BORDERS AND ‘GHOSTS’:   
MIGRATORY HAUNTINGS IN CONTEMPORARY VISUAL CULTURES

Nermin Saybaşılı

PhD. Visual Cultures
Goldsmiths College
University of London
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ABSTRACT

This work examines the issues of displacement and migration through the notion of the 'ghost' and in the context of hauntology, as proposed by Jacques Derrida. Focussing on the complexities of haunting and the very particular condition of ghostliness, the arguments throughout the text are centred on the production of subjectivities on/through borders/boundaries, with reference to both contemporary practices in art and materials circulated in contemporary visual cultures.

In its broadest sense, the study addresses fundamental questions such as: what gives the movement its start and how is it possible to address the complexities embedded in migratory movements?

By taking up theoretical models, bodies of artistic practice, ethnographic case studies of specific locations in Turkey and the broader geographical region, the study produces an in-depth cross section of migratory effects and perceptions.

The main argument of the study is that immigration is not a problem in itself; it is rather produced as a 'problem'. This concern is played out through the theme of haunting. The conditions of haunting emerge when the illusion of coherence, stability, homogeneity and permanence is confronted with the shadowy realities of displacement, dislocation and unbelonging, with all the layers of diasporic formations and migratory flows, with the crossover and overlap of cultures, and with hybrid identities and new ethnicities that are constantly being formed.

Rather than simply focussing on mapping the trajectories and consequences of human movement, the study is an inquiry into strategies for uncovering hidden structures embedded in the realities of displacement and migration. In this instance, the notion of the 'ghost' emerges as a strategic tool in an attempt to connect the past to the present, the living to the non-living, presence to absence, the visible to the invisible, the near to the far, the abstraction to the materialization.
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in loving memory of my father Kemâli Saybaşılı
who taught me to see things differently
and
who gave me the inspiration to make,
whatever it takes,
my own personal adventure out of life
INTRODUCTION

_Borders and 'Ghosts': Migratory Hauntings in Contemporary Visual Cultures_ reconsiders the issues of displacement and migration through the notion of the 'ghost' and in the context of hauntology. As proposed by Jacques Derrida, in his book _Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning and The New International_ (1994), these concepts refer to 'a science of ghosts' or a 'science of what returns'. Focussing especially on the complexities of haunting and the very particular condition of ghostliness, the arguments throughout the text are centred on the production of subjectivities on and through borders and boundaries. The issues of immigration and cultural displacement are brought together into the very heart of contemporary art practices and issues of cultural representation. The study takes up theoretical models, bodies of artistic practice, ethnographic case studies of specific locations in Turkey and the broader geographical region, to produce an in-depth assessment of a cross-section of migratory effects and perceptions.

In its broadest sense, the thesis addresses fundamental questions such as: what gives the movement its start, how is it possible to consider the complexities embedded in migratory movements and how can we address the future understanding of the complex ways migrants participate in and reshape the social world within which they move?

The study sets up an inquiry into strategies for uncovering hidden structures embedded in the realities of displacement and migration, rather than simply focussing on mapping the trajectories and consequences of human movement. In this instance, the
notion of the ‘ghost’ emerges as a strategic tool in an attempt to connect the past to the present, the living to the non-living, presence to absence, the visible to the invisible, the near to the far, the abstraction to the materialization. It will be argued that, in this way, it is possible to address many different layers of displacement; border habitations, conditions and crossings, border syndromes, diasporic exile, phantasmatic projections, extra-territorial space production, the close link between global networking and migratory movements, and the digital geographies generated by satellite technologies.

_Borders and ‘Ghosts’_ aims to show that immigration is not a problem in itself; rather it is produced as a ‘problem.’ By using different theoretical models and visiting a variety of sites, the study, whose trajectories purports to displace the notion of destination, discusses the way in which this ‘problem’ is firmly linked to border-construction and border syndromes, dislocation and displacement, ignorance of difference, and the realities of global economy and industry. By making a journey in time and space, the text traverses the geographies of hauntings: including; postcolonial Uganda and the Ugandan diaspora; the borders of Western European countries haunted by 'illegal' immigrants; the conflict-torn land of Israel/Palestine; the derelict, yet 'intensive', border zone between Iran and Iraq; where one can, and should, only follow ghostly existences and ghostly effects; Tarlabası, a multi-inhabited quarter in Istanbul, which functions as a ‘container’; Albania, the land of migration and the space for phantasmatic projection; Cyprus, a crushed land stuck in a perpetual childhood; the virtual zone of global networking; and the digital landscapes of women trafficking in the sex industry.
Geographies of Hauntologies

Haunted by the migratory movements, the text makes a journey from the geography of ontologies to the geography of 'hauntologies', from actual presences to repressed absences, from comfortable familiarities to troubling strangeness. The researcher, therefore, as well as the reader, will enter into a constant dialogue between past and present, near and far, foreign and familiar.

In the early 1970s, just as the second phase of the mass migration schemes for labour was launched in capitalist Europe, John Berger wrote these words:

A man's resolution to emigrate needs to be seen within the context of a world economic system. Not in order to reinforce a political theory but so that what actually happens to him can be given its proper value. That economic system is neocolonialism. Economic theory can show how this system, creating underdevelopment, produces the conditions which lead to emigration: it can also show why the system needs the special labour power which the migrant workers have to sell.

Yet necessarily the language of economic theory is abstract. And so, if the forces which determine the migrant's life are to be grasped and realized as part of his personal destiny, a less abstract formulation is needed. Metaphor is needed. Metaphor is temporary. It does not replace theory...

Yet his migration is like an event in a dream dreamt by another. As a figure in a dream dreamt by an unknown sleeper, he appears to act autonomously, at times unexpectedly; but everything he does - unless he revolts - is determined by the needs of the dreamer's mind. Abandon the metaphor. The migrant's intentionality is
permeated by historical necessities of which neither he nor anybody he meets is aware. That is why it is as if his life were being dreamt by another (Berger 1975: 41, 43).

By using the notion of the 'ghost' as a strategic and provocative metaphor, Borders and 'Ghosts' seeks to expand the field of inquiry, to introduce into the 'dream' Berger has so poetically described, the element of awakening. This concern is worked out by the theme of haunting, which enables us to move beyond the mechanistic frameworks of causation and consequence, and focus rather on processes.

The notion of the 'ghost' emerges as a metaphor that operates by recalling a repressed absence that can be inspired by announcing all presence. As Derrida discussed in his essay 'White Mythology' in Margins of Philosophy (Derrida 1982: 270), rather than metaphor denoting a similarity, metaphor is how we deal with differences between things, because it is the force of displacement of meaning that enables us to associate one thing with another, thereby establishing the differences between them. Derrida is against the philosophical concept of metaphor which 'coordinates metaphor with the manifestation of truth, with the production of truth as presence without veil, with the re-appropriation of a full language without syntax, with the vocation of a pure nomination' (Ibid., 270). For Derrida, metaphor in language is anti-metaphysical parts of language, because through metaphor we see how language works as difference not as the appearance of, or submission to, an indivisible Being. He writes:
Metaphor does not just illustrate the general possibilities, thus described. It risks disrupting the semantic plenitude to which it should belong. Marking the moment of the turn or of the detour [du tour ou du détour] during which meaning might seem to venture forth alone, unloosed from the very thing it aims at however, from the truth which attunes it to its referent, metaphor also opens the wandering of the semantic. The sense of a noun, instead of designating the thing which the noun habitually must designate, carries itself elsewhere’ (Ibid., 241).

The word ‘ghost’ is used as an object in itself, separate from any possible subject/object to which it might refer in the common sense of the word. Following the notion of ‘ghost’ as proposed by Derrida, I use ‘ghost’ as a metaphor to refer to ‘spectral’ realities associated with dislocation and migration; as a strategy for uncovering power relations and the effects of globalisation, for understanding what is happening, what ought to happen at the very moment of border-crossing, and/or what it means to live either in border zones or inhospitable cities.

In *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning and The New International*, Derrida splices ontology with its near homonym hauntology (Derrida 1994: 51). According to his conceptualisation, as opposed to ontology, which is about the effectiveness of a presence-being, the act of haunting is about the ‘traces’ that oscillate between past and present, between here and there, without being reduced simply to one.

Derrida developed the notion of ‘trace’ in his earlier works. In ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ in his book *Writing and Difference*, he formulates the notion of temporalisation in order to get beyond a view of time as a linear sequence of moments, in which each
moment is immediately present at that moment and is therefore an instance of present (see Derrida 1978: 198, 202-203). For Derrida, there is no moment that was just immediately there. Every moment is already an effect of itself, existing in relation to past and future, which prevents the moment from ever achieving presence as an isolated moment in the present. Derrida puts this in the context of ‘trace’ and ‘différance’ (deferral) (Ibid., 203). He argues that time and experience rest on the absence of the presence of being:

No doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, différance (deferral). But we must be wary of this formulation: there is no life present at first which would then come to protect, to postpone, or reserve itself in différance. The latter constitutes the essence of life. Or rather: as différance is not an essence, as it is not anything, it is not life, if Being is determined as ousia, presence, essence/existence, substance or subject. Life must be thought of as trace before Being may be determined as presence (Ibid.)

In Derrida’s conceptualization, an instant cannot be abstracted from time and difference. According to Derrida, an instant in experience must contain a duration, and, therefore, must contain difference.

In Spectres of Marx, Derrida does not deal with present origin or presence-being. In his ‘hauntology’, there is the temporalization of time. Derrida notes that ‘to haunt does not mean to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time. That is what we would be calling ... hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration’ (Derrida 1994: 161). In his conceptualization, the spectre
represents the inherent instability of reality. It serves as the sign of an ‘always already’ unrealized and unrealizable ontology within the social domain. In *Spectres of Marx*, Derrida critiques the notion a ‘New World Order’, which proclaims the death of Marx and Marxism, and undertakes a reading of Marx in the post-capitalist or global system. His main argument is that the spirit of Karl Marx is even more relevant in our times: ‘... one must assume the inheritance of Marxism, assume its most “living” part, which is to say, paradoxically, that which continues to put back on the drawing board the question of life, spirit, or the spectral, of life-death- beyond the opposition between life and death’ (Ibid. 54). He seeks to carry out the work of inheriting from Marx; that is not communism, but of the philosophy of responsibility and of Marx’s spirit of radical critique (Ibid., 49-75). He speaks about specific responsibilities, beyond all others; responsibilities such as those to the victims of wars and political violence; nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations; victims of the oppression of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism.

Derrida lists ten plagues of the post-capital and global system, as an illustration of the spectre of Marx:

1. unemployment, that more or less well-calculated deregulation of a new market, new technologies, new worldwide competitiveness, requires, like labour or production, ‘another concept’;

2. the massive exclusion of homeless citizens from any participation in the democratic life of States, the deportation or expulsion of so many exiles, stateless persons, and immigrants from a so-called national territory;
3. economic wars between countries and between international blocs: the United States, Europe, and Japan;

4. the inability to master the contradictions in the concept, norms and reality of the free-market (the barriers of protectionism and the interventionist bidding wars of capitalist States seeking to protect their nationals, or even Westerners or Europeans in general, from cheap labour, which often has no comparable social protection);

5. foreign debt and other connected mechanisms that are starving or driving to despair a large portion of humanity;

6. the arms industry and trade that has become the part of the normal regulation of scientific research, the economy, and the socialization of labour in Western democracies;

7. the spread of nuclear weapons, which is no longer controllable;

8. inter-ethnic wars driven by an archaic and primitive conceptual phantasm of community, the nation-state, sovereignty, borders, native soil and blood;

9. capitalist phantom-states within organised crime, the non-democratic power gained by drug cartels in particular; and lastly,

10. international law and its institutions dominated by particular nation-states that make the decisions, and thus that are characterised by the incoherence, discontinuity and inequality of states before the law and the hegemony of certain states over military power in the service of international law (Ibid. 81-84).

Derrida uses the concept of 'hauntology' in order to uncover spectral realities, and warns us that we can contact them only if we take a look beyond present time, beyond
the empirical or ontological actuality of political, economic or social events. After listing these plagues, Derrida takes note of a new grouping of activism, which he calls ‘New Internationalism’ and describes as:

[The “New Internationalism”] is an untimely link, without status, without title, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, without contract, ‘out of joint,’ without coordination, without party, without country, without national community (International before, across, and beyond any national determination), without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class. The name of New International is given here to what calls to the friendship of an alliance without institution among those who ... continue to be inspired by at least one of the spirits of Marx or of Marxism. It is a call for them to ally themselves, in a new, concrete and real way, even if this alliance no longer takes the form of a party or a workers’ international, in the critique of the state of international law, the concepts of State and nation, and so forth: in order to renew this critique, and especially to radicalise it’ (Ibid. 85).

Derrida proposes an alternative mode of being and different mode of collectivity. In the same spirit, *Borders and ‘Ghosts’* takes as its departure point not the notion of territorial unity and absolute belonging. Instead of searching for a single point of commonality to define a community in terms of a geographical territory or a set of social concerns, the study re-considers the relation between geography and subjectivity beyond identity politics. It explores an alternative mode of being, termed ‘singularities’ by Giorgio Agamben, which form a community without having representable identity and absolute belonging, or with respect to a common property such as ‘being red’, ‘being French’, ‘being Muslim’ (Agamben 2001: 86).
Concentrating on haunting, the present text discusses the way in which migration should be seen as both the all too visible problem and the invisible catalyst. In his comprehensive book *The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity*, Nikos Papastergiadis uses the metaphor of ‘turbulence’ to draw attention to the complexities of migration. Papastergiadis suggests that, in the absence of structured patterns of global migration, with direct causes and effects, turbulence is the best formulation for the mobile processes of complex self-organization. He claims that migratory movements in our times may appear chaotic, but that there is a logic and order within them. By using the metaphor of ‘turbulence’, adapted from James Rosenau (Rosenau 1990), he aims to explore alternative models for mapping migration and social change by especially focussing on the way in which migration is linked to the broader social changes associated with globalization. For Papastergiadis turbulence is not just a useful concept for describing the unsettling effect of an unexpected force that alters your course of movement, it is also a metaphor for the broader levels of interconnection and interdependency between the various forces that are at play in the modern world. He writes: ‘The internal structures of migration have often gone unnoticed. Both the drag effect that is produced on migrants as they are caught in the flow of movement, and the complex linkages that are generated to sustain a momentum are overshadowed by the attention given to external forces. I am concerned with the inter-relationship between the energy for movement and the effects on its surroundings’ (Papastergiadis 2000: 4-5). In his study, he aims to offer an account of how the experience of movement has produced novel forms of belonging and stimulated shifts in our understanding of contemporary culture.
As Papastegiadis' useful metaphor of 'turbulence' also implies, a hauntological approach, which hints at the fact that migration cannot be described through a single frame of reference and cannot be tied down to the linear structure of a story. Haunting, above all, has the force to put the familiar social and political structures into crisis through the processes or the mediations it actively creates. In this way, it urges us to attempt a more complex understanding of the 'material reality'. 'What kind of case is a case of a ghost? It is a case of haunting, a story about what happens when we admit the ghost – that special instance of the merging of the visible and the invisible, the dead and the living, the past and the present — into the making of worldly relations and into the making of our accounts of the world,' writes sociologist Avery F. Gordon, in her inventive book *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (Gordon 1997: 24-25). Thus, it has to be noted that *Borders and 'Ghosts'* cannot be considered as a study that seeks to provide an account or a picture of the 'mobile turmoil'. This is because concentrating on the act of haunting is about focusing on instantiation and 'performativity' as opposed to description and representation.

In *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*, Avery Gordon focuses on haunting as she acknowledges a need for a fundamental change in the way we know the world and create knowledge. In her engrossing book, she examines the ghostly aspects of social life by analyzing it through haunting, which is, for her, a constituent element of life. Gordon argues that haunting is paradigmatically different to the way in which those of us who study it have usually granted (Ibid., 7). Her attempt, above all, is to re-think sociology as a discipline itself, to try to grapple with what it represses. She insists that it is essential to see the things and the people who are
primarily unseen and banished to the periphery of our social graciousness; who are
absent, forgotten, neglected, and that would also mean ghostly. She attempts to show
how paying attention to 'ghosts' can, among other things, radically change what we know
about the world and how we know it. She argues that we should expand the domain of the
empirical considerably to include, not only haunting and ghostly matters, but also our own
relationship to social analysis. Gordon suggests that haunting is neither pre-modern
superstition nor individual psychosis. It is rather a generalizable social phenomenon of
great import. She writes:

If haunting describes how that which appears to be not there is often a seething
presence, acting on and often meddling with taken-for-granted realities, the ghost is
just the sign, or the empirical evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking
place. The ghost is not simply a dead or a missing person, but a social figure, and
investigating it can lead to that dense site where history and subjectivity make social
life. The ghost or the apparition is one form by which something lost, or barely visible,
or seemingly not there to our supposedly well-trained eyes, makes itself known or
apparent to us, in its own way, of course. The way of the ghost is haunting, and
haunting is a very particular way of knowing what has happened or is happening.
Being haunted draws us affectively, sometimes against our will and always a bit
magically, into the structure of feeling of a reality we come to experience, not as cold
knowledge, but as a transformative recognition (Gordon 1997: 7-8).

The present study is an attempt to offer, as Gordon has suggested, a 'transformative
recognition' through which we come to realize that migratory movements have been and
will continue to be a dynamic force in shaping the social world we live in.
Borders and 'Ghosts' aims to scrutinize geographical haunting. Such a theme is explored by addressing the particular 'phenomenon' that occur with an act of haunting; the geopolitical boundaries and territorial identities are deeply disturbed, and what is called 'home' becomes deeply unfamiliar. The study facilitates a re-thinking of geographical unity and absolute belonging. The conditions of haunting emerge when the illusion of coherence, stability, homogeneity and permanence is faced with the shadowy reality of displacement, dislocation and unbelonging, with all the layers of diasporic formations and migratory flows, with the crossover and overlap of cultures, and with the hybrid identities and new ethnicities that are constantly being formed.

From this perspective, the hauntological concern in Borders and 'Ghosts' develops a 'performative' inquiry, as it deals with effects and temporal or frequent situations. There are two aspects of its 'performative' inquiry. Firstly, it explores what the migrant 'does' for the world; how s/he can affect the way we think about and create knowledge of the world. It examines the way in which the migrant both produces in the world and for the world, thereby facilitating critical perception on the part of the researcher. Secondly, it applies the mode of 'performative writing' in its analysis.

The concept of the 'performative' was developed by linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin in his book How To Do Things With Words (1962). Austin coined the word 'performative' to describe certain utterances. He develops a contrast between two kind of sentence in language: 'constative' and 'performative'. Whereas 'constative' sentences are descriptive (Austin 1976: 3), 'performative' sentences bring things about, are actions in the world. Austin's examples of 'performative' sentences include 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my
lawful wedded wife', 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth', 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow', 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother' (Ibid. 4-5). As Austin noted, in these cases, by uttering the words the subject is doing it (Ibid. 6). We change something in the world by using words that bring about actions in the world. He wrote: 'The term “performative” is ... derived, of course, from “perform”, the usual verb with the noun “action”: it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action' (Ibid. 6). Austin regards the ‘performative’ as tied in with the social contract that establishes all our social, legal and political institutions, including language itself.

The social aspect of performativity has been extended by theorists; for instance, by American philosopher and queer theorist Judith Butler, whose main assertion is that sex and gender are the ‘effects’ rather than the causes of institutions, discourses and practices. Butler extends French existentialist writer Simone de Beauvoir’s famous insight that ‘[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes a woman’ (de Beauvoir 1949: 281) to suggest that ‘woman is something we ‘do’ rather than something we ‘are’. The idea of performativity is introduced in the first chapter of Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, when Butler states that ‘gender proves to be performative - that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed’ (Butler 1990: 25).

When I say haunting is ‘performative’, what I want to indicate is that it requires a certain type of interpretation; that is, in Derrida’s words in Spectres of Marx, ‘an interpretation that transforms the very thing it interprets’ (Derrida 1994: 51). In other words, haunting always brings us to the recognition of our limit. In this study, I am dealing,
in particular, with the limits of representation and description. In the context of the issues of dislocation and migration, *Borders and 'Ghosts'* aims to show that there is always something beyond these limits: there are always things that are about to emerge; things that can be made visible and that can be articulated.

In the study, I am searching for the possibility that something substantial can be made from things invisible or hardly visible. This requires the mode of 'performative writing' proposed by Peggy Phelan (Phelan 1997: 12) in her book *Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories*. Phelan notes that one of the deepest challenges of writing about performance is that the objects of one's mediation, the performance itself, disappears. In that sense, Phelan argues, performance theory and criticism are instances of writing history. She is concerned with the adaptation of primarily a conservative and conserving method in performance theory and criticism. Phelan argues that writing about performance has largely been dedicated to describing in exhaustive detail the *mise-en-scène*, the physical gestures, the voice, the score, the action of the performance event. According to her, the desire to record, the desire to preserve and represent the performance event is a desire we should resist (Ibid. 3). She writes on 'performative writing':

Performative writing is different from personal criticism or autobiographical essay, although it owes a lot to both genres. Performative writing is an attempt to find a form for 'what philosophy wishes all the same to say'. Rather than describing the performance event in 'direct signification,' a task I believe to be impossible and not terrifically interesting, I want this writing to enact the affective force of the performance event again, as it plays itself out in an ongoing temporality made vivid by the psychic
process of distortion (repression, fantasy, and the general hubbub of the individual and collective unconscious), and made narrow by the muscular force of political repression in all its mutative violence. ... Performative writing is solicitous of affect even while it is nervous and tentative about the consequences of that solicitation. Alternately bold and coy, manipulative and unconscious, this writing points both to itself and to the 'scenes' that motivate it (Ibid 11-12).

A hauntological concern is not about establish a smooth continuity through representation and description – a knowable past that determines a stable present leading to an inevitable future. All historical narratives are haunted by what or who is erased, or troubled by what or who demands representation, however, hauntology introduces a recognition that the past is full of holes, the present is provisional, the future not known. Thus, the struggle to write on migratory flows and migratory effects is not about representing events or describing conditions. It, rather, is a performative process.

Haunting complicates everything. It makes us question the ideas or the ideologies we have believed in for a long time; the realities we have taken for granted. It makes us question the present, because it does not belong to time. It rather facilitates a temporal disjoining. In *Spectres of Marx* Derrida uses as an example William Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* to illustrate the temporality of ghosting. In *Hamlet*, the Prince of a rotten State, who encounters the apparition of the spectre of the King, says: ‘The time is out of joint’. What Hamlet means by that, Derrida explains, is that: ‘Time is *disarticulated*, dislocated, dislodged, time is run down, on the run and run down [traqué et détraqué], *deranged*, both out of order and mad. Time is off its hinges, time is off course, beside itself, disadjusted’ (Derrida 1994: 18).
‘Time is out of joint’ for the researcher who is concerned with haunting. The hauntological concern inevitably drifts the researcher back and forth, locates him/her in a complex, and mostly invisible, net of relations which pushes him/her simultaneously both to the past and the present, to the near and the far.

Deconstructive Strategy of ‘Hauntology’ and ‘Uncanny’ Geographies

In this section, I will examine closely two concepts, those of ‘deconstruction’ and the ‘uncanny’, that will be employed in my analysis of that what I call ‘migratory hauntings’. I will also discuss the existing literature relevant to the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of these concepts.

‘Hauntology’, as proposed by Derrida, has a deconstructive strategy. In his essay ‘Marx & Sons’, in which he reflects upon his analysis in Spectres of Marx, Derrida asserts that the spectral logic he appeals to is deconstructive. This logic is required uncover the processes and effects of abstraction, idealisation, and fetishisation (Derrida 1999: 244-245). Deconstruction reminds us that we should not assume that the way we perceive the world is the same as the way the world actually is. Likewise, Borders and ‘Ghosts’ can be seen as an attempt to take a different look at migration.

One of the most precise and explicit accounts of the operative logic of deconstruction can be found in Derrida’s essay, ‘Signature event context’:

Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a neutralisation: it must by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an overturning
of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is only on the condition that deconstruction will provide itself the means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions that it criticises, which is also a field of nondiscursive forces. Each concept, moreover, belongs to a systematic change and itself constitutes a system of predicates. There is no metaphysical concept in and of itself. There is a work—metaphysical or not—on conceptual systems. Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated (Derrida 1982: 329).

Deconstruction, which appeared in several texts Derrida published in the mid-1960s, is a critique of linguistics as merely metaphysical. Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics relies on an absolute opposition between the natural and the social in which language marks the emergence of the social, in a break with nature. Such complete breaks and oppositions are what Derrida regards as metaphysics. For Derrida, all metaphysical oppositions are the attempt to overcome contradictions that cannot be eliminated. However, in Derrida’s account of deconstruction, the ideas of duality and equivocation are constant. In this system of oppositions one term is placed above the other. The history of metaphysics, according to Derrida, is the history of what is absolutely present. The interiority and the immediacy of the present, with no intrusions, is deeply metaphysical assumption (see Stocker 2006: 27, 31).

Derrida’s thoughts are partly derived from Martin Heidegger who is concerned with Being and Presence. For Heidegger, Being or Presence are both distinguished from beings or what is present. What is present in Heidegger is never Presence or Being itself.
Being is what is in a constant withdrawal from what it is. There is never a fully present in Heidegger (Heidegger 1972). Derrida agrees with Heidegger that the history of metaphysics is the history of some thing that is a substitute for Being, or Presence, and can be grasped only as present. What interests me in Derrida’s deconstruction is the way in which it troubles the assumption that what is given immediately in experience is the real or the true. Like Heidegger, Derrida thinks of Being or Presence as the unnameable and the ungraspable. There is no Presence, or Being, in Derrida other than as the impossible and the contradictory. There is no Presence or Being that we have an intrinsic tendency to search for. They can only be the opposite of difference and absence. Metaphysics itself includes a tendency to assume what is present as completely present and exclude absence as illusion, difference and non-Being. However, for Derrida, Being itself can only be absent, and we are never confronted with Being itself. Absence is necessary for there to be difference (see Stocker 2006: 33-34).

The loss of an absolute origin is where Derridean deconstruction arises. For Derrida, there is a difference between the same, because of that there is no absolute presence of Being, or the origin, truth, logos, and so on. In his book Speech and Phenomenon (1972), Derrida uses a word for this kind of difference: ‘différance’. ‘Différance’ means the kind of difference that indicates non-identity within the same, which suggests that a regular kind of difference distinguishes between things that are taken as the same. ‘Différance’ is a way of referring to how materiality itself disrupts identity, by showing that the ‘same’ in our ideas contains difference. Identity and non-identity are identical in the same. The inclusion of non-identity within identity is a way of undermining the identity of identity, and is the movement of différance (Ibid. 175-176). In my own reading, the ‘ghost’ inhabits the
difference between the same, thereby making the claim of the unified, stable and fixed identity impossible and only illusionary.

One of Derrida's contributions to the theory of knowledge is that knowledge is without a centre. There is always tension, paradox and contradiction in Derrida's account of knowledge. Reality does not exist in the stark oppositions of presence and absence or being and nothingness. Reality is the constant equivocation between absence and presence, as everything constantly comes into and out of existence, and changes and exists only in relation to other things (see Stocker 2006: 185). Deconstruction, in large part, means facing contradictions rather than trying to eliminate them. The present study, which mainly aims to produce an alternative way of approaching migratory flows, operates at the very threshold between the past and the present, the living and non-living, the presence and the absence, the visible and the invisible, the here and the there and the near and the far. In doing so, it hopes to provide a fuller picture of the realities of dislocation and migration.

The distinction between inside and outside is another way of setting up metaphysical oppositions. The binary logic of metaphysics is picked up by Derrida and conceived of in terms of the inside and the outside. In *Of Grammatology* Derrida argues (see Derrida 1997: 27-73) that metaphysics takes the inside as good, real and true, and takes the outside as evil, apparent and false. The inside and the outside do not only map onto the production of well-frontier space, but also map onto being and non-being, presence and absence.
Borders and ‘Ghosts’ focuses on those instances where the borderline between inside and outside is blurred or troubled. Haunting always implies a space, since, by definition, only space can be haunted. Moreover, space is understood as that which ‘houses’. This is a point made by Mark Wigley in his book, *The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s Haunt*, where he offers a way of rethinking the subject of architecture, while using architecture to rethink deconstructive discourse. He argues that the word ‘haunting’ is etymologically bound to that of ‘house’. He points out that ‘haunting is always the haunting of a house. And it is not just that some houses are haunted: A house is only a house inasmuch as it is haunted’ (Wigley 1997: 163).

Haunted geographies are also ‘uncanny geographies’, just as haunting experiences are ‘uncanny’ experiences. In his essay ‘The Uncanny’ (1919), Freud claims that the ‘uncanny’ (*unheimlich*) refers to the uneasy sense of the unfamiliar within the familiar, the unhomely within the home. We learn from Freud that when we have an uncanny experience, we feel like there are ghosts in our house (Freud 1919: 225).

In ‘The Uncanny’, Freud begins with an interrogation of the denotation, as well as the connotation, of the word ‘heimlich’ (homely), which is the opposite of ‘unheimlich’. He writes that ‘*[heimlich] is ... used of a place free from ghostly influences ... familiar, friendly, intimate’ (Ibid., 225). Freud gives many definitions of heimlich in different languages. From the long lists he gives two sets of definitions are particularly relevant: ‘belonging to the house, not strange, familiar, tame, intimate, friendly, etc.’ and ‘intimate, friendly comfortable ... arousing a sense of agreeable restfulness and security as in one within the four walls of his house’ (Ibid., 222). However, Freud seems more interested in
other sets of definitions of the word *heimlich*: ‘Concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know of or about it, withheld from others. To do something *heimlich*, i.e. behind someone’s back; to steal away *heimlich*; *heimlich* meetings and appointments; to look on with *heimlich* pleasure at someone’s discomfiture; to sigh or weep *heimlich*; to behave *heimlich*, as though there was something to conceal; *heimlich* love-affair, love, sin; *heimlich* places (which good manners oblige us to conceal)’ (Ibid., 223).

We learn from Freud that ‘uncanny’ means what is familiar and agreeable, on the one hand, and what is concealed and kept out of sight, on the other. We also learn from Freud that when we have an uncanny experience, we are not homesick, or in a state of intellectual doubt or uncertainty in the face of a new, alien or foreign reality. Rather something familiar has become an unsettling spectre: ‘[U]ncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-fashioned in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression’ (Ibid., 241). In the structural slippage from *heimlich* to *unheimlich*, that which supposedly lies outside the familiar comfort of the home turns out to be inhabiting it all along, surfacing only in a return of the repressed, the excluded, or the neglected, as a foreign element that, strangely, seems to belong in the very domain that renders it foreign. We can therefore only be haunted by something or someone we have been involved in, yet we have chosen to ignore, forget or lock it into our unconsciousness.

In her book, *Strangers to Ourselves*, Julia Kristeva utilises Freudian psychoanalysis to point to our own alienation. Kristeva convincingly argues (Kristeva 1991: 191-192) that, throughout his work, Freud did not mention ‘foreigners’ because he showed us that we
are foreigners to ourselves. As she puts it, 'if I am a foreigner, there are no foreigners.
Therefore Freud does not talk about them' (Ibid.).

In fact, in 'The Uncanny', Freud mentions the uncanny experience of the arrival of a
person from elsewhere, from the world outside himself, through which he recognized
himself as a stranger. He tells us:

I was sitting alone in my wagon-lit compartment when a more than usually violent jolt
of the train swung back the door of the adjoining washing-cabinet, and an elderly
gentleman in a dressing-gown and a travelling cap came in. I assumed that in leaving
the washing-cabinet, which lay between the two compartments, he had taken the
wrong direction and come into my compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the
intention of putting him right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was
nothing but my own reflection in the looking-glass on the open door (Freud 1919:
248).

Freud admits that he ‘thoroughly’ disliked his appearance. The ‘uncanny experience’,
therefore, is the encounter of a stranger who is in fact not a stranger at all. What is
‘uncanny’ draws us from ourselves, from our familiar and secure world, in order to
‘correct’ our vision. Haunted by a ‘ghost’, we come to know the world for the first time.
Kristeva explores the ghostly figure of the ‘stranger’ who is the foreigner, the outsider or
the alien, in a country and society not their own:

Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the space
that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder. By
recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself. A symptom that precisely turns 'we' into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible. The foreigner comes in when the consciousness of my difference arises, and he disappears when we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, unamenable to bonds and communities (Kristeva 1991: 1).

In a similar way, Homi Bhabha re-appropriates the 'uncanny' to speak of the return of 'the migrants, the minorities, the diasporic' to the city, 'the space in which emergent identifications and new social movements of the people are played out.' What Bhabha calls 'the perplexity of the living' might be, in these terms, interpreted through a theory of the uncanny that destabilizes traditional notions of centre and periphery – the spatial forms of the national – to comprehend how 'that boundary that secures the cohesive limits of the western nation may imperceptibly turn into a contentious internal liminality that provides a place from which to speak both of, and as, the minority, the exilic, the marginal and emergent' (Vidler 1992: 10-11; Bhabha 1990: 319-320, 300).

The 'ghost' is an 'uncanny stranger', because it is neither outside nor inside. This subject is therefore quite clearly related to borders and frontiers, to migrants and diasporic communities, to the colonized, to political refugees and to the consequent refiguring of notions of 'home' and 'nation'. As the 'unhomely' becomes the norm, replacing the sovereignty of nation or the universalism of a human culture, so new subjectivities are needed (Pile and Thrift: 18).
Borders and 'Ghosts' suggests that the occurrence of new subjectivities requires an alternative understanding of the movements and flows across the earth. The existence of the immigrant, the refugee or the asylum-seeker destabilises the authority of geography, through which locations are named, subjects' belonging is defined and the relation of a location to other places in the world are plotted on the historical or global world map (see Wood 1992 and Gregory 1994). The authority of geography, that centres power, either colonial, imperial or global; names and writes lands; that determines identities and collectivities; that classifies and subordinates people; that controls the rigid structure of inclusions and exclusions, and that regulates movements, is thus rendered problematic by the hauntings of the immigrant, the refugee or the asylum-seeker.

In her influential book *Terra Infirma: Geographies Visual Culture*, Irit Rogoff conceptualizes 'unhomed geographies' as a possible means of redefining issues of location to get away from notions of belonging and not belonging as determined by the state, which controls privileged inclusions and desperate exclusions. The alternative geography Rogoff is mapping out is, as she has noted, an 'uncanny geography', 'uncanny' in Freud's sense of 'that class of frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar' (Rogoff 2000: 7). She tries to rethink the relations between subjects and places traditionally known as 'geography', in a way that escapes the dominant powers and practices that have the authority to name us, to locate us, to determine our collectivities and identifications, and to establish the rights and privileges we do or do not have. She claims:
Geography ... is a system of classification, a mode of location, a site of collective national, cultural, linguistic and topographic histories. All of these are countered by the zones which provide resistance through processes of disidentification; international free cities, no man's land, demilitarized zones, ghettos, red light districts, border areas, etc., and work towards our recognition of traditional geography as a sign system in crisis (Ibid., 8).

Rogoff attempts to locate geography within a revised understanding of an alternative set of relations between subjects and places, in which 'it is not scientific knowledge or the national categories of the state which determine both belonging and unbelonging, but rather linked sets of political insights, memories, subjectivities, projections of phantasmatic desires and great long chains of sliding signifiers' (Ibid., 7). Rogoff speaks of geography in relation to issues of cultural difference that take us beyond identity politics; beyond the understanding of community within an already established identity 'in common'. She tries to think of difference as, to put it in her own words, 'different modes of knowing rather than different subjects within known modes' (Rogoff 2003: 53).

Geography, thus, is a way of speaking of cultural difference, a way of acknowledging that all difference is always epistemologically embedded and subject to regimes, rather than simply subjugated to dominant powers. It is made manifest in the world through sign systems that include cartography, border marking, landscape stereotypes, national cultures and many others' (Rogoff 2003: 53).

The present study is based upon the idea that haunting can only happen if there is a geographical enclosure. This is because its very existence precedes a well-established, frontier space. 'Ghosts' are produced at the very moment of the constitution of space.
Thus, the element of haunting is in the nature of any place. 'Ghosts' are always inside and silently awaiting their turn. When they appear, they severely disrupt the law of institutional space. The power of haunting comes from the fact that it displaces the house and the whole regime of placement based upon it.

From this perspective, Borders and 'Ghosts' offers the suggestion that migratory movements should be understood as an 'uncanny internal displacement', since the structure of the house is doubly bound to the sense of the haunted house. The flow of migration 'deconstructs' the internal structure of geography, interrogating the construction of territory, border and enclosure, and making them blurring in order to see what is blurred within them. If geography regulates movements and defines belongings and unbelongings, then haunting uncannily orchestrates an exterior hidden inside the house, something foreign to the space itself and yet uncannily part of its very constitution.

The irrepressible haunting, primarily, is the enigmatic movement of displacement or dislocation (Wigley 1997: 177). Derrida's deconstruction, in fact, showed us that there is no location without dislocation; that the order of any place is actually displacement. Haunting is that which displaces space, revealing that place is produced as a space by the very fact of dislocation or displacement in the first place. In this sense, internal dislocation or displacement precedes the existence of any space. In Spectres of Marx, Derrida critically displaces what he calls 'ontopology. In his words, 'ontopology' is 'an axiomatic linking indissolubly the ontological value of present-being [on] to its situation, to stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general'. Derrida reverses the conventional formulas and asserts that: 'All
national rootedness ... is rooted first of all in the memory or the anxiety of a displaced or – displaceable – population’ (Derrida 1994: 82-83).

Haunting disrupts the house by subverting the logic of the ‘house’. It is itself ‘spacing’, to put it in Derrida’s words, which troubles the institutional space (Derrida 1981: 27). ‘Spacing’ is not space exactly but what Derrida describes as the ‘becoming space’ of that which is meant to be without space (presence, speech, spirit, ideas and so on) (Ibid.). It is that which opens up a space, both in the sense of fissuring an established structure, dividing it or complicating its limits, but also in the sense of producing space itself as an opening in an institutional and well-established space. ‘Spacing’ is at once splintering and productive. Spacing, as distinct from space, first and foremost, is not a thing but a movement (Wigley 1997: 73).

If it is anything, it is a no-thing. Derrida writes: ‘Spacing designates nothing, that is, no presence at a distance; it is the index of an irreducible exterior, and at the same time of a movement, a displacement that indicates an irreducible alterity. I do not see how one could dissociate the two concepts of spacing and alterity’ (Derrida 1981: 81). This argument renders alterity internal or, rather, problematizes the very sense of interior and thereby the whole economy of identity, propriety, immediacy, presence and so on, which is based on it: ‘spacing is the impossibility for an identity to be closed on itself, on the inside of its proper interiority, or on its coincidence with itself. The irreducibility of spacing is the irreducibility of the other’ (Ibid., 94).
Moreover, the notion of ‘spacing’ involves a rethinking of the subject. The subject is not just housed within the space or detached from it, but is produced by that which violates space and is concealed to produce the effect of space in the first place. The subject is neither violently controlled by space nor exercises control over it. To rethink the subject must be to interrogate the idea of place (Wigley 1997: 176). In this respect, the immigrant, the refugee or the asylum-seeker appears in Borders and ‘Ghosts’ as the figure of haunting, a slippery figure that involves a rethinking of the house, of the homeland. S/he is an elusive ‘spectre’ whose habitation without proper inhabiting is haunting. The house, as the very emblem of presence, is disrupted from within by what it excludes.

The ‘ghost’ is always the ‘uncanny’ guest. It never simply occupies the space but elusively haunts it. As has already been mentioned, the hidden logic of the domestic is understood as a haunting of the house. The uncanniness of the foreigner is that s/he is never simply alien to and separable from the social body to which s/he already haunts.

‘Ghost’ is both a subversive and a constructive thing. The migrant is mostly seen as the ‘parasite’ in society. S/he is seen as a threat or a burden to the state. Throughout the debates around migration, immigration is linked to the destabilization of traditional communities and migrants are blamed for unsettling changes in social relations. Today the term ‘migrant’ has a looming presence. It has ambivalent associations. For some, it suggests a positive image of cosmopolitanism. For others, it elicits a defensive reaction against the so-called ‘dirty’ foreigner and the ‘bogus’ asylum-seeker who abuses the limited resources of the nation-state. Hostile stereotypes are actively produced.
However, the present study offers a re-thinking of migration as the positive outcome of de-stabilization. Migratory movements can be seen as an attempt to inspire a deeper rethinking of the relationship between the stranger or the foreigner and the citizen. In Chapter 1 especially, this theme is highlighted by proposing the urgent need to acknowledge 'ghost citizens'. Wigley has pointed out that 'deconstructive discourse seeks an uninhabitable outside on the inside' (Wigley 1997: 159). What Wigley means here is that deconstructive discourse is no more than a rethinking of inhabitation. This study is based upon the idea that the flows of migration resist the logic of inhabitation. Migratory movement displaces the house. The people who circulate on/through borders disrupt the lines of exclusion, for there is no more a place to draw a line in order to exclude them as their movements actively produce a counter-cartography and a global area in which to operate. I use the phrase 'ghost citizen', as I think that their 'absence' from their originating community creates a new kind of community; a community that we might refer to, as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt do, as 'multitude' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 103).

The Visuality of 'Ghosts'

Drawing on an analysis informed by Visual Culture studies, Borders and 'Ghosts' addresses pressing social conditions and cultural problematics around vision and visuality in relation to dislocation and migration.

Visual Culture emerged with the rapid expansion of cultural and media studies over the past two decades. Visual Culture is concerned with the all manifestations of 'optical' experience, all variants of visual practice. This new field seeks a critical theorization of visual materials and artefacts. It deals with the social world in which images are produced,
circulated and consumed, and in which visual materials and artefacts emerge to function (see Mirzoeff 1998; Mirzoeff 1999; Evans and Hall 1999).

Philosophers, theorists and critics, such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard and Franz Fanon, have been concerned with visual and visuality. Their work help us to think about the visual in a much broader sense, as the visual in their work always refers to the non-visual domain: mainly ideology and power, the politics of representation and larger questions regarding the construction of subjectivity. Their texts highlight those moments where the visual is contested, debated and transformed during the constant challenges that emerge with the social interaction involved in forging class, gender, sexual and racialized identities. We are offered several useful terminologies and new modes of thinking to understand the operation of looking and being looked at, and the production of visualities and visibilities. These include: the society of the spectacle; the simulacrum; the 'gaze'; the mirror-stage; panopticism and surveillance; fetishism and voyeurism; the reproduction of the image; the 'other' as the projection of racialized discourse (Evans and Hall 1999: 14).

Visual Culture, therefore, is far more than the study of images. Taking up theoretical models, Visual Culture offers not only new ways of looking, but also new models of thinking. It takes into account of the centrality of vision in producing cultural meanings and in establishing and maintaining aesthetic values, gender stereotypes and power relations within culture. Its preoccupation ranges from analyses and interpretations of the audio, the spatial and the visual, to the physic dynamics of spectatorship. Irit Rogoff, one of the
forerunners of the emergent field of Visual Culture, has written, 'visual culture opens up an entire world of intertextuality in which images, sounds and spatial delineations are read on to and through one another, lending ever-accruing layers of meanings and subjective responses to each encounter we might have with film, TV, advertising, art works, buildings or urban environments' (Rogoff 1998: 14).

As a field, Visual Culture is part of a cultural shift that occurred in the humanities. As Jessica Evans and Stuart Hall have pointed out (Evans and Hall 1999: 2), the revolution across much of the social and human sciences, characterized by what is variously termed the 'linguistic turn' or, they would prefer, more broadly, the 'cultural turn', has led to an emphasis upon social practices and relations as signifying practices. In other words, the emphasis is now on practices that organize and constitute social actions and involve or assume interpretative, meaning-making persons. Evans and Hall have argued that cultural studies rests on the achievements of semiotics as a whole and stakes its distinctiveness upon the analysis of the symbolic, classificatory and, in short, meaning-making practices. Any study of the image conducted under the impact of cultural studies is indebted to semiotics. Thinking of cultural studies as a discipline has enabled a reach into the cultural practices of the everyday, such as the popular practices of photography, previously dismissed for their trite and highly restricted iconography. There is a sense that the privileging of the linguistic model in the study of representation has led to the assumption that visual artefacts are fundamentally the same and function in just the same way as any other cultural text. Accordingly, the specific rhetoric, genres, institutional contexts and uses of visual imaginary can become lost in the more global identification of cultural trends and their epic narratives of transformations of consciousness in the rubric of 'postmodern
culture'. Thus, in the field of image studies, Evans and Hall have claimed, it is no longer possible to turn back to the pre-semiotic assumptions of reflectionism; it is no longer possible to think of social experiences as existing in a pre-linguistic realm; abstracted from the signifying systems which in fact structure (Ibid., 2).

What we can understand from the arguments of Jessica Evans and Stuart Hall, is that in the emergent field of Visual Culture, the focus has shifted from signifying practice to the relation of seeing and knowing. In cultural studies, culture has been defined as signifying practices by structuralist methodology and, as a result of an increased stress on meaning, the image also has come to be understood as a signifying practice. In the emergent field of Visual Culture, vision has started to be questioned from the framework of post-structuralist theory.

Derrida's deconstruction comes in here. Derrida argues that it is the exchange and equivalence between different linguistic values that determines meaning, not a structure that is a form imposed on an already existing set of linguistic values or meanings (Stocker 2006: 29-30). In Writing and Difference, Derrida discusses play as having an important aspect of deconstructive strategy:

Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Play is always a play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence. Being must be conceived as presence or absence of play and not the other way around’ (Derrida 1978: 292).
Language exists as signification because of the system of differences and the chain of substitutions. This means that signification only exists in the equivocal manner that arises from change and context. Play is the repetition, substitution and contextualisation of the sign that can never be said to be simply absent or present. The same applies to anything in the experienced world. Understanding the meaning of cultural forms based on continuity of meaning in structuralist thought requires dismantling and then reconstituting meaning, as reflected in Rogoff's framing of the field of Visual Culture:

... we have produced a field of vision version of Derrida's concept of différence and its achievement has had a twofold effect both on the structures of meaning and interpretation and on the epistemic and institutional frameworks that attempt to organize them. Derrida's conceptualization of différence takes the form of a critique of the binary logic in which every element of meaning constitution is locked into signification in relation to the other (a legacy of Saussurian linguistics' insistence on language as a system of negative differentiation). Instead what we have begun to uncover is the free play of the signifier, a freedom to understand meaning in relation to images, sounds, or spaces not necessarily perceived to operate in a direct, causal or epistemic relation to either their context or to one another. If feminist deconstructive writing has long held the place of writing as the endless displacement of meaning, then visual culture provides the visual articulation of the continuous displacement of meaning in the field of vision and the visible' (Rogoff 1998: 15).

The de-stabilization of signs and a certain crisis in meaning is the main pre-occupation of this study. Borders and 'Ghosts' tries to recall the instances in which a sign has become unstable when it stops doing what it is supposed to do and stops signifying in a direct way.
There are two implications of this: a sign is not there and/or a sign is not, in fact, that. I am trying, therefore, to activate a visual field where there is an absence, but not the absence of meaning. I claim that the crisis of meaning is always linked to the possibility of writing. An example of the activating of a visual field where there is an absence can be found in my discussion of Zarina Bhimji’s video-work ‘Out of Blue’ (2002) in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1). In the video, in which the artist deals with the dislocation of the Asian population in Uganda during the dictatorship of General Idi Amin, every image articulates an absence. Another example can be found in my discussion of Gülsün Karamustafa’s installation-work, ‘Where The Continents Meet’ (1997), in which the photograph of a boy as a child-soldier reveals the instance his body takes on the apparitional appearance of the Family, the State and the Motherland, activating a nationalist discourses (Figure 3.8).

Deconstructive methodology defines rigidly what is ‘present’ (presence) to start with and what is ‘past’ (absence) to apply a methodology. To engage with haunting is to acknowledge the fact that the very experience of meaning is itself an experience of difference, such that we come to question what appears to be immediate and present. This also means that writing lacks absolute reference to an absolute world in a relation with absolute truth, although the desire for the absolute inevitably haunts writing (Stocker 2006: 155-156). What we learn from Derrida’s deconstruction is that modern writing confronts the impossibility of separating meaning from writing as there is no *logos*, absolute meaning, preceeding writing. Meaning, therefore, only comes from the forces and structures of writing (Ibid., 156).
Nicholas Mirzoeff, one of the forerunners of the emergent field of Visual Culture, has pointed out that Western culture has consistently privileged the spoken word as the highest form of intellectual practice and seen visual representations as a second-rate illustration of ideas. He suggests that the emergence of Visual Culture develops what W.J.T. Mitchell has called 'picture theory'; the sense that some aspects of Western philosophy and science have come to adopt a pictorial, rather than textual, view of the world. This, for Mirzoeff, marks a significant challenge to the notion of the world as a written text, which dominated so much intellectual discussion in the wake of linguistics-based movements, such as structuralism and post-structuralism. In Mitchell’s view, picture theory stems from ‘the realization that spectatorship (the look, the gaze, the glance, the practices of observation, surveillance, and visual pleasure) may be as deep a problem as various forms of reading (decipherment, decoding, interpretation, etc.) and that ‘visual literacy’ might not be fully explicable in the model of textuality’ (cited by Mirzoeff 1998: 15; Mitchell 1994: 16).

