s being in this philosophy. For Sankara, what can
be described as the ‘will-to-knowledge’ would constitute a form of action. All seeking,
investigating and busying with are obstacles to revealing Brahman as the identity of all
Being.

In a dense passage of Sankara’s commentary, knowing as the action of the intellect is
shown to be dependent upon the will of the agent, who chooses and nurtures its
realisation. ‘It can be done, left undone, or be done otherwise; every sacrificial work is
such an action, such too is meditation.’ (406-7) In contrast to works, perfect knowledge
cannot succumb to partial or relativist entelechy. It cannot, like a deed, be done in one
way or another. Indeed, says Sankara, ‘it entirely depends not upon any human action
(sic), but upon the quality of the object to be known’. Considering the ‘object’ here is
the ultimate reality of Brahman, this is to say that total knowledge cannot be objectified.
It cannot be approached with human intentionality. This formula, which displaces
somewhat the Schopenhauerean recourse to ‘Grace’ as the serendipitous envoy of
release. Sankara’s commentary, reads:

“Man is a fire”, “woman is a fire”; this is an invitation to conceive of
man, or woman as a fire, and its realisation depends upon the choice of
the conceiver; on the contrary the knowledge of actual fire as such
depends not upon any invitation or action of man, but only upon the
object which lies before the eyes, and thus it is knowledge and not
action. (407)

This statement might imply the crudest of empiricisms were it not that, for Sankara, the
expressions ‘Atman is Brahman’ (the individual self is the Cosmic Self) and ‘tat tvam
asi’ (this thou art) are not of the order of metaphor but of the evidence of something
‘which lies before the eyes’.* This assertion emphasises that the Atman/Brahman
doctrine does not submit itself to any order of proof, since it claims to incorporate all
modes of evidence in itself as perfect knowledge, *samyagdarsanam*. In relation to this
Perfect Knowledge, the knowing of the I is equated with the individual way of acting as
a way of being which restricts and limits the world, obscuring the identity of self and
Brahman.

Sankara’s point might also imply that perfect knowledge is disclosed by a kind of
‘letting be’ of the thing which is to be known. That is, ‘letting be’ involves neither
action nor ordinary knowledge, in that it does not grasp things through negation, ‘in one
way or another’. In this way, perfect knowledge depends only on the nature of
Brahman, and not upon any ‘invitation’, whether issued by the Veda or by the names
and forms. It corroborates the rejection of the objective morality of duty and law,
described above, in which what is moral is defined by the object of an idea, e.g. the
Good. In the Upanishads, Brahman is an object neither to be sought for nor avoided,
since its purpose is ‘liberation from all that is to be done’. (407) The ‘tools’ of the organs
of sense, activity and intellection are relinquished.

Despite having earlier argued earlier for their futility, the soteriological doctrine also
outlines a way to perfect knowledge which includes works and devout meditation.
These can be considered to be ‘auxiliaries’ to the attainment of knowledge. (411)
Deussen insists however that this must be a ‘deviation from the logical system and a
concession to practical demands’. (310) It spoils the transcendent and metaphysical
nature of knowledge to mix it with considerations of ego-life. The ‘purity’ of the
metaphysics of morality seems to be at stake.

* It also recalls the speculative mystery of the Hegelian ‘is’, in the maxim ‘the real is rational and the
rational is real’.
Nevertheless such an approach is consistent within Advaita Non-Dualism. It also recalls how in Pierre Hadot’s investigations, the ancients engaged in spiritual practices, conscious that perfect knowledge was inaccessible. The ancients conceived that ‘real wisdom does not merely cause us to know: it makes us ‘be’ in a different way’.  

The ancients knew that they would never be able to realise wisdom within themselves as a stable, definitive state, but they at least hoped to accede to it in certain privileged moments, and wisdom was the transcendent norm which guided their action.

The works and meditation that might be practised as ‘means’ to liberation were methodically expounded by Sankara; but are merely listed by Deussen, expediting material which he deems un-rigorous. Deussen himself never addresses himself to these catechisms. This lacuna was thoroughly compensated for by the translator, the American Charles Johnston, whose life’s project was to present a dogmatic formulation of the practical philosophy of the Vedanta. The many essays he published in the journal of the Theosophical Society tender didactic versions of Sankara’s counsels, which he refers to as ‘the Six-Jewelled Crown of the Vedanta’, a title taken from Sankara himself.

Nevertheless Deussen easily allies himself with Sankara’s view that the study of the Vedic sutras was useful in ‘diverting man from the natural drift of his thoughts’. This was equally true of the imperatives they outlined directed to ‘removing obstacles’ to perfect knowledge. If karmic factors are stronger than the operation of knowledge and interfere with it, then Sankara concede the necessity,

\[
\text{to regulate the train of remembrance of the knowledge of the Self by having recourse to means such as renunciation and dispassion; but it is not something that is to be enjoined, being a possible alternative.}
\]

Five ‘external’ means to knowledge are posited: Vedic study, sacrifice, alms, penance and fasting. These criteria previously determined an end rather than a means, as leading to the path of the Fathers. By contrast, the means which are literally ‘closer’ or in Deussen’s translation, ‘internal’, are comprised of virtues or states of consciousness as opposed to delimitable duties. They are: serenity, self-restraint, renunciation, patience.

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5 Deussen disliked the Theosophists and despaired of their ‘wildly imaginative’ misrepresentations of the ‘noble philosophic instinct of the Indians’. He refused to be introduced to Col. Olcott during a brief, accidental encounter in the waiting room of a railway station near Benares in 1892. (EI, 142)
and concentration. (Three of these virtues re-occur in the list of the eight agra's or spiritual elements of Yoga, c.f. PU, 387-95) With the exception of fasting, all these practices are orientated to contemplation and introspective reflection rather than austerity. They resemble, in a general sense, three of the spiritual practices Hadot mentions of the Stoics and Epicureans: ‘peace of mind (ataraxia), inner freedom (autarkeia), and a cosmic consciousness’.56

This perspective emphasises the disclosing of essential Being through other ways of being illuminated by these spiritual practices. It would be strictly opposed to the Schopenhauerean emphasis on the nirvana principle of Indian philosophy. In response to the question which arises for Deussen, ‘does ethics negate the world, or negate the Will-to-Life?’, this section of the Vedanta is more likely to endorse ataraxia than asceticism. Sankara himself sees the aim of the practices precisely in the elimination of obstacles so that the subject ‘is not overpowered by affections, such as Passion, etc.’. (411) This particular point is related by Loy to the question of energy. In following the ataraxic practices, physical energy is no longer direct towards satisfying cravings and the world is no longer approached as a set of situations to be manipulated to satisfy those cravings. This releases the self from ego-existence and Will. In his characteristically direct expression, Loy says ‘By understanding that the same energy that moves my body activates everything else, ... we experience a great freedom: the world is vast and wide.’57

The values described here do not play a meritorious role in the scheme of salvation. They cannot produce Perfect Knowledge as a direct result, since the latter is neither subject to prescribed rules, nor can it be precipitated by any means. These practices indispensably remain ‘auxiliaries’. In this function, they also serve as substitutions for older rules of the Brahmanic order. The Commentaries mention how these means vouchsafe the grace of knowledge ‘even to such as from poverty cannot perform the works of the ashramas’. (412)

Orlan Lee’s thesis is that this ideal form of spiritual life was accessible only to the Brahmin priest, who derived his livelihood from being the source of the regulation of ritual life in society, rather than from the produce of his own land.58 Others might not have the resources either to pay for Brahmanic instruction, or to leave their own plot of land to lead a meditational life in the forest or to survive as a mendicant. The changes
that were made by the Vedanta undermined the older order in which it was the Brahman's prerogative to direct how one participated in one's own spiritual well-being. Deussen's theory importantly places these changes before the Buddhist 'revolution', allowing for spiritual practice to become more internalised and 'democratic'. As Lee asserts,

The essential element of the Vedantin Reformation remains the seizure of a personal role in one's own salvation. This 'Reformation' - a reorientation from within - kept the psychology of Vedic philosophy but rejected the effectiveness of ritual practice. The older ritual order of society, sacrifice, and religious works become superfluous if the individual realises for himself the identity of self and Brahman.

The exhortation to meditation as a means to knowledge further confirms the argument that in Vedanta, for the spiritual outlook of the renunciant, the individual is complete in himself. In the Upanishads it is stated:

Atman verily is to be beheld, is to be heard, taught upon, and meditated upon. (Br.Up.)

Him shall ye investigate, him shall ye seek to know. (Ch.Up.) (321)

Deussen interprets this only to mean that meditation may be a cumulative exercise; it must be frequently made, 'until intuition occurs, just as one must go on threshing until the grain is freed from the husk.' (413) In a vague analogy to Cartesian analysis, first one doubt, then another must be removed so that perfect knowledge my be attained. In Vedantic philosophy, the obstacles removed by this process are the organs of differentiation, the limiting upadhis. 'As the tortoise draws in all its limbs', the emanations of atman, i.e. the senses and the active mind are withdrawn into man, checked and enclosed in the heart. 'The objects of sense are brought to rest and the senses restrained as in sleep.' (PU, 389) In this meditation, the two concepts tat, Being, the Brahman, and tvam, the inner Self, the witness Sakshin, are brought together to identify each other through meditation. The Yoga of Patanjali goes further than the Vedanta in allowing for the effectiveness of concentration and meditation. It concedes that, in Deussen words,

Meditation becomes absorption when the subject and object, the soul and God are so completely blended into one that the consciousness of the separate subject altogether disappears and there succeeds that which... is described as niratmakatvam (selflessness). (PU, 392)
As already stated, Sankara considers meditation to be an auxiliary practice but not an alternative to gaining the consciousness of identity with Brahman. Deussen seemed to accept this on the level of removing obstacles to the negation of the Will, but his systematisation begins to go awry is when Sankara paradoxically states that although works cease when Perfect Knowledge is attained, ‘certain other obligations still persist for the knower’. (411) Deussen’s own philosophy does not contain any speculation about acting or even existence in the Will-less state. This seems to bring the discussion concerning moral actions full circle. The doctrine of liberation has detracted from sacrifice, offerings and ritual actions. These encapsulated what Deussen called morals of ‘external value’, whose effect was recognised and judged, in a sense, partly by the community of men. Perfect Knowledge has also gone beyond Tapas and Asceticism. These were construed as ‘teleological’ actions which maintained moksa as a futural event. Finally, the doctrine of moksa also rejected knowledge for the same reason, since it objectified both the identity of Atman/Brahman and the event of deliverance. In other words, we might say that Non-Dualist Vedanta rejects philosophy for the same reasons.

This oscillation between mediated and immediate identity with Brahman is summed up by Badarayana’s metaphor of the pharmakon. Works, he says, are an auxiliary to liberation ‘just as even poison may serve as medicine’. (412, ff134) This logic is also encountered in the view of the illusionary world as a fever that contributes to curing an illness. At this point, there is only a latent distinction between esoteric and exoteric doctrine, thus producing a problematic ellipsis in Deussen’s systematisation.

The Brihadaranyaka Upanishada says, ‘he who knows this [Brahman], he is calm, resigned, subdued, patient and collected’. (411) The ataraxic dispositions of the mind continue to be practised by the jivan mukta. At another point, Sankara intimates that although obligation ceases, the knower may continue to perform works if he chooses, which yet no longer adhere to the moral limitation and cling to this soul. It is in this manner that the sage is beyond Good and Evil: his actions no longer enter in the general economy of cause and effect, punishment and reward. With an oblique reference to the ancient ancestral cults of immortality, his Commentary asserts:

> Whether the knower shall perform works rests with himself to choose; no necessity for so doing, for example, for begetting offspring, exists....'Wherefore do we need offspring, we whose soul is this
universe'. For the fruit of knowledge does not, like the fruit of works consist in something future, but is based upon immediate (inner) perception. (406: emphasis added)

Deussen, perhaps too quickly, interprets this as announcing the annihilation of the world extended through names and forms, once the knower has dispelled the Ignorance on which it rests. Yet the existence of the world as the arena for expiating karmic reserves is the very illusion, dissipated by samyagdarsanam. His further instinct is to read this an ascetic vow of chastity; which is more prescriptive than the verse suggests.

Another way of interpreting this 'acting without necessity' is to consider it as an example of acting viewed from the transcendental standpoint. There is no bifurcation between the self-conscious subject and 'his' action. The decisions are not made by 'him'. Without the interference the self creates, Brahman's all-encompassing web of causal conditions is indeed seamless. 'Thoughts and actions well up from a source unfathomably deep, or from nowhere.'60 The enlightened one engages in spontaneous, unselfconscious action. This is not to say that the action is random or irrelevant; the exhortation to 'concentration' orientates him to appropriate action which is, at the same time, in a way both completely caused and uncaused. In order to explore further what this might mean, David Loy quotes from Meister Eckhardt:

> The just man wants nothing, seeks nothing, and has no reason for doing anything. As God, having no motives, acts without them, so the just man acts without motives. As life lives on for its own sake, needing no reason for being, so the just man has no reason for doing what he does.61

Eckhardt's statement seems to articulate the way of being, knowing and acting of the 'un-selfed self' Deussen referred to in his philosophy of aesthetics. In the next chapter we will explore Deussen's response to the problem of seeking out how the unknown, individual self and cosmic Self has previously appeared in the history of philosophy, despite the fact that the truth of this eternal Self of the cosmos cannot enter into the time of the world.
4. The Universal History of Philosophy

Aber wo viele Lichter zusammenkommen, da wird viel Licht. (I.1, vi)

1. Introduction

In July 1917 in Kiel, Deussen completed the last part of the six volume Universal History of Philosophy which had taken thirty-five years to prepare. Like every universal history, it inextricably engages the reader in the production of an imaginative picture of the world. From this image, we can tell how the author constructs the experience of history for himself and for his audience.

This world-image has much in common with a map. The map is both the memory of a past journey and an imaginative conjecture of a future journey. Yet it is crucial that its representational form exclude all the instability of its relationship to time and to the territory. As antique maps with their obsolete place names remind us – Persia, Abyssinia, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Babylon – maps as material artefacts include in their own representation the impossibility of overcoming the movement between presence and absence, between subjective and objective on which they depend. A map reflects the problem that bringing an eternal truth into the interior of time produces only heterogeneity and the most unstable relationality. As Jenckes says in her work on Borges’ famous map* in his Universal History of Infamy:

...[in the map], the particular and the abstract evade closure even as their uneven engagement paradoxically represents a certain union. The map, which holding its constituent elements apart, also holds them together.¹

The only time when maps ever achieve perfect stability is when they are no longer being used. Yet taking an old map out of a drawer can still be an ontologically risky incident.

It is important to mark this from the beginning because the universal history involves the same relationship between instability and closure, between seeking and showing. It projects the reader into an imagined universal community, all the members of which share the same universal history. It does this pre-emptively and while reader and author are still constructing it through reading/ writing the book. This repeats the problem

* The map which covers the territory in the story Of Exactitude in Science, discussed in Baudrillard’s Simulations.
already encountered in the *Elements of Metaphysics* of the relationship between the particular and the universal. There, this problem appeared as the elusive explanation for the differentiation of individuals from the Idea of Man and the Will. It now recurs in the question of the relationship between the individual and *philosophia perennis*. Since Deussen, like other neo-Kantians, insists that this relationship is a non-dialectical (non-Hegelian) one, he seems compelled to search for a stable, structural solution. He frames his response in terms of a universally accessible yet subjective insight, a moment of 'initiation', a vision of the Thing-in-itself, but this fails to eliminate instability and areas of the unknown from his map of world philosophy.

When he compares the history of philosophy with a map, it is because its value lies in it being grasped and employed by the readership. Abandoning the history of philosophy, he says, would be like throwing away all the maps and descriptions of a country in order to wander there oneself. Such a person would certainly experience the valleys and mountains, rivers and seas more immediately and essentially than is possible with even the most precise map.

However he would only at length and perhaps never understand the river networks and the range of the mountains and never arrive at a representation of the whole....The first and most essential task of the history of philosophy is to present the whole of a philosophical system in a short overview (*Überblick*) in order to put us in a position to correctly comprehend the details when studying philosophy. (I.1, 28-29)

This metaphor recalls that of the mountain-climber of Chapter 2 who reaches the highest peak by discovering the metaphysics of morality. Without a panoramic vista of the whole landscape, the inter-connectivity of the whole can never be understood. The point of arriving at this understanding, according to the *Elements*, is in order to see that the whole thing must be changed if man is to be freed from the world of necessity, unfreedom and the blind Will-to-live.

This absoluteness always seems deferred in Deussen's history. His project nonetheless seeks the supreme picture of the whole, the incommensurable element which contains itself and all the other elements of the series. It can only be achieved within the individual. If we consider the *Universal History* as presenting another element of Metaphysics, it tries to locate that final incommensurable element that Deussen believes
will complete Man's metaphysical consciousness and initiate that turning of the Will to denial. Unlike the Elements which was conceived for individual instruction, this book is also addressed to the philosophical community as an appeal to renew the original spirit of philosophy the uncovering of the principles of affirmation and denial.

2. The Mission for India
The writing of the Allgemeine Geschichte spanned a long period of time. In its prefaces Deussen often looks back over his life in terms of the Hippocratic schema of measuring existence in seven year periods. The first seven, 1873 – 1880, served for 'linguistic preparation' for his plan of bringing together his two 'beloveds': Sanskrit and philosophy. This second septet, ending in 1887, produced the System of the Vedanta and the lengthy Sanskrit-German translation of the Sutras of the Vedanta and the Commentary of Sankara. Then in the phase following the Sankara work, he relates how his plan to devote himself to Indian philosophy changed and was widened to encompass a general history of philosophy. His permanent appointment as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kiel in 1889 would provide a stable platform for his work. Perhaps he realised from the success of the System of the Vedanta that it was necessary to establish the legitimacy of Indian through the academic institution. In 1891 he reached

...the decision to present the philosophy of India as an integrated part of a general history of philosophy and thereby to introduce it into the circle of the philosophical disciplines. (II.3, vii)

Indian ideas needed to pass into the European canon. Deussen's aspiration for Indian thought to belong to a living tradition of philosophical discourse can be contrasted with the western tendency described by Said to associate eastern culture with a distant, archaic past - even a mythological past- and to avoid considering it as active in the current movements of world history. Enough time had passed since the great 'opening of the archives of humanity', as Schwab described the Orientalists' scrabble for Eastern manuscripts and their translations. Three years later the first volume of the Universal History of Philosophy was published (1894).

In the third septrional period between 1887 and 1894, the newly-married Deussen and his wife travelled extensively - in Italy, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Egypt, Palestine – visiting Nietzsche in Sils-Maria in 1887. 1892 marked Deussen's extraordinary visit to India which is documented in the philosophical travelogue Indian Reminiscences (1904). His account follows his tour throughout colonial India,
describing its main cities, shrines, pilgrimages and many holy spots of Hindu, Parsi and Muslim faiths plus the leading men of various communities and classes. Above all, the landscape's evocation of the places and events of the ancient Vedas predominates throughout. Deussen continued to see shadows of the ancient society in the people and in his surroundings, so that India seemed to him to be a kind of 'Pompeii' where the classical past and the present melted into each other as in a dream-world. This anecdote encapsulates succinctly Deussen's view of history, his 'mission' as a historian of philosophy to bring the past and the present into encounter with each other.

It includes the text of his address to Royal Asiatic Society in Bombay (25 February 1893) on the subject of the Vedanta. Deussen was fluent in English but it was his proficiency in Sanskrit, the sacred language of the Vedas, that allowed him to converse with an incredible diversity of people from the Maharaja of Benares to pandits, holy men and ascetics. The introductions he had acquired through the Oriental Congresses in Europe - to merchants, lawyers, nobles and teaching staff of the various Sanskrit colleges - were invaluable since many of these people became his guides to Indian society. However his status as a foreigner and therefore as a **Sudra** or pariah, made access to the Brahmin caste extremely problematic. He was nevertheless determined to sponsor officiants who would perform the **agnihotram** or fire sacrifice for him. Ultimately he was disappointed at the inauthenticity of what turned out to be a most unspiritual spectacle for tourists.

In view of his plan of integrating eastern and western philosophy, one of the most striking things about the book is the account of his own formal exclusion from Indian society and how he nevertheless negotiated access to philosophical and religious intellectual life while he was in India. He had frequent recourse to the appeal that in a previous birth he had been a Brahmin but as a consequence of some sin, had been reincarnated as a European and that he hoped to redeem himself by studying the Veda and the Vedanta: an explanation which as often evoked derision, scorn and sympathy. (EI, 84, 200) Of his understanding of the philosophy being taught in India, he wrote:

> What pleases to term itself philosophy here, at home in Germany, in England, and - as far as English influence extends - in India, is no longer the **Wissenschaft** of Plato and Aristotle, but a psychological system of experimenting, the actual value of which is decidedly questionable, and which may be looked upon as an ante-chamber into
the halls of philosophy, though now it presumes to oust true philosophy and to usurp its place. (EI, 106)

This comment reflects his long term concern with the question of the 'true philosophy', or the question of validity in philosophy. The development of Deussen's engagement with Indian philosophy and his plans for writing a universal history of philosophy - despite the magnitude of these subjects in themselves - belong within the horizon of this question. In the quotation above, he uses language which reflects a power struggle. An impoverished empirical psychology promotes itself as philosophy proper, both in Europe and India, and threatens to usurp the more essential metaphysics for which it is simply a propadeautic. We can see that his struggle for Indian philosophy is also a struggle against a certain type of European philosophy. According to Deussen, metaphysics is the proper dwelling place for philosophical thought. Philosophy cannot be limited to the logic of the Given, of 'what is', since this cannot provide the foundation of its own validity. Metaphysics must discover what exceeds the essent (what is), discover what is more fundamental to it, i.e. the being which is its ultimate foundation. This however points towards an infinite regression or a vicious circle between condition and conditioned. Can metaphysics be more than the history of metaphysics and thus the history of this vicious circle?

Eventually, his plan took three further septroinal periods to achieve. The publication of his three volumes on the history of Indian philosophy was accompanied by original translations: *Sixty Upanishads* (still authoritative) and *Four Philosophical Texts from the Mahabharata* (including the Bhagavad Gita). With the feeling of having elevated the status of Indian philosophy through his comprehensive *Gesamtdarstellung*, he wrote, 'I could in 1908 consider my mission (Mission) for India launched' (II.3, vii), i.e. the proselytising of Indian ideas in Europe. After this, he turned to the philosophy of Greeks and a minor publication on Boehme, followed by a volume on the Bible and the Middle Ages. The massive work concluded in 1917 with the history of the *Neue Philosophie* from Descartes to Schopenhauer.

3. The Definition of Philosophy

The Introduction to the whole oeuvre defines the concept of philosophy and prepares the *Grundlage* from which Deussen will launch his interpretation, his evaluation of Eastern and Western philosophy. It deliberately addresses the question 'What is philosophy?' to the history of thought.
The question of the definition of philosophy is an important starting point. Taking into account the comparative foundation of his enterprise, Deussen notes simply, ‘A general name for our discipline is lacking’. (1.1, 1) However this problem extended beyond the boundaries of histories of philosophy. The definition of philosophy and its relation to its historical manifestations troubled the inheritors of the Kantian and Hegelian legacy as a whole. ‘Kantians distinguished between philosophy itself and the history of philosophy. Kant had raised modern philosophy onto a higher level.’2 Thus emphasis was placed on employing Kant’s architectonic and sustaining the transcendental and critical method. Little importance was placed on the history of philosophy. The brevity of Kant’s treatment of this theme in the Critique of Pure Reason seemed to justify such a view. Hegel directly undertook to deal with the quasi-vacuum which Kant had created of the history of philosophy. He identified philosophy with the history of philosophy. Through the Spirit of philosophy, which was manifested in him, he claimed to write philosophy’s autobiography.

The truth of Kantian philosophy itself, Hegel argues, can be proved only by a study of the dialectic from which it results. Logic alone does not demonstrate truth in philosophy; history is necessary for its complete understanding and justification.3

Of course after Hegel, many protested against his metaphysical definition of philosophy as the Spirit’s coming to self-realisation in history. Schopenhauer completely rejected the dialectic, famously writing ‘The material of history is the transient complexities of a human world moving like clouds in the wind, entirely transformed by the most trifling accident.’4

Yet many others were struck by the enormous implications of the question of development of the history of Spirit in philosophy. In a commentary on Nietzsche’s history of Greek philosophy, Whitlock discusses a number of such philosophers whom he describes as variously sympathetic to Hegel and as ‘proto-Neo-Kantian’ including Friedrich Ueberweg, Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann von Helmholtz, Eduard Zeller and, to an extent, Jacob Burckhardt. While the influence of these figures on Nietzsche’s early work must be carefully considered, we can note from the outset that Deussen lists Ueberweg, Zeller and the latter’s pupil, Kuno Fischer as prominent sources for his history of philosophy. Ueberweg’s work was the standard textbook on the history of philosophy in German universities. It was highly critical of Hegel’s definition of

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philosophy as the science of the absolute in the form of dialectical development. He argued that this could hardly be reconciled with what is universal – and perhaps eternal – in philosophy:

Such definitions as limit philosophy to a definite province (as, in particular, the definition often put forward in recent times, that philosophy is 'the science of spirit'), fail at least to correspond with the universal character of the great systems of philosophy up to the present time, and can hardly be assumed on the basis of an historical exposition.5

The concerns of Ueberweg were also taken up by another of Deussen's main sources, the historian Johann Eduard Erdmann, whom Hubscher described as 'the first to start with efforts, which get under way in the middle of the century, to unite Hegel and Schopenhauer'.6 Erdmann shared with Fischer the idea of a spiritual development in history as an idea which is never attained. Their approach was obliged to think the historical trajectory of the intellect and Will together, without reinstating dialectics. Thus they did not distinguish between the speculative and the practical but saw philosophy, religion, art and science existing as 'intellectual creations side by side with the physical'.7 As we will see, Deussen shared this view to an extent but, given his personal philosophical principle of ennobling negation, he continued to wrestle with the problem of explaining the relation between history, the Thing-in-itself and the individual.

Although he proposes various solutions in the course of the Universal History, there is a clear refusal of Hegelianism from the outset. When Deussen argues that understanding the Indian world-view will reveal the 'colossal one-sidedness' of 'our entire religious and philosophical thought', he continues by saying that it will make us realise

...that there may be quite another way of treating things than that which Hegel construed to be the only possible and reasonable way.

(I.1, 36)

This statement emphasises that a comparative approach to Indian philosophy is importantly of practical and not just scholarly value. However, as Halbass has pointed out, this reference to Hegel demonstrates that the 'colossal one-sidedness' Deussen hopes to alleviate ‘is not related to the Western tradition per se, but to a certain dominant trend of Western thought.'8
We have already observed how Deussen replaced the *Elements of Metaphysics*’ struggle with the concept of teleology with the *System of the Vedanta’s* eschatology. In the *Allgemeine Geschichte*, his approach to the problematic concept of development maintains this relationship to individual enlightenment. The philosophical development which is never completed in historical time is only completed in the individual, in the illuminated moment of the mutual identification of ego-self and Thing-in-itself which demolishes the barrier of time (‘*Tat tvam asi*’). While Deussen may well speak Platonically of an ultimate *eidos* of truth and its reflections in past philosophy, he is sharply aware of the necessity to deal with the history of philosophy on the level of proof in support of the Idealism he espouses. There follows the quasi-Kantian kind of argument which says: if Idealism is true, it is universal. Deussen’s History endeavours to demonstrate that Idealism is universal and thus it is true philosophy. While the shimmering paradox of this argument sometimes appears tautologous, it should nevertheless not be seen as a sterile vicious circle or dead end. As all of the Kantian and Hegelian philosophers mentioned above had grasped, with the definition of philosophy the whole future of philosophy is at stake. As we now turn to Deussen’s definition of philosophy, it can be noted in advance that the search for the productive ‘seed’ (*Kern*) of philosophy emerges as the central metaphor of his historical method. He continuously recalls the fact that his history endeavours to produce a foundation for all future philosophy.

