The Production of Urban Public Space:
A Lefebvrian Analysis of
Castlefield, Manchester

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Declaration

I declare that the thesis presented here is all my own work.

M Leary

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Michael E Leary
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my mother Margaret Lillian Leary and my father Emmanuel Aghamadedeye Owhin. Your strength and dignity made the good things in my life possible.
It was from one of these soldiers that Obi had his first picture of Lagos. ‘There is no darkness there,’ he told his admiring listeners, ‘because at night the electric shines like the sun, and people are always walking around, that is, those who want to walk. If you don’t want to walk you have only to wave your hand and a pleasure car stops for you.’ His audience made sounds of wonderment. Then by way of a digression he said: ‘If you see a white man, take off your hat for him. The only thing he cannot do is mould a human being.’

(Chinua Achebe *No Longer at Ease*)

Emancipate yourself from mental slavery.
None but ourselves can free our minds.
(Bob Marley *Redemption Song*)

I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams.
(William Shakespeare *Hamlet*)

Dragonfly out in the sun you know what I mean (don't you know?)
Butterflies all havin' fun, you know what I mean?
Sleep in peace when day is done
That's what I mean.
And this old world is a new world
And a bold world for me.
And I'm feeling good.
(Nina Simone *Feelin Good*)
Appreciation

Sincere thanks to Michael Keith who provided expert guidance of the highest quality throughout the six year production of the thesis. Always perceptive and precise his support has been munificent and unstinting - the intellectual and practical jolts were timed perfectly. Many thanks too for the support and encouragement of Bev Skeggs who made telling contributions at every twist in the research plot. Brian Alleyne provided sound advice for which I am grateful. Les Back gave intelligent, sensitive support at a critical time in the research. Ben Gidley’s remarks on the Upgrade had enduring value. Many people gave their intellect, time and resources liberally thereby making the research possible: the archivists and the interviewees were magnificent in their willingness to engage with me and the research - heartfelt thanks. Goldsmiths’ PhD students over the years deserve thanks, particularly Sireita Mullings who listened patiently to my ramblings for several years, offering valuable insights along the way and Rachel Dunkley-Jones who offered penetrating observations in the formative years. Nick Denes gave fulsome erudite comments on a methodology paper presented to the Goldsmiths College, Sociology Department Exploding Objects conference. Bridget Ward and Sheila Robinson merit my thanks for sorting out the admin and being a friend. Thanks to the staff of Goldsmiths Library especially Liz Williams for her nonchalant encouragement. Colleagues at LSBU did their bit, always willing to hear another story about Castlefield. Duncan Tyler’s forthright observations were of great help. Munir Morad of DUELS, LSBU supported the research for which I am grateful. LSBU provided partial funding which was a good incentive. Jane Haye of LSBU Library provided a wonderful inter-library loans service. In the course of the research papers were presented at conferences organised by Goldsmiths College, Liverpool University, LSBU, UI at Chicago, UNAM Mexico City and the University of Louisville (in Hawaii) and I would like to thank the participants for their thoughtful and enlightening comments. My family has been a source of constant support: Emmeline, Melanie, Jude, Jade, Paulyn, Michael and Margaret. Lifelong friends Bolagi Lawrence and Glenn Blaylock - thanks for the blasé expectations. Carla Diego-Franceskides’ friendship is a special gift. All the friends, family and colleagues who from day one only wanted to know: “So when will it be finished?” prevented temporal complacency. Finally, profound gratitude goes to the people, spaces and histories of Castlefield and Manchester - through a misty dawn you can see the belly and guts of the (post)industrial revolutions.
Abstract

The aim of this research is to unravel and interrogate critically the recent histories of the production and reproduction of Castlefield, Manchester. This unravelling is accomplished theoretically through the historicised application of Lefebvre’s spatial triad. Production of space histories and Castlefield’s ‘regeneration’ are revisited principally through archival and interview evacuations of the neglected years of the 1970s. Urban public space is seen as the key city synecdoche. The thesis argues against what is called the ‘dominant academic narrative’: challenging the narrative where it ignores or downplays the role of counter-representations and counter-projects in the production of urban public space. The empirical research is based mainly on archival data and complimentary interview and visual data; the analyses are qualitative. Visual representations of space largely neglected in the literature are foregrounded throughout the empirical research. Spaces of representation and spatial practice are interrogated from the perspective of public space analysis which emphasises the importance of the contested nature of representations of space within the public sector and the vulnerable and unstable character of some official representations of space. The thesis therefore does not seek to reproduce what might be called a ‘traditional’ Lefebvrian analysis which counter-poses repressive official representations of space against quotidian heroic, poetic spaces of representation. The research challenges oversimplified characterisations of Castlefield as a space simply of heritage, leisure and exclusive residential enclaves. A dynamic, complex spatial portrait is revealed whereby ludic, ‘natural’ and abstract space rise and fall through intricate spatial layering as time unfolds. Urban differential space and ludic space are found to emerge through the interstices of abstract space as key outcomes of the contestation of space. The thesis concludes that the potential for differential urban public space exists through the production of new spaces and their diverse politicised appropriation.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

BR - British Rail
CABE - Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment
CBD - Central Business District
CCA - Castlefield Conservation Area
CMC - Castlefield Management Company
CMDC - Central Manchester Development Corporation
CND - Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
COWP - Castlefield Officers Working Party
CPO - Compulsory Purchase Order
CSC - Castlefield Steering Committee
DCLG - Department for Communities and Local Government
DCMS - Department for Culture Media and Sport
DoE - Department of the Environment
ERDF - European Regional Development Fund
ESRC - Economic and Social Research Council
ETB - English Tourist Board
FOIA - Freedom of Information Act
GLC - Greater London Council
GMAU - Greater Manchester Archaeology Unit
GMC - Greater Manchester Council
GMMSI - Greater Manchester Museum of Science and Industry
GNOW - Government Office for the North West
GrG - Georgian Group
GTV - Granada TV Ltd
GWA - Groundwork Associates
HBB - Historic Buildings Bureau
HBC - Historic Buildings Council
LDDC - London Docklands Development Corporation
LRS - Liverpool Road Station
LRSS - Liverpool Road Station Society
MIA - Manchester International Arts Ltd
MCC - Manchester City Council
MCHP - Manchester Conservation Areas and Historic Buildings Panel
MDC - Merseyside Development Corporation
MEN - Manchester Evening News
MHLG - Ministry of Housing and Local Government
MLPS - Manchester Literary and Philosophy Society
MNB - Manchester No Borders
MOSI - Museum of Science and Industry
MOWP - Manchester and Salford Inner City Partnership, Officer Working Party
MSCC - Manchester Ship Canal Company
MSICP - Manchester and Salford Inner City Partnership
NWRO - North West Regional Office (of the DoE based in Manchester)
renamed the Government Office for the North West in 1994
NW TB - North West Tourist Board
ODPM - Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Quango - Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation
SCC - Salford City Council
SoS - Secretary of State
SPZ - Simplified Planning Zone
UDC - Urban Development Corporation
UHP - Urban Heritage Park
UMIST - University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology
UrP - Urban Programme
VSMG - Victorian Society Manchester Group

(abbreviations and acronyms for the archives can be found in appendix 1)
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mid the various doubts and uncertainties with which ignorance and inattention have clouded the Roman geography of our island, no uncertainty has ever arisen and no doubt has ever been stated concerning the well-known claim of Manchester to the character of a Roman Station... A Roman station has been acknowledged by all the antiquarians to have been constructed upon the bank of the Medlock and within the circuit of the Castle-field. And the station is considered by all of them to have been the denominated Mancunium of the Roman Itinerary. (Whitaker 1771: 1-2 CLA)

Castlefield has now been redeveloped into an Urban Heritage Park. Aside from the huge science museum, the big draw here is the Castlefield Basin. The Bridgewater Canal runs through it; in summertime thousands of people amble about the place and patronise its fine pubs and trendy restaurants. (Lonely Planet 2007)

Not so many years ago, the word ‘space’ had a strictly geometrical meaning: the idea it evoked was simply of an empty area… and the general feeling was that the concept of space was ultimately a mathematical one. To speak of ‘social space’, therefore, would have sounded strange. (Lefebvre 1991: 1)

This thesis seeks to unravel the recent history of the production of Castlefield, Manchester; a place that is something of an enigma. It does this by drawing on Henri Lefebvre’s theoretical ideas about urban space explicated below. Castlefield is located at the south western edge of the city centre (figure 1.1) and nowadays is a famous heritage and leisure ‘cultural quarter’. It is known to travel agents the world over and afforded a decent boost from Lonely Planet. It is a place of pleasant canals, museums, expensive bars and upmarket apartments (figure 1.2). Mick Hucknell of Simply Red opened one of the bars, named Barça. One of the city’s most famous personalities, the late Tony Wilson, joint founder of Factory Records and the Situationist inspired Haçienda nightclub, bought a penthouse flat here in the converted Middle Warehouse in the 1990s. Castlefield is a photogenic place frequented by film makers such as

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1 Archival references have an abbreviated code; see the list of archival data sources and appendix 1.
2 All photographs by author unless otherwise attributed.
Leslie Woodhead and Guy Ritchie. In November 2010 Manchester United striker Wayne Rooney was in Castlefield filming an episode of Sky TV’s *Street Striker*.

Figure 1.1 Recent Ordnance Survey map showing Castlefield in its city centre context

Castlefield as the Rev John Whitaker pointed out is integral to the city and its history since it was Manchester’s Roman birthplace. Manchester was acknowledged widely as the world’s first modern industrial city by the 19th century. Before attaining city status in 1853 it was a thriving textile township without a modern town Corporation (Briggs 1963). Flemish weavers were welcomed rather than shunned when they brought new weaving technology in the 14th century. Without walls and strong guilds it was a physically and economically open enterprising town; a sign of things to come. Dislike of government taxation led to the development of the economic laissez faire ideology of the ‘Manchester School’ and this truly liberal city built the Free Trade Hall in 1856 to commemorate its opposition to oppressive government specifically the Peterloo massacre of 1819 and Prime Minister Lord Liverpool’s Corn Laws.
Figure 1.2 Castlefield montage: urban space-scapes

Figure 2.1 Castlefield montage: urban activity - scapes
Before the creation of the cotton industry that led to Manchester ‘cottons’ or ‘goods’ being shipped all over the world, the township was already a prosperous textile production centre, taking advantage of its soft water and damp climate to produce high quality woollen, linen and fusian textiles. Manchester is famous as the home of world communism. It was in Chetham’s Public Library that Engels wrote *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, drawing on his experiences in Manchester - providing the empirical basis for Marx’s theories. Marx sat in the same window seat and formulated the revolutionary ideas that would soon emerge as *The Communist Manifesto* and *Capital*.

Manchester is known throughout the world as the home of *Coronation Street*, the world’s first TV soap opera which started in 1960, though it is in ‘Weatherfield’ and as the home of Manchester United the world’s most famous football club, though Old Trafford is in neighbouring Trafford Borough. Intriguingly, the name Manchester is shrouded in myth and mystery. Whitaker claims it was also called Mamucium by the Romans and with some justification (Nicholas Higham 2008 email, appendix 2), that Mancunium and Mamucium are based on the Celtic name for the Castlefield area, Mancenion3 (Whitaker 1771: 2-5 CLA). Hence the first of Ford Maddox Brown’s murals in the Town Hall is called *The Romans Building a Fort at Mancenion*: rather than Castlefield or Mancunium - a puzzle to many visitors. Ironically the least interesting historical fact about Manchester is clouded by no uncertainty. The Fort was started in AD 79. A 20 foot high red sandstone bluff at the confluence of the Rivers Irwell and Medlock was chosen as the location under the orders of the Roman General Julius Agricola. Manchester and Castlefield’s histories are bound up with water and other ‘natural’ features like the nearby coal bearing geological formations. Watercourses have influenced greatly the city’s socio/economic history.

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3 The Anglo-Saxons may have renamed the settlement Manceaster, the ‘ceaster’ suffix meaning a site on which early fortifications or their remains are found. The Domesday Book spelling Mamecestre occurs, with slight variations, in later medieval documents. The present name appeared near the end of the 15th century, but was not fully established until the 17th (Shercliff 1983: 3-4). Cooper (2005: 20-21) disagrees believing that the original settlement was called Manceaster - ‘nam’ from the Celtic for hill and ‘ceaster’ from the Latin for walled town: strange because Manchester was never a walled town. Kidd (2006: 1) prefers the idea that Mamucium is a Roman name derived from the ‘breast-like-hill’ on which the Fort at Castlefield stood. All this goes to show how place naming can be somewhat arbitrary and mysterious.
An industrialist, John Byrom built wharfs in the 18th century on the River Irwell at what later became Quay Street. The Bridgewater Canal and of course the ‘Great Ditch’, the Manchester Ship Canal, opened officially by Queen Victoria in 1894 were crucial for Manchester’s industrial prominence. It terminates at ‘Manchester Docks’ which somewhat perversely are in Salford. When the Manchester Ship Canal Company bought the Bridgewater Canal Company in 1887 the cheque for £1,700,000 was the largest ever cashed. The smaller Pomona Dock, named for the trade with the Italian city, was constructed in Manchester on the western extremity of Castlefield.

The startling growth from the 17th century of the township’s population, industry and economy has been told many times (Briggs 1963; Hylton 2003; Kidd 2006). Manchester from the 1800s was more than just a cotton-based manufacturing town. The “overworked sobriquet Cottonopolis” masked its importance for engineering, chemical industry innovation and technological advances (Kidd 2006: 22). It was also a commercial centre for banking, insurance and commodities trading and a nationally significant medical and scientific research centre of the highest quality. The equally dramatic story of the city’s post-World War Two industrial decline has been the subject of considerable research (Girodano and Twomey 2002). Manchester’s dramatic growth saw the population peak at about 766,400 in 1931. The population had declined to 392,800 by the time of the 2001 Census (a figure later revised to 422,900), but the city is now growing again according to the Office for National Statistics 2009 mid-year estimate of 483,830 (Manchester City Council 2010). An ethnically and religiously diverse population characterises the city, especially in some inner city wards, which dates back to the 19th century and earlier. The Ship Canal brought many vessels crewed by sailors from the British Colonies and it was in the booming industrial metropolis that many of them settled and raised families.

Castlefield has a reasonable claim to be the place in the city where the industrial revolution started. It was here in about 1765 that coal was first unloaded, from the innovative engineering marvel, James Brindley’s Bridgewater Canal, funded by Francis Edgerton, the 3rd Duke of Bridgewater, to be loaded onto carts and taken east across the city to the world’s first working class industrial ‘suburb’ at Ancoats. Here in
the giant mills it powered textile machinery and an assortment of great steam engines producing manufactures from cutlery to steam locomotives.

Figure 1.3 Liverpool Road Station Frontage
First Class Passengers’ Entrance (2006)

Castlefield became a transport and industrial hub when in 1805 the Rochdale Canal terminated at Lock 92 where it met the Bridgewater Canal. After canals and coal came the wonders of railways and steam trains. It was in Castlefield in 1830 that the world’s first locomotive hauled intercity passenger railway station opened at Liverpool Road Station (LRS): a name that no doubt raises ironic smiles in the city 30 miles to the west. This renders the world’s first railway station Georgian, a point grasped easily when viewing the elegant frontage (figure 1.3)\(^4\). All manner of goods and produce moved through this elaborate transport interchange including: grain, sugar, wheat, potatoes, timber, chemicals, slate and other construction materials but above all cotton. These events are well documented and they helped turn Manchester into Cottonopolis and for a while in the 19th century the shock city of the modern age (Briggs 1963), the industrial centre of Empire and the workshop of the world (Kidd 2006).

\(^4\) Note that not all of the author’s photographs which were taken in Castlefield 2004-10 are included in the list of figures.
Culturally too Manchester and Castlefield have great importance. It was in Castlefield in the 19th century that the first free municipal library in Britain opened, disturbingly close for some to the largest annual fair and carnival in the North West. The German Charles Hallé founded Britain’s first permanent professional municipal symphony orchestra in 1858 finding a home for it in the Free Trade Hall on the edge of Castlefield. Culture combined with industry when the canals, railways and factories became some of the world’s first industrial tourist attractions, after Richard Arkwright’s great water-driven mill at Cromford (Dimbleby 2005). Manchester businessmen prided themselves on their cultural enlightenment and alongside, if not quite satanic then certainly dreadful factories, innovative cultural institutions were created such as the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, the Athenaeum, Manchester Art Gallery, Belle Vue Pleasure Gardens and the Manchester Guardian (Kidd and Roberts 1985). Such innovations followed the founding in 1653 of Chetham’s School and Library: the world’s first free English language public library. These cultural traditions continue with the highly acclaimed People’s History Museum, Bridgewater Concert Hall, the Manchester International Festival and the National Football Museum which comes to Manchester in 2011.

Cotton and the related industries of Manchester and surrounding northern towns depended predominantly at the outbreak of the USA civil war in 1861 on raw cotton grown in the Confederate States by West African and other enslaved peoples. Raw cotton was imported through the port of Liverpool then via canals and later railways into Castlefield for transhipment to Ancoats, Chorlton-on-Medlock, Ardwick and Clayton. Finished textiles and other manufactured goods were sent in the reverse direction; a proportion of the output of Manchester textiles being traded for more West African peoples. The story of Manchester’s reliance on capital investment derived from the profits from the Transatlantic Trade in West African peoples although first asserted in Eric Williams’ 1944 text Capitalism and Slavery and reiterated in Peter Fryer’s 1984 Staying Power, is less well known but no less important than the ‘traditional’ history. They claim that the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company was funded partly by profits from the Transatlantic Trade (Williams 1944: 105; Fryer 1984: 16). Williams’ renowned book, based on his Oxford University PhD was
controversial for many years but its central thesis tends now to be accepted (Inikori 1989; Solow and Engerman 2004; Johnson 2010).

The cotton and LRS links with enslavement locate Castlefield spatially at a key point in an emerging system of first Imperial then globalised worldwide industrial manufacturing, finance, commerce and cultural intermingling. Although not the focus of my research the Transatlantic Trade in West African peoples who were enslaved is not ignored here as it is in other historical accounts (Hylton 2003; Kidd 2006). One of the few reminders of this unfortunate phase of the city’s history - a statue of Abraham Lincoln - stands in Lincoln Square in Manchester city centre. It is inscribed with his thanks to the city’s workers for their support during the civil war - the Mill owners tended to support the Confederacy. The so called Cotton Famine (1861-1865) caused by the Union blockade of Confederate ports imposed massive unemployment and hardship on ordinary working people in Manchester and the northern mill towns. The statue’s inscription is based on an 1863 letter Lincoln addressed to the working men of Manchester:5

...I know and deeply deplore the sufferings which the Working-men of Manchester and in all Europe are called to endure in this crisis… Under the circumstances I cannot but regard your decisive utterances on the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country. (Abraham Lincoln in Clifford and Miller 1909)

Those were turbulent times as was the post-Roman era. The village or vicus which grew up outside the Fort to service its needs, supplying food, drink and women for the soldiers stationed there and passing through, was the first Manchester. The Fort and village were all but destroyed after the Roman colonisers retreated in the 5th century. Although its precise origins remains a mystery, a second settlement was founded two miles to the east at the confluence of the Rivers Irwell and Irk, close to what is now the city’s Cathedral, several hundred years later by Anglo-Saxon invaders. On two more occasions Manchester would be not so much re-founded literally as remade through the dialectical production of space during the Georgian/Victorian industrial eras and the present postindustrial epoch (O’Connor and Wynne 1996). Each transformation was as startling as the last, especially for ‘travel writers’, who came from the 18th

5 In 1986 a new pedestal was built and history rewritten; the inscription now reads, “To the ‘Working People’ of Manchester”.
century to marvel at this startling industrial wonder and who tended to express shock, admiration or disgust, or all three (Bradshaw 1986). One of the world’s first modern industrial city tourist guide books by James Ogden urged visitors to Manchester to “begin in Castlefield” (Brumhead and Wyke 1989: 3) something which had become unthinkable by the 1950s when AJP Taylor condemned Castlefield unflatteringly as “the bottom of Deansgate” (Taylor 1957: 4).

![Castlefield dawn](image)

**Figure 1.4** A misty Castlefield dawn: looking south across the Bridgewater Canal with an inquisitive Canada Goose in the foreground and ‘pleasure barges’ in the background alongside Slate Wharf (2009)

Castlefield can appear mystifying times. Certainly the early morning mist which enveloped the area in Roman times would have made it seem so and still does today (figure 1.4). Even the etymology of the name is uncertain and certainly misleading. It is thought to be a contraction of Castle-in-the-field. Whitaker (1771: 8-10) does not claim that he coined the name but he does claim there was an Anglo-Saxon castle on the site. Although Whitaker was a dedicated, knowledgeable scholar, he was at times fanciful and idiosyncratic in his assertions and his castle claim is rejected firmly by today’s scholars (Nevell 2008: 17). Nevertheless the evocative name remains. It is a name that appears on some maps from the 18th century although the Ordnance Survey
began mapping the area in the mid-19th century and chose to call the area Mancenion on the 1851 map (Brumhead and Wyke 1989: 2). Four behemoth-like viaducts were built in the 19th century and came to dominate Castlefield, soon becoming blackened with coal soot; appearing threatening before being perceived as attractive and historically important in the 1980s (figure 1.5). One is disused and provides a haven for wildlife.

Figure 1.5 Castlefield’s Imposing Viaducts (2009) express confident Victorian engineering innovation: the crenelated turret signifies a nod to the past

Along with transport infrastructure, factories, warehouses, abattoirs, churches and pubs Castlefield was also home to about 50,000 working class people in the 19th century and still contained working class housing areas north and south of Liverpool Road in the 20th century (figure 1.6).
George Orwell nominated Manchester the belly and guts of the nation in his seminal text *The Road to Wigan Pier*, perhaps to echo Emile Zola’s assertion in his 1873 eponymous novel that Les Halles was ‘the belly of Paris’. With its slaughter houses and markets Castlefield was certainly the belly and guts of Manchester.

Figure 1.6 Detail from the 1920s Ordnance Survey map of the Castlefield Area. Note the name ‘Castle Field’, the dense working class housing and abattoirs.

Many of the area’s terrace houses were not cleared and the residents scattered until the early 1970s. To the north of the terraces and back-to-backs, a well-to-do middle class suburb developed in the 18th century centred on St John Street. Castlefield lies about a mile from the Town Hall and covers an area of approximately 150 acres (60 hectares). Being an imagined place Castlefield is not bounded by local government boundaries. It
spreads to the west across the border (the River Irwell) into the city of Salford and the Conservation Area (figure 1.7) only covers it in part. And as if to emphasise this the application for World Heritage Site status calls it ‘Manchester and Salford (Ancoats, Castlefield and Worsley)’ and as the name implies this area extends several miles to the east and west. In the 1990s Castlefield was linked into the city’s new tram network called Metrolink thereby reinstating the transport technology that linked Castlefield to the city centre in the 1900s. Metrolink inspired a detective yarn weaved around a tale of city planning and homicide, Mike Hamer’s (1993) novel Off the Rails: The First Metrolink Murder.

Figure 1.7 Castlefield Conservation Area (shaded) showing proximity to the Town Hall (MCC 1980 MPDA)

**Inspirational Moments and Approach**

In deciding to pursue this thesis I was inspired by the mixed methods rigour and engaging style of Berman’s (2006) history of Times Square, New York, his home town. Its neon vibrancy, cinematic representations and monumental modernist buildings, brought to pulsating life by Berman, endow the Square with sheer urban
exuberance that Castlefield struggles to match. Times Square, named after the *New York Times*, is arguably more famous than Castlefield but smaller, not as ancient and without worldwide revolutionary impact. If for Gerard Kenny *New York New York* was so good they named it twice then Manchester is so good because it was founded twice and trumps New York by being named three times.

Even from the brief description above the feel and complex identity of Castlefield begins to emerge. The material presence, both natural and man-made, is a visually striking feature of the area. Even so I argue throughout the thesis, following Lefebvre, that Castlefield is constructed too in spatial representations and the imagination. The city as an imagined place has been a popular orientation of some researchers in recent years (see the papers in Westwood and Williams 1997; Çınar and Bender 2007) some of whom echo Lefebvre with claims that cities are not just material and lived but are spaces of the imagination and representation (Bridge and Watson 2002a: 3). Before this Raban (1974) conjectured that the imagination of newcomers to London shapes the city around them and the city’s *identity* at times goes ‘soft’ and dissolves; a new city emerging from the precipitate. Lefebvre (1991) argues continually that the hard *material* city is remade too, subject to the ‘soft’ but extremely powerful influences of representations of space. Each time the city is remade the reproduction draws necessarily on its history as constraint and opportunity, or at least a version of its history. Or as Massey (1994: 8) puts it “ideas of place-identity are always constructed by reference to the past”. The built environment acts a material reservoir of collective memories which are overlaid on the present, but what counts as legitimate memory and heritage is contested across social interest groups and the generations (Hayden 1995; Jacobs 1996; Graham 2002). The chapters which follow work with notions of the material, represented, social and imagined city to historicise the production of Castlefield space.
Castlefield is enigmatic for me because despite it momentous role in the city’s industrial development and cultural life it was until relatively recently little known to the people of the city and beyond. Born in Ardwick and brought up in Wythenshawe, our mother whose vocation was teaching was keen that we learn about our home city’s Roman, medieval and industrial histories. It is something of a conundrum therefore how I had not have heard of Castlefield until 2002 when researching for a masters degree (Leary 2003). The paradox arose as to how the area could be so important yet seemingly invisible? At the start of this thesis in 2004 published academic literature about Manchester was copious but about Castlefield scarce; Degen (2003) and passing mention in a few books, for example (Haslam 1999; Peck and Ward 2002) and journal articles (Quilley 2000). The literature portrayed the area in the 1970s and ‘80s, like many similar places in the UK and elsewhere as derelict, empty, depressed and depressing. Given its edge of city centre location, the obvious question was why? Brief, glib answers invoking industrial decline did not feel satisfactory. The area was designated a conservation area in 1979 and a major science museum opened in 1982. It seemed unlikely therefore that the 1970s could have been totally void and uninteresting. Something did not feel right and I began to see the veiled production of the area in 1970s increasingly as a mystery to be unravelled rather than the inevitable result of Adam Smith’s invisible hand or a deus ex machina.

Six years ago these initial questions provided the momentum for a more sustained critical engagement with a large and growing body of relevant literatures including many sources outside the academy. They tended to present similar narratives of 1970s downcast dereliction. The urge to challenge these accounts became overwhelming but to do that, powerful theoretical tools were needed. Lefebvre’s theorisation of the city has a preeminent place in critical urban studies alongside thinkers such as Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin, Michel de Certeau and Michel Foucault (Tonkiss 2005; Bavidge 2011). Following research in 2003 I began to realise that the most appropriate theoretical framework to carry out PhD research centred on such old, complex urban space as Castlefield was Henri Lefebvre’s spatial triad and the wider insights provided by the 1991 edition of his book The Production of Space (Lefebvre 1991). Many shrewd interpretations of Lefebvre’s work made this highly challenging part of the
research less fraught than it would otherwise have been (Gottdiener 1985; Soja 1989; Harvey 1989a; Fyfe 1996; Shields 1999; Borden 2001). Initial fascinations, interests and questions were distilled into the present thesis.

**Aims and Structure of the Thesis**

At its heart the thesis is a piece of exploratory research concerned fundamentally with questions about the production of urban public space. It seeks to unravel through a critical investigation, the history of the production of Castlefield space, arguing against what I call the dominant narrative. The thesis does not seek to reproduce approaches which tend to contrast dominant official representations of space with heroic, quotidian spaces of representation. Rather the thesis explores: the importance of counter-representations and counter-projects; the role of contested representations of space, the importance of visual representations; the blurring of representations of space and spaces of representation and Lefebvre’s concept of differential space in the context of the production of new public space.

The temporal focus encompasses the production of space in the 1970s and the decades before and after this neglected era. Methodologically a twofold research design is adopted. Firstly, mixed research methods are used for the collection and construction of a range of relevant case study data. Archival methods and data form the foundation of the empirical research supplemented substantially by interview and visual data. Secondly, qualitative analysis only is used. Theoretically the aim is to deploy the elements of the spatial triad to gain a critical, substantive appreciation of the production of urban public space. Lefebvre saw urban space, often regarded as empty and geometric, as replete with social meaning and power relationships: outcome and process. It should be admitted at the outset that Lefebvre’s stimulating ideas concerning space and its production are at times complex and contradictory. I take a cautious stance to Lefebvre’s assertions that spaces of representation are “passively experienced” and “aspire to do no more than describe” (1991: 39) and that representations of space are inherently dominant. Putting the myriad interpretations of the spatial triad to one side for now (taken up again in chapter 3), the spatial triad does have an intuitive simplicity (Lefebvre 1991: 38-46) and my approach sees its elements as follows (adapted from Healey 2007: 204; Leary 2008a and 2009a: 196):
- **spatial practice**: the physical, material city; its maintenance, its redevelopment in the context of existing neo-capitalist and state power structures; routines of daily life that conform with official representations of space; space directly perceptible through the senses - perceived space

- **representations of space**: rational, intellectualised conceptions of urban areas for analytical, architectural, engineering, planning and administrative purposes, produced by technicians (and artists with a scientific bent); they are the dominant representations and may be in the form of the written word or quasi-scientific visual representations of various kinds - conceived space

- **spaces of representation**:
  
  6 space as directly lived by inhabitants and users through associated images and symbols imbued with cultural meaning; emotional, artistic interpretations of city space by poets, writers and painters; they overlay physical space and value places in ways that run counter to the dominant representations of space and can help to stimulate counter-space – quotidian lived space.

In addition to what may be called the traditional triad three other Lefebvrian spatial concepts are important for the thesis:

- **natural space**: the spaces of ‘nature’ which can re-establish through or over abstract space (Lefebvre 1991: 30-31)

- **abstract space**: the urban spaces of state regulated neo-capital characterised by their commodified exchange value and their tendency to homogenisation (Ibid: 49-53, 285-288)

- **differential space**: privileges use value rather than exchange value; often transitory spaces which can arise from the inherent vulnerabilities of abstract space (Ibid: 52)

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The structure of the thesis while perhaps not immediately straightforward does have an internal logic dictated by the research aims, the richness of the data and the penchant for epochal events to occur sequentially and simultaneously. The next chapter provides a critical engagement with relevant published academic material arguing for the importance of seeing the modern city and urban public space as material, represented and imagined. It sets out the importance of a sophisticated understanding of public space and argues that a dominant academic narrative is discernable in published urban studies research related to Manchester and Castlefield. Chapter 3 contributes theoretical grounding for the thesis and presents a reasoned justification for the chosen methodological approach at the theoretical and practical level.

Chapter 4 is the first empirical research chapter. It focuses on a critical analysis of key official representations of space from the 1940s in particular the 1945 City Plan and the important repercussions for Castlefield of national urban policy representations of inner city space from the 1960s. Chapter 5 concentrates on an archival based investigation of a crucial, contested 1970s/80s counter-project. I argue that it was instigated by several historic building conservation/preservation (or amenity) societies and based on a spatial network of interests that stretched from Manchester to London. Chapter 6 explores the production of Castlefield for the same era as chapter 5 but from the standpoint of the production of counter-representations of space or quasi-spaces of representation which began to valorise Castlefield historically as an integrated spatial entity. Chapter 7 unravels the importance and ramifications of the main heritage loaded representations which influenced the production of new public spaces, especially bridges. It plots the interrelationships between CMDC and local public institutions asking questions about the importance of civic mindedness for the production of new public space. Chapter 8 proffers critical empirical research exploring the history of Castlefield’s differential space. This is set in the context of the disappearance of 19th century large scale ludic space and examines how new public spaces of Castlefield created by CMDC were sites for the eruption of appropriated differential space. Chapter 9 provides for a reflective evaluation of the important findings of the research in relation to the central theme of the thesis, the empirical data analyses and theoretical considerations for the future production of urban space.
Chapter 2

Theorising the City, Public Space and the Dominant Narrative

Sicinius: You [Plebeians] are at point to lose your liberties.
Marcius would have all from you, Marcius,
Whom late you have named for consul.
Menenius: Fie, fie, fie!
This is the way to kindle, not quench.
First Senator: To unbuild the city and to lay all flat.
Sicinius: What is the city but the people?
Plebeians: True,
The people are the city.
(Coriolanus Act 3 Scene 1)

Humidity’s rising (hmmm rising).
Barometer’s getting low (how low girl?).
According to our sources (what sources now?).
The street’s the place to go (we better hurry up).
(The Weather Girls 1982 It's Raining Men)

Introduction

This chapter performs three related roles in the thesis. It outlines the way the city, in the abstract, has been ontologised since the 19th century, demonstrating the consequences for the thesis. It presents the proposition that public space integrates the amalgam that is the city, illuminating the importance of public space conceptualisations for the production of new urban space. It examines how the thesis can be positioned relative to the pertinent academic literatures (Hart 1998) regarding the material and social spaces of Castlefield and their representations, arguing that a dominant academic narrative has emerged. Today’s theorists of the city argue that there is merit in the “understanding of materiality that sees materials not as inert objects but as assemblages of social/technical and physical relations” (Bridge and Watson 2010a: 5). Lefebvre would surely agree. However, he would probably dispute Sicinius’ and the Plebeians’ one dimensional view of the city implied by Shakespeare’s famous ontological epigram. This frequently quoted cogitation on the essence of the city is however, deceptive. Rome is revealed progressively as multilayered and complex. Shakespeare’s Rome is palpably a material city of streets, squares, the market-place, public buildings and the Capitol. Rome is a city of institutions and power structures: a city of tensions and problems. The Plebeians are
tricked into making their assertion by Sicinius’ sly manipulative leading question but in so doing hope to assert their ‘right to the city’ in the context of city-wide famine and tumultuous political times. Coriolanus is doubly encoded being the name bestowed on the Play’s protagonist, Caius Marcius, after he captures the city of Corioli. It emerges that Coriolanus disagrees with the Plebeians, thinking them bestial and not worthy of Roman status - even though they may have been “calved i’ the porch o’ the Capitol” (Act 3 Scene 1) - believing the essence of the city to be the nobility and military hero-saviours such as himself. Above all then Shakespeare’s city is a complex of contested phenomena that inhere in dynamic tension: a tension that became the focus of intense scrutiny with the emergence of the modern industrial city.

**Understandings of the City**

Although it is common to refer to the Modern Movement in 20th century architecture and city planning there was no one set of agreed analyses and principles. Internationally, different interpretations are evident (Gold 1993) as seen for example in the divergent ideas of Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier. However, common threads include the need for the rational imposition on city space of order, cleanliness, healthiness, efficiency and beauty. Harvey (1989a: 12) refers to the “project of modernity” from the 18th century which envisaged the accumulation of scientific knowledge enabling “human emancipation and the enrichment of daily life”. Urban planning was a key tool for the achievement of such progress (Fishman 2003).

Modernity is of course a complex, and at times contradictory set of understandings, propositions and styles that reaches across, philosophy, music, literature, painting, politics and medicine, architecture and urban planning (Gold 1997: 14). However, of all the senses, the visual is generally agreed to have a hegemonic role in knowing the modern world (Levin 1993). Lefebvre and others have pointed out that just because some material thing is there in urban space does not automatically mean it will be seen or comprehended. Here of course seeing has several meanings: visible to the eye, intelligible and valued by the mind and perceptible politically. That which is merely seen is hard to see (Lefebvre 1991: 286), if it is not simultaneously represented and valorised. A detailed account of the European Enlightenment and modernity debates is beyond the scope of this thesis (but see Harvey 1989a; Shoshkes 2009) but it is important to highlight several of its key aspects at this point. Eight elements are said
by Allmendinger (2000: 11) to constitute modernity; of most interest here is his claim that it is: a bundle of ideas, an intellectual movement, and a set of institutional centres. Such characteristics are seen as being underpinned by amongst other things: reason, empiricism, science, universalism and progress (Ibid: 12). Boyer (1983) in particular shows how in the USA the supposedly progressive modernist city doctrine emerged as an elitist consensual solution to the perceived urban problematic through a variety of actors, interests and institutions including: elite experts in the field of architecture, city planning, sanitation, transportation. They were joined by housing welfare reformers, charitable trusts and the city-beautiful movement.

From the materialisation of the modern city in the 18th century, travellers, journalists, theorists; practical men and women were enraptured by the brilliance, beauty, civilised treasures and allure of the city and repelled by its ugliness, cruelties and horrors. Ambivalence regarding the nascent modern industrial city is captured quintessentially in the vivid eloquence of Alexis de Tocqueville’s assertion that Manchester is a vile, “filthy cesspit” from which “flows pure gold” thereby allowing the attainment of the miracles of civilisation but also the conversion of men into desperate savages (in Bradshaw 1986: 34). Due to the efforts of proselytizers, events and institutions such as: James Brindley, Richard Arkwright, Cobden and Bright, Friedrich Engels, the Free Trade Hall, Adolphe Valette and Manchester Ship Canal; Manchester has since the 19th century achieved iconic status as the archetypal modern industrial city. For Briggs (1963) Manchester was the shock city of the Victorian age. Over the decades the city that became the workshop of the world also generated an industry dedicated to writing myriad accounts and one can only agree with Katznelson that the “literature on Manchester is immense” (1992: 144). Not surprisingly, it was one of the first cities to experience postindustrial decline and restructuring (O’Connor and Wynne 1996; Peck and Ward 2002), again generating intense interest. In cities across Europe and North America industrial decline has seen capital, jobs and residents flee or be removed from inner city areas, like Castlefield, leaving parts of cities haunted by the ruins of a former industrial age (Edensor 2005). Thus, urban landscapes became “devalorized and revalorized” and city centres reimagined and appropriated, for example as sites of urban spectacle (Hall et al 2008a: 1).
Ambivalence remains a major element shaping feelings about the city. Politicians, planners, architects, engineers and theorists have sought to govern, build, beautify, cure, clean, protect, control, profit from, understand and explain the city with greater or lesser degrees of success. Each of these endeavours has tended to be undertaken from one particular perspective; or it might be said, from different metaphysical and ideological points of view (Harvey 1973: 195). I argue, following Amin and Thrift (2002: 30) that in seeking to understand the city, theorists have tended to apply a methodological approach which foregrounds one ontological city element. Although the city is a dense, complex amalgam of phenomena it nevertheless needs to be disaggregated for the purposes of analytical investigation leading to some of the 'great' city analyses: Ferdinand Tönnies (society/anomie), Camilo Sitte (architectural aesthetics), Engels (material city), Karl Marx (economy), Ebenezer Howard (garden-city), Max Weber (institutions), Charles Booth (social inequality), Georg Simmel (psyche/mind), Walter Benjamin (sensory pleasures), William DuBois (racial discrimination). Each analysis produced particular almost exclusively written representations of the city. These quite different analyses and solutions were rooted in European Enlightenment inspired modernist problematisations of city space and the apparently rational responses to them (Boyer 1983; 1989; Gold 1997; Sandercock 1998).

This is not to say that any of the ‘great’ analyses are simplistic or that they ignore totally other city ontologies but one can almost hear the authors defending their approach with the words, “above all the city is…”. This formulation was used by Mumford who saw the city “above all else a theatre of social action” (2007: 85). In similar vein, one of the foremost city theorists of the 20th century argued famously, following Simmel that:

The city… is something more than a congeries of individual men and of social conveniences - streets, buildings, electric lights, tramways, and telephones, etc.; something more, also, than a mere constellation of institutions and administrative devices - courts, hospitals, schools, police, and civil functionaries of various sorts. The city is, rather, a state of mind, a body of customs and traditions, and of the organized attitudes and sentiments that

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7 See: Bridge and Watson (2002b); Miles et al (2004); Hubbard (2006); LeGates and Stout (2007); Hall et al (2008); Bridge and Watson (2010).
inhere in these customs and are transmitted with this tradition. The city is not, in other words, merely a physical mechanism and an artificial construction. It is involved in the vital processes of the people who compose it… (Park 1984: 1, emphasis added)

Park’s contribution has triple importance. Firstly, his analysis goes beyond the existing materiality of the city to include key institutions and social processes. Secondly, he stresses the importance of historically transmitted cultures including customs and traditions. Thirdly, the people create the city but in turn the vital institutions and processes of the city impact on the people. So while Park on the one hand takes a pluralistic view of the city, on the other he privileges the city as a collective of intangible social attitudes and traditions, which are just as real as the material city (Pile 2005:2).

In the 1970s the reality and importance of the immaterial, imagined city was captured compellingly in the soft city of Raban (1974) at the same time as Lefebvre was refining his production of space theories. Cities of the imagination have become a significant theme in recent literatures (Westwood and Williams 1997; Donald 1999; Bridge and Watson 2000; Shiel and Fitzmaurice 2001; Amin and Thrift 2002; Pile 2005; Dimendberg 2004). Burgin affirms that the city is an actually existing physical environment, and a city in a novel, a film, a photograph, a city seen on television, a city in a comic strip, a city in a pie chart (Burgin 1996: 48). It is argued persuasively by Pile that the real and imagined city is a false dichotomy: rather it is the material and the imagined that are in mutual tension and both are ‘real’ (2005). Many of the representations discussed in the texts above measure, depict, interrogate and critique public urban space which in turn became a key trope of the city discourse.

Mumford’s ‘theatre of social action’ trope highlights the importance of the appropriation of material public space for social and political purposes. He warned that if the city loses its public performance of dramatic dialogue then civilisation itself is in peril. Sennett (1974) explores similar territory lamenting the loss of the democratic role of public space due to the dual threats of the rise of the nuclear, insular family and the deadening, homogenising impacts of misguided state/capitalist dominated city planning. He argues that together with middle class fears of being in public space, these factors have served to pauperise the public realm creating overly controlled and
too orderly public space denuded of the capacity to stimulate, inspire and challenge. Such fears are not new and go back at least to the bourgeois and governmental panics of the 19th century. Engels reflects these fears in a tirade against the whole of the working class spilling out in an orgy of drunken debauchery onto the main thoroughfares, ‘respectable’ middle class space, every Saturday night (Engels 1999: 138). These kinds of anxieties were the focus of a government investigation in 1833 because no provision had been made for the working classes in the industrial towns such as Manchester to enjoy “healthy exercise” or “cheerful amusement” (Select Committee on Public Walks 1833: 4-5). It is likely that the 1833 Report legitimated and formalised the idea of the civilising power of public space through the interaction of different social classes (Wyborn 1995; Gurney 1997).

One of the major challenges in thinking about cities to emerge in recent decades is to theorise the diversity of the so called postindustrial city (Bell 1973; Marshall 2001) and the highly contested postmodern city (Jameson 1984; Harvey 1989a; Soja 1989; Watson and Gibson 1994) without losing sight of its “extraordinary variety and vitality” (Amin and Thrift 2002: 7). Similarly, in the last few decades, recognition of city pluralities has become evident under the theoretical scrutiny of a range of theorist (Ibid: 8). Such theorists accept the value of understanding the city from different perspectives and multiple spatialities (Gregory 1994; Soja 1996; Keith 2005; Pile 2005; Pinder 2005) although the tendency to generalise “from prevalent phenomena or driving processes” remains a notable feature (Amin and Thrift 2002: 8). The roots of this plurality lie partly in the complexities and interconnections of the city itself. This complexity can be understood as arising from the dynamic interweaving of four key essential elements of the city: the material, the economic, the social and the imagined. This proposition of a limited number of differing perspectives vis-à-vis the city is open to the criticism that this or that essential element is missing; nevertheless I argue that it is a useful heuristic for making sense of city theorisations. Although historically, theorists have often pointed to one essential quality of the city, I am drawn to Amin and Thrift’s position which “deliberately avoids an essentialist reading” in terms of driving structures (Ibid); for reasons that will become obvious below.
What many city theorists share is a close engagement with the ideas of Henri Lefebvre, whose work through the proposition of the spatial triad seeks to integrate in a holistic way the apparent disparate phenomena of the modern city: principally the material, economic, political, social, everyday and imagined; Soja (1989) and Dear (2000) in particular see in Lefebvre (1991) the precursor of the rich vein of city theorising unleashed by postmodern thinking about space, place and urbanism. For Dear, there is scarcely a project in theoretical urban planning, architecture and human geography over the past two decades “that has remained untouched, consciously or not, by Lefebvre’s problematic” (2000: 47). While this is overstating the case, there is no doubt that Lefebvre’s influence on the way cities have been theorised is immense. Therefore, urban studies in general and research concerned with unpacking city change holistically can draw on a “fertile tradition of scholarship” which has sought to delineate, describe and analyse the city and provide a springboard for exploring its geographic, economic, social and historical aspects (Hall et al 2008a). Public space, perhaps more than any other way of seeing the city clearly entails a physical manifestation and has overlapping economic, social, cultural and political dimensions (Madanipour 2003: 3).

The City and Public Space
Since the 1960s a variety of public space social commentators such as novelists, film makers and academics have been intrigued by urban public space as a repository of material and behavioural cultural practices. It continues to be seen as vital for healthy urban cultural life (Bridge and Watson 2010b: 255). Light and Smith note that any consideration of public space “would be incomplete” without an understanding of Lefebvre’s contribution (1998: 6). The synonymity of the city and public space reached a high point when Jane Jacobs in her 1961 book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* associated the public space of the street with the city asking rhetorically, “Think of a city and what comes to mind? Its streets.” (1993: 37) then declaring, “if a city’s streets are safe from barbarism and fear” then so is the city (Ibid). A theme taken up by Berman (1986) who delights in tagging 1960s songs about

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8 The extent to which Lefebvre (1991) can be understood as an early definitive postmodern break with the grand meta-theorising engendered by European Enlightenment and modernity is of course highly contested (Harvey 1989a; Dear 2000).
the joyous appreciation of city streets: a theme propounded in the Weather Girls’ sonorous affirmation and lyrical fisticuffs regarding knowledge of the qualities of “the street”. Although barbarism of course can and does exist in the private spaces of the city, Jacobs’ plea for the synecdochic quality of public space is persuasive.

In this section I trace the key elements of the public space debates of the last few decades and point to the implications for the production of space and of Castlefield. In searching for a single characteristic which epitomises the essence of the city many theorists have constructed understandings based around the notion of public space and public life drawn from interpretations of ancient Greek city states such as Athens. Sennett (1974 and 1994) drawing on Hannah Arendt’s seminal 1958 text *The Human Condition*, is one of the chief exponents, lauding public space for its humanising and civilising potential based on the positive aspects of social interaction in public between diverse individuals and groups. The public space of cities is seen as precious because it encapsulates two things crucial for democratic political life. Firstly, the right of everybody to free association in the public space allows individuals to rise above the familiarity of family and kin and encounter the social heterogeneity which is a key feature of the city. Secondly, freedom of association in public space allows political opinions to be expressed and opinions different from one’s own to be heard; both of which are thought to be essential for the operation of wholesome democracy.  

Another line of thought stresses the importance of the bodily occupation of public space; of seeing and being seen in daily life and in the spectacular moments of carnivals, fairs and parades. This happened in the vitality and diversity of the Greek Agora where wealth, class and social status were no barrier.

The Hellenic city Agora “combined several important urban functions - law, government, commerce, industry religion and sociability” (Mumford 1960: 150). By the 5th century BC as Athens grew, threats to public space were evident as the Agora became too disorderly and chaotic – an "indiscriminate container" (Ibid). He comments that the Agora served as an informal club where, if one waited around long

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9 Claims for the democratic purity of Hellenic public space are contested vigorously. Critics point to its exclusively and oppressiveness especially for enslaved peoples and women (Young 2002; Madanipour 2003; Low and Smith 2005).
enough, one would meet one's friends. At this time though the landed gentry preferred to “loaf in the gymnasium where they would meet only their own kind” (Ibid). So it appears that ancient Athens produced at least three kinds of space with varying degrees of publicness; the lively inclusive popular-democratic ‘chaos’ of the Agora, the exclusive ordered citizen-space of law and government and the elite ordered outskirts-space of the gymnasium where difference was reduced both in terms of function and access by disenfranchised non-citizens (Sennett 1994: 52-61). Mumford’s and Sennett’s analyses reveal the mythical status of ideal homogenous Hellenic democratic public space: though it is an important myth. Its power lies in its aspirational value. Used as a practical standard against which to assess the loss or degradation of modern public space the romantic ideal of ancient public space is perhaps less helpful. But even its aspirational value is limited since all public space tends to have some controls on access and performance (Lees 1998). Merrifield makes this point in trenchant terms with a severe critique of Sennett’s (1970) invocation to create spaces of disorder and Berman’s (1968) injunction to take it to the open minded streets and let it all hang out (Merrifield 1996). Young (2002) takes a different tack arguing against homogenous spaces of ‘community’ in drawing attention to communities of difference.

Since Sennett warned of the threats to public space in the 1970s a certain amount of debilitating pessimism has been a key feature of urban public space literature. Analyses have tended to be dominated by narratives of loss, privatisation and excessive control exemplified by the 1990s arguments of Davis (1990), Sorkin (1992) and Mitchell (1995) around the corporatisation, commodification and commercialisation of public space. Others have focused on different aspects of public space death and decline: exclusion and gentrification (Deutsche 1996; MacLeod 2002; Atkinson 2003) and disproportionate surveillance (Coleman and Sim 2000; Bernd and Helms 2003). Authors such as Davis (2006) and Sorkin (2010) following the destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York and Zukin (2009) in the context of New York gentrification, reiterated their death and degradation of public space arguments. Fear of crime and disorder in public space lie at the root of many UK government and local government proclamations and initiatives. A concern with the perceived deterioration of public space has been a major preoccupation of the UK government (DCLG 2006); likely to survive the change to the coalition government in
May 2010. One government minister voiced the peculiar worry that “streets are losing their English character” (Pickles, in DCLG 2010). A theme of these critiques centres on threats to free access, performative democracy and the right to claim one’s place in public. However, the sub-text of these critiques is simply that public space is good but under serious and varied threat and that (privat(e)ised space is bad and spreading (Merrifield 1996). Much of the ‘public-space-good, private-space-bad’ debate fails to problematise what is meant by public space in the first place, why it is good and for whom it is good (Ibid: 59). In recent years parts of the public space discourse have begun to reflect a nuanced understanding of newly created public spaces that goes beyond the public-private dichotomy (Madanipour 2003; Low and Smith 2005). This is not to deny that individuals’ rights to such public spaces and indeed all streets and squares are not constrained, necessarily so, under certain logics of control and exclusion (Tonkiss 2005: 68).

Some sharp insights into the complexities of public space are offered by Tonkiss (2005: 66-68) who explores the root causes of some of the basic controversies encountered in the literature. Taking up Merrifield’s challenge to be explicit about what is meant by public space in the first place, Tonkiss argues that there are three types; 1) the square; representing collective belonging to a political community, ideally offering free access for all; 2) the café; drawing on Habermas’ idea of the public sphere, which though privately owned still involves a sense of being in public and facilitates social exchange providing for an architecture of sociability; and 3) the street; representing informal domestic scale encounter based ideally on identical rights to ordinary public space which may allow the resolution of social difference issues. Of course any such categorisation is open to the complaint of incompleteness. It would seem that under this schematic that there is no place for ‘the museum’: although it is argued by some that museums and galleries produced by the spatial practice of regeneration programmes are key sites of new public space and have been crucial for the reimagining and changing representations of cities such as Vienna (Frantz 2005), Bilbao (Cellabos 2003), London’s Bankside area (Teedon 2001).

In contrast to the views of Tonkiss it is claimed controversially that, “ordinary streets and squares have rarely been viewed as public spaces” which has tended to imply only
green open spaces and iconic civic spaces (Magalhães and Carmona 2006: 294). However, the surface appearance of this statement is deceptive. Apparently their research was based on interviews with local authority public space managers, who revealed that streets and squares have rarely been viewed as public spaces in the context of their general environmental management responsibilities, “where they have been conspicuously absent from policy debates and initiatives” (Claudio Magalhães 2007 email) - another contentious claim. Magalhães and Carmona are justified in their focus on management and maintenance since mismanagement can result in the degradation of public space. A rather less idiosyncratic view sees public space as places where people gather to talk to argue to trade to rest; in squares streets parks foyers and public buildings, in encounters planned and unplanned (Mayor of London 2002: 3).

Alongside the pessimistic discourse there is a more muted but nonetheless significant optimistic one highlighting positive aspects of public space. Attention is often focused on the creation through urban regeneration schemes of public space with a variety of affirmative qualities (Carr et al 1992; Goss 1996; Bailey et al 2004). A number of authors are asking who these new public spaces are for, how processes of access and control operate and with what consequences, for example, in Glasgow (McInroy 2000) and Vancouver (Lees 1998). Several of the authors in the collection edited by Lees (2004) wish to reveal positively the ambiguities, complexities and contestations of new public spaces in preference to ploughing the public-space-good, privatised-space-bad furrow. In contrast to the pessimism that characterises much of the US writing on public space, apart from the upbeat controversial claims of the new urbanism movement, significant improvements in the pedestrian experience of city centre space have been achieved in many European cities (Gehl and Gemzøe 2004). There are signs in the UK that complex spatial patterns are emerging as a result of urban regeneration programmes which can have positive impacts on the ‘publicness’ of new public space, for example in Newcastle (Akkar 2005). Taking a different tack Watson (2006: 2) argues that, despite severe challenges, the story of urban public space in recent decades is not all doom and gloom, especially if one seeks out spaces which are not “overplanned”. She finds the survival of heterogeneity and tolerance, considered lost by the academic pessimists, in a number of established but neglected city spaces,
especially street markets (Watson 2009). Similarly, city space in recent years is seen as an arena for the contested appropriation, by ordinary individuals and groups, of what is called insurgent public space (Hou 2010): which shares some qualities with Lefebvre’s differential space (discussed in chapters 3 and 8).

Rather than city space being understood as either purely public or private, I suggest it is better conceptualised socially as a bundle of rights and responsibilities of publicness and privateness. Rights to free entry and unmediated performance including political democratic expression are usually associated with public space. Rights to limit access and circumscribed performance, for example to achieve privacy and peace and quiet, are usually associated with private space. There are clearly degrees of privateness and publicness. These rights and responsibilities can be enjoyed or circumscribed whether or not land and property is in public or private ownership (Madanipour 2003). Habermas’ public sphere of the coffee shop and the ‘free’ press were privately owned spaces with degrees of publicness and relatively free speech and degrees of privateness that restricted rights of entry across gender and social status. In contradistinction, the archetypal public space of the public park is subject to all kinds of (petty) restrictions and access is often denied (Wyborn 1995).

**City Government, Governance and New Public Space**

Governing the city, especially controlling and maintaining its public spaces have been long standing preoccupations of the state, municipalities and private land owners. In the post-WW2 period cities suffering deindustrialisation, loss of population, increasing amounts of derelict land and perceived social disintegration turned to modes of management and control other than civic/municipal in the context of the breakdown of the post-WW2 social democratic consensus and rise of a neoliberal political economy (MacCleod and Ward 2002; MacCleod et al 2003; Raco 2005; Harvey 2007). Paradoxically, as sites of industrial manufacturing were disappearing through abandonment, demolition and (limited) redevelopment in the 1960s and 70s, by the mid-1980s an industrial heritage valorisation movement resulted in the preservation of some industrial sites for their historic interest and the memorialisation of sanitised working class industrial life (Hewison 1987, revisited in Hewison 2009). What counts as heritage says a great deal about the power of key groups to appropriate spatial
historical meaning in a contemporary context (Lowenthal 1998; Graham 2002). Empirical case studies have emphasised the political and ideological nature of heritage projects especially where historical artefacts are decontextualised when exhibited in new public spaces (Johnson 1999). What the heritage industry could not do was stop the growth of abandoned and under used industrial property post-WW2; sites which were later reimagined and taken over in the creation of postindustrial city spaces. Some city spaces in favourable city centre locations were appropriated for conversion by middle class artists and residents in processes of gentrification (Glass 1964; Zukin 1982). It should be noted that while Glass analysed the middle class appropriation of working class residential areas, Zukin examined middle class appropriation of historic former industrial buildings and areas. Other city centre and waterfront spaces were redeveloped by the service sector for corporate office and leisure uses (Harvey 1989a; Zukin 1991; Marshall 2001; Berman 2006).

The physical regeneration of cities suffering industrial decline has in recent decades been associated with attempts to change city images through place marketing and property-led regeneration in order to create the spaces and conditions thought necessary for the attraction of private sector businesses and investment (Healey et al 1992; Crilley 1993; Philo and Kearns 1993; Smyth 1993). Baltimore’s Harbourplace development dating from the 1960s was seen later by many city authorities and academics as the iconic model of how to achieve urban regeneration (Hula 1990); others were critical of the Baltimore model (Loftman and Nevin 1996; Harvey 2000). The Baltimore model included coalition or partnership working, first within the business communities, and later between them and the city’s public administration: the forerunner of the entrepreneurial forms of city governance.

These post-WW2 changes in the physical and institutional landscape have been theorised in what became known as the entrepreneurial city discourse, usually attributed to Harvey (1989b). He argues that urban governance had by the 1980s become ‘entrepreneurial’ - preoccupied increasingly with the exploration of new ways of fostering and encouraging property development, business investment and urban tourism as stimulants for growth and wealth creation. This entrepreneurial mode contrasted with earlier forms of ‘managerialism’ which focused on the direct municipal
provision of services and social benefits to local populations. Public-private partnerships are the key entrepreneurial institutional vehicle (Bailey et al 1995). Harvey offers little empirical evidence for his ideas but draws on the work of Martin Boddy to argue that entrepreneurial practice was an extension of UK local authority economic development activities dating from the 1970s. Harvey’s examples tend to be drawn from USA cities where the idea of the City as Growth Machine presented in the seminal 1976 article by Harvey Molotch was another predecessor to the notion of the entrepreneurial city. The importance of the entrepreneurial city idea for the present thesis is that once city space is represented as sites of private sector investment and urban attractions, the need to entice private sector investors and cash rich visitors through commodified cityscapes becomes paramount (Zukin 1995).

According to Harvey and many who followed, the shift from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism remains a persistent feature of city redevelopment. Widespread 'structural' unemployment and public sector fiscal austerity coupled with a rising tide of neoliberalism provide a backdrop for understanding the emergence and continuance of entrepreneurial governance in the UK and overseas (Raco 2005). British municipal socialism is claimed to have been transformed into urban entrepreneurialism: social welfare into support for new business investment, wealth creation and the imposition of safe controlled public space (Atkinson 2003). When subsidising speculative urban projects, often cultural projects which create new public space; local government takes on much of the risk normally associated with the private sector (Wilks-Heeg and North 2004). Many writers have taken up the entrepreneurial city theme, especially in the context of urban regeneration, city marketing and public space (e.g. Hubbard 1996; Hall and Hubbard 1998; MacLeod et al 2003; Cronin and Hetherington 2008). Harvey points to the iniquitous repercussions of publicly subsidised private sector redevelopment for the (re)creation of a favourable place image (1989b: 8) in such postindustrial UK cities as Manchester, Glasgow, Liverpool and Sheffield.

City centre, edge of city centre and waterfront spaces have been identified as key sites for struggles between large capital rich corporations, amenity societies, small businesses and local residents. Jacobs (1996) explores how these contestations played out with different interests devalorising and revalorising material city space, city
histories and place memories in East London. In her analysis, heritage amenity societies tended to be co-opted as a means of purifying the city in favour of an environment that supports an entrepreneurial image for the city. Further afield academic work identifies entrepreneurialism operating in the production of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao (Cellabos 2003) and in Hong Kong (Jessop and Sum 2000) in processes which reconfigure radically public space and city images. Public space therefore plays a key role as a symbolic marker of institutional environments favourable for business investment and partnerships as Harvey noted in 1989. New public space is often viewed negatively (Harvey 2000; Atkinson 2003) as local authorities vie with it other to attract private sector investment and middle class residents through the production of homogenised, aestheticised, sanitised, safe and ordered public space, especially in Manchester (Degen 2008). At its most extreme this results in the purification of public space through the rejection of difference and the securing of boundaries to maintain homogeneity as argued presciently by Sibley (1988). Clearly, the state plays conflicting roles in these dramas (Boyer 1983; Brownhill 1992; Imrie and Thomas 1993; Jones 1998) through its need to provide welfare services for ordinary people and the manner in which, under entrepreneurial regimes it is implicated in subsidising private sector economic interests (Harvey 1989b; Colenutt 1991; Harding 1991; Jessop 1997). Lefebvre (1991: 375) makes the same point arguing from a Marxist perspective that although the state seems to act in the interests of all users of space, its interventions tend to favour capital, especially property developers. Manchester’s conversion to an entrepreneurial city is seen as retaining elements of managerialism (Leary 2008b) but clearly plays an important role in the recent regeneration dominant narrative.

Manchester and Castlefield:
The Dominant Academic Regeneration Narrative

By 1998 most of Manchester’s industry had disappeared but some previously dominant representations of space refuse to wither:


The previous section disrupted the narrative of public space loss and suggested it is beneficial to move away from the dualism of public/private space. It explored the
importance of emerging new public spaces as one outcome of the spatial practice of urban regeneration under the conditions of an entrepreneurial mode of city governance. In England from the 1980s, governments unleashed a welter of successive urban policy initiatives in response to perceived urban problems including the creation of the inner city land and property focused urban development corporations (UDCs) - tasked with redeveloping industrial sites of the de-centred city for employment and residential use (Robson et al 1994). By the time the National Lottery and Millennium Commission were funding projects too in the mid-1990s, no town in Britain was untouched by urban regeneration projects large and small (McCarthy 2007; Tallon 2010). Precisely what regeneration is and who should be the target of urban policy intervention is of course contested (Cohcrane 2007: 6-15).

Manchester is often heralded as an iconic regenerated city in what I call the dominant academic regeneration narrative: a set of predominantly statistical and written (rather than visual) analyses and representations (Williams 2003; Kidd 2006). Young et al (2006) concentrate on young professionals’ recent creation in the city centre of ‘cosmopolitanism’. Hetherington (2007) explores the impact of Urbis ‘Museum of the City’, opened in 2002, on the Manchester’s regeneration. The mainstream press too champions Manchester’s evident renaissance, especially for the creation of multifarious cultural attractions and upmarket repopulation of the city centre (Chrisafis 2001; Mills 2003; King 2006; Menzies 2006; Hunt 2007; Bayley 2009). According to Brookes (2004) “few places in the world have reinvented themselves so successfully” as Manchester. Ambivalence was evident though even in the late 1990s when press opinion still held that, “It’s still grim up north” (Morgan 1999). In the 2000s the Prime Minister was happy to associate with the regeneration trope:

When Tony Blair stood on the podium for his final party conference speech in Manchester, last week, he praised the host city as a beacon of New Labour’s success. “And what about Manchester?” he said. “A city transformed. A city that shows what a confident, open and proud people with a great Labour council can do”… The urban regeneration did not begin with the Labour’s election victory in 1997, but started in the late 1980s. (Harrison and Miller 2007)

City transformation as Tony Blair deemed it was a major preoccupation of ‘New’ Labour governments between 1997 and 2010 generating a steady stream of publications and policy documents (Urban Task Force 1999; ODPM 2000): grist for
the academic mill (Roberts and Sykes 2000; Imrie and Raco 2003; Atkinson and Helms 2007). Harrison and Miller’s article for The Sunday Telegraph reflects the dominant narrative of the city’s regeneration; that it started in the late 1980s/90s under the influence of the entrepreneurial city mode. I argue that Manchester’s dominant regeneration narrative is predicated on three key spatial moments: the entrepreneurial city turn (Quilley 2002), the 1996 IRA bomb (Williams 2003), and to a lesser extent the 2002 Commonwealth Games (Cochrane et al 1996; Carlsen and Taylor 2003). The materialist (non-Marxist) approach to the city resonates in recent analyses such as Urban Task Force (1999) and Hebbert (2009) which highlight Manchester’s problems of physical dereliction and the perceived successful responses to them from the 2000s. Manchester’s postindustrial regeneration has attracted a good deal of attention as did the Georgian and Victorian ones. Peck and Ward’s (2002) collection of papers focus on Manchester’s postindustrial transformation from the early 1990s. Williams (2003) takes his starting point from the explosion of the IRA bomb in 1996. One of the few comprehensive analyses of the impacts on city centre public space of the entrepreneurial mode of city governance is Massey (2007) which explores post-1996 city centre redevelopment focusing on the creation of a major new city square. King (2006) draws on his many years as a Manchester based journalist to describe the ‘rebirth’ of the city after the 1996 IRA city centre bomb. O’Connor and Wynne (1996) present a collection of papers dealing with the notion of Manchester’s transition to a postindustrial/postmodern city from the 1990s. The role of CMDC in the regeneration of Manchester is privileged in Deas et al (1999 and 2000). Drawing on Amin et al’s 2000 booklet Cities for the Many not the Few, that sees cities as plural spaces, Mace et al (2007) strike a cautionary note regarding the recent regeneration initiatives which they argue veer towards a pragmatism of city renaissance favouring the attraction of the middle classes, in what has become known generically as ‘East Manchester’.