With the emergence of the field of Visual Culture, it was increasingly widely argued that the elements visual and culture had to be re-examined in a wider context. It became obvious, from its apolitical and uncreative research results, that, as a discipline, art history and its methods of study failed since the visual could not be isolated from the entirety of the culture from which it emerged. In her article, ‘Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture’, published in 2003, the theorist Mieke Bal noted that, the centrality of visuality as the ‘new’ object of Visual Culture studies, distinguishes it from other object-defined disciplines, such as art history and film studies. Attempting to define the object domain of Visual Culture Ball suggests that, ‘the object domain consists of things we can
see or whose existence is motivated by their visibility; things that have a particular
visuality or visual quality that addresses the social constituencies interacting with them’
(Bal 2003: 8-9).

At first glance, `ghosts' might seem to be a very unusual topic for an academic
study, especially given the fact that this inquiry is mainly directed at the field of vision.
However, as Derrida notes, in Spectres of Marx, when a 'ghost' appears what it
addresses is always a spectator. The spectator does not see who looks at him/her. It
looks at him/her and sees him/her without being seen, even when it is there, being
outside of any synchrony. Derrida calls this special condition a 'visor effect' (Derrida 1994:
7). This term refers to the condition of a spectator who is very conscious that they are
seen by a look that will always be impossible to cross.

The perspective, therefore, has to be reversed: the 'ghost', which is sensuous/non-
sensuous, visible/invisible, sees us. From the other side of the eye, it looks at us even
before we see it. In Spectres of Marx, Derrida writes:

We feel ourselves observed, sometimes under surveillance by it even before any
apparition. Especially – and this is the event, for the spectre is of the event – it sees
us during a visit. It re-pays us a visit [il nous rend visite]. Visit upon visit, since it
returns to see us and since visitare, frequentative of visere (to see, examine,
contemplate), translates well the recurrence or returning, the frequency of a visitation.
The latter does not always mark the moment of a generous apparition or a friendly
vision; it can signify strict infection or violent search, consequent persecution,
implacable concatenation. The social mode of haunting, its original style could also be called, taking into account this repetition, *frequentation* (Derrida 1994: 101).

In a much earlier work, an essay entitled ‘Living on: Border Lines’, Derrida is already concerned with ‘seeing’ the things which are beyond sight, beyond our very eyes. In the essay, when Derrida asks the question of where the edge of the text or its border is, he indicates that ‘what has happened ... is a sort of overrun [débordement] that spoils all [the] boundaries and divisions, and forces us to extend the accredited concept, the dominant notion of a “text” ...’ (Derrida 1980: 83-84). Finding the truth that waits somewhere to be discovered and deciphered, or to put it in Derrida’s terms, ‘the secret-less secret’, is not the issue here. What Derrida means is that writing, as well as reading, has to do with seeing and imagining beyond the framework of the possible narration, beyond the margins of the story. The writer, and we should also add reader here, Derrida indicates, ‘let[s] appear’ the non-appearing, as such on the limit of the beyond, a limit that is not a determinable, visible or thinkable line, and that has no definable edges, on the ‘limit’, therefore, of the beyond of phenomena and essence (Ibid., 83).

What I find very useful in Derrida’s discussion is the understanding of the existence of realities that go beyond visibility. Just as with writing and reading, seeing is also to look and imagine beyond what is visible. ‘What enables us to see should remain invisible,’ writes Derrida, and adds:

If from ‘life’ we appeal to light, from vie to vision, we can speak here of sur-vie, of living on in a life-after-life or a life-after-death, as sur-vision, ‘seeing on’ in a vision-
beyond-vision. To see sight or vision or visibility, to see beyond what is visible, is not merely 'to have a vision' in the usual sense of the word, but to see beyond-sight, to see-sight-beyond-sight (Ibid., 91).

If what is at stake is to see beyond sight, one has to deal with some 'ghosts' that are in between the visible and the invisible, the material and the immaterial, the palpable and the impalpable, the voice and the phenomenon.

The field of Visual Culture offers the reinvention of the relation between seeing and knowing, as they are mutually constitutive. The act of looking that describes, analyses and critiques is central to the process of inventive and creative interpretation of the world and the making of knowledge of the world. Visual Culture is concerned with the act of seeing as a product of the tensions between external images or objects and internal thought processes (cited by Bal 2003: 19; Hooper-Greenhill 2000: 14). In the field of Visual Culture there is a 'performative' act of seeing, not the materiality of the object seen, that defines a specific cultural artefact, whether it is artwork or visual material circulated in Visual Culture, as the object of study (Bal 2003: 11). Bal writes: "[W]hat happens when people look, and what emerges from that act? The verb “happens” entails the visual event as an object, and “emerges” the visual image, but as a fleeting, fugitive, subjective image accrued to the subject. These two results – the event and the experienced image – are joined at the hip in the act of looking and its aftermath’ (Ibid., 9). Moreover, interpretive practices in Visual Culture endorse the notion that meaning is dialogic. Meaning is a dialogue between viewer and object as well as between viewers (Ibid., 24).
One major aim of *Borders and 'Ghosts*', therefore, is to get us to consider a different way of seeing, one that is less mechanical, more willing to be surprised, to link imagination and critique, one that is more attuned to the task of 'conjur[ing]' up the appearances of something that [is] absent' (Berger 1972: 10).

To sketch the Visual Culture of 'ghosts' is to engage with 'intelligibility', that random slipping in and out of visual and sensory perception and empirical and representational concerns. For Derrida:

A traditional scholar does not believe in ghosts—in all that could be called the virtual space of spectrality. There has never been a scholar who, as such, does not believe in the sharp distinction between the real and the unreal, the actual and the inactual, the living and the non-living, being and non-being ('to be or not to be,' in the conventional reading), in the opposition between what is present and what is not, for example in the form of objectivity. Beyond this opposition, there is, for the scholar, only the hypothesis of a school of thought, theatrical fiction, literature and speculation (Derrida 1994: 11).

Derrida outlines a new understanding of the role of the scholar and the method of academic and scientific research. He looks towards a new notion of scholarship and other spaces of intellectual thinking; spaces that can be called spectral or ghostly. Derrida's scholar is capable of thinking the possibility of the 'spectre', which pushes the limits of knowledge and of the visible back to its margins, because s/he know that s/he has to look beyond the opposition between presence and non-presence, actuality and inactuality, past and present, life and non-life. A 'ghost' is an intermediary apparition between life and
death, between being and non-being, between matter and spirit, whose separation it dissolves. Being half this and half that or being half here and half there, the 'ghost' leaves a 'trace' that marks the present with its absence.

Images always carry meanings; as Rogoff argues (Rogoff 1998: 15), they convey information, afford pleasure and displeasure, influence style, determine consumption and mediate power relations. She suggests that the major concerns of Visual Culture are '[w]ho we see and who we do not see; who is privileged within the regime of specularity; which aspects of the historical past actually have circulating visual representations and which do not; whose fantasies of what are fed by which visual images?' (Ibid., 15)

'Ghosts', in Visual Culture, call up a more complex understanding of seeing and visuality. Haunting is the condition of the impossibility of the opposition of presence and absence. The dialectics of visibility and invisibility in the act of haunting involve a constant negotiation between what we can see and what we cannot. In this respect, the present study is based upon a Visual Culture-informed analysis of visual regimes, in the sense that, Visual Culture works towards a social theory of visuality, focusing on the questions of what is made visible, who sees what, and how seeing, knowing and power are inter-related.

Through an examination of the visuality of the 'ghost', Nicholas Mirzoeff notes, the 'ghost' is not a retreat to the margins, whether of art history, aesthetics or cultural studies, it is rather an assertion that the virtual is in some sense real, and the paranormal normal, as what was formerly invisible comes into visibility (Mirzoeff 2002: 239). He writes: 'The
ghost is that which could not be seen in the panoptic spectrum and it has many names in many languages: diasporists, exiles, queers, migrants, gypsies, refugees, Tutsis, Palestinians. The ghost is one place among many from which to interpellate the networks of visibility that have constructed, destroyed and deconstructed the modern visual subject. By the visual subject, I mean a person who is both constituted as an agent of sight (regardless of his or her biological capacity to see) and as the effect of a series of categories of visual subjectivity' (Ibid., 239-240).

*Borders and 'Ghosts' can be viewed as an attempt to read images 'symptomatically', in order to manage to understand the most fundamental questions of social and political life. Working with visual materials in a cultural and a theoretical framework means finding new ways to intersect the visual. 'To illuminate' the world, we should find new models to bring to consciousness what before was only dimly perceived so that certain things become available for critical perception.*

*Hauntological concern in Visual Culture therefore requires the re-consideration of visuality. This concern, I would suggest, requires what Irit Rogoff calls the 'curious eye'. Rogoff tries to find an alternative viewing position to, what she calls, the old art historical chestnut or 'the good eye', which she sees as an anatomical entity founded on connoisseurship, and on a consensus of what constitutes both 'quality' and 'value'. She proposes 'the curious eye' to counter the 'good eye' of the connoisseurship. For Rogoff, curiosity implies 'a certain unsettling, a notion of things outside the realm of the known, of things not yet quite understood or articulated, the pleasures of the forbidden or the hidden*
or the unthought, the optimism of finding out something one had not known or been able to conceive of before' (Rogoff 2000: 32-33).

This study considers migratory movements in an attempt to produce a social theory of 'ghosts' in the field of vision. This inquiry requires a shift from the discourse of 'speaking about' towards the discourse of 'speaking to' in order to re-frame the visual materials one is looking at. In her essay 'Cotton and Iron', Trinh T. Min-ha speaks of the difference between 'speaking about' and 'speaking to'. Min-ha is concerned with the production of knowledge. In her words:

For without a certain work of displacement, 'speaking about' only partakes in the conversation of systems of binary oppositions (subject/object, I/t, We/They) on which territorialized knowledge depends. It places a semantic distance between oneself and the work; oneself (the maker) and the receiver; oneself and the other. It secures for the speaker a position of mastery: I am in the midst of a knowing, acquiring, deploying world—I appropriate, own, and demarcate my sovereign territory as I advance—while the 'other' remains in the sphere of acquisition. Truth is the instrument of a mastery which I exert over areas of the unknown as I gather them within the fold of the known (Minha 1990: 327).

Haunted by 'ghosts' the researcher, at least to some extent, finds herself/himself in the middle of an unknown territory. S/he is not the one who knows but the one who tries to contact, to 'speak to' the things that are beyond 'the visible'. For Derrida, the scholar or the intellectual:
should learn ... from the ghost. He should learn to live by learning not how to make
conversation with the ghost but how to talk with him, with her, how to let them speak
or how to give them back speech, even it is in oneself, in the other, in the other in
oneself: they are always there, spectres, even if they do not exist, even if they are no
longer, even if they are not yet. They give us to rethink the 'there' as soon as we open
our mouths ... (Derrida 1994: 176).

Notes on methods of exploration

To concentrate on haunting is not a methodology or a consciousness you can simply
adopt as a set of rules, as Gordon has pointed out (Gordon 1997: 22). Hauntological
concern is not a method if we take 'method' to mean a general set of practices or
prescribed formulae and so on, which will operate consistently every time (systematic and
programmatic). If we say we are going to do something 'methodologically', we mean that
we are going to follow a set of rules or fixed procedures, which, if followed through, will
yield the desired result. In this sense, the idea of a 'method' presupposes the nature or
route of inquiry and the result of that inquiry. However, if hauntological concern is a
deconstructive discourse, then we know that there is no set of rules, no criteria, no
procedure, no programme, no sequence of steps and no theory to be followed.
(McQuillan 2000: 4). Deconstruction is not a method or a methodological step. It is the
singular act of reading and commenting itself, not a method applied to the text to produce
the reading. Deconstruction is not a thing in this sense. It is, as Martin McQuillan has
claimed, a situation or an event of reading; it is what happens (Ibid. 6). McQuillan writes:
'... deconstruction reads a text in its singularity. Deconstruction does not bring to a text a
pre-conceived methodology which can be applied to a textual difficulty as if it were an
ointment being applied to an infected area in order to "clear up" the problem. Rather,
deconstruction is a reading which is sensitive to what is irreducible in every text, allowing
the text to speak before the reader, and listening to what the text imposes on the reader’
(Ibid., 5) In this respect, deconstruction is performative. Haunting is also performative; it is
what happens at the very moment of a troubling encounter.

At the very beginning of her book Woman, Native, Other, Trinh T. Minh-ha writes of
a remote village meeting at nightfall:

Never does one open the discussion by coming right to the heart of the matter. For
the heart of the matter is somewhere else than where it is supposed to be. To allow it
to emerge, people approach it indirectly by postponing until it matures, by letting it
come when it is ready to come. There is no catching, no pushing, no directing, no
breaking through, no need for a linear progression which gives the comforting illusion
that one knows where one goes (Minh-ha 1989: 1).

Likewise, the present text has arisen at specific moments in my thinking process; in
the moment of encounters with theoretical texts, visual materials, contemporary artwork
and cultural and political events that all relate to my personal, intimate experiences and
then proceeded slowly from them. I chased the things that caught my attention and made
me think differently. The composition of the text, therefore, did not develop in a linear
fashion. It can be seen as fragmentary, but I would prefer to consider my approach
‘nomadic’, in the manner in which Rosi Braidotti takes the Deleuzean concept of
nomadism. According to Braidotti, the nomad is the prototype of the ‘man or woman of
ideas’. Being an intellectual nomad is about crossing boundaries; about the act of going,
regardless of the destination. The nomad, she writes, is ‘a figuration for the kind of subject
who has relinquished all idea, desire, or nostalgia for fixity’ (Braidotti 1994: 23). She draws attention to the fact that the idea of the ‘nomadic subjects’ is inspired by the experience of peoples and cultures that are, literally, nomadic. This figuration expresses the desire for an identity made of transitions, successive shifts and coordinated changes, without and against an essential unity. Her concept of nomadism refers to the kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes of thought and behaviour. She notes that not all nomads are world travellers; some of the greatest trips can take place without physically moving from one's habitat. It is not the actual act of travelling that defines the nomadic state, but the subversion of set conventions. She considers many of the things she writes as ‘cartographies’; that is to say ‘a sort of intellectual landscape gardening that gives me a horizon, a frame of reference within which I can take my bearing, move about and set up my theoretical tent’ (Ibid., 16).

This research maps out the intellectual cartography drawn by my own mental trajectories and physical movements throughout the last six years, beginning with my move from Istanbul to London to undertake my postgraduate education. In this respect, it follows the research method of Visual Culture, which directs ‘our attention away from structured, formal viewing settings like the cinema and art gallery to the centrality of visual experience in everyday life, as most of our visual experience takes place aside from formally structured moments of looking’ (Mirzoeff 1994: 7).

The project started with my puzzling and troubling encounter with a photograph taken in Rafah, one of the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, when I was reading Spectres of Marx. The photograph published in a newspaper (Figure 1.2) shows three children at a

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home who are looking out of a window. This small photograph addressed me, as its spectator, echoing the insight of Roland Barthes, who has spoken of the ‘attraction of certain photographs’ (Barthes 1993: 18) upon the spectator. Barthes calls this particular attraction ‘advenience’ or ‘adventure’. He explains his point in these words: ‘This picture advenes, that one doesn’t’ (Ibid., 18-19). What Barthes is speaking of is the impulse of the over-ready subjectivity of a spectator, whose individuality, on encountering a particular photograph, is marked as the beginning of a personal history:

In [the] glum desert, suddenly a specific photograph reaches me; it animates me, and I animate it. So that is how I must name the attraction which makes it exist: an animation. The photograph itself is in no way animated (I do not believe in ‘lifelike’ photographs), but it animates me: this is what creates every adventure (Ibid., 20).

The photograph I saw in the newspaper marked out the very beginning of ‘my personal history’ of this research. Haunted by a photograph, my adventure had started. Nothing else would perfectly fit than a study such as this, whose preoccupation is ‘ghosts’ and haunting. While I was looking at the photograph, I started to think about what Derrida meant by ‘hauntology’. I discuss the photograph in detail Chapter 1, but what I want to raise here is that, in my reading, it was demanding a critical look from its spectator in order to signify not what is in its framed space but to reveal what is beyond ‘the visible’. In this sense, it was revealing a relationship with haunting. It was leading its spectator towards something, which was neither life nor death. Although a horror was clearly exposed on the walls of the house, riddled as it was with bullets, it was too late to grasp what had really happened. Nonetheless, the photograph illustrated how people have a
double life; a slippage between life and death under state terror and how they become the agents of a haunted culture.

It is important to note that my engagement with contemporary works of art and material from visual culture is based neither on material-specific analysis nor on critical analysis. My approach is not to examine visual materials either in a descriptive or a reflective manner. Nor do I intend to look at the issue of migration and immigration through works of art or other cultural artefacts, because such an approach, I believe, cannot uncover the complexities of migration. Rather, I consider the fact that the materials circulated in visual culture or artistic production can serve as an alternative model for the knowledge production. They can reveal the complexities involved in dislocation and migration by offering alternative reading strategies and facilitating new ways of knowing.

The writers, critics and theorists involved in the emergent field of Visual Culture have aimed to collapse hierarchical distinctions and to promote a visual version of intertextuality (Rogoff 1998: 14). They have sought to uncover the complicity between power and images, or conversely probed the ways in which visual experience can resist, transgress and contest the status quo.

In the emerging field of Visual Culture we have shifted from art to the visual and from history to culture. This new field has demonstrated the impossibility of distinguishing between the products of culture and those of art. Our very understanding of culture, therefore, has changed dramatically. Art is part of culture, both in the sense of high culture and in the anthropological sense of human artefact (see Mirzoeff 1999: 22-26).
The field is bound up with the idea that art cannot be isolated from and studied apart from the social and political conditions in which it emerged. Visual Culture is not only concerned with the image, but also the culture in which production, circulation and consumption of visual materials and artefacts provide the conditions of existence of any particular meaning. There is an awareness that cultural meaning can reside anywhere. Thus, traditional notions regarding visual literacy and the purity of aesthetics have been left behind.

The discussion in each chapter has been triggered by an image, either a piece of artwork or material from visual culture. In Chapter 1, it is the photograph mentioned above. Chapter 2 discusses the video-work, *Brothers&Sisters* (2003), by Esra Ersen, in which an African immigrant, who is living illegally in Tarlabası, a multi-inhabited quarter in Istanbul, likens Tarlabası to a refugee camp. In Chapter 3, the video-installation, *Apparition* (2001), by the Albanian artist Adrian Paci, is considered. It shows Paci’s small daughter, who lives in Italy, constantly appearing and disappearing on the small screen, singing an old traditional Albanian song whenever she does appear. Chapter 4 is inspired by *Search* (2005), a documentary film on refugees who are ‘illegally’ living in Van (a city at the geographical edge of Turkey) and who ‘contact’ the world by going to the internet-cafés. Finally, the concluding chapter considers an x-ray image published in a newspaper which shows illegal immigrants crammed into hidden compartments on a lorry that was stopped at a British channel port.

Even though each chapter proceeds from an image - a documentary film, a piece of artwork or a photograph published in the media, a variety of methods are utilised in the
study; including ethnography and semi-structured interviewing in Chapter 2 and literary analysis, specifically of Hari Kunzru’s novel, Transmission, in Chapter 4.

Borders and ‘Ghosts’ takes up a trans-disciplinary and cross-methodological approach, as described by Roland Barthes: ‘Interdisciplinarity is not the calm of an easy security; it begins effectively (as opposed to the mere expression of a pious wish) when solidarity of the old disciplines breaks down –perhaps even violently, via the jolts of fashion— in the interests of a new object and a new language neither of which has a place in the field of the sciences that were to be brought peacefully together, this unease in classification being precisely the point from which it is possible to diagnose a certain mutation’ (Barthes 1977: 155).

Visual Culture is not concerned with breaking down the old disciplinary barriers in order to replace them with new ones. Rather it asserts that the concern of each subject or theme will vary and, thus, requires analysis that draws on the conventions of a variety of different disciplines. In so doing, each discipline loses its ground as it can be freely ‘activated’ by the researcher. Even though the present text has a thematic concern, it searches for a flux and changing space to operate, as it engages with motion and mobility itself, not only in the actual sense of migratory flows across spaces, but also in looking for a language ‘to claim rather than discipline its meaning into existence’ (Gordon 1997: 7).

Migrant life is complex and migratory hauntings are very complicated. In the study, by using different modes of methodologies and critical theories, I try to overcome the
limitations of disciplinary barriers in order to produce a far richer vocabulary and the denser and more in-depth analysis that is required to get to grips with these complexities.

The issue of migration is well illustrated in the media. Even though the present study uses photographs circulated in the media to develop its arguments, it does not treat them as 'empirical evidence', that point to a mass of undeniable facts that the picture, in its framed space, might describe or denounce. It rather attempts to apply a 'double interpretation'. 'Double interpretation' involves the concurrent readings that the images seem to call for and to oblige us to associate with the complex realities of migration and dislocation. In this type of analysis, 'ghosts' appear to be outside the 'objectivity' of the framed space of any given image. The point of departure is that certain images make us question the limits and the politics of representation, as they do not come into existence through what is seen in its framed space, but also through what exceeds any locatable site. This is what gives rise to the haunting presence of 'ghosts'. These 'ghosts' are what Roland Barthes calls punctum in his book on photography, Camera Lucida (1981).

The element of the photograph that 'transforms' "reality" without doubling it, without making it vacillate' is termed the stadium by Barthes (Barthes 1993: 41). The stadium does not refer to the detached study of a photograph, but rather to a kind of participation in the culturally, historically and politically transparent information of the photograph, without 'special acuity' (Ibid. 26). It appeals to our cultured habits. The punctum is what 'breaks' or 'punctuates' the stadium. It is 'that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me)' (Ibid. 27). The punctum is the small detail that creates the paradoxical experience of seeing what appears to be not there: 'Whether or not it is
triggered, it is an addition: it is what I add to the photograph and what is nonetheless
already there' (Ibid. 55). In other words, the punctum it is that which haunts the one who
is careful enough to notice it. To be haunted by a photograph is to come to question the
limits of representation and 'enter a kind of disturbance zone where things are not always
what they seem, where they are animated by invisible forces whose modes of operation
work according to their own logics (Gordon 1997: 46).

In the popular media, immigration is often narrated and visualized as exploitation,
victimization or alienation, which can only produce empathic narratives and empathic
responses. Empathic attachments tend to come with a moral demand, and thus, empty it
of the political content that is at the heart of the issue. In fact, empathic attachments
diminish further the realities of immigration. They reduce the immigrant, the refugee or the
asylum-seeker to a state of inertia and passivity, constructing them as those who need
only aid and protection. I believe that, as a theoretical model, the notion of the 'ghost'
makes the arguments around migration politically more powerful, for it enables us to
move beyond empathic attachments or approaches.

There is no correlation between my use of the theoretical concept of the 'ghost' and
the representations of the 'ghosts' in popular imagination/culture. The 'ghost' does not
appear as a fictive character. Rather it is a social figure. However, as our perception of the
world, as well as ourselves, is mediated partly through media representations, at certain
points in the text I cannot escape drawing on the representation of the ghost that appears
in popular imagination and culture. However, this is not because I want to reproduce
already existing discourses, but rather to facilitate an alternative reading strategy. It has
been already argued that Visual Culture takes account of the importance of image making, the formal components of a given image and the crucial completion of the image by its cultural reception (Mirzoeff 1998: 3). This point will become clearer in the concluding chapter, in which I discuss the x-ray image published in a newspaper that shows a group of illegal immigrants crammed into hidden compartments in a lorry who appear, to the observer, as 'ghost-like' figures (Figure 5.5). When I suggest, in Chapter 4, that this particular image looks like a scene from a horror film, what I wish to indicate is that, by recalling the language of popular horror films, potentially the representation serves as the embodiment of the fear and panic provoked by 'intimations of the borders'. By remarking upon how even technologies of hyper-visibility cannot make the visible the invisible', I aim to show the 'blindness' the x-ray image imposes on the audience. In so doing, I intend to shift the discussion from media representations, and the structure and the operations of visual regimes, to critical readings. This is in order to subvert the coercive and normalizing effects of media representations. In my own reading, the object of Visual Culture is not defined in terms of those things that are included, but in terms of what a work or a study does with the things it is concerned; what effects the work produces in the world and for the world.

In the project, I use the methods of ethnographic research. Chapter 2 is partly based upon the fieldwork I conducted in Tarlabası, a multi-inhabited quarter in Istanbul. The nature of the fieldwork and the use of the materials (photography and interviews) to develop my argument are discussed in the chapter at length. At this point, I will only provide some important points.
In 1996, the North American art and cultural theory journal, *October*, published the results of a survey on Visual Culture. The results were drawn from a questionnaire put to well-known art theorists, art and architectural historians, film theorists, literature critics and artists. As the field had emerged as a discrete area of study in higher education over the previous ten years, the editors of the journal were interested in the positioning of visual culture studies, in relation to the traditions of humanities such as art history, architectural history, film theory, and so on. They and claimed that ‘the interdisciplinary project of “visual culture” is no longer organized on the model of history (as were the disciplines of art history, architectural history, film history etc.) but on the model of anthropology’ (October 77, Summer 1996: 25).

However, as Mirzoeff has indicated (Mirzoeff 1999: 24), Visual Culture develops the idea of culture which people define their identity and that it changes in accordance with the needs of individuals and communities to express that identity. In this respect, *Borders and Ghosts* takes a cross-cultural approach, a transcultural model of analysis.

Both the anthropological and the artistic models of culture rest on being able to make a distinction between the culture of one ethnicity, nation or community and that of another. Traditionally, visual anthropology uses culture to make the classification between cultures. The discipline’s history demonstrates that the anthropological understanding of culture demonstrates a clear distinction drawn between ‘their culture’ and ‘our civilization’, which is based upon a binary opposition between the Western and the non-Western, the civilized and the uncivilized, the developed and the undeveloped. In order to re-write culture, Mirzoeff argues, it is now important to do the hard work of moving beyond an
essentialist approach towards an understanding of the plural realities that coexist and are in conflict with each other, both in the present and in the past. Mirzoeff writes:

The problem lies in the assumption that the 'West' is a hermetically sealed cultural entity, whose border patrols may allow in other cultures as sources for Western ideas but never as equal and interactive entities. In forming approaches to visual culture, a key task is to find means of writing and narration that allow for the transcultural permeability of cultures and the instability of identity. For despite the recent focus on identity as a means of resolving cultural and political dilemmas, it is increasingly clear that identity is as much a problem as it is a solution for those between cultures. (Ibid. 24-26)

Visual Culture, therefore, should be concerned with the dynamic assemble of transculturalism, rather than the static edifice of culture in the anthropological sense. It no longer makes sense to locate cultural activity solely within national or geographic boundaries. Rather than continue to work within the modernist oppositions between culture and civilization, transculture offers a way to analyze the hybrid 'global diaspora' in which we live.

In 2003, an important conference took place in the Victorio Miro Gallery in London, entitled 'Field Work: Reports from the Fields of Visual Culture'. Organized by Cross-Cultural Contemporary Arts in Goldsmiths College, University of London, the conference opened up a new inquiry in the emergent field of Visual Culture. It brought together an eclectic mix of artists, theorists, academics and curators, and included: Stuart Hall, Iain Chambers, Irit Rogoff, Ursula Biemann, AbdoulMaliq Simone, Rob Stone and John
Palmesino (Multiplicity), to name but a few. The participants conceptualized the arenas of their activity in Visual Culture as 'fields'. They defined their attempt as an interdisciplinary effort to identify bodies of knowledge and argued that the visual arts are becoming central in the production of new knowledge. They claimed that, 'in doing field work we step outside of ourselves to critically reflect upon the confines of our practices and locations'. By replacing the emphasis on nation-states and geographical regions, on to more fragmented sets of locations, such as a street corner, a landscape, a cultural horizon or ambient aurality, it was suggested that, undisciplined and dislocated, the activity of doing 'field work' facilitates the role of the arts in the production of new knowledge (see the text, available at http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/crossculturalarts/outcomes.html#vol2).

In the same fashion, I wish to consider the materials generated from my fieldwork in Tarlabası, my photographs, as the part of the processes of knowledge production. Mieke Bal has written that 'far from being a feature of the object seen, visibility is also a practice, even a strategy, of selection that determines what other aspects or even objects remain invisible' (Bal 2003: 11). Away from being empirical evidence of the facts on the ground through which one can get to the heart of the truth, I want to see my photographic documentary as 'strategic material', which put the work, along with my writing, to the production of a visual criticality in order to recall complexities embedded in the place.

The method and the nature of my ethnographic research is that described by George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fischer as 'multi-sited' or 'multi-local ethnography', in their book *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Science* (1986). I define my fieldwork as a 'journey' through which the site emerged as a
location through the processes of my subjective mapping. The site spontaneously came into being through the flows of my inter-related spatial practices and the intricate webs of unpredictable connections.

In Tarlabaşı I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews. It is through understanding the practical know-how of the inhabitants about their quarter that knowledge is formed and my theories are formulated. However, I also deploy an inventive writing strategy, in order to convey the realities, when I find difficulties to convey the complexities embedded in the space. 'Put the name on the things here yourself.' This sentence uttered by a young man whom I interviewed expresses perfectly the method and interpretation of my findings, in some instances. I personally carried out the coding and the analysis of the data by the interviews.

Each fiction creates its own 'language' in order to make possible what was repressed or made imperceptible, or at least hardly perceptible, in reality. Through a story, suppressed realities or silenced conditions might find its way into language for the first time. However, this does not mean, as might first appear, a collapsing of the distinction between the imaginary and the real. On the contrary, it is only made possible by this distinction. Richard Kearney explains this phenomenon very clearly: 'The imaginary liberates the prisoners of our lived experience into possible worlds where they roam and express themselves freely, articulating things that generally dare not say their names and giving to our inexperienced experience the chance to be experienced at last. And though such experience is vicarious - i.e. unreal on the face of it - it is experience
nonetheless; and one more real sometimes than that permitted in so-called reality’ (Kearney 2002: 25).

At certain points, the writing in Chapter 2 switches to the method of story telling, as a creative and inventive solution for actual conditions and problems. In Chapter 4, I apply literary analysis in order to address the complex and inter-related structure of migration in the age of globalisation in relation to cyberspace. Hari Kunzru’s novel, *Transmission*, (2004) provides uses tools to discuss the way in which, in the global world, realities are challenged and caused to waver visibly, yet also invisibly. Through the fictional story of Arjun Mehta, a computer programmer and an empowered Indian migrant to America, we find possibilities, subversions and struggles within cyberspace. The fiction therefore creates the possibility of making a life, of becoming something else, in the present and for the future.

In this study, documentary is not examined for its (mythical) ‘reality’ but as a useful tool for providing some clear and important observations about social life. The documentary is not treated as a totalizing or objective knowledge. It is not drawn upon as though it were ‘truer’ than fiction. Rather documentary is viewed as a critical interpretation of reality and a ‘creative treatment’ of actuality (Rosenthal 1988: 13). In the last analysis, all films are fictions, as they are representations. Trinh T. Minh-ha who, in her films, deliberately plays with our expectations of the true and the false, the real and the staged, pointed out in an interview: “Every representation of truth involves elements of fiction, and the difference between so-called documentary and fiction in their depiction of reality is a
question of degrees of fictitiousness. The more one tries to clarify the line dividing the
two, the deeper one gets entangled in the artifice of boundaries' (Minh-ha 1992: 145).

Chapter by Chapter

The thesis consists of five case studies of haunting.

'Ghosting Borders' introduces the problematic of the 'ghost' in relation to the issues of immigration and migration. Focussing on the act of haunting, the discussion especially centres around the production of subjectivities on/through the border/s. The main argument in the chapter is that migrants, themselves, are not a problem. Rather they are produced as a 'problem.' I discuss the way in which this 'problem' is firmly linked to displacement, border construction and border syndromes, restrictions of subjective trajectories, hostile stereotypes and ignorance of difference. In the chapter, the 'ghost' emerges as a powerful figure for speaking about new ways of 'being someone', with regard to the refugee and the asylum-seeker.

'Tarlabası: "Another World" in the City' examines a multi-inhabited quarter in Istanbul, which functions as a 'container' in the city.

'Tarlabası is like a refugee camp'. These are the words of a young African man, one of the protagonists in Turkish artist Esra Ersen's video-work Brothers & Sisters (2003), who is illegally living in Tarlabası, a place in which, for him, the 'good' and the 'bad' are fused to form one single entity, 'another world', where he does not feel a foreigner or a stranger. However, for a 'native of Istanbul' Tarlabası is, without doubt, a 'mysterious' or a 'fearful'
place which s/he has never been to and would never think of going to; a place which is, paradoxically, at once nearby and distant.

Starting from a single but puzzling question, 'why did “Kissin”, the young African man, liken Tarlabası to a “refugee camp”?', I started my own journey on the streets of Tarlabası. Partly drawing on fieldwork I conducted in the quarter, Chapter 2 focuses on the production of space and subjectivities in Tarlabası. Tarlabası is examined as a space which is founded on a state of being the exception, or what Agamben calls 'dislocated location' regarding the camp, a zone of 'indistinction between the outside and inside, the exception and the rule, the licit and the illicit, in which every juridical protection had disappeared' (Agamben 2000: 40-41).

The main concern of the research was two-fold: one was to consider how an area located in the back streets of Taksim, a well-known entertainment and cultural centre of Istanbul, had been produced as a hidden matrix. The other research interest related to how an area that used to be inhabited mostly by minority groups, such as Greeks and Armenians, had been transformed into a 'transit space' or a 'permanent space' for Africans, Iranians and Afghans, and a place where they and Turkish and Kurdish newcomers from eastern Turkey meet.

The text problematizes Tarlabası as the 'unlivable' and 'uninhabitable' zone of social life, which, nevertheless, is densely populated by those who do not have the status of subject. In the quarter, homo sacer (sacred man), who inhabits the zone between the city and the forest (Agamben 1988: 8), meets with the figure of the citizen. The discussion
posits to suggest that in the zone of disidentification, the ‘abjected subjects’ (Kristeva 1982 and Butler 1993) become threatening ‘spectres’, just as the oppressor has long been the haunter.

There is an official conviction that the residents of Tarlabası are criminals (robbers, drug dealers, illegal residents) and this conviction actively functions as the act of affirmation of whatever has taken and will take place there. In this respect, residents of Tarlabası have become the agents of a haunted culture, but at the same time cannot be indispensable to the operations of power. They, both domestic and foreign, reveal the covert operations in the area as they are ‘ghosting’, a strange act which gives way to what is hidden underneath the topography of Tarlabası.

It is argued that, if Tarlabası haunts the city, it is because this space, unlike the homogenous space of the nation-state, which insists on one singular spatial inhabitation and one clear identity under one dominant role, is a place of intersection for distant and different places, and various identities. Therefore, we are forced to notice the fact that there exists another city, a ghostly one within the familiar one, which escapes any specific enclosures and opens up new formations.

Throughout my analysis, I zoom in and out of Istanbul. This is mainly because I believe that my perspective can produce a model through which I can project knowledge onto the outer world. Currently, it is becoming clear that location cannot be considered a stable and fixed space through which identities are actively regulated. In the case of contemporary cities, for instance, which result from an endless and uncontrollable flux of
migrations, classical oppositions of city/country and insiders/outsiders no longer work. Parallel with this reality, throughout Europe, we encounter certain locations in the cities, such as ghettos, centres for refugees and asylum-seekers, or even sections at airports, which are allocated only to refugees or asylum-seekers. The locations each function as a 'container', and through them, identities on the move are reduced in order to shore up the exclusive representation of the nation-state. I argue, as a result, that we should develop a more complex understanding of the relationship between geography and subjectivity, between location and identity.

The following chapter ‘Figuring The Child’ focuses on the figure and the image of the child in relation to nation-state building, nationalist discourses and phantasmatic projections. It also examines the divided island of Cyprus, in the Mediterranean, in terms of territorial haunting.

The chapter does not look at a specific child, but at the very particular condition of ‘being a child’. Such pre-occupation facilitates a re-thinking of the child in terms of performativity. Children are not fully rooted or fully imbricated in the complex social networks of citizenship and cultural belonging. It is seen as a brief period, a distinct time-frame. The chapter questions the notion that ‘being a child’ is natural category seeing it rather as a socially constructed category. This leads to a discussion of the way in which the figure of the child works in a performative fashion with the result that certain discourses are circulated within the political, social and cultural domain; discourses such as ‘the innocent child’, ‘the child as the future generation of the nation’, ‘the child as the soldier’ and so on. In this respect, the figure and the image of the child is discussed as
the 'ghost' that carries inscriptions other than its own. The body of the child is a revenant that is possessed by invisible, external powers such as the Family, the State, the Motherland or the Fatherland.

The chapter also explores Cyprus as a fabricated geography, with its state of 'being a child'; a crushed land stuck in a perpetual childhood. In this case, 'being a child' refers to being a small part attached to a greater whole. The discussion in this section of the chapter draws on Gilles Deleuze's essay 'Deserted Islands', to posit a new understanding of the island as topography and an alternative understanding of collectivity, as opposed to territorial unity and a single point of commonality.

The last chapter 'Spectrality in Global Networking' examines the 'spectral' reality of migration in the global world. It addresses the complex and inter-related structure of global migration in relation to technology, especially the Internet and the satellite-generated digital geographies that aim to track migratory movements. The discussion is based upon the argument that cyberspace and border reinforcement technologies remain a distinctly human phenomenon, as opposed to their supposed neutrality. Such themes are explored through a focus on a new mode of diasporic subjectivity that is emerging in the virtual cyberspace, on the one hand, and the close link between global networking (especially the Internet) and the trafficking of women in the global sex industry, on the other.

This account leads to the consideration of the virtual as a site of the emergence of new subjectivities that erase the difference between the real event and virtual event. The
'ghost' emerges, in this context, as a link, whose uncontrollable and unpredictable apparitions occur both in real and virtual space. This theme is developed by Hari Kunzru’s novel, *Transmission*, which tells the story of an Indian migrant in America, a computer programmer, and the way in which, by spreading a world-wide computer virus, this empowered migrant is 'reborn' as a digital ghost residing in the very system of European, capitalist networking. In so doing, it reveals the darker side of the global West. In *Transmission*, haunting makes a history of its own. Through his fictional story, Kunzru makes us realize possibilities for subversions and struggles within cyberspace.

The processes of globalization are the phenomenon of abstraction and spectralization. The transnational operation of global capital becomes powerful, mostly in disguised and highly subtle ways. The chapter also takes into account, along with video-essays by the artist Ursula Biemann, the Internet, which defines migratory routes and launches migration for women. This type of connectivity calls for a ‘ghost-connection’, in which networking is materialized through subsequent actual movement in space. Global networking is further examined by the gendered geography of the trafficking of women into the sex industry. The chapter problematizes the way in which women gain ‘presence’ without gaining power. This discussion, above all, illustrates how border reinforcement technologies and European immigration policy hinder and push the flows of migrant women into the illegal sector.

The concluding chapter, ‘The Coming Justice’, introduces the temporality of the ‘ghost’, which makes us question the present. The performativity of the ‘ghost’ makes us figure out the present in order to imagine the future. At the beginning of his book,
Spectres of Marx, Derrida cites Marx's very famous sentence: 'A spectre is haunting Europe — the spectre of communism' (Derrida 1994: 4). A 'spectre' is still haunting, but not only Europe. The migrant is haunting the whole world as the promise of the future to come.
CHAPTER 1

GHOSTING BORDERS

Hospitable Memory

Currently, it is becoming clear that we are living in a period in which the illusion of unity imposed by the nation-state is increasingly undone by civil war, ethnic cleansing or wars of domination fought under the guise of liberation struggles. The more this occurs, the more those who, as a result, have been dislocated and forced into movement, come to be seen as a ‘mass of people’ circulating on or through borders and, consequently, as a ‘problem’ to be contained.

In this chapter, I want to look at this issue from within an alternative set of parameters. I would like to consider whether, what is perceived a ‘problem’, is in fact produced as a problem. I will consider whether it is possible to look at this picture from another perspective, and ask if what we see in front of our very eyes is rather formed by that which we do not and cannot see.

I want to talk about a particular social figure who is both there and not there - the immigrant, the refugee or the asylum seeker who is living on the border zones or who is legally or illegally crossing border/s. In this context, I think that the notion of the ‘ghost’ is a very useful term. By its nature, a ‘ghost’ is always outside the picture and outside the text, so that they, rather, inhabit the shadows.
'Ghosts' are borderline creatures; insiders as well as outsiders. Any borderline, either as the margin of a text or a dividing line of a country, indicates an absolute end and a new beginning. However, as we know from popular imaginings, aliens or strangers always manage to cross borders. In my reading, 'ghosts' represent the 'unthought' of any given knowledge and the 'invisible' of any given representation. They open up a new space within the familiar space by resisting any closure or restful halt. By leaving a room to imagination or dream, they shadow the 'Truth' itself. From this perspective, what interests me are the 'ghosts' that push the limits of knowledge and of the visible beyond its margins.

I am not using the word 'ghost' in the common sense of the word; that of the partial presence of a dead person. On the contrary, it is a social figure. It is not one of the protagonists of the writings of Shakespeare or Goethe. Neither is it a central character of a horror movie, nor a metaphoric or symbolic figure in a romantic poem, nor a hero from the collective and historical imaginary of tales or epics. Instead I will argue that the immigrant, the refugee and the asylum-seeker, like a ghost, have been made unlocatable in a world that has lost all measurements, and become part of a 'spectral' reality. Understanding how this subject comes into being, and under what conditions, requires a certain kind of knowledge or an alternative mode of knowing. In this instance, I find the notion of the 'ghost' very useful as a strategy for uncovering power relations, for understanding what is happening, what ought to happen at the very moment of border-crossing and what it means to live on the border zones.
‘The one who has disappeared appears still to be there, and his apparition is not nothing. It does not do nothing,’ (Derrida 1994: 97) writes Jacques Derrida in his book Spectres of Marx. ‘Ghosts’ eternally return to seek emancipation. They haunt. They demand to be seen; to be noticed. Refugees, immigrants or asylum-seekers ‘belong’ to the vast geography of disappearance where ‘ghosts’ reside, because the ones who stand on border zones, have some kind of half-presence, an ‘illegal’ presence or a not fully materialized presence. The ‘ghost’ haunts the full presence of “the real”\(^1\), in the form of a debt to the past and a promise of justice in the future. Furtive and untimely, the apparition belongs to future-present, whose past has a claim and whose present comes with a demand.

Saskia Sassen, in her book, Guests and Aliens, traces how, beginning from the nineteenth century, immigration has been embedded in the history of Western Europe and how it is both a necessity and a product of urbanized and industrialized Western Europe. Moreover, she suggests that, often, refugees have been unwilling departees, pushed by circumstances completely out of their control (Sassen 1999: ix, 1). From this perspective, immigration or refugee flows are an integral part of Western European history that wait to come into the light from spaces in the shadows.

Haunting effectively pulls us into the structure of a reality we come to experience as recognition. At the start of his book, Spectres of Marx, Derrida claims that the foreign

\(^1\) As one of Jacques Lacan’s categories, ‘the real’ is that which is beyond the ‘symbolic’ and the ‘imaginary’. The real is the unknown that exists at the limit of the socio-symbolic. In contrast to reality that is associated with the symbolic order or ‘social reality’, ‘the real’ is beyond the realm of appearances and images, and is in constant tension with social reality.
guest has always occupied the domesticity of Europe (Derrida 1994: 4). Haunting, therefore, marks the very existence of Europe; problematizing the great authority of geography; the authority which centres power, either colonial and imperial or capitalist and global, which names and writes lands, which determines identities and collectivities, which classifies and subordinates people, which controls the rigid structure of inclusions and exclusions, and which regulates movements. It troubles any attempt to construct Europeanness, because haunting, in fact, is the very name of the ‘house’, the institutional, the well-guarded frontier, the fixed and stable space. Mark Wigley points out: ‘Haunting is always the haunting of a house. And it is not just that some houses are haunted: A house is only a house inasmuch as it is haunted’ (Wigley 1997: 163). An unsettling spectre is already at home. It is, in reality, what is secretly familiar, as Sigmund Freud has convincingly revealed in his essay ‘The Uncanny’, claiming that the ‘uncanny’ (unheimlich) refers to the uneasy sense of the unfamiliar within the familiar, the unhomely within the home. We have learnt from him that when we have an ‘uncanny’ experience, we feel like there are ghosts in our house (Freud 1919: 225).

Is not the ‘ghost’ the one who disappeared in the past but appears, sometimes without any notice, to those with whom it used to be familiar? It tries to speak or to indicate something, even if it does not always manage to. It is, though, capable of doing at least one thing successfully, of making us feel that something is going wrong in the present. In so doing, it makes us question the present. ‘If haunting describes how that which appears to be not there is often a seething presence, acting on and often meddling with taken-for-granted realities, the ghost is just the sign, or the empirical evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place,’ (Gordon 1997: 8). This act of haunting is
very important for it has the force to put into crisis familiar social and political structures through the processes or the mediations it actively creates.

‘Delusion or insanity, hauntedness is not only haunted by this or that ghost, ... but by the spectre of the truth which has been ... repressed. The truth is spectral, and this is its part of truth which is irreducible by explanation,’ writes Derrida (Derrida 1996: 87). Built into any system but secreted away is an archival anxiety. In the context of the memory, ‘ghost’ serves as a ‘deferred supplement’ in the form of a suspended and enduring ephemerality that troubles the ‘material truths’. For Derrida, the origin is never present, the consequence being that there is always a ‘supplement’, as an addition or replacement (see Stocker 2006: 180). The ‘ghost’ is a remnant that will draw recollection inward into the present, for the witness to an event.² In that sense, haunting is historical, but, as Derrida has noted, ‘it is not dated, it is never docilely given a date in the chain of presents, day after day, according to the instituted order of a calendar’ (Derrida 1994: 4) Rather it disturbs, or even threatens, the linearity and stability of a single historical time.

Returning to her home country, Uganda, more than twenty years after her departure, in her video-work, ‘Out of Blue’ (2002) Zarina Bhimji tries to ‘testify’ to the traumatic impact of an historical scene that left no witness or witnessing. In the video we are haunted by ‘mid-day ghosts’. The camera wanders around the unpeopled topography of Uganda years after all the Asians were expelled from the country during the dictatorship of General Idi Amin (Figure 1.1). Every image in the video refers to an

² Derridean ‘supplement’ does not enhance something’s presence, but rather underscores its absence. One of the implications of this, in the context of memory, is that we can only engage with the effects of an event after the event; we always have a memory of the event, not the event itself or even the original form of the memory.
absence, but this absence becomes apparitional, since each photographic image is constantly haunted by the puzzling sounds and voices of the past: sounds of a baby crying, of a woman screaming, of men laughing, of murmuring, of whispering, of burning fires or of gun shots. Thus, these very absences articulate a presence. The camera brings us to places and spaces as varied as the houses of the colonial power, ruined ancient graves, prison cells, deserted streets, military barracks, interior spaces whose walls are full of traces and shadows, and an abandoned airport. Bhimji's palimpsestic\(^3\) visual and audio video-document is about engaging with the 'silence' caused by elimination, extermination and erasure (Evrengil 2003: 77).

One of the voices we hear in the film is that of General Idi Amin, which had originally been broadcast in a radio-programme one year after he came to power. He is heard to say, 'I have, therefore, today signed a decree revoking with effect from today, August 9, 1972, permits and certificates of residence granted to the above categories of persons. They are, however, permitted to stay in Uganda for a maximum period of 90 days from today' (Ibid., 552).

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3 This refers to a document or art work that has been repeatedly written or drawn on, then partly erased, then written or drawn on again, so that the previous writings leave a still visible trace/s on the surface. Thus, a palimpsest contains and expresses its own history of being inscribed on within a period of time. As a metaphor, palimpsest indicates that history is not a story of 'what happened' but rather is an ongoing struggle to 'write', or to claim historical narratives. Yet every narrative, no matter how elegant or seemingly total, is full of holes, absences and contradictions. Palimpsest, as a form, leaks various pasts and alternatives into the present order of things.
‘Ghosts in ‘Out of Blue’ haunts the filmic images that convey us the present day topography of Uganda in order to end up with a ‘certain concept of history’, (Derrida 1994: 15). The ‘mid-day ghosts’ are what have remained to be seen with the truth, what is needed to speculate with the truth that flickers on the screen. In his second cinema book, *The Time Image*, Deleuze has written that political cinema should be centred on one basis: ‘the people no longer exist, or not yet ... the people are missing’ (Deleuze 1989: 216). In ‘Out of Blue’, except for a silhouette or the reflected shadows of a group of people on the wall against which guns were leant, visually, we never catch a glimpse of any people throughout the film. Nonetheless, ghostly voices and sounds in the past register the presence of the displaced and now transnationally located Asian population in the present. Iain Chambers claims that by acknowledging the necessity of the dispersal of a
single History, one can start to hear composite voices: ‘In the movement from concentrated sight to dispersed sound, from the “neutral” gaze to the interference of hearing, from the discriminating eye to the incidental ear, I abandon a fixed (ad)vantage for a mobile and exposed politics of listening – for a “truth” that is always becoming’ (Chambers 1996: 52).