In the *Elements*, Deussen defined philosophy in general by its need to present itself as a supplement to empirical knowledge. Science otherwise is capable of developing infinitely without ever reaching a comprehensive grasp of existence. Bolstering the Kantian transcendental deduction with six other postulates, he arrived there at an unequivocal statement of the definition of philosophy. It will be recalled that in the comparative triads which he introduced, he also drew on the testimony of Indian, Greek and Christian metaphysics.

> Clearly and incontestably the great doctrine of Idealism, this very root of all religion and philosophy, appears as the result of our inquiries so far. (EM, 53)

This statement may have sufficed for the philosopher-author of that metaphysical text, but for the historian this generalisation is inadequate. Deussen now focuses on investigating the history of philosophy as a discontinuous series of principles whose role it is to ground the connection between supplement and supplemented. Philosophy’s
all-important feature is that it is ‘systematic’, he claims. From our study of his *Elements of Philosophy*, we know that by systematic he means the total elaboration of the relationship between the *Weltprinzip* and the appearance of the world. The later work takes a step back from the difference between phenomenal and noumenal being to the question of how a principle might posit the being of Being. How in a broader sense does the principle ground ways of knowing and acting and reveal the world in a particular way? This question makes the *Allgemeine Geschichte* much more than a chronicle of past systems of thought.

4. The Idealist Definition of Philosophy

He states that the history of philosophy must ‘do justice to’ the concept of philosophy in face of the absence of a fully comprehensive representation of its idea. The impossibility of precision in outlining a concept of philosophy reflects this curious life of thought. The concept of philosophy must possess the same dynamism that Deussen imputed to the representations of art. Yet if ‘Philosophical thought is incapable of being technically demarcated, delimited (abgegrenzt) from the rest of the world of thought,’ (I.1, 1) this is because it is representation in the form of abstract thought. This seemingly implies that philosophy means somehow ‘partaking’ in the noumenal rather than just thinking about it: a true mode of being rather than second-hand representation.

For now, it can be remarked that this disjunction in philosophical representation leads Deussen to a strange disembodiment of thought, and even in the opening statement philosophy seems to be concerned principally with a set of exceptional brains. He writes:

> The history of philosophy is the history of a series of thoughts about the *Wesen der Dinge*, which have appeared in the course of the centuries in a number of sublime minds and which, related by them, have been understood, approved and disseminated in greater or smaller circles. (I.1, 1)

By introducing the notion of the series [Latin = row, chain], this idea of the history of philosophy eschews both the linear narrative and the nihilist refusal to acknowledge historical sense. History is best considered in a form other than human or organic life with its preconceived notions of linearity, descendence and finitude.

What the philosophies gathered in the *Universal History* have in common is a schema
which claims that their principles are legitimate because they explain how being appears. Surveying the principles which have been formulated in the course of history, he says:

All these efforts, as varied as they are, have one thing in common. They consider the Dasein of the world and its appearance as something which cannot be understood from itself. Even though it may be continually clarified through empirical knowledge, it still requires further enlightenment. All of these philosophies posit a principle from which they endeavour to grasp (begreifen) the Dasein of the world. (I.1, 4)

Given the reign of the principium individuationis in the phenomenal world, it is impossible, Deussen has already stated, to posit anything other than an Ideal definition of the concept of philosophy. Yet clearly a criterion of selection has been applied in composing this series, though one which, at first, appeared to Halbfass to be entirely subjective and 'ahistorical'. A criterion for selecting 'true' philosophy is established here despite the fact that the Thing-in-itself is necessarily, eternally absent from the horizon of representational consciousness. In this, it is analogous to the Platonic anamnesis: the attempt to recall something one does not actually know or remember. (I.I,1)

The common element of philosophical thoughts is not an internal determination but lies beyond them in the Thing-in-itself. Beyond time, beyond space, the Idea of philosophy remains eternal despite its reflections sometimes appearing incoherent or grotesque to finite cognition. Pre-empting his second attempt at definition philosophy, we can see that for Deussen, '[Philosophy] is essentially the search for the Thing-in-itself'.(I.1,2)

His project of re-newing philosophy is one of re-membering the moments when thought penetrated the ground of all being in the world: the instances of true philosophy. Gathering together these philosophies, he seems to try to complete a 'map' of the 'metaphysical world', which otherwise can only be received as an artistic or mystical insight or else remains invisible but present in moral action; as if it were possible to force a way through phenomenal being on the strength of comprehending the totality. I will return to this later in the discussion of his view of the function of the history of philosophy. The challenge his definition responds to, is that in lieu of a predetermined pattern of simulacra, the history of philosophy shows that the Idea disseminates its sameness in different ways. Hence the importance of the universal as a (unifying)
response to the abundant articulations and divisions of the Idea.

Philosophy's search for a definition of its own concept is confounded by the heterogeneity historically ruling among systems. What one system deliberately includes, another expressly excludes. In India, the names of the different systems approximate their varying principles: 'Mimamsa or research, Sankhyam or speculation, Nyaya or analysis'. (I.1, 1) This simple self-identification reflects the originality of Indian systems. Unlike most abendländische systems which 'arose in the historical succession of a coherent tradition,' Indian schools arose simultaneously and independently of each other. (I,1, 2) Thus their differences are not due to agonal or historical, dialectical reasons. This magnifies the originality of Indian thought: in Deussen's metaphor, it is more Kern than Schale. He also suggests that it is because Europeans have been stultified by their own tradition that they have ignored the originality of Indian thought for so long. In the west, he claims, only the ancient systems of Greece rivalled India in originality, as they too arose independently and simultaneously. This appraisal clearly extracts both Greek and Indian philosophy from their embeddedness in social and historical realities. As will be seen, the hermeneutical analysis he embarks on rejects outright any dialectical relationship between historical representation and eternal, 'original' truth. The purity of the latter must be maintained as a guarantee of its status as philosophia perennis.

5. The Principial Form of Philosophy
The names for the Greek systems also reflected their originality. Although the term had been used at least since Pythagoras, 'philosophy' was born when Socrates established a general principle for it. (Zeller had made the point that the term philosopher did not gain currency until this time.)

The word philosophy, 'love of wisdom', which has been used in a general way since Socrates and Plato, originally included all kinds of knowledge (alle Wissenschaften). Indeed it contained something more; for wisdom (sophia) is Wissenschaft (episteme) plus the neighbouring concept of a specific influence on the common relations of men in cultural and moral respects (geistiger und sittlicher Hinsicht). (I.1,2)

The original factor in the term philosophy is that it embraced both the ordering of knowledge and its supplement: Wissenschaft and the influence on man's spiritual, cultural and moral conduct. This conception seems to resonate with an authority beyond
itself. Something was lost with the disintegration of wisdom into specialisations and partial disciplines. What Deussen claims is an original unified wisdom contrasts sharply with cultures which segregate Wissenschafter from ethics. It emphasises the distinction between original wisdom and the specialist divisions of modern European culture. Since Socrates and Plato:

Some [philosophies] dealt with all Wissenschaften, whereas others excluded some parts; some emphasised the purely theoretical character of philosophy, whereas others gave prominence to the practical conduct which ensued from philosophical pursuits. (I.1, 2)

As he will explain, the idea of holistic wisdom endures despite the subsequent differentiations of general and specific metaphysics because, from seen from the highest standpoint, it is neither purely representational nor concerned with ego-relations in human community. In contrast to self-sufficient regimes and techniques of knowing and acting, philosophy can be identified by its unifying search for a total explanation of Being (‘the Dasein of the world’).

Still lacking in a definition of philosophy, Deussen observes that this unifying thought has been ‘ein roter Faden’, a leitmotiv or leading theme which always reappears even in of moments of decline or obscurcation of the philosophical endeavour. The term Faden or 'thread' was also employed by Kant in his essay ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, in which he ostensibly imagines how world history might be written according to philosophical rules of discourse. For Kant, this trope enables man to give a sense to his judgements by orienting them in terms of a purposiveness (Zweckmäßigheit) despite the impossibility of identifying the final purpose, (Zweck) or the horizon which would give the ultimate meaning to history. At the very least, the Kantian Faden represents the ineliminable sense of the difference of the future which each thing feels even if the line which connects them to it is at different times taut or slack. The philosophical discourse of the leading or guiding thread, the Leitfaden itself goes beyond this feeling of difference in order to produce difference and the future. Philosophically, if one proceeds as if Nature does not work without a purpose:

...if one writes a history in accordance with an Idea of how the course of the world must be, if it is to lead to certain rational ends,...a guiding thread will be revealed.11

As well as clarifying the past confusion of human history, for Kant the Leitfaden can orientate human activity to the creation of a future in which ‘all the seeds planted by
Nature’ can fully develop. To proceed as if this were the case may even produce the conditions in which mankind participates in creating a worthy purpose for history.

The roter Faden Deussen sees appearing throughout history makes a difference by ceaselessly ‘raising us up’ like Goethe’s Eternal Feminine. It consists notably in an agreement about the Aufgaben and Ziele of philosophy:

Despite these and other differences... a certain consensus regarding the Aufgabe and Ziel of philosophy like a guiding thread can be recognised throughout the whole history of philosophy. (I.1, 2)

Aufgabe and Ziel are difficult philosophical concepts to translate. Aufgabe can be rendered as problem, question, even task since its components signify ‘what is given to be responded to’. Ziel means aim, goal or endpoint (as opposed to purpose, the Hegelian Zweck). Both deal with the approach to the metaphysical foundation of the enterprise of thought, and thus surpass the specificities of historical manifestation. The general historical consensus concerning the given task and aim culminates in two propositions.

(1) Philosophy lays claim to the total field of existents. (I.1, 3) Despite the attempts of empirical science to impose limits and specialisations on it, philosophy surveys the total field and cannot be restricted to a specific region of nature.

(2) For philosophy, empirical reality is a problem which always points beyond itself. Even should the empirical universe lie directly before our eyes, philosophy sees it as something which demands further enlightenment. (Ibid) Thus philosophy must become transcendental.

Hence [philosophers] find it necessary to posit a principle from which they strive in various ways to grasp (begreifen) the Dasein of the world and its appearances. (I.1, 3)

The philosophies of the past have thus found it necessary to devise a principle to unite what is given with the basis of its existence. Part of the problem for Deussen is the fact that the principle appears each time with its own cultural and epochal particularities. In classical Greek philosophy, principles supplied the basis of the discrete divisions of philosophy into physics, ethics and logic. After Wolff and Kant, the principle was associated with methods of proof, e.g. for intuitive and discursive principles. Deussen maintains this association with levels of proof. As he observed in the Elements of Metaphysics, the principle has a dual function: it establishes what the world is, and
explains how it appears. So if he says that the principle ‘establishes’, this is really also
to say that it grounds and validates; while to say it ‘explains’ also says that it orders and
regulates modes of approaching (disclosing) being. As Reiner Schürmann has written,

The principle of an epoch is a matter both of knowing and of acting; it
is both the principium, the foundation that provides reasons, and the
princeps, the authority that dispenses justice.\textsuperscript{12}

Deussen interprets the principal form of ordering thought as a consequence of the
search for the unknowable Thing-in-itself. It returns as the Ziel of all philosophical
endeavour, an index point beyond the world, beyond itself. Whereas Schürmann
analyzes the connection between principles and epochs, Deussen focuses on what is
universal and eternal. To bring to light the discontinuity in the manifestations of the
Same disrupts the Hegelian notion of epochs. What is important is what transcends the
epoch: each principle is a different reflection of the Same, the eternal Idea.

It is worth quoting in full the long passage in which he gives a lightening tour of the
principles devised in the history of Indian, Chinese and European philosophy. It is a
sketch of the complete History and the map it offers.

As such a world-disclosing principle, (\textit{Weltklärungsprinzip}) appears,
e.g. the \textit{Atman} in the Vedanta, \textit{Prakriti} and \textit{Purusha}, material and
spirit in Sankhyam, the \textit{Tao} in Lao-tze; a material \textit{Urstoff} for the
Ionians, Heraclitus and the Stoics whom he inspired, number for
Pythagoreans, Existence (\textit{das Seiende}) for the Eleatics, the Four
Elements plus \textit{philia} and \textit{neikos} for Empedocles, \textit{Nous} and
\textit{homoiomereiai} for Anaxagorus, the Atom for Democritus and
Epicurus.

Socrates, an analyst, had posited neither system nor principle. In Plato
and Aristotle, this appears as the \textit{Idea}, as the \textit{Ev} for the Neo-Platonists,
as \textit{God} for the philosophers from the time of Christ until Descartes and
Spinoza.

The analyst Locke did not posit a principle, but gave the opportunity
to materialism to posit \textit{Material (die Materie)} as a principle, from
which he thought to explain all appearances. The principle of the
Leibnizian philosophy is the \textit{Monad}. Kant did not establish a world-
disclosing principle, but by dismantling the content of experience into
and a posteriori pointed to the Thing-in-itself as the principle - albeit unknowable - on which both are based. *(From this point, modern philosophy appears to recapitulate older systems.)* Fichte finds a sufficient principle in the Ich; Schelling renews in a certain sense Spinoza's principle, Hegel renews the principle of Plato and Aristotle, Herbart renews Leibniz, while Schopenhauer deciphered the Kantian Thing-in-itself as Will and diverted this into the two poles of Welt and Überwelt.(I.1, 3-4)

What are identified as the key points of these philosophies might be open to interpretation, but the claim Deussen is making about their form can be recognised as a standard of Western metaphysics. 'For Western culture, things manifold have been frozen - diversely, of course, according to the epochs- around a first truth or a rational principium.' This form is common to east and west.

The interpolation of this list of historical principles allows him to arrive at an important definition of philosophy.

Hereby can be posited, if not a historical definition which would conform to all previous systems, then an Ideal definition, i.e. one which denotes the goal (Ziel) to which the philosophical efforts of all times and lands have been directed, even if a clear consciousness of the actual Aufgabe of philosophy has only been established, and is still to be established in the course of history. (1.1, 4)

The list of principles itself testifies to the fact that there has been and there is still disagreement concerning the nature of what is given us to accomplish (the Aufgabe) but that the goal is clear. It might be noted that his definition combines two discursive regimes which Foucault has called 'positivist' and 'eschatological'. On one hand, Deussen legitimates his position through historical precedence and through generalisations made on the basis of historical evidence. On the other, he orientates this material to a metaphysical goal, which is both eternal as the presence of the Thing-in-itself and yet absent from the reality of the historical present.

Deussen's Ideal definition adds an evaluative aspect to the two common elements of past philosophies which he outlined above. In short, it combines them with the Idealist principle of differentiating between the eternal and the non-eternal. The definition
cannot be broad enough to include all the ‘errancies’ of past, he writes, yet it can serve as a measure or standard (Maßstab) marking out those which have proved and continue to prove to be ‘valuable and productive’. (I, 1, 4) The two characteristics of Ideal philosophy are as follows:

(1) Ideal philosophy pertains to all that is present in existence (alles dessen, was seiend vorhanden ist) whereas empirical sciences investigate only a specific part of the complex of experience. To Deussen this means that it must combine the science of nature with Psychology and its branches: logic, aesthetics and ethics. That is, it combines knowledge of external and inner experience. (I, 1, 5)

(2) Philosophy is rooted in the consciousness that nothing can be clarified through efforts of empirical orders of knowledge except the external side of nature, which philosophy goes beyond in that it searches to penetrate the interior of nature (das Innere der Natur). For empiricism it is sufficient only to observe, describe and classify actual objects (das tatsächlich Vorhandene) and to explain them by the law of causality. Only philosophy ‘penetrates to the intrinsic, deepest and final essence of that which appears to us as the totality of nature – to fathom ‘the Self’ (atman) of the World, like the Vedanta, the ‘Thing-in-itself’ as Kant says, the ‘Self-in-itself’ (auto kath auto) according to Plato’s expression which combines the two.’ (I, 1, 5)

Since what is given cannot provide the foundation of its own validity, Idealist philosophy searches for a Welterklärungsprinzip in the deepest, eternal, inner essence of Being. The Ziel of all philosophy is the Thing-in-itself or rather the Self-in-Itself. Thus he states:

_Die ganze Aufgabe_ of philosophy makes itself known as the effort to win the means to fathom the inner being (Wesen) of nature’s appearances through the investigation of our own interior. (I, 1, 6)

The Kantian-Schopenhauerian philosophy of the Elements posited man as the only physical-metaphysical ‘doublet’ in nature endowed with the consciousness of his own essence. The History also maintains the priority of investigating man’s inner nature. According to Deussen, all the orders of knowledge which process inner experience are valid branches of philosophy. Hence he says ‘Psychology, and its branches, Logic, Aesthetics and Ethics’, are to be ‘amalgamated (einzuordnen) as integrated parts’ of philosophy. (I, 1, 5)
All other orders of knowledge belong to Physics since they only consider nature (*physis*) and its causal interconnectivity. In contrast to these sciences of the surface of things:

Philosophy alone is **metaphysical** not in so far as it goes beyond experience (transcendent), but rather in that it reaches through this (immanently) to seize the inner kernel, whereas all physical sciences stop at the shell. (I.1,5)

This is the only time that Deussen employs the word *immanent*, which is in parentheses, despite the potential affinity of this concept with the philosophy of Non-Dualism. Immanence is a problematic concept because his practical philosophy contains something which must remain absolutely pure and heterogeneous to 'natural' experience: moral freedom. Metaphysics must confirm that it remains pure and unafflicted by the necessity of the ego and the Law of Causality. 'Critique' (*Scheidung*) is essential for differentiating between the phenomenal and the noumenal. He essays recourse to other non-dialectical concepts such as Non-Dualism or, as he discusses below, Monergism to find more subtle ways of approaching this problem.

If the philosophical problem of unlocking the inner being of nature can be resolved, he writes:

... it can only be undertaken from the point where this interior of nature opens itself to us to a certain degree. (I.1, 6)

Thus as concerns the evaluative aspect of this standard, it is clear that a philosophy's value lies in its ability to discover in man's internal experience the means to grasp the inner *Wesen* of the world. This places metaphysics in immediate connection with the sciences of inner experience, as well as indirectly with the sciences of outer nature. Thus for practical purposes, the 'system of physics' bifurcates and its inner science, Psychology, is integrated into metaphysics. Importantly, it seems as if this strategic 'way in' emphasises the immanence of the Thing-in-itself to the phenomenal world while avoiding the question of the movement and the dialectic. I will return to the question of the dialectic in more detail below.

6. The Mystical Nature of Living Philosophy

The necessity for the historian of philosophy to address the question of representation leads Deussen to elevate the process of critique and to inaugurate the measure (*Maßstab*) of the Idealist definition. This has up until now been discussed in terms of the
Schopenhauerean physical-metaphysical doublet and the decision of Idealism to ennoble the eternal Same: both of which may perhaps be critically considered as ways of thinking valued by and therefore valid for the type of life called Western man. The Vorwort presents the problem of representation however in a way that makes us doubt to what extent this strategy is a subjective or cultural choice. It seems endemic, inevitable that:

There where the greatest philosophers want to introduce us directly to the innermost sanctum, the Adytum of their wisdom, there they are at their darkest, most obscure. (I.1, vi)

The goal of philosophy, as he first describes it, will be totally irreducible to mastery through representation. He describes the history of philosophy as a process in which this darkness is lifted from ‘our eyes’ resulting in ecstasy for the initiate - to stand outside one’s natural self – the final Ziel.

Seeing is, for Deussen, the possibility of an un-mediated or immediate relation with Being. If he considers a philosopher to have approached the Thing-in-itself through abstract thought, Deussen switches to the vocabulary of ‘seeing’ in the place of writing/reading. However this is quite a naïve move and presents him later with irresolvable problems concerning the function of the philosophical and historical text. Meanwhile, metaphors dealing with vision and the eyes are discussed in terms of co-presencing: subject and object reveal themselves to each other. He speculates on the possibility of a way of seeing which would transcend subject-object perspectives. In ego-less vision, the self and the world would approach each other in mutual identification and run through all the moments of present-time in a timeless instant. To understood that the actual, natural ways of seeing and comprehending the world depend on the innate, a priori forms of the intellect leads to the necessity of imagining other ‘ways of seeing’. The alternative is to remain trapped in the nexus of empirical causality, oppressed by the materialism of language and the density of history. He writes:

If many take a merely historical interest in the history of philosophy, it is partly because of the way in which it has been brought into representation. Indeed, for one to whom once and for all is given the eye only for the horse and not the ‘horseness’, it would even be futile even if Plato returned from the dead to help him. (I.1,5)

This strange invocation of the dead suggests the difficulty if not the impossibility of
attaining to the un-mediated presence of the Thing-in-itself. Even the ‘highest observatorium’ of the intellect is innately partial and restricted. Yet Deussen believes that much can happen ‘to lift the cloud which from birth lies on our eyes,’ so that the empirical standpoint is surpassed. The point from which all philosophy flows, he says, is the standpoint from which is observed the contiguous activity, \textit{die Gegeneinanderarbeitung}, the contra-production rather than co-production, of nature and the intellect.

That this standpoint wants to raise us over the perspectival limitations of the intellect, and yet must remain such an intellect (seen from the states such as \textit{yoga}, \textit{ekstasis}, \textit{unio mystico}), therein lies the great ineffable difficulty of metaphysics. (I.1, vi)

It is the very limitation, the darkening of our intellect which, he claims, is origin of ‘the great and rewarding \textit{Aufgabe}’ of the history of philosophy.

The solution is evasive while the barriers of time, space and causality stand not only between us and the Thing, but us and the original philosophers of the Thing-in-itself. Can it be claimed, he asks, that Plato and Kant have indeed been thoroughly understood while the Thing-in-itself is ‘passed over lightly or dismissively?’ Here especially he makes it clear that the success of a history of philosophy ultimately depends on ‘\textit{einem innern Schauen}’. If the subject remains uninspired, then arduous compiling and collating, reflecting and reasoning are inadequate. This is ‘at best only \textit{myesis} which we must overcome in \textit{ekstasis}.’ (vi) \textit{Myesis} refers to the preparatory rite of the lesser Eleusinian mysteries in which priests purified candidates for initiation. \textit{Ekstasis} refers to the greater mysteries in which mortals were supposedly united with the gods during a celebration of the return of Persephone from the underworld. In a similar sense, to inspire ‘inner vision’, to transform and renew, is the ultimate goal of the history of philosophy.

[T]he most pressing \textit{Ziel} of all history of philosophy is that it must bring us to the point where we learn to behold the nature of the Thing, its external and internal nature, as it were with the eyes of each and every philosopher (\textit{jedes einzelnen Philosophen}). (Ibid)

The Eleusinian ritual was synchronous with the first rains of the year, during which seeds are planted and the cycle of growth is renewed. The rebirth of Persephone is symbolic of the rebirth of all plant life during Spring and by extension all life on earth. For Deussen, the reference to mystical rapture signifies the breaking through of the
Thing-in-itself or Will to empirical reality, thus breaking through the barriers of the temporal realm of death.

The Foreword to the *Allgemeine Geschichte* therefore expresses the belief that it is possible to bridge the abyss between creaturely and divine reality by the passage through the human history of "philosophy". It presupposes that this initiation has occurred many times in the past in individual instances, in the individual minds of the philosophers. 'Seeing through their eyes' is the solution the historian of philosophy can offer to the ineffable problem of metaphysics. The philosophers were witnesses of the really and eternally Real. It is only because of the discrepancy in the consciousness of the knowing subject (he intuits his metaphysical being, he feels it but he knows nothing about it), that their *inneres Schauen* must be translated and disseminated through the same names and relations by which phenomena are known. Representation fails the real reality of the Thing-in-itself by implicating it in the names and relations of time and spatialisation; this is also true of the representation of the moral event in which, as it were, the freedom of the Will breaks through. That is why one must be brought to the edge of the adytum (by the philosopher, by the historian), where one cannot enter and then one must be shown, or rather one should see for oneself.

In the *Elements*, Deussen wrote that the philosopher breaks down the barriers of time, space and causality in abstract thought; the artist does it in an intuitive way; and the moral agent does so in a practical respect. (EM, 225) I have signalled that as a historian of philosophy, he seems to want to combine the first two paths by presenting a complete series of philosophical insights and mapping out their inter-connectivity i.e. in their approach to the Thing-in-itself. The text of the history of philosophy would then be the incommensurable final element in the series which by 'completing' philosophy demands the production of yet another element. Darkness surrounds the empirical intellect, he writes, 'Aber wo viele Lichter zusammenkommen, da wird viel Licht.' (I.1, vi) There is something perhaps naïve in this faith in a passive eschatological interruption of natural consciousness. It is a problem which stems from his rejection of idea of spiritual development in history, rendering entirely mysterious the subject's individual non-dialectical relationship with the first principle of Being. In order to guarantee metaphysical freedom, in its purity, the intuition of man's ownmost metaphysical nature must be personal and intimate. The series of thoughts he begins with floats adrift from all concerns of historicism and anthropology.
How can this strategy succeed? Is it ever possible? In the course of the elliptical exposition in the *Allgemeine Geschichte* of philosophical doxographies and biographies, one often feels that one is looking at a portrait of the individual rather than looking through their eyes at the fulcrum of being-in-itself. And is not, to quote Oscar Wilde, 'Every portrait that is painted with feeling... a portrait of the artist'? It might be concluded then that the function of the history of philosophy is to enable the reader to dislocate the ego from the self and to accede to greater consciousness of existence, effectively becoming other, by 'looking through the eyes of the philosophers'. The notion of displacement corresponds to etymological derivations of the word ecstasy (ek "out" + histanai "to place, cause to stand") as well as the massive effort to change the rubric of philosophy by displacing it towards the orient. 'Advaita Vedanta in the Eyes of the West', the title of Deussen's address to the Royal Asiatic Society in 1893, evokes also the eyes of the east that regard Kantian Idealism and retranslate its terms in strange Sanskrit aphorisms. On the other hand, there is nothing inevitable about displacement to the *universal* from the perspective of the singular or particular.

The method of wishing to transmit oneself to the place of the other – looking through their eyes – makes the subject in fact a simulacrum of the other, exactly when it is the truth, the authenticity of their experience that is desired. A gap, a discrepancy, a difference arises. The subject becomes an impostor of the other and of himself, but nevertheless discovers a truth: the power of being more or less than the self, the self +n that rattles identity but reveals that unknown element that is the truth of selfhood. For deconstruction, the Thing would really consist in the truth of the supplement, the difference, and as long as Deussen maintains that the Thing is Unknown (and yet more intimately known than anything else) he also sustains the thinking of difference. As yet, as is already noticeable, this would introduce a significant element of instability to the project of a universal Ideal philosophy, and make us think twice about approaching his work as a straightforward comparative philosophy.