An often repeated contention holds that the local political hiatus that followed the 1987 general election was a watershed for Manchester’s emergent entrepreneurial city strategy (Williams 2003: 63). It is claimed that Manchester underwent “dramatic change” as it switched from a mode of local government to that of local governance, adopting a form of “entrepreneurial politics” (Williams 2003: xiii, see also Quilley 2000; Cochrane 2000; Ward K 2003). Despite Quilley being cited frequently in
support of the dramatic and sudden conversion of MCC to an entrepreneurial mode, his most extended piece on the subject offers a more nuanced insight resulting from PhD research and stresses gradual and contested change (Quilley 1996). Interestingly the Labour dominated MCC is relaxed about presenting the city as entrepreneurial in the ‘Harvian’ sense (MCC 2004). I have found empirical evidence though to suggest that the entrepreneurial mode has not replaced the managerial (or municipal socialism) mode of local government in Manchester but runs alongside the rhetoric and practice of the entrepreneurial city (Leary 2008b).

Since the 1990s ‘cultural quarters’ have opened up in Manchester and many other British cities through the almost ubiquitous promotion of heritage, alternative lifestyles or a revalorised ethnic minority presence (Montgomery 2003; Bell and Jayne 2004; Keith 2005; Leary 2005). Although the racialisation or exoticisation of space engendered through the public sector manufacture of cultural quarters has been rightly problematised (Keith 2005); ‘organic’ cultural quarters have long been an accepted part of city socio-geographies and were seen as sources of vitality in the Chicago of the 1920s in Burgess’ 1925 paper The Growth of the City. Across Britain the phenomenon of cultural quarter creation is firmly entrenched in the spatial practice of urban regeneration (McCarthy 2005; Bailey et al 2004). Manchester has its share and since the 2000s the city council has promoted ten cultural quarters on its official website (Montgomery 2008). The most prominent is Castlefield which is highlighted for its industrial heritage identity (Schofield 2000; Leary 2003). Other Manchester cultural quarters have attracted the attention of academic researchers: the Northern Quarter (Wansborough and Mageean 2000); the Gay Village (Binnie and Skeggs 2004); the ‘Curry Mile’ (Barrett and McEvoy 2006) and Chinatown (Luk 2008). The question of the right to the city (Lefebvre 1996) was an important preoccupation of Lefebvre as was his insistence on “the right to be different” of ethnic and other social groups (Lefebvre 1991: 64). Cultural quarters can be sites of acceptance of difference or constrained enclaves (Fincher and Iveson 2008). Several writers have sought to foreground the dangers in the marketing of quarters of ethnic difference which can exhibit essentialising tendencies and the hazard of trivialising and commodification of difference, through claims of questionable authenticity (Keith 2005; Chan 2007). This
dominant narrative version of the city’s regeneration history has elided other possible spatial moments, particularly in the 1970s not just in Manchester but in Castlefield too.

**Castlefield in the Dominant Narrative**

Castlefield in the dominant regeneration narrative appears in the 1970s and 1980s as a place of dereliction and stagnation (Tiesdell et al 1996; Kitchen 1997; Williams 2003). By the 2000s the area had been “dramatically transformed” into one of “the most attractive and visited parts of the city” (MCC 2004: 54) (figure 2.1). Dave Haslam, DJ turned writer, comments that as export markets vanished through the 20th century, manufacturing industry faded and by the early 1980s Castlefield was dead (Haslam 1999: 249-50). Madgin (2009; 2010) paints the same picture of a decrepit wasteland. Degen’s Castlefield research (2001) includes a comparative analysis of the El Raval area of Barcelona. She claims that in the 50 years before the 1990s the Castlefield area changed from a lively working class industrial neighbourhood to “an abandoned place devoid of most of its population, a forgotten wasteland, filled with scrap-yards and derelict canals” (Degen 2008: 119, 145). This style of representation is reminiscent of Taylor’s 1950s opinions. A quotation from the *Manchester Evening News* (*MEN*) is used by Degen to emphasise the point that Castlefield is:

… a decaying little known backwater on the fringe of Manchester’s city centre… Like a doormat trodden on by the passage of time, it lies now in Manchester’s forgotten no man’s land - a city’s classic backyard… where the sun never shines beneath the stairway to the city’s history.

(in Degen 2008: 79-80)

However, this quotation is from an *MEN* article entitled “Treasures in city’s backyard” which drew attention to the Roman archaeological value of Castlefield (Duffy 1979a BLNA). He focused for the opening few sentences only on wasteland Castlefield, the rest of the article concentrated on the “priceless historical connection” of the area. Degen (2003) draws on interviews with MCC and CMDC planners to support the ‘empty dereliction’ representations of Castlefield space. Interviewees represented the space as an “impenetrable area” dominated by scrap-yards and concrete plants “with Alsatian dogs prowling and barbed wire” (in Degen 2003: 871). Degen takes on these representations uncritically, stating that by the 1980s the area was gradually “transformed into a no-go area” (Ibid: 867). For Degen this situation pertained until the regeneration of Castlefield “commenced in the early 1990s” (Ibid: 867).
Figure 2.1 Castlefield montage: urban activity-scapes
In her research although she does provide many important insights into the production of Castlefield after the CMDC intervention, her characterisation of the area before this time contributes to the wasteland trope of the dominant narrative and the idea that the production of Castlefield space was somehow suspended until the 1990s.

Madgin (2008) is a comparative study of Castlefield and sites in Leicester and Roubaix, France. She also quotes selectively from Duffy (1979a) that Castlefield in the 1970s was, “pitted by crofts, crumbling buildings, silted waterways” (in Madgin 2008: 37-38). Apparently, in the 1970s and 80s “only people working in the noxious industries and vagabonds entered the area”. Castlefield was “devoid of life, meaning and people”. Derelict deindustrial spaces, “became little more than devalued dens of despair that demonstrated the decline of the city” (Ibid: 14). Madgin claims Castlefield in the 1970s was described in Duffy (1979b BLNA) as “a den of thieves and vice”. In fact in the article local historian Chris Makepeace applied this description to 18th century Castlefield! Bagnall contributes further to the dominant narrative with the assertion that the depression of the 1930s triggered the decline of Castlefield until the whole area became derelict (1998: 114).

Other literature engages solely with vituperative representations of Castlefield space in the 1970s, for example the view of Castlefield from the train window on the journey between Trafford Bar and Deansgate railway stations presented a “moribund urban wasteland” (Schofield 1997: 88). Dave Haslam (2004: 90) recalls with aplomb that Castlefield in the 1980s would have made a superb “gritty film set” with its “rusty bridges and canals the colour of lead” making it the “best example of urban dereliction you could find anywhere in the world”. According to the MCC (2004 and 2009) Castlefield has been transformed from a derelict area into one of the country’s most celebrated regeneration success stories. MCC reflects the dominant narrative with the claim that by the 1970s “buildings had become dilapidated, piles of scrap metal and cars littered the land and the canal arms had become clogged and dirty” (MCC 2004: 54-55). Journalistic websites have also taken up the ‘wasteland’ Castlefield trope, for example it is claimed that in the 1980s Castlefield was “a derelict and abandoned no-
The process of reimagining and regeneration is said to have been led by the private sector in entrepreneurial city partnership with MCC (Quilley 2002; Williams 2003; MCC 2004). The result for the advocates of the traditional discourse is a successful regenerated city, a city reborn materially and in the popular and private sector investor imaginations. In the dominant Castlefield regeneration narrative key enterprising private sector individuals, development companies, MCC and CMDC had the foresight and enterprise to reimagine the city and lead its regeneration (MCC 2004). Gibson and Hardman (1998: 43) assert that the initial impetus to regenerate Castlefield came from MCC. Jim Ramsbottom, a Salford born millionaire bookmaker and founder in 1981 of a property development company called Castlefield Estates Ltd is often seen as the pioneer of Castlefield’s regeneration (Parkinson-Bailey 2000: 289; Haslam 1999: 250). According to Hebbert (2009: 58) Ramsbottom “set the pace” when he bought up scrapyards and industrial slums “and revealed the eighteenth century canal basin”. Jim Ramsbottom’s view was that Castlefield in 1988 was “a dump” and he is not bashful about his role in the revival of the area, claiming with energetic verve that he had a plan to bring the historic buildings back into use while, “resisting any quick fix solution”. He applauded the arrival of the CMDC who “rolled into town on a white charger, with saddlebags full of money” (in MCC 2004: 27).

Alternatively Tom Bloxham (a member of Richard Rogers’ Urban Task Force) is seen as the private sector inspiration for the regeneration of Castlefield. Bloxham founded the company Urban Splash (based in Castlefield) in 1993 which was responsible for

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10 See for example www.VirtualTourist.com “Castlefield is Manchester's regenerated canalside district.” www.worldwidepanorama.org “Forest of Bridges in Castlefield. Castlefield is Manchester's regenerated canalside district. Not so long ago, it was a derelict and abandoned no-go area.” www.bcgl.co.uk “Browns Construction Group Ltd, Castlefield Hotel, Castlefield is Manchester's regenerated canalside district.” www.worldtravelguide.net “Manchester Top Attractions Heading south to the edge of the city, Castlefield is Manchester's regenerated canalside district.” (all accessed in 2010)
the award winning conversion of several mills, warehouses and new-build apartment blocks at the Pomona Dock western extremity of Castlefield in the late 1990s.

Bloxham promotes actively a version of Castlefield’s transformation that begins with the arrival of Urban Splash (Bloxham 2001). His characterisation of recent Castlefield history forms a recurring theme in the dominant narrative (Fairs 2004; Davidson 2007; Boddy and Parkinson 2004) and is reproduced in the most august arenas (Bloxham 2000). The Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), the quango which advises the government on the ‘creation of place’, claims Castlefield was “a derelict industrial area”, before it was transformed by the CMDC, MCC, English Heritage, Castlefield Estates and Urban Splash (CABE 2008).

The dominant narrative encountered across a range of recent academic, journalistic and local government sources assumes a materialist perspective and presents Castlefield regeneration accounts which start in the late 1980s/90s after a period of long term post-WW2 decline (Loftman and Nevin 1996, Williams 2003; King 2006).

While a significant range of material and socio-economic interventions took place from the 1990s (figure 2.1); at times the tip of a 1970s/80s counter-narrative with different protagonists peeps through. Parkinson-Bailey (2000) and Madgin (2008) acknowledge that the GMC and amenity societies had a role from the 1980s. Degen (2008) too provides interesting seeds for different spatial histories with the mention of the MOSI but does not pursue the history of its production. Bagnall (1998; 2003) evaluates the MOSI and Wigan Pier as sites of heritage consumption. Away from academia, Luhrs (1980) diverges most from the dominant narrative providing a brief (insider’s) view of the contribution of several amenity societies to Castlefield’s production 1975-80. Canal restoration led by the Inland Waterways Association and a Trust established by GMC and the metropolitan districts was significant in the 1970s in Manchester including in Castlefield (Fletcher 1989). Heaton (1995: 56-63) affords positive glimpses of Castlefield from the 1930s told mainly through oral history accounts. Jack Abram and others recall nostalgically the close knit community life of the Byrom Street area. Elderly Castlefield residents recall how the area in the 1920s and 30s furnished a variety of children’s playscapes:

- George Green: fishing, swimming near Nemesis Boathouse
- Doris Brack: canal and river swimming, frozen slides in St John’s churchyard, bicycling on smooth St John Street, popping pitch bubbles
- Jack Green: rat hunting with dogs, playing with pigs’ bladders
- Kathleen Ward: games in the timber yards
- Gerry Ennis: running on bridge girders

Therefore 19th century Castlefield was a more complex space than simply one of capitalist production, accumulation and proletarian exploitation. Castlefield is elided though by Heaton’s use of the name Deansgate. Of particular note is the front cover of this booklet. Published by a small independent publisher, the cover features the only image encountered during the course of the research of a Black person in Castlefield (figure 2.2): the schoolboy Bertie Armitage.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Figure 2.2 Schoolboy Bertie Armitage looking perfectly at ease with friends outside the Glasgow Arms, Lower Byrom Street (1930) (in Heaton 1995)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{11} However, the MOSI appears to be opening up the possibility of engagement with the spaces of representation of Manchester residents of African, Afro-Caribbean and Asian descent. A 2008 exhibition told the stories of industrial Manchester’s links with the colonies of the British Empire. However, the links with enslavement were not featured because the exhibition’s curators considered they did not have the necessary artefacts (Jan Hargreaves 2009 email).
Conclusions
This chapter locates the thesis theoretically within the landscape of relevant academic literatures, moving logically from ideas about city ontology and public space debates to the particularities of Castlefield in its Manchester context. I show that while city ontologising often tends to essentialise one key facet of the city, more fruitful approaches encompass a range of key interrelated features in adopting a critical, practical and theoretical engagement with urban analysis. The similarities of this approach and Lefebvre’s spatial triad in unravelling the production of urban space will not have gone unnoticed. In thinking through ways of interrogating the urban, the recognition of the importance of the material, imagined, represented and institutional elements of the city have been demonstrated to be paramount. In particular following Lefebvre (and latterly Pile 2005) cities are seen to be material, represented and imagined: and all these conceptualisations are real and salutary for unravelling the production of space.

Public space rather than being a neutral container, a single-element homogenised phenomenon, is shown to be constituted by the material city, its representations and the socio/economic relations which bring it about. Without social interaction public space cannot be brought into being. In considering the public space debates since the 1990s it is clear that its death was overestimated. Public space has undoubtedly been lost and corrupted in the UK and elsewhere but the literature gives too little weight to the survival and creation of viable new public spaces with inherent affirmative qualities. Above all pubic space is a key focal point for urban analysis because of its key role in constructing and nurturing democracy at the national and local scales. The right to occupy public space bodily, to see and be seen, especially in collective political action, marks public space as the city synecdoche par excellence.

A dominant regeneration narrative is identified in this chapter which I argue seeks to demonstrate that Manchester and in particular Castlefield’s putative regeneration was bound up with an entrepreneurial approach in the 1990s and 2000s. The dominant narrative elides the 1970s production of Castlefield space, vaulting from post-WW2 decline to its postindustrial reimagining in the 1990s. However, the Castlefield that was re-envisioned in the 1990s, through the heritage and leisure space cultural quarter
lens differed fundamentally from the actual working industrial area that was erased. If Castlefield was reinvented and re-visualised as a heritage cultural quarter then questions remain about how the new space was produced, especially the urban public space. The dominant Castlefield narrative dismisses the 1970s as an uninteresting era in which depression and dereliction reigned in an urban wasteland. Despite this, the dominant narrative is striated with the seeds of something interesting and contradictory: the formative role of the 1970s in the production of postindustrial Castlefield. The empirical chapters which follow investigate the potential for recovering Castlefield’s 1970s prehistory, its antecedents and consequences, from the gloss of the dominant narrative. Before that, the next chapter provides the theoretical underpinning for those empirical investigations.
[to reveal the production of space] We should have to study not only the history of space, but also the history of representations along with that of their relationships - with each other, with practice, and with ideology. History would have to take in not only the genesis of these spaces but also, and especially, their interconnections, distortions, displacements, mutual interconnections, and their links with the spatial practice of the particular society… 
(Lefebvre 1991: 42)

Rather than being governed by logic and method, modernity's drive for order conceals its messy, contingent, unplanned and irrational character. If we wish to rethink the way we produce knowledge and the forms of knowledge we value, we need to recognise, even celebrate, its unplanned and messy nature. 
(Turnbull 2000: 1)

We’re building something here, Detective. We’re building it from scratch. All the pieces matter. (Detective Lester Freamon The Wire Series One)

**Introduction**

Academic research is sometimes written up as a neat seamless, apparently effortless, logical exercise moving from the generalities of overarching theory and research aims to the specifics of methods, data and analysis. That was not my experience. Although there was a bit of this order and logic; the process was constituted also by messiness, dead ends, lateral thinking, hope, serendipity and the need for dogged determination. Before Turnbull, Hammond (1964a: 2) had noted that research has an irrational side to it. Occasionally, in amongst all the seemingly unrelated bits of found data and in the search for stubbornly ‘unfindable’ empirical research objects I felt more like a detective than a researcher. Maybe the two are not that dissimilar. The thesis is underpinned predominantly by archival research supplemented substantially by interview and visual data. This chapter explains how the key methodological choices were made and provides their theoretical and practical rationales. Two other sources should be mentioned: the internet and emails (Markham 2004) which provided crucial access to sources and interview subjects. In essence a case study approach (Yin 2008) was deployed allowing a critical engagement with the rich variety of sources and perspectives which have contributed to production of Castlefield. Thinking about how
to research the city; touching on ideas about what constitutes credible evidence, whose knowledge counts, how to present findings and the role of the researcher is not new. How empirical social research is shaped by ontological and epistemological assumptions and research objectives and interim data has been the continuing focus of theoretical attention (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Social researchers are required increasingly to be explicit about and justify their research strategy and methods (Seale 2004; Bryman 2008; Hammersley 2008).

Since this research is exploratory; rather than defining a rigid research design at the start the approach and methods evolved through a process akin to grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Bryant and Charmaz 2010). That said, the research process was framed within two theoretical parameters which shaped the production of knowledge. Firstly, the spatial triad of Henri Lefebvre and secondly an approach to ontological, epistemological and methodological issues shaped by the precepts of constructionism and interpretism (Bryman 2008: 18-19). Case study researchers are usually advised to choose cases rigorously based on objective selection criteria but as Healey (2007: 291) argues, the selection is often more about pragmatism than following strict criteria. The thesis grew out of research begun in 2002 as outlined in the introduction above and a long standing interest in the history of Manchester, so it is fair to say that it chose me rather than the other way around. It became apparent as the research progressed that the history of Castlefield’s regeneration is not just about historic buildings, heritage or local authority planners - important though these are - it is replete with the elements of Lefebvre’s spatial triad, their interactions and distortions. The case study approach used here employs qualitative data, with “qualitative interpretative” analysis used to uncover latent textual meaning (Tonkiss 2004: 372).

In looking at the material traces of five year’s worth of research amassed while redrafting this chapter: masses of hand written and typed notes, piles of archival documents, journal articles, books, policy documents, images, emails and unfinished draft chapters; I was struck by the essential messiness of real research. However, while Western modernity’s drive for order conceals its messiness, the apparent messiness of research conceals if not complete order then at least a lack of the arbitrary and the
random. While the temporal focus of the thesis is the 1970s there was a necessity to extend the analysis back to the 1940s in order to develop a critical understanding of the factors which shaped the production of Castlefield in the 1970s (chapter 4). Similarly, crucial transitions of 1970s representations of Castlefield space were thought to shape the interventions of CMDC in the 1990s with implications for the production of differential space (chapter 8). The overarching aim of the thesis prompted three principal research questions. What would a Castlefield production of space history look like and be constituted by? Seen through a Lefebvrian lens, how is Castlefield constituted? How can the research questions be explored using a Lefebvrian approach? The first question goes to epistemological issues regarding what can be understood as useful and credible knowledge for exploring the production of Castlefield space. The second relates to ontological issues which go beyond seeing Castlefield solely as material space, or imagined space or represented space but rather asking how it is constituted by and through particular and contingent elements of the spatial triad. The third relates to methodological issues. There are no straightforward, agreed methods for researching the production of space. Certainly, Lefebvre (1991) does not provide an explicit research toolkit. However, he does leave several significant ontological, epistemology and practical clues that point the empirical researcher in certain directions (Borden 1998).

**Research Strategy**

A research strategy evolved, rather than being imposed at the outset. The strategy has three key elements: 1) an iterative process in which my thinking moved between theory, empirical data and academic literature; 2) the use of different kinds of empirical research data; 3) the building of archival networks of different kinds. Documents and images were analysed qualitatively (Scott 2006; Rose 2007, respectively). Just as there are no agreed methods for researching the production of space, there is no ready-made Castlefield archive waiting to be mined for data. Piecing together Castlefield’s archival sources (see appendix 1); creating an archival network was a crucial element of the research strategy (Prior 2008). Rather than simply several physical depositories the archival network is conceptualised as a something more diffuse which includes: files, documents, images, the archivists, interviewees’
transcripts (where historical events are narrated) and of course researcher archival interrogations and interpretations.

Having established the notion of a 1970s prehistory of Castlefield’s urban regeneration as one of the key element of the thesis, careful consideration of potential methods of carrying out the research took place. Since the amenity societies and key actors were unknown at the outset, it appeared that the only viable means of pursuing the empirical research was through archival methods. The application of archival data to explore the production of space involves important considerations relating to archives themselves (archival realities) and the documents (documentary realities) they contain. Decisively, most 1970s official archival materials pass the 30 year rule for public accessibility, although the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000 now makes it possible to ask for the release of many government records. I accessed several archives through FOIA requests, for example from the DCLG and English Heritage (appendix 1). Originally it was intended that the research be based solely on archival sources. However, the 1970s is a historically ambivalent era; too young to be history, too old to be contemporary. It is therefore an era located partly in the archives and partly in living memory. Once the archives revealed the identities of some of the key actors involved in the production of Castlefield, the intriguing prospect of research interviews emerged should there be a need. The need for interviews surfaced in the different ways: where the archival materials threw up intriguing questions that just hung stubbornly in the air, where historical documents could not be tracked down and where a different voice would enrich the data and aid epistemological judgements about the status of some of the data. Although some of the actors in the files had passed away, a few were still in robust health.

A purposive sampling approach was used in selecting the archives and interviewees (Bryman 2004: 333-334). Here the researcher endeavours to achieve good correspondence between research questions and sampling, thereby sampling on the basis of judgements made about the potential relevance of the archives and interviewees for the research questions. The archival research was carried out between 2007 and 2010. From March 2007 a total of 18 archives were accessed all of which are physical depositories (appendix 1):
- 8 are not open to the public
- 12 were visited
- 6 were accessed remotely
- 2 are collections in private homes and are included in the list of archives for the sake of simplicity and comprehensiveness.
- the archives of the CMDC are included in appendix 1 since it is important to document their existence before destruction.

The archival data amassed were mostly in official institutional files and consist of a variety of types: official memoranda, official and unofficial minutes, formal and informal letters, public and private sector reports, briefing notes, handwritten notes, policy documents, drawings, photographs, maps, architectural plans, leaflets, pamphlets, newspaper cuttings, flyers and other publicity materials. Some of these documents were marked ‘confidential’. Hard to find books were also located in archives. Hundreds of files were accessed and thousands of pages of text filtered for their relevance. All relevant archival documents and images were photographed digitally. Several thousand jpeg files were created to form the most substantial element of the empirical dataset. Archival data sources are itemised following the list of references. A small sample of the data is included in the chapters that follow where the images/text assist with the analysis or to provide a feel for the data.

A total of 14 in-depth, semi-structured interviews took place, of which 10 were face-to-face and 4 were by telephone (appendix 2). All interviews were recorded apart from three. All recorded interviews were transcribed by the author. Interviewees were given the opportunity to correct any errors of transcription and provide additional clarification which did not result in any significant challenges to the accuracy of the transcripts. Before each interview a list of issues was normally sent to the interviewee: afterwards email exchanges sometimes ensued. Castlefield was visited many times during the course of the research from 2004 and many photographs taken but no claims are made that a comprehensive or systematic visual survey was undertaken. My own photographs are included for a variety of purposes (see below).

Mixed methods research has matured into a recognised approach (Brannen 1992; Bryman 2007; Bergman 2008; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2008). However, there is no
definitive agreement about what it is since different things can be mixed; data, methods, analyses and theoretical approaches. Controversially, Hammersley (1992) argues that most social research mixes methods and the differences and animosities resulting from the quantitative and qualitative research divide dissolve under close inspection. My approach mixes types of data and methods of data collection and construction but employs only qualitative analysis thereby avoiding the most damning epistemological and ontological criticisms (Bryman 2007). Denzin (1970) is often deferred to as providing formal legitimacy for mixed methods research across the qualitative-quantitative divide. However, he is adamant that he is advocating mixed methods and triangulation from the perspective of symbolic interactionism (1970: ix). Methodological triangulation was developed by quantitative social researchers to check the validity of statistical inferences (Denzin 1970; Hammersley 2008: 33) and has been taken up explicitly in qualitative research mainly for purposes of facilitation or complementarity (Ibid). This approach, relying as it does on micro-level sociological analysis and a close engagement with social interactions and meanings, complements Lefebvre’s production of space ideas. The mixed approach used is justified theoretically: by the multi-faceted ontological status of Castlefield space as revealed by the spatial triad; methodologically by facilitating the creation of a more rounded and comprehensive account of the production of space and practically by the requirement to think creatively about how to access certain hard to find data in revealing the production of space.

What epistemological status can and should be bestowed on the different kinds of data on which the thesis rests? Archival, interview and visual data and qualitative analyses can raise potentially tricky issues (Hammersley 2008) and although there is a need for a certain amount of reflexive deconstruction of the texts and images this process must of necessity be limited because of a double danger. Firstly, overblown reflexive deconstructionism will lead to paralysis and the inability of the researcher to make meaningful claims arising from their research. Secondly, obsessive reflexive constructionism can lead to an infinite regress through refusal to accept basic facts for what they are. Bourdieu is alive to these dangers arguing that social research needs to take onboard elements of constructionism and deconstructionism but that the endeavour ultimately “presupposes standards of truth and rational language rooted in
the social structure of the intellectual universe” (Wacquant 1992: 48 paraphrasing Bourdieu).

With this in mind the epistemological approach trod a path between, on the one hand a scepticism born of the necessity to deconstruct the data and on the other a pragmatic willingness to accept the validity and reliability of the data derived as they are from a carefully considered and explicit methodological approach. One straightforward consequence of this was that all archival documents and all images are accepted as authentic representations (Scott 1990) in the sense that I found no evidence to suggest they are deliberate distortions or forgeries. Similar considerations apply to the interview data. At times my scepticism led to attempts at corroboration, for example regarding some of the documents and interview data, the results of which can be gauged below. Where deconstruction led from analysis to my own conclusions will be evident as the research narrative unfolds in the following chapters. Hammersley (1996) is helpful in thinking through the epistemological status of qualitative social science research data and argues that there are three epistemological underpinnings to mixed methods research:

- 1. triangulation; ‘
  o Type 1’ refers to the use of qualitative research to corroborate quantitative research findings or vice versa;
  o ‘Type 2’ refers to using different kinds of data for corroboration purposes
- 2. facilitation; refers to the use of one kind of data to point to additional data or a new research method
- 3. complementarity; this refers to the use of two or more kinds of data or methods to bring additional perspectives and richness to the research subject

(based on Bryman 2008: 607).

In the thesis the mixed methods approach serves three purposes: Type 2 triangulation, facilitation and complementarity. With these ideas in mind the epistemological weight and credibility of the research data encountered was not fixed but could vary as the research progressed. A datum was not afforded greater or lesser epistemological weight a priori simply because it was for example, an official archival document,
interview transcript or photograph (Scott 1990; Samuel 1994; Ritchie 2003; Rose 2007). The danger of assuming official documents must be ‘true’ came early in the research when a statement in an MCC document, regarding the sale one of Castlefield’s most important historic buildings, was found to be incorrect, or more accurately, partially wrong. Conversely, some of the 30 year old memories of the interviewees were found to be remarkably accurate.

It should be stressed that research methods literatures although providing relatively copious guidance for the analysis of documents provides relatively little methodological guidance and certainly no agreement regarding archival research (May 2003). For example the otherwise comprehensive Denzin and Lincoln (2005) does not contain a single paper or index entry about either archival or documentary research. Hill (1993) is probably the most authoritative methodological guidance on the construction of archival research data (but see Gidley 2004; Craven 2008a). Hill (1993: 27) introduces the term “target” to describe the subject of archival research. How the Castlefield archival data were constructed by drawing on this concept is outlined below. The following three sections discuss in detail the issues raised briefly in this introduction.

Exploring How to Explore the Production of Space
Although favouring Marxist methods of historical materialism, Lefebvre recognises explicitly the difficulty of researching the production of space from a structural positivist perspective hinting that a constructionist approach is preferable:

… for the theory [of space] I am proposing to be confirmed as far as is possible, the distinctions drawn above [between the elements of the triad] would have to be generalized in their application to cover all societies, all periods, all ‘modes of production’. That is too tall an order for now… representations of space are shot through with a knowledge (saviour) - i.e. a mixture of understanding (connaissance) and ideology - which is always relative and in the process of change. (Lefebvre 1991: 41 emphasis in original)

In constructing the theories for the production of space Lefebvre drew on his empirical research comparing the French post-WW2 new town of Mourenx with the medieval town of Navarrenx, the site of his family home (Elden 2004: 140; Merrifield 2006: 60-64). Lefebvre said poetically of Navarrenx that, “In these stones I can read the centuries” (Lefebvre 1995: 116). Therefore the gradual process that is the production
of space points to the importance of an eclectic historical engagement with representations of space and spatial practice as shown above; the diverse nature of the spatial triad hints at the need for diverse data (Soja 1996: 67; Borden et al 2001: 7). Traditionally, a range of methods and data have been used in micro-urban research from the 19th century (Bridge and Watson 2010c). Historical analysis forms a key element of my research approach but the thesis is not based only on a document centred historical method. In disciplinary terms history has witnessed fruitful methodological debates in recent years (Brown 2005) and there have been calls for a more inclusive history which allows memory, unofficial knowledge and visual images to play their part alongside archival data and the voice of the professional historian (Samuel 1994). Similarly productive have been the discussions derived from an engagement with new theoretical insights have prompted “the study of new subjects and the exploration of different types of sources” with implications for archival research (Prescott 2008: 31).

It is evident from their citations that those researchers who seek to approach urban change through an understanding the production of space often do so through a reading of the first wave of theorists who engaged with Lefebvre’s ideas in the original French (Harvey 1973; Gottdiener 1985; Harvey 1989a; Soja 1989). While they had their own take on Lefebvre, first wave theorists tended not to use the production of space as a framework for empirical research. Later second wave urban researchers did use Lefebvre ideas as a springboard for empirical research notably Allen and Pryke (1994), Fyfe (1996), Borden (1998) and McCann (1999). Although there are differences in emphasis, commentators tend to agree that the triad relates to material, represented and lived space, that is, perceived, conceived and imagined space. It is easy to see though how confusion can arise since Lefebvre refers to at least 50 different kinds of space and favours at times a desultory literary style. None of the first wave theorists engage much, if at all with Lefebvre several claims for the importance of the differential space or the visual in the production of space, especially in representations of space. Coming from a slightly different direction Gregory employs a useful visual schematic of Lefebvre’s spatial concepts. Gregory calls it ‘The Eye of Power’ (figure 3.1). This diagram is useful because it stresses that the processes are non-hierarchical and cyclical. It also stresses the centres of power and ideologies ranged against concrete
space, the space of everyday life. Interestingly, neither natural space nor differential space appears in the schematic; an issue to which has great importance for the thesis in the chapters that follow.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.1 “The Eye of Power” (in, Gregory 1994: 401)**
A Schematic Representation of the Production of Space

While there is much in Lefebvre that is open to argument and interpretation, he is adamant that the elements of the triad must be considered as an interconnected whole rather than in isolation (1991: 37, 40). Relations between the three spatial moments of the triad are “never either simple or stable” (Ibid: 46). Spatial practice although it may be perceived through the senses is also conceived, described and analysed on different levels: in architecture, city planning and in the study of social relations. It is analysed in the actual design of routes and localities and in the organisation of everyday life “and naturally, in urban reality” (Ibid: 413). So while accepting that spatial practice consists of the material reality of the city; Lefebvre acknowledges that the acts of perceiving and conceiving space are not simply about positivistic quantification. Spatial practice relies on contingent ways of understanding the city. Representations of space are not solely rational quasi-scientific schemes; they are suffused with ideology and interpretation. Second wave Lefebvrian inspired researchers therefore, treat
representations of space as ideologically problematic (Fischler 1995; Degen 2008; Lehtovuori 2010). Although Lefebvre is clear that representations of space are the dominant spaces of any society his insistence on the dialectical nature of the triad points to inherent contradictions between the elements of the triad and within each element. Fyfe’s (1996) research is important because he works with the latter contradiction by introducing the possibility of conflicting official representations of space in the post-WW2 planning of Glasgow.

Lefebvre’s Empirical Research Clues

In ruminating on the research approach it was noticeable that the literature provides conflicting views on the usefulness of the spatial triad for empirical research. Unwin (2000) provides one of the strongest, if somewhat polemical critiques of Lefebvre (1991). Unwin is particularly scathing regarding the implications “for our empirical research practice”, finding little practical methodological merit in Lefebvre’s work (2000: 23). It is true that there is no step-by-step research cookbook in Lefebvre’s text. This is perhaps just as well given that it was first published in 1974 and any empirical research recipe for the production of space may well have sunk beneath an inundation of methodological critiques of, for example: postmodernism, ethnography and feminist research and the sheer innovative eclecticism of much actual urban research. In contrast to Unwin, Merrifield thinks that Lefebvre’s framework provides a flexible device which can illuminate the nature of space and its relations with a broader social whole (1993: 522). Soja too sees in Lefebvre the potential for a method based on “trialectics” that stresses the interweaving of the three spatial elements (1996: 10) and the history of representations (Ibid: 164-5). Kofman and Lebas (1996: 8-10) argue that being Lefebvrian “is more a sensibility, rather than a closed system” and that many have found his theoretical insights difficult to apply due to the fluidity and openness of his thought. They are able though to deduce a Lefebvrian approach to production of space research based on observation, investigation of concrete reality and historical analysis (Ibid: 9).

Borden is perhaps the most explicit in divining in Lefebvre (1991) guidance for empirical research and postulates eight “clues” which although useful are more conceptual than concrete (2001: 11-12). He is quick to point out that these do not
constitute a “patented system” (Ibid) but are an approximation of a method which nevertheless keeps the researcher on the right track. In doing so Borden seems inspired by Lefebvre’s claim that:

The theoretical conception we are trying to work out in no way aspires to the status of a completed ‘totality’, and even less to that of a ‘system’ or ‘synthesis’. It implies discrimination between ‘factors’, elements or moments. To reiterate a fundamental theoretical and methodological principle, this approach aims both to reconnect elements that have been separated and to replace confusion by clear distinctions; to rejoin the severed and reanalyse the commingled. (Lefebvre 1991: 413)

I argue therefore, that Lefebvre offers two kinds of insights into how to research the production of space: 1) overarching, theoretical; 2) flexible, heuristic, practical. Overarching insights are based on a theoretical, epistemological and ontological framework regarding the nature of urban space; the spatial triad and the importance of the historical. Heuristic insights relate to a closer interrogation of the spatial triad and are of three kinds. The first in a nutshell, is that to reveal the production of space the dialectical and interwoven nature of the spatial triad must be grasped. The second is that because the production of space occurs slowly, its history must be unravelled applying a dialectical analysis based on the spatial triad. The third is that explorations of the production of space must go beyond the triad to incorporate analysis of the cracks in abstract space created by counter-spaces of representation and counter-projects that can produce differential space. This is a somewhat different interpretation of counter-space than that offered by Tonkiss (2005: 64) which sees them as the means rather than the ends.

Lefebvre is also adamant that concrete place-based research must take precedent over interminable abstract theorising (1991: 40). Bearing in mind Lefebvre’s avowal that social relations have no meaningful existence except in and through space and that their underpinning is spatial (Lefebvre 1991: 404); the appropriate level of analysis in the exploration of the production of space is therefore the social relations of “each particular case” (Ibid). Such cases may well involve counter-space which “insert themselves into spatial reality” (Ibid: 382). Such analysis must imply and explain a genesis and constitute a critique of those institutions and transpositions that have transformed the space under consideration (Ibid). Given this research schema it is clear that data should be generated from official representations of space, the material spaces.
of spatial practice, lived space and spaces of representation but the precise methods are left by Lefebvre to the researcher in each specific context.

Issues for Reflexive Research

With typical acerbic humour Mark Twain seemed to relish an anti-reflexive approach, advising Rudyard Kipling, “Get your facts first” and then “you can distort ‘em as much as you please.” (in Brooks 1969: 83). Getting the facts though can be epistemologically treacherous and Wacquant provides a useful interpretation of Pierre Bourdieu’s take on reflexivity and Bourdieu’s plea for an epistemologically grounded reflexivity has certainly inflected the research underpinning this thesis:

[reflexivity] is neither egocentric nor logocentric but quintessentially embedded in and turned toward, scientific practice. It fastens not upon the private person of the sociologist or her idiosyncratic intimacy but on the concatenations of acts and operations she effectuates as part of her work on the collective unconscious inscribed in them. Far from encouraging narcissism and solipsism, epistemic reflexivity invites intellectuals to recognize and to work to neutralize the specific determinisms to which their innermost thoughts are subjected and it informs a conception of the craft of research designed to strengthen its epistemological moorings. (Wacquant 1992: 46)

This section returns to some of the issues raised at the opening of this chapter not least of which is my position as researcher. The previous section outlined the main theoretical and methodological issues that have shaped the research approach for the thesis but it has also been shaped by issues of reflexivity. Reflexivity has been treated differently over the decades. Reflexive details have been provided retrospectively in memoirs (see DuBois’ reflections in Anderson 1998). One of the early treatments of reflexivity is the collection of papers in Hammond (1964) which was followed by a raft of descendants (Bryman 2008: 682). Given the voluminous literature, it is not considered necessary to provide an account here of the rise since the 1960s of reflexivity in social research where various challenges to naïve positivism, such as ethnography, feminism, post structuralism, postmodernism and critical realism are made. Good summary accounts are available (May 2003; Bryman 2008; Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009).

Reflexivity is far from being a settled concept and while it is advocated widely as a set of techniques for sensitising researchers to their position vis-à-vis research methods and subjects, critics challenge its status as a superior approach. Lynch (2000: 26)
voices a number of concerns; going “against reflexivity” in his eponymous article. He identifies confusion in the debates caused by the plethora of ‘reflexivities’, 20 in all. He is critical of claims that researcher self presentation and methodological self criticism are desirable per se, arguing that if protracted such accounts may well be silly, boring or pretentious (Ibid: 47). Despite the provocative title he is not really against reflexivity, advocating a form of constructionist ethnomethological reflexivity which foregrounds the taken-for-granted ordinariness of social reflexivity.

I suggest that each social researcher enters to some extent into what might be called a ‘reflexive pact’ with a whole range of actors and institutions such as funding bodies, publishers, research colleagues, work colleagues, research subjects, future readers of the work and of course themselves. This pact is largely unwritten, although ethical research codes are becoming increasingly common, especially but not only where research is externally funded (ERSC 2006). Put simply the key elements of the research pact and my reflexive approach are informed by Alvesson and Skoldberg’s two fold reflexive definition which privileges “interpretation” and “systematic reflection” (2009: 9). My reflexivity requires being:

- sensitive to the interpretive work of research in the construction of new knowledge in its disciplinary and social contexts
- methodologically thoughtful and explicit
- sensitive about my place in and influence on the research project, especially through power relationships
- open about how data are generated and analysed
- fair and unbiased in the treatment of data
- honest, especially with research subjects
- inclusive regarding research subjects and letting them and the data have a voice in the finished work
- sensitive to the exercise of power in my authorial role.

Specific ethical issues beyond those of reflexivity do not arise in the research since it does not deal with, for example: young people, medical issues, sensitive behaviours or confidential data.
In thinking about my position as researcher it became evident that I have, in most contacts with the research subjects, the status of ‘partial’ insider (Lyser 2001): partial because I have not lived or worked in Manchester for 30 years. Insider status results from my Mancunian identity, my identifiable Manchester accent and knowledge of the city its people and places. Partial insider status extends also to the subject matter and some of the institutions in the research field: I worked in local government town planning for 5 years and am familiar with its bureaucratic structures and jargon. In the course of the research my insider status took a twist when it transpired surprisingly, that I am one step removed from an important empirical source in the House of Lords (chapter 6). My status as a Black Briton could have rendered me an outsider in the predominantly White worlds of local government (outside London), heritage conservation, archives and the spaces of Castlefield itself, but in face-to-face encounters I never felt this, quite the reverse.

The presentation of self in the research context is always part ritual, part game and partial revelation (Goffman 1990). In approaching an interviewee the researcher has to be careful about what to reveal of themselves and the research lest it interferes with the interview process (Walsh 2004). Appearing to know too much may appear condescending, knowing too little may suggest a researcher who is over ambitious and floundering. In approaching potential research subjects I would usually make a point of setting out my PhD researcher status and Mancunian credentials. This was partly to comply with ethical requirements of openness but also I hoped it would signal my trustworthiness, my commitment to the research and generate empathy particularly in the interviewee. My Mancunian background placed me as an insider in relation to the Manchester based archivists. This may be important where archives such as those of the MOSI and the GONW are not open to the public (appendix 1). The powerful gatekeeper and knowledgeable research collaborator status of the archivist is well known and they are adept at sizing up a research customer (Hill 1993: 41). The reflexive power relations of the interviews are complex. All of the interviewees were either experienced experts in their field, experienced politicians or experienced and highly educated activists. Therefore the research power relationships had me enjoying at best, parity. However, my first foray into the empirical research phase was not to conduct interviews but to enter the archives.
Constructing Research Data

Archival research has elicited strong feelings from detractors and advocates throughout the 20th century typified by these observations:

You have been told to choose problems wherever you can find musty stacks of routine records based on trivial schedules prepared by tired bureaucrats and filled out by reluctant applicants for aid or fussy do-gooders or indifferent clerks. This is called "getting your hands dirty in real research." (Robert Park speaking in the 1920s, in Prus 1995: 119)

Each new box of archival material presents opportunities for discovery as well as obligations to treat the subjects of your research with candour theoretical sophistication and fair play. Each archival visit is a journey into an unknown realm that rewards its visitors with challenging puzzles and unexpected revelations. (Hill 1993: 7)

With the decline of folk memory in the age of modernity archives are regarded in some quarters as the institutional memory of government, collective memory of society and, rather heroically, the “backdrop to all scholarly research” in the humanities and social sciences (McCulloch 2004: 51). Despite such compelling claims, archival research and its methodological discussion remain strangely unpopular in the social sciences (May 2003: 176). At the outset of the empirical archival research two key questions were how are representations of Castlefield space constituted through the archival sources and how can the ensuing data be analysed? Drawing on grounded theory and Ritchie et al (2003) data analyses were based first on the identification of key analytical themes which were refined as the research generated additional data and tentative results (table 3.1). Adopting archival methods meant engaging with government bureaucracy where document creators are likely to be aware that their official documents might well be archived. Amenity societies too could be expected to have archival records. However, precisely how to approach the archival research was not obvious.

Claims are made in the literature that certain kinds of research methods such as archival research are unobtrusive and non-reactive (Webb et al 1966; Lee 2000). While an interesting debate, it rather misses the point that from the constructionist and reflexive positions all social researchers are engaged actively in producing knowledge.
### Descriptive Analysis
who, what, where, when, how much, how many, associations, linkages

### The Actors and Agencies
amenity society & active member
urban space activist
technical ‘expert’
local, national politician
central & local government
local authority committee
nationalised industry
government minister, MP, civil servant
quango
private company  private individual
the press, journalist
television programme maker, filmmaker, artist, photographer, architectural illustrator

### How did the text (therefore its authors) represent, discuss, describe, value
Roman, Georgian, Victorian eras
Castlefield spaces and their constituents
industry: existing & historical ugliness, beauty, cleanliness, dirtiness, order, disorder, chaos
public & private space
public access to urban space
heritage: industrial & history
urban heritage/cultural tourism
other actors
other agencies/organisations

### Key Concepts
institutional insider
conflicts of interests
confidentiality
importance of the visual

place ambiguity through spatial valorisation
representations of space conflicts
quasi-public space
representational blurring
i.e. merging of representations of space into spaces of representation and vice versa
intertextuality between texts/actors/agencies
ludic space e.g. fairs, carnivals

### From the Theoretical Framework
spatial triad
spatial practice
(quasi-scientific) representations of space
spaces of representation
abstract space
e.g. valorisation of exchange value and homogeneity, intolerance of spatial diversity
commodification of space
differential space
e.g. valorisation of use value
spatial contradictions
counter-space & counter-project
production of space alliances

### From the Literature
the ‘dominant narrative’
problematisations of urban space
modernist planning principles
urban policy regimes
social interaction
archival target

### Explanatory Analysis
archival network construction
research questions: why, how?
who and what influenced who and what?
(tentative) relationships

### Qualitative analytical framework
(based on: Ritchie et al (2003); Spencer et al (2003); Bryman (2008: 537-60); Silverman (2010: 218-46); all these sources draw on Miles and Huberman (1994))

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<th>Table 3.1 Analytical themes derived from iterative analysis</th>
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And it is certainly the case that persuasive arguments exist for the proposition that archival knowledge is not simply out there waiting to be found but is actively constructed through value laden reactions between researcher, archivists and the data (Ketelaar 2008; Prior 2008). Documents in social science research can be regarded rather like the anthropologist’s informant and sociologist’s interviewee (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 163). Similarly, academics and archivists in recent years argue that all manner of interactions are involved between the documents, archivists and researchers (Ketelaar 2008). Advocates of archival research argue that documents have two levels of interactive importance: at the time of production and through archival interaction. Prior (2008) develops the idea of an archival network that includes human agents but also documents as active social agents. While the notion of an archival network is useful and is taken up here, documents as active social agents is more contested and does not have the same level of coherence.

Although documents can be completed and files closed, archives are always in a continual state of energetic interpretation and reinterpretation. Files may be closed formally and bear a stamp to prove it but they will be “reactivated again and again”, each reactivation “leaves fingerprints” and attributes of “the archive’s infinite meaning” (Ketelaar 2008: 12). Archival records it is argued are not simply neutral, true accounts of social reality (Atkinson and Coffey 2004). What becomes important in archival documentary analysis is not just a search for evidence as a basis for establishing true histories (Platt 1981), but the search for evidence of the production of different representations of space constructed through processes of intertextuality in the creation of archival realities (Allen 2000). Following constructionist ontology, my understanding of archives is that they are partial representations of events and social interactions which may stimulate interventions in material urban spaces.

Archival research is fraught with difficulties such as gaining access, tracking down relevant files, deciding what is relevant and organising the large amounts of data that fruitful sojourns can generate: it can become messy. In some ways the research process is a continual struggle to overcome or outflank such problems as recognised by Bourdieu:

What I expect is not a formal presentation, that is, a defensive discourse closed unto itself whose first aim (as is readily understandable) is to exorcize your fear
of criticism, but rather a simple, unpretentious, and candid exposition of the work done, of the difficulties encountered, of the problems uncovered, etc. Nothing is more universal and universalizable than difficulties. Each of us will find considerable comfort in discovering that a good number of the difficulties that we attribute to our own idiosyncratic awkwardness or incompetence are universally shared… (1992: 218)

Constructing an archival network capable of providing robust insights into the production of Castlefield space meant going back to first principles, since no organisation has ever been charged with the responsibility of compiling and maintaining such a depository. When starting archival research, Hill (1993: 27) recommends establishing an archival “target” - in this case Castlefield. A major challenge therefore in the initial stages of the empirical research concerned conceptualising then constructing “a corpus” of relevant documents (Flick 2006: 249). Conceptualising Castlefield’s archival sources was focused on tapping into existing mainly public archives constructed for a range of differing purposes. Each archive was approached with an open mind regarding the quantity, quality and accessibility of potentially relevant documents. Crucial for achieving the most from archival sources is the presentation of self to the archivist at the crucial first meeting or “orientation interview” Hill (1993: 41). Securing archivists’ trust and interest is vital for productive research. A competent archivist is not just a resource gatekeeper but a “scholarly colleague” (Brooks 1969: 36; Craven 2008b). The archival ‘first interview’ where the researcher presents themselves at the archive, is a social interaction ritual where unlike the classic social science research interview the researcher is the interviewee. In these meetings the “power, status and resources” lie with the archivist who literally holds the keys to research success (Hill 1993: 41).

These issues were important because some of the archives I used were not open to the general public and did not have a comprehensive (electronic) catalogue. This meant I was reliant totally on them not just for their knowledge but for their willingness to devote time to helping with the research. What the archival data did in theoretical terms was to stimulate the animation of a series of epistemological issues: truthfulness (Dunkerley 1988), meaning (Scott 1990), intertextuality (Atkinson and Coffey 2004) and archival networks (Prior 2008): consideration of these issues is presented in the analysis of the archival data in the chapters that follow.
Archival data are of great importance because archived materials are “typically unique, irreplaceable one-of-a-kind items that cannot be obtained elsewhere” (Hill 1993: 22). Unlike statistical data one or a few pieces of archival data can allow significant conclusions to be drawn. Dramatic ‘legal truths’ can emerge such as during the libel case in the High Court brought by Jonathan Aitken against The Guardian.\textsuperscript{12} Archives are termed sedimentary deposits by Alfred Schultz (in Ibid: 8) but unlike the creation of geological strata, the processes by which archives are created are not predictable or certain. When the target is a city neighbourhood such problems are compounded. Along with sedimentation, archival ‘erosion’ can occur when parts of or even a whole archive is lost, mislaid or destroyed (as discussed below).

It is accepted generally that archives contain only \textit{a selection} of records related to any particular issue. What they do and do not contain is governed by actor and organisational imperatives at different stages in the archival production process. Before professional archivists become involved the original creators of documents decide in the course of day-to-day work and life which documents (and artefacts) to keep and which to throw away or destroy. The future value of lost or destroyed archival documents can never be known with any degree of certainty. What is destroyed is often mundane and uncontroversial but could also be substantively important documents that the originators or organisational managers wished never to enter the public domain. Whole archives being mislaid, lost or destroyed is anathema in archival quarters. During my research the archives of the CMDC appeared to offer a potentially rich source for insights into the production of Castlefield space. Despite its status as a multi-million pound government quango with an eight year life, the difficulties in the protracted search for the physical location of the CMDC archives were as surprising as they were frustrating. In an effort to track down the archives, questions about their location were asked in the House of Commons on my behalf in 2007, 2008 and 2009.\textsuperscript{13} Conflicting evidence about the location of the CMDC archives came to light.

\textsuperscript{12} Aitken was convicted of perjury and jailed on the basis of archival evidence found in the basement of a Swiss hotel by a newspaper journalist (Pallister and Leigh 1997). Memory of this case remained fresh in my mind as an example of the power of archival research.

\textsuperscript{13} I am grateful to my local MP Kate Hoey and Graham Stringer MP for asking these questions and to an acquaintance, Jeff Hennessey at (the former) English Partnerships for helping locate the CMDC archives (Hennessey 2007 email).
Eventually, a letter I received from a senior DCLG civil servant with responsibility for archives seemed to provide a definitive answer (chapter 7).

The decision to make archival data central to the empirical research emerged as the thesis was refined in an iterative process between the theoretical considerations, the literature review, empirical research objectives and potentials provided by the research methods. This iterative process led to the construction of a network of Castlefield archival relationships of the kind signalled by Prior (2003). Two moments during the literature review triggered the crucial archival network aspects of the empirical research and without wishing to pre-empt the research narrative in chapter 6 it is worth outlining them here briefly for their methodological value. First, Degen (2001) stimulated questions about the treatment and representation of Castlefield in the Manchester press with her citation of an article (discussed in the previous chapter). The article was found at the BLNA in Colindale, London prompting an unexpected but extremely production line of empirical research (chapter 6). Second, the UK’s largest public archives, the National Archives, England (TNA, see appendix 2) were visited to examine the files of a variety of government departments which may have left traces of Castlefield’s production (appendix 1). It was here that file HLG 126/1702 was discovered. It is a composite file relating to LRS and includes documents from the Historic Buildings Council (HBC) and its successor English Heritage. It proved to be a valuable source of relevant documents and as importantly, pointers to other archives and key actors. The moment of discovery stimulated euphoric exhilaration. It brought to mind Derrida’s evocative febrile metaphor and the associated state of mind in which researchers suffer a feverish compulsive need for the archive:

> It is to burn with a passion. It is never to rest interminably from searching for the archive right where it slips away… It is to have a compulsive repetitive and nostalgic desire for the archive. An irrepressible desire to return to the origin, a homesickness… (1995: 51-52)

In this research I do not assume that archives are simply neutral accounts that can tell us about an unproblematic past reality (May 2003: 197) but they do reveal facts, representations of space, visual data, arguments and opinions of many kinds which can

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14 File HLG 126/1702 proved a valuable source. It was started by the HBC, part of the Department of Housing and Local Government and covers the decade from 1973.
be used to challenge myths, obfuscations or simple errors about the production of space.

**Research Interviews**

Once the thesis became focused on the 1970s prehistory, initial data suggested that it would be worthwhile to extend the research design to include interviews, for a variety of reasons. Interviews can help establish informal social relations beyond the formal work-based relationships and hierarchies revealed by the archival data. They can bring fresh meanings to representations of space encountered in the archives. They can offer backstage insights into organisational operations and conflicts. They can fill in the archival gaps and point to new archival and interview sources. They can provide data to challenge or corroborate other data. The interviewees were selected through non-probability purposive sampling (Bryman 2008: 458-62). Two preliminary pilot interviews were carried out in early 2007 with Martin Willey and Mike Horner (appendix 2) in order to hone my interview skills and gain pointers to relevant sources. To gain further insights interviews were carried out with informants active during the 1970s and ‘80s. Generally what was sought from the interviewees was: their organisational roles and interactions with other actors and agencies, how they constructed their understandings of Castlefield in the 1970s and 80s, how they interacted with the representations of space and how they made sense of the interventions of which they were key protagonists. The interviews were semi-structured, largely open-ended and exploratory. I tended to approach the interviews mainly from a constructionist perspective (Silverman 2004; Holstein and Gubrium 2007). This approach which sees interview data and the knowledge produced as the outcome of a mutual construction/interpretation process can be contrasted with a more positivistic approach which sees the interview as a process whereby the interviewer extracts truth statements from interviewees. Both approaches are ideal type caricatures and although I approached them from a constructionist viewpoint I also saw the interviews as a chance to document simple facts of who did what, when and where.

In this way the research strategy for analysing of the interview transcripts was similar to the archival documents: 1) establish the interviewee’s view of the production of space; 2) place the interviewees’ responses in their organisational and intertextual
contexts; 3) establish a spatiotemporal map; 4) explore documentary realities in the transcripts; 5) recognise and explore backstage insights. Producing transcripts is not only time-consuming but requires making many choices about how to represent the talk in the conversions as text. Transcripts are “decontextualised conversations” (Kvale 1996: 167). They are always an approximation of far more complex situated conversations that include a plethora of non-verbal communication, social interactions and external sights and sounds: clock chimes, interruptions, umms and ahhs. Some of these and others such as pauses and laughter were included in the transcripts. In practice, trying to establish with interviewees a spatio-temporal network map for events over three decades ago is challenging but is no more fraught than producing archival realities.

**Representations of Castlefield in Visual Data**

Accounts in the dominant Castlefield narrative draw hardly ever on visual evidence to support the ‘derelict wasteland’ metaphor, relying more on economic statistics, consultants’ reports and interview data (Bagnall 1998; Madgin 2008; Degen 2008). Although some of the archival sources contained relevant visual data, frustratingly, photographs are often separated from letters and reports and stored separately, when not misplaced. The most prolific photographic source used was the Manchester Local Image Collection (MLIC) held at the Manchester Local Studies Archives (MLSA) of the city’s Central Reference Library. The MLIC contains over 80,000 digitised images of Manchester and its suburbs, available via the internet, including about 200 of the Castlefield area (Moorhouse 2004). Another useful source for photographic representations was the National Monuments Record (NMR); the photographic collection of English Heritage. The representational status of many of the images in the official archives is complex since although some were the work of officials such as city engineers, many of the photographs were taken by local amateur photographers and donated to the archives (Moorhouse 2004). Like the other predominantly documentary official archives, photographic archives are understood here as institutional constructions (Sekula 1989).

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15 Moorhouse (2004) reveals the existence of extensive Castlefield photographic archives held by MSCC but accessing them was beyond the scope of my research.
Cutting through controversies about what photographs are; at one extreme they can be understood as true records of material reality. Therefore, Roland Barthes suggests provocatively that the photograph “captures what is really there when the shutter snapped” (in, Rose 2007: 15). Alternatively, photographs are also understood (controversially) as artistic renderings (Sontag 2008) with no simple correspondence with material reality. In the field of historical analysis Samuel notes that photographs cannot be treated as “transparent reflections of fact” (1996: 329). Of course these positions have their advocates and where the balance lies will depend on circumstances of the production and display of particular images, but regardless of this, photographs are undeniably representations that always need to be interpreted. Using photographs to document social reality systemically and comprehensively (or the material spaces of Lefebvrian spatial practice) has been controversial since its inception in the late 19th century (Emmison and Smith 2000; Edwards 2008) and an enterprise of this kind is beyond the scope of the thesis. Lefebvre’s warning, that spaces “made (produced) to be read” rather than lived, i.e. the photograph, which gives the impression of readability is a “trompe l’oeil” – is apposite here (1991: 143, emphasis in original).

Despite Lefebvre’s numerous references to the representational elements of the spatial triad consisting of written document and oral accounts and images such as drawings and paintings and photographs and maps; and that the elements are intimately interconnected, Lefebvrian inspired research tends to foreground written documents and oral accounts and downplay visual representations. Visual images from the archives and elsewhere are important for the thesis because of the ways in which they can be used to illuminate how the elements of the triad are inflected by each other. Artistic spaces of representation when juxtaposed with supposedly rational, representations of space can stimulate a muddying of Lefebvre’s classificatory distinctions. Similarly there is no easy identification of the representational status of the maps used in the production of space. Lefebvre (1991: 84) affords glimpses of how visual representations such as plans are deployed “in a travesty of enlightenment” (Ibid: 76) where once sight and seeing epitomised Western spatial intelligibility. Photographs and film are treated with suspicion by Lefebvre who doubts the can “expose errors concerning space”; regarding them as fragments of space (Ibid: 96-97). Therefore, the status of the production of space work done by images raises important
theoretical questions which have barely been addressed in subsequent Lefebvrian inspired research. Radical questioning in cartography from the 1970s (Harley 1989) of the assumed objective status of maps as simple, true reflections of material reality is rarely incorporated into production of space research (but see Fischler 1995). This is surprising given that the visual plays a central role in field of town planning and urban regeneration (Söderström 1996; Dühr 2007) and that there is a history of cartographic questioning (Gudgin and Taylor 1982) in the world of urban studies at least.

Photographic imagery is useful as it provides a wealth of visual material succinctly presented which it is hard or tedious to communicate in words (Latham 2003: 127). So in attempting to convey the sense of place of Castlefield at the time of the research in the early 21st century I have included some of my own ‘researcher-made’ images. The intention here is to use my own photographs to communicate the feel of Castlefield or what Latham (2003) calls ‘texture’. Nevertheless in the interests of pragmatic realism, some of the “found images” (Rose 2002: 237) are used as evidence to support my arguments and contribute to the persuasiveness of the thesis but where they are it is always on the basis of my explicit interpretations. The images are mainly from the MLIC and are included in several chapters. However, I do not regard the photographs and other images as evidence of a definitive social (or material reality). Photographs (even realist, or especially realist ones) are evidence of nothing until interpreted and as Hall (1997: 9) observes “there is no single or correct answer to the question, ‘What does this image mean?’ “.

**Data Analyses**

Qualitative researchers face two major problems regarding data analysis. Firstly, qualitative research tends to collect or generate large, unwieldy datasets, which Miles (1979: 590) drawing on legal doctrine dubbed an “attractive nuisance”: attractive because of the richness of the data, nuisance because of the challenges thrown up for making sense of the ‘nuisance’. “Voluminous and messy” is how Spencer et al (2003: 213) describe qualitative data which can make researchers feel bogged down and unable to see relationships, interactions or patterns. Secondly, unlike the analysis of quantitative social data, there are no agreed analytical techniques: it will depend to some extent on the type of data and the epistemological approach of the researcher.
Spencer et al identify nine approaches to analysis ranging from the quantification of content analysis through discourse analysis concerns with language and rhetoric, to the attempts at theory building of grounded theory (Ibid: 200-1). Analysis should be a pervasive iterative activity which begins early in the research process, certainly when the first data are collected, and continues into the writing up phase (Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 11). Data analysis whichever method is adopted tends to fall logically into three stages called “data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification” by Miles and Huberman (1994: 10) and “data management, descriptive accounts and explanatory accounts” by Spencer et al (2003: 212). In essence the researcher moves from organising the data, filtering, reducing, applying initial themes and categories, detecting patterns and associations; to developing explanations and referring back to wider theory.

I adopted an eclectic approach to textual analysis which deployed elements of discourse and narrative analysis (Tonkiss 2004) within a thematic framework where a large number of themes were identified initially then refined progressively as the research unfolded (Ritchie et al 2003). Documents were analysed for their meaning as individual texts bearing in mind Scott’s (1990) advice regarding the importance of interpretations of meaning and the warning of others not to treat archival documents as neutral, face-value windows into the truth of a past reality (Atkinson and Coffey 2004). Therefore all data including found written texts, interview transcripts and visual data were interpreted at two levels: the level of their surface, apparent meaning and a deeper latent, intertextual level in relation to the circumstances of their production (Atkinson and Coffey 2004).

A three stage process (adapted from Hill 1993: 58-62) was developed to construct Castlefield’s archival realities building in where appropriate the data generated by the interviews. In the first stage, the documentary evidence from each archival visit was used to construct a spatiotemporal network map of who did what, where and when. Not only key actors and events were mapped but also key documents and their intertextual linkages (see chapters 5 and 6). This analytical process helped confirm the key idea that archives and the production of space is always about social interaction in social space, i.e. the public space of cities. Secondly, the analysis of documentary
realities, i.e. meanings and interpretations were constructed treating the documents as straightforward texts but also intertextuality in their organisational and historical contexts. Thirdly, backstage insights were noted, informed by the documents and the interviews, especially concerning the behind the scenes construction of representations of space. It should be noted that the stages are not linear and isolated but interact in an iterative process which informs the way the documents produce representations of space and impact on spatial practice.

A similar interpretist and social constructionist approach allied with qualitative analysis was pursued with the visual data (Knowles and Sweetman 2004a; Rose 2007). Tagg argues that photographs can operate as a “politically mobilised rhetoric of truth”, framing any set of social (or physical) circumstances “in any number of ways” (in Knowles and Sweetman 2004b: 3). Above all I regard images as representations (Hall 1997: 16-18). There may not be any “essential truth lurking in each image” (Rose 2007: xiv) therefore each image requires careful analytical interpretation:

… work in the area is bound to be a debate between… equally plausible, though sometimes competing and contesting, meanings and interpretations. The best way to ‘settle’ such contested readings is to look again at the concrete example and try to justify one’s ‘reading’ in detail… (Hall 1997: 9)

An eclectic approach to visual image analysis was taken but always from the perspective of how the images can be constituted as representations of space and spaces of representation, while not ignoring images of classificatory uncertainty. Images were analysed for their content, their semiotic meanings as individual texts, their meaning in the context of their organisational status, genre and production context and their intertextual meaning in relation to other images and documents (Emmison and Smith 2000; Knowles and Sweetman 2004a; Pink 2007; Rose 2007). This approach to visual analysis facilitated revelations regarding the interweaving and mutual influence of representations of space and spaces of representation. Visual images therefore take their complimentary place alongside other the data referred to above allowing the construction of diagrammatic representations of complex spatio-temporal networks (see chapter 6). These visual tools aided a critical understanding of the production of Castlefield space. In particular they facilitated the reproduction of mutual interconnections, the rejoining of severed links and the reconnection of disassociated representations of space and spaces of representation with spatial
practice. In analysing the visual data across the range of photographs, maps, drawing and paintings I found it useful to keep in mind Lefebvre’s dual categorisation of quasi-rational representations of space and imaginative spaces of representation. The image’s producer, institutional context and the circumstances of production often presented images as sitting in one of the two categories. However, thinking through the production of space work done by the images that seemed to blur Lefebvre’s classification proved interesting and revealing.

