In Service to India: The ethics of Rule and conduct of British Administrators and Army Officers in late nineteenth and early twentieth century India

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ABSTRACT

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IN SERVICE TO INDIA:
THE ETHICS OF RULE AND CONDUCT OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATORS
AND ARMY OFFICERS IN LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH
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In this study I explore the military, administrative and governmental practices of
British men as rulers in India during the Victorian and early Edwardian period. The
historical events that are the focus of this study are the massacres and disturbances in
Punjab, Amritsar 1919. I concentrate on three ruling characters involved in these
events; an administrator, a military officer, and an Indian Secretary of State. The
central question I ask is: how are these white men who claim to be fitted to rule over
others made? I explore the changing relationships between these men and the history
of colonialism in India. More specifically, I examine the intersections between
movements for independence and shifts in styles of colonial domination amongst these men in India at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In analyzing the events of 1919 I bring together discourses usually separated in discussions of colonial power. First, by following Foucault's leads on the problem of government and his reformulation of it as 'governmentality', I pursue the question of colonial subjectivity and its constitution. I remove the colonial authorities in these instances from discourses of the singular and sinister. I find on the contrary that what is at stake are specific professions and traditions of imperial duty that have both internal and external manifestations. Internal in the sense that the men I investigate are concerned to conduct themselves in a manner that befits their calling as rulers, and their conduct is in their view beyond reproach in this regard. External in the sense that their deportment is directed to carrying out their imperial duties in the service of others. I also implicate Indian rule in the extra state techniques of government that preoccupy Foucault's histories of governmentality. Second I combine this approach with an attention to the lives and biographies of certain exemplary individuals. Here I use an approach close to Stefan Collini's characterological method, in which O'Dwyer, Dyer and Montagu exemplify a certain character formation crucial to the exercise of colonial rule. Each of the men I investigate is concerned in their own ways, to support the longevity of empire. In this sense, both through their larger work, in particular their writing and public conversations, and their conduct, they give voice to their specific traditions of empire.
I therefore propose a novel reading of Amritsar that sees those events as a window for exploring shifts in styles of colonial rule and domination in India during those times.

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1

Foreword

In this chapter I introduce the historical events that are my anchor and with which I engage- the massacres and disturbances in the Punjab, especially Amritsar, 1919. Through a (re)reading of relevant historiographies, I consider the massacres, and set out my point of departure from the scenes as they are recounted in that literature. In the final analysis, I do not analyze the events of 1919 as an event. Nor do I judge the events of 1919 in terms of legitimacy or justice. My analysis is of a different question: how the three central characters I investigate are fashioned as rulers?

Thus, in chapters 3, 4 and 5 I investigate how each of the white men, who are centrally involved in the Amritsar massacres and are the focus of my concerns, is shaped as a ruler. I explore firstly, the ethos of an 'administrative man' (Sir Michael O'Dwyer); secondly, those of an 'military man' (Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer); and thirdly, those of a man who finds himself in 'government' (Edwin Montagu).

In the final section I summarize my research aims and present a precis of the chapters that follow.
Massacre and Shame

(a) Massacre

At about 4:00 p.m. on the 13th April 1919, Brig-General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer led a small group of troops through the narrow streets of Amritsar, posting bands of pickets at strategic points along the way, to the Jallianwala Bagh. There he found a meeting being held despite his earlier proclamations prohibiting any gatherings. The Bagh, far from being a garden, is a bleak, uncultivated and neglected strip of waste ground, approximately two hundred yards long, wholly enclosed by backs of houses and low boundary walls which rose sheer from the edge of the Bagh' (Sayer 1991: 144/5). The only space free of houses was the end farthest from the main entrance at which the General and his troops arrived. He hesitated for a moment. The entrance is only just wide enough to permit two people walking abreast to pass through. It proved impossible for him to take his armed cars, with their mounted machine guns, through such a narrow lane. Consequently he had to leave them behind.

In the next moment he walked with his men through the lane and stepped into the Bagh. He took up position on a raised platform just inside the entrance. There,
from his panoptical position, he saw a large crowd at the opposite end of the Bagh being addressed by a man standing on a raised platform. Estimates of the size of the crowd vary - initially thought to number about 5,000, with the figure being revised later to between 15,000 and 20,000.

Within seconds of his entry to the Bagh he deployed twenty-five of his men to the left of the entrance, and twenty-five to the right. He then gave the order to fire. There was no warning. Nor any demand that the crowd should disperse.

The firing continued unabated for ten minutes, with 1650 rounds of ammunition discharged; the only interruption in the sequence of firing being Dyer's order directing fire to where the crowd was thickest and countermanding his fellow officer's view that the firing should be over the assembled heads. In their panic, many had rushed towards the mud and brick walls that surrounded the Bagh in desperate attempts to escape the hail of bullets. It was providence perhaps that delivered so many into the hands of the Brig. General.

According to official figures, 379 died, with over 1,200 wounded. Unofficial figures of casualties and fatalities were even higher. Later, before the Hunter Committee, Dyer admitted, had he been able to bring his armored cars into the Bagh and use them, he would have done so.

With almost all his ammunition spent, and the Bagh littered with the bodies of the dead and dying, Dyer marched off with his troops in tow, the way they had come.
He '...did not do anything to see that either the dead were attended to or the wounded receive help' (Hunter 1920: 116). The Committee commented, Dyer '...did not consider it to be “his job”' (Hunter 1920:116). Dyer added,

'...the hospitals were open and the medical officers were there. The wounded only had to apply for help. But they did not do this because they themselves would be taken in custody for being in the assembly. I was ready to help them if they applied...' (Dyer in Hunter 1920: 116).

And so ended one of the bloodiest, and arguably, one of the more inglorious, episodes in British imperial history. ³

(b) Reactions at the Time - Shame

For many writers, readers and contemporary commentators, the massacre and the authorities’ conduct in bringing it about, is an imperial story of shame? But, what is interesting about that story, is the variety of shame it elicits.

(i) Honor and Prestige

For some, perhaps a majority, assuredly of a certain ruling and imperial class, General Dyer’s actions inflicted utter defeat upon the opponents of empire that day.⁴ Who would, they reasoned, expect anything less from a man like Dyer - a soldier, indeed! (Men like Dyer). ⁵ These men were imbued with empire to the
bottom of their boots, and are of proven heroic standing. They were truly, as Kipling came to revere them, Victoria’s sons:

'Ave you 'eard o’ the widow at Windsor
With a hairy gold crown on 'er 'ead?
She 'as ships sail on the foam – she 'as milliona at 'ome,
An' she pays us poor beggars in red.
There's 'er nick on the cavalry 'orses,
There's 'er mark on the medical stores –
An' 'er troopers you’ll find with a fair wind be’ind
That takes us to various wars.
Then 'ere's to the Widow at Windsor,
An' 'ere's to the stores and the guns,
The men an' the 'orses what make up the forces
O' Missis Victorier's sons. (Kipling 1927: 406/7).7

According to these gallants, the defeated masses would have to come to terms with their disgrace at the hands of such a vigorous servant of empire.8 In this sense, Dyer’s actions wiped away any stain on the edifice of empire, ensuring continuing imperial prestige, and taught those who sought to blacken its name, a lesson they would not forget.9

Dyer would by his actions humble a nascent Indian national consciousness; and in the bargain embolden Anglo-Indian senses. What, we may ask then, is the nature of the lesson Dyer’s supporters maintain he delivered to that constituency by his actions? Perhaps, for them, the key lies in his unashamedly reminding the squeamish amongst the ranks of imperial rulers, whether official or unofficial,
where their duty lay. According to such conceptions they would have to learn again, and try to hold on to, the principles of rule, in India, enumerated over thirty years earlier, by James Fitzjames Stephens. According to Stephens, the government in India is,

‘...essentially an absolute government founded, not on consent, but on conquest. It does not represent the native principles of life or of government, and it can never do so until it represents heathenism and barbarism. It represents a belligerent civilization, and no anomaly can be so striking or so dangerous as its administration by men who, being at the head of a Government founded on Conquest, implying at every point the superiority of the conquering race ... and having no justification for its existence except that superiority, shrink from the open, uncompromising, straight-forward assertion of it, seek to apologize for their own position, and refuse, from whatever cause, to uphold and support it’.

In sum, according to practitioners of this style of rule, India, obtained by the sword, was to be held on to by the sword.

(ii) Dishonor and Humiliation

Others however, thought, and told, a different tale. Members, certainly of a specific subject class, simply enumerate a story of sadness, even bemusement.

Prakash Tandon, who Helen Fein describes as a non-political Indian, is simply amazed at the turn of events (Fein 1977: 171). Taken in by, and taking seriously,
the administrations' claims to bring a benign paternalism to their rule in India, he
describes how he and his contemporaries, couldn't believe what transpired.
According to him, they ‘...were born to the “blessings of the British Raj” and
accepted them as the natural order of life....’ (Tandon 1961: 120/3). Anesthetized
perhaps, to the growing frustrations with British administration all around them,
and not yet in tune with calls for freedom from so-called political Indians, he adds,
‘in Gujrat we felt the tremor only slightly.’ It wasn’t long though,

‘...when news of Gandhi’s arrest came there was trouble also in our Gujrat. A
young handsome cousin of ours, grandson of granduncle Thakkur-Das, led
some young men to cut telegraph wires and march about the city, until they
were picked up and put in the local jail. But in Lahore we heard that martial
law was declared....
All kinds of rumors floated out of Lahore of beatings and mass arrests, of
people being made to crawl on their bellies on the roads, of students made to
walk every day to Lahore cantonment six miles away in the hot sun just to
salute the flag. And then came the news of the Jallianwala Bagh at Amritsar....
People in Gujrat were stunned and fumbled back in their memory to Nadirshah.
But Nadirshah was just an adventurer, a bandit who claimed he had an excuse:
some of his soldiers had been murdered after Delhi had capitulated, and the
order of general massacre was the punishment he prescribed for Delhi breaking
its word. But this Sarkar was different; it had been kind and benign, it had ruled
for sixty years without the traditional marks of power. Why this sudden
change?’ (Tandon 1961: 120-3; Fein 1977: 171).

Tandon was not alone in feeling so let down. As Datta reminds us, such turns of
sadness, such dismal distress, such tortuous torment even, we find especially
prevalent among those of the ruled, who were honored by the administration. So,
for instance, Rabindranath Tagore was so moved, he renounced his knighthood.\textsuperscript{14}

He wrote to the Viceroy saying,

‘Knowing that our appeals have been in vain and that the passion of vengeance is blinding the nobler vision of statesmanship in our government, which could so easily afford to be magnanimous as befitting its physical strength and moral tradition, the very best I can do for my country is to take all consequences upon myself in giving voice to the protest of my countrymen, surprised into a dumb anguish of terror. The time has come when badges of honor make our shame glaring in their incongruous context of humiliation, and I for my part wish to stand shorn of all special distinctions, by the side of those of my countrymen who, for their so-called insignificance, we are liable to suffer degradation not fit for human beings. These are the reasons which have painfully compelled me to ask your Excellency, with due reference and regret, to release me of my title of knighthood, which I had the honor to accept from His Majesty the King at the hands of your predecessor, for whose nobleness of heart I still entertain great admiration’ (Tagore 1919 in Datta 1969: 170).

Tagore ‘underscored his anguish and disillusionment,’ with another, perhaps more radical turn, when he wrote to C F Andrews:

‘...The late events have conclusively proved that our true salvation lies in our own hands, that a nation’s greatness can never find its foundation in half-hearted concessions of contemptuous niggardliness...’(Tagore 1920 in Mohan 2000: 69)
Yet another so-called honored Indian, who admitted to a deep regret at the turn of events in Amritsar, is Mohindas K. Gandhi. He experienced them with a profound sense of betrayal. All the promises contained in David Lloyd George’s 1917 war speech, intoning all peoples of the empire to support the empire in its fight against injustice, and to which Gandhi and many other Indians nodded assent, now seemed nothing more than flakes of so much dust. Lloyd George said,

‘Now we are faced with the greatest and the grimmest struggle of all. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, not amongst men, but amongst nations – great and small, powerful and weak, exalted and humble – equality, fraternity, among peoples as well as amongst men – that is the challenge which has been thrown to us...My appeal to the people of this country and, if my appeal can reach beyond it, is this, that we should continue to fight for the great goal of international right and international justice, so that never again shall brute force sit on the throne of justice, nor barbaric strength wield the sceptre of right’ (in Rai 1919: 1).

Now, like Tagore, Gandhi chose to renounce certain honors that fell to him for being a loyal Indian. According to Datta, ‘Gandhi, who had rendered great service to the British cause during the first World War... returned his Kaiser-i-Hind Gold medal, and...with it...his Zulu War Medal’ (Datta 1969: 171); And, when doing so commented on the administration’s actions, thus:

‘the punitive measures taken by General Dyer...were out of all proportions to the crime of the people and amounted to wanton cruelty and inhumanity unparalleled in modern times....Your Excellency’s lighthearted treatment of
the official crime, your exoneration of Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Mr. Montagu's dispatch and above all your shameful ignorance of the Punjab events and callous disregard of the feelings betrayed by the House of Lords have filled me with the greatest misgivings regarding the future of Empire, have estranged me completely from the present Government and have disabled me from tendering as I have hitherto tendered my loyal co-operation' (Gandhi 1920 in Datta 1969: 171).

Many joined in these disapproving choruses. Disapproval burst forth from such a growing band, if not of malcontents, then certainly, as they would perhaps perceive their plight, of the dishonored. So, Tagore and Gandhi were certainly not alone. Other Indians matched them in their words and actions. Indeed, such instances could be multiplied. The remarks of Mian Feroze Ali, an Honorary Magistrate, summarized the intensity of a sense of betrayal he and those others experienced. Commenting on the conduct of martial law in Amritsar he noted,

‘I must say,...the pride which I myself, and my countrymen, felt in British justice, had received a rude shock...So far as the people of Amritsar are concerned I pray to God that we may not have to see those martial law days again’.

Fed by such feelings of shame, Gandhi, already engaged in a mass movement he called Satyagraha, led the way, hoping to carry his fellow ashamed with him, to define the precise hue that the burgeoning national consciousness would take. His very distinctive project for gaining honour in freedom came to be defined by an ethics of non-co-operation with the administration, and its practice informed by
his antipathy to violence. Non-violent, non-cooperation, as many sought to label it, grew out of Gandhi’s realization that the consent of the ruled was vital to sustaining that rule. As worked out in his classic, *Hind Swarag*, addressing himself to the colonial power, he said:

‘You have great military resources. Your naval power is matchless. If we wanted to fight you on your ground, we should be unable to do so, but if the above submissions be not acceptable to you, we cease to play the part of the ruled. You may if you like cut us to pieces. You may shatter us at the cannon’s mouth. If you act contrary to our will, we shall not help you and without our help, we know that you cannot move one step forward. It is likely that you will laugh at all this in the intoxication of your power. We may not be able to disillusion you at once; but if there be any manliness in us, you will see shortly that your intoxication is suicidal and that your laugh at our expense is an aberration of intellect...If you will abandon your so-called civilization and search into your own scriptures, you will find that our demands are just. Only on condition of our demands being fully satisfied may you remain in India’ (Gandhi 1938: 88).

(iii) Militant Reclamation

Other Indians, whether contemporaries, forerunners and those who followed, Bhagat Singh perhaps the foremost, but not the only among them, preached the adoption of a different set of strategies and tactics to salvage their pride. Only by engaging in forceful counter-action, Singh and his fellows argued, would they be able to wipe away the shameful stains and agony that rule by others had brought upon their consciousness.
Almost cathartic in its insistence on meeting force with force, for Singh and his colleagues, nothing less than violent revolution to overthrow the administration would do. They would, they reasoned, give no quarter to the colonial state. That state, always in a position of ‘precarious hegemony’ for these putative revolutionaries, could no longer consider itself sovereign. Their feelings of shame then are altogether different from the shame Indians complicit in colonial promises would suffer. Their radicalism would not be extinguished by platitudes calling for togetherness, or awards, or favors and honors from the bureaucracy. Undoubtedly when Lloyd George made his appeal to the people of his country and beyond to the empire, Bhagat Singh and his fellow revolutionaries would not rush to, would not be first to, offer their services to Empire. Echoing sentiments contained in the ‘Commonweal’ in 1916, expressions of loyalty to empire and India, in such an instance for them would not mean ‘...loyalty to the King-Emperor but the support of foreign domination, embodied in the administration as it exists’ (Datta 1975: 940). Their experience of the colonial administration is not characterized by wanting to help with peace and order so that Anglo-Indians could go about their business undisturbed, rather it is inscribed as humiliation by autocracy.

These so-called ‘young revolutionaries’ Mohan maintains, could not easily be dismissed as ‘impulsive or irrational’ troublemakers, addicted to some simplistic nostrum termed violence (Mohan 1985: 212). In a hurry they certainly were. Yet, as Mohan once again usefully reminds us, ‘they had...a clear grasp of the existing political situation...’ They knew how difficult non-violent methods for
'fighting against the foreign rulers' are (Mohan 1985: 212). In their tract, 'The Philosophy of the Bomb' they sought to chide Gandhi about the complexity of his message. Though comparable leaders, Singh and his colleagues argue, liked to claim themselves men of the people, they deluded themselves. Referring to Gandhi's tours round the country, they asked, when does he ever step off his public platform and truly mix among the masses? In an ironic echo of many an Anglo-Indian's claims to know his flock, they ask rhetorically, when

'has he sat with the peasant round the evening fire and tried to know what he thinks? Has he passed a single evening in the company of a factory laborer and shared with him his woes?' (in Nayar 2000: 177).

In contrast, the putative revolutionaries assert, 'we have, and therefore we claim to know what the masses think.' But, perhaps even more to the point, they seek to remind '...Gandhi that the average Indian, like the average human being, understands little of the fine theological niceties about Ahimsa and loving one’s enemy...' (in Nayar 2000: 177).

For them, these questions are quite simple really, and they describe matters thus,

'The way of the world is like this. You have a friend: you love him, sometimes so much you that you even die for him. You have an enemy: you shun him, you fight against him and, if possible, you kill him. The gospel of the revolutionaries is simple and straight. It is what has been since the days of Adam and Eve, and no man has any difficulty about understanding it' (in Nayar 2000: 177).
Their tract ‘The Philosophy of the Bomb’ is not the only place in which the prospective revolutionaries set out their stall, and call for revolution. Mohan cites an extract from the journal, ‘Peaceful and Legitimate’ that she thinks elaborates a little further on their complex commitment to and engagement with other than non-violent methods of usurping foreign rule. Hence:

‘Non-violent Satyagraha would rank as an invincible weapon if the conditions governing it could be satisfactorily fulfilled. A particular moral and mental atmosphere is necessary for its success. But this atmosphere is very difficult to achieve, so difficult, that up to time, despite the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi, it has not been possible to bring it into existence...because they are under the wrong impression that this form of struggle is easier than armed resistance...the absolute faith in Ahimsa and Satyagraha is mostly wanting in them....Besides, the lack of mental and moral climate, there was the provocative attitude of the Government. With the help of its repressive policy the Government would be able to incite the uneducated masses to violence. This would lead to the disintegration of any Satyagraha movement, as it had happened in the case of the non-cooperation movement’ (in Mohan 1985: 212/3).  

Of course, it can be insisted, that so-called, non-violent non-co-operation, and violent confrontation, pace the versions here enumerated, are not so distinctive as to be separates. Perhaps, in a Foucaultian sense they are better regarded merely as different perspectives on resistance. Foucault after all did leave us with the now familiar statement, ‘where there is power, there is resistance’. In this sense
violence/non-violence are different techniques in resistance maybe even tactics in pursuit of a strategy that each party understood to fall under the umbrella they called freedom.

Indeed, however different, formally stated at least, Bhagat Singh’s engagement with and practice in pursuing liberation; and whatever their precise disagreements, Mohan reminds us how much the revolutionaries did appreciate Gandhi’s contribution to awakening the masses:

‘Mahatma Gandhi is great and we mean no disrespect to him if we express our emphatic disapproval of the methods advocated by him for the country’s emancipation. We would be ungrateful to him if we do not salute him for the immense awakening that has been brought about by the non-cooperation movement in this country. But to us Mahatma Gandhi is an impossible visionary’ (in Mohan 1985: 213).

Yet, Bhagat Singh and his fellow patriots, Chander Shekhar Azad, Raj Gur, Sukhdev and Bhagwati Charan, sought to catch and prevail with a certain, more assertive mood among the ruled, foretold in numerous places. In 1916 a poem published in the ‘Pratap’ is a case in point.

‘The lions of India will ceaselessly work to free their revered mother from her troubles. They will not retreat through fear. Thousands will die in the service of the country. They will remove with the sword all the obstacles standing in the way of their union and nationality. Their enthusiasm will overcome all difficulties and they will bring cruel oppression to an end’.
Sarojini Naidu’s epic poem, reflecting specifically we are told on Amritsar, is another occasion where the ensuing, more assertive mood, and the coming battles for freedom are captured in all their complexity:

How shall our love console thee, or assuage
Thy hapless woe; how shall our grief requite
The hearts that scourge thee and the hands that smite
Thy beauty with their rods of bitter rage?
Lo! let our sorrow be thy battle-gage
To wreck the terror of the tyrant’s might
Who mocks with ribald wrath thy tragic plight,
And stains with shame thy radiant heritage!
O beautiful! O broken and betrayed!
O mournful queen! O martyred Draupadi!
Endure though still, unconquered, undismayed!
The sacred rivers of thy stricken blood
Shall prove the five fold stream of freedom’s flood,
To guard the wrath-towers of our Liberty.†

**Making Sense of the Massacre**

Much has already been written about these episodes, both official and unofficial. The secondary literature is vast. I will review this in detail in Chapter Two. Here, for simplicity, we can say that there are two main approaches.
The first, exemplified best by Rupert Furneaux’s *Massacre at Amritsar* (1963), suggests that Brigadier-General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer’s resolve on that fateful day was due to his mental state. He suffered from arteriosclerosis from which he would eventually die. So, According to Furneaux, the actions Dyer took on that day were his and his alone, and because of his illness wholly exceptional in that regard.

The second, adopted by a number of other writers, though they all vary in their tracking of the nuances in the story, is marked by a shifting of the responsibility for events in 1919, away from an individual officer. B G Horniman, Chief Editor of the Bombay Chronicle for instance, in his *Amritsar and Our Duty to India* (1920), seeks to emphasize the role of the bureaucracy at large. For him, it is their refusal to countenance radical constitutional reform in Government, that leads to protest, that in turn lead to the massacre.

Written in the same year, Pearay Mohan’s *An Imaginary Rebellion*, seeks to show how the Punjab Government, composed of men like Sir Michael O’Dwyer were especially brutal in their conduct of Government. This they imagined was the only way to gain and then keep control of India, but more specifically keep control of the ‘virile and action-oriented inhabitants of the Punjab...’ (Mohan 2000: 69).

Alfred Nundy’s compilations, *Present Situation with Special Reference to Indian Unrest, 1919-1920* (1919), and his *Revolution or Evolution* (1922), written almost
contemporaneously with growing unrest in India and the Punjab at the time, highlight the increasing misunderstandings of intention between ruler and ruled, and their consequences.

Mark Naidis’s *The Punjab Disturbances of 1919 – A study in Indian Nationalism* (1950), from his thesis of the same name, is similarly concerned to show how the administration saw a more assertive population as a threat to British India, and reacted accordingly.

Arthur Swinson’s *Six Minutes to Sunset* (1964) forthrightly declares that in a battle between ruler and ruled, as it is argued this was, by taking the prompt actions he did, General Dyer saved the threatened lives of all Anglo-Indians, particularly those of white women.

Raja Ram’s *Jallianwala Bagh: A Premeditated Plan* (1969), tries to show, without supporting evidence, in many commentators’ views, that the massacre, far from being the result of actions led by an individual officer, was an orchestrated plan thoughtfully carried through to fruition on the appointed day.

V N Datta is arguably the most prolific contributor to the vast literature on the Amritsar massacres. His work includes the *Jallianwala Bagh* (1969), *New Light on the Punjab Disturbances Volumes I & II* (1975) and his more recent edited collection, *Jallianwala Bagh Massacre* (2000). He sees the events as an expression of the confrontation between ruler and ruled.
Similarly, in her *Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Justice 1919-20* (1977), Helen Fein assumes that ruler and ruled occupy separate moral domains, such that the massacre should be seen as a 'prototypical instance of a repressive collective punishment practiced by the British in black and Asian colonies.' (Fein 1977: xii-xiii).

4

**Windows of Opportunity**

My argument will be that though all these narrative histories of events in Amritsar tell us something of what happened, until relatively recently most stick with a simple narration of those events in order to establish what really happened. As I say above my concerns are somewhat different. I analyze the forms of colonial government in India at this time; the role of the military within such government; and the shaping of particular men who exercise rule, whether as members of the military, the administration, or government.

**(a) Conceptual Resources**

My conceptual inspirations for such an enterprise are many and varied. But the work of Michel Foucault is a significant presence. I draw on both his methods and his substantive concerns. Borrowing a sentiment from Rai, who in turn borrows
from Foucault's 1978 lecture 'What is Critique', my critique and concern in the analysis of Amritsar 1919 does not seek to establish 'what error or illusion' about Amritsar is fostered by 'the relay between knowledge and power' (Rai 2002: xv). Rather, my

'...question(s) instead would be: how can the indivisibility of knowledge and power in the context of interactions and multiple strategies induce both singularities, fixed according to their conditions of acceptability, and a field of possibilities, of openings, indecisions, reversals and possible dislocations which make them fragile, temporary, and which turn these effects into events, nothing more, nothing less than events' (Foucault 1978 in Rai 2002: xv).

Thus, the displacement in the genre I seek is not for a better more complete history. Rather, the inspiration I gain from Foucault is that of the open book. I look for a field of openings, of possibilities, in the relay between power and knowledge about Amritsar. What is crucial for me in Foucault's method is its avowed aim of recording 'the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality' (Rai 2002: xvii). Being sensitive to the singularity of events in the way this method proposes enables me to pursue a non-linear even disruptive narrative about Amritsar. Foucault continues, his aim is to 'listen...carefully...to history' to find 'something altogether different behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence and that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms' (Foucault in Rai 2002: xvii).
Let there be no mistake. In proposing to write another series of contributions, the histories I suggest do not move my readers or me beyond what I call the genre or this particular way of knowing about Amritsar. That would merely be another proposal for transcendence. The other histories I construct, the file of possibilities that are opened up by my refusal to repeat the genre are necessarily complicit in what has gone before. I do not regard that as disabling the claims in my histories. My histories explicitly recognize the nominalism at the heart of every historical enterprise; or as Rai puts it, '...the essential instability of any historical enterprise' (Rai 2002: xviii). In this sense refusing the impulse to rise above the instabilities of any historical enterprise enables me to tease out other memories immanent in Amritsar. Naming his endeavors as genealogies Foucault put it thus:

'...If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is 'something altogether different' behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence and that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms' (Foucault in Rai 2002: xvii).

Foucault is not alone in urging us on a genealogist's work. This is how Michel de Certeau describes such an unstable but fruitful task of history:

'Historians are in an unstable position. If they award priority to an "objective" result, if they aim to posit the reality of a former society in their discourse and animate forgotten figures, they nonetheless recognize in their recomposition the orders and effects of their work. The discourse destined to express what is other remains their discourse and the mirror of their own
labours. Inversely, when they refer to their own practices and examine their postulates in order to innovate, therein historians discover constraints originating well before their own present, dating back to former organizations of which their work is a symptom, not a cause...Thus founded on the rupture between a past that is its object, and a present that is the place of its practice, history endlessly finds the present in its object and the past in its practice. Inhabited by the uncanniness that it seeks, history imposes its law upon the faraway places that it conquers when it fosters the illusion that it is bringing them back to life' (de Certeau in Rai 2002: xviii).

Writing of this past in the present, or as de Certeau has it, locating myself in this uncanny but enabling space, allows me to write that other history or those other histories of Amritsar. I want to fill the space opened up by the genealogist's method by posing questions about government; that is to say colonial government.

Foucault's histories are concerned with matters of government too. Like much else that Foucault talks about, the concept of government in his hands underwent a profound transformation. That is to say as well as giving me the space in which to think differently, to be alert to the vicissitudes of history, Foucault's work on government introduces me to the practical possibilities of such a space.

So for instance he analyzed the state and power. Of course many have already grappled with questions about either or both. Generally these have been about the state as a source of authority; in whose name does it act? How in times of crisis does it perpetuate that tainted knowledge? Foucault's intervention aims to change the way in which '...notions of state and power...' are analyzed (Rai 2002: 1). 'We
know' he says, 'the fascination which the love, or the horror, of the state exercises today; we know how much attention is paid to the genesis of the state, its history, its advance, its power and abuses, etc' (Foucault in Rai 2002: 2). Foucault regards such fascinations with the state as

'...paradoxical because apparently reductionist: it is the form of analysis that consists in reducing that state to a certain number of functions,...and yet this reductionist vision of the relative importance of the state's role nevertheless invariably renders it absolutely essential as a target needing to be attacked and a privileged position needing to be occupied...But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor...this importance, maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than any of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modernity - that is, for our present - is not so much the étatisation of society, as the 'governmentality' of the state' (Foucault in Rai 2002: 2).

The implications of Foucault's intervention and reformulation here cannot be underestimated. Rai sums it up thus:

'Such a shift entails a massive estrangement of analysis of power; instead of a centered locus of legitimate violence, one is able to pose questions that dehisce this unity, and re-member other sources and dynamics of force relations, other sites of counter-discourse, and ex-centric practices' (Rai 2002: 2).
Foucault's 'reformulation of notions of state and power as governmentality' (Rai 2002: 1) veers us away from asking questions just about who exercises power and whether its exercise is legitimate. Rather these notions appearing as governmentality lead us to look at the problem anew. That is to say instead of asking whether a particular act of authority is legitimate or not, he asks how authorities can better govern others. In his later work he asks how '...authorities constitute themselves as authorities...' and needless to say how the other, in the form of counter discourses etc, is always present (Osborne 1984b). One's attention is drawn firmly to the logic of how we do what we do, and not why we do what we do. I am reminded here of Foucault's comments about violence rather apt in the context of my work on Amritsar. Hence, he says

'All human behavior is scheduled and programmed through rationality. There is a logic of institutions and in behavior and in political relations. In even the most violent ones there is a rationality. What is most dangerous in violence is its rationality. Of course violence itself is terrible. But the deepest root of violence and its permanence come out of the form of the rationality we use. The idea had been that if we live in the world of reason, we can get rid of violence. This is quite wrong. Between violence and rationality there is no incompatibility' (Foucault 1980: 299).

As we see many have not hesitated to take up the leads provided by Foucault. Thomas Osborne has done so in his work and for me in an extremely useful way (Osborne 1994; Osborne 1994b). Hence as he points out, when Foucault talks about government he refers in the most general sense to 'all those means and
techniques for guiding and shaping conduct' (Osborne 1994b: 6). Yet, Osborne goes on 'this is not simply a question of regulating the conduct of others; rather it is a question of regulating...'the conduct of their conduct', that is, the ways in which people understand and reflexively regulate their own conduct' (Osborne 1994b: 6). Osborne uses the words of Gordon, to explain what is at stake thus

'Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty...[Foucault] was interested in government as an activity or practice, and in the arts of government as ways of knowing what that activity consisted in, and how it might be carried on. A rationality of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable or practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practised' (Gordon in Osborne 1994b: 6).

I draw on these insights when I explore the makings of the different men who are the subject of my own remaking of Amritsar.

Rabinow is another who distills the later work of Foucault in a manner that aids my project (Rabinow 1991). Hence, Rabinow outlines how the problem of the subject is a fundamental to Foucault's work. He notes Foucault's 'recent self characterization' of his work when he says:
'the goal of my work during the last twenty years has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture human beings are made subjects' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 7).

I turn these comments to account in relation to the figures that are my subjects; Sir Michael O'Dwyer; Brigadier-General Dyer; and Edwin Montagu. Rabinow helpfully splits Foucault's objectification of the subject into three modes. In my character studies I show how Foucault's third mode - what Rabinow calls subjectification, the 'way human beings turn him - or herself into a subject' - is particularly relevant. Though all my characters are in some sense part of various traditions, this mode of subjectification stresses and isolates what Foucault calls '...those techniques through which the person initiates an active self-formation' (Rabinow 1991: 11).

Just as Rabinow draws our attention to the part of government that is about the techniques of active self-formation, he reminds us of its other broader but related aspects. How in other words do these individuals who actively turn themselves into, in my thesis a military officer; an administrator; a member of the government, carry out their roles. In the knotty problems of colonial government we see perhaps more clearly than elsewhere the concern with orderly government or with what Foucault calls the arts of government (Rabinow 1991: 15). What Rabinow alerts us to here are governments', especially colonial governments' concerns with
how best each activity could be accomplished. Best, Foucault reminds us, invariably means 'most economica[lly]' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 15). Thus,

'The art of government...is concerned with...how to introduce economy that is the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family,...how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family, into the management of the state' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 15).

To clarify further what is at stake here, Rabinow refers us to Foucault's adoption of Guillaume de la Perrière who says, 'government is the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to the most convenient of ends' (Perrière in Rabinow 1991: 15). Rabinow observes that in 'Perrière's definition there is no mention of territory' (Rabinow 1991: 16). On the contrary, 'a complex relationship of men and things is given priority' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 16). Hence for Foucault the implications are obvious. He resolves that:

'the things which the government is to be concerned about are men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility etc.; men in their relation to other kinds of things which are customs, habits, ways of doing and thinking, etc.; lastly, men in their relation to that other kind of things which are accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 16).
I pursue the shifts in modes of colonial government that pay a great deal more attention to arranging things so as to achieve the most convenient of ends, in my investigation of the character Edwin Montagu.

Recently, writers who take the massacres and disturbances as their central point of concern have tried to open out the historiographies. In this sense I follow the leads provided by Derek Sayer in his *British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre* (1991), and lately, Kamlesh Mohan’s contribution to V N Datta and S Settar’s edited collection, *Jallianwala Bagh Massacre* (2000).

Sayer seeks to open up the historiographies by alerting us to the problems of government over others, and Mohan by alerting us to the role of so-called ‘muted groups,’ in political consciousness.

Mohan takes the lead for her discussion of a change in and articulation of a political consciousness among ‘muted groups’ from the work of Edwin Ardener (Mohan 2000; Ardener 1975). I say no more about her discussions here, save to register its importance in moving us on in our discussions of Amritsar from a simple narration of events. I do however want to dwell for a moment on Sayer's work. I discuss the details of his claims in chapter 2. Here I want to signal the conceptual, Foucaultian, basis for his arguments.

Sayer pursues the argument that many regarded Dyer's conduct as the perfectly normal actions of an officer of his rank and experience. Underpinning these
arguments he suggests is the positive construction of Indians as particular sorts of subjects who need the guidance that only their rulers can provide. Positivity is akin here to signaling a factual enterprise. That is to say an empirical facticity of things. What he hooks into are the moral, perhaps ethical, relations at stake? Dyer's defence he suggests was 'rooted in widely held norms' (Sayer 1991: 160).

If that is the case, Sayer asks 'what kind of ethos could have allowed, indeed obligated, the actions he took' (Sayer 1991: 160). The kind of morality that is at stake here is not simply about totting up the good and bad moments - avoiding dastardly deeds! What such a debate about morality leaves out is how officers like Dyer conceived of their job and responsibility toward Indians. Borrowing a description from Osborne the morality at stake here is 'a question of discipline and self-discipline...' (Osborne 1994b: 4). In a profoundly Foucaultian manner Sayer refers to the words of Lords Sumner and Salisbury as exemplifying what Osborne, borrowing from Austin, calls a 'performative aspect of moral forms' (Osborne 1994b: 4). Hence, Lord Sumner argued that Dyer took the action he did '...in mercy to them ['the Indian population themselves'], in order that they might not die, that it became the duty of General Dyer to use force and put to death those who were challenging the authority of the Government, who were rebels, only not in arms' (Sumner in Sayer 1991: 161). Another, the Marquess of Salisbury put it thus: 'The people of India are entering upon a great experiment; and surely the lesson which, above all others, you must teach them is that there is nothing in self-government which authorizes disorder' (Salisbury in Sayer 1991: 161). I draw on the conceptual map Sayer paints in my discussions of notions of duty.
The works of Ranajit Guha and his colleagues on the Subaltern Studies project has also proved very useful. In *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (1997), he sets out the project’s initial impetus. It aims at nothing less than revising ‘studies on colonial India’ (Guha 1997: ix). According to Guha, whatever their precise tendencies, the ‘whole range of liberal-imperialist and liberal-nationalist’ writings about colonial India assume that ‘...the power relations of colonial rule were contained in an integrated and unified field with all the ideologies and political practices of the period articulated within a single domain’ (Guha 1997: ix). Influenced in no small part by the work of Michel Foucault, the group questions such an assumption. As Guha puts it ‘...there was no such unified...and singular domain of politics...’. Indeed politics ‘...was, to the contrary, split between an elite and a subaltern part, each of which was autonomous in its own way’ (Guha 1997: ix).

Inevitably the split the group points to and calls for between elite and subaltern histories raises further questions about the colonial state itself. Thus according to them all South Asian historiography has ‘proceeded from a thoroughly unexamined belief that the so-called unitary character of politics was nothing other than the effect of the homogenizing function of colonialism’ (Guha 1997: x). If politics can be split between an elite and subaltern part, then it can also be split between different modes of doing politics. In their inaugural statement this is how they defined their project:
'What is clearly left out of...the...un-historical historiography is the politics of the people. For parallel to the domain of elite politics there existed throughout the colonial period another domain of Indian politics in which the principal actors were not the dominant groups of the indigenous society or the colonial authorities but the subaltern classes and groups constituting the mass of the labouring population and the intermediate strata in town and country - that is, the people. This was an autonomous domain, for it neither originated in elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter' (Guha 1997: x).

Writing other histories, especially as Guha says histories from below, is the hard task they set themselves. The sources for such histories are not readily retrieved. Their project is an example then of profoundly important scholarship. What I take from their plan in addition to their commitment to writing histories of the other is their characterization of the colonial state. The colonial state was they contend very different from the 'metropolitan bourgeois state' (Guha 1997: xii). The difference they enumerate is worth setting out in full. Hence:

'The difference consisted in the fact that the metropolitan state was hegemonic in character with its claims to dominance based on a power relation in which the moment of persuasion outweighed that of coercion, whereas the colonial state was non-hegemonic with persuasion outweighed by coercion in its structure of dominance...The originality of the South Asian colonial state lay precisely in this difference: a historical paradox, it was an autocracy set up and sustained in the East by the foremost democracy of the Western world...Since it was non-hegemonic, it was not possible for that state to assimilate the civil society of the colonized to itself. We have defined the character of the colonial state therefore as a dominance without hegemony (Guha 1997: xii).
Though I do not explicitly write a history from below, the value of the groups' project to my work is multifold. Generally, the other haunts the histories I write. Just as importantly I benefit greatly from their emphasis on the limited reach of the colonial state, which I translate into a series of problems about the fashioning of power. To take an example from the work of David Arnold about colonial prisons, his observation that 'revolts against the gaze' - resistance in other words - was far more widespread amongst the prison population specifically than many describe. Thus, taking prisons as a case in point he says 'prisoners were far from being the docile bodies that Foucault describes' (Arnold 1994 in Arnold & Hardiman 1994: 150). In this sense he reinforces Foucault's observation that 'where there is power there is resistance' (Foucault 1895: 95).

(b) Conclusions

Instead of being involved in a faithful recounting of the events of 1919, this chapter has positioned my thesis in relation to the literature on how rulers are fashioned. In particular what went into their making? In the chapters that follow I examine how those rulers are made. The types of authority claimed over others and over themselves by such men are many and varied. I contend that in each of their varieties, in our case military, administrative and governmental, they form a distinctive set of ethics and codes of practice, that are entirely normal.
Distaste for their practices is an entirely modern abhorrence. We see in particular how each man is concerned to be faithful to himself in his calling, and do his duty to India and Indian others. My concerns in the foregoing chapters then are, with forms of colonial government in the Foucaultian sense, as governmentality. In chapters 3 to 5 one by one I concentrate on how certain ruling men grapple with their jobs as rulers both in terms of policing themselves, and others. Thus in chapter 3 my focus is on Sir Michael O'Dwyer. I look at how he is made a candidate for colonial governor and how he is trained in the arts of colonial government in the elite institutions of empire. I show how Benjamin Jowett's pivotal contribution to O'Dwyer's formation ensured that these candidates never doubted for a minute their place as rulers. In chapter 4 I turn to how the army, the imperial army, is formed in an age when its job grew more complicated. No longer the amateurs of the East India Trading Company, they now grew into the habits of professionals. In that they are drilled ultimately to perform order in carrying out their duty. In chapter 5 my focus shifts from the day to day job of empire as performed by O'Dwyer and Dyer. I relate how Edwin Montagu dares all future rulers to think differently about their roles in India. I find that imperial purpose in Montagu's hand changes but stays the same.

Thus I investigate the roles of the military and administration within colonial government. In short I am concerned with the making of those who would exercise rule in the traditions of imperial purpose. Firstly I investigate the ethos of an 'administrative man'; secondly those of an 'military man'; and thirdly those of a
man who finds himself in 'government' as Secretary of State for India, the later being a deal more complex than the two other men because he was Jewish.

Before I embark on my journey of reconstruction in these terms I engage the secondary literature on Amritsar in detail in the next chapter and give a sense of the methodological resources I use to propose the readings I do.

5

Thesis Structure

(a) Chapter 2, 'The Search for a Narrative,' looks in detail at the literature addressing itself to the Amritsar Massacre;

(b) Chapter 3, 'The Administrative Complex,' begins my exploration of the makings of competent men, men who claim to be able to bring a special expertise in their administrative service to India. I focus on the figure of Sir Michael O'Dwyer Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab at the time of the massacres;

(c) Chapter 4, 'The Military Complex,' takes the story of the makings of a competent administrative man to a consideration of specifics in the make up of a military officer. The figure I concentrate on here is Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, the officer who conducted operations at the Bagh;
(d) Chapter 5, 'The Government Complex,' examines how Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India at the time, grapples with and tries to define and designate a different mode of being a ruler in India;

(e) Chapter 6, presents my conclusions.
...area had once belonged to one Bhai Hamit Singh Jallianwala, a courtier of Raja Jaswant Singh of Nabha, who had been a vakil (lawyer/pleader) in the service of Ranjit Singh. ‘Jalla’ is the caste name of the owner, ‘wala’ the genitive cane and ‘bagh’ ‘garden.’ The Bagh was used as a dumping ground and not even the oldest living citizen of Amritsar has any recollection now whether it has ever really been a garden...Sunk bellow the level of the city...it was situated in the heart of the town and surrounded by narrow mazy lanes. It was an open uneven space, oblong in shape and about twelve bighas in area, a kind of irregular quadrangle closed in by the back walls of adjoining houses and by stretches of clumsily built wall. At some places the houses projected into it. It had three or four openings through which people could pass without much inconvenience and between the houses parts of the boundary wall were low enough to lean over. Opposite the main entrance (a narrow passage just broad enough for two men to walk abreast) there were no houses for about a hundred feet and a low brick and mud wall about five feet high marked of this portion. To the right there was another low wall made of mud. Within this area a few mounds of broken earthenware lay scattered among trees, a dilapidated smadh... (Mausoleum)...with a dome and closed well’ (Datta 1969: 96).

Among other descriptions of note, Gandhi characterizes it as a ‘dunghill’; General Sir George Barrow, biographer of Sir Charles Carmichael Munro, forthrightly dismisses any images of utopia, conjured up by use of the term garden. For him, it is in no sense such a place. He thinks it can best be ‘described as resembling a very large sunken bath with perpendicular sides’ (cf. Furneaux 1963: 16; Barrow 1931: 184).

3. Of course, as Sayer comments, the British were no strangers to putting down challenges to their authority with exemplary brutality. As instances, he cites their actions during the so-called Indian Mutiny; actions against Kuka rebels in 1872, again in India; and draws our attention to Governor John Eyre’s conduct in Jamaica 1865. He also reminds us of actions closer to home, when over four hundred were killed in actions taken to suppress the Gordon Riots. The British authorities were no strangers then to taking forceful action in the restoration of order (Sayer 1991). Returning to an Indian context, the 1893 edition of the Amy Book for the British Empire states categorically that in the defence of British imperial possessions, force of arms is a crucial necessity (cf. Goodenough & Dalton 1893; Chap. 4 on notions of the Garrison State). Uday Mahukkar alerts us to a similar carnage. Three years after the events at Amritsar, Mahukkar reminds us that ‘in a remote Bhil village in north Gujarat...its alleged that 1,200 people were killed as a result of actions conducted by Major H G Sutton’ (Uday Mahukkar 1997).

4. A so-called ‘Planters’ views set out in the Calcutta Statesman are exemplary in this regard. Thus, our ‘Planter’ berates those who seek to criticize Dyer’s actions as versions of Prussianism – a distasteful synonym applied to describe German actions during the First World War. According to our planter’s view, Dyer alone had by his actions shamed the opponents of empire; He alone restored the prestige of empire. He brought law and order to Amritsar and consequently, India. ‘I wonder,’ our Planter adds, ‘if they will think of the man whom they have helped to malign if they have ever the experience of being chased by a maddened mob of coolies who are out for their blood.’ An Englishwoman writing in Blackwood’s Mag was as equally sure. He and he alone, by his actions that day, had saved them! And saved them from the shameful indignities of the ‘...crowded, insanitary and servant-less conditions suffered by... European women and children who had never known a days real hardship before’ in the fort during the next few days’ (Calcutta Statesman 20 July 1920, in Sayer 1991: 138/9; On alleged German atrocities see Bland 1915).

5. Men, whom Kipling never tied to embroider, who played the great game like soldiers they were:

‘When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier’ (in Strawson 1989: 72).

6. According to Sayer, Commander Carylon Bellairs captures, perfectly, the tone of Dyer’s supporters; frightening in its utter conviction of the rightness of their heroes actions, and its utter contempt for its critics:
The Dyer controversy may, indeed, be a turning point in our Imperial history. British rule has been respected because it has been wisely strong without being cruel, and because the word of the Englishman was his bond ... under democracy there has been a progressive decline in both these directions ... Chatham gave his men a free hand. He certainly censured for sins of omission, but one would be surprised to come upon any episode in his career where he excitedly censured the too thorough execution of any task ... In the wake of every great achievement, as in Dyer’s case, there is dust and dirt ... When a handful of whites are faced by hundreds of fanatical natives, one cannot apply one’s John Stuart Mill’ (in Draper 1991:152; The Times 8 July 1920).

Thanks to Peter B. Freshwater for drawing my attention to this reference.

Amritsar was in a state of open rebellion; not only Amritsar but the surrounding country was being infected by Amritsar. The civil authorities had informed General Dyer or his predecessor to endeavor to establish Civil Government by military measures. In re-establishing order the first duty of General Dyer was to see that the authority of the Government, which they had violated, was obeyed. Therefore, having proclaimed an order that if any meetings were held they would be dispersed by force and as the people in defiance of that order had held a gathering, he was, in my opinion, not only entitled, but bound to disperse it. I may say as head of the Government of the Punjab at the time that if General Dyer had not dispersed that crown by force, we should have an infinitely more serious state of rebellion’ (O’Dwyer 1920 in Mohan 1985: 32).

The Hon’ble Mr. J P Thompson, Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, would approve Dyer’s actions in the most exacting of terms. He said, ‘I approve the exact amount of bloodshed which was necessary to produce the effect that was produced...if he had not taken some action like that we should have had much blood shed in the end’ (Thompson in Mohan 1985: 295/6 n.106).

Prestige may seem such an ephemeral thing, but many an empire subsisted on its indefinability. But for all that, the importance attached to its subsistence cannot be underestimated, whether in military discourses or strictly administrative ones. I talk specifically about its military cadences in chapter 4, but we can glean an instance from the Field Service Regulations issued in 1920, concerned with military history for the staff college entrance examination, about operations in Afghan war of 1919. The British lost many a hard battle in Afghanistan, and perhaps for that reason felt the importance of getting prestige and retaining it, particularly there, so acutely. Hence, the regulations include notes on some points of interest. Thus, ‘in 1842 — ... after many vicissitudes and one of the worst disasters in British military annals — and again in 1878, we forced our way to the hostile capital, replaced the reigning Amir by our own nominee, and successfully made evident the superiority of our arms, to the great and lasting benefit of our prestige throughout the east...’ (Field Service Regulations 1920: 115).

A man of many parts, not least of which was to inspire the future Lord Curzon in a lecture he gave at Eton. According to Gilmour, on that day Stephens described how, in ‘the Asian sub-continent...Britain held an empire more populous, more amazing and more beneficent than that of Rome’ (Gilmour 1994: 35). An English lawyer, Stephens served as the Viceroy’s council as the law member from 1869-72. Kamlesh Mohan describes Stephen as one whose mode of operation marked the end of what she calls the paternal element in British rule. Stephen’s modus replaced it with, ‘an authoritarian tendency towards utilitarianism, though an evangelical zeal still energized the imperial mission. Believing that the foremost function of government in India was “to protect peaceable men and to beat down wrong doers, to extort respect and to enforce obedience,” he highlighted the positive role of law, backed by power’ (Mohan 2000: 54; Stokes 1982: 299).

Stephens 1883 in Sinha 1995: 40. Stephens views were given in a letter to the Times dated 1 March 1883, which, Fein tells us, attacked proposals contained in the notorious Ilbert Bill. The Proposals incited a lurid controversy known as the ‘white mutiny.’ According to Sharpe, one Courtnay Peregrine Ilbert proposed that Indian magistrates should have criminal jurisdiction over Europeans. This proposal caused outrage amongst Europeans, especially since there was an assumption that white people should be subject only to the judgement of white magistrates. Opposition, Fein tells us, was fiercest among indigo planters in Bengal. And that fear Sharpe points out, found itself expressed most vociferously in terms of their fears for white womanhood (Sharpe 1993: 89-91; Fein 1977: 51-52; see also Mrinalini Sinha 1992). Anil Seal tells us that, ‘A European and Anglo-Indian defense Association was formed ... There was wild talk of a white mutiny, of packing the Viceroy off to England by force, of getting the European Volunteer Corps to disband ... The cry of “our women in danger” revived fears and passions latent since the Mutiny. They were not confined to India. In England, too, the controversy evoked an outspoken attack on liberal policy towards India and an uncompromising assertion of the doctrine of racial superiority’ (Anil Seal 1968: 165).
Of course, we must not confuse this particular mutiny with others that sprang up from time to time and were so described. Another, earlier, mini revolt amongst the white population concerned pecuniary matters – grievances about the amount of Batta paid to army officers for instance. Sometimes the army officers would take matters into their own hands. Cardew tells us of an old practice in Bengal – a Bazar tax – levied by officers ‘for their own benefit, on the bazaars within their jurisdiction...an abuse imitated from native practice, but...very lucrative.’ He adds, ‘at a time when no retiring allowance or pension was provided, there was a certain excuse for it.’ Needless to say when the Company moved to withdraw the privilege for levying it, it was ‘bitterly resented’. Yet another well known instance occurred during Sir George Barlow’s tenure as Governor of Madras at the beginning of the nineteenth century (on these disputes and more cf. Cardew 1929: 10; Mason 1974).

A phrase so often repeated that it is apt to describe it as an axiom of a style of British rule. One Frank Richards for instance, is not the first, nor would he be the last, to regard it as totemic. He has one of his colleagues repeat the mantra to him when their party is confronted one day by an uppity road sweeper. Directed by one of the party to another job the so-called native apparently replied, that he would do it once he’d finished his sweeping up. On hearing this the old soldier drove his fist into the natives’ stomach, shouting at the same time, “you black soor, when I order you to do a thing I expect it to be done at once.” He then added “my God it’s scandalous the way things are going on in this country. The blasted natives are getting cheekier every day. Not so many years ago I would have half-killed that native... If he had made a complaint afterwards and had marks to show, any descent commanding officer would have laughed at him and told him to clear off.” They all agreed that the natives were getting cheekier every day. And none balked from the proposition, ‘what is won by the sword must be kept by the sword, and it’s the law that will ever apply to this country’. Strawson, a commentator on the army brings it right up to date. Fulfilling what he calls, the imperial urge meant the realization, ‘India no doubt had been won by the sword and would have to be kept by the sword’ (Richards 1936: 74-75; Strawson 1989: 45).

Renunciation of titles of course is nothing new. These occasions are specific instances in which dissatisfaction at the bureaucracy is expressed. On 28 June 1918, the Amrita Bakaria, tells us about other, earlier, instances worth noting. Reporting a speech by Babu Jitendra Lal Bannerjea given to honor Subrayma Iyer, Bannerjea congratulates Iyer whom he describes as ‘...neither 'Sir' nor 'Dr.' but simply Subramanya Iyer – the man who without titles is the greatest of the modern living Indians.’ Though, the writer tells us, there are others who have refused titles, Mr. Gokhale and Mr. Narottam Moraji Gokuldny, being among their number, ‘the case of Subramanya Iyer stands on a different and more remarkable footing.’ Not only did he not accept the colonial yoke, he ‘flung it in the face of the English people...for a genuine Indian...knows that no foreigner, no alien, can honor a native son of the soil.’ The writer finishes with a call for alternative approbation: ‘If we must be houred, it is from ourselves that the honour must come: It is from the approbation of our counymen – from the sanction which the country lends to our activities- not from anything else’ (in Datta 1975 vol. II: 930).

David Lloyd George, ‘Causes and the Aims of war,’ Speech delivered at Glasgow on being presented with the freedom of that city, June 29 1917. Quoted in Lala Lajput Rai, The Political Future of India. B W Huebsch Inc.Nyork 1919. A month before ‘New India’ would counsel against holding out false hopes of great changes in Indian government after the ‘Great War’:

‘The President of the United States talks about a league of Free Nations, declares that the war is a war of democracy against autocracy not even remembering that England has established in Asia the most powerful autocracy in the world..and...fathered more repressive acts than the Central Powers can boast; intern the youth of the country by hundreds untried and unsentenced and restrains the liberty of peaceable citizens to travel freely over the land. All the paans sung over the successful revolt (i.e., of Russia) sink into the minds of Indians who, like Mary, ponder these things in their hearts...Desperate they (students) broke away from all control of their elders, began to conspire and numbers of them have conspired ever since. Some have been hanged, some...sent to the living death of the Andaman Islands; some...imprisoned here. Now the students watch with amazement the Premier of Great Britain rejoicing over the results of the similar actions of young Russians who blew up trains and assassinated a Tsar, and who are now applauded as martyrs....The names which were executed are held sacred and sufferings are crowned with triumph’ (New India 23 May 1917 in V N Datta 1975: Vol. II, 911).

In his autobiography, Gandhi tells us how, at the outbreak of the Zulu rebellion in 1906, his citizen ship of Natal and his belief then that the ‘British Empire existed for the welfare of the world,’ made him write to the Governor ‘expressing...his... readiness to form an Indian Ambulance corps’. The Governor wrote back accepting his offer. How could he do otherwise he reasoned? He bore no animosity, nor grudge, toward the Zulus, he says. They after all had harmed no Indian. Nor did the rightness or otherwise of their rebellion effect his decision to support the
A genuine sense of loyalty prevented me from wishing ill to the Empire” (Gandhi 1927: 261). During this period, and a few years later during the 1914-1918 war, loyalty to Empire is his watch-role, so to speak. At a meeting in London, August 1914, he exhorts all present to volunteer and serve in the army just as so many English students did. Many among his audience objected. Why should they serve the empire, they asked? There was a world of difference between Indians and the English. Indians were slaves and the English their masters. How, in these circumstances, could a slave, or indeed should a slave, co-operate with his master particularly in his master’s hour of need? Shouldn’t the slave, instead, ‘seeking to be free... make the master’s need, his opportunity’ Persuasive though this argument is, it failed at the time to appeal to him. He knew the difference between Indian and Englishman, he said. Yet he didn’t think Indians slaves. And about misunderstandings between Indians and Englishmen from time to time, as a true loyalist at the time he added: ‘I...feel...it is more the fault of individual British Officials than of the British system, and that we could convert them by love. If we would improve our status thorough the help and co-operation of the British, it was our duty to win their help by standing by them in their hour of need’ (M K Gandhi 1927: pp290-291).

- Kamlesh Mohan describes these gestures as signaling a rise in an Indian consciousness, a turn in such a putative constituency, from ambivalence to alienation. She suggests many people in the Punjab followed the example set by Gandhi. They returned their ‘Kaiser-i-Hind decorations, their certificates, their sanads, and their titles of Rai Sahib, kurinashin, etc.’ Interestingly, she also notes the actions of Sarla Debi Chaudharni, a ‘lone women’, ‘who returned her war badge, granted for recruiting services for the formation of the Bengali regiment during the first world war’ (Mohan 2000 in V N Datta & S Settar eds. 2000: 52-79).

- From Report of the Commissioners Vol. II Statement No.2, cited by Kamlesh Mohan ibid: 68 Perhaps, for the sake of completeness, we should note that Anglo-Indians often use the words of Indians in contrary senses. For instance, to augment their approval of the shame inflicted by the administration on opponents of empire. In a letter to The Times (1 June 1920) for instance, (Lord) Sydenham writes of one Hon. Mahommed Shafi, who was one amongst a deputation received by Sir Michael O’Dwyer, and who, according to Sydenham, complimented O’Dwyer’s administration in the following terms:

‘The province (Punjab) owes it to your wise administration that it has enjoyed complete tranquility and peace throughout the war and has seen a remarkable diminution of crime...Although towards the end of your Honor’s brilliant regime the enemies of law and order, as a result of organized conspiracy, succeeded in deluding a section of the people into riots and disturbances, yet it is a tribute to your Honor’s far-sighted statesmanship that firmness that the situation was soon got well in hand by using the speedy and effective method of martial law....The critics of the Punjab Government outside the province do not realize of what stuff the Punjab is made, and the recent disturbances must open their eyes and would show how dangerous it is to allow the agitators to play with such stuff

Sydenham dismisses later reports of the same Mahommed Shafi apparently saying that since ‘there had been no organized conspiracy or preconceived conspiracy to subvert British rule....there was no justification for the enforcement of martial law.’ Sydenham scoffs at this apparent retraction as, the misconceptions of a man that become used to the calm security, even serenity, of Simla (Emphasis mine). The Times 1 June 1920: 12).

- Is the name given to Ghandhian, non-violent forms of political protest – its literal meaning being, ‘truth force.’

- Its antecedents lay in his campaigns to resist South African government restrictions on the movement of Indian (coolie) labour.

- Mohan adds, Gandhi ‘..acknowledged that the development of such a critical temper and consciousness of the people’s strength among the thirty crores of Indians demanded a psychological transformation. It implied the removal of ‘slavish and defeatist mentality’ underpinned by fear, caused by infliction of brutal physical force and psychological onslaught.’ So he promptly set about cultivating such a critical temper (Mohan 2000: 56 in Datta & Settar (eds.) 2000).

- The Ghadar (revolutionary) movement founded on 18 August 1913 in San Francisco, is an earlier case of an organization that wanted to gain India’s freedom explicitly by force. Its objectives were succinctly stated in its newspaper, ‘Ghadar’ as a slogan: ‘Today, there begins in foreign lands, but in our country’s language, a war against the British Raj...What is our name? Ghadar. What is our work? Ghadar. Where will Ghadar break out? In India. The time will soon come when rifles and blood will take the place of pen and ink.’ The party’s impact extended well beyond its initial focus – immigration to Canada. At the turn of the Century immigration from India to Canada became a focus of contestation. Under a ‘keep Canada white for ever’ policy, the Canadian authorities came to an agreement with the Government in India that it would discourage the
emigration of Indians to its shores. The Indian Government obligingly invoked the provisions of the Emigration Act 1883. Under this Act emigration was only allowed to countries listed in its schedule and which had adequate legislation in force to protect the interests of such emigrants. Of course Canada was not to be found listed in the schedule as one of the approved countries and no provision had been made by the Canadian authorities to protect the interests of immigrants. This lead to many aborted attempts by men from the Punjab, mostly Sikhs, to land in Canada and to those already there being under pressure from the local laws to make the return journey to India. As Datta says, between 1908 and 1911 approximately a thousand of these émigrés were compelled to return to India with many more fleeing to the United States. In an incident that tested to the limit the notional separation between radicalized reason and universal laws, a Japanese merchant ship, the Komagata Maru, chartered by a Gurdit Singh, was turned away by the authorities at Vancouver and forced back to India. Arriving at Hoogly estuary on 27 September 1914 it docked at Budge-harbor on 19 September. The passengers were not free however to disembark. They were ordered onto trains bound for the Punjab under the Ingress Ordinance 1914 passed by the Indian Government to restrict the movement of anyone entering India after 5 September. But these returnees had to some extent become radicalized through their experiences and the vehicle that provided a focus for many of their concerns was the Ghadar party. Many, Datta continues, disobeyed the directive and marched through the streets of Calcutta. The resulting confrontation with the police left eighteen dead with another twenty five wounded. Two hundred Ghadar party supporters were subsequently interned with the rest returned to the Punjab.

