The Aftermath of Political Violence:

The Opposition’s Second Generation in the Post-Coup Chile and its Familial Memory

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I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own.

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the aftermath and afterlife of violence (Gómez-Barris 2009) in post-coup Chile from the perspective of the second generations of victims of state violence perpetrated during the dictatorial period (1973-1988), the modes of inheritance of family political memories and the mechanisms of inhabitation of such family legacies. Drawing on Plummer’s ‘documents of life’ approach (Plummer 2001) and Avery Gordon’s theory of haunting (Gordon 1998), the research is based on thirty one family life story interviews and two group interviews.

This thesis critically dialogues with the Holocaust tradition and its legacies for the memory field, arguing for a critical awareness of ‘what is helped and what is hindered’ by its lens (Huyssen 2003). Departing from the widespread belief that trauma is something ‘other’ to everyday life, this thesis is based on Das’ assertion that political violence unfolds in the everyday life and its modes of inhabitation (Das 2007). Denaturalizing the family as a site of ‘pure memories’, the thesis is focused on family political memories of state violence and their modes of remembering and transmission to the second generation. It explores the way in which political violence has been passed on to the second generation in the form of familial legacies and embedded in local patterns of political, social and family relationships. The thesis draws attention to the context in which these memories are produced, but also sheds light on how they are transformed into stubborn memories through their familial transmission. Basing itself on this double perspective, the thesis illustrates how, as a consequence of the politics of fear, opposition memory became invested as a family possession. It explores how political memory was at the same time both something to conceal and something to inhabit and own, triggering a sense of loyalty and belonging. The thesis also shows how not every experience is rendered as a family memory but those that are undergo a process of selection in which gendered models of family relationships also play a role. Examining the production of family countermemories, the thesis concludes that the second generation makes of family memory not only a place for tradition and affective ties, but also for contestation, moral interpellation and rupture.
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While I was writing this thesis an important personal event took place: the birth of my son Mateo. So the first words are for him, for all that it has meant for him to have a mother immersed in books, ghosts and writing, and for having made of his life a story of airplanes, farewells and airports since he was born.

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Preface

In 1973 the three-year long socialist government of Salvador Allende was abruptly interrupted by a Military Coup, which was the prelude to 17 years of dictatorship in Chile. On the 11th September, La Moneda Palace was bombed by a section of the army which considered that the country was on the verge of a civil war. Public activities were forbidden, unions were dismantled and a politics of fear was put into practice. After the coup, a neoliberal regime was installed which had a deep impact on Chilean culture and the local regimes of memory. It was a time of persecution, death, unemployment and exile for some; but a time of order, stability, privatization and enrichment for others.

I was born in 1978, during Pinochet’s regime of fear. I remember my childhood: I believed there were prehistoric animals hidden under the carpet, fluorescent spiders creeping along the walls at night and giant insects living in the garden. Although those fantasies were part of my daily life, I never talked about them to anyone, not even my parents. I was a child with a strong sense of privacy. As a child of opponents of an authoritarian regime, I was aware of a radical distinction between inside and outside, between privacy and social relationships, between home, neighborhood and school. At home we were allowed to do things that outside home we could not do; there were family stories that could only be told at home. I always knew it was a secret that my parents had been members of the Communist Party before the coup and that my father went into clandestinity for months. The story of my grandfather’s kidnapping by the secret police and his experience of being tortured was never told to anyone, to the extent that it still sounds like a fictional memory to me. Despite the smoothness of everyday life of my childhood, I grew up feeling some aspects of my personal life were secrets I had to protect from others. It was not the told story alone which shaped my sense of self; those unsayable stories were equally important. At the heart of this idea, it was the feeling that in the presence of others I had to make a great effort. I could not just be who I was; I had to be someone else. In every social encounter - outside my family - there was implied a process of simulation. From a very early age, I learnt to be two: one who follows the rules and one who silently distrusts them.

I remember the end of the dictatorship in 1988 as one of the happiest days ever. I was 12 years old and for first time we could use the public space to expose our secret. After decades of social movements, the opposition managed to win the Plebiscite under the slogan “Chile, la Alegría Ya
Viene”. These were years of social euphoria during which a significant number of exiles returned to the country. But afterwards, I forgot about politics and lived my adolescence intensively. Despite the fact that during my childhood being part of the opposition to Pinochet had been fundamental to my family identity, after 1988 the past did not find an easy role in the present. Looking back on my own story I find no memories related to the decades of fear until 1998. My personal amnesia is correlated with a broader phenomenon of forgetting, but also with long term forms of memories which I aim to illuminate in this thesis.

In 1998, however, Pinochet was detained in London and the House of Lords decided that he could be allowed to face an attempt to extradite him to Spain to be investigated for human rights abuses. After hearing the news, I experienced a state of euphoria. I did not understand why I had such an overwhelming reaction after almost a decade living in democracy. I started to think of the past as a seething presence, even when it was absent. I realized, for instance, that I rarely talked about my family experiences of that period; but I would still become furious at people if they showed support for the dictatorship.

This thesis is concerned with family legacies and the affectivity of politics. It is about how we are marked by intimate life and family stories, and how intimacy, affects, pain, shame and pride are at the center of the way we remember the past. After all, I resort to an understanding of memory which looks at the patterns of everyday life and the crucial role of families in its making.
Chapter 1: Mapping Chilean history and memory after the military coup

Crises of memory are moments that highlight the relations between individual memory and group memory, concerning a past event that is stipulated as important by the group at a given time.

(Suleiman 2012, 5)

Introduction: When The Past Matters

In 2008 I visited Doña Agustina in the village in the north of Chile where she lived. A humble woman in her late fifties, the widow of one of the desaparecidos of Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, she has never recovered from the disappearance of her husband (how one could recover from such an event?). When I asked her about the days that followed the 1973 military coup, she stood in silence and after a while she started weeping. At that moment, Doña Agustina’s son, who was in his mid-thirties, came into the room and asked her if she was all right. He looked at me in a slightly disapproving way, which mirrored how uneasy I felt interviewing the victims of state violence, opening ‘the memory box’¹ and bringing back with just one question emotions that have taken a long time to die down. The woman told me that her son did not approve of her giving interviews because they open a wound which she could not easily close afterwards. “The interview finishes”, he complains, “but the sorrow remains”.

As a result of this interview, ethical issues concerning the general relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee in contexts of political violence came up - I will deal with these in the chapter on methods - but the figure of the son as the witness to and partner of his widowed mother has continued to haunt me as a sociological concern. To what extent, for instance, has the military regime finished for Doña Agustina’s son, despite his father’s corpse never having been found? How does he mourn his father’s death: as an activist, as a son, as a bystander? Does being

¹ This is an expression first coined by Stern. In his words: ‘The metaphor I find useful – to picture memory as competing selective remembrances to give meaning to, and find legitimacy within, a devastating community experience – is that of a giant, collectively built memory box. The memory box is foundational to the community, not marginal; it sits in the living room, not in the attic’ (2006:xxviii). Since the publication of his groundbreaking three volume research the term has remained as part of the local memory lexis.
the descendant of a victim of state violence impose certain duties on him? And if it does, what kind of duties? The space in which Doña Agustina’s son can be located is uncertain: systematic forms of state violence have passed. Indeed, Pinochet died in 2006, but the memory of his family’s loss constitutes an indubitable presence for him, complicating notions such as transition or reconciliation traditionally used in post-conflict societies. His presence at the interview indicated a triangulation in the site of mourning and pointed to the concept of the post-coup second generation in its own right.

The son’s presence has to do with the role of the family within the aftermath of violence and the role that family bonds have had in memory making in Latin American countries during the last few decades, specifically in Chile. The persistence of the past draw attention today to what Judith Butler calls ‘the tasks that follow political violence’ (Butler 2003) and which Macarena Gómez-Barris has called the afterlife of violence: ‘the continuing and persistent symbolic and material effects of the original event of violence on people’s daily life, their social and psychic identities and their ongoing wrestling with the past in the present’ (Gómez Barris 2009,6). These concepts focus attention on the aftermath of political events from the perspective of everyday life and the intersubjective effects of state violence². They support the critique I aim to develop in the thesis: that the memory crisis in Chile has been analysed mainly from an institutional perspective (developed in Chapter 1), on the one hand, or a clinical approach to the traumatic effects of violence (developed in Chapter 6), on the other. This has been very productive and has made it possible to talk about the regime’s abuses and human right violations in the public domain after a 17-year long regime of fear and silence. However, this has also left to one side the dynamics of political memory in everyday life. Throughout the thesis I will use Cath Collins et.al definition of political memory: ‘constructions of fact, myth and interpretation that constitute, precisely, the noninstitutionalized dimensions of politics’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013,6). I differentiate between the everyday life of political memory and the politics of memory so as to shed light on the quotidian expressions of the memory of political violence and the ability of people to coexist with it and absorb it into everyday life. In the literature review I will further develop the approach to memories of violence and their absorption in everyday life initiated by the anthropologist

² I follow Gómez Barris when she states that state violence helped to produce: ‘subjectivities, or how people identify in the social world, and intersubjectivities, or the way people identify in the social world with each other’ (2009:10).
Veena Das. By the politics of memory, by contrast, I refer to those institutional mechanisms which deal with memory (Collins et al. 2013).

The figure of the second generation not only raises questions about the relationship between generations, family memory and the aftermath of political violence, but also about the relationship between violence and time and the scope and effects of political violence in everyday life. For the Argentinian Gabrielle Nouzeilles: ‘The problem of transmitting past experiences to younger generations and therefore the question of the meaning of memory, is central to understanding more recent manifestations of remembrance in post-dictatorial Argentina’ (Nouzeilles 2005, 265). In a similar perspective Susana Kaiser states in her book *Postmemories of Terror*:

‘Research on societies that have recently undergone mass human rights abuses has disregarded the “second generation/non victim perspective”. Young people’s stories shed light on how the memory construction process works by revealing those who lived through the dictatorship were reconstructing and transmitting this experience to their descendants. These are key issues for assessing the legacies of terror and the role that this new generation of citizens might play in the consolidation of democracy’ (Kaiser 2005, 3).

Agreeing with Nouzeilles and Kaiser but looking at Chile, my interest in this thesis is in how these modes of remembering³ have been entangled with the dynamics of everyday life since the coup and through the culture of fear imposed by the military regime, and this way are at the heart of broader processes of memory making. I echo the statement of Veena Das in her introduction to *Life and Words*: ‘my interest in this book is not in describing these moments of horror but rather in describing what happens to the subject and world when the memory of such events is folded into ongoing relationships’ (Das 2007, 8). It is in the double movement between the life which continues and the past which haunts the present that the aftermath and afterlife of violence takes place.

³ Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning suggest that the focus of memory studies should be with modes of remembering. That is, with the diverse forms of reconstructing and representing the past, with the ‘what’ of memory and also the ‘how’, or, in their words, with ‘the quality and meaning that the past assumes’ ((Erll and Nünning 2008, 7).
This thesis explores the aftermath and afterlife of violence in post-coup Chile from the point of view of one of the opposing memory traditions of the crisis of memory: that of the opposition to the regime during the dictatorship, specifically, of victims of symbolic and physical forms of state violence. Focusing on the second generation, this research is concerned with the new dilemmas and perspectives that stem from the intergenerational transmission of political memories 40 years after the military coup, and raises the following questions: What is the role of family memories in the broader crisis of memory in Chile?, and in what sense may an understanding of the dynamics of appropriation and inhabitation of these family political memories by the second generations shed light on this?

With the above questions in mind, this first chapter aims to describe the historical, theoretical and cultural context of the thesis and suggest that the aftermath of violence brings new challenges to memory-making and explore how the second generation may contribute to this debate. The chapter provides the reader with a historical, political and cultural panorama of what is at stake in the memory field in Chile, how this has been shaped within local discussions and how this thesis engages with these debates. In the first section I introduce the concepts of ‘memory crisis’, ‘memory impasse’ and ‘divided memories’ as a way to set up the cultural environment of this thesis. Here I explain that after 1973 Chilean society developed the divided memory frames of a contested past: opposing pasts have been remembered and therefore opposing futures have been visualized. Then, I provide an historical and theoretical overview of the main discussions that the critics of the dictatorship have developed between the reestablishment of democracy in 1990 and today (2013) and also describe some of the most relevant political events. Exploring the stages of the memory debate in Chile, I focus particularly on the work of two scholars whose ideas are pivotal to the thesis: the historian Steve Stern and the psychologist Elizabeth Lira. Stern’s trilogy The Memory Box (2006a, 2006b, 2010) has defined the conflict around memory as ‘a matter of hearts and minds’, shedding light on the stubbornness of memories and the ‘material’ from which

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4 It is interesting to note that within the local memory and human rights field the concept of state violence has been used by both left-wing and human rights organizations. As the Rettig Report (the first of the reports for reconciliation, which I will introduce soon) explains, there was a debate around whether to consider as human rights violations any action against human dignity, or only those actions committed by state agents, who are supposed to protect those guarantees. While left-wing sectors prefer to speak of state violence and human rights violations as being equivalent, the Rettig report speaks of political violence. It does so because it also considers human rights violations performed by individuals, in this case members of left-wing groups who promoted the armed struggle against the regime. Thus, the report also included a list of uniformed victims (members of the police).
they are made. Lira’s book chapter: Dilemmas of Memory (2011) offers a long term perspective on how the transmission of political memories gets solidified in ‘ghetto memories’ which are passed on from generation to generation. From her work, we see that there is a relationship between the impasse, the stubbornness of memories and their accumulation through time. In the last section, I introduce the second generations as producers of memory and situate them as part of new narratives of memories, raising questions about the dilemmas and issues that these narratives entail. Following this, the chapter offers a brief outline of the thesis chapters and the main arguments they aim to develop. Finally, I describe the main conclusions of the chapter.

The Division Of Memory

During the 1960s and 1970s an intense political process of social and political polarization took place in the Southern Cone of Latin America. In Chile this was radicalized by initiatives such as the nationalization of the US-owned copper industry and an agrarian reform supported by the Christian Democrat government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970). The latter ‘sought to expropriate the inefficiently exploited landed estates of Chile’s central and southern provinces, and to reorganize them into agrarian cooperative settlements (...) that would transform servile peasant tenants into agrarian proprietors’ (Stern 2006, 13). However these redistributive processes were succeeded by military regimes in several countries of the region (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil) which were both reactionary with respect to the social mobilizations that were taking place and foundational, attempting to create new kinds of societies (Garretón 1992). Encouraged by the United States and the Doctrine of National Security, the militaries took a new role in the region. They had a messianic discourse: they were supposed to bring order to multiple social pressures, defined by them as social chaos and even as a ‘Marxist cancer’ which had to be exterminated. (Stern 2006b; Lira 1993, 109. According to Manuel A. Garretón:

‘The process in the Southern Cone, however, involved more than disarming, disarticulating, fragmenting, or repressing the opposition. The goal of those military regimes, in contrast to that of more traditional dictatorships, was to transform society. Their plan was first to re-create the relations between the state and civil society in order
to institute a nonredistributive, nonparticipatory brand of capitalism, and then to reinsert their respective economies into the world system’ (Garretón 1993, 16).

In Chile the military coup triggered a long term crisis of memory which has been characterized by the existence of opposing memory frames competing to give meaning to the events, around which has prevailed antagonistic interpretations (Constable and Valenzuela 1993; Lazzara 2006; Lazzara 2007; Stern 2006). One of the boundaries between communities is the relationship that they hold towards state violence: whilst for supporters of Pinochet’s military regime it was a necessary price\(^5\), for the moral opposition to the dictatorship it inspired an ethical struggle to protect human rights, denounce state terror and then, not to forget. For the opposition, memory became a moral duty and a form of justice. For Elizabeth Jelin, an Argentinian scholar of memory, this was part of ‘the memory work’ in the region (Jelin 2002).

In *The Memory Box* (a book whose arguments I will further outline later in this chapter) Stern uses the concept of ‘memory impasse’ to describe those competing visions of the Pinochet years which seemed irreconcilable with one other (Stern 2006a). For the scholar Michael Lazzara such impasses refer to certain dilemmas that a divided community faces when it finds it difficult to create the agreements for an imagined future together after episodes of political violence:

‘How to construct a narrative of the individual and social traumas that plagued Chile after September 11, 1973; how to build convivencia (the ability to live together civilly and peacefully, leaving aside the enmity solidified by the experience of a 17-year dictatorship); how to strive for justice, offer reparations to victims, and achieve some semblance of ‘reconciliation’; in short, how to construct a ‘culture of human rights’ rooted in a genuine, non-evasive coming to terms with the past, have been key issues that Chilean society has dealt with, gradually, fitfully, painfully, since 1973’ (Lazzara 2006, 342–343).

The above quotation shows the complexity that a ‘memory impasse’ may involve and how the issues that are at stake are - if expressed through memories - beyond them. The Chilean impasse describes the familiar scenario of that of ‘divided memories’, a concept which has been used to

\(^5\) In Collins’ words: At most, the vague notion that there had been ‘excesses’, particularly in the (long-ago) early period after the coup - when, after all, the country had been at war – entered the national psyche, and was used consciously or subconsciously to quiet any prickings of conscience (Collins 2013, 65).
understand the sort of crisis that communities have to undergo once they have divided positions towards episodes of violence.\textsuperscript{6}

**The Moral Opposition to the Dictatorship**

In 1988, after 15 years of dictatorship the opposition to the regime succeeded in calling a Plebiscite in order to decide Pinochet’s continuity in the government. As well as in Chile, in other countries of the Southern Cone opposition ‘moral’ communities were important actors in the struggle against the regimes and then in the consequent struggle for justice (Lazzara 2011; Lazzara 2006; Stern 2006a; Jelin and Candina 2002; Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013; Wilde 2013). This coincided with the broader phenomena related to the memory field called the ‘formation of cosmopolitan memory’ (Daniel Levy and Sznaider, 2002). Levy and Sznaider show how the language of victims and perpetrators which stem from the Holocaust was adopted by international communities and created a sort of moral voice, which was effective in creating pressure in violent contexts.\textsuperscript{7} The language of trauma used by many of these moral agents helped to place the Chilean case in a universalistic context, where the experience of suffering would allow local victims to find an international/global lexis in common with other groups of people who had also experienced suffering and the effects of political violence, but in completely different contexts. The globalization of the memory frame is certainly problematic as it raises questions about to what extent political histories might be homogenized by a moral frame, and also how the language of memory studies may have shaped the way local communities relate to their histories of struggle and or suffering. I further explore these tensions in the literature review.

The ‘internationalization’ of the Chilean case, according to Stern, started with the work of exiled communities, whose public denunciations of the regime contributed to creating pressure within

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\textsuperscript{6} Dramatic events resulting from World War II have inspired multiple discussions in such kind of dilemmas (Portelli 1991; Cappelletto 2005; Suleiman 2012) To give an example from another historical context, after the fall of Mussolini the members of some Italian villages collaborated with the Nazi occupation while others joined the political opposition and became members of the resistance. Commenting on this, the scholar Michael Lambeck suggests: ‘Here the usual dualistic categories of friends and enemies, victims and perpetrators, are much more ambiguous but the violence even more insufferable and far less easily resolved that when it is understood to come from outside’ (2005: xiii).

\textsuperscript{7} Levy and Sznaider call this ‘transnational solidarities’ (2002).
Chile (Stern 2006a). The Aggrupation of Relatives of the Disappeared\(^8\) (Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos, AFDD), the Catholic Church (through the Vicaría de la Solidaridad\(^9\)) and the communities of exile\(^10\) outside the country had all contributed - together with the political opposition which organized the work and the protests of the social movements - to the fall of the regime and the conquest of the moral space in the late 80s. They had their main triumph when in 1988 the No campaign won the election and therefore in 1990 the democratic system was re-established.

The Recovery of Democracy

Since the end of the dictatorship, one of the main questions that has haunted Chilean society is what kind of justice the state would seek and, therefore, what the real meaning of the political project of reconciliation would be. The scholar María Angélica Cruz shows how this translated into an intense debate within the Catholic Church, a moral authority within Chile, about whether reconciliation meant the search for justice or forgetting about the past (Cruz 2004). In fact, once democracy was re-established, one of the first steps of the democratic government of the elected President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), supported by the Concertación coalition, was to establish the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional sobre Verdad y Reconciliación) which in 1991 elaborated the Rettig Report\(^11\) (1991). This report made official what before had been known as a secret: that in Chile there were victims of human right violations.

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8 The relatives of detenidos desaparecidos started to gather spontaneously with the support of the Vicaría and then became active participants in the search for relatives and the demand for justice and memory.
9 Started first as the Pro Peace Commitee, this was an organization promoted by the Catholic Church to support the victims of the dictatorship, who brought legal and humanitarian advice to the victims and their relatives.
10 According to Stern the number of exiles increased to about 200,000 (2006). In the book Exiliados, Emigrados y Retornados Loreto Rebolledo mentions the statistics of the Liga Chilena de Derechos del Hombre which state a total of 400,000 and the Vicaria de la Solidaridad’s statistics which suggests a total of 260,000 people (Rebolledo 2006).
11 It was known as the Rettig Report, after Raul Rettig, the commission’s chairman. The commission’s mandate was to acknowledge and document individual deaths and disappearances under the dictatorship. They gathered information (documentation and also investigative work done by human rights organizations) and heard testimony from witnesses and relatives.
carried out by agents of the state (Perotin-Dummon 2005). For the first time it systematized a list of dead and *desaparecidos*, as well as the circumstances in which these actions occurred. However, at the same time as the report considered the victims of the regime, it also listed ‘the victims on the regime’s side, of unknown or leftist political origin’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013). Although Aylwin exhorted the militaries to cooperate voluntarily with the search for further information, the report was dismissed by the armed forces who denied its legal or historical validity.

In that context, Aylwin’s democratic government gave birth to the philosophy of *en la medida de lo posible* (as best as possible) which marked a decade of a vulnerable democracy and the deepening of the free-market economy, but also of social disenchantment regarding social expectations with respect to the meaning and pace of democracy. As the armed forces still had power, every decision was made by consensus, and Pinochet, rather than being judged for his political responsibility, stood as the Army commander until 1998 (when he resigned), and then became a Senator for life. This figure became the phantom for the ex-opposition and was at the centre of a critique of the Chilean transition which began to take shape. As a consequence, in the late 90s and in the face of new scenarios during the so called ‘transitional process’, social researchers began to focus critically on the concept of ‘reconciliation’. This concern was the result of the marginalization of human rights violations as a political priority in the first stage of the post-dictatorship, in order to not affect the stability of the new democracy (Wilde 2013). In the prologue of *Todo es Según el Dolor con que se Mira*, Ignacio Martín-Baró stated a thesis which embodies the critique of the period: ‘This formulation (reconciliation) impedes and complicates reparation, because it transforms the consequences of human rights violations into private issues for the victims and into a topic of interest for specialists, denying their social and public origins, evading their latent and evident effects, either at a psychological or political level’ (Becker and Lira 1989, 7). In this quotation, the main tensions of the following decades are articulated: the

12 The initial number of victims listed was 2000, while a subsequent investigation recognized a total of 3,216 in August 2011 (Collins, 2013).
13 In the report they formed 11 per cent of final victims. However Hite et al. note that today this number has fallen ‘since no judicial case has to date found any other than state actors responsible’ (Hite 2013 28).
14 According to Collins: ‘Specific threats, civilian-military standoffs, and the negative example of neighbouring Argentina finally convinced president Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) that limited truth, together with some reparations measures, was the most that could be achieved or should be attempted’ (Collins 2013, 65).
15 My translation.
privatization of memory, the frustration with respect to the institutional work of justice\textsuperscript{16} and the demand to develop an official discourse about the past.

\textbf{1990-1998 A decade of Social Disenchantment}

As part of a sense of general disenchantment during the first decade of the post-dictatorship, the democratic character of Chilean political system was questioned by several scholars. Within Chilean historiography - and the way Chileans have shaped their identity - the idea that the country has had a democratic tradition which differentiates it from other Latin American countries has had pride of place (Stern 2006a; Lazzara 2011). However, in \textit{La Vía Chilena a la Transición Política} Lira and Brian Loveman argued that the Salvationist character of the Army during the military coup, which allowed intervention by military means in the political life, was not unique to the 70s. They observed how the Chilean Army had already intervened in the three constitutions\textsuperscript{17} of the 20th century (Loveman and Lira 1999). They stated that the local political system has always found it very difficult to articulate social pressures and that a pattern can be seen: after social conflicts, episodes of social violence and polarization took place and were followed by amnesties. Conflicts ‘disappear’ from the public sphere and become concealed or contained by amnesties. Years later, however, these conflicts would come back. This insight invites the reader to wonder about the ‘afterlife’ of conflicts, of their transmission and aftermath, and the conditions under which they become a presence after being absent. What happens to the conflict, to the injuries provoked by the conflict and by what means are these memories stored and transmitted? This thesis engages with these questions, particularly in Chapter 6 (Family Memories and Intergenerational Remembering of Political Violence).

\textsuperscript{16} Until that date the work of justice was slow. However, Collins notes ‘Indeed, in spite of successive centre-left Concertación collation governments between 1990 and 2010 proving to be particularly wary of decisive action on issues of justice, by 2012 Chile had compiled one of the most active and complete records of judicial accountability anywhere on the continent, and perhaps in the world. Despite the continued existence of a 1978 amnesty law which effectively granted impunity to former agents of the regime, and notwithstanding 2010’s political shift to the right, in mid-2012 64 former members of the security forces were completing prison sentences for their role in the dictatorship era crimes. These formed part of a total of 800 agents actively investigated or charged over such crimes since 200’ (2013: 61).

\textsuperscript{17} They show how at the beginning of the 20th century the army was established under Prussian influence and that they wanted to professionalize themselves ‘against’ the politicians.
The critique of ‘individualization’ was another pivotal element in the diagnostics of the Chilean transition and was entangled with the economic transformation undergone by the country through the implementation of neoliberalism (Lazzara 2009a). In fact, the analyses of transition were tied to the neoliberalization of economy and were somehow two faces of the same coin. Influenced by the language of psychoanalysis, the theory of the collective denial of mourning was taken up by the sociologist Tomás Moulian in order to think about Chilean society. In his widely-read *Anatomía de Un Mito* he describes how neoliberal ideology succeeded in defining Chilean subjectivity in terms of materialistic concerns and individualistic desires (Moulian 2002). His thesis is that the Chilean democratic transition was characterized by a forgetting about the past, a collective amnesia provoked by the neoliberal dynamic and the disciplining of Chileans as ‘credit cards citizens’. In a similar analytical perspective, the cultural theorist Idelber Avelar states: ‘The Chilean dictatorial state operated culturally through the imposition of a veritable passion for consumerism, the absolute privatization of public life, the obsession with individual success and aversion to politics and collective initiatives’18 (Avelar 1999, 66). Describing the transformations that followed the military coup, she shows the extent to which they surpassed the economic field and entered into of culture and into the making of selves.

While some authors emphasized the privatization of politics and economy, others focused on the (displaced) experience of loss. For example, the documentary maker Carmen Velasco, widow of Miguel Enríquez19, represented this bitter feeling of uneasiness with the political establishment in a documentary (*Calle Santa Fe* 2007). This film was made on her return to Chile after almost 30 years of exile in Paris, and she reads a voiceover while the camera travels around Santiago, saying that for her post-dictatorial Chile “is no more than a group of traitors”. She never came back to live in Chile, due to the depth of her feeling of loss (political and private) that the bombing of La Moneda represented. But what she could not really stand was the fact that life continued and people adapted to a (neoliberal) future, which appeared to her as aberrant. In the documentary, she only returned to finally meet the anonymous person who saved her on the day on which Enríquez and she were shot. In all other respects, the country seemed for her a different place; apart from losing her partner, she lost her idea of home.

18 My translation.

19 Miguel Enríquez was the leader of a leftist group, MIR (Revolutionary Left Group), inspired by the Cuban guerrillas and advocating violent social transformation. Enríquez was shot by state agents while he was in hiding with his pregnant wife, Carmen Castillo, and their son.
These works made concepts such as privatization, amnesia, loss and denial of state violence seething presences in the critiques of the Chilean transition to democracy. They have been part of an ‘influential criticism of the post-dictatorship society of the 1990s’ which ‘has invoked the dichotomy of remembering against forgetting to characterize Chile as a culture of oblivion, marked by a tremendous compulsion to forget the past and the uncomfortable’ (Stern 2006b, xvii). Stern adds: ‘The dialectic of memory versus forgetting is an inescapable dynamic, perceived as such by social actors in the heat of their struggles. In regimes of secrecy and misinformation, the sense of fighting oblivion, especially in the human rights community, is powerful and legitimate’ (Stern 2006b, xviii). In the years to come, Stern would contribute to understanding such dynamics of memory by exploring the competing narratives that were simultaneously at stake.

Beyond memory and forgetting

Although observers of the period have tended to see in the constraint imposed by the 1980 Constitution the reasons for silence about the past (Wilde), a third position has started to emerge. This position would begin to destabilize the dualistic tendency of Chilean memory crisis (ie: friends or enemies, memory or forgetting) and, I argue, enriches the debate about the past and the elements involved in the memory-making of the past. Complicating the diagnostics, but also criticizing the Chilean transition and pointing to the transformations triggered by Pinochet’s regime in Chile, Marco Antonio de la Parra wrote La Mala Memoria (1998). The book was a memoir, a personal story of contemporary Chile which explores the transitional process from within. He reminds us how in the 90s Ariel Dorfman’s Death and Maiden was staged in Chile, but failed to gain any public attention, even from the press. For De la Parra, the striking lack of response to an internationally recognized work - considered by the Nobel Prize-winning writer Harold Pinter as a masterpiece - is because it portrayed characters such as the victim and the prosecutor, while Dorfman’s empathy was clearly with the victim20. For De la Parra, Dorfman’s work is ‘… biased, too clean, it leaves outside the whole complexity of the Chilean phenomenon. It portrays a history which may be real, exact, but which is too accurate to give an account of the

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20 See also Steven Waine’s analysis of The Dead and the Maiden in his book Testimony After Catastrophe (Waine, 2006)
terrible character of the national metamorphosis. When he says that the story is ‘too clean’, he is referring to the moral distinction between characters, where the woman is the tortured subject and has to do the memory work. To De la Parra, Dorfman did not represent the identification of Chilean society, which he claims is with the doctor (the torturer). For him, the Chilean story would start when Dorfman’s work finishes: ‘For me the best scene of the play is the last scene, when the couple meets the doctor during a concert, and they are all dressed up for the occasion. Maybe it is then that those who stayed in Chile would have started the play script. But I am not sure whether we could have tolerated this’ (De la Parra 1998, 219). In fact, De la Parra’s work shifts the debate from the questions of amnesia, loss or repression to those of identification with perpetrators, the issue of complicity and the relationship with the past through the writing of history. He basically brings a psychoanalytical insight to his cultural critique, and shows how identification matters when we remember or write history. Here he is close to Dominique LaCapra’s position when he criticizes the Historians dispute, arguing that a reflexive relationship to traumatic history can only emerge after acknowledging the observer’s mechanisms of identification with the past (Booth 2006; LaCapra 2001). De La Parra took up Theodor W. Adorno’s thesis, developed in the context of his discussion of Alexander and Margarette Mischerlich’s The Inability to Mourn, that after the Holocaust there was no observable melancholia in post-war Germany (as the psychologists had previously stated). This was because the collective identification with the Fuhrer continued, secretly, to exist (Santner 1993).

21 My translation.
22 My translation.
23 The Historiskerstreit or historians dispute deals with the normalization of the Holocaust, its relation to other historical events and the moral dilemmas of writing history. It was triggered after the 40th anniversary of Hitler’s defeat, when Kohl invited Reagan to a commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Holocaust in a site where victims of the SS were buried together with victims of the World War II. A public debate was triggered after this and Jürgen Habermas’ response to Ernst Nolte received particular attention. The latter had argued that the past should be allowed to die and that Hitler should be contextualized so as to enable understanding of his motivations and fears. For Habermas, Nazi crimes were not comparable to any other crime, and what was at stake was the public use of history. He argued that the historian’s objectivity was an illusion, but was always traversed by a moral duty. This debate has been commented on in various works, among which I highlight Dominique LaCapra’s and James Booth’s comments on it (quote).
24 In the 60s, Alexander and Margarette Mischerlich applied Freud’s theory of the psyche to the mourning of collective losses in their groundbreaking study The Inability to Mourn. They were struck by the rapidity with which the Führer was renounced and by the lack of signs of a psychological reaction to the event, which according to them was at least a ‘prerequisite for a melancholic reaction’. In their book they suggested that Germans had not been able to mourn their Nazi past and the loss of the figure of the Führer, and instead had continued in the narcissistic way of love. For them, the Germans would have had to work through the
For her part, referring to the social psychology of the first years of the post-dictatorship, Lira observes that there cannot be processes of mourning in contexts in which society defines the meaning of the trauma differently to the way in which the mourner does (Lira and Castillo 1993). She challenges the main strategy of the official project of reconciliation: that it would be reached through a personal process of forgiveness. According to her argument, mourning episodes of state violence cannot be worked through as private experiences, because their origin is not private. How could any reconciliation be possible if Chileans never agreed on the interpretation of the past? How can someone forgive someone else if there is no justice in-between? And moreover, how can social and state violence be redeemed by individual forgiveness? Lira argues that in Chile there was a lack of basic collective agreements about social life which impeded a healthy response to human rights violations.

In an insightful later study, the scholar Katherine Hite also provided an alternative to the dichotomist approach to the crisis of memory, and complicated the conception of political agency, by suggesting that the extent of the traumatization of political actors has not been taken into account in attempts to understand the way the democracy was managed after the dictatorship. Destabilizing the idea of rational political agents, and concerned with understanding the other reasons for official silence, she asks: ‘Why was there this official silence about the recent past, when this very past was the topic of various publications and it was present in popular memory?’ For her, the traumatic experience of loss and failure in the 70s left deep marks within the political class and determined their way of negotiating the transition. Her thesis was that: ‘the effects of trauma have been underestimated as an explanation of the silence of the political elite during the 90s, with respect to the last three decades and half’ (Hite 2007).

relationship of identification they had maintained with the Führer, particularly the embodiment in his figure of the ego-ideal). According to Santner ‘This remarkable diagnosis offered a new framework of interpretation, one that promised to extend the reach of the analysis and moral evaluation of social and political behaviour in postwar Germany’ (Santner 1993, 2). For Adorno, instead, there was another conclusion to be reached after such lack of melancholic reaction: ‘secretly, unconsciously smouldering and therefore especially powerful these identifications as well as group narcissism were not destroyed but continued to exist’ (Santner 1993, 5).

25 My translation.
In 1998, after recently having become a Senator for life, Pinochet was detained in London\textsuperscript{26}. He had travelled to the UK for health reasons and the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón took advantage of this trip to demand his extradition to Spain in order to try him for crimes against humanity. According to Ximena Tocornal: ‘many scholars have suggested that these years [1996 and 1997] are a prelude to, if not the start of, an open public debate about the past…’ (Tocornal 2008,30)\textsuperscript{27}. Collins et. al. describe the climate during the period:

‘(..) Pinochet’s arrest ‘fronted’ the past to the present, sending ardent supporters and opponents into the streets to rally his defence or to celebrate his detention. Emotions initially ran high, with pro- and anti- Pinochet ralliers confronting one another in high political drama. Pinochet’s arrest demanded a response, a public debate. His arrest forced conversations and arguments among political and not so political citizens, between parents and children, in public and in private’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013, 19).

For Wilde, Pinochet’s detention abroad: ‘encouraged incipient efforts under way in Chileans court to investigate and prosecute the dictator and his associates for human right crimes’ (Wilde 2013, 34). This was later called ‘the Pinochet effect’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013). In fact, the same year the Human Rights Roundtable (Mesa de Diálogo) was inaugurated, and for first time the armed forces cooperated with the government concerning the fate of the desaparecidos. The initiative included militaries, human rights lawyers and civilians and was triggered by the government’s attempts to negotiate Pinochet’s return to Chile, arguing that he should be tried in the country. The Mesa was a way to ‘show’ that there were the conditions for that within the country. In 2001 it produced a document with information about 200 cases of death and disappearance, and gave details of the destination of the remains (Wilde 2013).

After the London impasse (which lasted a year) and once back in Chile, Pinochet also faced other problems with justice and at the end of 2005 he faced several trials linked to human rights violations; the assassination of Allende’s army commander, Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos

\textsuperscript{26} This happened during Eduardo Frei’s government – the second government of the Concertación in this period.

\textsuperscript{27} Wilde notes that the number of publications increased between 1996 and 1997/8, as the 25th anniversary of the coup approached (Wilde 2013).
Aires in 1974 and the discovery of his secret account at the Riggs bank in Washington (Perotin Dumont 2005). This last aspect meant a political isolation for the dictator which no human rights case had succeeded in doing before. For Wilde, all these events were ‘irruptions of memory’: ‘unbidden intrusions of past conflicts into public life that raised symbolic and moral issues that troubled its transition’ (Wilde 2013,33). He describes these irruptions as ‘external to those institutional aspects well analysed by political scientists’ (Wilde 1997). By pointing to what he calls ‘intrusions’ he is referring to that stubbornness of memory that my thesis also aims to explore: in what conditions may the past be present, in what conditions and how past events may haunt.

**Stern’s ‘battle for hearts and minds’**

In this context, Stern’s work made a significant contribution to the way the memory impasse was being framed in Chile. In his trilogy *The memory box* he argues against a dichotomist idea of memory versus forgetting, which had assumed that struggles in the memory field are against social oblivion (Stern 2006a; Stern 2006b; Stern 2010). He also argues against the idea - widespread within human rights movements - that it is only the moral complacency of middle and wealthy classes that has legitimated political violence in the Southern Cone military regimes. For Stern, these two conceptions (social oblivion and moral complacency) are insufficient and misleading when analysing memory because they conceptualize the field as one where social actors are aligned on one side or the other. By contrast, he understands memory struggles and frameworks ‘as a set of relationships, conflicts, motivations and ideas that shaped history’ (Stern 2006b, x).

Concerning the Chilean case, Stern suggests that it was not a struggle between memory or forgetting, but among different memory frameworks instead. In fact, he identifies four memory frameworks which have the role of giving meaning to the coup, and differentiates them depending on where they locate the ‘traumatic’ event. Each of the four memory narratives starts from a traumatic event which caused suffering and resentment to an opposing community of memory. Stern’s book points at the negotiation of meaning underlying memory struggles, and how the meaning of each memory frame depends on the definition of the traumatic. Thus, the traumatic
provides the analytic lens of the events in which the victims, the guilty party, the heroes and the perpetrators are identified. Stern’s work shows how the memory framework of the supporters of Pinochet would always consider the 1960s Land reform process as the traumatic event and see the coup as the salvation which ended the chaos engendered by the agrarian reform. On the other hand, the opposition to the coup and supporters of the UP would see the coup itself as the traumatic event which gave birth to other traumatic situations: torture, imprisonment, exile, persecution, etc.

Stern’s work resonates with Francesca Cappelletto’s findings in her work on Italian communities which suffered the effects of the World War II where she states that the memory of the traumatic past is the fabric that holds together a community of memory (Cappelletto 2005). The community is not defined by spatial boundaries only but through narratives of the past. But by exploring the memory impasse as a ‘matter of hearts and minds’ Stern goes further and sheds light on the problem of legitimacy. For him ‘contentious memory’ is: ‘... a process of competing selective remembrances, ways of giving meaning to and drawing legitimacy from human experience’ (Stern 2006b, xxvii). At the same time he shows how important is to take into account not only the culture in which memory impasses are inserted but the affects and identifications that these memories carries with them. Memory struggles have been built over embodied experiences in the social world. As it can be seen in the life stories narrated in his book, at the heart of the Chilean impasse there was a struggle in which individual, family, class and social identities were intertwined with individual and collective narratives of the past, the present and the desired future. Stern’s influence is evident in the mode in which I will present my interviews in this thesis, so that my interviewees’ family histories (and stories) are made visible and become an important aspect of the way that each interview demands to be listened to.

2003 up today: Forging Memorias militantes

After Pinochet’s detention in London and the irruption of the recent past into open debate, the crisis of memory would reach a different stage more favourable towards the (ex) opposition
memory framework\textsuperscript{28}. In 2003, during the government of the Socialist President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), the 30th anniversary of the military coup obliged Chileans to face the past. According to Peter Winn the date made Chileans: ‘confront a history that many would have preferred to forget or ignore’ (Winn 2007). A commemorative boom started in memory of that date and ‘plaques and monuments were erected throughout the country, and initiatives were launched by many of the victims associations in order to conserve the most emblematic sites of torture’ (Perotin-Dummon 2005). The following year, 2004, the Valech report was issued by the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura)\textsuperscript{29} and President Lagos, on behalf of the state, asked the victims of the regime for forgiveness. Perotin speaks about a process of recognition triggered by the two reports (Rettig and Valech). For her, recognition meant that what had previously been rendered unspeakable, started to gain public space and legitimation. This was also given representation through a new symbolic act performed by the President in 2003. After 30 years, Lagos opened a door from La Moneda which had remained closed since the coup: the door through which Allende’s corpse left the palace (Perotin-Dummon 2005). Collins et. al observes how during Lagos’ government: ‘[He] began publicly to cast, even to embrace, Allende as a fallen democrat committed to his country’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013, 12). After this period, a change within public opinion was noted by Wilde: ‘Public opinion, shaped by the revelations from judicial investigations and prosecutions of Pinochet-era officials, rapidly became more supportive of establishing the truth about the practices of the dictatorship, even such topics as torture that had been taboo earlier during the transition’ (Wilde 2013, 34). As Collins et.al observes, by 2003 ‘the testimonies of relatives of the dead and desaparecidos meanwhile began to gain new visibility, particularly in the television media…. Human rights associations found new space for their accounts and demands and, crucially, survivors began to become publicly and judicially visible for almost the first time’ (Collins, Hyte and Joignant 2013, 18).

In 2006 the fourth Concertación government was elected and Michelle Bachelet assumed the presidency (2006-2010). This marked a milestone in the struggle for justice. Being a member of the

\textsuperscript{28} I say ex- opposition to the military regime considering that democracy was already established. But throughout the thesis I will show that the group identity forged in this period would have long term effects.

\textsuperscript{29} The report has been updated between 2003 and the present and has recognized a total number of 38,254 victims of torture or political imprisonment in hands of state agents between 1973 and 1990. Source: Rettig Report.
Socialist Party, she was the daughter of a victim killed by the regime, and she and her mother were tortured during the dictatorship. During her government a new Museum of Memory and Human Rights was inaugurated in 2010 and the memory boom continued: everywhere sites of memory and memorials were inaugurated.

Towards a Memoria Militante

From 2003 onwards the image of the victim of state violence which prevailed the decade before has been replaced by the martyr or the hero, and narratives of suffering began to be reframed as narratives of resistance. In this period, for instance, works such as *Memorias en Rojo y Negro* were published (Vidaurrezáaga 2005). This is the oral memory of three left-wing women activists, which expands the image of the imprisoned victim to that of a combatant (*combatiente*). They recount how women not only fought against social injustice but also against social stereotypes in Latin American culture, such as the meaning of being a ‘good mother’, a ‘good women’ and a ‘good militant’.

This phenomenon might help to explain the quiet/cold response that Dorfman’s work had in Chile, but from a different perspective to that of De la Parra. It might also be possible that activists did not want to remember the ‘dead’ as victims but as heroes or militants. In fact, Lira describes how during the therapeutic work she did with victims of the dictatorship, the main adaptation she made to the Freudian theory of trauma was to replace the role of the sexual for that of the political (Lira 2007). She realized early on how important it was for her patients to articulate their lives in terms of political life stories and place their injuries in the contexts of political activism: ‘The suffering of ex-prisoners to whom we were trying to bring relief had, therefore, an eminently political dimension... They demanded to be recognized as protagonists and militants of a project of social change, which was politically legitimate, and not as promoters of a criminal project’ (Lira 2007). Lira’s argument shows how storytelling played a central role in the post-dictatorship,

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30 In addition, it was the first time a woman had been the Chilean President. This year, 2013, she is campaigning for reelection, and her principal right-wing contender is also a woman, Evelyn Matthei, the daughter of Fernando Matthei, an Army official, former member of the military junta and ex-Health Minister of Pinochet.

31 My translation.
because it gave people the chance to tell the story of what happened through their own voice and through a different narrative to that of the regime.

In this context, Lira’s article: *Dilemmas of Memory* (2011) sheds light on the current situation, where in spite of a favourable institutional context and an important change in terms of public opinion about the condemnation of human right violations, this does not translate into a memory closure. For the scholar, the memory question in Chile is related to (but not caused by) the form in which political memories have been transmitted and how they have created a political culture over historical generations. If in her previously quoted work with Loveman, they stated that the recurrence of social polarization and amnesties has been a pattern within Chilean political history rather than an isolated event, it is in Lira’s *Dilemmas of memory* that the role of memories as solidified affects starts taking shape. For her, the memory impasse is not anchored in the 1970-1973 and the dictatorial regime; instead it stems from a long term history preceding the UP which was already built upon divided political memories and their ritual remembering in political rituals, popular music, poetry, etc. In her account, the memory of state violence and its ritualistic transmission has been at the heart of left-wing political communities and rather than meaning the privatization of grief, it has constituted a long term historical memory (she contextualizes its origins in the early 20th century). In her words: ‘During the twentieth century, social memory was the memory of tragedies associated with social struggles in northern and southern Chile (...) The commemoration of these tragedies has become a ritual of unions and parties of the political Left ever since the events occurred, with greater social and public interest during certain periods of national history’ (Lira 2011,109). Suffering political violence, then, triggers a political memory, which unites a community who remembers together and at the same time this puts it into opposition to others.

For Lira, political organizations held a memory of the past which may inspire struggles of the present; however, they tend to remain strictly ‘political’ and ‘meaningful’ only to specific groups

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32 The opposition was constituted mainly by left wing parties and groups and the Christian Democrat Party. However, the ghettoization of memory is particularly relevant for more left wing affiliations, such as Communist Parties, Socialist Party, Party for the Democracy, Radical Party and other left-wing groups. This has been observed in a radicalization of the last Presidential campaign, radicalization which involves Right-wing parties and Left-wing parties, which follows years of social mobilization which has increased these last years, particularly 2011 and 2012.

33 In this, Lira’s work echoes Butler’s recent work on the ethics of responsibility, in which she sees in the feeling of being injured a political potential. I develop this in Chapter 2.
and therefore will not be shared by other members of society because of the specific past they commemorate. She states: ‘Yet, in general, it had meaning only within the context of such organizations’. In other words, Lira emphasizes the fact that political memories have both a potentiality and a limitation at the same time: they are ritually transmitted within political communities but their scope of meaning outside these groups is limited. For Emilio Crenzel: ‘Lira analyses the emergence of an activist memory and claims that it is part of a historical practice of remembrance marked by tragedy and willingness to redeem. In this way, the author historicizes the memory of the dictatorship in Chile and the difficulties for collective ownership faced by the accounts circulating in the public sphere’ (Crenzel 2011, 8). For every memory researcher in Chile this is a well-known fact and the starting point of the field: memories are divided and easily find themselves in an impasse. But the strength of Lira’s theory is that it suggests a socio-historical perspective in which to understand how memories have been compartmentalized and transmitted in the form of ghettos, reproducing deeply divided accounts of the past. For her this is not a product of Pinochet’s regime, but is previous to it. Underpinning these ghetto memories are opposing and conflicting interests in society. As Crenzel points out, this would carry with it a new dilemma: the fact that memories are not representative of society, but they work as ghettos instead. By exploring this, Lira is touching on an important aspect of the division of memory in Chile: the ghettoization of memory is not the monopoly of a specific memory impasse but according to Lira it is embedded in Chilean political culture itself.

The Manicheism of Memory

Challenging the memoria militante trend, Lazzara has shifted the debate from a focus on the categories of victims or heroes to the greys of memory. According to his argument, a contrast of black and white has dominated the process of looking at the past in Chilean political culture. For him the official discourses about memory – no matter what their political adscription is - are Manichean (Lazzara 2011). In his book Luz Arce, he interviews an emblematic collaborator with the regime who in the beginning was a leftist activist but finishes giving her comrades away. Here, Lazzara is interested in the greys of memory such as: ‘mutated, destroyed, traitorous or shamed
bodies’. Referring to the protagonist, he states: ‘she obliges us to confront our own human frailty
as well as ethical (and political) gray zones generated by torture, state violence and neoliberal
hegemony’ (Lazzara 2011, 9). For him, the figure of the traitor is a product of Pinochet’s neoliberal
project in Chile, whose implementation required that bodies were broken down and made
complicit with his project.