Conclusions
In underpinning the approach to the empirical research this chapter provides a crucial element of the thesis. The chapter delineates a theoretical and methodological framework for the empirical research. Details of the data on which the thesis rests are provided to demonstrate the rigour and credibility of the research and aid ethical transparency. The chapter explains how a social constructionist ontology and epistemology is allied with mixed methods, grounded theory and reflexivity giving direction and rigour to all stages of the research. To facilitate analyse an analytical thematic framework was developed iteratively. Qualitative analysis was used to develop what is called the Castlefield archival network. Analysis was informed by a critical engagement with the key ideas underpinning Lefebvre’s spatial triad; although I acknowledge that a focus on differential space emerged from an iterative engagement with the data. Thinking through what the spatial triad and Lefebvre’s other production of space ideas meant for the practicalities of my research proved challenging but ultimately highly beneficial and productive. Of necessity the characteristics of the spatial triad pointed to a range of relevant interrelated data which could inform the research. The decision to include a range of different kinds of data proved of enormous value in allowing a richer and more complex spatial history to develop than would otherwise have been the case.

The chapter demonstrates that the research approach had the potential to create contradictory moments for example through the use of official minutes of meetings juxtaposed with informal letters and artistic spaces of representation. However, Lefebvre’s research clues, an explicit mixed methods approach and a constructionist mindset strengthen rather than weaken the thesis. At times the apparent messiness of
the research process was a necessary step towards plotting some of the more interesting relationships between the fragments which together constitute the production of Castlefield space. The linkages archivists made with other sources, especially archival sources, confirmed that archival networks can be most fruitfully conceptualised to include archivists and interview subjects where the research era in question is one where archival and interview data overlap. Detective work was required to uncover some of the more important but elusive data. Managing to unearth some of the frankly obscure sources to which the archival network pointed provided some of the most satisfying moments of the research. The methodological approach adopted certainly allowed the discovery and construction of many new spatial fragments and relationships contributing greatly to what we know about the production of Castlefield. In marshalling numerous ‘facts’, opinions and relationships which help explicate the production of Castlefield, the intention is to analyse and interpret them in a transparent way, rather than distort. Although not building an exhaustive picture of Castlefield’s production from scratch with Freamon’s masterly dexterity, all the pieces are seen to matter.
Chapter 4
Modernist Representations of Space and Urban Policy Transitions

Some, such [representations] as maps that show ‘beauty spots’ and historical sites and monuments to the accompaniment of an appropriate rhetoric, aim to mystify in fairly obvious ways… The conventional signs used on these documents constitute a code even more deceptive than the things themselves, for they are at one more remove from reality. (Lefebvre 1991: 84)

Mrs. Lintott: Now. How do you define history Mr. Rudge?
Rudge: Can I speak freely, Miss? Without being hit?
Mrs. Lintott: I will protect you.
Rudge: How do I define history? It’s just one fuckin’ thing after another.
(Alan Bennett 2004 The History Boys)

A great city is always in process of gradual reconstruction. Old buildings are continually being pulled down and replaced… Most of Manchester has been built or rebuilt in the last half-century; but because the process went unplanned, the city we live in today is not a great improvement on the Manchester of 50 years ago. Individual buildings have changed, but congestion, dirt and ugliness remain. (Nicholas 1945: 1 MLSA)

Introduction
This chapter contributes to the thesis in several ways and provides historical and political context for the empirical research which follows. I argue that although Manchester has been highly visible in myriad representations of space for two millennia, paradoxically Castlefield was rendered ‘invisible’ as a site of historic importance by two chronologically overlapping 20th century discourses: the modernist city planning discourse of the 1940s and inner city urban policy discourse from the 1960s. The chapter explains the importance of the City of Manchester Plan 1945, in particular its inhibitory affect on the production of Castlefield in the post World War Two (WW2) period. I argue that the reorientation of the 1960s Urban Programme (UrP) after 1978 laid the ground for ruptures of official representations of space which

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16 Rowland Nicholas was appointed City Surveyor and Engineer in 1940. He was the inexorable driving force behind the 1945 Plan. While not writing every word of the 1945 Plan, he had an over arching editorial role. He started the Plan with an “Authors Note” where he stressed he was given carte blanche and that he alone bears full responsibility for the text. For this reason the Plan is referenced as Nicholas (1945). He is sometimes misnamed ‘Roland’ (Kitchen 1997: 61; Parkinson-Bailey 2000: 162).
impacted on the production of Castlefield. The chapter highlights the inherent flexibility of the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) regime. It also explains the importance of the visual for spatial practice urban policy interventions funded by public sector subsidy. I argue for a more nuanced critical appreciation of the durability and the fragility of representations of space which produced continuity and rupture in the production of Castlefield, dependent as its production was on public sector funding through various grant regimes. The research presented in this chapter rests on newspaper archival data (appendix 1), semi-structured in-depth interviews (appendix 2) and a close textual and visual analysis of the City of Manchester Plan 1945.

Castlefield’s production is tied up intimately with Manchester’s and with national representations of space through city planning and urban policy regimes, so it is apposite to consider Castlefield in its wider national context. Although we might agree with schoolboy Rudge; history of course is not only one thing after another. One of the difficulties of researching and writing up historical analyses is the way that notable events and themes often occur simultaneously across historical eras.

Castlefield’s wealth of historic buildings and its city centre proximity are paramount for the empirical analysis of this and the next four chapters. Its location on the edge of the city centre places it in what Engels described as the working class girdle. This in 1970s parlance is the inner city: like Castlefield, a material and “imaginary” space (Keith and Rogers 1991: 2), though it is perhaps (in the light of chapter 2 above) better conceptualised as imagined space. Castlefield’s location means it fell within the ambit of two key public sector regimes that created powerful representations of space and which provided resources for spatial practice: 1940s post-WW2 reconstruction planning and 1960s urban policy. A critical understanding of both these regimes is crucial for the unravelling of the production of Castlefield. Since the major themes examined in this chapter are partially chronologically parallel, the chapter is structured by overlapping chronologies starting in the next section with an examination of how analyses of urban space based on ideas of modernist materiality influenced the 1945 Plan with significant repercussions for Castlefield. Following this is an examination of two crucial reorientations of the UrP in 1977/8 and 1979. The final section explains how the shift of national urban policy to UDCs was crucial for the production of Castlefield.
Modernist Planning Ideas and City Reconstruction

For the UK and Manchester in particular, modernist formalisations worked out in the 19th century probably reached their zenith in the 1940s and the post war period when legitimisation and public acceptance of state planning interventions were enjoying a “golden age” of “almost mystical belief” (Meller 1997: 67). This section presents a critical analysis of the modernist City of Manchester Plan 1945 which dominated official representations of space for several decades. An explanation is provided of the ways in which the 1945 Plan rendered Castlefield ‘invisible’ and unimportant historically. Implicitly, some of the power of representations of space derives from their historical continuity and repetition, especially in the restless context of modernity. Manchester was not the only city to produce a reconstruction plan during the 1940s. They were produced for over a hundred towns and cities, many of which had not suffered bomb damage. The research literatures are rarely concerned with the treatment of the historic built environment in the plans apart from Larkham and Lilley (2003). Hubbard et al (2003) apply Lefebvre’s triad in an archival and oral history based analysis that exposes the contradictions and conflicts between the planners’ vision for Coventry in the 1940 reconstruction plan and the appropriation and use of the resulting urban landscape by the city’s inhabitants. A detailed archival case study, of the production of Abercrombie and Watson’s 1943 reconstruction plan for Plymouth sought to unpack the complex history of the clash of individuals engaged in a power struggle for control of the plan (Essex and Brayshay 2005). The local political context was crucial for the approach and implementation of the reconstruction plans for Bristol, Coventry, and Southampton (Hasegawa 1992). Manchester’s 1945 Plan has been the subject of only limited academic research, for example, Kitchen (1996) points to the 1945 Plan’s emphasis on housing redevelopment, transport, public open space, air pollution and its population projections. Parkinson-Bailey (2000) and Hylton (2003) provide brief synopses of the 1945 Plan. Hylton (2003: 213) is the only writer encountered to reproduce any of the Plan’s visual images: the ‘New’ Town Hall, it is presented in black and white and Hylton fails inexplicably to acknowledge that the original was in colour. Given its importance for the production of Manchester and Castlefield, a detailed analysis of the 1945 Plan follows after a consideration of its context.
The 1945 Plan in Context

By the end of the 19th century British industrial cities were regarded by politicians and elite experts as “repulsive and inefficient” (Sharp 1940: 15). For the expert town planning elite they contained “vast drab areas of mean streets” mixed in with ugly inefficient, polluting industry (Ibid). Housing and industry were crammed indiscriminately on to the land at too high densities in “intolerably insanitary conditions” (Ibid: 79). Beauty and order were disappearing in cities: a disaster, because they are “as necessary to civilised life as health and convenience” (Ibid: 74). Modernist ideas regarding urban improvement based on “the socially redeeming virtues of science and technology” (Gold 1997: 78) suffused British planning at the national and municipal levels. Put rather crudely, the modernist urban planning discourses were distilled by the time of the first UK Town Planning Act 1909 into a set of axioms and principles regarding the problems of and solutions for the large industrial cities.\(^{17}\)

Attention was focused on: land use segregation, ‘slum’ clearance, population and industrial dispersal, overspill housing and road building and just as importantly, moral improvement. Victorian squalid dreariness would be cleared away by the architect/planners’ pencil under the direction of elegant representations of space.

A host of wartime reports set out the coalition government’s social engineering reforms for health, education, social welfare and city planning. One of the most prominent was the 1940 Barlow Report on industrial location, regional spatial inequality and the need for a national land use planning system. Nationalisation of key industries such as the railways, coal, road haulage, ports, canals, shipbuilding and the Bank of England followed just after the end of hostilities: a further expression of the confidence of the British people in the ability of government to intervene rationally and effectively in the building of an orderly, modern society and economy. It was in this context that the city reconstruction ‘planners’ (mostly architects, engineers and surveyors at that time) were entrusted to devise comprehensive plans for the building of a new Britain after the outbreak of peace (Hasegawa 1992; Ward 2004). So in the

\(^{17}\) During its passage through the House of Commons the Bill was lauded in glowing, modernist terms by the President of the Local Government Board:

The Bill… hopes to secure, the home healthy, the house beautiful, the town pleasant, the city dignified, and the suburb salubrious. (Burns 1908)
midst of wartime deprivation and devastation there was a mood of modernist optimism (Bullock 2002). One of the tools to achieve this was the wartime city reconstruction plan.

The 1945 Plan needs to be understood in the context of the city problematisation and planning discourse that became established towards the end of the 19th century influenced greatly by the ideas of amongst others Ebenezer Howard, Patrick Abercrombie and Le Corbusier (Dehaene 2004). This discourse can be characterised crudely as ‘anti-urban’ (Taylor 1998): obsessed with residential ‘slum’ clearance, working class population dispersal, zoning, industrial decongestion of city centres and road building (Larkham 2003; Stamp 2007). I argue further that the 1945 Plan’s visual representations of space’, imbued as they were with spatial order, need to be taken more seriously than has so far been the case. The 1945 Plan did not simply emerge pristine from the mind of Rowland Nicholas. It was a product of its time and drew on the dominant modernist city planning discourse and a range of influential publications. Gold (1997: 93-94) argues that by any standard, British cities were in crisis by 1930 “due to the inefficiency, confusion and in equity of the Victorian industrial metropolis” which made a ready case for bold urban planning interventions. Early British town planning visionaries such as Ebenezer Howard, Patrick Geddes and Patrick Abercrombie portrayed the Victorian era as a horrible social and environmental failure partly to justify their own agendas for the “recovery of urbanity” and “interventionist social engineering” in the form of garden cities and inner area clean sweep redevelopment (Dennis 2008: 33). Patrick Abercrombie reformulated the Geddes triad of: place work folk, into "Beauty Health Convenience" (Abercrombie 1933: 104): convenience required imposing order onto the chaotic Victorian city to create the conditions for economic efficiency.

A key figure in articulating the dominant pre-war city problematisation and planning discourse in Manchester was Ernest Darwin Simon. He was a respected politician: “one of the greatest housing authorities in the country” (Manchester Evening Chronicle 1944 MLSA). In 1935 he wrote with John Inman, The Rebuilding of Manchester, a trenchant exposition of the dominant modernist paradigm. Simon left no doubt that the crucial focus for the replanning of Manchester and other great cities for
the next 50 years will be the task of “clearing their slums”, the rebuilding of their “old, unhealthy and congested districts” and the building of new roads (Simon and Inman 1935: v). The UK wartime government’s Chief Town Planning Inspector replicated what had become a mantra:

Manchester, like other great industrial cities, suffered from a good deal of traffic congestion in the central city area. What most towns most needed now was more elbow room in the central areas for their main civic functions - commercial as well as municipal. It would be foolish to reinstate abuses which had been swept away. (George Pepler in Manchester Guardian, 1941a MLSA)

Cleaning up the city was a major theme the press (e.g. Manchester Guardian 1941b MLSA). These priorities became the dominant themes of the 1945 Plan: several of Simon and Inman’s proposals were taken up by Nicholas suggesting historical continuity in the representations of urban space. Although Simon included maps for the road routes he did not include any perspective representations of the city’s bold new spaces. However, the Manchester press in the aftermath of the 1940 air raids carried many articles with visualisations of ‘new’ Manchester. For example, a year after the December 1940 bombing raids a future visual representation of the heavily bombed Piccadilly Gardens appeared in the local press. Drawn by Mr LW Daniels, Northern Art Editor of the Daily Herald (1941 MLSA) it depicted medium rise, functional, plain buildings in a 1930s beaux-arts modern style. Soon after the December bombing raids other voices were raised advocating a complete change in Mancunians’ outlook for the future of their city. Where in the past citizens had been content with Manchester’s reputation for industry and enterprise, accepting an unlovely cityscape dominated by “unsightly chimney stacks” and the “ceaseless clatter over cobbled streets”, it was time for a re-evaluation. The dream of “a beautiful city with noble architecture, and wide sweeping thoroughfares, is no longer a subject for derision” (Tewson 1941 MLSA). Subsequently all six Manchester newspapers showed great interest in the 1945 Plan.18

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18 The local newspapers were the: Daily Dispatch, Daily Herald, Manchester City News, Manchester Evening Chronicle, Manchester Evening News (MEN) and Manchester Guardian. For most of the 20th century, up to a third of all Britain’s national newspapers were published and printed in Manchester, “the other Fleet Street” (Waterhouse 2004: 7).
Nicholas’ first words in the 1945 Plan explained that the Blitz awakened people’s interest in planning, but “it was not the Blitz that made planning necessary” (Nicholas 1945: 1 MLSA). The Blitz air raids of December 1940 were devastating for Manchester. Eighteen Junkers Ju 88 twin engine bombers wrought destruction and terror killing about 600 people in the city, Salford and Stockport, thousands were injured. East Manchester was a target partly because it was here that the Avro aerospace company built the twin engine Manchester Bomber, forerunner of the more famous Lancaster. Within a square mile of the Town Hall 165 warehouses, 150 offices and five banks were destroyed totally. About 30,000 houses were damaged or destroyed (Hardy 2005: 77). The Free Trade Hall, classic home of music and oratory suffered horribly; the Royal Exchange was partially gutted; the grand, monumental Assize Courts were badly damaged; the Cathedral was hit. Frightful gaps were torn in Portland Street and Mosley Street: one of the finest commercial thoroughfares in Britain. The medieval Shambles was burned out (Reece in Parkinson-Bailey 2000: 161). Castlefield’s location close to Pomona docks and the city’s railway terminals made it a target. Merchants Warehouse in the Castlefield canal basin was badly damaged and many houses in the area destroyed (Heaton 1995). The restrained tone of the press report: “Manchester has its largest and most severe raid on Sunday night, when considerable damage was caused” (The Times 1941) belies the horror of those two nights which made the task of replanning the city desperately urgent.

Manchester Corporation initiated the production of a city-wide plan a few months later. Nicholas understood here was a unique opportunity to create an orderly, aesthetically pleasing modernist city. The result was a large folio format, hard bound volume, consisting of 274 pages, 83 photographic plates, many of them in colour, 31 diagrams and 14 graphs. Nicholas was content that a “somewhat technical script” had been transformed into “a book which the layman can appreciate” by Derek Senior (Nicholas 1945: vi MLSA). The dust jacket is particularly striking with its rationalist-cartographic dissection of the city (figure 4.1). In addition to the Plan proper, a cheaper summary Abridged Edition of 52 pages was prepared. At the same time a regional strategy was prepared which was a far less grand affair than the 1945 Plan (Manchester and District Regional Planning Committee 1945 MLSA).
Figure 4.1 Dust jacket image (*City of Manchester Plan 1945*)
The dust jacket is extremely rare and is not referred to in the literature. It reduces Manchester to homogenised, zoned geometrical space. This image was discovered on eBay; thanks to Ann Knitting.

Producing a reconstruction plan capable of confronting realistically and imaginatively the city’s problems was a daunting task, the difficulty of which was not underestimated by those involved. It was a labour intensive and financially expensive project employing 29 professional and technical staff. Nicholas’ Plan took longer to produce than other war-time plans such as those for Coventry and London. While there was widespread political support for the Plan within the Corporation, the press and city at large, towards the end of the process exasperation surfaced. Local politicians such as Councillor Fitzsimons expressed restrained impatience when the Plan was delayed by a year (*Daily Dispatch* 1944 MLSA). The Plan’s proposals were first made public on 20 July 1945 at a seven week exhibition at the City Art Gallery. The exhibition included large scale models, development proposal maps, drawings and *paintings*. It was attended remarkably for the time, by about 151,000 people (*MEN* 1945a MLSA).
The Plan adopted a rational structure moving from perceived problems to solutions and had a clearly stated if rather vague modernist aim:

The main object of The Plan outlined in these pages is to enable every inhabitant of this city to enjoy real health of body and health of mind. For most of us in Manchester this must remain an unattainable ideal until radical improvement have been made in our living and working conditions. (Nicholas 1945: 1 MLSA)

In the short phrase “enjoy real health of body and health of mind” can be divined the 19th century modernist origins of The 1945 Plan’s approach and priorities. The Plan focused almost entirely on the city centre and the ring of working class housing districts around it, the so called slum housing. Nicholas regarded Manchester as a product of the Victorian age, evident in the long exposition on the impact of the industrial revolution on all aspects of the city and city life in the historical section of The Plan. Nicholas was sure the Victorians made a complete jumbled, repulsive mess of Manchester. He was adamant that virtually the whole of the city would have to be completely redeveloped in the coming 50 years. Modernist mantras of visual beauty and order permeate the Plan:

A monumental plan in the grand manner, with showy vistas and processional ways, would be totally out of keeping with the essentially practical character of Manchester. That, however, is no reason why we should perpetuate the spirit of sheer materialism and indifference to beauty which has been mainly responsible for the undistinguished appearance of the present city centre. On the contrary, the ultimate achievement of the city beautiful should be our constant purpose. The true ideal must surely be a combination of beauty and utility. (Nicholas 1945: 7 MLSA)

Industry, housing, roads and the abolition of smoke pollution were the key priorities but Manchester’s 100 year status as a nationally important cultural hub was not ignored and this and the provision of public parks is as close as Nicholas comes to considering the need for what Lefebvre calls differential space. Cultural facilities such as museums, a concert hall and a city assembly hall were zoned in a new ‘Cultural Centre’ to be located in the university area at All Saints, south of the city centre. This “penchant for mono-functional zoning” (Freestone and Gibson 2006: 26) is an enduring feature of modernist planning, seen for example in Ebenezer Howard’s and Le Corbusier’s plans. The idea that such ‘high culture’ could be located in the dirt, smell and the low culture of Castlefield’s pubs and betting shops did seem to occur to the Manchester planners.
The Plan is replete with statements of all-encompassing denunciation of ‘old’ decrepit Manchester and its irrational, cramped street pattern. A radical improvement must be made in the living and working conditions of most Mancunians, otherwise they will be condemned to live under a perpetual smoke-pall, “which enfeebles the health-giving property of the sun’s rays” and lowers resistance to infection (Nicholas 1945: 185). Nicholas was particularly scathing about the disorder and ugliness of the city centre which was “completely lacking in architectural form” (Ibid: 185). The centre was hardly worthy of its importance as a regional capital and focus of world trade, commerce and culture. It was an “amorphous mass”: a “dark maze of streets” lacking light, air and easy movement (Ibid: 186). In the whole of the city centre Nicholas thought only about 10 or 12 existing historic buildings should not be swept away.

Disparagement of Manchester is expressed in scientific and statistical language but Nicholas’ voice switches frequently to a poetic register. He was aggrieved at Lefebvre would regard as the abstract space of the city centre. When considering its depressing impact on a visitor he asked rhetorically:

What impression does it make on the visitor arriving by road, along miles of mean streets roughly paved with granite setts; or by rail, at a gloomy, dirty station debouching on to a confined and congested approach?… climb a tall building and what do you see assuming that the day is fine? Looking eastward across the city centre, a picture typical of the British industrial scene: on the skyline a few new office buildings, gleaming white and clean against a smoke-pall laden with the soot that will soon darken them to the sombre hue of their less recent neighbours, and eventually to the dead black of the Town Hall tower; in the foreground, a jumble of derelict warehouses and narrow alleys - a dingy squalor that has long outlived its time. (Nicholas 1945: 183-184)

Nicholas reinforces this flamboyant derogatory description with a remarkable full page reproduction of a water colour painting (figure 4.2). Under a leaden sky a city centre panorama seen from the top of an unidentified building depicts three crucial aspects of war-time representations of space: ugly Victorian Manchester typified by the cathedral-like, soot-blackened Town Hall and dreary abandoned warehouses; bomb-ravaged derelict spaces; and crucially for modernist town planning, beautiful, bright modern office blocks. This image was painted by Arthur Sherwood Edwards of the City Architect’s Department. Edwards was an architect, painter and sculptor: some of his other wartime cityscape paintings are held by Manchester Art Gallery (Michaels
He was therefore one of the artists with “a scientific bent” conjured up by Lefebvre (1991: 38).

Figure 4.2 Water colour painting of Manchester’s bomb damaged city centre under a leaden sky (City of Manchester Plan 1945)

However, this image is clearly not simply a quasi-scientific, architectural representation of space, nor is it an entirely abstract poetic rendering. It is a realist painting with buildings that would have been easily identifiable to those who knew the city. Appearing as it does in the city’s official Plan this image and others blur the distinction between Lefebvrian representations of space and spaces of representation. The all embracing panopticon style viewpoint emphasises an expert planner’s scopic

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19 Many of the Plan’s images would not be out of place hanging in the city’s art galleries and Manchester Art Gallery does exhibit some of Edwards’ 1940s cityscapes (Gillian Michaels 2009 email). The cityscapes depicted are similar to those of LS Lowry and William Turner (Whittle and Barker 2005) and the work of some of today’s Manchester based artists (Denise Thornton 2009 email) such as Liam Spencer (Kendall and Rose 2004), Michael Gutteridge (BBC 2008), Christine Lawley, Ian Fennelly and Anthony Orme who produce Castlefield spaces of representation in styles ranging from realist and impressionist to surrealist. The irony is that many of the 1945 Plan’s images were displayed in City Art Gallery in the public exhibition.
perspective: the hegemonic view from above (Bridge 2005: 48) and recalls de Certeau’s concept city (1984).

Reactions to the 1945 Plan

Morrison’s fulsome praise was typical of the overwhelmingly favourable governmental and professional reaction to the Plan:

You have set an example to the rest of England in constructive and positive planning… The Plan is founded upon an uncommon degree of actual research into the ascertainable facts of the situation. It is a stupendous feat. (William Shepherd Morrison, Minister of Town and Country Planning, in Manchester Guardian 1945a MLSA)

George Pepler, Morrison’s chief technical advisor, prophesied that it would be a landmark in planning literature because of the scientific approach adopted (Ibid). Nicholas was praised for “his “great breadth of vision” and his “artistic gifts” (1945b MLSA). One of the leading academic-practitioners of the day, Thomas Sharp, President of the Manchester and District Regional Planning Committee declared that “they had all been extraordinarily interested” in The Plan (Manchester Guardian 1945b MLSA). The men behind The Plan were praised repeatedly in the press as practical visionaries (e.g. Critchlow 1945 MLSA). Nationally The Times (1945) thought the 1945 Plan could “serve as a model for every municipality in the country”. Manchester newspapers carried many articles about the rebuilding of Manchester and the 1945 Plan especially after the exhibition opened. Journalists took advantage of the Plan’s many drawings to illustrate the proposals visually (e.g. Manchester City News 1945a MLSA). Despite its association with the Victorian economic heyday of the city, the proposed demolition of the Town Hall drew no criticism from the press, politicians or professionals; most other historic buildings could therefore expect short shrift. Wartime conditions undoubtedly contributed to Mancunians’ limited criticisms of the Plan. While few in number, the exhibition generated written comments in which many people showed, “a keen appreciation of the deficiencies of the city today and of the planning problems involved in their rectification” (Manchester City News 1945b MLSA). There seems therefore to have been harmony in Lefebvrian terms between official representations of space and citizens’ spaces of representation.
Although rare, criticisms of the Plan did appear in various fora. In a stinging critique, Spann (1946: 98-99 MLSA) lambasted the Plan’s inclusionary rhetoric, “that must be regarded as eyewash”. He doubted that the Plan was based on any meaningful engagement with the views and wishes of ordinary Mancunians. Instead, he noted the wealth of original survey data relating to physical aspects of the city such as transport, land use and building condition. A typically forthright Mancunian letter signed ‘Plain Citizen’ commenting on a request from councillors for local people to participate in making the Plan raised fears that the lack of information provided so far could result in citizens “being given patronisingly, what other people think is good for us” (in, *Manchester City News* 1944 MLSA). After what they saw at the exhibition, 1,000 local shop keepers of the Independent Traders Alliance campaigned against the proposals for neighbourhood units that signalled the end of the corner shop in the city (in, *Manchester Evening Chronicle* 1945 MLSA). Even the proposed exhibition and publication of the Plan itself were condemned as extravagant wastes of money by the Manchester Ratepayers Council (*MEN* 1944 MLSA). So much for the Plan in general, attention now turns to it representations of Castlefield.

**The 1945 Plan’s Ambivalent Eliding of Castlefield**

For Nicholas in the 1940s Castlefield did not hold any historic significance; neither did he use the name as a historic place signifier:

> It may be of interest to follow the City Circle route section and examine its possibilities. Starting at the southern end of the westerly section, a diversion of Chester Road is proposed by way of a viaduct passing over Castlefield wharfage and under the railway viaduct leading to Central Station, to join the City Circle at the junction of Liverpool Road and Lower Byrom Street. (Nicholas 1945: 188, emphasis added)

However, the naming of place is a key aspect in the production of space (Lefebvre 1991: 118). The 1945 Plan represented the Castlefield area under the rubric of ‘Knott Mill’ as a purely industrial area, unworthy of any preservation and ripe for urban road and rail redevelopment. Nicholas emphasised Manchester’s *medieval* rather than its Roman origins; representing them visually with an impressive two page colour image across the inside cover (figure 4.3). The map, dated 1650 is centred on the medieval Cathedral, excluding the city’s Roman origins at Castlefield. Nicholas’ treatment of the Castlefield area bordered on the professionally schizophrenic: on the one hand acknowledging in passing the area’s Roman history but on the other indicating the area
must be comprehensively redeveloped, presumably destroying any Roman artefactual traces. In order that the city's regional status can be preserved and enhanced, city centre communication routes:

… will have to be rearranged over a long period. In particular, the blighted area between Deansgate and Salford, the site of Roman Manchester, must be revitalised by drastic redevelopment and better communications between the two cities. (Nicholas 1945: 6)

Figure 4.3 Map dating from 1650 of Manchester in the vicinity of the Cathedral (City of Manchester Plan 1945)

Far from being historic, Castlefield is simply a bomb-damaged ‘blighted area’. This dismissive stance towards Castlefield’s historic value was to resonate in AJP Taylor’s famous 1950s claims (Taylor 1957) reiterated in the 1970s, that Manchester “is irredeemably ugly” and its Roman remains at Deansgate (Castlefield) are the “least interesting” in Britain (Taylor 1977: 308). For Nicholas, Knott Mill, was simply a waterfront industrial area. In fact the Knott Mill area adjoins Castlefield in the vicinity of Knott Mill railway station. According to Nicholas, the Knott Mill area is:

… situated immediately to the south-west of the city centre, it accommodates motor-service depots, food manufacturers, textile finishers, paint manufacturers, non-ferrous metal workers and electrical engineers. It is also interspersed with storage warehouses and ancillary business premises linked to the Pomona Docks. Such mixed development, frequently found in an area
adjoining an inland waterway terminal, should be sorted out. The whole may be zoned for general industrial purposes, but the area to the south of the Inner Ring Road should be reserved for industrial warehouses attached to the docks. A large proportion of the remainder would then be available for food manufacturers and importers, textile packers, crate manufacturers and others concerned with the import and export trades. (Nicholas 1945: 39)

Most of the industries attributed to the Castlefield area are highly noxious and polluting, especially the abattoirs, associated knackers yards and rendering plants; textile finishers and paint manufacturers. Nicholas’ detailed description is factual and dispassionate rather than hyperbolic; his representations of the area saw Castlefield as industrial space. What is intriguing (in the context of the empirical research below) is his acceptance of the right of industry to remain in the area. This is one of the key changes in Castlefield representations of space which emerges in the 1970s as the area’s historic past is rediscovered (discussed in chapters 5 and 6). Nicholas did mention ‘Castlefield’ but languishing under layers of sooty deposits “Castlefield wharfage” signified only the canal frontage: a place of noxious industry rather than a space of historic value.

The big issues of the day appear to have dominated the limited public reaction but Nicholas’ treatment of the Castlefield did stimulate pointed criticism. Oliver (1948 MLSA) after some initial praise developed a compelling critique of the treatment of history and Castlefield. He shares the general enthusiasm for the 1945 Plan which had been “universally acclaimed as an outstanding example of civic idealism” Oliver (1948: 2 MLSA). The eulogy was short lived. Oliver directed his critique towards the Plan’s treatment of the city’s history because; in devising a plan for the city’s future “some thought should be given to the heritage of the past” (Ibid). He was unhappy about the proposal to demolish the Town and set out in a manner redolent of Dennis’ (2008) tensions of modernity: how the balance should be struck between preserving the old and instituting the new. Oliver welcomed the proposals to preserve the Cathedral precinct but provided a completely different emphasis for his understandings of Manchester’s historic city centre space.

He lamented that for The Plan it was not Roman history that appeals to “Manchester men” but that of the industrial revolution. He stressed that Nicholas is remiss in associating the founding of Manchester only with the Cathedral and medieval town on
the bank of the River Irk at the confluence with the Irwell in the 15th century (Ibid: 3), explaining that:

Hundreds of years before the settlement on the banks of the Irk there had been an earlier settlement on the banks of the Medlock. This is the real Manchester. (Oliver 1948: 3 MLSA)

And it was on the bank of the Medlock that “Manchester was born” (Ibid). Oliver was referring to Castlefield but unlike Whitaker did not mention it by name, nor did the press, who referred to the area as Knott Mill (e.g. *Manchester City News* 1947, MLSA). Strangely, he did not object to the ring road proposal which would cut through Castlefield but saw this development as an opportunity to rescue the open space of the Fort from the industrialism that had engulfed it in ways “which would commemorate the ancient heart of Manchester” (Ibid). The Fort could then be given some dignity in an appropriate setting and the relics “gathered together in an appropriate building” (Ibid). Although highly prescient, this museum idea was not pursued at that time. It is likely that the precise nature of the historic buildings in the area was unknown in the 1940s since LRS would have been blackened by centuries of soot and was not listed as being of historic importance until 1970. Oliver’s sentiments regarding the city’s material heritage, eventually taken up by amenity societies, would not gain common currency for 30 years (as shown in chapters 5 and 6).

Castlefield’s Georgian and Victorian historical importance were overlooked too. The Plan’s representations ignored the historic importance of the Bridgewater Canal and LRS. It described the station as “Manchester's first railway station” (Ibid: 11, emphasis added), although the claim that the Liverpool Road was the first passenger station in the world is not recent (Veitch 1930). Its claim to fame was signified not only by the ceremony for its opening by the Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington but by the lavish 100th anniversary celebrations in 1930, opened by the USA Ambassador. Nicholas expected the station buildings at ‘Knott Mill’ will be demolished and replaced with new, efficient, modern stations (Nicholas 1945: 66). While the 1945 Plan did not acknowledge the historic importance of LRS, this point was taken up in the local press, but Castlefield remained invisible:

There is still in existence near Knott Mill a little group of whitewashed buildings bearing a commemorative tablet which records that these comprised the first railway passenger station in the world… (*MEN* 1945c MLSA)
Present and Future Visual Representations

Lewis Mumford was aware of the clarifying, persuasive power of visual images in representations of space and Nicholas proffered Mumford’s words in defence of the 1945 Plan:

The orderly arrangement and graphic presentation of these data through maps, statistical charts and photographs are important aids in clearing the mind of confusion, partial observation and misleading generalisation formed on the basis of insufficient evidence. (Mumford in Nicholas 1945: 15)

Larkham (1997) argues that perspective drawings and maps in the post-WW2 city reconstruction plans were symbols of control. However, no analysis of the images of the 1945 Plan has ever been carried out. In promoting proposals for a future modernist city, Nicholas utilised sophisticated rhetorical visual techniques to persuade readers of the merits of the new Manchester.

Throughout the 1945 Plan depressing ‘before’ black and white photographs are contrasted with the ‘after’ of colour images of the future. For example the existing area of the soot blackened Town Hall is represented visually by a black and white photograph taken in the 1930s. In contrast, a remarkable colour visualisation of the proposed Town Hall and its processional way appears close by. Painted by JDM Harvey from a high perspective, the freshness and vigour of this pencil and watercolour image contrasts markedly with the depressing photograph of the existing sooty Town Hall. Interestingly, Harvey was a respected free lance architectural artist with a national reputation for excellence: “a perspector of top rank” (Wright 1983: 218). PD Hepworth was another renowned architect/illustrator who was commissioned by Nicholas to prepare perspective and axonometric drawings and paintings. A full page colour map shows how the new radial and ring roads would disfigure much of the area’s extant physical historic traces for example by necessitating the removal of two of the distinctive Victorian viaducts and the remains of the Roman Fort and vicus.

Across the canal basin a new railway line was proposed to provide access to the enormous new Trinity Railway Station that would be shared with Salford and serviced from the south by new lines that would cut through Castlefield (The Times 1945 MLSA). Liverpool Road Station and its associated warehouses would vanish literally

Nicholas does not give the source but this quote comes from Mumford’s 1934 book The Culture of Cities (p376).
providing land for the City Circle road routed along a widened Liverpool Road. Where the proposed radial roads were routed through Castlefield, huge roundabouts were envisaged at the junctions.

Figure 4.4 City centre zoning proposals map (*City of Manchester Plan 1945*)

In addition to not naming the city district of Castlefield, the Plan rendered the area invisible through the use of powerful visual imagery that deployed architectural techniques for the representation of urban space. A fold out colour Zoning Map proposing the rational, modernist transformation of the city centre is one of the most arresting images in the Plan (figure 4.4). The map overlays an Ordnance Survey base map and imagines a regular grid-like system of new roads: the ‘irrational’, irregular historic street pattern, visually muted, can be discerned below. The eye is drawn to the centre of the map where bold, dark colours indicate the buildings to be preserved: for example: the Cathedral, Chethams Library and School, Central Library, the Town Hall Annex and Rylands Library. Colour was used purposefully on the map. Roads are coloured fresh white and vibrant green and stand out as does the black of the new railway lines. New buildings are bright eye catching red. Castlefield is diminished to
the point of invisibility through three visual devices. Firstly, its buildings are a dirty grey and its canals a dirty blue. Secondly, the new railway passes through it. Thirdly, and most tellingly the area is masked almost completely by the ‘Key to Colours’ legend.

Nicholas saved the ultimate Castlefield ignominy for the final pages of the Plan. His preoccupation with sweeping away squalid, ugly Manchester and replacing it with the beauty of modernist order reaches its zenith not in words but in a spectacular colour axonometric image spread across the pages of the back inside cover. Axonometric images are panoptic representation of space tools like the rational plan of de Certeau’s concept city which is “simultaneously the machinery and the hero of modernity” (1988: 95). This image, with the new modern Town Hall at its centre, shows how the city should look in the year 2045 (figure 4.5). It imagined most of the city centre redeveloped into city blocks of similar size, style, massing and orientation. It is a remarkable architectural representation of future Manchester space that offers no prospect of historic preservation other than for the Cathedral area and a handful of buildings. Nicholas’ blindness to Castlefield’s historic value was accentuated most shocking by the stamping of the area with the same regular blocks that will cover the
rest of the city centre. In addition the new roads and railways depicted would help to remove all material traces of Castlefield’s historic significance. For good measure the map’s north point sat resolutely on top of Castlefield!

**Continuity: The 1945 Plan’s Enduring Influence**

A large number of concrete proposals for new infrastructure and comprehensive redevelopment for housing, roads, retail and civic functions were proposed in the Plan. Although many of the more fantastical, grandiose proposals did not reach fruition, other Plan schemes were implemented in the 1950s, 60s and 70s (Kitchen 1996). A major feature of the Plan therefore was its enduring impact on the production of Manchester space for three decades. Robert Maund (2008 interview, appendix 2) and David Rhodes drew my attention to the importance of the Plan for Manchester and Castlefield. He was adamant that I should, “look at the proposals in the Manchester 1945 Plan” to “realise the fight we had on our hands” Rhodes (2008 interview).

Rhodes had previously derided the Plan’s cavalier proposals for a 50 year epoch of historic insensitivity and demolition in Bluhm and Rhodes (1990). Part of the reason for their interest in the 1945 Plan was due to the succession of official city development plans on which it was based. The Town and Country Planning Act 1947 required all local authorities to produce a statutory land use development plan: the *Manchester Development Plan* was finished in 1951 but government approval took 10 years, not because it was controversial, simply because it was a slow process (Manchester Corporation 1961 MLSA). During that time it was not updated. The 1961 Plan saw Knott Mill as suitable for industry but did not refer to Castlefield (Ibid Appendix 3 Sheet 2). Ted Kitchen, a Manchester City planning officer from 1979-95, stresses that the 1961 Plan was “strongly grounded in the Nicholas Plan” (Kitchen 1997: 61): a view shared by Parkinson-Bailey (2000: 180). In pointing to the legacy of the 1945 Plan for the 1961 Plan, Kitchen is in agreement with Rowland Nicholas who accepted that the availability of the 1945 Plan “had been of considerable assistance” (Nicholas 1952: 83). Much of the original survey and research work was reused and “many of the actual proposals of the 1945 Plan have been retained in principle” (Ibid).

Nicholas remained wedded to the approach of the 1945 Plan after the war, defending its modernist planning principles from an invocation by the Town Planning Minister
Lewis Silkin that planning’s cherished axioms be rethought (Nicholas 1949). Seventeen years after the 1945 Plan was published Nicholas reaffirmed its principal aims. Above all Nicholas remained focused on the greatest single problem, the 60,000 ‘slums’ (Nicholas: 1962: 224). His modernist visual problematisation of Victorian Manchester remained unwaveringly steadfast:

Manchester has become crystallised in its Victorian setting and stabilised, so that it is still essentially as the Victorians built it. A new look for the City has been long overdue… Its unsightly areas of mixed industrial, commercial and residential development need to be systematically unravelled and redeveloped on comprehensive lines. (Ibid: 254)

Maund affirms that Nicholas was a strong willed character, a “very forthright chap”, and that there were people “who were terrified of him”. Of course strong will was undoubtedly an asset for the leader of the 1945 Plan project but Nicholas’ idiosyncrasies could bring quirky problems:

He didn’t drive and a driver took him round everywhere. He had these coloured note pads. When he was driving around if he saw something that needed fixing he’d make a note: yellow urgent, green very urgent, magenta top priority. Everybody jumped when they saw magenta. One day he was driving along and saw a really badly broken pavement so he got out the magenta pad. The repair work was done straight away. Then a few days later he got a letter from the Town Clerk of Stockport County Borough thanking him for repairing the pavement in Stockport and welcoming further repair work by Manchester Corporation [RM and ML laugh]. (in Maund 2008 interview)

Nicholas always regretted the Corporation had not given him more power, saying in his retirement speech that, “I am not retiring because I can no longer do the job” and declaring combatively that, “I do object to working for the difference between my salary and my pension. Goodbye.” (Ibid). Nicholas was succeeded in 1963 by John Millar, a man as steeped in the 1940s planning discourse and efficacy of the 1945 Plan as Nicholas (Millar 1966; Turner 1967). Millar led the production of the 1967 Manchester City Centre Map (a planning policy document recommended by the government and intended to complement the 1961 Plan). The 1967 Map continued with the modernist mindset inherent in the 1961 Plan. Neither the 1960s Plans offered an alternative to the drastic redevelopment of Castlefield proposed in the 1945 Plan. It would not be until the 1984 City Centre Local Plan that some of the most influential planning ideologies embedded in the 1945 Plan would be seen as having outlived their usefulness (see chapter 6). Disruption of the official representations of space embedded in the 1945 Plan was the outcome an extended struggle for the meaning of
Castlefield space initiated by the interventions of amenity societies and urban policy makers and implementers (see chapters 5 and 6). How the production of space was contested and by whom is the subject of chapters 5, 6 and 7. What follows in the next section of this chapter is a critical account of the transitions in the representations of space and governmental models which were crucial for the spatial practice of urban policy interventions or lack thereof in Manchester and Castlefield from the mid-1960s.

Transitions in Urban Policy Representations of Space

In the second half of the 20th century in Britain urban policy emerged, alongside physical planning approaches, with the aim of tackling social problems in situ without comprehensive redevelopment and the dispersal of working class communities, that is, the focus was not on bricks and mortar. There are several accounts of the development of urban policy in the UK (Lawless 1981; Stoker 1997), which tend to concentrate on how deprivation was measured, arrangements for the delivery of policy and its impacts on intended recipients. My intention here is to focus on how urban policy drew on powerful representations of space and the continuities and ruptures in these representations of space and associated governmental models for policy delivery. I argue that 1960s urban policy was modernist in its attempts to intervene rationally but shifted the focus away from physicalist solutions. Urban policy entered the political lexicon in 1968 when Harold Wilson, in response to J Enoch Powell’s racism (Billig 1988) made his anti-racist declaration of a new Urban Programme (UrP) focusing on housing, acute social need and the ‘immigrant problem’. In an important declaration (not long after the devastating war-time racism of the Third Reich and Axis Powers) he said that he was not prepared “watch this country engulfed by the racial conflict which calculating orators or ignorant prejudice can create” (Wilson 1968, in The Times). Wilson’s May 1968 speech has importance for the thesis on several levels. It marks a shift from 1940s representations of problematic city space, implying a transition from concerns predominantly with the material space of spatial practice to those of acute social needs. However, it illustrates also with the reference to housing, that while

21 Wilson’s strong anti-racist rhetoric directed against J Enoch Powell should be considered in the light of his government’s Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968, which racialised immigration policy and distinguished for the first time between potential UK citizens who were ‘patrials’ - those who possessed identifiable ancestors in the British Isles - and those who were ‘non-patrials’. It was clear that patrials would be exclusively White (Spencer 1997: 143).
political necessity dictated a response to the dangers posed by calculating orators, hence a UrP to defuse the visible immigrant problem, 1940s representations of space had not dissipated entirely. After the inception of the UrP, there was continuing national, intractable tension regarding the role of race and racism in urban policy (Keith and Rogers 1991).

Wilson gave responsibility for devising and implementing the UrP to the Home Office, the government department responsible for immigration. UrP was set up initially not by legislation but by Home Office Circular 225/68. Thirty four local authority areas were given UrP status: 17 London Boroughs and 17 County Boroughs, one of which was Manchester. The Circular was meant to allow local authorities in England to address inner city areas suffering from, “deficiencies in the physical environment, particularly in housing; overcrowding of houses; family sizes above the average; and persistent unemployment” (Home Office 1968 TNA). It added that a substantial degree of “immigrant settlement would also be an important factor” but by no means the only factor, in determining the existence of acute social need (Ibid). UrP therefore presents a partial rupture with the past but continuity too. Inner urban areas continued to be represented in accordance with the modernist material city discourse. In preparing to rebut Powell, Harold Wilson requested data on public expenditure under section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966. Categories were specified for grant in respect of “social services – education, housing and slum clearance and health and welfare” (Ibid, emphasis added). Detailed figures were provided by the Home Office for the 57 qualifying local authorities (including Manchester) with over 2% new settlers from the Commonwealth in their areas (Warne 1968 TNA). The 1966 Act therefore also reflected an adherence to 1940s representations of space. In a Home Office background briefing paper for the 1978 Race Relations Bill it was noted that the certain difficulties had arisen with the formula for calculating expenditure “in respect of visits by Public Health Inspectors to houses in multiple-occupation” (Anon undated TNA). Public Health Inspectors were of course one of the 19th century modernist responses to the perceived urban problem.

22 This Act defined areas with a high ‘immigrant’ presence as those with greater than 2%, based on the 1996 10% sample Census.
Although it takes time for spatial practice to materialise on the ground, the Prime Minister, being linked so closely with UrP, was soon demanding visible signs of UrP success, leaving it to his Cabinet Office civil servants to sort out the details (Andrews 1969, TNA). Andrews was aware that the area would need to be “chosen rather carefully” from the perspective of “the nature of the problems and from the point of view of the work that is in hand” (Ibid). Andrews was advised by the Home Office that the difficulty “is to find a place with a substantial amount on the ground”. Sheffield “is considered the best, Liverpool should do”, but Manchester and Nottingham “will not have enough” (Morrison 1969 TNA). Wilson did visit Sheffield in a three day tour of the North West in January 1970. In wishing to be seen in urban space improved visibly through UrP, Wilson was following (unconsciously) the imperatives of the ocularcentric modernist tradition (Levin 1993). UrP was not, “a wholesale programme of urban renewal but is intended to supplement expenditure on major social services” (Gregson 1970a TNA). Spatial practice, the renewal of the material city, was not the focus therefore of 1960s urban policy which shifted attention to areas with great social needs and a ‘high’ proportion of newcomers from the Commonwealth. Consequently, Castlefield therefore was invisible to urban policy.

**Urban Policy Assertions of Material Dereliction Problems**

If Wilson’s 1960s hurried policy reaction to the perceived visible immigrant crisis was founded on a response to an imminent threat, the 1970s re-evaluation of the urban problem followed years of careful analysis (Lawless 1978; Hall 1981) by the Home Office through the voluminous Community Development Projects (CDP) and DoE (1973 and 1975). While the pivotal transitional moment was undoubtedly the comprehensive analysis of DoE, Secretary of State (SoS) Peter Shore’s 1977 White Paper *Policy for the Inner Cities*, (DoE 1977a), the transition started with the three studies commissioned by Conservative DoE, SoS Peter Walker in 1973 (DoE 1977b). These investigations concerned Birmingham, Lambeth and Liverpool and were carried out by government commissioned private sector consultants. The White Paper also drew explicitly on other analyses such as the CDPs. Inner Liverpool’s CPD study for example after four years research, characterised the inner city as suffering from severe working class poverty and poor housing but the “most striking impression of inner Liverpool is its physical decay” evident in the abandoned docks, railway sidings,
empty warehouses and boarded up shops (Ibid: 3-4). Running through these analyses are representations of space that centred on visually perceptible material problems. Anticipating the policy shifts after 1979, the White Paper had a profound influence on the problematisation of city space moving it away from social needs back towards the perceived dereliction of material inner city space. Noticeably too, but drawing little academic comment, the White Paper saw a key role for the private sector and highlighted the need for policy “to encourage changes in the attitudes of industry and financial institutions so that they play their full part” (DoE 1977a: 9).

In addition to (re)presenting the urban space problematic, the White Paper proposed a radical reorganisation of the local authority dominated institutional arrangements for the targeting, grant allocation and management of urban policy projects, giving increased control to central government. Inner City Partnerships in the major cities of England were to be established in the areas suffering most from urban deprivation. Each Partnership Board was to be chaired by a government minister and each officer working party by a senior civil servant. In Manchester the Partnership included the MCC, Salford City Council (SCC) and crucially the Greater Manchester Council (GMC). Called the Manchester and Salford Inner City Partnership (MSICP), it covered the inner city wards of Manchester and Salford. Interestingly, the boundary of the MSICP was drawn to include Engels’ densely populated inner girdle which still included the most socially deprived working class areas and huge amounts of physical dereliction and decrepit industrial city space.

Castlefield lay towards to middle of the Partnership area and though it contained large amounts of abandoned land and decaying industrial buildings it lacked significant population; ‘immigrant’, socially deprived or otherwise. Despite this, I argue that the MSICP became crucial for the production of Castlefield (as explained in the next chapter). In line with the 1977 White Paper, the first Draft of the MSICP Programme of intervention projects concluded that the decline of the economy of the inner areas “is the major factor causing the inner city malaise” (MOWP 1978a: para 8 TNA). Lack of private investment had resulted “in the inner area containing the bulk of the two cities’ vacant industrial buildings and derelict land (Ibid: para 4): a major issue was therefore, how to accomplish the “renewal or refurbishment of industrial buildings and
infrastructure” (Ibid: para 8). In addressing the reconfigured urban problem the
government allocated an annual budget to the MSCIP of about £10M; in 1980/81 it
was £12.37M (MSICP 1979a TNA). A year after the creation of the inner city
partnerships, following the May 1979 general election, Margaret Thatcher appointed
Michael Heseltine SoS at the DoE. Academic attention has focused on his UDC
experiment but I argue below (and in chapter 5) that his treatment of the UrP Inner
City Partnerships was also crucial for the production of Castlefield.

**Urban Programme Reorientation: The ‘Private Sector’**

Heseltine shared with his predecessor Peter Shore a material understanding of the
urban problematic, based on his first hand observation of the physical problems of
dereliction and underused land in East London. Paradoxically, and pragmatically
Heseltine approved of Peter Shore’s totally public sector inner city Partnerships
because “it was early days” and the Partnerships “hadn’t had time to work” (Heseltine
2009 interview, appendix 2). Heseltine decided to chair the Liverpool Inner City
Partnership as Shore had done. This was his first significant contact with that city. For
Heseltine the first Liverpool Partnership Board meeting was seminal in changing the
thrust of UrP nationally, for two reasons. Firstly, because the change was immediate in
1979, while the UDCs took two more years to happen and longer before they started
spending regeneration money to subsidise the private sector. Secondly, Partnerships
and the wider UrP affected cities across the whole of England. At his first meeting as
chair of the Liverpool Partnership Heseltine announced that he had only one change to
make. At this point in our conversation Heseltine was remarkably candid and self
derecrating:

LH: The initiative that I took at that first meeting is that I said, I’m going to
continue with Peter’s partnerships. I’m going to continue with the designation
[of Inner City Partnerships] and I’m going to continue with ministers being in
charge, one each, of these places: all very commendable. And the money’s
available. I only have one change and that is this. “You will only get the money
and spend it after consultat with the private sector”.

ML: Ah.

LH: That was revolution. There was no precedent worth the name of local
authorities, if you like, working with the consent of the private sector: just did
not happen. They didn’t like each other. They didn’t talk to each other. There
was no relationship. So that was what I said.

ML: So how was that formalised within the Partnerships, because they weren’t
members of the Board were they, the private sector?
LH: That was the first question. After the stunned, horrified silence [ML laughs] somebody said, “Well what is the private sector?”
ML: Yea.
LH: And there is no answer to that question in truth. But you can’t be a Secretary of State and say I don’t know [ML laughs]. So there had to be an answer. So I clutched at the only straw that happened to be passing in the wind at the time and said, “The local chamber of commerce”.
ML: Oh no, you didn’t.
LH: I did, I did, I promise you I did. And as I did it my reaction in 79 was precisely yours now. I knew this was ridiculous. You know, they just weren’t up to it. But what could I have said? (in Heseltine 2009 interview)

Heseltine’s exaggeration here in the context of the government’s neoliberal politics is understandable but not excusable. MCC had worked in partnership with private sector property developers in the 1970s, providing £11M of the £30M scheme to build the enormous Arndale Centre (Welch 1973 BLNA).

His civil servants were incredulous asking what had possessed him. Prescribing private sector involvement in UrP proved tricky politically and practically. This is evidenced by the intense discussions within the civil service about what Michael Heseltine could have meant by the injunction to involve the private sector:

I am afraid that we cannot at this stage be seen to be encouraging the widespread use of… subsidies to the private sector even where extra employment is involved… Then there is the question of just how we really think the private sector can be involved in the identification, preparation and implementation of schemes. The difficulty is that the consultative arrangements can only be operated through the local Chamber of Commerce or the regional office of the CBI. Neither of these organisations are [sic] representative and neither of them can really indicate how new investment is to be attracted to a particular location. (Pelling 1979 TNA)

Policy guidelines were produced but these still left scope for local discretion at Inner City Partnership level about “just how the private sector is to be involved” and the extent to which Partnerships should emphasise physical regeneration projects concerned with derelict land and buildings (Prest 1979 TNA). I argue that this local

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23 Manchester Corporation has a history of working with the private sector and established Britain’s first modern public-private partnership. The Manchester Ship Canal Company (MSCC), set up by act of Parliament in 1885 as a private company capitalised at £5,000,000. The project went vastly over budget but was rescued when Manchester Corporation invested a further £5,000,000; taking a 51% stake as the company teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. MCC retained this stake and associated Board members until the takeover of MSCC by Peel Holdings Ltd in the mid-1990s.
Partnership discretion was crucial for the funding of LRS conversion to the MOSI (see chapter 5). Michael Heseltine’s urban policy involvement with Liverpool is well known, especially in the aftermath of the 1981 riots. His involvement with post-1996 regeneration initiatives in Manchester generally is also well documented (Williams 2003; King 2006). What has not been the subject of previous research is the reason for establishing the UDCs and his long term direct and indirect involvement in the production of Castlefield; issues addressed below.

Continuing Representations of Space and the Reorientation to Urban Governance

I always found it rather mysterious that Heseltine only ever set up two UDCs in London and Liverpool. Yet what is important was that his legislation: the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (1980 Act) allowed UDCs to be created anywhere in England and Wales. Manchester city centre UDC, which was crucial for the production of Castlefield owes its existence therefore, to Heseltine’s intervention. Two of the most authoritative investigations of UDCs (Barnekov et al 1989; Imrie and Thomas 1999) focus on the strategy formation of particular UDCs, their links with other agencies; impact on material, economic and social conditions, on urban governance and their distributive costs. Colenutt (1991) and Brownhill (1992) provide trenchant critiques of the LDDC especially regarding its failure to benefit local working class communities. However, all the research encountered in the literature views the policy process leading up to the UDCs as unproblematic, typically “UDCs were created by the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Act” (Ibid: 4). Before analysing in chapter 7 the considerable impact of the Central Manchester Development Corporation (CMDC) on Castlefield it is worth outlining the rationale for and origins of the UDCs. In so doing the relationship between continuing modernist representations of space and the UDCs will become apparent.

UDCs are quangos with land use acquisition, grant giving, policy making and development control powers established by the government for a designated area of land and specified period of time, ten years originally. Heseltine’s UDCs and those designated later by Nicholas Ridley were well funded but controversial. Their Chairmen and 13 member Boards were appointed by the SoS at the DoE and the first
two divested the local authorities of their land use planning and CPO powers. For this reason they were regarded as undemocratic and resisted by local government and some local interest groups. A number of academics claim the inner city UDCs idea arose after the 1979 election (see Barnekov et al 1989; Thornley 1991; Imrie and Thomas 1999), but this confused the origin of the idea with its public announcement in September 1979. While there is a great deal of literature on the private sector orientation and undemocratic nature of UDCs there is little recognition that they were at odds with the anti-public sector ideology of the first Thatcher government. However, for Evans and Blowers (1997: 127) the underlying ideology of UDCs and the political philosophy Michael Heseltine were contrary to the neoliberalism of the 1979 government and Margaret Thatcher was right when she said of Heseltine, “he is not one of us”. Hence the provenance of UDCs raises an interesting question. If it was not from the Conservative government’s neoliberal ideology, from where did the UDC idea originate? Policy diffusion from the USA is one suggestion found in the literature because of the “hundreds of policy-entrepreneurs” who from the 1970s made “the pilgrimage to garner inspiration from the Baltimore model” (Quilley 1999: 190). Hambleton (1991) and Falk (1986) also point to the importance of the ‘Baltimore model’ in influencing British urban policy. Keith and Rogers (1991: 2) assert that “American experience initially served as a model” for British UDCs.

A new neoliberal government committed to reducing public spending, red tape and state interference in markets is unlikely in principle to relish the prospect of establishing large property development quangos funded lavishly with public money and endowed with strong intervention powers. Archival documents uncovered at TNA seem to support the notion that the inner city UDC idea did not originate with Michael Heseltine but came from two further possible sources apart from USA policy emulation. Firstly, a paper entitled Renewing the Inner Areas: The Task and the Means (Roche and Thomas 1978, TNA), was presented to the DoE’s Property Advisory Group in March 1979 (Brown 1979; Dormer 1979 TNA). A year before the basic arguments had appeared in the T&CP journal (Roche 1977). Its authors were New Town officers Fred Roche (Chief Architect, Milton Keynes) and Wyndham Thomas (General Manager, Peterborough New Town). The paper suggested inner city regeneration should be carried out not by local authorities through the town planning
function but by bespoke single minded central government development agencies based on the New Town Development Corporation model. By far the most bizarre suggestion for the origin of UDCs, given his neoliberal political credentials, is that the UDC idea was taken up by Keith Joseph (figure 4.6).

UDCs have probably attracted more critical academic and popular criticism than any other single urban policy initiative. And while many journalists have interviewed him about the UDCs over the years and continue to be fascinated by his staunch support of them (Leftly 2003; Hetherington 2007), no academics in the urban policy field appear to have interviewed him on this subject. The research outlined below casts doubt on the contention that UDCs originate from the immediate aftermath of the May 1979 election or international public policy emulation. What is clear is that the character of UDCs was based on powerful political beliefs in the failure of local government inner city interventions and the concomitant importance of private sector engagement in inner city revival. UDCs are of course associated with Michael Heseltine’s first period as DoE, SoS 1979-83. Conventional wisdom holds that they stem directly from the complex and somewhat contradictory nature of the Conservative neoliberal political agenda that wished to see reduced state interference in markets and an enhanced role
through urban governance for the private sector, but at the same time strong central control and a weakening of the power of (Labour dominated) local government (Colenutt 1991; Brownhill 1992; Imrie and Thomas 1999). This rationale epitomises a major contradiction of Thatcherite neoliberalism (Harvey 2007: 69) since UDC-scale state intervention would be anathema to a ‘pure’ neoliberal government.

I put the three possible sources of the UDC idea to Lord Heseltine who laughed heartily at the suggestion that UDCs came from Keith Joseph and the London Chamber of Commerce (Heseltine 2007 interview). He also dismisses the idea that the UDC concept came from the paper by Fred Roche and Wyndham Thomas, conceding only “their names I know” (2009 interview) and that he could not recall such a paper. This was the only point in the interview when I felt Lord Heseltine exhibited discomfort. He became mildly strident in defending his ownership of the inner city UDC idea. Such insights cannot of course come from textual analysis alone where is hard to convey tone of voice and body language. Neither was he inspired to create UDCs because of visits to Baltimore. Lord Heseltine did not date the UDC idea to 1979 but much earlier. While a junior minister in the new DoE under Peter Walker in 1972 he became increasingly concerned about the terrible state of London’s Southbank arts complex, the first phase of which was built with public money for the Festival of Britain in 1951 in the golden age of modernist planning and enlarged progressively through the 1960s. He found it unacceptable aesthetically; it was ugly, depressing, decaying and deserted (Ibid). His objection focused not only on the brutalist modern architecture, “it was the buildings that had been put there that were so awful” but on the ineffective management and maintenance regime (Heseltine 2009 interview).

He asked his senior civil servant, Ron Brain, to devise an intervention mechanism for him to take over the planning, redevelopment and improvement of the Southbank Centre; something along the lines of a central government agency, modelled on the New Town Development Corporations with planning, land acquisition and redevelopment powers. A report was duly prepared.24 Heseltine liked Brain’s proposals but was transferred suddenly to the Department of Transport where he took

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24 A political irony is apparent here since the NTDCs were the result of the New Towns Act 1946: one on the most interventionist pieces of town planning legislation ever to reach the statute book.
up the Aerospace and Shipping portfolio so the Southbank UDC scheme was never operationalised (Heseltine 2007 interview). However, during his time as Aerospace minister Heseltine spent many hours looking down on the East End as he flew to and fro to view the site of the proposed third London airport at Foulness, Essex. What he saw was “the emptiness and hopelessness of hundreds of acres of deserted docks, wharves and warehouses” (Heseltine 1987: 133). The visibility of problematised material space is crucial here. He therefore had literally seen for himself the problems of material dereliction in the East End and docklands.

When in opposition from 1974 to 1979 Heseltine was shadow environment spokesman and he saw again the large scale abandonment of London’s docklands and the East End which was “one vast tract of dereliction, emptiness, rotting buildings, public sector monopoly” (Heseltine 2009 interview), but this time, through the reference to the public sector he indicates his concerns with urban governmental structures, i.e. the local authority dominated Docklands Joint Committee (DJC). On his first day at the DoE in 1979 Heseltine took his permanent secretary, John Garlick to lunch and gave him an envelope with 10 priority agenda items he intended to pursue, one of which was an inner city UDC saying “find me the papers from 1972” (Heseltine 2007 interview). He was at this point determined to create one UDC, not on the Southbank of the Thames “which would have been small beer”, but for 6,000 acres of East London; intending to commandeering the planning, redevelopment and improvement of London Docklands via a quango under his control. Civil servants across Whitehall balked at the thought of having to put into place a new government agency hugely unpopular with local authorities. It was suggested there was a chance of “achieving the objectives of your Secretary of State [Michael Heseltine]” without “the establishment of complex new machinery” (Russell 1979, TNA). Russell suggested transferring the powers of the London Boroughs to the GLC in the docklands area: a move which would not be anti-local authority or anti-democratic and had the advantage that the (Conservative) GLC, “could be relied upon to have broadly the same objectives as

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25 The DJC was a statutory committee set up in September 1974, made up of the GLC and the boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Newham, Southwark, Lewisham and Greenwich. It was charged with producing a regeneration strategy for Docklands (see www.lddc-history.org.uk/). With hindsight its lack of visible projects on the ground by 1979 was a strategic error.
Ministers” (Ibid). Lord Heseltine explained this suggestion was not feasible because Docklands would remain at the mercy of the slow, ineffective local government public sector (Heseltine 2009 interview).