The return of what the Government saw as potential revolutionaries was to be repeated soon after, leaving, Datta estimates, about one thousand individuals who had been influenced by the Ghadar party living in close proximity to one another. They were closely policed. And a general rising fixed by their leaders to commence on the night of 21 February 1915 was quickly foiled. By as early as August 1915, the Punjab Government had virtually wiped out any trace of the Party, using its extensive powers under The Ingress Ordinance in combination with those found in the Defence of India Act. According to O'Dwyer himself 175 people were brought before Special Tribunals, of whom 136 were convicted of offences that in nearly all cases were punishable with death. 38 were sentenced to death, with 20 eventually being hanged. Of the rest 58 were sentenced to transportation for life and 58 transportation for varying terms. The Tribunals made the usual orders for the forfeiture of property (Cf. Harish K. Puri 1993; For a more detailed discussion about the specifics of nationalist imaginings in Asia see Partha Chatterjee 1993).

Nayar recounts to us a legend he thinks vouches for Bhagat Singh's radicalism. According to him, Singh 'had visited the. Jallianwala Bagh... and carried in his pocket for a long time a packet of dust he had collected from there. Thus was his way of paying homage to those whom had been killed by the rulers.' And perhaps, Nayar speculates, made him vow that members of the bureaucracy who conducted themselves as Dyer had, and referring specifically to Superintendent Scott actions against Lajput Rai, would be made to pay for those actions (Nayar 2000: 34).

The reference to the terms 'precarious hegemony' is from Mohan in Datta & Settar 2000: 57, but the sentiment is from the work of Ranajit Guha and the Subaltern group of scholars. See in particular his, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India, Harvard University Press, London 1993.

The ‘Commonweal,’ 18 August 1916.

Such sentiments found an echo in ‘New India’ comments about Britain’s place as a premier autocracy in the world at the time:

The president of the United States talks about a League of Free Nations, declares that the war is a war of democracy against autocracy not even remembering that England has established in Asia the most powerful autocracy in the world [and] has fathered more repressive Acts than the Central Powers can boast; interns the youth of the country by hundreds untried and unsentenced and restrains the liberty of peaceable citizens to travel freely over the land. All the paens sung over the successful revolt (i.e., of Russia) sink into the minds of Indians who, like Mary, ponder these things in their hearts... Desperate they (students) broke away from all control of their elders, began to conspire and numbers of them have conspired ever since. Some have been hanged, some were sent to the living death of the Andaman Islands; some were imprisoned here. Now the students watch with amazement the Premier of Great Britain rejoicing over the results of the similar actions of young Russian men and women who conspired and blew up trains and assassinated a Tsar and who are now applauded as martyrs. The names, which were executed, are held sacred and sufferings are crowned with triumph (New India 23 May 1917. See V N Datta, New Light on the Punjab Disturbances 1919 Vol. II 1975: 911).

The Manifesto of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association had already called the young to arms:
The future of India rests with the youths. They are the salt of the earth. Their promptness to suffer, their daring courage and their radiant sacrifices prove that India's future in their hands is perfectly safe... Youths-ye-soldiers of the Indian Republic fall in. Don't stand easy; don't let your knees tremble. Shake off the paralyzing effects of long lethargy. Yours is a noble Mission. Go out into every nook and corner of the country and prepare the ground for future. Revolution which is sure to come. Respond to the clarion call of duty. Don't vegetate. Grow!... Sow the seeds of disgust and hatred against British Imperialism in the fertile minds of your fellow youths. And the seeds shall spout and there shall grow a jungle of sturdy trees, because you shall water the seeds with young warm blood' (Manifesto 1929 in Mohan 1985: 208).


29 On the pamphlet itself she alerts us to an intriguing matter of detail: '...Though issued by the Atashi Charkar Group...it did not profess a different ideology. One of the various reasons for formation of the Group by the erstwhile members of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association was to divert attention of the police to the new party. It was likely to give freedom of action to Chander Shekhar Azad. Hence this pamphlet is regarded as part of the HSRA literature' (Mohan 1985: 377 n.64).


31 Sarojini Naidu, 'Punjab in 1919'. Naidu isn't alone in trying to capture in prose, the deafening screams and emotions, stirred and calling all to be ready for forceful action. Hari Singh reminds us how another writer, Subhadra Kumari Chauhan, comprehends such an enduring memory:

'The Sweet notes of the nightingale are no longer heard here. Instead, cawing of cows renders this place noisy. The sombrous insects and moths generate an illusion of humming bees. Buds are semi-blossomed and engulfed by thorny outgrowth.

The pollen-dust deprived of its usual fragrance had now, turned into an unseemly speck. Alas, the loveable, beautiful garden is all blood drenched. Welcome to the king of seasons but come stealthily.

For this being a place of mourning where noise is forbidden. The wind may blow but she be bade to blow slowly. Lest she should blow away the sights and sobs of sorrow. The nightingale may sing and pour our mournful notes.

The humming bees may hum but relate the tale of oppression. Thou mayest bring flowers but they be not extra decorative. Their fragrance be mild and they be dew dropped, Present then not as gifts to one's near and dear:

They be scattered in devotion and in memory of those who are gone. Children innocent and of tender age fell here to the bullets. Thou mayest scatter some petals of buds in their name. Many a heart full of ambitions and longings have been pierced with bullets here And they by brute force removed from their loving families and country at large. Some buds semi-blown be offered here in their memory. And some dew drops be scattered hither and thither in the form of tears. The old and elderly died here of bullets wounds writhing in pain.

In their memory too thou mayest scatter some flowers dried up. O! spring, the king of seasons Hail to thee But come stealthily For it being a place of mourning Where noise is forbidden.'

Quoted by Hari Singh from Mukul (Collection of Poems of Subhadra Kumari Chauhan, Allahabad 1965) in Datta & Settar 2000: 80-87. Singh's comment on the outpourings contained in such prose is instructive. According to him:
'Creative literature – be it poetry, fiction, drama or any other literary form – had a much wider impact than the intellectual writings, the difference being that the former appealed to emotions and sentiments and the latter to the intellectual faculty. Our cognitive behavior is forever more rooted in emotionality, therefore, the creative literature produced as an aftermath of this great human tragedy of Indian history becomes as relevant as any intellectual analysis thereof can claim to be' (Singh 2000 in Datta & Settar 2000: 85).

32. Emphasis mine.
CHAPTER 2 - THE SEARCH FOR A NARRATIVE

1

Introduction

As I outlined in chapter 1, much of the writings on the Amritsar massacres and disturbances are concerned to analyze the events of 1919 as an event. A faithful account of those occurrences is their raison d'être. Those attempts of course are not abstract detached, exercises, but battles in defining how it should be understood. More to the point they are political contests. They are struggles to try and find those responsible or in the alternative to exonerate the bureaucracy. We saw in particular how dishonored Tagore felt about the turn to events. How in the alternative the pride (Kipling notably) others felt at Dyers actions.

There are consequently many histories written over the years that have sought the final word on an event or series of events like these. This is a very noble, necessary if arduous task. So, for instance, histories of the holocaust are a case in point (Ozick 1984; Bauman 1989; Bauman 1991). Now the desire to write a final verdict on Amritsar is not so much an explosion of naivete as a very specific practice. So, such work is important not least for those who thought to point to its political uses. Hence, borrowing from Bauman, such scholarship lends weight to those warning and pointing out that these events could happen
'anytime and everywhere' (Bauman 1991: 41). We must therefore be on our guard. In the way Fein makes abundantly clear (Fein 1977). Sticking for a moment longer with accounts of the holocaust, Bauman, via Chorover, incites us to recall that the advent of the third Reich was not so much of a nazi invention. It has a profound history. Hence:

'The sociological framework, upon which the justifications for genocide were ultimately built, was plainly not a Nazi invention. It had been erected in the name of science long before National Socialism became a reality...
The Nazi extermination programme was a logical extension of sociobiological ideas and eugenics doctrines which had nothing specifically to do with Jews and which flourished widely in Germany well before the era of the Third Reich...
The path was direct, from an allegedly objective brand of scientific discourse about human inequality to a purportedly rational form of moral argument about "lives devoid of value" and then to the final solution: "the release and destruction of lives devoid of value"' (Chorover in Bauman 1991: 41).

Such work then has as I say an important place. I do not join in such a project however. Borrowing once again from Bauman I see Amritsar as '...a window, rather than as a picture on the wall' (Bauman 1989: viii). In other words, I take the battles in the scholarship to be part of the discursive production of Amritsar. Looking through the window then I engage with the events of Amritsar not to establish what really happened, and so for me it is not a question of truth vs. falsity. Since for me, and I paraphrase Veyne, history is a false natural object.
He adds, '...history is what one makes of it. It has never stopped changing' (Veyne 1997: 182). Derrida reminds us that 'the day that there will be a reading of the Oxford card, the one and true reading, will be the end of history' (Derrida in Bauman 1991: viii). So, readings of history will not stop.

My reading of these events then is different. Following what Veyne describes as Foucault's 'central and most original thesis'; I ask 'what is made' (Veyne in Davidson 1997: 160). Foucault doesn't take anything for granted. My interest then is in how subjects, in our case, rulers, are made. That, I contend '...is explained by what went its making at each moment of history; we are wrong to imagine that the making, the practice, is explained on the basis of what is made' (Veyne in Davidson 1997: 161).

How, I ask, are the ruling characters involved in the massacre, and that I investigate, fabricated as rulers. How is General Dyer fashioned; how is Sir Michael O'Dwyer shaped; and how is Edwin Montagu made? That is the different history of these events that I write.

I supplement my Foucauldian resources for writing the histories I do with reference to the work of Stephan Collini. In particular his, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930*. I do this in part because Foucault's work on the ethical practices of the self is a method that typically eschews biography. To be sure the writing of the self is a complicated
endeavor. Foucault knows this as his comments on the author function show us (Foucault in Bouchard and Simon 1977). He complicates any author function as he calls it by reminding us of its location within discourse and its 'differences from other discourses' (Foucault in Bouchard and Simon 1977: 124-127). For instance, 'criticism has been concerned for some time now with aspects of a text not fully dependent upon the notion of an author' (Foucault in Bouchard and Simon 1977: 124-127). Nothing comes out of the author per se. The words he/she speaks are not his/her alone. They are generally part of a tradition.

But the focus of my characterological studies is different from if similar to Foucault's emphasis. I do not write biographies of the characters I examine. To be sure an author's words are complicated in the way he describes. But I treat the characters I focus on quite simply as exemplar figures. Figures whose words and actions illustrate the traditions of rule they are a part of. Collini also engages in studies of exemplary characters. He constructs for us the life histories of members of the Athenaeum Club. It is important for us because it represented the 'peak of London's club land, especially for the subjects of Collini's interest - the public intellectual' (Gorman 2001: 1). He tells us how prominent intellectuals spoke to a receptive audience among the educated classes' (Soffer 1992: 1524).

Interestingly the membership of the club was not restricted to the 'world of inherited wealth and status' (Gorman 2001: 1). Under rule II the club accepted
men of distinguished eminence in Science, Literature, or the Arts or for Public Service' (Gorman 2001: 1). These men, these public intellectuals, as Collini has it, spoke on many moral issues of the day. Their talk, or as he glosses it, the written voice, becomes 'an extended conversation' in a language defined by common and continuing cultural and moral values' between an 'elite political class' about those shared moral values (Soffer 1992: 1524). The archetype, the individual, that emerges from these conversations is a figure who attempted to 'persuade their contemporaries to live up to their professed ideals' (Gorman 2001: 2). Obligation, manliness, altruism, proper character, duty and all such assumed and shared knowledge developed the identity of the man of the public sphere.

The characters I investigate were not members of this club, but they were engaged in Public Service. Members of this class held forth in all their spoken and written voices on important issues in empire of their day. For instance their conversations ranged over national character. The 'abhorrence of apathy, the valuation of work as compared to Georgian leisure, self restraint and the domination of the will over baser motivations ... that ... marked the Victorian intellectual's moral terrain' (Gorman 2001: 3). In short, public service.

Many of these conversations were conducted in and through their varied contributions to debates about moral conduct. That debate ranged far and wide and found its way into biographies, legislative debates, public speeches and
diaries. O'Dwyer for instance writes in his autobiography that he couldn't believe how any Indians would want to be free of their guardians. He believed there to be a right way of doing things and very definitely a wrong way. Guardianship right and freedom wrong. Indeed, so much freedom talk was a figment of many an Indian imaginations. Dyer in his turn similarly thought himself a dutiful character. For him demands for self-government by Indians were a horrible pretence (Dyer 1921). Montagu, in his diaries and numberless contributions to the public voice, expanded that talk to include Indians in such exchanges. Even after his resignation as Secretary of State for India he wanted to continue with the conversations he had started.

Collini's approach offers me some interesting methodological insights into the characterological method that I deploy when telling of my character's life's work and the contributions that they made to public service. He enables me to appreciate how important speech and exchange is to the formation and flow of ideas that rule an empire. Specifically that what is often important in the circulation of public morality is not 'so much...contained in...the accepted 'texts' of the period but rather the full range of the intellectuals public engagement' (Gorman 2001: 3). In this sense what he leaves us with is an appreciation of an individuals exemplary, ideal contributions to that morality. Their contributions are not by nature proselytizations, but rather conversations '...upon which some ideological agreement has been reached...' (Gorman 2001: 2). Hence, the talk is directed to audiences whose evaluative responses often
get brushed aside in considerations of political theory. They are on the contrary
often '...parasitic upon the lesser explicit habits of response and evaluation that
are deeply embedded in the culture...' (Collini 1991: 4-5).

The 'assumed knowledge' that circulates among the members of an elite defines
an identity that coheres around exclusionary principles. Hence, we see for
instance many Anglo-Indians cling together when defending the rightness of
General Dyer's actions. Dyer's own contributions to that debate in standing up
as he saw it for the rightness of his conduct are exemplary. His writings in this
regard are not conventional texts. So for instance his defence of those actions
was contained in a well-crafted, legal riposte. Drafted by Sharpe Pritchard and
Co, a firm still in practice today (Draper 1981: 222).

The other characters at the centre of Amritsar similarly engaged in speaking
about these events. To be sure my figures spoke to each other, and were often
in fierce disagreement with each other as well as confirming to themselves the
rightness of their actions. The disagreements between Montagu on the one hand
and O'Dwyer together with Dyer are an instance of this.

All this should not detract us from or be incompatible with, the use I make of
Foucault's approach to ethical practices of the self. As I say above though the
net in terms of conversations is cast wider, the words of the figures I investigate
illustrate the traditions of rule they are a part of. They are in this sense
compatible with Foucault's method in exploring the formation of subjects. As I say mine are simply exemplary figures that illustrate the tradition of rule of which they are a part.

Now in this chapter I engage with the discursive production of Amritsar for two reasons. Firstly in order to show just how vast that literature is, and the variety in their perceptions, and readings of the events. Secondly, as a preparatory to compose a different production in the terms I stated in chapter one; that is of the characterizations of men who rule and how such characterizations are subject to challenge and change.

2

In Pursuit Of Closure - The Secondary Literature

(a) Epic Restoration – Pearay Mohan (1920)

One of the earliest texts that claims to have the Amritsar disturbances and the Jallianwala Bagh Massacres as its central focus as an event, an event whose recounting it is hoped will bolster a political sensibility, is Pearay Mohan’s, *An Imaginary Rebellion (1920).* Sir Michael O’Dwyer stands accused of deliberately provoking the disturbances with his refusals to countenance the participation of educated Indians in government. Beyond this, perhaps
somewhat against the grain, Mohan wants to inaugurate a new era of goodwill in connections between India and England.

Beginning in a solemn and somber mood, it consists to close on 200 pages of commentary and takes us through an analysis of the above events, with an admirable tenacity. Mohan follows this by 737 pages of small typed collections of various materials. Among these are journal articles on martial law and its applicability; reports of the proceedings in the Martial Law Commissions; debates in the Imperial Legislative Council; and evidence given to the Disorders Enquiry Committee (the Hunter Committee), appointed on 14 October 1919 to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab, etc.

Hastily conceived and written, it is nevertheless a thorough and demanding tome.

No lesser person than Lala Lajput Rai wrote the book’s foreword, and his comments on it, and recommendations about it, are revealing. He compliments the exacting styles — this book he says, ‘has been written with a scrupulous regard for truth and with remarkable lucidity, precision and impartiality’ - and gives the reader a flavor of such a crucial labor (in Mohan 1920: xxi).

Rai defines the rationale of the book as a desire to lay bare a brutal despotism, as opposed to a benevolent one, practiced by the administration in all its horrid
details. It aims to put it before the people so they could study the whole in readiness for effective and constructive criticism. And so put forth, Rai urges that ‘...every iota of our energy...(be put to use)...to get rid of the bureaucratic system of government, under which we have lived for the last 70 years or so’ (in Mohan 1920: xxi). According to Lala Lajpat Rai, the Punjab tragedy, as he called the events of 1919,

‘..is a chapter of the world’s history – a bloody chapter albeit – dyed red by the high Priests of Imperialism, which will retain its freshness whenever future generations of men and women happen to read it. It has placed us in a position to visualize the barbaric possibilities of Imperialism run amuck’ (in Mohan 1920: xix).

As I suggested in chapter 1, it is a story of shame. It is time, Rai went on, that Indians saw for themselves, the character of foreign rule. Mohan’s treatise showed them that character. It was time they realized that their hopes for a greater say in their rule did not lie with foreigners but with themselves. Amritsar merely gave more impetus to seeing so-called benevolent despotism for what it really was. And why had Indians not seen this before? It could only be because he conjectures

‘Modern Indians had been so well inoculated with the serum of ‘benevolent despotism’, as to make them forget that it is easier for a leopard to change its spots than for imperialism to change its true nature. Benevolent imperialism is like a caged lion. However you may play with it so long as it is caged, or
under the spell of a master trainer, the moment it gets out of control, it is bound to behave in conformity with its real nature. The atrocities perpetuated at Amritsar have proved that Imperialism run mad is more dangerous, more destructive, more vindictive, and more inhuman, than a frenzied uncontrollable mob. When a mob get out of hand, it does things pretty bad and cruel; but its destructiveness is born of passion and is not deliberately planned and thought out. Imperialism, on the other hand, as represented by O'Dwyers, Dyers, O'Briens, Bosworth Smiths, Johnsons, Dovetons and others takes revenge with a deliberate aim. It plans out with a fixed purpose, and carries out those plans in a spirit of military vindictiveness' (in Mohan 1920: xix).

Bearing the weight of such recommendations, Mohan doesn’t disappoint. He concentrates his commentary on what he calls the 'reign of terror' both before and after the advent of martial law. Mohan it seems is committed to the notion that the voluminous materials he puts before us will convince us of the terrors practiced by India’s so-called Guardians. He tries through their recounting, to alert his readers, perhaps enable them to grapple with the horrors he says Indians feel at the ‘atrocities perpetrated by some of the officers of the crown, under the cloak of martial law’ (Mohan 1920: 182).

Nothing in his work is merely detail. Instead the detail become the specifics in a sad tale of failure. Hence, as Mohan says,
‘Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s theory of government miserably failed in the Punjab; and, on his own showing led an unarmed and... loyal population to rise in open rebellion against his authority’ (Mohan 1920: 182).

In disgust almost, he scolds; it need not have been this way! So deep, according to him, did India and its inhabitants drink in the British well of just and beneficent rule. So deeply had loyalty to the British nation been rooted in their hearts, that Indians would refuse to be seduced into disloyalty, even in spite of what he calls ‘the brief reign of terror, which was carried on in the Punjab under martial law’ (Mohan 1920: 182).

But, unfortunately, the famed Indian loyalty he proudly proclaims could not, according to him, last the reign of terror that took on new turns under martial law. ‘Every loyal citizen,’ he thinks,

‘is horrified at the atrocities perpetrated by some of the officers of the crown under the cloak of martial law, and is distressed to see that acts were done in the name of peace and order, of which every civilized Government should be ashamed. The vehemence with which these acts have been criticized is the measure of the ... esteem in which the British Government is held in India. Had such acts been everyday occurrences, had the whole purpose and policy of British rule in India not been sound and honorable, the horrors of martial law would not have caused so much pain and indignation throughout the country, nor would they have produced so insistent a demand for reparation’ (Mohan 1920: 182-3)
As if to force home the message that the administration had 'caused...pain and indignation...' Mohan hoped they would learn that

‘the regime of blood and iron, which was inaugurated by Martial Law... proved that a policy of repression weakens the prestige of Government and makes martyrs of the persons who are unjustly made to suffer. Every person, of whatever position in life, who was imprisoned under Martial Law, has been feted and hailed as a hero and patriot on his release, which has naturally led him to believe that he has done something to merit the acclamations of the people. It is indeed a sad state of things that the measure of a man’s sincerity, patriotism and ability is the extent to which he is chastised by the Government. Such a state of affairs is injurious to both the Government and the people; and the Government should realize that repression carried beyond a certain point becomes its own antidote, just as at a certain stage pain becomes its own anodyne. Every wise Government should see that that limit is not crossed’ (Mohan 1920: 182).

Human (British) salvation in this context lies he proposes, in its, and Indians’, full appreciation of the errors of wielding the big stick in these ways. Aren’t we all working towards the same goal, one could imagine him asking? The Indo-British connection he feels is such that only by working together will they arrange for the good government of India. Once good government returns the ‘honor and reputation of England’ should be restored (Mohan 1920: xvii).

This then I propose is the path Mohan plots.
He stages the events of 1919 as a tragic drama – 'the tragedy of errors' he calls it - in the hope that the temporal index of human (British) salvation can be restored. Thus he divides the 'tragedy of errors' 1919, into five acts.

The first consists of the events leading up to the disorders under what he calls the effective and able guidance of that august administrator, Sir Michael O'Dwyer. Sir Michael, he says, 'never lost an opportunity to proclaim to the rest of India the loyalty and magnificent sacrifices of the (Punjab) province.' Even on occasion he thinks in 'a most aggressive and offensive form' (Mohan 1920: 2). Hence, Mohan notes how on the 7th April 1919, only a week before martial law was declared, and in his last speech to the Punjab Legislative Council, O'Dwyer observes: -

‘Gentlemen, I have often been criticised for dwelling on the achievements of the Punjab in season and out of season. But my pride in the province is based on no parochial spirit. I have spent 15 years away from it, during which I have seen many other parts of India.

I might say: -

‘Much have I seen and known – cities of men,
And manners, climates, councils, governments.
But nowhere did I find the same qualities as the Punjab can show from the prince’s palace down to the peasant’s hut. I found I could meet the Punjabee, whatever his class or condition, as man to man without suspicion or mistrust. I found him in the mass – and I refer primarily to the rural masses – loyal but not subservient, brave but not boastful, enterprising but not visionary,
progressive but not pursuing false ideals or mistaking the shadow for substance....

I regard it as great privilege to have lived and worked with such a people and to be closing my service amongst them....' (in Mohan 1920: 2).

The week before, during one of the stops on his tours - at Gujranwala - exhorting people in the Punjab to join in supporting, mainly by providing manpower, the war effort, we find in his words another instance of his confidence and pride in the Punjab: -

'It is a great pleasure to me to come among you today and to have this opportunity of meeting so many friends whom I have not forgotten and who have not forgotten me, to hear such good accounts of the progress of the town and district and to be able to congratulate you on the staunch loyal support which I and my office have received from you during my six years term of office and particularly during the critical period of the war....

As you know Gujranwala was slow in starting but under the stimulus given to your efforts by the vigorous personality of Colonel O’Brien, it made a notable advance in the last year of the war, and in the 11 months from December 1917 to October 1918 it raised 7,000 recruits for the army.

When the war ceased you had about 13,000 men in the army and in proportion to your male population while far below Amritsar and Gurdaspur, you were equal to your neighbours in Sialkot and a good way better than Lahore. So Gujranwala though not in the first rank has removed the reproach that would have attached to it had you allowed other people to fight your battles. In the matter of War Charities the generosity of Gujranwala has been conspicuous
and Lady O'Dwyer desires me to express her gratitude to the zealous workers who gave such liberal and unfailing support to the Red Cross and Comforts Fund.

And now Gentlemen, I take leave of you with a heart saddened by the thought that I shall not see you again. Many happy days I have spent here, but I find comfort in the recollection of the many and valued friends I have made here' (in Mohan 1920: 3).

Yet, Mohan wonders at his conceit; for when the curtain rises a second time – and the time Mohan fixes on is the 10th April in Amritsar - we are confronted with scenes of panic, murder, riot, arson and bloodshed. Perhaps, hints at what is to become the second scene of the drama are to be gleaned from the night before. According to Sayer, on the 9th Miles Irving, the Deputy Commissioner, witnessed extraordinary ‘scenes of fraternization between Hindus and Muslims, including the public sharing of water vessels’ (Sayer 1991: 137). Perhaps, the unease these extraordinary instances of fraternization instilled in Miles Irving led O'Dwyer to order the deportation from Amritsar of two prominent campaigners against implementation of the Rowlat bills.7

And so when on the 10th news of this spread, crowds gathered, determined to breach the civil lines – the name given to the area where Europeans lived – and protest against the deportations outside Miles Irving’s bungalow. They were confronted by troops equally determined to keep them back. Borrowing a description from Sayer,
by the end of the day many buildings had been looted and burned down, and five Europeans had been beaten to death. One such assault, the attack on the manager of the City mission school, Miss Sherwood – who was left for dead, but was given first aid by Hindu shopkeepers – was particularly to incense Dyer, who arrived in Amritsar late the next evening to take effective control of the city from the civil authorities. The rest of the European women and children were safely ensconced in the fort by 4 p.m. on the 10 April. The railway lines had been damaged, and the telegraph and telephone wires cut. Word came in, magnified by rumor, of riot, murder and arson elsewhere in the Punjab’ (Sayer 1991: 137-138).

By the third act scripted by Mohan, we witness scenes of devastation and destruction, where official bloodletting reaches new heights of ‘vindictive lawlessness, both before and after the proclamation of martial law’ (Mohan 1920: xvii). In the district of Gujranwala, two weeks after O’Dwyer’s speech eliciting recruits for the war effort, Mohan tells us how machine guns and airplanes were deployed against disorder (Mohan 1920: 3). Amidst such scenes, Mohan unfolds the penultimate act in his drama; the clash of opposing forces. Their clash is magnified, depicting a colossus of disorder bearing down upon the civilization that Europeans have brought with them to bestow on those less fortunate than they are. 8

According to Mohan, many column inches in the Anglo-Indian press, and numerous hours of debate in the Imperial Legislative Council, are given to justifying the extraordinary responses that such a situation demanded from the
authorities. It began, he thinks, a ‘white washing process’ that would be completed by Lord Hunter’s Committee of Inquiry.

It is in this condition that we approach the fifth act, for him the most important part of the drama so far. At stake here for Mohan, as I point out above, are grave issues concerning the future of India. Specifically, ‘the contentment of the people of India and the honor and reputation of England as well as the mutual goodwill of the European and Indian people’ (Mohan 1920: xvii). He admits the arguments will be passionate. In these scenes we will witness, he thinks, people’s attempts to bring the perpetrators of terrorism to justice, and the government’s counter-attempts to ‘shield their protégés from the consequences of their misdeeds’ (Mohan 1920: xvii).

At the time Mohan began writing ‘An Imaginary Rebellion...’ (1920) the Punjab Sub-Committee’s report on the disturbances, cataloguing the humiliations of the martial law regime, lay ready. Mohan confidently asserts that before the curtain comes down on this final act we should know the moral and political repercussions of the tragic drama of the Punjab disturbances and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. He hopes it would be a restoration of Britain’s imperial mission to carry civilization to the nether regions of the world.

Thus a tragic tale of errors can mean only one thing. They should detract only for a moment and not a second longer from the sound and honorable purpose
and policy of British rule in India. That the moments of terror and humiliation, 
slaughter and persecution, imprisonment and transportation (to the Adnam 
islands usually), are so intensely felt is for him only so much confirmation of 
these honorable purposes. Now is the time for justice and reparation. But, he 
warns, justice must be delivered in full measure, only then he argues can the 
bitter memories of 1919 be obliterated from the collective recollections of the 
people of India.

The first step in such an obliteration he says must be to bring to trial those 
responsible for the cruel and vindictive enforcement of the regime of martial 
law, thereby bringing the name of the government into disrepute. It is for the 
sake both of Indians and England that Mohan asks for an assurance that cruel 
and inhuman acts will never again tarnish the name of Great Britain. That 
name, so long synonymous in her colonies, with the ‘principles of justice, 
liberty and Imperial rectitude...may...be irretrievably lost’ (Mohan 1920: 183). 
Thus, whatever his criticisms of the brutalities and barbarisms of 1919, and 
there are many, he seeks to rescue British honor and its civilizing mission from 
the funeral pyre. From the still burning embers, he says, a new more rigorous 
monument to progress is about to arise, inaugurating a new era in

‘the history of our connection with England. It is proper that...[we]...should 
begin with a clean slate and that all rankling sense of injustice over the past 
acts of the Government or its officials should disappear without leaving the 
slightest trail behind. Let us enter upon the era of peaceful reconstruction with
mutual confidence and goodwill: and let not the dawn of the new era be
darkened with the clouds of suspicion and mistrust (Mohan 1920: 183/4).

(b) Another Comprehensive attempt at Redemption – V N Datta (1969)

Mohan’s account of the Punjab disturbances is plotted as an insightful and epic
drama, in which he attempts to resolve the contradictions in Britain’s imperial
mission. V N Datta’s early contribution, Jallianwala Bagh (1969), though
similarly epic in its dimensions, is less so in its refusal to restore the
monumental vision of empire (Datta 1969). There is little to be rescued in this
sense Datta thinks from the scenes of rubble that Mohan writes about. Datta’s
emphasis rather is on how the disturbances, and Gen. Dyer’s actions, are ‘an
expression of the confrontation between ruler and ruled’ (Datta 1969: ix),
without the tale of redemption told by Mohan. The scenes of a tragedy of errors
that Mohan recounted will, Datta argues, never be redeemed. He describes the
tyrannical rule of India by the British not so that he can retrieve it from the
funeral pyre, by some reconciliation between ruler and ruled. On the contrary
he argues, the ‘Jallianwala Bagh was the parting of the ways between the
British and Indians’ (Datta 1969: ix). An unstoppable parting of the ways he
argues, that gave great ‘...impetus to the struggle for India’s freedom, because
people [realized they] could no longer afford to be complacent’ (Datta 1969:
173).
In my introduction we saw how ashamed some honored Indians were at the administrations actions, Tagore being prominent among them. In time, Rabindrinath Tagore now added, the present shock of disillusionment would pass away and

‘form the basis of the new era of the career of national self-respect, spiritual emancipation and national progress only by freeing ourselves from the spirit of dependence and mendicancy, casting out fear and guarding ourselves against the wasteful destruction of impotent rage and revengeful resentment.’

Using the words of a resident of Amritsar, Datta neatly sums up what he sees as the new situation

*Ab to hai apne sud o zyen par mujhe
Voh din gha ke lab peh mere ji hazur thaa.*

We know now what’s good or bad
We are no more yes-men.

Of course Datta is reluctant to rebuild the edifice of Britain’s imperial mission. He carefully highlights the historical specifics and complexities of such a mission. Yet, in his desire to propel into the history of the Jallianwala Bagh a burgeoning Indian nationalist sentiment that confronts an equally belligerent, though by now anxious, British imperialism, his argument, borrowing a description from Young ‘…functions as an overall syncretic frame’ (Young
1990: 173). Such an argument works as a transcendentalising historical gesture to produce what Benjamin calls 'the historical outlook of historicism' (Benjamin 1992: 247). An emphasis that proclaims, 'the truth will not run away from us', it is waiting to be recovered (Benjamin 1992: 247). This of course is a profoundly political gesture. It is not naïve to think or want such and analysis. But more to the point Datta complements such an emphasis with a complicated story of political protest.

Hence Datta devotes the whole of chapter one of his Jallianwala Bagh (1969) to recovering the origins of the growing nationalist sentiments and plotting their rise (Datta 1969). Herein perhaps, more than his refusal to reconstruct the imperial mission lies his disagreement with and difference from Mohan. Insightful though Mohan's work is, for Datta it is not insightful enough. I suggest that this is not regret by Datta that Mohan excludes such a context as part of the background to the disturbances and the massacre, but the desire for a yet fuller account of the Massacres et al as an event. What Datta means in other words is that Mohan's book is not voluminous enough. He thinks it remains 'at best a chronicle of events derived from official reports: Legislative Council Debates and Ordinances, but not from the Hunter Committee evidence' (Datta 1975: 8). Not only, according to this argument, does Mohan's account of the disturbances, the massacres and the martial law regime depend largely on official sources, there is a great lacuna in its perusal of the documentation. The official report of the disturbances had not yet been completed. Thus, however
fulsome Mohan’s attempts at ascertaining the truth, and however much Mohan defines his project as being about placing the truth ‘in its naked form before his readers,’ and howsoever ‘unpleasant that task has [personally] been’ (Mohan 1920: xviii), it is not, for Datta, complete enough.15

As I argue above, this engagement with Mohan’s text by Datta is clearly based on the assumption that it is desirable, possible even, to get to the whole truth of the events at Amritsar as an event, and to describe the past as it really was. In order to articulate it as it really was, it is necessary to deny those accounts that fall short of the exacting requirements he, and this conception of history, demands of them.16 Evidence of what went on during early 1919 is stacked up and up, because it is assumed that in this way we can get at its reality. Then, when we come to writing it up the words we use will be nothing but merely a ‘reflection of the real.’ Michel de Certeau for instance aptly describes this type of historical discourse, when he writes that it

gives itself credibility in the name of the reality which it is supposed to represent, but this authorized appearance of the ‘real’ serves precisely to camouflage the practice which in fact determines it. Representation thus disguises the praxis that organizes it (de Certeau 1986: 203).

The denial of the role and place of a mediating historian is somewhat ironic, though perhaps understandable. Ironic because it is plainly Datta - an historian - who argues and therefore puts himself between the material and its writing -
it is writing he says, that is not complete enough. Understandable, in that he wants to win the political battle over its comprehension as a confrontation between ruler and ruled, and wins it via a tradition of historical writing that defines its project in terms of finding the truth.

Whilst it is impossible by this means to falsify Mohan’s interpretations, the ‘at best’ formulation, allows Datta at the very least to side-step them and continue with his immensely scholarly and important task.

Datta’s engagement with Mohan’s tome entails a claim as to how the study of history should proceed. His own contribution(s) and I am thinking here in particular of his *Jallianwala Bagh 1969*, though rigorous in its applications of the ‘historical project,’ also has its own supplements. They cannot be reduced to technical or methodological imperatives of the passage of time as progress. Commonly deemed a linear conception of historical time. Enormously interesting from this point of view is the first chapter in the above book. As he enumerates the history of nationalist sensibilities among the diverse populations of India for instance, our attention is not solely drawn to the recovery of pre-existing and invariant traditions of political protest that cohere around a stable national culture. Rather it is drawn to their immense complexity, taking different shapes in the course of argument and negotiation.
Thus, important as this project is – politically, there is a certain integrity at stake in the struggles for independence of Indians - we do well to remember that, as well as such coherence, traditions of political protest acquire power and resonance through their profound anti-conformism. In this sense, Datta’s historical context doesn’t correspond to a pre-given reality out there that he meticulously recovers and catalogues. I propose rather that his foray into the growing demands for freedom by the diverse populations of India should be read another way. They should be read as an exegesis on the creation and construction of complex movements with inter-cultural, inter-national and trans-national networks that mediate against their easy location within a mapping of history as progress.

Instead of presenting us only with an uncomplicated narrative of the rise of nationalist sensibilities, he draws attention to their messy realities; to their unstable and changeable character and to their emergent identifications. The story of Amritsar presents us then with a window of opportunity. An opportunity for exploring beyond this genre’s demands for the last word. In this sense, the stories about Amritsar, this story of Amritsar, in spite of following a certain tradition, is more than just about recovering the events as an event.

(c) The Case of Guy Horniman (1920)
Datta’s scholarship is first and foremost driven by the desire to offer his readers a complete and definite account of the events of 1919, notwithstanding my reading of his opening chapter that suggests his writing turns out to be about more than that. Datta reads the events as an expression of a confrontation between ruler and ruled.

Guy Horniman’s book *Amritsar and Our Duty to India* (1920), offers us some other interesting supplements on the theme of what really happened. Central to that is his claim to have based his account on personal observations and experience. Hence, making explicit the importance of his role in narrating the story.

Regarded by many as an effective propagandist in the cause of Indian Home Rule, he edited the *Bombay Chronicle*.\(^{17}\) His ‘...pungent criticisms of British rule...’ over a number of years, ensured that he attracted the ire of the Government of India in droves (Draper 1981: 113).\(^{18}\) The Governor of Bombay notes one such incident and remarks on it with barely concealed alarm. Thus, he notes that 'on Tuesday 8\(^{th}\) (April 1919)...Horniman published in...the Chronicle a passive resistance manifesto in which methods of resistance to certain laws were explained.'\(^{19}\) Only a month before Horniman had shown what a thorn in the Government of India’s side he was with a series of notable diatribes in the *Chronicle* of 11 March 1919. Commenting on the strangulation of Indian industries by selfish alien rulers, the *Chronicle* agreed with a recent
speech by Sir P C Ray. For him the masses must be alerted to this fact and that until they had sufficient cognizance of it, they would continue to be the ‘victims of those who...despoil them of the fruits of their labor’ (in Datta 1975: 915).

After conferring with the Viceroy about the grave situation in Bombay the Governor of Bombay decides at last that '...Horniman must be deported.' The Governor adds:

'I have shown great patience and done all I can to bring public opinion round on the side of the Government, but it is no longer possible to allow open advocacy of law breaking to continue.'

On 27th April and for some not before time, Horniman would be put on board the S.S. Takada, which set sail from Bombay, and deported to England. Deported, according to the Viceroy, '...in view of the inflammatory propaganda being conducted by him.' Propaganda the authorities reasoned would '...be a cause of...the...recrudescence of...trouble and also...ferment...discontent among the troops by the free distribution to them of his paper.'

Planning ahead, the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent word by telegram to the Governor of Gibraltar, and administrators in Malta, that Horniman 'should not be granted a passport to return to India.' If they hoped by this means to silence him they were in for a shock. Paraphrasing Draper, 'what
could be done...with impunity...in India could not be done in England...'. Horniman knew this and needless to say '...seized his deportation as an opportunity to write an account of the events in the Punjab...based...on his personal experiences and observations' (Draper 1981: 114).

Horniman continued to mock Sir Michael O'Dwyer's attempts to silence the press. Thus:

'One of the greatest counts in the indictment against Sir Michael O'Dwyer...is the policy of concealment which he deliberately pursued...From the beginning every newspaper in the Province was placed under pre-censorship by the Government and nothing, either by comment or reports of events could be published without being submitted for official approval and sanction. In this way the publication of inconvenient exposures of the methods that were being pursued was prevented at one stroke' (in Draper 1981: 114).

Of course Horniman's departure from the scene didn't go unheeded or indeed unmarked. As news spread of his deportation, and the politicians came under pressure to react in some way to show their disapproval of the authorities actions, Gandhi convened a meeting of the Satyagraha Sabha on the 4 May 1919. The Sabha decided, 'after mature deliberation that next Sunday 11th instant should be the day of observance of Hartal, fasting for 24 hours reckoning from previous evening and private religious devotion in every home.'23
If the Government hoped, by deporting Horniman, to stem the flow of wounding invective coming from his direction, they failed miserably. The point being that Horniman took his deportation as an opportunity to write his own account of the Punjab disturbances, published as *Amritsar and Our Duty to India* (1920).  

Based on his personal observations and experiences, (he apparently stood near the scene), *Amritsar and Our Duty to India* (1920), is a provocative and highly polemical indictment of the British bureaucracy and military. That the events of 1919 should be completely accessible to Horniman without mediation, is just one of the underlying assumptions of an account that places an undue emphasis on being a first hand description of what appeared to the senses. In this case what he witnessed and experienced. Yet precisely because Horniman’s description in this sense is explicitly tied to his narration of events as a dereliction of imperial duty, the urgency and exactitude of those descriptions carries a strong emotional charge. His representations of those events are informed by his adherence to the task of piecing the fragments of British honor back together, after its soiling at the hands of a few, but thoroughly determined officials. A similar task perhaps to the one undertaken by Mohan: The recovery of the Imperial mission.

Thus, he is scathing in his remarks about Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s tenure as Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. Not surprisingly he felt the full weight of
O'Dwyer's measures against the press. He terms them deliberate policies of concealment. Hence:

'...every newspaper in the Province was placed under pre-censorship by the Government and nothing, either by comment or by reports of events, could be published without being submitted for official approval and sanction. In this way the publication of inconvenient exposures of the methods that were being pursued was prevented in one stroke' (in Draper 1981: 114).²⁶

If this wasn't stain enough on British honor his suggestion that the punishments and humiliations meted out to all and any Indians who transgressed the martial law rules, made up often at a soldier's whim, conformed to a pattern that seemed more than mere coincidence. He went further.

It seems hardly conceivable that fortuitous circumstances could have produced, at one moment and in one Province of the Empire a coterie of officials who were capable of the frightful excesses which occurred in the Punjab last year. It is hardly credible that the moment should have found ready to hand the men to commit these excesses directly the opportunity occurred, and to vie with one another in their severity and cruelty. The question must suggest itself to the mind of those who know the British Character as it really is, whether it was not by premeditated design that the right men were in their places ready for the job when the moment arrived (in Draper 1981: 116).
What at first sight may appear to be a gentle suggestion - i.e. that a group of officials came together to plan and execute the massacre - the punishments and humiliations of 1919, he argues, suggest something rather more momentous. The shock of the gentle is deceptively traumatic. Horniman’s seeming disbelief that the excesses of 1919 are anything but fortuitous is tied to the suggestion that those who really know the British character could not help but ask themselves the question whether those occurrences were not in some sense premeditated. The guilt of a few is used as a weapon, in a way that resembles Mohan’s project. Whilst I do not intend to pursue the argument further here, what seems to be being paraded is an overpowering spectacle of disempowerment, even if ultimately, certainly in Mohan’s case, to return us to an innocent pursuit of progress (civilization).

Doubtless the urgency of this history – history with a capital H - to tell it as it is, in the hope of rescuing something productive from the wreckage, is undermined somewhat for many traditionalists by its polemical tone. Because of course it is supposed that in the best traditions of history, as I note above, the constructive principle is held in abeyance. Moreover Datta’s comment that although Horniman stood near the scene he had no access to the, as yet unavailable, official records somewhat adds to traditional historical criticisms of its incompleteness.
Certainly for instance in the rush to weld the baton of premeditation according to these models of history, it is a prerequisite that some evidence tending towards that conclusion be tendered. If Horniman is reluctant or is unable to do so in a way that satisfies the requirements of historicist methods, then among the other secondary literature, Raga Ram's writing of History is another attempt to do so.

**(d) Ram's Conspiracies (1969) – A Premeditated Plan?**

The title of Raga Ram's book, *The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: A Premeditated Plan* (1969) gives away his particular emphasis. In what can be described as a supplement to Datta's writings, or even perhaps Mohan's, Ram suggests, like Datta before him, that the 'great massacre was the inevitable clash between two diametrically opposed forces, those of Imperialism and Nationalism' (Ram 1969: 142). His twist lies, though rather ironically Mohan and Datta signal much of it, in his claim that

the massacre was not the result of a decision taken by an individual (General Dyer) on the spur of the moment, but of a premeditated plan, carefully designed in advance, and executed on the appointed day, by the British bureaucracy (Ram 1969: vii).

The Jallianwala Bagh in this sense is only where 'the final showdown' between the two great monoliths of imperialism and nationalism takes place. Of course
we are already aware, even if only seemingly, that this view is not as contrived or as outlandish as some suggest.\textsuperscript{28} Even those most reticent of committees, reticent in their thorough determination to check, cross check and check again every piece of testimony so that it constitutes evidence of this reality, the Punjab Sub-Committee, left the door open to such possibilities. Tied still to a conception of History as knowing and uncovering the truth, because, as Jayakar says, ‘we do not have enough evidence before us to support a definite finding,’ they tacitly admit that doesn’t mean they have no evidence (in Draper 1981: 202).

The coup d’état in the battle over this particular detail, and by implication, in the larger battles for a singular explanation of 1919, as an event in which the Bureaucracy conspired to teach Indians a lesson, lies in a number of interrelated suggestions, which concern a character called Hans Raj.\textsuperscript{29} Yet, Ram only devotes half a page to a consideration of his role. But, this particular detail can also be read as an opportunity to move us beyond singular explanations.

One of the organizers of the Jallianwala Bagh meeting,\textsuperscript{30} many thought Raj a police informer (Mohan 1920: 117-25) (Datta 1969: 166). Indeed, according to a leading article in the Bombay Chronicle of 15 July 1920, Hans Raj, ‘...was in active touch with the police...and...a death trap had been laid by police underlings to help the authorities...teach a lesson to the citizens of Amritsar’
(Datta 1975: 166). Raj announced before and during the gathering of people for the meeting, the presence of a notable speaker, who it transpired, never attended. When an airplane flew over the Bagh frightening the audience, Raj calmed their fears by urging them to remain seated and not to worry. According to Datta,

he told the people that the 'Government will never fire.' After a while he waved his handkerchief and Dyer and his soldiers appeared. Hans Raj then stepped down from the platform and disappeared in their direction on the pretext of having a talk with them. Immediately after this the shooting began. Hans Raj had already left the meeting' (Datta 1969: 163).

Hans Raj managed to evade attention for a few days. But, extraordinarily perhaps for a so-called police informer, according to Mohan, the police arrested him on 16 April. Subsequently the authorities accused him of sedition and waging war. Yet, Mohan continues, four days later he became the chief approver in the Amritsar Leaders case (Mohan 1920: 120).  

Known before the Bagh for his vigorous, albeit recent, championing of the Indian freedom movement broadly construed, just as extraordinarily he somersaulted into the role of government approver. He described his apparent change of allegiance thus:
On my arrest was taken to fort, was kept with other persons arrested.... For four days there made no statement, was not questioned. No one said I was to be shot. I was taken to Kotwali, and placed in lock-up. On reaching Kotwali I was asked to make a statement and I said I was ready to do so. I was put before a magistrate and I made my statement....After my statement I went to lock-up. No police officer spoke to me after that. When I made my statement I was not given a pardon. I was given a pardon on the 24th May (in Mohan 1920: 120).

With more than a touch of irony, Mohan is amazed. How, he asks, on the basis of this statement, could

the genuine patriot, the intrepid lieutenant of Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal and the great leader of the Jallianwala Bagh, to whom General Dyer's bullets were blank cartridges, became an approver without the slightest persuasion or inducement, without any pressure or threats by the police, without even a pardon by the police. Such selfless altruistic approvers are indeed a rare commodity. Who could have played the police spy to a greater perfection? (Mohan 1920: 120).

In addition to his comments about Hans Raj and his proclivities, Ram suggests the existence of a plan to 'shoot well' those residents of Amritsar, who attended the Bagh that day (Ram 1969: 175). On the 9 April 1919, he says, a group of officials met at Government House, Lahore, and decided that no better opportunity presented itself than the day's Baisakhi celebrations, to carry out their 'nefarious plan' (Ram 1969: 175).
Yet, a little later Ram adds, 'what actually transpired among the few top officers of the Government [on] the evening of 9 April, nobody can now know' (Ram 1969: 176). Nevertheless, he insists the authorities knew on the evening of the ninth that trouble might occur on the thirteenth and laid their plans accordingly.33

Like other historians we have encountered so far Ram tries to offer us a compelling account of the events of 1919. In this sense the narrative elements of the plot structure are as important as the specific claim to the way things really are.34 It is not inconceivable that the colonial government felt under such siege from growing nationalist sentiments, that they convinced themselves the only way to prevail on Indians that they would remain under British rule come what may, was by military might. To do that they had to deliver a blow that would reverberate throughout the land and across Britain’s other imperial possessions.

Ram searches for the crucial detail that will assure us of a complete and definitive meaning in terms of a predetermined plan. Thus, he says, on the evening of 12 April Sir Michael O’Dwyer informed the authorities at Simla by telephone of the state of affairs in Amritsar and elsewhere. They replied, he says, that ‘if troops had to fire, they should make an example’ (Ram 1969: 178). Ram doesn’t give us any reference for this quote. It may be this lack and others like it that led Sayer to comment that Raga’s claim of a premeditated plan is unsupported by the evidence (Sayer 1991: 133).
Of course this engagement with Ram’s work is premonish. But, perhaps deserving – for it fails in its own terms. Ram does after all write about and seek to analyze the events of 1919 as an event. In the absence of evidence to support his hypothesis his claims are, to borrow a recent phrase from Datta, ‘ridiculous’ (Datta 2000: 4). Ram’s story remains opaque.

For me of course this is not a cause for despair, or indeed lament in the terms used by Pearay Mohan. It is merely an acute incitement to my project; that is, to analyze;

(a) Forms of colonial government;
(b) Roles of the military within colonial government; and
(c) The shaping of those who would exercise rule - the ethos of a 'military man'; those of an 'administrative man'; and those of a man who finds himself in 'government.'

My task is to read the events of 1919, in this instance as elaborated by Ram, otherwise, otherwise than as a government conspiracy.

(e) A turn to biography - General Dyer: a Case of Mis-representation (1964)

Arthur Swinson’s book Six Minutes to Sunset: The Story of General Dyer and The Amritsar Affair (1964), is another work in broadly the same genre as many
of the others I have discussed here – engaged in a recuperation of the events as an event. He battles to define Amritsar, and does not flinch from claiming that General Dyer’s actions were justified, on the grounds of a perceived threat to the Empire from Afghanistan. In other words Dyer merely carried out his duty as a soldier and protector of European, particularly women’s, lives.

At the outset Swinson defines his task in grandiose terms. His quest is proposed in a series of questions prompted by opposing stands, as he sees them, in the existing debates and literature. The city of Amritsar he says has become synonymous with violence, emblematic of the violence of the military against civilians. Its horrors are still imprinted on the Indian mind. The English mind is similarly tortured regarding, in turns, General Dyer as a dutiful guardian of a whole way of life or a ‘sadistic butcher.’ None of these views is obviously satisfactory, for he asks,

but what is the truth? Who was Dyer and what kind of man was he? How did this extraordinary incident come about? Every time there is violence against a civilian population, such as Sharpville or Budapest, the name of Amritsar is mentioned again and all the old arguments, the charges and counter-charges reappear, but.., very few people know the facts...The truth has become buried beneath a rising mound of prejudice, suspicion and hatred (Swinson 1964: 1).

According to him over the years the entanglement of ‘moral, military, legal and constitutional’ issues concerning Amritsar and the Bagh has added to their
opacity (Swinson 1964: 1). No one, he says, ‘has attempted to separate the various issues’; nor does any one ‘...assess the Amritsar affair on a realistic basis’ (Swinson 1964: 1).

However after setting out on a grand quest for the truth he is suddenly aware of its compensatory rhetoric. He settles instead for a more modest project. Certainly analyzing the Amritsar affair in a less absolutist sense, as far as getting to a truth is concerned, and on a realistic basis, is a more pragmatic position from establishing what really happened. What really happened assessing on this basis it seems is that Dyer took the action he did because he feared both for his safety and the safety of the women and children who lived behind the civil lines.\textsuperscript{35}

Perhaps it is Swinson’s pragmatism that leads at the end of his quest, to a begrudging recognition of some of the problems that beset any colonists’ history of the Bagh. If, he says, it is ‘complained that the foregoing chapters have been written from the British viewpoint as it then appeared...[I would answer] that is inevitable’ (Swinson 1964: 204). The burden of history it seems is too much to bear. Thus,

in this drama, Dyer is the protagonist and the politicians, British and Indian are the antagonists. Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah, together with the small fry like Satyapal, and Kitchlew were fighting to free their country from what they regarded as alien domination, and one can sympathise with them and respect
them for it. One can forgive them their duplicity, their lies, they’re dissembling; the way of patriots is hard and they had to battle on the best way they could. One can even forgive them their conceit; the belief that all their troubles were due to the British and that they will disappear when India assumes responsibility of her own destiny; that they were ready, even in the early twenties to take over the country (Swinson 1964: 204/5).

Although Swinson has submitted rather meekly to an antecedent reality that lies outside the realm of disputation, he does nevertheless appreciate the mutual exclusivity of the respective points of view - British and Indian. He is not too enamoured of certain British points of view either. His distaste in this instance is because they are those of Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, and an Anglo-Jew. He is harder on them, particularly on Montagu, than he is on the so-called Indian patriots. He can forgive these patriots their duplicity. What is harder to forgive he argues, is ‘the duplicity of British politicians; the hypocrisy of a man like Montagu, who could tell the House of Commons that Britain did not rule India by domination or the rule of force, but by partnership’ (Swinson 1964: 205).

The refuge that a realistic basis for assessment of Amritsar momentarily provided from the onerous demands of truth, is now a cauldron of complexities. Swinson soon returns us to the certainties of his earlier cultural logic. This is after this hesitating detour through the complexities that an Anglo-Jew like Montagu brings to the equation. The inevitability that his history is written
from the British point of view, sealed off from an Indian one is reinforced through a mutual recognition of an eternal truth. Hence, ‘...the truth was, and both the British and the Indians knew it, that the British governed India or any other place by force’ (Swinson 1964: 205).37

Swinson starts by defining his project in terms of a quest for the truth of Amritsar. Then he moves to the deceptively less onerous task of offering his readers a purely descriptive task that accounts for the protagonists and antagonists. He does not stay there long though. He moves his project back again to a search for monumental and eternal truths of what we always knew to be foundational to Amritsar 1919. In this sense Swinson remains committed to a universal and singular narration of Amritsar as an event. Hence his lament when he is unable to track down Volume VI of the evidence submitted to the Hunter Committee Inquiry. Thus

Even today [Vol. VI] is extremely elusive and this writer has failed completely to run a copy to earth even with the assistance of the British Museum, State Paper section, the Commonwealth Relations office, and the various specialist libraries in England. Montagu may have been devious and misguided, but he was certainly thorough (Swinson 1964: 146).38

Swinson's disappointment with being unable to track down the elusive volume VI is quickly dissipated when he tells us Dyer’s last words, spoken he says to his daughter-in-law on the morning of 14 July 1926 (Swinson 1964: 208/9).39
That is not to say that Vol. VI contains such testimony. Rather that, committed as he is, to a universal and singular history of events, particularly as they impinge upon the story he tells of General Dyer, such testimony can only enhance his claims to tell that story as it really happened. In a sense, his inability to locate Vol. VI, though encoded as a failure according to conventional models of history, is more than compensated for when we are introduced, in a much more immediate way, to the his story of General Dyer’s final demise. The tension and drama of his last moments more than makes up for the general inadequacy Swinson undoubtedly feels at his failure to recover all ‘the facts.’ That lacuna is quickly forgotten and resolved when, with the General’s daughter-in-law, he takes his readers into the room with him to be present at this most engrossing of moments. The drama of this moment is undeniable. His readers feel honored to be at Dyer’s bedside as he breathes his final breath (Swinson 1964: 209).

(f) Dyer’s Pathology – Brigadier-General Dyer’s State of Mind (1963)

In his Massacre at Amritsar (1963), Furneaux doesn’t dwell to any significant degree on the background or context to the disturbances and massacre of 1919 in the way for instance Datta does. Yet, he too pursues what I call a grand history of the events of 1919 as an event. Like Swinson he focuses on General Dyer.
Furneaux argues that both at the time of the massacre and subsequently General Dyer suffered from arteriosclerosis. Since arteriosclerosis he contends has a 'retrograde effect' on those suffering from it, it may well be that this illness crept up on Dyer throughout 1919. The cumulative effect of this condition is such, it is claimed, that 'his judgement, at times of extreme mental stress, may have been so impaired as to diminish his responsibility' (Furneaux 1963: 178).

Prior to the incident in the Jallianwala Bagh, Dyer had been under extreme tension for two exhausting days. His mind had been inflamed by stories of brutal murder and dastardly assault. He believed the situation to be critical. In Amritsar he was responsible. He and he alone could save the situation in the Punjab. His orders...had been disobeyed, flouted. He marched to the...Bagh determined to break up the meeting and teach the unruly mob a lesson. To punish them and teach them a lesson for their previous bad behavior. When he reached it he was excited and angry. He opened fire. The blood flowing to his brain became congested.... He may have misjudged the position, thinking that the two waves as they surged back were going to rush him. He fired at first to warn and punish; he continued firing because he feared his force might be overwhelmed. His mind became confused and he went on firing (Furneaux 1963: 177).

The implication of these arguments is clear. To support them Furneaux cites the case of R v. Kemp 1957. Heard in the Queen's Bench Division, Kemp was charged with causing grievous bodily harm to his wife. His defence counsel
maintained that Kemp suffered from arterioscelrosis, although he displayed no obvious signs of mental impairment. The incident with which he stood charged occurred when he temporarily lost consciousness 'from a congestion of blood on the brain.' In the original case Mr. Justice Devlin accepted counsel's argument, and allowed the appeal ruling that such a condition came within the McNaghten rules.

For Fumeaux, insanity, at least in law, is a convenient explanation. Indeed, such a matter would be a convenient defence for Dyer's actions throughout this period. But it is, to say the least, a desperate one. There is much wringing of the hands, as Fumeaux agonizes over what I suggest is the defining principle of his investigations. That is his disbelief that the killings at the Bagh, and the atrocities of the martial law regime could have taken place. All Fumeaux's investigations are directed at establishing the singularity of the events of 1919 in terms both of their marginality to the imperial project and their being perpetrated on the orders of an increasingly insane individual.

It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that Fumeaux is terrified of the disruption that Dyer's actions have wrought on, the supposed serene economy of colonial order. We can glimpse the restorative confluence of insight and anxiety in the following thickly layered passage much of which we have encountered before, but which nevertheless deserves setting out in full:
It is natural that we should wish to find some reasonable explanation for Dyer’s conduct, which it seems impossible to justify. He was a British officer, a Colonel, an acting Brigadier, who, on his own showing, callously and in cold blood shot down an unarmed and unresisting crowd of natives, directing his fire to where the crowd were thickest, picking off those trying to escape. He gave no warning of his intentions, and he admitted that the crowd might be dispersed without firing. If he had stronger means the casualties might have been greater. He fired and continued to fire because he feared the crowd might laugh at him, make him feel a fool, not because his troops were in danger. Having exhausted nearly all his ammunition, he marched away leaving the wounded to take care of themselves. If the act had been done by a German, a Russian or an Afrikander, we would not bother to seek an explanation. We would probably condemn a man of another race out of hand. Therein lies the danger that we may try too hard to find an excuse for Dyer; because our national pride demands it, we may delude ourselves, we need to realize (Furneaux 1963: 176).

For skeptics there is little or no precise information on Dyer’s mental condition, before or after 1919. Indeed, Furneaux himself is careful to hedge any unadorned assertions about Dyer’s mental stability. Arteriosclerosis may have been creeping up on him in 1919; his actions suggest that he was the victim of some mental disorder; the blood flowing to his brain may have led him to misjudge the position of the crowd and so on. Certainly, even for those who consider seriously the proposition that upon firing Dyer experienced a rush of blood to the brain, that lead him to imagine the crowd were getting ready to rush him, whereupon he directed continuing fire on the carnivalesque gathering
at the Bagh, this has yet to be proved. Interestingly Datta uses remarks made by Sir Michael O’Dwyer to cast further doubts on Fumeaux’s claims. Interesting, not only because they contradict this account of events, but also because they are set out in Vol. VI of the evidence given to the Hunter Committee of Inquiry, a volume upon which Fumeaux does not, according to Datta, comment. O’Dwyer said:

I ought to mention this in justice to Dyer. He was aware that his retreat might be cut off. I think, he said after he fired the first volley, the crowd made a rush. He thought that this was intended to intercept his retreat and he went on firing, but he thought afterwards (he was very frank about it) that this was one of the methods of egress so as to escape from the Jallianwala Bagh.46

But, given Fumeaux’s anxieties and pressing needs these rather technical criticisms ignore the power of a story which as well as being committed formally at least, to a conventional recovery of what really happened, weaves a tale of distant terror, from which we can comfortably feel removed. So when Fumeaux says of Dyer’s proposed insanity, ‘that is the kindest excuse we can find for [him]’ he is also saying, we can once again feel at ease with ourselves in the sites of centralized (imperial) production (Fumeaux 1963: 177). By weaving a tale that exceeds the terms of its own project. In the sense that the power of his history stems at least as much from its formal status as narrative, as it does from its adherence to historicist methodologies, we are once again alerted to the ironies of historical evidence. It is by this means that he hopes to
restore the only slightly ruffled vision of the imperial project. The madness of an individual like Dyer can, according to this view, be put to one side. Its sheer exorbitance, it is thought, marginalises it.47

(g) Collective Punishment - Helen Fein’s Imperial Crime and Punishment (1977)

_Imperial Crime and Punishment, The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgement_ (1977), is an urgent attempt to explain how, ‘groups condone, legitimate, authorize violence toward other groups which would be punished as criminal if committed against their own members’ (Fein 1977: ix). She concludes, the only way, in this instance, colonial rulers can condone violence against the ruled is by not considering them a part of their world of moral obligation (Datta 2000: 5) (Cohen 2001).