In spite of this effect of dissemination – of self-difference, difference from others, and difference in time – or rather alongside it, in order to make his project work, Deussen makes the thought of the Universal predominate as the thinking of the Same. Ultimately it is not the eyes, the standpoints which make the difference but the eternal, intransigent Thing that is contemplated. If the perspective is different for each of the philosophers,
from each ‘cell’,

Yet it is also one and the same region (Gegend) which they view from so many different standpoints. (I.1, vii)

It is noticeable that the deliberate spatialisation of the different manifestations of the Idea erases the question of their temporality and hence of their temporal difference. A similar experience of time is designed into the experience of the colonialist institution of the Universal Exhibition, where time and space is reduced and one walks from one cultural exhibit to the next. In the next section, we will encounter such a ‘treasure house’ when Deussen, as historian, attempts to reverse time’s scattering of the fragments of true philosophy by assembling them all in one place/ text. The same truth is present in every piece, he claims, just as that ecstatic time is present equally in every moment, which would allow the freedom of the Will to break through to the empirical.

A second image reinforces this erasure of temporality which is an important condition of the spatialisation undergone by thought in every universal history.

And if the different worldviews of it do not immediately merge in a unified image of eternal philosophical truth, like the photographic recording of the aforementioned region from different standpoints, this is essentially because the surface of consciousness which has to record the image, is hardly a tabula rasa, but is innately inscribed with various traditions from each culture, religion and foregoing philosophy. (I.1, vii)

Here tradition is seen as a corrupting agency, threatening the immanence of the Thing, synonymous with cultural or national prejudices, prevailing orthodoxy, conceptual conservatism. What he calls the most ‘original’ thought of the philosophers, their ecstatic vision, on the other hand operates on the threshold of what is known and representable. The social cannot in any way mediate this truth.

7. The Critical Method

The Idealist sense of Deussen’s history throws into relief the question of the relationship between universal and particular, and the related question of the non-dialectical and ‘Neo-Kantian’ concept of development. In contrast to Hegel’s focus on the unfolding of Spirit, Deussen maintains a formula of presenting where possible both a biographical and a doxological account of the philosophers in each episode. For exegetical purposes however he strictly separates between three elements in each philosophy: the individual,
the traditional and the original element. The first two include the facts of the philosopher's life and the cultural environment within which he dwelled. The second in particular is associated with 'a certain passivity' and is regarded as the shell, 'the worthless side' of any philosophical system. (1.1, 30) This excludes the context of production of thought and marginalises political, social, economical, religious, intellectual, etc. factors, while seeming to retain a mundane psychology.

The focus of his concern is the original element, 'that which a philosopher has created (geschöpft) immediately from the observation of external and inner Nature.' (1.1, 30) This is a very peculiar use of the word 'original'. While the philosopher is directly inspired by his own contemplation of existence, the original element conforms in essence with the eternal Wesen of nature. While this singular insight cannot be communicated through abstract thought, it is crucial for the historian to locate the perspectival point (Gesichtspunkte) from which the philosophical gaze extends. While these points are numerous, the nature from which they are drawn is one and the same in all times and land.

Thus it cannot fail that all original thoughts which are freed from the husk of tradition display a wonderful unity, which is no small guarantee of the truth of their doctrines. (Ibid)

That is to say, Deussen does not treat the problem of his sources as a sociological, historical or material problem and relies instead on his own exegetical powers and the validity of the two universal criteria established by the Kantian Critique. Recalling the bifurcation off the systems in Elements of Metaphysics, empirical methodologies focussing on new discoveries and their causal interrelations must, he states, be replaced by philosophical, i.e. 'critical' methods. Otherwise the manner in which the empirical sciences abandon all previous forms in favour of the latest discovery will obscure everything that can be gained from the history of philosophy. This criticism seems also to be directed at the process of Aufhebung which constitutes the history of philosophy for Hegel. Philosophy must not be compared to a pyramid which is gradually constructed of building blocks conglomerated over thousands of years.

It is much rather like a pyramid which is as old as the world itself, which is steadily approached... and ever more clearly perceived, until one happens right upon it. The conceptions of the pyramid and its parts one began with never lose their value. (I.1, 31)

The pyramids symbolise here an enigma on a sublime scale, a mystery which is
nonetheless imposing in it very silence and thereness.

As Deussen’s history of philosophy was elaborated over the course of twenty-three years, it might come as a surprise that it may in fact be summarised swiftly enough. As we shall see, it is not because of any innate simplicity that it lends itself to such abbreviation. It is in the very nature of his universal history to identify an eternal truth, the seed or ‘kernel’ which he continuously recovers from the past. Within his chronological account, he identifies a small number of doctrines as having been the most ‘fruitful’ and ‘valuable’ in uncovering the first principle of Being, whose longevity signals their value. As he wrote in the methodology, philosophy is not interested in the traditional or sociological. This is why from every philosophy must be peeled back the ‘traditional element’ which stifles and conceals that ‘original element’ within it, which does not belong to its own time but belongs to the eternal truth.

Thus it is that within the same opus the kernel of the work is recounted time and time again. The six prefaces provide in the first instance ample opportunity to establish and re-establish an overview of the whole. In addition to this, at crucial moments in the otherwise conventionally chronological work of History, the matrix of historical manifestation of the Idea reappears in order to gather up the significance of the philosopher under discussion. Hence in the introduction to the Kantian philosophy (Vol. II.3) Plato, Berkeley, Sankara, St.Paul, Descartes and Zarathustra appear to be sustaining a contemporaneous colloquy with the citizen of Konigsberg. This repetition is experienced as a kind of time lag, break or rubato in the rhythm of the text and alters considerably the time of the consumption of the philosophical ideas. Deliberately or not, with each individual, philosophy seems to unfold all at once, each time renewed. In this way, the Allgemeine Geschichte avoids descending into the forms either of chronological, linear history or the spatialised order of the encyclopaedia.

Philosophy, as Blanchot also suggested, is constituted in this ‘eternal conversation’. However appropriate this case may be for Kant, it must be remembered that this convention is imposed on all philosophers in the collection, regardless of their own view of time and history. Yet even the lesser doctrines, deselected by the Idea of philosophy, are integrated into the eternal matrix, since even their elements, fragments or antitheses converse with the eternal. As he writes in the introductory section on the concept of philosophy:
While many catch sight of the one, universal, eternal Truth, the mirror of genius reflects it more and more differingly and it appears always in a new and ever more interesting light. (I.1, 5)

As he claims that philosophy approaches the same inner nature of being in different ways, by presenting the individual perspectives of the philosophers for us to follow their line of vision, he hopes to add substance to his hope that ‘Wo viele Lichter zusammenkommen, da wird viel Licht’ (Ibid).

Before continuing, it should be remarked however that not all his readers have appreciated or tolerated this structure. On one level, his approach is utterly subjective: the selection procedure has been determined by Deussen alone. This is the charge which, as I have already noted, Halbfass makes in his appraisal of Deussen’s work in India and Europe, where he contended that Deussen’s work was fundamentally ‘ahistorical’. While Deussen would perhaps agree with the concept of his ahistoricity, the first criticism – that his work is absolutely subjective – would surely have been totally unacceptable to him. Romantic or absolute subjectivism was for him a modern and post-Kantian aberrance. The task of philosophy, he wrote, is ‘to discover the eternal unity at the basis of all subjective and objective being.’ Halbfass indeed in his later essay on Vedanta changes his perspective, foregrounding the ethical cornerstone in Deussen’s philosophy which pits the tat tvam asi against the principium individuationis.

Nevertheless, the succinct selectivity of the truth stands in marked contrast to the universalist aims expressed of the work. It is possible to read the universal methodology as acting as apologia and justification for the particular and subjective agenda of one individual. One might agree to explore the implications and the possibilities opened up by a universalist historical theory and yet radically object to what in practice is a reduction of the history of thought to a restricted list of Idealist philosophers. The juxtaposing of such a subjective selection with universalism evades taking responsibility for its own anthropological, political or even nationalistic prejudices. In this case, universal history would be the vector by which a trenchant individual perspective is made palatable as a generalisation.

This simplistic ‘strategist’s’ interpretation would however not take into account the neo-Kantian tradition with which he is connected (which will have been indicated at the very least by the dominant references to Kuno Fischer and Johann Eduard Erdmann in
the 'Sources' of the *Allgemeine Geschichte*). The relationship between the universal and the particular is a fundamental problem addressed by Deussen's work. It is a primary factor motivating his translations and research on Vedantin Non-Dualism. His intrinsic approach to this problem, as we have seen, is to elevate the individual over universal concepts and to emphasise the power of the individual's moral disposition over the apparent abstractions of duty and law. What this project is intended to challenge, it must be recalled, is the ascendancy of forms of rational psychology, materialism, empiricism, and atheism among Deussen's contemporaries. By championing those philosophies which exalt both the physical and metaphysical nature of being, the *Allgemeine Geschichte* is pervaded by the awareness that it engages directly with these debates.

These criticisms are useful in pointing to an important question about the internal consistency of Deussen's argument. His recourse to practical philosophy to solve the antinomies of the theoretical are everywhere coherent with his aim – except for here, in the constantly recapitulated summaries of the history of philosophy. Whereas the triads which punctuated the earlier works served comparative philosophy well in establishing the relativity of cultural representation and the underlying unity of metaphysical thought, Deussen's particular account we are now confronted with in the universal history is more problematic. There is no inconsistency in his maintaining that the individual, through introspection, leads towards the unity of all things, i.e. establishing the non-dual relationship between particular and universal through the "way in" of the metaphysical standpoint.

It is the rejection of the dialectic and all intermediate forms, and its implied rejection of Difference which becomes problematic in the examination of the history of thought. All doctrines are referred back to an always already existing Idea of philosophy: the Thing-in-itself or Self-in-Itself. The conclusion is determined in advance, both for the future of philosophy and for the reader. The historian of philosophy must continue to testify to the eternal truths underlying all thought: the philosopher is bound to engage in renewing the 'original' truths; and the reader is left to his own endeavours to realise the connection between his ego and the totality of the world, until he is overcome by reflection and released from the *principium individuationis*. This is what the historian will have shown him to be the truth whose kaleidoscopic forms repeat themselves throughout the history of thought. What seems unsatisfactory is the exclusionary principle which is at work here, whether this refers to false copies of the Idea, errant
philosophies or the illusionary teleology of the empirical world.

For example, while Deussen uses the Maya concept to support his turning away from the illusionary world of phenomena, it can be noted that Indian Non-Dualism maintains a much more subtle perspective on empirical reality. Some later commentators even deny that Sankara ever uses the concept of Maya. Yet the selection process which Deussen employs in creating his treasury of world philosophers relies on an entirely different hierarchical and differential approach. The lack of engagement with a Non-Dual methodology (what would it be?) seems disappointing, in terms of the theory of the Allgemeine Geschichte as well as in its performative aspects. The Other and the future for philosophy must always be returned to the eternal Same. The individual is always returned to absolute, isolated autonomy in his search for freedom.

To elaborate on the problems raised by this 'neo-Kantian' approach to history, I will now describe two of Deussen's 'overviews' of his project in the form of the 'treasure house' and the 'map' of philosophy. The first overview introduces the article on Kant in Vol.II,3. It consists of a list of eastern and western philosophies which have repeated the same truth of Kantian Idealism in the past. The second overview, 'the map', refers to the philosophic geography which is sketched at the beginning of the first volume. The fact that a geo-philosophical Vorläufig Übersicht precedes his section on 'Sources and Methods' demonstrates that selection has already taken place according to the Idealist definition. Methodology is relegated to last place and is to be a means to the pre-defined Idealist end, rather than a tool of investigation.

8. The 'Treasure House' of Kantian Philosophies

This beginning of the article on Kant reprises Schopenhauer's principle that all of the teachings of philosophy are available to all men through intuition. In his contest with Hegelian philosophy, Schopenhauer claimed that any unity seen in history was purely fictional, for history offered up only fragments. However Deussen attempts to apply the latter's theory about intuition to history in order to provide proof of the universal validity of the Idealism expressed by Kant and Schopenhauer. He writes that the results of the Kantian philosophy 'correspond with the noblest thoughts of the past thereby making their significance fully comprehensible.' (II.3,172) As I discuss below, this seems to accord with Schelling's conception that 'Philosophy is, as such, nothing but an anamnesis.' While this approach contradicts the Hegelian notion of progress, it
encounters many difficulties in explaining the concepts of difference and development, both on the level of the individual and the species. As previously remarked, the question of evolution in the historical sciences had challenged many of the neo-Kantians who flourished in Deussen's time between the 1870's and the First World War.\textsuperscript{16}

The supreme importance of Kant's philosophy lay in its systematic arrangement of the conditions of cognition and of experience at the foundation of all philosophy. This scientific (\textit{wissenschaftlich}) aspect of Kant's thought made it possible, in Deussen's eyes, and legitimate to use the architectonic as the basis for a reconciliation of all philosophical and religious texts of the past. The \textit{Universal History} foregrounds the activity of unifying the thought of the past, although it is latently a work of justification and validation. This activity of gathering, restoring and renewing is translated into the metaphor of constructing a great edifice in which to house the treasure of the world:

When we finally arrive at Kant after long wandering in the old and new systems of Occident and Orient, we are like the man who returns from a long journey in foreign lands to find, not a fully-built house but the ground on which he may confidently construct it, since it belongs to him and no-one may rightly fully cast him from it. (171)

The emphasis on the inalienable right to land reflects Deussen's concern with bringing philosophy home, as it were. West-Asian philosophy must be returned to its original source in India, and philosophy in general must be returned to the investigation of universal Idealism. Of the many different forms of the 'return to Kant' which were initiated in the second half of the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{17}, this one gathers in its scope the extended history of both East and West. The metaphor of philosophy's \textit{Heimat} is highly resonant. The search for the \textit{archē} or the first principle is here discovered on returning the point of departure, 'always already there', becoming the foundation for a dwelling. However, the dialectical movement of the going-out and coming-back is curiously challenged here by the assertion of the inalienable rights we have to the property of the ground. Moreover what it finds outside itself becomes treasure to it and is seemingly acquired without negation. The self is described as being straightforwardly augmented, enriched by the journey.

Since however no traveller returns from foreign lands with empty hands, we also have appropriated many precious goods and long only for a secure base on which we may permanently establish ourselves
with all these foreign treasures, that we may take untroubled delight in them. (171)

That I am inherently Other, that the Self remains unknown to itself as it unconceals the Self of the Cosmos is disclosed in the fateful encounter with the Other. *Tyche* is the tutelary deity of these travels, the source of these treasures. Yet the emphasis on bringing them home, keeping them close reveals a desire for permanence, presence and plenitude which are opposed to the conditions of the encounter. In one perspective, the collecting of resources which are supposed to restore vitality to the truthfulness to philosophy, when it comes back to rest in itself, looks not unlike a museum. Despite the eternality of the Idea, the timelessness of the Thing-in-itself and the divine force, discontinuity, silence, depletion and pause seem irrevocably woven with the *Wirksamkeit* of philosophising.

Stepping back a little, before becoming disorientated by Idealism’s tautologies and repetitions, we can now observe those singular points which, in representation, mirror the Idea in the absence of the Thing-in-itself. For Deussen, they form a constellation which promises to enrich and to reflect back to us the meaning of Being. It is useful to quote this passage at length as it is a microcosmic representation of the author’s intention. These are the treasures which furnish and enhance the edifice built on Kantian foundations:

Thus we have brought with us from India the knowledge that empirical reality is a pure *Maya*, a transitory illusion, and that the true and everlasting reality of our Self and the whole, surrounding world exists in our own *Atman*. So we found enduring worthiness in Iran in the thought of two opposing world principles of Good and Evil, which we only had to strip of their mythical form to retain their inalienable truths. And in the Platonic doctrine of Ideas we recognised a truth which, had it not existed would have had to be invented in order to attain an understanding of the world with its multifarious forms and shapes.

Further we discovered, behind their encasing in mythical thinking, four great and eternally valid truths in Christianity which we determined and described as Determinism, the Categorical Imperative, Rebirth and Monergism. Finally we draw the conviction from the
cogito, ergo sum of Descartes that the point-of-departure and foundation of all philosophical certainty is consciousness and also learn from Berkeley.... that everything which we call World is nothing other than a series of representations in this consciousness. (II.3, 171-72)

Perhaps read far from the context of a universal history, the most striking things about this inventory is the heterogeneity of its sources. It freely mixes elements from Christian, Zurvan and ‘Hindu’ religions with classical Greek and modern rationalist concepts. Despite its simplistic, enumerative style, this series interweaves philosophical, religious and scientific discourses in a profound relation. The principles postulated by these different systems are thought to bring to fruition the wisdom of all previous philosophy and, once combined with Kant and Schopenhauer, of all philosophical thought to come.

Although the intuition of eternal truths is established here as a fact, a universal reality of human experience, Deussen suggests that its lack of (objective) justifiability or validity has obstructed it coming to full fruition in individual consciousness.

All these achievements of human profundity were already available (vorhanden) without being able to unfold their full effectiveness (Wirksamkeit), partly because they were only intuitively and fleetingly understood, partly because their creators were hindered by many mistakes and grasped them only incompletely. (Vol. II.3, 172)

The notion of Wirksamkeit relates to practical end of the turning of the Will to negation, when the divine and radical element in man is revealed and his über-individual actions partake of Being which is raised above the natural reality of ego-consciousness. Of course the illuminati referred to in the shortlist above were ‘initiated’ into the insight. However due to the darkening nature of representation, the means to break down the barriers of time, space and causality and thus the proof of the true philosophy was unavailable until Kant. Before this, access to the truth was dependent on mystical and intuitive means. Thus the essential insights of the philosophers were impeded ‘because their most foundational thoughts had not yet been articulated with total clarity or been supported with strong epistemological (wissenschaftlich, scientific) proof.’ (Ibid)

This brings him to the genius of Kant, whose significance he compares to Christianity
as the two most important events in the spiritual life of humanity. On the one hand, Kant completed an unparalleled critique of the rational psychology, cosmology and theology of the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition. On the other, his analysis of the intellectual faculties established the solid, incontrovertible foundations for an entirely renewed metaphysics.

Moreover, he created an epistemologically secure foundation (eine wissenschaftlich gesicherte Grundlage) for both the sciences of experience (Erfahrungswissenschaften) as well as for moral and religious consciousness. (172)

Although Kant had concluded that no human intellectual faculty could access metaphysical truth, his analysis of consciousness had provided ‘proof’ that man actualises both his physical and metaphysical nature in moral action. Thus he advanced further than anyone else in fulfilling the task of philosophy, as identified by Deussen in the Introduction: to provide the ‘means’ to investigate the inner Wesen of nature through man’s own inner experience.

While clarifying his method of validation, it still has difficulty explaining development in philosophy without reverting to dialectical means. In fact it resembles in part Schelling’s account of progress in philosophy as the ‘transcendental history of the I’.18

Progress therefore always consisted in that fact that ...the objective I became completely the same as the philosophising I, thus subjective I; the moment at which this sameness begins, at which, then, exactly the same was posited in the objective I as in the subjective I, was the closing moment of philosophy, which had thereby definitely assured itself at the same time of its end.19

The foundation of Schelling’s philosophy is that in the objective (Deussen would say empirical) I, more is always posited than it itself knows. The task of philosophy must be to make the I conscious of what is posited in it, bringing it to complete knowledge of itself. Being subject and object at the same time, Schelling says the I is now for itself. It also ceases to be in itself, and breaking out from limitation into freedom is now for itself as pure freedom. ‘With this the theoretical philosophy was closed and the practical philosophy began.’20

The difference between Schelling and Deussen is that the former insists in seeking out the necessity with which progress occurs. Fichte before him had merely attributed the
productivity of consciousness to the nature of the I. Schelling saw himself as solving the problem of combining/co-aligning the necessity reigning in nature and history with the freedom of the I from a higher (synthetic) viewpoint of freedom. Naturphilosophie becomes philosophy of history. The transition from speculative to practical philosophy, involved debate over morality, good and evil, the state ‘as an albeit subordinate mediation of freedom and necessity’ and finally history itself ‘as the great process in which the whole of humanity is involved’. Finally a necessity is demanded even for history itself, ‘which mediates freedom with necessity because it does not itself (like human freedom) come into conflict with necessity and remains not just relatively but absolutely free’.

Although Deussen’s invested interest in Kant’s philosophy was discussed at length in Chapters 1 and 2, it can be noted that at this point Deussen quotes Kant’s all-important summary of his work:

In 1791, [Kant] summarises the essential result of his philosophy;
“There are namely two angles on which the whole of metaphysics turns:
(1) firstly, the doctrine of the Ideality of space and time...
(2) secondly, the doctrine of the reality of the concept of freedom, as the concept of a knowable supersensible...(178-79)

Without repeating what was discussed in the Elements of Metaphysics, it suffices to say that ‘the supreme triumph of Kant’s philosophy’ for Deussen is the proof of the co-existence of metaphysical freedom with empirical necessity is one and the same human action. (cf. SS, 57) However in a Schopenhauerean vein, Deussen continues to concentrate on the Psychological, inner means to establishing a complementary proof to Kant’s principle by excavating philosophies of the past. Deussen thus criticises Schelling for ignoring man’s inner experience of moral consciousness and the moral law. The Universal History places him between Fichte and Hegel in classifying his philosophy as ‘Objective Idealism’. In short, Schelling’s philosophy crucially does not assist in providing the means to proving that self-denial, renunciation of the self is man’s only ‘way in’ to metaphysical freedom. What will become clear in the course of the History is that although Kantian philosophy might provide validity for the Idealist form of philosophy, the value that Deussen ascribes the principle of negation is clearly Schopenhauerian in origin.
9. Cosmic Anthropology

An image of the world, a *Weltanschauung* is necessary for the writing of a universal history. In his essay ‘Universal History and Cultural Differences’, Lyotard contended that the faculty of the imagination is always put into play by the demands of a universal history. The imagination provides the means to unify the heterogeneity of perspectives which arise inevitably when the universal idea of history is confronted by the derisory object of singular givens. As discussed in the previous section, in Deussen’s *Universal History*, the role of the intuition replaces the imagination as the unifying faculty. The *Vorläufig Übersicht* presents a panorama of the terrain covered by universal history. It is a rudimentary form of the ‘map’ of thought that history ought to present to the subject who seeks to understand Being from the highest standpoint. The map appeals to the intellect’s need for completion in understanding the world but for Deussen this completion most importantly refers to the description of the inter-relation between historical doctrines. The western history of philosophy is, he claims, the result of a geographical accident. Things might have been completely different were it not for the stochastic geographical dispersion of populations.

As previously remarked, this is a decisively un-Hegelian notion. It denies the necessary collaboration that Hegel identified between Absolute meaning and the history of philosophy. The spatialisation of thought that Deussen imagines complicates the simplified geography of Hegel’s lectures, where he posits the correspondence between particular lands and the different epochs of Spirit. There he calls the phases of world history ‘the great day of the Spirit and the day’s work it accomplishes’.

World history travels from east to west; for Europe is the absolute end of history just as Asia is the beginning. The sun rises in the Orient...It is in the west that the inner sun of self-consciousness, which emits a higher radiance, makes its further ascent.

Here the teleological movement of the Spirit determines the geo-philosophical worldview. The distribution of epochs to coincide with geographical spacing, as the self-consciousness of Spirit conquers the world bit by bit, makes these horizons into limits. This epochal history collapses an idea or a culture within temporal horizons, giving them a finitude they come to possess by virtue of the other successive epochs in the series.
From the beginning, we have been aware that Deussen rejects philosophical teleology. It is true however that teleological questions did arise in the *Elements of Metaphysics*. There he posited that Will strove to develop self-consciousness in human reality in order ultimately to overcome its affirmative mode for the sake of its 'negative' mode of limitless freedom. This necessitated a development in the power of reactivity in the nervous and intellectual faculties of the higher species until Mankind emerged. It will also be recalled that he dismissed Darwin's theory as the simple question of representing how the Ideas or forces come to objectify the Will in empirical theory. Therefore evolution in nature – the story of the development of the reactive forces – is seen as absolutely unrelated to the eternal Ideas of the species/ table of forces. Development of individual consciousness is seen as part of the uniform *telos* of the Will to guarantee itself eternal presence. In order to avoid the term *telos*, Deussen is often obliged to revert to convoluted terms for this such as ‘the principle of impelling propulsion’. However the major problem with his discussion of development is that he offers no explanation for the relationship between the Will's putative 'teleology' and the 'eschatology' of the individual, wherein he finds his freedom. The relationship certainly exists, since he claims that the superior reason behind the evolution of self-consciousness is in order to 'know' that the world is the Will's affirmation and that freedom lies in negation. The *Universal History* is itself part of a project to promote or inspire this 'knowledge'.

The *History* continues to keep organic development apart from intellectual development. The discontinuities in the history of thought are proof that the evolution of man's individual consciousness and powers of re-activity had no necessary or essential connection with the dispersion of Idealisms in philosophy. The ancient Vedic philosophers acknowledged the same truth as Kant, he argues. He would also argue that since the Will lies beyond the faculty of human cognition, it is impossible to know the former. Yet his claim to know that the *aim* of the Will is to overcome itself in negation seems to be based on the logic of contradiction. Since the Will is the condition of all life, - i.e. nature and the mind which contemplate it are the same in all times and places - thought has always contemplated this Thing-in-Itself and its appearances. We will examine his theory on the birth of *philosophy* below, but it seems ultimately that the most important task of philosophy is to understand both *modes* of the Will: the affirmative and the negative. At this point, we recall his identification of the guiding thread, the common *Aufgabe* and *Ziel* of philosophy in the Introduction. Thus there is a
universal consensus in philosophy on its question and aim regarding the investigation of
the Thing-in-itself through Man's inner experience, yet Deussen denies that there is any
progress in philosophy since what we know as the turning to denial of the Will can be
achieved intuitively and does not differentiate itself in essence from affirmative being.
(Moral acts take the same form as egoistic acts: only the intention is different.) If the
event of the Kantian philosophy has been a 'turning point' in history, it is only because
it finally provides an acceptable *wissenschaftlich* proof of what has been known all
along. It finally makes 'knowledge' of the truth of the Thing-in-itself universally
possible and accessible. It 'proves' the principle of negation. And yet, there has been no
progress in philosophy...

The map of philosophy provides an additional explanation to these tangled thoughts. It
shows that the geographical spacing of the fragments of Idealist philosophy is just as
arbitrary as their appearance in time. In displaying the relations of the doctrines to each
other, it demonstrates how essential metaphysical knowledge came to degenerate, into
*Avidya* or ignorance in Vedantin terms. The map blames a *geographical accident* for this
degeneration. As we will see, *The Philosophy of the Bible* further explains how ancient
Hebraic 'realism' in the Old Testament played the major role in this catastrophe. Thus
the importance of the geo-philosophical map elucidates how the true knowledge was
replaced by doctrine based on natural egoistic consciousness. It must be clarified
however that Deussen does not use the reactive, *völkisch* or 'right-wing' vocabulary of
contamination that Schwab imputes to the German Orientalists in *Oriental Renaissance.*

The empirical standpoint remains in his view the natural standpoint of man. This is
consistent with what has been called the 'utilitarian' aspect of Vedanta, i.e. that those
who have not attained the enlightenment of the sage may continue to live an equally
spiritual life and follow 'the Path of the Fathers'. What is crucial is that Deussen refers
to ignorance and failure in 'knowledge' where Nietzsche investigates the motivations
for such *self*-misunderstandings, the will to *unknowledge* and the lie. This is clearly a
point where Nietzsche developed his philosophy in a totally different direction from
Deussen.