Heseltine originally wanted UDC powers only for the London Docklands area but even this raised strong resistance from within his own department and from powerful Cabinet colleagues, “Joseph the party guru and my friend Geoffrey Howe the Chancellor” (Ibid). “Howe said we haven’t got the money” and Joseph resisted for ideological reasons because “it was interventionist and we are a [pause] new type of government”. Civil servants, including John Garlick resisted because they “believed they were the custodians of local government and we taking powers away from local government” (Ibid). Heseltine felt cornered and decided to go to the Prime Minister and argue the case for a London UDC “which the three of us did one night in Downing Street”. The three Cabinet Secretaries of State deployed their arguments and “she came down on my side” and that was how “the concept of an urban development corporation for London became real” (Ibid). Lord Heseltine admits the UDC was not an original idea, being based on the new town development corporation. What was new was “taking it into the inner city” (Heseltine 2007 and 2009 interviews).

John Garlick was effusive in his praise of this victory against formidable senior Cabinet opponents, but “produced with a flourish of triumph” another objection (Heseltine 2009 interview). While admiring of the battle he had fought Garlick announced there was an insurmountable problem: a London UDC would require hybrid legislation - an impossible situation.  

At that moment Heseltine “asked with a smile” where is the second worst place in the country? “Liverpool Secretary of State” was the immediate answer, “that’ll do, give me general legislation and I will designate London and Liverpool”. Lord Heseltine explained “that’s why Liverpool got an urban development corporation” (Ibid). London Docklands Development Corporation

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26 Hybrid legislation unlike general legislation applies only to, for example, a specified geographical area. The problem with it is that all those individuals and organisations affected who oppose the measure have the right to be heard when the Bill passes through Parliament and debate cannot be guillotined. A hybrid London UDC bill would at best have taken years to secure passage through arduous parliamentary procedures, with no guarantee of success.
(LDDC) was created formally on 2 July 1981. Two of the first Board members to be appointed were John Garlick and Wyndham Thomas! Lord Heseltine did not mention this during the interviews. Although Heseltine will always be associated with his work in Liverpool after the 1981 riots, he was adamant that his only concern in 1979 was London Docklands, if he could have had just this one UDC that would have been enough, “my intention was to restore London, Liverpool was included in order to avoid the risk of hybrid legislation” (Ibid).

The struggle to establish UDCs was by no means won that night in Downing Street and continued well into August. In remarkably candid emotional language the case against UDCs was still being made by civil servants in July 1979. The struggle revolved around the issue of governmental models rather than representations of urban space:

> It is like the question: "When do you sack Don Revie?” I reckon the manager has a run of 15 bad matches before he has to go... Thus in my view the UDC concept is premature… The DoE and public opinion are not reduced to such despair as to will the alternative. For the alternative is a red-blooded meat-eating tiger. It has immense resources, and immense powers; local government, accustomed to processes of planning consultation and fair process, property rights - all sacred - can go hang. That is what a UDC is like (I happen to find it distasteful). I don’t think it is warranted by the problem in Liverpool or Docklands…

> You may think the DJC pretty awful- and it is pretty awful on anything which goes wide of a single borough - but it is not, as yet, so manifest a failure (all variants and approaches having been tried) as to be - to itself and the world - a manifest failure. Since July 1974 my view has been that it would be 1982 before the DJC was so manifest a failure that its protagonists would fade away shame-faced… Therefore the UDC concept (meat-eating tiger) will be watered down to the u.d.c. (domesticated she-cat): on the one hand no-one can afford it any resources; on the other, it can’t have greater planning powers than a democratically-elected body like a Borough Council can it?... Without superabundant powers, and superabundant resources, an [sic] UDC would be a hollow sham. (Gunn 1979 TNA)

Gunn’s incredulity that local democracy and consultation with local communities could be swept aside for an undemocratic quango is poignant. Heseltine was well aware of the strength of civil service antagonism towards his proposed major shift in London governance and wanted to make the UDC public announcement with utmost speed. In a memo to the Prime Minister, Heseltine claimed that the Cabinet Ministerial

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27 Its budget in its first year was £50M, rising to £100M by 1991.
Committee on Economic Strategy on 25 July “enthusiastically accepted in principle my proposal for setting up UDCs” and that nothing in the detail to be worked out would change that decision (Heseltine 1979 TNA, figure 4.7). However, Joseph’s resistance is still evident at the end of July:

New legislation will be essential if we decide to take this further. But for the moment we have asked Michael Heseltine to arrange for urgent detailed studies by an interdepartmental group of officials with a view to enabling him to formulate detailed proposals... Pending that further consideration, no public announcement will be made. (Joseph 1979 TNA)

Figure 4.7 Confidential memorandum from Michael Heseltine (TNA)

Joseph stressed that unlike New Town Development Corporations on which they were modelled, UDCs should be able “to put real emphasis on private sector development”
(Ibid). A big part of Heseltine’s struggle, “cornered as he was by his civil servants and senior Cabinet colleagues”, was the need to placate the two sources of opposition through a “careful compromise” (Heseltine 2009 interview). That led to UDCs becoming private sector led through Board membership but as a counter-weight local councillors, acting in a personal capacity, were allocated a few token seats on the Board. It was not until September 1979 that Heseltine was able to make the UDC public announcement which, crucially for the thesis, included confirmation that UrP would continue but with significant private sector re-orientation.

Of course having secured conspicuous amounts of scarce public money at a time of local government public spending cuts, Michael Heseltine, like Harold Wilson with UrP, was desperate to demonstrate rapid results. Unfortunately, for the first year Nigel Broackes (LDDC chairman) could only point to an output of consultants’ reports, strategies and planning documents - classic representations of space. When Heseltine was about to leave the DoE for Defence in late 1982, he was preoccupied by the urgent political need to demonstrate UDC efficacy. There was high unemployment and he, “had the Tory Party round my neck” (Ibid). He met with Broackes, pleading for something visible and tangible to which he could point. Broackes suggested restoring “some wonderful but derelict churches” in the Docklands area. Lord Heseltine laughed when recalling the other Broacke’s suggestion: a request for £250,000 to restore some old dockside cranes. It was a potentially “career wrecking” gamble if the project went wrong. Heseltine worried what would happen, “when Margaret got to hear about these cranes” (Ibid). A quarter of a million pounds was a large amount of money in 1982 for industrial heritage conservation rather than property development or job creation but the risk of appearing foolish and wasteful was considered worth it. The cranes and churches were restored and Lord Heseltine was moved emotionally when remembering that these were the same cranes which had bowed their heads in a mark of grieving respect as Winston Churchill’s funeral cortège went by in 1965: “tear jerking stuff” (Heseltine 2009 interview). Heseltine and the LDDC therefore, legitimised historic preservation in urban policy which would have great importance for Castlefield in the 1990s. Both these spatial practice heritage conservation examples are interesting for what they say about the importance of visible spatial practice as a marker of how UDCs could be seen to “get things moving” which was to be the essence of the UDCs
(Joseph 1979 TNA). This is a different rationale for heritage regeneration projects from the one which saw industrial heritage as a refuge from Great Britain’s postcolonial decline (Wright 1985; Hewison 1987).

Heseltine is perhaps best remembered for his dramatic intervention in Liverpool after the 1981 riots when the media dubbed him ‘Minister for Liverpool’. He stresses however, that his involvement with Manchester went back much further to 1970 when as a minister at the DoE he flew over greater Manchester to inform the decision about where the boundaries of the new Manchester metropolitan county should lie. He helped shape the Local Government Act 1974 which defined the powers and responsibilities of and boundaries for the metropolitan counties. Heseltine therefore created the GMC. In relation to specific Manchester projects he is best known for his support of the Task Force which oversaw the redevelopment of the city centre after the 1996 IRA bomb (Williams 2003; King 2006). More relevant for the thesis is that his direct involvement in Castlefield came near the beginning and end of his ministerial career. Heseltine was keen to point out that before UrP was reconfigured and the UDCs set up, “one of the first things I did in 1979 was to help fix the finance for GMEX” (Heseltine 2009 interview). During his second stint SOS at the DoE in 1992 he supported strongly the CMDC/MCC Bridgewater Hallé Orchestra concert hall project. This was a complex regeneration project utilising a former coach station site on the eastern edge of Castlefield. The developer AMEC PLC rescued the precarious project in a depressed property market when they acquired the scheme from the Hanson Group (Horner 2007 interview, appendix 2). Unsurprisingly, the difficult economic conditions of the early 1990s saw the scheme suffer numerous financial setbacks which threatened its survival. Heseltine’s intervention was crucial therefore not just for guaranteeing the necessary central government grant funding but for restoring commercial confidence in the scheme (Willey 2007 interview).

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²⁸ G-Mex was an urban regeneration project of lengthy gestation located in Castlefield and led by the GMC (Parkinson-Bailey 2000: 212-215) which resulted in the conversion in 1986 of Central Station to a conference and exhibition venue (see chapter 6). It was recently renovated, renamed and rebranded ‘Manchester Central’ by MCC, eliding the role of the GMC in the production of space.
Heseltine flew to Manchester by helicopter in 1992 to make the announcement that the government would approve a £12M grant for the Bridgewater Hall project. It was the last decision of that Conservative government because the next day an election was announced. He claims with practised political aplomb and an eye on the history that:

I supported the concert hall project because I am deeply involved in dispersing power across the UK. Rebuilding the great industrial cities is a major historic change that needs to take place. I was supporting the great cities - turning them into engines of enterprise and culture is an important part of that process. Here was an opportunity to build a world class cultural facility in a great city. (Heseltine 2009 interview)

Of course the CMDC and UrP did not provide any ‘new money’. The cost was met by swingeing cuts in rate support grant especially in Manchester (Brown 1985 DCLGA). Heseltine’s friendship with Manchester was therefore at best ambivalent. Nevertheless the manner in which in 1992 a senior Cabinet Minister could support a cultural regeneration project, in a former industrial area of the city and would wish in 2009 to be seen as a key protagonist in that drama, says a great deal about how representations of space changed in years from 1970. In the 1970s nobody in the UK was talking about cultural regeneration and industrial areas in decline were considered solely as spaces for continuing industry (Darley 1978). Where a continued industrial use was not considered viable, buildings were left idle or were being pulled down to make way for new offices and urban roads. The history of the production of space in that era, based partially on the valorisation of historic industrial space, is the subject of the next two chapters.

Conclusions
This first of five empirical research chapters ranges over a chronology between the 1940s and ‘80s providing a context for the chapters that follow. Original first hand archival and interview data, brought into the public academic domain for the first time, have revealed disruptions, transitions and unexpected linkages between the understandings and representations of urban problems in the eras of the 1940s, ‘60s, ‘70s and ‘80s. This demonstrates the utility of the historical approach to the understanding of the production of space favoured by Lefebvre. The interviews provide new insights and help animate the spatial history especially where it pertains to some of the pivotal characters such as Rowland Nicholas and Michael Heseltine.
And while Heseltine’s role relates directly to Castlefield projects which are outside the scope of the thesis, they were important signifiers of the postindustrial transition. His reorientation of UrP and UDC legacy had undeniable impacts for the production of Castlefield. The mixed research methods deployed construct multi-faceted insights into production of space history. They reveal for the first time contestations over the dominant representations of city space in the 1945 Plan which rendered Castlefield invisible and unimportant historically. They also reveal that Heseltine, the well known architect of the UDCs intervened in decisively UrP bringing about an emphatic reorientation.

Several key themes which run through the next four chapters are introduced and deployed in the context of the specific data and arguments presented above: the role of representations of space in the production of space, place (in)visibility - literally and politically - the importance of visual rhetoric in the construction of official representations of space, the significance of continuities and ruptures or more accurately partial ruptures in the history of representations of space and the unsettled nature of official representations of the urban problem nationally from the 1960s compared with the evident modernist consensus in Manchester in the 1940s. What stands out though is the importance of visual representations and direct sensory experiences of urban space for constructing urban problems and highlighting policy interventions success. Such purposes for representations of space are a key element which differentiates the thesis from Lefebvre’s own ideas about the production of space and those of the researchers he inspired.

It is clear from the analysis in this chapter that the history of Castlefield spatial production in the 1970s needs to take account of the crucial role of the 1945 Plan and the enduring power of the representations of space it embodied not least in determining the 1951 and 1961 city development plans. In its bold written and visual rhetoric, drawing as it does on the modernist city planning tradition, we can appreciate the Plan as a product of its time. Nicholas and the Corporation were able to benefit from the ‘golden age’ consensus which allowed Castlefield to languish far from the city’s imagined cultural centre and outside the ambit of modernist ‘slum clearance’. Similarly, 1960s configurations of urban policy based on problematisations of city
space which privileged acute social need and the ‘visible immigrant problem’ saw Castlefield as outside their purview. Each of these spatial initiatives rendered the area unnamed and virtually invisible. How Castlefield was re-visioned but in ways entirely different from the working class industrial space which had existed for the previous 200 years is the subject of the next two chapters.
Chapter 5
The Contested Re-production of Liverpool Road Station
and its Importance for the Rediscovery of Castlefield

...countries in the throes of rapid development blithely destroy historic spaces - houses, palaces, military and civil structures. If advantage or profit is to be found in it, then the old is swept away ... Where the destruction has not been complete, “renovation” becomes the order of the day ... In any case what had been annihilated in the earlier frenzy now becomes an object of adoration. (Lefebvre 1991: 360)

Over the last two years members of the above panel have been extremely concerned about British Rail’s shameful neglect of Liverpool Road Station, Manchester. (Hawcroft 1973a [undated] TNA)²⁹

Introduction
This chapter explores how differing representations of space imbued a long neglected but historically important Castlefield space with new meaning in the 1970s thereby overthrowing the dominant official representations inherited from Nicholas’ 1945 Plan. It reveals how Liverpool Road Station (LRS), the world’s first railway station, became a counter-space of intense reimagining that influenced the spatial practice of its transformation into the public space of the Museum of Science and Industry (MOSI) (figure 5.1). The historic revalorisation of the station space is seen as a crucial re-presentation that heralded the re-visioning and reimagining of Castlefield after the blithe frenzy of post-WW2 urban destruction. In this chapter a complex web of interactions between a plethora of organisations and individuals is tracked through the empirical data analysis. This chapter pulled on the thread of the assertion that, “The railway complex at Liverpool Road was sold to a conservation group for £1.” (MCC 2005). That thread led to a number of archives, interviewees and visual data through which an investigation of the production of Castlefield in the 1970s is achieved.

²⁹ Generally acknowledged as the world’s first railway station for passengers hauled by locomotive, it and the adjoining Station Master’s house were listed Grade I on 18 December 1963; the 1830 Warehouse was listed Grade I in 1973. Crown Street Station, the Liverpool terminus of the railway was converted to a goods depot in 1840. From that time it was gutted and drastically remodelled, becoming a scrap metal yard before being demolished in 1973 (Wright 2007).
Through the data analysis a great deal of the behind the scenes strategies and manoeuvres in the production of Castlefield in the 1970s are revealed for the first time.

Figure 5.1 Recent Ordnance Survey map showing the location of the Canal basin, Roman Fort, the Museum of Science and Industry in relation to the Town Hall (TH) and G-Mex (former Central Station)

It is worth recalling that for Lefebvre representations of space are the conceived space of planners, urbanists and social engineers which are mainly systems of verbal signs. They are the dominant spaces in any society (Lefebvre 1991: 38-39). The approach taken here is to extend Lefebvre’s ideas somewhat to take account of different scholarly interpretations of his work since the 1990s in two main ways. Firstly, it difficult to maintain that representations of space are constituted by one uncontested vision of present and future city space as revealed in Oliver’s contestation of the 1945 Plan in the previous chapter. Secondly, this chapter investigates the consequences for spatial practice (material space) of particular (counter)representations of space in line with Lefebvre’s claim that “representations of space must therefore have a substantial role and a specific influence in the production of space. Their intervention occurs by way of construction…” (Lefebvre 1991: 42). The thesis in general and this chapter in particular is not concerned with investigating the production of the museum per se as a
collection of cultural artefacts: nor is the concern with railways or LRS per se. The focus here and in the following chapters is on taking up the central argument of the thesis, that understanding urban space requires a sustained critical engagement with the histories of the production of space.

Literature exists which has examined the ‘reinvention’ of the science museum in the buildings of the station complex (Greene 2000), its history and status as a visitor attraction (Bagnall 1998) and its innovative exhibition practices (Harvey 2005). Several writers have dealt with the engineering architectural and historical aspects of the station (Fitzgerald 1980; Thomas 1980). This chapter argues that Castlefield’s production, usually attributed to major urban policy interventions from the late 1980s, cannot be understood fully without unravelling a prehistory of regeneration in the 1970s. The argument here takes up one of the key research questions of the thesis; how was the production of Castlefield space brought about? Structuring this and the other empirical chapters proved challenging since several crucial events and interactions were happening simultaneously during the eras under consideration. A joint chronological and thematic structure is used but of necessity the narrative on occasion loops back in time. The chapter presents the proposition that the reimagining of LRS played a crucial role in the production of Castlefield and by implication Manchester. After a consideration of the 1970s context and an analysis of the empirical data the chapter covers: 1) civil society networks and the contestation of official representations of space, 2) the interventions of the GMC and CSC; 3) representational intertextuality and televisual representations; and 4) the role of the Manchester and Salford Inner City Partnership (MSICP).

**Manchester in the ‘Grim’ 1970s**

Vituperative incantations about Manchester in the 1970s abound in the retrospective accounts of the media and those who lived through the period. A love/hate relationship with disparagement worn as a badge of honour is evident:

Manchester in the 60s and 70s was a crumbling remnant of the industrial revolution, where slums were demolished to make way for bad modern housing and mis-placed shopping developments…
The dereliction of the city in the mid-1970s, as my LA friend said, “I visited in the seventies Tone, it was like fucking Detroit.” It was, it was worse than Detroit. (Tony Wilson in BBC 2007)

In the 1970s Castlefield suffered from planning and urban policy invisibility and the appellation was not used to signify a city district. Use of the name appears to have fallen into disuse during the 19th century and it was not used in the 1945, 1961 or 1967 City Plans. LRS began in 1970s to attract national attention, for the wrong reasons. It was in a dreadful state of disrepair (Chippendale 1972 GrGA). The station was listed Grade I in 1963 but this did not ensure it was either valued or maintained. Eventually to prevent collapse it had to be supported by massive wooden shoring (figure 5.2). It stood opposite the 1830 Warehouse; the first railway warehouse in the world, listed Grade II in 1973. Together they constituted a 2.5 acre (1 hectare) site and with other large warehouses the whole complex consisted of a 9 acre (3.6 hectare) site under British Rail (BR) ownership. This chapter develops one of the main arguments of chapter 2; that in concentrating on Manchester’s urban regeneration since the late 1980s recent academic research has largely neglected the production of the city’s space in the 1970s. This era, is usually represented in academic discourse and in official representations of space as one of economic stagnation, decline, decay and material decrepitude.

30 John Simm was the actor who played Sam Tyler in one of the few spaces of representation to present 1970s Manchester in a positive (nostalgic) light, the BBC’s Life on Mars (season 1).
31 Historic buildings and structures can be listed as important historically and/or architecturally since the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 and can be Grade I (most important, e.g. St Paul’s Cathedral and Manchester Town Hall) or Grade II. Owners and the local authority have a legal duty to preserve and enhance the buildings.
32 “…surprisingly there never has been any specific obligation on an owner to repair or maintain a listed building. It is an offence to carry out works of demolition, alteration etc without consent - but failure to maintain is not an offence. It is possible for the SoS or the LPA [local planning authority] to serve a repairs notice if a building is being neglected but only as a preliminary to compulsory purchase... It is thus very much a last resort.” (Airs 2007 email).
A popular example of this was the ghastly characterisation of 1970s Manchester in the BBC4 TV programme Factory: Manchester from Joy Division to Happy Mondays (BBC 2007). 1980s band New Order’s lead singer Bernard Sumner recalls:

There was no sense that the canal was somewhere for living beside; it was rats and drunks and hollow little black seepages… So it had a strange atmosphere from its past, as if it would never escape its past. (in BBC 2007)

Some of those rain-soaked grim cityscapes were captured at the time by New Musical Express photographer Kevin Cummins (2009). Manchester’s cityscape, its modern and industrial public spaces, appear to be just as important to Cummins as the bands he photographed (Rourke 2009).

Wrecking ball flattening of the city’s residential and commercial ‘slums’ was still widespread in the early 1970s (Shapely et al 2004); their place being taken by gruesome unloved office blocks, desolate surface car parks and poorly constructed system built housing estates (Stamp 2007). By 1967 Nikolaus Pevsner was able to claim that Manchester is “engaged in one of the largest slum clearance enterprises of all time” (in Stamp 2007: 139). BR’s Head of Public Relations expostulated in 1976, “historic railway buildings - we'd knock the lot down tomorrow” (in Binney 1984:
Perhaps with this in mind Parkinson-Bailey (2000: 209) refers to 1970s Manchester as the era of “developers and demolition”. Although Stamp claims that “after the war, Manchester - like every 19th-century industrial city - began to hate itself” (p138); it was not so much ‘the city’, as modernist architects, planners (such as Rowland Nicholas), property developers and politicians who rejected Victorian city space in favour of orderly, clean modernist redevelopment. This mood was captured evocatively by Gardiner (1973 DRPA):

The property developers have moved in on Manchester alarmed at the potential threat to a unique Victorian city the Civic Trust for the North West invited Lucinda Lambton to make a photographic record... "What's happening to Manchester! says the man behind the desk in the planning office. What's happening? Why it's going going gone." (What ever he may say in public this is how he talks in private.)... “Things have changed you know. We aren't living in the nineteenth century now - you can't stop progress...Why from what some of these preservationists on the conservation committee (that's what we call it up here) say, you'd think that Victoria was still alive. I mean one's got to be realistic. One's got to keep up with the times. Land means money. Not just money, it's a goldmine.” (in Ibid)

It was Rhodes who invited The Observer journalist Gardiner and photographer Lambton to Manchester (Rhodes 2008 interview, appendix 2). Unfortunately, Gardiner did not speak to any planners in Manchester. Rhodes was disciplined by his boss John Millar and a claim to the Press Complaints Commission by the Corporation against The Observer upheld (The Times 1973; Powers 2007).

Demolition was not restricted to individual buildings. Manchester’s 30 acre Arndale Centre, completed in 1979 resulted in the demolition of the Whithy Grove/Shude Hill area including the loss of the medieval street pattern and many historic buildings. Manchester lost its oldest pub, the Seven Stars: dating from the 14th century which had a claim as the oldest pub in Britain. However, it should be appreciated that during its development the Arndale Centre, was generally welcomed as a sign of progress and the restoration of Manchester's premier shopping position in the North West of England (Welch 1970 BLNA). No doubt in response to the perception of the arbitrary and relentless destruction of the English historic built environment, throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a rapid growth in the number and visibility of historic building protection amenity societies which became important elements of civil society (Harris 2003). They were tuned into the general feeling of unease as the melting into
air of familiar historic buildings exerted its influence and the significance of amenity societies as barometers of public opinion began to be appreciated (Lowe 1977). The growth of amenity societies and the nascent nationwide revalorisation of the historic built industrial environment provided an important context for the production of Castlefield space in the 1970s. To a large extent this revalorisation was driven by the perceived post-WW2 loss of treasured familiar historic buildings which had helped create a sense of personal identity (Hubbard et al. 2003). Soot blackened buildings not demolished were cleaned to reveal attractive brick and stone frontages; presciently, Alderman Mrs Nellie Beer promoted the city as a retail, entertainment and cultural attraction and Blue Badge Guides were trained (Duncan 1970 MENA; Humphreys and Leach 2005).

The saga of the re-presentation and re-production of LRS took place against an economic background of the early 1970s UK property slump, high inflation and crippling industrial relations confrontation. In 1973 Edward Heath’s government was struggling to contain deepening economic problems, efforts not helped by the Lord Lambton and Lord Jellicoe sex, drugs and national security scandal. In the early 1970s Mancunians had priorities other than historic building preservation, such as; manufacturing job loses, electricity blackouts and the three-day-week. In the mid-1970s Britain was still coming to terms with its changing economic status as the manufacturing sector including textiles, declined precipitously (Girodano and Twomey 2002). In Manchester old industrial buildings became redundant and were left to decay quietly or demolished. In common with the national picture, where any future reuse of old industrial buildings was contemplated it was for industrial use rather than conversion to ‘cultural’ leisure or service uses (Darley 1978). Manchester Corporation’s 19th century motto was ‘wisdom and labour’ which can still be seen emblazoned on the city’s coat-of-arms, but in the late 1970s the municipal slogan became “defending jobs - improving services” (North 2006: 53).

In 1973 Manchester local authority was still known by its 1838 name, Manchester Corporation it was the most powerful unit of local government, a county borough. Local government structure was recommended for overall in the Redcliffe-Maud Report of 1969. Heseltine at the DoE oversaw the creation in 1974 of the metropolitan
counties including the GMC – his first contact with the city. It had responsibilities, inter alia, for strategic land use planning and transportation matters. In addition it had a project focus dealing for example with arts/recreation and environmental improvement schemes for former industrial sites. What this meant was that another player entered the field of spatial practice. GMC crucially took a controlling stake in the science museum. Under the new arrangements GMC, UMIST, MCC and the University of Manchester each contributed 24% of the museum's revenue funding, and Salford University provided 4%. A year later the financial arrangement was revised, making GMC the largest single contributor (42%) (North West Museum of Science and Industry (NWMSI)1978 MSIA). At its inception key Corporation personnel moved to the new GMC including John Millar (County Planner), Robert Maund (Assistant County Planner) and Donald Burns (Assistant County Planner): the first Chief Executive was the Corporation’s Sir George Ogden. This was advantageous “because many had several years with the City and there was continuity and a real understanding of the issues” (Robert Maund 2010 email):

George Ogden was statesmanlike and never got involved in petty arguments of the kind that happened in other areas. John Millar was widely respected within the profession and outside it and got on well with councillors of all the parties. Sir George and John set the tone. (Ibid)

In some ways the legislation that set up the GMC was thought in some quarters to be poor but:

…that was an opportunity because there was a whole series of things that were described as concurrent functions and you could get together with the district councils and say, “Look we have an interest can we work together on this. Can we agree on who should do what and how we should do it?” Recreation and Arts was a concurrent function… (Maund 2008 interview).

From the beginning according to Maund the GMC was anxious to establish its economic development credibility with the production of visible projects on the ground

33 Manchester’s science museum was established jointly in 1968 as the "Manchester Museum of Science and Technology". It was legally constituted under the Manchester Corporation Act 1967 in accordance with an agreement between Manchester University, UMIST and the Corporation (Salford University became a partner a few years later). It was located first in the UMIST Department of the History of Science and Technology soon moving to cramped ‘temporary’ premises on Grosvenor Street in the All Saints area: ironically in the 1945 Plan’s Cultural Centre! The first of several name changes occurred in 1972 when the Museum became the North Western Museum of Science and Industry to reflect its growing regional importance.
(spatial practice) and not just strategy documents (representations of space). Housing was not a GMC function and in the early 1970s Manchester Corporation (rebranded Manchester City Council in 1974) was still pursuing policies of ‘slum’ clearance coupled with industry and population dispersal to the outskirts of the city and beyond - an urban problematic at the core of the 1945 Plan. Attempts to rid the city of its Victorian built legacy sat uncomfortably alongside concurrent attempts to reclaim Manchester’s Roman past through archaeological excavations at sites in Castlefield in 1972 led by Professor Barrie Jones of Manchester University’s Archaeological Department (Spilsbury 1979 BLNA; Makepeace 2007; Nevell 2008).

Although LRS was Grade I listed technically affording it the strongest protection, it was allowed to fall into disrepair by BR which owned hundreds of listed buildings. Throughout the country listing alone however, did not secure adequate financial resources for the maintenance of listed buildings. In recognition of the difficulties the government established the Historic Buildings Council for England (HBC) under the Historic Buildings and Monuments Act 1953. The HBC was part of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) which became the DoE in 1970. Simultaneously, the 1953 Act established the Historic Building Bureau (HBB) which was the marketing arm, charged with finding buyers for listed buildings. The HBC’s remit was to advise on the disbursement of historic building restoration grants. With only a relatively small annual budget (£1M in 1972/73) the HBC was overseen initially by a team of grandees and scholars and limited legally to giving grants for listed buildings it considered ‘outstanding’. Its approach, especially in the early years was “elitist and haughty” as it concentrated funding on the restoration of English gentlemen’s country houses (Delafons 1997: 75). Slowly, as industrial buildings were recognised as outstanding by the HBC - as was LRS and the 1830 Warehouse – the HBC was better able to reflect the post war “mainstream of growing public concern for conservation” expressed through amenity societies (Delafons 1997: 75). The HBC remained operational until it was absorbed by English Heritage in 1983. It is against this background that the (re)production of Castlefield space in the 1970s was played out. However, this chapter argues the 1970s was also a critical transitional moment as historic industrial city space started tentatively to be valorised.
Civil Society Networks and the Contestation of Representations of Space

For Lefebvre the production of a new space, originally a counter-space, can never be bought about by any particular social group and must necessarily result from relationships between diverse groups which may include: ‘reactionaries’, ‘liberals’, ‘democrats’ and ‘radicals’ and:

There should therefore be no cause for surprise when a space-related issue spurs collaboration… between very different kinds of people… Such coalitions around some particular counter-project or counter-plan, promoting a counter–space in opposition to the one embodied in the strategies of power, occur all over the world… (Lefebvre 1991: 380-1)

The discovery of Francis Hawcroft’s letters in TNA was a pivotal moment in the research revealing as they do the emergence of historicised spaces of representation which ran counter to the dominant official representations of space. He was a prominent curator in the museums world whose interest in the preservation of LRS grew into a passion. He was a “serious figure in public life” (Clifford 1988) but he probably did not expect one of his letters would find its way to a senior cabinet minister, Sir Geoffrey Rippon, SoS at the DoE, and kindle the eventual re-presentation and re-production of the LRS site. The letter (Hawcroft 1973a TNA, see figure 5.3) underscores the potentially complex civil society networks; their interaction with the state and the rich intriguing stories behind the struggle for the station. His letter is a striking vignette of the actors’ roles and relationships in the efforts to assert their particular spaces of representation. In a few words Hawcroft unintentionally provided sharp insight into the motivations of the amenity societies and denoted the battle lines for coming contestations of city space.

Hawcroft did not at this point write directly to the owner of the building, BR nor to the body responsible for protecting listed buildings, the Manchester Corporation, he wrote instead to the Manchester MPs and wondered if they “could act personally to safeguard the future of this extremely important building” (Ibid). Five MPs joined the nascent
space-related coalition; making representations to: BR, government ministers, Manchester Corporation and the GMC.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Figure 5.3 Letter (1973) from Francis Hawcroft to the Manchester MPs (TNA)}

In his letter Hawcroft’s fervent re-presentation of space placed him firmly under the mantle of the amenity societies, thus distancing him from the Whitworth Gallery and his employer, Manchester University:

I am writing to you as the Georgian Group’s representative on the Manchester Conservation Areas and Historic Buildings panel rather than as Keeper of this Gallery... We visited the station in March 1971 and a report on our views was sent three months later to British Rail. Every member of the panel was of the opinion that steps should be taken to arrest the decay of the building.

\textsuperscript{34} They were: Sir Robert Cary, Conservative and Labour MPs: Charles Morris, Alf Morris, Gerald Kaufman and Will Griffiths.
the opinion that steps should be taken to arrest the decay of the building. (Hawcroft 1973a TNA)

These opening lines of the letter written on Manchester’s Whitworth Art Gallery headed paper displayed the writer’s credentials to speak on the subject of the station, not as an ordinary concerned citizen, but as a member of the MCHP and the Manchester representative of the well connected GrG. He spoke not just from academic knowledge but from first hand experience. He spoke not just for himself but for every member of the MCHP. British Rail’s responsibility for and “shameful neglect” of the station is made clear, and became a recurring theme for the amenity groups. Hawcroft recognised BR’s ability to prevaricate, even at this stage. Hawcroft’s scholarship was displayed when he drew an analogy with the 1815 Waterloo defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte by the alliance led by Wellington, the soon-to-be British Prime Minister. For Hawcroft and the amenity groups the station had that much historical gravitas. Their concern was with the use value of the station site, seeing it as a kind of differential rather than abstract space. Hawcroft’s counter-space of representation is legitimised by his personal experience having seen with his own eyes the dreadful state of the building. A first hand account of the state of the station in April 1973 renders Hawcroft’s outrage understandable. One of the HBB surveyors was so disgusted at the terrible state of the station he penned a ‘counter-minute’:

I am writing a separate minute because you may not wish it to go on the file… I made a conducted tour on Wednesday of the whole station building and was shocked at the appalling condition of the place. The building is suffering from gross and long-standing neglect… Rain pours into the blg. [sic] at several places… The offices and store rooms are mostly crammed with, not only junk of all kinds, but with old wooden office desks and stools etc., some of which may be as old as the station itself… Apart, perhaps from the large upper room still used as a canteen, the whole blg. [sic] and its contents are indescribably filthy. I was told that parties of interested visitors, including foreign tourists, come to the station; one can only imagine the impression they must receive. (Leach 1973 TNA)

The status of this document is not obvious. Although Leach calls it a minute, suggesting official status, it is in the form of a hand written note. However, it is clear from Leach’s professional assessment that for many years prior to 1973 BR had avoided carrying out even minimal listed building repairs and Manchester Corporation

35 The Manchester Conservation Areas and Historic Buildings Panel (MCHP) was created in 1970 to advise the Corporation regarding planning matters and included relevant professionals and organisations such as the MLPS, GrG, VSMG and CTNW.
was reluctant to use costly compulsory powers to force BR’s hand. Sir Robert Cary MP was sufficiently moved by Hawcroft’s plea to write to Geoffrey Rippon. Cary shared Hawcroft’s view of the historical importance of LRS (Cary 1973 TNA). He wrote to “Geoffrey” urging him to take action. In writing to Rippon, Cary reported that he had told Hawcroft “that in a matter like this, the Government can give an order to Richard Marsh [BR chairman] to act without further delay” (Ibid). Cary was mistaken. Rippon devoted precious time to the LRS cause despite a major threat to his political career in 1973.⁶ Although Rippon agreed with Cary’s preservationist sentiments, he was advised by a senior civil servant that he did not have the power to instruct BR to incur expenditure for repairing a listed building for which BR had no operational use (Speed 1973 TNA). British Rail had to operate on quasi-commercial lines. To his credit Rippon did not leave it there but took robust action, mobilising his civil servants to bring the relevant parties together:

I have therefore instructed officials to seek an immediate meeting with British Rail, Manchester City Council [sic], and the interested amenity societies in order that ways may be found to prevent further deterioration of the station and to secure in the long term its full repair, maintenance and use. (Rippon 1973 TNA)

What is more important for the thesis is that in replying to the MPs, Rippon saw a place in future meetings for “amenity societies” and felt that the HBC would “of course entertain sympathetically” a grant application towards the cost of repairs. Rippon understood the need to secure the station’s long term future:

The solution must lie in finding a new and suitable use for this station and the Historic Buildings Council would, of course in these circumstances entertain sympathetically an application for a grant towards the cost of repairs. (Rippon 1973 TNA)

Records of two meetings prompted by Rippon’s intervention survive in TNA. Both meetings took place at Manchester Town Hall in June 1973 and 1974. For each meeting a set of minutes was produced where candid views about LRS were recorded. It is important to realise that these and all the minutes for the ad hoc LRS meetings quoted below were never made public, until placed in TNA because they were not records of a formal local government committee. The 1973 meeting signals the start of

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⁶ Rippon was named by Peter Hain, in his anti-establishment days as the third government minister in the high profile sex scandal, exposed by sex worker Norma Levy, involving Lords Lambton and Jellicoe who had by then resigned (BBC 2004b).
a prolonged struggle for the valorisation of the LRS site and the wider area that later was rediscovered as ‘Castlefield’. Manchester Corporation’s highest ranking officer, the Town Clerk was Sir George Ogden; prompted by Rippon, Ogden organised a meeting inviting only representatives of the Corporation, BR and the DoE (Ogden 1973a). There was no place at the table for the amenity societies or politicians. In setting up the meeting Ogden wondered if the long term future of the Grade I listed LRS building may best be secured by relocating the ‘Museum of Science and Industry’ to the site (Ogden 1973b TNA). This suggestion was not pursued seriously by Manchester Corporation for financial reasons. In suggesting a museum Ogden was resurrecting, in a different context, Oliver’s 1949 idea of a Roman museum for Castlefield.

The North West Regional Office (NWRO) of the DoE based in Manchester made the crucial decision to involve the HBC in the first meeting which “would at least enable something positive to be said to the MPs” and make the provision of a public sector grant more likely (Aston 1973a TNA). Mr Glennie was the HBC representative and grasped the political importance of the station’s plight once the case had been taken up by SoS Rippon. In an unguarded moment Glennie strayed from the path of restrained official civil service language, expressing his feelings about the politicised nature of the LRS problem. He anticipated too the difficulties ahead in working with a recalcitrant Corporation and BR:

Would you please see this correspondence. This is a hot potato and I am under instructions to do what I can to make Manchester and British Rail do something about these buildings. (Glennie 1973a TNA)

Glennie was urged from the beginning by a senior DoE colleague “to include any voluntary bodies concerned” in the meetings (Lipman 1973 TNA). Despite this there were no complaints when they were not invited. Glennie however, played a pivotal role in supporting the amenity societies’ claims for the intrinsic value of the station within the DoE through continual repetition of the ‘first station’ narrative. In promoting historicised counter-representations of space, Glennie and by implication the HBC, acted rather like an amenity society proxy within the public sector articulating views contrary to the mainstream representations of space. He was certainly in correspondence with members of the GrG, writing to at least one of them at his home address and revealing inside information that the MCC would not be
pursuing the museum suggestion (Glennie 1974a TNA). He would not be the only protagonist to hold an ambivalent, privileged insider position (Olsson 2009) as the saga of the production of Castlefield space unfolded.

Minutes of the 1973 meeting record Glennie asking “whether the several societies and the public had been invited to contribute their opinions and suggestions” (in, Manchester Corporation 1973 TNA). Rippon seems not to have objected to their omission, assuming he even knew about it. After the meeting Glennie confided in colleagues that Manchester Corporation “would much rather see the bulk of the building demolished” and was sure that, “no money would be forthcoming from them for repairs” (Glennie 1973b TNA). What is interesting about the dynamics of the 1973 meeting is the key role played in the power networks that mediate the production of urban space, by amenity societies, even in their absence. At the meeting John Millar, the city’s chief planning officer and successor to Rowland Nicholas from 1963, was disarmingly frank about amenity societies’ role in rendering the station visible politically for the first time:

> The building had deteriorated and was now in a bad condition. There had been a national revival of interest in Victoriana. The Manchester Historic Buildings Panel had considered the situation – they being constituted of representatives of various groups and societies with architectural advisors and had drawn the attention of the Planning Committee to its derelict condition. (Millar in Manchester Corporation 1973 TNA)

**Contesting Spatial Representations**

A prominent feature of the June 1973 and 1974 meetings is the contested claims that were made for the historic meaning of LRS as the different branches of the public sector vied to impose their representations of space. Roberts the Corporation architect thought the only part of the listed building worth preserving was, “the main entrance and first class staircase, the old platform and ticket office – with the sundial, clock and bell” (in, Manchester Corporation 1973 TNA). BR’s representative at the 1974 meeting, a BR Estates Surveyor, was implacable that “only the station staircase and a small portion on each side” were worth preserving (Fulford in MCC 1974 TNA). These views were held despite a re-survey of the station in 1973 resulting in the decision that the Grade I listing applied to the “remains of the original terminus of the railway including the former master’s house and the section to the right later converted
into a canteen” (Aston 1973b). Fulford and Roberts’ emasculated valorisation implied only grudging acceptance of the historic attributes of LRS and was later applied consistently by BR. Articulating counter-spaces of representation at the two meetings were not amenity society voices but Glennie of the HBC. He was adamant the whole of the Grade I station building was of great historic importance and sacrosanct: as for demolition “the Minister would never allow it” and “the preservation of a small token area or shrine would not be suitable” (in Manchester Corporation 1973 TNA).

The two meetings demonstrate clearly the radically different representations of space promulgated by on the one hand BR and the Corporation and on the other the counter-representations of Glennie acting effectively as proxy for the amenity societies. Furthermore, BR and the Corporation were conjuring up the dominant 1970s representations of historic British railway buildings: that most of them could be demolished as was the magnificent Euston Station Arch in 1961. In addition, for BR and MCC the edge of city centre station site encapsulated not historic but financial property development value. Tension between the Corporation and BR about responsibility for the repair and maintenance of the station was at the root of the impasse during the 1970s. Glennie wrote in exasperation after a year of deadlock for him but three years for the amenity societies:

We are battling Manchester City and the Greater Manchester County over the restoration of the railway station. The matter is complicated by a private vendetta between BR and the City. (Glennie 1974b TNA, figure 5.4)

Similar sentiments of exasperation were implied the year before when Ogden claimed that the Corporation had “not succeeded in getting them [BR] to do any work” on the station (Ogden 1973a). What Glennie failed to notice, or at least comment on, was the tension between the HBC and the Corporation/BR alliance. Frustration was a feeling Glennie shared with other protagonists such as the new Manchester Town Clerk who in 1974 was suffering from station fatigue and despondency. He shared with Glennie his feelings that LRS came into the category of “white elephants and impossible cases” (Calderwood 1974 TNA).

From the June 1973 meeting, the Corporation appears mesmerised by its own spatial claim that the whole station site be redeveloped for residential use. In the 1970s MCC persisted with its ‘housing future’ representations of space, informed as they were by
1940s modernist planning and Labour Party working class housing provision ideologies (Shapely et al 2004). Above all it was the residential redevelopment value representations of space that were contested by the amenity societies. David Rhodes was adamant that the amenity societies were convinced that the 1978 Byrom Street Wimpey Homes Ltd scheme was inappropriate although Wimpy were, “terribly enthusiastic about it. They wanted to clear everything and just do housing.” (Rhodes 2008 interview). In like vein, one of the active members of Liverpool Road Station Society (LRSS) declared emotively in a memoir that MCC wanted to “bulldoze” all the old buildings in the area and replace them with town houses (Peters 2001 MSIA).

![Figure 5.4 Memorandum from Mr Glennie, Secretary HBC (annotations in original TNA)](image)

**Behind the Scenes Networks in the Production of Space**

The Manchester MPs provided a link in the network between Manchester and London exemplified by Minister of State, Charles Morris’ suggestion in 1974 of a meeting between MCC, BR, HBC and the new GMC (Glennie 1974c TNA). Bridson of the
HBB used his contacts at the *Daily Telegraph* (Armstrong 1973 TNA) to ensure further national press coverage. It is somewhat ironic that in parallel with Hawcroft’s Manchester/London network, another one formed centred in Manchester involving the Victorian Society Manchester Group (VSMG) founded in 1966 (Steve Roman 2010 email appendix 2) and a new amenity society. In 1976 Rhodes and Jane Kennedy, VSMG Secretary who worked for GMC, wrote to every railway buff in the North West inviting them to a meeting at the Town Hall. It was well attended and the outcome was the formation of the single interest group, the LRSS; constituted formerly in 1978.

Rhodes became the first chairman, thereby entrenching further his insider conflicts of interest. In 1979 LRSS received a boost to its credibility when former Prime Minister Harold Wilson agreed to be its President (Wilson 1979 MSIA). Undoubtedly, the most high profile and well connected amenity society involved was the GrG based in London (appendix 1). In the early 1970s it was chaired by Ivan Chance known to his friends as Peter who was chairman of Christie’s the London based international fine art auction house (Lynda McLeod 2008 email). The Group's patron in the 1970s was H M Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother. It is now Prince Charles. Although based in London the GrG intervened in ‘worthy causes’ all over the country. It was Hawcroft who first brought the station counter-project to the attention of the GrG in June 1972 (Hawcroft 1972a GrGA). The GrG archives reveal that Hawcroft and Chance were in continual communication from the early 1970s until the early 1980s regarding LRS’s preservation. Several times Hawcroft roused the GrG to lobby the relevant public sector organisations and MPs in Manchester and London.

BR’s prevarication was evident and “the longer they dither” the more “dilapidated the building will become” (Ibid). Hawcroft it was who orchestrated a joint GrG/Victorian Society letter to *The Sunday Times* (Murray 1972 GrGA).37 The joint letter resulted from one of several behind the scenes interventions by Hawcroft revealed through the archival research. If the letter (Chance and Pevsner 1973 BLNA) with its talk of “nothing but procrastination” was meant to shame BR into preservation action it was ineffective. After several years during which little progress was made Hawcroft sought to accelerate the process by inducing action from GMC via the GrG. Applying his

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37 The first Victorian Society was founded in London in 1958 “To awaken public interest in an appreciation of the best of Victorian and Edwardian era arts, architecture and design.” (Bluhm and Rhodes 1990: 45).
knowledge of committee structures he prodded the GrG to write to several leading
GMC politicians but urged discretion:

I would rather that my name was not mentioned in your letter simply because
the Gallery is very dependent on G.M.C. for financial aid and I would not want
to antagonise the County Secretary or the Chairman of the Recreation & Arts
Committee in any way! (Hawcroft 1977a GrGA)

So while Hawcroft was at times ready to go public in the interests of the station
campaign, he was also acutely aware of his precarious ‘insider’ position and the
potential conflict of interests confronting a public sector official engaged actively in
amenity society lobbying. Hawcroft trod this thin line from the start of LRS counter-
project when he reported to the GrG that “negotiations are going on behind the scenes
at the Corporation” and that, “somebody from the architect’s department” had reported
the station had deteriorated so much it will be impossible to put right (Hawcroft 1973b
GrGA). Rhodes too found himself compromised by his amenity society activism. He
chaired VSMG (1977-81) while working for MCC. He was counselled by Millar,
MCC chief planner to stand down from VSMG because of the potential conflict of
interests but continued with both roles (Rhodes 2009 interview). A variety of tactics
was adopted by the amenity societies, ranging from direct confrontation with BR and
the local authorities to more subtle networking to influence those at the top of key
organisations. Confrontation and shaming tactics seem to have achieved little when
Chance chided BR’s prevarication and claimed LRS had the potential to embarrass the
UK on an international scale:

You will recall our correspondence in 1972 about this interesting complex of
buildings. Not only is the continuing delay bound to lead to further
deterioration in the building but it is the 1975 European Architectural Heritage
Year and the relentless probing of the press is likely to show up the nation's
black spots as well as our achievements in the context of European
conservation. (Chance 1975 TNA)
Archival data reveal the utilisation of connections between amenity groups in the struggle to valorise the station. Chance was advised by Jonathan Minns (1976 GrGA, figure 5.5), founder of the Brighton & Hove Engineerium, to contact William McAlpine, millionaire chairman of the eponymous construction company, owner of the Flying Scotsman and a keen railway buff: Chance (1976 GrGA) did so. McAlpine’s reply to Chance emanated from his private address and the tycoon advised Chance to contact BR’s recently appointed chairman Peter Parker who would be “very sympathetic” having officiated at the formal starting up of the restored historic engine at Kew Bridge Pumping Station (McAlpine 1976 GrGA).

**Figure 5.5 Extract from a letter from Jonathon Minns of the Brighton and Hove Engineerium (annotations in original GrGA)**

Although they did not attend the 1973/74 meetings and there is a frustrating archival gap for 1975-77 amenity societies’ attendance was significant numerically by 1978 coinciding with the founding of the LRSS in that year. Amenity society representation
at GMC Liverpool Road Station meetings grew significantly sometime in the mid-1970s. At one meeting in 1978 the seven amenity society representatives made up 40% of those present (GMC 1978a NMR). Hawcroft’s membership of this amenity society opened up another front in the struggle for the station and extended the spatial network to London. Although the amenity societies had powerful connections and a consistent preservationist voice their counter-representations remained subjugated by the dominant representations of space of MCC and BR.

The amenity society struggle was not at this stage producing the resources needed for the spatial practice that would ‘save’ the LRS. Spatial practice is the Cinderella of Lefebvre’s spatial triad. It has received less attention than the other two elements. But for Lefebvre it is important partly because it is delivers the specific places and facilities that urban society needs. Much of Lefebvre (1991) operates at a theoretical level. At times though, Lefebvre indicates the importance of the small scale, down to the individual buildings:

Spatial practice is the production and reproduction of specific places and spatial ‘ensembles’ appropriate to the social formation. It would include building typology, urban morphology and the creation of zones for specific purposes; a specific range of types of park for recreation; test sites for nuclear weapons; places for this and that; sites for death (graveyards) and remembrance (memorials, battlegrounds, museums, historic walks and tours). (Shields 1999: 162, based on Lefebvre 1991)

Due to financial pressure British Rail sought to achieve the best possible financial returns on its land assets. Hence BR refused to offer for sale any more than LRS itself after Glennie suggested to BR that the station could be sold for “a nominal sum” (Glennie 1973b TNA). Financial property development logic was deployed by BR: the smaller the extent of historic building preservation, the greater the redevelopment value. Similarly, for MCC the smaller the extent of the listed building, the fewer subsidies from city coffers would be needed for repair and the more land for housing. BR’s property negotiation team consisted of professionals who were experienced at

38 The amenity societies were: Civic Trust London (Peter Robertshaw), CTNW (Jonathon Hall), LRSS (Clive Luhrs, David Rhodes and Jane Kennedy), GrG (Francis Hawcroft). Other meeting were attended by representatives of the VSMG, MCHP and Manchester Regional Industrial Archaeological Society
securing the most profitable deal. Maund in remembers the discomfort they provoked in the GMC planners:

We used to meet BR estates people and I think we had a quarterly liaison meeting with them, because they were always contemplating developing land that they thought was surplus to their requirements, it was a way of making money. But they were also very reluctant to give up land that the city needed for its projects. Our negotiations were entirely with the estates side not the operations side. And they were hard lads. Their view of life was very narrow. They had instructions from government to maximise income and operating surplus etc. We didn’t fall out with them but, you know, you didn’t go to a quarterly liaison meeting with a spring in your step [RM and ML laugh]. (in Maund 2008 interview)

When they were not intimidating planners BR property professionals were denying liability. From 1975 when BR ceased use of the station building it was viewed as somebody else’s responsibility:

In the view of my Board the matter is now a wholly civic one… because of its importance as an integral part of the historical development of the city it should be properly be owned and cared for by the city. (Kaukas 1978 TNA)

The view of the station as an economic cost had received sympathy from Rippon who felt unjustified in pressing BR to repair a building for which they had no operational use “ever since passenger traffic ceased some years ago” (Rippon 1973 TNA). This may be English ministerial understatement or civil servant ignorance since the building ceased to be a passenger station in 1844 when it became a goods depot. BR’s view was that the rehabilitation of the Grade I listed station was not possible within their operating budget. This view went to the top of the BR hierarchy. The chairman wrote personally to the GrG, with which he had been in cordial correspondence for some time, that BR was unable to maintain the listed building because “we simply do not have sufficient money available” (Parker 1977a GrGA). However, the starkest expression of the dominance of the pecuniary rather than the intrinsic historic value of rail property assets derives from indiscreet comments committed to an internal memo by BR’s Chief Executive, Operations regarding the 1980 celebrations for the 150th anniversary of the Liverpool to Manchester Railway:

I certainly believe we must take advantage of this opportunity to publicise the advance of railways over the last 150 years and to provide the Rainhill trails as a focus for increased business. I would like an assessment of the risks towards achievement of the revenue level of £1,200,000. Again is this pitched optimistically or pessimistically? I would like to feel that there is absolutely no
chance of losing any money on this speculative venture and there is a reasonable chance of making a handsome profit. (Campbell 1979 TNA)

There was throughout the 1970s three demands on the resourcing of LRS spatial practice: the immediate weather proofing repairs, the necessary structural works and the conversion to a viable long term use. Once the non-operational uses ceased in 1975 and BR was ready to sell LRS, there was even less incentive to maintain the building as it could be expected reasonably that a future purchaser would want to demolish the ramshackle structure. The June 1973 meeting raised the spectre that structural repairs would cost £100,000 (Manchester Corporation 1973 TNA). Glib talk of 1973 prices can suppress appreciation of the size of the spatial practice problem task facing the three interested parties. In today’s prices building costs of £100,000 are considerable.39 Talk of major structural rebuilding on this scale seemed to inhibit action. From 1973 between them the MCC, HBC and BR harangued persistently by the amenity societies did set about trying to achieve badly overdue weather-proofing repairs. The long drawn out three-way financial tussle that ensued was on the scale of epic tragicomedy. On one hand the nugatory sums of money for weather-proofing repairs are comically small, on the other the MCC and BR were held in a tightening budgetary straightjacket. A deal was finally worked out for HBC, BR and MCC to share equally the small immediate repair costs of £400. Boardman, the city’s Deputy Town Clerk then announced that an additional £93 each was required for “an area of perished rendering on the front elevation” (Boardman 1975 TNA).

Although piffling, these HBC and MCC grants were the first elements of concrete spatial practice, and broke the deadening cycle of neglect BR had established. British Rail’s view was consistently that there “were no funds available to rehabilitate the building” (Fulford in MCC 1974 TNA), i.e. for major structural works. Head of city centre planning, Henry Blacknicki saw BR as “responsible for the restoration of the property” as late as February 1978 (in, GMC 1978b TNA). The parsimonious deadlock

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39 The Retail Price Index (RPI) averaged about 6.7% since 1973, but a better index might be general building costs. Building Cost Information Service data only go back to 1985 but since then building costs have risen by about 4.5% per annum. Extrapolating back to 1973 would give a factor of about 4.5 so £100,000 then would be about £450,000 now. If the RPI approach is used the net present value figure (at 2007 prices) was about £900,000 (Rapley 2007 email).
between BR and the Corporation should be seen in the context of the squeeze on UK public spending, especially nationalised industries and local government budgets. Therefore, after their minimal combined expenditure in late 1974 BR and MCC remained united in frugality. Absence of notable public pressure probably contributed to the impasse despite Corporation worries about nebulous and unspecified “increasing public concern” (Ogden 1973b TNA). Structural repair costs, though considerable, were not the principal impediment to the re-production of the station space. Lack of public concern was a regarded as a more serious problem by Glennie who lamented that “the cost of repair is high” but that “the real difficulty is to find and generate local enthusiasm” (Glennie 1975 TNA). Ironically, it was not public enthusiasm that stimulated large scale spatial practice but the unflagging efforts of the amenity societies and the arrival of the GMC.

The Importance of GMC’s Intervention in the Coalition

Given the propensity of officialdom in the 1970s to devalorise historic industrial city space within key parts of the public sector, their resistance to the spatial practice of historic building preservation looked set to continue indefinitely. However, the most significant addition to the core group of public interests was GMC which created tensions with MCC and SCC. Although a strategic planning authority, the GMC’s second Chief Executive understood the powerful showcase effects of visible inner Manchester spatial practice projects on the ground:

> There is an understandable divergence of views about the responsibility for industrial development schemes as between the Districts and the County... It would clearly be unfortunate if the County's development activities were steered entirely towards the outer Districts. This would be a natural trend if the County is effectively shut out of normal industrial development schemes in the Inner Area... I very much hope, therefore that on issues like the acquisition of nationalized industry sites the County will be able to play a role. (Harrison 1978 GMCRO)

The GMC established itself quickly as a major protagonist in the LRS counter-project. By the time the GMC became involved the MCC had opted out of buying the station from BR (Merrill 1976 TNA). It was GMC officers, especially Maund (the planner) and Evans (the architect) who saw the potential of the station and the necessity of including the wider site in any acquisition deal with BR. Politicians were more reticent to offer support as it was seen as a high risk venture:
It was quite funny at the outset. Errm there were going to be senior [political] people from GMC at the meetings. But both of them said at the last minute, “I’ve been called away and can’t make it, good luck.” [laughs], I think because it was very political at the time. I remember the County Secretary saying to me as he disappeared “do be careful” [RM and ML laugh]. They could see that politically we officers would get a lot of flak if we couldn’t deliver after rushing into commitments.” (in, Maund 2008 interview)

There was therefore a differential infusion of amenity society counter-representations into official representations of space with GMC politicians lagging behind officers. Unnecessary delay seemed to plague the labours of the amenity society activists.

Sentiments of frustration and anger at the apparent lack of progress were expressed in 1977 when Hawcroft observed that the GMC “shows little enthusiasm for acquiring the building” (Hawcroft 1977b GrGA). A year later Hawcroft divined from his inside knowledge that it was “very clear that GMC and MCC politicians are unenthusiastic about taking over the station” (Hawcroft 1978 GrGA). Feelings of annoyance surfaced in the normally restrained urbane Hawcroft who fulminated uncharacteristically that, “it is simply appalling that BR and the local authorities have made no progress whatsoever” (Ibid). At ministerial level too one senses growing irritation. Reg Freeson, Labour government Minister for Housing and Construction replying to lobbying from Alf Morris MP was well briefed on the deadlock and the Minister “did not welcome the apparent competition between two major local authorities” to buy the station site (Freeson 1978 MSIA).

This period from 1974 to late 1978 is characterised differently by Maund (2008 interview) who felt that GMC was making steady progress and that the amenity societies were unappreciative and obstructive:

…the Liverpool Road Station Preservation [sic] Society was chaired by a man called David Rhodes. David was a young architect, a fiery bloke. He may have been chairman at the same time of the Victorian Society and he was very good at criticising others for not doing their duty. We held the meetings monthly. David started every meeting with a harangue against those who had not done things. At the end of each meeting I listed the things that we would try and do because we were going to try and deliver it for this partnership thing. We would take these things to a GMC committee to try and get agreement for the next stage. And we delivered. Each month we could report back that we had got approval from committee to do this or that: didn’t stop David haranguing at every meeting…. I remember David starting with the harangue again and I said, “David you’ve done this every meeting for about six months now. We know it off by heart. We’ve actually delivered on everything we said we’d do.
What have these harangues contributed to progressing things?” And there was this shuffling of feet.

On the other hand Rhodes criticised strongly “the lack of action” from the local authorities (in, GMC 1978b MSIA). It is important to note that Rhodes attended several meetings as an either a VSMG, LRSS or MCC representative, making him an insider activist par excellence. He felt that he and the amenity societies had produced the results on the ground:

You see, all the establishment, 90% of them are reactive they’re not proactive. They don’t go beyond the job and I was going way beyond my job. But look what’s happened as a result of it. (Rhodes 2009 interview)

In April 1978 the GrG became openly hostile to GMC and the Group’s Secretary, consumed with anger after five years of frustration was still, "trying to fight the apathy” of officialdom (Murray 1978 GrGA). She was disappointed with GMC and BR who clearly “have no intention of taking positive action”. For Murray the necessary initiatives had all been taken by the amenity societies. However, the amenity societies were not privy to the “secret meetings” between BR and the local authorities (Rhodes 2009 interview) and therefore unaware of the progress being made. Drawing on the experience of their planning and recreation teams’ work in Lancashire and Manchester, the GMC grasped the necessity of acquiring the wider station site in order to be able to develop a suitable museum project. Amenity society hostility to GMC in 1978 was ironic because it was early in that year that the Leader of GMC himself was in negotiations with BR to buy the LRS site (Harrison and Millar 1978a NMR).

BR estates officers understood that divesting the wider site of the listed station for a nominal sum was only acceptable if the rest of the property assets could be sold at market value. A major difficulty faced by GMC was that throughout the negotiations BR still hoped to be able to sell the whole 9 acre site to MCC who had for several years wanted to redevelop the whole area for housing, hoping to extend the Byrom Street scheme (Bray 1976 TNA). In the strict financial climate of the mid-1970s, no public housing redevelopment scheme was proposed by MCC although it made money through the sale of a so called slum housing site in Castlefield to Wimpey Homes Ltd (figure 5.6). In the context of the next chapter it is interesting that although Castlefield is named on the Ordnance Survey base map, the area was called ‘Area 58’ and ‘Byrom Street’. British Rail clung to the possibility of maximising the financial redevelopment
value of the 1830 Warehouse through the mid-1970s with BR’s chairman Peter Parker making it clear to Gerald Kaufman and Alf Morris that the 1830 Warehouse, "could be included in the deal but a proper price must be paid for it" (Parker 1977b). What was offered initially to the GMC by BR however, was only the station and platform. 

Figure 5.6 Extract from a Manchester Corporation map (1966) showing Byrom ‘Street slum’ clearance area and Castlefield at the bottom left (MPDA)

A draft contract, in which BR specified the price of £1 for a station only deal was drawn up in 1975 and offered to the County Valuer (Bray 1975 TNA). This seemingly benevolent offer was rejected sensibly by GMC, as it carried a repair obligation of £100,000; precipitating protracted negotiations over the next 3 years as the GMC officers remained focused on acquiring for £1 the larger 2.5 acre site, the minimum necessary for a viable science museum. By late 1978 a deal was close and the (MEN 1978 NMR) seemed to give credit to BR for saving “an important part of the nation’s railway heritage”. Eventually, GMC officers persuaded their politicians to buy the 2.5 acre site which included the station and the 1830 Warehouse for £1; concluding the formalities in early 1979; the delay resulting from BR’s tenacious insistence on selling

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40 Although the letter refers to ‘the platform’ in fact Liverpool Road Station was only a passenger station for 14 years and never had a platform.
only LRS (Tideswell 1977 GrGA). While negotiations were proceeding, the chairman of BR did offer the station personally to the GrG for £1 (Parker 1977a GrGA, figure 5.7). The Group declined politely, citing “financial constraints” (Murray 1977 GrGA). The source of the confusion about who bought the station for £1 is a premature statement made in error by the chairman of the LRSS in 1978 that they had bought the station (Peters 2001 MSIA).

At the point when the GMC was about to make the breakthrough by acquiring the station site, the Manchester counter-space network appears to have become alarmed at the lack of progress. In response the LRSS and VSMG organised 148th LRS birthday campaign, giving out birthday cards at Manchester railway stations (figure 5.8) as a prelude to the grander 150th birthday celebrations (Robert-Blum 1980 MENA). A major precursor to the fulfilment of the station valorisation project was the LRSS inspired steam extravaganza in 1979 (Rhodes 2008 interview). Thousands of people
came to Manchester to watch a cavalcade of steam traction engines parade through the city terminating at LRS (Thornber 1979 NMR).

A larger LRS event which combined with events at Rainhill and Liverpool in 1980 to celebrate the 150th birthday of the Liverpool to Manchester Railway was an even bigger success (Rhodes 2009 interview). LRSS managed to secure the re-instatement of the track that connected the station across George Stephenson’s River Irwell Bridge into the mainline network allowing the Flying Scotsman to feature spectacularly in the celebrations (Ibid). During the interview Maund remembered vividly the 1980 celebrations:

It was going to be a big day and they got a steam engine and they got the fog warning things on the tracks so when the train went over it went bang! You know, and they put a great sheet on a scaffolding frame blocking the view
down the line. Everybody was assembled, you heard but couldn’t see the train going whoosh, whoosh, whoosh and the colossal bangs and it burst through the huge sheet. My son who was about four was sat on my shoulders and I thought he was going to go into orbit. (Maund 2008 interview)

And as Maud spoke he produced completely unexpectedly a set of 35mm slides he had taken of the event that had sat in his filing cabinet for nearly 30 years.

Figure 5.9 and 5.10 Flying Scotsman at the Liverpool Road Station 150th birthday celebrations (1980, RMPA)
His slides capture the moment of excitement when the magnificent steam train became visible (figure 5.9 and 5.10). His realist photographic record contrasts with the representations of space imaginings of an anonymous GMC architect as to how the 1980 event might look (figure 5.11). Some of the imaginings turned out to be fanciful, such as the free bus service.

![Figure 5.11 GMC architectural artist’s visual representation of how the 1980 Liverpool Road Station 150th birthday celebrations might look (TNA)](image)

Others, like the first passenger locomotive replica, boat rally, carousel, traction engine show, steam train rides and the spread of events and museums across the whole site were prescient. However, what the drawing encapsulates most, exemplified by the hot air balloon rides, is the shift in official representations of the station site from unpleasant industry to heritage and leisure. However, it should be noted that the reimagining did not extend to ‘Castlefield’ which does not feature in the 1970s struggle to establish the LRS counter-project. What the station project did was liberate this industrial site from the confines of past representations of space, something that was advocated by Oliver in the 1940s but never initiated. For example, it was claimed
that Liverpool Road could be a museum quarter to rival London’s Cromwell Road (1979 MENA). Perhaps in recognition of the area’s post industrial transition the Castlefield Art Gallery opened in 1984.