In broad-brush strokes equal to the broad canvass Fein constructs, she argues that collective violence, the violence that often appears in its different guises as ‘racial, religious, or communal violence,’ is the scourge of the century (Fein 1977: ix). Since the mass exterminations practiced against European Jewry during the 1939-1945 war, we have she adds, witnessed many instances, too numerous to be a final account, of genocide and massacre practiced against a range of distinct groups ‘without external check’ (Fein 1977: ix). In spite of its prevalence, she argues, we have learned very little about how it occurs and
whether it can be checked. To retain any belief at all in the fulfillment of the hopes and aspirations embodied in a document like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, and the covenants, protocols and conventions that have followed, she thinks that social theorists need to develop a coherent explanation of collective violence. As I indicated earlier and as we see below she gives no quarter in the pursuit of such an explanation.

Although there are she confesses, analyses of collective violence, these have been ‘divided arbitrarily by disciplinary borders, regions in which the cases occur, and topical contexts’ (Fein 1977: x). What is overlooked by these discrete case studies she believes, is the ‘essentially repressive nature of collective violence - the deliberate injury of any and sometimes all members of the tribe, race or community accused of the crimes of one member, or some members. Or accused of simply being the other’ (Fein 1977: x).

In an echo of V N Datta’s writings on Amritsar she maintains that the Jallianwala Bagh massacre should not be thought of as an isolated phenomena. It should be read as ‘an expression of a confrontation between ruler and ruled’ (Datta 1969: ix). Specifically, relying on and developing the work of Emile Durkheim, she attempts to show how the massacre (and disturbances) of 1919 should be read as ‘a prototypical instance of a repressive collective punishment practiced by the British in [their] black and Asian colonies’ (Fein 1977: xiii-xiii).
Understanding collective violence as collective punishment, as a ‘crime and punishment simultaneously,’ enables her to explain how

repressive sanctions - punishment designed deliberately to injure the offender - restores the unity of a community based on mechanical solidarity, likeness of role, belief and habit and sentiment. An injury against one is an injury against all until it is expatiated. (Fein 1977: x-xi).

A social order predicated on ‘membership in racial, ethnic, religious or national groups tends to produce class crimes and class solidarity’ (Fein 1977: xi). In this way, she argues, ‘each class is excluded from the universe of moral obligation of the other’ (Fein 1977: xi). The consequences of such an order become a common place: offences against a putative other are not recognized as such. The conclusion seems irresistible:

Although crimes against members of the dominant class by members of the class dominated are understood by the dominant class to be crimes against all its members, they recognise no obligation toward the dominated class that impels them to punish their own crime toward the dominated (Fein 1977: xi).

However irresistible her conclusion, it is not the occasion for her to throw hands up in despair. The urgent need she expresses for an explanation assumes the sense that knowing more about these massacres may place us in a better position to be able to prevent such explosions of violence in the future.
Comparing the judgements made by the British in Parliament and elsewhere confirms to Indians, she claims how for the most part their person and their claims for self-government could be violated with impunity. Yet, to reiterate this is not intended as an invidious exercise. She is quite clear that the comparisons of British judgement does not, is certainly not intended to, diminish the dignity of the victims as human beings. Comparisons of British judgement are ‘both irrelevant and irreverent in weighing the pain to the survivors of lives cut down and wasted’ (Fein 1977: xv).

Some writers, seeking to commemorate the victims, have contrary she says to her portrayal, sought to identify those present on that day in the Bagh, in mythical terms, as freedom fighters or martyrs in the cause of Indian freedom (Singh & Saggar 1996). However demeaning or distasteful it may be to portray the violation of Indians almost at will by the British powers, they do not have their dignity confirmed by such a re-writing of their collective biographies (Fein 1977). She prefers instead an assumption. That assumption is the assumption(s) of a right to be and to enjoy elementary human rights. It is a supposition she thinks most readers will grant. Where on the contrary, ‘dominant classes,’ some of whom might be her readers ‘do not grant them we must learn how to establish or defend these rights’ (Fein 1977: xv). Such is the core of her project.
(h) Making Sense of the Massacre Beyond the Events as an Event - A Productive Reading - Indians as Children; Imperialists as Fathers (1991)

Helen Fein does not undertake the kind of complex analyses that the massacres demand. However in a relatively recent contribution to debates Derek Sayer offers us an interesting supplement of fragments more attuned to and informed by 'a constructive principle' of history (Benjamin 1992: 254) (Sayer 1991).

Sayer criticizes suggestions that Dyer's actions were singular. By doing so he is agreeing with many commentators who read Dyer's actions as being part of the imperial system. That manifests itself in a number of versions. Ram's view that the massacre was part of a nefarious plan by the British to teach so-called uppity Indians a lesson is a prominent one (Ram 1969). Datta of course takes the view that in the light of the various movements to rid India of British rule, the massacre, far from being an isolated phenomenon appears as an expression of a confrontation between ruler and ruled (Datta 1969). Fein's view that the massacre is a prototypical instance of a repressive collective punishment practiced by the British throughout their colonies, focuses squarely on an Imperial system (Fein 1977).

Yet, there is another constituency that does not see the massacre as 'singular,' monstrous, or even sinister.50 It is with those views Sayer in the main is concerned. Epithets like Prussianism, used specifically to describe the actions
of Dyer and others involved in the administration of martial law, elicit little remorse or guilt from members of this constituency. Even the luke-warm disavowal of Dyer’s actions on what appears to be the technical grounds of a mistaken conception of his duty, by the majority of the Hunter Committee was, Sayer says, deplored by the large and influential Anglo-Indian community.

Sayer reminds us that the Houses of Parliament did not exactly condemn Dyer’s actions (Sayer 1991). Indeed a large minority in the House of Commons and a majority in the House of Lords, full to the brim with ex-officials of the empire of one sort or another, failed to join in that condemnation. Eventually, to the joy of his supporters, no less a figure than a British judge appeared to lend his support to Dyer’s actions in the course of Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s libel action against Sir Sankaran Nair. 51 Nor should we forget the vociferous campaign by some sections of the press on his behalf. The Morning Post’s campaign resulted in a substantial sum of money for the General’s defense fund. For them too Sayer notes, Dyer’s actions were no aberration.

As we see in chapter 1, this constituency did not look for excuses. It believes precisely in Dyer’s characterizations of his action. I had he said, simply carried out ‘my duty - my horrible, dirty duty ’ (in Sayer 1991: 134). 52 The remarks, thoughts and actions of this ruling class constituency provide the focus for Sayer’s discussion. It is his contention that this is a significant and perhaps a sufficient explanation for Dyer’s actions. He argues that Dyer’s contemporaries
were indeed correct when they believed that he had only carried out his duty his horrible, dirty duty. To this extent he was merely articulating the views of this constituency, ‘trailing his coat,’ before Anglo-Indian opinion’ (in Sayer 1991: 133). Thus, although ‘in some quite obvious ways,’ he suggests, Amritsar was singular, ‘its explanation lies rather in the ways it was not’ (Sayer 1991: 134).

Thus to this extent Sayer agrees with Fein. Members of a dominant imperial class do exclude the dominated class from their own ‘...universe of moral obligation’ (Fein 1977: xiv). As I note in chapter one, the British have a history of putting down rebellions in India and elsewhere with exemplary brutality. Whether or not the situation in Amritsar constituted a rebellion, in the final analysis rule by a small minority over other peoples can be a messy business. The use of machine guns and bullets undoubtedly play a large part in guaranteeing the continuance of such rule. Often a precondition of those charged with ensuring the continuance of such rule is the defining of the actions of the dominated group, against members of the dominant group as crimes. Conversely they will define the actions of the dominant group against those dominated as legitimate punishment.

Nevertheless characterizing the relationship between ruler and ruled as entirely or wholly defined by these imperatives is, according to Sayer, ‘an oversimplification,’ and a dangerous one at that (Sayer 1991: 139. It isn’t
simply the case, according to Sayer, that the colonial rulers of India exclude those whom they ruled from their domain of moral obligation. Quite the contrary he argues. As Dyer’s evocation of duty suggests, the relationships are a great deal more complicated.

Nevertheless Sayer delivers a suitably somber reading of the extent to which different moral standards did apply to Indian and British actions. This is not done, I suspect, in order to try before some later day tribunal the misdeeds of the past imperial administrators. Yet, it is important not to lose sight of this for the reasons below and I follow him in recapitulating the application of different standards, which resulted from the exclusion of Indians from the same moral standard as the British.

All this supports the hypothesis Fein advances. Sayer’s comments do not detract from that, but he goes beyond a simple cataloguing of them. Of course we should appreciate their breadth of horror. In this regard I can do no better than emphasize one notorious instance concerning Dyer - the so-called crawling order. That order should alert us to talking about the massacres and violence not as if they were over there, activities not a part of this British imperial practice. On the contrary, we should appreciate their frightfulness as being a part of our story, the story of an intensely moral universe, in which both ruler and ruled are implicated. According to Jenny Sharpe it is hard to maintain their separation when the putative civilized is implicated as an ‘agent of torture
and massacre' (Sharpe 1993: 6). The emphasis is not so much on the exclusion/separation of the moral universes of the ruled from those of the rulers, rather their moral connectedness.

Bearing these imperatives in mind we begin to reap what Fein sows. Thus, according to Sayer, collective punishments were widespread. Electricity and water supplies, for instance, were shut off in Amritsar (Sayer 1991: 140). At Gujranwala, the authorities resorted to aerial bombardment. Among the targets were a student residence called the Khalsa Boarding House, and a wedding party of about 150 people on the roadside, making its way to Gujranwala. If the bombing of villages and the machine gunning of houses are not sufficiently confirmatory of Fein's hypothesis, then in her search for the truth, Fein readily turns to the infamous crawling order promulgated by General Dyer. It does seem then that in her search for evidence, to substantiate her hypothesis, Fein is spoiled for choice.

Thus the 'crawling order' is only one of the more notorious instances of repressive collective punishment. The so-called hallowed principles of British criminal justice, not least the bedrock 'thou art innocent until proved guilty,' were more honoured in their breach than in their application. So six Indians were tied to a triangle erected in Kaurhianwala Street and whipped for little more than their implication in an assault on the missionary Marcella Sherwood. Quite fortuitously the six breached fort discipline whilst in military custody. Such a
breach didn’t concern the missionary. Nor had they been charged with assaulting her. Indeed Dyer initially appeared reluctant to charge them. It is quite unlikely that they would be so charged. Evidence linking them to the assault was thin and in these circumstances Dyer, notwithstanding his and the administration’s feeble concern to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, could not be sure that they would be found guilty of the so-called assault. So, as Sayer notes '...dispensing with the niceties of a trial...Dyer...had them flogged there...' (Sayer 1991: 142).

Yet, due process as such was not dispensed with certainly as far as Dyer himself is concerned. This comes across quite clearly in the protests at Dyer’s treatment, often and ironically, stated on the grounds that a conspiracy of politicians (Frocks!)58 hounded him out of the army without regard to due process of law! It may be being a bit melodramatic to describe being asked to resign his commission with his one would guess not inconsiderable military pension intact, as being hounded out of office. But that aside, Sir Edward Carson spoke for many when he said:

You talk of the great principles of liberty which you have laid down. General Dyer has a right to be brought within those principles of liberty. He has no right to be broken on the *ipse dixit* of any Commission or Committee, however great, unless he has been fairly tried - and he has not been tried.59
An even more passionate evocation of due process for Dyer came from Lord Sumner in the House of Lords:

If General Dyer had been tried - tried in any form that you like, such as enables a man to have it called a trial - he would have been entitled to have a very definite charge formulated against him in writing before the inquiry began, so far as it related to him; he would have been entitled to know who was to be called against him; he would have been entitled to cross-examine those persons and to call witnesses to answer them; he would have been entitled to representation; he would have been entitled to be present at every stage of the hearing, and he would have been entitled if he chose, to offer himself as a witness, with the protection of advisers if he gave evidence, not in the capacity of a person who, as an officer of the Government, was bound to give an account of his doings. He would have been entitled then to be warned that there were questions that he need not answer...he was heard without any of these protections.

Of course what allows Carson, Sumner and many others, to call for the application of due process in Dyer’s case; to proclaim that ‘to break a man under the circumstances of this case is very un-English’, an interesting choice of phrase (Carson 1920 in Sayer 1991: 154); in short to sound ‘a very English refrain’ about Dyer’s treatment at the hands of his detractors, and not to express the same or similar horror at the treatment of sundry Indians does suggest the exclusion of Indians from the British rulers’ universe of moral obligation. It seems a reasonable explanation.
The individuals caught in a British terror mill did change their fate. Arguably the Amritsar massacre provided one more impetus along the road to freedom from the British yoke. Indeed some have called it a watershed in Indian-British relations (Spear 1990; Sharpe 1993). The massive display of sovereign power is symptomatic not of a confidence in their position, but a realization of decline, the last massive gasp of a body that knows it has lived on borrowed time since 1857 (Cohen 1985; Mohanty 1991; Sharpe 1993).

Indeed the water-shed year of 1857 inaugurated an humanitarian form of government in India that emphasized the values of '...self sacrifice, moral duty and devotion to others' garnered as racial superiority (Sharpe 1983: 8). It is this change that leads Sayer to contend that Fein's conclusion that colonial rulers excluded the ruled from their domain of moral obligation is an oversimplification.

It is not the case, he says, that the British recognized no obligations towards Indians. It was because Dyer 'had acted morally - dutifully - according to the canons of mutual obligation between ruler and ruled, as they were defined by the former,' though increasingly subject to negotiation and formulation by a rising Indian professional class, that his actions were so vehemently defended by his supporters (Sayer 1991: 139). We are not entering into an a-moral universe here, but on the contrary into an intensely moral one. As if to emphasise this Sayer points to the laconic and he believes thoroughly accurate
observation made by Rudyard Kipling about Dyer: ‘He did his duty, as he saw it’ (Kipling 1920 in Sayer 1991: 158). 62

'Men like Dyer and O'Dwyer,' Sayer adds, 'had a clear conception of their duty towards Indians, and of Indians' obligations toward the Raj' (Sayer 1991: 160). Central to this, Sayer argues, is the maintenance of order (often to the extent of inflicting massive disorder). The supreme value placed on order is predicated on a complex composite set of beliefs. One of the more predominant is the 'construction of Indians as unfitted to govern themselves’ (Sayer 1991: 160). The corollary, of course, being the construction (endurably patriarchal, indeed masculinist) of white Christian men as being eminently fitted to rule over others less fortunate than themselves.

The relationship that Sayer is proposing has conveniently been expressed elsewhere in the Latinised vernacular, popular with those writing in English as Ma-bap: literally, mother-father. It designates a relationship at once protective, at times benevolent and certainly paternalistic. What was expected of Indians in return was obedience, loyalty and gratitude. Thus,

'It was the place Indians occupied within their rulers' moral universe, not their exclusion from it, which explains why, in the situation that prevailed at Amritsar - a 'rebellion,' as it was necessarily defined by the same set of conceptions - they could be slaughtered for moral effect; like the cattle to
whom O'Dwyer once compared them, grazing, as he put it, in the shadow of the British oak' (Sayer 1991: 163).

As Dyer did not tire of repeating, on that day in the Bagh he faced a stark choice. He faced the prospect of 'carrying out a very distasteful and horrible duty or of neglecting to do my duty, of suppressing disorder or of becoming responsible for all future bloodshed' (Dyer 1920 in Draper 1981: 155). According to Sayer, in this as in his later testimony to the Hunter Committee his language 'recalls nothing so much as the schoolmaster's: this will hurt me as much as it hurts you' (Sayer 1991: 162). Thus, to pick only one more instance from Dyer's numerous testimonies, asked by Chimanlal Setalvad whether by adopting what he called these methods of frightfulness, it ever occurred to him that he was doing the British Raj a great disservice, he replied:

No, it only struck me that at the time it was my duty to do this and that it was a horrible duty. I did not like the idea of doing it but I also realised it was the only means of saving life and that any reasonable man with justice in his mind would realise that I had done the right thing; it was a merciful though horrible act and they ought to be thankful to me for doing it...it would be doing a...lot of good and they would realise that they would not to be wicked (Dyer 1920 in Disorders Inquiry Comm. Vol. III 1920: 126).

Conclusion
In this second chapter I have attempted to show how large the literature that addresses Amritsar and the Massacres is. I also tried to show how that literature went about its tasks and how different authors joined in battles to define how it should be understood. The literature itself is part of the discursive production of Amritsar. But my concern is rather different. It is to compose a contrary production. My concern is with the characterizations of three white men who are centrally concerned in the drama of Amritsar; and how such characterizations are subject to challenge and change. How I ask, are these men made and made as rulers? That is my history of these events.

In order for me to get there, as I point out earlier, I treat Amritsar as a window rather than as a picture on the wall. So looking through that window I treat Amritsar not as something we can give a faithful account of. History for me is a false natural object. It is plainly as I point out 'what one makes of it. It has never stopped changing' (Veyne 1997: 182). I choose to look through the window to glimpse the processes of the formations of these particular men as rulers. How their characters are shaped so as to exercise and conduct colonial government as colonial governmentality. I ask, how they become men who do their duty both to themselves and by India? How are they quite simply exemplary in that regard?

I take each character in their turn in chapters three, four and five. Thus, in the next chapter, I begin my composition of Amritsar in these terms with a
consideration of the figure of an 'administrative' man - Sir Michael O'Dwyer. O'Dwyer was Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab at the time of the massacres. He carries forward a changing tradition of white ruler in India; an inheritor one moment but a professional turned out in the elite institutions of imperial rule, in the other.

In chapter four I move to a consideration of a 'military' man - General Reginald Dyer. Dyer was for many the military hero of the hour. Almost, 'cometh the moment cometh the man'. A decorated soldier of some renown (he was a Companion of the Order of Bath - CB) in the Victoria's little everyday wars in India he exemplified a growing tradition of professionalism in the carrying of arms, but with more than a nod towards the adventurers of old. A soldier made in Sandhurst and the Staff College at Camberley.

In chapter five I consider the makings of a man in the imperial government - Edwin Montagu. He was Secretary of State for India at the time. He was resolutely opposed to O'Dwyer and Dyer's conduct in Imperial government. Cooperation was his aim and he tried and spoke his heart out to try and achieve it.

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1. Thanks to Gursharan Singh for bringing my attention to this invaluable work of reference.
2. The dedication reads:
   'To the Revered and
Sacred memory
Of the Europeans
And Indians, who died
As the result of the disorders,
This book is most
Respectfully
Dedicated
by the
Author (Mohan 1920: v).

1. Lala Lajpat Rai, calls this assortment a ‘unique collection of documents, needed to throw
light on the various phases of the tragedy’ (Mohan 1920: xxi). Hunter Committee 1920 (cmd.
681).

2. We appreciate just how hasty, compelling and important Mohan conceives of his task from
the recommendation he gives to his readers. Hence he says:

‘we are so near the actual enactment of the tragedy, that it is not possible for us to have the
proper perspective which is necessary to obtain a detached view of the history of the disorders.
But on the other hand, it may be pleaded that we are the men who have seen these events with
our own eyes and have heard the harrowing tales of afflicted Punjab with our own ears from the
very lips of those who have suffered. What ever view the reader may take, the author can
assure him that he has tried his best to ascertain the truth and place it in its naked form before
his readers, however unpleasant that task has been on many occasions’ (Mohan 1920: xviii).

3. Lajpat Rai is one among the famous trio of radical Indian nationalists whose activities sent
the bureaucracy into waves of panic. The others are, Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak,
celebrated for coining the demand, ‘swarag is my birth right and I shall have it;’ and Bippin
Chandra Pal. Collectively they came to be known as Lal-Bal-Pal. Rai’s publications include,
*Story of my Deportation* (1915); *A history of The Aya Samrag* (1917); *England’s Debt to
India* (1917); his famous, *Political Future of India* (1919); *The Agony of the Punjab* (1920);
*India’s Will to Freedom: Writings and Speeches on the Present Situation* (1921).

4. Datta tells that on the 13th April the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab moved for the
governor-general in council to stop the normal functioning of the criminal courts in Amritsar
and Lahore and announce martial law declared so that all offenders could be tried by court
martial (Datta 1969: 93).

5. For the sake of clarity, I should point out that one of the administration’s claims for
governing India was the construction of these communities as antipathetic to each other.

6. For the specific place of law, and by implication order, in the gospel of civilization
generally see Peter Fitzpatrick 1992. By reference to Stephen’s words he draws our attention to
how law, our law is implicated in such a project. Hence according to Stephen our law
‘...is...the sum and substance of what we have to teach them. It is, so to speak, the gospel of the
English, and it is a compulsory gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience’ (see

7. This is a reference to the *Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-
Committee of the Indian National Congress Vols. I & II Bombay 1920*

8. See also E J Thompson’s, *A Letter from India*, in Datta 1969: 173. For Thompson Amritsar
would ‘...end...the British connexion with India.’ On his response generally, as an attempt to
sanitize the British implication in barbarism, past (the ‘mutiny’) and present (Amritsar and
Jallianwala Bagh) see Jenny Sharpe 1992: 117.

Urdu poet expressed the same mood in almost identical terms:

Har Zaarey Chaman se yeh kehti hai khake bag
Gaigel na reh jahaa men gardun ki chaal se
Sinchae gya hai khane shahidan se is ka tukhm
Tu aansuon ki bukhl na kar is nihaal se

The dust of the garden says to every bird in the orchard
Do not ye remain indifferent to the ways of Heaven
Its seed has been watered with the blood of martyrs
Do not ye grudge to shed tears for this budding.

In V N Datta 1967: 171/2

Benjamin borrows these words from Gottfried Keller.

Emphasis mine.

Mohan is aware of this lacuna and is therefore complicit in the conception of historical discourse that it assumes. Dividing what he calls the tragedy of errors enacted in the Punjab of 1919 into five acts, he writes immediately after the curtain has risen on the fourth. That is after commentators in the Anglo-Indian press and on the floor of the Imperial Legislative Council, sought to exaggerate the violence in order to justify the measures taken by the authorities. The Hunter Committee is appointed, but has yet to report. He therefore confines himself to recounting the first three acts in his drama. Though we are he admits 'so near the actual enactment of the tragedy, that it is not possible for us to have a proper perspective which is necessary to obtain a detached view of the history of the disorders,' it must he continues, be 'pleaded that we are the men who have seen these events with our own eyes and have heard the harrowing tales of the afflicted Punjab with our own ears from the...lips of those who have suffered' (Mohan 1920: pref.). Of course, as I note in my opening remarks, to be or remain detached in recounting any but perhaps especially these events, is near on impossible. Perhaps in this context such a statement of aims is a profoundly political one in the sense of playing and trying to beat the master at this own game, with his own assumptions. Mohan was a lawyer, and trained in the game of constructing a case. And so in fact I think Mohan knows he is battling in a game of validity and uses all the tricks of his trade, to make that case.

See note 13 above.

He warrants an entry in the 1964 edition of 'Who Was Who' Vol. IV 1941-1950. His associations with the Indian Freedom movement are long and varied. His entry reads,

'Journalist and Author; President, Indian Journalists' Assoc.; ...Editor Southern Daily Mail, 1897-1900; subsequently on leading English journals; Assistant Editor Calcutta Statesman, 1906-1912; Special Correspondent Eastern Bengal, 1907-8;...founded, with Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, Bombay Chronicle, 1913; after continued exclusion for over six years, landed Colombo and India Jan. 1925; Founder and Editor Indian National Herald, 1926-29; later associated with conduct of Bombay Chronicle and associated journals; Editor-in-Chief, Bombay Sentinel, 1933-45.Publications: Amritsar and our Duty to India; The Agony of Amritsar (with Helena Normanton). Recreations: housework and loafing....' (Adam & Black 1964: 564).

The Viceroy would later reflect in scrupulous detail on what the imperial authorities would regard as Horniman's deleterious career and dangerous presence in India. Horniman, he reasons, left him with little choice, but to do as he did! He recalls how:

'Shortly after arriving in Bombay as editor of the Bombay Chronicle, Horniman established himself as prominent member of extremist section. The paper which became recognized a (organ) of extremist politics was conspicuous for consistently misrepresenting policy and intentions of Government, making personal attacks on officials and giving prominence to all incidents likely to arouse racial animosity'.

Condemnation of course is never pint sized. It comes in the bucket full. He continues in this vein and ends with the resounding chorus of public interest. Public interest he recalls is what 'compelled local government to use more expeditious means of removing this prime mover of attacks on the Government who was one of the most dangerous elements in the...situation'

Telegram from Viceroy 15/5/1919 in L/P&J/12/11 file No. 3266/19 April 1919-Nov. 1921 p25 - India Office records. See also National Archives India: Home Department, Simla, file No. 204, Period 1907 to 1926, Special Branch (confidential), No. S D 523 of 1919.

Letter from Governor of Bombay 15/4/1919 in L/P&J/12/11 file No. 3266/19 April 1919-Nov. 1921 p3 - India Office records.

Ibid.

ibid, p12.

ibid, p24.

See n. 28 above. A Hartal is a complete cessation of economic activity – A strike!

Draper includes the following paragraph as an instance of the kind of invective - so-called – that the government so objected to. Horniman wrote
‘One of the greatest counts in the indictment against Sir Michael O’Dwyer, as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, is the policy of concealment which he deliberately pursued. In the first place, from the beginning every newspaper in the province was placed under pre-censorship by the Government and nothing, either by comment or reports of events, could be published without being submitted for official approval and sanction. In this way the publication of inconvenient exposures of the methods that were being pursued was prevented at one stroke’ (Draper 1981).

25. Swinson, who calls Horniman a ‘formidable propagandist,’ quotes his description of General Dyer thus:

‘The Jallianwala Bagh battle is an achievement which has created for Dyer a special niche in the gallery of frightfulness...it will go down in history as an indelible blot on British rule in India. He did not pretend that what he did was necessary, even for the dispersal of a meeting - he had no authority for what he did. He had no authority to make his proclamation prohibiting meetings. Martial law had not been proclaimed. He conceived in the wisdom of his own Prussian mind that the time had come to act, without rules or regulations’ (in Swinson 1964: 69).

That Swinson labels a highly inaccurate piece of invective!

26. We learn from the confidential papers of the Home Department files that on February 20, 1918 Horniman, as keeper of the Bombay Chronicle press, paid the maximum possible security of Rs. 2000.

27. It is interesting to note here that this strategy, if indeed it were a strategy, resembles that adopted by Gandhi and his Satyagraha movement. A kind of purity of the victim.

28. It is echoed to some extent in the deliberations of the Punjab Sub-Committee’s Report on the disturbances. One of its conclusions included the claim that ‘the Jallianwala Bagh massacre was a calculated piece of inhumanity towards utterly innocent and unarmed men, including children, and unparalleled for its ferocity in the history of modern British administration.’ Another that the ‘Martial Law Tribunals and...Summary Courts were made the means of harassing innocent people, and resulted in abortion of justice on a wide scale, and under the name of justice caused moral and material sufferings to hundreds of men and women’ (Report 1920: chap VI). The first claim is admittedly not the same as saying that the massacre is the result of a carefully worked out strategy. But, according to Draper the Committee did wish to go further but felt it couldn’t for lack of evidence. He cites the following private note written by M R Jayakar, one of the members of the committee:

‘On all the facts it is suggested that the meeting had been planned by Hans Raj and his associates with a view to making a large number of people gather at the Bagh. Whether the authorities at Amritsar were parties to this plan and yielded to it in their desire for revenge we are unable to say, as we have not enough evidence before us to support a definite finding. But it is any rate perfectly clear that Dyer took fullest advantage of the meeting in effecting on the inhabitants of Amritsar as condign and complete a punishment as was needed to satisfy their lust for revenge’ (Cf. Draper 1981: 202).

29. For a brief biographical sketch of Hans Raj see Datta (Datta 1969: 162). Also see Mohan (Mohan 1920: 117-120).

30. As Ram suggests, on the 12th July ‘a meeting was held in the compound of the Hindu Sabha School. No president was elected. Hansraj, an active worker of the Congress, made a speech...He announced that a meeting would be convened the next day in the Jallianwala Bagh, where letters from Dr Kitchlew and Dr Satyapal would be read. He exhorted people to be prepared for...sacrifices...and...proposed that volunteers should be recruited, whose duty would be to inform the public of the arrests made in the city, and...said that those proposals would be discussed at the next day’s meeting. In the end he advised that suspension of business should be continued till Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satypal were released. The audience agreed to his suggestions (Ram 1969: 107-108).

31. For those inclined to find in this line of thought a total explanation for the massacres and disturbances and the punishments handed out under the martial law regime, it is significant they think that so many gathered in the hope of seeing and listening to Lala Kanheya Lal. Such explanations become more believable in the light of Colvin’s comments. Dyer’s biographer writes that the General believed the best way to fight the rebels would be away from the
winding streets of Amritsar. If only he could somehow get them out in the open, he would deliver his Cromwellian nightmare. Referring to the meeting at the Bagh Colvin writes, 'this unexpected gift of fortune, this un-hoped for defiance, this concentration of the rebels in an open space - ... gave [Dyer] such an opportunity as he could not have devised. It separated the guilty from the innocent; it placed them where he would have wished them to be - within reach of his sword. The enemy had committed such another mistake as prompted Cromwell to exclaim at Dunbar, 'The Lord hath delivered them into my hands"' (Colvin 1929: 172).

These sentiments, and Dyer's well documented refusal to do anything to prevent the meeting taking place as scheduled at 4.30 p.m. when he first learnt of people assembling as early as 1 p.m., leads Helen Fein to agree with Datta and presumably Ram, that a conspiracy did exist (Fein 1977: 34).

Chief approver means accuser for the government. The Amritsar Leaders case concerned accusations of revolutionary conspiracy against a number of Amritsar residents.

In support of his propositions and arguments he cites a note from Adjutant-General Hudson. The note reads 'No previous warning was received at Army Headquarters from either civil or local military authorities that trouble was expected at Amritsar (on the 10th April), and, so far as is known, the only information which the G.O.C., 16th Division, received was verbal information at Government House, Lahore, on the evening of the 9th that it was possible that trouble might occur on the 13th in Amritsar.' Emphasis is from Ram. His source reads: Punjab Govt.-Home-Military-Part B-Jan. 1920-No. 256 Adjutant-General to Thompson, dated Simla, 11 Oct. 1919.

Perhaps in spite of what many commentators feel is lacking - evidence for his proposition - in Ram's work is compensated for by its narrative compulsion. Hence, Arendt once said, 'narrative reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it, that it rings about consent and reconciliation with things as they really are, and that we may even trust it to contain eventually by implication that the last word which we expect from the day of judgement' (Arendt in Mcthenia 1991 in Papake ed. 1991: 30).

A term used to describe the areas behind which Europeans lived.

See chapter 5.

Emphasis mine.

See also Datta 1975. Of course Datta uses Swinson's lament to signal the death of any claim Swinson has to writing a complete and definitive account of Amritsar. But the lament defies even this conventional reading, arguably denying the lacunae's relevance through the strenuous and almost exhaustive assertion, as we shall see, of the reliability and accuracy of the materials he has been able to get his hands on. Moreover here Swinson deflects us away from his own perceived inadequacies at writing a comprehensive history by telling us a heroic tale of the writer's quest for the holy grail (cf. Ira B. Nadel, 'The Biographer's Secret' in James Olney (ed.) 1987: 24-31).

Dyer is reported as saying: 'Thank you, but I do not want to get better.... So many people who knew the conditions in Amritsar say I did right...but so many others say I did wrong.... I only want to die and know from my maker whether I did right or wrong.'

A disease that Furneaux suggests '...has a retrograde effect... and means blood does not flow to areas of the brain. Thinking becomes impaired.'

R Furneaux 1963: 177.

For these short details of the case R v. Kemp I rely on Swinson (Swinson 1964: 199). For a fuller report of the case see 1956 3 All E.R. 249.

On these rules cf. any criminal law textbook. The standard work in the field is Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law. I have taken the following description from the second edition of Philip Harris's Introduction to Law. For the sake of completeness, formulated by the judges in the McNaghten case in 1843, the rules outline the occasions when insanity can be a defence to the commission of a criminal offence. In short, with a few notable exceptions none of which are relevant here, every person charged with an offence is presumed sane, unless the contrary is proved. If however it is shown that at the time of the commission of the offence, s/he had 'such a defect of reason resulting from a disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of his action; or if he did know it, that s/he did not know he was doing wrong,' then s/he will not be responsible for those actions.

Furneaux's text is littered with statements of disbelief, or consistent with what I have called his hand wringing, liberal angst. For instance he says, Dyer 'seems to have been prone to outbursts of indignation, such as when he imposed his crawling order and when he had the boys
who were suspected only of the assault on Miss Sherwood flogged. Those acts alone suggest that Dyer was a victim of some mental disorder' (Furneaux 1964: 177).

43. There is a little more information from Swinson who, at least in part, is in agreement with Furneaux when he says, that his theory cannot be dismissed lightly. In November 1921 Dyer suffered a stroke, leaving him partially paralyzed. And on 2 June 1919 in Thal, he collapsed when giving orders for the final attack. In failing health he applied in August of that year for leave due to ill health. Yet he goes on to say, whilst we are in a sense entitled to conclude from the above that Dyer’s health throughout this period began to deteriorate, that is a long way from agreeing with Furneaux’s propositions (cf. Swinson 1964: 199).


45. Emphasis mine. Sir Henry Cotton provides us with an insightful commentary on the extent of imperial terror. He alerts his readers to the everyday, violent reality of Imperial rule. He catalogues the amount of terror routinely inflicted on Indians for instance under the Indian Whipping Act 1864, which according to him is ‘...one of the disastrous consequences of post-mutiny legislation’ (Cotton 1911: 79). He continues, ‘...the number of judicial floggings ... inflicted in India is appalling: in 1878 it amounted to 75,223...in 1900 it was 45,054 and has rarely been below 20,000 in any year’ (Cotton 1911: 79). In the same urgent vein he also tells us of what he calls ‘the cult of Nicholson.’ A fetish of the rulers of India for stick and whip, beyond strict legislative legitimacy. He narrates the oft told story about a number of youths at Lahore who used to hang about the door of the church which a parishioner called John Lawrence frequented. They frequented it ‘because they knew,’ he says, that ‘the Chief Commissioner would be sure to hammer his syce (groom) before driving home, and they wanted to see the fun’ (Cotton 1911: 65). Striking the natives he says ‘prevailed as a common and general habit during the whole of my residence in India’ (Cotton 1911: 65).

46. A conclusion she arrives at first of all she says, deductively, by ‘extrapolating Durkheim’s theory of crime and punishment,’ and secondly ‘inductively, by reading the debates on the Dyer sanction and testing the hypothesis by examining whether it explained the way the speakers in the debates voted (Fein 1977: xiv). Clearly repressive collective punishment is a feature of the imperial project. In this context we would do well to bear in mind Walter Benjamin’s famous proposition that ‘there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism’ (Benjamin 1992: 248).


48. Of course, as I point out in my introduction, sheer exorbitance in actions taken by the British, throughout their Imperial history is not so rare as Furneaux’s descriptions of Dyer would have us believe. In fact, instead of imagining this as exorbitance per se, as being completely beyond the pale, I would suggest such episodes to be at the very heart of Britain’s imperial project. In this context we would do well to bear in mind Walter Benjamin’s famous proposition that ‘there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism’ (Benjamin 1992: 248).

49. There is a little more information from Swinson who, at least in part, is in agreement with Furneaux when he says, that his theory cannot be dismissed lightly. In November 1921 Dyer suffered a stroke, leaving him partially paralyzed. And on 2 June 1919 in Thal, he collapsed when giving orders for the final attack. In failing health he applied in August of that year for leave due to ill health. Yet he goes on to say, whilst we are in a sense entitled to conclude from the above that Dyer’s health throughout this period began to deteriorate, that is a long way from agreeing with Furneaux’s propositions (cf. Swinson 1964: 199).

50. See chapter 1 for commentary on members of an Anglo-Indian constituency for whom Dyer is a hero.

51. Of course the list of voices that railed to Dyer’s defence that I discuss here is not exhaustive. Many members of the military formed part of this broad Dyer lobby. And many believed precisely in his characterisations of his actions. Sir Henry Wilson, chief of the Imperial general staff said ‘The Frocks have got India (as they have Ireland) into a filthy mess. On that the soldiers are called in to act. This is disapproved of by all the disloyal elements and the soldier is thrown to the wolves. All quite simple’ (Major General Sir C E Callwell 1927, Vol. II: 238).
‘Trailing his coat’ Sayer tells us is Miles Irving’s description. It is found in Edward Thompson’s A Letter from India (London 1930: 104). There are of course many literary sources for these views. E M Forster’s, A Passage to India is a good source. In A Passage to India Forster characterizes Ronny Heaslop, the overzealous and just as officious administrator as one who exemplifies such an ethic of stiff-backed duty towards Indians. Speaking about the naïveté of Adela Quested who apparently questions the unpleasant behaviour of Anglo-Indians toward Indians, Ronny exclaims

‘What did I tell you? I knew it last week. Oh, how like a woman to worry over a side issue!’

‘A side issue, a side issue?’ she repeated. ‘How can it be that?’

‘We’re not here for the purpose of behaving pleasantly!’ Ronny exclaims

‘What do you mean?’

‘What I say. We’re here to do justice and keep the peace. Them’s my sentiments. India isn’t a drawing room.

‘Your sentiments are those of a god,’ she said quietly (Forster 2000: 69).

The minority on the Hunter Committee reported that Michael O’Dwyer, the Lieutenant Governor, considered that the hartal at Gujranwala presented ‘a good opportunity for aeroplanes to use bombs, as there is little opportunity of hurting friends’ (Hunter 1920: 134).

Major Carberry’s evidence is cited by the minority on the Hunter Committee and, in terms of the truth that Fein is advocating, would seem to provide the ample confirmation of it that she requires. Thus, one of the committee members asked him whether after he dropped bombs he agreed with the assessment that the people began to run away in the direction of the village and into their houses, seeking shelter from the bombardment. To which he replied, yes. Pressing the Major a little further, the member asked ‘You fired [a] machine gun into the village and threw bombs onto those people who took shelter in the houses, but were there other innocent people in those houses?’ The major could not have misunderstood the implication, but he was forthright in his unconcern. He retorted: ‘I could not discriminate between innocent people and other people who were I think doing damage, or going to do damage.’ The examination of the Major continued in this manner. The coup d’état for the questioner and Fein’s hypothesis came soon enough, when the questioner asked a supplementary: “When the crowd split up and there could not be on the spot particular people in the village, they must be running away and entering the houses, then you fired [a] machine gun into the village which hit the houses in which there were perfectly innocent people?” If he felt no concern at the implications of an earlier question, he felt even less when asked this one: ‘I was at a height of 200 feet. I could see perfectly well, and I did not see anybody in the village at all who was innocent’ (Hunter Committee 1920: 133).

The crawling order is a reference to an instruction issued by Dyer to make Indians atone as he saw it for the assault against the missionary, Miss Sherwood. He ordered the street where she suffered assault to be closed. At on end of the street he put a whipping triangle, posted pickets at the other end and made it known that anyone wishing to pass through the street and that included its residents, had to do so on all fours. Sayer notes:

‘In practice people had to squirm through the filth of the lane on their bellies, prodded along by the boots and bayonets of the soldiers. Prisoners were deliberately routed through the “Crawling Lane”’ (Sayer 1991: 142).

And after criticism, even by Sir Michael O’Dwyer, this was Dyer’s explanation:

‘It is a complete misunderstanding to suppose that I meant this order to be an insulting mark of race inferiority. The order meant that the street should be regarded as holy ground, and that, to mark this fact, no one was to traverse it except in a manner in which a place of special sanctity might naturally in the East be traversed. My object was not merely to impress the inhabitants, but to appeal to their moral sense in a way which I knew they would understand’ (Dyer, Statement to the Army Council Cmd. 771 1920).

Frocks are a derogatory description often used by members of the army to describe politicians. See n. 16 chapt. 4.

Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, Vols. 115-148 (29 April 1919-10 November 1921), col. 1712.

Sir George Barrow in his biography of Sir Charles Munro denies the claim that Dyer never had or was denied the assistance of counsel (in Colvin 1929: 238). In full Barrow contends,
...it would be interesting to know who it was denied Dyer the assistance of counsel. It was certainly not the Government of India, nor the Commander-in-chief, nor the Hunter Committee. On the contrary, counsel was pressed on Dyer by the Government; and his friends, knowing his tendency to excitability, begged him to accept the assistance that was offered to him. Dyer obstinately refused saying that he would and could conduct his own case. Neither was he cross-examined without warning. He had many days in which to prepare his evidence. As to friends ready to help him, they too, were not wanting...General Beynon gave Dyer a friendly hint as he was going into the room where the Committee sat...There was a friend on the Committee itself who was only too anxious to extend to him all the assistance that was possible, but Dyer never gave him half a chance. Dyer was at liberty to employ the services of counsel or of any of his friends in that capacity. Naturally his friends could not take his place in the witness-box’ (Barrow 1931: pp212-213).

62. This observation accompanied Kipling’s contribution to the Dyer relief fund.
63. The extract is from General Dyer’s report to the General Staff, written whilst on sick leave in Dalhousie (1920).
CHAPTER 3 – THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEX

Introduction

'The Primal Duties shine aloft like stars,
And charities that soothe, and heal, and bless,
Are scattered at the feet of men like flowers' (Smiles 1880: 11).

In this chapter I continue my analysis of Amritsar 1919 – and begin my composition of those events in terms of the characterization of men who rule and how such characterizations are subject to challenge and change. The events of 1919 throw up a whole host of characters, and I shall refer to them throughout my narrative. Here I start by focusing on one of the main protagonists in this saga - Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab 1913-1919. I take him to be an ideal typical representation of a certain style of administrative composure.

I address the question of the relationship between specific administrative competencies and the history of colonialism in India. I ask, what is the style of administration O'Dwyer practiced? More especially I examine the intersections between movements for independence and shifts in the styles of colonial domination in India at the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.
In my analysis of the discursive production of Amritsar events of 1919 in those terms I pull together discourses usually separated in discussions of colonial power. First, by following Foucault’s leads on the problem of subjectivity and its constitution, I remove the ruling colonial subject from discourses of the singular and sinister. Second, by engaging his suggestive comments on the arts of government, I implicate Indian rule in the extra state techniques of government that preoccupy his histories of governmentally.

An Administrator par-excellence

(a) Descriptions in Administration

‘There is nothing so bad or good that you will not find Englishmen doing it; but you will never find Englishmen in the wrong...His watchword is always Duty; and he never forgets that the nation that Lets its duty get on the opposite side of its interest is lost’ (Shaw 1930-38: vol. viii: 193).

‘We are here ... by our own moral superiority, by the force of circumstances and the will of Providence. These alone constitute our charter of government, and in doing the best we can for the people we are bound by our own conscience and not theirs’ (J Lawrence in O’Dwyer 1925: 407)

‘It is true that to hate injustice and cruelty is the right of every man, and not of one particular faction. It is more especially the duty of those who administer affairs among a subject population to cultivate that feeling. But
severely to punish those who openly set themselves against the laws, promptly to crush an incipient rebellion ruthlessly, to trample out a flagrant insurrection, these are equally the duty of an administrator. When there is doubt some will give it in favorem vitae, others in favorem republicae. And here is the difficulty. It is no small check over a vigorous administrator that he knows that he will have to justify any act of severity at the bar of a clamorous, powerful and prejudiced tribunal.’ (Carthill 1924: 86).

"For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is administered is best' (O'Dwyer 1925: 372).

(b) The Lieutenant Governor's Times - A political context and contests

"O'Dwyer is...opposed to everything ... he is determined to maintain his position as the idol of the reactionary forces, and try to govern by the iron hand' (in Draper 1982: 33). 1

Sir Michael O'Dwyer, famously gunned down at Caxton Hall in 1940, exemplifies a specific ruling tradition in India. He was a man who had no doubt, whatsoever, about his place and role in the sub-continent. 2 And he arguably became more belligerent in his beliefs, as the realization dawned on him that he was entering an age when all that he assumed about his place, his role, and how he should rule over others, was increasingly in question, and was about to come to an end. Nevertheless, at this time, all the passionate certainties about their place and role in another’s land, espoused by him and his brethren fell to be replaced by a growing discomfiture with his and their place there. Before I examine how he envisioned the make up of a man who sought to rule over others, particularly Indians, and the
make up of traditions he formed so much a part of, I consider the historical contexts that threw these questions into such sharp relief at this time.

(i) Are we staying or will we be forced to go? – Official contemplation

Few doubted that British rule in India would not go on forever, but for a while at least, plenty reasoned, bluster would continue to suffice. Many simply sought to deny the impending menace posed by movements for independence. Menace! What menace?, they asked? If they ever got as far as asking the question that is. As many again, looked inward, and simply couldn’t understand what they’d done to invoke the rise in counter passions for freedom from the colonial yoke, by a people whom they considered, their charges, their children. At such times doubts about British rule in India resembled a tale almost of an unrequited love.

Claude Auchinleck records a pre First World War army view. Only 40 or so years before, the empire’s army had experienced a revolt in its ranks. Yet, with almost disdainful presumption he confidently states:

‘I don’t think the average subaltern thought much about British Rule and, indeed, took it for granted that it would go on forever. I do remember when one of our Indian officers from the hills in the north said to me, “What is going to happen when the British leave India?” I looked at him and said, “Well, of course, the British are never going to leave India” ’ (Allen ed. 1975: 203).
Many in the Indian Civil Service (ICS), O'Dwyer prominent among them, joined in to deny such a menace. So, for instance, Allen once more recounts how even for young men who sought to join at the time of the so-called Great War 'such as Christopher Masterman, it was not a serious issue' (Allen 1975: 203). A career in the Indian Civil Service, to be a servant of Empire, at this time is still, if only just, held in high regard. In Masterman’s words,

‘...When I first went to India it never entered my head that India would one day be independent, but I saw a sign when the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were introduced in 1921. I certainly felt then that independence would come, but I don’t think we realized that it would be coming so soon’ (in Allen ed. 1975: 203).

Those in government could barely visualize their charges grown into a maturity where they would want, or could, flee the nest. O'Dwyer famously and continually dismissed all calls for self-government by an increasingly assertive subject population.

Allen usefully refers us to some interesting correspondence in the form of certain minutes floating around offices, hidden away in files, and quoted by Vere Birdwood. Although they relate, strictly speaking, to a time after the events with which I am concerned, they still display an almost ridiculous ambivalence, even at this late stage, towards freedom’s prospectus. Apparently, late in 1941, Birdwood saw a minute attached to a file, in which,
the most junior officer had written, "I don’t think we’d better start this project, there may not be time to finish it." His senior officer had minuted on the file, "What nonsense. I was told this in 1919." And the most senior officer, the Governor, had minuted on that same file, "Absolute nonsense, I was told this in 1909" (in Allen ed. 1975: 203).

Rather than ensure longevity in British administration the tendency to deny India’s ferment for freedom only ended up inciting more intense political activity by Indians. Hence, Indian politicians started to believe that when the time came, the British administration did not have ‘any intention of handing power over at all’ (in Allen 1975: 203). In fact time again Indian campaigners managed to convince themselves that British officials ‘were going to find some trick to avoid handing over power’ (in Allen 1975: 203). Such uncertainties were Allen thinks, the perfect ‘foundation...for... Indians'...Non-Cooperation Movement’ (Allen 1975: 203).

(ii) Are we staying or will we be forced to go? – Unofficial contemplation

If those in government were prone to rue the day when they were not on hand to keep order, and carry on with their mission in the sub-continent, then those same events came to baffle a mass of Anglo-Indians outside government, who, formally at least, were distant from officialdom.

To some extent, Indians' disbelief echoed that in governmental quarters. Eugene Pierce for instance didn’t believe ‘...British rule would come to an end, and certainly not as abruptly as it did’ (in Allen 1975: 212). Pierce adds, ‘when it was
announced that India was to get her independence we were very jittery about it. We immediately started discussing what we were going to do' (in Allen ed. 1975: 213). They had a job to do, and would continue with it. In this sense, although these particular people were outside government, when they came to question movements and demands for freedom by Indians, their doubts arguably amounted to a pure statement of the principles at stake. The job and nothing less than the job guided many a government official in relation to India and Indians. Their jobs in India are everything.

For others, it is different. Of course their concerns against movements for home rule, could easily be stated in the same missionary terms as their colleagues in government. But, their refusal to contemplate an end game for themselves in India is informed rather more by the frightful prospect of their hedonistic days in the sun coming to an end. Indeed, Allen alludes to ‘a certain escapism’ affecting those outside government about the ferment for freedom from Indians. Thus, he refers us to another (unnamed) of their number who concedes for instance, ‘if we thought about Ghandi at all it was really that he was just a bit of a nuisance and slightly absurd’ (in Allen ed. 1975: 203).9

If there is any doubt about demands for self-rule, we should more appropriately call them refusals to understand or contemplate the mood abroad then Allen’s tale of the audacious Roberts family is positively brazen.10 Even in Bengal, where Allen says ‘officials and policemen were being regularly assassinated, the Roberts could still feel untroubled.’ They added, ‘For the first twenty or thirty
years...we were on our own there, sleeping out on the verandah. The house was more or less open but I don’t think we felt uneasy at all”’ (in Allen ed. 1975: 204).11

By seeking to deny, and failing to understand the melee breaking all around and seeking to continue with and confirm their rather quixotic relation to India and Indians Anglo-Indians' heads remained firmly stuck in the sand. But in the end Anglo-Indians, both inside and outside government, were simply unable to dispute fervent native/nationalist yearnings for home rule. Anglo-Indians would just have to adjust to the terms of new debates and practices.

Many Indians just didn't have the same memories of empire so loved by their rulers. Their memories are not so endearing about their so-called benevolent rulers.12 Their recollections are often littered by the ‘vulgar, violent, or coarse minded men, often of an inferior class,’ (Russell 1857 in Brown 1948: 229). The practices of such men would only add to the aversion Indian’s felt towards their rulers. Nor did such practitioners have sufficient imagination to posit a world so very different from how Russell describes an earlier time.13 Borrowing once again from Russell, the good old days of the hookah and cut-glass goblets had well and truly gone.14 We are at this time in a different age!

(iii) Their ruling investments in this land
Of course, both those in government, and those outside it, would not easily give up, what they, in turn, saw as their duty to India. Nor part easily with their seductive privileges there. Just as those in government could not envisage their tutelage of the Indian masses as ever being complete, then those outside it were loath to give up their endless days of pleasure in the sun.

It is instructive to look at some expressions of regret and disbelief in the prospect that their days as masters are soon to end. By doing so we get a sense of how intensely gripped the context of the lives and imaginations of some Anglo-Indians are with these fears. We also get a peep of the depths of what I call, a ‘crisis in denial’; how such crises, or perceptions of such, affected and re-ordered the task of administration. Breakfast, lunch, dinner and port, would certainly not taste or be at the normal time ever again...

Many a tear or two would be shed at the mere thought of such a prospect, and perhaps a river of grief flow when that thought became a fait accompli. Isabel Hunter for instance gives us a taste of the investments made by the ranks of unofficial Anglo-Indians, many of who are women, in a land that had cast a spell on their minds. On her impending departure from India she recalls those, and specifically her, uncomplicated times fondly:

'I love the very recollection of these days, the easy pleasantness of every detail. I loved the attentions so freely and unstintingly given; these never failed or lacked. It was a Miss Sahib. She must be looked after; and not once or ever, can I recall rudeness or the slightest approach to it, but instead, a
superfluity of all that was kind and nice. Dare I contrast English ways? I will not detail them, but only two journeys have I taken in England in one year, and on each occasion there was default and impertinence for which there was no justification or need.' (Hunter 1909 in Brown 1945: 261/2).

What was it then that such Anglo-Indians, who are, strictly speaking, outside government, would miss most? Of course for some, as Isabel Hunter recognizes, the context of rule is a powerful drug. It induces expectations of obeisance, from those one rules over, towards you and all you do, however much your subjects may contrive their approbation. When one is no longer on the same dosage, one gets attacks of cold turkey. As many realize, there is little chance of similar treatment once they are back to a place they are not even sure is home. So who, for instance, would run your bath at a moment’s notice, without so much as a titter? Who would glory in your presence by addressing you by the right exaltation? As Hunter glories in, Miss Sahib this, Miss Sahib that, on and on and on! Who would pull the punkah, all day, to ensure fresh air waft in your direction, all day? All this, and more, ... and more.. and .... Is it any wonder then that the only thought on Anglo-Indian minds, for a while at least, is to traverse the rising opposition to British rule?

However many rulers, albeit outside formal government may wish to deny the shift in contexts, the (expectant) disappointments and sadness on such a shift, are still palpable. This is the sense one gets from the litany of letters written by Anglo-Indians about such a prospect. When the time eventually came, they would bid farewell to their beloved India with huge regrets. In 1914 G M Graham wrote:
‘When the spell of the East falls veil-like upon me I see a procession of familiar faces, those of friendly thieves and liars, amongst which Peter’s is strangely distinct, and I am conscious that despite his approbation of my stockings, my spoons and my substance generally, and ayah’s shameless annexation of what was left, I still hold them both in affectionate remembrance. They are friends and unchanging ones, for if I ever return to find my face forgot by those of my own race, these two would come to me with welcoming words of deferential devotion to anticipate my desires and to steal my possessions. I am in the land of my birth again now, but the joys of the day that is done are still with me. As for the rest, philosophy asks whether it is better that the dhoby should steal one’s garments, and hire them out for weddings, funerals, and sea bathing indiscriminately, or that the steam laundry should riddle them with holes and amputate entire limbs! Pour moi, c’est egal. Here I am learning formalities, conventionalities, and many other useful things, but I have my hours of longing for the land of the lotus, with its subtle scents, it impenetrable solitudes, and its unfathomable peoples’ (Graham 1914 in Brown 1945: 262).

The adult/child like relations and language here is unmistakable. Graham is like a tolerant grand aunt. She is conscious of her subjects’ juvenile antics, but always forgives. Parting, for her, and for massed ranks of other Anglo-Indians, often means the end of their world, and these relations. Many ask themselves a profoundly disturbing question; who precisely do we think we are? When there are no longer any dhoby’s, no punka-wallas, and any ayas, who are we?

Sir William Hunter’s answer to such a conundrum did not reassure. According to him, ‘the Englishman in India has no home and leaves no memory’ (Hunter in Allen
Maud Diver, is another who is just as equally opaque. She just couldn’t adjudicate upon the rival claims bearing down on her from India and England. Pragmatism it seems, would never find a better suitor, but even then all her agonizing led to only one result – a broken heart:

‘...The problem of nurse or ayah pales, all too soon, before one of infinitely greater moment – the rival claims of India and England; of husband and child. Sooner or later the lurking shadow of separation takes a definite shape; asserts itself as a harsh reality; a grim presence, whispering the inevitable question: “Which shall it be?” A question not lightly to be answered: if indeed, in generalized form, it can be answered at all. Every woman, when her time comes, must face it frankly, from her own individual standpoint; and thresh out her own individual answer according to her lights. An unsatisfactory one it is bound to be, at best; and countless brave hearts have been strained to breaking point during those bitter hours of indecision’ (Diver 1909 in Brown 1945: 257).

Olive Douglas is perhaps a little more sanguine. Though she too wraps it in her own particular confusions; but not so much so. She meditates morbidly

‘...and so I am going home to my own bleak kindly land, “place of all weathers that end in rain.” I am going home to my own people; and I am going home to you. And the queer thing is I can’t feel glad. I am so home sick for India’ (Douglas in Brown 1945: 262).

Maybe she is a little more sanguine about her impending move away because her questions, about her place in this strange land, and who precisely she is, fell from her head at an earlier time. All she could do, at one time, she tells us, was to walk
around and ask herself, why? Why me? Why am I here? and broadening it out, why are we (the British) here?: why do I/we require an army of servants to cater after our every need?: all day, and everyday she continues in the same vein, until such thoughts begin to irk her. No one it seems could, or would, give her any satisfactory answers. So she continued to ask, why? But, all her questions led only to a mild reassurance from a colleague about how she should moderate her conduct while in India, and agonize a little less about her presence, and the precise character of her relations with those who served her (Douglas in Brown 1945: 211/2). In her own words, these are her agonies-

‘Why, for example, should we require a troop of servants living, as we do, in a kind of hotel? And there they are – Boggley’s bearer and my ayah – I can see some reason for their presence – a kimutgar to wait on us at table and bring tea in the afternoon, another assistant kimutgar who scurries like a frightened rabbit at my approach, a delightful small boy who rejoices in the name of paniwallah, whose sole duty is to carry water for the baths, the dhobi who washes our clothes by beating them between two large - and I should say, judging by the state of the clothes, sharp – stones, losing most of them in the process, and a syce or groom for each pony. Seated as one sometimes sees them, in rows on the steps, augmented by a chuprussi or two, brilliant in uniform, they make a sufficiently imposing spectacle. I have few words, but I look at them in as pleasant a way as I know how, partly because I like to be friends with servants, and partly because I’m rather afraid of them and don’t want to rouse them to mutiny or do anything desperate, but Boggley discouraged me at the outset. “You needn’t grin at them so affably,” he remarked, “they will only think you are weak in the head” ’ (emphasis mine. Douglas in Brown 1945: 212).
Irene Edwards\textsuperscript{19} is another consumed by similar questions/uncertainties. Once it looks as though her time in India is coming to an end, she is assailed by questions of identification – paraphrasing Allen, she has to ‘decide once and for all where .. her .. loyalties and .. identity ..lie..’ (Allen ed. 1975: 213). As soon as she articulates these fears and perhaps goes some way to understand them, she appeals to recognizable symbols to reassure her that things would remain just as they are; and would continues to be so. She looks back with fondness. She says,

I remember once sitting on a platform in Mhou. You could see the fort in the distance with the Union Jack flying, and a group of little Indian chokras ... sitting and talking near by ... One said to the other, “do you see the flag up there? Do you know, there are a lot of people who want to see that flag come down? But that flag will never come down.” And I, in my foolishness, agreed with them; I thought the flag would never come down. We were proud of being British. My father, when he heard “God Save the King” being sung, even away in the distance, stood up and we had to stand up with him. That is what we thought of the British Raj and it came as a shock to us when it ended. Now we did not know where we were, whether we were Indians or British or what’ (in Allen ed. 1975: 213).

Romance, nostalgia, spicy sensibilities are all in the jumble of emotions and attachments many would feel. Comfortable times in Indian from a lasting impression on our coterie of Anglo-Indians. What would it take to guarantee their round of balls, concerts, harmonica nights and supper on the veranda?\textsuperscript{20} Subsisting without a care in the world wouldn't last forever.
In an everyday sense, the changed and changing circumstances did prove impossible to ignore. To those who thought themselves sovereigns over all they surveyed, often in the most to them abhorrent of ways. Allen once again provides us with a most superlative instance showing how such changes were effecting Anglo-Indians daily lives. One Edwin Pratt, recalls, ‘when I first went to Calcutta you could walk down Chowringee and the Indians walking in the opposite direction would just get out of your way. Time came when they just continued to walk where they were and you got out of the way’ (in Allen 1975: 204). Times were indeed changing.

(iv) Defining/Groping for an administrative tradition - Curzon

Keeping control in these most fractious days began to consume passions both inside the ICS and outside it. Of course in one sense it is an old enigma. The imperial writ often had a limited range. After 1858 governing India came to be seen not so much a given but a problem. The question honestly put was how best to keep a firm hold on India. Lord Curzon, Viceroy 1899-1905 turned his not inconsiderable talents to defining a ruling tradition and actualizing that goal.

Gilmour tells us how Curzon's interest in India was inspired. He heard Sir James Stephen lecture at Eton. Stephen would claim that in ‘the Asian sub-continent,’ Britain held ‘an empire more populous, more amazing and more beneficent than Rome.’ That determined him in his design about the conduct of rule in India. He firmly believes that ‘British rule in India was the greatest thing his countrymen had
achieved.' So much did he suppose this to be the case that '...he dedicated his Persian volumes to the officials who carried it out' (Gilmour 1994: 135).

Administration of the empire would be in the hands of the ICS. Curzon considered them ‘the proudest and most honorable service in the world’ (in Gilmour 1994: 160). Yet, Gilmour adds, Curzon's '...standards of efficiency were so high that he was bound to find fault with its performance' (Gilmour 1994: 160). Nevertheless, as Gilmour suggests,

‘dedicated and incorruptible, the ICS was the most admirable component of the British presence in India. Fresh from Balliol or Haileybury, the young official spent his early career in the district subdivisions, riding for half the year from village to village, his day starting in the saddle at dawn and progressing through visits, inspections and disputes settled from his office-tent under the trees, before ending in an evening stroll, the camp fire and the mosquito net’ (Curzon 1994: 159).

Curzon himself would not tire in stressing the importance and urgency of the task of administration. He writes

'It is only when you get to see and realize what India really is – that she is the strength and greatness of England – it is only then that you feel that every nerve a man may strain, every energy he may put forward cannot be devoted to a nobler purpose than keeping tight the cords that hold India to ourselves' (in Allen ed. 1975: 202).
Perhaps the first words he spoke on his arrival in Bombay would signal his intent like no others. He announced, as Gilmour reminds us, that 'he had come to India "to hold the scales even" between the different races and religions of the country...' (in Gilmour 1975: 171). Perhaps, as important as these statements of his job in India is what Gilmour calls his 'first commitment...to "righteousness in administration"' (Gilmour 1975: 171). According to Gilmour, Curzon set out his administrative stall as follows...