Deussen's geo-philosophical map is drawn up on the basis of two groups: the Semitic
and the Indo-European or Indo-German. It is important to emphasise that these names
refer to linguistic rather than ethnic groups, reflecting his philological training and not a
racialised perspective. Deussen's use of the linguistic term Indo-German in lieu of Indo-
European stems from a tradition stretching back to Bopp’s Comparative Grammar, popularised outside of Germany by Max Müller. Schwab draws strong links between the term Indo-German and myths of German nationalism, but this is an over-generalisation. Deussen’s broad definition is specifically derived from Bopp’s comparative system and not from *Volksphilosophie*. Comparative linguistics provides Deussen with a model for the genealogy of philosophical principles and their dissemination. The insight of the philosophers can only be grasped, frozen and communicated by language, whereupon its trace enters into the heritage of that linguistic group. This retains the point that thinking also includes the unsaid and unsayable, the silent.

As Müller had written,

> The Science of Thought is to the Science of Language what Biology is to Anatomy. It shows us the purpose of the organ, its work, its life.  

As we have seen in Chapter 1, Deussen sees the relationship of thought to language in a different light. The difference between Müller’s and Deussen’s perspective is that for the latter language is a dissimulating medium, whereas the former considers language an active medium which changes the essence of what it communicates. For Deussen, language does not have the qualities of force. His concentration on the Semitic and Indo-European language groups needs to be seen in the context of his Idealist philosophy of forces. These specific languages are historical, empirical aspects of the universal Idea of Man. Without going too far into Müller’s theories, it can be noted that Deussen’s connection of *eide* with forces stands in contrast to Müller’s maintaining the link between *eide* and *logoi*. In the Schopenhauerean view, forces are inassimilable to both reason and representation (*logos*). The *eidos* is an objectification of the Will, while the *logos* is a servant of the Will. What is important is the mysterious *inneres Schauen* into the Thing-in-itself which is in a sense pre-linguistic. The science of comparative linguistics suggests therefore that where Idealist philosophy has preternaturally developed, it will have influenced the development of the language. Deussen is seemingly identifying Idealist and Realist linguistic tribes, an idea which Nietzsche certainly agreed with, albeit lamenting and excoriating the evolution of Indo-German Idealist language.

A thought experiment at the beginning of the *Volatüfige Übersicht* asks us to imagine the infinite universe in order to illustrate the significance of the universality of the Idea of man.
Let us assume that there are other humans or humanoid beings on one
of the other planets in our solar system. (I.1, 35)

We are not only to think of the evolutionary, Darwinian creature but the eternal form of Man. In the Elements of Metaphysics, Deussen described natural man as only an imperfect and compromised version of this Idea, thus suggesting that mankind in its current form is something to be superseded. Nevertheless if he invokes the thought of life on other planets and elicits an encounter with alien nature, this is in order to illuminate the characteristics Mankind shares as a species. It contrasts with the image Nietzsche once evoked of the Earth as a tiny planet in the vastness of space, and all terrestrial life as enduring for only a brief minute in the time of the cosmos. There the reference to outer space made human life seem too brief to even be insignificant. Here Deussen's image invites us to consider what a universal and eternal human form might consist in. This will determine how he draws the horizon of the history of thought.

If other planets supported a species similar to man and if philosophy evolved in their culture, it would 'agree in its essential developmental phases and results' with that of our planet. There as here, he writes, the same intellectual forms of cognition would confront the same nature of the Thing. (I.1, 7) The reference to Man and Thing-in-itself, phenomenon and noumenon, notions which preside over the Idea of the human race belongs firmly to the heritage of Kantian anthropology. Furthermore he writes that we can already refer to the empirical example available on earth of the confrontation of two parallel philosophical developments 'which are as independent of each other as those of different planets, and yet demonstrate remarkable agreement in their methods and their results': the Indian and the European. (Ibid)

To introduce the dynamism of forces into his account of alien life forms, Deussen links the Kantian forms of intuition with a 'development phase' in which Self and (the nature of) the Thing-in-itself confront each other, which shows how close he comes to a dialectical explanation of the origin of metaphysical thought. It begins with a territorially aggressive, omnipotent drive. To paraphrase his account, at first the mind (der erkennende Geist) is filled entirely with a sense of its own power (Kraft) and it extends itself to conquer the world. Eventually internalising the limitations imposed on it by nature, it is pacified by fully comprehending these limits and their finality. Thereafter the alien, yet mortal mind concerns itself with judging the most useful means of satisfying the innate drive towards happiness. This continues until the highest aim of
Man is conceived, not as the satiation of this pleasure principle, but its overcoming, releasing the natural ego from the chains of empirical reality in which the drive fetters him. (I.1, 7-8)

As well as the theoretical universals (the a priority of intuitive forms) Deussen posits a second practical universal, the goal of achieving freedom, attributing to Kant the justification of these principles as we saw above. (As Lyotard observed, the Idea of a vocation for emancipation was a common theme of the narratives of the universal histories of the Aufklärer.27) This Kantian doctrine then points to the way Deussen will transform Schopenhauerean pessimism into his own defense of asceticism. Positing an aggressive, repetitive and all-consuming Will as the ground of all Being left Schopenhauer with no way to ground freedom except by reverting to the doctrine of negation of the Will. As we have also seen, Deussen arrives at this conclusion in his own way: firstly, by arguing that the negation of the individual Will-to-live has ‘actual’, positive results and secondly, by restoring the significance of the Categorical Imperative and the moral conscience, both of which were rejected by Schopenhauer. Thus the ‘neo-Kantian’ Universal History is also an attempt on Deussen’s part to provide the ground for a transcendental doctrine of freedom as negation. It constitutes an archive of the means that have been historically discovered to arrive at this emancipation.

10. The Geo-Philosophical Map: Three ‘Kulturkreise’

I have suggested earlier that Deussen’s explanation of the arising of difference among the philosophies of the world is somewhat problematic. At this point, he has recourse to the thoroughly Hegelian concept of ‘work’ in order to state that only a few cultural peoples in human memory ‘took part actively and successfully in philosophical work’. (I.1, 8) With this, he makes the transition from anthropology to the geography of the tribes. Such a move clearly conceals many complex and unanswered questions concerning differentiation. Some uncertainty seems to result from the deferral to comparative linguistics which investigates only structural mutations and bypasses signification. It does not attempt to evaluate the genesis of linguistic form. It is left to us to wonder what influences the development of thought in the first place. In a general sense, the uncertainty is the consequence that Deussen does not question difference: it is rather a fact of empirical consciousness. His claim relates to philosophia perennis.

Accordingly then, in the search for the means to discover the Thing-in-itself through
inner experience, the Egyptians and Chinese play only peripheral role and only the Semitic and Indo-German peoples appear as the 'bearers of the highest culture and philosophical endeavour'. Reiterating the linguistic basis of this classification, he defines the Semitic group from the steppe lands of Arabia as comprising

...the Arabs, Babylonians and Assyrians, Aramaic people and Caenanites, [who] originally formed one culture as a comparison of their languages proves. (I.1,9)

The Indo-German linguistic tribe similarly comprises various branches: Indian, Iranian, Greek, Italian, Slavic, Germanic and Celtic, which once constituted a unified, original culture whose cradle was probably somewhere east of the Aral sea. (I.1,10) He justifies this grouping by referring to the discovery in Sanskrit of 'the unmistakable root of all these languages'. Deussen's geography is based on the migration of these tribes and their interaction or isolation, the vagaries of their culture. The multiple and mobile circles of their cultural development break down the tropes of the opposition of East and West, and that of the teleological Hegelian narrative of philosophy that followed the arc of the rising and setting sun.

He created his map by sketching out the lines of migration from the two original homelands of these cultures. Whereas sometimes (perhaps for ourselves) the geography of philosophy can be interpreted as reproducing the unconscious of thought, in Deussen's case the map is actively and consciously constructed. The way in which he fosters connections between fields is quite transparent. We might reject some of his archaicisms, but it would be difficult, maybe impossible, to propose such a map today.*

According to his research, only the Arabs remained on the site of the first Semitic tribe, whereas others travelled as far east of the steppes as the river Tigris, with some migrating to the Armenian mountains in the North, some to Syria and the Red Sea in the West. Of the original Indo-Germanic tribe, two lines travelled south, dividing in Afghanistan: the 'Iranians' pushed west until they bordered Semitic territory, while the 'Indians' migrated east to the floodplains of the Indus and the Ganges, where they were fully isolated from neighbouring peoples. Others journeyed west and dispersed themselves in Europe, becoming Slavs, Germans, Greeks, Romans and Celts. He wants it to be acknowledged that the geographical proximity of these two philosophical peoples is purely contingent but that this accident has been decisive (maßgebend/
grundbestimmend) for the development of philosophy up to the present day. These were the conditions in which ‘the knots of the further formation of human culture were tied, which became so essential to the development of philosophy.’ (I.1,9)

Following the hypotheses elaborated by Schlegel and Bopp, Deussen maintains that Indian culture after this migration unfolded in isolation from the outside. The ‘first wave of Aryan invasion’ assimilated the native inhabitants to the dominant culture thus, he claims, immunising themselves from neighbouring influences. The Indian world constitutes what Deussen calls the first Kulturkreis, circle of culture. (It seemed important to him to stress, in the light of Nietzsche’s philosophy, that ‘Hindu’ philosophy was elaborated by the strong and not by oppressed peoples.) The dispersion of the two linguistic tribes forms three Kulturkreise in total. His claim is that the philosophical and religious ways of thinking that arose in India are so valuable for Europeans because they were purely internally unfolded and are thus utterly original (ursprünglich). The reasons why he is so resistant to the mixing of the Indo-German and Semitic culture is explained by his conception of the second and third cultural circles. (I.1,1) What is called philosophy emerged differently in each tradition, as we will see in his section on the origin of philosophy. The way that philosophy traditionally developed in each culture became an important factor in their differentiation and thus contributed massively to the obscuring of the original kernel of philosophy. As explained below, his theory concerning this ‘decadence’ refers to the differing alignments of science, theology and philosophy in each culture.

Following on from the first Kulturkreis in East-Asia, a second and heterogeneous culture was formed by the gravitation of both Semitic and Indo-German tribes to regions of the Sinear peninsula. Stretching from Iran to Egypt, the circle was, he alleges, dominated by Semitic culture. The ‘highest productions of its Gedankenwelt’ were the Old and New Testaments. At this point it becomes clear that although the Semitic tribe includes the Arabic branch, this culture does not make an appearance in universal history. Said’s thesis, that the construction of European identity is contingent on the exclusion of the Arabic world as its Other, becomes pertinent in respect of Deussen’s work. The discussion of Semitic culture is limited to Volume II.2, the Philosophy of the Bible, i.e. it appears only in relation to the historical development of Judeo-Christianity (in ancient Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, and Iran). Its arc excludes all reference to the history of Islamic philosophy. In this Kulturkreis, it is effectively eclipsed by the
Christian tradition. One could say that Islam now moves into the space occupied by Indian thought at the beginning of Deussen’s introduction: a chapter of history that is held in reserve, an invisible circle not yet drawn into the map of philosophy.

The Greek and Roman world is the third and final original cultural circle which he maps out. The geographical situation of this Gedankenwelt is held responsible for all that happened next. Its highest bloom was the philosophy of the Greeks. Yet despite the prodigious wealth of thought it unfolded, for all its sages, ‘it was not still not capable of fulfilling the needs of both the head and the heart.’ (I.1, 11) This original lack became essential to the evolutionary horizon of European thought.

Thus it happened that, at the beginning of our history, a feeling of emptiness and need developed in the world of antiquity which was expressed in general inclination (Hinneigung) in the time of the Roman empire towards oriental religion (orientalischen Kulten). (Ibid)

Here the geographical accident became decisive once and for all. ['wo jener Zufall...in entscheidenden Weisen geltend machte': Deussen’s use of the rhetoric of decision in its passive mode is slightly ambiguous. It avoids any analysis of the historical, political, social, etc. conditions to focus on a ‘lack’ occurring in the ethical domain.]

Then conscious of its insufficiency, the Greco-Roman world, stretched its hand towards the East for assistance. There it encountered not the Indian wisdom to which it was originally related, but Christianity which has grown from the Semitic branch, even if it was perhaps only a graft. (I.1, 11)

The encounter of these two cultures through a geographical accident is compounded by their internal conditions. The latter, it is suggested was in decline, whereas Christianity was imbued with the ‘full of the vigour of youth’: thus it ‘embarked on its conquest of the world.’ In these circumstances, a great historical fusion took place. The two currents of Biblical and Greek wisdom merged, producing the worldview of the Middle Ages, where after much time and effort, the drift of the two heterogeneous elements came to a standstill.

This union was highly unstable, or unnatürlich, as he writes, and could not last. Inertia transformed itself into its opposite, emancipatory force:

Towards the end of the Middles Ages, the human spirit awoke to the consciousness of its own power and sought to break free from the
shackles which the age had laid on it. Contemporary philosophy is this war of liberation (Befreiungskampf). (I.1, 11)

This is certainly a romantic account of the birth of modern philosophy: a type of imprisonment or servitude of the human spirit leading to illumination and a struggle for freedom. The conflict audaciously gathered momentum, he writes, until through the Kantian philosophy its former manifestation was completely dissolved and the renewal commenced. It will be recalled from his list of philosophic principles, that Kant and Schopenhauer are practically the only 'original' philosophers and the rest are presented as re-interpretations of the past, e.g. Hegel renews Plato and Aristotle. The Neubegründung of philosophy through Kant, according to Deussen, promised a whole renovation of the culture:

It promises to impart the long awaited and vainly sought after internal reconciliation and serenity in (innere Versöhnung und völlige Befriedigung) human culture both in scientific and religious respects.

(I.1, 12)

This sentence explains the earlier reference to the failure of Greek philosophy to accommodate the needs of the 'heart and the head'. It in only fully explained in the section on the Philosophy of the Bible (1911), which is in many senses the heart of the entire oeuvre.

In this manner, a European narrative beginning with the lack inherent in ancient Greek culture of antiquity comes to a close, or rather a turning point, with the renewal of philosophy according to Kantian criteria. With Schopenhauer's 'perfection' of Kant, there is a vindication of the investigation of metaphysical being at the singular points at which this being 'crosses over' into the empirical realm (the way in): the Knüpfungspunkte where ways of knowing and acting appear necessary and free. It is at these points that a synthesis of the cognitive, metaphysical and ethical dimensions seems to be achieved. However the history of philosophy as an artistic-philosophical endeavour does not reach an end at this point. As the Introduction suggested, philosophy's Aufgabe and Ziel are ceaselessly repeated in the individual. Each individual must either see the Thing for himself or see through the eyes of the philosophers.

In this section, I have presented the 'Preceding Overview' of the Allgemeine Geschichte as Deussen's geo-philosophical map since the textual device of the overview is a clear
reminder that every universal history engages in creating an image of the universe it addresses. (Lyotard’s essays on the subject emphasise that this image must include the author, the audience and the projected ‘universal’ audience.) The geo-philosophical image he presents of the three cultural circles shape the entire History. The rest of the work involves identifying the relationships between philosophical doctrines in order to fill in the map of thought for the reader, for he must also be brought to that insight which reveals to man his radical and divine freedom. I now turn to an examination of what Deussen considers to be the most important parts of the map: the treasures that Kant’s system has allowed him to gather together and contemplate. If the geography gives sense to the insights of these philosophers, it is because it shows that if we consider the history of thought literally and figurally from the highest perspective, we will be convinced that Indian and European philosophy must be reunited to rescue metaphysical truth from the accidental fall.

In the main part of the text, the discontinuous series of thoughts evoked in the Introduction is assembled as five episodes which, he says, ‘arise naturally from the Overview’. (I.1,12) In contrast to epochal history, the rubrics he uses for these mix geographical, temporal and religious categories. The first three correspond to the ‘original cultural circles’ he outlined previously:

1. Indian Philosophy
2. Greek Philosophy
3. The Philosophy of the Bible

The final two episodes are shaped by the geographical accident which brought Semitic and Indo-German culture together at a time when a metaphysical explanation of inner nature was most needed. These parts no longer deal with ‘original’ cultures, but with untenable, unstable mixtures and the struggle for emancipation from them.

4. The Philosophy of the Middle Ages
5. Contemporary Philosophy (Die neuere Philosophie)

The final part brings us to a reconciliation of Indian philosophy with Deussen’s contemporary European philosophy and what he claims is the true ‘kernel’ of Christianity. Above all, Deussen selects Parmenides, Zarathustra, Plato, Christ, St.Paul, Sankara Descartes, Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer as the ‘treasures’ of his philosophical history. These are the lights that illuminate the darkness, Advidya (ignorance) of the natural state.
One way of presenting the Allgemeine Geschichte would be to focus exclusively on these exceptional doctrines, examining how the Idealist criterion of selection is used as a hermeneutic device in relation to their texts. While keeping this in mind, I would like to retain the question concerning development and examine Deussen’s reflections on the origin of religion and philosophy. The connection with the geo-philosophical map is maintained through his account of the differences that arose in the Greco-Roman and Indian Kulturkreis. This leads me to the key text of the work, The Philosophy of the Bible, corresponding to the third ‘West-Asian’ Kulturkreis. As a result of the geographical accident which brought European culture into contact with the West-Asian one, the philosophy of the Bible has provided a powerful framework of authority for the Will-affirming principles of realism and egotism. Finally, Deussen’s narrative arrives (again) at the Kantian philosophy after what he deems to be the war of liberation from the shackles of medieval philosophy. Instead of returning to a discussion of Kant again, I focus on his own principle of negation as philosophy ‘comes home’ to that inalienable ground provided by the Kantian philosophy. Some final remarks will be made on his positive philosophy of negation by referring to Deussen’s essay on Nietzsche’s philosophy, in order to offer some perspective on what he hoped to achieve by writing this History of Philosophy.

11. The Origin of Religion: The Origin of Philosophy
There has long been a tradition which searches for the origins of philosophy in Greece, a tradition which is highly polemical since it seems to tie the inaugural moment of philosophy with the future of Western thought. Deussen challenges many assumptions of this cultural posture, not only by juxtaposing Greece and India but by laying the ground for a new history of philosophy, which posits an older cultural precedent to many soi-disant Greek ideas. His work provides only the haziest outline of this historical possibility as he does not examine the specific vectors of influence between the two cultures. Yet despite his Idealist view that philosophy is universal, trans-historical and trans-cultural, to open a history with complex engagement with Indian thought unsettles many of the presumptions his audience would have made/ still make about European identity and culture, its past and its future. This innovative stance was shared by his fellow philologist Max Müller, editor of Sacred Texts of the East. In investigating the origins of mythology, he also came to the conclusion that:

The anterior of Greek mythology is not only a different geographical

* This was recently attempted by McEvilly, 2002.
locale, but also a subtly different human sphere; this other place is India (before Greece), and this other sphere is language (before mythology).29

While for Deussen the only valid universal sphere of inquiry is metaphysics, he is as equally committed as Müller to looking beyond the Mediterranean through the linguistic traces of the Vedic culture. He employs Müller's philological equation *Zeus – Dyaus Pitar - Jupiter- Theos* in order to make his own connections between the religions of Sinear Peninsula and Mediterranean Basin. These connections imply that the Greek past can no longer illuminate the history of philosophy: it is Hellenic thought itself which is in need of being illuminated by comparisons. Deussen was also convinced that the same task needed to be imposed on the history of Bible. The heterogeneous aspects of its development must be brought to light in order that a future exegesis may uncover its eidetic content and is not mislead by its more fortuitous accretions.

Nowhere is Deussen's metaphysical inquiry more challenging than in his endeavour to return to the origin of religion via the account of the awakening of man's self-consciousness of his own divine nature. It may be contrasted with a reading of Müller's work based on the following quotations, notably: 'Mythology is a disease of language,' and 'Nomina (names) become numina (divine beings).30 Yet where Müller makes the passage from words to gods a product of man's usage of the alluring treachery of language, Deussen's aim is to go far beyond the name to the nameless, the Thing-in-itself. Moreover he is convinced that this name-less, limit-less Thing is even the truth of religions of the name. As he says in the foreword to the fifth volume:

*The essence of Christianity stretches much further than its name and exists in a thought which is as eternal as the world. (II.2, v)*

In order to go beyond the fissure of consciousness, Deussen begins with the primal phenomenological scene: when through self-consciousness Man comes into being. Before this, only the animal exists in the permanent now-ness of the Will. The advent of Man coincides with awareness of the two sources of his experience.

*Wie die menschliche Erkenntnis überhaupt, so ist auch die Philosophie ausschließlich angewiesen auf zwei Quellen: auf die äußere Erfahrung... und auf die innere Erfahrung. (II.1, 13)*

While human consciousness has from time immemorial endeavoured to observe these two *Erfahrungskomplexe*, to find their sources and to comprehend their inter-relativity,
philosophy begins, according to Deussen, only with ordering, with systematicity. It is inaugurated when these strivings take on a wissenschaftlich character, and is extended in scope and depth by sublime thinkers in a manner relatively free of fantasy. (II.1, 14) In a remarkable statement, he asserts that this beginning is in fact only a question of degree. Even if the cut-off point is clear enough to identify the determinate beginning, ...it also necessarily entails seeking the Anknüpfungspunkte for philosophical thought in the preceding development of consciousness in general. The oldest interpretation which a people possess of its external and internal existence lies in its religion. (Ibid)

This perspective reveals the academic specialisation of philosophy as a very late, artificial construction of 'West-Asian' institutions of knowledge. It is consistent with Deussen's analysis of the universal elements of metaphysics. However he is noticeably silent on the relation between individual and collective consciousness. Here, the people (Volk) is a ready-made, chthonic formation. Yet despite this evasion, the 'traditional element' is clearly accused of obstructing original thinking.

To contemporary philosophers, this perspective would have seemed greatly unorthodox. Halbfass observes that, 'His 'ideal concept' of philosophy, which does not segregate philosophy from religion and thus allows him to include the metaphysical efforts of all peoples and times, was not shared by the academic historians of philosophy.'31 By pursuing the graduated line between religion and philosophy, Deussen is working outside of the tradition of philosophical history. It is true that Müller also emphasised the inseparability of both: 'We should damnify religion if we separated it from philosophy: we should ruin philosophy if we divorced it from religion.'32 We can connect this with the fact that the Orientalists in general came from a philological background, and were engaged in applying the same manner of analysis to both Classical and Biblical texts. The flow of Deussen's exegesis from one text to another permitted him to gather in his wake all kinds of metaphysical elements. Unlike the 'positivist' historico-critical method he was taught, Deussen's interpretation strives to reconcile the religious and scientific aspects of hermeneutics (heart and head).

Thus it is not the distinction between religion and philosophy which is important, but how the relationship between internal and external nature is conceived. The earliest volume makes a decisive assertion concerning the equivalence of the former terms:

The first and oldest philosophy of a people lies in its religion. This
contains the first attempt to understand and to clarify existence
(Dasein) and its phenomena. (I.1, 77)

Deussen's analysis shows the earliest religion extending its attempt to comprehend
existence in two directions: to external nature and to internal being. The difference
between them is discussed as the contemplation of forces on one hand, and of the
mysterious tidings (Kunde) from the obscure interior on the other. He now investigates
each direction in turn.

The analysis of external existence lead firstly to the personification of natural forces as
individual gods. For example:

Now the Sun becomes the tireless wanderer who knows and finds his
way; now the wind becomes a wild charioteer or hunter, pursuing the
clouds with bow and arrow as man tracks his prey in the forests. (II.1,
15)

This is consistent with the so-called nature-myth theory which has been associated
simplistically with Müller's work. Masuzawa summarises it as 'the once-popular
opinion that all religions began as a primitive and pre-scientific contemplation of
natural wonders and the subsequent personification of those natural phenomena, above
all the sun.' In Deussen's interpretation, the natural elements appeared in opposition
to Man as possessed of powers to act analogous to his own agency and power over the
immediate environment. Thus he posited a will as the internal principle of each force.
Hence early man's interpretation was partly correct, according to Deussen and was
corroborated in the course of the history of philosophy (ultimately by Schopenhauer).
Yet:

...the formulation which followed it was entirely incorrect: namely,
the attribution of an individual personality to this representation of
will. (I.1, 78)

This formulation Deussen says, originated first and foremost in practical need and not in
an anthropomorphic impulse. One wanted to influence these natural forces, the gods,
through gifts, flattery, sacrifices and offerings. Hence the gods were a natural, 'semi-
unconscious' creation of the human intellect.

In India, the forces were seen in the external world (Indra, Agni). In Greece on the other
hand, divine nature was attributed to the forces of the internal world, as in Homer's time
(Ares, Pallas, Aphrodite). In opposition to Müller's linguistic theory of myth, Deussen
sees a link between science and a will to mastery in the nature-myth theory of religion. As we will see, this will lead him to critique the bifurcation of science and the exploration of ethical relations associated with conceiving the gods as moral powers.

As knowledge of external nature progressed, he writes, the anthropomorphic products of 'childlike imagination' would have been dropped as fictions at a later time. With the separation of religion and natural philosophy (science):

Indra would dissolve and become electricity, Agni would become oxidation: religion would dissolve and vanish into science. (I.1, 79)

This scenario sees electricity and fire essentially as deities stripped of their mythological embellishment. Modern science would turn to the secular worship of an Electric Indra. At least this would have happened, if the Indian deities had not come to be defined by a very different relationship to their Greek counterparts; a relationship 'which contradicts every attempt at a decomposition into physical sciences'.

For Deussen, this is the major difference between Indian and Greek thought. In Greece, the pursuit of a (proto-scientific) explanation of the cosmogony came to dominate the essential relationship to the ethical constitution of existence. The pursuit of natural science came to dominate the ethical relationship to the gods (and eventually to eclipse them). (I.1, 79-80) 'Demythologising' the gods does not necessarily have to mean their evaporation or exorcism through rationalisation. In India, it changed everything that the understanding of the forces of external nature was channelled into relationship with the realm of inner experience. The external became rooted in inner experience (we might perhaps refer to this as dharma, the maintenance of the cosmic order.) This brief sketch of his theory is to be found in expanded form in Volume I.2 The Philosophy of the Upanishads. There Deussen describes how the formal Brahmin ritual intended to maintain balance in the cosmos came to be internalised in the supplicant. Henceforth the ritual Vedic soma sacrifice or horse sacrifice, for example, was internalised, as is demonstrated by the new doctrine of the five fires which replaced the sacred fires of the Brahmin priests:

He who knows the Atman...is in himself the five-fold sacrifice, the five-fold sacrificial animals (man, horse, cattle, sheep, goat), the five-fold man, the five-fold universe. (PU, 410)

As discussed in Chapter 3, this aspect of Deussen's work is brought out in Orlan Lee's theory of an 'Indian Reformation', by which the older priestly institutions were
transformed by transferring spiritual power to the individual. It emphasises the importance of the turn to analysing inner experience.

Whereas there is a certain degree of imbrication of Deussen’s and Müller’s thoughts on the mythology of personified force, the second hypothesis, - that religion originates also from the attempt to explain existence through inner being - is very specific to Deussen. He turns to an experience which is not so much pre-linguistic, as a region which is beyond subjective/ objective knowledge. For what inspired the Urheber of religion was:

...one and the same thing in all times and lands: a very real thing, internally experienced and seen – it was, if one wants, a revelation, which swelled out (entgegenquillt) of man’s abyssal interior...[It] became the most vital and fruitful of matrices out of which philosophy has grown in India, Greece and the present.(I.1, viii)

Deeper than the intellect, this source is ‘the a priori of a prioris’. (KI, 19) It might be compared to Schleiermacher’s view that the source of religion was a ‘religiöse Stimmung...a sense or appetite of the Infinite’.34 Deussen of course equates this sense of the supersensuous with moral consciousness and the categorical imperative. The principle at the centre of his ethics is that it is the divine and radical element in man, or ‘Man-as-Thing-in-itself’ who gives the law to natural man in moral action.