Returning to the less spectacular work of the public sector players, by 1978 a few hundred pounds had been spent on basic weather-proofing repairs to the Grade I station. What was required was a shift from the seemingly unquenchable prevarications that would propel the counter-project forward into concrete spatial practice. Such a shift was instigated by GMC which adopted gradually the station counter-project. Interestingly, GMC went further than the amenity societies, seeing the station building not in isolation but as part of a wider collection of historic industrial buildings big enough to accommodate the growing science museum collection in a viable county-wide visitor attraction. Ironically one of the reasons the museum needed to relocate related to its rapidly expanding collection. This was because many manufacturing companies in the area were going bankrupt, due in part to high interest rates and a strong pound sterling; as they went bust they donated important industrial artefacts with historic or scientific value to the museum. The big picture of industrial restructuring due to government monetary policy and globalisation, therefore, provides context and partial explanation for the LRS story. GMC contested BR and MCC’s minimal historic valorisation, expanding the area of historic interest:

The Grade I frontage, Grade II Listed Warehouse and the area of track between the two buildings could be used as a science museum. A scheme had been prepared within the Planning Department some two years ago to investigate his possibility and the costs identified at todays [sic] prices are in the order of £2M. (Maund, in GMC 1978b TNA)

After a February 1978 meeting GMC approached the HBC and gained an assurance for a grant of £23,000 towards emergency rebuilding costs (Maund 1978 TNA). Clearly, a large funding gap remained which was bridged by a different coalition (discussed below). On disposal of the station, track and adjoining 1830 warehouse (the 2.5 acre site) to the GMC, BR agreed to contribute £100,000 towards the project costs - a small price to pay for ridding itself of the growing burden of a troublesome, resource hungry building. Spatial practice had shifted from an excruciatingly slow, minor project of amenity society counter-space to the mainstream of central and local state intervention. The archives record this moment in the words of Maund who:
…expressed the view that the only way in which the complex might be saved would be if the County Council could use the buildings to meet one of its major requirements. Museum policy might be just such an opportunity. (in, GMC 1978b TNA)

Expansion of the project created tension between GMC and HBC who complained that they were not consulted about the expansion plans (Jennings 1980 NMR). Despite this, in 1978 Jennings praised Maund’s contribution to the station project in glowing terms, feeling that he should “take most of the credit” for the successful acquisition of the site from BR, having done an “enormous amount to persuade local politicians” of the project’s importance (Ibid). Following GMC acquisition a cascade of financial resources poured into the LRS complex. A further HBC grant of £119,000 to partially fund phase 2 rebuilding work was approved in 1979 (HBC 1979 NMR), followed by £50,000 in 1982 (Maund 1982 NMR). In 1981 a grant of £211,000 was secured from HBC for works to the Station Master’s House adjacent to LRS (Brereton 1981 NMR). Despite this an article in the Guardian which gave a fairly detailed account of the restoration did not mention the HBC (Thornber 1979 NMR). Somebody, presumably from HBC and sensitive to HBC’s need to demonstrate visible success on the ground, annotated the article in the archival file “No mention of HBC!” GMC set up a charitable Trust in 1981 to run the MOSI aided by a grant from the North West Tourist Board (County Legal Officer 1981 NMR) requiring only a peppercorn rent for the station buildings. Sir Peter Parker (chairman of BR at the time) became its first chairman along with several prominent GMC councillors.

From 1980 the amenity societies were marginalised in the local arena of spatial practice to the disgust of the VSMG which was “deeply concerned at the lack of liaison over proposals for the site” (Rhodes 1981 MSIA). Similarly LRSS protested bitterly to GMC about the “severe lack of communication” and complete failure to acknowledge the Society’s positive support (Sharples 1982 MSIA). Nevertheless the amenity societies had achieved their prime objective of ‘saving’ LRS. In so doing they achieved official acceptance of their counter-representations of historic industrial city space. Their marginalisation left the three major public sector players: GMC, MCC and the HBC to manage the task of amassing as best they could the considerable additional resources needed. Despite the basic repairs to the station, the ecstatic frisson of the 150th birthday celebrations and the large numbers of people and organisations
who participated; there remained a significant financial shortfall stymieing the progression of the ambitious station/museum project. To understand how the last piece of the project’s financial jigsaw was manoeuvred into place requires a return to inner city urban policy.

The Decisive Intervention of the MSICP

Urban Programme of the 1960s with its focus on social needs did not see any grant monies flow to Castlefield. The Manchester and Salford Inner City Partnership (MSICP) began work formally in July 1978. It had a two tier structure: a politician led Partnership Committee, chaired initially by Reg Freeson, Labour DoE Minister for Housing and Construction. He was followed after the May 1979 election by Lord Bellwin, Conservative Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, DoE under Michael Heseltine. Below the Committee was an Officer Working Party (MOWP) chaired by the Regional Director, DoE, initially Mr W R Corrie. The Committee had about 15 members including two government ministers, the leaders of MCC (initially Norman Morris, followed by Graham Stringer in May 1984), GMC, Salford City Council (SCC) and the chairmen of Manchester and Salford Area Health Authorities. The MOWP had a membership of over 25 consisting of senior civil servants, local authority CEOs and the heads of a number of quangos such as the area health authorities and Manpower Services Commission: but the MOWP was dominated by the DoE, at the October 1979 meeting out of 25 attendees, 10 were from the DoE. Alongside this executive was an advisory body called the Economy Working Party, also known as the Task Force which offered a private sector perspective on Partnership strategy. Economy Working Party included members of the local CBI and Chamber of Commerce together with the Independent Review Team of prominent local business leaders (MOWP 1984 DCLGA). An initial budget of £10M p.a. was allocated by the government which towards the end of the Partnership’s tenure had reached £25M. It was split 60:30:10 between MCC, SCC and GMC projects.

Taking its cue from the White Paper the first Draft Strategy of the MSICP defined the key problems as: economic decline, physical decay and social disadvantage (MOWP 1978a: para 7, TNA). Unsurprisingly, when consulted about the draft programme of MSICP schemes in 1982 the Manchester Chamber of Commerce thought that, “the
overriding priority should be given to projects that would stimulate economic activity” (Thomas 1982 DCLGA). In line with the 1977 White Paper’s reconfiguration of governmental representations of urban space, the MSICP’s basic objective was, “the regeneration of the inner areas of Manchester and Salford” recognising that “economic regeneration is the priority” (MOWP 1978b TNA). The Partnership’s emphasis on economy and environment rather than social needs or visible immigrants came almost word for word from the White Paper. One of the Partnership’s first tasks was to draw up a three year programme of projects with estimated costs. Covering social needs and physical renewal projects, the programme presents a nascent transition to the priorities of the White Paper. In 1978 GMC promoted the MOSI project as fitting well within the scope of the reformulated inner city policy and MSICP Programme (Harrison and Millar 1978b NMR). A large budget of £1,570,000 was allocated in the first draft of the Partnership Programme by the GMC (MOWP 1978a TNA). And although agreeing the Programme quickly was a priority its inclusion was contested with reference to social needs representations of inner city space.

Harrison, CEO of the GMC thought that because of its environmental and cultural benefits the MOSI scheme was appropriate for the Programme (in MOWP 1978c TNA). Opposing Harrison, at the October 1978 MOWP meeting was Mr Rees CEO of SCC who felt that the project did not meet the social welfare needs of local people and that “the scheme was not relevant to the inner area” (Ibid). His negative views were shared by the powerful chairman of the meeting, Mr Corrie of the DoE. Rees’ enthusiasm for deletion led to his claim, disputed by the chairman, that the project had been rejected at the October meeting (Ritchie 1978 TNA). In writing to Corrie after the October meeting Harrison expressed his fears about the operation of the MOWP (1978 TNA, figure 5.12). A special meeting of the MOWP was convened to consider disputed GMC projects. In advance of this November MOWP meeting the chairman, Corrie wrote to Harrison explaining that because of the “divergence of views” between the MOWP members, he (Corrie) is obliged to advise the Minister that, “the DoE should decline to provide funding” for it under the Urban Programme for the time being (Corrie 1978 TNA). Corrie added that the Minister himself was in any case not convinced, holding the view firmly that:

…this proposal cannot be said to make a direct contribution to the social and economic objectives of the partnership, however much it may further those
ends incidentally... the benefits of this scheme are cast so wide that they could not be said to be of the particular local importance that would justify funding under urban programme. (Freeson in, Ibid)

Significantly, Norman Morris (MCC) agreed with this view. GMC made the mistake of presenting the scheme as only generating county-wide benefits. At the November 1978 meeting it was agreed, with “regret” on the part of Harrison, that the project be deleted from the Programme (in, MOWP 1978d TNA) and other projects substituted.

Left in limbo, the project had stalled again and heritage invigorated representations of inner urban space remained dominated at the national level by continuing social needs representations of space.
Bearing in mind Lefebvre’s comment that the production of a new space can never be bought about by any one particular social group and that it should be no surprise when a space-related issue spurs collaboration between very different kinds of people (Lefebvre 1991: 380-1), he would no doubt have appreciated the poignant irony of this funding hiatus in November 1978. Here was a Labour government declining to fund a regeneration project promoted by a Labour dominated inner city partnership. Such difficulties of instigating partnerships between local authorities were appreciated, when the 1977 White Paper was drafted, especially those in Salford and Manchester, which were fiercely independent, “politically self-confident local authority machines” (Parkinson and Wilks 1983: 31). Following the November meeting, the MOWP proposed replacement projects for the rejected MOSI scheme. There the LRS project and with it the reproduction of Castlefield may have hung uncomfortably; conflicting local political interests having stymied the progression of a historic space counter-project. But as often happens with long term projects, political events elsewhere had unexpected impacts. A wave of industrial and public sector strikes hit Britain in late 1978 becoming so serious that the era was dubbed by the media, with a poetic nod at Shakespeare’s Richard III ‘the winter of discontent’. Things deteriorated in the New Year and a general election announced for May. Mrs Thatcher’s Tory Party won with a decisive Commons majority of 43. From May 1979 therefore there was greater equanimity between the GMC and the government since after May 1978 the GMC was Conservative controlled.41

Margaret Thatcher’s government is of course noted for its controversial UDC urban policy innovation, what is less appreciated is the impact of Michael Heseltine on the Inner City Partnerships under the reorientated Urban Programme regime (discussed in the previous chapter). Lord Bellwin, the MSICP’s new chairman suspended immediately the existing Programme of projects. Discussions ensued leading to changed priorities and objectives for the MSICP. Economic and physical environment issues remained priorities, but there was to be an enhanced role for the “stimulation of activity by the private sector” and crucially for the MOSI project and Castlefield, an

enhanced role for capital investment “to achieve a discernible visual impact on the inner area” which was thought vital for “generating confidence in the future of the area” (MSICP 1979a TNA). After the May election a series of MSICP meetings over several months began to reconfigure the Programme of regeneration schemes. Once again the LRS museum conversion project was proposed and supported strongly in the MSICP but this time by the Conservative Councillor Fieldhouse, Leader of GMC. His justification for the project is interesting, he claimed that, “it would make a significant impact upon the environment of a run-down area of the City and would be a major tourist attraction” (Fieldhouse, in MSICP 1979b). Leader of MCC Norman Morris gave wholehearted support too, placing the project in the context of plans to redevelop the nearby City Exhibition Hall. He argued further that the “economic impact of the station project was an important consideration” and that what was proposed “would have important implications for the economy of the inner city area and its environment (Morris, in Ibid). In contrast with the county-wide arguments put forward at the 1978 November meeting, the project was presented in late 1979 as bringing “significant local economic benefits in terms of local employment prospects”. It was felt that “inner city residents” in particular would benefit and that the Museum “is likely to be heavily patronised by local schools” (MSICP 1979b TNA).

The Conservative chairman of the MSICP, unlike his Labour predecessor indicated that “in the light of what had been said I am prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the GMC’s proposals” (Bellwin in Ibid). At the December 1979 meeting it was agreed that the project should receive UrP funding; a hand written annotation on the minutes reads, “The Dept [DoE] has already agreed to match BR’s contribution which was £100,000.” (Ibid). The project with a total estimated cost of £4,351,000 over three years was duly included in the 1980-83 Inner Area Programme (MSICP 1980 TNA), with an initial MSICP grant of £300,000. In addition the project attracted Derelict Land Grant, European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) money and further funding from mainstream GMC and MCC Arts and Recreation budgets. Before being approved by DoE, ERDF funding was queried by a DoE civil servant because “a strong tourist connection” had to be made and Manchester “itself is not a tourist centre (naturally I would be pleased to be contradicted)” (Moffitt 1978 NMR) - evidently he was.
MSICP funding for the GMC’s MOSI project was therefore a decisive spatial moment in the 1970s prehistory of the production of Castlefield. The Museum of Science and Industry as it was then called relocated to the converted LRS complex and was opened by the Queen in 1982, although its official opening date is given as 1983 because this is the date of the second phase which included the large warehouse on the corner of Lower Byrom Street. After the move it was rebranded the Greater Manchester Museum of Science and Industry (GMMSI) reflecting the dominance of the GMC in its production. Rivalry between MCC and GMC emerged at this point. Not to be outdone MCC opened the Air and Space Museum in one of the 19th century market halls, the City Exhibition Hall in 1983. Graham Stringer notes ruefully that although they faced each other:

They had been built with their doors facing in opposite directions because one was City and the other County [GS and ML laugh]. It was the worst kind of municipal competition. It was pathetic really. (Stringer 2009 interview)

In further recognition of the historic character of the area the viaducts which cross Castlefield were listed Grade II in the late 1980s. The one which ran to the Great Northern Goods Warehouse has been unused for decades and forms a linear ‘natural’ space through the area. Having established quickly a national reputation, the GMMSI underwent numerous expansions and at the abolition of the GMC in 1986 changed its name to the MOSI. Funding from then on came from central government. The “huge science museum” as Lonely Planet (2007) imply became synonymous with Castlefield’s changed cultural imaginary from the 1990s. Being a single interest group which had achieved it prime objective, the LRSS was dissolved in 1986 and metamorphosed, “with its assets and liabilities” into a less confrontational group, the Friends of the MOSI (Rayner 1986 MSIA). Throughout the emergence in the 1970s of the LRS counter-project and its transition into the mainstream, it is noticeable that Castlefield is not mentioned in the archival data encountered. Castlefield is named in the archives for the first time in 1979. A senior MCC planning officer indicated that the council was “looking at the whole of the Castlefield Area” which had the "potential to become a showpiece of archaeological and industrial heritage" (Blackniki in GMC 1979 MSIA). Given his role in its production (see chapter 6), it is apposite that Blackniki named Castlefield at this point.
Conclusions
This chapter reveals the production of Castlefield space to have gained significant impetus during the (reviled) 1970s through the influence of counter-representations of a national amenity society network. It is evident that the LRS counter-project spurred collaboration. Dense spatial networks stretching from Manchester to London, in which several amenity societies and key activists played decisive roles, drove the LRS/MOSI counter-project into the mainstream. Alongside the contribution of the amenity societies, the research has brought to light in intricate detail the critical roles of the GMC, HBC and MSICP. The last two play no part in the production of Castlefield in the dominant academic narrative. Part of the reason for the success of the counter-project, apart from the doggedness of the activists was the well connected insider status of the likes of Chance, Hawcroft and Rhodes. Importantly, for Castlefield the MOSI project was instrumental in providing visible confirmation on the ground of the nascent reimagining of the area. The chapter helps redefine the ‘dismal’ 1970s explaining how BR’s neglected industrial ‘private’ space was appropriated first in the imaginative spaces of representation of the amenity societies before the LRS area was re-produced as postindustrial heritage-ludic public space. The chapter therefore, provides empirical grounding which disrupts the dominant academic narrative identified in chapter 2.

Bringing these significant histories into the public domain is possible because of the availability of copious archival sources, some of which are not open to the public; supplemented by interviews and visual data. The backstage revelations and shenanigans are particularly illuminating and at times entertaining. In compelling fashion the data weave together the three elements of Lefebvre’s spatial triad. The chapter creates new understandings of how amenity societies’ unequivocally industrial heritage-centred counter-representations and what might be called their quasi-spaces of representation influenced and eventually superseded the dominant official representations of space. However, the official representations of space, the plans, schemes, and policy documents of planners, technocrats and urbanists, the strategies for change, whatever their provenance, would remain just that without political support and the resources necessary to see them implemented on the ground.
Reorientated 1970s public sector grant regimes were crucial. Firstly, those of the HBC and secondly those of the unusual coalition that was the post-1979 Urban Programme MSICP. Resources came from public sector grants through urban policy and governmental regimes which underwent significant shifts in perspective on the urban problem and associated appropriate interventions and do not map easily into neat party political divisions. Spatial practice is the poor relation in Lefebvrian inspired research, with more attention being given to critiques of official representations of space counter-posed against spaces of representation. However, without spatial practice urban representations of space would be pointless and urban spaces of representation impossible. Counter-representations spaces and projects and the alliances they generate have also been overlooked in Lefebvrian inspired research until recently (Groth and Corijn 2005) although they can be discerned as a key idea in Lefebvre (1991). This chapter demonstrates how a range of Lefebvrian theoretical constructs can be applied successfully in empirical research. The next chapter moves the analysis from the scale of the LRS to that of representations and spatial practice of ‘rediscovered’ Castlefield.
Chapter 6
The Rediscovery and Reproduction of Castlefield

Nor can an *oeuvre* exist without things, without something to shape, without practico-material reality, without a site, without a ‘nature’, a countryside, an environment… We should perhaps here introduce a distinction between the *city*, a present and immediate reality, a practico-material and architectural fact, and the *urban*, a social reality made up of revelations which are to be conceived of, constructed or reconstructed by thought. (Lefebvre 1996: 103, emphasis in original)

...and he paid us to do a study of the area around his Granada television thing, and so I had to study that area going down to the rivers and the primary objective was that Granada’s contract with their staff was that everybody could have a parking space, and he wanted to know how much of all that dereliction he could buy up... (Rhodes 2008 interview)

Introduction
The previous chapter identifies crucial counter-spaces of representation in the prolonged struggle to establish the LRS counter-project through the deployment of heritage infused spaces of representation. Lefebvre’s insistence that the history of spaces of representation is important, provided some of the inspiration for this chapter; this, and his claim that we must examine, “their relationships with each other” and their links with “the spatial practice of the particular society” (Lefebvre 1991: 42). And Lefebvre’s observation that places not named are “blank or marginal” (Lefebvre 1991: 118) also provided a frame of reference for this chapter. Clearly then, following Borden (2001: 11) Lefebvre’s pointers to empirical research method cannot be tested solely by theoretical abstraction but “must be brought about through an encounter with a specific subject matter”. This chapter uses archival and interview sources to focus on the 1970s and ‘80s history of the production space from different viewpoints than the previous one. It is concerned with the emergence of Castlefield as a discrete socio-geographical entity loaded with contested meanings and argues that Castlefield was rediscovered and reproduced from the early 1970s through the efforts of a different

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42 The city as oeuvre, i.e. a material and social work in progress, is the totality of artistic and social interaction that has produced capitalistic urban spaces of work and spaces of play and non-work (Pinder 2005: 262).
coalition of interests than identified previously. The process involved a transition, seen also in the previous chapter, from destructive frenzy to historic adoration. A striking feature of the production of Castlefield in the 1970s is the re-emergence of the name itself. It is significant that Taylor for instance did not mention Castlefield by name preferring to call it “the bottom of Deansgate” and to designate the world’s first passenger railway station “a goods-yard” (Taylor 1957: 4, reiterated 1977: 308). Castlefield was not so much stigmatised as forgotten and ignored through the 20th century. The chapter explains how representations of Castlefield space from the early 1970s diverge progressively from those of the 1940s. Four crucial spatial moments for the production of Castlefield are identified: 1) the crucial role played by amenity societies in the initial rediscovery and renaming of Castlefield; 2) the pivotal intertextual role of two key amenity society reports and their influence on subsequent representations; 3) the ambivalent intervention of the Castlefield Conservation Area Steering Committee (CSC); and 4) tensions in the struggles to work out on the ground through spatial practice a reimagined postindustrial Castlefield. The chapter proposes that each of these spatial moments interacted through processes of dialectical tension especially regarding extant industry and the impact of emerging heritage tourism.

The Civic Trust’s Counter-Spaces
Many writers who wish to say something about post war Manchester quote AJP Taylor’s opinion that Manchester is “irredeemably ugly” and that it “has the least interesting Roman remains in Britain” (Jones in Nevell 2008: 19). Taylor’s diatribe was based on the fact that by the 1950s virtually nothing visible remained of the Roman Fort. Most of the stone walls had been carried off through the centuries for use as second hand building materials. Further destruction of the fortifications resulted from the building of the canals and railways across the area. It was in the early 1970s that glimmers of valorisation began to shine on Castlefield. Research for the literature review revealed the existence of a potentially important report cited by Duffy (1979a BLNA). Duffy claims that the report “proposed the establishment of a conservation area” (Duffy 1979a BLNA). Research at the BLNA revealed that the article is in fact the first of a three part series (Duffy 1979b and 1979c BLNA), something not mentioned by previous researchers. It refers briefly and with typical journalistic disregard for sources, to a report authored jointly by two historic preservation amenity
societies: the Greater Manchester Archaeological Group (GMAG) and the Victorian Society, Manchester (VSMG). The official story of the CCA (MCC 2005) does not mention anything about amenity societies’ involvement in this regard, which added to the importance of exploring their potential contribution.

However, searching for an obscure report from 30 years ago without basic bibliographic details is difficult. Searching for the GMAG led to a frustrating dead end because it had long since changed its name. Eventually, a telephone conversation with Andrew Myers at the Greater Manchester Archaeological Unit (GMAU) pointed me to the Greater Manchester County Records Office (GMCRO). Unfortunately GMCRO archivists did not know of the report. However during the 2008 research interview I asked David Rhodes if he knew about a late 1970s MUAG/VSMG report. He said he was the author and produced a copy of the elusive report. Rhodes revealed that this was his second Castlefield report; he wrote the first several years before in the early 1970s.

Rhodes (2008 interview) divulged that in the early 1970s two unlikely interests, a TV mogul and an amenity group, coalesced around the rather disparate subjects of company car parking and historic area preservation. In 1956 Sir Sidney Bernstein founded Granada TV (GTV) which won the independent television franchise for the North West of England and began broadcasting in the same year. He had state of the art offices and television studios built in 1962, designed by Ralph Tubbs. The office block was located on a bomb damaged site in Quay Street at the north western edge of Castlefield and the critically acclaimed modern international style building was the first major post war development in the city centre. A small car park was built on land occupied formerly by working class housing demolished by Manchester Corporation under its ‘slum’ clearance programme. By the early 1970s GTV employed a significant number of well paid actors, technicians and administrators many of whom could afford and wanted to drive to work. Bernstein wanted to make a pact with his employees that

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43 The GMAG was set up by GMC and included academics from Manchester University. It was tasked with advising the ten districts of Greater Manchester. The Group became the Greater Manchester Archaeological Unit (GMAU) after 1986.

44 In 1986 a large number of GMC records passed to the GMCRO where they are preserved as the GMC archives (Patch and McKernan 1993; Lees et al 2004).
guaranteed them all a parking space close to their workplace (Rhodes 2008 interview). In order to keep his promise Bernstein imagined the rather nondescript industrial area from GTV down to the River Irwell and canals would make ideal staff car parks. At the time it was probably not an unreasonable proposition. For many people including Rhodes the area was “a total knackers yard everywhere” (Ibid). Sidney Bernstein and GTV commissioned the Civic Trust for the North West (CTNW) to undertake a pilot study exploring the feasibility of using the area later called Castlefield for car parking. The CTNW was formed in 1961, five years after the Civic Trust was established in London. The CTNW presented itself as a down to earth organisation, active on the ground with high profile local preservation campaigns and not at all “high falutin” (*The Times* 1961). Rhodes, employed by CTNW at the time was appointed to carry out the study. Realising the historic importance of the area he took the opportunity to turn Sidney Bernstein’s brief into a CTNW campaign:

… and when I looked into it *I discovered* that it was where the Roman Fort was, it was where the first canal system in England, the first real canal in England - the Bridgewater - and the first real railway system in the world, so I produced this document which I called *Castlefield, Past Present and Future*, and this is my Castlefield file gathering dust [pointing]. (Rhodes 2008 interview, emphasis added).

Clearly Rhodes, an architect who was born and grew up in Ashton seems to have been unaware before the investigation of the historic nature of Castlefield. The Report is not dated but Rhodes thought it would have been written in 1972, clues in the text support this so it is referenced here as Hall and Rhodes (1972 DRPA). Only about 20 copies of *Castlefield: Past Present and Future* were ever made and the document does not exist in any library or official archives encountered in the course of this research. I encountered the Report at Rhodes’ house in Harrogate but it was not until I returned home that I saw on the back cover it was co-authored by a Jonathan Hall, something Rhodes neglected to mention. Authorship of this Report raises important issues.

Rhodes spoke in 2008 as if he was the sole author. I raised this with him at the second interview:

**ML:** I notice Jonathon Hall was one of the authors of the first Castlefield report we talked about. What role did he play in the report?

**DR:** When I was working for the Civic Trust he came as a student and worked for 2 or 3 months during the summer when I produced that document. He then went back to finish his degree. After he’d finished his degree he came and worked for the Civic Trust for a number of years. So he came back as a junior planner at the Civic Trust and he attended that for a short period…
ML: What was his input? Did he do the drawings?
DR: No. I did the drawings and the plans and everything. He basically, erm [pause] I put him down because I’m a generous person. He had worked on it with me, not just me. I don’t know that he did anything specific on it but you know he’d worked on it with me.
ML: OK.
(in, Rhodes 2009 interview)

Hall was clearly the junior partner in the production of the document and Rhodes, although slightly equivocal is honest enough to accept his contribution. Establishing Hall’s joint authorship is important for the historical record per se but also because when he returned to the CTNW Hall attended GMC meetings (highlighted in the previous chapter) related to the LRS counter-project, something not mentioned by Rhodes. Hall is therefore one of the several like minded activists who brought continuity and a professionalised heritage vision to the production of Castlefield.

Rhodes’ explanation as to why Bernstein should commission a historic building conservation group to carry out a commercial survey was only that it was cheaper than instructing a surveying company. A more plausible explanation is that Bernstein’s motivation for the study and his brief to the Civic Trust was more ambivalent than Rhodes indicates. It seems unlikely that Rhodes discovery of historic Castlefield was completely unknown to the CTNW at the time bearing in mind LRS was listed Grade I in 1963. Hall claims more plausibly that GTV and Bernstein:

…were interested to explore for generally philanthropic (but also obvious commercial) reasons how the area might be “improved”. (Jonathon Hall 2009 email)

GTV and Bernstein had been “stalwart supporters” of the CTNW for years and realised that the area had dual potential because of its edge of city centre location for property development and because of its historic value (Hall 2010 interview). The commercial problem for GTV which had significant land holdings in the area was that there was no property development demand in: a “grotty area that looked like a bomb site” (Hall 2010 interview).
An extended analysis of the 1972 Report is presented below because it is the first attempt to appraise Castlefield’s historic value and because it was crucial for establishing the parameters of the valorisation of historic space and the devalorisation of existing industry. The Report (12 black and white, unnumbered A4 Pages) is the first concerted attempt to reimagine the Castlefield area as a whole, rather than just the Roman Fort or vicus. It was produced to a tight budget using typewriter and stencilling, including hand drawn maps of the area, but no photographic images. Rhodes claims he named the area Castlefield because it appeared one of the most celebrated historic maps of Manchester: William Green’s 1974 map (figure 6.1).

Green’s map was the most authoritative plan of Manchester available in the eighteenth century (Wyke 2006: 12) and is interesting because it shows the outline of the Roman

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45 While there is no reason to doubt Rhodes’ recollection of why the name Castlefield was chosen, it should be noted that the name is used in Frangopulo (1962) who felt that “a visit to the site of the fort at Castlefield can be exciting and rewarding to those who are prepared to inform themselves of its dimensions and position.” (p169). This is a rather obscure text however, residing at the time of this research in the Manchester Central Library Local Studies Unit reserve stack. Castlefield is also named on the Ordnance Survey maps of the 1920s.
Fort and names this area “Castle Field”. It also shows the Duke’s Warehouse, the first canal warehouse in Manchester and Grocers Warehouse which had a unique hydraulic system for lifting coal from barges designed by James Brindley. Both of these historically priceless warehouses were demolished in 1960 (Parkinson-Bailey 2000; Nevell 2008).

The 1972 Report does not include the term ‘heritage’ but instead as might be expected given the involvement of the CTNW, pinpoints the key visible historic features of the area that should be treated with respect and preserved:

- the Roman Fort
- the canal basin
- the historic warehouses
- Liverpool Road Station
- the huge castellated railway viaducts

Hall and Rhodes (1972 DRPA) considered the canals typified Castlefield, the Bridgewater Canal having special significance because it was the first true canal in Britain. LRS is fêted unequivocally as “the World’s first railway station” (Ibid). Merchants Warehouse, the oldest extant warehouse in Castlefield probably built in 1828, although damaged by bombing in 1941 and fire in 1971 (Scattergood et al 1985) was regarded by Hall and Rhodes as “outstanding”. Like Hawcroft and the GrG, Hall and Rhodes were concerned only with Castlefield’s use value as differential space rather any than abstract space exchange value it may have.

The abattoir was a large low rise complex of substantial brick and stone buildings constructed in the 1880s by Manchester Corporation in a recognisably Victorian neoclassical civic style and the 1972 Report asserts that it is one of the major activities “which have moulded the present shape of Castlefield” (Ibid). Abattoirs produce edible animal material and spawn a host of rendering plants to process non-edible animal matter such as: skin, hair, hooves, bones, blood and intestines. It should be no surprise then that in its heyday the abattoir attracted related industries such as hide and skin plants and “the Gland Supply Company which had successfully remained” (Ibid). Ambivalently, given its historical role, the Report saw the abattoir complex as “an eyesore” and its demolition, in progress at the time, went unopposed.
While the huge viaducts were appraised aesthetically and considered, “pleasing to the eye” the problem was thought to be “what happens on the ground below”. Hall and Rhodes argued that the “multitude of small industrial activities that collect underneath need extensive improvement”. Aesthetic sensibilities therefore are privileged above existing industrial economic activity in the nascent adoration of historic space after frenzy of demolition. A degree of ambivalence about existing industry suffused this amenity society Report:

 Industrially the area would seem to be in decay and clearance would not seem to be of disadvantage to anyone. However, within this seeming morass of spent industry there are at least seventy-five firms many of which are thriving concerns which could not be elsewhere because, they are deemed bad neighbours, others can only survive because of the low rent. (Hall and Rhodes 1972 DRPA)

Parts of Castlefield were therefore rendered unpleasing in aesthetic and olfactory terms. The pejorative use of the term bad neighbour is important because the trope recurs frequently as Castlefield space is narrativised during the course of its production from the 1970s.\(^46\) This particular representation of space reflects the 1940s modernist imperative to purge the city of unhealthy disorder. Ambivalently too, Hall and Rhodes advocated the area could be cleared of existing industry but recognised that many of the everyday industrial companies were viable small businesses and by implication provided jobs for ordinary people. Hall remains ambivalent about Castlefield’s 1970s industries over 30 years later:

 It is worth pointing out that the area at the time was not only visually run down but also had accumulated a number of “bad neighbour” uses. In particular I recall a “Gland Processing” business which despite being smelly and generally disagreeable was very much a viable and profitable business. So the problem with the area was not a simple one of cosmetic environmental improvement but rather one of a complete redefinition of uses in the area. This was in marked contrast to much of the environmental work that was going on in Manchester at

\(^46\) The term ‘bad neighbour’ first appeared in a piece of town planning secondary legislation, the 1947 Use Classes Order. It became a common piece of town planning jargon after WW2. It refers to industries which create high levels of noise, smoke, dust, smell, fumes or vibration or those which use toxic or hazardous materials and included such delights as: vehicle breaking, blood boiling, glue making, bone grinding and the breeding of maggots from putrescible matter (Blackhall 2005: 95).
the time where the works was mainly focused on the visual improvement of otherwise derelict and unused areas. (Jonathon Hall 2009 email)

An Ambivalent Castlefield Future

The 1972 Report concluded that: there are many “bad neighbour” industries in Castlefield, the area “is invisible to the public”, the land is in a “general state of dereliction” and “nobody cares so anything can be done”. The 1972 Report stressed Castlefield’s historic importance as Manchester’s Roman point of origin and its importance for the development of Manchester into the world’s first modern industrial city during the Georgian and Victorian industrial eras. It was thought the greatest potential for the area was for water based leisure activities. The Castlefield basin at the canal junction was recommended for development into a “recreation spot, a boating marina” and the warehouses “have tremendous potential for a city centre boatyard”. Apart from the need for the industrial areas “to be cleaned up” there was no suggestion that in the future industry would be inappropriate and should be removed; Hall and Rhodes were sanguine about the future role of industry. Light industry and distribution were expected to continue in the area in line with the zoning in the 1967 Plan
Some changes of land use were envisaged, crudely from bad neighbour industry to leisure, but the pivotal point for Castlefield was not seen as Roman heritage but the abattoir site the redevelopment of which, “should be seen as a turning point in the revitalisation of Castlefield” (Hall and Rhodes 1972 DRPA). In contrast with later studies, the Report did not touch on the need for public sector subsidy or the need for the public acquisition of private property. Similarly, there was no consideration of the need for public access to and through the area: an issue that assumed great importance two decades later (chapter 7).

**Visual Representations of Castlefield Space**

An integral part of the 1972 Report are the visual representations of Castlefield space. These consist of hand drawn maps annotated to pick out key historic features. Maps, especially those produced by professional cartographers and architects, are of course not innocent reflections of material reality but are the subject of comprehensive selection and exclusion and can be overloaded with explicit and implicit meaning (Harley 1989). Long held positivist assumptions that maps are “unproblematic communications devices” have been challenged by an epistemic break in cartography (Crampton 2001: 235) that stresses maps as social constructs (Dühr 2007: 28). Not surprisingly, maps lend themselves to representations of material visible features in urban space (Söderström 1996), that is they concentrate the gaze on spatial practice. Poignantly, Lefebvre asserts that architects’ drawings “serve as reducers of the reality they claim to represent” (Lefebvre 1991: 338). It is clear the maps in the 1972 Report were traced from an Ordnance Survey base map. This technique allowed Rhodes to exclude features considered irrelevant such as the Byrom Street site of working class housing, while simultaneously imbuing the maps with quasi-scientific cartographic legitimacy through the deployment of the 1:2500 scale. The visual representations follow the logic of the 1972 Report’s structure depicting Castlefield past, present and future. Castlefield ‘past’ (figure 6.2) is a visual representation of six key historic features of the area stressing: the Roman Fort, the Georgian canals and the Victorian, City Market Halls, but not the abattoir. Notice that the Roman Fort outline goes against the topographical, cartographic grain by representing something that could not be seen.
Although in the 2008 interview Rhodes describes Castlefield as a complete knackers yard; the architectural precision of the map of ‘present apparent land use’ (figure 6.3) tells a different story. Only a relatively small part of Castlefield centred on the abattoir site was depicted as derelict. This presented a dilemma for Hall and Rhodes in that the abattoir was also identified a key historical component but is at the same time an aesthetically unappealing bad neighbour. Rather than record this complexity visually to complement the written text, figure 6.3 simply categorised the abattoir space as “vacant or socially unpleasant”. A complex hybrid space full of spatial memories was thus conflated and purged of spatial richness. Figure 6.3 therefore, introduced a range of aesthetic judgements about the quality of the Castlefield cityscape and categorised the land uses as “unsightly and unused”, “used but unsightly” and “vacant or socially unpleasant”. Through these representations Hall and Rhodes initiated the process of the devalorisation of Castlefield’s existing industries. Such disparaging descriptions while not entirely condemnatory, reflect the 1945 Plan’s environmental and aesthetic aversion to industrial areas, the critical difference being that Hall and Rhodes valorised
Castlefield’s historic industrial attributes. Devaluing present and past spatial practice, especially working class residential areas and industry, either to facilitate commercial property speculation or middle class gentrification, is a tactic that has been recognised by commentators such as Zukin (1991) and Smith (1996). A major difference here is that Hall and Rhodes valued the historic area intrinsically without regard for what that might mean for land prices and exchange value.

Figure 6.4 Castlefield ‘Future Development’ Proposals
(in Hall and Rhodes 1972 DRPA)

Through the device of zonal partitioning creating 8 distinct bounded areas (figure 6.4) Hall and Rhodes inscribed CTNW’s present heritage values on to Castlefield space (Graham 2002) and an imagined future. In so doing they reveal the power of a socially constructed past to inhabit the present. Zoning schemes have been a fundamental tool for the representation of modern city space since the early 19th century allowing for the designation of homogenous spatial units in “mono-functional zoning” (Freestone and Gibson 2006: 26) and consequent spatial practice interventions through city planning and urban policy. Cultural zones in particular whether of high or low culture have been a feature of city planning for a hundred years (Ibid) and were prominent in the 1945 Plan as discussed in the previous chapter. However, it should be noted that
the practice of zoning often presents a far less complex understanding of city space than written representations (Söderström 1996). Unlike some later representations of Castlefield that homogenise the whole area as a derelict wasteland, Hall and Rhodes presented a more complex understanding of Castlefield, although homogeneity remained within the zones. What is peculiar about Hall and Rhodes’ zoning map is that while the ‘future’ does identify some of the key historic potentials of the area the site of Roman Fort itself disappears, overlain by other zones.

Surprisingly, given the aims of the CTNW there were no direct recommendations to revitalise Castlefield based on the area’s rediscovered historic credentials. The abattoir complex south of Liverpool Road, rather than the site of the Fort, or the canal junction, is seen as the best place to “start the revitalisation of the Castlefield area”. There was no suggestion that the area could become a major tourist visitor attraction with visitors wanting to move through the space between the eight different zones. Only a partial reimagining of the area was undertaken, most of the industry was expected to remain with only the Castlefield canal basin in the vicinity of the canal junction being targeted for development into a leisure area. The warehouses and wharfs were regarded as having potential for boat repair and maintenance thereby consolidating the industrial nature of the area. Access is only considered to industrial rather than historic sites and the notion of the area’s need to become a collection of linked public spaces did not arise. The 1972 Report therefore challenged only partially the industrial representations of Castlefield space inherent in the 1967 Manchester City Centre Map, which were based on the 1945 Plan.

However, the 1972 Report needs to be understood in its context. Castlefield had been an industrial district for the previous 200 years. Manchester was not perceived as a destination for mass historic tourism. Taylor proclaimed in 1977 that there are no sights for conducted tours in Manchester, “no waiting coaches in Albert Square” (1977: 307). With no roads or pedestrian routes passing through it Castlefield was literally invisible to most Mancunians. A variety of key local landmarks were located on the edges of the area, for example, GTV, St John Street, Central Station, the pretty Methodist Chapel and the principal city abattoir. It is hardly surprising therefore, that Sidney Bernstein saw the area as prime car park land and probably expected rubber
stamp approval for his car parking scheme. Unfortunately, for Bernstein the 1972 Report did not even mention car park feasibility. It not only renamed evocatively a nondescript industrial city district, it also valorised its historic and industrial character in a manner never seen before. Little wonder that Bernstein, “was not very enamoured by it, he did not want to know that the area was phenomenally historic, so it went on the back burner” (Rhodes 2008 interview). A few months later Rhodes moved to the Planning Department of MCC to start a historic building conservation officer post. Castlefield was forgotten until it became a cause célèbre for another amenity society and Rhodes co-authored a second report.

It should be recalled that the dominant Castlefield narrative has little positive to say about the existing industries of the area in the 1970s, often failing even to acknowledge their presence and characterising the whole area as a wasteland. Hall and Rhodes’ sympathetic reference to 75 companies and lack of total condemnation of the area sounded an interesting note that deserved further exploration. In the second meeting (Rhodes 2009 interview) I pressed him on his ‘knackered’ characterisation of Castlefield. It is important to quote this exchange at length because it presents a sophisticated ocularcentric oral history appreciation of the complexity of Castlefield in the 1970s not encountered in the literature:

ML: When you went to Castlefield to do that first report, you described it as being in a horrible state but I notice that in 1982 GMC did an industrial survey of all the companies in Castlefield and 70 odd replied so there must have been a lot more. So I wonder what it felt like in the early 70s when you were there?
DR: First of all if you go down Liverpool Road from Deansgate all the shops are occupied. Erm [pause] City Hall is where the Air and Space Museum is and it’s where the Ideal Homes Exhibition was and similar things all year round but that was the ultimate one. Before that in the 60s it used to be where they had the Christmas circus with elephants running round in a ring in the middle. The Upper Campfield building was always a bit more mysterious. I’ve got a feeling Manchester used that as a base. On the other side there were pubs and all sorts of little businesses. Now as you go through there, there’s the St Matthews Church school rooms. There were all sorts of genuine little businesses going on around there. There was a car park between [pause]. What was the pub?
ML: The White Lion?
DR: Yeah, the White Lion is where the road goes to the Roman Fort. That was a municipal car park. Beyond that was odd jobbing firms. Every railway archway coming along until you get to the Roman Fort had little car places, you know where you can get your MOT, things like that. And there’d be a window cleaning company. They’d be cleaning office windows and they’d
have their ladders and their cart near there. So there’s all those sort of businesses going on. The moment you go under the arches to come down to the canal then it was just knackers’ yards and they ran quite a way through. Where the big bases come down, that was real knackers’ yards and big Alsatian dogs that were ferocious when you walked through there. Of course it’s all dripping [ML laughs]. The water’s dripping down all the time because when it stopped raining it’d still drip for days afterwards. So it had this grey overcast Manchester abandoned look about it. It was all chain link fences and bits of boarding and stuff. (in, Rhodes 2009 interview, emphases added)

Rhodes’ vivid, unembellished positive recollection of 1970s Castlefield is quite remarkable and having explored the area many times in the last view years, I could follow easily his walk through the different elements of the area. It resonates with Lefebvre notions of knowing the city through everyday lived space and de Certeau’s (1984) claims for walking as a quotidian route to knowing the city. Note that Rhodes’ 2009 account refers to real knackers’ yards. What Rhodes clarifies is that it was only the spaces under the huge viaducts that were truly unpleasant to the point of feeling threatening. Railway arches have been occupied since they were created as a by-product of the industrial revolution (Hills and Tyer 2002). In Manchester these “empty, dripping, sinister” underneath-the-railway-arch places presented furtive unpredictable menace in addition to space for small-scale artisanal workshops (Ibid: 105). Far from revealing overly romanticised, nostalgic memories or unequivocal denigration, the 2009 interview constructs a dispassionate, account of bad and good neighbour activities in a city space of complexity. Rhodes’ account contrasts with the blanket condemnation of the area encountered in the dominant academic narrative and in his own recollections in the 2008 interview. Rhodes’ saw only a small part of Castlefield as grey, overcast and abandoned but this view was applied to Castlefield and Manchester as a whole in retrospectives of people like Tony Wilson, his friend encountered in BBC (2007) and by the various critics mentioned in chapter 4 above. Of course Rhodes had a foot in two camps: local government and amenity societies and was therefore in tune with conceived space and lived space.

The Briton’s Protection Counter-representations of Spaces
Throughout the early 1970s, as set out in chapter 4, modernist city planning ideals were a wellspring for the erasure of large parts of Victorian Manchester. Rhodes maintains that after the 1972 Report went on the back burner he continued to agitate
for the appreciation of the historic importance of Manchester’s Victorian space and Castlefield in particular. Rhodes was embarrassed about inviting Gardiner to do *The Observer* article but the debacle strengthened his resolve to persevere with the Castlefield counter-project (Rhodes 2008 interview). Rhodes’ contribution to the production of Castlefield is important because he straddles the whole timeline from counter-project to mainstream project. Like many of the most active amenity society members in the 1970s he was professional, middle class and concerned more with historical and architectural merit than ‘community history’. Other research has noted a similar amenity society profile (Jacobs 1996: 102; Hayden 1995: 53). Rhodes became a leading figure in the VSMG rising by 1978 to the position of chairman. Like the CTNW, the VSMG under Rhodes’ chairmanship, tasked its most active members with finding projects around which the Society could build high profile publicity-grabbing campaigns. Rhodes called a meeting of a handful of key VSMG members held one evening in the back room of a pub on the edge of Castlefield, The Briton’s Protection. Four other members attended, one of whom was archaeology Professor Barri Jones. They all put a ‘fiver’ on the table to pay for production costs of 50 copies of a report setting out in detail the historic importance of the whole of Castlefield (Rhodes 2008 interview). The report was to be authored jointly by Rhodes in his capacity of chairman of the VSMG and Jones, a prominent advisor to the Greater Manchester Archaeological Group (GMAG). This report was entitled significantly, *Historic Castlefield* therefore privileging a totalising look backwards. During the 2008 interview Rhodes had difficulty in remembering the year it was written suggesting it was about 1975 but further research dates it to 1978; it is referenced as Jones and Rhodes (1978 DRPA). It is more comprehensive than *Castlefield Past Present and Future*, running to 23 unnumbered A4 pages including significant visual representations.

The different provenance of the *Historic Castlefield*, originating as it did entirely from historic preservation amenity societies rather than property development interests, is reflected in the forthright preservationist language of its opening:

The area of Manchester known as Castlefields [sic] to the south of Quay Street… has an historical importance which is only now being fully appreciated… Moreover, Castlefield contains some of the most important features of Manchester’s industrial revolution – a fine and accessible canal system, the earliest purpose-built passenger railway station in the world,
churches, warehouses and factory buildings which are some of the finest examples of the ingenuity, wealth and confidence of our nineteenth century ancestors… The purpose of this document is to present to the Local Planning Authorities proposals for a broad policy of preserving the essence of the area, to bring to public attention the importance of our heritage. (Jones and Rhodes 1978 DRPA)

Its provenance is important also because it drew intertextually on the 1972 Report, as Rhodes freely admits “it is very similar to the first one” (Rhodes 2008 interview). Use of the term heritage is important, signalling the deployment of preservation rhetoric that would become increasingly persuasive throughout the 1980s (Wright 1985). Historic Castlefield provided a reasonably comprehensive, though concise account of the development of Roman, Georgian and Victorian Castlefield. Crucially the 1978 Report depicted the location of the Roman Fort and vicus graphically plotting their relationship with the canals and rivers. It valorised the same set of historic eras and artefacts as the 1972 Report but significantly, the extent of Castlefield is widened to include; the 1830 Warehouse, St John Street and GTV studios. Presciently, the 1978 Report urged that a range of facilities, under the heading of what is now called cultural regeneration, could be accommodated in the market halls and LRS buildings complex. The market buildings were recommended for conversion into a comprehensive heritage museum for Manchester, similar to the Museum of London. LRS was imbued with the potential for providing excellent facilities for a museum of transport and industry. The 1978 Report lamented the demolition of the abattoir which was structurally sound and an “impressive example of Victorian civic architecture”, insisting that the existing buildings could have been reused “if a little more imagination had been employed”. Crucially, the 1978 Report made visible the importance historically of the area as a residential site which incorporated “a select residential area” and an “extensive working class housing area” including “squalid basement slums for which Manchester is well known” (Jones and Rhodes 1978 DRPA). Significantly too, Jones and Rhodes signified the area as the site of the annual Manchester Fair, an event frequented by thousands of working class visitors which ceased to operate in 1878. These ludic spaces become essential for the thesis in chapter 8 below.

Jones and Hall went further than the 1972 Report arguing that “re-population and re-vitalisation of industry are vital to the future of the area” (Ibid). They advocated
Castlefield should contain a permanent Roman Manchester exhibition, an idea first suggested by Oliver (1948 MLSA). Castlefield was not represented as a wasteland or completely derelict but in gentler vein it was accepted that the area had “been somewhat neglected”. Rather than talk of the complete clearing out of inappropriate industry, which was to come later, preservation of the historic fabric and enhancement of its special qualities was privileged. Jones and Hall did call for a conservation area but it was to include only the LRS site, implying that the rest of Castlefield was compromised by industry. The 1978 Report was strident in its claims for a particular set of historically important attributes: the Roman Fort and vicus; Georgian and Victorian industry and includes a number of novel visual representations of space.

The Visual Representations of Jones and Rhodes

Two visual representations of space in the 1978 Report are important for the reimagining and reproduction of Castlefield at this time: the front cover of the Report and a proposals map. Unlike the hand drawn images in Hall and Rhodes (1972), the future proposals map (figure 6.5) is an adaptation of a standard Ordnance Survey 1:2500 plan. Seven zones were defined, five are numbered, crucially number one is the Roman Fort and two are labelled. The abattoir site was sanitised into ‘new industry’; similarly the Byrom Street ‘slum’ clearance area became ‘residential’. Interestingly, this mapped space was more fluid than the equivalent in the 1972 Report: the zones are not bounded. Four images on the cover of the 1978 Report manifested the way Castlefield was meant to be reimagined, highlighting the four key historic elements the area: the Roman Fort/vicus (in the form of an image the 1972 archaeological Roman dig), the Georgian canals and warehouses; the Victorian railways and LRS. Jones and Rhodes juxtaposed cleverly the historic against the contemporary: a section of Green’s 1794 map and recent photographs respectively.

Whether deliberately or not the front cover of the 1978 Report presents a more simplified version of Castlefield than is reflected in its richer written narrative. On the cover there is no place for representations of residential histories: exclusive or working class, nor for the abattoir, or what might be called everyday existing industry as opposed to heritage dominated views of the industrial past. The visualisations of space embedded in the front cover of Historic Castlefield speak eloquently in favour of a
complete reimagining of the area. But like its predecessor the 1978 Report was silent about a number of marginalised race and class histories in the evolution, place memories and spatial practice of the area. Although class histories do feature in the televisual representations discussed below. Jones and Rhodes privileged particular histories as the history of Castlefield that required, “a new awareness of the historical significance of our environment so that its essential character can be preserved and protected for all to enjoy” (Jones and Rhodes 1978 DRPA). The 1978 Report has great value as a piece of archival documentary evidence for the production of Castlefield, but it has greater significance for what happened next. Unlike the 1972 Report it was not put on the back burner. The 1978 Report enjoyed a remarkable circular journey generating, in ways not dissimilar to Hawcroft’s 1973 letter to the MPs, discussed in the previous chapter.

Figure 6.5 Castlefield ‘Future Proposals’: ‘New Industry is the site of the former abattoir and ‘Residential’ is the Byrom Street site cleared of working class housing (in Jones and Rhodes 1978 DRPA)

**Historic Castlefield: a Circular, Intertextual Journey**

Although the 1978 Report *Historic Castlefield* was important for its comprehensive analysis and especially the privileging of Roman Castlefield, its intertextual linkages
render it crucial for the subsequent production of Castlefield. Above all the reaction to
the 1978 Report began to move the Castlefield counter-project from the margins to the
mainstream. Although Rhodes co-wrote the Report in the guise of the chairman of the
VSMG, his conservation officer job and the political connections of Barri Jones are
crucial for understanding the Report’s subsequent circulation and its impact. Jones, a
capable publicist, gave a copy of the Report to the Leader of MCC, Norman Morris
who he knew well. Morris gave a copy to Brian Redhead, a local BBC
journalist/television presenter who he knew well. Redhead was so impressed by the
historic credentials of little-known Castlefield conjured up by the 1978 Report that he
decided to devote one of his Friday night ‘Homeground’ programmes to the area.

During the 2008 interview Rhodes mentioned that he had tried over the years to obtain
a copy of the Redhead programme but was told by the BBC it had not been preserved.
In searching for this programme I encountered another called Fabric of An Age (BBC
1976 NWFA). Featuring AJP Taylor, this programme focuses on the impact of the
cotton industry on Manchester and opens with shots of the Bridgewater Canal and
various warehouses in Castlefield. Although Taylor takes the viewer inside LRS,
climbing the same 1st class passenger staircase mentioned at the meeting in June 1973,
he did not draw attention the building’s historic value nor to its decrepit state. To be
fair Taylor did note that the Liverpool to Manchester was the first passenger railway
ever. Despite the various press reports, the historian did not draw attention to the
ongoing amenity society campaign to ‘save’ the station: clearly he was not part of the
counter-project network.

Fruitless searches for the Redhead programme for over a year were one of the most
frustrating aspects of the research. A sliver of hope appeared with the mention of the
programme in Redhead (1993). After protracted enquiries through the labyrinth of
BBC’s archives, a DVD copy of the programme was found with the help of
serendipity. The DVD was acquired eventually through a school friend of my sister,
Emmeline Leary. Baroness Estelle Morris is the friend (Morris 2009 letter). Redhead’s
programme was called simply Homeground Castlefield and aired on Friday 15
September 1978 on BBC2 North West (BBC 1978 BBCA) bringing Castlefield to the
attention of a television audience of millions. In the programme he interviewed
Rhodes, Jones and Norman Morris. In opening Redhead confronted the studio audience with the question, “What is the most historic place in the north west? Chester, Lancaster? Or is it Castlefield in Manchester?” (Rhodes 2008 interview). That Castlefield was unknown to the audience is evidenced by Redhead answering his own subsequent question, “So where is Castlefield?” with the help of a map derived from Hall and Rhodes’ Report. The whole programme is a sustained attempt to valorise Castlefield’s historic credentials and convince an incredulous studio audience. Rhodes’ remarkably accurate recall of the opening of the programme was confirmed by Redhead (1993: 26) and of course the programme itself. Much of the 30 minute programme is shot on location in Castlefield making visible a declining industrial area in transition; a place Redhead refers to evocatively as “the grotty end of Manchester” and “a very lived upon place, though you might not think so at first glance” (in BBC 1978 BBCA). The producers chose to depict a variety of Castlefield spaces including: the LRS frontage, complete with British Rail ‘Goods Depot’ sign, the Roman dig, the canal basin, historic viaducts, warehouses and the active Wimpey Homes housing construction site. Televisual documentary history can be an important historical record in its own right (Wheatley 2007). That said it is regarded here, like the other visual data encountered, as a representation rather than a neutral, truthful window into past reality.

Redhead’s programme includes a rare working class contribution from a man called Alf Hayman. Born in 1912, Alf started work for MSCC in 1927 at the age of 14 and was still working in Castlefield for the Bridgewater Department of MSCC in 1978. He recalled Castlefield as a busy port in the 1930s handling 100s of barges a day. When asked by Redhead while on location on the towpath of the Bridgewater Canal, what kind of trade would have been going on in the middle of the last century, Alf replied “cotton, grain, rubber and foodstuffs of all descriptions” (in, BBC 1978 BBCA) making him one of the few voices encountered in my research to associate cotton with the production of Castlefield. He rendered visible another unnoticed working class
history that of the *passenger* boat services which carried ordinary working people as far as Liverpool, including the “speed boats” whose “jockeys” would achieve a velocity of 12mph (Ibid). Hayman portrayed Castlefield as a space of everyday working life, neither nostalgicised nor a wasteland space of dereliction and danger. His voice makes an important contribution to Castlefield’s regeneration pre-history in the 1970s.

It is not only as a historical record that the programme is important: it has major intertextual significance too. Redhead drew extensively on material and opinions supplied to him by Jones and Rhodes. Perhaps more importantly the historic valorisation theme espoused by Redhead was fed to him by Jones and Rhodes. Redhead prompted by Jones and Rhodes was at pains to question Norman Morris about what was to be done in the future now that the historic value of Castlefield had been recognised. Morris added weight to the rediscovery of historic Castlefield with his support a programme to secure the area’s protection and improvement. Eventually, though not without equivocation, he became part of the coalition which drew the Castlefield counter-project into the mainstream. However, no acknowledgement was given in the programme of the work over the preceding eight years of the amenity societies, probably due to Rhodes’ conflict of interests. No recognition was given either of the involvement of HBC or GMC, probably due to local government rivalries.

After the programme was broadcast the 1978 Report followed a remarkable trajectory:

Now the Leader of the Council was called Norman Morris. He was only a very small chap. Erm he was interviewed on the programme. I was filmed in Castlefield but not in the studio because they were interviewing the Leader of the Council and I was working for the Council. But Norman Morris gave a copy of that to Brian Parnell the Chief Planning Officer and said, “make that legislative”. Brian Parnell gave it to Henry Blackniki and said, “make that legislative”. I was in Blackniki’s team and he gave it back to me and said, “make it legislative” [DR and ML laugh]. (in, Rhodes 2008 interview)

By make it legislative Morris meant create a statutory conservation area for Castlefield under the terms of the Civic Amenities Act 1967. By doing so the area would receive legal protection from inappropriate development with MCC, property owners and developers having a duty to preserve and enhance the historic and architectural
character of the area. Crucially though, conservation area status does not automatically release additional public sector resources.

Jones and Rhodes’ Historic Castlefield made its circuitous journey in early 1979. After this the injunction to make it legislative meant that the Castlefield historic revalorisation counter-project began to enter the mainstream of MCC representations of space. What is salient about the discussions in the archival documents, leading up to designation, is the way Castlefield continued to be represented as an area of historical value and a working class industrial area. For MCC it was vital that the Castlefield Conservation Area was “seen to be a thriving working and living area and not just a museum of past glories” (Parnell 1979 MPDA). The July 1979 meeting of the city’s Planning Committee approved Parnell’s recommendation to designate Castlefield a conservation area. It was designated officially by the full MCC on the 13 October 1979. After designation city conservation officer Rhodes, continued to play a key role in reimagining the area. He led the production of the first official MCC Castlefield report - the Conservation Area Statement (MCC 1980 MPDA). This booklet has heavy intertextuality with Rhodes’ two previous reports in its text and images. The 1980 Statement concludes with a low key acceptance of Castlefield’s partially degraded physical appearance, “although parts of the area suffer from a poor environment at present it is full of character”. In style and structure the 1980 Statement follows Hall and Rhodes (1972 DRPA) with sections concerning Castlefield’s past, present and future. This official Statement is important because it continues with the dual prioritisation of Castlefield. A Castlefield future was envisaged based on selective historic valorisation that would produce an area “increasingly attractive for living as well as working and heritage leisure - and indeed tourism” (MCC 1980 MPDA).

**Castlefield Conservation Area Steering Committee: Contested Transition to Heritage Dominance**

Conservation area statements are constructed by architects, planners, and urbanists; articulated in quasi-legal language and jargon and can be considered therefore, through a Lefebvrian lens to be classic examples of official representations of space. By themselves such representations cannot produce space without the interventions of spatial practice and the resources they bring. By 1980 little had happened on the ground in Castlefield, apart from minor works to LRS. Castlefield was still largely a
space as described in *Castlefield: Past Present and Future*. Senior GMC officers came to realise the complexity of the issues faced required a new governmental/management structure. A steering group was seen as necessary. The idea was mooted first in 1981 by County Planning Officer Don Burns (1981 GMCRO) after a meeting with the English Tourist Board whose Assistant Director supported the idea and thought Castlefield had “considerable potential to become a major visitor attraction in its own right” (Mills 1982 GMCRO). Burns (1981 GMCRO) argued that the fragmented ad hoc approach was inadequate to achieve Castlefield’s “unique potential for tourism” and that “greater impetus could be given to the development of the area by the formation of a Steering Committee”. Burns’ Report was instrumental in the setting up of Castlefield Steering Committee (CSC) and in determining its remit, membership, structure and focus. Burns suggested the organisation be constituted by a two tier structure: an upper tier, the CSC to provide priorities and a lower Castlefield Officers Working Party (COWP) of professionals across a range of fields mainly from GMC and MCC. The upper policy making tier was to include representatives from the key public sector organisations: GMC, MCC, MOSI, GMAU, Air and Space Museum Trust, British Rail, the North West Tourist Board and the Central Station Joint Venture Study. Burns also proposed that the key private sector land owners in the area, MSCC, GTV and Rochdale Canal Company should have a place on CSC; they joined but although invited Manchester Airport and BR did not (McWilliam-Fowler 1983a MPDA). In structure and in subsequent, approach therefore, CSC can be regarded as a forerunner of the entrepreneurial mode of urban governance (Harvey 1989b) but one which significantly retained a strong civic and public service ethos (important for the following chapter).

Burns stressed that the body should/could not take over individual projects – these would be left to their own sponsors, crucially, neither would CSC have any resources of its own. Burns suggested the purposes of CSC should be to:

- provide momentum for the overall development of the area and help speed up individual projects
- work towards the environmental improvement of the area
- co-ordinate the individual developments, e.g. relating to access and joint marketing
- assist in pressing for financial help from grant giving bodies

(Burns 1981 GMCRO)
Burns’ Report did not do at this point specify the priorities for CSC in any future conflicts between the needs of Castlefield as a space of historic visitor attractions and a space of not so pleasant but viable industry. However, the future was seen to be linked inextricably with the area’s Roman historical associations and the rather nebulous, idiosyncratic “romantic appeal of Coronation Street” (Ibid). Although Castlefield had been made a conservation area in 1979 this was a MCC designation. Burns as GMC Planning Officer wanted to differentiate the Committee’s area from the city’s conservation area. He suggested this could be achieved by giving the area “an impressive name e.g. “Castlefield Heritage Area” or the “Castlefield Experience, etc” (Ibid). In common with the earlier reports, Castlefield’s existing industry was still seen as having an important but ambivalent future role. Agreement between the parties identified by Burns was reached through the exchange of letters and CSC was set up in 1982.\textsuperscript{47} Research related to CSC is rare although Jennings (1989 GMCRO) and Madgin (2008) document some limited aspects of its work using publicly available sources. Published research revealing the important role played by GMC in the creation of CSC and the behind the scenes tensions does not exist.

Being a loose alliance of interested parties CSC was not a legal entity, did not have a bank account, annual audited accounts or employees. GMC’s commitment to the new CSC was signalled by the involvement of the County Legal Officer who invited the relevant parties to attend the inaugural meeting on 1 July 1982 at County Hall (Quick 1982 GMCRO). Membership of CSC and attendance at meetings was dominated by GMC, for example, the first meeting had four GMC councillors but only one from MCC: five GMC officers but just two from MCC. In financial terms too GMC dominated providing 50% of the funding (Jennings 1989 GMCRO): proportions which continued until 1986. Although amenity societies played no direct part in CSC, two major reports produced by CSC (discussed below) appear to draw intertextually on the 1970s amenity society reports particularly in relation to representing the historic qualities of the area. Of course not all CSC’s business was conducted in official meetings. Graham Stringer, who in the mid-1980s as well as being a city councillor

\textsuperscript{47} In the archival documents the Castlefield Conservation Area Steering Committee is usually referred to as the Castlefield Steering Committee, CSC or simply the Steering Committee, highlighting that its concerns were not solely those of the statutory conservation area. For the sake of simplicity the term CSC is used here.
was deputy chairman of MSCC, remembers a productive series of meetings with GTV’s David Plowright to discuss the development of Granada Studio Tours which MCC supported (Stringer 2009 interview). Another debate was between SCC, GTV and MSCC regarding the route of the inner ring road and the “vexed question” of whose land values would be affected for better or worse (Ibid). This is the same City Circle road that was specified in the 1945 Plan.

**Creeping Industrial Denigration**

The first major report produced by CSC, the *Castlefield Tourism Development Plan* (CSC 1982a GMCRO), sought to balance competing needs of existing industry and perceived future heritage tourism needs. Rather than balance however, the 1982 Plan manifested unequivocal support for industrial heritage coupled with ambivalence towards everyday existing industry. I argue that the Tourism Plan constitutes a transitional moment in the area’s representations of space. Castlefield was no longer valued historically for its own sake but instrumentally because the promotion of heritage tourism “will bring vital economic benefits” not only to the area but “to the inner city generally” (Ibid: para 2.2). One of the Tourism Plan’s first initiative’s was the idea of rebranding to facilitate interpretation, “of the area’s heritage and to provide opportunities for recreation and leisure” (Ibid: para 3.3) which it was hoped “will act as a catalyst for development” through public and private sector investment (Ibid para 3.1). Inspiration for the rebranding came from the industrial heritage preservation initiatives in the former industrial town of Lowell, Massachusetts, which in 1973 saw the creation of Lowell Heritage State Park. In 1978 it became the Federal Lowell National Historical Park (Stanton 2006). The 1982 Plan suggested naming the area the, Castlefield Urban Heritage Park (UHP) and the name was adopted by CSC. However, unlike the official Castlefield Conservation Area, the Castlefield UHP was really no more than an impressive name to differentiate it from MCC’s conservation area (Brumhead 1984).