Resembling the work of De la Parra, Lazzara states that the grey zone is one of the most
intolerable features of Chilean collective memory:

‘The Chilean post-dictatorship period is full of mutilated biographies that have been
silenced or not have fit into the Manichean lexicon of official discourse (betrayal and
heroism, left and right)... Within the human rights community, and more broadly within
Chilean society, the official story has tended to reify the martyred militant, rendering him
or her untouchable, while the traitor figure has remained stigmatized, hidden from view,
muzzled, a taboo subject for former militant reticent to admit ‘defeat’, as well for a nation
reluctant to face the ethical quagmire of complicity on which Pinochet dictatorship forged
its economic miracle’ (Lazzara 2011, 1).

Lazzara’s explanation points to the current blind spot in the Chilean case, which I suggest is
related to Lira’s phenomenon of the ghettoization of memories. By opposing the figure of the
traitor and the figure of the martyr, Lazzara shows how the narrative structure of memories is
Manichean. At the same time, it resonates with Andreas Huyssen’s warning against the
mythologization34 of the past which may stem from a memory culture: ‘… the fault line between
mythic past and real past is not always easy to draw – which is one of the conundrums of any
politics of memory anywhere –. The real can be mythologized, just as the mythic may engender
some strong reality effects’ (Huyssen 2003, 15-16). Just as Huyssen argues, a culture which lies too
much on memory accounts, will be vulnerable to the works of remembering and the effects that
narratives have over the past, when they pretend to be even more real than reality.

34 Andreas Huyssen’s argument resembles Barbara Misztal work on the sacralization of memories. For
Huyssen it is ‘the excess’ of memory-based accounts which is problematic, while for Mistzal it is the
influence of trauma which leads to the sacralization of experiences (Misztal 2004).
Second Generations: Beyond the dichotomist memory impasse?

As I mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, in addition to the dualistic tension between enemies and friends, and left and right, some new forms of memories have arisen in recent years, making the panorama of memory more complicated. Although today the ‘memory taboo’ has rendered the memory of the victims and the resistance of the dictatorship visible and what was previously the opposition memory has become an official memory (in other words, the memory promoted by the state), it seems that the memory impasse has entered into a new stage.

In 2010, after four consecutive governments of the Concertación Coalition, the right-wing - represented by the Alianza coalition - won the presidential elections for the first time in almost 50 years in Chile and the millionaire Sebastián Piñera took office as President (2010-2014). During his government there has been a certain amount of concern that historical revisionism may cause regression in the struggle for a culture of human rights but this has not in fact been the case. For example, the Institute for Human Rights conceived during the Lagos’ government was finally established as part of the state apparatus and amnesty for military personnel in prison was rejected by the President in 2011.

However, the crisis of memory persists at the same time as it has been problematized. Emotions like violence, anger and pain and sets of contradictions still come to the fore, even 40 years later and even though Pinochet has been discredited. These conditions make the very act of speaking in the context of this research potentially problematic. Just 2 years ago, for instance, the BBC interviewed President Piñera, and when at the end of the interview he was asked if public pro-Pinochet acts were allowed in Chile, the interview was suddenly interrupted by his advisers. Later, the local TV commentators dismissed the impasse and described it as a “communicational mistake”35. However, it was not only a mistake; it was a symptom of a long-standing taboo about the 1973 coup, which makes it a critical issue, even when it has become apparently ‘past’. For instance, we will see in chapter 6 on Family Memories an extreme example of this; just a couple of years ago, a third generation descendant of a desaparecido experienced the denial by some of his classmates of his grandfather’s death. After getting involved in a passionate debate he learned that the practice of forced disappearance during the dictatorship was still considered an

35 TV program: Tolerancia Cero, June-July 2013.
‘invention’ by a group. Although there is a general feeling that the ‘truth’ has finally triumphed, there are still serious doubts about the extent of this triumph. There have been greater and lesser resistances to this historical memory, even though it has been proved to be ‘true’. Collins et al note: ‘However, memory-related politics and policies seem to have failed to enter the majority public imagination in any sustained way’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013, 14).

In this new stage, rather than taking a too optimistic approach I rather see new dilemmas but also forms of continuation with the memory impasse. There is a re-politization of the narratives of victimhood (as Lira’s work on ghetto memories have attempted to explain in a long term perspective); although there is increasing consensus on the reproach of the military coup and especially of state violence, there persist similar mechanisms of denial in some (emblematic) political actors and finally, the emergence of new forms of memory making such as Lazzara’s interview to Luz Arze or the recently published account of the collaborator, in a book recently launched (El Mocito) by the journalist Javier Rebolledo (2012). One of these new narratives, and the one which is at the centre of this thesis, is the experience of the second generation, for and its mode of remembering, not from the zone of combat but from the experience of family life and the coming to terms with a culture of fear in the past.

In fact, in the last few years, several filmmakers from the second generation have voiced their perspective as ‘the children of the dictatorship’ in Chile, focusing on their personal relationship with the past which is at the same time political and familial. In 2010 the question became even more topical, and films such as Mi vida con Carlos (Germán Berger, 2009), Abuelos (Carla Valencia Dávila; 2010), El Edificio de los Chilenos (Macarena Aguiló; 2010), and El Eco de las Canciones (Antonia Rossi; 2010) were released. In all these films the film director tells a family story which is entangled with local history, in such a way that a personal drama follows a historical drama. Through these films the concept of the second generation has been recently articulated within Chilean society as a site of multiple losses thus giving an account of the presence of the past. The interrelation between personal and social search and the process of memory recovery is used as a resource by the directors in all four documentaries. Thus, these films are classically a second generation memory exploration as all of them deploy the practice of unearthing hidden family stories. In these accounts, memory is also a form of relatedness to a family legacy. But while the second generation category (a concept which I will further explore in the literature review) has
been often used to explore cultural or artistic categories, in this thesis my aim is to explore the memories (understood as embodied knowledge, narratives and silences) of sons and daughters of victims of the military regime.

Chapter Conclusions

This chapter has offered an overview of the main debates and milestones of the crisis of memory in Chile during the last decades. Examining its different periods, I have shown how memory has attained different levels of presence in the public sphere. In this sense, the chapter is aligned with Collins’s et al. assertion that: ‘Human rights issues narrowly defined have, perhaps deliberately, not been central to the national political agenda over the course of the Concertacion’s twenty year rule and the centre-right Alianza’s interregnum to date. Nonetheless (...) the overarching memory ‘tropes’ involved have been central to political thinking, instincts, and action over the same period’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013,23).

By exploring the principal political events, topics of debate and tensions, in this chapter we have seen that what comes to be considered as ‘memory’ in contemporary Chile surpasses the limits and boundaries of the politics of memory (in Collins’ sense). I have also shown how memory is the lens through which we gain access to complex elements of the building of convivencia (Lazzara, 2006). From the revision of periods we see that although reparation is a fundamental demand of the politics of memory, it seems that the memory question in Chile goes beyond the politics of reparation. However, as new actors and positions become part of the ‘polyphony of memories’ in Lazzara’s terms, the field become more complex. Drawing on this complexity, this thesis explores the voice of the second generation in a context in which it has recently become part of cultural memory and in which individual stories have started to frame this generational narrative. Considering Lazzara’s critique of the Manicheism of memory, it is interesting to see whether the second generation may open new forms of thinking about the past, and what new questions they will posit in the memory field.
Finally, it is important to highlight that Stern’s and Lira’s insights (described in the chapter) have inspired my enquiries throughout this research through basically two main points: that memory is stubborn because it is rooted in our basic but most fundamental sense of ‘how things are’ (and the belief of how they should be) and that in the course of its very transmission, the affects that compose memory get solidified and become ‘fixed’ to certain ways of remembering the past. I will come back to this in the course of the following chapters of the thesis. However, I disagree with Lira in that she does not consider the role of family transmission within the ghettoization of memories. Throughout the following chapters, in turn, I will explore family transmission to the second generation to show how this gives us new clues which help us to make sense of the crisis of memories and also to understand the afterlife of violence forty years after a traumatic event.
Chapter 2: The legacies of the Holocaust and the status of family memory

Our first consciousness of the Shoah was transmitted to us through the immediacies and intimacies of family life and through means that were bodily, palpable, densely affective.

(Hoffman 2004, 33)

Introduction

In Chapter 1 I described the local context of the division of memory in Chile, focusing on how it has been framed and entangled with local political, academic and cultural debates of recent decades. However, as Stern notes, the struggle of the opposition against the dictatorship during the 70s and 80s took place in an international context of human rights sensitization, which contributed to the pressure of the international community on the local political scenario (Stern 2006b). This influence did not circumscribe only the political contingency within Chile but coincided with a global cultural process which, for some authors, has been considered as a ‘memory boom’ on one hand and the ‘era of trauma’ on the other (Huyssen 1995; Jelin 2002; Argenti and Schramm 2010; Olick and Levy 2011). Among other things, this has meant that the literature of the Holocaust has been an unavoidable referent in thinking about the aftermath of violence among populations. Its corpus has surpassed the geographical, historical and cultural boundaries of the event, triggering a dialogue with other histories placed in different times and contexts. In fact, in this thesis I use the concept of the second generation to speak of the descendants of the victims of state violence in Chile, who grew up within opposition families. However, the genealogy of the concept ‘second generation’ shows that it was shaped during the post Holocaust years.

Arguing that these analytical concepts (i.e: trauma and second generation) cannot simply be translated without a critical awareness of their cultural histories, this chapter aims to problematize the influence of the literature of the Holocaust on the memory field and particularly, on the
In the first section I focus on what has been called ‘the trauma paradigm’, exploring its influence and also considering two of its main critiques. The first of these concerns the extent to which the trauma paradigm might conceal local responses to violence, specifically in the context of divided memories when it is the very status of the traumatic that is being contested; the second concerns the extent to which it might depoliticize suffering. For the first of these I draw on Das’ critique of the ‘trauma bias’ and the ‘Holocaust template’ and agree with her insight that political violence is woven into everyday life and adjusts itself to the patterns of each social context. In this thesis, it is precisely the interweaving of the culture of fear, the imaginary of the military regime and also the important role of family which gives family transmission of political memory to the second generation its character. In relation to the second of the critiques, I explore here some of Butler’s ideas concerning - amongst others - the status of suffering and mourning in the making of political communities (Butler 2003). I also mention Das’ definition of ‘critical events’ as a counterbalance to those negative effects which traditionally have been related to the post-traumatic (Das 1995)

In the second section I focus on debates concerning the transmission of memory, particularly those around the second generation and postmemory. These discussions deal with the questions of the means by which memories circulate and of who is entitled to bear these memories. It is in this intersection that some of the most interesting debates have taken place and I describe their principal implications. Here I will develop the work of two of my referents: Eva Hoffman’s work on the memory of the second generations and Marianne Hirsch’s development of the postmemory concept.

In the last section I explore the critiques to the family bias which is present in Hirsch’s work but also in scholars from the Southern Cone military regimes. Agreeing with the importance of denaturalizing the family, I also defend the focus on the family as a site for memory production
which is characterized by ‘relatedness’ (Carsten 2007) and which also bridge various forms of private and public memory and identity constructions (Carsten 2007; Smart, ).

**The Trauma Paradigm: A debate**

As I have already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the language of memory studies - which has usually focused on processes of commemoration and ritualization of the past - has been deeply influenced by the reference to World War II and specifically, the Holocaust. For Susan Rubin Suleiman: ‘If Word War II was arguably the central event of the twentieth century, whose aftereffects and afterimages are still firmly lodged in public consciousness, it is in large because the Holocaust was part of it’ (Suleiman 2012, 3). The shocking knowledge of what happened in the concentration camps, which emerged after the German defeat, has circulated in compelling forms such as photographs and testimonies which have told the world stories beyond the imaginable.

Underpinning the imaginary of the Holocaust, and also of other episodes such as the military regimes in the Southern Cone, the bombing of Hiroshima and the Vietnam War, is the concept of trauma, which has shown how the effects of shocking events continue to be felt and disturb their witnesses for a long time after they had taken place. Although the concept of trauma was initially mainly used to classify an individual state of mind, during the twentieth century it has evolved to also allow understanding of the psychosocial effects of violence among populations and its transmission. The scholar Ruth Leys describes what she considers ‘... the absolute indispensability of the concept for understanding the psychic harms associated with certain experiences of the twentieth century...’ (Leys 2000, 2). From a similar perspective, Dominique LaCapra states:

‘Trauma studies have arisen as one of the most significant and at times controversial areas in psychoanalytic thought with significant implications for history and critical theory. And it has played a key part in the analysis of testimonies of survivors, notably Holocaust survivors but also victims of other genocides and extreme events such as rape and assault as well as longer-term processes( such as domestic violence’ (LaCapra 2009, 60).
As we see, according to LaCapra one of the results of the proliferation of the imaginary of the traumatic is that different experiences are conceived within the same field. Without reducing the Holocaust to trauma studies, he implies that a significant amount of Holocaust research has been shaped around the concept of trauma and has constituted a field characterized by experiences of victimhood, witnessing and testimony. For his part, Huyssen notes how the notion of trauma has acted as a countermemory to the optimism of globalization and served as an idiom which speaks of transnational modes of suffering and exploitation. As the author puts it:

‘If 1980s were the decade of a happy postmodern pluralism, the 1990s seemed to be haunted by trauma as the dark underside of neoliberal triumphalism. The concern with trauma radiated out from a multinational, ever more ubiquitous Holocaust discourse. It was energized in the United States as well as in Latin America or South Africa after apartheid, by the intense interest in witness and survivor testimonies, and it merged with the discourses about AIDS, slavery, family violence, child abuse, recovered memory syndrome, and so on’ (Huyssen 2003,8)

Huyssen sees the proliferation of different modes of traumatization as a feature of the 90s. As a result, different histories of suffering which had been caused by distinct sources of violence came to be recognized as being traumatic. For some, this has created the basis for new forms of solidarity (Huyssen 2003; Stern 2006a; Langenhol 2011; Craps 2013), whilst for others it engenders two risks: it might conceal local forms of dealing with political violence and depoliticize the historical features of various forms of suffering (Antze 1996; Misztal 2004). In the next section I will further explore these two critiques of the trauma paradigm.

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36 Alan Young offers a different genealogy of trauma. His work complements Huyssen’s by arguing that its history can be traced back to the 19th century and has been shaped by the idea of intimacy. Young’s argument is that memory is connected to our sense of self, providing the body with a subjectivity consisting of the connection between the past and our self-awareness. In this context, the emergence of a traumatic memory would reveal something of the manner in which we have framed personhood since the 19th century onwards (Young 1997).

37 Antze and Lambeck remark that: ‘the current politics of memory and its associated culture of victimhood draws attention away from collective forces and issues, and produces a shift from collective obligations and modes of accountability to narratives of individual suffering and accusations of individual blame’ (Radstone 2010, 34).
Local responses to political violence and the divided memories context

The question of the homogenizing effect that the concept of trauma may have on distant realities has been taken up by Lucy Burke et al. They state: ‘Focusing on academic discourse, we want to argue that the ways in which trauma is engaged with runs the risk of homogenizing different kinds of events and forms of violence, subsuming the contingencies of their historical production under a single concept’ (Burke, Faulkner and Aulich 2010). The authors point to the need to take into account the specificities of local histories, how the concept of trauma is first produced and then embodied and what struggles it might conceal and, in particular, distinguish the different kinds of violence behind different forms of social suffering.

This discussion is particularly relevant for the Chilean case. As I noted in Chapter 1, according to Stern, among the characteristics of the memory impasse were precisely the difficulties in finding an agreement on the very meaning of the traumatic. In his work, he illustrates how within post-coup Chile contending narratives of victimhood have reclaimed legitimacy for their ‘suffering’. For example, two distant experiences become homogenized, such as being the victim of land expropriations in the 60s on the one hand and the victim of state violence in the 70s or 80s on the other. Although both experiences have been narrated as forms of victimhood, which from a narrative perspective may be ‘comparable’, from an ethical and political perspective they are very different. This contrast shows how problematic is the status of the traumatic for societies with deeply divided memory frames, where the very definition of the traumatic implies a political and moral struggle. In fact, in Chapter 1 I referred to how, particularly in the 80s and 90s, an activist community of memory and public opinion came together around the concept of trauma and the moral distinction between victims and perpetrators. Although this moral distinction was crucial, it was also problematic because its sharp distinction concealed its weakness in the local debate. In fact, from its weakness stem questions such as social complicity with state violence, which is an issue in the Chilean case (Lira and Castillo 1993). What was the role in state violence of the supporters of the regime and of the bystanders? Thinking in terms of social responsibility in episodes of violence and the complex forms in which violence might be legitimization - as Hannah

38 Aware of this, I have focused on one side of the Chilean memory tradition, that is to say, the opposition to the dictatorship lineage, which is defined by their experience of state violence. However, as we will see in chapter 7, even within this community of memories there is no absolute consensus either, and generational appropriation of familial political memories might be complicated.
Arendt did in her book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the Banality of Evil* makes violence something much more familiar and quotidian than implied by accounts of the traumatic (where there are clear distinction between victims and perpetrators).

Das also warns about the way the model of the Holocaust has become a template through which we think and speak of the traumatic as if it were the only form of experience after episodes of violence: ‘I would submit that the model of trauma and witnessing that has been bequeathed to us from the Holocaust studies cannot be simply transported to other contexts in which violence is embedded into different patterns of sociality’ (Das 2007,103). She states that, in order to give an account of collective traumas, we would need to look at specific socio-historical backgrounds instead. The anthropologist’s concern with the ‘attention to the local patterns of memory’ is taken up in, for example, Jennifer Cole’s research. Her book, *Forget Colonialism*, is a good example of what it means to take into account local patterns of memory and why this is important. She explores how inhabitants of a small village in Madagascar remember the colonial violence in their daily lives, and how its past is woven together and continually remade (Cole 2001). During the first months of her fieldwork, the past seemed an issue completely irrelevant to local people. Cole found a local community where practices seemed to be unquestionably local, while the colonial influence seemed to be absent. In her own words: ‘Elders would politely tell me about the colonial period when I asked, but for the most part I had to elicit the information; it did not appear to have any life of its own’ (Cole 2001, 4). However, the longer she stayed in the village, the more she started to perceive the hybrid nature of the place and the strong French influence on people’s life. She felt the need to go beyond people’s manifested concerns to find a selective process of social memory working in creating an indigenous sense of locality. Cole’s work shows how traces of past violence are not homogeneous and they might not be evident at first sight, but need to be elucidated in each particular context. For her, memory did not have ‘verbal’ expressions but was embodied in practices and rituals.

During my fieldwork I had a similar experience to that of Cole: after several attempts at speaking about what I described as a traumatic experience, my interviewees were not really prompted to answer. By contrast, when in later attempts I asked about ‘growing up during the dictatorship’, they turned to their experiences which were based on their family histories and in narratives that circulated within their families. These stories were not organized around the template of the
traumatic, despite the fact that the question is organized thus within academic work or even in colloquial language. This draws attention to the multiple forms taken by experiences and narratives of the aftermath of violence.

2) Depolitizing suffering

A second critique of the use of the concept of trauma as a metaphor for the aftermath of violence is that this might pathologize social experiences of suffering which are the product of social relationships and forms of abuse, exploitation, domination, etc. In *Suffering Violence*, for example, Arthur Kleinman and Das also challenge the unreflexive use of the category of the traumatic and its ‘pathological’ connotations. They state in their introduction: ‘our notions of normality and pathology seem to be at stake as we explore the connections between the different forms of violence which pervade our contemporary world’ (Kleinman, Das, and Lock 1997, 2). In fact, the preponderance of this essentially clinical perspective applied to the studies of social violence has its critics, who are not satisfied with the notion of trauma when it is used to refer to episodes of social and political violence. Commenting on this, Stevan Weine also states that traumatic stress theory has been criticized for taking historical crimes and making them into a clinical disorder (Weine 2006). For Das, similarly, the psychological symptomatology of trauma makes it difficult to simply transport it and think unproblematically about cultural traumas (Das 2007). She criticizes a tendency of among authors like Cathy Caruth (considered as one of the most influential trauma scholars) to make a ‘too quick transition between individual and collective symptoms’. In particular, Das casts doubt on whether repetition – one of the symptoms of trauma - is to be considered as the traumatic in the social sphere, displacing the local manifestations that the aftermath of violence may have. She states: ‘... the idea of the re-enactment of the past at the collective level is a compulsion to repeat seems to short-circuit the complex ways in which we might understand how particular regions of the past are actualized through mediums of rumour, or in the singularity of individual lives as they knit together relations that have become frayed’ (Das 2007, 102). Das’ point is crucial as she pushes the concept of the traumatic to see how it is embodied in local histories.
As I have shown, Das, Kleinman, and Weine - among others - all note that traumatic symptomatology has a specific clinical history in Europe and therefore all are especially cautious with respect to the universalization of the concept. But Rebecca Saunders and Kamran Scot Aghaie go even further in their critique; for them the concept of trauma is a Western artefact, ‘a specific socio-political and clinical genealogy which emerges with late modernity and is assembled out of Euro-American experiences of industrialization and warfare, its gender relations, and its conceptions of normalcy and deviance’ (Saunders and Aghaie 2005, 18). For these authors, the trauma paradigm would universalize a diagnostic which emerged within particular historical conditions and which also may serve ideological purposes.

Among trauma critiques there is also the concern that the concept may not grasp what remembering the past actually means in terms of political agency. Burke et.al for example, state that the concept of trauma is not what should be central for sociologists when they look at episodes of social violence and the role of commemoration in them. Commenting on rituals of remembering of the French Communist Party (PCF) in the research of the historian Robert Gildea, they state:

‘What we are suggesting is that the concept of trauma alone cannot help us to make sense of an emotional connection with the sacrifices of those of the past as a facet of group identity. The members of the PCF are not traumatized by the historical fact of the bloody suppression of the Commune but they are deliberately recalling the event in order to enact an emotional and political relationship to this moment in the past’ (Burke, Faulkner, and Aulich 2010, 10).

The critique is directed at the core of clinical trauma theory: the scholars see in repetition not a form of identity fragmentation or pathological melancholy but a way of strengthening group identity.

Butler’s Precarious Life gives a different twist to the debate, when she articulates the expression of ‘the tasks of mourning that follow political violence’ which I used in Chapter 1 (Butler 2003). There she explores the grounds of political responsibility and envisions the possibility of mutual

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39 David Eng and Judith Butler argue for a new interpretation of melancholy which would see in it, rather than a form of pathological mourning, a form of resistance (Eng 2003).
acknowledgment in the aftermath of violence, stressing the political impact that this may have. For Butler, the memory of political violence is not an ‘unspeakable’ individual memory which isolates the person from the world. Rather, she develops a frame within which suffering and vulnerability may work as the basis of communities: ‘I propose to consider a dimension of political life that has to do with our exposure to violence and our complicity in it, with our vulnerability to loss and the task of mourning that follows, and with finding a basis for community in these conditions’ (Butler 2003, 19). With Butler’s assertion the question about the bonds that bring together a group of people is reinstalled within cultural and political debates. In Butler’s account we see a turn to the embodied dimension of community life, one which is born out of a concrete experience of grief and where a scar may act as a source of enduring mutual recognition. She adds: ‘Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is, in that sense, depoliticizing. But I think it furnishes a sense of political community (...) by bringing to the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility’ (Butler 2003, 22–23). Butler’s argument may seem counterintuitive, for we usually hear that exposure to violence and its traumatic effects provokes the malfunctioning of families and communities. Despite the fact that in so-called ‘cultures of victimhood’, the focus on suffering and the proliferation of testimonies among memory studies have been criticized for their depoliticizing effects (Sarlo 2005; Misztal 2004), Butler envisions the possibility of mutual acknowledgment in the aftermath of violence and stresses the political impact that this may have.

Inhabiting the aftermath of Political Violence

My findings are in tune with Butler’s appreciation of the role that suffering may have in long term forms of remembering. As we will see in my interviews, remembering state violence acquires an affective meaning within the family. It also becomes an impulse towards finding answers and reconstructing lost histories in the family genealogy, in which suffering bridges individual and social histories. In this sense, Das’ understanding of political violence as a ‘critical event’ counteracts the bias that trauma theory may have: rather than focusing only on the negative

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40 Discussions of trauma tend to go back to the idea of the ‘impossible’. Caruth has labelled trauma as ‘the impossibility of experience’ (Caruth 1995).
effects of violence, she also explores the actions and relationships that stem from it and which invest the past as a matter for the future. Janet Carsten explains how: ‘Das has characterized critical events as moments when everyday life is disrupted and local worlds are shattered. But more than this, they bring new modes of action, which in turn change the categories within which people operate. People learn to relate to each other in new ways’ (Carsten 2007, 4). In this sense, rather than being conceived only as forms of disruption and fragmentation, Das sees ‘critical events’ as being also a form through which new forms of life and relationships are created.

For her, the way people articulate political violence in its aftermath is: ‘as a gesture of inhabiting a violated world’ (Das 2007). Das’ focus in inhabiting is in tune with Victor J. Seidler’s critique of the way the social sciences have disembodied the subject: ‘A notion of the disembodied rational self has informed these rationalist traditions of social theory that have tended to discount the significance of bodies and emotional life in the creation of identities’ (Seidler 2010, 184). Thus, for Seidler, we need languages which connect the sense of self with its affective and cultural legacies: he does not speak from the standpoint of an idealist voluntarism but from a point of view which takes into account the weight of affective, family, and cultural histories in forming who we are.

The intergenerational transmission of memories

‘The traumatic’ has not been the only legacy of Holocaust studies; one of its other legacies is its corpus on transmission. With the passing of time after the fall of the Nazi regime, it became clearer that the effects of the disaster were not only felt by the immediate protagonists, witnesses or survivors, but also by their offspring and the following generations (Argenti and Schramm 2010; Rosenthal 1998; Epstein 1988). Despite the pioneering work of Halbwachs, who located the first level of memory transmission in the social institution of family (Halbwachs 1992, Erll 2011), it was after the Holocaust that family transmission became a focus of research on the memory of violence As Eva Hoffman puts it:

‘Loss leaves a long trail in its wake. Sometimes if the loss is large enough, the trail seeps and winds like invisible psychic ink through individual lives, decades and generations. When the losses are as enormous as those that followed from the Holocaust –when what
was lost was not only individuals but a world, the disappearances and the absences may haunt us unto the third generation; and they may inform our very vision of the world’ (Hoffman 2010, 405).

As we can see, entangled with the idea of transmission is that of family generations. Most of the academic work dealing with this topic was done under the umbrella of memory and trauma studies and was focused on the question about what it meant, first, for the offspring of victims - and later those of the perpetrators- to be born in dysfunctional families and with such heavy cultural legacies. Hence the modes of transmission, that is to say, how this trauma can be passed on to other generations, became the pivotal concept. From these studies arose the idea that the effects of trauma would reach the offspring of affected families and, therefore, that the effects of catastrophic violence are intergenerational and even transgenerational (Hohenlohe 2011; Hirsch 2001,2008; Rosenthal 1998).

The psychoanalytical paradigm offered a language with which to speak of forms of unconscious transmission between family generations; however, it remained the domain of psychoanalytic oriented researchers and was rarely considered by sociologists. Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, for example, has been read as a reflection on intergenerational transmission (Caruth 1996), while Nicolas Abraham’s and Mária Torok’s work ‘rediscovered’ the psychoanalytical tradition and employed it so as to study the passing on of secrets between generations (Abraham, Torok, and Rand 1994). Although these theories provide a basis for speaking about the intergenerational transmission and memory bonds, some of them also tend to psychologize the analysis and overlook how other elements intersect in the transmission of political memories within the family. They tend to sideline broader cultural, political and social contexts which are also significant in the transmission of memory (Hohenlohe 2011). I will develop this point later, when I will argue that the focus on family enables us to see the site where the private and the public are entangled and the boundaries between them are blurred.

Among the works on intergenerational studies, Harald Welzer’s investigation of mechanisms of memory transmission within families stands out. In his book Grandpa Wasn’t a Nazi he explores ‘how memory of the Nazi past is shaped by family dynamics, finding that even when particular pasts are explicitly acknowledged by grandparents, grandchildren do not always assimilate that knowledge into their conception of history or into their familial identity’ (Olick and Levy 2011,
Thus, as Olick puts it, Welzer shows that memory is a complex process of construction and reconstruction. Discussing how historical knowledge is transmitted within families, Welzer studied conversations with families, in group and individual interviews. He observed that official memory is one thing: he observed how memorials and schools have educated society in a narrative about the past. However, he observes that within families the situation is different: grandchildren for instance, cannot accept that their grandparents had committed atrocities during the Nazi period. This raises interesting questions about the various layers of memories which circulate and the relationship between family and the other memory-makers at different levels. Cristian Gudehus also reflects on this gap (in the case of Welzer’s study, between family memories and official memories) but from a different perspective: he demystifies the idea of a European memory and he shows how instead of national or transnational memories, specific narrative modes dominate political discussions. In this context (and it is here when he is in agreement with Welzer), he points to the necessity of understanding the private adaptation of history, which for him is often shaped by the family, and which according to him has not been fully researched (Gudehus 2013).

**The second generation**

In the introduction to my thesis I described an encounter with a widow of one of the regime’s desaparecidos and her son. In that context, I suggested using the concept of the second generation as a means of speaking about such a memory position. What interests me here is what such a category means and what implications it carries with it. As an analytical category, the concept of the second generation emerged as part of the cultural memory of the Holocaust (Assmann 2006, Hohenlohe 2011). The concept is an extension of the idea of victimhood and what it means to be traumatized, or from a different perspective –which I prefer-, of what is the scope of violence. More concretely, in the beginning it referred to the sons and daughters of concentration camps survivors, but since then its use has been expanded to cover other forms of survival, such as the experience of being a refugee after the Nazi regime. The publication of *Children of the Holocaust* by the writer Helen Epstein has been described as a key moment in the articulation of the second generation as a form of both experience and memory (Grimwood 2007). The second generation on the victim’s side was conceived of as the generation of absence, because they grew up with a reference to a traumatic event that was fundamental to the
biographies of their parents. Even though they grew up in the shadow of its memory, this event was alien to them; they could never represent it because its nature was beyond any possibility of imagination. For some, they were ‘the wall generation’: they were separated from their parents by the impossibility of experiencing the event (Grimwood, 2007). Dan Bar On put it simply: ‘My parent’s generation grew up in a world without a Holocaust’ - he writes - ‘but for us there could be no such world’ (Hoffman 2010, 406).

Concerned with postwar literature in Germany, which deals with the experience of being second generation, Assmann suggests that it is an experience: ‘defined by their direct contact with their parents, who were exposed to the cataclysmic events of the Holocaust and who survived the trauma under different circumstances’ (Assmann 2006). This made them inheritors of a shared legacy and points at the family as a space of memory transmission which is differentiated from institutional and state led initiatives of memory. For Assmann, family memory differs from other forms of memory transmission in the basis that it is based on experiences which are recorded on the body. Distinguishing between communicative memory and cultural memory, for her family memory belong to the first form of memory transmission, characterized by proximity and face to face relationships.

Assmann’s distinction between the family transmission of memory and other forms of memory circulation comes from her work, together with Jan Assmann, where they distinguish two basic kinds of memory: cultural memory and communicative memory. The first corresponds to ‘images of the past negotiated and handed down within groups from grandparents to grandchildren and in everyday communication, with limited time horizons, and thus malleable and changing’, while the latter are ‘accumulated residues of often distant pasts that constitute ‘the store of knowledge from which a group derives awareness of its units and peculiarity’ (Olick 2011, 207). For Assmann: ‘Just as the communicative memory is characterized by its proximity to the everyday, cultural memory is characterized by its distance from everyday’ (J. Assmann, 213, Olick, 2011). Welzer makes a crucial point for the discussion:

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“Cultural” and “communicative memory” can only be strictly separated in a theoretical context; in the actual memory practice of individuals and social groups, their forms and methods are linked together. This also explains why the shape of “cultural memory”—at least when observed over a longer period of time—can also be seen to change: Communicative memory devalues certain aspects while placing more value on others, and also adds new elements. (Welzer 2008, 285)

As we can see in the above quotation, the second generation concept points at two elements: first, that of family position (being the son or the daughter of someone who underwent a traumatic experience), and second, the fact of reworking an experience which, although ‘indirect’, is nevertheless crucial to their identity and which nevertheless still reclaims the status of ‘experience’. After this, memory is no longer a ‘direct’ form of contact with the past, but rather a form of mediation. Assmann destabilizes the idea that a second generation memory might be a passive legacy: she emphasizes the active search of the family history.

Eva Hoffman writes:

‘It is for these literal descendants that the legacy of the Holocaust is felt in its most intimate form; and it is here that the delicate issues of transferred trauma and deferred mourning are felt most poignantly. In a sense, the elusive, deeply subjective experience of the Shoah’s heirs is also an acute example of a broader phenomenon: the bequest of historical experience from one generation to the next; and the attendant passage of that inevitable knowledge of loss and death that are the constants of the human condition, and sometimes, of wisdom’ (Hoffmann 2010, 406).

In the above quotation, Hoffman attempts to understand what is constitutive of the experience of being second generation. For her this corresponds to the transmission of historical experience between generations and therefore the merging of history and memory and the role of family in this entanglement. If we examine her words, we will find that she envisions a double perspective on the legacies of the Holocaust for the first generation. She says that if forms of loss and death can be passed on as knowledge, wisdom can be also the result of this transmission. Hoffman’s reading of this double legacy has been important in shaping my understanding of the second generations in Chile: a political memory was transmitted as family legacy, a point I will develop in
the following chapters. Whilst this consisted of narratives of violence and fear, it was also a political memory which mobilized senses of solidarity, empathy, acknowledgment and political belonging. I am in debt to Hoffman’s sense of complexity in her understanding of the various forms of legacies that horror may have, something which is consistent with other perspectives I have been exploring in this chapter and the thesis.

In her book, *After Such Knowledge*, Hoffman provides new insight, suggesting that it is not only undergoing an experience which matters or what is transmitted, but that *knowing* about an experience also has several effects. In *The Long Afterlife of Loss* she writes about what it means to be born after an event which completely transformed the life of previous generations and those who were born afterwards: ‘...for many of us, as we were growing up in the proximity of an awful knowledge, the Holocaust constituted both the most frightening kind of family fable and a sort of awful normalcy. The knowledge of great loss and destruction was for us the first knowledge’ (Hoffman 2010, 407). It is of interest that ‘knowing’ in Hoffman’s account is close to the production of myths (fables) within family stories, highlighting the importance that this sort of fables has in the generations who ‘listen’ to them. Here, she also deals with the epistemological effects of belonging to the second generation: the problem of knowing about death and loss through familial memories. As this is also relevant to the second generations of the post-coup Chile, who were close witnesses of the victims of state violence, I touch on this in chapter 4, the Culture of Fear, where I use the insights of Hoffman and Das into what it means to ‘know’ about experiences of violence from very early in life. I also develop this in Chapter 6, when I describe how this knowledge is transmitted between generations.

Another element which stands out in Hoffman’s last quotation is the double bonding that the Holocaust represented for the second generation: how at the same time that these stories constituted a terrifying narrative of extraordinary events, they were also normalized in what constituted their family memories. Hoffman’s description of the ambivalence towards violence in the post-Holocaust generations, which means that the abnormal is inhabited as a fact of everyday life, will be found in the Chilean post-coup second generation too. This is something I will explore in several chapters of the thesis, especially in Chapter 4 (the culture of fear) and 5 (intergenerational stigmas). This double bonding is in tune with Das’ notion of violence and its
folding into everyday life. Das argues against the view of violence as something ‘other’ to social life and urges researchers to find it embedded in forms of the social (Das 2007; Das 1995).

Postmemory

The ‘second generation’ is not the only concept which has been used to refer to the intergenerational transmission of memories. In fact, the ‘postmemory’ framework has been increasingly used by researchers to speak not only of the Holocaust case, but the military regimes of the Southern Cone (Serpente 2011, Jara 2012, Lazzara 2009, Kaiser 2005). The postmemory debate is not merely a replacement for the concept of second generation. It responds, rather, to broader tensions that stem from memory transmission and the distinctions between family transmission and the global circulation of memories, and between communicative and cultural memories. It emerged when people started thinking about the transmission of traumatic memories and, therefore, about who is entitled to ‘inherit’ or bear them. For Marianne Hirsch, Assmann’s distinction between cultural memory and communicative memory cannot explain the transmission of traumatic memories when memory has been interrupted, for instance, through the destruction of archives and also in those cases in which these two forms of memory overlap (Hirsch 2008). Differing from Assmann, but still using the terms second generations or third generation in her work, she wants to give space to the affective attachment of memories even though they have not been transmitted exclusively within the family domain. She wants to explain how traumatic experiences may be deterritorialized, drawing on ideas such as the globalization of the Holocaust. How can a local experience be universalized? How can empathy work transnationally?  

42 Another example of the concerns raised in these debates was Landsberg’s book on the US-American mass culture of memory (2013). Therein she developed the concept of ‘prosthetic memory’. Like Hirsch’s, her theory is ‘based upon the idea that our individual and social memories are increasingly “indirect” experiences, construed through medialization and dislocation’ (Hohenlohe 2011). In Landsberg’s words: ‘…modernity makes necessary and possible a new form of public cultural memory. This new form of memory (...) emerges at the interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site such as movie theater or a museum (...) In the process I am describing the person does not simply apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal, deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did not lived ’ (Landsberg 2013, 2)
Struck by the intervention of a photograph, Hirsch observed how traumatic events are received, internalized, reinterpreted and recreated by a second or third generation, leaving traces of different sorts of mediations and reappropriations throughout the process of memory transmission. In her research, attention travels from the event represented in the photo to the effect that the photo and its history/memory have had on the family and how it becomes part of a legacy. Her work is also a reflection on how we are surrounded by objects that ‘speak’, that is to say, carry a memory with them. The concept of postmemory emphasizes the hypermediation of memory, its openness to being shaped (for instance by the media) and therefore its failure to capture a ‘true past’. Like Assmann’s concept of the second generation, that of postmemory questions the idea of memory transmission as a natural process with an authorized voice (there is no longer an authorized testimony and witness); rather, the recollection of a ‘true past’ is shown to be an impossible project that highlights the gaps of representation (Lazzara 2009b). Hirsch states:

‘The term ‘postmemory’ is meant to convey its temporal and qualitative difference from survivor memory, its secondary or second-generation memory quality, its basis in displacement, its vicariousness and belatedness. Postmemory is a powerful form of memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but through representation, projection, and creation —often based on silence rather than speech, on the invisible rather than the visible—. That is not, of course, to say that survivor memory itself is unmediated, but that it is more directly —chronologically— connected to the past’ (Hirsch 2001, 9).

In her research into the Argentinian second generations who grew up after the diaspora of their parent, Alejandra Serpente takes from Hirsch the idea that there is no longer a privileged site for the transmission of a true memory and is optimistic about the experience captured within the concept:

‘As a concept it seemed to offer a new perspective that allowed for the possibility of transcending this issue of representing the impossible aspects of traumatic situations, by

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43 Referring to the objects as ‘carrier of memories’, J. Assmann states: Things do not “have” a memory of their own, but they may remind us, may trigger our memory, because they carry memories which we have invested into them, things such as dishes, feasts, rites, images, stories and other texts, landscapes, and other “lieux de mémoire.” (Assmann 2011, 111)
dealing with the traces of traumatic memories as they unfolded in the act of transgenerational witnessing (...). What became important for academics was not the accuracy of the testimonial account but the significance of what was being transmitted (…)’ (Serpente 2011, 138).

For Serpente, postmemory redirects the researcher’s attention to the intergenerational relationship it engenders, rather than the content of the transmission. According Serpente, it ‘is the significance’ of the transmission that it matters. For Susana Kaiser, instead, what postmemory draws attention to is the issue of mediation. In her research into the Argentinian generation of postmemory, she defines the concept as:

... ‘intergenerational interconnections by which people adopt their elders’s memories by their own. It is the process of reconstruction of memories by the descendants of the witness generation. We are talking ‘of memories of memories’ to borrow an expression from Luisa Passerini who also talks of layers of memories, of a chain of representations by which you receive a representation and you create new ones. Although more mediated and less connected to the past, postmemory is in itself a highly significant form of memory (Kaiser 2005, 3).

In Postmemories of Terror Kaiser focuses on the sources through which the postdictatorship generation reconstructs the recent past, and identifies three sources: intergenerational dialogue, education and the communication media (Kaiser 2005).

Another element of Hirsch’s theory is that it expands the idea of second generation beyond the family sphere. Distancing herself from Assmann’s work, Hirsch states that postmemory is not restricted only to the family or even to a nation, and that it can also convey forms of transmission of cultural memory44. This, to my view, is the main difference between these concepts:

44 Hirsch’s understanding of cultural memory is different from the one accepted by the Assmanns. Hirsch’s and Valerie Smith’s cultural memory is, in her words, indebted to Paul Connerton’s ‘act of transfer’: ‘an act in the present by which individuals and groups constitute their identities by recalling a shared past on a basis of common, and therefore often contested, norms, conventions, and practices’ (Hirsch and Smith 2002, 5). And they add: ‘always mediated, cultural memory is the product of fragmentary personal and collective experiences articulated through technologies and media that shape even as they transmit memory’ (Hirsch and Smith 2002, 5).
‘Thus, although familial inheritance offers the clearest model for it, postmemory need not be strictly an identity position. Instead, I prefer to see it as an intersubjective transgenerational space of remembrance, linked specifically to cultural or collective trauma. It is defined through an identification with the victim or witness of trauma, modulated by the unbridgeable distance that separates the participant from the one born after’ (Hirsch 2001, 10).

As we see, through the notion of postmemory Hirsch ‘renounces’ seeing in embodied forms of transmission any specific difference in relation to other mediatized forms, as her emphasis is on showing how embodied and globalized contents of memory are entangled.

Despite postmemory’s contribution to thinking through mechanisms of intergenerational memory transmission, the Argentinean Beatriz Sarlo has questioned the usefulness of the concept of postmemory (Sarlo 2005). She argues that it might indeed be part of a postmodern tendency to create new concepts that often are empty. She argues that in the nineteenth century one could already find family biographies, where second generations wrote about the experience of the first generation. ‘Is not memory always built on absences?’ she asks. However, she does not consider that the contribution of Hirsch’s category is precisely to problematize ‘private legacies’ and show how they are mediated by cultural memory –now defined in different terms—.

Sarlo criticizes efforts to give an account of private memory in the work of Annette Kuhn, Hirsch and in Albertina Carri’s Los rubios (The Blondes –see Chapter 7: Family countermemories), suggesting that the focus should instead be on the politics of memory at the institutional level. For her, what this concept really does is to detach memory from public process of memory construction. Sarlo refers to the importance of highlighting the effects that ideology and politics of dictatorship have on the construction of public memory. By doing this, the author opposes public to private memory, and states that public memory is more relevant than private memory. Through her critique, Sarlo dismisses private life and affects as irrelevant to understanding social processes. It is precisely this sharp distinction between what is rendered private memory or family memory and what is considered public, official or collective memory that my thesis aims to destabilize. I criticize Sarlo’s rigid distinctions, as they bypass important interrogations raised by

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45 For a defense of the sociological importance of ‘the personal’, see Carol Smart’s: Personal Life (2007).
the relationship between collective and individual memory frames, as well as the politics of memory and memory in everyday life. The assumption that individual memory frames are shaped exclusively by the work of social and collective memory frameworks transforms the individual in an automaton (Cappelletto 2005; Stern 2006b) and does not give an account of the complex relationship between various levels and forms of memory.

**Family Memory in the aftermath of violence**

Despite Sarlo’s critique of postmemory, there is something on which she agrees with Hirsch: the critique of ‘the family bias’. Both authors are concerned with thinking about the ‘representativity’ of memories: who is entitled to have a memory and whose memories are worthy of being voiced? They both contend that memories are not only a result of affiliation but also of adscription (Hirsch 2008) Hirsch aims to explore the ways in which second generations can manifest solidarity with the experiences of the first generation through their own reappropriation of memories, not on the basis of familial bonds but of political (or aesthetical) adscription. For Sarlo, the problem instead is in the appropriation that both the left and the victims themselves have made of the legitimacy of testimony, which lies in the fact of being there or its proximity.

Hirsch’s and Sarlo’s arguments are in tune with Southern Cone scholars who also have accounted for a ‘beyond the family approach’ (Sosa 2011, Serpente 2011 Sarlo 2005) and have criticized the reliance on family bonds that have predominated in the debates on human rights in the Southern Cone. This is related to the fact that human rights discourses have relied on family relationships: the legitimation of demands for justice and knowing came from their role as mothers or wives. In Chapter 7 (Family Countermemories) I further develop this point. For Sarlo, this could be dangerous in terms of democracy and create a conflict in terms of ‘public’ interest. Cecilia Sosa has taken up these discussions and also has argued for a non-familial perspective on the understanding of loss and mourning in post-dictatorial Argentina (Sosa 2011).

In this context, I think it is necessary to clarify the purposes and aims of this thesis with respect to the question of the role of family and its status in the memory field. My thesis is not an argument in favour of the politics of memory based on family ties. I am not arguing for the monopoly of the
idea of victimhood based on direct experience and ‘blood’; I am rather exploring its boundaries. My thesis examines a memory tradition, that of the left-wing community of memory, and sees how forms of relatedness (specifically, familial) are part of the memory making of political opposition memory. However, I do argue that the embodied and affectively invested site of the family, in any of its forms and styles, do have an influence in the way the second generation listens to the first generation, particularly in the Chilean local patterns of family life. Here I follow Kuhn when she states:

‘Disputing the givenness of social categories like class, race, gender identity and sexual preference confers no exemption from the necessity of negotiating their social meanings in daily life. While fully aware that femininity is a fabrication, for example, as far as the world is concerned – and indeed as far as I too, am concerned – I am still a woman, and live with the very real consequences of a particular gender label. So it is with the identity conferred by family (Kuhn 2002, 1).

Focusing on family transmission does not mean that that is the only way of transmitting memory, but that it deserves to be explored on its own right. As described in the introductory chapter, from the coup onwards most scholars of the Chilean case have drawn attention to symbolic memories (in Gómez-Barris’ sense), focusing either on state or official memories or on public negotiations between political groups or organizations and the state. However, if we agree with the statement of Barbara Mistzal that ‘Families, it may be said, are as much collections of memories as they are of actual related people and kin’ (Misztal 2003, 82), another question arises. How can family memory dynamics and its focus on relatedness shed light on the broader dynamics of public and political memory in the aftermath of violence in Chile? What and whose memories are rendered as family memories? Very few studies of family memory and memory transmission to the second generations in Chile have been carried out, but in the last two years the topic has started to be dealt with in various narrative forms: TV series, films, books, panels in conferences, etc. This is a field which is likely to continue growing in the coming years. In chapter 5 I will refer to pioneering work on topics such as exile and traumatic transmission.

Although the family bond became a crucial moral resource in publicly legitimizing the opposition’s struggle against the dictatorship, family transmission of state violence has been overlooked in Chile. Memory scholars have tended to take for granted the role of the family, either because it is
considered as subordinate to other dynamics or spaces for memory making or transparent, natural, predictable, in other words: irrelevant. The focus has been on how political parties, social organizations, social movements and institutions have framed/shaped the process of coming to terms with the past in Chile. I echo Collins et al. remark concerning the bias of political science: ‘despite these biases against the study of memory as a lens on politics, some political scientists have come to appreciate how a range of historical memories that powerfully influence politics in observable ways fall outside the rubric of institutional analysis’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013, 6).

Addressing this gap, but in the domain of the Chilean memory field, this thesis deals with two main issues: on the one hand, with the ways in which family memories of political violence acquire meaning or ‘weight’, so that they mobilize a sense of duty and inheritance across generations; on the other, with the ways in which family memories are rendered as such. According to the sociologist Carol Smart:

‘The study of family secrets can be seen as an investigative approach which troubles the smooth facade of ordinary family life –not in order to decry family life as if some other form would be above such practices– but in order to demonstrate how complex family practices can be and how entangled they are with matters as conceptually distinct as public values and the personal construction of the self. Tracking family secrets sociologically is a method of linking the personal and the cultural, the historical, and the social’ (Smart 2011, 551).

