Commitment to A Life:
Thinking Beyond Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Conceptualization of Art

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The work presented in this thesis is the candidate’s own.
Abstract

This thesis takes as its point of departure Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s conceptualization of art. Art for them is the expression of A Life in the living. A Life is the ontological and genetic condition of that which we are and ordinarily experience, it is the vital and material transcendental plane of immanence which characterizes Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology. Their conceptualization of art, however, sits uncomfortably with contemporary art in rejecting conceptual and photographic practices, and in its radical rejection of human experience. The aim of this thesis is to expand their conceptualization of art whilst remaining close to what is argued to be its core or essence: a commitment to A Life. This thesis explores three paradigms of commitment to A Life that move beyond the paradigm of A Life in the living. These paradigms are developed through the application of concepts developed by Deleuze and Guattari to contemporary mediums and artworks, with the aim of broadening the relevance of their philosophy for contemporary artistic practices. Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetics is analyzed and expanded through an engagement with works by Francis Bacon, Thomas Struth, Pierre Huyghe, Francis Alÿs and Peter Doig. By finding a commonality between these artists in their commitment to A Life, this thesis hopes to develop a conceptualization of art which allows us to understand how contemporary art practices engage with A Life, the infinite inside which we live and which lives inside us.
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Introduction

This text takes as its point of departure Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s conceptualization of art. To a large extent, this conceptualization is established in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991) and in Deleuze’s writings on painter Francis Bacon in Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (Deleuze, 2002). The following summarily introduces terms related to DG’s conceptualization of art and the motivation for and purpose of this text.

DG conceptualize art as the expression of ‘Life in the living or the Living in the lived’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 163). A Life is a transcendental field, a pure plane of immanence (Deleuze, 2003a, 361), it is a ‘material vitalism that doubtless exists everywhere but is ordinarily hidden or covered’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 512). It is as a material vitalism that the transcendental field or plane of immanence is termed A Life, and it is as the ontological and genetic condition of the living or the lived that A Life is ordinarily hidden from or covered by the living, i.e. by the conditioned. A Life is in the living in that A Life is in reciprocal presupposition with the living: A Life and the living presuppose and determine each other, A Life conditions the living and “in turn” (in fact simultaneously) the living “feedbacks” into A Life changing its very own ontological and genetic condition in a never-ending process. A Life is ‘non organic Life’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 512) in reciprocal presupposition with the living or what can be termed nature. The living, nature, consists in what we ordinarily experience A Life as, it is that which we ordinarily experience of the transcendental field or plane of immanence inside which we live. The living or nature refers not only to “the natural” (trees, rain, stars, etc.) but also “the artificial” (technologies, architectures, medias, etc.), it refers to all that which we ordinarily experience the world as.

1 “DG” is used to reference “Deleuze and Guattari”.

2 In relation to the terminology of the concept of ‘A Life’, ‘the indefinite article [serves] as an index of the transcendental’; this quote is from Deleuze’s last published essay Immanence: A Life… (Deleuze, 2003a, 359-363), originally published in Philosophie, number 47, September 1995, pp.3-7.
Art ‘liberate[s] life where it is imprisoned’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 162). The expression of A Life in the living is the liberation of A Life imprisoned, ordinarily hidden or covered, in the living or nature. The artist for DG is ‘a seer, a becomer’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161), qualifications which have undertones of hardship: ‘to have seen Life in the living or the Living in the lived, the novelist or the painter come back with red eyes, and short breath’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 163). Art and philosophy have in common to ‘call for a new earth and people that do not yet exist’, and it is not ‘populist authors’, but ‘the most aristocratic’, that call for a new ‘earth and people that will not be found in our democracies’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 104). By liberating A Life where it is imprisoned, art gives us that which we ‘lack’: ‘resistance to the present’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 104), resistance to our democracies, to the common realm of perceptions, affections and opinions which concern the lived and oppose themselves to A Life, in other words resistance to the living which imprisons the transcendental plane of immanence that A Life is.

DG’s conceptualization of art is at odds with contemporary art practices. In the chapter Percept, Affect and Concept of Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? where DG explicitly discuss art, the artists (which also include writers and musical composers) encompassed by their conceptualization of art include exclusively celebrated art historical figures of past generations: Cézanne, Klee, Miro, Dürer, Bonnard, Rembrandt, Melville, Virginia Woolf, Debussy, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 156-168). Simultaneously, other celebrated art historical figures or types of art practice are rejected: for example, in Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation, Deleuze to a certain degree rejects abstract painting (Mondrian for example) and ‘abstract expressionism, or art informel’ (for instance Pollock) in favor of an alternative way of painting exemplified by Bacon (Deleuze, 2002, 96-102, 110-111). The expression of A Life in the living is termed sensation: the artwork is and through its aesthetic experience gives a sensation. Deleuze rejects abstract painting and abstract expressionism because they fail, he argues, the sensation, they fail the

3 ‘Life’ in this quote refers to A Life, to Life, as in the previously quoted passage: ‘Life in the living or the Living in the lived’. In the essay Immanence: A Life... the indefinite article indexes the transcendental (“a life”), and in Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, as quoted above, the capital letter serves as such index (“Life” or “the Living”).

4 To the trilogy perception, affection and opinion opposes itself the trilogy percept, affect and concept, i.e. that which art and philosophy create, and through which they attain to and engage with A Life.
expression of A Life in the living. And when DG discuss types of art practice of more recent generations, in particular conceptual art and the use of photography⁵, they assign to them this same status of failing the sensation, and as such failing art as it is defined by them (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 187). Whereas art creates sensation, philosophy creates concepts. Conceptual art fails both the sensation and the concept: ‘it is not sure that we as such attain to [...] the sensation nor the concept, because the plane of composition tends to be “informative”’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 187). The same can be said for photography (and of many contemporary art practices): it is informative and as such fails the sensation, it aligns itself with perceptions, it is “of the living”, “of the sensed”, and as such fails A Life, i.e. the sensing, the genetic condition of the living, the lived or the sensed. Abstract painting, abstract expressionism, conceptual art and photography fail the expression of A Life in the living, and as such cannot be encompassed by DG’s conceptualization of art. Their conceptualization of art sits uncomfortably with contemporary art practices, conceptual art and photography arguably being two of the most important aspects of contemporary art. Many contemporary art practices engage with perceptions or figurations, affections, opinions, information, journalism, appropriation, etc.; they represent, comment on, discuss, the living or the lived, and as such cannot either be encompassed by DG’s conceptualization of art. And yet, DG are frequently referenced in discourses that surround such practices. It seems however that whilst using many of the concepts DG have created many of these discourses do not explicitly engage with what DG actually write about art, with their conceptualization of art. The purpose of this text is to expand DG’s conceptualization of art whilst remaining close to what is argued to be its core or essence: what I term a commitment to A Life. This has for purpose to allow for the understanding of contemporary artworks or types of practice which cannot be encompassed by DG’s conceptualization of art but which can nevertheless be said to embody a commitment to A Life.

Art, following DG’s conceptualization, can be said to be a commitment to A Life because it always is the liberation of A Life imprisoned in the living. The artist herself is committed to A Life because her act of creation requires the difficult task

⁵ Deleuze discusses the failure of photography to express sensation most explicitly in Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (Deleuze, 2002).
of having seen A Life in the living and to express it in the artwork. Art is a commitment to A Life because art always is and gives expressions of A Life in the living, expressions which are termed visions.

Vision can also be said to be the mode of aesthetic experience which corresponds to the expression of A Life in the living: the viewer through his aesthetic experience of the artwork has (or is given) a vision. The composition of these visions in painting are termed Figures. Bacon paints Figures: visions of A Life in the living which oppose themselves to figures, i.e. to the figurations of views of the living. The Figure, Figural painting⁶, can be termed the mode of practical engagement with painting by which painting expresses A Life in the living. The expression of A Life in the living, the Figure as its corresponding mode of practical engagement in painting, and vision as its mode of aesthetic experience, form what I define as a paradigm of commitment to A Life. This paradigm of commitment to A Life can be termed A Life in the living, and is said to be embodied for example by Bacon’s work. It defines the way (or the paradigm) by which Bacon’s practice embodies a commitment to A Life, and corresponds to DG’s conceptualization of art.

The basis for the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art is the affirmation that A Life in the living is not the only paradigm by which to embody a commitment to A Life, but one amongst others which are yet to be conceptualized. The expansion is operated through the conceptualization of three other paradigms of commitment to A Life, three other ways by which art can embody a commitment to A Life. The four paradigms of commitment to A Life are inspired by and conceptualized through an engagement with works by Francis Bacon, Thomas Struth, Pierre Huyghe, Francis Alÿs and Peter Doig.

DG’s conceptualization of art is the most radical paradigm of commitment to A Life possible: the artwork is and gives a sensation, in other words the artwork is and gives A Life. Their conceptualization of art might be accused of being narrow, exclusive, and limited in relation to contemporary art practices, but it is exactly as exclusive that it can be, and should be praised for being, an intransigent and radical

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⁶ ‘Figural’, a term used by Deleuze in Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (Deleuze, 2002, 12), opposes itself to “figurative”; Figural qualifies the mode of practical engagement with painting by which painting can be and give visions of A Life in the living.
commitment to A Life. Each of the three other paradigms of commitment to A Life consists in an increasing level of expansion, and departure from, DG’s conceptualization. In the order in which these three paradigms are conceptualized in this text, they are: the living as point of view on and from A Life, new living emerging from A Life and to live A Life. The four paradigms of commitment to A Life are defined through a set of five properties. For example, each paradigm is defined by a property termed mode of aesthetic experience. Corresponding to the paradigm A Life in the living is a mode of aesthetic experience termed vision; corresponding to the three other paradigms are respectively the modes of aesthetic experience termed hallucination, view and narration. The definition of each paradigm through this set of properties charts the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art.

In addition, three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life are conceptualized. These paradigms define ways by which some works give the illusion of a commitment to A Life but in fact fail such commitment and as such fail A Life. This total of seven paradigms define the boundaries of an expanded conceptualization of art centered on the aim of embodying a commitment to A Life.

In addition to its introduction and conclusion, this text is composed of 8 sections:

- the introduction to A Life (section 1),
- DG’s conceptualization of art, and the paradigm A Life in the living elaborated through a discussion of the mediums of painting and cinema (sections 2 and 3),
- the motivation for and the logic of the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art, and an introduction to the three new paradigms of commitment to A Life (section 4),
- the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life conceptualized through an engagement with the medium of photography (section 5),
- the paradigm new living emerging from A Life (section 6),
- the three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life (section 7), and
- the paradigm to live A Life (section 8).
The purpose of a concept of art is not to prescribe modes of art practice, it doesn’t futilely define what art *should be* (who would listen?). It only defines what art *is* for the propose of developing new understandings of what art *can be*. A conceptualization of art defines interrelations between different types of practice which otherwise might be thought to be incommensurable, it proposes to define what appears to be a shared interest between artists, a common problem addressed by different practices. Whereas DG, through their conceptualization of art as expression of A Life in the living, define an interrelation between amongst others Cézanne, Melville, Debussy and Bacon, the expanded conceptualization of art this text develops defines an interrelation between Bacon, Struth, Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig as contemporary art practices which differently embody a commitment to A Life.
Section 1 – A Life

A Life

Deleuze begins his last published essay *Immanence: A Life*… (Deleuze, 2003a, 359-363) with the question: ‘What is a transcendental field?’ The transcendental field is ‘defined by a plane of immanence, and the plane of immanence by a life’, as A Life (Deleuze, 2003a, 361). Immanence is pure or absolute because it is not immanent ‘“to” something’: pure immanence ‘is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life’ (Deleuze, 2003a, 360, Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 47). Nothing transcends the pure and absolute immanence, nothing is external to it, nor is immanence immanent to life, immanence is itself A Life. When a form of exteriority to the plane of immanence is posited, or when immanence it attributed to something, immanence loses its purity, its absoluteness.

A Life, the transcendental field or pure plane of immanence forms the conceptualization of a ‘wild and powerful’ empiricism, a transcendental empiricism (Deleuze, 2003a, 359). A Life, ordinarily hidden or covered, is simultaneously the unformed matter of the living (a transcendental materialism) and the non-organic Life or forces that animate matter (a transcendental vitalism).

There is no reason to believe that physico-chemical strata exhaust matter: there is an unformed Matter, submolecular. Equally the organic strata do not exhaust Life: rather the organism is that which life opposes to itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful, in that it is anorganic (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 628).

The living or nature is that which A Life opposes itself in order to limit itself. A Life is a continuously renewed consistency given to chaos, an incessantly renewing genesis, ‘a continued and renewed creation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 627). A Life is non-organic Life or becoming, it is ordinarily7 “witnessed” or “lived” as our usual perceptions and affections, for example our perceptions of the changes or movements of nature and the way by which these changes affect us. In DG’s

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7 “Ordinarily” as when we are not having “visions” of A Life in the living (like the artist is required to have following DG’s conceptualization of art), and also in reference to A Life as transcendental material vitalism being ‘ordinarily hidden or covered’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 512).
ontology, being is becoming; ontology is the affirmation of ‘the being of becoming’ (Deleuze, 2007, 27) and becoming is creation, genesis. A Life is becoming in reciprocal presupposition with that which becomes, the living. It as such drives what is yet to come, and launches the living towards the future, A Life is the ‘forces of the future’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 383). It is designated as the virtual, and the living or nature as the actual. They respectively are the transcendental plane of immanence and what we ordinarily experience of it. The living, nature or the actual universe, is what of A Life we ordinarily experience, that which A Life is ordinarily experienced as.

A Life is the condition or ‘conditions of real experience’ (Deleuze, 2008, 13): the condition of perception, affection, consciousness, thought etc., A Life is the condition or genetic element of the living or the lived (the experienced, the sensed). As condition of experience, A Life ordinarily exceeds experience and as such remains covered or hidden. As ontological and genetic condition, A Life is that which “gives to see”, and that which “is seen” can be said to be that which is perceived of A Life according to one’s threshold of perception.

In most cases, the soul contents itself with very few clear or distinguished perceptions: the soul of the tick has three [perceptions], a perception of light, an olfactory perception of its prey, a tactile perception of the best place [to burrow itself], and everything else, in the immense Nature which the tick nevertheless expresses, is only dizziness, a dust of minute, obscure and non integrated perceptions (Deleuze, 1988, 122).

Our ordinary perceptions, our perceptions of the living or nature, are clear or distinguished. These perceptions are produced when at least two minute and obscure perceptions ‘enters in a differential relation that determines a singularity’ (Deleuze, 1988, 117). For example, ‘yellow and blue can surely be perceived, but if their perception vanishes by virtue of becoming ever smaller, they enter in a differential relation $\left(\frac{db}{dy}\right)$ that determine green’ (Deleuze, 1988, 117). Minute and obscure perceptions are the ‘requisites or genetic elements’ (Deleuze, 1988, 118) of our clear perceptions; the vanishing, minute and obscure perceptions of yellow ($dy$) and of blue ($db$) are, through the establishment of a differential relation between them, the genetic elements of a clear perception of green. The tick has three clear perceptions,
they determine both the (clear and distinguished) world the tick perceives and that which the tick can perceive of the (obscure and confused) immense Nature inside which it, and we, live. This immense Nature is universal in that it is the same for all perceiving subject (or ‘monad’), we all live in and “look at” the same infinity of minute and obscure perceptions. As such, we all in a sense “see” the same green in that we all “look at” the same vanishing quantities of blue and of yellow; and yet, we never perceive the same green because each perceiving subject actualizes minute and obscure perceptions differently (Deleuze, 1988, 119). ‘It could be said that each monad [perceiving subject] privileges certain differential relations that hereafter give it exclusive perceptions, and that it leaves other relations below the necessary degree, or, further, that it lets an infinity of minute perceptions subsist within itself without assuming relations [between them]’ (Deleuze, 1988, 120). This universal and immense Nature, this gigantic, dizzying and yet ordinarily invisible realm is the transcendental field or A Life, the unformed matter and invisible forces which condition the living or the lived, and which the living as such expresses (‘the immense Nature which the tick nevertheless expresses’); it is the Life of the living, the virtual transcendental plane of immanence inside which we live; it is that which gives to see and is seen according to that which one can, i.e. according to one’s threshold or ‘degree’ of perception, in other words according to the differential relations one can establish or privileges between minute and obscure perceptions, actualizing them as clear perceptions.

**the transcendental and Kant**

A Life ordinarily exceeds experience but the conditions of experience ‘are not, in the Kantian manner, the conditions of all possible experience, they are the conditions of real experience’ (Deleuze, 2008, 13). The transcendental, a concept initially created

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8 I find that the quote above helps to discuss the relation of immanence or reciprocal presupposition between A Life and the living in relation to perception. However, it references Deleuze’s work on Leibniz and it is beyond the scope of this text to establish detailed relations between the concept of A Life and minute perceptions. It seems however appropriate to propose that they tightly relate in Deleuze’s ontology, especially when minute and obscure perceptions are discussed as the genetic elements, and as such the virtual, of clear perceptions: ‘the clear emerges from the obscure by way of a genetic process’ (Deleuze, 1988, 120).

9 ‘Unformed matter and invisible forces’ or vanishing quantities, ‘the differential quotient [e.g. \( \frac{db}{dy} \)] being the common limit of the relation between two vanishing quantities’ (Deleuze, 1988, 24).
by Kant, refers in Kant to *a priori* concepts which define the conditions of *any* possible experience. These *a priori* concepts are not grounded in nor dependant on experiences themselves, they are ‘too general or too large for the real’ (Deleuze, 2003b, 94). They are as such general, abstract (Deleuze, 2008, 17), and arguably transcendent. Deleuze’s conceptualization of the transcendental “in opposition” to Kant’s defines the conditions of *real* experience and these ‘are not general nor abstract, they are no broader than the conditioned’ (Deleuze, 2008, 17). Deleuze’s transcendental exceeds experience but it is not general or abstract, since it is in reciprocal presupposition (or reciprocal determination) with that which is experienced: A Life is a continuously renewing genesis which operates as a kind of “feedback” process, it conditions real experience and real experience “in turn” feedbacks into A Life which in turn conditions real experience … and so on. On the other hand, Kant’s transcendental, the conditions of any possible experience, conditions experiences but these experiences do not “feedback” into the transcendental, experiences do not “affect” the *a priori* concepts, the conditions. Whereas the conditions of any possible experience is always the repetition of the same *a priori* concepts, the conditions of real experience in Deleuze are a genesis which cannot be preconceived or predetermined, and if it is a repetition, it is in opposition to the repetition of the same the repetition of *difference* itself, the affirmative and creative power of A Life. Whereas Kant’s transcendental is general, abstract and *arguably transcendent*, Deleuze’s transcendental field is conceptualized as pure immanence. Deleuze’s transcendental is an *Outside* since it is ordinarily hidden or covered, since it exceeds real experience, but it is an Outside which is conceptualized as pure plane of immanence, an Outside from which nothing can transcend, an Outside inside which we live and which lives inside us.

The living or nature, as that which is ordinarily experienced of A Life, corresponds to a tamed empiricism, a ‘simple empiricism’ which “opposes” itself to the wild and powerful empiricism that A Life is (Deleuze, 2003a, 359). A Life, the transcendental field, the *Outside* or the plane of immanence forms a radical ontological view of the world entirely decentred from humans: a non human landscape, ‘the impression of a fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the presentiment that this
world is already ours, and those creatures, ourselves\(^\text{10}\) (Deleuze, 2005d, 35). The transcendental field is effectively already ours and we already are its creatures: we live “in its middle”, experiencing it as nature.

Thought or creation is a form that gives consistency to the reciprocally presupposing virtual and ‘infinite movements and speeds’ of chaos (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 44). Chaos is intrinsically linked to A Life, both can only be thought in relation to the other. Chaos, ‘in fact, is less the absence of determinations than the infinite speed at which they take shape and vanish’, it ‘chaotises, and undoes all consistency in the infinite’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 44). A Life is genesis defined as the continuously renewed consistency given to chaos, whilst nevertheless withholding within itself the infinite movements and speeds of chaos as that which launches the actual into becoming, undoing all actual consistency in the infinite. A Life is simultaneously both the \textit{actualization of the virtual} (consistency given to chaos) and the \textit{virtualization of the actual} (chaotization of all consistency). A Life is chaosmos or ‘rhythm-chaos’, rhythm being that which gives consistency to chaos.\(^\text{11}\) The chaosmos is both ‘affirmation’ and ‘ontology’ (Deleuze, 2003b, 80, 257): both repetition of difference, the continuously renewed consistency or rhythm given to chaos and the chaotization of all consistency, i.e. becoming (= affirmation), and nature of being (= ontology; the nature of being \textit{is} becoming, repetition of difference, incessantly renewed consistency given to chaos).

Chaos cannot be thought of (and does not exist) \textit{in and of itself}, it is always in relation to a rhythm or consistency. Chaos cannot be thought of outside A Life, and inversely so: \textit{both need to be thought of as chaosmos}. Following DG, the three forms


\(^\text{11}\) One of the first appearance of the term chaosmos in Deleuze links Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘eternal return’ to chaos: ‘Joyce presented the \textit{vicus of recirculation} as causing a chaosmos to turn; and Nietzsche had already said that chaos and eternal return were not two distinct things but a single and same \textit{affirmation}.’ The notion of chaosmos is crucial to (in fact constitutive of) Deleuze’s ontology: ‘Ontology is the dice throw, the chaosmos from which the cosmos emerge’ (Deleuze, 2003b, 80, 257).
of thought or creation (thought is creation and inversely so) art, science and philosophy, think or create through the operation of a ‘cut across chaos’, they ‘trace planes on chaos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 196, 190). Each form of thought traces its own specific type of plane and as such relate to chaos differently. The three planes are ‘the rafts on which the brain plunges into and confronts chaos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 198). Science traces a plane of reference whereas art traces a plane of composition, two different types of plane which correlate to two different types of cut through chaos.

‘Art takes a bit of chaos in a frame in order to form a composed chaos that becomes sensory [...]; but science takes a bit of chaos in a system of coordinates and forms a referenced chaos which becomes nature’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 194).

There is a need to be careful here because in the above quote it is as if chaos is thought of in and of itself, whereas it can only be thought of as chaosmos, in its relation to A Life. It seems as such useful to immediately explain a crucial difference between art and science in their relation to chaosmos, to A Life. Evidently, in science, referenced is not chaos in and of itself, since such an operation, would it be possible at all, would result in a chaotic and meaningless reference. Equally art does not make sensory chaos in and of itself but a composed chaos. The crucial difference between art and science stems from the fact that art operates in co-creation with A Life (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 164) in that, like A Life, it operates a genesis by which it gives a consistency to chaos. Science is not said to operate in co-creation with A Life because it does not operate a genesis: its operation is to reference the genesis that A Life is. Both science and art plunge into and confront chaos, but science does so in order to give reference to creation, to the genesis that A Life is, whereas art is itself co-creation, genesis. Newton’s act of thought or creation is to trace a plane of reference on chaos, giving reference to A Life and as such defining a nature; Einstein, however imbricated with “Newton’s” nature or plane of reference, defined another nature by tracing another plane on chaos. Science needs to plunge into and confront chaos as the necessary process by which it can pass from one nature to another nature, from one reference to another reference. On the other hand, art needs to plunge into and confront chaos in order to compose it and make it sensory. Art does not have the purpose of attaining to another nature as science does, art has the purpose of attaining to the chaosmos, to A Life. Science operates a
movement from nature to another nature, and art operates a movement from nature to A Life.

Through the tracing of their specific types of plane on chaos, art and science operate a *territorialization of chaos* which gives rise to different types of territory. Science leads to the re-definition of the *actual universe* whereas art leads to what is termed a *possible universe*. Whereas art operates in co-creation with A Life and as such leads to a possible universe, science references the creation that A Life is leading to the re-definition of the actual universe. Science ‘renounce[s] to infinite movements and speeds’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 45) whereas art renders them sensory; whereas science’s act of thought or creation is to territorialize the infinite that A Life is as a finite nature, art’s act of thought or creation is to territorialize the infinite *as such* so as to render A Life sensory. ‘Art wants to create the finite which restores the infinite’, whereas ‘science on the contrary renounce the infinite to gain the reference’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 186).

Between art, science and philosophy, DG insist that there isn’t a more creative or important form of thought. It is not because science, as opposed to art, renounces the infinite and does not operate in co-creation with A Life that it is a less important or creative form of thought. Both art and science involve the equally difficult task of plunging into and confronting chaos.
Section 2 – DG’s conceptualization of art, painting and the first paradigm of commitment to A Life: A Life in the living

commitment to A Life

It can be said that for DG, art is and requires a commitment, a commitment to A Life. The act of artistic creation ‘is always to liberate life where it is imprisoned’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 162). Artists have ‘seen Life in the living’, they are ‘seer[s], a becomer[s]’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161), they see A Life in the living and go through becomings by which they establish a unity with A Life, by which they become A Life. It is as a commitment to A Life that artists aim to capture and express the visions they have and the becomings they go through. Artists are committed not per se to their practice or to art in general, but their practice is the means by which to commit to A Life. Terminologically, the term commitment, in its resonance with dedication, perseverance, effort, is the appropriate term to describe the artists’ relation to A Life: artists are athletes, they practice an inorganic athleticism through which they have visions of, and become, A Life (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 163). Artists do not per se practice art, artists practice A Life, art being the name given to this practice and to that which results from it. Their practice is an athleticism through which they live A Life, A Life lived beyond that which is ordinarily experienced and from which they ‘come back with red eyes, and short breath’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 163).

summary of Bacon’s practical procedure, or the procedure of Figural painting

If the painter is to operate the expression of A Life in the living, if he is to attain to the vision, the painter must exceed ordinary experiences, the living or the lived. The task of the painter is to exceed the figurations, clichés, photographs and views of nature to attain to the vision: ‘The painter does not paint on an empty canvas […]; but the […] canvas is already so covered with preexisting, preestablished clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings us the vision’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 204). Photographs or clichés ‘virtually’ condition our sight, photographs ‘is what modern
man sees’, they cover the ‘white and virgin surface’ of the canvas even before the painter starts painting (Deleuze, 2002, 19).

The practical procedure by which the painter (or Bacon) attains to the vision primordially involves the passage ‘through the catastrophe, i.e. by the diagram and its involuntary irruption’, the diagram being ‘a chaos, a catastrophe, but also a germ of order or rhythm’ (Deleuze, 2002, 111, 95). Through the handling of the paint, the painter (and the painting) plunges towards chaos, towards a catastrophe. This operation is practically realized by Bacon as he ‘make[s] random marks (lines-traits); scrub[s], sweep[s], or wipe[s] the canvas in order to clear out locales or zones (colour-patches); throw[s] the paint, from various angles and at various speed’ (Deleuze, 2005b, 70). The diagram often appears in Bacon’s paintings as the most
chaotic expression on the canvas; for example in *Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne* where the area between the nose and the right part of the mouth expresses a chaotic zone of indiscernibility between the two, a section of more or less random lines-trait and colour-patches. In order to express a vision of A Life, the chaomos, the painter must attain to chaos to compose it, and as such express it, anew: ‘Art is not chaos but a composition of chaos that gives the vision or sensation, it constitutes a chaomos, as Joyce says, a composed chaos – neither foreseen nor preconceived’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 192). To express A Life or the chaomos, art composes chaos anew and this very process of genesis is rendered sensory, expressing A Life (genesis) beyond any of its previous conditions of existence, in an expression that is ‘neither foreseen nor preconceived’. After or simultaneously to the moment when chaos is attained, a chaomos or *Figure* emerges through the diagram, constituting an order or rhythm over chaos. The Figure is an invention, a construction “from scratch”, from chaos. The operation of the diagram is simultaneously destruction (from a view of nature to chaos) and construction (from chaos to its composition, from chaos to the Figure or chaomos, from chaos to a vision of A Life). Painting operates in co-creation with A Life in that it, like A Life, gives consistency to chaos, it is a genesis by which chaos is composed. The diagram is an operational device, but it also is, in a sense, the previously mentioned ‘frame’ inside which painting (or art more generally) ‘takes a bit of chaos’ in order to compose it and to render it sensory. Crucially, the co-creation or genesis that Figural painting operates does not give rise to, and as such does not give to experience, that which we perceive through our ordinary views. Figural painting expresses its own genesis, its own conditions, and it is as such that it is and gives to experience visions of A Life (ontological and genetic conditions), which ultimately “forces” us, its viewers, to experience our own conditions of real experience.

**analogy**

The Figure is composed through an analogy that is not figurative. The problem of the expression of A Life is not to compose a form that resembles another form, the form of a chosen object/subject (for example the human being Isabel Rawsthorne). The passage through chaos involves the ‘destruction of figurative coordinates’ (Deleuze,
2002, 111), and from chaos, the problem is exactly not to re-establish figurative coordinates, traits, forms. The figurative analogy is intentional and representational. Figural painting on the other hand follows an aesthetic analogy (as opposed to a figurative analogy) that is operated through analogical language (Deleuze, 2002, 107-109). In Figural painting, the analogy is not figurative in that it is not between resembling forms, the analogy is between Life forces which compose or transverse the living (for example the Life that Isabel Rawsthorne is) and these same forces that are captured and expressed in the painting (the Figure, Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne). A resemblance is established (one can for example recognize Isabel Rawsthorne in Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne), but this resemblance is not primary or intentional in the process of Figural painting, it is one of its consequences, the resemblance is produced (consequential) and not productive (a motive) (Deleuze, 2002, 108).
The three dimensions of analogical language: the body, planes and colour

The figure – ground relationship in Bacon or in Figural painting is best described as figure – transcendental field (the transcendental field, the plane of immanence or A Life imaged as ground). The Figure articulates, expresses, the relationship between the figure (the living) and the transcendental field (A Life), it opens the figure or

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13 Deleuze discusses the form (or figure) and ground relationship in Bacon as that which relates his work to Egyptian art. Deleuze does so through a discussion of the ‘assemblage of bas-relief’ where characteristically ‘the form and the ground [are] as two equally close sectors on the same plane’ (Deleuze, 2002, 115-116).
view onto its conditions, the living onto A Life. The problem in composing a Figure is that of consistency. The hardest is to make the Figure hold, together and within or as the field: to give consistency to chaos without falling back into figuration, whilst not simply remaining chaotic. To that aim, the painter operates the radical invention or construction of the Figure along the three dimensions of analogical language: the body, planes and colour (Deleuze, 2002, 111).

the body

To discuss the Figure in terms of the body is not to refer to organs, to the organism, in other words to the living. Organs can be perceived in Bacon’s paintings but this resemblance is consequential to the capture and expression of Life forces. What is painted, what is the Figure, then if not organs? A body without organs, a concept which Deleuze borrows from Antonin Artaud.14 A body without organs (BwO15) is not per se organs or their organization as organism, it is the ‘intensive fact of the body’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48). A BwO is the Life that the body is. The ‘organism is not life, it imprisons [life]’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48). To liberate A Life where it is imprisoned and fulfill the task of art is to liberate the BwO imprisoned in the organism, human or otherwise. Our BwOs are the Life through which we sense, through which we have our ordinary views of nature, they are us in the transcendental field and the transcendental field in us. They are the Life in the living or the Living in the lived, the lived body or organs is exceeded by ‘a more profound and almost unlivable Power’ (Deleuze, 2002, 47): A Life.

The sensation expresses (and is in the aesthetic experience of the artwork) the ‘action of forces on the body’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48), Life forces acting upon, and effectively composing BwOs. Figures express and as such are BwOs, ‘Bacon never ceased to paint bodies without organs, the intensive fact of the body’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48).

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14 ‘the Figure is precisely the body without organs’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48).
15 This notation found in Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux uses the capital letter to index the transcendental as for the concept of Life or A Life.
16 The BwO ‘opposes itself less to organs than to this organization of organs that is called organism’ (Deleuze, 2002, 47).
17 Again, in this quote ‘life’ needs be understood as A Life in reciprocal presupposition with the organism or the living.
There are in Bacon’s paintings what resemble organs, but this resemblance is only consequential to the expression of the BwO, they appear as it can be seen in *Figure in movement* to different degrees stretched, contracted, folded, integrated in one another, split open, overtaken by a spasm, dissolved etc. The sensation has many levels which the BwO or Figure ‘accounts for’ (Deleuze, 2002, 50), it accounts for the difference of levels that is constitutive of the sensation. The levels refer to a difference “of levels” between the sensed and the sensing, between the lived and the Living, between real experience and conditions (of real experience). To account for and as such express the difference of levels constitutive of the sensation is to reveal the ‘presence of a body without organ under the organism, [the] presence of transitory organs under organic representation’ (Deleuze, 2002, 52). But it is also to express an indiscernibility between the sensed and the sensing, between the organism and the BwO precisely because both reciprocally presuppose each other. It is not however as if there are only two levels, one correlating to the organism and one to the BwO. The difference of levels can be thought of as an infinity of levels that map or correspond to (*Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne*): the absolute infinite monochromatic black which the Figure emerges from and appears to dissolve into “all the way down or up to” the consequential or produced resemblance of an organ (an eye, a mouth, a nose, etc.). The difference of levels needs to be thought of as the difference between the infinite speeds of chaos at one end (lowest or highest level) and its temporary and transitory\(^\text{18}\) “coagulation” into nearly fully-formed organs at the other end (the right eye in *Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne* is practically fully-formed), with passages between levels. It is these passages between levels which *Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne* expresses that stretch what resembles a nose into a mouth and tears it open onto the infinite blackness into which the Figure’s shoulders also dissolve. These passages between levels are rhythms expressing the action of forces on the body, composing the intensive fact of the body: the BwO.

In opposition to Figural painting, the photograph ‘tends to flatten sensation on a single level, and remains unable to include within the sensation the constitutive difference of levels’ (Deleuze, 2002, 87). The photograph, even if it gives to see a view beyond the threshold of human perception (as in x-ray photography), cannot

\(^{18}\) Deleuze discusses time in relation to the BwO and the levels of sensation it accounts for (Deleuze, 2002, 50).
express the difference of levels constitutive of the sensation since it actualizes sensation on a single level, falling to express an indiscernibility between that which it gives to see and its conditions. In that sense, the photograph is “similar” to our ordinary views, they do not include within that which they give to see an indiscernibility with the infinite speeds of chaos (or the chaosmos) they presuppose.

A question remains however: how are Bacon’s paintings not the figuration of deformed living creatures but BwOs, the expression of the Life that bodies are, A Life in reciprocal presupposition with the living? In other words, how do Bacon’s paintings “get” ‘under the organism’? There are two answers to this question: a specific type of line and the modulation of colour.

*the line without contour, and planes*

The body in Bacon is often expressed as flows of broken tones against a monochromatic black (*Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne*) and/or a shore of bright tone (*Figure in movement*), and most often it is held by an armature or planes. The body emerges through or as the catastrophe of the diagram. When Bacon throws, scrubs, smudges or cleans the paint on the canvas, he destroys figurative traits and coordinates. Traits that emerge from the diagram are not figurative but material, accidental and asignifying lines, marks and patches which have the effect of opening up a world: ‘it is as if, all of a sudden, a Sahara, a zone of Sahara, is introduced in the head’ (Deleuze, 2002, 94). There are two inseparable consequences to Bacon’s use of the diagram: a specific type of line emerges, composing the Figure, and a specific type of space opens up or overtakes the purely optical space of figuration.

The type of line which serves to express the body is the ‘line without contour’ (Deleuze, 2002, 102), an ‘abstract line’ exemplified by Jackson Pollock’s work (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 624), the Gothic line Deleuze borrows from Worringer (Deleuze, 2002, 48). The line does not represent forms. For example in *Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne*, the line which appears to imprecisely emerge from the inside part of the right eye swirls around, nearly dissolves in the black field and it is as if it is re-captured by another swirl which leads it towards what resembles a mouth. This line serves not to define an organ, the form of a nose, it, following Deleuze (and Worringer), expresses a ‘powerful non organic Life’ (Deleuze, 2002, 48). As opposed to overtaking the whole surface of the canvas as in Pollock, in Bacon the
line without contour serves to compose the Figure. Deleuze tells us that Bacon is not ‘attracted’ by the line as it is used in abstract expressionism (for example Pollock) because it is used in such a way that ‘the diagram takes over the whole of the painting […] and that its proliferation makes a real “mess”’ (Deleuze, 2002, 102). When the diagram, and the line without contour it gives rise to, overtakes the whole of the painting as in Pollock, it fails to compose a Figure and simply remains chaotic. But there are, obviously, contours in Bacon’s paintings; for example, the contour of the hair is clearly defined against the field, and the nearly perfectly formed right eye. They serve to contain, hold, the expressive line which is itself without contour, and as such give consistency to the body which would otherwise dissipate in or as chaos. The armatures, frames or planes (which can generally be termed planes) often seen in Bacon (for example the armature and monochromatic orange plane in Figure in movement) have an equivalent purpose. These planes are architectural: from a non-Euclidean or a-spatial “space”, i.e. from chaos, the junctions of planes, and as such their relations to the field, replace perspective and serve to isolate and hold the body within the field. When Bacon discusses his repetitive use of such planes, he says that it is ‘to see the image’, and that they ‘never ever had any sort of illustrative intention’ (Sylvester and Bacon, 2008, 22, 23). To see the image, in other words the Figure, Bacon needs to give consistency to the sensation, to make it durable, to give solidity to the BwO.

haptic space

Asignifying, figural material traits that emerge from the diagram (including the line without contour) impose ‘a violent manual space’ (Deleuze, 2002, 120) over or into the purely optical space of figuration (a space which can be said to correspond to the space perceived through our ordinary views). A new type of space emerges, a haptic space. The emergence of a haptic space is ‘like the emergence of another world’ of which the viewer is given a vision. The haptic is the tactile, insofar as it is the eye which gains a sense of touch; haptic space ‘can be visual and auditory as much as tactile’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 615). Haptic space involves a new eye, a ‘non

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19 Pollock’s work is only “problematic” in the context of Deleuze’s writings on Bacon. In Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux, Pollock is exemplary of ‘nomad art’ which DG value (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 624).
optical function’ of the eye: a haptic eye which the Figural painting gives to the viewer.

 [...] space is not visual, or rather the eye itself has a haptic, non optical function: no line separates the earth and the sky, which are of the same substance; there is no horizon, no bottom, no perspective, no limit, no contour or form, no centre (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 616).

A haptic space is neither abstract nor general, it is specific and precise in its composition, only its ‘topology relies not on points or objects, but on haecceities, on set of relations (winds, undulations of the snow or the sand, song of the sand and crackling of the ice, tactile qualities of both)’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 474).