'He would not connive at scandals or wink at fraud or hush up ill-doing in high places, because the British were in India to set an example, and all their actions should be open to inspection. Only by demonstrating 'superior standards of honor and virtue' could they continue to hold the country' (Gilmour 1994: 171).

(v) A changing inheritance in administrative tradition – Sir Michael O’Dwyer

Curzon’s specific modes of ruling over others, were drawing to a close. So what were the elements that Sir Michael O'Dwyer brought to his job? What, to coin a phrase, are the elements of O'Dwyerism? The days of ‘Curry and Rice’, and all things nice, relatively speaking, were already the stuff of recent memory when he entered the job.\textsuperscript{23,24}

The Guardians, as Woodruff describes men like O'Dwyer, were now trained to think about, and do little else but, their duty by India and Indians, however
perverse. This new breed of professional administrator, Woodruff adds, sought to model themselves on Dr Arnolds’s famous hope and dictum spoken by the character Squire Brown about pupils passing through Rugby: ‘if he’ll only turn out a brave, helpful truth telling Englishman and a gentleman and a Christian, that’s all I want.’ (Woodruff 1954: 21). Their tasks and the manner in which they were to achieve them grew more complex day by day. Ironically if successful in pursuing their duty to India and Indians they would eventually write themselves into oblivion (Woodruff 1954).

Of course many Indians never accepted English suzerainty. Perhaps, it is the growing realization by many in the bureaucracy of such non-acceptance and, not incidentally, competition regarding claims to competence in governing themselves by those groups, that would demand that members in the bureaucracy relate to Indians differently.

O’Dwyer was not one of those. His collar remained firmly starched. Never mind that he saw his charges exceed his expectations. He invariably finds their skills uncomfortable, threatening even! Doing his duty for Indians as we see would ensure he remain marked by his distrust of pretenders as he saw it, to the sovereign’s throne. O’Dwyer has little patience with what he regards as the soft hearted or feeble-minded peddlers, advocates, for Indian democracy. Khuswant Singh rather colorfully describes how O’Dwyer thought of demands for self-government and freedom from the colonial yoke. Such demands he thinks as being
‘preposterous figments of the mind of the urbanite babu and the wog barrister’ (SinghII 1999: 162).\textsuperscript{28}

O’Dwyer’s reputation was for a tough, ‘I know best’ rule. It is no accident perhaps that he found himself in the Punjab. It was one of the last states to fall under British tutelage and only then after a composite of treachery and two bitter, hard fought wars in 1845 and 1848.\textsuperscript{29} In this sense he carried on a long tradition. E M Forster, chronicles it well in his, \textit{A Passage to India} when he has Ronny dismiss Adela Quested’s questioning of the unpleasant behaviour of Anglo-Indians towards Indians with the terse assertions, ‘we are not here for the purpose of behaving pleasantly!’ When she asks, ‘What do you mean?’, he replies, ‘what I say. We’re not here for the purpose of behaving pleasantly…. We are here to do justice and keep the peace…. India isn’t a drawing room’ (Forster 2000: 69; see chapter 2. n. 53).

Such a hard reputation could arguably only be enhanced by accusations, ultimately rejected by the majority on the Hunter commission, that he ran a press ganging system for recruitment into the army throughout the Punjab, during the 1914-18 war.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{(vi) Anglo-Irish antecedents}

One of fourteen children, O’Dwyer came from a wealthy land owning Irish family. According to Woodruff, O’Dwyer was
brought up in a world of hunting and snipe-shooting, of threatening letters and houghed cattle, where you were for the Government or against it, where you passed everyday the results of lawlessness in the blackened walls of empty houses... a world very different from the ordered life of southern England' (Woodruff 1954: 236).

His Anglo-Irish background is an interesting back cloth to his role as Lieutenant-Governor in the Punjab. He had a fearsome dislike of 'politics', and the disorder that he felt came in its train. The first few pages of his autobiography are littered with a sneering impatience with its Irish versions. He extrapolates at length about how it should also be excised from its Indian terrain, coupled, ironically of course, with an equally fearsome assertion of an independence of spirit, a peculiar property we are told, of the O'Dwyers' (Woodruff 1954: 235-43).

He attributes the source of his dislike for politics, to the views of his father. He says, ‘... as regards internal politics, all of his nine sons followed the example of.. their.. father, who had a dislike for politics and a distrust for politicians, less rare in an Irishman than is commonly thought...' On the very next page he adds, ‘...my father was too much concerned with the problem of bringing up a family of nine sons and five daughters on four or five hundred acres of land to have any time to spare for politics.' (O'Dwyer 1925: 5-6) The coup de grace in this particular denial of the importance of, or indeed the need for politics, is delivered in his preface. There it is stated as being the central reason he turned his hand to writing his book, and its ethical urgency is proclaimed when he explicitly couples it with the misdirected interests of his Indian charges:
'Many of the matters I ... touch ... on are controversial; but in discussing them my sole object has been to place the facts as known to me on record, and to state my own conclusions as based on those facts. The main purpose of the book is to emphasize the responsibility of the people and Parliament of Great Britain “for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples,” and to show where that responsibility is being lost sight of or inadequately discharged ... In my time I have done what I could according to my lights to serve the interests of the peoples of India, and particularly the dumb masses who, in the tumult and shouting of politics, are least likely to get a hearing. If these pages direct attention to their wants and wishes, which find but little expression in the new Indian Legislatures now dominated by a small but very vocal class, my purpose will have been served’ (italics mine. O’Dwyer 1925: ix-x). 31

As Woodruff reminds us, these sentiments are not ‘irrelevant to O’Dwyer’s perceptions of what his job as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab demands of him. According to Woodruff, he knew ‘...from his boyhood what conspiracy and outrage meant to peaceful folk’ (Woodruff 1954: 238). Of course, demands for freedom from a subject population, which ran as follows, would only amount, could only amount, in these genuflections, to what he was later to suggest to a travesty of conspiratorial facts:

'The Indian nation was united, civilized and prosperous under its indigenous rulers. Then the British Wolf found his way into the fold and struck down the helpless flock. The British, by treachery or...ruthless force, strangled the independence of India, made her free people slaves, bled them white by...excessive taxation, ruined their trade and industry to benefit Britain's commerce, made them powerless and unmanly by prohibiting the use of arms,
maintain a costly mercenary army at India's cost for the service of the British Empire and, to strangle Indian patriots by cruelties such as the Punjab atrocities and the Amritsar massacre of 1919, exploit the immense resources of India for the benefit of Britain, and India's sons their rightful place in the administration of their own country and that independence which is their birthright.' (Unattributed in O'Dwyer 1927: 167).

The lessons that he learned from a version of Irish politics whose aims, with an eye to India, he loosely dubbed Irish Swaraj (home rule), and later Indian Swaraj, led him to conclude,

'If the home rule movement after a hundred years of agitation has so far produced no better results among a people fairly enlightened and homogeneous, in a country no larger or more populous than a single one of the five divisions of the Punjab, what results can we expect from it in this vast continent of 315 millions, with its infinite variety of races, creeds and traditions, and its appalling inequalities in social and political development? What results could we expect from it even in our own province? In the matter of Home Rule, I fear the case of Ireland, in so far as it is analogous at all, conveys to us a lesson and a warning' (O'Dwyer 1925: 14).

Indians, and political Indians in particular would have to be content and recognize the fact that, 'an Indian nation has never existed and is not likely to come into existence for generations, if ever' (O'Dwyer 1927: 178). Once they come to their senses, 'we can, then,' he adds, '... ask Indians to co-operate with us in the development of self-government in its only practicable form, i.e., provincial autonomy. Even here, progress will be difficult' (O'Dwyer 1927: 178). And
competent Indian opinion he says agrees with him. He quotes the Maharaja of Benares of whose authority he thinks no-one can be in any doubt. Thus, according to O'Dwyer, the Maharaja said 'it is a mockery to call ourselves a nation. We cannot do without British protection for centuries. A further reduction of the British element in the services and the courts would be a disaster.' (Maharaja of Benares in O'Dwyer 1927: 177).

Clearly then, as an administrator in India, and as an administrator of one of the provinces thought by the administration to present them with more challenges than most, his modus operandi had, to be more than merely acquiescent. Rather it would have the character rather aptly described by Carlyon Bellairs. According to him 'British rule has been respected because it has been wisely strong without being cruel, and because the word of an Englishman is his bond...' (The Times 8 July 1920). Perhaps the phrase that is the closest to describing his ruling style is the description of his conduct in India as a benevolent, independent, autocracy. That very independence of mind and action are also loudly proclaimed by him as his very raison d'ètre, alongside his distaste and impatience with politics in equally forthright terms.

He supports our vision of him as a stern fellow when he recounts in the opening page of his autobiography, a story of what he refers to as his clan from Ireland. He proudly boasts how in Ireland the O'Dwyer's are mentioned in a Lord Justices's report of 1515 to Henry VIII, on 'The State of Ireland and plans' for its Reform, as constituting one among the twelve clans thought of as the King's Irish Enemies.
The clan, described as being of Muster and holding North Tipperary, and its captains (chiefs of clan), ‘...maketh war and peace for himself and holdeth by sword and hateth imperial jurisdiction within his room, and odythe to no other person, English or Irish, except only too such persons as may subdue him by sword’ (O’Dwyer 1925: 1).

(vii) Education of an administrative elite

O’Dwyer went to a Jesuit school called St. Stanislus (O’Dwyer 1925: 16). From there he went to Wrens towards the end of 1881, where he passed as a probationer for the ICS examination the following year (O’Dwyer 1925: 18). His batch of probationers went to Balliol College, Oxford where he initially spent two years, then staying on a further year to get a degree and read a normally three year law course in a year. He managed to get a first and shone as a linguist. In general Woodruff remarks that during his studies one gets the impression of a man consumed in his own thoughts with little time for the complexities of the world (Woodruff 1954: 235-43).

Balliol College, under the vice chancellorship of Benjamin Jowett, from 1882 to 1885, was pivotal in providing prospective ICS candidates with, as Osborne notes, ‘... the main perquisites for Civil Service appointments in India’ (Osborne 1994b: 24). Indeed after the closure of Haileybury College in 1854, discussion on the recruitment to the Civil Service in India passed almost exclusively to the place of
Oxbridge in equipping candidates for their furlough to India. On these developments Jowett comments,

‘I cannot conceive a greater boon which would be conferred upon the University than a share in the Indian appointments. The inducements thus offered would open to us a new field of knowledge: it would give us another root striking into the soil of society; it would provide what we have always wanted, a stimulus reaching beyond the fellowships, for those not intending to take orders...’ (in Osborne 1994b: 24)

O’Dwyer himself observes that Jowett had always shown a very great interest in the ICS exams. He believes that he, Jowett, was responsible for the rules and regulations, as well as the content of the examination. The ICS Probationers, O’Dwyer informs us, had their own curriculum. It consisted of Indian languages; Law; and Political Economy. Having their own curriculum exempted them from the College and University exams, and according to him ‘in... such... a large college where the tone was... rather highbrow and cliquey’ this had ‘... a tendency to... mark us out as birds of passage’ (O’Dwyer 1925: 19-20).

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Balliol was then at the zenith of its fame (O’Dwyer 1925). Its hall of fame reads like a, Who’s Who of Indian administrators. Although as O’Dwyer’s tells us the likes of Asquith, Milner and Curzon had by that time gone, their achievements and glamour remained a profound influence on all who aspired to follow in their footsteps. Amongst the many prominent names reading at the college in 1885, he lists a few who, he says,
were marked out for brilliant careers. Amongst these are to be found, Lord Grey of Falloden, later to be archbishop of Canterbury; Anthony Hope; and F W Pember, later warden of All Souls (O’Dwyer 1925: 19-20).

Paying attention to such a hall of fame alerts us to the question of the existence of a substantial body who would be termed an administrative elite. Such an elite didn’t simply exist to extend, or pursue ‘imperial forms of proselytization.’ What is at stake here, is passing on forms of expertise. This new clerisy, Osborne says, would practice, what Osborne terms a new form of ‘moral regulation’ (Osborne 1994b: 24). That is to say, one whose major focus of concern is not with proselytization, but with the formation in these souls of certain characterological traits that would enable them to better experiment with and practice, good government. What is envisaged in the formation of such a new clerisy is ‘... a cultural and administrative intelligentsia - entrusted with a particular vocation in terms of moral regulation ... ’ (Osborne 1994b: 24). O’Dwyer was very much of this tradition.

What is being passed on here, is ‘...all those means and techniques for guiding and shaping conduct’ (Osborne 1994b: 6). Not the regulation of the conduct of others; quite simply the conduct that forms the material to be defined, crafted, shaped and played with here, is the ‘conduct of their conduct’ (Osborne 1994b: 6); the conduct of the new clerisy. What is expected is a self-reflexivity; an attention to form as one would pay attention to any handbook or practical manual on conduct and manners; but in addition, an auto-critique, if required, when one steps outside
those mannered terrains as one must when exercising those precepts. Gordon describes these relations to the self thus,

"Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty ... [Foucault] was interested in government as an activity or practice, and in arts of government as ways of knowing what that activity consisted in, and how it might be carried on. A rationality of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable or practicable both to the practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced' (in Osborne 1994b: 6-7; Gordon 1991: 2-3; Foucault 1979; 1990).

There is little doubt of the confidence bestowed on O'Dwyer by his time at Balliol. O'Dwyer's belief in his ability to carry out administrative tasks/roles in India on behalf of, and for, his colonial charges, people famously characterized by Kipling, as 'new-caught, sullen peoples half-devil, half-child', was never less than unflinching. To be sure, as Draper notes, O'Dwyer's belief in his right to administer Indian territory was enduringly racist. Yet as Draper adds, this is racism of a specific sort. It constructs village India as the real India; the majority India. It is a simple India. An India, suffering from arrested development. This India, as the real India, and its 'pathetic contentment' is the (ICS) masters sole concern. Indeed as O'Dwyer says, fair treatment by the administration of the peasant class ensures that his, the peasant's, reasonableness endures: 'In the
Punjab... the placid pathetic contentment of the peasantry, which highly placed British politicians thought right to disturb, is not due to dull apathy, but to a consciousness that they are being fairly dealt with.’ (O’Dwyer 1925: 56). Trouble and agitation would in these circumstances not be in the forefront of their minds. He adds, ‘..only when they had reason to think otherwise.. would they be.. quick to show their discontent and insist on redress.’ (O’Dwyer 1925: 56).

(viii) O’Dwyer’s rule in practice

O’Dwyer gives us a short history lesson regarding his regard for the peasant’s contentment. According to him ever since Akbar’s time the peasantry formed a particular object of government concern. In that sense at least the newly emerging arts that British administrators laid claim to had time honored antecedents.41 On this account, Akbar ensured as far as possible that the burdens imposed on peasants in the form of the State demand were kept to a light touch. At one time constituting nearly one half of all the farmers’ revenue, the demand came down to 'one-third of the produce or of its estimated cash value.’ (O’Dwyer 1925: 57). This special taxation regime ensured a 'great extension of cultivation and of agricultural prosperity under his (Akbar's) beneficent rule.’ (O’Dwyer 1925: 57).

In time he thinks, this changed.

The local rulers began once again to squeeze as much out of the peasantry as they could. This he says, is the state in which the new rulers, the British Government, found matters. No better description of this state if affairs is found than 'in the
pathetic saying', '...the peasant has no one to look to but God, and God is far off...' (O'Dwyer 1925: 57). As if a warning to so-called Bolshevik inspired political ambitions, he adds, 'I heard the same wail in Russia...' (O'Dwyer 1925: 57). Unlike the Russians presumably, he says that the new administration realized quite quickly or at least convinced itself that 'the well being of the peasant and the protection of agriculture are the foundations of the prosperity of the state...' (O'Dwyer 1925: 57). There is little doubt that he placed this concern for the peasant very high on his list of personal administrative achievements. The peasants as he defined them were his babies; he would not desert them. Hence:

'In the Punjab even today, notwithstanding the great increase in prices and in the selling value of land, the Government demand on the land does not average more than half-a-crown per cultivated acre, while the average sale value over £20 per acre. It is this consideration for the peasant and his dependents (90 percent of the population) - "whose life is a long drawn question.. Between a crop and a crop.." - that has been, and is, the greatest asset of the British government in India and the strongest argument for the permanence of our rule. The town-bred intelligentsia, whom we are now putting in power, have no sympathy for the peasant, and as in the past would suck him dry if allowed to do so ... Yet the Governments in India and here, both of whom claim to be the champions of the weak and oppressed, feebly acquiesced in this selfish proceeding as being the natural result of the new democratic (?) institutions in India. Those of us who have been working all our lives for the Indian peasantry view with dismay this betrayal of their interests in the name of democracy' (O'Dwyer 1925: 58)."
There is here a real aversion to what he calls the educated middle classes. They were deemed transgressors of his real – peasant - India. Having stepped outside their characterizations as simple people who tilled the land, they presented a profound challenge to their rulers, and their self-conceptions as the bringers of order. Thus,

‘In much Anglo-Indian Mythology, the authentic India was the India of the villager and the loyal sepoy; simple manly fellows, far more congenial to it than the Bombay bania or shop keeper-moneylender, or the voluble Bengali babu, or clerk, or the madrassi lawyer, heir of a log line of Brahminical logic choppers’ (Kiernan in Draper 1981: 161).

Woodruff also captures the perils presented to O’Dwyer’s ilk, by those of their wards who had grown up:

‘...More and more educated Indians were in varying degrees nationalist at heart. They were rivals for power and knowledge, sharp critics too of all that Western world in which they claimed a share, and it was easy to be jealous and resentful of them, to fall into the habit of glorifying instead the villager, the soldier, the servant, all who had not yet been ‘spoilt by education,’ who were still ready to use the old obsequious expressions of respect’ (Woodruff 1954: 17).

Compensatory visions of the simple villager, soldier and servant would have to do. Such an India in these versions is the authentic India. Time in this India had it is supposed, stood still. In such a casting, O’Dwyer is compelled, committed even,
just as enduringly to his role as an administrator - a commitment to a particular role - with its own historical specificity; to do one's duty by one's charges.44

In the Punjab, where O'Dwyer gained his first appointment, there was a special place, romantic or otherwise, for men of vigour, who took to loving India as well as its supposed simple inhabitants. O'Dwyer, that most masculine of men, conceptualized his role in the most paternalistic, misogynistic of ways. Woodruff recalls the relations posited here:

'The tolerant and bantering but none the less real affection of the master and officer on one side, the soldier's or the villager's trust, the confidence he mingled with a shrewd perception of character like that which small boys nickname a schoolmaster. Those feelings were real; servant and master, officer and soldier, risked and sometimes laid down their lives for each other..' (Woodruff 1954: 17).

Affection there may be, but, he adds, 'the relation was not one of equality; there could be no familiarity and no unguarded speech...' (Woodruff 1954: 17). His '…reference to small boys is telling' (Sayer 1991: 162). Administrators like O'Dwyer would find themselves at the tender age of 25, in charge of a district composing an area of three thousand square miles and a population of nearly three-quarters of a million. In such circumstances they were the men who would be; and for all practical purposes were, kings; firm, but fair kings, maybe!

(ix) O'Dwyer's character and order in the Punjab – Traditions
It is probably true to say that O'Dwyer was aglow at being posted to the Punjab. In the battle for precedence between the central administration and 'the man on the spot', O'Dwyer was very much wedded to a demeanor that would ensure the latter's priority; and his probity came foremost, especially when judging such a man's conduct of his administration. For instance, O'Dwyer comments that during Sir Charles Aitchison's Lieutenant-Governorship (1882-87),

'there was ... an uneasy feeling that the secretariat was gaining an undue influence and that skill in minute taking was the test of efficiency and the stepping stone to promotion ... The appointment of Sir James Lyall to succeed Aitchinson ... was generally welcomed by the official world and ... rural interests. Lyall had never been a Secretary, having spent all his official life ... working among the rural masses as settlement officer, Settlement and Financial Commissioner ... Lyall had a unique knowledge of the people, and though shy and unpretentious in manner, had their confidence and affection to an extraordinary degree. His judgment in matters affecting their interests and welfare was almost unerring. He lacked Aitchinson's intellectual distinction and clarity of expression, but his wide knowledge of and sympathy with the people made his administration more popular and efficient' (O'Dwyer 1925: 28).

And, he adds, with an even more undisguised relish, that

'...in the Punjab, which had been then only thirty-six years under our rule, there was still ample scope for the individual effort and initiative of the British officials, who had built up the fabric of British rule ... The Punjab ever since annexation had offered a splendid field for a progressive and beneficent administration...' (O'Dwyer 1925: pp27-28).
The role that comes most readily to mind when one thinks of this independent sphere of action is that of the much maligned, if almost in equal measure much revered, if lonely, District Officer; an almost legendary official in imperial labour. He would sit so the stories go, under the bunyan tree, listening to the woes and agonies of the inhabitants of his district and deliver, if necessary, speedy and effective justice. In exercising such a sympathetic authority it is hard not to remember the qualities required of an administrator enumerated by Sir Bartle Frere to Lord Goderich almost seventy years earlier:

'It is really of more consequence to the natives that he (the young British Officer or official) should be good in the cricket field and on horseback, popular with servants and the poor, and the champion of bullied fags, that he should have a mother who taught him to say his prayers, and sisters who helped her to give him reverence for womankind and respect for weakness, than that he should be first to take a double-first at Oxford...' (Frere 1858 in Brown ed.1945: 229).

Borrowing a phrase from Barnett who is talking about a related topic - the education of military elites - in this instance Bartle Frere sees the qualities of character as being amongst the most important postures in an Indian administrator; a posture in which we saw 'reflected the finest virtues of the nation..,' in its assumed role as benevolent ruler in India.

Woodruff gives us a taste of some of these finer virtues when he conveys the jobbing elements in a district officer's day taken from G O Treveyan. Though
Trevelyan's account is written in the 1860s, Woodruff thinks it still a faithful summation of an officer's job even many years later. According to this account, the district officer

'...rises at daybreak and goes straight from his bed to the saddle. Then he gallops off across fields bright with dew to visit the scene of the late dacoit robbery; or to see with his own eyes whether the crops of the zemindar who is so unpunctual with his assessment have really failed; or to watch with fond parental care the progress of his pet embankment.... Perhaps he has run with the robbery pack of the station, consisting of a supernatural foxhound, four beagles, a greyhound, the doctor's retriever, and a Skye terrier belonging to the assistant magistrate, who unites in his own person the offices of M.F.H., huntsman and whipper-in. They probably start a jackal, who gives them a sharp run of ten minutes and takes refuge in a patch of sugar cane; whence he steals away in safety while the pack are occupied in mobbing a fresh fox and a brace of wolf clubs... The full field of five sportsmen... adjourn to the subscription swimming bath, where they find their servants ready with clothes, razors and brushes. After a few headers... and tea and toast.... the collector returns to his bungalow and settles down to the hard business of the day ... He works through the contents of one dispatch box after another; signing orders and passing them on; dashing through drafts, to be filled up by his subordinate; writing reports, minutes, digests, letters of explanation, of remonstrance, or warning, or commendation. Noon finds him quite ready for a dejeuner a la fourchette, the favourite meal in the districts, when the tea-tray is lost amid a crowd of dishes - fried fish, curried fowl, roast kid and mint sauce, and mango-fool. Then he sets off in his buggy to the courts, where he spends the afternoon in hearing and deciding questions connected with land and revenue. If the cases are few and easy to be disposed of, he may get away in time for three or four games at rackets in the new court... By ten o'clock he is in bed,
with his little ones asleep in cribs enclosed within the same mosquito-nets as their parents' (Trevelyan in Woodruff 1954: 92-93).

According to Wilkinson, such a level of sensitivity in all his works marks out this model District Officer as a 'paragon of virtue' (Wilkinson 1963: 104). To be sure Wilkinson adds, '...in a remote district far from higher authority, in a position of great power not simply as an administrator but also as a judge, the District Officer had every opportunity to be lazy, corrupt and unjust...' Yet, as he recounts, such officers were rare. Instead they were invariably '...nearly always honest, humane and hard working...' (Wilkinson 1963: 103); committed to the principles redolent of a noblesse oblige. So perhaps instead of choosing between such a false antithesis, it would be better to say, they were both lazy and hard working; corrupt and honest.48

It is well of course in this regard then to remember Philip Mason's characterization of his first arrival at the civil station in Saharanpur. The shock of the new remains with him, in a hauntingly quietest way. Though presented with numerous challenges and seemingly quite frightening burdens, the shock of the new was not meant to stifle the official and sometimes unofficial actions of an energetic administrator. He would be required to hold his nerve in any situation, as well as on this occasion learning to play polo:

'I arrived in the middle of the night, which one almost always did in India ... I was met by a man two years older than myself, who was killed playing polo about a year later. He met me at the station and drove me to the Collector's house, where I was put into a tent, a great big marquee. Its floor was covered
with straw, with a dhurri laid over it and there was a bathroom at the back. I was astonished how comfortable it was and how fresh and clean and pure the night was in December...In the morning I looked out and I saw trees which looked so like English trees...the most beautiful landscape. There was a feeling of freshness and vigour which I have never forgotten. I met my collector for the first time at breakfast. He came in from his morning ride and said, 'Hello, Mason, I've got a pony for you that you can buy immediately after breakfast if you like. There's a dealer here and you might wish to buy it. Work? ... no, you don't have need to do any work for your first year. Here's a book about polo, you can read that and I'll examine you on it in the evening...' Also that first morning, very early, there came a long procession of officials who said, 'Sir, I am the Nazi, have you any orders for me?' and Sir, I am the tahsildar, have you any orders for me?' I simply couldn't think what to do with any of these people, and I only gradually found out who they all were and how they all fitted into the hierarchy...' (Mason in Allen ed. 1975: 61).

Once O'Dwyer was similarly placed in a district, he would he reasoned be able to combine all the character traits that are supposed to be the peculiar preserve of an ideal imperial administrator at this time. Borrowing once again a characterization from Wilkinson - O'Dwyer ideally portrays himself as a man like many a colonial administrator who came before him and those yet to come, ready to build up and maintain the high standards assumed of British administration. In exercising his duties, O'Dwyer thought and felt he would bring together '...a sense of moral obligation without the cruelty of the crusader' (Wilkinson 1963: 103). In his own words, O'Dwyer describes with pleasure the innumerable duties he undertook whilst a Settlement Officer for the authentic India he is so fond of; if at the same
time, tinged with a growing suspicion and fear of burgeoning ranks, for him in his monopolistic role, of threateningly clever natives—his bogey:

'For a civilian the post offers the best life and the most fascinating work to be found in India. It is the basis of all real knowledge of the rural masses. For six or eight months in the year he lives and works among them, almost exclusively. He learns their inner life, their trials and hardships, their joys and their sorrows. He deals with them in their fields and their villages, where they are at their best, rather than in the law courts, where they are at their worst; for they are then endeavoring to circumvent, often by fraud or false evidence, the various obstacles in the shape of legal formalities which to, their minds, we have placed between them and justice. When an Indian rustic comes into the atmosphere of a court he has his mind made up to swear to anything alongside that he thinks will suit his purpose, and it is no light task to get the truth out of him. Put the same man in the same cause in the village chauk ... or under the village tree among his own people, and he will hesitate to lie even in a good cause. That is why the peripatetic justice, to which the Indian lawyer and the Indian politician so strongly object, as wanting in legal formalities, is so much more speedy and satisfactory...' (O’Dwyer 1925: 53).

As a settlement officer in Gujranwala, the job of recording all rights in the land, '...field by field, holding by holding and village by village...', was O'Dwyer says, an arduous but necessary task; a preliminary to setting as he saw it a fair rental that would apply for the next twenty or thirty years (O'Dwyer 1925: 53). Though savouring of a rather bureaucratic, formal process he rather enjoyed the personal contact such a process allowed him to have with the rural population. Maybe this was all the release and reward that a conscientious administrator needed. As
Orwell describes it, administration in India was an unrewarding daily grind. If Orwell is to be believed, one should not underestimate how desperate the need for confirmation in one's role was:

'The life of the 'Anglo-Indian' officials is not all jam. In comfortless camps, in sweltering offices, in gloomy dark bungalows smelling of dust and earth oil, they earn, perhaps, the right to be a little disagreeable' (Orwell 1935: 32).\footnote{51}

Quite simply, the Anglo-Indian official's life consisted in, '...service, service, service every time..' (Allen ed. 1975: 182); in another guise, duty, duty, duty every minute of everyday. In this sense O'Dwyer was no different. He along with innumerable others thought, 'Only British control can hold together the jarring elements of even a single province..' (O'Dwyer 1927: 178); members of the ICS, being duty bound to perform this role could not baulk in that duty.

Charles Allen refers to Rosamund Lawrence's comments on her husband - Henry Lawrence – and his work. According to her, her husband sought to steer his everyday life in a direction that ensured he carried through his duty, duty and duty. A Herculean commitment that reminds me of Wordsworth's ditty to duty:

'Stern lawgiver! Yet thou dost wear
The Godhead's most benignant grace;
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face;
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,
And fragrance in thy footing treads;
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens, through Thee, are
Fresh and strong' (in Smiles 1880: 30).

In Rosamund's words, in his commitment to duty her husband was '... like the Duke of Wellington, always talking about duty. My husband's people, the Lawrences, were very religious and they were absolutely immersed in what they felt was their duty to India.' We might add with Smiles, it is the toiling away in ones duty that turns the onerous principle fixed on conscience into action. Rosamund Lawrence even likened the form her husband's relation to duty took as if it were a charm whose allure captivated him. In vernacular terminology it '...took the form of a shauq, an obsessive interest.' (Allen ed. 1975: 183):

'My husband was absolutely heart and soul wrapped up in what he called the Sukkur Barrage. He was obsessed by it, by the amount of people there were and how they were all going to be fed by it, but he was only one of a chain of people, who had started it long before.' (Allen ed. 1975: 183/4).

A days work in India for a member of the ICS was never done; at least that is according to Rosamund Lawrence's account, or should we say lament, for her husband. It was nothing but duty, duty, and duty:

'run.. like.. response(s) through litanies of 'Anglo-India'. Even those outside the military or the civil administration used.. them.. when referring to the 'tour of service' by which they were contracted to their employers. It was part of an.. unconscious attitude inherited.. by all those who made their careers in India ..' (Allen ed. 1975: 182).
A little resentful and often a little bitter, according to Carthill, '... men trained in the atmosphere of a free state...were...particularly jealous of paternal government...'; as such, these men '... were... by no means men who would have been the servile tools of an oppressive tyranny' (Carthill 1924: 42). Accordingly,

'They felt they had two duties, a duty to India, and a duty to England. But they felt that everyone whose opinion was of any value would feel that in doing their duty by India they were also doing it by England. England required no tribute from India. She did not ask for any special privileges there. She looked merely to the increasing wealth and prosperity of this valuable market for her material reward, and to the consciousness that she was ruling and benefiting three hundred of millions of the human race for the satisfaction of her appetite for less material recompense...' (Carthill 1924: 42).

Allen once again, offers us a window on the activities that such a cluster of obsessions sets in train:

'Duty of the order exercised by the ICS meant that 'an officer of the Raj could never say his home was his castle. There never seems to be a moment when you could be entirely free - unless you were on leave. You would find somebody waiting to see you on a Saturday evening or a Sunday, because he knew that that was the time you were free.' Accessibility to the humblest petitioner was a Mogul tradition inherited and maintained by the British. Its most significant expression was in the early morning queues of Mulaquatis on the verandah of every district or political officer in the land.' (Allen ed. 1975: 184).
The assumptions that drilled one into such a devotional ethic came, according to his illustrations, from both ruler and ruled. Here for instance is Geoffrey Allen speaking about how the local population in Bihar relied on him for justice: 'you were always being asked to try cases which were before you. It was much cheaper for tenants to come to you to decide cases than to go many miles away to the civil courts.' (in Allen ed. 1975: 182). Who amongst the ranks of our Oxford educated administrators would not believe in their ability to deliver justice on demand; a belief inherited Symington suggests, '... by all those who made their careers in India...' Such a belief came, he thinks from the realization,

'...that we were members of a very successful race. We belonged to a country that, in the world league, had done exceedingly well for a small island ... We also realized that we were working in a country which was as preeminently unsuccessful as we were successful. I suppose that produced a frame of mind in which we tacitly - not explicitly - felt ourselves to be rather superior people ..' (in Allen ed. 1975: 182).

In the high noon of British Imperialism it never occurred to administrators so placed to doubt their abilities or standing. Nor that they could not exercise authority over people they regarded as a subject race. Listen to George Carroll. He '...had authority over hundreds of policeman in his district': So, '...The question of exercising my power never arose in my mind because it seemed so natural that, as an Englishman, I should have power over all my Indian subordinates...' (in Allen ed. 1975: 182).
What was that power for? 'For the good of my charges' is a phrase that rang out loud and clear in every district up and down the country; even more so when an administrator convinces himself that his charges would expect nothing less from him. His authority could only be enhanced by such expectations. Delusionary it may be, but it founded an ethos. Many an administrator stood by that ethos religiously. Doing work on behalf of their charges, and working for their good, further convinced these administrators of the rightness of their actions. In this sense the ruler's authority, Allen reasons, is founded on the ma-bap principle - literally, 'I am your mother and your father' - a principle that assumes the existence of what I've hinted at already - a dutiful paternalism; Allen illustrates this by reference to Kenneth Warren. Warren was a tea-garden manager. Warren describes his daily contact with his labour force thus:

'...It was customary for a member of the labour force who had a request to make to come to you and first of all to address you as Hazar - Your Honour, and then ma-bap - you are my father and my mother, I have this, that and the other request to make.' (Warren in Allen ed. 1975: 183).

So many colonial administrators, so many stories to tell about life 'under a blazing sun.' Yet, there are a few constants and these senses of duty, however perverse they may seem in the light of a modern day sun, contain some of them. Warren recounts another tale of these ethics in practice. Warren shares with his readers an incident at his workplace:

'We had an epidemic of opthalmia in the garden where I was manager and a number of the labour had to come to hospital for treatment, among them a
man who was three days in hospital under treatment and was cured. The next thing I heard at my early morning durbar was that this man's child had been taken to hospital with her eyes burnt out. She had developed ophthalmia and her father, although he himself had been cured in the hospital, said he knew better and that he knew of a jungle cure, a mixture of certain herbs and jungle plants, which he mashed up and plastered on his daughter's eyes and burnt them out. She was a child of about fourteen, a charming little girl, and when I came into the hospital she heard my voice and fell on to her knees and held on to my legs and implored me to cure her saying, 'Sahib, I know you can cure me. You can do anything if you wish to.' It was a most distressing and terrible experience for me. I held the durbar the next morning. I had the father brought up to my office together with the whole of his clan. I told them what had happened and how disgraceful it was and what did they, the clan, suggest should be done. With one accord they said he should be beaten. They put their heads together and discussed it and then the headman turned to me and said, 'Sahib, we think it is right and proper that you should beat him and not us.' So I said, 'Well, if that is your decision all I can do is carry out your wish.' I came down from the verandah and I went up to this fellow and I hit him. I hit him so hard that I bruised my right hand and I had to have it in a sling for twenty-four hours afterwards (in Allen ed. 1975: 183).

Though all Warren's actions are informed by the need, as he sees it, to ensure that the cured father's daughter receives hospital treatment - as opposed to an unholy species of jungle treatment - the practice of duty here is also what Smiles calls, self devoted. Though our version of administrative practice did not seek gold, and our practitioners would deride any accusation that implied so, the general point is well made. Duty is,
'...not merely fearlessness. The gladiator who fought the lion with the courage of a lion, was urged on by the ardour of the spectators, and never forgot himself and his prizes. Pizarro was full of hardihood. But he was actuated by his love of gold in the midst of terrible hardships.' (Smiles 1880: 16).

Perhaps this so-called self-devotion to duty is better glimpsed in Samuel Smiles comment that, 'the best kind of duty is done in secret':

‘Many... duties are performed privately. Our public life may be well known, but in private there is that which no one sees - the inner life of the soul and spirit. We have it in our choice to be worthy or worthless. No one can kill our soul, which can perish only by its own suicide. If we can make ourselves and each other a little bit better, holier and nobler, we have perhaps done the most we could' (Smiles 1880: 17).

(x) Duty's seminal regard

To recap, regard for others is a part of the characterological traits that our administrators hold so dear. Smiles adds the sentence that come back to us time and time again and which ought he thinks to be written in every book on morals: 'Do unto others, as ye would that they should do unto you.' Yet, his explicit reference to self-devotion as a regard to one's inner life, soul or spirit, alerts us, as I discussed earlier, to the 'constitution of authority itself...the...ways in which sources of authority construct themselves as... subjects with the authorization to subject others to authority' (Osborne 1994b: 2).
Smiles elaborates on this aspect of duty, by using a sentence from Goethe that travels there via a regard for others. In the first part, Goethe asks what 'is your duty?' The reply comes back, 'the carrying out of the affairs of the day that lie before you' (in Smiles 1880: 22). This is consistent with the kind of paternalism that characterized many administrators’ actions. An ideal administrator did not, indeed could not desert his post in this sense. As we have seen already, Allen alerts us to a, 'duty of the order exercised by the ICS...which...meant that an officer of the Raj could never say his home was his castle. There never seemed to be a moment when you could be entirely free - unless you were on leave' (Allen ed. 1975: 184).

But, this is Smiles says, too narrow a view of duty. Goethe realizes it and asks, 'what...is the best government?' (in Smiles 1880: 22). To which he replies, 'that which teaches us to govern ourselves...' (in Smiles 1880: 22). So government is not outward directed, but comes to be fixed on managing the souls of the administrators themselves. To illustrate Smiles has recourse to what Plutarch said to the Emperor Trajan. Plutarch told the Emperor, ‘...let your government commence in your own breast, and lay the foundation of it in the command of your own passions...’ It is here that we find the triumvirate of self-control, duty and conscience (in Smiles 1880: 22)

As I instance above, Warren's sense of the right way to conduct oneself endears him he hopes, to the local population. Yet, his conduct also confirms to himself the rightness of his presence and his actions, carried out according to his own rigorous
protocols. No doubt a little heroic martyrdom entered into such equations. If the little girl's father wouldn't admit to the superiority of hospital treatment, even though he was cured there, then he, the caring and dutiful Sahib would ensure she is admitted. In doing so Warren would ensure the continuance of the Golden age of paternalism. Many administrators still adhered to Senex's version of The Golden Age,

'No deep division severed them
The Powers that Be from other men;
But all was friendly to the core,
When Thompson ruled in Thompson pore.' (in Allen ed. 1975: 61)

Somewhat romantic it may be, but there are many Thompsons and countless tales of their deeds.\textsuperscript{56} There are many statements of intent and action full of references to working for India's and Indians' welfare. Administrative history in India is littered with such references. But we probably won't be able to find a better, general, almost manifesto like statement, than that contained in Cunningham's manual (1882). He writes '...in a form easy of access and simple in arrangement, for the practical discussion of some of the principal administrative and social problems involved in the government of India...' (Cunningham 1882: 4). The object in view is simply to instruct administrators how they should govern India in a way, that is most conducive to its and its people's welfare, conducted by those most suited to the task. The administration can sit back and watch its responsible superintendence bare fruitful improvements. Thus, '...in considering the administration of the country...no other object but its welfare has to be taken into
According to Cunningham (1882: 4), the duties of superintendence are to keep order, reclaim, irrigate, extend communications, develop trade, educate to improve jails and hospitals and courts and police, and the administrative machinery - generally to import as many European improvements as there is money to pay for. This task is performed with vigour and success by the Englishman, who feels himself especially qualified and performs well. Yet, many who worked their entire lives in India often felt misunderstood and forgotten. Service, service, duty; all came to nothing. Rewards were nonexistent! Kipling once again:

Take up the white man's burden - /
And reap his old reward /
The blame of those ye better /
The hate of those ye guard (Kipling 1899).

For yet others, the pursuit certainly wasn't heroic and manly. Norman Watney asserts his roles' banality: "I thought nothing about the Raj... It seemed to me that I had a job, it was a tough one, and that was all there was to it" (Allen 1975: 217). The job is wrapped in a self-serving ethic of self-sacrifice (Sharpe 1993; Macaulay 1833).
'I don't think we ever consciously thought about the British Raj as such. We simply accepted that this was where fate had placed us. We felt that this was our destiny - in many cases the destiny of our forebears - that we were there at some sacrifice to serve India. Those long partings from children were a great sacrifice, the loneliness was a sacrifice. There was absolutely no feeling of exploitation, no feeling of being wicked imperialists. In fact in those days we didn't think imperialists were necessarily wicked.' (Watney in Allen ed. 1975: 217).

There is no denying the strength of such a feeling. The taste for India that is exhibited here, goes beyond a mere relish for savoury foods. For many, unashamedly as Allen remarks, '...on a personal level...benevolent paternalism had much to commend it' (Allen 1975: 217); and certainly a worthwhile job for many an ICS probationer:

'The fashion is to judge India by the few who have made money out of it, and forget the devotion of people who served it. The men who looked after the forests, the people who built hospitals, the people who made roads, who did the irrigation. It was their occupation, granted, but they did it with a love of India, a love of the people, and what they did and what they contributed is now forgotten to a large extent. They were the ordinary, plain little people, the ones in the middle who were never exalted, but who ran India really...and...if[they] had not made a raj in India, somebody else would have - and they would not have made such a good job at it...' (in Allen ed. 1975: 217).

Turning once again to Kipling, as the chronicler of 'the job', he gave his seal of approval to such small people. 58 Heroes, perhaps - for as he put it in the context
of famine relief work - '...famine was...a...sore in the land and white men were needed...' (Kipling in Parry 1998: 207). Administrators in this oeuvre are certainly thought of as heroes in their performance of the job.\textsuperscript{59} Hence Kipling once again as Parry puts it, '...gave a spurious grandeur to...British peoples...posturings...as a nation of law-givers...and endowed the discomforts of their job as imperial rulers with the glory of suffering and self sacrifice...' (Parry 1998: 207).

There was to be no stepping over the mark. There would be no overfamiliarity with the natives. For Parry once again comments, doing the job '...was a bid for security...' not romance.\textsuperscript{60} Falling down on the job would mean hordes streaming over the North-West Frontier, probably in the pay of Russia. We all know where overfamiliarity led a succession of British secret service agents. Kipling himself warned his readers about such dangers in his chilling story, 'Beyond the Pale':

>'The story of a man who willfully stepped beyond the safe limits of decent everyday society, and paid for it heavily. He knew too much in the first instance; and he saw too much in the second. He took too deep an interest in native life; but he will never do so again...' (Kipling 1993: 159).\textsuperscript{61}

In the face of such a grotesque prospect it is much better to be someone who is a strict copy of a Kipling character called Strickland. In Kipling's pantomime Strickland knew the 'path(s) to understanding Indians and its purpose' (Parry 1998: 211). Strickland 'knows as much of the natives of India as is good for any man...and...hates being mystified by natives, because his business in life is to overmatch them with their own weapons' (Parry 1998: 211). Indeed he 'know(s) as
much about the natives as the natives themselves' (Kipling 1993: 25). For all these reasons and more, 'natives hated Strickland; they were afraid of him. He knew too much' (Kipling 1993: 27).

In Kipling's tale of 'Miss Youghal's Sais', he plots how Strickland made it his lives works to know the ways and habits specifically of the saises. As Kipling writes it, Strickland's

'...crowning achievement was spending eleven days as a faquir or priest in the gardens of Baba Atal at Amritsar, and their picking up the threads of the great Nasiban Murder case. But people said, justly enough, 'Why on earth can't Strickland sit in his office and write up his diary, and recruit, and keep quiet, instead of showing up the incapacity of his seniors?'...(Kipling 1993: 26).

Eventually, Kipling has Strickland marry Miss Youghal '...on the strict understanding that he drop his old ways'; that is touring the bazars with his ears very much to the ground, and '...stick to Departmental routine, which pays best and leads to Simla...' (Kipling 1991: 31).

But Kipling writes how such an adventurous man of the bazars, and so useful to the administration in that guise could not keep away from them for long. Thus, it was a sore trial for Strickland to keep away. Not long after his promise, 'the streets and the bazars and the sounds in them...full of meaning to Strickland, called to him to come back and take up his wanderings and his discoveries...' (Kipling 1993:
That Parry adds, is 'the call of the job.' (Parry 1998: 211). And the job in this instance is all.

Often the balance between the job as adventure and the job as job in these senses is difficult to draw. Kipling himself knew that to be the case and was sneering if not also a little scolding (as Parry helpfully tells us), of 'the British people for their immoderate toastings of empire' (Parry 1998: 215). For, in such toasting they are prone he would think, to forget the serious tasks that colonialism sets for itself. Hence,

'If drunk with sight of power we loose
Wild tongues that have not thee in awe,
Such boastings as the Gentiles use
Or lesser breeds without the law-
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet
Lest we forget, lest we forget (in Parry 1998: 215).

Parry reads Kipling's, 'The Man Who Would be King' (1890) as one such immoderate yarn. It tells a tale of two adventurers, Peachey Carnechan and Daniel Dravot. Their lives and times in India are conducted in such a way as to be completely destitute of the laws of colonial order; they are loafers; the kind of nasty members of the population one meets when travelling intermediate class on Indian Railways, Kipling tells us. Kipling alerts his readers to the lessons imperial administrators should draw from the tale at the outset - 'Brother to a prince and fellow to a beggar if he be found worthy'; these loafers are not worthy individuals (Kipling in Parry 1998: 221).
For Kipling the loafers' conduct in India is not worthy of the great names involved in the administration of India; certainly not for instance in the Bartle Frere; John Jacobs; John Beames; Charles Aitkinson; or even John and Henry Lawrence modes. They appear as '...archetypes of... adventurers whose greed, grandiose dreams and psychological need for license made them dangerous men in ordered society' (Parry 1998: 216). Their ethics are spelt out by one of them at a chance meeting on the train with our narrator. Thus, '...if India was filled with men like you and me, not knowing more than the crows where they'd get their next day's rations, it isn't seventy millions of revenue the land would be paying - it's seven hundred millions...' (Kipling 1987: 244).

All the facets of empire that were later reconfigured in Kipling's 'White Man's Burden' as self-sacrifice; duty; toil; 'seek another's profit / and work another's gain' - do not drive these men. Our attention is drawn to a series of earlier stories - to stories of 'avarice...to...the thirst for personal glory...to...the satisfactions of feeding on the homage of dependent peoples...' (Parry 1998: 220). In these senses however much Kipling wished by writing this story to alert his readers to a more virtuous story of empire '...the story...nevertheless...mimics historical occurrences from whose ethical assumptions Kipling did not dissent...' (Parry 1998: 219). Avarice, rapine, plunder '...form...as these did an integral part of the white man's imperialist experience...' (Parry 1998: 219). Our fools and loafers, detested, feckless and hopeless folk as they are, envisioned as such by many a righteous Anglo-Indian, comment on their desires and dreams thus,
'we have been all over India, mostly on foot. We have been boiler fitters, engine-drivers, petty contractors, and all that, and we have decided that India isn't big enough for such as us ... The country isn't half worked out because they that governs it won't let you touch it. They spend all their time in governing it, and you can't lift a spade, nor chip a rock, nor look for oil, nor anything like that, without all the Government saying, "Leave it alone, and let us govern." Therefore, such as it is, we will we let it alone, and go away to some other place where a man isn't crowded and can come to his own. We are not little men, and there is nothing that we are afraid of except drink, and we have signed a Contract on that. Therefore we are going away to be Kings...'

(Kipling 1888 in Parry 1998: 216).63

Little men with enormous appetites they are set on their course.

'I won't make a nation ... I'll make an Empire ... There must be a fair two million of 'em in these hills... Two hundred and fifty thousand fighting men, ready to cut in on Russia's right flank when she tries for India! Peachy man ... we shall be Emperors of the Earth! ... I'll treat with the Viceroy on equal terms ... When everything was ship-shape, I'd hand over the crown - this crown I'm wearing now - to Queen Victoria on my knees, and she'd say: "Rise up, Sir Daniel Dravot!" Oh, it's big! It's big, I tell you...' (in Parry 1998: 219).

For Kipling whatever sympathy he has with the derring doers of Empire, ideal moral authority is based on the law, and its subsequent worth is precious. He warns

'The law, as quoted, lays down a fair conduct of life, and one not easy to follow. I have been fellow to a beggar again and again under circumstances
which prevented either of us finding out whether the other was worthy. I have
still to be brother to a prince, though I came near to kinship with what might
have been a veritable King, and was promised the reversion of a kingdom -
army, law-courts, revenue and policy all complete. But today I fear my King is
dead and if I want a crown I must go hunt it for myself...' (Kipling 1982: 244).

Our adventurers aren't enamoured of good rule by law. They are not interested in
India. Certainly not in the sense of giving their time over to conducting a
'progressive, beneficent rule' (Myers 1968: 711-23). Quite the contrary. They are
of an old school that believes explicitly in markets and their morality; or borrowing
a phase from Sharpe, 'self interest and...its...moral superiority' (Sharpe 1993:7).

Thomas Babington Macaulay envisaged

It is scarcely possible to calculate the benefits which we might derive from the
diffusion of European civilisation among the vast population of the East. It
would be, on the most selfish view of the case, far better for us that the people
of India were well governed and independent of us, than ill governed and
subject to us; that they were ruled by their kings, but wearing our broad cloth,
and working with our cutlery, than that they were performing their salams to
English Collectors and English magistrates, but were too ignorant to value, or
too poor to buy, English manufactures. To trade with civilised men is
infinitely more profitable than to govern savages...' (Macaulay 1883 in Sharpe
1993: 7).64

Sir Michael O'Dwyer describes a different pleasure. He describes the pleasure he
derives from doing right by the inhabitants in whatever village is under his tutelage,
as doing his duty. Doing his duty as we have seen, often meant echoing the playful contests, termed, 'bantering between master and servant':

'We would go round the village lands - say one thousand acres of cultivation for an average village of one hundred peasant proprietors - to see the crops. The headman would, of course wish to take me to the worst lands. I had a big black Turcoman horse known as "Death". He had killed a wounded boar, that unwisely attacked him in the jungle, by a well aimed right and left from his hind legs, and thereafter was thought highly of. I would leave the selection to "Death," who for his own selfish aims would invariably make for the fields where the crops were thickest and highest. This would draw a laugh from the crowd who said the horse was not death but "Shaitan" (Satan) from his uncanny knowledge. This playful contest of wits would be renewed most mornings for the five or six months of the cold weather, from 7 am till noon. In that time three or four villages were covered daily. The group of villagers was then assembled outside my tent in the afternoon, and in the general pow-wow further facts were elicited, if not from the village concerned at least from its neighbours, for each would magnify its neighbour's resources while minimising its own...' (O'Dwyer 1925: 55).

Is it any wonder, given the intensity of the experiences, and the burden of expectation it is imagined falls on their paternal shoulders, that the imperial administrator feels most at home, at home so to speak in camp. In camp in Gujranwala as a settlement officer, O'Dwyer was

'...in daily touch with the...peasantry. He saw the villagers swarm around himself and his assistants with their disputes; he lived among them in tents for nine months every year, with no Sundays or holidays, spending most of the
day in a good-humoured chaffing battle of wits, they trying to persuade him that their land was poor, he looking for the best crops with an eye sharpened by the knowledge that the tallest sugar cane might hold a boar or a partridge. No one who has ever been a settlement or a record officer can forget those months in camp; he comes to think of the peasants as his children, and the more masculine his character the harder he finds it to believe that anyone else can look after them. And there could be few characters more masculine than O'Dwyer's (Woodruff 1954: 237)

A master such as O'Dwyer whose deeds and actions were informed by such a moral universe, wouldn't hesitate, if he deemed it necessary, to chastise his charges. Perhaps he would see himself as less of a man if he did anything short of such chastisement. As his officer in charge on that fateful day - April 19 1919 - Brigadier-General Dyer, would later say to the Hunter Commission, his actions were intended to punish the 'naughty boy' (Dyer 1920). That these actions, informed as they are by the moral codes I am describing, resulted in such a loss of life is not really the point. Chastisement, in the precise form it took on the 19 April 1919 is elevated by adherence to these codes to what Sayer terms, '...the high moral status of duty...'. Carthill even exalts massacre to a form of good, effective chastisement, especially since,

'...massacre as a part of the activities of government, is by no means in itself abhorrent to the mind of the Oriental, and the Indian was familiar enough with it. There are several forms of the political massacre, and there was nothing about any of them which was repugnant to the Indian. There is the massacre which is the resource of the weak government. If offences are not punished from time to time, and particularly if dangerous agitation is tolerated, then it
invariably happens that the government must ultimately abdicate or fight...'
(Carthill 1924: 93).

When it came to quelling disorder, one of the prime reasons administrators rationalised their presence in India, many would not readily dismiss or question O'Dwyer's use of Saidi's Persian couplet in relation to their actions when they sought to put down such disorder,

'The spring at its source may be turned with a twig;
When it has grown to a river it cannot be crossed by an elephant' (in Woodruff 1954: 239)

Woodruff even gives these proceedings a name. He calls it, 'the Lawrence Tradition'. In a similar, though in a more specific vein, Colonel Edward said of both Lawrence brothers - 'They sketched a faith, and begot a school, which are both living things at this day...' (Edwardes in Smiles: 78). Perhaps O'Dwyer and some of his fellow administrators inherited their pose. According to Woodruff,

'The Lawrence tradition had not died and in the Punjab more than anywhere it was the first article of faith that the man who is most ready to use force at the beginning will use least at the end' (Woodruff 1954: 236).

Perhaps the Lawrence tradition gained a particular kind of notoriety because of its over-association with muscular and masculine action. In this regard a case concerning a Mr Cooper and his actions during the 1857 rebellion is interesting. Ian Colvin tells us about it in his biography of General Dyer. According to Colvin
The 26th Native Infantry mutinied on the 30th July 1857, murdered their Colonel and four officers, and fled from Lahore to join the mutineers marching on Delhi. They were intercepted at Ajuala, near Amritsar, by Mr Cooper ... with a body of armed Punjab police, forced to surrender and shot – to the number of 240. Sir John Lawrence, the Lieutenant Governor, wrote to Mr Cooper on the 2nd August congratulating him on his success. "You and your police," he added, "acted with much energy and spirit, and deserve well of the State. I trust the fate of these sepoys will act as a warning to others" (Colvin 1929: 332).

Yet Colvin also relates to us a seemingly different element in our erstwhile pose that is given the honorific tradition. He describes how when,

'some months later Cooper described his action in the 'Crisis in the Punjab,' and gloried in the carnage in a style which Lawrence found 'nauseating.' But Lord Canning made this comment: "I hope that Mr Cooper will be judged by his acts done under stern necessity rather than by his own narration of them" (Colvin 1929: 332).

It is important to place such a tradition in its specific context. For this purpose I want briefly to look at the lives and the administrative/military traditions that the brothers Lawrence brought to their roles in India.

(xi) Vigorous Traditions
The Lawrence brothers cast a long shadow over Indian affairs; Henry Lawrence even being included alongside Clive, Warren Hastings and Sir Henry Havelock the hero for many of the Mutiny, in F M Holmes, *Four Heroes of India* (1892). One reason for such a worshipful devotion to the Lawrence's heroic stature, is the way in which they dispensed policy at fraught times. At the time of the 1857 rebellions, John Lawrence was Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. Mason relates how when news of the troubles spread, John Lawrence was impatient of delay in acting to root out the rebels. Uncertainty regarding his and his soldiers' food supplies did not deter for long. He calculated that his mobile force could march with only four days supply of food; supplies being replenished by officers as needed. It didn't enter his head that the rebels could possibly succeed in their design. So sure was he in his propose he counselled, 'Reflect on the history of India. Where have we failed, when we have acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded, when guided by timid counsels?' As Smiles relates, such an officer could think, feel and act with a frightening conviction fed by a racial arrogance to be sure, but also his devotion to the ethic I label, 'duty'.

"The country which...John Lawrence...governed had just been conquered by the English. He governed his new province well and wisely. He trusted the people the people about him, and made them his friends. And then he did what is perhaps unexampled in history. He sent away the whole of the Punjab native troops, to assist the English army at Delhi, leaving himself without any force to protect him. The result proved that he was right. The Sikhs and the Punjabees proved faithful. Delhi was taken, and India was saved. All this depended on the personal character of John Lawrence. The words which his brother, Sir Henry desired to be put upon his tomb, modestly describe his life
and character - "Here lies Henry Lawrence who did his duty!" (Smiles 1880: 79).

As MacKenzie notes, at least until the 1960s and 1970s, the Lawrences appeared in school history text-books as figures to be admired by pupils (Mackenzie 1984; Dawson 1994: 147). What precisely is it then that they brought to India? A word that appears to be constantly applied is the familiar term, duty. Hence,

'It is related of the great Lord Lawrence, that during the conduct of some important case for a young Indian Raja, the prince endeavoured to place in his hands, under the table a bag of rupees. "Young man," said Lawrence, "you have offered to an Englishman the greatest insult which he could possibly receive. This time in consideration of your youth I excuse it. Let me warn you by this experience, never again commit so gross an offence against an English gentleman"' (Smiles 1880: 78).

As Smiles adds, 'it is by the valour and honesty of such men that the empire of India has been maintained...They have toiled at their duty, often at the risk of their lives' (Smiles 1880: 78-79). Retaking Delhi from the clutches of mutineers ensured their posterity in the annals of imperial heroes.

The Lawrence brothers, Henry and John, defined their own modus operandi. Speaking about troubles stirring in Mooltan in 1852, Sir Henry Lawrence, eerily predicting the principles guiding his brothers' actions in the 1858 rebellion, set out his thoughts on the actions necessary at these times: '... we cannot afford in India
to shilly-shally, and talk of weather and seasons. If we are not ready to take the field at all seasons, we have no business here' (in Kaye 1880: 127).

After the annexation of the Punjab, announced in a Proclamation by the Governor-General to the assembled Chiefs in Lahore on 29th March 1849, its affairs were set to be administered under the care of a Board presided over by Henry Lawrence. His brother John sat alongside him. A Mr Mansel assisted them. Sir W J Kaye sets out for us how the Board so constituted saw it role. Starting by complimenting it on their notable accomplishments, he alerts us to the how the problem of government presented itself to them and the nature of the task before them and how these characters went about performing their task. Thus,

‘All the turbulent elements of Punjabee society were now to be reduced to quietude and serenity; out of chaos was to be evolved order; out of anarchy and ruin, peace and prosperity. Since the death of Ranjit Singh, there had been no government in the Punjab with the strong hand by which alone all classes could be kept in due subordination to each other; and the soldierly had therefore been dominant in the state. Their power was now broken; for the most part; indeed, their occupation had gone. But hence the danger of disbanded soldiers; factions grown desperate; and the greater question was how these praetorian bands, and the Sirdars, or privileged classes, were to be dealt with by the new government. If there was one man in the country better qualified than all the others to solve in practice that great question, it was Henry Lawrence; for with courage and resolution of the highest order, were combined within him the large sympathy and the catholic toleration of a generous heart’ (emphasis mine. Kaye III 1880: 135).
Kaye doesn’t hold back in his admiring words about the two brothers. Their make up is presented as little short of god like. So much is Imperial conviction, so much hyperbole. Yet the belief in its appropriateness is little short of chilling. It is certainly a paradoxical mode of power. Paradoxical, in the sense that at its very centre lay toleration and generousness of heart. Yet, paraphrasing Rai, this is combined with an apparatus of security that becomes, as we have seen, more and more hysterical as well as total, at least in its aspirations after the Indian Mutiny of 1857...'. Indeed as we see, one of its foremost enabling conditions is a steely paternalism; despotic it certainly is; but also proud in its boasts of kindly affection; utmost in its duty. Kaye goes on to say that in the work of this Board of Administration,

‘...we see epitomised a history of British progress in the East - we see the manner in which men reared under the great monarchy of the middle classes, which so long held India as its own, did, by dint of a benevolence that never failed, an energy that never tired, and a courage which never faltered, let what might be the difficulties to be faced, or the responsibilities to be assumed, achieve these vast successes which are the historical wonders of the world’ (emphasis mine. Kaye III 1880: 136).