In the quotation above, Smart describes the site of family as the entanglement between the private and public. Similarly, for Carsten ‘The history of kinship is always, among other things, a political history’ (Carsten 2007, 22).

46 Describing her book, she says:

‘The idea of autonomous personal, collective, or familial memory is (...) a chimera that only occasionally seems to correspond to actual processes. More usually, these memories merge into and out of each other as they are continuously created and reconstituted. The state may co-opt the language of kinship, constrain the forms of familial life, and shape

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46 See also David Eng in The Feeling of Kinship, where he questions the liberal distinction between the private and the public, between a space of intimacy and a space of public concern. Rephrasing Cathy Davidson’s memorable phrase: ‘no more separate spheres’, he conceives his book as an exploration of a critical vocabulary: ‘for examining the political, economic, and cultural processes by which race and racial difference continue to saturate our material and psychic lives, all the while denaturalizing liberal distinctions between the public and the private domains by challenging its false divisions’ (Eng 2010, 8).
possible dispositions to the past, present and future, but the accumulations, losses and restorations of memories of relatedness are part of the very fabric of national identity-making as much as they constitute more intimate narratives of personal or familial history’ (Carsten 2007, 26).

As we see in this quotation, Carsten argues against too rigid distinctions between family memory and forms of public memory circulation, and advocates instead a focus on the way that they interact and affect each other. I would like to highlight from Carsten’s quotation the fact that she mentions the concept of ‘relatedness’ and draws attention to the role of relationships (relatedness) within the family. To illustrate –by contrast– Smart’s and Carsten’s point, I describe Gomez-Barris’ analysis of the circulation of memory in Chile during the dictatorship and its aftermath. Although she too focuses on the family, she develops a contrasting perspective to that of Smart and Carten’s in which she suggests that private memories (ie: family memories) were independent of and almost parallel to public forms of memory (ie: the official regime of censorship and denial of state violence).

Studying the cultural arena as the site where subjectivities perform, Gómez-Barris describes the reception that the film Fernando Ha Vuelto (Fernando is Back, 1998) by Silvio Caiozzi received when it was released in Chile in 2000. Dramatically real, the documentary shows the moment when Fernando, a former left-wing activist who has been disappeared for 30 years, returns home and is ‘reencountered’ by his wife and family. In fact, it is his bones that come home, being displayed on a table to be recognized by his beloved ones. Gómez-Barris observes that when this film was presented at a local festival, it triggered a cathartic experience for viewers. As Caiozzi (the director) recalls, many people approached him to share their own experiences of violence during the dictatorship. In this respect, Gómez-Barris thoughtfully argues that this reveals that it is in the public realm that the circulation of memory has been limited and silenced and that memories continue to be repressed and elided. However, in her view, this is not what happened in the private worlds and within families. She focuses on the scene in the film in which the family comes together with the encounter of their disappearance, something which she considers to be a metaphor of the dynamics of memory in Chilean society, where family is isolated from the public space (Gómez-Barris 2009).
Gómez-Barris does not question the impact this may have on our understanding of the role of family memory in the transmission of political memory in authoritarian contexts, for instance, and seems to be interested only in visualizing official and family memory as two separated fields. This is important, as she attempts to show that not all memories are malleable by official memories. However, as Huyssen points out, family memories are not the only forms of pure memories ‘decontaminated’ by cultural memories, challenging too rigid distinctions among them (Huyssen 1995). In fact, if we go back to Assmann’s understanding of the second generation, we see the role that she gives to ‘bridge objects’, which are imbrications of family and cultural memory at the same time. This mutual relationship has been widely acknowledged in memory studies, with an emphasis on how cultural and the politics of memories shape family memories. However, throughout the thesis I emphasize also the influence that local family dynamics (communicative memory) has on cultural forms of memory circulation. I will refer to this in Chapter 6 Family Memory and Chapter 7 Countermemories.

Gabriela Fried, in turn, has explored the role of family in a different way. In Private Transmissions she focuses on family modes of memory transmission and the intergenerational relationship between members of the family but she also situates them in broader contexts. She writes about intergenerational transmission within families of desaparecidos in Uruguay and shows how family dynamics are related to the politics of memory: ‘The relatives of the disappeared ones go through a unique kind of mourning process and a transformation of identity. They are at loss for words, or facts, to process and discuss what happened and cannot mourn their loss as one may do with an ordinary death. They cannot put the past behind them because it is not past’ (pg 138). Thus, she problematizes the relationship between family practices, mourning and the politics of memory and explores in what sense they are related and to what extent they shape each other. Focusing on the intergenerational transmission of memory within Uruguay, she explores the forms of mourning that disappearance may throw up, and how this unresolved mourning demands at the same time justice (Fried 2009, 2011). She states:

‘my study suggests that members of the subsequent generations, far from forgetting or healing, are struggling with an inheritance of an unresolved injustice. They are also starting to express ambivalence about the inheritance that has impacted their life. They may follow
or avoid those transmitted and felt obligations. It appears that subsequent generations are links in a long-term process of multigenerational behavior’ (Fried, 2011).

It is interesting to see how Fried links the idea of intergenerational witnessing to that of responsibility. She talks about ‘obligations’ which appear to be passed on when new generations inherit a common history of political violence.

Chapter Conclusions

In this chapter I have argued that the universalization of the Holocaust demands a critical awareness of its influence and also of the differences between the local (in the case of this thesis, the South American military regimes, in particular in Chile) and the Holocaust context, which has become the universal. As various authors have observed, although the concept of trauma has become part of the imaginary of the aftermath of violence, it is important to see what is ‘helped and hindered’ by this concept (Huyssen 2003), rather than either simply dismissing it on behalf of ‘the local’ or applying it automatically. Taking an intermediate position, which takes into account not only the global character of the Holocaust but also the critiques of its flattening effects with respect to local manifestations of episodes of violence, Huyssen notes: ‘At the same time it is important to recognize that although memory discourses appear to be global in one register, at their core they remain tied to the histories of specific nations and state’ (Huyssen 2003, 16). And he adds: ‘Although the Holocaust as a universal trope of a traumatic history has migrated into other, nonrelated contexts, one must always ask whether and how the trope enhances or hinders local memory practices and struggles, or whether and how it may help and hinder at the same time’ (pg 16). Thus, exploring what the universal might conceal in the local, I have also argued for not reducing the aftermath of violence to the pathology of trauma. In Chile political violence and its memory have also engendered forms of mutual acknowledgment, solidarity, and identity making. In fact, this last point will be illuminated in chapters 4 and 6 when I deal with how violence, at the same time that it provokes injuries, also creates a sense of identity within family transmission.
In the case of this research, the Holocaust corpus has illuminated my exploration of individual and family stories by situating my interviewees’ direct or mediated experiences of state violence within a corpus which has recognized that violence has effects beyond the event itself, can reach different generations and may create different forms of suffering and victimhood. In fact, throughout this chapter I have explored the debates which are at the core of thinking about the intergenerational transmission of the memory of political violence and which have been developed in the context of the Holocaust. I have shown how the works of Assmann, Hoffman and Hirsch have provided the basis for thinking about the intergenerational transmission of political violence, and even about cultural traumas. All three authors reject the idea of ‘direct experience’ and therefore of ‘true memory’ in favour of emphasizing the second generation’s appropriation of their legacy. The authors contribute to explaining new forms of social affiliation and ethical responsibility stemming from the transmission of traumatic experience beyond its immediate victims, making it possible to move forward from the authority of the first person and/or generation (I was there). The contribution of these scholars to the field is important as their work makes it possible to see the impact that events have on populations without their needing to have experienced them directly.

This thesis starts from the standpoint of family transmission and A. Assman’s concern with the difference between embodied and other forms of transmission is therefore relevant to my work. However, I do take into account Hirsch’s insight that family memory is not conceived as a ‘pure memory’, isolated from other forms of memory transmission. At the same time, drawing on Smart’s contribution, I suggest that the family blurs the limits between levels of memory (for instance between private and public memory) and instead provides of a space in which the personal, the familial and the cultural are entangled with and shape each other.
Chapter 3

Researching Chilean Memory Across Generations

‘Following the ghosts is about making a contact that changes you and refashions the social relationships in which you are located. It is about putting life back in where only a vague memory or a bare trace was visible to those who bothered to look. It is sometimes about writing ghost stories that not only repair representational mistakes, but also strive to understand the conditions under which memory was produced in the first place, toward a countermemory, for the future’

(Avery Gordon 2008, 22)

‘Identities are malleable and multidimensional (...). And yet, we do not only define ourselves; we are also defined by our circumstances, culture, the perceptions of others and –perhaps most of all– the force of an internalized past. However much I wanted to keep the Holocaust history in the shadows, there was no countenancing its presence in my life’

(Eva Hoffman, 2004 27)

Introduction

In 2008, before I started my PhD, I conducted interviews throughout the country to understand the apprehensions that human rights communities, such as the AFDD, activists, members of various churches, etc. may have had concerning the representation of trauma and about the role of an official and state sponsored museum of memory. Among these encounters, I was particularly struck by the response of the son of Doña Agustina to the interview setting —as discussed in Chapter 1—. The son’s gaze, anticipating the various forms of haunting that this thesis would encounter, was my first step towards the questions regarding what it means to be the post-coup second generation. His gaze problematized the relationship that as an interviewer I would

47 I was invited to participate in this research by the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO).
have with my research and whether I was going to become affectively involved with my interviewees or would continue performing as the neutral observer I had been used to being for years.

At the same time—and this is the main aspect developed in this thesis—, his presence points to what Gómez Barris defined as the afterlife of violence: the personal or private struggles that may follow state violence. My assumption has been that methodologically, one way to have access to these struggles is through memory: not only how the past is represented in a narrative form but also how the past haunts the present. I maintain this as an analytical distinction which will also give access to two forms of thinking and complementing the methods. The first of these corresponds to the qualitative tradition—specifically, biographical narratives— and which KenPlummer has called ‘documents of life’. The other is concerned with modes of haunting, even beyond representation, which is developed in the work of Gordon’s. I will develop these two lines of enquiry later.

In this chapter I focus the reader’s attention on the methodological question of how to approach a generation born to families with histories of political opposition, which has grown up under a culture of fear and during a ‘memory impasse’. Thus, this methodological chapter describes the sociological practice and delineates the process which concluded in the interviews I conducted. It is about something which is not visible in the ‘final product’ but which determines it or, in other words, what I learned and how I learned it during this process. In the first section, I introduce the origins of the project. I describe an initial observation phase where, through interviews and biographical writing, I obtained valuable insights which would later help me in the fieldwork. I explain how after this initial phase I defined the main elements of my methods: that the interviews were to be framed under the umbrella of family stories and the interview questions would deal with issues of everyday life during the dictatorship.

Then, I proceed to set the terms for defining the second generation category, the sample and a way of approaching my interviewees. I identify a set of criteria for establishing my cohort: the interviewees were born between 1968 and 1980, were the children of people who suffered a wide range of forms of state violence and grew up during the military regime. Although this generation did not really have a personal memory of the coup (and if they have, it takes the form of childhood memory fragments), they had to go to school during the decades of fear and socialize within this
context. Many of them witnessed their parents’ suffering, the fracturing of their personal lives, feelings of loss, etc. I explain how the concept of the second generation draws on the relationship between one generation (the first), their offspring and an event.

After this, I describe my fieldwork context in 2010 and how the fact that it took place immediately after an earthquake affected the interview contents by arousing fears of death and vulnerability. I give details of the sample I interviewed, describe modes of recruitment and also describe and explain complementary interviews conducted during the same period of time. I then describe how I conducted the interviews and suggest that reflexivity was crucial, on the one hand, to shaping the concept of the second generation during the encounter itself, and on the other, creating the conditions in which political memory can be remembered safely.

In the next section, I discuss the methods which were at the basis of the techniques I used during the fieldwork and its mode of analysis. I explain Plummer’s concept of documents of life and Gabriele Rosenthal’s approach to thematic analysis. I also reflect on some limitations that I found concerning this project and how I turned to Avery Gordon’s idea of haunting, which for her will mean an ethnographic ‘hospitality’ to the ghost. In other words, to forms of presence which demand of the sociologist an imagination capable of seeing and listening beyond positivistic terms. Finally, I deal with some ethical issues involved in the way we frame interviewees, and in this case, how we avoid creating a simple subject of victimhood. In this respect I argue for Gordon’s concept of ‘complexity’. Then I describe the main chapter conclusions.

The origins of the Project
In 2009 I conducted preliminary observations so as to inform my research questions in the first year of the project. As I was living in London I started an exploration of my personal experience of being part of the second generation - which I initially defined vaguely as being the children of the opposition to the coup, in a broader sense - and how it affected the way I was conducting the interviews. Inspired by feminist methods, I spent time practicing a way of speaking about the past which was both quotidian and had a reflective attitude by observing precisely the opacities of
these acts of speech. I knew by experience that the memory impasse might trigger debates, confrontations and also resentments. Based in London, my possibilities for finding interviewees were quite limited, so I told some Chilean friends what I was doing and some of them agreed to have a chat about “the impact of being born after a traumatic event, in post-coup Chile and inheriting the coup memory”. I did four interviews in total, with two men and two women, all of whom were doing postgraduate studies in London. I knew how biased a sample of postgraduate students in a foreign country would be, but although aware of its limitations, I nevertheless decided to go ahead with the interviews. I saw them as an exercise and a way of exploring the scene of speaking about what I assumed to be a ‘traumatic memory’ – which was how I framed my project then.

I asked them what they knew about the coup. Influenced and inspired by the Holocaust literature on memory and trauma transmission between generations, I suggested the topic of conversation as follows: “What has it mean for you to be born after a traumatic event such as the 1973 coup?”. However, I had the impression that the question about being second generation of ‘a traumatic past’ was operating as an empty initial question. Alessandro Portelli shows how every interviewer will create a narrative which does not exist outside of the interview and which will be shaped by the interaction between interviewer and interviewee, (Portelli 1991). However it is not that narratives can be instilled as a form of voluntary idealism; the problem is, rather, one of how to speak in the aftermath of violence and how creating the conditions for that speaking. This would become increasingly important for my work. I follow Rosenthal when, in her work about Holocaust three generations of victims and perpetrators, she states:

We can thus assume that the process of selection being carried out by the biographer whilst presenting his or her life story is not haphazard or arbitrary, merely reflecting possible interactive influences of the interview situation or a passing mood. A life story does not consist of an atomistic chain of experiences, whose meaning is created at the moment of their articulation, but is rather a process taking place simultaneously against the backdrop of a biographical structure of meaning, which determines the selection of the individual episodes presented, and within the context of the interaction with a listener or imaginary audience. This texture of meaning is constantly reaffirmed and transformed in the ‘flux of life’. (Rosenthal 1993, 61)
Rosenthal’s quotation sheds light in the various elements that interact in a life-story or biographical interview. I agree with the emphasis that she gives to the interviewee’s intentionality of speaking, in the light of his/her lived experience. Just a few years ago, in 2009, speaking about the second generation was still unusual in Chile. The drama of the Chilean first generation (marked by the UP and the events that followed: state violence, diaspora, fear or repression) has been the subject of many representations within political discourses and in the cultural sphere. Nevertheless, the almost saturated first generation practice of testimony/witness accounts has been strongly contrasted with the second generation’s silence and its difficulty in ‘finding words’. So when in these initial interviews I suggested to my interviewees a relationship between the dictatorship, the traumatic and ‘normal people’, it was unusual. I was dismantling a wide-spread belief that the effects of state violence only affected their direct victims. For me as a researcher, it constituted my first insight into the field: that at that time the legacies of the past were not only invisible in everyday life, but also at the moment of narration. On the other hand, I also saw it as a way to resist universalized portraits of suffering.

During one of these interviews, the child of a left-wing activist family told me that during her childhood the fact that Pinochet represented “all the evil in the world” was terribly shocking for her. She prayed at night “asking God how He could let someone be that bad”. I asked her if she believed that the dictatorial experience was important to her in the present. She said not at all. At the end of the interview, she told me that she was now working as a forensic psychologist with the aim of understanding criminal behaviour. I asked her if she could make any connection between her work and her childhood experience and her (a) moral image of Pinochet. She said that she never thought of it before.

These interviews were crucial in helping me to see that I wanted to speak of something which did not have a language, which did not have a social frame yet, but which was there⁴⁸. In the four interviews I asked about memories of the coup itself, and there was not in fact an answer to a question which itself caused confusion: what had their parents have told them? What had they learned at school? What do they think about the coup? What did they think years ago? The issue of disconnection between the present and the afterlife of violence was also symptomatic: what

⁴⁸ Raymond William’s definition of structures of feelings as ‘social experiences in solution’ might illuminate this fieldwork ‘intuition’. (Williams 2009)
does it mean that a bright woman with psychological training had never found any meaningful connection between her childhood anxieties and her later decision to become a criminologist? It were not only narratives which showed themselves to be relevant but those zones which remained unexplored, most likely due to cultural forms of rejection and silencing. Referring to the relationship between silence, family and the cultural context in her research among German families with ethnic German members from the former Soviet Union, Rosenthal argues in the prologue to *Ethnicity, Belonging and Biography*: 'That which is effective in terms of family history and family dynamic is always dependant on other social units and vice versa. For example, the social silence in the public discourse of the Soviet Union supported the silence within the families, and the silence in the families supported the silence in other social contexts’ (Rosenthal and Bogner 2009, 13). It is here that Gordon’s assertion about invisibility can offer insights if we expand it to cover the idea of speaking and silencing: “To impute a kind of objectivity to ghosts implies that, from a certain standpoint, the dialectics of visibility and invisibility involve a constant negotiation between what can be seen and what is in the shadows” (Gordon 2008, 17)

During these initial and unstructured interviews\(^{49}\), I was not sure how to approach the afterlife of a past which to a significant extent has been normalized and which has become, overall, inhabitable and rendered invisible. The concept of the traumatic was not helpful, because it raised the link with direct forms of violence and the imaginary that the AFDD and other human right organizations already represented. But I continued to explore the idea of being the second generation of the military coup. Neither my interviewees nor I understood fully what it was to be a second generation. Of what? Of the coup? Of family life? I agree with Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinckmann when they state: ‘The skills of interviewing are learned through the practice of interviewing’ (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, 17) I felt confronted then with an ‘experience in the shadows’ or an experience without a testimony – this also emphasizes the social character of a testimony or a narrative, problematizing the relationship between narrative and experience in the research context. How could I expect to deal with experiences and memories if people (including me) could not talk about them, or when there might not be anything to talk about? I began to

\(^{49}\) Sharlene Hagy Nesse Biber defines unstructured interviews as those in which ‘(…) I have a basic interview plan in mind, but I have a minimum of control over how the respondent should answer the question’ (Hesse Biber 2006,105)
suspect that, as I too am part of that generation, perhaps I did not know how to talk about it either. The evidence was that for the second generations finding the narrative of their lived experience in front of an interviewer proved difficult – if not impossible.

Framing the post-coup second generation category

I have been fortunate enough to see both a cultural change in this initial silence in the course of this investigation, and also how what was silent when I did my interviews has slowly begun to obtain a narrative form, in documentaries, books and theatre, for example, in what still is an incipient process. One of the issues here is how we think about the moment in which experiences that did not have a social label, or a shared name, suddenly obtain one. This is particularly relevant when we speak of the second generation. It also raises the question of the relation between memory and time: memories are not fixed but are transformed in a permanent dialogue of ‘the memory work’ (Jelin, 2002), which operates in a complex overlapping between individual and social experiences.

The juncture in which this thesis has been written is interesting: it is the moment of transit, in which a social category started to obtain social meaning, and media, particularly filmography and documentaries, were part of this shaping. But this is not a feature exclusive to the Chilean case: in fact, that is why the postmemory category has been productive in exploring the kind of experience which is shaped through a mediated and mediatized access to the past (Hirsch 2008). In this sense, the category of the second generation sheds light on family histories and affective legacies, and defines them as a point of access to a position from which to remember the past. Since 2010, a number of art and media works have begun to install a new narrative within cultural memory. These have contributed, on the one hand, to rethinking what it means to suffer violence in what has been rendered as the aftermath of violence. However, it is not merely that these forms of representation created the category of ‘the second generation’, for the number of people who in fact attended to these exhibitions is not significant. In fact, none of my interviewees did so. On the other hand, these narratives of the second generation bring the issue of the role of intimacy and
subjectivity to a local debate which has traditionally preferred areas such as modernization, institutional parties, social movements, debates concerning models of development, etc. In chapter 5 and 7 I analyse documentaries produced by and / or about the second generation in so far as they raise issues of inheriting the legacies of the dictatorship.

In a different context - that of the post Holocaust - Hoffman sheds light on this moment of transition, which is not a case of a new language creating something entirely new, but rather one in which something that is already there is brought into a form of consciousness; in other words, when what has remained invisible is rendered visible. In *After Such Knowledge* she reflects on the impact it had on her the first time she heard of the concept of second generation; she describes a process of newness but also of recognition, both involved in the moment when she first heard of the concept of ‘the Holocaust second generation’:

> How did we, the comfortable children of those who lived through the horror, suddenly become a sociological phenomenon? Was this just another American affectation, a group “identity” conveniently invented at the very moment when everybody was beginning to insist on having one? At the same time, I could not deny that I felt a surge of recognition, curiosity, even excitement. I had mostly thought about the post Holocaust strand of my biography in solitude, and as something purely private, or at least personal (...) But now that it had been so identified, I could quickly see that it could constitute an element of commonality with others (Hoffman 2004, 27).

And she adds: ‘The phrase [second generation] suggested that there were others for whom a Holocaust inheritance was both meaningful and problematic; that living with it was a palpable enough experience to be overtly recognizable; that it was in fact an experience; and in some way, it counted’ (Hoffman 2004, 27). It is this sense of ‘truthfulness’ or ‘correspondence’ between speaker and speech which I found particularly interesting: that which will make something ‘recognizable’ or which will trigger ‘acknowledgment’. Hoffman’s articulation of the idea of inheritance was insightful and also raised a new issue: that violence is normalized and transformed in everyday life. I develop this chapters 1 and 2, where I further develop this fieldwork insight: that the traumatic is not the best frame within which to think of the post-coup Chilean second generation, but rather, the forms of life that follow violence and its inhabitation in everyday life.
The opposition’s second generation

The concept of second generation and the assertion of a certain experience which stems from a family position may provoke resistance in a reader suspicious of too solid forms of identity and the danger of essentialism. I follow Seidler when reflecting on the insights that the critique of identity has offered within sociology; he also mentions what it conceals:

There is a tendency within postmodern writing to resist notions of identity as somehow essentially fixed, and so to prefer talking in terms of processes of identification (…) [But] This can also work to make identities too provisional and at the same time can render invisible the emotional pain and suffering, as well as traumatic histories and memories, that can come with the fragmentation of identities and can be passed on transgenerationally. (Seidler 2010, 45)

In this sense, the category of the second generation sheds light on family histories and affective legacies, and defines them as a point of access to a position to remember the past. For Robert Miller: ‘The term “generation” has multiple meanings and needs to be clarified into (i) generations in the sense of parent/children family generations and (ii) periods of significant social experience – cohort generations’. (Miller 2007, ix). In fact, in this thesis both forms correspond to my use of the category. It refers to family generations, to the children of parents who were in the opposition to Pinochet’s regime, the majority of whom experienced various forms of state violence or authoritarianism. It also refers to a cohort generation, as they were born in a particular context: they inherit a memory which was not their own. This led me to define my focus on people born between 1968 and 1980. Thus, the concept of the second generation draws on the relationship between one generation (the first), their offspring and an event. Identifying the coup and the dictatorship as the event (or rather, a process), I refer to them as the children of those people who themselves suffered or witnessed forms of state violence during their childhood and who grew up during the regime of fear. Many of them were children of parents who suffered various forms of state violence, from ostracism to execution or disappearance.

The project is about the mnemonic tradition, which during Pinochet’s regime was united around the concept of ‘opposition’. Although the opposition memory I frame in this thesis resembles Lira’s
study of the left-wing tradition of memories, it also differs from it in terms of its political composition. The opposition’s post-coup identity came to conceal an intense process of upheaval and tension which the left in Chile had previously undergone and which was also part of the crisis of the UP, when the left was torn between guerrilla inspired groups and a more institutional kind of support for the government of Allende. However, after the coup, these tensions were displaced from the political juncture and all these groups united and became the opposition to Pinochet, until 1988. During those 17 years there were ruptures and differences within the opposition, and different movements, alliances and strategies were followed. However, the identity of being part of the opposition to the dictatorship was still strongly felt. It united a wide range of political identifications: it brought together the Communists, the Socialists, human rights communities, sectors of the Church and, in the late 70s, the Christian Democrats – who in the beginning had supported the coup. Together, they were united under the umbrella of the opposition and the recovery of democracy.

One of my concerns throughout this research is whether I am able to transmit to a non-Chilean reader the extent of the affective investment in the UP and the magnitude of loss that the coup triggered on part of the Chilean population. This topic has been widely researched and although I have read dozens of books and more papers on the matter, still nothing illustrates better the feeling than what a first generation victim once told me: “They [the military regime] chose the best of us, and they killed all of them. They killed a generation of political activists”. Thus, the intergenerational transmission of memory and the second generation’s inhabitation of that memory to which I refer needs to be contextualized in the climate of the international disappointment which followed 1968 and locally, the military coup, the massive exile of UP supporters and the suicide of Allende. Whilst the post-coup second generation saw (or heard about, in the ‘language of the family’) the fall of the UP, they witnessed the defeat of their parents’ ideals and of the very possibility of transforming the world through politics. This is related to the loss of the left in a more global context:

Certainly the losses, accountable and unaccountable, of the left are many in our time. The literal disintegration of socialist regimes and the legitimacy of Marxism may be well the least of it. We are awash in the loss of a unified movement, in the loss of labor and class as inviolable predicates of political analysis and mobilization, in the loss of an inexorable and
scientific forward movement of history, and in the loss of a viable alternative to the political economy of capitalism”. (Brown 2003, 460)).

As Wendy Brown suggests, loss is expressed together with a kind of longing for something, although at the same time this involves a distance from what has been lost. So how may one mourn for the loss inflicted by state violence and at the same time the loss of visions of a collective future? The second generations are in a position in which they have to learn how to inherit a memory which is both a family memory and a social memory. Following Seidler, the second generation’s relationship to family and history enables us to make visible those stories that are inherited but were not chosen. Throughout the thesis I emphasize not only the inheritance, but also the inhabitation of those legacies and its tensions. I recall here Sarlo’s critique of Los Rubios, a discussion I will further develop in Chapter 7, when she suggests that there is not one intergenerational approach to memory, but various modes for doing so. Rosenthal’s insight into how to think about the relationship between generations is helpful: ‘[their research suggests an] interactive-intergenerational concept which does not view the second and third generations as passive recipients of the past, but rather as active agents in the way they deal with their parents and their pasts’ (Rosenthal 2010, 7).

Breaking the silence: the biographical interview and the children’s gaze

Encouraged by my supervisor, I started writing my biography as a methodological approach and preparation for the task of interviewing. I had planned to do fieldwork in the coming year, but I did not feel prepared to interview people about this topic. Reflexivity has been considered as a tool which allows the researcher to understand how their own position affects their research (Plummer 2001, Hertz 1997)). Thus, through the exercise of biographical writing I realized, for instance, that I rarely talked with my peers about my family experiences, that I would become angry at people when they showed support for the dictatorship and that I felt really uncomfortable when telling

50 I follow Gabriel Rosenthal’s preference of the term biographer rather than autobiographer, as she considers that the latter does not account sufficiently for the social constitution of the subject (Rosenthal, 1993).
people (even friends) that my grandfather was imprisoned and tortured by the military. Although the dictatorship was part of my everyday life during my childhood, I had never talked about it personally. In some ways, my parents’ generation’s experience of the coup was a taboo for me: it belonged to them, not to me. I realized how a political fact which was a family secret affected my way of doing interviews and listening to the second generation.

Writing about the second generation’s appropriation of the memory of the coup, I changed the initial focus from memories of the coup event to the context in which that memory was produced and invested with meaning: the dictatorship. I explored this with other people of my cohort. Still in England, I continued the exploration by speaking with my peers and I asked – now through an email invitation - a number of Chileans who were born between 1968 and 1980 and who grew up during the dictatorship, to write their biographies and describe how they experienced growing up during Pinochet’s regime within their particular families and political legacies. This step lacked any clear methodological design but still I consider it as an essential part of the observation of the fieldwork and a process which led me to frame my research questions.

In the email I told people that I was doing research into the ‘post-coup second generation’. I did not select participants according to their political party affiliation, social class or gender; I just spoke to people who were part of my personal contacts. Ten people agreed to participate, which for my expectations was a high number; seven women and three men, all of whom had completed their undergraduate students in the social sciences, arts or humanities: they were people who were sensitised to the idea of writing a memoir. The process of writing took a month. Six volunteers finally handed in their writings to me (five women and one man); three had grown up within opposition families and three within families which supported Pinochet’s regime. They were born between 1975 and 1978 in Santiago (the capital city).

The amount of writing varied from case to case, from one page to five. Although I did not use the biographies in the later analysis which structures the chapters of the thesis, they were crucial to learning a way of listening and preparing a set of interview questions for the fieldwork of the second stage. They were, like my own biographical writing, memories of everyday life. They told a story with no heroic deeds: the story of growing up under the dictatorship and being the inheritors of a past. For these voluntary writers, family histories were the context in which the stories took place: the meaning of the dictatorship would be related to the family position towards it. This does
not mean that they will be a reflex or lineal continuation of their parent’s options or views, but rather would be in dialogue with them. Thus, one of the volunteers disapproved of their family position and their role in the past, and she explained how it would mean for her a sense of anger and reproach with respect to her family, while for another the contrast between her family political memory and school was crucial to her childhood and adolescence. I learned that it was through the process of remembering childhood and the political context in which the interviewees grew up, that I would elicit a narrative about modes of remembering (family histories and stories, political events, personal experiences, etc.) which would reveal crucial aspects of recent Chilean history.

The second generation’s memories of the coup or the dictatorship, depended on their family histories. Memories of this past (the one which led us to the memory impasse) were familial and were told through a family genealogy. It was not the story of the ‘I’ but of a legacy. I learned that ‘remembering the coup has a family history’, and I put it into practice: being second generation in post-coup Chile had as one of its main tropes family genealogy and family life. Family genealogies were a way of de-individualizing testimonies and putting them in their social and historical context from an everyday life point of view.

Carlos, for instance, a right-wing ‘biographer’, studied in an upper class school. He does not remember the coup so much as the Land Reform because for his family the dictatorship brought things “back to order”. He recounted a story from his childhood which reveals much. One of his classmates was the grandson of Pinochet, a middle class military man. The grandson did not have friends in this high-class school, and Carlos tells how once in an argument with him, he shouted Pinochet’s grandson: “milico de mierda!”. Milico is a colloquial and derogatory way to name the military in Chile (and also in Argentina and Uruguay). With this he showed how, although a child, he knew a lot about social class and political memory and thus was able to reveal the instrumental alliance between the military and the upper class in Chile. Carlos reflects “I knew he wasn’t one of us” (because of Pinochet’s grandson’s middle class social origins).

His story problematized my definition of second generation: is he a second generation although he belongs to a family which supported the regime and for which the coup was lived as salvation? Although I felt that was a challenging question, I also felt that the sort of questions that including him as second generation would raise would led me to a different project, and encouraged by my
supervisor, I focused on one tradition of memory, which I defined earlier. However, stories like his were told in the biographies and showed how the child’s gaze (or memories) in the voice of an adult might be a precious sociological tool. Works such as “Berlin Childhood” by Walter Benjamin, Eva Hoffman’s *After Such Knowledge*; Victor Seidler’s *Shadows of the Shoah*, Ingeborg Hecht’s “Invisible Walls” are examples of this. They weave a world of silence, scared teachers, dangerous words, spontaneous solidarities, urban symbols and myths. However, they are not memories of childhood, but about childhood (Freud).

As a result, with the narration of everyday life the non-extraordinariness of the second generation’s memory came into focus. The losses of the past or any experience of mourning would not be found only in spectacular forms of horror: it would be found in the extremely rich and complex experience of growing up during the dictatorship. I returned to doing interviews because I felt there was a bias in the biography: it would limit my sample to people with technological and writing skills.

**Landing in the Fieldwork: Life Stories Interviews**

My field research took place in Chile after the earthquake of 2010, and this event deeply affected both the way people spoke to me and the way I spoke to them. Any qualitative (and quantitative) analysis needs to pay tribute to the way data was produced - ‘uttered’, in Catherine Kohler Riesmann’s terms (2003) - and the special social, political, and psychological circumstances of its production. As she indicates: ‘… any speech act is embedded in a specific social context; rather, as a historically specific and contested concept, authenticity itself is an object of sociological and anthropological research’ (2003, 95).

In fact, March 2010 was a particularly unsettling moment in Chile, because the 27th February tsunami had just destroyed part of the Southern coast of the country and various stories of personal and collective drama were told in the media every day. In one of the cities most affected by the earthquake, Concepción, social chaos reached the point at which law and order temporarily broke down and looters took over the streets, which was unusual in Chile. There was an intense debate whether to call in the Army, but the then President, Michelle Bachelet hesitated to do so on the grounds that it would arouse memories of the military coup. However, it was the earthquake itself, not only the presence of the Army in the street, which opened the ‘memory
box': there was no electricity, people had to use candles and reestablishing normal life took a long time. People felt vulnerable. I remember spending time listening to casual chats in public spaces or even in the hairdresser and they all consisted of describing in detail their memories of 27th February, a practice which echoes the sharing of memories of the coup. Everybody remembered what they were doing on 11 September 1973, as they now remember the day of the tsunami. This was the context of my interviews. In many of them, a parallel between the coup and the aftermath of the earthquake was drawn literally by the interviewees. People experienced fear and had confused feelings towards authority. There was a sense of emergency, while everyday life was interrupted. Fear, the presence of the Army, the sense of danger, and blackouts all echoed the experience of the dictatorship. Despite the fact that it took place about 30 or 40 years ago, it was fresh as a cultural memory among most of my interviewees.

The magnitude of the earthquake shocked the population, bringing the experience of death and vulnerability to the surface and situating them at the centre of social life. The context in which I did my fieldwork brought to the surface memories which resonated with the coup and the almost two decades of curfews. The earthquake was followed by a sense of a ‘catastrophe’. Furthermore its memory has provoked a strong need for justice among the family of the victims which continues today. In fact, the expression “never again” (also used to demand recognition about the abuse of force by the state during the 80s and 90s) has been used to speak of the earthquake’s victims, while the President and other authorities have had to respond in front of courts and public opinion about their responsibility for the late response to the tsunami. There was a generalized feeling of danger everywhere, echoing the opposition’s experience of the dictatorship. Despite the fact that the regime ended about 25 years ago, it was a “fresh” cultural memory among most of my interviewees.

**Recruiting Interviewees**

I identified a set of criteria for establishing my cohort and conducting interviews: first, they were born between 1968 and 1980. As I mentioned before, this generation barely had a personal
memory of the regime, had been to school in the decades of fear and many of them witnessed their parent’s suffering or fracture of their personal lives. Considering the time constraints, I chose to carry out interviews in a limited number of zones of the country: Santiago (the capital city) and Regions: Valparaiso, Valdivia, Puerto Montt, Río Bueno and Lago Ranco. The first four were urban cities, while the last two were villages within semi- rural areas.

I contacted members of social and political organizations and also recurred to my personal contacts to finally get in touch with my intervieewees by snowball method. Except in bigger cities like Santiago, and Valparaiso for instance I did not contact all of them in advance. In some cases, I just turned up and visited in situ the local organizations and local governments. In small places, I even just rang the bell or knocked on the door without previous arrangement in much more informal modes of interaction.

I conducted twenty eight individual interviews, of which twenty five were with men and women who were born between 1968 and 1980, either in Chile or abroad within left-wing families, and who grew up in the country during the regime. I will introduce the three pendant in the next section, for they were considered as complementary to my main focus. I also carried out two group interviews.

Among my individual interviewees were children of executed prisoners, guerrilleros, people who supported the left, tortured people, activists, politically disappeared and exiled families. I wanted to bring together different voices, and included the children of peasants, trade unionists, Mapuches, as well as of the political elite. At the moment when I did interviews they were adults, between 28 and 40 years old. The sample explores a range of social positions considering different socio-demographical variables: rural, urban, middle class, lower class, intellectuals, and illiterate people.
Table 1: Individual Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Undergraduate studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Active opposition</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Desaparecido Father</td>
<td>Region, rural area</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Ostracism</td>
<td>Region, semi-rural and indigenous area</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Silent opposition</td>
<td>Region, rural area</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Silent opposition</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ostracism</td>
<td>Region, rural area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Father’s execution</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Father political prisoner</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Political persecution</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Exiled family</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Exiled family</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Exiled family, internationalist</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

51 Chile is divided into 15 regions, of which the capital city is Santiago. Because the country is centralized such that almost half of the population is concentrated in Santiago (about 6 million inhabitants), I differentiate in the table between interviews done in Santiago and those done in the “regions”. I think that for a foreigner reader this is clearer than listing the names of the villages or cities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Strong moral opposition</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Executed father</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Active opposition</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Father involved in armed struggle and family exile</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Politically divided family, mother active oppositionist</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Political persecution and father’s imprisonment</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Moral opposition</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Active opposition</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Father’s political imprisonment</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Ostracism</td>
<td>Region, rural area</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Political persecution</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I also conducted two focus groups among second generations, with five and six participants each, taking place in the city of Santiago. In chapter 4 and chapter 7 I describe these interviews.
Table 2: Group interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Interviews</th>
<th>Women Participants</th>
<th>Men Participants</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Complementary interviews:**

During the period in which I was contacting people and interviewing, I also got in touch with people who were not part of my sample, but whose points of view I thought were complementary to my work. I finally included them in the presentation of the cases I selected for the thesis. I included two grandchildren of executed prisoners, born in the late 80s, who currently work as memory activists and a member of a right-wing family, the son of a Secretary of Pinochet’s regime. I used this interviewee as a counter-voice to my interviewees and something which also highlights the specificity of my research.

Table 3: Complementary interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Undergraduate studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Right-wing family</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Desaparecido Grandfather</td>
<td>Semi-Rural area in Santiago</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Desaparecido Grandfather</td>
<td>Semi-Rural area in Santiago</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
More importantly, the inclusion of a right-wing interviewee in Chapter 6 reinforces one of the assumptions of my thesis, namely, that the second generation from opposition families would be different to those of supporters’ families. The event they considered as traumatic was inconsistent with that reported by opposition families, and therefore the meaning they gave to the life under the dictatorship. For their families, the coup was the story of a triumph. I recall here Rosenthal’s results of her interviews with three generations of victims and perpetrators of the Holocaust, when she argues that their experiences would vary according to their position before the end of the war: it was the pre-1945 position which would be determinant for the experiences that families would undergo later (Rosenthal 2010). She explains:

‘In survivor families, the silence of grandparents about their experiences is connected to completely different problems and motives than the silence of grandparents who were implicated in Nazi crimes. A grandmother who survived the ghetto and the death camp is not denying persecution in her past if she does not speak about it, whereas this certainly is the case when Nazi perpetrators or accomplices remain silent’ (Rosenthal 1998, 13).

The same is true of the Chilean case, as it was the position during the UP and the decade before, and especially during the agrarian reform, which would determine the subsequent memory of the events: in other words, family memories would vary according to family histories.

**Conducting interviews**

Interviews were conducted between March and May 2010. They were done in local cafes or at interviewees’ homes, depending on their preference, and each took about 1.30 and 2 hours. I did only one interview per person: for a limited period, I opted for including more interviewees and a greater diversity of experiences. Although I made this decision, it was something which I have returned to and which I would review if I could, because after reading some of the interviews, I would have appreciated the chance to counter-ask some questions. However, having ‘more’
interviews allowed me to the identification of certain patterns and tensions, around which I organized the chapters.

I conducted interviews which were strongly based on biographical methods, where ‘the past and people’s experience of the past takes on a much more central significance than usual…’ (Miller 2007, 2). I conducted the interviews in an active way, in contrast to the prescriptions of post-positivistic approaches to social interview, which attempt to minimize the role of the researcher (Miller 2007; Rosenthal 1997). During my initial explorations I realized that the second generation position was something that needed to be ‘produced’ in the interview setting. This does not mean that we were ‘inventing’ life stories, but rather that we were in the process of giving meaning to personal life through an active remembering, through the lens of the legacies of the past. I often heard the expression: “I have not spoken of this before”. I followed Miller when he states:

‘The narrative approach (...) is seen to be situational and fluid – jointly constructed by the Interview partnership during the conduct of the interview. The personal characteristics of the interviewer can constitute one of the main stimuli to the interviewee and there is no blanket prohibition against the interviewer either reacting openly to the statements of the interviewee and/or revealing personal details of their own. In fact, the ethnomethodological question of ‘how the interview is constituted’ (Silverman and Gubrium, 1994, Holstein and Gubrium, 1995) is central to the narrative approach’ (Miller 2007, 14).

There was a second reason for being an active interviewer, which I would understand and also reinforce during the interview process: I was asking once forbidden questions, and the very encounter conjured up the landscapes of fear around which memories of the past were produced. I will further develop this in Chapter 4. For now, it is important to highlight the crucial role that confidence between interviewer and interviewee plays here. I learned that I needed to go beyond the barriers that the dictatorial speaking had imposed, and that I needed to show my position and create a safe territory. I will develop this in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 because is at the core of the second generation’s experience: the fact of inhabiting a landscape of fear which controlled the speaking. I needed to create a safe space first and show my interviewees that I was one of them; I was part of the sample and I was asking those questions I have first asked myself. Rosenthal has reflected on the role that researchers have in the interviews:
‘The narrator does not simply reproduce pre-fabricated stories from her or his life regardless of the interactional situation, but rather creates his or her story within the social process of mutual orientation according to his or her definition of the interview situation. The neopositivist research tradition would regard this aspect as an irritant which must be eliminated, reduced or at least controlled. In our view, trying to eliminate a ‘problem’ such as this amounts to a quixotic fight against imagined giants, giants which in the final analysis are revealed to be not even windmills but rather the ‘winds’ of the everyday world. The ‘wind’ driving the mill that is creating biographical constructs cannot be eliminated without eliminating the constructs themselves, since this wind is in fact the ongoing interaction between the biographer and his or her social world. Life stories, taken as constructs, are inseparable from these interactional processes; they themselves evolve out of the genetic process of interaction, just as their presentation in the biographical research interviews a product of the interaction between narrator and listener’.

I initiated the interviews by asking for people’s family story, understood as the narrative construction of the family history (Rosenthal 2010). This was highly positive for the development of the interview because interviewees were situated in a genealogical perspective, and developed a narrative of themselves as part of such lineage.

During the interviews I was an active listener, and I asked directive questions, and often told episodes of my own life. It often happened that when I asked about the effects of the dictatorship my interviewees did not understand or felt that they themselves were not victims of torture, for instance. So I started speaking or sharing my personal experiences and episodes such as carrying a secret, simulating at school, knowing of left-wing and forbidden symbols, etc. which were all raised in the opposition’s second generations’ biographies. So I used them as a way of illustrating what it means to be second generation. It was a way to create a category, to explain the newness of the concept, but it was also something which would be transformed into a recognition process during the interview (in Hoffman’s sense).

As already mentioned, I started the interviews by asking about the family story. I initially explained that I wanted to understand the experience of being the second generation of the coup, and being born within opposition families. I started the interview asking: “tell me about your family story, who were your parents, or your grandparents”. Inscribing my interviewees in a genealogy was a
way to link them to their family trajectories and speak of the idea of inheritance, and appropriation of or relationship to that legacy. After that initial family story, I asked about the interviewee experience of bearing that family memory, which became a family political memory when it intersected with political events.

**Discussing Methods: the Narrative Approach and its limitations**

My thesis is based on individual and collective interviews with the second generations, and in chapters 4, 5 and 7 I also refer to the narratives of documentaries, most of which deal with the issue of being the second generation. I consider them in terms of what Plummer calls a human document: ‘... an account of individual experience which reveals the individual’s actions as a human agent and as a participant in social life’ (Plummer 2001, 29). With respect to what can be considered as ‘documents of life’, Plummer describes a wide range of potential sources which he relates to a long tradition within humanities and part of social sciences:

This particular methodological style has gone by various names: personal documents, the documentary tradition, oral history; and it connects to an array of different styles of qualitative talk that have been developing over the past century. (...) These accounts embrace a wide range of forms (...) letters and diaries, biographies and life histories, dreams and self-observation, essays and notes, photographs and film. (Plummer 2001, 3)

Plummer’s understanding of multiple accounts of human experience gives the researcher a wide range of sources to explore in order to elicit a narrative, which would be the element all these ‘documents’ have in common. There will be a narrative present in every document of life and every life story. Although there is no agreement on what a narrative is, Plummer states that ‘narrative structures enable us to speak, and the multitude of fragmenting experiences that constitute our lives come to be patterned into some seeming sense of order’ (Plummer 2001, 185). This way, though narratives aim to give an account of experience, they are not experience, and therefore their analysis must start from this insight. In Rosenthal’s words: ‘How does one proceed from a given autobiographical text to life itself? To what extent is one receiving an account of an actual life history and to what extent is one being presented with the
autobiographer’s present construction of his or her past, present and future life?’ (Rosenthal 1997, 1). On this basis, she suggests that is important to make the distinction between the narrative that tells the story of a life, and the lived experience which is being narrated: ‘By life story we mean narrated personal life as related to another in conversation or written down in the present-day; by life-history we mean the experiences that a person has lived through (Rosenthal 2010, 10).

As a mean of representation, narrative analysis starts from the opacity of experience and therefore does not aim to make legible experience itself but rather the pattern through which it is narrativized and the form in which it is given meaning –or how. The researcher focuses on what is said during the interview, and specifically on the meaning that the teller finds in his/her story (Riessman 2005). For qualitative analysis, the main element of interest within narratives is the ‘frame’: this is to say: ‘an issue wider than the subject in hand (...), ‘a basic structural unit onto which or into which other constituents of a whole are fitted, with which they attach or with which they are integrated’ (Plummer 2001, 185). In this view, different instances of life stories will always be located within some wider ‘frames’ and can be interpreted through them (Riessman 2005). Rosenthal calls this ‘the thematic field’. She states:

The intersubjective meaning of individual stories cannot be reconstructed by subsuming the stories presented by the narrator under the categories set up by the interviewer nor by interpreting single text passages independently from the narrative context. Hermeneutic analysis requires that contextual interpretation take into account the entire interview; in the case of biographical analysis this means that each narrated experience must be identified and localized within the framework of the biographers overall construction, as defined through the biographical strands and thematic field presented in the interview.

Thus, in this thesis I identify the frames and tensions which would organize the narratives, and accordingly organize them into different chapters. Although some experiences are transversal to every chapter, I identified frames which organized the different forms of giving meaning to experience and also give space to different mechanisms to deal with them.
Letting the Ghost In

At an early stage of this investigation, however, I realized that relying on narrative analysis of documents of life was not sufficient to give an account of the subject of this thesis. Often, what was silenced within the interview, or what happened after or before the interview, imposed itself on my attention. For this reason, the idea of the ‘afterlife’ has been crucial to the methods of this thesis: because early on I found that the narrativization of the past was traversed by other forms of struggles.

Gómez-Barris notion of the ‘afterlife of violence’ allows her to engage with other phenomena beyond the problem of memory and forgetting. I have argued, following Stern, that neither the emphasis on memory or forgetting provides an explanation of the presence of the coup in the present. For this reason, we need a language with which haunting, and paradoxically, objective violence (according to Gordon: repressed violence) can be apprehended. This is my main critique of many of the narrative-based approaches: the way they emphasize cognitive or narrative frames and overlook other forms of memory transmission (or irruption). As Gordon states:

“If haunting describes how that which appears to be not there is often a seething presence, acting on and often meddling with taken-for-granted realities, the ghost is just the sign, or the empirical evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place. The ghost is not simply a dead or a missing person, but a social figure, and investigating it can lead to that dense site where history and subjectivity make social life” (Gordon 1997,8).

