TROUBLE IN THE GARDEN: EXPLORING THE AMBIVALENCE OF PUBLIC SPACE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

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I declare that all of the work presented in this thesis is my own

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Abstract

This thesis explores questions posed by the production of informal spaces in relation to space produced by the state. What kind of practices produce informal space, and to what extent do informal spaces either subvert or reinforce the order of private property? What is at stake in this thesis is the tension between the production of social space – that is, shared public space or space for society as a whole – on the one hand, and the tendencies and desires of individuals or small groups of spatial users to appropriate and produce their own space, on the other. In this research project, space is understood as the form through which questions of freedom, free will, and self-determination become culturally and politically manifest. This thesis analyses examples of spatial production such as Osman Kalin’s informal garden in Kreuzberg, Berlin, and the French social utopian new town Villeneuve, located in the suburbs of Grenoble. It explores stories, histories, and material forms of construction, building regulations and codes from these sites. This thesis analyses notions of freedom and free will which on the political left, are often said to exist when citizens forsake a degree of individualism for the good of the greater social whole, and on the political right, are said to be expressed through an individual’s right to fulfil his or her individual needs and desires. In the central case study of this thesis, I look at what happens when Osman Kalin appropriates a triangular plot of land in the centre of Berlin for his garden and hut. This act can be read as subversion, an appropriation of bureaucratised, state-capitalist urban space. However, Kalin’s actions, borne of a desire to produce a space based on his own needs, have serious implications for the production of shared social space. This thesis explores the contradictions that emerge through such acts of appropriation, and how they might mirror early forms of private property production. It looks at how spaces such as Kalin’s question the boundaries between private property and public space, and how other examples of collective appropriation might differ not only from Kalin’s actions but also from the top-down, state-produced utopian social projects of the 1960s and 70s in France. It goes on to explore notions of the commons, and discusses two informal collective spaces in order to question how the use and distribution of space is defined, as well as how claims and counter claims are managed when the state’s regulatory role is absent.
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Introduction

The desire to write this thesis came out of a need to deepen my understanding of issues that have arisen out of my art practice. This practice occurs in irregular, unpredictable circumstances, often outside the art world context, which means no studio, no exhibition space, no art funding and no institutional expectations. It often occurs while travelling, typically while visiting a friend in another city or another country. In order to situate the relationship between this art practice and my thesis it is necessary to speak briefly about how my current art practice emerged from an experimental series of works that evolved during 1994-6. At this time, I earned a living by carrying out a variety of building jobs in Parisian apartments. I tended to work intensively for a period in order to accumulate enough money to live for a given amount of time in which I would be able to engage with my artwork. Through the media of film and photography, I documented and projected architectural spaces to explore questions of appropriation, time, and space. This disjointed activity made it difficult to maintain any kind of continuity in my art practice. To address this issue I began to consider a way of appropriating my labour time, so that the time I spent earning money could in some way become “art time”. This experiment consisted predominantly of documenting my labour time using photography, video, text, and audio recordings of my existence. The practice of auto documentation was my attempt to create a degree of integrity and continuity between my labour time and my art practice. In the beginning, it was simply a survival activity, an act of desperation. Finally, its purpose was to create a record of what I was doing. The desire to conflate my labour time with art time was an experiment to disalienate myself from my commitment to economic production.

My experiments in the appropriation of time and the physical spaces I was building and altering in these contexts led to my interest in spatial appropriation and the production of informal spaces. Henri Lefebvre, a key theorist for this thesis, argues that space is never a ‘form or container of a virtually neutral kind, designed simply to receive whatever is poured into it’.¹ He argues that space is produced rather by a given society’s activities. Intervening in people’s living spaces gave me an insight into the way that one generation replaced the space of a former generation. The process of taking down,

covering up and replacing one space with another seemed to reflect how modes of production changed over time, and appeared to be in accordance with economic and cultural shifts. I became curious as to what such spatial changes said about the spatial practices of a given society. I wondered whether people make their own decisions about space as much as they would like, or whether the changes are determined to a far greater degree by the prevalent mode of spatial production in a given society. Lefebvre proposes three concepts of lived, conceived, and perceived space to explore these tensions. This thesis will use these ideas from Lefebvre’s work to look at notions of freedom as well as social and spatial determination through a series of examples of informal and formal spatial production.

When living in Paris, to economise as much as possible, I rented a small chambre de bonne in the 9th Arrondissement. The low rent reflected the tiny dimensions of the room, which measured approximately two meters across by three meters long. In the corner of the room was a plastic shower, and diagonally across was a mattress. Living in such a small area, I had to be pragmatic in the way that I arranged the space. I built as many shelves as possible for books and storage. I made a small desk for eating and writing. To have a break from living in such a confined space I would, on occasion, look after a friend’s apartment while they were on their summer vacation. In 1996, I had occasion to combine my flat sitting more directly with my art practice. In March that year I had an exhibition scheduled with Eriko Momotani, a Japanese curator who used her bedsit in the centre of Paris as an exhibition space. During the months leading up to my exhibition, Eriko went to Japan for three weeks. While she was in Japan, I lived in her bedsit to prepare my exhibition.

Living in Eriko’s bedsit, I became preoccupied with the functionality of her space. I thought about the way her personal affairs were arranged in such a small area. As I lived in an even smaller space, I was already aware of the difficulty of not having enough space to arrange things effectively. I used my attic room to sleep in, to wash myself, and to study. Although I took most of my meals outside in cheap restaurants I had a bar fridge to keep small food items and a coffee machine so I could make breakfast. Eriko had more material possessions in her bedsit than I was able to accommodate in my attic room. She had a lot of books, CDs, and ornaments. As well as living in her bedsit, Eriko

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2 Lefebvre, The Production of Space 38.
3 A chambre de bonne is a small room at the top of a Parisian apartment building.
used it as an office space to prepare and document the exhibitions of the artists who exhibited there. I was aware of how difficult it was for Eriko to create boundaries between the different activities that she was engaged in. Her personal possessions were mixed up with exhibition files, which were next to a fruit bowl, biscuits, tea cartons, and the rice cooker. The spatial congestion came to a head one time, when the fax machine that Eriko specifically bought for the purpose of discussing the exhibition while she was in Japan, stopped working. I discovered that juice from a decaying orange in the fruit bowl above the fax machine had dripped into its circuit board. This mini crisis became the catalyst for a wave of repairing and organising things in her bedsit. I fixed the fax machine, the dripping toilet, hid her ornaments behind her books and CDs. I arranged her books in order of height. I took one leaf of a folding table and fixed it to the wall to make a small table for her fax machine and a yucca plant. I moved the phone away from the cooking area and finally I removed a particularly annoying electric cable from the IKEA standing light, rendering it dysfunctional as a light but good as a freestanding sculpture. In brief, I re-organised the space according to how I thought it would work better. In a sense, I was also appropriating Eriko’s space for my own particular needs and desires.

Although I was not aware of it at the time, the experiments I was engaged in with my art practice were considered by some to be part of a trend in France in which certain artists incorporated everyday life experiences into their art practices. Exhibitions such as *L'art et la Vie Confondus* (1996), at the Centre Pompidou, helped me to think about the relationship between art and everyday life. I later took an interest in the practices of artists such as François Deck, who exchanged an afternoon of his work as an art teacher at Grenoble art school with the work of a woman who cleaned the school. I was also interested in the work of Hendrik Sturm, who lives in Marseille and researches the cityscape of Marseille to devise historical walks through the hidden parts of the metropolis. Both Deck and Sturm are examples of artists whose practices are engaged with the appropriation of time and space. Deck’s job exchange with the cleaner questions the value of his intellectual labour time compared with the physical labour

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time of the cleaner. Sturm’s urban walks are ways of re-appropriating parts of the hidden city space that have been taken over by the state or private enterprise.

The exhibition in Eriko’s bedsit, along with other similar experiments at this time, was the early steps towards my interest in temporal and spatial appropriation. While travelling around France, I became interested in ways in which people produced informal modes of appropriation. I began documenting the ways in which certain people transformed their immediate environment in such a way as to reflect their needs and desires. In the course of various travels over the past 15 years, I have encountered within metropolitan towns and cities a particular form of occupation and use of public space that disrupts urban homogeneity. During a two-year artist in residency in Villeneuve, Grenoble, I witnessed how certain inhabitants of the social housing estate invented strategies to overcome the limits of their uniform living space. Other informal spaces that I encountered range from informal individual or collective gardens to clandestine tunnels dug under the street. Although these spaces vary in appearance and content, they exhibit a common aesthetic value, generated from the lived space of inhabitants and users.

During a working sojourn in Berlin in 2004, a friend showed me an unusual garden on a triangular plot of land. The garden is surrounded on all sides by roads that isolate it from the formal space that surrounds it. Osman Kalin made the garden. Kalin’s artisan use of discarded materials distinguished the garden from the formal qualities of the neighbouring buildings. Planks and sheets of wood, metal grills, bed frames, wooden posts and street barriers made up an exterior fence that separated the garden from the surrounding pavement and roads. Parts of the street barriers, which made up a large portion of the exterior fence, were built onto irregular curving cement walls of varying height. A one-storey hut-like structure built on the land was perhaps the most striking feature. Kalin had assembled several versions of this structure as his garden evolved. Kalin’s garden is located in part of the Kreuzberg district that borders the Mitte district of Berlin. After the initial encounter with this garden, I was overwhelmed by his

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6 The Villeneuve residency was organised by Le Magasin de Grenoble (Centre National d’Art Contemporain). Originally the residence was programmed for four months but I ended up staying two years. Following the four month residency funded by Le Magasin de Grenoble I was self-funded and in constant conflict with the art centre.

7 In November 2004 I travelled to Berlin, on behalf of the foundation Hans Hartung, to make video interviews with two of ex-studio assistants of the German painter Hans Hartung.
achievement of making such a space in a dense, central city location. There was a degree of celebration and fascination about my interest in his garden. I felt it was a celebration of human resourcefulness and I developed a fascination with the creative way in which Kalin was able to invent possibilities to overcome restrictive rules and regulations. I wanted to know how, in a world full of private property, laws governing the use of public space, and health and safety regulations, Kalin’s garden and rickety house was allowed to exist. How was his garden even allowed to be built, when urban space is so completely governed by the bureaucracy of planning regulations?

It could be argued that urban space in Western societies is largely planned by urbanists, town planners and architects, who employ a specialized language to communicate between their professions. Their language is a visual one of maps, plans, and diagrams, although it is also verbal. Both the visual and verbal languages are technical and abstract, and as such, they are inaccessible to most untrained people. On the same level, the legal system that determines who can own what space also uses abstract, complicated, and technical language. After preliminary research into Kalin’s garden, I discovered that he was a Turkish man who had come to work in Germany as part of the first wave of economic migrants at the end of the 1950s. I was later shown a video by two filmmakers who made a documentary about notions of property that included Kalin’s garden. From the video footage of Kalin it was clear that he struggled to communicate in German. This was substantiated to a degree by the various newspaper articles written about his garden. What was impressive to me was how an old man who supposedly lacked the legal or linguistic skills necessary to traverse the bureaucracy governing space had been able to overcome these limits to build a space for himself. The primary part of my research was to find out how he did this, and how his space was allowed to exist. While grappling with the legal and theoretical complexities that surrounded Kalin’s garden, questions began to emerge about the social consequences of Kalin’s actions. Was his garden a one-off, singular situation, or could it be seen as an example of something more general about spatial appropriation? Would it be possible to extrapolate from it a more general theory and set of propositions about lived space? The questions that emerged could be formulated around two initial observations I made about the way in which Kalin claimed a space for himself. Firstly, he succeeded in

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8 This is my own summarising of Lefebvre’s spatial theory from Lefebvre, The Production of Space.
overcoming abstract regulations that govern space by using his practical skills. Secondly, because he took the direct route to claiming a space for himself, he necessarily ignored authority. On the one hand, Kalin’s use of practical skills to claim space for himself can be viewed as a triumph over repressive laws. His actions might infer values such as individual freedom, self-reliance, self-realisation, and self-ownership. On the other hand, the fact that Kalin ignored authority to claim his space he raises questions about the ethical and moral value of his actions. This is the paradox between individual freedom and living collectively. The question is how anyone can act in his or her own self-interest and yet be reconciled with the greater interest of the social whole. Writing about Osman Kalin’s informal appropriation of space is therefore an opportunity for me to address issues concerning freedom and control that have existed in my practice over the past 15 years. The informality of Kalin’s actions underline the tension between space that is planned and spaces that are made by people who ignore authority.

My encounter with Kalin’s garden, the questions that this space allows me to ask about other spaces, and how I come to define it as an informal space are part of my partial, lateral and subjective art practice, which is the basis of the research methodology for this thesis. Where did I get the material for this thesis and more specifically Kalin’s garden? In 2006, Martin Pfahler of the 2yK gallery in Berlin organised a presentation of Kalin’s garden.\(^\text{10}\) I understand that the presentation showed photos of the site taken before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a video documentary concerning the site made by Imma Harms and Thomas Winkelkott, and Kalin’s son Mehmet also spoke at the presentation. When I began my research into Kalin’s garden I contacted Pfahler for information about the garden: I wanted to know when the garden was made, how it began and why it is still there today. Pfahler was only able to give me a partial response to my questions. He did however forward the photographs used in the presentation as well as the contact information for the filmmakers. This material and more importantly a very informative meeting with the filmmakers are the point of departure for this research into broader questions about spatial appropriation and the production of space.

To further research Kalin’s garden I had to rely increasingly on particular archival material rather than direct conversations with him. With this regard, my capacity to

\(^{10}\) I did not see the 2yK gallery presentation of Kalin’s garden. I heard about it by Hiedi Sill, the person who first showed me to Kalin’s garden. Martin Pfahler, Baumhaus, 2yK Galerie, Berlin.
engage fully with possible research material was limited. This is principally due to the particularities surrounding the border areas of the Berlin Wall, which meant that reliable resources were hard to come by. To add to this, I do not speak or read German (or Turkish). Finally, around the time that I began my research Osman Kalin was diagnosed as having Alzheimer’s disease. For these reasons gathering information about the garden could not be had through the standard research methods of consulting municipal maps and documents or interviewing those who were in charge of the Wall, or indeed the main protagonists. Therefore, the partial, lateral and subjective modes of practice are a necessary part of my research methodology. My reading of Kalin’s garden is informed by my experience as a carpenter and as a sculptor. I was, therefore, particularly attentive to both technique and form in building throughout the thesis. Embedded within Kalin’s garden are partial, contested, fragmented, and informal histories. A degree of lateral research therefore allowed me to piece together and bring to life this story. The partial, lateral and necessarily pieced together modes of research reflect in part how Kalin’s garden, and the other informally organised spaces to which I will refer throughout this thesis, come to be known and understood. It is this very partiality which both expose the impossibility of a purely objective encounter with the site or with history, and which suggests other modes of research.

Also vital to the research methodology are the writings of a number of key theorists and the role they play in framing and complicating the research questions in this thesis. Henri Lefebvre’s spatial concepts of perceived, conceived, and lived space form the framework from which to analyse Kalin’s spatial production. Martin Heidegger’s notion of dwelling and building as a way of defining human existence helps to further understand the kind of spatial difference that Kalin and other producers of informal space generate.\footnote{Martin Heidegger, \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought} (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001).} John Locke’s labour theory of property provides the frame through which I analyse Kalin’s spatial appropriation. I draw on the similarities between Locke’s unregulated, unclaimed world in a state of nature, and the administrative fog surrounding Kalin’s garden. Going through Locke’s discussion of property also allows me to explore the dichotomy between public and private property, in a context where liberals and conservatives use Locke’s writings to justify contemporary notions of
individual freedom and private property.\textsuperscript{12} Contrary to Locke’s notion of property based on natural reasoning G W F Hegel argues that individuals do not have a natural reasoning capacity and are not able to regulate their affairs. Hegel allows me to explore the idea that the state is a necessary and essential organ for the organisation of civil society.\textsuperscript{13} David Harvey writings on uneven geographical development help me to consider the notion of the state mode of production and more specifically capitalist space. Although my reading of the French state mode of production is informed by own experience, I also draw on the French architectural and urban historian Bruno Vayssière. Vayssière’s writing on the thirty-year post war French urbanisation process helps me to contextualise Lefebvre’s notion of the state mode of production against which I analyse Kalin’s mode of production.\textsuperscript{14} Philippe Boudon analyses Le Corbusier’s workers settlement in Pessac, France, in which inhabitants altered the original design of Le Corbusier’s houses to suit their needs and desires.\textsuperscript{15} Boudon allows me to consider how Le Corbusier’s production of conceived space differs from the conceived space of the state. In addition, Boudon’s analysis of The Quartiers Modernes Frugès allows me to explore how spatial users adapt space and how these adaptations might therefore complicate the dichotomy between conceived and lived space. In contrast to other informal spaces discussed in this thesis, I did not encounter Navarinou Park, in Athens first hand. My analysis of Navarinou Park borrows material sourced from the German review An Architektur.\textsuperscript{16} In the issue entitled “On the Commons”, Massimo De Angelis, and Stavros Stavrides discussion of the Park as a contemporary form of commons informs my arguments concerning the organisation of collective informal spaces and the role that conflict plays in the sustainability of such spaces. Finally, Alexander Kluge’s notion of the Third Acre is a useful metaphor through which to explore the dynamics of conflict in spaces that have been commoned.\textsuperscript{17}

In chapter one, entitled, The Exceptional Case of Osman Kalin’s Garden, I explore in detail Osman Kalin’s informal appropriation of public space to make a garden in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Andrew Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics, Palgrave Study Guides (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000) 142.
\item Alexander Kluge, “On Film and the Public Sphere,” New German Critique 24/25 (1982).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Kreuzberg district of Berlin. The aim of the chapter is to construct an overview of Kalin’s garden. After recounting how I encountered the garden and presenting a visual description of the space as seen in 2004, I go on to address two pressing questions: how a space next to the Berlin Wall was allowed to be used to make an informal garden, and how the informal garden was allowed to stay after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In order to respond to these questions it is necessary to understand the specific history of the location of Kalin’s garden. During a second visit to Berlin, I gathered as much information about the triangular plot of land as I could. This included newspaper articles written about Kalin’s garden, maps that showed the plot of land during the period of the Berlin Wall, photographs of the garden during and after the Berlin Wall, and the accounts of various people who had been in contact with the garden. One of the main sources of information for this chapter is a documentary film about the plot of land made by Imma Harms and Thomas Winkelkotte. Their video documentary features interviews with Osman Kalin as well as other important actors surrounding the story of his garden. The video document, together with transcriptions of the interviews, that Harms and Winkelkotte made for their film form a substantial source of material for the research into Osman Kalin’s occupation of the triangular plot of land. The chapter concludes by acknowledging that Kalin’s garden produces an ambivalent space, which is neither privately owned nor publicly accessible. In the succeeding chapters, I explore the significance of Kalin’s ambivalent spatial production.

In chapter two entitled, *A Lived Space in a Conceived World*, I develop my analysis of the ways in which Kalin’s garden distinguishes itself from its surroundings by introducing Henri Lefebvre’s theory of spatial production. Lefebvre identifies a potential within lived space to counter the contradictory effects of what he calls the state mode of production of space. He characterises the state mode of production as a mode that simultaneously fragments and homogenises space, reducing it to interchangeable (exchangeable) fragments, while at the same time rendering it exploitable on a global scale. In this chapter, I analyse Kalin’s way of making a space for himself through Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. This analysis allows me to explore the textures and practices of lived space as well as to look at the contemporary relevance of lived space as a response to the supposed alienating effects of state and state-capitalist forms of

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spatial production. At the same time, this approach allows me to question my initial assumptions about Kalin’s garden and to look at what kind of space it is that Kalin actually produces. Lefebvre’s spatial concepts help to explore the tension between the state mode of production that is characterised by planned space and informal, spontaneous, and ambivalent spaces such as Kalin’s garden. In order to develop an understanding of the state mode of production, I discuss the post war French urbanisation process that occurred between 1950 and 1970. This period of French urbanisation is arguably the best modern Western example of a state mode of production. The French example of urbanisation allows me to explore and question how space is lived by inhabitants. What is questioned in this chapter is the way in which people inhabit a space, in other words, the degree to which a person resides in a space or actively produces a space. To further my analysis of the state mode of production I consider an early Le Corbusier housing project, where inhabitants of a small estate made alterations to Le Corbusier’s housing designs. The way that inhabitants change Le Corbusier’s original design begs the question as to whether forms of conceived space could respond to the needs and desires of inhabitants of such space.

In chapter three, entitled The Property of Spatial Production, I explore the way that Kalin went about making his garden through Locke’s labour theory of property. I examine two ways in which Kalin’s mode of spatial production overlaps with Locke’s theory of property rights: Locke’s labour theory of private property and Locke’s justification of private property based on natural limits. I examine the ways in which Locke’s arguments for property rights complicate Kalin’s mode of spatial production read as lived space. There are striking similarities between Lefebvre’s lived space, and Locke’s arguments for private property. In their writings, both Lefebvre and Locke create arguments against the unifying and standardising power of the state.

In the second part of this chapter, I begin to look at Kalin’s garden and its complex histories in relation to the project of hyper-organised French social utopian housing projects of the 1970s. Here, I draw on a certain amount of material from my experiences of living in France between 1992 and 2006 and my work not only in Paris, but also in other cities. Having left the UK in the midst of Margaret Thatcher’s wave of neo-liberal transformations, which saw the state sell it’s nationalised utilities and industries, I was very conscious of the role that the French state played in the everyday lives of its
citizens. While the government in the UK was promoting an environment of self-dependence, my foremost impression on arriving in France was that people expected a lot from the state; they expected to be housed, taken care of, and to be employed for life. In contrast to the UK state, which was running itself down and selling off nationalised utilities, public housing, and infrastructures, the French state was investing in technologies to improve its infrastructures and financing urbanisation projects, all of which played a role in unifying France’s national territories and maintaining a French identity. My residency in Villeneuve played a significant role in my thinking about the role of the French state. Villeneuve underlines the contradiction between the types of space produced by the state, and how space is actually lived in by inhabitants. In my time there, I encountered a number of inhabitants who actively participated in and encouraged a different kind of social space to that which was designed by the government and its agencies. I also encountered a number of inhabitants who needed to satisfy their individual needs and desires by transforming their own living space without taking part in any collective. These acts stood out in a context where it seemed that almost every aspect of everyday life had been decided and pre-arranged.

In my account of Lefebvre’s lived space, I argue that Kalin’s garden is a good example of the appropriation and adaption of space to a much more singular set of needs and desires. Kalin’s space evolves over time with experiments and by learning from the mistakes. In contrast, Villeneuve displays very little sign of such appropriation, experimentation, and evolution. The French state mode of production erases the past to create a new beginning, which I argue, on a broader level, proposes a new foundation to be laid for a new ethical and moral order. As I go on to explore through the work of G.W.F. Hegel, such an ethical order is not a given: it has to be imposed from the top down. In the conclusion to chapter three Hegel’s theory of ethical life allows me to explore how the aspirations towards social utopia of the French state during 1970s, are played out in space.

Chapter four is entitled The Production of Spatial Difference. In the previous chapter, I question Lefebvre’s notion of lived space by discussing the significance of informally produced individual space. In this chapter, I focus on the question of informal spaces that are used by more than one individual. My aim in this concluding chapter is to question how spaces that exist alternatively to the state are managed. Having created
arguments that raise doubt about the validity of the French example of social democratic social space, I pose the question in this chapter as to what kind of alternative social space can be produced beyond the actions of individuals. Using three brief examples I discuss how disputes and conflicts between users of a space are resolved, how space is organised beyond the state and how space is distributed and accessed. I begin by returning to the triangular plot of land in Kreuzberg, Berlin to discuss a moment in the history of the garden when the space was shared between Osman Kalin and Mustafa Akyol. During 1998, a major disagreement took place between the two gardeners that resulted in the departure of Akyol. Their dispute complicates the question of how the use of space is used to justify the occupation of space. To further the analysis I go on to explore two alternatively organised collective spaces: Navarinou Park in Exarcheia in Athens, and a group of informal gardens in Saint-Martin d’Hères in the suburbs of Grenoble. The two spaces share the fact that they are both used by groups of people. However, what is of interest is the difference in the way that they are organised. In the case of Saint-Martin d’Hères gardens, the gardeners appear to co-exist harmoniously on the strip of land without the need of any formal structure. In contrast, Navarinou Park has an experimental open form of organisation and appears to be in a state of constant conflict.

These accumulated experiences and documents of informal modes of spatial production taken from my time in France, as well as other travels, form the research methodology for this thesis. The encounter with Kalin’s garden together with the other informal spaces generates key research questions for this thesis. What happens when space is not regulated by the state? What justifies a claim to a space when there is no formal transaction and no legal document that guarantees ownership? What happens when there is trouble in the garden; when more than one person claims a particular space. How is the use of a space determined and how do spatial users decide what is allowed or not allowed? What happens when people cannot agree with the way a space is used? Does the lack of formal spatial regulation invite conflict with other groups that might have a counter claim on a space? How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? If there is no state institution to mediate between disputing parties what form do negotiations between spatial users take? Can forms of informal spatial organisation be sustainable/reproducible? Does conflict play a role in maintaining informal spaces? What kind of politics does this trouble in the garden produce; this act of commoning
that sustains something through visible conflict with the state and other actors? Finally, is it possible for spatial users to produce lived spaces of maximal difference beyond the institutionalised form of minimal difference permitted by the state?
Chapter One

Introducing the Context, Ambivalence and Possibility of a Triangular Plot of Land

This chapter serves as an extended introduction to a triangular plot of land in the district of Kreuzberg, Berlin. The site, together with its use as an informal garden, is the starting point of this thesis and will frame the discussion and analysis in the ensuing chapters. This chapter provides three readings of the site; first, I will consider the site in its current state as a traffic island with an informal garden and a one-storey hut-like structure constructed on the land; second, I will consider the history of the site and its various uses during the period of the Berlin Wall; and finally, I will discuss the administrative confusion over the status of the site immediately after the dismantling of the Wall in 1989. While the triangular plot of land that initiated my research is paradigmatic for this dissertation’s central questions of the production and appropriation of space, it is important here, as in every case study, to look closely at the specific contexts in which this space came about.