Haptic space expresses the topology of the transcendental field, the topology of bodies in or as the transcendental field, a field not of forms but of a continuous variation of unformed matter and forces: a ‘world of movements, of stirrings that are still deaf, blind, without memory, for draft-subjects 20 neither yet qualified nor composed’ (Criton, 2007, 138). This world appears like the emergence of another world under the subjects, under the organisms. Figures, otherwise termed haptic visions, are the topologies of BwOs, “maps” of the Life that we are. As a specific and precise composition, the Figure is constructed as a ‘set of relations’, more precisely a set of differential relations. These differential relations are not relations between forms, they are differences which attest of the variations of unformed matter and invisible forces that A Life or the transcendental field is. Differential relations are expressed, as previously introduced, by the differential quotient \( \frac{dy}{dx} \); for instance, the vanishing, minute and obscure perceptions of blue and of yellow enter in a differential relation \( \frac{db}{dy} \), a differential relation which is the virtual, or conditions, determining an actual and clear perception of green. Differential relations in Deleuze’s ontology serve to articulate an infinite field that is neither simply homogeneous nor actual but that is constituted of continuously vanishing (and emerging) heterogeneities or quantities (for example \( dy \) and \( db \)) between which relations are established \( \frac{db}{dy} \). The transcendental field or A Life is an infinite and

20 Translated from French: ‘sujets-ébauches’.
continuous variation of differential relations. This infinite and continuous variation is the ontological and genetic condition of the living or the lived\(^{21}\), and it is by virtue of its heterogeneities or quantities continuously vanishing and emerging, by virtue of being a variation, that the pure plane of immanence it constitutes is called A Life. Differential relations serve to articulate the determinations of a topology of the transcendental field, pure plane of immanence, A Life or chaosmos which again is not characterized by ‘the absence of determinations [and as such an homogeneity, but by] the infinite speed at which [these virtual determinations or differential relations] take shape and vanish’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 44). These differential relations, in other words the topology of the transcendental field, the topologies of BwOs, are expressed in the painting through the modulation of colour.

*modulation of colour and haptic sense*

There are evidently differential relations between the field and the body, and between different zones of the body. For example, the “nose” in *Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne* is defined only in relation to other zones of simultaneously emerging and dissipating “organs”, and in relation to the field from which it emerges and tears itself open onto. The body’s head is not a collection of organs composed as an organism (mouth, two eyes, nose, two cheeks, chin, etc.), it is an ocean or Sahara of differential relations, Isabel Rawsthorne in or as the transcendental field. But ultimately all differential relations depend on the differential relation that colour *is*: ‘“Colorism” is not only colours that enter in relation […], it is colour that is discovered as the variable relation, the differential relation on which everything else depends’ (Deleuze, 2002, 130). Through the operation of modulation of colour, all “other” differential relations are modulated: body-field, zones of the body to other zones of the body, ‘form-ground, light-shadow, bright-dark’: ‘if you bring colour to its pure internal relations (hot-cold, expansion-contraction), then you have everything’ (Deleuze, 2002, 130). It is colour that is “primarily” modulated. In the haptic space of Figural painting, in this Sahara of differential relations, everything is first and foremost colour. It is not that forms are given colours, an operation which

\(^{21}\) For example an actual perception of the colour green \(\frac{dh}{dy} = G\), a formulation Deleuze uses (Deleuze, 1988, 117), where “\(= G\)” signifies the actualization of a clear perception of green determined by the differential relation between vanishing quantities of blue and of yellow.
remains figurative. The modulation of colour, the modulation of the differential relation that colour is, the continuous variation of its pure internal relations, serve to express in a sensation all the other differential relations that the BwO constitutes. The resemblance of forms is only consequential: a ‘secondary figuration which depends on the neutralization of all primary figuration’ (Deleuze, 2002, 42). The diagram is not only the emergence of asignifying lines, marks and patches, ‘the diagram is then also a colour map, or a map of sensation’ (O'Sullivan, 2006, 63). The nose in Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne: the broken tones, from a red-orange to a bluish grey, modulate differential relations of a semi-formed or vanishing organ to other zones of the body, and these broken tones against the monochromatic black simultaneously modulate a body to field differential relation. Red, orange, blue, grey and black, and potentially an infinity of variations within colour, is all that is needed for a body without organs to appear, a body which appears through colour. Through a haptic vision, one sees not the universe in colours but the universe through colour: ‘objects no longer appear in optical space, but are “in” the eye, constructed from colors that exist “within sight itself”’ (Zepke, 2005, 202).

The modulation of differential relations, and primarily of colour, is the operation of the diagram, it is through this modulation (and the emergence of the line without contour) that chaos is composed and A Life expressed. Modulation is the operative function of analogical language, a ‘language of [differential] relations’ (Deleuze, 2002, 147), and that by which it can express unformed but specific continuous variations: nonorganic spasms, contortions, expansions, deformations of the body, continuously vanishing and emerging differences “of differences” which maps the Life that a body is. Analogical language, and the Figure it serves to compose, works directly on the nervous system (Deleuze, 2002, 107). It does not “communicate” a representation (figurative painting), it does not model a form, it modulates differential relations giving rise to the Figure which itself is and gives to “feel” a sensation directly on the nervous system (Figural painting). The Figure expresses the action of forces on the body, and these forces directly act upon the BwOs that we, as viewers, are. The haptic sense liberates the eye from its belonging to the organism, from its character as a fixed and qualified organ: the eye becomes virtually the polyvalent indeterminate organ that sees the body without organs, i.e. the Figure, as pure
Painting gives us eyes everywhere: in the ear, in the stomach, in the lungs (the painting breathes …) (Deleuze, 2002, 54).

This “liberation” induced in us by the artwork opens us, our organism, our eyes, onto A Life. The haptic sense through which we have a vision is the process by which we, viewers, are “forced” to experience our conditions of real experience. The artwork, the Figure, is A Life, it both is and gives a sensation to the viewer. Through the aesthetic experience of the artwork, an indiscernibility is produced between the viewer, the artwork and A Life. The viewer through her encounter with the Figure is to a certain degree dispersed in and as A Life, in and as chaosmos. Liberated from her organism, the viewer through the sensation becomes, she goes through nonorganic movements, dissipations, contractions, deformations, she is pushed into A Life, she becomes A Life as A Life becomes through what “she” now is: ‘In a sensation, in its rhythmical flesh the chaosmos destroyed me, and constructs me anew as a BwO, and in and through it I become with the world, I become-universe, but only as the universe creating itself’ (Zepke, 2005, 210).

**affect and percept**

In *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* DG discuss art, referring to painting, literature and music, through the concepts of percept and affect. The two are intrinsically linked and as a couple form a bloc of sensation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 158). The viewer through his aesthetic experience of the artwork reveals the sensation: he is caught up by A Life captured and expressed in the materiality of the artwork, he has a vision and is launched forward into becoming. A bloc of sensation is said to be the ‘tearing out’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 158) of percepts from perceptions and of affects from affections. A bloc of sensation is the non human torn out of the human, the conditions of real experience torn out of real experience, the non organic Life torn out of the living, the body without organs torn out of the organism. The composition of the bloc of sensation in the artwork, the percept and affect, fulfills the task of art to liberate (tear out) A Life where it is imprisoned. A Life is torn out of the living not as the expression of A Life “in and of itself”, but as an indiscernibility between the living and A Life, as A Life expressed in reciprocal presupposition with the living: from an absolute monochromaticism to the produced or consequential resemblance of organs. The Figure is affect, a ‘non human becoming of man’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 159), the Life in reciprocal presupposition with our
affections, the affection being that which is ordinarily experienced of the affect. The affect is in a sense a means to refer to A Life (and as such to the Figure) as forces, as becoming. Becoming is what Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne expresses, the action of Life forces upon the body, the Life that the BwO is. The Figure is also simultaneously percept, a ‘non human landscape of nature’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 159). The percept is a means to refer to A Life (and as such to the Figure) as landscape, as vision: a radical ontological vision of the world entirely decentred from humans, us in the transcendental field and the transcendental field in us. A sensation or bloc of sensation, and as such the Figure, is an indiscernibility between vision and becoming. The viewer simultaneously has the vision of a non human landscape of nature (percept) and goes through a non human becoming of man (affect), as the Life she has a vision of passes through her, launching her forward into becoming. The synchronicity of or simultaneity between the affect and the percept is like when hearing a piece of music: to be “taken” or “transported” by it (becoming or affect, forces) and simultaneously “seeing” the landscape onto which the piece opens itself (vision or percept, landscape). As the viewer is dispersed through a becoming, as she crosses a ‘threshold of consistency’, liberated from the organism that she was, she is taken, transported, into a universe:

In short, affect is not a question of representation and discursivity, but of existence. I find myself transported into a Debussyst Universe, a blues Universe, a blazing becoming of Provence. I have crossed a threshold of consistency. Before the hold of this block of sensation, this nucleus of partial subjectivation, everything was dull, beyond it, I am no longer as I was before, I am swept away by a becoming other, carried beyond my familiar existential Territories (Guattari, 1995, 93).

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**vision or Figure as possible universe**

The Figure or haptic vision, as the opening of the living onto the Life which conditions it, ‘constitutes a world’ (Deleuze, 2002, 129). The vision is, opens itself onto and leads (the viewer) to a universe: a possible universe (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 168). Possible universe is a concept highly relevant to this text since it is fundamental to the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art. Possible universe is a concept which stems from Deleuze’s work on Leibniz in *Le Pli, Leibniz et le*
Art creates possible universes. Possible universes are territorializations of chaos actualized in the materiality of the artwork, they are possible consistencies given to chaos. Nature, the living or the actual universe is also a territorialization of chaos, one which is actualized in the materiality of the universe and as such said to be ‘real’ (Deleuze, 1988, 140). ‘God chooses a world amongst an infinity of possible worlds’ (Deleuze, 1988, 140): the actual universe is a possible universe (one amongst an infinity) that has become real, or more precisely that is in the continuously renewed process of realizing itself. On the other hand, possible universes are actual but they are not real, for example ‘Adam who does not sin or Sextus who does not rape Lucretia’: ‘there exists an actual that remains possible, and that is not forcibly real’ (Deleuze, 1988, 140). In *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* the most explicit conceptual formulation of possible universes does not qualify them as ‘actual’ in order to emphasize their status as ‘possible’ and to oppose them to the actual universe:

> These universes are neither virtual nor actual, they are possible, the possible as aesthetic category (“the possible or I shall suffocate”), the existence of the possible, whereas events are the reality of the virtual, forms of a thought-Nature that surveys every possible universe (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 168).

The ‘reality of the virtual’, ‘events’, ‘forms of a thought-Nature’, is *A Life*. *A Life* surveys every possible universe in the sense that it is in reciprocal presupposition with every possible universe, that it is the ontological and genetic condition of every possible universe. Universes come into existence, whether they are “only possible” or real, through a genesis by which chaos is given a consistency, through a territorialization of chaos. Whereas the actual universe is that which is ordinarily experienced of the genesis that the chaosmos is (creation), the possible universes that art creates come into existence through the geneses that compositions of chaos are (co-creations). Art operates in co-creation with *A Life* in that, like *A Life* (creation) which is the continuously renewed consistency given to chaos, art operates a genesis, a composition of chaos by which chaos is given consistency and by which *A Life* is rendered sensory.
The crucial difference between the actual universe and the possible universes art creates (following DG’s conceptualization of art, for example the two paintings by Bacon discussed above) is that a possible universe expresses and as such gives to experience something completely different to that which the actual universe is ordinarily experienced as. As such, a haptic vision or Figure (to refer to Figural painting) as possible universe is not as if the representation of another imagined or fantasized universe that could have realized itself (instead of our actual universe) like ‘Adam who does not sin’, a haptic vision is not a narration, a symbolization or a figuration. A haptic vision expresses and as such gives to experience Life forces which are the onto-genetic conditions of our actual universe, and it is as such that it opens itself onto a universe, a possible expression of A Life. A haptic vision as possible universe is a composition of chaos which has the specific quality of expressing the absolute that A Life is. It can be said to be a specific “territorialization” on and of the absolute that A Life is, and it is as such that the artwork is said to be a ‘finite which restores the infinite’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 186). The painting constitutes a territory: a specific type of territorialization termed possible universe which accounts for, expresses, is and gives the vision of the absolute that A Life is.

The possible universes art creates are not “possible representations” of A Life, they are A Life (and not representations of A Life). It can however seem easy to read Bacon’s broken tones as symbolic of virtual movements or forces (A Life) and his shores of bright tones as representative of the non human landscape that the transcendental field is (A Life). Considered in isolation, it is nearly as if we have to convince ourselves that Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne is not the representation of A Life in the living but its capture and as such its expression. The important point to remember about a haptic vision, as that which is and as such renders A Life sensory, is that it can be achieved through an infinity of ways. How could it be representative since it always emerges as a composition of chaos neither foreseen nor preconceived? How could it be representative since it is only one possibility amongst an infinity? The territorializations on and of the absolute that A Life is can be achieved through an infinity of diagrams each modulating differential relations uniquely, through an inexhaustible amount of possible universes; it is not the reserved domain of Bacon and Cézanne which Deleuze discusses in his logic of
sensation. It is like with music, there remains an infinity of melodies and harmonies which by constituting and opening themselves onto possible universes will make us sense the insensible forces of A Life, not through representation but through expression.

**painting and music**

The operation of the diagram, i.e. the modulation of differential relations, is rhythmic. To establish a relation with music, colour is electromagnetic waves of which the frequency, amplitude and phase are varied and combined through the diagram by modulation: the diagram as modulation of waves, or the diagram as synthesizer. From the diagram results a territorialization, modulation, composition or synthesis (synthesizer) of chaos, which renders the genesis and the absolute that A Life is sensory. The Figural painting as possible universe is like a piece of music as possible universe, a universe that opens itself to us as it opens us to A Life when the piece is heard. The analogy in Figural painting (as in music) is not representational, it is expressive: the Life that Isabel Rawsthorne is “played” once more, A Life expressed anew, a piece of music that has nothing to represent but “everything” (A Life) to express. The possible universes of Pierre Boulez or Francis Bacon: geneses operated through modulations of waves or territorializations of chaos, and which replay and give to experience the genesis that A Life is through visions and becomings of A Life beyond any of its previous conditions of existence.

22 Deleuze on the musical instrument of the synthesizer (the term Cosmos needs to be understood as A Life): ‘Varese’s approach, at the dawn of this age: a musical machine of consistency, a sounds machine (not for reproducing sounds), which molecularizes and atomizes, ionizes sound matter, and captures an energy of the Cosmos. If this machine must have an assemblage, it will be the synthesizer. By assembling modules, source elements and elements for treating sound, oscillators, generators and transformers, by arranging micro-intervals, the synthesizer renders audible the process of sound itself [‘le processus sonore lui-même’], and the production of that process, and puts us in relation with others elements that exceed sound matter’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 423-424). The synthesizer does not reproduce sounds, it renders audible sound itself (‘the process of sound itself’) and the genesis of sound (‘the production of that process’) putting us in relation with its virtual or conditions: the transcendental plane of immanence, the infinite realm of differential relations between vanishing quantities of sound and non-sound matter (‘others elements that exceed sound matter”).
The Figure is the expression of *A Life in the living*. The Figure is as such defined as a medium-specific *mode of practical engagement* by which painting embodies the paradigm of commitment to *A Life termed A Life in the living*. The paradigm *A Life in the living* is not exclusively defined by the Figure, it is not exclusive to the medium of painting: as discussed in the following section, cinema can also be said to engage with the paradigm *A Life in the living* through its own medium-specific mode of practical engagement termed *crystal-image*. The paradigm *A Life in the living* is not defined by medium.\(^{23}\) This is also true of the three other paradigms of commitment to *A Life* conceptualized to operate the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art.

Cinema is not in this analysis considered to form part of DG’s conceptualization of art, it is considered as a separate field of engagement.\(^{24}\) Deleuze’s conceptualization of *modern* cinema, of a ‘cinema of the seer’\(^{25}\) (Deleuze, 1985, 9), is however related to art since it can also be said to embody a commitment to *A Life* by following the paradigm *A Life in the living* in that like the Figure, although differently, it gives visions of *A Life in the living*. For this reason, and because it seems crucial to, and will inform, the conceptualization of photography as medium by which it is possible to embody a commitment to *A Life*, the following section engages with Deleuze’s writings on cinema.

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\(^{23}\) This text exclusively engages with the embodiment of the paradigm *A Life in the living* in painting and in cinema, but there could also potentially be conceptualizations of other mediums by which to embody this paradigm. For example, DG exemplify the way by which the ‘material passes into the sensation’ and as such expresses *A Life* with ‘a Rodin sculpture’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 164). Furthermore, their discussions of literature in the chapter *Percept, Affect and Concept* of the same book can be described as the embodiment of the paradigm *A Life in the living* in literature.

\(^{24}\) This is reflected in the absence of any mention of cinema in DG’s discussion of art (they refer to painting, sculpture, literature and music) in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991).

\(^{25}\) Translated from French: ‘cinéma de voyant’ (Deleuze, 1985, 9).
Section 3 – Cinema and \textit{A Life in the living}

Through his conceptualizations of art and modern cinema, a cinema of the seer, Deleuze develops an ‘aesthetic of the virtual’\textsuperscript{26}, an aesthetic of a materialism of the virtual, of a transcendental material vitalism. Deleuze conceptualizes art and modern cinema as different practices and mediums which engage with \textit{A Life} by virtue of giving visions of \textit{A Life}. Deleuze thinks, philosophizes, \textit{through} art and cinema to develop what concerns him primarily: the philosophy of a transcendental material vitalism, the conceptual establishment of \textit{A Life} in reciprocal presupposition with the living, of a pure plane of immanence \textit{as} \textit{A Life}. Deleuze is committed to \textit{A Life} through philosophy, ‘the problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 45). Part of Deleuze’s philosophical commitment, and as a means to develop this commitment, is to conceptualize how art and modern cinema also engage with the problem of the infinite into which thought plunges, and are as such themselves modes of commitment to \textit{A Life}.

\textit{A Life as sensation or as the transcendental form of time}

Modern cinema, like Figural painting, can be said to follow a paradigm of expression of \textit{A Life in the living}. Whereas painting embodies this paradigm through a mode of practical engagement termed the Figure, cinema embodies it through the \textit{crystal-image}. The crystal-image expresses an indiscernibility between the living and \textit{A Life}, it is an indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual raising itself to the vision of \textit{A Life in the living} (more precisely, as discussed below, it gives the vision of the ‘direct time-image or the transcendental form of time’ (Deleuze, 1985, 358)). Evidently, although both modes of practical engagement give visions of \textit{A Life in the living}, by virtue of being embodied in different mediums, the Figure and the crystal-image are very different types of engagement with \textit{A Life}, they give very different

types of vision and as such types of experience. This difference is so profound that A Life itself as a concept is articulated by different terms according to which medium is discussed. A Life in relation to Figural painting is best articulated as sensation: the body without organs, the Life under the organism, the Life in the living or the Living in the lived. A Life in relation to the modern cinema is best articulated as the transcendental form of time or duration (as that which the crystal-image gives a vision of). Sensation and time (its transcendental form) are unequivocally “the same” Life, in other words A Life: Deleuze explicitly refers to the transcendental form of time in Cinéma 2, L’image-temps as ‘The powerful non organic Life that grips the world’ (Deleuze, 1985, 109). Both Figural painting and the cinema of the seer gives to experience different visions of A Life: either the constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is (painting), or ‘the gushing of time as dividing in two, as splitting’ (Deleuze, 1985, 109), in other words the transcendental form of time (cinema).

A new aesthetic the virtual, a new “image” or conceptual articulation of the relationship of reciprocal presupposition between the living and A Life

The living in its reciprocal presupposition with A Life is perhaps most usefully described in relation to a discussion of cinema as (Deleuze quotes Blanchot): the “dispersion of the Outside” (Deleuze, 1985, 235). The Outside is time, the transcendental form of time, and the living emerges or is dispersed from time splitting in two. Time ‘splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves the past’ (Deleuze, 1985, 109). A Life, as “feedback” process, as repetition of difference, is in terms of time now “imaged” as both dispersion of the Outside (which makes the present pass on) and “preservation” (of the present which becomes past) into the Outside. This can also be understood in terms of the living: the Outside relentlessly disperses itself as the living simultaneously as the living incessantly falls back into the Outside, incessantly changing its very own onto-genetic conditions, i.e. the Outside. The term dispersion (and “preservation”) is a new term which describes the relationship of reciprocal

Deleuze’s conceptualization of cinema is inspired by the philosopher Henri Bergson. It is beyond the scope of this text to engage in details with the conceptual relations between Deleuze and Bergson, it can simply be mentioned that the ‘transcendental form of time’ directly relates to Bergson’s concept of duration.

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presupposition between the living and A Life, or more specifically the relation of the indirect representation of time (the living, the actual) to the transcendental form of time or duration (A Life, the virtual). It articulates a way by which “to image” A Life as genesis whilst denying any form of transcendence. Through cinema, Deleuze develops a way by which to conceptually articulate an aesthetic of the virtual. A Life as sensation (Figural painting) is best described in terms of genesis as consistency given to chaos and the simultaneous chaotization of all consistency. A Life as the transcendental form of time (modern cinema) is best described in terms of genesis as dispersions “dispersed” from the Outside simultaneously as they fall back into it. These are two ways by which to articulate or give an “image” to the actualization of the virtual (to give consistency, dispersion) and the virtualization of the actual (chaotization of all consistency, “preservation”), and consequently to the reciprocal presupposition or reciprocal determination between the actual and the virtual.

*modern cinema*

Cinematic images (perceptions, actions, affections, as embodied in movement-images) are in classical cinema linked through an ‘operation of association’, ‘an uninterrupted chain of images each one the slave of the next’, with the purpose of forming a ‘whole’, a whole described as an ‘open’ (Deleuze, 1985, 233-235). This whole or open can be understood in its most simple terms as the “actual universe” of the film, the “actual universe” that the film constitutes through the association of movement-images, the “actual universe” in which the characters “exist” and which the viewers see. This open corresponds to or is actual movements used to describe the living, the movements of or in nature, it is the continuation of linear time and the constitution of actual space. This forms that which typifies classical cinema: the ‘indirect representation of time’, the indirect representation of the transcendental form of time (Deleuze, 1985, 233). The whole described as open, the actual universe that the film constitutes through the association of movement-images, is the indirect representation of time, the indirect representation of the Outside with which it is in reciprocal presupposition. The movement-image is akin to ‘natural perception’ (Deleuze, 1983, 11), it is, and this is how Deleuze differs from Bergson in his conceptualization of cinema, a ‘middle image’ to which movement belongs to
intrinsically. The indirect representation of time or of the Outside embodied in the association of movement-images in that sense corresponds to that which we experience of time or the Outside through our ordinary experiences. This association of movement-images (the indirect representation of time) undergoes in modern cinema an upheaval, and a new type of image appears: the direct image of time otherwise termed *time-image*. This image corresponds to a new type of experience (and a new image of thought (Deleuze, 2005a, xvii)) that is properly modern and that is expressed in the cinema of the seer. The movement-image is defined by an interval between a perception-image and an action-image; through the movement-image, perception prolongs itself into action, defining a ‘sensory-motor’ link which characterizes movement (Deleuze, 1985, 50). That which the characters (and viewers) see prolongs itself into that which the characters do, and the repetition of such linkages constitutes the actual universe of the film, correlating to the continuation of linear time and the constitution of actual space inside which the character perceives and acts. In modern cinema, the sensory-motor link is broken. Perception no longer prolongs itself into action, perception becomes the vision of the direct image of time as the actual universe of the film becomes indiscernible from the Outside, from the Outside it presupposes as its onto-genetic condition. The actual or open and the virtual or Outside become indiscernible in, for example, an ‘amorphous space […] in the style of […] Antonioni’ (Deleuze, 1985, 169). The character’s (and the viewer’s) perception leads not to an action, but he ‘has gained in vision what he has lost in action or reaction: he SEES, so the problem of the spectator [and viewer] becomes “what is there to see in the image?” (instead of “what will we see in the following image?”)’ (Deleuze, 1985, 356).

In modern cinema, the ‘whole’ changes, it changes in nature. The whole is not the open anymore, it is not the actual universe that the film constitutes as in classical cinema, in modern cinema the whole is the Outside. The Outside is interstice or fissure (Deleuze, 1985, 234-235), it fissures the open or actual universe of the film and becomes interstices between the association of movement-images. The Outside

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28 In opposition, Bergson conceptualizes the cinematic image (or Deleuze’s movement-image) as a series of photograms to which is added an ‘abstract time’, and as such to which movement does not belong to intrinsically or ‘really’, it is the ‘false movement’ of the ‘cinematic illusion’ (Deleuze, 1983, 10, 11).
correlatively fissures or breaks the sensory-motor link. Not only is it as if the open is fissured or torn open onto its Outside, but the ‘fissure has become primary’ (Deleuze, 1985, 235): the Outside has become primary in the sense that the open becomes its dispersion, and as such in a sense “secondary” to the Outside (although both are in reciprocal presupposition and become indiscernible in the crystal-image). The Outside is interstice between images, a ‘spacing that makes each image tear itself from the void and fall back into it’ (Deleuze, 1985, 234). In modern cinema, cinematic images tear themselves from the Outside into which they fall back following a genesis described as differentiation or dispersion (Deleuze, 1985, 234, 235). The operation of association of classical cinema is replaced in modern cinema by an operation of dispersion. The whole, now Outside, is itself process of dispersion. The purpose of modern cinema is not anymore to form a whole of actual movements through an uninterrupted chain of images slave to one another, but between two images to ‘make the indiscernible, that is the frontier, visible’ (Deleuze, 1985, 235). Its purpose is to make visible the indiscernibility between the Outside and its dispersions (the open), in other words to construct an indiscernibility between the open and its condition, i.e. the Outside or the transcendental form of time.

This is achieved through the cinematic image termed the crystal-image. The crystal-image is the moment when the image is not associated to, enslaved by, other images to constitute actual movements but when ‘the actual image enters in relation with its own virtual image as such’ (Deleuze, 1985, 358). The nature of movement has changed. Movement is no more actual, movement is no more the continuation of linear time and the constitution of actual space (actual movements, movements in or of nature). Through the constitution of an image, a crystal-image, that is ‘double-sided, mutual, actual and virtual simultaneously’ (Deleuze, 1985, 358) what is seen indiscernibly from the actual in the crystal is a movement that is virtual or absolute: ‘the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time, Cronos and not Chronos. The powerful non organic Life that grips the world’ (Deleuze, 1985, 109). What is seen through the crystal-image is an indiscernibility between the actual and the

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29 The crystal is a metaphor for an actual perception that expresses its virtual, a metaphor for a view of the actual which is indiscernibly a vision of the virtual. The term crystal is used for such metaphorical purpose because the atomic properties of crystals means that their actual forms, as perceived through the naked eye, express their internal molecular arrangements which can be thought of as their virtual.
virtual, between the open and the Outside. What is seen is the Outside dispersing and “preserving” itself, simultaneously. This indiscernibility between the Outside and its dispersions is imaged in the crystal-image as a germ: ‘the germ is the virtual image which will crystallize a milieu that is actually amorphous; but on the other hand the latter must have a structure virtually crystallizable in relation to which the germ now plays the role of actual image’ (Deleuze, 1985, 100). The crystal-image or germ is simultaneously the (virtual) image of an actual amorphous space resulting from the germination, crystallization or dispersion of the virtual, and the (actual) image of the structure of the virtual “in the process” of crystallizing itself. These two images are indissociable, they are the two sides of a single image: it is to see the virtual through the actual and to see the actual through the virtual, two sides of the single image of genesis.

Seen through the crystal is the transcendental form of time: modern cinema is not the indirect representation of time but its direct presentation (Deleuze, 1985, 358), the perpetual foundation or split of time, the incessant crystallization of the virtual or dispersion of the Outside. The split of time is simultaneously in the tearing of the images from the Outside, in the actualization of the virtual which makes all the present pass on, and in the images falling back into the Outside, in the virtualization of the actual which preserves the past. The crystal is this simultaneity, it is ‘without inside nor outside, in vertiginous planes and faces, where the frontiers of life and death, of the past and the present exchange themselves […]’ (Buci-Glucksmann, 1998, 96).

The conceptualization of a cinema of the seer “aestheticizes” the genesis that A Life is as Outside itself process of simultaneous dispersion (or differentiation) and “preservation”. Were it not for this “preservation”, for this “feedback” of the living into its very own onto-genetic conditions, the Outside could rightly be accused of being a form of transcendence, a transcendent to the open. The virtualization of the actual is the difference between Bergson (and Deleuze) and Kant, and is that which conceptually affirms the transcendental as pure immanence.31

30 Translated from French: ‘actuellement’; Deleuze refers to this amorphous milieu as being actual.

31 Deleuze discusses the relation of Bergson to Kant in Cinéma 2. L’image-temps p.109 (Deleuze, 1985).
Deleuze assigns the status of ‘perfect crystals’ to the images of film director Max Ophüls, in for example *Madame de …* (1953) and *La ronde* (1950) (Deleuze, 1985, 111). It is true that ‘no outside subsists’ in *La ronde* (Deleuze, 1985, 111), meaning that the Outside becomes indiscernible with the open or actual universe of the film. The master of ceremonies is like an agent of dispersion of the Outside, the “rounded vision” he claims to have *is* this operation of dispersion. Outside or virtual himself, he finds his presence in the actual, in the “actual universe” the film constitutes, as interstices, as fissures between the different characters, decors and sequences. As he says when he is asked to identify himself: “No one. That is to say, anyone.” 32; he is the Outside personified, no one and anyone, nowhere (outside the open which he disperses) and anywhere, which also means everywhere (in reciprocal presupposition with the open he disperses), he is the modern whole: the Outside. The master of ceremonies embodies the image of a man which Deleuze gives to the transcendental form of time: ‘the man without name, without family, without qualities, without self nor I, the “plebeian” guardian of a secret, the already-Overman whose scattered members gravitate around the sublime image’ (Deleuze, 2003b, 121). The actual movements of the characters, and the sequences of the film, are orchestrated, projected, dispersed by the master of ceremonies from the Outside he embodies. They turn in round with the Outside, turn in round with the master of ceremonies who operates the continuously renewed genesis of the open. The master of ceremonies operates the continuation of the plot through the projection of characters on the scene, through the dispersion of sequences as constitution or actualization of an open, and the simultaneous virtualization of these characters and sequences through their recuperation or preservation into the Outside he *is*. The master of ceremonies *is* genesis, an Outside *itself* genesis of the actual universe the film constitutes. The plot must go on, “La ronde” must turn as the continuous actualization of the virtual and virtualization of the actual: actual-virtual-actual-virtual-…. or dispersion-preservation-dispersion-preservation-…. etc. The master of ceremonies repeats and repeats, he is himself difference (Outside) and the repetition of difference (dispersion of the Outside). He is himself the relentless split of time as dividing in two: into the passing of the present (the actual, the continuation of the

32 Translated from French: ‘Personne. C’est-à-dire n’importe qui.’
plot taking place in the open), and the “preservation” of the past (the virtual, as he makes the characters fall back into the Outside that he is). The master of ceremonies is Outside and continuously renewed genesis, repetition of difference.

Zabriskie Point

The crystal-image can be exemplified, perhaps more potently than in Ophüls, with the visionary sex scene in Michelangelo Antonioni’s Zabriskie Point (1970). The scene exceeds ‘the horizon of event’, ‘man’s banal horizon’, the living or the open the film constitutes, in the attempt to construct an indiscernibility with the ‘always receding cosmological horizon’, the Outside (Deleuze, 1985, 28). The sequence of the couple kissing in the desert opens itself onto a plurality of couples, unknown to the viewer and to the plot; they are no one, anyone and everyone like the master of ceremonies in La ronde. Of the plurality of couples some are often mistaken for being the two protagonists, which as such, like all the others, become no one, anyone and everyone. Groups of them fight, sexually tease each other, bite one another; the romance is animalistic, sexual; their bodies are interlaced in masses of flesh on the desert sand of which they are covered and into which they seem to disappear. There are very slow movements randomly interrupted by rapid movements, changes of viewpoint and close focus. The sequence does not linearly develop the narrative, there is no clear progression of the sexual act, the couple exists in a time that is not chronological: they are nude, dressed, nude, dressed, and so on. The sequence does not associate images with the purpose of establishing the continuation of linear time and the construction of actual space. The sensory-motor link is broken, perception is not prolonged by an action (progression of the sexual act) but becomes the vision of a time that is not chronological and of a space that is ‘amorphous’, devoid of Euclidean co-ordinates (Deleuze, 1985, 169). Sand, organs, smiles, traces, hairs, sexual acts, dust, animals, teeth, fog, etc., interlaced at shifting speeds and unusual angles as an a-spatial space and an a-temporal time outside narration: an amorphous crystallized space itself vision. From the initial couple, the sequence repetitively moves to other unknown couples and groupings before going back to them, and like

33 Antonioni spoke of ‘the horizon of events’, but noted that in the West the word has a double meaning, man’s banal horizon and an inaccessible and always receding cosmological horizon (Deleuze, 1985, 28).
in *La ronde*, the sequence turns and turns between the actual image of the romance of the initial couple and the virtual image of the amorphous space in which they are: actual-virtual-actual-virtual-..., ‘one can only just turn in the crystal’ (Deleuze, 1985, 111). A fog leads to traces of anyone’s and everyone’s sexual acts and animalistic combats on the grounds. The vision leads back to the view, there remains only actual traces of virtual movements on the sand floor, time is again linear and space actual. The open or actual universe of the film had torn itself open onto and became indiscernible with the reciprocally presupposing Outside of which it is the dispersion. Now the interstices or fissures which led to and gave the vision are closed again. The visionary sex scene is in the style Deleuze assigns to Antonioni: ‘empty and amorphous spaces which lose their Euclidean co-ordinates, in the style of Ozu or Antonioni. […] crystallized space, when the landscapes become hallucinatory in a milieu which now retains only crystalline seeds and crystallizable materials’ (Deleuze, 1985, 169).

*Figural painting and a cinema of the seer*

This description of the indiscernibility between the open and the Outside, the direct image of the transcendental form of time, resembles to a certain degree the description of the body without organs expressed in a sensation: ‘as if the organisms were caught up in a whirling or serpentine movement that gives them a single “body”, or unites them in a single “fact”, independently from any figurative or narrative relation’ (Deleuze, 2002, 122). The loss of Euclidean co-ordinates in amorphous or crystallized space reminds us of the milieu Bacon composes through the radical invention of the Figure from chaos. One could begin to think of the modulation of colour in Figural painting, and as such the establishment of differential relations, as a process of crystallization. Figural painting, *Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne*: composition of chaos, chaosmos, or crystallization of the virtual, dispersion of the Outside, rendered sensory. Connections can be made between the nature of haptic space given to experience by a Figure and the nature of an amorphous crystallized space perceived through a crystal-image. The liberation of the eye from its optical function through the haptic vision given by a Figural painting could surely be linked with the rupture of the sensory-motor link through which perception prolongs itself no more into action but opens itself onto a vision. But the distinctions between the vision that a Figure is and a vision perceived through the
crystal-image should not disappear through over simplified descriptions. The painter and the director both engage with A Life or the Outside, but, in concordance with their respective mediums, completely differently: sensation or transcendental form of time (and necessarily through different modes of practical engagement, the Figure or the crystal-image). Deleuze’s conceptualization of Figural painting and of a cinema of the seer helps to understand and appreciate the complexities of Deleuze’s ontology, and his own philosophical commitment to A Life. They define medium-specific modes of practical engagement by which to embody a commitment to A Life, by which to express and give visions of *A Life in the living*. 
Section 4 – Introduction to the paradigms of commitment to A Life

motivation

Two things have motivated me to operate the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art. Firstly, the intuition that, like Bacon’s work, some works by Thomas Struth, Pierre Huyghe, Francis Alÿs and Peter Doig
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embody a commitment to A Life. This intuition stems from the aesthetic experiences of these works, I feel that these works and the experiences they provide involve A Life, but in very different ways from Bacon’s Figural paintings (and the films which can be said to be encompassed by a cinema of the seer) which express A Life in the living. The works I am interested in are not, and as such do not give, visions of A Life. From this emerges the need to conceptualize other paradigms by which these works can be conceptualized to embody a commitment to A Life. Secondly, as previously discussed, DG’s conceptualization of art is, some might say, narrow, exclusive, and limited in relation to contemporary art practices. Most relevantly, their conceptualization of art rejects photography since, as further examined in the following section, it cannot attain to its own conditions, i.e. A Life, and express it in a sensation. And it rejects conceptual art because it ‘tends to be “informative”’, failing simultaneously the concept and the sensation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 187). Many contemporary art practices produce works which tend to be “informative”, it seems that we very often have to “read” works (information) rather than “feel” them (sensation), we have to make


35 DG indirectly refers to the conceptual artwork One and Three Chairs, 1965, by Joseph Kosuth: ‘a thing, its photograph on the same scale and in the same place’. In One and Three Chairs the ‘thing’ is a chair. The work fails to attain to the concept of chair, ‘reducing the concept to the doxa of the social body’, as if trying to attain to the concept by presenting infinitely reproducible perceptions or affections of the living. Conceptual art, by only giving to experience ‘ordinary perceptions and affections’, also fails to attain to the sensation, even to attain to ‘the sensation of the concept’ conceptual art might be thought to aim for, an objective DG find more appropriate to assign to abstract art: not the sensation of sea, not the Life that the sea is, not the BwO of the sea, but a ‘dematerialized’ sensation, a sensation of the concept of sea. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 187)
sense of information embodied in or about the works in order to fully engage with them. Many contemporary works do not express a sensation but appear to express a concept, expressions which to different degrees demand a “reading”, and as such involve an ontology and modes of engagement and of aesthetic experience which completely depart from DG’s conceptualization of art. It would be difficult not to agree with the assessment that DG’s conceptualization of art has limitations in relation to contemporary art practices. It seems however that this should not be evaluated, at least primarily, as a negative aspect: on the contrary, the narrowness of their conceptualization is that which allows it to be a forceful and radical articulation of a commitment to A Life, the artwork *is* and *gives* A Life, it restores the absolute, the infinite. Evidently, this force and radicalism is overshadowed by their conceptualization’s incapacity to encompass most contemporary art practices. There definitely is in writings engaging with contemporary art practices a desire to overcome this limit, not by departing from DG but from within Deleuze’s and DG’s writings. And effectively, ‘there is no reason we cannot look to Deleuze’s other writings, on cinema and literature, for example and creatively apply concepts from these different mediums and milieus to the field of expanded visual art as it exists today’ (O’Sullivan, 2006, 144). Such creative applications of concepts to contemporary art practices in many cases give very interesting results, however my approach is to a certain extent different. My approach is not to apply to contemporary art practices concepts which DG have developed in relation to mediums and milieus other than art, it is to take their conceptualization as a point of departure and attempt to expand it whilst remaining close to its essence. This essence is argued to be a commitment to A Life: a commitment articulated radically in DG through a paradigm of expressions/visions of A Life. In the following section Struth’s work is analyzed through the creative application of concepts extracted from Deleuze’s writings on cinema (and on Nietzsche and Leibniz), but my approach is not fully rendered by such description. This is partly because Deleuze’s writings on cinema (and literature, music could also be included) involve the same paradigm of expression of A Life as DG’s conceptualization of art. My approach is not per se to use concepts through which DG have approached a paradigm of expression of A Life in mediums or milieus other than art and apply them to contemporary art practices, it is to conceptualize new paradigms by which art can commit to A Life beyond a paradigm of expressions/visions of A Life. Most obviously, the difference of my
approach is that it results in a new conceptualization of art and as such in a new
definition of art. As it will be seen through its incapacity to (or “refusal” to)
embrace contemporary works such as Gerhard Richter’s abstract and “blurred
photograph” paintings and Pierre Huyghe’s work titled A Journey That Wasn’t,
2005, my expanded conceptualization of art remains relatively narrow with rigid
criteria defining its borders. Its purpose is not to encompass a high volume of
contemporary art practices but practices of a high quality in their capacity to
embody, and push the boundaries of what it means to embody, a commitment to A
Life.