In 2008, before starting this thesis on the second generation, I visited an erudite academic and family man in the north of Chile to ask him about his memories of the military coup. From the start of the interview he affirmed that he probably would not have anything to say because in the early 70’s he was still too young to be politically engaged. After twenty minutes of conversation about his memories, however, what at first did not seem to me anything special to him became a source of deep grief. He talked about how the experience of a social euphoria (the UP and its social revolution) and its dramatic failure (the bombing of La Moneda) had been profoundly disturbing for him. He believed he has carried with him a silent depression which has its source in that experience, in the feeling of loss and failure.
From this interview onwards the problem of unearthing experiences of loss which have then become displaced, silenced or discredited became recurrent metaphors of my work for this thesis and I learnt that “unearthing” and “digging” are part of the afterlife of violence and how the interview can facilitate a process of recognition. These forms of exploration refer not only to a topology of the mind, but also draw attention to forms of listening to that which has not been named yet, and therefore remains unsaid. In Gordon’s words:

‘What is distinctive about haunting is that is an animated state in which a repressed or unresolved social violence is making itself known, sometimes very directly, sometimes more obliquely. I used the term haunting to describe those singular yet repetitive instances when home becomes unfamiliar, when your bearings on the world lose direction, when the over-and-done-with comes alive, when what’s been in your blind spot comes into view. Haunting raises specters and it alters the experience of being in time, the way we separate the past, the present and the future” (Gordon 1997 xvi).

I develop this in chapter 4 when I explain how I felt haunted when I conducted focus groups in Santiago. As Gordon states, haunting comes from cultural forms of ‘repression’. In fact, the mechanism of denial was a symptomatic form of life during the dictatorship, and gave rise to forms of communication and to silence. Even 30 or 40 years later, this was still an issue in the interview encounter, and I learned at a very early stage that this would be one of my main methodological challenges. This, in a context in which speaking to others would not have the fluidity of everyday forms of speaking (if we think of them as fluid), but would become an issue in itself. As I have said before, even today, in Chile every time we talk about the 11 September coup we may feel the late effects of an atomic explosion or a volcano eruption; the event has had the power to explode, emanate, irradiate and persist.

The ethical insight

In a way, Doña Agustina’s son did not want his mother to speak, not to not speak in general but not to speak to me, to the interviewer, to the eyes (and ears) of a social researcher. He
understood the effects that an interview may have after the interview, this is to say, how the act of speaking may affect the person who is speaking, how speaking and memory trigger affects. But he might also have known about the effects of the forms of listening (and analysing) which might stem from the interview: how in contexts of state violence the very interview might be producing a certain kind of knowledge and also a narrow form of subjectivity: victimhood.

The son was afraid of a certain form of listening to his family story. He probably thought of the various social researchers, social workers, members of churches, and politicians who have asked Doña Agustina again and again to tell her story. Not any story, but the form of testimony which has been shaped by the work of humanitarian organizations and which was fundamental to creating a social consciousness of the human rights violations of the regime. All these practices need the viuda’s (widow’s) narrative memories, for the pursuit of justice, oral memory, reconciliation and so on. But little has been asked about the personal and social cost of the collection of these memories: what does the narrative do once the story is told, both to Doña Agustina and to our understanding of what follows political violence?

Taking into account the critique which the son makes possible, the problem of how to listen and analyse remained central to the development of this thesis. How to deal ethically with this first encounter, which not only precedes the current research but also haunted it, was an important question. Further questions that become significant were: What kind of sociology could ask for people’s testimony? What can we, as sociologists, do with these testimonies? What can we do in exchange for these stories? The questions were: how to listen and what would be voiced? Neither listening nor giving voice are practices which can be taken for granted. Gordon suggests that to avoid any reduction, reflexivity (or responsibility, I would add) alone is not sufficient; it is also necessary to bear in mind the statement of complexity. She challenges any short-circuit when we think in terms of social agents, and includes in this category any form of victimization of social agents. In Gordon’s words: ‘...even those who live in the most dire circumstances possess a complex and oftentimes contradictory humanity and subjectivity that is never adequately glimpsed by viewing them as victims or, on the other hand, as superhuman agents’ (Gordon, 1997, 4). The sociologist addressing this question would need to consider as a sociological statement the complexity of events and agents. Gordon adds:
Complex personhood means that all people (albeit in specific forms whose specificity is sometimes everything) remember and forget, are beset by contradiction, and recognize and misrecognize themselves and others. (...) [it] means that the stories people tell about themselves, about their troubles, about their social worlds, and about their society’s problems are entangled and weave between what is immediately available as a story and what their imagination are reaching toward (...)” (Gordon 1997, 4).

I introduced this thesis by expressing my concerns about the role of the researcher in contexts of state violence. This concern is multi-layered and sometimes works more as a sense of uneasiness which encompasses but also illuminates the thinking process rather than a clear account of something where we are sure of what is wrong. Through this encounter, I wanted to ask questions about my own practice and also take charge of them.

Chapter Conclusions

My work is based on ‘documents of life’ (Plummer), consisting principally of interviews based on life stories. However, I also draw on and bring into practice Gordon’s theory of haunting throughout the process. I have described how fieldwork consists of various stages, where ‘everything counts’ and not only the final instrument for data collection (in this case: the interview). Presenting the methods I used for narrative collection, I have signalled three elements as relevant: framing the interviews in the light of family genealogies, taking an active role within the interviews and also drawing attention to the everyday life forms of violence. Thus interviewees will speak from the position of a second generation and narrate the everyday life conditions and effects of bearing a political memory, the theme around which the very experience of the dictatorship was framed. I also reflect in the chapter on the fact that while narrative methods can help the researcher to grasp the way people represent and construct a narrative (how they make of their life stories something narratable), Gordon suggests that this is not enough, particularly in contexts of social violence. Rather than opposing a clear methodological corpus, she invites us to move the limits of sociological exploration in the shaping of the phenomena. I take two aspects of Gordon’s work: “ghostly matters” and the issue of “complexity”. 
Chapter 4: The culture of fear and its afterlife

Children witnessed different forms of violence. Their parents were disappeared and executed. Together with their families, they underwent exile and uprooting from their homelands. Armed strangers entered their homes using violence. They undertook visits to relatives who had been imprisoned for long periods of time. Direct violence transformed them into prisoners, deaths or disappeared.

(Text in the Permanent Collection, Children Area, at the Museum of Memory)

Introduction

In Chapter 2 I argued for the importance of the influence that concrete histories and patterns of sociability have on the aftermath of political violence and in the shaping of various forms of memory, in other words, the way in which memories are mediated by their social conditions of production. In this chapter I aim to describe those historical and social conditions in which the local political memories of the opposition were shaped and how political memory has been inherited and inhabited in specific socio-historical circumstances by the second generation. The chapter also problematizes linear conceptions of time, memory and violence by exploring the aftermath of the politics of fear during the military regime and how its inter-subjective effects might still haunt the present in spite of changes in the state politics of memory.

Thus, the chapter starts by describing the culture of fear imposed by the military regime in Chile between 1973 and 1990. Although this operated through two forms: fear of the other on the one hand and state terror on the other, following Jacques Semelin’s contribution to understanding social violence I suggest that these strategies were also inseparable. In fact, I show how the politics of fear promoted by the regime through state terror was accompanied by an increasing fear of the other which permeated social life in post-coup Chile (Garretón; Lechner 1992; Lira and Castillo 1993). Shedding light on the pervasiveness of state violence, in this section I reflect on what an encounter with state violence means and how it leaves traces in the landscapes of inter-subjective
life and the making of political memory. I present one of the several paradoxes attached to cultures of fear and the complexity of its experiences (and memories): at the same time as the culture of fear dispossess individuals of their sense of dignity, the presence of fear or the sense of threat is normalized and absorbed into forms of everyday life.

Once I have described the cultural context in which political memories of the opposition circulated and were transmitted, in the following section I draw the reader’s attention to David, the son of an activist. In this section I show how these traces of violence are related not only to the culture of fear but also to the memory of the opposition and its performative effect, marking the boundaries between what can be said and when. The analysis focuses on different elements of the way David has inhabited his political memory, which cannot be thought of as independent of the culture of fear in which it was shaped. This includes the identification with his parents’ experiences, narratives and political identity; the distinction between the inside and the outside; the fear of speaking or performing the ‘true self’, among others. I show how the knowledge of the culture of fear, which in this case also works as the transmission of political memory, is also a rite of passage for David which permits him to enter into the opposition culture. It is by doing so that he acquires a ‘poisoned knowledge’. By exploring his interview I elucidate how the politics of fear has displayed a landscape based on a strong distinction between inside and outside, a distinction which has left its traces in the longer term, even in changing memory landscapes during the post-dictatorship.

Rather than focusing solely on how David has represented the coup, in the last section of the chapter I reflect on how the past has been embodied and the ways in which fear still has a presence or, better, an afterlife. I aim to show how David’s testimony enables us to grasp ‘the afterlife’ of fear up to now. Taking into account David’s experience of haunting during the interview, and referring to Gordon’s book *Ghostly Matters* and its sociological use of experiences of haunting, the last part of the chapter shows how even the research setting itself became a scene in which the fears described by David were elicited. For this I draw on my personal experience during the fieldwork.
The Culture Of Fear

A central element of a culture of fear is the ‘inherent conviction that humanity continually faces threats, which challenge daily existence; consequently fear becomes an all-pervading force in the everyday life’ (Cahir; 2013). Fear may have different sources such as today’s war on terrorism, which affects the developed countries principally, but it also may be occasioned by the state, as happened in the 70s and 80s in Latin America and particularly the Southern Cone. As Norberth Lechner points out: ‘Authoritarianism creates a ‘culture of fear’. The term, coined for Argentina by Guillermo O’Donnell, refers to the wholesale, everyday experience of human-rights abuse’ (Lechner 1992, 26). A description of what a culture of fear in such contexts is has been provided by Linda Green: ‘Rumour of death lists and denunciation, gossip, and innuendos create a climate of suspicion. No one can be sure who is who. The spectacle of torture and death, of massacres and disappearances, becomes deeply inscribed in individuals and in the collective imagination through a constant sense of threat’ (1995, 105). Although Green’s definition of a culture of fear was developed to describe life in Guatemala, at its core it illuminates the Chilean case and the almost two decades that followed the military coup.

The fear tactic

In the deeply polarized Chile of the 70s, fear had two different manifestations: fear of the Other and fear of the state. Despite being different in appearance, these two aspects are related. After the military coup, the military junta’s aim was to bring back ‘order’ to the country. In the first days after the coup, they called on people to denounce any behaviour that could be suspected of being directed against the new regime. Public meetings were forbidden, and with this, public speech. People could not speak in public about politics –or about any social concern– that could be considered as suspicious.

The junta created a narrative for its role of salvation. For this, it was necessary to shape a powerful enemy: the Communists, which they called ‘the Marxist cancer’ (Stern 2006a). They created the fiction of a leftist plan of attack against the country which would have led to a proletarian
dictatorship. This was called ‘Plan Z’ and was considered as ‘evidence’ of the danger that the left-wing groups represented for the state. The dissemination of this narrative contributed to the feeling of salvation that many Chileans invested in the regime. In Chapter 5 I will show how this aspect of the politics of fear is entangled with the intergenerational transmission of political stigmas.

According to Semelin, in underlying episodes of social violence which may culminate in mass crimes, there is a social-affective process which transforms social anxiety into fear (Sémelin 2007). The latter is directed against an enemy who is imagined to be highly dangerous: ‘The aim of such rhetoric seems to be to make this anxiety fix on some ‘enemy’ who is then endowed with a real-life figure denounced as being cancer within society’ (Sémelin 2007, 16). To identify an enemy is already a way of providing an explanation of the source of the threat. After this, the new social construction acquires a life of its own and becomes a figure on which to project hatred: ‘This transmutation of insidious anxiety into a fear concentrated on a hostile figure serves as the foundations for hatred to develop against the evil-minded Other’ (Semelin 2007, 16). For Semelin, this affective process acts is a scapegoat mechanism: it helps to strengthen the afflicted community and reshapes it in order to enable it to emerge from its state of crisis.

In the mid-80s Lira and Isabel Castillo, among others, dealt with the psychosocial effects of the regime’s on the population. Although they use the language of psychology, they attempt to de-individualize a symptomatology which they believe was caused by the military regime. In that sense, they frame the culture of fear in terms of the paradigm of trauma (see the literature review for more about this), but always keeping in view its political origin ((Lira and Castillo 1993; Lira 2007). They stress that although fear is a private experience and tends to be socially invisible, under regimes of fear it becomes embedded in social relationships, affecting people’s consciousness and behaviour, dramatically transforming everyday life. The regime’s ‘planned arbitrariness’ turned fear into a generalized feeling, which they call ‘chronic fear’, that is a fear that is no longer a response to specific situations but rather a permanent condition in everyday life (Lira and Castillo 1991). People became suspicious of each other, because the ‘other’ could potentially become an enemy and a political threat. They see in the friend/enemy dichotomy a

52 They used this expression to refer to the ubiquitous presence of the state in regimes of fear: it is present everywhere through military and paramilitary and this also means that it can ‘act’ at any moment.
new logic in social life stemming from the military discourses in the Southern Cone which emphasized the dichotomization of social life, reducing it to an affective distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Constable and Valenzuela 1993; Feitlowitz 1999; Stern 2006a). For Lechner, this created a paranoid society in which people were highly suspicious of each other and preferred to be very cautious when they were in the company of other people (Lechner 1992).

The other campaign consisted in what has been considered classically as state terrorism. Arbitrary detentions, mass assassinations, mutilations and disappearances were part of the aggressive first period of the military dictatorship, between 1973 and 1980 (Lira and Castillo 1993; Stern 2006a). State violence and its consequent action, the torture of the body, had the aim of reducing opposition attempts to reorganize after the coup. Taming and disciplining were the main goals of these practices which used the punishment of the body as one of their primary strategies. As Gómez-Barris states: ‘Torture was a means of isolating and breaking down collective identities, inducing pain as a fear tactic (one that had reverberations in the wider social sphere) and producing a traumatic rupture in victims’ (Gómez-Barris 2009, 77). Like Green, Gómez-Barris also emphasises the relationship that fear has with experiences of physical violence, and how these do not affect their victims alone, but also the rest of society. She also refers to torture as a form of the reduction of the other, a debasement of any sense of dignity. It is interesting to note this point of relationship between the physical threat and the moral domain, the understanding of which was developed in the late 70s by Guillermo O’Donnell and Cecilia Galli in Argentina (Robben 2011 Corradi et.al 1992). They were the first to speak of a culture of fear in the context of the Southern Cone military regimes. They pointed out that it was not a black or white picture in which an evil state victimized society, but was rather a complex scene of legitimacy and silence. They stated that repression and violence had provoked a depoliticization within civil society, leading to the individual ‘decision to overlook the worst aspects of the repression’. For O’Donnell and Galli, systematic exposure to the culture of fear provoked the social dispossesson of judgment, and eventually, complicity with horror. They saw compliancy as a result of terror, as its product, rather than its condition.

The metaphor of the encapuchado (hooded man) introduced in Estadio Nacional (2001) – a documentary about a torture centre during the military regime – fully represents the institutionalization of fear and the dispossesson of morality in such a context. Carmen Parot’s
The documentary explores the contradictory meanings of the National Stadium through the uses to which it has been put. The National Stadium is traditionally where the most important football matches and large-scale meetings took place in Chile. However, immediately after the coup it was used as a detention and torture centre through which thousands of people passed. The documentary confronts this hidden and painful other meaning: although it was used as a site of torture during the first months of the military junta, it has continued serving as the national referent for sports and cultural spectacles even up to the present period. It has only been in recent years that groups of organized neighbours have started to demand forms of memorialization within its facilities.

In this documentary ex-prisoners talk about their experiences in the concentration camp; they describe how the military would choose a politically active prisoner. This prisoner would be tied with rope, dragged along and obliged to identify some of his peers amongst the prisoners, and to *hablar* (denounce, grass on). If someone was recognized, they would be tortured, and maybe shot dead. The *encapuchado* was the finger of death, pointing at those he or she recognized. They were deprived of their moral nature and reduced to choosing between different deaths. For the other prisoners, he or she represented what the public arena had become in Chile. None of them wanted to look into the other’s eyes; distrust permeated the social arena, making the idea of social intercourse potentially dangerous.

**Fear and everyday life**

The description of the unmaking effect of state violence given in the paragraphs above is supplemented by the testimony of Luis, one of the children of the victims who I interviewed. His testimony adds another element to the experience of violence and the unmaking of identity: the

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53 I remember when I was at school and practiced sport, I heard that one of my classmates would not be allowed to participate in the championships at the National Stadium. As we were very close friends, I asked her why, and she told me that her mother would never enter a torture site. It affected me in the way that cultures of fear and public secrets do: I had the same knowledge, and moreover, I knew that it was there where my grandfather had been tortured, I could even remember his stories about running over nails without shoes and fake shootings for the prisoners. I knew this, but I participated not once, but several times in championships there, without hesitating or even giving a thought to this when I was young.
loss of meaning; its impact is complicated when this loss is witnessed by a member of the second generation. For his mother, such an experience conveyed the loss of meaning of everyday life, giving her encounter with state violence a surrealistic aura which obliged her to suddenly redefine the limits of reality. In the interview Luis described his mother’s close encounter with state violence. By reading his account, we can see how, although his mother was not exactly a victim of torture, her story expands the very meaning of state violence and how we think of injuries in the aftermath of political violence:

“And about a year ago I found out that in 1974 my mother was pregnant (…) and one day she went out to do the shopping and they caught her and took her to a cell for 6 hours (…). She told me: ‘When you walked around in the garden of this house (you could see that), there were lots of holes in the ground; in the holes you could see 4 or 5 guys lying down who couldn’t stand up. As I was pregnant, they took me to a room and left me there for 6 hours without food, without water, anything. And that happened just because I went out to buy a chicken for lunch’. So, that image, my mother’s pain… I try not to touch on it (in any conversation), because it hurts her too much”.

This story is particularly compelling, not only because of the dramatic events involving a pregnant woman, but because of her fixation on the fact that she had bought a chicken the day she was imprisoned: ‘that happened just because I went out to buy a chicken for lunch’, she says. This expression is somehow enigmatic. What is the role of something so quotidian in the description of the horror story? As I explained in the literature review, for Das violence is an experience of/at the limit, an experience which confronts the subject with his or her own limits in the world, in the very making of it. When Das refers to violence, she thinks of it in terms of a boundary; violence is experienced through an event which becomes part of our personal histories. It is something beyond here which becomes part of here. In her words: ‘There was, I argue, a mutual absorption of the violent and the ordinary so that I end up thinking of the events as always attached to the ordinary as if they were tentacles that reach out from the everyday and anchor the event to it in some specific ways’ (Das 2007, 7). For Das, the interest is in those mechanisms which allow people to inhabit violence and to normalize it, while at the same time they transform the sense of what ordinary life might be.
Another account of the colonization of everyday life by politics of fear, albeit in a different context, has been given by Marguerite Feitlowitz. In her compelling *Lexicon of Terror*, she draws our attention to how a language of violence entered into the colloquial uses of language in post-coup Argentina, spreading the memory of violent practices and also introducing extreme fear into the flow of normal life (Feitlowitz 1999). She focuses on how violence has contagious effects, *unnoticeably*. To Feitlowitz, dwelling in a violent world means that the language of everyday life is colonized by the language of the torture chambers. And the evidence she gives is striking. She gathers words used in everyday language which have been transformed by the perpetrators of the Dirty War. She explains:

‘Perversions of the language contribute to the sinister, indeed surreal, quality of life in Buenos Aires. In concentration camp slang, the metal table on which prisoners were laid out to be tortured was called *la parrilla*. Traditionally, *la parrilla* has referred to the classic horizontal grill — the centerpiece of the beloved social barbecue — and to the ubiquitous restaurants that serve grilled meat’ (Feitlowitz 1999, 49).

Both, Das and Feitowitz, point out that after episodes of state violence, fear spreads within society and is absorbed into the practices of everyday life, and vice-versa. This process can be seen at work in the interview in which the quotidian (shopping for lunch) roots the whole story in everyday life, becoming its condition of reality. Only once horror becomes part of reality does it transform the horizon of what is real. Such an encounter becomes the experience of the limit of what has been previously known. In fact, the image of the family lunch which was impeded comes into mind as an impossible event. It is not part of the scene of state violence, but it shows what has been left out; it is an experience of loss in the place where the encounter takes place; an interruption of a quotidian which will never come back. But what does it mean to hear this story or to grow up in a society where these stories are produced or become part of what is possible? This is the topic I will discuss in the next section of the chapter.
Passing On Fear To The Second Generation: The Afterlife Of Violence

The concern with the ‘afterlife’ of violence destabilizes traditional accounts of time and also undermines the idea of political reconciliation. It raises the question: to what extent are past harms and suffering still occurring? If they still occur although the regime which gave rise to them have fallen, through what mechanisms are they reproduced? While these questions involve a reflection on the aftermath, they are also a meditation on the very scope of violence: does state violence have a legacy and, if so, how? What is the meaning and the impact of state violence for and on the following generations? Gómez-Barris’ idea of the afterlife shows how violent events have an inter-subjective aftermath in the form of identity struggles or conflicts. In this section I show how these traces of violence are related to the culture of fear but also to the memory of the opposition and its performative effect.

For one of my interviewees, the son of a desaparecido peasant, the fear of the state has a magnitude which can be passed on through generations:

“Due to the fact that I have this family story, I feel something that most of my peers do not feel: I feel fear... I don’t know if other people feel the same, but I am afraid of the state. There is the threat that if something changes, if a dictatorship comes again, you could be subjected to human rights violations, you could be subjected to torture or you could even disappear... So, to be honest, you become paranoid, and that’s how difficulties are inherited...”

What is striking in this quotation is that the knowledge of fear has a sort of contagious effect which can be passed down from one generation to another. The quotation shows that to experience state violence does not require physical exposure to it and that violence does not necessarily consist of torture. This remark shows that the culture of fear expands through indirect experience, but it is nevertheless internalized through a sense of threat which ‘infects’ everyday life. Compellingly expressed in this testimony, the fear of the state is associated with an awareness of the fragility of the body and the unmaking effect that the loss of ontological confidence provokes. But we also see that it is transmitted in the form of knowledge –“due to the fact that I have this family story”. This shows that it still requires forms of embodiment and embeddedness in the local and affective worlds –“I feel fear”.
In the next section, I will introduce David, the son of an activist who became involved in terrorist activities. The stories he heard from his father—his family political memory—were secrets that separated him from the outside. Rather than questioning David’s memories and whether they are fictional or true, I am interested in exploring what memory has done within David, how he has inhabited this knowledge and how a state of emergency has come to be lived as everyday life, so that violence is made invisible and bearable. I will also explore the effects of the memory of opposition, which creates an inter-subjective landscape for the second generation to live in. I will also explain my understanding of the concept of poisoned knowledge in the context of the transmission of state violence.

**David’s Life Story**

David is in his mid-thirties and works as a psychologist. I contacted him through a common acquaintance and told him the topic of my research and that I was planning to visit the city where he lives. He immediately agreed to be interviewed and we met in a coffee shop a few days later. As soon as we met, he told me that one of his friends had told him he could not understand why would he spend his time meeting a strange person to speak about his past. I felt that telling me this was his way of letting me know how important was for him to speak of this past, not any past, but a past narrated from the standpoint of a child of the dictatorship. David seemed to be ready to speak in front of someone else and throughout the interview I would understand the meaning of this, and in what sense it was also an experience of transgression for him.

The present in David’s account is woven around episodes that his parents—principally his father—endured. When I asked him to tell me about his parents, he replied: “My father? hmmm… I will talk first about my mother, because that is simpler”. The gendered distribution of roles is common among my interviewees. In such an extreme context, the father took the role of the militant and represented a sense of altruism or idealism while the mother was the keeper of ‘the life that goes on’. This also structures the way stories are told, as in the case of David, whose story is structured around his father’s life story. I will further develop this in Chapter 7, where I will show how this also affected the gendered politics of mourning victims of the dictatorship in post-coup Chile.
After years of therapy, David learned to speak about his family story. But when he talks about this, he speaks in the present tense. By speaking this way, David reveals how present the past is for him; listening to him gave me a clue to understanding the afterlife of political violence amongst the second generation and its haunting presence. Being the child of a charismatic trade union leader during the UP, David was socialized within the opposition culture. He always knew that after the coup his father was dismissed from his job, their home was raided several times by the secret police and his family lived clandestinely for months. Blacklisted and prevented from finding a new job, his father had a critical encounter with the regime’s secret police, something which turned his life upside down. Soon after this experience, his father fell into a deep depression, the first of several depressions that would profoundly mark their family life. Over the years, the father became involved in clandestine groups; first, he bought a printing press and started producing pamphlets against the dictatorship. After a few years, as his anger grew, he joined in an armed leftist group. David has chosen to not know the full extent of his father’s involvement.

At the end of 1970s, the opposition groups started to reorganize and differentiate themselves in accordance with their strategy for fighting the dictatorship. Although the majority of the opposition preferred a democratic path and also opted for the reorganization of the political system which promoted a union between the left and the centre, there was a minority which believed that the dictatorship could only be overthrown with violence. The most important of these groups was Patriotic Front Manuel Rodriguez54.

In 1987 David’s family had to leave the country after discovering that the father had been blacklisted and that the intelligence services were planning to kill him. Ironically, only one year before the Plebiscite they fled to Switzerland. But once the family had left Chile, the father suffered a new deep depression, and this became worse after the 1988 Plebiscite. The fact that the return to democracy had been agreed between the regime and the opposition, and that the

54 A paramilitary Marxist inspired left wing group, promoted by the Communist Party to fight against the dictatorship. The armed radical wing of the left political parties has been a taboo memory and it has only been in the last few years that this memory has become public. In fact, in 2012 a TV series (Los 80s) had a member of this group as one of its protagonists. Years ago it would have been unthinkable that they could be represented as heroes on TV.
political parties had decided to negotiate with Pinochet was something that David’s father could not cope with. He died of cancer in exile only a couple of years later.

The Poisoned Knowledge As A Rite Of Passage

My interviewees have in common the experience of having been socialized since they were children into living within a regime of fear or of having had to learn to do so at some point of their childhood. Part of this socialization happened through stories told within family life, familial memories of political violence. When these stories are about encounters with forms of state violence, I call them ‘poisoned knowledge’. When David was just 6 years old, his father told him about his encounter with state violence. In his words:

“In 1974 he picks up a passenger in his taxi, who says “let’s go to Playa Ancha” [a coastal locality in Valparaíso, over an hour away from Santiago] (...) When they have travelled quite far, the guy takes a gun, he places it against my father’s head, and says: “stop here, motherfucker”. Suddenly, two other cars surround the cab, they take him to another car, and say “you are a dead man”. It was the CNI55 (...) “There is no way out”, my father thinks to himself, so he asks them for a chance to speak. “No” they say. “Please, it is only a word”. “No, no, no, no”. Finally they say: “Hey motherfucker, what do you want to say?” And my father says: “I know maybe I talk too much [against the dictatorship] in the taxi rank, but it doesn’t mean anything. I have children, and I struggle every day to work”. And the motherfuckers reply: “Yes, we know that your wife is called Tatiana, and that you have three children, we know where you live... We know everything about you”. (...) Then they are silent, they stop the car, one of them stays inside, and the other guys start to argue. (...) Then, they pull my father out of the car, they make him kneel down, they take out a gun and put it against his head: “Ask for forgiveness, motherfucker”. “But why?” says my father. “Ask forgiveness for what you did during the UP government. If you don’t ask for

55 In the interview, David referred to the CNI (Central Nacional de Informaciones; National Information Centre). However he meant DINA (Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia; National Intelligence Directorate), which was formed immediately after the coup to coordinate the activities of the military intelligence services. From the beginning the DINA functioned as a secret police force in charge of repression, including persecution, torture, kidnapping and assassination. It was replaced years later by the CNI.
forgiveness we will kill Tatiana and all your children”. He asks for forgiveness and they release him (...). I tell you this story because it is a milestone for everything that happened after (...). During those years a feeling of hatred and anger against the military regime grew within my father”.

Like the story of the woman who went out to buy a chicken for a family lunch and was kidnapped, David’s father’s story is located within everyday life. He was driving his taxi and thought he was taking a passenger to a remote home. These details of the stories are perhaps what make them horror stories: they reveal an everyday life which is not any longer guaranteed as such. Just by listening to this story, David was exposed to violence although only a 6 year old child. His is a striking case but not an isolated one. Although in some cases parents would conceal the reality of terror from their children in order to protect them, within several families the parents decided to tell their children extraordinary details of what was going on, irrespective of their age. They did so in order to protect them. David belongs to the latter case; he knows his father’s story in detail. But, what is the impact of being socialized in fear and how does one get used to thinking of what is really a state of emergency as being everyday life? What are the repercussions of hearing tales of fear from early childhood?

The encounter with the secret police was the most destabilizing event for David’s father in the chain of traumatic\(^{56}\) happenings that followed the military coup. He was exposed to the imminence of death and the lack of control in front of state power. Listening to David’s testimony it seems that he was not only hurt by his father’s suffering but by his own encounter with state violence through his father’s story. In the course of several interviews I conducted with children (today adults) of Pinochet’s victims I asked: “how could you bear this being only a child?”\(^{57}\) My idea of children as naïve and fragile has been challenged by listening to all these stories, which have helped me to make sense of the great impact on the child’s perception of the world of having to come to terms and work through life stories in contexts of state violence. But also how the most horrible events can be normalized, appropriated and inhabited.

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56 Here I am using traumatic with its colloquial connotation.
57 Another example of such suffering would be a 10-year-old girl who discovered that her father had been kidnapped at the school gates only to learn a few days later that his throat had been cut.
In *Life and Words* Das uses the term ‘poisoned knowledge’ to describe the impact that various forms of witnessing violence (including the intergenerational passing on of stories) may have. The concept creates space for the embodied effect that witnessing—even through testimony—may have on people (Das 2007). Poisoned knowledge is different from trauma: although both refer to a terrible experience, trauma emphasizes the elements of fragmentation and irrationality. With poisoned knowledge, by contrast, the focus shifts to how this knowledge is embodied and owned, disrupting previous understandings of social reality and how it becomes normalized. It is about something which, despite being terrible and having a poison-like effect, becomes coherent (knowledge). As it does not involve any form of dissociation, it merges the embodiment of the presence with forms of violence, ‘infecting’ subjectivity, or at least, transforming it.

David: “(...) There was nothing that could have happened to my father that I didn’t know, because he told me everything”.
I: “But you were a little child… Why do you think he did that?”
D: “I will use his own words to express this; “You are my best friend, I have no one else in the world to trust”. Sometimes, when I wake up in the middle of the night, I feel annoyed with him. When I was just 6 years old, he told me that they put a gun to his head”.
I: “What could you do with that information?”
David: “That’s right. I felt very proud when he told this to me. But now, I look at this again, and I realize that it triggered many psychological problems during primary school. I felt scared throughout my time at primary school. I was in the classroom and then I heard a siren and I immediately thought that they had come for my father, that they were taking him to prison. I compare it to the present: let’s imagine that I tell my son that I am going to a social demonstration. As a child, I do not know if my father is being taken to jail, or if they are going to beat him up or if he is going to ‘disappear’. It was like being constantly terrified, all day (...).”

According to David’s testimony, we see how the family tale about state violence, which brings the poisoned knowledge into the narrative, also acts as a rite of passage. It is the transition from being

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58 Ron Eyerman, however, has a different approach and he suggests that cultural trauma is transmitted through representation and a narrative articulation about the traumatic (Eyerman 2001).
‘neutral’ to being part of the opposition culture. It was also a form of being welcomed to a family legacy which will reinforce the family identity. Within opposition families, speaking at home became a practice of resistance to the dictatorship; through it, family political identities were passed on to the next generation and living under a repressive regime became bearable. When David says “I felt proud when he told me”, he is also showing how it makes him feel special; how these secrets created a bond with his father, an experience of belonging and identification, and at the same time they were an experience on the threshold of the world of adults. In fact, as I have described above, in Pinochet’s Chile parents didn’t ‘protect’ their children against the horror of the dictatorship but showed them the contexts in which they lived. Situations in which parents apparently showed too much to their children are also practices of resistance, where speaking acted as a practice of freedom. As Stern shows, it was in this way that the opposition created a culture of resistance that permeated ‘hearts and minds’ (Stern 2006a). Speaking was part of this very code. But as I will explain, this situation contrasted with children’s commitment to silence, and their role as the keepers of family secrets.

Inhabiting landscapes of fear

The children of the opposition inhabited an extremely tense socio-political environment in which violence, suspicion, mourning and fear were entangled. My interviewees usually described how their everyday life was at one and the same time shaped and interrupted by their parents’ protest against the dictatorship. They had to learn how to distinguish the landscape of fear and to navigate through it.

The culture of fear created a landscape centred on the distinction between the inside and the outside. The opposition to the dictatorship practiced the right to speak out in the intimacy of their private world. Speaking within protected spaces brought with it a cathartic effect and allowed people to reaffirm their convictions, their emotions and their political views in a way that shaped their political identities. Speaking out at home or within a selected group of friends was a practice which attempted to assert a degree of freedom, but even this could also be contaminated by the
malign effects of the culture of fear. Speaking in the wrong space and to the wrong people would become a betrayal (like the *encapuchado*). In the short term, this created a new landscape, based on a strong distinction between inside and outside, categories which indicated when people were or were not allowed to speak. The ‘inside’ consisted of spaces where the true self could be performed, “where one could speak” (*dónde uno puede hablar*). The ‘outside’ consisted of spaces where the true self could be punished to the point of disappearance. Thus, *passing* and silence became strategies for survival.

The landscape of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ cannot be reduced to the classical distinction between the private and the public. The personal or the private were not the opposite of the public. Privacy could be easily violated and the body could be tortured. Homes could be raided by the police and families could be dramatically separated by different political points of view; you could live underground even among one’s own family, and could have different names depending on who you were speaking to. But, at the same time, an unknown person could become an ally after you had recognized in him small signs of opposition.

As Carina Perelli suggests in her description of social life during the military regime in Uruguay (1973-1985), the dissociation between self and behaviour was a survival mechanism during that period. She refers to a new status, ‘inxile’: ‘... an internal exile, a new way of relating to an order that was external but that was nonetheless legitimized by the very fact that it was being obeyed. The basic mechanism through which inxile operated was dissociation between the self and the world, between behaviour and the self’ (Perelli 1992,214). Although I do not agree with the parallel that Perelli sees between obeying the law (or a regime) and its legitimacy, I think that her concept of ‘inxile’ is very interesting. She shows how it is in this very distinction that she finds the grounds for a form of subversion. While the individual may obey a regime publicly, he might also disobey it privately: that is the undermining force of ‘inxile’. However, at the same time that this form of political dissociation might be the basis for subversion, it was in first place a form of survival. She explains: ‘Inxile was more than the privatization of activities that were previously regarded as being in the public sphere (...) It involved the recognition of the incriminatory potential –even if unintentionally– of association with others, including all significant others’ (Perelli 1992, 214). Perelli shows how it might be understood as a defence mechanism against the effects of the politics of fear.
Like David, most of the second generation learned about the landscape of fear principally by observing their parents; living within it required the creation of filters. The distinction between the inside and outside was a guide to when to show or conceal from the world their sense of ‘true self’. David and his father created a strong ‘inside’ between themselves, and this inside was shaped through family stories which could only be told within the family; in David’s case, only between him and his father. But this inside also made David suspicious of the outside, experiencing the unpredictable character of society—the potential danger of social intercourse—as something extremely threatening for a child.

**Keeping Secrets**

The feeling of humiliation David’s father experienced is still present in his son’s detailed account of the event. This humiliation is rooted in the fear felt by the man when his kidnappers threatened to kill him. Being a child, David grew up attempting to protect his father by listening to him, being his partner and being silent about his activities. He had the fantasy that as his son he could somehow redeem his father from suffering; he felt the responsibility of bringing him redemption.

Silence was used as a mechanism for protection, and children were often the keepers of that silence, even when they did not fully understand it. They had to cope with fear and silence without being able to rationalize their experience. As we shall see in the quotation which follows, David just knew that there were stories he could not tell outside home. For the children of the dictatorship, their parents’ act of speaking was experienced instead as listening to forbidden stories; these stories brought with them the responsibility of keeping a secret. At the same time as they ‘spoke’, the parents taught their children to not repeat outside what they had listened to at home.

Interviewer: “Did you talk about your family at school?”

David: “Never. I never talked about my family (...). I talked about history but never about my father, I never mentioned him to anyone”.

Interviewer: “Would you say that there was a norm about not speaking?”
David: “Yes. It wasn’t like “don’t talk about this at school”, but more “don’t tell this to anyone, ever”. It was the feeling one should “avoid speaking about certain things” (...). As you said, my way of taking care of my father, was to not talk about him ever. In fact, I believe this is the first time that I have talked about this without being wary, without the fear I had then…”

Interviewer: “I wanted to ask you about that. How did you learn to speak about this secret?”

D: “Therapy, a lot of therapy. I am a therapist, so from time to time I go to psychotherapy”.

The distinction between inside and outside, and the taboo of its transgression had a significant impact on the second generation. The most common way of talking about the distinction between inside and outside is to say ‘to speak or not to speak’. It was not only a matter of maintaining silence, but of passing and knowing the rules of the game. There were certain words, the saying, showing or uttering of which was forbidden outside home. These things were not written anywhere, but were known by the second generation: not to speak of politics, not to mention Allende, not to say the words ‘dictatorship’, ‘coup’ or ‘momios’.

Speaking in public was understood as a dangerous practice that only adults could perform; it was forbidden for children. In case they forgot about this, they would be reminded of it by force, as in the experience of the 6 year-old Juan, the child of a left-wing family who had lived in exile since soon after the coup. During the early 80s his family decided to return to Chile, because they felt very optimistic about the new social movements and protests against the regime. Juan grew up listening stories about Chile; he grew up within the Chilean refugee community so he was familiar with the practice of speaking as a ritual of belonging, and was very keen about coming back. But his first memories of their return concerned a winter day when he and his grandfather went to do some paper work at an embassy. With the innocence of a child he confused the Chilean flag with the Cuban flag, and he said out loud: “look, that is Cuba’s flag!” But his grandfather beat him. Today, Juan is still able to transmit the shock of a grandchild who has been punished by his grandfather. That was the first and the only time his grandfather beat him. Shocked and scared, he learned immediately that there were certain words that he should never pronounce outside

59 A colloquial and derogatory way to call the right-wing adherents in Chile.
home, never again. Juan did not know then who Fidel Castro was or what Communism meant; he only knew that Cuba has become a dangerous word from then on.

For the second generation the speaking/silencing dilemma had a radically different meaning than for the first generation. If for the first generation speaking was a resistance practice, for the children of the dictatorship speaking and being became dissociated in the public sphere. Instead, during the decades of fear, the children of the opposition were prevented from speaking in public and were taught to keep their political identity as a family secret. Silence was a commitment for children, who became the keepers of words and this way, any utterance become potentially dangerous. Consequently, they learned to discern between concealing the self and showing the self as a pivotal mechanism for social relationships.

For many of the children of the opposition, the tension between listening to forbidden stories and keeping secrets would create space for complicated productions of self and intimacy, diffuse feeling of guilt happening in conjunction with the splitting of the self and the constant differentiation between the public and the private; all of these were different process which were triggered and accentuated by living within a culture of fear.

**Changing landscapes and stubborn memories**

David’s family left Chile when he was a teenager, but he decided to come back only a few years later, once democracy was re-established. It was the beginning of the transition, and he realized how he had to ‘forget’ what he had learn about navigating the ‘outside’ in what seemed to be a new landscape:

“... When I came back, during the first year, I was still afraid of the police, I could not walk in a relaxed manner if I saw a policeman in the street. Once, something curious happened. I was walking through Plaza Sotomayor and two policemen were walking by my side, and I heard that one was saying to the other: “I have to bring bread home tonight; otherwise the vieja [wife or mother] will scold me”. I was 19 years old and hearing that dialogue for me was striking: “these huevones are normal people, they have families, they have a life”. 
David’s narrative tells how the landscape of fear was built over a simplification of people’s roles, through a similar mechanism to the one that Semelin observes in processes of growing fear within social life and its Othering effect described at the beginning of the chapter. David provides an everyday life example of how Manichean categories operated within Chilean memory field. He shows how he had to humanize the evil figures of two policemen, to de-learn or re-learn how to inhabit a landscape where they would not be mortal enemies. However, he also shows how various forms of memories and knowledges might coexist: how although he recognized the new politics of memory in terms of the national climate, old strategies of survival had left their traces in his instinctive feeling after seeing a policeman in the street. In the next section I will explore this point in greater depth. David’s encounter points at the way in which political memories which have apparently been buried, may return and haunt in the present.

**Haunting fears**

40 years after the military coup in Chile the military regime has fallen, the transition has finished, a Museum of Memory and Human Rights has been inaugurated and the first seminar for judges who investigate human right violations in Chile has been held\(^6\): only five years ago all of these would have been unthinkable. Although the contexts have changed, the dictatorship and the politics of fear have left traces of a muted past. If we agree with the initial claim of this thesis – that violence has an aftermath, then what is its scope and in what way is violence transmitted, passed on and/or reproduced? In which ways does the past haunt the present and how? Old fears remain an invisible presence in Chile today, the aftermath of a dramatic rupture within the social fabric. Examining the passing on of a culture of fear means looking at the ways in which those fears continue to circulate in present society. In Ross Chamber’s words: where and how are events still haunting us (Chambers 2002).

At the beginning of the interview, David’s loyalty to his father was challenged when he had to deal with his old fear of speaking about his family in a public space with a stranger. Although his father is already dead and the dictatorship ended around twenty years ago, David noticed the shadows of old fears when we first met for our interview. Our conversation took place decades after the

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\(^6\) The seminar took place the 8th August. 2013
dDictatorship, but immediately David’s ghosts gave a warning. It was as if the events were still happening in the process of him coming to terms with his own story. During the interview, he reflected:

“Now that I have started speaking about it, I am suddenly struck with the feeling of “watch your words”. I automatically reply to myself: hey, don’t be silly, look where you are”.

In order to understand David’s fear, I propose examining Gordon’s definition of haunting. This concept also argues for giving relevance to this ‘accident’ or anecdote in the interview:

“Haunting raises spectres, and it alters the experience of being in time, the way we separate the past, the present and the future. These spectres or ghosts appear when the trouble they represent and symptomize is no longer being contained or repressed or blocked from view. The ghost, as I understand it, is not the invisible or some ineffable excess. The whole essence, if you can use that word, of a ghost is that it has a real presence and demands its due, your attention” (Gordon 2008, xvi).

As Gordon states, the haunting fear demands attention: but for the sociologist this is not only anecdotal. It is in this context that Gómez-Barris’ idea of the afterlife shows its adequacy: to see how after political violence there is an ‘ongoing wrestling with the past in the present’. When I asked about this feeling, David associated it with one of his recurrent fears as a child of an opponent to the dictatorship; it operated as a catastrophic fantasy. According to Freud, these fantasies stem from feelings of guilt. In its origins, this feeling is the repression of a desire which is projected as a need for punishment (Freud and Gay 1995)). In the case of David, having internalized the pragmatic survival instinct developed during the culture of fear, he knew that if someone had heard him talking about the political identity of his family, “they could send his father to jail”.

I: “What were the barriers that prevented you from speaking? What would have happened if you had spoken?”

D: “Now that we are talking about this, I realize that this concern did not have to do so much with uncovering a secret that could jeopardize my father’s life as with uncovering something of mine, something which belongs to me, something I care about a lot,
something which despite having provoked suffering for me during my childhood, it...
(silence)“.

Forty years after the military coup, David is still struggling not only with the violence suffered by his father but with the politics of space generated by the culture of fear. In fact, in common with other children of Pinochet’s opposition, David has the experience of having dealt with a sanction about speaking about his political memory and, like them, the safe option has been to ‘keep silent’. The sanction with respect to speaking somehow reproduces the landscapes of fear and restores its potentially dangerous areas, splitting public life from private.

Gordon’s insight opens up a different enquiry in relation to discovering what ‘appeared’ in front of David and me. After I suggested talking about the dictatorship and making the past present, he unwittingly projected his feeling into the interview setting. The interview consisted of speaking, and although David was keen to speak, he also felt the anxiety that talking could provoke, as it reminded him, that there might be zones of danger between us. In the end, moreover, David also suggests that his fear might be something that, rather than having happened to him, was part of him.

Fieldwork Catastrophic Fantasies

When David was haunted, I recognized also my own fieldwork experience. As part of my research I organized several focus groups in a café in Santiago, in a middle class urban context. I invited groups of people to elicit memories of the past, but as I did so I started to develop a degree of paranoia. I conducted two focus groups in a public space. During these focus groups I was struck by the fact that I felt really paranoid during our conversations, I felt disturbed and had the feeling that something catastrophic could happen. I kept a record of these sudden fantasies that arrived completely out of control, to the extent that I came to understand them as something more than simply anecdotes, but as forms of ‘haunting’.

I went to the café twice. After the first group, I arrived earlier because I thought that the manager might have wanted to have a word to me, asking me not to bring these focus groups to their
rooms. Every time a waitress came to our table I felt paranoid about the content of our conversation. I thought they waited longer than normal when they were serving our table just to surreptitiously listen to what we were saying. I noticed that when the conversations were loud, I began to sweat and wanted to ask everybody to please speak more quietly. In a sense, I felt responsible for making problems, for bringing violence and disruption to the otherwise calm salon. In one of these groups I even had the fantasy that the people sitting at the next table were part of the ex-CNI, the intelligence organization of the dictatorship. And I really thought they were, and I felt anxious. I kept observing how opening the past memory box in a public place, where those issues are considered to be in ‘bad taste’, touches on a taboo memory. I felt frightened and the subject of judgment and hostility.

The panic reaction was not personal; it was the haunting of what constituted our experience as children of the opposition and hence as the keepers of familial memories. Suddenly the old psycho-geography of fear was revived. David and I were afraid of the harm that speaking could bring. The memory of everyday life was stubborn with respect to changes in the politics of memory and the current situation of openness. In my case, I did not feel only that words were dangerous, but that I was doing something reproachable. When I reflected later on what kind of harm I could do by speaking, I associated this with an irresoluble conflict, which is part of the mnemonic drama in Chile. There are divided memories of the past and no real agreement has been ever reached. The harm referred to brings up the fracture within society in relation to the past, which makes the present uninhabitable. But it also has to do with the regime’s discourse of the left-wing responsibility for the social polarization, and to my regret, it was the regime’s official memory which was speaking through this feeling.

David’s story draws attention to how, to this day, old fears are an invisible presence in Chile; the aftermath of a rupture within the social fabric. Their invisible presence had been considered as an absence, displaced as something non-existent or dismissed as an issue that ‘belongs to the past’. But these fragmented scenes create space for something which would otherwise remain invisible. In the methods chapter I highlighted instead those perspectives which are sensitive to the subtle manifestations of ‘ghostly matters’ (Gordon 2008). In the context of the interview, haunting points not only to fear as a circulating affect but at the mechanism and the conditions that turn fear into a way of navigating social life.
Chapter Conclusions

In this chapter I have explored, through an analysis of David’s interview, how political memory is shaped by local political, cultural and social contexts. The memory of the opposition to the regime was shaped by and within the culture of fear, a context which is crucial to grasping the meaning of ‘stubbornness’ (or persistence) and of the quality of familial political memories in the opposition culture and their afterlife. Thus, throughout the chapter I have shown how the culture of fear and the political memory of the opposition were entangled. Political memories were performative: at the same time as they mobilized narratives, stories, affects, knowledges and images united as ‘familial memories’ by family members, they performed and created a relationship with imaginary Others who were enemies and of whom should be – at least– distrusted. Here we see how what was initially a political community (the adherents of the UP and Allende’s government) is transformed into a community of memory, a form of remembering together certain pasts and how this is reinforced through the transmission of political memories to the second generation.