The case of Kalin’s garden is closely tied in with the history of the Cold War period when the Wall separated Berlin into East and West sectors that provided the conditions of possibility for this space. The plot of land is located right on the border between the Berlin districts of Mitte and Kreuzberg. As I will go on to explain, before the construction of the Berlin Wall Kalin’s garden was part of the Mitte district in East Berlin. However, following several reconstructions of the Wall the plot of land came to be on the west side of the Wall. It was during this period that Kalin made a garden on the land. His appropriation of this area was thus made possible by the ambivalent location of the land. Following the demise of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of the East and West sectors of the city, a second state of spatial ambivalence arose from the administrative indecisiveness of those who ran Mitte and Kreuzberg districts, as they dithered about the future of the site. It was in these periods of uncertainty, I will
argue, that were crucial in creating the conditions of spatial ambivalence that opened up the possibility of informal spatial appropriation.

Before I begin this section of the chapter, I would like to set out the materials, sources, and methodology used in this chapter. Only a very fragmented set of archival materials relating to the triangular plot of land and the garden that occupies it are available for researchers. Because of its’ vague histories and border jurisdictions, a comprehensive set of state plans or bureaucratic documents related to the site is not available. During the period of the Berlin Wall, the land was officially part of the GDR territory. Information concerning GDR territories, especially border sites, was highly classified, and since the fall of the Berlin Wall a lot of information concerning border areas has been misplaced, destroyed or not made available to the public. Accessing this information and history is further complicated by the desire of former GDR personnel responsible for controlling the East/West border to forget this period. They would have known the site well, but are reluctant to speak about this period for fear of the negative effects of being associated with crimes committed against GDR civilians. As a result, much of my research into this site has been through interviews and oral testimonies. The main source of this history is Kalin himself. Due to a number of factors, however, Kalin has proven rather difficult to access. In meetings and conversations that have been recorded with Kalin, it is often hard to understand what he is saying. This is not simply due an English-German language barrier; it is because Kalin, as a Turkish immigrant to Berlin, speaks in a relatively singular Turkish-German hybrid. Even taking this into account, however, it has not always been clear to me whether this lack of clarity in language was at least partially a deliberate, tactically evasive stance so as to avoid certain questions relating to the triangular plot of land. Access to Kalin’s history has been further complicated by the fact that he was diagnosed as having Alzheimer’s disease in or around 2006. Due to Kalin’s illness, he has been unable to meet with me. Therefore, research concerning his garden has had to rely increasingly on particular archival material rather than direct conversations with him. Embedded within this site therefore, is a partial, contested, fragmented, and informal history. Accessing cannot be had through the standard research methods of consulting municipal maps and documents or interviewing those who were in charge of the Wall, or indeed the main

19 Conversation with Imma Hamms and Thomas Winkelkotte
20 See interviews in the documentary film about the triangular plot of land, Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte.
protagonist. It is important however, to acknowledge that these modes of research reflect in parts how Kalin’s garden, and the other informally organised spaces to which I will refer throughout this thesis, come to be known and understood.

One of the documents that has been important for my research is a documentary film made in 1998. In this documentary, Mr Lexen, a civil engineer from the district of Mitte, Mr Schultz the Mayor of Kreuzberg, Mr Schumacher, the landscape architect who designed the Luisenstädtischer Memorial Wall Park, Mr Müller, the Pastor of St Thomas church behind the garden, and Kalin and Akyol, the two founders of the garden, discuss the triangular plot of land. Other important sources are interviews I carried out with Imma Harms and Thomas Winkelkotte (the documentary makers), and Mehmet Kalin, Kalin’s son. More recently, I have had email exchanges with Martin Pfahler (who organised a presentation of Kalin’s garden in the 2yk Galerie, Berlin), and Metin Yilmaz, who is a Turkish journalist, living in Berlin, who photographed Kalin in the early stages of making his garden. I managed to obtain from Kartenabteilung Staatsbibliothek some historical maps that show more broadly the course of the Berlin Wall during the Cold War period. I viewed newspaper articles in the Kreuzberg Museum that reported the status of the triangular plot of land after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the Landesarchiv Berlin, I viewed archival photographs that show the section of the Berlin Wall where the triangular plot of land is located on Bethaniendamm. I was not able to obtain copies of the most useful photographs taken by Klaus Lehnartz, because he is in dispute with Landesarchiv, Berlin over the issue of copyright. Harms and Winkelkotte, Mehmet Kalin and Martin Pfahler took other photographs of the site.

**The Triangular Plot of Land, September 2006.**

I first encountered Kalin’s garden while on a working visit to Berlin in 2004. Two years later, in 2006, I went back to Berlin to research the history of the triangular plot of land in order to understand how Kalin was able to make a garden on this site. During my research, I came to understand that the site changed size and appearance according to the activities occurring around it and upon it. As well as growing vegetables on the site, Kalin was changing the space by expanding the borders, making enclosures, and constructing various forms of cabins. When I returned to Berlin in, 2006 I found that the pavements around the garden had been re-laid since 2004. The smooth, even surface of
the new pavement appeared to formally frame the informal aesthetics of the garden as well as acting as a limit to any further expansion.

Figure 1. Berlin maps showing Kalin’s garden location

The land is located in the district of Kreuzberg. Described by some as a traffic island, it is situated behind St Thomas’ Church, between Mariannenplatz and Bethaniendamm (the former Luisenstädtischer canal).\textsuperscript{21} Seen from above, the plot is virtually a right-angled triangle. Using this description, the short opposite side of the triangle faces Mariannenplatz and St Thomas’ Church. The long opposite side faces the residential side of Bethaniendamm. The hypotenuse side faces Bethaniendamm that lies inside the Mitte district borders. Today, traffic arrives from Mariannenplatz around the triangular plot of land to join Bethaniendamm. Bethaniendamm and Engeldamm run either side of the former Luisenstädtischer Canal. The two streets begin near the river Spree and arc round until they reach the Engelbecken basin. During the Cold War period these streets formed part of the Berlin Wall known as the military zone (also known as the death strip). Since the demise of the Wall, the former Luisenstädtischer has been developed as a Memorial Park for the Berlin Wall. Mr Schumacher, the landscape architect who designed the Luisenstädtischer Memorial Wall Park, visited the garden in 1998 and noted that it contained a Chestnut tree, a Peach tree, a Rowan tree, and a Maple tree, the

\textsuperscript{21} See Schumacher and Koch interviews in Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte.
latter estimated to be more than one hundred years old and coming to the end of its life. He also noted that Kalin was growing spring onions, mint, spinach, potatoes, black cabbage, green beans, sweet corn, courgette, and Kohlrabi.²²

Figure 2. Still from “Was man so sein eigen nennt, Der Mauergarten und audere Grenzfälle” 1998

The land consists of two gardens enclosed by a perimeter fence. The gardens do not take up the totality of the area. A publicly accessible pedestrian pavement surrounds the garden. The tip of the triangle is covered in light sand/gravel. Although the garden is closed off to the public by a fence erected around it, Osman Kalin placed a table and a bench on the pavement area beside the garden’s main entrance on the residential side of Bethaniendamm. A one-storey hut-like structure also extends beyond the garden perimeter. The shape, dimensions, volume, the materials of the garden, the-hut like structure, the fence, and the street elements have all varied during the time of occupation. Evidence of this can be seen from photographs of the site taken by various people between 1986 and 2006. The most active producer of the changes relating to this site was Kalin. Since he developed Alzheimer’s during the course of 2006, however, the garden has seen relatively little change.

²² Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte.
Different newspapers have estimated the plot of land to be between 350 and 500 square metres. The reported difference in the size of the space would seem to be due to the fact that the garden’s dimensions have been in a state of flux throughout its history. Because of its specific history and lack of a clearly defined status, the plot is also not considered important enough to be measured by officials. This is applicable both to the district of Mitte, the former GDR, and the district of Kreuzberg. The re-laying of the streets and pavements that surround the garden, in 2004, make it unlikely that the garden will change in volume from now on.

Today the triangular plot of land is divided into two unequal gardens. The garden that runs towards the tip of the triangle is used by the Kalin family to grow vegetables. The Akyol family, to whom I will return later, used to grow vegetables on the St Thomas’ church end of the garden, sold their part of the garden in 1998 to another Turkish family who now cultivate a lawn. The gardens are separated from one another by an improvised fence made out of a variety of re-cycled materials such as planks and sheets of wood, metal grills, bed frames, wooden posts and street barriers. A similar variety of materials used for the interior fence make up an exterior fence that separates the garden from the surrounding pavement and roads. Parts of the street barriers, which make up a large portion of the exterior fence, are constructed onto irregular curving cement walls of varying height. There is also a small section of wall made of breezeblocks. Photographs taken of the site over different periods since the fall of the Berlin Wall reveal how the gardeners used whatever materials were on hand at any given time. One photograph shows parts of Bethaniendamm, the road that immediately surrounds the garden, dug up in preparation to be re-laid. In the same image, Kalin is applying the finishing coat of cement to part of his garden wall.

25 I Harms and T Winkelkotte, Kalins Hütte 2004, Berlin. See also Was Man film where it is suggested that Kalin enjoyed good relations with the British workers employed in the road construction.
Figure 3 & 4. Kalin plastering the perimeter wall of his garden
The one-storey hut-like structure built on the triangular plot of land is perhaps the most striking feature when encountering the garden. This is the work of Kalin, who has assembled various versions of this structure in his part of the garden. Originally, it was made out of recycled wooden elements, such as bits of furniture, old doors and windows, planks and boards. However, after it was twice burnt to the ground, Kalin built the later versions of the structure partly out of concrete. Kalin’s structures have varied in size and form over the years. They have been described as huts, shacks, one-storey houses, and, by one journalist in Berlin, as a ‘gecekondu’. 26 This is a cultural reference both to Kalin’s Turkish origin and the common name given to a type of low cost informal building or house in Turkey.

![Figure 5, 6, 7, 8 versions of Kalin’s hut-house structure](image)

This type of housing is constructed in a short time by people migrating from rural areas to the outskirts of large cities. Inhabitants of such housing exploit a legal loophole in Turkish law which states that anyone who starts building a habitation after dusk and succeeds in moving into the completed building before dawn on the same day without having being noticed by the authorities, means that the authorities are not permitted to tear the building down. Instead, the authorities must begin legal proceedings in court. Thus, any such building is more likely to stay up than be pulled down. Such buildings

26 Korfmann, "Ein Stück Anatolien in Berlin."
may be constructed without going through the necessary procedures required for construction, such as acquiring building permits, and can result in some areas of the city being very densely populated. The journalist and author of Shadow Cities, Robert Neuwirth, states that ‘half the residents of Istanbul - perhaps six million people - dwell in gecekondu homes’. Literally translated, gecekondu means a house put up quickly. Although Kalin’s hut-like structure looks like a house with its veranda on the first floor, he does not live in it. He lives in an apartment on Bethaniendamm, opposite the plot of land. The comparison between Kalin’s hut-like structure and a gecekondu is related to the informal aesthetic of the structure as well as the way that Kalin went about using the land to make his garden. The journalist and former resident of Kreuzberg, Metin Yilmaz, captured one of the earliest moments in the garden’s history. Yilmaz claims that Kalin’s building was constructed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, there is some doubt over this issue: in an interview with the filmmaker Imma Harms, Kalin was asked whether the GDR allowed him to build on the plot of land. Somewhat confusedly, Kalin said the GDR border commander allowed him to build a low building in 1986:

Yes, GDR say, take a building, so small! Make a building, the earth near you allowed! All debris, three trucks remove debris... That stinks. Then I clean.

When asked what he used his garden structure for, he said that it was to get out of the rain. He also said that he and his wife used the first floor of the building to pray and that the room used for that purpose was built so that it faced Mecca. The different materials used to re-lay the streets and pavement that surround the triangular plot of land in 2004 signal the limits of normal (municipal) public space of the pavement (the public footpath) and a sort of intermediary space that Kalin himself made by placing a bench, a table and a few chairs on the street beside the entrance of his informal structure. This is a significant gesture on Kalin’s part that creates a new place of conviviality. It is interesting because he creates a space that he is not claiming for his exclusive use but rather for a public use. This intermediary space between Kalin’s private, informally appropriated garden could be read either as Kalin’s genuine attempt to create or contribute to the neighbourhood or an effort to create a space that diffuses tension

28 Metin Yilmaz, email to author, Re-Osman Kalin, 11 February 2009.
resulting from his private appropriation of what would have been normal (municipal) public space. Although the table and chairs are clearly meant for public use, Kalin has cemented the feet of the furniture to the pavement to prevent them from being taken away.

![Figure 9. Kalin cemented furniture to the street](image)

The triangular plot of land changed in some ways between my first encounter with it in 2004 and my last view of it in 2006. The main change was the re-paving of the surrounding area. The hut-like structure, which is the outstanding landmark of the site, changed slightly. A few windows were added. A balcony, supported by metal stilts, was extended beyond the building over the street. Hung over the edge of the balcony is a board on which the words Baumhaus (tree house) are hand painted, together with a mobile phone number. The garden is unlikely to change further due to the nature of Kalin’s illness, which restricts his physical activity, but also because the re-paving has limited the expansion of its perimeter. What impresses me about Kalin’s garden is that it is not hidden away like the majority of informal spaces that I have encountered. Its close proximity to formal planned buildings creates a clash between formal and informal spaces. Everything that Kalin made on his garden appeared to break building and planning regulations. I am fascinated that someone could make such an individual space that looks so different and out of place with it’s surroundings. How was his space allowed to exist?

When I asked Hiedi Sill, a friend in Berlin, how Kalin was permitted to build his strange garden and house, she told me that he built it on no man’s land during the period of the Berlin Wall. The words “no man’s land” conjured up a powerful and romantic
idea of a moment in history where bits of land belonged to no one. In my ignorance, I imagined that Kalin had made his garden just after the fall of the Berlin Wall. I imagined him walking through a hole in the wall seeing an expanse of baron empty land in the military zone and claiming a part of it for himself. However, when I began to research its origins further, I realised that the explanation of how he made his garden was more complicated than this. First, Kalin had begun to make his garden before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Second, the triangular plot of land was not a no man’s land, as it was part of GDR territory. Nonetheless, the idea of no man’s land is not completely inaccurate. Kalin was able to make his garden on the plot due to a degree of spatial ambivalence that developed towards the site during the period of the Berlin Wall.

The Triangular Plot of Land during the Period of the Berlin Wall

During the Cold War period, the longest side of the triangular plot of land was bordered by the 3.6 metre high Berlin Wall, which ran the length of Bethaniendamm. Despite the fact that the land was on the west side of the Wall, it was part of GDR territory. This meant the West Berlin police had no jurisdiction over the site. Only the GDR could police the space. As Kreuzberg was part of the American sector, the American army were responsible for monitoring the space. Their disinterest in this space left it open to alternative forms of use.

How did this particular piece of GDR territory come to be on the west side of the Wall? Hagan Koch, a former Stasi captain associated with Wall security, gives three main reasons. First, the GDR built the Wall one metre behind the official East/West border. This was to allow GDR border troops to have access to both sides of the Wall so that the Wall could be maintained. Second, the border along Bethaniendamm came right up to the front doors of apartment buildings on the west side of the Wall. Sufficient space had to be allowed for West German residents to access their homes and enough street space to walk alongside the buildings. Third, the Wall was built in front of, rather than around, the triangular plot of land in order to maintain a smooth arc that followed the bend of Bethaniendamm. For the triangular plot of land to be on the east side of the Wall, the Wall would have had to be built around the land. This would have meant

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29 Hagen Koch is a former Stasi captain associated with the Wall security. He was interviewed by Imma Harms. See I Harms and T Winkelkotte, "Interview Transcriptions, Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt..." (Berlin: 1998), 184 – 213.
creating a kink in the Wall, including one internal corner and one external corner, which would have been more difficult to control in terms of surveillance. The decision not to build the Wall around the triangle was also made partly on economic grounds, as it helped to reduce the costs of construction and surveillance.

It is important to note that the positioning of the Wall was not constant during the time it existed. Koch explains that there were four generations of the Berlin Wall. Each time the Wall was knocked down, a technically more advanced, stronger, taller, tougher and more weather resistant one was built in its place. Each time the Wall was re-built its location moved further into East Berlin. It is highly likely, therefore, that the original 1961 Wall would have been built on the triangular plot of land and that later generations of the Wall would have moved further into East Berlin, leaving the land on the west side of the Wall.30

30 Harms and Winkelkotte, "Was Man… Interview Transcriptions," 184 – 213.
In 1998, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Imma Harms and Thomas Winkelkotte, who were researching the triangular plot for their documentary film about the site, visited the Mitte office for civil engineering and spoke to Mr Lexen, who is responsible for the post-Wall border sites in the district of Mitte. The filmmakers wanted to know why there was not a map from either Mitte or Kreuzberg that showed the measurements of the plot of land during and after the period of the Berlin Wall. Lexen told them that the land did not appear on Kreuzberg maps during the period of the Wall because it was in GDR territory. ‘Kreuzberg has no reason to show anything there, because it (the triangle) is not part of the district of Kreuzberg.’ Nevertheless, Harms is surprised that the triangle is not marked on the GDR maps either, because she thinks that they would have produced very detailed maps. Lexen says this is probably because the GDR did not update maps of areas close to the border and especially the border zones. He goes on to say that the nature of this kind of material was and still is very sensitive:

[…] a lot of material was destroyed, or disappeared and is therefore no longer accessible. In any case, this material was not accessible to the East German population. Any space within the border fortifications was classed at a top-secret level. We know that. I myself am not from the east, so the reasons as such are purely humanly incomprehensible. But since the four years that I’ve worked here, I know, and the many colleagues here in the office know, that none of the management plans in the underground room

Figure 11. Illustration showing ensemble of elements that make up the Berlin Wall
are available, because this floor is under secrecy. The consequence is that when we work with any type of border area it is the worst experience.\textsuperscript{31}

The maps of the area were updated in 1994 but still the triangle is represented in a generalised and imprecise manner. It is marked as a green space. Lexen says this is because the mapmakers would consult the nature and urban planning department about areas that were designated for development. He continues:

Sometimes the cartographers asked: What is planned here? And then they get the information, for example, from our nature and urban planning department: there we are going to restore the green space. Then they paint the whole area green because there are no details of the area.\textsuperscript{32}

Continuing to research this question, the filmmakers asked Hagen Koch (the ex Stasi captain and Wall expert) why the plot of land did not appear on GDR maps of border zones. Koch says it was not considered important enough for the GDR to measure and represent on their maps. When pressed, Koch and Lexen admitted it was probable that the GDR had made maps that would have shown the plot of land in detail, but that these were either destroyed or not available to the public. Lexen says this secrecy makes his job of dealing with border sites very difficult.

The Harms and Winkelkotte interview with the ex Stasi captain and Wall expert Hagen Koch revealed the likelihood that the land was originally on the east side of the Berlin Wall and then came to be on the west side. Koch estimates that this occurred during one of the later reconstructions of the Wall. He gives two reasons for this; first, to build around the plot of land would have been more expensive, and second, reconstructing the Wall to exclude the triangular plot of land alleviated the kinks in the Wall that posed more of a surveillance problem for the border guards. The passing of the triangular plot of land from the east side of the Wall to the west side underlines the GDR’s ambivalence towards it. Increasing the security of the Wall in an economic way was more important than any small plot of land.

What is also significant here and as I will go on to explore later, is the distinction between the way that Kalin uses the land and the way this space is perceived and represented by planners, bureaucrats, and administrators. After the fall of the Berlin

\textsuperscript{31}Harms and Winkelkotte, "Was Man… Interview Transcriptions," 82 – 99.
\textsuperscript{32}Harms and Winkelkotte, "Was Man… Interview Transcriptions," 82 – 99.
Wall, the area around Bethaniendamm, including the triangular plot of land, was earmarked for redevelopment. On the urban planning maps of the area, it was indistinguishable from other areas around the Wall marked in green. On the one hand, the technocrats, planners, and administrators viewed the plot as a space to be developed, whereas for Kalin it was an opportunity to fulfil a desire. The relative disinterestedness of the GDR and the West German authorities in the plot is understandable given the complex situation surrounding the site during the period of the Berlin Wall. The GDR may have viewed the plot with ambivalence, but it is difficult to believe that there was no opposition of any kind when Kalin first began his garden. When Kalin made his garden were there any objections to it from other quarters? Did he have to negotiate with someone, or an authority figure? As I explain later in this chapter, questions relating to Kalin’s continued occupancy of the triangular plot of land did not come into play until the fall of the Berlin Wall when the districts of Kreuzberg and Mitte debated the ownership of the triangular plot of land.

**Determining When the Garden Began**

Photographic documentation shows that squatters used the plot sometime before Kalin and Akyol made their garden. In an article for Deutschland radio Berlin, Vanessa Fischer states that Kalin began his garden in 1982. She describes how he cleared the site, which at the time was being used as an informal dump by local residents. Fischer also states that in 1984 GDR border troops granted Kalin permission to make a garden on the border site. Both Kalin and Akyol have their own accounts of the moment when GDR border troops came across the border from the east to the west to confront Akyol and Kalin about their garden. Akyol claims that the border troops appeared from over the Wall standing on a ladder. He also claims they came through a secret door in the Wall. Kalin maintains that two armed soldiers threatened him with machine guns. Both men claim that the border guards then gave them permission to use the land to make a garden on the condition that they did not dig below a certain point and that vegetation should not grow above the height of the Wall. Kalin then goes on to claim that the

34 Fischer, "Mauergemüse Statt Mauerblümchen. Ein Türke Bewirtschaftete Im Sperrgebiet Ein Stück Land."
border guards had given him the land as a gift for his contribution to the allied victory
during the Second World War. He states that:

One day, two military come here. Mustafa watched from behind the
lattice. The commander with two military rifles asked me “who
owns the space?” I told him the land belongs to me. He said, no the
land belongs to the GDR! Not true I say; East Germany is on the
other side of the Wall, the site belongs to me! He asked me how long
I had been in Germany. I told him that in 1944 I was in Germany in
the military for three years. He looked at my passport. Then he told
me that the land was a gift to me.\footnote{Harms and Winkelkotte, "Was Man… Interview Transcriptions," 156 – 68.}

The encounter between the gardeners and the border troops is difficult to confirm.
Hagan Koch says it was highly likely that the troops would have been from the Border
Regiment 33 as they were responsible for the lower section of the Wall that runs north
of the Brandenburg Gate to the Berlin city limits.\footnote{Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte.} However, Koch says it would be
difficult to find personal data concerning the border troops involved because there is too
much sensitivity about the role played by those troops - many terrible things happened
during their reign. The troops are afraid of being accused of a crime that they might not
have committed, and as often happens he states, ‘if you cannot find those you think are
guilty, then look for someone else.’\footnote{Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte.}

Kalin claims that in 1986 he was given permission to build a small hut by the border
troops. He says the border guards helped him clear the land with trucks. Metin Yilmaz,
a Turkish journalist living in Kreuzberg during this time, took a photograph of Kalin
digging on the triangular plot of land. Yilmaz dates his photograph of Kalin to 1987.
There are no plants, no fence, and no hut. It looks as if it is the beginning of the
garden.\footnote{Metin Yilmaz, Osman Kalin in Harem Trousers.} However, the most concrete evidence of gardening activity on the triangular
plot of land is a West German police report. It confirms that a fence was erected in
February 1988 – The police document is entitled “Making an allotment in the triangle,”
and states that:

On 01.02.1988 around 10:55am, while on patrol it was established
that on the triangle opposite 27-29 Bethaniendamm, behind St
Thomas’ Church, an unknown person furnished a small garden
(allotment). Last weekend about ten fence posts were planted
covering around twenty-five square metres of cleared soil. The erecter could not be established.  

Despite the official document from the West German police dated 1988, Metin Yilmaz’s photograph of Kalin digging on the triangular plot of land suggests that Kalin began his garden a year earlier. However, although Yilmaz’s photograph shows the land clear of any vegetation, thus implying the beginning of the garden, it could have been taken during the winter months when it is common for gardeners to rest the soil. Knowing the exact date that the garden began is not important.

![Figure 12. Kalin digging on the triangular plot of land in the early stages of the garden](image)

What is significant to this story is that Kalin began the garden during the period of the Berlin Wall and not immediately after, as I had previously understood. The reported encounters between the GDR border guards and the gardeners help to clarify how Kalin got permission to use the land. The border guards represent the authority that owns the land. What is significant for me in these stories, is how Kalin insisted that the land belonged to him; believing it to be a divine gift and that he had some kind of natural right to use it. The encounter between Kalin and the border guards is the make or break moment in the history of the garden. If Kalin had not believed the garden to be his, then perhaps he would not have stood up to the GDR military and there would be no garden today. The above section gives an indication of how Kalin was allowed to make a garden on the triangular plot of land during the period of the Berlin Wall. How did

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Kalin managed to continue occupying the triangular plot of land after the fall of the Berlin Wall?

**Post Berlin Wall**

Moving away from the River Spree, the Berlin Wall initially followed the bend of the former Luisenstädtischer Canal, which flowed in the direction of the Engelbecken basin before turning southwards towards the Landwehr Canal. Although 1989 was the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, photographs of Bethaniendamm taken between September and October 1990 show that the Wall was not removed from this area until October that year.40 When the Bethaniendamm part of the Berlin Wall was knocked down, the triangular plot of land was opened up to the Luisenstädtischer canal and the district of Mitte. At this moment, the question of the administration of the land was raised: which borough council did the triangular plot of land belong to, Mitte or Kreuzberg? The fate of the land was linked to the redevelopment of the Luisenstädtischer canal. Bethaniendamm is the boundary between Mitte and Kreuzberg and technically, the triangular plot of land is on the Mitte side, but “emotionally” the space belongs to Kreuzberg.41 However, the argument for the land being part of Kreuzberg is more than emotional. The space was originally seen as being part of Mariannenplatz, which is part of Kreuzberg. This becomes apparent when looking at the space on a map where the triangular space can be associated with the church that forms part of Mariannenplatz.