The 1982 Plan claimed that environmental improvement measures would “ensure an appropriate quality and setting for the various attractions” (CSC 1982a GMCRO). Roman history was seen as Castlefield’s premier heritage credential and translated into the suggested spatial practice of “exposing and recreating” the walls of the Roman Fort...
(Ibid para 5.6). Subsequently the idea of ‘rebuilding’ the North Gate was proposed even though the original gate had been obliterated and no records of its form remained. It proved controversial with some ‘archaeological purist’ members of CSC who argued that a recreation would “bear no resemblance to the original” (CSC 1982b GMCRO). Opposition also came from the GMAU who claimed that it would be a “Disney-ish hotch-potch” (1983 MENA). Despite opposition the proposal was approved because it would “give continuity to the theme of people living in the City over a very long period of time and would make the area more attractive” (CSC 1982b GMCRO). The facsimile gate was ‘opened’ ceremoniously in 1986 (COWP 1986 GMCRO and became a striking feature of the UHP. It remains a wonderfully controversial example of a simulacrum, à la Baudrillard and a material manifestation of contested heritage-led spatial practice. The Tourism Plan highlighted the Annual Manchester Fair drawing on Jones and Rhodes, suggesting “it would not be completely out of character” for fairground or carnival-type activities, Roman/Turkish baths, planetarium or market stalls to be located in Castlefield (CSC 1982a: para 5.6, GMCRO). This aspect of the production of Castlefield is discussed in chapter 8.

Promoting an Unequivocal Heritage Tourism Aesthetic

From the time the Castlefield series of articles appeared in 1979, it featured regularly. Coverage was largely supportive and uncritical of the heritage reimagining which was transforming the area, thereby assisting with the consolidation of the heritage valorisation. Duffy (1982 MENA) reported the release of the 1982 Tourism Plan and was obviously briefed by GMC officers because the article saw the initiative entirely from GMC’s perspective. The article set the Tourism Plan in the context of the MOSI and Central Station (GMEX) projects which were led by GMC. Clues to the source of the copy include the claim that promotion of tourism and leisure facilities would bring benefits to the regional centre, to the county and the North West (Ibid). Ironically, Duffy was enthused by the prospect of "exciting new additions to the area” which could include “a busy boating marina at the Castlefield basin” (Duffy 1982 MENA). Hall and Rhodes no doubt drew some long delayed gratification from this. Duffy concentrated on the future for tourism rather than existing industry, proclaiming that the masterplan will “knit together the gems of ages bygone into one big 40 acre tourist
trap” (Ibid). Urban tourists need visitor attractions plus pleasant environments and easy public access. Within two years of its inception these became the watchwords of CSC.

For the COWP it was “imperative that steps be taken to ensure a high standard of visual environment” and that this would be entirely consistent with the need to create a fitting setting for the UHP (CSC 1982a para 6.4). While the Tourism Plan saw most of the existing industrial land uses being left undisturbed, it contained a firm if contradictory land “acquisition philosophy” (para 10.6) which solidified the ambiguous attitudes towards industry. This policy disrupted the support for industry, seeing it as a threat because, “some existing land uses may be viewed as inhibiting the concept of an Urban Heritage Park”: such uses “may need to be relocated” (Ibid). To function properly it was thought this public access route had to be made “as attractive as possible” and that discussions should be started in order to relocate these businesses. In addition, improvement to the area in the vicinity of “the attractive warehouses on Castle Street” could be achieved by the “eventual relocation of other businesses” (Ibid). Should voluntary relocation be resisted, MCC’s compulsory purchase powers were regarded by CSC as instrumental for the acquisition of these sites. Just when it seemed their total erasure was imminent, a belated survey of Castlefield’s industrial businesses was instigated.

The industrial survey was a GMC initiative, funded by GMC and organised by its officers (COWP 1984a GMCRO). There were three main objectives, to: obtain a detailed picture of the type and scale of industrial and commercial activities, familiarise the occupiers with CSC’s objectives for the UHP and inform occupiers of financial assistance available to improve their premises (Ibid). The survey was considered important enough for the County Planning Officer, Burns to invite participation. Great stress was placed on the proposition that industry had a key role in the future of the area and Burns told the companies “we want the improvements to benefit you as well as visitors” (Ibid, emphasis in original). Burns provided a clear statement of industrial valorisation but one set firmly in the context of an urban tourism future:

… we are well aware that there is more to Castlefield than history and archaeology, and the increasing flow of visitors to the two impressive new museums. We realise that it is also a place where lots of firms and their
employees are working hard to make a living, and we regard this as a key factor in planning the area’s future. The aim is to make sure that Castleton is a place where industry and commerce, leisure and tourism, can operate successfully side by side. (Ibid)

However, the recognition by Burns of the increased visitor flows carried with it the potential of conflict with the aesthetically unpleasing firms. A total of 93 firms in the Castlefield area were invited by Burns to participate in the survey. By August 1984, 71 responses were received. Most of the respondents were happy with their location (COWP 1984a GMCRO). To the surprise of the COWP the area presented a stable industrial character. The majority of firms were doing reasonably well and having been in the area for many years, were keen to stay. Many envisaged expanding their operations in situ. Although the needs of Castlefield’s industrial companies were meant to be taken into account, Burns’ and GMC’s attitude to industry became fraught with ambivalence. In an important sense the industrial survey was a doomed rearguard action to maintain the dual future for Castlefield.

**Industrial Heritage Dominance**

A year after the industrial survey the *Castlefield Development Strategy* (CSC 1985 GMCRO) hastened the hegemony of heritage tourism representations:

>The Castlefield area has a unique history and character which should be carefully conserved and developed… As part of a broad strategy, the area needs to be developed in such a way as not to detract from the very features which give Castlefield its unique character. Making the area more accessible and the provisions of “crowd pulling attractions” should go hand in hand with the relaxed enjoyment of a canal-side environment steeped in history. (CSC 1985: para 8 GMCRO)

The priority for the UHP over the next few years was to be the improvement of the area of the canal basin for heritage tourism, an objective which was becoming incompatible with the presence of industry. However, ambivalent support for industry was retained in the 1985 Strategy; the many industrial businesses in Castlefield were seen as providing an important contribution to the city’s economy and an “integral” element of the plans for the area (Ibid: para 9). However, it is apparent that several industrial concerns have already been relocated, for example, Southern and Darwent Timber Merchants and Collyhurst Cooperage. The 1985 Strategy aspired to see other industrial businesses relocated such as Bennett Brothers scrap dealers whose removal
was regarded as an urgent priority. This is an example of one of the “visually intrusive uses” which were “incompatible with the tourism development aspirations for the area” (Ibid: para 20.1). The 1985 Strategy noted ominously MCC was prepared to use its compulsory purchase powers if necessary.

After 1984 MCC politicians and planning officers begin to imagine a purely postindustrial future. In a report to the city’s Planning Committee, chief planning officer, Parnell articulated the city’s priorities that patently did not see industry as integral to Castlefield’s future:

- the early relocation of the remaining tenants within the City Council’s basin landholdings
- early implementation of environmental improvements and schemes related to the industrial archaeological heritage of the basin
- exploit new opportunities for the interpretation and display of Castlefield’s Roman Heritage. (Parnell 1985: para 13.iii GMCRO)

Something of the tension between the GMC dominated CSC and MCC emerged as the city’s planners drove the efforts to rid Castlefield of inappropriate industry:

… in Castlefield there had been a long term Planning Department view that the area should be de-industrialised. The mass of sort of scrap iron places, rendering plants; all those sorts of smelly bad neighbour kind of industries should be moved out and it had the potential err to become a major err tourist attraction. (Stringer 2009 interview).

Howard Bernstein, MCC Assistant CEO at the time reproduced this problematisation of industry:

ML: But what do you think of the complete loss of all those job for ordinary working Manchester people in the Castlefield area from the 1980s?
PB: I wouldn’t say it is a complete loss because a lot of businesses were relocated because you had concrete batchers, breakers yards that relocated they didn’t just disappear.
ML: Fair enough. But they disappeared from Castlefield.
HB: But they disappeared from Castlefield because many of those industries were what I would call bad neighbour industries. You are not going to create a place where people are going to find attractive to live, if they’re being asked to live next to a concrete piling manufacturer. So a lot of those industries were in the wrong place and as Pat rightly says a big effort was made in relocating them. (in Bernstein 2009 interview, see appendix 2).

Reimagining and Representing Future Public Space

Public access into and through the UHP assumed greater significance as the heritage attraction objectives for Castlefield began to be realised. Interestingly, public space
was not conceptualised as sites where difference is encountered positively (Sennett 2000; Young et al 2006) but rather as routes to heritage consumption. CSC drew up detailed proposals for such matters as “public circulation, including possible pedestrianisation links with the rest of the city by public transport and on foot” (Burns 1981: para 8 GMCRO). Reinforcement of the importance of public access to Castlefield space was apparent in the 1982 Tourism Plan: “a greater degree of access” and further “opening up” to view are all important aspects (CSC 1982a: para 5, GMCRO). ‘Opening up’ became a key trope of the emerging Castlefield heritage narrative. The COWP believed that it was vital to improve public access” by creating new open spaces, opening up the waterways and providing through access beneath the viaducts” (Parnell 1985: para 13.iii GMCRO).

A north-south division of Castlefield was conceived by CSC which became a key spatial organising device. Once legitimised, “a clear linkage between the canals [south] and Liverpool Road [north] needed to be created” (CSC 1985: para 5.3). This was the logic behind the imperative to relocate the Duke Street scrap metal merchants. The need to improve public accessibility was reaffirmed in the 1985 Strategy which hammered home the priorities:

The clear priority for the next few years must be to take a dramatic step in opening up and improving the area around the canal basin and rivers. (CSC 1985: para 11, emphasis in original)

In a report to MCC’s Planning Committee Brian Parnell stressed that the potential of the UHP was “not being realised” because of the “very poor public accessibility” amongst other things (Parnell 1985 GMCRO). A crucial strand in the 1985 Strategy was therefore, the “need to make access easier into the heart of the area”. COWP felt it was vital to “remove the sense of isolation and to encourage people to explore its attractions” (CSC 1985: para 10.iii). To achieve this there had to be major improvements to Castlefield’s public spaces, the watersides must be brought back into active public use and their visual environments improved: the important historic buildings, including the viaducts and their settings must be restored (Ibid para 10.ii). Attaining greater public accessibility was one of the objectives of MCC’s land acquisition policy. It was recognised that the area was “relatively inaccessible” to the general public with only one direct reasonable access - Castle Street. The Duke Street
access was considered too environmentally degraded (Ibid: para 20.iii). In order to facilitate public access, acquisition by MCC of areas of land and property in the canal basin, especially under the viaducts was achieved by the late 1980s (Stringer 2009).

Public space and access routes are spatial features that have a long history of depiction in urbanists’ and planners’ visual representations of urban space (Söderström 1996) but the 1982 Tourism Plan contained no maps, no drawings, no photographs and no images. In contrast a wealth of visual representation is presented in the 1985 Strategy. A striking feature of CSC’s work was the emphasis given to the creation and improvement of public space and the enhancement of its publicness. Nowhere is this expressed more forcefully than in the imaginative visual representations in the 1985 Strategy. Two line drawings deserve careful consideration. Although the 1985 Strategy foresaw “many options” for the canalside sites, only heritage tourism/leisure futures were represented visually. The first line drawing is a future impression of how part of the canal basin in the vicinity of Merchants Warehouse might look and be used in a postindustrial Castlefield (figure 6.6).

Figure 6.6 Architectural artist’s representation of how the Merchants Warehouse area should look in a postindustrial Castlefield (Steve Jackson in CSC 1985 GMCRO)
This space was also to be improved through the use of Victorian style hard infrastructure and soft landscaping. It will be used for strolling, sipping al fresco coffee and leisure boating. This partially commodified ludic space will be appropriated by those who appreciate the calm, heritage inspired ambiance such as the gentleman with the trilby, furled umbrella and suit who looks like he has stepped out of a 1950’s architect/planner’s imagination.

Figure 6.7 Architectural artist’s representation of how Castle Quay and Coal Wharf sites should look in a postindustrial Castlefield (Steve Jackson in CSC 1985 GMCRO)

The second line drawing is an imaginative future rendition of the 10 acre Castle Quay and Coal Wharf sites and appears on the front cover the 1985 Strategy (figure 6.7). It displays a high degree of skilled architectural draughtsmanship in the execution of the lifelike buildings and viaducts which would be easily recognisable to anyone who had familiarity with area. One the other hand the drawing creates a purely imagined space of representation in three important senses. Firstly, the cityscapes are not perspectival, elevational nor axonometric; rather, they are seen from an imaginary, privileged
elevated viewing position adopted by the artist/planner allowing a panoptic eye to look down on the scene. Secondly, the bucolic foreground scene is a breathtaking leap into future fantasy: a future where people will stroll in public parkland, lingering for a cool drink on a hot summer’s day shaded under café umbrellas in separate areas of parkland isolated by watercourses. This futurescape provoked a journalistic comparison with Venice (Brown 1985 MENA). Thirdly, the drawing shows Grocers Warehouse reinstated complete with the canal barge holes under the structure. Bought by MCC for £1, the Grocers Warehouse ‘reconstruction’ initiative (figure 6.8) was seen as a great tourist attraction (King 1988 MENA).

6.8 Architectural artist’s representation of how a ‘reconstructed’ Grocers Warehouse might look (Harry Warren (1985) MPDA)
However, this ‘reconstruction’ to the second of the four storeys only was not achieved until 1988 with grants from Urban Programme and the European Regional Development Fund (King 1988 MENA). Ironically, the architectural draughtsman responsible for its design, Harry Warren, admits he was unable to persuade a local enthusiast to give him access to photographs of Grocers Warehouse taken just before demolition in 1960 and therefore had, “virtually nothing to go on” (Warren 2008 interview). He reveals that his drawing on which the rebuilding was based “more fantasy than historical reality”. The level of detail was “inappropriate and unnecessary” but had been included during the early hours of the morning while working at the drawing table under great fatigue in a dream-like state (Ibid). I would argue that Warren’s image and those in the 1985 Strategy blur the distinction between representations of space and spaces of representation. Warren was also responsible for the design of a series of interpretation sign boards that help visitors navigate the area. It is hard to grasp the imaginative leap taken in the production of the 1985 Strategy cover image given that in the early 1980s Castlefield would have appeared little changed from the 1970s/60s. Figure 6.9 depicts a 1960s photographic moment of an almost identical area to that of figure 6.7 except the former is from a slightly lower vantage point. A buttressed wall stands at the site of Grocers Warehouse. By the 1980s coal storage had ceased and if anything the area would have appeared more underused and forlorn. Kevin Cummins captures in a realist photograph of Castlefield in 1985 the desolate feel of the area; Mick Hucknall poses by the degraded Merchants Warehouse (figure 6.9). Lefebvre (and many others) was mindful that photographs can be deceptive (1991: 93). With this in mind it should be stressed that the intention here is not to counter-pose the ‘real’ of the photograph and TV documentary against imaginative drawing; all are considered spatial representations that provide different insights into the production of space.
Figure 6.9 1960s Industrial canalscape photograph: Castle Quay and Coal Wharf with the site of Grocers Warehouse in the background behind the coal (source MLIC)

Figure 6.10 Mick Hucknall opposite Merchants Warehouse in 1985, alongside the Bridgewater Canal with Middle Warehouse in the background (Kevin Cummins 2009; permission applied for from publisher)
Frictions and Tensions in the Production of Space

Spatial production and reimaging carries the potential for contestations about the past in representations of space and their significance for present spatial practice (Lefebvre 1991: 416; Jacobs 1996: 93, 124). There is evidence in the archives of tension, friction and conflict within CSC and between it and private interests, particularly GTV. In the late 1970s Coronation Street was enormously popular and GTV was going through a period of expansion. The company wanted to enlarge its studio space and outdoor sets for Coronation Street and Sherlock Holmes. By 1980 GTV was contemplating allowing the public to tour the Coronation Street set, merely a frontage at that time (Brown 1980 MENA). In 1982 a full scale outdoor set was planned and Granada Studio Tours started to operate from 1988. The tours included visits to Coronation Street, Downing Street, Baker Street and the set of the Houses of Parliament. At its peak it attracted 5.5 million visitors per annum, closing in 1999.

Although GTV was a member of CSC its managing director was secretive about their plans and worrying about the impact of new public space revealed his chagrin directly to GMC about recent heritage tourism proposals:

I am afraid we are not yet able to give you details of our plans for public access to our part of the Castlefield site. We have stated previously that while we have every wish to be helpful in promoting the Castlefield area, our priority for the use of our part of site is for programme making. Compatibility between that requirement and those of tourism is difficult to achieve, as has been demonstrated by our present problems with the Science and Industry Museum over their surprise proposal to use the sidings level for car parking and the potential interference with our SHERLOCK HOLMES production. Until problems of this nature and the whole question of crowd control around our production areas have been resolved, we cannot agree that public access to our site can be assumed and must be excluded from any immediate marketing strategy. (Plowright 1983, GMCRO, capitals in original, figure 6.11)

In promoting Castlefield successfully as a visitor destination, CSC had manifestly not given much consideration to the impact on existing non-industrial companies such as GTV. It did not help that GTV representatives attended CSC meetings infrequently. However, a series of meetings between GMC’s McWilliam-Fowler, GTV’s General Manager Mr Quinn and Plowright appear to have resolved the differences amicably (McWilliam-Fowler 1983b GMCRO).
During the archival research a film script came to light unexpectedly: *Yesterday’s Dust, Tomorrow’s Dreams* (GTV 1981 GMCRO). It reveals ironically, that while Granada was not sharing its plans for the future with CSC it was embarked upon a secret project to produce a dramatised documentary film with Castlefield as the central protagonist. The area was to be lauded for the romance of its 2,000 year history, canals, railways, warehouses, Roman excavations and “the excitement of Liverpool Road Station”. The script tells the story of the history of the area, especially GTV and Castlefield’s mutual interconnections. Dramas, such as *Coronation Street* “dovetail into the historic surroundings”; the drama of television and, “the drama of Castlefield’s history seem to make good bedfellows” (Ibid).
Eventually a copy of *Yesterday’s Dust, Tomorrow’s Dreams* was located at the Leeds archives of GTV and transferred to DVD format (GTV 1982 GTVA). In the film we are reminded that through the decades Castlefield provided GTV with many film locations:

- the city of Prague, *Invasion* (1980)
- a railway yard during the general strike, *Brideshead Revisited* (1981)

One of Britain’s most recognised faces, Annie Walker, landlady of the Rovers Return, opens the film at the site where construction of the new full size *Coronation Street* set is underway, with the words:

Well as Hilda Ogden said “We’ve had a lot of history in these parts and it ought to be a consternation area.” But now thank goodness it’s a conservation area”. (Doris Speed in GTV 1982 GTVA, emphasis in original)

The film entwines cleverly a number of histories: Roman, Georgian, Victorian, industrial and that of GTV. Archaeologists are seen excavating the site of the Roman Fort and the film provides information about the continuing ‘reconstruction’, of the Fort walls and ramparts, pottery kilns and iron smelting furnaces: the precursor to Manchester’s industry, science and technological greatness. Despite this no recognition was given of the conservation and heritage valorisation work of the amenity societies, GMC or HBC. In a series of dramatised sketches, the film highlights Castlefield as a place where generations of workers - “shock troops of the industrial revolution” – real soldiers, entrepreneurs and their female ‘companions’ had passed through in a cascade of brief encounters leaving legacies remembered and forgotten: memories of “warhorses, warehouses and whorehouses”. Jake Abram a retired canal-boat-man recalls that his 19th century terrace home at Water Street was demolished in the late 1960s under the ‘slum’ clearance programme to make way for GTV expansion: televisual dreams out of demolition dust. Interestingly, he was also a major contributor to the history of Castlefield seen through working class eyes (Heaton 1995).

We see in the film the boathouse of the Nemesis Rowing Club, one of the founders of the 19th century Manchester and Salford Regatta (discussed further in chapter 8). It was converted in 1980 into a pub/restaurant, the Mark Addy, by Jim Ramsbottom in
his first foray into historic building property development.\textsuperscript{48} A haunting soundtrack provides nostalgic echoes of times past. It consists of extracts from Elgar’s 1908 Symphony No.1: the great British composer wrote the symphony apparently with Manchester in mind and insisted that the inaugural performance be there, which it was. Hans Richter, the Hallé’s conductor is said to have carried the new symphony to the Free Trade Hall each day as he commuted into Manchester by train across Castlefield’s viaducts. He certainly did conduct the Hallé’s first performance of Symphony No. 1 in 1908; a year of crushing economic depression. Elgar said of the symphony, “it is more than an elegy for yesterday and asserts massive hope for tomorrow” (Elgar, in GTV 1982 GTVA). Elgar’s hope is elegantly transposed by the film into the 1980s era with GTV’s investment and the transformation of Castlefield representing: “the hushed breath between yesterday’s dust and tomorrow’s dreams”, memories of “unforgettable brief encounters all too easily forgotten” (in GTV 1982 GTVA).

\textit{Yesterday’ Dust, Tomorrow’s Dreams} is partly romanticised dramatic fiction and partly a contemporary gritty record of industrial Castlefield. Unlike Redhead’s 1978 programme no experts or politicians appear. Nonetheless a witty and engaging script, documentary location filming, copious historical detail and Jake Abram’s working class oral history provide a unique record. Combined with fictionalised drama and poetry they bring Castlefield’s history alive in an engaging conflated confection of representations of space and spaces of representation. Hope for the future was epitomised too in the centrepiece of the film, the Queen’s visit to Castlefield in 1982 to open formally the new \textit{Coronation Street} set and the MOSI. Inside the recently completed first phase of the MOSI, the Queen is shown around displays of Castlefield and Manchester’s industrial history and recent developments by several MCC and GMC planners. There is on hand for the Queen, “a bevy of mayors to lend ballast to their planners’ flights of fancy” (in GTV 1982 GTVA). Those flights were of course tempered not just by politicians but by exigencies and conflicts that required imagination, considerable negotiating skills and a willingness to compromise. In closing the script (and film) eulogised Castlefield and GTV deploying a poetic arboreal

\textsuperscript{48} Mark Addy (1838-90) was a local hero, a Salfordian riverboat man who saved about 50 people from drowning in the River Irwell.
metaphor, one of industrial decline and decay as the seedbed for future hopes and dreams:

**Screen Image & Location**
- Canal tunnel – the roots break through the roof

**Actor or actress voice over**
- Castlefield survived because its roots went deep and at long last those roots are being acknowledged.
- In a railway yard in Castlefield. That tree down through brick, through mortar.
- The roots in the water
- As if it could hear the living water. Murmur its secret, long concealed.
- The tree again
- Which fed the shoots and so arose.
- High angle long shot
- To fill the shoots of the tree that grows.
- We zoom out and up to reveal ‘Granada’ high foregrounded
- In a railway yard in Castlefield.
- Aerial shot circling GTV

**Commentator voice over**
- And we in Granada are very happy to have our roots here too. On a clear day you can see for two thousand years.

**End credits**
(Ibid: 38)

**Friction Revisited**

The Queens’ visit offered an opportunity to put local conflicts and rivalries aside for a while but they soon returned. The most serious friction occurred in 1983 when the LRSS, with the support of CSC, proposed the creation of a circular route for the Planet (simulacrum) steam train ride from LRS that would take the smoky, clattering steam engine close to GTV’s Coronation Street set. Granada opposed the proposals using legal means. David Rhodes came close to being sued personally by GTV:

Anyway I got the rail buffs to advise me about 19th century and modern railway law and Granada got these solicitors who were the biggest bar stewards in Manchester. Al Capone would have hired them. Anyway the Museum fought for this rail link and I was indirectly party to it and Granada backed off. So the museum got the rail link going through here [pointing to a map] and round. But they only run it on special days because of the smoke and noise. I think Granada gave them £200,000 or something. (Rhodes 2008 interview)

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49 The steam engine The Planet designed by George Stephenson’s son Robert was a much larger and more fuel efficient engine than the Rocket which won the 1830 Rainhill Trials.
While conservation area status and purposes were understood by local officials and politicians, the Heritage Park concept was a novelty in 1982. Since it was not a statutory designation there was doubt and disagreement not just about what the concept meant but more fundamentally how CSC was supposed to operate. A member of the COWP from the North West Tourist Board (NWTB) was concerned that “the concept of an urban heritage park was still not fully accepted” and that the promotion of activities of the constituent bodies “were still un-coordinated and planned on an individual basis” (Tucker in COWP 1984b GMCRO). This problem probably contributed to friction between GMC and MCC:

I challenged Leatherbarrow about the City Council's likely commitment to the [Castlefield] Carnival (financial or otherwise) and he said that while they could not provide any financial support, they were prepared to offer support for advertising (press and TV) to the value of just under £5000. However, he gave the impression that this would take the form of the City doing its own thing on promoting Castlefield carnival, quite separate from any corporate promotion which GMC was planning. I told him that this was not on and that an urgent meeting was needed… Quite honestly, it struck me that once again the City was declaring UDI and didn't really want to know about any promotional plans we might have. (Grosvenor 1984 GMCRO)

Grosvenor’s emotional outburst in this internal GMC memorandum regarding small amounts of money, illustrates how official minutes do not always capture the stresses and tensions of a spatial coalition. Graham Stringer remembers that CSC resourcing “in cash terms it was really small potatoes” (Stringer 2009 interview), hence for him hardly worth bothering about.

Friction caused problems of a different kind between GMC and MCC. A partnership between the Labour dominated MCC (dating back to1838) and GMC (created by a Conservative government in 1974) carried inherently the potential for implacable tensions. For example, the 1982 Tourism Plan located Castlefield not in its city context but in the wider county, and saw the UHP as presenting an opportunity “which is unrivalled in Greater Manchester” (CSC 1982a para 1.1 GMCRO). Unambiguously, the Tourism Plan saw the benefits accruing not just to the city but “local residents [those] living within GMC” (Ibid: 2.2). Although membership of CSC included high ranking local government officers, the highest officials were not involved directly. Howard Bernstein retains forthright views about the conflicts engendered by CSC:

ML: Do you recall the Castlefield Conservation Area Steering Committee?
HB: Yes with great trepidation.
ML: Trepidation? Were you a member of that?
HB: I certainly wasn’t.
ML: You weren’t? Why do you say trepidation?
HB: Well I’m passionate about heritage, as long as heritage can be combined with the growth and development of places [pause] and there have been debates around Castlefield where people’s preoccupation with heritage can be at the expense of progress and development, “No you can’t knock that building around, it’s a very important building”, so some people would rather have left it derelict than actually bring it back into productive use. (in, Bernstein 2009 interview)

This interchange typifies two of the main sources of friction between the MCC and GMC which the heritage driven plans for Castlefield’s future epitomised. At the root of the friction was; firstly, differences about the legitimate extent of preservation intervention in the historic built environment. Since its inception GMC had championed the preservation of what it saw as the county’s architectural heritage. For example in 1975 for the European Year of Architectural Heritage GMC organised a travelling exhibition showcasing the county’s architecturally and historically significant buildings. It was led by Robert Maund in his role as head of Special Activities (Makepeace 2007: 7). Secondly, was the divergence of view between GMC and MCC about the allocation of GMC resources. Howard Bernstein, MCC Assistant Chief Executive in the 1980s was adamant that GMCs’ approach to resource allocation, especially for regeneration projects was flawed fundamentally:

They invested in culture and that was because the Chair [of GMC Arts and Recreation Committee] at the time was an ex-Manchester councillor, Bert Langton and he understood it. But they spent most of the time watering down the impact of the city centre and again it was opening a box of Quality Street toffees: 5 for them, 5 for them, 5 for them. They could not differentiate in priority terms between the economic significance of Manchester and the rest of the conurbation. So they attached as much importance to Stockport as they did the regional centre. (Bernstein 2009 interview)

To some extent this view is corroborated by the archival evidence. GMC investment in its own LRS project was large but its investment through CSC initiative, was relatively small. Bernstein’s criticisms were not aimed at GMC officers, like Don Burns, who he praised but at the political priorities of GMC which were always trying to “relegate the importance of Manchester” in favour of other places within Greater Manchester (Ibid). Before GMC was created, MCC was by far the most powerful local authority voice in what became the Greater Manchester area. Publicly MCC opposed Margaret
Thatcher’s plans to abolish GMC which was Labour controlled at the time but behind the scenes sentiments were conflicted:

ML: When I mentioned GMC you said “pinch of salt”.
HB: GMC [abolition] was one of the few policies that was not widely supported by the [national] Labour Party but which was joyously supported within the City Council. That’s because GMC did hardly anything for Manchester: the regional centre. Yes they made one or two interventions, which over time have stood the test of time. We are very grateful for that… When they went, it was a great day for Manchester, frankly.
PB: We flourished after that.
(in Bernstein 2009 interview)

The GMC area covered a population of about 2.5 million containing 10 metropolitan districts but Manchester with a population of only about 350,000 dominated the county economically in terms of jobs (and by implication GDP) contributing about one third of the county total from 1971 to 1997 (Girodano and Twomey 2002). When it came to GMC’s limited funds for urban improvement, city politicians and planners expected Manchester’s allocation to reflect its regional importance, not its population or status as one of 10 metropolitan districts. Clearly, this did not happen to the satisfaction of MCC. Members of CSC were aware that although some local money would fund Castlefield’s projects, grant aid from central government, “through Derelict Land Grant and the Inner City partnership is essential” (COWP 1984b GMCRO).

Understanding struggles for public sector urban policy resources, influenced as they are by representation of space is crucial for an informed appreciation of the production of Castlefield space. The work of the CSC continued until the arrival of the CMDC in 1988; its contribution to the production of space is the subject of the next chapter.
Before concluding it is worth returning to the concept of the archival network outlined in chapter 3. In the course of the empirical research diagrammatic representations of the main network relations of the kind shown in figure 6.12 were found to be useful. Informed by the theoretical approach to archives of Prior (2008) and Ketelaar 2008 the network provides a complex appreciation of the how mixed methods research can contribute to the construction of archival knowledge about the production of space.
This diagram helps our understanding of the linkages and intertextuality of the various elements of the archival networks uncovered by and constructed through the empirical research.

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Figure 6.12 Example of archival network linkages developed during the course of the research
Conclusions

In common with the others, this chapter covers much fertile ground in efforts to unravel the histories of the production of Castlefield space in the 1970s and ‘80s. It necessarily presents a picture no less complex than the previous chapter.

Methodologically, the data derived from the mixed methods approach helps construct a far more comprehensive and robust picture of the production of space than would have been possible using a single research method. Being able to re-interview Rhodes also brought significant additional richness to the understanding of Castlefield in the 1970s.

Archival and interview data reveals Hall and Rhodes’ 1972 Report to be significant because it was the first to re-christen the area ‘Castlefield’ and inscribe it with a meaning other than ugly industrial. Hall and Rhodes’ spatial intervention was crucial for the selective reimagining of the area as an agglomeration of important historic sites and place memories. Amenity society visual representations played a crucial role in the heritage reimagining, using quasi-rational cartographic rhetoric to initiate an oversimplified zoning of the area, which could not reproduce the complexity and sensitivity of their textual analysis. In the process existing industry was problematised irreversibly. It is noteworthy methodologically that the 1972 and 1978 Reports only came to light through research efforts which combined secondary sources, interview data, archival data and internet tracking.

These Reports although obscure and unrecognised in the academic literature, have great importance for the production of Castlefield because their ethos and visual representations infiltrated later official representations of space through processes of intertextuality. Their influence extended into the realm of the BBC’s Homeground: Castlefield – a programme only made because of the efforts of amenity society activists. Official and amenity society representations of space are found in this chapter to include significant visual representations of space some of which (as in the previous two chapters) blur Lefebvre’s binary categorisation of representations of space and spaces of representation. Where the two amenity society reports sit in Lefebvre’s classification is a moot point since they combine elements of representations of space and spaces of representation. They combine expert language and visual techniques and counter-representations that challenged the dominant industry-centre understandings of
Castlefield and are perhaps best conceptualised as hybrid representations. Categorical blurring extends also to the televisual representations of the BBC and GTV.

Archival data reveal also the continued importance of the GMC in the production of Castlefield especially regarding its crucial inputs into the Castlefield Carnivals. CSC emerges as an organisation that should be considered an early example of entrepreneurial city management. Through CSC’s strategy documents the chapter traces the evolution of its approach from one of finely balanced ambivalent support for existing industry and support for instrumental heritage, to one which saw industry as something to be eviscerated so that heritage urban tourism was able to make its vital contribution to the local economy. Interview and archival data provide fascinating insights into behind the scenes machinations. CSC’s work was not without tensions and conflicts, within the public sector and between it and GTV, not surprising in hindsight given the range of different interests involved. Despite this, the chapter forces consideration, in the context of the pessimistic public space literatures (discussed in chapter 2), of how democratic public institutions in difficult economic times sought to achieve the production of new public spaces which facilitated large scale free ludic events. We can take our hats off to them for that, while realising that they did this for reasons of heritage-driven economic expediency which chastens the temptation to see their work purely through an altruistic ‘Sennettian’ public-space-of-difference lens. Spatial practice requires resources; in the 1980s Castlefield context, scarce public resources. Once GMC was abolished and the local authority spending squeeze continued into the late 1980s, Castlefield’s envisaged heritage-led spatial production would require resources on a greater scale than hitherto. How these resources were appropriated and with what consequences for the production of public space is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 7
CMDC and the Production of Public Space

Space is never produced in the sense that a kilogram of sugar or a yard of cloth is produced… Does it then come into being after the fashion of a superstructure? Again, no. It would be more accurate to say that it is at once a precondition and a result of social superstructures. The state and each of its constituent institutions call for spaces - but spaces which they can organize according to their specific requirements. (Lefebvre 1991: 85)

Our early works in Castlefield was [sic] to dredge the canals improve the tow paths, put in some bridges… But what you couldn’t do is [pause] if you came in on the A56, if you went in there, you came out there. You couldn’t cross over and come out onto Liverpool Road so it was a question of putting bridges in, opening it up and we spent about umm about six million of our budget over a period of about two and a half years doing a lot of those enabling works. (Glester 2008 interview)

Introduction
This chapter contributes to a critical understanding of the production of Castlefield space through an exploration of notable spatial moments in the 1980s and 90s. The argument focuses on the production of new public space by state institutions but quite what their requirements were is revealed to be far from obvious. Previous published research has explored how the Central Manchester Development Corporation (CMDC) served, due to its property development remit and its close relationship with the private sector, to produce homogenised spaces of consumption (O’Connor and Wynne 1996, Degen 2008; Madgin 2008) or in Lefebvre’s terms, abstract space. This element of the thesis does not dispute such research findings but a key argument here disrupts the dominant Castlefield regeneration narrative that understands CMDC intervention predominantly in these negative terms. Similarly, one of my aims here is to expand on Deas et al’s (2000) claim that there was a uni-directional impact on the MCC by CMDC which pushed the former towards an entrepreneurial mode of governance and away from municipal local government. This chapter draws on a range of primary data: from the archives, interviews and visual data. It is not the intention to privilege

50 The GONW oversaw CMDC’s work and its relevant archival files proved illuminating. In trying to track down CMDC’s archives I found Yvette Cooper MP (2006) claimed that the CMDC archives were held by the GONW. Research there
one or the other of these different kinds of data, rather they are all seen as contributing in different ways to the richness and complexity of Castlefield space.

Furthermore this chapter explains why ‘Castlefield’ needs to be interrogated ontologically rather than accepted under this or that homogenous banner, e.g. privatised consumption (Mellor 1997), tourism heritage (Schofield 2000) or aesthetic exclusion through public space formalisation (Degen 2008). I argue that Castlefield’s bridges stimulated the creation of significant new public spaces, in particular the Castlefield Arena. How these spaces came about and the manner in which they assumed tremendous importance for the production of space is unravelled in this chapter. The chapter returns to the complex public space conceptualisations explicated in chapter 2 by asking, what is Castlefield? Before this element of the theses can be explicated it is necessary to discuss the creation and importance of the Manchester UDC (presented in chapter 4), which through deployment of its large scale resources compounded the spatial practice of the previous decade leading to the production of complex multi-layered new spaces. While there is published research concerned with counter-posing representations of space with spaces of representation, this chapter argues that an interrogation of the recent history of spatial practice that produced new public spaces with an ambivalent hybrid character is crucial for a critical appreciation of Castlefield’s production.

The Creation of CMDC and Recurring Representations of Space

After the re-election of the third and last Margaret Thatcher government in June 1987 Nicholas Ridley (SoS at the DoE) resurrected the UDC idea with the creation of four large scale non-city centre UDCs covering extensive areas of declining heavy industries: for Birmingham, Tyneside, Teeside and Trafford Park industrial estate just outside Manchester. These were the second generation UDCs. The sprawling area of

proved this was not the case. Kate Hoey MP asked the same question on my behalf: Parmjit Dhanda MP (2008) was similarly unhelpful. Eventually the government’s line changed: Rosie Winterton MP (2009) stated in response to a second question from Hoey that the CMDC archives were to be “securely destroyed” in 2006. Subsequently I received a letter from a DoE civil servant stating that three of the CMDC files had been “marked for possible selection and preservation at the National Archive” (Murray 2009 letter). Apart from being a disturbing and extremely disappointing episode, it demonstrates that the truth about official archives can be frustratingly elusive.
industrial East Manchester was a contender for a second generation UDC but MCC was “somewhat diffident” about having a UDC in a part of the city which included a large population and had opposed the idea strongly (Glester 2008 interview). In 1987 Ridley floated the idea of creating third generation city centre ‘mini-UDCs’ that would not need massive infrastructure investment and where it was thought that tens rather than hundreds of millions of pounds could unlock potential private sector investment.

There was a list of about 12 from which only three or four would be selected. Glester claims that in 1987 he suggested a Manchester UDC and Ridley was enthusiastic for Thatcherite political reasons, seeing a chance “you might say to take on the socialist municipal citadels” (Ibid). Ridley was also sympathetic towards Manchester because Glester had taken him around the area privately so Ridley had seen for himself the problems of the derelict areas behind Piccadilly Railway Station; Castlefield’s rundown canals and neglected warehouses. Manchester made it on to the short list in 1988 following powerful advocacy from sections of Manchester’s business community including the Manchester Chamber of Commerce (George 1988 GONWA). The suggested UDC area encompassed 460 acres (187 hectares) on the south western edge of the city centre and included the whole of the Castlefield Conservation Area. MCC in the 1980s was perceived by the government to be using the local state as a site of resistance to local authority public spending cuts and the wider neoliberal agenda while attempting to develop a genuinely local socialism (Quilley 2000: 601). There were attempts to resist the policy of rate capping (Grant 1986), first from 1979 by ‘old’ municipal MCC led by Norman Morris, then after the 1984 local elections by ‘new left’ MCC led by the young, university educated, Graham Stringer. DoE civil servants sought therefore, to vitiate potentially strong opposition from MCC by careful manipulation of the proposed city centre UDC boundary, choice of chairman and chief executive and the offer of a light touch planning regime.

Probably due to the relentless criticism, planning powers of the third round mini-UDCs were reduced in comparison with the 1981 versions but not before some hard negotiations. The government proposed in the consultation stages that city centre UDCs have full and exclusive land use planning powers. On hearing from Jack Cunningham, Shadow DoE spokesman that a city centre UDC was mooted Stringer,
lobbied that it had no planning powers. He had met GONW officials and significantly, in the light of Heseltine’s ‘private sector’ UrP initiative, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to garner their support. For the Chamber, its President thought the UDC would "be of great benefit to the revival of the City" and he wanted to do nothing that would "jeopardise the chance of its successful establishment"(George 1988 GONWA). He declined to support Stringer commenting that the government would not give way on this issue and that any MCC opposition would lead to delay and be futile. For their part MCC did not relish the prospect of making its planning staff redundant (Bernstein 2009 interview). An agency agreement was proposed by the DoE whereby planning applications were made to CMDC and MCC. City planning officers would then deal with the application and make a recommendation to CMDC which made the formal decision. A formal agreement to this effect was ratified in October 1988 (Hood 1988 GONWA). Contrary to Stringer’s fears, his Planning Department’s recommendations were rarely ignored and the CMDC Board received the same planning advice “via John Glester and their officials” as MCC Planning Committee (Stringer 2009 interview). This was an effective compromise which attenuated MCC opposition.

Another worry for the MCC regarded the potential disenfranchisement of citizens in any proposed UDC area. First round UDCs especially the LDDC were condemned consistently for the so called democratic deficit. Critics of the LDDC claimed that its population of 40,000 in 1981 was disenfranchised locally, and its social and community needs ignored, by the imposition of an unelected quango that had considerable planning, compulsory purchase, infrastructure and property development powers (see Colenutt 1991; Brownhill 1992). Therefore in problematising city space by means of material and economic criteria, the extent to which resident populations are included in a UDC area becomes crucial. Although positioning the northern boundary was straightforward, because the UDC was not meant to include viable city centre development sites, the boundary to south had a politically derived genesis.

DoE officials, including Glester, thought long and hard about how to avoid stimulating local political opposition to a Manchester city centre UDC and he claims he suggested an area “wrapping round the southern boundary of the city centre but taking in the Victorian heritage and the Castlefield canals” (Glester 2008 interview). In 1987
defining the boundary was politically sensitive and the DoE sought advice, in confidence, from private consultants (Glester 1987 GONWA). Stringer too claims a significant role in deciding the boundary and found the DoE Minster responsible, David Trippier responsive to his suggestions (Stringer 2009 interview). Ultimately, along with exclusion of city centre sites on the northern boundary, part of the boundary compromise was to exclude the economically and socially disadvantage populations to the south of the city centre (Hulme and Moss Side) and the east (Ardwick, Beswick and Ancoats). By doing so the DoE sought to avoid confrontation with MCC because of the problem of perceived local disenfranchisement:

JG: And then we got to the boundary issue and the boundary was [voice rising] faaairly self evident. It wasn’t going to encroach into East Manchester you know. It was going to go as far as urm Argos, Toys R Us there in front of that road…
ML: Great Ancoats Street?
JG: Yea, that was going to be the boundary. It wasn’t going to be going into Ancoats or East Manchester… [it would] narrow a bit as it got behind Piccadilly Station, run down urm by Portland Street bounded by the railway line and it swept in a thin wedge down there [pointing to outside the hotel]. The reason for that was you didn’t need to go beyond Portland Street because you are into the CBD ahh and you didn’t need to go the other side of the railway line [to the south] because you are getting into different issues like Moss Side and Hulme which would need a different sort of agency.
(in Glester 2008 interview)

Designating CMDC’s boundary in this way emphasises how far problematisations of city space had shifted away from 1940s and 1960s priorities (discussed in chapter 4) and highlights how in the 1980s material dereliction came to be implicated in economic stagnation. The CMDC was designated in September 1988. A major beneficiary of this approach was Castlefield: a place with little resident population but considerable underused and outright derelict land and property. Castlefield was one of the six CMDC ‘corporate sectors’ and along with the Great Bridgewater Hall project51 was the recipient of the lion’s share of CMDC’s lifetime budget of about £100M. In concentrating a large proportion of its interventions and budget on Castlefield CMDC drew on representations of space established over the previous 15 years by the HBC, GMC and MCC influenced by the quasi-spaces of representation and counter-representations of the amenity societies.

51 The Great Bridgewater Hall project opened in 1996 providing a new home for Manchester’s Hallé Orchestra. Grants of £10.8M were secured by CMDC.
Nicholas Ridley was astute in his choice of CMDC chairman when he selected James Grigor whose appointment had to be approved by the Prime Minister (Bush 1991 GONWA). He was boss of the Manchester based Swiss chemical engineering company Ciba-Geigy which first came to Manchester in 1911. Grigor was a well respected businessman who unlike the chairmen of the LDDC and the MDC was seen as politically neutral rather than an outright Conservative Party supporter and “he wasn’t part of the Manchester mafia” (Glester 2008 interview). Grigor had argued strongly for the setting up of the Trafford Park UDC in 1987 (partly out of self interest as Ciba-Geigy had a large plant here). He knew and had good relations with the leader of MCC Graham Stringer and the Deputy Chief Executive, Howard Bernstein. Grigor’s affinity for Castlefield may have attracted him to an agency dedicated to improving the area. Through his contacts at the Manchester Literary and Philosophy Society (MLPS), he would have been well aware of the work to convert LRS to the MOSI. In a paper written for the MLPS he argued for the importance of the MOSI project for “focusing interest and attracting visitors to Castlefield” (Grigor 1994: 62). Prior to 1987 MCC had not cooperated with the government and not made any spending cuts but “1987 gave us pause for thought” MCC politicians knew they could not continue to “rescue the public and private sectors” (Stringer 2008 interview). Stringer is sure that if Grigor had come with his offer in 1985 or ‘86 “he might not have found us quite so responsive”: a view supported by an archival datum (Glester 1987 DCLGA). MCC would have said no to “an old style LDDC” (Stringer 2008 interview) but in 1987, Stringer argues what really made a difference was Jimmy Grigor’s personality, “there was no aggression from Jimmy” who felt they could, “work together to use this extra money to help Manchester”. (Ibid)

Ridley was politically deft with his appointment of the chief executive, demonstrating a willingness to listen to the views of MCC. John Glester was appointed after consultation with MCC (Stringer 2009 interview). Glester was no stranger to UDCs or Manchester politics. He was a career civil servant involved in setting up the

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52 The Manchester mafia was a term used in the 1990s to describe to the coalition of locally business interests operating in the city that for example promoted the Olympic and Commonwealth games bids and the Phoenix and City Pride initiatives (Peck and Tickell 1995).
Merseyside and Trafford Park UDCs having transferred from London to the DoE’s North West Regional Office through promotion in the mid-1970s. Significantly, his ideological commitment to involving the private sector in urban policy and acceptance of the need for partnership across the public and private sectors to achieve inner city improvements dates back to his engagement with the Manchester and Salford Inner City Partnership (MSICP) in the 1970s (Glester 2008 interview). He knew personally the key MCC politicians and officials through his work with MSICP and with Grigor he established cordial working relations with MCC. Perhaps to emphasise their empathy with MCC, CMDC selected a symbolic bee to brand its letterheads, documents and project sites. Glester would have known that ‘busy bees’ symbolised the city’s frenetic 19th century industrial prowess. Bee mosaics adorn the 19th century Town Hall floors and bees circling the globe, signifying the city’s status as the centre of world trade, appear in the coat of arms designed in 1842. A coalition triumvirate emerged therefore with Stringer, Grigor and Glester regularly going for a meal to “have a chat and by and large sort things out” which meant there was little conflict at Board level (Ibid). Stringer had significant input into the appointment of the Board members and was happy with the appointment in particular of Bob Scott who had a long record of cordial working relations with MCC and Councillor Jack Flanagan who had worked with Grigor on the Manchester Science Park project: so “the Board had a coherence” (Stringer 2009 interview).

CMDC had only a small staff complement and contracted out most of the professional analytical and policy making work. ECOTEC planning consultants were appointed in 1988 to produce the first CMDC Development Strategy (ECOTEC 1988 GONWA). Following the legal remit for UDCs the Strategy proposed four major objectives:

- helping to bring back into use existing property and land

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53 CMDC’s first Board had three Councillors: Jack Flanagan, Joyce Hill and the Leader Graham Stringer. The other members were: chairman Grigor, deputy chairman Mr D Bootham, Mr K Alford, Mrs D Buchanan, Mr P Carmichael, Mr R Gerrard and Bob Scott.
- the development of new property
- the attraction of private finance as part of these developments and redevelopments
- environmental improvement to the UDC area

Protection and enhancement of the historic built environment was noticeably absent but would not remain so. Castlefield along with other UDC areas such as London and Liverpool docklands had a wealth of historic buildings and their treatment at the hands of those UDCs was causing consternation in the heritage sector. DoE and English Heritage civil servants did not see eye-to-eye regarding the potential for conflict between “conservation and inner city policies, particularly in the context of grant availability” (Page 1989 GONWA). This had resulted in conservation failures where inner city grants had been deployed through “a failure of coordination and indeed comprehension within DoE” (Ibid). Officials at the DoE would accept only that “there can occasionally be difficulties” in certain UDC areas (Butler 1990 GONWA).

GONW’s Regional Controller was unhappy with Page’s “wild statements” about lack of comprehension and stressed the potential for UDCs to exploit their heritage through conversion schemes that, “could avoid ‘the shock of the new’ and the disincentive effects of ‘carbuncles’ “(Isherwood 1990 GONWA). CMDC showed sensitivity to the heritage potential of its area as it began to assimilate the industrial heritage preservation ethos inculcated in the MCC over the last decade. CMDC’s Development Director considered that because of its historic nature, a Simplified Planning Zone (SPZ) (an area with reduced planning control) could not be introduced without strong opposition and would be “too crude for such an area”. He felt that developers and investors would expect a “higher level of control on adjacent sites to protect their investments” than the SPZ approach could achieve (Hood 1988, GONWA).

A year later CMDC had refined its strategy emphasising the provision of financial “assistance to encourage private sector investment” (CMDC 1989: 2 GONWA).

Echoing earlier amenity society and MCC assessments the 1989 Strategy now considered that the Roman Fort, canals, historic warehouses and railway infrastructure created a “Unique Selling Proposition” (Ibid: 6). Regarding the waterways, CMDC saw their great tourist potential “to link centres of activity” (Ibid: 7).
Grigor wrote reflectively that at the start of the CMDC era Castlefield suffered from a poor environment, very high costs of historic building refurbishment and the need for redevelopment of derelict and contaminated sites, that is, visually signified problems. He felt that “the primary reason for setting up CMDC was to remove or reduce these barriers” (Grigor, in Cityscape 1992: 63 GONWA).

The 1989 Strategy is on the one hand an example of staid official representations of space mainly in textual form. On the other, one of its striking features was the inclusion of artistic visual imaginings of the future. While the written text kept faithfully to the script of private sector property subsidy and heritage tourism, the imaginines are more daring (figure 7.1 and 7.2), depicting spaces reverberating with environmental improvements and new developments. Additionally, new public spaces are animated by throngs of people enjoying heritage tourism and leisure-based consumption. However, two further points must be made. Firstly, the use of these thoroughly artistic images in the 1989 Strategy blurs the distinction between representations of space and spaces of representation in ways similar to those

Figure 7.1 CMDC architectural artist’s representation of how Castle Quay should look after redevelopment, complete with an artist creating spaces of representation (in CMDC 1989 GMCRO)
encountered in previous chapters. Secondly, these visualisations imagine Castlefield as a place of such high aesthetic qualities that artists would wish to come to create visual spaces of representation. With the area run down and still mostly ‘private’ space, this vision required a significant imaginative leap.

Figure 7.2 CMDC architectural artist’s representation of how Castlefield should look after redevelopment, with a waterside café-scape reminiscent of the one imagined by the CSC artist in 1985 (in CMDC 1989 GMCRO)

The first grant decision to be made by the CMDC Board was for GTV’s proposals for the conversion into a hotel of derelict warehouses called Victoria and Albert (which became the Victoria and Albert Hotel (table 7.1). Stringer thought it did not need grant aid but “went along with it” (Stringer 2009 interview). CMDC was under pressure to show results by spending money quickly and, “I suppose as Granada had supported the [CMDC] process it was also a favour to Granada” (Ibid). Another early large grant for ‘private sector’ property development was ironically made to the Youth Hostel Association (YHA), a registered charity, therefore a not-for-profit organisation. Their first venture was a hotel followed by a youth hostel. Unsurprisingly, the YHA pressured for the adjoining area to be improved (it eventually became the Castlefield Arena site).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Castlefield Project</th>
<th>Total Cost (£M)</th>
<th>CMDC Grant (£M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victoria and Albert Hotel - GTV</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YHA Hostel - YHA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castlefield Hotel - YHA</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<td>Eastgate Offices (Gail House) – Castlefield Estates Ltd</td>
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<td>1.72</td>
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<td>0.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slate Wharf Housing - MacBryde Homes</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NB. CMDC funding for Castlefield was supplemented by ERDF environmental improvement grants totalling £2.4M (CMDC 1994 GONWA)

Table 7.1 Major CMDC grant subsidies for private sector development in Castlefield

Environmental improvements were central to CMDC’s core strategy. By 1989 a package of environmental measures had been agreed by the CMDC Board, at a cost of £1.8M (for 1989/90). Exaggerating somewhat, an excited Manchester journalist once again claimed it was a “new vision of Venice” (1989, MENA). All these measures of spatial practice provided for a visible impact in the area. Some of the funding (£569,000) for these and other projects, 31 in all came from the UK’s European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) budget, since Manchester was by the 1990s an Objective 2 area (Ellis 1994 GONWA). In 1989 CMDC indicated that environmental improvement in the Castlefield Canal was a major priority with the appointment of Groundwork Trust’s national commercial trading company, Groundwork Associates (GWA) to produce and implement an environmental improvement masterplan for the Canal area. Their team was led by landscape architect Kevin Mann. The brief from CMDC required the creation of public access routes through the area to produce recognisable new public spaces, respect for the historical qualities of the area and the creation of high quality landscapes (Kevin Mann 2010 email). For CMDC it was also important that the improvements created a “dramatic visual impact” (Mann 1992: 35). CMDC also saw the bridges as essential, “If this area was to attract investment” (Mann 2010 email). Pugh (1990 MENA) shows the bridges being erected onsite which
illustrates Kevin Mann was right to observe that “CMDC wanted to get results on the ground as quickly as possible” (1992: 35).

Glester admits that CMDC did not devise its development strategy in a vacuum; they were influenced greatly by existing understandings of Castlefield. In 1984 MCC pressed ahead with a new city centre plan to inter alia, better reflect Castlefield’s changed heritage status. The culmination of Castlefield’s reworking in the local political imagination from neglected industrial backwater to leading edge heritage and cultural opportunity was the area’s explicit inclusion in the Manchester City Centre Local Plan (MCC 1984 MPDA) approved by MCC in 1984. The 1984 Plan is another classic Lefebvrian official representation of city space which carried the considerable techno-bureaucratic authority of democratic local government. Until 1984 the approved land use plan for the city was still the 1961 Development Plan. The 1984 Plan, after the creation of the Castlefield Conservation Area, the UHP and the 1982 Tourism Plan, could hardly ignore Manchester’s reimagined premier heritage tourism space.

In the 1984 Plan initiated a radical break was made from the 1961 Plan’s industrial representations of Castlefield’s present and future. The manner in which the area was becoming rediscovered as ‘Castlefield’ is interesting; since it was not named as such by the 1984 Plan. ‘Castlefield’ was divided into two separate city centre policy areas (numbered prosaically ‘Area 26’ and ‘Area 27’) with a boundary that sliced the area in half north-south cutting through Liverpool Road! Area 27 was seen as “predominantly industrial” but was noted for its historic character and seen as offering “considerable potential” for tourism and mixed use developments including residential (MCC 1984: 104-105). During the interview Glester stresses that although CMDC employed consultants to produce its 1989 Strategy:

The thing that was in existence, if you like, from the City Council at the time was City Centre Local Plan which covered this area, which was a very flexible document in many ways and in a sense we took that as our starting point.
(Glester 2008 interview, emphasis in original)

The recommendation to follow the 1984 Plan came from CMDC’s Planning Manager who called it a “very flexible policy tool” and thought it provided a convenient framework for tourism and housing development and was “entirely relevant and
supportive” of CMDC’s regeneration brief (Roberts 1991 GONWA). This was fortunate because even before CMDC started work officially MCC’s planners were adamant that there was already a salient planning framework – the City Centre Local Plan and, “in only a few aspects does it need updating or fleshing out” (Kitchen in MCC 1988 GONWA). Kitchen argued that CMDC “could not operate in isolation” and that the UDC area had to be seen in its local and strategic planning context.

MCC’s office policy following the early 1970s property boom had sought to constrain development especially where industrial employment land would be lost.\textsuperscript{54} Hence the city’s motto in the early 1980s ‘defending jobs - improving services’: the jobs in question were by implication the industrial jobs that had made Manchester great. Bearing in mind the track record of the LDDC in promoting office development on former industrial land against the wishes of the London Boroughs, it was anticipated that CMDC would adopt a similar stance (Glester 2008 interview). Hopes of rampant speculative office development were not however, to be realised. Glester explains that CMDC from the start did not intend to challenge MCC’s protection of industrial land in the 1984 Plan:

\begin{quote}
One of the things we made pretty clear early on and this is very germane to Castlefield is that we weren’t umm, you know, the white charger coming over the hill and going to kick Manchester’s office policy, you know, into the dust. I think a few developers came along, saw what had happened in [London] Docklands and thought, oh well we’ll just get an office permit and just develop, and we made it pretty clear we were not in the business of just giving out office permits, ahh the same tests would apply and we’d be operating it fairly tight. (Glester 2008 interview)
\end{quote}

The irony of a Margaret Thatcher neoliberal government’s private development subsiding quango supporting a Labour local council is brought home further by CMDC’s tactic in its first few months of, ”spreading the word about our intention to pursue CPOs wherever appropriate and essential” (Glester 1989 GONWA). CMDC used its CPO powers extensively often acquiring sites from MCC (table 7.2).

\textsuperscript{54} MCC’s office development policy: restricted large developments to sites allocated in the development plan, e.g. not industrial land, required that the development satisfy actual demand and that the offices be pre-let.
It is likely that Glester’s long term involvement with planning and regeneration issues in Manchester and his established working relationships Stringer, Howard Bernstein and Grigor facilitated the seemingly cordial rapport between the MCC and CMDC. The other significant player in the production of Castlefield during the CMDC years was local developer Jim Ramsbottom. Born in Salford, he inherited the family chain of betting shops in the area becoming a millionaire through prudent expansion of the business. He is claimed to be “one of the most influential figures in the development of Castlefield” and the first developer to see its potential (Parkinson-Bailey 2000: 289).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site - Vendor</th>
<th>Total Cost (£M)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water/Dawson Street - MCC</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>89/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawson Street Coach Park - MCC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>89/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Darwent Timber Yard - MCC</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>89/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Street Cleansing Depot - MCC</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>89/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS Site - Grendell Ltd</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>89/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castlefield Foods - Edmund Walker Ltd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gland Supplies, Potato Wharf - Dalgetty</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>90/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spillers PLC</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>90/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Cooling Equipment 115-119</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>90/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool Road - I.C.E. Ltd</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>90/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice/Duke Street - n/a</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>90/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Windscreen Site - National</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>91/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windscreen Ltd</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>92/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool Road Leases - MCC</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>92/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castle Quay - MSCC and others</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potato Wharf Leases - n/a</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>92/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woollam Place Leases - n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>92/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawasaki Site - Kawasaki Ltd</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CMDC (1993 GONWA)

NB. funding was supplemented by ERDF environmental improvement grants totalling £2.4M (CMDC 1994 GONWA)

Table 7.2 Sites in Castlefield acquired through CMDC’s CPO powers (to 1993)
Chapter 6 revealed his 1981 work on the Mark Addy pub. Ramsbottom’s affinity for Castlefield grew in the late 1970s when he suffered a bout of depression and used to enjoy taking long therapeutic walks in the area (Glester 2008 interview). The vehicle for his property developments was his company Castlefield Estates Ltd, established in 1981 and based initially in Castlefield’s Lock Keeper’s Cottage. However, plans for the redevelopment of his early 1980s property acquisitions in Castlefield stalled because of the banks’ reluctance to lend for property redevelopment in the area (MCC 1985, MPDA). Although Ramsbottom’s first property investment in Castlefield was the acquisition of Merchants Warehouse in 1982 for £25,000, or “buttons” as Glester put it, redevelopment of this and other projects in Castlefield had to wait for the arrival of CMDC and its crucial financial subsidies. Even more significant for the thesis is the fact that Ramsbottom acquired ‘private space’ from MSCC including Coal Wharf and Castle Street. Although these sites went into Castlefield Estates private ownership, their unfettered public access, especially for pedestrians, meant they functioned (and still do) as quasi-public/private space. I use the term here to signify private space that has some of the rights associated with traditional public space, rather than the more common ‘privatised space’ which tends to signify compromised public space (Button 2003).

This second triumvirate of MCC, CMDC and Ramsbottom was instrumental in bringing about the first large scale investment in Castlefield’s spatial practice since the GMC conversion of LRS to the MOSI. During the interview Glester alludes to the closeness of his working relationship with Ramsbottom. Glester recalls that at a formal business dinner, “Jim said, you know one of the greatest things we’ve had recently is the arrival of Father Christmas in the guise of CMDC”. So Glester sent him a Christmas card with Father Christmas on the front. Glester provides insight too into how the triumvirate operated:

Jimmy and I used to meet regularly with Graham Stringer and the chief executive or the deputy chief executive who by this time was Howard Bernstein, erm who was the fixer [laughs]. Erm Jimmy and I used to meet with Graham and Howard, maybe once every two months we’d have a tour d’horizon over dinner. (Glester 2008 interview)

Such coalitions and alliances are seen by Lefebvre as necessary for the production of urban space. Undoubtedly, such informal arrangements and familiarity served to build
trust and would have contributed to some extent to a shared perspective on the future of the CMDC area. Cynics might worry, though it never happened, about the potential for corruption and the shutting out of proper, formal publicly accountable if not democratic mechanisms. In terms of bringing tourist/leisure related development and investment into Castlefield there was complete agreement. Ramsbottom worked closely with CMDC to convert the Rochdale Canal Stable Block into Dukes 92 bar/restaurant and refurbish the associated Lock-keeper’s Cottage (1992). The conversion of warehouses into offices/studios followed (table 7.1): Gail House Warehouse (1993), Merchants Warehouse (1996). The CMDC worked closely also with MSCC the other major land owner. This alliance produced the CMDC subsidised conversion of the MSCC owned Middle Warehouse at Castle Quay into ‘up market’ flats and penthouses, bars and offices/studio space (table 7.1).

A Clash of Spatial Interpretations Representations
However, the representations of space of what might be called the Castlefield public-private sector coalition were not always in harmony. In line with its 1989 Strategy of bringing private sector residential development into Castlefield, CMDC, MCC and the MSCC (the landowner) championed residential development at the area of Castlefield known as Slate Wharf.55 They supported a planning application for 100 flats by McBride Homes Ltd. In the 1980s the suitability of the area for future residential development became official City Council policy (MCC 1980 MPDA). Ramsbottom’s strident hostility to this proposal was provoked by his belief, that historically Castlefield was an area of tranquil, green open spaces, he asserted that, “Slate Wharf was one of the most vital areas of open space in the entire Castlefield basin”. He objected to the design saying, "you wouldn't build ticky-tacky shoebox houses in the middle of Britain's first urban heritage park” (in King 1993 MENA).

To counter Ramsbottom, Gordon Hood, CMDC’s chief planner deployed a different historical interpretation, "There's been no field in Castlefield since Roman times."

55 It was so named because here in the 19th century barges from North Wales, laden with slates for working class terrace houses were unloaded for forwarding to sites in Manchester and beyond. A plaque in Castlefield commemorates this transhipment history.
Both men’s views can be vindicated by cartographic evidence, such as William Green’s 1794 and Casson and Berry’s 1741 maps. They show, in favour of Ramsbottom, that Castlefield was still largely agricultural fields in the ownership of the Duke of Bridgewater throughout the 1700s. Supporting Hood, are the 19th century Ordnance Survey maps which show the Byrom Street area north of Liverpool Road occupied by dense back-to-back working class housing. Of course there were also the large factories and warehouses, railways, city abattoirs and small scale workshops (Ordnance Survey maps 1894-99). So the area far from being tranquil then was a busy, noisy place. Relative peacefulness did not descend on Castlefield until the industrial companies started to cease operations (rapidly) from the 1980s. Despite Ramsbottom’s objections CMDC did grant planning permission and the development was built.