The culture of fear and its logic of suspicion created landscapes of dissociation between the inside and the outside, which structured part of the experience of the second generation. This created, for example, a constant state of vigilance in David as well as his anxiety about exposure. We have also seen how political memory and its reverse side of secrecy acted as a form of initiation into family reciprocity and relatedness. David’s responsibility towards familial political memory was mediated by his relationship to a family member: his father. There is another important side to his story and to those of all my interviewees: within the family not all the members have the same status which allows them to reveal and speak about political memories. In fact, at the beginning of the interview he preferred to speak of his mother as it was ‘easier’ but it was evident that the story he wanted to tell was his father’s. He barely spoke about his mother during the interview. In David’s story we see that family memory is narrated by his father, it is his experience which acquires such status.

I have also explored how political memories act as rites of passage within the family, initiating the second generation of the opposition and giving them a new status within the family. Transmitted as part of family life, such ‘poisoned knowledge’ was invested in the same way as goods and possessions that family lineages may inherit and transmit (I will further develop this aspect in Chapter 6). However, I have also shown how mechanisms such as forgetting, forms of secrets,
camouflage or dissociation are paradoxically inherent to these political memories. The ambivalence in these political opposition memories will also be found in other chapters: just as they are memories to remember they are also memories to camouflage and to hide. I will further develop this in Chapter 5.

The dynamic between political violence and its normalization is at the core of forms of remembering the past in the aftermath. It is interesting to note that remembering is also a response to violence. In a sense it has a functional side, which allowed the political opposition to reinforce its identity. But by the end of the chapter I also have shown that memory is not just adaptive or functional for the second generation, but responds to other forms of relationship with the past—an example of what the task of mourning that follows political violence might be.
Chapter 5: Political stigmas and family legacies

To be a member of a family is to share in a community stretched across generations. (…) We understand these family memories as at once given to us, existing independently of us, and revisable. They are experienced as independent in that they are, so to speak, our inheritance, something in which we are born, or ‘thrown’, and over which we have no further say. That our parents did such and such, something we are proud or ashamed of, belongs to us insofar as it is given in the identity of the family. Yet we also know that it can be received in narrative form, revisable, not infinitely so, but in the value we attach to its elements, to what we elect or emphasize or to leave in the shadows, choices that are themselves instructed by the habits of the heart already acquired in the bosom of the family. The familial framework of memory makes our own memory as family possible and at the same time leaves a space for us to mold and reshape the narrative of which we are inescapably a part.

(Booth 2006, 22)

Introduction

In Chapter 4 I explored how the culture of fear shaped family political memory among opposition communities. These memories were shaped in sociocultural landscapes which triggered forms of inhabiting the culture of fear, distinguishing between inside or outside as well as between friends or enemies and of knowing when to keep secrets or making revelations in everyday life. In this chapter I will show some of the costs and legacies of inheriting these family political memories and the dilemmas of inhabiting them.

The chapter is framed around the politics of stigmatization of the left-wing militant or political activist during the dictatorship and its effects on the second generation. The aim is to explore the way that second generations have appropriated their family histories and political memories, asking for example: how have these stigmatized political memories been embodied in the aftermath of violence and what happens when these histories carry with them a polluted name which it is necessary to inhabit? The chapter problematizes Ervin Goffman’s theory of stigma by introducing a destabilizing insight: that the stigma is something to pass from at the same time it is something to inhabit.
In the first part of the chapter I describe briefly how ‘intergenerationality’ has been framed within post-coup Chile, from the 90s onwards in particular. I argue that although some academic and clinical work has been done around the transmission of trauma, particularly amongst victims of torture, it is within the cultural sphere that the concept has been most insightfully explored, for instance in the second generation film ‘boom’ over the last few years. As well as looking at the films of the second generation, I will also consider a first generation film, Patricio Guzmán’s *Nostalgia de la Luz* (Nostalgia for the Light, 2011), in which he interviews the daughter of desaparecidos who feels she has a ‘production flaw’. I highlight the embodied political memory that Guzman’s interviewee frames when she speaks of her family inheritance and suggest that rather than dealing with a stigma, Guzman’s interviewee is dealing with a stain: an internalized and naturalized mark. I will come back to this metaphor in my analysis of the interviews presented later in the chapter.

Then I describe how the politics of fear of the other has resulted in a stigmatization of the left-wing activist, whose ‘marks’ were transmitted within family and whose legacies were inhabited by the second generation. I describe how the military regimes used a language of salvation, circulating within public opinion the image of the ‘Marxist cancer’ which they have to eradicate. I show how they created an imaginary of pollution which demarcated clean from dirty zones. Through one of my interviews, I explore the metaphor of being marked and also suggest a connection between the practice of stigmatizing social others during the regime and the Christian concept of having a stain. Both cultural discourses meet and resound in experiences of being marked, potentially dangerous and subjects of correction. Making this connection sheds light on the way institutional discourses (i.e.: religion and politics) become entangled and woven together in everyday life.

In the subsequent section, I introduce Marcela, who has moved on from family experiences of state violence consisting of social ostracism and social exclusion. I describe the context in which Marcela grew up. Being the child of a marked family, she inherited a form of pollution which was neither physical nor psychical, neither political nor moral, but both. Arguing against Goffman’s interactionist conception of ‘passing’ as a defence mechanism against stigmatization, I suggest that the relationship to the family name is not something to avoid, clean or conceal, but to inhabit, embody and appropriate. I also draw on the experiences of other interviewees to illustrate the
points I am making in the chapter. I rethink passing, not as a strategy ‘of not being who they are’ or ‘being someone else’, but as a form of staying safe within the culture of fear. I also contend that ‘passing’ overlooks that *which does not want to pass* in family political memories within opposition. The latter, I argue, points instead at the dilemmas of dealing with family legacies, involving affects, feelings of belonging and forms of relatedness between generations.

**The Intergenerational Effects of the Dictatorship**

Although the question about the legacies of the dictatorships has been a matter of concern in the Southern Cone (Constable and Valenzuela 1993; Corradi and Garretón Merino 1992; Feitlowitz 1999; Lessa and Druliolle 2011), the intergenerational transmission of the memory of state violence in Chile has not been sufficient explored in Chile. Research has dealt with the intergenerational transmission of trauma from a clinical perspective, specifically with respect to victims of torture, and has been dominated by a psychological and psychosocial approach taken by the Latin American Institute of Human Rights and Mental Health (Instituto Latinoamericano de Derechos Humanos y Salud Mental, ILAS) and the Program of Reparation for Integral Care in Health and Human Rights (Programa de Reparación en Atención Integral en Salud y Derechos Humanos, PRAIS) from 1988 onwards. After the restoration of democracy and following the Rettig report, one reparation measure was the PRAIS program, which offered support, medical attention and psychotherapy for victims and relatives. More recently, scholars have begun to give a new twist to the focus on intergenerational traumatization, legacies and transmission not only in Chile but also in Argentina and Uruguay (Jara 2012; Serpente 2011; Kaiser 2005) by focusing on the new generations and reshaping not only the concepts of ‘victims’ and ‘memory’ but also of legacy and trauma. This opens up new perspectives about the legacies of the military regimes within broader spheres. But it has been within the cultural industry that the sharpest questions and most compelling reflections have been articulated (Lazzara 2009b; Nouzeilles 2005). In recent years a generation of filmmakers has started to narrate their biographical experiences and has explored

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61 ILAS was created in 1988 by a group of psychologists and therapists who have worked with victims of repression since 1978. PRAIS started in 1991 as one of the commitments of the state to the victims of human right violations. It offers full health attention, with a special emphasis on mental health.
the complexities of having grown up in post-coup Chile as ‘second generations’. In doing so, they have configured a new approach to the legacies of the dictatorship and redefined the scope of violence beyond reductionist portraits of victimhood. Perhaps not surprisingly, they all explore the meaning of being the children of activist parents and inheriting family political memories.

Patricio Guzman’s *Nostalgia de la Luz* is an exception to this rule, but nevertheless explores compellingly some of the dilemmas faced by the second generations. Being first generation, he has been recognized for documenting the Chilean political scenario before the military coup. This has been important because, rather than focusing on the devastating effects of the military regime, he has brought back to collective memory the years of the UP. As Lazzara has suggested, Chileans have largely dealt with the Pinochet years but have omitted public debate on the meaning of Allende’s UP (Lazzara 2006). In his last documentary, however, Guzman’s motto illuminates what I aim to discuss in this chapter: he sheds light on how affects triggered by political violence have been transmitted to the next generation and have been embodied by them, being mediated by family political memories. In the film, Guzmán interviews the daughter of *desaparecidos* who says that after having been taken prisoner, her grandparents were threatened by their captors and forced to choose between her parents and her, and inform on where they were hidden. In the scene from the film, they are sitting next to her, but they do not talk; they just look at the camera. Without a word, Guzmán takes the viewer into the hell which all this biographical narration might have meant for them: the grief of being informants against their own family, the sorrow of having lost their children, the desperation of having to choose between their granddaughter and their own daughter and the feeling of guilt they have to cope with – all the greys of violence that are not easily represented in the commemoration of the past. This shows how the regime put people in impossible situations. Then, the granddaughter makes a confession: she always felt she had a ‘production flaw’ and was afraid that people may notice it. She grew up feeling that something has been inherently wrong with her from ‘the moment of production’ (“*una falla de producción*”). What does it mean to feel that one has a production flaw? What is this saying?

Guzman’s interview resonates with one of my fieldwork findings. Inheriting polluted identities (the family name, their political identity or both) was related to the experience of being born within
In this chapter I suggest that the first generation’s ‘leftist’ stigma is naturalized as a ‘stain’ in the second generation; from being something external to the body, it becomes something within the body, embodied as a sense of self and although people may have various forms of appropriating it, it haunts them. Thus, different forms of symbolic violence in relation to political identities (such as stigmatization or the political persecution of a family member) - despite being socially-rooted – are felt as something personal. In order to shed light on this my focus on this chapter is on what it means to grow up feeling one’s self and one’s family marked and in what ways second generation individuals would appropriate their parents’ stigma as a personal fault in the aftermath of violence.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the junta took great care to give form to their enemy. During one of their first public speeches, they presented their main objective: to save the country from ‘the Marxist cancer’. The latter was a metaphor of the social; it imagines society as a body which could be the object of surgical interventions with the aim of restoration. In other words, it refers to a process of social deviation which could be corrected and for that, the country would need the guidance and protection of the militaries. Like Franco’s Spain, the regime promoted ‘a juxtaposition of political attitudes and mental pathologies’ (Ericsson and Simonsen 2005). Thus, by coining the ‘Marxist cancer’ label, they transformed the political identity of diverse left-wing people into one category – Marxists – which they invested with a negative moral connotation. According to Lira and Castillo: ‘The extreme polarization existing in the country made it possible

62 This was offset in cases where the second generation studied in schools which were in opposition to the regime. There were a few of these kinds of schools, which were private attempts to reunite and protect political communities. Among the most well known are Francisco Miranda and Latinoamericano.

63 In their first TV and radio message after the coup, Gustavo Leigh, an air force general and one of the first members of the junta, said: “After three years of enduring the Marxist cancer, the junta has accepted its sad and painful mission. Chileans are ready to struggle against Marxism and to extirpate it to the very end”.

64 Mary Douglas’groundbreaking Purity and Danger may provide insight into the junta’s discourse. She suggests that the ideas of hygiene and pollution structures classifications in social life, rather than the idea of fear - as anthropologists had previously maintained She writes: ‘For I believe that ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It is only exaggerating the difference between with and without, about and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created’ (Douglas 2002, 5).
that the left became considered as the carriers of a malignant or negative identity, promoting the idea that their existence represented a threat for the whole society' (Lira and Castillo 1991, 234). The authors highlight how a malignant identity was projected onto the political opposition to the regime, and how the dichotomization between good and evil was part of the social polarization that affected Chilean society. For Stern, these messages ‘encouraged a disposition to see human rights violations either as necessary actions against savage zealots, or as manipulative lies invented by enemies’ (Stern 2006a, 39).

Naming the ‘Marxist cancer’ was a perlocutionary act. Marxists, subversives and terrorists became synonyms in the new lexicon. From then on, all those individuals who could be associated with Marxism would be considered enemies or traitors of the country. In Chile and in Argentina as well, the expression “No eran santas palomas” (they were not holy doves) was used to legitimate the violence inflicted on left-wing activists; it is a religious lexicon used in everyday language which shows the intersection between the junta’s morality and the Catholic symbolic universe. This expression was used colloquially to justify human rights violations through a resource to causality (Jara 2012). This way, state violence was considered as the inevitable product of malignant activists who deserved moral and physical punishment, or at least, correction. Left-wing politicians, revolutionaries, sinners and criminals were all the same: they were the Other threatening the imaginary peace of everyday life, and in the name of that, they should be punished, purified or excluded from the community.

65 In 2008 I conducted a focus group among upper class youngsters and I was struck by the fact that this expression was completely valid among them, having a cynical and pragmatic moral about the use of violence.

66 Despite the junta’s appropriation of a discourse of salvation, the Catholic Church played a role of moral opposition to the Military Regime under the leadership of cardinal Silva Henríquez. However, as Cruz shows in her study of the Chilean Church, a progressive and a conservative church co-existed within the institution. Despite this, the junta succeed in creating a new code of political morality this time dissociated from the official institution, showing how religion can serve the means of any political purpose.
The language of salvation

In Chile, an important part of the military campaign to ‘open hearts and minds’ took place at the intersection of language, affects and morality. A semi-religious language was part of the junta’s performance of power: references to salvation, healing and sacrifices gave them a numinous aura in a country very sensitive to religious lexis. In their public interventions, the military junta explained that their efforts were oriented towards the ‘salvation’ of the country, and then, its re-foundation (Garretón 1992). Calming messages were given to people to encourage them not to be afraid “if they have nothing to regret” (Stern 2006a). In the regime’s discourse, those who were persecuted ‘deserved’ to be punished, mobilizing social fear against them. Those who were ‘good people’ did not need to be afraid. They knew how to use an important aspect of Chilean culture: the influence which Catholic Church and its view of the world have on people’s life. They created a scenario where they controlled meanings and mobilized people’s fantasies, fears and hopes around the ideas of being ‘good’, being a good man and a good citizen.

All these references make it necessary to pay attention to the place of purity and dirtiness within the Christian schema. Within the Christian theodicy there is a metaphor of a certain dirtiness which is intrinsic to every human being until they are baptized. Encrypted in this paradigm is the idea of original sin, which is the fault which the human being committed against the natural order. It means that people are born at fault, and require a certain redemption which can be obtained after committing to institutional rites. For this fault they were expelled from a cherished space and all the disgrace (suffering, death, work and shame) which follows this expulsion is experienced as a punishment for this very act of rebellion. The original sin is a stain marking every human being, and is the spiritual memory of the act of disobedience. Through immersion in pure water during a ceremony called baptism, people have the chance to erase their stain and be initiated into a moral community. In this way, religion offers a path of goodness which brings redemption from original sin and cleans the stain. As Seidler states: ‘(within the Catholic tradition) “Goodness” became fundamentally a matter of obedience, of obeying the orders of authorities who knew what was expected of you better than you could know yourself. The feeling of being at fault and the need

67 I take this expression from Steve Stern’s book: Battle for hearts and Minds. Through this expression he wants to stress that legitimacy is not only cognitive but also emotional.
68 In Chile more than 90% of the population is Catholic.
69 Being a ‘good sheep’ is a metaphor that comes from the Christian imaginary.
for redemption are crucial to the survival of the institution’ (Seidler 2010, 3). For Seidler, the binary distinction between purity and dirtiness, goodness and evil, obedience and disobedience is functional to the moral language of Catholicism.

The military junta’s imaginary was structured in a similar way to Catholicism: it created zones of pollution, disobedience and deviation. These connections were clearly observed during the interview I did with Victoria, the daughter of an important youth leader during the UP who went into exile after the coup. My encounter with her was special, because her father’s name has featured frequently within many of the stories and anecdotes from my parents’ youth which I had heard and was part of my family’s political memory. Her father was my parents’ hero. Although her father left the country, Victoria stayed in Chile with her mother, and she only met him when she was 13 years old and travelled to Argentina where he was living underground. During the first half of the interview, I wanted to talk about being the child of a UP leader, but Victoria wanted to talk about her affiliation to a Christian Church, which she said had a hierarchical organization and a very strict code of behaviour. Rather than speaking about the dictatorship, she preferred to speak about the Church and her feeling of “being vaguely wrong for something” (siento una cosa culposa), feeling ‘dirty’ and the need to ‘feel clean’. I considered that this might exceeded the scope of my research. However, when she then spoke about the dictatorship, we had the following exchange:

Victoria: “I grew up with fear under the dictatorship and I think it affected me a lot”.
Interviewer: “What were you afraid of?”
V: “…There is a repression within me, something which makes me feel guilty. I don’t want to feel this... What I am afraid of? For instance, when I was a child, they were constantly talking about politics at home, or about human rights, about what was going on with Pinochet and all that stuff. They warned me not to talk about that at school, they said ‘you can’t talk about this, don’t talk to anybody in the street even if they offer you candy’...My mother was really afraid, that was a time of repression, I was the child of someone important...”

Victoria’s story helps us understand that, surprisingly, for some children, the culture of fear took a paradoxical route: it can be tracked and connected to vague feelings of shame and guilt which lack a clear object. Like Victoria, in this chapter I suggest a connection between the institutional politics
of stigmatization and imprecise feelings which are felt as ‘personal’ but which may be seen as the
different forms of haunting of a past which demands to be recognized: the way in which the
regime has an afterlife. In the next section I introduce another of my interviewees, Marcela, and
exploring her interview, I will suggest that her narrative disclosed the feeling of having a stain but
makes of the idea of political stigma something more complex, which brings together not only the
problem of inheritance but also that of choice.

Introducing my encounter with Marcela: fieldwork notes

Today in her early forties and a mother of two, Marcela is a smart, self-controlled woman who
speaks fluently. She works in the local government offices of a semi-rural village in the Southern
Chile. I contacted her after asking at the local government public relations office for information
about possible interviewees who could talk about the legacies of the dictatorship. They gave me a
list of families who were well-known during the dictatorship as opposition families: “The Pérez,
The Rojas, etc.”, and one of these families was Marcela’s. This made me think of the agency of
names, and how they mobilize emotions and knowledge in particular contexts, and how although
the contexts have changed, names continue carrying ‘something’, a reminiscence of the past.70

Rural communities have traditionally been the most conservative regions of Chile; at the same
time the peasants live in the most precarious conditions. Even today there is still a relationship of
subservience and domination between the peasant and the landowner. Walking around a small
village, one can distinguish the landowners from the peasants easily by looking at very simple
details: the way they walk, move or talk in the local market. Peasants would bring their vegetables
to the market to sell them. Their often dark skins, worn-out clothing, stooped backs and wrinkled
faces contrasted with the confidence of the well-dressed tall bodies, light skins, and loud voices of
the patrones (landowners). The first morning I arrived in the town I sat down in a small park in the
centre. The next day I met one of my interviewees and he said that the moment ‘he saw me sitting
in the park’ he knew I did not belong there and he wondered what I was doing in a place like that.
Decades ago the landowner provided shelter and food for the peasant in exchange for his labour.
Being dismissed by the landowner would be a tragedy, since he was the owner of everything a

70 I express my gratitude to my colleague Ana Gross for drawing my attention to this.
That sense of dispossession is still alive in the everyday life of these communities. During the Land Reform process (1962-1973) the landowner played an important role in opposition against land redistribution, provoking a strong sense of resentment among different social actors which increased as the redistribution process deepened, particularly between 1970 and 1973 under the UP government. After the coup, many of the peasants who had taken part in land expropriations were killed. That many of those peasants were denounced by landowners for motives of revenge (Stern 2006) is part of the oral memory of these communities and something which has also been accepted by historians. However, those who survived did not escape the effects of the coup: the few members of the UP living in those small communities were dismissed from their employment, which for a peasant meant complete isolation and condemnation to starvation. All these experiences left deep marks among local people.

During my fieldwork I observed that peasants and villagers were reluctant to talk about the past but they all remembered silently what they seemed to have forgotten. When I asked for suggestions of people that I could interview, I always got an immediate response: “Los Perez”, “Los Gonzalez”, “Los Benitez”. Families affected during and after the coup were still marked as having a stain. The memory of what happened to them coexists with the apparent normality of everyday life. Their names carry their stigmas and bring them to the present with the silent disposition inherited from the past. During my conversations with peasants I often heard the phrase, “do not bite the hand that feeds you”, expressed as their moral maxim. I saw how that expression was a statement of fear, affirming a status quo and loyalty to an economic relationship, making it somehow personal and emotional through a servant morality. This expression has a subtext: the memory that the peasant revolution was disloyal to the patrón. And that is the meaning which has prevailed in this community, a meaning which was reinforced through the threat of dispossession or death. It is not that there is no memory here, but that there is no room for a militant memory or a deviant memory. It is the memory frame of the patrón which has triumphed in its hegemony.

In fact, in one of these villages, Ranco River, nine peasants were thrown in to the local river after the coup. However, in contrast to what has happened in other local communities in Chile, their past has not been memorialized; the peasant opposition experience has had no voice. Though it is well known that nine peasants in the area were thrown into the local river, there has been no monument at all and the memory of this event operates as rumour. Paralyzing fear still threatens these communities.
Marcela's life story

Marcela and I met in an empty classroom in a public school near her office, which was the ideal setting for bringing up her childhood memories. This was the school where her parents had worked until the day of the coup. Since being born she has always lived in the same village, where everybody knows each other. Throughout the interview I could sense how mechanisms of defence were activated and deactivated, depending on what position I stood in, depending on what kind of Other I was to her. When I interviewed her, I felt how she oscillated between being very formal and even distant and being more open and vulnerable. It was difficult for me to establish a deeper connection with her at that point. I see this dynamic between openness and closeness as a metaphor of her childhood experience: how public exposure and personal information may become a threat to her family life. I tried different ways to make contact with her and cross that characteristic barrier I learned to know well from my second generation interviewees. When I exposed my own experiences to Marcela and I showed her empathy and actively demonstrated that I could understand what she was telling me, Marcela let me enter more deeply into her story.

During the 60s and early 70s Marcela’s father was a prestigious local politician and member of the local government. He was a member of the Socialist Party and was one of the local leaders during the UP. However, after the coup, his luck dramatically changed: like thousands of people, he lost his job, was blacklisted and marginalized from social life. Having previously been a respected authority he came to be avoided and excluded from the village’s social life. Because he was a member of a left-wing party, he was stigmatized to the extent he could never re-integrate into his community and no one would even rent his family a home where they could live. In absolute despair and after being prevented from finding a job for years in a patriarchal culture where the value of a man is given by his role as provider, he retreated into alcoholism, from which he never recovered. Marcela’s family suffered years of social isolation and economic deprivation, and became known for everybody as “Los Pérez”, one of the leftist families of the village, ‘stain’ which would follow them up to today.

Her mother also suffered from persecution. She was a teacher and, after the coup, although she was not an activist in any political party, she was also persecuted within the village for being ‘the
wife of’. For almost 15 years she only managed to find jobs in remote locations, far from their family home. In Marcela’s words:

I: Couldn’t she get a job? (after the coup)
M: No she couldn’t work within the village, she wasn’t allowed to stay here, she had to work abroad for being Pérez’ wife. It was a way of persecuting our family. As my dad was dismissed from his job, and he didn’t get a job neither here nor anywhere else …he was a political prisoner for being socialist militant….so what they did was to persecute my mother too, and so she couldn’t find a job here either.

Marcela shows that although they were alive and apparently ‘safe’, her family suffered persecution and punishment as living examples of being polluted within small communities.

Troubled remembering: inheriting political stigmas

Marcela was, among interviewees of the second generation, who had some fragmented images of 11 September 1973. Marcela’s memories were not narratives or images of her parent’s past; it was more complicated. When I met her, curious about the apparently immediacy of her memories, I wanted to explore what kind of memories they were and how important they had been for her over the years. I wondered for instance whether having first hand memories would have an influence on the form in which family legacies have been appropriated.

I: “Have you got any memories of the coup day?”
M: “Well, I remember that that day we woke up and we left our home, we went to the home of an aunt who lived nearby and who was very close to my mum. I don’t remember if my father was there, but it is likely that he wasn’t… I don’t know where he could have been. I also remember the military planes, the feeling that something bad was happening, the feeling of danger, that something was going on…”
(Someone knocks on the door; I stop recording)
I: “Well, so you heard the military planes… Did you understand what was going on?”
M: “No, I didn’t have a clue”.

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In fact, the memories of the second generations – and this is specially highlighted in the postmemory frame - differ from those of the first generation because they are not based on witnessing, but they nevertheless mobilize affects and a sense of ‘responsibility’ which bind them in an ‘intergenerational liaison’ as Jürgen Habermas puts it (Habermas and Nicholsen 1989). However, as we see in Marcela’s interview quotation, some members of the Chilean second generation have fragmented but vivid memories of 11 September itself, but this does not make them part of the first generation. However, although Marcela says she “did not understand anything” the day of the coup, she did not forget any details either. In fact, she remembers. Her modes of ‘knowing and unknowing’ might work as a gesture of her relationship to the past: being present and being absent, at the same time. She did not have information, but she “felt something was going on”; she knew without knowing. However, as with most of my interviewees, the core of Marcela’s memories do not refer to the events of 11 September, but to the forms of life that followed it, and the multiple fragmentations and transformations that she and her family underwent. It was what followed the coup, rather than the coup itself, that would become her political memory. This raises questions about to what extent the postmemory frame is in fact accurate for the Chilean second generation, or that of the Southern Cone military regimes. Their memories, or their narratives of remembrance start perhaps on the day of the coup (probably before) but, on the basis of my interviews, they are not focused on an event, but on its aftermath.

Indeed, Marcela’s narrative becomes legible through the lens of political stigmas. She spoke about her family’s fate after the coup, when they became polluted to the extent that they could not even find a place to live in. Her words are linked to the question I put forward in the introduction: what does it mean to grow up in a family which is marked?

M: ”Imagine, no one would even rent us a house”.
I: “People were afraid of you…”
C: “They were afraid. We had to stay at my aunt’s home; we stayed there for a while, but then it was taken away from her... She lost her house too!”
I: “Just because you were staying there?”
C: “Yes, because she had received us there. Friends... they crossed the street so to avoid saying hello to us. No one looked at us, no one visited us, the only house we found to live in was an abandoned house by the river (...). We knew that we could not enter anywhere
because we were going to be rejected for being member of the Pérez family... We were the Communist Pérezes, though we were not Communists, but that was our stigma”.

Marcela’s words demonstrate the work of pollution within a community, and how each member of the family group became infected by the stigma of being left-wing. In this context, Goffman’s groundbreaking work on stigma might illuminate some zones of such an experience, but I will argue that it also conceals the form in which Marcela relates to her family legacy (Goffman 1986). Goffman made a shift from the emphasis on deviance which was predominant in sociological theory to the focus on the gaze (Hacking, 2004). Noting how the view of Others shapes and influence people’s behaviour, the sociologist shows how attributes do not discredit as things in themselves, but only within certain settings and interactions. According to Goffman the term stigma refers to individuals who have been disqualified from full social acceptance. His work brilliantly sheds light on how a stain has a materiality without having it, and shows how this can be apprehended during interactions. Marcela, in fact, speaks of this form of materiality in the interview, showing how it marked her childhood. Such materiality with no physicality is referred by Marcela as “information which is in the air” in the following quote:

I: “When you were at school, did you ever feel the stigma of being a Pérez family member?”

M: “Yes. I was an outstanding student at school; however I could never be involved in any activity, for instance in the student centre, I was never considered for such roles”.

I: “Did you ask why you were not considered?”

M: “No, because I already knew it, so why ask?”

I: “Where was that commandment written, that if you were a Pérez family member you were excluded?”

M: “It was in the air, people were like “A Pérez would never enter here””.

This invisibility (illustrated by Marcela’s recurrent metaphor when she speaks of social convention: “things are in the air”) which is full of materiality at the same time, is what struck Goffman, as well as stigma’s ability to create norms and habits without being ‘written’, without any form of objectivity. The above quotation emphasizes the interactional dimension of stigma. It tells us about the landscapes created by stigmas, and how they give way to areas which are forbidden and cannot be entered by those people who are polluted.
Feeling safe in the Culture of Fear

The fact of having a non-tellable story was a common experience among my interviewees: they learned to manage information in front of others and to never speak too much. They did so in order to feel safe in the culture of fear. Camilo (whose story I will further develop in Chapter 7), for example, grew up in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and once his family returned to Chile he learned to omit which part of Germany he had lived in. He knew the GDR would create undesirable connections for him, which may have made visible an ‘unworthy’ and polluted identity concealed in him.

Another of my interviewees, Ruth, witnessed violence and loss from when she was a child. One of seven siblings, she belongs to a family which lived in a deprived rural area in the south of Chile. She was just 6 years old when her father, a humble peasant, was detained in their home in an operation known as Chihuío 71. Although he was only 17 years old, her elder brother disappeared too. She never saw either of them again, so over the years she and her family had to accept they were part of the desaparecidos. For a long time, Ruth concealed her grief from others. During her school years, she created a fictitious life story to explain her father’s absence to her schoolmates and teachers as a way of protecting herself and her family from stigma. She never showed her grief to others, and she learned to estrange herself from her pain by creating a parallel life which could allow her to dwell in safe stories. Ruth tells how during her childhood her strategy was to lie about her father’s story; rather than saying that he and her brother were desaparecidos, she told her classmates they had died in traffic accidents. But Ruth says that she also felt less than others, she felt marked:

I: “Did you have a feeling of persecution?”

71 In this infamous operation, 17 people were killed by the armed forces. Most of them were forest workers and young peasants who were members of the Union or had been supporters of the UP. Ruth’s brother’s story is known because he was taken when he followed the truck which picked up his father, and after he asked the soldiers what they were going to do with his father, they put him on the truck too. It has been remembered as one of the emblematic massacres of the regime, because the massacre and the burial took place on the property of one of the best-known local landlords. Source: oral interview and CEME, Centro de Estudios Miguel Enríquez: http://www.archivochile.com/Derechos_humanos/chihuio/ddhh_chihuio0001.pdf
R: “I did feel persecuted, but it provoked some feelings in me... I was very green, I think it lowered my self-esteem”.

I: “Did you feel marked?”

R: “Yes, particularly when I started going to school. I went to schools where there were girls who were policemen’s daughters... I had to live in silence”.

I: “How did you experience that, what were your emotions about this, how did you feel?”

R: “I felt inferior. Besides, those girls were like city girls and we were country girls, we were peasants and apart from that we brought with us a history and a secret”.

I: “Did you feel that you carried with you a secret when you were at school?”

R: “Right, during many years I felt I carried within me a secret, and it was about the way my father had died”.

I: “Did you ever tell this to someone else?”

R: “No. During so many years I avoided talking about my father”.

I: “Because of fear?”

R: “Yes, because of fear, so nobody would know the story”.

Having a secret family story made Ruth feel somehow inferior to her classmates. This mark transferred to her a sense of indignity, a sense of shame: ‘Shame as opposed to guilt is a bad feeling that does not attach to what one does, but to what one is’ (Eng 2010, Goffman 1986). But Ruth learned to talk in the public space about her desaparecidos 17 years later, when democracy was re-established in Chile and the first prosecutions for human rights violations began. Encouraged by the new atmosphere brought about by re-democratization, Ruth – seeking justice – presented the disappearance of her father and brother in court. It was only then, when it was socially allowed, that Ruth and her family faced the past together and started to feel able to speak about it. As Das states ‘Pain, in this rendering, is not that inexpressible something that destroys communication or marks an exit from one’s existence in language. Instead, it makes a claim asking for acknowledgment, which may be given or denied’ (Das 2007, 40). Ruth has moved from the privacy of her pain to seek its social acknowledgment and here she found the possibility of telling her family story to others.

During the regime Camilo and Ruth concealed their family pasts as if there were a fault in them. Like Marcela, it was common for the children of victims of state violence to learn to cover and
protect their political identities which many times included painful family stories. These were all forms of muting their political identity in landscapes of fear and authoritarianism. They had to cope with denial by the media and the government: the second generations usually lived between mutually discredited and competing truths – the familial truth and the official truth –.

As in Marcela’s story:

I: “Was there a difference between the topics you could speak about at home and those you could speak about outside? Was there a difference between home and the outer world? Did you have to keep silent outside?”

M: “Of course... The music which you listened to or the topics you spoke about, or if you criticized the political authorities... They were all family topics, they were private, and you couldn’t speak of them outside”.

I: “How did you know that?”

M: “I just knew it, it was tacit”.

As we have seen, the opposition’s second generation lived between two forms of belonging and had to negotiate between them: the official culture which ruled public spaces and the counter-official knowledge of the opposition and victims which ruled their private landscapes. Their family history was a family secret and they knew that it was a matter which could not be acknowledged in public conversations.

The Ambivalence of Passing

For Goffman, interaction was the clue to getting into the social. But he also observed that what was left out of interactions was important too. He used the phrase ‘the double perspective of stigma’ to refer to the fact that there were stigmas which could be concealed and others which could not. Here, the sociologist introduces the concept of ‘passing’, which refers to the anxiety of

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72 I consider a counter official knowledge the very act of feeling oneself a victim of state terror or having witnessed it.

73 Goffman distinguished between the discredited (the term reserved for evident attributes) and the discreditable (those attributes which could be concealed). When the attribute is concealable, the danger and
revealing and concealing during social encounters, which is particularly relevant to the cases I am studying in this thesis.

The concept of passing is born out of social processes which make identity a space of value and where, as a result, some identities are rendered ‘unworthy’. However, if the emphasis on passing may explain some aspects when we attempt to grasp experiences of stigmatization, oppression or ‘otherization’, it also obscures others. What I am interested in tracing here is that which does not pass and, more importantly, does not want to pass, as this may be the basis for collective or individual forms of liaison and resistance. At the same time, this is related to the work of Assman, Hoffman and Hirsch on memory transmission, and the more general sense of responsibility which comes from the relationship between the first and second generations. I argue against Goffman that the relationship to the polluted or rejected attribute is not as instrumental as the strategy of passing might suggest, and I rather want to point out what remains as problematic and not disposable in inhabiting each one’s name. It is in my reading of the meaning of passing in Marcela’s childhood that I will depart from presentists accounts of stigmas and also explore how a stigma comes to be felt as a stain – a durable mark.

Like David, Camilo and Ruth, Marcela also grew up with the legacy of a dubious kinship, or put better, a kinship which became suspicious from the point of view of the state in the political context in which they lived. Through her memories, she is caught between two belongings which reclaim her loyalty: her belonging to the community (represented by the state) and the chance of having a future with others on the one hand and her belonging to her family and the chance to have a memory and a legacy on the other. In my view, Goffman’s theory deals with the first of them – the anxiety to ensure her belonging to the community and the dominant frame of values – and provides tools to give an account of it. His image is of someone who wants to become someone else in order to belong. However, this perspective may put too much emphasis on the weight that the hegemonic community may have on family and individual identities. My approach, by contrast, is to turn from an emphasis on assimilation to alternative strategies such as mimicry or simulation⁷⁴. The latter are different forms of response to forms of domination or value/cultural anxiety related to the stigma being discovered is called the discreditable, hinting a potential future of stigmatization which should be avoided.

⁷⁴ For a further reflection on the ambivalence of mimicry, see: “Key concepts in post-colonial studies” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1998)
confrontation. In fact, during my conversation with Marcela about her childhood memories and the decline of her family after being stigmatized during the dictatorship, Marcela described an event which I argue clearly illustrates the experience of children navigating between an opposition culture and an authoritarian regime. Ambivalence and a multilayered experience (complexity, in Gordon’s terms) can be used as lens with which to look at Marcela’s memoir.

During the regime, ceremonies, rites and discourses were a crucial part of the performance of power and glory. One day, Marcela heard that Pinochet was going to visit her village during an official tour. The whole village was excited about this visit and they prepared different activities to welcome the President. Although she had grown up listening to stories about the dramatic effects which the coup had on her family and they practiced the rituals of the opposition (giving particular meaning to speaking, for instance), she clapped and welcomed him as all her classmates did. Marcela remembered how she smiled in front of the authority and cheered the military dictator:

M: “Once, when I was 9 years old, Pinochet came to the village. All the students had to go to the park, wearing our uniforms and waving white handkerchiefs to welcome him; we all had to go. But we were happy, because we were skipping classes”.
I: “Were you happy too?”
M: “Of course, we were skipping classes, so my classmates and I were happy (she laughs). We were waving our handkerchiefs, listening to Pinochet, clapping our hands”.
I: “What did you feel for Pinochet?”
M: “Well, I felt anger…”
I: “Did you feel anger that day?”
M: “No, I was happy that day, we were all happy, it was just the way children are. We were skipping classes, so it was fine”.
I: “Did you associate Pinochet with your family story?”
M: “Of course, I knew who Pinochet was, I knew everything. I was happy because I was sharing with others, but I also felt repudiation without being aware, in the way children do, letting me go with the situation”.

The scene portrayed by Marcela has returned to me often. I wonder, was she really happy that day? When a child who has been victim of the dictatorship smiles in front of the dictator; is her smile pure joy? Was her smile an effort ‘to pass’? Though she was a child, she was left in a difficult
position where loyalty to her family and loyalty to the community clashed; she was in-between two belongings. Such dilemmas were not articulated by the children of the dictatorship’s political opposition, but it does not reduce the dissonance they were exposed to. It is true that the experience of being a child is much broader than being a child of the opposition and/or a child of victims, but it is also true that for them, their childhood experience contained these two experiences. They belong to opposition families at the same time they belong to their school and other social groups.

By welcoming the dictator and applauding him, I suggest that Marcela was making and unmaking herself at the same time; she was publicly performing at the same time she was withdrawing into her private world. I argue that her enthusiasm at being part of a school activity was fractured by the latent knowledge of her father’s depression and their family’s social isolation after the coup although she was not necessarily aware of it. Marcela passed in front of her classmates, but the fact that she succeeded in doing it, does not express the complexity of the event. To me it is in the ambivalence of passing where we can grasp the task of appropriating forbidden counter-hegemonic identities and the role of affects in this. It is in examples like this that Gordon’s concept of complexity demonstrates its strength as does Das’ critique of the ‘short circuit’ that the trauma paradigm may represent for understanding local patterns of memory of political violence (Das 2007). In fact, reading Marcela’s gesture, as complex we can grasp a new meaning of her clapping in front of the dictator. She is neither the traitor nor the victim; she reclaims her right to be someone else.

Dwelling in family histories

Marcela’s legacy was lived with an inherent duality: at the same time that it may have complicated her presentation of the self during the decades of fear (and its aftermath), it also gave her an opposition identity and a sense of being part of a community of memory and a lineage. Therefore, if the focus is on passing and interaction, then how can we give an account of that which does not want to pass? That is what binds Marcela, Victoria and many other of the second generation to their family legacies and their political memory.
Inhabiting one’s family name in the aftermath of violence brings us to the intersection between stigma and the transmission of political memory within the family. Thus, the intergenerational transmission of stigma blurs the accent on interaction and opens a space for the inhabiting of each one’s histories and the dilemmas which stem from it. Goffman’s focus on the externality of stigma provides a brilliant description of the calculations involved in the task of passing, but he does not account for the ambivalence of passing, the ambivalence which comes from the affective liaison of the second generation with the first generation. It is not only about others and managing information, but also about appropriating (or rejecting) each one’s family legacy.

In various interviews I heard the story of how, when children were told to sing the national anthem at school (which was one of the symbols of military glory during the regime), pretended they were singing, but were in fact just moving their lips. I remember having done the same. People, and particularly children who live in the culture of fear, ‘learned’ to live in public spaces. This is for me the main territory covered by the presentist concept of passing. However, according to Hirsch and others, there is another side to it.

For Hirsch, a sense of affiliation follows the act of witnessing traumatic experiences. For Butler, as we saw in Chapter 2, this sense of affiliation comes from a shared feeling of vulnerability after episodes of political violence, an experience which, for her, provides the basis of the feeling of being part of a community (Butler 2003). Lira’s work, introduced in Chapter 1, also deals with this aspect: how political memory is invested with personal and affective meaning every time it is remembered and commemorated (Lira 2011). In Chapter 6 I will further explore the relationship between family and political memory. All these writers observe something which also emerges from my fieldwork: the relationship - which may range from forms of duty, rejection, pride or shame - of second generations to their family political memories.

75 Except those families who created a ghetto culture and surrounded themselves with people who shared the same resistance culture. Examples of this were Francisco Miranda and Latinoamericano schools. However, this was an exception, and the majority of the people continued their lives in places where being part of the opposition was considered dangerous.
Stains and Marks

When I asked Marcela her about her father and how she coped with her family fate after the dictatorship, she spoke of the effects of belonging to a polluted family, but another process also takes shape: the personalization of the mark. Like Marcela and Victoria, Ruth - the child and sister of desaparecidos - speaks in her interview about a mark which dirtied her. The language of dirtiness and cleanness structures her experience as it structured the national imaginary of the junta and the transnational imaginary of Catholicism. In the context of these multiple experiences around the left-wing stigma intergenerationality, this shows not only how political violence transforms the world in which we live, but how we inhabit it. While stigma is a mark which is triggered during social interaction, the metaphor of the stain points at a different operation: the stigma naturalization as a ‘personal’ attribute. Let’s go back to Marcela’s words:

D: “What did your father do after the coup?”
C: “Well, my dad... His story is not too different from other people, but it is sad. What happened? He was imprisoned for three months, he was exonerated, he was released from prison, and as we didn’t have a home any more, we were homeless. Then we found a new place (...) What did he do then? He became a Mormon (she laughs), he became a Mormon... I was already 8 years old. After he was a Mormon, he tried to be a shoe maker, and then, he started drinking, he is an alcoholic. Afterwards, he tried to work and in 1995 he found a job within a school in Valdivia, where a group of people who had been exiles in Switzerland sent resources to open a school and by this way offer job vacancies to those people who had been exonerated”.
D: “Could he re-integrate?”
C: “He re-integrated, but... He worked there a couple of years but then and due to his alcoholism he was dismissed. (...) For someone who had worked all his life, who was recognized within his party –in fact here there are still people who know who he is and who recognize what he did, and there is a certain respect for him...– so for him, to become no one, it was too heavy to cope with...”.
I: “(...) How did you live your father’s transformation (into an alcoholic)?”
M: “I have always coped with a sense of marginality, knowing that you are on the margins. Why? Because you know you can’t enter anywhere because you don’t belong to the
political system. You don’t assume it, you don’t accept it, and you will also have to cope with the feeling of persecution and with the stigma. We know this although no one told this to us, it is just the perception which floats in the air, because in fact, no one ever told us anything (...)”.

(...) Speaking from the standpoint of the subtle difference between being the target of stigma and inheriting a concealable stigma, Guzmán’s Nostalgia de la Luz and Marcela’s interview trigger a question: how did Guzmán’s interviewee and Marcela grow up, how could they have kept a secret which was impossible to talk about? Guzmán’s film shifts the focus from the mark to the process of inhabiting a mark and, in doing so, situates the stigma in the space of legacies. As we see, Marcela speaks of feeling on the margins and not belonging. This ‘being on the margins’ is not simply a matter of the other’s gaze, but a form of making her family political story part of ‘her’. Marcela’s quote shows how a stigma might be contagious, resulting in the isolation of her family, but it also becomes something else, a personal stain, the product of the naturalization of violence.

I: “Later on, have you searched for the effects which this feeling of being discriminated, of being stigmatized, had on you?”
M: “No, but I think now that is why I am so anti-establishment”.
I: “Was it a defence mechanism?”
M: “Yes. It was like making the double effort within a society which doesn’t value you, so, this way, maybe unconsciously, I tried to stand out, as a student, at work, you try to do it the best you can and the double you can, so this way you validate yourself”.

(...) I: “Let’s go back to your childhood, when you went to school. Were you ever in conflict with authority figures?”
M: “In fact, I have conflicts with accepting authorities today. I find it difficult to respect the authorities; I have conflicts with accepting them”.
I: “What happens to you in the face of authority?”
M: “Actually it is not about the authority figure... I feel really angry when I see that there is too much injustice and I react and I need to speak out. I can’t stand unfair authorities”.
I: “But at the same time, you make efforts to be valued by authorities, as you said...”
M: “Yes, but I want to be valued by the society itself rather than by authority. It is like winning my right to have a space, to feel that I am someone and that I have the right to be here and live my life and do whatever I want, independently of what I think or what I do”.

(...) 

In the quote above there is a clue to the problem of the transmission of stigma, because we see the appearance of a personal ethics in the account of the past. This appears both as a survival response to the politics of stigmatization, and also as a form of agency before it. It shows how the phenomenon of stigmatization becomes more complex in the aftermath of violence when other elements come to play a role. When Marcela says that the stigma became a source of a personal ethics (“that’s why I am so anti-establishment”), she is posing it in different terms, which requires a language with which to speak of the process of the inhabitation of one’s own name.

Appropriating legacies

The metaphor of the stain provides an entry to the passing on of painful memories of political violence (physical or symbolic) and its embodiment. But this also means a shift from classic accounts of stigma, such as Goffman’s. I described how his work emphasizes the gaze and the interactional dimension of stigma; however, his theory does not help understanding of the passing on of political stigmas to the next generation and by what means such stigmas became not only transmittable but inhabitable by them. His theory does not give an account of the relationship between stigma and different generations, and the process of appropriating an inherited mark and the tensions that may stem from this. For inhabiting might also mean the desire to escape from legacies which are too oppressive, something which became clear to me after an odd encounter in the village where I interviewed Marcela.

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Goffman says that though stigmatized people may feel normal or like everybody else, through interaction with others they realize they are not the same, that they are not allowed to be like everybody else, and this makes them feel shame and experience different forms of self-degradation. Thus, stigma is conceived as fundamentally given in the interaction between people. The notion of stigma, then, “...will be used to refer to an attribute that is deeply discrediting, but it should be seen that a language of relationships, not attributes is really needed” (Goffman 1986, 13).
I tried to interview the son of a former political prisoner, who was also part of the marked families. We had a common acquaintance who helped me to arrange an appointment with him. I wanted to interview him because I knew that he had become a right-wing militant and an activist against the Concertación alliance and especially, the Socialist Party — in which his father had been a militant. He was the counter-example to the idea of legacies, a topic which I will further explore in chapter 7 (Family Countermemories). But on the day of the interview, he did not open the door to me. After I had been waiting outside for half an hour, someone appeared at a window: it was his young wife, telling me that he was at work and he would come back very late that night. Frustrated, I went to the shop near their home and the shop owner who had seen me waiting, intervened, assuring me that my interviewee was at home. The next day I called him just to be sure that he did not want to talk and to close the encounter, but now he said he wanted to speak briefly and he invited me to come to visit him. When we met, he had only one ‘message’: that he hates conflicts, he hates political divisions and he believes in forgetting and reconciliation. Then he left. It was an odd encounter, and his difficulties in talking and his defence of reconciliation were striking. It was as if in his case his father’s past was indeed too heavy a weight for him, and he had made a huge effort to distance himself from his father’s political identity.

In Marcela’s case, the appropriation of the legacy of stigma and the memory of political violence was not a desire to escape or deny, but she too distances herself from what she considers part of her legacy. This is important because it reframes transmission and the problem of legacies, not as a linear progression or a form of predictable transference, but as a process involving choice and reflection on the part of the second generation. I asked Marcela whether she ever became part of a political party:

D: “Have you ever been part of a political party?”
C: “Never, because I had a negative view of political parties… I have an issue with groups; I don’t like groups where I have to obey. The left-wing political parties were too pessimistic: ‘we are so bad, Pinochet has taken us down so much, we are so sad, everything is so terrible, and all this is a tragedy’. But there was also another side to life and we had to make the most of it, we had to continue our lives. I didn’t like that Manichean vision, black or white that the left-wing groups had (...). That is to load a too heavy bag, where there is nothing I can do to solve it, nothing, for what does it give me to say that they are the evil
and we are the good and the victims? If you make yourself a victim, you don’t believe in rights”.

The quotation above shows Marcela’s distancing of herself, as a second generation, from the portrait of being a victim of the regime. Although in her story she acknowledges suffering, she also seeks for a retrospective in which the narratives of victimhood do not prevail.