From the engagement with specific works by Bacon, Struth, Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig
emerges four different paradigms of commitment to A Life. The three newly
conceptualized paradigms do not relate to A Life as radically as does the paradigm A
Life in the living corresponding to DG’s conceptualization of art: the works which
embody either one of these three paradigms do not express and give visions of A
Life. The loss of radicalism of the three new paradigms is compensated for by the
expansion they offer. Each of the three new paradigms is a departure from DG’s
conceptualization of art, a departure which allows for the inclusion, in an expanded
conceptualization of art, of other modes of aesthetic experience beyond vision:
hallucination, view, narration, and of other mediums: photography, performance and
figurative painting. The problem is how to be more inclusive of contemporary art
practices whilst establishing rigid criteria by which an expanded conceptualization of
art embodies the essence of DG’s conceptualization.

As the three new paradigms of commitment to A Life emerged from the engagement
with the artworks intuited to relate to A Life, I came to realize that a certain logic
linked the four paradigms together. This logic is best articulated in relation to the
notion of movement.

movement, and the aesthetic experience a haptic vision

In terms of aesthetic experience, a haptic vision (for example Portrait of Isabel
Rawsthorne) not only is but can be said to lead to and open itself onto a possible
universe. The aesthetic experience of art can as such be expressed in terms of
movement, and movement in turn can be described in terms of deterritorialization
and reterritorialization.
Deterritorialization is ‘the movement by which “one” leaves the territory’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 634). The deterritorialization is always necessarily in reciprocal presupposition with a reterritorialization since as soon as a territory is left, another territory (or the absolute, as it will be discussed) is necessarily entered, attained, conquered, etc.; and inversely so, a reterritorialization also inevitably involves a deterritorialization by which a previous territory was left. Through the aesthetic experience of a haptic vision the viewer can be said to go through a movement of deterritorialization from nature and of reterritorialization onto a possible universe. This movement can equivalently be described as: from the view of the living to a vision of A Life in the living; from real experience to conditions of real experience; from the finite to the infinite; from nature to a “territorialization” on the absolute that A Life is; from nature to a possible universe.

The movements of de- and re-territorialization do not only describe the aesthetic experience of the viewer. Movement also articulates the process by which A Life is a continuously renewed genesis, by which chaos is given a continuously renewed consistency, and as such by which nature as we perceive it through our views incessantly changes. Movement has what could be termed two components in reciprocal presupposition: a virtual component by which it is absolute and an actual component by which it is relative. Movement is simultaneously absolute and relative, it is simultaneously virtual movements and actual movements. DG discuss movement in *Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux*:

Movement has an essential relation to the imperceptible; it is by nature imperceptible. Perception can grasp movement only as the displacement of a moving body or the development of a form. Movements, becomings, in other words, pure relations of speed and slowness, pure affects, are below and above the threshold of perception (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, 309).

In this quote, movement is that which is here termed virtual movements (becomings, pure relations of speed and slowness, affects, etc.), and the displacement of a moving body or the development of a form is here referred to as actual movements. Relative or actual movements describe the living, the movements of or in nature, and absolute or virtual movements describe A Life, the infinite movements and speeds of chaos.

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36 “Movement from nature to a possible universe” is a specific formulation which will form part of the new definition of art correlated to the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art.
and its genesis, the chaosmos. Relative movement is that which is ordinarily grasped of (absolute) movement through perception, it is absolute movement within the threshold of perception. ‘Threshold of perceptions are relative, there is always one capable of grasping that which elude the other: the eagle’s eye …’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 344). What different perceiving subjects see of absolute movement depends on ‘the mediation’ which corresponds their specific threshold of perception (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 344, 345). But absolute ‘movement in itself continues to occur elsewhere’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 344) beyond the mediation of perception, beyond the threshold of perception: like the living is that which we perceive of A Life through our ordinary views, the relative actual movements are that which is perceived of the absolute virtual movements. A perceiving subject is in A Life, the transcendental field or pure plane of immanence, and looks directly at A Life but sees “only” that which her own threshold of perception allows for: not the infinite movements and speeds of chaos, virtual absolute movement, but the relative movements that form the nature she perceives or “mediates” absolute movement as (the nature she can perceive: neither the eagle’s nature nor the tick’s nature, her nature).

Our ordinary movements in and experiences of nature are relative deterritorializations and reterritorializations. A relative de- and re- territorialization is a movement from one territory in nature to another territory in nature, for example from the room to the corridor. It also corresponds to our ordinary experiences or views of nature: from a view of the room to a view of the corridor. By virtue of reciprocal presupposition, a relative deterritorialization ‘requires an absolute for its operation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 636), meaning that a relative movement always necessarily supposes absolute movement. It is like saying, using DG’s quote above: the displacement of a moving body or the development of a form requires and as such reciprocally presupposes becomings, pure relations of speed and slowness, for its operation. But through a relative de- and re- territorialization this absolute is “missed” in experience like A Life is “missed” in our ordinary experiences of the living, like the vision is “missed” in the view, like the conditions are “missed” in real experiences.

The aesthetic experience of a haptic vision involves a movement different to our ordinary movements in and experiences of nature, it involves a movement of
**absolute deterritorialization:** the viewer goes through a movement by which it leaves the territory in or of nature and attains to the absolute that A Life is. The absolute deterritorialization is coupled with what could be termed a “reterritorialization on the absolute”, from nature to A Life, from the finite to the infinite. There are no territories on the absolute that A Life is, hence the expression “reterritorialization on the absolute”, which is my own and not DG’s, might appear to be misleading. But since this text emphasizes the aesthetic experience of a haptic vision as a movement from nature to a possible universe, in other words as a deterritorialization from nature and a reterritorialization on a possible universe which itself expresses the absolute that A Life is, the expression “reterritorialization on the absolute” seems appropriate. A haptic vision can be said to be a territorialization on and of the absolute: a possible universe that gives consistency to the absolute and by which the absolute becomes sensory.

In this case movement ceases to be related to the mediation of a relative threshold that it eludes ad infinitum; it has attained, regardless of its speed or slowness, an absolute but differentiated threshold [...] It could also be said that movement ceases to be the procedure of an always relative deterritorialization, to become the procedure of absolute deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 345).

The perceiving subject through her aesthetic experience of a haptic vision no longer sees the nature her relative threshold of perception gives or allows her to see, perception opens itself onto itself and as such onto its conditions as the threshold becomes absolute *but differentiated*: what is experienced is the infinite variation of vanishing and emerging differential relations determining the topology of the transcendental field, onto-genetic conditions, a Figure by Bacon for example. The threshold becomes, and correlatively the perceiving subject becomes one with, ‘the construction of this or that region of the continued plane’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 345) or plane of immanence, the transcendental field, A Life. When the viewer is reterritorialized on the possible universe that a haptic vision is, she attains to the absolute, she goes through an absolute deterritorialization uniting with the absolute component of movement, establishing a unity with A Life. The viewer is, as previously discussed, dispersed in and as A Life, the viewer experiences the sensation that the artwork is, and liberated from her organism, she is given a haptic eye by which she becomes other than she was, she crosses a threshold of consistency.
becoming A Life as A Life becomes through “her”. The absolute deterritorialization necessarily requires a relative for its operation ‘precisely because it is not transcendent’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 636). The absolute deterritorialization does not mean to attain to a transcendent universe as if leaving nature towards an exteriority transcendent to the pure plane of immanence. Absolute movement always operates through a relative movement (and inversely so), meaning that the viewer which goes through an absolute deterritorialization establishing a unity with A Life is and remains, for example, in front of the painting in the gallery space. The aesthetic experience of a haptic vision is the way by which a relative movement opens itself onto its absolute; in other words the way by which the living or nature opens itself onto itself and as such onto the Life that it is, the way by which the body, the view, the finite, open themselves onto themselves and as such onto the body without organs, the vision, the infinite.37

three qualities or moments of movement

Movement can be defined by three inseparable and presupposing qualities or “moments” which describe the interrelations or “incessant passages” between its relative and absolute components, between actual and virtual movements: the virtualization of the actual (actual – virtual); the reciprocal presupposition between the actual and the virtual, their inseparability; and the actualization of the virtual (virtual – actual). It is important to understand that there is only “one” movement, which can be thought as having both a relative and an absolute component, and as “being composed by” or as “in-between” the actualization of the virtual and the virtualization of the actual. Effectively movement can be described as actual-virtual-actual-virtual-..., as the continuously renewed genesis of the actual (virtual – actual) and the incessant “preservation” or feedback of the actual into the virtual (actual – virtual). These two qualities or “moments” of movement presuppose each other and entail a reciprocal presupposition between the actual and the virtual. Hence movement can also be described as virtual-virtual-virtual-virtual-… (virtual movements) in reciprocal presupposition with actual-actual-actual-actual-… (actual movements). The former sequence corresponds to the absolute component of

37 D. N. Rodowick provides an account of relative movement and absolute movement in relation to cinema, of the ‘relative and absolute as two perspectives on movement, inseparable yet quite different in their relation to images’ (Rodowick, 1997, 44-45).
movement and the latter to its relative component. virtual-virtual-virtual-virtual-… is A Life, and actual-actual-actual-actual-… is the living, that which we ordinarily experience or grasp of A Life.\textsuperscript{38}

The three qualities of movement respectively correspond to: \textit{absolute}\ deterritorialization (from the living to A Life, the virtualization of the actual); \textit{the reciprocal presupposition between the absolute and relative components of movement} (the living and A Life in reciprocal presupposition); and \textit{relative reterritorialization} (from A Life to the living, the actualization of the virtual). In terms of genesis, the three qualities of movement respectively correspond to: the chaotization of all consistency or the dispersions falling back into the Outside; the “tension” between chaos and consistency, the “tension” between the Outside and its dispersions; and chaos being given consistency, the dispersion of the Outside.

\textit{Introduction to the four paradigms of commitment to A Life}

The artwork described by DG’s conceptualization of art (for instance \textit{Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne}), the artwork which embodies the paradigm of commitment to A Life termed \textit{A Life in the living}, embodies the first quality of movement: absolute deterritorialization, from the living to A Life. This quality effectively corresponds to DG’s definition of art as the finite which restores the infinite, a movement from the finite to the infinite, from nature to a possible universe which expresses the absolute or infinite that A Life is. This quality of movement also describes the aesthetic experience of the artwork: the haptic vision as discussed above. This quality can be termed the haptic quality of movement, it is the quality by which movement always necessarily \textit{is}, and opens its relative component onto, the absolute that A Life is (although it is not ordinarily experienced as such). The artwork which embodies the paradigm \textit{A Life in the living} is said to \textit{embody} and as such give to experience this haptic quality of movement.

\textsuperscript{38} In these sequences, the “actual” can be replaced by “the living” or “nature”, and the “virtual” by “A Life”. Movement can be described as nature-A Life-nature-A Life-…; the relative component of movement, that which we ordinarily experience of A Life, as nature-nature-nature-nature-…; and the absolute component of movement as A Life-A Life-A Life-A Life-….
The logic by which there is a relation between the first three paradigms of commitment to A Life is that each paradigm corresponds to a quality of movement: each of these paradigms embodies and as such gives to experience one of the three qualities of movement. The first three paradigms are as such intrinsically related since the three qualities of movement are in an ontological sense inseparable.

Works which embody the second paradigm of commitment to A Life (the paradigm termed the living as point of view on and from A Life) embody and as such give to experience the reciprocal presupposition between the absolute and the relative components of movement, between the living and A Life, in other words the tension between chaos and consistency or between the Outside and its dispersions. As discussed through the development of an ontology of the photograph and Struth’s New Pictures From Paradise series of photographs, the experience of the reciprocal presupposition between the living and A Life involves an experience of the living as point of view on and from the Outside or A Life. How is an engagement with the reciprocal presupposition between the living and A Life a commitment to A Life? Through the works which embody this second paradigm, the living is simultaneously experienced as point of view on A Life, meaning that the living is that which is perceived of A Life (in accordance with our respective threshold of perception), and as point of view from A Life, meaning that it is from and through A Life or the Outside that the living is perceived. This engagement does not give visions of A Life in the living, hence it is less radical than the paradigm A Life in the living, but it “relates” the living to the Life that it is, and as such it is a commitment to A Life.

Works which embody the third paradigm of commitment to A Life (new living emerging from A Life) embody and as such give to experience the relative reterritorialization corresponding to the quality of movement by which movement is from A Life to the living. This living or nature is not the same as the one prior to the movement, it is a new living or new nature which emerges from A Life or the Outside. The third quality of movement is the one by which movement always necessarily results or (re-)emerges from the continuously renewed creation that A Life is, the quality of movement by which nature continuously renews itself, by which nature continuously re-emerges anew. An embodiment of this quality of movement is a commitment to A Life because it gives to experience a new living or nature which emerges from A Life, giving to experience the renewing force and
creative potential that A Life is. In comparison to the first two paradigms, this paradigm is a more pronounced departure from DG’s conceptualization of art: as it will be further discussed the new living or nature which emerges from A Life opposes itself to the ‘new earth and […] people’ that art ‘calls for’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 104), and involves through its aesthetic experience no unity with A Life as do works which embody the first two paradigms. Consequently this third paradigm corresponds to a less radical commitment to A Life in comparison to the first two paradigms.

The fourth paradigm of commitment to A Life (to live A Life) does not relate to either one of the three qualities of movement encompassed by the first three paradigms. The first three paradigms are concerned with the “nature” of movement, with the qualities of movement which describe the interrelations between its relative and absolute components, qualities which define how our ordinary experiences of the living relate to A Life and inversely so, how A Life relates to our ordinary experiences. The fourth paradigm concerns itself with a different type of problem: not the “nature” of movement but the “performance” of movement. The fourth paradigm is like the three others a paradigm of commitment to A Life, in other words a paradigm of commitment to the absolute component of movement. Concerning itself with the “performance” of movement and being a commitment to the absolute component of movement, the fourth paradigm concerns itself with the performance of absolute movement. The performance of absolute movement means not to perform the relative movements we ordinarily perform, but as it will be discussed through works by Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig, it means to perform absolute movements, not to ordinarily live the living (as we ordinarily do), but to live A Life (which we rarely do). This fourth paradigm is the most pronounced departure from DG’s conceptualization of art. As it will be further discussed, this paradigm involves the narrations of “stories” of figures who live A Life. Narration, and its intrinsic links to figuration (Doig’s paintings for example are said to narrate through figuration, Doig paints figuratively), is in complete opposition to DG’s conceptualization of art. The paradigm A Life in the living always involves expression (Figural painting for example) in diametrical opposition to the representational practices of both figuration and narration. This fourth paradigm nevertheless corresponds to a
commitment to A Life since A Life is that which is lived, the artworks narrate stories about the possibilities of living A Life.

Why exactly are these three new paradigms said to constitute an expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art? Because like DG’s conceptualization of art, at the core of each of these three paradigms is A Life, each concerns itself first and foremost with A Life (and inevitably with its reciprocal presupposition with the living). Following a concern with the visionary expression of A Life in the living, the concern with A Life then shifts: A Life is that which “gives to see” the living and that which is “gazed at” (but not seen) when seeing the living, the living is simultaneously point of view on A Life and point of view from and through A Life. The concern with A Life shifts again: A Life is that which renews the living and that which the living continuously re-emerges from, A Life is the creative potential which leads to new possibilities. And finally, in a shift that can be said to be more drastic, A Life is that which is lived, beyond, although necessarily through, the living which we ordinarily live.

no medium specificity

By definition, the expression of A Life in the living as a conceptualization of art encompasses many different mediums as it is clearly articulated in Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (it applies to painting, literature, sculpture and music), although it needs to be precisely conceptualized in relation to each medium (for example painting as Figural painting). Each of the four paradigms of the expanded conceptualization of art is also not medium specific. A specific medium can embody different paradigms. For example, some of Doig’s paintings are conceptualized to embody the paradigm to live A Life. Doig’s work does not fail art following DG’s conceptualization of art because it is figurative and fails to express A Life. Doig uses the medium of painting to embody another paradigm by which his work embodies a commitment to A Life, although not as radically as Figural painting does. And correlatively, a paradigm can be embodied by many different mediums. For example, Alýs performances and their documentations are also said to embody, like Doig’s work, the paradigm to live A Life.
Each of the four paradigms is defined by the same set of five properties. The paradigm \textit{A Life in the living} encompasses the mode of practical engagement with painting termed Figure\textsuperscript{39}; but since a paradigm can encompass many different modes of practical engagement, a paradigm is not defined by these modes. The first property of a paradigm is a \textit{mode of aesthetic experience} (the set of five properties defining a paradigm are in this paragraph italicized). The paradigm \textit{A Life in the living} is defined by the \textit{mode of aesthetic experience} termed vision. This paradigm is defined in terms of \textit{movement} by the absolute deterritorialization (and the reterritorialization on the absolute). The \textit{description of experience} correlated to this paradigm is nature opened onto itself and as such onto the absolute that \textit{A Life} is. Its \textit{corresponding quality of movement} is the haptic quality of movement (as previously mentioned the fourth paradigm has no corresponding quality of movement). The final property is the \textit{type of possible universe} the artwork which embodies a specific paradigm is said to lead to or to open itself onto. As it has already been discussed the haptic vision involves a deterritorialization from nature and a reterritorialization on a possible universe which itself expresses the absolute that \textit{A Life} is. The paradigm \textit{A Life in the living} is defined by a \textit{type of possible universe} termed haptic vision. These five properties constitute the set of properties by which all paradigms are defined.

\textsuperscript{39} Cinema, although not explicitly categorized as art as previous discussed, could be said to embody the paradigm \textit{A Life in the living} through a mode of practical engagement termed crystal-image.
Section 5 –Photography and the second paradigm of commitment to A Life: the living as point of view on and from A Life

The interest in conceptualizing photography as medium by which it is possible to embody a commitment to A Life stems from the intuition that the aesthetic experience of Thomas Struth’s *New Pictures From Paradise* series of photographs of jungles and forests relates to A Life or the Outside. This intuition cannot find its conceptual explanation in Deleuze since for him a photograph cannot express A Life in a sensation, it cannot give a vision of A Life in the living.

*Deleuze and photography*

Following DG’s conceptualization, art is the expression of A Life in the living, it expresses A Life in a sensation, giving to experience a percept and an affect. The photograph cannot achieve this because, as previously mentioned, it cannot express the constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is. The photograph is not a vision but a view, it is unable to express an indiscernibility between that which it gives to see (the sensed, the lived, a single level) and its conditions (the sensing, the Living in the lived, the difference of levels).

Deleuze establishes a link between our ordinary human views and photographs. Photographs ‘impose themselves upon sight and rule over the eye completely’ (Deleuze, 2002, 87). Photographs condition sight, photography ‘is what modern man sees’ (Deleuze, 2002, 19). It seems that Deleuze means two things here: that modern man is conditioned to see clichés (and as previously mentioned that the modern painter faces the danger of painting the preexisting clichés that already cover the white surface of the canvas), but also that photographs condition sight “to perceive on a single level”. Photography participates in denying us visions, it works against the possibility of experiencing the constitutive difference of levels that sensation is,

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Thomas Struth produces a series of photographs titled *Paradise 1, Paradise 2*, etc., followed by the region and country in which they were taken. As of 2002, 25 photographs formed the series; each were reproduced in the book *New Pictures From Paradise* (Struth et al., 2002). The series is formed of photographs taken from jungles and forests of Australia, Japan, USA, China, Germany, and Brazil.
(in painterly terms) against the constitution of a haptic sense. An x-ray photograph of the body does not express the body without organs which accounts for the difference of levels that the sensation is, on the contrary, it flattens it, it actualizes it onto a single level. To introduce a relation between science and photography, a relation that is more my own than DG’s: the photograph catches the BwO in a system of reference by which it “gives” organs to it, by which it measures it as organs.

Plate 62, Horse Catering, Annie G. With Jockey (.056 second) by Eadweard Muybridge, 1887

And yet, paradoxically, Deleuze writes that ‘Muybridge’s photo-images’ manage to include within their sensation the constitutive difference of levels (Deleuze, 2002, 87). Deleuze does not tell us how the photo-images manage to do so, but through this proposition he opposes them to photographs. This proposition appears like a contradiction since Deleuze rejects the ‘hypothesis’ that ‘levels of sensation would be like stops or snapshots of movement, which would recompose movement synthetically, in its continuity, speed and violence, as in synthetic cubism, futurism, or Duchamp’s Nude’ (Deleuze, 2002, 44). Effectively, levels of sensation are not instantaneous snapshots decomposing movement into stills, they are, as previously discussed, that which the body without organs accounts for. This tension in Deleuze’s writings with regards to the capacity of Muybridge’s photo-images serves as a clue explaining my intuition that Struth’s New Pictures From Paradise series relates to sensation and as such to A Life.
photography and movement

The difference between photography and cinema in terms of that which they give to see is obvious: the photograph has no movement whereas cinema, as previously discussed, gives the movement-image, a middle image akin to natural perception since (actual) movement belongs to it intrinsically. (Actual) movement is a ‘mobile cut of duration’ or mobile cut of virtual absolute movement (Deleuze, 1983, 22); in turn, the photograph is an instantaneous image, an ‘immobile cut of [actual] movement’ (Deleuze, 1983, 22). Photographs perhaps condition sight in terms of pre-mediating our views with clichés and conditioning our sight “to perceive” on a single level, but that which the photograph gives to see is not what is experienced through human or natural perception. Human perception, as Deleuze writes in his discussion of the movement-image, is not the successive perceptions of static points of view, it is not the successive perceptions of immobile cuts of actual movement (Deleuze, 1983, 11). Human perception is not photographic, its continuously renewed genesis is not the serial actualization of static points of view. As for the movement-image of cinema, movement belongs to human perception intrinsically. It is as such impossible for human perception (without the photograph) to experience a static point of view. Simply by virtue of being static, of being an immobile cut of actual movement, the photograph is ontologically different to that which human perception “perceives”. The photograph gives to see a view beyond the threshold of human perception. This formulates that which we all know intuitively on a pragmatic level: the photograph gives to see something different to what we see through human perception, as it is clearly exemplified by the work of Muybridge (even by a single photo-image in isolation from the others on the same plate)\(^4\). The photographic apparatus (or camera) has its own relative threshold perception by which it “sees” (that which we see in the photograph) beyond the threshold of human perception. But this does not mean that the photograph gives to experience a vision of A Life, the photographic apparatus’ threshold of perception remains relative, it is not absolute as through the haptic vision and absolute deterritorialization. As DG writes: ‘in relation to the photograph, the [virtual absolute] movement and the affect [A Life] once again took refuge above and below’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 344) the

\(^4\) It is as such that Muybridge was able to respond to the challenge that was given to him and prove that there is a point at which a galloping horse does not touch the ground.
photographic apparatus’ relative threshold of perception. The photograph does not give to see A Life, it gives to see a view of the “nature” the photographic apparatus can perceive, a view of the “nature” that constitutes that which the photographic apparatus can perceive of absolute movement, in other words a view of that which the photographic apparatus perceives A Life as according to the mediation it operates.

5.a – Ontology of the photograph

The ontological shift of the photograph (in comparison to our ordinary views) can be summarized as: the photograph relates the living in its point of view to its genesis, and it achieves this by virtue of ‘sharing’ its genesis with the living.42

The photograph relates nature to its genesis, the living to A Life, it relates the living to the Life that it is. This does not mean that the photograph expresses the Life of that which is in its point of view. I agree with Deleuze, the photograph cannot express A Life in a sensation. But by virtue of sharing with the living (in its point of view) the same genesis, the photograph, more potently the extra-ordinary photograph, relates nature to the Life or genesis that it is, leading to an aesthetic experience that is very different to both our ordinary views and the experience of a haptic vision.

horizontal line of actual movements and vertical line of genesis

A constant paradigm in Deleuze’s ontology is the opposition of two imbricated, reciprocally presupposing lines. They are a horizontal line of actual movements (history, movements in or of the living, actual relative movements) and a vertical line of genesis (becoming, movements of A Life, virtual absolute movements).43

42 The term “sharing” is borrowed from André Bazin (as further discussed below): ‘The photograph as such and the object in itself share a common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint’ (Bazin, 1990, 8).

43 The qualifications horizontal and vertical are taken from Deleuze’s discussion of Baroque music which he characterizes by two lines, an horizontal melody and a vertical harmony (Deleuze, 1988, 174).
These lines are in reciprocal presupposition, ‘one does not know where one finishes and where the other begins’ (Deleuze, 1988, 174). Their reciprocal presupposition conceptualizes the relation of actual movements to their genesis and inversely so, the relation of genesis to the actual movements it incessantly gives rise to. The vertical line of genesis “traces a line” from the infinite speeds of chaos “all the way up or down” to its actualization, from the infinite to the finite, from the absolute to the relative we perceived through our ordinary experiences. This vertical line is “traced” through the difference of levels constitutive of the sensation, it “maps” the sensing (conditions of experience) all the way up or down to the sensed (experience). It is effectively that which the Figure expresses, Figural painting opens the view, or the horizontal line of actual movements, onto itself and as such onto its vertical line of genesis.

That which the photograph gives to see is not only an immobile cut or cut across the horizontal line of actual movements, it is also simultaneously a cut across the vertical line of genesis of that which is in its point of view. It is as such that the photograph shares its line of genesis with that which is in its point of view (nature) and inversely so, nature shares its genesis with the photograph. In other words, both the photograph and the part of nature that was photographed have or share the same vertical line of genesis.

**Bazin’s ontology of the photograph**

André Bazin, a considerable influence on Deleuze’s writings on cinema (especially in *Cinéma 2. L’image-temps* (Deleuze, 1985)), conceptualizes this “sharing” or “ontological imbrication” in *Ontologie de l’image photographique* (the first article in the first volume of *Qu'est-ce que le cinéma?* (Bazin, 1990) originally published in 1958). The photographic image or the photograph in relation to the ‘object’ it has captured is effectively ‘the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it’ (Bazin, 1990, 8). It is so because ‘the image [the photograph] can be blurred, deformed, discolored, without documentary value, it proceeds, by its genesis, from the ontology of the model [the object]; it is the model’ (Bazin, 1990, 14). The photograph *is* the model, the photograph *is* the object, it ‘share[s] the same being’: ‘the photograph as such and the object in itself share a common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint’ (Bazin, 1990, 8). The photograph *is*
that which is in its point of view, and ‘therefore, photography actually contributes something of the order of natural creation instead of providing a substitute for it’ (Bazin, 1990, 16). The photograph is not representational of nature (it does not provide ‘a substitute for’ nature), it ‘contributes’ or gives to see ‘something of the order of natural creation’. This “contribution” for Bazin is the ‘revelation of the real’ (Bazin, 1990, 16), the photograph gives to see the ‘real’: this is where this development of an ontology of the photograph departs from Bazin. What Bazin calls ‘natural creation’ is in this development genesis, A Life, the “natural creation” that A Life is. The photograph does not reveal the real, it is a cut across the Life that the object in its point of view is, a cut across its vertical line of genesis, giving to see that object in a view beyond the threshold of human perception. For Bazin the photograph is to nature that which the fingerprint is to the hand, it is revelation of the real. Bazin’s metaphor of the fingerprint is, as discussed below, relevant to this ontology but in a way that is unrelated to a concept of the real. The problem is to conceptualize how this ontology of the photograph, and as such the ontological shift from human perception, relates not to a revelation of the real but contributes to articulate a relation between the living and A Life. Similar is Deleuze’s stance towards Bazin. Deleuze acknowledges Bazin’s influence on him in the beginning of Cinéma 2. L’image-temps with a discussion of the “‘fact-image’” (Deleuze, 1985, 7). The fact-image is a conceptualization by which the cinematic images developed in Italian neo-realism produce an “‘additional reality’” (Deleuze, 1985, 7). Deleuze expresses his reservations about such a notion of reality, he is not ‘convinced that the problem […] poses itself at the level of the real’ (Deleuze, 1985, 7). Deleuze goes on to conceptualize the time-image to relate the cinematic image not to the real but to the transcendental form of time, i.e. duration.

**photography and science**

That the photograph shares with nature the same line of genesis corroborates the relation of photography to science. Science renounces the infinite movements and speeds so as to give them references. It measures A Life with relatives unities determining extensive quantities as nature. However small or large these extensive unities are, science is forever unable to “attain” to the reciprocally presupposing and ‘indivisible’ intensive realm that A Life is (Deleuze, 2003b, 306). Science’s threshold of perception is by definition relative (and not absolute). Science ‘is a
fantastic slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter actualizes itself, but also that scientific thought is able to penetrate it by proposition’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 112). Its act of thought or creation is through the genesis that A Life is, through the chaosmos, by cutting across it to gain points of view inside it. Equally, the photograph is not point of view onto things ‘providing a substitute for [them]’ (Bazin, 1990, 16), but it is, like science, point of view ‘inside things themselves’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 126). Photography and science measure or give reference to the chaosmos, to A Life. The photographic apparatus measures the chaosmos, operating a ‘spatialization of time inseparable from science’ (Deleuze, 2008, 88) and from photography. Like science, the photograph is a ‘freeze-frame’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 112) on absolute movement and proceeds with a plane of reference. The photographic apparatus “freezes” the infinite movements and speeds into its “frame” or plane of reference, it is itself a plane of reference and gives to see that which is perceived from the point of view of the plane of reference that it is. DG explicitly discuss this relationship between photography and science in Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? when they discuss ‘those qualities devoid of all subjectivity, sensorial data distinct from all sensation, sites established in states of things, empty perspectives belonging to things themselves’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 125). DG tell us that these ‘unsensed sensibilia’ given to be seen by scientific instruments such as the ‘photographic plate, camera, mirror’ are the ‘sensory that qualifies […] a scientifically determined state of things, thing, or body’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 125). This passage in Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? is complex, and in it DG tells us something rather strange, but especially relevant: ‘geometrical figures have affections and perceptions’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 125). DG uses geometrical figures to exemplify fonctifs, the objects by which science thinks, the functions and variables by which it traces planes of reference on chaos, by which it cuts across the chaosmos. Scientific instruments, like the photographic apparatus, give to see the unsensed sensibilia which are perceived and determined by their corresponding planes of reference. The photographic apparatus gives to see from the point of view of a plane of reference by which it, or science, “scientifically determines” nature. It gives to see from its point of view, a point of view which can

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44 Equivalent to the “concept” as the object through which philosophy thinks, and the percept and affect, or bloc of sensation, as the object through which art thinks.
be imaged as a geometrical figure “in the middle of” (and which as such cuts across) the chaosmos, a triangle in “in the middle of” the transcendental field, a square “in the middle of” the pure plane of immanence. To use DG’s strange proposition, the photographic apparatus gives to see that which geometrical figures perceive and feel (perceptions and affections). Different photographic technologies correspond to different planes of reference, and as such to different ways to cut across the chaosmos, giving different points of view inside things themselves. This proposition is not only relevant to highly technological cameras such as those used for x-ray photography that literally sees inside things, it is relevant to the ontology of the photograph and as such to all photographs. As Bazin writes, the photograph is the model, and it is so because it is point of view inside the model, it is cut across the line of genesis of the model.

_the photograph as “fingerprint”_

A Life captures itself as the living simultaneously as it captures itself in the plane of reference or cut across that the photographic apparatus is. In terms of perception, the same vertical line of genesis, the same Life, captures itself as a human perception simultaneously as it captures itself in the photograph (which has the same point of view as that human perception). Critically however, the photograph gives to see a view unavailable to human perception. Of the object (or the living) in its point of view, the photograph gives to see a static view from a cut across its vertical line of genesis beyond the threshold of human perception, hence the photograph’s ontological shift. It is as such that the photograph can be understood as a “fingerprint” of the object in its point of view, in the sense that a fingerprint is commonly understood as being beyond some threshold of perception and only revealed through a technical process. The photographic process expresses the Life that the object is in an actualization that presents a view (and not a vision) beyond the threshold of human perception, in a view ordinarily unavailable to human perception.

The ontological shift from human perception to photograph, from ordinary view to “fingerprint”, corroborates to a change in the unity between the elements in the point of view. This means that our experience of the unity or relationship between objects in a single point of view is different in a photograph in comparison to a human
perception. This is obvious in for example the relationship between the horse and the ground in any single photograph in Muybridge’s *Plate 62*. What the photograph gives to experience that is beyond the threshold of human perception is a specific type of unity between objects in a point of view, an unity that ontologically defines these objects as dispersions of the Outside. As it will be further discussed through an engagement with *Paradise 6 Daintree, Australia* by Thomas Struth, a view through human perception ordinarily gives to experience what can be termed a smooth continuity of space, whilst in the photograph this smooth continuity is to some extent “broken” by virtue of the elements in the point of view appearing to a certain degree heterogeneous to one another (for example the horse and the ground in Muybridge’s *Plate 62*). It is also as such that the metaphor of the “fingerprint” is appropriate to define that which the photograph gives to experience: the “fingerprint” to some extent breaks the smooth continuity of space, the finger, by decomposing it in parts that are to a certain degree heterogeneous (the different lines – which represent epidermal ridges – that constitute the print).

45 In the photograph, the horse and the ground became, to some extent, heterogeneous to one another, allowing Muybridge to confirm that they were at some point “separated” (the instant when the horse doesn’t touch the ground at all), and to some extent “breaking” the smooth continuity of space proper to human perception. This example seems perhaps rather obvious because the horse is moving rapidly and the instantaneous image evidently allows to perceive a view that could not otherwise be seen through human perception. But even in a photograph from inside a jungle where effectively “nothing move” (*Paradise 6 Daintree, Australia* discussed below), the smooth continuity of space is also to some extent broken by virtue of the elements in the point of view appearing to a certain degree heterogeneous to one another. As ontological shift of the photograph, the change in the unity between elements in the point of view is necessarily true of all photographs.
Paradise 6 Daintree, Australia by Thomas Struth, 1998

Paradise 6, formal description

Paradise 6 is considered to be extra-ordinary, it is considered to be exemplary of extra-ordinary photographs, the specific mode of practical engagement by which photography embodies a commitment to A Life.\textsuperscript{46} Paradise 6 is composed of a series of different and interweaving elements of all shapes: leaves, trunks, branches, stems, etc. The depth of field is shallow, only in a few small areas is the sky visible as oversaturated white light, making the picture plane extremely flat and as if having no background per se. Hues are mainly green and brown, and the tones vary widely. It is hard to follow the length of a single plant or tree, or to locate precisely where it begins and where it ends. There are lines which link together certain elements which

\textsuperscript{46} Paradise 6 is here used to develop the ontology of the photograph which by definition concerns all photographs; the specific characteristics of extra-ordinary photographs are specifically engaged with further below.
are not directly juxtaposed on the picture plane. No single element or object seems more important than any other, creating a form of equality between all elements with no specific element to focus on. The depth of field is slightly deeper in the middle of the picture plane, to some extent leading the eye towards the centre. There is no background per se and as such no specific figure – ground or object – background relationship. The different elements are imbricated, interweaved, as if paradoxically of a single fact and simultaneously as a variety of more or less randomly distributed and heterogeneous elements. This simultaneity can be termed a field of more or less accidental and heterogeneous variations. It seems that there is no precise aesthetic intent with regards to the specific distribution of the field, the only apparent aesthetic intent being to capture the field itself, to a certain degree, regardless of its specific distribution. In other words, the specificities of the composition do not seem to be of great relevance except from the fact that they embody a field.

dispersive unity versus associative unity

The ontological shift of the photograph (in comparison to a human perception) corroborates to a shift in the unity between the elements in a point of view. The unity shifts from being primarily associative (human perception) to being primarily dispersive (photograph). The associative unity references Deleuze’s conceptualization of cinema when he discusses the process of association of classical cinema by which it produces ‘an uninterrupted chain of images each one the slave of the next’ with the purpose of forming the unity of an actual whole, the open or “actual universe” the film constitutes, the unity of the continuation of linear time and the constitution of actual movements (Deleuze, 1985, 234-235). The dispersive unity references the process of differentiation or dispersion by which, in modern cinema, cinematic images find their unity in the Outside of which they are the dispersion and into which they fall back. In Paradise 6 this shift is further emphasized by the diversity of different objects (leaves, trunks, branches, stems, etc.) which appear to emerge from and plunge back into obscurity. Furthermore, most of these objects appear as a multitude of shifting tones breaking each of them into collections of smaller distinct tonal planes, into small figures of light, related to an obscurity. Through human perception the unity of the elements in a point of view is primarily associative, the unity is experienced as smooth and continuous, in occurrence a smooth continuity of space along the depth of field and across the
viewpoint. In the photograph the unity of the elements in the point of view is primarily dispersive: the elements primarily find their unity in the Outside of which they are the dispersion and into which they fall back. Through human perception, the relation of the living to the Outside can be said to be deferred through, missed in or confused with the relentless passing of relative and actual movements. We perhaps have a presentiment of the Outside, but it feels that this intuition is always deferred through or confused with our ordinary experiences of the living. Similarly, the dispersive unity of the elements in a point of view is through human perception confused with their associative unity. To “have removed movement from human perception” and as such give to experience a view beyond the threshold of human perception (since, as previously discussed, movement is intrinsic to human perception), the photograph reveals the dispersive unity of the living with which it shares its genesis. The associative unity of the elements in a point of view perceived through human perception is in the photograph “broken up” by their dispersive unity, in a “kind of cubism of the transcendental” which relates each element to the Outside of which it is the dispersion. The photograph gives to experience a kind of cubism where what is perceived is not many facets of an object in actual space (analytic cubism) but a myriad of facets that are themselves actual dispersions of the Outside which itself remains absent from the picture.