Indeed, despite the moral relativism apparent in history, according to Deussen the form of opposition between good and bad, or rather the two opposite impulses of affirmation and negation are universal. He hypothesises that in the search to discover the source of these imperative representations, they could be traced back to meanings such as ‘useful and destructive, strong and weak, aristocratic and common, permitted or forbidden by god’, etc. (the vocabulary testifies to a Nietzschean influence). History confirms that all of these meanings have existed in the past. The question is how these concepts were modified to become pure representations of what is unconditionally to be done or unconditionally to be avoided, i.e. the genealogy of Good and Evil. ‘Without diminishing the historical validity of any developmental theories’, he contends, can any of them refute the following considerations:

No one will doubt that the main drive (Triebrad) of human behaviour has always been egoism. Everyone will equally admit that there have always been men who sacrifice their Egoism for a higher cause and one calls such men Good. (I.1, viii)
In opposition to Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*, it would appear that Deussen is performing an Idealist analysis of moral value by searching for universal common elements. The universal egoism described above refers not to a (Freudian) type of subjectivity, but to the ubiquitous struggle of the Will for eternal presence, manifested at the individual level in the impulses towards nourishment and propagation. It means that moral relativism can be indexed to this basic egoism. Thus Deussen claims that the difference between Good and Evil, between self-seeking and selfless men is *uralt*, indeed as old as Man himself. (I.1, 81)

Deussen derives his theory of religion from the history of the relationship between the *Naturkräften* and the transcendental moral conscience. Many traces of his Monergistic doctrine, that man effectuates his moral work through a supra-human, 'divine' power, can be detected in this account. He postulates that, historically, the power of the divinities and man's dependence on them lead to the conclusion that human morality was a manifestation of fantastical, poetic fantasies of natural forces imbued with Will and personality. The morally good, since it lead beyond man's own nature and interests, was thought to depend on the Will of those divine personalities that man had derived from natural forces. Thus the *Verschmelzung* of these two heterogeneous, internal and external things - the moral impulse and the personification of forces – became the basis of religion. The innate moral law and the positing of a contractual relationship between men and gods lead further still to the transition from religion to philosophy, as the ethical and the mythical sides of the culture came to compete for dominance. As we will see later, one particular point in this myth was extremely important to Deussen: the suggestion that in order to achieve moral actions, men were assisted by divine powers. His own notion of the expansion of the ego breaking down the barriers of time, space and causality in a practical respect seems to retain the idea of augmented *übermenschlich* power or energy. This is discussed in his article on Monergism below, a which gives a Vedantin twist to the Christian doctrine that denies the human will any agency in the act of salvation and insists on the primary power of the Holy Spirit and God's grace.35

Deussen's theory of the transition to philosophy appears most clearly in his work on Greek thought. As already remarked, what seemed crucial in Greece was the prioritising of the development of a 'pre-scientific' yet potentially *wissenschaftlich* cosmogony. In India, ethics and philosophy continued their intertwined development without being
challenged by the dominance of scientific theories. I will present his account of Indian philosophy first, and then examine the Greek episode. Indian philosophy presents itself as eternally valuable to the philosophical task of discovering the means to the internal investigation of the Thing-in-itself.

12. (I) Indian Philosophy

Deussen divides his work on India into three volumes: the Old Vedic period, beginning approximately 1,500 B.C.E.; the Early Vedic Period, incorporating the Upanishads; and finally a Post-Vedic period, from 500 C.E. to the present day. The earliest mantras of the RigVeda provide a profound insight into ancient Indian polytheism. However, the later songs begin to presage its downfall, recording doubt about the reality of the Gods and mockery of priests and officiants (Sänger). Yet from the outset, all of these ideas were ‘reigned over by a philosophical consciousness’. (I.1, 13) Breaking off from the old paths of knowledge, a handful of beautifully expressive later songs derive the multiple Gods, worlds and beings from one ineffable, unknowable Unity, thus pointing to the early development of philosophical Monism. As Nietzsche had earlier remarked in a letter to Deussen, the appearance of religious and philosophical elements in these hymns controverts those evolutionary accounts of knowledge, such as that of Comte (1798-1857) which placed the ‘theological’ stage before that of metaphysical and abstract thinking. Many attempts to further determine this unity followed in the Early Vedic Period (1,000 B.C.E.-500 C.E.), for example, as Prajapati, the Lord God or as Purusha, the true Self. During this time, from 500 B.C.E. onwards, sacred texts began to be mixed with the profane. Eventually through the ritual manuals and the hymns of Rig- and Atharvaveda: ‘this unity was found in the only place it can be found – in the Self.’ (I.1, 12) This is what the Upanishads, the youngest and most valuable products of Vedic literature, express in myriad variations. Namely the essential thought of:

...the identity of the Self (Atman) with the force (Kraft) which brings forth, sustains and retracts all worlds back into itself (Brahman). (Ibid)

The reference to the word force is striking and in recalls the exposition of the System of the Vedanta that the creative and destructive forces behind the world is an exoteric conception of the Saguna (with-properties) Brahman. Only later Vedanta philosophy internalises this force as that divine element in man which enables the overcoming of the ego in acts of morality.

Vedanta is however only one orthodox Vedic tradition. Between the Vedic Age and the
Classical Age, when Sanskrit was codified by Panini and the philosophical schools were formed, Deussen identifies a transitional period (500-200 BCE) of the great epics, such as the Mahabharata and the related Laws of Manu. These constituted a ‘transitional philosophy from the Idealism of the Upanishads to the Realism of classical Sankhyam philosophy’. (1.3, vi)

Thus Sankara (apparently born circa 788, exactly 1000 years before Schopenhauer) fought with great bitterness against the Post-Vedic systems, the Sankhya-karika and Buddhism by falling back on the pure teaching of the Upanishads. He created a theological-philosophical structure from their material which endures even today. (1.3.2)

Volume I.3 deals with the development of the embryonic Upanishadic ideas into a series of systems in the Post-Vedic period. It will be observed that the word ‘system’ is significant for Deussen since he posits that philosophy begins when the comprehension of the Erfahrungskomplex assumes a ‘scientific (wissenschaftlich)’ character. The conscious attention that is paid to the nature and function of knowledge is presented as a sign of the systematization of earlier thought - a ‘progressive [intellectual] development’.

Deussen hopes that the reader will obtain an insight into the ‘workshops’ of the Indian thinkers, to understand ‘not only their doctrines but their ways of philosophising’. He compares it to the argumentation style of the Greek sophists and medieval Scholastics, without commenting further on the conditions that would have made this differentiation necessary. For the six orthodox Vedic systems however, Deussen returns to material from the foundational texts, presenting the ‘three metaphysical Hauptsystemen’, as he sees it, in more detail: the Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrshna, the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali and Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta. Only a brief overview suffices for what he considers to be systems of the ‘empirical viewpoint’: Nyaya logic, and the Vaiceshika’s classificatory system of natural science and of course non-Vedic Carvaka materialism. (I.3, 7)

A brief note can be added about a new admiration this 1917 text expresses for Yoga, and its elevation in significance for Indian philosophy. Whereas Hegel restricted his translation of Yoga to the German Vertiefung, Deussen in his general Introduction equated it with the terms unio mystico and myesis.
The Indians were capable of advancing to the very depths for early on through Yoga, a gift awarded them more than any other people on earth. Yoga is submersion in the secrets of our very own inside. (I.2, 3)

Nevertheless because this knowledge was intuitive, Deussen claims it lacked 'scientific grounding' and was susceptible to being seized by rhapsodic flights. Ultimately, everything in this episode tends towards the Vedanta as the culmination of religious and philosophical development. It achieves the philosophical systematisation of two opposing tendencies in the Veda, which stand in remarkable analogy to the main parts of the Bible's Old and New Testament. (I.2, 3) The reconciliation and resolution of Realism and Idealism thus becomes the endpoint of the Indian narrative and points towards analogical developments in other cultures. The comparison between the Indian religions and the Bible was offensive to some Hindus, as is evidenced by Indian criticism of Max Müller's similar comments. However, this comment needs to be seen in the particular context of Deussen's history of the Bible which is considered in the third episode, and which would itself would have been objectionable to many of his Christian contemporaries.

Thus despite the differences in the origin of philosophy in India and Greece, Deussen identifies similarities in the trajectory of their philosophical development. In both, a magnificent achievement of Idealist thought gives way to 'realist' systems. Then appear Vedanta and Neo-Platonism, doctrines which renew the original zenith of philosophical Idealism. It presages the possibility of a renewal in the Neue Philosophie, for the sequence of mythology-Idealism-realism can only be seen by Deussen as a decline. This sequence seems to carry resonance beyond its historical significance which is intended to reach out to Deussen's contemporary audience as an impetus to repair the damage of the decline into realism and renew philosophy from its metaphysical elements.

13. (II) Greek Philosophy

In Greece,

Two things lead over from religion to philosophy: the search for a cosmogony, i.e. the explanation of the external world by more or less fantastical means; secondly, ethical reflection which contemplates the relation between inner being and the outer world. (I.2, 3)

Whereas Indian deities were predominantly personifications of external natural forces, the Greeks transformed and elevated ideal types of human internal inclinations. The
gods possessed feelings and drives, thus transcending only certain limits of human nature. This anthropomorphisation made it easier to relate to them and inspired poetry and the arts, but the ambiguity made it more difficult to conceive of the gods as moral powers, i.e. in moral binary terms. (II.1, 17)

This resulted from the fact that ‘Greek genius was directed towards the external’, a claim which Deussen bases on many reasons, from their relationship to a bountiful and fertile environment to the Hellenic development of an autarkic constitution. Contemplation of the abyss of internal existence, ‘which is only developed in the deep internal struggles of men’, was inaccessible to them. Hence:

Even where the Greeks were oriented to the consideration and study of inner being (\textit{Innernatur}) (as by Socrates), they immediately represented internal experience as external, plastic forms (the Platonic Ideas). This … prevented them from advancing through internal reflection to a profound ethical world and its oppositions. (II.1, 4)

As in India, the Greeks sought to influence the gods through offerings and prayer. Yet this ‘exchange-business’ as he calls it, could not have remained satisfactory for long. It would become clear to perceptive minds that the gods are too powerful to need men. Thus an alternative explanation was required as to why the gods rewarded some and punished others.

Here the theological attempt to explain the external world reached a compromise with the observation of individual interior life (\textit{des eigenen Innern}). (II.1, 15)

As the moral phenomenon was revealed by the \textit{überirdische}, non-egoistic side of the self, it was perceived to be ‘a voice from another world’. (II.1, 16) ‘Conscience-fear’ was assimilated with fear of the powerful forces of nature: satisfaction was associated with a beatific (\textit{beseligend}) feeling, i.e. consciousness of divine grace. Thus Gods became moral powers without forfeiting their original characters as forces of nature. As powers of nature, the Gods are only thinkable in multiplicity. As moral powers, Deussen says, they flow into a unity, into one moral (\textit{sittlich}) Will which forbids evil and commands good. This can be seen in the tendency to regard Zeus as the creator and ruler of all. However, paradoxically, whether in terms of polytheism or monotheism, it subsequently transpires that the degree to which God/the gods reward goodness and punish evil must inevitably be seen as contradicted by experience: hence doubts set in about divine justice. Either there seem to be two different laws or else the divine law is
unjust. This doubt, he remarks, set in early with the Greeks and Hebrews. Theognis of Megara (the subject of Nietzsche's early work) is identified as the first to propose a cutting and total critique of divine justice: from then on, 'the age was ripe for philosophy'. (II.1, 20). Deussen seems to suggest that spread of scepticism about divine justice and the Law (the lack of evidence for it in experience) prompted in Greece a rationalisation and disenchantment of the 'mythical' elements in the ancient-nature religions.

'He lets the whole fiction fall after he has understood that the Good would not be good if it found its reward in anything other than itself.'

(II.1,15)

(As Deussen had already stated in his address of 1891, the essence of the Categorical Imperative is that 'it is the law which Man as thing-in-itself gives to man-as-appearance'. (KI, 19) This by-passes or short-circuits the debate about divine justice.) If this scepticism prepared the age for 'philosophy' (a unified, all-inclusive, metaphysical system), the two things which lead to the transformation in Greece were the debates concerning cosmogony and ethical reflection. Unlike India, in Greece, religious thought was put aside in order to consider Wirklichkeit directly. Perhaps the essence of this difference for Deussen is that Greek philosophy never arrived at an absolute moral dualism of Good and Evil. In his terms, it failed to identify the absolute value of negation and thus obscured the divine element in man, leading to the inability of this culture to respond to the call of the moral conscience and 'the needs of the heart'.

First came the mythical cosmogonies which reflect to a certain extent on the essence, nexus and origin of the appearances of nature. Homer, Hesiod, Pherekydes and the Orphics produced the half-myths concerning the Ocean, Chaos, Space, Matter, Forces, Earth and Eros.(II.2, 26) This demonstrates to Deussen's Schopenhauerean proclivities that ancient thought already contained the an impetus to draw an analogy between desire (Eros) and the Triebkraft inherent in all nature. In Pherekydes for example, he sees Zeus, Matter and Time as the forerunners of the philosophical concepts of Force, Material and Time. (II.1,27) In order to create the world Zeus is transformed into Eros, Chthon and Chronos. To Deussen this is not a 'myth' but rather a philosophical allegory.

Secondly Deussen states that there was no real moral philosophy in Greece before Socrates, but only deep insights into inner psychology and ethical relations, e.g. Homer, Hesiod, the Gnomic poets, Solon, Theognis, Aesop, and the wisdom of the Seven Sages.
The Greeks created a wealth of psychological wisdom which still reveals today all of the ‘vivid colours of the psyche’ without ever becoming formulaic or abstract. Deussen presents a dominant image of the ancient Greek as that of natural man ‘von dem Geiste der Moralität noch wenig berührten’. Thus before Socrates, the ancient Greeks had only indirect measures for moral relations, namely the impressions of wellbeing or misfortune. Nevertheless Deussen concedes that from this perspective they not only valued justice, which Phokylides cherished as the essence of all virtue, but also ‘love, friendship, childish piety, hospitality, and self-sacrifice’. Still they had not yet recognised the ‘ethical world and its oppositions’. In Deussen’s terms, the purity and autonomy that characterised moral actions and which was a corollary of absolute freedom could not have been identified. There was no way for Greek thought to isolate and extirpate the ego-root of empirical reality which Deussen calls the root of evil and suffering. In this perspective, the contrast with Nietzsche is striking.

If we now turn to the ‘treasure’ he finds in Greek thought, those compatible with Idealist philosophy, we find a repetition of the same developmental arc Deussen identified in India. The myriad forces or gods of nature leads to a golden age of Idealism, which then disintegrates into various competing systems. Greek scepticism was also fuelled by this bias, as one began to doubt the availability of an objective truth that would solve the enigma of the existence: doubt which was exacerbated by and also declined with the Sophists.

He saw pre-Socratic thought as predominantly employed in reflecting on external nature. Consideration of the external world diverged into opposite directions, represented by Heraclitus and Parmenides. Yet Parmenides, he claims, had anticipated by the sixth century B.C.E. the principal doctrine of contemporary philosophy. Pursuing the question of how being must be constituted (wie ein wahrhaft Seiendes beschaffen sein müss), he concluded that it must be both unified and unchangeable. When he found his convictions contradicted by the pluralism and fluctuations of nature, he was great enough to say:

If nature contradicts that which I have found through clear thinking, now then it is nature that is incorrect and multiplicity and changeability as they are reflected in front of us are deceptions and empty appearances. (II.3, 3)

In this way, Parmenides came to the same basic convictions as the Indian sages who had
independently arrived at this conclusion by plumbing the depths of inner nature. Yet in 
Greece, his paradoxical doctrines never became generally accepted. The fact that 
Parmenides' philosophy resisted systematic exposition is also perhaps the reason why 
Deussen is ambiguous about including Parmenides in the 'treasure house' and 
sometimes excludes him.

In the period of centralisation which occurred when Socrates, Plato and Aristotle 
became the leading figures of Greek philosophy, Socrates opened up the region of 'inner 
experience'. He posited philosophy's first and most important Aufgabe: 'know thyself'. 
(1.1, 14) On a basis of the Socratic philosophy, Plato undertook a universal synthesis of 
all the preceding philosophemes.

He thereby became the first abendländisch creator of a universal, 
metaphysical system in which the opposition, namely between 
Heraclitus and Parmenides was justly acknowledged and raised 
aufgehoben to a higher unity.(I.1, 15)

Plato reconciled these two oppositions by unfolding Being in the plenitude of the world 
of unchanging Ideas which were rooted ultimately in a single, profound unity: the Idea 
of the Good. (II.3, vi) His work guided Aristotle's search for a universal system of 
philosophy. The latter broadened the fundamental Platonic thoughts about life and the 
world, becoming the 'father' of a series of sciences of inner and outer experience. 
Despite the greatness of this contribution to empirical science, it also obscured for 
posterity Plato's glimpses or intuitions of the truth (Anschauungen). In the post-
Aristotelian period, the drive towards inquiry into truth stepped into the background. In 
it's place:

Philosophy posited itself essentially in the service of a Bedürfnis 

des Gemüts towards assuaging the doubts of existence itself and 
towards a valid norm for practical behaviour. (II.1, 7)

The systems of the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics responded to this need each in their 
own way. This same need came halfway to finding solace in the Alexandrian and Neo-
Platonic doctrines which related human existence to an unknowable beyond. (Ibid) While Christianity was a 'powerful and vital' response to this spiritual need, it only 
partially fulfilled them. In the final volume, when Deussen comes to ask why mankind 
needed yet further philosophical developments in the modern period, he emphasises that 
the Greeks left many essential questions unanswered. These included 'questions 
concerning the reality of the external world, the co-existence of empirical necessity and
metaphysical freedom and the significance of ethical behaviour for emancipation from the fetters of empirical reality.' (II.3, 4) Ultimately, the means that the Greeks derived from psychology to explore man's inner experience were only turned outwards to provide general norms of knowing and acting. They were never turned inwards towards the hidden 'Thing-in-itself' and what Deussen seems to imply is that this 'spiritual insufficiency' in the culture motivated their search for a metaphysical supplement.

14. (III) Philosophy of the Bible

Deussen associates four major philosophical points with the doctrines of Jesus and St. Paul. Noting already that the textual as opposed to the geographical rubric of this section, these four points can be seen as 'apocryphal/hidden' in more than one sense. Firstly, they are concealed in an external Schale of misrepresentations: a shell which has grown from the disastrous crossing over of the egoistic drive into the ethical sphere. Secondly their status as essential Christian truths is also open to dispute, on the same grounds that Müller's similar theory of religion was accused of 'reducing God to mere nature' and 'repudiating a personal God'.

The motivation behind this key volume of the History stemmed from a dilemma which had troubled Deussen since his time with Nietzsche in Schulpforta. He saw it as an enormous problem that 'Biblical Realism'

...stands in irreconcilable contradiction with the most certain results of

historical and natural scientific research. (II.2, 285)

Incompatibility between the points of view of religion, science and history is for him a problem of the validity of types of principles at the level proof, and is exacerbated by the problems of representation and orthodox tradition. It will be recalled that from the outset, Deussen had endeavoured to divide all thought into systems of Physics and Metaphysics. The irreconcilable schisms between the two - which had been for him the defining character of pre-Kantian modernity - is the principal cause of the casting into oblivion of the Man's deepest and true metaphysical nature: the object of the Kern of Christianity.

In his view, contemporary philosophy had reacted to the antagonism between these systems by rejecting both the Kern and Schale of Christianity. (II.2, 288) The judgement that European culture has retained some Christian values while jettisoning its
foundational principles is a crossing point between Deussen and Nietzsche. However while Nietzsche's 'death of God' was a destructive moment of negation, it was also a twilight occasion for celebration and joyful anticipation of the new gods to come.

At last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea." — 41

For Deussen, the demise of God is the occasion to search the world for the precious fragments of the truth of that Christianity which goes beyond the name. It is as if he wishes to construct a temple with these and from there enter into the Adytum which is otherwise inaccessible to (abstract) philosophical representation. In this manner, he can show that science, religion and philosophy may be reconciled in the search for the Thing-in-itself.

It is the spatialisation of the Idea and its distribution in different linguistic tribes which is again foremost in Deussen's mind as he begins his history of Biblical philosophy. The Fall into the principium individuationis will already have taken place. He focuses on the various movements of invasion, migration and exile within the geographical area of the second Kulturekreis. Consistent with the sense of the Overview, he derives the differences between Biblical and Indian philosophy from the diverging implications of their geographical settings. Indian thought remained relatively isolated: its developments were sparked internally. The emergence of the Biblical worldview by contrast, incorporated many diverse factors. Palestine, 'the theatre of this great spiritual creation', is a land which lies open to the south-west and to the east.

It inhabitants amalgamated (preisgegeben) various external influences, in political and in spiritual respects...from the Assyrians, the Babylonians and Persians in the east and possibly also from Egyptians in the south-west....All of these political disruptions and upheavals ...have influenced the evolution of the Old Testament, the Apocrypha and the New Testament and have validated the worldview contained in these texts. (II.2,2-3)

It is noticeable that he first approaches the Bible as a 'scientific' historian. He points out how the profane interests of territory and political sovereignty have influenced the development of this Kulterkreis. This is particularly resonant if we recall Deussen's
metaphor of territorial infringement and defence to explain to explain ‘the war of all egos against all’ which prevails in the empirical realm of the principium individuationis. These circumstances can then be interpreted as causing the personification of Jahweh to be strengthened as the protector god of the tribe. This anthropomorphism implicates the religion in an economy of calculation, of sacrifice, ransom and repayment. This is ‘realism’ on the level of the ego and the protection of the ego, and has been a characteristic (in this account) of the early religions of the Greeks and Indians.

Given these observations, Deussen’s reticence in employing any critique beyond eternal seed from transient shell contrasts starkly with Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of the nexus of forces which gives a culture its values. To an extent however, Nietzsche’s genealogy agrees with Deussen’s main contention in the preface, that contemporary philosophy ‘is hardly less under the influence of Jesus and Saint Paul, than it is of Plato and Aristotle.’ (II.1,1) Yet whereas the purpose of the Genealogy of Morals is to examine how forces of resentment came to dominate the inheritance of the ‘glad tidings’, Deussen’s project is oriented to presenting a genetische Darstellung of the original Biblical teaching in order to clear a way to its original element; the eternal metaphysical truths it contains beneath the shell of tradition. He insists that the historical certainty offered within the Biblical accounts must be renounced. This is designed as much to prepare the reader to abandon familiar and ‘consoling’ religious representations (the personal deity), as it is meant to tackle the historical criticism of the Bible which had become the resource of ‘Realists’ and atheists alike. To this end, he identifies five stages of development which have shaped Biblical philosophy. Again this repeats the developmental arc of his theory of the origin of religion and philosophy.

Firstly he examines the extent to which the models of Egyptian religion and philosophy had an impact of the Biblical worldview, but rejects the myth of an Egyptian Ur-wisdom. Next the Mosaic culture of the Hebrews begins to reveal the ‘stepwise progress’ from the original polytheism of the Semites, modified through Babylonian influence towards the monotheism of the Old Testament. In terms of historical fact, he writes, ‘we are on solid ground for the first time nach erfolgter Eroberung of the Promised Land in the time of the prophets and first kings’. (I.1, vii). Many sources indicate how during that time Jahwe prevailed as the most powerful of the Gods, becoming the protector-God of the Hebrews to whom all devotion and loyalty was owed.
As Deussen previously explained, the transition from a plurality of Gods representing natural forces to a unique deity leads to an instability in ethical life. The monotheistic, personified God now appeared as the sovereign legislator and judge. Hence morality was transformed into a calculation of rules of reward and punishment. And yet he appeals to the self-evidence of the fact that this justice is 'entirely one-sided and entirely in contradiction with mundane experience. (I.1, 16) The intolerable discrepancies which arise between monotheism and empirical experience also lead to an instability which arises wherever in history a single god has prevailed. In a Nietzschean phrase he says, it is the more 'noble and lively spirits' of the time who suffer most from this contradiction between belief in divine justice and evidence of experience. Hence the reflection on the psychology of redemption begins.

These deficiencies led directly to a third stage: the transformation under the aegis of the Persian empire. In this developmental narrative, the religion of Zoroaster is the essential 'middle link without which the transition from the Old Testament to the New Testament cannot be conceived' (Ibid). It is well worth considering whether Deussen's history might shed some light on Nietzsche's choice of Zarathustra in the most important statement of his affirmative project. Deussen's account shows how much was at stake in the Iranian episode. Its absolute necessity is linked to the necessity of explaining the existence of evil and this is the condition of possibility of creating an absolute dualism between Good and Evil. It seems to have been the key step in realising what Deussen refers to as a metaphysics of morality. (By contrast Nietzsche's later works absolutely insist on the absolute fatality of the becoming metaphysical of morality.) To Iranian influence, he attributes 'the knowledge of Man's eternal quality and the Vergeistigung of Messianic hope'. (I.1, viii)

When the prophets attributed the creation of the world to one omnipotent God, they also attributed to him the Urheberschaft of evil. Man, also seen as the creation of the all-powerful God, is thus that creature 'who is created out of nothing and in death, sinks back into that original nothingness.'(I.1, viii)

These views of God and man were most unsuited to becoming the foundations of a world religion: for this purpose, the ancient Hebrew concept needed a transformation ...which was only possible through the introduction of a foreign element...the Iranian worldview of
Zarathustra. (I.1, viii)
The Iranian resources which were interwoven with Hebrew culture rendered it possible to 'exonerate' God from the authorship of evil and to retain him as the principle of morality. Above, we saw how Deussen included the 'thought of two opposing world principles of Good and Evil' among the treasures which philosophy appropriates during its travels.

Nietzsche also clearly considered the Persian episode a critical moment for western culture; for him, it indicated the urgency of re-writing the testimonies of Zarathustra. Witness the zeal of his writing in the Anti-Christ - 'I shall now relate the real history of Christianity.' In his affirmative project, the creative re-writing of the past actively opens a different path towards a future. In Zarathustra's speech 'On Redemption', he says

> All 'it was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident - until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I willed it.'

Until the creative will says, 'Thus I will it: thus I shall will it', the inability of the Will to go backwards risks becoming the spirit of revenge. Beyond the reconciliation with time, Nietzsche stakes out the possibility of willing 'something higher than any reconciliation'. (Ibid) Also Sprach Zarathustra attests to the difference between Nietzsche's and Deussen's intentions in turning to the philosophical past: one reinvents it for all futures, one recuperates it for the eternal present. '[M]ein Zarathustra wird wie die Bibel gelesen werden' Nietzsche wrote to Deussen in 1888.

These innovations prepared the ground for the fourth stage. The Judaism of the time of Moses developed by intertwining Babylonian and Iranian elements into the Palestinian culture which was contemporary with the life of Jesus. This was, according to Deussen, the traditional element in which the originality of Jesus' thought was embedded. The key chapter of this volume, 'Kern und Schale', is partly dedicated to dismantling this traditional shell, represented by deficient and hopeless 'ancient Hebrew Realism': a realism which he describes operating as a myth. Its other function is to posit with the utmost clarity the four main truths of Christian philosophy, of which two are attributed to Jesus: Determinism and the Categorical Imperative. I now turn to an examination of these four essential truths.