Chapter Conclusions

The politics of fear triggered a process of stigmatization of the left-wing militant which reaches the second generation, mostly because they grew up within the culture of fear. This makes political memories not only a matter of remembering, or a form of ‘postmemory’, but of embodying the post-coup landscape. For instance, I suggest a relationship between the feeling of being marked – which came up not only in Guzman’s film but also in my interviewees – with the otherization of the left-wing activist promoted by the regime. However, we have seen that the second generations were not only passive victims of the politics of fear and stigma, but that they also inhabited and appropriated these legacies in complex ways. In fact, I have not only explored the legacies of the politics of fear on everyday life, but also the forms of inhabitation and appropriation of these legacies by the second generation.

Examining the feeling of being marked and marginal in Marcela’s life story or in Ruth’s case the feeling that something ‘is wrong’ with them, the chapter reflects critically on what it means to be politically stigmatized and problematizes the focus on normative culture that stigma theory (in Goffman’s version) carries with it. I suggest that although the second generation learnt to navigate the culture of fear and ‘passed’, they also practiced ambivalent forms of relating both to the official culture and to their family legacies.

In my critique of passing, I suggest that this does not mean that their family political identities were only something to conceal in front of others so as to stay safe. I have emphasized instead the affective liaison that they have with their family memories and the ‘pride’ they may find in inhabiting such a legacy. However, I have also suggested that there is not only one way of appropriating these memories, and although Marcela has honoured her family political memory,
she also distances herself from it, by questioning, for example, left-wing institutions and their narratives of suffering.
**Chapter 6: Family Memory and the Intergenerational Remembering of Political Violence**

[The working class struggle is] ‘...nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than by the ideal of liberated grandchildren’ (Walter Benjamin 2011, Thesis 12).

‘... there is an intuition which belongs to keeping such forms of memory that they should be preserved and transmitted as a kind of bearing witness, as a debt owned to a community. This obligation in certain respects is closely kindred to justice, as we shall see, and might be described as a kind of indebtedness: what is owed within the context of an enduring community, an obligation incumbent on us as persons sharing a life-in-common’.

(Booths 2006, xii)

**Introduction**

In the last chapter I explored some of the dilemmas of being a descendant of victims of state violence during the authoritarian regime. Although the chapter focused on the legacies of stigmatization within opposition families, I suggested that their political family legacy (or stain) was not something that the second generation would want to completely conceal, simulate or ‘pass off’. Instead, examining Marcela’s interview I suggested that there was also a sense of loyalty and belonging which would rather bind the second generation to their opposition family identity. Now, in this chapter, I aim to explore the affective ties that are transmitted in the language of the family, the way intergenerational memories of state violence are invested with an affective value and also in what sense families may act as memory ghettos in contemporary Chile. What happens when family legacies are political? To what extent can state violence and political violence be inherited as family legacies and if so what does this mean? What happens when political memories are remembered as family memories?

First, I describe the encounter I had with Rafael, the son of one of Pinochet’s collaborators, who contrasts with my other interviewees’ narratives and life experiences. However, I suggest that his
interview sheds light on the role of family in the shaping of ghetto memories and therefore situates the chapter around the topic of inheritance but also of memory ghettoization. Rafael’s is a very interesting case because it shows how little value the context and general framing of public opinion have had for his narrative of the crisis of memory, registered in the language of family and social class. His account of the legitimacy of the military coup has remained basically unaltered despite changes in the politics of memory, and after previously having been the official point of view, it has become a peripheral narrative as a result of political changes. Presenting Rafael’s case, I argue that these peripheral memories are sustained within family life, which emerges as a memory site which might contest, oppose or defy state and official memories.

Then, I introduce Gabriel’s life story, the child of exiled parents, which is a family history of diaspora. His case raises questions about transmission, the making of political narratives within the family sphere, and to what extent his family’s fate after the military coup was influenced by family memory. Examining his interview we see how different events (the First World War, the Franco dictatorship and the Military Junta) are entangled within his account of the past. I highlight how his family memories triggered subtle but dense connections between different times, generations and dictatorships. I also show how intergenerational legacies of state violence are shaped not only by narratives but also by silences. I refer to how, when living abroad, he remembered a place he had never been to, and once he returned he had to learn the codes of political opposition. Describing his ‘return’ (which in his case was not exactly an arrival and not exactly a return) to the culture of fear, I explore how he had to learn new codes because of the landscapes of fear, which included both forms of friendship and secrets. I explore, for instance, the moment of transgression of a code, and show how even in that moment Gabriel was performing a form of loyalty to his family legacies. Therefore, I suggest that family memories mobilize a sense of duty between generations, which may vary in its forms, and may range from sympathy to political agency, but which nevertheless refers to a response to the legacy which has been passed on. To close this section, I refer to a form of haunting which Gabriel told me about once we finished our conversation, and suggest that a dream in this case would be the ghost which mobilizes histories traversed by a transgenerational political fear. Drawing a parallel between Gabriel’s dream and his family legacy, we see how the dream can be the messenger of a ghostly fear which has no name, which might be triggered anywhere and can make everyday life suddenly terrifying. It is the awareness of the potential interruption of normality provoked by an ambivalent representation of
the state or of figures of public order (in the Fear chapter I called this awareness ‘poisoned knowledge’). I then introduce Eliana and Gustavo. They are the grandchildren of desaparecidos, but their ancestors’ encounter with state violence is remembered by them and they have become carriers and activists of memory. My aim in this section is to further explore what it means to have a duty of memory. Their different family models of transmission show that political violence may be told or hidden, may be narrated in early childhood or found later in life as a missing piece of the puzzle, but for both of them, learning about their grandparents’ story brought a sense of duty and of belonging to a lineage. It is not so much the mode of transmission which is relevant but rather the sense of duty the past has.

The everyday life transmission of family political memory

Smart states that family affairs are entangled with public values and the personal construction of the self (Smart 2010). For the sociologist, tracking family matters shows how the personal and the cultural are linked as well as the political, the historical and the social. Consistent with Smart’s concern with the family, Stern’s The Memory Box shows how a politically motivated position, for instance the critique of the Land Reform process which took place in Chile in the 60s and early 70s, was entangled with a whole worldview where affective bonds, family traditions and class beliefs are overlapped. He also shows how whilst the parameters of family life were built over cultural and social conventions, still, they were lived within the dense web of loyalties and affective forms of relatedness of family life.

Stern provides a new understanding of the impasse, by showing how what constituted ‘the traumatic’ for Pinochet’s supporters was the feeling of threat which burst into the midst of their family life. In other words, he portrayed the social clash in terms of subjective characters. From his perspective the memory impasse draws attention to the mechanisms through which legitimacy is built and also points to its affective foundations. At the same time, through Stern’s life-stories (as I explained in the introduction), the reader finds that family intimacy had an important role in the shaping of attitudes and affects on both sides of the memory impasse (supporters and opposition
to the regime). This insight reveals how non-institutionalized relationships have an influence on the crisis of memory, which is usually misrecognized in the analysis of the politics of memory.

In 2010 I interviewed Rafael, the son of one of Pinochet’s Ministers, who was introduced to me by a mutual friend. Although he was not part of my sample, his case also serves to reinforce my argument in this chapter and throughout the thesis. His family history has paved the way for his memory-framing of the past. The child of parents from landowning families, he in turn married a few years ago into another landowner family too (“I am married to Anita, who has the same family history as mine... they belong to Los Larrain who are landowners too”\textsuperscript{77}) and that is the fundamental worldview which structures his – and his family’s – relationship with the past. My interviewee speaks (and reproduces) the narrative of the high class Chilean elite and portrays a dynamic where certain surnames are the introduction to family prestige and give them a symbolic capital which will ensure their belonging to a class with a perceived common past and a desired common future.

The positionality of Rafael’s memories is that of a privileged family. It was within the family that he learnt of ‘the nature of things’ and that he created a horizon of values which would sustain and protect that ‘nature’. He was socialized in what seems a different sense of context to that of the majority of my interviewees. This pushes our understanding of how the sense of the local is built in the light of divided memories, shows in what sense they can be ghettos and also challenges the chronologies which scholars usually assign – or struggle to find – in the Chilean crisis of memory. He told me, for instance, that he never heard of the word ‘dictatorship’ during his childhood:

“Actually, we never used the word ‘dictatorship’ within my family or at school”.

This statement constitutes a striking contrast when we listen not only to dozens of my interviewees but also to the hundreds and thousands testimonies of Chileans who suffered state violence during that period. What this means is that, for some people, the very basis of their childhood experience was precisely the fact that the first thing they learned about the world was that ‘there is a dictatorship’ and at the same time there are a significant number of people of the same cohort who never heard such a concept. What does this say about their future together and

\textsuperscript{77} Larrain is one of the surnames of Chilean aristocracy.
the way they contribute to thinking about their (un)common past? I will come back to this point later.

Once Rafael’s father left the government, he was sent as an ambassador to Switzerland. Rafael remembers the changes of environment which give a different status to his family. After growing up among supporters of Pinochet in a school attended by right wing elite – including Pinochet’s grandson – he then went to a public school in Switzerland. Abroad, they were in a position of isolation in terms of international relationships. Rafael says for instance that they would not be invited to international meetings, and that just a few other ambassadors were interested in having friendly relationships with them. But none of this made Rafael questions the meaning of the dictatorship or his father’s role in it, even today when he is an adult and two official reports on human rights have been published. In fact, he also tells how after the regime the democratic insight could not trespass the boundaries of his family.

When I asked Rafael about this (lack of) ‘knowledge’ about the dictatorship and state violence, his response confirmed what my other interviewees have said: that rather than a systematic knowledge or a coherent memory frame, family political memory is a fragmented mixture of values which most of the times are picked up in the everyday of family life. However, the fact that they are fragmented does not mean that they are not stubborn. In Rafael’s words:

I: “Between your parents…. who do you think transmitted the political identity within your family?”
R: “Both”
I: “In what ways?”
R: “Yes, well, my dad was part of the regime, so I associated him positively with it. My mum… in her family they are all women and they are all intense, so…. no one ever explained to me…. I just heard what they spoke”.
I: “And to whom did you listen speaking about politics more often?”
Rafael’s interview suggests that the family operates as a carrier of political memory and this would explain that my interviewee finds anecdotic something which I found really striking: his mother’s refusal to take into account the official reports on human rights (see introduction for a context for these reports). He does not make an issue of this:

R: “My mum, instead, until today she can assure you that that [human rights violations and the Riggs case] didn’t happen, although she knows it happened, but nothing would make her change her political views”.
I: “How do you explain that?”
R: “I think that her position is not rational; it is completely emotional, absolutely. I mean, for her Allende was the devil and Pinochet saved them”.

The interview quotation shows that Rafael was socialized within a ghettoised memory framework which was first picked up within everyday life of family. Lazzara, in fact, commenting on the crisis of memory in Chile, suggests that there is no better definition of what is memory than: that which is talked about through family onces (tea time) (Lazzara 2010). Rafael’s comment about his mother’s refusal to accept the ‘truth’ of the regime’s crimes is intriguing: “although she knows it happened”. What does it mean to know and not know at the same time? This quote introduces a gap in the periodization of the memory field, for Rafael’s tradition of memory seems to travel parallel to the memories of my other interviewees, and obey different logics to those of the state politics of memory. Rafael’s narrative seems impervious to ‘progress’ in terms of historical truth or judicial truth. He resorted to the idea of a ‘fair battle’ which is argued on the right-wing memory tradition: “they died in their law”, he says.

The above mentioned is in tune – although it also contrasts – with Lira’s work on the ghettos of memory in the left-wing tradition, presented on chapter 1, when she comments that these

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78 He emphasizes this because just a few decades ago, the fact that children would eat separately from the adults was common. During the 80s this convention started to change and made possible a different kind of convivencia within the family.
memories remain meaningful only to their community. I mentioned in the Introduction how Crenzel picks this up and reflects on the major problem of the ownership of the memory of state violence. In light of these questions, the problem of the ownership of memories shows us much of (an impossible) political future, as opposing traditions of memories seem to obey to different genealogies, articulate contending pasts and project divided futures.

**Official memories, family memories**

As I explained in Chapter 1 and also refreshed in the introduction to this chapter, in Lira’s account the memory of the victims of state violence and its ritualistic transmission have been at the heart of left-wing political communities, leading to the ghettoization of memories in the long term. It was an illustrative example of how communities of memories engage in ‘memory work’ and may become hegemonic in their interpretation of the past. For her, the essential feature of social memory would be that the memory of left-wing institutions (mainly the Communist Party, which has a long tradition in Chile\(^{79}\)) is a memory of tragedy and commemoration of violence, which has solidified a transgenerational militant memory. However, as I have shown, Rafael’s interview challenges Lira’s equation between social memory (as opposed to state or official memory) and the memory of the oppressed, and also the implicit opposition between official memory and social memory. Social memory has not been always oppressed and the memory of state violence might also become official memory, as it has done the last decade in Chile and as the example of President Lagos asking forgiveness shows (see Chapter 1).

During the dictatorship, Rafael’s family narrative was in tune with the official memory of the moment, but once the transition period started, it lost that status. Once democracy was re-established and more and more people felt free to speak and researchers started documenting the past, the supporters’ version become more ‘peripheral’\(^{80}\), but not necessarily weaker, especially

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79 Founded in 1912 as the Socialist Worker Party (Partido Obrero Socialista) and then refounded in 1922 as the International Communist Party (Partido Comunista Internacional).

80 Boeseen et. al. link the idea of peripheral memories to ‘small’ memories, which are neither the focus of national or transnational memory. However, it is interesting to note that for the Chilean case this relation
during the first years of the transition when the fear of a new coup haunted Chilean society. As Rafael says, there are people – like his mother – who today still identify with such accounts of the past (people who say “that didn’t happened” – eso no pasó –, or who thinks that it was a fair war), even when the fallacy of such statements has been demonstrated. This shows that official memory is a mutable category and does not refer to a content of memory, but rather to its institutional position. But it also shows how once oppressed memory may become official and vice versa. However, Rafael’s interview and also the analysis of family memory during the dictatorship open a fissure on the hegemony of official memories by showing how peripheral accounts of the past still circulate and are transmitted within the intimacy of family circles who mobilize a particular idea of justice and truth – not the state version at least.

What emerges from listening to Rafael is that although recognition of the reality of state violence becomes an official memory, this does not mean that it can permeate antagonistic communities of memory. Instead, Rafael’s interview shows how less institutionalized forms of transmission, such as the memory of everyday life remembered in the subtle language of the family (i.e. in the classic Chilean family lunches on Sundays) can equally have the ghetto effect in the long term. Here we start elucidating the core of my argument: the stubbornness of family memories, their active role in shaping public opinion in a mode which has not been sufficiently taken into account.

In the section that follows I focus on the family transmission of state violence but now from the opposition perspective. As I argued in the literature review, research has tended to deal with how memories change and how the past is shaped by the politics of the present. However, there is also another side to the presentism of memory, an aspect which makes us think about the mechanisms through which some memories become less permeable and remain affectively meaningful and charged across generations. My focus is on how they are invested of affects within family life.

does not work because although supporters’ memories were not official, they were not ‘small’, even if they were peripheral (Boesen et al. 2012).

Part of the effort of human rights lawyers and organizations has been to demonstrate that supposed ‘confrontations’ were in fact military raids against left/wing activists.

Peripheral accounts or countermemories have usually been assigned of a ‘redemptive’ value, or related to the struggle of working class. However, Rafael’s interview and also my next chapter contradict this common understanding by suggesting no teleological form to any mechanism of memory.
Introducing Gabriel: His family story

Gabriel is a creative writer, historian and journalist in his mid-thirties. We already knew each other before the interview, but it was the first time we talk about ‘this’. I asked him to choose the time and place for the encounter, and he chose a local pub in Santiago, one evening. During the interview we talked about being a child during Pinochet’s dictatorship – an experience we shared – and I asked him about the legacies of fear within his life. He did not know exactly what the legacies were; he had never thought about this before. During the meeting I was trying to find out how ‘understandable’ the effects of the dictatorship were and to what extent the legacy of the regime was something that I could talk about with my interviewees. It coincided with the period in which I was shifting my approach from a focus on traumatic memories to a focus on everyday life during the dictatorship.

When I asked Gabriel about his family life story, he went back to the early 20th century. I asked him the same question I asked other interviewees: “tell me about your family history/political trajectory”, with no more specific demarcations. I realized that Gabriel’s conception of family was notably broader than that of other interviewees and to explain his family present he retraced his family history for three generations, to the time they had left Franco’s Spain at the end of the Civil War. He articulates a narrative that crosses frontiers and mixes nationalities. But, significantly, he focused on his mother’s family history, as it that is the legacy he has chosen to inhabit. In his words:

“My mother grew up within a Republican family, and she is the one who inherited the tragic legacy of this political default”.

His grandparents left Spain during Franco’s dictatorship (1938-1975) as his grandfather had fought with the Republican forces during the Spanish civil war; after Franco’s triumph, he escaped with his family by sea. They were war refugees who arrived in the port of Valparaíso in the late 1930s, together with two thousand other exiles aboard the Winnipeg, an emblematic ship in Chile’s
cultural history. Once settled in Chile, he ran a family business, brought up his children and became himself a prestigious doctor.

During Allende’s government, the doctor – Gabriel’s grandfather – was involved in social issues due to his interest on public health and he even became one of Allende’s candidates for the post of Health Deputy. After the 1973 coup, which took place almost 30 years after the Winnipeg’s arrival, Gabriel’s grandfather was imprisoned and tortured. He did not belong to any political party, so the reasons for his detention remained unclear to the family and the idea of ‘treason’ (that someone wanted to damage him) has resonated as the most likely explanation. In fact, during that period, political accusations were often inspired by personal revenge and often had tragic consequences. The regime promoted such situations as rewards were offered to people who denounced ‘the traitors’.

While in prison, Gabriel’s grandfather managed to see his daughter and advise her to leave the country immediately, though she was not directly threatened by the regime. He was very emphatic about this and pushed her into exile. As a result, she went into exile for several years to a neighbouring country in South America, while all the other members of the family went to diasporas in different parts of the world. It was a difficult time, as the family members were living in different countries and could not reunite for years, rewriting for the second time their family traumatic past after Franco’s regime.

Gabriel was born in exile and grew up as a child of a mixed family in Ecuador. With his mother, they lived in the exile and he grew up listening stories about Chile. After the social mobilizations started in the early 80s, he came back to Chile with his mother, being part of the first waves of ‘retornados’ to the country. Gabriel was just 6 years old when they returned. His family got split again: in Ecuador he left his father and his family line.

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83 The ship was sent by Pablo Neruda, a Chilean poet, and is part of the cultural and political memory of the left in Chile.
Remembering a non-past from abroad

During their time in exile, Gabriel’s family met other exiled Chileans. He came to know of Chile through adults’ stories about the country and the nostalgia they felt for the homeland was the first lens through which he learned of his maternal history. He was socialized in the practice of remembering from abroad a past he never lived, but which was part of him:

G: “There was a community of Chileans in Ecuador and they met in a Chilean restaurant. Every 18 September84 there were empanadas, posters of Violeta Parra85… They remembered Chile, they spoke about politics… it was a very free environment, because they were exiled. Although I was a child, I remember the political atmosphere. It was very clear to me. I knew exactly who Pinochet was; I was very clear with respect to Latin American politics… ‘Very clear’ in brackets, of course. But I understood, for instance, what was happening in Nicaragua. It was a much politicized atmosphere (…)

I: “What did you know about Chile?”

A: “I knew it was my mum’s homeland. I looked at the maps and I found it so weird, such a long country. There was an affective bond to it. I grew up with icons, Violeta Parra, handicrafts of Rari86, the arpilleras87, so many things (…)”.

I: “Did you know about Pinochet then?”

G: “Yes I knew, I knew there was a terrible dictatorship, which was gloomy, I knew there was so much pain. More than knowing, I had a perception of fear and suffering in relation to what was happening in Chile. And nostalgia: It was a mixture of fear, pain and nostalgia (…). I think that never in my life I heard so much garabatos88 as then. There was a notion of what it meant to be Chilean, of Chileans who were there. My mum’s friends had a football team and they played against Ecuadorians, Argentinians and Uruguayans... it

84 The National Day, which is celebrated with ramadas, empanadas and wine.
85 Chilean folklorist, composer, poet and visual artist who dedicated her life to documenting Chilean oral traditions of music and created the basis for the New Chilean song movement. A left-wing icon, she committed suicide in 1967, aged 50.
86 Rari is a village in Southern Chile in the Andes foothills where, traditionally, craftswomen make unique handicrafts with horse hair (crin). These objects are used for decoration.
87 Arpilleras are handmade quilts whose origins are credited to Violeta Parra, who was the first Latin American women to exhibit her work consisting of arpilleras and oleos at the Louvre. Later, arpilleras were promoted in workshops in Vicaria de la Solidaridad and became a symbol of women’s opposition to the dictatorship. Today, for instance, in the Museum of Memory they have become part of its forms of merchandising.
88 Bad language.
coincided with the exile of Argentinians and Uruguayans, so there was a group of people coming from the Southern Cone... I've got memories of the Chilean restaurant, of people speaking until very late at night, I don’t remember what they said, but I was always a sapo [interloper] there... I've been always a night bird, so I listened…”

Gabriel tells how during the time he lived in Ecuador they recreated the Chile they missed, through exaggerating its features. While empanadas are the typical national food, Violeta Parra was the left-wing singer who would condense the identity they wanted to reaffirm and protect. Garabatos are a colloquial way of speaking a transgressor language, which would only trespass a boundary within Chile. This shows the role of the aesthetic in creating a place like home abroad, which also meant maintaining visible that distance. These were all nostalgic resources which mark a difference between the past and the present, and therefore reinforced the distance so to make the object of loss more clearly visible and memorable. The recreated home was not home, it was like home, so it kept the nostalgic practice of reconstruction visible.

**Intergenerational remembering**

As we see in the last quotation, Gabriel speaks of ‘a perception of fear’, suffering and nostalgia in his childhood. But it is the presence of fear which he will constantly allude to throughout the interview. Although he did not grow up under a dictatorial regime, the poisoned knowledge was still passed on to him. When Gabriel looks back at his family story, he thinks it was the inherited family memory – a memory inscribed in their bodies as the memory of fear, almost mechanically as habit memory – which made his mother leave the country after having been advised to do so by her father and thus reproduce the family drama: exile and not belonging. Within theories of memory, the habit memory concept has been used to refer to information which is stored unconsciously, a mnemonic function about how things are to be done, and has also been used to

89 For Paul Ricouer, drawing on Bergson’s work, habit-memory: ‘is the one we employ when we recite the lesson without evoking one by one each of the successive readings of the period of learning’. In this case, the lesson learned ‘is part of my present, exactly like my habit of walking or of writing, it is lived and acted, rather than represented’. (Ricoeur, Blamey, and Pellauer 2006,25). For Booth: ‘And as well, body, habits of the heart, mores and place are intimately intertwined in the presence of the past, and they are not
name the kind of background knowledge of social life (Ricoeur, Blamey, and Pellauer 2006; Booths 2006). When Gabriel tells his story, he implicitly says that there were no ‘real’ reasons for his mother to leave the country, but once she did leave she became inheritor of a family story of persecution and exile acting out her habit memory of persecution and exile. He also speaks of inheriting a political default, which would link the republican loss to the UP loss years later, configuring a sort of familial ‘eternal return’. According to Gabriel, the fear of the state had been passed on (at least) from his grandfather to his mother and then to him. Let’s listen to his words:

I: “Do you feel there is a pattern in your family, a ‘diaspora pattern’, transmitted among generations?”
G: “I don’t believe in karma”.
I: “It is not about karma perhaps, but a sort of intergenerational transmission…”
G: “Of fear. Yes, I believe there is a physical fear which has been transmitted. Indeed, on my mother’s side there is a huge fear of violence”.
I: “Do you recognize it within you?”
G: “Yes, I believe I have an inherited fear related to what can happen to my body. There is fear... My grandfather was tortured, and although he has never spoken about it, I believe that this experience has been transmitted to us through subtle but consistent interstices”.

When Gabriel tells his family story, he mixes generations and they often participate in each other’s life: his grandfather is often present in his mother’s actions and in his. His family story shows the effects that members of the family may have on other members, and how once experiences are transmitted they become part of family identities, shared by its members, though in different forms. However, Gabriel’s family story roots him in a relationship with a past which is not national but diasporic, where two violent and dramatic political episodes of the 20th century are entangled in the family biography.

What is Gabriel doing when he remembers his grandfather’s deeds? He is inscribing himself in a genealogy. According to Smart, family memories may sustain kinship relationships while narratives

something that we intentionally inscribe on the world but rather are acted out in that world or elicited by its memory spaces’ (Booths 2006, 36)
may lend substance to the family lineage⁹⁰ (Smart 2010). In her work about family narratives, Robyn Fivush identifies what she considers an intergenerational self, which would then explain how memories can be diasporic within families and how this can give them a meaning for kinship. She argues that family stories create meaning beyond the individual, to include a sense of self through historical time and in relation to family members ((Fivush 2008; Fivush, Bohaneck, and Duke 2008). For her, part of who a person is, is defined by the experiences of his or her parents and their parents before them: the intergenerational self is a product of family reminiscences (Fivush, 2008). Thus, Gabriel’s sense of intergenerational self leads him to include the diasporic movements of past generations as part of his personal story, where the personal trespasses national imaginaries.

These intergenerational narratives ‘do things’ in the world: they have an exemplary status, they are constituted as the frames within which to read presents and futures, or to brake with them. Gabriel says, for instance, that he cannot stand the idea of going abroad, because he is afraid of not being able to return to his homeland. He also says that the same ‘intergenerational knowledge’ caused his grandfather a moral default too, a dispossession of dignity, immediately after the coup: he acted out his fear. Soon after Gabriel’s mother left the country, his grandfather was asked to provide refuge for a family friend who was being persecuted by the military junta. Though he had himself been tortured, he refused; he could not act on the basis of his moral convictions or sense of empathy. He denied help to his friend. Instead, he gave her money, and bought her a bus ticket and elegant clothes so she could escape.

“It is all about memory. What my grandfather did was to remember what women did when they escaped from Franco (...). He remembered that, and after witnessing the meaning of war, he used one of the European refugee’s resources. However, he couldn’t [help his family friend]. I think he felt very bad about the way he behaved, but he just wasn’t able”.

⁹⁰ Specifically, she refers to the virtual myth, as a family secret ‘which took the form of a well-rehearsed account, such as the one focusing on a distant uncle running away with a circus entertainer or being related to royalty. The colorful story does not have to be totally mythical, but it offers a strong narrative about the qualities of ancestors whose exploits somehow lend substance to the family lineage’ (Smart 2010, 542).
According to Gabriel, his grandfather returned to the memory of his fragile body and intertwined it with his past memories (fighting against Franco’s regime). These embodied narratives impeded him from acting on the basis of his ethical beliefs, but rather subjected him to fear. Through Gabriel’s voice, I could still feel his grandfather’s shame for not being able to act irrespective of his fear. The same way the prisoners were devoid of morality when using the hood (see Chapter 1), Gabriel and his grandfather have seen themselves constricted by old fears and spectral psycho geographies. This, for Gabriel, “is all about memory”.

Unspoken narratives

Gabriel’s grandfather never spoke about torture or about the Civil War, but those experiences are at the heart of his family intergenerational memory. This shows how silence also has the power to shape a narrative about silence (Fivush 2010). Episodes of physical suffering were not articulated as told stories; they were left in silence within the family’s closed memory box. However, they remain as an intergenerational knowledge, although several decades have already passed since a member of his family had suffered state violence.

I explained above that Lira’s concept of ghettoization links the dynamics of memory to local history, political tensions and community commemoration. However, in Gabriel’s story we see also that other forms of passing on and commemoration, which are less institutionalized, trespass local boundaries and takes place within family relationships. Let’s focus now on the second part of the quotation from the interview:

G: “Yes, I believe I have an inherited fear related to what can happen to my body. There is fear... My grandfather was tortured, and although he has never spoken about it, I believe that this experience has been transmitted to us through subtle but consistent interstices”.

I referred before to intergenerational narratives which may provide a sense of self, but here I open a new sense to the means of legacy and how they can be transmitted and appropriated. For how could the body learn about fear, how can the body know? Gabriel is speaking of a certain knowledge, dealing with “what can happen to my body” which has been transmitted in the silence
of the unspoken. In her work about the relatives of desaparecidos in Uruguay (quoted in the literature review) Fried described these ‘silent narratives’ as ‘nonverbal expressive practices’. According to her findings, they were often used within family life as way of remembering daily the un-mourned victims of state violence91: ‘...mainly through their nonverbal expressive behaviour and implicit exemplary teachings embodied in ‘pedagogies under terror’, muted emotions and affectively charged silences, these caregivers passed on to their children a legacy of pending obligations towards the disappeared’ (Fried 2011, 151). In Gabriel’s interview we see that it is not only something which happens after disappearance but also after a wider range of experiences of fear and state terror.

From a different context, but also sustaining the idea that silent or incoherent narratives are passed on and constitute part of family identities, Smart states: ‘Of course, in considering family secrets and memory there is a problem because secrets are not typically thought of as being rehearsed and refreshed. Secrets, it is assumed, are just buried and forgotten (...). But it is equally likely in families that secrets can be kept alive by innuendo, palpable silences, evasions and rumour’ (Smart 2010, 543). Contesting the common-sense based idea that silence is synonymous with disappearance, Smart explores the way that secrets are transmitted within families: she argues for the efficacy of silence and the unspoken and how it constitutes one of the family legacies. Similarly, although the experience of his ancestor’s physical suffering has not been articulated as a detailed family narrative, Gabriel talks about an awareness of the body’s fragility. Gabriel ‘knows without knowing’; paradoxically this diffuse knowledge of family experiences is quite common within families who have suffered political violence. Details are lost but the generalities of the event remain and moreover, are passed on. It is precisely this never-told knowledge, a narrative of the family which is absent but which constitutes a precious part of family identity, which will be at the heart of the intergenerational self in families of victims of state violence. At the centre of this identity there is an operation of knowing the untold, of grasping or picking up what is at the zone of rumour but which constitute a ‘transformative’ knowledge. This recalls Martin, quoted in the chapter on Fear, when he says that he feels different to his peers because he knows “what the state can do to him, that he may become a desaparecido”.

Throughout David’s story I mentioned how knowing would work as a rite of passage. Similarly, within Gabriel’s family, the (silenced) experience of physical suffering became a ‘poisoned

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91 In Uruguay an amnesty law has been approved twice (explain)
knowledge’ carried between generations, which brought the fear of what may happen to the body.

Returning to the Culture of Fear

Fear wasn’t born of his direct experience, but it was a family legacy in his early childhood. Gabriel’s story is interesting because, although he lived in exile during his childhood, he tells that still he had a vivid perception of fear in those days. In Chapter 4 I situated the poisoned knowledge in relation to the landscape of the culture of fear, but Gabriel’s case shows us something else. Not only would the poisoned knowledge be shaped according a landscape, but it could be transmitted through an imagined reconstruction of the lost home or past family deeds. Probably aware of this contrast, in a prior quotation he mentioned that remembering Chile in exile happened in a “free environment”. Later, when he remembers their return to the country, he will perceive the signs of coming back:

“Political discussions at home continued to be intense, but they were less festive, less fuelled by the warmth of wine and empanadas, but much more oppressed...”

Gabriel was 6 years old when they returned to Chile and he narrates the encounter between him, through his semi-foreigner eyes, and the Chile of Pinochet’s years. As happened to my other interviewees, the intersection between fear and the second generation took place at school. In Gabriel’s case the situation was peculiar because he was enrolled in a school which had been intervened by the military regime. When he speaks about school time, the first thing he says is ‘it was too authoritarian’:

I: “Why did you feel that your school was that authoritarian?”
G: “Because of the teachers, and we had to sing the national anthem every Monday, and wear uniforms... it was shocking!”
I: “Why did your parents chose that school?”
A: “There wasn’t enough money. It was the affordable school. But it had some positive things too”.

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His passage to the opposition culture also meant that he became part of the memory communities of reciprocity and belonging. He explains for instance how at the same time he disliked his school system, it was there that he met his first friends. He describes the process of recognition with one of his classmates who also belongs to an opposition family, providing an ethnographic insight into these encounters, in which a sense of friendship was shaped:

G: “Alberto was my first friend, and thanks to him I started to settle down here, thanks to the support of this friend who was also part of an opposition family (...). His parents had been communists, he never mentioned this, of course, but all his family had been exiled in Switzerland or the GDR”.

I: “How did you realize that you were members of the same ‘tribe’?”

G: “Speaking. You look each other, you speak and realize that you both have forbidden topics. The first thing you learn is that you have forbidden topics, you can’t say anything. Not of Cuba, not of nothing, not if you dislike Pinochet, nothing, my mum, my family, everybody warned me. And for Alberto it was the same. So you find those weird secrets, you start visiting your friend’s home, and you start hearing the music they listened to – which is key –, or the home decoration, the posters (...) So I started identifying the icons and the music, so then I started asking questions (...)”.

Gabriel shows the extent in which the second generations were also actors within the culture of fear, and knew the codes and how to navigate them. Their friendship was shaped around the idea of a shared secret around which they were complicit. In fact, the fear of being persecuted or sanctioned was part of Gabriel’s childhood and he remembers how he created all sorts of codes to communicate with others safely. He made his family-forced camouflaging practices part his own practices. In the quotation above he tells how his best friend was one of his classmates with whom he shared common practices of opposition.

I: “During the time that you lived this part of your life as a secret, how did you live that with your friend, the fact of sharing a secret?”

G: “I think that there was a childish thing in that too: there was something that you know and that the other knows, so you play around the idea of complicity. (...) I had the same complicity with other friends, and it was something like a shared secret which was also a shelter, and that was the good side of it. It was childish in a sense, it was something that
you were aware of, and so you believe that... like masons, I think, when they enjoy having a secret”.

The idea of the secret and the way Gabriel’s describes it, allows understanding of in what sense the second generation would not be the victims of the culture of fear, but they would rather appropriate it and transform it.

The duty of memory

The sense of responsibility and intergenerational bonds make the family a place of inheritance and legacy. For it is not only goods, possessions or names that are passed on between generations, but stories fully charged with social identifications, images, myths and affects. Although social class, for instance, influences the way subjectivities give meaning to life stories, the very fact of having experienced state violence has also a binding effect and crosses the boundaries of social class. The recognition of a violent common past frames the way Gabriel and other interviewees of the second generation organize their own life stories, although this past contains what were at some moment forbidden experiences which were ‘secrets’. As I showed above, these secrets sometimes offer shelter among friends, but they could also be dangerous and should not be transgressed.

In fact, on one occasion he felt he had failed his family because he spoke ‘the truth’ in front of others: he said what he thought about the political contingency and did not use the concealing codes that his family had taught him to use. He was caught in an aporia. His family legacy was at stake and he saw a conflict in two forms of duties: to defend his family story or to obey his parent’s instructions not to speak ‘outside’.

G: “I was friend with a girl who was right-wing and we started a discussion about Pinochet. We started very soft, but then we got into an argument. I think we were 12 years old, we were not adolescents yet. But then it became a heated dispute, we were shouting each other, and when it finished I became aware of the transgression and I felt fear. I felt I had betrayed my family, and I knew that it was a secret, a secret and I sold them just because I got angry with this girl and I remember that Alberto looked at me and he said ‘shut up’
and I couldn’t because I was outraged. I remember how afraid I was, and I went to confess everything to my mother…”

I: “Let’s go back to the moment when you unveiled your family secret. What did you feel, what happened to you, what did you feel?”

G: “I was afraid of people, not the girl. I was afraid of the teachers, what would have happened if they had listened… in fact they listened and they were frozen… I don’t remember, but I know Alberto said shut up and I was shouting with my head off”.

D: “Why did you feel so angry?”

A: “I was so angry that she could think of that… because we were discussing human rights. I knew there were people who had been assassinated, desaparecidos, I knew there were crimes, I had it very clear and I couldn’t stand that someone denied it. It made me angry that someone would lie, that someone could deny what was evident, even if she was a child…”

When Gabriel broke the law and spoke against the regime in a public space, he was not only performing a political preference, but a family past, an inheritance. My argument here is similar to the one I used when I analysed Marcela’s case, pointing to the task of dwelling in one’s family name (see the chapter on stain). In that chapter I situated Marcela in relation to two forms of belonging: to the community or to her family, and I showed she would know how to simulate clapping for Pinochet. Gabriel here resolves it in the opposite way to Marcela. Gabriel’s feeling of anger somehow blurs the demarcations of Hirsch’s postmemory (the rigid distinction between generations and memories, for whose memories was he protecting?) but at the same time it highlights one of the main points which gives Hirsch’s work its relevance: that it takes into account the responsibility that follows witnessing, and establishes a connection and liaison between generations on the basis of various forms of listening (see the discussion on Hirsch’s work in the literature review) to their common past.

However, I do not want to develop a fixed idea of what duty means. In the first section of the next chapter (Family Countermemories) I will present Albertina Carri’s film, which is a critique of the expectations that the second generation may have as the ‘inheritors’ and ‘representative’ of a certain kind of memory and discourse. Taking into account what Lazzara called ‘the generational
remove’, the duty I am trying to frame here is not a duty to act in terms of similar political codes: it rather refers to affective ties to family political legacies.

**Haunting dreams**

Once we ‘finished’ the interview, Gabriel wanted to tell me about a recurring dream which he intuitively associated with my question about fear and with the presence of the past in the present. It is significant that this dream came up once the tape recorder was off. Before we had had a very long conversation about his family story and the diasporas that have marked his family life, all of them occasioned by political fears and important events. The dream came up when the interview ‘finished’ (when I turned off the recorder and we walked to the bus stop after an almost three hour conversation). In part, this might have happened because of the generalized understanding that ‘dreams are not important’ or the fear that a dream might be considered too esoteric or invalid knowledge. However, at the same time, I tend to think that speaking the content of the dream could only come after speaking about the family history. The dream did not have any connection with Gabriel’s family story, but was remembered after the interview took place; it was a result of the previous narrative. So I finish this section where he finishes the interview:

“In the dream, I walk around Plaza Ñuñoa [a very popular park area in Santiago] and suddenly feel panicked. I see a strange figure, like Faustus, walking around the park. I recognize Pinochet’s grey suit”.

In the dream, fear is presented as something uncanny and Gabriel saw Faustus as a sort of phantom, who brought with him the destabilizing presence of fear in his everyday life, with no clear object but rather in terms of a diffuse anxiety. It recalls what Lira and Castillo described as ‘the chronic fear of the dictatorship’, which also haunted David in chapter 4. It shows how the dictator’s grey suit came to invade his daily life, thereby transforming it, making it uninhabitable and dispossessing him of his familiarity with an otherwise too familiar place. But what I found remarkable is that before this conversation, Gabriel never thought of a possible connection between his Faustus and Pinochet.
It may be useful to draw attention to the concept of the uncanny. Freud states that the uncanny is something which is familiar but which has become suddenly unknown (Freud 2003). The uncanny has proved—and this is something that Freud might not have expected—to be adequate to describe certain experiences of state violence in the Southern Cone. Lira has used the concept to refer to experiences of state violence, which dispossess people of the feeling of everyday life, but which, paradoxically, become normalized as everyday life (Lira 1993). She describes how during the first half of the dictatorship, social meanings and spaces were disarticulated and invaded. The fear of death and social distrust were the effects of an external power over precarious bodies. It means an estrangement over one’s sense of everyday life, ‘one’ as the centre and autonomous subject of memory. In the chapter of fear, referring to the testimony of someone who went shopping and went kidnapped, I illustrated the same point. Was the dream about the pervasive effects of fear on Gabriel’s everyday life? Or could the dream be speaking about familial inheritances of fear although he himself has never experienced an encounter with state violence? The heuristic power of Gabriel’s dream is that it makes visible not only the dictatorship’s traces on everyday life and its unwitting but constant presence, but it also makes visible and therefore capable of being narrated other stories that precedes him and interrogates the way past affects have been linked to the fear of state violence throughout his family past, and the feeling of loss and grief it mobilizes.

**Interviewing the Third Generation: Introducing Eliana and Gustavo**

In this section I introduce two new interviewees whose cases provide lens to further explore the way intergenerational memories mobilize affective ties and memory duties. I met Eliana and Gustavo in a fuente de soda (a diner) in Santiago. Although they were not part of my targeted population—in other words, they were not second generation but third—I felt very curious to know them because they were the grandchildren of victims of state violence and were descendants of people whose victimhood was to have been orphaned due to the action of the state. I felt unsure about how to approach them; I was too aware, perhaps, of the generational difference between them and the rest of my interviewees. They were about 10 years younger than my other interviewees and had been born in the late 80s. They went to school in the 90s and
2000s, during the Concertacion governments, when how to talk about the past started to unveil an impasse which has proved to be profoundly entangled in Chilean politics (see introduction). However, their apparent ‘newness’ to the dictatorial experience, the fact that they grew up under democracy, does not mean that they are estranged from about the questions this thesis deals with. In fact, I found multiple connections between the second generation and the third which I will discuss in the following sections and which, moreover, illuminate the relationship between family memory and political memory.

Their family life stories

Eliana works as a secretary and in her spare time she volunteers in memory initiatives, while Gustavo has pursued an academic career in memory studies. They are part of the Paine third generation. They are the grandchildren of peasants who were executed, or desaparecidos in a rural community which has the sad record of having the highest number of deaths in relation to their population. After the coup, Paine had more than 70 victims of which 40 are still desaparecidos. Eliana and Gustavo were both actively engaged in memory work and have been engaged in the construction of the Paine Memorial since 2004.

Their grandfathers and granduncle were peasants who were involved in the Land Reform during the UP. As happened to other rural communities, after the coup and in revenge for the resentment triggered by the redistribution of lands, they were persecuted. Being a small community, Paine’s case is striking: apart from having to deal with state terror, victims and perpetrators knew each other as close neighbours, as this interview with the President of the Agrupación (Juan Maureira) shows:

“We know that the lieutenant Magaña knows what happened to my dad and other 22 peasants, among other cases. He killed our relatives. The police have denied that they were involved, but they are the same ones who still live in this town. How can they deny it if everybody here saw it? It is the same for the civilians who acted. Paine is a small

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town”. Similarly, the Paine Memorial’s web page tells us:

“70 victims were killed during those terrible events, but it was the whole community which was destroyed on the basis of fear and dread”. After the coup, Gustavo’s relatives became desaparecidos whilst Eliana’s relative was found dead weeks after his disappearance. Thus, their grandmothers were among the first women who went out to look for their husbands, contributing to the creation of a powerful moral opposition to the regime.

Growing up among divided memories

Despite the fact that when they went to school the dictatorship was officially ‘over’, they found very similar mechanisms to those of the culture of fear still active in the classroom: they had to cope with a ‘memory impasse’ (Stern 2006) and ‘memory ghettos’ (Lira 2011) among their classmates about the ‘history’ or ‘story’ of the desaparecidos. Even years after the human rights reports were published and officially accepted as ‘truth’, they still faced the scepticism of some of their classmates. Once the debate became an issue among the students, the silent response from the teacher followed, avoiding making this a matter for reflection:

G: “Once I had a highly symbolic experience at school, within my classroom, that I won’t ever forget. I don’t remember why, but we engaged in a discussion... It wasn’t part of the class contents, but it came up that I was the grandson of a detenido desaparecido, and one of my classmates said “the desaparecidos doesn’t exist, is not true”. Then, the entire class got divided (...)

I: “What happened then?”

G: “Well, we were all divided (...). Some of my classmates started writing on the blackboard “Long live Pinochet”, while others wrote “Pinochet is a murderer”. I am not lying; I can remember that all this happened. And then the teacher came into the classroom (it was in between two subjects). The first thing he did was to erase the blackboard, and he asked everybody to go back to their seats... he didn’t touch the topic...”

I: “Did he say anything to the class?”

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94 Quote available at the Memorial web page: http://www.memorialpaine.org/
G: “No, no, he didn’t. He just said, oh, let’s erase this and go back to your seats, let’s start with the lesson. The issue was over”.

Their stories provide insights into how changes in the political system allowed for some conversations to take place, for instance at school, but still faced with old fears, denial and displacement. This, by people who lived through the dictatorship (like the teacher), but also by others who did not (like the classmates involved in the impasse). I argue that this parallel is important to the points I am trying to make in this chapter: the recognition of historical truth is entangled with the family transmission of memory. Scholars were acting out what they saw and listened to in their everyday life and they were performing their family legacies too. The discussion between the classmates, which took place not too long ago, is striking. Gustavo was not as afraid as Gabriel was when he ‘spoke’ at school, transgressing the landscapes and culture of fear, but he was rather frustrated: he found that the ghettoization of memory still works in spite of the human rights reports. If denial was not promoted by the Concertación governments, but rather the opposite, then why did his classmates persist in their parallel truths? Like Rafael’s interview, this episode also provides an insight into the nature of the memory impasse: it may come up in any context, whilst triggering passionate affiliations. It corresponds to what I defined in Chapter 1 as ‘memory burst in the public sphere’ (Wilde 1999). The impasse activates boundaries and communities of belonging which seemed to be inactive, but which suddenly are there. My argument is that family transmission of memory plays a fundamental role in maintaining and protecting institutional memories of political violence which can circulate in spite of the information being public. This, because they are lived as affective family legacies, part of intergenerational legacies and may work as parallel sources of legitimate truth. Otherwise, why would youngsters see themselves involved in such impasses with respect to something which they have not experienced?

We saw that Hirsch argues that ‘having an experience’ is not necessary to ‘have that memory’. However, it seems necessary to add that people need a memory which is accepted as their own. This attachment to an inherited memory rests on the family identification, the set of truths and statements that the family have defined as their own, even when they have not been articulated as such and when they may act as contradictory statements between them. Here we find a link which can help us to think about the role of family as a carrier of political memory, complementing
Lira’s work. The children reproduced within the classroom what they had heard within their homes.

The classroom story is an insightful metaphor: the teacher shows himself unable to deal with the impasse, either because he is afraid of what is behind that impasse, or because he thinks that ‘politics is dangerous’, or because he thinks that at school ‘people go to study not to protest’ (which was an infamous expression of a Chilean celebrity). For Gustavo, both, the fact that someone as close as a classmate would be sceptical of his grandfather’s tragic fate and the silent indifference of the teacher, were painful but predictable (he calls it ‘symbolic’). It resounds with Fried’s notes on disappearance in Uruguay and the unresolved mourning which followed: ‘Forced disappearance and civil society’s prolonged denial of acknowledging it, leaves the families with sole responsibility for searching for the disappeared, claiming them, and making sure they are not forgotten’ (Fried 2009, 140). As Fried writes, for the children of desaparecidos the realization that they have no clear place in memory (despite having one in official history after state recognition in two official reports) is deeply unsettling and confirms the anxieties of state violence lineages: that violence may take place again. The identity of the offspring is in part made of divided memories: it is a reinforcement of what others reject, deny or neglect. That some people would deny an experience of violence and suffering is a violent experience of social life and shows how the legacies of the culture of fear still organize the way that my interviewees perceive social space.

**Dealing with family legacies in the aftermath**

In a previous section, exploring Gabriel’s case, I explained that I did not want to use a fixed idea of the duties of memory. Speaking with the third generation I found support for this: it is not the case that generation would suppose a lineal and predictable form of relationship to the past. In fact, despite being third generation, both interviewees revisited their family stories and had to deal with different family models and different ways of handling the past. Their stories show evidence for and against using the concept of intergenerational transmission of memory. On one hand, they show there is no one model of transmission and that the image of silence or ‘the wall generation’ (defined by Grimwood as the generation which is in between a first generation and the Holocaust) is usually too rigid to give an account of haunting within families in the context of contemporary
Chilean history. At the same time, there is not one kind of victim, there are different forms of transmission. On the other hand, when they narrate their life stories, they situate themselves in relation to a lineage which shares the memory of state violence, and to which its very narration constitutes one of the practices which define them as members of the family. On the other hand, the very act of knowing about this past may mark a different status within the family.

Eliana grew up in a family which dealt silently with the death of the father and with fear, while Gustavo has been involved, since he was an infant, in public demonstrations against the dictatorship. Eliana learned the tragic fate of her ancestor when she was a teenager, while Gustavo had known about it “since he had memory”. However, both of them feel they are the inheritors of their grandfathers in different ways. Despite having different stories, they both have a relationship to memory and legacy. Eliana experienced the moment when she learnt about her family past as a moment of illumination. She knew her family story when she was a teenager, but she adds “I always knew that something weird had happened”. Eliana believes that it was her grandfather who in some way inspired and guided her, having a sort of totemic relationship to her ancestor.