Towards the end of ‘Out of Blue’, we see an abandoned airport and hear the humming, flurrying noises and sounds that fill the airport. This scene is followed by the image of a plane that has just taken off, leaving behind an empty runway. The next scene is a border demarcated by barbed wire. The visual story of displacement documented by Bhimji summons up a diasporic space that has resided in the ‘European psyche’ for some time. This is because diaspora is not only a destabilized border (Braziel and Mannur 2003: 8) that powerfully rewrites the history of nation, but also is a site of traversals, through which the European history of conquest and colonization, and the subsequent European cartographies of migration, can be tracked. Diasporas at the heart of the European cities haunt the geopolitical boundaries of Europe from the inside, demonstrating that Europe, in fact, is everywhere outside itself. Diasporas thereby trouble the ‘Europeanness’ of European borders. When Etienne Balibar acknowledges the vacillation of borders, in both their layout and function, he proposes that ‘Europe is not and never has been made up of separate regions (“empires”, “camps,” “nations”), but rather of overlapping sheets or layers …., and that its specificity is this overlapping itself: to be precise, an East, a West and a South’ (Balibar 1998: 225).
As Bhimji reveals, in 'Out of Blue', to engage with ghostliness and haunting is a matter of producing a hospitable memory; of encouraging memory to become present, in order to give a historical counter-response.

**Beyond the 'Visible'**

My aim, throughout this and the other chapters in the thesis, is to think of ghosting and haunting, in all the complexity these terms imply, in relation to material from contemporary art and visual culture. I believe that artwork and visual materials have the potential for the production of the sorts of knowledge that establishes new relations with issues that need to be questioned and examined further. In this context, my interest is not in the visual objects themselves, but rather in what they produce.

In the context of dislocation or migration, we have seen many images, possibly too many, in the media. The problem is not that nobody speaks or writes about the lives of immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers; quite the contrary. However, interestingly, many aspects of these movements remain virtually unknown or untouched, for such images tend to come with a moral demand, with the result that the political dimension, often at the heart of the issue, is obscured. Thus, most of these images only diminish further the realities of such movements. They reduce people to inertia and passivity, constructing them as those who need only aid and protection. The images reflected in the photographs sometimes coincide with the vulnerability of the people, who are seemingly out there in front of our eyes, ready for consumption.
In the thesis I ask whether it is possible to look at these photographs in ways that open up a critique of the regime of representation and the production of meaning. Can a photograph have the potential to address the 'unspoken' or the 'unrepresentable', offering the viewer a new mode of knowing in the field of vision? Can a double inhabitation be inherent to a photograph's very structure, such that we are able to trace haunting and ghosting?

In his essay, 'The Deaths of Roland Barthes', Jacques Derrida discusses 'ghosts' with regard to the photograph. The 'ghost' in the photograph, Derrida suggests, 'belongs to it without belonging to it and is unlocatable in it; it never inscribes itself in the homogenous objectivity of the framed space but instead inhabits, or rather haunts it' (Derrida 1988b: 267). In other words, the photograph does not come into existence only through what is seen in its framed space, but also through what exceeds any locatable site. This is what gives rise to the haunting presence of 'ghosts'.

The immediate dilemma, and seemingly unavoidable paradox, of sketching the visual culture of 'ghosts' is to engage with 'intelligibility'; that random slipping in and out of visual and sensorial perception. This seems to be the case in the small photograph I saw in a newspaper (Figure 1.2) that was taken in Rafah, one of the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. The scene is not unusual in that it shows three children at home who are looking out of a window. What is unusual, however, is the house they are in. 'The house', is this really the right word? It might be rather more suitable to call it a 'haunted house', where a particular kind of event took place.
In this context, the photograph traces a relationship with haunting. It reveals something that is neither life nor death. The camera was considered as a decisive tool to capture reality; its machinations and processes were previously believed to be capable of capturing the 'real'. However, we find a 'historical' phenomenon that interrupts that claim. In *Spectres of Marx*, where he undertakes a 'spectral' reading of capitalist ideology, Derrida outlines a new science that he calls *hauntology*, which is a science of 'ghosts' or a science of what returns. He splices 'ontology' with its near homonym, *hauntology*: 'To haunt does not mean to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and...
time. That is what we would be calling ... hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration' (Derrida 1994: 161). The spectre represents the inherent instability of reality. It serves as the sign of an 'always already' unrealized and unrealizable ontology within the social domain. Spectrality surfaces as a kind of psycho-social dynamic arising out of the vicissitudes of ontology. Whereas ontology is about the effectiveness of a presence-being, the act of haunting is about the ‘traces’, in a Derridean sense, that oscillate between past and present, between here and there, without being reduced simply to one. Instead of attaching importance to the beginning and the end, there is a need to focus on the process.

The ‘trace’ lies beyond what profoundly ties ontology to phenomenology. It does not belong to ontology, to the discourse on the Being. It rather dissolves the opposition between actual, effective presence and its other. It does not belong to phenomenology. ‘Trace’ is a ‘thing’ that is between the material and the immaterial, between the phenomenon and the impalpable, and between the ordinary and the extraordinary. Phenomenology opens up an inquiry into our experience of the world, including everything from our perception of objects through to our knowledge of science. According to phenomenological thinking, our experience is constituted in and by consciousness. From a basic stream of undifferentiated experience, we construct the objects and our knowledge of these objects that we take for granted in our everyday lives. The basic act of consciousness is ‘typification’: bringing together typical and enduring elements in the stream of experience, building up typical models of things and people, and building a shared social world. To trace this process of constitution, phenomenological thinking
argues there needs to be a disregard for what we know about the world and an addressing of the question of how, or by what process, that knowledge comes into being:

Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from above, and this of the object-in-general, must return to the 'there is' which precedes it; to the site, the soil of the sensible and humanly modified world such as it is in our lives and for our bodies — not that possible body which we may legitimately think of as an information machine but this actual body I call mine, this sentinel standing quietly at the command of my words and my acts. Further, associated bodies must be revived along with my body — 'others,' not merely as my congeners, as the zoologist says, but others who haunt me and whom I haunt; 'others' along with whom I haunt a single, present, and actual Being as no animal ever haunted those of his own species, territory, or habitat. In this primordial historicity, science's agile and improvisatory thought will learn to ground itself upon things themselves and upon itself, and will once more become philosophy... (Johnson 1996: 123).

The 'ghost' introduces knowledge of a 'supernatural and paradoxical phenomenality, the furtive and ungraspable visibility of the invisible' (Derrida 1994: 7). In Derridean thinking, difference and otherness cannot be thought of without the notion of the 'trace'. 'Trace' is always the trace of 'otherness' that represents an absence and is constituted by the possibility of effacement. Always deferring, 'trace' is never presented as such (Gasché 1998: 188-189). A 'ghost' is an intermediary apparition between life and death, between being and non-being, between matter and spirit, and whose separation it dissolves. It introduces a fleeting modality to material being. Being half there and half not or half this and half that, it leaves a 'trace' that marks the present with its absence in advance. In the
field of vision ‘trace’ is the empirical sign that things are repressed and that there is more to see and more to know. ‘Trace’ does not obey the linearity of logical, dialectical or diachronic time. By constantly moving back and forth in the realm of disappearance, it constitutes itself as relation to other ‘traces’. Concentrating on haunting we come to de-establish the dominant and authoritative relations and re-establish new ones in an undetermined and undistinguished topography.

Returning now to the discussion of the photograph published in the newspaper (Figure 1.2), bullets have perforated the white walls of the house in the photograph and there are no windowpanes. The image troubles one. If it were not for the children, one would believe that the house was vacant, but their presence does not permit that. The more one looks at the photograph, the more one thinks one cannot see the whole picture. In A Thousand Plateaus, in the section ‘1874: Three Novellas, or “What Happened?”’, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari discuss the differences between a novella and a tale, opening with an illustration by Outeceult. In the cartoon, four people are standing and looking in astonishment at a dead animal lying on the street. They are all puzzled. Each of them expects to find the answer to the question ‘what happened?’. However, perhaps the event has just ended and it is now too late to unravel the ‘secret’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 192-193). Similarly, although a horror clearly exposes itself on the walls of the house in the photograph, we are too late to grasp what really happened. What we have is only traces of the event that reveal a particular kind of ‘secret’. The photograph unveils to us a double life; a slippage between life and death lived out by people on the borders. Border zones are, above all, sites of survival. The house can easily slip from being a homely place to being an unhomely one inhabited by ‘ghosts’ (Vidler 1992: 17-44). The
house, in this case, paradoxically, has become secure for those people who are somehow unaffected by the war or the conflict. The event itself has domesticated the organized violence the defined inside and outside. However, through the children's existence in the photograph, what we could not see has been revealed. The children have become the agents of a haunted culture; but what is also revealed is that the children could not be indispensable to the operations of power. The space of this house - its walls, its windows - disrupt the sense of interior and exterior. The traces of the event after the event and the have-been-there presence of the children trace out an alterity that refuses to fix the meaning in the frame of the photograph. Both the traces of organized violence, which systematically expands borders, and the stubborn presence of the children cannot be excluded from the visible world.

The photograph is 'uncanny'. The children become both domestic and foreign, revealing covert operations on the house as well as on the homeland. The house leaks, if you like, as the results of a 'secret'. The 'uncanny', or unhomely, as Freud indicates, derives its force from its sense of lurking unease rather than from any clearly defined source of fear: 'This uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-fashioned in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression. ... [T]he uncanny is something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light' (Freud 1919: 241). In other words, the uncanny derives from an uncomfortable sense of haunting.

The children's presence in the photograph opens up a new place within the given space. They are what resist being domesticated by affirming, without being able to
change what happened, the violence that took place in the house, in the homeland. They haunt like 'ghosts' without inhabiting any particular space. The secret of the house leaks from the cracks in the walls and from the existence of the children in the windows. The photograph embodies an interruption. It shows us how the subjectivity is constructed by the violence operated in the space. However, inasmuch as bombings as events attempt to produce space of their own, the subjects return to haunt the visible space in which they are buried. The residents of the house and of the homeland are somehow detached from this space, but the act of haunting functions as the linkage between the past and the present thereby opening up the question of future, and through this, the question of justice. At the very beginning of Spectres of Marx, Derrida writes: 'Someone, you or me, comes forward and says: I would like to learn to live finally' (Derrida 1994: xvii). Haunting is the product of an asymmetrical relation and an irreversible condition.

How can we relate these children in the photograph to the house? In the last analysis, it is impossible to re-locate them where they used to belong: a home or a country. But these children, in their engagement with the 'event', are haunted inasmuch as they are haunting. Haunting is never singular. In other words, the act of haunting precedes being haunted. In turn, the people who were haunted become the haunters. The topography of the social is constituted by an act of haunting long before it is haunted by people who live their 'after-lives' after 'the event'.

Becoming-Terror
For many years, the figure of the child has been identified with innocence or weakness (Jenkins 1988: Kincaid 1992). However, under certain conditions, the child is seen as a
threat, as something to be feared. What happens when we perceive them as frightening beings? How does the child come to symbolise the 'uncanny' in Freudian terms?

The space of the child has become the very location of the political itself in the Middle East. Children on the borders are still playing games, maybe the same kind of games as other children do, but with different materials. The press reports that, in the Gaza Strip, hurling homemade grenades, instead of balls, is something that 'kids do', not teenagers, and certainly not adults (Beaumont 2003: 42-48). Instead of playing hide-and-seek, children spy on the 'enemy's' positions and test settlement security fences to search out weak points in order to help adults. Under these circumstances, what category these 'games' or activities fall into becomes a serious issue. This particular issue arises, because children are themselves 'becoming', as Deleuze and Guattari have written in A Thousand Plateaus: 'The girl and the child do not become; it is becoming itself that is a child or a girl. The child does not become an adult any more than the girl becomes a woman; the girl is the becoming-woman of each sex, just as the child is the becoming-young of every age' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 277). Children draw strength by 'becoming molecular', so that they can pass between sexes, ages or beings and things. They slip everywhere, between borders, acts, ages, and sexes.

The child can more easily create linkages with other surfaces, other planes and other objects, or in Deleuze and Guattari's term, other 'assemblages' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 56). From this perspective, a Palestinian boy's hand can make a connection with a stone so that this 'external object' can no longer be considered either
an internalized part of the subject or an external residue of the subject; rather it becomes part of the body.

The child in the Middle East represents a world in which the boundary-line between being an adult and being a child has somehow lost its clear-cut or certain ontological status, as these children have come across an 'international or institutional malice' - war and the violence of the soldier - at a very early stage of their lives. The writer Jean Genet, who lived in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan for almost two years, writes in his book, *The Prisoner of Love*, that in the 1970s, the word 'Palestinian' did not refer either to being masculine or being feminine, or to being singular or plural. It meant only an armed people and, for him, represented revolution (Genet 2003: 149). Almost thirty-five years on nothing seems to have changed. Production of hostility is one of the most necessary components in constructing the borders and expanding them. The word 'Palestinian' does not only denote men or women, but children too.

Children's games, as Freud writes in *Beyond The Pleasure Principle*, are based on the production of pleasure or at least the avoidance of unpleasure. The course of the events is set in motion by an unpleasurable tension and children playing games take a direction so that the final outcome coincides with the lowering of that tension (Freud 1920: 7). The game is neither naive nor funny. It is the way in which the child expresses his or her fears, expectations, desires and pleasures, and most of all, how s/he learns to cope with the given world.
Freud's famous example of the child's game, 'Fort/Da', which his grandson played when he was one-and-half years old, has to do with the production of borders since, by trying to control the movement of his mother, the child develops a sense of border between itself and the other. In the video work, 'Borders/Borders', (1999) by Hale Tenger, the game played with a string recalls the same bordering and the same attempt to control people's comings and goings, as well as a similar fear towards the 'other' who threatens the unified self (Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4).

In Freud's story, the game, 'Fort/Da', is based on the act of disappearance and return. His grandson was playing with a wooden reel that had a piece of string tied around it. Freud's grandson held the reel by the string and threw it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared out of it. While he was performing the game, he utters 'o-o-o-o', which, according to Freud, represented the German word 'fort', meaning 'gone'. He would then pull the reel into the cot again using the string and hailed its reappearance with a cheerful 'da', meaning 'there'. The child plays the game repeatedly and, in his analysis, Freud interprets the game in relation to his mother's comings and goings. By throwing the cotton reel out of his cot, the child manages to cope with his mother's absences without any sadness. The retrieval of the object represents his mother's return. Freud emphasizes the fact that the game plays a central role in turning the child's passive situation into an active one by transforming the unpleasurable thought to an, at least bearable one (Ibid., 14-16).

In Tenger's video work, string plays a central role too. Two monitors are seen, one above the other. On the monitor below, we observe two groups of children in park
resolutely tugging on either side of a long piece of string. Midway between the two groups, a line is drawn on the ground and whichever group crosses the line first loses the game. We hear the children’s shrieks and excitement as they try not to pass the border. The game is clearly about the desire of each group to show the other their strength and to establish over them their power. On the monitor above, a fragile line is endlessly redrawn on the sand with a stick, whenever it is erased by a wave, suggesting that power can easily and without any notice change hands with its infinite flows. In the background, we hear the voice of a child shouting: ‘neither of you won’.

Fig 1.3 and Fig 1.4 Hale Tenger, ‘Borders/Borders’ video-stills, detailed views from two-monitored video-installation, 1999
The children playing the game in Tenger's film try, with all their might, to keep the line of demarcation, just as adults aim to keep borders 'clean' from 'others.' The children, to borrow terms from Deleuze and Guattari, transform the 'smooth space' in the park into a 'striated space'\(^4\), by drawing a line and positioning themselves according to it. However, in the monitor above, any attempt to turn the sea from the 'smooth space' to the 'striated space' fails. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, these two spaces exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated into striated space, and striated space is constantly being reversed and returned to a smooth state (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 474-475). The movements of de-territorialization and the process of re-territorialization always connect one space to another. There is an important implication in this: borders are 'ghost lines.' As in the video, they have to be relentlessly produced and reproduced through the perpetual tension between the limitation of the border and the transgression of this limitation, which is what makes it visible. Borders are 'performative spaces.' There has to be the crossing of a border, or the feasibility of a crossing, to make the border 'real'\(^5\). Otherwise, it is just another stone, another wall or another river, without codes or attached meanings.

\(^4\) For Deleuze and Guattari, 'smooth space' is a nomad space and 'striated space' a sedentary space (Deleuze and Guattai 1988: 474).

\(^5\) I want to refer here to Ursula Biemann's video-work, 'Performing The Border' (1999), in which the artist examines the border zone between Mexico and USA as a highly performative place. In the very beginning of the video, the Mexican artist Bertha Jottar comments off-screen: 'You need the crossing of bodies for the border to become real, otherwise you just have this discursive construction. There is nothing natural about the border, it's a highly constructed place that gets reproduced through the crossing of people, because without the crossing there is no border, right? It's just an imaginary line, a river or it's just a wall....' In the video, Biemann examines the border zone as a transnational space where the US electronic industry installed assembly plants, known as maquiladoras (The Golden Mills), employing women on low pay on the Mexican side of the border. In this highly constructed space, labour-intensive processes are located in Mexico, as capital-intensive ones are located in the US. Biemann especially focuses on the circulation of female bodies, in this transnational zone, and on the regulation of gender relations in representation, in the public sphere, in the entertainment and sex industry, and on the reproductive politics of the maquiladoras (see Biemann 2000).
Border zones are both 'visible' and 'invisible' spaces. They are a 'veiled' reality in that they are sites where the perception of being on a border is based only on symptoms and evaluations rather than on actual measures and properties. One can, and should, only follow ghostly existences and ghostly effects.

Elia Suleiman's latest film, *Divine Intervention* (2002), demonstrates this successfully, and in a playful way. Even the image of one of the country's leaders can leave a ghostly, but at the same time, material, effect on the border (Figure 1.5).

In the film, a red balloon, stamped with the portrait of Arafat, sails smoothly through the air towards a checkpoint, and puzzles the Israeli guards as to whether they should shoot it down before it enters their territory. The uncanny space where nothing is a stranger and is yet more worrying: the balloon is something that is there without being there. It is the unnamable thing: between something and someone, anyone or anything (Derrida 1994: 6).
In his essay 'The Uncanny', Freud suggests that an uncanny feeling emerges when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced. 'When a symbol takes over the full functions of the thing it symbolizes,' Freud stresses (Freud 1919: 244), the uncanny effect can be easily produced. The balloon, a lifeless object, paradoxically appears to be alive. In this case, the uncanny feeling is not really created because there is intellectual uncertainty as to whether the object is alive or not, or because an inanimate object becomes too much like an animate one. The balloon creates the uncanny affect not because of what it is, but because of its power to deceive, the result of fear projected onto it by those who encounter it. In this respect, it has the power to haunt, deeply and with apparent ease.

The balloon, in this case, is the double of the 'enemy'. Freud indicates that the double was originally an insurance against the destruction of the ego, a denial of the death at the stage of primary narcissism. The double functions as preservation against extinction. However, there is another very different aspect to it, which is at issue in the case of this balloon; from having been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death. 'The double', Freud writes, 'has become a thing of terror, just as, after the collapse of their religion, the gods turned into demons' (Ibid., 235-236).

The Palestinian leader Arafat comes to life through the balloon. The logic of the double is bound up with the apparition, for the double is always ghostly. In the last pages of his book, Spectres of Marx, Derrida writes about what Freud calls 'es spukt' ('it ghosts', 'it comes back', 'it spooks') in The Uncanny. For Derrida, it is a matter of becoming ready to welcome the stranger:
... a stranger who is already found within (das Heimliche-Unheimliche), more intimate with one than one is oneself, the absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous (es spukt), an unnameable and neutral power, that is, undecidable, neither active nor passive, an un-identity that, without doing anything, invisibly occupies places belonging finally neither to us nor to it (Derrida 1994: 41-42).

The 'ghost', thus, represents more than the instability of reality. It also holds the ghostly embodiment of a fear and panic provoked by internal alienation. The balloon as a familiar-stranger shows how the fear of the other, in fact, comes from the fear of the self. As Julia Kristeva has pointed out: 'Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face our identity ... A symptom that precisely turns 'we' into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible ...' (Julia Kristeva, 1991: 1). It is like those who were made not to belong in their own land, ghosting the land, leaving its shadows behind, on the houses, on the lands, on the ramparts (Figure 1.6).

Fig 1.6 Elia Suleiman, Divine Intervention, film-still, 2002
At the very beginning of *Divine Intervention*, Nazareth appears as an empty place. We are looking at the land from the point of view of a new and invented Palestine, from Upper Nazareth, which is a Jewish addition to the town. It implies that political circumstances on this territory turned the insider - Nazareth, which is an old Palestinian town - into the outsider. The insider experience of the old Palestine has become the external experience. Palestinians were excluded, yet they have remained.

‘Ghost Citizens’

I would like to propose that there is an urgent need to acknowledge ‘ghost citizens’. What I wish to indicate here is that we are faced with a new crisis in identity concerning refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants, since we can no longer describe identity in terms of ethnicity, in terms of class or in terms of gender. The notion of ‘ghost’, however, has the potential for speaking about new ways of ‘being someone.’

The existence of refugees, asylum-seekers and immigrants disrupts the lines of exclusion, for their movements actively produce a counter-cartography and a global area in which to operate and, in so doing, erase the lines drawn in order to exclude them. They haunt. The conditions of haunting emerge when the illusion of coherence, stability, homogeneity and permanence are faced with the shadowy realities of displacement, dislocation and unbelongings. They emerge with the intense and complex layers of diasporic formations and migration flows, with crossover and overlap of cultures, and with the hybrid identities and new ethnicities that are constantly being formed when geopolitical boundaries and territorial identities are disturbed. Haunting emerges, and what supposedly lies outside the familiar comfort of the ‘home’ turns out to be inhabiting it
all along, surfacing only in a return of the repressed, the excluded or the neglected, as a foreign element that strangely seems to belong in the very domain that renders it foreign. When haunting emerges, the 'uncanny' experience arises within us, revealing that we can only be haunted by something or someone we have been involved in, yet we have chosen to ignore. The forgotten, the neglected, the repressed or the excluded return as 'ghosts.' If the element of haunting is in the nature of any place, if the 'ghost' is produced in the very moment of the constitution of any institutional, well-established space, as we have already noted, then, when it appears, it deeply disrupts the law of the institutional space. The power of haunting comes from the fact that it displaces the house and the whole regime of placement based upon it. Migratory movements should be understood as an 'uncanny, internal displacement', since the structure of the house is doubly bound to the sense of the haunted house. The flow of migration 'deconstructs' the internal structure of the geography, interrogating the sense of territory, land, border and enclosure. If geography defines belongings and unbelongings, and regulates movements, then haunting uncannily orchestrates an exterior hidden inside the house, something foreign to the space itself and yet uncannily part of its very constitution.

The immigrant, the refugee or the asylum-seeker re-appears as the figure of the 'ghost', the slippery figure that involves a rethinking of the house or of the Homeland. S/he is an elusive 'spectre' whose habitation without proper inhabiting is haunting. The house, as the very figure of the presence, is disrupted from within by what it excludes or represses. Her or his haunting disrupts the house by subverting the logic of house. It is itself 'spacing', to put it in Derrida's words, which troubles the institutional space. 'Spacing' is precisely not space but what Derrida describes as the 'becoming space' of
that which is meant to be without space (presence, speech, spirit, ideas and so on). It is that which opens up a space, both in the sense of fissuring an established structure, dividing it or complicating its limits, but also in the sense of producing an opening in institutional and well-established spaces. If it is anything, it is no-thing. Derrida writes: ‘Spacing designates nothing, that is, no presence at a distance; it is the index of an irreducible exterior, and at the same time of a movement, a displacement that indicates an irreducible alterity. I do not see how one could dissociate the two concepts of spacing and alterity’ (cited by Wigley 1997: 73; Derrida 1981: 81). This argument renders alterity internal, or rather, problematizes the very sense of interior, and thereby the whole economy of identity, propriety, immediacy and presence on which it is based: ‘spacing is the impossibility for an identity to be closed on itself, on the inside of its proper interiority, or on its coincidence with itself. The irreducibility of spacing is the irreducibility of the other’ (Ibid, 72; Ibid., 94).

I use the phrase ‘ghost citizen’ to refer to the immigrant, the refugee and the asylum-seeker as I think that their particular ‘absence’ creates some kind of new community, a community that we might refer to, as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt do, as ‘multitude’. The multitude cannot be localized within a unified world. Border construction requires a defined horizon in which bodies already have been coded and legitimized in the landscape. However, the multitude is what is left over from the process through which the nation-state constitutes its citizens. Negri and Hardt make a distinction between the people and the multitude:
The multitude is a multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations, which is not homogeneous or identical with itself and bears an indistinct, inclusive relation to those outside of it. The people, in contrast, tend toward identity and homogeneity internally while posing its difference from and excluding what remains outside of it.

(Hardt and Negri 2000: 103).

Immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers embody a community of the ‘multitude’ that does not unite or merge against its will within a central organization. Like a ghost, ‘multitude’ makes the structure of the nation-state leak. More interestingly, it sucks in both the collective and the individual, yet it is neither a collective nor an individual concept. It brings a ‘mass’ of individuals together, yet it does not make them uniform. The multitude stands for a single thing, yet the singularities it represents do not unify or establish themselves under ‘One’. The refugee or an immigrant has a life, but is without a personal life or individual property. ‘Not without identity (the ghost is a “who”, it is not of the simulacrum in general, it has a kind of body, but without property, without “real” or “personal” right of property),’ writes Derrida (Derrida 1994: 41-42). His or her body, like that of a ‘ghost’, is not fixed into one identity, but searches for a meeting point in various networks of identities. S/he has a body that cannot be ‘named’.

Gülsün Karamustafa’s installation work, ‘Courier’ (1991), in which children’s vests hang from a ceiling, recalls this kind of situation - a situation in which there is nothing to claim (Figure 1.7). The children’s vests are up in the air without any embodiment. The image defines a moment of conflict in a history beyond borders, as the borders of the Ottoman Empire were constantly being erased because of wars in the Balkans that were
lost and people were forced to leave their homes. The only person who knew where s/he belonged was the one who wore a uniform. All those people constantly on the move had become 'ghost citizens' in a 'no-man's-land,' a land that Cornelia Vismann examines closely as an emblem of World War 1.

Fig 1.7 Gülsün Karamustafa, 'Courier', installation view, fabric, synthetic cotton and plexi-glass, 1991

"En traversant les frontières, nous dissimulons, cousu dans les gilets des enfants, ce qui était important pour nous."

Drawing on Carl Schmitt's spatial notion of order, Vismann examines 'no-man's-land' as a metaphorical territory wrought by a highly effective encounter between the military and the legal discourse during World War 1. In wartime, she argues, the concept of order is markedly spatial. Order becomes concrete and dynamic, immediately responsive to war's marks in the soil and to the changing demarcations of space.
The destruction of landscape, extreme de-territorialization and the complete
dissociation of habitual systems of order actively produce a land that has left a new
definition of order only in the realm of military strategy. A concrete, new order emerged
providing its own legitimation. This order not only reflects the war experiences of 'no-
man's-land', but also posits war itself as a concept of order (Vismann 1997: 46). In
wartime, territory was treated like an unmarked piece of land, which implies an empty
statehood, a state of homelessness, and an abstract and bodiless space. The land that
has no visible order imprinted in its soil is the land that authorizes, merely by the absence
of any order, the imprinting of such an order, which is to say, the occupation of the land
(Ibid., 51). Vismann asserts that there is a shift from the perception of a 'line' to a
formation called the 'zone' during the period of war: 'The zone reaches for the depth of
the space and structures the terrain of war spatially – according to military necessities'
(Ibid., 53). The zone consists of virtual lines running from one point to the next and
differing for each fighting unit. For soldiers, its shape depends on the position and the
situation of the battle. In the particular moment of action, and only in this moment, the
landscape is coded according to tactical values. When the line no longer applies, military-
trained eyes will perceive a zonal order, where untrained eyes see nothing: 'That there is
nothing to see, precisely that the habitual structures of perception and models of order do
not fit, finds expression in what eventually became the emblem of World War 1: the no-
man's-land' (Ibid., 54). The land becomes a zone, which is an ultimate border because of
its impassability. 'The boundary that effaces all boundaries. The line that negates all lines,
that is a zone' (Ibid., 55). Vismann notes that the military requirement 'Adapt to the terrain
means 'disappear!'; means to disappear by transforming into a stone, a furrow or a tree.
Therefore the battlefield is ‘abandoned by men’ for survival. The territory looks deserted, because someone who assimilates with the elements of a landscape becomes a no man. Vismann writes: ‘For identity is based on the order of a dividing line. Without the line, this order breaks down. In the zone, identity is negated. And no man’s land precisely designates this condition. Dismemberment, destruction, disappearance. ... Weapons turn into a terrain, where no one could dwell’ (Ibid., 54).

Karamustafa’s installation is based on a true story told to the artist by her grandmother. Her ancestors moved from the Crimea to Turkey in the eighteenth century, another branch originating from Bosnia. The nearly transparent and milky white vests in the installation imply that the children wearing these vests and roaming from one border to another, as the result of the de-territorializing of the lands of the Ottoman Empire, had become the ‘ghosts’. Below the vests, we read a sentence in quotation marks: ‘As we crossed frontiers, we used to hide what was important for us by sewing them inside children’s vests.’ Apart from the vests, which represent absence, the quotation itself indicates that the speaking person is not there either. In addition, this sentence, which is uttered by a plural subject, indicates that s/he was not alone. They are ‘singular plural’, to paraphrase Jean-Luc Nancy (Nancy 2000: 30), in a moment of history that produces an alternative mode of being. This ‘potential-being’ refers to nonessential ‘being-in-common,’ which holds a ‘togetherness of singulars’ that, in the words of the philosopher, are ‘neither the sum, nor the incorporation, nor the “society,” nor the “community”’ (Ibid. 33). Singulars collectively inhabit an ‘open space.’ Nancy writes:
The horizon of the infinite is no longer the horizon of the whole, but the ‘whole’ (all that it is) as put on hold everywhere, pushed to the outside just as much as it is pushed back inside the ‘self.’ It is no longer a line that is drawn, or a line that will be drawn, which orients or gathers the meaning of a course of progress or navigation. It is the opening [la brèche] or distancing [l’écartement] of horizon itself, and in the opening: us. We happen as the opening itself, the dangerous fault line of a rupture (Nancy 2000: xii).

It is the moment in history in which the horizon is open and the land is a ‘zone’, rather than a ‘visible line’. Moreover, although this land is full of bodies, the landscape looks empty, since the bodies stand for the negation of all kinds of orders linked with identity (Vismann 1997: 57). In this mobilized landscape or transitional zone, those bodies which drew no attention and which were considered the safest and most secure place, that is the bodies of children, were covered by vests in which the people hide their valuable items and important messages. Paradoxically, these fragile vests became armour for the children. We cannot clearly see what is hidden under this semi-transparent fabric, in the same way as the soldiers or the border guards could not ‘see’ the children as ‘suspicious people’. It is this which Derrida observes as the complexity inherent in the ‘ghost’: ‘It may always be a case of still someone else. Another can always lie, he can disguise himself as a ghost, another ghost may also be passing himself off for this one’ (Derrida 1994: 7-8). The children became the couriers of the past, the present and future of the people. They kept the future themselves as a promise for a coming justice.
Unfinished Journeys

Movements or events taking place on borders are all about the matter of visibility/invisibility or about disappearance as coming into presence. The flickering visibilities of the people crossing borders interrupt bordered and policed spaces that seek to restrict subjective trajectories. However, through the movements of the people, the borders expand their lines to passages that mark processes rather than limits. Their hauntings and ghostings interrupt empirical concepts of spatial coherency and navigation. The nomadic and smooth trajectories that their movements generate do not obey enforced striations and guarded localizations.

In the film, *Blackboards* (2000), by Samira Makhmalbaf, in the empty space of the brutal mountains on the Iran/Iraq border, at the edge of two countries’ territories, we watch as two nomadic teachers roam the landscape, in search of pupils. What the film shows us is that these derelict, empty spaces are paradoxically ‘intensive’ spaces; they are the topographies of ‘events’. Talking about any event requires an answer to the question: ‘what happened?’. However, in the film, everything seems to be up in the air. This space has become what Agamben calls ‘outside’: ‘Whatever ... is the event of an outside’ (Agamben 1993: 67). The movements of the people and the events that have taken place there have made the space outside: ‘The outside is not another space that resides beyond a determinate space, but rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access - in a word, it is its face, its eidos’ (Ibid. 67). It is as if nothing is happening, but all the while, many things have happened and are happening in this space. As young smugglers are carrying contraband and the stolen goods from one border to the other, a group of nomads tries to find their way back to Iraq. The people
have passed the boundary the border imposes and the space, thus, has become a
‘threshold’ in Deleuzean terms; an empty space that has no determinate entity, no
beginning and no end.

The film starts and ends in the middle of the story. We do not know where the
people we see are coming from or where they are going. Although a Kurdish group finds
the border on the Iraqi side, we do not see what is going to happen, as they simply
disappear into a dense fog. I would call such events taking place on borders ‘ghostly
events’. Sometimes we can catch only a glimpse of what has happened or is happening,
as in the case of the guards on the borders. Everything, then, returns to ‘normal’ in a few
seconds, as if nothing ever happened. Both the young smugglers and the nomads have
to disappear in order to appear. They have to be absent, when really they are there, so as
not to be seen.

This particular phenomenon has to do with ghostly existence; an existence which is
up in the air and almost impossible to map or lay claim to. The ghost is there without
being there, or, to put it in Derrida’s terms, ‘the spectre is the frequency of a certain
visibility’, the visibility of the invisible (Derrida 1994: 100). So as not to be seen, the
children in the film are always on the run and become the targets of the border guards
(Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9). The attempts of the teacher, Reeboir, to teach the children to
write are interrupted by the need to escape the ‘eyes’ of the soldiers and their gunshots.
As one of the children says in the beginning of the film, ‘you have to sit down in order to
read’. In the absolute speed of movement, no one can reside, just inhabit, in the manner
of a ‘ghost.’
When one of the children wants to reside rather than to inhabit and to learn to write his name, the gunshots from the border entrap him and the others. Living on borders, as the film shows, requires a particular kind of subject, who has to be always on the run; a line of flight, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms.

What the people on the borders are performing is to ‘enter the ghost, exit the ghost, re-enter the ghost again’ (Ibid., xxi). There is always a repetition. In the case of the young smugglers, they perform as they try to pass safely over the border with the stolen goods, and, leaving the goods on that side, return to the other side to get more goods to carry over the border again. As Derrida writes, ‘the present is what passes, the present comes to pass, it lingers in this transitory passage, in coming-and-going, between what goes and what comes, in the middle of what lives and what arrives, at the articulation between what absents itself and what presents itself’ (Ibid., 25).

Fig 1.8 and 1.9 Samira Makhmalbaf, *Blackboards*, film-stills, 2000

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6 A line of flight, refers to the movements of de-territorialization and destratification ‘as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 21).
Border zones are full of events, but they are ghostly ones: 'to do something and not to do something' is the peculiar nature of the ghostly existence. A ghostly moment does not belong to time. The time is out of joint (Ibid., 22). Something in the present is not going well; it is not going, as it ought to go. For instance, what has disappeared is always already inscribed elsewhere. One is always already too late to grasp what has happened. The children who have a 'ghostly existence' are always coming back. The events they create are made of the repetitions, but, paradoxically, since the event ends when it starts, since the singularity of any first time makes of it also a last time, it is always the first time. Each time the 'ghost' arriving is the event itself. Since the first time is already a last time, one cannot really control the 'ghost's' comings and goings (Ibid., 11). What we see is only the affect of the event after the event, for instance, the stolen goods on the other side of the border. Between these two spaces, there is an absence. One might be waiting for something to happen, but what one is waiting for might be what is no longer and what is not yet.

**Life Stories / 'Ghost' Stories**

The lives of people on the move are not seamlessly evident for our consumption. When we encounter them, the events they caused, or took part in, have already ended. We cannot know where they have been. We do not and cannot know what their stories are.

If Shahroukh Khan, an Afghan refugee currently living illegally in Istanbul, did not recount his story, we would not have known that he lost his mother, his brother and his sister when American bombs destroyed his family home. We would not have known that he crossed five countries and four borders, alone, with only a map in his hands, without
the help of smugglers. We would not have known that three months on the road, he left Afghanistan for Pakistan, travelled through Pakistan and entered Zahedan in Western Iran, took buses to Tehran and later to Isfahan, moved to Urumieh in Western Iran and brought himself to a village on the border with Turkey. We would not have known that, while walking through the Turkish border to Bulgaria, his long journey was interrupted when he was arrested and taken to prison, where he spent two days and nights. That the Bulgarian soldiers took him to the border, kicked him and set him their dogs on him, before they ordered him to go back to Turkey (see Yaghmaian 2003).

How can it be possible for Shahroukh to tell of what happened to him, when these ghostly events are no longer present? Is it possible to re-establish a dynamic connection between the past and the present, and here and there, so that we are able to move beyond the mechanistic frameworks of causation and consequence, and focus, rather, on the processes?

Shahroukh’s is a long journey without destination. The writer, who met with Shahroukh Khan in his ‘permanent’ place in the world, and who recounts his story, remembered one particular day they spent together:

We walked by the magnificent Bosphorus. The weather was pleasantly warm, the air was clean and the view was majestic. The flying seagulls, men fishing in the sea and the sun reflecting on the water widened the happy smile on Shahroukh’s face. This was a world starkly different from his past, and a world alien to his life in Istanbul, a lonely life in the pension. The day was a brief introduction to the world of the others,
the fortunate others. "This was one of the best days of my life," he told my psychologist friend.

Sitting by the water, hearing his stories, I noticed Shahroukh's worn out shoes. Holes on the sides, open gaps between the top and the sole, the shoes were inadequate for the winter in Istanbul. Noticing my eyes fixed on his shoes, he said with laughter: 'They have travelled a very long distance from Afghanistan to here.' Shahroukh left Afghanistan in these shoes, travelled through Pakistan and Iran, trekked the mountains separating Iran from Turkey, moved to Van and later to Istanbul, walked through the Turkish border to Bulgaria, and returned to Istanbul after being arrested by the Bulgarian soldiers. The shoes knew the story of his journey away from home. He joked about the shoes, laughed about his experience at different borders, drowned into moments of sadness, rebounded, and continued to tell me his story. 'I will always keep these shoes," he said the day he got a pair of boots for the winter (Ibid., 2003).

Shahroukh's 'ghost story' offers no more than traces to us; traces that are neither in the present nor in the past but between the two. The present time itself refers to an absence and these traces can speak to us only if we can establish a relationship between absence and presence and between there and here.

Derrida asks: 'What is the time and what is the history of a spectre? Is there a present of a spectre? Are its comings and goings ordered according to the linear succession of a before and an after, between a present-past, a present-present and a present-future, between a “real time” and a “deferred time”? (Derrida 1994: 39) The logic of the ‘ghost' points toward a thinking of the event that necessarily exceeds a binary or
dialectical logic; the logic that distinguishes or opposes effectiveness or actuality (either present, empirical, living — or not) and absolute non-presence.

Shahroukh’s journey is as fragmented as his life story. The narration illustrates that the borders are no longer separate human realities. His movements have traversed and re-organized places. ‘Every story is a travel story — a spatial practice,’ writes Michel de Certeau (de Certeau 1988: 115).

The chain of spatializing operations seems to be marked by references to what it produces (a representation of places) or what it implies (a local order). We thus have the structure of the travel story: stories of journeys and actions are marked out by the ‘citation’ of the places that result from them and authorize them (Ibid, 120).

In Shahroukh Khan’s journey, however, we do not have any structure, since everything had happened in non-spaces without any determined plan. There is, to put it in de Certeau’s words, no ‘spatial legislation’ for his journey. His feet could only touch lands without touching them. His feet could not provide a space for the actions that were to be undertaken. Nothing is either transparent or comprehensible. His journey traverses and organizes different places. There is no way, therefore, to talk about the contrasting principles of stability and mobility. He has multiple identities and life trajectories that are beyond the act of being seen, defined or categorized. He ‘can no longer be considered a complete and fully realized historical agent. Without a fixed origin or destination this subject lacks even the relative stability afforded by the cumulative intersection of multiple localities (gender, ethnicity, class, sexuality...)’ (Chambers 2002: 117).
Chambers' analysis enables us to formulate the manner in which the immigrant, the refugee and the asylum-seeker come to be seen as a problem, and the way in which their existence leads the production of hostile stereotypes. Included in Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer's book, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, are some notes, one of which is entitled, 'On The Theory of Ghosts'. In the short, two-paged note, they point out that the notion of human life as the unity in the history of an individual has been abolished and the life of the individual is defined only by its opposite; that is, destruction. This destruction, they argue, does not manifest itself. Rather it remains hidden, and all harmony and continuity of consciousness and involuntary memory have lost their meaning. In the same note, when referring to the figure of the 'threatening emigrant', they point out: 'Individuals are reduced to a mere sequence of instantaneous experiences which leave no trace, or rather whose trace is hated as irrational, superfluous and 'overtaken' in the literal sense of the word' (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997: 215-216).

It seems that nothing much has changed. During the last election in Switzerland, the rightwing and nationalist SVP party, which has a very negative attitude towards migrants, won most of the votes. One of the posters they used during their campaign showed the face of a black man with the text next to it reading: 'Swiss people are becoming black.' In another poster so-called criminals are pictured being searched by the police, the text next to the imager reading: 'Our dear foreigners' (Vassaf 2003). This subtle fascist discourse de-familiarizes the familiar. The socio-political problem of the 'under-representation' of immigrants coincides with an 'over-representation' that actively produces discourses of hate and fear. In most European cities, the production of fear and criminality functions as an act of identification by which the migrant becomes a criminal (robber, drug dealer or
illegal resident) or, at the very least, a probable criminal, thus has to be kept as far away from the borders as possible. When Agamben, in *The Coming Community*, underlines the fact that the struggle for the conquest or control of the State (being Communist, being Italian or even being terrorism) is not politically considered the most important threat, he draws attention to the fact that, what the State cannot tolerate, is the ‘singularities’ that ‘form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging’ (Agamben, 1993: 86). In the context of this discussion, there is an interesting scene in the film, *In This World* (2002), by Michael Winterbottom. It tells the story of two Afghan boys, Jamal and Enayatullah, who are making their own way to Europe from a refugee camp in Pakistan, beginning in the city of Peshawar on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and carrying on through Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Italy and France. At the very beginning of Jamal and Enayatullah’s journey, when their bus is stopped on the Pakistan/Iran border, the soldier asks for their identity cards and puts them behind bars just for being Afghans. Simply being Afghans ‘marks’ them, since Afghans have no proper country nor one ‘clear’ identity (Figure 1.10).

![Fig 1.10 Michael Winterbottom, *In This World*, film-still, 2003](image-url)
In This World is a fictional film based on real life stories. In order to make his film, Winterbottom retraced the road travelled from Asia to Europe every year by thousand of refugees. It has been widely argued that the work, although a work of imagination, remind us that sometimes only fiction can convey hidden realities. There is more than that in Winterbottom’s film, though. Magically, it shows us that fiction can make something real.

The main protagonists in the film are two young men who are genuine Afghan refugees. At the time they were chosen as the lead actors for the film they were living in Shamsato refugee camp in Pakistan. At the end of the shooting of the film, the two actors went back to their real lives in the refugee camp. However, one of them, fifteen-year-old Jamal Udin Tourabaz, decided to use the money he had earned from the movie to make the trip for real and now he is living in London. Although his application for asylum has been refused, having the status of an unaccompanied child, he is able to live in the country until his eighteenth birthday, just as the young Afghan boy, Jamal, in the film, whose application was refused and who works illegally in a restaurant in London. In this particular case, the usual order has been reversed: now life ‘imitates’ fiction, not the other way around. In an interview in the DVD format of the film Winterbottom stresses the following: ‘Obviously, it wasn’t planned, but the fact is that Jamal did come over and adds to the layers of fiction a reality. It shows how real this subject is’.

In the film, Winterbottom shows migration as constant movement (Figure 1.11), the negotiation of one border after another and the waiting in small rooms and unfamiliar towns for the next ride to appear. Nothing is predictable. Everything happens in the very present. Even the film images look as if they have been smuggled across borders, in a
similar manner to the movements of the actor, fifteen-year-old Jamal, who finally reaches London after his long journey.

In this context, the discussion has to do with the question 'what happened?'. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the novella and the tale in terms of the questions 'what happened?' and 'what is going to happen?', which they consider to be the fundamental differences between the two literary genres. A reader of the tale, according to the authors, endlessly asks himself or herself the question 'what is going to happen?'. In contrast, in the novella everything is organized around the question 'what happened?'.

'Something is always going to happen or come to pass' in the tale. In other words, the living-present is divided at every instant in two different directions: 'the novella already casts [the present] into the past from the moment it is present', whereas the tale 'simultaneously draws it into the future'. In the novella, as the reader, we will never know what just happened, whereas in the tale we will learn everything as we turn the pages of
the book. In the novella, we do not wait for something to happen. Quite the contrary, we expect something to have just happened. According to the authors, from this perspective, the novella has to do with secrecy (their emphasis), 'not with a secret matter or object to be discovered, but with the form of the secret, which remains impenetrable'. Deleuze and Guattari sum this up in one sentence: 'The novella is a last novella, whereas the tale is a first tale' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 192-193).

The life stories of people constantly on the move are formed in the style of the novellas. There is perhaps no way to answer the question 'what happened', but they are 'in this world.'
CHAPTER 2

TARLABAŞI: ‘ANOTHER WORLD’ IN THE CITY

You can see, can’t you?
How flimsy the city has become
As if from here and there
Suddenly another city will appear
Edip Cansever, ‘Two Cities’ (Cansever 1982: 154)

A Ghost-Quarter in Istanbul

A ‘ghost’ possesses Istanbul. This ‘ghost’ is Tarlabaşı, a multi-inhabited quarter, located in the city centre, which has been haunting the city for some time.

My aim in this chapter will be to question why a location that makes up a vast circuit of connections not only to other cities, towns or villages in Turkey, but also to foreign cities, can be perceived or imagined being at once near and far. I wonder how, for an ordinary resident of Istanbul, Tarlabaşı can be seen as nothing more than a ‘mysterious’ or a ‘scary’ place that s/he has never been to nor would never think of going to. As shall become clear, subjectivities are produced in relation to Tarlabaşı and, in light of this, I will argue that this proximity of remoteness is a sign of repression and implies the presence of ‘ghost’. 
In Anthony Vidler’s comprehensive book, *The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely*, in which he examines the way in which architecture has been linked to the notion of the ‘uncanny’ as a metaphor for a fundamentally ‘unhomely’ modern condition, Vidler claims that the ‘uncanny’ is not a property of the space itself nor can it be provoked by any particular spatial conformation. Rather, he argues that, in its aesthetic dimension, the ‘uncanny’ is a representation of a mental state of projection that precisely elides the boundaries of the real and the unreal, in order to provoke a disturbing ambiguity; a slippage between waking and dreaming (Vidler 1992: 11). In other words, it is not that the space itself possesses uncanny properties, but that we divert our repressed fear or desire upon it. In this context, I would suggest that the physical space of Tarlabasi has been transformed into an imaginative space and that the residents of Tarlabasi have become imaginary representation. They are almost all marked as ‘robbers’, ‘drug dealers’, ‘street children’, ‘illegal immigrants’ or ‘prostitutes’. What is not presented has to be represented and the ‘ghosts’ are only the representations of imaginations. Armondo Silva writes:

The relationship between the imaginary and the symbolic in the city is produced as a basic principle in their perception: the imaginary uses the symbolic to manifest itself, and when citizen fantasy has an effect on a concrete symbolism (rumour, gossip, representation of catastrophes, and countless citizen evocations on safety, work, etc.), the urban makes itself present as the image of a form of being. The imaginary construction thus passes through multiple banners of citizen narration, but a psychic event runs below all of its narratives like a primary source: the dark, dense figure of the social phantom (Silva 2003: 36).
I will argue throughout the chapter that if Tarlabası haunts the city, it is because the act of haunting is always the confirmation of repression. If Tarlabası is seen as a problem to be contained, it is because this space, unlike the homogeneous space of the nation-state, which insists on one singular spatial inhabitation and one clear identity under one dominant role, intersects distant and different places and various identities in one specific location. If Tarlabası troubles the image of the city, it is because, whether we like it or not, we are forced to notice the fact that there exists another city, a ghostly one within the familiar one, which escapes any specific constitutive enclosures and opens up new layers and formations. If Tarlabası awakens uncanny feelings upon city dwellers, it is because this ‘basement of the city’ endlessly iterates the collective consciousness, thereby eroding its high and strong walls.