Landscape architects were quick to propose that the former border strip should be made into a green space again. Work on redesigning the site began in 1993, plans were drawn up to integrate the plot with the planned green space of the memorial Wall Park, but Kalin’s garden prevented further development of the site. Kalin received several letters requesting him to vacate the site but he chose to remain. In 1998, part of the Luisenstädtischer Canal section of the Wall Park was completed. The section between Mariannenplatz and Köpenicker Strasse was not completed due to a lack of funds.

It is worth pointing out here that there is a clear difference of attitude towards Kalin’s occupation of the triangular plot of land between the boroughs of Mitte and Kreuzberg.

41 Franz Schulz, Mayor of Kreuzberg, Harms and Winkelkotte, “Was Man... Interview Transcriptions,” 71.
For Mitte, the priority in terms of the old border area was integration between the former East and West Berlin. Mr Lexen, representing the borough of Mitte, viewed Kalin’s garden as ideologically and aesthetically inappropriate when considering it in terms of integration with the surrounding space. There are two points here. First, the Wall Park is a green space built from a specific design. In Lexen’s opinion, there is a conflict between the informal and spontaneous vegetation of Kalin’s garden and the planned green space of the park. The second conflict is between the Wall Park as a public space and Kalin’s garden as a private space. Mr Schulz, who was the Mayor of Kreuzberg in 1998, was willing to tolerate the garden as he considered it one among many alternative spaces already existing in Kreuzberg. In Schulz’s opinion, the spontaneous vegetation in Kalin’s garden can complement the formal green space of the Wall Park. However, from the broader perspective of the redevelopment of the Berlin Wall border area, Kalin’s garden was not seen as a priority, and so Kalin continued to occupy the space during this period of administrative indecision. Eventually, in 2004, the borough council of Mitte agreed to adjust the district-boundary between Mitte and Kreuzberg, thus allowing the plot of land to become part of the borough of Kreuzberg. Following this event, Kreuzberg was able to grant Kalin a special informal right to occupy the land until further notice. However, they added that if, at a future date, it was decided that the area should be redeveloped, or that the plot should be re-landscaped, then Kalin would have to vacate the site.

In conclusion, it is important to emphasise that Kalin was able to make a garden on the plot in Kreuzberg because of the extraordinary circumstances that surrounded this particular area. Between 1961 and 1989 the Wall was constructed along the longest side of the triangular plot, separating it from Bethaniendamm, which was on the east side of the Berlin Wall forming part of the GDR military zone. Although the plot was on the west side of the Wall, (in Kreuzberg) it belonged to the GDR. Because of the disinterested attitude of the GDR and the West Berlin authorities, the land appeared to belong to no one. It was open to informal uses such as the illegal dumping of domestic materials. This status allowed Kalin to make a garden on the site. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the land was transferred from the Mitte district to the Kreuzberg district. In addition, at this point the Kreuzberg authorities allowed Kalin to continue using the land as a garden until further notice.
Does the location and the extraordinary circumstances of Kalin’s garden mean that we can only view it as a singular instance, that it cannot add anything to the subject of informal spaces? During the period of the Berlin Wall the triangular plot of land was not so unusual, as there were other pieces of GDR land located in West Berlin, some of which were squatted. It is also worth pointing out that the district of Kreuzberg had a reputation for its tolerance of alternative spaces. Perhaps Kalin’s garden could be seen then as just one among many alternative spaces in Berlin. In many ways it is. Nevertheless, this does not answer the question of why I have felt drawn to write about Kalin’s garden more than any other alternative space in Berlin. One of the reasons might be that it reminds me of so many other informal spaces that I have encountered while living in Grenoble, France and elsewhere. In one instance, a Vietnamese community had used a nondescript space under a footbridge that linked two social housing estates in the southern suburbs of Grenoble. They used the space to play pétanque. In another example, a Maghreb community used a space located between a motorway and a train track to make vegetable gardens. What these spaces have in common with Kalin’s garden is that they appear to be produced out of a need to satisfy a desire, collective or individual, which cannot be fulfilled within the space produced by the state.

The spatial ambivalence of Kalin’s garden arises from these specific circumstances and histories. However, the space and how it developed poses crucial questions about how space is produced within and beyond the framework of state regulations and what the social consequences of Kalin’s individual act of appropriation might be. These issues can be formulated around two key questions: First, to what degree do Kalin’s skills, labour and actions constitute an act of freedom that overcomes repressive laws and regulations that govern social space? Second, if this is the case, is there a conflict between Kalin’s actions, his bypassing of regulations and law, and the laws and conventions that govern public space and ensure that it is shared? On the one hand, Kalin’s practical skills, labour and actions have allowed him to claim space for himself, and that can be viewed as a triumph over repressive laws: his informal appropriation of space infers values of individual freedom, self-reliance, self-realisation and autonomy. On the other hand, because Kalin bypasses regulations and laws to claim his space, questions arise over the ethical and moral value of his actions. If Kalin ignores regulations that in part ensure some spaces such as parks are kept public, does his
process of claiming the land and making his garden have adverse social consequences? What can be extrapolated from this example of an apparent conflict between Kalin’s overcoming of laws and regulations to achieve a degree of relative freedom and autonomy; and his disregard for the rules that maintain public social space?

In order to address these questions, in the following chapter I will draw on Henri Lefebvre’s theory of spatial production. Lefebvre will allow me to begin to determine the nature of the space produced by Kalin and its relationship with the space that surrounds it. Once I have established a framework to describe the complex forms of spatial production that occur in the triangular plot of land, in the chapters that follow I will compare Kalin’s garden with other informal spaces and with examples of pre-designed or planned space. This analysis of formal and informal modes of spatial production will allow me to identify both what is compelling about Kalin’s garden and what might be at stake in its existence. For Kalin’s garden raises difficult and important questions about the ambivalence and possibilities of practices of spatial autonomy, freedom and appropriation, as well as individuated private space versus collective social space.
Chapter Two

A Lived Space in a Conceived World: The search for social space

What is immediately apparent when physically encountering Kalin’s garden is how it stands out in stark contrast to the neighbouring architecture. Looking towards the old East (Mitte district), there is the recently constructed Berlin Wall Memorial Park that occupies Bethaniendamm. Beyond Bethaniendamm in the Mitte district the horizon is predominantly filled with tenement blocks constructed during the Communist era, along with more recent buildings constructed after the fall of the Wall. Behind the garden looking south to the Kreuzberg side of Bethaniendamm, which was the old West during the Cold War, is St Thomas’ Church, built in the 17th Century. Looking west from here there is a row of 17th to 19th - Century residential buildings that run north towards the river Spree. At the end of the street is a smaller apartment block constructed in the 1980s. Next to this is an old people’s home. Within the landscape of Kreuzberg and Mitte, architectural eras and ideologies of the past, exist side by side with that of the present. Despite the plurality of architectural styles, Kalin’s garden still looks out of place. It looks out of place because of its informal and ephemeral qualities: the odd assortment of materials used to make the rickety fence that mark the garden’s boundaries, and the equally strange assortment of materials that make up the one-storey hut/house structure suggest a certain impermanence. In contrast, the straight lines and smooth, regular, levelled surfaces of the space that surrounds Kalin’s garden suggest order, permanence, and durability.

Is it only the visual difference in the arrangement of materials in space that distinguish Kalin’s garden from its surroundings? Yes and no. What I encounter with my eyes also confirms the aesthetic difference between Kalin’s garden and a more obviously planned formal (technically built) space. When I look at the elements that make up Kalin’s space, I can see how they are constructed: I recognise the materials that he has found and adapted for his purpose. For example, I recognise the bed frame that he used for the perimeter fence, and the floorboards that he used for the walls of his one-storey hut. In other words, the means of production are visible in Kalin’s garden and hut. This is what
distinguishes Kalin’s mode of spatial production from the abstract space of the “state mode” of production. Kalin’s mode of spatial production is also characterised by his transgressive use of space. He has ignored the question of legal ownership of the land that he uses to make his garden, and has disregarded formal planning application procedures in the process. However, it is not possible to fully understand Kalin’s space by simply looking at it. In order to tell the full story of power relations and the conditions of its existence it is useful to analyse Kalin’s space through Lefebvre’s spatial trialectic of conceived, lived and perceived space. In the following pages, I will proceed to outline how Lefebvre’s three spatial concepts are useful for understanding and determining the significance of Kalin’s form of spatial production. Through laying out Lefebvre’s three principal spatial concepts and how they are related, I aim to develop terms that allow me to evaluate Kalin’s improvised and individuated spatial production with the state mode of production.

As I have already outlined Lefebvre’s principal claim about space is that it is not a pre-existent given entity. It is not a simple container in which things happen or are placed. Space is an on-going production of spatial relations, ‘fashioned, shaped, and invested by social activities’. Lefebvre’s extensive critique of the production of space is achieved by expanding the knowledge of space and by practicing a cross-disciplinary methodology. Crucially, his approach moves away from the scientific notion of space to an idea of spatial production, which brings into play the relationship between mental, physical and social production. What is useful in Lefebvre’s writing is this weaving together of physical (tangible) space, mental space and the various processes of using and inhabiting space in particular ways.

**Conceived Space**

Conceived space is the space of abstraction, calculations, and geometry. Lefebvre also calls this kind of space ‘representations of space’ as it includes plans, maps, and drawings. Conceived space is where ‘scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as well as certain types of artists with a scientific bent

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44 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* 73.
45 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* 38.
identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived. Conceived space, therefore, exists primarily in the mental realm – it is not a physical or material space, and it does not involve a physical spatial practice. Conceived space is rather the mental space that imagines and conceptualises space of any description, including utopias and their opposite. David Harvey describes conceived space as the way in which humans represent the material world. ‘… We do not conceive of or represent space in arbitrary ways, but seek some appropriate if not accurate reflection of the material realities that surround us through abstract representations (words, graphs, maps, diagrams, pictures, etc.).’ Edward Soja observes that, ‘[s]uch order is constituted via control over knowledge, signs, and codes: over the means of deciphering spatial practice and hence over the production of spatial knowledge.’

Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space therefore underlines the tension between the practico-sensory realm of perceived space and types of conceived space such as the institutional space of planners, architects and urbanists, as well as the space of some artists, philosophers cinéastes etc. Lefebvre adds: ‘conceptions of space tend, with certain exceptions, towards a system of verbal (and therefore intellectually worked out) signs.’ This often takes the form of the written and the spoken word. Conceived space – as the dominant space linked to the relations of production that impose social order through design – can be therefore understood as the spatial term that characterises a state mode of production that dominates and undermines other forms of spatial production.

**Perceived Space**

Lefebvre says that perceived space is related to, ‘daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes, networks which link up the places set aside for work, private life and leisure).’ However, many Lefebvre scholars have commented on his complex and often self-contradictory style of writing, and how the terms he creates in his most important book, *The Production of Space*, are sometimes confusing. This is certainly the case for his notions of perceived and lived space, which appear to overlap and at

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46 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* 39. In the English translation of *The production of space* Donald Nicholson-Smith translates conceived space as representational space, but here I’m following Soja and Harvey’s re-naming of the term.


49 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* 39.

50 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* 38.
times become difficult to distinguish from one another in his writing. In order to clarify my own working definitions of these terms, I will draw on some secondary sources throughout this chapter. David Harvey uses a more “common sensical” reading of Lefebvre’s notion of perceived space. Harvey defines perceived space as material space, ‘the space of experience, perception open to physical touch and sensation.’ He goes on to say that perceived space is ‘for us humans, quite simply the world of tactile and sensual interaction with matter; it is the space of experience. The elements, moments and events in the world that are constituted out of a materiality of certain qualities.’ This is the space that our bodies interact with. It is the tangible space that I walk on, climb up, fly through, and build in. It is the space where conceived and lived forms of spatial practice materially exist. For Lefebvre perceived space is therefore also a form of spatial practice.

**Lived Space**

The last concept in Lefebvre’s triad of spatial terms is lived space. Lefebvre also refers to this as ‘spaces of representation’ and says this is the space that is ‘directly lived through its associated images and symbols and hence the space of inhabitants and users but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe.’ Lefebvre says that lived space is the space of inhabitants and users, but what does he mean by this? He is speaking about a particular way of inhabiting and using space that is more than just residing in it. Lefebvre’s lived space is the space produced by inhabitants and users, which involves building, changing, and adapting space to suit an inhabitant’s needs. In this sense, Lefebvre’s notion of lived space takes its cue from Martin Heidegger’s notion of dwelling and building as a way of defining human existence. Heidegger argues that the activities of building and dwelling are related to one another. He finds his evidence in the old English and High German word for the verb to build, *buan* which, he says, means to dwell. Heidegger’s notion of dwelling goes beyond the conventional definition of inhabiting, which is to live in, occupy or reside permanently in a particular place. It is  

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51 Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism* 130.
52 Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism* 130.
53 Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism* 131.
54 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* 39.
more than just the assurance of shelter.\textsuperscript{56} This is apparent when Heidegger questions the act of living in a house. He says modern housing may be low priced, well designed, easy to maintain, and have humanistic qualities of clean air, good light and sun, but he questions the degree to which dwelling actually occurs in it.\textsuperscript{57} In this sense, the act of dwelling alludes to the act of building. Heidegger asks to what extent an inhabitant of modern housing, or any house for that matter, is actively producing space rather than simply residing in space.\textsuperscript{58} Likewise, Lefebvre’s lived space is a way of inhabiting and using space that involves producing, changing, or adapting space to suit one’s needs. Lived space is the space of inhabitants and users that interact and engage directly in perceived and conceived space.

Lefebvre’s triad of spatial terms will help me to analyse Kalin’s garden and its relationship to the state mode of production. Later in this chapter, I will view Kalin’s mode of spatial production through the lens of Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. Before I do this, however it is important to contextualise and expand the definition of the state mode of production.

\textbf{The State and Capitalism}

At times in my own writing, and indeed in Lefebvre’s, it can seem as if the state mode of production and the capitalist mode of production are used interchangeably. At the time, Lefebvre wrote \textit{The Production of Space} in France (1974), a national urbanisation process was in full swing, the social democratic state mode of production was dominant. Lefebvre’s notion of state mode of production describes how a state maintains and reproduces itself by producing continuity of an ideology, a way of thinking, a way of life, a way of producing, by maintaining the social relations of production necessary for its own survival.\textsuperscript{59} Lefebvre had a strong critique of the state: ‘there is no “good State”; today there is no state which can avoid moving towards this logical outcome: the state mode of production; that’s why the only criterion of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{57} Heidegger, \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought} 146.
\textsuperscript{58} Heidegger, \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought}.
\textsuperscript{59} Henri Lefebvre and Frank Bryant, \textit{The Survival of Capitalism : Reproduction of the Relations of Production} (London: Allison and Busby, 1976).
\end{footnotesize}
democracy is the prevention of such an outcome.\textsuperscript{60} The social democratic state produces spaces that facilitate capital accumulation by facilitating the production, regulation, and production of capitalist space. \textsuperscript{61}

If this was the context of Lefebvre’s critique of the state, then how does the term state mode of production operate in my dissertation? It is clear that many kinds of modern state exist, and in many forms: from monopoly capitalism, to social democratic, totalitarian, neo-liberal and so on. It is also clear that the relationship between the state and capitalism has been fiercely debated since at least the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century. From Karl Marx’s writing on the Paris Commune, to his debates with Bakunin and later, to Lenin’s heated arguments about the role of the state, and on to 1968, the counter-globalisation movements in the late 1990s and into the current banking crises and ensuing social movements against enforced austerity, the state and its role in progressive social change is understood in conflicting ways. Debates in these most recent contexts re-formulate somewhat schematically a division between those who believe the state should be there to protect us from the excesses of capitalism, to re-distribute wealth, and act in the name of general social good, and those who argue that the state and capitalism are intimately bound up, and so the state cannot be of any use to those who strive for progressive social change. We might trace the former position to Hegel’s understanding of the state: ‘as the embodiment of society’s general interest, as standing above particular interests, and as being therefore able to overcome the division between civil society and the state and the split between the individual as private person and as citizen.’\textsuperscript{62} It could be argued further that this view continues in part through the ideologies of social democracy. The political theorist Andrew Heywood argues:

\textquote[\ldots]{} social democracy stands for a balance between the market and the state, a balance between the individual and the community. At the heart of the social democratic position is an attempt to establish a compromise between, on the one hand, an acceptance of capitalism as the only reliable mechanism for generating wealth, and, on the


\textsuperscript{61} Goonewardena, Kipfer, Richard and Schmid, \textit{Space Difference, Everyday Life} 238.

other, a desire to distribute social rewards, in accordance with moral, rather than market, principles.\textsuperscript{63}

Marx however, rejected Hegel’s claims about the state on the grounds that the state, ‘in real life, does not stand for the general interest but defends the interests of property.’\textsuperscript{64} Furthermore, Engels points out that the state ‘has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no idea of the estate and state power.’ He argues, however, that the birth of the state is synonymous with ‘a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the spilt of society into classes; the state became a necessity owing to this split.’\textsuperscript{65} Rather than working to reform the state, Marx famously argues in the ‘18\textsuperscript{th} Brumaire’ that all revolutions have ever succeeded in doing is perfecting the machinery of the state, instead of smashing it.\textsuperscript{66} He writes that ‘the next attempt of the French revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it, and this is the preliminary condition of every real people’s revolution on the continent.’\textsuperscript{67}

Writing from prison between 1926 and 1934, Antonio Gramsci argued that: ‘a major function of the state in its partnership with the economically dominant class is to regulate class conflict and to ensure the stability of the social order.’ \textsuperscript{68} Rather than argue that this function is limited to a certain kind of capitalist state, he says that ‘the class rule which the state sanctions and defends assumes many different forms, from the democratic republic to dictatorship; the form which class rule assumes is a matter of great importance to the working class in a context of private ownership and appropriation, however, it remains class rule, whatever its form.’\textsuperscript{69} As we can see in this latter view, appealing to the state, or seeking its reformation, is seen as inadequate as the state itself is utterly bound up, both in its inception and in its practical functioning, with maintaining and managing property and class relations. In other words, the state cannot and has no interest in moderating, or protecting us from capitalism.

\textsuperscript{63} [Heywood, 2000 #51@74]
\textsuperscript{64} Heywood, \textit{Key Concepts in Politics} 72.
\textsuperscript{66} Bottomore, \textit{A Dictionary of Marxist Thought} 467.
\textsuperscript{68} Bottomore, \textit{A Dictionary of Marxist Thought} 466.
\textsuperscript{69} Bottomore, \textit{A Dictionary of Marxist Thought} 466.
Crucial to these debates, however, has been the notion of freedom – both individual freedom and broader questions of social emancipation. It could be argued that while the political system and ideologies of social democracy act in the name of equality and emancipation, they are also ‘top down versions of socialism, meaning that socialism amounts to an extension of state control and a restriction of freedom.’\textsuperscript{70} This problem further complicates the schema above, for those who argue against engagement with the state, perhaps in the very name of freedom, often end up aligned with a form of liberalism – or, in today’s political configuration – neo-liberalism.

The classical notion of liberalism, where individual freedom and the limitation of political authority are advocated, can be traced back to John Locke’s \textit{Two Treatises of Government} published in 1690. The political theorist and historian John Marshall writes that:

\begin{quote}
It is this combination of the assertion that individual men are responsible for their own action and should be free because of their capacity to reason, with the limitation of political authority to the preservation of individual property, including their liberty, that gives rise to the classic view of Locke as the founder of liberalism.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

While the central theme of liberalism as a political ideology revolves around a commitment to the individual and the construction of a notion of the individual, I would argue that liberalism and capitalism have always been intrinsically linked. Arising during the time of the transition from feudalism to the modern state, capitalist society coincided with the birth of the bourgeois individual; Heywood argues, ‘early liberalism certainly reflected the aspirations of a rising industrial middle class’.\textsuperscript{72} He adds that, ‘in the nineteenth century, classical liberalism, in the form of economic liberalism, extolled the virtues of laissez-faire capitalism and condemned all forms of government intervention.’\textsuperscript{73} Although in the late nineteenth century, a form of social liberalism emerged that looked more favourably upon welfare reform and economic intervention, the central principles of liberalism and its relation to the state can still be seen in recent forms of the neo-liberal state and governance. David Harvey argues that ‘the fundamental mission of the neo liberal state is to create a ‘good business climate’ and

\textsuperscript{70}Heywood, \textit{Key Concepts in Politics} 77.
\textsuperscript{72}Heywood, \textit{Key Concepts in Politics} 61.
\textsuperscript{73}Heywood, \textit{Key Concepts in Politics} 61-62.
‘therefore to optimize conditions for capital accumulation no matter what the consequences for employment or social well-being.’

Through privatisation programmes, reducing taxation on business, enforcing flexibility on labour, and by promoting globalised “free trade”, Harvey argues that neo-liberalism ‘trumpets the virtues of competition while actually opening the markets to centralized capital and monopoly power.’

Harvey’s position, shared with many others, is that far from moving away from the state and towards freedom and emancipation, neo-liberalism is simply another configuration of the relationship between state and capital. Under neo-liberalism, the state continues to regulate class conflict and ensures the stability of the social order. It does this both through consent (for which an individualised sense of freedom is crucial) and increasingly through coercion (enlarged prison populations, increasing military and police forces, for example). Through outsourcing, privatisations, and deregulation, the state appears less present, less centralised, authoritative and less visibly the direct source of endless bureaucracy. Nevertheless, it is the state that mandates this outsourcing, and it is the revolving door of business leaders and political leaders that manage and profit from it. The state continues to plan and enforce from above the complete re-structuring of all aspects of social life as a business, a competitive market in which we are “free” to choose how to consume. As seen in the popular discourses of the American right, this conflation of freedom with the neo-liberal small state produces endless contradictions.

In a related example of how a claim or desire for freedom and freedom from the state can end up aligned with neo-liberalism, Nancy Fraser analyses second wave feminism in the west. She argues that in pitting freedom against the paternalistic state, second wave feminism largely fell in line with the principles of neo-liberalism, its economic and labour terms. For example, in arguing against the sexism of the ‘family wage’ and for women’s right to work, we are no closer to any claim for a social wage, as women have been simply subsumed under the same capitalist wage-labour laws and regimes as men. While aware of the problems with feminist campaigns for social protection from

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74 Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism 25.
75 Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism 25.
76 Thinking of Walden Bello
77 Nancy Fraser, “Marketization, Social Protection, Emancipation: Toward a Neo-Polanyian Conception of Capitalist Crisis,” The Crisis of Capitalism (Goethe University Frankfurt: 2010).
the state, Fraser argues that all projects of social emancipation must ally with demands for social protection while finding a way out of the duality of the social protection via the state, versus freedom in the form of neo-liberalism.

The principal discussion of the spaces with which this thesis is concerned occur against the backdrop of a neo-liberal state such as the UK, where I grew up, the social democratic states of France, where I lived for 15 years, and Germany, where Kalin’s garden is situated. When I entered the labour market in the UK in 1979, Margaret Thatcher was starting her first term as prime minister as head of the Conservative Party. During her three and half terms in office, the radical changes she made to public services, the welfare system, labour laws and public utilities such as transport, energy and housing, transformed the UK from a social democratic state to a neo-liberal one. This transformation saw state owned, state regulated public services and utilities shift from public ownership into private ownership to become enterprises run for profit. Five years later, and partly because of these transformations, I moved to France. Here I experienced a much more centralised, bureaucratic social democracy, in which the state expected conformism and promoted a much stronger nationalist identity and set of social ‘ideals’. On arriving in Paris in 1994, my impression of the French state can be summarised to some extent by my first encounter with a French artist. He was complaining about the lack of grants available to artists in France at that time. What struck me was how he seemed to be immobilised by his situation. It was clear to me, having arrived from the UK – where artists expected no financial aid from the state, and as such were expected to fend for themselves – that artists in France expected to some extent to be taken care of. In this respect, the French state appeared to me as benevolent and paternal in its practice of social democracy. During my fifteen years in France while I earned most my living by renovating apartments, I did benefit from a number of substantial state art grants that allowed me to experiment in an unconditional and un-commercial way with my art practice. Although I was struck by the contrast between UK artists and French artists it is not my intention to become involved in a discussion of a fake duality between forms of state that express social protection on the one hand and freedom and self determination on the other. However, these experiences of different forms of state and their relationship to spatial production have been key for this thesis. While I could see that the state mode of production and the capitalist mode of production could not be separated from each other either in the UK or in France, their
configuration produced substantial differences in how space is produced, managed and understood.

In the 1970s, according to Lefebvre, the French state had an unparalleled capacity to channel large-scale, long-term investment into the built environment for industrial production, collective consumption, commodity circulation, transportation, and communication. This, he argued, gave the state a privileged institutional position in the production of capitalist spatiality. This led him to note that ‘only the state can take on the task of managing space on a grand scale.’ While in the 1970s this state mode of production – specifically its monopoly of networks and resources – were clear and direct, under neo-liberalism, a capitalist monopoly, facilitated and often subsidised by the state, emerged more subtly in the UK and the US from the 1980s onward.

What I want to underline in this brief analysis of the state is that whether talking about the protecting, paternalist and unifying social democratic state or the neo-liberal state that promotes “small government” and reduced social welfare in favour of “individual freedom”, in the final analysis it is the state that has the power to deregulate or regulate resources, markets, infrastructure, labour, banking and so on. Therefore, I understand all forms of state to come under the heading of state mode of production. In other words, I am not interested in examining a false binary between capitalist and socialist democratic space in my contexts. What I am interested in exploring is the way that Kalin creates a different form of space from that of the state mode of production; how he claims space for himself, the way he creates a degree of autonomy over his space, and the way he informally organises his space. All of this complicates the various forms of state modes of production. At the end of chapter three, I will develop these arguments by looking at the distinction between the state mode of production and informally organised space through Lefebvre’s term ‘maximal difference’. Lefebvre uses this term to emphasise the illusionary difference or choices that the state mode of production creates regardless of ideology.

