Pragmatics of explanation:
creative accountability in caring for ‘medically unexplained symptoms’

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Abstract

This paper describes an emergent reconfiguration of the problem of somatization in contemporary research and practice around ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ (‘MUS’)) among UK-based primary care researchers with a special interest in these conditions. Based on an analysis of clinical research literature and on participant observation in the early stages of a clinical research project, the paper explores the iatrogenic dimension of somatization, and contemporary efforts to address it by developing and testing clinically effective explanations. These explanations, I argue, are conceived and enacted not as a representational objective ‘truth’ on the basis of which treatment (or care) of one kind or another should follow, but rather as a speculative ‘truth’ that is efficacious or performative, and that as such is already a form of treatment. Read in the context of current policy imperatives, this development exemplifies an orientation towards cultivating the ability of patients to re-imagine themselves in order to activate their inherent but indeterminate potential for (self-)transformation, growth and self-healing. In the course of my argument I characterize these explanatory strategies as a form of speculative pragmatism, where explanations are conceived as an ingredient in the becoming of the reality of the phenomenon they address and where their value is immanent to the quality of that becoming. In this sense, they may be said to instantiate a form of ‘creative accountability’. In the concluding section of the paper I contrast the speculative pragmatism of these explanations with the ‘cash-value’ pragmatism implicit in explanatory strategies evident among participants of self-help groups for contested illnesses, particularly in the US.

Keywords: somatization, medically unexplained symptoms, contested illnesses, pragmatism, accountability, explanation

In the course of the last two decades, health care policy has become increasingly defined by the notion of patient-centredness and by a number of concepts that cluster around it, including those of participation, involvement and empowerment. While the precise scope, meaning and value of these concepts can be a matter of debate (Salmon and Hall, 2003 and 2004; Thompson, 2007;
Andreassen and Trondsen, 2010), they now inform a wide range of activities and associated technologies at different levels, from individual doctor-patient consultations to the development of clinical guidelines and research programmes. The same period has seen the conspicuous rise of a multiplicity of patient groups and health social movements, including forms of evidence-based activism that ‘focus on knowledge production and knowledge mobilization in the governance of health issues’ (Rabeharisoa et al., 2014: 112). These have involved multiple reconfigurations of the traditional lay/expert distinction, in which patients may be constituted as ‘lay experts’ based on their acquisition of scientific and medical knowledge (Epstein, 1995); as possessors of distinct and irreducible forms of knowledge (Arksey, 1994; Rabeharisoa and Callon, 2004; Pols, 2013); or as partners in the process of scientific research and knowledge production (Rabeharisoa, 2003). These developments are part of a broader movement of democratization of expertise, characterized as such by new opportunities, but also by new tensions and dilemmas (Liberatore and Funtowicz, 2003). One of these concerns the relative value of propositions put forward by different types of ‘experts’ in a variety of situations and what forms of accountability they should be susceptible to, particularly in situations marked by contradiction and conflict (Jasanoff, 2003; Novotny, 2003; Collins and Evans, 2002; Smith and Wessely, 2014).

Another aspect of this health policy context is the increasing reliance on citizens’ capacity to self-manage by ‘taking ownership’ of their problems and exercising responsibility. While this development is closely associated with the rise and consolidation of neoliberalism, it cannot be reduced to a politically motivated strategy to individualize responsibility for health in a move to reduce funding for public services. As Åkerstrøm and Knudsen (2015) have argued, the call to self-management and responsibility is a solution to the ‘heterophonic’ character of health, or the fact that health is increasingly recognized to be dependent on factors that are outside the direct remit of healthcare systems as such (see also Osborne, 1997). This context has seen the emergence of dialogue-based action plans as a technology of governance, through which ‘shared’ perspectives are developed whose aim is to ‘make the citizen claim ownership of the problem while allowing the professional to use their knowledge to shape the
problem’ (Åkerstrøm and Grønbæk, 2016: 286). Questions around motivation and the individuals’ relation to themselves (or self-relation) become central to this form of governance: while citizens are expected to take care of themselves – by coordinating the demands of their multiple spheres of existence and activity, and bridging the tensions between them – it cannot be assumed that they are necessarily motivated or able to do so. By the same token, the remit of governance comes to encompass a speculative dimension, in so far as it addresses ‘the potential for the self-relation to become something it is not yet. ... It is a question of cultivating the ability of citizens to imagine themselves’ in terms of what may be possible rather than what is actual (Åkerstrøm and Grønbæk, 2016: 188-189; see also Greco, 2001).

Against the broad background of this policy landscape, in this paper I examine an emerging form of problematization in the field of research and practice around ‘medically unexplained symptoms’. As illnesses that do not correspond to ‘any known conventionally defined disease’ (Fink et al., 2005: 227), these conditions arguably represent a paradigmatic instance and limit-case of the ‘heterophonic’ character of health problems in so far as they are simultaneously recognized as genuine illnesses, and yet as dependent on biopsychosocial factors that are largely outside the remit (or control) of medicine and the healthcare system. As clinical presentations they are also characterized by inherent uncertainty, often associated with clinical conflict, and in more extreme cases with public controversy as to their nature and aetiology. For these reasons, the ‘responsibilization’ of individuals who present with them can be ambiguous and difficult to differentiate from disqualification from the role of patient. The character of (even hypothetical) explanations that are explicitly or implicitly endorsed to account for the symptoms is crucial to the possibility of making such a differentiation, although the specific significance of this point will vary depending on the healthcare system under consideration. In the US for example, where access to healthcare is largely mediated by private insurance, different explanations can be immediately relevant to determining whether insurance will cover the illness and at what level (Dumit, 2000). In the UK, where healthcare is still free at the point of delivery, access to care is not contingent on having a diagnosis that accounts for the illness, but explanations are immediately
significant in the context of face-to-face encounters with primary care providers, and thus in inflecting a patient’s journey through the system.