John Lawrence himself elaborated on his relation to India and the Punjab in the following words to an assembly of notables after the formal opening of Lawrence Hall in the Punjab. They are worth citing in full:

'Maharajas, Rajas, and Chiefs, - Listen to my words. I have come among you after an absence of nearly six years, and thank you for the kindly welcome
you have given me. It is with pleasure that I meet so many of my friends, while I mourn the loss of those who have passed away. Princes and Chiefs, it is with great satisfaction that I find nearly six hundred of you assembled around me in this durbar. I see before me the faces of so many friends; I recognise the sons of my old allies; the Maharajas of Kashmir and Patiala, the Sikh Chiefs Malva and the Manjha, the Rajput chiefs of the hills, the Mohammedan Maliks of Peshawar and Khohat, the Sadars of the Derajat, of Hazara and of Delhi. All have gathered together to do honour to their old ruler. My friends, let me tell you of the great interest which the illustrious Queen of England takes in all matters connected with the welfare and comfort and contentment of the people of India. Let me inform you, when I returned to my native country and had the honour of standing in the presence of Her Majesty, how kindly she asked after the welfare of Her subjects of the East. Let me tell you, when the great Queen appointed me Her Viceroy of India, how warmly she enjoined on me the duty of caring for your interests. Prince Albert, the consort of Her Majesty, the fame of whose greatness and goodness has spread through the whole world, was well acquainted with all connected with this country, and always evinced an ardent desire to see its people happy and flourishing. My friends, it is now more than eighteen years since I first saw Lahore. For thirteeen years I lived in the Punjab. For many years, my brother, Sir Henry Lawrence, and I governed this vast country. You all know him well, and his memory will ever dwell in your hearts as a ruler who was a real friend of its people. I may truly say that from the day we exercised authority in the land, we spared neither our time nor our labour, nor our health in endeavouring to accomplish the work we had undertaken, we had studied to make ourselves acquainted with the usages, the feelings and the wants of every class and race, and we endeavoured to improve the condition of all. There are few parts of this province which I have not visited, and which I hope that I did not leave in some degree the better for my visit. Since British rule was introduced taxation of all kinds has been established. From the highest to the
lowest the people have become contented and have proved loyal. When the
great military revolt of 1857 occurred, they aided their rulers most effectively
in putting it down. The chiefs mustered their contingents, which served
faithfully and thousands of Panjab soldiers flocked to our standards and shared
with the British troops the glories as well the hardships of that great struggle.
Princes and gentlemen, if it be wise for the rulers of a country to understand
the language and appreciate the feelings of its people, it is as important that
the people should have a similar knowledge of its rulers. It is only by such
means that the two classes can live happily together. To this end I urge you to
instruct your sons, and even your daughters. Among the solid advantages
which you have gained from English rule I will only avert to one more. It has
given the country many excellent administrators. Some of the ablest and the
kindest of my countrymen have been employed in the Panjab. Every man,
_from the highest to the lowest, can appreciate a good ruler. You have such
names as Sir Robert Montgomery, Mr Donald McLeod, Mr Roberts, Sir
Herbert Edwardes, Col. Lake and Col. John Beecher, officers who have
devoted themselves to your service. I will now only add that I pray the great
God, who is the God of all the races and all the people of this world, that He
may guard and protect you and teach you all to love justice and hate
oppression, and enable you, each in his several ways, to do all the good in his
power. May He give you all that is for your real benefit! So long as I live, I
shall never forget the years that I passed in the Panjab and the friend that I
have acquired throughout this province...' (italics mine. Lawrence 1864 in
Latiff 1889: 587-588).

According to William Kaye, after some three years as head of the Board of
Administration, John Lawrence's brother, Sir Henry had written to him from
Lahore. In his letter he outlined on what foundations the British precedence in
India stood. Kaye comments:
'In [Lawrence's letter] we see epitomised a history of British progress in the East - we see the manner in which men reared under that great 'monarchy of the middle classes,' which so long held India as its own, did, by dint of a benevolence that never failed, an energy that never tired, and a courage which never faltered, let what might be the difficulties to be faced, or the responsibilities to be assumed, achieve those vast successes which are the historical wonders of the world...' (Kaye 1880: 136).

Picking out a few of Sir Henry's own words,

'We wish to make the basis of our rule a light and equable assessment; a strong and vigorous, though uninterfering police, and a quiet hearing in all civil and other cases... We have hunted down all the daciots. During the first year we hanged nearly a hundred, six and eight at a time, and thereby struck such a terror that Dacoitee is now more rare than in any part of India (Kaye 1880: 136).'

After the so-called Mutiny in 1858, the Queen-Empress reassured her subjects of the merciful, indeed sympathetic character of her rule over them. All this at a time when administrators and army officers were calling for and often wreaking, a horrid revenge on Indians implicated, or not, in the revolts of 1857 (Sharpe 1993). Indeed, after the last battles in the rebellion, there were, Latiff tells us, proposals to raze to the ground the whole of Delhi, and with it the grand Mosque; but as he adds, John Lawrence resisted all such calls, saying, 'I will on no account consent to it. We should carefully abstain from the destruction of religious edifices, either to favour friends or annoy foes' (Latif 1889: 582).
Reinforcing that paradoxical moment after the rebellion, The Queen-Empress said

'To the nation at large, to the peaceable inhabitants, to the many kind and friendly natives who have assisted us, sheltered the fugitives, and are faithful and true, there should be shown the greatest kindness. They should know that there is no hatred to a brown skin, none; but the greatest wish on the queen's part is to see them happy contented and flourishing' (in Latif 1889: 582).

Such a statement by the so-called Queen-Empress alerts us to the nuances of colonial power that Foucault's work on governmentally usefully highlights. It also indicates how limited such complexities often are. The nation that the Queen-Empress speaks to is still constituted for the greater part by so-called natives whose contentment is the sole concern of their (Platonic) Guardians. In the phraseology of rule at the time, 'them is for whom we labour.' The investment and belief in such a duty is not to be underestimated. Sir Walter Roper Lawrence elevated the Guardian's status with Shakespeare's words from the Tempest:

'How many godly creatures are there here,

How beauteous mankind is! Oh brave new world,

That has such people in it' (Lawrence 1928: 14)

They, who have yet to reach maturity, know not what is good for them. If left alone they would soon revert, it is assumed, to the chaos that is their peculiar mark of their styles of government. So O'Dwyer would argue we must persist with our plan for bringing order out of that chaos to India and beware of the noisy
'Mugwumps' as Carthill called Indians with political aspirations' (Carthill 1924: 73, 74, 351). In his own inimitable style O'Dwyer would often repeat the following warning/lesson to the administration:

'Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate cries, while thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the Great British Oak, chew their cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field' (O'Dwyer 1925: 410).

Conclusion

In this chapter my aim has been to distill a distinctive set of practices that define the manner in which British administrators, specifically Sir Michael O'Dwyer, sought to conduct themselves in relation to governing/ruining India and Indians. By focussing on Sir Michael O'Dwyer I sought to present an ideal typical version of that relation at a specific moment. O'Dwyer's renditions of those relations, remains resolutely rooted in a vernacular of duty, a manly duty. In his version of such a duty he envisages a brand of patriarchy/style of domination firmly opposed to the idea that Indians might be able to manage the tasks of government for themselves. I argue that the man that emerges from my considerations of the literature is, paraphrasing a famous Kipling tale, a man who would be king—a benevolent king at that. He is a man who is compassionate, firm and fair in all his
dealings with Indians. A man who regards Indians as his children and children who need looking after. A man who is proud to proclaim from the roof tops to anyone who will listen, 'You can (if your very clever and very unscrupulous) fool all the people for some time. But you cannot fool all the people for all the time' (O’Dwyer 1925: 270). That was the lesson that his competitors for Indian government needed to learn.

The government of India was a hard task. Not everyone or anyone could be trusted to fulfil that role. He understood it better than most. According to him, all that politics would result in would be disorder. Such disorder could mean only one thing. People would be at each other's throats. Quelling disorder was what white men were here and made to do. At the first signs of disorder white men resolved to act, bearing in mind 'Saidi's Persian couplet'

'A stream can be stopped at its course by a twig,
Let it flow and it will drown even an elephant' (O'Dwyer 1925: 268).

In the next chapter I follow the duty filled elements in the making of an administrator through a specific consideration of their applicability and importance in the poise of an army officer - Brigadier-General Reginald Edward Henry Dyer CB. Dyer carries forward these traditions of a tough, belligerent and thoroughly professional man into the Indian army. The army was the bedrock of empire. The Indian army in particular were quite simply, as we see, the 'Praetorian Guard of Empire, set apart from the public control, and available always for the protection of the Inner State' (Morris in Strawson 1989: xvii). Always ready to ensure the
longevity of empire, these men were ready to act a moment's notice. They were made as modern managers professional soldiers, with a hint of adventurers of old. How else, Strawson asks, 'but by the power of the sword could the empire have survived?' But now it was the power of the professional sword (Strawson 1989: xii). It was in Dyer's time that the power of Sandhurst and Camberley drilled these men into taking on a vocation, second they thought to none. A growing militocracy made of such men, would turn their attention to achieving a 'carefully regulated empire' (Guha 1997: 25). It is to a consideration of the foundational ethics of armed order, and how the schools and experiences associated with the delivery of such order, turned out men, that I now turn.

Draper attributes these remarks about Dyer to Lloyd George Montagu, but without further reference.

1. Draper attributes these remarks about Dyer to Lloyd George Montagu, but without further reference.

2. Intensely felt and fiercely practiced; See below. One amongst many of his comments, on this occasion to the Punjab Legislative Council on 7 April 1919, is an instructive moment in this regard. He sets out his stall in the fight for competence in government and its manner in the Punjab firmly on the necessity of public order:

'The government of this province is, and will remain, determined that the public order which was maintained so successfully during the war shall not be disturbed during time of peace ... The British Government which has crushed foreign foes and quelled internal rebellion could afford to despise these agitators, but it has the duty of protecting the young and the innocent whom they may incite to mischief and crime while themselves are standing aside...I therefore, take this opportunity of warning all who are connected with political movements in the province that they will be responsible for the proper conduct of meetings which they organize, for the language used...and the consequences that follow from such meetings' (see Datta 1969: 55).

3. An early instance of doubts about British Rule, and of course not the only one, and its precarious nature, what Driver characterizes as 'Solemn thoughts', were expressed in 1838 by Miss Eden, whilst ruminating on Simla. She says,

'Twenty years ago no European had ever been here, and there we were, with the band playing the 'Puritani' and 'Masaniello,' and eating salmon from Scotland, and sardines from the Mediterranean, and observing that St Cloup's potage à la Julienne was perhaps better than his other soups, and that some of the ladies' sleeves were too tight according to the overland fashions for March, etc.; and all this in the face of those high hill, some of which have remained untrodden since the creation, and we 105 Europeans being surrounded by at least 3,000 mountaineers, who, wrapped up in their hill blankets, looked on at what we call our polite amusements, and bowed to the ground, if a European came near them. I sometimes wonder they do not cut all our heads off, and say nothing more about it (Emphasis added. Miss Eden in Brown 1948: 255).

4. Perhaps we would be hard put to find a more exigent instance of bluster in the manual of O'Dwyerisms than in his mocking references to Mohandas K. Gandhi's political creed - passive resistance. Gandhi maintains, 'the sword of passive resistance does not require a scabbard.' For him, resistance to colonial rule in this way had an honorable heritage. Hence, 'Jesus Christ, Daniel, and Socrates represented the purest form of passive resistance or soul force.' In answer to such a creed, O'Dwyer is reported as saying, 'remember, Gandhi talks of soul force, but there is another force greater than Gandhi's soul force...' Jayakar adds, 'saying this he raised his fist in a menacing manner and thumped the table.' O'Dwyer has only one answer - 'The right answer to
soul force was of course, fist force' (O'Dwyer in Jayakar 1958: 364; see also V N Datta 1969: 54).
5. Of course, as we see when I discuss what went into the make up of a General Dyer in chapter 4, many in the army elite did still fear the sepoys. At this juncture the so-called Mutiny remains an eerie presence in their memories. Many knew colonial power was nearly broken in the uprisings of 1857. The so-called mutiny did not constitute a minor local difficulty. As Omissi argues, ‘in the years that followed, the white elite still feared the sepoys’ (Omissi 1994: 131). He further reminds us of Lord Roberts's remarks in1907. According to Roberts 'there are many discontented people amongst the 300 millions of India, and the native troops may again be lead astray' (Roberts 1907 cited in Omissi 1994: 131/2). Fears for the empire were ignited by rebellion in 1857 to such a degree that dread it might happen again persisted. Such fears are a potent part in all formulations of imperial civil and military strategy at this juncture. These fears Omissi points out were not allayed much during the 1914-18 war. Around this time the Ghadar movement began its campaigns. Because their leaders knew that 'without the active cooperation of the troops, their plans for revolution in India are doomed to failure', inciting rebellion amongst sepoys forms part of their strategies (Omissi 1994: 132). Of course, fears that Russians or Germans would meddle in Indian affairs did not ease apprehensions about India. For a fuller discussion of army views, see chapter 4.
6. Masterman's, KCSI, CIE, entry among Allen's contributors reads thus: '..born 1889; entered ICS (Indian Civil Service) (Madras) 1914; Sec. Board of Revenue 1924-28; Collector of Salt Revenue 1928-22; Collector, various districts, Madras 1922-6; Education and Public Health 1936-9; Board of Revenue 1942-6; Chief Sec. Adviser to Governor 1946; Deputy High Comm., India 1947-8' (Allen ed. 1975: 224). 
7. Since I use her descriptions of an Indian scene frequently, I note her antecedents. Vere, Lady, Birdwood CVO, is one of Allen's informants. For completeness, he describes her biographical details thus: born 1909: father Sir George Ogilive, KCIE, IPS; ancestors in India since 1765, was sixth generation to have lived in India; married Capt. (later Col.) Christopher Birdwood, Probyn's Horse (son of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood, C.-in-C. India) in New Delhi 1931; left India 1945' (Allen ed. 1975: 221). I shall continue to note the antecedents of others that Allen refers to, and I use.
8. Allen notes Pierce's biographical details thus: ‘...born 1909 Dehra Dun; Father in BB & CI Railway; educated St Joseph's Naini Tal; followed father on to railways, then into commerce; leading role in Anglo-Indian affairs; left India after independence' (Allen ed. 1975: 225).
9. Draper tells us that the British regarded Gandhi 'as an unworly crank totally divorced from the realities of life' (Draper 1981: 39). He ventures that 'the word "phony" was on their minds if not on their lips' (Draper 1981: 39). Some others regarded him a half-naked fakir, and asked how such a person could possibly threaten the mighty British Empire. O'Dwyer himself is no less dismissive when he describes him as 'an uncouth hypocrite with his ascetic pose' (Draper 1981: 39). O'Dwyer was no more impressed by Gandhi’s political ethic, ‘soul force.’ See n. 2 above.
10. Husband and wife, Rev. Arfon Roberts and Rosalie Roberts, their notable entries read: 'Rev. Arfon Roberts born 1906; went to West Bengal 1928 under Methodist under Methodist Missionary Society; service included Superintendent, Lepers Homes, Bankura and Raniganj; left India 1951 ... Rosalie Roberts (nee Harvey) born 1902; went out as SRN to West Bengal 1926; nursing supt., Santal Mission Hosp., Sarenga 1926-31; married Arfon Roberts at Sarenga 1932, continued voluntary medical work in villages, West Bengal; Left India 1951' (Allen ed. 1975: 225).
11. Perhaps, the Roberts are mesmerized by the assumption that loyalty to the Raj is still the dominant ethic that guides Indians in their relations to their British rulers. There is much written evidence for such an assumption. As there is much, probably more, to the contrary. Brown highlights an ideal typical instance he regards displays loyalty. It comes from sentiments supposedly found in an address given to an English Collector by the inhabitants of Duboy on his final departure. Apparently translated from the Persian, Duboy’s inhabitants are depicted in the depths of despair at the news that their Collector is to leave them. What they wonder, had they done to bring them to this pass. They blame themselves! Should their Collector leave, they would be as inconsolable, as a son would be hearing about the death of his parents!

'Dhuboy famed among the cities of the east, was happy when this English sirdar presided in their durbar; his disposition towards the inhabitants was with the best consideration ... All castes who looked up to him obtained redress, without distinction and without price. When he took the poor by the hand he made them rich: under his protection the people were happy, and reposed on the bed of ease. When he superintended the garden, each gardener performed his duty; and all the trees in the garden flourished. So equal was his justice, that the tiger and the kid might drink at the same fountain; and often did he redeem the kid from the tiger’s mouth.... In this country we have not known any government so upright as that of the English;— Alas! if our protector forsakes us we shall be disconsolate as a widow: we shall mourn the loss of a father and weep as for the
death of a mother! — ALLA! In thy mercy continue him to us!’ (Forbes 1783 in Hilton Brown ed. 1948: 223/4).

12. Sir Henry Cotton gives us a glimpse of what he terms ‘the cult of Nicholson’. Or, what he calls his exploits with stick and whip. It involves a rule of benevolence that invariably entangles rulers in the use of corporal punishment. He tells us about a story doing the rounds in John Lawrence’s time as Chief Commissioner in the Punjab. This would be the 1860s. Apparently, young men at Lahore he says,

‘used to hang about the door of a church that John Lawrence frequented, because they knew that on some pretext or other the Chief Commissioner would be sure to hammer his syce (or groom) before driving home, and they wanted to see the fun. It was public property that as Governor-General he was not exempt from the old vice, ... the pernicious practice of striking natives ... especially domestic servants’ And Cotton adds, ‘...striking natives... prevailed as a common and general habit during the whole of my residence in India’ (Cotton 1919:65).

And Russell gives us another glimpse from 1857:

‘I was very shocked to see in this courtyard, two native servants, covered with plasters and bandages, and bloody, who were lying on their charpoys, moaning. On inquiring, my friend was informed by one of the guests, they were so and so’s servants, who had just been “licked” by him. It is a savage, beastly, and degrading custom. I have heard it defended; but no man of feeling, education or goodness of heart can vindicate or practise it... The master who had administered his “spiriting so gently to his delinquent domestics, sat sulky and sullen, and, I hope, ashamed of his violence, at the table; but he had no fear of any pains or penalties of the law’ (From Russell 1857 in Hilton Brown ed. 1948: 213).

13. Describing British rule in 1858 Russell says:

‘I could not help thinking as we drove home how harsh the rein of our rule must feel to the natives...Some of the best of our rulers administer justice in their shirt sleeves (which by the bye are used as a substitute for blotting-paper allover India), cock up their heels, in the tribunal, and smoke cherots to assist them in council; and I have seen one eminent public servant, with his braces hanging at his heels, his bare feet in slippers, and his shirt open at the breast just as he came from his bath, give audience to a great chieftain on a matter of considerable importance. The natives see that we treat each other far differently, and draw their inferences’ (in Brown ed. 1948: 229).

14. Russell refers of course to a post 1858 prophecy about ‘race-relations.’ The good old hookah days are those for instance when relations between white men of the company and their concubines were encouraged. In full:

‘The good old hookah days are past; cheroots and pipes have now usurped the place of the aristocratic silver bowl, the cut glass goblets, and the twisted glistening snake with silver or amber mouth piece. ... The race of Eurasians is not so freely supplied with recruits.... There is now no bee-bee’s house — a sort of European Zenana ... There are now European rivals to those ladies (the native kept woman) at some stations. It was the topic of conversation the other day at mess that the colonel of the regiment had thought it right to prohibit one of his officers from appearing with an unauthorised companion at the band parade; and the general opinion was that he has no right to interfere. But the society of station does interfere in such cases, and though it does bot mind beebees or their friends, it rightly taboos him who entertains their white rivals’ (in Brown 1948: 258).

15. As late as 1947 Reginald Savoy was heard to say: ‘when I left India in December 1947 I felt we were leaving a task half finished... Our intention in India was to hand over a running show and I believe that if we could have held on for another ten years that would have been the case.’ (in Allen ed. 1975: 214).

16. Maybe doing nothing is not exactly a pleasurable experience. But as for instance Maud Driver sees it, frolics in the sun did conspire to emphasize pleasure in the sun as the first principle of an Anglo-Indian woman’s experience. Hence,

‘Save for arranging a wealth of cut flowers laid to her hand by a faithful mali, an ‘Anglo-Indian’ girl’s domestic duties are practically nil. All things conspire to develop the emotional, pleasure-loving side of her nature, to blur her girlish visions of higher aims and stern self-discipline’ (Diver 1909 in Allen ed. 1975: 72).

17. Many of these experiences I glean from their words as collected and set out by Hilton Brown (Brown ed. 1948). There are specific histories relating to white women’s experiences in India that I do not go into here. My references to some of their letters about their experiences only serve to highlight the intensity of an Anglo-Indian relation to India. For further commentary on white
women's or Memsahibs as they came to be known, experiences see Georgina Gowans (Sept. 1999), 'A Passage From India: British Women Travelling Home 1915 – 1947' unpublished Ph.D. Thesis University of Southampton; Some of those I make reference to, see also, Maud Driver, The Englishwoman in India 1909; Harriet Tytler, An Englishwoman in India: The Memoirs of Harriet Tytler 1828-1858; Olive Douglass, Olivia in India 1913: Isabel Hunter, Land of Regrets 1909; Emily Eden, Up the Country (1836-1840); Maria Graham, Journal of a Residence in India (1809-1811) There are numerous accounts by the same women (Memsahibs) of their experiences during the mutiny. Jenny Sharpe, Allegories of Empire 1993 is a good source for these.


20. The reference to the daily round of amusements is from Brown ed. 1945: 194. See esp. chap.VI.

21. The problem of government for Bartle Frere, one of the administration's most legendary figures, boiled down to a prosaic practicality. Stemming from an age when imperial government still reeked of amateurism, he succinctly summarized his thoughts on mundane government thus:

'It is really of more consequence to the natives that he (the young British officer or official) should be good in the cricket field and on horseback, popular with servants and the poor, and the champion of bullied fags, that he should have a mother who taught him to say his prayers, and sisters who helped her to give him reverence for womankind and respect for weakness, than that he should be first to take a double first at Oxford' (Brown ed. 1948: 229).

22. He certainly felt himself more than adequate to the task. According to Gilmour, Margot Asquith memorably describes his expression as being one of 'enamelled self-assurance.' Chiseled features 'combined with his manner' to give him an air of superiority, which Gilmour adds, led a couple of his Oxbridge contemporaries to dedicate a few lines to him. A legend he fondly repeated with a subtle humour:

'My name is George Nathaniel Curzon, I am a most superior person, My cheek is pink, my hair is sleek, I dine at Blenheim once a week' (Gilmour 1994: 30).

23. Atkinson summed up the adventures he would recount in Curry and Rice fulsomely, at the outset. What, perhaps more than anything else, astonishes the modern day reader, is the luxuriant style of Anglo-Indian existence – akin to a medieval court. Thus,

'What varied opinions we constantly hear
Of our rich Oriental possessions;
What a jumble of notions, distorted and queer,
Form an Englishman's “Indian impressions!”

First a sun, fierce and glaring, that scorches and bakes;
Palankeens, perspiration, and worry;
Mosquitoes, thugs, cocoanuts, Brahmans, and snakes,
With elephants, tigers, and curry.

Then jungles, fakeers, dancing-girls, prickly heat,
Shawls, idols, durbars, brandy-pawny;
Rupees, clever jugglers dust-storms, slipper’d feet,
Rainy seasons, and mullingatawny.

Hot winds, holy monkeys, tall minarets, rice,
With crocodiles, ryots or farmers;
Himalayas, fat baboos, with paunches and pice,
So airy clad in pyjamas.

With Rajahs--------- But stop, I must really desist,
And, let each one enjoy his opinions,
Whilst I show in what style Anglo-Indians exist
In her Majesty’s Eastern domains (emphasis mine) (Atkinson 1854: 3).
to readers by Captain George Atkinson is the 'sunny side of Indian life.' Enough certainly to while away the hours is a serenity that often defies the coming complexities abroad. Hence, the most popular scenes of resort at our station where we 'are groomed and rubbed down by Anglo-Indians at their station in India.'

The growing complexities in their role, and its performance, is not lessened any by a frightening realization among their ranks that they could perhaps be the last in the line of an honorable tradition in administration. The prospects of failure to men who spent the best part of their lives doing the job are terrifying. Certainly O'Dwyer felt this acutely. In a particularly maudlin moment he says, '...there is one saddening feature for those of us who went from Oxford to take up our life-work in India...we see practically no-one now coming forward to take our places...There are now only a few candidates for an Indian career'. Not only would Oxford suffer, he thought, but also, the loss to India would be grievous, particularly as it was men like these who built up and developed the high standards of British administration. Apparently according to him, 'the word had gone round in Oxford and elsewhere that the conditions of service in India [are] so altered, that a British official finds it difficult to serve with honour and self-respect (O'Dwyer 1925: 24). Of course, all the sound and efficient administration for so long practiced by him and his peers would be lost once their British character and personnel were replaced by so-called Indian competition-wallahs. If this tradition was lost either because 'suitable British recruits' weren't coming forward, or educated Indians took the reins, all the good work of a noble tradition would be lost. He appealed to his reader by asserting that even the best Indian elements viewed the prospects of a diminution in the English role with foreboding (O'Dwyer 1925).

Lord Glenville describes such a sovereign as, and Woodruff glosses its consequences, thus:

'The British Crown is de facto sovereign in India. How it became so it is needless to enquire...But the sovereignty which we hesitate to assert, necessity compels us to exercise' (in Woodruff 1954: 27). Woodruff adds, 'it ought to be exercised, first, to provide for the welfare of the Indian people, next, but ranking far blow the first, to promote the interests of Great Britain. Lord Glenville's views had been accepted by almost everyone...(in Woodruff 1954: 27).

We are lucky as historians to have access to a surfeit of sentiments spoken freely by O'Dwyer on this, his bete- noire of a topic. Indians, his children, he would stubbornly maintain are not ready to take charge of their own destiny, now, nor even in the foreseeable future. Singh uses his expressions on this topic quoted in the Congress Punjab Enquiry. O'Dwyer finds comfort in expressing in a vainglorious manner; both his ability to govern over others less fortunate than himself, so much better than they ever could themselves, and their complicity in agreeing to such a state of affairs. Thus, speaking about the demands he assumes are being made by the educated middle classes he says,

'... it is clear that the demands [for self-government] emanate not from the mass of the people, whose interests are at stake, but from a small and not quite disinterested minority, naturally
enough eager for power and place ... We must, if we are faithful to our trust, place and the interests of the silent masses before the clamour of the politicians however troublesome and insistent" (in Singh Vol. II 1999: 162).

29. See Gough & Innes 1897; Pearse 1848; Singh 1999; Singh 1968;

30. The Punjab, with roughly 7.5% of the total population of India supplied about 60% of the total number of troops recruited. Raja Ram & V N Datta are less than sanguine about O'Dwyer's recruitment practices (see Ram 1969; Datta 1969).

31. See also O'Dwyer's review of V H Rutherford Modern India (1927) and R Palme Dutt Modern India (1927), where he dismisses a version of politics he calls Indian political nationalism, with reference to Sir Abdul Rahman's words,

'The fact that they [Hindus and Moslems] have lived in the same country for nearly 1,000 years has contributed hardly anything to their fusion into a nation. The English panacea of nationalism has brought not more unity but worse divisions' (O'Dwyer 1927: 178).

32. According to Woodruff, 'in the rest of India an Englishman alone in a village was usually physically larger than anyone he met and men were in awe of him. But in the Punjab, Sikh, Jat and Muslim are all big men physically, taller than most Englishmen, and the visitor must assert himself to hold the mastery. Further, Punjabis made up more than half the Indian Army. The civilian in the Punjab was at the fountain-head of power and could afford no laxity... ' (Woodruff 1954: 236).

33. On this event O'Dwyer slyly remarks, ' ... Wren, who never minced his words, used to say that our batch of thirty was the rottenest that had ever passed through his hands ... often contrasted unfavourably with the brilliant stars of the following year ... [Among whom] ... were J S Metson, Sir E D Maclgh, Sir B Robertson, who became respectively proconsuls of the United Provinces, the Punjab, and Central Provinces, and Sir H J Maynard who was... known as the brains of the Punjab. We were a more humdrum lot and perhaps did better in administration than - the role for which the ICS is better suited - than in politics, a comparatively new and exotic cult in India, which has still to justify itself by results ... ' And his humdrum list goes on to enumerate such notables as Sir F W Duke, Sir A E Gait, Sir R H Craddock, himself, who became governors of Bengal, Behar, Orissa, Burma, and the Punjab. With Sir S M Forster finishing as Resident in Hyderabad, an appointment he regards as the 'blue ribbon of the Indian Political Department, and Sir H V Lovett and Sir D H Twomey, rising respectively to Head of the Revenue Board in the United Provinces and Chief Judge of the court of Lower Burma ... '; all of which leads him to conclude his sly comments with the satisfactorily smug remark, that '... Wren's harsh criticism was hardly justified by results' (O'Dwyer 1925: 19).

34. Jowett was a member of the committee set up after the Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, named after its authors, Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan. He would perfect its recommendations that entry to the Civil Service should be by competitive examination. The move away from allowing entry solely by reference to patronage is justified by him as complimenting the detailed knowledge of a candidate a patron would acquire and so be a good judge of his candidature. Thus:

'For the moral character of the candidates, I should trust partly to the examination itself. University experience abundantly shows that in more than nineteen cases out of twenty, men of attainments are also men of character. The perseverance and self-discipline necessary for the acquirement of any considerable amount of knowledge are a great security that a young man has not lead a dissolute life...' (Northcote-Trevelyan 1854: 24).

Suffice to say entry by such means was not entirely accepted as being better than the old system that recruited, as Reader puts it, according to agitation on a particular candidates behalf by well connected patrons. Sir Arthur Helps, as Reader notes, was more than a little acerbic in his comments:

'I believe that the present system of competitive examination is a dream of pedantry - dreamed by some Chinese philosopher - and that more witches and wizards were discovered by the notable system of pricking with pins, than judicious and capable men are likely to be discovered by the present system of competitive examination' (Reader 1966: 87).
The moment that Haileybury represented in the arts we understand as government in India is a distinctly paranoiac one. As Osborne describes it, fearing an over-accommodation in the government of India to Hindu Culture, the court of Directors of the East India company, led by Charles Grant, set about establishing Haileybury College; a fear in short of officials charged with administrative government in India, going native. The emphasis at the college was ultimately on 'founding a common culture of officialdom, separated from those who were governed, a homogeneous class of experts with a common ruling identity' (Osborne 1994b: 20).

In a not unrelated field, specifically, the uses of military knowledge gained on what for British governors remained a place of romance if also a perennial headache, see also Andrew Skeen's, 'Passing It On'. It is a series of notes and lectures on managing, what he calls tribal country; where often the only way to neutralise the troublesome hordes is by 'alertness and cunning', modes of conduct that in this context are not so much ruled by abstract precepts as governed by being attentive to the details of their practice at the cliff and mountain face (Skeen 1932).

See Kipling's 'White man's burden' 1899; and see Draper 1981.

For a discussion of the so-called 'White Mutiny' against proposals contained in the Ibert Bill permitting Indian judges to try Europeans in certain areas; how such a revolt by the tea and indigo planters in Bengal, should be seen not only as enduringly racist but based on claims to very specific claims to professional competence, based on manliness; see Sinha 1995; and Sharpe 1993.

Graham Dawson tells us that Henry Lawrence, the elder of the two brothers in this partnership featured amongst notable company in F M Holmes, *Four Heroes of India: Clive, Warren Hastings, Havelock, Lawrence* (1892). He adds, in the pantheon of heroes to be emulated both of the brothers featured heavily in school history books in the 1920s and 30s (Dawson 1994: 147-49).

'Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate cries, while thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the Great British Oak, chew their cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field' (O'Dwyer: 410).

Akbar son of Humayan and grandson of Barbur – 1542-1605. He was Mughal Emperor of India from 1556-1605.

Rudyard Kipling is a fine cataloguer and soother of a British psyche that might feel threatened in any way by the rise and rise of what for him would be termed, an educated middle class of Indian. One is reminded in this regard of one of his creations in the novel, *Kim* - Huree Babu. Huree is caught up with Colonel Creighton in the great game of espionage, in their roles as information gatherers used to more effectively exercise political control over the country. Huree has a not so secret desire to become a member of the Royal Society. To be recognised by such a prestigious institution in his role as an ethnographer for the secret service, would found his claims to be taken seriously as a man of science. Yet as Said reminds us he is almost always depicted by Kipling as, '... funny, or gauche, or somehow caricatural, not because he is incompetent or inept - on the contrary - but because he is not white ... that is, he can never be a Creighton ... Lovable and admirable as he may be, there remains in the Babu the grimacing stereotype of the ontologically funny native, trying so desperately ... to be like us' (Said 1993: 185); (Kipling For a discussion of a much more threatening figure represented by the native lawyer see Upendra Baxi 1993.

Ranajit Guha describes this moment, when duty is elevated to an imperative political philosophy, as 'the high-noon of mid-Victorian imperialism' (Guha 1997: 40). Samuel Smiles is one of its greatest exponents. He wrote a series of books in the mid 1800s starting with, 'Self-Help'. Then followed with three more; entitled respectively, Character; Thrift; and climaxing with
"Obedience to duty" is considered paramount (Guha 1997: 40). Duty. Here, as Guha suggests, "obedience to duty" is considered paramount (Guha 1997: 40). Doing one's duty is constitutive of the glory of manly character. Thus, he who does his duty '...is entitled to rank with the most distinguished of his race' (Smiles 1880: 11). Hence:

'...Man does not live for himself alone. He lives for the good of others as well as for himself. Every one has his duties to perform — the richest as well as the poorest. To some life is pleasure, to others suffering? But the best do not live for self-enjoyment, or even for fame. Their strongest motive power is useful work in every good cause' (Smiles 1880: 15).

Akin I would suggest in this guise to Bartle Frees' thoughts on administration. A legend in a liberal conservative administrative practice, he was scathing of the Vice royalty, practiced by John Lawrence. Finding the old informal methods he carried through in the Punjab did not work, he fell back Frere felt, on a rigid system where rules ruled. This lead Woodruff thinks to 'that debilitating disease that sooner or later invades the bureaucratic system...'. Frere wrote to Lawrence

'There is always in India some need for public servants acting without orders, on the assurance that, when their superiors hear their reasons, their acts will be approved and confirmed; and I hold that when you have extinguished that feeling of mutual confidence between superior and subordinate authorities and made public men as timid as they are in England, you will have removed one great safeguard of our Indian Empire. It does not take long so to bridle a body of public servants as to paralyse their power of acting without orders...'. (Woodruff 1954: 40).

46. That the informality of it all could be detrimental to as well as ensuring the continuance of British rule is clear. Russell describes these processes thus, '
I could not help thinking as we drove home how harsh the reins of our rule must feel to the soft skin of the natives ... Some of the best of our rulers administer justice in their shirtsleeves (which by the by are used as substitutes for blotting paper all over India), cock up their heels in the tribunal, and smoke cheroots to assist them in council; and I have seen one eminent public servant, with his braces hanging at his heels, his bare feet in slippers, and his shirt open at the breast just as he came from his bath, give audience to a great chieftain on a matter of considerable state importance. The natives see that we treat each other far differently, and draw their inferences accordingly...'. (Russell 1857 in Brown 1958: 229).


48. Accounts of the character of days under a blazing sun aren't exactly rare. The classic collection of such memoirs that I'm using here is Charles Allen's sumptuous, Plain Tales From The Raj. Recently reissued it opens to us a world of work, pleasure and ultimately anguish (Allen ed. 1975).

49. Allen also gives us an account of plantation life in Assam. His account is very different from that narrated by Mason (1975). Allen thinks for instance, Kenneth Warren's untypical. Thus 'Having had lunch, Bertie Fraser - with whom I was to share the bungalow - went off to play polo and I was left sitting on the verandah with nothing to do. I couldn't speak the language so I couldn't speak to the servants and I got more and more hungry. It was not until about eight o'clock that night that Bertie Fraser returned, having played two or three chukkas of polo and having spent the rest the evening at the bar. He came full of good cheer and called for dinner and we sat down for a meal. He seemed to be rather a queer sort of fellow; he was telling me about various matters of which I had no knowledge whatever when he suddenly leapt to his feet and, seized the lamp from the middle of the table and rushed out of the room, leaving me in complete darkness. I thought, 'Well, he is mad after all!' Then he started shouting at me from the lawn in front of the bungalow saying, 'Come out you fool!' Then I suddenly realised that the bungalow was swinging about. I got halfway down the steps when the bungalow gave an extra heave and I slid down the remaining steps...'. (in Allen ed. 1975: 62).

Yet, Allen alerts us to instances of life in India that give us some perspective on the assumed privations and hardships of those on service in India. Thus

'...For the great majority [of Anglo-Indians on service to India] actual hazards and privations were limited in duration and interspersed with generous periods of leave and a great deal of leisure. When not on active service officers in the Indian army observed a far from uncomfortable routine. An early morning parade was followed by breakfast and a change into mufti before regimental office' when charges and grievances were dealt with. Lunch was usually followed by a long siesta:
"Then in the late afternoon you either played games at the club or, if you were so inclined, you played games with your own men. Thursday was a whole day holiday. Saturday ... was a half-holiday and Sunday was a holiday. You had as a right ten days absence every month and you were also entitled to an annual holiday of two months. Every three or four year you got eight months furlough at home. So it really cannot be said that any of us was greatly overworked" (in Allen ed. 1975: 190).

50. Interestingly he contrasts the role of two officials at his earlier posting in Shahpur – Western Punjab, to emphasize their differences. It is clear which he valued most. Hence, he says, during Charles Aitchison’s time as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (1882-87),

‘there was... a feeling that the Secretariat was gaining an undue influence and that skill in minute writing rather than capacity in administration was the test of efficiency and the stepping stone to promotion... The appointment of Sir James Lyall to succeed Aitchison in the spring of 1887 was generally welcomed by the official world and the rural interests. Lyall had never been a Secretary, having spent all his official life... working among the rural masses as Settlement Officer, Settlement and Financial Commissioner. He had a unique knowledge of the people and, though shy and unpretentious in manner, had their confidence and affection to an extraordinary degree. His judgement in matters affecting their interests and welfare was almost unerring. He lacked Aitchinson’s intellectual distinction and clarity of expression, but his wide knowledge of and sympathy with the people made his administration more popular and efficient’ (O’Dwyer 1925: 29).

It’s almost as if O’Dwyer is writing his own manifesto!

51. I touch on some accounts that alert us to administrative discomfiture in more detail later. For instance the awful loneliness felt by some on service; and the privations and hardships experienced by some in a district. Just as Orwell alerts to the smelly discomforts of dust, earth and oil; he is also the author who alerts us to the burdens, confusions and expectations experienced by young men on service. In ‘Shooting an Elephant’ he tells how on service for the Empire, he vacillated between the great joy he would experience when he drove ‘a bayonet into a Buddhist priest’s guts,’ and thinking the British Raj ‘as an unbreakable tyranny, as something clamped down... upon the will of prostate peoples...’ But perhaps the most famous instance in the essay that recounts the fears and anxieties experienced by an administrator is when Orwell tells us about a rampaging elephant. He is expected by the entire crowd to take appropriate action against the animal. With rifle in hand and an ever growing crowd following on his heels, he realises he has to shoot the elephant; the people expected it of him. It is at that moment he grasps what he calls the ‘...hollowness, the futility of the white man’s domain in the East. Here was I, the white man with his gun, standing in front of an unarmed native crowd - seemingly the leading actor of the piece; but in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces behind...’ And with an altogether unsure resolution he decides to act like a Sahib, simply because has to act like one. He has to appear resolute, to know his own mind and to do definite things. To come all that way, rifle in hand, with two thousand people marching at my heels and then to trail feebly away, having done nothing - no, that was impossible. The crowd would laugh at me. And my whole life, every white man’s life in the East was one long struggle not to be laughed at...’ (Orwell 1957: 96)

52. A humorous if serious lament in this regard is found in Carthill’s work: The Lost Dominion. He decries all calls for the emancipation of India, as Mugwumpery; practiced he argues, by a creeds obsessed with skepticism; creeds that, ‘consider... all things as open to question, the utility of which is to be tested not by any apparatus of pragmatism, but by the mediaeval a priori and deductive method.;’ and creeds to whom he applies Cicero’s taunt, ‘...as the ultimate definition of mugwumpery...’: "This man imagines he is living in the republic of Plato, instead of in the dregs of that of Romulus..." ‘ In the end success for the Mugwumps means that ‘... all our labour has come to nought...’ The only consolation for his conscientious administrator, is the knowledge ‘...that it is...God which assigns the task and the reward for the task. We labour blindly, not knowing the event. That knowledge the God has kept to himself, and none can fathom his purposes. If we have worked well and faithfully, then it is well with us.’ (AL. Carthill 1924: 73, 74, 351).

53. In Charles Allen’s list of contributors, the entry for Geoffrey Allen reads: ‘Geoffrey, St G. T. Allen, OBE, MC; born 1912 Cawnpore; ancestors in India since 1799; grandfather founded Pioneer and Civil & Military Gazette; returned India 1919; Asst. Manager Darbhanga Raj 1933; 2/7 Gurkha Rifles 1939-45; Seconded IPS 1945. Asst. Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract; stayed on in IPS after independence’ (Allen ed. 1975: 221).

55. Of course, some thought this a psychology of the Raj, based on a lie - John Morris declared, ‘...the majority of the British in India were acting a part. They weren't really the people they were supposed to be. They were there for a very good reason; earning a living and making money - nothing ignoble about that - but I don't really feel that most people had a sense of vocation, that they were really serving India.’ Others, Allen tells us had their own criticisms. For some, he adds, ‘English rule in India was very often called sarcastically banya ki raj, the rule of the money lender, because all our laws enabled him to lend money to the illiterate poor at vast interest. It was money for jam for the moneylender and the law was on his side.’ Ed. Brown, another critic, thought the jewel in the crown of the Raj was cheap labour. He added, ‘at the back of the jewel was squalor, hunger, filth, disease and beggary. Only when I came out of the army could I see what a terrible thing it was that a country had been allowed to exist like this. Such snobbery, so many riches, so much starvation’ (in Allen 1975: 216-217).

56. The Work of Meadows Taylor is an interesting fictional source for many of the modes of conduct and character traits in administrators I am pointing to here. See in particular his, ‘Seeta’, in which he paints a bold picture of one Cyril Brandon. A man he depicts as being revered by the native population of his district - ‘many a dame, humble as she might be, repeated his name with that of her household gods each night, as she lighted the lamp before the simple shrine of her faith, and taught her children to say it; many a rude village poet had written ballads, and the minstrels had sung them to his praise, at village festivals. He had perfectly acquired the common vernacular dialect of his province, and spoke it almost as one of the people; and he was able to read and answer his ordinary letters without difficulty or error...He had studied...the...manners and customs...of the people...very deeply, and the people were therefore perfectly at ease with him; but he was so strict and so impartial in his duties, that no one ever dreamed of taking a liberty...’ Taylor goes on in this manner to describe his subject's high birth, that he narrates as helping him immensely in his duties. He goes on, ‘...there is...no point on which natives are more curious, and none which, when joined with other qualities, so soon or so completely influences popular estimation, as gentle descent...’ (Meadows Taylor 1881: 70).

57. Kipling's work is a good source for this kind of emphasis on the job of imperialism. Borrowing from Benita Parry, Kipling saw ‘...in imperialism a means through which men... (often of the ICS) could win their moral integrity by self-abnegation, commitment to task and the exercise of responsibility...’ (Parry 1998: 206). She adds, one of the most unadorned statements of such an ethic is found in, 'The white Man's Burden' in full from McClure's Magazine 1899:

Take up the White Man's burden--
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.
Take up the White Man's burden--
In patience to abide,
To veil the threat of terror
And check the show of pride;
By open speech and simple,
An hundred times made plain,
To seek another's profit
And work another's gain.
Take up the White Man's burden--
The savage wars of peace--
Fill full the mouth of Famine,
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
(The end for others sought)
Watch sloth and heathen folly
Bring all your hope to nought.
Take up the White Man's burden--
No iron rule of kings,
But toil of serf and sweeper--
The tale of common things.
The ports ye shall not enter,  
The roads ye shall not tread,  
Go, make them with your living  
And mark them with your dead.  
Take up the White Man's burden,  
And reap his old reward—  
The blame of those ye better  
The hate of those ye guard—  
The cry of hosts ye humour  
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:—  
"Why brought ye us from bondage,  
Our loved Egyptian night?"  
Take up the White Man's burden—  
Ye dare not stoop to less—  
Nor call too loud on Freedom  
To cloak your weariness.  
By all ye will or whisper,  
By all ye leave or do,  
The silent sullen peoples  
Shall weigh your God and you.  
Take up the White Man's burden!  
Have done with childish days—  
The lightly-proffered laurel,  
The easy ungrudged praise:  
Comes now, to search your manhood  
Through all the thankless years,  
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,  
The judgment of your peers!

58. For these observations on Kipling I am indebted to Benita Parry's work, *Kipling: Delusions and Discoveries: Studies on India in the Colonial Imagination 1880-1930*, Verso 1998

59. Privation and hardship tales on the job are not rare. Allen refers us to Arthur Hamilton who after a particularly tedious period in his job of surveying longed ‘...to meet a European to talk to him. The vastness of the mountains overcame me and I had an awful feeling that I must throw myself over a cliff...’ (Allen ed. 1975: 190).

60. One of Kipling’s most admired works, *Kim*, is a tale of how complicated doing the job is, especially when it involves playing the Great Game, the Great Game of espionage, subject all the time to the heat of failure (Kipling 1901).

61. The story is intended as a warning to all that transgress the bounds of the colour-line. Kipling begins his tale with the now familiar warning against any so inclined; ‘...A man should, whatever happens, keep to his own caste, race and breed. Let the White go to the White and the Black to the Black. Then whatever trouble falls is in the ordinary course of things - neither sudden, alien nor unexpected.’ Our hapless hero, Trejago, stepped beyond these bounds. In one sense an over familiar tale that resembles many other an Anlo-Indian tale of forbidden love. Yet it all ends with a limp. Trejago doesn’t hear from his sweet Angle, Bisesa for two weeks and decides to visit once again the dark Gully where he first heard her voice. Bending down to greet her at the sill of a grating he notices both of her hands cut off at the wrists. At that moment he hears a grunt akin to that of a wild beast and feels something sharp stab through his boorka cutting into one of the muscles of his groin’, and he limped for the rest of his days (Kipling 1993: 159-166); (1888).

62. Walter Lawrence applied the description loafer to those he saw as derelict men who though sometimes interesting were definitely annoying particularly to administrative prestige:

'I have seen the loafer as a troublesome and limpet like guest in a Dak Bungalow, running up a bill and terrifying the hypnotised Khansaman; an unwelcome visitor to my camp far away from any railway, indignant and abusive when offered food without drink and a pass to Bombay instead of a gift of money. I have met him at railway junctions, uncertain and seeking my advice as to the city or the Raja he should next exploit; have admired him as a temporary and wholly inefficient servant of some ostentatious Indian magnate who preferred a white coachman to safety. There was always the inevitable end - fiery country spirits and a bad smash, and then to pastures new. The kindly'
villages would find food and shelter, indeed, do anything if he would only move on to the next parish as soon as possible' (Lawrence 1928: 100).


66. The four are Clive, Warren Hastings, Havelock, and Lawrence.

67. There are variations in the latinised spellings of this place name. It often appears as Multan (see Latif 1889: 650).

68. A dacoit is a robber, hence dacoity robbery.

69. That there were conflicts between the parties in London about the precise status of the English and their role in India is not in doubt. And Woodruff broadly divides these camps into Liberals such as Gladstone and Morley and Conservatives such as Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain; The former having more faith in the ability of Indians to govern themselves quite soon, and the latter seeing little immediate prospect of self rule, and delaying such a prospect into the long distant future.
CHAPTER 4 – THE MILITARY COMPLEX

1

Introduction

‘Covenants without swords are but words’ (Hobbes in Howard 1957: 11).¹

In the last chapter I began my analysis of the characterisations of men who rule by focusing on the figure of an administrative man – Sir Michael O’Dwyer. In this chapter I consider the figure of a military man – Brigadier-General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer (1864-1927) and the military traditions to which he is a party.

This chapter explores the intersections and battles between military and civil authority in the exercise of power, particularly colonial power in India at the time. It argues that military codes of conduct played a vital part in defining styles of imperial rule. I read the two spheres as being at times thoroughly embedded together. They are substantively so, in their avowal and practice of tough, belligerent styles of rule. Arguably they are also formally so in their interchangeability of roles. Each man in his own way, as soldier or administrator, saw himself as doing his duty by Indians.

In the figure of Sir Michael O’Dwyer we glimpsed a particularly acute instance of a muscular administration at work. As we saw he exemplifies a specific ruling tradition I would characterise as ‘tough love’. One that nods approvingly towards imperatives
more conventionally associated with the conduct of war. In the figure of Dyer (strictly speaking a military officer), we glimpse an instance of a muscular militarism at work. Not only do military ethics form a central plank in the organisation of manners in governing Indian others but also, in such acute manifestations we see an instance of larger debates about the precise role and mould of a soldier in India at the time.

In Dyer, we discern a figure caught in battles raging at the time, about the traditions of a soldier both in India and beyond. The battles are between defining a soldier’s role in technical terms - where he is more akin to a manager, maintaining order being his prime concern; and defining his role in more familiar terms – as a warrior, even adventurer; Clive of India being the most famous role model here.

2

**Distrust of Military Manners**

Before I examine precisely how Dyer envisioned the make up of a military man, specifically a military man in India, and the military traditions he carries forward in his actions, I consider the historical antecedents of those men who carry such traditions. There is a long history of suspicion between civil and military realms in Britain. This takes on both familiar and novel configurations in India.
(a) Breeds of antipathy

'Was it reasonable...that an honest gentlemen should pay a heavy tax, in order to support in idleness and luxury a set of fellows who requited him by seducing his diary maids and shooting his partridges? (Macaulay in Strawson 1989: 1).'

'An armed, disciplined body is, in its essence, dangerous to liberty...Undisciplined, it is ruinous to society' (Burke 1790).

My objective here is not to rehearse a long history of origins about the British Army. Nor do I narrate a precise history of its structures. However, with the help of a few instances from that saga, I aim to register the existence of a profound history of suspicions, sometimes fearful ones, at specific moments, about standing armies; conflicts about their independent spheres of action; their costs, and their control by the civil power. Such complex relations become even more complex when as in the colonial Indian context, a variegated-armed force seeks primacy over opposition forces. In colonial India military traditions quite easily coalesce with strictly administrative ones. A simple reason is of course that one country is claiming rule over another. Thus, in a general sense, these are issues of complex civil – military relations.

Borrowing a description from Hammer, the problems of civil-military relations
involve two closely related issues ... First, the problem of royal authority over the army ... a constitutional question...that...involved the conflict between Crown and Parliament for supremacy over the armed forces. Secondly, out of the gradual encroachment of parliament upon royal authority there developed another issue, namely the extent to which civilians should participate with soldiers in deciding questions of a professional and technical nature' (Hammer 1970: 5).

Howard pursues this a little further. Via observations attributed to C. M. Clode, who is in turn borrowing from William Windham, he alerts us to a context that did little to dampen the mutual fear and distrust civil and military authorities have of one another. He describes the army as a body of men who hold in their hands a monopoly of force; men of action; easily seen perhaps as a competing centre of authority, subject only to crown control. Thus, the army constituted

'a class of men set apart from the general mass of the community, trained to particular uses, formed to peculiar notions, governed by peculiar laws, marked by peculiar distinctions...and known as...the armed forces of the crown' (Howard 1957: 11).5

Strawson in his turn rather elegantly reinforces the conundrum presented to civil authorities by the supposed competing loyalties of the army – stated baldly, to Crown or Parliament. One would be hard put to find a more paranoid register of distrust. What, we may ask, was at stake in resolving these questions? Extraordinary though it might be, what are at stake are nothing less than the integrity of a nation. And the
query at the heart of the conundrum is justice! Hence, according to Strawson, distrust of a standing army was traditionally 'one of the main pillars of English justice' (Strawson 1989: 1). To ensure justice prevails in the face of such competition, a way would be found to keep the army in tight check. Thus, according to Byrant, '...Parliament – alone capable of voting funds for its maintenance' – kept those funds 'at the lowest level compatible with national safety and often a good deal lower' (in Strawson 1989: 1).

Strawson is not alone in bringing such matters to our attention. Michael Howard in his turn adds that for a long time the decision about who should have effective control of the armed forces went by default. Eventually it was 'solved in England,' Howard remarks, 'by a decision to have virtually no armed forces at all – certainly none that might be used by the Crown to secure its authority' (Howard 1957: 14). The decision to have no army or only a limited force is made easier of course by the incontrovertible fact of the British Isles being surrounded by the sea. The pressing needs of a power bordered on all sides by other states that may or may not be hostile just didn't exist.

Nevertheless old fears about control of an armed presence, and an army's loyalty were never more than a hairbreadth away. A dread, haunted by the memories and principles associated with 1688. As Hammer contends, 'Whig fears that the crown would use the army...for its own ends...to suppress or threaten popular liberties died
slowly' (Hammer 1970: 6). It would be many years before the association of force with monarchical power was dismantled.

(i) An early instance – Crown or parliament

Strawson gives us a number of previous instances of such conflicts rearing their head in civil and military relations. Thus, he contends, in an earlier time, during Edward I’s reign for instance, demands for an army to subjugate Wales enabled Edward to muster an army that was ‘the largest, best-equipped force that England had seen for more than two hundred years...’ (Strawson 1989: 5). Yet, they were Strawson grants, an assorted levy. And their connections with the King, though large and quite diverse, were nevertheless with the King. So,

‘...from France he acquired destriers, battle chargers and remounts for his household guard, able to carry the most heavily armed nobles. Apart from the feudal levy which raised a thousand armoured horsemen, he put together no fewer than 15,000-foot soldiers, some conscripted from the Fyrd, some volunteers recruited by veterans who had fought with him in the Crusade...’ (Strawson 1989: 5).

Men of action so assembled and owing loyalty to the Crown could indeed appear a fearsome prospect.

Strawson continues; when elements in the region rebelled once again, Edward resolved to raise another force. This time the method he deployed differed. His aim
this time was to have under his command a more professional fighting force. Apparently he managed to persuade his barons and knights to ‘contract with the crown.’ By so contracting Edward hoped ‘to have their fighting men paid for agreed periods, instead of the former system of having at his disposal the tenants-in-chivalry serving at their own expense for...forty days and then free to please themselves’ (Strawson 1989: 5). Of course, as Strawson points out, Edward’s former ‘principal officers of state’ anticipated in his move a likely loss of independence. In the old regimes many owed principal personal allegiance to the crown – a matter of filial devotion not contract. Edward fought many wars. These other wars stood out just as fearful a marker in civil/military relations.

Perhaps these matters, as well as the suspicions an armed force generally generated, are not the only ones. The other perpetual problem, arguably merely a version of the problems with control, with which Edward came to be concerned and that would occupy many of his successors, was how to pay for raising and maintaining his armies. § Herein Strawson says ‘...lay the beginning of the endless struggle between crown and parliament.’ (Strawson 1989: 7).

(ii) A later Instance about civil vs. military control – Salisbury vs. Sir Henry Wilson

We don’t need to go quite so far back, as Edward’s I’s reign to glimpse other military and civil conflagrations, this time over control and command. Of course the First
World War, in the European theatre of action, provides us with many instances of disagreements between civil and military authorities. Though strictly speaking pre First World War, Hammer gives us a readily retrievable case of army and civil distrust of this sort, arising in a colonial theatre of action. That is, the mistrust between Lord Salisbury and Sir Henry Wilson at the end of the nineteenth century. As I detail below, Wilson is implicated in another dispute over civil and military competencies, this time concerning our military figure, General Dyer.

Hammer reads this as an instance of what the army would regard as ‘the continuous encroachment of the civilian upon the military.’ Such encroachments began in earnest he suggests, as long ago as 1782 ‘with the appointment of...a...Secretary at War...’ which opened up ‘...a vast area for controversy in the field of civil-military relations’ (Hammer 1970: 41).

In 1896, for instance, Lord Salisbury was determined to keep a forthcoming expedition to Dongola as far away as possible from the military's clutches. Writing to Lord Lansdowne, Salisbury declared, ‘I shall assent to anything which commends itself to you. But my advice will be, not to pay too much attention to your military advisers’. In holding to such a slant he echoed his earlier disdain for military expertise, when he said, ‘I have the greatest respect for the advice of soldiers as regards the conduct of a war, none whatever for their opinions as to the policy which dictates war’ (Hammer 1970: 41; 30).
According to Hammer, in this instance, the soldiers involved countered. They expressed their own doubts and questions. What, they would ask, is the basis for claims of civilian authority and competence in military matters. Sir Henry Wilson put it as follows,

‘During this year I have got a wonderful insight into the working of the War Office...and to my mind it is exceedingly unsatisfactory. The whole idea of governing the army by a civilian, whose training has been political expediency, and who knows less about the army then I do about the Navy, is vicious in theory and hopeless in practise’ (in Hammer 1970: 41). 15

(iii) Sir Henry Wilson vs. the government

Leaving aside Sir Henry Wilson’s spat with Salisbury over competencies and their respective spheres, he expresses a deep contempt for civil authority in the row over General Dyer’s military future and treatment by those authorities.

In his diary he describes a fraught meeting he attends on 14 May 1920 with the politicians. In full

‘Winston (Churchill) made a long speech, prejudging the case and in effect saying that the Cabinet, and he, had decided to throw out Dyer, but that it was advisable for the army council to agree. It appeared to me, listening, that the story was a very simple one. The Frocks had got India into (as they have Ireland) into a filthy mess. On that the soldiers are called in, and act. This is disapproved by all the disloyal
elements, and the soldier is thrown to the winds. All quite simple...After the Army Council, I had a short meeting of Military Members, at which I suggested that it was our duty to protect a brother officer until he had been proved in the wrong by a properly constituted Court of Inquiry...In the near future we should have many Dyer cases both in India and Ireland, and that if we didn’t stand by our soldiers we should lose their confidence... (emphasis mine. Wilson 1920 in Callwell 1927: 238).

Though there are other instances of antipathy between these realms, these spats between the two realms should be sufficient in giving us a flavour of the long saga. I turn now to a specific consideration of such a legacy in India. Though suspicion between the spheres persisted in India, it coalesces with the recognition of the crucial importance of arms to the imperial project. Men under arms in India transmogrified into what Strawson calls the ‘Praetorian Guard of Empire’ (Strawson 1989: xii).

3

**Militarism in India before 1857/8**

‘It would appear, that the artificial entity known as India, in the absence of a strong, external, compulsive force, might cease to exist’ (Carthill 1824: 347; 348).

‘Our only dependence is upon the same ground that we began and by which we subsist, fear’ (Roe 1618 in Mason 1985: 8).
‘Our government of the country is essentially military, and our means of preserving and improving our possessions through the operations of our civic institutions depend on our wise and politic exercise of that military power on which the whole fabric rests’ (Malcolm in Peers 1995: 1).

In spite of all I have argued thus far, about the many and historic quarrels between soldiers and politicians, Howard nevertheless suggests that in Britain these conflicts were ‘primarily….administrative…embittered – as such struggles usually are – by personalities’ (Howard 1956: 21). So according to him, the conflict

‘…was not nourished by the bitter continental traditions of civil-military mistrust. For over two centuries the supremacy of the civil power had been unquestioned. Neither the army nor the navy had a political past. Nor did their officers constitute a separate caste with distinct values distinct from and hostile to those of the nation. The purchase system in the army had at least ensured this, that they were drawn from the country gentry, they took more pride in their amateur status than in their professional ability, and back to the country gentry, on retirement, they returned...Thus the quarrels between politicians and soldiers in the First World War had few overtones of ideological conflict or political mistrust: they were...straightforward disagreements about the best way of winning the war’ (Howard 1957: 21).

Disagreements between civilian and military realms during this time may indeed be straightforward in the way Howard suggests. Nevertheless they do indicate the existence of larger, more complex battles in other spheres, at other times and in other theatres involving action. As Howard proffers in his closing remarks, there was an
intense battle looming, over whether the army should primarily be a professionally constituted body, or a force of amateurs who came together as and when necessary. Perhaps the place where we glimpse the intensity of these battles, battles in defining what is at stake when we speak about an army vernacular, and its relation to the conduct of supposedly civil activities such as business and government, is in Britain’s pursuit of its Imperial projects, especially in India.

(a) Enterprise – A joint stock co. takes its fill.\textsuperscript{16}

It bears repetition that the East India Trading Company’s arrival on the scene is a significant marker of Britain’s engagement with India and things Indian. On 31 December 1600 Queen Elizabeth I had granted a charter to the ‘Company and Merchants of London...to trade...with the East Indies’ (Hibbert 1980: 17).\textsuperscript{17}

Once there the Company and its merchants quickly had to learn how to develop and negotiate trade concessions from India’s Moghul rulers. Notes put together by the South Asian History Project (hereafter SAHP) emphasise how the Company had to win such concessions as it could with a ‘measure of humility and propose trade terms that offered at least some benefits to the local traders and merchants’ (SAHP 2001).\textsuperscript{18} Hibbert adds, ‘thirteen years later, in 1613, Jahangir...[Akbar’s great-grandson]...granted this company permission to establish a permanent trading station on the Indian coast north of Bombay’ (Hibbert 1980: 17). As it transpired, this was to be only the first foothold the company was to acquire along India’s coastlines.
I don’t go into any great detail about the intricate trading and military engagements of the Company with indigenous powers. I do mark these engagements however as intellectual and ethical problems, and, especially where trade is concerned, the Company ‘entered the scene as…only…one more player capable of pursuing the same …economic…functions,’ as indigenous institutions (Chatterjee 1993: 31). So, ‘rather than representing a set of governing principles imported from a foreign and ‘more advanced’ culture, the early East India Company state might be seen as a logical extension of processes with distinctly ‘indigenous origins.’… If one is not to disregard the ‘preponderant evidence’ of early capitalist groups in India subverting indigenous regimes in order to seek support from the Company, one must accept the conclusion that “colonialism was the logical outcome of South Asia’s own history of capitalist development” ’ (Chatterjee 1993: 31).