79 Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism.
The Lived Space of Osman Kalin

Lived space is Lefebvre’s most useful spatial category in terms of analysing Kalin’s mode of production. Nevertheless, how exactly is Kalin’s mode of spatial production an example of lived space? In the introduction to this chapter, I described how Kalin has claimed a space, and continuously hand-built it, using and arranging materials in a way that allows the space to evolve over time. These elements represent the informal qualities of Kalin’s mode of production. Furthermore, the materials that make up the one-storey hut like structure and the perimeter fence around the garden show the high degree of contingency involved in both Kalin’s choice of materials and the way in which they are spatially arranged. There is an evident accumulation of materials that have come to hand at various times throughout the building of the space. As stated above, an example of this is the perimeter fence of Kalin’s garden, which is made from a variety of re-cycled materials such as metal grills, bed frames, wooden posts and street barriers. Similarly, the one-storey hut like structure is mostly assembled out of recycled wood such as bits of furniture, old doors and windows, planks and floorboards. Kalin has assembled materials in such a way that the majority of surfaces are neither vertically nor horizontally level. The result is a patchwork of shapes, uneven surfaces and a mixture of textures and colour.

This contingent use and arrangement of materials is one of the ways in which Kalin’s mode of spatial production contrasts with the surrounding architecture. Whether buildings are constructed by the GDR or by the West Germans, they conform to building regulations, codes of practice and standards of construction that are followed and respected by architects, town planners and builders, and ignored by Kalin. A photograph taken from the inside of Kalin’s garden in 2000 shows Kalin’s hut-like structure with a view of three apartment blocks in the background that were constructed sometime between 1960 to 1980. The right angles of the walls and the alignment and repetition of the doors and windows of these apartments are just some of the architectural features that signify order, technique, permanence, stability, continuity and uniformity of materials – all of which are characteristics of conceived space. The solidity and order of these buildings emphasises the apparent disorder of Kalin’s hut-like structure, which looks as if it would blow away in a strong wind.
The photo shows the back of Kalin’s hut. We have to look hard at the density of different materials that make up the strange construction in order to distinguish between them. The majority of materials are neither horizontal or vertical, nor straight or level. Instead, the wooden boards of various origins that make up the façade are leaning and tilting into each other. From this point of view, I see no right angles. Structural strength would seem to be provided by the way the materials have been layered on top of one another. This is strength by accumulation, rather than by rational technique. The jagged surfaces and curved lines give a very ornamented and cluttered aesthetic, which some might find stimulating and decorative but others would find barbaric, disturbing and inferior to the classical equilibrium of rectangles and pure volumes.80 This is an observation that I will return to later in this chapter when I will discuss an early example of Le Corbusier’s workers settlement in Pessac, France. However, for the moment, it is important to underline how the apparently chaotic layering of materials reveals the process of a structure evolving over time.

Kalin’s informal and contingent spatial arrangement of materials is evidence of how he produces lived space. The evolutionary nature of his space is another way that Kalin produces lived space. It is a testimony to the way Kalin is actively living in his space, which, arguably, demonstrates the difference between Heidegger’s notion of residing

and dwelling. If we compare photographs taken of the triangular plot of land over different time periods since the fall of the Berlin Wall, then we can see the extent to which the size and shape of the garden has changed over time and, perhaps more remarkably, the variations of the one-storey hut-like structure that he built from 1982 to 2004. These documents show that Kalin is not working within time constraints. He produced his space over a period of many years and was continuing to make changes to it until he was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. This aspect of Kalin’s mode of spatial production is not restricted by time; there is no ‘building deadline’. Instead, time is open, allowing for experimentation and failure, which is how his space evolves, continually changing form. While Kalin’s garden and hut were made through a process of dwelling, it was the ambivalent status of the triangular plot of land that allowed Kalin to bypass the laws of either the GDR or the West German jurisdiction and was a precondition for the type of lived space that he has been able to produce. The way that Kalin’s mode of spatial production is revealed by looking at his garden also exposes the limits of analysing the space. How the space looks is not enough to understand its significance. The ambivalent status of the triangular plot of land gave Kalin the opportunity to physically construct his own space. However, in the process Kalin also claims a space for himself. Despite the quasi acceptance of the garden by the state, significantly his claim to space is manifested from the bottom up.

The informal and contingent attributes as well as the evolutionary nature of Kalin’s mode of spatial production could also be thought of as a form of bricolage; that is, a sense of making do with what is at hand. Physical equivalents of Kalin’s mode of spatial production can be found in the sheds on allotments in England, France, and many other countries. It is also the kind of architecture that spatial theorists, architects, and urbanists associate with the much-admired barrios, bidonvilles, shantytowns, and favelas around the world. As we have seen, one local journalist described Kalin’s garden and one-storey hut-like structure as a gecekondu in Berlin, referring to Kalin’s Turkish origins 81 and to the common name in Turkey for a form of low cost spontaneous housing. 82 Despite the similarities between Kalin’s space and the above-mentioned informal types of architecture, it is important to mention here that differences between his space and informally constructed forms of quasi-legal spontaneous

81 Korfmann, “Ein Stück Anatolien in Berlin.”
82 Lefebvre, The Production of Space 373.
housing. Significantly, Kalin did not produce his space to live on. He already has a modern apartment close to the garden in the district of Kreuzberg. The fact that Kalin does not live on the triangular plot of land underlines an important distinction between residing in space and lived space that is produced by a process of using and inhabiting space in a specific way. The apartment that provides Kalin with shelter as well as all the conveniences of modern life belongs to the category of conceived space, as it is a space that is designed and built for residing.

**Conceived Modes of Spatial Production**

Having spoken about the qualities of Kalin’s space and how his way of dwelling and building can be defined in terms of Lefebvre’s notion of lived space, I now want to give two examples of conceived modes of spatial production. These examples sit in stark contrast to the triangular plot of land, and will allow me to further explore what is at stake for me in this analysis of Kalin’s garden. If Kalin’s garden can be understood as his own singular utopia, how does this differ from the social utopian vision of architects and planners in the 1960 and 1970s? I mentioned earlier that it is not only the physical and visual difference of Kalin’s space that I am interested in, but also its transgressive use of space. The first example of conceived space that I will explore concerns the specifically French state mode of production that was in evidence during the post war reconstruction of France between 1950 and 1970. The French urbanisation process during this period is interesting because of the scale of the project and the centralised way that it was implemented. It is epitomized by the elevated role of the civil engineers who developed new building, production, and administrative techniques that standardised the production of housing as well as living space. The post war French urbanisation process is a very clear example of a type of conceived space that dominates most other modes of production, and in this way aims to unify space by eliminating spatial difference, as I will go on to explain.

This first example of a conceived mode of production is characterised by a high degree of intervention by the civil engineer. While French post-war housing construction is a powerful example of Lefebvre’s conceived space, it is important to remember that Lefebvre also saw some forms of an artist’s spatial production as a production of conceived space. In the second example of conceived space, I consider a housing
project of the architect and town planner Le Corbusier. What is interesting about Le Corbusier’s production of conceived space is that he appears to share many of the qualities of the French state mode of production that define conceived space – such as the standardisation of building techniques, and standardised construction components. Le Corbusier also has a vision of habitation that is imposed on future inhabitants from the top down. However, as we will see, the way that Le Corbusier intended his houses to be used and how they were actually lived in did not always match up. This is evident, for example in the Quartiers Modernes Frugès, Le Corbusier’s first major realisation of workers housing in Pessac, France. Philippe Boudon, an architectural theorist, published an account of how inhabitants of the Quartiers Modernes Frugès altered the original design of Le Corbusier’s houses to suit their needs and desires. Boudon’s account allows me to consider how Le Corbusier’s production of conceived space differs from the conceived space of the state. In addition, this example will allow me to explore how users adapt space and how these adaptations might therefore complicate the dichotomy between conceived and lived space.

It is important to note here again that my reading of Lefebvre’s spatial terms places great emphasis on the Heideggerian aspect of lived space in which a distinction is made between space that is produced through the act of building and dwelling as opposed to space that is not actively lived in, but simply resided in. What is at stake in my comparison of the post war French urbanisation process and Le Corbusier’s architecture is not a detailed analysis of the broader social and political aims of these contrasting modes of production. It is rather to probe further Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. Although my chosen examples of lived and conceived spatial production are diverse, their particular qualities and my specific knowledge of these spaces allows me to frame the way in which I want to analyse Kalin’s garden; namely, in terms of the antithesis between specific individual and collective forms of living implied in these versions of individual and social utopias. An important contrast emerges between how an architect or planner intends a space to be used and how it is actually used. In turning now to forms of social housing I want to explore tensions between conceived space and lived space and the question of whether inhabitants of social housing are required to give up individual spatial needs and desires in order to conform to the state ideal of what is ‘social’ and what living together might entail.
Dwelling in the State Mode of Conceived Space

My reading of the French state mode of production is largely informed by the French architectural and urban historian Bruno Vayssière. Vayssière is the author of a critical study of the post war French urbanisation process entitled *Reconstruction-Deconstruction*. He used the term ‘Hard French’ to describe a form of urbanism based on the aesthetics and economics of concrete. Vayssière argues that the specificity of French urbanization programmes during the 1950s and 1970s was a response to a housing crisis that was exacerbated by the effects the Second World War. France’s relatively late development of industrialisation compared to other industrialised countries such as the United Kingdom meant that after the war the country was still a largely rural society characterised by fragmented and plural forms of housing. The aim of the French urbanisation process was to provide affordable housing for everyone. Housing programmes also revealed however, the will of the French state to modernise its economy and industry and homogenise a nation.

The degree to which a plural form of housing was replaced by a national form of housing in France could only have been achieved through a strong and dominant state mode of production, every bit of which exemplifies the category of conceived space. The dominant aesthetic of the French state mode of production during this period can be defined by the extensive use of re-enforced concrete. This was the main ingredient of the hard monolithic forms that replaced stone, whose smooth hard surface of carved limestone had defined the state spatially through institutional buildings and spaces. In contrast, the use of re-enforced concrete extended beyond institutional and governmental buildings to house a large percentage of the population, its functionality becoming an aesthetic symbol of equality and housing for all.

The French state’s will to produce affordable housing for everyone was an important vehicle in transforming a nation into a modern productive state. The process of urbanisation during this period was a motor for economic development as well as a process of consolidating space into a unified national territory. What defined the French urbanisation process more than anything, and what makes it a useful example for understanding Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space, is the way in which it was

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83 Vayssière, *Reconstruction - Déconstruction*.
defined by technocratic procedures. This was expressed through the privileged and expanded role of civil engineers, which far outweighed that of the architect during the urbanisation period. During the post-war French urbanisation process there is a transfer of technique from one sphere to another. Before the Second World War, the role of the civil engineer was confined to the building of roads, bridges, and viaducts. After the war, the same materials, techniques, and use of re-enforced concrete previously used for bridges were applied to making the foundations of high-rise housing estates (les grands ensembles).\(^{86}\) Crucially, the civil engineers formed a connection between the technical knowledge and administrative expertise necessary to control resources and to effectively organise society over a national territory. Once it was bridges and roads that connected one place to another; now it was housing.\(^{87}\)

These skills formed the juridical and technical infrastructure of what has come to be known as ‘Hard French’ architecture. The point that I want to underline here is that the conceived space produced by the French state during this period, which is defined by the dominance of the technical and administrative expertise, is at the cost of a more singular, creative, everyday form of conceived space. In addition, the distinction and shift in roles between the architect and the civil engineer that emerges in the post-war French urbanisation process allowed a further opening up of Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space. In this reading of the post-war French urbanisation process, the distinction between the civil engineers form of conceived space and an architectural spatial practice is defined more by singular, contingent, or specific concerns than statistics and population management.

At the beginning of the French urbanisation process, the construction industry was largely based on artisan techniques, which are exemplified by an empirical knowledge of physical materials and the manual or semi manual techniques needed to work with them. The artisanal way of building a wall meant fixing many bricks or stone elements together with mortar, and making sure the wall was vertically and horizontally straight and level. As the urbanisation process evolved, large-scale production line methods were developed to facilitate a large part of the construction of social housing. Walls,

\(^{86}\) Despite the grey social realities of les grands ensembles today their title (great collectives) reveals the monumentality of the French urbanisation process and the ideology of a singular identity contained therein. The UK equivalent of the les grands ensembles is the high-rise housing estate, which is a purely descriptive, functional term.

\(^{87}\) Vayssière, Reconstruction - Déconstruction 59.
doorways, windows, stairs, and other such prefabricated building components were produced in factories in series. These prefabricated components were then transported from the factory to the construction site where they were assembled. Prefabricated construction elements may have been fast to produce. However, in reality they were very heavy and because of this had to be transported by water, which was slower than road or rail transport. There were also difficulties in joining the prefabricated elements to the main building structure.

Figure 14. Two workers assembling a house with prefabricated housing elements (1968)

The slow transport and added assembly problems, ironically underlined the false economy of prefabricated construction components as well as revealing the extent of the state’s commitment to modernise in this way. The invention of prefabricated construction components is however, an example of the way that the French state restructured production processes in order to promote speed, economy, and standardisation. The French state’s serialisation of living spaces symbolises the difference between residing and dwelling or conceived and lived space more than anything. The process of serialisation standardises space, removing any initiative or input of inhabitants. It undermines the capacity of an individual to produce a type of

88 Vayssière, Reconstruction - Déconstruction 126.
space that evolves over time. In his book, *Reconstruction-Deconstruction* Bruno Vayssière states that:

Most social housing before the war still used a certain number of transitional spaces derived from the traditional French house. The French still lived in furnished houses and pavilions, as well as with their parents. An important proportion of the French population were housed as concierges (1/9 of the Parisian population). Contrary to this dispersed form of housing, the ideal cell of the 1950s was intended to re-concentre a population. 89

The model French family consisted of two adults and two children, which became the model for a family cell apartment. This consisted of a cell that was divided into four spaces: the parent’s bedroom, the children’s bedroom, a living room, a small kitchen, and a small bathroom. This spatial arrangement was know as ‘formula four’, which is abbreviated to F4. The F4 cell composition was the basis for the spatial arrangement of apartments and studios suitable for other family sizes. The overall composition of a high-rise bock of flats was based on the multiplication of rectangular F6 cell units. This allowed for variable distribution of apartments sizes throughout a block, as the cellular space of an F6 is equal to an F4 plus an F2, or two F3s and finally an F5 plus an F1. 90

Importantly, an apartment building is constructed on the basis of load bearing walls that run from the top to the bottom of the building. The reinforced concrete walls are not only hard and difficult to cut through, they are also the very structure of the building and cannot be altered. The load bearing walls that slice through an apartment building creates a closed architectural plan for each cellular apartment. It structurally precludes a form of dwelling that involves changing a space to suit one’s needs. Lefebvre says that a user’s space is ‘lived – not represented (or conceived). When compared with the abstract space of the experts (architects, urbanists, planners) the space of the everyday activities of users is a concrete one, which is to say, subjective.’ 91 What I understand Lefebvre to mean by the subjectiveness of lived space is that the over-determination of conceived space is designed for residing rather than living, and has little capacity for transformation.

91 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* 362.
There are of course exceptions to this. Despite the seemingly impenetrable, unchangeable appearance of such concrete spaces, one can find examples of inhabitants appropriating state forms of conceived spaces. Examples of how inhabitants have changed such serialised living space can be found in the high-rise housing estates in Grenoble where I lived for two years. For instance, Mahmoud Boukadoum, a resident of Villeneuve, constructed a recording studio in his living room. He did this by building a soundproof room that he suspended within his living room. A more common alteration made by residents of les grands ensembles is the use of the external space of the balcony to extend the living room space. In La cite Bellevue, Marseille, inhabitants have achieved this by bricking up their balconies. However, these are exceptional cases, or cases that can occur because they exist on what are now the social margins of these cities, that is, in the deprived areas of the city where there is less social control of these buildings.

Figure 15, La cite Bellevue, rue Felix Payat, Marseille, France

The post war French urbanisation process that took place between 1950 and 1970 presents a clear example of conceived space. This is a conceived space produced by the state that is defined by the role of the civil engineers. In this urbanisation process the civil engineers developed techniques of standardisation, and a mode of administration of building processes whose intentions were to do away with archaic plural housing and create a modern unified space. I have discussed conceived space here in terms of habitation in order to underline how the space produced in the state mode of production is not for actively living in the Heideggerian sense of dwelling and building. There is clearly a huge contrast between these buildings constructed within a certain state mode of production and the lived quality of Kalin’s mode of spatial production.

Having discussed the conceived space of the state, characterised by, ‘the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers’, I now want
to briefly expand Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space in order to include the space of a, ‘certain type of artist with a scientific bent - all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived.’\textsuperscript{92}

Below, I will discuss the Quartier Modern Frugés in Pessac, France, which was constructed in 1927. This project was Le Corbusier’s earliest attempt at building workers housing and the first major opportunity for Le Corbusier to experiment with a concept of standard housing and town planning. Like the French post war urbanisation process, Le Corbusier’s formula for standard housing and planning was based on economic, statistical, rational, and technocratic processes. Nevertheless, what he produced was also his own vision of space and as such, contained within it the contradictions between how space is designed and how it is lived. Le Corbusier aspired to produce good quality low cost housing for workers at the same time as assembling a form of architecture and town planning that promotes collective living. Unlike the post war French urbanisation process, Le Corbusier wanted to produce a variety of spatial forms and maintain a degree of individuality using standard building components. What makes the Quartier Modern Frugés pertinent to this analysis of conceived space is the way in which inhabitants of the project rejected the specific architectural principles that Le Corbusier proposed from the start. The first houses of the Quartier Modern Frugés were occupied between 1929 and 1930. From this moment onwards, certain inhabitants began to make changes to the original architecture of Le Corbusier. These alterations said a great deal about the gap that had emerged between the concept and the design of the houses and their eventual use. As we will see, the Quartier Modern Frugés also said a lot about what happens when a social utopia is handed over to people who don’t necessarily want it, or who choose not to take part in the way they were supposed to. The Quartier Modern Frugés further underlines the key dynamics of spatial production that were thrown into relief when I first observed Kalin’s mode of spatial production: namely, the contrast between individual forms of living and social utopia (community) and between conceived space, (residing as passively adapting to architecture) and lived space (dwelling as actively living in architecture, changing it to suit one’s needs).

\textsuperscript{92} Lefebvre, \textit{The Production of Space} 39.
Le Corbusier’s Lived-in Architecture

In 1922, M. Henri Frugés, an industrialist and philanthropist who was interested in art and culture, commissioned Le Corbusier to produce houses for the workers who worked at his sugar cube factory in Pessac. This is how Le Corbusier described M. H. Frugès’s brief for the project:

…M. H. Frugés said to us: I authorise you to put your theories into practice and to carry them to their most extreme conclusions; I wish to achieve a really conclusive result in the field of low-cost housing: The Quartier Modern Frugés must be regarded as a laboratory. I authorise you to break with all conventions and abandon traditional methods. In a word: I am asking you to tackle the problem of designing a house, to establish a suitable form of standardisation, to build walls, floors and roofs to a high standard of strength and durability and to introduce a full system of Taylorization by the use of machines, which I authorize you to purchase. You will equip and design the interiors of these houses to make them easy and pleasant to live in. As for any aesthetic quality that may result from your innovation; this should reflect the contemporary epoch. The purity of the proportion will provide you with the most eloquent testimony.93

The Quartier Modern Frugés was Le Corbusier’s first major attempt at building social housing on a large scale. Le Corbusier constructed 51 houses in Pessac, which were completed around 1927. The project was an opportunity for Le Corbusier to put his theories about urban reform into practice. Le Corbusier wrote a lot about the need to move away from the chaotic and over decorative forms of habitation and architecture that were constructed over a long duration without a master plan. He criticised traditional housing, which was based largely on a substantial survey of regional housing published in 1884. The survey revealed the plurality of housing in the various regions of France. The goal of the survey was to deduce common characteristics from the thousands of dwellings whose elements could be defined in order to clarify a house-type. This survey influenced Le Corbusier’s search for a minimal-standard house-type suitable to contemporary needs. Le Corbusier was critical of the intuitive plan of the traditional French house with its thick heavy stone walls that create a frozen plan, a closed architectural space that is difficult to change. He believed that the design of the traditional French house is cluttered by unnecessary ornamentation, and that the curved lines and jagged surfaces create an aesthetic disequilibrium. Le Corbusier’s vision of

93 Le Corbusier in Boudon, Pessac De Le Corbusier 193.
architecture was based on an idea of the purity of minimal geometric forms ordered according to proportions derived from his reworking of the golden ratio. Le Corbusier argued that an uncluttered space is a harmonious space, and improves the living conditions of working people.

Le Corbusier achieved his form of minimalist standard housing in the Quartier Modern Frugés by exploiting the benefits of reinforced concrete. These allowed him to experiment with factory produced prefabricated components. Le Corbusier’s use of prefabricated standard construction components cut the cost of building a house. It is possible for standard construction components and elements such as windows, doors, walls, and staircases to be arranged in different ways to produce variety. Thus, the prefabricated elements are part of the economy of house construction, but the standard elements are used in such a way as to create variety and difference: they become components, signs that can create a spatial language. In terms of my exploration of the distinction between dwelling and residing, it becomes clear that it is not simply the utilisation of reinforced concrete and standard construction components that determines the nature of the housing space. Le Corbusier’s designs for housing reveal his desire to create spatial variety using standard building components, which was missing from the social housing produced by the French state in the 1950 and 1970.

The difference between the conceived space produced during the French urbanisation process and the type of conceived space that Le Corbusier produced in his early projects was that of two approaches to building mass living spaces. These approaches have a significant bearing on how such spaces of habitation are dwelled in (lived in) or resided in. Of course, Le Corbusier’s experimentation in social housing occurred twenty years or so before the French post war urbanisation process. Yet, his architectural ethos appeared to have much in common with the way in which the French post war urbanisation process was defined: his research and belief in the standard formula living space based on a house-type; his commitment to developing industrial building processes characterised by prefabricated building components, the use of reinforced concrete; and finally his belief in the role of scientific, statistical research and civil engineering in the construction of habitation. Despite these similarities, there is a use of these resources that distinguishes Le Corbusier’s architectural model from the French post war urbanisation process. Whereas social housing produced by the French state
eliminated difference, the houses Le Corbusier designed for the Quartier Modern Frugès
tried to maintain individuality. There are two important ways in which Le
Corbusier attempted to do this. First, his spatial arrangement of standard elements
allowed each habitation to distinguish itself from the next. The basis of Le Corbusier’s
houses were standard cell modules that measured 5 metres by 5 metres, a demi-module
of 5 metres by 2.5 metres and a quarter module of 2.5 metres x 2.5 metres. ‘By playing
around with these three elements, by placing them in different alignments, it was
possible to obtain considerable diversity.’\(^94\) Apart from the visual differentiation created
through the play of modules, Le Corbusier guaranteed that inhabitants of cell modules
experienced a degree of intimacy and privacy from their neighbour. Le Corbusier
achieved this with a system of alternating façades:

… every house is turned back to front, which ensures that each
individual house is readily distinguishable from its neighbours.
Thus, differentiation is achieved by effecting positional variations of
absolutely identical components. This variation also ensures that
each pair of houses is isolated in functional terms. The result is that
the bedroom of one house is juxtaposed to the terrace of the two
neighbouring houses. By juxtaposing living areas which served
different purposes – bedroom/terrace or dining room/patio – Le
Corbusier achieved a high degree of isolation, both physically and
psychologically…\(^95\)

The second way that Le Corbusier attempted to maintain individuality and difference in
the Quartier Modern Frugès is perhaps his most important innovation: the Dom-ino
system. Whereas traditional buildings used load-bearing walls as the basis of
construction, in the Dom-ino system it is the floor that bears the weight. The Dom-ino
system is based on solid reinforced concrete floors built on stilts (pilotis). For architects
the benefit of this is not only that the layout of the interior space is not fixed, it is also
that the façade of the building is not load bearing. This gives the architect more freedom
with the exterior and interior surfaces as well as the spatial layout. An apartment built
on the basis of the Dom-ino system has consequences for the occupant too, because the
open plan structure allows for change. The principle of the open plan skeletal
construction of living spaces is what distinguishes the Dom-ino system from most social
housing produced by the French state during the post war urbanisation process, which
were built on the principle of load bearing reinforced concrete walls.

\(^{94}\) M.H. Frugès in Boudon, *Pessac De Le Corbusier* 11.
\(^{95}\) Boudon, *Pessac De Le Corbusier* 38.
Figure 16. Le Corbusier’s standardisation principle

Figure 17. Le Corbusier’s Dom-ino
The Quartier Modern Frugés was constructed to house the workers of Mr Frugés’s sugar factory, who were used to living in traditional houses. How did these occupants experience Le Corbusier’s radical design of living space, which broke with such traditional forms of housing? Lefebvre addresses this issue directly, commenting that the inhabitants:

[i]nstead of installing themselves in their containers, instead of adapting to them and living in them ‘passively’, they decided that as far as possible they were going to live ‘actively’. In doing so they showed what living in a house really is: an activity.96

Apart from the variation designed and legislated for in Le Corbusier’s original units, the inhabitants of the Quartier Modern Frugés made many alterations to their living spaces. Their alterations destroyed his concept of geometric purity, and of clear and uncluttered spatial functionality. The inhabitants decorated the façade with plant pots; they shortened the long windows by bricking up the ends. The flat roofs that Le Corbusier designed were intended to do away with the attic space where so much clutter accumulates over time – and to extend the internal living space by providing a roof garden. However, many inhabitants covered the roof area and used it as a storage space. An open space on the ground floor was often converted into a garage by enclosing the space with doors. These are just some of the ways that the inhabitants altered Le Corbusier’s original design and in so doing, disrupted the visual consistency of the architecture.

It is crucial to note, of course, that Le Corbusier was in no way concerned with producing the conditions for this kind of lived space. His designs imagined and conceptualised these living spaces from an abstract realm of mental space. Although his position and the scale of his commissions did not allow him to impose social order through design to anything like the same degree as the mass housing construction of the post-war French State, his is nevertheless a thoroughly conceived space. The closed spatial plan used by state mode of production and Le Corbusier’s open plan of spatial construction were both attempts at producing social utopias. What emerges, however, are important questions about what it means to live in a conceived space and who ultimately determines what the nature of such a space will be. Embedded in the notion of conceived space is a risk of seeing inhabitants of conceived forms of spatial

96 Lefebvre’s preface to Boudon, Pessac De Le Corbusier.
production as strictly passive. In the example of Le Corbusier’s Quartier Modern Frugés it becomes evident that spatial practice is determined only in part through the conceived space of the architect/artist, but that this space is never totalising and can be transformed by an activity of living in space that goes some way towards the production of lived space.