Unsurprisingly, the question of ‘explanation’ thus looms large in relation to symptoms and illnesses that are unexplained; it is central to the controversies associated with them, and to the conflict between different (types of) experts in a variety of situations. In this paper I describe a reconfiguration of the way the problem of explanation is being posed by UK-based clinical researchers and practitioners with a specialist interest in this field. This reconfiguration, as I will illustrate, enacts explanation not as a representational objective ‘truth’ on the basis of which treatment (or care) of one kind or another should follow, but rather as a speculative ‘truth’ that is efficacious or performative, and that as such is already a form of treatment. Read in the context of current policy imperatives, this development exemplifies an orientation towards ‘cultivating the ability of citizens to imagine themselves’ in order to activate their inherent but indeterminate potential for (self-)transformation, growth and self-healing. In the course of my argument I shall characterize these explanatory strategies as a form of speculative pragmatism, where explanations are conceived as an ingredient in the becoming of the reality of the phenomenon they address. In the final section of the paper I contrast this form of pragmatism with the ‘cash-value’ pragmatism implicit in explanatory strategies evident among participants of self-help groups for illnesses that ‘you have to fight to get’ (Dumit, 2006).

The argument I develop is based primarily on an analysis of clinical research literature – particularly a series of studies of primary care consultations that have resulted in the proposition that there is a need for a ‘curriculum of medical explanations for medically unexplained symptoms’ (Salmon, 2007; see also Burton, 2014). The analysis of this literature is also informed by my involvement as a participant observer in a conference of the European Association of Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry (Aarhus, 2012) and in the early stages of a programme of research devoted to the trialling of explanations as a clinical intervention in primary care.
In describing ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ as a space of problematization rather than as a particular category of illnesses I seek to address the whole range of theoretical and empirical possibilities involved in forms of discourse that relate to this expression, including those that engage with it specifically in order to reject it. Many illnesses are unexplained, but not all of them fall under the rubric of ‘medically unexplained symptoms’. Unlike the term ‘idiopathic’, this expression is specifically used to indicate physical symptoms that ‘are not attributable to any known conventionally defined disease’ (Fink et al., 2005: 227), and is discursively related to several other terms and concepts, each with different connotations, that may be used to describe the same phenomenon (or indeed to dispute such sameness – see Greco, 2012 for a review and discussion). These include the concept of somatization, the DSM diagnostic categories of somatoform disorders (DSM-IV) and somatic symptom disorder (DSM 5), the concept of functional somatic syndrome(s), and the multiple diagnoses that – often controversially – are subsumed under it, such as fibromyalgia; chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), also known as myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) and often as ‘ME/CFS’; multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS); irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) and others. This terminological multiplicity and the controversies surrounding the use of many of these terms reflects the fact that basic taxonomic questions – such as ‘are we dealing with one or many phenomena when it comes to describing medically unexplained symptoms?’ (Deary, 1999: 51) – have not been resolved.

The lack of consensus about nomenclature and classification as well as the supposedly ‘unexplained’ nature of the symptoms are an empirical phenomenon of sociological, psychological and medical significance in its own right. I propose to regard this as a second-order phenomenon, to be distinguished analytically from the first-order phenomenon of symptoms themselves. Illnesses without a diagnosis, or with a contested or illegitimate diagnosis, involve an additional burden of suffering that stems from profound uncertainty, from social stigma, from the potential denial of access to benefits and services. Much of the sociological and anthropological research on these conditions has focused on
making this additional burden visible and discussable (eg Cohn, 1999; Clarke and James, 2003; Nettleton, 2006; Dumit, 2000 and 2006; Stenner et al., 2000; Stenner et al., 2015). Any serious discourse about ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ today must thus take as its point of departure a recognition of this second order phenomenon, and of a potential dimension of conflict with patients who are thought to reject labels and explanations that suggest their illness may be ‘psychological’. This is reflected in the contemporary preference, in the scientific literature, for expressions like ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ – over ‘somatization’ in particular – not as an ideal choice but as the lesser evil, and therefore often in scare quotes or followed by qualifying statements and disclaimers.¹

Among significant portions of the medical profession the tacit commonsense consensus remains that medically unexplained symptoms (or ‘MUS’) and somatization refer to the ‘same’, poorly defined, clinical phenomenon, albeit (at least for those specialising in this field) with significantly different theoretical connotations. Pragmatic considerations inform the terminological shift regardless of theoretical ones: while ‘somatization’ is a resented and stigmatising term, ‘unexplained symptoms’ appears, at least in principle, comparatively neutral, un-psychological, and benign. There is, however, something paradoxical and self-defeating in these terminological shifts, in so far as they are perceived to be catering to patient ‘preferences’ (that is, to their psychology) and to be informed by pragmatic or even cynical concerns (as a form of appeasement, to avoid conflict), rather than attending to the objective reality or truth of their condition. The more care is taken not to offend patients, the more sensitive patients seem to become to the possibility of being duped, infantilized and offended. This is reflected in the notion, expressed colloquially by a senior clinician in this field, that each new expression coming into use has a limited ‘shelf life’: its utility expires as soon as patients realize that it’s ‘just a new name for somatization’.²