I speak of spectrality since it gives me tools to move beyond the empiricism of knowledge into a focus on the experience of speculation, darkness, rumours and imaginations. Before I started my research in Tarlabası, I had the following argument in my mind: in their simultaneous excesses and lacks, urban narratives produced about Tarlabası were both too much and too little, they are both out there and totally lost. Yet for the Istanbulites everything is very clear and simple, because the information we have of Tarlabası is limited to the news circulated through the popular media, in which the quarter is often narrated and visualized as the ‘shelter of criminals’. For instance, in a news stories published recently in one of the more popular newspapers in Turkey, the area in which Tarlabası is located is described as ‘a laboratory of crime’. The article is based on a 24 hour ‘investigation’ of this ‘laboratory of crime’ at the police station, also located in Tarlabası, and its surroundings. A journalist and a photographer report that, during their
stay in the area, there was a total of eighty-four incidents during the day and twelve during the evening and night. The information is supported by a variety of documentary photographs of the inside and the outside of the police station (Figure 2.1. and Figure 2.2), and the people involved in the incidents. These included: a panhandler, who snatched the bag of a professor of law; a suspect giving his statement inside the police station; a transvestite passing in front of the police station, where a group of police are on duty; another transvestite waiting at the door of the police station to lodge a complaint against a man who beat her in an attempt to persuade her to work for him, and a police officer talking to a young man who beat up the bouncer of a local bar (Kalkan and Karakurt 2006: 14-15).

Fig 2.1 and 2.2 Representation of Tarlabasî in Turkish popular media: photographs from the 'laboratory of crime', (Source: Hürriyet, 11 Haziran 2006).

Through these and similar public narrations, Tarlabasî is turned into a darker place, and one that is more isolated and more silent. Even the word 'Tarlabaş' negatively marks its inhabitants. To take just a few examples: when a teacher who works in a prestigious high school tells his students that he lives in Tarlabasî, they are puzzled and ask, 'How
can you live there?'. Similarly, if one wants to take a taxi to the area, taxi drivers are reluctant to go to there. Then there is the woman who does not visit her sister who lives in Tarlabasi.

The Turkish poet, Ilhan Berk, describes Tarlabasi in his book, Pera, in these words:

From outside, [Tarlabasi] is a Well of Gayya. The eye sees nothing at first. ... From inside, ... it resembles the molehills. As if you are going down to the underground catafalques, and wandering there. ... You have to find your own way like an archaeologist. Only sounds and smells, only they will stimulate you (Ilhan Berk 2004: 39).

Henri Lefebvre's notion of 'social space' and what he calls 'the illusion of transparency' has a great relevance to a project such as this, which is mainly concerned with the production of space and subjectivities. With his notion of 'social space', Lefebvre provides us with an alternative apparatus to consider space. Rather than seeing space as a natural (physical) given, mathematically produced or fixed absolutely, his approach enables us to critically engage with the process of spatialization, and the production and the circulation of certain discourses and specific social relations through the urban planning of the city and its available spaces. Lefebvre sees great danger in perceiving space 'as luminous, as intelligible, as giving action free rein'. He shifts the argument towards, what he calls, 'the illusion of transparency':

The illusion of transparency goes hand in hand with a view of a space as innocent, as free of traps or secret places. Anything hidden or dissimulated – and hence dangerous - is antagonistic to transparency, under whose reign everything can be
taken in by a single glance from that mental eye which illuminates whatever it contemplates. Comprehension is thus supposed, without meeting any insurmountable obstacles, to conduct what is perceived, i.e. its object, from the shadows into the light; it is supposed to affect this displacement of the object either by piercing it with a ray or by converting it, after certain precautions have been taken, from a murky to a luminous state. Hence a rough coincidence is assumed to exist between social space on the one hand and mental space – the (topological) space of thoughts and utterances – on the other. ... The illusion of transparency turns out (to revert for a moment to the old terminology of the philosophers) to be a transcendent illusion: a trap, operating on the basis of its own quasi-magical power, but by the same token referring back immediately to other traps – traps which are its alibis, its masks (Lefebvre 1991: 27-29).

Fieldwork in Tarlabāşı

I would term my field work in Tarlabāşı\(^7\) a 'journey of a reconnaissance', since, as Berk implies in his poetic text, on the streets of Tarlabāşı I had to forget what I already knew or already expected about the space and to follow instead that which stood before me or which caught my attention. The method of the research was not the nature of the traditional, exotic strangeness of anthropological fieldwork, which requires being immersed in the other’s world of difference and which anthropology itself has prepared one for.

The starting point for this research was to see whether an alternative to the traditional research location gives rise to shifts in the character of both fieldwork and

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\(^7\) This chapter is partly based on fieldwork I carried out in Tarlabāşı from 1 December 2003 to 3 January 2004. During the research, I undertook semi-structured interviews with some inhabitants of the quarter. In total, I talked to 30 people from different ethnic and social backgrounds and of different ages.
fieldworker, Two specific questions arise: How can I participate in my research setting? How can I materialize the object of my study and data about those objects to constitute the 'real'?

In his historical critique of anthropology as a discipline, James Clifford sees fieldwork, both in reality and metaphorically, as a travel practice. While arguing that ethnography has privileged relations of dwelling over relations of travel, he states that: 'where professional anthropology has erected a border, I portray a borderland, a zone of contacts – blocked and permitted, policed and transgressive' (Clifford 1995: 8). In the same manner, the fieldwork I conducted was developed through the routes drawn by moments, coincidences and fortuitous encounters, in contrast to the proper mise-en-scéne of fieldwork - a physically and symbolically enclosed world, with a culture for the ethnographer to live within and work out.

During the 1990s, anthropologists began to question ethnographic research processes, and the analysis and interpretation of the findings generated by fieldwork. Instead of the reproduction of anthropological methods developed in traditional societies, anthropologists found themselves encountering unexpected contexts, shifting constituencies, and changing agendas, and altered classic conditions of fieldwork and writing.

The ethnographic research I conducted in Tarlabası can be seen as a part of the exploration and questioning of ethnographic practice in this experimental trend; an 'ethnography of experience', to put it in the words of George E. Marcus and Michael M.J.
According to Marcus and Fischer, 'ethnographies of experience' are now trying to make full use of the knowledge that the anthropologist acquires from fieldwork, which is much richer and more diverse than that which he was able to distil into conventional, analytic monographs (Ibid. 1999: 43). This is because experience is more complex than the representation of it that is permitted by traditional techniques of description and analysis in social-scientific writing.

The changes in the research practice of anthropology were first presaged in the 1980s critiques of the authority of ethnographic research and anthropological writing (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Clifford 1988). The most important legacy of the theoretical and conceptual discussions of the 1980s is the reconsideration of the nature of representation, description, subjectivity and objectivity, and the questioning of the notions of 'society' and 'culture'. As a result of the raising of the issue of epistemology, which touches directly upon ways of thinking about research and how knowledge emerges from it, as well as on the rhetorical persuasiveness of ethnography as a mode of communication in competing regimes of representation, new modes of research and writing were proposed. New formulations are informed by the theories of post-structuralism in literary criticism, which challenge the authority of the writer and, more broadly, the construct of the unified agent, integral subject or the autonomous self. Such influences include the semiotics of Barthes, Foucault's notion of discourse and Derrida's attack on the metaphysics of presence. Re-formulated as cultural critic, anthropology becomes more sophisticated and intellectually challenging than ever before. Anthropologists began to take into account modes of knowing and the political implication of the research project itself.
The postmodern premise is that there is no possibility of a fixed, final or monologically authoritative meaning. This has radicalized anthropology’s critique of its own forms of representation by challenging the authority on which they have been based. Postmodern thinking has also undermined the practice of a kind of interpretation from which authoritative meaning could be derived; for instance, the interpretive practice that the anthropologist Clifford Geerz promoted, which constituted cultures through the metaphor of text, and the practice of interpretation through the metaphor of reading. The postmodern notions of *heterotopia* (Foucault 1986), juxtapositions and the blocking together of ‘incommensurables’ (Lyotard 1988) have served to renew the long-neglected practice of comparison in anthropology, but in a different way. Juxtapositions do not have the obvious meta-logic of older styles of comparison in anthropology. Rather, they emerge from putting questions to an emergent object of study whose contours, sites and relationships are not known beforehand, but are themselves a contribution of making an account which has different, complexly connected, real-world sites of investigation. Moreover, the postmodern object of study is ultimately mobile and multi-situated, so any

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8 In his essay, ‘Of Other Spaces’, Foucault speaks of two types of space: ‘utopias’, which are sites with no real place and have a general relation to direct or inverted analogy with the real space of society, and ‘heterotopia’, which is capable of juxtaposition in a single, real place several sites which are themselves incompatible. According to Foucault, the mirror is an example of heterotopia. This is because the mirror is the place in which the one who is looking at himself or herself, occupies absolutely. It is real as it is connected with all the space that surrounds it and absolutely unreal since, in order to be perceived, it has to pass through the virtual point (Foucault 1986: 24). In the same essay, he uses the concept of ‘heterotopia’ to refer to scientific method and knowledge: ‘We might imagine a sort of systematic description – I do not say a science because the term is too galvanized now – that would, in a given society, take as its object of study, analysis, description and “reading” (as some like to say these days) of these different spaces, of these other places. As a sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in which we live, this description could be called heterotopology. … there is probably not a single culture in the world that fails to constitute heterotopias. That is the constant of every human group’ (Ibid. 24).

9 Modernism, associated with the Enlightenment, involves the idea of universal rationality - a search for a knowledge that is certain and universal. In his book *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979), Jean-François Lyotard criticizes what he calls ‘metanarratives’ (or grand narratives) which, for him, are global and totalizing cultural narrative schemas that order and explain knowledge and experience. Lyotard refers to what he described as the ‘postmodern condition’, which he characterizes as increasing scepticism toward the totalizing nature of “metanarratives” that are typically characterised by some form of ‘transcendent and universal truth’. In his conception, the production of ‘incommensurables’ refers to the conditions of ‘incomplete’ information, fractures, discontinuities and paradoxes (see Lyotard 1988).
ethnographer of such an object inevitably will have a comparative dimension. Comparison re-enters the very act of ethnographic specificity through the postmodern vision of seemingly improbable juxtapositions. The global is collapsed into and made an integral part of parallel, related local situations, rather than something monolithic and external to them. This move toward comparison as *heterotopia* firmly deterritorializes culture in ethnographic writing and stimulates accounts of cultures composed in a landscape for which there is, as yet, no developed theoretical conception (see for an account Marcus 1998: 186-187).

Like every story of a journey, my own story can sketch only a subjective map. The roads I walked, the walls I looked at, the signs I saw, the corners at which I stood, the dark spots I suddenly found myself in, the doors that were opened or kept shut, the smiling faces, the distant or unwelcoming glances, the people I came across, the questions I asked, the responses I received or was refused, the roles that were played, the masks that were worn, the sounds and voices I could or could not hear, as well as my own curiosity, prejudices and limits; these all guided me. As might be the case in traditional understandings of fieldwork, the site was not considered ontologically given. The quarter was neither visited by a 'knowing subject' or an expert whose situated, unmediated position would define the exterior and interior borders of the research-field nor was it a location which was to be inhabited by a professional for a specific period of time. Rather the site as a field emerged as a location, and an unstable location at that, as, through the processes of the research itself, it spontaneously came in to being through the flows of inter-related spatial practices and the intricate webs of unpredictable connections.
In *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experiment Moment in the Human Sciences*, George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fischer propose a new formulation and conception of ethnography as 'multi-sited' or 'multi-local', instead of the typical site-specific fieldwork. They argue that 'fieldwork should be recognized as a complex web of interactions in which anthropologists, in collaboration with others, conventionally conceived as informants and located in a variety of often contrasting settings, track connections amid networks, mutations, influences of cultural forces and changing social pressures (Ibid., xviii-xix). What has emerged is a different sense of the politics of ethnography; a field in which the ethnographer appears to be more engaged than in the past. In practice s/he conducts fieldwork with a keen awareness of being within the landscape and, as the landscape changes across sites, the identity of the ethnographer requires renegotiation.

Marcus and Fischer’s conception and formulation helped a great deal in my ability to conduct research in a multi-inhabited quarter, as they address complexities of the sort integral to the positioning of any ethnographic project, and offer possibilities for productively increasing the ‘cartographic precision’ of ethnographic analysis.

The concept of ‘multi-sited’ or ‘multi-local’ ethnography requires a re-consideration of location and signifies a re-formulation of community. The traditional, anthropological, concept of community, as a sense of shared values, shared identity, and, thus, shared culture, has been mapped literally onto locality in order to define one basic frame of reference orientating ethnography. As Marcus and Fischer discuss, the connotations of solidity and homogeneity attached to the notion of community, whether in a locale or
dispersed, has been replaced with a ‘multi-sited’ and ‘multi-local’ approach and research imaginary. Moreover, ‘multi-sited’ or ‘multi-local’ research imaginary offers a challenge and a potentiality regarding the overall model of anthropology’s research process, from the conception of fieldwork to the production and reception of its results (Marcus 1998: 13).

Therefore, there are two important implications emerging from ‘multi-sited’ or ‘multi-local’ research strategies and imaginary. Firstly, a new sense of the locations and spaces in the field has emerged, and secondly, recognition has developed that, beyond the site, there is still ethnography. The result has been to expand and innovate the possibilities for making arguments through description, for the delineating of processes, and for the orchestrating and representation of voice or perspective of the fieldworker. Both in my research in Tarlabası and in my writing on Tarlabası, I intended to trace and to draw attention to the connections and relations, associations and circulations, as well as the separations, limits, obstacles, fractures and discontinuities I encountered. This also necessitated the leaving behind of the unified ethnographic subject, as well as the monologic authority of the writer as anthropologist, figured as scientist and sojourner. My fieldwork ranged across contested and conflicted social political ground. Consequently, the text is composed of many voices and perspectives emerging out of the fieldwork, since multi-sited ethnography is designated around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions or juxtapositions of locations, in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of association or connection in site or among sites. However, there is more to it than that. Within the same research frame of reference, the text is written by discussing some theoretical concepts since a multi-sited
ethnography inevitably is the product of knowledge based on varying intensities and qualities. It involves the composite, multi-method, mobile work of scholarship.

As has already been mentioned, in practice, a fieldworker conducting ‘multi-sited’ ethnography develops a keen awareness of being within the landscape. The movement among sites and levels of society, or, in this case, social groups, lends a new character to the investigation; a ‘research persona’ that is created according to circumstance the fieldworker encounters. Marcus has pointed out that operating within these new spaces of fieldwork has implications for the traditional, ‘sympathetic’ involvement of ethnographers with their subjects: these involvements are now multiple, conflicting and more ambiguous (Marcus 1999: 17). The construction of a persona or identity, both in fieldwork and in writing, creates what he calls a ‘circumstantial activism’. ‘Circumstantial activism’ is about shifting personal positions in relation to one’s subjects and research conditions. As a particular method of operation, it refers to the condition in which other discourses in various disciplines, that overlap with one’s own, generate a sense of doing more than just that which happens in traditional ethnography. It arises from the various interventions one makes in each fieldwork site and from the resulting need to resolve the, sometimes contradictory, relations among those interventions. The anthropologist is no longer the presumed outsider that she or he was in traditional research. In order to work at all, the anthropologist must make certain types of alliances to define their very position as ethnographer. They must be seen to be working with changing sets of subjects in certain sites, and, in others, working against them (Marcus 1999: 17). In his book, Ethnography Through Thick & Thin, Marcus points out:
What multi-sited strategies of research offer is an opportunity to dislocate the ethnographer from the strong traditional filiation to just one group of subjects among whom fieldwork is done and instead to place her within and between groups in direct, and even indirect and blind, opposition. This is, to be sure, not a very comfortable position for the ethnographer, in which ‘not taking sides’ is not an option, and in which deception and betrayal are ever present possibilities. In each case, some form of “circumstantial activism’ …is necessary to give better access to these more complicated ambiguities of fieldwork ethics’ (Marcus 1998: 20-21).

If the nature and quality of fieldwork can be very different in different sites, what is required is a kind of resolution quite different from that normally characterizing the anthropological fieldworker. That research persona was a major component of the, much critiqued, traditional conventions of authority in ethnographic writing; that of the “I know because I was there, I saw, I sympathized’ variety. In contrast, there needs now to be new narratives of work that no longer occupy the same position or are circumscribed in the same way as the older disciplinary narratives. This means a necessary revision of interpretive anthropology such that ‘getting inside’ loses its force as the trope that defines fieldwork.

Fieldwork involves an engagement between ethnographer and subject: an inter-subjective sharing of the same historic time and space. In contrast, ethnographic rhetoric has systematically distanced the subjects of fieldwork (Marcus 1999: 23). My aim in this thesis is adopt a method of writing, which is best viewed, ‘not as a function of intellectual
work separate from fieldwork but as an integral, inseparable part of it' (Ibid., 24). The voice I use can be seen as ‘subjective’. However, through this method of writing, which I would call ‘dialogic’, I intend to stimulate thinking about alternative textual strategies for knowledge production, as well as to address the specific character and intimate scenes of my fieldwork. Instead of reproducing the conventional, authorial function of the fieldworker in relation to his or her subjects, my aim is to break out of that frame altogether, in an effort to create different and more complex spaces in which fieldwork or ethnography might occur. The text involves an inter-subjective mode of the ethnographic research, and the photographs generated by my fieldwork imply the limits of representation. My fieldwork was collaborative, and a collaborative approach necessarily entails the notion that knowledge creation in fieldwork always involves negotiating a boundary between peoples and cultures. The result is never reducible to a form of knowledge expressed by the monologic voice of the ethnographer. To convey cultural experience through the life-stories of the people I interviewed in Tarlabası, the expressions of emotions and feelings of the inhabitants of the quarter serve to cut through the apparent homogenization of contemporary institutional social life. As Marcus and Fischer have suggested, ‘focusing on the person, the self and emotions, is a way of getting to the level at which cultural differences are most deeply rooted: in feelings and in complex indigenous reflections about the nature of persons and social relations’ (Marcus and Fischer 1999: 45). It is also important to note that such experimental ethnography imply that feelings and experience can never be apprehended directly, and certainly not conveyed across cultures, without careful attention to their diverse, mediating modes of expression (Ibid., 46).
In order to use these types of materials generated from fieldwork one should find and develop writing strategies. This requires different sorts of framing strategies and different modes of textual organization than that found in conventional, functionalist ethnographies, which rely primarily upon the observation of social activity. In discussing experimental ethnography, Marcus and Fischer refer to Raymond Williams, the Marxist literary critic. They argue that, in his discussions of social-realist fiction, Williams is concerned with the increased difficulty, in realist fiction, of representing whole worlds and complex social structures within the limited narrative frame of a plot and set of characters. Drawing on Williams' important concept of the 'structure of feeling', which is based upon the articulation of richly described experiences of everyday life with larger systems and the subtle expressions of ideology, Marcus and Fischer attempt to link ethnographic writing to fiction. They claim that experiments are needed to merge knowable communities conceived by novelists (and observed by ethnographers) with the 'darkly unknowable'. They claim that Williams suggests combinatory texts, which link intimate, ethnographic-like detail concerning language and manners, with portraits of larger, impersonal systems that abstractly affect local communities, on the one hand, and are an internalized component of characters' (ethnographic subjects') lives, on the other (Ibid., 77-78). Williams uses this concept to escape from the, deeply ingrained habit, in theory, of fixing the states of society and culture as already formed and understood as such, by social actors. Instead, experience refers to a domain of life that, while indeed structured, is inherently social, and dominant and emergent trends in global systems of political economy are complexly registered in language, emotions and the imagination (Ibid., 78).
In order to understand the subjects' points of view in circumscribed, social settings and to convey realities that, at times, are difficulties to represent accurately due to the visible or invisible forces, I deploy inventive and sometimes fictional writing strategy.

The interviews I conducted in Tarlabası were centred on people's life-stories and the ways in which they describe the quarter and perceive the space. Life stories, feelings and experience can provide knowledge of social life and serve as 'data' through which to explain a social phenomenon. I used mainly 'data' compiled through semi-structured interviews to construct the viewpoint of the inhabitants of the quarter and to discover the hidden mechanisms that produce the space and their subjectivities. In other words, it is through an understanding of the practical knowledge of the inhabitants, that the knowledge and the theory to express the objective relationships discussed in the thesis are formulated.

During the earlier stages of the research, I used personal contacts in order to arrange interviews and gain access to all the social groups and ethnic communities living in Tarlabası. However, as my fieldwork is based on what I call a 'journey of a reconnaissance', most of the interviews were the result of chance encounters. I conducted all the interviews personally and at different times over approximately one month. The interviews were conducted either in respondents' homes, at their places of work or, in most cases, on the streets.

The interviews were mostly short, uneasy conversations, held in a hurry. At other times, the conversations were made up of pauses of uncertainty and, sometimes, just
silences. I always was alert to the fact that what could not be said was as relevant as
what could be, and that what could only be felt was as important as what could be out
there, in front of one's very eyes. To give an example; when I was taking a photograph of
some graffiti on a wall, a door suddenly opened and a young woman invited me into her
home to take a photograph of her son. Her son was waiting for me in silence. I took one
photograph of the young boy squatting and smoking a joint in their one-room flat. He did
not like my timing, and warned me: 'The smoke had already disappeared when you took
the photograph'. He wanted me to take one more photograph, and I did. This time he was
satisfied, but he did not say a word then. He refused to speak with me, or answer my
questions. It was as if his voice had found its language through the smoke that covered
his face. Only a few words came from his lips, when I was leaving the house: 'put the
name on the things here yourself'.

'Put the name on the things here yourself.' This sentence expresses perfectly the
method and interpretation of my findings, in some instances. I personally carried out the
coding and the analysis of the data by the interviews. As mentioned above, these were
semi-detached interviews with open-ended questions. As Bertaux and Thompson (1997:
9) indicate, the use of a questionnaire may suppress the interviewee's attempts to
describe the complexities of her or his situation. In fact, the survey method investigates
social phenomenon through the technique of the representative sample of individuals.
From this sample, each interviewee answers the same basic list of closed questions
(Bertaux and Thompson 1997: 6-7).
The semi-structured interviews I conducted allowed the informants the room in which to convey their experiences more fully. Indeed, this method of interviewing can be more accurate and informative than closed questions (Bertaux and Thompson 1997: 17). It a method that abandons much of the positivist arguments regarding the importance of conducting interviews in an impersonal, neutral and standardized manner. My interviews became one of a series of ongoing conversations and also demonstrate how, giving more space to the expression of the interviewees’ subjectivity, allow one to achieve greater depth, and to interpret the social action and the social processes underlying them.

It is also important to note that only some of the interviews were tape-recorded. In most cases, I consciously choose not to use a tape recorder, the aim being to reduce the power inequalities between the one who interviews and the one who is interviewed that using a tape-recorder can introduce. Some people did not what their interviews to be taped, or during the course of an interview, at a specific moment, some of the respondents expressed discomfort about their statements being taped. None of the interviews or conversations conducted on the street were taped. In these instances, on the completion of the interview, I wrote down as closely as I possibly could exactly what the respondent said and later transcribed all the interviews, and analysed each of them, along with all the others, so that I was able to become familiar with each account.

In Tarlabası, life is very complex and power relations are constructed in particular ways. Thus, in order to carry out research in such a space, one has to engage with the limits of knowledge and its sources. Recalling Lefebvre, Irit Rogoff has summarized one of the approaches of visual culture: ‘the project of visual culture has been to try and
repopulate space with all the obstacles and unknown images, which the illusion of transparency evacuated from it' (Rogoff 2000: 22). The emergent field of Visual Culture brought us an awareness that cultural meaning can reside anywhere. The writers, the critics and the theorists involved in the project of visual culture aimed to collapse hierarchical distinctions, to promote a visual version of inter-textuality and to problematize the assertions of value that had informed 'culture' when it was primarily an elitist term. They sought to uncover the complicity between power and images, or, conversely, probed the ways in which visual experience can resist, transgress and contest the status quo. In other words, in visual culture studies there has been a shift from art to visual and from history to culture. From this perspective, my photographs, as the materials of ethnographic research, are neither the facts on the ground nor the evidence through which one might get to the heart of any truth. Rather, they are 'strategic materials' that put the work, along with my writing, into the production of a visual criticality in order to recall complexities embedded within the space. As part of the processes of knowledge production, I also aim to reflect on my 'photographic documentary' through some artwork. My photographs and the artwork I will touch upon in this chapter mark the moment at which the visual interacts with the social.

Visual Culture is concerned not only with the image, but also with the culture that provides the very conditions for the existence of any particular meaning in which visual materials and artefacts are produced, circulated and consumed. The very understanding of culture therefore has changed dramatically. As I have already noted, the emergence of Visual Culture has marked the impossibility of distinguishing between the products of culture and those of art. Art is part of culture, both in the sense of high culture and in the
anthropological sense of human artefact. But in what way does Visual Culture look at culture for its analysis? More importantly, how does the concept of ‘fieldwork’ as a methodology inform my analysis of Tarlabası from the perspective of the field of Visual Culture?

Visual Culture, Mirzoeff has indicated develops the idea of culture as expressed by Stuart Hall: ‘Cultural practice ... becomes a realm where one engages with and elaborates a politics’ (Mirzoeff 1999: 24). Politics refers to a culture where people define their identity and it changes in accordance with the needs of individuals and communities to express that identity. In this respect, Visual Culture has taken a cross-cultural approach; a transcultural model of analysis, rather than the static edifice of culture in the traditional anthropological sense, which rests on the modernist oppositions between culture and civilization. My study of Tarlabası is based on the idea that we should move beyond an essentialist approach towards an understanding of the plural realities that coexist and are in conflict with one another, both in the present and in the past.

To operate through the logic of ‘ghost’ is to know that one cannot search for and achieve a totalizing and unified vision, rather, one can only work with a fragmentary and partial vision. It is merely an exercise in observation and in limited social interaction. What I want to produce, through my photographs, is a specific condition that makes the viewer constantly consider the act of image-making and the desire to produce meaning. My approach is not about documenting realities but about organizing complexities. In the project, the visual materials are very valuable since they have to respond to a complex society where the mere depiction of visible realities has become insufficient.
In conventional research and writing, problems of description become problems of representation. What I try to demonstrate through my photographs, as well as through my writing, is the limits of anthropological representation. My visual documentary is consciously engaged in the activity of representation itself, in order that one might study and analyze complex relations. If the photographs, along with the writing, ‘illustrate’ anything, it is complicity. The visual materials generated from my ‘travel story’ do not investigate ‘facts on the ground’. My travelling story is political as it explores the spaces of individual agency in relation to geopolitics, the relationship between macro- and micro-politics, the politics of government and the politics of the governed. If ‘facts on the ground’ are used to denote the gap between what is said (rhetoric) and that which is really going on, then I attempt to undo ‘facts on the ground’ to make them a problematic, to de-naturalize the architecture of power and the production of subjectivities.

‘Another World’

Located on the slope down towards Dolapdere, Tarlabası (Figure 2.3) is part of the Beyoğlu sub-province of Istanbul, on the European side of the city (see Map A). The quarter is located on both sides of Tarlabası Boulevard, which begins where Taksim Square and Cumhuriyet Road intersect and ends where Refik Saydam Road starts. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Tarlabası was a residential area housing minority groups in Pera (now Beyoğlu) and mostly inhabited by Greeks, Armenians and the Levantines. Since the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, it has been gradually disconnected from its history, its narratives of nation and the collective memories of the social. The Turkish Republic was founded on the notion of ethnic and religious homogeneity in society, which was in direct contrast with this non-Muslim, ethnically-
diverse quarter. Some examples of the major events aimed at achieving this homogeneity are: the compulsory population exchanges after the Turkish Republic was established and the Lausanne Pact was signed and the Wealth Tax (1942-44), which was passed during World War II for the rectification of the economy and which was applied only to minority groups (mainly Greeks and Armenians) in order to break their strong position in the market; the 'Events of 6-7 September' in 1955, when minority groups, both in Beyoğlu in Istanbul and in İzmir, had their goods and property looted, their homes broken into, and were beaten and harassed; the 1964 Decree, in which the Greeks in Istanbul were deported; and the Cyprus Operation in 1974. Since the 1940s, Tarlabası has become the 'unhomely house' for the rootless and displaced urban population migrating from the rural areas of the eastern part of Turkey. It has come to be, not only a site of physical dilapidation, but also of social deprivation (Figure 2.4).
The story of Tarlabası is about its disappearance, the absence of a lived past, ghostly citizenship and urban inequality. We already know that a nation-state consists of what is excluded, ignored or isolated. The production of a stable and fixed locality is dependent on the exclusion of those who are, or might be, or have been, displaced. Derrida critically displaces ‘the ontology ... (an axiomatic linking indissolubly the ontological value of present-being [on] to its situation, to stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general)’ (Derrida 1994: 82). He reverses the conventional formulas and asserts that: ‘All national rootedness ... is rooted first of all
in the memory or the anxiety of a displaced or - displaceable - population. It is not only time that is “out of joint,” but space in time, spacing’ (Ibid., 82-83). National space gains its stability and fixity through erasure and, in order to protect its border, the space has to continually be under erasure for new inscriptions. In this respect, I argue that Tarlabası - its architecture - is tracing a relationship with haunting (Figure 2.5), for the spectral memory of the displaced minority population of the Ottoman Empire and the displaceable, migrant population currently living in the quarter, inhabits the space, or rather haunts it.

Fig 2.4 a view from a market opened every Sunday in Tarlabası (photo: Nermin Saybaşılı)
Fig 2.5 Tarlabası, its architecture, is tracing a relationship with haunting, for the spectral memory of the displaced minority population of the Ottoman Empire and the displaceable migrant population currently living in the quarter, who inhabit the space, or rather haunt it (photo: Nermin Saybaşılı)

In The Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin recalls a dream centred on the fear of open doors in which, as he walked with a friend, a ghost appears in the window of a house and follows them:

And as we walked on, the ghost accompanied us from inside all the houses. It passed through all the walls and always remained at the same height with us. I saw this, though I was blind. The path we travel through arcades is fundamentally such a ghost walk, on which doors give way and walls yield (Benjamin 2003: 409).

Nicholas Mirzoeff provocatively reads Benjamin's dream as signifying the return of the Jewish as a 'ghost' to The Arcades Project, for Benjamin totally forgot the Jewish, even his own Jewishness, and, thus, the book became a Jewish-free Arcadia. Mirzoeff writes:
'Haunted as he was by the loss of the world of the Arcades, Benjamin saw them [the Jews] as being the place of ghosts' (Mirzoeff 2002: 245-246). He reminds us of the Freudian description of the house and the door: whereas the house represents the body, the door is the orifice. Mirzoeff reads Benjamin's fear of the open door as the fear of the open body, the uncivilized or uncanny body that exceeds its limits. During such a period, he argues, the body that cannot be named is the Jewish body; the absent presence in the Arcades (Ibid., 246). Similarly, 'ghosts', inevitably, would haunt the one walking down the streets of the quarter, Deserted by the minority groups of the Ottoman Empire, the abandoned or ruined houses in Tarlabasi recall their peculiar absence and become ghostly. The historical houses become the empirical signs that haunting has taken place, and the geography and culture of the Ottoman Empire is not a dream or non-existent. Rather, it is a haunting reality.

Beginning in the 1970s, Tarlabasi gradually became a location, firmly settled inside the city, for those who were destitute, repressed and exploited. According to data provided by the State Institute of Statistics, which is based on the 2000 Population Census, the population of Tarlabasi is estimated to be around 31,040. From their fieldwork in Tarlabasi, Iclal Dinçer and Zeynep Mery Enlil stress that destitution is a primary and permanent condition of the population of Tarlabasi, 78 % of who are migrants (Dinçer and Enlil 2002: 416-418). Destitution in Tarlabasi consists of different layers of exclusion. At the economic level, there is high unemployment. Most of the people living in

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10 In fact, with the level of urbanization and the dynamics of migration in Istanbul, destitution has become the object of exclusion, of fear and of hatred. İşik and Pinarcioğlu examine the struggles with poverty and the attempts to overcome it through illegal networks adopted by the inhabitants of a shanty town, Sultanbeyli, in Istanbul (İşik and Pinarcioğlu 2001).
Tarlabaşı look for work on a daily basis. Those who have proper jobs work mainly as peddlers, waiters and cleaners, or as workers in manufacturing workshops. At the social level, the population has difficulty reaching basic social services, such as education and health. At the political level, there is the stigmatization of ethnic identities. All these stratified layers of exclusion are fed by spatial exclusion.

One respondent from Romania, who had to leave his country and who was trying to earn money to send to his family by collecting used papers for recycling, replied to my questioning quite angrily: ‘Are you asking who the people are who are living in Tarlabası? They are just the poor, we are just the poor’. When I say Tarlabası is ‘another world’ in the city, what I mean is that there is continuity between immigrant and poor-illegal-criminal, pertaining to the very category of ‘un-qualified’ people. That is, a huge nameless crowd has found its residence in Tarlabası, on the edge of social life, where the struggle to survive has become a daily routine.

Migration from the rural areas of Anatolia to Istanbul began in the 1940s, and from the 1950s, the immigrants began to be seen as invaders and uncivilized people who ‘conquered’ the city, coming from outside to press themselves and their ‘low culture’ upon ‘Istanbulites’. Istanbul represented certain values, such as privilege, perfection and elitism, and the newly built squats of the immigrants on the outskirts of the city were seen as a ‘threat’ to the modern city. The polarization of ‘rural person’ versus ‘city man’ was centred around a discussion of ‘who owns the city, who belongs to Istanbul?’.

11 Ayşe Öncü examines the construction of this dichotomy between ‘Istanbulites’ and the ‘Others’ by analyzing cartoons circulated during this period (Öncü 2000: 117-144). See Erder (1997) for a detailed discussion of the
Tarlabaşı this phenomenon is more complicated, the main reason being that, unlike the squatters, this quarter is located in the city centre, making it impossible for ‘Istanbulites’ to neglect its ‘vibrant’ existence.

If Tarlabası is seen as a problem for urban life, it is mainly because, in this multi-ethnic space, the urban public is wearing thin and splitting open. New inhabitants of this old abandoned city centre are: the Kurds, who had to migrate during the ‘unspoken war’ against the Kurds on the Eastern border of the country in the 1990s; the gypsies, who moved to this part of the city in the 1970s and the 1980s; transvestites and transsexuals, who previously lived and worked in Cihangir, a quarter near Beyoğlu, before it was gentrified and they were forced out; foreign immigrants, such as the Afghans, Iranians and some Africans (especially from Nigeria), who plan on a short stay before moving on to a city in the EU; and Romanians, Bulgarians and Russians, who work as a cheap labourers. They have all been made unlocatable, like the ghosts, in the city. Tarlabası does not belong to the city, so its inhabitants are not public figures. Their existence, their displaced bodies, does not refer to an original entity, since they are left outside of history and outside of social life.

‘The boulevard defines our destiny,’ says a father, and adds, ‘when my children go up to Beyoğlu, I wish they would never return’. Here we should remember Neil Smith’s concept of the ‘urban frontier’, where he emphasises the politics of spatial difference and differentiation, and the excessively national scripting that gentrification processes engender. He stresses the fact that urban frontiers draw a sharp economic line in the complex issues of migration into Istanbul and the social tensions in the city resulting from urban inequality, networks of illegality, local politics and ethnic identities.
urban landscape by dividing areas of reinvestment from areas of disinvestment and that they are related to economic expansion, rather than geographical expansion. At the beginning of his book, Smith points out that the frontier discourse serves to rationalize and legitimate a process of conquest, whether in the West during the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century, or in the late-twentieth-century inner city (Smith 1996: xv-xvi). When Smith discusses the gentrification frontier, he writes:

The frontier imaginary is neither merely decorative nor innocent ... but carries considerable ideological weight. Insofar as gentrification infects working-class communities, displaces poor households and converts whole neighbourhoods into bourgeois enclaves, the frontier ideology rationalizes social differentiation and exclusion as natural, inevitable. The poor and working class are all too easily defined as 'uncivil,’ on the wrong side of a heroic dividing line, as savages and communists (Ibid., 17).

The words of the father quoted earlier indicate an existence of a border which functions as a ‘frontier’ within the city. Tarlabası Boulevard (Figure 2.6) divides two worlds: one is gleaming, the other murky; one is rich, the other poor; one is visible, the other invisible. Through Tarlabası Boulevard, Tarlabası has become the counter-part of what a modern city should be: the habitat of disease and disorder, crime and corruption, drugs and danger. Tarlabası Street, now Tarlabası Boulevard, was widened during the 1990s era of neo-liberalism, as part of a project to ‘make Istanbul the city of the world’. The urban space was violently rewritten and during this clean-up operation, 368 buildings in Tarlabası, mostly historical, were demolished (Akbulut 1993: 219). Beyoğlu, the quarter that covers the area defined by İstiklal Road and the streets opening onto it, was
considered a lawless district from the 1970s and was gentrified throughout the 1990s. It became the cultural and entertainment centre of Istanbul and Tarlabaşı was pushed towards the other end; the wrong side of Tarlabaşı Boulevard. With this push, the city was re-arranged by wiping out the public space of all those who were ‘unsuitable’ for urban life. Whereas this wide street functions as a link to Taksim and other centres, for the residents of Tarlabaşı the boulevard is a border, where the flux of traffic becomes a river, so that Tarlabaşı can be cut off, like an island, from the rest of the city and from the world.

Fig 2.6 Tarlabaşı Boulevard (photo: Nermin Saybaşılı)

It is no coincidence that in two popular, Turkish films, both shot towards the end of the 1990s, Tarlabaşı is depicted as a forgotten, neglected place, where the people have ‘disappeared’ in the disorder of Istanbul. In Eşkiya (The Brigand) (1997), by Yavuz Turgul, a fearless and a good-natured brigand, who was arrested by the gendarmes in the mountains of the Eastern Turkey and served a thirty-five year prison sentence, having nowhere to live, finds himself living in an old and small hotel in Tarlabaşı. However, whereas he was a bandit of the mountains, and the only brigand amongst his friends still
alive, he is defeated by the city, which he likens to the mountains, and ends up on the streets of Tarlabası. The film *Ağır Roman* (1997), by Mustafa Altıoklar, which was adapted from Metin Kaçan’s 1990 novel of the same title, depicts Tarlabası as a space which can only be told as a tale. It is a tale of losers; the real ‘city heroes’ surrounded by the flash-fire of the metropolis. In the aptly named Kolera (Cholera) Street, where the lives of the unfortunate residents have already been conditioned to death, the story is centred around a man, whose family has migrated from Anatolia, and his lover, a Greek prostitute. All the misfortunes in the film are lived out in their extremes (vagrancy, crimes, murders, fire and love), and, since there is no way out, this dangerous space becomes a trap for its inhabitants.

Is it the case that if, one lives in a city, its geographically defined limits secure one’s status as citizen? I think we already know the answer. Nonetheless, I am wondering in what way the law of the city is reproduced in an immigrant quarter, such as Tarlabası, that escapes all specific constitutive enclosures policed by the nation-state.

**Tarlabaşı as a Container**

The Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben’s writings on camps¹², in which he examines camps as a geopolitical space of modernity, provide us with a tool with which to understand new and more lucid inscriptions of life in the city, such as those found in Tarlabası. Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s notion on sovereignty, Agamben argues that

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sovereignty decides on the state of exception, which is directly related to the act of abandoning the subjects. However, what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in the form of the general rule’s suspension. Agamben notes that sovereign exception is the fundamental localization, that is, the camp (Agamben 1998: 17-19). Agamben stresses that, when a nation-state can no longer regulate subjects as citizens under its dominant structure, it enters into a period of crisis and the structure of the camp appears. Thus the unlocalizable is granted a permanent and visible localization as exception. The camp was originally an exceptional, excluded space; entrenched and surrounded with secrecy. However, Agamben argues that the prevailing of ‘bare life’, or life deprived of any form and value defined by the politics of the nation-state, has gradually extended beyond the walls of the concentration camp today, as the logic of the camp tends to be generalized throughout the entirety of society; such as in airports or certain outskirts of our cities (Ibid., 174-175).

I am not suggesting that Tarlabası has become the official solution for the ‘problem’ of ‘displaced people’, marginal groups or those few who remained living there after the compulsory exchanges following the establishment of the Turkish Republic. However, I am suggesting that we should recognize the camp in its metamorphoses. This old city centre has become a ‘compulsory space’ for those who are excluded from the society, and who have no social security and are left outside all formal or informal networks, business markets and housing facilities. Therefore, they dwell in the city and are not to excluded, but rather included as an ‘exception’ within it; they are permitted their life, but to put it in Agamben’s words it is a ‘bare life’. It is where the figure of citizen has become
homo sacer\(^3\) in the struggle to survive; the one ‘who may be killed and yet not sacrificed’ (Agamben 1998: 8). His body is inscribed in a zone of indistinction, situated between the zoe (natural life) - or the simple fact of living common to all living beings - and bios (qualified life in the polis) - the way of living proper to an individual or a group. This paradox, Agamben stresses, is the main operative in the status of the modern individual living in a system that exerts control over the collective ‘naked life’ of the ‘abandoned’ subjects who inhabit the extreme threshold between life and death, the human and inhuman, the city and the forest (Ibid., 1, 9, 105).

In *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Agamben draws upon Aristotle’s definition of the polis as the opposition between life (zen) and good life (eu zen) in conceptualizing the exclusion of ‘bare life’. Agamben notes that what remains to be interrogated, in the Aristotelian definition, is not merely the sense, the modes and the possible articulations of the ‘good life’ as the telos of the political, we must also ask why Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life (Ibid., 7).

As his analysis develops, Agamben states:

The structure of the exception delineated in the first part of this book appears from the perspective to be consubstantial with Western politics. In Foucault’s statement according to which man was, for Aristotle, a ‘living animal with the additional capacity

\(^3\) Sacred man is a figure of archaic Roman law, whose life is included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion. Drawing upon Carl Schmitt’s idea of the sovereign’s status of ordering as exception, Agamben defines the status of the modern individual as having ‘bare life’. See Agamben (1998: 8, 15-29).
for political existence, it is therefore precisely the meaning of this 'additional capacity' that must be understood as problematic. The peculiar phrase 'born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life' can be read not only as an implication of being born (ginomene) in being (ouse), but also as an inclusive exclusion (an exceptio) of zoe in the polis, almost as if politics were the place in which life had to transform itself into good life and in which what had to be politicized were always already bare life. In Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men. (Ibid., 7)

In *Homo Sacer*, when the philosopher analyzes the naked life of sacred man in the modern state, he also discusses the way in which the figure of the bandit, banned from the city in the Middle Ages, has been reincarnated as homo sacer. He explains the particular logic of exclusion, the 'inclusive exclusion', through the figure of the 'wolf-man' since, according to the historical sources, the bandit's liminal status was defined as a wolf-man:

What had to remain in the collective unconscious as a monstrous hybrid of human and animal, divided between the forest and the city — the werewolf — is ... in its origin the figure of the man who has been banned from the city. That such a man is defined as a wolf-man and not simply as a wolf ... is decisive here. The life of the bandit, like that of the sacred man, is not a piece of animal nature without any relation to law and the city. It is, rather, a threshold of indistinction and of passage between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and inclusion: the life of the bandit is the life of the *loup garou*, the werewolf, who is precisely *neither man nor beast*, and who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging to neither (Ibid., 105).
In light of Agamben's arguments, we can analyse the production of space and subjectivities with regard to Tarlabası. Some important questions arise: Does Tarlabası belong to the city? Do the people in Tarlabası have the same civil rights as ordinary citizens living in Istanbul? Are they seen as public figures?

In Esra Ersen's video-work, 'Brothers & Sisters' (2003), which was shown during the last Istanbul Biennial (2003), and consists of interviews with African immigrants living in Istanbul, Kissin, an immigrant living illegally in Istanbul, likens Tarlabası to a refugee camp. 'Talking about Beyoğlu is fun. .... Compared to back behind Beyoğlu; there is this deadly place, the grand finale of Istanbul: Tarlabası. Tarlabası, where all atrocities, all the good things, everything you think the good and the bad exist. Tarlabası is like a place where ... is like a refugee camp. You don't fault anybody. You know, in the refugee camp, ... this place is a mix of everybody: the father, the mother, the sister ... Everybody stays inside. It is a party place,' he says.

The video starts with a scene in Haydarpasa Train Station, the main train station in Istanbul. This has been host to the most memorable scenes of Turkish melodramas of the 1970s. It is the place where the main protagonists, migrants from rural regions of Turkey, for the first time face their dream city, Istanbul, which symbolizes Western values, with vast opportunities and a good standard of living. In Esra Ersen's video-work, a very similar story enfolds in the same train station. This time, however, it is a group of black people who has just arrived in Istanbul (Figure 2.7). Standing in front of the same train station, they are observing Istanbul, 'the last gate' before reaching to Europe. The African people standing in front of the train station, which was built by a German architect,
assume it is Hamburg. The smuggler, who was paid to take them illegally to Hamburg, has deceived them and left them in Istanbul.

While they are looking at the beautiful scenery of Istanbul, standing on the stairs of the train station, they seem to know that they will never be part of the city, just like the immigrants from the impoverished rural areas of Turkey. They bump into each other at the train station and it is more than likely they will end up living in the same or similar areas in Istanbul; areas like Tarlabası.

According to the UN, worldwide there are nearly seventeen million refugees or asylum-seekers (Özçelik 2006), and the paths of most have crossed Turkey. Countrywide, there has been a vast amount of cross-border flows, especially from the

Fig 2.7 Esra Ersen, 'Brothers & Sisters', video-still, 2003
eastern borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria. Istanbul itself functions as a place of transit for the people who are circulating through the borders. As a growing city, each year Istanbul hosts hundreds of immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers that have been dislocated or forced to move. Between 2000 and 2003, 9,750 applications for asylum were accepted in Turkey and the asylum-seekers granted refugee status by the UN (Ibid., 2006).

Historically, the city originated and was imagined in acts of inclusions and exclusions, in terms of insiders and outsiders, and subjects and outlaws. The outside, non-urban was perceived as distinct and far away from the city. However, this distinction is no longer valid, since in contemporary cities there is a multitude of cross-border flows in every direction. As early as the end of the 1970s, Foucault drew attention to the fact that the ‘territorial state’ had been turning into the ‘State of population’ (cited by Agamben 1998: 3; Foucault 1994: 179). Currently, this phenomenon has become so clear in cities where the politics of quality and of citizenship meet the politics of quantity, of difference and of the anxieties of density.

The protagonists, Jamal and Enayatullah, of the fictional film, In This World (2002), discussed at length in the previous chapter, stay in Tarlabası for a short period of time. After their dangerous border-crossing into Turkey, through Iran, in pitch-black darkness and under gun-fire from the border guards, they stay in a small room in Tarlabası found for them by their smugglers. The film shows how, as the result of an endless and uncontrollable flux of migrations, the classical oppositions of city and country or centre and periphery no longer work. It illustrates how, in our times, ‘cities are engaged as opening onto the possibilities of the unconventional and the unrecorded – where urban
dynamics are shifted away from actual cities to murky borderlands, and where new formulations of sovereignty, belonging and nationhood are provisionally concretized. Exclusion and incorporation, marginality and experimentation, then, converge in ways that are not easily discernible to any kind of actor operating in this interstice' (Simone 2002: 29).

As a quarter into which there is a permanent flux of migrations, Tarlabası has ghostly relations to other cities and other towns, such as Batman, Diyarbakır, Mardin, and Siirt. It is perhaps closer to these cities or towns than where it is actually located. However, this mobility into Tarlabası also creates immobility for its inhabitants. The maze-like, narrow and steep streets of Tarlabası seem to superimpose one street onto another, without reaching anywhere else in Istanbul (Figure 2.8).

Although Tarlabası is characterised by the juxtaposition of multiple and diverse cultural identities, modes of life and forms of appropriating urban space, it turns back to itself. People moved into the quarter when they first arrived to Istanbul thinking that they could move to a better area of the city or soon move ‘forward’ to a city in Europe. However, their temporary settlements have turned into permanent living quarters. ‘Being unwelcome in other quarters, they learnt to welcome each other here,’ says a pharmacist who has been running a pharmacy in Tarlabası for almost twenty years. In other words, they do not want to live there, but they have no other choices. On many occasions, the people I interviewed told me that Tarlabası, for them, is a ‘compulsory space’, leading to tensions and reactions towards society as a whole, as well as between different ethnic groups – the most apparent one being between Kurds and gypsies, for each ethnic
groups accuses the other of street robbery and for the stigma Tarlababı carries. Nationalism, as a reaction towards the Kurdish people, is very common amongst the gypsies. A gypsy who invited me into her house pointed out menacingly: 'There is a Turkish flag hanging on my balcony. Let them dare come and take it down, if they can. The Arabs are good, but the others have spoiled everything. 'Don't be afraid of us, but of the Kurds,' said another person I interviewed. Those from Africa, though, are the most 'undesirable community' in the quarter.