Making common cause with indigenous traders, it is suggested, John Company’s trade would flourish. The Company’s directors heeded the early warnings given to them from the Moghul court by their ambassador, that ‘they must never “seek plantation by the sword,” ’…but should go about their business, ‘ “at sea and in quiet trade” ’ (Hibbert 1980: 17). Questions of security, a systematic variety at least, did not seem at this stage to be a part of the Company’s vernacular. So, flourish it did. Times however are wont to change.
In the fractious environment that accompanies the weakening and eventual collapse of Moghul prominence in India, the Company would have to confront the growing problems of managing its valuable trade directly. Past experience should have taught that not all the Mughuls were as willing as Jahangir to readily accede trading concessions to the Company. Many, others, according to the SAHP, Aurangzeb in particular, would attempt to 'limit and control the activities of the...Company,' (SAHP 2001).

In the face of such a growing ambivalence in dealings with the Company, the Directors in London realised that the hitherto mercantilist emphasis it pursued would now have to be explicitly complemented by reference to violence and the sword. The concessions it had worked so hard to acquire from the Mughul court had to be defended and when possible expanded.

Of course in one sense, trade and military power are old bedfellows. Gaining and keeping new markets then is as much about military prowess as it is about the inherent value of what it is you're peddling. So, SAHP tell us that by 1669...Gerald Ungier, chief of the factory at Bombay had written to his directors: “the time now requires you to manage your general commerce with the sword in your hands” (SAHP 2001). Naturally the military interest and the mercantile one did not always coincide. However, in this context, the Company was prepared to go to almost any lengths to guard the valuable concessions its servants had worked hard to win from the Mughuls.
(b) Sir Josiah Child – early calls for sovereign power

Whether, and if so how, to defend English factories, often in the midst of competing Indian powers, had of course already become a pressing concern for many of our erstwhile traders. Mason recounts an early instance. This concerns Sir Josiah Child, Bt, Director of the Company, 1677 till his death in 1699. Bombay’s mainland was in the hands of the Marathas, a competing power to Mughul prominence. The Company were completely reliant on the mainland for food. Yet, seemed powerless to deny access to the harbour by the Moghul admiral, who, ‘used it...’ Mason says ‘for constant raids on the mainland.’ It was obvious, Mason adds that the Marathas would sooner or later, retaliate (Mason 1985: 17).

The English wished to remain neutral between Mughuls and Marathas. Of course such neutrality was tinged with a good dose of self-interest – ‘it was impossible to break with the Mughuls, to whom Surat and other factories were hostages’ (Mason 1985: 17). Caught in such an intricate web with competing powers, and confronted with growing Marathan raids on Bombay harbour, Josiah Child chose, Mason says, to do nothing. He felt, Mason adds, that ‘to defend the island was a vain pompous and insignificant course.’ Child commanded that the existing defences be ‘left unfinished and the militia disbanded... Money had to be saved’ (Mason 1985: 17). All this in the face of an impending Marathan attack on the harbour!
Sir Josiah Child’s imperious manner inspired a rebellion led by Captain Keigwin, commandant of a small garrison of 150 European and 200 native troops (Mason 1985: 17-18). Keigwin’s mutineers declared the island subject to the authority of the Crown; thereby superseding any authority vested in Josiah Child or the Company. Any real attack on the harbour at this time would ensure its fall. Eventually Keigwin and his rebels surrendered. But before the rebellion fizzled out it passed on a valuable lesson in the arts of government in this context to Sir Josiah. A lesson Mason says led ‘the great Josiah’ to become a ‘changed man’ (Mason 1986: 18). During his rebellion, the mutineer, Keigwin,

‘...told the Moghul admiral to keep out of the harbour, finished the fortifications, paid everyone his dues, and handed over the Treasury with as much in it as when he had taken it over. He had made the English a power; secure in their island, they could now ride out a storm on the mainland’ (Mason 1986: 18).

Sir Josiah took the lessons of this mini rebellion to heart. In 1685, two years later, he set out what is arguably an early expression of a changing sentiment of an orderly progress in the pursuit of trade – the ledger was well and truly to be accompanied by the sword to ensure order. Defence would be expensive, but security in going about their profitable business would presumably be well worth it! Sir Josiah said:

‘It is our ambition for the honour of our King and County and the good of Posterity, as well as this company to make the English nation as formidable as the Dutch, or any other European nation...in India; but that cannot be done only in the form and
with the methods of merchants, without the political skill of making all fortified places repay their full charges and expenses’ (in Mason 1986: 18).29

This was, Mason adds, ‘in 1685, a year after the rebellion; two years later he was writing of “the foundation of a large, well grounded, secure English dominion in India for all time to come” ’ (Mason 1986: 18).

(c) Plassey – perhaps the defining, moment

More conflagrations would come and go. Perhaps the most remembered, not least, because of its associations with the Black Hole of Calcutta,30 and the Imperial adventurer Clive, is the battle of Plassey. Plassey counts as another, perhaps the defining moment in the genesis of this new idea about how to conduct trade with the sword in your hand not so as to raze and seize by rapine, but to establish order so as to trade by orderly means.

(i) The build-up

Some would have us believe that the Company had hitherto been carrying on a quiet trade in Bengal.31 Macaulay paints the scene there in idealistic terms. He says,

‘In spite of the Mussulman despot, and of the Mahratta freebooter, Bengal was known throughout the East as the garden of Eden, as the rich kingdom...Distant provinces were nourished from the overflowing of its granaries; and the noble ladies
of London and Paris were clothed in the delicate produce of its looms. The race by whom this rich tract was peopled, enervated by a soft climate and accustomed to peaceful employment, bore the same relation to other Asiatics which the Asiatic bear to the bold and energetic children of Europe...Whatever the Bengalee does he does languidly. His favourite pursuits are sedentary. He shrinks from bodily exertion; and, though voluble in dispute, and singularly pertinacious in the war of chicane, he seldom engages in a personal conflict and scarcely ever enlists as a soldier. We doubt whether there be a hundred genuine Bengalees in the whole army of the East India Trading Company. There never perhaps existed a people so thoroughly fitted by nature and by habit for a foreign yoke’ (Macaulay 1891 Vol. III: 34).

It would for many plausibly pass as heaven on earth. Yet its materiality whilst excluding it from heaven would ensure that it would be a veritable temple to Mammon. Mason puts it thus:

‘The English settlement had grown to a city of four hundred thousand inhabitants; it was a City of Refuge not only for men but for money from all over Bengal, Behar and Orissa. All the richest Bengalis banked in Calcutta as the only place where property was respected...’ (Mason 1985: 32).

However, trade was to become less than quiet in Bengal. The Nawab, Alivardi Khan, ruler of the Subah of Bengal, died on April 10 1756. During his rule, English, French, Dutch and Danish East India Trading Companies pursued their activities, but only at his sufferance. He had, Rai tells us, taken measures to keep their political and
economic powers within certain limits (Rai 2002). As a consequence they played exceptional games with the limits he set on their activities. Rai puts it thus:

‘The French and British Company’s servants and administrators, each in their own way, never stopped pushing the legal limits that Alivardi had set for them; one could say that 18th century French – and Anglo-Indian Colonial praxis was a performance of exceeding Oriental law.... In the case of the British, this colonial improvisation was easily construed as an outright defiance of the Bengali political order. But not without a crisis’ (Rai 2002: 7).

A crisis was indeed in the offing. Rai goes on

‘A number of different antagonisms were sutured together in an intolerable mode of tension brought about by Alivardi’s death: First, for years the British Company’s servants had abused their exclusive farman (royal grant) of 1717 by using their dastaks (guarantees for duty free trade) to cover not only the trade of the Company, but also their own private trade, and even more disastrously for the native government, that of Asian merchants who were willing to pay large sums for use of these dastaks – both practices exceeded the terms of the farman...Consequently, the Bengal subah was losing hundred of thousands of rupees yearly. Second, in preparation for the impending Seven Years War with France, all British presidencies were concerned about ensuring the defensibility of their territories, and were consequently fortifying their various forts...Operating within a cultural logic of territorial integrity, the Nawabs of Bengal did not consider Calcutta a separate Company territory; Alivardi had made it clear that... the Company and its servants
were obliged to submit to his protection. Nonetheless, even during the time of Alivardi the Council at Fort William ordered that fortifications be built—all without the Nawab’s permission’ (Rai 2002: pp7-8).

(ii) A quiet trade no longer

On Alivardi’s death the question of his succession became an urgent one for all, especially the competing trading companies. There were numerous candidates, but without the bloodshed that often attends such stories of accession, the contending parties agreed to Alivardi’s own choice of successor. He chose the son of his nephew, one Mirza Muhammed, known by the more familiar name Sirag-ud-daullah.

Writing many years later Thomas Babington Macaulay thought Alivardi’s choice of successor the worst of all worlds, certainly for the European Companies. Looking back, Macaulay writes about Sirag-ud-daullah in the following terms - ‘oriental despots are perhaps the worst class of human beings; and this unhappy boy was one of the worst specimens of his class’ (Macaulay 1891 Vol. III: 35). James Mill was no more flattering. In his monumental History of British India he writes

‘Siraj-ud-daullah was educated a prince, and with more than even the usual share of princely consideration and indulgence. He had accordingly, more than the usual share of the princely vices. He was ignorant; he was voluptuous; on his pains and pleasures he set a value immense, on the pains and pleasures of other men no value at all; he was impatient, irascible, headstrong’ (Mill 1817: 225).
Practising a quite trade then in the context of such upheavals looked increasingly unlikely.

If not exactly his father incarnate, so far as the Company was concerned Sirag-ud-daullah did take on his father’s mantle, in the sense that he would practice his relations with them, on similar terms. It was inevitable then that existing antagonisms between the Company and Alivardi’s Subah would coalesce with ease into newer, perhaps more urgent ones. Only a matter of days after Sirag-ud-daullah’s succession a character called Krishnadas, son of Raj Ballav, ‘the revenue administrator of Dacca and a confidant of one of Sirag’s rivals for the throne’ is alleged to have embezzled a treasure of 5.3 million, and taken refuge in Calcutta (Rai 2002: 8). Sirag-ud-daullah despatched a messenger to the Council with a demand for the return of Krishnadas. Governor William Drake refused. As Rai puts it, Drake ‘...ordered the Nawab’s messenger be immediately expelled from Calcutta...This expulsion was subsequently interpreted as only the most outrageous confirmation of the Company’s general lack of respect for the new Nawab’ (Rai 2002: 8).

What little respect Sirag-ud-daullah had for the company, was about to evaporate. The young Nawab decided to put up with their pretensions no longer. Perhaps for all the reasons he carefully set out in his letter to his negotiator, Kwala Wazid, but particularly the Company’s audacity in fortifying their positions at Fort William, without his permission, Sirag-ud-daullah mobilised some 40,000 troops to lay siege to
Fort William. When Drake ‘refused to come to terms with the Nawab,’ he took the Fort by force (Rai 2002: 8).

As Macaulay narrates events, the traders at Bengal were ‘terrified and bewildered’ by the turn of events. Macaulay describes how the Governor, who he suggests, ‘...had heard...of Sirag-ud-daullah’s cruelty...frightened out of his wits, jumped into a boat, and took refuge in the nearest ship...’ (Macaulay 1891: vol. III: 36). Others in the fort he maintains were similarly inclined. So, he continues, ‘the military commandant thought he could not do better than follow so good an example.’ The result of all this he tells us was that the ‘fort was taken after a feeble resistance; and...great numbers of the English fell into the hands of the conquerors’ (Macaulay 1891: vol. III: 36).

Once the battle was over, Macaulay depicts a nascent scene of oriental despotism. Hence:

‘the Nabob seated himself with regal pomp in the principal hall of the factory, and ordered Mr. Howell, the first in rank among the prisoners, to be brought before him. His highness talked about the insolence of the English, and grumbled at the smallness of the treasure which he found; but promised to spare their lives, and retired to rest’ (Macaulay 1891: vol. III: 36).

After the Nawab’s assurance that no harm would come to them, Rai recounts the story as told by Mr Howell, a man who Macaulay describes as ‘...the first in rank among the prisoners, to be brought before...’ Sirag-ud-daullah. Mr Howell
reported that on the night of June 20, 1756, after the surrender of Calcutta, some Company soldiers, content with the Nawab’s assurance that no harm would come to any of them, celebrated by drinking the officers’ “spirituous liquors”, and in their intoxication attacked and killed a Bengali Officer. As punishment the Nawab ordered that the English be imprisoned, after which he retired for the night; when asked where in the Fort criminals were usually incarcerated, some Company servants pointed to what was known as the Black Hole, an airless dungeon look-up measuring fourteen by eighteen feet’ (Rai 2002: 9).

This is what people at the time, and others following, call the horror of the ‘Black Hole of Calcutta.’ Clive, who was in Madras at the time, could not have hoped for a better opportunity to reek the foulest vengeance.

Within 48 hours of the news about Calcutta reaching Madras, Clive determined to recapture Calcutta. How crucial this enterprise was to Clive in his make up as a military saviour of the Company’s enterprise and his own, is often not emphasised enough. Just how close the two are in pursuit of glory and money is captured superbly by Mill. He speaks about the 'deliberations for recovering Calcutta', that took place in Madras, and says,

'It was resolved, after some debate, that the re-establishment of the Company’s affairs in Bengal should be pursued at the expense of every other enterprise. A dispute, however, of two months ensued, to determine in what manner prizes should be divided; who should command; and what should be the degree of power entrusted
with the commander. The parties, of whom the pretensions were severally to be weighed, were Mr. Pigott, who... was void of military experience; Colonel Aldercreon, who... was unacquainted with the irregular warfare of the natives; Colonel Lawrence to... whose asthmatical complaints the close and sultry climate of Bengal were injurious; and Clive, to whom none of these exceptions applied. It was... determined, that Clive should be sent. It was also determined, that he should be sent with powers independent of the Presidency of Calcutta...' (James Mill 1817 Vol. II: 230).

As it transpired, and as Rai, by reference to Hill, puts it,

'the Capture of Fort William in the year 1756 is one of the most prominent incidents in the history of the British in Bengal, not merely as one of the great clashes of arms between the British and the Natives of the country, nor because of the sufferings of those who took part in the defence or underwent the hardships of the long stay at Fulta, but for this reason, that the behaviour of the Nawab, Sirag-ud-daullah, forced the Honourable East India Company to reconsider the whole question of its relations with the native Government of Bengal. Up to the outbreak of the war the servants of the Company had been satisfied to pose as foreign traders, practically unarmed, and not presuming in Bengal – whatever they had done in Southern India – to take any active share in the political arrangements of the country. Sirag-ud-daullah by his violent action convinced the Company that its merchants must be no longer looked upon as mere foreigners but as Lords of the country in which they resided for the purpose of trade. It took nearly ten years to realise this fact and perhaps still longer to acknowledge it but the recapture of Calcutta is the starting point of the new idea' (emphasis mine. Hill in Rai 2002: 5).38
This would be a new chapter in the history of the Company. Indeed as putative Lords of the country, the Company and its servants would no longer wish to be just merchants. Order for the long term was yet to be established, but at this stage the Company could and would no longer ignore potentials for native disruption of their trade. So, they would grasp this moment as marking the beginnings of their new idea – a new British imperialism in the above senses and move towards the ‘establishment of sovereign rights’ with the sword (SAHP 2001). Clive was their man. In the ensuing battle, as Macaulay would tell the House of Commons in 1833, the Company would unite ‘...in itself two characters, the character of trade and the character of Sovereign’ (Macaulay 1898: 545).

Of course in his descriptions of the changing character of the Company at this time, Macaulay insists that the Company was not a mere trader one day and sovereign the next. He reminds us that ‘it is a mistake to suppose that the Company was a merely commercial body till the middle of the last century’ (Macaulay 1898: 547). According to him

‘Commerce was its chief object; but in order to enable it to pursue that object, it had been, like the other Companies which were its rivals, like the Dutch India Company, like the French India Company, invested from a very early period with political functions. More than a hundred and twenty years ago, the Company was in miniature precisely what it now is. It was entrusted with the very highest prerogatives of sovereignty. It had its forts, and its white captains, and its black Sepoys; it had its
civil and criminal tribunals; it was authorised to proclaim martial law; it sent ambassadors to the native governments, and concluded treaties with them; it was Zemindar of several districts, and within those districts, like other Zemindars of the first class, it exercised the powers of a sovereign, even to the infliction of capital punishment on the Hindoos within its jurisdiction. It is incorrect, therefore, to say that the Company was at first a mere trader, and has since become a sovereign' (Macaulay 1898: 547).

Perhaps it is truer to say then, as he further reflects, that

‘it is impossible to name anyone day, or any one-year, as the day or year when the Company became a great potentate. It has been the fashion indeed to fix on the year 1765, the year in which the Moghul issued a commission authorising the Company to administer the revenue of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, as the precise date the accession of this singular body to sovereignty. I am utterly at a loss to understand why this epoch should be selected. Long before that the Company had the reality of political power’ (Macaulay 1898: 548).

Macaulay’s refrain about the already multiple characters of the Company is in a sense, a refrain about the impurity of all characterisations. Perhaps the only certainty in our story of the Company, its trade and how it governs its activities, is that it would often change its modus operandi. Macaulay once more provides us with a neat summary. Hence, ‘the transformation of the Company from a trading body, which possessed some sovereign prerogatives for the purposes of trade, into a sovereign body, the trade of which was auxiliary to its sovereignty, was affected by degrees and
under disguise' (Macaulay 1898: 549). It is at such a conjuncture that Clive, described by Pitt as a ‘heaven-born general’, set out on his adventure (Morgan 1999: 452). If the Company wished to continue with its trade both in Bengal and elsewhere, the native challenge had to be met, and met with force. If Siraj-ud-Daullah would not co-operate in the Company’s enterprise, a more compliant Nawab would have to be found.

Precise accounts of the ensuing battles and manoeuvres in Bengal differ. It is not my intention to go through them here, save to note that by hook or by crook the Company triumphed and Clive’s engagements would usher in our complicated new idea. In this way we see how the so-called new idea would exceed commerce and bring into serious consideration, trade as a problem to manage and govern. Mason puts it with a suitable brevity - ‘Siraj-ud-Daullah was...put down; Mir Jaffer was put up’ (Mason 1985: 36). Trade would now, it is hoped, be secure. Mason elaborates further:

‘Clive had pursued his way with his usual dogged pertinacity; he had let nothing turn him aside, he had not shrunk from intrigue and deception. He had rid Bengal of the French and for the English had won security to trade. Those had been his two main objectives, but he had also won much more...These were the first steps towards an empire; now everything was ready for one of the worst chapters in English history. The English on the spot had deliberately, and with the aid of force, both overt and diplomatic, of bribery and of intrigue, set out to attain two...objectives, to drive out the French and to make their trade secure. They had been led further than they meant to go; they had wanted power but had not realised that it must bring responsibility. As for the Directors in England, they had been presented with an empire at which they
looked with the incredulous elation, shot with sharp twinges of doubt, of a village grocer who had inherited a chain of department stores and is not quite sure whether they will pay him a profit beyond his dreams or drag him down to ruin' (Mason 1985: 37).

In times to come, chroniclers of these new moments in the Company’s adventures on the sub-continent would sweeten the imperatives and bitter dosage of trade with a variety of humanitarianism. Hence, they would echo Macaulay in surprisingly missionary tones when he says:

‘It is scarcely possible to calculate the benefits which we might derive from the diffusion of European civilisation among the vast population of the East. It would be, on the most selfish view of the case, far better for us that the people of India were well governed and independent of us, than ill governed and subject to us; that they were ruled by their kings, but wearing our broad cloth, and working with our cutlery, than that they were performing their salaams to English collectors and English magistrates, but were too ignorant to value, or too poor to buy, English manufactures. To trade with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages’ (Macaulay 1833 in Sharpe 1993: 7).

But for now they would probably be more at ease with James Morris’ future sentiments. He envisages a different version of this relationship. Writing about the effects of the so-called Mutiny in 1858, he says
The mutiny had demonstrated ... that not all the coloured peoples were capable of spiritual redemption ... but the British could always concentrate on material regeneration – the enforcement of law and order, the distribution of scientific progress and lubrication of trade’ (in Strawson 1989: 33).41

The Anglo-India war of 1857-58 and the changes incumbent on that are still to come. The army would play a crucial role in defeating the insurgents. For the moment it would, Strawson notes, ‘...help with all three’ of the above objectives (Strawson 1989: 33). What is particularly important for our purposes is that arms and the practice of arms in India would now change. They would change, as Guha puts it, into a more systematic imperial career. What are now at stake are matters of professional competence – matters of law and order. If Clive had not quite done with his mercenary mercantile adventures, he certainly appreciates the prospect of a regulated empire. The Marquess of Wellesley is one of those who would carry that forward.

4

A Growing Militocracy - From Violence to Order42

Less than a hard fought battle Plassey may have been but in terms of the ultimate aim of arms and forces in the field, Clive’s armies triumphed. Clive now considered himself master of all Bengal. He set about the administration with gusto.43 Many, according to Macaulay, prostrated themselves at his feet. Meer Jaffer showered him with gifts. Perhaps the lucre exceeded even Clive greatest expectations.44 Macaulay
comments, ‘there was no limit to his acquisitions but his own moderation’ (Macaulay 1891: 54). Doubtless the greatest gift of all that Meer Jaffer bestowed on Clive was the estate, comprising the land the East India Company held and paid rent to the Nawab for. Clive would now hold it free of all rents for life. Whatever the monetary benefits flowing into the war chest held by Clive, and plunder would not cease just yet - he would still take immense pride in being regarded as a military man.

As Warren Hastings put it after the conquest, ‘the resources of this country (Bengal) in the hands of a military people...are capable of raising them to the dominion of all India’ (in Mason 1974: 18). Almost a hundred years later Major Edward Caulfield Archer would evaluate these processes, with a characteristic ‘military bluntness’ (Suleri 1992: 83). Though less hagiographic, critical even, he nevertheless captures an essential insight about the importance of arms. He says

‘It is not to be denied that the power of the British has been obtained more by force than by other fairer means...Those of former Governors-General, whose exactions and grasping seizures have acquired to the perpetuators such damming shame, have been accounted the greatest of Indian statesmen. Among these names are those of Lord Clive and Mr Hastings’ (Archer 1833: 155).

Of course there would be more opportunities for grasping seizure, shameful or otherwise. Yet there is a growing realisation that the use of violence and the sword to garner, even guarantee trade, for a time would have to give way to a less haphazard, more certain means in its conduct. What is at stake here is a burgeoning Imperial
career in arms – a Militocracy, a Military rule. A change in career path Guha expresses better than most.

Hence, in the face of increasing ambivalence in their relations with the Mughuls, the Company did indeed as we see resort to the use of violence and the sword. It did manage to establish a sort of sovereignty along certain bits of India’s coastline. Guha uses the words of Philip Francis to emphasise this fact: ‘there was no power in India, but the power of the sword, and that was the British sword, and no other’ (in Guha 1997: 25).

Yet, Guha continues,

‘The justification of Britain’s occupation of India by the right of conquest was subjected before long to a dialectical shift as colonialism outgrew its predatory, mercantilist beginnings to graduate to a more systematic imperial career. What was acquired haphazardly by conquest developed, in the course of this transition, into a carefully “regulated empire.” Corresponding to that change, the exclusive reliance on the sword, too, gave way to an orderly control in which force (without losing its primacy…) had to learn to live with institutions and ideologies designed to generate consent. In other words the idiom of conquest was replaced by the idiom of order’ (Guha 1997: 25).

Clive is himself clear about the importance and success of arms in the hunt for further colonial riches and expansion. We see just how importantly he views an imperial
career in arms to such an expansion especially in the form of a standing force in his letter to William Pitt (Pitt the Elder). Written two years after Plassey, Clive put before the Prime Minister exact amounts of the extensive revenues of the country. Surrounded by such a fortune Clive brings to the Prime Minister’s attention his own hand in acquiring such riches; urges him not to neglect the exploitation of such Indian riches; and implores him to work constantly to their care and enhancement. Hence,

‘The great revolution that has been effected here by the success of the English arms, and the vast advantages gained to the Company by a treaty concluded in consequence thereof, have I observe, in some measure, engaged the public attention; but much more may yet in time be done, if the Company will exert themselves in the manner the importance of their present possessions and future prospects deserves. *I have represented to them in the strongest terms the expediency of sending out and keeping up constantly such a force as will enable them to embrace the first opportunity of further aggrandizing themselves;* and dare I pronounce, from a thorough knowledge of this country’s government, and the genius of the people, acquired by two years’ application and experience, that such an opportunity will soon offer … It is well worthy of consideration, that [our] project may be brought about without draining the mother country … A small force from home will be sufficient, as we always make sure of any number we please of black troops, who, being much better paid and treated by us than the country’s powers, will very readily enter into our service’ (in Keith 1922: 13-18) (in Malcolm II 1836: 119).

There were difficult times ahead. The Company may have proclaimed itself master in Bengal, but mastery of the vaster region of all India was not a forgone conclusion.
Before claiming dominion over all India, 'the...Company’s army had to meet three considerable military powers and were to suffer many set backs' (Mason 1974: 18). They would also meet with many other kinds of insurgent, no less trying for that, along the way.⁵⁰ British mastery secured a foundation that always rested on a precipice; it 'hung by a thread' (Mason 1974: 83).

Whatever the conflicts between London and men on the spot in the growing dominions in India – the directors in London were often the last to know about action taken in their name – security became the paramount concern for the men in India. The reins around India’s neck would have to be tight. Some, as we see below, became exasperated at the Company court’s lack of understanding of the conditions bedevilling commanders on the ground.

(a) A Welleslian school?

According to Peers, the Marquess of Wellesley ⁵¹ is one of the first to give serious consideration, post Clive, to the formation and pursuit of an imperial career in arms; an imperial career in arms in India.⁵² Not for the first time, nor would it be the last, he gave vent to the frustrations many a Company official on the ground felt with the court in London, when he echoed the sentiments of the Marquess of Hastings:

'It is difficult to make this court understand that their territorial possessions here are not precisely like an estate in Yorkshire, or that they are not to expect blind
compliance with their orders in the one case as they might in the other’ (Hastings 1858 in Peers 1995: 44).\textsuperscript{53}

Dealing with such complexities would become daily preoccupations of men like Wellesley who wanted both to keep that already acquired and sustain the aggressive acquisition of more. So much so, Peers argues, that the Company’s concern with shareholder value became a secondary consideration:

‘The East India Trading Company’s annual dividend, or the state of its China trade, were matters of secondary importance to officials more concerned with squaring the territorial revenues of India with governmental expenditure, or dealing with what they thought were endemic challenges to their authority. Home charges, domestic machinations and the broad issues of imperial defence and corporate stability were all secondary to the principle imperatives of security and stability. Policy in India was conceived in the first instance with reference to the army and financial resources necessary to sustain it. Hence, officials in India would assert that the “British system in India has always been to keep the troops in a constant state of preparation for war” \textsuperscript{54} (see Peers 1995: 44).

Peers terms this burgeoning style of rule, a ‘militocracy.’ It had ‘…its genesis in the grouping of officials around Wellesley during his tenure as Governor-General’ (Peers 1995: 45). By collecting together remarks from its advocates and practitioners, Peers elaborates its reasoning thus:
Perhaps the most complete articulation of this school of thought can be extracted from John Malcolm’s *Political History of British India*. There it was stated quite bluntly that, “the only safe view that Britain can take of her empire is to consider it, as it really is, always in a state of danger.” The widespread acceptance of Malcolm’s line of thought can be seen in a journal article from 1845 when it was said, “No man...better understands the habits and feelings of our subjects in that part of the world than Sir John Malcolm.” Malcolm’s conclusion that, “Our government of that country is essentially military,” was one that many officials in India would have agreed with. Thomas Munro remarked that, “in this country we always are, and always ought to be prepared for war.” These sentiments were further echoed by Charles Metcalfe who proclaimed that “the main object of all the Acts of our Government [is] to have the most efficient army that we can possibly maintain” (in Peers 1995: 45).

Previous Governor-Generals had on the whole remained mesmerised by control from London. Wellesley is different. By the time of his Governorship, the Company had a man whose explicit aim would be expansion. Thus he wrote, ‘I can declare my conscientious conviction, that no greater blessing can be conferred on the native inhabitants of India than the extension of the British authority, influence and power’ (in Mason 1985: 84). For Wellesley British supremacy through arms was not merely a matter of observation but instinctual command.

According to Mason, Wellesley would ‘grasp nettles without hesitation’ (Mason 1974: 135). There were many battles both historic and burgeoning to resolve often all at once. I don’t go into detail here save only to mention those Wellesely either
inaugurated or brought to a conclusion by the 'device of...subsidiary treaty' or subsidiary alliance (Spear 1965: 103). 

Spear describes its essential features thus:

"Wellesley...took...advantage of...acute divisions and jealousies of the remaining Indian states. For this purpose he employed the device of the subsidiary treaty. He would guarantee the independence of a threatened state in return for control of its external relations. The method was to station a force of the Company's troops in the capital, available to deal with any attack. These were under the control of a British Resident and were paid for by the state itself. Thus, should the state fall out with the Company, it would find the Company's hand already at its heart. The financial arrangement made internal interference possible at any time on the ground of non-payment of the subsidy for the force. In the then circumstances the whole arrangement meant for any state freedom from Indian conquest at the price of subjection to the British" (Spear 1965: 103).

(b) A Wellesleyan future

I’m not writing a biography of Wellesley. However, the claims for his character and policies are relevant as significant markers in defining our nascent traditions in arms. As legends of a soldier hero go they imbibe part of the package in the details that go to make up an ideal soldier at this time – an adventurer yes, but also a man who, realising the immensity of the tasks that lay ahead of him, sought to convey order.
Order would be the preoccupation of many soldiers to come, not least of General Dyer.

Wellesley’s staff would eulogise him as the ‘glorious little man’; sometimes he is known as Wellesley Bhadhur. In a metaphoric translation, bold as brass; a man of considerable energy; a man with a ‘staggering attention to detail’; and more valuable than anything else perhaps, a man of ‘resolute common sense.’ (Mason 1974: 154-155). Paraphrasing Mason once more, it is frightening how, although the imperial project had yet to become as ‘brassy, vulgar and self-assertive as it was at the time of the Diamond Jubilee,’ Wellesley exemplifies a sense in which ‘...the certainty that right was on our side was even stronger’ (Mason 1974: 166).

The views of men like Wellesley and the officials around him are neatly summarised in another place. This time by Stocqueler in his ‘The Old Field Officer’ (1853). All our wars Stocqueler suggests are

‘almost always for the purpose of extending social improvement and good government...and the blessings of tranquillity and security of life and property...and these...more than compensate for the rudeness by which amelioration is usually effected’ (in Mason 1974: 166/7).56

However large a claim this may be it did signal just how demanding the new career in arms in pursuit of tranquillity would be. Trevor Hearl captures it perfectly when he says,
'the new responsibilities of imperial power (resulting from the Wellesley brothers’
extension of Company territory in India), exposed old weaknesses, created new
demands and expanded career opportunities in the armed forces and overseas
administration. Significantly, these developments required a new type of soldier and
administrator; not eighteenth century gentlemen, but nineteenth century
professionals’ (Hearl 1976: 254).

It would simply not be enough anymore for men who bore arms in these senses to be
fitted for this role in the absence of good schooling and good practise in that role. To
be fitted as a soldier, meant more than being able to conduct a ‘hard gallop, a gallant
fight, and...[drink] a full jug’ (Barnett 1967: 16). Borrowing from Barnet, character
would no longer suffice to the neglect of intellect in defining the ethics of men who
fought to defend, and when the occasion demanded, expand empire (Barnett 1967:
17). The use of violence in forging and gaining markets is now well and truly to be
transformed into fighting in the name of law and order.

5

Formalising Military Instruction and Training

Wellesley himself did not formulate any course of instruction in military education.
He did however direct his attention to ‘improving the personnel of the civil service’
by proposing the ‘establishment of a college at Fort William at Calcutta...where...the
education of the young civil servants sent out from England should be completed’
(Stephen & Lee 1917: 1129). The company did not approve his scheme. They thought it 'too vast and too expensive' (Stephen & Lee 1917: 1129).\textsuperscript{57} His proposals do exemplify nevertheless just how urgent the provision of training for men under arms was and just how contiguous the role and characters of administrator and soldiers are at this time.\textsuperscript{58}

There were at this time still two routes, ultimately to a commission, in the armed services; 'the direct route straight from home or school into the services at sixteen...or...the scholastic route from school...via a cadet college and its qualifying examinations...’ (Hearl 1976: 251). The former,

‘...used by over 80 percent of officers, required the help of patronage for the navy, the marines and the East India Company, and additionally until 1871, the price of purchase for infantry and cavalry in the Army, costing...between £450 and £570, according to regiment and pro rata for promotion’ (Hearl 1976: 251).

According to Hearl, ‘by 1812, a tenfold expansion of official provision in military and associated education had...already...been achieved’ (Hearl 1976: 254). Numerous establishments sprang up, catering for the different arms of service and were taking on candidates. Hence

‘The Royal Naval Academy (1729) at Portsmouth was transformed into the Royal Naval College (1808) and the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich Warren (1720) was rebuilt on the Common (1808), together increasing a...cadet strength of 80 or 90
to almost 300. A new Royal Military College for 400 candidates was opened at Great
Marlow (1802) and moved to Sandhurst (1812), while the East India Company
opened its colleges at Haileybury, Hertford (1812), and Addiscombe, Croydon
(1809), for over 200 civil and military students’ (Hearl 1976: 254).

(a) Early battles for a professional heart

Professionalisation in military character and education is now well under way. Hearl
distinguishes this mini-revolution as being marked out by a trivalent of

‘colleges, curriculum...and...examinations: these three scholastic factors thereafter
combined to produce a force, based on military needs, powerful enough to generate,
“an educational revolution in this country during the 1820s and 1830s,” 59 and to
establish... "the military ancestry of the Meritocracy” , 60 (Hearl 1976: 255).

As early as 1855 Lord Panmure and the Council of Military Education inaugurated a
series of changes to military education. But it was really only a start. Henry Barnard
summarises what the changes would mean:

(i) Success in competitive examination would now govern admission to the
various military schools;

(ii) The Council of Military Education would take charge of the ‘order and
method of studies and all examinations for promotion’ (Barnard 1872: 529);
(iii) The weight of study and the order in which it is to be delivered would be minutely organised with each Professor expected to keep to the requisite courses by 'the supervision of a Master of Studies' (Barnard 1872: 529);

(iv) A Staff School to be developed and complete the system (Barnard 1872: 529).

Of course the system of purchase would now have to be tackled head on. Brian Bond reminds us that

‘...a really professional system of advancement was incompatible with the existence of the purchase system which of course effected the majority of first commissions offered for the infantry and cavalry, and of promotions up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel’ (Bond 1972: 18).

Commissions already cost hundreds of pounds, but according to Bond by the time of the Crimean war, ‘a captaincy might cost £2,400 and a lieutenant-colonelcy £7,000 - in ‘smart’ regiments it would be much more’ (Bond 1972: 18).

After prolonged, often heated debate, in 1871 Edward Cardwell\(^6\) repeated the necessity for reform in the following terms:

‘If there is one lesson which we have learned from the history of the...Franco-German War,...it is this – that the secret of Prussian success has been more owing to the professional education of the officers than to any other cause to which it can be
ascribed. Neither gallantry nor heroism will avail without professional training’
(Cardell in Bond 1972: 19).

Though reform was introduced, the antagonism between reformers and conservatives would endure for a good while yet. Alongside these developments grew up an army of another type; an army of tutors, and crammers who would ready candidates for the entrance examinations many would now need to pass as several colleges instituted entrance examinations.

These were indeed seminal moments in the burgeoning professional character of imperial army careers. Perhaps an even greater impetus in the rush to army reform would be ‘the legacy of the Anglo-Indian War 1857-58’ (Wolpert 2000: 239).

(b) A new order

Officially at least in 1858 Company rule came to an end. The Crown would now assume direct responsibility for the Indian Empire. Of course in some senses nothing had or would change. As Mason highlights by reference to the words of Lord Grenville, generally nothing did indeed change. As early as 1813 Grenville ‘had said in parliament...“the British Crown is de facto sovereign in India” ’ adding, ‘each of the great Government of India Acts, in 1813, 1833 and 1853 had asserted a little more clearly the sovereignty of Parliament’ (in Mason 1985: 173). So, according to Mason, as far as the army was concerned ‘all that happened in 1858 was the final extinction
of a corporation through whom sovereignty had once been exercised, but over whom parliamentary control had progressively been strengthened' (Mason 1985: 173).

Yet, the one institution the war did have a profound effect on was the army. The fallout was tremendous even given Mason’s argument about continuity (Mason 1974). Hence as Wolpert succinctly puts it ‘The Company’ s presidency armies were reorganised as a martially co-ordinated royal machine designed to prevent any recurrence of rebellion’ (Wolpert 2000: 241).63

The dissolution of John Company in 1858 would herald the end of its civil service training college at Haileybury and 3 years later the closure of its military training college at Addiscombe. Unlike the former where (as we saw in chapter 3) universities were able to take up the slack, military training particularly for the army resolved to the Royal Military Academy, junior and senior departments.

6

Military Traditions, New Models and Brigadier-General R E H Dyer

(a) Antecedents

Reginald Edward Harry Dyer (R E H Dyer) hailed from a family with a tradition of military service in India. His and his family’s connections with India were long and deep. His biographer, Ian Colvin, tells us that the Honourable East India Company
employed Dyer’s grandfather, John Dyer, as a ships pilot. John Dyer fought ‘with success…Dyak pirates who then infested the seas, islands and estuaries of Burma and the Malay Archipelago’ (Colvin 1929: 2). Edward, Dyer’s father, born on 7 July 1831 in Calcutta, also sought employment in the military as an engineer. Eventually, persuaded by his brother, he settled down to a trade in beer by setting up a brewery. He began working in what he probably thought a quiet trade in the Hill station of Kasauli satisfying the growing thirst of the ‘many Englishmen, servants and soldiers of John Company’ (Colvin 1929: 3).

It was whilst he and his wife were in the hills that they got their first taste of the turbulence associated with the so-called Mutiny about to break out around them. Colvin elaborates - they sheltered ‘some of the English women who escaped, trembling and aghast, from the smoke and carnage of the plains below to the safety of the hills’ (Colvin 1824: 3). Such an experience would live on in the memory not only of the Dyers, but many a so-called Britisher and define their changed relations with India and Indians. The Brig.-Gen. to be Dyer would carry the burden of the memory of the so-called mutiny.

(b) An army cadet

Like many of his contemporaries, Dyer was sent to Ireland for schooling. He attended Midleton College in Cork. After flirting briefly with the possibilities of a medical career, he opted for the prospects of a military career. After finishing with Midleton
he set sail for London where he would cram for entry to Sandhurst. His tutor, Ashton, had high hopes for him. But struck down with illness Dyer had to delay a year. He finally entered Sandhurst as a Gentleman Cadet on 3rd September 1884, when aged 19 yrs and 9 months (Colvin 1929: 11). He left in August 1885 with ‘proficiency in military law and tactics’ to take up a commission on 29 August in the Royal West Surrey Regiment (Colvin 1929: 11).

According to Mockler-Ferryman, the tone of the college at this time had changed entirely. Whereas it had been a

‘...mere boys’ school open to any one passing a low standard qualifying examination, with just sufficient military veneer to make the cadet a little different from an ordinary public school boy...now...the small boy was abolished, and the age of admission (by competitive examination) was fixed at between sixteen and eighteen’ (Mockler-Ferryman 1900: 35).

Once there the education was determinedly military and determinedly practical. Mockler-Feryman once again gives us a window on the ‘status of the cadets.’ He adds, ‘where possible military men took the place of civilian instructors’ (Mockeler-Ferryman: 1900: 36).

Orgill informs us that the ‘...subjects in which Dyer was examined were Military Administration; Military Law; Tactics; Fortification; Military Topography and Reconnaissance; Drill; Gymnastics; Riding’ (Orgill 2002). Dyer’s mark at the end
was 1980, which Orgill thinks put him ‘about half way in the order of merit.’ Perhaps most intriguing of all is Orgill’s comment that ‘Dyer’s conduct as a probationer was described as ‘good,’ but in his final term was described as indifferent, which was an unusually pejorative comment.’

(c) ‘At staff college batch’

The senior section of what was once known collectively as Sandhurst now stood on its own as Camberley. A place for the elite in the armed forces, Dyer took his staff college entrance examinations while in Meerut on 7th August 1895. He learned of his success in November and set out for England in December 1895, entering Camberley in January 1896.

The tide of professionalism did not elude the Staff College. Bond suggests that by the 1890s it put behind it ‘...much of its reputation for pedantry...’ Consequently ‘...it was attracting some outstanding students; and, above all, the magic letters p.s.c. were worth having since they opened up opportunities not only of coveted appointments, but also of accelerated promotion’ (Bond 1972: 153). It now had at its disposal the services of two officers, Henry J. T. Hildyard and George F. R. Anderson. They left Bond argues, ‘...a lasting impression on the educational history of the army’ (Bond 1972: 153).
Dyer came to an institution then much changed; but still in the serious business of turning out men who would in the near future ‘...command...armies, corps and divisions in the First World War’ (Bond 1972: 162). His contemporaries read like a list of what Bond terms a ‘galaxy of future stars’ (Bond 1972: 162). In a letter to the Times, a writer extols the class of 1896, teachers and students both, as quite simply the best. Signed under the pseudonym ‘Archimedes,’ he speaks without reserve in the honour he pays. Much of the success of the General Staff of his day is due he thinks to their instruction - the instruction of Hildyard and Anderson.

(d) A Regime of practise

Yet, our signatory, Archimedes, is not so complimentary as to embellish Staff College practice without contradiction. Brig.-Gen. Edmonds’ reminiscences, according to Bond, are ‘for the most part unflattering description(s) of the Staff College in the 1890s’ (Bond 1972: 159). For instance he is not enamoured by the fact that in 1896 of the thirty-two students in each year, only twenty-four entered by competition. Eight entered by nomination (Edmonds 1896). For our unflattering critic the whole of his first year was wasted – purely formal.

Leaving aside the details of the curriculum, the second year saw Hildyard and Henderson’s ethics really came to the fore. Even our unflattering critic would approve the turnaround. According to Bond, Hildyard loathed cramming: ‘...we do not want any cramming here ...we want officers to absorb not to cram’ (in Bond 1972: 154).
The next logical step for Hildyard would be to try and abolish all written examinations. Though it didn't happen as quickly as he would like, he did manage eventually to put an end to the final examination. Now under the new regime the manufacture of officers and future commanders in the field shifted from preparing the candidates for paper examinations to encouraging them to solve 'problems of strategy, tactics and organisation both in their quarters and in the field' (Bond 1972: 154). Hence, Henderson summarises his ethic of training thus:

'This method of training, accompanied as it was by a salutary friction with other brains ... was undoubtedly a great advance... It was more exclusively practical than the method pursued at any Staff College in Europe; and it was the best substitute for the complete experience on which Wellington laid stress, and also the best supplement to the partial experience... of one or more minor campaigns' (Henderson 1910 in Bond 1972: 154). 70

This then was the formal Staff College training Brig.-Gen. Dyer underwent - hard work and application. Though Dyer, his biographer supposes, 'left but a slight impression on this brilliant assembly,' he also draws our attention to Hildyard's closing remarks in his report of Dyer: 'This officer has shown great force of character, and I shall expect to hear of him again' (in Colvin 1929: 34). Colvin adds, 'he took in a great deal more than his comrades and teachers supposed' (Colvin 1929: 34). The assumption that an officer on the ground knows best very much defined Dyer's creed.
Dyer graduated from the college on 21 December 1897 and sailed for India where until spring 1900 he was Lieutenant in the 29th Punjab infantry.

In Practice

‘He did his duty, as he saw it’ (Kipling in Swinson 1964: 209).

The Staff College was not to be Dyer’s last encounter with military education. From 1901 to 1908 as Captain Dyer he took charge of a Garrison School in Chakrata as an instructor. He returned to work in his regiment soon after his stint at Chakrata until February 1916. Opportunities to put into practice all his skills and experience gained at the heart of the centres of British military tradition would shortly appear. General Kirkpatrick, Chief of Staff at Delhi sent for Dyer, now a colonel, instructing him to ‘take charge of the military operations in South-East Persia’ (the Sarhad) (Colvin 1929: 67). It was for the successful conclusion of this campaign that he was made a Companion of Bath (CB), and during it that his request to be made a General was granted (Colvin 1929: 48/67).

(a) A call to the Sarhad

Traditionally, men like Dyer built their reputations on what Sir Isaiah Berlin characterise as ‘the supreme value of action’. They would aim to be ‘the dominant character’ in all their engagements with whomever they did battle (in Strawson 1989:
Operations in the Sarhad would be one of the better known occasions when Dyer would cement his claim to being part of such a tradition. His campaigns in the Sarhad, to bring order to the ill-defined border areas with Persia are another episode in that job; another one of Victoria's little wars in all their complexity.\footnote{71}

I do not discuss the campaigns in any detail here. There is an official history of the campaigns published by HMSO (Bayliss 1987), as there is Dyer’s own account, which is akin to an adventure story (Dyer 1921). I do however highlight some instances of Dyer’s encounters with what he would regard as recalcitrant natives as cases exemplifying the traditions of his style as a tough soldier and ruler; bringing the chaos all around him to order.

The sub-title of Dyer’s account of the campaign gives us a clue as to what is at stake. He calls his account, ‘The Raiders of the Sarhad: Being the account of a campaign of arms and bluff against the brigands of the Persian – Baluchi border during the Great War’ (1921).\footnote{72} These weren’t just conventional wars, but also games of bluff and impression. We get a sense of the games he plays and the impression he seeks to foster in the Raiders when he recounts for us a moment involving his motor car. His companion explains the car to one of the Raiders: ‘do you see that queer thing there?’ he asks. ‘And do you see that the front part of it is filled with hundreds of little holes? The General only has to press a button and a hail of bullets will come out of those holes, and you, and all your men will be killed’ (Dyer 1921: 116). The chortle of laughter from his driver and assistant nearly has them falling over. Yet the point is
well made. The bluff must be held onto as long as possible, remembering all the while Dyer says, ‘...to show no sign of fear or doubt of them. That impresses them more than any thing else’ (emphasis mine. Dyer 1921: 116).

An amusing moment perhaps, but from the outset Dyer makes clear his role is to bring the 'nomad tribes of the Sarhad...back into line with their old policy of friendship with Britain' by fostering in them an impression of his and British invincibility (Dyer 1921: 18). His duty is to teach them a lesson that seeking friendships elsewhere, in this context with sundry Germans, by allowing such Germans free passage thorough their lands is not in the end to their benefit. Of course bringing them into line would mean bringing them to a very British order and understanding of their relations with British power. Such a colonial understanding and order smacks of the paternalism we saw in chapter 3 practised by O'Dwyer, the administrator. So he, Dyer, would, he says, show these troublesome tribesmen that their activities were causing the British Raj harm, and that they '...must...fall into line with their old policy of friendship with Britain' (Dyer 1921: 18).

The force of these lessons would be driven home! Of one thing he is quite sure:

‘...no race, white or coloured, ever held in respect any man or government showing weakness or indecision, and...it was little use in making friends with these tribesmen without first inspiring them with a wholesome respect for British arms’ (Dyer 1921: 216).
He adds confidently,

‘...once the lesson...is...driven home...only then...should...an endeavour be made to become friendly with them...win them back to our side and...appoint them as doorkeepers of the Baluchistan frontier...but door keepers with their rifles pointed at our enemies instead of at us’ (Dyer 1921: 28).

So he would comport himself in precisely the manner of a latter day Lord, goading the raiders both collectively and individually to try him, with a view to these ends. We see a clear version of such practice in his dealings with the entire Raider chiefs when he calls for their attendance at various Durbars; Durbars he calls to listen to their explanations/excuses for not behaving themselves and then insisting they change their ways.

Thus, we see a particularly evocative moment in his style of dealing with the raider chiefs when caught in a trap of his own making he tells us about. He makes his way to Karismabad to convey his demands to one of the raider chiefs, Jiand. A meeting is convened at which he storms about the burning of animal feed, demanding to know who did it – ‘how dare you burn my busha? What reason had you for doing it, and who told you to do it?’ he storms. The reply is swift – ‘the country is ours and everything in it. We will burn the busha, or burn anything we like’ (Dyer 1921: 158). Surrounded he tells us by men who are armed with rifles, he angrily tells his interlocutor to sit down and orders one of his men to arrest the interlocutor. At that moment he relates how Jinand’s men rose at once and brought their rifles to bear on
him and his party. Instantly he roars “how dare you, you dogs? Sit down this instant!”
Reaching out to Jiand he ‘forced him down to his side.’ Disarming all competitors, he
finished off addressing them with disdain: ‘if there is the slightest sign of treachery I
will shoot you down like the dogs you are’ (Dyer 1921: 159).

Other raiders he meets are treated with similar disdain. Suffice to say that his mode of
relating to Indians is, as I note, not so extraordinary as to be, to borrow a phrase from
another place, ‘beyond the pale.’73 The official account of his campaigns
congratulates him on a success that stems in their view precisely on the ‘...way in
which he outwitted the Sarhaddi chiefs’ (Bayliss 1987: 167).

(b) Called to restore order in Amritsar

Following on from this logic, one would say that Dyer’s actions in Amritsar 1919
stem precisely from his way of conducting himself in relation to his charges - as a
soldier. Arguably his statements/explanations for his actions in Amritsar, in all their
versions are merely those of a soldier who understands his duty through the lens of
his job as a defender of empire. Their monstrous character is not as something other
to that job. Perhaps there is nothing more interesting than their normality – ideal
statements of his practice!

I want to end by highlighting some of his words as displaying his character and the
assumptions of his role in relation to those over whom he exercised authority.
Perhaps the most candid statement about his actions and their imperatives is found in his report to the General Staff in August 1919 about his actions on that day. As we saw in chapter 1, he did not remonstrate with the crowd after arriving at the Bagh, after all he had not come ‘...to further parley with the mob...they were there to defy the arm of the law’ (in Sayer 1991: 144). Borrowing from Sayer, in what follows he states ‘...exactly why he acted as he did’ on that fateful day (Sayer 1991: 144). Hence

'The responsibility was very great. If I fired I must fire with good effect, a small amount of firing would be a criminal act of folly. I had the choice of carrying out a very distasteful and horrible duty or of neglecting to do my duty, of suppressing disorder or of becoming responsible for all future bloodshed...What faced me was what on the morrow would be the Danda Fauj (Rebel Army). I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed and I consider this the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and widespread effect it was my duty to produce, if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd but one of producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on those who were present but more specifically throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity' (in Draper 154-6).
In this chapter I have attempted to show at some length how important the tradition of arms is to Britain’s imperial projects and mission in India. If anything, such an enterprise goes a long way to recognising how Britain's adventures in the sub-continent were far from being merely accidental. It was more in the nature of a modern plan with its attendant schemes. Thus, far from being a fortuitous enterprise, armed order deserves the epithet tradition, and those who were at the forefront of that exercise, were drilled in its delivery. The events in Amritsar provide an exemplar par excellence for us to see the imperatives of order swing into action. Dyer was quite literally the man whose make up ensured he took no prisoners. Colonel Hildyard, as we saw, summed up Dyer's make up in a single sentence. It is worth repeating. Commenting in his final report on Dyer at the Staff College Hildyard said 'this officer has shown great force of character, and I shall expect to hear of him again' (in Colvin 1929: 34).

Of course traditions of arms have varied over the time of Britain’s connections with the sub-continent. My aim has been to distil a distinctive set of practices that define the manner in which soldiers, specifically Reginald Dyer, saw themselves and their roles in India, given that project's initial imperatives and the impetus towards an Imperial profession in arms. We see how profoundly Dyer’s versions of his duty and
conduct in relation to Indians are informed by histories of imperial adventure in the shape of the East India Trading Company. That adventure turns into a recondite professional career in arms the major preoccupation of which was order. Its major focus turned along the assumptions of sovereignty always a significant problem for our erstwhile rulers.

In the next chapter I take the problems of order into a consideration of the role and make up of the Secretary of State for India at the time. He presents us with a much more complex figure who battles with the whole rationale for a foreign power being in India. He is in this sense different from the two characters we have encountered thus far. His solutions to the question of who should take the mantle of governor, are exemplary, if somewhat quixotic. Perhaps that is because he is slightly removed from the day to day reality of the conduct of empire. He is freer to take a longer view. Doing so gave him the time and freedom to ponder the requisite roles of Indians and their imperial masters. His ideal ruler gives a much greater scope and regard for the other. His version of the man who is made to rule was not so much 'after me no more fathers' as 'what can we do together?'

This characterisation, however is perhaps rather too critical of his attempt to renew the character of ruler. In the figures of O'Dwyer and Dyer we encountered men who were certain of themselves and their roles in India. Montagu is certain of neither. The massacres at Amritsar urgently propelled him into finding a solution to the character of rule and ruler. One thing he is certain about is co-operation. His version of the
make up of ruler was not easy for either side to come to terms with. He wanted co-operation to be the bedrock of empire. Hence his task as he sees it is to renew the relations of ruler and ruled. He envisages the formation of a co-operative domination. That is no easy task. Not easy for the rulers who were so used to getting their own way, not easy for the ruled who found it hard to trust their ruler's manoeuvres. But that did not scare him. If the words he expended on the task are anything to go by he is sure of his contribution to this historic question. In my re-composition of Amritsar in the terms I set out, I turn now to a consideration of the figure of a ‘government man’ – Edwin Montagu and his hard task.

1. The reference to Leviathan reads, Michael Oakeshott (ed.), Leviathan, Oxford 1952: 109. The fuller, perhaps more useful quote in this context, continues ‘...and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men’ See Richard Flack (ed.) (1991: 117-118). Being the keepers of such an order is how many colonists fashioned their duty to India to be.

2. Many men under arms were depicted as ‘scum of the Earth’; men who enlisted for drink, or who were eager to ‘avoid gaol or escape from the cloying opportunities of women folk’ (Strawson 1989: 12).


4. Mistrust and fear in this relation is not just one way. So, the distaste with which army officers, in their turn, viewed interference in their affairs by politicians is comically summarised by Sir William Butler. In a description of the War Office, he says:

   ‘A corporal and a file of men could not move from Glasgow to Edinburgh except with the sanction and under the sign-manual of the headquarters in London...The thing that soon became clear to me, holding even a subordinate position in that great congeries of confusion then known as the War Office, was the hopelessness of any attempt to simplify or improve matters in any way. A vast wheel was going round, and all men, big and little, were pinned to it, each one bound to eat a certain set ration of paper every day of his life’ (Butler 1911: 186-7 in Hammer 1970: 9).


6. The reference to 1688/9 is to the co-called Glorious Revolution. William III and Mary II acceded to the English throne. The Declaration of Rights and Bill of Rights redefined the relation between ruling monarchs and their subjects. As well as barring any future Catholic succession to the throne, the settlement abolished the royal power to suspend and dispense with laws. The Crown could no longer levy taxation nor raise or maintain a standing army without getting prior parliamentary approval (detail from encyclopedia.com).

7. Howard adds, the liberals declared that ‘professional armies, were not only politically dangerous; as military weapons they were unnecessary...The Whigs had for generations belittled the standing army
and declared that the strength as well as the liberties of the nation lay in the militia, the constitutional
8. Strawson gives us a more detailed exploration of origins that includes many more instances of
similar disputes. See esp. chapt. 1 (Strawson 1989).
10. Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil Salisbury, was the third Marquis of Salisbury. His entry in
*World History* Reads ‘Leading conservative states man and three times Prime Minister of England
between 1886 and 1902... he was directly descended from Elizabeth I minister, William Cecil... His
foreign policy was described in 1896 as one of ‘splendid isolation,’ a peaceful imperialism based on
the strength of the British Empire rather than alliances in Europe’ (Guy Uden 1989: 815).
11. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, (1864-1922), was Chief of Imperial General Staff 1918-1922.
12. Dongola is in the Sudan. The battle for it against the Dervishes is reported in *The Tablet* Sept. 26
1896 Vol. 88 No. 2942.
13. Lansdowne was Secretary for War, 1895-1900; and Foreign Secretary, 1900-1905. See Lord
14. Salisbury was even clearer about the question of civil/military authority in his remarks in a debate
in the House of Lords in March 1901. He said, ‘in speech after speech from military men, men who
know the language and spirit of the war office, it is easy to detect a desire that military problems shall
only be solved by military men; but any attempt to take the opinion of the expert above the opinion of
the politician must, in view of all the circumstances of our constitution, inevitably fail’ (in Hammer
15. Earl Haig famously echoes this sentiment. He says, ‘It is a good thing to see the inside the War
Office for a short time since it prevents one from having any respect for an official letter, but it is a bad
thing to remain there’ (Earl Haig in Hammer 1970: 1).
16. For recent work looking at the East India Co. see Anthony Wild, *The East India Company: Trade
17. In its thirty-nine articles, the charter enshrined a right to trade. Such a right, Keay tells us, attempts
to unsettle prior claims made by Spain and Portugal. Thus, ‘Madrid’s claim to the treasures of the
Americas and Lisbon’s to the trade of the Indies, for each of which Papal authority was...invoked,
were seen as "insolencies."’ Apparently God had shifted his allegiance. Now, Keay adds,
"...according to the text of Queen Elizabeth’s standard letter of introduction to eastern princes,
God...in his infinite and unsearchable wisdom...had so ordained matters that no nation was self-
sufficient and that "out of the abundance of fruit which some region[s] enjoyeth, the necessitie or
wante of others should be supplied... Thus "severall and far remote countries" should..."traffike" with
one another and "by their interchange of commodities" should become friends’ (in Keay 1991: 9-10).
For the full text of the charter see India Office collections at the British library – Ref. No. IORNEG
10872.
18. At this stage in their adventures both the English and French were regarded as mere suppliants, ‘to
the powerful princes who were nominally Viceroyes or Governors on behalf of the Mughal Emperor in
Delhi’ (Mason 1974: 17).
19. John Company is an early term used to describe the East Indian Trading Company. See Carey
1907.
20. In the pages of SAHP, they tell us that in ‘1616, Sir Thomas Roe, an envoy of the East India
Company had declared to the Mughals that war and trade were incompatible’ (See From Trade to
Colonisation, *http://members.tripod.com/~INDIA_RESOURCE/eastindia.html*). Yet, as my use of his
words from Mason earlier tell us, Roe also made what Mason calls, ‘some far-sighted remarks, arguing
that “our only dependence is upon the same ground that we began and by which we subsist, fear”’
(Mason 1985: 8).
21. The SAHP list how numerous factors combined to ensure the Company’s flying start in trade; it
did after all have a monopoly status in England; its ships were amongst the largest among other trading
companies; and they bought their goods at source, eliminating agents fees. Even in relatively lean
times, and borrowing from Veronica Murphy’s ‘Europeans and the Textile Trade,’ the SAHP remind
us that they supplemented their income from the slave trade – ‘The Atlantic slave trade was...a vital
contributor to the financial strength of the East Indian Trading Companies’ (From Trade to
Colonisation, SAHP 2001).

22. Keay tells us how one historian put the Company’s and Aurangzeb’s relationship – ‘to Aurangzeb
the Company was still a mere flea on the back of his imperial elephant’ (Keay 1991: 146).

23. The terms Aurangzeb demanded from the Company were often exacting. Any trading activity not
approved of, or conducted in such a way that it would fall outside of the parameters defined by him,
would incur hefty fines. Keay recounts an instance of piracy, when two of Auragzeb’s ships were
sacked. They were laden with treasure and pilgrims. Auragzeb subsequently ‘...demanded both
compensation and a written agreement making the Europeans in future responsible for all acts of
piracy’ (Keay 1991: 188). The Company official involved in these negotiations, one Samuel Annesley,
Chief Factor, wanted time to clear the terms with London. Yet, they were Keay tells us, presented with
a stark choice: expulsion or execution. Trade of course was at a standstill while the matter was
resolved. In the end Annesley ‘...was forced to capitulate and immediately afterwards...dismissed from
the Company’s service’ (Keay 1991: 188).

24. The military resources for such an endeavour came from a variety of sources. In fact at this stage it
is hard to talk of an Indian Army. Mason tells us how from the very earliest times the Company would
employ locals to watch over their factories. They did not constitute an army, but rather were more akin
to ‘...bands of swashbucklers,...hired...through some acknowledged leader of their own’ (Mason
1974: 20). The first soldiers, that is ‘men recruited direct, trained and sworn in, with known obligations
and fixed pay, organised in companies with officers and non-commissioned officers,’ generally came
from the localities in which the Company had those factories (Mason 1974: 20-21).