The research developments to which I now turn emerge from and against this background. As we shall see, rather than discarding the concept of somatization as obsolete or politically unacceptable, they reconfigure it in significant ways.
Turning the tables on ‘somatization’: evidencing the iatrogenic vortex

In what is still a standard reference for the definition of the concept, Z. J. Lipowski (1988: 1359) describes somatization as ‘a tendency to experience and communicate somatic distress and symptoms unaccounted for by pathological findings, to attribute them to physical illness, and to seek medical help for them ... despite doctors’ reassurances that physical illness cannot account for [the] symptoms’. Lipowski further adds that ‘the appraisal, and hence the meaning, of the experienced symptoms needs to be in terms of an actual or threatened disease of or damage to the body for the term to apply’ (1988: 1359). Core to the construct of somatization is the notion that patients who somatize are committed to physical (biomedical) explanations of their condition. By inference, the construct also involves the assumption that patients cannot think psychologically and/or that they resist psychological explanations.

A series of studies published from the mid-2000s has challenged the axiomatic status of these propositions and tested them empirically by analysing consultations for unexplained symptoms in primary care settings, with surprising results (Ring et al., 2005; Salmon et al., 2006; Salmon et al., 2007). One study showed, for example, that patients with unexplained symptoms offered many and varied opportunities for their doctors to address them in a psychological register. Although patients provided unambiguous cues to emotional and social problems, these were blocked by most doctors in a variety of ways: by disregarding the cue, by normalising it (‘it’s bad luck, isn’t it?’), by emphasising the patient’s responsibility for the problem, or by reasserting the somatic agenda. ‘In responding to patients’ cues for explanation by providing symptomatic treatments, investigations or referral’, the authors write, ‘doctors effectively “somatized” these patients’ (Salmon et al., 2004: 175). Having thus demonstrated how the clinical consultation can have ‘somatising effects’ (Ring et al., 2005), they call for further research into the motivations behind doctors’ somatising responses to their patients (Salmon et al., 2006).

Why do doctors focus somatically? Suggestions as to the likely nature of their motivations point to multiple sources of doctors’ anxiety when faced with symptoms they cannot explain: these include feelings of inadequacy when faced
with manifestations of psychological distress that they do not feel trained or equipped to manage (Wileman et al., 2002; Chew-Graham et al., 2001); reluctance towards using stigmatising diagnoses; and fear of overlooking a genuine physical disease, linked to fear of litigation and media exposure (Fink et al., 2005). What is interesting about this list is that it points to the relevance of the psychology and affective involvement of doctors in co-producing the reality of ‘somatization’. Intensely negative emotions were apparent in the accounts of the general practitioners studied by Wileman et al. (2002), including frustration and resentment, with some doctors admitting that these affected their clinical judgment. The authors illustrate this with a quotation from one of their participants, GP10:

You can get yourself into the position where you will never spot an illness in this patient if it was staring you in the face and they were dead on the floor, because you will feel it’s just their bloody somatising (GP10, cited in Wileman, et al., 2002: 181).

The changing balance of power within the medical consultation, which some GPs in this study perceived to have become skewed in favour of the patient, is explicitly addressed as a source of doctors’ negative emotions. The feeling emerging perhaps most strongly from these accounts, according to the authors, was a general ‘sense of powerlessness ... in the face of apparently intractable symptoms rooted in the realm of the social’ (Wileman et al., 2002: 181). These findings were consistent with a series of earlier studies by the same team, exploring GPs’ responses to manifestations of psychological distress in consultations for chronic lower back pain and depression (Chew-Graham and May 1999; Chew-Graham et al., 2001; Rogers et al., 2001).

Taken all together, these propositions can be read as an emerging problematization of somatization that does not simply dismiss the concept either on epistemological grounds, or on grounds that patients find the term and its connotations unacceptable. This problematization engages with somatization as a concrete process, not just as an unfortunate or invalid construct (cf. Crombez et al., 2009), but turns it around, or reframes it fundamentally. It does this by providing the
elements for an empirically-based analysis of how patients are ‘somatized’ in the clinical interaction and by the medical system within which this takes place.

The proposition that somatization is a systemic product of Western medicine is far from new. The psychiatrist Horacio Fabrega articulated it in the journal *Psychosomatic Medicine* nearly three decades ago, for example (Fabrega, 1990). Until recently, however, this remained an abstract proposition based on a discussion of the features of biomedical epistemology considered, as in Fabrega’s case, in a comparative historical and anthropological perspective. Biomedicine, like much of modern science, is predicated on what Alfred North Whitehead described as the bifurcation of nature: a mode of abstraction that makes a fundamental distinction between objective, causal nature (defined as primary) and subjective nature (defined as secondary). In medicine this bifurcation translates into the conceptual distinction between objective ‘disease’ and subjective ‘illness’, which is hierarchical in that the truth or reality of an illness is understood to be secondary to the truth of a disease. Fabrega refers to this as the ‘postulate of mind/body correspondence’: a postulate that prescribes ‘how a patient behaves and should behave in the context of specific/measurable disease changes in the body’, and that encompasses ‘such things as reports of pain, bodily experience and physiological dysfunction’, as well as ‘culturally appropriate degrees and forms of worry … modes of social role functioning and health care seeking’ (1990: 554). From the perspective of this epistemological orthodoxy, illnesses that are not supported by evidence of disease can in principle be dismissed or explained away as medically insignificant. The endurance of this epistemological orthodoxy, despite the proliferation of conditions that would seem to challenge it or contradict it, can be attributed at least partly to the practical value that it continues to have in relation to problems and functions that are other than strictly medical, such as gatekeeping (Greco, 1998). In other words, evidence of disease offers a baseline discriminating criterion for access to the sick role and a bulwark against moral ambiguity – however questionable and complicated this may have become in a social context defined by a prevalence of chronic and ‘lifestyle’ diseases and by the redefinition of patients as ‘consumers’ (Varul, 2010). In the absence of evidence of disease – as in the case of ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ – doctors still make gatekeeping decisions that admit patients into the sick role, but these become less transparent and more difficult to account for (Mik-Meyer and Obling, 2012); in healthcare systems mediated by
private insurance they may also become legally and politically contentious (Afram, 2004; Dumit, 2006).