Before doing so, it can be briefly mentioned that the fifth and final stage describes how
this ‘seed’ grew into the arboreal expanse of Christianity. Its cultivation was undertaken by St. Paul, appointed, it is stressed, by his own revelation. (I.1, ix) St. Paul is said to have contributed two further original points to the central teaching of Christianity: the doctrine of rebirth and that of Monergism. This stage also incorporates praise for the contribution of John the Evangelist. His gospel is first and foremost a Christology, declaring Jesus to be the Logos, the Archē, the son of God and the saviour of mankind. This gospel achieves a synthesis of Jesus and St. Paul with Mosaic, Iranian and Greek elements. Hence in terms of the Universal History, if it is not the most accurate, ‘[it] still remains the most mature and influential source of Christianity’. (I.1, 17)

15. Der Kern des Christentums

The most important work on analysing the universal elements of Biblical philosophy is contained in the section on the kernel of Christianity. It was written following a milestone event in Deussen’s life, the founding of the Schopenhauerean Society in Kiel, 1911. He recounts that he spent two years, 1911-1913, searching for a conclusive solution to a question which had caused him much turmoil since his youth, namely:

How it [is] possible to unconditionally fulfil the demands of historical and scientific analysis and nevertheless to fulfil the no less justified requirements of religion? (II.3,vii)

His Philosophy of the Bible arose from his conviction that a solution was to be found on the basis of Kantian-Schopenhauerean transcendental Idealism. He believed he had found and demonstrated ‘the only way to arrive at a philosophically and religiously satisfactory worldview, by bringing in to the light the true significance of Christian thought and free[ing] it from all surrounding detritus.’ (Ibid) Looking back on this section after the final volume of the History had been completed, he wrote that having achieved the critical separation of Kern from Schale ‘was to me the most valuable of all my achievements.’(II.3, vii) The identification of the four core truths of Biblical philosophy was so important to Deussen that he also published a summary of this work in the 1915 Jahrbuch of the Schopenhauerische Gesellschaft under the title ‘Schopenhauer und Religion’. The purpose of this text was to illustrate ‘the complete identity between Schopenhauerean ethics and the real spirit of Christianity’.(SS, 22) Both texts enumerated the four elements discussed here: determinism, categorical imperative, the monergism and regeneration or rebirth.

1. Determinism was a name popularised by J.S Mill and brought to the fore in modern
philosophy by Hobbes, Spinoza and the materialist systems of the nineteenth century. For Deussen, determinism means that the domination of the law of causality in nature also extends to man's free will. At the moment of action, character and motive are already in the past and are therefore necessary. Although Deussen notes traces of this thought in Indian, Greek and ancient Hebrew sources, Jesus and St. Paul were the first to 'pronounce them clearly', making them the 'cornerstone' of their whole worldview. (II.2, 282) He interprets Jesus' proverb, 'As the tree, so its fruits,' in Schopenhauerean language in demonstration that '[Jesus] clearly recognised the Will's unfreedom'. We can see why he states the 'the fundamental view of the New Testament and Schopenhauer' is that the law of causality is the Will's empirical want of freedom. (SS, 62) St. Paul's doctrine of Predestination results from combining this knowledge with Old Testament theism. If man must act in accordance to how he is created, freedom may only belong to a being:

welches sich selbst erschaffen, welches die Beschaffenheit, nach der es mit Notwendigkeit handelt, aus sich selbst heraus geboren hat.

There is no possibility of moral action for empirical consciousness. This doctrine was most clearly established by Deussen in the section on 'Practical Philosophy' in the System of the Vedanta. The condition of moral conduct is self-denial, i.e. the renunciation of oneself as the link in the chain of this causal connection that rules the world. Every moral action is rather 'this imperishable freedom of our essence-in-itself burst forth in this world'. (SS,62) We can see why he states the 'the fundamental view of the New Testament and Schopenhauer' is that the law of causality is the Will's empirical want of freedom. (SS, 62) St. Paul's doctrine of Predestination results from combining this knowledge with Old Testament theism, adding that vocation, justification, glorification and election result from 'God's own purpose and Grace'. This rather systematic articulation of Jesus' message seems strange, but it will be recalled that Deussen wishes to reconcile Glauben and Wissen, and thus maintains the perspective that faith is in essence knowledge of the Will and its modes.

2. The Categorical Imperative contradicts Jesus' Determinism. However the fact that in making a decision man experiences an awareness of choosing freely between different courses of action would seem to preclude universal determinism. For Deussen, moral consciousness attests to the freedom of the Will and he equates this with the Moral Law. This is because for him, the imperative form is essential to every ethical system, even though he admits that Schopenhauer vehemently contested this. Still he observes that in
Schopenhauer’s early writings, he had written of the denial of the will-to-live as ‘the better consciousness’. In spite of determinism, ‘the command to accomplish good and shun evil persists’.

[T]he freedom of the Will and the moral law inseparable from it have the same root. They are merely two sides of a consistent, metaphysical state of affairs which penetrates, not mediately through the intellect, but from the inside outwards, from our deepest Will. (KI, 26)

His expressions quickly establish the equivalence between this command and the Kantian Imperative. (II.2, 282) Deussen translates in his own way, admittedly not strictly Kantian, the most profound sense of the Categorical Imperative: (deferring to German grammar)

*Handle nicht individuell, sondern überindividuelle, handle so, wie der handeln würde, den du dir als den allgemeinen Gesetzgeber des Weltalls vorstellt.* (II.2, 283)

Kantian Reason plays no role however in this summation: it is the ‘inner voice’, the ‘impulse towards good’ and the ‘feeling of freedom’ which ground the metaphysical reality of the deepest essence of man. As it will be noticed, all of these factors are rooted in inner experience, albeit a non-egostic, überindividuelle one.

It is interesting that in his lecture on the ‘Categorical Imperative’ (1895), Deussen speaks of a ‘moral ‘phenomenon as an innate form of inner experience, i.e. akin to or like the a prioris. Thus how it is conceived depends on whether one observes it from the empirical or metaphysical standpoint. It can appear as:

(1) the feeling of freedom in our behaviour (i.e. independence from motivation), (2) the consciousness of responsibility for our actions, and (3) an imperative *Impuls* which strives against egotism and which is equally an imperative natural drive to will that which is represented as Good and to deny what is universally perceived as Evil. (II.1, 13)

(While Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals* explored the violent history of these values, tracing the evolution of their forms both noble and base, Deussen posits them as positive, innate elements of human existence.)

As Deussen repeats throughout his works, the basis of ‘practical metaphysics’ (KI, 6) is this:

The Categorical Imperative is the law which man as Thing-in-itself
Here is a second value system fighting against egoistic value system. Deussen does not discuss it as or consider it a value – which may be chosen over another – since the motivation for all choices is necessarily egoistic. It is in ‘inner voice’, an instinct, a crevice in consciousness from which issues the possibility of moral action. The Categorical Imperative is transformed into the command to extirpate entirely the egoistic forces which confine man to the realm governed tyrannically by the Law of Causality. Now the necessary inter-relation of cause and effect in empirical reality is reconsidered as a hinge point, where the freedom of Being-in-itself breaks through. Therefore it is not sure either that the human, or the animal, enters only into a quantifiable economy of energy, or how this other event occurs. It appears to Deussen that there is evidence that man is capable of activity for which he neither has, nor can have, sufficient resources. Schopenhauer referred this problem to the expedient idea of ‘Grace’, whereas Deussen appeals to the doctrines of Monergism, Vedantin Non-Dualism and, in the last section, Occasionalism. Clearly ever since he elaborated the philosophy of forces as discussed in Chapter 2, the concepts of *energeia* and *dynamis* are continually present in Deussen’s thought. In Chapter 3, I referred to David Loy’s discussion of energy and Non-Dualism. For the sage of Practical Vedanta, who exists ‘beyond Good and Evil’, physical energy is not preoccupied in satisfying cravings. ‘When the world is not approached as a set of situations to be manipulated to satisfy those cravings, then we experience a great freedom and the world is vast and wide.’

The concern is not with changing basic energies, but changing how they manifest themselves. For the moment, Loy seems in fact to offer the best explanation of Monergism. Otherwise it is a concept which is only defined in passing in opposition to Melanchthon’s doctrine of Synergism.

3. It follows from the first two points that the demand to do good cannot be fulfilled unless ‘we become other than what we are.’ (SS, 21) Consequently, what is demanded is a *kaine kiisis*, a totally new creation:

...a transformation of the old man into the new, as with St. Paul; a

turning of the Will from affirmation to negation, as with Schopenhauer. (II.2,283)

*Rebirth* or *regeneration* is the highest goal of existence and the supreme fulfilment of the Categorical Imperative. While it may not be led by Reason, rebirth is nevertheless accomplished through ‘knowledge’ according to Deussen. He corroborates this with
reference to the Indian axiom, jnanad mokshah, 'From knowledge comes deliverance'.

The knowledge which leads to regeneration consists in knowledge of the consequences - in oneself and in the world - of affirming the Will. In abstract thought, he says, this is represented in the concept of an instantaneous change, whereas in practice it is a lifelong process of purification. However the knowledge which purifies the self from egoism can be wrought neither by indoctrination nor any other means. (II.2, 284) (We can see the seed of this thought in the thesis Deussen defended during his theological exam in Marburg 1871: 'ethics does not prescribe but describes'. (SS, 6))

St. Paul's conversion is a rebirth (Wiedergeburt) within the course of a life and immanent to worldly existence. Perhaps this takes things too literally, but it is nevertheless possible to see in this a divergence from some orthodox forms of Christianity since it does not insist on belief in the mystery of the resurrection but refers rebirth to a transformation which occurs within life. In any case, this seems to be Deussen's interpretation. For this reason, the concept of 'regeneration' seems more appropriate to his discourse than 'rebirth'. Certainly in St. Paul and in Schopenhauer, he says, regeneration is an act that occurs only once, in that both teachers represent in abstract thought as an individual unity that which in reality is a process of purification prolonged throughout the whole of life. A quotation from the Bhagavhad Gita serves him as a corrective: 'Purified by many a rebirth, He finally follows the highest course....'.(SS, 22)

4. Given that it affects the whole nature of man, Christianity attributes the cause of regeneration to to God. Thus according to Deussen, the fundamental view of the Holy Scripture is that 'all moral actions of self-denial are effected by God.'(SS, 22) For man only sinful, egoistical actions are possible. Deussen also posits that this is a necessary corollary of the Kantian Categorical Imperative which he described above. (Ibid). Only a philosophy of Monergism has the resources to reconcile the absolute separation of natural, egoistic behaviour with moral, self-denying actions. The consciousness of sacrificing oneself for a higher purpose means that this act 'is not to be conducted or conceptualised in the natural order of things.'(Ibid) This is not to imply that ethical regeneration is caused by God, for:

The deeper meaning of the whole conception of God is in fact that our true, metaphysical being is not limited to this corporeality. (SS, 23)
As remarked earlier, Deussen also upholds the view shared by Max Müller that a personified and personal God is an aberrance, and that what language identifies variously as *God-Zeus-deva-theos-Dyaus Pitar-Jupiter* is in fact the hidden, inner nature of all things or an immanently metaphysical prospect of being. The possibility of detaching ourselves from the illusionary cycle of empirical reality and returning to ‘our in-itself, divine nature’ stands open in every act: the possibility of ‘returning to God’. Deussen annexes a democratic version of Monergism in the 1915 essay, describing the path of release as follows,

To this [release], we aspire only on the path of moral conduct in an endless process of approach and sooner or later everyone will assuredly reach it. (SS, 23)

With this, we can see that the democratic aspect of Christianity that Nietzsche hated is supported and even promoted by Deussen as the corollary of the presence of a universal radical, metaphysical element in all beings.

16. *Die Schale des Christentums*

The discussion of the *Schale* reveals an enormous amount about the schism between philosophy and religion, between thinking and believing that Deussen wants desperately to reconcile.

The precious kernel of ethical and metaphysical truth was subsequently encased in the hard shell deriving from the Old Testament’s ancient Semitic realism. It stands in irreconcilable conflict with the surest results of historical, philosophical and scientific research. (II.2, 285)

The cultural dissemination of the philosophy of the Old Testament seems to play a major role for Deussen in alienating man from the radical element of freedom he harbours internally. It will be recalled that for this history of philosophy, what has shaped the destiny of European thought has been the accidental fusion of Greco-Roman culture with Christianity, rather than with its sororal Indian wisdom.

His history of Greek philosophy stressed the weakness of its ambiguous ethics and the predomination of systematic natural philosophy. In Greece, Indra became electricity as it were. Science conquered the gods hence its failure to appease the needs of ‘the ‘heart and the mind’. The weaknesses of Greek philosophy were exacerbated by its encounter with youthful Christianity. Deussen claims that the Old Testament realism alienated man
even further from his radical element by transplanting the economy of the regime of causality into the domain of ethics.

His objections to monotheistic Realism spring initially from the antinomies of time and space; i.e. the indeterminacy of infinitude of time and space combined with the necessity of conceiving of their limits. According to his presentation, the fundamental aspects of the Christian cosmogony confound belief, paradoxically because of their effort to create a ‘realistic’ representation: the sudden beginning of the world, the creation in six days, geocentricism. The problem is with the inconsistency rather than the doctrinal ‘realism’ of the perspective. The flaw of the early Dogmatics is that:

They posit God as the principle of the salvation of the world as well as the creation of the world...If the creation is the work of such a God [all-powerful, all-knowing, all-Good], then he cannot be responsible for the iniquity and Evil which fills the world, as is incontrovertibly maintained by Christianity according to the Old Testament. (II.2, 286)

Deussen takes the position that free will is incompatible with divine omniscience and contradicts man’s nature as a created being who must submit to the law of causality which orders all existence. Untroubled by these difficulties, the system teaches that God freely created Man and that the first Man used this freedom in an act of disobedience. By divine law, this ‘seemingly simple act by human standards’ brought suffering, death and eternal damnation into existence. (II.2, 286) Divine justice consequently demands that only the sacrifice of the son of God will suffice for the remittance of Mankind’s sin: to Deussen this destructive logic is absolutely unjustifiable. (287) The injustice is doubled by the fact that an innocent atones for the guilty.

This theory unhappily transfers the concept of material compensation to the realm of Ethics. Accordingly Men are saved from the force of Evil (Gewalt des Teufels) through the sacrifice of the son of God, only on condition that they believe in the Grace. (287)

This statement is the culmination of Deussen’s earlier criticism of the morality of reward and punishment, of empty, formal legality, and of the power of sacerdotal authority. In Elements of Metaphysics he held that these laws were irrevocably manipulated and constrained by egotism. The present work goes further in engaging with the problems Kant dealt with in his treatment of faith and knowledge on Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.

Contrary to the promise of a saving ecclesiastical faith, it is not within Man's power to fulfil the condition of redemption. Deussen's pietism has influenced his belief to that God's Grace has freely predetermined some for faith and salvation and some for damnation. This is the rub. The following plea reprises elements of his own intolerable dilemma:

Consider now how many people of the Earth, in the pre-Christian and post-Christian era have never been able to hear the message of faith; not to speak of the inhabitants of other worlds. How many already here on Earth have been made incapable of adhering to the Kirchenglauben through a certain degree of scientific and historical education? In this case only a small percentage of men are to partake of Seligkeit, while eternal damnation awaits all the others. (287-88)

Kirchenglauben refers merely to the external acceptance of the fact of salvation (Heilstatsache). He sees this as having come to dominate the more profound Pauline understanding that faith is the internalisation of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection as the elimination of egoistic, human nature and resurrection in a renewed life (einem neuem heiligen Lebenswandel).

We can in fact compare this criticism to remarks Nietzsche made in the Anti-Christ concerning the psychology of redemption:

It is false to the point of absurdity to see in a 'belief'... the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian: only Christian practice, a life such as he who died on the Cross lived, is Christian...Even today, such a life is possible, for certain men even necessary: genuine, primitive Christianity will be possible at all times...Not a belief but a doing, above all a not-doing of many things, a different being...47

I would say that this is the most important crossing-point between Nietzsche and Deussen. The final statement in particular emphasises a 'not-doing', 'a different being'; these, as we have seen, were the richest ideas Deussen brought out in his System of the Vedanta. The Vedantin sage who is liberated in life and who lives 'as it happens' (idria a'eva) seems to embody the living practice which Nietzsche describes. It is clear however that both thinkers drew different conclusions from this idea; Nietzsche in particular recognises the strangeness of this path, the integrity which it demands. This also resonates with the Upanishadic quotation discussed in Chapter 3, 'The Self alone is his path,' where the Self is the unknown self or Atman. Nevertheless, Deussen commits
himself to what he considers the stability and the systemicity of knowledge. His *Universal History* is a map, as he says, and the reader, it seems, must make his own way. (On the other hand, sometimes when Deussen writes ‘*Wissenschafi*’, we have the impression he is referring to the Sanskrit word: *Jnana*, as in the *jnana-kanda* or knowledge doctrine of the Vedanta. *Jnana* breaks the mutually reinforcing pattern of thoughts, so that Non-Dual nature can be recognised.)

Kant had contrasted the saving, ecclesiastical faith to 'the faith that we can become well-pleasing to God through a good course of life in the future'. However Kant's hope for a practical faith to become the basis of universal religious fraternity appeared inadequate to Deussen. He continues to see in this the hubris of 'certain confidence – in which one hopes, in which one has no doubts, which one does not see – an explanation which finally leads to conviction without adequate grounds'. Deussen's intention is rather to demonstrate that faith is a kind of knowledge which renews. It confronts man with the inner reality of nature, i.e. the Will, his ego, and hence reveals self-denial to be the path to his hidden, metaphysical and divine element of freedom. The influence of ancient Judaic tradition on the message of the Bible is the external shell which obscures true knowledge of man's physical and metaphysical elements because it insists on the concepts of 'faith' and 'redemption by faith'. The quote above frames the *Kirchenglauben* as radically unjust to human life in general. In particular for modern, western culture this faith demands intolerable choices.

This is the very thing against which we are justifiably warned in life as in *Wissenschafi*: namely to assume something to be true, about which we cannot be convinced. This very thing becomes here the condition of our eternal redemption. (289)

Because this obstacle grew into and grew up with the Christian tradition, the 'lack' felt originally in the Greco-Roman world remains unfulfilled. It will be the task of the *Neue Philosophie* to return revelation to its authentic site as Thing-in-itself in the inner nature of (human) being.

17. **(IV) Medieval and (V) Neue Philosophie**

Originally intended to be the opening chapter of the final episode, re-telling 'the war of freedom of the human spirit from the shackles laid upon it through the medieval world-view,' (II.2,1) it was finally published in the same volume as *Philosophy of the Bible*. Deussen does not consider the episode of medieval philosophy (800-1600 C.E.) as
'original' thought but rather as 'a remarkable melting process'. He saw it as a *mixtum compositum* of the completely heterogeneous elements of 'Greek 'worldly' wisdom (*Weltweisheit*) and Biblical revelation.' (II.3, ix) (II.2, 1) As regards the search for the means to discover the inner essence of nature, he says this:

In the philosophy of the Middle Ages, mankind fell in love equally with the shell and the kernel, unconscious of the difference in their value. (II.3, 5)

The growth of the disfiguring shell was spurred on by the elaboration of Christian dogma. This episode focuses on the manner in which medieval theology, 'the queen of sciences', institutionalised redemptive faith, the *Kirchenglauben*. The Church Fathers reinforced the importation of ancient 'realism' and hence egoism to metaphysical thinking. Following the Council of Nicea this doctrine was projected onto the re-worked surface of Greek philosophy, thereby compounding the geographical accident that bound European culture with Christianity instead of Indian philosophy. Yet from 200 CE onwards, 'the most beautiful after-bloom of Hellenistic wisdom', Neo-Platonism, developed in Alexandria, combining the best of Greek philosophy with certain elements of the 'oriental ways of thinking'. (I.1, 18)

[Der Neuplatonismus]...dem erstarkenden und erstarrenden *Kirchenglauben* als ein um so gefährlicherer Gegner erwuchs, je mehr auch er denselben Herzenbedürfnissen entgegen kam, welchen das Christentum seinen Sieg verdankt hatte.

I.1, 18)

Neoplatonism was inherited by the Scholastics whose task it was, to Deussen's mind, to finally construct a *Religionsphilosophie* which would serve equally the needs of the heart and the mind, i.e. to accommodate the *logos* and the *aestheton* of metaphysics. The first attempt to understand Christian thought on the grounds of Neo-Platonism failed in the face of an increasingly resistant orthodoxy. There followed a return to conceiving certain fundamental thoughts of Christianity as mysteries to cognition and the whole was framed in an essentially Aristotelian *theologia naturalis*, resulting in the great doctrinal systems of Albertus Magnus and Aquinas.

Yet hardly had this final connection between faith and knowledge, between Bible and Aristotle been concluded, when numerous symptoms of its untenability arose, [namely...the works of Dun Scotus, Occam and the Neo-Platonism of Eckhardt]. (Ibid)

This instability marked the beginning of a transition period and the struggle for
emancipation from medieval philosophy. This war was fought on two fronts, he writes. The Reformation’s attack was grounded in a return ‘from Scholastic interpretation to the original texts of Christianity, ‘das urkundliche Christentum’’. (1.1, 19) At the same time, Renaissance philosophy abandoned Scholasticism, turning first to the original texts of Aristotle and then to the study of nature itself. It attempted ‘to ground a new philosophy merely on the facts of external nature and inner consciousness.’(II.3, 5) Yet despite the innovations of men such as Cusanus, Bruno, Boehme and Bacon, none of these philosophers,

... were capable of compensating the age for what it lacked. Thus around 1600 man found himself between a past which he distrusted and a future which was enigmatic and so was more expectant and receptive than ever to a new age in human culture.(II.3,6)

He gives the impression that it was the Neo-Platonists and Bruno and Boehme in particular who kindled the flame of true Christianity in this episode but that, despite the vitality of their philosophy, it waned under the dominion of the search for a reconciled and total system. Deussen’s final section on the Neue Philosophie continues the same drama which is presented in the previous sections. Here too Realism and Idealism struggle for pre-eminence rather than reconciliation, as the divide between them remains insuperable.

This final section in particular bears the distinctive influence of a Kantian model. Two aspects of it take their cue directly from the cursory history of philosophy ‘from a transcendental perspective’ which Kant sketches at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason. There Kant outlined three points of view on which the most notable changes ‘on this stage of conflict’ were founded: consideration of the object, the origin of pure cognition and the method. Given that Deussen is excavating the history of philosophy for psychological means in order to reveal the Thing-in-itself, he seems to focus on changes in the origins of cognition. In this regard to this he describes two definitive bifurcations in philosophy since Descartes, organising them into a genealogical Tabellarishe Übersicht. (II.3, 11)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Deus} \\
\text{Extensio} \\
\text{Res} \\
\text{Motus corporis} \\
\text{Cogitatio} \\
\text{ideae} \\
\text{voluntas}
\end{array}
\]
Descartes:

Geulincx, Malebranche:

Spinoza:

Realism

Locke

Wolff

French Materialism

Idealism

Locke

Wolff

Berkeley’s

Locke

Wolff

Hume’s Skepticism

Kant

Herbart’s Realism

Fichte’s Subjective

Schelling’s Objective

Hegel’s Absolute

Deussen insists on signalling that the ‘shaping forces of previous philosophical events reached down through the Middles Ages to influence [the moderns]’. Thus he indicates how the division of the medieval idea of God as uncreated substance into extended and thinking substance lead to the conciliatory efforts of Descartes, Geulincx, Malebranche and Spinoza. This view is largely indebted to Spinoza, whom he considers the first to show that dualism was the inevitable consequence of medieval thinking about the causality or influence of an otherworldly God. Given Deussen’s assertion that negation is one of the two modes of the Will, - a concept which is not found in Schopenhauer - an undeveloped and latent Spinozism can perhaps be identified in his work.

Systematic, logical, wissenschaftlich, Cartesian philosophy exerted its leverage at the point where it was most able to weaken medieval philosophy: the idea of an otherworldly God and an immaterial soul. His inauguration of substance dualism, united in the physicus influxus in man is compared by Deussen to the Indian Mñnu system. This was based on a discrimination of the dual natures of Spirit and Material, prakrti and purusha and fundamentally connected to the Yoga of Patanjali. Continuing the historical parallel, he sees Sankhyam as responsible for the transition to pure Materialism. [Contrary to Sprung’s claim that Nietzsche never solicited any information on Indian philosophy from Deussen, we can cite letter of 20th September 1886 where
Nietzsche says he wishes Deussen would write an equally clear and 'Dialektisch-Durchgearbeitetes' book on Sankhyan philosophy.\textsuperscript{30}

The other philosophers in this category in fact provide curious prototypes for what Deussen has identified as the true elements of Idealist philosophy, i.e. Spinoza's principle of Identity recalls that of Atman/ Brahman and Occasionalism that of the doctrine of Monergism. Spinoza's solution differed of course by proposing 'a double identification', identifying God with the world and the soul with the body, as two parallel-running modes of revelation of the Godly being. However, Deussen writes:

We only need to take Spinoza at his word to understand his \textit{cogitatio} and \textit{extensio} as the world as representation and his \textit{Deus} as the Thing-in-itself in itself (\textit{quod in se est}) (II.3, 8)

This example perhaps best illustrates how this universal history rewrites philosophy in order to recuperate it and include it in the validation of neo-Kantian Idealism. Deussen's hermeneutic constantly applies itself to discovering the expression of the Thing-in-itself as the true, inner text of philosophy. Yet he is unforthcoming with an explanation for Spinoza's failure to be selected for the 'treasure house' of philosophy. The revival of his philosophy in the post-Kantian period arrived 'too late on scene; when it was no longer needed...'. (II, 3, 6)

Next, Geulincx and Malebranche, considering the \textit{influxus} impossible, expounded a doctrine by which the \textit{Ursache}, or what is called 'cause', is purely the opportunity (\textit{occasio}) by which the real cause enters, i.e. God. Unlike Spinoza's philosophy, Deussen appears to take this doctrine to heart:

In a certain sense Occasionalism was right: what we call \textit{Ursache}, as we will see later, is only the occasion by which the real Agent (\textit{Agens}) is unleashed and as effect breaks through. (II.3, 7)

This idea of a divine, omnipresent \textit{Agens} as the prime actor as it were sheds further light on Deussen's explication of Monergistic Christianity. To a certain extent, it also echoes Loy's Non-Dual expression of Non-Dual activity. All partial actions are eliminated and thus also all sensations of action (which depend entirely on the limited nature of actions). The result resembles a certain passivity.

This is the activity of the human being who has become whole: it has been called not-doing, for nothing particular, nothing partial is at work in man and thus nothing of him intrudes into the world.\textsuperscript{51}
Deussen warns that Occasionalism must not be conceived of as the pantheistic thought of the medieval otherworldly God brought closer and closer into the world. In comparison, his defines Monergism as the possibility of withdrawing into the eternal, causeless, divine being-in-itself by denying the world, its order and ourselves. This possibility become reality is ‘the gateway to salvation’. (SS,59)

From these emerged the two hegemonic systems of Idealism and Realism as philosophy began to question whether Descartes had been correct in positing two substances. Was it not possible to posit one substance and derive the other as its mere modification? Briefly, Deussen sees a solution pursued in two ways: one could realistically conceive the spirit as a modification of material or idealistically conceive material as a spiritual substance. The Realistic branch began with Locke’s Empiricism and led through Voltaire to French Sensualism and Materialism. In the Idealist branch, Locke inspired Berkely’s precipitous Idealism, ‘which could no longer find its way back to nature’. Leibniz was next to adopt a form of Idealism, though as he was Locke’s main opponent, he ‘could not avoid however reverting to a Spinozian Ideal realism.’ (II,3, 9) Wolff’s Leibniz-inspired philosophy became the dominant form of metaphysics taught in German universities. When Hume’s Skepticism, ‘arrived at the position that philosophy was incapable of solving its own problems’, modern philosophy threatened to run aground. (II,3,8) ‘More than ever it was mired in a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction.’