As I want to distinguish between the conceived space of the state and a less hegemonic form of conceived space, in this analysis of the Quartier Modern Frugés I am interested in the concept and the use of habitation from the viewpoint of the architect – the person who produces conceived space. Le Corbusier was hoping that the spatial order and functionality of his houses could mould inhabitants into “better”, happier, more productive beings. Nevertheless, the spatial theories put forward by Le Corbusier were countered by the actions of the inhabitants of the Quartier Modern Frugés. Lefebvre concludes in his observations that the way the inhabitants altered Le Corbusier’s apartments must be thought of as an activity. His concept of a house as a machine to live in would seem to indicate that despite his non-standardised use of standardised building components and materials, he most likely understood the occupant as residing in his spaces rather than dwelling, building and producing lived space. In a later reflection about this he responded in a rather enigmatic way, saying: ‘you know, it’s life that’s always right and the architect who’s always wrong.’

Figure 18. Inhabitant’s alterations of Le Corbusier’s Fudges architecture

By contrast, Kalin’s form of informal building is not in any way conceived, planned or designed. Kalin’s production of lived space, however, has probably more in common with the traditional housing that rightly or wrongly Le Corbusier and the French state wanted to eradicate during the French post war urbanisation process. Kalin’s space is the antithesis of modernist space in its aesthetic of chaotic arrangement of materials, the

contingent choice of materials, the lack of plan or concept, and the hand made quality of the whole project. These facets of Kalin’s space show a process of dwelling, of adapting and building an evolving space that is invested with notions of individual creativity and freedom. However, Kalin’s form of lived space remains an individual utopia, while the forms of conceived space produced by the French state and Le Corbusier were attempts at producing social utopias. The role of the architect or any figure that plans, conceives, and designs is also complicated here.

In exploring these dynamics of conceived and lived forms of spatial production in this chapter, I do not intend to conclusively validate one form of space or mode of production over another. Through looking at Kalin’s garden in relation to these examples of French housing, my intention is to work through the kinds of issues that Kalin’s spatial production raises. The examples that I have discussed in this chapter reveal the dilemma and contradictions that emerge between the desire to construct social spaces through forms of affordable mass housing, and the need of spatial users to construct a form of lived space. For Lefebvre, the state mode of production and conceived space in general is viewed negatively. Conversely, he valorises lived space throughout his writing. By appropriating this space and building his garden and the strange house, Kalin both exemplifies and complicates Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. However one could argue that post-Berlin Wall, Kalin’s space might have become a public park, for example. The kind of space he produced was deeply ambiguous, lying somewhere between individuated space and a lived space that has been re-appropriated from the state. Kalin’s space is an appropriated, lived, individuated space in the sense that it was built with his own hands and in accordance with his own desires and imagination. It is also a private space in the sense that a perimeter fence restricts access to the garden. This recognition of the private nature of Kalin’s garden is a significant element in understanding Kalin’s space in terms of an opposition between lived and conceived space. The fence that Kalin erected around his garden reinforces his exclusive use of, and access to, the garden, and it means that the garden begins to take on attributes of private property more than the social aspects of Lefebvre’s lived space.

In the following chapter, I open up the contraction between Lefebvre’s social space (lived space) and the state’s social space (conceived space) by revisiting the foundation of the modern concept of property. I open up the notion of property and question its
relationship to social space. Here the relationship of freedom, free will, and self-determination are discussed. I ask whether social space is equated with living together, and whether an individuated private space can be a social space. I also ask whether the production of an individuated (lived) space means having to own or take possession of a space in the form of property.
Chapter Three

Individuated Space versus Living Together: Towards a Definition of Social Space

In the previous chapter, I used Lefebvre’s spatial terms of lived and conceived space to compare Kalin’s mode of spatial production with a particular mode of state spatial production in the context of French social housing. In doing so, I tried to ascertain to what degree users of space are able to become producers of space when space is primarily conceived and planned through state apparatus or a utopian architectural vision. In contrasting these modes of spatial production I aim to highlight the central contradictions and ambiguities that arise between forms of conceived space, understood here as the planned social space of equal citizens on the one hand, and Kalin’s appropriated, informally constructed garden on the other. While Lefebvre’s spatial concepts are notoriously difficult to pin down, it is through exploring the complexities of Lefebvre’s notion of lived and conceived space that I will be able to interrogate the forms of social space that are implied by the modes of spatial production at work in Kalin’s garden. In order to do so, in this chapter I will explore Kalin’s mode of spatial production through John Locke’s primary property theory. By way of a contrast to Locke, I will then explore the state mode of production through Hegel’s theory of ethical life. Before doing so, however, it is important to consider briefly the broader political and theoretical framework from which Lefebvre’s notions of lived and conceived space emerged.

As a Marxist thinker, Lefebvre is interested in defining who produces space and who defines the status of space. Lefebvre insists that space is not a given but that it is produced by a society’s spatial and social practices. For Lefebvre, his contemporary mode of spatial production was defined as a state mode of production as well as a capitalist mode of production. These conceived modes of production are characterised by Lefebvre as the dominant spaces of our society, linked to and reproduced by the dominant relations of production that impose social order through, among other things,
design. The concept of conceived space emphasises the role of ‘experts’ and ‘professionals’ in the production of dominant forms of space, whose creation requires specific forms of technical and administrative knowledge. The professionalism and governance of conceived space means in effect, that space is produced hierarchically from the top down. Not only do the experts and professionals require a particular form of knowledge to process abstract thought, they also need access to advanced and specialised education in order to become architects, planners or civil engineers. These are the people who work in public offices, planning and designing buildings, determining construction standards, housing policies, and the design of public space, on a local and national scale. By contrast, lived space is a form of space that is produced through a process of dwelling, building and living in space: an evolving process of spatial embodiment.

Lived space for Lefebvre is dis-alienating; it is produced not by experts or people further up a professional hierarchy, but by the users of social space. Anyone can produce lived space because such space evolves out of everyday practices. It is the space produced from the bottom up. This is possible because the means of production for lived space are not exclusive and do not require the specific skills and knowledge held by the spatial professions, the finance people, and the state bureaucracy. Kalin, for example, achieves relative autonomy by limiting his requirements to his own labour (not expensive machinery), and to materials that are scavenged from his environment. Importantly, the land that Kalin uses is “free” – in the first instance, unclaimed and unused by anyone else. However, while this form of appropriation of space, may be understood as the opposite of mass-produced, standardised, conceived space, might it also be possible to compare the individuated quality of lived space to the very privatised space or capitalist space that Lefebvre seeks to critique? Might the notions of freedom and creativity implied and valorised by Lefebvre in his idea of lived space bear striking similarities to notions of liberalism that define contemporary capitalism? For, liberalism classically promotes notions of individual freedom where the state has less influence over everyday life. If this is the case, then how might the example of Kalin’s space complicate Lefebvre’s lived space – and what is at stake in the tensions that begin to arise within this concept?
The space that Kalin produces corresponds in part to Lefebvre’s vision of the
production of lived space as far as Kalin achieves a relative autonomy of the means of
his production. However, in doing so he also produces an individuated space for his
own private use on what would and could have been public space. It is important to
remember that Kalin’s garden was an unused piece of land in the city until he claimed it
for himself, and that today his garden is effectively a traffic island. It is a visible part of
the street now administered by the district of Kreuzberg, but it is a space that has been
fenced off for private use. Due to the shifting historical context and jurisdiction of the
triangular plot of land, it is not possible to say for sure what might have become of it
had Kalin not fenced it off to make his own private garden when he did. Nevertheless,
as the nature of his appropriation shifted over time, along with the local jurisdiction, it
is fair to assume that this piece of land in latter years would have been integrated into
the Berlin Wall Memorial Park, and therefore opened up for public use. Although
Lefebvre’s notion of lived space was arguably intended to describe socially organic
forms of spatial production that evolved through the use and production of space,
Kalin’s form of spatial production exposes the dilemma of producing such deregulated
spaces. Kalin in effect, produces a space in accordance with his needs and desires,
spatially integrating himself with his surroundings potentially at the cost of a more
public, collective, or open space. To explore the above contradictions further this
chapter will now move on to discuss Locke’s account of property in the Two Treatises
of Government, first published in 1690. I will compare this briefly with Hegel’s
particular vision of civil society where the individual and the state are perceived of as a
single body (1807).

Why use seventeenth century political theory to discuss Kalin’s contemporary spatial
appropriation? The fundamental contradiction embedded in Kalin’s garden is the
tension between public and private space: does Kalin’s singular use of the triangular
plot of land amount to just another form of individual appropriation based on liberal
capitalism’s notion of private property? I turn to these earlier theories, because in the
course of my research it became clear that Kalin’s spatial production and Lefebvre’s
notion of lived space overlap with many aspects of seventeenth century primary
property theory, in particular Locke’s labour theory of property. Reading Kalin’s
actions through the prism of Locke, who was one of the founders of liberalism, allows
me to understand in more depth the contradictions between Kalin’s actions and
Lefebvre’s notion of lived space.\(^{98}\) The similarities between Locke’s unregulated, unclaimed world in a state of nature, and the administrative fog surrounding Kalin’s garden make a compelling argument for revisiting Locke’s account of property. Going through Locke’s discussion of property also allows me to explore the dichotomy between public and private property, in a context where liberals and conservatives use Locke’s writings to justify contemporary notions of individual freedom and private property.\(^{99}\) In the first part of this chapter, I shall show how the situation surrounding the triangular plot of land bears some resemblances to Locke’s notion of a state of nature as the hypothetical absence of society, its laws and its enforcement of laws. It was this effective absence of regulation surrounding the triangular plot of land that first allowed Kalin to appropriate this space and make his garden. I will outline the principal arguments that Locke uses to justify a notion of private property. I then compare the way that Kalin went about making his garden with Locke’s labour theory of property and his theory of natural limits. The contradiction between individual and collective needs present in Locke’s theory of property allows me to look at the similarities and differences between Kalin’s mode of spatial production and these foundational notions of private property. In doing so, I will ask whether Lefebvre’s lived space, like Locke’s arguments for property rights, is an assertion of individual rights against the unifying and standardising power of the state. The condition in which Kalin’s garden occurs is, I argue, comparable to the anarchic (stateless) conditions in which Locke’s notion of property occurs: beyond civil society. The role of civil society in Locke’s theory of property is a purely functional one, however, and has no moral or ethical part to play. This hypothetical stateless situation begs the question of how individuals with counter claims to the same land resolve conflicts, further underlining the need to tackle the social, public and collective frameworks of lived space, perhaps beyond the terms Lefebvre’s offers us.

In the second part of this chapter, I will outline Hegel’s understanding of the concept of property and the role it plays in ethical life. For Hegel, property is a journey to knowledge and self-knowledge that leads to a moral transformation, which in turn leads to freedom and free will. In order to explore this notion of property, I will introduce and discuss a short case study of two residents of Villeneuve, a French social utopia built in

the 1970s. Between 1997 and 1999, I was artist in residence in Villeneuve. The residency was organised by the Magasin (Centre National d'Art Contemporain de Grenoble). The intended duration of the residency was three months. However, I quickly realised that I would require a substantially longer stay in order to produce something meaningful from the residency. After complicated negotiations, I stayed for two years. The very particular example of Villeneuve allows me to push my analysis of lived space and private property through considering Hegel’s account of property and the state mode of production (conceived space) discussed in chapter two. At the time of its conception, Villeneuve was a progressive form of social housing that genuinely attempted to produce a social utopia. However, despite the good quality housing and the recognition of the needs of inhabitants to personalise their living space at Villeneuve, the response of the state to individual needs of residents remained highly problematic. Central to Locke and Hegel’s thought, and to my interrogation in this chapter, are questions of freedom or free will. While the needs and desires of Lefebvre’s ‘spatial users’ and their production of lived space was never articulated in terms of private property, the question of property played a vital role for both Hegel and Locke in their arguments for freedom and free will. Freedom and free will for Locke is precisely expressed in the process of claiming part of the material world, appropriating or more precisely taking possession of it. In the final section of this chapter I question whether other terms or modes of producing lived space might be mobilised to disrupt the dichotomy of public and private, and propose other collective forms of spatial production.

Kalin’s Claim Through the Prism of Locke’s Property

There are compelling similarities between Locke’s justification of private property and how and what Kalin does with the triangular plot of land in its initial stages. The spatial ambivalence of the plot of land caused by its location and indecisive administration echoes strongly the characteristics of Locke’s notion of the state of nature. Kalin takes advantage of this ambivalent moment to make his garden. My intention in this chapter is not to make an extensive commentary on, or critique of, Locke’s property theory, but rather to look specifically at the ways in which Kalin’s appropriation of space for his own use coincides with aspects of Locke’s theory of property rights. As outlined above, the spatial ambivalence of the plot of land where Kalin made his garden can be
compared with Locke’s notion of the world in a state of nature. I believe that there are two other primary ways in which Kalin’s mode of spatial production overlaps with Locke’s theory of property. First, Kalin uses his physical labour to convert the unused land into a garden. Arguably, Kalin makes something from nothing. This action resembles Locke’s labour theory of property where an ‘added value’ is produced when labour is mixed with the material world. For Locke, when a person adds value to a thing this justifies a persons right to abstract that thing from the world given to humanity in common thus giving that person private ownership of the thing. Second, Kalin only uses as much land as he can physically manage. In other words, the relation between Kalin’s physical capacities and his energy determine the amount of land he uses. The way in which Kalin determines the amount of land he uses can be compared to Locke’s notion of natural bounds; that is through seeing the physical body as a resource and a natural limit to property and accumulation. For Locke this natural limit acts as a guard against over accumulation as well as a guarantee of the fair distribution of resources. Furthermore, Locke argues that in a state of nature humanity has a right to claim things in nature for their own subsistence. What is interesting for me is how Kalin, unknowingly, plays out Locke’s theory through his everyday practice.

In chapter one, I described how the confused administration of the triangular plot of land during and after the era of the Berlin Wall appeared to suspend the question of ownership, use and governance of the land in question. There was a general disinterest in the land, east and west of the Wall, as it had little value or importance. The ambiguous and confused administration of the plot of land during the period of the Berlin Wall meant that it was temporarily placed in a condition analogous to the state of nature imagined by primary political theorists of the seventeenth century. The state of nature in Locke is essentially an anarchic situation where there is no governance, no state, and no civic laws. Within the historical backdrop of European revolution and colonial conquest of new territories, primary political theorists such as Locke and Thomas Hobbes attempted to answer the question of how human beings would act in a world where there was no state, regulation, laws or jurisdiction – in other words in a state of nature. Hobbes argued that a world without government and laws would

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produce a situation of perpetual war, ‘a war of every man against every man.’ In his view, humans were not capable of governing themselves, and the world needed to be regulated by a higher authority. Locke’s view of humanity in a state of nature was somewhat less pessimistic. He argued that human beings were born with a natural reasoning capacity and as such would be able to work out disputes about material possessions through a logical process. This process was based on Locke’s interpretation of natural laws. Locke’s arguments for individual property rights were initially expressed, however, in theological terms. In Section 26 of the Second Treatise of Government, Locke declares that rights shall be determined by, ‘God, who hath given the world to Men in common.’ In the state of nature, according to Locke, the world in its original state belongs to human beings in common. This means that humans are equal and have the same possibility to claim things in the world. The triangular plot of land is similar to the state of nature described above, because as long as the authorities were not interested in it, the land remained in a suspended open situation, unregulated and unclaimed. In terms of spatial production, the disinterest from the state meant that the abstract planning laws, mass production, technocratic building practice, the things that define conceived space and the state mode of production, were all suspended. In other words, the state of nature like condition of the triangular plot of land allowed Kalin to produce a piece of lived space within a conceived space. Once Kalin claimed this space by building a fence around the garden, he abstracted the land from ambivalent space. The unclaimed and unregulated status of the land and the way in which Kalin claimed his garden, I argue, can be likened to the way that Locke justifies an individuals’ claim to property.

Locke’s notion of the state of nature is not enough in itself to understand the mechanisms through which Kalin claimed his garden. It is Locke’s labour theory of property, or the taking possession of something through labour, that provides his justification for an individual’s right to claim or abstract a part of the world that is given to humanity in common. Locke uses the term in common here to describe a world before anyone has acted upon it to claim a space for himself or herself. In this sense, the world in a state of nature that belongs to humanity in common can be read as an

103 Laslett, Two Treatises of Government 287.
104 Ibid
opportunistic world waiting to be acted upon. Locke’s description of a state of nature that belongs to humanity in common must not be confused with the notion of traditional commons of the Middle Ages that refers to land reserved for communal use. In Locke’s state of nature, the world belongs no one. Everyone has an equal right to claim a part of the world for his or her own subsistence. The material world is in a state of suspended animation, waiting for human beings to use it. Human beings making use of this material world, their labour, and their investment of themselves in improving something makes it their property. Locke gives the example of the simple act of picking fallen fruit from the ground as a moment when the material world becomes a person’s property. The moment that a person takes the fruit off the ground, according to Locke, that person has ownership of it. What once belonged to everyone in common now belongs to one person. The justification for this is simply that the person who takes the fruit to eat it has found a use for the fruit. The person has bent over to pick the fruit off the ground, and this act alone qualifies as labouring. In addition, the act of picking the fruit off the ground is seen as improving the state of the fruit, preventing it from being left on the ground to rot. Locke argues that it is through this mixing of one’s labour with an object that the material world becomes a person’s property. It is important to note that for Locke, this notion of property extends from his earlier proposition that a person has property over their own body and their own labour. Locke believes that one’s labour is one’s property because we are born into the world as free people and as such own ourselves:

Through the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatevsoever then he removes out of the state of Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excluded the common right of other Men. For this labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is one joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.\textsuperscript{105}

Locke adds, that it is the fact that labour makes \textit{use} of what would otherwise rot or lie dormant that is important:

\textsuperscript{105} Laslett, \textit{Two Treatises of Government} 287.
Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the community of Land, for tis labour indeed that put the difference of value on every thing; and let any one consider, what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley; and an acre of the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. 

Before Kalin made his garden on the triangular plot of land, local inhabitants of Kreuzberg were using it as an informal dump. In order to make his garden Kalin cleared away the rubbish that had accumulated on the land over the years. In this initial process of clearing rubbish from the plot of land, Kalin mixed his labour with the material world. In doing so, he could arguably be said to have improved the land by making it useful or productive. He then went on to make use of the land for growing flowers, vegetables, and building his small hut-like structure. The value that his labour has added to the land improved it from its original state. It is worth noting here that both Lefebvre’s notion of lived space and Locke’s labour theory of property contains within them the idea of appropriating the world through a process of transforming it. In Locke’s theory of property transforming a thing is about improving a thing from its original state to add value to it, which in turn justifies private property. As I have outlined above the production of Lefebvre’s lived space occurs through a process of dwelling in the Heideggerian sense. This is a way of inhabiting and transforming space over time. Lefebvre does not speak about lived space in terms of increasing the value of a thing or as a process that justifies private property. Although both Lefebvre and Locke use notions of transforming the world as a way of appropriating space, Locke’s labour theory of property became a defence for legal individual possession or ownership.

Locke is conscious that his theory of property rights could lead to over-accumulation of private property by some individuals at the cost of others. To counteract this, he incorporates a third characteristic to his theory of property: he says that a limit to the ownership of the material world should be based on natural bounds. In other words, nobody should claim more than they can physically labour on, or more than they need to survive. Property in this sense can be read as an egalitarian or levelling process because in a state of nature there is enough land for everyone to make his or her claim. In Locke’s theological justification of individual property rights, he argues that god

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106 Laslett, Two Treatises of Government 296.
gave the earth to all humans in common to use for their pleasure, but humans also have a duty to reproduce themselves and populate the earth. Humans must therefore use the earth for their subsistence. In order to stay alive and populate the world, human beings are encouraged to appropriate the world and turn it into something “useful”. To maintain harmony and production there are two rules that follow: first, humans cannot claim part of the world if it is already being used by someone else; and second, that humans cannot claim more than they can use without waste. If the first rule is self-explanatory, the notion of wasting the material world needs explaining. If we go back to Locke’s example of gathering fallen apples off the ground, then you must not gather more than you are able to consume before the apples go bad. The egalitarian part of Locke’s argument is in the proportional relationship between a person’s rights to the material world and what they can produce or use from it without waste. When considering the production of physical space we can see how Locke’s theory of property based on natural bounds has a proportional rationale behind it. For example, materials can be produced or extracted from the earth that are useful for the survival of humans, but it would be considered wasteful for a person to produce an amount greater in proportion to their physical capacity to use these things. In other words, a person should not claim more of the material world than she/he could effectively use. For example, a person should be able to cultivate and harvest all of their land and use everything produced from it before it perishes.

Locke’s theory of property based on natural bounds addresses the issue of unfair or disproportionate accumulation of property. The specific parallel that I want to draw to Kalin is the fact that his manual way of producing space similarly provides a physical limit on the extent of his production. There is, I argue, a relationship between Kalin’s physical capacities and the amount of land that he can manage, which therefore partly determines the size of his garden and how much he produces from it. This fact could be used to justify Kalin’s right to use the plot of land based on Locke’s labour theory of property based on natural bounds. At stake for Locke is a demonstration of a civil way of living that can be founded on nature through the capacity to find ‘natural’ limits to the boundless human desires.

Looking at Kalin’s mode of spatial production through the lens of Locke’s account of property rights suggest that Kalin’s production of an individuated (private) space can
indeed be read through arguments based on Locke’s three central premises for property rights. Locke’s theory of property is based on individual rights and although these rights may be extended to include the family, the needs and desires of individuals and their family are always put before the needs and desires of any broader collective or society. In this sense, the question arising here is whether reading Lefebvre’s concept of lived space through Locke’s account of property reveals how lived space, might not produce social space, and might actually be bound up in the production of individuated space that is akin to what we now understand as private property. In order to go further with this question I will now look at how the production of lived space might be different within a conceived spatial environment that is produced and regulated by the state, and in which the needs and desires of society come before those of the individual.

Before returning to Lefebvre’s notion of conceived space, it is useful first to stay within the earlier primary property framework of this discussion. I will do so by turning briefly to Hegel’s proposition of an ‘ethical society’ as a way of understanding what it might mean to produce a lived space within a conceived state environment. While Hegel does not have a discrete theory of property, his discussion of property appears in tandem with his theory of rights and his theory of an ethical society. Unlike Locke, Hegel discusses freedom in the context of his largely pro-state philosophy. In Phänomenologie des Geistes, (1896) Hegel argues that the state is a necessary and essential organ for the organisation of civil society because individuals don’t have a natural reasoning capacity and are not able to regulate their affairs. Freedom, for Hegel, can only exist when an individual agrees to put aside some of their needs and desires for the greater good of the state. In this way, an individual integrates her/him self with the social whole: the philosophical ideal is for the individual and the state to have the same values. For Hegel, an individual’s needs and desires are equated with those of the state and vice-versa. Hegel thought that the idea of individual appropriation of the world to satisfy individual needs, as opposed to the those of a greater social body, could not lead to free will. If one’s will is free in a state of nature, guided by a presumed reason, which is informed by a natural law rather than rational thought, how does Locke’s man in a state of nature find a way out of existence as an endless proliferation of desires, consuming more than he needs? Charles Taylor says Hegel recognises this as a conflict that is:

107 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right (London: George Bell and Sons, 1896).
108 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society.
... the reflection of an opposition between two requirements which hold of us as agents. On one side we are called on as rational agents to be free, and hence follow reason. On the other side, freedom means acting out of motives which flow from the self rather than being externally imposed or induced. But since I am also a natural being, a conception of freedom which excludes and even opposes natural inclination must be defective.\textsuperscript{109}

For Hegel, a will could only be free if the needs of an individual equated to the will of the greater community, which he calls ethical life. In other words, this would be a society where subjects are not alienated by decision-making and life administration processes. An individual’s total participation in the state means they are embodied in it in such a way as to recognise themselves in it. Hegel begins his philosophical search for freedom by asserting the opposite view to Locke’s ‘man in a state of nature’ who is fully constituted and at one with nature: a nature that yields to man’s needs without question.

For Hegel, man is not free and at one with nature, as he is dependent on it for his existence. Nature is alien to man, and he has to struggle with it for integrity as he needs to recognise himself in the external world. To overcome his resistance to the external world he needs to appropriate and construct himself within it. However, this is more than an act of individual intervention. Appropriation for Hegel is a process rather than an action, but in a similar way to Locke’s labour theory of property, a person’s acting upon an object causes a transformation. The difference, however, is that it is not expressed in terms of an economics of increased production or exchange value, but rather as a three-way process between the appropriator, the appropriated and the non appropriators. The way that Locke’s man in a state of nature appropriates or takes possession of the world, and the way that Hegel uses the concept of appropriation, is key to understanding the difference between these opposing notions of property. For Hegel, appropriation is a process of overcoming one’s alienation to the limits of the external world and constructing oneself as an integral part of a greater social body. It concerns a person’s self-determination, because in the process of appropriating an object one determines one’s self within it – that is to say one recognises oneself in an appropriated object and as such can be recognised by others in that object. This is best understood through Hegel’s master and slave dialectic where the slave, who produces the needs of the master, is the one that is in contact with the world of materials. The

slave produces everything for the master. The master’s relationship to the material world is through the slave, and in this way, the master is reduced to a mere consumer. The slave, however, is touching and forming objects from the world and imprinting his ideas and himself onto them. He is constructing his own man made environment made up of his creation. The world of the master as produced by the slave is unfamiliar and alienating. In Charles Taylor’s words:

The master being in a world that offers no effective resistance tends to sink back into a stupor of self-coincidence. He approaches the stagnant pole where I = I. He is simply a consumer.\textsuperscript{110}

We need to keep in mind that Hegel is talking about appropriation as a path towards the ethical life, which is his vision of an integral society. Part of the purpose of the master and slave dialectic is to reveal how recognition operates to determine a person’s worthiness to participate in ethical life. In this case, neither the master nor the slave makes it. Although the master is recognised by the slave as an independent human being, he is dependent on the slave for his needs, and the slave has no recognition because he is inferior to the master. This operation of recognition extends into the way appropriation becomes property, as we will see.