In this epistemic context, patients who present with unexplained symptoms can easily find themselves caught in a iatrogenic dynamic well rendered in the famous phrase by the rheumatologist Nortin Hadler: ‘If you have to prove you are ill, you can’t get well’ (1996). This is a dynamic whose elements are now illustrated in rich empirical detail by the sum of the studies that form part of the problematization addressed here, and it goes something like this: since there is ostensibly ‘nothing wrong’ with them, patients with unexplained symptoms need to work hard in a clinical context to ‘fit in with normative, biomedical expectations’ and become a ‘credible patient’ (Werner and Malterud, 2003: 1409). This effort includes adopting an idiom of explanation that focuses on the physical aetiology of symptoms at the expense of other, more nuanced idioms that are typically employed elsewhere, such as in conversations with family or friends (Bech-Risør, 2009). Patients are encouraged to present in this way by doctors who, as we have seen, themselves tend to focus somatically and to ignore psychosocial cues. This predicament constitutes what Paul Watzlawick and colleagues (1967) called a pragmatic paradox: the efforts made to behave as a credible patient, to the extent that they are perceived as such by others, will tend inevitably to backfire, because a true illness is supposed to be something that befalls us rather than something we ‘perform’. Therefore, while adopting a somatic idiom of explanation is facilitated and reinforced by the clinical setting and its structural constraints, doing so when there is ‘nothing wrong’ actually renders the patient conspicuous from a psychobehavioural (and moral, in a broad sense) point of view, prompting doubt or negative feelings in the doctor, and renewed effort to establish credibility on the part of the patient. The logic of this dynamic tends towards a polemical polarization of the positions of doctor and patient, and of physical versus psychological explanations.iii

This situational (and socioculturally embedded) logic, in other words, sets physical and psychological explanations up to emerge as mutually exclusive alternatives, regardless of any more complex or nuanced understandings that the parties involved may privately hold.

Although the studies discussed so far mostly refer to clinical interactions in the context of individual doctor-patient consultations, a similar dynamic is fractally reproduced at other levels of analysis, such as in public and cultural discourse. In his
study of ‘very large scale conversations’ (Sack, 2002) among members of online newsgroups for CFS and for MCS, for example, Joe Dumit (2006; 2000) has shown how sufferers mobilize biomedical facts – the equivalent of a somatic idiom of explanation – as ‘forces’ in the struggle to obtain legitimacy. At the same time, within the space of the newsgroup, they may discuss strategies for self-presentation such as how to dress in order to appear convincingly disabled (‘sloppy’), and the possibility that this may backfire (‘don’t you think that all those disability review doctors know perfectly well that anyone faking a disability will be trying to look sick by looking sloppy?’) (2006: 586). What this demonstrates is not, of course, these members’ collusion in a form of malingering, but rather that the system itself provokes and facilitates the emergence of such tactical behaviours to ensure the legitimation of illness, and yet treats them as disqualifying evidence as soon as they become conspicuous as behaviours. Another example is offered by Kristin Barker’s analysis of discourse around fibromyalgia, with reference to the FDA approval of Lyrica as the first prescription medication specific for the management of the condition (2011). Sufferers initially welcomed Lyrica enthusiastically on internet bulletin boards and other public forums, not only for the promise of relief that the drug offered, but also for its value in legitimating fibromyalgia as a ‘real’ (ie biomedical) disease rather than a mental illness. Seemingly well aware of the importance of this dimension to its target market, Pfitzer’s advertising campaign for the drug specifically stressed that that it was ‘not an antidepressant’ (2011: 837). In this case, Lyrica became the proxy for a biomedical explanation for somatic symptoms. In so far as this was the case, however, any failure of the drug to deliver on its promise could also be interpreted as proving that fibromyalgia is not a biomedical condition after all: ‘If Lyrica does not restore [sufferers] to health, as seen on television, and in the vast majority of cases it will not, this could be used to confirm that their problem is all in their head, that they are hysterical, or that they do not want to get better’ (2011: 840). These examples – both referring to studies based in the United States – illustrate collective efforts to become ‘credible’, both as individual patients and as a category of patients, on the part of members of self-help and discussion groups who share a contested diagnosis. They also show how such efforts can backfire on the larger scale of cultural and public discourse, and not just within the privacy of the consultation.
As Hadler already suggested two decades ago on the basis of his own clinical experience with fibromyalgia, the effort to behave as a credible patient has effects beyond the realm of communication, arguably reaching all the way down to an individual’s physiological capacity for self-regulation. As a result of having to prove they are ill, Hadler wrote, sufferers are ‘likely to lose the prerequisite skills for well being, the abilities to discern among the morbidities, and to cope’ (1996: 2398). A set of normative constraints that include the use of differential diagnostic algorithms, disability determination for social security purposes, and tort law thus collude to draw the patient into a ‘vortex of escalating vulnerability and disaffection’ from which ‘very few recover’ (ibid.). Even when legal and political battles to obtain access to services are not involved, the uncertainty and moral ambiguity associated with the lack of a diagnosis and explanation can leave sufferers in a state of ‘embodied doubt’ and permanent narrative ‘chaos’ (Nettleton, 2006; Frank, 1995). While it is commonsense – within a dualist framework – to suppose that a lack of narrative coherence may have implications for mental health, recent conceptualizations of the immune system suggest that the achievement of narrative coherence may be directly relevant to immune function and thus to physical health as well (Koschwanez et al., 2013; Petrie et al., 2004; Booth and Davison, 2003; Pennebaker et al., 1988). The implication of this is that there is a feedback loop between the psychosocial suffering associated with delegitimation (or what I called the second-order phenomenon) and the genesis of somatic symptoms (the first-order phenomenon).