18. Conclusion: Kant, Schopenhauer and the Function of the History of Philosophy.

This ‘war of liberation’ from the dualisms originating in medieval thought was brought to a conclusion by Kant. For Deussen, this was the most important event in the history of philosophy, comparable only to the teachings of Jesus and St. Paul. (II,3, 172)

As befitting the predominantly psychological orientation of Deussen’s Kantianism, his praise focuses on the transcendental aesthetic and the analytic of concepts: ‘the critique and test of the apparatus of cognition’. Kant’s analysis of consciousness established - with ‘incontrovertible proof’ – the concrete foundation of an entirely new metaphysics, compatible in its results with the noblest doctrines of history, the field of natural science and with moral and religious consciousness. (Ibid)

Thereby Kant arrived by way of the surest, wissenschaftlich proof at the knowledge which the deepest minds of orient and occident had
only intuitively felt and suspected more than they had cognised (erkannt) and proved.... [T]he world does not reveal to us the Wesen of the Thing-in-itself. (II.3, 10)

Before Kant, other philosophies such as the Vedanta had grasped the Non-Dual nature of Being yet because this knowledge was intuitive and only grasped transiently (im Fluge), it lacked wissenschaftliche Begründung. (I.1,1) Thus even if this intuition was organised into an ethics and a practical philosophy, it could not refute the validity of the claims of materialism, i.e. the world seen from the 'natural' standpoint. When the gods become electricity and oxidation – the death of God – the spontaneous discourse of feeling/intuition is futile. In this case, if religion and science were to come into conflict, the latter's 'realistic', empirical claims would appear irrefutable.

Thus Kant's achievement was to explicate for the first time 'auf dem Wege unumstößlicher Beweise' how all previous philosophy had endeavoured to derive the world from one principle, that is, to derive appearances from the Thing-in-itself appearing in them. As I investigated the Kantian-Schopenhauerean framework of Deussen's system in Chapters 1 and 2, I assess here only how he evaluates Kant's significance for both the history and the future of philosophy.

Kant wrote in 1791 that his metaphysics turned on two angles, to which Deussen adds the following interpretations. The first concerns the a priority of time and space. Because Kant provided 'einen vollkommen wissenschaftlichen und streng erweislichen Ausdruck' for this universal principle of philosophy, he revealed the full significance of the metaphysical efforts of the past for the first time. (II.3,172) Moreover, his proof finally made it possible to reconcile the modern scientific understanding of existence with that of the religious perspective. Since Copernicus and Bruno had 'replaced heaven and God with endless space with suns and planets', he writes, man was forced to sacrifice scientific conviction for the sake of religion or vice versa.

Kant however it was, who removed all of endless space with all its contents, by proving it to be a mere appearance, a mere representation of our consciousness, and through this made room for the possibility of an otherworld, space-less, time-less and godly. (Ibid)

Thus not only are the empty heavens of modern astronomy replenished but the eclipse of all galaxies and suns in the final image of Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation is reversed.
Kant's second revolutionary achievement concerned the articulation of the innate moral law, on which the certainty (*Gewissheit*) of freedom depends. Despite Kant ruling all knowledge of the Thing-in-itself to be impossible, Deussen sees him nevertheless indicating 'a way to the truth' in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. This is the only point where the Thing-in-itself comes forth from beyond the veil where Kant conceals it. In that text, he elucidated the categorical imperative as the law which man as Thing-in-itself gives to man as appearance or, in Deussen's words, 'the law which man as God gives to man as man.' (II.3, 178) The statement positively identifies the existence of a divine element in man, an 'immanent' world-turning power, whereas Kant maintains a more uncertain and incremental approach to man's capacity for freedom.

This implies that Deussen's 'return to Kant' also involves a Kantianism without Kant, as it were. Deussen asserts that he cannot agree with Kant in regarding metaphysics only as an inventory of pure concepts and thereby ignoring the *a posteriori* given, immeasurable nature with its secret forces and appearances. (174) He claims that Kant made two key mistakes, the first of which is linked to a Hegelian kind of abstraction. Although Kant correctly recognised causality as the function of the understanding which converts sensation into cognition, yet he viewed it as an 'abstract concept' rather than as a form of intuition, and even required eleven others concepts to complete it. This mixing of intuitive and conceptual cognition, in Deussen's view, placed philosophy under the tyranny of concepts. (428) Hence Schopenhauer's perfection of this philosophy consisted in proving that the external world is cognised through intuition, and that reason, the conceptual function, serves only to assess the causal nexus in order to master it, i.e. to serve the interests of the Will. By 'dismantling' consciousness into intellect and Will, in the same way as Lavoisier analysed water into its two constitutive elements, he took the highest step of 'liberating us from the tyranny of concepts' through demonstrating that intuition (*Anschauung*) is the only source of all true knowledge. (429)

Concerning the second error, Deussen confirms Kant's wish to recognise the limits of knowledge, but yet considers it incontrovertible that corporeality can be known both as Thing-in-itself and as appearance. Schopenhauer had showed that what is internalised in consciousness is the ground of all appearances in animals, plants and the inorganic world: it is the Will. Thus 'we carry that eternal secret of nature in ourselves, which
already in India had been conceived as Atman.'(178) From this it followed that the source of all true moral activity could not be practical reason, but must spring from the Will in its negative mode.

Deussen now posits in fact a metaphysical ground of freedom which goes beyond what both of these philosophers considered legitimate. Criticising Kant’s formula of the categorical imperative for being ‘without the positive content and the clarity necessary in moral things,’ Deussen reasserts that the fact (Tatsache) of moral consciousness cannot be created from pure reasoning. He sees the categorical imperative in a sense, not as a posteriori but as ‘das Apriori des Apriori’. (KI, 13) While it may well appear in the light of reason in the rational form of Kant’s law,

... without it being clearly conceived, the divine source of the categorical imperative also appears as the moral measure (Takt) which regulates our behaviour, as the renunciation with which we burden ourselves in obscure feelings of culpability, as the love which only finds itself in others and in the love of one’s neighbour as oneself. (KI, 12)

An innate ‘moral compass’ promotes the self-denial and self-sacrifice constitutive of the negation of the individual Will-to-live. However this is entirely incompatible with Schopenhauer’s intention of abolishing the categorical imperative and the moral law. He fundamentally resisted all attempts to ground practical philosophy on the freedom of the Will. Deussen’s insistence on the empirical evidence of moral conscience pushes in quite the opposite direction.

The extent to which Deussen promoted the universal fact of moral conscience can be seen from his perspective on Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values. He fiercely defended Nietzsche’s ‘breaking of the tables of the law’ which were impeding the development of humanity’s noble forces. However he saw the project of establishing new values as less successful chiefly because of Nietzsche’s rejection of negation as the greatest ennoblement of the Will. (EFN, 173) Most importantly Deussen draws attention to the justification of Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values and identifies it with the innate moral conscience described above.

If we ask from where he takes the right to proceed with his revaluation of all values, it can only be a question of the most unconscious, metaphysical depths of our nature, and thus something effectively
given which guided Nietzsche in his determination of values, as it did all previous moralisers. (EFN, 169)

This interpretation relocates Nietzsche’s complex analysis of foreground motives and background instincts in the metaphysical fact of moral conscience. This illustrates succinctly their divergence over the metaphysics of morality, a mode of thought Nietzsche actively combated. The basis on which Deussen wished to renew philosophy, as we shall see, was perceived by Nietzsche, on the contrary, as an imperative to revalue all values and create a new philosophy.

Deussen believed that the inheritance of past philosophy imposed an onerous duty on the present, one that was devalued by the chronicler’s mere ‘historical interest’ in the past. His *Universal History* supplies the ground work for a renewal of philosophy along neo-Kantian lines. The task of the future, he says, is to do justice to ‘the glimpse of the Thing-in-itself afforded by Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s doctrines, by building on their worldview in two directions: the historical and the scientific.’ (vi) Deussen has undertaken this task in the historical direction, hoping that in tandem with natural scientific work “the illumination (durchleuchten) of the radiant foreworld of silvery forms” will provide universal validation for a unified, metaphysical science.

This completes his project to articulate an order of thought which reconciles science, philosophy and religion. It is also importantly one which,

...appears in its most profound practical part as a Christianity renewed on wissenschaftlich foundations and which will remain for the foreseeable future the ground of all scientific and religious thought of humanity. (1.1,22: emphasis added)

This practical part is of the utmost significance. In a sense, the total system of philosophy will have been constructed in order to ground the freedom of the Will. This is what Deussen means when he writes that ‘[Philosophy] is essentially the search for the Thing-in-itself,’ and this is has given his work the impetus to go beyond Schopenhauer. (1.1, 5) Yet this reference to the practical part of philosophy indicates that even the unified metaphysical system of philosophy still requires a supplement.

Let us recall Deussen’s description of the hierarchy of the metaphysical disciplines in the *Elements*. There he stated that philosophy breaks down the barriers of time, space and causality in an abstract way, while art does so in an immediately intuitive way and morality does so in a practical respect. The function of the history of philosophy is to
gather up the means which have been historically uncovered to break down these barriers through the investigation of man’s ‘dual’ physical and metaphysical nature. It proves that the way into the Thing-in-itself must transpire internally, through the dormant, divine element in man. Deussen hopes to show this to his reader by mapping out these means, so that the reader can fully comprehend them in their entirety and interconnectedness. For it is the very truth of truth, the reality of reality, to be always already in its place, and for this reason it can only be discovered at the appropriate place and not approached in a progressive manner. His philosophy of history functions as a kind of a treasure map, to use the vocabulary of the Vedanta, which compares the unenlightened to ‘a man who knows not where the treasure is buried, but passes over it many times.’ (PU, 242)

The series of thoughts of the philosophers remains eternally incomplete before the final negation of the Will-to-life by each person who contemplates the quasi-totality. This is an element which can be brought neither into history nor into representation. This truth would release man from the principium individuationis and return him to eternity: he would be ‘reborn’, or rather that divine, supra-human element which has not yet been born would be released from its immanent limbo. Deussen’s ultimate motivation in pursuing this Universal History is the thought that this regeneration would reveal a cosmos beyond the world and a temporality beyond ego-reality which would be characterised by serenity, compassion and universal peace. For negation, as he declares, is entirely positive. It is ‘the source of all disinterested justice, the love of one’s fellow men, the sacrifice of oneself for noble ends, of every great heroic and supra-individual enterprise and of creativity’. (EFN, 176)

Thus the final supplement indicated by philosophy lies in problem of individual enlightenment. The individual denial of the Will-to-life cannot be ‘accomplished’ through the abstract thought of philosophy alone. It is only through the subject that it is possible to recuperate and possess the inner being of the world and the self in permanence, plenitude and full presence. This perspective has been amply evidenced by Deussen’s shift from a concept of teleology in the Elements to one of eschatology in the Vedanta. It is further testified to in this Universal History’s non-Hegelian geo-philosophy which has presented an alternative to the dialectical method of Hegel’s philosophical history and its teleological principle.
However even when Deussen claims that the historian of philosophy's task is to permit the reader to glimpse the Thing-in-itself 'through the eyes of the philosophers', this means only to defer again the mutual revelation of cosmic and individual self. As a historian of philosophy, he can only bring the reader to the edge of the Adytum, pointing beyond the darkness of representation to this radical element ('Where there are many lights, ...'). I have tried to illustrate this paradox at the beginning of this chapter with reference to the idea of the map. (Borges illustrates the same paradox of knowledge in his fragment 'Of Exactitude in Science' concerning a map on the same scale as the territory it maps.) A map incarnates the problem of attempting to bring truth into the interior of time. It symbolises the plenitude of the terrain which is an impossibility for the walker, the pathmaker. The zenith of this instability is reached in Deussen's anticipation that the map (representation) will disappear when it has been comprehended entirely. This dizzying mobility of knowledge returns the self to the immediate presence of the *hic et nunc* but destabilises the immobility of 'the barriers of time, space and causality'. Then it actualises the possibility of new relations with the outside of the egoistic self and the empirical world.
Conclusion

It was while Deussen was teaching at the University of Aachen in 1873 that as, he describes it, he experienced a 'night of illumination' liberating him from the burden of having to make a difficult decision about his life's work. Incapable of choosing between Sanskrit and philosophy - two subjects which he loved, studied and taught in equal measure - this 'night' revealed to him the possibility of pursuing a vocation in Indian philosophy, a field of study which was entirely absent from the western academy at the time. Clearly it was the reconciliation of Deussen's expertise in the two domains of languages and philosophy which made his work so rich, resourceful and influential. It brought many important unprecedented philosophical ideas into Europe and made them accessible to new audiences through the use of Kantian-Schopenhauerian vocabulary. This 'revelation' event can perhaps also be seen as revelatory of the psychology of the individual who was responsible for introducing the system of Non-Dualism to the west, i.e. the tradition of Advaita Vedanta or the treatise of the 'not-two'. What Deussen chose was, significantly, a synthesis, a reconciliation which attempted to deal practically with the possibility that he would have to negate one of his interests. In this conclusion, I will examine Deussen's principles concerning the realisation of moral activity in non-dualist, monergistic philosophy. This involves essentially considering how the idea of the Thing-in-itself can be completely affirmed by man, that is to say, how the inner, divine core of man and nature can be brought to presence in a total and non-subjective (i.e. non-negating) way.

While Deussen's core texts demonstrate how his engagement with Indian philosophy progressively developed during his career, it is equally clear that a particular question continued to preoccupy him throughout his lifetime, that is, the question of how the negation of the will-to-live can be something positive. As I discuss here, the problem of how moral activity can be realised is the most significant aspect of this question. The fact that this question remained open, I believe, is not an autobiographical accident related to his particular motivations and passions but an essential consequence of the terms of the problem as he posed it.

One of the main aims of this thesis has been to explicate the influence of Kantian and Schopenhauerian principles on Deussen's interpretation of Indian philosophy and to firmly locate his work in the context of the Neo-Kantian philosophers who were
responding to Hegel's critique of Kant. In Deussen's own opinion:

Kant founded and Schopenhauer completed a unified metaphysical doctrine, thoroughly grounded in experience and thoroughly self-coherent, which appears, in the practical part of its profundities, to be a Christianity renewed on logically systematic (wissenschaftlich) grounds and which will become and remain for the foreseeable future the foundation of all of the scientific (wissenschaftlich) and religious thoughts of mankind. (AGP, I.1, 22)

This assertion emphasises the extent and thoroughness of the metaphysical validity that Kant's philosophy was allegedly able to claim for itself— a validity that importantly touched on both thought and experience. However, although Deussen does not want to recognise it (and this distances him from Kant), the articulation of Kantian project, the Critical project, necessarily includes antinomies and aporia. Despite Deussen's claim to work within the framework of a thoroughly unified, experientially-grounded metaphysics, his ethics is constantly challenged by the problem of explaining how the negation of the ego-self can result in concrete moral activity. If he cannot explain this, then his ethics simply advocate a punitive asceticism which does not and cannot provide the foundation – as he wants it – for justice, love, ennoblement and creativity.

Of course it was Schopenhauer who provided Deussen with the possibility of continuing to adhere to a Kantian transcendental idealism after the historico-critical methods of Deussen's education had tempted him into a modern, scientific atheism. For Deussen, Kant had provided new metaphysical foundations for the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental but Schopenhauer first recognised the significance and the consequences of this method when he identified 'the way in' to the Thing-in-Itself', providing experiential proof of the identity of the phenomenal subject and the noumenal Will. What Kant had sundered in his transcendental method, Schopenhauer had brought back together.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Deussen saw the Schopenhauerean Will as only one mode of the Thing-in-Itself: the negation of the Will, non-willing, is itself not nothing. It is God. The flipside of the affirmative Will, its negation, is the divine, radical, metaphysical element of man and all things, which lies dormant in nature. The fact that
Schopenhauer taught that the essence of human being is Will made him, in Deussen's eyes, the 'philosophicus christianissimus'. In Deussen's view, the positive mode of the Will is the ground of all morality and the source of moral conscience and the categorical imperative. Thus on a personal note, he writes: '... the Critique of Practical Reason and The World as Will and Representation led me to ground my Christianity on the Christ in us.' (II.2, x) This conviction can be seen to underlie all Deussen's work from 1875 onwards.

How is positive negation not nothing? Deussen tries to give it substantial meaning by using various descriptions which struggle to extract themselves from the logic of contradiction by which the positive mode of the Will was identified in the first place. In the Elements of Metaphysics, positive negation is a 'supernatural power (Macht), a world-turning principle', i.e. that which accomplishes the turning of the Will to denial. (314) Since, like the affirmative will-to-life, it cannot enter into the circle of intellectual representation, 'the principle of denial might be designated by the name of God', the 'most obscure' and 'most significant thing'. (313) However this divine negation can only be known through its traces: by the trace in knowledge or the moral conscience, and by the trace in willing or the manifestation of unselfish actions, as observed externally. (315)

In the first case, we are able to recognise our actions as evil and in the second, we are able to recognise our ability to chose a non-egotistic action but nevertheless we are unable to directly identify (cognise) the source of the moral judgement or the freedom of choice. 'We have no intellectual form by which to conceive it [the trace] although external observation testifies to its truth. (EM, 315) Deussen, like Kant, has used a transcendental deduction to identify the two 'traces of the divine' in the empirical world. Just as in Kant, God is deduced after the fact of the moral law has been posited. He cannot be known positively.

These traces, although they are employed transcendentally to deduce that the divine mode of the Will exists and that it is the basis of the freedom of the Will, cannot however prove that positive negation is positive in a second sense beyond the fact of its mere existence. According to his expectations, positive negation seems also to need to be positive in the sense that it is substantially good. In a late essay (1902), Deussen succinctly defines the affirmation of the will as 'the pursuit and satisfaction of man's
drive for happiness'. Negation of the will is not nothing but allows 'our true supra-individual and divine nature' to return from the shadow into which it had fallen because of the eudemonistic drive. (EFN, 174) True supra-individual and divine nature is substantial and not simply the restraining of bad or evil actions: an impulse resulting, for all extents and purposes, in moral inertia. As Deussen states, the denial of the will-to-live is entirely positive because:

- it is the source of all disinterested justice, the love of one's neighbour, self-sacrifice for higher ends, the source creation and of all great heroic and supra-individual effort. (EFN, 175-76)

The aporia between restraint or asceticism and the constructively good appears clearly in this assertion and resists Deussen's explanations. This gap appears because of the antimony in his system between the idea of the negation of the Will (the opposite of Will) and the reality or actualisation of ennobling the Will, that is, substantial ethical activity. I would now like to briefly review Deussen's key texts once more in light of his response to this problem of ethical activity.

The non-dual Avaita Vedanta which Deussen analysed in *The System of the Vedanta* confirmed his principle that a metaphysical essence lies at the core of human existence through its meditation on the identity of the individual self and the cosmic Self, i.e. Atman is Brahman. As I have shown, Deussen's work on the Upanishads and on the Vedanta derives its meaning from his focus on what he calls the practical philosophy of the Vedas. Significantly, it is a comparison with Christianity that brings the practical importance of the Vedanta to the forefront. Both systems, Deussen claims, have the same aim: to liberate man from ego-reality (nasty, brutish and short), which is also to say, to liberate man from the restricted economy of causality and necessity (the realm of sin and death, Samsara). Christianity, however, sees the essence of man in Will, while 'Brahmanism' sees the essence of man in Knowledge. (SV, 403) While Christianity, according to Deussen, is the more profound of the two, it is nevertheless the more incomprehensible since the liberatory transformation of the Will which it envisages is utterly unknowable. This is why he declares while Christianity has most profoundly grasped morality, Brahmanism (Atman is Brahman) has set forth the highest attainable explanation of it.
Brahmanism considers all empirical, egoistic reality to be a form of Avidya or ignorance. The intellect in this position forces even moral action into egoistic forms of intuition. When the boundaries of egoism are enlarged as the result of a new form of knowledge or Vidya,

egoism draws the not-ego within the spheres of the ego
and treats it accordingly: even the good man (according to
the law of Causality) loves "his neighbour as himself" just
because he has recognised him as his own self. (SV, 404)

For Deussen, this is the deepest possible explanation of the essence of morality that mankind has ever achieved. It manages, in his view, to accommodate moral actions to the inexorable rule of the Law of Causality in the 'real' world of empirical, individuated experience. It provides a rationale for activity of a supra-individual kind. However, as it perhaps evident from the language of the New Testament used in this section, he is obliged to note that this conclusion is not drawn by Sankara in his Commentaries, although he claims that it is sometimes to be found elsewhere in the Vedas. (Ibid) While the projection of Christ's second commandment onto Vedantic thought should strike us as problematic, this nevertheless represents for Deussen a conclusive response to the problem of the actualisation of moral activity. This asymmetry is illustrated intriguingly by the arresting effect of Swami Vivekananda's form of address to his audience, each time he lectured on the non-dual Advaita Vedanta:

He went so far as to address his audiences in India as well as in the West as if they were literally included in his own identity. i.e. parts of relations of the one omnipresent self: 'my own self in all these forms'; 'my own self in the form of brothers and sisters'; 'my own self in the form of ladies and gentlemen'.

This address not only illustrates a performative paradox but also, insofar as it recalls the absolute heterogeneity of the protocols of Greek and Roman rhetoric, indicates the extent to which this 'practical Vedanta' implies a completely other thinking of law, property, community and politics. This thinking, moreover, would be completely alien to and impracticable in traditional western terms.

What this illustrates is that, effectively, the Brahmanic solution transfers the problem to identifying the manner in which the individual ego acts or operates in the manner of the cosmic Ego. Will this 'rationale' not be uncovered merely as a technical, strategic self-deception if the neighbour does not reciprocate and refuses to recognise me as part of
'his' Cosmic Self? Does it not simply repeat the incommensurable Christian demand for Faith which Deussen finds impossible in the context of modern scepticism? If so, this would make it impossible for him to replace that doctrine of Faith or *Kirchenglaube* by the unified, neo-Kantian 'foundation of all scientific (wissenschaftlich) and religious thought' referred to above.

If 'Atman is Braham' is used as the foundational principle of ethics, *how* will the expanded ego incorporate the non-ego and treat others as itself? If Deussen attests to the reality of this transcendental transformation but cannot identify how the actualisation of this process is possible, he nevertheless argues that knowledge concerning this metamorphosis is necessary and universal. One of his aims in the *Allgemeine Geschichte* is to testify to the recognition in all times and places of (1) the transcendental origin of freedom and (2) the ideality of space and time. The problem, as I am emphasising, stems from the attempt to reconcile these two principles in terms of actualisation. As we have seen, the textbook Deussen drew on for over thirty years, the *Elements of Metaphysics*, interpreted the second of these Kantian principles essentially through the notion that *the actual is the egoistic* (energeia) plus its objective corollary, *the actual is that which operates in space and time* (dynamis). The divine mode of the Will, the Cosmic Self, the Thing-in-Itself neither operates in space or time, nor is it finitely egoistic and this renders ethical activity impossible to recognise or understand. In this case, it is not certain that the Brahmanic solution (the cosmic Ego acts ethically) is not the greatest inflation of the stakes of egoism rather than a negation of the ego-self. As this negation can never enter the horizon of consciousness, the lived reality of the subject, it is impossible for the subject to identify the difference. Even after enlightenment, as the Vedanta itself acknowledges, the individual body continues to live on, just 'as the potter's wheel continues for a time to revolve, even after the vessel has been completed, so also life continues after liberation'. (SV, 424) While *jivan mukti*, or the liberated in life, is a key doctrine for Sankara and other Vedic philosophies, for Deussen, it belongs to the inferior, calculative exoteric doctrine. Although I have offered some speculative remarks concerning the practices of the 'liberated in life', my account has drawn heavily on David Loy's work on non-dualism. As a practising Zen Buddhist, Loy has an extremely different framework and religio-philosophical references from those of Deussen's neo-Kantianism.

After *System of the Vedanta*, we can see similar preoccupations in the work Deussen
pursued as a sideline to his great Sanskrit translations of the Upanishads and Sankara's *Commentaries*. In these years (between 1883 and 1899), he addressed the University of Kiel on two occasions and chose discourses on the categorical imperative (1891) and on the life and philosophy of Jakob Boehme (1897). Indeed, Deussen is often quoted as an authority on Boehme and the introduction which he wrote for the English translation of *The Three Principles of the Divine Essence* in 1910 is widely quoted. My thesis points to the need for more work to be done on Deussen's dissemination of Boehme's history and philosophy, especially given his later interest in the Occasionalist philosophy of Boehme's contemporary, Geulincx, at the time of writing the *Universal History*. Kiel University at this time appears to have been the site of a major revival of interest in these 17th century philosophers. They are interesting principally in view of an apparent revival of the idea of *Monergism* which appears in Deussen's writing around 1910 since both Boehme and Geulincx have significant contributions to make to the elaboration of non-dualist, monergist philosophy. A historical analysis of the revival of these monergist/occasionalist ideas at Kiel might also profitably be referred to contemporaneous notions of a unified field theory as suggested by Einstein's modern physics. It is certain that such work would enrich our understanding of Deussen's most interesting, perhaps most important, texts in relation to Nietzsche but especially to Hegel, that is, volume II.2 of the *Allgemeine Geschichte, The Philosophy of the Bible*, in which monergism figures as a core doctrine. This is because Deussen again attempts through monergism to reconcile the dichotomous principles of transcendental idealism and to explain how substantial ethical activity may arise.

While Brahmanic knowledge may expand man's consciousness, how is this knowledge to be related to the postulated 'springtide' of energy that is the condition of moral activity? What remains to be explained is how this knowledge is related to the emancipation of man from the restricted economy of energy that defined both his subjectivity and the struggle for survival in the individuated realm. While preparing the first part of the *Allgemeine Geschichte*, on Indian philosophy, Deussen continued to focus on the question of ethics, this time in his translations and historical work on the religio-philosophical liturgical commentaries which constitute the Upanishads (AGP I.2) and in the epic of the Mahabharata (AGP 1.3) Based on my analysis in Chapter 3, I suggest that *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (AGP 1.2) and in particular its section entitled 'The Practical Philosophy of the Upanishads' is the focus point of the first three
volumes of the *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*. Contra Albrecht Weber, it argues that the doctrine of liberation or moksha is the primary doctrine of the Vedas and historically precedes the development of the doctrine of transmigratory reward-and-punishment or samsara. This proves, for Deussen, the primacy of the universal intuition of the origin of freedom in an immanent yet transcendental dimension of being (i.e. the Vedic liberation philosophy is not the strategic consequence of importing the calculatable and causal regime of empiricity into the metaphysical realm). The Thing-in-itself, from which freedom originates, 'breaks through' in the minds of illuminati in all times and places, as Deussen's *History* demonstrates. In Comtean terms, the account of early Indian philosophy in his *Allgemeine Geschichte* firmly puts the metaphysical stage of thinking before the theological. It also characterises the development of this philosophy in a later period, circa 500-200 BCE, in terms of a degeneration of Upanishadic Idealism into the realism of materialist and dualist traditions, e.g. Sankhyam (which greatly interested Nietzsche).