25. There are many instances throughout the history of Britain’s imperial adventures that smell of this
closeness. On the opium wars for instance see Arthur Waley, The Opium Wars Through Chinese Eyes,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958; P W Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, University of North
Carolina Press, Carolina, 1975; and see http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/CHING/OPIUM.HTM; On arms see
also Goodenhough and Dalton’s, Army Book for the British Empire 1893; Holden Furber, Rival
Empires of Trade in the Orient 1600-1800, University of Minnesota Press, 1976.

26. My emphasis. SAHP add some observations about French imperial designs. In their view, the
French Duplexis advocated protection of their trade by similar means. The other imperial powers they
point to as going along with these sentiments are the Netherlands. According to them, as early as 1614,
‘the Dutch Jan Pieterzoon Coen, had written to his directors: “Trade in India must be conducted and
maintained under the protection and favour of your weapons, and the weapons must be supplied from
the profits enjoyed by the trade, so that trade cannot be maintained without war or war without trade” ’
(From Trade to Colonisation, SAHP 2001).

27. Described by an unknown author as a ‘tempestuous...overbearing autocrat....used to getting what
he wanted by bribery, intrigue and sheer force of character...a man who did nothing by halves...’
(Mason 1985: 17). We learn from his entry in the on line 1911 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica
that he is one of the first to advocate a change in the Company’s practice from unarmed to armed
traffic, in explicit renunciation of the practice of quiet trade associated with Sir Tomas Roe. See
http://98.1911encyclopedia.orf/C/CH/Child_SIR_JOSIAH.htm


29. In 1685 Child explicitly spelled out the consequences of a new doctrine. This would be the
discipline of sovereignty (Mason 1985: 19). According to Keay, after ‘James II had issued the Company
with a new charter which...inured it to any...challenge from within and empowered it to meet any
assault from without,’ Child, ‘...began to sound like a bullish imperialist.' Tired of ‘Moghal exactions’
and other challenges to the Company’s trading monopolies, he advised Surat’s factors,

‘If any natives fall upon you...we would have you take the first and best opportunity you can to right
us and yourselves without expecting further orders from England, for we are now in such a posture in
India that we need not sneak or put up [with] palpable injury from any nation whatsoever’ (in Keay
In his unpublished paper, Rai characterises 1756: the Black Hole of Calcutta, as an event caught in a complex web of discourses, superbly. According to him, ‘although the story circulates within the vague fantasies of our collective post-colonial imaginary, at the time perhaps nothing in the history of European expansion excited so much horror and righteous indignation among British citizens than the events associated with the Black Hole of Calcutta...’ With 123 Europeans dying, ‘...it served something of a primal scene for a burgeoning colonial imaginary. That event was, furthermore, part of what is no doubt the most significant reversal of fortunes in the history of the British Colonisation of South Asia’ (Rai 2002: pp4-5).

Rai borrows a sentiment from Hill. Hill says ‘up to the outbreak of the war the servants of the Company had been satisfied to pose as foreign traders, practically unarmed, and not presuming in Bengal—what ever they had done in southern India—to take any active share in the political arrangements of the country’ (Hill 1902: 1, in Rai unpublished 2002: 4). The term quiet trade (see ante) is borrowed from Sir Thomas Roe. He was nothing if not a pragmatist. To repeat and expand, he said—‘...if you will profit, seek it at sea and in a quiet trade; for without controversy it is an error to effect garrisons and land wars in India’ (Roe 1620 in Keay 1991: 141).

Like the haze under which Sirag-ud-daullah youth is discussed there are different versions about the transfer of power to him. Keay says ‘...after the usual bloodbath Siraj succeeded to the Nawabship in April 1756’ (Keay 1991: 300); Mason, with whom Mill would agree, says he took his ‘seat on the throne with no need to fight an exhausting civil war’ (Mason 1985: 32); (Mill 1817 vol. II: 224).

Rai tells us how in all the histories he has consulted the Nawab’s age varies. A flavour of such variety can be gleamed even from my limited sources. So Keay merely describes him as a ‘young and beautiful reprobate’; Mason describes him as an ‘unfortunate young man’; Macaulay describes him as a ‘youth under twenty years of age.’ H H Dodwell, Rai tells us, describes him as being ‘23 at the time of his accession’ (Keay 1991: 300; Macaulay 1891: 35; Rai 2002: 8 n. 14).

That didn’t amount to very much, as Mason tells us. Sirag ‘saw no reason why these aliens should live on any different terms from the rest of his subjects... they were merchants and money lenders, no more, and ought to be subject to a capital levy whenever it suited their sovereign’ (Mason 1985: 32).

Rai usefully alerts us to a neat summary of Sirag’s complaints about the company set out in a letter to his Armenian negotiator. In it Siraj says,

‘I have three substantial motives for extirpating the English out of my country: one that they have built strong fortifications and dug a large ditch in the King’s dominions contrary to the established laws of the country; the second is that they have abused the privileges of their dastaks by granting them to such as were in no ways entitled to them, from which practice the king has suffered greatly in the revenue of his customs; the third motive is that they give protection to such of the king’s subjects as have by their behaviour in the employys they were entrusted with made themselves liable to be called to an account’ (in Rai 2002: 8).

Rai calls him John Z. Howell. In Macaulay he is merely Mr. Howell. I assume this is the same man (Rai 2002: 8; Macaulay 1891 Vol. III: 36).

Macaulay describes the scene with suitable dramatic verve, perhaps even license and awesome disbelief (see ante). Perhaps it is the scenes as recounted in these senses that would drive Clive to Calcutta. Thus,

‘Nothing in the history or fiction... approaches the horrors which were recounted by the few survivors of that night. They cried for mercy. They strove to burst the door. Howell who, even in that extremity retained some presence of mind, offered large bribes to the gaolers. But the answer was that nothing could be done without the Nawab’s orders, that the Nawab was asleep, and that he would be angry if anybody woke him...The prisoners went mad with despair. They trampled each other down, fought for the places at the window, fought for the pittance of water with which the cruel mercy of the murderers mocked their agonies, raved, prayed, blasphemed, implored the guards to fire among them. The gaolers...shouted with laughter at the frantic struggles of their victims. At length the tumult died away...Day broke. The Nawab had slept off his debauch, and permitted the door to be opened... It was some time before the soldiers could make a lane for the survivors, by piling up on each side the heaps
of corpses on which the burning climate had already begun to do its loath some work. When at length a passage was made, twenty three ghastly figures, such as their own mothers would not have known, staggered one by one out of the charnel-house. A pit was instantly dug. The dead bodies, a hundred and twenty three in number, were flung into it promiscuously, and covered up' (Macaulay 1891: 38).

I pass over issues about the veracity of these events as narrated by Howell in particular. Rai does a brilliant job in alerting us to the complexities in the various narratives of the Black Hole incident. He reminds us of J H Little's two articles published in 1915-16. There he calls 'the Black Hole incident a "gigantic hoax,"' citing inconsistencies in contemporary records, contradictions in Howell’s different accounts, as well as the absence of the story in his official dispatches and in important contemporary histories written in Persian' (Rai 2002: 19).

The sentiment is from Charles Hill, Last of the Europeans and Others in the English Factories in Bengal at the time of the Siege of Calcutta in the year 1756; with an appendix containing lists of European sufferers, Calcutta 1902, p1.

Of course, as Sharpe elaborates, this 'human-making project...is inseparable from the profit making enterprise of creating new markets for English manufactures.' She adds, 'the appeal that modern colonialism had for Europeans was that they could benefit both monetarily in producing a need for western goods and spiritually in generating a desire for good government, wealth and knowledge’ (Sharpe 1993: 7-8). She includes comments by Brison Davis who describes the process to come thus: ‘For the first time in history, the more enlightened nations were beginning to understand that morality, self-interest, and human progress were mutually interdependent and were to be achieved by the same means' (in Sharpe 1993: 8); (Davies 1980).

There are many that refer to these events in a different way. Without even a mention or use of the term mutiny, Wolpert for instance prefers ‘Anglo-Indian War of 1857-1858 (see Wolpert 2000: 230, 238, 241)

Strawson doesn’t give us a full source for this reference, save a brief bibliographical note that reads, ‘Morris, James/Jan, Pax Britannica Trilogy, Faber’ (Strawson 1989: 285).


Clive spent a number of different periods in Bengal (See Mason 1985: 37; Mill 1821 Chapt12; and Macaulay 1891 Chapt 1).

Mill suggests that the moneys and treasures of Sirag-ud-daullah were insufficient to satisfy the demand made by the English (Mill 1821: 241).

Macaulay further notes that the ‘treasury of Bengal was thrown open to him...He walked between heaps of gold and silver, crowned with rubies and diamonds, and was at liberty to help himself’ (Macaulay 1891: 54/55).

He would be the subject of censure for receiving the many gifts from Meer Jaffer by Parliament at a later date. See Macaulay 1891, pp 1-98.

Amongst the many hagiographic descriptions applied to Clive and his deeds Mason’s work includes the following: ‘Brilliant in sudden danger & adversity, profuse, moody, recklessly generous, unable to endure himself or subsist in idleness.’ (Mason 1985: 26).

In Sara Suleri 1992: 83.

My emphasis.

Mason lists the military engagements as the wars against Hydar Ali and his son Tippo Sahib; the wars against the Marathas; the Pindarry wars; and the two hard fought wars against the Sikhs. See post. Of course the impediments to colonial consolidation were not just external ones of this type. Other external impediments consisted in the different spiritual traditions, Sufism especially; tribal resistances catalogued by Ranajit Guha in his classic work, Elementary Aspects of Peasant insurgency in Colonial India 1983; and resistance by the indigenous economic and political classes. We must not neglect internal impediments either, stemming from conflicts within and between the different factions within the Company’s structures, particularly fiscal conservatives (Mason 1985: chapt. 7).

The Duke of Wellington’s elder brother, he Lived from 1769-1842. He succeeded Cornwallis as Governor-General of Bengal, 1797-1805. See Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee (eds.) 191773.

In their entry in the Dictionary of National Biography above, Stephen and Lee suggest that ‘the most brilliant part of Wellesley’s career was unquestionably his government of India’ (191773: 1134). They regard him as ‘...one of the three men who consolidated the empire of which Clive laid the foundation,’ the others they mention are Hastings and Dalhousie (Stephen and Lee 1919/73: 1134).


One of the more difficult to resolve were the Mysore wars, 1767-1799, where after victory he handed nominal control of Mysore over to a boy of seven; the Marathian wars, 1775-1817; Others include his actions against the Nizam of Hyderabad, where he forced the Nizam to disband his forces. The Nizam, fearing the rising powers around him, had to yield to an alliance with the British; he also forced the annexation of the whole of the Carnatic; the Nawab of Oudh was compelled to cede administration, civil and military, to the Company (see generally Mason 1974).

This quote Mason tells us is from J H Stocqueler, The Old Field Officer, or The Military Adventures of Major Worthington, Edinburgh 1853. In 1899 Henry Labouchere would lampoon these versions of the imperial project. Militocracy for Labouchere is intimately associated with the ‘power of automatic weapons.’ As we see in Chap. 3, Kipling gave us the White Man’s Burden’, a reading of his imperial project as self-sacrifice on behalf of ‘new-caught, sullen peoples / Half devils and half child.’ Labouchere gives us the ‘Brown Man’s Burden,’ a rather different reading of that project. Titled ‘An address to the United States by a Jingo Stripling’ mockingly he concludes

‘Copyright’ – All rights (of white men) reserved. No red, black, yellow or brown man’s rights need to be regarded, as they haven’t got any…” (Truth Feb. 9 1899: 331)


However, their objections didn’t stop it becoming a reality, some years later with the opening of the East India College in 1806 at Hertford, which then moved to Haileybury in 1809.

Mason reminds us how before the so-called mutiny ‘...there was not much feeling between Haileybury...(the company’s training college for civil servants)... and Addiscombe...(the company’s training college for a small number of engineer and gunner cadets)...since...there was too much to do...’ (Mason 1985: 148). Both the military in its guises as a mercenary army and the bureaucracy that developed around it to administer its newly won possessions, are implicated in pursuit of what Kipling later came to describe as the ‘Great Game.’ There are many so-called servants of empire at these early stages whose carers fit this model. The careers for instance of the Lawrence brothers as both Company soldiers and administrators are exemplary in this regard, but not unusual. Mason neatly summarises the co-correspondence as it were of military and administrative competencies. The rapid expansion of the empire from about 1800 meant the army often being called to aid the so-called civil administration. Hence as

‘...more and more districts came under direct British rule...there was nothing like enough convenedrated civilians – that is members of the Honourable East India Trading Company’s Civil Service, the parent of the Indian Civil Service...There was besides a feeling that in the first years after annexation, there might be work for which the soldier was better suited. There were also states where a British representative was needed, not only the great ambassadorial posts with the principal states, but lesser ones’ (Mason 1974: 277).

More than merely being auxiliaries, fulfilling an added value administrative role, military men became crucial in the work of the Company. In a rather romantic mode Mason lists some of those men who are crucial instances in this sense. He adds,

‘...Meadows Taylor, for example, after very few years of military service went to such a post for the best part of his time. Sir Thomas Munro...eventually Governor of Madras, left his regiment for civil employ before he was thirty; Sir John Malcolm...was another who spent his whole life in civil posts, ending as Governor of Bombay; the list could go on for pages. In addition there were what we should now regard as legitimate staff appointments – quartermasters and adjutants to generals commanding
brigades and divisions. Men for all these posts were ‘on the staff’ and stayed in their regimental lists’ (Mason 1974: 177).

61 Viscount Edward Cardwell 1813-1886.
62 Trevor Hearl (1976) is good on this, as is Brian Bond (1972).
63 Perhaps the significance of change is signalled specifically by a growing distrust in the so-called Sepoy. Hence, Wolpert says:

‘The ratio of Indian to British troops was reduced to between two and three to one, total manpower in 1863 being 140,000 Indian to 65,000 British soldiers. The British were moreover given exclusive control over artillery and other “scientific branches” of the service, so that in the event of any threat of mutiny, they could immediately use such weapons to overpower it...’ (Wolpert 2000: 241).

64 Colvin adds: ‘It is certain that report of “clanging fights and flaming towns, and sinking ships, and praying hands,” came up to the Himalayan stations like the hot blast... The massacre at Cawnpore, the defence of the residency at Lucknow, the siege of Delhi, the deeds of Nicholson, Hodson, and other heroes of that ferocious struggle, must have furnished nursery tales for the Dyer children’ (Colvin 1924: 4).
65 This and the above commentary are the result of personal enquiry of the senior librarian at the Central Library, Royal Military Academy, and Sandhurst early 2002.
66 This is from the title of a note/letter to the Times titled ’Camberley 1896: A Staff College Batch’ signed ‘Archimedes’ (11 January 1921).
67 p.s.c. literally, ‘passed staff college’; or simply graduate of the staff college, Camberley.
68 The Pseudonym Bond tells us was Brig.-Gen. Sir James Edmonds’ nickname (see Bond 1972: 159).
69 Perhaps we can gain a flavour of those included in what Colvin calls a ‘year of extraordinary brilliance,’ if I mention just a couple. Included among their number are Earl Haig; Viscount Allenby; and Brigadier-General Findlay. Dyer however much some following the Jallianwala Bagh shootings depict him as being beyond the pale, was very much of the military establishment. See n. 66 above.
71 Strawson reminds us that being a soldier,

‘during the latter part of Queen Victoria’s reign, or any part of it for that matter, was to be more or less continually on active service... she herself... made it plain that if the British were to maintain their position as a first rate power, it would be necessary to be prepared for attacks and wars, somewhere or other all the time...’ (Strawson 1989: xi).

72 My italics.
73 I borrow this phrase from Kipling’s poem of the same name.
CHAPTER 5 – THE GOVERNMENT COMPLEX

1

Introduction

In Chapter 4 my story of the composition of Amritsar in terms of the make-up of ruling subjects centred on the figure of a military man – Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer. As we saw in one sense his practice as such an officer exemplifies another version of our administrative man – Sir Michael O’Dwyer; in another his practice signifies a specific ruling tradition I characterise as ‘armed order.’ In this chapter I turn to a specific consideration of the figure of a man, an Anglo-Jewish man, in government – Edwin Samuel Montagu, Secretary of State for India, (1917-1922). My major resources for the readings I propose are S D Waley’s biography, and Naomi Levine’s tale of love (Waley 1964; Levine 1991).

I consider how the spirit Montagu cultivates, complicates the ideal practices of colonial authority represented by the O’Dwyers and Dyers. I read his journeys to India and his contribution to the Montagu/Chelmsford reform process as substantial engagements with these problems. He struggles to define a different, perhaps new, make-up of governor whose style of colonial rule and domination in India at the time lays a much greater stress on co-operation, thus founding a claim for British prestige on official competence, not competent fist-force.¹
Though Montagu is a figure who is very much in the imperial establishment at the time, he is also a figure - and his Jewishness perhaps being crucial in this - marginal to it. I argue that such a position makes him both an ardent critic of the ingenious autocracies implied in an ethics that stood its ground on forceful and dutiful (fatherly) impulses; and one who engages in the production of a sympathetic tryst, however limited, with so-called native demands for self-government. So, in looking at Montagu I engage in a double movement. I catalogue his personnel battles to be both in and of the imperial centre, and his battles for another style of rule in India. In Montagu we see a figure that begins a journey to step out of, and not be imprisoned by, accepted forms and manners. Thus in Montagu's words and actions we see a profound attempt to move imperial administration and rule away from muscular duty as played out by the figures of O'Dwyer and Dyer.

2

**Orthodox Judaism – Stories from the Margins**

(a) An established circle

Born in 1879, Edwin Samuel Montagu came of a long established Jewish family that could plot its movement to England in the middle of the eighteenth century from North Germany. They settled in Liverpool and Waley tells us, the Samuel family as
they chose at that time to be known, 'gave many leaders to Liverpool Jewry' (Waley 1964: 3). The family adopted the name Montagu in 1842. This change was formalised 'when Sir Samuel Montagu became a baronet in 1894…' (Waley 1964: 3).

All the above and his 'numerous philanthropic activities made Samuel Montagu one of the leading figures in Anglo-Jewry' (Waley 1964: 4). Yet, Waley argues, amongst all he had going for him, there is a surprising flaw in his character. Thus, 'though a Liberal in politics he was intensely bigoted in his conservatism as a rigidly orthodox Jew' (Waley 1964: 4). This attachment, and its consequent battles, was to mark Edwin, his son, for the rest of his life (Waley 1964).

(b) Sustained ambivalence

To give us a flavour of what is at stake in the way that Edwin Montagu casts himself, we can glimpse elements of the complexities in the character Montagu plays by reference to Sir L E Jones. Jones gives us a vivid description of a young Montagu, when an undergraduate at Trinity College Cambridge. In Jones' book, An Edwardian youth, he says of the young Montagu:

'A deep... impression was made on me by another guest in these rooms – an undergraduate who struck me as unbelievably mature, almost world-weary. His long, ugly bony face was pockmarked like a photograph of the moon, but his eyes held
me: sombre, patient, unhappy eyes of extraordinary intelligence. He held the talk: he was sophisticated and mocking, and more amusing I thought, than anyone I had met’ (emphasis mine. In Waley 1964: 7).

Montagu’s propensity for independent thought and action is a reputation he cultivated throughout his life. We see an early and continuous echo of that in his battles with his father against what Waley calls a ‘rigid ceremonialism’ of Jewish laws. According to Waley, Montagu’s father objected to his son turning as he saw it, away from Judaism, to a kind of agnosticism. He saw his son’s battles with him as a rejection of many of the strict practices associated with Orthodox Judaism. He reasoned, if Edwin continued in his manner, he would through those actions, humiliate him and the faith he proclaimed. In an attempt to reassure his father, Montagu wrote to him that he acted as he did from a profound sense of duty (Waley 1964: 7):

‘Religion concerns only the individual and can be no man else’s concern. By race I am an Englishman and my interests are mainly in England, but I will never forget that I am a Jew and the son of a Jew and I will always be a good ‘Jew’ according to my lights, my definition of a good Jew differs from yours. It is an awful thing to lose a father’s love, as I fear I’m doing now and how I shall live without it I cannot think. But I must not and will not consider the temporal advantages....However much it grieves me or my relations I must try and be true and honest.....It grieves me terribly to write like this to a father who does so much for me, but I can’t help it. Try to forgive me. I must do my duty ’ (emphasis mine. In Waley 1964: 8).
Of course such a letter did not reassure his father. The personnel rancour between father and son over religion, rumbled on for many years; the pain associated with such discord for even longer (Waley 1964: 8).

During his father’s life Montagu ensured as far as possible that he met his father's wishes regarding religious ceremonies. In 1901 for instance, he went, when at home, to the 'Synagogue on the days of the main festivals, New Year and the day of Atonement in the autumn and Passover in the spring' (Waley 1964: 8). Even after his father's death on 12 January 1911, at the age of seventy-nine, Montagu continued to be made unhappy at having to break his schedules, as he saw it to appease his father's memory. According to Waley, '...every autumn and every spring when Montagu was able to snatch a few days' holiday in the country...he would be made unhappy by reluctantly breaking his holiday or by facing a major row if he did not do so' (Waley 1964: 8).

These early battles with his father and his memory over his relation to his Jewishness were by no means benign. His father at one time, according to Waley, even believed that, ‘Edwin, not having a Jewish name or Jewish appearance...tries...to conceal his Jewish race’ (Waley 1964: 7). The result of doing so his father thought, would be to ensure that Edwin’s friends ‘would despise him’ (Waley 1964: 7). At times he regretted ‘allowing his son to study science and go to Cambridge’ (Waley 1964: 7. He
feared humiliation if Edwin ceased to practice Orthodox Judaism (Waley 1964: 7). He pondered like a tired patriarch, how he could ever bring him into line? Perhaps he never would. Maybe worse, certainly in his terms, was yet to come. Even after his death his hand reached out beyond the grave. He left Edwin a substantial inheritance of over a £1 million. Yet it was only a life interest. The income from such an interest was be only payable so long as his son ‘should profess the Jewish religion’ (Waley 1964: 47). His will declared that ‘...no child of his should at any time or under any circumstances abandon the Jewish religion or intermarry with a person not of the Jewish religion’ (Waley 1964: 47). A wish Edwin negotiated with a heavy heart, and ultimately failed to fulfil.8

3

Journeys into Indian Government

Montagu’s flirtations with India and things Indian were to be more than just that. Some dismissed them as mere Oriental fascinations. Montagu was often spoken about, as an Oriental so why shouldn’t he be so fascinated.9 Keynes captures their complex character in his observations, which he wrote as an obituary. They give us a glimpse of how such complex entanglements impact on the figure that Montagu is and aspires to be in government. Hence:
'[Montagu] was one of those who suffer violent fluctuations of mood, quickly passing from reckless courage and self-assertion to abject panic and dejection – always dramatising life and his part in it, and seeing himself and his own instincts either in the most favourite or in the most unfavourable light, but seldom with a calm and steady view. Thus it was easy for the spiteful to convict him from his own mouth, and to belittle his name by remembering him only when his face was turned towards the earth. At one moment he could be emperor of the East, riding upon a elephant, clothed in rhetoric and glory, but at the next a beggar in the dust of the road, crying for alms, but murmuring under his breath cynical and outrageous with which pricked into dustier dust the rhetoric and the glory.

That he was an Oriental equipped, nevertheless, with the intellectual technique and atmosphere of the West, drew him naturally to the problems of India, and allowed an instinctive, mutual sympathy between him and its peoples. But he was interested in all political problems and not least in the personal side of politics, and was most intensely a politician. Almost everything else bored him...' (in Waley 1964: 15).

Waley summarises his recondite character beyond the merely whimsical when he says

'It has often been said that it was Montagu's Jewish descent which made him, as an Oriental, fascinated by India. It would surely be better to say that it was his imagination which enabled him to realise the vast magnitude of India, his liberalism that made him the life-enemy of race-snobbery and police-state rule and his intellectual capacity and administrative ability which made India's problems so fascinating to him' (Waley 1964: 39).
That Montagu is trying to work out a distinctive style of colonial domination there is no doubt. An early trace of his open-ended commitment in the above senses, indeed a trace of a very specific kind, is found in a letter to his mother. In it he distinguishes the driving force behind his work from those behind that of Lily Montagu:

‘You say Lily was looking forward to seeing me. Poor girl, I believe she of all those at home believes there are possibilities about me and spares a corner from the marvellous work she is engaged in for me, but her life and my life are destined to always to be apart, for she works for sectarian purposes – I abominate them. She strengthens the barriers; I want to abolish them. So I cannot take an interest in her club (emphasis mine. In Waley 1964: 11).

An exchange such as this, with these associations and the duties that came with them, as Montagu saw it, would stick with him for ill or good throughout his time at the heart of Government. His goal so far as India is concerned, as he characterised it, is an Anglo-India. In this sense and in marked contrast to the administrative and military figures of O’Dwyer and Dyer respectively Montagu’s first principle is accommodation.
(a) The first rung – PPS

Montagu could not have hoped for a better start to his parliamentary career. In early 1906 he was '...appointed Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Asquith)…' (Waley 1964: 20). He acted as Asquith's eyes and ears. Thus, from 1906-1910 he worked as a conduit to the leader. He warned 'of the dangers to the Liberal cause and....criticised him when he felt bound to do so' (Waley 1964: 20). Waley characterises this as a brilliant start to Montagu’s career. Perhaps one of the more notable elements Montagu displays for our purposes is an appreciation of one of the arts of government – pragmatism. Government for him is as much about the right arrangements, as about standing on the precipice of principle. In his next step on the ministerial ladder he would get more opportunities to fine-tune these techniques.

(b) Under Secretary of State with his mentor

‘A new force in English Politics’

His time with Asquith ended in 1910 with the call of the election. The Liberals won the election and returned to power. Asquith was grateful to Montagu for all his hard work and set out to reward his endeavours; he appointed Montagu Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for India in February 1910 (Levine 1991: 123); a post he held for four years (1910-1914). This came at a most opportune time. He spent almost
a year under Lord Morley the Secretary of State for India at the time. He could not hope for a more suitable pairing. A liberal, his appointment to the post, Levine argues, '...put an end to the habit of regarding India as a "dumping ground for mediocrities" and announced that India was important enough to have as its Secretary at Whitehall one of the leaders of Liberal England' (Levine 1991: 128).13

Morely had already tried but failed to carry forward a reform scheme in 1908-1909, known as the Morely-Minto reforms. Nevertheless for Montagu it marks the beginnings of a growing '...realisation that what has been called the "brightest Jewel in the British Crown" is no mere ornament but an Imperial charge involving great and growing responsibilities' (in Levine 1991: 128).14

As a Liberal, Morely seemed Montagu's ideal mentor. Wolpert recounts for us an exchange between Morely and Minto, the authors of earlier ill-fated reforms, that signals Morely's distaste for repressive acts carried out in the name of the Raj; a distaste Montagu, in his turn, would in the course of his associations with India seek to foster. Hence, Wolpert notes the conversation:

'One young English "corporal" in a "fit of excitement shot the first native he met," Morely noted, expressing his concern over such matters to Minto and inquiring, "What happened to the corporal?...Was he put on trial? Was he hanged? If we are not strong enough to prevent murder, then our pharisaic glorification of the stern justice of the British Raj us windy nonsense".' (in Wolpert 1999: 282).
These were the foundations on which Montagu hoped to build.

If the number of words uttered, and schemes proposed, is a measure of tenacity, Montagu spent his time as Under Secretary of State in single-minded pursuit of his reform agenda for Indian government. Even after Morely’s departure, Montagu found comfort in his dealings with Morely’s successor, the Marquis of Crewe. Montagu thought the Marquis was an ‘essentially conservative’ man. He found out just how conservative in Crewe’s reaction to one of his speeches. In the meantime he found him ‘patient…and…courteous’ (in Waley 1964: 38).

In Montagu’s first Indian Budget speech he set out the Indian scene. ‘Normally a very humdrum affair,’ given Montagu says, on days when the ‘House was always empty,’ he set out his mode of operation in relation to it (Waley 1964: 40). The government of India was immensely difficult and yet it presented unique opportunities to Britain. Thus:

‘...In India are associated under a single rule varieties of races far wider than can be found in the whole of Europe, as many different religions as Europe contains sects of Christianity. Stages of civilisation range from the Hindu or Mohammedan Judge on the bench of the High Court to the naked savage in the forest. Grafted on to this diverse population, numbering nearly 300 million, is a European element,
numerically insignificant, less than 200,000 in all, a population in no sense resident in the country, but of an importance in the spheres of education, commerce and administration wholly disproportionate to its numbers. The problem before us is to yoke a Government, as complex and irresponsible to the people it governs as the Government of India, to a democratic system in England which every year shows itself more determined to do its share in the Government of this great dependency’ (in Waley 1964: 40).

Not for the first time nor the last, Montagu’s enthusiasm and advocacy for sharing the burden of rule with those over whom such rule is exercised, is evident here. His hopes for India and Indians, and his appreciation of what they, at least the so-called educated ones, long for, or at least should be satisfied with at this time, are even clearer when he confronts the growing problem of Indian unrest. Unrest at this moment, according to him was inevitable. He is astonished by the reactions of a ‘progressive people like the English…(to)...unrest.’ He adds, ‘we welcome it in Persia, commend it enthusiastically in Turkey, patronise it in China and Japan...(but)...are impatient of it in Egypt and India!’ (in Waley 1964: 41). His colleagues he thinks should look at themselves when assessing unrest. Perhaps even feel a modicum of pride when its practitioners look over the ramparts. Hence he argues,

‘...whatever...our object in touching the ancient civilisation of the Indian Empire, whatever...the reason for British occupation, it must be obvious that Eastern
civilisation could not be brought into contact with Western without disturbing its serenity, without bringing new ideas into play, without infusing new ingredients, without, in a word, causing unrest...When we undertook the Government of the country, when further, we deliberately embarked on a policy of educating the peoples on Western lines, we caused the unrest because we wished to colour Indian ideals with western aspirations...' (in Waley 1964: 41).

The rambles of a novice these are not. Expanding on his consideration of so-called political unrest, later, in the same speech, he adds:

‘In so far as this political unrest is confined to pressing the Government to popularise the Government of the country, so far as the conditions in India will permit, I do not believe that anyone in this House will quarrel with it. You cannot give to the Indians Western education either in Europe or in India and then turn round and refuse to those who you have educated the right, the scope, or the opportunity to act and think as you have taught them to do. If you do, it seems to me that you must cause another kind of unrest, more dangerous than any other, amongst those bitterly dissatisfied and disappointed with the results of their education...For this reason it seems to me...that the condition of India at the moment is one which handled well, contains the promise of a complete justification of British rule, handled ill, it is bound to lead to chaos...(emphasis mine. Montagu in Waley 1964: 42).

For him any action whose result is chaos is not a proper way in which to conduct an empire, this empire, the British Empire. This is the spirit in which he commented,
during his first tour to India, on the police investigation of a bomb-throwing incident in Delhi. He says:

‘The police in this country are a real danger...They were doing their best to stir up all the old trouble at a time when the policy of conciliation is likely to do so well, and there is evidence that they are being supported by that arch retrograde, Craddock...He and all the police are “they all want to cut our throats” believers. Even if they do, what is the use of stirring them up by refusing to treat them fairly, and shadowing them with heavy-footed constables?’ (in Waley 1964: 319).

So another piece in Montagu’s preoccupation with working out his distinctive style of colonial domination is placed. He has no time for Independence. Co-operation is the key. As he was to say on another occasion, ‘an Indian India,’ or an India for Indians does not and will not exist, but an Anglo-India does. The goal of an Anglo-Indian India is where he heads (in Waley 1964: 293).

It is not long before he returns once again to his pet theme, this time in his Second Indian Budget speech on 26 July 1911. They are perhaps his clearest expressions yet among all the words he expends during his time as Under Secretary of State, of his proposed style of rule. After a long consideration of the political case for India he admonishes those who travelled no further in their dealings with India than a period called the ‘High Noon of Empire.’ So,
‘There are those who, filled with an ante-diluvian imperialism, cannot see beyond domination and subjection, beyond governor and governed, who hate the word ‘progress’ and will accuse me of encouraging unrest. I bow in anticipation. I believe there is nothing dangerous in what I have said. I have pointed a long path, a path perhaps of centuries, for Englishmen and Indians to travel together. I ask the minority in India to bring along it in the widest sense, by organisation and by precept, all those who would be good citizens of their country... When at intervals this well-ordered thought shows us that they have made social and political advance to another stage, and demand from us, in the name of responsibility we have accepted, that they should be allowed still further to share responsibility with us, I hope we shall be ready to answer with knowledge and with prudence. In this labour all parties and all interested... may rest assured of the sympathy and assistance of government’ (in Waley 1964: 49).

The words he expends on this, his favourite topic, many though they already are, would now proliferate. Yet, it would not be long before someone would object to them and object to such a free expression of them. Waley relates one such instance. On February 28 1912 he delivered a speech to the Cambridge Liberal Club, of which he was president. In his comments he paid homage to the work of Lord Curzon in India, but asks rhetorically, ‘how has he spent his time since?’ He answers,

‘...admiring what he has done, not looking and saying, “We have done this,” but saying, “This is my work.” It is not “Hands off India” which he preaches: it is “leave
Curzonian India as Lord Curzon left it”...These are not the grave and weighty criticisms of a statesman; they are the impetuous, angry fault findings of a man thinking primarily of himself”’ (in Waley 1964: 51).

The personnel rancour his words aroused lasted for years. According to Waley, it was a battle he would lose ten years later (Waley 1964: 51).

Yet more trouble followed later in the year. This time his words elicited more than mere personal pique. The liberty he took in the above speech by quoting from a despatch of 25 August 1911, was interpreted by various Indian nationalists to be ‘...a declaration in favour of Home Rule for India...’ (in Waley 1964: 51). The relevant passage reads:

‘The only possible solution...(to constitutional reform)...would appear to be gradually to give the Provinces a larger measure of self-government until at last India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, with the Government of India above them all, and possessing power to interfere in cases of misgovernment, but ordinarily restricting its functions to matters of imperial concern’ (in Waley 1964: 51).  

Waley tells us how, in the House of Lords, Montagu’s emphasis on these words, and Indian nationalist reactions to them, caused alarm in the ranks of some old imperialists – Lords Lansdowne and Curzon in particular. Waley continues, Montagu’s boss, the Marquess of Crewe, had to assure the Lords that Home Rule or
anything akin to it was never promised (Waley 1964: 51). Montagu did however intend something very different to the present state of affairs. Speaking about the despatch very directly, he forthrightly declares that the statement, ‘shows the goal, the aim towards which we propose to work – not immediately, not in a hurry, but gradually...We cannot drift on forever without stating a policy...’ (in Waley 1964: 51). This for him was an opportunity. The moderates, amongst the Indians, he adds,

‘...look to us to say what lines our future policy is to take. We have never answered that and we have put off answering them far too long. At last and not too soon, a viceroy has had the courage to state the trend of British policy in India and the lines on which we propose to advance’ (in Waley 1964: 51/2).

The controversy rumbled on into the House of Commons. Waley recounts how on 22 April 1912, Conservative MP Andrew Bonar Law revived the argument. He recapitulated the differences in understandings of the Despatch. Montagu persisted, replying that as far as he was concerned there was no difference. Thus

‘...when others were advocating their own ideals, it was not out of place to show the people of India that there was a direction in which the British occupation was tending, “some definite aim and object,” and that they were in India not merely to administrate, but to develop India to a plan...’ (Waley 1964: 52).

The argument wound its way back to the House of Lords on 24 June 1912. This time Lord Curzon brought up the topic. He refers once again ‘...to the Nationalists’
interpretation of the Despatch which Crewe had denied and Montagu had twice confirmed...’ Waley continues, ‘...Crewe repeated his denial and stated emphatically that he saw no future for India on the lines of colonial self-government’ (Waley 1964: 52).

Montagu felt the rush to clarify his sentiments as a snub. He wrote to Crewe expressing his profound disappointment. He says, ‘I am more than unhappy...I have always hoped that even if I did let you down you would be certain in public to come to my assistance. That is an incentive to do his best which any member of the Government however subordinate must feel.’ In another letter four days later he adds, ‘I hate to be acclaimed...a friend of the extremists or to be told I’ve been overruled’ (in Waley 1964: 52/3).

Crewe brought an end to the debate. In fact he brought an end to any debate, when he too denied any difference in view between himself, Montagu or the Government of India. It’s just that his policy was the policy of them all. According to him all parties apparently were convinced of

‘...the supremacy of British rule in India, because maintenance of British rule was the best method of securing the happiness of the people of India...Was it conceivable that at any time the Indian Empire could succeed on the lines, say, of Australia or New Zealand?’ (in Waley 1964: 53).
This early spat didn’t deter Montagu from pursuing his particular goals. He would continue to espouse his views and distil his brand of rule. After his third budget speech in which he drew attention to the changing character of the Indian population, he sought and obtained Lord Crewe’s permission to visit India for six months from October 1912 to March 1913. Crewe assented and Montagu would hasten there with unbounded enthusiasm.

(i) **Montagu’s first visit to India – October 1912-March 1913**

‘The infection of this country has become so acute I doubt I shall ever get over it’ (Montagu 1912).¹⁷

I will not describe his travels during this visit in detail, but pick out a few instances in his encounters that exemplify his creed. Whether he envisaged he would get a more favourable reception, for his tenet of co-operation in the governing of India when in India, is unclear. Of course he hoped those in the front line battling the new complexities in the problems of governing India would welcome and be interested in his input. As he hoped would those governed. He did not spend time agonising over such questions, but rather continued headlong with articulating his creed in the most forthright terms. We know this because Montagu kept a full diary of all his travels. They are not the recounting of a tourist. To be sure he did his fair share of sightseeing. Waley constructs him as an ‘...indefatigable sightseer...’ who would constantly ask questions. By the end he managed to accumulate a wide store of information (Waley 1964: 291).
Yet, his writings are also 'vivid character studies...and assessments...of all the men
he met,' and their conduct in the affairs of Indian government (Waley 1967: 291).
Such assessments formed crucial material in his calls for new co-operative styles of
rule. Generally he notes how members of the Indian Civil Service, though
'...devotedly interested in their files...' had 'surprisingly little interest in the people
of India' (Waley 1964: 292). Not only he says, did they have little interest of this sort,
but also perhaps even more frightful he thinks, were appalled at the '...prospect of
changed relations to the natives' that any widening of recruitment to the service
would involve (Waley 1964: 292). He in his turn is aghast at their state of being in
relation to such a prospect. They are he feels quite conventional in this regard. None
of them, he thinks can break down conventions in recruitment. Any movement, to
borrow a phrase, 'beyond the pale,' in recruitment would they believe inevitably
entail a lowering of the prestige in which the Civil Service is regarded.18 He
concludes his rather terse views of the Indian Civil Service with a neat summary of
their vast opportunities but limited imaginations:

'Up to the present I do not see anything very alarming with regard to the rift between
the I.C.S and the people; but what I do think I see is, that the I.C.S. men ignore the
existence of people and pursue a machine-made path. Is it not true to say, that with
every new educated man you produce, the cry that good government is no substitute
for self-government – corruption notwithstanding – gains force? The question
remains – what does 'self' mean? We ought to make it our business to see that it
means India and English together' (in Waley 1964: 292).19
Montagu thought these fears misguided. As we see above, an India for Indians is not where Montagu wants to lead them. As Waley summarises it, though in this instance Montagu is ‘…most anxious that more Indians should be recruited to the Indian Civil Service he regarded “India for the Indians” as an almost infinitely distant ideal’ (Waley 1964: 292).

(ii) Bombay

While he went about his journeys he would encounter many he would be critical of and occasionally others he would regard as fellow travellers. Perhaps in a general sense the members of the Indian Civil Service he meets are peculiarly sensitive about any proposed changes in Indian government. However, according to Waley, the impression he gets from administrators he meets when in Bombay is different. Perhaps in this instance they are more to his liking. As Waley puts it, his impression of Bombay ‘was one of belief in British rule and pride in our administrators’ (Waley 1964: 296). The administrators in Bombay Montagu feels are

‘…doggedly doing their jobs, interested in their departments more than in speculation of government problems, doing their daily work without hypotheses, working on no principle; but so official, so keen, not on the country, on their work’ (in Waley 1964: 296).
This arrangement suits Montagu, and he hints neatly perhaps at the driving force behind such efficiencies - an ideal separation between administration (the job) and politics (government).

(iii) Simla

By the time Montagu gets to Simla he is convinced that Bombay isn’t an isolated instance of good government in the above sense, even in spite of its imperfections. He is impressed he says ‘with the patriotism and devotion to efficiency of the Indian civilian and soldier’ (in Waley 1964: 301). Yet, whilst here he is struck by an episode of race snobbery.20 On this he chose not to enlarge.

Montagu did not hold back though when, Waley tells us, he bemoaned the growth in luxury among the governing class. All this Montagu adds, ‘...when the very poor...are beginning to think...’(in Waley 1964: 301). He’s afraid that circumstances such as these will not change ‘until someone who does not worship conventionality is Viceroy with a good Secretary of State’ (in Waley 1964: 301). One who did not feel constrained by convention.

Of course changes in such opulent lifestyles, as this will not come quickly; especially he thinks, as any Viceroyalty that embarks on a project to rein in such lifestyles is sure to encounter hostility. Nevertheless he is convinced that ‘it should be done’
(Waley 1964: 301). He sets out an extraordinary personal manifesto. He volunteers, ‘I think I could do it,’ and adds, ‘if I felt weak I would give the money I saved to charity...’ Action like this he reasons, ‘would help to stop the growth of luxury which Indian agitation is...watching. People should lead simple working lives at Simla. It should be like a Cabinet Minister’s weekend, not like Oyster Bay’ (Waley 1964: 301).

(iv) Peshawar

Even when he gets to the bête noire of British rule, Peshawar, the Punjab border town in the new British manufacture called the North West Frontier Province, he finds an interesting version of co-operation. Ross-Keppel,21 the Chief Commissioner reveals a piquant style of management. Killing it seems, is that vigorous form of co-operation. Thus, ‘despite raids and the necessity of shooting one another, English and Afridis are on most excellent terms...’ (Waley 1964: 301). Of course these inhabitants of the frontier were immensely useful to the British Raj. Montagu refers to them thus: ‘...nothing in the history of the world is probably so remarkable as keeping a country in order by the brothers and relations of the raiders themselves...defending posts without the assistance or the immediate supervision of any British officer’ (in Waley 1964: 301). Though he encounters similar antipathies from the civil service in Pershawar to the ones he encounters at the very beginning of his journeys, the vicarious management of the frontier, Ross-Keppel style, is, he feels, a tangible result of his style of co-operation.
(v) The Canal Colonies

His comments about the Dante administration in these colonies capture once again his desire for an ethic of co-operation in Indian government. He is impatient of men in Dante’s administration who he thinks ‘...are not really interested in men as individuals; they want progress reducible to statistics; the men are pawns.’ These observations are, according to Waley, like so many others, ‘...very charitable comments illustrating Montagu’s imaginative sympathy with Indians as human beings’ (in Waley 1964: 308).

(vi) Lahore

Impatience gets the better of him in Lahore when he is invited to a garden party at Government House. He sneers about these so-called ‘Bridge Parties’ where everyone makes a great pretence of getting to know each other. In reality he says the ‘smart English ladies were gossiping together, while a few of them, with nearly all the English men, were playing tennis or badminton, ignoring all the Indians.’ It does nothing for cordiality for they must he argues, ‘increase bitterness...among highly educated Indians...and lack of respect, through misunderstanding’ (in Waley 1964: 310).

(vii) Aligarh
A little while after his encounter with what he thinks are the detritus of administration in Lahore, and the ‘indescribably horrible’, panoply of a bridge party exemplifies this he visits Aligarh (Waley 1964: 310). Here he feels he is on firmer ground in the company of Lord Metson and Sir William Marris. 22 Thoroughly impressed by their relation to their job of administration he gives them a glowing reference:

‘Here are men convinced of the changing conditions, looking forward to the part that they will have to pay, without fear, without pessimism. The very complication of an administration in partnership as compared with the administration of governor over governed does not frighten them, but leads them to new enthusiasm’ (in Waley 1964: 313).

How he wished for a few more Metsons and a lot fewer Craddocks. 23

(c) A conclusion or opportunity

Montagu thought his trip a mixed fortune of frustration and success. On leaving he remarks:

*India is absorbingly interesting and difficult. Would that I had more opportunity to help! One feels that one is shrieking like Cassandra... No one seems to disagree with, or to take, my advice; what with no parliamentary opportunity, the censure-like action of Asquith and Crewe in regard to the Commission, and the difficulties about a private secretary etc. I go home without zest and rather depressed. India ought to
have a great official purifying and it does so want energy. Almost a revolution of
ideal and method is needed to avert a revolution of its people. One cannot feel
optimistic after being there and discussing almost every problem with nearly
everybody of importance’ (in Waley 1964: 333).  

Ending, if not exactly on a high, he certainly trod a path few others even dared
contemplate. After setting out the foundations of his duty, as he saw it, and working
towards forming a distinctive ethics, he would, in his role as Secretary of State for
India, his most challenging yet, move onto devising the next phase of Indian reforms
in the traditions of his mentor. He would however have to wait. It was not until July
1917 that he was appointed Secretary of State for India. In between times he filled the
roles of Financial Secretary to the Treasury and Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster.

‘We cannot devote more than a century to the tilling of the soil and then refuse to
plant the seed’ (Montagu 1918).  

We would be mistaken for thinking his promotion to Secretary of State fortuitous. A
less casual description should recognise his sustained campaign for being in such a
role. His intense interest in India didn’t at first propel him into playing the part he
-craved in Indian affairs. Waley tells us about his frustrations with such slow progress.
He thought himself stuck at the India Office. He wrote to Venetia, his wife, forlorn at
his future prospects. He agonised, ‘...as...the years go on...they...make things grow
worse and more dismal...I remain, and I fear forever, a celibate, boycotted, unused,
USS of S for India‘ (in Waley 1964: 60). In short he longed ‘...for the power to do something for India, and not merely make speeches’ (Waley 1964: 60).

He was not modest in his ambitions. Before becoming Secretary of State, he would attempt to supplant Lord Hardinge as Viceroy of India. In December 1915 he wrote to the Prime Minister in forthright tones. He said, ‘I feel I should not be doing my duty to myself or as I conceive it to India, if I did not once again put forward with insistence, but for the last time, my own claims...’ to succeed Lord Hardinge as Viceroy of India (in Waley 1964: 83). He did not expect the Prime Minister to resent his claims, when he adds,

‘I have carefully considered all the other possible names and, if I say that I know of no one who seems to me likely to do for India what I want done, I hope you will take it as an expression of opinion given in the frank and unpretending spirit in which you have always allowed me to address you...Indian problems attract me with an intensity which I can find for no other problems. I have no other ambition save to go to India and I have had no other since I entered public life’ (in Waley 1964: 83).

He is not beyond pleading. He implores:

‘...I have in asking you for favours in the past always been able to consider the interests of your Government and the personnel affection and esteem for yourself which grow with length of association. But in this instance I am only considering
myself and after a continuous consideration of my motives I find them respectable' (in Waley 1964: 83).

Not for the first time or the last, he refers it to what he feels are his special claims on such a role. Of course he admits his insistence in one sense is purely selfish. Yet he also declares that he does so on behalf of the British government. His personal claims, his manifesto for Indian government, should be one and the same. He believes there is no one else quite as ideally fitted to the role. This is why in the penultimate paragraph of his letter to the Prime Minister he includes an object lesson in how a Viceroy should conduct himself in India. He writes a job description that relates his ideal candidate – that is no other than himself. Hence,

'I want to see a Viceroy who will try to be an energetic administrator rather than a mock royalty surrounded by out of date and rather tawdry pomp – one who goes to India attracted by India rather than the dignity of the office, one who will improve the system of representative government, consider without prejudice the demands born of India’s share in the war, devises a better system of taxation, heals the schisms between Islam and Hinduism, simplify the land system, organise the independent States and decentralise the Government...' (in Waley 1964: 84).

Finally, like a soothsayer in the Bazaars of India, Montagu charms the Prime Minister with the wiles of his claims to competence. He adds,
‘These are the problems, which of all others in the world I want to tackle. I know of no others to which I could apply myself with the same faith of some result. I believe I could do something while setting myself the task of avoiding friction either with many interests out there or the Home Government. If I could have my chance out there, I am quite prepared to abandon all hope of ever being asked to do anything else’ (in Waley 1964: 84).

As Waley tells us, Montagu is ultimately unsuccessful in his petition to Asquith. Yet in a larger sense all is not lost. It wouldn't be too long before his persistence paid off. It paid off in a dramatic way.

In July 1917 Montagu got the call he was waiting for. Lloyd George appointed him Secretary of State for India. If he thought it would all be plain sailing from now on he was mistaken. According to Waley, Lord Derby commented, ‘the appointment of Montagu, a Jew, to the India Office has made...an uneasy feeling both in India and here...’ Derby couples his unease with a pointed compliment when he says, ‘I personally have a very high opinion of his capability and...expect he will do well’ (in Waley 1964: 30).

Quite fortuitously perhaps Montagu made a speech in the House of Commons a few days before his promotion, in his role as Vice-Chairman and acting Chief of the Reconstruction Committee. In it he touched on what he terms failures of the Government of India. Ostensibly his criticisms relate to their failure to supply
Nixon’s army in their attack on Baghdad with the requisite munitions. In the course of his comments he describes the Government of India as ‘too wooden, too iron, too inelastic, too anti-diluvian to be of any use for the modern purposes we have in view’ (in Waley 1964: 127). He generalises his criticisms, to include ‘the whole system of the India Office…’. It is he feels ‘…designed to prevent control by the House of Commons for fear there might be too advanced a Secretary of State’ (in Waley 1964: 127).

One would be hard pushed to find a more damming indictment of the conduct of Indian Government! The logic of Montagu’s comments is clear to Waley. For him it is nothing less than a demand for the wholesale reorganisation of the ‘executive System of India’. It amounts to a demand for ‘…less control by Westminster and Whitehall…’. He asks that ‘…more responsibility…be…given…to the people of India’ over their own affairs (Waley 1964: 127). He sees his goal as being to ensure that the ‘…self governing Dominions and Provinces of India…are… organised and co-ordinated with the great Principalities - not as one great Home Rule country, but…in…a series of self-governing Principalities, federated by one Central Government…’ (in Waley 1964: 128).

In his gracious written acceptance of the Prime Minister’s offer of the Secretaryship of State, he presumes and replies on that basis. If he is to accept the Government’s offer he reasons, it must accept his. That is to say it does so with the full knowledge
of his policy for Indian government. Now he reasons he could set about the job with a real glimmer of hope.

(d) Secretary of State - A grand office

Levine imagines for us the thoughts that ran through Montagu’s mind when he stepped into his plush new offices ‘as the New Secretary of State for India...’ (Levine 1991: 450). She describes a kingly scene:

'It was a regal office, furnished magnificently with thick Oriental rugs, an elegant hand-carved desk and chair, and oak panelled walls decorated with Indian miniatures and with the oil portraits of former Secretaries of State. These looked down upon him, stern and stately, staring, perhaps incredulously, upon this rather unattractive Jew, the first of his religion to hold this office. Here was Edwin Montagu, the great-grandson of a man born in a small village in the Jewish ghetto of Poland, grandson of a watchmaker from Liverpool, son of an Orthodox Jewish banker to whom the Jewish Sabbath was more sacred than the Magna Carta, following in the footsteps of the Earl of Derby, Lord Salisbury, Lord Randolph Churchill and the Duke of Argyll, to mention only four of the great British aristocrats who held this post' (Levine 1991: 450).

Montagu, one feels, is not unduly troubled by the grandeur of the scene that greets him. His concerns so far as India is concerned were to bring to fruition his ideals
about its government. He must he thinks to do his duty. A duty he defines very differently from the O’Dwyers and Dyers. Lord Chelmsford, with whom he was closely associated, was the Viceroy at the time.

(i) The Declaration of 20\textsuperscript{th} August 1917

A month after his appointment, Montagu issued a proclamation outlining his and his government’s intention towards Indian government. According to Levine, ‘...the fact that this was achieved at all and...done in thirty-four days is a singular tribute to Montagu’s obsessive determination...’ (Levine 1991: 154). Paraphrasing Levine, he tried to cajole, write memoranda, lobby, persuade, pursue every stratagem and tactic of which Machiavelli would have been proud, to win over and get the agreement of his colleagues to the issue of his declaration. Levine declares, ‘...he made Chamberlain his ally and advisor and, in spite of his personal dislike of Curzon did all he could to win him over...’(Levine 1991: 454). Later he warned his colleagues, ‘...action is necessary at once...if you do not act soon, you will be lead irresistibly along the lines of repression, coercion, imprisonment – compared with which I am certain that the recent history of Ireland will be placid and peaceful...’ (Levine 1991: 454).
In the end all finally agreed to steer India toward a version of self-government. Hence, the 'bipartisan Unionist coalition cabinet' (Fein 1977: 74) of which he was a member announced:

‘...the policy of his Majesty’s Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire’ (in Fein 1977: 74).

The only significant amendment to the final text came from Curzon. He preferred the phrase ‘responsible government’ to Montagu’s original words ‘self-government’ (Levine 1991: 456).

The British government were now ready, as ready as they would ever be. This would be a difficult road to traverse. Indian nationalists thought it a very limited reform. Nevertheless the announcement aroused little in the way of opposition. Waley uses words from Morland and Chatterjee in their short History of India to summarise the reaction:

‘This announcement while it excited some surprise, aroused little opposition in England. It is probably correct to say that up to 1914 very few Englishmen had given
serious thought to the future of India. Ordinary people know it as a distant dependency, plagued by a few irresponsible politicians and agitators but progressing under British rule, and they were content to leave the matter there. The events of the war brought the dependency nearer to their minds and their minds and their hearts and feelings were stirred by various picturesque incidents of the time which operated to make it appear natural and reasonable that the dependency should develop into a dominion’ (in Waley 1964: 136).

Montagu is aware of the difficulties that lie ahead. He worked hard to bring such a policy to fruition. The day after the proclamation of his policy, he wrote to Chelmsford about the potential high cost of his proposals. Reforms, he suggests ‘...cost money and we have...nearly reached the limit of the taxable capacity...of Indians’ (Montagu 1917 in Waley 1964: 137). Yet there were other equally pressing matters that disturbed him. These related to fundamental issues of administration. He wrote once more to Chelmsford outlining his uncertainties. It is worth quoting in full:

‘...The more I think of the subject, the more I realise the extraordinary difficulties of the position... We have promised...the development of self-governing institutions and a progressive realisation of responsible government in India. How far can we go in this direction safely...? If this is our object, the nearer we approach it, the greater our success...But that is all that is simple. If the situation were such that we could say to India: “Bless you. The time has now come when we withdraw our machinery of executive government and substitute for it an indigenous one completely responsible
to the Indian people, and we are determined not to interfere with its wishes"; we could...draw up a beautiful constitution. Embodying all the best features of all the constitutions of the world. It would look beautiful on paper and we could then fold our arms and watch the Millennium. But... we are discussing a problem of the administration of an important part of the world, and are not considering an abstract mater for debate...Is there any country in the world that has attempted a half-way house in this, or a quarter-way house? An autocratic and independent executive is common. Self-governing institutions are now...accepted as the only proper form of government. How can you unite the two? Can you have a form of government administered by an alien agency partly responsible to the people of the country itself?

You have got a democracy at home, ignorant of Indian conditions, a Central Government in India naturally jealous of the efficiency of the Government of which it is the custodian, local governments growing in importance with the civilisation of the countries over which they preside, and an Indian opinion produced by a long series of statesmen from Macaulay to Morley which his now...impossible to ignore. How can we reconcile all these things at a time when no complete solution is possible and everything must be another step on the slope which we started a hundred years ago?’ (Montagu 1917 in Waley 1964: 137-138).

Such conundrums in the conduct of this imperial government could mean only one thing. Montagu set out for India again. Once there he attempted to reconcile all the competing parties and elaborate a plan that would meet with the approval of as many as possible. Amongst all those who accompanied him on his trip, the most significant
name is that of Lord Chelmsford. He would be a co-designate to the eventual scheme that emerged.

(ii) A second Trip to India – Nov. 1917 – May 1918

That Montagu was convinced of the importance of this tour there is little doubt. In his diary he says, ‘...my visit to India means that we are going to do something big... I cannot go home and produce a little thing or nothing, it must be epoch making, or it is a failure; it must be the keystone of the future history of India’ (Montagu 1930: 8).

As well as being convinced of the importance of his trip he has some very definite ideas about how he should conduct himself in relation to Indians. This would be a constant source of frustration in his dealings with his accomplice, Lord Chelmsford. Not long after he arrived he expresses his fear that Chelmsford would make things too formal for his liking. He paints him as ‘...cold, aloof, reserved’ (Montagu 1930: 16). Montagu’s designs are not exactly the warmest of descriptions. Yet his remarks got even chillier. He sees Chelmsford as ‘...strongly prejudiced in his views...’. Perhaps he damns with faint praise when he says ‘...I don’t see that any of them are his... They seem to me to be...collected from his surroundings...’ (Montagu 1930: 16).
Montagu certainly didn’t adhere to any protocols. He did not hesitate in characterising Chelmsford as being wholly unsuited to the role of Viceroy. He makes these feelings plain when he says,

‘...the fact of the matter is – and it is borne in on me every moment of the day...but it is no use because nobody will believe me – the sort of man we seek to make a Viceroy is wholly wrong. He comes from the wrong class. It is not right to blame Lord Chelmsford; it is only right to remember that that is not the sort of stuff of which to make Viceroys...’ (Montagu 1930: 16).

In an echo of remarks he makes to describe administrators in the I.C.S on his first trip to India – he continues in this critical vein. Thus in his view,

‘They...(Viceroys)... approach their problem from the wrong side; they do the work they are called upon to do; they wade through files; they think of their regulations; and then as to the social side - precedence, precedence, precedence. Everything is divided into Government and those who are not Government, official and those who are not official, Government and the opposition. Informal discussion, informal conversation they do not know. Political instincts they have none. The wooing of constituents is beneath their idea; the coaxing of the press is not their métier. Nothing is required of them but to get through their files, and carry on their social work according to the rule. Everything is prescribed; everything is printed...This may be
Montagu dispensed with protocol when discussing the character of Chelmsford. Montagu's comments about Chelmsford are not isolated instances of how he deals with the cast of characters on the Indian scene. Dispensing with form is a marked feature of how he comports himself generally. So for instance he deployed similarly informal methods in his discussions with Indians. In fact he maintains that their discussions with him should proceed on as familiar a basis as possible. Moreover acting in concert he is determined both he and Chelmsford should take their time in those discussions. He did not want to contemplate failure. He is quite clear when he says, 'rather than fail, I would stay a year in India and resign rather than hurry things' (Montagu 1910: 7). He would he insists, take as long as it requires to '...get at the bottom of matters...I cannot confine myself to ten minutes or a quarter of an hour' (Montagu 1930: 8).

Montagu got his way. They received many a deputation and he did not confine himself to brief chit-chat with his interlopers. He reasoned that this method of proceeding is sure to pay dividends. He even feels he has a special relation with Indians, because of his Jewishness. Perhaps he recognises the recondite character of his Jewishness. This is how he puts it:
‘I have only been here two days; and all the Indian Chiefs have called on me and
talked to me as a friend, and I have got far more out of them than the Viceroy got in
ten days of Conference. They asked for interviews; interviews were granted to them
of ten minutes each because it was not considered that anything but formal interviews
were necessary. They have all come back unofficially, and we have an hour and a
half or three-quarters of an hour together at odd times, and they talk to me, as they
never dare talk to anybody else. Perhaps there is some truth in the allegation that I
am an Oriental. Certainly that social relationship which English people seem to find
so difficult come quite easy to me; and we shall go from bad to worse, until we are
hounded out of India, unless something is done to correct this sort of thing’ (Montagu
1930: 17).27

(iii) Dyarchy

The scheme Montagu and Chelmsford proposed is called Dyarchy. Originally
conceived by Sir William Duke it did not satisfy any one (Levine 1991: 464). Montagu
feared as much. For some it went too far too soon. For others not far
enough. Yet Montagu wrote in his diary:

‘The main principle...[of the report]... is that instead of founding the Indian
Government on the confidence of the people of England, we are gradually to found it
on the confidence of the people of India. We are, beginning in the Provinces,
maintaining the Government of India as now, but subjected, I am glad to think, to
more criticism, and future progress will depend on the creation of an electorate. I do not see how any reasonable man can find fault with the principles…’ (Montagu 1930: 362).

The sentiments that William Duke first used to describe what he had in mind are the reasons why nationalists did not. He insisted on

‘…introducing true responsible government in a limited and manageable field of administration, which could be contracted or extended in accordance with the practical results attained, without imperilling the structure of the government itself. The method by which this gradual and safe advance to responsible government could be made in India…is…”dyarchy” ’ (Duke 1915 in Levine 1991: 464).