To explore how Hegel’s theory of ethical life could be played out spatially, I will now discuss the Villeneuve high-rise estate in Grenoble, which is an example of a French state mode of production (conceived space) that aspired to be a social utopia during the 1970s. If traditional lived space and dwelling evolve over time with the experiments and mistakes of inhabitants changing and learning from the mistakes of the past, this state mode of production seeks to erase the past in order to create a new beginning, a new foundation for a new ethical and moral order. Such a model assumes that an ethical order is not a given, but must rather be imposed from the top down. What makes Villeneuve worthy of discussion is the way in which the project combined architectural concepts with pedagogy and participation for the purpose of achieving social harmony.

**The Production of Lived Space in a Conceived Form of Social Utopia**

The concept of new towns is the ultimate conceived space. Nothing evolves from living and inhabiting space over time, as everything is built from scratch and in theory,

\textsuperscript{110} Taylor, \textit{Hegel and Modern Society} 156.
anything is possible. Villeneuve came about after a new municipal government was elected in Grenoble in 1965. This municipality was politically left of centre and governed with the PSU (the united socialist party), which at the time was a harder and rather intellectual left-wing party. The PSU wanted to resolve the housing shortage in Grenoble that had been caused by property speculation. Many unsold apartments belonging to private property developers were too expensive for people earning a moderate income. At the time, there were approximately 2,000 people requesting accommodation. The response of the new municipality was to build an enormous housing estate in the southern suburbs of Grenoble. Political will and economic conditions allowed the council to experiment with a monumental social utopia, which they called Villeneuve (new town).

The terrain of Villeneuve covers 11 hectares, the centre of which is reserved for a park around which the apartments are constructed. In total, the four neighbourhoods of Villeneuve accommodate 11,000 inhabitants, of which there are 40 nationalities. The ensemble of Villeneuve is comprised of 4,200 apartments, 50 per cent of which are classed as social housing. In reality the social utopia experiment primarily concerns the high-rise estate called Arlequin (Harlequin).

The Arlequin estate, partially completed in 1972, was the first and most innovative group of buildings, and was the estate around which the big social utopian experiments
were grouped. The buildings that make up the estate borrow many architectural innovations from the mass-produced housing of Le Corbusier that aimed to improve the standard of living for inhabitants. Like Le Corbusier’s pilotis system, the buildings that make up Arlequin are raised off the ground to permit high density. The layout of the estate is a circular configuration that allows light and space between each building. Each has a large number of apartment design, many incorporating spilt levels. This creates a feeling of variety for inhabitants, avoiding repetition or a standard homogenous response to densely populated housing. Also borrowed from Le Corbusier is the idea of keeping cars away from living spaces. This is assured by setting up a pedestrian zone below the apartments and parking spaces and garages positioned on the periphery of the estate. The circulation of cars is kept at a distance from inhabitants, making the area safer and keeping noise and pollution to a minimum.

A number of services for inhabitants are situated at the base of the buildings, of which the Maison de Quartier (the neighbourhood social and civic centre) is the most successful example. It accommodates workshops open to residents (such as for painting and photography), a media centre, a library, a documentation centre, a television studio, a school cafeteria open to the residents, a space devoted to recreational activities (such as pottery and weaving), a theatre, facilities for home economics and adult education, and some associations for women’s groups, trade unions and families. It is also where the various sports and cultural activities are coordinated, as well as children's activities, and it is the home of the Centre for Continuing Education and Social Cultural Animation (CESPASC).

Villeneuve was a progressive architectural project for social housing. In order to get so many people to live together successfully required a particular kind of management. As an insight into the realities of how the production of conceived space involved the management of inhabitants and their spatial production, the experience of Anne-Marie Naudin, who was a resident of Villeneuve from 1982 to 1994, is instructive. I met Naudin while researching material for a collective project that explored the experience of Villeneuve as a social utopia. Naudin was married to one of the architects involved in designing some of the apartments in the Arlequin estate. She was a strong advocate

111 This was a filmed interview with Anne-Marie Naudin that was made in collaboration with Marcelo Expósito. The interview with Anne-Marie Naudin was part of a series of interviews made between 1998 and 2000 with inhabitants or ex-inhabitants of Villeneuve for a collective project that was never completed.
of the utopian aspect of the Villeneuve project and was eager to live in the estate. In order to be more actively involved in trying to get the project to succeed, she worked for the office of public housing that managed the social housing part of the estate. She was part of a team whose role was to help new inhabitants adapt to a collective way of living in what was at the time perceived to be an unfamiliar form of architecture. In an interview with me in 1998, Naudin talked about her experiences in the early years of Villeneuve. She began by telling me how she and other families wanted to move to Villeneuve to experience a collective form of living. She explained how it was difficult for people on relatively high incomes to get a flat in the Arlequin estate, which was the first of four Villeneuve neighbourhoods to be built:

I was living in the Olympic village (the neighbouring estate to Villeneuve) while the Arlequin estate was being constructed. I have to say that the Arlequin estate caused a lot of problems, as I said before, it had a difficult beginning.

Villeneuve received a lot of bad press because of its experimental nature, as well as the problems caused by the density of its population. Naudin went on to explain how she finally succeeded in getting an apartment in Villeneuve after 10 years of trying. She would have moved there sooner but she could not find an apartment to rent:

I don’t know why, but the people that wanted to live in Villeneuve couldn’t find an apartment and the people that didn’t want to go there were sent there. My opportunity to live there came about because the building that we went to live in, building number 50 in the Arlequin estate, needed community minded people to live there. Number 50 was a very high building with a lot of large apartments. It was what they called a catastrophic building.112

It should be explained here that the Arlequin estate was made up of a number of buildings managed by different housing organisations. Each building was designated to house a specific social group:

Building number 50 in the Arlequin estate was managed by OPAC (the municipal housing office) and housed large low income families… We were several families who wanted to live close to each other so that we could exchange services such as child minding etc. Because we wanted to try this experiment, Marie Bernard, who was in charge of what was to became the OPAC, told us that they would like to help us, but if we wanted to live close together we

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would have to live in building number 50 so as to help rebalance the population, that is to install so called normal people, that is people who were considered to be less problematic than the rest of the population of the building.\[^{113}\]

Naudin’s is one of many stories that I have heard from inhabitants or past inhabitants of Villeneuve who told me they moved to Villeneuve because they wanted to experience a form of communal living. Some families went as far as buying two apartments and knocking down dividing walls to make one large apartment where several families or couples lived. This was not the case for Naudin, who was working for the public housing authority. Her role was to encourage residents to socialise as well as to adapt to their new, unfamiliar form of living space:

I worked in the reception committee. The reception committee worked on how to receive the new inhabitants, how to help them discover the estate. This included how to help people make themselves at home in their apartments, because the apartments were not traditional apartments and therefore people were a bit afraid. People found it difficult to arrange their traditional furniture, their big wardrobes for example. We worked on the question of how we could assist people to make their apartments their own.\[^{114}\]

Villeneuve had a metal workshop as well as a wood workshop on the estate. As part of her job, Naudin organised workshops in the wood studio. As she states above, part of her role was to encourage and help inhabitants to appropriate their living space. This process seemed to involve humanising what were perceived to be hard and aesthetically uninviting living spaces. Inhabitants were encouraged to make fantasy inspired shelf and furniture designs that incorporated bright pastel colours and organic forms. A photograph taken at the time shows the interior of a participating resident’s living room, where a series of pink shelves with a yellow flower motif occupy one of the walls. The face of the shelves had been cut into an undulating curving form. Naudin told me that the residents were encouraged to challenge the hard regular concrete interior.

Naudin’s woodwork design practice with inhabitants is the most revealing part of her work for the reception committee with regard to the question of spatial production. What is interesting here is that there was an assumption that inhabitants needed help to personalise their standardised living space. What seems remarkable now is how the

\[^{113}\] Gee, Villeneuve Project.
\[^{114}\] Gee, Villeneuve Project.
public housing office never considered it possible that inhabitants of the new form of architecture were able to come up with their own solutions for adapting their living space to suit their needs and desires. Instead, the potential for the production of lived space was “managed” by the public housing authority, which made inhabitants largely dependent on the state for spatial solutions. Naudin’s testimony underlines the complex transition between conceived spatial production and lived space; that is space conceived of and produced by the state and the production of lived space that evolves over time by a process of inhabiting and dwelling.

In terms of the question of residents appropriating their living space, it is worth pointing out the distinction between residents of social housing and those who privately own their apartments. As mentioned above, there are many stories of groups of people buying two or more adjoining apartments and knocking walls down to make one large collective space that was shared between two or more couples. It is interesting to note that the residents who privately owned their apartment were not the social group that the municipal housing office were concerned with helping to appropriate their living space. They wanted to help low-income residents who lived in rented apartments in parts of the Arlequin estate designated for social housing. The question of aiding inhabitants of rented social housing to adapt their apartments was built into the concept of Arlequin right from the start. Many of the apartments reserved for social housing had flexible interior spaces consisting of partition walls that were designed to be moveable, thus allowing residents to decide the proportion and size of the interior spaces as they desired.

The Arlequin estate in Villeneuve was a top down solution to spatial production, embedded with many assumptions about renters versus owners. The key question for me here is whether Naudin’s experience with the reception committee at Villeneuve shows that producing a collective space is inevitably at the cost of the production of lived space. I will return to this question later. It is important first, to show how “low-income residents” of the Arlequin estate in Villeneuve did actually produce a form of lived space when left to their own devices. I will now briefly discuss the experiences of Mahmoud Boukadoum, who was one of the residents I met who had adapted his living space to suit his needs and desires.
Boukadoum’s story relates to a later chapter in Villeneuve’s history. At the end of the 1990s, Grenoble had already experienced two changes of municipality: a right wing politics that governed during the 1980s and a centre left politics that governed during the 1990s. The reception committee ceased to exist, along with the institutional form of helping residents of low-income apartments to appropriate their living space. In 1998, Boukadoum was 36 and divorced with two children. He had a two-bedroom apartment in building number 90 in the Arlequin estate. His children shared their time between himself and their mother. Boukadoum spent most of his time with Brigitte, his long-term partner who lived four tram stops further south in the Grenoble suburb of Échirolles. As his children grew up, he found that he could use more of his apartment in Villeneuve for other things than raising a family. Boukadoum is a writer and a musician and has his own folk rock group that performs in the Grenoble region. The band often used Boukadoum’s apartment as a place to rehearse. When the group first started using his apartment to rehearse, Boukadoum had an agreement with his neighbour to organise the practice session while his neighbour was out. Nevertheless, as the goodwill between Boukadoum and his neighbour broke down, his neighbour began to complain to the local housing authority that managed the building. To overcome this problem, Boukadoum built his own soundproof room in his living room. This effectively meant suspending another room within his living room, building a box inside a box. As Boukadoum was unemployed and existed on social welfare at the time, he could not afford to buy the necessary materials for his project. He therefore constructed the room entirely from recycled or discarded materials: the chip board that made up the walls, the screws and nails that held everything together; the insulation material inserted between the walls, the rubber blocks that the sound proof room sat on; and the carpet that lined the interior of the sound proof room were all collected locally by hand with the aid of a supermarket trolley. By finding his own solution to appropriating his living space in his own time, Boukadoum showed what inhabitants could do with their mass-produced living space when left to their own devices.
It is important to underline the fact that the municipal housing authority recognised that this mass-produced form of housing (conceived space) might be alienating for inhabitants that were used to living in traditional forms of housing. This realisation led them to put into place a number of institutional responses to the problem of individual needs of inhabitants. I mentioned above the example of Naudin’s woodwork shops that were intended to encourage inhabitants to personalise their living space by producing their own furniture. However, the production and mounting of bright coloured, curvy shaped shelving units does not amount to appropriating a space. In other words, the institutional assistance that some inhabitants received to customise their living spaces did not produce lived space. In addition, the institutional way of responding to the needs and desires of inhabitants was necessarily abstract and never specific. In this sense, what was produced by inhabitants in the Villeneuve workshops remains a state form of spatial production. Naudin’s experience working for the reception committee in Villeneuve as well as being a resident there, leaves us in doubt as to whether the production of lived space and spatial appropriation can ever be mandated from the top down. Boukadoum’s soundproof rehearsal room, on the other hand, can be seen as a form of lived space within a state mode of production (conceived space). The important distinction is that Boukadoum initiated his own spatial adaptations and without any institutional aid.

If lived space is produced through the contingent accumulation, choice and arrangement of materials, the hand made and that which is produced through a process of living in a space (dwelling and building), this evolutionary process of spatial embodiment can be understood as mostly dis-alienated. Lived space can be produced by anyone; it is the space that is produced from the bottom up; or in Lefebvre’s Marxist terms: it is dis-alienating because the means of production for lived space are not exclusively owned by
one class. In comparing lived space with Locke’s account of property, namely, a form of freedom that is expressed in an individual’s capacity to act for her or himself, lived space is understood as independent from the state. In Locke’s account of property the notion of freedom and free will are related to appropriating the world. Conversely, Hegel argues that individuals are not free agents and therefore are unable to make decisions that are not influenced by forces outside of their control. Hegel’s notion of freedom is related to the self being integrated with other selves and the body of governance, in other words the state. In this chapter, I have proposed that the key tenets of Hegel’s notion of freedom might be understood through the example of the unified, mass-produced, conceived space of Villeneuve. In Villeneuve, the social utopian aspirations of this form of conceived space might be understood in terms of the Hegelian concept of the ethical life. Space is predominantly publicly owned, with space governed and regulated by the state. Here the notion of freedom and free will (needs and desires) is related to a notion of being integrated with, and having common cause with the state. In the context of Villeneuve the state is parental and social democratic in nature; space is produced from the top down. Viewed through Hegel’s perspective the world and the society in which the individual lives is familiar, and there is therefore no need to adapt, personalise or customise space for the purpose of making it familiar. The notion of appropriating the world becomes redundant, because in the Hegelian interpretation of this spatial situation, users of space already recognise themselves in the material world.

Viewing Villeneuve as an example of Lefebvre’s conceived space, and of Hegel’s notion of an ethical life begs the question of whether it is possible for individuals or groups to perceive themselves as integrally part of this social whole in spatial terms? Can mass-produced housing ever accommodate inhabitants in such a way that they feel part of the state and would that be desirable? Would this mean that inhabitants would have to have had some part in the design of the housing in the first place? In my definition of Lefebvre’s spatial terms I underlined how conceived space, the space of abstract calculations and geometry, is dominated by scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic sub-dividers and social engineers, all of whom practice a specific form of spatial knowledge. Generally speaking, inhabitants are too far removed from the process of spatial production, as the language of spatial production is not accessible enough for inhabitants to be able to participate in the production of their own habitation. The
language gap between spatial producers and spatial users denies inhabitants the possibility of meaningfully participating in the conception of their living space at the point of its initiation. Instead, inhabitants are encouraged to participate in the social utopian experiment through pedagogical practices ranging from practical workshops to local TV debates and theatre.

The failure of Villeneuve to achieve a social utopia in the Hegelian sense – where inhabitants can recognise themselves in their surroundings as well as the everyday life administrative processes – is, as I have stated above, due in part to the institutionalization of spatial appropriation. Institutional initiated forms of appropriation only allow inhabitants to adapt and change space in a limited way. In this sense, the majority of Villeneuve inhabitants can only passively reside in space. Any process of dwelling (producing dis-alienated lived space) in Villeneuve is an exception. In Hegel’s theory of appropriation, the desire to act and change the world comes not from the state but from an individual’s own self-determination.

If we take another look at the way that Kalin produced his garden, we can see that it was a self initiated project, that it was his own self-determination that led him to break the law as well as to confront the East German border guards. The evolution of Kalin’s space over time is in this sense a journey or process that is more comparable to the kind of knowledge and self-knowledge that is associated with Hegel’s notion of appropriation. Nonetheless, Kalin’s spatial production does not resolve the issue of collective living. Villeneuve as a model of Hegelian ethical life (as a state social utopia) also does not resolve the question of whether users of space are able to produce their own space within conceived space. Villeneuve, as an example of state produced space (conceived space), fails because, in Hegelian terms, the state never fully reconciles itself with the individual. In other words, the state can only provide in Villeneuve, a mostly alienated form of habitation. The state-initiated forms of appropriation that attempt to help inhabitants dis-alienate themselves fail, because the limited form of appropriation only leads inhabitants back to a recognition of the state. The conundrum that Villeneuve presents is that this form of social housing does not solve the problem of living together in a Hegelian sense. It also shows that Locke’s liberal individuated space cannot solve the problem of living collectively. In the Introduction to this chapter, I underlined the ways in which Kalin’s garden complicates Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. I have
argued that Kalin’s form of appropriation might in effect amount to a form of individuated space that is equivalent to processes of private property production as defined by Locke. I have argued that the production of an individuated space is contrary to the kind of social space that Lefebvre aspired to in his entire work and, more specifically, when he introduced the concept of lived space. If Lefebvre’s notion of lived space was intended for the description of socially organic forms of spatial production, which evolved through the use and production of space, then Kalin’s form of spatial production exposes the paradox of the production of lived space as individuated, appropriated, private, and ultimately proprietorial space. Locke and Hegel’s accounts of freedom and free will, although quite different from each other, allow us to complicate notions of public and private property, as well as Lefebvre’s notion of lived and conceived space. What emerges is a need to find another way of expressing spatial production, where appropriation does not equate to exclusive ownership, and where rights over the material world are not expressed solely in the binary terms of public or private property.

Lefebvre argues that economics and power dominate the production of modern space, and that the production of space has thus become abstract to its users. Lefebvre’s description of spatial production as abstract space follows Marx’s narrative of abstract labour under the development of capitalism. Abstract or conceived space, therefore, can be understood as a state mode of production that is either a liberal or neo liberal, state based on individualism and the markets (small state), or a socialist or social democratic state based on collectivism and state intervention. Lefebvre’s concern is that the planned, regulated, and determined nature of conceived space limits the possibility for users to produce their own space. My reading of Kalin’s spatial production through primary political theory forms a background to a discussion of my practical research into the experiences of inhabitants that live or have lived in the French social utopian new town Villeneuve. What I discovered through my research was that despite the determination of the architects of Villeneuve to find ways for individuals to personalise their living space (moveable walls etc), individuals tend to ignore institutional tools of appropriation and instead find their own way of taking possession of a uniform or standardised living space. Both Kalin’s form of spatial production as well as those of certain inhabitants of Villeneuve, expose a paradox in Lefebvre’s lived space: namely, that lived space often results in an individual space, which is contrary to an idea of a
more collective, egalitarian social space. In other words, the spatial forms that manifest free will, freedom and individual needs are not necessarily compatible with the forms of social and spatial order produced through top down, homogenising processes of social democratic planning. As a conflict emerges between Lefebvre’s desired ideal of social space and state produced social space, the crucial question remains as to how social space can therefore be defined and manifested.
Chapter Four

Complicating Informally Organised Spaces

In this final chapter, I will take up the dilemmas that have emerged from chapter three through two further examples of spatial appropriation, this time collective, and through a brief return to Kalin’s garden. The sort of space that I thought that I had found in Kalin’s garden but did not, was a collective; egalitarian space, where free will; freedom, and individual needs and desires of spatial users can manifest themselves. What kind of space can allow for such a form? If I am talking about unclaimed, unregulated spaces, similar to Locke’s idea of a stateless space in a state of nature, then in reality there is no such space. Visibly all spaces in over developed Western states are either privately owned or belong to the state. The closest thing to Locke’s idea of a space in a state of nature is that which is abandoned, unused, and often waiting for development – and whose status, for whatever reason, becomes ambivalent and therefore open to informal use. However, if space is not regulated by the state then questions about the management of conflict remain. How are claims and counter claims to space managed? How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? How is the use of a space determined and how do we decide what is allowed or not allowed? What form does negotiation between spatial users take if there is no state institution to mediate between disputing parties? Before moving on to explore these questions and discuss other ways in which social, collective or other forms of shared space might be produced and understood, I want to briefly explore Lefebvre’s notion of difference and suggest how it might be productive when thinking about the question of conflict that arise in collective forms of spatial appropriation.

The concept of difference is a key issue in Lefebvre’s critique of the state mode of production. Although Lefebvre’s notion of difference concerns heterogeneity and multiplicity, his use of the term is more to do with distinguishing lived modes of spatial production from the homogenising effects of the state mode of production. Lefebvre accounts for the overwhelming spatial difference produced by state modes of production by making a distinction between two forms of difference. He calls one ‘minimal
Lefebvre argues that minimal difference is an induced, cohesive form of difference associated with the state mode of production. The state mode of production produces a diversity of spaces; spaces of production and work, private spaces of habitation, spaces of leisure and tourism, all of which are linked by infrastructures: road, rail, water and air as well as telecommunications and today, the internet. These spaces appear different, but crucially, this difference is illusionary because each space is part of a process that functions to reproduce the relations of production necessary for the survival of the state and capitalism. By simultaneously homogenising, fragmenting, and hierarchizing space through processes of uneven geographical development (in favour of production and consumption), the state mode of production fragments social relations and undermines social space. Maximal difference, by contrast, relates to the qualities of lived space: the autonomous, informal, creative and the playful, implying a form of individuality capable of meaningful social relations unfettered by mediation. Lefebvre’s category of maximal difference is a strategy to assert the right to difference – in other words organising oneself alternatively to the state. The terms maximal and minimal difference are useful here, as they help to underline given perceptions of capitalist and socialist states, i.e. capitalism infers choice, difference, variety and change, whereas socialism is characterised by its homogeneity; everyone being the same, living in boxes and doing the same job all their lives. There is a danger that my exploration of lived space might fall into the false binary between capitalist and socialist space. Therefore, the notion of difference would challenge this false binary by underlining the illusionary difference of the state mode of production regardless of ideology. The forms of adaptable interiors proposed to the inhabitants of Villeneuve exemplify Lefebvre’s notion of minimal difference. As I have outlined above, the moveable walls etc, are a top down solution to spatial appropriation. Not only are the various modes of adaptable interiors limited, the type of difference proposed are the same for each inhabitant and therefore can only produce sameness and not difference. How is it possible then for spatial users to produce lived spaces of maximal difference in this form of conceived space?

Significantly, Lefebvre’s anti-state critique of space looks to forms of autogestion (self-management) as a way towards un-commodified modes of spatial reproduction. For Lefebvre, self-management is not a voting block, but rather a continuous process of

115 Lefebvre, The Production of Space 372.
democratic experiment on a small local scale. Lefebvre’s notion of self-management is related to a form of continuous discursive process, in which differences and conflict between groups and individuals are made visible. Because of the varied political uses and the meaning of the term “self-management” since the 1970s, I choose not to use this term in the following chapter. Instead I will use the terms “informally organised space” and “self organised space” to refer to spaces that are organised alternatively to the state mode of production. The concept of “informally organised” and “self organised” space, however, are not used as precise terms in this chapter. They act rather as intermediary terms that will help me to navigate between concepts that describe spaces organised alternatively to the state mode of production.

The forms of spatial organisation that I will discuss in this chapter exist despite the state. Each one in its own way resists the reproduction of the means of capitalist production and could be said to produce maximal difference. I raise the question of conflict by asking what happens when there is trouble in the garden, when there is more than one claim to the same space: how can these spaces be appropriated collectively?

In order to work through these questions I will discuss two examples of informally organised space that exist alternatively to the state space: Navarinou Park in the district of Exarcheia in Athens, and a group of informal gardens in Saint-Martin-d'Hères, Grenoble. In contrast to the individuated nature of Kalin’s garden, and the state planned spaces of Villeneuve, both the Navarinou Park and the gardens in Saint-Martin-d'Hères were produced and, are used, by groups of people. The shared nature of the two spaces will allow me to address more specifically the social aspect of informally organised space. To further address the issue of spatial conflict, I will return to the triangular plot of land in Kreuzberg to discuss a territorial dispute between Kalin and his former co-gardener Akyol. Before doing so however it is important to say that crucial to the production of these spatial conditions and forms of organisation is the initial nature or status of the space in question, the means through which it is first called into existence, and how it is subsequently sustained. For example, Kalin appropriates the triangular plot of land primarily for his individual use. While his claim on the land is initially uncontested due to its ambiguous jurisdiction and its lack of interest to other users, this mutates as the jurisdictions shift and conflicting interests appear. The French State, on the other hand, grants the land for a new housing development, designates, and
regulates its use. Neither Navarinou Park, nor the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens are designated, granted, or appropriated for individual use. Existing land is ‘commoned’, and this act both claims and sustains the spaces in question. A useful metaphor through which to explore these dynamics and the question of conflict in such spaces is the notion of the *Third Acre* put forward by the German filmmaker, author, and theorist Alexander Kluge.

In an interview for *New German Critique*, Kluge uses the metaphor of the third acre of common land (typical of the Middle Age three-acre European economic system) to underline the political function of ambivalent space.\(^{116}\) Ambivalent space for Kluge is that which is neither public space nor private property. Kluge underlines the necessity of a degree of ambivalent space for the production of politics. In Kluge’s three part spatial division, historically the Lord of a region would own a third of the land, another third would be given over to peasants to live on, and in return they would give the Lord a part of what they produced from the land. The last third of the land is reserved for common use by local people. The third acre of common land is therefore an ambivalent space that belongs to no one. In the historical three-acre model, the Lord tends to appropriate, little by little, parts of the common land. It thus becomes a site of contestation, a space where private unmediated experiences are publicly distributed.

What is significant here with regards to informally organised space is the manner in which ambivalent space is contested. Unmediated conflict occurs in an open or visible way that is not hidden by bureaucracy or other means of state apparatus. Kluge describes the conflict that occurs around the ambivalent space of the third acre, as ‘the factory of politics – its site of production.’\(^{117}\) He goes on to say that:

\[\ldots\text{this site of production - the space in which politics is first made possible at all and communicable - is caught in a scissors-grip between private appropriation (which is no longer public in the authentic sense) and the self-eliminating classical public-sphere (its mechanisms of subtraction and exclusion).}\]\(^{118}\)

A contemporary analogy to the tendency that Kluge describes is that, like the Lord in the third acre model, the private entrepreneur, corporation or developer that continuously aims to appropriate public space – and in doing so, not only takes that

\(^{116}\) Kluge, "On Film and the Public Sphere."