E: “My grandmother told me the story when I was about 14 years old…I always sensed that something weird had happened, but I didn't know what. But one day they told me suddenly, and from then on I got involved in the question (...) and that is why I decided to link my life to this (...) I have always felt and always dreamed that I have inherited my grandfather’s character. Everybody told me that… I feel that he has taught me through a form of inheritance. “

I: “And do you like that?”

E:” Yes”.

For her, the concept of lineage has a strong meaning. The ancestor, from the past, gives her a calling for the future. Here we find the connection between memory and justice, as her grandfather’s presence demands that a truth be known. Gustavo instead emphasizes how he picked up from the environment stories about his grandfather. He speaks of his familiarity with intergenerational knowledge of state violence, and how its poison “has always acted and will always act”. He shows how the intergenerational narrative does not need to be understood so as
to be spoken and how, while it binds him to some family members, it poses him against or in opposition to others:

G: “Since I was very little I knew that my grandfather was a desaparecido. Perhaps I didn’t understand what it really meant, but I always knew it. And perhaps that had certain effects, for instance, for me it was a contradiction when I heard at school that the police were there to protect us and that the Army would defend us... whilst I had a family story which was different and I thought ‘It happened something different to me’”.

Gustavo reinforces the idea that has appeared in many of my interviewees: that state violence is learned through a form of knowledge which does not require understanding: “I did not understand, but I knew it”. As I described before, Smart’s focus on family secrets and zones of rumours and partial revelations might help us to make sense of these expressions. They show a form of latency in knowledge, but which does not interfere with the work of the poisoned knowledge and the making of a lineage.

Both, Gustavo and Eliana, have a consciousness of and distance from their place in family life. They see how their parents felt an intense anger with respect to what they had undergone. These feelings of anger are problematic, as they are not always directed against the state agents, but are sometimes directed at the victims themselves (the lost relatives, the victims). It is not clear whether this historical awareness has something to do with their position in terms of generations or with the politics of memory, namely, that in a repressive system people could not see beyond fear while in democracy there has been more information about the past. However, they do mark their difference with their parents in terms of generations, and fulfil this sort of duty to their family history and family fate, which will shape their attitude towards politics and the state. Fried calls this sense of intergenerational liaison between generations ‘the transmission of pending accounts’. In her words: ‘The burden of ‘not knowing’ creates a sense of urgency and obligation to unearth the truth about the fate of the disappeared, a task which is passed-on from grandparents and surviving parents, to younger generations, This sense of urgency and obligation distinctly impacts children’s character...’ (Fried 2009, 144). Fried’s point complements Smart’s view of family with respect to the specificities of state violence and the kind of relationships that are forged after such critical events. Their stories, as well as Gabriel’s story, show the family role in the
transmission of memories of state violence, and how its sense of lineage contribute also to embody the memory of a tragic past which is also used to imagine a form of future.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have been concerned with intergenerational transmission of memory and its double sided influence: how it shapes family inheritances, but also how it may shape memory ghettos. I have explored life stories which are beyond the limits of my initial sample. However it has been precisely through contrast (in Rafael’s case) or extension (in the third generation cases) that these life stories shed light on the focus of the chapter.

Through my reading of Rafael’s interview, I problematized the conception of legacies and showed how at the same time family political memories they may act as forms of resistance and endurance, family memory provides the solid for ghettoization. Family memory might not recognize history or any external sense of truth, but only its sense of lived experience, transmitted and anchored to affective ties. Having pointed this out, I marked a difference with Lira’s concept of ghettoization. For her, the concept links the dynamics of memory to local history, political tensions and political community commemoration. However, I aimed to present in the chapter also those other forms of transmission, commemoration and ghettoization, which are less institutionalized and might even trespass local boundaries. In fact, through face to face interaction and communicative memory, I have shown that family narratives can also be diasporic: the intergenerational self narrated by the family can bridge different territories, expanding Lira’s understanding of ghetto memories and the sort of solidarities they may sustain.

Based on my interviews, I also pointed to the tasks and duties that remembering may entail for the second generation in specific contexts: I showed how, once it becomes part of family legacies, political memory carries a sense of duty towards and inheritance of the past which is not only narrated but transmitted in multiple ways, and which helps to give form to a sense of an intergenerational self. Particularly throughout Gabriel’s, Eliana’s and Gustavo’s stories, the family appears as an intergenerational long body carrying messages, knowledge, affects and experiences.
Chapter 7: Family Countermemories

With the passage of time, frames of reference change and experiences lived in the past by mothers and fathers may become practically illegible to sons and daughters. How can the daughter of a disappeared revolutionary, for example, fully understand the weight or density of the politically charged experience of the 1960s and 1970s or, for that matter, what it meant to suffer torture?

(Lazzara 2009, 148).

Introduction

When exploring intergenerational narratives of memories of political violence within the family in the previous chapter, I suggested that affective ties of family memories of political violence also entail a sense of duty to the past. There have been rich discussions of how we can think about the duty of witnessing and how can this be related to some form of memory (Booth 2006; Hirsch 2008; Caruth 1995; Fried 2009). However, framing the relationship to the past in terms of duty should not lead to rigid taxonomies of intergenerational relationships. In this chapter I will further develop the complex meanings of duty by exploring countermemories, one of the multiple ways of responding to or appropriating past legacies. Throughout the chapter I will also use the concept of countermemories to show how behind family memory transmission there is a reworking of memory contents, family relationships and also of what counts as valuable and memorable within a society. My aim is to frame a sense of legacy which is not passive, but which implies an active relationship between generations.

In this chapter my focus is on the children of left-wing guerrilleros and activists who question their parent’s displacement of family life during the 70s and 80s in the name of the causa. Although they were a minority among my interviewees, I felt they were pointing at an important aspect of
family memories. Their narratives of loss are embedded in the memory (promoted by human rights organizations) of the traumatic national past of state violence, but expressed through the voice of family collapse and private loss. They tell a different story to that of the memoria militante or even to those stories told in the previous chapter, complicating the post-dictatorial reconstruction of the past. Together, they divest memory of any teleological sense, and open gaps and fissures in any attempt to construct representations of the past.

In the first section I introduce two films: Albertina Carri’s Los Rubios (The Blondes), released in Argentina in 2003 and Macarena Aguilo’s El Edificio de los Chilenos, released in Chile in 2010. These films show how memoria militante has triggered intergenerational countermemories which question the very consensus about what is rendered valuable within a society or in this case within a specific tradition of memory. The countermemories I explore here criticize (Carri) and hint at (Aguiló) parental abandonment and also their disappearance, understood this time in the sense of disappearance from the everyday life of the child.

In the following sections I contextualize the countermemories I am dealing with in the chapter in terms of the politics of gender in South America and specifically in Chile. On the one hand, I refer to the challenges that recognizing gender particularities threw up for the radical guerrilla-inspired left-wing organizations. I refer to a critique of the militant model of ‘disembodied militancy’ which demanded that women erased all traces of their gender, but which has been also contested by the testimonies of women who disagree with this approach and who defend their right of redefining their womanhood, including their role as mothers or wives. Next, I show how state violence unveiled what I call ‘the Antigone model of mourning’ which would expect women to be those who mourned and searched for lost relatives, who would often be men, who then become heroic (even in the form of martyrs).

I then introduce two of my interviewees, Tamara and Ernesto, who hold countermemories to their parents’ memoria militante. By exploring the interviews I hope to contribute to the understanding of how cultural frameworks, generations and memory are intertwined in the operations of countermemories. Tamara’s and Ernesto’s accounts are striking because their memory of the past is built on the moment at which male activists leave their family life, something which became a

95 The memory work of members of leftist groups.
crucial point in their life stories. Their countermemories break with the Antigone model of memory (the gendered model of memory in which the father who left home is rendered heroic), but are also its inversion: the father is not reclaimed as a dead corpse but is grieved for his absence. Through their interview analysis I examine how they denaturalize cultural and family models of political mourning, redefining whose and what suffering counts, and how in doing so they destabilize the primacy of the public over the private as a sphere of legitimate or real value. I argue that they destabilize the dominant militant version of the past, decentering the strictly political debate (framed for instance in terms of left, centre and right wing) through moral questions. In the case of Tamara, I explore how she points at a tension between grand narratives and experiences of everyday life, and how it is on the basis of the latter that criticizes the universalism of her parents’ political causa. Then, in Ernesto’s case, I develop his countermemories and draw attention to a new complexity: he found out that once the opposition became part of the political system through the Concertación coalition, his father’s past as an internacionalista became a taboo memory for second time, due to his relationship with armed struggle and guerrilla warfare, which became an uneasy past and a difficult memory to unveil.

Examining Los Rubios and El Edificio de los Chilenos Countermemories

In the early years of this century, there was a debate in Argentina about a film which challenged the memoria militante (the dominant left-wing narrative about the dictatorial past) shedding light, not only on issues of social memory and private loss during the transitional process, but also destabilizing assumptions about the transmission of memory within the family space. In this chapter I shape these tensions with the concept of family countermemories, which refers to the reworking of similar memory contents but in a different direction within the family sphere.

Albertina Carri, the daughter of Montoneros96 desaparecidos, directed in 2003 Los Rubios (The Blondes)97, a film which dealt with the vacuum and sorrow their absence left in a 4-year old girl. The disappearance of Albertina’s parents by the military regime became secondary to their

96 Argentinian left wing guerrilla group active during the 60s and 70s.
97 The script was written in collaboration with the writer Alan Pauls.
disappearance from her life. In fact, she disqualified the importance of their political past (and therefore, historical research) for her search: she wanted to know about her parents, not about the activists. Despite the fact that her parents were intellectuals committed to the political causa, she asked their comrades unusual ordinary questions which suddenly became much more relevant to her (“were they tall?”). According to Nouzeilles, Carri reacted against the monumentalization of memory, this is to say, against those monopolistic narratives that exclude difference and pretend to have caught the past and own it (xx). For her, the film would be an example of what Huyssen described in Present Pasts: ‘Out of the ruins of conventional history emerge, multiple and contradictory, the fractured discourses of memory’. In contrast, Sarlo reacted harshly to Carri’s film and, recurring to Susan Sontag, demanded ‘more history and less memory’. Commenting on the film, she stated: ‘A revolutionary utopia charged with ideas gets an unjust treatment if it is presented as fundamentally a postmodern drama of the emotions/affects’ (pgxx). When she speaks of an utopia she is speaking about the Montoneros as a political movement, and she then undermines a memory-based version of its past.

Agreeing with Nouzeille in her reading of Carri’s film as a response to hegemonic memories, I see it as an example of the struggle over values within the memory field. The most interesting aspect is that these different judgments about past actions are situated within family life and involve an intergenerational dimension. Carri’s refusal to create new idols and mythologize memory is also a critique of the ways of making not only memory but history. In this sense, her film works as a countermemory which demystifies dominant versions of memory in transitional contexts, destabilizing the consensus about the dominant – or the true – version of the past. It brings new judgments and criterias to the making of history, and by doing so, transforms the landscape of the past and gives voice to unacknowledged losses.

In 2010 Macarena Aguiló released El Edificio de los Chilenos (The Building of the Chileans) which I situate in a similar way to Los Rubios, although the narrative voice is far less tensioned towards the first generation. The film starts with Macarena’s experience of being kidnapped by the secret police for 20 days when she was just 4 years old. She was the daughter of the leader of the MIR. In one compelling scene she said: “I hate candles on birthdays because they remind me how I had only one wish: that my parents come back”.

Translation by John Beverly.

Hernán Aguiló.
and her disappearance was a threat to the whole group. As the historian Cristián Perez observes, this was a warning of the DINA to the MIR, which for the scholar would work as the context for what came later\textsuperscript{101}. In fact, the film is about what came next: the story of a group of a left-wing militants living in the exile (in the film, in Paris) who, in 1978, decided to return clandestinely to Chile in what was called as Operación Retorno\textsuperscript{102} (Operation Return). During the first years of the Operación, only men and not women returned to Chile, so a group of militant women began to think of a way to join them: to do so, they created Proyecto Hogares\textsuperscript{103}. MIR militants involved in the Operación would leave their children in the care of collective parents (padres sociales) who would raise them and act as an alternative to their biological family. In total about 60 children were raised within this project for a period of close to 5 years. For Perez\textsuperscript{104} it was also a way of dealing with the group’s Achilles’ heel:

‘It was about avoiding what had happened to Lorena (Irene), the protagonist of The Double Life written by Arturo Fontaine. Disobeying her chief, she refused to send her child to Cuba. However, when the agents of the regime found out about her child, they took pictures of her and filmed her at school, so as to show them to Lorena. After seeing this, Lorena broke down and became an agent’\textsuperscript{105}.

Aguiló was one of the children who were raised in Proyecto Hogares. Her documentary explores her mixed feelings of appreciation and respect for the militant’s commitment to the Marxist

\textsuperscript{101} However, in opposition to that of Pérez’ reading, there is also another interpretation which circulates among left ex MIR members, and that is that Miguel Enríquez—the former leader who died after being shot—was the ideologue of Proyecto Hogares. It is interesting to note how each version responds to different genealogies: one emphasizes the culture of fear, while the other emphasizes the militant project and tends to reify the visionary leader as the inspiration of such a project. See interview: xx

\textsuperscript{102} The MIR had a particularly stormy relationship with the exile and the idea of asking for asylum, since its emblematic leader Miguel Enríquez created the slogan “The MIR doesn’t seek political asylum” (El MIR no se asila). Instead, they believed in organizing the armed struggle to overthrow the dictatorship. Later, they were criticized for the high amounts of deaths among their members in what was considered a political suicide. The cover of a local newspaper referring to their death is infamous: ‘They fall as rats’ (Caen como ratones).

\textsuperscript{103} According to Pérez, by 1983, once Operación Retorno failed, Proyecto Hogares also lost its rationale and the children started to be absorbed by the Cuban schooling system, and the tutors started looking for new jobs. See online edition: http://diario.latercera.com/2011/09/11/contenido/cultura-entretenccion/30-83334-9-la-historia-de-los-hijos-del-mir.shtml

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{105} This fear was rooted in the Flaca Alejandra, which was an emblematic case of an ex MIR who became an informant of the regime.
revolution, but also a vague uneasiness with their decision to leave their children behind on behalf of the *causa*. This uneasiness is not, however, expressed as reproach. She films her talks with her mother, a radical left-wing militant too, and asks her about the decision, while they also read together the intimate letters her parents sent each other. The mother did not show regret but rather conviction, subverting the meaning of motherhood and family ties.

In the film it is not clear whether Macarena would ever find clear answers to her life story. *Edificio* constitutes a nostalgic exploration of a private past in the light of collective history, where rather than giving most importance to what had actually happened, she leaves the audience wondering about ‘what never happened’. It is an exploration of the several sites of multiple losses: the guerrilla project, the family ideal, the UP government, the never attained armed defeat of the dictatorship. As an alternative second generation documentary, one of its strengths is that it succeeds in exploring the greys of memory, where rather than blacks or whites the spectators are haunted by unresolved dilemmas. In Vidaurrazaga’s words:

‘The film distances itself from narratives of heroism/victimization, because it is not the story of the public deed or the resulting martyrdom which is told, but the consequences of the revolutionary dream for the private life of its protagonists’ descendants’ (Vidaurrázaga, 2012:157).

Commentators in Chile have been sympathetic both to the way Aguiló does not judge her parents’ decision, and also to the complexities of the dilemmas of ‘a different time’ (the 60s and 70s). Pérez, for example, says of an interview in which one of the protagonists of the *Proyecto* says that, when the children were leaving Paris for Cuba, “they were sad, but not so much”, and in that way he opens a new clue to reading the story: not as an experience of abandonment but also as one of discovering new forms of relatedness. In fact, during that experience, children also created new relationships and created new affective ties. For instance, Pérez says: ‘The collective parents promote communitarian ways of life, they challenge conceptions of family, women’s roles, couple relationships and the traditional ways of bringing up children, becoming the only attempt in the history of the left in Chile to move towards the construction of the New Men, as the revolutionary literature claimed’ (2011)\textsuperscript{106}.

For the erudite historian Manuel Salazar, the operation should be read in two ways:

‘it was a dual project: a) political-military (the disciplined return of militants split from their filial and social networks) and b) socio-educational (educating children in accordance a pristine socialist project). In the first dimension, they experimented with the life of parents with no offspring. In the second, they experimented with the human development of offspring with no parents. The supreme imperative was the absolute commitment to defeating the dictatorship at any price, together with the popular movement... Everything was done in the name of the Pueblo’\textsuperscript{107}.

However, there is a tension that the film suggests, which challenge memory hegemony and which I found productive to explore since I also found it in my interviewees: the unvoiced feeling of loss which haunts the film and which in the Manichean local debate has tended to be considered as ‘reactionary’\textsuperscript{108}. There is a scene where Macarena asks one of her friends what he thinks about what their parents did and he vehemently defends their decision, situating it in the context of life or death. However, Macarena’s silence does not solve the questions she is raising, and her nostalgic approach remains as her central mechanism for exploring the past. In this chapter I deal with these unnamed losses and the nostalgic feelings lived within family life (or in its ruins), and which have not been voiced yet in the collective memory field. My argument can be summed up in Vidaurrezaga’s words: ‘that this story might not have been told yet as it hurts even more than the political defeat’ (2012). I draw attention to these narratives because they have remained as the unspoken, and have been dismissed by dominant and collective left-wing memory frames, both at a national and family level. This is because they point to grey zones of memories which, as Lazzara argues, destabilize the Manichaeism of memory which has constituted the memory discourse (2011). But I suggest here that these unvoiced injuries demand to be acknowledged and reconsidered in the light of the aftermath of violence.


\textsuperscript{108} An academic colleague told me that, when she commented to the head of her department that she would like to show El Edificio to her students, she disagreed by that, saying that this film was too reactionary. It is a similar response to that of Sarlo to Los Rubios, even though Aguiló is far less openly critical of the memoria militante.
Gendered militancy and gendered bereavement

What is at stake in these family countermemories? What politics of memory is behind the acknowledgment of such a sense of loss? In what sense are feelings of loss not only private but also of cultural relevance, and not only a ‘postmodern drama’? The stories of Albertina, Macarena and the interviewees I will present later become legible once we examine the cultural contexts in which they speak. The family stories I am introducing in this chapter are structured around a critical point in their family life: during the 1970s, when political life was lived as a moral duty to the extent that it could displace family life voluntarily (through active militancy, resistance, internacionales) or involuntary (through state abductions). Although there is no clear estimate of the distribution of militants according to gender within left-wing groups, the history of left-wing militancy in Chile has been written predominantly in a masculine voice, while the relationship between gender and politics has remained problematic or displaced.

The culture of the militants was supposed to be neutral, but that neutrality was in fact identified with the masculine or with the disappearance of ‘women’s traces’ and their reappearance as militants or mourners. This left women in a difficult position, caught between abstract discourses of what it should mean for them to being ‘a good woman, a good mother and a good militant’.

However, there have been other approaches to the role of women within the guerrilla movement, which have attempted to frame differently women’s militancy, such as Rojo y Negro by Vidaurrázaga (2006). In these works, the authors explore the life stories of women who were part of revolutionary groups and show the dilemmas they courageously faced. They maintain that women were not disembodied militants, but rather were the kind of militants they wanted to be. Rather than pointing at the sacrifices they made, they point instead at the fact that these women had to break with cultural expectations about what they were supposed to be and the roles they were not fulfilling (i.e.: mothers or wives).
The model of Antigone

In fact, the cultural context in which these women lived was dominated by the silent assumption that the mother was left in charge of children and is supposed to do the work of family carer and often, of mourning, while the militant male leaves home for the battlefield. The entrenchment of this model is explored in Sonia Montecino’s groundbreaking research *Madres y Huachos*, where she shows how mothers have traditionally been the carers of the family since the days of Spanish colonialism, due to the pattern of women abandonment and rape (2007)\(^{109}\). Her argument is that the *huacho* (the name given to illegitimate child), has played a central role within Chilean culture and she shows how an initial experience of loss was transformed into a festive relationship between mothers and her *huachos*. In fact, one of the most recurrent memories of the post-coup period, and one which has been installed in the collective imaginary of the past, is that of women looking for their husband or son outside detention centers. Like others of my interviewees, Ruth, for instance, remembers:

R: After a few days (...) those women who were now widows started their search. My mother came to Valdivia, and she met other women and they started asking, asking and asking for them. In the meanwhile my brothers and I were left in the care of other people, because she could be away for weeks,

I: Were you aware of what your mother was doing?

R: Yes, I knew she was searching my father.

Another of my interviewees, Maria, describes how, when searching desperately, her mother – holding one of her babies in her arms – visited every public place where the regime was known to keep its prisoners. A double moral existed then, when military personnel were touched by the image of a women-with-a-baby-looking-for-her missing-male. Once she found him, a young soldier agreed ‘to be part of the story’ and helped to introduce (clandestinely) the new born baby and father. The Chilean military coup’s oral story is full of this kind of anecdote, where people who were fulfilling their roles suddenly transgressed them. For some reason, people are keen to tell this kind of story. In the Chilean case, I see this as the need to reassert the social bond over and

\(^{109}\) The woman’s right and duty to be the carer of the family (children) is defended and promoted by the Law, except when the woman is lesbian, losing the right to maternity, as in the dramatic case of Karen Atala, who lost the right to raise her children for being “morally dubious” according to the Chilean courts. http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2012/04/01/fallo-atala-el-golpe-al-poder-judicial-chileno/
above the political impasse; it is like saying: “we are killing each other, but we are still humans, are we not?”

These stories worked as a form of Antigone strategy to claim a place in history (Das 2007). This refers to a Greek myth in which Antigone demands her right to bury her brother, who, in turn, had been expelled by the state for being considered a traitor. Hegel’s view of Antigone differs from Aristotle’s. Aristotle saw in Greek mythology the stories of heroes; Hegel, by contrast, considered that what made of Antigone a tragedy is that two legitimate realms of value were opposed (Das, 2007).

The Antigone model is embedded in the Chilean culture, where family is seen as a natural site, one with religious and moral connotations, and which is safe from political ‘contamination’. Political widowhood became almost a template in the recovery of political memories, in which women’s political role has been to reclaim the men’s bodies, fulfilling social expectations of gendered roles within families¹¹⁰. In the Southern Cone, the mother’s/wife’s search for her desaparecido son or husband was used as an image of the resistance to the dictatorship, removing the struggle from the semantic field imposed by the Military Junta (the Marxist cancer) and locating it within different moral terms. The appearance of women gave the resistance an aura of moral legitimacy (Stern 2006b) for they were doing ‘what they had to do’ without this being exclusively political. They appealed to the ‘ideal Mariano’ and to the idea that ‘everybody has a mother’. All of this gave the search of missing people the legitimacy of Antigone’s claim within Hegel’s interpretation. To the aim of the state of cleaning the social cancer—as the Junta described its actions—these women opposed their right to reclaim their husband’s or son’s presence. In fact, Madres and Viudas reclaimed their relatives’ bodies from the state. That was the power of the encounter and why they succeeded in entering into the public imaginary, gained media attention and therefore became a relevant actor for the state until today.

The memory of the Familiares is a clear example of the ‘memory work’ (Jelin, 202). The search for relatives taught women, who often did not have any prior relationship with speaking in public, to speak and denounce publicly (like Ruth in Chapter 5 or Eliana’s grandmother in Chapter 6).

¹¹⁰ I do not intend here to diminish the role of women in the struggle of the dictatorship. There are valuable accounts of how resistance from the private domain was key for certain social manifestations, like ollas comunes apart from their experience as militants. However, I am pointing out that the Antigone model of political intervention has a double side which hasn’t been fully appreciated in terms of political power.
Women brought a private disappearance into the public domain, making evident how the distinction between what is rendered private or public becomes fragile in extreme circumstances. Thus, women learned to speak politically, to have a collective voice and to be spoken by a discourse, the discourse of the Familiares who became, not only in Chile but also in Argentina (Las Madres y Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo), a powerful and influential social actor. They represented the ethic of family love beyond politics, and on this basis obtained strong public support. However, in the next section I will show how the second generation’s countermemories destabilize both the gendered attempts to include feminist concerns within militancy by challenging the ideal mariano, and also Antigone’s politics of loss. Rather than accepting the departure of the hero, my two interviewees would reclaim the hero’s presence not as a corpse but as a ‘living’ father.

**My first encounter with Tamara: Contesting generational remembering**

I first met Tamara in 2010, during one of the two focus groups I conducted with post-coup second generation participants, inviting them to talk about their experience of growing up during the dictatorship. Collective metaphors of the past were recurrent during group-interviews. Although the interviewees recounted personal experiences, they were in fact reproducing communitarian ways of remembering. Thus, when they remembered opposition family codes, they stressed the generational dimension of their socialization – the way people’s experience found an echo in that of others in similar age cohorts: i.e.: parents listening to Radio Cooperativa, families hearing Violeta Parra, etc. –. The fact that they have all grown up within opposition families facilitated the use of collective tropes, as we see below:

Men: “When one is a child, one doesn’t realize that one’s family is different, until one gets in contact with the external world. The saucepan demonstrations [cacerolazos], the blackout and using candles were funny; at least, our parents showed us those things in a way that wouldn’t scare us. But once we started hanging out (...) [for instance] I did my secondary education at a public school where we had to sing the national anthem every day and raise the flag. Then when I came back home and sang there the national anthem,
my father would say: Shut up!. And I wondered why, because all my classmates had sung it (...)

[Laughs]

Woman: “You could sing the first part [of the national anthem], but never the second part…”

Men: “Sure! ... And there were those ‘weird’ conversations, which were spoken like in code, or books that we couldn’t open or take out from home. When I was a child I read Mafalda, and I thought that reading Mafalda was completely normal, but then I realized that no one else in my class knew who Mafalda was, [and I thought] how come they don’t know Mafalda? Then, my dad couldn’t get a job, and things were not good for my mum either, so my brother and I went to live with my grandparents. My grandmother was super facha, she had a photo of Pinochet in her dining room, and for me it didn’t make sense that it was the same person I had seen in the Fortin Mapocho in those caricatures with a skull on his hand and with a killer expression in his face.

The quotation above reveals interesting details of how an opposition culture is created upon the details of everyday life, and how it will become full of ‘material symbols’. Quotidian objects would become barriers between political communities: this way, having read Mafalda’s stories would be part of the kind of knowledge that within their families were validated. Once again, the national anthem also appears as a crucial marker for the second generation: they learn the meaning of simulation and mimicry, which will protect their subversive identities and will keep them safe.

Conversations about the past within the (former) opposition tend to be quite nostalgic: the group sought to find certain elements in common, such as remembering once secret codes which are now being increasingly processed as part of communitarian memory of everyday life under the dictatorship. They speak of their individual remembering but deploying the grammar of ‘one’ (uno), which is broad enough to include the other participants of the group. Here we see that ‘acts of memory are performed by individuals in a cultural framework that encourages these acts’ (Bal,

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111 The ‘second part’ allowed here refers to a verse added by the regime to the national hymn.
112 Argentinean comic strip written by Quino. Mafalda is a 6 year old girl who, being rebel and sweet at the same time, represents the humanitarian concern with the political affairs. This humanitarian criticism made it part of the opposition culture in Chile during the dictatorship.
113 A colloquial way to refer to someone with right-wing political preferences.
114 It was the opposition newspaper during the dictatorship.
1999, xiii). They stress the collective ‘communality’ of memory, but as we see in this chapter they displace unvoiced and individual experiences which have been left out of history so far.

**Contradicting the Past: Unmaking Memory Frameworks**

Tamara broke the spell and brought into the group a certain uneasiness which did not receive a clear response from the group\(^{115}\), threatening the shared feeling of nostalgia and the very cohesion of the group. She somehow disrupted the flow of the conversation by bringing a divergent idea to the group: she talked about her resentment against her parents for having abandoned her and her siblings because of the ongoing political events. This was striking, because in most of the narratives of the children of opposition we find that the enemy is imagined ‘outside’: Pinochet, the state, the police, the *momios*, the informants, etc. For example, I described in the methods chapter how one of my interviewees remembered how, when she was a child, she could not sleep for trying to come to terms with the idea of evil, and that she could not bear the thought that so much evil existed embodied in only one person: Pinochet. The external world was full enough of danger so as to make possible a distinguishable ‘us’, associated with the moral attributes of the opposition. However, Tamara’s countermemory destabilizes the homogeneous sense of being ‘us’ and creates new internal distinctions and fractures. In a way, she was threatening the identity of the group and also of her family by questioning the feeling of complicity and identification with their parents.

“My friend and I have that contradiction. We understand the ‘causa’, the *lucha*, the idealism, the political project, all that, but we feel that we had to take its toll. Our parents weren’t there with us. In my case, my parents failed to be there. I was alone, I felt scared (...). That basic thing, having a family space, didn’t exist for me. So there is lots of anger because of that, because of what one didn’t have, so... fucking *causal*! For instance today, one of the reasons I have preferred to be a full-time mum is that wound. I have no option; my wound doesn’t allow me to leave my kids. Because I lacked it, although I understand why, I needed it. I feel anger even though I also understand, but I feel anger for their

\(^{115}\) Moreover, I even hesitate to say that she had feedback: after many of her interventions, no one commented on them.
abandonment anyway. You see, the contradiction is too big. When I can forgive and when I can’t forgive my parents. It is not the same as forgiving the oppressor, no, because the parents are your closest figures (...).

Tamara questions the collective forms of remembering being in the opposition by giving voice to unvoiced memories: that a parent’s active involvement in politics meant in many cases that they had to displace their family life and their relationship with their children. This dynamic is particularly interesting if we think of the way sociology has shaped memory since Halbwachs’ studies: the preponderance of group memories over individual memories. Here, in turn, individual uneasiness with collective memory frameworks struggles to be heard and gain recognition. Tamara departed from the idea of memory as a collection of anecdotes about the dictatorship (a memoir) by situating herself in rivalry with cultural frameworks of the past. Tamara was un/speaking the past, she uncovered a taboo subject, thus questioning the basic consensus of the mnemonic group: the fact that there was a moral and universal value in being in opposition to the dictatorship, and that this would legitimate her parent’s life story. Although she is not questioning directly the point of being in the opposition, she destabilizes the consensus about heroism by voicing the gray zones of memory, challenging the idea that there is a lineal and redemptive narrative of the past, even if this past consists of trauma.

I approached Tamara after the group session and asked if she wanted to be interviewed in depth about her experience, and she agreed straight away; this was something she definitely wanted to talk about.

Tamara’s family story

Tamara is the child of UP activist parents. After the coup her father became a fugitive, so her pregnant mother and 2 children stayed in her grandmother’s home while he was away. When Tamara was born, her father visited his newborn daughter, but the very same day he was caught and became a political prisoner. The family did not hear from him in months; it was a painful wait at a time when there were many stories circulating about state violence and the shock-strategy of
spreading fear through exemplary killings. Like thousands of other families, Tamara’s mother and her three children were left in total ignorance of his fate. To some extent it was a gendered issue: as most of the activists were male, many women faced the drama of their missing husband (or children). For many of these women, the husband’s absence also meant the risk of starving.

After a year, Tamara’s father came back to the family home, but the experience of being tortured for so long had completely changed him. He woke up in the middle of the night and hid under the bed, thinking someone was persecuting him. The experience of torture was a limit experience and triggered in Tamara’s parents different responses to the crisis. Soon after he was released, the father decided to actively fight against the regime. The fact of having gone through a limit experience gave him a sense of being called, a moral duty, and he started working for the Vicaría de la Solidaridad\textsuperscript{116}.

By contrast, her mother felt she could not stand again the fear of persecution and asked him to choose between family life and political commitment (which meant underground activities)\textsuperscript{117}. Verbalizing this tension and presenting it as a dilemma, triggered the family’s rupture: the choices were irreconcilable. Tamara’s father left the family home and some time later got married again to a partner he met in the Vicaría and formed a new family. He remained committed to the resistance against the dictatorship and became even more deeply involved. He helped to transport people to the embassies where they would ask for asylum, to hide families from the police, etc. He scarcely ever met his former family, and had a distant relationship with them. Years later, he moved with his new family into another city, far from Santiago, where his 4 new children grew up.

By contrast, Tamara’s mother never accepted their family rupture and did not rebuild her life. In her search for a better life for her and her children, she focused only in her job for giving them a “better standard of living”.

\textsuperscript{116} “Carrying on the work of the Peace Committee set up in 1973 and banned in 1975, Monsignor Raul Silva Enriquez, Cardinal Archbishop of Santiago, established in 1976 the Vicaría de la Solidaridad with the three firm basic objectives of defending the lives of those persecuted, obtaining freedom for prisoners and providing aid to the poor”. Source: http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=9373&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

\textsuperscript{117} This need to choose between normal life and political commitment is present in many of the first generations and it shows the extent to which the culture of fear spread and invaded people’s subjectivity.
Assessing the Past

I started the interview wondering about Tamara’s experience of the dictatorship. However, rather than speaking about the culture of fear (which I had at first expected to be the subject of the interview), she wanted to speak about family life and her experience of abandonment. She brought a new association to the experience of being part of the opposition to the dictatorship; the mourning of the loss and the fracturing of people’s lives and how this was lived within families. Despite the fact that this narrative was common among the first generations, it was usually structured from their perspective as ‘victims’, and therefore the narrative tells the story of how they were affected by state violence. Tamara, however, re-narrates these stories by carrying out a reassessment of the values which are narrated in those pasts. Contrary to narratives of victimhood or heroism which see altruism and honor in personal sacrifice, Tamara focuses on how the commitment to the *causa* meant the displacement of family life. Thus, she reconfigures a different sort of ‘victimhood’: that of the children of the militants who were ‘abandoned’ by their militant parents. Offering a similar interpretation to that of Carri, Tamara gives more importance to her family drama than to the sociopolitical context. However, it is not just a matter of the privatization of the past: Tamara is questioning a political paradigm detached from a sense of the local, the affects and the value of everyday:

I: “Did your mother talk to you about the political situation within the country? What did she transmit to you about the dictatorship? Did she talk about fear, for instance (…)?”

T: “Actually she didn’t talk to me too much. She was never there. I feel abandoned by my father and my mother, in different ways, but in the end neither of them was there. My mother didn’t speak about anything at all. But she transmitted to me, through my senses, fear (…)”.

The sorrow of abandonment, and having been displaced by her father and then replaced by political commitments has turned into anger and reproach, and become overlapped with a demand to know (and understand) her family past. Tamara questions the first generation’s narrative (ie: the *causa* was the most valuable principle; the commitment to the *Pueblo* over personal commitments) which sees in the public sphere more value than in the private sphere. Her memory instead is structured around the non-heroic aspect of her father’s political commitment, or in the effects it had on her: she remembers, for instance, how little they met him, and how he
was always busy doing ‘important’ things. In order to listen to Tamara’s voice, I depart from Sarlo’s view (who dismisses Carris’ film as a post-modern drama) and rather see in these narratives gestures of a radical critique of the political culture and the consensus about what is rendered ‘valuable’.

“As the children of survivors –or at least this is my story, I won’t pretend I am representing anyone else– we felt that our suffering wasn’t valid enough; we didn’t feel that we were entitled to have a valid drama. I felt invalidated for a long time with respect to my demands, because yes, of course, my father had been a political prisoner, he suffered torture and my mother was on her own, and almost starved; she worked very hard to support us. There is a story of suffering around us, where my mother is a victim, my father is a victim, we are victims, and everybody is a victim then. But come on! (…) Do I have a future? Do I have a hope, Can I find reparation? Just as my father has looked for ways to repair, can I validate my own drama? Can I suffer when I am 13 years old and have a spot in my face? It’s been like ‘you and your silly and little life’ (…)”

In the quote above we see that Tamara articulates two kinds of complaints: how the grand narratives overshadowed her sense of everyday life and the criticism of a culture where victimhood became a template for speaking about moral strength. Tamara explained how both of these narratives are functional to the first generation but leaves the second generation’s experience out.

**Grand narratives v/s everyday life**

Tamara grew up dealing with the dilemma between everyday life and political commitment, inherited from her parents’ conflict as a couple but provoked by the impossible situations the regime put people in. For Tamara, the tension between political commitment and everyday life destroyed her family. She feels that her life story was overshadowed by the urgency and magnitude of the events. However, this had a counter-effect for her, and her own story was somehow invalid in the context of her parent’s stories, and was dismissed as ‘less valuable’. She felt that her feelings or even her everyday life as a teenager had become irrelevant.
“There was a void for the children of desaparecidos or political prisoners; we didn’t play, we were shut up within our homes all day long, we never went to parks... We were abandoned children, some of us were left in the care of our neighbors, there were also children whose father and mother were both missing. This is a fact, but no one cares. We were living in a world made for adults, and children were just... I don’t know... it was very difficult for us, we were just on our own”.

Tamara has a sense of a ‘generational experience’, which is explained by the fact that she studied in one of the schools in which the left-wing opposition gathered. For Tamara, her childhood was a symptom of a generation who lived in what she considers ‘a world of adults’, pointing at the private effects – with a focus on affective damage – of committed resistance. In this sense, like the children of the Edificio, Tamara’s experience differs from other children of the opposition. The majority of the children of opposition were ‘camouflaged’; for instance, they had to hide their political identity at school and therefore the limits of their belonging to school were complicated. In turn, Tamara grew up in a school community where there was nothing to hide, and where integration into society was not the main (and most complicated) task. She did not have the experience of dissimulation or dissociation but was openly socialized as being part of the opposition. She grew up with people with similar political experiences to her and with whom she identified. There, she could create an imaginary of her story as part of a generation; she could feel part of a community of people, a feeling which contrasted the solitude she felt at home.

Against the causa

“(…) One day, when we were youngsters, I was chatting with one of my friends about our life stories, and it came to her mind that in fact the political cause was a bitch, that because of the just cause, all us children were on our own”.

The above quote shows how complex the tension is between particularism and universalism in everyday life. For Tamara, the causa, the collective project, has become distant enough to become an abstract discourse opposed to her everyday life, and furthermore, one which interfered negatively in her affective relationship with her parents. Tamara stressed this tension: she calls it “the just cause” to emphasize the moral legitimation of her parent’s political commitment.
Nevertheless, she opposes to it the negative domestic effects that the militant culture had on some children during Pinochet’s dictatorship (“we were in our own”). Tamara’s countermemory works as a sacrilege in the commemorative works of memory. She is transgressing the social convention on values (i.e.: that struggling against the dictatorship was heroic) by questioning who are the objects of value and who deserves a place in memory.

Tamara refers to Gladys Marín, a local left-wing leader from the Communist Party who, after having been Deputy in Allende’s government, fought against Pinochet’s dictatorship. When my interviewee speaks of her, she destabilizes her label as ‘hero’ by emphasizing that Marín’s relationship with her children raises difficult questions:

“For instance, Gladys Marín, she is an idol, it would be a shame to criticize her, but, she had children, and the children were left without their mother, because this woman preferred to commit herself to the revolution, and she went into hiding, and she had to live abroad and come back clandestinely to see her children while they were playing in a park... This provokes in me physical sensations, I find this unfair, too unfair... And yes, looking back in 2010, yes, it happens and now we have different codes, I understand. But anyway, they are now adults who didn’t have a mother, they were not cuddled, if they had fever, their mother wouldn’t sing them a song. I find that in the end, these things are really worthwhile. Perhaps it has to do with my story, but I feel that what is cool today is to stay with your children, to be a family. It sounds crazy to listen to me saying this, because during my whole childhood the idea of family never made sense. My parents were divorced, we had a collapsed structure, the exploited family, everyone was on their own... but actually I believe that our parents’ generation chose a global and communitarian cause, and now things have changed”.

Marín is an example of the kind of dilemmas that the militant culture would bring to people and how these might be reworked as moral dilemmas of the greys of memories. This quotation introduces the kind of tensions countermemories might bring, and how they also go beyond family life: they point at a broader tension between everyday life and local worlds on the one hand and universal values on the other. It is interesting, for instance, that Tamara uses references to the body in order to question Marín’s commitment to the causa over her children: “This provokes in

118 Being the leader of the Communist Party, she was the first person who brought a criminal suit against Pinochet in January 1998 (Wilde, 2008) on behalf of her desaparecido husband.
me physical sensations”, she says. She opposes to the abstract commitment the image of the cuddle, and the reference to “the baby with fever”.

**Struggling against the reification of victimhood**

The second path opened by Tamara’s complaint points at the effects that the status of being a victim have, as I mentioned before. For years, there was consensus on the strategic need to become a victim of the regime: how important it was to establish that there were human rights violations and that the regime was based on terror (Stern). Tamara questions the political project of narrating the past in a victimhood narrative form as it was done in the 80s and 90s. She shows how for her it was a reduction of her identity and that at the same time it fixed her to a certain relationship with history and a past she did not want for herself. The criticism of the victimhood frame also developed in Chile from 2005 onwards with the militant memory framework, but it is not that narrative either which Tamara embraces when she remembers.

However, Tamara’s countermemory, as well as Carri’s film, can only be the indicators of a different period, one where it is not the status of victimhood which is at stake, but instead the critique of the reification of that experience. Tamara says: “…There is a story of suffering around us, where my mother is a victim, my father is a victim, we are victims, and everybody is a victim then. But come on! (...) Do I have a future? Do I have a hope, Can I find reparation?” This is a complicated figure which however leads us to the weight of history and the paradox of the struggle for justice.

For years, being the victim of the dictatorship was not acknowledged and –even worse– it was denied in the media, dismissed as an invention of ‘enemies of the fatherland’. It meant years of political organization, social activism, church intervention and international pressure so as to obtain acknowledgment, first, that there had been state violence –and not national security, as they preferred to call it– and, second, that there were human rights violations. This meant that for years the status of victimhood was desired, and in a way, it also concealed another category: that of the hero, or better, the martyr. The struggle for truth during the dictatorship also meant the polarization between good and evil, and gave to the status of victimhood an aura of sanctity: the victim easily became a martyr, and somehow, the recounting of one’s wounds was proof of
resistance to the dictatorship. But Tamara destabilizes the long held consensus about these categories, emphasizing the values which underpin the victim/martyr/hero framing. Tamara is rebelling against the victim’s cultural status, and the way her family have told and presented their story.

Reclaiming the value of intimacy

During her childhood, Tamara’s pain was projected against her mother, and then transformed into anger. She remembers a distant mother whose suffering she could not understand and whom she blamed for her father’s abandonment. During the whole interview, Tamara showed herself to be understanding about her father but very hard in relation to her mother. Sometimes she realized this and attempted to be fair to her mother: “at least, she was there”. Paradoxically, in spite of critizing her father’s choice, she reproduces the gendered organization of memories in Chile, and the valuation of the man and the public as heroes, and the displacement of privacy and everyday life as less valuable. Even in her memories, she reproduces this gendered distinction between everyday life and politics in Chile: she remembers her mother’s face and gestures, her quotidian, but remembers her father’s political anecdotes and deeds.

T: “[After their divorce] my mother was depressed and got hospitalized. We were alone for long time, neither our father nor our mother was there. She [my mother] was emotionally unstable most of the time. I remember her face, she looked bad, bad, bad, and she even tried to commit suicide”.

I: “Because of your father’s abandonment?”

T: “Because of everything, everything. It was horrible, I can imagine it, horrible, and it was like hell. Besides, she had to take charge of our family. My dad didn’t give us anything; he didn’t help us with money. He lived almost in the underground, and then he got married to Sheila, and they had kids together. He got a parallel family”.

(...)  

I: “You said you were displaced by political events. When did that feeling start? Did you feel that during your school days?”

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T: “No, it was later”.
I: “And that anger... Was it there since your childhood days?”
T: “I think it was there, but I didn’t give it room, and I didn’t have the resources to name it. I was too young, and I didn’t have the concepts, but there was always a feeling of anger that I couldn’t manage. I always expressed my anger against my mum, I hated her, and we had a very bad relationship. We always fought during the little time we spent together, it was so bad. I couldn’t understand her. I didn’t understand her, I criticized her... we had a bad, bad, bad relationship”.

The gendered model of memory is questioned by these experiences and located within a different context. It is no longer a demand for memory as a form of justice; the struggle is not expressed in terms of remembering or oblivion, but of value and recognition. The uneasiness of Tamara as second generation comes from a struggle over the zone of value and legitimation: the dichotomy between the public and the private is reintroduced and this time, the value of private family life as ‘the real’ world is striking, and brings a story of disagreements and cultural gaps entangled with local politics of memory.

Judith Butler asks in *Precarious Life* what deaths are to be mourned. ‘The question that preoccupies me in the light of recent global violence is: Who counts as a human? Whose lives count as lives? And finally, What makes for a grievable life?’ (2003). In doing so she is posing difficult questions about the memory making process in post-conflict societies. She is undoing the politics behind loss and memory, and redefining the objects of loss as a struggle of forces in order to give meaning, and in the end, value. She is pointing at the site of memory (and history) as an active site of power, desire, affects and belonging. This insight portrays the experience of what is lost and how this is traversed by social conventions. Butler’s expression of ‘what counts as...’ takes us to the idea of acknowledgment, which refers to the interrelational need of being *visible* and *audible* to others. Behind any act of recognition there is a principle of inclusion and exclusion operating, and that is the paradox that Butler’s question and Tamara’s story point at in the quotations above.
Introducing Ernesto

I met Ernesto in his flat in a wealthy area in Santiago city. When I arrived at his flat he was nervous. Like many of my interviewees he had high expectations of the interview. This was not because he wanted to know more about my research, but because he was eager to tell his story from the point of view of a child of the dictatorship. Ernesto was eager to be framed and be acknowledged as a child of a generation who suffered repression and political trauma, an acknowledgment which somehow liberated him from an unspoken personal past, which demanded recognition. He was aware of the implications of meeting for an interview: to make his past as a child of the dictatorship tellable. Of all my interviewees, Ernesto was the one who most ‘needed’ to speak. Somehow, most of them have been able to articulate their experiences in shared narratives, having found a voice in which they can identify with others and therefore be the subject of social recognition. Media series like Los 80 o Los Archivos del Cardenal (see Introduction) have helped in this sense.

Ernesto’s family story

Ernesto is the child of UP activists who left the country after the coup. His parents settled in the Federal German Republic (FGR) with Ernesto and his elder brother. However, during their exile, his mother left her political activism and started to focus on raising her children, while his father strengthened his commitment to political activities. ‘Politics’ was the label that concealed for years his family’s past from his eyes. As the years went by, he discovered that ‘politics’ in fact consisted of firearms and guerrilla training. But this was a dangerous knowledge, and Ernesto heard about this only after the transitional period.

In the early 1980s, while his mother decided it was time to return to Chile and reunite her children with their family, his father made the opposite decision: he decided to go to Nicaragua to fight as an internacionalista\(^\text{119}\). He became an international guerrillero, loyal to a political project of

resistance and revolution. Thus, after having lost their political project after the coup, their native language, their family connections and their friends in exile, his parents lost the personal connection which had united them, making different choices in the face of their personal crises in the aftermath of the coup. While his mother turned to ordinary life and found in the family space an emotional refuge, Ernesto’s father decided to commit himself not only to the Chilean political struggle but to Nicaragua’s political crisis. As a couple, they negotiated the agreement that she and their children would return to Chile, while he would fight for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. He would send money and letters from time to time; and they planned to meet in a neighbouring country in the near future, for Ernesto’s father couldn’t enter Chile and continue to participate in the guerrilla. But they never met.

One day, Ernesto’s mother – already living in Chile with her 2 children – stopped receiving her partner’s letters. After a long search, she found out that he had died in combat. She had to deal with the most difficult aspects of underground life. She had to keep her grief and her pain somehow frozen, and couldn’t show her sorrow and ask the questions she wanted to ask. Performing publically her bereavement could have jeopardized her life or that of her children. She had to deal silently with the fact that as he had entered into Nicaragua illegally, it was very difficult to reconstruct the whole chain of events; she was told he died, but there was no corpse and there were no details about the circumstances. She didn’t have the right to keep his belongings either; she wasn’t entitled to anything. In such a context, she couldn’t appeal to the Chilean embassy to intervene, because political affairs were strictly regulated by the military regime. Over the years, she had to rely on testimonies of people who travelled to Nicaragua and on other rumours. She reconstructed a diffuse story of his participation in the guerrilla war and the circumstances of his death. After years of uncertainty and only after the end of the dictatorship, was she able to travel to Nicaragua and bring the corpse of her husband back to Chile, to bury him close to their family.