**CMDC: Rational and Imagined Success**

Through the lens of the spatial triad it is germane to consider how CMDC’s intervention was perceived. There is no doubt that in 1988 Castlefield though not a wasteland was still a visually unattractive place with a neglected, rundown air; these perceptions took time to mellow. Many businesses had closed or been relocated, the sites left uncared for and dishevelled. CMDC spent £100M of public money in its eight years of operation. The largest proportion went for “support for the private sector”, £25M but notably the next highest category of £21M was “environment” (Centre for Policy Studies 1996: 13 GONWA). A wide range of opinion over the years viewed CMDC as a ‘dramatic’ success for ‘rational’ reasons. In the House of Lords’ debate for the Order to wind up CMDC, Earl Ferrers, Conservative DoE Minister of State, declared it such a marvellous success because so many achievements deserve recognition, “but I fear that, were I to mention them, I might weary your Lordships greatly, which would be distressing” (Ferrers 1996). A Labour peer was adamant that CMDC “was in danger of giving development corporations a good name” (Dubs 1996). Similarly in the House of
Commons it was claimed that CMDC “has revitalised huge areas of what was a decaying city” (Dover1996). Others saw CMDC going beyond the crude UDC stereotype of “glorified estate agent”, claiming it employed an “expansive agenda” leading a business growth coalition that helped restructure the city economy moving it towards services encompassing flagship projects, prestige events and visitor attractions including the marketing of historical assets (Deas et al 1999: 228). DoE officials were satisfied from an early stage with CMDC success. Civil servants argued that buoyant residential sales indicated the “acquisition of a ‘designer label’ status” for Castlefield which was “a measurable indicator of the success of the environment/investment link” that required the presence and not just the expectation of a “changed and unified physical identity” (Comrie 1991 GONWA).

Pieda Ltd, the private sector consultancy appointed by the DoE to evaluate the environmental improvement work of CMDC was impressed. However, there were criticisms:

… in the Castlefield area much [sic] of the Canal Basin improvements have been hidden by derelict or unattractive buildings along Liverpool Rd and Chester Rd frontages. The approach by CMDC has been to start work on improvements in the heart of the area and move outwards to the fringes. In consequence it is only recently that the full scale and standard of the EIPs has become apparent to passersby. A number of developers thought that the alternative approach of improving gateways and the outside edge of the site first would have meant that the EIPs could have had an earlier impact on potential occupiers/residents. In a sense the lesson here is that it may be possible to design a programme of EIP work so that the maximum visual impact is achieved as early as possible. (Pieda 1991: para 4.2 GONWA)\textsuperscript{56}

The visual qualities of public space were therefore, considered paramount, as they were by Harold Wilson and Michael Heseltine (in chapter 4). Pieda by focusing on the EIP programme highlighted the importance of Castlefield’s public spaces, especially where they abutted boundary roads, waterfronts, historic buildings and potential development sites. What is striking however is that Pieda adopted CMDC and MCC’s already existing representations of Castlefield. While Pieda brought a critical perspective to bear on their examination of CMDC’s environmental improvement

\textsuperscript{56} EIPs were environmental improvement areas. Three were evaluated by Pieda: Castle Quay, the MOSI site and the canal basin.
schemes, they absorbed uncritically CMDC’s 1989 Strategy which denigrated industrial space:

Castlefield is an interesting area with a maze of canals, rivers and railway viaducts, and is associated with the start of the Industrial Revolution. Until recently a number of low value industrial users occupied most of the sites next to the canals and the area was not open to the public. There were also a number of warehouses in disuse/dereliction. The gateways to the area (the Liverpool Road and Chester Road frontages) consisted of unattractive or nondescript commercial retail uses which effectively hid the area from the outside. The EIPs are based on enhancing the older, more interesting buildings and opening the gateways to the area (eg. GMMSI & Castle Quay) and replacing the sites of older industrial use by landscaped areas or new development. (Ibid: para 3.5)

This downbeat view of existing industry is remarkably consistent with that of CSC in the 1980s and the amenity societies in the 1970s.

Glester appears to share the views of the dominant Castlefield regeneration narrative when he says wittily of the Castlefield he first encountered that it was, “clearly not a destination at that time, you know, apart from a day out amongst the pallets”, it was just “a forgotten backwater” (Glester 2008 interview). It was not a pleasant place as Glester recalls thorough a mixture of memories of his routine working life and more unexpectedly, through others’ macabre televisional spaces of representation:

JG: …we got a lot of flak from people who wanted to do development in other parts of town where they were looking for city grant but we were saying you don’t need city grant there or we haven’t got the resources to give you there because we’re spending it elsewhere. And err umm people were saying well why are you spending it there on what was basically regarded as Granada’s murder set, because it was where they filmed Sherlock Holmes and they filmed murders and things. And erm you know there were abattoirs at the bottom end of Liverpool Road with blood running down the streets.
ML: It was still there?
JG: No its not still there.
ML: At that time in the 1980s?
JG: Yes at that time, yeah it was. (in Glester 2008 interview)

Apart from the MOSI and some canal improvements, Castlefield was visually run down but the abattoir where Glester saw blood flowing in the streets had been demolished 10 years before. Maybe he had visited in the 1970s. It is apparent that Glester and CMDC employed a strategy at the time of devaluing existing industrial space, a strategy that was employed by a range of development interests in Castlefield (Degen 2008). Glester’s unexpected implication is that Castlefield could not be
perceived a success while it was a grisly televisual murder location. Glester, the rational civil servant and erstwhile creator of quasi-scientific representations of space therefore has a unique approach on how to evaluate the success of CMDC. His evaluation was based not so much on his familiarity with expert reports but his memories of the area suffused by half remembered visual spaces of representation:

JG: I think that we realised we might have achieved something when ahh Granada started filming their whatever it was called, their yuppie Manchester programme, what was it called?
ML: There were quite a few, Cutting It?
JG: Yeah Cutting It and also the one with James Nesbitt in. Was it called Best Friends? Anyway when they started to film those down there rather than Sherlock Holmes [laughs] we knew.
(in Glester 2008 interview)

The commercially and critically successful Sherlock Holmes detective series starring Jeremy Brett was made by GTV, broadcast 1984 to 1994. Best Friends was actually the comedy drama Cold Feet, broadcast 1997-2003, providing a timeline that seems to support Glester’s interpretation. However, I argue below that Glester’s idea of a linear, positive televisual transition is more complex that it first appears. Through its spatial practice, CMDC created the potential for more than private sector property development and a heritage tourism destination. It facilitated the creation of new spaces of representation and produced new public spaces. The contention that Castlefield’s new bridges and the Arena were the progenitors for these new spaces is examined below.

**Bridges and the Arena: The Production of Public Space**

Spatial practice is a neglected element in Lefebvrian inspired research, with most researchers, as discussed in chapter 2 choosing to focus on disjunctions between representations of space and spaces of representation. This section concentrates on how the heritage dominated representations of space regarding the purposes of public space, influenced spatial practice and the production of Castlefield’s distinctive material presence. Bridges come into being not merely to connect separated places but to join spaces which are divided in our imagination (Simmel 1994). If we did not first “connect them in our imagination“, then the division would have no meaning (Ibid: 6). Bridges become an aesthetic focal point for the eye, making abstract, imaginative connections “directly visible” (Ibid). It follows that it was the Board and officers of
CMDC who understood the meaning of spatial division in Castlefield. Bridges can serve many purposes, not just practical and technical but symbolic - “the marriage of old and new” (Dennis 2008: 20). They symbolise too the imagined ability to make progress and enhance spaces. They embody people’s hopes and fears as Dennis shows for Brooklyn and Tower Bridges. On a smaller scale the bridges of Castlefield, especially Merchants Bridge, have had great importance for the production of space. I argue their designer’s tried consciously to instil the bridges with symbolic meaning in reference to either a heritage infused industrial past or an optimistic, modernist future.

CMDC’s statutory mission was to subsidise private sector development in order to simulate further private investment in the area. Following this logic public space is regarded simply as a channel through which visitors will flow to reach new points of private sector consumption (and new owner occupied homes). This perception of space was rendered material through the many high quality bridges that CMDC commissioned and funded, most spectacularly, Merchants Bridge. While previous analyses notably Hall and Rhodes (1972 DRPA) understood Castlefield as a collection of historically important separate spaces, their representations did not make the imaginative leap to conceive them suffering from spatial division. However, I maintain that CMDC problematised Castlefield instrumentally and imaginatively as a collection of divided areas that necessitated connection to stimulate private sector activity. However, through its spatial practice of public space creation and connection, CMDC also produced unexpected possibilities for encounter and political expression in differential space as discussed in the next chapter.

‘Opening Up’ Castlefield
This chapter’s opening quote highlights how Glester appreciated the commercial importance of Castlefield’s bridges, a point made by (Degen 2008: 106). Given their importance for the potential commodification of space and creation of convivial public space, it is surprising they have not stimulated comprehensive academic analysis. It is apparent from the Glester interview that the bridges were considered crucial by CMDC for Castlefield’s ability to attract private sector investment and realise its tourist development potential:

And we saw Castlefield very much as a sort of urm potential to be an international area of international renown, ahh with principally leisure and
tourism type activities with a bit of residential thrown in… Castlefield was of real significance urm in terms of opening it up in terms of the canal basins and we were there to make a real difference. (Glester 2008 interview)

CMDC’s Board prioritised the improvement of pedestrian access into and through Castlefield from an early stage as a prerequisite for enticing the private sector to invest. Glester explains the importance of this preparatory work in changing private sector perceptions of a relatively unknown, degraded and inaccessible city centre area:

But basically what we were seeking to do was to demonstrate the potential of the area. And the response of the private sector was really positive in that regard once we’d done the work. (Ibid)

This view, that is was for CMDC to create the conditions for private sector investment confirms what other researchers have found (Pieda 1991 GONWA; Robson et al 1997 GONWA; Degen 2008). CMDC employed a two pronged approach: firstly, through environmental improvements; secondly, creating easier public access through Castlefield. Following Simmel though, it should be noted the bridges also have an aesthetic dimension. In taking this approach CMDC turned spatial representations of the amenity societies and CSC into concrete spatial practice. The Castlefield that Rhodes encountered in 1972 was dominated by industrial land uses. It was an area into which ‘the public’ would have had little reason, ability or desire to venture. By the time CMDC took over Castlefield, much of the Castlefield canal basin area was still owned by the MSCC whose “customs police patrolled regularly with no public access, it was vacant, derelict and forgotten about” (Kevin Mann 2009 email). Having recognised the historic importance for the area, characterised by isolated sites that could have significant public interest, neither Hall and Rhodes (1972) nor Jones and Rhodes (1978) as revealed in chapter 6 above had specific proposals for connecting the zones identified in their reports. CSC through its work exacerbated the poor access problem unintentionally by adding three more points of historic interest: the North Gate, the Roman Gardens and the partially reconstructed Grocers Warehouse. In the late 1980s CMDC planners did more than simply consolidate the heritage valorised representations of space, they engaged in spatial practice on a relatively grand scale, building bridges and linking through the production of new pedestrian public space, points of consumption and points of historic interest per se.
Despite the centuries of massive infrastructural investment and discounting the viaducts which cross rather than link Castlefield spaces, only three bridges had ever been constructed in this area as it was dissected by waterways. A single arch stone bridge was built across the Rochdale Canal, a double arch stone bridge was built across the River Medlock at Potato Wharf and a utilitarian metal bridge was built by Merchants Warehouse. By the time CMDC was wound up in 1996 a further 11 bridges had been built, plus the impressive steps linking Liverpool Road southwards down to the Arena area and a smooth sloped access along Castle Street down to Coal Wharf. Significantly, all the new bridges were pedestrian except for Elm Road Bridge (see table 7.3).

Table 7.3 Castlefield canal basin bridges pre and post-CMDC

It is indisputable that the CMDC bridges did facilitate access to points of consumption; the bars and restaurants and to the new housing. In this CMDC functioned to produce the abstract spaces of capital (discussed in chapters 2 and 3). What goes unremarked in the dominant narrative is that five of the new bridges don’t only lead consumers to sites of consumption. Rather they also provide the north-south pedestrian routes promoted by CSC facilitating access to the MOSI and new public spaces of the canal

Pre-CMDC
- Historic Lock 92 bridge across the Rochdale Canal
- Elm Road Bridge, Potato Wharf (built by MCC)
- Utilitarian footbridge at Merchants Warehouse (demolished in the 1960s)

CMDC & Peel Holdings
- Merchants Bridge

CMDC/Groundwork Associates
- Middle Warehouse Canal Bridge
- River Medlock, Castle Quay Bridge
- Grocers Warehouse Bridge
- Slate Wharf Canal Arm Bridge
- Slate Wharf Bridgewater Canal Bridge
- Potato Wharf Canal Arm Bridge
- Small Potato Wharf Bridge
- Small Castle Quay Bridge
- Victoria and Albert Hotel Bridge

Castlefield Estates Ltd
- Architect’s Bridge

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57 So called because for decades this was the predominant cargo unloaded here, leading to the naming of the nearby Oxnoble pub. It is the only pub in Britain named after a (19th century Norfolk variety) potato (Glinert 2008: 52).
basin. Before presenting a more detailed analysis of the unashamedly modernist Merchants Bridge, it is worth considering how several other bridges expressed the tension between acknowledging the past while encompassing the latest engineering techniques and heralding a brighter future.

Architects Bridge completed in 1996 and so named by Hartwell (2001: 262) plays with the area’s history in ways unlike the other bridges. Its 15 yard single span modernist engineered steel structure is hidden by the traditional aesthetic of red sandstone cladding. An outcrop of this strikingly ruddy stone on top of which the Roman Fort was built, can still be seen at Coal Wharf. Cleverly then, the designers, through the visual aesthetic of its sandstone finish, point to Castlefield’s geological and Roman histories. Perhaps because it is the only bridge in Castlefield commissioned solely by a private sector client, Castlefield Estates Ltd, Architects Bridge has a hard to find quality to the point of surreptitiousness. A steel plaque discourages casual access, declaring it to be a private right of way with no intention for adoption as a public right of way by the local authority. That said the bridge cannot be closed off and anybody who wishes can occupy the space at any time. Public space critics may argue it is privatised space but its signifiers, construction and usage place it ambiguously as hybrid public/private space.

A different approach was taken with the foot bridges commissioned by GWA who went to great lengths to ensure the new bridges respected their historic surroundings, drawing inspiration from extant historic canal bridges in Manchester and Castlefield’s viaducts. Originally, Kevin Mann of GWA wanted to reproduce Victorian cast iron bridges but this proved too expensive so Groundwork compromised with cast iron, steel and brick (Mann 1992). Structural ironwork is exposed and finished in “traditional black and white canal colours” (Ibid: 37). The result is structures that are perfectly at home amongst the historic viaducts, canals and warehouses of Castlefield yet elegant and attractive enough to signal future optimism. GWA also oversaw the work to reinstate the canal edge stonework, the York stone, cobblestone and granite sett paving. Most notably too, GWA specified the black street lighting columns found throughout Castlefield all of which help to create a seamless experience as one moves through the space.
In my experience GWA’s footbridges are often mistaken for historic structures by professionals and lay people. Therefore, in resolving the tension between Castlefield’s industrial past, modernity and the future, the GWA’s bridges are resolutely backward looking. Drawing inspiration from Castlefield’s Victorian viaducts was not straightforward since they too drew on historic elements but combined them with the latest Victorian engineering expertise. In a double layering of symbolic meaning, it is said by many that one of the most prominent viaducts incorporates crenelated towers as homage to the Roman Fort. A perplexing claim since the turrets bear a closer resemblance to a Plantagenet castle. Perhaps these bridge builders were swayed by the mythical Castlefield castle of Whitaker (1771).

A major problem confronting those interests which aspired to affect a transformation of Castlefield was the contradiction that the water features, which contributed to the area’s attractiveness, also formed barriers between the different historic, consumption and residential spaces. Particularly pressing was the need for a north-south link across the Bridgewater Canal from Coal and Slate Wharfs to the Arena site and Liverpool Road. Unlike their Victorian predecessors, which were over engineered massively, 20th century bridges became lighter, longer, curvier and prettier. A design competition was initiated by CMDC. It was run jointly with Peel Holdings who owned (and still own) the canal tow paths and the Canal itself (Mike Webb 2007 email appendix 2). The brief stipulated a striking structure which would offer the best of 20th century design and engineering while complementing the existing bridges’ 200 year history (Hands and Parker 2000). Renowned engineers Whitby Bird and Partners won the competition. Completed in 1996, Merchants Bridge cost £450,000, is 71 yards long (67 metres) and curved in every possible direction in ways not possible without sophisticated computer modelling (Hands and Parker 2000). It comprises a slender wedge-shaped box girder and an inclined arch that lifts the bridge high above the canal.
to allow boats to pass below (figure 7.3). In form, style construction and finish Merchants Bridge is self consciously modernist. It signifies a break with the engineering feats of the past, embracing design innovation.

The bridge is a clever feat of engineering but what is more important here is its symbolic importance, and its contribution to representations of space and spaces of representation. Whitby Bird themselves writing just after the bridge won the Institute of Architects Excellence in Design Award 1997 were conscious of its symbolic meaning role commenting, ”the bridge has become a focus and symbol of the regeneration of the area” (Whitby Bird Spokesman 2009). Essential to the project's success was the “client's vision in establishing the competition brief that created this opportunity” (in Ibid). On completion the searing white finish and spectacularly confident optimism of the dazzling, curving bridge contrasted markedly with the still run down appearance of the canal basin. \(^{58}\) Important for the thesis is the impact it has had on the public space of Castlefield, the area’s representations of space and spaces of representation. Although with no way to restrict access, the bridge appears to be public space it remains the ‘privatised’ property of Peel Holdings (Mike Webb 2007 email): another hybrid space. Beyond these considerations the bridge constitutes an element of new quasi-public space produced through I would argue the interaction of representations of space, spatial practice and a civic minded UDC. Merchants Bridge therefore was the realisation of CSC’s desire for a north south link but it also facilitated public access to the CMDC Arena.

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\(^{58}\) Visually impressive, it has become a recurring iconic marker of postindustrial Manchester and can be found incorporated into organisational and company logos and website headers of e.g. MCC and Dpercussion.
Figure 8.3 Merchants Bridge Montage
New Public Space: the Castlefield Arena

The Arena (figure 7.4) (also known as Castlefield Arena, the Events Arena and the Castlefield Amphitheatre) occupies a large site just south of Liverpool Road that in the 1980s was called Staffordshire Wharf. Two ‘tuning fork’ canal arms from the Bridgewater Canal reached into the Wharf over which was built in about 1790 the Staffordshire Warehouse, so called due to trade with the Potteries in the 19th century. After the warehouse was demolished in 1950 and canal arms filled in (Hartwell 2001) utilitarian industrial sheds were erected and by the 1980s the area was being used as a tyre depot and waste dumping ground. It should be noted that the site has a difficult topography from a development perspective as lies at the foot of the 20 foot high escarpment carved out of the red sandstone by the River Medlock. Vehicular access too was difficult, not being possible from Liverpool Road to the north or under the viaducts to the south, with the only vehicular access being from the east. Designed by the planning and architectural consultancy DEGW, the Arena covers an area of 37,800 square feet (3,500 square metres), accommodating 15,000 people with seating for 450 under the sweeping white canopy of what John Glester calls the grandstand. The designers took advantage cleverly of the natural topography of the site and built the steeped seating area into the solid rock of the escarpment. It was opened in late 1993 at a cost of about £2M. According to Glester the rationale for the Arena and the steps down to it from Liverpool Road (figure 7.5) was that they were part of the CMDC public realm strategy (John Glester 2009 email). In its design and use the Arena, was “a response to tackling the lie of the land in that area” and also “the need for an outdoor events space as perceived at that time” that would bring a prominent area of land next to the Castlefield Hotel back into some form of productive use (Ibid). Stringer from an insider’s position offers an additional, psychologically centred logic for the production of the Arena related to the civic obligation.
He argues that members of unelected quangos can be “a bit guilt ridden about what their relationship is with the public” and that they “have a sense of obligation to the public”. For him if the “academic literature is saying it’s only about property subsidy, it’s got it wrong”. It was more than one or two individuals:

GS: Oh yea. They [CMDC Board] didn’t have any people to consult because there was nobody living in the area. But they did have a sense of obligation to the public… On Friday mornings there were hard headed debates about the money, whether a grant would make it work, whether it was the right thing to grant aid and all those other things…
GS: A community legacy, a public legacy was always part of the CMDC discussion.
ML: Really?... Was it anybody in particular in CMDC who was civic minded?
GS: No, it was the whole ethos really. The private sector people, this was their big chance to contribute. They wanted jobs and economic development, flats and office development and things but they also wanted something for the public whether it was subsidising art galleries or museums, the MSI or the Arena. There was definitely a civic responsibility side to it… If you look for instance at one of the things I laughed at but they were absolutely committed to, was putting the bits of the machinery from the old gas works under the arches. And they saw that as public art. They wanted to both remember the gas works and have some public art that people would like. I mean some of the
numbers speak for themselves but there’s definitely a culture there of wanting to put something back for the public. (Stringer 2009 interview)

Stringer has mellowed since his firebrand 1980s days but is still a staunch left-wing back bench Labour MP and there is no reason to doubt his sincerity on this point (or any other in the interview) about the importance of a visual civic legacy. Similar sentiments may well have persuaded the LDDC Board to back the historic cranes and churches restoration (chapter 4 above).

Figure 7.5 Public access steps into the Castlefield canal basin from Liverpool Road (2008)

When Glester says during the interview that the Arena was built in such a way that it could be fenced off and a charge made for entry if necessary he seems to confirm Degen’s (2008: 122-124) proposition the that the Arena allowed privatisation, exclusion, commodification of public space, and the entrepreneurial formalisation of public life. The character of the first major event at the Arena lends weight to her stance. The similarity with the structure of CSC is interesting and the Castlefield Management Company (CMC) certainly resembles an entrepreneurial governance structure. Glester asked Jim Ramsbottom to chair the CMC but he declined. The Arena came to be managed by CMC which levied fees from event promoters that with the other income streams were ploughed back into public space maintenance and enhancement. The Arena was meant as an entertainment and sports venue under the tourism and leisure remit of CMDC/MCC. Management of the Arena was not handled
by CMDC or MCC but by a dedicated not-for-profit company, an idea supported by private consultants (L&R Leisure 1990 MSIA) as Glester explains:

If we skip to the end of the CMDC erm we were aware that we had put in substantial amounts of public realm funding and if we just walked away, the parks department [of MCC] which had a budget of tuppence would not cope. So I went to Boston, Lowell and Philadelphia I think to have a look at schemes that they had where they had got the local private sector and public sector to come together to put [public space] maintenance schemes together because it hadn’t been done in the UK before. So I had a look over there and I came up with the idea of putting an endowment from CMDC erm that would last for seven years, it was matched by a similar sum from the local private sector within Castlefield and the City Council and I can’t remember the actual sums but after significant discussion talking to the private sector principally the Ship Canal Company and Granada and one or two others we established what we called the Castlefield Management Company. (Glester 2008 interview)

The first major event to be held here had a sporting flavour. Manchester’s private sector led 2000 Olympic Bid Committee with its, “unmistakable neoliberal undertones” (Cochrane et al 1996: 1325) chose the Castlefield Arena as the venue for the Bid Decision Party. The Party held on 23 September 1993 saw the Bid team, members of CMDC, MCC and thousands of revellers assembled at the first live televised event in Castlefield. President of the International Olympic Committee, Juan Antonio Samaranch’s announcement was relayed to Castlefield and the scenes there shown live on BBC TV. Manchester first bid for the Olympics in the 1980s, loosing out to Atlanta in its efforts to win the right to host the 1996 Summer Games. When it was revealed that Manchester had lost again, the crowd in true Mancunian fashion, burst spontaneously into a rendition of Monty Python’s *Always Look on the Bright Side of Life* – a popular chant on the terraces of Maine Road football ground, a place well used to chronic disappointment.

In spectacular style the 1993 Bid Party demonstrated that Castlefield had relevance for the city beyond its industrial heritage and waterside environments. Although the decision favoured Sydney, the all night party went ahead with music by Manchester band 808 State. CMDC championed the event to the DoE as another symbol of success for Castlefield, Manchester and by implication CMDC (Bishop 1993 GONW). The Olympic Party was a highly organised, controlled and exclusive event with invited guests based on a list draw up by CMDC and Manchester’s Olympic bid team admitted by ticket only. It was seen as proof of the viability of large-scale organised outdoor
events in formalised public space which included the availability of alcohol. It confirms Degen’s (2008) critique of the exclusionary, privatised nature of Castlefield’s new public spaces. However, it was paradoxically the IRA bomb of 1996 that was to help establish the Arena as a more indeterminate quasi-public space through the Dpercussion free pop music concerts discussed in the next chapter.

**Televisual Spaces of Representation**

With Castlefield’s 1993 nationwide television exposure, it is apposite here to return to Glester’s belief that CMDC success could be measured through the changing televisual depiction of Castlefield. Several of GTV’s programmes in the 1980s and early 90s produced dark, sinister Castlefield spaces of representation notably *The Travelling Man* (GTV 1985 DVD), *Sherlock Holmes* (GTV 1994 DVD) and *Cracker* (GTV 1999 DVD). GTV dramatised most of Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes short stories (broadcast 1984-94). According to one producer, a major problem was that “Manchester cannot be London” so they went to other places to achieve a London look (Wyndham-Davies, in Marcel 1996). However, a variety of Manchester locations were used (Nash 2005), most strikingly in the final story, *The Cardboard Box* broadcast in April 1994 (GTV 1994 DVD). Jim Browner, a sailor who murdered and cut of the ears of his wife and her lover, is seen travelling at night from ‘Dover to London’. In a noir scene we see him walking across a black and white foot bridge in foggy ‘Castlefield’. The scene is one of dreadful foreboding as the audience knows he is on his way to commit a gruesome double murder. Ironically, the ‘Victorian’ foot bridge was one of those built by GWA in 1990. Castlefield is the location for a grisly murder in GTVs *Cracker* (broadcast 1993-96), a violent psychological murder drama. In the 1995 episode *Brotherly Love* (GTV 1996 DVD), a female sex worker is driven there against her will and is murdered brutally on a murky night under the gigantic, glowering iron viaduct which hovers over a slick cobbled street. Before producing these spaces of representation, GTV in
the 1980s filmed crucial scenes for the two season vicious police detective drama *The Travelling Man* (broadcast 1984-85). Castlefield is represented as a lonely canal-dominated cityscape. Alan Lomax the protagonist is a drug squad officer framed for corruption. Several scenes were shot in Castlefield, for example in the season two episode, *The Hustler* an aerial panoramic shot shows an extant industrial cityscape including timber yards and the huge corrugated iron sheds of Slate Wharf (GTV 1985 DVD). More importantly, scenes of violence and torture, especially in the (Southern and Darwent) timber mill are saturated with malevolence but a deserted Castlefield provides simultaneously a sanctuary for his narrowboat.

This analysis provides some support for Glester’s uni-linear representation hypothesis. GTV filmed several scenes for the comedy drama series *Cold Feet* (broadcast 1997-03) in Castlefield. James Nesbitt starred in the Manchester based series about a group of middle class best friends, which has none of the desolation of *The Travelling Man* or the night-time malevolence of *Sherlock Holmes* or *Cracker*. Castlefield is represented as a place of safety and middle class leisure. Rather than the night-time, foggy haunt of murderers Castlefield in *Cold Feet* is mostly a bright, sunny place. Full of greenery and waterscapes, it is a middle class destination for relaxed eating, drinking, strolling or night clubbing. Scenes in what is recognisably Castlefield are seen in the feature length trailer, the first episode proper and several other episodes (GTV 2003 DVD). Castlefield’s bridges in particular attracted the attention of the programme makers, along with the watersides, viaducts and railway arches of the canal basin. Notably, too Castlefield is represented as a diverse everyday lived space populated by canal boaters, parents, carers, children, young professionals, office workers, rollers skaters, joggers and night clubbers. In similar vein, *Synchronicity* and *Queer as Folk* represented
Castlefield as a bright place of leisure and adult fun interspersed by tragicomic moments.

The shift from *Sherlock Homes* to *Cold Feet* seems to herald a uni-linear transition involving the material and imagined positive redefinition of Castlefield but such ideas of linearity are misleading. Castlefield I would argue continued in the 1990s and 2000s to be represented as a dark, lonely space of crime and visceral danger, for example in such television dramas as *Coronation Street*. In recent years under cover of a threatening night-time beloved of film noir directors: Steve Macdonald beat-up Vikram Desai in a canalside confrontation in Castlefield. Samir Rachid (Deirdre's husband) was murdered in the Deansgate Tunnel of the Rochdale Canal. Tony Gordon attempted to murder Roy Cropper by throwing him into the Bridgewater Canal (Daily Mail 2009). In cinema too Castlefield is still embraced for its baleful qualities. In 2008 a film crew was busy in Castlefield working on a new *Sherlock Holmes* film directed by Guy Ritchie and released in 2009. Its closing scenes reveal a well dressed Victorian woman pursued by Sherlock Holmes and an evil, murderous English aristocrat through a network of large tunnels under the ‘Houses of Parliament’. One memorably stunning shot in particular, filmed in Castlefield, features a diminishing perspective through 8 railway arches. It is identical to a shot seen in *Yesterday's Dust, Tomorrow's Dreams*. Such televisual and cinematic urban spaces of representation continue to depict the chilling spatial excitement of the dark representations of the 1990s and the romance and laughter of ‘regenerated’ commodified city space. Ambivalence is wrapped up in dialectical tensions that signify the complexity of Castlefield space. In an important sense too these spaces of representation contradict and validate the heritage representations of the amenity societies, city planners and politicians. The next chapter explores another contradiction, that between heritage representations and the unexpected production of differential space.

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59 Enterprising travel companies and Manchester hotels started recently to offer the ‘Sherlock Holmes Manchester Tour’ which includes Castlefield (Visit Britain 2010).
Conclusions
This chapter examines the role of CMDC in the production of Castlefield mainly from the viewpoint of the creation of new public space; especially the bridges and Arena which I argue contribute greatly to the complex nature of Castlefield making it more than simply a place of selective heritage and privatised, commodified consumption. The approach and findings contrast markedly with previous research. A range of data sources and methods are used which enrich our understanding of 1980s and 90s contributions to the production of Castlefield space. These insights are achieved despite the unfortunate destruction by the government of the official CMDC archives. Significant CMDC resources were deployed in Castlefield and of these a sizeable proportion was devoted to environmental improvements and improved public access not just to points of consumption but to points of non-commodified heritage. More surprisingly new public spaces were produced. While some of the new space created has exclusionary commodified characteristics, I argue it also functions as more complex quasi-public/private space. Rather than simply being the much reviled privatised public space, the key attribute is here is that the new spaces, though privately owned have some characteristics commonly associated with traditional public space.

In its development strategy and official representations, CMDC drew intertextually on the heritage valorised representations of the amenity societies, CSC and MCC. These representations included images of the future that blurred the distinction between representations of space and spaces of representation. One outcome of the adoption of existing representations of space was the shift from an ambivalent attitude towards existing industry exhibited by CSC to one of outright denigration and systematic eradication of industry. Revealed for the first time in this chapter through analysis of interview data is the manner in which CMDC’s CEO partly judged its success through perceived shifts in the way Castlefield was portrayed in televisual spaces of representation. Analysing these spaces it is clear that fictionalised representations of Castlefield were not uni-linear but that multiple, overlapping positive and negative representations of Castlefield space exist simultaneously. Contrary to Deas et al (1999) the research reveals a bi-directional influence between CMDC and MCC. In other words, CMDC was shaped greatly in its strategies and interventions by the
representations and plans of MCC and by a sense of civic responsibility which engagement with the public sector inculcated in CMDC Board members. In Lefebvrian terms therefore, the Castlefield counter-project begun over a decade before by historic preservation amenity societies and carried into the mainstream by HBC, GMC and MCC was furthered by CMDC in coalitions that functioned in surprising ways. Another unexpected aspect of the CMDC legacy; the indirect, inadvertent production of differential space is revealed in the next chapter.
Chapter 8
The Production of Differential Space

From a less pessimistic standpoint, it can be shown that abstract space harbours specific contradictions. Such spatial contradictions derive in part from the old contradictions thrown up by historical time… Thus, despite - or rather because of - its negativity, abstract space carries within itself the seeds of a new kind of space. I shall call that new space ‘differential space’, because inasmuch as abstract space tends towards homogeneity… a new space cannot be born (produced) unless it accentuates difference. (Lefebvre 1991: 52)

The word is about, there's something evolving. Whatever may come, the world keeps revolving. They say the next big thing is here that the revolution's near. But to me it seems quite clear that it's all just a little bit of history repeating. (Shirley Bassey 1997 History Repeating)

Introduction
This chapter re-interrogates the era from the 1980s onwards through the Lefebvrian lens of differential space. It argues that far from becoming a homogenised place of capitalist consumption, Castlefield has exhibited significant spatial difference or differential space that can be traced back to 19th century. The chapter tracks various aspects of the histories of Castlefield’s differential space before arguing that urban activists’ concerns about the right to the city are producing new kinds of differential space. Through spatial contradictions inherent in the spatial triad, potentials exist for the production of a different kind of space, a space which disrupts the normal exchange value and profit accumulation logic of abstract city space under state regulated neo-capitalist conditions. Lefebvre is ambivalent about how this space might be brought into existence and what it might look like, leaving the possibility of alternative space “frustratingly undefined” (Harvey 2000: 183). Perhaps for this reason differential space has received far less attention in the literature, where it is often mentioned in passing if at all, than Lefebvre’s history of space or his spatial triad (e.g. Goonewardena et al 2008). The chapter draws on an analysis of empirical sources: archives, interviews and visual data. This first section of the chapter presents the approach to differential space deployed in the empirical research presented below, followed by an examination of Castlefield in the 19th century which argues that rather
than totally homogenised abstract space, the area exhibited spaces of difference: a palimpsest of contradictory spaces. The bulk of the empirical research follows exploring the history and recent manifestations of differential space.

Lefebvre is ambivalent about differential space, associating it with a utopian post-capitalist world, “on the horizon” produced by social revolution that will result in a planet-wide space of “transformed everyday life open to myriad possibilities” (Lefebvre 1991: 422-23) but he also detects differential space more prosaically in the immediacy of Brazil’s favelas and in 1960s Paris. The teleological nature of Lefebvre’s historical dialectic in which an inevitable transition unfolds, from the absolute space of nature to capitalist abstract space, finally reaching utopian differential space, has been observed several times (Keith and Pile 1993: 24-5). Shields interprets differential space like Lefebvre as post capitalist society and transformed everyday space (1999: 183) as does Kolb (2008: 95). Merrifield (2006: 120) declares only half jokingly that the project of differential space can “begin this afternoon" through academics "reclaiming our own workspace”, by giving a nod to disruption rather than cooptation, a nod "to real difference rather than cowering conformity".

Scholars in the UK have tended not to pursue differential space empirically, unlike the overseas scholars who presented papers at a recent Lefebvre centred conference (Eizenberg 2008; Frehse 2008; Wilson 2008). Although the perceived low level of the conference sparked criticism (Mark Gottdiener 2010 email).

Differential space is possible partly because under the conditions of neocapitalism land and property is abandoned periodically by capital interests and the state. This withdrawal from space occurs continually in urban areas even in the centre of cities. Abandoned urban land is seen in a variety of positive lights by Bowman and Pagano (2004) including the opportunities it engenders for ‘natural’ space wildlife habitats. Although their contention that abandonment and vacancy “are simply stages on the road, perhaps a long road, to renewal” is more dubious (Ibid: 4). In the UK and other countries capital and state abandonment of space is associated with the cyclic, sharp economic crises of capital and with more long term structural changes in the economy in the fields of for example, manufacturing industry and transport infrastructure. From his Marxist perspective Lefebvre highlights the potential for ordinary users of space to
seize new rights to urban space and produce differential space from abandoned abstract space:

An existing space may outlive its original purpose and the *raison d’être* which determines its forms, functions, and structures; it may thus in a sense become vacant, and susceptible of being diverted, reappropriated and put to a purpose quite different from its initial use. (Lefebvre 1991: 167, emphasis in original)

In addition to what might be called ‘utopian socialist’ differential space, Lefebvre speaks of another kind arising from what might be called the ‘here-and-now’ contestations and bodily “re-appropriation” of city space. An example in 1969 was the take over by Parisian students and others of the wholesale produce markets of Paris, Halles Centrales, which were “transformed into a gathering-place and a scene of permanent festival” (Ibid), that is a ludic space of play rather than work. Although Zetter (1975: 268) thought the area encapsulated “vitality, urbanity and ambience” he was oblivious to the creation of this transient differential space. Lefebvre presents a contradictory categorisation of ludic space suggesting at one point that it is a vast counter-space that escapes the control of the established order (Ibid: 383) only to affirm also that the space of the leisure industry, through commodification is a victory of neocapitalism (Ibid). However, leisure space bridges the gap between spaces of work and spaces of enjoyment and fun (Ibid: 385). It is therefore “the very epitome of contradictory space” hosting exuberant new potentials (Ibid).

Borden (1998 and 2001) is one of the few British researchers to deploy Lefebvre’s differential space concept in empirical research. He sought to deconstruct skateboarding’s history and differential space arguing that the temporary appropriation of space even for a matter of hours is a useful tactic but is not full blown, which implies ‘ownership’. Co-optation as Lefebvre calls it is therefore more likely to be tolerated by powerful social groups (Borden 2001: 54-55). Differential spaces of temporary appropriation are documented in comparative research focused on abandoned city space in Berlin (railway workshop), Brussels (railway station) and Helsinki (warehouse) (Groth and Corijn 2005). Theirs is a sophisticated insightful understanding of here-and-now differential space:

… it is a space created and dominated by its users from the basis of its given conditions. It remains largely unspecified as to its functional and economic rationality, thus allowing for a wide spectrum of use which is capable of integrating a high degree of diversity, and stays open for change…. a kind of
‘urbanity’ is produced in which the ‘lived’ and the contradictions that constitute urban life are nurtured, their deliberate juxtaposition allowing for a more complex vision of development than is evident in their immediate urban surroundings or in the unidimensional planning proposals to which these areas are subject. (Groth and Corijn 2005: 521)

Differential space seems not to be bestowed on city dwellers through the largesse of landowners or the state; it has to be appropriated through active assertion of rights to urban space. Lefebvre makes this clear through the relationships he enunciates between differential space and the right the city. His thoughts on the right, or rather, rights to the city were written up presciently in 1968 just before the Paris uprisings in May of that year (Mitchell 2003: 17-19). By implication the right to the city includes individuals’ access to public space but it additionally it encompasses collective access, needs for work, security, certainty, adventure, work, similarity, difference, isolation and encounter:

The right to the city cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life. (Lefebvre 1996: 158, emphases in original)

The right to the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: rights to freedom, to individualization in socialisation, to habitat and to inhabit. The right to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property), are implied in the right to the city. (Ibid: 173, emphases in original)

The city as oeuvre, a complex totality, a work, is a key Lefebvrian construct. Since the city/urban is a collective continuous work in progress, it follows that all people across the great heterogeneity of city dwellers have the right to participate (Mitchell 2003: 17) and the right to spatial justice (Fincher and Iveson 2008; Soja 2010). Since 1968 the concept of the right to the city has been in constant evolution around the world and urban citizenship is seen as practical rights involved with “articulating, claiming and renewing group rights in and through the appropriation and creation of spaces in the city” (Isin 2000 14-15). In 2004 in Quito a group of NGOs, Social Forum of the Americas, proposed the World Charter of the Right to the City which was refined at the Barcelona World Urban Forum 2004. Appropriations of space by local people have been documented recently in many cities, for example in Los Angeles (Soja 2010). He highlights how some of the non-profit organisations leading the LA ‘right to the City’ campaign draw on the ideas in Lefebvre’s 1968 book, Le Droit a La Ville. Fernandez (2007) is much quoted for an essay which explores Brazil’s attempts to enshrine
legally right to the city principles for urban dwellers. UN-Habitat following Fernandez argues that the right to the city involves:

- Liberty, freedom and the benefit of the city life for all
- Transparency, equity and efficiency in city administrations
- Participation and respect in local democratic decision making
- Recognition of diversity in economic, social and cultural life
- Reducing poverty, social exclusion and urban violence
  (Brown and Kristiansen 2009: 3)

Rather like the right to the city, differential space can be seen as a grand post capitalist epoch or a call to immediate action at the local scale (Mitchell 2003; Harvey 2008; Soja 2010). Although the “teleological prediction” (Howell 2001: 224) of forthcoming world-wide differential space has not been fulfilled yet, I draw on the following approaches to differential space in realising the empirical analyses below:

- Lefebvre (1991: 52) space which “accentuates differences”
- Borden’s (2001: 55) “tolerated” skateboarding
- Groth and Corijn’s (2005: 503) “indeterminate spaces”
- Kolb’s (2008: 95) “complex local places”

I argue that the creation of non-exchange value ludic space and spatial appropriative activity in Castlefield since the early 1980s, following abandonment of space by capital and the state, has produced spaces of difference akin to Lefebvrian ‘here-and-now’ differential space. The chapter now goes on to present a brief historical encounter with Castlefield’s differential space. This analysis is important in its own right but also for a critical understanding of the production of Castlefield’s differential space from the 1980s.

**19th Century Ludic Space**

Originally, the fairs and abattoir located in Castlefield partly because it was an expansive liminal site between town and country away from residential areas (Joyce 2003: 81). Being between the city centre and industrial areas associated with canals and railways, it provided cheap land. Castlefield is an old place where over the centuries layer upon layer of appropriation, everyday use and meaning have been piled up, each never quite eradicating entirely what came before. In a wider sense modernity tends not to eradicate the pre-modern entirely. Greene’s 1794 map of Manchester
show shows clearly most of Castlefield in productive agricultural use (figure 6.1). This bucolic era was destined not to last long into the 19th century as landed capital bought up swathes of land for canals, industrial capital for railways and factories, merchant capital for warehouses and residential capital for workers’ housing. However, abstract space did not dominate totally. In the 19th century Manchester and Salford Regatta, a major ludic event, was held annually on the Castlefield stretch of the River Irwell. It rivalled Henley Regatta with the construction of over one mile of boardwalk and seating for 50,000 (Wigglesworth 1986). Crews travelled from across the nation to compete. It was a time of punts and parasols, boaters and blazers. Before and after the Regatta, Castlefield’s abstract industrial space was punctuated by similar large scale ludic occasions. From the 1760s Castlefield accommodated Knott Mill and other fairs. With the eradication of the fairs, Castlefield retained certain of its quotidian ludic spaces as documented in the children’s playscapes of 1930s residents (Heaton 1995).

Historically in British towns and cities the marketplace was the location of periodic, temporary markets which usually combined commercial activity around the sale of livestock and food produce with leisure and non-work activity (Stallybrass and White 1986). These predominantly town centre sites also accommodated all manner of fairs and carnivals and have been a feature of British and European urban life for centuries. Markets, fairs and carnivals were city sites of differential space that brought together diverse and opposed elements. Here were found: ordinary workers, the middle classes, the poor, thespians, fortune tellers, magicians, sellers of wares, whores, rogues, pickpockets and ‘police’. There were common and uncommon foods, grotesque giants, dwarfs and exotic beasts. Profanity, vulgarity and carnivalesque laughter reverberated; mummery and absurdity abounded. These spaces are also understood as sites of working class resistance occupied in defence of popular rights to public space (Ibid: 16). Marketplaces provided “a commingling of categories usually kept separate and opposed” for example, centre and periphery, stranger and local, commerce and festivity, high and low (Ibid: 27). In addition to markets; pleasure fairs and carnivals, without the market element became increasingly common in Britain in the 19th century often taking advantage of new mechanical and lighting technologies.
Three fairs were operating in the Castlefield area by the early 19th century: Acres Fair, Knott Mill Fair and Dirt Fair, so called because it was invariably muddy in November when it was held. Dirt Fair was originally a Salford Fair, but was “inexorably banished” to the more expansive area of Castlefield “as an intolerable nuisance” (Shaw 1894: 144). Nuisance in public space was perceived by the authorities as a recurring problem of markets and fairs. Since the 13th century Manchester had by royal charter held a large annual market in October at Acres Field - Manchester Fair. This area later became St Ann’s Square and the fields developed for housing in the 18th century. By the early 19th century the Fair had sprawled into the streets which accommodated the grand houses of well-to-do industrialists and merchants. Manchester Fair was deemed by the municipality too big and unruly for its location. Under the auspices of Manchester’s Court Leet it was relocated in 1806 (Ibid) to a more spacious area on the south western edge of the Manchester township at a place called Knott Mill (Castlefield). Once in Castlefield, Manchester Fair was renamed Acres Fair. A third fair, Knott Mill Fair also took place in the Castlefield area. It was founded as a celebratory festival in the 1760s to commemorate the opening of the Bridgewater Canal. Knott Mill Fair was predominately a site of play, entertainment and leisure and was held over the Easter holiday weekend (Wheeler 1836: 349; Love 1842: 243). All the fairs grew rapidly in the 19th century as the population and economy of Manchester and the surrounding towns mushroomed during the coal and cotton fed industrial revolution.

Geographically, a pattern of expansion into adjoining streets followed the inauguration of the fairs in Castlefield. At first they occupied part of Liverpool Road in the vicinity of St Matthew’s Church but spread rapidly each year. Legitimate stalls brought in toll revenue for Manchester Corporation (Manchester Guardian 1849) but unofficial stalls were considered to be causing a nuisance along Deansgate all the way to St John Street (Ibid). In 1841 police presence seems to have deterred the pickpockets (Manchester Guardian 1841). Eventually, these several fairs were merged into one large fair known as the Knott Mill Fair (Makepeace 1987: 16) gaining renown as "the great Manchester carnival" (Samuel 1973: 132).
By the 1850s Knott Mill Fair was attended by many thousands of working class revellers. The fairgoers would linger long into the night sustained by gingerbread and refreshment stalls, lit by “dripping and flashing camphene or naptha lamps” (Manchester Guardian 1852). In the 1850s the Fair was ‘enriched’ by exotica imported from British imperial outposts including “Kaffir war chiefs” and “Amaponda Woman and Zoolu Child” (Ibid). Various gas lit theatrical establishments boasted attractions from the Empire such as “The Arab’s Oath” (figure 8.1). By 1852 the Knott Mill Fair had become so fearsome that ‘respectable’ folk avoided it, encouraged to do so by hostile press rhetoric.60

It may with equal truth be said that among the great majority of the frequenters of the place, [Knott Mill Fair] there is to be seen a larger amount of brutality, roguery, and every other phase of human degradation, than could be found among an equal number of persons collected upon any other occasion, or under any other circumstances. And all this is in the neighbourhood of and surrounding a church, and the now handsome building containing the Manchester Free Library… The idea of any person trying to avail themselves of the “reference library,” with all the hideous din of the multitude outside, is too extravagant to be entertained for a moment. (Manchester Guardian 1852)

Knott Mill Fair was replete with “monstrosities, absurdities, and nastiness” (Ibid).

What appears to be just as shocking to journalistic sensibilities, reminiscent of Engels, is the fact that the uncivilised working classes spilled out into the commercial public spaces of the city. To be fair though press reports of “this annual scene of frivolity” were not universally hostile (Manchester Courier 1834).

60 Remarkably similar journalistic opprobrium was heaped on other working class public space leisure pursuits such as the summer evening Monkey Parades in Oldham Street, where young men and women would don their Sunday best, perambulate and flirt (Birchall 2006).
For centuries the fair was a space to which people of all classes and social rank came, until the slow disengagement and disowning of the fair by the middle classes in the 19th century (White 1989: 181). With disengagement came a reconceptualisation of the fair and carnival. Through the late 19th century markets, fairs and carnivals were seen increasingly by ‘respectable’ people and government as vulgar, dangerous, disorderly, promiscuous and criminal: ripe for control by emerging modern government (Joyce 2003). These sites of thronging contradictory differential space were throughout the 19th century abolished systematically in Britain (Ibid: 81): creating purified and homogenised city space. Knott Mill Fair was “suppressed” by Manchester Corporation in 1876 (Ibid). In its place were built the upper and lower Campfield Market Halls in 1878. Castlefield’s unruly differential space was thereby neutered. At least one voice did not approve lamenting that, “the place has now become hopelessly civilised” (Shaw 1894: 144).

Before its termination, Knott Mill Fair became embedded into contemporary artistic representations of Manchester’s urban life in songs, poetry and painting. A poem by Edwin Waugh provided unequivocally positive Knott Mill spaces of representation:

Well, we’d just bin a fortnit wed,
When Jamie comes to me -
I could see he'd some’at in his yed
Bi th’ twinkle of his e’e,-
An’ he chucht me under th’ chin an’ said,
Come, lay thi knittin’ down;
Yon’s Knott Mill Fair agate like mad,
Let’s have a look at th’ town!

…

An’ when we coom to th' fairin’ ground,
An' geet i’th thick o’th throng,
For stalls, an' shows, an' haliday folk,
We could hardly thrutch along;
An' th' drums an' shouts' an' merry din,—
Thou never yerdt the like!
An' there nob'dy laughed much moore than me,
It fairly made me skrike!
(Waugh c1889)\(^{61}\)

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\(^{61}\) This extract comes from *Going to the Fair*, written sometime before 1889 (in Hollingworth 1982); which provides an explanation of the defunct Lancastrian dialect. A popular ballad based on the poem was recorded by Dowding and Harvey (2005).
Frederic James Shields, the Pre-Raphaelite painter, visited the Fair many times and referred to it frequently in correspondence (Mills 1912: 78, 84):

… in 1893 he painted Knott Mill Fair, his largest realistic oil-painting, a replica of an earlier water-colour, using many old costumes and properties which had actually been purchased at the fair in those early days. (Ibid 90)

Knott Mill Fair is a sympathetic depiction; attractive women are buying clothes in an orderly fashion. For this reason it is sometimes called Factory Girls at the Old Clothes Fair, Knott Mill.

These visual and literary imaginative works are significant spaces of urban representation which memorialise differential space; space which in the 20th century faded from the collective consciousness. These social realist poets and painters offered alternatives to the critiques of behaviours in public space formed the dominant representations of Knott Mill space. Contradictory spaces therefore arose which did not reject the experience of modern urbanism “for inducing disorientation” (Timms 1985: 1) but challenged the 19th century’s dominant representations of Castlefield space. Despite this all the city’s fairs were abolished eventually by the Corporation through the Manchester Municipal Code 1894 - Abolition of City Fairs. With abolition Knott Mill Fair rather than being erased from history was quietly forgotten, rather like Castlefield. Everyday ludic space was not abolished entirely as is clear from the accounts of Castlefield residents in Heaton (1995). However, the area’s liminal status continued into the post-WW2 period retaining the potential for the production of differential space. Such a moment was captured poignantly for example by the 20th century expressionist painter William Turner (figure 8.2) with his haunting image of The Lone Fisherman in Castlefield (Ward D 2003; Whittle and Barker 2005). The next section considers how a constellation of material, historical, heritage, property development factors and social issues coalesced in Castlefield to realise this potential more recently.

The Production of Postindustrial Differential Space

Public space is thought by many writers (as shown in chapter 2) to be an essential feature of the modern city (Sennett 2010). For Jacobs (1993: 37) synecdochically, the street was the city. Lefebvre had an overriding concern with the harmful impacts of (state implicated) neocapitalism on urban public space through fragmentation,
segregation, homogenisation and commodification in the creation of abstract space (Lefebvre 1991: 48-52; 1995: 118-119; Merrifield 2006: 60-67). Two key elements of public space are political expression and the encounter with difference (as discussed in chapter 2). Lefebvre provides a third in his arguments about differential space; the ludic appropriation of space which has outlived its original (or last) purpose. The 19th century demise of Castlefield’s fairs and public markets reduced drastically the differentiation of Castlefield space tending towards the production of abstract homogenised space with no rights of public access. There was a lack of public routes into the area even though much of the land was owned by MSCC, therefore in partial public ownership, like most docks and harbours in Britain after WW2.

Figure 8.2 *The Lone Fisherman, Castlefield* (William Turner 1960s)  
(Thanks to Steve Whittle and Rachel Dunkley-Jones)

Concomitant with the voluntary withdrawal and banishment of industry from Castlefield from the 1980s was a spread of the area’s postindustrial land uses (discussed in chapter 6). Another way of thinking through the ramifications of differential space conceptually and on the ground is through a spectrum of abstract to differential space. Under this formulation it is not a matter of abstract space undergoing a unitary conversion to differential space in a linear, teleological
transformation but rather like the processes of the spatial triad the production of
differential space can be conceptualised as involving dialectical cyclical tension.

Ludic Space: Castlefield Carnival, Carousels and Canal Barges
In 1982 as Castlefield’s industry retreated, the area became progressively quieter. The
work of Castlefield Steering Committee (CSC) became pivotal for the production of
postindustrial space. Its members understood the need to animate Castlefield’s ‘new’
heritage public spaces with human activity - which Lehtovuori (2010: 128) refers to
generically as “the event of assembly” - to accompany the heritage-derived
representations of space and conservation practice. In the 1980s before the Arena was
built CSC began to organise free family orientated events which attracted large
numbers of visitors. The largest of these was a leisure extravaganza which harked back
to the 19th century Knott Mill Fair. An event of this kind had been mooted first in the
1982 Tourism Development Plan which noted the Fair’s 100 year history as discussed
above. CSC decided to build on the success of the 1980 LRS birthday party and
wanted a new big idea for an event that would extend conceptually beyond railway
heritage and geographically beyond the station complex on Liverpool Road
(McWilliam-Fowler 1983a GMCRO). It was to be called the Castlefield Carnival and
be held over two days. In the 1980s there was still significant derelict land and active
industries in the canal basin which was characterised by lack of public access.
Interestingly, in the context of the 19th century fair, the Castlefield Carnival was to be
confined to Liverpool Road, and Deansgate.

Carnival can include much more than these of course: costumes, masks, giants, dwarfs,
monsters and trained animals; parodies, travesties and vulgar farce (Stallybrass and
White 1986: 8). Unfortunately, there is not space here to explore this fascinating
concept in great detail save to say that the attempt at carnivalesque revival in
Castlefield sat uncomfortably beside the amenity societies’ staid valorisation of
historic architectural space. Nevertheless, CSC agreed that an event called the
Castlefield Carnival should take place: the first one was held in September 1984 and
resembled a traditional working class fair with a carousel, game stalls, jugglers and
traditional ice cream (figure 8.3).
Figure 8.3 Castlefield Carnival Montage
Bicycle Jugglers MEN 13 September 1990;
Fire Juggler, Anon (1986); Carousel, Derek Brumhead (1985);
Carnival Scene, M Luft (1984) (MLIC)
GMC and the MOSI organised it although GMC covered almost all the £37,000 costs (COWP 1985 GMCR). The prime objective was to "promote and market Castlefield’s heavily capitalised fixed attractions” and serve a key role “in marketing the large local authority investment in Castlefield” (Ibid). The first Castlefield Carnival was held in September 1984, attracting a crowd of about 40,000. A second carnival organised and promoted by GMC followed in 1985 at a cost of £65,000 attracting about 80,000 making it the largest free public event of its kind in the North West of England. Here was a ludic space that harked back (perhaps unknowingly) to the marginalised 19th century fairs (figure 8.3), rather than heritage valorised extant historic architecture, envisaged by the amenity societies and increasingly by CSC. The point here, following (Jacobs 1996; Ashworth et al 2007) is not that one version of heritage is authentic and the other fake but that the production of space is played out through struggles by particular interests and multi-cultures which retrieve and value particular spatial histories and memories.

CSC carried out a detailed review of the first two carnivals discovering that most popular were the mobile attractions: street theatre, musicians, performers and the stalls/exhibitors. Unlike the 19th century fairs, the press was kind to the Castlefield Carnivals (Green 1990 MENA). One of the Carnival organisers draws attention to the industrial nature of the area and the importance of its liminal character which meant complaints were non-existents:

[it was] Funded by GMC Marketing budget!! A popular family event, free and attracted loads of local families. But for the first years it didn’t use the arena, just the science museum and streets around Liverpool Rd, to the Roman fort. The arena [site] was a bit dark and horrible then – no Castlefield Hotel, no visitors centre, no YHA etc. (Anne Tucker 2010 email appendix 2)

However, like the 19th century fairs, Castlefield Carnival was not without its problems. In the eyes of the organisers the infiltration of "unauthorised hot-dog and burger mobile traders” caused great consternation by “descending in great numbers” (COWP 1985 GMCR).
Despite this, the first two Carnivals were deemed an “overwhelming success” and were “unquestionably popular” with the general public (Ibid). CSC agreed that Carnival “must continue in future years, regardless of the GMC’s demise (Grosvenor 1985 GMCRO). Although there are obvious similarities with the 19th century fairs, ironically COWP seemed oblivious to their existence declaring the 1984 event was “the first large-scale Castlefield Carnival” (COWP 1985 GMCRO).

Following the success of the 1980s carnivals, the Inland Waterways Association (IWA) approached CSC in 1985 with a proposal to hold their National Boat Rally in the Castlefield canal basin (Gall 1985 GMCRO). Gall’s assessment of Castlefield’s capacity to host the event is revealing. Such an event would obviously focus on the Castlefield canal basin and need decent canal waterways and large amounts of adjoining land. However, the Bridgewater Canal “is in a dirty and dilapidated state”, towpaths “in a bad state of repair” and the “footbridges over smelly unused canal arms are missing”, three of the arms had been filled in and locks were broken (Ibid). Four and a half acres of land in the canal basin, essential for the rally had been acquired by MCC from MSCC but were still occupied by “undesirable industrial companies” that were a “complete blot on the middle of the horizon” (Ibid: para 4). The IWA was clear that if they had tried to organise the rally in the previous four decades there would not have been enough publicly accessible space of the right quality. John Fletcher, the on-site manager for the 1988 Rally recalls that the canals arms at Staffordshire Wharf were excavated from under a pre-mixed concrete production facility (Fletcher 1989: 16). The first of several IWA Castlefield National Boat Rallies took place in 1988 and was attended by thousands of enthusiasts. Its importance was twofold: it reinforced the growing potential of the canal basin as a large scale, viable public space (Brown 1988 MENA) and it was a critical spatial marker because it represented a hybrid ludic event between heritage valorisation and leisure.
**Free Events, Quasi-commodification and Corporate ‘Philanthropy’**

In the 1980s as Castlefield was abandoned systematically by industry for one reason or another, ludic appropriation of the space grew in quantity and diversity. Although the events’ takeover of the area was legitimate and facilitated by the municipal authorities, the fact that the area had become ‘empty’ was crucial. Following the success of the Carnivals and Boat Rallies, small voluntary sector (non-profit) organisations, working with MCC in the mid-1980s, began to organise family themed traditional and experimental theatre and concerts. One such company was Manchester International Arts Ltd (MIA). Thousands attended these events which included theatre groups, musicians and dancers from Europe and South America (Gary McClaran 2010 interview, appendix 2). Often the events brought together diverse peoples; one show in the 1980s featured a thousand Samba drummers from all over Britain (Ibid).

In the uncertain aftermath of the 1996 IRA bomb many Mancunians were keen to demonstrate the city’s resilience and optimism after the shock and devastation of the June explosion. Several events were planned but the most ambitious was suggested by a music promoter, Steve Smith, who came up with the idea of a free pop music concert funded by grants and corporate sponsorship (Ibid). Ear To The Ground, a local events company founded by Smith, promoted the event named Re.percussion, with the aim of highlighting the positive repercussions of the bomb. After securing small grants from MCC and CMDC and sponsorship from music companies ‘Re.percussion 1997 went ahead but the organisers eschewed the traditional municipal public space of Albert Square for Castlefield Arena. It attracted an impressive crowd of about 15,000. Ticketed access to the Arena site although free was managed strictly by fencing and roping; with entry and egress controlled by a large number of private security personnel supported by a prominent police presence. In 1998 the name changed to Dpercussion (for digital) and it became an annual event for 10 years (Ryan 2007).

Although McClaran is critical of Dpercussion saying it was orientated to a “white hip hop youth audience” (McClaran 2010 interview), others disagree, likening it to Notting Hill Carnival and arguing that it constituted a multicultural space where difference is celebrated (BBC 2004a). Dpercussion featured computer created acid house dance music and Steve Smith drew a link between what he saw as two revolutionary moments in Manchester’s history:
The Bridgewater Canal is where the industrial revolution started. Here we have a celebration of the second industrial revolution or the digital revolution. (in Haslam 1999: 256)

In several respects the early use of the Arena for the 1993 Olympic Decision Party and Dpercussion corroborate Degen’s claims that the regeneration of Castlefield and the public space of the Arena in particular, implied “a highly circumscribed activity” (Degen 2008: 121) limited by the powerful representations of space of CMDC and MCC. In other words, for Degen there was a formalisation of the public life of Castlefield through commodification of space, organised exclusive events and the construction of a potentially restrictive physical environment. However, the analysis presented here of a range of organised events and informal everyday uses of the Arena and the Castlefield canal basin, before the Olympic Party and after Dpercussion complicates Degen’s one dimensional interpretation and opens up the possibility for a critical engagement with Castlefield’s differential space.

The first large scale music event in Castlefield however, predate Dpercussion, occurred before the Arena was built and was jointly funded by CMDC and private sector music companies:

In 1992 (I think it was) we did an event called Manchester Alive, sponsored by HMV and CMDC which was a large afternoon world music festival featuring all local cultural groups. We had one stage on the Roman fort site and one under the archway between the arena and the back of Barça. There was no Arena there then, just grass all the way up the banks and rough gravel on the ground. (Anne Tucker 2010 email)

These large scale innovative family orientated events continued throughout the 1990s. McClaran stresses that it was easier to promote large scale spectacles in the Castlefield canal basin before the residential development arrived. In the mid-1990s Jeremy Shine of MIA organised an International Markets Festival utilising large parts of Castlefield. A particularly innovative and successful recent MIA show was Insect @ Castlefield Arena by the German alternative theatre group, Theater Titanik featured a
world of giant mechanical ants some of which could fly; created by “barmy contraptions and exciting effects” (Bourke 2006). Notably, these events had free entry, were family friendly, alcohol free and the organisers did not seek to accumulate profit.

Dpercussion and similar sponsored events can be regarded as only ‘quasi-differential’ space since although access was free, it could be restricted by the corporate sponsor. Corporate sponsored screenings of England football matches, where entry is by ticket bought in advance are further examples of the commodification of the public space of the canal basin. In 2006 the Castlefield screenings did not suffer the problems of drunken violence seen at other venues (Ottewell 2006). Thousands of football fans watched England beat Ecuador in 2006 and “a jubilant” Councillor Pat Karney (the Castlefield Liberal Democrat representative) who helped with organisation said, with an unconscious nod at the 1980s carnivals, "It was a fantastic family event". There was “no alcohol, no accidents, and no trouble - that is the secret behind this sort of event” (in Frame 2006). The ‘free’ concerts of the 1990s aimed at local youth had evolved by the 2000s so that classical music found a home in Castlefield. The Hallé Orchestra teamed up with local pop music band Elbow for a concert that had hints of elitism about it but was screened perfectly:

People had come with picnic blankets, food and booze and spread them out on the cobbles. Others sat on the Greek theatre-style seating or lay out on the grass banks above. Some stood on the Roman Fort battlements or against retaining walls for a view… There was a big screen over the canal arm with the Y-Club and the Castlefield Hotel rising behind it. The curve of the West Coast mainline enclosed the south, the rise to Liverpool Road the north. Castlefield Arena is a great space for the right show. A natural. This was the right show. It was a Manchester moment. (Schofield 2009)
At times too with the absence of industry Castlefield becomes a space of informal leisure pursuits, especially in summer: strolling, jogging, skateboarding, urban cycling, free running, picnicking, photography and quiet contemplation.