Fig 2.8 The maze-like, narrow and steep streets of Tarlababı seem to superimpose one street on the other, without reaching anywhere else in Istanbul (photo: Nermin Saybaşlı).
One of the features of Islamic cities under the Ottoman Empire was that neighbourhoods were differentiated according to residents' religious and ethnic identities (Duben and Behar 1996: 41). An individual's belonging to the city was shaped by the quarter they lived in. The quarter represented a collective identity. Purity, innocence and unity were all integral parts of it. In a quarter that during the Ottoman Empire was a non-Muslim, middle and upper class neighbourhood, today in Tarlabası we have to talk about spectrality because of its insecure housing. A room is often rented and shared by one, or even more, families, or people sleep in places they are connected to through work or kinship. Owners of houses or small estate agents let flats or rooms and charge foreign immigrants two or three times more. Semi-organized crime controls access to abandoned, historical buildings. The people of Tarlabası cannot develop any sense of belonging to where they live. On the contrary, they hate being there.

On one occasion, I read on a wall: 'Today, too, we will survive' (Figure 2.9). For those of us who are careful enough to notice it, this graffiti whispers more things than we can see and hear about Tarlabası. The inhabitants of Tarlabası lack almost all the rights and expectations that are guaranteed to citizens, and the graffiti is a futile effort on the part of the graffiti artist to inscribe himself onto the place. To find some money, to find something to eat and survival are all parts of the inhabitants' daily routine. Therefore, their lives are characterised by uncertainty, insecurity and the lack of safety. As in the camps, their homes have turned into traps where the streets and the houses have become indistinguishable (Figure 2.10) We can see this when we look at their interiors. The belongings in their homes are either too many or too few (Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12). The houses are either too crowded or too empty. The people do not actually inhabit the
space. The asymmetric order and the accumulation of objects and photographs hint at a reality: the lack of an actuality of a home and of a place to which they can declare they belong. It is as if time is suspended; neither past nor future, and the heaviness of waiting infuses every corner, as if they have just arrived but, already, are ready to go (Figure 2.13).

Fig 2.9 Graffiti reads, ‘Today, too, we will survive’ (photo: Nermin Saybaşlı).
Fig 2.10 Homes in Tarlabası have turned into traps, as in the camps, where the streets and the houses have become indistinguishable (photo: Nermin Saybaşılı).

Fig 2.11 The belongings in the houses in Tarlabası are either too many or too few (photo: Nermin Saybaşılı).
Fig 2.12 The interiors of the houses in Tarlabası are either too crowded or too empty (photo: Nermin Saybaşlı).

Fig 2.13 It is as if the people have just arrived, but already they are ready to go (photo: Nermin Saybaşlı)
Irit Rogoff has pointed out we now are seeing ‘extra-territorial spaces’ for the containment of ‘illegal immigrants’ in cities (Rogoff, 2004: 87). The bodies of the immigrants rupture the city’s increasingly constricted boundaries. The existence of the immigrants prevents society based on citizenship to be fixed within a central organization. The material bodies of those people from various ethnic groups resist ‘enclosure’. The barrier to closure, therefore, is seen as a threat and new barriers are built in order to subordinate this ‘surplus mass’, for their existence challenges the very definition of the nation-state and the nation-state’s appearance in public. A paradox produces a structure in the city similar to the camp: the immigrants’ bodies, even if they are not wanted, occupy space and require space. In order to shore up the exclusive representation of the nation-state in the cities, their existence, is reduced through containment in shanty towns, ghettos and centres for the refugees and asylum-seekers. In this way, they are domesticated. Their bodies are squeezed into a tiny space in the city, cordoned off and sealed, into a certain location and within certain geographies in the city, which function as a ‘container’.

Tarlabası is the zone of dis-identification. It is a no-man’s-land, and ‘the production of the unsymbolizable, the unspeakable, the illegible,’ Butler writes, ‘is always a strategy of social abjection’ (Butler 1993: 190). Julia Kristeva has developed the notion of ‘abject’ in her important book, Powers of Horror. She conceptualises ‘abject’ as being opposed to the autonomous and unified ‘I’. It is a threat that cannot be assimilated. This ‘thing’ (dung,
waste, filth, corpse, wound, etc.), being improper and unclean, creates the condition of loathing or fear on the one who establishes herself or himself as a subject and define her or his body’s inside and outside. Kristeva refers to ‘uncannies’ in discussing abject and abjection:

A massive and sudden emergence of uncannies, which familiar as it might have been in an opaque and forgotten life, now harries me as radically separate, loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either. A "something" that I do not recognize as a thing. A weight of meaningless, about which there is nothing insignificant, and which crushes me. On the edge of non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me. There, abject and abjection are my safeguards. (Kristeva 1982: 2).

The ‘abject’ is an ambiguous ‘thing’ or an ‘uncanny’ figure that breaks down the oppositions between I and the ‘Other’, between the inside and the outside. Kristeva traces a link between the ‘abject’ and the exile, arguing that for the space that engrosses, the excluded is never one, nor homogenous, nor totalizable. Rather it is essentially divisible, foldable and catastrophic. In other words, the spaces occupied by the exile is fluid, for the exile is constituted of a non-object - the ‘abject’ (Ibid. 8).

Drawing on Kristeva’s notion of the ‘abject’, Butler argues that the repudiation of abjection constitutes the ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life, which is nevertheless densely populated by those who do not have the status of subject (Butler 1993: 3).
I would argue that ‘abjected subjects’ become threatening spectres, as the oppressor has long been haunter.

Containing a mass of desperate and helpless people who are excluded from the body of the social and are deprived of adequate housing, social services and education, Tarlabaşı, this repressed and forgotten quarter, inevitably has been transformed into a dangerous zone within the city. It produces its own vicious cycle. Once it is sealed by criminality and illegality, it turns into a grey zone in which nothing is simply black or white. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ rather are fused to form one single entity, as Kissin in Ersen’s video-work says, ‘In Tarlabası, everything you think within the good and the bad exist’.

Tarlabaşı has been produced as a space where the police force and politics merge, and where the difference between violence and law disappears. One man, complaining about the pressing presence of the police in the area, said: ‘Our relations with the State is limited to the police. It is only the police we see in our daily lives.’

Overcoming the ‘urban jungle’ is the justification for monstrous incivility in the heart of the city. Although its geography is too visible, making it unlikely to be missed, it has become a ‘quarantined war zone’ between gangs and the police. It confounds and unhinges clear assessments regarding the activities of the police or the gang groups. In this respect, following Agamben’s characterization of the camp, Tarlabaşı is a ‘dislocated location’. It is a zone of ‘indistinction between the outside and the inside, the exception and the rule, the licit and the illicit, in which every juridical protection has disappeared’ (Agamben, 2000: 40-41). While the highly visible presence of the police overtly marks the
space (Figure 2.15), it also indicates a covert violence that constitutes the space, for the events taking place there are often not seen and simply left unexamined. The space, therefore, is included through the creation of a zone of indistinction that traces a threshold where 'outside and inside, the normal situation and chaos enter into ... complex topological relations' (Agamben 1998: 19-20). Tarlabası is haunting its inhabitants. A young panhandler captured this well when he stated: 'Tarlabası is like mud. You should not touch it, otherwise it will suck you in, it will infect you.'

Fig 2.14 Stefan Römer, 'Architectonics 2', 2005. The photograph of the police station in Tarlabası. While the highly visible presence of the police overtly marks the space, it also indicates a covert violence that constitutes the space.
From the few conversations I had with the police, it seems that they, too, attributed ‘dirtiness’ to Tarlabası. As Agamben reminds us, homo sacer designates the person or the thing that one cannot touch without dirtying himself or herself; hence the double meaning of sacer as both ‘sacred’ and ‘accursed’ (Ibid., 79). ‘This place has to be destroyed’. I heard this, or similar statements, many times. For the police, the inhabitants have to be rooted out of the city. It is because the inhabitants of the quarter have no life with a value, like that of homo sacer, that destruction and extermination is imaginable. If the deed followed up the wish, any ‘dirt’ on the hands of the exterminators would be the ‘filth’ of the inhabitants, and would pose no danger or threat for those responsible.

There is a big gap between what is visible in the maze-like architecture of Tarlabası, with its dark and narrow streets, and what is secreted within it. In this sense, the space is produced by elements that we cannot see, as much as those that we can. When I asked the question ‘How would you describe Tarlabası?’, the answer often was ‘here vision goes beyond reality’, But the answer also can be reversed: ‘Here reality goes beyond vision’.

The ‘absent presence’ of the inhabitants of Tarlabası calls for the questioning of the production of space by inhabiting space in a way that frustrates the limits of its inhabitability. Both domestic and foreign inhabitants reveal the covert operations on the area as they are ‘ghosting’ ‘our world’, ‘interrupting’ the present time; a strange act which gives way to what is hidden underneath the topography of Tarlabası.
As already noted in Chapter 1, the haunting is itself the product of a double, uncanny violence. The official violence that sustains the institution can never detach itself from what it repressed or excluded. One type of violence always haunts the other. As an institution, the police act as a hinge between the two forms of violence that constitute any space (Wigley 1997: 169-170). In this respect, the hauntings of the inhabitants of Tarlabası put the structure under pressure and take it to its limits, for the institutional space is regularly visited, haunted and inhabited by what it has excluded or repressed, This is in line with ideas Derrida developed throughout his work. For example, a young boy fights off his disappearance in the public domain. He knows that he cannot totally overcome the obstacles, but he can violate the space by declaring his presence in the space. His gestures have a ‘spectrality effect’ (Derrida, 1994: 40) as they undo the opposition or dialectic between actual presence and absolute absence. These acts are about ‘traces’, in Derridean terms, in that they are neither past nor present but between the two.

**Voicing Out Difference**

In her video, ‘Brothers & Sisters’, the artist, Esra Ersen, draws attention to the fact that African immigrants living in Istanbul feel comfortable only in places which are not characteristic of the city; such as night clubs, shopping malls, parks, hotels and McDonalds. Recalling the anthropologist Marc Augé’s concept of ‘supermodernity’, which refers to the logic of late capitalism in the global world, all these places are ‘non-places’. The ‘non-place’, where no organic life is possible, creates ‘solitary contractuality, since it mediates a whole mass of relations, both with self and with others, which are only indirectly connected with their purposes’ (Augé 1995: 94). What Augé sees as the
paradox of the 'non-place' is relevant to this discussion: 'a foreigner lost in a country he does not know (a 'passing stranger') can feel at home there only in the anonymity of motorways, service stations, big stores or hotel chains' (Ibid., 106). It is in these worldwide consumption spaces and amongst the multinational brand names that the individual can easily develop a sense of 'belonging' in his or her solitude.

In addition, in the case of the African immigrants, they find shelter in 'being invisible' in the 'familiar crowd' of the 'non-spaces'. Here they can be faithful to a 'shadow' without being fully there in the present. Referring to a world 'surrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral' (Ibid., 78) and having no concern with any identity, these places, in which people possibly are most unaware of one another, cannot be defined in relational, social or historical terms.

The narrow and maze-like streets of Tarlabası, which do not lead to any common square but fall back upon themselves, can be considered as 'non-places' and indefinite spaces. These streets can only impose isolation rather than any form of communication, interaction or participation. They prevent the chance encounter between diverse population and the city dweller. The public space of the inhabitants of Tarlabası, if there is any, is where they chat in front of their doors that, open onto the corridor-like streets. A young Kurd, sitting on the stairs in front of his house, complained that the police always asked for his ID whenever he went to sell mussels on İstiklal Street, only one boulevard away. In the 1990s, while the political geography of sovereignty focused on border wars against Kurds, the urban geography focused on a visual purity that produced continuity between being Kurdish and being a PKK-terrorist. This Kurdish man is reminded that he
does not belong there. In this respect, it is not wrong to say that the exclusion has material effects and produces particular forms of materiality that I call ghostly.

The public sphere has already been conceptualized as a ‘phantom’. I wonder, though, whether we also can think of community as a ‘phantom’ in order to think beyond formulaic prescriptions of community and to open up an altogether different model of collectivity and belonging. As an elusive, discursive formation, community can be seen as a ‘phantom’ because it is not there in the present. Jean-Luc Nancy calls community ‘un-working’ or ‘inoperative’. What he means is that community, as a collective, social body, with total consolidation, wholeness and unity, is impossible. Nancy defines this alternative understanding of community as, ‘non-essential being-in-common’ (Nancy 2000: 33). From this perspective, one can suggest that only a community that questions its own legitimacy is legitimate.

15 Walter Lippmann first spoke of the public as a phantom in his 1925 book, *The Phantom Public*. In discussing identity and difference, Lippmann calls into question the expectation of a unity that can absorb diversity. He argues that, ‘modern society is not visible to anybody, nor intelligible continuously and as a whole. One section is visible to another section, one series of acts is intelligible to this group and another to that’ (Lippmann 1925: 98, 42). Drawing partly on Lippmann’s idea of public as phantom, in his anthology, *The Phantom Public Sphere*, Robbins attempts to cast doubt on the existence of a unified public. This understanding of public stresses that the image of the unified public is necessarily phantom, on the one hand, and draws attention to the potential to think or imagine some alternative modes or possibilities, on the other. He challenges the Habermasian ideal of a singular public sphere that has supposedly fallen into decline. For Robbins, the Habermasian ideal itself is a phantom because, what makes the public sphere public - qualities such as inclusiveness and accessibility - has always been illusory. Therefore, in contrast to Jürgen Habermas’ suggestion that we once had publicness but have now lost it and must somehow retrieve it, the publics neither lost nor retrievable. In his book, *Structural Transformation of the Public Space* (1962), Habermas claims that the public sphere was gained by the liberal bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century and then lost in the epoch of consumerism, mass media and the expansion of the state into the intimate space of the family. Robbins, however, claims that the public is a phantom because what it has always stood for is itself irremediably deceptive and oppressive. The ideal of a non-coercive consensus reached through reason is an illusion maintained by repressing differences and particularities. However, Robbins also sees, in the idea of the public as phantom, a positive sight; an alternative public. If public space is a phantom, then more radical possibilities for democracy may lie in a public sphere that is precisely phantom. See Robbins (1993: vii-xxvi). See also Deutsche (1998: 319-321), for a detailed discussion of Robbins’ arguments.
In her collaborative video-work, ‘Final Sounds from the Other Side of the Street’ (2000), the French artist, Claude Leon, is searching for a ‘community’ which comes into existence only temporarily, without having any determinate intention or performing any planned activity. Leon took her video camera and wandered the streets of Tarlabası for one day. During this journey, she asked the people whom she encountered to sing a song from where they originated. Leon’s camera does not show a grounded or a fixed event in the specificity of a location. In the video, various people of different ages and ethnic groups sing songs in front of the camera; some eagerly, some reluctantly, some at ease and some having a difficult time thinking of a song or feeling able to sing one (Figure 2.15, Figure 2.16, Figure 2.17, Figure 2.18, Figure 2.19 and Figure 2.20). Their singing did not last very long. Through the manner in which the protagonists of the video fleetingly inhabit the screen, one by one, Tarlabası begins to operate in the logic of the ‘fold’, in Deleuzean terms. The ‘auditory space’ Leon has opened up consists of a variety of voices, languages, accents and sensibilities. In spatial temporalities, the unexpected singularities and the unplanned activities of singing emerge. As the film continues, Tarlabası ceases to be a static and fixed topography, and becomes a fluid and changing geography, as it is enveloped by the different voices and sounds of the people who come, not only from other cities, towns or villages in Turkey, or from marginalized groups, such as transvestites and transsexuals, but also from distant, foreign lands.
Video-stills from 'Final Sounds from the Other Side of the Street' (2000) by Claude Leon. Fig. 2.15 Bekir from Sivas; Fig. 2.16 Zeki from Sivas; Fig. 2.17 Klum from Nigeria; Fig. 2.18 Sati from Tokat; Fig. 2.19 Songül from Mardin, Ipek from Gaziantep and Mehmet from Mardin; 2.20 Durdu from Maraş.
Miwon Kwon has argued:

Today's site-oriented practices inherit the task of demarcating the relational specificity that can hold in dialectical tension the distant poles of spatial experience.... This means addressing the uneven conditions of adjacencies and distances between one thing, one person, one place, one thought, one fragment next to another, rather than invoking equivalences via one thing after another. Only those cultural practices that have this relational sensibility can turn local encounters into long-term commitments and transform passing intimacies into indelible, uneretactable social marks - so that the sequence of sites that we inhabit in our life's traversal does not become genericized into an undifferentiated serialization, one place after another (Kwon 2000: 166).

Leon searches for a terrain between mobilization and specificity - to be out of place with punctuality and precision. In re-considering the relationship between location and subjectivity, recent models of site specificity and community-based art challenge the very nature of site as an actual and defined location, and the idea of a stable and fixed identity that inhabits it. Instead, the site is reconfigured as an open space that is actualized through inter-related spaces and multiple subjectivities.

'Final Sounds from the Other Side of the Street' endlessly produces folds that take us to their labyrinth-like, energetic trajectory. In discussing his concept of the 'fold', Deleuze writes: 'A labyrinth is said, etymologically, to be multiple because it contains many folds. The multiple is not only what has many parts but also what is folded in many ways' (Deleuze 1993: 3). Leon's film shows the operative logic of the multi-inhabited
quarter. There are all kinds of folds coming from, at once and at the same time, the very
centre or from the remote; from the East or from the far-East, from the South or from the
far South. These include: Gaziantep, Ağrı, Sivas, Van, Çatalca, Nigeria, Tokat, Batman,
Kocaeli, Urfa, Hatay, İzmir, Kahramanmaraş Kayseri, Mardin; and all these folds push the
limits to infinity.

It has been widely argued that the essentializing process in community-based art
isolates a single point of commonality in order to define a community as a coherent social
entity that is shared by unified subjects. It is as if a shared identity can be viewed as self-
affirming. It is a self-validating expression of that community through the final work. There
is a presumption that a community in a specific location can be fully self-present and able
to communicate its self-presence to others with immediacy (Kwon 2002: 151). Although it
is based on a specific location and results from a collaborative and collective artistic
project, ‘Final Sounds from the Other Side of the Street’ does not try to take the
community in Tarlabası as a referential social entity. What it has done is to reveal the
impossibility of community and the impossibility of total consolidation, wholeness and
unity. In this respect, the film is ‘un-worked’. It is ‘inoperative’, as George Van Den
Abbeele writes, when analysing Nancy’s notion of community: ‘community is neither a
community of subjects, nor a promise of immanence, nor a communion of individuals in
some higher or greater totality…. It is not, most specifically, the product of any work or
project; it is not work, not a product of projected labour, nor an œuvre, but what is un-
Voice has to do with boundaries, for it is bound up with the existence of a space that precedes it. Only if one has the space to stand and speak, can his or her voice can be heard. If it is audible then she or he is considered a member of society. Without the spatiality that precedes and contains it, there cannot be an audible voice. The residents of Tarlabası have a bodiless voice because they are deprived of the words through which they can produce an effect in the public domain. In her book, *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt remarks on the fact that the term public is strictly tied to what she calls ‘appearance’. She suggests that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody, and attains the widest possible publicity and reality (Arendt 1958: 50). Arendt claims that speech and action are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not as physical objects, but *qua* men and recognize each other as a member of society (Ibid., 176). In other words, ‘appearance’ is performative, and a body without speech and action is not considered to be there at present, to be in public nor to belong to a certain community.

In the 1990s, Tarlabası could have ‘appeared’ in the public domain only in the figure of those ‘children who sell handkerchiefs’ (*seípak satan çocuklar*) in Taksim, to earn some money for their unemployed parents. The public found its romantic and ‘benign’ (innocuous) figure in the image of these children, whose desperate lives were ‘shown’ to the public on TV shows. The discussions in these programmes revealed condescending or romanticizing understandings of their ‘guests’. However, although the programmers claimed to enable these forgotten children to speech, they often imprison them in the mechanism of representation and made them ‘speechless’.
A section from an interview with Zeynep, a young girl, whose family migrated to Istanbul from Agri in Eastern Turkey, illustrates my argument:

Necmi Erdoğan: What did you feel then when you suddenly appeared on television? Did you like it, did you enjoy it?

Zeynep: No! Street children, they called us. Never enjoyed it... If these ladies were there in the present, I wouldn’t care about the rules of respect. I would scream. I mean street children. My friends in school saw. ‘Are you a street child,’ they asked; ‘are you going to such places? I said ’no’. ‘They misunderstood,’ I said.

Cengiz Çiftçi: But didn’t you say on TV that we are not street-children?

Zeynep: We said it a couple of times, but still they didn’t listen. They had written it incorrectly.

Cengiz Çiftçi: They had written incorrectly? Then they didn’t listen to you.

Zeynep: They didn’t (Erdoğan 2002: 295).

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak main argument, in her article ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, is that even when the ‘subaltern’, the oppressed or the excluded one in the colonial or the imperialist system makes an effort to speak, s/he cannot be listened to or be heard (Spivak 1996: 292). In other words, the ‘subaltern’ does not have his/her own language. S/he cannot master his/her speech in the phono-centric world, just as s/he cannot master his/her own image in the regime of the visible. It is as if his/her language is borrowed from another language. Otherness, therefore, is spectral, for its voice cannot find its echo in the social. It always returns to itself as muteness.
In his consideration of space in the ‘moving bodies’ of the pedestrians, Michel de Certeau touches on the affinity between walking and speaking. For him, walking is a spatial acting out of space, just as the speech act is an acoustic acting out of language. ‘The act of walking is to the urban system what the act of speaking, the Speech Act, is to language or to the statements uttered’ (De Certeau 2000: 106). In other words, there is a ‘bodied language’ in spatialized terms. Whoever is outside the language cannot be emerged or cannot be heard in the hegemonic representation of language. Both the African immigrants in Ersen’s video-work and the inhabitants of Tarlabası have ghostly steps and ‘silent voices’.

I wish now to examine the way in which, in ‘Final Sounds from the Other Side of the Street’, Leon urges us to listen to the voices kept in silence. Her attempt is not about ‘giving a voice’ to the people who have been left unheard, because this would inevitably produce a power relation for it imprisons the subjects in the regime of representation. Instead, her approach, in her artistic practice, makes ‘acoustic transgressions’ possible. The people powerfully take possession of the streets. For the moment, though, I want to shift the discussion to another video-work, Ersen’s ‘If You Could Speak Swedish’ (2001), in order to consider how the ‘foreigner’s’ appearance signals a ‘border’, and how language, itself a cultural form, can become a powerful instrument for the fortification of this ‘border’ between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This discussion will help us engage critically with immigration policies and with the grand project of multiculturalism. These have left us with an increase in racism and racist violence, on the one hand, and with an identity politics, that has brought difference into identity demarcations and the category of ‘ethnic minority’, on the other.
In, 'If You Could Speak Swedish', Ersen collaborated with immigrants and asylum-seekers attending a Swedish language course in a suburb of Stockholm. At the beginning of the film, we see two signs at the entrance to the language course in InfoKomp, Huddinge. The language courses, which are organized according to what is called an integration (not immigration) policy (Grammel 2001: 19)\textsuperscript{16}, are designated to ‘two types of participants’. One sign indicates the way to a language course reserved for those whose visa applications have been accepted and the other leads to other courses in the same building that are designated either for those whose applications have not yet been accepted or for immigrants who are permitted only a limited stay in the country. Esra Ersen is herself a traveller who is constantly on the move and an artist whose work is formed by and through the journeys she makes and the people she meets on her way. In her work, she deals with the tension between stable and delineated locations and the uncontrollable flux of migration. In ‘If You Could Speak Swedish’, she examines this tension by focusing especially on the complex processes of integration and assimilation immigrants have to cope with.

For an immigrant, acquiring a new language represents a process of ‘integration’ into the coordinates of a completely new cultural system. S/he, thus, is made ‘motionless’. However, migration should be seen not as a process that is completed by the arrival of an

\textsuperscript{16} In 1998, the Swedish Integration Board was founded; a new authority with comprehensive responsibility for an integration policy. According to this policy, every municipality in Sweden is responsible for offering courses — ‘Swedish for immigrants’ — in the Swedish language and for providing a basic knowledge of Swedish society. Grammel points out that the extensive programme of language courses and training in Sweden derives, for one, from its role and its history as a country of immigration, and, secondly, points to a widespread programme in Europe for productivity and efficiency. He writes: ‘This orientation of politics towards modern management is symptomatic of the industrial nation’s political programme and also marks the aims and mechanism of their immigration policy. Policies that are openly xenophobic and isolationist are simply inefficient and have therefore become fossilised, which — above all, in the social democratically governed countries in Europe — were replaced by so-called integrative programmes’ (Grammel 2001: 19).
individual in a foreign place. If there is an arrival, it is absolute and beyond the politics of assimilation or integration. As Papastergiadis has pointed out (Papastergiadis 2000: 205), migrants are often transformed by their journey, and their presence is a catalyst to new transformations in the spaces they enter.

Ersen, herself attending the course for one term, asked the immigrants who were participating in these language courses to write down, in their mother tongues, what they would like to say if they could speak Swedish. These texts include personal, emotional comments and political statements, and were translated into Swedish from a variety of languages, such as Arabic, Russian, Spanish and Chinese. The apparent uneasiness of the students as they try to read their own sentences in Swedish in front of the camera, and the perceptible incongruity in the environment, hint at the impossibility of inhabiting a foreign language or being able to fit into an already existing community and its cultural values and norms. This is especially noticeable in the lack of harmony between the posters hung on the classroom walls, such as one showing a beautiful Stockholm with bright skies and a blue sea, and the real condition of the immigrants standing in front of the posters, struggling to 'express' themselves (Figure 2.21). The haunting existence of the language teacher, who is off-screen and whose voice can be heard correcting the students' pronunciation, again and again asking for words to be repeated until they are correct, conveys a kind of aggression. The teacher's interruptions double the immigrants' foreignness and bring us face to face with the dominating 'European presence'.
In her important book *Strangers to Ourselves*, Julia Kristeva points to the subtlety of power over a 'foreigner'. She writes:

To be of no account to others. No one listens to you, you never have the floor, or else, when you have the courage to seize it, your speech is quickly erased by the more garrulous and fully relaxed talk of the community. Your speech has no past and will have no power over the future of the group: why should one listen to it? You do not have enough status – 'no social standing' – to make your speech useful. ... Your speech, fascinating as it might be on account of its strangeness, will be out of no consequence, will have no effect, will cause no improvement' (Kristeva 1991: 20).

One wonders whether an immigrant's speaking in Swedish can convey its intended meaning, not only to us, but also to the author of the sentences. Seated before a colourful poster filled with a rich selection of fruits and vegetables (some have a clear resonance of
'exoticism'), an Iraqi man reads: 'When he sought to make me one of his tools of oppression I declined. He sought to make out of me a murderer of innocent and unarmed people ... I left my friends and family and came to Sweden'. While he is speaking his translated text, his own sentences became suddenly strange to himself. It becomes quite clear that his voice cannot really be heard in a completely different sign system and under the pressing power of cultural codes which come from outside. By positioning the subject in the regime of representation, the language, in this case, has the power to make the immigrants see and experience themselves as the 'Other'.

This discussion brings us to the notion of 'untranslatability', proposed by Sarat Maharaj: '... self and other could never translate into or know each other. This sense of opacity served to underpin its doctrine of an absolute 'epistemic barrier' – grounds for institutionalizing a radical sense of ethnic and cultural difference and separateness' (Maharaj 2001: 28). By accepting the impossibility of perfect translation and of transparency of meaning, we come to realize that what is not and can never be inside representation is the untranslatable. Mapping out a new space for thinking about difference, this notion helps us to rethink, in a political sense, the failure of the state's attempt to translate and slot a person into a set category of difference. Both translatable and untranslatable, this new space ultimately escapes fixity and closure. When it comes to the discourse of 'integration', we can go further and claim that cultures have been broken into and interrupted by cosmopolitan dispersals, by migration and displacement. In this cultural climate, cultural languages are no longer closed. As Stuart Hall points out (Hall 2001: 16, 18), they are constantly transformed, from both within and outside, continuously learning from other languages and traditions, drawing them in and producing
something that is irreducible to either of the cultural elements that constituted it in the first place.

As has been widely argued, multiculturalism has been developed as a concept by nations and others aspiring to geopolitical cohesiveness who are trying to represent themselves as transcendentally homogeneous, in spite of their heterogeneity (Sneja 2004: 16). The politics of representation is at the heart of multiculturalism, because this project aims to manage and control difference in order to establish the internal coherence of the members with an already established identity in 'common.' However, in 'Final Sounds from the Other Side of the Street', the video-geographic space is inhabited by multiple identities and cultural languages. It enables us to think difference; that is 'different modes of knowing rather than different subjects within known modes' (Rogoff 2003: 53). Unlike the voices in the language courses in Sweden, the people of Tarlabası 'appear' to us in their temporary stabilisations. The people in Tarlabası 'appear', because Leon tries to find a new form of visual representation, unchained from the position of enunciation or from a place that the subject speaks or writes. The video hints at the fact that, compared to the linguistic or to the visual, the 'materiality' of sound or voice can operate at a different level of communication. Through the performative act of singing, the people gain an unexpected and unpredictable visibility.

In 'Final Sounds from the Other Side of the Street', Tarlabası is not mobilized in order to celebrate the 'richness of Turkish culture', as has been done in the name of the project of the 'multicultural society' in Turkey. Beginning in the 1990s in Turkey, the project of multiculturalism has been voiced through a discourse of 'the mosaic society'.
The metaphor of `mosaic' signals the haunting of the Ottoman Empire. In the colourful pattern of mosaics, every small stone is carefully segregated from the others with black borderlines. The cities of the Ottoman Empire recall the structure of a mosaic as they were planned along ethnic and religious identity lines, thereby regulating difference and managing the geopolitical diversity of ethnicity. This metaphor reveals the way in which the Ottoman Empire continues to regulate political and social life, through the manner in which the former colonial power marks the boundaries of the Turkish Republic's consciousness. The history of the Ottoman Empire has returned in the manner of a 'ghost'. As Derrida argues (Derrida 1994: xviii-xix), inheritance is a history of 'ghosts' whose mysterious familiarities turn ontology into a hauntology. If history, in the traditional sense, is understood as a linear temporal movement in which each event follows the other in ordered succession, Derrida's conception of inheritance interrupts this infinity of history by proposing memory as a condition of finitude. It exposes the possibility of choice, or what the historian Eric Hobsbawn calls the 'invention of tradition.' Haunting is historical, but not encumbered by the specificity of dating; it is not without time but it is 'untimely': 'Untimely, it does not come to, it does not happen to, it does not befall' (Derrida 1994: 5).

Both 'If You Could Speak Swedish' and 'Final Sounds from the Other Side of the Street' imply that, the real challenge in our times is not to regulate and rule out the differences and treat them according to a policy or a programme that which Sarat Maharaj has described as 'multicultural managerialism' (Hall and Maharaj 2001: 46). Nor is it to 'imprison' them, as in the Tarlabası example, in a well-policing, well-bounded, well-frontiered set of spaces. Rather it is to find a way of engaging with fractures and
untranslatabilities, and of writing uneasy moments into culture. We should develop a more complex understanding of the relationship between geography and subjectivity, and between location and identity. It is because of this necessary task that, throughout my analysis, I zoom in and out of Istanbul, as I believe that my perspective can produce a model through which I can project knowledge onto the outer Western world.

Location can no longer be considered a stable and fixed space through which identities are actively controlled and regulated. From this perspective, we come to realize that both the anthropological and the artistic models of culture rest on making a distinction between the culture of one ethnicity, nation or community, and another.

As have been discussed in the Introduction, Visual Culture approaches culture from a fluid, dynamic perspective. In similar manner, the approach I take in my analysis in this chapter, which is informed by Visual Culture studies, is based on the idea that it no longer makes sense to locate cultural and artistic activity solely within national or geographic boundaries (see Mirzoeff 1999: 24-26). Transculture offers a way to analyze the hybrid 'global diaspora' in which we live, and I believe that both Esra Ersen and Claude Leon take this approach in their artistic practices. In the age of global production and the circulation of images, the visual is not simply a local question.
CHAPTER 3

FIGURING THE CHILD

In his essay, 'What Children Say', Gilles Deleuze mentions Little Hans, who coloured in maps in, inverted them, superimposed them, and populated them with their leaders: Churchill for England and Hitler for Germany. Deleuze interprets this re-mapping, which follows historical trajectories, in these words: 'It is the libido's business to haunt history and geography, to organize formations of worlds and constellations of universes, to make continents drift and to populate them with races, tribes and nations' (Deleuze 1998: 62). Little Hans' imaginary cartographic activity is lack of trajectories, the trajectories that powerfully turn the imaginary into a 'becoming' of an affective 'real journey'.

In this chapter, I first will try to track down what is behind the appearance of the figure or of the image of the child on the haunted map of nationalist discourses or migratory sites. 'The child', we will see, serves as a device to map out the various ways of haunting and the complexity of haunting and ghosting. 'The child' I talk of here refers not only to certain ages or physical attributes, but also, and more importantly, to the condition of 'being a child', especially in the context of nation-state building and the haunted geography of a particular island in the Mediterranean Sea; namely Cyprus. Regarding Cyprus 'the child' is, far away from 'becoming', a topography whose territory has been captured. However, we also will see the determination of a 'becoming' in the performative speech of Neşe Yaşın, a Turkish Cypriot poet living on the Greek side of Cyprus, who
cannot travel to the Turkish side. Yaşın draws her own cartographic mapping, which turns her fixed immobility into a voyage across the divided land of the island.

The Child: Biography of Nation

As all binary terms, 'adult' and 'child' are defined in relation to each other. As a historical and social construct, 'childhood' is considered as the process of formation into adulthood and citizenship. Since the 18th century, the child has been understood as lacking that which defines an adult, for example, as lacking reason or physical independence. The empiricist, John Locke, likens all children to travellers, who are 'newly arrived in a strange country, of which they know nothing' (cited by Archard 1998: 87). Since there is an understanding that humans become knowledgeable, reasoning beings, 'childhood' is seen as being an imperfect, incomplete version of 'adulthood' and children as citizens in the making.

Children's association with authority or the nation-state is more problematic, or at least more complicated, than that of the 'adults'. The child is not fully rooted in complex social networks of citizenship. Under the law of the UN (United Nations), for instance, an individual comes of age at 18. At this stage, their status changes radically, for the nation-state gives young people the right to vote as members of the community. They become the citizens of a particular nation. According to the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of The Child, a child refers to every human being below the age of 18 years.

Childhood is a social category that, since its conception, has changed over the centuries. In his well-known book, Centuries of Childhood (1962), Philippe Ariès argues that our understanding of childhood did not exist prior to the Middle ages (i.e. before the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). He examines the way in which the conception of the child, as separate from the adult, was shaped and changed over the centuries in accordance with certain historical conditions and processes.
unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. They are not seen as subjects tied ‘yet’ to any institutional structure; their subject formation has not yet ended and they are still in the process of becoming subjects. This explains why the unaccompanied child, who arrives in a foreign country as an asylum seeker, can stay in the country until the age of 18, even if his or her application for asylum is refused.

However, even if children are not considered citizens, some conception of the child is necessary in order to imagine the nation. The existence of the child makes the nation possible. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, understood this. He deliberately had his photograph taken with children during ‘the birth of a nation’, after the Ottoman Empire. One of the most famous photographs of him was taken while he was teaching the Latin alphabet to two children, one a boy, the other a girl. The photograph shows white, clean, Latin letters shining on a blackboard. Here it is important to remember that on the cover-page of the new Turkish alphabet made up of Latin letters (established in 1928), Atatürk was represented as a ‘headmaster’ teaching his adopted child, Ülkü, who wears a modern school uniform. The child, in this context, represents a new nation, a beginning from scratch and the hope for the future. Atatürk, especially in his public speeches, put an emphasis on the importance of children and the youth. In 1930, he stated: ‘Whatever the age of the student is, s/he should be seen as the adult of the future and treated as such’ (Özel [N.D.]: 259). His words indicate that children were selective agents or ‘projects’ that must continuously be managed by the adults. He was the first leader who established an annual National Children’s Ceremony and National Youth’s Ceremony, both of which have continued to be celebrated ever since.
Nikolas Rose writes

Childhood is the most intensively governed sector of personal existence. In different ways, at different times and by many different routes, varying from one section of society to another, the health, welfare and rearing of children have been linked in thought and practice to the destiny of the nation and the responsibilities of the state. The modern child has become the focus of innumerable projects that purport to safeguard it from physical, sexual and moral danger, to ensure its 'normal' development, to actively promote certain capacities of attributes such as intelligence, educability and emotional stability (Rose 1989: 121).

In the case of Atatürk's nation, the child embodied change and development. S/he was the figure of the utopian imagination, enabling people to conceive of a new nation that must be built in the present. Childhood, seen as a temporary state, had become the vehicle of hope for the future.

The historical time of modernity - of the nation-state - is a diachronic time, in which one event follows the other, in order and without interruption. Its calendar is permanent and stable, and its rhythm is continual and measured. However, both the fall and the birth of the nation introduce a clear interruption to the diachronic calendar. The child can take away anxieties about the passing of time, the destruction of historical formation, and the paralysis and destabilisation of the calendar of a nation.

The Albanian artist, Adrian Paci, migrated with his wife and two daughters to Italy in 1997, the year civil war had just begun to ripple through Albania. The same year he left
Albania to start a new life in Italy, Paci made a film about one of his daughters’ games. This earlier video-work later would lead to a couple of other films. In his work, in which his daughters always are the testimonial figures, Paci tries to convey his family’s experience of dislocation and exile. In his video-work, ‘Albanian Stories’ (1997), Paci simply shot his three-year-old-daughter, Jolanda, playing with her toys and telling fairy tales. In her reinvention, she mixes the protagonist of the stories with her memory of war in Albania and her family’s experience of exile. For instance, a cock, a cat, a cow and a family were very frightened because of the ‘bad forces’ that made a fire near a wall. They were waiting for ‘international forces’ to come and rescue them, but, in the end, they had to flee to Italy to survive. Two years later, in another video-work, ‘A Real Game’ (1999), again Jolanda is shown recounting her unhappiness in her new life in Milan. She tells how because of their new jobs, her mother is always tired and her father is rarely at home. Her mother and father, who both used to work at a university when they were living in Albania, are now a baby-sitter and a restorer. In another work, ‘Exist’, dated the same year, Paci photographed his two daughters’ backs, on which he drew copies of the stamps the emigration authorities put in the passports of people from Eastern Europe. These photographs, shown at an exhibition in Albania, somehow ended up in the hands of Italian police. He was accused of being a child abuser and pornographer, and was interrogated by the police. In ‘Believe Me, I am an Artist’ (2000), Paci turned this police interrogation into an art-piece by using the original interview, which had been videotaped. In the interview, he tries to explain to the officer, who apparently is not convinced, that these stamps are not real. Paci tells the officer that these stamps are metaphors of their departure from Albania, of leaving the native land. Marking their bodies, the stamps are the signs that come to signify their whole lives.
In all these autobiographical works, Paci tells a story of the loss and pain of exile through the figure of the child. The presence of the child eliminates the fracture in historical and national time.

In his video-installation, ‘Apparition’ (2001), the apparitional, temporary appearance of a child serves as the only tie that connects the past to the present, a lost geography to a newly born nation. The installation, displayed in the exhibition, Blood and Honey, Future’s in the Balkans (2003), at Sammlung Essl near Vienna, is made of two projections on two opposite walls. The artist’s small daughter, Tea, who constantly appears and disappears on the small screen in the manner of a ghost, sings an old, traditional Albanian song when she appears. On a different screen, opposite and lower down, a group of elderly people, all of whom are the artist’s family members in Albania, are echoing love for a child whom they might never see again. Until the child’s appearance on the screen, they are all silent, waiting for her, as if their existence depends on the child, as if they have forgotten this old Albanian song and need someone to remind them of what they have forgotten (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). The child, who they can only imagine, haunts them. From this perspective, it is not wrong to say that both the people in Albania and the child now living in Italy are in fact not living in either of these geographies. They are all living somewhere else where fiction and truth are intertwined.
In Paci’s video, the child embodies the story of nationhood within herself. She is the integrating element of ‘one big family’. Her existence comes to her relatives as an echo. It is a powerful echo that makes them both remember their history, and project their desires and wishes upon the future. The past, in the embodiment of the child, can only be like a ‘ghost’: ‘The spectre is also, among other things, what one imagines, what one thinks one sees and what one projects on an imaginary screen where there is nothing to see. Not even the screen sometimes, and a screen always has, at bottom or background that it is,
a structure of disappearing apparition' (Derrida 1994: 100-101). Its image is always temporal, as the ghost’s comings and goings are always unpredictable. This raises a problem related to the impossibility of making any decision about the past or the present. The inevitable desire to break with the past also produces relationships, but unstable ones with other territories, and friends and relatives living elsewhere.

The former dissolution of Yugoslavia has awakened the ‘ghost of Balkanization’ in the Balkans. Can we really talk, though, about an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) in a country like Albania, a country that has a past which is takes on the entire world, without a whole entity in one land, a country whose past traverses the entire world. Benedict Anderson, in his definition of the nation, draws attention to the fact that communities are to be distinguished by the style in which they are imagined (Anderson 1991: 6). If the nation is imagined as necessarily ‘limited’, because even the largest of them has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations, how can the Albanians imagine themselves in a land which has clear boundary lines and finite entities, when they live mostly in cities across Europe?

Can the child in Paci’s video sustain the ‘biography of nation’? Benedict Anderson claims that, after experiencing the physiological and emotional changes produced by puberty, it is impossible to ‘remember’ the consciousness of childhood. Photographs of children, therefore, have to be kept and shown for confirmation:

How strange it is to need another’s help to learn that this naked baby in the yellowed photograph, sprawled happily on rug or cot, is you. The photograph, fine child of the
age of mechanical reproduction, is only the most peremptory of a huge, modern accumulation of documentary evidence (birth certificates, diaries, report cards, letters, medical records and the like) which simultaneously records a certain apparent continuity and emphasizes its loss from memory. Out of this estrangement comes a conception of personhood, identity (yes, you and that naked body are identical), which, because it cannot be 'remembered', must be narrated (Anderson 1991: 204).

However, we cannot find the child in Paci’s video installation in, what Walter Benjamin calls, ‘empty, homogeneous time’, for her appearance is always unpredictable. We, rather, can speak of a messianic time that ‘for every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter’ (Benjamin 1999: 255).

In Paci’s work, the child can bring no less than some flashbacks, and the adults can only form patch-works. Her comings do not provide ‘representational machinery’ that makes the past present for the older generation. Rather, the ‘ghost’ can only keep the future as an expectation or as a promise.

In his other video-work, ‘O-O’, Paci seems to comment on the very short life-cycle of birth and death for both Albania and Albanians. In the film, we watch a white sheet rocked like a cradle in the corner of a room in a house that is apparently destroyed and abandoned (Figure 3.3). We cannot see the women who are rocking the sheet, as though there were a baby inside, but we can hear them moaning unhappily instead of singing a lullaby. The more the sheet is rocked, the more it becomes stained with blood and reminiscent of a shroud. In ‘O-O’, Paci seems to refer to the disappearing geography of Albania, which has become the topography of chaos and a site of migration. In his other
video-work, ‘The Weeper’ (2002), this time Paci mourns his own death and the death of his nation. (Figure 3.4) It is clear that Paci enacts his own funeral, as a metaphor of being in exile and as a symbol of searching for a personal renewal. In the film, he stages the Albanian ritual of mourning in the city of Shkoder where he was born. In the beginning of the video, Paci arrives at the house of an Albanian woman who works as a professional mourner. After he puts on a dark suit, he stretches out on a bed. The woman sits down on a chair next to the bed and starts to chant a soft, soulful lament, as he gradually becomes rigid:

What is this lament, this mourning of a mother weeping for her only son? Poor woman. What happened to you? How can I cry for so young a man who died in a foreign land? O Adrian Paci, young man, I want to lament and I want to cry for his wife and daughters sigh, to come and cry over their misery. O mother, cry thus over thy son, weep thy only son. Wake my son, wake my son and see. What thy wife and daughters will be. Thy wife, abandoned and blinded by thee. Left with orphaned little girls. Poor mother, still in life’s whirls. Do you know what chanced upon thee, son? Missing went thy father young. A son and a daughter left he. Do you know, son, what chanced upon thee? His same lot you encountered. You died afar, stranded. Oh so far from home and hearth. Oh so far from thy Shkoder. O son, speak to me for thou wounded me. For thou with tears blinded me. How can I go on living, I beg thee speak. For my crying needs to cease. I cannot carry on. I will say two words to all. God help thee overcome thy toll. Jesus takes thee by His hand. God help thee thy pain to stand. To those who survive I wish long life in this land. I must stop my mourning here. Earth on thy shroud be ever light (text available at http://www.e-cart.ro/blood/poze/blood9_uk.html).
The 'ghost', above all, is an unstable signifier in which the clear boundary line between synchrony and diachrony, and between the world of the living and the world of the dead, is shattered. Funeral ceremonies, Agamben argues in his book, *Infancy and History*, prevent the dead, the unsettling and the restless being from becoming a ghost and, thus,
guarantee the transformation of this unsettling, restless being into a friendly one, living in a separate world where there is only synchrony (Agamben 1993: 82-83).

When the performance ends, Paci sits upright. He gives the weeper a hug and a handshake, and leaves with bizarrely cheerful music. One wonders whether, after his funeral ceremony, Paci's soul will ever find rest and leave his 'Albanian ghost' behind.

Performativity of the Child-Soldier

In the 70s and 80s, a particular image of a child, the sad portrait of a boy, was circulating in the public domain in Turkey (Figure 3.5). This sad face was everywhere: on the walls of a cafe, a house, a restaurant, an office or the back window of a coach or a truck.

Fig 3.5 A poster depicting the sad portrait of a boy shedding tears
In one of the essays in her important book, Kötü Çocuk Türk (Turk The Bad Boy), the Turkish literary critic, Nurdan Gürbilek, discusses this image of the boy shedding tears. In the book, she looks at cultural images from recent history in Turkey; from photographs to the Turkish melodramas of the 60s and 70s, from newspapers to literature, and from popular songs to popular novels. The main theme throughout the book is a certain feeling resulting from a dilemma between a call of allure and of turning to self, between a fear of being fascinated and of loss of identity, between a praise of the West and an enmity of the West, and between a feeling of inadequacy and feelings of pride. Nurbilek is trying to understand the way in which ‘being a Turk’, and what she calls ‘malice’, somehow touch each other.

When discussing why the sad portrait of a small boy shedding tears has become a cherished image, she suggests that people - adults - identified with this oppressed child. The portrait embodies calmness and pride, as well as sorrow. The people feel sorry for themselves through this boy. His sad face is the symbol of being a victim of an unfair law. Moreover, because the boy is blonde, Gürbilek suggests that this image became a metaphor for social sorrow. Turkish society was identifying itself with a white, Western boy instead of a dark-skinned boy who would remind them of their otherness, of being ‘Eastern’, of being ‘underdeveloped’ or of being ‘impoverished’ (Gürbilek 2001: 39-42).

The dichotomy of child and adult parallels other dichotomies that have characterized Western discourses: nature and culture, primitive and civilized, emotion and reason. The child, therefore, serves as social mirroring. Nurbilek sees reflected in the mirror, a ‘child society’ that is struggling against its perpetual childhood, trying to
transform it into something likeable and reversing the image in which it is held by the
West. This sad figure of the boy has become the symbol of the whole of culture and tells
us about the adults’ own inabilities. However, Gürbilek argues that society, having
accepted being a child, has managed to derive from it an Eastern and national pride. To
bear sorrow has become a ‘national value’ and it has materialized in the image of the
child himself as the feeling of national orphanhood. Having to grow up too early, that is to
say still remaining a child, gives them not only sorrow, but strength or pride as well (Ibid.,
39, 42).

As Gürbilek notes in her essay, sadness and loneliness were also the central
themes in the Turkish melodramas of the 1960s and 1970s. In these films, though, the
sad and lonely child who is shedding tears meets with the precocious, heroic child who
has ‘grown-up-and-then-become-a-child’. In all these films, in which the search for a
family provides a repertoire and the space for melodramatic enactments, the child, usually
an orphan, is the figure of the ‘saviour’ who ‘delivers justice’ to the world of the adult,
which is full of cruelty and injustice.

In one, old Turkish melodrama, *Sezercik Küçük Mücahit* (Sezercik The Little Crusader)
1974, (directed by Ertem Göreç), for instance, Sezer, an orphan searching for his mother,
from whom he was separated when he was only a baby, finds himself at war with the
Greek Cypriots alongside the Turkish army in Cyprus (Figure 3.6). The film repeats the
usual clichés one finds in many Turkish melodramas shot in the 1960s and 1970s, which,
although advertised as children’s films, were widely watched (and still are) by adults. In
these melodramas, the sad and lonely yet strong and virtuous child, the child that almost
literally is 'the thirteen going on thirty' boy, is the central protagonist. At the very beginning of the film, he becomes an object of pathos; he is the victim of forces that lie beyond his control. Yet, it will not take too long before this oppressed but haughty child becomes a 'crusader' against cruel and guilty adults, trying to help his desperate parents and adult friends. In the end, with the help of the poor yet good-hearted people in his neighbourhood, this clever, resilient and brave child saves his father from prison and his mother from his brutal stepfather, and, consequently, hospital. Thus, the family, which almost fell apart, is happily reunited.