Montagu and Chelmsford’s plan did not deviate profoundly from Duke’s. According to Wolpert, the technique of dyarchy was devised to ensure that

‘several provincial departments of government were “transferred” to ministers elected by elected legislative council representatives, while other departments were “reserved” to officialdom. The reserved subjects were the most well-funded, powerful branches of government, finance and law and order’ (Wolpert 2000: 297).
With such devices in mind the plan's limitations are obvious. Yet Wolpert argues ‘...dyarchy was a substantial step toward independence. No such transfer of executive authority would as yet be introduced at the center, but the Imperial Legislative Council would be “enlarged and made more representative” ’ (Wolpert 2000: 297).

There are others of course who agree in general with Wolpert's assessment. According to Datta, Coupland described it as a ‘...permanent contribution to the science of politics and the history of British Imperialism’ (Coupland 1944 in Datta 1964: 27).

Contrasting views to this kind of optimism are generally twofold. Thus for instance, Annie Besant was highly critical. For her the plan ‘...is unworthy for England to offer and unworthy of India to accept’ (in Datta 1964: 27). The Indian National Congress convened a special meeting to discuss the report. They called it ‘disappointing and unsatisfactory’ (in Levine 1991: 471). Nonetheless, the Congress accepted its broad thrust. They saw it as an attempt to put into practice the principles set out in the declaration of 20th August (Levine 1991: 471). In the meantime they continued ‘to urge modifications and improvement...to make it a substantial first step towards responsible government in India...both in the Central and Provincial governments’ (in Levine 1991: 471).

However Montagu’s hopes for his proposals were somewhat dashed in a different way by the appointment and deliberations of the Rowlatt Committee. It recommended the extension of the Defence of India Act, a hated wartime measure.28
Montagu's nemesis Sir Michael O'Dwyer was also critical, but for different reasons. He called Dyarchy 'a spider's web spun out of the brain of a doctrinaire pedant' (O'Dwyer 1925: 369). He also wrote what Montagu describes as a '...violent note damming our scheme all the way up the hill and down the dale...' (Montagu in Waley 1964: 149). His spats with O'Dwyer did not end with this. They broke out again on a more intense scale the following year.

Curzon, a colleague in government, is another critic who took exception, to Montagu constantly pushing him (Levine 1991: 469). He warned Montagu that '...haste and confidence are liable in Indian undertakings to rude disappointment' (in Levine 1991: 464). Montagu did see his scheme enacted. Yet, as Levine points out, '...they did not...prevent future conflict and bloodshed, nor...lessen the unrest and violence that convulsed India in the decades ahead...' (Levine 1991: 467). Nevertheless Zimmern thinks the report 'a watershed in British-Indian relations'. He's in no doubt that the report prefaced 'developments of great moment' (Zimmern 1926: 13-14). In fact the same historian views it Levine suggests '...as the beginning of the end of...'

'...the Second British Empire and the beginning of the Third British Empire, the transformation of the Empire into a Commonwealth of Nations...a landmark in
British Imperial History...it marks the definite repudiation of the idea that there can, under the British flag, be one form of constitutional evolution for the West and another for the East, or one for the White race and another for the non-white’ (Levine 1991: 467; Zimmern 1926: 13-14).

A lot of the commentary, historical or otherwise, judges Montagu’s attempt at reform of British Government a failure. My task is not to join in such evaluations. Whatever view we may take on his attempts at reform, both on a personal and governmental level, they mark a sustained endeavour to change both its face and ethics in the idealistic terms Zimmern proposes, and the practical ones I do. They mark a moment in the make-up of a ruler in India who sought out sympathy as his duty. A tougher test of his ideas and putative practice was still to come. It is to that I now turn.

4

**Dampening the Fire – The Hunter Committee Enquiry and Report**

1919 turned out to be ‘...both the best and worst times for... Montagu’ (Levine 1991: 492). It began with Montagu gushing with enthusiasm about the reform process he set in trail. Hence, ‘...the Government of India Bill was passed into law with little opposition...’; and the ‘...enactment of...such...a liberal measure by a Conservative
Government...’ Waley suggests, ‘...was largely due to...Montagu’s...pertinacity and patience’ (Waley 1964: 191). Yet 1919 was also a ‘...year of tragic riots in the Punjab’, culminating in 'the...massacre by General Dyer at Amritsar’ (Waley 1964: 191). The massacres heralded another series of encounters with Sir Michael O’Dwyer; more opportunities for Montagu to condemn rule by order; and see him urge all concerned in Indian government to couple duty with co-operation.

(a) It’s All About Contrasting Styles?

The antipathy Montagu and O’Dwyer shared is legendary. Neither gave the other any quarter. As I outline in chapter 4, O’Dwyer is renowned for a style of rule he made all his own; his rule would be akin to a tough but benevolent king. Montagu’s preferred style of colonial domination couldn’t be more antithetical. He styles it on what he terms co-operation. The aftermath of the massacres saw them joust for their particular versions of domination.

The imperial order exemplified by the versions of rule Dyer, O’Dwyer and others of their proclivities display were still well entrenched. Time and again, Montagu, by his words and actions expressed his utter contempt for such styles. For him such styles of rule did not work well, particularly at this time. In a long letter to Chelmsford he derided O’Dwyer’s style thus:
‘There is nothing so easy at any particular moment as to govern through the police. It is far simpler than any other method. It requires less thought, less circumlocution. Take every man on his police record, use intercepted correspondence and exceptional powers and you sow the whirlwind for your successor to reap and you bring down the Government in God’s own time as certainly as it was brought down in Russia. That is why I have always thought O’Dwyer’s success in the Punjab so cheap a success’ (in Waley 1964: 201).30

The massacres at the Jallianwala are for him the exemplar par-excellence of the failure of O’Dwyer’s style of rule. If this event was not to mark the end of the Raj, Montagu reasons, he would have to get a grip of matters before they spiralled out of all control.

(b) Hunter

Montagu steadfastly held to his views about the character of his proposals for reform. He did fear nevertheless that the events at Amritsar signalled an end to all talk and practice of progressive reform in Indian government. Yet in spite of all the distress wrought by Amritsar he pressed on. He resolved to see reform carried through to fruition. He wants to show ‘...as soon and as emphatically as I can, that we do not want to find in these distressing occurrences a cause for any retreat from the pledges we have given or the proposals we have made...’ (in Waley 1964: 207). Determined to discredit O’Dwyer, he writes to Sir George Lloyd:
'I cannot help thinking that what the asses call strong government is very largely responsible for what has occurred. Sitting on the barometer, stifling discussion, interfering with the free movement of people, eases the situation at the moment, but brings its reward...' (in Waley 1964: 207).

The Amritsar massacres provided Montagu with an ideal opportunity to shake up his critics. They would now have to engage critically with the hitherto prized methods of strong government. In a speech to the House of Commons he declares, '...you cannot have disturbances of this magnitude without an enquiry into the causes of and the measure taken to cope with...' them. In May 1919 he took the opportunity to write to Chelmsford repeating his conviction that they must hold an enquiry into the causes of and the treatment of the riots that have occurred in India...The more I read of these occurrences, the more I am struck by the fact that there is every reason to believe that they are the inevitable consequences of that easiest form of government...firm strong government' (in Waley 1964: 207).

(i) Composition

After Montagu decided to hold a committee of enquiry, he worked to ensure that its make-up was suitable. Of course some regarded his concern about who should sit on
it suspiciously. Sir William Marris is one of that number. In fact he doubts the value of any committee Montagu appoints. Marris set out his doubts thus:

'It would be most dangerous to have a committee consisting of persons appointed by Montagu. We cannot hope to get really first class men from Great Britain and should probably be forced to take second grade politicians of little independence of character in sitting in judgement on the Government in India' (in Datta 1975: 5).

Yet, such suspicions didn't deter Montagu. He persisted with his concern about its make-up. He obtained a membership for it consistent with his ideal model for Indian Government. He wanted to change its face and practice to a more co-operative venture. So he ensured that the Government of India roamed far and wide when making their final selection of members for the Committee. According to Datta, he went as far as to impose '...guidelines for the Government of India...in regard to the composition of the committee' (Datta 1975: 5). He even wrote to the Viceroy on the 7th August 1919, insisting that '...Indians who command the confidence of the moderates...are essential' as members of any proposed committee (Datta 1976: 5). In a later telegram he warned of the dangers in being seen to be fearful of Indian opinion. Hence, '...nothing does the Government of India more harm than the allegation that we fear Indian opinion and make safe appointments that command no confidence among those they are supposed to represent' (in Datta 1975: 5).
In the end the Government of India did appoint a mix of members. Lord Hunter a little known quantity in India, would be chairman. The other members of the committee read like a modern day list of the great and good. There we find past and present day lawyers, civil servants and military officials. They were joined by three Indian lawyers – The Honourable Pandit Jagat Narayan; Sir Chiminlal Setalvad; and Sardar Sahibzada - who by their skilful interrogations about the codes of conduct of government and its administration in India, broke the administration's, and specifically General Dyer’s, composure.

In October 1919 the Committee commenced its work. Its terms of reference charged it to ‘inquire into the causes of and measures taken to cope with the recent disturbances in Bombay, Delhi and Punjab.’

In taking such a keen interest in the composition of the committee Montagu had bigger prey squarely in view. The findings and conclusions of the Committee would, he hoped, sound the death knell of the manners of a school of government he so despised.

(ii) A New Ethics?

After my discussion of Montagu's views on government it would be easy to clad him in heroic garb. That is not my aim. Certainly in comparison to O'Dwyer and Dyer he
saw both himself and his job rather differently. As we see he makes that abundantly clear on numerous occasions. His ideal ruler and the form of rule he should practice are what he calls co-operation. He wants what he calls an Anglo-India. He sees his duty as being to extend rule, but somewhat differently. If that is not as vulgar as O’Dwyer characterising himself as a father figure and Indians as his charges; or Dyer who thinks himself a soldier hero similarly characterising Indians as children who need looking after, and when being naughty require chastising; it is still domination, however collaboratively, however co-operatively.

In spite of the formal change in the style to a man whose make-up prizes empathy as much as chastisement, many Indians as we see did not want to join Montagu. They did not want in effect be complicit in their own domination. High imperialism it may not be, but imperialism it is. Nevertheless Montagu’s putative modus-operandi can be characterised as a different conception of the make-up of the person of colonial governor. Perhaps Datta summarises Montagu’s journey, both in his singular endeavours in insisting on an enquiry, and generally in relation to India, better than most when he alerts us to its political ethics. Hence he argues,

‘In forcing the…enquiry Montagu was moved by considerations of practical politics

He was most intensely a politician, who worked for immediate returns. In the formation of policy for the management of affairs of state he would probably ask, not “what are the principle involved in it”, but “what are the chances of its success.” He knew what was brewing in the political cauldron in India. He recognised that public
opinion in India had felt outraged at the role of British officials in the disturbances. On grounds of political exigency, he considered it necessary to assuage the injured feelings of...Indian leaders over the...disturbances, for they held the Government responsible. For the implementation of constitutional reforms, on which depended his reputation among his colleagues in England and his political strength he was anxious to rally nationalist public opinion around him in India. The Indian problem had been pending for long, due to the tasteless handling of it by the Government of India, and Montagu was determined to settle it...In order to enlist...Indian support in favour of his proposals he tried to appease...nationalist opinion by conceding an enquiry’ (Datta 1975: 3).

Datta’s comments are a necessary corrective to those who would place Montagu on a pedestal. As I say above, Montagu’s oeuvre and deeds are all too easily categorised in heroic terms as attempts to deliver India from tyranny. I do not join in such praise. Montagu was a consummate politician, and a practical one at that. What we need to add to Datta’s corrective is an appreciation of Montagu’s manoeuvres and their profoundly ethical content beyond the merely self-indulgent - the making of a different colonial governor.

Sympathetic engagement with Indians – and educated Indians at that - Montagu argued, is a much more convenient way of conducting affairs in India. You do not shoot your charges. You do not even thunder, as Sir Michael O’Dwyer is once reported as saying, ‘remember Gandhi talks of soul-force, but there is another force
greater than [his] soul-force...its called...fist force,' as he pounded the table (in Jayakar 1958: 364). Montagu’s mind fixes firmly on what Foucault terms the 'economy' of governing. Never fist-force, let alone soul-force, the word economy in this co-joining ‘comes ... to designate a level of reality, a field of intervention...’ whose primary object is ‘the right disposition of things ... arranged so as to lead to a convenient end.’ At this Montagu would attempt to excel:

‘...the definition of government in no way refers to territory. One governs things. But what does this mean? I do not think that is a matter of opposing things to men, but rather of showing that what government has to do is not territory but rather a sort of complex composed of men and things. The things with which in this sense government is to be concerned with are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc; men in their relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc; lastly, men in their relation to that other kinds of things, accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc ... (Foucault 1991: 93).

(iii) Outcome

The Hunter Committee submitted their final report on 8 March 1920. It is more accurate to say however that they submitted their reports ‘...for the committee split, on racial lines...’ (Sayer 1991: 147).
The majority condemned Dyer’s actions, though rather meekly. Dyer’s justification for his actions on the ground of their moral effect on the populace, they construe as being ‘a mistaken conception of his duty’. Individual acts by O’Dwyer or Dyer though injudicious did not in the majority’s view amount to systemic failures. The Punjab government escaped censure.

The minority censured Dyer with more force. Sayer comments, Dyer’s order to fire, in an interesting choice of words, is ‘...condemned as an act of “frightfulness”’. They compared his actions ‘...to German atrocities in France and Belgium.’ They were simply ‘“inhuman and un-British”’ (Sayer 1991: 148). The regimes of martial law they thought unnecessary. Its enforcement they thought nothing less than opprobrious.

Montagu got more or less what he wanted from the reports. In case there was any doubt, he writes to Chelmsford saying so. Thus his focus once again is to discredit O’Dwyer the governor:

‘I do not regard the Report of the Hunter Committee, on first reading as having exonerated O’Dwyer. On the contrary they are inclined to say in guarded language what I would say about the rule for which he was responsible...I was not at the India Office during most of O’Dwyer’s regime. Whether the ring-fence policy, which he to some extent advocated, was necessary or not, I do not choose to say...But let all people beware that when they contemplate executive action, deportation, suppression
of the press, prohibition of public meetings, prohibition of free movement, they are bound sooner or later, to reap the reward. It is an expedient which perhaps tides them over for the moment. I am convinced that it does not tide them over in the long run...Do not let us shut our eyes to the fact that there must be a harvest. The greatest administrator and the greatest Governor is the man who keeps his Province quiet and orderly without recourse, or with the minimum of recourse to those powers with which he has been entrusted' (Montagu in Waley 1964: 229).

The military part of the cabal, Dyer, did not suffer dismissal. Instead he would be required to resign his commission. According to Fein, the Government of India managed to restrain Montagu from issuing his initial press release. Originally it would read, ‘His Majesty’s Government repudiates emphatically the doctrine of frightfulness upon which Dyer based his action.’ The eventual release read:

‘The principle which has consistently governed the policy of his Majesty’s Government in directing the Methods to be employed when military action in support of the civil authority is required may be broadly stated as using the minimum of force necessary...Brig.-Gen. Dyer’s action was in complete violation of this principle’ (in Fein 1977: 106).

(iv) In the House of Commons
Having got this far with the enquiry and taking things to a conclusion, Montagu had still to battle with protests from his contemporaries.

The anti-Semitic character of much of the criticism directed at Montagu reared its head perhaps even more viciously at this time. An attenuated instance occurs on the occasion of the House of Commons debates. In an extraordinary move Montagu’s opponents in the Commons proposed a debate. The debate, which was ‘technically on the motion to reduce the salary of the Secretary of State for India by £100’, lasted nearly seven hours (Waley 1964: 231). If the nominees of such a debate intended by this means to express their disapproval of the way Montagu had conducted himself in relation to the cashiering of General Dyer, they failed. Formally at least, the government triumphed by 230 votes to 129.

In the debate Montagu opens for the government. He is unbending in his convictions about how India should be governed. In fact he declares he would do no more than restate his and the government’s views. Debate being ruled out, he asserts, rather rhetorically perhaps, how he is not in the Commons to discuss the 1919 disturbances but rather to restate his and the government’s views. Hence,

‘I am in the position of having stated my views and the views of His Majesty’s Government, of which I am the spokesman...The dispatch...was drawn up by a Cabinet Committee and approved by the whole cabinet. I have no desire to withdraw.
from or add to that dispatch. Every single body, civil and military, which has been charged with the discussion of this lamentable affair has...come to the same conclusion. The question before the Committee...is whether they will endorse the position of His Majesty’s Government, of the Hunter Committee, of the Commander-in-Chief in India, of the Government of India, and of the Army Council, or whether they will desire to censure them." 

He continues in this mode. One of the defining moments for him comes when he candidly states the issues the House of Commons have to contend with. There is he argues only one question. Hence he asks,

‘if an officer justifies his conduct, no matter how gallant his record is – and everybody knows how gallant General Dyer’s is – by saying that there was no question of undue severity, that if his means had been greater, the casualties would have been greater, and that the motive was teach a moral lesson to the whole of the Punjab, I say without hesitation, and I would ask the Committee to contradict me if I am wrong, because the whole matter turns on this, that it is the doctrine of terrorism.’

Terrorism is not his style of government. Having posed the question, he pointedly asks of the Commons,
...are you going to keep your hold on India by terrorism, racial humiliation and subordination, and frightfulness, or are you going to rest it upon the good will of the people of your Indian Empire?"41

This theory, his theory of partnership would, he assured his audience, ensure both British honour and Indian honour. Are you, he pleads, on

'India's side in ensuring that order is enforced with the canons of modern British democracy...? We hold British lives sacred, but we hold Indian lives sacred, too. We want to safeguard British honour by protecting and safeguarding Indian honour, too. Our institutions shall be gradually perfected whilst protection is afforded to you and ourselves by revolution and anarchy in order that they may commend themselves to you...42

Of course, in spite of the government winning the vote, many were not convinced of the call for partnership. Sir Edward Carson for instance is not at all sure the issue before the Commons is, or should be, 'the governance of India' (Sayer 1991: 154). His sole concern is with the treatment meted out to General Dyer (Sayer 1991: 154). He gives members, Montagu specifically, a reprimand. They should be ashamed he thinks of their appalling treatment of General Dyer. Hence:

'You talk of the great principles of liberty which you have laid down. General Dyer has a right to be brought within those principles of liberty. He has no right to be
broken on the ipse dixit of any Commission or Committee, however great, unless he has been fairly tried – and he has not been tried...’ 43

He concludes, to ‘loud and prolonged cheers’, by adding, ‘to break a man under the circumstances of this case is un-English.’ 44

Perhaps Carson meant these comments more as a snub to Montagu rather than anything else. Only a very un-English Secretary of State would on his reasoning bypass all the protocols of understanding between men of a certain class!

Sir W. Johnson-Hicks is just as biting in his comments about what he thinks is Montagu’s mendacity. He is convinced ‘...a more disastrous speech...has never been made on the Amritsar affair.’ He adds,

‘My Right Hon. Friend the Secretary of State has for some time past entirely lost the confidence of the Indian Civil Service throughout India...The speech which he has made this afternoon will have utterly destroyed any little shred of confidence which was left to him, not merely in the minds of the Indian Civil Servants, but in the minds of the British army in India...The speech of the Secretary of State...was merely one long vituperation of General Dyer and his actions in India, and one long appeal to racial passion.’ 45
Of course there was more to come. Brigadier Surtees passed on a warning. He says,

‘I will ask hon. members to consider carefully the effect of this debate, not only in India, but among the civilised and uncivilised peoples among whom we rule. There are vast areas in Africa and the Pacific, where the sole British representative is the one white man. It is up to him to keep the native race more or less in order, to look after administration, to see to justice, and, so far as possible, to stamp out violence and vice. In the most favourable circumstances this official is allowed a small-armed native guard, but in the case of any serious upheaval, he and his police would be scattered like chaff, but for one thing...British prestige. Once you destroy that...then the Empire will collapse like a house of cards, and with it all that trade which feeds, clothes, and gives employment to our people...’

Rupert Gwynne is another who doesn’t hold back in his criticisms of Montagu’s conduct in relation to Amritsar. He accuses him of ‘deliberately misleading’ the house about the precise date of the outbreak in Amritsar. If that isn’t enough he charges him with having an unhealthy interest in India and all things Indian, particularly in those who Gwynne brands agitators. In one such instance Gwynne accuses him of naked favouritism. The House according to Gwynne would be shocked to learn ‘...that first-class priority tickets on...steamers were given to...representatives of the agitators in India to let them come...here and give evidence, while officers and women and children anxious to get home could not obtain berths...’
Thomas Jewell Bennett, a liberal like Montagu, commented on the debate in a letter to The Times. He thought the whole proceeding ‘charged with personal antipathy towards Montagu – not free from the racial prejudice which worked mischief in France during the anti-Dreyfus controversy’ (Bennett 1920 in Fein 1977: 135).

Hurtful though these attacks and racial slurs are, Montagu stuck by his guns. The debates did however leave him a gloomy and sick man. It didn’t help that Chelmsford would write to him to protest about his charges of ‘frightfulness’ (Waley 1964: 233). Montagu’s response was robust. In fact he regrets little. If he had any regrets at all it was about what he did not say. Frankly, he remarks,

‘...the “word frightfulness”...was absolutely necessary...to show when we are told that O’Dwyer saved India from Mutiny, that it was the principle on which he acted...that was condemned. To do that it was no use mincing words in the debate...I do not regret in the least having called a spade a spade’ (in Waley 1964: 234).

(v) Doubts

Quite close to collapse at this stage, Montagu believed and expected that his colleague, Chelmsford, should stand with him in carrying through to the ends what they had started (Waley 1964: 235). There are moments now however when he expresses a deep pessimism about the process of reform in India. He even allows
himself the luxury of disbelief. He manages to convince himself that pursuing the policy of self-government at this time is a mistake. Hence in a letter to Lord Willingdon he admits as much. It had lead he thinks to a heightened racial consciousness. Who he wondered could or would hold the ring in these times when his hopes and policies for India would merely intensify them further. In a sense he merely repeats and finds that some of the antipathy he detected on his earlier journeys to India is very much a reality of British rule. Hence, he writes

'I personally do not believe that the Dyer incident was the cause of the great racial exacerbation which is now in existence and which has got to be lived through and down before we can get into a more hopeful atmosphere...This racial consciousness is inevitable. As soon as the Indians were told that we agreed with them and they were to become partners with us, it instilled into their minds an increased feeling of existing subordination and a realisation of everything by which this subordination was expressed. Similarly, when the Europeans were told that, after driving the Indians for so many years, that regime was to be over and they might find themselves forced to Cupertino with the Indians, or even forced to allow Indians to rule India, their race consciousness sprang up afresh. I am convinced in my own mind that that has been the fatal mistake of our policy in India. We ought to have let Indians run their own show from the beginning, with all its inefficiency and imperfections. Development would have been much slower, but the inevitable transition would have been less difficult...The temper of democratic countries such as our is increasingly against remaining in a country where we are not wanted, and we have either got to make our peace with the Indians, or as the educated class grow, we shall find a
strenuous desire in this country to get rid of India and all its bother...' (Montagu 1920 in Waley 1964: 235). 49

5

Conclusions

(a) Resignation

Exhausted and depressed after so much effort in pursuit of governmental reform, it was not long before Montagu decided enough was enough. Yet like much else in the sweep of his revisionist zeal, he would be brought down as much by the deeds of others, as of his own accord. I am not writing a biography, but it is as well to note the part played by his arch detractor, Lord Curzon, in his eventual fall.

Montagu’s downfall came about because of the circulation by him of a telegram relating to the problems of the Turkish Empire. His interests in the settlement of the affairs of a defeated Turkey arose because of the large Muslim population in India. Yet he would be deemed impetuous in his hurry to publish the Government of India’s manifesto ‘about the terms of peace with Turkey’ (Waley 1964: 273). Curzon did not hesitate to take advantage of such an opportunity. He set the ground of fault out like a ruthless tiger hungry for his game. Sanctimonious to the last, he writes about the above in barely disguised contempt:
'In common with my colleagues I received on...March 4th a copy of the telegram from the Government of India in which they sought permission to publish their manifesto...Knowing that there was to be a Cabinet Meeting at the beginning of the next week and not deeming it possible that Mr Montagu could conceive of publication without reference to his colleagues, I regarded it as certain that the question would be brought up at the meeting on Monday [March 6]' (in Waley 1964: 273).

To his chagrin he finds that Montagu chose to allow circulation of the memo without reference to the Cabinet. He wrote to Montagu expressing his disgust at his impetuous conduct. Had he, Curzon, when Viceroy of India, '...ventured to make public pronouncement in India, about the foreign policy of the Government in Europe,' he would he thinks, have been recalled (in Waley 1964: 274). Moreover, he found the presumption that because the Government of India ruled over many Muslims it could concern itself with and influence matters on 'Smyrna or Thrace...Egypt, the Soudan, Palestine...or any other part of the Moslem world...' ridiculous (in Waley 1964: 273). The upshot was that Montagu had to resign.

Resignation did not dampen Montagu's enthusiasm for India. Even after his departure as Secretary of State in 1922 he did not want to lose the ties he had built up in the recent past. Lord Reading discouraged him from visiting India. He warned:
'You can never come as a private gentleman ... You will find that you will be Secretary of State still to most people in India. I mean they still think of you in that capacity. I doubt whether you quite realise the hold you have on the Indian public. I shall say no more and merely put this view to you' (Reading in Waley 1964: 281).

(b) Legacy

Of course it could be said that ultimately Montagu left his task incomplete and a broken man. Yet as I say above, I am not concerned with judging his contributions to Indian government in that way. I am content merely to mark him as someone whose ideals and practice of being a ruler and ruling over Indian others constituted a distinctive style of governor. He, of course, would term it co-operative domination, with an emphasis on the former rather than the latter. If what is at stake in our exploration of styles of rule at this time is individual claims to competence, then Montagu did not think his style of person and rule needed a big stick to support such claims. The events in Amritsar lead him to an urgent re-evaluation, spoken and written, of Britain's place in India. He is exemplary in this regard.

One part of what is crucial in Montagu's style of ruler is the vernacular of 'being Montagu' that he brings to the task. It is worth repeating that what we think marginal is often at the centre in an epochal way. So in this instance, Montagu's marginality as a Jewish member of the colonial government teaches us to regard another history as our history, a British history. His conception of the make-up of a colonial governor is
one who engages in what I call a sympathetic tryst, however limited, with so-called native demands for self-government. We have seen him struggle with conceptions of the make-up of the person of the colonial governor, in a way that ensures both a continued domination, and lays a much greater stress than either O'Dwyer or Dyer on co-operation. His Jewishness is central to this as he strives to attain a different modus operandi for government. Yet, borrowing from Rai the fact that his sympathetic tryst did not enable him to be a man who could move beyond a '...non-propriative identification with others...' entirely merely marks him as being a man of his time (Rai 2002: 161). Paraphrasing Rai, doing one's duty and listening, being sympathetic and ensuring a continued domination, 'was in fact a stern and savage oppression' (Rai 2002: 160).

In chapter 6 I set out my conclusions from my particular perspective on Amritsar. What emerges from my consideration of Amritsar in this way is how profoundly empire was a job of work. The characters I have examined took the matter of government seriously. It was for them a problem not a given. A problem that grew to be taken seriously the more remote the Indian Empire became from the days of the East India Trading Co. Trade required treaties and needed arms to be sure. But it also needed careers. The careers of imperial servants of empire grew in that era which was the high noon of empire. All its servants, and these servants particularly, wanted to make their mark in its history. Consequently they spent a considerable amount of time thinking about and practising government as governmentality.
Commenting on the administration's conduct in relation to the setting and enforcement of martial law, in the Punjab, in particular the notorious crawling order, Montagu wrote to Sir George Lloyd, "...what the asses call strong government is very largely responsible for what has occurred. Sitting on the barometer, stifling discussion, interfering with free movement of people, eases the situation at the moment, but brings its own reward...The more I read of the riots that have occurred in India...the more I'm struck by the fact that there is every reason to believe that they are the inevitable consequences of that easiest of all forms of government, firm strong government..." (In Waley 1964: pp207/8).

On a brilliant re-reading of colonial sympathy see Rai 2002.

In 1847 Samuel Montagu moved to London with is brother. They started a business dealing in foreign exchange and banking. Success came quickly. 1862 he married into what Waley describes as 'one of the rich and exclusive Jewish families; his wife, Ellen Cohen, was a grand niece of Sir Moses Montefiore' (Waley 1964: 4). He sat as a Liberal MP for 15 years (1885-1900) and in 1907 barely seven years after claiming a baronetcy he became a Peer.

Emphasis mine.

My engagement with these elements of his life are not merely intended as flowery embroidery of detail to a writing of his life; Rather I mean to highlight the complexities in (his) life stories that are occluded by conventional accounts of Amritsar 1919. For instance these complexities rather stand in the way of accounts that see events in 1919 solely as a 'confrontation between ruler and ruled' (Datta 1969: vii). Edwin Montagu is a figure more than simply on one side and not the other. We see that in his profound engagements with styles of colonial authority. See N. 4

Emphasis mine.

I've sought to focus on the practice of his Jewishness as a point of contention between him and his father, because I see that as an important element/experience in defining how he negotiates his duty to India. We should also note however the relevance of another experiential element in defining his style in relation to India and his friends there. This concerns his relation to the law as a profession garbed in unchanged tradition. He said, of his time at Messrs Coward Hawksley Chance, 'No work has ever bored me more...'. The law he adds,

'is a profession which I would never recommend to, or willingly see adopted by, anybody I was fond of. It is a bloodsucking, all-domineering profession, which takes a man who practices it, twists him and distorts him, and demands from him youth, energy, vigour, long years of disappointment and despondency, waiting for a practice and bitter regret when a practice arrives; work from morning to night, without excitement, without reward, not allowed to choose the subjects which engross you, with a hidebound etiquette and a cynicism which is not surpassed by the medical profession itself' (Waley 1964: 12).

In his dealings with all things Indian, in whatever guise, he would try his utmost to exceed, as he would regard it, all 'hidebound etiquette'

He married Venetia Stanley who Annan tells us ‘...came from a well-known aristocratic family, the Stanley’s of Alderley' (Noel Annan 1991; see also see Levine 1991).

The Times would report on his speech to the Commons in terms that didn't simply draw attention to his ethnicity, but comments on its supposed consequences. Thus, 'Mr Montagu, patriotic and sincere English Liberal as he is, is also a Jew, and in excitation has the mental idiom of the East' (in Sayer 1991: 157).

Just as interesting, in this sense, and consistent with his declared creed, though not specifically relevant to the Indian scene, is Montagu's well-documented opposition to the so-called Balfour Declaration 1917. The government of the time proposed that 'Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people.' He objected to such a wording proposing instead the amendment that there should be the 'establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.' Montagu insisted on including a caveat in the declaration. Thus, "...it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country' (see Naomi B. Levine 1991: 446; and http://digilander.libero.it/APecci/friends/documenti/balfour.htm).

Waley relates one such instance. It relates to how Montagu negotiates a burgeoning controversy between the Church of England and Nonconformists. The former were adamantly opposed to
secularism in education, whilst the latter would oppose denominational teaching. It's not so much the dispute or even outcomes of this dispute that interest me in itself, as much as the methods Montagu employs to dissipate the dispute. The pragmatic arts he deploys are not to decide a winner in the dispute but to satisfy all comers. So in his advice, he suggests a conference and stresses:

'...the enormous importance of obtaining, if we can, a solution which is not opposed by the official part of the Church of England, and which at the same time satisfies the Nonconformists; for we do not want the bitter hostility of the Church of England at the next General Election, if it can be avoided' (Waley 1964: 22).


The excerpt is from the Cambridge News, Nov. 14 1910.

I do no more than to allude to these reforms here; they are known merely as the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1908-1909. After the initial euphoria that greeted the proposed scheme of reforms—eventually embodied in the Indian Councils Act 1909—the proposed scheme was found out—many saw through them. It contained only a limited proposal for election of members of the Central Legislative Council, hedged about in ways that ensured only a limited number of propertied Indians would be eligible to vote. In fact Morley would later sum up his proposals' first objective as follows:

'There are three classes of people whom we have to consider in dealing with a scheme of this kind. There are the extremists who nurse fanatic dreams that some day they will drive us out of India.... The second group nourish no hopes of this sort, but hope for autonomy or self-government of the colonial species and pattern. And then the third section of this classification ask for no more than to be admitted to co-operation in our administration. I believe the effect of the Reforms has been, is being, and will be to draw the second class, who hope for colonial autonomy, into the third class, who will be content with being admitted to a fair and full co-operation.' (from http://www.maoism.org/misc/india/rupee/1sh/chap2.htm).

Radical it may not have been, and many objected even to its limited schemes, but it did nevertheless introduce an elective principle into colonial/Indian government.

I borrow this phrase from Strawson (1989: chap. 2).

Waley cites this as being from Cd. 5979, page 7.


The phrase is from Kipling's poem of the same name. See Kipling 1993 (1888).

Emphasis mine.

Waley quotes Montagu's observation of Lord Nicholson, '...he urged me never to talk to my servants, as this was harmful to prestige.' Waley also tells us, Montagu would '...suspend judgement,' he says, 'on the equally striking superficial aloofness and apparent lack of interest in the Indian citizens of the country' (in Waley 1964: 301).


As set out in Waley's footnote and for completeness, Marris and Metson's antecedents are as follows:

'Lord Metson (1865-1943), Secretary to the Finance Department of the Government of India, 1906-12; Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces. 1912-18; Imperial War Cabinet, 1917; Finance Member of the Viceroy's Council, 1919.'

'Sir William Marris (1872-1945), Joint Secretary of the Home Department of the Government of India, 1917-22; Governor of the United Provinces, 1922-27; Member of the Secretary of State's Council' (Waley 1964: 313 n. 9 & 10).

See ante, chapter 3 n. 35.

Emphasis mine.

A committee delegated by Asquith to consider the ‘problems that will arise on the conclusion of peace, and to co-ordinate work which has already been done…in this direction,’ that the end of the first World War was bound to raise (Levine 1991: 399).

Of course this trip can easily be seen as little more than an emollient exercise. Datta for instance suggests, Montagu’s ‘…missions in India was to arrest the rising tide of extremism in politics and to stop the defection of moderate opinion…Montagu’s visit was determined…by “enlightened self-interest” (Datta 1969: 27). In support of his claim Datta refers to two extracts from Montagu’s diary. Hence Montagu says,

‘I have kept India quiet for six months at a critical period of the war; I have set the politicians thinking of nothing else but my mission.’ Later he adds, ‘we have kept India quiet for six critical months. When I came out moderates were rushing to join the Home Rule League; on leaving, the succession of moderates from the Home Rule League is making marked headway...(Montagu 1930: 288; 363 in Datta 1964: 27).

The new Acts, named after the man who proposed them, are known as the Rowlatt Acts. Mohammed Ali Jinnah knew them as the ‘Black Acts.’ Passed in March 1919, Jinnah wrote, ‘The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the state, by an overfretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with public opinion’ (in Wolpert 2000: 298).

Many more would join in a chorus of condemnation. Waley tells us how his attendance at a conference of Lieutenant Governors, did nothing to bolster his confidence. After hearing them he admits to being more depressed than ever. They seemed not to be speaking the same language as him. He imagined if they were right, then his policy would be wrong. That he would not contemplate. They had their own schemes for Indian government, which he felt ‘dated from a day before Parliamentary institutions dawned in India.’ Yet, he held steadfastly to his desires. In language reminiscent of the so-called agitators calls for freedom, and in dismissive fashion, he continues

‘I heard them say, to my amazement, that it was a most disquieting sign that agitation was spreading to the villages. What was the unfortunate politician in India to do? He was told that he could not have self-government because there was no electorate, because only the educated wanted it, because the villagers had no political instincts; and then when he went into the village to try and make an electorate, to try and create a political desire, he was told he was agitating….that agitation must be put a stop to…We should try and educate the villagers; we should put our case; but to sit quiet while an agitator was agitating and then intern him showed that we had no answer…Disaffection was an excellent thing if it meant you were teaching a man that he must hope for better things. Our whole policy…is…to make India a political country, and it was impossible to associate that with repression…” (in Waley 1964: 150).

Letter to Chelmsford March 8 1919.

Parliamentary debates House of Commons, Hansard 19th May to 6th June 1919. Vol. xvi p. 338. Intriguingly he also believes an enquiry ‘would not only help remove the causes of unrest but…dispose…of some of the libellous charges which have been made against British troops and those upon whom the unpleasant duties in connection with those riots have fallen’ (ibid.).


For a list of all that agreed to serve on the Committee see the so-called Hunter Committee Report, HMSO, London 1920 Cmd 681:iii.

I don’t discuss their often-forensic assassination of General Dyer in any detail here. For detail see Swinson 1964; Sayer 1991; Datta 1975/2000

The resolution by the Government of India appointing the committee was passed, with the approval of the Secretary of State, the 14th October 1919.

Sayer offers us a useful summary of those acts. Hence, Dyer is censured for not giving the ‘assembly a chance to disperse…’ and ‘…for continuing to fire after it had…started to do so’; They condemned his crawling order – an order requiring all Indians who wished to pass a tract of land to do so on their hands and knees – as “injudicious” since it did not distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, which they felt an “act of humiliation” that could only cause “bitterness and racial ill-feeling”.
Other irregularities in the conduct and enforcement of the martial law regime are also condemned (A good source for all these acts is found in the Indian National Congress report) (see Sayer 1991: 147-148).

37. I say more or less because Sayer alerts us to the peculiarly exonerating language used in the Viceroy’s executive council when they discussed the reports. So for instance, in spite of the council adopting the majorities’ conclusions, they thought Dyer ‘acted honestly’. By his actions he ‘checked the spread of the disturbances’. Though they felt, ‘General Dyer acted beyond the necessity of the case…beyond what any reasonable man could have thought…necessary…and not act with as much humanity as the case permitted…’ they nevertheless added, ‘…it is with pain that we arrive at this conclusion, for we are not forgetful of General Dyer’s distinguished record as a soldier…[especially]…his gallant relief of the garrison at Thal during the…Afghan war’ (in Sayer 1991: 148-149; Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State for Indian the Report of Lord Hunter’s Committee, 1920 Cmd. 705: 21).

38. Naomi Levine (1991) alerts us to what she sees as a particularly vicious streak of upper classes anti-Semitism in Britain at this time. However Annan, her reviewer, argues that ‘Britain was the only major European country in which fascism gained negligible support.’ Commenting specifically on Montagu Annan says, ‘nor is it tenable that Montagu failed to get the high office he deserved just because he was a Jew.’ Many Jews in England, according to her ‘rose to the top in politics, in the judiciary, in…medical colleges, and in the universities earlier than they did in East Coast America.’ Perhaps in Montagu’s case Annan suggests, he was just ‘too volatile in temperament, too given to euphoria then to dejection, too apt to appeal to his colleagues for support’ (Annan 1991: 5). Whatever the final verdict on the effect of such anti-Semitism generally and on Montagu particularly, it is an element that complicates our story in the ways I enumerate.

39. See Hansard, 5th ser. (Commons), cxxxi, cos. 1705-820, 1706.

40. Ibid 1707.

41. Ibid 1708.

42. Ibid 1708-1709.

43. Ibid 1712.

44. Ibid 1719.

45. Ibid 1755.

46. Ibid 1775.

47. Ibid 1796; 1797.


CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS

In Service to India: The ethics of rule and conduct of British Administrators and Army Officers in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries India

1

Introduction

‘By what men have done, we learn what men can do. A great career, though balked of its end, is still a landmark of human energy. He who approaches the highest point of the supreme quality of Duty is entitled to rank with the most distinguished of his race...and to count as...the best and bravest men and women in...the career of well-doing' (Smiles 1880: 11).

‘Out of this fiery and uncouth material, it is only soldiers' discipline which can bring the full force of power. Men who, under other circumstances, would have shrunk into lethargy or dissipation are redeemed into noble life by a service which at once summons and directs their energies' (Ruskin in Smiles 1880: 158).
'If I were to be asked what is the great want of English society...I should say...the want is the want of sympathy' (Talfourd in Smiles 1880: 219).

In thrall to Duty

The aim of my thesis has been the re-construction of the Amritsar Massacres and Disturbances of 1919. I reassembled them as a case that tells us about the histories of manly moral duty and the active questioning of such notions of duty by others deemed beyond the pale. I argued that the question of character is crucial to our understanding of duty as a mode of power.

I discern that manly moral duty was quite simply good policy. It was often practised in such a way as to consolidate white men as good characters. But practised also in such a way as to carry out their imperial duties in the service of others (Rai 2002). Hence my histories enable readers to grasp the formations of white men as rulers in these senses at particular times. To do this I made use of Foucault's notion of government as governmentality. But as I say in chapter 2, the focus of my characterological studies is different if similar to Foucault's emphasis. So I complimented his approach by using Collini's focus on exemplary characters (Burchell et al 1991) (Collini 1991).
The implications of this mode of analysis are quite clear. I find that the events I focus on were not accidental. On the contrary they defined the norms of British administrative and army practice. Maybe they were not part of a bigger plan. But they were nevertheless part of what two of my characters, O'Dwyer and Dyer, thought a fit and proper man should do in these circumstances. In this sense I find that it amounted to a form of moral uplift. Part of a tradition, or traditions of imperial duty. I find that taking care of events were simply a question of good government in a Foucaultian sense. That is to say government of both self and other. Thus, when presented with such a state of affairs, and in order to establish order and prolong British imperial power they so acted.

We see how their instruction in the conduct of rule in the elite centres of imperial schooling - Balliol College Oxford and the Staff College at Camberley - ensured that they would so act. Montagu, the third character I focused on, had been to Trinity College Cambridge, however this did not detract from the ultimate aims of such actions but only the means to be utilised.

What we find in situ at these moments I argued is a developed and developing arenas of expertise in that endeavour. At one moment we find that that manifested itself in notions of fatherly care as an administrator. Sir Michael O'Dwyer was adamant in this regard. We saw a flavour of these thoughts in chapter three. On the very first page of his autobiography he forthrightly declares his life's work and sole concern. It is to '...emphasise the responsibility of the people and Parliament of Great Britain for the
welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, and to show where that responsibility is being lost sight of or inadequately discharged' (O'Dwyer 1925: ix).

In his early posting as a member of the ICS in Gujranwala we find him take the mantle for instance of Settlement officer. Taking on such a role his sole concern is to arrive at what he thinks is a fair and final assessment of rights in the land so that all can be fairly dealt with. He thinks that only he can do this because his concern is with their 'placid and pathetic contentment' (O'Dwyer 1925: 56).

At another moment it manifested itself in a display of professional force by Reginald Dyer, an army officer charged with defending India from sundry Russians, Germans and insurgents closer to home. Dyer stated that the force he used on that day 'was no more... than was required by the occasion' (Dyer 1920: 5). He too wanted to be their father. If he had to hurt them they knew he was only doing it for their own good. He merely carried out his duty. I find that the carrying out of that duty in this sense is thoroughly imbued in immense horror and megalomania. The massacred and bleeding other marked the normalised objects with which he could identify. I borrow once more from Rai, but such duty is carried on only so as to habituate 'the self to propriety' (Rai 2002: 165). In Dyer's own words, '...the assembly of the crowd that afternoon was for all practical purposes a declaration of war by leaders whose hope and belief was that I should fail to take up the challenge' (Dyer 1920: 19). Failure is not something he contemplated. He was not going to do that. The implication being that he secured his dignity with all the force at his command and ensured that by his action
he secured order for all. The implication is that Dyer was very definitely a part of the 'dominant conception of imperial purpose, throughout this period' (Sayer 1991: 162). He did not represent someone outside of those ethics. In his military training throughout he represented the normalisation of what many commentators saw as someone who by his actions was 'beyond the pale.' As we saw in a letter sent to *The Times* and signed by 'Archimedes', his batch of Staff College attendees was a roll call of 'extraordinary brilliance' (Colvin 1929: 33). In this sense he was very definitely a man of the military establishment.

At yet another moment in the struggle to define a new modus of operandi between the relation of Indians and their rulers. Montagu wanted them both to work together. Ruling India he thought of as a joint enterprise. That was his sense of duty. The character that emerges from this staging of duty was one who fantasised about the other joining him in government. He imagined keeping in contact with those others once he relinquished his job as Secretary of State for India. In such fantasies one glimpses how he reaches out for a dutiful being who recognises another place beyond the proprietary of his self. Yet, as we have seen, ultimately this observance of the other beyond the self does not '...spill beyond policy' (Rai 2002 167).

Through my exploration, in sources as diverse as parliamentary debates, news reports, contemporary commentaries, moral exegesis and writing about imperial conduct and character, we have seen how the imperatives of imperial duty defined the proper contours of imperialism.¹
3

The Journey to Professionalism

After the end of the East India Trading Company we saw how its mantle of instruction in the conduct of empire was passed on to the home that is the British imperial government. I have argued that such government wanted to reach a position in which they were guaranteed near certainty in its conduct. Government now became a problem.

There were two areas of concern for the imperial government. Administration as practised by the ICS and the conduct of military affairs in the Indian army.

I have shown that the implication of this, as far as administration is concerned, is that India was to be ruled from the top 'by a picked aristocracy whose ideal was a light but benevolent administration' (Mason 1985: 207). Or more precisely, to use Osborne's term, it was to be a new clerisy. Their concern was with how they could make themselves competent to rule. This was to be the new zeitgeist. It was quite simply to be a new mode of governing. The certainty craved for was to be found in the practice of duty. As I have already argued it is through the practice of duty that the colonial self gathered himself up in sovereignty. That, as we see, was the expertise that they garnered at Balliol College.
Habituating themselves in this practise of duty, as we see, is not a chance endeavour. On the contrary, I have shown that whole systems are put in place to train candidates in its manly pursuit. Whether that was in the fields of administrative practice. Whether it was in the fields of military discipline. Whether in the more intellectual areas of meaning, speeches and policy, it was akin to drilling candidates into careers of well doing. That is to say in the careers of turning oneself into a professional who looked after his charges. And doing that well. Doing ones duty in this sense is constitutive of the glory of manly character (Smiles 1880: 11). The implication is that a whole new professional form of life and type of character developed to satisfy the needs of the colonial state. Each of the men that are the subject of my study worked to ensure and support the longevity of empire.

Thus, what this amounts to, I show, are 'new careers in domination' or new professions of rule (Rai 2002: 162). Put another way, I proposed that my colonial subjects found new and other ways in which to consolidate their dignity. Quite simply, the pedagogy of duty defined the proper limits of white masculine selves. I find that its practitioners might blush. But more than likely they would fill with pride.

I borrow a concluding sentiment from Rai. He speaks about a different but related tradition. That is to say he alerts us to a history of sentiment. He urges us to rethink elements of the colonial enterprise 'in the name of sympathy' (Rai 2002 161). He detects from within sympathies performances, an astonishing desire to fulfil an Anglo-
Indians role. I detect a similar ethic within duties performance. This is the profundity of duty. Hence,

'...within this tradition, from inside a discourse that seems to abject relentlessly the racial other, we...come across scenes where a...European man...sympathises with those who seem to be beyond the pale of humanity - savages and barbarians, or even Indians' (Rai 2002: 161).

This is a difficult lesson to learn. My aim here is not to proselytise. I wish merely to demonstrate that doing good and looking out for ones charges was the foundation on which many believed the empire stood. We see how Montagu sought a place beyond self and other. Perhaps the protesters who were ashamed of Dyer's actions, discussed in chapter one, got closer still to pushing duty in the direction of a radical justice. That is to say they wished to use the pedagogy of duty and the practice of duty as a demand on the imperial power. A demand for justice in rule. Borrowing and paraphrasing an observation from Rai about sympathy, 'if...duty... was a form of European power, then it did not go unchallenged; the question of justice in...[India]... was posed through practices that were both negotiations with and ex-centric to European forms of sympathy' (Rai 2002: xx). The asking of questions about the imperial power would now proliferate. From the now memorable reply Gandhi gave to the question of Western civilisation, 'I think it would be a good idea'.\(^2\) To his re-appropriation of duty, 'non-cooperation with evil is a sacred duty'.\(^3\) He set out his radical soul force. Horniman too gives it a good disruption in his demands for another 'duty to India'. But they and he remained within the bounds of accepted policy.
Doing ones duty after 1858, I argue, is turned into a '...more systematic imperial career(s)' (Guha 1997: 25). In this sense carrying out one duty to oneself and the other belonged in the realm of a 'carefully regulated empire' (Guha 1997: 25). If that meant that hundreds of people would die then so be it. For as far as most members of the bureaucracy were concerned they were stirred by duty as a mode of power.

The implication was as follows: the days in which the empire was an amateur pursuit were no longer. It is not possible to mark the exact date on which such a change came into effect. Suffice to say that the events of 1858 gave an added urgency to the pursuit of new professions of rule. I have argued that what was new in this style of rule was the formation of a whole bureaucracy devoted to turning out men who elaborated a sense of duty as a professional mode of power.

I believe that the massacres at Amritsar are a useful case against which to examine the working out of these notions of duty. The empire was for many, if nothing else, a job of work. On occasion it was a monstrous job of work. To this extent the men charged with carrying it out were sensitive both to conducting themselves in a manner beyond reproach and acting in the service of others. But they did not believe that carrying it out was some kind of malady to the Great British Raj. As I noted in chapter three, there was no sense in which they thought that what they did was a wicked imperialism. In fact some '...didn't think imperialists were necessarily wicked' (in Allen ed. 1975: 217). Modern day readers might take fright at Anglo-Indians actions
being described in terms of monstrosity. But that is not the point. In this sense these imperialists followed good practice, ideal practice. There were few critics of General Dyer's actions that day. I have argued that he merely carried out his duty both to himself and others. Many would have thought him remiss had he not so acted. They're calling demanded nothing less. Horrifying it may have been but very British of the time nevertheless. I argue that what are at stake are whole professions of rule, whole professions of monstrosity.

The implications of this thesis are quite simple. If the term monstrosity is used to describe Dyer's actions, and Sir Michael O'Dwyer's support of them, and to a lesser extent Edwin Montagu's, then we need to regard this as demonstrating only the norms of British practice. The monstrous in government and the Indian army is the very epitome of British Imperial practice at this time. Those norms ensured - first and foremost - in all circumstances, the fulfilment of imperial purpose, i.e. the longevity of empire. The traditions entailed in such a project did not just mean repetition in government. My practitioners' character guided them on how they carried out the arts of government. That often meant ensuring that the servants of empire did their duty and their duty to empire. To themselves and to others. I find that they served 'this world, where much is to be done and little to be known....' (Johnson in Lawrence 1928: 32). I establish that the only thing not up for negotiation was the empire.

Government in this sense required men to be made as heroes. It is little wonder that the training and fitness of these men reminded one of a description from
Ecclesiasticus: 'He shall serve amongst great men and appear before Princess; he will travel through strange countries' (Ecclesiasticus in Lawrence 1928: 55).

In conducting this research I have sometimes ventured into the terrain of military as well as administrative authority. But the question of better governing in India concerns itself as much with that terrain, as the strictly civil. Indeed civil in this sense is somewhat of a misnomer. Lest we forget, one of my most important findings is that India, conquered by the sword, was to be held on to by the sword. I therefore undertook to chart the growth in professional conduct of the men who ruled respectively as an officer of the army, a member of the Indian Civil Service and a man in government.

We have discussed an ethics of engagement by servants of empire with the problems of colonial government in India. Being concerned with carrying out their duty to those deemed their charges, to the best of the abilities, many a British official made themselves and India their life's work. The individuals I am concerned with, who were entrusted with those tasks, are ideal examples of such men.

Borrowing from Rai once again we can see that a complex process of identification between those who rule and those others over whom rule is to be practised (Rai 2002). Thus each of the characters I investigated is concerned with doing their duty in India in their turns as an administrator; as a military officer; and as a member of the colonial government. In this respect they carried out their duty in a manner beyond the merely
self-devoted. His was an empathetic calling conducted with due reserve and often little reward. It is, in other words, performed in such a way as to make the official fitted for modesty's crown. Thus

"Do you wish to be to be great?" asks St. Augustine. "Then begin by being little. Do you desire to construct a vast and lofty fabric? Think first about the foundations of humility. The higher your structure is to be, the deeper must be its foundations. Modest humility is beauty's crown' (Augustine in Smiles 1880: 16).

After a lifetime of devotion to their duty practised in such a way, Smiles suggests, quoting the words of St. Francis of Assisi, that on his last day he who has lived up to expectations can satisfy himself with the knowledge that:

'There such is Time, which takes in trust
Our youth, our joys, and all we have,
And pays us nought but Age and Dust,
When in the dark and silent grave,
When we have wandered our ways,
Shuts up the story of our days;
And from which grave and earth and dust,
The Lord shall raise me up, I trust' (Assisi in Smiles 1880: 340)

What I have found, more than anything else, is that the imperialists' concern above all else was to drill the empire's servants into practising duty as a job (Rai 2002). It was sometimes a hard job, sometimes incredibly easy job. But the colonial self-image was
never sullied by it. Massacre or no massacre the imperialist was in India to carry out a job of work. Whatever its versions, military or civil, it was quite simply the norm of British civilisation.

I have not explored here the question of what I term 'lesser breeds without the law, dangerous breeds within the law.' That is to say the role and make up of Asian lawyers in disrupting Dyer's composure in the grilling they gave him during the Hunter Committee's questionings of him. Such lawyers are indeed modernity's shadows. In particular I want to look at the life and works of Chiminlal Setalvad. But that is for another place at another time.

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1. I owe this model of thinking about what I've written to Amit Rai (Rai 2002).
2. I get this from a collection of his quotes found at [http://www.sfheart.com/gandhi.html](http://www.sfheart.com/gandhi.html)
3. Ibid.
4. T E Lawrence had an interesting comment on the affinity with the other that comes over many an Imperial mandarin. He said

'We export two chief kinds of Englishmen. [The great majority] assert their aloofness. They impress the peoples among whom they live by giving them an example of the foreigner apart. [A few] feel deeply the influence of the native people, and try to adjust themselves to its spirit' (Lawrence in Dewey 1993: 1).
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**AN ADDENDUM**

**THE STORY OF MY BIBLIOGRAPHY**

There is ostensibly a vast literature on the Amritsar disturbances and Massacres of 1919. So in this sense I was somewhat spoilt for choice in terms of signposts. But, as I learned most writings about the events of 1919 offer a similar formal structure. That is to say whatever they're precise conclusions, they all engage in finding out what really happened on that April day in 1919.
As my intention was somewhat different, that is to say, to explore the ethical competencies claimed by white governors; a military officer; a man of government; and an administrator, I had to follow a divers route. My interests are in the empire as a job of work. Ironically, the clues that led me on my way in ploughing my furrows were found in their structures and bibliographies. My starting place into this intensely cultivated terrain was Derek Sayer's article, 'British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacres', 1919-1920 (1991). Perhaps because his work is article length and not a whole book I found my way through the terrain by a close attention to his scrupulous footnotes.

His article was then my first encounter with the vast field of literature that forms part of the historiography of the events. Yet his article did more than just introduce me to these writings. Because it took its subject to be the British reaction to the massacres it roamed further than the body of work that makes what I call the form. So for instance unpacking British reactions to the massacre led him to the Houses of Parliament, both the Houses of Lords and Commons. The reactions he is charting led him also to the press coverage of the time. This in turn led him to account for, in brief, the make-up of the ruling characters involved.

These brief references to, and accounts of the characters involved, led me in turn to explore and chart their life histories. Each of the characters that are the subject of my reconstruction of the Massacre and disturbances claimed a different, if related series of competencies. My task therefore would be to unpack their life
histories and the traditions of which they are a part. This is how I hooked onto a field defined by notions of duty and its sympathetic practices.

I took these varied practices as marking a significant set of ethical imperatives in the make-up of my governing characters. The Problems of rule and the adequate character and characterizations of those who exercised such rule were now to become issues of professional conduct. Ranajit Guha's, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (1997)* is one of the texts that provided me with the conceptual and theoretical resources I needed to explore this further. He alerted me to the writings of Samuel Smiles. Smiles work exemplified a working out of a set of such practices. At its heart was the imperious idea that

'...the most important results in daily life are to be obtained, not through the exercise of extraordinary powers, such as genius and intellect, but through the energetic use of simple means and ordinary qualities, with which nearly all human individuals have been more or less endowed' (Smiles 1859: 8).

Biographies and autobiographies of my characters seemed to be the next places to continue with my journey; to reconstruct Amritsar and the disturbances in terms of a set of ruling ethics. O'Dwyer has written an autobiography about his time in India; Dyer has been the subject of a biography; and Montagu the subject both of a story about a love triangle and a conventional biography (O'Dwyer 1925; Colvin 1929; Levine 1991; Waley 1964).
I considered other works penned by my subjects. In the case of Dyer, I examined his account of his campaigns in the Sarhad (Dyer 1920). In the case of Montagu, a diary he kept, but published posthumously by his wife (Montagu 1926). In the case of O'Dwyer his contributions to debates about India's future; his criticism of the Hunter enquiry process; and a collection of his war speeches (O'Dwyer 1919; 1920; 1927).

Though enlightening, all this work offered me many more clues and references to follow up. I complemented these texts with biographies, autobiographies and accounts by others and about others, of their times on the job, so to speak, in India as Indian officials. The three volumes by J W Kaye, *The Lives of Indian Officers* (1880) are immensely helpful in this regard.

The autobiographies and biographies I looked at are not particularly centred on the characters to the neglect of all else. I nevertheless felt I needed to broaden out my stories to take in a fuller sense of the different traditions. Invaluable to me in this respect is the edited collection of the thoughts of Anglo-Indians put together by Charles Allen called, *Plain Tales From The Raj: Images of British India in the Twentieth Century* (1975). Hilton Brown's, *The Sahibs, The Life and Ways of the British in India as Recorded by Themselves* (1948), provides a substantial pre-history of Anglo-Indian lives to the times Allen focuses on. I complemented Brown's earlier focuses by looking specifically at East India Trading Company histories, and the maneuvers attributed to Clive of India (Macaulay 1877; Carey 1906; Bence-Jones 1974; Keay 1993; Lawson 1993; Wild 1999). In general these
compendia provide a useful synopsis of the lives of Anglo-Indians who were in service, or not, at these times.

I then moved on to divide my labour between the different traditions my subjects carried forward. In both cases of ruling army and administrative traditions in India, I started with the influential works of Philip Mason, who also wrote as Philip Woodruff (Woodruff 1954; Mason 1974). The work of Thomas Osborne provides an invaluable aid to understanding the construction of imperial expertise in governing others (Osborne 1994). The work of military historians such as Brian Bond and Douglas Peers was immensely helpful (Bond 1994; Peers 1995). Bond in particular charts the growth in military academies and schools that catered specifically for the new breed of soldier manager. Broadening my antenna still further to capture the drama of the empire as a job, I turned to fictional representations of what Kipling calls the 'White Man's Burden' (Kipling 1899). Kipling often mentioned the army in his writings. His War Stories and Poems is particularly evocative of the job as presented to Sahibs (Kipling 1990).

Of course I utilized the resources of a number of libraries in my search for material in my reconstruction of Amritsar. The Army Museum in Chelsea is a case in point. I spent many an hour there going through their immense catalogues of writings about the British army and its relations to empire. That is where I came across Goodenhough and Dalton's Army Book for the British Empire (1893) and Fortescue's histories of the army; especially, as he saw it, their gallant deeds in many theatres of operation (Fortescue 1914; 1927). I obtained a copy of the official history of Dyer's campaigns in the Sarhad by Frederick James Moberly
titled, *Operations in Persia 1919 (1987)*, from the Imperial War Museum. I also made use of the libraries at Sandhurst and what used to be known as the Staff College at Camberley.

Apart from my use of the Museum at Chelsea, and the training colleges, I used the general collections about India at the India Office in the British Library. Further afield in my search for materials, I travelled to India twice and worked at the universities in the Punjab; the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library; the National Archives in New Delhi; and the Khalsa College Library in Amritsar. Fortunately, I was able to find a copy of the *War Speeches of Michael O'Dwyer (1919)* at the Khalsa College after I drew so many blanks back in London. Ironically, after my return to London, and trying for what I thought would be one last unsuccessful time, I managed to find microfilm copies of these speeches at the India Office library. I uncovered other source material in India. For instance, in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library I came across an important article by N. Gerald Barrier called, *How to Rule India: Two Documents On The I. C. S. and The Politics of Administration (1971).*

Outside of these spaces, and just as useful in my reconstruction of Amritsar, are the collections of materials put together by retailers of naval, military and imperial histories both here and in India. Francis Edwards and Woolcott Books are among two of those I used most frequently. But perhaps even more useful was an organization called Low Price Publications that operates from India. It specializes in the re-publication of long forgotten tracts on such varied topics as India's rulers; ethnologies and histories of its peoples, especially the Sikhs; and
the perennial source of imperial fears, the North West Frontier (Cunningham 1882; Barstow 1928; Cunningham 1849; Douie 1916). I also found the resources of the Indian Military Historical Society very useful.

I'm sure my searches have, as always, revealed many more leads than contained in my final collection of materials. All searches of this nature must of course be selective. The journey in itself is an adventure. Before I even begin to put finger to keyboard, I imagined I'd written a book of exploration. Itching to get back to an exploration of terrain uncovered and yet not used will mark my next adventure.