The polarization of biomedical and psychological explanations, in a dynamic that makes them present as mutually exclusive alternatives, therefore appears not only scientifically flawed but also performatively toxic. In choosing the word toxic here I refer to the propositions of Isabelle Stengers in relation to what she calls the ‘efficacy’ of theory. ‘The manner in which something is theoretically characterized’, she writes, ‘is part of the milieu of that something, and may empower it or poison it’. (2008: 51). Theories ‘are always efficacious, they always add to a situation even when they only aim at diagnosing it’, and they can be ‘maleficent’ even when they are right (2008: 53). Thus theories – like the ‘facts’ mobilized by the sufferers, doctors and institutions observed by Dumit (2006) – are indeed ‘forces’, they have the power to produce effects. If we follow Stengers, however, the salient effects are not limited to those that result from the impact of theories on the organization of social and discursive practices (eg
victory in a legal case transforming the conditions of access to services). As part of the vital milieu of the ‘something’ to which they refer, and in combination with its ontological propensities and sensitivities, theories infect the immanent becoming of that ‘something’, they affect its homeostatic capacity and ultimately its health (or ‘power’) – in this case not only a sufferer’s capacity to access health services but also their immanent health status, independently of the question of access (cf. Greco, 2004).

The turning of the tables on the concept of somatization – its reconfiguration as the iatrogenic product of a medicine organized around the distinction between disease and illness, objective evidence and subjective experience, and biomedical versus psychological explanations – constitutes an implicit acknowledgment of the potentially maleficent force of abstract propositions, even when they are based on valid (if inevitably partial) knowledge, and even when they are not immediately tied to practical social consequences such as the denial of access to care.

As we have seen, the notion that somatization is a product of Western medicine is not new. The inadequacies of epistemological dualism have been denounced in the name of varieties of ‘holism’ for more than a century (Lawrence and Weisz, 1998), and they are routinely regretted in editorials and commentaries published in medical journals. In this sense, the problematization described here is remarkable only in that it challenges empirically some of the assumptions and concrete practices that stem from epistemic dualism, to demonstrate with richness of illustrative detail not just that, but how Western medicine has ‘somatising effects’. In addition to this, however, this reconfigured space of problematization also involves a propositive dimension, and it is to describing this that I now turn.

Taking symptoms seriously

Taken as a whole, what I am calling here the propositive dimension of the new discourse on unexplained symptoms stems from two seemingly contrasting conclusions emerging from different strands of research. The first of these conclusions may be summarized by the injunction: ‘forget explanation!’, and we find it in the context of debates on classification and nomenclature that intensified as the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM 5) was being prepared.
Shifting the terms of the debate hitherto, which had focused on problematising specific aetiological assumptions reflected in terms such as ‘somatization’, Sharpe et al. (2006) questioned the privilege accorded to aetiology more generally, advocating a research and clinical focus on symptoms ‘in their own right’. They argued that existing diagnostic nomenclature is misleading and counterproductive in so far as it implies hypothetical underlying pathology – be it physical (as in ‘myalgic encephalomyelitis’) or psychological (as in ‘somatoform disorder’) – because this reinforces the assumption of a linear causal relation between pathology and symptoms. Sharpe et al.’s proposition stems from a developing field of ‘symptom research’ whose ‘possibilities and challenges’ (Kroenke and Harris, 2001, p. 801) are only just beginning to be articulated. In this field, symptoms are approached as ‘higher order’, emergent phenomena ‘reflecting the brain’s integration of multiple aetiological factors’ (Sharpe et al., 2006, p. 355) of which conventionally understood disease may, or may not, be one (Kroenke, 2012). This is in sharp contrast to the conventional approach that regards symptoms (and illness) as epistemologically subordinate or secondary with respect to underlying pathology (or disease). From this perspective, ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ no longer appear marginal and residual to ‘proper medicine’, as they are no longer conceived in terms of an absence, or in terms of what they are not; on the contrary, they become instances of organic (mal-)functioning of the highest order of complexity, requiring the deployment of sophisticated scientific models that do not lend themselves to the specification of clear or simple causal narratives. For the same reason, the distinction between symptoms that can be attributed to a conventionally defined disease and those that cannot – that is, the distinction previously articulated as the one between ‘medically explained’ and ‘medically unexplained’ symptoms – appears no longer relevant. In fact, a focus on the qualities of the symptoms alone (including how they are experienced and interpreted) reveals more commonalities than differences between patients with ‘explained’ and with ‘unexplained’ illness (Creed, 2013). This is the rationale behind the revision of the DSM-IV category of Somatoform Disorder into the DSM 5 category of Somatic Symptom Disorder, for which the presence of ‘unexplained’ symptoms is no longer a diagnostic criterion.
Alongside this proposition, that invites scientists to suspend the question of whether symptoms are biomedically explained and to cease constructing taxonomies around it, we find the sum of social scientific and consultation-based research – some of which I discussed above – which indicates that sufferers nevertheless need (good) explanations. A ‘good’ explanation, often implicit in a ‘good’ diagnosis, reassures and legitimates; without it, as we have seen, the interaction with the medical system can easily leave sufferers in the existential no-man’s land of a chaos narrative (Nettleton, 2006). In this sense, explanations and diagnoses can be regarded not merely as more or less accurate representations of the patient’s condition, but as efficacious interventions with therapeutic and social value in their own right. But what can constitute a ‘good’ explanation in this sense? What set of constraints are relevant to defining a ‘good’ explanations in this context? This is a context, let us remind ourselves, defined by the ‘proto-professionalization’ of patients and the public at large, who have learned to adopt biomedical vocabularies and expect biomedical explanations (de Swaan, 1988; Dent, 2006); by multiple claims to epistemological authority in potential tension with each other (Smith and Wessely, 2012); and by the ‘problem of whose knowledge counts in the medical encounter’ (May et al., 2006: 1028).