\(^{117}\) Kluge, "On Film and the Public Sphere," 213.

\(^{118}\) Kluge, "On Film and the Public Sphere," 213.
space away from public use, but also controls the very political process that determines the survival of a way of life dominated by markets and private interests rather than the social or common good. Kluge’s description of the third acre as the factory of politics could also be read as a reference to the ambivalence of common space. For ‘communing’ aims to continually produce a space that belongs to no one, and in which the question of use and ownership are open to dispute. In this sense, Kluge’s third acre of common land is often a conflictual space, where struggle and negotiation are visibly acted out in public. It also provides an historical spatial metaphor through which to imagine a space that is neither public nor private, neither given by the state, nor taken by an individual. For the common space of the third acre would be defined and sustained only by the social processes that produce it.

The site of the gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères is an example of informally produced space that I encountered first hand during my residency in Villeneuve. I discovered the gardens while walking in the suburbs of Grenoble. I was struck by the contrast between the social engineering of Villeneuve that aimed to produce a social utopia, and what I felt was a much more organic form of social space apparent in the informal organisation of the gardens. After several visits to the site, I met the founders of the gardens who agreed to be interviewed on video on site. I was interested to know about the origins of the gardens, how they started, how space was distributed, and whether there were any territorial disputes. How, in the absence of centralised planning or any form of regulation from above, did the garden function? Moreover, how were the spatial production and the desires of individuals accommodated or collectivised within a shared space?

Initially, I came across the Navarinou Park in an issue of the German review An Architektur dedicated to the informal use of space in relation to a notion of commons. In an article that discussed Navarinou Park, Massimo De Angelis and Stavros Stavrides referred to the park as an example of contemporary commons. The questions both authors raise about contemporary commons overlapped with the questions I was asking about the kind of social space that Kalin produced in his appropriation of the plot of land near the Berlin Wall. De Angelis expanded on the social aspect of Navarinou Park by comparing it to the pre-enclosure English commons. De Angelis takes his cue from

120 Massimo De Angelis & Stavros Stavrides, "On the Commons."
Peter Linebaugh’s use of the verb ‘to common’, which describes how the social process of using space creates and reproduces the commons as a shared resource. De Angelis describes how English commoners were able to maintain and develop certain customs in common — collecting wood in the forest, or setting up villages on land that belonged to the crown or local landowners. Through the practice of ‘commoning’, communities were able to assert their right to use land that others wanted to enclose.\textsuperscript{121} The article, however, highlighted the possibilities as well as the problems of spaces that are not regulated by the state.

The discussion of Navarinou Park as a contemporary commons certainly raises important issues about access and participation as well as sustainability. These two spatial examples show a spectrum of informally organised spaces: the gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères are organised in an ad hoc, contingent and organic manner, in contrast to the Navarinou Park, whose experimental form of organisation is nevertheless deliberate, considered and not contingent. If space and resources are limited, then how can these examples of informal organisation, address questions of use, distribution, and equality? In what way do the issues around spatial organisation in these examples help to further complicate and define the meaning of social space?

\textbf{Saint-Martin-d'Hères gardens, Grenoble}

In the commune of Saint-Martin-d'Hères, in the south east of France, near Grenoble, concealed between a railway track and a motorway, is an allotment consisting of around twenty gardens. The gardens are hidden away from public view by a wall that runs along the side of the railway track. Access to the gardens is by a low concrete tunnel that passes under the railway. The other side of the wall is a narrow strip of land, on which the gardens are situated, and beyond that, the motorway. This group of gardens have not been officially planned or granted, but is an informal use of space. Interestingly, the gardeners decided to make their gardens not as a group or a collective, but individually or in small groups. Each person or small group manage his or her own plot of land. Any shared land, such as the pathways that lead to each garden, is left wild. If each person acted individually to make their gardens, how did these gardens begin? The gardeners do not own the land and they do not pay rent. There are no meetings

between gardeners to decide how the allotment should be organised; no formal rules or regulations. Yet, this space is so far, shared in relative harmony between users. It is an example of a kind of self-organised space where there is effectively an absence of formal organisation: things just seem to sort themselves out. The absence of formal organisation raises an interesting contradiction with regard to informally organised space that I will address later in this chapter.

In 1998, I spoke to Mahmoud, one of the founders of the garden. Mahmoud told me that the land belongs to the French railway company and the motorway company. He said that he and his brother found the space by chance in 1992. They thought it would be a good place to meet with their friends. Together with his friends, Mahmoud cleared the rubbish away from the site to make the garden. However, the space was more than a garden for Mahmoud and his friends. They also built a large hut to hang out. Behind the hut, the group had made a covered outdoor space for slaughtering sheep, for use during the Ramadan festival. According to Mahmoud, after they had made their garden, other people came and saw that there was a possibility to make a garden for themselves. People arrived over a period. The earlier arrivals had more space to choose from. Once the gardeners chose their space, each one enclosed their garden with a fence. Eventually the strip of land was filled with gardens and there was no more space left for new arrivals. Before the gardeners made their gardens, the site had been used as an informal dump. It was full of rubbish; rubble, black bin bags, old fridges, cookers and washing machines.

![Figure 21 Gardens, Saint-Martin-d'Hères](image)

122 Pioneers, dir. Gee.
When I first visited the site in 1997, Mahmoud’s garden was completely overgrown and at the back of the garden was a large pile of beer cans and bottles. The neglected condition of Mahmoud’s garden was an exception. The rest of the gardens in the allotment were well kept and enthusiastically used as plots for growing vegetables and flowers. The difference between Mahmoud’s garden and the other gardens underlined the extent to which the users of the allotment acted by themselves, as each space was treated as an individual project. The process of each gardener choosing a space and fencing it off also appears to have occurred of its own accord. There were no disputes about who took what and what size of space they should get. People just got on with it.

There are two points that I want to emphasise here. First, when choosing where to make a garden, gardeners respected the boundaries of already existing gardens. In other words, new gardeners recognised a sort of right, not in a legal sense, of gardeners to occupy a space that they had begun to use. Second, when choosing a garden, gardeners never took more space than they could physically manage. It is striking to note when visiting the allotment that all of the gardens use approximately the same amount of space. The one exception in size is the garden of Mahmoud and his friends, which occupies more space than the other gardens. As the number in Mahmoud’s group is between 10 and 15 men, it could be argued that they need more space.

The way that the gardeners of the informal allotment in Saint-Martin-d’Hères went about making their gardens resonates with Locke’s theory of property, based and natural reasoning. Arguably, the gardeners at Saint-Martin-d’Hères substantiate Locke’s account of property in which he says that human beings have a natural reasoning capacity. The amount of space that each gardener occupies reflects Locke’s theory that human beings natural reasoning capacity respects a natural limit to the boundless human desires. At the same time, each gardener encloses his or her garden with a fence. The enclosure of the gardens at Saint-Martin-d’Hères developed without consultation, negotiations, meetings, or forming a group. It is arguably an informally organised space without organisation. This organic form of social organisation might have consequences in terms of whether this kind of space is sustainable or not. I will return to the question of the sustainability of informal forms of spatial organisation at the end of this chapter. I now want to examine a second example of informally organised space that raises very different questions to the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens.
Navarinou Park, Athens

Navarinou Park is a former paid parking lot that was taken over by a grassroots initiative that transformed it into a neighbourhood park in 2009. The park is located in the heart of the Exarcheia district of Athens, between the streets Charilaou Trikoupi, Navarinou, Zoodochou Pigis, and Didotou. The Exarcheia district is one of the most densely built neighbourhoods in Athens and does not have a lot of green space. The park exists on a site previously occupied by a four-storey building. The building was demolished during the 1980s in order to construct the offices of the Greek chamber of architects and engineers. Due to complications in negotiations between the municipality and the landowners, the project never took place. Instead, the site was leased for use as a paid parking lot. When the parking lease ended in 2008 a local residents group representing the district of Exarcheia made a request to the district council for the site to become a green space for the neighbourhood, which was denied. A year later the residents group mobilised local people to occupy the site. According to a blog site dedicated to the park, the local response was enthusiastic. Events were organised, and people were united in support of the demand that the parking lot become a park.123 In March 2009, the residents took matters in their own hands. Using pneumatic drills and cutters they broke the asphalt, removed the rubble with trucks, and planted trees and flowers: ‘The dynamic response from almost everyone surpassed all expectations and the park was born.’124

What is interesting in this example of spontaneously produced space is how it is organised and managed, how the park is regulated, and how decisions are made about the management of the park. The park blog site states that open meetings were held on the second day of its creation. The park was busy with lots of discussions, many contradictions, and a lot of goodwill. During the meeting, separate groups were created to organise things such as planning events, creating and taking care of plants, organising a playground, creating mosaics and raising financial support for the park. The organisers requested the participation of park users in an open meeting for the joint development of the project. They also made a plea for volunteers to help with cleaning, watering, building, and organisational work. Apart from physical participation, the organisers also asked for financial donations. The Navarinou Park functions as a

124 Navarinuo Park Collective.
playground, a place to walk, communicate, play sports, be creative as well as being a space for reflection. It is also used for film projections, parties, and discussion about political aspects of local and national problems such as ecology.

The park blog site states that the park aims to include everyone in decision-making, and that anyone is invited to participate in the management process of the park. It adds that: ‘any idea can be expressed and nothing is rejected.’ The organisers declare the park as a plural and inclusive space that aspires to: ‘remove the barriers between age, origin, levels of education, as well as social and economic differences.’ This is a form of deliberative self-organisation that aspires to be: ‘a place of creativity, empowerment and resistance, open to political and cultural action,’ – and does not want to be a space for ‘profit and accumulation’.  

![Figure 22. The local residents group making Navarinou Park](image)

The local resident’s group effectively appropriated a piece of state regulated space and created a form of contemporary commons. The notion of contemporary commons is partly based on the ambivalent status of space, meaning that the space belongs to no one. Legally the space belongs to the state but by using the space as a park organisers

125 Navarinuo Park Collective.  
126 Navarinuo Park Collective.  
127 Navarinuo Park Collective.
have created a claim to space through use, which De Angelis calls an act of commoning. Nevertheless, a claim to a space does not make it private property in Locke’s sense; the status of the park remains ambivalent to a degree, as a claim to space is defined more by the use of space. Despite the strong and clear intentions of the park organisers to create an open and participative form of spatial organisation, the question remains as to how far the open and inclusive form of participation can reach. Is there a limit to the degree of ambivalence concerning the use of and access to the park, and does the lack of formal spatial regulation invite conflict with other groups that might have a counter claim on the space? The plural, inclusive aspirations of the park organisers were tested when a group of young anarchists, who hung out in the park at night, used the space in what the park users regarded as a non-consensual way. The following account of the unwillingness of the group of young anarchists to participate in the open and inclusive organisation process of the park is an example of the sort of conflict that can arise from spatial ambivalence.

In Massimo De Angelis’s account of Navarinou Park the park involved four parties, the state (represented by the police), the residents group that took the initiative to make a park, the young anarchists who used the park at night, and the people that lived close to the park who were disturbed by the noise and mess that they claimed the young anarchists made. The local residents complaints about the young anarchists validated the state’s actions via the police to control the space. The activists stated that they would like the young anarchists to participate in the self-organisation process of the park and respect the rights of the local people. However, the young anarchists stated that they were not interested in joining the community of activists. Furthermore, they regarded the local residents as collaborators with capitalist society, and part of a system that they were rebelling against. For this reason, the peace of mind of the residents who lived near the park was not regarded as an important issue by the young anarchists. The conflict initiated by the interventions of the young anarchist group questions the inclusive and pluralistic aspiration of the park organisers. The young people’s lack of interest in taking part in the organisational structures, and their disregard for the neighbours around the park, are an example of how informal organisation becomes problematic when particular groups operate with a degree of exclusivity. De Angelis

argues that when alternative communities are creating rules for alternative governance, they must be aware that total inclusivity is impossible and that there are always those who are included and excluded. On the other hand, he would argue in this particular case that rather than seeing the young peoples’ attitude as radically oppositional, it might actually be regarded as a form of individualism concurrent with capitalism.\(^{130}\)

The state and the residents group that initiated the park, together with the young anarchists group and the local residents who live near the park, represent the complexities of a contemporary form of commons. The initial status of the park was that it was a state owned space that was not being used. The residents group appropriated the unused space and began to use it as a park. However, despite the residents’ group’s claim to the space as a park, it still has an ambivalent status – in other words, the park is still open to other possible uses. It is only through the act of commoning, the continual use of the space, that the residents group maintains the space as a park.

Navarinou Park and the informal gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères are two cases where individuals act together to claim, use, and regulate a space that they informally produced. What are the issues that arise when individuals, and not the state, act together to regulate space? The proposition of the garden at Saint-Martin-d’Hères is that it might not be necessary to formally organise space in order to determine how it is used and how it is distributed equally. It could be argued that the needs and desires of individuals are consolidated within the collective nature of this kind of informally organised space. An important and useful lens through which to test this claim however is to look at how specific conflicts and conflicts of interest occur in these spaces, and if, or how, they are resolved. I will return to the role of conflict in informally organised space later in this chapter. I will begin by exploring how the notion of contemporary commons overlaps with Lefebvre’s concept of lived space.

**Commons in lived space**

How might the notion of a contemporary commons overlap with Lefebvre’s notion of lived space and Locke’s account of property? Does Kluge’s reference to an historical notion of the commons simply posit a kind of social space that existed prior to what

\(^{130}\) Massimo De Angelis & Stavros Stavrides, "On the Commons," 20.
Lefebvre calls abstract space? De Angelis and Stavrides’s notion of contemporary commons is also derived from the commons that existed in England before the enclosures. It is useful to briefly look at how Lefebvre understands these spaces historically. Although Lefebvre does not directly name the historical event of enclosures, he clearly refers to it when he describes the transition from a feudal mode of production to capitalism. This is the moment that defines the production of abstract space, which is synonymous with the beginning of the capitalist mode of production. Lefebvre relates the process that separated people from their means of production with the beginning of abstract space in the following way:

The mobilization of space for the purposes of its production makes hard demands. The process begins, as we have seen, with the land, which must first be wrested away from traditional form of property, from the stability of patrimonial inheritance. This cannot be done easily, or without concession being made to the landowners (ground rents). The mobilization is next extended to space, including space beneath the ground and volumes above it. The entirety of space must be endowed with exchange value. And exchange implies interchangeability: the exchangeability of a good makes that good into a commodity, just like a quantity of sugar or coal; to be exchangeable, it must be comparable with other goods, and indeed with all goods of the same type. The “commodity world” and its characteristics, which formerly encompassed only goods, and things produced in space, their circulation and flow, now govern space as a whole, which thus attains the autonomous (or seemingly autonomous) reality of things, of money.132

The process of expropriation and dispossession of commoners, in other words the enclosures, was the beginning of abstract space and what Lefebvre calls abstract labour. The transition from primitive accumulation to capitalist economy, crucially, introduced a contradiction between use value and exchange value. The contradiction between use value and exchange value relates to the way that the price of something is determined. In Marx’s primitive economy, determining the price of a thing involves calculating the cost of production; the cost of materials, the amount of time it took to make it, and the skill and knowledge of the maker. Added to this is the scarcity of a thing. In a capitalist economy, monopolising the production of a thing and controlling its availability can artificially create scarcity. The skills and knowledge of the maker are appropriated and generalised in the manufacturing process. Because people no longer have the use of the 

131 Lefebvre, The Production of Space 49.
132 Lefebvre, The Production of Space 336.
means of production, they are not able to work to produce the means of their subsistence for themselves. Instead, they have to sell their labour in the market for exchange value (money), which they exchange for food, clothes and other goods and services. For Lefebvre, this in turn produces abstract and disconnected spaces for work and private life, which are separated by networks of road and rail, distance and time. In the capitalist mode of production, space is also abstracted when it becomes an object; space gets homogenised, classified, surveyed, quantified and mapped, to become an object of exchange, interchangeable with other spaces, other commodities and money. Lefebvre says that, ‘it was during this time that productive activity (labour) became no longer one with the process of reproduction which perpetuated social life; but, in becoming independent of that process, labour fell prey to abstraction, whence abstract social labour – and abstract space.’¹³³ For Lefebvre, there is a strong connection between abstract space and abstract labour, not only because of the disconnection from processes of reproduction described above, but also because space shifts from being defined by how it is used, to being a form of property that is to be defined by its exchange value. In addition, Lefebvre notes that the contradiction between the use and the use value of property lies, ‘in the clash between a consumption of space which produces surplus value and one which produces only enjoyment – and is therefore “unproductive”.’¹³⁴ The notion of space as a commodity also resonates with Locke’s labour theory of property, in which the emphasis is placed on producing use and value from space and not a space of enjoyment.

The process of enclosure thus transformed common land into private property, and space became a commodity. The separation of people from the means of production entails the separation of people from their means of reproduction. As space is reified, so are social relations. Objects and people become things, as they lose all human characteristics: ‘the transformation of humans’ as well as objects, ‘into thing-like beings which do not behave in a human way but according to the laws of the thing-world.’¹³⁵ The thing-like world is the world of pure commodities, where everything is viewed in terms of exchange value and nothing in terms of use value.

¹³³ Lefebvre, The Production of Space 49. ¹³⁴ Lefebvre, The Production of Space 359. ¹³⁵ Bottomore, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought 410.
The above account of enclosures brings me back to my opening questions in this chapter: if space is ambivalent and not regulated by the state then how are claims and counter claims to space managed? How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? How is the use of a space, what is allowed or not allowed, determined? What form does negotiation between spatial users take if there are no state institutions to mediate between disputing parties? While Kluge stresses the importance of a sort of ambivalent space that belongs to no one, in reality today all spaces in which I work and live belong to someone. The ambivalent spaces that I am discussing in this chapter are spaces that are ‘commomed’, but they are mostly spaces of urban abandonment. They are spaces that are technically either publicly or privately owned, but were not being used at the time they were initially claimed. It is apparent in both these examples, however, that there is neither a resurrection of a third acre law, nor a piece of common land granted. Rather, it is through the act of ‘commoning’ that this ambivalent space is identified, claimed, and used. These spaces return, therefore, to being defined through their use.

**Spatial Difference: Alternative Spaces**

The differences between Navarinou Park, and Saint-Martin-d’Hères are vast; the gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères are more like a rural site compared to Navarinou Park. It would be fair to say that the location of Saint-Martin-d’Hères is not desirable in terms of real estate. It is a peripheral site, close to a busy motorway that generates noise and pollution. On the other hand, Navarinou Park occupies a densely built part of Athens, where space is at a premium and green space is rare. Nevertheless, both examples reveal the complexities of organising and regulating space when the state is removed from these functions. What I am looking for in these spaces is something beyond the abstract or conceived state regulated public space, something beyond Kalin’s individualistic space which, I argue, combines Lefebvre’s lived space and Locke’s version of private property – something more than the institutionalised form of spatial appropriation offered to residents of Villeneuve.

The Navarinou Park was created out of very different circumstances to the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens. The Exarcheia district in the centre of Athens has a reputation for alternative, political actions. It was the scene of much of the anti-capitalist disturbances in 2010. The park was born out of a grass roots initiative that recognized
the need for green space in the neighbourhood. The founders of the park confronted the state in a deliberate way. Their action was collective and had a political motivation to reclaim private space for common use. The very process of acting collectively entails organisation, negotiating differences, and finding common goals. This is very different to the way that the Saint-Martin-d’Hères garden came about. The Saint-Martin-d’Hères garden was not motivated by a political aim. It was born out of the desire of a small group of young men who needed a place to hang out after work. The rest of the gardeners followed the example of the young men, each arriving in their own time. The comparison between the two spaces reveals the contrasting forms that informal organisation and commons can take. The gardeners of Saint-Martin-d’Hères have no collective political aspirations when they garden, there are no discussions about how the gardens should be organised and no conflict between the gardeners.

The garden is collective only in so much as there are a number of people that use the space for the same purpose. As there is nothing else that binds them together in a political sense, it is questionable whether the gardeners would organise themselves to fight collectively if the landowners decided to evict them. It could be argued that the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens are a politically indifferent space. However, the question could be asked as to whether, in Lefebvre’s terms, the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens are less political just because they are situated on the social margins of the city. Space is more abundant there, so the question of rivalry or counter claims to space is less of an issue. Furthermore, there appears to be no tension concerning what the space is used for, as the gardeners have the same intention, to garden. It would be different if another group, with different intentions, came along one day and challenged the gardeners. The Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens will remain a sort of utopia in the sense that all is well in the garden while; there is no challenge to their use of the space. On the other hand, the tensions and conflicts that surround the Navarinou Park produces more overtly the kind of politics that Kluge imagines when he refers to the commons as an ambivalent, disputed space, or what he calls a factory of politics.

What Kluge is referring to in this metaphor for commons as a factory of politics is the visibility of conflicts and power relations that occur in his notion of commons; relations and processes that are otherwise hidden or disavowed in the state regulated space. Kluge’s metaphor for commons resonates with Lefebvre’s notion of maximal
difference, as it also refers to hidden power relations within the state mode of production. What is interesting in the Navarinou Park is that it may not be a social utopia in the sense of social harmony and spatial autonomy, but something important is revealed about the power relations between actors/agents at work in spatial production. In this instance, the struggle for space is between the police and the residents. The negotiations that define the use of the space are carried out between the residents and the young anarchists. In both instances, the struggles and negotiations are visibly acted out in public. In order to explore further what is revealed through conflicts in these appropriated spaces, I will now briefly return to Kalin’s garden and an episode that occurred in 1998 in the form of a dispute between Akyol and Kalin over the use of the garden.

All is Not Well in the Garden

Throughout this research, I have referred to the garden made on the triangular plot of land in Kreuzberg as Kalin’s garden. This is not only because Kalin was the principal founder of the garden in 1982; it is because Kalin’s name is the one that is now primarily associated with the space. In fact, Kalin shared this garden from 1987 to 1999 with his neighbour Mustafa Akyol. However, Kalin used the garden more than Akyol, and produced the many highly visible huts on the site, as well as the table and bench on the pavement outside the garden. In a photograph taken by Metin Yilmaz in 1987, we see Mr and Mrs Akyol standing in the middle of the plot of land. The garden looks healthy with many green plants growing. The Berlin Wall encloses one side of the garden; the other edges of the plot appear to be open. There is no sign yet of a fence that later appears, dividing the garden into separate parts to be used by Akyol and Kalin. It is difficult to know how they used the garden at this time, because neither Kalin nor Akyol are available to be interviewed anymore. I can speculate that they both used the entire garden together or maybe that they had an informal agreement to divide the garden into two parts. The fact that the photograph shows Mr and Mrs Akyol standing in the middle of the garden and not further towards the riverside is consistent with the way that the garden was later divided; the Akyol family used the St Thomas’s Church end of the garden, while the Kalin family used the Spree end of the garden. Whichever way the garden was used in 1987, the absence of enclosures around the perimeter as well as the

136 Yilmaz, Osman Kalin in Harem Trousers.
absence of a dividing fence shows that the garden began as an informal arrangement and somehow became more formalised later on, with the construction of a perimeter fence as well as a fence that divides the garden into two parts.

In 1998, Kalin and Akyol were involved in a dispute concerning the use of the garden. To help reconstruct the event I am using material sourced from Imma Harms and Thomas Winkelkott’s film about the triangular plot of land. The film makers interviewed Kalin and Akyol about the dispute, as well as Pastor Müller from St Thomas’s Church and a lady called Barbara who lived in a flat that overlooks the garden. Akyol told the filmmakers that he came to the garden one day to find that Kalin had taken down the fence that separated his part of the garden from Kalin’s. Kalin had planted onions along a one and a half metre strip in Akyol’s part of the garden. He asked Kalin why he had taken down the fence. Kalin replied, ‘I can do that because it’s mine’. Akyol responded, ‘I’ll give you until next Wednesday to put it back. If you don’t put the fence back where it used to be, I’m going to do it myself’. Akyol put the fence back, but not in the right place. The dispute continued until it escalated into a series of

137 Was Man So Sein Eigen Nennt, dir. Harms and Winkelkotte.
violent clashes involving the sons of each family. The police were called to stop the dispute. In the fighting, Kalin broke several ribs.

When Imma Harms asked Kalin why he took down the fence and planted onions on Akyol’s part of the garden, he said he thought that Akyol had stopped using his garden because he had not seen him there for a long time. Kalin heard from a man called Hoxa that Akyol had moved to another neighbourhood. Barbara and Pastor Müller substantiated Kalin’s observations. Barbara said that she liked to look at the garden from her balcony and she had not seen any of the Akyol family in the garden for a long time. His side of the garden had looked neglected and overgrown. Pastor Müller remarked how Akyol’s part of the garden had not been watered for a while and that the soil had dried up. Akyol’s absence was in contrast with Kalin’s presence in his garden. Barbara and Pastor Müller say that Kalin used the garden on a more regular basis, and both argue that this justified his occupation of the space. The garden appears to have been, among other things, a way for Kalin to supplement his earnings. Kalin tells Imma that he sold the onions twice a week in the market place. He did this until the end of May, and then sold black cabbage. According to Akyol, Kalin did not pay tax on the produce he sold. Kalin said the argument with Akyol was all his wife’s fault because she said that their garden needed to be bigger. ‘That’s why I did it’, he said. In the film, Kalin appears to regret taking down the fence and calls his wife an idiot.

In chapter three, I compared the way that Kalin made a garden on the triangular plot of land with John Locke’s account of property. I identified three of Locke’s arguments for property that overlapped with the way that Kalin made his garden; the mixing of labour with the material world, natural bounds to limitless desires, and the natural reasoning capacity of humanity that allow conflicting parties to peacefully resolve disputes by acknowledging the rights of another. The territorial dispute between Akyol and Kalin begins to complicate Locke’s arguments. The garden begins because there is an unused plot of land in the centre of the city, and two men with their families invest their labour to clear the land and make two gardens. The labour invested in the space justifies their use of space. Each family has a proportional amount of space that corresponds to what they are able to manage. Each family uses their natural reasoning capacity that allows the process to take place without argument. All is well in the garden until Akyol stops using his part of it. This opens up a possibility for Kalin to expand his garden. On the
basis that the use of something grants a person the right to claim ownership of it, then Kalin’s use of Akyol’s part of the garden can be justified. However, in this instance, Locke’s assumption that humans have a natural reasoning capacity that allows people to resolve disputes peacefully breaks down as Kalin’s action results in violence.