Fig 3.6 Film poster Sezerçik Küçük Mücahit (Sezerçik The Little Crusader), director Ertem Göreç, 1974.
In *Sezercik Küçük Mücahit*, which was shot in 1974, the year of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, and which can be read as a propagandist film activated by nationalist feelings, Cyprus is directly linked to the official ‘Family History’ of the Republic of Turkey. In a one-and-a-half-hour film, the chain of events is as follows: Before Sezer's mother, Lale, gives birth to him, his father, Murat, a pilot and first lieutenant, is killed when his plane crashes on the way to Cyprus. The devastated Lale travels to Cyprus with her sister and brother-in-law, and, gathering up her strength there, gives birth to her son. Lale travels to Turkey for a brief period to visit her mother who has had a stroke and leaving her baby with her sister and her doctor brother-in-law. While she is away, the murders and tortures of Turkish Cypriots, following the *coup d'état* in Greece, begin. EOKA militants raid Sezer's aunt and uncle's house, stealing their jewels and money, and murdering them. By chance, Sezer, who is in his crib, goes unnoticed by the militants. He then is raised by a couple that have no children of their own. Lale, who has learnt of the death of her sister and her husband from the newspaper, has gone insane and is admitted to a mental institution. In Cyprus, the tyranny of Greek Cypriots over Turkish Cypriots is escalating. The couple that adopted Sezer also are killed by Greek Cypriots. Sezer has already learnt they are not his real parents. He survives by hiding in a closet. He overhears the Greek Cypriots planning to raid a neighbouring village and goes to the village to inform the villagers that a Greek raid is imminent, thus saving the entire village. Through this heroic act, Sezer earns the respect of the adults, especially the soldiers, for his fearlessness and heroism in face of the oppression and terror of the Greek Cypriots. From this point onwards, Sezer begins to represent the solitary, brave, just, compassionate Turkish nation. Nothing else would be expected from the son of a martyr, anyway! The shoemaker who, for years, takes care of him as if he were his own son tells
him, before being killed, that it is his fate to become 'an honourable Turkish soldier' as it is 'in his blood'. Sezer's first heroic deed is to assist in the capture of the EOKA militants who murdered his family and planned to raid the neighbouring village. The soldiers salute him as a 'real' soldier, but he does not use the gun given him by the sergeant to kill the EOKA militants.

In this scene of the film, the line between good and bad, right and wrong, innocent and guilty are conclusively drawn. The Turkish sergeant shouts at the EOKA militants who have been seized: 'You have killed innocent, unarmed people. Your nation can't learn how to fight'. When Sezer chooses not to raise his gun to them, he continues: 'Even the children of the Turkish nation will not draw their guns on the enemy'. Joining the squad at the rank of corporal, Sezer is now a true soldier wearing a uniform. As the film continues, he is promoted to first lieutenant, the rank of his long-dead father, after various heroic acts, including delivering a letter to a flagman, thereby saving three villages, and rescuing a woman from being raped by a Greek Cypriot. Meanwhile, Lale recovers from her illness. Following the Cyprus Peace Action, she visits Cyprus and learns there that her son is alive. She listens to heroic tales of her son, who has become a legend in Cyprus. At the end of the film, the mother and son reunite at a military procession - the ceremony recalls ceremonies that take place in the big stadiums in Turkey during national holidays. In the final scene, mother and son are saluting Turkish soldiers under the Turkish flag.

The story of Sezer İkik Küçük Mücahit is based upon the events that occurred during the period of 1963-1964 in Cyprus. For instance, Sezer's pilot father, who was killed in an airplane crash, recalls lieutenant Cengiz Topel, whose airplane was shot down in 1964.
Similarly, the doctor who looks after Sezer recalls a doctor and commander whose family was murdered by the EOKA.

Christine Gledhill points out (Gledhill 1987: 30) that melodrama refers not only to a type of aesthetic practice, but also to a way of viewing the world. Melodrama, she argues, ‘utilizes narrative mechanisms that create a blockage to expression, thereby forcing melodramatic enactments into alternative and excessive strategies to clarify the dramatic stakes’ (Ibid., 30). It searches for lost or repressed feelings and, thus, attests to forces, desires or fears which, even if they no longer possess metaphysical reality, still appear to operate in human life independently of rational explanation. Working less towards the release of individual repression than towards the public enactment of socially unacknowledged states (Gledhill 1987: 31-32), melodramas offer an alternative reality to the ones that are familiar, accepted or expected. The fantasies on the screen can be distorted projections of the audience’s own fantasies; the world the audience wants to see (power, wealth, beauty, passion) on the screen directly reflects its inner thoughts, fears or desires.

By depicting the island as a geography overflowing with the ‘turbulent’ waves of Turkish nationalism, Sezercik Küçük Mücahit affirms the ongoing construction of the official ideology of Turkey regarding Cyprus (recalling once again that the film is shot in 1974, the year of the so-called Cyprus Peace Operation). In every way, Cyprus is ‘family business’; subject to injustice, cruelty and orphanhood, and yet the motherland will not desert the ‘baby-land’, and will reach out to the desperate island-folk one way or the other. Thus, kin will be reunited with the ‘main family’ in a happy ending.
Yet, the figure of the 'child-soldier' does not simply remain a film hero and a fictional character. 'Real' soldier-children, as central and strategic actors, have long inhabited public settings in the social topography of Turkey. Small boys, especially, are sometimes seen alongside their parents, wearing military uniforms and participating in protests or national demonstrations. The presence of boys at these events not only affirms the stability of the assumed collectivity of adults, but also strengthens it. These are the moments when nationalism not only is displayed, but also is actively reproduced.

The child-soldier and the image of child-soldiers is not a recent phenomenon, but it does have different dimensions in different contexts. Children have been part of state military organizations for centuries. One of the earliest records of children going to war is the children's crusade of 1212, when two armies of children from France and Germany joined with adult soldiers in a crusade to recapture the Holy Land (Chains 1996: 131). Centuries later, in 1943, they were called out by Angelo Patri, one of the pioneers of the progressive education movement in the New York education system during The Second World War. He presented a series of radio talks to children and their parents about the war and its impact upon the family:

Boys and girls of the United States of America, you are enlisted for the duration of the war as citizen soldiers. This is a total war, nobody is left out, and that counts you in, of course. ... You are now a soldier in the United States Army. Your duty is to keep well, cheer up your father and mother by doing a good job, help your country by doing the chores appointed you, whether it is blowing a bugle, rolling bandages, running errands or ringing doorbells. Do it to the best of your ability and you will be helping your country (Patri 1998: 480).
His words signify the militarization of daily-life, and children, as ‘citizen soldiers’, cannot be excluded from it.

In our times, there are also child-soldiers in numerous countries, for instance in Uganda, where there is civil war and children are kidnapped and forced into military service. In other cases, such as in the occupied territories of Palestine, young boys have willingly joined armed groups and become primary catalysts for violent strife. 18

I have a lingering memory of a small photograph, an image of a baby dressed as a suicide bomber, which raised a lot of discussion in public. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) released that photograph on 27 June 2002 and claimed that the photograph, which depicts a Palestinian baby wearing a belt laden with explosives and the red bandana of the Islamist group, Hamas, was found in a house of a militant in the West Bank (Figure 3.7). For some people, the photograph of this 15-20 month-old ‘suicide bomber’ symbolizes the incitement to hatred that the Palestinian leadership was using to brainwash an entire generation of Palestinian children. For others, this photograph distorts the Palestinian position and conceals the reality of the Palestinian experience, since it both enables the justification of Israeli crimes against the Palestinian people and their occupation of Palestinian territories, and affirms the Israeli’s propaganda that the Palestinians are simply ‘terrorists’ (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2071561.stm).

18 See, for instance, Goodwin-Gill and Cohn (1994).
Is there any 'real' body of the child, other than the production of what precedes its very presence? Is 'being a child' not like any other category, such as 'being a woman', 'being black'; that is, the result of discursive practices that enact or produce what they name? 'Being a child', as a socially constructed category, rather than as a natural category, works in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of a certain body and, thus, circulates certain discourses in the social, political and cultural domains.

Fig 3.7 Palestinian baby as a 'suicide bomber', wearing a belt laden with explosives and the red bandana of the Islamist group, Hamas (Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2071561.stm).

What interests me with regard to child performativity is the way in which the figure and the image of the child are mobilized as means to achieve other ends and the way in which, while engaging in a masquerade\(^\text{19}\), the body of the child performs a set of pre-

\(^{19}\) The term *masquerade* comes from an essay entitled ‘Womanliness as a masquerade’ (1986 [1929]) by Joan Riviere. The term is used in the context of the social and political critiques of feminity. Riviere develops the notion of womanliness as a feint or cover-up coequal with the social constructions enabling feminity to be pretended into existence. She uses the term *masquerade* to argue that there is no absolute feminity beneath
planned activities, produces material effects, and accumulates and distributes specific discourses. This can indicate only one thing: what is called ‘the child’ is in fact what is missing from the picture; it is constantly someone else and somewhere else. If the materiality of the body is nothing more than the effect of power, as Foucault has shown us (Foucault 1991 [1997]), then the child is ‘the ghost’.

Judith Butler distinguishes performativity from a singular ‘act’, theatrical self-presence and performance. In her conception, performativity cannot be understood outside a process of iterability, a regularized and constrained repetition of norms. Butler points out that the subject does not perform this repetition, rather the repetition itself is what enables a subject and constitutes its temporal condition. This iterability implies that ‘performance’ is not a singular ‘act’ or event, but a ritualized production reiterated under and through constraint (Ibid., 95). In his essay, ‘In Playland’, Giorgio Agamben notes that, in its temporal form, ritual transforms events into structures and functions as the fixing and structuring rhythm of the official calendar of society (Agamben 1993: 69). As performative events, the depiction of the child as a child-soldier, or the demonstrations and protests the children participate in, can be read as ritualistic events. Nationalist discourse is more a praxis than a thought, and its strength lies in the accumulations of events. Through the events, mostly spectacular and watched by the masses, nationalist discourse achieves its imagined and desired goals by producing subjects and bodies, by determining behaviours and by penetrating people’s minds. The phantasmatic staging of nationalist protests or demonstrations reveals that identification belongs only to an

the veil, only a set of ontologically tenuous codes that normatively induct the feminine subject into the social practice of ‘being’ a woman through mimesis and parroting (Riviere 1986 [1929]).
imaginary site. As Butler points out, fantasy is not an activity of an already formed subject, but the staging and dispersion of the subject into a variety of identificatory positions: 'Identifications are phantasmatic efforts of alignment, loyalty, ambiguous and cross-corporeal cohabitation; they unsettle the "I"; they are the sedimentation of the "we" in the constitution of any "I" (Butler 1993: 105). During the discussion of the phantasmatic, Butler mentions Zizek's attempt, in his book, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989), to link political signifiers and rallying points for mobilization and politicization like 'women', 'democracy' and 'freedom', with the notion of phantasmatic investment and phantasmatic promise (Ibid., 191). The body of the child in the structural events carries the performative character of political signifier. Political signifiers do not represent pre-given constituencies, but are empty signs that come to bear phantasmatic investments. In this respect, the child, as a political signifier, has become mobilized and his body has been turned into the site of phantasmatic investment.

Hauntology, Derrida has proposed, is concerned with an 'always already', unrealized and unrealizable 'ontology' within the social domain. Whereas ontology is about the effectivity of a present being, hauntology will deal with a 'presence' that has strong and unbreakable ties with the past. In this context, what 'the body of the child' can signify is no more than an invisible, 'external' power that possesses it.

By problematizing the materiality of the body, Judith Butler argues that, rather than a natural or static condition of the body, 'sex' is what Foucault has called the 'regulatory ideal' whose materialization is compelled. This materialization takes place through highly regulated practices, the processes of forcible reiteration of fixed and regulated forms.
Butler points out that, what constitutes the fixity of the body - its contours and its movements - can be fully material. However, in light of the dimension of 'performative' construction, we are able to rethink this materiality as the effect of power: '... once "sex" itself is understood in its normativity, the materiality of the body will not be thinkable apart from the materialization of that regulatory form. "Sex" is not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which the "one" becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility' (Butler 1993: 1-2).

The body of the child, its positioning as a highly loaded and fetishized sign, carries inscriptions other than its own. In her installation, 'Where the Continents Meet' (1997), Gülsün Karamustafa uses a photograph of a boy dressed as child-soldier. The artist saw the photograph in a photographic studio, and managed to acquire a copy of it. The photograph recalls how parents in Turkey are keen to dress their six or seven year old boys in soldier uniforms and to display, with great pride, the photographs of this 'special day' in the most prominent corner of their living room or in their family albums. Serving as a sort of evidence, these photographs represent the first stage of the transition from 'being a boy' to 'being a man'. 'Being a man' is directly related to being a strong man who loves his country and, if possible, to being a soldier, who, no doubt, is capable of protecting it.
In ‘Where the Continents Meet’, the child is located in a landscape covered with soldiers’ uniforms (Figure 3.8). The boy looks exactly like Sezer, does he not, except for the fact that he is not as blond? He stands on a border, a ‘sunny land’ behind him. Could this easily be an island, Cyprus, for instance? Along the bottom, we read: ‘Objects found in Tahtakale on the European coast at 14.37, 24 March 1997, and a photo, found in Kadikoy, on the Asian coast at 11.25, 7 April 1997, in Istanbul (where the continents meet)’. Istanbul, because of its geographical location, has long held a symbolic ‘value’ in the ideological and political world map. It serves as an arena through which essentialized oppositions are played out in world politics, oppositions such as East versus West, Islam versus Christianity, and local versus global. The body of the boy in the photograph represents the world’s geographical and imaginative crossroads; it is both what connects these two continents and what dissolves them. In Sezerlik Küçük Mücahit, Sezer crosses the barricade-like, newly constructed border as the ethnic conflict is at its peak. At the
same moment he crosses the border we notice a warning sign on the border wall: 'The Other Side is Greek'. Sezer's acts are performative. His presence marks the land; his crossing makes the border more visible, loaded with particular codes and certain meanings.

Cultural production and reproduction work in a binary logic: man and woman, white and black, civilised and uncivilised, East and West. We could add to these dualities another: adult and child. As Peggy Phelan conceptualizes throughout her book, *Unmarked: the politics of performance*, whereas one of binary is marked with value, the other is left unmarked, lacking measured value and meaning. However, the unmarked one is not left as it is. As the norm, the marked one marks the unmarked one, both rhetorically and imaginatively (Phelan 1993: 5). The question then has to be posed: In what way and by whom is 'the child' marked and re-marked?

In her essay, 'White men and pregnancy: discovering the body to be rescued', in the book, *Unmarked*, Phelan discusses the way in which Operation Rescue is established in 1987 by a group of male activists in New York. They stage theatrical demonstrations against abortion outside abortion clinics, generating a feeling of terror and thereby producing the feeling that one needs to be saved and that the unborn need to be rescued. In some demonstrations, protestors carry placards with alternating images of an 'innocent' baby and a 'mutilated' foetus. Phelan argues that by subtly erasing the pregnant woman from the image and, thus, ignoring the mother, these placards allow the foetal form to become a token in a discourse of and about men. 'By locating “maleness” within the image of the foetus, men displace their new reproductive visibility onto
representations of the hitherto unseen "child", further strengthening the identification between the foetus and the men of Operation Rescue' (Ibid., 134). In society, the discourses of care, need and responsibility constitute 'childhood' as a category that is always dependent on external powers, such as the family, school, the State, etc. In the case of Operation Rescue, morality and protectionist sentimentality are played out even with the unborn child. The nature of Operation Rescue's performances indicates that 'childhood', as a mental construct, is always partly visual. The visibility this visuality offers serves as a cultural, ready-made image-bank where we can access the whole discursively and symbolically constructed category of what is named 'the child.'

Thus, the figure of the child-soldier, and even the image of the unborn baby, can serve as constitutive material for a cultural politics. These kinds of visual images have, in fact, hidden potential to shape people's imagination, and to mediate and legitimate expectations of and demands on the nation-state. Through the body of a child, which is left 'unmarked' in order to be 're-marked', as Peggy Phelan has noted, people indicate how they see the world, or more precisely, how they want to see it. In other words, 'childhood' is variable and intentional, and we cannot see these two worlds - the 'adult world' and the 'child's world' - as being two separate entities, despite what is widely claimed.

The child is a cultural sign and its meaning never sticks for long; sooner or later it is replaced by another sign; sometimes with its opposite. The image and the figure of the child-soldier can operate freely, or at least almost unnoticed in the social domain, because of the established mythology of childhood innocence. However, the myth of
childhood innocence, as James Kincaid argues, ‘empties’ the child of its own political agency, since innocence is a state of being that is pure nothingness, secretly nourished by its opposite. As a category created but not occupied, the child can be a repository of cultural needs or fears not adequately disposed of elsewhere. As Kincaid rightly asserts, ‘the child carries for us things we somehow cannot carry for ourselves, sometimes anxieties we want to be divorced from and sometimes pleasures so great we would not, without the child, know how to contain them’ (Kincaid 1992: 77-79).

The body of the child in Gülsün Karamustafa’s work, like that of Sezer, activates nationalist discourses, proudly announcing ‘Glorious History’ or ‘One Turk is Worth the Whole World’, and so on. The child comes to life in the image of a child-soldier - a fetishized object, a borrowed body or an incarnation of a body. Derrida notes that there can be no ‘ghost’ or no apparition unless there is a body to be returned. This body to be returned is a visible-invisible body under institutional or cultural protection; a fetish under armour. The fetish, in Derrida’s words, is ‘neither perceptible nor invisible, but remains flesh, in a body without nature, in an a-physical body that could be called ... a technical body or an institutional body’ (Derrida 1994: 126-127). The child-soldier standing on the border in the photograph does not have his own body; his is a haunted-body. His material body has taken on the apparitional appearance of the Family, the State and the Motherland.

**Bordering The Island**

Sezer never grew up in his film series and, as if sharing his destiny, Cyprus too was condemned to be an eternal ‘child’. In the context of this discussion, ‘being a child’ does
not refer to a certain age or physical quality, but to being a small part attached to a
greater whole that ontologically precedes its very presence. This 'child'\(^{20}\), so far away
from 'becoming' in Deleuzean terms, is also a topography whose territory has been
captured, or rather, has been haunted.

Cyprus does not refer to an original entity, just as the two ethnic groups that inhabit
her do not come with a demand on an ontological existence. Even though the two Cypriot
states (one of them unrecognized) make claims on the ownership of the island, neither of
them comes with the demand to attain an ontological status, since they see themselves
as the organic parts of two different nation-states; namely Greece and Turkey. The island
as a territory refers to two other territories outside its space, both of which precede its
existence. It recalls a particular colonial discourse, that in which family and filial bonds
bind the colony to the mother country. In the words of Achille Mbembe: 'The native was a
great child crushed by long atavism, was incapable of autonomous thought and could
make no distinction between vice and virtue' (Mbembe 2001: 33). Two parties, through
operations of ownership have territorialized Cyprus, a previously colonized land.

The unity of the divided island was imagined through race and religion: either being
Greek and Christian or being Turkish and Muslim. The border between the two
communities on the island is the border between Turkey and Greece. This produces an

\(^{20}\) Northern Cyprus is called 'babyland' (yavru-vatan) in Turkey. At the same time, as Vamik D. Volkan and
Norman Itzkowitz tell us, Greece is seen as 'mother' of the Republic of Cyprus, who is looking after it with
compassion, Turkey is depicted as 'father' who, as a real threat, tries to do everything to destroy the Republic
of Cyprus (cited by Volkan and Itzkowitz 2002: 209).
ambiguity about where the 'real' border lies, and escalates the tension between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

In this respect, Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean and restrained by Turkish nationalism and Greek nationalism, is too 'crowded' in the sense that it is located in a zone of interaction between regional pressures and international politics. It is seen as a matter of 'national business and interest' for Turkey and Greece, two hegemonic state forces that are outside its territory yet firmly attached to it - a relationship reminiscent of the infant's primal relation to the body of his/her mother\(^2\). It is also seen historically as an 'international interest', mainly for Britain, the US and the EU. When we look at the so-called 'Cyprus Problem', we see that the island has become prosthesis or a supplement that opens up its space to external powers and dynamics.

How has an island in the middle of the Mediterranean become a bounded space within a vast amount of water that served as the meeting point of various traditions and cultures throughout history? For Deleuze, humans can live on an island only by forgetting what an island represents. The island is either before or after humankind. It has to be preserved absolutely separate and alone, and even if it is inhabited, it is still to be 'deserted':

\(^2\) Drawing on Freudian theory of human maturation, Melanie Klein notes that the mother, who is loving, caring, helping and feeding the infant, represents to the infant, in the first few months, the whole of the external world. But the maturation of the child depends on gradually cutting his or her ties with the maternal body which, as the source of phantasy, stirs in him or her love, hatred and a powerful curiosity (Klein 1960: 4, 6-14).
The island is ... the origin, radical and absolute. ... It is no longer the island that is separated from the continent. It is humans who find themselves separated from the world when on the island. It is no longer the island that is created from the bowels of the earth through the liquid depths, it is humans who create the world anew from the island and on the waters. Humans thus take up for themselves both movements of the island and are able to do so on an island that, precisely, lacks one kind of movement: humans can drift toward an island that is nonetheless originary, and they can create on an island that has merely drifted away. On closer inspection, we find here a new reason for every island to be and remain, in theory, deserted (Deleuze 2004: 9-10).

Geographically, an island is born as the result of eruptions and fractures. It, therefore, is counter-geography and a ‘line of flight’ from any attempt at localization. The island is beyond all horizons; it is related only to its own being. Its very existence, by its nature, cannot know any totality outside of itself. Perhaps it is because of this that the idea and image of the island symbolizes utopian dreams and promises of the future to come. The opposite might also be the case: the island can be functionalized as a prison that guarantees the isolation of the most ‘notorious criminals’ or those being exiled.

For Deleuze, the movements of people put an end to the island’s desertedness, but only in appearance. In reality, the élan, the mythological figure that draws humans towards islands to their death with its beautiful voice, produces the island as deserted. The existence of the human on the island brings desertedness to its peak and perfection. In other words, humans cannot really conquer or master the island, their movement
cannot overcome the existence of the island itself and their existence on the island does not mark any type of belonging. On the contrary:

... they would give the island only a dynamic image of itself, a consciousness of the movement which produced the island, such that through them the island would in the end become consciousness of itself as deserted and unpeopled. The island would be only the dream of humans, and humans, the pure consciousness of the island (Ibid., 10).

What Deleuze calls the desertedness of the island clearly is the opposite of the notion of territorial unity and absolute belonging. He writes:

... human beings live there already, but uncommon humans, they are absolutely separate, absolute creators, in short, an idea of humanity, a prototype, a man who would almost be a god, a woman who would be a goddess, a great Amnesiac, a pure Artist, a consciousness of Earth and Ocean, an enormous hurricane, a beautiful witch, a statue from the Easter Islands. There you have a human being who precedes itself (Ibid., 11)

The human's sheer being joins the 'deserted' island, without claiming ownership and identity, not in order to re-produce something already known, but to create anew. In the conception of Deleuze, the 'deserted' island can be a prototype of the collective soul, constantly a re-creation or a re-beginning.
Deleuze’s ideas and arguments bring us to a point where we can suggest that each island is singular. An island knows no interiority; it has its own exteriority that cannot be enclosed. It is self-organizing. It borders itself and it is itself bordering. In this sense, the island is what Agamben calls the ‘outside’: ‘The outside is not another space that resides beyond a determinate space, but rather, it is a passage, the exteriority that gives it access - in a word, it is its face, its eidos’ (Agamben 2001: 68). This understanding of the island can offer us an alternative mode of being and a different mode of collectivity that takes place in its open and empty space. In Agamben’s conception, ‘outside’ is a threshold that is a point of contact with an external space, which must remain empty (Ibid., 67). ‘Outside’ can not be rooted, only be inhabited by the ‘singularities’ that form a community without having a representable identity and absolute belonging, or with respect to a common property such as ‘being red’, ‘being French’, ‘being Muslim’ (Ibid., 1, 86).

In Cyprus, the movement of humans has never been fluid or without pre-established and planned objectives. Movements towards the island were organized and controlled mostly by forces and powers outside its territory. When the Ottoman Empire’s rule began in 1571, a population of Muslims was sent to the island in order to ‘balance’ the Christian population. This was followed by a period of British colonization, starting in 1878. Unlike the independence movements that arose after World War II in other colonies, such as the African countries of Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire, where the idea of ‘nation’ was the main driving force for resistance against imperial power and oppression, Cyprus has never been able to go through the process of nation-building. In 1960, the outcome of international treaties between Britain, Greece and Turkey was that the island gained its independence and legitimacy as the state of Cyprus. However, the words of the Greek
leader, Makarios, through light on the perceptions of both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, which emphasize that this state is not based on a national identity: 'International treaties built a state, but not a nation'. Indeed, conflict was soon to follow. In 1963, following a coup d'etat in Greece, the Turkish Cypriots were forced into enclaves and attacked by the EOKA, whose goal was Enosis (union with a greater Greece). In 1974, there was another coup d'etat, this time in Cyprus, and supported by Greece. This was followed by an armed intervention by Turkey, and the island was divided into two. A demographic division followed the geographic division as, within a year of Turkey's armed intervention, Turkish Cypriots were forced to move to the northern part of the island and Greek Cypriots to the south. Turkish Cypriot elites, since the 1950s had aimed to divide the island between Turkey and Greece, and were supported by the Turkish government and by demonstrations held in the large cities of Turkey. The name for this planned partition was Taksim and the agenda was to nationalize northern Cyprus in order for it to become an organic part of the Turkish homeland. Since many Turkish Cypriots left the island after 1974 because of financial difficulties, the Turkish government transferred 'Turkish' people to Cyprus in order to prevent a decrease in the Turkish population. Rauf Denktaş was one of the chief architects of the construction of Northern Cypriot Turkey', and served as leader of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus between 1975-1983 and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus between 1983-2005. He was responsible for systematically establishing Turkish nationalism on the island, and stated that 'both those leaving and those coming are Turkish'. In fact, he viewed those who moved to Cyprus as even more 'Turkish'. During one of his public addresses, in 2000, the President of the Republic of Turkey at the time, Süleyman Demirel, referred to Denktaş as the 'hero of a national cause' and someone who 'always has held the Turkish flag at the highest point'.
For Demirel, Denktaş not only defended and protected the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in Cyprus, but more importantly, also the ‘world of the Turks’ and ‘Turkishness’. ‘The flag is the same flag,’ Demirel said, and added, ‘this movement is an event belonged to the world of the greatest Turks’ (cited by Kızılyürek 2005: 84-85).

In Cyprus, political choices, intentions and demands are defined in relation to ethnicity. What really matters is your identity, rather than who you are, and more importantly, who and what you want to be. The island has been captured as a closed space, inhabited by a stable and fixed identity, either Greek or Turkish. This is in contrast to what Deleuze sees as the fundamental nature of the island, that is being co-inhabited by multiple subjectivities that are without a set of social and political concerns or agendas, and who are not striving for a single point of commonality. The nature of the island of Cyprus is captured in the words of Denktaş:

I am an Anatolian boy. Every part of me is Turkish and my roots are in Central Asia. I am Turkish with my culture, my language, my history, with my entire existence. I have a nation and a homeland. The culture of Cyprus, a Turkish Cypriot, a Greek Cypriot, Federal Republic, this is all nonsense. If they have Greece and we have Turkey, why should we live under the roof of the same republic? ... There is neither a Turkish Cypriot nor a Greek Cypriot, nor even a Cypriot. Don’t ever ask us if we are the ‘Cypriots’. This might be considered as an insult and some misunderstanding might occur. Why? It is because there is only one Cypriot living in Cyprus and it is the donkey of Cyprus (cited by Kızılyürek 2005: 40; Ortam, 13 November 1995).
Steeped in ethnic conflict and seized by Turkish and Greek (Hellene) nationalism, both built upon race, blood, origin and religion, Cyprus has lost everything an island represents. Cyprus’s divide is based on identity demarcation. As we know, during ethno-nationalist conflict in a territory, the main impulse is to redefine the borderline of inclusion and exclusion, and to draw a straight line between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The words of a young woman illustrate this phenomenon:

Every country has its own enemy, but here there is a very definite, obvious enemy; that is there is a border in between, and this border isn’t like the customary borders that separate countries from one another. ... for me the border is recompense of struggle that lasted for many years. It is the symbol of security, of dignity. It is because of that I am very sensitive to the events taking place on the border. We would never take lightly even the slightest, smallest attack on our border (Güngör 2002: 29).

There is always an inherent paradox in every border. The single border, in fact, is always double, for it is always between two states, each one of which has been marked as its opposite.

In Derviş Zaim’s film, Mud (2003), an allegorical tale about the Cyprus divide, mud is a metaphor, suggesting that the construction of a border requires the act of ‘othering’; the process of abjection. The director, Zaim, who himself became a refugee in 1974, focuses on the trauma caused by not confronting the past. Words and deeds alike have vanished in the whiteness of the salt lake where Turkish Cypriot, Ali, is on sentry duty. A massacre has taken place by the lake where the border between north and south lies. Ali,
whose military service will soon end, is struggling to find a cure for his speechlessness. Ali’s close friend, Temel, is unable to find the courage to acknowledge the existence of corpses buried within the mud of the salt lake. Even though he confesses on tape to the killing of three people, he destroys the cassettes soon after. Ali, though, discovers the mud underneath the surface of the land where he is a border guard. This mud, this ‘abject’, which is not wanted, has no shape and leaves nothing other than dirt and stains, has become a passion for him (Figure 3.9). In the conception of Julia Kristeva (Kristeva: 1983), the ‘abject’ is effectively established through expulsion. The enclosure has to be reached, the boundary of the body has to be clearly defined as the first contours of the subject without leaving any room for permeability, and the inside and outside have to be remain distinct. However, covering his face and body with it, Ali discovers that the mud is able to cure his mysterious illness. The more he covers himself with it, the more he breaks his silence and starts to recover his speech.

Fig 3.9 Derviş Zaim, Mud, film-still, 2003
A young Turkish Cypriot woman says: ‘You are saying that you will enter my home; it is my right to protect my home. I am contented with the existence of the border, it gives me a sense of security’ (Güngör 2002: 125). The feeling of division is lived by the people, and this implies that the geographically concrete border, with its watch-towers and barbed wire, exists as a psychological one, as well. In people’s minds, the image of the border is very real, very powerful and very material. It is laden with emotions. The people go to the border to demonstrate. All small or big events occur in the border zone; sometimes bloody ones.

‘Beyond’ the Border: Reflections in the Mirrors and Other Possibilities

In one of her poems, entitled ‘Love Your Homeland’, the Turkish Cypriot poet and writer Neşe Yaşın writes

They say that a person should love his or her country,
That’s what my father always tells me.
My own country has been divided in two,
Which of the two parts should I love?

(Available at http://www.stwing.upenn.edu/~durduran/newpage/culture/poetry/NešeYaşın/Neše1.gif)

The border here represents the separation from half of one’s self. In Yaşın’s poem, there is a yearning to cross the uncrossable divide. However, her internal sensibilities cannot correspond to the external realities. Kutluğ Ataman’s video-installation, ‘1+1=1’ (2003), centres on the life-story of Yaşın, who was caught in the middle of the armed conflict in
Cyprus as a child in the middle of the 60s. In the installation, there is one body but two of Neşe Yaşın (Figure 3.10). By duplicating the image, Ataman refers to the ‘double life’ of Yaşın, who now lives on the Greek side of a divided Nicosia. The body is not only a biological entity, but also a psychological topography. The surface of the body is the point of conversion of the outside into the body and of the inside, out (psyche and mind). In the case of Yaşın, the border is a wound. It is not only inscribed onto her body, it also is inscribed into the depth of her body, penetrating her psyche and mind.

![Fig 3.10 Kutluğ Ataman, ‘1+1=1’, film-stills from two-screened video installation, 2003](image)

In the video-installation, the two Neşe Yaşın are on two different screens projected onto the walls that adjoin in a corner and run simultaneously. Each recounts her experiences and memories on the island beginning with her childhood. On one side, she tells the story of how her father went missing, and how they had to flee from the Greeks and leave Peristerona for Nicosia. She tells of this leaving in these words: ‘I grew to feel that in our village we had been very happy. It was paradise there and when we came to the city we became very unhappy’. Simultaneously, on the other side, she recounts how
the Turkish army took over the northern part of the island, claiming that they were bringing peace, and the hardship that followed.

The implication in ‘1+1=1’ is that specific social and political circumstances on the island have shaped individuals' lives. Yaşın’s speech recalls a memory, a tense and tangled memory, squeezed between the north and the south of the island. The two screens in ‘1+1=1’, where Yaşın endlessly tells her life-story, from her childhood to the present, turn into a palimpsestic memory that unfold into a plural story of a singular reality where the island becomes a metaphor of Yaşın, on the one hand, and Yaşın becomes a metaphor of the island, on the other. Her mind provides a kind of landscape or intensive zone reminiscent of Freudian accounts of psychoanalysis that view childhood, not as the process that ends in adulthood, but as a most complex and sophisticated process, since our personalities, minds and lives have been built upon childhood experiences, emotions and fantasies. In the video, Yaşın says:

Memory is, no doubt, selective. Because of this, it is possible that certain facts from the memories of childhood have been modified by the influence of official versions. However, certain moments are so strong that I remember all the details. I mean I feel almost certain. I don’t know for sure if it is true or not, but I feel certain. But the truest story I know is my own.

In Yaşın’s video-testimony, the memories recollected and imagined on the screen can only project the broken and troubling image of an ‘I’. The mirrors in both filmic spaces can only ‘reflect’ the dissolution or disintegration of the unified body, which is only an imagination or an illusion that brings us back to the narcissistic experience of the child.
This is just as Jacques Lacan has theorized in his important essay, ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience’, when he speaks of the child who wrongly thinks that the image s/he sees in front of the mirror is complete and perfect. In Lacan’s conception, there is always an ontological gap at the very heart of our subjectivity. The mirror image, as the verifier of identity, disguises the truth of fragmentation and alienation in subjectivity. Lacan points out:

The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body - image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic - and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development (Lacan 1989: 5).

The mirrors are shattered and cracked in ‘1+1=1.’ Neşe Yaşın is more than one, and her stories are complex and fluid. Like the reciprocal transparency of mirrors, this brings forth at once both fusion and separation, and identity and difference. The screens become mirrors that can only reflect the ever-changing nature of the self; the complexity of subjectivity through constantly forming and deforming the image of Yaşın. By appealing to imagination, introducing new perspectives and anticipating other truths, the mirrors in both filmic spaces, far from reflecting the story unfolding on the other screen, imply deceptive illusions and visualizes fractures. Moreover, we, the viewers, play active roles in the encounter with these screens; these ‘mirror-screens’, if you will. They urge us to take part in the diverse, and sometimes contradictory, processes of observation, transformation, concealment, frustration, imagination and so on. As the bibelot on the table where Yaşın is sitting, speaking unsettles the perspective and creates effects of
distortion, the ‘mirror-screens’ hint at the relativity of all points of view and, in so doing, imply scepticism. In her book, *The Mirror, A History*, where she examines the power of the reflection in the mirror, Sabina Melchior-Bonnet suggests: ‘By simulating resemblance, the mirror dissimulates another truth, one that can emerge only surreptitiously, in a fearsome difference and obliquity: “dubious resemblance” or troubling strangeness, the mirror is a mirror of otherness’ (Melchior-Bonnet 2002: 224). The mirror, therefore, can only reveal the indecipherable figure of a stranger who reveals that, in fact, it is none other than the untroubled and stable ‘I’ who presents the essential problematic.

Yaşın tells us:

> I think three of the most essential roles in life are that of the tyrant, the victim and the saviour. But these roles switch places somehow. I mean, the victims can become the tyrants as they grab the power. The tyrants can be the victims. The saviours can be the victims. I mean these three roles can always transform into each other. I used to think that Turkish Cypriots were always the victims. But then I saw Greek Cypriots becoming the victims after 1974. ... Before, there was that dualism for me. The Turkish Cypriots were the victims and the Greek Cypriots were the tyrants. This was learnt. Then this changed. I saw the Greek Cypriots becoming the victims and I saw that the Turkish Cypriots could take the role of the tyrant. I lost the sense of us, goodies, and them, baddies. I started to question this.

Thus, the dualism is not the split between the body and the soul. It rather is the revolt within the self, not only against all outward injustices, but also against the injustice of outwardness. Shoshana Felman has pointed out that to testify is to accomplish a
performative *speech-act*, rather than simply formulate a statement (Felman 1992: 5). Felman writes:

In the testimony, language is in process and in trial, it does not possess itself as a conclusion, as the constatation of a verdict or the self-transparency of knowledge. Testimony is, in other words, a discursive practice, as opposed to a pure theory. To testify - to *vow to tell*, to promise and produce one's own speech as material evidence for truth - is to accomplish a *speech act*, rather than to simply formulate a statement. As a performative speech act, testimony, in effect, addresses what in history is *action* that exceeds any substantialized significance, and what in happenings is *impact* that dynamically explodes any conceptual reifications and any constative delimitations' (Ibid. 5).

Neşe Yaşın's testimonial speech is 'performative', which actively makes connections to larger contexts of geographical location, historical events, and social and political life. During her speech, the past and the present are connected to the cursed, ghostly history of society. Nothing in the past has simply ended, some part of it or some affect continues to 'live on', not only in the social geography of where people reside, but also in the collective unconsciousness of society where the repressed thoughts, fears or desires are collected and kept in. In this sense, Yaşın does not simply speak in the language of memories. Her speech refers to haunting, and thus, to a future memory which holds a promise for justice. In the words of Avery F. Gordon, '[h]aunting is an encounter in which you touch the ghost or the ghostly matter of things: the ambiguities, the complexities of power and personhood, the violence and the hope, the looming and receding actualities, the shadows of our selves and our society' (Gordon 1997: 134). By concentrating on the
act of haunting one is able to contact ‘spectral’ realities that are embedded, with their lingering effects, in the topography of the social.

The body of Yaşın has been invaded by the spectre of two borders, neither of which she can identify with, and each of which, as the Ego-State, thrust themselves upon her. When she speaks about her life, her past and her present, when she says ‘I am’, it also means, ‘I am the one who has been haunted’. For Gordon, as a constitutive feature of social life, haunting is a mediation, a particular process that ‘links an institution and an individual, a social structure and a subject, and history and a biography’ (Ibid., 19). Haunting traverses time, periods and places. It diffuses into every corner of social and political life. It produces connections. It locates subjects in certain places where there is no room, or very little room to move about and breathe.

Yaşın, though, is haunting the borders, too. She has freed herself through her transgressions that know no limits or boundary, or that do not respect any system or order. She tells the audience:

Every kind of institution and authority felt like an element of the oppression I was subjected to. So, what does one do? If your father oppresses you, you run away from home. You do something and save yourself. If you are married and your husband oppresses you, you get divorce. But if a state, if an army oppresses you, then what do you do? So, I chose to dissent. I wanted to free myself. Because I could not bring myself to accept such a rule that if you are a Turkish Cypriot, the most suitable side of the island, not even the most suitable but the suitable side, is the north side of the island and you shall live there. And if you are a Greek Cypriot you shall live in the south side of the island and forget the other side.
I didn’t want to accept this rule and wanted to disobey. And I wanted to be free. I wanted to cross to the south and with the help of a smuggler I did. Only for a night. It was an amazing feeling. I could have been caught. I wanted to be caught. ... However I didn’t get caught. I did it again. I didn’t get caught. ... It was a very pleasant feeling, to become free. I don’t know why I do such crazy things but it must be the freedom. It is sort of an obsession. I mean, overcoming what is forbidden. Then I came to the south of the island once again via London. That time I stayed for one week. Then I found another way and came back three times that way. I would fly from Nicosia to Istanbul, from Istanbul to Athens, from Athens to Larnica and back to Nicosia. This meant that I could go 50 meters only by changing three planes in one day. And then I would go back. Everyone was shocked that I was doing this and this was exactly my intention. People around me were getting upset. I was very hurt that even my close friends would criticize me. But I am very content. ... I wanted to normalize this. I wanted to stand against this stupidity. I wanted to show how ridiculous it was. And I wanted to show that I was not afraid, that I was not afraid of armies and authorities!

The main argument of the second section of this chapter is that Cyprus is a produced or fabricated geography, and, with its state of ‘being a child’, a crushed land stuck in a perpetual childhood. But what lies beneath Yaşın’s transgressions, her ‘free journeys’ across the bounded geography of the island, can be read as an attempt to transform from being a victim into being a performer of her own life story. Perhaps that is why Yaşın speaks so eagerly and ceaselessly.
'1+1=1' proposes and produces a new subject in the social and cultural field; one made up of unexpected conjunctions and one determined to undo all easy categories and the internal coherence of groups formed with an already-established identity 'in common' (Rogoff 2002: 12). Yaşın creates an alternative mapping and produces effects through the performativity of her speech act.

For a moment, I want to go back to Deleuze's essay, quoted at the very beginning of the chapter. At the beginning of the essay, he writes: 'Children never stop talking about what they are doing or trying to do: exploring milieus, by means of dynamic trajectories, and drawing up maps of them. The maps of these trajectories are essential to psychic activity' (Deleuze 1998: 61). At the very end of the same essay, he writes: 'In its own way, art says what children say. It is made up of trajectories and becomings, and it too makes maps, both extensive and intensive' (Ibid., 66).

Yaşın lays out paths and routes, not in the actual geography, but in the emergent visual counter cartography realized by her performative speech act. Ataman makes a portrait of Yaşın that does not have representational visibility. 'Appeared' on the map of virtual and audible landscape, she takes away the privilege of mapping from two nation-states and their unshakable authority in defining the identity of people living each side of the divided island, and inserts her own trajectories. This, itself, is a journey.
CHAPTER 4

SPECTRALITY IN GLOBAL NETWORKING

In Bahman Ghodabí’s film, *Turtles Can Fly* (2005), in a Kurdish refugee camp on the Iraq-Turkey border, a few weeks before the American invasion of Iraq, people are desperately trying to find out when the war will start. Soran, a thirteen-year-old boy nicknamed Satellite, installs a satellite dish so the villagers can receive the latest news about the impending war. Soran commands an army of children to clear the fields of American mines, and has the respect of both the village’s children and elderly. Bush’s war statement, broadcast on CNN, is translated by Soran, in his poor English, as: ‘It will rain tomorrow’. Actually, ‘rain’ will soon fall from the sky for these Kurdish refugees, deprived of both the earth and the sky, in the form of leaflets dropped by American helicopters over the crowded refugee camp. ‘We will make this country a paradise. We are here to take away your sorrow’, claim the leaflets. These small pieces of paper serve as the news that informs the curious villagers that the war has already begun, compensating for their lack of information.

The world of the villagers, which seemingly spins on an entirely different axis than the rest of the world, is in fact a microcosm of the experience of all disempowered people in the world. On this map, no place is either separate or autonomous, neither distant nor unreachable. Quite the contrary, there is no more ‘there’. Everywhere is here already captured. Satellite is optimistic, as he naively believes that the arrival of the Americans in Iraq means ‘passports to America’. He joyfully announces, after he measures on a map
the distance between Iraq and America, that it is just the distance between his two fingers!

The main characteristic of the twenty-first century probably cannot be better defined than with reference to the term ‘networked society’. Thanks to technology, no one is ‘alone’ or ‘independent’ in the globe and nothing is un-programmed. Everybody and everything is connected in very complex ways. The destiny of somebody or something on earth operates according to the logic of global power. Even if this power exercises control without displaying its existence, if we are willing and ready to see, sooner or later the scenarios it has carefully written and the outcomes it has vigilantly programmed produce material effects. The encounter with these material effects is what we call haunting, which will be the preoccupation of this chapter.

In this chapter, the discussion will be centred on the ghostliness in global networking and the spectral reality of the trafficking in women in the global sex industry. I will attempt to bring to light the complex and inter-related structure of globalization and migration, with reference, especially, to the Internet, as well as to digital geographies generated by satellite image technology. On the way, we also will see some ‘digital ghosts’, lurking in the overflowing network of global capitalism.

‘Ghost’ on the Internet
During a conference in London, the Microsoft chairman, Bill Gates, announced that within ten years we will all be connected to the Internet all the time, carrying paper-thin devices that will interact with our environment and provide our entertainment, education and
information needs (Gibson 2005: 9). He told the conference that Microsoft was creating a detailed photo-realistic 3D map of the world, allowing anyone to virtually experience being anywhere on the globe. The next step in his vision for a 'digital lifestyle', he heralded, would be characterized by computers that would become almost invisibly integrated into everything we do. 'In some ways the computer just disappears into the environment. All these devices will be hooked up to the Internet and the Internet will not have any speed limitations. They will be a lot cheaper than they are today' (Ibid.).

Networking has become the defining characteristic of the twenty-first century urban condition and of the way in which we inhabit the globalized world. At every level, our lives depend on networks: digital circuitry (registers, electron pathways, switches), global transportation networks (warehouses, shipping and air routes, ports of entry) and communication networks (mainly the Internet). Gates' wired world is the celebration of the technology that offers a world without limits or obstacles. As an extended cyborg (Haraway 1991), the user will possess an idealized freedom and mobility. Since the Internet has become part of our daily-lives, there is a belief that getting online and becoming part of a global network will liberate the user from the body, with its inconvenient and limiting attributes, such as race, gender, disability and age. However, the transnationality this technology offers is clearly more available to the 'first world user', whose position on the network allows her or him to metaphorically go wherever s/he likes, do whatever s/he wants and be whoever s/he wants. William Mitchell points out:

... networks of different types and scales are integrated into larger network complexes serving multiple functions. Depending upon our relationships to the associated social...
and political structures, each of us can potentially play many different roles (some strong, some weak) at nodes within these complexes: owner, authorized user, operator, occupant, occupier, tenant, customer, guest, sojourner, tourist, immigrant, alien, interloper, trespasser, snooper, besieger, cracker, hijacker, invader, gatekeeper, jailer, or prisoner. Power and political identity have become inseparable from these roles (Mitchell 2003: 9-10).

We are not all networked either for the same reasons or in the same ways. The Internet connects and disconnects individuals at the same time. In his video-documentary, ‘Search’ (2005), shot in Van, a Turkish city that borders Iran, one of the ‘illegal’ immigrants waiting to ‘move forward’ gives his reason for going to Internet cafés in the town:

The first reason forcing us to go to Internet cafés is to communicate, to communicate with the world, with our friends, with our family. The second reason is to use the Internet. What is the Internet? It is the only thing, the only tool, which never disappoints the one wanting to use it. Whatever my aim or my reason, when I want to use it, it covers my needs.

Contrary to the customary profile presented of an Internet user, celebrated widely by its supporters as the most democratic form of communication, ‘Search’ portrays the users of the Internet as sad and lonely people: ‘Imprisonment... Being a refugee is the prison, the jail. ... You are in a city, but you have no right to do anything’, says a refugee. The Internet is not simply a new ‘location’ for their fantasies, but also for their dramas. The
video provocatively defines the condition of a refugee 'having a life on the Internet' (Figure 4.1).

![Fig 4.1 Yılmaz Özdil, 'Search', film-still, 2005](image)

Persistent and pervasive discourses about the Internet, which suggest there are vast numbers of people online and that they are to be found in every corner of the globe, become a myth. Many inhabitants of Van do not even own computers. Households are highly unlikely to have access to the Internet nor are they likely to even go to Internet cafés. In contemporary cities or the cities located at the crossroads of migratory routes, Internet cafés house refugees or 'illegal' immigrants who are desperate to make contact with the world. In 'Search', Özdil shows how even in a small rural town, on the geographical edge of a country, refugees can do no more than sit side by side, in a partially lit room, separated from family, friends or any human contact, withdrawn equally from public space and from nature, sun-light and fresh air. One refugee in 'Search' explains their condition:
We are like a bird in a cage. ... The reason for going to Internet cafes is to communicate. When we enter chat rooms, we are searching for people of the same nationality or people who speak our language. It is not important whether they are in Iran, in Canada, in America or in Australia.