The question of what constitutes a good explanation is being asked and researched, as part of the problematization outlined here, in ways that I argue propose attention to a set of new contrasts: not the familiar contrast between the ‘physical’ (or biomedically explained) and the ‘mental’ (or biomedically unexplained); nor the contrast between ‘evidence’ (and the epistemological authority of biomedicine) and ‘experience’ (and the epistemological authority of the patient). Both of these, as we have seen, are contrasts that the classic model of somatization rendered as a polemical contradiction between mutually exclusive alternatives. The new contrasts specifically concern the pragmatic value of the explanations at play, and introduce important differentiations in terms of what it means to be ‘pragmatic’ in relation to the problem of explaining symptoms that are not susceptible to a linear causal narrative. In what follows I will stage these contrasts to argue that an appreciation of them is important not only in a clinical context, but also for the purpose of defining the value of social scientific representations of, and interventions in, this contested field.
Explanations as a ‘wager on an unfinished present’

If it is true that the clinical consultation can have somatising effects it is also true that not all patients are badly managed in the sense of being ‘somatized’. On this basis, the same group of researchers who illustrated the somatising effects of the clinical consultation have also studied the communication between doctors and patients with ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ with a view to articulating what types of explanations are perceived as ‘satisfying’ and ‘empowering’, and can as such be considered clinically effective (Salmon et al., 1999; Dowrick et al., 2004). Like the studies reviewed above, these too turn the tables on how the problem has traditionally been posed.

Often referred to as an act of ‘normalization’ of symptoms, the process of reassuring patients is conceived as facilitating the ‘recognition that symptoms are part of the normal human experience’ and do not necessarily represent disease, or even illness (Kessler and Hamilton 2004: 163). This process often fails, and the failure has traditionally been imputed to the psychological characteristics of patients (‘what’s wrong with this patient, such that they cannot be reassured?’). Indeed, the failure to be reassured is a key aspect of the classic definition of somatization by Lipowski (1988). In contrast to this approach, and focusing on the delivery of reassurance by doctors, Dowrick et al. (2004) found that the explanations that succeed in reassuring patients have three characteristics: first, they acknowledge and validate the patient’s sense of suffering, without dismissing the reality or significance of the symptoms; second, they provide ‘tangible mechanisms’ to explain the symptoms, arising as part of a discussion with the patient as an active interlocutor; and third, they offer patients the opportunity to link the physical symptoms to the psychosocial dimensions of the patient’s life (see also Salmon et al., 1999). At least one programme of research in the UK is currently taking these characteristics as points of departure for the development and testing of explanations as a form of intervention, in the context of a primary-secondary care interface clinic known as The Symptoms Clinic (Burton et al., 2012; Burton et al., 2013; Morton et al., 2016).
For the present discussion, it is worth dwelling on a data excerpt that Dowrick at al., in their original study, present as an illustration of a successful explanation (2004, p. 168):

**Dr:** ‘*The only thing that fits is, it’s the sort of pain you get with shingles because it comes around in that pattern.*’

**P:** ‘Yes, yes.’

**Dr:** ‘*And that’s sometimes irritation of the nerve endings.*’

**P:** ‘That’s what somebody else, me Nan says, “It could be your nerves”.’

**Dr:** ‘*I don’t mean your emotional nerves, your actual physical nerves that come round your body – but it could be made worse by stress or things like that.*’

**P:** ‘*I mean, I’m obviously one of them people that are highly strung anyway, I know that. [...]’

**Dr:** ‘*Have you had any sort of relaxation to see if that would help your pain?*’

What is immediately striking about the content of this exchange – like that of the other excerpts the authors bring as examples – is its distance and difference with respect to the sense in which it might qualify as an ‘explanation’ in any scientific, epistemologically authoritative sense, or even as the rendition of such an explanation in commonsense language. This is a point Dowrick et al. (2004: 169) stress in the discussion of their findings: ‘*[w]hat is emerging here*, they write, ‘*is a crucial difference between explanations drawn *a priori* from medical knowledge, and those developed by patients and practitioners within shared frameworks that ... are more likely to provide a satisfactory representation of illness, and of the causes and consequences of symptoms.*’