**the dispersive unity and fissures or interstices**

*Paradise 6* embodies a diversity, a multitude of more or less heterogeneous elements or variations. The living or nature is dispersed from the Outside as a diversity where each element or variation has its own vertical line of genesis, and all are separated from one another by interstices or fissures in-between which they tear themselves from (actualization of the virtual) and fall back into (virtualization of the actual) the Outside. There are in the photograph, like in the cinema of the seer, interstices or fissures which link the living to the Outside. Obviously these interstices are not between movement-images, they are between the elements or variations which constitute the field captured in the static view. In the photograph these interstices do not open themselves onto the Outside, as through the crystal-image, giving to experience a vision. In *Paradise 6* for example, they exist between the leaves, trunks, branches and stems, but the Outside is nowhere to be seen. The interstices or fissures are not “wide open”, they are there in *Paradise 6* but they are infinitely small and as
such as if closed, like a broken and fissured piece of glass that has not collapsed or that has been re-glued. The interstices do not open themselves onto visions of the Outside, they simply relate each element to the Outside of which it is a dispersion, they relate each element to its transcendental background. The associative unity (in a sense proper to human perception) is in the photograph fissured by the interstices between elements, interstices in-between which they tear themselves from and fall back into their transcendental background, the Outside. The elements are said to be more or less heterogeneous not simply in terms of occupying different positions in actual space but in terms of being, to a certain degree, separated by interstices which relate them to the Outside. The elements come to appear as more or less heterogeneous in the photograph because their dispersive unity is revealed. The expression “more or less” heterogeneous is used because the associative unity never completely disappears (Paradise 6 still present a continuity of space across the viewpoint), it simply becomes subordinated to the dispersive unity.

The photograph does not express the Life that the living is in a vision (sensation), it does not express an indiscernibility between the living and its onto-genetic conditions. That which it gives to see that is beyond the threshold of human perception is the Life that the living is, expressed in a view which reveals the dispersive unity of that living. The photograph relates the living to A Life, to the Life that it is, in that it reveals its dispersive unity, in other words it reveals the living as dispersion of the Outside or A Life.

*the photograph experienced as point of view on the Outside or A Life*

The Outside is nowhere to be seen in the photograph but by revealing or expressing the dispersive unity of the elements in its point of view the photograph can be said to “set” the point of view “against” its transcendental background or Outside. Paradise 6 appears like a thin screen or plane beyond the threshold of human perception onto which the Outside has captured itself as it captured itself as the living (and hypothetically as a human perception of the same point of view). Paradise 6 is like a thin screen between us and the Outside, as if “affixed onto” or “set against” the Outside. This corroborates Struth’s own assessment of the pictures from his New Pictures From Paradise series: ‘the picture stands like a screen in front of another, invisible image’ (Struth, 2002). The experience is as if facing the Outside as it
disperses or projects itself towards our eyes. The point of view is as such revealed and given to experience as point of view on the Outside or A Life: the experience of looking at Paradise 6 is not per se of looking at nature, it is of looking at the Outside but “only” perceiving nature (since the Outside is nowhere to be seen). What is revealed in the photograph is that the living is that which we ordinarily perceive of the Outside, that which we ordinarily perceive the Outside as. The photograph reveals the living as dispersion of the Outside and correlatively as that which we ordinarily experience of the Outside, it can as such also be said to reveal the living as point of view on the Outside that is itself in the process of dispersing itself.

photography and expression, the photograph as a point of view from the Outside

The photograph does not reveal the ‘real’ of the object, the ‘real’ that the object is (Bazin). Whereas a concept of the ‘real’ aligns itself with a notion of truth, the photograph reveals itself, and correlative the living with which it shares its genesis, as affirmation of the power of the false. This ontology of the photograph is a conceptualization of photography which is not based on a logic of representation, it thinks photography in relation to expression, in other words in relation to genesis, consistency given to chaos, or dispersion of the Outside. The photographic apparatus is a plane of reference or cut across the Outside of which it captures the dispersion, and the photograph is the point of view from, and mediated or determined by, this cut across. The photographic apparatus is not in a pre-determined nature capturing points of view onto pre-determined things (its operation is as such necessarily not representative of a pre-determined nature). The photographic apparatus is in the Outside capturing points of view onto undetermined things which it as such determines according to that which it can, i.e. according to its respective threshold of perception. The photographic apparatus is in the previously discussed immense, obscure and dizzying Nature, and that which it gives to see depends on the (differential) relations it assumes and privileges between an infinity of minute perceptions or vanishing quantities. “Un-determined things”, the Outside, are determined or actualized by the plane of reference that the photographic apparatus is.

The photographic apparatus is in the Outside, and as such gives a point of view from

47 The “power of the false” is a concept developed by Nietzsche and used by Deleuze in his discussion of cinema; it will be further engaged with through the analysis of the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph.
the Outside. That the photograph gives, and comes to be experienced as (as it will be discussed below), a point of view from the Outside, whilst it is simultaneously experienced as a point of view on the Outside in the process of dispersing itself, forms the core of the definition of the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph: an experience of the living as simultaneous point of view on and from the Outside.

the accident of nature, nature as accident

Revealed in the photograph is that the living is the Outside or A Life capturing itself as the materiality of the universe, that the living comes into existence as a neither foreseen nor preconceived consistency given to chaos or dispersion of the Outside. The photograph reveals nature as “accident”, “accident” understood as ‘fruit of chance in the Nietzschean sense’ (Deleuze, 2007, 45), as result of a throw of dice, as result of chance. Chance for Nietzsche is affirmation (Deleuze, 2007, 30), affirmation of the creative power that A Life or the Outside is, affirmation as throw of dice, affirmation as (in Deleuzian terms) repetition of difference. From chance, from affirmation, results necessity: the resulting, and “accidental”, combination of dice. The incessant throw of dice and the ever changing resulting combinations is a Nietzschean image of the continuously renewed genesis or repetition of difference that A Life or the Outside is. The photograph does not reveal an accident in nature, it reveals the accident of nature, i.e. nature as accident. The photograph captures not only an accident in nature which “takes place” along the horizontal line of actual movements (cut across the line of actual movements), it also reveals and gives to experience the reciprocally presupposing accident of nature which “takes place” along its vertical line of genesis (cut across the line of genesis). The photograph relates the living to the throw from which it results, to the Outside of which it is the dispersion.

48 It is not the purpose of this text to establish detailed relationships between Nietzsche and Deleuze’s concept of repetition of difference, but it seems appropriate to suggest that a strong relationship exists between this concept and Nietzsche’s concepts of chance and affirmation. On the throw of dice, “in the Nietzschean sense”, in relation to the eternal return and chaos p.29-31 (Deleuze, 2007).
As an ontology of the photograph, the development above necessarily concerns all photographs. It is obvious however that it is not all photographs that can unequivocally be said to relate the living to the Life that it is, revealing and giving to the experience of the living as dispersion of the Outside, as that which we ordinarily experience of the Outside, or as point of view on the Outside in the process of dispersing itself. As previously mentioned, the interest in conceptualizing photography as a medium which can embody a commitment to A Life stems from the intuition that the aesthetic experiences of photographs from Struth’s *New Pictures From Paradise* series relate to or involve A Life. Photographs such as *Paradise 6* are called *extra-ordinary photographs*. The extra-ordinary qualifies photographs which emphasize most explicitly that which defines them ontologically, their ontological shift, the revelation of the dispersive unity of that which is in their point of view. It is through such emphasis that they most obviously relate the living to the Life that it is. Terminologically, extra-ordinary photographs *are* extra-ordinary for two reasons: amongst the vast amount of photographs that we experience daily, extra-ordinary photographs are extra-ordinary in that they are rare; but also, if the living is understood as that which is ordinarily experienced, extra-ordinary photographs give an experience that is more than simply ordinary, they give an aesthetic experience which involves A Life. The photographs in the *New Pictures From Paradise* series are extra-ordinary to different degrees. There could be a scale of *extra-ordinariness* onto which all photographs could be positioned, and of which Struth’s jungle and forest photographs would occupy the high end. *Paradise 6* appears as one of the most extra-ordinary photograph of the series; it is used to define the set of principles and formal characteristics by which a photograph is qualified as extra-ordinary, defining the specific mode of practical engagement with photography by which it embodies a commitment to A Life.

**two interrelated non formal principles of the extra-ordinary photograph**

The extra-ordinary photograph has two interrelated non formal principles: it avoids subject matter and narrative, and has no illustrative or documentary aim.
The extra-ordinary photograph reveals not an event or accident in nature but the event of nature, the event of the actualization or coming into existence of nature. The extra-ordinary photograph avoids emphasizing any object or event in nature of any relevance or interest which would detract attention towards itself, become a specific subject matter and inevitably lead to a narrative. *Paradise 6* embodies this concern through a form of equality between the elements of the composition by having no actual background per se, no figure – ground relationship, preventing the focus on any specific element. The photograph also avoids emphasizing an event in nature: in *Paradise 6*, nothing is happening. The photograph avoids capturing any specific, relevant or interesting event in nature, it as such avoids emphasizing itself as a cut across actual movements, all the better able to emphasize itself as cut across the vertical line of genesis, to emphasize the event of nature (its actualization or coming into existence). Avoiding to emphasize an object or an event, and as such a subject matter, the extra-ordinary photograph also prevents a narrative to emerge.

Correlatively, the extra-ordinary photograph has no illustrative or documentary (or journalistic) aim, it does not aim to communicate a view of specific relevance or interest that would otherwise be unavailable to an audience. The extra-ordinary photograph does not “reveal nature” in the sense of making available an otherwise unavailable view to the viewer (in the sense that journalistic or reportage photography “reveals nature”). On the contrary, the extra-ordinary photograph reveals the event of nature, and the specific view through which it does so has no specific relevance or interest (beyond possessing formal characteristics by which it is extra-ordinary). This seems to go against an instinctive “reading” of the photographs from the *New Pictures From Paradise* series which capture remote points of view from inside jungles and forests around the world, views certainly unavailable to most, views which “reveal nature”. What is meant however by saying that the extra-ordinary photograph, *Paradise 6* for example, has no illustrative or documentary purpose is that it is without consequence, the view of the specific location where *Paradise 6* was taken has no explicit relevance, and it has no more relevance than any of the other captured points of view in the series. There is in fact a principle of equivalence at play between the different photographs of the series, each of them is without consequence, without specific relevance, it is irrelevant whether a specific photograph was taken in Brazil, China, Australia or Japan, etc. The photographs are
in a sense equivalent in that they are not per se of specific locations in nature, they are of nature, meaning of the event of the coming into existence of nature, of the accident of nature, of nature as accident.

**conceptual principle of the extra-ordinary photograph: no actual background but a transcendental background absent from that which the photograph gives to see**

The formal principles of the extra-ordinary photograph derive from a focus not on a figure – ground relationship in nature, but on the nature – “transcendental ground” (or Outside) relationship of nature. To think through the usual figure – ground relationship, for the extra-ordinary photograph the figure is nature or the living itself, and the ground is the Outside, the transcendental field or A Life. The extra-ordinary photograph is concerned with the nature – Outside relationship. This informs the conceptual principle by which there is no actual background in the extra-ordinary photograph but only a transcendental background absent from that which the photograph gives to see. The extra-ordinary photograph emphasizes the “behind” or “outside” of that which it gives to see not as a continuation of actual space but as the Outside (for example the “behind” or “outside” of the lush vegetation of *Paradise 6* is experienced as Outside as opposed to the continuation of actual space)\(^{49}\). In *Paradise 6* this is emphasized by the literal absence of an actual background (except small and oversaturated areas of the sky), preventing to focus on a figure – “actual ground” relationship, better allowing for the experience of a “behind” or “outside” that is transcendental (“transcendental ground” or the Outside).

**formal principles of the extra-ordinary photograph**

The quintessential formal principle of the extra-ordinary photograph, as previously observed in *Paradise 6*, is that it embodies a field of more or less accidental and heterogeneous variations. This principle constitutes three different although interrelated formal characteristics:

\(^{49}\) A principle which again corroborates Struth’s comment on the photographs from the *New Pictures From Paradise* series: ‘the picture stands like a screen in front of another, invisible image’ (Struth, 2002). However, as it will be further discussed, this formulation is to a certain degree inappropriate for the conceptualization of the extra-ordinary photograph in relation to the reciprocal presupposition between the living and the Outside.
the extra-ordinary photograph embodies a diversity of elements that appear as more or less heterogeneous to one another,

- its composition is more or less accidental, and without any specific relevance or consequence, and

- its elements, its more or less heterogeneous and accidentally composed variations are intrinsically linked as a field, and in that sense appear to be related to a single fact.

**First characteristic: diversity and heterogeneity**

The extra-ordinary photograph embodies a diversity, a multitude of elements between which an heterogeneity is emphasized. It serves to emphasize the dispersive unity which the photograph expresses, accentuating between the elements the fissures or interstices revealed by the ontological shift of the photograph. In *Paradise 6* this diversity is embodied by the multitude of objects present in the composition and by the myriad of shifting tones breaking each object into many facets or small figures of light, emphasizing interstices within objects themselves. Interstices leading to the Outside exist not only between objects, in other words at their edges, but also within each object itself, at the edges of each of the small facets into which they are divided. The dispersive unity revealed in the extra-ordinary photograph “breaks” the smooth continuity of space, and consequently “breaks” not only the smooth continuity of space between objects but “breaks” the objects themselves (since each object contributes to constitute the smooth continuity of space). Fissures or interstices exist not only between objects but within objects themselves. This corroborates the ontological fact that the living (or objects) is opened onto the Outside (as expressed for example in a Figural painting), and consequently potentially infinitely fissured by the Outside; the Outside is *in* each object simultaneously as each object is in the Outside. Evidently, an object, as dispersion of the Outside, does not tear itself from and fall back into the Outside “at its edges”, “at its actual edge” which it only gains once actualized, an object tears itself from and falls back into the Outside at an infinity of points, or through an infinity of interstices, *within* itself.
second characteristic: more or less accidental, tension between the Outside and its dispersion

The composition of the elements in the field is more or less accidental, it appears as an accident, as a result of chance. There is no specific relevant order according to which the elements are distributed, their composition is without any specific consequence or relevance except from the fact of embodying a more or less randomly distributed field. The expression “more or less” accidental is used because there is a tension between chance and necessity: the composition appears as it could have been otherwise, and yet it is as such (in the sense that a throw of dice for example can result in any combination, and yet it results in a specific one). This tension the extra-ordinary photograph expresses is a tension between A Life and the living, between the Outside and its dispersion, between chaos and consistency, it is the tension proper to the chaosmos (between chaos and cosmos), the tension of the continuously renewed consistency given to chaos and the incessant chaotization of all consistency. In relation to Paradise 6, this characteristic is emphasized by the fact that the jungle appears as a more or less random composition of objects. It is also emphasized by the fact that it is part of a series, each photograph in the series emphasizing in relation to one another the fact that it could have been otherwise and that yet it is as such (because each photograph in relation to another shows how it can be otherwise). This emphasizes the fact that each photograph presents a composition of the living that is “more or less” accidental, and that each composition is linked to all the others by virtue of resulting from the “same accident”, the same repetition, the same affirmation.

third characteristic: the same affirmation

Although heterogeneous, the diversity of elements are related to one another through a single fact, their more or less accidental distribution appears to stem from the same affirmation. The elements appear as heterogeneous dice emerging from a single throw. The diversity is both a multitude (many elements) and a plurality (elements of different kinds). The elements, although different in kind, appear as different facets of a same fact. This also expresses the tension between chaos and consistency, between the Outside and its dispersion, not in terms of random distribution but in terms of diversification, in terms a unity differentiating or dispersing itself into a plurality. The elements are intrinsically linked as a “dispersed field”, and in that
sense related to a single fact, the single fact of the Outside from which it is dispersed. In *Paradise 6* this characteristic is emphasized by the plurality elements appearing to emerge from the same obscurity. It is also emphasized by the fact that most elements in the composition are of different hues of green, it is as if each element is an accidental variation of the same green hue, as if a powerful green light, projected towards the picture plane from behind, is diffracted into a multitude of hue variations when caught by the picture plane which can be imaged as a broken piece of glass.

Tokamak Asdex Upgrade Periphery Max Planck IPP, Garching by Thomas Struth, 2009
Many obvious formal links can be established between *Paradise 6* and *Tokamak Asdex Upgrade Periphery Max Planck IPP, Garching*, 2009. On one level, the distribution of the elements in *Tokamak Asdex …* expresses the single fact of a human and technical necessity. To discuss the photograph in terms of such necessity is on one level to consider its subject matter and documentary qualities. It is also to refer to the associative unity of the photograph by which it presents a relatively smooth continuity of space across the viewpoint. But possessing the formal characteristics of the extra-ordinary photograph, on another level *Tokamak Asdex …* emphasizes the ontological shift of the photograph, it emphasizes its unity as being primarily dispersive. Related to the Outside of which it is the dispersion, the single fact that the composition of elements expresses appears not as a human and technical necessity but as the accident of nature, as a “non human necessity”, the necessity of the dispersion of the Outside or affirmation of chance. It is not only the smooth continuity of space that is in a sense “disturbed” by the revelation of its dispersive unity, it is also the photograph’s subject matter and documentary qualities. By being extra-ordinary, *Tokamak Asdex …* is experienced less as the representation of a human and technical necessity than as the accident of nature by which all subject matters become irrelevant. Not the event of a technical production in nature but the event of nature emerging from and plunging back into the Outside. Struth establishes a relation between an order of natural creation and an order of technological development. When Struth reveals or expresses human technological development as dispersion of the Outside, he constitutes an indiscernibility between the “artificial” and the “natural”. From the radical ontological view of the world entirely decentred from humans, i.e. from the point of view of the Outside, nothing is “artificial”, everything is “natural” (or nothing is “natural” and everything is “artificial”): as when one entertains the thought that atomic bombs are natural phenomena, or that the exploration of the moon by humans is as natural as the growth of a flower. When the living is through the extra-ordinary photograph revealed as dispersion of the Outside, categories of artificial and natural become irrelevant, all that is perceived,

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50 A point of view which, as previously mentioned and further discussed below, the extra-ordinary photograph reveals and gives to experience in correlation to the fact that the photographic apparatus is in the Outside.
all that is lived (the living), is neither natural nor artificial but simply genesis, simply
dispersion of the Outside.

**summary: the non formal principles and formal characteristics of the extra-ordinary
photograph**

The non formal principles and formal characteristics of the extra-ordinary
photograph are: it avoids subject matter and narrative; it has no illustrative or
documentary purpose; it has no actual background, it only has a transcendental
background which is absent from that which it gives to see; it embodies a diversity
of elements that appear as more or less heterogeneous; its composition is more or
less accidental, it appears as it could have been otherwise; and finally its elements,
its more or less heterogeneous and accidentally distributed variations, are
intrinsically linked as a field, and in that sense they appear to stem from the same
affirmation.

**the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph**

**the living as point of view on and from the Outside**

The extra-ordinary photograph, by emphasizing the ontological shift of the
photograph through its specific characteristics, by emphasizing the dispersive unity
the photograph reveals, is experienced as a thin screen or plane as if “set against” the
Outside, capturing its dispersion in a view unavailable to human perception. The
experience is as if looking at the Outside but “only” perceiving nature. Through the
extra-ordinary photograph, the living is experienced as *point of view on the Outside
or A Life*; the Outside is not given to be seen in the static view, the living is
experienced as that which we ordinarily perceive of the Outside, that which we
ordinarily perceive the Outside as. This constitutes the first aspect of the aesthetic
experience of the extra-ordinary photograph. But there is a second aspect to this
aesthetic experience by which the point of view is simultaneously reversed.
Following this second aspect the living is not only experienced as point of view *on*
the Outside but also, simultaneously, as point of view *from* the Outside. The first
aspect supposes a subject *in* nature looking at nature as if looking towards the
Outside: nature is revealed as that which the subject *can see of* the Outside. The
second aspect supposes a subject in the Outside looking at nature, in the Outside looking effectively at the Outside but “only” seeing nature. Effectively, the photographic apparatus is in the Outside, it gives a point of view from the Outside.

**the scientific eye or slicing eye, and the viewer as geometrical figure**

Through the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph, the perception of the viewer becomes that of the photographic apparatus in the Outside. The eye of the viewer becomes the eye of the photographic apparatus itself in the Outside, seeing a point of view from the Outside. It is very different to the haptic eye given by a Figural painting, the eye the viewer is given by the extra-ordinary photograph could be called a **scientific or slicing eye** which cuts across the Outside. The viewer can perceive nothing else than that which is captured by her scientific or slicing eye, but she experiences being in the Outside of which her perception is a cut across. To refer to the previously established links DG make between photography and science, and to create an interesting image of the ontology of the viewer: in her aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph, the viewer becomes one of these ‘geometrical figures [which] have affections and perceptions’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 125), it is as a geometrical figure that the viewer perceives. Through her aesthetic experience, the viewer is not dispersed as it is through the haptic vision. She is in a sense given the consistency of the plane of reference from which she perceives, as if a geometrical figure in the Outside, frozen in time at the instantaneous moment of capture (of capture of the dispersion of the Outside). The scientific eye can also be called a slicing eye because it cuts or slices across the Outside actualizing itself as a point of view beyond the threshold of human perception. The viewer experiences an instantaneous slice or cut across the Outside in the process of dispersing itself as a nature, a nature which as discussed below “encloses her” whilst she simultaneously, and in a sense paradoxically, experiences being in the Outside. The slice or cut across is not the Outside and as such not a vision, it is a view of nature but a view that comes to be experienced as from the Outside.

**alienation and vertigo**

The aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph involves a form of alienation from nature, nature which ordinarily is experienced through human
perception as a closed form which encloses us. The associative unity, corroborating to a smooth continuity of space between the elements in a point of view, means that nature is experienced as closed and enclosing. Its subordination to the dispersive unity revealed in the extra-ordinary photograph changes this. The aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph is of being in nature which is closed and encloses us whilst simultaneously being in the Outside, it is of being simultaneously in nature looking towards the Outside and in the Outside looking towards nature. To this form of alienation corroborates an experience of vertigo. It is as if the subject of this experience, inside a closed and enclosing nature, suddenly loses its footing to find itself inside an infinite Outside, a vertigo triggered by an experience of a fall into an infinite obscurity. This vertigo is however continuously, or simultaneously, “remediated” by the fact that the viewer is given to see nothing else than a view of nature which to a certain degree encloses her. The viewer simultaneously experiences being in the infinite whilst “never leaving” the finite nature in which she is enclosed, the living being experienced simultaneously as point of view on the Outside and point of view from the Outside.

*nature perceived from and through the Outside, denying transcendence*

To experience the living as point of view from the Outside (more specifically simultaneously as point of view on and from the Outside) corroborates to the ontological fact that we effectively perceive nature from and through the Outside or A Life. We perceive nature from and through the Outside in that it is A Life, our bodies without organs, as onto-genetic conditions of real experience, that give us the living to experience. To experience the living as point of view from and through the Outside simultaneously as point of view on the Outside is the conceptual requirement by which to think the photograph in relation to pure immanence. As long as the photograph is only thought to give a point of view on the Outside (as in Struth’s formulation: ‘the picture stands like a screen in front of another, invisible image’ (Struth, 2002)), the Outside remains arguably transcendent to that which the photograph gives to see, to the living and to the position of the viewer in a closed and enclosing nature. To insure a relation of pure immanence and reciprocal presupposition between the Outside and the living, the Outside also needs to be acknowledged as that from and through which the living is perceived: it is the Outside which gives us to see nature “in the first place”. We are not only in nature
looking towards the Outside which appears as if “hidden behind nature”, crucially we simultaneously are in the Outside, looking at the Outside, but “only” perceiving nature. Through the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph, nature is not only that which appears to hide the Outside behind it, it appears like an hallucination experienced from the Outside.

*nature as a hallucination: nature hallucinated*

To experience the living from and through the Outside is not how nature is ordinarily experienced through human perception. Given to experience is undeniably a static view of nature, but through the extra-ordinary photograph nature is perceived or experienced as what can be termed a *hallucination*. The term hallucination is borrowed from Deleuze who uses it, in a context unrelated to photography, in his book on Leibniz Le Pli. Leibniz et le Baroque (Deleuze, 1988). ‘The Baroques know well that it is not the hallucination which feigns presence, but that presence is hallucinatory’ (Deleuze, 1988, 170). In this context, ‘presence’ can be understood as A Life or the Outside. What the ‘Baroques know’ can be re-phrased as follows: one’s relationship with A Life is not that of hallucinating A Life from the position of nature (‘it is not the hallucination which feign presence’), on the contrary, it is from and through A Life that we have our perceptions of nature that themselves can be called hallucinations (‘presence is hallucinatory’). A Life is hallucinatory, and it that sense “primary”, in that it is from and through it that one perceives, that one has perceptions of nature, that one experiences of the living. As Deleuze emphasizes in italics: ‘*All perceptions are hallucinatory, because perception has no object*’ (Deleuze, 1988, 170). ‘*Perception has no object*’ because that which is perceived comes into existence, and as such is perceived, simultaneously with it being perceived from and through A Life. Correlatively ‘*perception has no object*’ because one is in the immense, obscure and dizzying Nature that the transcendental field is, perceiving that which it can according to the differential relations it assumes and privileges between an infinity of vanishing quantities or minute perceptions (and not perceiving pre-determined objects). In simple terms, perception has no object because perception has no pre-determined object to look onto. That which is primary to all perceptions is not a closed and enclosing nature, it is A Life or the Outside from and through which we have them. The photographic apparatus is apparatus of perception like human perception (although it gives to see something completely
different), and neither operate in a pre-determined nature gazing onto pre-determined things. That which the hallucinatory (presence, A Life, the Outside) gives to see can be termed hallucinations. Our ordinary human perceptions are hallucinations, only they are not experienced as such, they are not experienced as hallucinations. In other words, our ordinary human perceptions are not experienced as points of view from and through the Outside. It is the extra-ordinary photograph which gives us an experience of the living as a hallucination. Revealing the living as point of view on and from the Outside, on and from and through the Outside, the extra-ordinary photograph gives to experience the living “only” (and not a vision of A Life), but the living or nature as a hallucination, otherwise termed nature hallucinated.

**hallucination: mode of aesthetic experience corresponding to the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life**

Whereas the paradigm *A Life in the living* (DG’s conceptualization of art) was mainly developed through an engagement with Figural painting and the cinema of the seer, the second paradigm of commitment to A Life, which is termed the living as point of view on and from A Life and which constitutes the first level of expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art, is mainly developed through an engagement with the extra-ordinary photograph.

The mode of aesthetic experience which corresponds to the paradigm *the living as point of view on and from A Life* is hallucination. This paradigm embodies a commitment to A Life since to give an experience of the living as point of view on and from A Life is to relate the living to the Life that it is, to its immanent transcendental Outside: the living is that which is ordinarily perceived of A Life and that which is perceived from and through A Life. In comparison to the paradigm *A Life in the living*, the second paradigm concerns not the finite which restores the infinite, it concerns the finite as that which is experienced of the infinite simultaneously as that which is experienced from and through the infinite. Hallucination is significantly different to the mode of aesthetic experience termed haptic vision, and as such a considerable departure from DG’s conceptualization of art. What is experienced through hallucination is a view, the extra-ordinary photograph, however extra-ordinary, is and remains a view, but a view that is
experienced as a hallucination, as from and through the Outside or A Life. On the other hand a vision expresses the difference of levels constitutive of the sensation, i.e. an indiscernibility between a view and its condition, A Life expressed in a sensation.

**movement from nature to nature hallucinated**

In terms of movement the mode of aesthetic experience termed haptic vision is, as previously discussed, a movement from nature to A Life, from nature to a possible universe which itself expresses the absolute that A Life is, a movement through which the viewer is dispersed as A Life, through which she establishes a unity with A Life. Hallucination on the other hand is a movement from an ordinary experience nature to an experience of nature as a hallucination. This movement is from an experience of nature as a closed and enclosing form, to an experience of nature as a point of view from and through the Outside (simultaneously as an experience of nature as point of view on the Outside) by which nature appears as a hallucination. The movement involves the form of alienation and vertigo discussed above. It can be termed movement from nature to nature hallucinated. The viewer is not reterritorialized on the absolute that A Life is, the viewer is not dispersed as A Life (haptic vision), the viewer is reterritorialized on the cut across the Outside which the scientific or slicing eye she is given corresponds to. But as for the vision, through her hallucination the viewer also establishes a unity with A Life or the Outside in that she experiences to be Outside, in that it is from and through the Outside that she experiences her perceptions of nature. The departure from, and expansion of, DG’s conceptualization of art is here obvious: although I agree with DG that photography cannot express A Life in the living, some (extra-ordinary) photographs allow for an aesthetic experience which involves the establishment of a unity with A Life.

**hallucinatory quality of movement, the tension or relation of territoriality between absolute movement and relative movement**

The mode of aesthetic experience hallucination described in terms of movement is best described as an experience of the reciprocal presupposition between absolute movement and relative movement, what can be termed the tension or relation of territoriality between absolute movement (the Outside) and relative movement (the living). The scientific or slicing eye, as geometrical figure or plane of reference “in
the middle” of the Outside, gives to experience this tension or relation of territoriality between the Outside and its dispersion, between the Outside and nature. The scientific or slicing eye gives to experience neither nature (as it is experienced through human perception) nor the Outside but the tension between the two. This tension corresponds to the second quality of movement: the reciprocal presupposition between the absolute and relative components of movement. Whereas the first quality was termed haptic, the second quality can be termed hallucinatory. It is the quality of movement by which movement is always simultaneously both relative and absolute. It defines the fact that relative movements (the living) are always experienced from and through absolute movements (A Life or the Outside), and inversely so. The artwork which embodies the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life, for example Paradise 6, embodies and as such gives to experience the hallucinatory quality of movement.

Whereas the paradigm A Life in the living corresponds to a movement from nature to the possible universe that the haptic vision is, the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life corresponds to a movement from nature to the possible universe that nature hallucinated is.

5.c – Nature hallucinated: nature as possible universe

Figural painting operates in co-creation with A Life in that, like A Life, it operates a genesis by which it gives a consistency to chaos, it is a genesis by which chaos is composed and which results in a possible universe. This possible universe is the haptic vision, a specific territorialization on and of the absolute that A Life is, meaning that it expresses, is and gives the vision of the absolute that A Life is.

51 The quality by which movement always necessarily is, and opens its relative component onto, the absolute that A Life is.
But as previously discussed when the concept of possible universe was introduced, a possible universe is not primarily defined as a haptic vision, a possible universe is defined as a possible consistency given to chaos or territorialization of chaos. The actual universe is a possible universe, a possible consistency given to chaos, only one which is in the continuous process of realizing itself as the materiality of the universe, as the living or nature. That the extra-ordinary photograph reveals the living as dispersion of the Outside, as a neither foreseen nor preconceived consistency given to chaos, as accident understood as ‘fruit of chance in the Nietzschean sense’ (Deleuze, 2007, 45), i.e. as affirmation of chance, is for it to reveal nature as a possible universe, as a possibility that is in the process of actualizing itself. That the aesthetic experience of the extra-ordinary photograph is of the living or nature experienced simultaneously as point of view on and from and through the Outside (hallucination) corroborates the experience of nature as possible universe. Nature is experienced as a possible universe in two ways: as if in nature facing the Outside as it disperses or projects itself towards our eyes (point of view on the Outside), and as if in the Outside whilst it disperses itself through our eyes (point of view from and through the Outside). This experience encompasses the feeling that it could have been otherwise, that nature could have been the realization of another possibility. Correlated to the hallucination, to an experience of nature as a hallucination (nature hallucinated) is the experience of nature as accident, of the accident of nature.

Through the extra-ordinary photograph, nature, the ‘body’ (for example the body of the jungle in Paradise 6), appears as ‘the most “surprising” thing’ (Deleuze, 2007, 45). Through Paradise 6, the living is experienced as the most surprising thing because it is as such whilst the experience of hallucination strongly suggests that it could have been otherwise. The amazement is not related to an accident in nature, it

52 Deleuze quotes “surprising” from Nietzsche, footnote 3 (Deleuze, 2007, 45): ‘VP, II, 173: “The human body is a thought more surprising than the soul of the past”; II, 226: “What is more surprising is rather the body; one never ceases to be amazed at the idea that the human body has become possible.”’ Nietzsche refers to the human body, but this surprise, this amazement, can be related to effectively everything that comes into existence, in other words any affirmation of chance, any necessity, anything that constitutes the living or nature.
is not surprising that the leaves, trunks, branches, stems are arranged in such a composition. What is surprising is that from the infinity that the Outside is, that which *Paradise 6* gives to see has emerged or come into existence. The amazement is at the accident of nature. Not only is nature experienced as a hallucination (experienced from and through the Outside), nature appears as alien. From an infinity of possibility, it is rather strange, surprising, amazing, that in *Paradise 6* the vegetation is green, since it could have been blue, red, violet or orange, etc. The fact that the vegetation is green is experienced as being as surprising as if it would have been orange. A “green jungle” is as strange as an “orange jungle”, the former is as alien as the latter. Through the extra-ordinary photograph, the living is experienced as the hallucination of an alien world.

*the power of the false and the extra-ordinary photograph*

As Deleuze writes of modern cinema, of a cinema of the seer, the extra-ordinary photograph ‘makes the image pass under the power of the false’ (Deleuze, 1985, 179). The extra-ordinary photograph is completely different to the crystal-image, it does not give a vision of the transcendental form of time or the Outside constructing an indiscernibility between the Outside and its dispersion, but it gives an experience of the living as dispersion of the Outside which directly relates it to the power of the false. The power of the false is a concept created by Nietzsche. The concept relates to art: ‘art is the highest power of the false, it magnifies “the world as error”’ (Deleuze, 2007, 117). With the concept of the power of the false Nietzsche attempts to do away with any claims to truth: Nietzsche ‘substitute[s] the power of the false for the form of the true, and resolves the crisis of truth, wanting to settle it once and for all, but in opposition to Leibniz, in favour of the false and its artistic, creative power …’ (Deleuze, 1985, 172). In this context, the power of the false can be understood as dispersion of the Outside, the creative power of A Life and art’s operation of co-creation with it. The world is beyond any claims to truth because it continuously enters into becomings, it repetitively metamorphoses itself: it

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53 What Deleuze writes about Orson Welles can equally be said of Deleuze’s conceptualization of modern cinema.

54 It is beyond the scope of this text to develop detailed conceptual relations between Nietzsche and Deleuze, but it seems appropriate to suggest that a very strong relationship exists between A Life and Nietzsche’s concept of the power of the false.
continuously falsifies itself. Truth allies itself with being, whereas the false allies itself with becoming. Whereas a concept of truth relies on a notion of being and affirms being, in Nietzsche (and Deleuze) it is becoming and the being of becoming (being = becoming) that is affirmed and described as artistic and creative power of the false: ‘Beyond the true and the false, becoming as power of the false’ (Deleuze, 1985, 360).

What is affirmed through an experience of nature as possible universe is this very fact: that nature is only a possibility that has realized itself, an accident, the extra-ordinary photograph magnifies “the world as error”. That the image passes under the power of the false is exactly that through the extra-ordinary photograph nature is experienced as a hallucination, as from and through the Outside, as its accidental dispersion. There is no stable truth to look upon, no pre-determined things to perceive, as Deleuze writes perception has no object (Deleuze, 1988, 170). That which is perceived, and perception itself, are dispersions of the Outside, affirmation the power of the false, points of view hallucinated from the Outside. The photographic apparatus is not in the truth of a pre-determined nature, it is in the Outside capturing its dispersion. The photographic apparatus has no truth to represent, only the unforeseeable dispersion of the Outside to capture and render sensory (the photograph) according to the differential relations it can assume and privilege between an infinity of emerging and vanishing quantities or minute perceptions.

haptic vision and the power of the false

A haptic vision, for example Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne, is also an affirmation of the power of the false: a haptic vision never makes any claims to the truth of the transcendental field, the Outside or A Life, as it would were it to operate by

55 ‘We have to reflect for a long time to understand what it means to make of becoming an affirmation. Without doubt it is to say, in the first place: there is only becoming. Without doubt it is to affirm becoming. But we also affirm the being of becoming, we say that becoming affirms being or that being affirms itself in becoming. Heraclitus has two thoughts which are like ciphers: one according to which there is no being, all is becoming; the other according to which being is the being of becoming as such. A working thought which affirms becoming, a contemplative thought which affirms the being of becoming’ (Deleuze, 2007, 27).
representation and take the Outside to be a transcendent universe. As opposed to the representation of a transcendent universe a haptic vision is the expression of the purely immanent transcendental. A haptic vision captures and expresses the very same forces which compose and transverse nature (A Life), and as an expression that always results from an accident or catastrophe (the diagram) rendering sensory A Life beyond any of its previous conditions of existence, a haptic vision magnifies “the world”, and its onto-genetic condition, “as error”. In relation to Bacon’s haptic visions, Deleuze discusses how man experiences itself as ‘accident’ (Deleuze, 2002, 117, 127). The co-creation of possible universes that art operates magnifies the creation of the actual universe as accident, as error, as affirmation of the power of the false.