It seems that diaspora in the twenty-first century is experienced differently to earlier eras because of new technologies and rapid communication. The impact of electronic media gives new meaning to Marshall McLuhan’s optimistic idea of ‘the global village’. In inhospitable, contemporary cities, Internet cafés emerge as new ‘ghettos’, and in the era of cyberscape, a new diasporic space takes new shape. In one of the scenes in ‘Search’, two young men are sitting on a bed in the corner of a room listening to their friend playing a guitar. The camera then focuses on a black-and-white drawing on the wall depicting a man chained from head to toe, to a chair and unable to move. This drawing, no doubt, expresses the situation of refugees living in a foreign city and amongst its inhospitable dwellers. There is also a key in the drawing. One wonders if the key

22 The World Wide Web has allowed certain diasporic communities to contact friends and relatives living in all corners of the world or to connect with the homeland or the homeland’s activity, albeit in a virtual sense. For an account of diasporic formations in cyberspace, see Mannur (2003). Herself a multiply located woman, Anita Mannur writes in her essay: ‘One way for many of us to keep track of our multiple border crossings has been through an Internet forum. ... [T]hrough the possibilities of cyber-interfacing, it has become apparent that many of us constitute a new diaspora – a Papua New Guinean diaspora. ... We can feel that we were part of a community that is not in danger of becoming an ossified memory. The World Wide Web in this example has legitimized a generation of memories of a particular space – Port Moresby - and a particular time – the 1980s and early 1990s. It has allowed people who never dreamed of being connected with each other after embarking on a flight out of Jackson’s International Airport in Moresby to feel part of a community that is alive and well – albeit in cyberspace’ (Mannur 2003: 285). For a discussion of created websites of countries see Jeganathan (1998). In his essay, Jeganathan discusses the way these websites reinforce, especially through their visual character, the presence of the nation and thus, give a certain locational identity to the websites. They appear encompassed by both nation and country, imagined community and bounded territory (Jeganathan 1998: 521).
represents the Internet; is it the ‘key’ that, for the refugees, will unlock the closed door to
the world outside?

Without having an existence in the world, the refugees in Van are ghosting the
Internet. I am concerned with cyberspace as ‘a lived space’ that produces webs of
interconnectedness. This ‘lived space’ operates free of the constraints of place, yet
produces a ‘real place’ through networking. As Yılmaz Ölzil’s film shows, a new mode of
diasporic subjectivity occurs on the Internet. In contrast to the transnational operation of
global capital on the Internet (the flow of capital, information or products), a new diasporic
(and virtual) zone is being remapped through cyberspace interfacing, illustrating that even
in techno culture, diaspora remains a distinctly human phenomenon. In ‘Search’, another
refugee says:

I couldn’t remember my father’s face; I saw it on a web-cam on the Internet. ... I like
the computer, because for the first time I saw my father on the computer. I like the
computer. I can talk to my father ...

As Paul Virilio, a philosopher of speed, has pointed out, today vision is becoming
teleobjective and the speed of light enables us to see. He asks: ‘Isn’t this a crime that the
technologies of telecommunications commit in isolating the present from its “here and
now”, and promoting a commutative elsewhere that is no longer the location of our
concrete presence in the world, but merely that of a discrete and intermittent
telepresence?’ (Virilio 2000: 46)
In the discourse of the Internet, virtual has become a supplement to the real; a simulacrum that holds ghostliness, gains its materiality and becomes more ‘real’ than the real. The movement of virtual events, Derrida argues, ‘prohibit us more than ever ... from opposing presence to its representation, “real time” to “deferred time”, effectivity to its simulacrum, the living to the non-living, in short, the living to the living-dead of its ghosts’. Then he asks: ‘Is there there, between the thing itself and its simulacrum, an opposition that holds up?’ (Derrida 1994: 169). The young boy who chats on the Internet sees ‘something’ like his father, but he does not really see him. Similarly, he hears ‘something’ like his father, but they do not hear each other. The distinction between the real and the artificial, the organic and the inorganic, and the authentic and the simulacrum is no longer confidently proclaimed. Now, there is a ‘real’, but it is not quite real, it is not an ‘actual real’, a ‘really real’, but a real whose reality is at best virtual. It is an apparent rather than an actual real.

Cyberspace adds new complexities to the world we live in. It appears as the last of the final ‘frontiers’; an artificial territory that operates as an infinite process of colonization, conquest and the flow of transnational capital. In his influential essay, ‘ALT.CIVILIZATION.FAQ’ (2000), Ziauddin Sardar draws attention to the fact that ‘frontier’, as an invented concept, is at work in cyberspace. In this case, the frontier, firstly, exists in the mind. As an idea, the frontier is a tool of domination that arises from the certainty that one already has total control. Sardar notes that the territory of the American West was already determined before the idea of the frontier could be effective as a means for its dominated integration within the praxis of American citizenry. As an instrument, the function of the frontier is to pass the routine practice of domination into the
hands of the populace, to give them the illusion of freedom while they merely act out the actual effective control that is already predetermined, scrutinized and seen to be good by those with power. He writes:

Cyberspace frontier is no different. It has already been controlled; the populace are now being motivated to explore and settle in the new frontier. The ideologically constructed anarchy of cyberspace reflects the drive of the early settlers who colonized the territory like free agents, but only as the free agents of the evolving concept of a particular civilization.

What the cyberspace ‘frontier’ is doing as the first step is rewriting history: an exercise in catharsis to release the guilt of wiping out numerous indigenous cultures from the face of the earth, the colonization of two-thirds of the world and the continuous degradation of life in the Third World that the West has engendered (Sardar 2000: 735).

Kevin Robins, on the other hand, questions the assumption that the social and political turbulence of our time – ethnic conflict, resurgent nationalism, and urban fragmentation – has anything at all to do with virtual space (Robbins 2000: 79). Virtual reality is imagined as a ‘nowhere-somewhere’ alternative to the difficult and dangerous conditions of contemporary social reality. The exhilaration of virtual existence and experience comes from the sense of transcendence and liberation from the material and embodied world. Rather Robins attempts to consider the cyberspace vision in the context of the new world disorder and disruption. He suggests that this anti-political ideal of techno-community naturalizes the conflicts in world society, denies the difference, or basic asymmetry, of
subjects. He argues that the new technological developments must be situated in the broader context of social and political change and upheaval (Ibid., 86 and 90).

However, are not certain subversions, alternative movements and struggles possible from within cyberspace?

Linking and networking will always be complex hybrid systems generating both predictable and unpredictable outcomes. Having taken possession of both the material and the media spaces, cyberspace can also create new, alternative social formations. One of the striking examples of its mass-mobilization, was the tens or hundreds of thousands involved in protests on the streets of Seattle and of Genoa at the turn of the twentieth century. These events were as global as they were digital events. First, protestors were organised and coordinated on specially created websites, operating as a parasite of the mainstream media. Then the virtual events were brought onto the streets. They became powerful evidence that real events can take place both on the street and online. Alternatively, symbolic sites are chosen, such as border regions (East-West Europe, USA-Mexico) or refugee detention centres (Frankfurt airport, the centralized Eurocop database in Strasbourg, the Woomera detention centre in the Australian desert). Rather than just objecting to it, the global entitlement of the movement adds to the ruling mode of globalization a new layer of globalization from below (Geert and Schneider 2003).

These techno-events have proved that the virtual, in fact, is essential to the real. Elizabeth Grosz has attempted to rethink the traditional concepts of the physical, the
corporeal, the real and the material in light of the unhinging of the concepts of the virtual in relation to the notions of inhabitation and architecture. She writes:

[the] virtual is not a geometric, spatial or a technological concept, nor is it structured by phantasmatic or imaginary projections alone; rather, it is the domain of latency or potentiality, given that the boundaries between the virtual and the real or the physical are unsustainable (Grosz 1997: 115).

In this conception, the virtual is also the site of emergence of the new, the unthought and the unrealized, in which every moment is laden with parallel universes, universes that might have been or are yet to come.

The techno-events in Seattle or Genoa urge us to ask this seemingly simple but in fact very complicated question: What is the power of the 'ghost'?

In these events, the haunted discover the way to become a haunter. The weak become stronger than the oppressors by becoming mobile, by moving fast across both the physical and virtual landscapes in order to trouble the oppressors in their own house. Derrida writes: ‘A stranger who is already found within ... more intimate with one than one is oneself, the absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous .... an unnameable and neutral power, that is, undecidable, neither active nor passive, an an-identity that, without doing anything, invisibly occupies places belonging finally neither to us nor to it’ (Derrida 1994: 172).
Then a series of questions arises: What would a real ‘digital ghost’ look like? In what spectrum would it appear to us? In what way does it produce material effects in our familiar and well-established world?

Derrida asks: ‘What is the effectivity or the presence of a spectre, that is of what seems to remain as ineffective, virtual, insubstantial as a simulacrum?’ (Derrida 1994: 10) To think through the logic of the ‘ghost’ is to point toward a thinking of the event that necessarily exceeds a binary or dialectical logic, the logic that opposes actuality to non-presence. What counts, with regard to global protests such as those in Seattle and Genoa, is what the digital practices are undoing, and what affects both these virtual and real events are producing in the world.

In this context, the ‘ghost’ is a link whose uncontrollable and unpredictable apparitions, nonetheless, are different on each occasion. The power of the ‘ghost’ is that there is no contradiction between the real and the virtual, and between the street and cyberspace. It is everywhere and nowhere at once.

In the context of this discussion, I wish to refer to Hari Kunzru’s novel Transmission (2004), in which the writer provides us with an alternative model in understanding the operation of cyberspace.

Transmission tells the story of twenty-three-year-old Arjun Mehta, a computer programmer, who comes as an arbitrary leap into the global network system and shakes the order of the land from top to bottom. Arjun is an economic migrant working in a
corporation in Washington. He learns that he lost his job, which automatically means that
he will have to return to India, and so tries to act, in vain, to keep the job he struggled so
long to find. When all his honest attempts and efforts do not work, he is left with no other
choice than to make himself a non-person. His 'digital ghost' appears, unexpectedly, and
takes possession of every corner of the world for a short period. Nothing will be the same
again.

Arjun leaves his home in a suburb of New Delhi for America, after he is wrongly
informed that he has secured a job in his dream country as an engineer. He believes that
in America there will be no obstacle to him becoming the person he always dreamed of
becoming. However, on his arrival in California, he learns that he has not yet secured a
job, and that he owes Databodies, the company that brought him to America, for his visa
and ticket. In addition, they charge him an administrative fee. Half of his salary, also,
would be go towards the rent for the house he is to share. Knowing that the terms of his
visa mean that he has to stay with Databodies or leave the country, he becomes a
modern slave. Working for only three and a half months out of twelve in his journey from
one city to another, he knows that he has these jobs, because he comes cheap. He
knows

what lies above him, the sublime mobility of those who travel without ever touching
the ground. He has glimpsed what lies below, the other mobility, the forced motion of
the shopping-cart pushers, the collectors of cardboard boxes (Kunzru 2005 47).

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When Arjun moves to Washington to work in Virugenix, a global security specialist in computer viruses, at first, things seem to get better. When he is fired, he knows he is 'no longer a real person, already faded into memory' (Ibid., 127). He comes to terms with the fact that he needs another person 'as a hard ache inside, an alien presence which had formed in his chest like a tumour' (Ibid., 110).

Arjun already has been another presence, an unauthorized presence in the underground network, where the connectivity calls up the ghost-connection. He had his own private area of the network, a zone that, over the years, he has gradually partitioned off and screened from other eyes. It is an interstitial world, with a discreet virtuality that can efficiently mask its existence from the network of NOIT (North Okhla Institute of Technology), the network of an institution that had mistakenly believed that over the years it rescinded all access to students when they graduated. Without having an agenda to make any trouble or wreak havoc, Arjun's badmAsh, very popular and respected, had long appeared on virus exchange boards, offering to trade code. One night badmAsh appears on a server belonging to a private internet-service provider in Indonesia, and Arjun’s journey at speed along the wires begins. His travel along the wires is launched as soon as badmAsh manages to communicate with a PC physically located in a suburb of Paris. When badmAsh sends a set of commands to the machine and takes control of the PC owner's email software the world is on the verge of a global terror that would be caused by a computer virus. Ten minutes after the first email is sent from the computer located in Paris, forty more people unknowingly distribute it to their friends and contacts. With one click, nothing is the same anymore and the world is soon to meet a 'digital ghost'. Very early in the morning, the PC in Paris sends out, in a constant stream to
hundreds of thousands of people around the world, emails containing what will come to be known as the ‘first variant Leela virus’, or *Leela01.*

By spreading a global virus, Arjun is ‘reborn’, on 13 June, in the digital image of Leela Zahir, a rising star of Bollywood cinema, and returns to Virugenix, the home of the Ghostbusters anti-virus team, as a threatening and overpowering spectre. During the days he worked there, he only caught a glimpse of the anti-virus team’s room, walled off from the rest of the office by clear plexi-glass panels and access to which required high-level clearance or a status. Through a reversal of fortune, Arjun now is very much inside the room; far more inside than even the Ghostbusters.

Appearing dancing in jerky quick-time in a pop-up window on the screens of thousands of computers across the globe, Leela Zahir becomes Arjun’s extremely tenuous yet strong link to the global world. While his ‘ghost’ is taking possession of the whole world, Arjun, the FBI’s most wanted man, disappears in Mexico. Having a virtual presence in the computer world, Leela also gains the presence of a vital spark in the real world:

A chain of cause and effect? Nothing so simple in Leela’s summer. It was a time of topological curiosities, loops and knots, never-ending strips of action and inside-out bottles of reaction so thoroughly confused that identifying a point of origin became almost impossible (Ibid., 4).
By never staying stable for long, by not being able to be scanned or recognized, Leela makes her rhizomatic\textsuperscript{23} journeys. With the power of metamorphoses, she travels into space, passing through people and buildings.

There was versions of her that break completely with the past, even her own past, to become something different, to take on new forms, able to target more software, to infect more computers. She also can camouflage herself within the programmes she infects, inserting herself between legitimate instructions and covering herself by resetting all references to the changes she has made. When the scanners peer at a Leela-infected file, it looks normal. It still functions. Nothing appears to have been altered since the last clean sweep was made. 'Legitimate programmes were doing legitimate things' (Ibid., 113-114). However, illegitimate Leela, still invisible, takes revenge on the uncontrollable world:

Arjun knew what was going on behind the eyes and the smile, how Leela was stealing resources from other programmes, taking up disk space, making herself at home. How perhaps she was also doing other things: malicious, corrupting things. Now it was just a question of how hard the analysis would find it to counter her (Ibid., 128).

Leela, somehow, touches everybody. A number of major networks that handle mobile telephones, airline reservations, transatlantic email traffic and automated teller systems...

\textsuperscript{23}Rhizome is a term used by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in 'Introduction: Rhizome' in their book, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia}. to describe non-hierarchical networks of all kinds. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree or root. There are only lines.' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 8) Later, in the same section, they describe the rhizomatic structure in these words: 'A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, \textit{intermezzo}. ... The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. \textit{Between} things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle' (Ibid., 25).
go down simultaneously. The material effects of her techno-events are felt in the public domain.

The virus turns the life of Guy Swift, a UK millionaire living in London, upside down. Leela finds him on an airplane outside time zones. Is that not the ‘ghost’s’ real time? Neither at the time of origin nor at the time of destination, the ‘ghost’ always resides in the middle. Leela has to wait to make him her subject, because Guy is sleeping as he travels back to London from New York. She approaches slowly, aggrandizing her effect for the final shot that will cast him adrift in the network of another world.

Leela comes at the perfect moment, not only to change the present but also the future of Guy, the boss of the media-agency, Tomorrow. Is it not true that tomorrow is happening today when a ‘ghost’ visits us?

Guy is under pressure from Transcendenta, a European company that funds Tomorrow. His own and his company’s future depends on a business meeting with the European Union (EU). Signing a contract would secure the branding of the entire European Union customs and immigration regime: logos and uniforms, of a whole continent’s border police. Leela arrives at that moment. As he switches on his computer, in the EU quarter of Brussels, to show a film they have made to promote the EU, a film about, in his own words, ‘Club Europe as the world’s VIP room’, he is haunted by the depressingly familiar little figure, dancing to Indian music. His marketing ideas have already been found to be very creative, especially when he says of Europe: ‘A continent that wants people, but only the best. An exclusive continent. An upscale continent’ (Ibid.,
257). If the border is everywhere, from a marketing point of view, a mental border is of value, and without a doubt Guy thinks this value is something they can promote (Ibid., 252-253). Then Arjun’s ‘ghost’ arrives and takes him from his privileged world by inserting him into a world of migrants in Brussels, a world that is, as the spectral reality of European borders, powerfully real.

In Brussels, leaving drunk in a lap-dancing club with a woman from an Eastern European country, Guy, a white UK citizen, opens his eyes, not in a four-star hotel, but in an apartment building in the suburbs of Brussels full oft ‘illegal’ immigrants. It does not take long before he finds himself squeezed into a police van with several Chinese and East African women. His ‘transnational journey’ is soon to begin but not in the way in which he is accustomed. His journey, over which he is powerless, begins from a temporary processing centre that has been set up by Belgian immigration in a hangar at the airport. It ends in a beach in Puglia, Italy, where he is found, having being dumped from a dinghy into the sea, some distance from the shore by a crew of Albanian people-smugglers.

It is at the airport that he first realizes an important fact that is to govern his life for almost one month:

Sitting on plastic seats were tall Somalis and tiny Latinos, Nigerians and Byelorussians, Filipinos and Kazakhs. ... There were more illegals than Guy had expected. It looked as if they had turned the city upside down and shaken it. An impressive operation (Ibid., 280).
It is through the ‘Leela factor’ in the Schengen Information System that Guy, young marketer, British National and native-speaker of English, comes to be identified as Gjergj Ruli, Albanian national, suspected pyramid fraudster and failed asylum seeker in Germany. *Leela08* was responsible for the destruction of a large number of EU immigration records before it was finally spotted and the system closed down some thirty-six hours after Guy Swift’s deportation to Tirana. In Tirana, he sells his expensive watch in return for a berth on one of the regular powerboat runs that take would-be Europeans to the Italian coast. However, when the lights of a customs launch are spotted in the distance, the two traffickers immediately pitch all five people on the small boat into the sea. By swimming in the right direction, he is washed ashore just before dawn on a tourist beach south of Bari.

Leela’s catastrophic visitation brings a moment of maximal uncertainty, a time of peaking doubt. There is heavy traffic across the border between unknown and known. Kunzru writes in *Transmission*:

> ‘We want to abolish the unknown’, writes one Leela researcher. It is a common enough desire. As humans, we want to know what is lurking outside our perimeter, beyond our flickering circle of firelight. We have built lenses and Geiger counters and mass spectrometers and solar probes and listening stations on remote Antarctic islands. We have drenched the world in information in the hope that the unknown will finally and definitely go away. But the information is not the same as knowledge. To extract one from another, you must, as the word suggests, inform. You must transmit. Perfect information is sometimes defined as a signal transmitted from a sender to a receiver without loss, without the introduction of the smallest uncertainty or confusion.
In a real world, however, there is always a noise (Ibid., 271).

In his novel, Kunzru reveals the reality of global power. When a 'digital ghost' resides in the very system of European capitalist networking for only a few weeks, the darker side of the global West is bounced back on itself. The very tool with which the West has networked the global world now acquires a life of its own and threatens to recast its own life. Leela is ungovernable and threatening, lurking beneath the surface disrupting the world. As her transparent virtual body dances its way around the world, global chaos follows every step and reveals the true darkness that lies underneath. Taking away power, her ghosting lasts for only a few weeks, but her hauntings make history.

**Virtual / Real Migration**

The larger dynamics organizing global society, especially economic activities, are embedded in electronic space that overrides all existing territorial jurisdiction and, thus, rewrites the concept of location. Through electronic networking, our habitats are becoming fragmented and dispersed. They no longer are bounded by walls, but by the reach of networks. They are occupied by spatially dispersed organizations. They are controlled and defended not along a continuous perimeter, but at separate and scattered access nodes. They are given order and meaning not by participation in strict spatial sequences and hierarchies, but by their specific global linkages.

Electronic space is generally read as a purely technological event and, in that, sense as self-contained and neutral. However, this is only a partial account. Whether in
the geography of its infrastructure or in the structure of cyberspace itself, electronic space is inscribed, and to some extent shaped, by power, concentration, and contestation, as well as by openness, de-centralization and the absence of hierarchy.

In 'Writing Desire' (2000), Ursula Biemann examines the production of desire in the late capitalist global economy by looking at the monetization of relationships between men and women on and by the Internet. By focusing on cyberspace’s role in the production of sites for the strategic instantiation of gendering, Biemann shows how, by producing needs, desires, bodies and social relations, the Internet is a powerful tool that defines migratory routes and launches migration.

In her video-essays, Biemann takes a gendered look at the movement of women across the globe by using visual information technologies to consider transnational and post-urban sites such as borderlands, free trade zones, outsourced labour ghettos, overseas military entertainment districts and tourist resorts. Her audio-visual essays, that are artistic as well as theoretical and political, are situated somewhere between documentary and video-art. Actively engaging in the activity of representation itself, Biemann points out that the essayist’s practice with visual language constantly reconsiders the act of image-making and the desire to produce meaning (Biemann 2003: 83). She suggests that the essayist approach in her artistic practice is more concerned with organizing complexities than with documenting realities or arranging the material into a particular field of connections.
In Biemann’s video-essays, the complex relationships between the seemingly unrelated issues of identity, politics, gender, spatiality, migration and technology in the global world are placed in dialogue with each other. The attempt to draw various layers together leads the artist to the creation of an ‘imaginary topography on which all kinds of thoughts and events taking place in various sites and non-sites experience a spatial order’ (Ibid., 84). The reference points of the video-graphic space, thus, extend beyond the meaning of a particular place and beyond its documentable reality, and recall things that are highly abstract or barely representable.

During the entrance sequence of ‘Writing Desire’, over the view of a palm beach, blue lettering flashes up reading: ‘Geography is imbued with the notion of passivity, feminized national spaces await rescue with the penetration of foreign capital’. This is followed by a list of countries and rapidly changing portraits of women. Biemann investigates the market in brides and virgins in the digitalized global sex industry that sells, to the global male community, large numbers of women covering a vast geography of feminized national spaces, from Russia to the Philippines (Figure 4.2).

Fig 4.2 Ursula Biemann, ‘Writing Desire’, video-still, 2000
It is important, here, to draw attention to the fact that colonial discourses have passed in to late capitalist and global discourses. Edward Said has argued that Orientalism takes perverse shape as a ‘male power-fantasy’ that sexualizes a feminized Orient for Western power and possession. The sexual subjugation of Oriental women to Western men ‘fairly stands for the pattern of relative strength between East and West and the discourse about the Orient that it enabled’ (Said 1995: 6). European porno-tropics have a long tradition. For centuries, the uncertain continents – Africa, the Americas, Asia - figured in European lore as libidinously eroticized ‘virgin lands’. Travellers’ tales abounded with visions of the monstrous sexuality of far-off lands (McClintock 1995: 22). There was an intimate relation between imperial power, race and gender. Women serving as the boundary markers of imperialism figured as the epitome of sexual aberration and excess:

As European man crossed the dangerous thresholds of their known worlds, they ritualistically feminized borders and boundaries. Female figures were planted like fetishes at the ambiguous points of contact, at the borders and orifices of the contact zone. Sailors bound wooden female figures to their ships’ prows and baptized their ships - as exemplary threshold objects - with female names. Cartographers filled the blank seas of their maps with mermaids and sirens. Explorers called unknown lands ‘virgin’ territory. Philosophers veiled ‘Truth’ as female, then fantasized about drawing back the veil. In myriad ways, women served as mediating and threshold figures by means of which men oriented themselves in space, as agents of power and agents of knowledge (Ibid., 24).
Hauntology teaches us that history is not simply in the past. It is irreducible neither to the past nor to the present. It makes us realize that history re-appears in the form of the 'ghost' and that there is a kind of 'non-contemporaneity' that determines the persistence of the haunting presence of history.

Enslaved and colonized womanhood, which came to represent uninhibited and unrestricted sexual intercourse, in many ways is reflected in today's global sex industry, including in sex tourism. The racial and ethnic structuring visible in the global sex industry, strongly resembles the orientalist and exoticist movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in which 'the exotic other' is regarded as a desirable, tantalizing and governable subject, suitable for temporary sexual intercourse or non-marital relationships. The images of the 'exotic' are entwined with ideologies of racial and ethnic difference. The non-European woman represents the unknown, yet is positioned in dominant discourse as the subordinated 'other'. Peoples and cultures that are different and remote are valorized while simultaneously having the status of inferiority imposed upon them. The eroticization of women of the so-called Third World countries is an integral part of the construction of female sexuality as highly attractive and fascinating, yet related to a natural primitiveness and of a lower order than 'Europeanness' (Kempadoo 1998: 10):

'Geography and space are always gendered, always raced, always economical and always sexual. The textures that bind them together are daily re-written through a word, a gaze, a gesture', writes cultural theorist Irit Rogoff (Rogoff 2000: 28). Electronic space is also gendered and highly sexual, and 'Writing Desire' traces out the networked and gendered geography that the electronic space generates.
Biemann's video investigates the way in which in the global world, places, subjectivities, and sexual needs and desires are constructed in specific ways through the Internet. For instance, in the video we watch a beautiful young blonde first wandering around in a small room, then sitting in a chair and beginning to talk: 'I would like to share my future with a man who would understand me completely and help me in my life and in my work. Goodbye, so long'. Then words scroll down the screen: 'she is beautiful and feminine/she is loving and traditional/she is humble and devoted/she likes to listen to mellow music/the smile is her rhetorical gesture/she believes in a lasting marriage/and a happy home/she is the copy of the First World World's past' (Figure 4.3).

Fig 4.3 Ursula Biemann, 'Writing Desire', video-still, 2000

Negri and Hardt have pointed out that the communications industries integrate the imaginary and the symbolic within the bio-political fabric, not merely putting them at the service of power, but actually integrating them into its very functioning (Hardt and Negri 2000: 32-33). The Internet produces a fluid space, where various ideologies and
stereotypes of particular racial-ethnic categories of sex are evident. In one of the scenes in Biemann’s film, these words appear on the screen:

emails conquer distance
emails maintain distance
emails mark exchanges
and promise fulfilment
the fullilment of promise
the bride is the promise
the groom is the promise
no longer physically delivered
but electronically generated

in the sexual economy
the body is eroticized
is made generic
is made anonymous
emptied of its specific identities
to signify the collective exotic
to engender desire
the desire to be conquered

The main method of the recruitment and trafficking of women in the global sex industry is ‘marriage agencies’, sometimes called mail-order-bride agencies or international introduction services, which operate largely on the Internet. Recruiters of the sex industry use ‘marriage agencies’ as a way to contact women who are eager to travel or emigrate
(Hughes 2000: 634). It is important to note that in these particular cases migration is actualized through the Internet. The Internet facilitates easy transport and information to buyers and allows agents to advertise women and children to their buyers in the global economy. The sites include comprehensive picture databanks with anatomical information about the future bride. Some sites feature short presentation videos in which the applicant can tell of her personal qualities (Biemann 2000: 310).

In 'Writing Desire', Ursula Biemann focuses especially on the bride-market operating on the Internet that facilitates migration. Unfulfilled desires travel along the wires in a highly coded, sexualized manner without any embodiment. This type of connectivity calls up a 'ghost connection' that is materialized through actual movement in space and time afterwards.

In cyberspace, the virtual and the physical movement of female bodies conflate. While many women enter the networks through recruiting agents, others do so by taking the initiative of posting their picture on the web with the hope of activating the interest of a remote person. These procedures involve the contradictory notion of 'routed agency', suggesting an active and highly directed use of digital space, while at the same time understanding its limitations and the channelling of their desire for mobility along profitable or simply practicable routes. Network navigation transcends the geographical understanding of boundaries. So travelling can take many forms. What starts as a virtual involvement can quickly lead to the purchase of a long distance train or plane ticket, or the clandestine handing over of the outrageous price of an illegal border passage. This is
the mind-boggling shift in scale that passes from the most intimate space of romantic
writing to the global scale of migration (Biemann 2007: 167-168).

Intellectual and critical work should shift the focus from simple hierarchies and
dichotomies to the problematizing of multiple spaces, seemingly contradictory social
locations and plural sites of power. There is a dynamic, geographically and temporarily
fluctuating pattern of presence. ‘Writing Desire’ shows how global spaces and the most
intimate personal spaces are contiguous. In the film, we move through the electronic
terrain of digital images generated both by the electronic communications network and by
the landscapes visually generated by satellite media and other visual information
systems. The video navigates through various viewing levels and cuts through the
simultaneity and multi-layeredness of ideas and images. We see the stereotypical
presentation of young women from former socialist countries and from South-East Asia
taken from the international organized marriage market operating especially on the
Internet alongside the story of the Mexican artist and feminist, Maria Bustamante, who
found her new partner on the Internet. There is the interview with the philosopher, Rosi
Braidotti, speaking about the increasing disembodiment of sexuality and the matter-of-fact
information given by the representative of the ‘International Organization for Migration’ in
Manila, Socorro Ballesteros, about illegal syndicates recruiting ‘mail-order-brides’. Finally,
there are images taken by Biemann from actual locations that, in fact, are all
translocations, such as an airport or busy urban traffic.

The Internet haunts the whole geography. It is both effect and cause. It produces its
own electronic space, in so doing managing territories and producing subjectivities.
However, the processes it triggers and the effects it causes remain both unreal and real at the same time. It shadows, or to put it in Werner Hamacher's words, 'spectrealizes' the migration it facilitates, the gender dynamics it actively produces, in the alternative cross-border circuits in which migrant women are playing a critical role (Hamacher 1999: 191). Realities are challenged and caused to waver visibly, yet also invisibly, just as when we say 'barely perceptible', we mean at once 'perceptible' and 'imperceptible'.

In 'Writing Desire', Biemann is also concerned with textuality or the way in which the body is 'absent' where there is an act of writing and the way in which bodies are reduced to a flat minimum of visual and textual information. There are 'ghosts' on the Net, 'there where they were already there without being there' (Derrida 1994: 79). Through the writing on the Internet, though, women will gain a presence in the end, for their absence produces effects.

When discussing the way in which technology has changed our bodies and minds, as well as our environment, Iain Chambers writes:

Our bodies become other bodies, that is, objects on the screen, further signs. The movement of writing, viewing, inscription, physical and imaginary travel all represent attempts to link these two shores, to navigate between the corporeal and the incorporeal, to break the rigid dualism of subject and object, of male and female, of reality and imaginary, in a recognition of desire. It is that desire, inscribed with all its cultural and historical signatures, that situates us, and not the apparent technical effacement of our selves as our bodies are dematerialised in the simulated and self-referring order of media metamorphosis. In this migrancy, it is the dialogue of desire,
of motion, of shifting sense and senses, of openings, rather than technology and the techniques distilled in the alienated body confronting the machine, that becomes the fulcrum of sense and provides the narrative ground upon which we base our movement (Chambers 1994: 62).

As it communicates, language does not only produce commodities but also creates subjectivities, puts them in relation and orders them. In spite of the impersonality of the screen, the digital zone facilitates unprecedented levels of spontaneous affection, intimacy and informality.

The Internet connects the users to a vast distributed plane, triggered by thoughts and desires. In the private space of the Internet, electronic desires and pleasures are culturally coded. The distinction between natural emotions and commodified ones become blurred. Emotion or desire becomes denaturalized, and bodies turn to images, to words and to codes. Electronic communications organize movements by multiplying and structuring interconnections through networks. They express the movement and control the sense and direction of the imaginary that runs throughout these communicative connections; in other words, the imaginary is guided and channelled within the communicative and productive desiring machine.

The Trafficking of Women in Digital Geographies

In the context of the global sex trade across borders, there is the kind of desiring production that is less about crossing borders or boundaries and more about what Deleuze and Guattari theorize, in Anti-Oedipus, as non-territorial flows and intensities that
can be tracked across borders. Desirous intensities at borders are merely knots in an extensive relational geography\(^\text{24}\) of male desire.

In Deleuze and Guattari's conception, desire is a machine and it causes the current to flow, its self flows in turn and breaks the flow (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 5). They question the definition of desire, developed by psychoanalysis, as primarily a lack: a lack of a real object and, thus, only phantasy. Deleuze and Guattari rather suggest that if desire produces its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 25-26).

In a global world, personal desire becomes global too. As a productive machine, it energizes migratory movements and produces global effects in chaotic, yet 'scheduled' and relational formations. To understand this new emergent structure of migration, Nikos Papastergiadis' notion of 'turbulence' is helpful (Papastergiadis 2000). Papastergiadis uses the term 'turbulence', adopted from James Rosenau's work in international relations (Rosenau 1990), in order to break out of the mechanistic models of migration. Through the notion of 'turbulence', he convincingly points out the way in which international structures of migration have often gone unnoticed in the global world. Both the drag effect produced on migrants as they are caught in the flow of movement and the complex linkages generated to sustain a momentum, often are overshadowed by the attention given to external forces. For him, turbulence is not just useful for describing the unsettling effect of an unexpected force that alters the course of movement, it is also a metaphor for

\(^{24}\) Relational geography, Irit Rogoff writes, is 'not being mapped out of any centre nor periphery, this relational geography ... has no particular direction, but instead establishes connection in the manner of the fold, its boundaries touching-not touching its inner recesses' (Rogoff: 2003: 57).
the broader levels of interconnection and interdependency between the various forces in play in global world, either being too visible or invisible a catalyst. In the absence of structured patterns of global migration, with direct causes and effects, turbulence is a very productive and critical formulation for understanding and analysing the mobile processes of complex self-organization that are now occurring (Papastergiadis 2000: 4). Papastergiadis draws attention to the fact that the particular movements he calls ‘turbulent flows’ may appear chaotic, but there is a logic and order within them. His notion of ‘turbulence’ helps us read the particular structure, which is lack of any structure, yet possessing of intricate patterns of interconnection. As Manuel de Landa has noted, ‘a turbulent flow is made out of a hierarchy of eddies and vortices inside more eddies and vortices (cited by Papastergiadis 2000: 5; De Landa 1991: 8).

In another video-essay, ‘Remote Sensing’ (2001), Biemann is concerned with the constructed desire that produces turbulent flows. She aims to show the way in which global desire covers just as much territory as border and military satellite technologies, which one would assume to be scientific, objective and informative. Satellite technology, through which multiple territories and borders are tracked in a single screening, simply represents a wider voyeurism. It, therefore, broadens desire.

In this video, Biemann seems to extend the spatial and tectonic interests of cyberspace and its urban manifestations towards the global digital geography that constitutes a space to be traversed by the constant motions of gendered bodies. Instead of representations of captivity, immobility or deportation, the video sketches out an
alternative territoriality, opting for images of women travelling, so actively traversing geographies.

The video investigates the complex networks of involved in the trafficking of woman in relation to the abstraction of technological representation, as well as a critique of their function as hegemonic visualisation. Scanning, x-ray and remote sensing, to name but a few optical technologies used in satellite image technology, are used to track and monitor migratory movements across land. They are constantly producing a new visuality that enables certain notions of globality, controllability and governability (Biemann 2007: 167). Images are produced to give certain meanings and convey specific messages. Visibility is very complicated and visual culture’s object of study is precisely the entities that come into being at the points of intersection of visibility with social power; that is to say, visuality.

A simple yet very important fact is that we no longer need an actual border to be under surveillance. The particular subject of the twenty-first century is the one who is constantly located at ‘checkpoints’ that are invisible or even immaterial. Chip cards, biometric systems or electronic collars regulate access to proprietary, privileged or otherwise restricted areas, and collate images of human movement in enormous databases (Schneider 2002: 183). In our daily lives, we are located in a vast space of specific types of enclosure that is filled up with the ultra-rapid forms of free-floating control.

In his important essay, 'Postscript on the Societies of Control', Deleuze mapped out a shift from what Foucault called the disciplinary societies towards what he came to call
‘the societies of control’. Deleuze’s point in his theoretical shift was that there was a generalized crisis regarding all environments of enclosure; the prison, the hospital, the factory, the school and the family. Deleuze saw that the old type of discipline, which operates in the time-frame of a closed system, had been replaced by controls that are, in his words, a ‘modulation’ (Deleuze 1992: 4), which continuously change from one moment to another without any limit or delay. ‘In disciplinary societies’, he pointed out, ‘one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in societies of control one is never finished with anything – the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation’ (Ibid., 5).

Information is central to the postmodern custom and immigration regime. In the advanced technologization at the borders, which accumulates detailed information and collects images without being able to visualize actual, moving bodies, individuals turn into numbers and cases. In the socio-technological aspect of the mechanism of border control, ‘[i]ndividuals have become “dividuals” and masses, samples, data, markets or “banks’ (Deleuze 1992: 6). Visual displays of information coming through the optical technologies correlate two of the crucial control-technologies of today’s borders - surveillance and filtering - because borders are not so much about racist permission and refusal of entry as there are about user-profiling. The ultimate aim of postmodern border management, above all, is the filtering of, presumably useful, from non-useful immigrants (Schneider 2002: 183).
However, bodies are not only traced by geographic information systems. Women themselves are involved in cartographic activities. In the course of the global dislocation of women and the sexualization of their labour, a new geography is being mapped by the recruitment of women from among minorities and slum communities, their transportation along trafficking routes and their own itineraries across borders, abroad and off-shore, for labour in the global sex industry. Here they build overseas economies and alternative circuits of survival in the margins of a pan-capitalist reality. Political theorist, Saskia Sassen, conceptualizes the highly patterned and structured cross-border circuits of women as ‘counter-geographies’ of globalization, for they overlap with some of the major dynamics that compose globalization: the formation of global markets, the intensification of transnational and translocal networks, and the development of communication technologies, which easily escape conventional surveillance practices (Sassen 2000: 504).

Spectrality involves the idea that the living present is not nearly as self-sufficient as it claims to be. We would do well not to count on its density and solidity, which might, under exceptional circumstances betray us: ‘... ghosts are these moments in which the present – and above all our current present, the wealthy, sunny, gleaming world of the postmodern and the end of history - unexpectedly betrays us (Jameson 1999: 39). The main characteristics of globalization is that, in its smooth space, one cannot spot its place of power, which has spread out across the globe. As Hardt and Negri note, there is no place of power outside the space of imperial sovereignty (Hardt and Negri 2000: 190). Ruling over the entire globe, global power is both everywhere and nowhere. In discussing Derrida’s book, *Spectres of Marx*, Negri writes that, in our time, the common experience
of spectrality is ‘as clear as the sun’ (Negri 1999: 9). The transnational operation of global capital holds spectrality for it is the movement of an abstraction par excellence that is materialized and becomes powerful, mostly in disguised and highly subtle ways.

There are spectral movements within migration itself, for the transnational criminal networks take advantage of patterns of migration to traffic women. Migration serves as a cover for traffickers in transporting women to destinations in the sex industry. The spectre of the trafficking of women for the sex industry has become embedded in the global sex industry. Alongside the apparel, automobile, electronic, computer and luxury good industries, the sex industry has grown since the mid-1970s to fully encompass live sex shows, sex shops, massage parlours, escort services, phone sex, sex tours, image clubs and exotic dancing. In so doing, it has created, as Edward Herman states, ‘one of the booming markets in the New World Order – a multi-billion dollar industry with finders, brokers, syndicate operations and pimp “managers” at the scene of action’ (cited by Kempadoo 1998: 16; Herman 1995: 5). The sex industry has become a new industry. Recruitment agencies and impresarios link local sites and the sex industry in various parts of the world, indicating a parallel with transnational corporations in the formal global economy.

There is a considerable gap between official policies and day-to-day experiences of prostitutes and mail-order brides. Whereas economic globalization denationalizes national economies, immigration is renationalizing politics. There is a growing consensus, in European nation-states, to lift border controls on the flow of capital, information and services. However, when it comes to immigrants and refugees, the state asserts its
sovereign right to control its borders. Border reinforcement technologies and European immigration policy hinder the flows of migrant women and push them into the illegal sector. This is mainly because Western European countries, where labour migration is restricted, insist that they are not countries of immigration. The official policies of receiving countries in Western Europe forbid labour migration from so-called 'Third World' countries. As a result, this type of migration is pushed into illegality and becomes part of organized crime, forming a shadow economy for globalization.

The migration of women happens in a network of global vectors. Trafficking in women and the sex industry are a worldwide phenomenon. It happens everywhere and, in its structural geography, migrant women emerge as key actors. Kevin Bales describes the current system as a new type of slavery\textsuperscript{25} that, not only is the outcome of economic globalization, but also is part of the globalization process itself. ‘Once officially abolished,’ Bales argues, ‘slavery was transformed: adopted as an illicit enterprise, it has mirrored changes in the general economy. No longer viewed as property, people are seen merely as disposable inputs into production’ (Bales 2000: 463). He maps out a relational geography of migrant women working in the sex industry:

In Southeast Asia, women are enslaved in Burma or Laos and transported to brothels in Thailand, Japan or Europe. Investment from Europe funds the charcoal operations of Brazil, while capital from Hong Kong funds the brothels of Thailand. Slaves from Mali are found in Paris, while slaves from the Philippines are found in London and

\textsuperscript{25} Bales defines new forms of slavery as the complete control of a person for economic exploitation by violence or the threat of violence. Modern day slaves are used in different kinds of work: agricultural work, brick-making, mining and quarrying, textiles, leather working, prostitution, gem and jewelry making, cloth and carpet making, domestic servitude, forest-clearing, charcoal making and working in shops.
Saudi Arabia. Eastern European women are being dispersed as slaves around the globe (Ibid., 461).

The current flows of global migration are now fundamentally different from earlier forms of mass migration. The earlier mappings of international migrations were predominantly Eurocentric. They were defined either in relation to the colonial ventures from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, or to the processes of industrialization and rapid urbanization in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. However, current trends of global migration reveal a far greater multi-directional phase. In this context, migration is neither directed to, nor exclusively generated by, the needs of the north and the west. While for the earlier periods of labour migration, movement was generally mapped in linear terms, with clear co-ordinates between centre and periphery, and definable axial routes, the current phase can best be described as ‘turbulent’ movement, to put it in Papastergiadis’ words. It is a fluid but structured movement, with multi-directional and reversible trajectories. The ‘turbulence of migration’ is evident not only in the multiplicity of paths along which migrants travel but also in the unpredictability of the changes associated with these movements (Papastergiadis 2000: 7).

The ghostliness of the global sex industry produces a zone of density and forces that paradoxically are there and not there at the same time. The economically determined and culturally suspended zones are being produced through the movement of women who are traversing and temporarily dwelling in sites that are not culturally embedded in the area. On the contrary, artificially created nests of activities are linked to its own operative logic.
'Remote Sensing' maps out this highly gendered and structured geography of trafficking in women in a sex trade in which women are 'programmed' by male Western customers, and their multiple movements run according to economic, social and political logic. Biemann follows the particular web of worldwide migration paths and the travel routes of women. Transnational mobility requires a transmobile artistic practice and intellectual analysis, an 'in-transit body and mind', in order to understand the complexities and interconnectedness of the global world. It requires a Deleuzean 'nomadic becoming', which, as a performative metaphor, allows for otherwise unlikely encounters and unsuspected sources of interaction of experience and of knowledge. 'Nomadic being' refers to a kind of critical consciousness that 'connects, circulates, moves on' (Braidotti 1994: 35). Biemann seems to be aware of the non-fixity of boundaries. Her migratory artistic practices map out nomadic cartographies which function as a net of interconnections.

In 'Remote Sensing', the camera never stops moving as it tracks the highly sexualized mobility in the transitory geography: the Mexico-USA borderland; the brothel in Thailand, which is a country of destination for many women from countries as varied as Russia, Burma, Vietnam and Cambodia; the East-German and Czech Republic borderland, where women from Bulgaria, the Ukraine and elsewhere work in the glasshouse brothels situated along the international roads; the former U.S. marine bases in The Philippines, where American men are the only customers; the Korean Peninsula, where mostly Filipina and Russian women work; Thailand, which is one of the most popular locations in the sex tourism industry, and so on.
The artist investigates the way in which cross-border flows form particular cultural and social landscapes, and women eventually inscribe themselves into the physical terrain at the fringe of society. Turning the focus away from the simple crossing of borders towards exposing the transnational, diffuse and semi-legal economic transactions behind the multiple movements of women, the video overlaps the electronic and social landscapes of the global sex industry (Figure 4.4). Apart from the actual locations, the artist deliberately uses the visual language of advanced image technology, such as satellite or x-ray images, and a great collection of data in order to investigate the representation of geographic movements on both material and electronic terrain. The detailed information and data, and the highly coded abstract images, correspond to both the meaning and image making processes.

What is very striking about the images captured by the advanced image technology, though, is that the crossing body never is materialized. The actual movements of female bodies in space and time can refer only to an ‘absence’ in the highly technological images. We are left with only remainders of ghosting. Women are missing. Something is making an appearance that had been kept from view, becomes disappeared in the electronic landscapes (Figure 4.5). Digital landscape has its own reality, full of spectres, which marks the ambiguous journey situated between ontology and hauntology, and between absence and presence.
Saskia Sassen has noted that, in much of her work, the central assumption has been that we learn something about power through its absence and by moving through or negotiating the borders and terrains that connect powerlessness to power. Powerlessness, Sassen says, is not, at bottom, a silence. Its absence is present and has consequences (Sassen 1998: 86). The places of absence and of silence are constituted in terms of inter-connectedness. In these spaces, women gain ‘presence’ and emerge as subjects, but without gaining power.
Bio-power\textsuperscript{26}, analyzed by Foucault as the main operative logic of the modern state, is at work in the era of global capitalism. Bio-political power is the form of power that regulates social life from its interior rather than from its exterior. It needs 'docile bodies' to create. It actively produces and reproduces life by penetrating the consciousnesses entirely, as well as the very bodies of individuals, treating and organizing them in the totality of its activity (Foucault 1990 [1976]; see also Agamben 1998).

Women are wandering trade in the impersonal and seemingly abstract system of the exchange of captured bodies in the global sex trade. In the opening scene of 'Remote Sensing', the moving camera captures a goods van and then, in the following scene, we see young women standing on streets waiting for customers in a city somewhere in the Mexico-US borderland. Later in the video, Biemann says off-screen: 'She is a large and fragile cargo'. The video focuses on the women who, like goods, are transported or waiting to be transported to a specific destination. In the transnational typographies, the female bodies are re-routed. In the video, two women, who have managed to escape the industry, tell their stories. They had been promised jobs in a restaurant in Germany. However, only as they were about to depart did the eight women learn that their flight tickets were for Nigeria. They were forced to work as prostitutes in a nightclub for Chinese clients. One managed to return to the Philippines after eight months with the help of a client, but the other woman first went to Lomé to work in a nightclub and then moved to

\textsuperscript{26} At the end of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault summerizes the process by which, at the threshold of the modern era, the individual's life and body begins to be included in the mechanism and calculations of State power, and politics turns into 'bio-politics'. 'Bio-power' is a type of power whose highest function, according to Foucault, 'was .. no longer kill, but to invest life through and through' (Foucault 1990 [1976]: 139). What characterized this power is that the old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully suplplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life (Ibid., 139-140). Foucault points out that 'bio-power' is an indispensible element in the development of capitalism which would not have been possible without 'the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes' (Ibid., 140-141).
Cyprus where prostitution is legal, hoping that she would save enough money to get back to her country.

Remotely looked upon from an orbital perspective, the abstraction of scientific images and their wider voyeurism creates technologically mediated landscapes. The media technologies operate as vectors that can link almost any point, either near or far distant. They make any and every point a possible connection, and everyone and everything is a potential object and/or subject of a mediated relation. In their fixed place, they network and connect vast and vaguely defined spaces together and move images, and even sounds, together. In this sense, they tend to homogenize the space of the world as they turn the earth into a borderland. Satellite technology creates a space for the logistical tracking of objects and subjects in movement, and for ordering that movement. Space is traversed by an emergent space composed of vectors capable of moving information more quickly than people or things can move.

The electronic landscape these electronic images mediate, however, cannot reveal the economic and sexual nature of this expanded geography that are trailed by the women in their accelerated mobility. Moreover, although there is no doubt that advanced technological machines capture the earth in every detail, they cannot provide information on the specific characters the spaces contain, the roles they play or the lived experience of the people who inhabit them. Somewhere in the video, in a small, dark room, a young woman working in a brothel in the East Germany-Czech Republic borderland says: ‘There are other borders over there, it is better here, you know’. What is striking in these
sequences of the video is that she knows these other borders, but she does not even remember their names even though she has experience of them.

The satellite view gives us a stable, unifying vision without a social perspective. Through the geographic foreclosure of globalization with new technologies, the world closes off and closes in. It leaves us with globalization without a vision.

Donna J. Haraway takes account of ‘vision’ in her discussion on techno-science from a feminist perspective and aims at a feminist writing of the body. She insists on the embodied nature of all vision and argues that the conquering gaze from elsewhere mythically inscribes all the marked bodies, and makes the unmarked category claim the power to see and to be seen and to present while escaping representation. Totalizing vision generated by visualizing technologies has shifted the myth of seeing everything from nowhere into an ordinary practice. She warns:

This gaze signifies the unmarked positions of Man and White, one of the many nasty tones of the word objectivity to feminist ears in scientific and technological, late industrial, militarized, racist, and male dominant societies. ... I would like a doctrine of embodied objectivity that accommodates paradoxical and critical feminist science projects: feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges (Haraway 1991: 188).

Haraway further argues that we should find ways of attaching objectivity to our theoretical and political scanners apart from the technological scanners, in order to take into account the dimensions of mental and physical space we hardly know how to name. In doing that,
objectivity makes contact with particularities and specific embodiments. She looks for morality, which, contrary to a vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility, is partial perspective promising objective vision. This vision initiates, rather than closes off, the problem of responsibility for the generativity of all visual practices. Haraway argues:

> There is no unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of bodies and machines; there are only highly specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organizing worlds. All these pictures of the world should not be allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability, but of elaborate specificity and difference and the loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another’s point of view, even when the other is our own machine. That’s not alienating distance; that’s a possible allegory for feminist versions of objectivity. Understanding how these visual systems work, technically, socially and physically ought to be a way of embodying feminist objectivity (Ibid., 190).