In a broader policy and cultural context characterized by values of patient-centredness and democratization, explanations that are co-constructed rather than unilaterally imposed may appear inherently more desirable or ‘better’ in so far as they instantiate values of patient involvement and participation. But when there is a conflict of interpretations involved, as often in the domain of ‘medically unexplained symptoms’, the effort to include patient perspectives can result in seemingly intractable dilemmas and distortions. Forms of professional collusion
or acquiescence with biomedical theories proposed by patients, even when these contradict existing evidence and/or the explanatory models favoured by doctors based on such evidence, have been documented both in the context of the consultation and at the level of clinical guideline development (Salmon et al., 1999; Smith and Wessely, 2014). In such cases, we might say that the political value of participation, when it is privileged uncritically with respect to the question of knowledge validity, is allowed to trump the latter, with the potential result of further undermining confidence in the competences of each party and in the process (cf. Jasanoff, 2003). It is therefore crucial to note, in this respect, that what is going on in the proposition of a curriculum of medical explanation for ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ is something different from the appeal to a form of political (and procedural) accountability in the name of patient-centredness or democratization. *This proposition instantiates co-construction not primarily as a political value, but rather as a process that is medically appropriate on account of how the nature of the phenomenon it addresses is conceived.*

Crudely put, the explanations that are being developed in the context of this problematization are explanations borne out of a recognition that the nature of the illness – and not just that of the patient as a citizen and consumer – is such as not to be indifferent to what explanations are applied to it. In this sense, it is an approach that foregrounds the importance of *process* not merely in procedural terms, as what occurs between pre-constituted subjects or entities, but in the conception of the nature of the medical entity as an explicitly unfinished, becoming entity, and also as a vital and responsive entity. It is therefore an approach that differs profoundly from the epistemological structure of biomedicine, where diagnostic acts are separated from therapeutic acts, on the assumption that disease is ‘a biological reality, independent of any therapeutic relationship or intervention, that is simply waiting to be discovered and correctly labeled’ (Kirmayer, 1994: 184). On the contrary, we may read these explanations, in the vein of a *speculative pragmatism*, as a ‘wager on the unfinishedness of the present, … an intellectual operation whose business is that of making thought creative of an alternative future by producing an inventive response to an impending problem’ (Savransky, 2016).
Conceived in this way, the explanations resemble forms of psychotherapeutic truth that Kirmayer (1994: 198 and ff.) describes as prospective, proactive and prescriptive: truths whose value relies not on their ability to accurately describe causal mechanisms and predict the future, but on their ability to lure events – and the embodied experience of the patient, in this case – in the direction of new possibilities. Importantly, the de facto psychotherapeutic character of the explanations, in this case, emphatically does not imply an attribution of psychopathology (as distinct from organic pathology) or a psychiatric diagnosis (as distinct from a biomedical one). Again, the reason for this stems less from ‘political’ concerns as such (eg a concern not to offend) than from the specific nature of the problem at hand and the exigencies or obligations this generates in terms of constructing a valid explanation, one that ‘satisfies’ from a scientific as much as from a clinical and political perspective. These are explanations that take somatic symptoms seriously as such, that is, that do not regard them as proxies for psychological distress; they refer to what goes on in the body and offer suggestions as to how concrete bodily processes may be visualized or imagined, in a conversational framework that relates these closely to the patients’ psychosocial reality, in response to specific cues (rather than as the application of an abstract and general theory). The science to which the explanations implicitly refer, as we have seen, is one not of simple causal mechanisms but of complex pathways and feedback loops involving simultaneously biological, psychological and social events. In focusing attention on these processes, rather than on a diagnostic label, the explanations are effectively educating patients (and doctors) into thinking differently about causality. If the explanations ‘ring true’, and are thereby effective, this is not because they simply confirm pre-existing (and possibly dysfunctional) beliefs but because there is no longer an irreducible contradiction between the medical (or scientific) ‘truth’ and that of the patient’s experience.

To appreciate the potential achievement of these explanations as a form of intervention does not imply, of course, that their value can be generalized to all patients with unexplained symptoms or other situations. Indeed it is no accident that they are being developed as an intervention in the context of primary care (rather than secondary or tertiary care) consultations, where the dynamic leading
to a *iatrogenic vortex* arguably begins or at least is found at its earliest stages. Whether the intervention can be generalized even to just primary care remains an open question currently being researched. My aim here, however, is not to focus on the transportability or otherwise of the intervention but rather to highlight how it instantiates a form of *creative accountability*, one that ‘dares to speculate about what may come into existence’ as a result of it (Stengers, 2008: 53; see also Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). These explanations, in other words, are conceived and enacted as *ingredients in the becoming of the situation*, and their value is immanently related to the quality of that becoming. If there is a more general conclusion to be drawn from this example, it concerns the importance of paying attention to the immanent features of situations, and to wonder what it might mean to act in ways that will facilitate novelty, and not hinder becoming, within each of them.

In the following and concluding section of this paper, I will contrast the ethos of speculative pragmatism - as a lure to the possible – with a different form of pragmatism exemplified by explanatory strategies adopted in relation to ‘illnesses you have to fight to get’ (Dumit, 2006), in contexts where the provision of care is mediated by private insurance or contingent of the ability to pay.