It is also necessarily as affirmation of the power of the false that a haptic vision can be achieved through an infinity of ways, through an infinity of diagrams each modulating differential relations uniquely, through an inexhaustible amount of possible universes: the expression of the power of the false against the representation involved in any claim to truth. Infinite expressions of the affirmation of the power of the false against the representation of a singular truth. Art is not representation but fabulation, it has no pretense to truth, nor is it the representation of a memory, a fantasy or even an imagination (‘Bergson analyzes fabulation as a visionary faculty very different to imagination’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 162)). What DG write of literature is equally true of painting: ‘One does not write with childhood memories, but by blocs of childhood that are becomings-child in the present’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 158). A haptic vision can be achieved through an infinity of ways because there is an infinity of potential becomings the writer or the artist can go through. Fabulation is the expression of such becomings. Against representation, the writer writes, the painter paints, not with memories, fantasies or imaginations, but with or as becoming-other in the present. It is impossible ‘to dissociate the becomings which literature [or painting] carries or creates from the becoming writer [or the becoming painter] which necessarily overtakes the one who writes [or paints] since it is him that invents or has experienced the becomings that he brings back to us and that it is by bringing these becomings back to us that he becomes writer [or painter]’ (Mengue, 2007, 163). The artist expresses her becomings in her medium and it is (only) in doing so that she becomes artist. In this
complex of becoming: the becoming artist of the one who expresses her becoming-other, the becoming expressed in the artwork, and eventually the becoming the viewer goes through during his aesthetic experience of the artwork, an indiscernibility between the artwork, the artist, the viewer and A Life (becoming) is established.

alien and foreign worlds, the first two paradigms of commitment to A Life

It would be hard to confuse works which either embody the paradigm of commitment to A Life *A Life in the living* or the paradigm *the living as point of view on and from A Life*, and their relation to the power of the false, in view of the aesthetic experience they give. Without any claims to truth, without representation, Bacon through the Figure renders sensory A Life or the Outside in reciprocal presupposition with the living. He gives us visions which open nature onto itself and as such onto its absolute, an infinity which perhaps initially was only ‘the impression of a fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the presentiment that this world is already ours, and those creatures, ourselves’ (Deleuze, 2005d, 35): us in the transcendental field and the transcendental field in us. On the other hand, Struth through the extra-ordinary photograph reveals the living as point of view on and from the Outside, giving us views of nature by which nature is experienced as the hallucination of an alien world. The living through the extra-ordinary photograph appears as an ensemble of foreign bodies, creatures (for example the jungle) perceived from and through the infinity of the Outside. The paradigm *A Life in the living* gives us fabulated visions of the Outside whereas the paradigm *the living as point of view on and from A Life* gives us views of the living as dispersions of the Outside. In terms of aesthetic experience, such is the extent of the expansion of, and departure from, DG’s conceptualization of art operated by the second paradigm of commitment to A Life: the paradigm *A Life in the living* gives us a foreign world entirely decentred from humans, a transcendental Outside as the world inside which we live, of which we are the creatures, and which lives inside us; and the paradigm *the living as point of view on and from A Life* gives us the world of humans as an alien world perceived from and through the Outside, an alien world experienced as an hallucination.
movement from nature to a possible universe

A haptic vision is a type of possible universe, an universe which is a territorialization on and of the absolute that A Life is. Nature hallucinated encompasses the experience of nature as the possible universe that it is. Nature hallucinated is another type of possible universe, a possible universe which has realized itself as nature and that is experienced from and through the Outside (or as hallucination). Through the modes of aesthetic experience vision and hallucination, the viewer is deterritorialized from nature and reterritorialized onto a possible universe: either onto a haptic vision or onto nature hallucinated. Both modes of aesthetic experience involve a movement from nature to a possible universe.

the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life is not medium specific

The paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life is not specific to the medium of photography. It is, like the paradigm A Life in the living which is not specific to the medium of painting, not medium specific. It does not need to be embodied by the extra-ordinary photograph like the paradigm A Life in the living does not need to be embodied by the Figure. Photography by virtue of its ontology is highly suited to serve as a medium by which to embody the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life. But there is also space for the conceptualization of how other mediums, for example sculpture, might be able to operate a cut across the Outside, capturing its dispersions, its genesis, in a view beyond the threshold of human perception. How could sculpture give the viewer a scientific or slicing eye by which he would experience the living as point of view on the Outside in the process of dispersing itself whilst simultaneously experiencing it from and through the Outside? How could sculpture give the viewer an experience of the living as the hallucination of an alien world perceived from an obscure infinity? These questions are a subset of a new set of questions or problems completely different to the ones which emerge when thinking of the capacities of different mediums to embody a commitment to A Life following the paradigm A Life in the living (or DG’s conceptualization of art). With the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life emerges a whole new set of possibilities as to how different mediums can embody a commitment to A Life.
Section 6 – The third paradigm of commitment to A Life: 
new living emerging from A Life

the world as theatre or illusion versus presence

Deleuze writes: ‘For a long time the world has been considered as a theatre, dream or illusion […] but the essence of the Baroque is neither to fall in the illusion nor to get out of it, it is to realize something in the illusion itself, or to communicate to it a spiritual presence that restores to its pieces and fragments a collective unity’ (Deleuze, 1988, 170). To ‘communicate’ a ‘presence’ to the ‘theatre, dream or illusion’ that the world is, is exactly what the first two paradigms of commitment to A Life (A Life in the living and the living as point of view on and from A Life) describe and what the artworks that embody these paradigms are concerned with and achieve. Again, in this context, ‘presence’ needs to be understood as A Life or the Outside, and the theatre or illusion that the world is as that which I have termed nature or the living.

Deleuze expresses this “communication” (‘to communicate’) of a presence to the world with two propositions: ‘to realize presence in the illusion’ or to ‘to convert the illusion in presence’ (Deleuze, 1988, 170). ‘To realize presence in the illusion’ can be said to correspond to the paradigm A Life in the living. Bacon “realizes presence in the illusion”, Bacon operates this realization through the opening of the illusion (the living) onto itself and as such onto presence (A Life), Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne is the realization and as such revelation of presence (onto-genetic condition) in the illusion (the conditioned). On the other hand, ‘to convert the illusion in presence’ can be said to correspond to the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life. Struth “converts of the illusion in presence”, his extra-ordinary photographs reveal and give the experience of the illusion (the living) as that which is perceived of presence (A Life), as that which presence is perceived as, as that which is perceived from and through presence. The living is related to the Life that it is and as such experienced as the Life that it is, and in that sense can be said to be “converted” into A Life.
The artworks which embody each of these paradigms give completely different aesthetic experiences: vision and hallucination. These paradigms are however linked in that they both, in different ways, “communicate a presence to the world” and it is as such that their respective aesthetic experiences both involve the establishment of a unity with presence, a unity with A Life: the viewer is reterritorialized onto A Life, dispersed as A Life (vision), or the viewer experiences the living from and through A Life or the Outside (hallucination).

The third paradigm of commitment to A Life is termed new nature or new living emerging from A Life. It is neither related to the realization of presence in the illusion nor to the conversion of the illusion in presence. An artwork which embodies this paradigm operates a metamorphosis of the illusion or theatre that the world is (the living or nature) into a new illusion or theatre (new living or new nature). It is concerned with what the essence of the Baroque is not: to get out of the illusion, to get out of the living or nature. To get out of the illusion that the living is does not mean to get to or attain to a unity with the Outside: this concerns the first two paradigms of commitment to A Life by which two different types of unity with the Outside are established (vision or hallucination); nor does it mean to get out of the living or illusion in movements towards death or towards a transcendent universe (Paradise for example). It means to get out of the illusion by virtue of operating the metamorphosis of the illusion which results in a new illusion, a new living or nature, a new possibility for nature.
La saison des fêtes by Pierre Huyghe, 2010
Pierre Huyghe constructed what can be termed a garden for his work *La saison des fêtes*, 2010, at the Palacio de Cristal part of the Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofia in Madrid. The garden fills a circle. Divided in twelve parts (in the manner of a pie chart) for each month of the calendar year, the circle contains plants which act as symbols for celebrations, anniversaries, festivities or rituals (for example pumpkins for Halloween, a coniferous tree for Christmas, roses for St-Valentine, etc.). The work is a ‘collection of symbols, anniversaries, dates’ and charts a ‘cycle divided by twelve months’ (Huyghe, 2010). As Huyghe says, the garden in a sense is not designed by him, it is of the illusion or theatre that the world is, in the sense of being part of the “scenario” or “script” by which the world is understood as an illusion or a theatre. The garden is designed not by Huyghe but ‘by how the year is entered by these celebrations’ (Huyghe, 2010). Huyghe in his work seems to be sensitive to a notion by which the form of the exhibition, its extent in space and time, is understood as the form of the artwork itself. Beyond the obvious relation to “gardens”, *La saison des fêtes* can be related for example to the exhibition *Jardins d’hiver*, 1974, by Marcel Broodthaers which Huyghe has, according to Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, cited as an influential figure (Christov-Bakargiev, 2004, 404). *La saison des fêtes*, like *Jardins d’hiver*, ‘played with and choreographed elements like characters in play’, both works activate ‘the exhibition space as both a theatrical space and a space of reality’, conflating a space of reality, the world, and a theatrical space, a theatre or illusion. These artworks achieve this through an engagement with formal devices such as scenarios, scripts or sets which reflect both an understanding of the world as theatre or illusion, and of us living in the world as characters in a play. The artwork/exhibition is a bloc of time and space theatricalized through the use of scenarios, scripts or sets, and inside it the viewer is a character: this constitutes a formal approach to the artwork and the exhibition (or the artwork/exhibition where both become indiscernible) which in and of itself reflects the Baroque notion of theatrum mundi, or the world as theatre.

The “scenario” of dated celebrations is not “scenarized” by Huyghe, but represents parts of the scenario by which the world is considered to be a theatre. Huyghe calls the scenario(s) inside which we live ‘fictions’: ‘Every day we move around in
fictions, which give rise to realities’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 31). What interests Huyghe in *La saison des fêtes* is ‘how you position yourself within this rhythm’ (the rhythm of time passing, of the twelve months cycle) which ‘history has colonized’ through the creation of ‘dates’ for celebrations (Huyghe, 2010). History has colonized this rhythm of time passing because ‘days have been replaced by dates’, by dates of celebrations (Huyghe, 2010). ‘These questions of festivities and ritual is again this idea of how you attach yourself within the return’ (Huyghe, 2010); one ‘attaches’ oneself to festivities, to the fictions that dates are, one becomes a character in the theatre that the world is. In *La saison des fêtes*, Huyghe engages with the ‘appearance and disappearance’ of that which returns endlessly, including ‘natural returns like the tide or like spring’ (Huyghe, 2010), as that which we ‘attach’ ourselves to. Like the tide returns, Christmas, Halloween and St-Valentine return, and we attach ourselves to them as Huyghe says like characters attach themselves to the scenarios or fictions “inside” which they live and which as such ‘give rise to [their or our] realities’, the realities of us playing characters in the illusion or theatre that the world is considered to be.

Huyghe planted in the garden of *La saison des fêtes* a Green Romantica flower, a green rose, as the ‘morphing of the traditional forms’ of the two celebrations St-Valentine and St-Patrick’s day (Huyghe, 2010). The green rose embodies the morphing of the vegetal symbols of these two celebrations: the morphing of the rose

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56 Huyghe’s work exposes a general interest in the form of the scenario or fiction. In some works, this takes the form of an interest in the literal form of the scenario or fiction, the scenario of a film or the fiction that a film is for example. The scenario or fiction is not in these works the scenario or fiction by which the world is defined as theatre or illusion (like is the list of dates of celebrations which *La saison des fêtes* embodies), they are the literal scenarios or fictions of cinema for example. In *Blanche-Neige Lucie*, 1997, *L’ellipse*, 1998, *The Third Memory*, 2000, and *No Ghost Just a Shell* (initiated in 1999), characters, real or not, go through processes by which they escape, “get out” of, the scenario or fiction inside which they were “caught” as characters, or predestined to be caught (*No Ghost Just a Shell*). To take the scenario or fiction in its literal form as it is in these works appears as a strategy of Huyghe by which to embody a metaphor of “getting out” of the scenarios or fictions by which the world is defined as theatre. In other words, the character of a film emancipates itself from the scenario or fiction of the film as metaphor for our potential emancipation from the theatre or illusion that the world is considered to be.

*La saison des fêtes* seems more interesting in that the scenario or fiction of dates of celebrations is not the fiction of a film but the fiction of the world, and as such the work need not function metaphorically but can function literally. In other words, if *La saison des fêtes* is engaged with “getting out” of the scenarios or fictions by which the world is defined as theatre, it can do so literally and not through the metaphorical use of the scenario or fiction of a film for example.
flower (St-Valentine) and the colour green (St-Patrick’s day). The Green Romantica is a new vegetal symbol for a new celebration between St-Valentine and St-Patrick’s day, a new date that adds itself to the calendar of dates (the 17th of March to coincide with the opening of the exhibition).

La saison des fêtes and the paradigm new living emerging from A Life

A constant in Huyghe’s work seems to be that it engages with the notion of theatrum mundi, that we live or ‘move around in fictions which give rise to [our] realities’, that we live in an illusion or theatre. In relation to Huyghe’s work, what is in this text termed the living or nature is the fictions we move around and the realities they give rise to.

La saison des fêtes gives us the view of a new nature: a nature where the Green Romantica serves as a symbol for a new celebration. This new nature is our nature metamorphosed, it is a new possibility for nature, a new celebration has emerged between St-Valentine and St-Patrick’s day. The new nature is a metamorphosis of the fictions we live in, appearing to hope to give rise to new realities. La saison des fêtes embodies the paradigm new living emerging from A Life. Its mode of aesthetic experience is neither vision nor hallucination but view, the artwork which embodies this third paradigm gives to experience the view of a new nature. As for the first two paradigms, the aesthetic experience of an artwork which embodies this third paradigm corresponds to a movement from nature to a possible universe. The specific type of possible universe associated with this paradigm is termed new nature. The viewer is deterritorialized from (our current) nature and reterritorialized onto a new nature, a new nature which itself is a metamorphosis of (our current) nature. La saison des fêtes presents the view of a new nature by virtue of presenting a new fiction or scenario. In the case of La saison des fêtes, the movement from nature to a possible universe, the movement from nature to a new nature, is a movement from our current fictions to a metamorphosis of these fictions.

This mode of aesthetic experience does not involve the establishment of a unity with the Outside. In terms of movement, it corresponds to a relative de- and re-territorialization through which no unity with the Outside is established. This
experience is nevertheless different from our ordinary experiences and movements, themselves relative de- and re-territorializations which always inevitably “lead us” to our actual universe, in that through this experience a possible universe is attained: a new nature, a metamorphosis of our nature (for example, the new nature where the Green Romantica serves as a symbol for a celebration on the 17th of March). The type of possible universe termed new nature is said to emerge from A Life or the Outside in that the movement that leads to it necessarily requires an absolute for its operation. This movement is described as [nature] – [A Life or the Outside] – [new nature]. No unity is established with the Outside through the aesthetic experience but nevertheless the new nature, our nature metamorphosed, emerges or results from A Life or the Outside. An artwork which embodies the paradigm new living emerging from A Life gives to experience the third quality of movement: the quality by which our ordinary experiences or movements incessantly lead us to and give us to experience a renewed nature which emerges from A Life or the Outside. This renewed nature is said to emerge from A Life or the Outside in that the creative potential that A Life is incessantly operates the (re-)actualization and (re-)virtualization of our nature, relentlessly giving rise to our nature as a renewed nature which (re-)emerges from the Outside. This quality of movement can be termed the renewing quality of movement. The artwork which embodies the third paradigm of commitment to A Life gives to experience the view of a possible metamorphosis of our nature, a new nature which is our nature metamorphosed or renewed. It embodies a commitment to A Life in that it gives to experience the renewing force and creative potential that A Life is.

The Green Romantica in La saison des fêtes is that which embodies the metamorphosis of our nature, it is because of the green rose that the work gives to see a new nature, the green rose “opens itself onto”, “blossoms into” and as such “exists within” a new nature. The movement La saison des fêtes corresponds to in terms of the metamorphosis of the fictions we live in is described as: [… – St-Valentine – St-Patrick’s day – …] – [A Life or Outside] – [… – St-Valentine – Green Romantica – St-Patrick’s day – …]. The Green Romantica (and correlative the new nature it “exists within”) relates to A Life or the Outside in that it results or emerges from A Life or the Outside. The Green Romantica does not blossom from within nature into nature, it blossoms from the Outside into a new nature. This could
in a sense be said of all flowers, all flowers blossom into the actual universe which itself is the incessant (re-)emergence of a new nature from the Outside, but the difference with the Green Romantica is that it emerges not into a new (re-)actualization of the actual universe, it emerges into a new nature that is itself a possible universe, a universe that is actual but not real.

new nature versus new earth and people to come

The paradigm of commitment to A Life new living emerging from A Life is so far the most pronounced departure from DG’s conceptualization of art. A new nature should not be confused with what DG term ‘a new earth and a people that do not yet exist’ and which art ‘calls for’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 104). A new earth and a people ‘to come’ relates to the absolute deterritorialization and the reterritorialization on the absolute (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 636). A haptic vision (for example Figure in movement), which is and gives A Life, ‘summons forth’ or calls for a new earth and a people to come (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 166). A Life, becoming, the forces of the future, art following DG’s conceptualization, calls for a new earth and a people to come because it opens us and nature to A Life, it gives us the vision and becoming that launch us towards the absolute and as such towards a future, the future of a new earth and people. However, us and nature, having become absolute and dispersed through the establishment of a unity with A Life, are inevitably eventually reterritorialized into the relative and actual universe that nature is. The new earth and people to come is consequently forever to come, because A Life will forever be this creative power which launches us and nature towards the absolute and the future.

The new nature or new living discussed in relation to the paradigm new living emerging from A Life is exactly not this new earth and people to come. A new nature is not forever to come, it is a metamorphosis of our nature of which the artwork gives a view: it “has already come”. A new nature is akin to the result of a revolution, the emergence of a new nature. But precisely as such, it loses its radicalism. As DG write of revolution: ‘But the success of a revolution resides only in itself, precisely in the vibrations, clinches, and openings that it gave to the men

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57 The expression ‘to come’ is often used to refer to a new earth and a people. For example, ‘the language of sensations […] that summons forth a people to come’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 166).
and women at the moment of its making’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 167). The ‘success of a revolution resides only in itself’ precisely because its success does not reside in that which it gives, in that which it results in: a new nature. The success of a revolution resides in the becomings and the openings these becomings allow for during the revolutionary process, and not after in the new nature the process gives. Nevertheless, a new nature embodies a commitment to A Life, like the result of a revolution embodies a commitment to revolution, since it results or emerges from it; such is the argument by which the third paradigm of commitment to A Life new living emerging from A Life is said to be a commitment to A Life, giving to experience the renewing force and creative potential that A Life is.

**commitment to pure immanence, and danger of transcendence**

The three paradigms of commitment to A Life are, and in terms of aesthetic experience correspond to, a movement from nature to a possible universe, from nature to either a haptic vision, nature hallucinated or a new nature. This movement results from the commitment to A Life, it is the consequence of the embodiment by the artwork of one of the three qualities of movement (haptic, hallucinatory or renewing). The commitment to A Life is a commitment to the pure plane of immanence that A Life is, and as such necessarily a commitment to immanence. Consequently, the movement from nature to a possible universe never describes a leap out of the pure immanence that A Life is, the movement is never from nature to a form of transcendence.

When art is movement from nature to a haptic vision (paradigm *A Life in the living*), that which is attained is not a form of transcendence but the transcendental, A Life in reciprocal presupposition with the living. Expressed in Bacon’s paintings are figures of our nature given ‘giant dimensions as if they were swollen by a life that no lived perception can attain’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 162). Nature opens itself onto A Life, and as such not onto a form of transcendence but onto itself. Nature as that which we ordinarily experience of the transcendental field or pure plane of immanence, opens itself onto the transcendental field inside which we live and which lives inside us.
Art as movement from nature (as it is ordinarily experienced through human perception) to nature experienced as a hallucination, from nature to nature hallucinated (paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life), does not either involve a form of transcendence. The hallucination, that nature is experienced from and through the Outside, involves no form of transcendence since nature is never “escaped” as if through a movement towards a transcendent exteriority from which nature is experienced (as if to experience nature from Paradise for example, or “the perspective of God on our world”). Nature as point of view from the Outside always also reciprocally presupposes nature as point of view on the Outside (from a position within nature) denying any possible form of transcendence.

When art is movement from nature to a new nature (paradigm new living from A Life), the view is not of a form of transcendence in that the new nature is a metamorphosis of our nature “through its middle”. Each of the three paradigms in a sense involves a metamorphosis of nature “through its middle”. Following the paradigm A Life in the living, through a vision, it is through its middle that nature opens itself onto itself and as such onto A Life. Following the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life, through a hallucination, nature is not per se metamorphosed but it is through its middle that the extra-ordinary photograph operates its capture (on its vertical line of genes beyond the threshold of human perception); and it is through its middle that the viewer experiences it simultaneously as point of view on and from the Outside, as if the viewer oscillates infinitely rapidly between nature and the Outside passing through the middle of nature. Following the paradigm new living emerging from A Life, nature is metamorphosed in its middle in that literally a new nature exposes a metamorphosis in the middle of nature, a new nature is our nature which embodies a change “in its middle” as it is clearly exemplified by the Green Romantica in La saison des fêtes (in the middle of St-Valentine and St-Patrick’s day). A new nature is our nature metamorphosed and as such “a future” of nature, a new possibility for nature.

Three types of universe transcendent to nature

Three types of form of transcendence, or what can be termed universes transcendent to nature, can be defined. An artwork which embodies a commitment to A Life corresponds to or gives a movement from nature to a possible universe that would by
definition (A Life being pure immanence) never lead to one of these three types of universe. The first type pretends to the Outside, not as a transcendental immanent Outside in reciprocal presupposition with nature (the transcendental field, A Life), but as a universe transcendent to nature (Paradise for example). The second type pretends to the Outside in reciprocal presupposition with nature, but by virtue of attempting to embody the Outside, to give the Outside “its own nature”, to represent or narrate the Outside as a world in itself, it makes the Outside a form arguably transcendent to nature. This type of universe results from the attempt to express the Outside as if “in and of itself”, meaning that its reciprocal presupposition or relation of immanence with nature is “lacking” (this type is further discussed below in relation to La saison des fêtes). The third type does not pretend to the Outside, nor does it pretend to nature in that it is not a metamorphosis of our nature through its middle (as is La saison des fêtes), it simply assumes itself as transcendent to our nature. This type can perhaps be described by what is commonly termed a parallel universe, a nature in parallel with our nature; it could be exemplified by the work of Charles Avery who since 2004 has developed an imaginary parallel world called The Island. Each of these three types corresponds not to the realization of ‘presence in the illusion’ (A Life in the living – haptic vision) nor to the conversion of ‘the illusion in presence’ (the living as point of view on and from A Life – nature hallucinated), but to an attempt to ‘get out of [the illusion]’, not through a metamorphosis of the illusion (new living emerging from A Life – new nature), but through a paradoxical “movement” towards a universe transcendent to nature. Each of them corresponds to a leap out of the pure plane of immanence (A Life), a “movement” which a commitment to A Life cannot encompass. They embody the attempt to get out of the illusion either by making of the Outside a universe transcendent to our nature, by making of the Outside another nature within our nature (but another nature which lacks a relation of immanence with our nature), or by making another nature outside our nature.
Huyghe talks of *La saison des fêtes* in relation to Alice from *Through the Looking-Glass* (1871) by Lewis Carroll (Huyghe, 2010). Huyghe says that his interest in creating a new celebration in-between two existing celebrations is an interest in an ‘outside’ (Huyghe, 2010), an outside of the fictions that the calendar of celebrations constitutes and by which the world is considered to be an illusion or theatre. Huyghe exemplifies this outside of fictions with the ‘unbirthday party’ Alice attends in *Through the Looking-Glass*: a celebration of every other day that is not one’s birthday (a celebration of the other 364 days). *La saison des fêtes* is through the Green Romantica what Huyghe calls the ‘negative exhibition’ of the fictions inside which we live, the negative exhibition of the fiction that the calendar of dates is, ‘a supplement of celebration’ (Huyghe, 2010).

From *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* to *Through the Looking Glass* to finally *Sylvie and Bruno* (1889), Deleuze sees a ‘progress’ (Deleuze, 1993, 35) in Carroll’s work. The progress has to do with the relationship between the ‘surface’ and the ‘world of depths’ (Deleuze, 1993, 34, 35), in other words between nature and the Outside. The progress is that increasingly, through the three books, this relationship becomes one of reciprocal presupposition, a relation immanence between nature and the Outside. In *Sylvie and Bruno*,

the previous depth has flattened itself out, and becomes a surface [the Outside] alongside the other surface [nature]. The two surfaces thus coexist, and two contiguous stories are written on them […]. Not one story within another, but one next to the other. *Sylvie and Bruno* is probably the first book to tell two stories at the same time, not one inside the other, but two contiguous stories, with passages constantly shifting from one to the other, sometimes owing to a fragment of sentence that is common to both stories […] (Deleuze, 1993, 35).

The Outside in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, Alice’s Wonderland, emphasizes ‘one story within another’, meaning a world (Wonderland) within another world (the “initial” nature Alice is in before she falls down the rabbit hole). Alice does not “constantly shift” between nature and the Wonderland, the two worlds are not contiguous, imbricated, a fragment of sentence could not be common to nature and the Wonderland. The Wonderland embodies the Outside within nature, but in a way
that the Outside is given “its own nature”, and through this embodiment the Outside remains arguably transcendent to nature. The “problem” is that the reciprocal presupposition between the Wonderland and nature is not expressed. *Sylvie and Bruno* operates a progress because the reciprocal presupposition between the two stories, between the two worlds, is more explicitly expressed. *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* describes a single movement from nature to an arguably transcendent Outside and back to nature. In that sense, Alice falling down the rabbit hole could be accused to arguably be a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that *A Life* is. *Sylvie and Bruno* explicitly expresses a relation of immanence between nature, i.e. the Victorian era of the narrator, and the Outside, i.e. Fairyland, through direct imbrications of the two (a sentence or a song can simultaneously pertain to both nature and the Outside) and through ‘passages constantly shifting from one to the other’: nature – Outside – nature – Outside – … . The Outside repeatedly actualizes itself in nature (as when the narrator first encounters Bruno, a fairy, in nature: ‘Those visions are destined to be linked with my waking life!’ ) and nature continuously falls back into the Outside (*Sylvie and Bruno* keep on disappearing back into the Outside). *Sylvie and Bruno* is not one story within another (*Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*), it is a single story which develops through an imbrication of nature and the Outside, explicitly expressing a relation of immanence between the two.

**transcendence or reciprocal presupposition in *La saison des fêtes***

A way by which to imbue a form of transcendence to *La saison des fêtes* is to interpret the Green Romantica as embodying the Outside in the same manner that Alice’s Wonderland embodies the Outside. It is to interpret the work as creating a new fiction (a new date in the middle of the calendar of dates) which hopes to give rise to the reality of a yearly movement from nature to the Outside, but where the Outside is arguably transcendent to nature. It is as if Huyghe wanted to give rise to the reality of a yearly absolute deterritorialization towards and onto the Outside, but

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58 That Alice’s Wonderland is arguably transcendent to nature is proper to my analysis and not to Deleuze’s. It seems however obvious that there is a sense in which the ‘progress’ that Deleuze sees in *Sylvie and Bruno* from *Alice in Wonderland* holds within itself the argument that there is a lack of reciprocal presupposition or relation of immanence between the Wonderland and nature (Alice’s nature), and as such that there arguably is a relation of transcendence between the two (Deleuze, 1993, 34-35).
as opposed to open nature onto itself and as such onto the absolute that the Outside is, Huyghe “opens” nature onto another world, a “Wonderland” arguably transcendent to nature.

**not yearly cyclical movement but a timeless linear movement**

It seems more appropriate and interesting however to interpret *La saison des fêtes* as being closer to *Sylvie and Bruno* than to *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. That the new nature is the metamorphosis of nature through its middle can be imaged as such: nature (the ‘surface’) tears itself open onto the Outside (the ‘world of depths’) simultaneously as the Outside “re-patches” the tear with its dispersion. New dispersions of the Outside emerge in the middle of nature, composing a new nature. The new nature does not give a vision of the Outside, but from the Outside something new has emerged, corroborating a metamorphosis of nature. Nature tears itself open in the middle of the calendar of celebrations, simultaneously as the Outside “re-patches” the tear with its dispersion, with the Green Romantica. This is to interpret the Green Romantica not as an embodiment of the Outside, but as an actualization of the Outside in nature, an emergence from the Outside, constituting a new nature. *La saison des fêtes* not as another story or world embodied by the Green Romantica within the story that nature is, but the single story of nature which incessantly tears itself open onto the Outside simultaneously as the Outside “re-patches” it with new surfaces, continuously giving rise to a new nature. Not the yearly cyclical movement from nature to an arguably transcendent Outside, but the timeless linear movement from nature to a new nature. The Green Romantica does not embody the Outside, it (and the new nature it “blossoms into”) emerges from it.

The new nature is never a “Wonderland”, but it is as if a “Wonderland” emerges in the middle of nature, that which emerges in nature (the Green Romantica for example) appears to come from a Wonderland: it is new, and as such appears as a strange foreign creature. A new nature is not a transcendent universe of strange creatures, it is the emergence or surfacing of new, unpredictable forms or creatures in the middle of our nature, to a similar effect as when in (the middle of) our nature are discovered new species that none could have preconceived.
the alien worlds art gives us

Art gives to experience possible universes that appear to varying degrees alien. However alien these possible universes appear to be, art never gives us a universe transcendent to nature by which the commitment to A Life would correspond to a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. Art, depending on which paradigm of commitment to A Life it embodies, gives us three types of possible universe. The haptic vision is the vision of the alien world that our world absolutely decentred from humans is, a vision of the Outside in reciprocal presupposition with our world. Nature hallucinated is our world experienced from and through the Outside and consequently experienced as the hallucination of a world that appears alien. The new nature is formed through the emergence in our world of new forms which as new necessarily appear alien.

co-creation

The paradigm new living emerging from A Life finds a commonality with the paradigm A Life in the living in that they both operate in co-creation with A Life. A haptic vision is a composition of chaos, a composed chaos or chaosmos which gives the vision of A Life in the living. A new nature is also a composition of chaos only it is not one which gives the vision of A Life in the living, it gives a view of a new nature or new living which emerges from A Life. Following the paradigm A Life in the living, the composition of chaos or co-creation has the purpose of rendering A Life sensory, leading the viewer to the absolute that A Life is. Following the paradigm new living emerging from A Life, the composition of chaos or co-creation has the purpose of operating metamorphoses in the middle of nature, or in other words of “re-patching” nature torn open onto the Outside with new surfaces, leading the viewer to a new nature. These two paradigms in that sense oppose themselves to the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life in that the latter does not operate in co-creation with A Life. The extra-ordinary photograph does not compose chaos, it cuts across the chaosmos (or the vertical line of genesis of the living), it captures chaos composing itself. An artwork which embodies the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life does not construct or give consistency to a possible universe because its purpose is to reveal nature as a possible universe (only one which “has realized itself” as the materiality of the universe). This artwork is not “less creative” because it does not operate in co-creation with A Life, it needs
exactly not to operate in co-creation with A Life if it is to achieve its purpose (the same could be said of science).
Section 7 – Three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life

Three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life are conceptualized, they are termed: human-actual, imaginary-transcendent and chaotic-noise. These three paradigms threaten the embodiment of a commitment to A Life because although they fail such commitment, and as such fail A Life, they give the illusion that they embody such commitment, they give the illusion of A Life. Whereas a commitment to A Life results in a movement from nature to a possible universe, an illusion of commitment to A Life results in a “movement” which leads nowhere. The paradigm human-actual leads nowhere in that it (its corresponding “movement”) remains in nature; the paradigm imaginary-transcendent leads nowhere in that it gives to experience, or can be said to launch itself towards, a universe transcendent to the pure plane of immanence that A Life is; and the paradigm chaotic-noise leads nowhere in that it plunges towards death.

The possible as aesthetic category and nature as suffocation

The possible is for DG an ‘aesthetic category’, it is that which art gives: ‘the possible as aesthetic category (“the possible or I shall suffocate”)’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 168). DG write “[…] or I shall suffocate”, because nature is suffocation, it is suffocating. For DG, art “remediates” the suffocation that nature or the living is, the vision of A Life in the living expressed as a possible universe (Bacon’s Figures for example) is brought by, is and gives a breath of air: ‘a breath of air from chaos that brings us the vision’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 204). The suffocation of nature is remediated by the vision, a possible universe which expresses nature opened onto itself and as such onto the Outside, a breath of air: ‘When Kierkegaard’s hero demands “the possible, the possible or I shall suffocate,” when James longs for the “oxygen of possibility,” they are only invoking the a priori Other’ (Deleuze, 2004, 356-357).

The two new paradigms (the living as point of view on and from A Life and new living emerging from A Life) by which DG’s conceptualization of art is expanded
remain faithful to a commitment to A Life, and also to the possible. The embodiment of each of the three paradigms of commitment to A Life results in a movement from nature to a possible universe. The paradigm *the living as point of view on and from A Life* can be said to remediate the suffocation that nature is not by giving the vision of A Life, but by giving an experience of nature from and through A Life, and consequently involving a unity with A Life or the Outside. Nature is perceived from and through the Outside, “from and through a breath of air”. The paradigm *new living emerging from A Life* can be said to remediate the suffocation of nature in the sense that nature tears itself open and is “re-patched” with new dispersions of the Outside, a new possible nature, a new possibility for nature has emerged (in a strict sense however, it cannot be said to give a ‘breath of air from chaos’ since no unity with A Life or the Outside is established). On the other hand, each paradigm of illusion of commitment to A Life fails A Life and as such the possible, each fails to remediate the suffocation that nature is.

‘Man imprisons Life’ Deleuze has said in *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze* (Boutang, 2004). It is in and by ‘man and his world’\(^59\) that A Life is imprisoned. Man cannot trust A Life to launch man and his world towards new possibilities, as if man was to sit back and watch himself and his world being captured by an absolute movement and made to go through an infinity of becomings as if launched towards a pre-determined destiny. But this is not because man cannot trust A Life, it is because man cannot trust himself.

Deleuze explains, through his writings on Nietzsche, that man and his world has for essence the imprisonment of A Life by the very fact of being an actualization of A Life (Deleuze, 2007, 192). In Nietzschean terms, man and his world are the ‘becoming reactive’ of the reciprocally presupposing ‘active forces’ that A Life or the virtual is, and it is this becoming reactive which forms the essence of man (Deleuze, 2007, 192). The actualization of the virtual (the actualization of A Life) is the *becoming reactive of active forces* (from A Life to man and his world), and the virtualization of the actual is the *becoming active of reactive forces* (from man and his world to A Life). Man and his world, here termed the living or nature, are *by*  

\(^{59}\) ‘Man and his world’ is an expression used by Deleuze in his writings on Nietzsche, it needs to be understood as what has been termed the living or nature (Deleuze, 2007, 192).
essence reactive and it is as such that man is said to imprison A Life. Man and his world are by essence the becoming reactive of A Life, A Life which is itself active, active forces.

the psychology of the cosmos and of man

There is another inseparable sense by which man and his world needs to be understood as that which imprisons A Life. It is that, in a sense, this “ontological” condition by which man and his world are by essence reactive “informs or forms” the values of man (and as such his morals, beliefs, institutions, etc.) with a ’psychological’ equivalent: nihilism (Deleuze, 2005c, 26). ‘According to Nietzsche, the analysis of nihilism is the object of psychology, understood also as a psychology of the cosmos’60 (Deleuze, 2005c, 26). Nihilism is a psychology of the cosmos in the sense that A Life, by actualizing itself as man and his world, “annihilates” itself: the active forces that it is become reactive. Evidently this is not a “bad” condition per se, it is the condition by which man and his world come into existence and this “annihilation” (or actualization, from A Life to the living) is reciprocally presupposed by a “vitalization or affirmation” (or virtualization, from the living to A Life). But nihilism is also the ‘object of psychology’ of man, and not just of the cosmos or of the genesis that A Life is. Man embodies in his values a becoming reactive, a nihilism: for example, the figure of Christ epitomizes the becoming reactive of man by ‘valoriz[ing] only the sick and desolate aspects of life’, by ‘judging life, and universalizing the condemnation of life’ in the name of divine values (Deleuze, 2005c, 44, 45). After the ‘death of God’, the ‘Higher Men’ replace these divine values with human values only to find new ways to annihilate Life: Higher Men ‘are “failed”, “wasted”, and know not how to laugh, to play, to dance’, they do not know the Life which they annihilate, they do not know how to embrace A Life, to unite with A Life (Deleuze, 2005c, 46).

Art is man’s “fight” against himself and his world, for A Life and for himself and his world. Art fights against the psychology of the cosmos and of man. The task of art for DG is to express A Life in the living, to express the active forces in reciprocal presupposition with the reactive forces that man and his world are. For DG, art is defined by such an expression of active forces and it is through such an expression

60 “cosmos” needs to be understood as A Life, as the genesis that A Life is.
that A Life is liberated from where it is imprisoned and given to us, given to us as visions and becomings through which we establish a unity with A Life.

_to resist the present_

When DG write that ‘we lack resistance to the present’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 104), they mean that we lack resistance to the prisons inside which man and his world imprison, constrain, obliterate A Life, and that it is as such that we suffocate. To resist the present through art is for DG to open the present (the living, nature, or man and his world) onto itself and as such onto A Life. It is to restore to nature its absoluteness, through the expression of the visions and becomings by which man, on rare occasions, (re-)finds the Life he annihilates by essence. In relation to each of the four paradigms of commitment to A Life (including the fourth paradigm to live A Life conceptualized in the following section), _to resist the present is to give a movement from nature to a possible universe_, a movement which remediates the suffocation that nature is. Each of the four paradigms of commitment to A Life is a _paradigm of resistance_, a paradigm of resistance to man and his world, but _for_ man and his world, and _for_ A Life.

_three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life_

_paradigm human-actual_

An artwork which embodies the paradigm _human-actual_ leads nowhere in that its “movement” remains in the actual universe, in the suffocation that nature is. The paradigm _human-actual_ describes our ordinary experiences or relative movements. This paradigm of illusion of commitment to A Life reduces A Life to the living, it reduces the extent of A Life to nature, it reduces the absolute to the relative, the infinite to the finite. The artworks which embody this paradigm are filled with perceptions or figurations, affections, opinions, cliché, appropriation, journalism, in sum they represent, comment on, discuss, man and his world.