In addition to quasi-differential space ‘natural’ space or a version of it continues to be produced in Castlefield. It comes as no surprise to find Lefebvre’s equivocal about nature which he sometimes calls absolute space: “nature is being murdered” by abstract space (Lefebvre 1991: 71); even so, “absolute space persists” according to Smith’s interpretation (1998: 59). Possibilities that urban ‘natural’ space may be produced and have resilience seem to have been overlooked by Lefebvre (Smith 1998; Jorgensen and Tylecote 2007). Improved water quality has seen the return of fish, breeding water birds such as mallards, swans and Canada Geese and leisure fishermen to Castlefield. Some of them have fished the Bridgewater Canal, water quality permitting, for decades (Fishermen X and Y 2008 informal conversations). While their activities are innocuous, the fishermen return the fish at the end of the day, technically fishing at Castlefield is not allowed by the multinational company, Peel Holdings which owns the canals, towpaths and fishing rights. Mike Webb explains “for your information we do not permit fishing in the Castlefield area” (2007 email). While the ethical fishermen throw them back, the herons and cormorants have no compunction about keeping them.

**The Re-production of Differential Space**

The right to collective expression of profoundly political opinions in public is one of the key markers of genuine, democratic public space. From the early 2000s people have come to Castlefield to express their identity often related to sexuality. The annual Gay Pride carnival starts from Castlefield (figure 8.4), which has also hosted Aids Vigils. On a smaller scale Castlefield was the venue for a photo-shoot for the ‘Vanilla Girls’ (figure 8.5). Local photographer, Paul Jones chose Castlefield when asked by Steph Kay owner of Manchester’s lesbian Vanilla Club to showcase some of the regular clientele. He selected Castlefield because it provides a spectacular, recognisable backdrop (Paul Jones 2010 email).
Figure 8.4 Manchester’s Gay Pride: start in Castlefield (2007)
(Thanks to Joseph McGarraghy @ flickr.com/photos/asisawit/1250046372/)

Figure 8.5 Vanilla Girls’ Castlefield photo-shoot (2009)
(Thanks to Paul Jones at flickr.com/photos/paul_jones/4185649988/)
Most tellingly though thousands of people descend frequently on the Castlefield Arena to add their bodily presence to the weight of political campaigns, so far with a remarkable lack of violent confrontation, either with other protesters or the police. Many of these events are ignored by the mainstream media but are documented by ‘alternative’ media and urban photographers many of whom post their images on photograph sharing websites such as Flickr (Leary 2010). Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 collective political action has focused on the Castlefield area as groups such as the Greater Manchester Coalition to Stop the War have organised protest rallies (BBC 2001). CND too has led marches that terminate in speeches and rallies in Castlefield (figure 8.6). Anti-racism events have been a feature of the Arena since 2000. They include ‘corporate’ events from that organised under the Kick It Out banner to those organised by workers’ groups and trade unions. In 2003 a “multicultural population flocked to Castlefield's Arena” to experience an event that wrapped up its serious anti-racism message in a day of music and entertainment aimed predominantly at young people (Kick it Out 2003).

Other event organisers have overlain political space with leisure space often as a strategy to avoid problems with local authorities or the police (Kate Richardson 2009 interview, appendix 2) as they can be suspicious of anti-racism events because of the potential for violent confrontation with far right groups. This was the strategy adopted by the Manchester Trades Council for their Love Music Hate Racism: Say No to the BNP! The Right to Work for All! protest held at Castlefield on May Day 2009 (figure 8.6). In 2006 Castlefield was brimming with narrowboats (figure 8.6) whose owners, members of ‘Save Our Waterways’ were protesting about the threats to Britain’s canals from public spending cuts (Dowling 2006).

62 Figure 8.6 Photo credits, clockwise from top left: Anti-racism rally (2009) thanks to Andrew Lane at flickr.com/photos/joshuakaitlyn/3501674463/in/photostream/ CND rally (2008) thanks to Jacqui. Burke at flickr.com/photos/cnduk/2889263067/ St George’s School rally (2008) thanks to Kate Furnell and Stephen Kingston at salfordstar.com/article.asp?id=74 Save Our Waterways rally (2006) thanks to Martin Clark at flickr.com/photos/sowpics/306833423/
63 The full ‘brand name’ of the campaign is Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football; established in 1997 by the Professional Footballers Association, the Premier League and the Football Association (Kick it Out 2003).
Figure 8.6 Politicised appropriation of space montage
In some ways, the production of Castlefield’s new public spaces, like similar initiatives elsewhere (Sennett 2010) was left ‘unfinished’ and in a state of agonistic emergence (Watson 2006: 7) creating all kinds of differential space potentials now being documented by urban photographers.

Castlefield’s differential space is often produced by local interests, most touchingly by Salford school who children in 2009 organised a rally at Castlefield to save their school, St George’s from closure (figure 8.6). Salford City Council’s (SCC) plan was to demolish and redevelop the site for private housing (Kingston 2010): thereby producing classic abstract space. Interestingly, the protest went to Castlefield to avoid demonstration charges after SCC “billed the school for more than £1,000 the last time the protestors took to the streets in Salford” (Britton 2009). The school won its fight to stay open (Keeling 2009). Castlefield’s politicised events also attract activists from all over England and beyond. A group of Rochdale firemen joined a mass rally of colleagues from all over Britain who occupied the Castlefield Arena in 2002 in a prelude to the national strike of that year:

The arena was packed with hundreds of firemen from across the country dressed in yellow and blue protest T-shirts, waving banners and sounding airhorns. The giant screen set up to show the conference refused to work, but the assembled union members listened patiently as delegates from brigades throughout Britain all called for a national strike ballot. And a great roar went up as the unanimous vote in favour of a ballot was announced. (Taylor 2002)

**Appropriation and Creation of Autonomous Spaces**

Organised marches and protest rallies are important aspects of differential space and the right to the city but some rights to the city cannot be gained by following rules formulated by those in authority. Lefebvre is clear that the “quest for counter-space” must derive from individual bodies through the appropriation of space - including new spaces for enjoyment (Stewart 1995: 615). Drawing on such propositions the peaceful bodily re-appropriation or co-optation of streets, squares and abandoned space through *unauthorised* action is or should also be a fundamental right to the city. One group which pursues unauthorised direct action is Manchester No borders (MNB), established in 2006. It started as a friends group until membership was boosted by a public meeting at the ironically named Friends Meeting House (Donna and Joe (not their real names) 2010 interview, see appendix 2). MNB has a clear philosophical
position, “we understand ourselves as an action and theory group” (Joe 2010 interview). They wanted to broaden the work of MNB away from only supporting refugees and asylum seekers, important though this is and have taken up European ideas of autonomous city spaces. Their theoretical basis is about asking, what is a right? “If it’s abstract it’s meaningless, it has to be connected with some material social gain”: rights have to be claimed by social movements in struggles for material things (Ibid). MNB announced a day of action in 2008 which expressed a desire to combine political action with leisure and pleasure: a cogent indicator of the production of differential space:

… we are calling for a demonstration in Manchester for the FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ALL and to DEFEND AUTONOMOUS SPACES. This forms part of the international days of action in defence of autonomous spaces that have been called for this weekend. The day's events will also include a fayre in the city centre, street parties, squat parties and workshops in occupied spaces. (MNB 2008, capitals in original)

MNB organised two events on 12 April 2008: a march/demo and a building occupation which signal how local people are prepared to occupy public space bodily to assert political rights to city space. Ironically, the occupation refocused attention on Castlefield as a node in a global network not so much of world trade but the international movement of people because, “squats and autonomous spaces face a hard time from the authorities”. Yet for MNB activist feel that, “especially some migrant communities, they are the only alternative to homelessness (Eliot 2008).”

MNB present a highly articulate eloquent rationale for their attempts to appropriate and create autonomous space which provides a considered theoretical understanding of city boundaries worth quoting at length:

It might at first seem odd for a group principally associated with aiding refugees and migrants to have called this action. However, by borders we refer not simply to the physical apparatus preventing the movement of people between nation states. There are other borders that prevent the free association of people within the city. The restrictions created by capitalist social relations and the property system abolishes common ground, segregates according to wealth and ownership, and in doing so throws up borders all around us… Control of the movement and association of people remains - whether at the micro-level of our inner cities or the macro level of international migration – a

64 ‘Karen Eliot’ is the pseudonym adopted by many urban activists in a practice probably inspired by Ivan Chcheglov, to challenge the perceived cult of individualism and intellectual property ownership (Plant 1992: 177).
central concern for the survival of state-capitalism. We should fight to create spaces in Manchester not simply as bases of resistance or celebration (though we hope they can provide this), nor to create ‘autonomy’ from capitalism (there is no autonomy within capitalism), but to go some small way to encouraging a departure from this system of control. (MNB 2008)

It is significant that MNB positioned the Castlefield actions in the context of a range of broader spatial struggles and socio-geographies. In the kind of rhetorical style which accompanies the production of differential space in Los Angeles (Soja 2010), and European cities (Fincher and Iveson 2008), MNB understood their combined politicised/ludic occupation of Castlefield space in a global context and seem inspired, consciously or not by the philosophy underpinning Lefebvre’s right to the city oeuvre:

With sky-high rents forcing the poor to the margins, the creeping privatisation of public space, and a council willing to close down vital community services and simultaneously sell off swathes of the city centre to luxury property developers and retailers, there has seldom been a time when fighting for autonomous spaces in Manchester has been more important. (MNB 2008)

Unlike most protest marches in Manchester, which normally start from All Saints Gardens (near the original site of the MOSI) MNB decided to start the march from Urbis, the Museum of the City, at Cathedral Gardens (a new public square created after the 1996 IRA bomb). It is a site frequented by young skateboarders several of whom joined the march. The marchers were led by a large banner which read Freedom Of Movement For All - Defend Autonomous Spaces. At Castlefield the marchers rendezvoused with a group of ‘elite’ squatters who had ‘cracked’ the Jacksons Wharf building, abandoned since 2005. Despite its historic warehouse style it was built in the 1990s as a purpose-built bar/restaurant. Rather than end the day with “boring speeches” (Donna 2010 interview) the day culminated with the symbolic occupation. Jacksons Wharf was draped in the autonomous spaces banner, fairy lights were hung, bottles of beer passed around and the ‘squatters’ revelled in a party with music and dancing (figure 8.7). However, it was far from a utopian differential space, right to the city spectacle. Shortly after the squat started the police arrived, having monitored the march continually via city centre CCTV. They gave permission for MNB to continue to occupy the building but only until it nightfall, then they had to leave. Such Foucauldian surveillance and control resonates with recent critical public space analyses (Coleman 2004; Berman 2006; Ruppert 2006).
The combination of political action and the occupation of space for ludic purposes is an interesting aspect of the MNB spatial appropriation. Clearly it resonates with the appropriation of Les Halles in the 1960s, the political work of carnivalesque spectacle and Berman’s (2066: 225) injunction to “fight for your right to party”. There was an important political message behind the fleeting symbolic Jackson Wharf squat:

Joe: It was a nice place, it’s a beautiful area; people got upstairs.
Donna: We climbed on the balcony.
ML: I’ve seen the pictures; very impressive with your banner; autonomous spaces.
Joe: That was made for that demonstration especially.
Donna: We’ve painted it over now; it says something else about anti-war.
Joe: We had a little mobile sound system with us so we had a dance and MNB donated 4 or 5 bottles of Cava which we opened on the balcony in style; which is part of what we said earlier about our reaction to austerity politics and having less. Squatting doesn’t mean you have to live in a dirty place [laughing]. It could be something really glamorous…
Donna: And also because in Castlefield there are the expensive looking bars and restaurants so it was that we could go there and open up our own drink and listen to our music. So it was kind of like you can make it happen yourself.
Well you know you’re excluded from that space because lots of people on the demonstration couldn’t afford it. (in, Donna and Joe 2010 interview)

Although Donna and Joe said they were not familiar with Situationist writing, this acknowledgement that in modern urban life people have to do things for themselves resonates with Ivan Chtcheglov’s haunting maxim, written in 1958 under the pseudonym Gilles Ivain (2009: 33) “You will never see the hacienda. It does not exist. The hacienda must be built.” (emphasis in original). It resonates too with Lefebvre’s insistence that the appropriation of space is important because it teaches us much about the production of new spaces (Lefebvre 1991: 167).

With much of inner and East Manchester still suffering the ravages of serious problems of multiple deprivation (Socialist Equality Party 2010, but see the rosier picture painted by Deputy Chief Executive (Regeneration) 2008) and the paradox of an affordable housing shortage juxtaposed against the abandonment of whole streets, the choice of Castlefield for the occupation might be perplexing. One of the organisers was candid enough to admit that:

To be honest the decision to occupy Jackson's Wharf was not the most politically-thought out one we've ever done, but was partly dictated by practicalities. It was a good City centre location in a historical area which had become synonymous with regeneration success through posh bars/clubs and then in the last few years has gone downhill again... (Anon MNB 2010 email)

Although there were ongoing squats in several parts of Manchester including nearby Hulme, Castlefield was not an obvious place to organise a symbolic squat but Joe and Donna explained the choice differently:

ML: OK, but you did go to Castlefield so there must have been some reason.
Donna: A lot of demonstrations end there don’t they in the [pause]
ML: In the Arena?
Donna: Yeah in the Arena and lots of rallies and marches end there. They are usually the most boring tedious ends to demonstrations ever because you get lots of socialist speakers…
Joe: And you are shut away from the public. You can say that there’s radical stuff happening in Castlefield. If you have a more cynical view you would say that they don’t want you in Piccadilly Gardens or Albert Square.
Donna: Yeah…
Joe: You are in this sanitised space where no one’s gonna see you.
Donna: Yeah, because if you’re having a rally there then you’re not bothering anyone but if you’re trying to do it in the middle of Market Street then, they probably just wouldn’t let you do it [laughing]…

Joe: So that’s why we wanted to start in a very public place but we also knew there were good reasons for going to Castlefield, which was the Jacksons Wharf.

Donna: Yeah.

ML: So you knew about that building before?

Donna: Yeah.

ML: How did you know about it?

Donna: It didn’t come from me individually. I think it came from some of the people who had been involved in squatting in Manchester…

Joe: We wanted to do something public en mass so we wanted to do a mass action. The squat was symbolic and it’s unusual for a large group of over 200 people to do a squat. It’s usually a small group that cracks the squat. It’s almost a bit elitist.

Donna: … but I guess the end part of the day to occupy a building and to have a bit of a party was really for us, wasn’t it? [looking at Joe] It was to bring together this group of 200 people, a bonding thing and working together. It definitely wasn’t chosen for its visible location. We knew we’d be out of the way but I guess that made it easier for us. Then also there had been a battle over Jacksons Wharf because it was going to be turned into. What was it?

Joe: It was flats. We never met up with anyone from the campaigners. I guess we had a fairly cynical view about it because we knew it had been regenerated so much already with all the flats behind it. We thought the campaign was by people who had already moved in, who were quite well off so they just wanted to maintain their space…”

(in, Donna and Joe 2010 interview)

MNB’s choice of Castlefield emerges therefore out of a complex nexus of interlocking rationales related to convenience, practicalities, visibility, invisibility, prior knowledge and an estimation of the probability that the squat element of the day could be carried through without interference from the police or other authorities. On the other hand St George’s School protestors had pragmatic reasons for choosing Castlefield: it was free and convenient. Other activists display similar reasoning:

- “Castlefields [sic] arena is the fall-back place if Albert Square is unavailable” (Darren Adams 2009 email, appendix 2)
- “Castlefield has good acoustics, it’s cheap and easy to book” (Kate Hudson 2009 email)
- “it’s large and conveniently located and it lends itself to the use of audio-visual equipment” (Mark Krantz 2009 email).

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65 This comment is ironic since their march did go along Market Street.
66 The proposed modernist residential block was thought by objectors so alien to the area it was dubbed the star trek development (Leary 2009c).
Kate Richardson of Manchester Trades Council (2009 interview, see appendix 2) explained a similar rationale. However, of the activist groups only MNB imbued Castlefield space with political meaning per se and the fact that they felt comfortable occupying the space is important. It is an attractive place of busy museums, bars and cafes but also expansive public spaces and neglected buildings; out of sight of the police yet public enough to deliver a political message about autonomous spaces in a city centre where space is highly commodified and controlled.

The April 2008 MNB actions were in response to an international No Borders callout from a meeting in Dijon, France for a day of happenings in defence of autonomous spaces; activists in many UK cities participated (Donna 2010 interview). MNB wanted to do something visible in the streets and make a statement about inequalities and unfairness in the allocation of and access to urban space that would make an impression on the people of Manchester; “we wanted people to see what we were doing” (Ibid, emphasis in original). Visibility is being used here to denote being seen in public space and politically, crucial factors in the struggle for the right to the city. Whether the appropriations of space during the march and occupation are seen by the public as they happen is I would argue only part of what it is to become visible in public: publicity is another aspect:

ML: I looked to see if the Manchester Evening News or other local press had covered your Manchester march and they hadn’t.
Joe: They never do. We used to send press releases but they never cover them.
Donna: Once they thought we were a group for free public transport. We use Indymedia, Libcom and a local newspaper called The Mule.67 (in, Donna and Joe 2010 interview)

Habermas’ notion of the public sphere which transcends material public space is clearly important here. And while being denied access to mainstream spaces of print and TV journalism may be problematic in terms of teaching about the production of new public space, being able to access the burgeoning public sphere of independent news and activist websites does allow MNB to reach potentially a great number of people.

67 The march and symbolic squat were reported by The Mule (2008). Almost certainly though they were not reported by the mainstream national or local media. Other MNB events, invariably portrayed as “stunts”, have been reported, e.g. Tibbetts (2008) and Swaine (2009).
Admittedly, the numbers of protestors involved in the Jackson’s Wharf protest were small (about 200) but what MNB succeeded in doing was making visible a neglected unused city centre space abandoned by capital, transforming it albeit fleetingly into differential space. While coverage of the event in the mainstream media appears to be non-existent, many (radical/alternative) websites promoted the action before the event took place then carried reports of the occupation proper. In attracting internet coverage in Britain and overseas, MNB opened up spaces where the potential for a different understanding of Castlefield space begins to emerge and the production of differential space can be valorised. Individually they may well be lack significance but together the diverse political appropriations revealed above amount to important challenges to abstract space and to traditional ways of imagining and being in public space exemplified by official representations of space.

Differential space as it has emerged in this thesis has profound significance for the production of space. Although I have talked to this point about the spatial triad, Lefebvre reveals other triads, for example: perceived, conceived and lived space; material, mental, and social space; counter-space, counter-projects (and by implication) counter-representations. Drawing together the empirical research findings I would conjecture that a double triad summarised in (figure 8.8) is implicated in the production of social urban public space. All its constituents and the processes involved have been discussed throughout the thesis. To the right of figure 8.8 is Lefebvre’s conventional spatial triad which has proved essential in providing a theoretical framework for the thesis. To the left are the spaces of the second triad constituted by material city spaces which assumed increasing significance as the research progressed, though they are of course represented and imagined too. The red two way arrows represent socio/spatial processes. They are two way because they point to spatial products that in turn influence the shaping of urban space through subsequent socio/spatial processes. It is important to note that as in Gregory’s spatial diagram (chapter 3), figure 8.8 represents spatial production that is: non-hierarchical, non-linear, cyclical, dialectical and non-teleological.
Conclusions
Differential space is one of Lefebvre’s more enigmatic concepts. Neglected by theorists in the 1990s who tended to focus on the spatial triad per se, it is full of exciting theoretical and practical potential to ground in concrete space a plethora of rights to the city. Concomitantly the chapter reveals how notions of differential space can draw theoretical power from right to the city ideas. The production of Castlefield’s differential space is revealed in this chapter through the lens of historical analysis informed by the spatial triad. A spectrum of spaces from abstract to differential is shown to be conceptually preferable to an either or dichotomy. Abandonment of industrial space after WW2 allowed the emergence of differential space interspersed with ludic spaces. Rather than something entirely new, these spaces should be appreciated in the context of the suppressed 19th century ludic space of fairs, carnivals and regattas and the Castlefield Carnivals of the 1980s. Not so much history repeating as history reasserting itself in a changed econo-political epoch. It is obvious that Lefebvre himself posited different kinds of differential space and Castlefield assumes the characteristics of differential space in two senses. Firstly, and most importantly, Castlefield encompassed from the 2000s public space appropriated collectively for
overt political protest and expression. Secondly, from the 1980s Castlefield becomes appropriated by diverse ludic space; non-work differential spaces of collective leisure and pleasure. Additionally, Castlefield became a space appropriated informally by people indulging in a multitudinous range of everyday leisure pursuits and politicised actions, realising Lefebvrian lived space through the appropriation of differential space. Crucially, all these aspects of differential space privilege non-work and the use value of space as opposed to the exchange value inherent in abstract space. Rather than a teleological shift from the absolute space of nature through abstract space to differential space, the research reveals the cyclical nature of the process as each space leaves residues that have the potential, in a different socio-economic context to emerge anew. Suppression of differential space in one part of the city at a particular time sometimes results in its reappearance through the interstices of abstract space.

Along with concepts of the production of space and the right to the city, differential space is probably Lefebvre’s principal legacy to city dwellers not just in Manchester or England but around the world. Castlefield accumulated qualities of Lefebvre’s differential space while simultaneously retaining elements of abstract space. New public space created in the 1990s is found to have been appropriated through collective action to articulate political opinions, voice political demands and to express marginalised identities in public. MNB’s interventions are in one sense spontaneous unregulated triumphs for the production of differential space, on the other they are managed along entrepreneurial city lines. Therefore, following the reasonable public space critiques reported in chapter 2, the temptation to see Castlefield naively as some kind of postindustrial differential space utopia should be resisted. So far it is better conceptualised as a circumscribed differential space subject to the exercise of state surveillance, control and power.

I argue we should challenge the totalising death of public space critiques in favour of a nuanced appreciation of public space and its differential space possibilities. Castlefield’s unique history, topography and spatial meanings endow it with contradictory qualities and differential space potentials found in this chapter to facilitate and hobble political activism and efforts to claim rights to the city. On the one hand the Arena area is a large, well maintained, easily accessible public space
where powerful institutions and state apparatus seem to have adopted light touch management strategies. On the other hand because it does not encompass traditional thoroughfares, Castlefield is understood as space activists are pushed into because here they become invisible, shorn of political influence. If space were only material this would be a problem but in occupying Castlefield’s material public space, political activism occupies concomitant imagined and virtual spaces of representation. A great diversity of politicised interests therefore gain access to the wider public sphere of the internet where differential space is made visible through activists’ own efforts to memorialise and preserve their fleeting disruptions of abstract space.
Chapter 9

Conclusions

Hypercomplexity in the Production of Urban Public Space

The hypercomplexity of social space should by now be apparent, embracing as it does individual entities and peculiarities… The principle of the interpenetration and superimposition of social spaces has one very helpful result, for it means that each fragment of space subjected to analysis makes not just one social relationship but a host of them that analysis can potentially disclose. (Lefebvre 1991: 88)

Thus social space, and especially urban social space, emerged in all its diversity - and with a structure far more reminiscent of flaky *mille-feuille* pastry than of the homogeneous and isotropic space... (Lefebvre 1991: 86 emphasis in original)

This chapter provides space to reflect on the thesis and gaze outward towards the wider academic world, the material city and the city of the imagination beyond. The thesis has brought into the public domain for the first time fresh insights arising from new data. It has rejoined the severed and reanalysed the commingled. On reflection the overarching conclusion can be stated succinctly before the elaboration which follows. It is that a theoretically robust critical appreciation of the production of urban space requires a careful engagement with the histories of the elements of Lefebvre’s spatial triad: analyses of the role of counter-representations and counter-projects in such an endeavour are vital. This engagement can best be achieved through the deployment of the elements of a second dialectical spatial triad: abstract space, differential space, ‘natural’ space in conjunction with Lefebvre’s more familiar one. Such analyses will elevate differential space theoretically, politically and practically to the status of the prime desired outcome of the production of urban public space.

This thesis set out to explore critically and unravel investigatively the production of Castlefield urban public space focusing principally on the era of the 1970s but investigating also how the production of space in this era was informed by representations of space from the 1940s and had implications for the 1980s, 90s and 2000s. Methodologically, the mixed research methods approach based on a series of clues provided by Lefebvre (chapter 3), provided a tough but flexible empirical
framework allowing for the qualitative analyses used iteratively throughout the research process. Through exploratory research the thesis has disclosed Castlefield to be a highly complex, contested palimpsest of urban spaces produced by multifarious social relationships. Its complexity has compounded through time by the accretion of layers of subsequent spatial practice, and through the myriad official and unofficial representations of space that have rendered the area more visible or less visible since WW2. Complexity extends also to the imaginative, artistic spaces of representation and differential spaces that have defined Castlefield intermittently since the 19th century but particularly since the reimagining and physical transformations from the 1970s. Lefebvre’s words regarding the hypercomplex could therefore have been written with Castlefield in mind.

Two critically informed theoretical relationships with the ideas articulated in Lefebvre’s inspiring text *The Production of Space* have been developed progressively throughout the thesis. Firstly, the thesis is grounded in the loose framework provided by the spatial triad (chapter 1). Secondly, the thesis of necessity moved beyond what Lefebvre himself admits is not a total system for researching the production of space by asking fundamental questions about the nature of the spatial triad particularly the two representational categories and their interactions. In drawing out the importance of the key findings of the research, this final chapter moves from the substantive specifics of Castlefield’s spatial production to generalities of production of space theorisations. Before reaching this point, the implications of the thesis are elucidated for the academic literatures of the dominant narrative (chapter 2) and for the methodological praxis of those who would continue to research the production of urban space of Castlefield, Manchester and beyond.

Each empirical chapter has thrown up a variety of significant and surprising findings which contribute tellingly and from new viewpoints to our critical understanding of the production of space. In short, original research in chapter 4 revealed the importance for Castlefield of two distinct policy discourses - city planning and urban policy - their contested nature, continuities and crucial reorientations. Chapters 5 and 6 concentrated on contested counter-representations of space and the interpenetration into these of (quasi)spaces of representation, while chapters 7 and 8 concentrated on spatial practice
and the production of new public space and the (re)emergence of differential space. I will not repeat the detail here but what I want to do is highlight four key themes related to the particularities of Castlefield’s complex social, urban public space which recur across several aspects of the research. The four themes are: 1) visibility and the visual; 2) contested representations of space; 3) problematising the public/private binary schism; 4) spatial networks in the production of research knowledge and the production of space. I will also delineate the importance and implications of the research that go beyond Castlefield, Manchester and beyond Lefebvre’s spatial triad. The four wider implications resonate with: a) the dominant academic narrative; b) research methodology; c) the potentials for future research; d) production of space theorisations.

Before this though there is an obligation to return to an important finding, though one admittedly that is not central to the thesis. The obvious roles played by people of colour and cotton in the production of Castlefield are elided in the academic literatures despite the revelations of Eric Williams in 1944 regarding the funding of the Liverpool to Manchester Railway by the proceeds of the Transatlantic Trade in West African peoples. It was left to an amateur historian and one-man publisher (Heaton 1995) to bring into the public domain the only image encountered in the literature of a black person in Castlefield, Bertie Armitage: an issue pursued below in ideas about future research. It is noticeable too that the historic preservation amenity society and public institutional representations uncovered by the research tend to ignore race and class issues in the production of Castlefield. However, to their credit the producers of BBC and GTV Castlefield programmes did allow working class voices to be heard. Castlefield’s history is told selectively through its spatial practice and inscription in material space which elides as much as it reveals: Coal, Slate and Potato Wharfs, Pomona Dock; Byrom, Duke and Water Streets, Liverpool Road; Grocer’s, Merchants, Staffordshire and Duke’s Warehouses. Most ironic is the mis-named Castle Quay and Castlefield itself. Cotton played a decisive 200 year part in Manchester’s development signified by the myriad cotton images embedded permanently into the structure Manchester Town Hall. Despite this there is no Castlefield cotton memorialisation, no Cotton Street, no Cotton Quay, no Cotton Wharf.
Visibility and Invisibility and the Visual

The issues of the visibility and invisibility of material urban space have been recurrent throughout the thesis. While appearing at first sight straightforward they quickly become complex, even enigmatic. Lefebvre was acutely aware of the complex relationships between material space, its visibility and its representations. That something can be seen is no guarantee that it will be seen. The most startling example of this (ambivalent) blindness at the institutional level is the eliding of Castlefield by Rowland Nicholas’ 1945 City Plan (chapter 4). In the 1970s, amenity society activists and urban policy politicians began to see a different Castlefield through the lens of heritage sensitive counter-representations of space that appreciated increasingly the value of the historic built environment (chapters 5 and 6). Public institutions began in the 1980s to value the historic environment instrumentally for its economic potential and devalue existing industry (chapters 6 and 7). Nicholas and the CMDC deployed rational/scientific images and artistic visual representations to legitimise their understandings of Castlefield creating what might be called hybrid representations.

The distinction between artists who create imaginative spaces of representation and technicians who create quasi-scientific representations of space is therefore problematised in the empirical research. Rather than MCC it was the officers of the HBC and GMC who were first drawn into the LRS counter project by the amenity societies’ adoration of historic space initiated by Hawcroft of the GrG and Rhodes of the VSMG.

A recurring theme in the archival and interview analyses has been the importance of visual material space as a signifier of serious urban problems and demonstrable successes. Politicians such as Michael Heseltine and the Board of the CMDC, needing to demonstrate success pointed to visible, material spatial practice as evidence that urban policy interventions in problematised urban space were working. Furthermore, the research has revealed that visual representations of space, especially when allied with words and place naming can elide urban space through selection and de-selection as well as render it visible. Ugly, industrial, liminal Castlefield slides on and off cartographic representations from the 1700s often being subsumed under the name Knott Mill. Different visual media do different representational work in the production
of Castlefield space. Redhead’s ostensibly quasi-rational documentary and GTV’s *Yesterday’s Dust, Tomorrow’s Dreams* drew on working class oral histories and docudrama to create spaces of representation (chapter 6) thereby blurring the representations of space and spaces of representation divide. I argue that the research has revealed complex picture whereby televisual representations of Castlefield are transient and cyclical rather than fixed and uni-linear. Castlefield was portrayed as a safe family friendly place but *continued* through the 1990s and 2000s to be represented in a succession of dramatised televisual representations as lonely and lethal, dank and dangerous.

**Contested Representations of Space**

One of the most important findings of the research is the contested representations *within* the branches of public sector whose actors exhibited marked differences in the meanings which they imposed on Castlefield space (chapter 5). A coalition formed between Manchester Corporation and BR which tended to devalue historic industrial space setting in train a marked disinclination to fund the maintenance and restoration of LRS, the world’s first intercity passenger railway station. An even more unlikely alliance, of the kind signalled by Lefebvre (1991) as being necessary for the advancement of a counter-project, formed between the DoE, HBC, GMC and several amenity societies which valorised Castlefield historically. The ensuing 10 year struggle to establish the LRS counter-project was to trigger the valorisation of Castlefield as historically important, aesthetically pleasing and desirable (chapters 5 and 6). Producing their own representations of space, to counter that of the official 1945 and 1961 City Plans was a decisive amenity society intervention in the (re)production of Castlefield (chapter 6). Conflicts and rivalries *within* the public sector institutions and between those and the private sector surfaced in the archival and interview data. The work of the CSC was hampered at times in the early 1980s by mistrust and suspicion especially between the GMC, MCC and GTV. It was the eventual emergence of an industrial heritage and cultural tourism consensus, requiring the eradication of real extant industry which assisted with the amelioration of conflict.

The reports by Hall and Rhodes and Jones and Rhodes do not fit easily into Lefebvre’s representations of space or spaces of representation categories and I argue that they are
best thought of as counter-representations of space or quasi-spaces of representation since they adopt the expert rhetoric and architectural techniques normally found in official representations of space but contradict directly the dominant official representations. This finding contrasts with other production of space research which usually sees conflict only between representations of space and spaces of representation (Hubbard et al 2003, Degen 2008; Allen and Crookes 2009). It should be noted however, that the amenity society denigration of Castlefield’s working class industries as dirty, ugly and inappropriate was similar to the castigation of Knott Mill Fair by the local press in the 19th century (chapter 8). While spaces of representation emerged in the 19th century to present a positive view of the Fair, they are notably absent in representations of Castlefield’s industries during the crucial heritage valorisation period of the 1970s/80s.

**Problematising the Public/Private Dichotomy**

A key finding of the research is the rendering as problematic of the public/private, managerial/entrepreneurial roles at the heart of the entrepreneurial city theory and practice as it relates to the production of urban public space. BR and MCC were found to behave like private sector companies in seeking to maximise the property development potential of its real estate assets (chapter 5). Private sector interests are seen to oppose the redevelopment of Castlefield for housing on the grounds of its historic qualities (chapter 7). The amenity societies are found to play the historic environment protection role usually attributed to the public sector (chapters 5 and 6). Most surprisingly though, the archetypal entrepreneurial city regeneration device, the CMDC is found to have produced, drawing a strong civic ethos, significant amounts of high quality public space – bridges and the Arena (chapter 7) - that contained inherently the potential for the production of differential space (chapter 8).

While there was an element of new public access provision to sites of consumption, the high quality of CMDC’s large scale environmental improvements and the extensiveness of the improved public access facilities went beyond what could be expected to service Castlefield canal basin’s few bars and restaurants. These kinds of city space which overlie ‘natural’ space are of course the abstract spaces of consumption that valorise exchange value. ‘Natural’ space though was not obliterated
by abstract space and it is clear that urban ‘natural’ space has a resilience that Lefebvre seems to have underappreciated but which has been recognised increasingly in recent years (Jorgensen and Tylecote 2007). Through their environmental improvement work, CMDC, MCC and later Peel Holdings inadvertently initiated a resurgence of ‘natural’ space especially the aquatic habitats of the canals which provide living, feeding and breeding space for distinctive fauna (chapter 8). UDCs were meant to bring private sector values into the realms of urban policy but there is evidence (chapter 7) that the reverse also happened. This is explained partly by the CMDC Board members wanting to leave a strong visible civic legacy and what better way to do this than in the production of new civic public spaces - the bridges and Arena. It is also explained by the long standing relationships between the key CMDC Board members and MSICP (chapters 4 and 5). Powerful representations played their part too through intertextuality chains that saw the heritage infused counter-representations of the amenity societies taken up by MCC which incorporated them into their official representations of space which in turn influenced CMDC (chapters 6 and 7).

Complex public spaces are revealed by the research (chapter 8) which resonates more with some published research findings (Akkar 2005; Groth and Corijn 2005), than with others which see public space as defined by public ownership and management (Magalhães and Carmona 2006). A blurring of the supposed Manichean public/private divide is reproduced in Castlefield’s transformative spatial practices in the 1990s (chapters 7 and 8). Through what might best be called civic minded redevelopment, Jim Ramsbottom’s Castlefield Estates, acquired significant amounts of land in the Castlefield canal basin. In particular the area of Coal Wharf effectively became public space in private ownership. Ramsbottom worked closely with Glester, Stringer and Bernstein through the 1980s and ‘90s: the result was the creation of seamless public urban space as one moved (and can still move) unfettered north-south and east-west through Castlefield. Consequently, the goal of CSC and CMDC to ‘open up’ Castlefield to the public to facilitate private sector investment was achieved but not in the rather straightforward way - building a few bridges - CSC anticipated (chapter 6).

From the early 1980s major large scale, organised free leisure/heritage events took place in the traditional public space of Castlefield’s streets (chapters 7 and 8). Later
from the 1990s events moved to the canal basin and the traditional public sector owned and managed public space of the Arena, but it is noteworthy that access to these was partly via the quasi-public spaces of canal tow paths and Merchants Bridge and Castle Street. What endowed the canal basin with aspects of publicness was not so much public ownership as the myriad informal uses made of it in the enjoyment of everyday lived space and the organised spectacular events and the regular though less frequent collective political appropriations (chapter 8) whether for political activism, protest, identity politics. The importance of bodily occupation in public was paramount: ownership of land incidental.

Spatial Networks in the Production of Research Knowledge and Urban Space

A major theme of the thesis is the need for production of space research to take seriously a rigorous engagement with the history of representations of space, spatial production and spatial coalitions. Despite Lefebvre’s injunctions published research tends not to track representations historically, notwithstanding Fyfe (1997) and Hubbard et al (2003). Two important kinds of networks have been revealed by the thesis. Firstly, archival networks based on mixed methods research have produced credible, robust data for the generation of new knowledge (chapters 3). Secondly, interpenetrating socio-political networks emerged as a key feature in the production of Castlefield space (chapters 5, 6 and 7). The empirical findings lead strongly to the view that Castlefield is constituted, especially historically, through a network of physical archival depositories. They range from the formal archives of public institutions to the informal ‘archives’ of individuals involved directly in the production of Castlefield. Moving beyond this, archival networks were found to be constituted too by document and image intertextuality (Prior 2008; Prescott 2008) and a variety of human agents (Craven 2008b) such as archivists, civil servants, and producers of representations of space (chapters 5 and 6). Research interviewees too were crucial elements of the archival network and there is much to be said methodologically for interviewing research subjects about events long in their past since political and other sensitivities have inevitably diminished allowing for more hard edged, candid ‘backstage’ revelations. Interviewees helped to fill and to identify gaps in the archives.
Without the assistance of the archivists and interviewees and the discovery of the embedded intertextualities the empirical data would have not proved so rich or insightful. For example, the network of revelations which flowed from BLNA data would not have been possible without being alive to the potential importance of archival intertextuality and networks. The archival network produced a copy of a previously unknown but crucial 1970s amenity society report and a copy of an elusive one. Revelations about its circular journey (chapter 6) which led to the *Homeground, Castlefield* BBC programme were a pivotal moment in the production of Castlefield research knowledge and the production of space. On a more sombre note one of the greatest disappointments was discovering that the CMDC archive had been destroyed by the British government. The loss of such a valuable depository of public institutional memory ranks as an issue of great concern to researchers and politicians.

The construction of the archival networks reveals how formal and informal relationships were crucial for the production of Castlefield space from the early 1970s. Archival data in particular from TNA and the GrG have revealed for the first time a political web of astute preservationists some of whom were ‘insiders’, that spread out from the Manchester based historic preservation amenity societies. It was this unlikely coalition across the political right and left, the national and local and the public and private sectors which eventually precipitated the deployment of financial resources on the scale necessary to produce transformative spatial practice on the ground, without which urban space cannot be produced. The interpenetration of amenity society activists into public institutions and private sector companies is a key explanatory factor of the success of the counter-projects they initiated and has been noted in other production of space arenas (Olsson 2009).

Towards the latter stages of the research networks of a different kind emerged as the data revealed the production from early in the present decade of diverse ludic and politicised spaces through collective social action (chapter 8). I argue that these spaces/events should be conceptualised as Lefebvrian differential space. Castlefield’s differential spaces are similar to disruptions of abstract space reported elsewhere (Fincher and Iveson 2008; Hou 2010). From the 2000s Castlefield space was appropriated and occupied temporarily in ways which held the potential to encourage
individuals and social groups to think differently about urban space and urban life (Groth and Corijn 200; Temel and Haydn 2006). Such political appropriations, some of which did follow bureaucratic management protocols while others did not, are strikingly varied (chapter 8). The sheer diversity of these happenings would be confusing without the theoretical insights provided by Lefebvre’s ideas underlying differential space. Few of Castlefield’s moments of appropriation were reported in the mainstream media. However, a network of international relationships and ‘alternative’ websites played a key role in bringing them into the wider (potentially world-wide) Habermasian public sphere.

We should though resist the lure of reading into Castlefield’s new public spaces a differential space utopia and not reject peremptorily the public space fears of the 1990s and 2000s (chapter 2). Mechanisms of institutional surveillance, control and power continue to circumscribe public space and differential space. That said, the differential space created by MNB is of particular significance because their political struggles render visible urban counter-spaces and interrelationships between cities globally regarding practical activism and theoretical discussions about rights to the city (Marcuse et al 2009; Soja 2010). Each one of these Castlefield differential spatial moments plants a seed to challenge abstract space. It becomes an urban space marker signifying the practical achievement of seizing rights to the city which go beyond merely accessing urban public space, important though this is. Statements are made through these appropriations about who belongs and can be seen, how public urban space should be talked about; how and for whom it should be managed and redeveloped and the political importance of its use value.

The Wider Implications
It is clear that the key empirical findings disrupt the dominant Castlefield academic narrative and by implication the Manchester narrative in several important ways. These literatures and other sources of course provide valuable scholarly insights into certain aspects of the production of Castlefield and Manchester. However, in these narratives Castlefield/Manchester in the 1970s is caricatured as merely: stagnant, derelict, crumpling, dangerous and hopeless. In contrast, Castlefield’s production of space in the 1970s emerges in this thesis as a fascinating highly charged, vibrant critical spatial
moment. 1970s spatial production processes triggered the transition to a postindustrial city both in the imaginative counter-spaces of the amenity societies and in the reorientated urban representations and spatial practices of public institutions. The thesis has revealed the salient role of the Labour dominated MSIP after its reorientation by Michael Heseltine (chapters 4 and 5) in the spatial practice of the transformation of space and its civic influence on subsequent governance structures (chapter 7). The thesis encourages a radical rethink of the accepted ways of understanding the CMDC as primarily a private sector orientated regeneration vehicle devoted to the public subsidy of private property interests. In Castlefield CMDC’s work was crucial for the large scale creation of new public spaces and their enhanced accessibility. It was these spaces which facilitated the unplanned, inadvertent production of differential space. Even though the dominant narrative is strong in its analyses of the contestations of space from the 1990s, the thesis sheds new light on the production of Castlefield’s differential space and its co-existence through time with other Lefebvrian spatial moments. Therefore the thesis makes noteworthy contributions through revelations about the hypercomplexity of Castlefield space; identifying the fragments of that space and plotting their relationships.

I would not pretend though, that the thesis is either definitive or exhaustive; it has caught, tagged and bagged some empirical and theoretical rabbits but others remain at large. Having tried for perfection, the thesis ultimately in its transparent, robust comprehensiveness merely flirts with it asymptotically. The future offers chances like those enunciated in Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho, to try again, to fail better. Or to return Lefebvre’s prose-poetic metaphor, disconnected flakes of the mille-feuille still abound. Future research arising from this thesis could be intensive or extensive in nature. Intensive research could pursue more Castlefield data revelations and relationships whether based on archival, interview or visual sources. Historical research could trace the rise and fall of the Knott Mill fairs and the interrelationships of these ludic spaces with the abstract spaces of Victorian industry and commerce. Spaces of representation could be revealed in greater depth and texture through oral history research with those who lived through Castlefield’s pre-WW2 industrial and its postindustrial eras. Research could also be devoted usefully to a critical engagement with current visual spaces of representation in the work of contemporary artists such as
Spencer, Gutteridge and Lawley. Policy orientated research may well seek to dig deeper into the nature of Castlefield’s differential space asking questions about whether it should and could be created deliberately, protected and enhanced or simply left, laissez faire, to the progenitors and users.

Class based analyses could also prove fruitful. What of the men, women and children who produced with their own sweat, blood and lives Castlefield’s ‘wonderful’ warehouses, factories and infrastructures? Their stories deserve to be heard. Castlefield remains enigmatic regarding issues of race and ethnicity elided by the bright lights of heritage valorisation. Where there was 19th century cotton and the massive provision employment one can expect to find that colonial subjects and other newcomers to the area played important roles. This approach to uncovering neglected histories could include links with the MOSI or the People’s History Museum. Such research could also be allied to comparative analysis with, for example, Lowell, Massachusetts where the different peoples who contributed to the production of that space are acknowledged (Stanton 2006). Extensive research could apply mixed methods approaches and historical spatial analyses to other liminal city spaces in the UK, Europe and beyond. Treating cities not as discrete entities but tracking the global interconnections in the production of urban space would be a fascinating endeavour. In the Castlefield palimpsest I argue that the emergence of significant differential space did not precipitate and does not require the total downfall of abstract space; a proposition which opens up avenues of further theoretical conjecture.

Production of Space Theorisations
A major theme of the thesis has been a determination to deploy Lefebvre’s spatial triad, coupled with a certain amount of open mindedness about the appropriateness and utility of such deployment. Lefebvre’s clues, elaborated by subsequent researchers proved valuable methodologically in pursuing the empirical research, particularly where they encouraged a historical approach and the acceptance of a wide range of data as valid. Thinking through what official representations of space and spaces of representation meant in the empirical research context proved stimulating and illuminating. Lefebvre’s insistence that the former is dominant and the latter dominated was however, found to be problematic. Without Lefebvre’s marvellous
insights it is unlikely, for example that I would have appreciated the importance of the 1945 City Plan for impeding the production of Castlefield space in the 1970s and ‘80s. Conceptualising urban space, in terms of the spatial triad, as a key constituent of social relations, rather than an empty, neutral container, also proved enlightening. For example, the material space of inner city sites and waterfronts (chapter 4, 5 and 6) proved a crucial rallying point for a variety of spatial actors, with varying degrees of power. Without attention to the importance of the shifting representations of these urban spaces the data, analysis and findings would have been impoverished greatly.

Future production of space theorisations offer intriguing possibilities. I have noted *en passant* the distinct blurring and merging of representations of space and spaces of representation. Although hinted at with his reference to artists with a scientific bent, this idea is noticeably underdeveloped by Lefebvre and subsequent researchers. The potential blurring facilitates the creation of more powerful representations. So for example the 1945 Plan is more powerful because it deploys quasi-scientific rationality and the rhetorical style of the Victorian novel and seductive artistic visual representations of space - creating what I call hybrid representations. Similar representational tactics were adopted by MCC and CMDC. In countering the dominant anti-heritage representations of space of the 1970s, amenity societies drew on cartographic quasi-rationalism and dispassionate research rhetoric *conjoined* with romanticised nostalgia. In adopting hybrid representations of space the key protagonists were responding to the twin art/science foundations of architecture/city planning and following a line mapped out in the florid rhetoric of Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier; rhetoric which empowers the quasi-scientific rationally for which they are better known. However, it is not only in discrete documents that this blurring was encountered. In the emerging discourses about inner city and Castlefield space evidenced in the empirical analysis, we see urban space represented persuasively as an amalgam of representations of space and spaces of representation.

The double triad explicated in the previous chapter recurs implicitly throughout Lefebvre’s unpacking of the production of space. One should not be deceived though into thinking that each of the material spaces in the second triad is not problematic, especially with regard to questions about the omnipotence of abstract space (Harvey 2000), the ontological status and ultimate voidance and destruction of ‘natural’ space.
(Smith 1998) and the penetrative power and resilience of differential space (Allen and Crookes 2009; Lehtovuori 2010). I do argue on the other hand that some of the opacity in the production of space debates stems from the reluctance of many researchers to engage substantially with differential space and the concomitant possibility of a theoretically valuable double triad. The points about the double triad being cyclical, dialectical and non-teleological can be illustrated by considering briefly differential space. At the end of Lefebvre (1991) the implication is that like Marxist post capitalism, differential space becomes inevitable and universal. However, the thesis demonstrates that differential space can exist in tandem with abstract space rather than being homogenised and negated totally by it. Politically appropriated differential space has resurfaced since the 1990s, which suggests it is not so much teleological as irrepressible. Similar points can be made about ‘natural’ space. Where urban space is abandoned by capitalist interests and state enterprises, ‘natural’ space reasserts itself, not that it ever disappeared totally under the repression of unstable abstract space.

Through the lens of the suggested double triad the rich panoply of urban public space is constituted by and constituent of social relations. Differential space confirms the unquenchable thirst of the human spirit for an urbanism of tolerant, diverse public space: the ultimate city synecdoche: not quite utopia but cause for sanguinity. Closing the thesis circle is partly a literary rhetorical conceit which answers and raises questions: a circle maybe but a complex porous animated one. In seeking to redevelop urban public space and in abandoning urban space; public and private institutions it seems produce inadvertently the potential for differential space. In tardy or rapid reactions to this potential, collective politicised action seizes opportunities to appropriate urban space for its use value, whether ludic or politically vibrant. Whether on a permanent basis running into years or on a temporary basis of months, days or hours, such appropriations are important for revealing the immanent vulnerabilities of abstract space. Differential space then rather than spaces of representation becomes one of the most important desired ongoing outcomes for the 21st century production of urban space project.
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Appendix 1

Details of the Archives and Archivists

BBCA - BBC Archives (various throughout the UK)
These archives are located at sites in many towns and cities in the UK and contain millions of recordings of TV, radio programmes and documents in various formats dating back 80 years. Surprisingly, the BBC archives are not accessible to the public and it is very difficult to obtain a copy of a programme made in the 1970s or 80s. Despite the BBC website, information about the physical whereabouts of the archives and what they contain is not generally in the public domain. Their prime purpose seems to be to service the internal needs of the BBC and support commercial activities.

BLNA - British Library Newspaper Archives
These archives, located at Collingdale, London is the largest collection of newspapers in the UK. A complete collection of all British national newspapers and many regional newspapers including the Manchester Evening News is housed here. These were the first physical archives explored. I visited the archives on 16 March 2007 and on several other occasions. Photocopies were made of relevant newspaper pages and photocopies were obtained of articles held on microfilm rolls.

CLA - Chetham's Library Archives
Chetham's Library was founded in 1653 and is the oldest public library in the English-speaking world. It is an independent charity and remains open to readers and visitors free of charge. It specialises in material related to Manchester and has collections of early printed books, maps, manuscript diaries, letters and deeds, prints, paintings and glass lantern-slides. I visited Chethams on several occasions between 2006-10 assisted by archivist Kathy Whalen and Head Librarian Michael Powell. Relevant documents were photographed digitally.

CMDCA - Central Manchester Development Corporation Archives
Mystery surrounds these archives. John Glester confirmed that he personally supervised the creation of the archives which were stored initially in a GONW depository in Manchester. Recently, Ministers of State claimed on three occasions from 2006 to 2008 in response to questions in the House of Commons that the archives were located at the GONW. Later a DCLG civil servant said the CMDC archives had been destroyed.

DCLGA - Department for Communities and Local Government Archives
The DCLG (formerly the DoE) has a number of depositories throughout England, access is by appointment only. Their archives contain files relating to the MSICP and CMDC which includes material generated by the GONW. At the time of my inquiry the files were classified 'Restricted' and not publicly available. As a result of my FOIA inquiry the 'Restricted' classification was
removed. The files were then transferred from the DCLG depository in Hastings for me to investigate at Ashdown House, Victoria, London during a visit on 16 March 2009. Ian Smart and Simon Currey were most helpful. Relevant documents were photographed digitally.

DRPA - David Rhodes Personal 'Archives'
These personal 'archives' are located in David's Harrogate home and include a wealth of documents and artefacts related to Manchester and Castlefield collected over the last 40 years. David kindly allowed me to photograph relevant documents digitally.

GMCR - Greater Manchester County Records Office
This large depository holds the archives of the former GMC and is located in a 19th century warehouse on the eastern edge of Manchester city centre. I visited first on 17 April 2007 and several other occasions when Tony Lees and Alison Gill were most helpful as was Sarah Hobbs. Relevant documents were photographed digitally and photocopies were obtained of microfiche documents.

GONWA - Government Office for the North West Archives
These archives are held in Manchester and consist mainly of files produced by the DoE (and MHLG). The GONW oversaw the work of the CMDC and therefore held many documents relevant for the research. The archives are not open to the public but I gained access partly through FOIA procedures with the help of Helen Roome and Simon Howles. I was allowed to photograph the relevant documents digitally.

GrGA - Georgian Group Archives
The Georgian Group was founded in 1937 and is located in Fitzroy Square, London. It archives are not open to the public; access is by appointment only. They hold extensive archives of all the major conservation campaigns with which the Group has been involved since the 1930s. I visited the archives on several occasions from February 2008 being assisted greatly by archivist Paul Robertshaw. Relevant documents were photographed digitally.

GTVA - Granada TV Ltd Archives
The bulk of Granada TV archives are located in Castlefield, Manchester and are not accessible to the public. They contain a huge number of recordings of its TV programmes and some scripts. Since the Granada TV takeover of Carlton in 2003 to form ITV PLC, the material from GTVA can be found at various locations in England including Leeds, which was the source of the 1982 documentary film *Yesterday's Dust, Tomorrow's Dreams*, the purchase of which I arranged by telephone with the assistance of Robin Bray.

MENA - Manchester Evening News Archives
At the time of the research these physical archives were located the Manchester city centre offices of the MEN and consist of collections of cuttings organised by subject related to people, places and issues. The
archives are not open to the public and access was by appointment only. They were visited once on 18 April 2007 when Susan Hayes was of great help. Relevant documents were photographed digitally. It is my understanding that these archives have now been destroyed.

MLIC - Manchester Local Image Collection
These archives are housed at the Manchester Central Reference Library. They contain over 80,000 digitised images of Manchester and its suburbs many of which are available via the internet. The original photographs are held at the archives. Relevant Castlefield images were accessed via the internet from 2006.

MLSA - Manchester Local Studies Archives
Housed in Manchester Central Library these are a collection of millions of historical documents relating to Manchester. These archives hold a significant collection of Manchester newspapers most of which have now ceased publication. They were visited many times throughout 2007-2010 when Paula Moorhouse and Rob Lewis were most helpful. Relevant documents were photographed digitally.

MPDA - Manchester Planning Department Archives
These archives are not open to the public, although some of the files can be accessed by appointment. I was able to access relevant material from these archives via Planning Department and MLSA staff during 2008. Harry Warren of the Planning Department and David Govier of MLSA provided valuable assistance. Photocopies of relevant documents were made and documents were photographed digitally.

MSIA - Museum of Science and Industry Archives
Although the MOSI hold several important public archives, I was allowed access to the Register or Records Management system which is not a publicly accessible archive but the MOSI’s own historical records of the organisation. It was visited twice in January 2008 when Jan Hargreaves provided valuable assistance. Relevant documents were photographed digitally.

NMR - National Monuments Record (English Heritage Archives)
These archives are located in Swindon and are the public archives of English Heritage. They consist mainly of modern and historic photographs of listed buildings and documents concerning listed buildings. Records relating to the Liverpool Road Station HBC grant applications are not part of the public archives but are within the Records Management Department accessible only under the FOIA, which is how I gained access. Images and documents were supplied by post in response to email requests in February 2008 with the help of Clare Broomfield, Katherine Davis and Crispin Edwards.

NWFA - North West Film Archives
Located in Manchester Metropolitan University they hold a large collection of films and TV programmes; copies of which, for a small payment, were to
sent to me after email requests by Geoff Senior, Collections Assistant. The NWFA were first contacted in November 2008.

RMPA - Robert Maund Personal 'Archives'
These personal 'archives' are located in Robert's home in Glengarnock, Ayrshire near Glasgow. They include documents relating to Manchester and Castlefield including hundreds of 35mm slide collection containing unique images of Castlefield in the 1970s and 80s. Robert kindly converted relevant slides into jpeg files.

TNA - The National Archives (England)
Located in Kew, West London, these are the UK's largest public archives. The TNA were created in 2003 by combining the Public Record Office with the Historic Manuscripts Commission. They hold millions of files including several relating to Castlefield, the Urban Programme, MSICP and the UDCs. I visited first on 31 March 2007 and on several other occasions over the next two years. Some files were accessed under the FOIA. Relevant documents were photographed digitally.
Appendix 2

Details of the Interviews and other Primary Sources

Adams Darren 2009 (6 May),
Email correspondence; he is Deputy Festival Manager, Manchester Pride.

Airs Malcolm 2007 (10 July),
Email communication; with Professor and Vice President, Kellogg College, University of Oxford.

Bernstein Howard Sir and Bartoli Pat 2009,
Howard Bernstein been the Chief Executive of Manchester City Council since 1990 and has worked for the Council since the early 1970s when he started as a junior legal assistant. In the 1980s he was Assistant Chief Executive. He was interviewed on 2 July at his office in the Town Hall. Pat Bartoli, Head of Regeneration attended the interview which lasted about an hour, was recorded digitally then transcribed.

Donna and Joe (MNB) 2010,
MNB was founded originally in 2000 but this group faded away rather quickly. The second incarnation was three and a half years ago when a group of Manchester activists attended a No Borders Camp at Gatwick Airport. I discovered MNB through the Indymedia website. Donna is a Mancunian and is studying for a PhD at Manchester University. Joe has recently completed a PhD at Manchester University, was born in Germany but now lives in Manchester. They are both founder members of MNB. I interviewed Donna and Joe in Manchester city centre at the On The Eighth Day Café, on 10 June. It lasted about one and a half hours, was recorded and transcribed.

Glester John 2008,
H was a DoE civil servant for many years rising by the 1980s to a senior position in the GONW in Manchester. He was the CEO for the CMDC throughout its eight year life 1988-96. He was interviewed for about two hours on 16 October at the City Inn Hotel, Manchester, located next to Piccadilly Station. The hotel is within the former CMDC area. The interview was recorded digitally and transcribed. Glester’s speech pattern is characterised by word repetition and many ‘umms, ahs’ and ‘you knows’ which were transcribed as spoken. The interview was supplemented by a series of email exchanges.
Hall Jonathan 2010, Telephone interview 26 July, which lasted about half an hour. He worked for the Civic Trust for the North West in the early 1970s and collaborated with David Rhodes on the 1972 Report for Sir Sidney Bernstein. He is currently a lecturer in Planning and Sustainable Development at University College Cork.

Hargreaves Jan 2009 (19 January), Email communication with senior MOSI curator and archivist.

Hennessey Jeff 2007 (6 June), Email communication; at the time he was Manager of the London and Thames Gateway Team of English Partnerships (now the Homes and Communities Agency). He drew my attention to the question regarding the archives of CMDC asked in the House of Commons by Graham Stringer.

Heseltine Michael Lord 2007 and 2009, He was junior minister in the DoE 1970 to 1972 and DoE Secretary of State 1979-82 and 1990-92. He was interviewed (about one hour) by telephone on 15 December 2007, notes were made immediately after. A second interview took place and at his Hammersmith Haymarket Publishing Office on 18 February 2009. It lasted about one hour, was recorded digitally and transcribed.

Higham Nicholas 2008 (14 November), Email communication; with Professor of Professor in Early Medieval and Landscape History Manchester University and a national authority on Roman Manchester.

Horner Michael 2007, Interview with AMEC Director Mick Horner at Dukes 92, Castlefield on 16 April. The interview lasted about 1.5 hours over lunch, was recorded and transcribed.

Hudson Kate 2009 (6 May), Email correspondence; with the Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).

Jones Paul 2010 (16 April), Email communication: he is a freelance photographer working in the Manchester area who often works with lesbian and gay subjects.

Krantz Mark 2009 (5 May), Email communication; he is the Convener of the Greater Manchester Stop the War Coalition and joint organiser of the 'Two Marches for Gaza in Manchester' protest on 26 January 2009, both marches from the north and south of the city culminated in a rally at the Castlefield Arena.
Mann Kevin 2010 (2 January),
Email communication; he worked for Groundwork Trust Associates 1989-92 in the capacity of Landscape Architect and was project manager for CMDC’s canal basin environmental improvements.

Maund Robert 2008,
He worked for Manchester City Council as a town planner from 1960 to 1974 when he joined the GMC’s newly established planning department where he worked until 1985 as Assistant Chief Planning Officer, in charge of Special Projects. A friend of mine, John Allinson who used to work for GMC suggested I contact Robert. He was interviewed at his home in Ayrshire on 24 October. When he started at the City Council his boss’ boss was Rowland Nicholas. The interview was an extended conversation, recorded digitally, that started in the morning and resumed again after lunch. The interview was supplemented by a series of telephone calls and email exchanges before and after we met.

McClarnan Gary 2010,
He is CEO and founder of the arts and media company Sparklestreet and a Manchester based arts promoter and entrepreneur who has worked in the field since the early 1990s. He was interviewed by telephone for about 30 minutes on 15 January. Notes were made during and immediately after the interview which were supplemented by email exchanges.

McLeod Lynda 2008 (5 March), Email communication; Librarian, Christie’s Archives, London.

Michaels Gillian 2009 (14 September), Email communication: she is Programmes Assistant, Interpretation Development at Manchester Art Gallery, Manchester Art Gallery.

Murray Timothy 2009 (2 September), Letter from DCLG Departmental Records Officer to the author.

Rapley Nigel RICS 2007 (2 July),
Email correspondence with London South Bank University property valuation expert with 35 years experience.

Rhodes David 2008 and 2009,
He trained as an architect in the 1950s and worked as a conservation officer for the Civic Trust for the Northwest 1971-73. Subsequently, in 1974 he started work in MCC Planning Department as a historic building conservation officer. While working for MCC he was also active in the VSMG and LRSS, becoming chairman of both these amenity societies. He left MCC for Harrogate Borough Council in 1984. He was interviewed at his home in Harrogate on 15 July 2008 and again on 8 July 2009 at the Victory Services Club in London W1. Both interviews were extended conversations starting in the morning and continuing during and after lunch. The interviews were
recorded digitally and transcribed. The interviews were supplemented by a series of telephone calls and email exchanges before and after the meetings.

Richardson Kate 2009,
She is Vice-President, Manchester Trades Council and one of the organisers of the 'Love Music Hate Racism: Say No to the BNP! The Right to Work for All!', a march that terminated in a rally at Castlefield on May Day 200. Kate was interviewed by telephone on 6 and 7 May for about 10 and 20 minutes respectively. Notes were made during and immediately after.

Roman Steve 2008 (6 June), Email communications; with VSMG member who put me in touch with David Rhodes.

Stringer Graham MP 2009,
He became a Manchester councillor in 1974 and was Leader between 1984-96. He was a Board member of the CMDC throughout its existence and a Board member and Deputy Chairman of the MSCC before MCC's Board memberships were bought out by Peel Holdings PLC in the mid-1990s. He entered Parliament in 1997 as a Labour MP and remains the MP for Manchester Blackley. He was interviewed in a House of Commons tea room and in Central Lobby on 2 June. The interview lasted about one hour; was recorded digitally and transcribed.

Thornton Denise 2009 (15 June), Email communication; she is the Director of The Blyth Gallery, Manchester which showcases the work of many Mancunian and Manchester based artists.

Tucker Anne 2010 (27 January),
Email communication; she is joint artistic director of Manchester International Arts and was involved with organising and promoting mainly free, often community based entertainment events in Castlefield in the 1980s and 1990s.

Warren Harry 2008,
He started work for Manchester City Council Planning Department in the early 1980s as an architectural technician and still works there. He worked on the 'rebuilding' of Grocers' Warehouse and the Roman North Gate. He was interviewed informally on 17 October by chance during a visit to the Planning Department to access archival documents. The discussion took place over the course of about 1.5 hours which included me photographing documents and Harry talking on the telephone with colleagues. It was not recorded but notes were made immediately after. The interview was supplemented by email exchanges.

Webb Mike 2007 (15 July),
Email communication: he is Publicity Manager, Peel Holdings PLC.
Willey Martin 2007,

He was the former Director of Beezer Developments, the property development arm of Beezer Homes who sold the Bridgewater Hall scheme to Hanson Group PLC. The interview took place at Paddington Station on 3 April and lasted about one hour and notes were made during and immediately after. He suggested I contact Sir Howard Bernstein.

The Other 'Interviews',

A number of informal, spontaneous 'conversations' rather than interviews took place at various times during the research. Most notable were the talks with archivists, the Castlefield fishermen and the Castlefield Estates Ltd maintenance workers. Conversations with people in the Castlefield area were also a feature of the research over the years since 2004. They included: canal barge enthusiasts, local residents, people relaxing in the area's public spaces; people in bars and cafés and in 'The Y' Gym and Fitness Club (part of the Castlefield Hotel where I stayed several times). These encounters were not recorded. Although they shed light on Castlefield's history and contemporary character as a space of diversity, they did not inform in any rigorous manner the contemporary or historical elements of the research.