Forgetting the Past

The family past of alienation, losses and hidden pain had a high cost for Ernesto. His mother’s muted widowhood was a model for his own bereavement, one which could not be shown to anyone and had to be grieved in silence and in secret. Giving voice to it has been a long struggle,
and it started just a few years ago, when he was already an adult. Ernesto's memories started when he, his mother and elder brother returned to Chile from the FGR, in the midst of the dictatorship. While he cannot remember anything about their life in Germany, his memories start the day they arrived at the airport and met for first time his Chilean family. In his words:

E: “Look, I am blocked; I don’t have many memories of Germany, just a few, only pictures. I went to Germany trying hard to remember and I am not sure whether it helped me to remember, but I went to the place where we lived, and I saw how changed it is. In fact, that Germany in which we lived, doesn’t exist anymore (...)”

E: “I’ve got just a few memories of Germany. I remember when we arrived there... I remember some specific facts... but I hardly remember my father. But I do remember with great detail when we got to the [Chilean] airport. I remember going out carrying my luggage and seeing lots of people who came to welcome us. There was a lady who was crying; we were still inside the airport but she looked at as... I didn’t recognize her, but she looked at me. She was my grandmother on my father’s side”.

His encounter at the airport portrays the paradox of the return from exile for children: they came back to a home which nevertheless was foreign for them, the same way he could not recognize a lady who was crying only to learn later that she was his grandmother. Ernesto had known since he was a child that, once in Chile, his personal story could never be completely told to anyone. He could not tell his classmates where he came from; although he did not have personal memories, he was aware that coming from FGR meant having a dangerous background and had to manipulate and recreate a ‘tellable past’ in order to pass in front of others.

I: “What did you know then [about your family situation]?”

E: “I knew that my father wasn’t there. When we came back to Chile [from exile] it was a situation in which we couldn’t speak, we couldn’t say where my father was, or where we came from. We usually said “Germany” and if people asked “what Germany” we had to lie... we couldn’t go into further details”.

I: “Who taught you that?”

E: “My mum. Yes, [she said] it was dangerous, that we had to watch our words. It was very complicated, especially after my dad died. He died in Nicaragua (...). I was going to school
then, so everybody asked me about my family and I had to start lying, that he had died in an accident, whatever. My mum told us it [speaking] was dangerous. I am not sure if she literally said we were under a dictatorship, but we had to be careful. One knew that one had to be careful and watch one’s words with the police and the military, and also with all of those who weren’t part of our family, one had to be careful with what one said…”

As the children of the dictatorship could not control the way their stories were listened to by others, their words could act against them. So Ernesto’s family story was not tellable and at the same time, it was not knowable for him. For years, a shadow was cast on his family situation. He did not really understand why his past was ‘forbidden’, though he was not really ‘interested’ in it anyway. He obeyed his mother’s orders not to talk in public about their family story, and by doing so he created a pattern of disconnection between him and his family past. He learned that he could not talk about certain things, and as he was not socialized into an active opposition community, he did not feel pride but rather seemed distant about political matters. He felt estranged from and ashamed about a family story which did not fully belong to him.

**Contesting the Hero**

At some point during his adolescence, Ernesto began to feel that his father’s decision to go to Nicaragua rather than going back to normal life in Chile had fractured for good the family structure, being the deepest loss in a chain of losses that his family had to face since the 1973 coup.

I: “How did you bear your hidden family history before the Plebiscite? How did you feel about it?”

E: “I have spoken a lot about this with my analyst, because I have been having therapy for different reasons. But I have realized that the fact of not being able to tell, or say who I am, where I come from, it was… in that moment I saw it as a complication, but once the time has passed… I think it was like not telling this because I might feel ashamed… it is not shame but… all of it affected a lot my personality. I was a rather shy person, very
introspective, and not being able to say certain things made me more introspective and it took a long time for me to gain in confidence. (...) I found it hard to open up and say who my father was and to feel proud about him. Because at that time I rejected him, I didn’t understand his story, it was when I had just started to understand what was happening in the country. My mother told me that my father had been in Nicaragua fighting for a just cause. I started reading a book and asked her why he left us, why instead of going to Nicaragua we didn’t go to somewhere else together as a family. Because he left us knowing that he could die! In a country where there is a war, one is likely to be killed. My mother always replied ‘you will understand your father when you grow up’, but I didn’t understand. Until I was 17, I always felt anger, anger towards my dad; I didn’t understand why he had left my mother. I was always very close to my mum, I tried to make her life as easy as possible, knowing that she was on her own and she supported me and my brother and everything she did, she did it for us. I always tried to support her, but I didn’t understand why she had agreed to that...”

In the quotation above, the concept of ‘just cause’ contrasts with Ernesto’s perception about losing his father. As with Tamara’s experience, we see how this moral definition of the political action as a just cause, gave it an abstract meaning which will deny his embodied experience of everyday life: “Why instead of going to Nicaragua we didn’t go to somewhere else as a family”. His life story is traversed by these kinds of tensions and contradictions, which oppose his immediate feelings to the morality of universal values.

What Ernesto’s approach to his past shares with Tamara’s is the fact that they both destabilize the cultural consensus in which their family memories have been framed and interrogate their stories from the standpoint of private affects. When he asks his father: why instead of going to Nicaragua...?, he is tackling the structure of values on which his father’s actions rested. It is interesting to see how differently his father’s actions were understood by his mother who never hesitated to support his political commitment, suggesting a possible generational gap in the memory contention and the problem of what counts as loss and mourning within the family in postdictatorial Chile. I addressed this in the interview, and wanted to know what it meant for him to grow up in the shadows of the hero’s (his guerrillero father) path.
I: “What has it meant to have such a heroic image of your father, very close to the Che Guevara... how do you cope with that?”

E: “My father was a hero, but an underground and hidden hero... For my brother... For me, because I am very rational, it was difficult to understand it. My father fought for that, we belong to that (...). I think I am marked by this... my dad... I am 36 years old... I wonder what my dad and mum did at my age... their experiences are very different to my experiences, the type of government, everything. (...) That’s why I appreciate that my brother has inherited all these characteristics from my dad. My brother works as a volunteer (...). I admit I’ve got a more selfish kind of education.”

Ernesto and his brother seemed to reproduce to some extent their parent’s dynamic, and both of them made different and maybe incompatible choices, reenacting their parent’s roles and each identifying with one of them. Somehow they actualized their parents’ split in their everyday lives. Ernesto identifies with his mother, who would be the ‘grounded’ model within family, while his elder brother seems to be identified with his father who would be allowed to be the ‘dreamer’ or the romantic. While Ernesto has followed a traditional path, and is an economist, his brother is a yoga teacher who works as a volunteer in charity initiatives.

The quotation above shows that the generational gap alone does not explain Ernesto’s countermemories. His brother, unlike him, has an easier relationship with his father’s memory and has approached his father past as an inspirational memory. The fact that it is Ernesto who does not identify with the narrative memory available for him within his family sheds light on the discontinuities of memory transmission among generations, and redefines family, not only as a sphere of fluid passing on, but also of contestation and reworking in the light of transformed cultural landscapes. As in Tamara’s case, Ernesto’s questions destabilize the politics of loss and memory within the opposition’s retrospective reconstruction of the past.
Unsuitable memories

For years, Ernesto felt distant towards his father, oscillating between a lack of interest and feeling resentment against his father for having gone to Nicaragua instead of coming back to Chile with his wife and children. When his father’s body was sent back to Chile, which happened once democracy had been reestablished, Ernesto started to reconstruct at his own pace various fragments of his father’s past. His case has an extra complexity in relation to Tamara’s, because his father status of guerrilla martyr was problematic during the first years of the transition. They were not ‘the white’ (or clean) victims of the dictatorship but rather political actors with agency. They exemplified the reasons the Military Junta had given to justify state violence, the relationship between left-wing groups and armed struggle, and therefore undermined the society’s confidence in the political transition.

E: “... when we came to know how my dad died, my mother... she resorted to the Party to repatriate him, to identify his corpse, but the Party did not help her at all...”

Once he decided to recover and reconstruct his father’s story, he had to make a double exhumation: first as part of the opposition to the dictatorship, and then as a fallen hero of the armed struggle in relation to the Concertacion’s moderate perspective taken from the 90s onwards and the general mea culpa of the parties which were part of the coalition (see Rettig Report on Chapter 1). This mea culpa meant that these groups took a more distant position concerning their former inspiration in models such as the Cuban revolution and the Soviet Union and also meant distancing themselves from prior models of political action, with much more pragmatic approach to governing. Concepts like consensus, reconciliation, or even ‘Concertación’ were revealing of a general mood among political actors of the post dictatorship which came to constitute the new elite.

I: “Do you feel that after the Plebiscite you were able to talk about your family story, that there was a sort of social permission to talk?”
E: “It wasn’t like that in the beginning, I mean it just wasn’t natural for me to start talking, it was difficult. I think it happened after we got my father’s corpse back...”

(…) 
I: “How was the process of learning to speak [publically]?”
E: “It was... before, I could only say that my dad had died in Nicaragua giving military support to Sandinistas. I knew those things, but the story I knew finished there. I didn’t know more. But then I started to ask questions, who my father was; what motivated him; how he was; was he happy? and it was difficult to start speaking”.

Thus, for Ernesto, recovering the past has been much more complicated and he does not question only the gender bias in terms of framing values, but has also faced the fact that the memory of his father was a taboo memory among his peers after the re-establishment of democracy. He found that for his father’s political party it has been also a struggle to acknowledge the *internacionalista’s* pasts, because they were part of the past which had to be forgotten (or silenced) in the first years of the transition. For him, the recovering of the past and its voicing did not correspond to the arrival of democracy, but has taken longer in terms of the status of armed struggle within Chilean society. He found that there were some pasts which could not be remembered even once democracy had been reestablished, because they were part of the dark side of the past of some moderate left-wing circles. Ernesto’s challenge has been to search for a past which has taken longer to be memorialized.

**Gathering the Past**

E: “I have done some research, because as I have told you, years ago I started to create a register... everything started on a trip I made to Germany (...). I met people who had known him, I went on my own initiative and I called one of his friends. My mother gave me the phone number of someone who lived in Germany. I called him, though I didn’t remember who he was. He remembered me, “little Ernesto”, but I didn’t remember anything (...). He invited a group of friends and we met in his home, I recorded everything, it was funny... I went on my own; If I had gone with my mother or someone else it would have lost its meaning. They told me things about my dad (...), about the time when everything was underground, and when my father was involved in armed struggle, he was specialized in tanks, and went to Nicaragua to give military support; he wasn’t a nurse, he
gave military support. I heard about this and started to come to terms with it in a different way”.

In the above quotations we see perhaps in its clearest model what Hoffmann and Assmann envision in her work on the second generations: their position as recollectors of different objects, testimonies, fragments, histories which together bridge the second generation with a lost part of their genealogy. This reconstructed past is overall the process of reconstruction and, according to Assmann, that is what would define the second generation position in relation to memory: it is a certain position within social time but also family time, and an access to sources which may be still be found as living-memories but which are about to become part of the past. In this way, they are in a moment of urgency, in the transition from orality to written forms of memory transmission. This, again, shows second generation memory not just as a search for meaning, but overall a reappropriation of a legacy which after being inhabited would result in new values, memories or judgments.

I: “Did your mother tell you about this before?”

E: “Not in this way (...). I met my father’s friend and he told me many stories. He is old today and he told me many stories that I don’t think my mother actually knows, and if she knows about them, I don’t know why she never told us. They are very painful. He told me where they were, where they were hidden, everything they lived through (...). I started to get to know my father and my own history, because before this, my story was my mother’s and everything she has told me. So... my story was idealized... Through speaking with my father’s friends, I was able to get a new idea. I also found my mum’s letters and some recordings... but still, there is something missing…”

(...) When Lazzara adds: ‘How can the daughter of a disappeared revolutionary, for example, fully understand the weight or density of the politically charged experience of the 1960s and 1970s or, for that matter, what it meant to suffer torture?…’, he is asking for the possibility of understanding, of translation, not only between different cultures but even between different generations. He points at the gaps provoked by the passing of time, and he destabilizes the hope for transparency, highlighting the horizon of opacity among generations. At the same time that there is an intergenerational self (as I suggested in the previous chapter), there is also a reverse
process which doesn’t define identity as sameness but as difference. How shall we think of the relationship between memory, cultural change and generations, without getting caught up in the dichotomy between tradition v/s radical change? If transmission somehow emphasizes on the continuities of memory, Lazzara also sees in it discontinuity, contributing to framing the intergenerational transmission of memories in terms of impossibility but also of conflict.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have explored how countermemories have the potential to destabilize dominant versions of the past, creating alternative routes to coming to terms with it. I have argued that countermemories may seek the social acknowledgment of up-to-date emotions which until then could not be spoken about, and therefore claim for their social existence in the realms of memory. By reading their parents’ actions through this frame, we saw how Ernesto and Tamara de-center the strictly political debate about the military coup (framed in terms of left, center and right wing) and bring new complexities to the understanding of the past. They depart from a discussion of political projects, and focus on affective loss and, indirectly, make a critique of militant and political culture. Tamara’s and Ernesto’s claiming of kinship are part of the Antigone model, but in a different direction, and that’s why they are a counter-memory: they open up a new field of concerns, which are to be listened to as a dispute about value. As Raphaela Mamphele argues, the acknowledgments of the pain and loss of social actors is a profoundly political act: it is about the contesting of moral space (1997:101). Through this process, memory is defined as a space of contestation, something which is emphasized by the idea of countermemories.

Ernesto and Tamara, as they tell their stories from the perspective of loss and family collapse, redefined the past in terms of moral dilemmas between the universal (the political cause) and the particular (the family). Their relationship to the past asks for a reassessment of values: they frame collective heroism in the light of the subsequent dislocation that followed their fathers’ departure. Thus, they dispute their participation in history as mourners and victims of a different nature. In their search for their fathers we see how they are trying to compensate for a personal absence and ask questions of value: whether the public or the private are ‘truer’. These are difficult
questions and show a dichotomist organization of life, where private and public worlds have become divorced and enter into contradiction. Their countermemories mark for them a shift in the broader relationship to their past, redefining the family as a space to ‘recover’, in a sort of affective neo-conservationism.
Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks

In this final chapter I aim to develop some concluding remarks about the major themes which have been discussed in the course of this research. I start by i) examining how the notion of everyday life gives an account of the way in which state violence might be embedded in local patterns of remembering; then ii) I highlight the importance that context (memory landscapes) has in shaping family political memories - in this thesis, how the authoritarian government contributed to shaping opposition memories; iii) I discuss the notion of memory which traverses and underpins this project, framing a way to think about stubborn memories and position them in the current memory field; iv) define the role of the family as a producer of memory in the everyday life while discussing what it entails and v) draw attention to the concept of the afterlife as a challenge to fixed concepts of time after episodes of violence. In the closing section vi) I discuss some final thoughts about the second generation and its role in the memory making process in post-coup Chile.

i) Everyday Life and Trauma: Inhabiting Memories of Political Violence

The thesis has offered a perspective in which it can be understood that state violence might affect and injure communities not only through episodes of physical or symbolic violence, but also by undermining the sense of social trust and by inscribing an intergenerational memory of fear of the state in their members. This is something which the majority of my interviewees has referred to and which I have described as a ‘poisoned knowledge’. For example in chapter 4, through David’s life story, I described it as the moment in which the rite of passage made him part of the opposition to the dictatorship during the regime. Through various examples across the thesis I have shown that this ‘poisoned knowledge’ is a haunting political memory which may be arise later in time, even years later.

From this first point stem various elements. First, the extent to which I have aimed to reimagine the role of suffering and experiences of victimhood in the midst of the critique of the trauma paradigm. Inspired by works such as Das’ and Butler’s, I have aimed to portray a complex notion of
suffering, one which, on the one hand, recognizes episodes of vulnerability before the state or before others as fundamental moments for identity making, but, on the other, also offers a perspective in which suffering is by no ways the only effect of state violence. Thus, while many of my interviewees experienced events of violence against their family members or forms of intangible violence, I have also shown their mechanisms for survival. In doing this I have been concerned with giving an account of the effects of a past which is not ‘traumatizing’ and does not reduce people to their experiences of pain and loss but which at the same time recognizes in experiences of vulnerability crucial moments in subjective and intersubjective life. As Butler says, it is in the acknowledgment of pain that a politics of responsibility may be engendered. I have found in uncertainty, vulnerability and doubt, creative moments instead, which overall have shown the complexity of the experience to which I was trying do justice when analysing the interviews.

As I mentioned in the thesis, the memory of state violence and its transmission has usually been studied in its form as traumatic rupture, belated memories and dislocation. I mentioned in Chapter 5 how a psychotherapeutic tradition emerged in Chile in the face of the desperate need to give care and attention to the victims of state violence. However, its normalization in everyday life and its absorption into the quotidian have been ignored in local studies, which have instead focused either on traumatic violence or in the politics of the regime. I have argued that although this is a valuable knowledge, it does not exhaust the subject. In the thesis I have been interested in exploring the forms of life, relationships and inhabitation of the social world that the family political memory has contributed to shape. Rather than doing an oral history of the forms of remembering the past (for instance, like Kaiser’s study of the Argentinian post memory) I have aimed to analyse how the familial political memory becomes invested with meaning, how this meaning influences the modes of inhabitation, and how also this familial political memory is not transparently inherited, but may imply complex modes of appropriation. In this sense, my perspective on the memory of the dictatorial era has given to me a complementary perspective with regard to the work of political violence in the aftermath.

Drawing on Das’ emphasis that what matters after episodes of violence is to understand how violated worlds are inhabited, I have drawn attention to process of inhabitation of political memories. By emphasizing inhabitation I have suggested an interrelational approach between generations. On the one hand, the first generations transmit a political memory spoken through
the language of family, invested with affective resonance for family members. On the other hand the second generations inherit this legacy. Although its appropriation happens under similar conditions, they deploy different mechanisms of inhabitation – to use Das’ expression again, ‘how do they own the world’, in this case, a world intersected by political memories and the identities that they help to reconfigure? This, because, as I have argued, political memory may operate as a form of embodied knowledge in the aftermath of political violence. It is constituted by shared narratives, symbols, and affects which deal with political histories and transform them into stories. In the case of this thesis, I have explored the appropriation of these stories by the family. By exploring the various forms and circumstances in which a political memory is inhabited as a family legacy by the second generations I have aimed to reflect on what happens to the memory of state violence when it is carried for generations as a memory of conflict, inhabited as an intergenerational narrative, and creates space for forms of resistance and meaning subversion (countermemories), forms of doing (or not doing) politics but also to forms of suffering and resentment.

A second aspect which stems from the perspective on everyday life is that it draws attention to the way that people may become habituated to political violence. While I acknowledged the contribution of Holocaust scholars to understanding the aftermath of violence, in chapter 2 I also described some critiques which show how their perspectives may obscure the everyday life of trauma and memory. In the literature review I developed the insight that global memories or universal memory frames do not give an account of local dynamics of memories. I have used instead Das’ work to provide a framework for thinking about how painful experiences of political violence - which need to ‘disappear’ so as to permit everyday life to continue - are normalized in the aftermath of violence.

Exploring the memory of the opposition I have been concerned with a perspective which looks beyond the coup itself, in other words, beyond ‘spectacular’ forms of violence. By doing this I have aimed to shed light on how the memory of a critical and traumatic event is entangled with and woven into everyday life and is shaped in accordance with it. In this context, the work of Das has been insightful in portraying a complex understanding of the internalization of violence and its concealment in the ‘innocuousness’ of everyday life. I recall Das’ ethnography in India when she says:
...the memory of the Partition was not then in the nature of something gone underground, repressed, hidden away, that would have to be excavated. In a way, these memories were very much on the surface. Yet there were fences created around them; the very language that bore these memories had a certain foreign tinge to it as if the Punjabi or Hindi in which it was spoken was some kind of translation from other unknown language. (Das 2007, 11).

This statement has guided my own research in terms of where and how I was to find the afterlife of violence among my interviewees. Das’ insight was also complemented by Hoffman’s description of the ambivalence towards violence in the post-Holocaust generations, which means that the abnormal is inhabited as a part of everyday life.

In fact, one of the main challenges in postdictatorial Chile (where the conflict has been ‘left behind’ and society has moved forward to a new stage) is to uncover the mechanisms whereby violence has been actualized, normalized and how it acquires a form of life which is different from the events which gave birth to it. During my fieldwork, it was striking that what I conceptualized as the legacies of violence was often not acknowledged or remembered as violence, or was experienced as such but not named. For instance, the stigma of being the children of persecuted families persists even today in small villages where the children, today adults, meet at work with people who in the past created and promoted rumours about their parents. Or the case of the successful executive who feels that he cannot tell his colleagues that he is a leftist because he feels that this could be detrimental to his position.

Thus, one of the main difficulties of understanding the legacies of the dictatorship is that often the legacies of state violence were not recognized as such among the second generation. Initially, I thought that this happened because the second generation would tend to think of themselves as non-victims of the dictatorship, and to think of the coup as the barbarism of the armed forces taking prisoners and turning them into desaparecidos. However, thinking in terms of the second generations means that I have been concerned with how torture sites become part of the landscapes of normality, and the complex and multiple ways in which state violence may leave traces in intersubjective life. By exploring the legacies of state violence and also opening up the meaning of what being a victim means and what violence is, I have integrated varied and rich experiences which (initially, unexpectedly) led me to an ethnographic-inspired approach towards
growing up under the dictatorship which has practiced ‘hospitality’ (and attention) to the ghost (recalling Gordon’s expression). In framing legacies I have shown how violence might not offer a reductionist victim portrait but instead a complex phenomenon in which the memory-making of state violence entails multiple processes, stages and struggles.

ii) The authoritarian regime and the memory landscapes

It was in the course of trying to understand the transmission of specific political memories - opposition memories - that the very context of their production became relevant: how they became oppositional, how they were articulated within and how they also articulated intersubjective landscapes which were structured around notions such as inside and outside, trust and distrust, speaking and silence, and friends and enemies. I will come back to this point later.

Contrary to the idea that the traumatic is woven exclusively as a form of structural repression or dissociation which is acted out every time it is remembered, I have shown that the political memory of state violence takes the form of the social patterns in which violence is embedded. In the thesis this has meant assigning importance to the authoritarian context in which political memories of state violence were to be transmitted and circulated. In the case of the Chilean second generations, their experience was not based only on their relationship to the first generation, but also on the fact of growing up under a military regime. The regime repressed and constricted the memory of the coup, defining not only the content of (opposition) memories but the overall meaning of bearing them.

Thus, the first two chapters explore what it meant to grow up within the culture of fear, inhabiting a heavy legacy of being members of opposition families and performing an opposition memory within an authoritarian regime. I explored how bearing this tradition of memory gave way to a set of practices, tastes, aesthetics and relationships which stem from the very fact of being in opposition to the regime. In order to do so, I explored ‘the culture of fear’, suggesting that it shaped the way the memory of opposition was performed and remembered.

In chapter 4 I described the politics of fear and a set of discourses and practices which were deployed by the military junta to create controlled landscapes, a culture of fear of the other and a
change in the patterns of sociability which divided people into friends or enemies. These were the terms in which political memories would circulate within the regime landscape, subverting its meanings. For instance, mimicry would become at one and the same time a form of simulation and also a form of cynical (and libertarian) distancing from the regime. In chapters 4 and 6 I described how family political memory of state violence was to a certain extent ritualized despite the fact that it was learned and practiced in the loose spaces of the everyday life: it distinguished between inside and outside, was passed on as a form of rite of passage and created the idea of the second generation as the carriers of family secrets. These findings were transversal to all the interviewees I did with the opposition’s second generation. That’s why in chapter 4 I suggested that political memories are performative: they do have an effect on their ‘bearers’ or memory-holders. So for instance, in focus groups it was easy to find a common generational experience (sustained in a weak narrative, but strengthened in the process of remembering together), with shared meanings and anecdotes (for instance, the reading of Mafalda, or listening to Cooperativa radio, or singing the national anthem). This is a generational experience, but one which again fractures Chilean society and divides it into political communities, so that in reality the generational memory is shared only by the second generation of the opposition. I showed, for instance, how Rafael, the son of a Pinochet’s minister, learned of the word dictatorship later in his life.

From the interviews also emerged the idea that the second generation has remembered as a form of resistance at the same time as they have chosen not to remember in order to stay safe. The post-coup political memories were transmitted as something to be remembered in silence but also to be remembered with others – very specific others. Opposition political memory was ambivalent: it was meant both to be muted and to be spoken, to be forgotten and to be remembered, to distinguish between the speakable and the unspoken. Here, the dialectic between silence and secret family stories may be insightful. Although secret and silence may seem similar, in fact, secrets are to be rescued from silence, but to be kept in this condition. That is to say, many family political memories are ‘publicly’ secret, or untold outside home, but through family transmission they are made to persist and be kept as secrets.

In chapters 4 and 5 I showed how the inhabitation of the stigma –one of the legacies of the politics of fear- was also ambivalent: at the same time that being the victim of ostracism created scenarios of shame and fear, it was also experienced with a sense of pride. In the course of investigating
these themes, in chapter 5 I questioned classic approaches to stigma, such as Goffman's, and suggested that political memory is at one and the same time something to conceal and something to own and protect.

iii) Stubborn Memories or the Stability of Memory

Throughout the thesis I have drawn attention to something that Stern called the ‘memory impasse’ and which Lira has called ‘the ghettoization of memory’ and have done so from the perspective of one of the memory traditions in Chile – the left-wing. While Stern’s perspective situates the conflict within a particular moment in Chilean history, Lira’s concept sees it as a process. In Chapter I outlined how both of these authors explore the crisis of memory, suggesting that such an antagonism requires an insight into what is implied in political remembering. Stern shows how memories are ways of legitimizing complex forms of life while Lira, in turn, explores institutional commemorative remembering and how this invests the memory of a consecrated narrative through its very transmission. Building on these contributions I have added a new element to the understanding of the crisis of memory and its afterlife: the thesis has approached these complex intersections from the perspective of the transmission of experiences of state violence within the family and their display in modes of familial political remembering. Through these modes of remembering state violence I have shown that families create intergenerational narratives which also include political violence, and are passed on to the second (and third) generations: these narratives are meant to be transmitted.

Although Lira’s insightful article offers new perspectives for the understanding of political memories and also for thinking about and questioning the future of memory in Chile, she does not deal with the relationship between national or institutional memories and ‘private’ memories, which are transmitted in the family space. In my fieldwork, by contrast, the institutional character of memories of state violence is much more blurred than in Lira’s account. I develop this in Chapter 6. Otherwise, how can non-official memories (such as the scepticism towards the existence of desaparecidos, or the belief that speaking about Pinochet might be dangerous, as
some of my interviewees have shown) circulate in Chile - despite being publicly discredited - and have persisted until today?

Throughout the thesis I have distinguished between various kinds, levels and forms of memory (family memory, official or state memory, peripheral memories, political memories, opposition memories, countermemories, habit memories, etc). Making these distinctions between these various forms of memory – rather than speaking of memory as if it were a homogeneous concept in its various expressions - has been productive in the same way that the criticism of the presentism of memory tradition was in shedding light on the complexity of memory. For instance in *Theories of Remembering* Mizstal describes how Eric Hobsbawm’s studies shed light on the role of official memory as a product of the dominant sectors of society with the objective of producing a common past which serves their interest (Misztal 2003). Hobsbawm’s paradigm in *The Invention of Tradition* emphasizes the way in which new traditions are deliberately invented so as to create new political realities and how memory is a construction which serves to legitimate social institutions that aspire for a shared destiny. Though this approach has served to enhance our understanding of the role of ideology in social memory and can always show something about the ‘who’ beyond the official narratives of the past, it also has its limitations. The presentism of this study has been criticized because it reduces the idea of social memory to the notion of ideology, does not explain why some traditions become popular and others not and underestimates non-official sources of memory (Mistzal 2003).

In the end distinguishing among these different forms of memories point at similar conclusions to those of, for example, Welzer and Gudehus: that family memories are a form of appropriating other forms of memories which circulate in the social. Holocaust research has explored how third generation Germans (the grandchildren of perpetrators of Nazi and their followers) have re-appropriated the global memory frame of the Holocaust into their family narratives of the Nazi past in such a way that it helps to portray their grandparents as victims (rather than perpetrators and supporters of Nazi crimes), and also tend to highlight positive and heroic deeds (Hohenlohe 2011), In the same way, I have also reflected on the gap between family memory and broader memory frameworks, i.e.: state politics of memory. This raises difficult questions, but overall shows that memory is ubiquitous and cannot be fully represented or monopolized in any of its forms.
In the thesis, however, whilst I refer to the malleability of memory, I also refer to its stability. Let me explain. Among my initial observations in the Chilean case was the insight that the memory/forgetting dichotomy would hinder other dynamics of memory, and specifically, those forms of memory of private and everyday life forms of remembering, such as the memory of social class and the right to property, for example, or the configuration of an identity in opposition to the state (the memory of *luchadores sociales*). Otherwise how can memories that are meant to be erased by official memories persist?

Making these distinctions has allowed me to see memory as a multidimensional category, in which different temporalities, purposes, ethics and meanings coexist and where memories are shown to be both malleable and also stubborn (or stable). Thus, in addition to focusing on how the authoritarian regime shaped an opposition memory, I have also been concerned with the idea of stability within certain memories: in the thesis, family political memories of state violence. In J. Assmann and A. Assmann’s distinction between cultural and communicative memory, family memory is defined as essentially malleable. However, I have pointed at an alternative understanding of family memories, which recognizes in them a certain stability which gives shape to intergenerational identifications in the political world and which are not necessarily malleable by official or institutional forms of memory discourse.

I recognize in the culture of fear and the regime’s politics of stigmatization, for instance, the ability to shape silenced memories and memories of shame, which may obey memory landscapes (that of the culture of fear) in terms of their ability to speak in public. However I described the case of Ruth, who sees her life as a process of speaking out about her sense of shame, who after lying about her father’s fate ended up becoming an active member of the AFDD. She has responded actively to the changing contexts of memory and become an agent of memory. Or the case of Camilo, who for years ‘forgot’ his forbidden family story and only started to recover his past at the time democracy was recovered within the country. In his case this process was associated with a compelling metaphor: the unearthing of memory was triggered by the arrival of his father’s corpse in the country in order to be buried.

The above-mentioned stories show how speaking and silencing are interrelated with broader ‘memory landscapes ‘or ‘politics of memory’ but are not determined by them. On the contrary, the influence might also go in the other direction. Although I agree that individual memory is
shaped by collective memory frames, I also want to point at a slightly different phenomenon. I have been concerned with exploring under what conditions memories might be stubborn and how their stability might lead to a long-term perspective of memory, such as Lira’s transgenerational approach. For example, how despite Ruth’s ashamed memories or the fictitious life stories she told to her classmates, her memory of desaparecidos would resist or persist. Or how Gabriel, in chapter 6, recognizes in political violence a tragic family legacy after transnational and transgenerational episodes of political violence.

The above mentioned resounds with the broader phenomena of multiple layers (and forms) of time and memory division in Latin America - silenced memories, unspoken memories, ashamed memories, militant memories and official memories, to name just a few – which have coexisted. The division of memory has been part of the very history of the region, including Chile, for five centuries. The tension around the idea of a ‘discovery’ of the new world, and then the meaning of being a colony and the project of independence have created layers of divisions and contested meanings. One of the most dramatic has been the period called ‘pacification of the Araucania’ which refers to the political project of the Chilean state during the 1850s of first reducing the Mapuche pueblo to a small territory, and then of converting them into Chileans. For the Mapuche, having a memory is the same as having a history, and memory thus has become a form of resistance which has endured to the present day, when ethnic conflicts have been revived. The case of the Mapuche pueblo shows how having a memory of the past has been a form of resistance and how, as an alternative to official socialization by the state, oral transmission of family memory has proved to be effective and durable (even beyond the classic three generations scope pointed by the Assmann).

Through my analysis of the family transmission of memories of state violence to the second generation I have shown how the crisis of memory is grounded in a sense of long term memory. The gap between family memories and other forms of politics of memory is related to the discussion of whether memory is to be conceived as purely malleable or in terms of stability. Constructivist approaches have prevailed in memory studies, and they start from the premise that memories are malleable and that virtually any memory could be constructed (Cole 2001). The presentist tradition has been crucial in showing how memory is malleable and how an invented past can be created through myths and the creation of stories about the past. However, these
approaches do not help us to think about why there are memories which persist even when they are not commemorated, when they are repressed or when they provoke feelings such as shame, fear or guilt.

In the literature review I presented Gómez-Barris’ research, which has been innovative and has opened a new line of enquiry in the understanding of memory making in post-coup Chile: envisioning family memory as a form of shelter from official memory, she has pointed to stable forms of memory-work, which operate at the level of embodied transmission (communicative memory, in Assmann’s terms). Exploring family memories and attempting to understand the circulation of repressed memories and objects during the authoritarian regime, she suggests that family memory ‘protected’ forbidden political identities and memories, rendering them clandestine within private forms of circulation. She destabilizes the relationship between silence and forgetting and shows how, despite being silent, the memories of the state victims had an afterlife. Therefore she attempts to explore how they could be impervious to state politics of denial during the regime and then the so-called politics of forgetting afterwards.

Using a similar approach, questioning the assumption of the malleability of memory within the family sphere, Booth states: ‘But family memories are not all the work of narration and invention. Some, on the contrary, seem to come back to us, as if the event “wants to be remembered”, and not always happily and voluntarily’ (Booth 2006, xi). For Booth it is not always the community which brings back the past, but it would be the memory which would ‘haunt’ the community. Thus, memory has become crucial to understanding the way people feel attached to some of their memories and in what ways some memories may work as the ground for certain forms of community. It is this last aspect which I believe is crucial for thinking about the memory of state violence and its aftermath.

For this, in a field in which constructivist perspectives have usually been dominant and productive, that which is not malleable was fundamental to articulating my research and one of my main concerns has been to shed light on the mechanisms through which family political memories persist. I have drawn on Lira’s perspective, but I have also departed from her analysis. My critique of Lira’s work is that memory ghettoization did not start nor took place only within the sphere of political parties, but has its roots in something which seems to me much more stubborn but less institutional than them: family life and everyday life forms of relatedness.
iv) The family as memory producer

Concerned with the problem of stability of memory contents, I have sought to understand its dynamics not in the domain of power and politics, but in the site of everyday life. To this end I therefore draw a distinction between the politics of memory and the memory of everyday life and situate family memories in the latter category. In chapter 2 I introduced Assmann’s approach to communicative memory, which situates family forms of memory transmission defined by embodied forms of relationships.

Throughout the thesis I have argued that the local patterns of family relatedness are a clue to understanding the ways in which loyalties and legitimacies have been woven into family political memories of state violence. This is something which has usually been left aside in the Chilean case, possibly as one of the taken-for-granted ‘facts’ and also due to the dismissal of private life and an approach to family as a natural entity which is there. In chapters 4, 6 and 7 of the thesis I dealt with the experience of family transmission of political memory. I explored the issue of temporality and saw in intergenerational forms of memory transmission the shaping of a long term family identity, a memory of state violence which, being entangled with family narratives, has contributed to the formation of communities of political memories (which are not the same as political communities in an institutional sense, i.e. they do not correspond to political party alignments).

Rather than seeing family memory as a producer of ‘pure’ memories, throughout the thesis I have reconsidered the relationship between family memory and state memory under the military regime, where the family acted not only as a privileged site for forbidden memory transmission, but also as a bridge to other forms and producers of memory – such as the school, which is often signalled by my interviewees as the most relevant ‘public’ space of encounter in terms of memory making. In fact, among my interviewees there was a coincidence in triangulating their personal identities, the families and the school, the school being the place where the culture of fear was ‘displayed’. However, there were two exceptions to this, and both of them people who studied at schools where the majority of the educational community were opposed to the regime. This experience configured different dynamics, and what I can conclude is that they had a less tensioned experience of the distinction between inside and outside than the other interviewees, and experiences such as stigmatization or the mark, for instance, was unknown for them.
I have shown how political memories were deeply influenced and mediated by the contexts in which they were remembered, but this does not mean that family memory depends in any simple sense on state memories. On the contrary, in Chapter 6 I put forward the concept of intergenerational narratives which are transmitted between generations and provide affective ties to a sense of self and lineage. I have argued that the dynamics of family memory sheds light on the affective investment that the political memories of the opposition had, and how political memories - either images, narratives, discourses, etc. - circulating in the public space were rooted in the dynamics of family transmission and the making of intergenerational selves. My interviews gave me an insight into how political memories may be intergenerationally transmitted and embodied. Thus, in framing my approach to the family as a memory producer I contest approaches such as that of the historian Stuart Woolf, who argues: ‘There must always have been a continuous but asymmetrical relationship between them: family and community memories, not just in modern times, seem to me inconceivable without the constant presence of public memories and have certainly always been nourished by the latter; whereas the converse is certainly not true’ (Woolf 2005). I dispute with Woolf the subordinate character that he assigns to family memory in relation to other forms of memory production. However, it is not my intention to discuss which kind of memory is most relevant, but to shape a perspective in which family forms of relatedness contribute to the making of stubborn memories, and where families and their forms of relatedness contribute to shaping political remembering.

However, the fact that I am arguing for considering the family influence in the shaping of memory culture, does not mean that my argument accepts family position uncritically. On the contrary, I agree with authors such as Serpente and Sosa when they suggest that family memory is a sphere which needs to be denaturalized. In the thesis I found it productive to explore how family memories are not good, reactionary, evil or revolutionary per se. In fact, I introduced Chapter 6 by exploring the peripheral memory of the family of one of Pinochet’s supporters and how this memory has discredited and bypassed public information concerning human rights and abuses committed by the military regime. I raised his case in order to de-romanticize the influence of family memory and explore to what extent the work of family memories may ensure the stability (persistence) of certain unvoiced stories, but also the extent to which they might be based on a self-referential and uncritical sense of truth.
Here are some of the questions that have emerged during the process of research: should family memories be co-opted by official memories? Whether a gap between these two forms of memories may be a danger to democratic forms of *convivencia*? I am thinking here, again, of the works of Welzer and Hohenlohe. They explore the extent to which family memories of the third generation Germans shows that they are undergoing a new twist in terms of a culture of ‘never again’, or more simply, in the consensus that the actions committed by the Nazis were evil. That is to say, to what extent is a public ethic emerging from the family position? What happens when families defy or challenge a public ethic? I think that my analysis shows that such a question is relevant for the Chilean case and does not have a straightforward answer. I have shown how family political memories might be stable, because they are affectively invested, and that they are ‘resistant’ in relation to other forms of public narratives. They mobilize a sense of truth and a memory of history; in the single case of a right-wing supporter of Pinochet I analysed the very same pattern. Here I want to go back to Crenzel’s concern, described in the introduction, when commenting on Lira’s work: who can own family memories and the values promoted by them? What do they mean in terms of democratic *convivencia*? They may protect democracy, but they may also undermine it.

In other parts of the thesis I also argued that memory is not teleological, and I also explored the idea of countermemories to show precisely how conservative stems may result from the reworking of memory contents. In chapter 7 I explored how within the intergenerational continuities there are also forms of value subversion and that family legacies can be confronted. Gómez Barris, for instance, stated that the family was a shelter which kept people’s identity safe during and after the dictatorship. In her account, the family appears as an unproblematic and somehow fixed concept. She considers that the film *Fernando Ha Vuelto* by Caiozzi, in which the family comes together around the encounter with their *desaparecido* member, is a metaphor for Chilean society’s dynamics of memory where family was isolated from the public space. Family loyalty would define political identity and would align family members around their affective ties.

However, as I have argued in the thesis, there has been a range of different experiences and commemorative practices and family relationships between members and with the past. In Chapter 7 the concept of family countermemories shed light on the way the space of family memory is also a space for the reworking of memory, disrupting family and cultural memory.
frameworks and questioning them in an attempt, for instance, to give social acknowledgment to certain emotions that have been ignored. Thus I explored cases where the politics of mourning were challenged or reclaimed, and therefore suggested that family memory is not only a place for tradition and affective ties, but also for contention and rupture. I explored how within the families not every memory has the same weight, and that what is rendered memorable is always a selected narrative which is passed on as the familial narrative. Suggesting that the family memories of the opposition rested on a certain kind of politics of family and mourning which has favoured a certain gendered bias, I gave examples which illustrated that in the making of political remembering within my interviewees there was a bias in terms of gender. Family legacies, for instance, were often (in the majority of the interviews and to a striking degree) the stories of militant men. This last aspect has not been taken into account in the memory debate in Chile.

v) The afterlife of violence

It interesting and relevant to note that during the days in which I have been finishing the writing of the thesis, there has been an ‘explosion’ of memory acts and events in Chile, even more than on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary, to which various observers referred as a ‘commemorative boom’ (Perotin Dummon 2005; Collins et. al 2013). This year, something new has happened: an overwhelming consensus on the evil of the dictatorship and state terror for first time ‘triumphed’ in the public debate: by this I mean the media debates that frame public opinion through radio, newspaper, internet, virtual social nets and fundamentally TV. Historical documentaries that just months ago could still be censored, were now programmed at the ‘peak times’. There are a few thoughts I would like to highlight here, also, to conclude my research in the best way I could have finished: forty Septembers after the bombing of La Moneda Palace and Allende’s death.

Gómez-Barris’ concept of the afterlife of political violence, introduced in Chapter 1, reinforces and challenges at one and the same time the commemorative boom of the fortieth anniversary of the military coup. Although during the 90s the critique of social amnesia was characteristic of the sectors committed to human rights, the manner in which the anniversary of the military coup is
being commemorated today reinforces the underlying assumption of this thesis. This is that the past persists – and matters. As I mentioned above, TV series, journalistic reports, conferences and film festivals are just some of the examples of ways in which the coup is being memorialized this year, undermining the previously wide-spread belief that the memory impasse would directly affect only those immediately involved while the rest of society contemplates it neutrally. The thesis has been concerned in fact with decentring the focus on the first generation victims by focusing on the second generations instead. I have shown in what sense - and overall how – bearing a political memory is not limited exclusively to those with first-hand experience but rather something which has shaped a political culture in the long term, by promoting a relationship with imagined others and with the state. This is a relationship which has been learned and forged through intergenerational narratives and imaginaries which have passed from one generation to other.

At the same time, displacing the focus from the first generation to the second generation also pushes the boundaries of what we understand by the legacies of political violence: by exploring how the past has an afterlife, in its modes of subjective and intersubjective struggles, I have aimed to open new enquiries into how the culture of fear has left traces which go further than has yet been recognized. In this thesis these traces have been related to the work of memory, but it also prepares the ground for future research into other forms of legacies, for instance, of neoliberalism.

On the other hand, dealing with the afterlife is also a way of contesting and challenging the predicament of commemorations: the fact that they produce pasts. For example, with the aim of contributing to historical reflection, various social actors today are calling on society to reflect on ‘the tragedy’ that afflicted Chile four decades ago. However, rendering the past as past also entails the risk of ´monumentalization’. James Young argues that monuments should not do the memory work, thus replacing the society’s responsibility for this (1992). I would like to argue that this is important to the Chilean case, because the political crisis, the violence that followed and the division of memory is not part of a ´tragedy’, which is how it is now being described within political language, but is rather part of more complex intersections between class, life stories, cultural patterns of relationships, family beliefs, modes of remembering and also modes of screening. This
also challenges how we understand the scope of violence and how do we think of the legacies of state violence forty years after the 11 September military coup.

Drawing on the concept of the ‘afterlife’ and also on Butler’s reference to ‘the tasks of mourning that follow political violence’ this thesis destabilizes the ideas of past and present, something which, in the light of today’s commemorative mood, seems important to bear in mind. Time – in its forms of past, present and future - has been problematized from the start of the project, which was conceived of as an investigation into the transmission of memories of political violence to the second generations. My interviewees shaped and selected the stories from their present, and it is also in the present that some of them are still haunted by political memories. In this sense, these memories belong neither to the past nor to the present, but rather to both, and certainly they are also tied to forms of making and imagining the future.

vi) The second generations and the dilemmas of memory

One of the expressions which has circulated in the light of the anniversary of the coup is that there are the new generations who are called upon to overcome the past. It is this assumption that the new generations are alien to local dynamics and learn the history through forms of cultural memories only, that the thesis rebuts.

As was outlined in chapter 1, justice has been done in a significant number of cases, there is a Museum of Memory and two reports of the Truth Commission have been published. However, it is at that moment when the past seems to be past - in other words, when it is memorialized - that a perspective on the presence of the past is relevant. The predicament of commemorations is that they produce pasts, while some of the struggles of the afterlife of political violence take place in the present. Speaking of the second or third generation, in this sense, is preferable to my perspective than speaking of the new generations. This, because it recognises its liaison with the past, and its being part of a memory chain; a milieu of memory, in Habermas’ terms.

Hirsch’s concept of postmemory highlights the relationship a second or third generation can have with a first generation. However, although her work has been inspiring and crucial to this thesis, I
have also identified a point of departure from her work. I have been concerned with forms of
memory which challenge the idea of the ‘post’. My concern has been to show how there is an
afterlife which stills has forms of presence, so my questioning of what is visible and what is
narratable resonates more with the concept of haunting that we find in the likes of Avery
Gordon’s work, for instance, than in Hirsch’s postmemory. Where the concept of postmemory did
remain useful however, was in my analysis of the films of the second generation, discussed in
chapters 5 and 7. There, the members of the family (usually the son or the daughter) develop a
reflection of their family story. As I have previously argued, these forms of cultural memory
simultaneously create and reflect new narratives and new sources of memory. I have used them in
the thesis as a way to illuminate dilemmas and narratives which are beyond the imaginable, but
once they are narrated, they triggered forms of recognition (in Hoffman’s words).

Just a few days before I finished the thesis, Juan Emilio Cheyre – the chief of the army during the
government of Lagos (2002-2006) was confronted by Ernesto Lejderman on public TV. Cheyre had
passed into history as the person who bridged the armed forces and civil society and in such
condition of prestige and public trust that he was currently the chief of the electoral system.
However, he was recently questioned by the son of two activists who were executed three months
after the coup and whose deaths were falsely treated as being the result of having blown
themselves up with their own dynamite. Lejderman denounced the fact that although Cheyre was
the person who took him to an orphanage when he was two years old, he did not give any
information about what had happened to his parents before any of the Human Rights
Commissions. He says to Cheyre on public TV:

I invite you to break the pacts of silence and say where the corpses of the desaparecidos
are, and what happened to my father and mother. I invite you to give substance to your
words.

In this encounter it is the second generation who interpellates the first generation, and not the
other way: it is not the legacy of the first generation which really matters here, but rather the
second generation’s questioning and searching. Lejderman’s position is that of the second
generation: at the same time as he wants to know about his own parents’ destiny, he demands to
know about the figure of the desaparecido.
As we saw in both Assmann’s and Hoffman’s references in Chapter 2, the second generation are searching for traces which could lead them to the reconstruction of their past (they have inherited a past which demands to be known), but they actively differentiate themselves from the first generations. Contrary to what happened in the case of the Holocaust, the second generation’s response to the past in Chile has not necessarily been ‘organized’ or ‘political’, if by this we understand collective action with a clear goal and program or an underlying utopia. Although a few of my interviewees have been affiliated to organizations such as AFDD, HIJOS or other similar groups which struggle for the memory of the human rights violations, they are not ‘representative’ of the role that the second generation has had in the Chilean case. However, it is easy to fall into the temptation of seeing the second generation dichotomically as either activists or passive actors, trapped in between honouring or failing their parents’ legacy. Avoiding a reductionist view, I suggest that in order to open the meaning of what it means to have political agency, it might be helpful to think of different forms of appropriating the world and relating critically to family political memories and its legacies.

I have developed a point of view which not only distances itself from Manichean memory frames which differentiate between the good and the evil in Chilean history but which tends moreover to give space to the grey zones of memories, which describe experiences which reflect the impossible circumstances in which people are placed. In framing legacies I have shown how the memory of state violence might not offer a reductionist victim portrait but a complex phenomenon like resistance, suffering, feelings of belonging and opposition to others. With this, a different kind of agency has been possible, one which, if it is not militant, is not treacherous either.
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