In a sense, the paradigm _human-actual_ does not pretend to A Life or to a commitment to A Life in that either: it denies the possibility to express, to give to experience or to establish a unity with A Life; or it does not consider A Life at all, it ignores A Life, or it takes it to be, and as such reduces it to, the living or the lived.
To use an example not directly related to art, we might be under the illusion that communication, that our new means of mobile and networked communications remediate the suffocation that nature is. But man’s incessant communications, his world of the ceaseless exchange of clichés, photographs, perceptions, affections, opinions and ready-made concepts provides none of the creation, vision and becoming that art as the expression of A Life in the living involves. Perceptions, affections and opinions are not A Life, they are that which A Life needs to be liberated from. ‘We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 104).
Gerhard Richter’s “blurred photograph” paintings, as exemplified by Mrs Niepenberg, follow the paradigm human-actual. Painted from a photograph\(^{61}\), Mrs Niepenberg operates a negation of painting’s capacity to express and give visions of A Life by equating its potential to that of the photograph: Richter seems to affirm that painting cannot show or give to experience anything beyond that which photography can. Simultaneously, Mrs Niepenberg operates a second negation, a negation of our ordinary human perceptions presumed to correlate to that which the photograph gives to see: Richter appears to indicate by “further” blurring the photograph that our ordinary perceptions are already blurred with regards to ‘a reality that we can neither see nor describe’ (Richter, 1982, 121).\(^{62}\) Man and his world (and the potentiality of painting) is addressed through a negative critique which cannot give a movement from nature to a possible universe. If the incapacity to, or supposed impossibility of, operating a movement from nature to a possible universe can be termed suffocation, Mrs Niepenberg emphasizes and has for subject suffocation. It seems that the only manner by which to see the work in a positive light is to assert that it functions as a denunciation of the failure of the paradigm human-actual, but it as such remains a self-defeating activity: to paint to assert the failure of painting, to make “art”, what pretends to be art, to assert the incapacity of art to attain to the possible. Mrs Niepenberg embodies perception, cliché, appropriation and journalism to, at best, operate a negative critique of man and his world. As negation, it opposes itself to the affirmation that a commitment to A Life is. Richter’s negations of painting and of human perception/photography oppose themselves to the affirmative embodiments of a commitment to A Life through painting (the Figure, paradigm A Life in the living) or through photography (the extra-ordinary photograph, paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life), both of which involve the establishment of a unity with A Life.

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\(^{61}\) One of the photograph in Atlas Sheet: 10, 1962; from the ‘Atlas collection - the newspaper clippings, photos and sketches which are the source material for much of Richter's work’ (Richter, 2010).

\(^{62}\) Beyond this double negation, Richter finds a positivity in his ‘abstract pictures’ (or abstract paintings) which ‘make visible a reality that we can neither see nor describe, but whose existence we can postulate’ (Richter, 1982, 121).
paradigm imaginary-transcendent

An artwork which embodies the paradigm *imaginary-transcendent* leads nowhere in that its “movement” is of a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is, it leads to a transcendent universe. As previously discussed, there are at least three types of universe transcendent to nature: a transcendent outside (a Paradise), an embodiment of the Outside which lacks reciprocal presupposition with nature and is as such arguably transcendent to nature (Alice’s Wonderland), or another nature outside our nature (Charles Avery’s *The Island*). This paradigm leads nowhere in that it involves “a kind of” de- and re-territorialization, but it is an impossible deteritorialization outside the pure plane of immanence and a reterritorialization on a *fictive*, imagined or fantasized and transcendent universe. It is “a kind of” de- and re-territorialization but one which does not involve movement, since movement never launches itself outside the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. Evidently, movement, and as such A Life as the absolute component of movement, never launches itself outside itself (A Life never launches itself outside A Life, in other words the pure plane of immanence does not and cannot escape or transcend itself).

projection-transcendent-fiction versus becoming-transcendental-fabulation

The paradigm *imaginary-transcendent* corresponds to *fiction* and as such opposes itself to *fabulation*, ‘creative fabulation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161), a concept which Deleuze appropriates from Bergson. Fiction can be conceptualized (through an articulation proper to this text and not to Deleuze) as an umbrella term with different interpretations which all oppose themselves to fabulation: fiction can be a ‘fantasy’, an “imagination”, a ‘memory’, and it involves a “projection of the self”63 (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161, Deleuze, 1993, 13). The universe given to experience by fiction can be said to be created through, and to involve a mode of aesthetic experience described as, a *projection* of the self onto a transcendent universe. In opposition, the universe given to experience by fabulation is created through, and involves a mode of aesthetic experience described as, a *becoming* of the self. The universe given to experience by fabulation is not a *transcendent* universe but an expression of the *transcendental*, i.e. becoming. Projection can be said to be

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63 ‘Creative fabulation has nothing to do with a memory, however amplified, or with a fantasy’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161); ‘[…] fabulation, the fabulating function, neither consist in imagining nor in projecting a self’ (Deleuze, 1993, 13).
the mode of operation of fiction. Projection is both the mode through which fictions are created, and the mode of aesthetic experience fictions correspond to, in other words fictions induce the viewer to project herself. On the other hand, becoming is the mode of operation of fabulation. Becoming is the mode through which fabulations are created, and fabulations give to the viewer becomings. Projection opposes itself to becoming, and correlatively fiction opposes itself to fabulation, and the transcendent opposes itself to the transcendental. The triad projection-transcendent-fiction opposes itself to the triad becoming-transcendental-fabulation.

to create through becoming, not through projection

Projection corresponds to an illusion of commitment to A Life in that it is the operation of a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. And since A Life never launches itself outside itself, since the pure plane of immanence is pure and allows for no transcendence, projection cannot be a commitment to A Life. Becoming on the other hand is a mode of operation, or a mode of creation and of aesthetic experience, by which the artist creates not through his projections (imaginations, fantasies, memories\textsuperscript{64}) but through his becomings. The artist paints or the writer writes through his becomings, and it is these becomings which the painting or the novel expresses. The artist paints or the writer writes the visions he attains to through his becomings, and not the fictions he “attains to” through his imaginations or fantasies:

He [the artist, the novelist] has seen in life something too great and also too unbearable, and the mutual embrace of life with that which threatens it, in such a way that the corner of nature he perceives, or the neighborhoods of the town along with their characters, attain to a vision that composes through them the percepts of that life, of that moment, shattering lived perceptions into a sort of cubism, a sort of simultaneism, of harsh or crepuscular purple or blue light, which have no other object or subject than themselves (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161-162).

\textsuperscript{64} A memory can be associated to projection, it is a projection on the past. Memory opposes itself to becoming. For example a memory of being a child in the past opposes itself to a becoming-child in the present. Deleuze mentions many times, in relation to literature, how creation has nothing to do ‘our small private lives’, with the memories of our private pasts, but with becoming-other in the present, with A Life (Boutang, 2004).
In painting, fiction opposes itself to fabulation like abstraction (for example geometrical abstraction) opposes itself to haptic vision or the Figure. Abstraction as projection onto a transcendent universe opposes itself to the Figure as becoming which is and expresses the transcendental. Fiction (imagination, fantasy) sets itself in diametrical opposition with the real, whereas fabulation ‘goes beyond the real and the fictive’ by raising itself to ‘visions’, ‘becoming or powers’ (Deleuze, 1985, 196, Deleuze, 1993, 13). Fabulation is the function by which A Life in the living is expressed, it results in a vision/becoming, in characters or landscapes that are ‘swollen by a life that no lived perception can attain to’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 162). Fabulation is the affirmation of the power of the false that goes beyond the real and the fictive, it is the power of the false against representation. Representation is a mode proper to fiction: fiction represents imagination or fantasies, it represents transcendent universes. In opposition fabulation expresses becomings, it expresses the transcendental. Whereas fiction creates representative narrations of giant monsters living in transcendent universes (for example Gods in Paradise or Charles Avery’s Aleph Null in The Island), ‘fabulation creates visions that falsify received truths by rendering visible the intolerable [A Life], thereby critiquing the present, while those same visions loom like giant mythic figures of yet to be explored possibilities’ (Bogue, 2006, 220). These expressive visions in opposition to representative narrations are ‘dynamic but unspecified in their narrative possibilities, and hence temporal forces that may generate stories, but not themselves properly narrative elements’ (Bogue, 2006, 220). Terms can be added to the triads opposed above: projection-transcendent-fiction-representation-narration opposes itself to becoming-transcendental-fabulation-expression-vision.

The universes that fabulation creates and gives to experience are, in relation to painting, the possible universes that haptic visions or Figures are. Haptic vision is the type of possible universe corresponding to the paradigm A Life in the living, and as fabulation, it opposes itself to fiction. But it is also the two other types of possible universe, nature hallucinated (paradigm the living as point of view on and from A

65 ‘Powers’ is translated from French: “puissances”.
Life) and new nature (paradigm new living emerging from A Life), that oppose themselves to fiction. Nature hallucinated, as nature, is necessarily not a fiction, and it involves no projection outside the pure plane of immanence that A Life is, on the contrary it is nature experienced from and through A Life. A new nature is perhaps closer to fiction, for example La saison des fêtes as “fiction of a metamorphosis of nature”. But the mode of creation of a new nature is not through projection, it is not through a leap out of the pure plane of immanence that A Life is. A new nature is created through A Life, through becoming, through a becoming which results in and opens itself onto a metamorphosis of our nature. A new nature, our nature torn open onto the Outside and simultaneously “re-patched” with new dispersions of the Outside (La saison des fêtes), opposes itself to a fantasy or imagination of a transcendent universe which is created through projection and projected onto (Paradise, Charles Avery’s The Island). La saison des fêtes evidently presents a nature that is very different to Charles Avery’s The Island, the former involves a metamorphosis of nature and as such a becoming of the pure plane of immanence whilst the latter involves an impossible leap or projection out of this plane.

fiction and suffocation

Through fiction, suffocation is perhaps remediated but through an illusion, through the illusion of a projection of the self onto a transcendent universe. Through fiction, nature is left unaffected by the projection, whereas through a commitment to A Life and as such through a movement from nature to a possible universe, nature is either: opened onto itself and as such onto A Life, experienced as a possible universe and as a hallucination, or made to go through a becoming by which it metamorphoses itself. Fiction, and projection as its mode of creation and aesthetic experience, transcends the pure plane of immanence and as such leaves this plane unaffected (correspondingly leaving nature unaffected, nature being that which we ordinarily experience of the pure plane of immanence). The remediation of suffocation is an illusion since nature is left as it is, unaffected. For example, for the ones who believe in the fiction of the bible and the transcendent universe it narrates (Paradise), suffocation is remediated through the illusion of a projection onto a form of transcendence (Paradise, God, etc.) until the afterlife when the projection can “realize” itself (“reaching Paradise, reaching God, etc.”). They believe in a fantasized or imagined life that is transcendent to the living and only attainable after
life. Surely the projection of the self onto a transcendent universe involves becomings of the self, but becomings which deny life, becomings which paradoxically deny A Life and as such themselves (becoming = A Life) until after life. These believers are opposed to the ones who believe in life and aim to go through becomings remediating the suffocation that nature is within life, embracing A Life within life. The ones who aim to go through becomings and who believe in Life as affirmation of the power of the false critiquing any form of truth oppose themselves to the ones who project themselves onto, believe in and affirm as truth a fantasized or imagined life.

The conceptualization of the paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life imaginary-transcendent and chaotic-noise relate tightly to Deleuze’s discussion of respectively ‘abstract painting’ and ‘abstract expressionism or art informel’ in Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (Deleuze, 2002, 96-102, 110-111).
On White II by Wassily Kandinsky, 1923

abstract painting codifies A Life

The “problem” of abstract painting according to Deleuze66 is that it takes the analogical, the ‘analogue flux’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110), A Life itself, as its object and in doing so separates A Life from the living or the lived in reciprocal presupposition with it, making of A Life a form of transcendence. Abstract painting pretends to the Outside, but through its engagement with the medium, it separates the Outside, the transcendental field or the pure plane of immanence from nature, “breaking” the reciprocal presupposition between the two. Abstract painting ‘proceeds by code and program: it implies operations of homogenization and binarization that are constitutive of a code’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110). The code functions as a digital language which opposes itself to the analogical language that serves to express A Life in reciprocal presupposition with the living as exemplified by Bacon’s use of the medium of painting. The paintings of Mondrian or even some works by

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66 In the specific context of his conceptualization of sensation in relation to and through Bacon’s work.
Kandinsky proceed by code, their paintings are like languages of binarized code or collection of pictorial shapes “aimed” at codifying the analogical flux or A Life which it takes as its object. It is as if these painters attempt to create a pictorial syntax to “phrase” A Life outside its reciprocal presupposition with nature. Their digital or codified languages should not be confused with analogical language: through an ‘intrinsically pictorial code’ they digitally attempt to express the analogical (Deleuze, 2002, 110). The notion of a digital or codified language to express A Life describes well the purpose of Kandinsky’s chapter on ‘The Language of Form and Colour’ in Concerning the Spiritual in Art (Kandinsky and Sadler, 1977): to articulate a pictorial code, a ‘language of form and colour’, to attempt the expression of the soul of nature and humanity, or, as Kandinsky terms it, the innerer Klang. Since the code results from operations of homogenization and binarization (for example Kandinsky’s ‘antitheses’ in ‘The Language of Form and Colour’ (Kandinsky and Sadler, 1977)), the code opposes itself to the analogical. What could be termed the “digital expression of the analogical” is ‘paradoxical’ and ‘a status that nears the impossible’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110). Through abstract painting, if A Life is said to be captured, it is captured through a code and not analogically, the capture is by codification and not by modulation of differential relations, in other words ‘the analogy passes by a code instead of passing by a diagram’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110). There certainly are rhythms in Mondrian and Kandinsky, but these exist through a code, a codified or digital rhythm which not only codifies A Life but also loses the reciprocal presupposition between A Life and nature. Their paintings do not include the constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is. Bacon expresses the transcendental in reciprocal presupposition with nature whilst Mondrian and Kandinsky present codified universes transcendent to nature. Abstract painting, by

DG associate Kandinsky to that which is characteristic, according to them, of abstract expressionism, or art informel: the ‘nomadic motif’ or nomadic line also present in Pollock (footnote 35) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 624). This is perhaps true of early works like Fugue, 1914, but latter works, for example On White II, 1923, exemplify a shift in Kandinsky’s work which seems to, by then, proceed by code: Kandinsky’s “motifs” become that of abstraction of clear and distinct pictorial shapes, if not only of geometrical shapes.

Originally published in 1911 in German as Über das Geistige in der Kunst.

‘innerer Klang’ can be translated from German as “inner sound”. This quote is from the Translator’s Introduction p. xiii (Kandinsky and Sadler, 1977). The English translation was originally published by Constable and Company Limited in 1914 as The Art of Spiritual Harmony.
taking A Life as an object in separation to the living, remains a mode of creation and a mode of aesthetic experience linked to projection and the transcendent, to the representations of imaginations of A Life, in opposition to becoming and the transcendental, to expressions of A Life. The paradigm of illusion of commitment to A Life imaginary-transcendent threatens the embodiment of a commitment to A Life because although it fails such commitment and as such fails A Life, it gives the illusion that it embodies such commitment and gives the illusion of A Life.

**paradigm chaotic-noise**

The paradigm chaotic-noise is the third paradigm of illusion of commitment to A Life. Abstract expressionism or art informel (Jackson Pollock for example (Deleuze, 2002, 99-102)) in opposition to abstract painting does not codify the analogical flux but leaves it as such, falling to make it pass through and re-emerge from the diagram to construct to the Figure and as such express A Life in the living. Pollock attains to ‘the secret of the gothic line’ (Deleuze, 2002, 101), the ‘line without contour’ of abstract expressionism (Deleuze, 2002, 102), the same line which Bacon uses to compose the Figure. In *Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux*, Pollock is exemplary for having attained to this line characteristic of ‘nomad art’ which DG praise (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 624). However, discussed in the context of the analysis of Bacon’s work in *Bacon. Logique de la sensation*, in Pollock’s work it is ‘as if the diagram was directed towards itself, instead of serving as a means. It no longer goes beyond itself through a code [as in abstract painting], but dissolves itself into a scrambling’ (Deleuze, 2002, 110-111). The line without contour, and Pollock’s work, expresses the analogical flux and as such A Life, but A Life is expressed as if “in and of itself”, lacking a reciprocal presupposition with the living. This expression results in a ‘painting-catastrophe: […] sensation is attained, but remains in an irremediably confused state’ (Deleuze, 2002, 102). And what is a sensation irremediably confused if not chaos? It is at least chaotic, a rhythm that nears noise. Chaos is necessarily composed, Pollock composes chaos, but the Figure fails to emerge, the composition is a “‘mess’”: ‘so much caution is needed to prevent
the plane of consistency from becoming a pure plane of abolition or death.\textsuperscript{70} (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 330-331). An artwork which embodies the paradigm \textit{chaotic-noise} is and leads to a plane of abolition or death, it leads to and is a mess, a catastrophe, a confusion, and it is in that sense that it leads nowhere.

\textit{Abstract Painting} from Gerhard Richter, 1987

\textsuperscript{70} The plane of consistency refers to the virtual, A Life, in opposition to, yet in reciprocal presupposition with, the actual, the living or the plane of organization.
The paradigm \textit{chaotic-noise} can be exemplified by Richter’s ‘abstract pictures’\textsuperscript{71}. As previously mentioned, for Richter, his abstract pictures ‘make visible a reality that we can neither see nor describe, but whose existence we can postulate’ (Richter, 1982, 121). In \textit{Abstract Painting}, 1987, chaos is necessarily composed, but since the Figure fails to emerge, the painting and as such this ‘reality that we can neither see nor describe’ loses its relation of reciprocal presupposition with nature. Consequently, not only does the painting is a mess which nears chaos, it also arguably makes of A Life a form of transcendence. By lacking an explicitly expressed relation of immanence with nature, the catastrophes Richter’s abstract pictures give to experience arguably remain as transcendent as the codifications of A Life that abstract painting operates. Whereas the paradigm \textit{imaginary-transcendent} is an attempt to remediate the suffocation that nature is by launching itself towards a transcendent universe, the paradigm \textit{chaotic-noise} is more appropriately described as attempting such remediation by plunging towards chaos. To follow the paradigm \textit{chaotic-noise} is to consider chaos as if paradoxically \textit{in itself}, and not as intrinsically linked to, and inseparable from, A Life or the chaosmos. The paradigm \textit{chaotic-noise}, like the paradigm \textit{imaginary-transcendent}, fails the “tension”\textsuperscript{72} (Deleuze, 2002, 102), in other words it fails to express the reciprocal presupposition or relation of territoriality between nature and A Life. The paradigm \textit{imaginary-transcendent} neutralizes the tension because it launches itself towards a universe transcendent to nature, a universe detached from, lacking tension with, nature. The paradigm \textit{chaotic-noise} neutralizes the tension because it launches itself towards death, a chaos \textit{in itself} where all tension disappears.

\begin{quote}
\textit{passage through chaos and the three types of possible universe}
\end{quote}

Art never simply leads to chaos: art involves a \textit{passage through} chaos in the movement from nature to a possible universe. But this passage through chaos always correlates to a genesis, to the genesis of a possible universe which the passage or movement through chaos leads to and opens itself onto: the genesis of the Figure

\textsuperscript{71} ‘Abstract pictures’ is an expression used by Richter to refer to his abstract “paintings” (Richter, 1982, 121). Paintings titled \textit{Abstraktes Bild} are on Richter’s own “online catalogue raisonné” translated as \textit{Abstract Painting} as per \textit{Abstract Painting}, 1987, above (Richter, 2010).

\textsuperscript{72} ‘Kandinsky defined abstract painting by “tension”; but according to Bacon, tension, is what abstract painting lacks the most’ (Deleuze, 2002, 102).
itself composition of chaos, expression of A Life, expression of the genesis that nature is (haptic vision); nature as (vertical line of) genesis, nature as possible universe in the process of realizing itself, nature hallucinated from and through the Outside or A Life, as it is experienced through the extra-ordinary photograph (nature hallucinated); the genesis involved in our nature being metamorphosed into a new nature, a new living emerging from the Outside or A Life (new nature).

**table: the three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life**

The following table charts the three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life. Each paradigm is described through that which it leads to (in different ways nowhere), its mode of aesthetic experience, that which it gives to experience and its corresponding “movement” or illusion of movement from nature to a possible universe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>paradigm of illusion of commitment to A Life</th>
<th>leads nowhere in that from nature it leads to …</th>
<th>mode of aesthetic experience</th>
<th>gives to experience</th>
<th>corresponding “movement” or illusion of movement from nature to a possible universe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>human-actual</em></td>
<td>nature or the living</td>
<td>suffocation</td>
<td>the living or the lived: perceptions, figurations, affections, opinions, cliché, appropriation, journalism, etc.</td>
<td>reduced to relative actual movements, i.e. no movement towards the possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>imaginary-transcendent</em></td>
<td>transcendent universe</td>
<td>projection</td>
<td>an imagination or a fantasy, or a memory, through a form of representation</td>
<td>impossible “movement” of a leap out of the pure plane of immanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>chaotic-noise</em></td>
<td>chaos (chaos thought of as in itself, having lost its intrinsic relationship to A Life or the chaomos)</td>
<td>chaos (thought of as in itself)</td>
<td>abolition, a mess, a catastrophe, confusion, death, a rhythm that is or nears noise, etc.</td>
<td>a paradoxical “movement” by which movement stops or dies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life
Section 8 – The fourth paradigm of commitment to A Life: to live A Life

This section conceptualizes the paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life, the third and last level of expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art, through an engagement with the following works by Pierre Huyghe, Francis Alÿs and Peter Doig:

A Journey That Wasn’t by Pierre Huyghe, 2005

A Journey That Wasn’t, 2005, by Huyghe:

On February 9th, 2005, seven artists and ten crewmembers set sail from the Port of Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, the southeast point of Argentina. Their journey centered on a search for an unknown island and an encounter with a unique solitary creature that was rumored to live only on the shores of an unnamed island somewhere at the height of the Polar Antarctic Circle (Public Art Fund, 2005).
When Faith Moves Mountains, 2002, by Alýs:

On April 11th, 2002, five hundred volunteers were supplied with shovels and asked to form a single line at the foot of a giant sand dune in Ventanilla, an area outside Lima. This human comb pushed a certain quantity of sand a certain distance, thereby moving a sixteen-hundred-foot-long sand dune about four inches from its original position (Alýs, 2002).
Untitled (Ping Pong), 2006-2008, and Paragon, 2006, by Doig:

Untitled (Ping Pong) by Peter Doig, 2006-2008

Paragon by Peter Doig, 2006
new problem: after the nature of movement, the performance of movement; to live the living and to live A Life

These works do not embody any of the first three paradigms of commitment to A Life, A Life in the living, the living as point of view on and from A Life or new living emerging from A Life, and yet they engage with A Life, with the absolute component of movement. They are not however concerned with the nature of movement, they are not concerned with one of the three qualities of movement. To embody a commitment to A Life through a concern with the nature of movement is to embody and as such give to experience one of the three qualities of movement, qualities which are not ordinarily experienced: the quality by which movement always necessarily is, and opens its relative component onto, the absolute that A Life is (haptic quality); the quality of movement by which movement is simultaneously absolute and relative, by which our ordinary perceptions (perceptions of the relative component of movement, of the living or nature) are that which we experience of the absolute (of the absolute component of movement or A Life) according to our relative thresholds of perception, whilst these perceptions are experienced from and through the absolute (hallucinatory quality); the quality by which movement always is and results from the continuously renewed creation or genesis that A Life is, by which nature (or the relative component of movement) continuously emerges anew from the absolute (renewing quality).

A commonality between the works mentioned above is that they are narrations, and each narrates one or many figures’ performance of an act or activity. The initial proposition is that they narrate a figure’s act or activity through which the figure performs an absolute movement. They narrate not a figure’s performance of an ordinary relative movement, they narrate a figure’s performance of an absolute movement.73 The problem has changed in comparison to the first three paradigms, it concerns not the nature of movement but the performance of movement. The performance of relative movements refers to our ordinary movements and experiences, they correspond to what can be termed to live the living. The works mentioned above are concerned with the performance of absolute movements, these

73 An absolute movement to which, by virtue of reciprocal presupposition, in other words because absolute movement is not transcendent, necessarily remains a relative component. As discussed below, that which is narrated is the relative component of a movement that is itself absolute.
movements are different to our ordinary movements and experiences, they correspond to what can be termed to live A Life. The new problem these works engage with is expressed in the name of the paradigm of commitment to A Life they are said to embody: to live A Life. This problem does not concern the nature of movement or the nature of the relation between the living and A Life as the three other paradigms do: A Life in the living, the living as point of view on and from A Life, new living emerging from A Life. It concerns the performance of movement, the performance of the living: to live. The logic by which this fourth and last paradigm of commitment to A Life adds itself to the first three paradigms can be expressed as such: after investigating the nature of movement through an engagement with its three qualities, the problem becomes to perform movement. Equivalently: after investigating the nature of the relation between the living and A Life, the problem becomes to perform the living (to live) as performance through which A Life is lived (to live A Life).

To live A Life equally means to perform an absolute movement, to establish a unity with A Life, to reterritorialize on the absolute; for example, through her aesthetic experience of a haptic vision, the viewer can be said to live A Life. By engaging with a figure’s act or activity, the paradigm to live A Life necessarily involves narration, it narrates the figure’s performance of that act or activity; and as engaging with the performance of absolute movement, this narration can be formulated interchangeably as: the narration of a figure’s act or activity through which the figure performs an absolute movement; the narration of a figure’s movement through which it establishes a unity with A Life or the Outside; the narration of a figure’s act or activity through which it reterritorializes itself on the absolute or the Outside; the narration of a figure who lives A Life; etc.

to live A Life and the artist following DG’s conceptualization of art

To live A Life is already the problem intrinsic to artistic creation following DG’s conceptualization of art. For DG, the artist lives A Life in that it is ‘a seer, a becomer’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, 161): becoming is A Life, the artist as becomer lives A Life, and as seer it has visions of A Life. The artist performs an absolute movement and by expressing this absolute movement in the materiality of the medium, it gives
absolute movement to the viewer. The artist lives A Life and gives to the viewer the experience of living A Life, of living absolute movement: visions of a non human landscape of nature, non human becomings of man, movements from nature to possible universes which express the genesis and the absolute that A Life is.

the problem with the narration of absolute movement

The fundamental shift of the paradigm to live A Life from DG’s conceptualization of art, from the paradigm A Life in the living, is that following this new paradigm absolute movement is not expressed and as such given, but narrated. In an artwork which embodies the paradigm to live A Life, absolute movement is narrated through the narration of a figure’s act or activity by which the figure performs an absolute movement. This raises a crucial problem. A hypothetical work embodying this paradigm, and taking for example Bacon as its figure, would narrate an act or activity through which Bacon performs an absolute movement: in occurrence his act of painting. But the narration of Bacon’s relative component of movement as he paints, the narration of the relative component of his absolute movement (a relative component which necessarily remains because absolute movement is not transcendent), “narrates nothing” of the absolute movement he performs. The narration is not of a figure who lives A Life, but simply of a figure who lives the living, of a figure who paints, the narration is not of absolute movement but of relative movements. A Life or absolute movement in the living escapes narration like the Figure escapes figuration or representation, like the Figure escapes the view, absolute movement cannot be narrated, it can only be expressed in visions. That absolute movement cannot be narrated is a problem that can be solved through an approach which, although directly inspired from DG’s writings, departs from DG.

new category of movement: absolute movements of the living

There are specific relative movements which can be said to express absolute movement, relative movements that are different to ordinary relative movements in that they express an absolute. These specific relative movements are like the ones DG typify as the ‘troubling […], more or less mysterious’ and ‘grandiose cases where the deterritorialization becomes absolute whilst losing nothing of its precision’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 401, 402). They give four examples:
(1) pilgrimages to the source, as among salmon; (2) supernumerary assemblies, such as those of locusts or chaffinches, etc. (tens of millions of chaffinches near Thourne in 1950-1951); (3) magnetic or solar-guided migrations; (4) long marches, such as those of the lobster (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 401).

That these grandiose relative movements are said to express absolute movement does not mean that they symbolize or are metaphors for absolute movement. In comparison to other ordinary relative movements, DG write that in these grandiose cases the ‘nature of movement changes’: ‘there is something of the Cosmos [or the absolute] in these more ample movements’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 401-402). These deterritorializations are absolute, and so are these movements. Crucially, there remains a relative component to each of these absolute movements by which they can actually be described and referred to: “pilgrimages”, “assemblies”, “migrations”, “marches”, etc. That absolute movements can be described, referred to and as such narrated by their respective relative component corresponds to a new category of movement which has not so far been discussed, a new category which differentiates itself from ordinary relative movements of the living as well as from absolute movements of A Life in the living.

Relative movements of the living, for example moving from the room to the corridor, do not express an absolute, they do not describe or refer to absolute movement: even if these movements need an absolute for their operation (by virtue of the reciprocal presupposition between the relative and absolute components of movement), they remain relative components of movement which describe movements of relative de- and re-territorialization. The new category of movement in contrast encompasses relative components of movement which describe movements of absolute deterritorialization (and reterritorialization on the absolute). Absolute movements of A Life in the living on the other hand, as expressed in Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne, cannot be described or referred to by their relative component: “Isabel Rawsthorne sits on a chair”. Again, this is because “Isabel Rawsthorne sits on a chair” is an ordinary relative movement which does not express an absolute. By definition absolute movements of A Life in the living cannot be described by their relative component because this relative component correlates to a view of the living (the

74 ‘Cosmos’ needs to be understood as A Life or the absolute, as absolute movement.
view of Isabel Rawsthorne sitting on a chair), these movements can only be expressed in a vision of *A Life* in the living.

The new category of movement is evidently inspired from DG, but also a departure from them (DG focus very little attention to these ‘grandiose cases’). This category of movement can be named *absolute movements of the living*. Neither relative movements of the living, nor absolute movements of *A Life* in the living, but absolute movements of the living. They characteristically are absolute movements of which the relative components express an absolute, and as such absolute movements which can be described, referred to and as such narrated by their relative components (“assemblies”, “migrations”, etc.).

*to “live the living” or to “live A Life”, in practical terms*

To perform ordinary relative movements is to “live the living”. To perform absolute movements of the living is to “live A Life”. But what does it mean in practical terms to “live the living”, for example for salmons, chaffinches, migrating birds or indeed for humans, and how does it compare to “live A Life”? What does it mean for the nature of movement to change, for the deterritorialization to become absolute? To “live the living” involves utilitarian functions and tasks such as ‘nutrition, reproduction, conservation, adaptation’ (Deleuze, 2007, 47). Territorialization could be added to this list, to establish a territory so as to protect oneself. To “live the living” involves activities so as to protect, conserve and reproduce oneself as a living organism, to adapt oneself to the living environment. To “live the living” encompasses all the utilitarian tasks and functions that involve and are required to *survive*. But to survive is exactly not “to live A Life”, obviously not in the sense that to die is to live A Life but in the sense that these tasks and functions always involves processes of relative de- and re- territorialization. To find a land; to construct a nest, a house to protect oneself from external forces, forces of nature: the wind, the rain, the sun; to establish a territory to conserve oneself but also to reproduce oneself; and then relative movements from the nest or the house to other territories in order to fulfill utilitarian tasks and functions: to find food, or to find money to buy food or

75 This quote is from Deleuze’s book *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. Relations between absolute movements of the living and Nietzsche’s concepts of the active and the reactive previously introduced are established below through the analysis of Alyśl’s work.
pay the rent (to “pay for the territory”), to find a mate to reproduce, etc. To “live A Life” on the other hand involves another type of movement, neither to find a territory, nor to leave the territory to simultaneously attain to another territory, but to leave the territory in a movement that is a ‘takeoff from the territory’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 401) and that does not attain to any other territory that might otherwise serve for reterritorialization. The nature of movement changes in an absolute movement in that the figure which performs it ‘follows cosmic [or absolute] variables’: ‘In migration, the sun is no longer the terrestrial sun reigning over a territory, even an aerial one; it is the celestial sun of the Cosmos, as in the two Jerusalem, the Apocalypse’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 402). ‘“Farewell!!, I’m leaving without looking back” ’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 403), “my sight is not on the territories I pass through but on the cosmic variables I follow, on the celestial sun of the Cosmos”. From the territory, the figure reterritorializes itself not on another territory but on the absolute, the deterritorialization becomes absolute. The movement loses nothing of its precision, the movement is precisely localizable in nature (because the movement is not transcendent) but the ‘localization has become cosmic’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 402). The movement of some hypothetical figures performing a solar-guided migration ‘exceeds the capacities of any possible assemblage [or territory], to enter on another plane’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 401). The figures necessarily pass through territories or from one territory to the other: this constitutes the relative component “which remains” to their movement that is itself absolute, they have attained to and travel on another plane. This relative component of movement, “a migration”, expresses an absolute, in other words it expresses their travel on this other absolute plane, and it is as such that this relative component can be used to describe and as such narrate an absolute movement, an absolute movement of the living. Their solar-guided migration express ‘the re-found or liberated forces of a deterritorialized Cosmos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 402), A Life, the absolute. A Life is not expressed in a vision, in an indiscernibility between itself and the living which it conditions (as in Figural painting), but it is expressed in what is termed an absolute movement of the living. The figures attain to A Life, they live A Life, as A Life lives through them; and that they live A Life can be narrated through the description or reference to the relative component of the (absolute) movement they perform. For example, Alýs’ work *When Faith Moves Mountains* is analyzed below as the documentation of a movement different in nature
to the ordinary movements through which we “live the living”. Five hundred people move a mountain by shoveling it a few inches forward as they walk “over” it. Through such movement, these figures are argued to live not the living but A Life, similarly to the figures of a solar-guided migration who follow cosmic or absolute variables. This movement of another nature is described as an absolute movement of the living, and its documentation, i.e. the documentation of their action or performance (“five hundred people move a mountain”), is the narration of absolute movement, or more precisely the narration of the relative component which remains to a movement that it itself absolute.

on the departure from DG, absolute movement of the living versus absolute movement of A Life in the living, narration versus expression

‘Kafka often opposed two kinds of voyage, one extensive and organized, the other intense and by debris, wreck or fragments. This second voyage can be on the spot, in “one’s bedroom”, and as such even more intense […]’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 65). In this passage, the “first kind of voyage” refers to relative and ‘extensive’ movements of the living whereas the “second kind” refers to absolute and ‘intense’ movements of A Life in the living. Through the mention of these ‘grandiose cases’ in Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Mille plateaux, although DG do not focus on them, they in a sense complexify the opposition they set up through Kafka in Kafka - Pour une littérature mineure (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975). 

Absolute movement is either on the spot, in one’s bedroom, in immobility: absolute movement is intensive. Or, following the mention of those grandiose cases, absolute movement can also occur through the performance of a movement that is ‘extensive and organized’: a pilgrimage, a migration, a march, etc. Absolute movement can also be of the living as well as being of A Life. It is as if a third kind of voyage adds itself to the first two: neither an extensive voyage where other places in nature are reached and explored, nor an intensive voyage on the spot, but an extensive voyage where other places in nature are necessarily passed through, but it is not them which are reached and explored, it is an absolute plane mapped by cosmic or absolute variables. The third

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76 Although the definition of, and emphasis on, absolute movements of the living belongs entirely to this text and not to DG’s writings.
kind of voyage is not a an extensive voyage in nature “when on some occasion” an intensive voyage on the spot is also performed, it is not a “combination” of the first two kinds of voyages, it is through and only through its extensity in nature that it is and can be absolute.

These absolute movements of the living are very different to the absolute movements of A Life in the living expressed in a haptic vision. Bacon’s Figures are mostly passive in terms of relative, extensive or actual movements, and by avoiding the figuration and as such narration of relative movements, Bacon is all the more able to express absolute, intensive or virtual movements, i.e. the Figure. For example, the

*Study after Velazquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X* by Francis Bacon, 1953

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extensive actual passivity of the pope in *Study after Velazquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X*, 1953, allows all the more for the visionary expression of intense virtual activity. The paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life relates to the problem of the performance of absolute movement through specific acts or activities. Bacon, and DG’s conceptualization of art, do not and cannot (and do not want to) engage with this problem. The problem Bacon is engaged with is the expression of absolute movements in reciprocal presupposition with the living, not the narration of figure’s act or activity as that through which it performs an absolute movement of the living. Engaged with the paradigm A Life in the living correlated to expression, Bacon is in diametrical opposition to the paradigm to live A Life correlated to narration. Effectively the narration of absolute movements of the living is in complete opposition to DG’s conceptualization of art, it is the diametrical opposite of the expression of a vision. The former concerns extensive actual relative activity as that through which absolute movement is performed (paradigm to live A Life), whereas the latter concerns extensive actual relative passivity as that ‘under’ which absolute movement is expressed (paradigm A Life in the living).

The narration of absolute movements of the living is the approach which solves the problem according to which absolute movement cannot be narrated: to narrate an absolute movement of the living is to narrate absolute movement. The works by Huyghe, Alýs and Doig discussed in this section are evidently very different on many levels. It seems however that each of them is engaged with the narration of absolute movements of the living. Each work seems to be engaged with the narration of a figure’s act or activity through which an absolute movement is performed, with the narration of a figure who lives A Life.

77 As previously mentioned Deleuze refers to the body without organs as ‘a revelation of the body under the organism’ (Deleuze, 2002, 150). The BwO is the absolute movement of the body, the Life that the body is, ‘under’ the organism.
Huyghe, Alÿs and Doig have different approaches to the narration of absolute movements of the living, with widely different results. Huyghe and Alÿs narrate movements that seem to relate more closely to DG’s grandiose cases of migration or march: Huyghe’s journey or “migration” to the Polar Antarctic Circle, Alÿs’ march through which a mountain is moved. Doig on the other hand narrates movements that are not “grandiose”, movements that correspond to common activities: to play ping pong or cricket. Through the analysis of their works, three different ways by which to approach the narration of absolute movements of the living are conceptualized:

- the fictionalization of absolute movement (Huyghe),
- the narration of relative components of movement which express an absolute, in other words the narration of absolute movements of the living (Alÿs), and
- the narration of relative components of movement which do not in and of themselves (meaning outside this narration) express an absolute, but that are narrated as that through which absolute movement is performed; in other words, ordinary relative movements narrated as absolute movements of the living (Doig).