Recalling what Haraway calls ‘feminist objectivity’, Biemann seems to make apparent the dynamic geography of moving and changing surfaces by layering images on the framed space of the film. In ‘Remote Sensing’, the screen is often split into autonomous parts. The central perspective of a single frame is thereby deflected into multiple perspectives and simultaneous topographies. Allowing travelling women to co-inhabit different spaces at the same time, along with the abstract satellite images, comes closer to a successful representation of a networked sex industry that operates ‘wirelessly’ in which clients, pimps and sex workers have access to pagers, cell-phones and instant messaging.
Donna Haraway argues

Feminist accountability requires a knowledge tuned to resonance, not to dichotomy. Gender is a field of structured and structuring difference, where the tones of extreme localization, of the intimately personal and individualized body, vibrate in the same field with global high-tension emissions. Feminist embodiment, then, is not about fixed location in a reified body, female or otherwise, but about nodes in fields, inflections in orientations, and responsibility for difference in material-semiotic fields of meaning (Ibid., 194-195).

Aiming at bringing to light the network geography of the trafficking in women, which washes across, with its actuality, both the land and the electronic landscape, Biemann has invented techno-scientific visualizations: ghostly X-ray portraits of young women. The electronic travel schedules running down over the portraits of the women, trace their routes across the globe; from Lagos to Munich, from Moscow to Tel Aviv, from El Salvador to California, from Thailand to Paris. The detailed routing, the meticulous tracking of bus rides from town to town, the timing of border crossings, arrivals and stopovers, airplane departures and destination airports, visa numbers and ship passage; such images speak about migration in an age of digital imaging. Paradoxically enough, the obsessively collected fictional data and invented images in 'Remote Sensing' come closer to documentary reality than anything else.

The movement of women in the highly gendered topographies do not simply involve any possible combination of countries; they are patterned. Further, their employment in the sex industry also is patterned. The women are part of a networked society in the
global world. In this world, locations are temporary, mobile and indeterminate. Whether the female passenger has been routed along a standardized, serialized migratory path or trafficked by a criminal gang, the repetitive sequences of the digitized blue journeys on the film screen convey the intensity and multi-directionality of the gendered traffic.

The complex processes that constitute globalization take place at a high level of abstraction. The further they are removed from material realities and physical embodiments, the harder it gets to represent them visually. ‘Satellite images, the ultimate abstraction of geographies into the remotely sensed, the most accurate data, yet it easily conceals nevertheless their gendered meaning’, says the off-screen voice of Biemann. Such images cannot capture the complexities of lives on the move and the reason why the women travel across the globe. Biemann says somewhere in the video: ‘Satellite visions of globality are based on a binary optics, which has been programmed in zeros and ones, quite unavailable to capture the between - between zero and one, the border area, the grey zone.’

In her important book, *Zeros + Ones*, in which she provocatively makes a connection between women and machine in the age of techno-culture, Sadie Plant reclaims a female and feminine role in the development of technologies from the most primitive tools to computers, telecommunications, virtual reality and digitalization. Plant notes that offering the perfect symbols of the order of Western reality, all digital computers translate information into the binary logic of zeros and ones of machine code. This list of binary oppositions is almost endless: on and off, right and left, light and dark, form and matter, mind and matter, mind and body, white and black, good and evil, right
and wrong, life and death, something and nothing, this and that, here and there, inside
and out, active and passive, true and false, yes and no, sanity and madness, health and
sickness, up and down, sense and nonsense, west and east, north and south, etc. Plant
suggests that the binary digits make another binary:

Man and woman, male and female, masculine and feminine: one and zero looked just
right, made for each other: 1, the definite, upright line; and 0, the diagram of nothing
at all...

It takes two to make a binary, but all these pairs are two of a kind, and the kind is
always kind of one. 1 and 0 make another 1. Male and female add up to man. There
is no female equivalent. No universal woman at his side. The male is one, one is
everything and the female has 'nothing you can see'. Woman ‘functions as a hole’, a
gap, a space, ‘a nothing - that is a nothing the same, identical, identifiable ... a fault, a
flaw, a lack, an absence, outside the system of representations and auto-
representations’. ... She has no place like home, nothing of her own, ‘other than the
place of the Other which,’ writes Lacan, ‘I designate with a capital O’ (Plant 1998: 34-
35).

If zero is supposed to signify a hole or 'something' that is lack of quality or quantity, one is
the sign of positivity. The electronic geography of the global sex trade operates in the
logic of these binaries. The male is at the centre, organizing, controlling and ruling out
everything, as he is the user of the most complicated machines. The female is the one
whose body is sensed and evaluated through technologies. In the service of a global
machine, she is the object of knowledge or of desire. Women are in a transitory zone
between men, travelling from one place to another, but never becoming active agents. In fact the use, consumption and circulation of women's sexualized bodies underwrite the organization and the reproduction of the social order, in which they have never appeared as what they really are: the key and advanced players of the economic game of the global trade, being flexible and disposable units with maximal adaptability.

The more the specific reality of migration I tried to touch upon in this chapter is made unseen and carried underground as the result of denial, the more we are left with ‘ghostly signals’ operated in the very system of optic technologies.

In the concluding chapter, we will see that ghostly signals illuminate the present by opening up the question of the future and the question of justice. Under an oscillating and weak light, we are distracted by the feeling of an 'alien' rhythm of another human being at the crossroads of our existence.
CHAPTER 5

THE COMING JUSTICE

Borderline Case - Reinforced Glass - Absent Friends – Passport Photos – An Elastic Past – Empty Pockets – And They Think It Is All – They Think Its Soul – All Wrapped Up On A Swollen Lip

He Draws The Warm Pipe – Chemicals Captured In Winter’s Grip - Turn Us On – Separate The Leper – Hungry Ghosts – Hungry Ghosts - Another Imprint – In Borrowed Clothes – We Can Be Numb – Passing Through – Blow Blow Blow Blow

Borderline Case – Future Proof – Real Thin Air – Real Thin Air – Real Thin Air

‘Future Proof’, Massive Attack27

How can we ‘move forward’ leaving behind all anxieties and all profound yet spectral realities of haunting, when we are constantly drifting towards today’s cruelly erected and electronically equipped ‘futuristic’ borders?

Rather than reflecting the world, Borders and ‘Ghosts’ seeks to interrogate the changing state of things. Thus, the way to end this thesis, which, as we shall soon see, is not an end at all, can only possibly be by collectively acknowledging the ‘performative’ character of haunting. So, haunted by near or distant pasts, we have finally arrived at the

27 Song from Massive Attack’s album, 100th Window (2003).
threshold of potentialities. Living in the enduring present and captured in the continual return of the 'ghosts', 'we are inextricably and historically entangled and longing for the arrival of a future, entangled certainly, but ripe in the plenitude of nonsacrificial freedoms and exuberant unforeseen pleasures' (Gordon 1997: 207).

In this concluding chapter, I will focus on the performativity of the 'ghost', which, as discussed in the Introduction, requires from the researcher an engagement with temporal processes and frequent conditions. As noted in Chapter 1, the appearance of the 'ghost' makes us feel that something is going wrong in the present. However, it not only makes us question the present, but also makes us comprehend the present for the sake of the future to come in the name of justice.

In this study, I try to elaborate alternative accounts, to learn to think differently about the subject, and to invent new frameworks, new images and new modes of thought with which to consider the relationship between geography and subjectivity. In this chapter, I will try to examine the 'prospect' the figure of the 'ghost' brings us, as opposed to the 'futurity' of the electronically equipped borders cruelly erected against people on the move. I will argue that spectrality urges us to engage a 'future-to-come' that is anti-nationalist.

**Subjects and Borders**

In *Borders and 'Ghosts*', I continually come up against the limits to subjectivity imposed by geographical discourse, raising questions about commonly assumed notions of the body, the self, the person, identity and the subject.
By using Derrida’s concept of the ‘ghost’, I aim to tackle the idea of a singular, self-contained and unified identity. ‘Hauntology’ is a deconstructive strategy. Deconstruction destabilizes the subject. During a conversation with Jacques Luc-Nancy, Derrida commented: ‘[i]n order to recast, if not rigorously re-found a discourse on the “subject”, on that will hold the place of the subject (of law, of morality, of politics – so many categories caught up in the same turbulence) one has to go through the experience of a deconstruction … there is a duty in deconstruction. There has to be, if there is such a thing as duty. The subject, if subject there must be, is to come after this’ (Derrida 1988c: 120). To deconstruct is to acknowledge and to analyze the operations of exclusion, erasure and foreclosure in the construction of the subject.

Deconstruction ‘affirms the iterability, alterability and alterity of the Same. Consequently, it does no less to disturb, dismantle and destroy the subject than to bring into the Open that which is always and already disturbing and menacing its consistency, coherence, stability and pertinence. In short, deconstruction affirms the destabilisation on the move which Opens (the place of) the subject to that which is wholly Other (Doel 1995: 204). If sameness involves otherness, then this means that Derrida’s subject is always incomplete. As has been discussed at length in the Introduction, the notion of the ‘ghost’ involves the idea that being is never present or pre-given. I will come to this.

Apart from Derrida’s conceptualization of the ‘subject’, I use a variety of theoretical models that have very differing conceptualizations of the subject and theorized. In doing so, I intend to take up the challenge of considering anew the place of the subject. I seek new spaces, new politics and new possibilities.
Overall, the study rests on Freud's notion of the 'uncanny' (Freud 1919), which does not only refer to an experience of strangeness or alienation, but also the peculiar mixing together of the familiar and unfamiliar. Nicholas Royle writes:

The uncanny entails another thinking of beginning: the beginning is already haunted. The uncanny is ghostly. It is concerned with the strange, weird and mysterious, with a flickering sense (but not conviction) of something supernatural. The uncanny involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the reality of who one is and what is being experienced. Suddenly one's sense of oneself (of one's so-called 'personality' or sexuality', for example) seems strangely questionable. The uncanny is a crisis of the proper: it entails a critical disturbance of what is proper ..., a disturbance of the very idea of personal or private property including the properness of proper names, one's so-called 'own' name, but also the proper names of others, of places, institutions and events' (Royle 2003: 1).

The 'ghost' appears as that which has a presence that persists and cannot be effaced; a symptom that renders 'ourselves' problematic, perhaps even impossible. As Julia Kristeva has claimed (Kristeva 1991: 1), the stranger commences with the emergence of the awareness of our difference and concludes when we all recognize ourselves as strangers. This study argues that the encounters with the immigrant, refugees or asylum-seekers mark the moment at which the boundaries that seemingly tells us who 'we' really are appear incoherent, fragmented, fuzzy, somehow unreal or fluid and on the move.

Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift point out that the human subject is difficult to map for numerous reasons:
There is the difficulty of mapping something that does not have precise boundaries. There is the difficulty of mapping something that cannot be counted as singular but only as a mass of different and sometimes conflicting subject positions. There is the difficulty of mapping something that is always on the move, culturally, and in fact. There is the difficulty of mapping something that is only partially locatable in time-space. Then, finally, there is the difficulty of deploying the representational metaphor of mapping with its history of subordination to an Enlightenment logic in which everything can be 'surveyed and pinned down' (Pile and Thrift 1995: 1).

This study, which focuses on diasporic formations, mobility and transculturalism, is an attempt to find an alternative way of mapping the subject. It does not intend to discuss the subject that is fixed, solid and dependable, or one that is located in, with and by power, knowledge and social relations. Drawing on a Deleuzean concept of the subject, Chapter 1 considered the self and identity as affirmative, in flux and an image set in direct opposition to a monolithic and sedentary image of self and identity, which rather is seen as deriving clearly from a phallogocentric system (see Pile and Thrift 1995: 9-10).

Deleuze's notion of subjectivity is full of swirls and whorls, pleats and folds: 'not ... an essence but rather ... an operative function' (Deleuze 1993: 3). In his conceptualisation, the body becomes a 'complex interplay of highly constituted social and symbolic forces. The body is not an essence, let alone a biological substance. It is a play of forces, a surface of intensities; pure simulacra without originals' (Braidotti 1994: 163). Conventionally, the subject is assumed identical to itself. It is the point, or the place in the pattern, that endures. It is the centre of identity; stable and unshakable. The subject is
universal, indivisible and eternal (Doel 1995: 229-230). However, in the Deleuzean conception of the subject, the assumption that there is a universal, unitary and centred subject, which can be situated, embodied, fragmented, decentred, de-constructed or destroyed, is precisely what is in question. Marcus Doel argues that the Deleuzean subject affirms the 'molecular movement' in things. '[M]olecular identities', he points out, 'are not there from the start, like an array of plenitudes or plenipotentiaries which could be selectively actualised within particular contexts, or which could become embroiled in a series of labyrinthine complications, contaminations or confusions. To the contrary, they are appended like so many dendritic prostheses to the swarming mass of fluid multiplicities in order to arrest becomings, regulate movements and impose stability' (Ibid., 230-231).

Deleuze and Guattari produce a different idea of subjectivity, one that privileges intensity, multiplicity, productivity and discontinuity. The subject is a machine, but a machine that is assembled and articulated in place (Deleuze and Guattari 1984). ‘Everywhere it is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces a flow that the other interrupts’ (Ibid., 1). The machinic production of the contextual subject is only a constraint from the perspective of a ‘desire’ to escape human locatedness and finiteness. In Deleuze and Guattari’s world, everything is flux, flow and ‘becoming’. Being is ‘becoming’, which begins as a desire to escape bodily limitation (Massumi 1999: 94). ‘Becoming’ is about movements. The subject endures through continually breaking down, but this is not a negative event. ‘Becoming is a tension
between two modes of desire - molarity and supermolecularity, being and becoming, sameness-difference, and hyperdifferentiation' (Ibid., 94).

Deleuze and Guattari develop a complex relationship between subjectivity and territory that makes it possible to develop a more dynamic relationship between past and present, and to interrogate new interpretations of the flows in the world. Becoming begins in a given space, but '[it] is always marginal, a simultaneous coming and going in a borderland zone between modes of action. The place of invention is a space of transformational encounter, a dynamic in-between. To get there, one must move sideways, through cracks in accepted spatial and temporal divisions' (Ibid., 106). By drawing on Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'becoming' and of the dynamics of 'deterritorialization' (Deleuze and Guattari 1984; Deleuze and Guattari 1988), Chapter 1 focused on the actual act of border-crossing, offering a fusion of the potential movements and formations on and across borders. It questioned the concrete coercions of belonging and not belonging determined by nation-states. In considering the 'uncanny', the discussion also rested upon the 'postcolonial subject' (Hall 1991), which, in part, refers to a recognition that subjects are found 'in-between' domains of difference like race, class and gender, in the interstices where these domains intersect. The postcolonial subject is a way of representing difference as, not simply a set of pre-given and calcified ethnic or cultural traits, but as a process of negotiation in which self and experience are never totalized and always on-going (Pile and Thrift 1995: 18). The ethnic absolutism of 'root' metaphors that are fixed in place is replaced by mobile metaphors. Stuart Hall writes:
Diaspora refers to the scattering and dispersal of people who will never literally be able to return to the places from which they came; who have to make some kind of difficult settlement with the new, often oppressive cultures with which they were forced into contact, and who have succeeded in remaking themselves and fashioning new kinds of cultural identity by, consciously or unconsciously, drawing on more than one cultural repertoire. ... They are people who belong to more than one world, speak more than one language (literally and metaphorically); inhabit more than one identity, have more than one home; who have learnt to 'negotiate and translate' between cultures, and who, because they are 'irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures' have learnt to live with, and indeed to speak from, difference. They speak from the in-between of different cultures, always unsettling the assumptions of one culture from the perspective of another, and thus finding ways of being both the same as and different from the others amongst which they live. ...

They represent new kinds of identities - 'new ways of being someone' in the late modern world. Although they are characteristic of the cultural strategies adopted by marginalized people in the latest phase of globalisation, more and more people in general – not only ex-colonised or marginalised people - are beginning to think of themselves, of their identities and their relationship to culture and to place in these more open ways’ (Hall 1995: 47-48).

Chapter 1 asserted an urgent need to acknowledge 'ghost citizens', arguing that we are faced with new crises in identity with regard to refugees, asylum-seekers and immigrants. We can no longer describe identity in terms of ethnicity, in terms of class or in terms of gender. The chapter argued that, in our times, when it comes to refugees, asylum-seekers and immigrants, there is a particular absence, and that
this ‘absence’ creates a community that we might refer to as ‘multitude’ (Hardt and Negri 2000).

Chapter 2, which examined the production of space and subjectivities in Tarlabası, a multi-inhabited quarter in Istanbul city centre, is based upon Giorgio Agamben’s concept of *homo sacer* (Agamben 1998). *Homo sacer* refers to s/he who is ‘abandoned’ and, thus, has a ‘bare life’, and one that is deprived of any form and value as defined by the politics of the nation-state in the modern state. The chapter discussed the way in which the inhabitants of Tarlabası reside on the edge of social life, where the struggle to survive is a daily routine. Tarlabası does not belong to the city. It is seen as a threat to the order of the city and urban life. Thus, the inhabitants are not considered public figures. They have become ‘ghosts’. Drawing on Agamben’s concept of the ‘camp’ (Agamben 1998), I argued that they are not simply excluded, but included as an ‘exception’ in Tarlabası, whose topography is situated between the forest and the city. The chapter argued against the common notion of the community as a coherent and unified social formation that often serves exclusionary and authoritarian purposes in the very name of its opposite. Instead, in order to get beyond formulaic prescriptions of community and to open up an altogether different model of collectivity and belonging, the chapter proposed the idea of community as a necessarily unstable and ‘inoperative’ spectre. It argued that the community might be seen as a ‘phantom’ (Lippmann 1925; Robbins 1993); an elusive discursive formation that, as Jacques-Luc Nancy puts it, is not a ‘common being’ but a non-essential ‘being-in-common’ (Nancy 2000).
Power relations and the effects of power are consistent themes throughout the study. Drawing on Judith Butler's theorization of gender 'performativity' (Butler 1993; Butler 1990), the discussion in Chapter 3 rested upon 'child performativity'. Butler asserts that gender is a process that has neither origin nor end, so that it is something we do rather than something we are (Butler 1990). In Butler's theory of the subject, existence is a sequence of 'acts' that undermines the idea that identities and bodies are pre-existing essences. She draws a distinction between 'performance' (which presupposes the existence of a subject' and 'performativity' (which does not) (Butler 1990). This implies that the subject is not exactly where we would expect to find it: 'behind' or 'before' its deeds. Taking this idea as my starting point, in the chapter, I questioned 'being a child' as a constructed category. By interrogating what is 'behind' the figure and the image of the child, in the context of nation-state building and the haunted geography of Cyprus, I attempted to explore those instances when the material body of the child, as a cultural and political sign, is the 'effect' of power (Butler 1990: viii-ix). Drawing on Gilles Deleuze's essay, 'Deserted Islands' (2004), the discussion in the chapter also aimed to suggest, a new understanding of the island as a topography, as well as an alternative understanding of collectivity, in contrast to territorial unity and a single point of commonality; that of being a Turk or being Greek. In order to undo the formation of the self which rests upon the identification of oneself as an autonomous coherent self, I referred to Jacques Lacan's 'the mirror stage' (Lacan 1989). Lacan examines the importance of the role of mirroring in the construction of self and self-consciousness. His subject is 'lack of being' (Miller 1996: 11), as the fascination and capturing properties of the image reflected in the mirror refers to an imaginary site which the sense of original unity and coherence is only an illusion.
The chapter takes as its departure point the acknowledgement that there is an ontological gap, or primary loss, at the very heart of our subjectivity.

Chapter 4 examined the spectral densities in the networked cities of a global world, which result from the trafficking of women into sex industry. It dealt with the theory of feminist subjectivity, in particular Rosi Braidotti's notion of 'nomadic subjects' and Donna Haraway's post-human feminism. Both Braidotti and Haraway are concerned with subverting conventional views and representations of female subjectivity. In her book, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*, Braidotti explores different facets of the notion of 'nomadic subjects', as a suitable theoretical figuration for contemporary subjectivity. The term 'figuration' refers to a style of thought that evokes or expresses ways out of the phallocentric vision of the subject (Braidotti 1994: 1). For Braidotti:

[t]he nomadic subject is a myth, that is to say a political fiction, that allows me to think through and move across established categories and levels of experience: blurring boundaries without burning bridges. ... The choice of an iconoclastic, mythic figure such as the nomadic subject, is consequently a move against the settled and conventional nature of theoretical and especially philosophical thinking. This figuration translates therefore my desire to explore and legitimate political agency, while taking as historical evidence the decline of metaphysically fixed, steady identities. One of the issues at stake here is how to reconcile partiality and discontinuity with the construction of new forms of interrelatedness and collective political projects (Ibid., 4-5)
Braidotti's approach helps the one who intends to find a way to contact the dynamic, emergent, geographically and temporarily fluctuating pattern of presences of migrant women, who eventually inscribe themselves into the physical terrain at the fringe of society. By questioning the illusionary stability of fixed identity, the notion of the 'nomadic subject', adopted from Deleuzean 'becoming' and 'lines of flight', is concerned with the close link between identity, subjectivity and power. It, thus, enables us to make a shift towards complex transitions and coordinated changes in order to find a way to interrogate intensive interconnectedness in global capitalism and the highly patterned and structured cross-border circuits of women. It is argued, in the chapter, that in the global spaces of the sex industry, women gain 'presence' and emerge as subjects, but do so without gaining power. The places of absence and of silence that are inhabited by migrant woman are constituted through the logic of inter-connectedness and complexities.

Donna Haraway, on the other hand, develops the notion of the 'cyborg' (Haraway 1991), which is high-tech imaginary concept, where electronic circuits evoke new patterns of interconnectedness and affinity. The 'cyborg', Haraway points out, is a 'creature of post-gender world' (Ibid., 150). The 'cyborg' is a form of political resistance to hegemonic and exclusionary views of subjectivity: 'The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience, that what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion' (Ibid., 149). Taking as her main point of reference the impact of new technologies (microelectronics, telecommunication and video-games) on the condition of women in society, Haraway stresses the importance of the global village, where women in Third World countries are the preferred labour force for the science-based multinationals.
in the export-processing sectors, particularly in electronics (Haraway 1991: 166). She argues that the processes are more systematic and involve reproduction, sexuality, culture, consumption and production (Ibid., 166). She thinks that women in the post-industrial power system have disappeared from the field as visible social agents. Reflecting on the changes that this new system of production imposes on society as a whole, Haraway expands the feminist theory of the 'subject'.

Concerning technology, Haraway's focus on the visual as location of power, which produces an intimate structure of seeing the invisible and representing what used to be 'unrepresentable'. Drawing on Haraway's theory, Chapter 4 included the analysis of the hegemonic production of vision generated by satellite technologies to track migratory movements across lands. Contemporary power has a specific character: it works through networking, communication and multiple interconnections. By drawing on what Haraway calls 'feminist objectivity' (Haraway 1991: 190), I discussed the way in which the totalizing vision of satellite technology lacks 'perspective' in a social sense.

In this concluding chapter, I will draw on Derrida's notion of the 'ghost', as it offers a theoretical figuration with which to better understand contemporary migrant subjectivity. My main argument is that the experience of haunting brings us to a particular structure of 'waiting' for a future yet to emerge. This is the pure performativity of the 'ghost'. Through the discussion, I wish to see what future we already have and what future the figure of the 'ghost' would offer us. In so doing, I first will examine Abderrahmane Sissako's film, Waiting for Happiness (2002), and then compare it with a chilling x-ray image that recently appeared in The Guardian showing 'illegal' immigrants crammed into the hidden
compartments of a lorry. This is an attempt to re-examine the notion of subjectivity in alternative manner to that of looking and being looked at. Visual Culture ‘designates an entire arena of visual representations which circulate in the field of vision establishing visibilities (and policing invisibilities), stereotypes, power relations, the ability to know and to verify: in fact they establish the very realm of the “known” (Rogoff 2000: 20). What I am interested in, therefore, is what is beyond the ‘known’ and beyond the ‘predictable’.

Waiting

Abderrahmane Sissako’s, Waiting for Happiness (2002), is about rootless characters that are suffocated by their geographic non-being in Nouadhibou, a Mauritanian port city surrounded by huge stretches of sand, dunes and the sea. In the film, a light bulb appears as a metaphor of hope for the inhabitants of this small and isolated seaside town, which is a transit city with predominantly temporary housing. It is as if the film narrative suspends an unforeseeable future, bearing the entire weight of isolation and loneliness of the lives of the people in the town who have been stuck on a geographical edge of the world. As a shadowy reminder of the world beyond, the resting vessels at sea imply the condition of people in departure, who, to a certain extent, have already left without actually having yet moved. In the exile before the voyage, we learn disjointed information about the characters that convey the sense of transition and movement. At the very beginning of the film, seventeen year-old Abdallah returns from Mali to his homeland on the West African coast, before leaving for Europe. Not being able to speak his native language and being frustrated by his rootless past, he has become a melancholic viewer, loaded with the unsettled condition of waiting for ‘moving forward.’ Abdallah rarely goes out and prefers to watch the outside world through the small window in his small, dark bedroom. His mother
is hoping that her son will get better when they finally have electricity in their house. We first encounter the light bulb in a scene where an old electrician, Maata, and a young orphan, Khatra, try to connect the house to the electricity. While Khatra and his mentor attempt to install a light bulb, Abdallah’s mother is talking to an officer at the doorsteps of their house trying to secure her son’s passport. Maata and Khatra’s struggle is futile. The light bulb is not lit (Figure 5.1).

In another scene, a young prostitute, Nana, tells a story of a trip to Paris to tell the father of her child that the young girl has died. Significantly, Paris looks otherworldly - shot in grainy stock, with none of the traditional images of the city. The trip is more of an emotional one and the story is representative of the desire of the people in the town to reach out beyond the current existence - to have both a place and a goal to aim towards. An illegal immigrant, Michael, another stranger in town, is looking forward to leaving for Europe. He is not only in transit in body but also in mind, because his expectations began long before the journey itself. Two weeks after he leaves, his two friends are trying to
predict how far he has gone. When a body washes ashore, the officials who are trying to identify this stranger can only find a faded photograph in his pocket (Figure 5.2). The photograph, taken in a studio in the town, shows Michael standing, smiling alongside a friend in front of a life-sized photograph of a brightly lit, Western metropolis at night (Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4).

This particular image reflects on an 'imagined world', whose landscape of images is produced and disseminated through the Western global media. In the age of advanced mechanical reproduction, 'the lines between the realistic and the fictional landscapes are blurred so that the further away they are from the direct experiences of metropolitan life, the more likely they are to construct imagined worlds which are chimerical, aesthetic, even fantastic objects, particularly if assessed by the criteria of some other perspective, some other imagined world' (Appadurai 2003: 33). The photograph found in the pocket of the immigrant illustrates how a migrant's decision is interwoven into the narrative of a collective.

28 In his important essay, 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy', Arjun Appadurai focuses on migration, diaspora and the movements of peoples and capital in the global world and extends Benedict Anderson's concept of 'imagined communities', to argue that global cultural processes are based upon the logic of the 'imagination' as a social practice. He writes: 'No longer mere fantasy (opium for the masses whose real work is elsewhere), no longer simple escape (from a world defined principally by more concrete purposes and structures), no longer elite pastime (thus not relevant to the lives of ordinary people), and no longer mere contemplation (irrelevant for new forms of desire and subjectivity), the imagination has become an organized field of social practices, a form of work (both in the sense of labour and of culturally organized practice) and a form of negotiation between sites of agency ("individuals") and globally defined fields of possibility. It is this unleashing of the imagination which links the play of pastiche (in some settings) to the terror and coercion of states and their competitors. The imagination is now central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order' (Appadurai 2003: 29-30). Following this claim, he employs five terms to stress different streams or flows along which cultural material may be seen to be moving across national boundaries: ethnoscapess (landscape of people who move between nations, such as tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles and guest-workers), technoscapes (technology, often linked to multinational corporations), financescapes (global capital currency markets and stock exchanges), mediascapes (electronic and new media whose space of operation is closely related to landscapes of images) and ideoscapes (official state ideologies and counter-ideologies, whose space of operation is also firmly attached to landscapes of images) (ibid., 31-35).
In *Waiting for Happiness*, Sissako urges us to read one of the familiar images from the large and complex repertoires of the global image bank in a critical and subversive way. The portrait of Michael standing with his friend in front of a life-sized photograph that depicts a bright, Western metropolitan city in the dark recalls the fact that the 'night' has already arrived and the future has already been fixed even before the migrant has begun his long and dangerous journey to Europe.

Towards the end of the film, Abdallah finally moves on, but he has a hard time negotiating a steep hill in the desert on the way to the train. The electrician Maata, who, his whole life has refused to emigrate, dies on the same shore where the dead body of Michael was found. While he is dying, the light bulb in his hand gradually lights up:
transference of power between his spirit and the external world. Derrida has noted that the spirit is before and outside the flesh, and can be seen only to the extent that it inhabits a visible, sensing body and produces effects only by taking on a material form (Derrida 1994: 6-7). This spirit is not simply the spirit of Maata, but the spirit of African migrants of the past, of the present and of the future, that draws us into a network of migrant populations.

The rootless people in Waiting for Happiness are fragile-beings, and this fragility becomes as nearly lightness. They have been caught up in a series of empty moments, awaiting a future that is already closed off. If there is a ‘frozen’ waiting without light, without any promise of brightness, outside of time and space, and a hopeless attempt at an ‘illegal’ crossing that has ended in death, it is because, in this small town, previously a French colony, this situation is not a condition of subjectivity but of the world.

**Border Surveillance System and ‘Ghosts’**

We have floodlights on borders. Border officials use this light against the ‘illegal’ crossing of ‘immigrants. In postmodern border management, there are electronic frontiers and visual borders. Borders are electronically equipped and under surveillance by means of heat, infrared, radar and satellite technology. In the advanced technological surveillance systems on European borders, the desire to make everything visible is also an imperative to make things legible and governable. But capturing an image ends up as catching a ‘ghost’, as is the case in an x-ray image showing ‘illegal’ immigrants crammed into hidden compartments in a lorry stopped at a British channel port (Figure 5.5).
Visibility is a complex system of permission and prohibition, of presence and absence. It always contains apparitions and often obligates blindness. The x-ray image reveals that even technologies of hyper-visibility cannot save us from ‘visible invisibilities.’ It reminds us that the highest level of visibility can actually be a type of invisibility.

Visually, luggage or the suitcase has long been attached to the state of exile, to the space of diaspora or to the issue of migration, signifying a variety of conditions, such as displacement and mobility, and a variety of personal feelings, such as nostalgia or longing. This small object containing very few personal effects signifies his or her owner’s lack of belonging. Yet, it serves as a compartment in which an immigrant carries his or her wishes, expectations, dreads and desires as well his or her anxieties or fears. Strangely enough, the x-ray image published in the newspaper reminds us of the image of the suitcase, but this particular suitcase is in the form of human cargo; a fragile cargo, of illegal immigrants.

Fig 5.5 x-ray image showing illegal immigrants crammed into hidden compartments on a lorry stopped at a British channel port (Source The Guardian, 12 October 2005).

29 for a detailed discussion of the image of luggage in relation to Visual Culture see Rogoff (2000: 36-72).
We learn from the newspaper that this is not an ordinary journey for the people who are circulating on borders. The illegal immigrants' trips, guided by the smugglers, often take months. They can travel hundreds of miles, as many as twenty of them lying flat, barely able to move, in cramped, secret compartments in lorries. People travel from Turkey in lorries up through the Balkans through Germany and Italy, continuing to Belgium or France, sometimes by train, where they hide out in safe houses near major ferry ports, such as Calais, Cherbourg or Dieppe, until the smugglers deem that the time is right to shuttle them to the UK (Cowan 2005).

Modern surveillance systems are based on the British philosopher, Jeremy Bentham’s, panopticon (Bentham 1843), which he invented in 1786 as the perfect prison, and which Michel Foucault saw as the major mechanism for the disciplining of society, and foresaw was destined to spread throughout the social body (Foucault 1991 [1977]: 207). For Foucault, as one of the technologies of discipline, the panopticon assures the automatic functioning of power. In the architecture of Bentham’s panopticon, each person in his or her cell or cage is alone, completely isolated and constantly visible under full lighting. The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities in such a way as to make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. Each individual is seen but s/he does not see. S/he is the object of information, but never a subject of communication. Foucault is referring to this in his infamous aphorism: ‘Visibility is a trap’ (Foucault 1991 [1977]: 200).

Having failed to notice that a straight sight line did not equated to visibility, Bentham simply assumed that the panopticon would bring perfect visibility with no shadows or dark
corners. However, we learn from Bentham's panopticon papers that even he came to realize that solitary confinement, a key part of his plan, was in fact the undoing of a system of visibility, since: 'in a state of solitude, infantile superstitions, ghosts and spectres, recur to the imagination' (cited by Mirzoeff 2002: 241; Semple 1993: 132). The prisoner could neither be perfectly visible nor be constantly aware of disciplinary surveillance. Consequently, they were not disciplined, but simply punished: they became 'ghosts' (Mirzoeff 2002: 241).

However, it seems that even in our times the most sophisticated surveillance systems introduced to borders cannot escape from 'ghosts'. I argued in the first chapter that people crossing borders, or on the move on border zones, operate as 'ghosts' mainly because 'illegal' border-crossing is all about visibility and invisibility; about disappearance as coming into presence. Strangely enough, the x-ray image of the 'illegal' immigrants published in the newspaper illustrates that even though they have been caught, what has been captured is no more than ghost-like.

For the most miniscule of durations, the 'ghosts' have been captured, and therefore removed from the event, by passing in front of both a machine and an official's eye. The image is a powerful reminder that materialist science cannot account for the textures of everyday experience of people crossing borders. 'Ghost-images' of the 'illegal' immigrants empty all the realities an immigrant would firmly be tied to. If it signifies anything, it would be an irreversible moment of rupture.
This bold, extraordinary and shocking image contains nothing that can be translated into experience. Giorgio Agamben argues in his book, *Infancy and History*, 'to experience something means divesting it of novelty, neutralizing its shock potential' (Agamben 1993: 41). He writes:

The unusual could not in any way be translated into experience. Each event, however commonplace and insignificant, thus became the speck of impurity around which experience accrued its authority, like a pearl. For experience has its necessary correlation not in knowledge but in authority – that is to say, the power of words and narration; and no one now seems to wield sufficient authority to guarantee the truth of an experience, if they do, it does not in the least occur to them that their own authority has its roots in an experience. On the contrary, it is the character of the present time that all authority is founded on what cannot be experienced, and nobody would be inclined to accept the validity of an authority whose sole claim to legitimation was experience (Agamben 1993: 14).

The circulation of these types of images in the media serves as the embodiment of a fear and panic provoked by 'intimations to the borders'. The alien strangers, who are already found within, trigger emotional reactions aimed at denying or exorcizing the necessary recognition of their very existence. Thus, we end up with an image that looks like a scene from a horror film.

This image blinds us. The light from the x-ray machine can only bring 'night', covering up realities and disguising human dramas, rather than making things more visible. The immigrants have disappeared with the dispersion of light coming from the x-
ray machine. The electronic image does not allow for any form of reflection about the textures of life on the surface of the image. In that sense, it is spectral. It refers to ‘something’, but it lacks the unfolding of any specific narrative and is unable to refer to any life with values or qualities.

Through the machine, movement in time has been reduced to a single image; a static, frontal section that refers to nothing outside its frame. The machines, or these ‘eyeless eyes’, do not correct vision, but construct a specific perception. As Paul Virilio points out:

Digital technology is a filter that is going to modify perception by means of a generalized morphing, and this in real time. ... we are faced with the failure of the analogical in favour of calculation and the numerology of the image. Every sensation is going to be digitized or digitalized. We are faced with the reconstruction of the phenomenology of perception according to the machine. The vision machine is not simply the camera that replaces Monet’s eye ... no, now it’s a machine that is reconstructing sensations pixel by pixel and bits by bits. Not just visual or auditory sensations, the audio-visible, but also olfactory sensations, tactile sensations. We are faced with a reconstruction of the sensas (Virilio 2005: 65-66).

The machines do not present or represent anything; they create and represent their own kind of presence. They have become ‘optical’, and, as Virilio argues, this ‘correction’ is not correct in the political sense of the world (Virilio 2005: 70). The vision the machines offer presses its own dominance, which is unquestionable, indisputable or without doubt. In one moment, the snapshot of the lorry in motion has formed an image that substitutes
the passing reality and takes on a privileged position. It produces an unreachable
distance between what we see in the photograph, and what was ‘out there’ at the moment
of the border crossing itself and what happened afterwards. In this ‘movement-image’
there is nothing ‘real’; they are only images which are quantitative. When Deleuze
discusses what he calls ‘movement-image’ in cinema, he writes:

The cinema can, with impunity, bring us close to things or take us away from them
and revolve around them, it suppresses both the anchoring of the subject and the
horizon of the world. Hence, it substitutes an implicit knowledge and a second
intentionality for the conditions of natural perception. It is not the same as the other
arts, which aim rather at something unreal through the world, but makes the world
itself something unreal or a tale [récit]. With the cinema, it is the world which becomes
its own image, and not an image which becomes world (Deleuze 1992: 57).

The light from the machine imposes its own regulations and propagates its own
conditions onto real people. Since it is coming from an invisible place and from an
unimpeded, unlocalized source, it has and is the absolute power. The photographic x-ray
image indicates that the border is a ‘surgical place’. It has to be closed. It has to be
protected through systems of militarization, purification and cleansing. The stranger is a
virus detected in the system. In this respect, the x-ray image becomes visible in the
context of haunting. It hints that both the illness and the cure lead us to the same site; that
is, the border.

What is appearing in the instant in which vision is refracted through technology
rather than through the eye?
Spectrality is already there, if there is a visibility of technology. In the film, *Ghost Dance*, by Ken McMullen (1984), Derrida states that 'modern technology, contrary to appearances, although it is scientific, increases tenfold the power of ghosts. The future belongs to ghosts'. When discussing photographic or digital image-making Derrida argues in an interview with Bernard Stiegler, that once an image of someone has been taken or captured, this image becomes reproducible in his or her absence. His or her disappearance is already there. S/he already is haunted; already transfixed by a disappearance that promises and conceals in advance an 'apparition' and a ghostly 're-apparition' (Derrida and Stiegler 2005: 116-117). When we see the electronic image of the immigrants being captured on the border, they have already been spectralized by the shot, and captured and possessed by spectrality in advance. In the 'darkness of night', they are already positioned outside of matter and time; they have become both phenomenal and non-phenomenal, both sensing and non-sensing. There is no longer anything material, only something invisible/visible.

In techno-reality, the event is not experienced in 'real time.' From the moment that there is a technical interposition, an event is always deferred. This brings us to the notion of 'différance' (see for instance Derrida 1973; Derrida 1982), which Derrida uses to suggest that the production of meaning is never simply the representation of what was already fully present, but is a moment of deferral in which every origin is constituted retroactively. In this way, an origin is never present except in its belatedness. Ghostliness and the act of haunting are related to the notion of 'différance', which is inscribed at the very heart of the supposed synchrony in the living present. Thus, being is exposure to an
alterity that makes any, and all, presence possible. Spectrality refers to the sheer persistence of beings in time; continuing temporalization, where our presence is given (to us) by an alterity (Cheah 2003: 387).

**Lightening Up**

Spectral knowledge considers the ‘ghosts’ to be someone or something with a demand or a claim. In Derridean thinking, this raises the question of the future and the question of justice. According to this way of thinking, the appearance of a ‘ghost’ has a potential to reverse the way things go. Not only is the ‘ghost’ not something or somebody that is captured and killed by the light, but it is also something which exudes an illuminating beam of light, making us see things differently. According to Derrida:

> All the grave stakes we have just named ... would come down to the question of what one understands, with Marx and after Marx, by effectivity, effect, operativity, work, labour [Wirklichkeit, Wirkung, work, operation], living work in their supposed opposition to the effects of virtuality, of simulacrum, of ‘mourning work,’ of ghosts, revenant and so forth. ... [D]econstructive thinking of the trace, of iterability, of prosthetic synthesis, of supplementarity, and so forth, goes beyond the opposition and the ontology it presumes. [It inscribes] the possibility of the reference to the other, and thus, of radical alterity and heterogeneity, of différence, of technicity, and of ideality in the very event of presence, in the very presence of the present that it disjoins a priori in order to make it possible (Derrida 1994: 75).

Spectrality, therefore, is another name for the condition of possibility and potentiality. Even as it disjoins the present, in the same movement, it renews the present. The ‘ghost'
enjoins us to act in the here and now. The temporality of the ‘ghost’ represents a momentary arresting of passing time, in any given instant, which changes or transforms. In this respect, spectrality has a ‘performative’ character. It ‘allows something to act on and affect itself or another (and also to affect itself as an other) or to be acted on or affected by another (and also by itself as an other)’ (Cheah 2003: 388). It allows an action or occurrence to take place.

I would suggest that the image of the immigrants conveyed through the x-ray machine implies that illegal immigrants, as figures of light, ‘shine’ for us, waiting to be seen. The x-ray machine is an aperture into a reality ordinarily unseen in the ontological sense. Ontology speaks only what is present or what is absent; it cannot conceive of what is neither. A world cleansed of spectrality is ontology itself; a world of pure presence, of immediate density and of things without a past. In contrast, hauntology is concerned with spectral knowledge in which the ‘ghost’ appears in the open joint between future and past. ‘The linear time of birth, life and death, of the beginning and the end, has no place in the hauntic. It allows us to speak of what persists beyond the end, beyond death, of what was never alive enough to die, never present enough to become absent’ (Montag 1999: 71). And the ‘ghost’ or the apparition is the principal form by which something lost, invisible or seemingly not there makes itself apparent to us. We come to experience things that are not able to manifest themselves otherwise. Haunting recognition is a special way of knowing what has happened or is happening. There is a partial occurrence. The state of being is not quite there, and this necessitates a preoccupation with what is there.
The 'ghost' haunts the full presence of the 'real' in the form of a debt to the past and a promise of justice in the future. Furtive and untimely, the apparition belongs to a future-present, whose past has a claim and whose present comes with a demand. Derrida has written, ‘Ghosts’ are:

certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no longer present, and where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws or rights. It is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it, from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born (Derrida 1994: xix)

Derrida speaks about a responsibility to the victims of wars; political and other kinds of violence; nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist or other kinds of exterminations; victims of oppression, of capitalist imperialism or of any of the forms of totalitarianism. In his conception, justice carries life beyond present life, or its actual there-ness; its empirical or ontological actuality. It urges us to contact ‘traces’ and the ‘traces of traces.’

The justice Derrida is talking about carries the temporal form of a future-present or of a future modality of the living present. Derrida writes: ‘At bottom, the spectre is the future, it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come again’ (Derrida 1994: 39). Derrida relates the question of future to what he calls the ‘messianic.’
As opposed to messianism, a religious concept in which the future is already fixed and filled up with certain determinations, calculations, objects or consequences, the ‘messianic’ refers, in every here-now, to the coming of an eminently real, concrete event, that is to the most irreducibly heterogeneous otherness (Derrida 1999: 248). There is an understanding of what I would call ‘the coming justice’ as something not to be applied to pre-existent discourses or to some pre-established social or political values and norms. ‘Messianic’ hope, as a ‘coming justice’, is without content and widely open to the coming of an event or of an alterity that cannot be anticipated beforehand.

Derrida dresses up spectrality as the scene of migrancy and transnationalism. Regardless of how lacking in content he purposely leaves the future-to-come, it is definitely anti-nationalist:

Awaiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming solution accorded in advance to the absolute surprise of the *arrivant* from whom or from which one will not ask anything in return and who or which will not be asked to commit to the domestic contracts of any welcoming power (family, State, nation, territory, native soil or blood, language, culture in general, even humanity), just opening which renounces any right to property, any right in general, messianic opening to what is coming, that is, to the event that cannot be awaited as such, or recognized in advance therefore, to the event as the foreigner itself, to her or to him for whom one must leave an empty place, always, in the memory of the hope — and this is the very place of spectrality (Derrida 1994: 65).
Derrida clearly dismiss nationalism as a discourse that does not allow for the promise of 'the messianic'. There is something that is always arriving but which never finally arrives. Derrida’s arguments bring us to experience the structure of waiting, the waiting that the past has a claim and the present has in every minute a potentiality which brings us a future, a future which is not a pre-existent one. The temporality of waiting, the temporality of ghosting, cannot be reduced to this or that image.

However, the x-ray image taken at one European checkpoint ‘visualizes’ the way messianism is already installed at the border in order to screen the arrivals. Therefore, it does not bring us into the future. But Derrida asks: ‘how to give rise and to give place [donner lieu], still, to render it, this place, to render it habitable, but without killing the future in the name of the old frontiers? (Derrida 1994: 169).

What happens if we think of this dividing line as a threshold, rather than as a concrete border or a frontier? Andrew Benjamin puts it beautifully when analyzing the notion of waiting: ‘the crossing of a threshold – a crossing in which futurity is introduced as made possible by the present’s potentiality - has to be thought beyond a conception of the future that is already pictured’ (Benjamin 2005: 165). Thus, crossing is more than a simple movement. Through the act of crossing, one takes the dividing line through one’s powerful motion. Disturbed by the passage of chronological time, this particular interruption has potentiality.

The blind field of the x-ray photograph is where the ghost’s arrival shines wavering on the edge of the event:
... [a] flow of light, which captures or possesses me, invests me, invades me or envelops me is not a ray of light, but the source of a possible view: from the point of view of the other. If the “reality effect” is ineluctable, it is not simply because there is something real that is undecomposable, or not synthesizable, some “thing” that was there. It is because there is something other that watches or concerns me. This Thing is the other insofar as it was already there – before me – ahead of me, beating me to it, I who am before it, I who am because of it, owing to it.... My law. ... The ‘reality effect’ stems here from the irreducible alterity of another origin of the world. It is another origin of the world. What I call the gaze here, the gaze of the other, is not simply another machine for the perception of the images. It is another world, another source of the phenomenality, another degree zero of appearing (Derrida and Stiegler 2005: 122-123).

The ‘ghost’ is a transformative figure. Wherever there is a spectre, even if I cannot see it, even if I am not able to exchange a glance with the invisible or unnoticeable ‘gaze’ of the other, the ‘gaze’ of the ghost not only touches my body and mind, but it also implies my responsibility towards the ‘other’. It becomes the law for me. The spectre is not simply the visible invisible that I can see, it is someone who watches or concerns me without any possible reciprocity, and who, therefore, makes the law when I am blinded by the situation. Derrida writes: ‘... my freedom springs from the condition of this responsibility which is born of heteronomy in the eyes of the other, in the other’s sight. This gaze is spectrality itself. ... wherever there are these spectres, we are being watched, we sense or think we are under surveillance. This dissymmetry complicates everything. The law, the
injunction, the order, the performative, wins out over the theoretical, the constative, knowledge, calculation and the programmable’ (Derrida and Stiegler 2005: 121-122).

The radiant flicker of promise, which the ghostly shadow of the disappeared illuminates, is waiting for us to experience it. The ‘dark’ visibilities, the apparitions of the immigrants in the x-ray image, should be seen as the bearer of promise in the name of justice.

Immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are all ‘limit-figures’ who trouble any attempt at border construction and identity demarcation. They are complex figures: of all possible figures they are never fulfilled and closed off in one figure. ‘The coming being is whatever being’, writes Agamben, and the whatever, Agamben explains, ‘relates us to singularity not in its indifference with respect to a common property (to a concept, for example: being red, being French, being Muslim), but only in its being, such as it is. Singularity is thus freed from false dilemma that obliges knowledge to choose between the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the universal’ (Agamben 2001: 1). Agamben’s conception of ‘whatever singularity’ seems to answer the question of future and of justice. The notion of ‘singularity’ implies that a fixed and stable identity is unthinkable in advance. It can be neither an object of knowledge nor of perception, and then only because it evades the controls of both perception and knowledge, and keeps the possibility of the future open.

This brings us to the Derridean notion of hospitality (Derrida 2000). The principle of hospitality should not be premised on the prior identity of the stranger. Hospitality should
not be confined to those with whom we already are familiar or we expect or have need for. The identity or utility of the stranger should not be determined in advance because when the stranger enters s/he marks an ‘absolute arrival.’

The spectral moment signifies a rupture that is pregnant with radical changes. It does not promise a figure. It is itself the promise of a figure yet to come in the map of intensities realized by dynamic trajectories that cannot be ‘identified with the commemoration of a figure or an arrival, but with the creation of paths without memory, all the memory of the world remaining in the material’ (Deleuze 1998: 64). There is no beginning or ending. There are no further lines to be drawn in order to establish absolute belongings and desperate unbelongings. The world is holding on journeys whose energetic trajectories constantly delineate new and untouched territories, which endlessly write unexpected and unpredictable stories.
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