The dispute raises questions in relation to Locke’s property theory and the behaviour of the gardeners. If Kalin was able to use and manage more of the garden, why did he want to share it in the first place? It is clear from Barbara and Pastor Müller’s interviews in the film that Kalin used the garden more than Akyol. They both remarked on the enthusiasm and energy that Kalin invested in the garden. What they also observed is the adjustments that Kalin made to the garden’s external boundaries over time. This is particularly noticeable at the time the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. From this moment on the garden was exposed to Bethaniendamm. Pastor Müller remembers how Kalin took advantage of this event by enlarging his part of the garden, digging up part of the Bethaniendamm pavement, and filling it with earth. He then cemented a fence into the ground. Pastor Müller allowed Kalin to take earth from St Thomas’s church to enlarge his garden. Does Kalin’s need for more space mean that he became a better gardener and therefore capable of managing more space? It is known that Kalin was selling his vegetables at the market, so the garden became a way of supplementing his earnings. Kalin’s industriousness is perhaps comparable to a capitalist entrepreneur and opens up the question of whether accumulation is part of what Locke would consider human nature. There is certainly a judgement made about the way Kalin uses the garden. Pastor Müller is critical of the way the garden moved away from being a pastime activity, growing a few plants and vegetables for home consumption, to become a place of commercial production. Akyol takes issue with Kalin earning money from selling his onions at the local market and making a straight profit without paying any tax. Meanwhile Akyol was dealing with a lot of the administrative part of the garden concerning their possible eviction. Akyol also claims that he was paying costly water bills each year for his part of the garden. Kalin, who somehow had a different water supply, paid nothing for this. Akyol says he did not make any money selling vegetables from the garden.

Despite this criticism, Kalin’s expansion of his part of the garden for commercial purposes is still relative to his own productive capacity. In other words, Kalin is
expanding and accumulating in a way that corresponds to Locke’s natural limits argument. However, the dispute between Kalin and Akyol also exposes the weakness of “natural” limits and “natural” reasoning. It is not “natural” reasoning that resolves the dispute. In this instance, informally regulated space requires the state and the law to intervene. What does the failure of “natural” limits and “natural” reasoning say about my comparison between Locke’s account of property and Lefebvre’s notion of lived space? Earlier I made the point that, in the end Kalin’s version of lived space comes to resemble Locke’s notion of private property. However, Lefebvre would not be interested in talking about the individual in his concept of lived space. There are clearly limits in both Locke’s notion of property and Lefebvre’s concept of lived space in my search for sustainable forms of collective, egalitarian social space.

The dispute between Kalin and Akyol is more like a dispute between neighbouring house owners. In other words, both parties treat their part of the garden as their own private property. Akyol’s attempt to keep the garden when he is not using it is like an abstracted form of property, or private property. Indeed, in 1998, Akyol sold his part of the garden to another Turkish family. The dispute between Kalin and Akyol only concerns two people and therefore it is likely to produce a final outcome: a winner or a loser, rather than a political process. In other words, the dispute is not a process that can amplify beyond the two people involved. Ultimately, it cannot become the factory of politics that Kluge refers to. Nevertheless, the regular use of the space by Kalin and Akyol maintains the space, and prevents it from being developed into a state managed space or sold off as private property in the formal legal sense.

Kalin’s occupation of the garden is an ongoing process that produces varying local discourses both for and against the garden. Through the production of his garden Kalin has inadvertently created relationships within the neighbourhood. It is true that Kalin’s activities have been mediated largely through Pastor Müller, who has seen Kalin’s use of the triangular plot of land as a focal point for the community. Without Pastor Müller’s help, particularly in dealing with the council, as well as practical matters such as water supply, it is questionable whether Kalin would have been allowed to continue to occupy the land. In the end, he was granted an indefinite right to keep his garden. The violence that ensued from the territorial dispute between Kalin and Akyol relied on the intervention of the state, via the police, to sort it out. The fact that the state granted
Kalin the land for his garden and the intervention of the state to resolve the dispute between Kalin and Akyol opens up questions about the status of Kalin’s garden: how alternative is Kalin garden today?

Each of the three examples of informally organised space I have presented above exemplify, to various degrees, the kind of spatial qualities that I am looking for in this research: a space where free will, freedom, and individual needs and desires of spatial users can manifest in a particular context. The aim of this chapter has been to question how free will, freedom, and individual needs and desires operate in a collective or social space existing alternatively, but alongside the space of the state. As I stated above the ambivalent spaces that I am discussing in this chapter are spaces that are ‘commoned’: they are spaces that return to being defined through their use. There is neither a resurrection of a third acre law, nor a piece of common land granted. Rather, it is through the act of ‘commoning’ that this ambivalent space is identified, claimed, and used. The background question while considering these spaces is about how people can live together without the state. How are claims and counter claims to space managed? How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? How is the use of a space, what is allowed or not allowed, determined? What form does negotiation between spatial users take if there are no state institutions to mediate between disputing parties? The above questions relating to alternative space feed into a new question: are any of the above forms of informal spatial organisation sustainable? Sustainability can mean something that supports itself definitely, something that endures. The term sustainable is more commonly used in the context of environment and development: ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’

However, the way that I am thinking about sustainability with regards to informal spaces is the ability of a spatial form to endure existing social conditions as well as the ability of a spatial form to reproduce itself in the future. To endure means a spatial form is able to exist alongside and within an existing state.

How sustainable each of the above spatial examples is depends on a number of things, including the relationship between the state and the space in question and the social organisation of the spatial users. I would argue that the state is not interested in the

gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères. The state’s disinterestedness in the site facilitated its use by the gardeners who, as stated above, made their gardens without any formal organisation. Furthermore, the gardeners are not organised as a collective in any form. The gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères are a contingent form of spatial organisation where space is evenly distributed on a first come first serve basis. The gardens in Saint-Martin-d’Hères can endure but I would argue that this type of informal a space would not reproduce itself. The gardens will only remain as long as the state is not interested in the site. If the state decides to develop the site, there is no collective body to resist or make a collective claim to the space.

The events surrounding Navarinou Park discussed above suggests that a certain kind of conflict has to be incorporated into sustainable forms of alternative spatial organisation in order for it to be able to reproduce itself. The location of the Navarinou Park is a site that the state did not, and does not; want to give to the people. For this reason it had to be forcibly taken by the park collective. This created a conflict with the state as the park collective are in a continual struggle to keep the land from being taken back by the state. I would argue here that the process of struggle between the users of space and the state is part of a process of sustainability. The other issue of conflict in Navarinou Park concerns the use of the park. The conflict is between the different users of the park, namely the park collective and the group of young anarchists. The park collective would like to appease the people that live near the park by reasoning with the young anarchists to be more considerate to local people. This opens up a complex dynamic between the three parties, or if we include the state again, four parties. In a way, these multiple conflicts can be seen as self destructive and detrimental to the survival of the park. However, they echo Kluge’s sentiments about the importance of ambivalent space and the production of politics. What is significant here is that these conflicts take place in an open and transparent way.

Let me return finally, to Kalin’s garden to ask the question: what is a sustainable form of alternative space? I have to argue from the perspective of Kalin’s garden that in its present form, the moment of alternative informal, autonomous space has already passed. The garden began as a form of transgression by occupying part of what was East German territory during the period of the Berlin Wall. To keep the garden Kalin had to confront different forms of state authority many times. The conflict between Kalin and
the state came to a conclusion in 2004 when the district council of Kreuzberg granted Kalin the right to keep his garden on the land. In my view, this is the moment when Kalin’s garden, despite its visual spatial difference, became part of the state mode of production. In fact, the spatial difference of the garden has aided the transition from its alternative status to become part of the institutional space of the state mode of production. The juxtapositions between Kalin’s informal architecture and the formal, conceived space that surround the garden, in the middle of a traffic island in Kreuzberg, has now made Kalin’s garden a sort of fetishized space for artists, researchers, tourists, and architects – and I include myself in this list.

When talking about a space defined by use, space that is reproducible, a space that is produced from the bottom up, a space that embodies the individual needs and desires as well as those of a collective, and most importantly a space that attempts to deal with conflicts that occur from differing views of spatial users, and perhaps even more importantly, a space that takes on the state in a reproducible form, then Navarinou Park would appear to be the most useful among the three examples discussed above. This begs the question of whether sustainable informal spaces need to have an overtly political conflict. Do they need to be produced by people with a certain education or agenda? If I had been writing about Kalin’s space ten years ago I would not have the same conclusion as today. At this time, Kalin was still fighting with the state to retain his garden. Once the state gave the land to Kalin then the informal, alternative status of space changed. The space, despite the origins of its idiosyncratic mode of construction, became part of the state mode production. Furthermore, it is important to consider the kind of politics that this trouble in the garden produces, this act of commoning that sustains something through conflict with the state and other actors. Perhaps this kind of sustained conflict might be call maximal difference.
Conclusion

This PhD project has given me a chance to reflect in detail on spaces that have interested me for more than 15 years. During this research, I have developed a more critical and analytical approach to my work that has allowed me to take a few steps back from my subject of interest. At the outset, I had an idea about space, or more specifically the street. I began with a naïve idea that everyone had a right to some part of the street. This was loosely based on the premise that the street was a part of public space and therefore belonged to users of space. Initially, this idea might seem to share the sentiments of groups such as ‘Reclaim the Streets’. However, I was less interested in the collective reclaiming of public space and more so, in the question of how individuals can claim a space for her/himself.

When I came across Kalin’s garden in the centre of Kreuzberg I was impressed with the degree of spatial difference that Kalin’s garden produced aesthetically, formally, technically and bureaucratically in relation to the area that surrounded it. I felt that Kalin’s garden presented itself as a good place to start to understand the mechanisms that define and govern public space. Previously I had come across examples of people, during my travels, who had constructed a personalised space. However, these spaces were always hidden away in the social margins of the city. I thought that by writing about Kalin’s garden I would be able to find a way through the fog of bureaucracy that surrounds public space.

At the beginning of my research into Kalin’s garden, I was concerned with historical, practical, and perhaps journalistic, questions. How was Kalin able to make his garden? When did he make it? How long had it been there? Who did the land belong to? Why was Kalin’s garden allowed to stay? The first chapter of this thesis is therefore an extensive description, tracing the evolution and the historical context of Kalin’s garden. While chapter one constructs a picture of the triangular plot of land, its appearance and physical nature, it also explores the history of the space before and after the Berlin Wall and tries to explain how it was possible for Kalin to do what he did. What becomes clear in this chapter is that it was the ambivalent status of the triangular plot of land that

139 The street is a metaphor for space in general, especially public space.
allowed Kalin to make his garden. Although the land belonged to the GDR, the location of the land was on the west side of the Berlin Wall. The abandonment of the land (left to be used as an informal dump) gave the impression it belonged to no one, and gave Kalin the opportunity to claim a piece of land for himself. The specific circumstances surrounding Kalin’s garden clearly put it into the category of singular spaces. Nonetheless, the spatial ambivalence of the land is comparable to abandoned spaces that have a less dramatic history and which have been defined by the state’s disinterestedness in certain spaces. Questions such as who owns a space, who has rights to a space, and who regulates and manage a space are unclear. As such, ambivalent spaces are open to other forms of use other than those produced by the state. In researching Kalin’s garden I wanted to question whether his garden could be a nucleus or a model in itself for an alternative society, a moment of resistance in an antagonistic process? Alternatively, will it always be a kind of exception?

In this thesis, the concept of a state mode of production that dominates other forms of spatial production is developed through Lefebvre’s concept of spatial production. Lefebvre’s concept of perceived, conceived, and lived space helps to distinguish the kind of space that Kalin produces with his garden, as well as the space that surrounds his garden. The distinction that emerges between Kalin’s mode of spatial production and the space that surrounds it is one of technical, administrative, and formal difference. Kalin produces a hand-made space built over time – out of his experience and experiments, through a process of trial and error, and where the use and arrangement of materials are contingent.

In chapter two I explored the difference between the mass-produced, planned and conceived space of the state and the contingent, spontaneous and hand-made quality of lived space that Kalin produces. Here the question is how Kalin’s singular form of utopia complicates social utopian visions of architects and planners of the post-war French urbanisation process from 1950 to 1970. This form of conceived space, known as Hard French architecture, is renowned for its social engineering led by civil engineers and the civil servants rather than architects. In contrast to Hard French architecture I also write about a form of conceived space that is led by an architect’s vision: Le Corbusier’s humanist, modernist social housing project in Pessac. Both forms of conceived space employ forms of architecture that propose a way of life through
planning design by the distribution, proportioning and arrangement of space. In both examples of conceived space, I provide evidence of ways in which inhabitants of social housing projects tend to adapt and change their living spaces according to their needs and desires, despite the formal dominance of the architectural design.

The dilemma that I pose in chapter two concerns the need of spatial users to express their needs and desires. On the one hand, the production of a lived space such as Kalin’s garden leads to an individuated form of space and not a shared social space. On the other hand, the state, in an attempt to produce affordable housing for its population, has often only produced an alienating kind of habitation by means of standardisation and mass production. Even when progressive forms of social housing such as Le Corbusier’s Pessac project, take into account individual needs of end users, by producing forms of spatial difference for inhabitants, we find that inhabitants tend to resist (at least in the beginning) conceived space as they adapt and change their living spaces according to their needs and desires. In adapting and changing conceived space, inhabitants produce a liberating space for themselves at the same time as producing an individuated one. The question remains as to how to resolve the tension between the need to house a population and the need for groups and individuals to express their needs and desires spatially.

The form of lived space that Kalin produced also reflects this spatial dilemma. Kalin’s garden raises difficult and important questions about the ambivalence and possibilities of practices of spatial autonomy, freedom, free will, and self-determination. By appropriating the triangular plot of land and building his garden and his strange hut-like structure, Kalin both exemplifies and complicates Lefebvre’s notion of lived space. Despite the spatial difference that Kalin produces, and the promise of a sort of emancipated form of spatial production, he produces a form of individuated space that is in effect closer to a form of private property and therefore contradictory to a notion of shared social space. Although Lefebvre’s notion of lived space was arguably intended to describe socially organic forms of spatial production, which evolved through the use and production of space, Kalin’s project exposes the dilemma of producing de-regulated spaces. Kalin, in effect, produces a space in accordance with his needs and desires, spatially integrating himself with his surroundings at the cost of a more public, collective, or publicly accessible space.
Highlighting the private nature of Kalin’s space has allowed me to look at the tension between individuated space and social space. In producing his own space, Kalin opens up questions about notions of freedom, free will, and self-determination. Is there a social cost to freedom? What is the trade off between individuated space (private space) and the social space of the state? What degree of freedom and free will is achieved in an individuated space? Can an individuated private space be a social space? These are the central contradictions and ambiguities that arise between forms of conceived space, understood here as the planned social space of equal citizens on the one hand, and Kalin’s appropriated, informally constructed garden as a form of non standardized space, on the other. The production of individuated space also raises moral and ethical questions. How are people able to claim, produce, or take possession of space without conflict with other spatial users?

In chapter three I open up the contradiction between Lefebvre’s social space (lived space) and the state’s social space (conceived space) by revisiting the foundation of the modern concept of property. Notions of freedom, free will, and self-determination are explored here. Kalin’s appropriation of space, which I have compared to a form of private property, is explored through Locke’s account of property. Locke believes that humans are born with a natural reasoning capability that allows them to make moral and ethical judgements. This innate natural reasoning capacity means that humans are free to make their own way in the world without the need of the state to decide what is right or wrong, or to resolve conflicts.

Questions of freedom, free will, and self-determination in the social space of the state are explored through Hegel’s ethical life. Hegel sought to present the state as the embodiment of society’s general interest, as standing above particular interests, and as being therefore able to overcome the division between civil society and the state and the split between the individual as a private person and as a citizen. He argues that individuals do not have a natural reasoning capacity and are not able to regulate their affairs. The state therefore, is a necessary and essential organ for the organisation of civil society. Freedom, for Hegel, can only exist when an individual agrees to give up a degree of individual needs and desires for the greater good. In this way, an individual integrates her/him self with the social whole: the philosophical ideal is for the

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140 Bottomore, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought 464-65.
individual and the state to have the same values. The needs and desires of individuals are expressed through the state and vice-versa.

Through my analysis of the experiences of certain inhabitants of Villeneuve, I conclude that inhabitants of state-produced space will tend to change their living space to suit their needs and desires. The failure of Villeneuve to achieve a social utopia in the Hegelian sense, where inhabitants could recognise themselves in their surroundings as well as the everyday life administrative processes is, due in part to the institutionalization of spatial appropriation. Institutionally initiated forms of appropriation only allow inhabitants to adapt and change space in a limited way. In this sense the majority of Villeneuve’ inhabitants can only passively reside in space, and any process of dwelling (producing dis-alienated lived space) in Villeneuve is an exception.

Certain Villeneuve inhabitants have succeeded in adapting their apartments to suit their needs and desires produce, in spatial terms, something more like Lefebvre’s lived space. However, lived space often results in an individual space, which is contrary to the idea of a more collective, egalitarian social space. Clearly there is a conflict between Lefebvre’s desired ideal of social space and state-produced social space, so the crucial question remains as to how social space can therefore be defined and manifested.

If the state cannot produce a space that allows users to manifest their needs and desires, then what is left? Without the state comes a risk of conflicts or war of all against all. In chapter four, I addressed the question of how to produce a social space that exists despite the state. The premise that the state does not administer or regulate informal spaces raises questions concerning the production of informal space. How are claims and counter claims to space managed? How is space distributed? How are conflicts between spatial users regulated? How is the use of a space, what is allowed or not allowed, determined? What form do negotiations between spatial users take if there is no state institution to mediate between disputing parties? How sustainable/reproducible are alternative spaces?

The idea of space that is not regulated by the state brings us back to Locke’s notion of natural reasoning, and begs the question of what role (if any) it plays in the production of an informal social space. The gardeners of Saint-Martin-d’Hères, I argue, organise themselves in a way that is comparable to Locke’s natural reasoning. The gardeners have informally distributed space; a new arrival occupies a plot of land that is not too
big and not too small. Each plot is fenced off to form a private space. The process of spatial organisation occurs without conflict, and without the need of an external body to police or arbitrate between disputing parties. However, despite the harmony of this garden (a harmony that could amount to a form of natural reasoning) and despite the reasonable behaviour of gardeners, each gardener only takes care of her or his own space: there is no collective or social occupation of this space. Locke’s natural reasoning does not appear to come into play concerning the resolution of conflict: perhaps, because on this wasteland there is enough room to accommodate the needs of each gardener. The Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens show that people are capable of appropriating space without conflict about the use and distribution of space. Nevertheless, what the Saint-Martin-d’Hères gardens also shows is that without organisation, without conflict, this kind of space will only exist while there is no commercial or state interest in the space. The reason for this, I speculate, is based on the ease of access to the space in the first instance, which infers there are no history of conflict and no culture of resistance. In contrast, the Navarinou Park in Athens is in a constant state of conflict: a conflict between different users of the park as well as a conflict between park users and the state, which contests the existence of the park. These forms of conflict, I argue, are more likely to sustain the park as an ambivalent space that is defined by its use.

Conflict between different users groups can therefore be viewed as a positive in that it is one important way that this kind of space distinguishes itself from the state mode of production. Conflict between different users groups is an open process that invites a direct form of participation. In the state mechanisms of regulating space, conflict becomes lost or hidden in the endless channels of faceless bureaucracy. Lefebvre uses the term ‘maximal difference’ to emphasise the illusory difference or choices that the state mode of production creates, regardless of ideology. Lefebvre refers to the process in which the state promotes illusionary forms of minimal difference while denying the kinds of difference that Navarinou Park exposes. The state creates these forms of difference in order to enable itself to reproduce the relations of production necessary for the survival of the state and capitalism. By simultaneously homogenising, fragmenting, and hierarchizing space through processes of uneven geographical development (in favour of production and consumption), the state mode of production fragments social relations and undermines social space. What is significant here with regards to
informally organised space is the manor in which ambivalent space is contested in an unmediated way. Unmediated conflict occurs in an open or visible way that is not hidden by bureaucracy or other means of state apparatus. As long as Navarinou Park remains in a state of conflict between the state and the park users, as well as the conflict between park users, then it will remain an ambivalent space. The multiple conflicts in Navarinou Park are what make it an ambivalent space, the space that Kluge defines as the factory of politics.

Throughout the process of writing this thesis I was drawn to write about questions concerning the language, knowledge and power relations that Kalin’s spatial appropriation raises. Although I refer in the thesis to the differences between the professional spheres of spatial production and those who produce informal spaces, to explore this line of research further was beyond the bounds of this thesis.

I stated above that the motivation to write this thesis began with a naïve idea that everyone had a right to some part of the street. This was based not on the collective ownership of space but rather on the idea that an individual had a right to make a space for her/himself. What I figured out during the writing of this thesis is that although, as an individual, I might at times feel like I should have a stake in public space, in reality the nature of public space is that it is owned and regulated by the state. The state commodification of public space is one reason why the examples of informal spaces and the arguments that they present in this thesis are relevant today. The state protects and promotes the interests of capitalism. These interests gradually corrode the shared and publically used aspect of public space. An example of this in the UK is the selling of playing fields. This has been a recurring theme over the last 30 years. A process that began with Margret Thatcher’s government, that intensified during Tony Blair’s government and is still happening today. Playing fields are not only the site of school sports they are often used for public events that create a sense of community such as sports day, bomb fire night, and fairs. In this respect, the use value of public space is stripped away as it is treated like a state commodity. The loss of such spaces resonates with Kluge’s fears concerning the private appropriation of the third acre of common land. Further to this tendency of state sanctioned commodification of user defined public space, the state is passing more laws in favour of private corporate interests. Today the criminalisation of squatting has extended the gap between space that is
defined by its exchange value and space defined by its use value. Private property laws are even more in favour of property owners, which further exasperates the crisis of affordable accommodation.

A contemporary battle for space that resonates with arguments that I have presented in this thesis is the occupation by the Occupy London Stock Exchange movement of the disused office building owned by the investment bank UBS in Hackney, London. Under the name of Bank of Ideas the occupiers opened the UBS bank space to create a platform for proposing and discussing alternatives to what they saw as the dysfunctional and corrupt financial system that was behind the 2008-banking crisis. In December 2011, I took some friends who were visiting from Paris to see the Bank of Ideas space. On entering the building immediately on the right there was a large room visible from the street. The room was half full of people some standing, some sitting while others wondered barefoot carrying a mug of tea. The atmosphere was both casual and yet serious. We had come into the middle of a meeting. We found a place to sit and observed the meeting in progress. The group was discussing what to do about two homeless people that were staying in the building who had broken the no drinking rule and subsequently had become violent and abusive towards a number of people staying in the building.

The meeting was conducted following a degree of protocol. A process and methodology was clearly at work. One woman had the job of chairing the meeting, noting what had been said, while directing who could speak. As a way to help the flow of the meeting a series of hand gestures were used: raising both hands in the air and rotating the wrists back and forth indicated agreement with what was being said, crossing both arms in front of the body indicated disagreement with what was being said, rolling both arms around each other indicated not to interrupt and to keep the process going. The meeting broke down at times when the accused men made irrational and erratic arguments that bordered on paranoia. They claimed that they were victims of a sort of exclusion based on class, race and educational discrimination. Finally in reference to the tone of the accused, one of the occupiers said he felt that the group was not equipped to deal with mentally unstable, or psychotic people.

141 The Occupy London Stock Exchange movement took over an abandoned office block owned by UBS bank, in Sun Street, Hackney, London. The building was occupied from the 17 November 2011 until the 30 January 2012.
The occupation of the UBS bank resonates in many ways with arguments presented above concerning Navarinou Park. To begin with the UBS bank occupiers were reclaiming an unused private space. They aspired to make the space as inclusive as possible. The occupiers of the UBS bank consisted of a cross section of people that included intellectuals, students, the homeless, and squatters of all ages, sexes and nationalities. Whatever background the occupiers came from, whatever class, sub-culture or minority they represented, this group of people represented the problem of how to live together in another way than that proposed by the state. Like in Navarinou Park, it is the dynamics of conflict that is most significant when considering the question of how to live together alternatively to the state. More importantly, in this instance, it is how the conflict between occupiers is played out.

The question raised in the Bank of Ideas meeting was what to do with two men that broke the rules and in doing so endangered the wellbeing of other occupants. The two men in question were homeless, as such they were already outsiders excluded from formal society. If they were kicked out of the informal society created in the Bank of Ideas they would once again become outsiders. It might well be too simple to suggest that this situation exposes the limits of a society that exists without the state based on openness and inclusion. The Bank of Ideas is like a “temporary autonomous zone” that is in the global space governed by the neoliberal power (a collusion between state and private capitalistic interests). Arguably this situation imposes an internal pressure from outside that persuades some militants to repress others with the intention of maintaining unity and “respectability”. It could also be argued that the reduced space within the UBS bank creates its own generally conflicting situation that forces pragmatic solutions on the occupiers. In the end the group proposed a cooling off period in which the two men are expelled from the building for a few days. After which they could come back if they accept the no drugs, no drink rules and respect the other occupiers by not abusing or threatening them.

The battle for commoned shared space in a free and open society, a space defined by use rather than exchange value is one way to address the question of how to live together alternatively to the state. However, a question still remains concerning who speaks and who is heard. Are there not always people that, by education, background, personality able to articulate better or simply talk louder than others? If the dynamics of
conflict is to play a vital role in the sustainability of spaces that exist alternatively to the state, then how in a discursive space of continual open conflict can everyone be guaranteed an equal voice? Although the occupation of the UBS bank raises important questions concerning the sustainability of spaces that exist alternatively to the state, it only partially iterates contemporary questions that I have been struggling with in this thesis. It does not address the original issue concerning Kalin’s garden, namely the significance of claiming space by physically building and changing space. Finally, what the UBS bank occupation underlines, together with the examples of other informal spaces discussed in this thesis, is that the possibility of living together aside from and within state capitalism is getting harder and harder and simultaneously more necessary?
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