*To conclude: ‘cash-value’ pragmatism and the creative accountability of epistemic agnosticism*

In a chapter entitled 'When explanations rest: “good enough” brain science and the new socio-medical disorders', US-based anthropologist Joe Dumit (2000) illustrates how patient groups involved in advocating the biomedical character of contested illnesses – such as multiple chemical sensitivity or chronic fatigue syndrome – often do so by mobilising brain imaging technologies as sources of factual and objective evidence for their claims. Dumit conducted a multi-sited ethnography: he observed communities of medical researchers in their laboratories and conferences, but he also followed activists, court cases, and popular culture representations. What he found, unsurprisingly, is that brain imaging scans were appreciated and evaluated very differently, as forms of evidence, in different contexts: explanations and evidence that might not satisfy a
scientific researcher could be ‘good enough’ in other settings such as courtrooms, for example, at least temporarily. His research clearly shows that, whether explanations are ‘true’ or not in a scientific sense, they have pragmatic functions and these are multiple and vary by context. Against this background, Dumit asks: ‘Are these preliminary underfunded [brain imaging] studies, which are touted as proof, “bad science”? Are internet groups pressing for specific research agendas biasing otherwise objective work? Or it is possible that there is a need for public relations research promoting these disorders as “brain disorders”?’ (2000: 227).

In other words: since there is a pragmatic value to these explanations, can and should their pragmatic value trump the issue whether they are scientifically ‘true’? In asking this question – to which his rhetoric suggests a positive answer – Dumit explicitly refers the pragmatic value of brain-based explanations to the context of the political economy of health in the United States, where access to healthcare services is highly contingent on criteria set by insurance agencies that rely on codified diagnoses and are typically reluctant to treat mental illness. In such a context, arguing for the neurobiological basis of a given disorder is equivalent, in a very concrete sense, to arguing for its recognition as ‘real’ versus its dismissal as ‘unreal’.

The pragmatism exemplified in Dumit’s approach tends towards a form of relativism or agnosticism in relation to the question of the nature of the illnesses about which he writes. Such agnosticism is not untypical of social scientific research on ‘medically unexplained symptoms’, much of which has focused on the psychosocial consequences of living with an uncertain illness, while remaining silent on the question of how they might be ‘truthfully’ characterized other than as ‘uncertain’ or ‘contested’. It is fair to say that, in the approach exemplified here by Dumit, it doesn’t matter if the science mobilized by patient activists is ‘bad science’: what matters is that it facilitates and sustains the mobilization. If what matters is the pragmatic value of the explanations favoured by internet groups rather than their scientific ‘truth’, however, it is still possible to put such explanations to the (pragmatic) test of the difference they make to the phenomenon they address. It is still possible, in other words, to consider how different theoretical characterizations of the nature of symptoms, by becoming part of their milieu, may infect and affect their possibilities of becoming. In this
sense, and to state the matter in the broadest terms, the pragmatic value of conventional biomedical explanations – in so far as these ‘work’ – is to purchase legitimacy on an immediate and piecemeal basis at the expense of reinforcing a bifurcated mode of thought that, as we have seen, is an important factor in (re)producing the experience and predicament of ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ at a variety of levels. The epistemic agnosticism of social scientists, when it implicitly endorses these explanations in the name of their immediate pragmatic value, colludes in reproducing what I have referred to as the iatrogenic vortex on a broad, cultural level. This ‘cash-value’ pragmatism stands in sharp contrast with a speculative pragmatism that is characterized by an effort to ‘[vectorize] a transition into ... novel situations’ (Savransky, 2016).

The reconfiguration of the discursive space around symptoms that we see currently occurring in the UK (and elsewhere in northern Europe) is facilitated by the existence of healthcare systems that do not yet require the reality of an illness to be established as objective, codifiable and itemisable as a condition of access to services. This means that ‘cultivating the capacity of citizens to imagine themselves’ (and their symptoms) differently, in an attempt to activate their potential for self-healing, can occur in a context of care and under the aegis of care. In a different system, as the US case of ‘illnesses you have to fight to get’ illustrates, the same capacity to imagine oneself differently might constitute a reason to be excluded from the system, and in this sense the system acts as a deterrent against developing it. This suggests, perhaps counter-intuitively, that responsibilization for health – the fostering of response-ability to ‘take ownership’ of health factors that are beyond the remit or control of medical practice – may be most effective when it is premised on the existence of a system that provides universal coverage (Evans et al., 2013) and that is capable of tolerating a relatively greater degree of indeterminacy or uncertainty (cf Greco, 2004). This is in contrast to the mainstream political rhetoric that associates responsibility for health with an ideal of autonomous individuals in control of their lifestyle choices.

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Notes

i It is significant in this respect that even the most thoroughly argued critiques of ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ – critiques that reject the expression on scientific and epistemological grounds – still retain it albeit in crossed-out form as *medically unexplained symptoms* (see Creed, 2013). This suggests that, for all its epistemological faults, it remains so far a useful point of departure and entry into the relevant debates.

ii In this connection it is worth mentioning that the expression ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ is already well past its sell-by date, with preference given (at least provisionally, in this study) to Persistent Physical Symptoms and Functional Symptoms (Marks and Hunter, 2015). See also Stone et al. (2002) for a study that measures the degree of offensiveness of different expressions that may be used to refer to symptoms.

iii In Greco and Stenner (in press) we describe this dynamic as typical of what we call a ‘liminal hotpot’, and discuss paradox, paralysis, polarization and the potential for pattern shift as generic characteristics of such hotspots.


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