Only Alÿs’ work is the narration of absolute movements of the living, and as such only his work will be discussed in close relationship to the conceptualization of these movements developed above. Huyghe and Doig approach the notion of absolute movements of the living in a very different way to Alÿs, and in that sense in ways that to some extent diverge from how these movements are conceptualized. Why then discuss their works in relation to such conceptualization? Because the narration of a figure who performs an absolute movement of the living, the narration of a figure’s act or activity as that through which it lives A Life, is considered to be exactly what they attempt to achieve in their works (in opposition to Doig’s work, Huyghe’s work A Journey That Wasn’t will be said to fail to embody the paradigm to live A Life).
Before the engagement with the different artworks, with the different approaches to the narration of a figure who lives A Life, the following introduces that which the paradigm to live A Life gives to experience, which is as such common to the three approaches: narrations, but more specifically what is termed tales of resistance. The paradigm to live A Life gives to experience tales of resistance.

The paradigm to live A Life is a means by which to engage with the subject of the figure of resistance. To live A Life is to resist, the figure who performs absolute movements of the living is a figure of resistance. The figure, through its act or activity, overcomes the suffocation that nature is by attaining to a breath of air as it enters another plane in reciprocal presupposition with nature, as it begins to follow cosmic or absolute variables and establishes a unity with A Life. The figures’ act or activity is an act of resistance.

The narrations of the acts or activities through which figures perform absolute movements of the living come to be experienced to different degrees as tales, the narrations form tales of resistance. By the term “tale” I mean a narrative which pretends to narrate an event which truly took place, but because of the nature of this event, the narration lends itself to have its veracity questioned. These narratives appear as tales because they are, like DG’s grandiose cases, always and inevitably, although to different degrees, troubling and more or less mysterious for the very fact that they are not ordinary movements but are rare movements of another nature.

The figures of resistance, the protagonists of these tales, are very different to Figures, visions of A Life in the living. Figures are the results of acts of resistance, the acts of resistance of the painters who liberate A Life where it is imprisoned. But these Figures are not themselves figures of resistance, for example Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne does not have for its subject a figure of resistance nor an act of resistance although it results from Bacon’s act of resistance.

An artwork which embodies the paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life narrates an act or activity as that through which A Life is lived, making of the protagonist a figure of resistance, of its act or activity an act of resistance, and of the narration of this act a tale of resistance.
A Journey That Wasn’t is a work that needs to be understood as in three parts: first, ‘the hypothesis of an elsewhere and a displacement’; second, ‘an encounter’; and third, ‘the mise-en-scène’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 32).

The first part is a scenario or fiction, and as a scenario, it was presented as a work (the scenario is the work) in L’Expédition scintillante, 2002, at the Kunsthau Bregenz. A Journey That Wasn’t is the enactment of this scenario and the narration of this enactment. More specifically the work consists in firstly, the ‘hypothesis of an elsewhere and a displacement’: ‘to produce the conditions of apparition of a narration, to invent fictions’ which in this instance takes the form of ‘the hypothesis of a new island in Antarctica and a rumor about some unique creature’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 27). A voyage towards this hypothesized elsewhere, this new island conceived in the ‘narration’ or ‘fiction’, is performed in order ‘to acquire the real resources to see if they exist’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 27). In other words, the voyage has the purpose to see if the new island in Antarctica and the unique creature from the narration or fiction exist “in reality”. Secondly, ‘an encounter’: the voyage or journey leads to the sight of the island and of the unique creature, an albino penguin. Thirdly, the ‘mise-en-scène’: the island is ‘modelized and transformed into sound’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 27) in view of its exposition upon the return from Antarctica, in occurrence in Central Park, New York, in 2005.

‘Regarding the Antarctic, we are in the non-constructed, whereas here, in the city, we are in a totally invented place with architecture, and social and legal rules. Every day we move around in fictions, which give rise to realities’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 31). Antarctica for Huyghe is the ‘non-constructed’, and corresponds to an outside of the fictions around which we move and which give rise to our realities.

**interpretation of A Journey That Wasn’t**

As for *La saison des fêtes*, the way by which to imbue a form of transcendence to *A Journey That Wasn’t* is to interpret the new island and the albino penguin, like the Green Romantica, as embodying the Outside in the same manner that Alice’s Wonderland embodies the Outside, making of it a form arguably transcendent to
nature. It is to interpret the work as creating a new fiction which hopes to give rise to the reality of a movement from nature to the Outside (the new island and the albino penguin). It is as if Huyghe wanted to give rise to the reality of a movement of absolute de- and re-territorialization towards and onto the Outside, but as opposed to open nature onto itself and as such onto the absolute that the Outside is, Huyghe opened nature onto another world, a “Wonderland” arguably transcendent to nature.

However, as for La saison des fêtes, it would seem more interesting to interpret A Journey That Wasn’t as being closer to Sylvie and Bruno than to Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: not one story or world within another, but two contiguous, coexisting and simultaneous worlds, two worlds in reciprocal presupposition. A Journey That Wasn’t not as hoping to give rise to the reality of a movement towards a “Wonderland” but as giving to experience our nature “re-patched” with new dispersions of the Outside, our nature metamorphosed, a new nature. Nature tears itself open onto the Outside as it is simultaneously “re-patched” with its dispersions: the new island and the albino penguin, understood as emerging from the Outside into the possible universe that a new nature is, like the Green Romantica. A new nature is not a transcendent nature of strange creatures, a “Wonderland”, it is the emergence of new forms or creatures in the middle of our nature, to a similar effect as when discovering new species, such as an albino penguin for example.

This interpretation is however contradicted by two aspects of the work. Nature, as ‘surface’ in reciprocal presupposition with ‘the world of depths’ (Deleuze, 1993, 34, 35), the Outside, can as it were tear itself open onto the Outside and be simultaneously “re-patched” by its dispersions at any point on its “surface”. But in A Journey That Wasn’t, nature tears itself open onto the Outside in Antarctica and this leads to a confusion. Most evidently, it is not that nature tears itself open onto the Outside in Antarctica, it is that Antarctica is itself considered as “outside”, as Huyghe tells us.78 The Outside is transformed into or replaced by a terrestrial outside beyond man’s control and or reach. It is an un-territorialized part of nature, in Huyghe terms: an outside the fictions around which we move and which gives rise to our realities. Unmistakably a terrestrial outside opposes itself to the Outside itself.

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78 As previously quoted: ‘Regarding the Antarctic, we are in the non-constructed, whereas here, in the city, we are in a totally invented place with architecture, and social and legal rules. Every day we move around in fictions, which give rise to realities’ (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 31).
a transcendental outside: not an un-territorialized part of nature but an absolutely
deterritorialized Life in reciprocal presupposition with nature, not Antarctica but the
transcendental field. This is the first aspect according to which the (more interesting)
interpretation of A Journey That Wasn’t is contradicted: the movement seems not to
be towards a new nature, towards nature metamorphosed in its middle exposing new
dispersions of the Outside, but towards a terrestrial outside.

The second aspect is the return. The journey returns back to apparently the same
nature from which it departed, to operate the mise-en-scène (in Central Park, New
York) of that which was discovered “outside”. The journey returns from an un-
territorialized part of nature back to the territorialized part of nature, from the ‘non-
constructed’ back to the constructed, ‘the city’, where fictions give rise to our
realities (Huyghe and Leydier, 2006, 31). In contradiction to the interpretation
above, the work embodies a cyclical movement from nature to a terrestrial outside
back to the same nature. Through the linear movement from nature to a new nature,
there is no return, there is no return since nature has changed, it has irreversibly
become a new nature. A transcendent “movement” [nature] – [transcendent outside]
– [same nature] or a terrestrial “movement” [nature] – [un-territorialized part of
[new nature]. The first two return to the same, whilst the latter does not return but
advance through difference, it advances through the incessant repetition of
difference. If there is a return from a new nature, it is necessarily a “return from the
future”, a return from the future of a new nature. A Journey That Wasn’t does not
embody such return from the future, it embodies a return from a terrestrial outside.

metaphor and deformation of the Outside: A Journey That Wasn’t and the narration
of absolute movements of the living

Absolute movement, A Life, is that which, from nature, leads to a possible universe
in a movement that can be described as: [nature] – [A Life or Outside] – [possible
universe]. A commitment to A Life as such necessarily results in a movement from
nature to a possible universe, and inversely so, to attain to a possible universe
necessarily takes place through a commitment to A Life.

With A Journey That Wasn’t, Huyghe attempts to fictionalize absolute movement.
The fictionalization of absolute movement means to narrate, to make a story or
fiction of a movement from nature to a possible universe. The fictionalization of absolute movement can equivalently be termed the fictionalization of a movement from nature to a possible universe. This is the conceptualization of the way by which Huyghe with A Journey That Wasn’t approaches the narration of absolute movements of the living. It means to narrate absolute movement or a movement from nature to a possible universe as a relative journey or voyage, creating a metaphor of the absolute with the relative. The fictionalization of absolute movement could mean to make either one of three stories or fictions: stories or fictions of movements from nature to either one of the three types of possible universe. It could be the story of an extensive journey that serves as a metaphor either for a movement from nature to a reterritorialization on the absolute or Outside that A Life is, or for a movement from nature to nature hallucinated, or for a movement from nature to a new nature. Out of the three possibilities, it seems that A Journey That Wasn’t is closest to being a metaphor of a movement from nature to a reterritorialization on the Outside.\textsuperscript{79} This is problematic because the metaphor requires the Outside to be embodied as “a place that is reached”, as a location that is reterritorialized onto. In A Journey That Wasn’t, as previously discussed, there are two ways by which to conceive how the Outside is embodied: either the Outside is embodied as a “Wonderland”, an arguably transcendent outside (the new island and the albino penguin as “Wonderland”); or the Outside is embodied by a terrestrial outside (Antarctica as un-territorialized part of nature). In both cases, the transcendental outside is deformed by virtue of being embodied by the metaphor. The narration of an absolute movement of the living fails because absolute movement is deformed through the metaphor, through its fictionalization into either an arguably transcendent “movement” (movement to an arguably transcendent outside like Alice’s fall down the rabbit hole), or into a terrestrial “movement” (movement to a terrestrial outside).

\textsuperscript{79} A Journey That Wasn’t cannot be considered as a metaphor of a movement from nature to a new nature following the two aspects of the work according to which it embodies both a terrestrial outside (as opposed to a new nature) and a return to the same (as opposed to advancing through different or a return from the future).
Huyghe’s approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living with *A Journey That Wasn’t* can be described as follows. First, the fictionalization of absolute movement (to make a story or fiction of absolute movement). Second, the performance by the living (the crew) of this fiction. Third, the narration of this performance.

The crew however does not perform an absolute movement of the living. It is as if Huyghe wanted to make a fiction of absolute movement to give rise to an absolute movement of the living through the enactment or performance of this fiction. But an absolute movement of the living is not the performance by the living (a person or a crew) of a fiction or metaphor of absolute movement which deforms the Outside (and absolute movement itself). An absolute movement of the living is always literal and never metaphorical, it is an absolute movement which can be described and referred to by its relative component (like DG’s grandiose cases). The hypothetical figures performing a solar-guided migration do not perform a fiction of absolute movement, they perform absolute movement literally.

DG’s conceptualization of art, the expression of A Life in the living, never involves metaphors. The Figure (Bacon’s work for example) is not a metaphor of A Life, it *is* A Life, it captures and expresses A Life, it *is* and as such *gives* A Life. Or in the cinema of the seer, the metaphor or ‘cliché’ is exactly what the crystal-image, which gives the vision, i.e. the direct presentation of the transcendental form of time, does away with: it ‘tears a real image [the vision] from clichés’ (Deleuze, 1985, 32) or metaphors, it gives the vision literally. In relation to the absolute movements of the living, the problem is to perform them literally, and not to perform a metaphor of absolute movement. The paradigm of commitment to A Life to *live A Life* never involves metaphors (this is true for all four paradigms of commitment to A Life). This is not merely a question of choice of stylistic form (“to use the metaphor or not?”): *A Journey That Wasn’t*, as metaphor of a movement from nature to the Outside, deforms the Outside and as such deforms A Life. The work follows paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life which threaten A Life or the Outside by pretending to it whilst deforming it: *A Journey That Wasn’t* is centered around the representation of an imagination or fantasy (the fiction of the new island and the
albino penguin) by which the Outside is either arguably transcendent (the paradigm *imaginary-transcendent*) or simply an un-territorialized part of nature (the paradigm *human-actual*). In both cases, the suffocation of nature is not remediated, and *A Journey That Wasn’t* fails to embody the paradigm to live *A Life*.

8.b – Alýs: the narration of absolute movements of the living

Alýs’ approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living is very different to Huyghe’s approach in *A Journey That Wasn’t*: it does not involve the fictionalization of absolute movement. Alýs’ approach is the narration of absolute movements of the living as they are conceptualized above, the narration of a figure’s (or many figures’) act or activity which itself is the relative component of a movement that is absolute. For example, when Alýs presents the video documentation of five hundred people moving a mountain (*When Faith Moves Mountains*), he narrates the relative component which necessarily remains to a movement that is itself absolute.

If a constant in Huyghe’s work is that it addresses the notion of “theatrum mundi”, that we live in fictions which give rise to our realities, the constant in Alýs’ work is the notion that we live in different types of territory, and that the world is not a theatre but a multitude of interwoven territories. Alýs’ works are engagements with different types of territory: for example geographico-political territories (the Mexico/United States border in *The Loop*, 1997, the Palestine/Israel border in *The Green Line*, 2004, the Cuba/United States “separation” in *Bridge/Puente*, 2006, etc.), physical territories (a mountain in *When Faith Moves Mountains*, 2002, tornados in *Tornado*, 2000-2010, or the delimitation of a city guarded by dogs in *Gringo*, 2003, etc.), individual territories, meaning the territory that an individual physically and socially is, etc.⁸⁰

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⁸⁰ This list of types of territory is not exhaustive, it does not aim to encompass all the different types of territories that Alýs’ practice as a whole engages with.
If Huyghe hopes to create new fictions which give rise to new realities outside the possibilities of existing fictions inside which we live and by which the world is defined as theatre, Alÿs narrates the movements of figures that embody a becoming active in their engagement with specific territories, against the becoming reactive which forms the essence of man and his world.

*A Life re-discovered, active negation or active destruction: transmutation*

As previously introduced in relation to the notion of nature as suffocation, *A Life* is active forces, and man and his world (nature, the living or the lived) are the becoming reactive of *A Life*. ‘Active negation, active destruction, is the state of strong spirits who destroy the reactive in them’ (Deleuze, 2007, 80). Through active negation or active destruction, the active forces of *A Life* are re-liberated, re-discovered. Active negation or destruction ‘is the only way by which reactive forces become active’ (Deleuze, 2007, 80). This can be thought in terms of Bacon’s work and the expression of *A Life* (active forces) in the living (reactive forces). Bacon is a ‘strong spirit’ who destroys the reactive in himself, hence he sees and becomes *A Life*. The process by which Bacon liberates *A Life* where it is imprisoned is through the active negation or destruction of the purely optical space associated with our ordinary views and correlative through the active destruction of the organism, including the eye which gains a new haptic function. The catastrophe in Bacon’s process of painting is an active destruction of the living as the necessary step by which chaos is attained, confronted and composed, and as such by which *A Life* is expressed. The organism is itself a territory, it is *A Life* actualizing and territorializing itself in or as an organism, the organism is a becoming reactive of active forces. In order to attain to an expression of the body without organs, the Life or active forces that the organism reciprocally presupposes, the organism must itself go through an active destruction. The aesthetic experience of a haptic vision correspondingly involves a departure from and an active destruction of the organism that the viewer is. It is only at the expense of the organism that the viewer becomes, that she becomes other and re-discovers *A Life*. An active negation is in Nietzsche’s terms a *transmutation*. Transmutation is the ‘reversal’ of reactive forces into active forces, ‘strictly speaking it is the reversal of a reversal, since the reactive began by taking the place of the action’ (Deleuze, 2007, 81). Transmutation is the reversal of a reversal because reactive forces are (in the first place) the reversal of the active
forces that A Life is. In other words, the territories which constitute nature or man and his world ‘began by taking the place of’ A Life, and through a transmutation, A Life is re-liberated, re-discovered. These “processes” of reversal define transmutation but also the continuously renewed genesis that A Life is: the actualization of the virtual or the becoming reactive of active forces, and “its reversal”: the virtualization of the actual or the becoming active of reactive forces. An active force is only active in relation to a reactive force and inversely so, refuting any form of transcendence between active forces and reactive forces. Bacon’s process of painting can be said to corroborate to a transmutation of the organism and of the purely optical space through which is re-discovered the Life which they are, their onto-genetic condition.

territories and the reactive, the active and the absolute movements of the living

Evidently these notions need to be related to Ályss’ work, to narrations of absolute movements of the living, very differently than to Bacon, than to expressions of absolute movements in the living. Ályss’ works that are of interest to this analysis are commonly termed “actions” in art discourses. However, an “action”, in the sense of a “performance”, is not necessarily active in the conceptual sense delimited by the Nietzschean concepts of the active and the reactive. An “action”, if it embodies the essence of man and his world, is reactive in a Nietzschean sense. As such, an “action” as it is referred to in art discourses needs to remain an object of analysis to determine whether it is active or reactive, i.e. an action or a reaction. An “action” is active when it is an absolute movement of the living, when its relative component of movement embodies an absolute. Absolute movements of the living are active, and our ordinary relative movements are reactive. Our ordinary relative movements are the movements which correspond to the becoming reactive which forms our essence, through them we “live the living”. On the other hand, absolute movements of the living are movements of another nature, they express an absolute, they involve our becoming active, and through them we “live A Life”.

Our movements inevitably operate within or across one or many imbricated territories. For example the organism, itself a territory, can be considered to be in physical territories: a house, a forest, a mountain, etc., and in geographico-political territories: a town, a province, a country, and so on. Territories are and as such
express the becoming reactive which constitutes our essence. To “live the living” is to submit to, to bear with, the reactive forces constituted by the territories inside which we live, it is to obey the prescriptions, directions or rules that territories impose on us. Like the territories that our organisms are can be thought of as imposing themselves upon us, upon the Life that we are (‘the organism is what life opposes to itself to limit itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 628)), a mountain or a country imposes itself upon us, it imposes directions (where to climb or pass around the mountain?) and rules (for example legal systems, what can be legally done in a country?). Territories limit the Life that we are.

To “live the living” is to react, our ordinary movements are reactive to the territories in or through which we live. Absolute movements of the living are the transmutations of such reactive movements, they as such necessarily involve another type of relation to territories: one that is active. In a world by essence reactive, absolute movements of the living are ‘rare’, they are the rare events of a “health” amongst the “sickness” that man and his world are. An absolute movement of the living can be imaged as the rare event of Life flowing through the living, of active movements flowing through territories which ordinarily induce reactive movements. An absolute movement of the living does not express A Life in a vision establishing an indiscernibility between onto-genetic conditions and the living, it expresses A Life in the relative component of a movement which appears to different degrees as grandiose, troubling and mysterious, because it is itself absolute. What is “seen”, or what is narrated, of an absolute movement of the living is in a sense a “view” of the relative component which remains to a movement that is itself absolute, for example: “tens of millions of chaffinches near Thourne in 1950-1951”. The figure who performs an absolute movement of the living is liberated from the territory, and flows through it unaffected by the becoming reactive the territory ordinarily imposes. This image is appropriate to the movement of the figures of magnetic or solar-guided migrations: they necessarily pass from one territory to the other: from the grassland to the forest, to the mountain, etc., but they are not submitted to these territories, having entered another plane, they flow through these territories unaffected. The

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81 The terms ‘rare’ and “health” are appropriated from their association to active forces, and “sickness” from its association to reactive forces (Deleuze, 2007, 128).
relative component of their absolute movement is imaged as the rare view of a river of active forces flowing on a sick earth of reactive forces.

*When Faith Moves Mountains*

*on the contextual readings of an action*

Alÿs’ practice has been described as embodying an ‘allegorical force’ (Godfrey, 2010, 15). Alÿs’ actions are often described as allegory, parody, allusion, reflection on, symbol of or metaphor for social, economic, political or artistic state of affairs, even by Alÿs himself. For example, *Paradox of Praxis 1 (Sometimes Doing Something Leads to Nothing)*, 1997, is the video documentation of an action performed by Alÿs in which he pushes a block of ice in the streets of Mexico city until it completely melts, nine hours later. The work is interpreted by Alÿs and Medina as ‘a decisive moment in his [Alÿs] attempt to reflect on the logic of the peripheral economies of the South’, ‘a parody of the massive disproportion between effort and result in much of Latin American life’, and ‘a sly means to symbolize the melting of the generic object of contemporary art’ (Alÿs and Medina, 2010, 82). And *When Faith Moves Mountains* is described by Alÿs as a ‘social allegory’ (Alÿs, 2002). The meaning or purpose of the actions, and their narrations, would be to create an allegory, a symbol, a metaphor etc., of or for something else, for instance, the complexities of ‘Latin American life’, its relation to modernization, to the economy, to the social, etc. It seems however that a contextualized reading of an action is not as interesting as the analysis of the action “in itself”, the action in terms of it being active (or in opposition reactive), of it being a movement different in nature to our ordinary movements. The *reading* of an action, as opposed to the analysis of the forces at play, necessarily asserts it as allegorical, symbolic, reflection on, metaphor, parody, etc. This “method” of contextualized readings of actions or movements (for example reading the action or movement “to push a block of ice in the street” in the contexts of the economies of the South and of the generic object of contemporary art) seems forced and neither relevant nor interesting in relation to the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art. Of interest to this analysis is not such contextualized readings but the ontological analysis of a movement that is different in nature, and the narration of this movement.
Another method of analysis is required, not contextualized readings, but ‘Nietzsche’s method’: ‘relating a concept [or an action] to the will to power in order to make it the symptom of a will without which it could not even be thought (nor the feeling experienced, nor the action undertaken)’ (Deleuze, 2007, 88, 89). The will to power can be understood as A Life, it is ‘an ontological energy, the living power of everything; it is Nietzsche writes, “the unexhausted procreative will of life”’ (Zepke, 2005, 12). The will to power is that which \textit{will} in life. And what does this will \textit{want}, what does A Life \textit{want} or \textit{will}? It wants to grow, to expand itself, at the expense of that which resists: man and his world, the living. The will to power can be said \textit{to will itself} in that it is becoming and it wants to become, forever, inexhaustibly. A Life as continuously renewed genesis is this will, incessantly overcoming and entering into becoming that which resists, the living. Such is the active negation or destruction of the living (the reactive) by A Life (the active) through which A Life expands itself launching (negating, destroying) the living towards new becomings. \textit{Negation} is the becoming reactive of the active, it is that which negates or resists A Life, whereas active negation, effectively \textit{affirmation}, is the becoming active of the reactive. The \textit{affirmative} and the \textit{negative} are the two qualities of the will to power, it both affirms and negates:

To affirm and to negate express the will to power just as to act and to react express the force. (And just as reactive forces are nevertheless forces, the will to negate, nihilism is of the will to power: “… a will to nothingness, a hostility towards life, a refusal to admit the fundamental conditions of life, nevertheless is and always remains a will” (1)) (Deleuze, 2007, 60-61).\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{will as genetic element and the action as symptom, the light and the heavy}

Will is the genetic element of all our actions, feelings and thought (Deleuze, 2007, 89), it is as such that each can be made into the ‘symptom’ of a will. The method of analysis proposed to counter a method of contextualized readings involves relating an action to the will to power, and as such to its two qualities, to make it the symptom of a will that is either affirmative or negative. The method involves asking

\textsuperscript{82} A Life can equally be said to have these two “qualities”: the actualization of the virtual which can be considered as negative, a becoming reactive which forms the essence of the living; and the virtualization of the actual which can be considered as affirmative, a becoming active, launching the living into becoming, (re-)plunging the living into A Life.
the question: what wills or wants the will which the action is a symptom of? ‘What
[wills or] wants a will is not an object, an objective or an end. Ends and objects, even
motives are still symptoms. […] One only ever wills qualities: the heavy, the light
…’ (Deleuze, 2007, 89). The answer to the question will always either be the heavy
or the light, and never ‘an object, an objective or an end’.

An action is symptomatic, or expressive, of either a will which negates A Life or a
will which affirms A Life. An “action” expressive of a will which negates A Life,
i.e. a reaction, establishes territories, conserves or protects territories, or adapts and
limits itself to the territories inside which it takes place, submitting to that which the
territories impose. The figure who performs a reaction wills the heavy, the heavy
burden of territories. ‘Heavy do earth and life seem to him; and the spirit of gravity
wants it so! But whoever wants to become light and a bird must love himself – thus I
teach’ (Nietzsche, 2006, 154). The figure who performs an action expressive of a
will which affirms A Life wants to escape territories, it wills the light, it wants to
flow through territories without being affected by them, it wants to liberate itself and
as such A Life from the burden that territories impose.

Of what will is an action a symptom of? In other words, what does a figure who
performs a movement or an action will or want? The heavy or the light. Of what will
is the action documented in When Faith Moves Mountains symptomatic of? What do
the figures of When Faith Moves Mountains will or want (or more appropriately
what does Alÿs will or want through the action he asked the figures to carry)?

action and reaction in terms of motive and objective

It seems to me that to ask what does a figure who performs an action will or want in
terms of ‘an object, an objective or an end’ is in a sense insightful when attempting
to identify the nature of the will its action is a symptom of (affirmative or negative),
i.e. when attempting to identify the quality of its movement or action (active or
reactive). To react is to establish, to limit, to protect, to conserve, in other words to
resist becoming, to resist A Life. The action on the other hand liberates A Life,
through it A Life expands itself. The reaction in comparison to the action appears to
have a more clearly defined and identifiable motive and objective. This is essentially
because the reactive force is ‘utilitarian, of adaptation and of partial limitation’
(Deleuze, 2007, 69), the reaction in a sense stems from an easily identifiable motive
and has a defined utility. Correlatively, the reaction always involves a movement of relative de- and re-territorialization and that which is reterritorialized onto is straightforwardly identifiable. For example, a figure establishes, protects or conserves a nest or a house in order to shield itself from the wind and the rain. The figure wants to protect itself, it reacts, and does so by reterritorializing itself on the clearly identifiable nest or house. On the other hand it appears more difficult to identify the motive and objective of the action. It seems difficult to identify what is the motive of a figure and what it wants in terms of an objective when it performs an action or active movement, otherwise termed absolute movement of the living. What do tens of millions of chaffinches want when they assemble together at a specific time and place? And what motivates them to do so? What do the figures of *When Faith Moves Mountains* want if they are not performing a social allegory, and if this objective cannot be, it seems, simply reduced to moving the mountain? The objective or purpose of an absolute movement of the living is not clearly defined, nor is that which the figure reterritorializes itself onto. What does a figure will or want when leaving the nest or the house in order not to confront but to unite with the rain and the wind? What is the figure’s motive, what motivates it? It is as if the only answer is the light, lightness, as opposed to an utilitarian objective. And what is the figure reterritorialized onto exactly? The rain, the wind? It is as such that actions or absolute movements of the living appear to different degrees as troubling and mysterious, they are to some extent inexplicable, their respective motive and objective are not as clearly defined as that of reactions. The absolute movement of the living is also to a certain degree inexplicable in terms of location and direction. Where is the figure who unites with the rain and the wind, and where is it going? Where were the tens of millions of chaffinches, and where were they going exactly? Although ‘near Thourne’, did they not simultaneously appear to be somewhere else, and did they not appear to go in a mysterious direction which escapes us and perhaps even them? The absolute movement of the living necessarily takes place in nature but to some extent it simultaneously appears to take place somewhere else, on another plane. The absolute movement of the living occurs according to a logic that does not belong to the sickness of man and his world but to the health of A Life, negating or transmuting the human, re-liberating A Life from where it is imprisoned.
Nihilism versus Transmutation

The “action never wills” (a formulation to shorten: “the action never is the symptom of a will which wills”) to negate or to destroy, only the “reaction wills” to negate or to destroy: nihilism. The action negates or destroys (active negation or active destruction) but in a sense wills not to do so, at least not primarily. The (active) negation or destruction of the action is a consequence of its will to lightness, of its affirmative will. The action negates “not nihilistically but affirmatively”, not to kill the living and A Life, but to transmute the living, to liberate A Life from the living. Nihilism is the destruction or killing of life and as such of A Life, whereas transmutation is a destruction which allows for becomings and which consequently liberates A Life, a destruction that is both a pre-requisite of, and consequential to, the liberation of A Life where it is imprisoned. It is in that sense that Bacon’s Figures are not the massacre or destruction of figures (mutilated bodies, figurative painting), an operation which would be nihilistic, but the liberation of A Life imprisoned in figures (bodies without organs, Figural painting).

When Faith Moves Mountains: to flow with the mountain

Of what will is the action or movement of the figures of When Faith Moves Mountains symptomatic of? It does not seem that the objective of the action is to move the mountain, at least not primarily. It seems obvious that it is rather irrelevant whether the mountain was actually moved or not, that it simply is a consequence which is worth little attention in comparison to that which it is a consequence (or symptom) of. The action or movement wills to flow through the mountain, to pass through the territory that it is whilst being unaffected by that which it ordinarily imposes. But even more so, the action wills to flow with the mountain, it wills to make the mountain flow as it itself flows through it. The action is the symptom of a will that is affirmative, the action or movement wills the light, lightness. Could it not be said that through their movement the figures burden themselves with the heavy that the mountain as territory is or imposes (and quite literally with the weight of the sand, with the weight of the mountain they shovel forward)? No because to burden oneself with a territory, to react to a territory, is to bear the territory, to be submitted to it, to follow that which it imposes. To be submitted to the mountain is to pass on or around it, it is to be forced to climb it or to have to go around it. The figures of When Faith Moves Mountains are not submitted to the mountain since their
movement involves the (presumed) movement of the mountain itself. Both the figures and the mountain flow together through a movement. Could it not be said then that their movement simply is a nihilistic reaction, that it negates or destroys a territory nihilistically, as if Bacon were to paint massacred figures, that it annihilates the living, killing A Life in reciprocal presupposition with it? For obvious reasons it seems rather ludicrous to propose that the figures annihilate the mountain, nihilistically killing the Life that it is. But in relation to this method of analysis of actions, the question is worth asking since nihilism and transmutation, and as such negation and affirmation (which involves active negation), can easily be confused (wouldn’t this confusion concern the misappropriation of Nietzsche by the Nazis?). Rather, the (presumed) movement of the mountain, the destruction of what the mountain was prior to the figures’ movement, is the active negation which the transmutation of the figures and the mountain involves, a consequence or symptom of their will to lightness. The action wills not to react to or negate the mountain, it wills lightness, and that the mountain is moved or not is a more or less relevant consequence of this affirmative will. It is by being an expression or symptom of a will to lightness that the action and as such the work finds it meaning, and not in the contextualized readings by which it is transformed into an allegory.

The figures neither territorialize themselves on the mountain, nor nihilistically destroy the mountain. They themselves become as if the wind and the rain, unrestrained, unaffected by the mountain, blowing over it and launching it into becoming. The figures leave a territory, their houses perhaps; they neither reterritorialize themselves on the mountain, nor climb or go around it (reaction), and neither do they annihilate the mountain (nihilism, which is also reactive); they unite with the wind, flowing through the mountain as the mountain flows through their movement (action, active, affirmation). The figures simultaneously liberate themselves “from themselves”, from their essence, from their becoming reactive through the transmutation, through lightness, and from the territory (the mountain) they pass through. Equally, the figures of solar-guided migrations liberate themselves not only from the territory they depart from and the territories they pass through, but they also simultaneously liberate themselves “from themselves”, they become other through their absolute deterritorialization: What have they become in
order to perceive not the terrestrial sun reigning over a territory but the celestial sun of the Cosmos?

faith and the future versus a commitment to A Life in the present

Alýs uses the term faith in titling and discussing *When Faith Moves Mountains*: ‘As Medina said while we were in Lima, “Faith is a means by which one resigns oneself to the present in order to invest in the abstract promise of the future”’ (Alýs, 2002). But it seems that it is exactly not faith which “moves the mountain”. What moves the mountain is a commitment to A Life which engenders a movement different in nature to our ordinary movements: an absolute movement of the living which is itself the symptom of a will to lightness. Through it, one is not ‘resigned to the present’, one embraces the present, certainly not to invest in the ‘abstract promise of the future’, but to literally attain to a unity with A Life in the present.

Alýs’ approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living

Alýs’ approach to the narration of absolute movements of the living can be described as follows. First, the selection of a territory and a mode of action (or transmutation, becoming active) in relation to this territory. Second, the performance of the action: a movement which in relation to the selected territory is symptomatic of a will to lightness, constituting an absolute movement of the living. Third, the narration (or documentation, representation) of the performance: the narration of an absolute movement of the living.

It is through an action, through a becoming active, that a figure lives A Life. The narration of this action is the narration of a figure who lives A Life. Each of Alýs’ actions needs to be analyzed through this method of analysis which involves no contextual reading, no allegory, no metaphor, no parody, etc. Each action needs to be related to the will to power in order to make it the symptom of a will which beyond any motive or objective constitutes its genetic element. The heavy or the light? In each case, the analysis is of the forces at play: the reactive forces that a specific territory is and imposes, and the forces of a movement that is either active or reactive. There is three possible outcome to this analysis: first, the establishment, protection or conservation of, or the submission to, a territory (reactions, ordinary
relative movements); second, the nihilistic negation or destruction of the territory by which the living and as such A Life is killed (nihilism, a will to nothingness, a hostility towards life, also a reaction); third, the transmutation, the becoming active which finds its ground or genesis in a will to lightness, involving an active destruction by which A Life is liberated from where it is imprisoned: both from the figure who performs the movement of transmutation and the territory in relation to which the transmutation is operated (actions, absolute movements of the living). To live A Life is to find the ground of one’s movements in an affirmative will to lightness.

the paradox of the will to nothingness, Tornado: nihilistic reactions by Alýs

*Tornado*, 2000-2010, is the video documentation of Alýs repeatedly running towards relatively small tornadoes which regularly form on the highlands south of Mexico City (Alýs and Medina, 2010, 169). A figure (Alýs) runs towards a tornado. The figure sometimes “enters” a tornado with a video camera in hand. On one occasion the figure is knocked down by the powerful winds and the camera falls down on the highlands’ sand, continuing to film the violent chaos of dust particles which fly around. This appears to be an example of nihilistic negation or destruction of a territory, the territory or organism that Alýs himself is. In this sense *Tornado* narrates the repeated embodiment of a will to nothingness which opposes itself to a transmutation by which the figure becomes active and liberates A Life. The figure instead nihilistically reacts to the territory that it itself is and the movement stops. What does the figure who performs such action will? It is as if the figure wills the light because it wants to liberate itself from the territory (the figure itself as territory or organism) which imprisons the Life that it *is*, but aims to do so paradoxically through a nihilistic reaction towards itself. It is as if it wills chaos and not chaosmos, A Life. This is the paradox of a nihilistic movement symptomatic of a will to nothingness, the figure who performs it does not want to be submitted to the becoming reactive that the territory is and imposes, but it does not know how to act, how to live Life, it only reacts to the living and in doing so kills the living and as such A Life.
To live A Life, to be active, is hard, like to attain to a vision of A Life in the living is hard. To live A Life is effectively against our essence, our continuously renewed becoming reactive. If the figures of solar-guided migrations are active during their migration and as such operate a deterritorialization that is absolute, as soon as they rest, they reterritorialize themselves on a territory, to protect and to conserve themselves. They have at that moment become reactive again, they survive as opposed to live A Life. They see no more the celestial sun of the Cosmos, they see the terrestrial sun reigning over the territory they occupy. Becoming reactive, our essence, always inevitably “catches up” with us. What did the figures of When Faith Moves Mountains do when they found themselves on the other side of the mountain they had moved? They probably needed to perform utilitarian functions such as going back home to feed themselves and to protect themselves from the sun, the heath and even the wind with which they previously had established a unity. They probably had to climb back the mountain or walk around it, submitting to that which the mountain imposed on them (the heavy), after having flown with it through their movement (the light). An absolute movement of the living requires effort and constancy. For a health to flow through the sickness that man and his world are, for a river of active forces to flow on an earth of reactive forces, for an absolute movement of the living to flow through the living, for a transmutation, effort and constancy is required.

There is an illusion of commitment to A Life or an illusion of absolute movement if there is a semblance of absolute movement without a figure’s movement which embodies an effort and constancy in nature. There is no effort in nature in a projection onto any of the three types of universe transcendent to nature (paradigm imaginary-transcendent). There is no effort and constancy in nature for example in Alice falling down the rabbit hole since she attains to a world which lacks a relationship of reciprocal presupposition with nature (the same can be said of “to attain to Paradise”, or to project onto Charles Avery’s The Island). Neither is there an effort and a constancy when the figure plunges towards chaos, there is no effort in death or nihilism (paradigm chaotic-noise). The effort and constancy in nature might be that which leads to death, when the effort fatally overcomes the figure, when the...
effort to attain to the vision of the celestial sun of the Cosmos or to move a mountain is hypothetically fatal, but death is the moment when the absolute movement ceases and the commitment to A Life fails. And finally, there is no effort when the figure bears with, submits to, the becoming reactive that nature is (paradigm human-actual). The submission or reaction might be thought of and felt as an effort, but it is what could be termed a reactive effort as opposed to an active effort, it is to suffer the becoming reactive which defines us and the world by essence.

Correlating to the illusions of absolute movement are the illusions of action. Corresponding to the paradigm imaginary-transcendent is the figure who is under the illusion that to act is to “project itself”, to imagine or fantasize a universe to project itself onto. To the paradigm chaotic-noise correlates the figure who is under the illusion that to act is to annihilate, to plunge towards death. To the paradigm human-actual corresponds the figure who is under the illusion that to act is to react, that to act is to perform in accordance to and as such bear with the territories that man and his world are. This figure is under the illusion of becoming active when it is in fact submitting to the becoming reactive of man and his world: to climb the mountain, to pass around it, to suffer the mountain, claiming victory and action whilst in fact performing a reaction. This figure is in Nietzsche’s Zarathoustra the donkey (or the camel), with its ‘false Yes’, the ‘Y-A, Y-A’, expression of bearing the weight of existing values, as opposed to the affirmative and true Yes of the Overman which expresses the lightness of the action (Deleuze, 2005c, 43), the lightness of living of A Life.

modest absolute movements of the living, absolute movements of the living are not defined by a quantity of movement but by a quality of movement

The effort and constancy of the movement do not need to occur on a grandiose scale. Absolute movements of the living are not defined by a quantity of movement but by a quality of movement: the active. Of what will is the action a symptom of, the affirmative will of the light or the negative will of the heavy? This has nothing to do with the quantity of movement which itself can be “measured” in terms of the relative component of movement. An absolute movement of the living is not defined by a grandiose relative component of movement. In most cases, Alyş’s actions are neither as grandiose as DG’s troubling and more or less mysterious cases, nor as
grandiose as *When Faith Moves Mountains*. A transmutation of reactive forces does not need to be on a grandiose scale. Alÿs’ actions could be categorized according to a “scale of grandiosity”. The action, the figure’s act or activity through which it lives *A Life*, can be like a “short”, “slow” and “modest” solar-guided migration which nevertheless follows absolute variables, an act or activity modest in terms of its relative component of movement but where the deterritorialization nevertheless is absolute. There can be modest movements which are symptomatic of a will to lightness, i.e. there can be modest absolute movements of the living.