The Universal History needs to be read in two complementary ways: as an Idealist philosophy of history, as discussed in Chapter 4, but also as an anti-Hegelian account of the aim of philosophy and religion. I have already described Deussen's method of analysing eastern and western traditions on the basis of their philosophical principles or Welterklärungsprinzips, which are defined by their (a) totalising and (b) transcendental propositions. This method is designed to emphasise the historical continuity of individual intuition of the eternal, unrepresentable in-itself of all being as a counterargument to the telling insurmountable dichotomy between the eternal idea and the hic et nunc of everyday life, the metaphysical and empirical realms. While the motto of history is, according to Deussen, 'eadem sed aliter' or 'the same only differently', this implies that the possibility of the breakthrough of the eternal, divine in-itself constantly accompanies the continuity of empirical life. I have highlighted the instability of such an account – which clearly aims at stable, universal validity – in my analysis of Deussen's metaphor of the philosophising subject as a wanderer in unknown terrain consulting an ideal map of the territory (i.e. the idealist history of philosophy). I concluded that the unstable nature this experience of the search for insight or truth is due to the impossibility of the identity between the actual or empirical and the ideal being resolved in subjective experience itself. This abandons the philosophising subject to despair: or, as Deussen described it at the end of *The Elements of Metaphysics*, abandons the wanderer at the peak of his endeavours, leaving him at an impasse, gazing
at the heavens above. It is not surprising that the consequence of this sense of having reached an unsurpassable limit sends the quester (Deussen) back to the inquiry into the history of philosophy - to dwell in the realms of its suspended animation, where dead philosophers come back to life but without the power to invite man beyond the threshold of representation. In this sense, the map becomes rather more like the anatomy of the philosophical thought which Schopenhauer referred to in his 'Fragments on the History of Philosophy' (a tract which rejected entirely the historical project). The anatomy may represent the dessicated traces of the paths where life and thought have run, but it cannot reveal the origin of thought's vitality: the all-elusive, illuminated knowledge of the essential, metaphysical identity of body and soul (or Will). It is nevertheless the vital coming to presence of the divine mode of the Will that Deussen's philosophy seeks, and therefore continues to seek after philosophising has exhausted all of its possibilities.

There is however a second sense in which the Allgemeine Geschichte may be profitably read, despite the intractable difficulty of reconciling its methodological aim with subjective ethical activity. This is the sense in which Deussen contests the Hegelian historical account of the end of religion and philosophy. Repudiating the dialectical trajectory of Hegel's philosophy, Deussen argues that the contemporary state of these fields is not a consequence of the historical destiny of the in-itself but the result of an accident which has obscured the truth. Deussen bases this part of his argument on a spatialised description of the three major Kulturkreise to have contributed to 'west-asian' thought. In this narrative, when the Greco-Roman culture arrived at a materialist impasse which failed to accommodate the possibilities of a spiritual or truly ethical life, in extending itself eastwards, it encountered only the 'Semitic' and 'realist' shell of a Christianity debased by a calculative and sacrifical regime of salvation: one which imported the causal economy of the empirical realm into the pure realm of metaphysics. This tragic accident prevented western thought, according to Deussen, from being reunited with an original non-dualist metaphysics which had been preserved in Indian traditions. The most urgent aim of the Allgemeine Geschichte can therefore be read in, what Deussen himself identified as, its key text, The Philosophy of the Bible (1913), a text which aims to reinstate the core or Kern of Christianity as the impetus towards a revolutionary renewal of philosophy in the west.

The Philosophy of the Bible (AGP II.2) forms the central volume of the second part of
Deussen's *Universal History of Philosophy*, and is located between *The Philosophy of the Greeks* (AGP, II.1) and *Modern Philosophy* (AGP, II.3) A note from an essay on Nietzsche (1902) confirms the significance of this ordering. In the history of thought, responses to the question 'what is the highest goal of man?' can be grouped into two camps:

the first of which writes the word 'happiness' on its flag, the other, the word 'abnegation'. We can characterise these briefly as the pagan and Christian groups. The first [is] represented by the morality of classical antiquity, with the exception of Plato, and by many manifestations of the modern epoch... [To this] is opposed the Christian tendency, whose principal representatives are the Vedanta, Platonism, *Christianismus*, and the philosophy of Kant and Schopenhauer.... (EFN, 174)

This explains Deussen's meaning when, in the AGP, he speaks of a Christianity that extends further than its name, i.e. one identified with the idealist *Welterklärungsprinzip*, and marks out the universal 'Christian' element as the negation of the subject through the interiorisation of the other, the non-ego: a process which allegedly results in the 'rebirth' of the metaphysical, divine self which had lain dormant under the mantle of the ego.

This late essay on Nietzsche (1902) describes immorality as based on fear and selfishness, concerns which prevent the subject from 'engaging all of his energy in pursuing any kind of noble aim with objective devotion.' (Ibid) Quite what this pursuit and devotion entails is unclear given that Deussen can only proceed by negation of accounts of the affirmative willing of life. He is unable to explain how moral activity operates or it is conditioned since the relationship to the other has become no-relationship but identity. He can only describe morality by using the vocabulary of self-negation and asceticism, although this is not a problem of rhetoric but of explaining exactly how substantial ethical activity can occur. That this is an absolutely crucial part of Deussen's project is clear from his recollection of an exchange with Nietzsche that took place in Basel as early as 1873.

Nietzsche told me that his goal was not the negation of the Will but its ennoblement and already at that time, I responded that the negation of the Will has not been understood if it is not yet seen as the greatest ennoblement. This announcement
Deussen understood that Nietzsche was less interested in the causes and effects of *physis* and *psyche* than in the values habitually accorded to them and that he was driven by the necessity of a project for the revaluation of all values. (EFN, 169) However, for Deussen it is significant that this Nietzschean project could only have found its legitimate foundation in the divine, radical mode of the Thing-in-itself.

If we ask ourselves, from where Nietzsche takes the right to proceed to his reversal of all values, it can only be a question of the unconscious, metaphysical depths of our nature. Therefore what has guided Nietzsche is something effectively given; the same thing which has also guided all moralists before him in determining their values. (Ibid)

With this assessment, Deussen places Nietzsche into the scheme of the *Allgemeine Geschichte*, re-idealising and reinstating the Categorical Imperative into his thought. Thereby Deussen dismisses the possibility of the revaluation of all values and reorients the reflection on the purpose of philosophy towards the renewal of man's comprehension of universal and necessary noumenal being. Nietzsche's project, he claims, can only be judged on whether or not he has perceived more clearly than his predecessors 'the voice of nature and [whether he has] exposed its declarations more clearly in the light of intellectual knowledge'. (EFN, 169-70) Thus the question of philosophy comes round again to an imperative to know being in order to realise or actualise its original, divine nature: a move which puts the meaning of the verb 'ennoble' under great pressure, as it would seem that this ennoblement happens only on the level of private intuition.

In response to these difficulties, *The Philosophy of the Bible* attempted to put in place the philosophical resources of monergism to provide both physical and metaphysical substance to the claims of this 'intuitive' knowledge, elaborating on the discourse of forces, energies and dynamis. Monergism asserts that all moral actions of self denial are effected by God and this, Deussen argues, is a necessary corollary of the categorical imperative, the fact of moral consciousness. God effectively works to bring about salvation through spiritual regeneration without cooperation from the individual. This does not mean that moral actions are caused by God, he alleges, and thereby maintains the purity of the distinction between empirical and metaphysical realms (recalling the non-causal nature of Schopenhauer's Will). Yet he elides the real question of ethical
activity and abides strictly with the *via negativa* of approaching the in-itself. Deflecting the question of realisation, he writes that the consciousness of sacrificing oneself for a higher purpose means that this act 'is not to be conducted or conceptualised in the natural order of things.' (SS, 22) Thus although the vocabulary of monergism suggests the notion of a unified, 'impelling principle' for Good, a divine *Macht*, Deussen restricts himself to the minimal claim that it means simply that true, metaphysical being is not limited to corporeality and that the possibility of 'returning to God', 'returning to our in-itself, divine nature stands open in every act'. (SS, 23)

While Deussen claims that this divine power, the negation of the Will, 'breaks through' and 'penetrates' the empirical realm in moral action, the active subject is bypassed in this border-crossing event although, paradoxically, he chooses intellectually and performs the action. Hence, the subject remains alienated from his own moral activity. The unknowable source of moral activity— the negation of the Will-to-life—remains absolutely heterogeneous to the living being: the 'crossing over' does not happen in the horizon of human subjectivity and therefore, while the source of morality is allegedly immanent, it remains absolutely transcendental.

The great defect in Christianity, Deussen believes, is its doctrine that the great reconciliation of the empirical and metaphysical aspects of man lies in the past, in the example of the life of Christ, while Nietzsche on the other hand thinks it lies in the future. (EFN, 178) In the *Übermensch*, divinity will overcome the natural self by the means of genius. (Ibid) In Deussen's terms, neither of these doctrines identifies the essential, non-dual nature of man, whose immanence he wishes to convince us of— despite the impossibility of this immanent identity entering into consciousness or therefore entering into our conscious relationships with others. Always with this aporia hanging over him, Deussen continues in his endeavour to bring the universal message of philosophy and religion to western and eastern audiences because he believes that it only a universal knowledge of the radical, divine in-itself of man can lead to the ennoblement of the Will. Only this universal, soteriological knowledge can successfully oppose the hateful and ossified *Kirchenglaugen* which condemns millions to a present without a presentiment of ethical ennoblement, whether this refers to modern pagans, modern men entirely disenchanted by materialism and scepticism, or to the unbaptised, the 'pagans' of the non-European world who have never encountered the letter of Christianity.
To separate the shell from the kernel of Christianity, to assert and validate the universal doctrine of non-dualism, in order to renew philosophy on the basis of an 'ennobling' reconciliation between theoretical and practical philosophy: this will have been the aim of the *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*. However it also sadly appears to abandon the subject to a practical impasse by its failure to elaborate on 'the liberated in life', i.e. those who have gained the soteriological knowledge of the Oneness of all being. The idealist terms of Deussen's interpretation of the history of philosophy appear to leave the individual with only the resources suggested by Schopenhauer's pessimistic alternative to ethical activity, the three a's: asceticism, aestheticism and attendance of Grace.

This is why his universal history of philosophy *ends* with Schopenhauer, the philosopher who 'perfected' the transcendental idealism which Kant was the first to validate systematically, i.e. as *Wissenschaft*. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, this 'perfection' consisted in Schopenhauer's identification of the Will as the core of all nature and his *experiential* proof that it lies at the core of man's being. Deussen's intention is for the universal metaphysical science articulated in the *Allgemeine Geschichte* to be seen as the final explanation of the world, existence and morality, thus reconciling the incompatibilities between the scientific, historical and religio-philosophical orders of knowledge. The end of philosophy, its purpose, is to demonstrate that

Both Faith and Knowledge are at the bottom one and the same:

that metaphysical consciousness which lifts us above the world

and raises us above all possibility of sin. (SV, 424)

Religion, according to Deussen, in its organised form has obscured this metaphysical consciousness through its insistence on the merely external acceptance of the fact of salvation (to be saved, one must have faith in Christ). However philosophy in its profoundest forms contains the same kernel of truth as the early (idealist) religions and therefore has the potential to inspire a renewal of true metaphysical consciousness, just as much as materialist philosophy – pagan and modern – has tragically, accidentally had the power to divert culture from the true metaphysical knowledge.

This renewal can issue only from a unified system of philosophy which respects empirical science and experience as well as religion and metaphysics. Deussen adheres to the Pauline view that real faith is the internalisation of Christ's crucifixion and
resurrection as the elimination of egoistic, human nature and resurrection in a renewed
life. (AGP, II.2, 288) It is exactly this doctrine which the *Allgemeine Geschichte*
attempts to ground as universal *Wissenschaft* by means of the idealist historical method.
Although the unified, metaphysical philosophy of Kant-Schopenhauer has perfected this
*Wissenschaft*, clearly while this faith-knowledge has not been accepted by all and its
ethical principles not yet interiorised and hence 'realised' by all, philosophy has not yet
been completed but must continue to clarify 'the voice of nature'. However the
philosophical system is alleged to have already been perfected so therefore the work of
clarification, persuasion and dissemination must be continued in the domains of *history*
and *science*. (AGP II.3,vi)

Yet as I have argued, Deussen acknowledges that even the truth of the universal history
of philosophy is obstructed by the inevitable material nature of communication as text,
as representation. Deussen's metaphysical knowledge, in which *Wissen* and *Glauben* are
equivalents, does not and cannot enter into a direct relation with the individual intuition
of the transcendental Thing-in-itself. Thus the process of interiorisation and realisation
of the individual self as the noumenal Self or cosmic Self is once again deferred, just as
in the conclusion of the *Elements of Metaphysics*. It is this deferral of the completion of
the religio-philosophical task that requires seemingly, not only the further elaboration of
history and the sciences, but also the continuous renewal of philosophy itself. This call
is at the core of Deussen's east-west philosophical project. His very approach to the
noumenal Adytum – historically (through the archive of philosophy), linguistically
(through translation, writing and lecturing) and materially (through text, *Rede*, travel
and teaching) among others – necessitate the renewal of endeavour. The accretion of
representation itself cannot reconcile empirical and noumenal existence, egoistic and
übermenschlich, divine, radical existence. The steps he takes towards the Thing-in-itself
are erased at the same time as they are made: only the momentum itself differentiates
this situation from inertia, from impasse and the six-volume history of eastern and
western philosophy is an enduring trace of that momentum.

The philosophy of the Vedanta that Deussen had brought to the west is content to dwell
in this momentum. In the words of Sankara that have served to preface this thesis 'No
path remains for him (the liberated in life). His self is the path.' I have attempted to
demonstrate the possibility of ethical activity for the *jivan mukti* or 'liberated in life' by
referring to David Loy's Zen Buddhist interpretations of non-dualist activity, and by
referring briefly to Reiner Schürmann's Heideggarian analysis of the ethics of 'letting be'. However the focus on alternative interpretations of Vedantic non-dualism in this thesis has been all too brief and indicates the need, in the future, for a thorough and perhaps genealogical investigation into both the eastern concept of non-dualism and the western concept of monergism. The principal result of Deussen's investigations into how 'the Christ in us' might be realised have led in a very different direction. Instead, the continual aporia between individuation and Oneness and the structural incompleteness of philosophy lead Deussen to writing the first history of philosophy to include both eastern and western thought. The encounter between the two thought-worlds, he hopes, would assist us in dismantling ossified traditions and in renewing of the core metaphysical principles of philosophy: the occasion for a profound revolution in western thought in which practical and theoretical philosophies might be reconciled in the aim of ennobling life.
Notes on the Text

1. The Elements of Metaphysics

1. AGP I.1, ii
Halbfass goes further and says he is 'the only holder of a German chair for philosophy up till now who was also an outstanding Sanskritist and who devoted his time and energy primarily to Indian philosophy'. 1985, p129.
2. Ibid, p145.
5. Said, 1995, p104
8. 'According to Hegel...those tensions and forces which have driven European thought from its Greek beginnings through the unfolding of the ideas of the subject, of human freedom and of “being-for-itself” to the social and political ideologies of the period of the French Revolution have been absent in India.' Ibid, p89.
22. Richardson, 1961, p32.
23. Ibid, p70.
28. Lange's work was read and admired by both Nietzsche and Deussen.
30. Schopenhauer, 1969, p95

2. The Philosophy of Forces

2. Ibid
3. Ibid, p203.
9. Ibid, p. 181. Byron's quote is from 'Childe Harold's Pilgrimage'.
10. Ibid, p181.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid, p412.
17. Cross, 1074, p1332. Synergism was associated with the teaching of Melanchthon, which was definitively rejected by the Formula of Concord in 1577.
3. The System of the Vedanta

Rollmann, 1970, p131
2 Letter to Peter Gast, 8th September 1887, Briefe IV, Ed. E.Förster-Nietzsche, quoted in H.Rollmann
3 17th September, 1887, Briefwechsel mit Franz Overbeck, Ibid.
4 15th October 1887, from Venice, Ibid.
5 20th December 1887, from Nice, Ibid.
7 16th March 1883, Ed. Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, quoted by Rollmann.
9 Sprung, ‘Nietzsche’s Trans-European Eye’ in Parkes, ed. 1991, p82
11 Nietzschebriefe, Ed. Colli and Moninari, III.1, No. 386, 6th March 1883.
12 Cf. T.Brobjer, 2004
13 Hiriyanna, 1995, p151
14 Hamilton, 2001, p67
15 Ibid, p127
16 Ibid, p126
18 Quoted in Schwab, p127
19 Müller, 2003, p69
20 Loy, p291
21 Müller, 2003, p68
22 According to Zeller’s exposition, c.f. p 124
23 Loy, 2003, p277
24 Ibid, p281
25 Schopenhauer, 1969, p412
26 Loy, 2003, p291
27 Halbfass, 1988, p91
28 Ibid.
29 Quotations from Deussen’s Sixty Upanishads of the Veda.
31 Ibid, p35.
34 Loy, 2003, p227
35 Deussen includes a photograph of this tree among the sixteen plates reproduced in his philosophical travelogue, Erinnerungen an Indian.
36 Lee, 1967, p278.
37 Hamilton, 2001, p125
38 Brahmasutraabhasya II, ii.31, quoted by Loy, 2003, p212
39 Copleston, 1975, p189.
40 Schopenhauer, quoted in Copleston, Ibid.
41 Quoted in Caygill, 1995, p250.
42 Lee, 1967, p279
43 ‘Indian Craddha (just as, through wrongly, most probably, by Lactant.inst. 4, 28 the Latin religio)…’;
44 SV, 378
45 Nietzsche, 1996, p111
46 Ibid.
48 Ibid, No.389, Genoa, 16. March, 1883, p342
49 Loy, 2003, p239.
50 Ibid, p 240-41
51 Ibid
52 Loy, p. 242.
53 Hadot, 1995, p265
4. Universal History of Philosophy

3. Ibid.
9. ‘The circularity of the argument is obvious: yet it has never been fully reflected, or clearly recognised as a problem, in Deussen’s works.’ Halbfass, Ibid, p.131.
14. ‘The term Maya is sometimes used in the context of Advaita Vedanta in the sense that conventional reality is “unreal” or “illusory”. While some other Advaita Vedantins did use this term, Sankara did not. Rather, he postulated two “levels of reality”, one absolute and one conventional. Conventional reality is the product of ignorance, avidya. This means that the world we inhabit while ignorant is “real” at that level; but when ignorance is replace by knowledge, reality is seen to be different from the conventional world.’ Hamilton, 2001, p.130.
15. Schelling, p.110.
16. This periodisation is taken from ‘Hegel Contra Sociology’, which identifies “four generations of critics of Kant” between 1780 and 1920.
22. Ibid, p.126.
28. The term Aryan does not appear in the Introduction. Deussen does not, generally speaking, have reference to this term.
30. Ibid, p.60.
32. Ibid, p.133. From *Life and Religion*.
33. Masuzawa, Ibid, p.60
34. Quoted in Van der Bosch, 2002, p.305.
36. ‘It was during the 5th century BCE that clearly identifiable schools of thought began to acknowledge each other, interacting, debating, seeking to refute and sometimes merging.’ Hamilton, 2001, p.9.
38. The presentation of original sources is partly a direct response to the situation of comparative studies at that time as well as the state of the market. Deussen expresses the hope that his approach - relying heavily on Sanskrit texts – will prevent his work from becoming outdated as the history of Indian thought advances.
Conclusion

1 EFN, p144. Boutout refers a lyrical passage in Deussen's autobiography concerning this event, cf. Boutout in EFN, p188.
2 cf. EFN, 'Remarks on the Philosophy of Nietzsche', p176
3 Ibid, p174
4 Ibid, 175
5 Halbfass has also emphasised this crucial aspect of Deussen's work in an essay with the same title ('Practical Vedanta') dealing with Deussen's relationship with Swami Vivekananda who lectured (and proselytised) widely on the Vedanta in Europe and America.
7 'Deussen was one of the early interpreters of Jakob Boehme.' The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Ed. Paul Edwards, 1972, p722.
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**Journal Articles**


Appendix A: Chronology of Paul Deussen’s Life and Works

1845 Birth of Paul Jakob Deussen in Oberdreis in the Westerwald, son of Adam Deussen and Jakobine Ingelbach. His father and his grandfather and great-grandfather through the maternal line were Protestant pastors. He had two sisters and three brothers.

1857 Fluent in Greek by the age of 10, he is sent on to secondary school in Elberfeld.

1859 Deussen is sent to the more renowned school, Schulpforta, for a specialist humanist education. The same year he meets Nietzsche and they become friends through their love of poetry and music.

1861 Deussen and Nietzsche are confirmed.

1864 Deussen and Nietzsche study philology together in the University of Bonn.

1865 Nietzsche follows Ritschl to the University of Leipzig. Deussen goes to Tubigen to study theology.

1866 Deussen returns University of Bonn to study philology.

1869 Deussen finishes his studies at the University of Berlin. His dissertation Commentatio de Platonis Sophista is published. Nietzsche is made Professor in Basle. Deussen takes a position as a school teacher.

1871 Nietzsche writes to Deussen to pass on the job opportunity to become a private tutor to an aristocratic Russian family. The two friends meet in Basle.

1873 After meeting Nietzsche in Basle, Deussen leaves Germany as tutor to Georges Kanchine. He begins to teach Sanskrit in the University of Geneva. Following a “night of illumination” he decides to make a career combining Sanskrit and philosophy.

1874 Following his charge to Aachen, Deussen teaches a University course in philosophy which become the basis for his first book. Nietzsche publishes Schopenhauer as Educator.

1875 Elements of Metaphysics is published. Deussen travels to Russia as a tutor for the aristocratic Sherbatoff family.

1879 The first of Max Müller’s editions of Sacred Books of the East published in Oxford. Nietzsche resigns from his post in Basle.

1880 Deussen settles in Berlin.
1882 He becomes a Privatdozent or unpaid lecturer in philosophy in the University of Berlin.

1883 Publishes System of the Vedanta. Nietzsche publishes Part I and II of Thus Spake Zarathustra.

1886 Marriage to Marie Volkman (1863-1914). Nietzsche publishes Beyond Good and Evil.

1887 Deussen's translation of Sutras of the Vedanta appears and he is made a stipended lecturer in Berlin. He visits Nietzsche in Sils-Maria before travelling in Italy and Greece. Nietzsche publishes On the Genealogy of Morals.

1888 Travels in Spain and Portugal.

1889 Deussen accepts a fully-paid post as a Professor in the University of Kiel, where he remains for the rest of his life. Nietzsche’s mental breakdown in Turin.

1890 Travels to Egypt and Palestine.

1891 Gives public address at the University of Kiel: ‘Der kategorische Imperativ’.

1892 In October sails to India for a five-month journey around the country.

1893 Addresses the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, ‘Advaita Vedanta in the Eyes of the West’, on 25th February. before sailing back to Germany. ‘

1894 Publishes first volume of the Universal History: The Philosophy of the Vedas

1897 Publishes his translation of 60 Upanishads of the Veda, dedicated ‘To the Manes of Schopenhauer’. English translation of Elements of Metaphysics. Addresses the University of Kiel ‘Jakob Boehme: Über sein Leben und seine Philosophie’ on the 8th May.

1898 French translation of Elements of Metaphysics

Second volume of the Universal History appears: Philosophy of the Upanishads.

1899 Death of Nietzsche

1901 Publishes Reminiscences of Friedrich Nietzsche after a newspaper publishes a heavily edited ‘scandalous’ version of Deussen’s article on Nietzsche’s illness.

1904 Publishes his Indian Reminiscences and Vedanta and Platonism in Light of Kantian Philosophy.

1906 Publishes his translation of Four Texts of the Mahabharatam: Sanatsujata-Parvan, Bhagavadgita, Moksdharma, Anugita. English translation of Philosophy
of the Upanishads.

1907 Third volume of the *Universal History*: Postvedic Philosophy of India. Publishes *Secret Doctrines of the Veda: Selected texts of the Upanishads*.


1911 Deussen founds the *Schopenhauerische Gesellschaft*. The first volume of his edition of Schopenhauer’s collected works appears, published by Piper and Co. The fourth volume of the *Universal History* is also published: *Philosophy of the Greeks* and *The Sacred Song*, an episode from the Mahabharata. His 1897 address on Boehme is also published.

1913 Fifth volume of *Universal History*: Philosophy of the Bible

1917 Final volume of *Universal History*: *Modern Philosophy*.

1919 *Anthology of Modern Philosophy* is published.

Death of Deussen, Leipzig.

1922 *Mein Leben* published by his daughter Dr. Erika Rosenthal-Deussen.
Appendix B: Glossary of Sanskrit Terms

Note: these definitions have been taken from Deussen’s *System of the Vedanta, Appendix IV.*

Some additions have been made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
<th>English Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advaita</td>
<td>not-two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni</td>
<td>fire, god of fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agnihotram</td>
<td>fire sacrifice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aham Brahman asmi</td>
<td>I am Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ahamkara</td>
<td>self-consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>akamayamana</td>
<td>he who desires not (no longer), the liberated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>akasa</td>
<td>ether, space understood as the material element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anubhava</td>
<td>absorption into self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anucaya</td>
<td>residue of works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apana</td>
<td>inhaling, absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apara vidya</td>
<td>the lower knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aparam Brahma</td>
<td>the lower Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apurvam</td>
<td>the moral merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ashrama</td>
<td>brahmanical stage of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atharva-veda</td>
<td>forest books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atman</td>
<td>the Atman, the self, the soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avidya</td>
<td>ignorance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bahr</td>
<td>to expand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhoktar</td>
<td>he who enjoys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhokyam</td>
<td>what is to be enjoyed, the fruit of the works, world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhuta-acraya</td>
<td>elementary substratum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhutam</td>
<td>element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brahmacaryain</td>
<td>student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caitanyam</td>
<td>spirituality, intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cakti</td>
<td>potentiality, power, will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cavadha</td>
<td>faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deva</td>
<td>old Vedic god (whereas Brahman is Isvara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dharma</td>
<td>quality, duty, order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grihasta</td>
<td>householder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isvara</td>
<td>Lord, god, Brahman, considered personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indra</td>
<td>old Vedic god</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jiva</td>
<td>the individual soul, self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jivan mukti</td>
<td>the living liberated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jnana kanda</td>
<td>knowledge doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kalpa</td>
<td>world period lasting from the creation to the dissolution of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kama</td>
<td>desire</td>
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<tr>
<td>karma</td>
<td>works, actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>karma kanda</td>
<td>action doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maya</td>
<td>the illusion of empirical reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manas</td>
<td>central organ of imagination and conscious will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mimamsa</td>
<td>research, system, exegesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mukya prana</td>
<td>central organ of unconscious life, vital breath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moksha</td>
<td>liberation</td>
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<tr>
<td>niratmakatvam</td>
<td>selflessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nirgunam Brahma</td>
<td>attribute-possessing lower Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nirvanam</td>
<td>extinction, bliss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paramartha-avastha</td>
<td>the practical (empirical) standpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para vidya</td>
<td>the higher doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prana</td>
<td>breath, life, especially (a) the metaphysical life principle, Brahman (b) the physical life principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prajna</td>
<td>knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prajna-atman</td>
<td>self of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>purusa</td>
<td>man, spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rishi</td>
<td>visionary, ecstatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sagunam Brahma</td>
<td>attribute-less higher Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sakshin</td>
<td>witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samradhanam</td>
<td>perfect or accomplished satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samsara</td>
<td>cycle, migration of the soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samyagdarcananam</td>
<td>perfect knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sannyasin</td>
<td>hermit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sruti</td>
<td>revelation, holy scripture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sutras</td>
<td>verses, aphorisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tapas</td>
<td>penance, asceticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tat</td>
<td>Brahman, <em>tat tvam</em>, to be Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upadhi</td>
<td>limitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
vanapratha hermit
vyavahara – asavtha the standpoint of the highest reality, the metaphysical standpoint
Yoga yoke