*Children’s Games*, 2008-present, is an ongoing collection of video documentations of children games; for example a fully dressed man stands in a lake or sea and throws a pebble attempting to make it bounce on the surface of the water (Alÿs and Medina, 2010, 164). *Doppelgänger*, 1999-present: ‘When arriving in … (new city), wander, looking for someone who could be you. If the meeting happens, walk beside your doppelgänger until your pace adjust to his/hers’ (Alÿs and Medina, 2010, 105).

What does a man or woman who plays a children game will, of what will is his or her action symptomatic of? Like the action of the figures of *When Faith Moves Mountains* expresses not a will to move the mountain, the actions documented in *Children’s Games* express not a will to play children’s games, the act of playing remains the symptom of a “deeper” will which is its genetic element. An adult who plays a children game wills lightness, he wants to flow through the socio-biological territory “adult” which he has to bear with and which he is submitted to. He wills the light through a becoming other, and in this instance he “symptomatically” becomes child. It seems obvious that the action of Alÿs in *Doppelgänger* is not simply the fulfillment of the objective to follow someone who could be him since, in a sense, this action appears as incredibly specific and yet rather futile. What the figure (in occurrence Alÿs) wants or wills is to flow through the territory he occupies as an individual in a social landscape. Alÿs wants to flow through the physico-social boundaries that are involved in one’s interactions within a social space. He quite literally wants to become other, to become someone who looks like him, as if wanting to disappear through adopting the rhythm of a stranger which for him can be thought to embody “the social”. Alÿs wants to disappear in or as, and as such become, “the social”. This action is symptomatic of a will to lightness, not the establishment, protection or reinforcement of territorial boundaries but their
disappearance, not to submit to physico-social boundaries but to actively destroy them and flow through them liberating the Life they imprison.

to disappear: to become other and to become imperceptible

Every movement or action symptomatic of a will to lightness, in its corroboration to a becoming other (becoming wind, becoming child, becoming “the social”, etc.), involves a will to disappear (the figure disappears since it becomes other), and ultimately a will to disappear “completely”: to become imperceptible. To become imperceptible does not occur through nihilism, through a will to nothingness, through organic death, it takes place through becoming A Life, through anorganic Life. ‘The imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula.’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 342) To become imperceptible means ‘être comme tout le monde’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 342), which signifies both “to be like everyone else” and “to be like the whole world”. To become imperceptible can mean both to become “the social”, to be like everyone else, to disappear in the social as the social, and to become the whole world, to disappear in the world as the world, for example to become and as such disappear in and as the wind, flowing with a mountain in one’s movement. The will to lightness ultimately leads the immanent end of becoming, the imperceptible, one is lightest when one has disappeared in and as the whole world, when one has become A Life.

the method of analysis never involves the destination of the action or the movement

Can the actions or movements documented in Doppelgänger and Children’s Games be said to be absolute movements of the living, and as such movements of reterritorialization on the absolute, movements of reterritorialization on another absolute plane in reciprocal presupposition with nature (or absolute deterриториализацию)? A transmutation, from reactive forces to their becoming active, by definition involves a reterritorialization on the absolute since the active is precisely the absolute or A Life. To become active is to attain to the absolute or A Life. Analyzed as active, the actions documented in Doppelgänger and Children’s Games as such involve, by definition, reterritorializations on the absolute. Could it not be argued however that these actions or movements are reterritorializations on “the social” or “childhood” which are not absolute? In other words, could it not be argued that the reterritorializations are not on another absolute plane but on “the
social” or “childhood” which remain relative? One could equally argue against DG that the movement of the figures of solar-guided migrations is not one of absolute deterritorialization but simply of relative reterritorializations on the territories they pass through and on the territory which will constitute their final destination. The method of analysis needs exactly not to focus on the destination of movement (“the social”, “childhood”, the final destination of the migrating figures) but on the quality of movement: active or reactive. The destination remains an end, it remains the symptom of a will that is either a will of the light or of the heavy. The actions documented in Doppelgänger and Children’s Games are movements of reterritorialization on the absolute because they are active. Through them one becomes other, but the absolute is not attained in the other (in the destination), it is attained in becoming itself: the “adult” attains to the absolute not by attaining to “childhood” per se (the destination), but in the movement between “adulthood” and “childhood”, i.e. in becoming itself. The method of analysis of actions or movements never involves the destination of the action or the movement, but always and only its quality.

quantity: difference of degrees in the experience of the absolute movement of the living as a tale

Absolute movements of the living appear as troubling and more or less mysterious to different degrees. Tens of millions of chaffinches assembling together or five hundred people moving a mountain are cases more mysterious than an adult playing a children’s game or someone following a stranger that looks like him or her. Correlatively, the narrations of absolute movements of the living come to be experienced as tale to different degrees. They are to different degrees experienced as the troubling, mysterious and rare cases of a health in the sickness that man and his world are. As previously discussed, absolute movements of the living are defined by a quality of movement, the active, and not by a quantity of movement, by the grandiosity of their reciprocally presupposing relative component of movement. But the difference in degrees according to which their narrations are experienced as mysterious and consequently as tale, depend upon their quantity of movement. In other words, the more grandiose the relative component of an active movement (of an absolute movement of the living), the more its narration will appear as a tale, as troubling, mysterious and rare. A thousand chaffinches might assemble through a
movement that is active, but an assembly of tens of millions of them, a high quantity of movement of the same quality, appears mysterious and as a tale to a higher degree.

To act, to live A Life, is to resist. Actions are acts of resistance, they resist the becoming reactive which forms our essence, they resist the living in order to liberate A Life, to allow A Life to flow through the enslaving territories inside which we live (including our organisms). For absolute movements of the living to be modest, and as such for their narrations to be experienced as tale to a low degree is not a negative aspect. On the contrary, by being modest they positively acknowledge that acts of resistance don’t need to be grandiose and spectacular, that figures of resistance don’t need to be heroic, and that absolute movements of the living don’t need to be epic.

the paradigm to live A Life and the possible universe

When Faith Moves Mountains, Children’s Games and Doppelgänger embody the paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life. As for works which embody the first three paradigms, works which embody this paradigm are said to correspond to and to involve in their aesthetic experiences a movement from nature to a possible universe. In relation to this paradigm, the possible universe is narrated: for example “the universe” where five hundred people moved a mountain, “the universe” where tens of millions of chaffinches assembled near Thourne, “the universe” where an adult plays children games, etc. This narrated universe effectively is our nature, but our nature where the troubling, mysterious and rare case of an absolute movement of the living has taken place, it is “the universe” of the tale (of what comes to be experienced to a certain degree as tale). The possible universe attained through the aesthetic experience (the narrated universe) is our nature, which through one or many figures’ performance of an act or activity, is transversed by an absolute movement of the living. Associated to the paradigm to live A Life is the type of possible universe termed nature transversed by an absolute movement of the living, a new type which adds itself to the types termed haptic vision, nature hallucinated and new nature. In an artwork which embodies the paradigm to live A Life, narrated is simultaneously an absolute movement of the living and a possible universe (our nature transversed by it).
In terms of the aesthetic experience of a work which embodies the paradigm to live A Life, the viewer does not go through the absolute movement of the living that the figure, subject of the narration, goes through. The figure through its act or activity goes through an absolute deterritorialization. The viewer on the other hand is effectively as if told a story (or narration), she goes through a relative de- and re-territorialization from nature to the narration of nature transversed by an absolute movement of the living. This aesthetic experience is similar to the relative de- and re-territorialization given by a work which embodies the renewing quality of movement, a work which gives to experience a new nature. The narration of nature transversed by an absolute movement is effectively the experience of a new possibility for nature, of nature metamorphosed, of nature transversed by a health, by a breath of air. The narration is experienced as the possibility to act and as such to resist: our nature as world where it is possible to live A Life.

The departure from DG’s conceptualization of art which this paradigm involves is pronounced. As previously discussed, this departure is explicit in the difference between the absolute movements which for example Figural painting expresses and the absolute movements of the living conceptualized in this text. The expression of A Life in the living never involves narration, it is not our nature as world where it is possible to live A Life, it is an expression of A Life in reciprocal presupposition with nature, a vision which has nothing to narrate, no story to tell, it is and gives A Life. Nor does the expression of A Life involve the experience of a new possibility for nature, i.e. the narration of nature transversed by a breath of air, it is and gives a breath of air, it works directly on the nerves, and not through what is experienced as a tale. Whereas Bacon’s Figures result from acts of resistance, Alÿs narrates the stories of figures who perform acts of resistance.
introduction to Doig’s work

Doig approaches the narration of absolute movements of the living differently to Alýs and Huyghe. He neither fictionalizes absolute movement (Huyghe), nor does he narrate absolute movements of which the relative components express an absolute, i.e. absolute movements of the living (Alýs). Doig’s approach is to narrate, to figuratively paint, a relative component of movement as an act or activity in nature through which A Life is lived. Doig’s paintings are the narrations or figurations of figures which perform ordinary acts or activities in nature, they might play ping pong or cricket, canoe, climb a tree, swim, walk, paint, etc., or even be immobile. These movements are different to Alýs’ actions in that their relative components do not express an absolute, they are not absolute movements of the living. But Doig’s approach is to “tell us”, to narrate to us, to figuratively depict, that through such movements A Life can be lived, that they can be the movements through which A Life is lived. Doig’s work, for example Untitled (Ping Pong), narrates to us that although the relative component of movement “playing ping pong” does not refer to a movement of absolute deterritorialization like for example “tens of millions of chaffinches assembling together” does, playing ping pong can be an activity through which the figure goes through an absolute deterritorialization. Untitled (Ping Pong) tells us that A Life can be lived through playing ping pong. Doig’s work tells us that playing ping pong or cricket, canoeing, climbing a tree, swimming, etc., can be activities through which absolute movement is performed, through which another absolute plane in reciprocal presupposition with nature can be attained, through which absolute variables can be followed, through which a unity with the Outside can be established. Doig for example portrays to us that the ping pong player can

83 Doig paints figuratively, and as such his work is intrinsically illustrative and narrative. Deleuze links ‘the figurative’ with narration and illustration (Deleuze, 2002, 12). Doig paints the living, figures (figurative painting), he does not like Bacon paint A Life in the living, Figures (Figural painting).

find himself not under the terrestrial sun which oversees his play but as having established new relationships with the sun, the ping pong ball, the table, the bat, the wall next to him and the surrounding environment by which the localization of his movement within such a scene has become cosmic, celestial, absolute. The figure plays ping pong in the transcendental field: not in nature per se, although necessarily in nature, but in the transcendental field, the pure plane of immanence or the Outside. Doig paints the scene of a figure playing ping pong as if this movement simultaneously takes place in nature and in the transcendental field (how Doig achieves this through the use of painting is discussed below in relation to both Untitled (Ping Pong) and Paragon). This does not mean however that Doig’s work is Figural, that his paintings express A Life in the living. Doig’s work is closer to the ontology of the photograph developed in this text than to Figural painting. Since he paints figuratively, Doig paints the living and not A Life in the living (Figural painting). But he paints the living as point of view on and from A Life and that has consequences for that which he narrates.

Engagement with the second paradigm through painting as a means by which to embody the paradigm to live A Life

Doig’s work is an engagement through painting with the second paradigm of commitment to A Life the living as point of view on and from A Life. His work, like the extra-ordinary photograph, although obviously through different aesthetic means, gives an experience of the living as dispersion of the Outside. Doig figuratively paints the living in such a way that whilst the Outside is nowhere to be seen in the painting, the living or nature (for example a ping pong player) appears suspended in the Outside, it appears as dispersion of the Outside, and as such it appears simultaneously as point of view on the Outside (as if in nature facing the Outside as it disperses itself towards our eyes) and point of view from the Outside (as if in the Outside whilst it disperses itself through our eyes). The figurative painting narrates playing ping pong as activity through which the figure performs an absolute movement of the living, establishes a unity with A Life, as an activity through which the figure lives A Life.

Doig does not express A Life in a sensation, he does not express the constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is (vision), and yet his work necessarily gives
to experience something different to the photograph which itself shares its genesis with that which is in its point of view. Doig’s work is neither genesis as the composition of chaos expressing A Life in a sensation (Figural painting which involves co-creation with A Life and a sensation), nor the capture or cut across the genesis of nature (extra-ordinary photograph which involves neither co-creation nor sensation, like science). Doig’s work is genesis as dispersion of the Outside, it involves co-creation but no sensation. As previously discussed, the second paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life which Doig engages with through painting corresponds to a concern with what has been termed the reciprocal presupposition, tension or relation of territoriality between the living and the Outside. This relation of territoriality is exactly what Doig paints: the figure plays ping pong in the Outside, not per se in nature, although necessarily in nature; Doig paints the ping pong player as tension between nature and the Outside. But for Doig this is not an end in itself, it serves to narrate any act or activity as a movement through which a unity with the Outside is established, as a movement through which A Life is lived. Doig’s engagement with the second paradigm is a means by which to embody the fourth paradigm to live A Life.

not an accident in nature but nature as accident, a new aesthetic in Doig after 1999

Results from the engagement of Doig’s work with the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life that there is in several of his paintings an aesthetic similar to the one which describes the extra-ordinary photograph. Generally referenced are works by Doig that are post-1999 and which depict figures and not only landscapes. Prior to 1999, it seems that a constant in his work was to paint a chaos of figurative elements (like snow or branches) or a unity of tone and hue, beyond or through which a landscape can be perceived (a house, a lake, a snowboarder on a ski slope, etc.). Doig refers to this as: ‘paintings with a proliferation of matter on the surface of the canvas. I had wanted to get away from that device of always ‘looking through’, whether it be trees, branches or snow – in to the painting’ (Doig, 2007, 135). Beyond this ‘device’ or “aesthetic”, there seems to be a tendency in works post-1999 where

nature itself comes to appear as accident: not the accidental composition of trees, branches or snow in nature, not an accident in nature, but nature as accident, the accident of nature. This aesthetic can be defined as an aesthetic of nature as accident, heterogeneous parts, interstices and Outside.

Untitled (Ping Pong), heterogeneous parts and colour

Untitled (Ping Pong). The painting is like a collage or capture of clearly defined heterogeneous forms or parts: some parts are organic (the player, the forest), others are geometric (the wall, the table), some parts are monochromatic and monotonic shores (some parts of the wall, the table) whilst others are of broken tones and painted with looser brush strokes (other parts of the wall, the grass, the forest). Untitled (Ping Pong) appears as collaged or captured “part by part” (parts of sky and of trees and of wall and of grass and … etc.). There is a sense of perspective but it is as if it is established by the juxtaposition of heterogeneous flat planes along the depth of field, denying a smooth continuity of space along this depth (the flat planes of the forest and sky, of the wall, of the table and of the grass). These heterogeneous parts, and it is as such that they are qualified as heterogeneous, do not primarily relate to each other through an associative unity. An associative unity constructs and “unites” space as a smooth continuity of space along the depth of field and across the viewpoint, as it is ordinarily perceived through human perception. The unity of the heterogeneous parts in Untitled (Ping Pong) is on the contrary primarily dispersive: they primarily find their unity in relation to an Outside of which they are the dispersion, denying to a certain degree the possibility of a smooth continuity of space. The associative unity of the view in the painting is doubled by the dispersive unity of its parts, the smooth continuity of space is fissured by interstices between its parts.

By engaging with the paradigm the living as point of view on and from A Life like Struth, but through the medium of painting, Doig has evidently more freedom than Struth in articulating the dispersive unity of a view. Colours are neither restricted to ordinary perceptions (Struth), nor do the pure internal relations of colour (hot-cold, expansion-contraction) serve to establish differential relations to construct a Figure (Bacon). Colour is dispersed into each depicted part or object like the colours of a rainbow are dispersed from white light (the wall in Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre or
the trees in *Red Boat (Imaginary Boys)* for example). The attribution (or dispersion) of colour to each part is more or less random or accidental. In *Untitled (Ping Pong)* there are two directions in which the view is split into heterogeneous parts: across the viewpoint and along the depth of field. There are the heterogeneous flat planes of which the juxtaposition forms the depth of field; and in turn each of these planes is split across the viewpoint: the furthest plane along the depth of field is split as different parts of sky and trees, and the plane juxtaposed next to it is split into parts of wall. Each of these parts are attributed a colour more or less at random, denying the smooth continuity of space of the sky for example. Each flat plane along the depth of field is as if a two dimensional mesh subdivided into parts, each part capturing a more or less random dispersion of the Outside. Between these flat planes or meshes, and in-between their respective parts, are the interstices which lead to and relate each part to the Outside nowhere to be seen in the painting. The painting does not give a vision of the Outside, it gives a view of the living as dispersion of the Outside. Through the haptic vision (Figural painting), one sees not the universe in colours but the universe *through colour*, A Life expressed through the modulation of the pure internal relations of colour. In Doig’s work, one does not see the universe *through colour*, one sees the universe in colours (the living) but the colours, as more or less random distribution, deny a smooth continuity of space and as such appear to result from a dispersion of the Outside.

*Paragon*, to flatten sensation on different non contiguous levels

In *Paragon*, the orange field is different to the monochromatic and monotonic orange field often seen in Bacon, which expresses the infinite movements and speeds of chaos as if “prior”, or “after”, being given any consistency. This “level 0” of the constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is, is the “initial” level with which to begin to establish differential relations, to modulate colour. In Doig the bright and intense orange field is the figuration of what appears to be a beach. *Paragon* denies a smooth continuity of space doubling the associative unity of the point of view with a dispersive unity through the use of large flat planes: the boldly contoured parts of the vegetation on the left and top, of the sky on the top right corner and of the sea on the right. The beach, like the other parts, appears to a certain degree heterogeneous to all the others; all parts find their unity in a dispersive unity which relates them to an Outside absent in the painting. But there also is an aspect according to which this
figuratively depicted beach relates to the monochromatic orange field in Bacon. The bright orange colour of the beach has an intensity which highly contrasts with the less vivid colours of the vegetation, sea, sky and figures; and the beach itself seems defined by the contours of that which surrounds it rather than possessing its “own” contour, as if the orange field simultaneously is a beach and a background to the less brightly colored parts that appear to be laid down on top of it. The orange colour expresses an intensity beyond the toned down and naturalistic colours of the vegetation, sea, sky and figures. It serves figuratively in that it gives a colour to the beach, but it also appears as an intense background light. It is as if from this vivid and bright light that the other parts are dispersed, as if the living is a “toning down” of this intense light. There is not however a modulation of colour which establishes a continuous variation between this orange light and the other parts, the painting is not a set of differential relations expressing the Life of the scene, the Life of the figures, of the vegetation, of the sea, etc. The figures do not appear to simultaneously emerge from and dissolve into the orange light as Bacon’s Figures often do. The difference between the vivid light of the beach/background and the other toned down and naturalistically colored parts nevertheless serves to express a difference that is not a difference in actual or optical space. This difference is expressed in a difference of intensity of colour, and as such through a “kind of” modulation of colour, but not the modulation proper to Figural painting through which a continuous variation of differential relations is established and correlative a haptic space “opened”. The beach/background is not only a figurative depiction and a background to the figures’ play in three-dimensional optical space, in relation to the other parts of the painting it simultaneously captures and expresses a different level of sensation.

Bacon expresses A Life in a sensation, the bodies without organs that he paints account for the vertical line of genesis “in its entirety”, i.e. from the infinite speeds of chaos all the way up or down to its actualization (hence the produced or consequential resemblance of organs). In other words Bacon expresses “all the levels” of the difference of levels that the sensation is, and it is as such that his work expresses an indiscernibility between the living and A Life. On the other hand, as previously discussed, the photograph flattens sensation on a single level, a level beyond the threshold of human perception, a level which corresponds to the plane of reference that the photographic apparatus is, a level perceived by a scientific or
slicing eye. The photograph necessarily flattens sensation on a single level because the photographic apparatus, as plane of reference, “sees” and cuts across the Outside with a single plane that is uniform across its surface. One could think of the plane of reference that the photographic apparatus is as a two-dimensional, flat and uniform plane cutting across the Outside on a single flat and uniform level. This effectively means that a photograph cannot give to experience more than one level of sensation. In composing an indiscernibility between the living and the Outside, between the sensed (the living) and the sensing (A Life), Bacon’s work can be said to express “all the levels” and “the contiguity between the levels” which constitute the sensation.

*Paragon* is different to both Bacon’s work and to photography. In *Paragon*, the parts of the vegetation, sea, sky and figures are the flattening of sensation on a certain level (or on different levels close to one another) and the part of the beach/background is the flattening of sensation on a lower (or higher) level closer to the infinite movements and speeds of chaos. As previously discussed, the use of colour in Doig serves to deny a smooth continuity of space and express the dispersive unity of a view like the extra-ordinary photograph does. Only as opposed to the photograph, in *Paragon*, the dispersed parts are captured on different levels “of dispersion”, in other words it flattens sensation on different levels. To think of *Paragon* “photographically”, its corresponding plane of reference by which it cuts across the Outside is neither flat nor uniform like that of the photographic apparatus, its plane has different depths by which it captures the Outside or A Life on different levels “of dispersion” or “of genesis”, at different “heights” along the vertical line of genesis that it is. The part of the beach captures the genesis at a low level on its vertical line whereas the other parts capture it at higher levels, i.e. closer to that which is perceived through ordinary human perception (hence for example the figures are fully formed and easily recognizable). *Paragon* captures or cuts across different depths along the vertical line of genesis.

To return to Deleuze’s discussion of Lewis Carroll, with regards to the reciprocal presupposition or relation of immanence between a nature and an Outside, *Sylvie and Bruno* operates a progress from *Through the Looking Glass* which itself is a progress from *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. In *Sylvie and Bruno* the reciprocal presupposition between a nature and an Outside is achieved in that a relation of immanence between the two is established: *Sylvie and Bruno* is not the two stories of
two worlds, nature (Victorian era) and an Outside (Fairyland), it is the single story of an imbrication between the two, of their becoming indiscernible. To compare painting and literature on ontological terms, Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne in comparison to Paragon is (ontologically) closer to Sylvie and Bruno in that Bacon establishes an indiscernibility between the living and the Outside. Paragon in a sense is closer to Alice's Adventures in Wonderland which does not fully realize an indiscernibility between nature (the nature Alice is in before falling down the rabbit hole) and the Outside (what Deleuze calls the world of depths), in that the book, or Alice, “only” establishes surfaces in-between the two (as opposed to an indiscernibility). Alice, after falling down the rabbit hole, ‘progressively conquers surfaces. She climbs or climbs back to the surface. She creates surfaces. Movements of sinking and burying give way to light lateral movements of sliding’ (Deleuze, 1993, 34). From the world of depths or the Outside, Alice climbs back to the surface or the living, through the creation of “intermediary” surfaces. The large and heterogeneous flat planes in Paragon are surfaces on the Outside, on the world of depths. From the intense and bright orange light itself captured as a surface (the beach), Doig creates other surfaces by which to climb back to the living from the depths of the Outside (the surfaces/flat planes of the vegetation, of the sea, of the sky). In another establishment of a relation between science and photography, Deleuze refers to Carroll as a mathematician or a photographer in relation to his approach to literature with Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: ‘Mathematics is good because it establishes surfaces, and pacify a world whose mixtures in depths would be terrible: Carroll the mathematician or Carroll the photographer’ (Deleuze, 1993, 34). Doig, like Carroll, establishes or traces surfaces on the Outside. As opposed to the photograph, Paragon has, like Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, many different surfaces on different levels by which to climb back to nature from the world of depths. These planes or surfaces on the Outside are different levels of sensation, different depths along the vertical line of genesis, ‘but the world of depths still rumbles under the surface’ (Deleuze, 1993, 34-35) or surfaces. The Outside still remains or rumbles under the surfaces created by Paragon and Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, an indiscernibility between nature and the Outside is as such not established.
In opposition to both Bacon and the photograph, Doig flattens sensation on different non contiguous levels: Paragon is the flattening of sensation on the lower level that the surface of beach is and on the higher level(s) that the surfaces of the vegetation, sea, sky and figures are. Can Paragon be said to express the constitutive difference of levels that the sensation is, to express A Life in a sensation? No, Doig “misses” the sensation since A Life ‘still rumbles under the surface[s]’ he establishes. In Paragon, the Outside or world of depths still remains under its dispersed parts even if these parts cut across it on different levels. Paragon does not account for “the whole” of the vertical line genesis like Bacon’s bodies without organs do, Paragon only expresses cuts across it on different non contiguous levels, a style of painting which remains figurative. Paragon can in one sense be thought of as photographic, but as a strange kind of photography which flattens sensation not on a single, flat and uniform level but on multiple non contiguous levels. Or, Paragon can inversely be thought of as Figural, but a strange kind of Figural painting which does not express sensation but flattens it on different levels unable to (and not wanting to) express an indiscernibility between the living and the Outside. This “ambiguity” between the photographic and the Figural is the strength of Doig’s work, and it is the property by which Doig is said to paint hallucinations.

Doig and hallucination, the hallucinatory cubist eye

Doig’s work is experienced as being of nature, and simultaneously as the view (his work remains figurative) of a landscape suspended in the Outside. Doig paints a view by decomposing it in surfaces each of which expresses a different level along its vertical line of genesis. As such, the view, like the extra-ordinary photograph, although on more than one level, expresses the relation of territoriality or tension between the living and the Outside, hence nature appears as suspended in the Outside. Through such view, nature is experienced as point of view on and from the Outside: it is as if the viewer cannot know if she is “standing” in nature experiencing different levels of nature’s genesis or if she is “standing” in the Outside experiencing different levels of its dispersion. She ultimately experiences both “positions” or points of view simultaneously, experiencing the simultaneity of or reciprocal presupposition between the living and the Outside. Whereas the extra-ordinary
photograph gives an aesthetic experience of nature hallucinated, Doig can be said to figuratively paint hallucinations of nature. To paint nature as a hallucination is for Doig perhaps an end in itself in his landscape paintings which contain no figures. But when he paints figures performing specific acts or activities, Doig narrates to us that the figures, through ordinary movements such as playing ping pong or cricket, have attained to a unity with the Outside, that they are, whilst necessarily in nature, suspended in the Outside. Through a figuration of nature which involves hallucination as its mode of aesthetic experience, Doig tells us that these figures live A Life. His work gives us neither the haptic eye of Figural painting, nor the scientific or slicing eye of the extra-ordinary photograph. It gives us a kind of hallucinatory cubist eye which breaks up a view not into multiple facets or surfaces corresponding to many perspectives on objects in the view, but into multiple surfaces expressing different levels along the view’s vertical line of genesis. Not a cubism which remains optical, giving to see nature simultaneously from different perspectives like a myriad of optical views, but a cubism which gives to see nature as different levels of dispersion or genesis of the Outside like a myriad of hallucinated views in a single viewpoint. Through the hallucinatory cubist eye the Outside is nowhere to be seen, and yet nature is experienced as suspended in the Outside and as different levels of genesis of the Outside. It is through the hallucinatory cubist eye that the ping pong player or the cricket players appear to be playing in the transcendental field, not perse in nature, although necessarily in nature.

*radical invention of an articulation between an associative unity and a dispersive unity*

Although Doig’s figurations of nature do not involve the radical invention of the Figure from chaos (Bacon), his procedure requires as much invention or “style”. For example *Stag*, 2002-2005, *Red Boat (Imaginary Boys)*, 2004, *Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre*, 2000-2002, or *Grande Riviere*, 2001-2002, can also be analyzed as an associative unity doubled by a dispersive unity. In each case the “style” of each painting needs to be understood not as modulation of differential relations of colour and the emergence of asignifying marks through the diagram, but as the invention of an articulation between an associative unity and a dispersive unity of parts that are heterogeneous as the flattening of sensation on different non contiguous levels. Each painting is the re-invention or re-instantiation of the aesthetic of nature as accident,
heterogeneous parts, interstices and Outside, each painting is a new manner by which
to paint a hallucination.

_Doig paints the possible universe, Doig and Alýs_

As embodying the paradigm of commitment to A Life to live A Life, Doig’s work
narrates a possible universe, the work is the figuration of our nature transversed by
an absolute movement of the living. _Untitled (Ping Pong)_ and _Paragon_ are nature
transversed by an absolute movement of the living in that the activity of playing ping
pong or cricket is narrated as that through which absolute movement is performed, as
that through which a unity with the Outside is established. Doig’s work depicts our
nature as world where it is possible to live A Life, and as such resist, even through
ordinary acts or activities such as canoeing, climbing a tree, swimming, walking, etc.
The departure from DG’s conceptualization of art is in a sense the same as for Alýs.
Similarly to Alýs’ work, it is as if the viewer is told a story, the story of the
possibility to live A Life. But Doig’s stories, as opposed to Alýs’ work, are not of
relative components of movement which to some extent appear as troubling,
mysterious and rare (for example “five hundred people moved a mountain”): there is
nothing mysterious about the relative components of movement narrated by Doig
(“playing ping pong”, “canoeing”, etc.). What is troubling and mysterious in Doig’s
stories is that the figures have attained to a unity with the Outside through the
performance of such ordinary movements. It is as such that Doig’s work is
experienced as tales of resistance: tales of nature transversed by a health, transversed
by a breath of air which the figures have attained to through their specific and
ordinary acts or activities. To resist and to live A Life by playing ping pong appears
as a tale. Doig’s work tightly relates to Alýs’: a breath of air through moving a
mountain, playing children games, playing cricket, canoeing, etc. The departure of
Doig’s work from DG’s conceptualization of art is in a sense not as pronounced as
that of Alýs’ work because although their work follows the same paradigm of
commitment to A Life, Doig’s work has as its mode of aesthetic experience
hallucination, which itself involves the establishment of a unity with the Outside.
The figures’ movements are in Doig’s work experienced through the hallucinatory
cubist eye, and as such from and through the Outside.
Sometimes Doig’s figures look back at us as in *Gasthof Zur Muldentalsperre* or *100 Years Ago* (*Carrera*), 2001. It is as if these figures invite us and wait for us in the possible universe that they stand in. This is ultimately what Alÿs’ and Doig’s work do, their figures invite us and wait for us in our very own nature, but as if in a new nature where it is possible to live A Life. They give us hope, the hope to resist, to act, the hope for a breath of air, the hope for A Life in our own nature.

*new definition of art: art is a commitment to A Life and as such it is the movement from nature to a possible universe.*

Art following DG’s conception can be said to have the following definition: art is the expression of A Life in the living. A work which embodies either one of the four paradigms of commitment to A Life both is and gives through its aesthetic experience a movement from nature to a possible universe. From the expanded conceptualization of art stems a new definition of art: *art is a commitment to A Life and as such it is the movement from nature to a possible universe.*

This definition encompasses the four paradigms of commitment to A Life: *A Life in the living, the living as point of view on and from A Life, new living emerging from A Life and to live A Life.* Art commits to A Life by opening our world onto itself and as such onto the absolute that A Life is, giving consistency to possible universes that themselves are and as such express A Life, the onto-genetic condition of the living or the lived, our world absolutely decentred from humans. Art commits to A Life or the Outside by giving us views through which our world is experienced as point of view on the Outside and point of view from and through the Outside, views through which our world is experienced as the hallucination of an alien world, as the possible universe that it is. Art commits to A Life by giving us views of our world inside which new forms have emerged, our world simultaneously torn open onto the Outside and re-patched by its dispersion, possible universes as new possibilities for our world. Art commits to A Life by giving us narrations of our world transversed by a breath of air from the Outside, narrations of the rare cases when one or many
figures perform an absolute movement, the narration of possible universes where it is possible, in our world, to live A Life.

The expanded conceptualization of art correlative embodies a commitment to A Life or the Outside and as such to immanence, and a commitment to the possible, an important aesthetic category for DG’s conceptualization of art: the possible against man and his world, against the living or the lived, or we shall suffocate. Each paradigm of commitment to A Life corresponds to a movement which leads to a possible universe which is of a specific type (haptic vision, nature hallucinated, new nature or nature traversed by an absolute movement of the living) and which remediates the suffocation that man and his world are in its own way.
Table 2. Paradigms of commitment to A Life, three levels of expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm of commitment to A Life</th>
<th>Type of possible universe – movement from nature to …</th>
<th>Mode of aesthetic experience</th>
<th>Corresponding quality of movement</th>
<th>Description of experience</th>
<th>Movement, or de- and re-territorialization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Life in the living</strong></td>
<td>haptic vision</td>
<td>vision from a view of nature or the living to a vision of A Life in the living</td>
<td>haptic movement is and opens itself onto the absolute</td>
<td>vision of nature opened onto itself and as such onto the absolute that A Life is</td>
<td>absolute deterritorialization (and reterritorialization on the absolute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the living as point of view on and from A Life</strong></td>
<td>nature hallucinated</td>
<td>hallucination from a view of nature to nature experienced as a hallucination</td>
<td>hallucinatory movement is simultaneously absolute and relative</td>
<td>nature experienced as point of view on and from and through the Outside or A Life, nature as possible universe, nature as the hallucination of an alien world</td>
<td>best described in terms of movement as the reciprocal presupposition between absolute movement and relative movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>new living emerging from A Life</strong></td>
<td>new nature</td>
<td>view from a view of nature to the view of a new nature</td>
<td>renewing movement is the incessantly renewed creation and emergence of the universe</td>
<td>view of our nature metamorphosed, nature simultaneously torn open onto the Outside (or A Life) and “re-patched” by its dispersions</td>
<td>relative de- and re-territorialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>to live A Life</strong></td>
<td>nature transversed by an absolute movement of the living</td>
<td>narration from nature to the narration of nature transversed by an absolute movement of the living</td>
<td>not applicable this paradigm is not concerned with the nature of movement but with the performance of movement</td>
<td>narration of our nature as world where it is possible to live A Life, where it is possible to perform an absolute movement of the living, to act and as such resist</td>
<td>figure (subject of narration); an absolute movement of the living, an absolute deterritorialization viewer: relative de- and re-territorialization (in Doig’s case: the movement corresponding to the mode of aesthetic experience hallucination)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

DG’s conceptualization of art is the expression of A Life in the living. It is, essentially, at its core, a radical commitment to A Life. The problem this text engages with is the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art, an approach which hoped to develop a new conceptualization of art which remains close to the essence of DG’s conceptualization: the commitment to A Life. This involves a new conceptualization of art which describes a commitment to simultaneously movement (A Life is movement), immanence (A Life is pure immanence) and the possible (A Life leads to the possible). The strategy to achieve this expansion is the proposition that the expression of A Life in the living is only one possible way by which a work can embody a commitment to A Life, that it is only one possible paradigm of commitment to A Life amongst others. This text conceptualizes three new paradigms of commitment to A Life, forming an expanded conceptualization of art encompassing four paradigms (including the one defined by DG). The expanded conceptualization gives rise to a new definition of art: art is a commitment to A Life and as such it is the movement from nature to a possible universe.

A commitment to A Life is not a disengagement with nature or the living, this would be a paradox, a contradiction, since they mutually presuppose each other. On the contrary, a commitment to A Life, following the four paradigms, has the fourfold purpose: to give visions of nature opened onto itself and as such onto the infinite that it is; to reveal our ordinary views of nature as points of view on and from the infinite inside which we live and which lives inside us; to launch nature towards the infinite so that it (re-)emerges anew, metamorphosed as a new nature; and to narrate the stories of figures who live in nature as in the infinite, to narrate the performance of acts or activities through which the infinite is attained and lived. A commitment to A Life is always to give back to nature its infinity, and to restore its infinite potentialities. A commitment to A Life is in a sense against the living or the lived, against man and his world, but for man and his world through (re-)discovering their absoluteness, through the embrace of the Life that they are.

There are four paradigms of commitment to A Life: A Life in the living, the living as point of view on and from A Life, new living emerging from A Life and to live A Life.
The first one corresponds to DG’s conceptualization of art, and the last three are conceptualized in this text. Each of the first three paradigms corresponds to the emphasis on one of the three qualities of movement, as if investigating the nature of movement, i.e. the nature of the relationship between its relative and absolute components, the nature of the relationship between the living and A Life. The fourth paradigm corresponds to another concern: the performance of movement, the performance of an act or activity as that through which A Life is lived. These four paradigms are inspired from and conceptualized through the analysis of works by five artists: Francis Bacon, Thomas Struth, Pierre Huyghe, Francis Alÿs and Peter Doig. The four paradigms are linked together by a specific logic concerning the nature and the performance of movement, a logic by which the expansion of DG’s conceptualization of art (the creation of new paradigms) is not simply arbitrary. This logic is not a predetermined logic illustrated by the works discussed in this text, on the contrary, it is the intuition that works by these five artists engage with A Life through different forms of commitment that led to the emergence of this logic. Other works by other artists could potentially inspire the conceptualization of other paradigms of commitment to A Life following this same logic, or lead to the emergence of a new logic by which DG’s conceptualization of art could be expanded differently than it is in text. The difficulty resides in conceptualizing new paradigms that actually describe ways to commit to A Life without falling into illusions of commitment to A Life.

In addition to the four paradigms of commitment to A Life, this text conceptualizes three paradigms of illusion of commitment to A Life termed human-actual, imaginary-transcendent and chaotic-noise. The total of seven paradigms define the boundaries of a conceptualization of art centered on the aim to embody, and push the boundaries of what it means to embody, a commitment to A Life without falling into illusions: A Life versus illusion of A Life, vision or hallucination versus imagination or fantasy, becoming versus projection or death, breath of air versus suffocation, transcendental outside versus transcendent or terrestrial outside, action or absolute movement of the living versus reaction, the light versus the heavy, etc.

A commitment to A Life always involves in different ways the decentralization of humans into the infinite transcendental plane of immanence inside which they live and which lives inside them. A commitment to A Life against man and his world, for
man and his world: ‘a decentring of man to better plunge it back in its living environment and as such find again the lost unity’ (Dosse, 2007, 205).
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